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20 SEPTEMBER 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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**Turkish Columnist on Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait**  
*90ES1186A Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 8 Aug 90 p 4*

[Article by Fasih Inal in column "Fasih Inal Writes":  
"Iraq, Kuwait and Beyond"]

[Text] When Iraq invaded Kuwait and gobbled up a tasty morsel, we suddenly found ourselves confronted by the heat of war and gunpowder. How will events develop now? Certainly one can only guess.

However, there are certain points on which it is possible to make more comfortable guesses. In Arab conferences from now on—at least for the present and for some time in the future—everyone will be looking to Iraq, not Saudi Arabia. That is probably what Saddam wanted anyway. That is, of course, if anything to be called an Arab conference is held...

Meanwhile, Iraq's concentration on the Saudi border does not necessarily mean that it will attack that country immediately, because Iraq got Kuwait, that is, the small but richest piece. There would be nothing smart about advancing further without provocation.

Nevertheless, it is well to take a look at Saudi Arabia's military strength. The country has an army around 60,000-65,000 strong. Because the country is so large, it cannot concentrate all of its troops on the Kuwait border, but will send 35,000-40,000 men there and spread out the rest. This will not be adequate to protect the region. Also, all of the 60,000 are not ground forces.

It is thought that the Saudis will be able to ensure air protection with AWACS aircraft and will get strong support in national defense through a \$1 billion project with the British. But this would not be enough for a Saudi military victory over Iraq, with its standing army of 1 million. It would not be sufficient, but if Iraq were to attack Saudi Arabia, all hell would break loose politically.

Bearing all of these possibilities in mind, one might think that there would be no possibility of an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia.

It would be useful, meanwhile, to compare the Saudi and Iraqi economies. Since the first of the year the Saudis have been bringing home for investment the money they have been holding abroad for many years. It may even be said that de facto capital transfers to Saudi Arabia existed but were accelerated. Now a backwards flow of capital may again be expected because of the recent events, because there is full freedom in the country.

A crude etatism, just the opposite, rules in Iraq, however, and for that reason very tight control exists. It is impossible to make a decision on anything by oneself. No one is willing to say anything about anything without forming a two- or three-man committee to share the responsibility.

Of course, the final decision-making body is Saddam Husayn.

The economy was liberalized slightly this year. The pressure of the state sector was relaxed a little and even lifted on certain sectors, actually allowing some free enterprise to take place. Now a war economy will reverse all of these positive developments and pull the country back into a crude etatism.

It seems that living in crisis is what Saddam likes. He fought the war with Iran for eight years without winning and will continue to live arm in arm with shortages again.

Actually, Saddam's position at home does not seem to be all that spectacular. It does seem that states that go around attacking others always have some internal problems when you stir up the bottom a little. It appears that Iraq has not managed to escape this general principle.

Saddam supposedly attacked Kuwait because he was desperate. This also has a little of the desert way in it. You can live in an oasis but the amount of food available to you is seriously limited. What can you do? You attack another oasis and take what they have. To sum things up therefore, Iraq went and took over Kuwait, seizing its oil deposits. The benefit they get from it will be what they can sell, because Kuwait has everything—the land of plenty. It is a country whose currency is valuable and whose streets glitter with luxuries and comfort.

Never mind Iraq itself, even the Iraqi troops entering Kuwait will be dazzled by all this abundance and, if not today, then tomorrow, will lose their patience and break into the windows. There are reports that looting has already begun. At any rate, to do otherwise would be unnatural.

It would also be well in this context to take a look at the status of Kuwait, especially Al Sabah and his family. First of all, is Ahmad al Sabah liked? Certainly every government has some opposition; this is true for democracies and dictatorships alike. However, the important thing is whether the majority of the country likes the administration and those in it.

Everything is abundant and rich in Kuwait. The Kuwaitis are called the "Jews of the Gulf." They are intelligent, and their merchants are smart. And foreign travel is totally free.

In short, there is no antipathy in the country towards the Al Sabah family. There is certain to be a general economic decline with the Iraqis in power now. And this will increase sympathy for the emir of Kuwait and, therefore, make Saddam's job harder.

After all this talk, if we may, let us come back home to Turkey's situation. Turkey will now experience, must experience, the Inonu policy of World War II in more or less the same form.

Actually, Turgut Ozal's saying recently that "Turkey must not get involved in any adventure for 10 years" is a clear indication that the principle of peace at home, peace in the world will continue unchanged. Mr. Ozal's having made this comment a few days ago is fortuitous and a commitment. We must ultimately take advantage of it insofar as possible.

At any rate, why would we initiate an action that Saudi Arabia has not? The Europeans had reached the conclusion that we were a secondary concern, and it turned out that they were badly mistaken. But it is certain in this situation that we will not sit down and prove ourselves.

They should never forget this: Turkey is the West's window, and door, to the Middle East. They can either stay close to this window and door, or they can push us away. But then they will lose time getting back to them. And what's more, they may not just lose time, but they may not be able to look through the window or go through the door.

The best thing, therefore, is to say that "Turkey is in the Western community;" to accept Turkey as a member of all the organizations, including the EC. Otherwise, you will always be pushing at Turkey in the Armenian disagreement, the Kurdish problem, the waters of the Euphrates, the Greek problem and the Cyprus question and then when you get in trouble, you will start to say, "Dear friend," and you will find that you have thrown out the baby with the bath water.

For heaven's sake, do they think they are fooling anyone?

### **Turkish Columnist Views Saddam's Moves in Middle East**

*90ES1186B Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish  
6 Aug 90 p 3*

[Article by Ergun Balci: "Saddam and Middle Eastern Dialectic"]

[Text] Saddam Husayn's occupation of Kuwait, one must admit, was a masterstroke in a first-class chess game. The Iraqi leader chose the best possible time and climate for the invasion.

Saddam had started scrapping with Kuwait over oil prices. Kuwait was responsible for the drop in oil prices. The large majority of the OPEC countries did not want oil prices to go down and sided with Saddam in the debate—to the extent that Saudi Arabia, which is now trembling in fear, and Iraq's biggest enemy, Iran, supported Saddam Husayn against Kuwait. Meanwhile, Saddam was steadily building up troops on the Kuwait border. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran nor the United States nor anyone else took this seriously. Saddam was bluffing to get Kuwait to accept its views. Some OPEC countries even pretended not to see this development. Saddam's military build-up was the guarantee of high oil prices. Kuwait would be frightened and no longer play the spoilsport.

And Saddam made a sudden move that no one, including the United States, expected, and said: "King and checkmate."

Saddam figured there would not be a very strong reaction from the Arabs. This was correct to an extent. Yitzhak Shamir's new right coalition in Israel had increased concern and pessimism among the Arabs. Egyptian head of state Husni Mubarak's refusal to take a decisive and harsh stance against Israel weakened the hopes for peace which had been pinned on Cairo. Saddam had begun to focus on tough statements against Israel and the Arabs' pessimism. The confusion in the Arab world shows that Saddam was partially right. In fact, Jordan, the PLO, the Sudan, Oman and Libya refused to censure Iraq, and the Arab mini-summit that was supposed to be held in Jeddah yesterday was cancelled.

Yes, Saddam did his homework and correctly read the barometer before invading Kuwait.

But did the Iraqi leader likewise correctly gauge the peculiar dialectic of the Middle East? And did he have any idea that the United States and the Soviet Union would make a joint statement for the first time and take a stand against Iraq?

We do not think Saddam correctly gauged these two points. In conjunction with the cooperation of the two superpowers, a new and interesting balance is forming that in the long run may leave Iraq in a difficult position in the Middle East.

This new balance originates in the fear that Iraq will become too strong in the region. Cairo, in competition with Iraq for leadership of the Arab world, openly took the front against Baghdad and strongly condemned the occupation of Kuwait. Syria, Iraq's traditional enemy, called for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and Emir al-Sabah's return to his country. In other words, Damascus supported Washington's view. It seems that Syria saw the Gulf crisis as an opportunity to make points with the United States and the West. If Israel was thought to be Iraq's chief enemy, it seems that a camp consisting of Egypt, Syria and Israel is forming under U.S. leadership against Iraq. These three countries may fear one another, but their greater fear of Iraq has pushed them into a partnership of interests.

And that's not all. This interesting alliance appears to have another candidate for membership, and that is Iran.

Not too many years ago, Iraq's greatest fear was that Iran would seize Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and rule the Gulf. Now the same fear consumes Iran about Iraq. Tehran was happy about forcing Kuwait into higher oil prices and supported Iraq. But it is not happy at all about Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and threatening Saudi Arabia, because it is afraid that Iraq, having acquired this enormous wealth and power, will one day turn its attention to Iran. Oil is not a threat for Iran as long as

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia exist. However, Iran would never feel safe if Iraq had oversight of the Gulf.

Thus Iran, the traditional enemy of the Gulf countries, today feels threatened by the possibility of these countries' being gobbled up by Iraq. Its interests at this point are closer to the interests of Egypt, Syria, Israel and the United States. Iran, like Syria, seems to see the Gulf crisis as an opportunity to open to the West. In fact, Tehran said in a statement released the other night that it is ready to reestablish diplomatic relations with London. Tehran's relations with Paris have not been good, either, since the Francois Mitterand administration released the terrorist Nejat Nakkash.

In sum, Saddam's occupation of Kuwait pushed Iran, Syria, Israel, the United States and Western Europe into a partnership of interests and led Syria and Iran to rapprochement with the West. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and Egypt have entered an interesting partnership of destiny against Iraq. This partnership will be supported from abroad by Israel and supervised by the United States.

Saddam invaded Kuwait and pulled Iraq into a big mistake in the Middle East. His only support is his 1 million man army.

Has not Israel been singing a tune for many years about its isolation in the Middle East?

True. But there are two important differences here. First, Israel is backed by the United States. Saddam, however, has no big power behind it. The second difference is in the two countries' armies. The Israeli army is one of the most dangerous in the world, not just from the standpoint of weapons, but also from the standpoint of the individual capabilities of the officers and soldiers. The strength of the Iraqi army is solely in its numerical superiority and modern weapons. During the eight years of the Gulf war, Iran always won in cases in which Iranian and Iraqi units met under equal conditions. The Iranian units put the Iraqi units in extremely difficult situations despite great weaponry disadvantages.

The common characteristic of all societies in history that followed a policy of force, from the Mongols to the Turks to the Germans and, recently, Israel, is their military prowess. It is doubtful whether the Iraqi army has such prowess. Countries that rely on modern weapons alone to pursue a policy of force may be doomed to disappointment. The misfortune of Italy in World War II is a concrete example of this conjecture.

Saddam also correctly gauged the timing and climate when he attacked Iran in 1980. Iran was in turmoil as a result of the Islamic revolution. The West welcomed the attack against the threat represented by Iran. However, Saddam was hoping to win a quick victory, but found himself in a bloody 8-year war in which he was often in deep trouble.

The Iraqi leader is a good tactician who does his homework well in the short term. But it is hard to say that he is a good strategist who thinks about the long term.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Former Foreign Minister Questions Role of Arab League**

90AA0305A Tunis LE TEMPS HEBDO in French  
6 Aug 90 p 3

[Interview with Mohamed Masmoudi, former Tunisian foreign affairs minister, by H.N.: "Current Arab League Has No Purpose"; date and place not given]

[Text] After the intervention of Iraqi troops in Kuwait and the various reactions it provoked around the world, we conducted a short interview with Mr. Mohamed Masmoudi, former Tunisian foreign affairs minister and eminent expert on inter-Arab affairs, who was happy to respond to TEMPS HEBDO's questions.

[LE TEMPS] How do you explain the Iraqi intervention in Kuwait?

[Masmoudi] Frankly, I am unable to come up with any sound reason to justify Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait. True, there had been a border dispute between the two neighboring countries since Kuwait became independent in 1961, but it was believed this problem had already been resolved.

And who would have imagined Iraq would attack Kuwait, a country that gave it an enormous amount of help during its war against Iran?

The only plausible hypothesis is that Iraq, becoming a power in the region and needing money to deal with its economic growth problems, decided to try to dominate the oil market.

But I also want to bring up a precedent that I consider a very serious one. I refer to the reason invoked by Baghdad to justify its intervention in Kuwait, namely that its action was a response to a request for help from the free provisional government of Kuwait. By that logic, any country that thinks it is strong enough to undertake a similar action could use the same pretext to invade a weaker neighbor.

This in turn leads me to voice my fears as to the future economic development of the Arab countries. Personally, I have always said that economic development should be a higher priority than military advancement, and strategic equilibrium cannot be achieved without the cooperation of Israel, the Arabs' number-one enemy.

In wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, other Arab countries may also hope to increase their military strength vis-a-vis a fraternal or neighboring country. That would be catastrophic, for we must not expect that the rich countries would come to help us with our development. It is especially unfortunate that this intervention comes at a time when the Arabs were beginning to reconsider their positions in light of Saddam Husayn's latest threats against Israel—which was thought to be his principal objective.

[LE TEMPS] Do you think the League of Arab States is an adequate forum for the resolution of inter-Arab conflicts?

I have said and I repeat again that the Arab League as currently structured serves no purpose and is absolutely of no use.

One must first of all restructure the entire Arab world, which in today's world should be composed of groups of states with similar geographic and political characteristics:

- One group comprising the Gulf countries except for Iraq;
- a group composed of Egypt, Iraq and Sudan;
- another group built around Syria and including Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan;
- and finally a group made up of the Maghrebian countries in the Arab Maghreb Union.

These four groups, centered around Egypt, which in my opinion is still the most important pillar of the Arab world because of its cultural influence, would constitute the foundation of a strong and homogenous Arab league, one whose charter and principles would have to be respected by all members.

Within such a configuration, any expansion of armed forces would be comprehensible as a necessary means of ensuring that the Arab world's views are taken into account in a world dominated by blocs and regional alliances.

## ALGERIA

**ANDI President Reportedly Victim of Attempted Assault**

90AA0296B Tunis LE TEMPS in French 28 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] Algiers (TAP [Tunis-African press])—APS reported Thursday that the president of the National Alliance of Independent Democrats (ANDI), Mustapha Toumi, was allegedly the "victim of an attempted knife attack committed by one of the alternate elected officials from the Staoueli APC [People's Communal Assembly] on the FIS [Islamic Front for Salvation] list."

Quoting an Alliance bulletin, APS reports that the attempted attack took place in Staoueli "on a public thoroughfare" and that the victim "only escaped thanks to the diligent intervention of police and neighbors." The bulletin goes on to state that Toumi had gone to Staoueli "as a humanitarian and legal gesture to help an ANDI member in dealings with the Staoueli Police Department."

While refusing to call the "incident" an act of political reprisal by a certain radical fundamentalist faction, the bulletin does state that "now more than ever, the ANDI nevertheless cannot refrain from reporting and condemning the use of violence and therefore asks FIS

leaders to rein in their followers and come out publicly against the violence of which citizen Mustapha Toumi was very nearly the tragic victim today."

In addition, several Algerian political parties plan to set up defense groups for protection against attacks by Muslim fundamentalists, an opposition party leader quoted by REUTER said Thursday.

Arezki Ait Larbi, spokesman for the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), a Berber secular movement, added that his party had been the target of intimidation by fundamentalist activists.

"The lesson one has to learn from these incidents is that all possible measures must be taken to protect our members and premises," he said at a press conference.

He also reported four attempts to burn premises belonging to his party.

### **New Political Party Presents Party Platform**

90AA0292A Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French  
24 Jul 90 p 13

[Excerpts of statement prepared by Ali Ammar Laouar, attorney: "The Alliance for Justice and Freedom"; first three paragraphs are EL MOUDJAHID introduction]

[Text] A new political association dubbed "The Alliance for Justice and Freedom," which is currently preparing its application for approval, sent us a long statement of which large excerpts are published below.

The document, composed by "patriots imbued with the social values of the November Revolution," announces that a more complete political strategy and program are being drafted.

The first part of the statement is devoted to a critical analysis of the overall situation in the country.

Given the gravity of a situation as complicated as it is complex, we, a group of patriotic citizens,

- Imbued with the sacred values of the November Revolution, a source of pride for the Algerian people and for free men of the world;
- Convinced that the fate of Algeria as a nation and its future as an entity is indissoluble from the continuity of the November spirit, and that any lapse in defending the Revolution and any assault on its principles exposes our nation to grave danger;
- Convinced that, faced with the gravity of the situation, the overwhelming majority of our people are determined to fight to preserve Algeria as a citadel of the struggle for freedom, justice, and dignity, and a symbol for all free men in North Africa, the Arab Macherek, Africa, and everywhere else in the world;
- Aware that the Algerian people can only preserve its freedom, dignity, political independence, and national sovereignty and remain faithful to the true nature of Algeria by building a modern, democratic,

and strong state, whose first duties will be based on the following guiding principles:

#### **Domestically**

- Consideration for citizens and respect for their political, economic, social, and cultural rights.
- The implementation of social justice, recognizing that only man's work is capable of guaranteeing development and progress in all areas.
- The ability to eliminate anything hindering the Algerian citizen from expressing his gifts and using his great potential.
- The conviction that the values of patriotism, loyalty, and self-sacrifice will spur the Algerian citizen to offer his skills in the service of the country's development.
- The defense of its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, with the capabilities and means of deterring the slightest attempt to violate that integrity.
- The ability to overcome our society's difficulties, and especially those of our young people who are faced with problems of education, training, employment, housing, and recreation.
- The ability to ensure safety and tranquillity and to prevent and deter any excess or violation causing mental or material suffering to citizens.
- To establish equality among all citizens, taking care to distinguish between men and women only with respect to the contribution of each to the nation and to society.
- The guarantee of equal rights, duties, and opportunities to citizens.
- The ability to submit to the authority of the Law, to enforce it, and to impose respect for it on all.
- The promise to found the state on the sovereign will of the people, who exercise their will using means freely chosen by them.
- The promise to always abide by the decision of the majority and by respect for the minority.
- Respect for democracy as a government of the people and not as a choice dependent on circumstances, dictated by whomsoever.

Faced with the gravity of the present economic situation, and until publication of our final economic platform, analysis of national, regional, and international economic data seem to indicate that any solution of the economic and financial crisis will require creating conditions to restore confidence and calm, both for managers and workers of public companies and for private entrepreneurs. Without such conditions, no one can assume any risks or wager on the future.

This can only be done by first drafting a coherent national development strategy. Both in conception and execution, it must be the work of all the nation's active members, female and male citizens, whatever their respective abilities or location.

The strategy must turn on the following six principles:

- Strengthening of the public sector and elimination of



all constraints hindering rational management of existing capacities in public companies;

- The state shouldering its responsibilities for large investments. Public companies today suffer from a multiplicity of conflicting duties: optimal management of existing capacities; new investment responsibilities; and the pursuit of social policies contrary to the elementary principles of economic management, [but] conducive to social peace, and benefiting the current government.
- Revision of customs, tax, and exchange-control systems in ways that will transform the state from a tool for plundering the savings of producers and private and public-sector businessmen, into an instrument for mobilizing domestic and international savings for economic development.
- Guaranteeing an optimal distribution of national income able to restore the central value of productive work and ensure that the essential needs of the working classes are met;
- Promoting integration of the nation's private sector into the development process: this can be done by ceasing to suppress it or treat it as a marginal and parasitic element.

The laws promulgated as part of the reforms under way, designed to attract foreign savings, will be ineffective for the following reasons:

- Mobilizing international savings for productive ends remains highly dependent on the ability to mobilize domestic savings. The latter are themselves linked to a climate of safety and confidence, and to a national consensus.
- Current laws foster a combination of conditions that dissolve the former system of management, without immediately replacing it with a new, coherent system. The effect of this is to inhibit and atomize the nation's workers, businessmen, entrepreneurs, etc., on both the micro- and macro-economic levels.
- Current laws and their implementation have neither eliminated nor reduced the preserve [in] which nepotism and corruption still reign supreme as a mode of economic management.

[We desire] a state that internationally supports the principle of exchanging mutual interests and bolstering Algeria's immutable principles, including the right of peoples to self-determination and full disposal of their wealth.

[We desire] a state where cooperation, including cooperation in the construction of North Africa, cannot be accomplished at the expense of our national economy's higher interests or our people's assets, whether in the short or long term.

#### **In The Foreign Policy Arena**

- The ability to protect its citizens abroad against any attack, humiliation, or aggression, whether for political or racial motives. The ability to guarantee conditions attaching them to their homeland, by exhibiting

their continuing desire to return there.

- The establishment of relations with the countries of North Africa, the Arab Macherek, and Africa based on cooperation in all areas, and the achievement of North African, Arab, and African unity in accordance with the wills and plans of the people.
- Implementation of a foreign policy based on respecting international charters, agreements, and customs, and on rules of reciprocity and mutual interests.
- -Support of and solidarity toward peoples and movements fighting for their freedom, self-determination, and independence.
- Steps to establish a just international political and economic order, prohibiting domination of the weak by the strong or the poor by the rich.
- Steps to eliminate the current international division of labor based on imperialist domination and exploitation.
- Refusal and stigmatization of interference in the domestic affairs of states, and condemnation of all forms of aggression against the sovereignty of peoples and their territorial integrity.
- Rejection of colonialism in all its facets and condemnation of imperialism, Zionism, and apartheid.

To work for the accomplishment of these goals, which are the sum of the universal and civilizational references shaping our people's aspirations.

We have decided to mobilize and combine our potentials to achieve these goals by officially declaring the creation of a political association named:

#### **"The Alliance for Justice and Freedom"**

It is our wish that our movement be a suitable democratic and peaceful framework for each patriotic citizen who shares the principles, values, and objectives enumerated above to devote all his abilities and resources to the service of our people.

Some of us belong to the generation that participated in the national movement. Others took part in the November Revolution. Still others are part of the generation that grew up under independence. Some of those in our group were organized within the FLN (National Liberation Front), but the majority, although believers in the FLN's original values, were not. What unites us is above all our love of country and our desire to serve it and devote all our efforts to it.

