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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Financial Commitment to Palestinians Renewed

90AE0106A Kuwait ARAB TIMES
in English 9 Jun 90 p 11

[Text] Vienna, 8 Jun (Kuna)—Kuwait has renewed its commitment to continue its support for the Palestinian people in their just struggle to attain their national rights and to back up the Palestinian intifadah against Israeli occupation.

Addressing an informal meeting of donor countries to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA] for Palestinian Refugees (Unrwa), member of the Kuwaiti permanent delegation at the UN headquarters in Vienna, Ali al-Sa'id pointed out that Kuwait's support to the Palestinian people and their uprising against the occupation authorities was not verbal obligation but an obligation supported by figures.

He indicated that the total financial assistance offered by Kuwait in support of the uprising on the official and popular levels had reached \$83 million during the last two years.

Sa'id expressed Kuwait's concern over Israeli inhuman practices and persecution and oppression against the Palestinians under occupation.

Unrwa's Director Giacomelli said that the agency was facing serious financial deficit amounting to \$30 million, indicating that the agency's obligations were badly affected by this failure.

He called on the international community to increase donations to enable the agency to carry out its task for supporting the Palestinian refugees in the occupied Arab land, Lebanon and Syria.

Projects

Unrwa is supervising relief projects for more than 2.5 million Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, especially in the fields of education and health.

Meanwhile, a PLO executive committee member yesterday said that the message sent recently to Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat by the U.S. administration stressed that convening an emergency international peace summit would not provide results and would only demolish peace progress achieved till now.

Sulaymun al-Najjab told a local daily that all U.S. messages whether direct or indirect hold the same contents and are always against the Arabs and the Palestinian people, in particular.

The U.S. veto concerning sending United Nations Security Council fact-finding mission to the occupied lands to investigate Israeli aggressive practice is considered a clear message of defiance to the recent decisions adopted by the summit in Baghdad, the Palestinian official said.

Al-Najjab called on the Arabs to take a unified stance against "this challenge."

Responsibility

He added that the PLO would issue a statement stressing Washington's responsibility for peace in the Middle East. He said the United States was "the only country that isolated itself from the international unanimity that denounced Israel which had refused all concerned efforts to convene an international peace conference."

In a related development, member of Fatah Central Committee Khalid al-Hasan told another daily that the decision by Washington to stop dialogue with the PLO would be a blow to the peace process and a preparation for exploding the situation in the region.

He said, however, that "it is better for us to stop the dialogue which began December 1988 because it was not a real dialogue and we believe that the real dialogue between the United States and the PLO has not begun yet."

He explained saying that real dialogue is not meetings between two ambassadors and exchange of letters as the present case is, but it should be at all levels and in all capitals and not only in Tunis.

He added that "it is better not to continue with this dialogue and to resume it, one day, on a new and solid basis."

He stressed that the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue could not be stopped for ever because the crisis is a moving process.

Force

He added "I do not know what the plans of U.S. officials are, but maybe they do not move or do not want to move seriously unless a war or a military confrontation in the region takes place."

Answering a question on the opinion of the Palestinian leadership about the U.S. demand to expel member of the PLO executive committee Muhammad al-'Abbas (Abu al-'Abbas) from the committee because of the commando operation his front has carried out last week, al-Hasan said "we do not expel anyone in order to appease the United States," adding that this "reflects clearly the American arrogance of force."

Another Kuwaiti daily meanwhile has called for revival of the eastern front and the joint Arab Defence Council to confront dangers facing the Arab nation.

The daily said that "available information from various sources affirm that Israel is preparing for aggression against Iraq and the Palestinian intifadah."

The paper called on the Arabs to learn from the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1980, affirming

that this means that enemies will continue to destroy scientific and technological development in the Arab nation.

Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor because this was the first attempt to break the siege imposed on the Arabs from obtaining necessary technology, the daily noted.

The daily urged all Arabs to unify ranks and stand by Iraq to defend the Arab nation's right to development.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO Response to Nitzanim Operation Given

90WR0182A Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 10 Jun 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Sa'adah Sudah: "Commandos Landed on the Beach of Palestine"]

[Text] More effort is needed to solve a long-standing problem in the Palestinian commando war: weak communication between field personnel and operation leaders. This weakness allows the Israeli enemy to control the media perspective on commando operations carried on deep behind enemy lines.

One did not have to don a tall black hat, rub a crystal ball, and mutter cryptic spells to predict that this third year of the intifadah [uprising] would witness a double escalation—Israeli and Palestinian—in the degree of violence by each side in this phase of the struggle, mostly because of objective factors and identical conditions, although the motives of the two sides diverged and their means were different. It was already clear that the process of political settlement initiated at the Palestine National Council's [PNC] latest session had been derailed because of the American administration's blindness and misreading (and perhaps bad intention) concerning its dialogue with the PLO and because of its failure to give this dialogue the same importance it gives to its contacts with Israel. The level of the dialogue, low to begin with, was reduced to bilateral meetings between the Palestinian and American ambassadors in Tunis.

Instead of taking the idea of ensuring international protection for Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the starting point in the settlement process, the Americans chose the idea of holding vague elections (they did not clarify whether these would be representational or municipal) in the two occupied areas. Palestinians treated the idea positively, despite its implicit casting of doubt on the PLO's representation of its people. Finally, however, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir began to set additional conditions and restrictions that even the Labor ministers in his coalition could not accept. The government collapsed, and Secretary of State James Baker's initiative became irrelevant.

The stages of the Washington-PLO dialogue were accompanied by clear signs of America's lack of seriousness in considering and working for a solution. The most

obvious of these signs was the political confrontation that the Bush administration launched against the Palestinian diplomatic effort that emerged from the nature of the Palestinian strategic choice in the Declaration of Independence and the Political Statement issued by the 19th session of the PNC. Confrontations took place in the United Nations, with repeated vetoes in the Security Council. This also happened in other international agencies: UNESCO, Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], World Health Organization [WHO], and even the Red Cross.

It was against this background that the naval operation by Palestine Liberation Force [PLF] fighters took place against Israeli military targets on the Palestine coast between Herzliyya and Ashqelon, a distance of about 70 km. On the commando side, the operation resulted in four commandos killed and 12 others captured; the Israeli side is still concealing its losses in the context of its general blackout of the events and field engagements of the operation in an attempt to downplay it and its success. To this end it is following a number of media lines, such as:

First, the Israelis have attempted to hint that Israeli army intelligence had prior information about the time and place of the operation. This could be seen as follows:

- Former Minister of War Yitzhaq Rabin announced that he had had such information for five months, while other sources believed that the time of the operation had been moved forward to make it look like a reaction to the Rish'on Letziyon massacre in which eight Palestinian workers were killed by an army recruit, Ami Papar, as well as seven others by soldiers' bullets.
- A report was published saying that the secretary of Kibbutz Ga'ash, north of Yafo, where the engagement between the commandos and the soldiers took place, had received official warning the day before the operation of possible infiltration in the area of the kibbutz. The newspaper DAVAR and Israeli Army Radio, which published the item, did not mention the number of times this kibbutz and others had been warned on the basis of mistaken information and deductions without the existence of any operation.
- Israeli television began its coverage of the events by broadcasting a film showing bathers on the beach, asserting without proof that an amateur had taken it the same day, and followed the film with shots of the capture of some of the commandos. This hinted indirectly at the existence of foreknowledge and readiness for the operation.

Second, the commandos were said to have reached the shore exhausted and careless, and had not fired a single shot at soldiers or civilians. One of their boats was said to have been wrecked while they were leaving their mother ship 200 km from shore, and two other boats were said to have stopped because they ran out of fuel. The leaders of the commandos were said to have been on board the mother ship, but did not disembark with their

soldiers. These and other stories were aimed at casting doubt on the planning of the operation and its military leaders.

Third, although this contradicted some other versions, the aim of the operation was asserted to have been to carry out a large massacre in Tel Aviv. Headlines in the main Israeli newspapers the next day were unanimous about this. This version was the backbone of the media campaign to brand the operation as terrorism and call on the American administration to halt its dialogue with the PLO on the ground that the PLO had clearly not renounced terrorism.

Chief of Staff General Dan Shomron went so far as to assert that the commandos had reached the beach at the settlement of Nitzanim south of Tel Aviv as the result of "a calculated risk by the general staff." Without considering whether this version was true or false, was there a wager that the commandos would fire on civilian bathers, thus providing a good opportunity for media exploitation?

Nevertheless, there are a number of indications of the operation's relatively great success and of the falseness of the Israeli assertions. For example:

1. The very fact that the commandos were killed confirms that they engaged the Israeli soldiers.

2. In one of the pictures that Israel made public, the barrel of a 14 mm caliber gun was visible. It was bent up, indicating that the commandos had used this gun at its maximum firing range.

3. Disagreements appeared within the army command concerning the investigations of negligence in confronting the commandos. A report in YEDI'OT AHARONOT (3 June 1990) on the authority of a high officer fit into this context. The newspaper reported that "army officials are doing all they can to cover up the results of the investigations made during the last few days concerning the episode of infiltration by sea."

4. Some military analysts made positive acknowledgments about the performance of the commandos. For example, Ron Ben-Yishay, in the 31 May issue of YEDI'OT AHARONOT, said, "The saboteurs have become not only more daring, but also more experienced and professional." On the same day, MA'ARIV's military commentator pointed to "the existence of development in the action, a process of broad study, training, and long-range plans, in addition to deep intelligence activity and logistic preparation." He concluded that "the saboteurs learned lessons from similar operations in the past. This time they were very close to a tremendous success."

5. There were newspaper criticisms aimed at the army's ability and performance in dealing with the operation, although one must not forget that these public criticisms avoid many essential points subject to military censorship. For example, MA'ARIV's commentator

said: "The Israeli navy's early warning network did not prove completely successful in dealing with the broad sabotage operation." He added: "There is one clear fact, that a boat carrying 11 armed men, equipped with a cannon and a Katyusha launcher, succeeded in landing on the beach in broad daylight and despite a state of maximum sea, air, and land alert in the ranks of the army." YEDI'OT AHARONOT subsequently reported a similar evaluation on the authority of a high officer: "The firm fact is that the armed men arrived inside the borders of Israel and successfully crossed and penetrated the early warning network. They also succeeded in penetrating the defensive network, particularly the military intelligence network. This means that there was only a step between what people are describing as having been a success and a national disaster."

Strangely, the United States confidently hurried to describe the operation as "a terrorist attack," despite having heard the Israeli version, which indicated that although the commandos had landed on the beach at Nitzanim, where there were hundreds people bathing and relaxing and dozens of civilian boats, they had not fired a shot at these people. This indicates that their objective was military, even according to this version. There can be no doubt that the concept of terrorism, which has been rejected by the PNC, the highest Palestinian lawmaking body, does not apply to military objectives, but includes only the targeting of civilians whether inside or outside of occupied Palestine.

Observers believe that the American threat to stop or suspend the dialogue with the PLO if it abstains from condemning the operation and retains Brother Muhammad 'Abbas (Abu-'Abbas) within its ranks is nothing but a miserable attempt to create a distraction so that America itself does not hear the coup de grace that Shamir administered to the Baker initiative on 15 March, when the government coalition in Israel collapsed because its head refused to deal positively with the American plan. The demand that 'Abbas be removed from the PLO Executive Committee is the other side of Shamir's attempt to choose the Palestinian representatives to the settlement negotiations. It ignores the democratic nature of the Palestinian coalition and the fact that the legislative body, the PNC, has the right to decide in the matter.

By no logic can the PLO be considered responsible for the operation, despite its not having condemned it, and despite the fact that the operation for a number of reasons is in harmony with the latest PNC resolutions. These reasons include the following:

First, there is no direct or implicit Palestinian pledge to stop the armed struggle against Israeli military targets. While the political statement of the 19th PNC session affirmed the rejection of terrorism, it renewed its "commitment to UN resolutions that affirm the right of nations to resist foreign occupation, colonialism, and racial discrimination and their right to struggle for their

independence." One cannot divide the content of the Political Statement and choose only what suits the United States.

Second, the operation was never discussed within any official Palestinian framework, either in the Executive Committee or in the Supreme Military Council. The heroic commandos who carried it out are not individuals in the Palestinian National Liberation Army that is directly under the Executive Committee and President Yasir 'Arafat as general commander of the forces of the Palestinian revolution.

Third, the American administration earlier, especially during the months of February and March 1988, attempted to raise a storm about operations then being launched by the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP] from southern Lebanon, but finally concluded that the PLO was not responsible.

Our stating these facts, such as they are, must not be interpreted as a disavowal of the necessity and legitimacy of armed struggle, which all the members of the United Nations, except the United States and Israel, have approved. However, we think that the choice of the politically most appropriate time for carrying out such heroic operations constitutes a necessary condition for assuring their full effectiveness. The commanders who supervised the planning of this operation should carefully study and examine it from all sides to extract the lessons and to profit from it in regard to whatever similar future operations they may be preparing, particularly since there were some obvious gaps and deficiencies in execution that must be fundamentally remedied. For example:

- One must make sure that preparations for an operation are completely secret at all stages prior to execution.
- There must be an attempt to find solutions to the long-standing problem in the Palestinian commando apparatus: weak communication between field personnel and their leaders. This allows the Israeli information media to control the media aspect of any of these operations by making information public or hiding it. While some aspects of this problem are bound up with the very nature of commando work, solutions to the problem are not so difficult.
- The most important thing is to work to ensure that similar operations are completely effectiveness and beneficial. The slogan should be, "Nothing less than complete success." Otherwise, there are other forms and methods for carrying on the armed struggle and striking the Israeli military and economic machine to support the Palestinian peace initiative and our people in their uprising.

It remains to be said that the Palestinian objective for the coming period is to confront American blackmail, bearing in mind that the stridency of the American threats cannot hide the weakness of their logic for long.

It is very unlikely that this sharpness will be translated into a practical stand such as halting the dialogue with the PLO or suspending it for long. This dialogue is not merely a Palestinian interest. It is basically in the interest of the United States. It is one of America's important points of entry into the region and one of the most prominent appearances of its role in seeking a settlement of the Middle East crisis. Things will not go so far as America's closing this point of entry with its own hand.

One does not have to don a tall black hat, rub a crystal ball, and mutter cryptic spells amid the smoke of incense to predict a double escalation—Israeli and Palestinian—in the degree of violence in coming months of this year. The continued political standstill, the obstruction of Palestinian diplomacy, and America's persistent reluctance to shake a stick in the face of those who have put stumbling blocks in the path of the Baker plan—these things leave no other choice to many in the Palestinian camp, and in the Arab camp also.

Current Political Platform of DFLP Presented

90AE0064A Nicosia AL-HURRIYAH
in Arabic 27 May 90 pp 6-13

[Article: "Important Document Issued by DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] Political Bureau; Current Political Tasks of Our Front and of Palestinian National Movement"]

[Text] Our people's glorious intifadah [uprising] continues. It is going through its third year of a popular, comprehensive, and ever-escalating confrontation with the occupation. It is opening its path with immense sacrifices made under the banners of the war of national liberation. All our people's masses, whether in the countries where they live as refugees or in the diaspora, unanimously embrace this intifadah as a tangible reflection of their unity and their fused collective will, which is polarized in the direction of the central national objective, namely: evacuating the occupation and securing the right to repatriation and self-determination, and to embodying the independent national state on the soil of the West Bank, of Gaza Strip, and of Arab Jerusalem.

The valiant intifadah is nurtured by our people's determination and by their deep yearning for freedom and independence. In turn, the intifadah nurtures and sharpens this determination in the turmoil of the daily confrontation against the occupation and against its settler troops. The totally popular and profoundly democratic character of the intifadah is confirmed daily in the occupied homeland's towns, villages, and refugee camps in the heated and massive clashes, and in the profound and broad ongoing effort that seeks to crystallize and develop the instruments of the people's authority which replaces the occupation authority and its instruments.

In the glow of the intifadah, the proclamation of the state of Palestine, and the Palestinian peace initiative, our people's unity is strengthened daily at home and abroad.

And their solidarity with the resolutions of the 19th PNC [Palestine National Council] session (November 1988) and of the PLO Central Council (October 1989) is growing stronger.

At the Arab level, the intifadah has reshaped Arab solidarity with the Palestinian national issue, as made evident by the unanimous approval given by the Algiers summit (June 1988) and the Casablanca summit (May 1989) to the Palestinian peace initiative emanating from the PNC session. This was also made evident by the adoption of and support for the intifadah objectives, by recognition of the state of Palestine, by the call to expand the sphere of international recognition of this state and of the PLO as our people's sole legitimate representative, and by the call urging the need to hold an effective international peace conference with the participation of the PLO and of the other parties to the Middle East conflict in order to secure a comprehensive and balanced solution. The intifadah, proclamation of the state of Palestine, and the Palestinian peace initiative have rehabilitated the central character of the Palestinian issue and the special and distinctive role of our Palestinian people's national movement (embodied in the PLO) in the center and forefront of the general Arab national struggle. The intifadah, the proclamation, and the initiative have created the objective base to enable the Palestinian national decisionmaking gain greater independence in formulating and offering solutions that take our people's supreme national interest into consideration.

Internationally, the intifadah and the Palestinian peace initiative have created a climate replete with a sympathy that has been embodied in the broad recognition of the state of Palestine and in the various forms of solidarity with our people's just national rights. The intifadah and the initiative have also scored outstanding and tangible successes in Asia, Africa, and the Islamic world generally, not to mention the socialist countries and the East European countries.

In the western world, Europe has moved toward a more positive stance vis-a-vis our people's struggle and their national rights. This has been embodied in raising the level of PLO representation in many of these countries, in the common positions taken by the EEC countries toward our people's right to self-determination (the Madrid summit), in the development in the Scandinavian countries' positions, and in the position toward the international conference, the comprehensive settlement, and the PLO's right to participate in this conference. Moreover, important capitalist countries, such as Japan, Canada, and Australia, have developed their position in the direction of dealing with the PLO, of recognizing our people's right to self-determination, and of demanding a just and comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflict.

Under the pressure of the intifadah, of the Palestinian peace initiative, and of the development in the international positions, the United States has also been compelled to partially alter its positions. It has launched an

initial dialogue with the PLO and has partially altered its behavioral mode of open hostility toward the PLO and our people's national rights in the direction of vague and maneuver-oriented modes which are represented so far in limited tactical adaptation to the phase of the intifadah and the peace initiative, considering that it is no longer possible for U.S. imperialism, nor is it in its interest, to confront this broad Palestinian-Arab-international front with the same old methods and language of open hostility. The United States has resorted to artifice and vague formulae to escape the traps of international isolation in the most important center of regional tension—a center which the intifadah has turned into a current and explosive problem at the local, regional, and international levels.

At the Israeli level, the intifadah has left its profound consequences and has created an ever-escalating crisis in the society and the government. With its comprehensive character, its continuity, and its depth, the intifadah has surprised the State of Israel and its civilian and military occupation agencies that are still groping about to innovate and apply methods to confront this intifadah. Many of the Israeli civilian administration's agencies and instruments in the occupied homeland have collapsed and instruments of the alternative national authority, embodied in the specialized people's committees, have risen on their debris. Broad masses have joined in confronting the Israeli agencies of oppression and the settler troops. The economic merger and annexation plans have gone awry as a result of the boycott of Israeli goods, the efforts to achieve self-sufficiency with the national alternatives, the riots, and boycotting work in the Israeli plants, establishments, and projects for long and intermittent periods of time.

With these developments as a base, our front's Central Committee held its session in February-March 1990 and conducted a comprehensive critical review of the front's policy from the time the intifadah erupted until the present. The committee also held a detailed discussion on the current political situation and on the action tendencies and tasks that emanate from it. The critical political review resolution was published on the pages of the central magazine (AL-HURRIYAH) and other publishing platforms. On the basis of the reports submitted to the Central Committee and enriched by the committee's discussion, the Central Committee unanimously approved the conclusions concerning the political and struggle tasks facing our front and the Palestinian national movement.

Our front's policy emanates from the belief that the central task in this phase is to entrench and develop the intifadah and to insure its continuation and escalation in order that it may accomplish the objectives defined by the PNC's 19th session and by the Palestinian peace initiative.

The total major developments which our people's valiant intifadah has created at the local, regional, and international levels and which constitute qualitative action in

the course of the realistic revolutionary national process impose on our front, our people's entire national movement within the PLO's framework, and the UNC [Unified National Command], specific tasks to develop the intifadah and to strengthen our national unity on the path of repatriation, self-determination and independence, and bringing the victory hour closer.

Current Political Tasks of Our Front and of Our People's National Movement

First: At Palestinian Level

1. Adhere firmly to the resolutions of the PNC's 19th session, confront any endeavors to swerve from or to back down on the resolutions, and adopt them as a basis for the Palestinian political movement and for mobilizing the efforts to implement them. These resolutions, especially the independence proclamation and the Palestinian peace initiative, have provided a tangible translation of all aspects of the phased national program and have shaped this program in a tangible political plan that defines the Palestinian people's and the PLO's vision of the bases of the political settlement to the Palestinian issue and to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Adherence to the Palestinian peace program approved by the PNC requires a clear definition of the program's fundamental elements which are embodied in seeking a comprehensive and balanced political settlement that guarantees Israel's withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories Israel has been occupying since 1967, and in enabling the state of Palestine to exercise its sovereignty and its authority over its territories in the Palestinian [West] Bank, Arab Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. This settlement should also provide guarantees of security and peace to all of the region's states, and should solve the Palestinian refugee issue on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolutions since 1948. The settlement should be developed through negotiation within the framework of an effective international conference held under UN supervision and with the participation of the five permanent Security Council members and all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO as an equal enjoying the same rights as the other parties. The conference should also be convened on the basis of the UN legitimacy which combines Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, on the basis of guaranteeing recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights, especially the right to self-determination, and in accordance with the UN resolutions on the Palestinian issue.

The Palestinian peace initiative reflects the PLO's readiness and determination to reach a comprehensive settlement based on balanced interests: an independent Palestinian state in the [West] Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip in return for peace. The peace terms (including recognition, the nature of the future relations between the region's states, and the international security arrangements and guarantees) are all subject to

mutual negotiation within the framework of the international conference to guarantee "balanced interests and compromises" between the parties to the conflict.

2. Escalate and develop the intifadah, entrench its popular democratic character, mobilize the broadest popular sectors within its various frameworks and activities, and prevent its bureaucratization through foreign intervention seeking to create bureaucratic alternatives to the intifadah's popular frameworks, especially to its people's committees, and to diminish the popular frameworks and devoid them of their democratic content.

Maintaining the popular character of the people's committees and specialized committees in their capacity as committees to which all the people's factions, regardless of their organizational or political affiliation, belong requires confronting the endeavors to transform these committees into factional committees and to restrict their membership to the supporters of this or that organization. It also requires fighting any tendencies to deal with the people's committees and specialized committees with imperative methods because such methods will strip them of their democratic content and will make the masses abandon them.

The level of vigilance and awareness the intifadah has attained through the rich experiences it has accumulated throughout more than two years makes it eligible to move to a more advanced phase than the phase of the spontaneous and semiorganized eruptions it experienced when it first exploded. The mainstays, bases, and instruments which make it more organized and permanent have come to rely on a broad and organized popular movement.

The new phase requires, among other things, developing the role of the labor unions and uniting them on democratic bases so that the working class may have its unified instruments that are capable of managing the battle of defending its interests and rights, and organizing its role in confronting the occupation. This saddles the Higher Labor Council with major tasks. The importance of unifying the labor movement in the occupied homeland and of bolstering its role is, perhaps, the most significant lesson learned from the battle of the magnetized identity cards—a battle which the brave Gaza workers have waged with a befitting spirit of struggle.

Moreover, the new phase requires developing the people's committees in their capacity as the popular authority's instruments that deal with the masses' urgent social and living problems. They organize the tasks of the strike teams by virtue of their being the framework that incorporates society's young groups. This is so that these tasks may expand to include, in addition to the confrontational tasks against the occupation forces, the tasks of defending the national and social institutions that are vital to the masses and the tasks of participating in political and social activities and actions and in voluntary work in the towns, refugee camps, and villages.

The new phase also dictates strengthening and developing the UNC's role, ending the external bureaucratic intervention in its affairs, fighting all the endeavors to impose custodianship on it, developing the relations of democratic alliance between its factions, enhancing its role so that it may become the intifadah's chief of staff in word and deed, insisting on designating the UNC as the main channel that is honest in delivering the requirements of steadfastness and support to the intifadah. It also dictates striving to prevent the PLO bureaucratic agencies from pumping funds through corrupt channels that divert the funds to factional directions that are, most often, remote from the intifadah's backbone, which is represented by working and toiling masses and by the production projects. It has also become necessary to create provincial unified commands, to boost their role on the instructions of the central UNC, and to strengthen the unity and the role of the various sectorial councils (women's, youth, student, health, education, and so forth) in developing solutions to the problems experienced by the people's various sectors.

3. Mobilize our Palestinian people's masses inside Israel and abroad and enhance their role in supporting and backing the intifadah materially and politically. This requires:

A. Elevating the role of our Palestinian people in the 1948 territories in supporting the intifadah, considering that this role continues to be below the realistically possible role, establishing and developing our organized action among their ranks, and developing the Israeli democracy and peace camp to support the intifadah on the basis of ending the occupation and recognizing our people's right to self-determination and negotiation with the PLO. This requires our front to establish the broadest relations with all the influential political forces in the 1948 territories that recognize our people's right to self-determination and to independent representation, regardless of these forces' general ideological or political affiliations. Our front must take the initiative to support the efforts seeking to establish a frontal alliance between the Israeli democracy and peace forces so that these forces may play their role on the Israeli scene, pressuring the Israeli Government to negotiate with the PLO and to recognize our people's right to self-determination.

B. Elevating the role of the steadfastness camps and the Palestinian concentrations in the Arab countries so as to enhance their national role in organizing the process of providing material, popular, and political support and backing for the intifadah according to their local conditions. This means continuing and developing the efforts to form the unionist national frameworks suitable for performing this task which tops our people's, our national movement's, and our front's agenda. It also means boosting the role of the popular national federations so that they may continue performing their task at this level. It further means developing and strengthening relations and establishing various forms of cooperation with the local democratic and national forces so as to boost the support given the glorious intifadah with all the

popular, political, material, and propaganda means. This is in order to pressure the Arab states so that they may fulfill their commitments in accordance with the Arab summit resolutions, to elevate the degree of their material and political support for the intifadah, and to impel the Arab states to put tangible pressure on the United States so that it may respond to the intifadah's demands and to the effective international conference initiative. This is in order to secure a comprehensive and balanced solution to our national issue and to the Middle East crisis.

C. Escalating and intensifying well-studied military operations inside the enemy's state so as to support the intifadah and to disperse the enemy army's capabilities while preserving and protecting the profound popular democratic character of the intifadah in the Palestinian [West] Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip.

D. Mobilizing the Palestinian communities in the diaspora, especially in Western Europe and the Americas, in order that they may provide the intifadah with material, political, and propaganda support and that they may, in cooperation with the peace and progress forces particularly, form living forces that exert pressure in the interest of recognition of the PLO, of our people's right to self-determination, and of the need for a comprehensive and balanced settlement within the framework of the effective international conference and that expose the enemy's violations of Palestinian human rights and international treaties. All this requires participation in creating organizational forms that unify these communities' efforts and that eliminate the obstacles from their path.

E. Letting the PLO bureaus play an active role in mobilizing the communities abroad and in establishing relations with the local political, social, literary, and spiritual forces, parties, and figures, so as to employ them in the interest of enhancing the campaigns of solidarity with and support for the intifadah.

F. Impelling the political and diplomatic activity of the PLO institutions on the basis of the PNC resolutions, the Palestinian peace initiative, and the Central Council [resolutions] (October 1989), in a manner that secures the broadest support for this activity and the broadest material and political support for the intifadah, in accordance with the Casablanca summit resolutions. This should be done to strengthen the PLO's role, status, and independence, to gain greater support from the world public opinion, especially in the United States and in West and East Europe, to expand the international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people's right to self-determination and of the Palestinian state, and to enhance the regional and international efforts for convening the effective international conference under UN supervision and with the participation of all the parties to the Middle East conflict, including the PLO and the five permanent Security Council members. This requires:

1. Adhering to the PNC's 19th session resolutions, to the Palestinian peace initiative emanating from this session, and to the Central Council resolutions (October 1989), confronting any swerving from or backing down on these resolutions, because this is likely to open the door to U.S. and reactionary Arab pressures and to create confusion in the Palestinian, Arab, and international ranks, and confronting the imperialist and reactionary endeavors to put pressure on the PLO so that it will back down on the resolutions of our PNC and Central Council and will submit to the U.S. and Israeli conditions.