What unites us also is our rejection of the current situation threatening Algeria's status as a citadel of free men and a feared and respected state in the concert of nations, and turning it into country of apostasy and submission to those who impoverished and burdened it with debt.

We are united also by our rejection of attempts to make Algeria, known for its courage, pride, and dignity, a simple consumer of goods and merchandise that it does

not produce and can only obtain at the cost of humiliations and sacrifices. Or, worse still, a simple traveler suspected and mistreated in all the ports and airports of the world.

We are declaring the creation of our movement at this particular time, a time of serious crisis in our country, because of our willingness to rise to challenges—a characteristic of the Algerian people.

Yes, despite Algeria's serious difficulties, we defy all those who believe it is capable of submitting, capitulating, and accepting humiliation.

On behalf of our people, who have proved during their millennial history that they are the people of great challenges, we make this appeal to all sincere patriots. We ask that they reflect on and become suffused with its contents. For we are convinced that it is everyone's duty to refuse to resign himself to wretchedness and to remain faithful to the principles of November. They are the key to conquering the crisis.

### ANDI Party Provides Political Platform

[First three paragraphs are EL MOUDJAHID introduction]  
90AA0294B Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French  
12 Jul 90 p 7

[Text] In an appeal published in EL MOUDJAHID just prior to the balloting on 12 June, Mustapha Toumi, speaking on behalf of the National Alliance of Independent Democrats (ANDI), urged all citizens to join together and to act as an organized and united bloc in order to achieve the democratic ideal and ensure its effective and daily implementation, and to safeguard and guarantee individual and collective freedoms, the safety of the citizen, and equality of rights, within a perspective of rallying the nation in unity and solidarity.

Mustapha Toumi insisted upon the urgent need for all democrats, whatever their ideological or doctrinal hue or inclination, either to rally around credible political groups, which have already given proof of their devotion to democracy, or to join and strengthen the ranks of the National Alliance of Independent Democrats. This organization, while it is a group of a political nature, defines itself as nonpartisan and bases its actions and its goals basically and in a priority fashion on actions designed to promote democracy, dialogue, tolerance, the acceptance of others, and respect for the opinions of others and their right to differ.

The following excerpts from the program statutes of the ANDI will thus enable citizens to join, based on full knowledge, by writing to Mr. Mustapha Toumi (ANDI), 17 Hocine Belladjel (formerly Edith Cavell) Street, Algiers.

#### Title II—Bases and Goals

Article 4. An association that is political in nature and national in scope, the ANDI rallies independent democrats from the whole of the national territory, without

regard to their diverse ideological inclinations, in support of a consensual program giving priority, beyond any partisan aspirations, to actions that promote democracy and the achievement of the common goals set forth in Articles 5 and 6 of these statutes.

Article 5. In addition to the provisions of Articles 3 through 7 of Law 89/11 dated 5 July 1989, the ANDI adopts as its basic mission the drafting and development, free of any dogmatic, ideological or doctrinal constraint, of:

#### I—A Democratic Alliance Charter

Motivated by:

a. The present situation and certain of the developments therein that threaten the freedom and the safety of the citizens, the democratic order, and public order, pure and simple.

b. The profound sociopolitical changes occurring in the current period of transition, and the growing danger of widespread anomy resulting from the confusion between the law of force and the force of law.

c. The fragility and precarious nature of the new democratic order, which is vulnerable to resistance to change and reactionary opposition, and is the target of multiple threats and hindrances which interfere with or delay the process of its completion.

d. The escalation of intolerance and constraints through the use of intimidation, threats, and verbal, moral, or physical violence.

e. The dispersal, disaffection, and passivity of the vast majority of the independent democrats, who are not yet entirely free of the reflexes and mechanisms that inhibit the will and responsibility, nor of subjection to political tutelage, so that they remain skeptical or undecided about their choices, commitment, and political action.

f. The demand for a new vision of a new order cannot coexist either with the negative residual effects of an order, which is now past, nor with reductive views or practices, which are restrictive of or abusive to democracy.

g. The need to mobilize all democratic energies with a view to concerted and multiform action to effect a radical alteration of the structures of thought, means, and forms of expression in language and discussion, and methods of conduct and social behavior.

#### II—Global Strategy

For a dynamics of change, taking into account:

- The popular desire for qualitative changes in our institutions and citizens, and for progress, modernization, and well-being.
- The irreversible nature of the democratic process on the conceptual level, and the need to ensure its implementation and the translation of the principles into facts and into daily life.
- The desire to raise human values, to promote the multidimensional citizen, and to ensure the flowering in him of the social being, in all his fullness as a participant in social dynamics and cohesion, which are inseparable from and complementary to the vital being.
- The need to understand man in the totality of his being, development, and situation, in relation, on the one hand, to the depth of the historic field and the socioecological and geopolitical environment, and on the other hand, with reference to population growth, average age, and social categories, with a view to improving and optimizing both living conditions and the quality of life.

Article 6. If it is to be implemented, this program will require a concerted and active alliance of all democrats, individually and collectively, on the political level, on the basis of the Democratic Alliance Charter for which Article 5 provides, to ensure the structuring and effective advent of the democratic order. This must be given priority, in the hierarchy of strategic and operational missions, through actions designed to achieve the following goals:

#### A—National Level

1. To deepen, strengthen, and consolidate actions with a view to democracy, in all its manifestations and in all sectors, in order to promote the advent of a civil society in a state of law, guaranteeing the freedoms, rights, equality of expression and enjoyment of these rights, extended to the political, cultural, social, and economic fields of application, as well as the safety of the citizen.
2. To establish the practice of dialogue, tolerance, acknowledgment, and respect for others and their political, cultural, and religious opinions, as well as their right to differ.
3. To contribute to the drafting of a code of conduct to be promoted and disseminated.
4. To ensure that the institutions are in fact operative, in conformity with the Constitution and its Article 30, for the purpose of guaranteeing the legal rights and duties of all male and female citizens, together with the elimination of the obstacles that hinder the flowering of the human personality and prevent effective participation by all in political, economic, social, and cultural life, with the revocation of all previous juridical provisions contrary to the Constitution, including the present Family Code, being effected to this end.
5. To encourage the assertion, recognition, and flowering of national cultural identities, since the Arab, Amazighite, and Islamic constituents are basic elements in the fundamental historic Algerian personality.
6. To contribute to the definition, extension, and delimitation of authority; to assure its separation and autonomy; and to work to ensure the separation of religion and the state.
7. To establish a normative scale of values, consistent with social morality and a new ethic for the new democratic order, establishing rights, but also duties, in the absence of other reference points likely to serve as potential sources of differences or partisan and divisive conflicts.
8. To eradicate social scourges and petty and major crimes, by using multiform preventive and curative actions in the struggle against them; against impunity for, complicity in, and tolerance of them; and against their spread and acceptance in terms of mental structures, since as a result of imitation and encouragement, these evils have led to contagious forms of individualistic, negative, asocial, and antisocial behavior.
9. To ensure respect for freedom of conscience, opinion, and expression, and to guarantee the citizens the right of and to information, through the promulgation of a communications code, which will include, among other practical modalities, the ethical aspects of the exercise of these rights.
10. To reestablish and develop the feelings of civic and community responsibility, sociability, patriotism, and social and national conscience.
11. To establish, as a function of a democratic model, and to define and specify, a new type of relations between those who are governed and those who govern, based on the sovereignty of the people and the exercise of that sovereignty, and to determine the type, function, and goal of the legitimate and legal institutions capable of representing the people, to which they will entrust their agreement and confidence.
12. To reestablish the concepts of respect for the state, its institutions, the authorities, and the public order.
13. To reduce the social inequalities and regional disparities, and to guarantee the equitable distribution of the national income, with all of the implications resulting therefrom.
14. To contribute to the drafting and promulgation of statutes that will improve and guarantee not only the rights of the family, but also those of children and youth, elderly citizens, and the handicapped, to education, training, jobs, health, housing, and social security.
15. To encourage more profound thought about the world of labor, trade-union rights, and their scope and forms of application, as well as conciliatory methods of preventing and resolving demands and conflicts.

16. To work to ensure that the Algerian state effectively undertakes the solution of the problems of our emigre population, by drafting, for the purpose, a strategy for protecting their rights in their host countries and arranging their eventual repatriation to Algeria, through the appropriate structures.

17. To contribute to the objective revision of the history of Algeria and the Algerian people, from their origins to the present day, and to take into account, among other things, their contribution to civilization and the multiple and successive struggles to resist foreign invasions and domestic oppression up until the popular uprising in October of 1988.

18. To assert the collective nature of history, which cannot be that of individuals, and to wage a battle as a result against any personal effort to appropriate and exploit merit, with a view to reestablishing the cult of personality, messianism, providentialism, and personal power.

19. To give young people the priority and very special attention to which they are entitled, as the priority motive social force they represent for effecting qualitative change, renewal, and the building of the present and future Algeria, and to emphasize the historic role young people have always played in the past, thus earning the right and the duty to take responsibility for the present and to build the future, in their advance toward freedom, prosperity, and progress.

20. To defend the FLN [National Liberation Front] and ALN [National Liberation Army], the historic motive forces (1954-1962) in the national liberation war waged by the Algerian people, against any effort to disparage, debase, or falsify them, and to ensure that the moral and material rights of the mujahedin, chauhada, and beneficiaries are guaranteed, maintained, and safeguarded.

21. To work actively to promote recognition of the combatants and martyrs in the struggle for freedom and democracy that followed the advent of national independence, and the equalization of their status with that of the mujahedin, with all of the rights inherent therein.

#### **B—International Level**

1. To contribute to the establishment of a new international order with a view to eliminating the serious imbalances in all sectors between the poor countries and the rich countries, and between the weak countries and the strong ones.

2. To strive for the elimination of all forms of domination, alienation, or blackmail, direct or indirect, used against the countries of the Third World and the deprived countries, in an effort to place them in debt, to plunder, or to exploit their natural and human resources, to the almost exclusive benefit of international capitalism.

3. To engage in appropriate actions to eliminate all forms of exploitation, enslavement, oppression, and discrimination by man against man throughout the world, and to support all movements working for the liberation of man and the recovery and effective exercise of the rights of man.

4. To work to promote peace in the world, rapprochement among the peoples, friendship, and universal solidarity.

5. To intensify activities designed to promote the Maghreb Union, consolidation of the bonds of cooperation and trade in all sectors, and the creation of community organizations to be defined with the Arab, Muslim, African, Mediterranean, and Third World countries.

6. To participate in the development of a planetary awareness of the human condition, solidarity with the human individual, preservation of his physical and moral integrity, and respect for and freedom to exercise his rights and liberties.

Article 7. With a view to the achievement of these goals, the ANDI will, utilize every necessary means appropriate to the situation, within the context of respect for national and international laws.

### **IRAQ**

#### **Abu-Iyad Claims Saddam Wants To Negotiate**

*90AE0310A Paris LIBERATION in French  
4 Sep 90 pp 2, 4*

[Interview with Abu-Iyad, second-ranking PLO official and head of intelligence, by Jose Garcon, special correspondent in Tunis; date not specified; first paragraph is LIBERATION introduction]

[Text] Tunis—Until now, PLO officials had left unexplained their support for Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait. But today, Abu-Iyad, the PLO's number-two man and intelligence chief, was willing to speak. It was the same day that Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO's executive committee, was quoted by the Palestinian news agency WAFAT on the 1,000th day of the intifada as saying that his organization stands with those hostile to Israel, "which is occupying the esplanade of the Mosques [Haram al-Sharif] in Jerusalem, and its imperialist allies." He added, "Never has such a crusade been seen on Arab soil nor has so much foreign sabre rattling been heard and this deployment of arms of destruction (...) could trigger a total war, the consequences of which would spare no one."

[Garcon] The PLO is stepping up initiatives to reach a political solution to the Gulf crisis and it asserts that Saddam is ready to negotiate. On what grounds?

[Abu-Iyad] Saddam Hussein is ready to negotiate and to withdraw from Kuwait, if he is given guarantees. Indeed, there is no certainty that Iraq will remain unattacked if

he withdraws from Kuwait and frees the hostages. He is convinced that the United States did not mobilize all its forces solely for Kuwait and that it intends to use the crisis as a pretext—namely, to weaken the Iraqi Army as much as possible, to destroy all unconventional weapons in Iraq's arsenal and to prohibit Iraq from using oil as a political weapon. He believes that the Americans will not be swayed from their course, whether he remains in Kuwait or withdraws. And that is the real problem facing him today. Can Europe guarantee him that he will not be attacked? At any rate, he is now open to negotiations. That represents a change in Iraqi position.

[Garcon] Your optimism contrasts sharply with the pessimism of the UN secretary general....

[Abu-Iyad] Perhaps Perez de Cuellar was wrong to start at the end—meaning, the hostages. For our part, we are sure that Iraq is willing to agree to a political solution. Saddam wants a negotiated settlement as long as it cannot be interpreted as a failure on his part.

[Garcon] You and Yasser Arafat have met with Saddam on three occasions. What does Saddam consider unnegotiable?

[Abu-Iyad] Two things: first, the areas of Bubiyan and what has been named "Saddamia;" second, Emir Jabir's return to power.

[Garcon] The PLO has been shuttling back and forth between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Can the Saudis agree to such terms?

[Abu-Iyad] The Saudis can bring themselves to accept the first point, but probably not the second. In any event, once Iraq is out of Kuwait, the return of the Kuwaiti ruling family must be discussed among Arabs. Whatever happens, Kuwait must acknowledge that there are Iraqi interests in Kuwait just as there are Syrian interests in Lebanon. That is the only way a solution can be reached.

[Garcon] The PLO has committed itself fully to Iraq's side. In so doing the PLO has scuttled what it had always demanded of Arab governments: the much-vaunted independence of Palestinian decision making....

[Abu-Iyad] No one can understand our position. If we were to take our own interests solely into account, we would side with the Gulf where 700,000 to 800,000 Palestinians live and that is the source of almost all our funds.

Contrary to what is being said, we never approved of the annexation of Kuwait and we have repeatedly said so to Iraq's president, even before he detained the foreigners in Iraq. But we have refused to condemn Baghdad for two reasons. A condemnation would have precluded us from acting as mediators. Also, those who called for condemnation of Iraq at the Arab summit in Cairo were in reality seeking war. And we see the consequences of a catastrophic war as more serious than any damage our image might suffer. In 20 days I have traveled more than in the past three years. There is good reason for that. A

war would be tragic—for the United States, but even more so for Europe which would have a heavier cost to bear. Remember that oil prices could climb to 60 or 70 dollars a barrel.

[Garcon] Would one of the consequences of a war be terrorism, the threat of which has been raised by Tarik 'Aziz?

[Abu-Iyad] Yes, and the most terrible consequence of all.

[Garcon] Nonetheless, the PLO may have to pay very dearly for its stand in this crisis.

[Abu-Iyad] Remember that this is not a classic inter-Arab dispute. The American intervention and presence have complicated everything. Not a single Palestinian in Jordan or the occupied territories can accept this brutal military intervention, especially in view of the fact that there has never been an international mobilization of this kind to back the UN resolutions on the Palestinian question. Where is there justice? The legality you talk about? We have not aligned ourselves with anyone. But the attempt is to have us legitimize a "yes to war." The Palestinian demonstrations in Jordan and the occupied territories are being construed as proof that we are aligned with Saddam. But how could there not be demonstrations? Anyone who says that force should be used against Israel, as does Saddam, will be acclaimed by all Palestinians in the territories....

[Garcon] Relations between Egypt and the PLO are at their lowest ebb. Can the Palestinian question be settled without Egypt?

[Abu-Iyad] No. But we have decided today to hold Hosni Mubarak publicly and personally responsible for the anti-Palestinian campaign now rampant in Egypt. The Egyptian press accused the Palestinians of being responsible for the looting that has taken place in Kuwait. The reaction was swift: Palestinian stores in Cairo began to come under attack. Yet we had done everything to bring Egypt back into the Arab world. In reality, what the Egyptians want is to keep us under supervision. That is something we cannot accept. We have been at war with Syria for eight years to preserve our independence.

## ISRAEL

### New Chief of Mosad Profiled

90AE0200A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
29 Jun 90 pp 21-23

[Article by Ron Adlist]

[Text] Upon assuming his position, the new chief of Mosad found an institution that was moving with difficulty, due to a lack of enthusiasm, amid the growth of all the ingredients of a lazy, ungainly bureaucratic mechanism. The new Mosad chief did not discover anything new, because he had served as the deputy of Nahum Admoni, the previous chief. Close to his retirement,

Admoni brought in the new chief, who had been studying at a prestigious U.S. university, in order to promote him as an inside successor to counter a trend toward bringing in an outsider. Many who are close to Mosad's activities, thought that someone from outside could give a kick to the rear of the system, which had been beaten after the Lebanese failure and needed shaking. The man singled out for this task was then, and still is, the head of AMAN [Military Intelligence Branch], Amnon Shahaq.

At that time, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir preferred an insider. An insider was indeed selected, perhaps because the defense minister at the time, Yitzhaq Rabin, was not crazy about appointing Shahaq, perhaps because Rabin was convinced by Admoni's arguments, perhaps because Issar Har'el, who had been harnessed to Admoni's persuasion campaign, reminded Shamir of what happened to Shamir, who was dismissed from the Mosad by an army man ('Amit) who was parachuted in from the outside to take over Mosad, and perhaps, in general, because it is difficult to contend with a lobbyist such as Ehud Olmert. In any case, a person was selected from within, and at least from the standpoint of the changes that occurred in the first year of his tenure, he is described as a real chimney sweeper, in contrast to the don't make waves policy of Admoni. To date, all holders of senior positions have been replaced, except one.

Except for the position of the chief, the entire unit heads forum in the Mosad is filled with new faces. The new chief did not hesitate to appoint a personal friend to a senior operational position, and although this person does have the suitable operational background, it is doubtful that he would have merited such a surprising promotion under any other Mosad chief. Regarding another senior appointment, the new chief dared to bring back a former Mosad officer from retirement, despite the protests of intermediate echelons, who saw themselves damaged by this appointment. The new chief also appointed a woman to head Mosad's administrative disposition, and he brought back a senior operations person whom Nahum Admoni had dismissed for sexually abusing a female employee. Further clarification did not indicate rape, but a consenting relationship for "office favors." However, Admoni publicized his dismissal in an internal manifesto. At the time, the man said "I am going home." He left, but the new chief reactivated him.

As expected, the replacement of personnel caused a shift within systems described in recent years by sources as "fossilized." However, the real problem facing the new chief is not the fossilization of Mosad systems, but the answers that he is supposed to supply by means of those systems to meet consumer demands. From this standpoint, the new chief has inherited a history of trenchant criticism levelled by AMAN regarding the quality of the goods his personnel provide. At one time, there were heated arguments regarding cooperation with AMAN personnel (read Mosad's second-ranking intelligence consumers after political consumers) regarding the selection and examination of raw material. Over the years,

more and more AMAN personnel have been integrated in the relevant systems, including not a few commanders, so that the current problem is correct utilization and the right people. This is the true test of the new chief, and it is still too early to judge him.

#### Friends from Across the Sea

Along with the continuing problematic nature of this large body, the new chief inherited a number of burning problems that have a direct, substantial effect on the activity of all systems.

Relations with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] always ranged from friendly to really warm. These relations had their ups and downs and involved a tinge of suspicion, as is customary between friends of this type. However, all of this was solvable within the framework of the friendly relations between Israel and the United States, and in continuation of the legacy of James Angleton, a senior American intelligence official who was almost as pro-Israel as he was anti-Soviet, not to detract from Admoni's ability in this area and the quality of his connections. What broke the harmony was the Pollard case. This has been comprehended by the new Mosad chief, who was presented to the head of the CIA by Yitzhaq Shamir on his visit there just after he was elected. American intelligence is still furious about the Pollard affair. There is talk of a leak that has yet to be located, because Israel refuses to give the Americans all of the goods connected to the use of Jews inside the American system. As much as we might scream that nothing of this sort exists, they will not believe us.

The importance of relations with parallel secret services goes beyond the bounds of operational cooperation. Such relations have a great added value for a state such as Israel, whose channels of communication with the world, in its present situation, are blocked as a result of political paralysis and the wars of the Jews. It is very important that friendly services save us from failures, to the extent that something happens to excellent boys when they become tangled in the middle. But it is much more important that these channels facilitate the transmission of information and messages that external bodies are prevented from transmitting. Mosad can and must gather information and defend the state from bad elements. But it must also gather counter-information and identify good elements. This is the great, true test of the current Mosad chief. No one expects him to prevent a war or bring peace. However, he is paid a salary, and there are hopes that he will act in these two areas. It is forbidden for a situation to develop in which Mosad knows everything about all that is happening everywhere in the world, but has no notion about what is happening in Israel. Accordingly, Mosad must deploy so that, if the political leadership (is there such a thing?) demands products suited to a political compromise, Mosad is ready to supply such products and moreover take a strong stand, instead of just standing by with the goods in hand. We heard an indication of this in 'Ezer Weitzman's remarks at the Labor Alignment's Center, in

which he disclosed that Mosad and Aman maintain that dialogue with the Palestinians is not possible without the PLO.

#### Eshqol Said "It Stinks"

Intelligence considerations must be directly weighed against political, including moral, considerations, even if that seems impossible, as part of an overall balancing. An example is the story of Ben-Barka. According to foreign publications, he was liquidated by General Oufkir, the head of the Moroccan intelligence service, because he opposed the king of Morocco and threatened the Moroccan regime. Somehow, information was leaked to the effect that Israel was involved in the matter, and Issar Har'el, who was then an advisor to Prime Minister Eshqol, accused 'Amit [the Mosad chief] of helping the Moroccans while plotting against Eshqol, when, at the same time, information suddenly arrived, which was in the hands of Issar, as well as the Americans, adding its touch to the wars of the Jews.