2. Rejecting the separate and partial solutions and all the liquidationist schemes that diminish our people's national rights, as defined by our PNC's 19th session, that disregard the PLO's role in representing our people, and that seek to fragment the unity of our people, their cause, and their future, and insisting on the comprehensive and balanced solution within the framework of the international conference.

The Shamir initiative, the Egyptian 10 points, and the Baker plan represent a series of plans that counter the Palestinian peace initiative and the comprehensive and balanced solution within the framework of the international conference. They seek to revive the Camp David scheme, to shatter the unity of our people at home and abroad, to fragment the solution to their national issue, to undermine the singularity of their representation, to exclude the PLO's role, to manufacture an alternative leadership of figures acceptable to the United States and Israel, and to enable this leadership to arrogate the right to negotiate in the name of our people and to replace the PLO as their representative.

The PLO leadership must continue to declare frankly that it will not submit to the pressure of these schemes and to the endeavors to drag the PLO toward the procedural steps that aim to implement these schemes. The schemes contradict the Palestinian peace initiative and the bases of the just and comprehensive solution on which the international community (excluding the United States and Israel) has unanimously agreed. Such a clear position is likely to rapidly deadlock these schemes and to foil their objectives, which seek to contain the intifadah and to procrastinate and gain time with the purpose of suppressing the intifadah.

Clear adherence to the Palestinian peace initiative and to the Central Council resolutions and ceaseless and tangible efforts along this line are what will enable the PLO's political movement to boost the Palestinian national efforts and the regional and international efforts seeking, in word and in deed, to convene the international conference.

3. Adherence to the Palestinian position, (and Arab position embraced in Casablanca), on the plan for elections based on an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories, held under UN supervision, and constituting part of a comprehensive settlement within

the framework of the international conference. These bases are identical to the Namibian solution model which was developed under the patronage of the United States itself. In this case, the elections will be a consequence of, not an inlet to, the negotiations on the comprehensive settlement. And the task of the elections will be defined in paving the way for exercising the right to self-determination and to independence according to an agreed timetable, as has happened in the case of Namibia. This is different from the task defined by Shamir's plan, namely the task of selecting a Palestinian team to replace the PLO and to negotiate on the basis of the plan for "administrative rule" under the occupation's umbrella.

4. Adherence to the Central Council resolutions (October 1989) and to the bases they spell out for dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue process. Our front's position toward the proposals concerning this dialogue is defined on the basis of our realization that this dialogue gains its purpose and its advantage in serving the peace process from the fact that it is an official dialogue between Israel and the PLO. The dialogue can thus perform its task in eliminating one of the most significant obstacles on the international conference's path by securing Israel's recognition of the PLO as a negotiating party that represents the Palestinian people. In order that this objective be accomplished, the dialogue must be founded on the five principles underlined by the PLO's Central Council, namely:

The PLO's absolute right to form and announce the Palestinian delegation without any intervention by any other party. The Palestinian delegation to the dialogue must be a PLO delegation and the PLO is the party that appoints the delegation members from home and abroad on a decision by its collective leadership bodies. Adherence to this principle means refusing to discuss the names of the Palestinian delegation members or the bases on which the delegation is formed with any outside party. It also means resisting the U.S. and Israeli pressures that seek to dictate certain formulae for forming the delegation from notables living at home or from such notables and a number of deportees. These formulae seek to pass the endeavors to separate home from abroad, to break our people's unity, to transform our national issue into a local issue concerning the occupied territories' population and the Israeli occupation—an issue detached from its international and regional framework—and to determine the dialogue framework in advance and in a manner that is compatible with the principle defined by the Shamir plan.

The dialogue must take place on the basis of an open agenda and without prior conditions. The Palestinian delegation to the dialogue must adhere to the Palestinian peace initiative.

The dialogue must be held under UN supervision and in the presence of the five permanent Security Council members.

The dialogue must be included within the framework of the process of preparing for the international conference.

G. How successfully these tasks are accomplished depends on how strongly the PLO institutions adhere to the resolutions adopted with national consensus and the resolutions of the PNC's 19th session and is tied closely to how successfully we work and struggle among our people's ranks within the intifadah and in the diaspora to defend our realistic national unity-oriented policy with a persistent and long-drawn unionist spirit that is detached from the narrow transient calculations. This policy must be tackled with integration and according to the priorities dictated by the current struggle phase and the special nature of the Palestinian condition. This means that our policy at this level must emanate from the nature of the main conflict controlling the national liberation phase being undergone by our Palestinian national movement, which is experiencing a raging conflict between the occupation and all classes of our Palestinian people. The alliance between these classes is dictated by the central objective of the Palestinian national struggle, namely to remove the occupation and to gain independence and repatriation. National unity within the PLO's framework constitutes the essential condition for triumph in this qualitative phase of the national independence war.

Because national unity is a frontal coalitionist unity between the political and organizational tendencies representing the varied social classes and factions within our people's ranks, and because what emanates from all this is diversity in deriving tasks and solutions to deal with the political, organizational, material, and practical developments that crop up in the course of the struggle, the law that governs the alliance between these tendencies is the law of "unity and struggle." This is unity over the political program whose main focus is to remove the occupation and achieve national independence, and struggle to develop the positions of the main allied forces in a realistic national and unionist direction at the political, tactical, and practical levels, and also struggle to restrain the tendencies for vacillation, indecision, and retreat, or the tendencies for rashness and adventurism. This dictates adoption of the following principles and tendencies:

1. Establish the alliance with the brothers in Fatah on the basis of common adherence to the resolutions of the PNC's 19th session, to the Palestinian peace initiative emanating from the PNC, and to the Central Council resolutions.

The priority given to the relationship with Fatah derives from Fatah's character as a popular national movement enjoying broad influence among the people's ranks and occupying the main position in the PLO leadership. The alliance between our front and Fatah has always constituted the certain guarantee for the PLO's unity. The relationship with Fatah must not be confined to the bounds of the relationship with Fatah's leadership but must be directed toward all of Fatah's organizational and

popular cadres and bases. It must address them with the language of the realistic unionist national political program and of the collective resolutions, must spread democracy in the alliance relations and tangible democratic reform within the framework of the PLO, of the other national unity institutions, and of the general national popular federations, and must adopt varied tactical policies and organizational and practical structures and steps that emanate from this relationship in order to bolster the alliance and the national unity.

Our front seeks to entrench this alliance. It is eager at the same time to pursue its independent policy, which emanates from the supreme national interest, in accordance with the national consensus program that is represented in the resolutions of our PNC and the PLO Central Council, and in accordance with the requirements of the intifadah and of the Palestinian peace initiative. Among the masses and within the PLO institutions, our front engages in open criticism of the harmful policies and of all the positions that swerve from the PNC and Central Council resolutions with a constructive and unity-oriented spirit. Our front also exercises its policy of criticism out of its eagerness for national unity, and remote from the fabrication and exaggeration of disputes, without submissively following the national bourgeoisie's steps and tactics, and remote from the adventurous leftist tendencies. Our front seeks to deal with the contradictions that emerge in the ranks of the broad national alliance within the context of preserving the unity of the PLO and its institutions.

2. The alliance relations with our brothers in Fatah are not a bilateral axis and they do not at all mean isolation from other forces. This is why our front struggles for cordial and fruitful national alliance relations with all the national factions, forces, and notables. Our front also seeks to develop and entrench its relations with the leftist and democratic forces in the Palestinian arena, led by the Popular Front and the Palestinian Communist Party, in emulation of the national and democratic alliances within the framework of the PLO and of the intifadah's UNC. It further seeks to open broader practical horizons for developing the relations between the national and democratic forces on the basis of the realistic and unity-oriented national consensus program.

Since the second national congress, our front has emphasized that the issue of the Palestinian left's unity occupies an important and distinguished place in our general national and unity-oriented struggle and that the left's unity constitutes a significant and fundamental guarantee in streamlining and developing our revolution's procession and in preserving and constantly strengthening our people's national gains.

Moreover, the Palestinian left's unity within the PLO's framework and the broad national unity gains extraordinary importance in this phase, and under the umbrella of the local, regional, and international developments. Within this context, the front appreciates the Palestinian Communist Party initiative which has emanated from

the party's latest Central Committee session, and has urged the left to unite. In the initial dialogue held so far, our front has expressed its readiness to embark on a fruitful and serious dialogue with the party and with the Popular Front, so as to give these common tendencies their tangible expressions and embodiments in a manner that serves the entire current national process, and to bolster the national unity among our people's ranks, in the PLO, and in the intifadah's UNC in order to remove the occupation and wrench independence.

[3. missing from text]

4. Democratic reform in the PLO:

Work to correct and develop the alliances and relations within the PLO's tendencies, frameworks, and institutions on the basis of a serious and tangible struggle to accomplish democratic reform within the PLO institutions and in the national popular organizations, in accordance with the principle of proportionate representation, to purge the PLO institutions of flabby and corrupt bureaucratic frameworks, and to put an end to all the aspects of financial and administrative corruption in the PLO institutions and all channels of delivering aid to the intifadah outside the UNC.

Waging the democratic reform process requires giving priority to the issues that concern our people's masses in the occupied homeland and outside it. Primarily, this requires efforts to end the bureaucratic intervention in the movement's national and popular affairs at home. This dictates reshaping the political, organizational, and fiscal relationship between "home" and "abroad" on the basis of actual involvement in the leadership of the national movement at home in formulating the PLO's political, organizational, administrative, and fiscal tendencies. The urgent task at this level is the drafting of advanced fiscal programs to aid the intifadah and its people in light of the current experience so as to insure that this aid is channeled toward the broad masses and the unionist, professional, and production institutions that play a national role, as well as to the areas that nurture development of the intifadah and escalation of the popular resistance to the occupation. This is provided that this is done through and under the supervision of the UNC, the people's committees, and the popular frameworks by relying on them as the sole channel of delivering aid to the intifadah and of bolstering its valiant steadfastness and by particularly involving them in formulating the fiscal policy of our people who are under occupation.

The democratic reform slogan must be transformed into detailed and tangible slogans that are raised according to a specific timetable that insures their implementation and the accumulation of democratic transformations at the various levels. The achievement of tangible accomplishments at the level of democratizing the PLO institutions and the national popular federations, and at the level of respecting their democratic rights and preventing outside intervention, is likely to make the masses more

confident that it is possible to accomplish broader reforms in order to achieve the fundamental reforms required to reinforce alliances within the context of national unity, and to enable the PLO institutions to mobilize the capabilities of millions of our people to serve the intifadah and bring the victory hour closer.

Moreover, spreading democracy in our front's ranks, renouncing the mentality of administrative control, developing and entrenching the view of the democratic popular organizations as frameworks within which the masses exercise direct democracy from bottom to top and through which programs and alliances are formulated and efforts are made to infiltrate the masses at a broad level that responds to their immediate national interests. This is likely to strengthen the masses' and the democratic forces' trust in our role and in our slogans for achievement within the PLO democratic reforms that will insure actual participation in the political decision-making and in the collective solutions for whatever is new in the intifadah's course and in the entire national process, and that lead to developing sound and balanced relations within the context of national unity and to enhancing this unity.

Second: At Palestinian-Arab Level

1. The axis of the Palestinian-Arab relations is built on securing maximum support and backing for the intifadah and for the Palestinian peace initiative on the basis of the PLO's independence, which has been clearly bolstered by the intifadah and by the Palestinian peace initiative. This independence was acknowledged and reaffirmed unanimously at the Casablanca summit. This summit's resolutions give the PLO a significant weapon to manage its relations with all the Arab states on the basis of equality and respect for the PLO's independent ability to manage its relations without getting involved in the Arab axes, and to proceed in its relations with each Arab state on the basis of independent national decision-making, of the Palestinian peace initiative which was adopted by the Arab summit, and of recognizing the state of Palestine. Our front struggles among the masses and within the PLO ranks for balanced Palestinian-Arab relations inspired by the supreme Palestinian national interest—the interest of the intifadah's victory and of national independence—remote from any pivotal ties, custodianship, containment, or consideration of the regional interests of this or that state.

Our front, as a main party of the PLO, seeks to normalize the PLO relations and our bilateral relations with all the Arab states in accordance with these principles and on the basis of respect for the PLO's right and our front's right to pursue our independent national policy and to employ these relations to strengthen the intifadah and to bolster the PLO's independent Arab and international status.

2. Strengthen the relations with the Arab liberation and progress movement and try to enhance this movement's role in mobilizing the Arab masses to support and

back up the intifadah materially and politically, to pressure their governments in order that they may strengthen their adherence to the Algiers and Casablanca resolutions, and to demand that these governments implement the resolutions seriously and that they employ the Arab capabilities to serve the intifadah, to expand the scope of international recognition of the state of Palestine, and to put tangible Arab pressure on the United States to make it retreat from its pro-Israel policy and recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people, as well as our people's right to self-determination, and speed up holding the international conference. This movement's role should also be enhanced in order that it may mobilize the masses to demand that the Arab economic, political, and military relations with the United States be used as an instrument of pressure in this direction. Within this context, it is necessary to intensify the efforts to speed up building the Arab front that supports the intifadah on bases which insure that the intifadah remains independent and that it does not become hostage to any Arab regime and also insures that the broadest Arab national forces and figures join this front.

3. Palestinian-Jordanian relations:

Establish the relations between the PLO and the Jordanian Government on the basis of equality, entrench recognition of the independence of the state of Palestine on the basis of mutual adherence to the two fraternal peoples' supreme national interests and of nonintervention in internal affairs, exert efforts to support the intifadah and bolster our masses' steadfastness, and embark on joint movement within a collective Arab framework toward a comprehensive and balanced solution within the framework of the international conference.

Jordan's adherence to the Casablanca summit resolutions since it proclaimed its administrative and legal disengagement from the occupied Palestinian [West] Bank, the democratic developments that have occurred since the April 1989 uprising, and the popular steps taken to support the intifadah materially, open a broad horizon for the PLO, the Jordanian Government, and the Jordanian national democratic forces to build the relations between the two peoples and the two states on sound and distinctive bases in accordance with our PNC's resolutions and on the basis of mutual adherence to the Casablanca resolutions, supporting the Palestinian peace initiative, and coordinating with the PLO according to these principles, so as to block the path in the face of any future U.S. and Israeli efforts to revive the "Jordanian option" to which the Shamir plan refers.

These developments require us and the PLO to continue to normalize our relations with the Jordanian Government, to strengthen our relations with the Jordanian national forces, to support the democratic transformation procession, and to boost the governmental and popular solidarity with the intifadah.

4. Palestinian-Syrian relations:

It is important to launch a dialogue between the PLO and Syria on the basis of the Casablanca summit resolutions and without any prior conditions by any party so as to normalize the Palestinian-Syrian relations and to establish them on the basis of equality, fraternity, respect for the independent Palestinian decisionmaking, adherence to the Casablanca summit resolutions, support for the Palestinian peace initiative and for the intifadah, and joint struggle within the context of the Arab summit resolutions for a comprehensive and balanced solution that guarantees restoring the occupied territories and our Palestinian people's national rights. Efforts must be made through this dialogue to solve the problems that continue to obstruct the normalization of Palestinian-Syrian relations, especially the problems of releasing the Palestinian political detainees, of recognizing the state of Palestine officially, and of protecting the Palestinian national presence in Lebanon. Normalizing Palestinian-Syrian relations is likely to develop the participation of the steadfast refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria in the popular political and material struggle to support the intifadah and our people's general national objectives. Normalizing relations is also likely to contribute practically to convening the Arab five-member meeting in accordance with the Casablanca summit resolutions.

5. Palestinian-Lebanese relations:

Al-Ta'if accord provides a basis for containing the devastating civil war the country has been witnessing for long years. This war has recently contributed to draining extensive local, Arab, and international capabilities in sidebattles and internal battles and to diverting attention from the intifadah and from the requirements of supporting this intifadah and backing the Palestinian peace initiative. Ending this war on bases that guarantee Lebanon's unity, that guarantee the complete liberation of its territories, and that preserve its independence, its Arabism, and its democratic development is likely to contribute to clearing the atmosphere, to bolstering Arab solidarity on the path of mobilizing the efforts for a balanced and comprehensive solution to the region's conflict, and to speeding up convocation of the international conference.

We struggle to unify the Palestinian national policy in Lebanon on the basis of bolstering a "national concord" process relying on the al-Ta'if accord which enjoys almost comprehensive Arab and international support, of refraining from joining the regional axes' conflicts in Lebanon, of steering away from intervention in the inter-Lebanese conflicts, and of seeking to normalize the relations with the legitimate Lebanese Government emanating from the al-Ta'if accord.

In Lebanon, we struggle to protect and rebuild our refugee camps and to preserve our people's national and civil rights and their right to join the armed resistance against the Zionist enemy in the occupied south, in cooperation with the Lebanese national resistance, and

to proceed from there in the direction of Palestine. We work to bolster relations with the Lebanese national and Islamic forces on the basis of respect for the security of the camps and of joint struggle against the Israeli occupation of the south while refraining from involvement in the internal Lebanese conflicts.

6. Palestinian-Egyptian relations:

The Egyptian Government's recognition of the state of Palestine and its approval of the Casablanca summit resolutions have formed the inlet to normalizing the relations between this government and the PLO. This is the inlet through which our front must proceed to normalize its relations with the Egyptian Government on the basis of respect for our right to pursue and express our independent policy. Such normalization is likely to influence the course of the Palestinian-Egyptian relationship in a manner that reinforces the independence of the PLO and its resolutions, that bolsters its political initiative, and that serves the process of supporting the intifadah and its objectives. This relationship will also contribute to confronting the endeavors and pressures seeking to divert the Palestinian-Egyptian relationship from its bases of equality, adherence to the Casablanca resolutions, respect for our people's right to independent representation through the PLO, and support for the Palestinian peace initiative. Emphasizing these bases is likely to protect the PLO from the endeavors that seek to impel it to respond to U.S. pressures and schemes. Moreover, strict and clear adherence to these bases is likely to enable the PLO to influence the Egyptian Government's positions within the bounds of adherence to the Casablanca summit resolutions and to convince this government to stop offering proposals such as the "10 points" which are incompatible with the Arab summit resolutions and which ignore the PLO and our people's right to self-determination, as they ignore the international peace conference aimed at achieving a comprehensive and balanced settlement.

Normalizing the PLO's relations with the abovementioned Arab states (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt) is likely to secure the conditions for agreement and cooperation between them and the state of Palestine on convening the five-member meeting and on coordinating the common movement to speed up convocation of the international conference in accordance with the Arab summit resolutions and the international resolutions.

7. Palestinian-Iraqi relations:

The relationship with Iraq occupies an important position by virtue of Iraq's role in supporting the PLO and the Palestinian peace initiative, and its weight in the Arab arena. This requires continuing the efforts to give this relationship its effective and positive character on the basis of the Algiers and Casablanca summit resolutions, of bolstering our people's intifadah, and of developing an Arab solidarity that defends our people's rights and that seeks to develop a common Arab position to pressure the United States. This is so that it may respond

to convening the international peace conference and to the necessities of a comprehensive and balanced solution, and so that this position may defend the supreme common Arab interests against Israeli expansionism and U.S. and Israeli threats against Iraq, Libya, and other Arab countries.

Our front has made a positive stride in normalizing the relationship with the Iraqi Government in a manner that respects the independence of the political line and the national decisionmaking of both sides. Our front supports fraternal Iraq in the face of the imperialist U.S. and Israeli threats aimed at Iraq. Our front also supports Iraq's right to defend its national soil and to contribute to defending Arab soil.

8. Our relations and PLO relations with Algeria:

Algeria has constantly pursued a policy of honest solidarity with our people's struggle. Under difficult circumstances experienced by our revolution, the PLO, and our national movement, Algeria, along with the Democratic Yemen, tended the Aden-Algiers' accord for restoring the PLO's unity, hosted the PNC which convened in February 1983, the unity-oriented PNC of April 1987, the Arab summit for supporting the intifadah, and the PNC's recent 19th session. Algeria also hosted the latest session of our Central Committee. The PLO is required to constantly develop this relationship. Our front will continue to work to entrench the Palestinian-Algerian relationship and to establish it on a firm base of fraternity of struggle that serves the interest of our two peoples and countries.

9. Our relations and PLO relations with Yemen:

The relationship between the Palestinian revolution and both parts of Yemen has been distinguished by a spirit of sincere cooperation and struggle solidarity. Profound historical relations have developed between our front and the 26 September and 14 October revolutions. Yemen has always embraced our people's just cause and has displayed toward our people a spirit of solidarity that has reached at times the extent of participating in our people's blood sacrifices and martyrdom.

The PLO always expresses its eagerness for this fraternal relationship and seeks to constantly develop it. Our front struggles from its fundamental position in the PLO and our people's ranks to entrench this relationship on the basis of the common struggle that serves the noble objectives of the two fraternal Palestinian and Yemeni peoples.

While Yemen prepares to proclaim the unity of both its parts, our people, revolution, support Yemen's procession toward unity, and view this unity as a support for our people's struggle.

10. On the same bases and in light of the same principles, i.e. the principles of adherence to the Casablanca summit resolutions and respect for the independence of the PLO and our national decisionmaking,

efforts must be made to normalize our front's relations with the other Arab countries, especially countries where major Palestinian communities with relatively large numbers live, at both the popular and official levels. This is in order to develop the PLO institutions and the Palestinian communities' methods of action, particularly the role of the PLO bureaus and embassies, considering that these bureaus' and embassies' relationship with the Palestinian masses is afflicted with the maladies of domination and waste. Correcting this situation with our people's concentrations is likely to contribute to enhancing these concentrations' role in providing material, political, and propaganda aid for the intifadah, as well as enhancing their role with the local forces and bodies.

Third, at Palestinian-International Level:

1. The qualitative change that has developed in world public opinion toward our national issue by virtue of the continued intifadah and the Palestinian peace initiative has led to including the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict in the agenda of international meetings as one of the most significant and serious regional conflicts requiring a political solution. This development has occurred under the umbrella of considerable relaxation in international relations, particularly between the two superpowers. This relaxation is applying pressure towards seeking political solutions for regional conflicts, including our region's conflict.

These changes create a convenient climate for further developing world public opinion in the direction of the Palestinian peace initiative, our people's rights, pressuring the United States and Israel to deal with this initiative seriously, and to hasten convocation of the international peace conference.

This international climate that is in favor of the intifadah will not continue automatically. It requires a Palestinian strategy that mobilizes all the elements of strength in the intifadah and that employs the intifadah's Arab and international ramifications and interactions to expand the scope of the intifadah's alliances and to intensify the isolation of the Israeli enemy and the policy of its U.S. ally in our region. The climate of relaxation and the tendency toward settling regional conflicts will not necessarily be reflected automatically in a settlement of the Middle East crisis unless the local regional elements ripen and unless a certain proportion of local, Arab, and international forces apply pressure in the direction of a solution.

If international relaxation creates better conditions for exposing the aggressive imperialist policy and intensifies the blockade on this policy, then it is evident that this relaxation does not abolish this aggressive tendency and does not diminish its danger. Recent developments, the latest of which is the invasion of Panama, the immense U.S. pressures that led to the Sandanistas' fall in Nicaragua, and the continued policy of aggressive intervention in Afghanistan, indicate that U.S. imperialism is

trying to exploit the relaxation policy and the reduced tension in international confrontation to improve its positions in numerous parts of the world and to escalate its offensive against the national liberation movements. This aggressive U.S. tendency leads to obstructing the development of peaceful solutions to regional conflicts—solutions that actually guarantee "balanced interests and compromises" between the disputing parties. This applies to the U.S. Middle East policy which continues to be based on exclusive U.S. control of the region, on endeavors to reduce the Soviet role into a secondary role, and on obstructing the efforts that seek to convene the international conference.

On the other hand, the Namibian solution model and the situation in Central America (Cuba, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, despite the outcome of the latest elections) and in Afghanistan and South Africa, confirm that the steadfastness of the national liberation forces and their struggle to create proper local balances of forces are what leads to making the actual local, regional, and international conditions ripe for the development of political settlements actually based on balancing the interests of the parties concerned. On this basis, international support and backing can be mobilized and conditions can be created to take advantage of the international climate that is putting pressure in the direction of political solutions for regional conflicts.

2. The PLO policy must emanate from this base. Taking advantage of the current international transformations and developments requires a Palestinian movement based on a complete strategy whose mainstays are: Continued development of the intifadah; mobilizing material, political, moral, and propaganda support for the intifadah at the Palestinian, Arab, and international levels; organizing daily action within the Israeli society; developing the level of [PLO] influence in the countries that influence Israel, particularly the United States and Europe; continuing the movement started with other countries, particularly Japan, Canada, and Australia; and coordinating closely with the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, other socialist countries, the nonaligned countries, and the Islamic and African countries. The PLO's political and diplomatic movement seeks to gain greater support and backing for the intifadah and for the Palestinian peace initiative and gain greater recognition of the state of Palestine and the PLO. Simultaneously, this policy seeks to impose greater isolation, including economic and diplomatic sanctions, on Israel and to pressure the United States to make it develop its position toward our people's issue, toward their right to self-determination and independent representation, and toward convocation of the international peace conference.

3. The Palestinian political movement seeks to bolster relations with the Soviet Union, to entrench coordination with the Soviets on the steps pertaining to the entire peace process, and to reinforce the friendship and cooperation with the PRC and the other socialist countries.

The call for entrenching the relationship with the friendly Soviet Union must not stand as an obstacle in the face of raising the issue of Jewish immigration to Israel, (and the issue of accepting Israel as a compulsory final station for this immigration).

What is happening under the false slogan of human rights constitutes a flagrant aggression against the Palestinian people's national and human rights and poses the threat of Israeli expansion to the neighboring Arab countries. The problem is a Palestinian national problem insofar as its dangers are concerned, a regional problem insofar as its ramifications are concerned, and an international problem insofar as its origins and the responsibilities for solving it are concerned. Therefore, it is our duty and the PLO's duty not only to raise the issue and discuss it with the Soviet Union but also to try to develop a clear and unified Arab position toward it—a position that must be discussed within the framework of the Arab summit as soon as possible.

The developing situation requires crystallizing, with a spirit of high national responsibility and positive pragmatism, a unified Arab position toward Jewish immigration and coordinating with the Soviet Union and with all the countries concerned about developing an international solution to this problem, so that it may not be solved at the expense of our Palestinian people and the fraternal Arab peoples.

4. The latest developments in East Europe require the PLO and our front to crystallize new methods of action to deal with the new and developing reality and to weave the broadest relations with the new political forces in these countries. The new situation requires new forms and new methods that guarantee the broadest support for our people's liberation cause and for the Palestinian peace initiative, and that expose the aggressive Israeli expansionism and the U.S. role in obstructing a balanced and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the current developments in the East European countries, which automatically supported and backed our people's struggle by virtue of their previous belonging to the socialist bloc, dictate dealing with these developments in light of the new reality. Public opinion and forces that do not give us the same pure support as in the past and that are even inclined at times to disavow this support and its justifications have developed in these European countries. Furthermore, these countries are subjected to immense economic and political pressure by U.S. imperialism and all forms of blackmail are practiced against them so that they may line up with the camp opposed to the peoples' struggle. The PLO is required to develop the broadest relations with these countries so that it may retain their support for our national struggle. The PLO must also deal politically and informatively with these countries' peoples and with their political and social forces in a manner that befits their new conditions. Our relatively large student communities in these countries—communities that are highly organized within party

frameworks and that are led by our party organizations—are required to make an extraordinary effort to explain matters without hostility to the old and new political parties and forces and to these countries' public opinion. Our front is also required to preserve its relationship with the old ruling parties in light of their new positions, and must try to establish a clear and frank relationship with the new forces to guarantee continued sympathy and support for our national cause. Moreover, the PLO shoulders, from its official status in the Arab League and through its broad relations with all the Arab countries, the burden of pushing in the direction of developing cooperation between these countries and the Arab countries, so as to weave a network of interests based on mutual benefits and to seek to create reasonable common factors with these countries. It is extremely important to prevent the frustration tendency from developing among the ranks of the liberation forces as a result of the political tremors that are being experienced by these countries or as a result of the initial successes achieved by the U.S. and Israeli pressures in some of these countries. This is a new struggle arena and we must observe all the available openings and possibilities for positive action in this arena.