In the same period, Mosad established a good connection with the Moroccans, i.e., the first crack in the wall of Arab enmity, including a Moroccan promise to allow the immigration of the Jews of Morocco. Mosad personnel used to travel with suitcases filled with money, returning with Jews, information, contacts in the Arab world, and a breakthrough to a general understanding. This connection was more precious than gold, and it allowed politicians to put a foot into the Arab world and begin to build relations with a view toward a compromise. What our politicians did with this connection is another matter. In any case, Mosad provided it. The problem is that, in secret relations, as in open relations, there is no free lunch or friendship without a quid pro quo. One day, apparently, 'Amit was asked by his Moroccan counterpart, General Oufkir, to perform a favor for him regarding Ben-Barka. No one spoke about liquidation. However, this request for help was clearly not a matter of supplying cookies to a knitting circle. 'Amit went to Eshqol, who told him, using a Yiddish expression, "it stinks." 'Amit said, fine, I will try to finesse this. The problem was that it was impossible to dismiss Oufkir with a fine Yiddish expression, because he did not understand Jewish humor, and mainly because the volume and quality of the Moroccans' help, from an international standpoint, went beyond a personal matter such as Ben-Barka, the more so because that matter would be acted on at any rate. Such a dilemma can be surmounted by a national belch or by racking one's soul for a solution, but there is no fleeing from it. Though, ultimately, flee they did, to the extent possible, but this too left a scar, because Ben-Barka was explicitly a freedom fighter in his country, and Oufkir was the brutal representative of a regime good to Jews, but bad according to the essential criteria of human society. (Incidentally, contrary to publications, it was not Oufkir who was in Paris in the same period, but his deputy, Colonel Dlimi, who is also not a colonel of the Salvation Corps.)

The story of Ben-Barka is an example of the complexity of the considerations facing a Mosad chief in general, and the complexity of matters in this short article that face the current Mosad chief. It cannot be demanded of the Mosad chief that he conduct his business according to the Boy Scout code. However, it is forbidden to concede this demand. At present, the dimensions of the threat to Israel's existence are changing and being conditioned by new elements. The new Mosad chief's role is to adapt Mosad to the world around it.

In recent years, there has been a significant decline in the power and influence of secret services in most of the Western democracies, and a real fragmentation in the Eastern Bloc. George Bush, who was the head of the CIA, is accustomed to joking that he learns more about what is happening from the press than from the reports of his services. In the United States, allocations for news departments in the media are no less than allocations for intelligence per mission, no joking.

#### Shamir Has a Lethal Record

In Israel, the subordination of Mosad to the political and public systems is deficient. Despite the failure of the Lebanon War, the combined trauma of the holocaust and the existential danger has stretched the bounds of security policy. For example, according to foreign publications, Israel has an unequivocal record in acting against its individual enemies, including sending letter bombs to missile scientists in Egypt, liquidating Palestinian terror, striking potential sources of Palestinian damage, liquidating Iraqi nuclear scientists, issuing warnings and threats against collaborators (some of whom have withdrawn quietly according to publications abroad), and liquidating the engineer and producer of the Iraqi super cannon. Israel has never responded regarding these topics, even if it was not involved in them. However, there is no smoke without fire. Only a month ago, a senior Egyptian official, an Ahmad Faraj, in an interview with the AL-ANBA' newspaper, stated that he "is not surprised when it is disclosed that Israel is killing Arab scientists working in nuclear engineering, computers, and the sophisticated missiles industry to prevent the Arabs from making technical achievements."

True, remarks by an Egyptian official, as senior as he may be, cannot be the basis for criticizing Israel's security/moral policy. However, only several months ago, the German intelligence service leaked that Mosad is responsible for the liquidation of the director of a German company that assisted Libya in equipping regular Hercules planes with an aerial refueling capability that would allow Libyan fighter planes to bomb targets in Israel. The same director, according to the German intelligence leak, was found dead in his hotel room in Tripoli, the victim of what was described as a heart attack. The body was flown to Germany for an autopsy, and the leak was apparently intended to express dissatisfaction and serve as a kind of a warning. There is no debate over the need to protect Jewish blood by acting

against potential sources of damage, but there is an argument over transforming this word coinage into the currency of every small dealer in blood who emerges in the markets.

These matters are usually decided between the Mosad chief and the prime minister, as happened between 'Amit and Eshqol regarding Ben-Barka. Regarding this subject, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has a sufficiently lethal record. When he was still in the Mosad, he used to say that if Hitler had been liquidated, the holocaust would have been prevented. He and his group there tried to engage in a similar subject until a lowly duty-officer got them to back away from it. It should be assumed that Shamir's reasoning as prime minister is different from his reasoning as a member of the underground or Mosad. Nonetheless, it should be taken into account that his mental foundation is built for suggestions and opportunities of this kind, and it does not seem that the new Mosad chief, with his own reasoning, can constitute a contender, because of his [Shamir's] operational-soldierly character. In a world in which hostility is dissipating, operations of this type that are attributed to Israel have a cumulative boomerang effect that pushes us into inferior opening positions in open negotiations.

Regarding the dissipation of hostilities, it is necessary to be somewhat monocular and to blunt eagerness. Attacks and murders are occurring throughout the field. However, they are the last chords by which each party is attempting to advance its position at any price, like an assault against commanding hills in the last hours before the declaration of a cease-fire. Thus, those engaged in matters over which there is no public control must be more monocular and less eager.

#### **Aggressive, Unsentimental**

In addition to policy problems, the new Mosad chief has inherited basic organizational problems, such as hidden unemployment, redundant positions, and even redundant departments. It has been said that he set aside a year for reorganization, but current events diverted him from a real reorganization. Thus, the mountain of rumors that swelled in the corridors brought forth a mouse, inasmuch as, after talk of hundreds of dismissals, only dozens actually left, mostly people who advanced their retirement date.

The new chief is investing personal efforts and long work hours in the reorganization. However, the system is clearly as unbending as he is, and the new chief is known for being particularly inflexible, not regarding his personal friends, but in work relations. This does not refer to the cold, buttoned-up aloofness of Admoni, but to squareness according to the book, and to the aggressive aura that he radiates, even when he fires off a "good evening" to one or another junior employee, which Admoni never did. Unlike Admoni, who dresses scrupulously, the new chief goes around in jeans, a knit shirt, and sneakers, even at formal occasions, as if he has just returned from his daily jog, including dashes to the

defense minister's bureau, where he is identified in dismay as "the one in the running shoes and jeans."

If some would argue that dressing like Admoni would be more befitting of the Mosad chief, everyone admires how the new chief has handled infractions of norms or corruption offenses. In contrast to the internal closure with which previous incidents were handled, i.e., white-washed, the new chief is unbending and devoid of all sentiment and calculation. A veteran worker's son who was corrupted by several thousand dollars was immediately dismissed and tried. A gang that took a commercial tithe from the Mosad kitchen was dismissed without delay. This way of handling of improprieties stands out in relation to past cases of corruption, which were handled leniently and labelled as deviations within the family. It sends a strong signal to anyone who thinks that connections—and the Mosad is rife with family connections, even family holdings of a sort—would save him from falling.

Regarding Jews living in distressed countries, the new chief has found himself in a different world compared to that of his predecessor. Mosad, due to understood sensitivities, does not maintain contacts with diaspora Jews, out of fear that they would become targets for anti-semitism, or simply the focus of the authorities' suspicions. However, the state of Israel has obligations to Jews throughout the world. This is no secret. On the contrary, every Israeli politician is at pains to say it as loudly as possible, and this commitment has also been demonstrated in Israel's efforts to facilitate Jewish immigration from countries of distress, such as Morocco, Iraq, and so on. Because of the above-mentioned sensitivities, the Jews of the Soviet Union are not handled directly in the Mosad, but by a department of a governmental ministry.

Gorbachev's chaotic race toward freedom, or to the abyss, and the march of Jews out of the Soviet Union, have actually eliminated the need to handle the Jews of the Soviet Union at the level that had been customary. According to foreign publications, the current, relaxed embracing of the remnant of Ethiopian Jewry has relieved the current Mosad chief of a previous task of the Mosad. The credit for this great work belongs to the previous Mosad chief and dozens of others who did the menial work.

#### **An Open Door to Mike Harari**

The new chief also inherited from Admoni the issue of Mike Harari and Harari's connections with Noriega. The new chief has to handle this issue as a decisionmaking chief, to be distinguished from a unit head or a deputy. The Americans sought Noriega's head during the period in which the new chief assumed his position. The Americans were constantly told that Harari is a private citizen, and we are a democratic country, blah, blah, blah. Unconvinced, the Americans exerted continuous pressure, the fruits of which are unclear. However, it is clear that Noriega is in the United States in a deluxe prison, and Harari is here. Harari is the man who drove Noriega



to the Vatican embassy in Panama City, after which he travelled along the canal highway to Balboa, while the Americans were controlling the roads, and from there, he crossed the Caribbean Sea to the Dominican Republic. A plane in San Domingo brought him home, to uncle Weitztom at the MABAT [television news] studio (Harari's timetable is not as compact as it might sound). Before and after that, he was received with open arms in the office of the new Mosad chief, most likely without any connection to the Noriega affair, but because of his personal friendship with the new chief, whose commander he had been.

Another matter that the new chief was relieved of was the dismantlement of LEQEM, the Bureau for Science Relations, which acted behind Mosad's back. The desire of government systems to organize their own private secret services led to the establishment of LEQEM by Shim'on Peres, who worked with secrecy and restraint until Ariq Sharon dismissed Benyamin Blumberg, a veteran, and appointed Rafi Eytan to replace him. Eytan, who is incidentally a friend of the new chief, and consults with him relatively frequently, discovered Pollard, and the rest is history and hysteria. However, the new chief's control over domains from which he can laterally detect anything similar to the Pollard affair has improved greatly.

There is also an improvement in procedures related to post-operation investigations, which have been practically nonexistent in recent years (except for reports by accountable personnel that were accepted without cross-checking with their subordinates or co-workers). This type of investigation has very slowly become institutionalized, albeit not to the degree seen in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], and it should be assumed that North Yemen's announcement several months ago of a forceful entry by Mosad personnel, dressed as El-'Al [airlines] personnel, into the branch of the Yemeni airline company in Turkey, did not enhance the health of anyone or that of the matter that was being handled.

#### **If the Head of the KGB Can, So Can the Head of the Mosad**

However, the area in which the Mosad chief clearly proved that he has not yet adapted to the changing world—in which secret services serve all of society, not the legacy of an internal interpretation of a national interest—is the Mosad's relation (in the singular) with the public through the media.

On the face of it, everything connected to the media is out of bounds and even dangerous from Mosad's standpoint. Actually, Mosad currently cannot ignore the media's role in treating the events to which Mosad is connected. Disregard of this role is a lack of treatment, and a lack of treatment is simply a failure. When your matter comes out into the open, and you disappear, i.e., try to disappear, you simply lose points. Mosad has never really ignored the media, but it always related to it on the level of psychological warfare, or the journalists

close to it. However, today's world simply does not function that way. It is set up for real, direct contending. If you hide, you are damaged. If you let loose canards, sooner or later they become liabilities. If you plant a canard that incessantly shouts that your sister is a prostitute, with the passing of time, your sister will become certain that she is a prostitute, even if you do not have a sister.

It seems really heroic to urinate on the media in an era of sell-outs, but to do so greatly is unwise, considerations of field security notwithstanding.

When Nahum Admoni's tenure ended, and the new chief assumed his position, the newspapers published a number of items regarding incidents that occurred in Mosad. Admoni dismissed from Mosad an excellent boy on the suspicion—never verified—that he leaked material to the press. The new chief is also strict in this regard. Immediately upon assuming his post, he ordered every worker in the office to take a polygraph test at a private investigation office. This testing lasted several months. As expected, and as was made clear to him earlier, no one was caught.

The Mosad chief does not have to hold a press conference before and after [every operation]. However, there must be no yielding to Mosad's arguments of field security when it wishes to evade the public eye and the accountability that arises from that. An analysis of Mosad's activity in preparing the background for the Lebanon War leads to an unambiguous conclusion: Information on Mosad's modus operandi in Lebanon before the war, were it to have emerged into the open, despite causing unpleasantness, would have produced second thoughts, and third thoughts. The damage caused by the Lebanon War to all involved is a million times greater than the damage caused by any exposure of people or methods, which can be replaced and changed. This is not to say that the exposure of Mosad's activity before the war could have prevented the war, but it could have contributed to a clarification and sharpening of the public debate, in which erroneous Mosad appraisal documents waved in back rooms promised politicians a Garden of Eden but gave us all Hell. It is absolutely certain that if the sword of exposure had been held—even without being used—over the heads of the Mosad personnel who were engaged in preparing for the Lebanon War, they would have been much more cautious in their wild, irresponsible game.

Mosad and SHABAK [General Security Service] cannot conceive of opening a limited dialogue with the press. However, in today's world, not doing so would be a loss of public credit for Mosad. Even the KGB opened its doors to the press, including the international press, when, several months ago, it presented a film about itself to the media in Moscow with the goal of softening its image. The KGB's press officer, a Colonel Igor Perlin, responded to questions and even presented the handler of Kim Philby, a Colonel Uri Modin, who joked with a reporter from the British INDEPENDENT, and related

that there was another mole who was not detected. The KGB did not disclose anything that it did not intend to disclose, but it understood that dialogue with the public would cause the system to function in a more balanced manner. Disassociation and faith in a murky existence produce excessively independent activity, as happened in Lebanon. If the head of the KGB can, so can the chief of Mosad.

#### **Officer Assesses Air Capabilities in Gulf**

*90AE0260D Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew  
19 Aug 90 p 10*

[Interview with Major General Benny Peled, Former Air Force Commander, by Dan Arkin, MA'ARIV correspondent; date and place not given: "The American Pilots Will Eat Iraqis For Breakfast"]

[Text] The Iraqi pilots and their commanders see the American aerial force opposing them in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and their knees are knocking and they don't want anything to develop," says former Air Force commander Major General (Res.) Benny Peled.

We asked Benny Peled to struggle with himself and to put himself in the place of the Iraqi air force command, and in the place of the commander of the air forces of the United States of America and its allies in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf: "There is no equality of aerial forces between Iraq and the United States, these are two different leagues, these are the NBA [National Basketball Association] and those are the basketball champions of 'Afula."

[Arkin] What are the differences?

[Peled] At the personnel flight level, in command and control, in planning ability, in the types of armament, and in the sophistication of the electronic equipment.

[Arkin] Has the Iraqi air force no advantages?

[Peled] The Iraqis have, perhaps, one advantage—that some of them have gone through a baptism of fire in the war against Iran, while today's American pilots are a generation that did not go through a baptism of fire. But they are well-trained. The American pilots have "eagerness to hunt," they have "an easy trigger finger." If their leash is released, they will fly like cowboys at high noon and will eat the Iraqi air force for breakfast.

[Arkin] What are the options of the commander of the U.S. Air Force?

[Peled] It is possible to mortally wound Iraq's industrial and transportation infrastructure. He cannot reduce the living standard of the Iraqis below pita, cheese, and olives.

Perhaps there will be difficulties for the American air crews in the first one or two days, due to the shock of the baptism of fire. So perhaps in the first one or two days there will be an American-Iraqi down ratio of one to 15.

But after several days, the down ratio, in my opinion, will be one to 50, because the level of the pilots is completely different—they are not from the same school.

I want to add that in the Air Force and in the air arm of the American Navy there are no mental health officers, and no education officers, and they do not recruit peace Now. If they are given the correct command—the Americans will get organized and will deliver a strong blow, and the Iraqis will be for them unusually good prey.

[Arkin] What do you mean, the correct command?

[Peled] I mean that if they conduct the war from a situation room in the basement of the White House, then the Americans will have problems. If they put limitations on the American pilots and instruct them to act cautiously, and if the commanders in the field will have to ask all the time for permissions from the White House, then it will be much harder for them. The question is, who will dare to give the order.

#### **Shamir, Sharon Accused of Prevaricating on Settlements**

*90AE0200D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 28 Jun 90 p 19*

[Article by Yitzhaq Gal-Nur]

[Text] This week, we derived some pleasure from Shamir and Sharon. With similar wording, and with well-coordinated timing, they both announced that the government would not settle the new immigrants in the territories so as not to harm the historical immigration process. Who knows, perhaps this surprising sensitivity will cause the government to start negotiations with the PLO, so as not to harm the historical opportunity for making peace.

However, suspicion was immediately aroused, because these two have a rich past in meaning the opposite of what they say. Shamir thwarted the peace initiative that bears his name, whereas regarding Sharon and the truth, it is said that they would tear each other to pieces if they ever met.

Where is the trick? My suspicions were aroused when the settlers did not immediately scream upon hearing the declarations made by Shamir and Sharon. Later, Beny Qatzover (HA'ARETZ 26 June) explained the reason: There is in fact an "understanding" between the settlers and the government, according to which "the settlements of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would not be neglected in governmental construction plans." That is all. Qatzover can rely on the reliable government. It will again attempt to deceive the squire. The government will not establish new settlements and it will not direct immigrants to the territories, but it will build 5,000 apartments per year in existing settlements in order to increase the number of residents in the territories to 120,000 by 1992, an increase of about 40 percent.

In the near future, the government will remain faithful to its declarations that, beyond the 1,000 apartments now being finished, most of which are designated for members of the [ultra-Orthodox] Haredi group, there are no apartments for immigrants in the territories. In the meantime, they will begin to build in the territories and interlocking methods will be used to increase the Jewish population in the territories. The first is: Subtract from here in order to add to there. The housing minister will see to it that a portion of the immigrants and the homeless will have no real housing alternative inside the green line, because housing solutions in the state of Israel will not be able to meet the demand, and so—pity—how is it possible to prevent the homeless from moving into empty apartments in the territories?

At the same time, the incentives method will be employed: Some of the immigrants will prefer to take advantage of government assistance for the acquisition of apartments that are part of the population thickening in the territories, because the prices of these apartments will be lower, and most of them will be built relatively close to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. For example, about 1,200 apartments are slated to be built in Ma'le Adumim and Alfe Menashe. Demonstrations by the homeless are contributing to this plan, because the enticement is also going out to them: Tents in front of the Knesset or spacious apartments in the territories? In such a situation, no one would be truly directed to live in the territories. All of the homeless people would be compelled to run there on their own accord.

If this does not work, it is always possible to conceal the population thickening using, "with God's help," old methods. They will call this lookouts, a zoological camp, exclusive apartments, and even Build Your House in Vilna of Jerusalem. I would not recommend to the Americans and the Soviets that they submit the historical touchiness of Shamir and Sharon to a simple test. They must commit themselves to stopping all construction in the territories immediately. Why do I convey such advice to the gentiles? Because they have become fed up with all of the laughable deceptions that harm immigration and my national pride. The huge investments in the settlements were, and remain, political nonsense and excessive waste for all of us—for the immigrants, for the homeless, for young couples, for the development towns, and for the neighborhoods. I would say this even if the entire world supported us.

### **Ra'anana Settlement Plans for 'Aliya Absorption**

90AE0218A Tel Aviv HAYARDEN in Hebrew  
17 Jul 90 pp 8, 10

[Article by M. Giv'ati]

[Text] The "Natasha-Rahel" project of the municipality of Ra'anana gained significant added reinforcement with the approval of \$2.7 million by the board of governors of the Jewish agency in its meeting in Jerusalem.

Ze'ev Bilsqi, the mayor of Ra'anana, who also serves as the chairman of the absorption committee of the local government center, appeared today before the board of governors of the Jewish Agency and made a detailed presentation of the successfully functioning model that was established in Ra'anana, which combines a direct absorption project and the support of neighborhoods in the city. The model, which bears the symbolic name, "Natasha-Rahel," indicates the two objectives for which the funds are designated [i.e., absorbing immigrants, as indicated by the Russian name, Natasha, and easing the negative impact of the influx of immigrants on Israelis, as indicated by the Hebrew name, Rahel].

Dozens of representatives on the board of directors of the agency visited Ra'anana the past year as part of delegations that arrived from all over the world to study the project from up close. Ra'anana has absorbed about 300 families directly. Another 150 families live in the absorption center in the city.

The project, which is the fruit of Bilsqi's initiative, is based on the principle of the municipality taking care of the immigrants from the moment they arrive in Israel. Apartments are rented in advance for the new immigrants, and these apartments are equipped and furnished with the help of dozens of volunteer organizations in the city. Each family of immigrants is matched with an adopted family, which facilitates its social absorption in the city.

Bilsqi, who was also very active in Operation Exodus to collect \$600 million from Jewish communities worldwide to facilitate absorption in Israel, has won much praise from the prime minister, ministers, and the Jewish Agency administration for his work and contribution toward settling immigrants.

### **Summer Hebrew Instruction Programs for Immigrants in Ra'anana**

The municipality of Ra'anana established two summer Hebrew language courses for about 200 immigrant students in the city. The two courses are held in the Ziv and Yavna schools for children from kindergarten through high school. In addition, a nursery school will be opened for the children of immigrants between the ages of three and six. The Hebrew courses last six weeks and will end on 10 August 1990.

The courses combine the acquisition of Hebrew with Judaism and Zionism studies.

To expedite acquisition of the spoken language, the courses employ sophisticated aids, such as audiovisual programs, films, video cassettes, educational television, and more. The students will learn about the religious and historical significance of the Jewish holidays, and will cover stories and events related to the state's establishment and personalities and events in the life of the country.

There will also be special study days dealing with such topics as the story of the first pioneers, various immigration waves and their significance, biblical heroes, the laws of the state, Israel's wars, and more, including enrichment through music, drama, and art. In addition, tours will be arranged to become familiar with the immediate surroundings, and visits will be made to military camps to become familiar with the IDF [Israel Defense Forces].