5. Seek to develop the relationship with the West European countries, Canada, Australia, and Japan, reinforce the positive developments in their positions, expand the scope of the movement of these developments, expose the bloody acts of oppression perpetrated against our people's intifadah, expose the Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories, entrench the relations with the broadest forces, parties, unions, and humanitarian institutions to make them channel their pressure in the direction of demanding economic and political sanctions against Israel and recognizing the state of Palestine, and raise the level of the relationship with the PLO on the basis of recognizing its full representative nature. To serve this tendency, additional efforts must be made to establish and entrench the relationship between the front and the communist, socialist, democratic, and liberal forces and parties, with the Greens Parties, and with all the progressive and enlightened forces in these countries.

Palestinian-U.S. Dialogue

Work to continue the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue in its capacity as a preliminary form of negotiation and of tacit U.S. recognition of the PLO, and on the basis that working to push this dialogue toward tangible results will contribute to overcoming the obstacles in the path of a balanced and comprehensive solution.

This is why we must confront the U.S. endeavors to transform the official dialogue channel into a marginal channel and even to obstruct and replace this channel, as has been done with the Egyptian channel since August 1989, and especially in recent months. The PLO leadership shoulders prominent responsibility in entrenching

the tendency toward dealing with the Egyptian Government as an actual alternative to the official dialogue between the PLO and the U.S. administration.

Therefore, efforts must be made to correct this situation and to stand fast in the face of the U.S. and rightist Arab pressures that seek to surpass confining of Palestinian representation to the PLO and to create alternatives to the PLO. Pressures on the PLO seek to form a delegation from elements from the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip exclusively, and to make the PLO practically back down on the PLO Central Council resolutions. This requires our front and the sound democratic and national forces in our people's and the PLO's ranks to confront any endeavor to bargain away, confiscate, or overlook the PLO's representative role.

The U.S. administration has tried to exploit this dialogue to put concentrated pressures on the PLO, to blackmail for concessions, and to impose prior conditions. It is now obvious that retreating before these pressures has not helped make the PLO eligible to be an acceptable party in the negotiations (U.S. maneuvers over Palestinian representation and bypassing direct dialogue in favor of intermediary Arab and non-Arab channels). All this has not facilitated convocation of the international conference. The U.S. administration has continued its pressures to weaken the PLO's negotiating position and to diminish its role in the peace process and has even made attempts to exclude the PLO and urge it to play an invisible role in facilitating the formation of a Palestinian delegation from the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip. This is with the obvious objective of creating artificial alternatives to the PLO, of excluding the international conference formula, and of diverting the course of the political process toward the labyrinths of partial solutions and the "step-by-step" policy.

Even though the United States persists in its policy of intransigence, of partiality to Israel, and of encouraging Israel's inflexibility, continuation of the Palestinian-U.S. dialogue with a unified and cohesive national policy that relies on a continued and escalating intifadah, on an expanded scope of Arab and international solidarity with the intifadah, and on the changes the intifadah is creating in the world countries, in Israel, and in the U.S. public opinion, is likely to intensify the siege against the intransigent U.S. position. This is in order to compel this position to gradually acknowledge the PLO's representative character and our people's right to self-determination, and to revive the efforts to tackle the need to convene the international peace conference.

6. Intifadah and worsening crisis in Israel:

The intifadah has created a tremor that is causing greater and greater interaction within the Israeli society and, by one degree or another, within the Israeli parties, with their various ideological positions and political programs. For the first time in 42 years, an Israeli cabinet has fallen under the pressure of the intifadah and our Palestinian national cause. The Israeli cabinet crisis is

intensifying under the pressure of the intifadah and the Palestinian peace program, and it is becoming more obvious day after day that there is no way out of Israel's domestic crisis without the presentation of an Israeli peace plan that responds to negotiation with the PLO and to our people's right to self-determination. The intifadah and the PLO have rejected Shamir's plan which is, even in the eyes of its author, no more than an interceptive propaganda plan aimed at containing the Palestinian peace initiative and the broad international will that calls for a comprehensive and balanced political settlement within the framework of the international peace conference.

Forming a new Likud cabinet, even a broad coalition cabinet, and operating on the basis of Shamir's plan will not lead the Israeli society out of its current political crisis. Regardless of how far it goes, the Israeli suppression machine will not be able to contain and break the intifadah. By the admission of the enemy's generals, "there is no military solution for the intifadah. A political solution must be sought."

The rightist developments in Israeli society, on which the Likud and the fascist parties positioned its wager, have—with their expansionist program that denies our people's right to end the occupation and to secure the right to self-determination—embroiled the Israeli society in a domestic crisis that persists by virtue of the intifadah and the broad international political balance of forces, which supports our people's right to self-determination and their pursuit of a comprehensive and balanced solution. Meanwhile, the right's expansionist policy, which is drunk with the dreams of the "greater Israel" as a result of the deluge of Jewish immigration, is countered by the rise of our people's masses in the heart of Israel. It is essential to intensify the pace of this rise and to increase the size of Israeli democracy and peace forces which, if rallied behind a common peace program, can play a tangible role in pressuring the Israeli governmental decisionmaking in the direction of negotiating with the PLO and recognizing our people's right to self-determination.

Exerting efforts in the direction of Israeli public opinion, parties, and society constitutes an important axis of the PLO's political and propaganda activity and our front's activity to expand the democracy and peace camp. Extraordinary and ceaseless efforts must be made in the direction of the enemy's society and public opinion to explain the Palestinian national struggle objectives as made evident by the Palestinian peace initiative. The UNC and the broad cadres working within the intifadah's framework shoulder the main burden of addressing Israeli public opinion with the proper language and weaving relations with the Israeli organizations, forces, tendencies, and figures that support or display inclinations toward sympathizing with our people's right to self-determination and toward negotiation with the PLO. Such a response constitutes the indispensable base for laying the foundations of a comprehensive and just peace with our people in the region.

Organizing tangible and joint activities with the Israeli peace-seeking forces is tantamount to putting on the Israeli authorities a pressure that is likely to grow with the intifadah's continuation and development and to sharpen these very forces' awareness of the need for further struggle to achieve comprehensive and balanced peace. Organizing such activities also bolsters our masses' morale and spurs their spirit of initiative and of going on the offensive in resisting the occupation and settlement activity and in insisting on convocation of the international conference and on our people's right to self-determination and independence.

Our ceaseless struggle on the path of achieving these tasks in their entirety and along their main axes and our front's vital and direct role in confirming these tasks and in the common action to boost the PLO's role on their basis is likely to impel the intifadah and our national cause toward certain victory.

Victory to the intifadah. Long live the PLO as our people's sole legitimate representative. Onward.

The Political Bureau, May 1990.

ISRAEL

Effects of Political Crisis on Arab Sector

90AE0073C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
9 May 90 p 7

[Article by 'Avner Regev]

[Text] The political crisis raging today also affects Israel's Arabs, who are now trying to consolidate a central force to be placed between the main political forces.

In advance of Independence Day the Central Statistics Bureau published data showing that 18.5 percent of the overall population in Israel is Arab. The electoral potential of this population amounts to about 14 Knesset seats. The ultra-Orthodox parties, Agudat Israel, SHAS [Torah Observing Sefardim] and Degel Hatorah today control about 13 seats, and they are the swing vote for the whole government.

The political crisis raging today also affects Israel's Arabs, who are now trying to consolidate a central force to be placed between the main political forces—Likud, Ma'arakh, the religious parties and the Arab bloc. The Islamic movement, which is leading this strategy, believes that a political union of forces will facilitate the application of the electoral potential of Israel's Arab population.

A lot of criticism has been leveled lately at the Arab MK's [members of the Knesset] who led the negotiation with the Labor party to set up a government. The negotiations were carried out on two levels—one, on the vote of no confidence and the second, in the framework of Shim'on Peres' attempts to form a government. Many

in the Arab community argued that on the list of demands presented by the Arab MK's, no emphasis was made on prioritization nor any indication given that something was more or less important.

Thus it happened that the demand to open additional classrooms came together with the demand to return to their homes those who had been dislodged from 'Iqrit and Bir'am. With demands presented in this fashion, the Labor party could actually postpone many of the demands with a promise to set up investigatory commissions to study the demands that were postponed. The coalitional negotiation that took place and is taking place now, presented problems of immigration and absorption, along with the issue of economic priority regarding the problems of the Arab sector, in order of importance.

Misleading Pronouncements

Another serious mistake was in the pronouncements of a number of Arab personages who raged against immigration and thereby associated themselves with the PLO and Jordan. They thus aided those who see the Arab MK's as "PLO agents" and push for the delegitimization of those MK's. It has been written and said many times already that immigration is the heart and soul of the Jewish people and the essence of the existence of the State of Israel, and it was a mistake to express opposition to it. (It should be noted in parentheses that among those who deal with the issue in government offices, there is great anger at the President for not coming out against this phenomenon, though he did express his opposition to the attempt to put down the Arab MK's).

Now it seems that the Islamic movement has gotten the message and is working for a union of political forces in order to raise the problem of Israel's Arabs on the State's scale of priorities. The various factions in the Islamic movement all united around the call of Shaykh Darwish from the Triangle—support that was difficult to discern until recently, especially on the part of members of the movement from the Galilee. The movement intends to convoke a national congress shortly in the Negev, to be held in the settlement of Tel Sheva, where a bedouin representative of the movement resides. At this congress they intend to consolidate the main forces for a common drive in the next Knesset elections.

The Radicals Are Getting Stronger

Another outcome of the political crisis is the strengthening of the radical bloc—the Committee for the Defense of the Lands. Until now this Committee had no legal standing. Now a battle is raging to register it as a public corporation. The strengthening of this committee came at the expense of the Committee of Arab Council Heads, which sees itself as the leadership of Israel's Arabs. The Committee for the Defense of the Lands is now increasing its membership and is also busy in areas that previously were the purview of the Committee of Arab Council Heads, such as illegal construction and the destruction of homes.

One of the heads of this committee, the priest Shihadah Shihadah, is attempting by this activity to concentrate political strength that expresses more radical positions, and be a partner to the Committee of Council Heads, about which complaints have increased of late. This hidden competition is likely to make the Committee of Council Heads realize that it must act energetically to turn itself into a supra-party framework in the next Knesset elections.

Christian Organization

This activity brings in its wake the organization of the Christian population in Israel. Lately there has been a tendency among the Christian-Arab elite, that does not include the party activists, to act to set up a political framework under the title of the "Christian Democratic Party." These people, who work apart from the large parties, claim that the essence of their activity is against the Muslim organizations, which leave them on the sidelines and in which they have no part. Among the goals of the framework, it is possible to discern two principal claims—the one, to act to prevent the emigration of Christians from Israel, and the other, to return to a "pristine splendor" in the town of Nazareth; i.e., the "capture" of the mayoralty from Rakah [Israeli Communist list] and the Muslims. (It seems to me, by the way, that this organization has missed the boat, and the Muslim movement has gained strongholds even in settlements with a lot of Christians).

One of the interesting demands of this organization is recognition of the right of Israel to make Jerusalem its capital. It seems strange, but the logic behind this demand is to prevent the possibility in the future that Jerusalem, or a part of it, be recognized as the capital of the Palestinian state to come. This back burner Christian activity suffered a serious blow at the time of the settlement in the Christian quarter, but the decision of the High Court of Justice brought color back to the cheeks of those who tie their future to the State of Israel.

These organizations, the Muslim and the Christian, will raise the problems of Israel's Arabs on the national agenda. This will be the case if a single framework arises that acts in advance of the coming Knesset elections to win a significant number of Knesset members. The country's leaders, on the right and on the left, would do well to pay heed to these developments before we are again faced with a surprise that we are hard-put to deal with.

Development of Military Intelligence Discussed

90AE0078C Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Jun 90 p 6

[Text] "The IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] will have something to say if and when Iraqi forces enter Jordan. That would be a new situation that we would have to deal with," said the head of AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence], General Amnon Shahaq, yesterday at a meeting with military correspondents in connection with Intelligence Corps day. The head of AMAN's research

brigade, Brigadier General Dani Rotshild, said: "Military cooperation between Iraq and Jordan is increasing."

Brig. Gen. Rotshild added: "This cooperation has not yet reached the point of introducing Iraqi forces into Jordan, since the two countries understand the significance of such a step, but everything that might be done up to that point has already been done."

He explained that for Jordan, in its difficult situation, Iraq is today "the best sponsor, despite the fact that it annoys the Syrians and involves a certain danger," and from Iraq's point of view, "her entry into the area of nonconventional weapons obliges her to use Jordan's territory as warning space."

The head of AMAN said that the Iraqis are building bases to launch ground-to-ground missiles, the aim of which is to deter the State of Israel in areas adjacent to the Jordanian border.

The chief intelligence officer, Brig. Gen. 'Oren Shahor, listed new Intelligence Corps projects:

- An improved miniature drone, "Searcher," manufactured by the Aviation Industry, which is more reliable and has a much greater capability to stay in the air.
- Mechanized digital mapping that will provide more precise data.
- The start of an overall process of mechanizing the Intelligence Corps.
- Projects that improve the ability of the field security division to listen to lines.

As to the attempted strike from the sea that was foiled last week, the head of AMAN felt that it "would weaken the hands of the terrorist organizations so as to keep them from trying it again." He added that the terrorist organizations are continuing to prepare for aerial strikes, to train and to purchase special equipment for that purpose.

As to the PLO's political goals, Brig. Gen. Rotshild said there was a tendency among some of the PLO leaders to move to the negotiating table and to pressure Israel via the U.S., but he was not sure that group would continue to set the PLO tone over the long haul.

Changes in Drone Technology Described

90AE0068A Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR
in Hebrew Apr 90 pp 20-23

[Article by Sharon Sadeh]

[Text] Every flight of a drone is a mystery unto itself: there is no absolute certainty that the drone will come back in one piece. The Air Force's drones are obsolete, of low reliability and suffer from a weak body structure and technical problems that have caused some of them to crash. Recently it was decided to reequip with new drones. Now we only have to choose.

"Pilotless planes—is that how the Air Force of tomorrow will look?" was the headline of a large article published in BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in November, 1972. Those in the Air Force's drone squadron respond with a somewhat confused smile to people who come to check out the squadron's inventory and accomplishments in light of the boastful scenario of that article. Indeed, a lot of time goes by from the time a certain concept gells to its operational implementation (in parentheses we will simply note that in that same issue was an initial sketch of a strange plane which was given the code name of Panavia-2000, better-known today as the Tornado), but despite the 18 years that have passed since the squadron was established, the promising scenarios have remained on paper.

The drones were attributed with many virtues. They were spoken of in revolutionary terms. People hoped they would completely change the nature of the battlefield, save costs and replace pilots in missions likely to expose them to danger. Further, the possibility of managing battlefields by "remote control," without excessive bloodshed through the use of ammunition-carrying drones ("violent drones"), drones for intelligence and interdiction, and all-weather drones was predicted. There was even talk of Stealth drones...but theory is one thing, and reality something else. As they enter the nineties, the Air Force's drones are not carrying out missions significantly different from those assigned more than 15 years ago when the first Firebee drones were acquired from the U.S. firm of Teledyne Ryan. It is still a matter of photographic sorties carried out in different areas. These sorties supply high quality aerial photographs from different angles for the Force's pilots, but no more than that. The vision of smart, multi-mission drones is far removed from reality.

Superficially, the squadron of drones and miniature drones is distinguished by an extraordinary calling card: In the entire Air Force there is no squadron composed of such a heterogeneous population of soldiers. The Force has no squadron so completely at the mercy of the weather, and when it is finally able to send aircraft aloft, the launch is limited to a single plane. An additional factor, the lack of which is felt—the squadron has never even come close to bringing another plane down which would give it a good feeling.

On the other hand, we have here a regular and available cadre of professionals who deploy the tools of their trade in minimal time, professionals who know every switch, electric wire and pipe, professionals who have learned to live with uncertainty, who have learned to contend with the feeling of frustration that accompanies the cancellation of a launch. That, it turns out, is a very important part of the game.

Losses in the Air

One fact that cannot be debated: Over the years the squadron has lost a number of drones. This data can be explained by the fact that the drones, unlike manned

aircraft, are not equipped with the sophisticated protection and backup devices that exist on modern planes. The Firebee drones, to give a concrete example, are based on technology of the sixties. Because of that, their reliability was not high, and they suffered from a number of technical problems in the drone's only gyro that caused a number of them to be lost. That and more. The body structure is very weak and cannot withstand a direct parachute drop, even if it is slowed gradually by the parachute. Parachuting occurs only if the aerial recovery process fails, i.e., if the helicopter charged with collecting the drone while it is still aloft misses its catch chute and does not haul it in. In that situation, the drone's controller has no choice but to rely on the ability of the tow chute. The latter slows the drone's flight until it hits the ground, but then the hit is unavoidable. The serious damage, sometimes irreversible, comes in the form of a heavy blow to the plane's belly and its hydraulic tubing, and, what is more serious, as a blow to the engine, which is mounted in the front of the drone.

Major "A.", a certified controller of drones and miniature drones, explains: "Every flight is a mystery unto itself. There is no absolute certainty that the drone will come back in one piece, and we don't take any chances. We try to preserve every craft at any cost. Even in the case of a possible problem, we prefer not to take the risk and recover the drone as soon as possible."

He adds, with a hint of sorrow: "The drones are not new. The situation is so pathetic that there are a number of hapless drones whose technical crews have branded them with an almost mystical stigma such as, 'this drone has such and such problems and will have them for the rest of its life; nothing can be done.'"

In recent years the need to preserve what we have at any cost has intensified so that we will be able to carry out missions despite the high launching costs which come to a quarter million new Israeli shekels per launch. It was clear that at some point they would have to compensate the squadron for its losses, and, in light of the number of successes in complex operational actions, it was proven beyond doubt that the drones have not lost their usefulness. There is no doubt that the awareness of just how vital they are, has only increased, despite the abundance of hi-tech, observation devices, and the Air Force's intelligence gathering. Thus the decision-making process for the acquisition of drones has gathered momentum.

Today, given the budget struggles for every shekel (or dollar), it was hard to come to a positive decision on re-equipping with a new supply of drones; all the more so in that the process, from the moment the decision is made to check out a specific platform until its acquisition, is very protracted and can take at least a few years. However, it was recently decided to test several types of drones. The operational requirement was formulated a long time ago so that all that remained was to choose between a number of candidates. Nor are the squadron's miniature drones to be left out; a purchase deal for them is also cooking.

There could have been no better timing to improve the squadron's morale. This was an infusion of energy that brought the sparkle back to the eyes of those who serve here, who yearn for "new blood," for new development directions and, most important, for more modern drones than those at their disposal. It was not only the purchase offer that was marked by excellent timing. A letter of appreciation sent recently by the Air Force commander to the squadron also gave them a lot of satisfaction. To hear the people in the squadron tell it, that letter meant more than just a routine expression of thanks. For them it was an expression of renewed confidence in the need for the squadron's existence.

Every attempt to compare the experiences of a pilot who flies a plane to those of a drone "pilot" are doomed in advance to failure. The quotation marks around the word "pilot" make all the difference, it would seem. For the experienced, the essence of satisfaction in flying a drone is in proving technical reliability: launching the drone, guiding it to its target (which may be far away), and recovering it safely. Those activities are not comparable to the physical hardships, the feelings of danger, and the fear of the unknown that real pilots experience. That reliability is acquired, if at all, only through long months of certification and requires "the hands and head of a pilot—nothing less," as one of the controllers (a real pilot) described it. It is no wonder that the overwhelming majority of them are former pilots or reserve pilots.

But beyond the usual professional boasting, the flying of a drone is not, in the final analysis, a sterile mission. The impressive takeoff that lasts two to three seconds gives way to a searching look (and the fear, will there be a problem or not?) at the map that sketches the flight path and the data being received on the gauges and computers in the control car. Only good eyes and a high level of attention will succeed in carrying out the guidance mission, which can last for hours. If we add the flight objective, its path and the nature of the photos, we will be convinced that it is a matter of a mission that is only apparently technical. But, again, the need to preserve the drones turns the somewhat "technical" flight mission into a nerve-wracking recovery operation. In intelligence operations in which the entire squadron must operate in total harmony, without any humbug, the feeling of "just another routine sortie" is replaced by tension that only fades when the drone returns and is hauled in by the Puffin helicopter that recovers it in flight.

The drones were first conceived some time in the twenties. In that era, they began with the development of target model planes that were called "Drones." It was an unmanned plane that flew launches on a pre-conceived flight plan with the aid of an automatic pilot that controlled its landing at a fixed location. From the control center it was possible to carry out only minor changes in the flight profile by deflecting the automatic pilot from one flight to another, by stopping the engine for a certain period or by carrying out a self-destruct during emergencies.

During the sixties the technology was perfected and a basis laid for drones as they are presently known. The innovation was in the ability to control and guide the drone over a long range (so long as it was within the "line of vision" from the control center. For the designers, it was like an opening to a new world. The possibilities it contained were, apparently, unlimited. They were predicting that within a few years, five or six at most (we should remind you that we're talking about the beginning of the seventies) the drone would be able to carry out any mission of a manned plane at similar or higher performance standards since it would be possible to entirely avoid the physical or psychological limitations of the pilot. An experienced pilot can withstand accelerations of up to 9 G's for short periods of time while a drone can withstand prolonged accelerations of 12 G's or more and accomplish tighter maneuvers than an armed fighter plane at any height and speed and thereby avoid the most crowded anti-aircraft defenses. Apparently a strategist's "dream come true!" In fact, the latest developments in this arena are still far from operational. Indeed, manufacturing technologies have been improved, the aerodynamic design has greatly advanced and, of course, the payloads for photographic targets have been perfected over time. In the U.S., where most of the development efforts are concentrated, there has truly been significant progress in this area, but, the "new generation" of drones cannot be defined as revolutionary. They contain conventional improvements required as a result of the advance of technology, but no more than that. Therefore, no real change is foreseen in the principal mission of the drones: intelligence gathering through photography. Either way, as long as no decisions are made to equip with new drones, the controllers, mechanics and electricians will continue to keep their fingers crossed at every takeoff and to hope that this time, too, the drone returns safely without too much damage.

New Models

Only in recent years have the new drones begun to look like the unmanned planes that were still only sketches in the 70's, the fruit of the imagination of designers and engineers. The present-day drone is very similar to a modern fighter plane. It uses the same design, manufacture and control technologies, taking into account, of course, budget considerations. Teledyne Model 324 reminds one, with a little imagination, of the modern F-15. Two vertical direction sticks, stabilizer fins, advanced aerodynamic design, the use of composites and digital control systems, and reliability are only some of the devices that have found their way into the drones.

The obsolete transistors have been replaced by modern microprocessor technology, which promises quicker reaction time, a lower failure rate and the miniaturization of the electronic components.

As a result, the accomplishments of the new generation of drones have been greatly improved, their radar signature has been reduced and their reliability of operation

increased. In comparison to the generation of the Firebee, drones like the 324 have twice the operational range, about 1,700 miles. They can fly low (and thus avoid radar eyes), and even cruise beyond "the line of the horizon"—a technical limitation that has thus far prevented an increase in the operational range of current drones. For this purpose, they were equipped with an advanced steering and control computer that can be pre-programmed. Their speed is in the high subsonic range (0.8-0.9 Mach), and in combination with efficient aerodynamic design, superior fuel consumption was achieved, which is among the principal factors allowing the increased flight range. A further issue to which a lot of attention was devoted is the way in which the drones land on the ground in case the aerial recovery misses. From now on, the drones will not take a sharp hit the moment they touch ground since they have been equipped with inflatable air cushions in addition to the integral parachutes.

Changes Planned in Reserve Duty

90AE0073B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
8 May 90 p 11

[Article by Avi Benayahu]

[Text] The Manpower Branch is quietly preparing a revolution in the area of the reserve service. It will be felt, for example, in a reduction of total days and in call to duty no more frequently than twice a year. They promise that reservists will begin to feel the fruits of the changes as early as this year.

The pronouncement of the head of the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] Manpower Branch, Maj General Dan Goren, a few weeks ago, regarding the "burden of the reserves as one of the components in the decision to emigrate from Israel," drew stormy reactions in the IDF. Even if what General Goren said was taken out of context, or improperly understood, he still did not "discover America." The report of the Lahis Commission, presented to the Jewish Agency a few years ago, dealing with emigration from Israel, brought up the issue of the reserves as a central burden on Israeli society. Ditto, the research of sociologist Dani Zamir of Mishmar Ha'emeq, published by the University of Haifa, and others.

Without any connection to the timing of that pronouncement, the Manpower Branch has been working energetically of late to ease the reserve burden on civilians. This work is being conducted in several channels all the time and can be described as a real revolution, the consequences of which will be felt by reservists as early as this year. The regular IDF call-ups for reserve duty over the last three years, in which the IDF has had to contend with missions in the territories, caused a lot of distortions in everything having to do with the distribution of this burden. Reservists from the fighting ranks complained that they were called a third and fourth time within a year for service in the territories and began to set up organizations to fight the decrees.

According to the data of the IDF's Manpower Branch, the average number of reserve days for a citizen comes to 26. Reservists in fighting units do an average of 27 days, while admin people do just 20 days. By comparison, it turned out that the Military Police carry a heavy yoke; its people are called for 30 days of service in the territories. Action has already been taken in the Manpower Branch to increase the Force's regular nucleus in order to ease the reserve service.

The average data seem deceptive because most of the shouting has come from soldiers of the fighting units, many of whom over the last two years were forced to serve more than 40 days. This sector, which carried on its shoulders the first two years of the uprising, constitutes only a part of the IDF reserve deployment. There was a lot of justice in the complaints by these people that their neighbors and colleagues at work are not called for reserve duty while their contribution is above average.

Within the framework of the revolution being woven for the treatment of IDF reservists, the head of the Manpower Branch, Maj General Dan Goren, issued instructions to deal with several areas. The guidelines are that the annual increase in the call-up of soldiers in obligatory service, who contribute directly to the growth of the IDF, will be exploited in an intelligent manner to release reservists from their assignments. This action is already being carried out in the field, and the regular soldiers are being directed into new frameworks such as "field companies," and into preferred professions in which many reservist serve such as drivers, cooks and medics.

A special commission headed by Brig General Menahem Zatorsqi (today NAHAL commander), which General Goren appointed, to study ways to ease the burden of the reserves, is now consolidating its recommendations and will shortly present them to the Manpower chief. The central recommendation is that "efforts must be made to expand the circle of those who serve in the reserves to lower the burden on the fighting cadres."

Despite the fact that there is a lot to do in this area, there is some danger lurking in its implementation. Who precisely will be responsible, in the event of an escape from a military prison in the territories, the penetration of a gang from Jordan or inappropriate behavior in a clash with terrorists in the territories—if reservists are placed there who are inexperienced and lack operational ability? That is a dilemma that the Manpower Branch and the Chief of Staff will have to deal with together when they make the decisions.

A second recommendation deals with the certifications of the Commission for Economic Coordination, which deals with reservist appeals for postponement of their service for economic reasons, because of studies, etc. The intent in the Manpower Branch is to move toward the citizen and guide those commissions to be "more receptive to the reservists than to the IDF." One of the

proposals raised in this connection is to release almost every student in his first year of studies from reserve service, if possible.

At the same time, and with no connection to the Zatorsqi Commission, the Manpower Branch began about a month ago to place senior officers from units in the rear, up to and including the rank of Brig General, for guard duty in the settlements and security installations in the territories and border settlements. Especially because of budget constraints, the IDF has this year been forced to cut hundreds of thousands of reserve days. The functions of those people are being filled by soldiers and commanders from regular IDF units, especially in the rear.

The mission of service in the territories is better understood today as the mission of the whole army. Even commands like the Air Force and Navy have to "get their hands dirty" with this sort of police duty, and reservists from those forces are being called upon to serve in the territories. Thus, for example, the IDF gave the Air Force command the job of securing the jail facility in Qasiyot. Reservists from Civil Defense, Anti-Aircraft, Gunnery and Medicine tour the streets of Shekhem and Jabaliya.

As noted the results of the feverish handling of the reserve issue will already be felt by the soldiers this year. A reservist this year will serve fewer days than in the year preceding the intifadah. According to the annual work plan, a reservist from the fighting cadre will serve 42 days and his commander, 48 days as compared to 60 days for the soldier and 62 days for his commander in the peak year of the uprising, 1988. By comparison, in 1987, when no one yet foresaw the intifadah, a reservist served 43 days, and his commander, 50.

By the same token, the head of the Manpower Branch, General Ron Goren, instructed the planning and implementation bodies on his staff to take action to set up a "biannual program for the reservist." The idea is that a reservist, who is routinely tied to his family and workplace, should know in advance what his unit's training program and employment will be over the next two years. Of course, everything is subject to changes flowing from the situation. However, even if they should manage to implement 50 percent of the program, it is mainly a question of attitude.

The Manpower Branch also instructed the reserve stores units and the communications units to dispatch the best of Adjutancy's manpower. The operative intent is to gradually replace the female regimental sergeant majors and the female communications officers with experienced veteran officers in ranks up to major (mostly in the reserves), who know the unit and would be in contact with its people on the eve of a reserve call-up and between service periods.

As to the service periods, it was recently decided to call up reservists twice a year at most. That is: only one gap between service times, of at least four months' duration.

Alongside the intensive treatment of the matter and in tandem with the Commission headed by Brig General Zatorsqi, the Manpower chief appointed another four commissions on the reserve question, headed by Lt Colonels or Brig Generals in the reserves. One of them is dealing with the "seam" between regular service and reserve service, aimed at getting the most out of the reservists in the best way possible and maintaining their readiness over the years.

One of the astounding pieces of data in this connection shows that for three years a significant percentage of the fighting reserve units has been lost. Some of them have emigrated from Israel or remain outside Israel for various reasons. Some of them have been lost for medical reasons, and others, for various and sundry reasons. As noted, a special commission is dealing with this matter.

What has been outlined by the head of the Manpower Branch and by the activity of the entire Manpower Branch is accompanied by cooperation on the part of other General Staff elements. All of them feel that the issue of the reserve burden is critical, and since Israel will require a reserve army for many years to come, the attitude, approach and methods of operation must change. The first fruits of that change are already being felt in the field.

Flight of Ofeq-2 Reviewed

90AE0078B Tel Aviv BAMAHA
in Hebrew 23 May 90 p 10

[Article by Sharon Sadeh]

[Text] At the beginning of next week, after a stay of almost two months in space, the satellite Ofeq-2 will come to the end of its life. In the estimation of Dr. Moshe Bar-Lev, head of the Aviation Industry's Space Administration, contact between the satellite and its tracking station on earth will cease on the 28th or, at the latest, on the 29th of the month. According to Bar-Lev, the launch of the satellite and its performance in space were more than satisfactory.

Ofeq-2 moved in a changing elliptical orbit above the earth's surface such that it made a complete revolution approximately every 100 minutes. In practical terms, contact was made with the satellite by the tracking station only six or seven times in a 24-hour period, and the reason for that is simple: "Revolution around the earth from east to west and, in addition, the independent travel of the satellite," Bar-Lev continues, "create a complex movement, similar to a bundle of wires. Only portions of the satellite's orbits pass over the ground station, and according to our calculations, that means six or seven times in 24 hours."

Ofeq-2, unlike its predecessor Ofeq-1, is a more advanced experimental satellite that can manage two-way contact with the tracking station, which is located in the Mabat plant. Its developers implemented a number of additional changes on it: The materials from which

the protective covers were constructed for the various systems were changed to better withstand the radical temperature differentials that prevail in space. The thermal protective covers intended to protect it from the sun's radiation, were improved as well as the satellite's processing systems and computers and those of its tracking station.

"The main problem we had to deal with," says Moshe Orts, deputy director of the Aviation Industry and head of the electronics department "can be summed up in two words: temperature differentials." The satellite is exposed both to the very high temperatures of the sun that come in the form of radiation energy of hundreds of degrees, and, on the other hand, to the -270 degree Celsius cold that prevails in space. The trick is to protect the equipment from this "mess" and keep it functioning. Therefore most of the efforts invested in it were in the area of thermal shielding, which constitutes the crux of the problem. Therefore, every box on the satellite was designed separately so as to optimally dissipate the heat it emits and to deflect the heat it might absorb from outside.

Within the satellite itself various measuring systems were installed to check the heat of the systems and their performance at any given moment. That was also the major part of the information that the satellite sent back to earth.

"I do not dismiss the possibility that in the future a number of tracking stations throughout the world will follow our satellites. But for now, given the limited quantity of information we required from Ofeq-2, the means at our disposal are more than sufficient." In the next several years, says Orts, Israel will bite off a proper slice of the space market. That slice will translate into profits of tens of millions of dollars following the export of technologies and various systems connected with the space arena, which, at the moment, are in the stages of development, testing and manufacture.

Recruits Desire To Leave Country After Discharge

90AE0078D Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] Almost a quarter of army recruits, 22 percent, do not see themselves as citizens of Israel after the end of their service. That was the report of Manpower chief Major General Ron Goren, based on a survey conducted by the army.

The data shows that about 30 percent of the [people involved in the] kibbutz movement are not interested in continuing to live in Israel, while only 12 percent of the young religious-nationalists are not interested.

Maj. Gen. Goren reported further that five percent of the entire draft cycle never get to the call-up bases because they are not in Israel, and ten percent of the reservists, five years after their discharge, are not in Israel.

In contrast to these gloomy statistics, the Manpower chief noted that about 93 percent of the draft-age young men and 95 percent of the draft-age young women would sign up for army duty even if IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] service were not obligatory.

Maj. Gen. Goren spoke during a study day on the topic of "the State of Israel—the Zionist Challenge and the Defense Challenge," held at Bar-Ilan University. He said that about 87 percent of those with fighting ability seek out the fighting units. It was further reported that over 85 percent of the draftees were interested in taking an officer course.

According to Maj. Gen. Goren, he has clear indications that self-interest is more the motivating factor in that choice than the desire to contribute to the Zionist-nationalist cause.

Extreme Right-Wing Parties Profiled

90AE0073A Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
11 May 90 p 3

[Article by Rubiq Rozental]

[Text] It is very possible that the seven MK [Member of Knesset]'s of the radical right will have representation in the Shamir government. Tzomet, Moledet and Tehiya are each mired in one of Israel's wars: Tehiya in the Six Day War, Moledet in the War of Independence and Tzomet in the events in the territories. The last three wars already stick like a bone in the throat.

Now, apparently, they will make it to the promised land. Tzomet, Tehiya and Moledet will be in Shamir's narrow government. The secret seven will finally break out of the underground. Let us become acquainted with these seven nationalist pilgrims along with their spears and lances: the Israeli right.

Here they are in order of importance: Tehiya, with three members; Ge'ula, who is always crying; 'Elyaqim, who is always shouting; and Gershon, who is always smiling. Here is a party that devours its members. Tzomet with Raful A. and Raful B. Moledet with Gandhi, who once and only once dared in the Knesset to express his real feelings about the Arabs and was immediately sent to Canossa. Ya'ir Shprintzaq, who is still pondering his age and therefore has not been heard from since the opening session of the 12th Knesset. No big deal.

Shamir is terrified of the secret seven. That fear leads him, among other things, into the arms of Rabin and a unity government. He has no reason to be afraid. At most this gang will prevent him doing now what Sharon and Moda'i had previously prevented him from doing, and at a lower price.

The three right-wing parties express a paradox in Israeli politics. Despite the common belief that the Oriental communities in Israel are inclined to the right, the

parties of the radical right are Ashkenazi both in language and leadership. The people of the Oriental communities have continued to vote Likud, or have been seduced by the charms of Shas. Gandhi is a dark figure lacking charisma who sprang up in the political marketplace just when a post became available. Moledet seized at least one seat from the refugees of Rabbi Kahane, for whom "transfer" is a vegetarian and cultural idea, after breathing pure Arab hatred in Rabbi Kahane's faction. Gandhi won another seat from the infants of the Six Day War who grew up with the occupation and in its image. Tehiya is the soured promise of the radical right. From the movement of Ge'ula, who printed the likeness of the open-eyed Sabra of Ya'aqov Shabtai on its posters, very quickly sprang a noisy, aging party. Today's Tehiya has nothing to lose but its neuroses. How many divisions does Yuval Ne'eman, the constant complainer, have? How long can people identify with the recycled hysteria of Ge'ula Cohen? How many people from Qiryat 'Arba' will vote for 'Elyaqim Ha'etzni for the neighborhood committee? Let us suppose you belong to the radical right; do you really need those problems?

That leaves us Raful, who brings to the Knesset 30,000 Rafulim who vote for him, and for that you have to tip your hat to him. Raful is a warm person who captures hearts. He is precisely the one who lends the secret seven, elements that the right tends to be proud of—simplicity and popularity. Raful has been shown to be like oil that cannot be adulterated. That is also his problem. After cutting himself off from Tehiya, he has at his disposal only the Raful race. Even in the future that will not win him more than two seats.

Each of the three parties speaks a slightly different language and sucks its milk from slightly different sources. They also have different solutions or emphases on the central question—what to do with the Arabs and the territories. Tehiya doesn't understand why we don't annex the territories, and do it right away. The nucleus of its desire for immediate annexation was the sweet moment Saturday, the day after the Six Day War, when Israel was big, the Arabs fled to the bridges or hid in their villages, Jews fainted at the Wall, everything was ours, and everything immediately got screwed up because we didn't know how to take it.

Tehiya of the nineties is like Count Dracula descending in a flowing black robe unto the territories to bestow the kiss of the final conquest, when he is forced to freeze in his tracks in mid-air, a moment before accomplishing his mission as someone down below waves a bundle of garlic cloves at him.

What is Moledet? Moledet carries the banner of "transfer." What is "transfer?" Transfer is not a sparkling, new idea that sprang up out of the blue in the brains of museum directors. Transfer is an old, worn-out idea that was effectively implemented in the War of Independence. Don't you have some Palmah veteran who, in the goodness of his heart over coffee, will remember the simple, effective and almost unfelt expulsions of the War

of Independence? Expulsions that could be distinguished from voluntary flight by only the thinnest of lines? What, in the final analysis, does Gandhi say? That the work was not finished and that we can finish it with relative ease if only we choose to, if the Gentiles would only close their eyes and if the Palmah would be resurrected as in the old days. And the Irgun should not get in the way. Transfer is not a stupid, unethical, satanic program. Transfer is also, today especially, a romantic idea, an illusion of fighters growing old around the lit hearth in 'Afeqa.

What is Tzomet? Tzomet carries the banner of peasant protectionism that twinkles in the image of the people of Hashomer and the veterans of the moshavim and moshavot. Tzomet was born of the same flesh of the Labor movement, and were Raful to try to return to his roots, he would long ago have joined up as a brigade commander in Ma'arakh. Tzomet is the tender branch of an old trunk, the development of an authentic line of the Labor movement that preached the holy trinity: immigration, settlement, defense. The central bloc of the Labor movement has for many years, had to show that there were still ways to look at the Arab problem besides through the barrel a gun, and that it was worthwhile to adopt the principles of compromise and political understanding. Raful and those of his ilk simply missed that lesson and were left stuck with the holy trinity in the pure form of the experiences and images of the thirties and forties -a house in a moshav, olive plantings and endless warring against mustachioed Arabs plotting conspiracies from the adjacent village. Practical Zionism vis a vis the "events." Thus the Secret Seven are stuck, each in his own party, in one of Israel's past wars. Tehiya in the Six Day War, Moledet in the War of Independence and Tzomet in the "events." All of them draw strength from days gone by, in which one just war succeeded another and lent reason and meaning to our existence here. The last three wars already stick like a bone in the throat. Tehiya lost Sinai in the wake of the Yom Kippur war. Raful thought he was going to impose law and order on a neighboring village and got stuck with Sharon in Beirut. Rabin expelled several dozen Arabs for Gandhi in the days of the intifadah ("the way that was proven to be most effective"), and immediately a thousand Arabs were born for each of those expelled. Each of the three parties apparently has a promising program of action, but in retrospect it turns out that the program is nothing but a romantic copy of a local myth.

What, then, is the function of the Secret Seven in Shamir's government, apart from supplying the precious merchandise of seven seats? It is doubtful if government membership will improve them. Thus far Gandhi has been acting like a wolf without teeth. Shamir and Sharon devour ten like him for breakfast. Ge'ula will try every morning to remove Yuval Ne'eman from the government until she eventually provokes a rift with him. Only Raful will derive real profit from a government post, especially if he accepts a defense post. As a mutation of a Mapainik [Israeli Worker's Party], authority might fit him to a tee. But that is not the point. The parties of the

right in Shamir's government will take upon themselves the function of gadfly. If Shamir tries to continue on his historic path; i.e., not to move in any direction under any circumstances, the Secret Seven will remind him insistently and by their very presence in the government, that the time has arrived to act in the right direction—forward into the past and long live warfare on the way.

Campus Activity in Territories Examined

90AE0065B Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
9 May 90 p 9

[Article by Rahel Zamir]

[Text] On February 28, an order was issued to close the universities in the territories for three more months. The chief of the Central Command, Yitzhaq Mordekhai, extended the order on the strength of his authority, according to an order regarding a security directive (Judea and Samaria) of 1970.

This step led to many appeals and requests from various people and organizations to reopen the universities. The European Common Market even threatened to break off ties with Israel.

In Judea, Samaria and in Gaza, there are now seven universities in the Ramallah region, in Nablus, Bethlehem, and Hebron. During the last school year, 1987, 8596 students studied there, and 525 instructors taught. All were established after the Six Days War within the framework of Israeli education policy in the territories.

It is clear that Israel would have had an easier time of it had these universities never been established. But if we want them reopened in order to improve the level of education and establish a normal community life, we have to act accordingly, says the coordinator of operations in the territories, Shmuel Goren.

All the universities in the territories are private. Most are recognized by the government. The diplomas they give out have academic weight. Since 1967, the number of academicians from the territories rose substantially. Many of the academicians, incidentally, are not finding work in their fields after completing their studies.

Over the years, acts of provocation and intense violence on the part of various hostile organizations, in which students, instructors and administrators have participated, have centered on these institutions. The student councils, which have been controlled by various PLO factions or Islamic movements which took control of the institutions, have succeeded in forcing through, by means of threats and internal terror, certain academic policies such as the program of study and the evaluation of student achievements. The campuses have turned into centers of disturbance with the obstruction of roads, stone throwing, and the staging of illegal demonstrations originating on these campuses. It should be noted that these disturbances were created because people were taking advantage of the academic freedom which existed

in these educational institutions. In many cases, students were involved in various activities like the murder of the mayor of Nablus and the preparation of explosives. Two members of the Democratic Front group which was captured in October of 1987, were students of Bir-Zayt University in Ramallah. During stormy periods, the universities would occasionally be closed for short periods by the authorities.

Since the uprising in December 1987, the universities have become conduits for acts of provocation and violence, and were therefore closed for an extended period. "In our minds, there is the fear that reopening the academic institutions in the territories will concentrate the intifada activities and make organizing them easier, especially given the fact, that these institutions are considered to be extra-territorial, and security forces do not go there often."

On February 26, 1990, Shmuel Goren, the coordinator of activities in the territories, announced the intention of beginning to gradually open the 16 colleges in the territories. The colleges are institutions beyond the high school but not universities. Until now only four have been opened.

"The opening of the colleges does not automatically mean that the universities will be opened. We are hoping that the opening of the colleges will help create a good and appropriate atmosphere which may help shift the balance in a positive direction towards opening them," Goren added.

It is important to point out that closing the campuses did not actually bring about a complete halt in academic studies. Other buildings near the campuses have been rented where the university administration is continuing studies.

JORDAN

Appeal for Arming Civilians Against Israeli Attack

90AE0082A Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
3 Jun 90 p 22

[Article by Mu'nis al-Razzaz: "Drums of War"]

[Text] I can almost hear the American war drums, preparing world public opinion for a bilateral (American-Israeli) strike against the Arab nation, in order to drag this nation to the table of capitulation, not peace.

We in Jordan, the graveyard of the invasion, expect Arab military assistance. Yes...we can almost hear them beating the war drums and pointing at "Libya," while the enemy's forces are preparing to cut through Jordan, in order to get control of the sources of oil and strike at the developing Iraqi power.

They are making preparations for an attack aimed at conclusively smashing this nation's will this time and,

consequently, drag it to the table of capitulation, without condition or restriction, so as to sign a blank check for the enemy.

We in Jordan expect Arab military and material assistance, with a patience we envy.

Training and arming the Jordanian people, so that Jordan can be one vast armed camp from al-Ramtha to al-'Aqabah, has become a national demand. Arming our people requires light and antitank machine guns, and requires leading the enemy into the cities, as happened in the invasion of Beirut. This light armament and training for the people is not a substitute for the role of our courageous Arab Army, but has become an urgent need as a reserve for our professional Army. The Lebanese-Israeli War and the Iraqi-Iranian War have taught us the importance of the role of armed people in defending their territory and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.

Until the arrival of "Arab assistance," both military and material, we advance our idea with regard to the way to change Jordan into a fortress impervious to attack, a graveyard for the enemy, and a rock that the enemy should think scores of times about, before attempting to invade it.

Regulations Set Up for Travel to West Bank, Gaza

90AE0082B Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
5 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Khalud al-Ja'uni: "Registration of Travelers to the West Bank and Gaza Strip Begins Saturday; Names of Centers, Documents Required, and Conditions of Travel Given"]

[Text] Brigadier General 'Abd-al-Hamid Arshid, director of the Department of Foreigners and Borders in the Directorate of Public Security, announced directives pertaining to the operation of registration centers for this year for those wishing to return to or visit the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In a special interview with AL-DUSTUR, Brig. Gen. Arshid made it clear that the registration centers would commence operations next Saturday, with actual reservations for travelers beginning on 13 June 1990. He said that the registration centers have been designated in the police directorates in accordance with destination points, as follows:

- Arawi Bint al-Harith Primary School, Jabal Amman, registration for provinces of Jerusalem and Hebron;
- 'A'ishah Umm al-Mu'minin Primary School, Jabal al-Husayn, registration for the Gaza Strip; and,
- Al-Husayn Mixed Primary School, Jabal al-Husayn, registration for the province of Nabulus.

Registration centers will be opened in accordance with preparations decided in the directorates of police of

Irbid, al-Zarqa' and al-Balqa', to register travelers from the provinces of Jerusalem, Nabulus, and Hebron, in the following places:

1. Directorate of Police for Governorate of Irbid, in the Department of Emergency Police;
2. Directorate of Police for Governorate of al-Balqa', in the al-Salt Primary School for Girls; and,
3. Directorate of Police for Governorate of al-Zarqa', in the police station of al-Zarqa' Refugee Camp.

The centers will be closed to registration on Fridays only.

Documents Required

The documents required to facilitate crossing arrangements to the West Bank were clarified by Brig. Gen. Arshid:

Departees who have obtained their annual drivers' license are required to have the following documents—Jordanian passport, civilian status identification, or any acceptable, Jordanian personal identification, in addition to the annual license.

Visitors to the West Bank:

1. Temporary passport for each person born before 1 January 1974 for males and females. Alternatives to the temporary passport for those whose ages are less than this date are:

A. 1 January 1974 and later, can be attested to by the temporary passport of those accompanying him, provided that it be attested to in the visit permit; and,

B. Those who accompany children under five years of age are requested to have original birth certificates, in addition to having them registered on the passport.

Returnees to the Gaza Strip—residence permit, annual license, travel document or temporary passport, and blue identity card.

Visitors to the Gaza Strip—temporary travel document or temporary Jordanian passport, visit permit, and rose identity card.

All those who accompany visitors to the Gaza Strip, who were born on 1 January 1974 and later, must be attested to by the permit or by the temporary passport or temporary travel document.

Citizens can make reservations for relatives without the relatives being present at the registration centers, after proving that they are in fact relatives, and that they are blood or collateral relatives only. Foreigners are permitted to travel without previous reservations, since they have a special arrangement. Bearers of Red Cross telegrams, and persons accompanying funeral processions, can refer directly to the Department of Bridge Security Detachments to register their trip.

Directives

Concerning the instructions pertaining to citizens traveling to the West Bank via bridges, Brig. Gen. Arshid said that ladies wishing to travel to the West Bank, for the purpose of visiting, must obtain a temporary passport before going to the bridge zone.

With regard to persons born outside the West Bank, they need a prior visiting permit if they exceed five years of age, as well as a temporary passport. If they are less than five, the registration must be entered on the mother's or father's passport, and an original Jordanian birth certificate must be in their possession.

Citizens who have accompanying children registered on their permits are not allowed to travel to the West Bank, unless they accompany those children to the occupation authorities to have their identity cards cancelled.

Young men born between 1958 and 1972 must obtain a departure permit from Public Conscription before traveling, if they carry a yellow identity card. If they have had a green card, and a temporary passport for two years, they can depart to the West Bank without needing a permit from Public Conscription. But in this case, if they want to return to the East Bank, they must obtain prior approval from the Department of Prosecution and Investigation permitting them to return. If they have open or unconditional permits from the occupation authorities they are permitted to return to the East Bank without requiring prior approval.

KUWAIT

Minister Discusses Energy Production Costs

90AE0083A Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 2 Jun 90 p 3

[Interview with Kuwaiti Minister of Electricity and Water Dr. Hamud al-Ruqbah by Hasham al-Diwan: "Private Sector Cannot Buy Our Facilities"; first two paragraphs are AL-WATAN introduction; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The minister of electricity and water, Dr. Hamud al-Ruqbah, said that the government has spent 2,324,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars over the past 14 years to produce energy and distill water. He added that total energy production constitutes double the requirements for water distillation, since the total expenditure for energy production during that period was approximately 1,740,000,000 Kuwaiti dinars, while the state spent 584,818,000 Kuwaiti dinars to distill water. [passage omitted]

The following are the details of the interview with the Minister of Electricity and Water Dr. Hamud al-Ruqbah.

[al-Diwan] What is the amount of total annual expenditure to produce energy and distill water? What was the total spent in this regard from 1975 to date?

[al-Ruqbah] Total expenditure for energy production and water distillation during that period was 2,324,831,594 Kuwaiti dinars, distributed as follows: [passage omitted]

In 1983-84, total expenditure for energy production and water distillation was 262,401,000 Kuwaiti dinars, of which 202,274,000 Kuwaiti dinars was for energy, and 60,127,000 for water. The amount in the following year went up to 294,676,000 Kuwaiti dinars, of which 225,772,000 was for energy and 70,904,000 for water. Expenditures fell back somewhat in 1985-86 to only 239,084,000 Kuwaiti dinars, and decreased even more the next year to only 152,200,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Then costs increased again in 1987-88 to 173,998,000 Kuwaiti dinars, of which 133,804,000 was for energy and 51,194,000 for water. In 1988-89, the energy expenditure was 127,123,000 Kuwaiti dinars, and 51,788,000 Kuwaiti dinars for electricity.

[al-Diwan] What are the amounts allocated in the next five-year plan for energy production alone?

[al-Ruqbah] The amount allocated within the next five-year plan for ongoing electrical energy production projects, currently being implemented, including the project to construct a new electricity station in al-Sabiyah, is 409,917,000 Kuwaiti dinars.

[al-Diwan] What does it cost the state to subsidize water and electricity prices for individuals?

[al-Ruqbah] These supports cost the state a total of 249.8 million Kuwaiti dinars in 1988-89.

No Unification of Energy Sources in the Gulf

[al-Diwan] Is there any intention of studying the possibility of unifying sources of energy production and water distillation in the Gulf?

[al-Ruqbah] There is no intent to unify sources of energy production and water distillation in the Gulf at the present time, because the process of determining energy sources is based on the circumstances of each individual country, for example, the type of fuel available in each country. As an example, there are many countries that have natural gas, while it is lacking in other countries. There is also the factor of the kinds of oil extracted. Consequently, it is possible to have differing types of electrical generators. This is also true with regard to unifying water distillation. As for studies, there have been many technical meetings to study such ideas as these, especially as pertains to the best interests of the region, because these committees pass their recommendations to officials through the Office of the Secretariat General of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

In any case, during the meetings that have been held on the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] level, there has been cooperation and consultation in drafting certain

unified specifications, which are put out to open competitive bidding, for electrical energy production equipment and water distillation equipment. This kind of expertise is still being exchanged among the nations of this region, and some of the recommendations have been adopted in the GCC states, when their feasibility and suitability for the area's countries have been established.

Electricity Net

[al-Diwan] What will the electricity net connecting the regional states achieve? What are the countries that it will encompass?

[al-Ruqbah] The electricity net connecting the GCC states will achieve many benefits for all participating nations. The most important are reducing the extent of the circulating reserve of electric power, which will lead to reducing the costs of building more electricity generating units, and ensuring better electric current continuity, reducing the possibilities of disrupted service for consumers in these countries. It will also give a greater opportunity for the economic use of power generating units in the region's countries, resulting in reduced costs for fuel, operation, maintenance and spare parts.

The Gulf nations participating in the network are the GCC states: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Within the context of cooperation with the rest of the Arab nations, there are committees at work on technical studies with regard to an electricity net among the nations of the Arab east: Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen, in addition to the GCC states.

Moreover, there is special cooperation with Iraq because, for some time, meetings have been held and information exchanged concerning the exchange of electrical energy in the 150 megawatt range between our two countries. These meetings are still being held.

Iraqi Water

[al-Diwan] Can bringing drinking water in from Iraq reduce current governmental expenditures?

[al-Ruqbah] Clearly, the demand for this important service is not flexible. Therefore, the ministry concentrates most of its attention on its availability in the quality and quantities required for consumption, without regard to the amount of governmental expenditure. Undoubtedly, the cost of 1,000 gallons of water will be less than what it is now, in the event drinking water is brought in from Iraq.

Millions of Dinars

[al-Diwan] It is well known that energy production and water distillation is very costly, and that the value of the ministry's assets and installations is very high. Will that prevent the ministry from changing to a private organization or transferring its assets to the private sector?

[al-Ruqbah] We have no intention of turning the ministry into a company or turning the installations over to the private sector, for the following reasons:

1. The private sector does not have the material resources to buy these installations, which are valued at millions of Kuwaiti dinars.

2. The state supports the prices of electricity and water by approximately 250 million Kuwaiti dinars a year. Any company that did this would not make a profit on its shares.

3. The private sector does not have a magic wand to solve problems; these days, many people claim that the private sector will raise efficiency and increase productivity and profit. I believe that many times this idea is not justified. There are many examples of certain private sector organizations that have failed, with the government changing them to public sector, and which began to make a profit, such as the Kuwaiti Airlines, the Kuwaiti Oil Company, etc. We must recognize the problems that impede us, and then attempt to resolve them. If there are shortcomings in administration, or in incentives, or something else, they must be dealt with.

Industrialist Emphasizes Export Funding

90AE0108A Kuwait ARAB TIMES
in English 7-8 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] A senior industrial official has called upon the government to set up a fund to finance Kuwaiti exports. Chairman of the Kuwaiti Chemical Manufacturing Co. Ibrahim al-Fassam has stressed the importance of such a fund at present. He also called upon the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to pay greater attention to national industries and complete the project of setting up the Public Authority for Industry to supervise industrial strategy in the country.

Al-Fassam said that the proposed petrochemical complex to be established by Kuwait will face stiff competition from Europe and we have to prepare ourselves well for it. He said that a wave of "unhealthy" competition has been going on in Kuwait as well as in the Gulf states concerning chemical and petrochemical products.

The Gulf states do not implement the economic agreement in its entire terms. Some obstacles are put before the Kuwaiti products. For example, al-Fassam stressed, Kuwaiti products do not get the same priority as Saudi products in other Gulf states.

Competition

Al-Fassam added that unhealthy competition also prevails at present between the Gulf states and among producers in Kuwait. The lack of co-ordination among producers themselves and between them and the Ministry of Commerce helped aggravate the situation.