The students will also enjoy summer recreational activities, including swimming in the pool, "hide-and-seek" games, riddles, and group singing.

The Education and Welfare Branch in the municipality of Ra'anana organized the summer Hebrew courses for student immigrants.

A full session of the local urban development committee of Ra'anana, chaired by Mayor Ze'ev Bilski, approved the planning of apartment buildings for new immigrants on agricultural areas in the city. The new housing will be for young couples and those lacking housing due to the housing crisis affecting the entire country as well as Ra'anana. The mayor thus responded to the appeal by Minister Sharon, who promised to help prevent delays in the implementation of plans.

In an extraordinary decision made by the committee, it was agreed that up to 66 percent of the expropriated lands would be designated for public parks and public educational and athletic facilities with the goal of preserving the city's village character and special color and to continue the trend of improving the quality of life. It should be indicated that, in the downtown area of Ra'anana, the ratio of developed areas to green and public areas is currently only 20 percent. Yesterday's decision thus constitutes a purposeful change toward cultivating green vistas in the city.

Bilski added that the municipality has assumed responsibility for preparing architectural plans that would determine building density, the setting aside of green and public areas, and the number of floors in each building, and contractors would have to adhere to these specifications.

A silver-plated apple bearing the inscribed name of New York Mayor David Dinkins was given to Bilski by a delegation of women leaders of the Jewish community from New York that was hosted in Ra'anana. The gift was prepared by Dinkins' office and given to Bilski as a token of appreciation for the mayor's activity in the area of the absorption of immigrants in general and immigrants from the Soviet Union in particular. Because New York is known as the "big apple," and the apple is also the symbol of the city, it is no wonder that Dinkins chose this apple to give to Bilski. Recently, a sympathetic article on the absorption of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union in Ra'anana was published in the NEW YORK TIMES, causing many echoes among U.S. Jewry and New York Jewry in particular. It turns out that the

echoes reached the mayor of New York, who sought to express with this gesture his esteem for Bilski and the city of Ra'anana.

#### **Senior IDF Officers in Ra'anana for a Workshop on the Absorption of Immigration**

Last weekend, about 60 IDF officers with the rank of colonel and above were guests of the city of Ra'anana. They held a workshop there to study absorption in the city. Colonel Ran Goren, the Chief of the Manpower Branch, headed the delegation of officers.

The officers toured the absorption center, were guests in the apartments of immigrants from the Soviet Union who were absorbed in Ra'anana in the framework of the direct absorption project, and they held a panel discussion with the participation of Anatoly Sharansky, writer Eli Amir, and the theatrical director Yosi Alfi. The latter two told about their immigration from Iraq and their absorption in the 1950s in the transit camps in Israel. The mayor of Ra'anana also gave a presentation to the officers on the Natasha-Rahel model of direct absorption in Ra'anana, whose basis is the absorption of immigrants and the fostering of neighborhoods simultaneously. This two-pronged approach is being followed in order to correctly respond to the fears that many expressed regarding the possibility of bitterness on the part of veteran Israelis, i.e., the people who live in the neighborhoods, toward immigrants from the Soviet Union.

#### **Russian Literature Section Established in the Municipal Library in Ra'anana**

Immigrants are being absorbed in Ra'anana with a personal, unique style that gets a "five-star" rating. Now that arrangements have been made for housing, the adoption of immigrants by Israeli families, and a well set-up Hebrew course, and the immigrants are starting to work a bit, the central municipal library has opened a special Russian literature section.

Lova Luzhinsky is a professional librarian who worked in her city of Riga as the head of a team at the Bibliographical Institute of the Scientific Library of the state of Latvia [and is involved in the section].

The director of the municipal library in Ra'anana, Miryam Printz, basing herself on her experience with immigrants who arrived previously in Israel, indicates that they love to read. Because their Hebrew is not yet fluent, they hunger for literature in their own language. According to immigrants from the Soviet Union, this is doubly valid, because many books whose publication is forbidden in the Soviet Union find a large readership here. "Forbidden" authors, such as Solzhenitsyn, Bogkov, and others, or certain literary genres, such as science fiction, modern poetry, and contemporary western literature translated into Russian, whose publication was not permitted in Russia, have become "passions" among the immigrants.

### A Daily Russian Newspaper Section as Well

The daily newspaper section, which is open to the general public of Ra'anana every day, has also begun to receive four newspapers in Russian, and many of the immigrants come to read these newspapers in the library.

To augment and develop the Russian literature section, volunteers are invited to contribute Russian books for children and adults and to bring them to the Lazar Municipal Library.

Major General 'Amos Lapidot, the commander of the national Security College last weekend invited two families of immigrants from Ra'anana to vacation with personnel of the college at a rest house in Tzafet.

The two families of immigrants from Ra'anana who participated in the vacation, the Karpman family and the Moyn family, left at noon on Thursday for Tzafet in a vehicle placed at their disposal by the National Security College, and they returned on Saturday night.

Lieutenant Colonel Dalya Hoxhberg, who coordinated the hosting with the municipality of Ra'anana, reported that this was a joint initiative of the commander of the National Security College and the mayor of Ra'anana in the scope of the IDF's preparation to learn about direct absorption from up close, and to contribute its share in the national effort to integrate new immigrants socially within the community and bring them close to the IDF. In the course of the weekend, the families spent time with officers of the college, toured Mt. Hermon and went snow skiing with them. They swam in a heated pool, ate together, sang, and became acquainted with Army personnel.

In the future as well, there is an intention to continue inviting families of immigrants from Ra'anana to additional events held by the college. This week, for example, Mayor Bilsqi was invited to lecture at the college in the framework of a discussion on absorption that the college is undertaking, in which he will present the Natasha-Rahel project for direct absorption and the fostering of neighborhoods in Ra'anana.

### Schiff Argues Need for Military Satellite

90AE0200B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
27 Jun 90 p 1B

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] The growth of the military power of Iraq, the threat posed to the residents of Israel by Saddam Husayn's use of chemical weapons and concentration of forces, including ground-to-ground missiles on his border with Jordan, require profound thought about whether Israel needs a military satellite. The need to know more about what is happening beyond the Arab confrontation states has been proven in recent years. However, this time, the need is not for general information on the structure of a military force in an Arab state located about 800 km from Israel, but for real-time

information regarding different details, such as Iraqi troop movements toward Israel or the firing of ground-to-ground missiles. Everyone acknowledges that, in the situation that has developed, Israel requires more advanced early warning.

If some opposed the construction of a military satellite in the past, they would now certainly fight over who would get responsibility for a satellite, if and when Israel builds such a system. It further remains to clarify whether they would be willing to contribute sums from their budgets for the construction of a system of military satellites.

It is easy to decide in the affirmative in this debate, because at issue is essentially a defensive warning system, a system that would primarily strengthen the defending side and would compensate for its inferiority in the field and regarding the scale of its forces. No less important, a system of military satellites can grant self-confidence to anyone compelled to concede territory in the framework of peace agreements. In the event of a war, a satellite would of course add important information. One must not conclude from all of this that a military satellite, if and when it is built, would be a miracle cure that would solve all of the questions facing intelligence.

As with aerial photography from aircraft, satellite pictures also do not supply a complete answer regarding the enemy's intentions. Satellite pictures also need correct interpretations. Despite these limitations, a military satellite would doubtlessly add much to Israel's warning system. Israel's warning system must be independent as much as possible and must not rely on fragments that it gathers from others. The main question is not whether a military satellite is necessary, but whether Israel can bear the cost of maintaining such a system of satellites.

Can Israel build for itself a system of military satellites? The answer, in my estimation is affirmative. Every expert with whom I have spoken estimates that it is only a matter of time. If Israel decides to move in this direction, within a short period of time, it can possess a military satellite. Clearly, if Washington helps Israel in this vital area, much time would be saved. The Ofeq-2 Satellite, which was launched two months ago, is about to re-enter the atmosphere and end its life. This launch was more reliable, and the injection of the satellite into space at a certain point was planned well, with good synchronization with other systems. During its cruise in space, there were several hitches in communication and regarding the accumulators, but on the whole, important lessons were recorded. The control center, where the aircraft industry monitors satellites, is nothing like the huge American control center, but Israel has good reason to be proud of its initial achievements.

Arye Herzog, the manager of the MBT [expansion unknown] Company, which employs about 1,700 workers, relates that about 20 percent of his personnel are involved in the space industry. To these must also be added many in other factories, the universities, and the

Technion Institute. This space industry is developing nicely, and immigrants from the United States and the Soviet Union are already knocking on its doors.

The planners of the Ofeq Satellite are proud of the computer that they built, a computer that has attracted attention in Germany and the United States because of its light weight and great computing power. Another computer, which was planned in Israel but unrelated to the Ofeq, has also made an impression and has been incorporated in the American Pegasus missile, which is intended, among other things, for launching satellites from an aircraft.

According to experts, Israel has no technological problem in building a military satellite. Its launch of a small satellite that transmits signals from space still does not testify to an ability to place a military satellite in space. The main question is what payload can the launch missile carry. The weight of the large military satellites of the two superpowers reaches about 10 tons. These satellites, whose fuel consumption reaches about nine tons, ascend and descend to different altitudes and their life span is long. There are also lightweight satellites with short lifespans weighing about a quarter to a full ton. Israel has announced, as stated, that the weight of the Ofeq 2 is about 160 kg.

Another question is the stability of the satellite. Anyone seeking to obtain good pictures must have a satellite that is stationary in one direction and not a satellite that is always spinning around its axis. A serious warning system cannot comprise only one satellite. Even in the case of a small state, it is necessary to consider two satellites and a third satellite that is ready to launch.

This is an expensive system. It includes launching means, a satellite control and maintenance station, and of course, intelligence experts who determine the orbits, and flight in different meteorological situations, and who would also be responsible for deciphering images. Hence, it is possible to estimate that, in the 1990's, if a decision is made to produce a military satellite, it would be necessary to plan the establishment of a unit that would engage in this.

### **Public Reportedly Losing Faith in IDF**

90AE0200C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
27 Jun 90 p 4B

[Commentary by Natan Donovitz]

[Text] The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has a difficult problem that is not discussed much in the government, but its repercussions and the confusion that it causes are strongly felt among ordinary people. Confidence in the IDF is being increasingly undermined. Since the Yom Kippur War, faith in the Army has not been as great as it was in the distant past. Recently, however, this faith has been subject to growing erosion, and there is certainly a crisis of confidence. Such a crisis indirectly affects the

behavior of the citizen in other clearly civilian areas because his confidence in his physical future has been shaken.

Once, it could be stated that the country's defense is not hermetic, which is reasonable. Although, the citizen has since come to ask himself if everything is really all right. But this phrase ["the country's defense is not hermetic"] is repeated time after time, and it has a mounting negative effect. It was said after the night of the [terrorist infiltration by] gliders in the Galilee. It was acknowledged that this attack did not have to happen, and it was known that it occurred because of a failure, but the citizen was consoled by statements that measures were being taken to prevent a recurrence. The measures were taken after the fact. After a time, the citizens of Israel again hear that their state is not hermetically defended: A Syrian fighter aircraft penetrated into Israeli air space, flew some distance, and landed in the Yizra'el Valley without being intercepted. If its pilot had wanted, the plane could have penetrated further. Again, the citizens were told that this indeed did not have to happen, but "there is no hermetic seal." Measures were taken after the fact. More time passes. Speedboats bearing terrorists race to attack the beaches of Israel on a holiday, and again, the defense system did not function as it should. Only by a miracle, an unprecedented mass tragedy was averted. "It is impossible to seal hermetically" was repeated to the citizen. Measures were taken after the act.

Because the citizen does not know when, where, and how the next failure will occur, doubts continue to gnaw at his heart and reduce his confidence in the IDF. If this is not enough, he reads and hears that senior Army commanders are not reporting the truth, not testifying truthfully, blaming each other for terrible acts and omissions, attempting to evade responsibility by blaming others, and making their advancement their main priority. A colonel places serious blame on the commanding officer of a command. A dozen colonels issue a joint letter, which reaches the media, in which they accuse the first colonel of wishing to settle accounts by means of lies. The citizen reads that the accusing colonel is a positive personality. The letter undermines that colonel's statements and image. The citizen is bewildered and confused. Who is telling the truth? Are they all perhaps lying, are they all corrupt. If so, how can he put his trust in them? They are his commanders, the commanders of his children. Can they be relied on? The conclusion: "The IDF is currently corrupt like all of Israeli society."

Colonel Yehuda Me'ir is also testifying in his trial, with great emotion, of evasion of responsibility in the senior officers' cadre. The citizen's dismay increases.

Doubt and dismay will not be turned back by statements and promises of a better future. This no longer works. At the end of the trials of Col Me'ir and Giv'ati Bet [of the Giv'ati Brigade], the chief of general staff is obliged to derive a conclusion from the findings and resign. If he does not do so on his own initiative, the government

must terminate his tenure. The IDF needs a commander who will restore trust in it. I do not know of such a commander, nor whether he will be found easily. However, the citizen deserves to know that the IDF has someone in charge. At present, he does not feel that this is the case.

### Harsh Policy Not Expected From Arens in Territories

90AE0198F Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew  
3 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by Pinhas 'Inbari]

[Text] The real foreign ministers of Israel are usually the defense ministers—those who have governed the territories and the Palestinian problem on behalf of Israel by dint of their purview. For this reason, it is no less important to follow developments related to the new Defense Minister, Moshe Arens, than the declarations made by the new Foreign Minister, David Levi.

Arens' 100-day grace period is indeed not over, and it is perhaps a bit premature to judge him, but it seems that the Likud minister will be more congenial and less harsh toward the Palestinians in the territories than his predecessor, Yitzhaq Rabin, which does nothing to glorify the Labor Party. In honor of the [Muslim] Feast of Immolation, Arens released 500 security detainees from Ketzi'ot [Prison Camp]. This was not merely a holiday gesture, but a clear signal of future intentions.

Minister Arens has no intention of compromising with the Palestinians in the territories. But he is seeking to obtain their trust. Why? First, Israel's new government is in a defensive position, because it is being blamed for disrupting the political process, and for having malicious intentions toward the Palestinians in the territories, inasmuch as various parties favoring a transfer [of the Palestinian population] are honored members of the ruling coalition. This government is not interested in progress in the political process based on Baker's plan or any other plan that requires more than lip service. It knows that its positions expose it to pressures. An improvement in treatment of the Palestinians is a kind of protective shield against outside pressures.

Rabin, it will be recalled, explained that a political plan was important because it was needed for overcoming the intifadah. Believing that Israeli policy could not be based solely on a "hard hand" toward the Palestinians, he declared two pivots to his policy, namely, a hard hand and political opportunities. The Likud was able to ignore Rabin's approach and adopt a policy of "routing terror" without trying to initiate a political process. Arens, on the other hand, has decided, without initiating a political process, to improve treatment of the population and attempt to create a more congenial atmosphere to blunt the sting of the absence of political horizons.

Sometimes, it seemed that Rabin laid his too hand heavily on the Palestinians to force them to accept his

plan. During his tenure, he also toyed with the hope that the intifadah's spontaneous leadership would be more amenable to negotiations with Israel, because of that leadership's disagreements with the PLO abroad. None of these calculations apply now, because, without a political process, there is no "cover" for the hard hand and nothing with which to pressure the intifadah leadership.

Arens is not new to the Defense Ministry. In his previous tenure as defense minister six years ago, he entered the ministry following another minister with a "strong hand," a member of his party, Ari'el Sharon. Arens' contribution then was also to create a more relaxed atmosphere. He released many administrative detainees, and it seems that the number of such detainees declined to the minimum necessary during Arens' tenure and that of Weitzman. Before the intifadah, Arens cooperated with the United States regarding the "quality of life" in the territories much more than Rabin, and today, although it is somewhat difficult to believe, he has given his approval to a large delegation from the territories to go Amman to meet with Yasir 'Arafat.

Special meaning has apparently become attached to "quality of life" in Arens' time, inasmuch as this is precisely the term that expresses a cover for the absence of a political progress in improving relations with the Palestinians, i.e., the placement of emphasis on economic or social improvement, not on a political breakthrough.

The crowning achievement of Arens' "Palestinian" policy was a meeting with Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj in the Bethlehem municipal building. This was much more than a mere meeting of a defense minister with the mayor of a municipality subject to his jurisdiction. It signalled the start of a withdrawal from Sharon's "grand strategy," which was essentially to "destroy the PLO" in Beirut and to install the village associations in its place. The Arens-Frayj meeting also signalled the resumption of a link between official Israel and the "central current" of Palestinian public affairs in the territories, after a prolonged break, as pressure of the old leadership to except authority of Mustafa Dawdin and his friends.

Accordingly, the discussion regarding the budget of the municipality of Bethlehem took its deserved place, not because the mayor was the minister's interlocutor, but because it is necessary to expect that all of the topics of "quality of life" would acquire a growing place among the minister's concerns. It is already possible to see a greater effort by defense spokesmen to divert attention to matters of "quality of life," such as aid to hospitals, advanced study courses for state workers, and so on.

An improvement in the treatment of the residents of the territories would be the result of another basic outlook of Minister Arens. Because he rejects the PLO abroad, and, as stated, he is not among those who believe that it is possible to forgo every political effort and devote all of his time to "routing the intifadah," he will attempt to

highlight the legitimacy of the local leadership. Because he cannot go back to the village associations, or turn to clear symbols of the PLO, such as Faysal al-Husayni, and because of internal Likud pressures, his only source of contacts is the moderate leadership typified by Frayj. In order to facilitate contacts with Frayj and his friends, Arens is obliged to defrost the atmosphere around him, inasmuch as Frayj's situation might become insufferable if news about suppression measures is published alongside news about meetings between Arens and Frayj. Thus, Arens' release of hundreds of detainees from Ketzi'ot after his meeting with Frayj is intended to encourage other personalities to meet with Arens without great fear.

"Quality of life" and meetings with the moderate leadership are primarily a substitute for a political process, and they are intended to protect the new government from international pressures and a new development that is, in effect, placing the territories under international protection. However, in these contacts, Minister Arens will also seek a "purpose," not just a protective wall from pressures, or a cover for the absence of a political process. The Karmon Report, which was prepared for the American administration to prove that the PLO has not renounced terror, quotes public threats made by 'Arafat against Ilyas Frayj, when Frayj suggested in January of last year the declaration of a "cease-fire in the intifadah." This reference to Frayj marks Frayj as a figure who took steps to initiate a temporary cessation of the intifadah, but encountered an obstacle in the PLO abroad. Accordingly, Arens would want to see to what extent it is possible to again attempt an initiative that would bring forth salvation from within the leadership in the territories. This approach is similar to Rabin's approach. However, Rabin sought the correct address, i.e., that of 'Adnan Damiri and his friends, while Arens is trying to find the coin under a lantern and not where it is necessary to search for it.

Frayj is thus perceived as a leader from the territories who is willing to confront 'Arafat to bring a relaxation to the territories. This is the reason why Arens defined what he heard from Frayj as the "authorized position" of the territories, and was happy to hear that the residents of the territories supported the peace initiative of the state of Israel. This is, of course, a naive position. Ilyas Frayj is far from moving against 'Arafat. On the contrary, when he was proposed as a candidate to be a member of the Palestinian delegation for talks in Cairo, he hastened to Tunis to receive the PLO's blessing.

Arens will seek—also without any chances of success—a solution that would allow elections to be held in the territories. When he was still foreign minister, he was surprised to hear that two successful municipal election campaigns had already taken place. He found it difficult to understand why Israel had stopped the habit of elections, which had already begun to strike roots. As far as is known, in his meeting with Baker, on the eve of the crystallization of the Shamir-Rabin plan, Arens tried to propose the renewal of municipal elections, but it was

already too late. That being the case under those circumstances, it is all the more so now. Nevertheless, the need to promote a democratic atmosphere in the territories could lead the new defense minister to encourage democratic processes, the opposite of what his predecessor determined.

It should be noted that the decision to re-open universities on the West Bank is also intended primarily as a gesture toward circles perceived as moderate by the defense system, not the universities of the PLO. Thus, for example, this process has begun with the institutions of higher learning of Dr. Yasir 'Ubayd, who has for many years been considered a senior representative of Jordan (although his status changed after Jordan's announcement of its separation from the West Bank, and he should now be included among the PLO's moderate supporters). Universities considered strongholds of the PLO factions, such as Bir Zayt University, will apparently remain closed for an additional amount of time.

In any case, given the need to make matters easier for leaders such as Ilyas Frayj, Arens will be compelled to begin a series of gestures toward the Palestinians in the territories. According to the first signs, the Palestinians in the territories will encourage him to continue on his course.

This is clearly indicated by the relative quiet with which the Arens-Frayj meeting was received. Wall slogans directed against the mayor did indeed appear, and the popular Front published denouncement notices in Damascus, but this was expected and taken into account. Beyond this, nothing more happened. The fliers of the unified command of the intifadah ignored the meeting, and the daily AL-FAJR published an interview with Frayj, which gave the Mayor of Bethlehem an opportunity to explain his step and enabled him to clarify that the meeting was apolitical, because "the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians and is authorized to hold discussions of a political nature." Frayj reported that the meeting left him—rightly—with the impression that Arens would change Rabin's policy, and that Arens would be much more congenial to the Palestinians than his predecessor.

The day before, the unified command had published an announcement forbidding meetings between figures in the territories and Arens, but it should be assumed that the debate over the meetings with Shamir will be reviewed. The moderate branch in FATAH [Palestine Liberation Movement] will give these personalities a green light, while the radical branch and leftist circles, such as the Popular Front, will object. Given that no there is no palpable danger of an "alternate leadership" growing out of meetings such as these, it should be assumed that differences over the meetings will not go beyond verbal sparring.