Some producers even produce materials without official licence. Among other reasons for the unhealthy competition al-Fassam said is the small market in the country. The market purchasing power has even sharply gone down and this has greatly affected the level of service and quality of products. Al-Fassam added that all these factors combined to force the bankruptcy of several companies in the country.

Al-Fassam hoped that the government of Kuwait will make some contacts with Gulf governments concerning the marketing of national products. He stressed on the fact that as concessions and facilities provided to the various factories in the Gulf differ, competition can't be even. He added that industrialists in Kuwait have already brought this to the notice of the concerned officials in the government. He said that they have been writing to the government about such problems facing the national industries particularly the petrochemicals and chemicals, over the past 3 years. He added "we have heard that some of the problems are to be resolved soon."

Workshops

Al-Fassam revealed that plans are ready to set up central maintenance workshops for identical industries in Kuwait in order to prevent each project establishing its own maintenance back-up and thus doubling overall expenses. But he said that the Shuaiba Industrial Area's management is the side responsible for carrying out such a project adding that so far no practical measures have been taken.

He warned of a fierce war particularly from European countries against the proposed multi-million mega-petrochemicals project. He said that measures against Kuwait getting modern technology for the project besides a media campaign against it is expected. He said that it is supposed that government officials are aware of such a war. He hoped that the project, which is still in the planning stage and may get underway after at least two years, won't be put aside like a previous identical project.

Al-Fassam admitted that government aid to the national industry is there but added is still not up to the desired level. "There is still scope for supporting national industry and giving it the necessary cares," he stressed. He described the level of government aid to industry as at its "minimum" level. Asked about the benefits of setting up a fund for supporting and financing Kuwaiti exports, al-Fassam said it will enable Kuwaiti factories to operate their presently unexploited manufacturing capacities. He said that the government is not paying enough attention to setting up such a fund simply because "there is not enough attention to industry."

SAUDI ARABIA

Ministry Report Details Water Production Plans

90AE0112A Jeddah ARAB NEWS
in English 6 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] Riyadh, 5 Jun (SPA)—The Saudi Government is working to meet the present and future water needs of society, ensure the development and conservation of water resources and the rationalization of their consumption.

Under the ongoing Fifth Development Plan, the government's objective is to increase water production and electric power generation capacity of desalination plants by one million cubic meters a day and 560 megawatts respectively, bringing the total output to three million cubic meters of water a day and 3,517 megawatts of electricity by 1994-95.

A report of the Planning Ministry says one of the main objectives of the government for the current plan period is the implementation and expansion of 300 water projects of various sizes in cities and villages, and the drilling of 450 water wells, deepening and repairing of 100 wells, construction of 49 dams, and supply and installation of 350 water pumping units in various regions of the Kingdom.

The planned government expenditure for the water sector, during the plan period, is set at SR22.193 million.

The development of infrastructure to improve Saudi living standards has been a stated goal of the development planning activities of the Kingdom.

The expansion of the water desalination capacity was undertaken by the government to meet the growing needs of the people. As a result, the rated capacity of desalination plants in the Kingdom has grown from 5.1 million U.S. gallons per day (MGD) in 1970 to 421.6 MGD in 1987, showing an average annual growth rate of 37.7 percent. The designed capacity of the plants amounts to 500 MGD.

The quantity of water supplied by the desalination plants is estimated to have risen from 4.6 MGD to 337.3 MGD, or at an average yearly growth rate of 36.1 percent.

The largest single plant has a capacity of 240 MGD. The plants at Jeddah and al-Khubar have a rated capacity of 88.5 MGD and 57.5 MGD respectively.

The plants supplying water to Medina and Yanbu' have a capacity of 25 MGD. The remaining capacity of 10.6 MGD consists of eight small plants at al-Wajh, Duba, Khafji, Amlaj, Farasan, Haql, Rabigh and al-Barq.

BANGLADESH

Election Details Noted in Ershad Speeches

Accord With Constitution

46001616 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 28 May 90 pp 1, 10

[Excerpt] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad on Sunday said the presidential election would be held next year in accordance with the Constitution, reports UNB.

"We have till today maintained the continuity of the Constitution. The next presidential polls will be held within six months before expiration of the current term to maintain continuity of the Constitution," the President told a meeting of the Central Command Council of the Bangladesh Muktiyoddha Sangsad.

The President was making an obvious reference to the reaction of major opposition political parties demanding election to sovereign parliament under a neutral authority before the presidential polls.

The opposition reaction came following President Ershad's announcement last week that he will run for the presidency for the second term in the elections scheduled for early next year.

President Ershad reaffirmed that elections would be absolutely free and fair.

The President, also chief patron of the Bangladesh Muktiyoddha Sangsad, said he had endeavoured to institutionalise democracy and strengthen democratic institutions.

Sangsad Chairman Jalaluddin Ahmed presided over the meeting held at the International Conference Centre.

President Ershad referred to his recent steps, particularly on education and population control sectors, and sought total cooperation of the freedom fighters to make the programmes a success.

He said primary education will be made compulsory from next January. "It is indeed a gigantic task which will need your help to bring the children to schools and fill up the gap of teachers... I seek your active support," the President told the freedom fighters.

Ershad also asked them to launch a social movement against the population growth now estimated at 2.2 percent. It was the number one problem before the nation, he said adding over-population was gobbling up all the development efforts.

"The growth must be checked if we are to survive as a nation," he emphasised.

He assured the meeting that different roads named after the martyred freedom fighters would not be changed. [passage omitted]

Time Period Specified

46001616 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 30 May 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Chittagong, 29 May—President Hussain Muhammad Ershad today urged the people to vote for him in the presidential polls which, he said, would be held any day between "14 April and 14 October next year," reports UNB.

"Elect the Jatiya Party nominee in the next presidential election and later in parliamentary polls if you consider this party has done good for you," the President said while opening the Karnaphuli Bridge this afternoon.

The President who announced last week his candidature for the second term made similar appeals while addressing public meetings at West Patiya and Nazirhat before flying back to the capital in the evening.

The foundation of the 919 metre long bridge over the river Karnaphuli was also laid by President Ershad in 1986. Construction of the bridge was completed at a cost of Tk 142 crore under a grant from the Netherlands government.

Communication Minister Anwar Hossain, Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmood and Dutch Ambassador in Dhaka J.H.J. Jeurissen also spoke on the occasion.

The President referred to various development activities undertaken during his eight-year rule specially in the field of communication, agriculture, education and industry and said "the frustrating faces of the past are no longer there."

"Jatiya Party is a party with difference. There is no gap in its words and deeds...we wanted to change the lot of the people through constructive and people-oriented activities," the President added.

President Ershad said "strengthen my hands and my party by electing the Jatiya Party nominee so that the trend of development continues to the benefit of the masses."

He said the Karnaphuli Bridge met a long cherished demand of the people of the region and also fulfilled one of my commitments to the nation. It would facilitate speedy industrialisation on the other side of the Karnaphuli where a second Export Processing Zone and a fertilizer factory have already been planned, he added.

Bangladeshis Living in Peace

The President pointed to the tense situation in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal without naming the countries and said people in Bangladesh living in peace, political stability and discipline....it's a matter of proud for the nation," he added.

President renewed his call to Chakma refugees languishing in camps across the border to return home. "I

know, you are passing your days in miseries (in Tripura Camps), return home and live in peace and security," he added.

The President said communal harmony as existed in Bangladesh would remain as a shining example elsewhere in the world.

Revision of Fourth 5-Year Plan To Be Considered

46001617 Dhaka *THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER*
in English 29 May 90 pp 1, 12

[Article by Reazuddin Ahmed and Shahiduzzaman Khan]

[Text] The size of the Fourth Five-year Plan, scheduled to be launched from 1 July next, is likely to be revised downward as the availability of local and external resources have become increasingly constrained. The Planning Commission will exchange views with noted economists early next month to review the plan targets, allocations, size and objectives of the plan due to change in international aid climate.

The World Bank in its country report for the year 1989-90 stated that Bangladesh economy is characterised by major structural problems and consequently the country is exceptionally dependent on external assistance for financing development activity and for bridging its sizeable fiscal and external deficits. The reduction in foreign assistance, therefore will affect the planning process in Bangladesh. The donors in last month's Paris Consortium meeting pledged lower quantum of aid which is U.S.\$1.8 billion as against U.S.\$2.2 billion last year.

Besides, some of the donors, particularly, Federal Republic Germany was very critical of the macroeconomic mismanagement in Bangladesh. West Germany did not make any pledge in Paris meeting. The diplomatic sources hinted that West Germany has changed its aid policy towards Asia as the country's commitment has increased manifold to East Germany.

The proposed size of the Fourth Five-year Plan is about Taka 67 thousand crore out of which public sector spending has been estimated at Taka 40 thousand crore. The public sector spending includes 2200 crore Taka for construction of Jamuna bridge. The size of the Annual Development Programme, taking into account Taka 40 thousand crore public spending during 4th plan period, should be Taka 8000 crore on an average. But the estimated size of Annual Development Programme for fiscal 1990-91, first year of the 4th plan, is Taka 5736 crore which is Taka 2264 crore less than the annual average.

WB Directive To Prune Unproductive Projects

The planners are also running into trouble due to huge number of spill over projects. The World Bank [WB] has asked Bangladesh to prune the unproductive projects

and to take up more productive projects on priority basis. A committee headed by Vice-President Moudud Ahmed has been working hard to prune the projects. The committee is learnt to have decided to drop a number of projects on halfway. About 54 percent of the total budget allocations will have to be earmarked for 516 ongoing projects, according to Planning Commission sources. The committee will have to save more money from this account to finance the new projects. The economists noted that under the given situation the scope of new investments during the Fourth Five-year Plan will be extremely limited. Besides, the due to higher rate of inflation the real investment almost stagnant for last few years.

Performance of Earlier Plans

The performance during the Third Five-year Plan (1985-1990) is disquieting achieving only 3.5 percent growth on average against the target of 5.5 percent. Besides, during fiscal 1987-1988 and 1988-1989 the growth was only 2 percent due to devastating floods. This year the growth has been estimated at 5.8 percent. The growth reflects better performance in agricultural sector due to bumper crop this year. But the growth in manufacturing sector declined from 6.4 percent in 1987 to 4.1 percent this year. The average contribution of manufacturing sector to Gross Domestic Products (GDP) has declined from 10.6 percent in fiscal 1981 to 10.1 percent in 1989. The major growth was recorded in service and construction sector during the Third Plan.

It may be mentioned that FFYP (1973-78), the two-year Plan (1978-80) and SFYP (1980-85) all failed to achieve GDP growth rate targets. FFYP achieved 4 percent against a target of 5.5 percent. TYP 3.5 percent against 5.6 percent and SFYP 3.8 percent against 5.4 percent.

20-Year Perspective Plan

Under this backdrop the targets and the objectives laid down in the fourth five-year plan, formulated within the framework of a 20-year perspective plan, apparently seem too ambitious to be fulfilled.

According to financial experts, the broad objectives of the FFYP are growth in national income, alleviation of poverty through generation of employment opportunities and increased self-reliance. They said the Third Five-year Plan as well as the earlier plans had the identical objectives.

The First Five-year Plan sought to achieve economic growth within a framework of a socialist order. The strategy shifted to one seeking growth within a framework of private enterprise in the SFYP and even more so in the TFYP. Some analysts said the later strategy was inherently unequal, particularly in a poor and already highly differentiated society of Bangladesh. The trend suggested that usually the rich and powerful elements benefitted from it while the poorer sections of the society continued to be deprived. As seen earlier, the analysts

said, this was what had been the nature of the outcome of the process of development pursued in Bangladesh.

Reduced Investment

Talking to THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, Dr Q.K. Ahmad, a noted economist of the country said that in view of the past record, the proposed national financing of 52 percent of the proposed total Fourth Plan outlay, which implies that 89 percent of the proposed public sector outlay being foreign aid financed, was highly optimistic. He said aid climate has already become difficult both because of a failure to put necessary local currency resources and proper utilisation of aid money and increasing donor interest in supporting Eastern European countries where far reaching political changes were taking place. Not so encouraging response was there at Paris aid Consortium Meeting on aid pledges to Bangladesh. Moreover, if the past is any guide, the proposed private sector outlay was not going to materialise either. The net result is expected to be a very much reduced total Fourth Plan investment.

Another expert, preferring to remain anonymous, told that the Fourth Plan was going to be another conventional exercise to promote growth and alleviate poverty through project approach and promotion of private enterprise. A strategy of the Fourth Plan would be the integration of sector-based (agriculture, industry etc.) plans and programmes with 'socio-economic group based' plans and programmes. It is claimed that, through this approach, the impact on the poorer sections of the population will be analysed in investment planning bringing them to the centre of the planning process from the periphery. The result will be enhanced possibilities of poverty alleviation along with economic approach. He said while the intentions were laudable, the claim about the results were highly ambitious. According to his suggestions, it was unlikely that such an exercise could be carried out purposefully given the data limitations. The results of the Social Accounting System (SAM) exercise which is claimed to provide the basic planning frame for the Fourth Plan were yet to be made available outside of a small group of people in the Planning Commission. It is highly doubtful if in practice sectoral plans and programmes could be integrated with socio-economic group based plans and programmes as proposed, he added.

Panel's Recommendations on Industrialization Approved

46001621 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 21 May 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] A package of recommendations to speed up the pace of industrialisation of the northern and southern regions of the country, including nine-year tax holiday and setting aside of 20 percent of investible resources of banks and development financial institutions for those regions, has been approved by the President on Saturday, reports BSS.

The recommendations have been formulated by the working committee, constituted with Industries Secretary A.K.M. Mosharraf Hossain as convener to study the problems of industrialisation of the country's northern and southern regions and recommend remedies, according to a handout issued by the Ministry of Industries on Sunday.

The problem had been reviewed earlier at a meeting of the National Council for industrial development of 7 August 1989 with the President in the chair and the working committee constituted.

The handout further stated that the working committee had drawn up a set of recommendations in an Inter-Ministerial meeting after having obtained the opinion and views of all concerned quarters. The recommendations were later adopted in a meeting of the executive committee of the National Council for industrial development held on 4 April this year and subsequently received the approval of the President.

Recommendations for the industrialisation of the northern and southern regions of the country are:

Nine years tax holiday for the industries in northern and southern regions, commercial banks and DFI [expansion unknown] shall set aside 20 percent of their investible resources for investment in northern and southern regions.

Sufficient manpower including high-ranking officials with necessary financial and sanctioning authority are to be employed in the bank branches operating in those regions to implement the investment programme envisaged for the regions.

Loan committees will be formed in each district of the regions for smooth execution of the industrial loan operation. Such loan committees shall be responsible to:

Recommend sanctioning of loans,

Coordinate activities connected with loans,

Loan recovery and monitoring activities, and subsidy on furnace oil enjoyed by some selected industries of northern region shall be continued and possibility of the extension of this facility to all industrial units of the region under both public and private sectors shall be considered.

Government will also consider the issues of reducing tariff on power used in the industrial sector and setting up of a separate bank like that of basic for the small scale industries of the regions.

In addition to the above recommendations, the following decisions had been taken: concerned agencies shall take necessary initiative for expansion of silk industries in northern and southern regions, BSCIC [Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation] shall conduct a survey to identify the areas where there is excess production of agricultural commodities owing to natural

endowment so as to facilitate the development of agro-based industries in these areas, infrastructural facilities to be developed keeping in view the natural trend of the growth centres of the northern region, ferry service from north to south to be strengthened further and the possibility of allowing private ferry service along with the existing public sector ferry service shall be examined, effective steps to be taken to expand the volume of export trade through Chalna port and measures will be taken to expedite the setting up of bridge over river Rupsa and training workshops to be organised, increase awareness among the entrepreneurs of the northern region and BSCIC shall undertake necessary programmes in this regard, the handout added.

INDIA

Problems With Dispute Over Religious Site Persist

Ceremony Thwarted, Swami Arrested

46001609A New Delhi PATRIOT in English
8 May 90 p 1

[Article: "Police Foil 'Shilanyas' Bid, 163 Held"]

[Text] Lucknow, May 7 (UNI): The Uttar Pradesh Government today thwarted the attempts to perform the "second shilanyas" of a Sri Ram temple in Ayodhya by arresting about 163 followers of Swami Swaroopanand of Dwarkapeeth who were on their way to the disputed place of worship.

While the district authorities in Faizabad seized shilas (bricks) meant for the ceremony early in the morning, it prevented two 'jathas' of the devotees who converged from different parts of the country from proceeding for the site and took them into custody. Those arrested included the head priest of Ramjanambhumi, Laldas.

An official spokesman here said no untoward incident took place in the twin cities of Ayodhya and Faizabad and the law and order situation was completely under control.

As a precautionary measure, the entry of people into the vicinity of the Ram Janambhumi-Babri Masjid site was banned and all roads leading to the disputed place of worship were sealed, official reports said.

Meanwhile, a report from Varanasi said that chief judicial magistrate Azamgarh today approached the Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth in Chunar Fort and asked for his signatures to extend the period of judicial custody til May 14 next.

The private secretary of Shankaracharya Swami Sadanand told UNI on the phone that the Shankaracharya refused to sign and wanted to know the reasons for extending the period of detention.

The chief judicial magistrate clarified that this was being done as the chargesheet against him and his 11 followers could not be prepared in time. The Shankaracharya however rejected it saying there was no guarantee that the police would be able to frame the charges by May 14.

Swami Sadanand said his lawyers were expected to arrive Chunar from Allahabad in view of the move to extend his detention period.

Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav, meanwhile, appealed to the Shankaracharya to give up his proposal to perform the "shilanyas". He told a meeting at Gorakhpur that "the Shankaracharya will be released as soon as he rescinds his decision to perform the shilanyas".

Swami Swaroopanand was arrested last Monday, and is now lodged in Chunar Fort at Mirzapur.

Mr Yadav said the Dwarkapeeth seer's decision to again lay the foundation stone of the temple was against the dignity of the court. This could flare up communal incidents in the country, he added.

He declared that the government would not hesitate in arresting anybody, irrespective of whether he was a religious, social or political leader, if he tried to vitiate the atmosphere by spreading communalism.

About 15 companies of paramilitary forces have been deployed in both Ayodhya and Faizabad towns and six checkpoints were set up on the roads to check infiltration.

The Punurudhar Samiti had claimed that thousands of people [words missing]

Meerut: Ninety-two persons, including Congress leaders, today courted arrest in Kotwali and Sadar Bazar areas, demanding release of Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth.

The temples in the city, which were locked soon after the arrest of Shankaracharya, were re-opened for mass prayers for early release of the Shankaracharya. Some people burnt an effigy of the Chief Minister in the district jail for arresting Shankaracharya.

Mathura: Brijwasis in this holy town began a 24-hour fast yesterday in protest against the arrest of Shankaracharya.

Bhavnagar: A day-long bandh to protest against the detention of Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth, today evoked a good response in the city and at other places in the district.

New Delhi: The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal will hold a dharna in front of Prime Minister V. P. Singh's residence on Tuesday to 'remind' him that three of the four months sought by him to resolve the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue had already elapsed.

Meanwhile, Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yajna Samiti chairman Mahant Avidya Nath, MP [Member of Parliament], has criticised the functioning of the three-member ministerial committee set up by Prime Minister to suggest a solution to the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue.

The Mahant condemned the arrest of Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth but opposed his programme to do 'shilanyas' at Ayodhya before the expiry of the four months' period agreed to by the Samiti.

Swami Interviewed

46001609B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 10 May 90 p 14

[Article: "Arrest Boosts Seer's Revolve"]

[Text] Chunar (Mirzapur), May 8. Swami Swaroopanand, Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth, is resolved to go ahead with the shilanyas.

"Let the government imprison me for life. I am not at all afraid of the government. I will not change my decision to construct a temple in Ayodhya at the disputed site," he says.

The swami reiterated his firm decision in an exclusive interview to TOINS today in the Chunar guest house where he was placed under arrest, rejecting the U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] chief minister, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav's offer of an immediate release if the swami changes his decision.

The seven-day judicial remand has been extended by another week. He terms wrongful his confinement at the place. The agony and sufferings he has undergone during his arrest have not brought about any change in his resolve. Rather the decision has been reinforced.

Referring to reactions to his arrest all over the country, the swami said, "Let the Vishwa Hindu Parishad [VHP] and the government realise today that I am not alone and the people across the country are with me." This was not the time for the VHP and the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] to criticise him. Instead, he was doing their self-assigned work and repairing the wrong they had done, for which they should support him.

This scribe could manage to enter the guest-room keeping his identity as a newsman secret and also took a photographer inside.

The swami was surprised, saying "How could you manage?" Only today I requested the jail authorities to allow me to hold a press conference to explain my views, as some of the Members of Parliament, the government and the chief minister have started spreading a canard against me. I have a right to defend myself."

To a question as to why he ventured to perform a fresh shilanyas as the VHP had already done the foundation-laying, the swami said, "The earlier shilanyas had been

performed not at the disputed site but away from it. The VHP has no right to change the birthplace of an incarnation. This is betrayal of faith."

The swami alleged that the BJP and the Prime Minister, Mr Vishwanath Pratap Singh, had hatched a conspiracy to arrest him to help the VHP construct a temple at Ayodhya at a place which was not disputed and where the shilanyas had been performed by the VHP.

Once the VHP was allowed to construct the temple at the place where it had performed the shilanyas, the Hindus would lose their right to the disputed place and the statues being worshipped there would have to be shifted. If this was done, it would be a fraud on the Hindu sentiments, he explained.

In his message to the people, the swami stressed that protests against his arrest should be peaceful and no room to violence at any cost be given.

He asked Hindus to be united and wage a peaceful fight to achieve their fundamental rights.

His movement was directed at repairing the wrong done in the past, as had already been done in the case of the Somnath temple.

The swami asked his followers to suspend agitations and cooperate with the government in case of external invasion, as the national interests were supreme.

The swami said that he was not allowed to take a dip in the Ganga which flows past the fort for seven long days. His bathing in the Ganga was arranged only today and some 200 police personnel were on guard, he said.

BJP General Secretary Comments

46001609C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 9 May 90 p 1

[Article: "NF Before Ayodhya: BJP"]

[Text] Mathura, May 8 (UNI & PTI). The BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] general secretary, Mr Jagdish Mathur, has said that his party would continue to support the V. P. Singh government even if it did not allow the construction of the Ram temple at Ayodhya.

He said his party would withdraw support to the National Front government only if the communists joined the ministry.

Asked to comment on the arrest of the Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth, Swami Swaroopanand Saraswati, he said the seer's arrest should have been avoided. He urged the Shankaracharya not to raise any controversy over the foundation of the temple.

"In case, the government does not allow the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) to construct a Ram temple at Ayodhya, the BJP workers will be free to join the agitation in their individual capacity."

Aides being freed (PTI from Lucknow): Nearly 170 followers of the Shankaracharya taken into custody during the last few days, were being released, an official spokesman said.

However, the judicial remand of the Shankaracharya was extended till May 14 by the chief judicial magistrate of Azamgarh.

The situation in Ayodhya and Faizabad was peaceful and no untoward incident had been reported.

Prof Giriraj Kishore, international joint general secretary of the VHP has said in Visakhapatnam that the parishad was "determined" to construct the temple.

Speaking to newsmen, Prof Kishore said if the National Front government failed to find a solution to the issue by June 8, the parishad would convene a meeting on June 23 and 24 at Hardwar to chalk out the future course of action. The parishad would also spearhead an all-India agitation to mobilise popular support.

The Prayag pithadhishwar, Jagatguru Shankaracharya Swami Shankar Chatan Saraswati, said in Allahabad that he, with his 12,000 followers, including Nagas, would march to Chunar Fort demanding the release of the Dwarkapeeth, Shankaracharya.

He told newsmen here that the National Front government had committed a blunder by arresting the Shankaracharya of Dwarkapeeth thereby injuring Hindus' feelings.

He said the government would have to face consequences, if it did not refrain from anti-Hindu actions, which is evident from the arrest of Shankaracharya.

With the sounding of conch shells, trumpets and bugles and the ringing of bells, some 300 activists of the Bajrang Dal and the Indraprastha Vishwa Hindu Parishad staged a noisy demonstration outside the Prime Minister's residence in New Delhi.

Speakers at the protest demanded the immediate release of the Shankaracharya.

Advani, Others Comment

46001609D Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH
in English 10 May 90 p 4

[Article: "BJP Condemns Seer's Arrest"]

[Text] New Delhi, May 9: After days of dithering over the arrest of the Dwarka Shankaracharya, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] has now come out strongly against the government's move and the party president, Mr L. K. Advani, has declared that there could be "no greater wrong" than his arrest. Mr Advani said this after a meeting of the home consultative committee yesterday.

Since the Shankaracharya, Swami Swaroopanand, is considered close to the Congress(I) and has spoken out against the BJP backed Vishwa Hindu Parishad [VHP],

the BJP leadership here was initially hesitant to condemn his arrest. Though he was arrested on April 30, Mr Advani did not even refer to this at the massive "save Kashmir" rally held here on May 2.

The BJP leader, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, who made the most "moderate" speech that day was the only one to mention the Shankaracharya's arrest. In a muted reference, Mr Vajpayee criticised the government's action but at the same time criticised the Shankaracharya as well. Since the government was negotiating with the VHP on the Ramjanmabhoomi issue, the Shankaracharya should not have attempted any action on his own, Mr Vajpayee had said.

However, in the past few days there has been a chorus of protest against the arrest of the religious leader from Hindu organisations and even Congress(I) members such as Mr P.N. Sukul and Mr Banwari Lal Purohit have spoken out against the action.

Thus, the fear of losing Hindu support appears to have promoted Mr Advani from strongly criticising the arrest at a meeting of the home consultative committee yesterday. Mr Advani is learnt to have accused the government of adopting "double standards" for taking action against leaders of the Hindu community only. Muslim religious leaders were not arrested despite making provocative statements, Mr Advani is learnt to have said. Dr Subramanian Swamy (Janata Party), who had criticised the arrest on the floor of the Rajya Sabha earlier this week, made the same point at the meeting.

Speaking on the subject, the senior party leader, Mr K. N. Sahni, told THE TELEGRAPH today that the government was promoting majority consciousness by its selective approach to the communal problem. Giving examples, he said Mr Simranjit Singh Mann as well as certain Muslim leader often made inflammatory speeches but were not arrested.

The BJP, which continues to be suspicious of the Shankaracharya, feels that by arresting him, the government has fallen into the "Congress(I) trap" and made an unnecessary hero out of him. The government could have prevented him from entering the disputed site and reduced the whole thing to a "non-event", sources said.

However, the real apprehension of the BJP is that the Uttar Pradesh chief minister, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadov, may be forced to take similar preventive action against the VHP if it resorts to direct action in Ayodhya in the coming months. The talks between the Union government and the VHP to sort out the temple construction issues have not made such headway and the VHP has threatened to start building the temple if the government fails to come up with a solution soon.

The BJP is at present trying to distance itself, at least publicly, from the VHP on the Ayodhya issue because it has realised that the Kashmir situation provides a much better card to combine Hindutva and nationalism. However, in case the government takes action against the

VHP, the BJP leadership will be forced to openly back the VHP against the government.

Failure With Muslims

46001609E New Delhi PATRIOT
in English 12 May 90 p 1

[Article by Abhay Sinha: "Government Move on Babri Masjid Fails"]

[Text] The Government effort to persuade the Muslim leadership to agree on the proposal of shifting the Babri Masjid from its present site for resolving the Ayodhya dispute has miserably failed and it has become nearly imminent for the Government to seek more time beyond the stipulated four months to sort out the problem.

In the face of an adamant stand adopted by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) with the three-member ministerial committee, the Government was left with no choice but to try to make some Muslim leaders agree on shifting on the mosque.

With this approval Uttar Pradesh Health Minister and one of the members of the committee Mukhtar Anees personally met Muslim Personal Law Board president Maulana Abdul Hassan Ali Nadwi and Abdul Qarim Parik, a Maharashtra Muslim religious leader, but both disagreed. Maulana Nadwi is also the director of the famous Nadwa Institute of Muslim Theology.

When two other members of the committee, Finance Minister Madhu Dandavate and Railway Minister George Fernandes, talked to the leaders of the All-India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC) and the Babri Masjid Movement Coordination Committee (BMMCC), in late April, they firmly declined to agree to the proposal.

The three-member committee was set up in early February after Prime Minister V. P. Singh made the plea to the VHP to postpone its programme of Ram temple construction in Ayodhya for four months within which, he had said, the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute would be resolved.

Before this, Mr V. P. Singh had already announced a committee comprising Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, Prof Dandavate and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav for the same purpose to negotiate with both the Hindu and Muslim sides to resolve the dispute.

Ever since the formation of the first committee, sources say, the Government was found succumbing to the pressures of the VHP and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

This was the reason, they say, why Mr Yadav, known for his anti-VHP stand on the Ayodhya issue and the Mr Sayeed were replaced by Mr Dandavate and Mr Fernandes.

The fact that the Government first served a notice on the VHP for income tax on its fund collections and then withdrew it, they explain, was also for the same reason.

"The tragedy of Mr V. P. Singh is that he brought the Janata Dal to power on secular vote but had to seek the support of the BJP for the formation of the Government. Now he is in no position to control it. He cannot afford to lose its support," sources say.

Not only the VHP refused to budge from its stand on the construction of Ram temple in Ayodhya, but the BJP too has been building pressure on the Government in this connection. Finding no way out the three-member committee was said to have been suggested by Bihar Governor Yunus Salim that some Muslim religious leaders be prepared to come up in the favour of the shifting of the mosque so that the idea gains wider acceptability among the Muslim populace in the country.

It was easy to arrest Dwarkapeeth's Shankaracharya Swaroopanand, a rival of the VHP, before he could perform shilanyas in Ayodhya on May 7 as he does not have much of following. But it would be difficult to contain the VHP. More so, because any tough action against it would also lead to the hardening of the BJP's attitude towards the Government.

On May 8, VHP activists gave a memorandum to the Prime Minister, threatening that after the expiry of the four months they would launch a fresh campaign of the construction of the Ram temple and the Home Minister also a few days before that told the press that the Government would try to resolve the dispute within the stipulated period, but it seems to be left with no choice but to seek more time.

The three-member committee has also been moving at too slow a pace. Over the three months, it has been able to meet both Hindu and the Muslim leaders only once. It is likely that the Kashmir issue and the danger of external threats would provide a good explanation for the Government to seek this extension.

IRAN

Iran, Austria Agree on \$4 Billion Economic Pact

90AS0161D Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
19 May 90 p 4

[Text] Tehran—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY—Mohammad Reza Ne'matzadeh, our country's minister of industries, went to Vienna as the head of a high-ranking delegation attending the first session of the Iran-Austria Commission, and returned to Tehran this morning.

Arriving in Tehran, he spoke with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY and described the results of this four-day meeting as very fruitful.

He said: At this meeting, agreements on about 100 projects were signed by the two sides, and it is hoped that final results will be obtained with follow-up by officials of the two nations.

The minister of industries said: During these meetings, talks were held with Austrian economic and political officials, including the president of the republic, the speaker of the Majles, the foreign minister, the ministers of economic affairs and transportation, and the Austrian deputy prime minister.

He said: The two sides emphasized the need to expand cooperation, especially in matters of education and health. During these talks the Austrian bank system also declared its willingness to cooperate in the implementation of various projects. Letters of mutual understanding were signed and arrangements were made so that within the framework of the Five-Year Plan and Iran's current laws the necessary financial resources will be obtained to carry out our projects.

He noted: In these projects, machinery and equipment will be obtained by Austria.

In his interview, Ne'matzadeh discussed petroleum, petroleum industries, and natural gas. He said: Good agreements were also obtained in these areas.

He continued: Arrangements were made to exempt exported Iranian handicrafts and carpets from customs duties, and fruitful results will certainly be obtained in this area.

He said: We also obtained agreements, to be implemented in the future, to utilize our idle industrial capacity by purchasing raw materials and selling the products.

The minister of industries said: The joint commission will meet early in the year 1370 [21 March 1991-20 March 1992] in Tehran, and until the second meeting of the Iran-Austria Commission, there will be coordination meetings at the deputy minister level.

Engineer Ne'matzadeh said: The results of the meetings were published in the form of a letter of mutual understanding which was signed by both sides at the end of the meeting.

He continued: It appears that about \$4 billion in projects are mentioned in this letter, and in view of the items to be added to it in the future, we hope to achieve this volume.

The first Iran-Austria Commission met from the 25th through the 28th of this month [15-18 May] in Vienna, and it was attended by representatives from the Majles and the appropriate ministries.

Iran, North Korea Increase Trade Volume to \$300 Million

*90AS0161E Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
19 May 90 p 4*

[Text] Thursday afternoon, at the end of the North Korean economic delegation's trip to our country, a note of mutual understanding was signed between the two countries.

This note of mutual understanding was signed by Mr. Foruzesh, minister of the reconstruction jihad, and Mr. Kim Dal Hyun, chief of the North Korean economic commission.

According to this note of mutual understanding, the volume of trade between the two countries will increase to \$300 billion, up from last year's \$250 billion.

According to the provisions of the note, the two countries will expand cooperation in the areas of industry, development, commerce, banking, fisheries, and light industries. The Korean side, in exchange for oil and some mined materials, will give Iran goods such as steel sheets, chemicals, and light machinery.

After staying in Iran one week, visiting industrial centers and meeting with some of our country's officials, on Thursday night the North Korean economic delegation was seen off by Mr. Foruzesh, minister of the reconstruction jihad, as it left Tehran.

Ranking Procedure for Revolutionary Guard and Komitehs

*90AS0161B Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
3 May 90 p 13*

[Text] News Service—The acting national commander of the Islamic Revolution Komitehs announced that this year has been named the "Recruiting, Training, and Organization Year" in the Islamic Revolution Komitehs. He said: Ranks will be assigned this year to personnel in the Komitehs and the revolutionary guard.

Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Mirlowhi added: Twenty-one ranks have been designated for both the revolutionary guard and the Islamic Revolution Komitehs, the highest of which is commanding general of the revolutionary guard, and the lowest which is private.

According to our correspondent, the national joint seminar for commanders and intelligence, operations, administration, and finance deputies of the Islamic Revolution Komitehs began its work yesterday at the Martyr Montazeri Complex Auditorium, attended by Mr. Mirlowhi, acting national commander; Mr. Za'eri, operations intelligence deputy; Allahi, training deputy; Zeyn'ali, administration and finance deputy; and officials of the Islamic Revolution Komitehs.

At this seminar, Mr. Zeyn'ali, Islamic Revolution Komiteh administration and finance deputy, discussed the methods used since 1365 [21 March 1986-20 March

1987] to recruit cadres and conscripts. He said: Last year 3,000 regular personnel and 19,000 conscripts were brought into the Islamic Revolution Komitehs.

He emphasized: In view of this year's consolidation project, the komitehs have received authorization to recruit more people, and some of the provinces have acquired good personnel.

Mr. Zeyn'ali asked the commanders of the Islamic Revolution Komitehs to take the necessary steps to recruit members of the mobilization and university and high school students.

In this regard, with the cooperation of [the Ministry of] Education and Training, during Introduction to Employment [Opportunities] Week commanders will go the schools and acquaint high school students with the revolutionary guard spirit.

Then Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Mirlowhi, acting commander of the Islamic Revolution Komiteh, praised the commanders and personnel of the Islamic Revolution Komitehs throughout the nation for their efforts. He said: This year has been named "Recruiting, Training, and Organization Year" in the Islamic Revolution Komitehs throughout the country, and this project must be carried out in the centers of the Islamic Revolution Komitehs with all power and strength.

He added: As deliberations begin on the Law Enforcement Forces Consolidation Bill, indications are that the respected Majles deputies have in mind the activities and measures taken by the brothers in the revolutionary guard.

He emphasized: The matter of security is considered to be one of the main concerns of a government, and during the period of reconstruction we hope to establish relative security for the nation's organizations.

Mr. Mirlowhi addressed the Komiteh commanders. He said: There must no longer be insurgents and tribal bosses scattered around the country. For this reason, this year the Komiteh must plan to be active in the remotest areas of the country. For example, the presence of the Komiteh in the tribal areas has produced a great reduction in violations by the tribal chiefs. In this regard, the Islamic Revolution Komiteh considers the spread of security to be a main and crucial part of its planning.

He discussed the extensive presence of Komiteh forces at the nation's eastern borders. He said: Operations forces must always be prepared with regard to narcotics, for the enemies of the revolution have seen that we are serious about fighting narcotics, and for this reason, they plan to do damage in various ways.

By mobilizing the nation's potential resources, the Islamic Revolution Komitehs will continue the anti-narcotics campaign with greater intensity, and they will not excuse anyone. The president of the republic has also emphasized the anti-narcotics campaign. He discussed the goal of Project val-Adiyat. He said: They have started

a plot in the world on the premise that poppies are being cultivated in Iran, and they have mentioned our country as a narcotics producer. With the continuation of Phase Three of Project val-Adiyat, the edges and borders of the country, the rural areas, the remote areas, the factories and the offices will be covered by the forces. The level of contamination in the areas will also be carefully determined. Of course, it has been proven to the international organizations that poppies are not being cultivated in Iran. Likewise, as soon as Molla Nesim Akhundzadeh was killed, America announced that they had paid him \$100,000 not to grow poppies any more.

He added: Last year, new Islamic Revolution Komitehs were established in 29 regions in various municipalities.

With Majles approval, the Islamic Revolution Komiteh will continue its assigned missions with more strength and power, with better coordinated organizations, with new organization, and using advanced equipment.

Therefore, within 15 days the commanders must announce what they need to advance the goals of the Komitehs. He emphasized recruitment of combat, specialist, and university forces. He said: The presence of Komiteh forces in society reduces crime.

Assigning Rank in the Revolutionary Guard and the Komitehs

Mr. Mirlowhi discussed the approval of the Komiteh Promotions Guidelines by the exalted leader. He said: This matter is being studied in the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. He noted: The unified ranks of the Komitehs and the revolutionary guard will include 21 grades. The highest rank for these two forces will be commanding general of the revolutionary guard, and at the low end they begin with private, then combat assistant, combat specialist, combatant, first lieutenant, second lieutenant, general guard, full colonel, general, and second brigadier general.

Mr. Mirlowhi announced: The project to assign rank will be implemented in the near future. Military occupation classifications will also be carried out this year.

Campaign Against Religious Deviation Assigned to Komitehs

The acting commander of the Islamic Revolution Komiteh discussed the assignment of the campaign against religious deviation to the komitehs by the Minister of the Interior. He said: The respected minister of the interior's guidelines for fighting religious deviation and unauthorized affiliations have been given to the Komitehs and will soon be implemented. He called upon all the peoples forces to cooperate with the komitehs, either officially or ceremonially, in the implementation of the various komitehs plans.

He emphasized: The fight against religious deviation is a sensitive matter, and it must be carried out with special delicacy in view of religious law, and in this matter there is also a need for cultural and propagation work.

In conclusion, Mr. Mirlowhi addressed the commanders. He said: The ceilings for admission, recruitment, and organization must be completed by the end of the current year [20 March 1991].

Assassin of Hojjat ol-Eslam Fakhr-e Bonabi Hanged

*90AS0161A Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
6 May 90 p 13*

[Text] Azar Shahr—ETTELA'AT Correspondent—Based on an order from the Tabriz Islamic Revolutionary Court and confirmation from the national prosecutor, the assassin of the militant clergyman Martyr Haj Mirza Mohammad Fakhr-e Bonabi was hanged.

According to this report, the assassin, named Khalil Mirza'i, martyred Hojjat ol-Eslam Fakhr-e Bonabi in the month of Farvardin 1365 [21 March-20 April 1986] by planting a mine in the pulpit at the Akhi Jahan Mosque, used by Bonabi's Azar Shahr followers. He fled from justice for four years until in the blessed month of Ramazan this year [28 March-25 April] he was identified, arrested, and confessed to the killing.

The hanging was done publicly in Azar Shahr and was attended by the family of Martyr Bonabi.

Qom Judiciary To Look Into Private Sector Corruption

90AS0165B Tehran RESALAT in Persian 14 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] Qom—RESALAT Correspondent: In line with the implementation of Principal 165 of the Constitution and following the directives of the chief of the judicial branch, the Islamic Revolution Public Prosecutor of Qom will hold an open trial in the case of 'Ali Sharifiun and his assistants who are charged with plundering the treasury, embezzlement of public wealth, speculating, swindling, hurting the economic regime, and accepting bribes.

While announcing the above, Hojjat ol-Eslam Naqvi, the religious judge of the Islamic Revolution Court of Qom in an interview with our correspondent regarding the need for the open investigation of these charges said: The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran prescribes open courts as a sign of respect for public opinion, for public awareness of social issues, introduction of culprits to the people, ensuring security, and in adhering to the rights of the people considers public trials as a necessity. The people can participate in a public trial and will be [made] aware of the investigation, prosecution, and implementation of Islamic justice. The culprits' punishment will be better felt by the public. As a result of the publication of open and public trials connected with wrongdoings of the accused—and decisive confrontation with the culprits by the judicial branch—in the mass media the people will be assured of the implementation of justice and will feel confident about the efficiency of the judiciary. [The public] will believe that the guilty will

not go unpunished. This will also have an effect on the accused when they realize that the judicial branch will, decisively and in accordance with justice, prosecute accused wrongdoers. As a result, they may refrain from other illegal activities in the future. He said: Public introduction of those charged [with a crime] will lessen the possibility of them repeating their activities. Therefore, the Islamic Prosecutor's office of Qom, in line with the 29 Khordad [19 Jun] remarks of the chief of the judiciary will hold an open court in Qom.

In connection with this case being investigated, Hojjat ol-Eslam Naqvi said to our correspondent: The case which is under investigation in Qom covers crimes such as plundering the Moslem treasury, hurting the economic regime of the country by speculating, accepting bribes, swindling, illegal use of government-supplied foreign exchange, and [public] sale of raw materials imported with government-supplied foreign exchange. Messrs. Seyyed 'Ali Sharifiun and Seyyed Abolqasem Sharifiun are the first and second defendants in this case. There were 20 other individuals who cooperated and assisted them. The court prosecuting this case will be held in the auditorium of Qom's Justice [Office] and it will be open to public. In regard to one of the charges which was misappropriation of government-supplied foreign exchange, the religious judge of the Islamic Revolution Prosecutor's Office of Qom said: The accused, under the cover of companies called Zar, Zarin, and Albaseh, gathered considerable wealth through unlawful means. An example of this is 400 million rials which was exchanged at the [government] rate of 70 rials per dollar. Part of this [hard currency] was sold at black market rates and another part was transferred out of the country. A substantial volume of imported raw materials which were to be used for domestic production [of goods] was sold—in raw form—at black market prices. Also, the goods produced from the raw materials imported with government-supplied hard currency were sold on the black market at exorbitant prices.

Concluding this interview, Hojjat ol-Eslam Naqvi, with regard to the confiscated belongings, said: In connection with this case 300 million rials in cash, several buildings, some parcels of land, and several vehicles have been confiscated from the accused so far. Except for one of the accused, all the rest have been released after posting bonds. However, steps have been taken to clear the situation regarding the unlawfully amassed and confiscated properties and also to investigate the [amount of] deposits belonging to the accused.

It must be noted that yesterday the religious judge of the Islamic Revolution Court of Qom, with the issuance of a notice, while announcing that a public trial of this file will be conducted, asked the people of Qom that, in order to inform the public of the prosecution of Mr. Shrifun's file, they can participate at 9 o'clock in the morning on 29 Khordad [19 Jun] in the auditorium of Qom's Justice office.

New Steps Taken To Fight Corruption in Society
90AS0165A Tehran RESALAT in Persian 14 Jun 90 p 2

[Text] Tehran—Islamic Republic News Agency: The Moslem and martyr-nurturing nation extends its appreciation and gratitude for the implementation of the plan to fight moral corruption and non-compliance with the Islamic cover [hejab] and demands its continued implementation.

While making these remarks to the Islamic Republic News Agency correspondent, the official of the Enjoin to Do Good and Exhort To Desist from Evil Section of the Islamic Revolution Komiteh of Tehran said: As a result of the implementation of the plan to fight social indecency, cases involving 216 people whose appearances were quite abnormal and their non-compliance with the Islamic cover was evident were referred to and they were handed over to the Islamic Revolution Magistrate.

He added: [Recent] arrest figures show [better] compliance with the standards of appearance, and the Islamic cover in the society have improved.

He stated: most confrontations resulted in warnings to individuals whose appearances were inappropriate and wore pretentious clothes. They were given notice of the need for adherence to the codes of Islamic society by trained officials.

He stated: Those whose appearances did not comply with the Islamic culture of the society were given notices to the effect that their [dress] and their presence in public with such unacceptable appearance is against public chastity and causes harm to it. The individuals accepted the notices and took steps to correct their appearance.

This official of the Islamic Revolution Komiteh said: The plan to fight social corruption will be implemented in two versions of visible and surreptitious forms. In clandestine operations, the pasdaran of the anti-corruption [division] will be active in civilian clothes to uncover examples of social corruption.

The official of the Anti-Corruption Division pointed out that unexpected inspection of companies, public places, service locations such as restaurants, hotels and, also, parks and entertainment centers will be included in clandestine operations. Agents of the Anti-Corruption Division, in civilian clothes, will submit reports indicating their opinions in regard to their encounters with individuals who have breached the law. If it is deemed necessary, the arrest of the guilty will be arranged by coordination among the appropriate centers. He noted that on days when the plan to combat bad cover and social corruption is not overtly implemented, it should not be perceived that its implementation has been halted because agents will proceed with the covert enforcement of the regulations.

To the merchants and traders who offer to sell consumer goods which contribute to the propagation of anti-Islamic culture, he warned that they will certainly be confronted by the agents.

He said: In confronting hoodlums, hooligans, and those who bother women, especially in parks and entertainment centers, one hundred of them have been arrested and handed over to the judicial centers.

He said: In connection with following up [on the issue of] bad cover, several other issues will also be followed up. We consider the issue of public places and public passages as the [cornerstone] for continuation of this plan and its determining role. While pointing out the perception that [in certain] places and locations [there] are causes [for] existence of bad cover, he added: Restaurants, companies (especially private), public service locations such as hotels, parks, agencies, and theaters must comply with the issued guidelines otherwise there will be harsh and decisive treatment in the face of violations at such centers and public locations.

In this regard, he pointed out: So far there have been over 70 instances regarding locations where there has been advocacy of bad cover and indifference by their management toward the presence of individuals whose appearance was not in correlation with the codes and conditions of Islamic culture. As a result of their non-compliance—despite repeated warnings—finally, by coordinating with the judiciary, their establishments were sealed up [and closed down].

He said: Those who are involved in the production, sale, and distribution of illegal and unauthorized films and corny music cassettes—as a result of their adverse effect, negative and immoral impression on the youth and the society—they will face full legal confrontation.

He said: In our view, this plan has been successful due to the people's support and the endeavors of the country's officials. Also, [the success of this plan] is indebted to women who adhere to Islamic cover. To those who have not yet aligned themselves with the culture of the cover and Islamic chastity, we declare that during the past 10 years it has been proven that revolutionary organs have confronted those who are against Islamic values. They will continue to prevent the propagation of corrupt and colonial cultures.

The Islamic Revolution Komiteh of Tehran in a communique announced that another phase of the plan for guidance and combating bad cover and social corruption will go into effect as of today, 24 Khordad [14 Jun], in Tehran province and will continue until further notice.

For this purpose, the Islamic Revolution Komiteh warns the ignorant people—who, so far, have failed to align themselves with revolutionary and Islamic conditions—to forsake ignorant ideas and do not allow themselves to become toys of arrogance.

Latest Economic, Social, Educational Statistics Published

90AS0161F Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
24 May 90 p 4

[Text] Economic Service—The seventh issue of *Iran Through the Mirror of Statistics* has been published.

This is one of the administrative publications of the Iran Statistics Center, which is published annually. The seventh issue of this publication contains selected statistics on the nation's economic, social, and cultural affairs for the year 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988], along with 47 color graphs recently published by the Iran Statistics Center.

According to the Iran Statistics Center Public Relations office, a brief look at some of the statistics presented shows that in the 1366-67 [1987-89] academic year, there were about 12 million students at various non-university academic levels, and there were 205,000 students studying in the nation's universities and institutions of higher learning.

More than one million new students took part in 79,012 classes held by the Literacy Crusade in 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988].

In the year 1366 there were 599 treatment institutions throughout the country, with a total of 74,365 beds.

In 1366, there were 347,000 marriages and 33,000 divorces recorded in the country.

In 1366, about 80 million people saw Iranian and foreign films shown in 262 of the nation's theaters.

This public relations office also added:

In 1366, 4,873 books were published with a circulation of 34 million volumes, of which 27 percent were on religion, philosophy, and mysticism, and 19.2 percent were children's and adolescent literature.

Mariam Behruzi Compares Western, Moslem Women

90AS0149A Tehran RESALAT in Persian
7 Jun 90 pp 5, 11

[Article by Mariam Behruzi]

[Excerpts] To thee have we granted the fount (of Abundance). Therefore to thy Lord turn in prayer and sacrifice. For he who hateth thee, he will be cut off (from future hope) [in Arabic, from the Koran—Kauthar or Abundance Sura]

Although veiling would appear to be a superficial and insignificant issue and according to some experts, first the rights, personality, and human values of Moslem women must be examined and discussed before the issue of veiling is dealt with, in my opinion, not only is veiling not in contradiction to such issues, but it affects most

areas of life. The relationship between veiling and personality and the ontological value of the woman is an important and inseparable matter, because the exterior of each of us stems from her spiritual and internal condition, indicates her actual personality, and determines her cultural beliefs. Also, it presents the objectives, beliefs, and cultural composition of the society.

What is certain is that unveiling is a cultural phenomenon or symptom, in fact a social problem with its own peculiarities, one which is considered to have been a result of colonial domination during the decadent and dependent rule of monarchical injustice in this country. In order to familiarize women with human character and Islamic values, it is necessary to make them aware of the futile values and false character to which they have been unconsciously subjected, having become captive to the cruel greed of the capitalist powers. Then, in keeping with our intellectual (ideological) beliefs, we must engage in a great reform movement. Otherwise, as long as unveiling is inculcated in the society as a value, a sign of freedom, character, power and independence, as a result of the invasion and penetration of colonial culture, and as long as it finds a place in the minds of people and becomes a normal phenomenon, this improper action cannot be completely prevented in a healthy way, because every society becomes accustomed to its values and in practice serves the goals that are determined by the value system.

The purpose behind the sinister conspiracy of global oppression, which later appeared as the White Revolution, on the part of the servant of colonialism (the cursed Mohammad Reza Shah) was to make a heinous and decadent change in the society, particularly in women. The goal was to strengthen the political, cultural, and economic dependence of Iran on global imperialism. It resulted in turning a group in the society upside down, a group lacking genuine intellectual faculties, one which was alien to Islam. Hence, in order to clarify the value and character of women in Islam and the world and the role of veiling in this regard, first we must examine the views of the various societies, regimes, and ideologies in regard to human beings, to be able to better evaluate them and prove that unveiling is equivalent to lack of character on the part of the Moslem women of Iran.

Human societies are composed of human beings, and all efforts are made to improve the condition of the human being and his society. But subjects for discussion are such questions as: With what values and beliefs can a human being and his society grow and reach perfection? And essentially, who is this human being? Where has he come from? Where is he going? And with what basic goal is he going through life? Here, except for the school of monotheism, the world of knowledge has no answers, because it has not understood the human being. The last scientific answer is from the well-known Dr. [Alexis Karl] (the human being is an unknown being). Therefore, the reason that human beings in general and women in particular have become victims of the greed of the global

plunderers is that the human being has not been understood. For this reason, the human character, stature, rights, and condition and the course of human progress and perfection remain unknown and unclear. As a result of the lack of awareness of the nature of the human being and the lofty goal of his creation, he has become a captive, a prisoner within certain material forms of limited human thought, wisdom and knowledge, forms that are the result of economic ideas and goals under a cultural cover, in fact, imperialist domination (colonialism) through cultural and economic goals.

Because culture deals with all aspects of human life and every human being who is born is directly or indirectly influenced by culture, and culture is the best tool for imposing economic intentions and domination, even though in many societies one speaks of culture, it is a superficial culture based on economy. On the whole, culture, politics, government, war, and peace are all based on it. Even, as Western intellectuals say, when in Africa clothing is encouraged and accepted as a norm, and the people of Africa accept that having many good clothes is an indicator of civilization, a practice that distinguishes human beings from animals, one which appears to be moral and human behavior, the intention has been to sell materials produced by British factories in their own interests. Only on the surface did it appear as a cultural effort. Hence, as we see today, the destiny and condition of human societies are the same both in the Eastern and Western blocs, and in terms of materialism the human being has become an "object," both in the Western capitalist world and the Eastern proletariat dictatorships. In both places he has lost his humanity. In the East, he is a producing animal and in the West a consuming animal. Hence, with such ideas and culture, the human being is ineffectual. He no longer has human essence. He has no freedom, no intellectual personality. And he is unable to think. In this regard, women have been victimized by every stratum. The condition of woman in the East (communism) as quoted from the UNESCO message is:

Women are free to work in all areas. At the present time, 67 percent are in the mass media, 72 percent in schools and universities, 80 percent in banks, 50 percent in medical affairs and research, 30 percent in machine manufacturing, and 47 percent in government agencies. But only statistics about profit-making work are given. No information is given about who this woman is, what her character is, and by what form of nuts and bolts and machinery she has been made captive. Indeed, the woman is captive in the hands of the plunderers who think of nothing but money. And the condition of women in the "wealth accumulating and capitalist" West is the other side of the same coin, nothing but looseness and instability of families, which is all too prevalent in such societies.

A cursory glance at the history of the personality of women in the Western world shows that as the great philosopher Will Durant says, "The source of women's freedom in the West was the machine and the industrial

revolution and not the woman herself." Hence, the oppressed women, due to the injustice carried out against them, have been unable to understand their fundamental and human nature or to have their potential powers used on the proper course. They have also become captive to the greed and economic interests of the accumulators of wealth and capitalists. Like wind-up dolls, they are controlled by masters, the powerful and global superpowers, without any independent choice, thought, freedom, and social personality. Slavery in the present age is a common practice. Dealerships which buy and sell cars, weapons, and other commodities also buy and sell women. This issue has been reported in magazines such as SPIEGEL, which I quote here.

The July 1, 1985, issue of the weekly magazine SPIEGEL:

Virgin girls are purchased from poor villages in Thailand at 1,000 DM by dealers and sent ostensibly as servants, but in fact for prostitution, to night clubs in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Japan, and Germany. Slavery in the present age consists of the trading of young girls. The main markets of trade are Thailand, the Philippines, and South Africa, and international agencies are in charge of transporting thousands of women from the Third World to the West. According to the statistics of the police of Bangkok, 16,000 women and girls were exported from Thailand to other countries. Of this number, the share of West Germany was 4,000. West Germany is considered one of the major importers of prostitutes, and this is done by special establishments for finding women in West Germany, which send their agents to Asian, African, and Latin American countries to purchase commodities. Such agencies are legal in Germany. Many men find women by going to these agencies and looking at photograph albums, and after taking advantage of them send them to the streets to turn a profit. The Third-World women for sale to men have to display their bodies, and in these establishments there are even monthly auctions. Travel agencies organize sex tours for their customers. The prices and kinds of commodity (women) are announced to the customers in catalogues. In West Germany alone, there are 2,000 companies of this kind. These establishments have 5,000-12,000 women ready for sale. The above-mentioned agencies carry out about 3,000 transactions (selling women) per month. This is the unfortunate situation of women in the present world under the guise of freedom.

These women have for all intents and purposes become a commodity in the West and tools of trade in parts of the East as a result of their lack of awareness of and familiarity with their human character.

Yes, the self-alienation of women and lack of understanding of the lofty purpose of their creation causes deviation, intellectual slavery, and increasing problems. They are on the verge of misery and fall, wandering and puzzled, looking to be saved. Hence, those who still insist on unveiling or on superficially improper veiling must know that the phenomenon of unveiling is the fruit of the

same idea, only in the context of a global culture. One of the important problems to be noted is the issue of a global culture. By nature humans accept culture, particularly with the vast technological advances in communications and the deep relationship and dependence that has been created today in the world to provide for the political, economic, and social needs among the nations, and susceptibility to influence appears to be inevitable.