Among military circles, Arens is regarded as a defense minister who is not well-versed in the mysteries of the defense system, because he did rise within it like Rabin



and Sharon. However, this is a great advantage in everything related to the territories.

Arens could meet with the disfavor of Jewish settlers, if the decision to establish a civil guard "within the borders of the settlements" turns into a "thunder-rod" when the settlers discern Arens' true intentions. However, this would not be anything new. In his previous position, abuses were heaped on him; on one of his stormy visits to Hebron, his official car was pummeled.

We will not get to see the great drama of a sweeping political process from this government. However, the Palestinians in the territories will get a more congenial defense minister than Rabin. This is not much, but it could be much worse.

### Science Reportedly Suffering From Lack of Funds

90AE0198E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew

3 Jul 90 p 1B

[Article by Eliyahu Salpeter]

[Text] The European Community's freeze in research relations with Israel could have become increasingly significant amid the grinding of Israeli science between the economic crisis and the rightist-Haredi [ultra-orthodox] government. The price of adding "security resources" for the settlements [to the budget] could very well cover the deficit in the universities' budgets. The sums that were added to the exclusive coalition funds would be sufficient to create a revolution in the financing of research and science in Israel. The reservations of the Western world regarding the government's policies are being signalled by a hesitation to share with Israel in technological developments that could have military implications.

In the past, Israel was in the front line of research in several important scientific fields. We have currently fallen into second, third, and fourth place. No country, except perhaps for the largest and richest, can today engage in all areas of modern science. However, there are two parameters that distinguish an advanced state from a weak state: On the one hand, a country must be a leader in several fields, because only if it is able to contribute, can it receive from others through information exchanges, research and teaching positions, or standing in scientific bodies and organizations. On the other hand, for a state that does not maintain a certain scientific level, the acquisition of the results of research is useless, because it is impossible to apply the results.

Several trends are coalescing in the situation of science in Israel: The training of high school graduates for academic studies is declining; among young college graduates, there is less willingness to make the personal, especially professional, concessions that are required of someone who decides to remain in Israel; and the use of modern laboratory equipment is increasingly vital for original research.

The main obstacle is a shortage of allocations, especially in the natural and biological sciences. There are academic institutions in Israel in which the focus is no longer on acquiring new laboratory equipment, but on maintaining existing equipment. New scientific books are not being purchased, subscriptions to scientific publications are being cancelled, and scientists are becoming cut off from events and new developments in their fields. Young researchers and their teachers spend part of their time working in institutions abroad, not only to improve their incomes, but also, and mainly, to obtain access to updated and comprehensive laboratories and libraries. The presence of a professor abroad for part of the year damages his role as an academic adviser for doctoral candidates, which is another reason why young researchers seek advance study abroad. The successful and the qualified among them find it difficult to resist the enticements offered to them so that they will stay in America, Europe, and recently, in Japan and Australia.

This damage to Israeli science is occurring at a time when the Arab states are beginning to narrow the gap, not only regarding their number of college graduates, but also the quality and level of their students. There is no need to elaborate on the security significance of this situation. However, all of this is also happening at a time when scientific research is more important than ever to make the transition to high-tech industries and a post-industrial information economy. Gradually, and perhaps not so slowly, Israel is falling behind. The lack of serious foreign investments in industrial development in the last decade is a cause and a result of the backwardness of practical research, which cannot be disconnected from theoretical research, in which Israeli industry has never been typically willing to invest.

The direct damage caused by the European Community's freeze in scientific relations with Israel is still limited. Most cooperation is still bi-national. However, the trend is serious and expanding. The states of Europe are moving increasingly toward scientific assistance in joint frameworks, and research is becoming more multinational. One should also not underestimate the effect of the Arab boycott. The bulk of applied research is performed in large companies that have become multinational and therefore more subject to pressures to refrain from becoming involved in joint activities with Israeli industry. It is difficult to know how much Israel is losing in investments and research opportunities due to the boycott, as long as Israel does not systematically monitor Arab economic warfare.

It is not only multilateral scientific relations and scientific relations in international frameworks that are being severed. Scientists also feel cut off from "under the table" relations that gave Israel access to research it could not have been a part of officially.

The science situation is a two-way street regarding immigration from the Soviet Union. Reaching us now are thousands of researchers, scientists, and engineers, some of whom are at a high international level. Much time and

money has been invested in their training. They bring with them a most precious asset, gifted minds. If Israel wishes to keep the best of them, it must give them not only housing and a livelihood, but also possibilities to engage in research and science. On the other hand, their presence can contribute greatly to Israel's scientific and technological progress.

Despite the dimensions of the problem and Israel's financial straits, it is possible to cope with the problem if three conditions are met:

Science must be given back its senior status regarding the allocation of resources. The Weitzman Institute should not have to compete for resources with some fictitious yeshiva, a bypass road [built to circumvent security risks in the territories], or a failing cooperative. The decision will be made according to the prices in the coalition votes market.

Priorities must be set for the research branches and fields that take into account both the predicted directions of scientific development and the chances for achieving excellence in a particular scientific field. This bet is made throughout the world, and it stands in inverse proportion to the means available for distribution. However, without it, a small state is unable to excel in any branch.

There must be an end to our gradual disassociation from the international scientific and research community, integration into which is increasingly becoming an existential, economic, and security question.

### **Business, Banking Activity With 1992 Europe Forecast**

#### **Cabinet Ministers Feud**

*90AE0221A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 p 7*

[Article by David Lifkin]

[Text] Facts are already being established for 1992 in Europe, and in Israel the cabinet ministers are still fighting over authority. Finance Minister Yitzhak Moda'i wants the subject to be centered in his ministry. In the previous government, Moda'i took care, in his capacity as minister of economics and planning, to learn thoroughly the subject of the European Community. He visited the offices of the Community's Commission in Brussels and became acquainted at first hand with several of the senior persons there, and learned their views. In the wake of the visit, he demanded that the subject of Europe 1992 be placed in his hands, already in the previous government.

Several of his colleagues in the present government are opposed: Minister of Industry and Commerce Moshe

Nissim, seeks senior status in the handling of this subject. Foreign Minister David Levy and Economics Minister David Magen also think that they are parties to the preparations for 1992.

Handling of the preparations of the economy for 1992 have been on the government's agenda for several months. A number of cabinet ministers submitted proposals, but due to the interministry struggle over who will handle the project, the prime minister has refrained from bringing the subject up for discussion.

In the previous government, there was a sharp struggle between the then-Deputy Minister of Finance Dr. Yossi Beilin, and the previous Minister of Commerce and Industry Ari'el Sharon over who had the authority. Yossi Beilin had already made preparations to activate a large number of committees that would handle the various subjects. Sharon opposed this initiative, and argued that 1992 belonged to his ministry, for he was the first to have established an interministry committee for the subject. The Foreign Ministry also made it clear at that time that it would oppose the handling of the subject in the Treasury.

From the viewpoint of the struggles over authority, nothing has changed in the present government. Meanwhile, time is passing, facts are being established in the field in Europe, and there is no supreme government body in Israel that is responsible for progress towards the united Europe of 1992.

#### **Ministry of Finance's Views**

*90AE0221B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 p 7*

[Article by Yossi Grinstein]

[Text] The year 1992 is already not so far off, and they are calm in the Ministry of Finance. Although they have established subcommittees, which are examining the various directions of taxation, regulations, and the capital market, this is only for the purpose of "tying up loose ends." Everything is ready.

This April, during his tenure as minister of economics, Yitzhak Moda'i submitted recommendations for Israel's preparations for 1992 to the transition government. The recommendations were written by his economic assistant Eytan Rob, who was sent for this purpose on a study tour in Europe. The principles of the document are acceptable today, as well, to the minister, who has changed ministries, and it may be assumed that he will act according to them.

Eytan Rob recommends, among other things:

- Examination of the signing of free trade agreements with the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] bloc of countries or with the main countries in trade with Israel, such as Switzerland and Sweden.
- Signing of bilateral trade agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe, and focusing in the first stage

on Hungary and Poland, as a possibility of entering the Common Market through the back door.

- Examination of the possibility of tightening the economic ties with West Germany, in view of its central importance in the processes that are going on in Western Europe.

Eytan Rob says that the economic preparations for 1992 are an empty slogan. "Everything was already wrapped up two years ago. Today, adjustments must be made in regulations, mergers, banks, and liberalization of the money markets."

### Joint Committee on Imports

90AE0221C Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 p 7

[Article by David Lifkin]

[Text] A new report on the state of preparation of Israeli industry for Europe 1992 is being prepared in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Its authors will present the progress that has been made towards 1992, on the one hand, and also the problems that will arise in the preparatory period, on the other hand.

The Ministry of Industry and Commerce was the first of the ministries to respond to the findings that were published in 'ASAKIM on 10 May 1988, where there was a warning of a lack of awareness in Israel regarding what to expect in 1992. The former Minister of Industry and Commerce, Ari'el Sharon, appointed an interministry committee, headed by the deputy director of the Foreign Trade Division at the time, Zohar Peri, in order to grapple with the preparation of the economy for the economic union in Europe.

[Boxed item]

### The Customs Duties Are Finished, Abolished

The Assistant Director of Customs, Shlomo Barkan, says that the preparations of the customs for 1992 are very simple. Why? Because there are no more customs duties.

At the beginning of 1989, all duties were abolished on imports from the countries of the Common Market, excluding imports of agricultural products, which are not part of the trade agreements.

The third increment (which creates discrimination in the taxation of imports as compared with domestic production) is being reduced uniformly and gradually, and will be abolished completely at the end of 1992. The same holds for the TAMA (increment of the basis for duty) on imports, so that in 1995 the discrimination against imports in comparison with domestic production will be abolished entirely.

For a lengthy period, this committee operated by itself, and its members tried on their own to crystallize proposals for action. Committees are now operating in

several other government ministries, including Finance, Agriculture, Communications, Law, and Transport, as well as the Bank of Israel.

The deputy director of the Foreign Trade Division in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Marcel Shta'on, notes that his ministry does not want to be the boss regarding the subject of the preparations, but only to promote the subject. "At this stage, we want to take the work that has been done out of the ministry framework and put them into a more inclusive framework, in order to make it possible to grapple with the conclusions," he explains.

Due to the need to get organized for 1992, a joint committee of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce is operating on the subject of the controlled exposure of the economy to imports, and the two ministries are discussing the crystallization of a joint policy on the vital subject. Clearly, Shta'on emphasizes, the economy must become more efficient and reach equilibria, and cheaper credit is essential, so as to allow competition in external markets.

There has not yet been progress on the important subject of government purchases. In the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, it is hoped that the opening of the subject of the purchases to Israeli factories will be resolved within the framework of an arrangement that will be obtained in GATT discussions.

It is a different matter as regards regulations. The European Community is not willing to proceed. While the management of the Market has issued instructions, in the European Market itself they still do not know how to implement them. Clearly, many problems will arise. The Ministry of Agriculture, for example, will have to change instructions and activities among the Israeli farmers due to ecological problems in Europe.

As for industry getting organized, notes Shta'on, the large companies are at an advanced stage, especially Israel Chemicals, Teva, Elscint, and Clal. But small- and medium-sized firms must grapple with the problem of getting organized, and they must think about the strategy that they will use in 1992, when they will want to hold on to their markets in Europe.

[Boxed item]

The year 1992 means, that the residents of the countries of the Market will be able to retire in any one of the member states, not necessarily in their own state, and still be able to receive the national insurance payments to which they are entitled.

### Interest in EFTA

90AE0221D Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 p 8

[Article by David Lifkin]

[Text] It is expected in the Foreign Ministry that the dialogue with the European Community will resume in September, and that the sanctions on scientific contacts

with Israel will be dropped. Along with that, the Foreign Ministry is negotiating with the smaller European economic bloc, EFTA. The goal is to arrive at an agreement with that entity on the creation of a free trade area along the lines of the agreement with the European Community. The goal is for the new agreement to take into account the conversion of the Community into a single European market, that will in time encompass also the EFTA and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dr. Ya'akov Cohen, deputy director-general for Economic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, explains that the Commission of the European Community is conducting negotiations with the countries of the EFTA aimed at creating a European economic space. This means that the EFTA countries will move up a grade. Therefore, the creation of the European economic space also will necessitate the deepening of Israel's economic ties with those countries. It is Israel's intention to demand the equalization of conditions in the EFTA markets from which Turkey—and, in time, also the countries of Eastern Europe—will benefit.

In recent years, there has been an erosion of our agreement with the Community following the inclusion of Spain and Portugal, the granting of advantages to the EFTA countries, and the granting of agricultural preferences to the countries of Eastern Europe, the Foreign Ministry official noted. On the other hand, the Commission has discussed the possibility of improving the agreements with the countries of the Mediterranean basin.

In his opinion, we cannot expect much from an improvement of the agreement on the basis of the new Mediterranean policy, except, perhaps, regarding several agricultural products. Therefore, we should fight for the subjects that are vital for us, such as industrial cooperation, joint R&D, participation in projects of European research foundations, etc.

In the situation that has been created in Europe, it is worth taking advantage of the positive atmosphere in relations with Eastern Europe, in order to act soon for the signing of broadened trade agreements with those countries.

In his opinion, the signing of agreements between Israel and several European countries, through the EFTA, and with Eastern European countries, will assist in integration over time in the future European economic space.

#### Views Of Attaches In Israel

90AE0221E Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 pp 8, 10

[Article by Esther Goldbershtatt]

[Text] A positive trend was evident during the first months of 1990 in Israel's balance of trade with the countries of Europe. The figures show growth in exports to Germany and France.

The economic attaches of Germany and France in Israel say that the economic union of Europe in 1992 will not necessarily cut short this trend. However, the removal of the customs barriers between European countries means, on the one hand, that the European countries will be encouraged to trade among themselves, at the expense of commercial cooperation with countries outside of Europe, but, on the other hand, this also opens up a gigantic market of 320 million consumers.

The German Embassy in Israel is swamped with queries by Israeli exporters about the expected change, if at all, in Israeli-German trade relations after 1992. The economic attache in the embassy, Wolfgang Rohrer, answers the questions and sends written material to those who are interested. Generally, he tries to ease the worries that gnaw at the Israeli business community.

As to what will be after 1992, he replies: no essential change is expected.

The economic unification of Europe removes political, economic, and legal barriers between the countries of the Common Market, and is not intended to build walls between Europe and the world. Each separate state will continue with its relations with the other countries around the world, says the attache.

Yet it seems that the Israeli exporters's concern is not without reason. The openness within Europe is liable to tempt states to buy more from each other, and then, of course, the situation is possible where intra-European commercial cooperation comes at the expense of the purchase of goods from Israel.

In 1989, Israeli exports to Germany came to 1.36 billion marks, and imports from there totalled 2.38 billion marks.

The figures for January-February 1990 show a positive trend in Israel's trade balance with Germany: Israeli exports to Germany rose 38 percent, while imports from there did not change.

This is a continuing trend. From 1988 to 1989, imports from Germany to Israel went up two percent, but Israeli exports to Germany rose eight percent.

Israel is worried unjustifiably by 1992, says Wolfgang Rohrer. There are liable to be marginal influences to Israel's detriment with the removal of the economic barriers between the countries of Europe, but he also points to a big opportunity: a market of 320 million consumers is opened. A market larger than the U.S., and one much closer than it to Israel. This is an opportunity to get a foot in the door in one European country, and to use that as a springboard to market in all the countries of Europe.

Edward Morad, second in command in the commercial department of the British Embassy in Israel, is currently involved in tying up loose ends in preparation for the arrival in September of an English trade mission, with representatives from 15 companies. This is an immediate goal, in view of the growing interest in Israel in purchasing prefabricated houses due to the housing crisis in Israel.

His immediate agenda does not include 1992, mainly because he is dealing only with exports from there to Israel. He refers any subject relating to exports from Israel to the Israel Export Institute.

The picture of trade relations between England and Israel in 1989 shows imports to Israel of 500 million, of which more than 20 percent are rough diamonds that are imported from the Syndicate in England, as against exports to England of 480 million.

Exports of agricultural produce account for 130 million, textile exports account for approximately 40 million, apparel exports come to 75 million, and exports of electronic equipment total 30 million.

#### [Boxed item]

The year 1992 means that an American or Japanese businessman can fly to Europe, pass through only one customs post, and afterwards travel between the member countries of the Common Market without seeing any more customs officials.

Imports from England, excluding diamonds, were 50 million of electronic equipment, medicines for 16 million, chemicals for approximately 50 million, and cosmetics for 10 million.

In the opinion of Edward Morad, the requirements of the Israeli market will determine whether imports from England increase, without any connection to 1992. While, in his opinion, there will be a change in exports to there after the economic unification of Europe, this is not his responsibility but rather the affair of the Israel Export Institute.

Bruno Rossilier, the French economic attache, says that Israel actually must pray that the French economy will continue to grow by four percent annually, because it will then buy more from Israel, with or without 1992.

In 1989, Israel's exports to France came to \$442 million, and its imports from there came to \$537 million. During the months of January-April 1990, Israel's exports to France came to \$203 million, while its imports from there totalled \$191 million.

"The economic situation in France is good, and, consequently, Israeli exports to France are developing."

France is, in principle, open to imports, without any connection to the policy of the Common Market.

#### Israeli Banks in Europe

90AE0221F Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 p 10

[Article by David Lifkin]

[Text] Only the two largest banking groups, Bank Le'umi and Bank Hapo'alim, attach importance to a presence on the European continent after 1992. They drew up the

first plans on the mode of getting organized in 1989, but the plans are being reviewed due to the dramatic events in Eastern Europe.

The chairman of the board of directors of Bank Le'umi, Moshe Sanbar, says that two characteristics of the organization of the banks in Europe should not be ignored. These banks are trying to develop a partnership with financial institutions that are active in the places where the banks do not have branches, and, in this manner, to ensure for themselves coverage of the European continent. Such a partnership saves the large investment that is required to establish branches throughout Europe.

The second characteristic is the process of mergers that banks in Europe are undergoing, in order to gain strength in the face of the invasion of the big American and Japanese banks, who are for this purpose establishing subsidiaries or purchasing banks in Europe.

On the background of these developments, it was concluded in Bank Le'umi that a presence was necessary in a large number of countries. But they do not intend to allocate financial resources to establish a chain of branches. It has already been decided to establish a holding company, which will control the activity in Europe, and to bring to it as a partner a foreign bank that operates in countries where BLL does not have branches, such as Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, and Luxembourg. The addition of such a partner will allow BLL to command a European banking chain with branches in the important countries of the European Community.

BLL's top executives are devoting efforts to finding a suitable partner who will meet their requirements. BLL will bring into the partnership as a "dowry" its branches in Britain, France, and Switzerland. A suitable candidate has not yet been found for establishing the planned holding company.

In Bank Hapo'alim, they examined the preparations for the economic unification of Europe with several teams from the international staff and the legal advisors. It was decided to act to establish a European subsidiary, that will be registered in Luxembourg and which will run the bank's branches on the continent.

Luxembourg was chosen for tax considerations, as the taxation there on banks is the lowest in Europe.

Bank Hapo'alim intends to make flotations through a subsidiary, to establish mutual funds for investments in Europe, and the like. The bank already has a branch in Luxembourg, as well as one in Switzerland.

Bank Hapo'alim does not now have plans to open additional branches in Europe, aside from an office in Frankfurt.

[Boxed item]

The year 1992 means that a refrigerator, a watch, or an automobile has a warranty certificate that is honored equally in all of the countries, no matter what was the place of purchase.

**Manufacturers Are Concerned**

90AE0221G Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Business Supplement)  
in Hebrew 31 Jul 90 p 10

[Article by Uri Ginossar]

[Text] In the Manufacturers Association they think that the situation is troubling. It took a long time to introduce consciousness into the plants in preparation for what is expected in 1992, but now everyone understands and many are beginning to put their houses in order. But the problem remains and it is quite significant.

Moshe Nahum, the director of the Foreign Trade and International Liaisons Department of the Manufacturers Association, states vehemently: There is no guiding hand and there is no clear foreign trade policy. Israeli embassies are scattered throughout Europe, and there is no coordination between them. Even the ambassador in Brussels has no authority or power to create such coordination. The lack of an Israeli lobby in the European Parliament also is striking. "Look," says Nahum, "Yigal Allon of blessed memory, when he served as foreign minister, he was personally involved in the agreement between Israel and the Common Market. Today, the negotiations are being conducted by low-level officials."

He warns that Israel has not yet positioned itself between the three world centers (Europe, the United States, and the Asian countries). Israel has not yet decided which bloc to join.

Israel is "selling itself" as a developed country, but it wants grants like a developing country, and that does not have a chance. The United States, he says, will soon get along with the Europeans. The question is how do we, the little ones, cope.

"The State of Israel cannot act in place of the isolated factory, it can only enlighten it. The factory must perform an analysis of its relative situation in the changing environment, take care to change contracts, packaging, marketing setups, and the like. The problem is that economic policy also means competitiveness, and the isolated manufacturer is not being given the tools to compete."

[Boxed item]

The year 1992 means that a Portuguese bank will be able to be a partner in a French-fashion firm.

Nahum points to the example of the monopolistic services that surround industry. "There are no American banks here that are opening branches, there is only one Zim, one Ports Authority, and for the import of heavy

industrial equipment there is generally only one large importer in each field. They want to expose industry, but they do not expose the services that it uses."

The manufacturers are concerned about the trends of exports. They are stuttering, they say. In the last five years, there was a boom in world trade, domestic demands in Israel were restrained, and Israeli exports still did not make a breakthrough.

From the monitoring by the Association's foreign trade department, it appears that the big concerns in the economy took matters seriously. "We got into the subject late," says Nahum, "after the media showed responsibility and warned that there were no preparations, but in the field they are now working—Israel Aircraft Industries, Intel, Teva, even Tadiran." The consciousness exists, the policy a little less.

**Export Institute: The Firms Are Very Fearful**

The Industrial Products Branch in the Export Institute offers aid to firms in preparation for the unification of Europe by creating a contact between them and marketing advisers on the continent. "The firms are very fearful," says Rafi Glick, the director of the branch. "They have a deficiency in marketing strategy. They are not doing anything there, even unrelated to 1992."

The plan has already been operated successfully in the United States. Seventeen Israeli manufacturers in the fields of medical equipment and biotechnology were assisted by American marketing experts through the agency of the Institute. Of these, five firms are now establishing a marketing infrastructure in the United States—the Meditrak company (rehabilitation equipment for the handicapped), Log (ampules and plastic packages), Shorashim (electronic equipment for medical diagnosis), Elkam (plastic equipment for laboratories), Toten'or (sterile equipment).

[Boxed item]

Similar action is being carried out in the software branch. Thirty software firms have created a link with American marketing entities, and three of them are now maintaining marketing networks with the assistance of the advisers—T.I.S. (imaging systems), Mashov (applications generator), and R.T.S. (various projects).

**Attacks on Settlements Forecast**

90AE0198D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
4 Jul 90 p 1B

[Article by Re'uven Pedahtzur]

[Text] "If the political freeze continues and there is no initiative that would integrate the residents of the territories into a political process, it is very likely that extremist elements among the Palestinians would shift to direct attacks against settlements in the West Bank." This is the appraisal of senior security elements who closely follow what is happening in the territories.

In their estimation, the situation that has now developed does not offer any chance for real progress and the breaking of the freeze. Therefore, they expect that there will be another escalation in the violence in the territories, the first signs of which can already be seen. These elements believe that the absence of a chance for progress is inherent in the vast, wide open differences that separate the positions of the security and political establishment in Israel from those of the leadership in the territories. The leadership rejects any dialogue that is based on a plan that leads to autonomy, while willingness in Israel to begin a dialogue, even among the most moderate, is entirely based on an prolonged, intermediate phase of autonomy.

Autonomy has become, as far as leaders in the territories of all levels and ranks are concerned, a dirty word, which they are not willing to discuss at all. For them, autonomy is charged with a very negative connotation that is based on the experience that followed the Camp David accords. They view the proposals made by Israeli politicians regarding willingness to establish autonomy in the territories as a deception aimed at circumventing the Palestinian problem, as Menahem Begin also attempted to do. The only political solution that Palestinians in the territories are willing to discuss is the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity.

The holding of elections in the territories is also dependent on an explicit promise that the PLO will require, according to which elections would be only a first step in a long-range plan that would end in the establishment of an independent Palestinian political entity. Without such a promise, the PLO would not consent to holding elections, and without such consent, there is no chance of holding elections.

Concurrent with, and as a result of, the freeze in the political process, the power of the religious leadership in the West Bank is becoming stronger, and it is accumulating increasing political strength. According to the estimation of senior elements, about a quarter of the population of the West Bank currently supports the Islamic leadership, while the rest supports the nationalist leadership.

A deterioration in the economic situation is also playing into the hands of the Islamic leaders, because the religious organizations engage in extensive social activity and maintain a network of institutions that provide assistance to the population in diverse social areas.

Paradoxically, Jordan supports the Islamic leadership in the territories, despite King Husayn's fear of the strengthening of religious elements in his kingdom, mainly by transferring funds to the Muslim religious endowments institutions.

## AFGHANISTAN

### 'Uneasy Balance' of Regime, Mujahidin Strength Analyzed

90AS0233A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Jul 90 pp 8, 9

[Article by Jochen Hippler: "'The Party of the Fatherland' Now Reigns in Afghanistan"—First paragraph is FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE introduction]

[Text] Once again there will be a meeting between the American and the Soviet foreign ministers—this time in Paris—to talk about ways to bring the civil war in Afghanistan to an end. But hardly anyone in Europe is still interested in what has become of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Yet, millions of Afghan refugees are still living in Pakistan and Iran. Why don't they go back home? An answer to this can be found in the following report which describes the political and military situation in Kabul and its surrounding area, with a subsequent discussion of the situation confronting the Afghan troops in exile in Peshawar, Pakistan. The author has recently visited both places.

Life in Kabul is still anything but normal, and it is also anything but simple or agreeable. It is, however, obvious that the situation today is more relaxed than it was one or two years ago. Public subsistence is still tight, but markedly improved. Only one year ago there were still severe shortages of flour, bread, and gasoline. This is hardly the case any more. While last August there was hardly any gasoline available even for government staff cars and it traded on the black market for 400 afghani per liter, there is plenty of it available in the summer of 1990, and cheap at that: one liter costs 80 afghani. It is a similar story for bread: while certain kinds sold for 150 afghani a year ago, today it costs 35 afghani. The bakers explain this with the fact that today flour is available cheap and in great quantities. Obviously the government made good on its forecasts made by Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil last summer: because of the catastrophic events during the winter of 1988/89, supplying the population of Kabul and other cities would take priority over the needs of the frontlines. This, he had said, was the only way in which potential unrest in the cities could be prevented.

The relative improvement in the availability of everyday necessities still cannot conceal the fact that life in Kabul remains difficult for the inhabitants. One of the main problems is inflation. While goods are available, many people are unable to purchase them in adequate quantities because of the rising prices. One kg of tomatoes for instance costs 210 afghani in the bazaar today, one kg of beans 250 afghani. But a nurse earns only 2300 to 4000 afghani per month, depending on her qualifications and age. During the past year the rate of inflation is said to have been between 60 and 90 percent. The drop in currency value reflects this development: while in

November 1988, one dollar could be had for 210 afghani, the exchange rate was 350 in August 1989 and 580 in June 1990.

The rate of inflation impacts most severely upon those segments of the population which have fixed incomes or salaries, i.e., most civil servants or officials. The loyalty of just those components of the population (including the military) is indispensable to the government. It tries therefore to cushion the impact of inflation. Three means are employed to accomplish this: first, letting employees work two jobs, perhaps in two different agencies (from the morning until afternoon in one job, then in another) with two salaries; second, the widespread tendency for civil servants, among others, to conduct minor occasional private business deals on the side (e.g., taking textiles from Kabul along on official trips to the provinces and selling them there at a profit); and third, all civil servants are given merchandise coupons as part of their salaries, which entitle them to obtain primarily food items free or at token prices. Thus at present every employee or official gets a free monthly allocation of 49 kg of flour. Whoever does not need this ration, sells it at a good profit on the black market. (Employees of private firms frequently get similar treatment; some of them receive monetary supplements in place of merchandise coupons.)

The fact that the situation is still unsatisfactory can be seen from the fact that almost 70 percent of the children admitted to Kabul hospitals suffer from malnutrition or deficiency diseases—much more than those in Afghan refugee camps around Peshawar, who are being cared for by dozens of humanitarian assistance organizations, while the partly starving civil population of Kabul (two-thirds of which also consists of refugees) is almost left to its own devices.

The Mujahidin missile bombardment of the capital has gotten worse. While one year ago an average of 10 to 15 missiles a day were launched against the city, the number was almost twice that during the first half of 1990. In addition, the attacks have become more consistent: while, in the past, days with no missile launches were followed by heavy attacks (about 169 missiles on one day last August), during the last few months there have been 10 to 30 missile hits every day. This increase was further supplemented by the use of missiles with cluster warheads. These missiles do not carry a single warhead to the target, but 96 smaller detonation charges, which are spread over an area of varying size prior to hitting the ground. These cluster bombs are particularly devastating to the civilian population, and the missile attacks against Kabul result almost exclusively in civilian casualties. Military facilities or soldiers are hit infrequently, and then only accidentally.

The missile attacks have steadily eroded sympathy for the Mujahidin in Kabul, though in varying degrees: Hikmatyar and Sayyaf are not only unloved, but actually hated, while Gailani and Mojadeddi enjoy a certain



amount of respect because they have distanced themselves from the attacks and appear willing to consider a peaceful solution. President Najibullah's credibility has increased. At times he is even seen as the man who ejected the Soviets from the country. Many people accord greater respect to Najibullah because his political and military survival has shown him to be "strong." It is said that a strong leader is particularly important for a fragmented country such as Afghanistan. By now his eagerness for peace and reconciliation is being praised by people who were quite skeptical only one year ago.

The missile attacks have diminished since 21 June. While only one day earlier more than 40 missiles had been launched against Kabul, that number decreased to from zero to 10 on the days after 21 June. On that day Afghan troops occupied strategic Mujahidin positions in the Paghman Valley, from where most of the missiles had previously been launched against the capital.

Paghman has been, and still is, of great political, military and symbolic significance for the war. Formerly an excursion and vacation spot just outside the city gates, the valley, the mountains to the north and west of it and the town of Paghman had been occupied by the Mujahidin almost since the beginning of the war. Here they could show their military presence near the capital. The Soviet troops had been unable to recapture Paghman on their own or with the help of the Afghan army. It was always considered "impregnable." The terrain is indeed difficult to occupy militarily: while approaching troops can be seen from far away and can be fired upon, the defenders have cover in the mountains or small adjacent valleys. Additional factors are caves used for military purposes and the broken terrain. Paghman was also a symbol for the Mujahidin presence in the immediate vicinity of Kabul; it was a symbol also for the Soviet and Afghan troops' inability to occupy a strategically important sector. For the Mujahidin themselves it was a symbol of their invincibility. Finally, Paghman became the principal launch site for the Mujahidin's missiles aimed at Kabul. More than half of these ground-to-ground missiles were launched here—during the last year, about 1300 out of the 2500 which hit Kabul. According to the government, this was the main motive for the operation.

The May offensive developed generally in favor of the government during a four-week period, though with numerous reverses and with few territorial gains. Nevertheless, by mid-June the army succeeded, after heavy fighting, to advance into the valley to the city of Paghman, against a force of 2500 Mujahidin and to occupy it. The city itself is of small importance; after eight years of heavy fighting it consists of nothing but ruins. Walls have been destroyed, trees torn up, metal roofs look like sieves from bullet impacts. However, by the end of June, the first small-scale clean-up operations were in evidence.

On 21 June the government army and the militia succeeded, after heavy fighting, in advancing further. While

the additional gain in territory amounted to hardly more than one or two km, the strategic importance of this breakthrough was, nevertheless, considerable. An important base, possibly the Mujahidin's regional headquarters, was stormed. The command center, observation and reconnaissance posts, a dispensary, a jail and several caves containing large quantities of missiles and large-caliber ammunition fell into the army's hands. Beyond that, it occupied one of the most important sites from which the Mujahidin had launched their missiles against Kabul. The launch ramps could still be seen in five or six different places.

What was remarkable about the occupation of this "impregnable" base was not only the action itself, but the power of the breakthrough of the attack: the Mujahidin had to evacuate their positions in a rout and with great losses. They were not only forced to abandon their missile depots to the enemy; there were signs of panic-like withdrawal everywhere. Flags had been abandoned; the dead were neither buried nor carried away, which is most unusual for Afghanistan. To abandon dead casualties without burial—Islamic warriors do such a thing only in the direst of emergencies. Four days after the battle, the army had interred some of the dead in shallow graves; others remained lying in the burning sun. The former base was enveloped by the smell of decay.

During the inspection of the battlefield by the government troops, lasting barely two hours, they were not at all fired upon by the retreating Mujahidin, while the army itself fired missiles and artillery against actual or suspected enemy and prepared to occupy another small mountain to the north. It is remarkable that Afghan officers, such as Colonel Abdel Qadir, are in radio contact with the Mujahidin. The colonel reported on political discussions with the adversary via radio, and also the fact that he had a good friend on the other side. By the end of June the army did not quite control the entire valley, but rather slightly more than one-third. Prior to making further advances, the objective was to assess the remaining strength of the enemy. The target of future operations is the complete occupation of the valley, all the way to the main ridge of the northern and western mountain ranges.

The government's self-confidence, which it had gained during the early part of last year's summer continues to grow. There is such a feeling of security that for the first time in 26 years, the second party congress of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took place. Unofficially there are admissions that the decades-long postponement of the party congress had a lot to do with the internal condition of the party: internal controversy was so great that no one dared to have a party congress. All that seems to have changed, particularly since the quick suppression of the coup attempt last March. The number of coup attempts and waves of arrests which this party has survived is amazing, as is the fact that it feels stronger now than it did prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

This has nothing to do with the fact that the party or the various branches of the armed forces are now "in agreement" as this has been stated officially for many years. There is no truth to that. On the other hand, there is no likelihood for the foreseeable future that the party or the armed forces would split up along the traditional fault line of "Khalqis" versus "Parchamis." This possibility has diminished after last March's abortive coup attempt. It was not a matter of a coup by the Khalqis, but solely one of an overthrow attempt by individual, Khalqi-related persons from the central committee and the politburo, who used their connections with ambitious Defense Minister Tanai. The suppression of the coup attempt within 24 hours was possible only because the interior ministry's Sarandoi troops and the mostly Khalqi-related army officers declined to participate and had even taken measures against the insurgents (though they had first let several hours elapse).

Contrary to common propaganda emanating from the government and the Mujahidin, the coup was not a joint operation between Tanai/Khalqis and Hikmatyar's party. It is true that all parties find it useful to label the coup in this manner—Hikmatyar can make himself look important; the other Mujahidin parties have an argument emphasizing Hikmatyar's dubious character; and Najibullah could motivate even Tanai-sympathizer officers to fight the coup. However, this is far removed from reality, as could be gathered from talks with independent observers, diplomats, and even, indirectly, through party members.

Thus even if today the different camps in the People's Democratic Party and the armed forces continue to exist—apart from the main wings, there are the once again influential followers of Najibullah's predecessor, Babrak Kamal—there are some indications of a more permanent process of differentiation and of President Najibullah's more secure position. In any case, ethnic, personal and especially tribal familial ties, loyalties and conflicts play a much larger role in the party and the armed forces than do political conflicts.

An alleged 170,000 party members (150,000 would be a more realistic number) sent 868 delegates to Kabul in late June who had been selected in a two-tier election process. One delegate represented every 200 members. What is remarkable about the congress is not only the fact that it was held after 26 years, but also its objective. It was to found a new party, a party with a new name and a new program. The "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" turned into the "Party of the Fatherland," the "Watan Party." Its program was basically oriented along conservative-democratic and Islamic principles. This change would constitute the second step in a transformation of the political scene, after the state apparatus and the government had already been similarly remodeled. In May a "Loyah Jirgah" issued a new constitution in Kabul, which deleted the last elements smacking of socialism from the 1987 constitution.

### Reform—An Empty Shell

The new constitution declares Afghanistan to be an Islamic State, in which no law must contradict "the principles of the holy religion of Islam" (Articles 1 and 2). Since 1 June, Afghanistan has had a government in which the former People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is in the minority, at least formally and by the numbers. Until now, however, the government reform and other reforms have not led to any change in the actual power structure in Kabul. PDPA ministers, though a minority, continue to occupy the decisively politically powerful departments. The military, paramilitary, police and intelligence agencies continue under PDPA control.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss the changes as mere propaganda. What exists so far is an empty shell, an unimplemented framework of a parliamentary-pluralist system. So long as the PDPA is the only meaningful actor in that framework, there can be no pluralism in the sense of parliamentary democracy. In the future, the question will be whether other relevant and oppositional groups and parties will be ready to accept the government's offer to participate in the political process in the new, formal democratic framework—and whether the PDPA will then in fact be prepared to let the legal democratization and the establishment of a pluralist system be followed by actual implementation. The presently established framework may have its faults, but this is a secondary consideration. The deciding question is a practical and political one: Whether the PDPA will accept the opposition (including the parties in Peshawar) as equally privileged competitors for governmental power and, on the other hand, whether the Peshawar parties will in the future consider the PDPA to have equal rights. Should this not be the case, the reforms in Kabul will remain any empty shell, and without them there can be no political solution of the conflict.

The policies of the PDPA/Watan Party are currently oriented toward two goals which are partly contradictory: on the one hand, the policies are determined by the search for a political compromise solution. The PDPA is fully aware of the fact that, without a peaceful resolution, Afghanistan will continue to bleed to death, and that the population, as well as the armed forces, are tired of war. On the other hand it is equally concerned with securing its position in power and its privileges. In that respect the PDPA and the government are less flexible now than they were in early 1989. They have the feeling of having survived from a position of strength and to be in a stronger position now. While a compromise with the Mujahidin will be considered, a simple surrender without a quid pro quo is unacceptable, contrary to the condition in January 1989. Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil and Vice President Abdul Hamid Mohtat, both of whom are also members of the PDPA politburo, indicate that they would not accept a solution forced upon them by the superpowers at the expense of the Afghan government and the PDPA.

The comprehensive status report of the central committee, presented by president Najibullah at the second party congress is also an expression of the party's new self-confidence. Najibullah and the party leadership evidently feel strong enough to give an account of certain aspects of the party's history, even going beyond formula confessions: they even admit such things as the torture and murder of members of the opposition by the party and the state apparatus. There is criticism not only of predecessors in office who have been discredited anyway, but also of "the party" itself. At the same time of course the president succeeds, for all the criticism, in presenting the history of the PDPA in a successful and heroic light. The changes in names, statutes and programs are presented as a necessary adaptation to social realities which do away with negative practices of the past and at the same time constitute a continuation of the party's positive goals and traditions. This overall approach is apparently attributable to intra-party resistance against restructuring, which are specifically mentioned. Certain ideological passages—such as those about the character of revolution in world history and in Afghanistan or the question "Capitalism or Socialism?"—constitute responses to intra-party critics. The president attempts to use their own weapons against his left-wing critics; for all the talk about the necessity for social and state democracy, it is limited once more by the party framework: freedom of speech is permitted, but the Leninist prohibition of splintering remains in force. Pluralism towards the outside, exclusivity on the inside—such is the motto of the PDPA/Watan Party, which is to be implemented administratively as well.

There has been a turnaround in sentiment among the Mujahidin groups in Peshawar also. A few months prior to the Soviet troop withdrawal the Alliance of Seven was still confident that the Kabul government could suffer a military defeat, and thus fall, within a few weeks or months. However, six months after the Soviet withdrawal, the first morning-after blues surfaced; the battle for Jalalabad had been lost and rallying cries were published—the situation, they said, was not all that critical; the government in Kabul would of course shortly be toppled, though it might take a bit longer than originally planned. However, behind that facade even then growing self-doubt and loss of orientation could be discerned.

In talking with representatives of the Mujahidin parties in Peshawar today, there is no mention of military victory. Today, no responsible source in Peshawar, be it among the Mujahidin, Western diplomats or independent observers, takes a military option for defeating the Kabul regime seriously. If it comes up in conversation at all, then only to deny its feasibility in the same breath. This has triggered different reactions among various Mujahidin groups. Hikmatyar's party, whose former close connection with the Pakistani military is visibly disturbed and which hardly seems to be receiving any more US support, bets on discord in the Afghan army. It

tries to establish sub rosa contacts with Afghan government officers to cause a coup in Kabul which would topple the government.

Other parties reject that strategy. It is even being whispered that, even if a joint Hikmatyar/Khalqi coup were to succeed in Kabul, other Mujahidin groups would consider offering Najibullah their support against this "extremist alliance." Officially, such a notion is, of course, denied.

Other groups, such as Jami'at, declare that they are waiting for the time when the USSR discontinues its military support shipments to the Afghan regime, at which time it would still try to defeat it. Both concepts are to be tied to additional military operations so as to exert pressure upon the government. This is also the reason for the continuing missile bombardment of Kabul by the Mujahidin, even though it makes no military sense.

Inherent in both concepts is the admission that military victory is not to be had. The Peshawar parties count on victory to be caused only by mistakes or weaknesses of the adversary, no longer by their own strength. The less radical competitor, the hisb [as published], even goes one step further, though, until now, with great discretion. Professor Mojadeddi's party has already conducted secret talks in Kabul; Gailani's party has done likewise in Baghdad with Iraqi go-betweens. But in a different configuration, such borderline negotiations are not forbidden territory even for Hikmatyar's party: it admits that besides contacts with Khalqi officers, it has already conducted "negotiations" with the Soviet Embassy in Bonn.

The mixture of various contacts among the parties to the conflict does not however indicate that a solution to the conflict could be realized in a direct political manner within the foreseeable future. Most Mujahidin still reject a negotiated solution, at least in public, as well as a coalition government. With the PDPA, they say, even if it has in the meantime renamed itself the "Party of the Fatherland," there can be no communication whatever, inasmuch as it is communist and has blood on its hands. This, they continue, is true not only for the party leadership, but also for its lower and bottom ranks. Any "transition government" resulting from a political settlement would have to exclude those forces. However, the Alliance of Seven in Peshawar does not have a strategy on how a political solution could in fact exclude the PDPA/Party of the Fatherland. All they have is a formula rallying cry which the parties still proclaim in public, but which they have already substantially renounced.

Beyond that, there has been a continuing trend, which was already clearly discernible last summer: the erosion of the impact and the military effectiveness of the parties located in Peshawar within Afghan territory beyond such border regions as Nangahar, Kunar, Paktia and a few others. Numerous commanders have by now renounced

the Peshawar parties and have concluded agreements with the government. One typical case is that of the Commander Abdul Hakim, known in Herat Province as "Son of Arab." He commands 2,000 armed fighters, has 30,000 partisans and has fought against the government since the start of the war.

Abdul Hakim is in his mid-thirties; he is still proud of the fact that his fighters have cost the government heavy casualties and material damages. However, last fall, he had a reconciliation with the government. He gives two main reasons for this: for one thing, the Soviet troops have left the country; he had always fought against foreign intervention and would continue to do so—no matter whether they were from the East or the West. He would fight them even if they came from Islamic countries. After the USSR withdrawal one of the main causes for the war had thus disappeared. Second, the Kabul regime had admitted its previous mistakes. He believes that it now knows its limitations and will refrain from interfering in his region hereafter. He had been assured of this by the deputy prime minister and by president Najibullah. Beyond that, Commander Hakim cites the following reasons for his change of attitude: continuing battles with the Mujahidin of Jami'at, who had mounted frequent attacks upon his people—and material support from Kabul. According to him, this support is far-reaching: it extends from food supplies through assistance for rebuilding his province to military assistance, including tanks and artillery. The commander is particularly amused by the thought that the government is now spending money to repair bridges, roads and facilities in his region which his own people had destroyed at one time.