Of course, if it takes place in a mutual and balanced manner and promotes and enriches the cultures of the societies, it is admirable. But a passing glance clearly indicates the unfortunate fact that the existing conditions and situation only create the rapid trend of decadence. Undoubtedly, one of the most essential and heaviest social and political corruptions lies hidden in the dire moral situation of the world and in its human values.

The present political, economic, and social superiority of large powers, especially the Western countries, has altered the susceptibility to influence, which has become a unidirectional transfer and the inculcation and victory of one culture over another. The economic or industrial invasion of the developing countries by the so-called developed countries may under certain circumstances help the industrial growth of these countries but is accompanied by a cultural invasion. The efforts of the powerful countries of the East and the West to have their cultures influence the developing countries has caused these countries to suffer culture shock and social self-alienation.

Cultural manifestations and domination gradually take over all aspects of society and gradually influence the most important political and economic problems as well as issues such as nutrition, clothing, and even entertainment. Often societies negligent of the domineering intentions of the colonialists and the powerful try to make of their world a cultural and behavioral model for themselves. When an action is propagated in a society as part of a global culture without attention being paid to that society's own beliefs and interests, that society submits to this so-called global culture, because it has been inculcated that this culture is accepted by the world, whereas, most unfortunately, this inculcated culture has been more of a factor than any other in preparing the grounds for the domination of the powerful countries over the Third-World countries. East and West both have claims to a global culture. And even though they are different in definition, for evaluating and measuring a human being in terms of cultural issues, they reach a common principle and standard which is based on economy, money, and material gain.

Have human societies, especially the countries that have made a revolution, not yet understood this issue? Certainly, they have. However, merely because of the factor of nationality, without taking into consideration the interests and ways to achieve the freedom, victory, and perfection of the society, they do not have the ability to

offer a comprehensive and sound system and to implement a rich culture for an independent government. But in the Islamic system, due to a vast and authentic ideological viewpoint, human beings, both men and women, are given great value. A human being is authentic when he relies on the school of monotheism, and human society must have power, greatness, freedom and just choices. The law that can save mankind and the entire human society is the life-giving law of Islam. From the perspective of Islam, mankind is the deputy and representation of the Creator. He comes from God and returns to God. He has a creative spirit, and his freedom is guaranteed under monotheism. Hence, with his faith in God, his actions are pure and constructive, and he would not submit to any power or domination.

This human-making and civilization-creating ideology has many programs for achieving the high goal of human promotion, progress, and perfection, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been established to gradually carry out and implement. In the Islamic regime, under the rule of God, life exists in its true sense of the word. Verse 97 of the Nahl Sura, He who does good deeds, whether a man or a woman, if he has faith, we grant him life, pure life (sound, pure life, good and eternal life). And there is no difference between men and women. The vast arena is open for human development and progress. Free mankind, free of all chains and shackles, can have pure life to step towards progress and perfection rapidly, towards God, Who is absolute perfection, and most importantly in this vast arena, the activity and evaluation of women is higher. God has presented woman as the mother of mankind. When God willed to send a prophet such as Jesus to guide mankind, first He created his mother, the Virgin Mary. Consider the fact that Mary's mother asked God for a child and wanted a son to serve Jerusalem, but the will of the Creator of the World was to grant her a girl named Mary. When Mary is born, Mary's mother complains to God that she gave birth to a girl, and a boy is not like a girl. But God knows best. (God wanted Mary to be born, because in order to have a prophet like Christ, in order to have a son like Jesus, first his mother had to be born and trained, a mother chosen by God. Mary's stature is so high that the prophet Zachariah envies her and says, Whenever I visited Mary, I saw good food before her. I asked, Mary where do you get these? She would answer, From God. Mary had reached such spiritual height that the Prophet Zachariah wished to have a child like her. The Koran speaks in the *Asiyeh* of an enlightened, intellectual, and independent woman who is the wife of the pharaoh but is unaffected by the polluted environment of the pharaoh. She chooses to worship God freely and by choice, and God identifies her as an example of faith, belief, and practice. For all those who had accepted the faith, all women and men, a woman called *Asiyeh*, the wife of the pharaoh, becomes a model and is placed among the worthy women. Therefore, if a woman is familiar with her position and worships God, she will reach great heights and become a model. She will become like *Khadijeh*, giving all her wealth for Islam and human freedom. Another example

is her holiness Zeynab, who, after Imam Hoseyn, took on a great responsibility and brought the storm-stricken ship of Karbala to the shore of victory. With her great patience, she played that constructive and valuable role and powerfully and bravely delivered comprehensive and interesting sermons which broke the dam of dictatorship. [passage omitted]

But more importantly, we should speak of a perfect example, such as Fatemeh Zahra. And Moslem women must evaluate her in everything.

God said to the Prophet, We gave you Kowsar, oh Prophet of ours, We gave you much good. One of the meanings of Kowsar is abundance, abundance in philosophy, in knowledge and patience, in politics and morality, in spirituality, purity and piety. In other words, we gave you Fatemeh. Truly, what great initiative Imam Khomeyni took in calling the birthday of the Grand Lady of Islam, her holiness Fatemeh, the Day of the Woman, intimating that women should observe the complete model of this woman's character and emulate her. [passage omitted]

Hence, in a world full of oppression and injustice in which women, more than any other stratum, are the victims of injustice and insults, we are proud that from the perspective of our ideology, women are the most essential pillar of the society, and for this reason, the formation of the character of women is very important. The Prophet said, "Establish equality among your children, but if you are to place more value over some than others, I prefer women to be given more value." Strive for the education and nurturing of women, because women are the main axis of the society. They are the source of elevation and progress. Women are the builders of human personality. Women are the transmitters of values to the society.

Hence, if women become familiar with the truth of Islam and achieve their actual character, not only will the hollow powers of the world be unable to enslave them in the dry material forms and change their human nature, but their bosoms and thoughts will be the creators of guidance to rule the world, with the power of Islam, and to save humanity.

One of the factors that caused our women to be influenced by the attack of decadent Western culture was weak faith and lack of awareness of Islam and its liberating instructions. When they were quite ignorant and negligent, the plan of colonialism was accomplished, and thus colonialists attained their political and economic objectives.

Social researchers and sociologists believe that when colonialists want to dominate a country, they first make that nation self-alienated and drain it of its values. When the society lacks all values, they take advantage of the susceptibility to culture. The society is naturally influenced by the greater power, and consequently it accepts all imported manners and behavior. Unveiling in Iran is the most clear example of this phenomenon. Without

any research or examination into the so-called global culture, where it has been planned, what its benefits or harms are for mankind and the society, and essentially who is propagating it and with what objectives, it was accepted, and everything looked beautiful to those who had accepted it, because they had lost themselves. (History has always been this way.) [passage omitted] Unveiling is equivalent to lack of character on the part of the Moslem women of Iran. In my opinion, the culture of veiling can be spread through several methods or considerations, involving several matters that must become accepted in the society. These methods are: (1) Raising the level of awareness of women regarding Islam and the personality of women in the Islamic society and also pointing out the unfortunate cultural and social situation of women during the infamous period of unjust monarchy, especially in the past half century, before the revolution, when women—of course, those who were subjected to the decadent Western thoughts and naturally were considered among the comfortable and well-to-do stratum of the society who could be more active in this area—were believed to be superior if they dressed better, flirted better, had improper contact with the opposite sex, and tried through coquetry to attract attention by any means in their circles and gatherings. Many unfortunate women existed who had no other duty at work but this, and, on the other hand, the directors and those in charge would not hire any woman except for this purpose. On the whole, from the profiteering and Westernized perspective, because of their particular physical characteristics, women were objects to appear in stores as exhibitors and mannequins to increase the sales of luxury and decorative goods and commodities a hundred fold. Naturally, men engaged in embezzlement, bribe taking, and sometimes direct and indirect theft to gain more money and in various ways carried out any kind of injustice against the society in order to be able to ensure that their material life would thrive and to satisfy their desires. The youth, both girls and boys, were involved in coquetry, moral corruption, and uncontrolled behavior during their younger years and later, during their so-called serious life, tried to gain higher positions, salaries, and income. Education was not for the purpose of raising one's level of knowledge and scientific advancement. Rather, its purpose was to ensure a better and more luxurious life. There was no longer any sign of spirituality, purity, love of immortality, service to the society, generosity, and self-sacrifice. Humanity was forgotten and neglected. Everything was materialistic and animalistic, and the society was summarized in this dimension. This was the great danger that threatened our society before the revolution. As a result of such incidents, the enemies of humanity stepped into the arena of human thoughts and ideas, offering mankind a series of false needs represented as true needs. Subsequently, human society, rather than involving itself in essential issues, is pursuing various playthings and kinds of entertainment prepared for it. Society has had the notion instilled in its members that they certainly need them and must have them. While they are being destroyed, unaware of the danger that is destroying them, they are happy, thinking

that they have achieved everything, because they have lost sight of true needs, thoughts, and human life and do not understand the path to salvation. They essentially do not understand the illness in order to be able to find a cure and eliminate the danger. This can only be done by divine human beings sounding the warning bell. In any case, this bitter truth was nothing but the inculcation of a decadent culture under the guise of civilization, which our women must understand as one of the misfortunes of the past half century, before the revolution—in other words, a pest that could destroy the society—and try to eliminate.

(2) Society must recognize the human and Islamic position and personality of women and respect them.

One of the factors in the advancement of the intentions of the tyrant to spread unveiling and promote women's uncontrolled behavior and moral corruption was taking advantage of the artificial weaknesses of women in the society. Towards the same end, the society carried out any injustice it could against them, as a result of severe government strangulation and an improper cultural environment, and as a result of lack of familiarity with the truths and human-building instructions of Islam it belittled women in action, words and behavior, even in story telling and proverbs, using in reference to them such statements as "Women are weak; they have no brains; they cannot be consulted; they think crooked; whatever they say is wrong; even their dreams are backward; they have no right to education; they have no right to engage in affairs." It thought of its women as miserable, retarded, imperfect creatures, lacking value and character. To quote the Imam, it had come to believe that they were nothing. Consequently, women tried to save themselves and achieve social and familial character. Hearing the false cries from the propaganda bugles under the guise of women's liberation, unconsciously and involuntarily, they followed the sound, imagining that they would achieve freedom and social personality, unaware of its dire consequences, and jumped out of the frying pan and into the fire. In this manner, the grounds for women's captivity and the subsequent domination of the society by the foreign culture was prepared.

Hence, in all fairness, let us not blame women. We must admit that the situation at that time was such that, in addition to the atmosphere of strangulation and abandoning women in ignorance and unawareness of the instructions of Islam, the interests of the society and her own personality, those who welcomed unveiling were for the most part the type of woman in the society whose nakedness and lack of chastity, unfortunately, were as evident as their ignorance and humiliation, whereas if women were familiar with the truth of Islam and if they had not been subjected to psychological pressures, they would never have fallen victim to the West. And if they had not viewed themselves as lacking personality, they would not have gone after that mirage and been attracted to that false personality.

Fortunately, the great Islamic revolution stopped the hands of the colonialists and criminals from this country and now, like an experienced physician, we must begin the treatment and, with a cultural movement along with constant efforts and guidance, save those who remain behind.

The basis of this movement is to return to the Islamic school and values, because the attractiveness of Islam is able to guide anyone with a sound spirit, wakeful mind, and freedom of thought. The victory of Islamic values over futile values guarantees the salvation of the nation. The first step is to raise the level of awareness of the society in regard to the personality and position of women in the society. If in evaluating women the society and its basis of organization (the family) thinks, as Islam has instructed, that girls are a blessing from God, that the woman (wife) is a bounty from God, and views the birth of a girl as a Mary who was the mother of Jesus, as high as Fatemeh Zahra and her daughter Zeynab, who could be worthy of a father such as 'Ali, in this regard, the Islamic society shall face no problem. Given the perspective with which the Prophet of Islam regarded women and the way he viewed and treated Fatemeh Zahra and given the ideas of his holiness 'Ali regarding his daughter and his just and wise treatment of Zeynab, who truly is an adornment for her father, and considering the fact that the Prophet says, Only generous people revere and respect women and only lowly people insult them, and in the last moments of his life he gave instructions on the good treatment of women, for all these reasons, he considered women the foundation of the society and the axis of the family and viewed paradise as under the feet of mothers, who are culture-making and civilization creating, beings from whose lap, as the imam reported, men rise to heaven. The center of the progress and high achievement of mankind is the rich lap of woman, a being who is protection and the result of whose being, thought, ideas and soul are human beings. Yes, women are the transmitters of values to the society. "The good is good from the belly of his mother, and the evil is evil from the belly of his mother." The belly of the mother means the cradle of society. Therefore, if a woman, who is the foundation of the society, is pure and has spiritual energy and power of faith, certainly the society will be pure and progressive. In such an environment, when given the proper treatment, the true character of the woman is formed. When the society becomes a cradle to nurture her and the woman has freedom, greatness, awareness, human value, and social personality, then she does not need to be told all about veiling. Rather, she will know that veiling protects her personality and guarantees the freedom of women. The status of women is above being viewed like a doll, without having a choice and being used for sexual gratification. Veiling protects the position of the woman and guards the sanctuary of the family from possible threats. She will hesitate to unveil, which would be to declare how she thinks, that she is a captive of the decadent Western culture, that without originality of thought and culture and without belief in Islam she is only a tool for pleasure. Hence, she

will make an effort to have her appearance express her thoughts and beliefs. With proud Islamic veiling, she declares that she possesses human character, social value, intellectual independence, Islamic culture, freedom of thought, legitimate rights and, on the whole, in the true sense of the word, belief in the human-building world-inclusive school of Islam.

(3) Lowering the marriage age. This issue is very important in connection with unveiling. One of the actions that took place during the black era of the Pahlavis, along with the spread of unveiling followed by uncontrolled behavior, which naturally brought about moral corruption and the spread of prostitution in the society, was the high marriage age, which was a cultural imposition in Iran making use of the views of Western sociologists and psychologists for the purpose of cultural domination and for the capitalist systems to gain more profit and to influence the morality and common law of the society. At that time, girls up to the age of 20 and boys up to the age of 25 were not considered of marriageable age. The youth and young adults were referred to as children at that time, and there were expressions such as: Now is the time for her education. It is still too soon for her to get married. They must think about their future, when they can make a decision about marriage and have all the resources necessary to live in complete comfort. The man was expected to have certain resources to be able to ask a girl to marry him, and the woman was expected to have such-and-such a dowry to accept a marriage proposal. Some girls had to work in government offices or companies for years to save money for a dowry. Hence, the increasing demands of life, in fact consumerism, which was one of the intentions of the multinational companies, were among the obstacles that existed for the young people to marry in time. Often during the critical ages, which are almost the most critical ages in terms of sexual instinct—in women, about the age of 13 and in men at 15-25 or 30—marriage would not take place. On the other hand, unveiling, which certainly motivates and represents sexuality, and which generally was engaged in by ignorant women who did not know Islam and their own interests, for purposes of exhibitionism and attempts to beautify, attracted men and women, like two poles of a magnet, to each other, who made contact like positive and negative electrical wires and set their own lives and that of their society on fire. (The statistics from before the revolution show this bitter truth.) In such an environment, certainly it is the woman who loses her values and human and social character as a result of being dragged into private and social corruption, as in the Western countries. Of course, when corruption and prostitution coupled with unveiling is discussed, many are offended and protest, because they are negligent. If they were to pay careful attention, they would agree that unveiling itself is sexually motivated, even though unconscious. Hence, in order to eliminate this problem, it is necessary to lower the age of marriage, create the necessary facilities for young people in regard to marriage, eliminate the artificial obstacles on the path of this divine tradition, and provide the

initial resources for the young couple to form a family as soon as possible. The easier and more timely marriage takes place, the sooner this problem will be eliminated. We must make investments in this connection and, by implementing the Islamic culture, eliminate, God willing, the rest of the false and deviant ideas of the tyrant's time.

Reforming the situation of the special civil courts to preserve the legal, social, and familial character of women. Unfortunately, as a result of the male domination of the society, less attention is paid to the issue of justice and the legitimate rights of women, and such actions have a negative influence on the morale of women.

In my opinion, the reform of the issue requires the establishment of just courts, mentioned in Paragraph Three of Article 21 of the Constitution. (Creation of just courts for the protection and survival of the family.) In every branch of the court, one family counsellor and one legal counsellor must be present, and the legal counsellor must defend men and women equally. Men are often familiar with legal matters and if necessary can hire attorneys, because they have the financial resources to gain more rights. On the contrary, women, often due to the lack of the above-mentioned resources, are unable to defend or gain their just rights. Also, the legal counsellor, with the help of the family counsellor, must try if possible to prevent divorce and the separation children from their mothers. However, if the best interests of the family would be served by separation of the couple and the children from their mother, they must convince the woman that justice has been carried out with regard to her and her family.

In conclusion, I strongly believe that a vast and rooted cultural movement, which is a characteristic of the revolution, if the revolution has depth, builds and reforms the society from the roots. By relying on the great Islamic revolution, certainly unveiling will soon be uprooted in this country.

With hopes for the globalization of Islam.

790,000 Take University Entrance Exams

90AS0161C Tehran ETTALA'AT
in Persian 3 May 90 p 3

[Text] Social Service—Competition for admission to the universities and institutions of higher learning began this morning for more than 790,000 applicants across the country.

Our correspondent reports that the first phase of national testing in the humanities for the 1369-1370 [21 March 1990-20 March 1991] academic year was held this morning for more than 335,000 applicants.

Our correspondent's report also states that this morning Dr. Hasan Habibi, first deputy to the president of the republic, and Dr. Mostafa Mo'in, minister of culture and

higher education, went to Sharif Industrial University for a first-hand look at the first phase testing procedure.

According to this report, a large number of applicants did not arrive on time for the test and were left out of the university admissions competition. Likewise, a large number of applicants had lost their admission passes and were unable to take the test.

Of more than 790,000 applicants, after the completions of the first and second test phases, about 56,000 will be admitted to the universities, 19,700 in mathematics and technical fields, 19,500 in laboratory sciences, 8,760 in humanities, 540 in the arts, and 1,500 in foreign languages.

Competition in the first phase of the testing will continue tomorrow morning with applicants in the laboratory sciences, and tomorrow afternoon with the mathematics and technical group and the arts.

It is necessary to note that the results of the first phase of the testing will be announced in the first week of the month of Tir [22-28 June], the second phase of the testing will be carried out on 25 and 26 Mordad [16, 17 August], and the final results of this year's testing will be announced early in the month of Shahrivar [23 August-22 September].

NEPAL

Urban Infrastructure Analyzed

46000128B Kathmandu *THE RISING NEPAL*
in English 1 Jun 90 p 6

[Armila C. Shakya: "Talk of the Town"]

[Text] Urban consumers often air complaints about inadequate and intermittent water supply, irregular electricity, poorly maintained roads and bridges, as well as inadequate drainage and sewerage systems, to name a few urban infrastructure sub-sectors. These concerns have not remained unheeded by the authorities, but so far the results have been inadequate when compared to the size of the challenge.

In addition, the approach of individual agencies has overlooked the coordination of urban services; a road may be paved one day, only to be cut up the next in order to install water lines, or other services. Needless to say, such a situation is far from satisfactory from the viewpoint of urban planning, development and management.

Study: A recent study, "Urban Infrastructure Service Delivery in Nepal—Toward a Model Framework," conducted by a World Bank/UNDP [United Nations Development Program] project. "Management Support for Urban Development" (Working with the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning), focuses upon a number of critical issues in urban infrastructure service delivery in an effort to suggest a model framework that could enhance infrastructure service delivery in the future.

The report contracts the tight settlement patterns of the early part of this century and the traditions of infrastructure delivery that developed within that environment with the current situation, where traditional settlement patterns have broken down and the effects of urban sprawl are to be seen in most municipalities across the country. Only recently have serious efforts been made to replace the traditional order that has been lost with the use of modern regulations.

But why worry about urban infrastructure in Nepal, when about 91 percent of the population lives in rural areas? Urban areas are engines of development providing alternative job opportunities to underemployed agricultural labour.

Assuming that the non-agriculture segment of national GDP [gross domestic product] is urban, the "urban" component was estimated to account for about 30 percent of Nepal's domestic production in 1987/88, a figure which has been growing at approximately 6.5 percent annually since 1974/75.

The long-term trend indicates that the urban sector's share of domestic production will exceed the rural's by the year 2000. Urban infrastructure services addressed by the study include electric power, water supply, sanitation, solid wastes, stormwater drainage, roads and bridges, and telecommunications (primarily telephone).

The study notes that while HMG [His Majesty's Government] has made significant efforts to provide infrastructure services to the country's municipalities, existing service deficits are widespread and are projected to get worse within the foreseeable future.

During the Sixth Plan period (1981-1985), the urban population having access to potable water in 33 municipalities increased by 38 percent, yet within 15 years almost three times as many new water connections will be needed as presently exist. By the year 2002 it is estimated that 1.8 times as many kilometres of urban roads and 9 times as many kilometres of stormwater drains will be needed, and almost 17 times as much solid wastes must be collected (when compared to 1987).

Wide differences in service delivery are currently seen across various sub-sectors. In 1987/88 less than half of the urban population had adequate sanitation, stormwater drainage and solid waste collection, while over 70 percent were adequately covered by water supply and electricity services. These figures hide, however, the fact that where services exist, they are frequently of poor quality due to inadequate maintenance and limited operation budgets. Applying moderate standards for needed urban infrastructure services, investment requirements up to the year 2002 are enormous, totalling an estimated Rs. 14,173 million for 32 towns (at 1987 prices, excluding electricity), and representing an annual average expenditure of Rs. 945 million (for about 20 percent of HMG's average 1985-1988 total development expenditures).

Given the very intense demand on HMG's development budget from agriculture, industry and transport, and social development programmes, it may be unreasonable to expect that such a high proportion could be devoted to basic urban services.

If only those investment requirements which are strictly municipal responsibilities are considered, annual urban investment requirements represent 4.5 times the 1987/88 capital surplus for 29 municipalities.

Municipalities would need to increase their capital surpluses by 15 percent every year on average between 1987 and 2002 in order to meet the estimated annual investment in urban services (assuming adequate financing of the remainder were available).

This is a difficult, although not impossible, task which will require the mobilization of additional sources of revenue at the local level.

Current impediments to proper infrastructure service delivery in Nepal are multiple, including: 1) the lack of agreed standards for urban infrastructure installations; 2) the demonstrated inability of government to control modern settlement patterns (thus making infrastructure service delivery expensive because of the dispersed nature of new housing); 3) lax enforcement of existing regulations; 4) the fragmentation of responsibility for infrastructure service delivery among line agencies, municipalities, and other agencies in the absence of an effective framework for coordination; and 5) the lack of demonstrable models for cost recovery and community acceptance in some urban sub-sectors.

According to the study, it is in those infrastructure sub-sectors where HMG still views its role as one of providing services at little or no cost to the people where policy dialogue would be most beneficial.

The study recommends changes in several policies and strategies in order to move toward a model framework addressing the identified impediments to infrastructure service delivery within the towns.

The thrust of the approach includes strengthening the ability of the local municipalities to take up more responsibilities for urban infrastructure services, while transforming line agencies from their current role solely as implementing agencies to a role in which they also function as supporting institutions for local municipalities.

One of the policies recommended is that of recovering the costs of urban improvements directly from the beneficiaries of those improvements, where possible.

Another policy change suggested by the study relating to cost recovery is the separation of social and economic objectives within "tariff sector" line agencies (i.e., NTC, NEA, and NWSC) in order to make explicit in budgeting which infrastructure elements are directly cost-recoverable from consumers and which are not (but are part of HMG's social objectives).

The study suggests that HMG continue to promote improved revenue performance and increased capital surpluses within municipalities. Moreover, it suggests that line agencies and municipalities be encouraged to adopt coordinated multi-year capital investment planning and budgeting systems.

Perhaps, the most interesting policy recommendation is that of the formation of a Municipal Government Support Program to coordinate urban infrastructure inputs by various agencies from the national to the local level, including inputs for training and institutional development.

Within such a framework, external support organizations can be asked to find their place of service toward the integrated effort by participating in individual project or programme activities.

Sustainable and replicable models remain to be demonstrated in a number of infrastructure sub-sectors, according to the study report. Examples where priority work is needed include: (1) funding for urban road construction and maintenance; (2) stormwater drainage design and construction funding; (3) cost recovery for sewerage; (4) cost recovery and leak detection and repair for water supply (including public standposts); (5) electrical distribution strengthening, cost recovery for street lighting, concessional funding for rural electrification; and (6) cost recovery in solid waste collection.

Density: Earnest deliberations on the various issues and recommendations put forth by this study are needed. Assuming present density trends continue, by the year 2002 an average 61 percent expansion in urban area will be required in 33 municipalities throughout Nepal to satisfy projected urban population growth.

As the urban population in Nepal is expected to be 2.2 times larger in the year 2002 than in 1987 (not counting the population residing in emerging new urban centres, serious consideration of the issue of urban infrastructure service delivery is more of a priority now than ever before.

PAKISTAN

Shariah Bill Said 'Major Breakthrough' for Islamization

46000127B Lahore *THE NATION* in English
15 May 90 p 6

[Editorial: "Shariah Bill"]

[Text] After having remained in the works for five years, and after accepting some amendments in its provisions, the private member's 'Shariah Bill' has finally been adopted unanimously by the Senate. Although its full text is not yet available, it would seem that a major breakthrough has been made in the country's march towards Islamisation of laws. The jubilation witnessed in the Senate at its passage, only goes to illustrate the

importance of the occasion. It indeed is an important event in the sense that for the first time in the history of the country the theoretical concept of the supremacy of the Shariah, that had remained an inactive part of the Objectives Resolution all these years, will henceforth have a practical application through a proper law. It will, when it becomes a law, have wide-ranging implications on our judicial system, national economy, mass media, education, etc. But it is not a law yet. It could get a relatively smooth passage in the Senate, because the pro-Bill elements had a clear majority there. No such majority would seem to be available in the National Assembly. It may also get stuck there because the Senate chose not to accept the amendments tabled by the Law Minister, and the Law Minister has a much greater clout in the National Assembly than in the Senate.

The criticism that the Bill attracted, at least in its earlier form, pertained to the likelihood of its promoting sectarianism and thus becoming divisive in nature, its adverse effect on the status of women and its likely destabilising implications on the economic life of the country. Presumably all these objections have been taken care of through the amendments which have already been incorporated in the Bill. And if through any misunderstanding or oversight some vital interest got left out, it should be taken care of now as the Bill moves through various stages of its consideration. The important thing nevertheless is that it has finally come out of the cold storage and whatever shape it finds in the end, it will in any case meet a long-standing demand of the Muslims of Pakistan.

Shariat Bill Termed 'Controversial'

46000138A Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 27 May 90 p 6

[Text] Multan, 26 May: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) is prepared to cooperate with other political and religious parties and groups on the issue of enforcement of Shariat Bill. However, the JUI has a right of making amendments in the Bill to make it acceptable to all schools of thought. This was stated here by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the JUI chief, while talking to newsmen the other day. He said unless the Bill was acceptable to all sects, it would not prove useful for national unity.

Replying to a question, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, MNA [Member of National Assembly], said "we never refused to talk to other leaders on this important bill which has bearing on national life to evolve a unanimous Bill but some parties and leaders who claimed to present people's aspirations had failed to respond to the JUI's offers.

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman said that JUI had prepared a draft of the Shariat Bill on the request of People's Party and had several meetings with the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leaders but the PPP government had put it in cold storage.

Replying to another question, the JUI chief said that the Senate had passed a controversial bill as it did not accept our objections. He said we stand by our demand that every court should not be empowered to explain the Shariat and only a high level court should be constituted to dispose off Shariat issues. However, he said the court should not be empowered to legislate as it was only the National Assembly which could legislate on the lines of Islamic Shariat.

Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman said that his party had not closed doors for negotiations with the ruling Peoples government, but unfortunately the latter had betrayed its allies in the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy].

He said the JUI was not a part of IJI and "we would resist any attempt on the part of Mian Nawaz Sharif to bargain with the Federal government to curtail the powers of the Federal Shariat Court.