To our question, what his and his fighters' reaction would be if the regime were to break its promises and once again exert influence in his area, he replies, with a gentle smile, but emphatically and with self-confidence, that in such an event the fight would be resumed. Accompanied by his people's laughter and murmurs of approval, he makes it quite clear that under his command there would be no such things as mandatory schooling for girls or land reform—and that the government was well aware of this.

Abdul Hakim is quite typical for a certain category of commanders who have signed agreements with the regime since the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Their turnabout is not to be considered "treason," but rather a balancing of profit and loss.

It should be noted also that there is increasing organization among those commanders who are still fighting the regime. In June there were two meetings in Paktia Province of Mujahidin leaders, attended by 50 commanders at the first and almost 400 at the second meeting. The second one especially was ethnically quite a mixed event. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmens and smaller ethnic minorities were represented, as were commanders of various Mujahidin parties. This fact imparted particular political significance to these assemblies. In addition it was remarkable that while the fight against the government in Kabul was loudly proclaimed, one

speaker representing that government expressed his satisfaction over these meetings, while the Peshawar parties could barely conceal their nervousness. It is a fact that these assemblies aim at least in equal measure toward greater independence from Peshawar and toward fighting Kabul.

In the overall picture, a differentiated situation emerges so far as the Mujahidin are concerned. Those who, based in Peshawar, have made warfare their main source of income, the leaders of the Seven Parties, are in a condition of being without a plan and of being helpless, without the prospect of the long-dreamed-of victory, and beset by the danger of becoming redundant. One Pakistani general declared that today the Mujahidin—without the prospect of victory—were much less useful to his country than they had been in the past, but that there was no way of getting rid of them and the refugees. Thus the Peshawar parties have become the big losers of the last 18 months. This does not mean however that they can now be ignored as a political factor. By virtue of their position, particularly in the Pakistani border region and by their continuing considerable military nuisance potential—e.g., the continual missile bombardments of Kabul—they have a de facto veto power over any comprehensive peaceful solution.

It is a different proposition for the commanders in the interior. Their significance and their independence from Peshawar have increased; they have obtained practically everything they have fought for: the retreat of the foreign intruders; repelling the government's attempts to dominate their regions and to force reforms upon them. The regime has pulled back and has cancelled virtually all attempts to enforce its own ideas in the regions of the commanders of the interior. Today the interior commanders can have anything of importance to them without a fight: autonomy, money, and weapons. There seems to be hardly any reason for continuing with the war therefore—at least outside the zone of direct influence of the Peshawar parties in the border regions. Just as obviously as the parties in exile are the losers in the recent developments, the commanders in the interior are the winners—a fact which has undermined the commonalities among the two groups and the solidarity of their tactical alliance.

## INDIA

### Article Urges Sensible Education Policy

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6 Jun 90 p 6

[Article by Nandkishore Acharya: "Since Education Isn't Just Education"]

[Text] Some people are having expectations from the committee formed under the chairmanship of Professor Rammurti for reconsideration of the national education

policy. They hope that perhaps now Gandhiji's educational ideologies might get a preference because the chairman of the committee himself is, not only on a theoretical level but also on a practical level, convinced of their credibility. The committee does not lack even in members who have been admirers of the indigenous sense of value and manners. But, in spite of all this, in reality, it appears that this committee will either consider its job accomplished by recommending some reforms in whatever is being practiced, or it will produce another report of the kind that has been generating intellectual discussions without having a practical impact.

One great weakness of our educational studies is that they are undertaken by those people who have no actual control over socio-economic processes. Education is a human resource; therefore, it is necessary to see that it is compatible with economic progress. If it is not done so, the education policy which appears faultless theoretically becomes a failure practically. This is the reason why Gandhiji's basic education is considered impractical. If we are going to create an industrial society in which big machines, totally new techniques, centralization of the resources of production, etc., are emphasized upon, then there is no doubt that in such a situation there will be no utilization of labor-based production and a system of education related to it. Therefore, it is necessary that before pondering over an educational policy a new scheme of economic policy should be prepared and a nationwide discussion be held on it. Our form of education depends on the direction of the future development of our society. The issue of economic development is not just economic, it is also a political, and even more than that, a cultural issue because both the economic process of a country as well as its sense of value are interdependent. If we give importance to decentralization of democracy, in the sense held by Gandhiji, then, we will have to develop such an economic process, such a resource, and such a technology as will lead the society to a decentralization. Centralization of big machines, production, and ownership, etc., demolishes democracy.

The purpose of education is also to make available necessary techniques for economic development and work out means of implementing them as well as to provide training in them. It is obvious that these techniques can be useful only when they are compatible to the populace, natural economic situations, social habits, and the environment. For a country like India, which has different societies from the point of view of multiplicity of parties and modern economy, an ultra modern technology cannot be effective. The reason is that for a very long time it will not be able to cover the whole population which will mean high unemployment, poverty, starvation, poor health, and a slowly developing sense of self-pity for the people of the lower strata. Our education system, therefore, must pay attention to developing the kind of technique which must be in consideration of the economic limitations and moral decorum of our society. This means that along with developing a new education policy we should also have to develop a new economic

policy together with a new policy in science and technology. It will, rather, be better to formulate such a coordinated policy as to include along with development of education a development of economy as well as scientific technology. If there is not mutual compatibility among the three, it is definite that a policy related to any of the three areas will remain incomplete and unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, then, market itself becomes the real and the only assessor of policies.

However, for development of a coordinated policy it is necessary to develop a view of life which should incorporate in itself all the aspects of life. Only then will it be appropriate to expect from education to develop such personal-social manners and necessary technical skills as well as management ability as to strengthen the view of life. Without a clear view of life, any system or process of education cannot be effective according to the objectives.

The issue of educational policy, therefore, is not an issue of education alone, it is also an issue of a composite view of life. If we bring about a change in education without a clarity of view, then more or less we will be getting the same results as we have been getting from the education system of the colonial period. The education system of the British period was not imbibed with the Indian view of life. As a result, an individual with modern education was cut off from his social life and roots, and became a victim of cultural bastardization or stagnation. It will, therefore, be necessary to develop in ourselves a view of life that should have a perspective of our own society and traditions. Obviously, all of this does not fall within the purview of the Rammurti Committee. It does not have to consider economic-political processes and directions of technological development. But, is it possible to consider education policy without considering the above? No alternative education policy is possible without an alternative view of life. Then, the only way left open is that by making some recommendations concerning the management aspects of the current education policy the committee may consider its obligations fulfilled. So far it does not appear that the government is in a position to consider any alternative model of any kind of economic development. From the type of governmental support provided to the projects such as those of Tihri dam and Narmada Sagar is it not obvious that it is no opportunity to think about any other alternative.

A person who lands himself in a blind lane has got to turn back even if he has to start his journey again provided he does not wish to meet his death there. We will have to clearly understand whether we want to be a capitalist state, dependent upon ultra modern industries and a centralized system and turn ourselves into a colony of foreign technology, or if we want to be a socialist democracy based upon economic-political decentralization. We will have to decide whether we are in favor of such a production system and technique as in the terms of Gandhiji support "sinful" and "satanic" civilization or we are in favor of such a technology as is born of a sense of entirety and religious vision, and which is not

only in harmony with the principles of environment but is also inspired by an intent of making our society self confident.

It may be said that it is a digression to reflect on the econo-political system and technology while we are talking about education policy. But this is the point we have to understand clearly. The objective of education is to develop society, every individual of the society. We, therefore, cannot adopt a vague attitude towards the direction of development. Until it is clear what type of society we want, education will be limited only to the passing of some information and teaching some skills. But, even behind every skill there is some kind of sense of value, whether it is declared or not. Therefore, education also has to clarify what its econo-political objectives are and whether it is directed towards those objectives in its structure and process. Discussing the role of education as a most important human resource in the capacity of an economist, Scheumocher states, "the problems of education are mere reflections of the most serious problems of our age. They cannot be solved by means of organization, administration, or by spending lots of money, although they are significant in themselves. We are actually victims of a metaphysical disease and the treatment has to be metaphysical. An education that does not clarify our convictions is just a type of training or simply an addiction. The fact of the matter is that our main convictions themselves are muddled and as long as there is a continuation of an anti-metaphysical atmosphere confusion will be on an increase. In this situation education will only become a means of human destruction rather than being a means of human resources."

Therefore, there is an opportunity before Professor Rammurti's committee. It should evaluate the whole process of our development in the name of evaluating the education system. It should also give us a well-considered and well-evidenced opinion in regard to the developmental model we have adopted and its effects on our society. It should evaluate its effects not only in the area of economy but also on our total pattern of life. Also, whether these effects are desirable for us or not. If this committee finds that the direction of the present development is correct and it simply needs to be accelerated, then it should recommend some reforms only in the present education system so that the existing developmental process may become more dynamic and effective. But, if the present system has not been able to imbibe good qualities in students and the inner strength of the society has gone down, then, it should question the basic tenets of the present education system. Before proposing an alternative education [proposal], a proposal for an alternative econo-political process should also be made even if it does not come under its purview.

This committee is not a committee of government officials who are under obligation to support government policies. This is a committee comprising of independent, thinking, and enlightened educationists. In this committee, to be sure, there are the kind of people who can

deliberate about the society by rising above contemporary views. Also, it is worth mentioning that if Professor Rammurti and his colleagues provide a proper evaluation of the direction of development of the whole society by means of the study of the education process and make a proposal for an education policy with an alternative view of life delivered, and fulfilling its needs, then, it will also strengthen the hands of even those peers who are sitting in planning commission and other policy making organizations. On the basis of the findings of this committee, there will also be a provision for country-wide discussions so that, even on the pretext of education, all of the society may share in the decision regarding the direction of development it wants for itself.

### Commentary Voices Strong Pro-English Stance

90P40139B Madras DINAMANI in Tamil  
14 Aug 90 p 6

[Editorial: "English Opposing Stalwarts"]

[Text] An "English Abolition" seminar was conducted in Indore and the chief ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh participated in it. The frenzied resistance to English seen in their speeches is bound to worry those who desire national progress and integration.

These ministers were determined to completely remove English from state administration, legislature, and from public relations. They requested also that the Central Government follow their example. It has been announced that, as a result of this, the chief ministers of six states will be meeting in the near future in Delhi to plan activities and further that they will compel the central government to "give Hindi its due recognition as the national language."

The chief minister of Rajasthan, Shekhawat, has also joined the list of English opposers. It may be expected that Bihar Chief Minister Lallu Prasad Yadav will also jump on the bandwagon of English resistance.

It is painful to see that these people do not realize that their actions are causing harm to the nation's integration. Apart from protecting the national unity by functioning as a cohesive language within the country, English, by being the international language, also contributes to the nation's progress in the world.

The then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru promised that English will be retained as the common language as long as the non-Hindi speaking people wanted it to. That should have been written into the national Constitution. The chief ministers of the non-Hindi speaking states must reiterate this with no waste of time. Claims such as there would be no forcing of Hindi, or the one made by former President Zail Singh that the Hindi issue will not damage national unity, are not plausible.

**ADMK Infighting Criticized**

90P40139A Madras ANANDA VIKATAN in Tamil  
19 Aug 90 p 15

[Editorial: "Boxing Politics"]

[Text] In winning the elections for the Legislative and the State Assemblies, Jayalalitha has proven "What I lead is ADMK [Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam]." At such a juncture, the Tirunavukkarasu group having been expelled recently, there has been increasing infighting for leadership and it has come to the streets now!

As a climax to this, the Tirunavukkarasu group attempted to "capture" the ADMK head office operating in Madras. Violence, disturbances followed!

This hooligan effort by the Tirunavukkarasu group does not seem appropriate. Physical brutishness is never desirable in politics. The Tirunavukkarasu group could have gone to the courts seeking rights to the head office, or they could have demonstrated peacefully near the head office in "satyagraha" fashion. Whatever it is, it is the duty of the politicians to wait till the next election. Why this frenzied haste?

At the same time, the police should have ensured that non-Jayalalitha supporters could not enter the head office. Instead, locking the office after the mishap in police presence is condemnable!

Even though this is all merely one party's infighting, it is indeed pitiable that the political stage of Tamilnadu which sported some great statesmen in the past is fast becoming a boxing arena!

**IRAN****Officials Note Problems of Distribution of Goods****Views of Deputy Minister of Commerce**

90AS0355A Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
22 Jul 90 p 11

[Text] Economic Division—In a press conference yesterday morning, the deputy minister of commerce for internal trade affairs answered issues raised concerning problems with the distribution system.

RESALAT's economic correspondent reports that Mr. Sadreddin Danesh-Ashtiyani, deputy minister of commerce for internal trade affairs, began his talk by saying: If the Ministry of Commerce does not receive cooperation in its duties from other executive organizations and units, there will be many problems. Distribution has no meaning without procurement. If we cannot procure goods, we cannot make specific plans to distribute them. The Ministry of Commerce estimates the needs of society at the outset, and it procures them through the two channels of domestic production and imports.

He added: The Ministry of Commerce does not have precise information and statistics on production planning, and the production program is not announced to this ministry. Therefore, the Ministry of Commerce has no information about the industrial production program, which ought to be announced at the beginning of the year, and it cannot take steps for production. For example, when the second three-month production program was made available to us at the end of the month of Tir [22 July], how could we prepare a timely program for its distribution? Based on regulations from the Economic Council, the Ministry of Industry must give us its production plan by 30 Khordad [20 June], despite the fact that new issues arise and the distribution system does not permit goods to be marketed and made available to the people.

Concerning issues that have been raised regarding the distribution of cement, he said: Concerning cement, there is a logical distribution system, and the Cement Committee, composed of the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Commerce, the Plan and Budget Organization and consumer representatives, continuously and weekly pursue its production and distribution program. Currently only about three million tons of cement left from last year are in the hands of the people and the cooperatives, meaning that industry has not been able to keep its commitments in this regard. Therefore, it is unfair for us to state to the media that cement is stored in the warehouses.

He emphasized: In 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] cement production was about 13 million tons. In that same year there were shipping problems. This year the level of production will be increased to 15 to 17 million tons, while there has been no increase in the shipping problems.

He emphasized: Ninety-five percent of the distribution problems are freight problems. The real and legal people have the transfer authorizations available, but because of the planning problems they cannot transport their goods. The shipping problems are among the nation's greatest problems now, and we are short of trucks, parts, and tires. Of course, these things do not mean that there are no problems facing the Ministry of Commerce. Perhaps half of the problems pertain to us, but all the organizations must act in coordination.

He answered a question from our economic correspondent, who said: Most of the managers in the production units protest the storage of goods in the appropriate units and the failure to issue transfer authorizations by the Ministry of Commerce. They cite as examples the tire factories. He said: Based on a written letter from five tire factories, their problem is not distribution, and they have thanked the Ministry of Commerce for the timely distribution of transfer authorizations. The issue is that because of the difference between the official and free

market prices and the problem of currency in circulation for producers, they are wondering why goods are being marketed in the distribution system at this price.

He added: There are now 300,000 people on the Dowry Staff [setad-e jahiziyeh] to obtain household necessities. At the same time the Ministry of Industry is announcing that we do not have a problem with household necessities and that the warehouses have been filled (in this regard one of the correspondents answered that the relevant officials said no such thing, they only announced that in the second half of the current year the production capacity of the household appliance production units would be active).

He was asked by RESALAT's economic correspondent: The Ministry of Industry said that the reason goods are piling up in the warehouses is because of the Ministry of Commerce's failure to issue transfer authorizations, and the Ministry of Commerce believes that the production program has not been made available to it, and here it is not clear what the needy people ought to do. He said: We issue transfer authorizations, but either the production is not done, or if it is done, it is not made available to us. In the end, it is possible that there may be a shipping problem.

Mr. Sadreddin Danesh-Ashtiyani said: The Ministry of Commerce believes that under current conditions, when there are 400,000 guild units, it is not appropriate to distribute goods through the authorized factory networks, and that this has a negative effect on the economic system. This ought to be done when we are producing at the export level.

Our correspondent asked: What is the reason for the failure to issue glass transfer authorizations for the units producing this product? Tens of millions of toman were lost during the earthquakes because this product was stored. Mr. Sadreddin Danesh-Ashtiyani said: The office of the president of the republic is also investigating this issue. In this regard there has been a shipping problem. These losses occurred because shipping has been monopolized by a single cooperative whose shipping capacity is limited. The transfer authorizations have been issued in the needed quantities. The Mirror and Glass Union now has many transfer authorizations for which it has not been able to obtain the goods.

RESALAT's economic correspondent also asked: After the availability of some rationed items is announced, if the people are too busy to obtain their goods in the very first days they must wait a long time for a new announcement. In this regard Mr. Sadreddin Danesh-Ashtiyani said: When 60 percent of the goods are in the distribution network, their ration coupons are announced, and as soon as the announcement is made there is a rush. There is also the shipping problem. Concerning some goods such as poultry, because of the rapid spoilage we cannot meet all the needs at once, and we ship them gradually.

Continuing his question, our correspondent added: Rice does not spoil rapidly, but sometimes if the people cannot get this item in the first few days after its coupons are announced, they must wait a long time. In this regard, Mr. Sadreddin Danesh-Ashtiyani said: It is not this way.

The deputy minister of commerce for internal trade affairs said: By the end of the current year [20 March 1991] the Economic Mobilization Staff Offices throughout the country will change, the size of their area of activity will decrease and the coupon volume will be reduced as needed.

He added: The basic coupons for Phase Nine in 15 of the nation's provinces have been printed and sent to the provinces. So far they have been distributed in Sistan va Baluchestan, Bushehr, and Bandar 'Abbas. By the end of the current year the distribution of these coupons throughout the country will be completed. The distribution of Phase Nine coupons in Tehran Province will be done when summer is over, during fall and winter.

He emphasized: To collect information and to monitor and supervise the distribution of coupons, computers have been purchased and are being shipped, and the executive cadres are being trained. To implement this system, every family will have a serial number to procure goods and services. This project is very great and 60 million kinds of information are being gathered, and if a family loses its coupons, it will have no problem. By computerizing the system and mailing photos of the people, there will be no need for repeated authorities to issue coupons. Complete implementation of this project will mean an annual savings of \$200 million in foreign exchange through the elimination of excess distribution.

He emphasized: To procure tires and various vehicle parts, \$790 million in foreign exchange has been provided, of which \$510 million will be spent to import parts and \$280 million to import tires.

Concerning the procurement of construction materials, the deputy minister of commerce for internal trade affairs said: In this area, to establish a balance between procurement and consumption, this year four million tons of steel are to be procured for development, provincial, and people's projects.

Concerning the distribution of writing equipment, paper, and clothing for students, the deputy minister of commerce for internal trade affairs said: So far 60 percent of the writing materials for Phase One of the 1369-1370 [1990-1991] academic year, including 50 million ball-point pens, 100 million pencils, 45 million pencil sharpeners and erasers, and 135 million note books have been procured and placed in the distribution, and the rest will be gradually distributed.

Likewise, by the first of Mehr [23 September] 10 million meters of cloth and sheets have been distributed or marketed to the production units for sewing.



Elsewhere in this interview, he discussed the allocation of foreign exchange to producing guilds and technical service units which have recently come to have special associations. He said: In view of the employment creation of these units, which have 50 production cooperatives, by the end of the current year [20 March 1991] \$500 million in foreign exchange will be allocated, of which \$380 million has been set as credit, and to expedite production, the purchasing function has also been given to these cooperatives so that they may conduct the pertinent affairs directly.

Concerning the procurement of paper, he said: To procure paper needed by organizations and the press, in the current year \$200 million has been allocated so the level of paper imports will be better than last year.

### Minister of Heavy Industries Comments

90AS0355B Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
22 Jul 90 p 11

[Text] Saveh—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY—The minister of heavy industries announced today in Saveh that production in all factories under the mantle of the Ministry of Heavy Industries will increase to nominal capacity within then next two months.

Dr. Nezhad-Hoseynian, speaking with reporters during an inspection of the Pars Aluminum Factory, discussed the nation's distribution system and the fact that the system of distribution must be removed from government monopoly. He said: Unfortunately, this procedure has not shown positive results in all dimensions.

In the same regard, he added: For example, one of the ways of marketing vehicles to applicants is through lotteries. Through this procedure, only a limited number of people have acquired inexpensive automobiles. They then sell them at high prices on the free market, and this has caused great damage to the nation's economic structure.

He added: Based on projects now being studied and acted upon by the Council of Ministers, the distribution of any kind of vehicle among the nation's applicants will be done through authorized representatives.

Continuing, the minister of heavy industries discussed the beginning of operation of the third aluminum sheeting production line at the Pars Aluminum Factory. He added: With the startup of this line, which increases the factory's daily production capacity from 40 to 60 tons per day, we will soon see a 30 percent drop in the price of this product on the free market.

### Bayat Discusses Assembly of Experts, Mohtashemi with RESALAT

90AS0352A Tehran RESALAT in Persian  
26 Jul 90 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Bayat by correspondents during a press conference; date and place not specified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] News Division—Hojjat ol-Eslam Bayat, a member of the Tehran Combatant Clergy Society [Majma' Rowhaniyun-e Mobarez-e Tehran], gave a press conference in which he expressed his views concerning recent decisions by the Assembly of Experts. Printed below is the text of the questions and answers in the conversation between our correspondent and Mr. Bayat. It is worth noting that to preserve overall coherence, all the views announced concerning a single subject in various parts of the interview are collected in the same place to permit the readers convenient access to the questions and answers and the logic of each one.

### Assembly of Experts Meeting Site Changes

[RESALAT] What is your view, and that of the Combatant Clergy Society, concerning Mr. Mohtashemi's statements concerning recent decisions by the Assembly of Experts?

[Bayat] The view of the Combatant Clergy Society is the same one announced by Mr. Karrubi, and I will state my own view. The position of the Assembly of Experts and their role and responsibilities are clearly stated in the Constitution. No one has any doubt about this. Clearly, we and the Assembly of Experts must act in such a way that the Assembly of Experts will not be weakened, and the way will not be paved to weaken them. The Assembly of Experts must retain the soundness of its position, even in the judgment of others, and for this reason, in the guidelines that were also approved by His Holiness the Imam (peace be upon him), the principal meeting site of the Assembly of Experts is to be Qom. The philosophy behind this provision is that the Assembly of Experts must be in a place where it is not under the mantle of any of the three governmental powers. Now if someone comes and announces his views and says that it is not advisable for the Assembly of Experts to be in Emam Khomeyni's sanctuary, which is practically a pillar and an integral part of the leadership complex, I believe that this serves to strengthen the Assembly of Experts. This is not aimed at weakening the Assembly of Experts. The interesting thing is that in this regard the exalted leader himself has expressed the same view. The exalted leader said that it is in our interest for the Assembly of Experts not to be here.

As a person somewhat versed in legal and legislative affairs and in social conflict, I consider this a measure that will strengthen the Assembly of Experts and I believe that those who approach everything with eyes closed and in a natural and decisive way, and who have even prohibited the idea that this strengthens the Assembly of Experts, are actually weakening it.

[RESALAT] Yes, that is true. According to the guidelines, the established and principal meeting place is Qom, but didn't the guidelines state clearly that if this is not the case, meetings can be held in centers other than Qom with the approval of a majority of the Assembly of Experts? In view of the fact that the change of the meeting place from Qom to Tehran and the fact that it

convened in the sanctuary of Imam Khomeyni (peace be upon him) was approved by the Assembly of Experts, do you still believe that the Assembly of Experts acted contrary to law?

[Bayat] No, it was lawful, but it was not in our interest.

[RESALAT] So this was lawful, and was determined by the Assembly of Experts not to be against our interests, but you said the meeting of the Assembly of Experts must not take place under the shadow of any of the three powers of government. How surprising. Do you mean that the sanctuary of Imam Khomeyni (peace be upon him) and the house of leadership is one of the three powers? Moreover, why didn't you and your friends protest when the Assembly of Experts met with the Majles, on the grounds that it undermined their independence? Aren't you taking a political approach?

[Bayat] As determined by the deputy chief of the Assembly of Experts (Mr. Hashemi), it formerly met in the Majles, and had nothing to do with us.

[RESALAT] But you did not protest. Why? And didn't the exalted leader say that the meetings ought not to be held in the sanctuary of the Imam (peace be upon him), and didn't the Assembly of Experts say, no, they should be?

[Bayat] The exalted leader did not know our best interests.

[RESALAT] Then holding the meeting at that place was lawful, and was not opposition to the exalted leader.

Wasn't it a lawful prerogative of the Assembly of Experts to change the site of the meetings and the guidelines?

[Bayat] In fairness, it was within their legal prerogatives, but it was contrary to our interest and to past practice.

#### Effects of Changing Selection Guidelines

[Bayat] The Council of Guardians approved the former guidelines and they were also validated by His Holiness the Imam (peace be upon him). It was on the basis of these guidelines that the current guidelines were approved, and I am satisfied with them. They also did a very good job in the selection of the exalted leader. In practice, we saw no problem with these guidelines that we would want to amend them.

[RESALAT] Some of the gentlemen stated clearly and by implication that the Assembly of Experts could not change the guidelines, yet under Article 108 of the the Constitution, writing the guidelines was one of the responsibilities of the Council of Guardians in the first session, to be approved by the leader, and after that any kind of decision on the guidelines, under the Constitution, was up to the Assembly of Experts. Please state clearly, did the Council of Guardians act contrary to law in this matter?

[Bayat] No. In fairness, what they did was legal, but why did they change a law that had no practical problem? The guidelines already said that the Assembly of Experts

must be completely familiar with the foundations of theology, and the authority to certify this would be "three teachers of external theology and principles at the seminaries." That is, they made them subject to approval by the seminaries, from which came the Imam, the exalted leader, and the theologians of the Council of Guardians, and we are proud of them. Now do you think this authority was stronger, or the one we have now? From the legal standpoint, it is obvious that we have lowered the level, and this brought under attack the legal question by those who are raising these legal problems. If someone says such a thing who has been confirmed by the Imam and who is loyal and concerned about the revolution, why should he be confronted and crushed?

[RESALAT] You have now confirmed that much of what I say is legal. Why do you attack and confront those whose points are legal and technical, and who are concerned about the government? At the same time, aren't Mohtashemi's approaches and analyses legal and technical? Listening to his discussions and in his tone, the listener concludes that future selections of the Assembly of Experts will be neither legal nor acceptable. Why did the Assembly of Experts act illegally and change the guidelines that were validated by the Imam (peace be upon him)? This is putting the Assembly of Experts up against the Imam. In fairness, is this a legal and technical approach? As for the question of which certification authority is stronger, in the view of the Assembly of Experts, as well as our own, the theologians of the Council of Guardians are stronger than the general category, "three teachers of external theology and principles at the seminaries," because first of all the theologians of the Council of Guardians have been confirmed by the leader with regard to their independent discretion in matters of religious jurisprudence and their justice and their familiarity with the issues of the day, and there can be therefore no doubt about their practical and political competence. If it were "three teachers of external theology and principles at the seminaries," however, who would have to certify their practical and political competence? If someone is confirmed who is not politically competent, do you think we ought to permit him to become a candidate? Do you think people who may have been in the revolution, who worked and were supported by the Imam, have the right to say whatever they wish and disappoint the people? Didn't the Imam say there are rigid teachers at the seminaries and that one ought to watch out for them? Do you accept this?

[Bayat] Why do you repeat some of what the Imam said and ignore the rest? Didn't the Imam also say there are rigid people in the markets, the university, and elsewhere? Aren't the roots of rigidity to be found in the hands of those who have money?

[RESALAT] Since we are talking about the seminaries, naturally we are considering rigid people in the seminaries. If we were talking about economics or culture, we would have to attack the rigid people in the seminaries and the universities as well.

Another point is, the Imam said: No one has the right to interfere with anything that takes the form of law, for that is against religious law.

[Bayat] It is true that the Imam said this, and the Constitution also acknowledges that no one has the right to interfere with the law. However, if someone says this law is defective, and this is true of some laws that have been enacted by the Majles (such as the free university and the nonprofit schools, now being protested by a number of people), we either amend or change the law after studying it. If someone says there is a defect in the implementation of a law, one ought not to stand in his way. Changes in procedures need a law, but the gentlemen are either unfamiliar with the technical issues, or they do not have the background to understand the issues logically and analytically. Mr. Mohtashemi is a sharp political and clerical figure loyal to the revolution. The criteria for us are the Imam's path, his way, and his manner of thinking, and we will not permit anyone to deviate from them.

[RESALAT] On the same basis, the Imam said the criterion is the current state of individuals, but you are saying that if the Imam validated Mr. Mohtashemi or someone else, they ought to keep their power forever.

[Bayat] When he said the criterion is the current state of individuals, the Imam was talking about those who have deviated from these principles (the principles of the Imam's way).

[RESALAT] What are the criteria for deviation from the Imam's way? Who is the authority that certifies this? Isn't the leader the best criterion and authority?

[Bayat] We deal with whomever deviates from the principles of the Imam.

[RESALAT] Then did the Assembly of Experts also deviate from the Imam's principles and his way, for Mr. Mohtashemi to deal with them?

[Bayat] I am saying that the former guidelines were confirmed by the Imam, and they had no practical problems. Therefore, those who changed the guidelines were politically motivated. It was definitely this way. We have no other issue, and it would be a sin for an insightful and clear-sighted person to speak of this.

[RESALAT] Then you are saying the motivation was political?

[Bayat] I consider these measures to have problems legally, and it is possible someone might say political motivations are involved. All those who do or do not accept me intellectually have the idea that I know and understand the guidelines better than others, and now you are saying the Assembly of Experts enacted such a provision, and I am saying that in any case I have these legal problems, and I have protested and do protest. Of course, the protest is not out of concern for myself, for I studied external theology more than 15 years, with great

and exalted masters. I studied with the Imam, and I have no concerns about my own competence.

[RESALAT] What is your view of the remark by Mr. Hashemi that to weaken the Assembly of Experts is treason?

[Bayat] I say that to weaken them is treason.

[RESALAT] Whom was Mr. Hashemi addressing?

[Bayat] You'll have to ask Mr. Hashemi. My own belief is that these are not the proper terms. No one should say such things, even if he is a very prominent figure. Don't say that weakening the Assembly of Experts is treason against Islam and the Muslims. Everyone chants slogans. Who weakened the Assembly of Experts? The person who weakened them was the one who created the conditions that produced talk like this.

[RESALAT] Another point is that there is a difference between supervision and interference. Under the Constitution, supervision over the selection of the Assembly of Experts, the president of the republic, and the Majles is the task of the Council of Guardians. How can it be that the Constitution did not say that the competence of Majles deputies is determined by the Council of Guardians? From a legal standpoint, one cannot both supervise and implement. Suppose now that both the beard and the scissors are in the hand of the Council of Guardians, and they came and rejected the competence of qualified persons. To whom could these people appeal? Those who are versed in legal affairs know that there is a difference between supervision and implementation.

[Bayat] I am surprised. How can you, who are familiar with legal issues, say that certifying competence is the same thing as implementation? Here the question is whether or not the certifying authority has the competence of the theologians of the Council of Guardians, not whether they are executive officials. Second, if it is your view that there is a problem when the supervisor and the one who certifies competence are the same, then why were both supervision of elections and certification of the competence of presidential candidates assigned to the Council of Guardians under the Constitution (Even regarding the Majles the final arbiter is the Council of Guardians)? As for your question about where people can appeal when the competence of qualified persons is denied by the Council of Guardians, the answer is that there must be an open hearing (just as there is in the confirmation of would-be presidential candidates), and in any case, the assumption is that since they are just, they will not take a factional or ideological approach, and if someone claims they are taking a factional or an ideological approach, he ought to take the issue to the leader so he can make the necessary decision. As it happens, Mr. Mohtashemi explained that with this measure the foundation has been laid for having a single-faction Assembly of Experts, meaning that the Council of Guardians will be looking at factional and ideological issues in the rejection and confirmation of the competence of would-be candidates.

As we scholars say, it is an impossible circle. It is not right for the Assembly of Experts to select the leader, the leader to select the Council of Guardians, and the theologians of the Council of Guardians to determine the competence of candidates for the Assembly of Experts. This is an analytical, technical, and legal question.

[RESALAT] The important point that both you and Mr. Mohtashemi have made has the result that since the theologians of the Council of Guardians are appointed by the leader, God help us, the leader might exercise influence through that channel and reject the competence of those who oppose him! This is the worst and ugliest part of recent statements, and it questions the religious legality of the leadership and the entire government (if it is accepted).

[Bayat] There is a series of articles saying the things you are saying, and in general, superficially, it is not surprising, because brothers who lack a bit of familiarity with theological issues say these things. I said a circle is impossible, and if this measure were put before the Council of Guardians, the theologians and legal specialists would discuss it and reject it, both from this perspective and from the standpoint that the meaning of a supervisor is that he watches to see what the other one is doing, not that I do something myself and I supervise myself. Unfortunately, the problem is that we want to pass laws based on current individuals, and although now there may be people we are not at all worried about, we have no control over what happens over time. No one has any doubt about the piety and justice of the theologians on the Council of Guardians, and I do not wish to say that, God forbid, these gentlemen would deliberately reject the competence of qualified persons. I do say that they might make a mistake, or if the masters certify someone as a person with independent discretion in matters of religious jurisprudence, then these gentlemen might say, in our view this individual is not a person with independent discretion in matters of religious jurisprudence and we do not accept what these masters have said. Another point is that the Constitution enumerated the duties of the Council of Guardians, and therefore one may not assign it additional duties.

As it happens, to prevent these problems we proposed that the certifying authority include two or three teachers of external theology and principles with 15 years' teaching experience, and the Imam's words in his message to the seminary students was with them. He said: You tormented students and revolutionary teachers must be together.

[RESALAT] Supposing this measure were sent to the Council of Guardians, how can you say with confidence that legal specialists and theologians would oppose it? Does the fact that a couple of legal specialists said such a thing to you make it the criterion of the Council of Guardians?

[Bayat] I conjectured that if the matter were to go before the Council of Guardians, they would reject it, and those

who believe this measure has legal problems did not come out of nowhere, these are people who are familiar with legislative practice.

[RESALAT] Meaning the Assembly of Experts came out of nowhere and are not familiar with law-making practice?

[Bayat] I did not say this. Even in the Assembly of Experts there were people who had these problems and opposed it.

[RESALAT] But in any case, most of them approved it.

[Bayat] Here I say openly that the Assembly of Experts, in the course of their theology and justice, in some cases think of political expediency; they have done this, and Mr. Ansari's appointment during the elections to the third term of the Majles is the best testimony to this.

[RESALAT] Then why didn't the Imam change them?

It might be worth mentioning that since we had many questions remaining and on the one hand it was announced that the time allowed for the interview was over, we arranged to ask other questions for him to answer when the opportunity arises.

## PAKISTAN

### Commentary on Legal Aspects of Army Role in Sindh 90AS0132A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Muhammad Muzaffarul Haq Advocate:  
"Army's Cooperation With Sindh Administration"]

[Text] The military has been called in after the state government in Sindh failed. This step was taken after Mrs. Benazir Bhutto's famous press conference in Hyderabad. According to Article 245 of the Constitution, a state, district, or divisional administration can call the army for assistance. There are some important criteria for calling the army. In the case of a natural catastrophe, the army is called to help the affected people. However, there are some questions when the army is called to control internal violence. Some legal experts maintain that the army can establish its own courts if it is summoned to help. However, it is important to know the reasons for calling the army. It would be a special case if the army is called only to help the police to control terrorists in the streets or to catch criminals. Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan, a renowned Karachi lawyer, had challenged the 1977 decision to put Sindh under army control under Article 245 in the Sindh High Court. The full bench had summarized its decision in the following words:

1. The army can help the civilian government within its own sphere of influence. However, it cannot take away the civil and basic human rights of the people. The army can help identify the persons involved in terrorism and violence for trials in regular courts.

2. No one's basic constitutional rights are suppressed nor are civilian laws suspended when the army is called to help a civilian government. Civil administration and laws will continue to be effective when the army is called. Political activities and democratic government will continue as usual.

3. Every citizen must help implement Islamic justice under Article 227. Stopping the courts from imparting Islamic justice is against the basic principles of Islam.

Mr. Niaz Ahmad is great as a senior lawyer. He is very active in helping implement Islamic laws. He works hard for justice and fairness of law. He had challenged the curfew and martial law orders in Karachi and Sindh in 1977 in Sindh High Court. Many well-known lawyers appeared in this case and the decision that appeared on page 604 of Karachi BLD [expansion unknown] is still referred to for guidance. Another lawyer, Darwesh M.R.B., had similarly challenged imposition of martial law under Article 245 in Lahore High Court. The full bench of Lahore High Court had heard this case and had decided that the decision to take away the rights of the high court to hear cases under Article 245 was not legally correct, and that the [Lahore] High Court had the right to hear cases which were filed under Article 245 instituting martial law. The court had declared Article 245 illegal and said that the two decisions [i.e., promulgating Article 245 and barring courts to hear cases under it] were contradictory.

The arrival of the army in Sindh in the middle of democratic rule is a sad development. The army plays an important role in controlling violence when the democratic government fails at this. Mrs. Benazir Bhutto had declared the late Ziaul Haq the worst dictator for his 11 years of martial law regime. She has, however, not demonstrated any special talent, common sense, or implemented any policy that could encourage democracy.

Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was jailed in Koh Murray when martial law was implemented in 1977. He cursed the military all the way from Murray to Karachi when he was released. This incident was published in newspapers with statements from many eyewitnesses. Calling our army bad names does not look good as our army is very brave and has made sacrifices at our borders to protect the nation. It is not the fault of our soldiers if its generals follow wrong policies or if the army loses a battle. We should show proper respect for our armed forces. People with normal intelligence live in Karachi and Hyderabad, and the Pakistani citizens living in Sindh are also sensible people. Seeds of hatred and prejudice were sown in their minds against each other. All the problems in Sindh would have been solved if the appropriate political action had been taken and the anti-national elements had been curbed. Our present government is responsible for the whole situation since peace is important for democracy. If a few persons are responsible for such a situation, they must be unmasked. It is common knowledge that our leaders know these people. Why are those people who are trying to break up our country and hurt our unity being protected? Why weren't they punished for their crimes

in time? If the former government was responsible for them, why didn't the present government take action against them when it came to power? A great ruler always works hard to keep the nation united and to curb the rebellious elements. Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, however, has not taken any action to control this situation. The situation in Sindh would have been under control if she had given personal attention to the situation there and deployed the present police and administrative organizations effectively. She should have also organized the military and her administration to make the democratic government successful. She could have used the power of the people's unity in this context. Alas, no attention was given to all these! As a result of this continuous anarchy and the failure of the constitutional government, our nation could not achieve the stability and law and order necessary for economic development and prosperity. This environment of uncertainty, murders, and crimes is not appropriate for the new generation to grow in. The nation has fallen prey to anarchy because efforts were not made to impart social justice according to Islamic principles. What is wrong if in this situation the people are blaming the police for inefficiency and corruption and calling for the army to help curb the violence? Who is willing to take the responsibility for this negligence? Who is ready to be audited for the one and a half years of government? Only Mrs. Benazir Bhutto can answer these questions. The arrival of the army in the state is living proof of the failure of the government. It is important to mention here that Mrs. Benazir Bhutto did not pay attention to the fact that if the people's minds and characters are molded within the framework of Islamic principles, they will help create a healthy society. However, no basic steps are taken by our government in this direction. As a result, today's Muslim youth have strayed away from the vision of a united Islamic nation and are involved in crime. Today's youth believes that his future depends on regional and factional interests. He is suffering from disappointment and lacks self-confidence.

Did the Pakistan People's Party promise to call the army to curb crime and to use it for law and order instead of the police in the name of democracy? The people are worried about another martial law regime because of these actions. The main purpose of the army is to protect our borders. It is not a good idea to send the army to curb internal problems when we are facing danger on our borders. If crime is stopped and the economic lot of the people is improved even a little, the nation can be saved from internal strife. The troublemakers and unsavory elements cannot use the people to hurt the nation.

### Commentary Examines Effects of Violence on Young Generation

90AS0132B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Jun 90 p 3

[Column "Jamhur Namah" by Rauf Tahir: "General Growing in Fear"]

[Text] There are some scary scenes that are seen by everyone. Innocent citizen are killed by terrorists' bullets. Women become widows and babies become

orphans. There is nothing secret about the problems that the people face when the economy is hurt by the closing of factories.

There are also some facts that are invisible. However, they are much more horrid in nature. The people have witnessed a smiling person suddenly taking a blood bath. Such scenes have clung to their minds and they have become emotionally disturbed.

A senior physician at a large Karachi hospital said, "People came to me and complained about various kinds of sickness. Some had lost their appetite or had stomach pains. Examinations did not reveal any sickness. They were sent to psychiatrists. On examination, they were found to have various psychological problems."

An English professor at a renowned college in our city witnessed his associate die. He had become a prey to terrorists belonging to a group supporting factional bigotry. Months have passed since this incident; however, this professor still is not able to leave his house. He starts to scream, "Do not open the doors, the terrorists are here," whenever someone knocks at his door or rings the door bell.

The generation that concerns us most is the children who have yet to grow into youth and who hold the key to our future.

These innocent children are perplexed by these insoluble puzzles around them. They used to attend schools and the children speaking Punjabi or Urdu sat in the same rows or shared desks with them. The star of a Sindhi-speaking parent's eyes and a pathan child sat in the same row. They had disagreements with each other at times on innocent issues. However, they never complained about the difference in their languages. Then all these changes began to happen. They saw the child that used to sit next to them and play with them leave school and his parents

moved to a location where the people spoke their language. These children also overheard talk about, "An Urdu-speaking refugee was killed by a Sindhi.... A Sindhi was killed by a Muhajir."

When I visited Karachi recently, I stayed with my friend Nasir Salimi. My niece, Salimi's eldest daughter, Sayeda, is a high school student. Some terrorists visited their street during Najib Ahmad's chehelum [40th day of mourning]. They fired shots at the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] office and then blindly fired at houses in the street while escaping. Mr. Nasir Salimi and other members of his family had gone to Sakkhar. Sayeda and her grandmother were alone in the house. She was praying in the living room with her grandmother when the firing started. Several bullets entered the living room through the patio. One bullet nicked Sayeda's shoulder. Since then a strange situation has developed. Sayeda grabs Mr. Salimi whenever he is ready to go out. "Please do not go," she says and insists, "return soon." She begins to tremble even at the sound of a firecracker.

Mr. Zahir Ahmad from Hyderabad told me, "My eight-years old daughter often gets up at night and wakes up her mother. She asks her, 'How many more people have been murdered?'"

Psychologists tell us that a pregnant woman should have a pleasant environment since her psychological condition affects the baby in her womb.

I wonder what kind of psychological atmosphere our children are growing up in? The children who should go to bed listening to their mothers tell them stories with happy endings and then lose themselves in sleep, wake up after nightmares and scream, "How many murders took place...how many men were killed?"

God, we are sinners! However, please do not punish the next generation for our sins. My Savior, please save these innocent children from fear and terror!"

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