Sentenced by Special Court

The judge of special court No. 7 (suppression of terrorist activities) Multan has convicted and sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment one Muhammad Akmal of Chah Ghaziabad (Makhdoom Rasheed) on the charge of uprooting railway track on 9 November 1987 near Seetal Mari level crossing. He was booked under 126 railway act. According to details, Muhammad Akmal was caught red handed opening the fish plates and bolts of main railway track on Multan-Khanewal section near general bus stand railway level crossing on 9 November 1987. However, investigation agencies could not find the causes of this act and his affiliation with any political party.

Demand To Impose Agri Tax

Trade chamber, Multan, has recommended the imposition of agricultural income tax to meet the budgetary deficits and to make the country strong and prosperous. Presiding over a meeting of subject committee of trade chambers, Shaikh Muhammad Rasheed, ex-MNA said that Federal Government had invited budget proposals and we had recommended that self-assessment of taxes system be revived and agriculture income tax be introduced. He made it clear that Multan traders would not accept the 30 per cent increase in existing taxes and they would be forced to stop payment of taxes to government. He appealed to traders to avoid strikes.

Students' Demo

More than 200 students yesterday staged a demonstration and blocked the road for three hours on Multan-D.G. Khan-Mianwali route by burning tyres as a protest against police's inability of apprehending the killers of a 12-year old girl who was subjected to criminal assault before murder. Students shouted slogans against police and authorities and demanded early apprehension of culprits who are reportedly influential. It may be recalled that some unidentified persons kidnapped a 12-year old girl from her home and subjected her to criminal assault.

Tributes Paid

Mr Justice Munir Ahmed Khan of Lahore High Court Multan Bench has said that a lawyer should be honest, dedicated, well-reputed and master of law so that his client could fully trust him. Paying tributes to Sahibzada Nusrat Ali Khan, and Ch. Muhammad Latif Amritsari he said that these two lawyers had introduced themselves as well-versed and honest lawyers. They never betrayed their clients. Justice Munir said that they were strong pillars of Bar. They had devoted their lives and energies to the supremacy of law. Mr Justice Shaikh Riaz Ahmed, Mr Justice Nazir Akhtr, Nafees Ahmed Ansari, assistant advocate general, Pir Rafi-ud-din, Rai Abdul Hafeez, Ch Saghir Ahmed, and Bar chiefs also paid tributes to two leading lawyers and threw light on their services.

Sindh: Peace Prospects Explored

Editorial: Political Decency as Price of Peace

46000136A Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English
7 Jun 90 pp 5, 6

[Editorial: "What Price Peace?"]

[Text] Every sane concerned citizen will agree that Sindh's blood-soaked, tangled skein must be unravelled knot by knot; and also that this can be accomplished only through the concerted efforts of all those who have not shed their humanity for the sake of personal gain or petty partisan ends. A great deal needs to be done on many fronts, but an honest appraisal leaves no doubt that the first priority must be given to the long-neglected task of disarming the people. As a result of Gen. Zia's Afghan policy, Pakistan's western borders have been thrown open to smugglers and gun-runners, introducing the dreaded Klashnikov to our towns and villages. We had warned repeatedly in these columns that by creating a huge free arms market on Pakistan's soil, Authority was inviting disorder and anarchy. The warnings were not heeded. The inflow of illegal weapons has continued. To compound the folly, a stupidly generous arms licensing policy has permitted legislators and their friends and retainers to possess high-calibre weapons that are not easily available even to the police and para-military forces.

The cult of the Klashnikov was allowed to spread. Today, the weapon is used in ethnic skirmishes, in battles between student factions or in tribal feuds, and, of course, by highwaymen, dacoits, kidnappers and rapists. No-one knows exactly how many Klashnikovs are in private hands, but it is known that on their strength private militias have been recruited, owing allegiance to political parties, religious sects and ethnic groups, but with no regard for the common weal or concern for public woe. Clearly, this evil menace must be eliminated. All unlicensed arms must be confiscated, and licences issued for weapons of offence cancelled. Where necessary, and because of prolonged neglect this may be necessary in many places, the help of the armed forces

should be sought to ensure that these operations are carried out speedily and successfully. At the same time, it is essential to interdict the flow of arms from the Bara market and from Afghan refugee camps. The arms sales depots established in different parts of the country must be liquidated, and the Afghan refugees involved in the trade must be barred from travel and confined to their camps.

All other facets of the Sindh situation have also to be dealt with soon and effectively. The political background to its troubles cannot be ignored, nor its deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, but Government's foremost duty is to stamp out terrorism and bring peace to the tortured land. It is wholly specious to argue that leniency must be shown to the "misled youth" even if they are found to be involved in cold-blooded massacres or if they kill and torture their opponents without mercy or compunction—at times even without discernible motivation, however perverted. No terrorist act can be justified or condoned, not even in alleged retaliation. All terrorists must, therefore, be identified, arrested and punished—irrespective of whether the war-cries they shout are in Urdu or Singhi, Pushto or Punjabi. Such certainly does not present a purely law-and-order problem, but it is essential that law should be respected and order restored, and full security guaranteed to all citizens, so that it is possible to deal with political problems on a rational basis.

In looking for sensible, workable solutions, it is seen that, in the atmosphere of blind hatred, rationality is in short supply. Living in stark, animal fear, people require special courage to speak or write the truth. Attacks on newspapers, which started months ago without evoking sufficient non-partisan reaction, have culminated in the killing of three journalists merely for doing their duty. In a bid to end the bloody stalemate, the Sindh Government has done the right thing in calling an all-parties conference to discuss the present situation in the province. Strangely, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] leader, in London for the last fortnight for medical treatment, has laid down meaningless conditions for his party's participation in talks that are vital not only for peace in Sindh but for the country's future. He remains busy trying to internationalise the question. This is not all. The leader of the Jamaat-I-Islami has, in a recent Press interview, declared that the Jamaat will "find the way to their destiny through civil strife." Further, some leaders of the MQM have begun to talk openly of dividing the Sindh province into two parts. Charges levelled by the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leadership on this count are confirmed by JUP [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan] leader Maulana Noorani who sees a conspiracy to divide the country in what is happening in Sindh.

What is the price to be paid for peace? The people have already paid a very high price—in innocent blood shed, lives disrupted, homesteads destroyed. The national leadership on both sides of the divide, must accept responsibility for the horrible situation. This is the

inevitable result when political principles are easily foresaken, manifestoes forgotten, and pledges made one morning forgotten before dusk. The worst example of low opportunism is offered by the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and the COP [Combined Opposition Parties], with their series of mesalliances, formed with the sole aim of destabilising or displacing the Bhutto Government, even if this means wading through rivers of blood in Sindh by widening the ethnic gulf.

The price that the political leadership must learn to pay for peace is a return to political decency and common sense. If the country is to be saved, such fecklessness and wild waywardness must be abandoned and an effort made to rise to principled politics based on democratic norms. All political parties must learn to co-operate with each other. Attention should be given to pending political problems, and proper heed paid to the genuine grievances of minority groups, ensuring that they get their due rights and can forget the demands for special privileges at the expense of the rights of others. It needs to be realised by everyone that the problems that plague Sindh and other parts of the country will begin to be resolved only when peace prevails, and the economy can be revived, giving people confidence in the country's future. It is, therefore, essential that all individuals and groups capable of influencing the political leadership should assert themselves, so that political parties can be diverted from their present collision course and can adopt policies that will save the country from an explosion that may well prove to be destructive far beyond what we can imagine today.

'Grim Situation'

46000136B Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 pp 14, 15

[Article by Zafaryab Ahmed; first paragraph VIEWPOINT introduction]

[Text] The situation in Sindh is grim. That is the least that can be said about it. Innocent people are being killed, both old and new Sindhis. The province appears on the edge of a precipice, says VIEWPOINT's Zafaryab Ahmad who has just returned from a visit to Sindh. He spent four days in Hyderabad and Karachi during which he tried to meet people representing all shades of opinion. Unfortunately, despite efforts, he was unable to establish contact with the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], and his reports and interviews therefore largely represent the Sindh point of view. But he did meet several Urdu-speaking journalists and political workers and their views are given in his report.

Guns crackling, killing with ever-increasing sophistication and intensity. The volcano of violence erupts intermittently in cyclic order.

The IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and its adjunct, the COP [Combined Opposition Parties], want to prove that what's happening in Sindh is a failure of the People's Party Government. On the one hand, there are demands

for the imposition of Governor's rule and, on the other, there are people who very strongly believe that interference from the Centre has brought about the present crisis. The situation is so confused that at times it becomes difficult to understand who is saying what and where the truth lies.

What was happening in Sindh, according to the version of our independent national Press, forced one to ask what had happened to the followers of Shah Abdul Lateef. But on reaching Sindh one found that the Sinhi side of the story was not being fully told. The first Sinhi I met said: "I am sure you have come biased by the news in the Press."

The latest conflagration in Sindh apparently seems to be a conflict between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis. But it has a host of other forces operating. The MQM is striving to establish its control over the cities and to have a key position in the affairs of the State by controlling the revenues and administration of the port city of Karachi. The Jamaat-i-Islami, having been defeated by both the People's Party and the MQM, is avenging itself by being in alliance with the latter and not letting the state of insurrection come to an end. Then there is much talk of some "invisible" or "foreign" hand trying to destabilise Pakistan. In the interior of Sindh there are defeated waderas who are said to have let their wrath loose on the people for not voting for them in the elections. They are thought to be encouraging the dacoits. Then, there are the youth without any sense of direction or a constructive cause to pursue and who are readily available for those who can provide an ideological cover to their frustrations.

To add fuel to the fire is the media, which has lost all sense of responsibility and thrives on sensationalising even national tragedies. It has reduced objectivity to a low level by not letting people know what the truth is.

Then there is the drug mafia, and unemployment and ten long years of intolerant rule and ethnic and sectarian prejudices—all make the situation so complex that there seems to be no end to the conflict.

However, a sense of deprivation and neglect is rife among the Sindhis. They feel helpless today in the hands of the 'national' Press. A cursory look at the Sindhi dailies makes one realise that their voice and aspirations are being stifled. A comparison of the news in the Sindhi Press and the other dailies gives an impression of reading about happenings in two different countries. What happens to the Sindhis hardly ever gets any coverage in Urdu and English. If at all it does, big happenings are made to look non-events. The Sindhis say that this is because of the Mohajir hold over the media: "The publishers are Mohajirs, the owners are Mohajirs, the reporters are Mohajirs. How can our point of view get proper representation, particularly when they are striving for a cause which is inimical to our interests?" asked a Sindhi intellectual.

"We are being made refugees on our own land. Every second Sindhi is on their hit list. When I go on a call to the hospital to attend a patient, I leave my home with the possibility of being killed," said a doctor at the JPMC. "I am not a chauvinist. I speak Urdu without being guilty or ashamed of it. But I cannot tolerate the division of Sindh. Let me tell you that no Sindhi will tolerate this. How can any people let that happen to their soil?"

Fear has become part of every-day life. Mohajirs too venture out to work afraid of snipers. People avoid coming out of their homes even in areas where there is no curfew. The Drigh Road, where there used to be bumper-to-bumper traffic, was empty during the peak hours when I entered the city. Whoever one talked to on the phone was reluctant to come out of his house. A journalist at the Press Club said that when he decided to go home on the night of May 28, at around 1 a.m., his usual time, he was overtaken by fear and didn't have the courage to walk along the roads he has traversed for the last 27 years.

The province has never been calm since the early years of the 80s when the Zia military Government, to contain the movement for democracy, unleashed a reign of terror on the people of Sindh. The most recent wave of violence began with the February 7 strike call for the MQM. It had formed an alliance with the People's Party Government immediately after the 1988 elections, but disassociated itself from it last November, accusing the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] of not fulfilling the terms of the accord that led to the alliance.

The latest trouble started with the administration's attempt to try and arrest some people from inside the city of Hyderabad. When the police arrived near the place called Pucca Qilla, it was met with resistance. In the process, a number of people were killed and the so-called operation ended with the police being called back without having arrested a soul. The media the next day printed gory details of the killings—in what the Sindhis call the Mohajir version of the story. The Press came down heavily on the police. However, the Inspector-General of Police [IGP], Sindh, who personally commanded the operation, defended his actions in a Press conference which was not covered by most of the English and Urdu dailies. The IGP denied the charges of having disconnected the electricity and water supply before carrying out the operation.

There were riots earlier also, but they were very different in form and essence from what is happening now. The province has undergone various phases of discontent among different people ever since the inception of Pakistan. The conditions have not been lacking for opportunists to benefit. However, the long periods of military rule and the absence of democracy obstructed possibilities of national cohesion. The Government of Gen. Zia, considering Sindh to be Bhutto's constituency, planned to divide the province on ethnic lines, and as part of this scheme, he wooed the Sindhi nationalists on the one hand and encouraged all sorts of ethnic organisations,

including the MQM; the PPI [Punjabi Pukhtoon Ittehad] came later on the scene. The MQM, claiming to represent and safeguard the interests of the Urdu-speaking people of Sindh, demanded abolition of the quota system in jobs and educational institutions. It is said to have been launched by the military government with the help of retired Mohajir bureaucrats. From the very first day, it aimed at the Mohajir youth and their problems because of the slackening job market. There were other major reasons for that, but the MQM concentrated on the quota system and instigated its young people to prevent Sindhi youth getting their share. Each and every job given to a Sindhi was kept track of and propagated as usurpation of Mohajir rights.

In the beginning, however, the main target of the MQM attack was not the Sindhis, but the Punjabis. In fact, the MQM started off with a good relationship with the Sindhi nationalist G.M. Syed which broke when it had settled its account with the Punjabis and Pukhtoons and shown the strength of its muscle. The non-party political era was conducive to the growth of ethnic parties in Sindh (just as elsewhere in the country it brought into play caste considerations.) The MQM made significant headway in the 1983 local body elections and made life difficult for the Jammāt-i-Islami. The MQM and its parent agencies seemed to have studied the election results seriously. It started building up an organisation of fund-paying members in the areas where it had won.

There were many genuine problems facing the people of Karachi, including the Mohajirs—problems like lack of low-cost housing, transportation and jobs. But the MQM, by its radical rhetoric, gave the problems a Mohajir colour and, playing on Mohajir cultural and linguistic sensibilities, caught the imagination of Mohajir youth, disenchanted with the religious parties they had earlier followed. The demand for Mohajirs to be treated as a separate nationality then came to the fore.

The MQM made ethnicity, communal hatred and jobs for Mohajirs as the basis of its electoral 1985 campaign. "The MQM still had good relations with the Jiye Sindh," said an Urdu-speaking Mohajir while recalling the election campaign. "And speakers in their meetings used to criticise the Sindhis for not listening to the message of G.M. Syed. To show his solidarity with the Jiye Sindh, Altaf Hussain in his public speeches used to tell his audience that he had an invitation from the Punjab and asked whether he should go, and the crowd would say, no."

"The MQM has failed as an organisation. It cannot deliver what it promised to the Mohajirs," said an MQM worker who, inspired by its populist appeal, had joined it but seeing nothing but bloodshed has become disillusioned. "Even if the MQM dream comes true, it wouldn't be what it has in mind." He believed that the MQM has no choice but to keep the present state of anarchy going and keep the hope of Mohajir controlled cities alive as long as possible."

On reaching Hyderabad, one found that the well-propagated incident of police excesses at the historic Pucca Qila was not an isolated incident. The city had been tense long before the incident. According to official figures, the death toll for nine days (May 14-23) was at the rate of six a day. Out of the 53 dead, only 19 were Mohajirs. The so-called operation clean-up, was carried out by the police, following repeated complaints that the people were being kept as hostages by terrorists. Even before the incident, on May 9, seven people were gunned down.

In Qasim Nagar, stories that the emigrants from Hyderabad city told showed the ordeal of the Sindhis at the hands of the MQM, Sindhi women and children surprised one with their fluency in Urdu. A woman from the Qambrani tribe whose son Qadir Bukhsh Qambrani was one of the first victims of MQM barbarism said that they had been living in the same vicinity for years, "but I do not know what has gone wrong with the Mohajir youth. They do not want to tolerate us. They abuse us and ask us to leave our homes."

There were at least 1,000 families in the Nargisabad camp also which have been forced to migrate. Each one of them had a story of threats to vacate their houses to tell.

Disruption in Work Place, Worker Unity

46000136C Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 pp 15-17

[Text] "This situation is alarming for the poor, not only in Karachi but all over Pakistan. It was never so dangerous," said Nabi Ahmed, General Secretary of the United Workers Federation when asked to comment on the present situation in Sindh from the vantage point of the working class.

"Poverty, hatred, exploitation, frustration have been consciously channelised into a strife between people and the outcome is being called ethnic violence. All the powerful, the moneyed, the capitalists and waderas, are involved in this conspiracy. They have been using the social situation to protect their vested interests. The working class, irrespective of differences of language, of religion, caste, colour and creed, was united on the platform of their trade unions. But their unity too has been disrupted by the events of the last six or seven years. We have been trying to resist, but our efforts do not seem to be bearing fruit. We do not have resources where as the vested interests have local, national and international support to implement their nefarious designs."

"If you ask me," he said when asked if things could be otherwise, "had there been a strong working class movement and had the working class of both East and West Pakistan been organised on class lines, what happened in 1971 wouldn't have happened. But the effort ever since the creation of Pakistan has been to divide the working class. All the successive governments have liked leaders

who could be their yesmen. Here we stand today in a situation where human beings have been reduced to savages; they are killing each other. I don't hold any particular group responsible for the present situation. I think we are all responsible for this. We all have failed to make Pakistan a democratic society. Each party is refusing to identify the miscreants in their own ranks. It reminds one of Partition when Hindus treated their goondas as heroes and vice-versa.

"We have gone beyond the stage of appeals. The sad part is that the mosques are being used to flare up emotions. If a place of worship is being used to sow the seeds of hatred, what can one say?"

This situation to my understanding is a product of the pattern of settlements made after the creation of Pakistan. The immigrants should have been scattered all over the provinces and allowed to intermix with people of other nationalities. There would by now have been a totally new generation composed of various nationalities growing up together and having fraternal feelings towards each other. Today in Karachi, if you look around, areas with mixed population are less affected."

Had the conflict in residential areas also affected the work-place?

Nabi Ahmed said: "I will have to say Yes, because saying No even for tactical reasons would be a mistake. Generally, industrial workers are less affected than white-collar workers. In the takeover industries, where there is less work, good salaries, ample leisure, there the discord has taken roots. But in industries where salaries are low—those who live in absolute misery tend to share it. No violence has been reported from these housing areas and there has been no killings among the multinational working class units. But if we look at banks, insurance companies, commercial establishments, takeover industries, the Steel Mills, KESC [Karachi Electric Supply Corporation], KMC [Karachi Municipal Corporation], we will find that in all such institutions the trade unions have been affected. But we are trying to keep the tension low. Those leaders are commendable who have not succumbed to ethnic or emotional prejudices."

Nabi Ahmad believes that it is a minority who does not want peace, "If a survey of Karachi is conducted, more than 95 percent of its population would be against violence and wouldn't be prejudiced. But the violent minority has become so powerful and has amassed such great resources that it has held the whole city at bay."

He pointed to another dimension of the tension. "Once atrocities have been committed and it is said that a certain group have committed them against the other, it naturally will lead to retaliation. But I am convinced that a majority of people from rural and urban Singh are peace-loving. I know Sindhis who wept at the killings of Mohajirs and Mohajirs who wept for the Sindhis."

Different political parties have their trade unions and recently, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] too has

started forming its trade unions. One was told by the sole surviving victim of the attack in the Labour Court premises the other day that the incident had its precedent in a division given in a case filed by a recently formed trade union in the united bank. Was this correct?

Nabi Ahmed said: "I am personally not aware of the facts. As there is no clarity about the incident, I will not comment. It is true that different political parties have formed their own unions. Not only this, to weaken the trade union movement welfare organisations were formed in the 80s on the basis of region and clan. The MQM also came in; the Punjabi Pukhtoon Ittehad also tried to have a foothold. This was poison for the working class movement—from which only the employers could benefit.

"The most dangerous trend was started by the bureaucrats and the technocrats who came to manage the takeover industries and used official facilities for their personal use. To avoid criticism from the trade unions, they provided facilities to the latter. This is so common now in the takeover industries that trade union office-bearers use official transport and have their offices in the premises of the factories. The political groups fight for control over these resources. They don't have any interest in the well being of the workers. You wouldn't find such a situation where the unions are poor. There, the political parties do not go and work.

"The People's Party too is equally involved in this race. The People's Labour Bureau [PLB] is not playing a good role as far as the institution of trade union is concerned, and the way it is functioning is a source of resentment among the workers. The People's Party, after coming into power, instead of giving preferential treatment to it, should have treated the PLB just like another trade union."

What did Nabi Ahmed think were the causes of the present unrest?

"The present political conflict which has taken an ethnic form is primarily a product of the high rate of unemployment. If this unemployed majority at our urban centres had been absorbed in the work force, I can say with confidence that no ethnic grouping would have gained any ground. But what we did instead of creating jobs by setting up industries, was to import goods which could be easily produced in Pakistan. And the industrialisation that was done did not take into account our national requirement. Instead of installing labour-intensive units, we went in for automated units. The United Workers Federation is the only federation that, instead of demanding a labour policy from the elected Government, demanded a new industrial policy suited to our national needs. We said this because we could see where this high rate of unemployment was going to end."

While talking about the emergence of an organisation like the MQM, Nabi Ahmed said: "I hold all those Sindhis responsible for the coming up of such an organisation who not accept even those Mohajirs who after

settling in the rural areas of Sindh and learning the local language had adopted the culture of Sindh. Instead they were ridiculed, given contemptuous names. It is a product of the extreme injustices done to them. These people left their property, their gardens and their homes and accepted an alien land as their homeland. Had they been treated with love and affection, particularly by the educated people, the intellectuals it would have been different. But as far as the ordinary Sindhis are concerned, they welcomed them, consoled them and helped them to settle. The Sindhi intellectuals and writers, through their writings and other activities, sowed the seeds of hatred. The vested interest among the Mohajirs also made use of the situation."

But hadn't the Mohajirs always been opposed to progressive, democratic parties and had voted either for the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan or the Jamaat-i-Islami and hadn't a majority of Mohajirs opposed the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] from day one?

"No, they weren't opposed to the PPP on that vast scale. But as I said they had left everything for an 'Islamic homeland' and they had a preference for religious parties. In the previous elections, a big number of Mohajirs supported the PPP. If you look at the recent eruption of violence, Mohajirs have fought and died for the People's Party."

Pirzada Interviewed, Sees No Solution

46000136D Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 pp 17, 18

[Interview with Abdul Hafeez Pirzada: "No Easy Solution"]

[Text] Abdul Hafeez Pirzada likens the present situation in Sindh to a "state of anarchy."

He said that the normal law-enforcing agencies were demoralised. "I do not see that the Government has the will or the capability to deal with the situation."

[VIEWPOINT] When you say 'will', what do you have in mind? Just stern administrative measures...?

[Pirzada] Well, it is a number of factors. It is dealing with a situation that does not have any easy solution. To a certain extent the Government is in a straitjacket. Over-centralisation of powers and overbearing interference from Islamabad have left the Sindh Government impotent. It has lost all initiative. They don't have the strength to deal with the situation. The new dimension to the crisis, which does not exist anywhere else in Pakistan, is the fifth dimension, the ethnic conflict. This has rendered our cities totally beyond governmental control. The writ of the government does not exist.

[VIEWPOINT] You seem to think that there is no way out.

[Pirzada] There is always a way out. At times, things get much worse before they improve. Sometimes people

beat each other up before finally realisation comes. There is a democratic and constitutional way to enforce the law. Make people obey the law. That is the solution. Even civil strife can be a way out. There can be so much blood-letting that eventually people get tired of it. But when we talk about a way out, we talk about a political-cum-administrative solution within the framework of the Constitution. That appears to be somewhat difficult. Here apparently there are two contenders but the dimensions of the conflict have gradually widened. The Government, which has come politically, is not free from a doubtful background. What has been happening in Karachi over the last four days, what happened in Karachi on October 1, 1988, what the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] wants—the People's Party Government can't give. There is the problem.

[VIEWPOINT] You think any other Government can give it?

[Pirzada] Two parties are vying for control over the same constituency. Both are struggling for the control of the urban areas of Sindh. What the MQM probably wants is a quasi, federal State for the urban areas heading gradually towards a de-facto, de-jure partition of Sindh. The People's Party's rural constituency will not allow that to happen.

In the past everything happened in haste. All arrangements and accords were made in a great hurry. These of course didn't prove to be expedient.

[VIEWPOINT] Do you think at this stage of the conflict a constitutional solution is possible?

[Pirzada] A constitutional solution is still possible.

[VIEWPOINT] But how about the impression that there are forces who do not want any settlement to take place?

[Pirzada] Yes, there are many forces active. Let us objectively analyse the situation. I don't think that the police in Hyderabad mishandled or handled the situation or that they killed or under-killed. Nobody can deny the justifiability of an operation like that. This province needs to be disarmed, more than any other province. It has been receiving all sorts of arms and drugs coming from the north as a result of the Afghan war. The arms were available freely. The militants are out of the control of their parent political organisations. There is a great need to disarm them. They don't listen to their leadership. Therefore, the situation can't be controlled politically.

In such a situation, there is no choice but to take administrative action, along with political negotiations. How can anything be done when hell has been let loose? The only agency available for action and to maintain law and order is the police. This is the normal constitutional and regular agency available to a democratically elected government. What happened in Hyderabad and when I point the backlash of that, I can see a totally demoralised institution. Now what is the other agency available with

the government to deal with the situation? The political party. If they bring their cadres out on the street, it will worsen the situation. That will be nothing but the beginning of a civil war. It is a very difficult situation. The dimension that is being added to the situation and which is most frightening and alarming is that the scope of the controversy is being widened by the MQM in Karachi. They are picking up Sindhis and killing them as their selected targets. This will only intensify and aggravate the situation. The MQM wants partition of Sindh. This is one thing that the Sindhis can't accept. This dimension, I must point out, on its own will precipitate a full-fledged civil war.

[VIEWPOINT] You have been talking about a constitutional-cum-administrative solution, but....

[Pirzada] If the Government is willing to lose its political constituency, I think that it can. If it is willing to have an even handed approach, and takes action across the board against all segments who have offended society and go in for massive constitutional-cum-political reforms, I am sure it can do it. In the process, it can lose power and can be unseated.

[VIEWPOINT] Have you posed the question that if this Government goes, what will be the alternative....

[Pirzada] Well, in our country, if one of the two democratic institutions survives, we do not have to worry about the future of democracy. If the Government falls, it does not necessarily mean that martial law will come.

[VIEWPOINT] Wherever one goes in the wake of the present spate of violence, there seems to be a feeling of urgency among the Sindhis to arm themselves.

[Pirzada] Their existence has been threatened. They will try to arm themselves more. Violence and display of arms have become the dominant features of our political culture.

[VIEWPOINT] What do you think about the contention that some foreign hand is involved in the violence?

[Pirzada] A foreign hand can't act as the principal factor. It can only act as a catalyst. Why should we rule it out? Nowadays every government considers it to be its lawful and legitimate pursuit to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, particularly if the neighbour is not very friendly. I do not have any concrete proof. I would be surprised if it was not here.

Mr. Pirzada agreed that the attempts to save the status quo had brought the country to this critical juncture. The Constitution in its present form, he believes, is not capable of resolving any crisis; it can only aggravate the situation.

Mr. Pirzada disagreed with the contention that the People's Party never had a constituency among the Urdu-speaking people. He thinks that it may not have won very many seats in the last elections, but the party still enjoyed solid support among the Mohajirs. "I was

chairman of Karachi People's Party in 1970. We won nine out of 15 provincial assembly seats. However, we did alienate some of our supporters during our rule, but the present divide is a post-1983 phenomenon. It was consciously done and even the constituencies were demarcated on ethnic lines for the 1985 elections which intensified the ethnic divide."

SNA Leader's Views

46000136E Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 pp 18, 19

[Text] Osman Baloch, veteran trade unionist and a leader of the Sindh National Alliance, believes that the main reason for the present crisis in Sindh is the inability of the leadership of looking into things objectively.

"We have been blinded by emotionalism in our understanding of reality. It all started right with independence. The people who migrated from India had been subjected to fear of Hindu domination for a long period and had lived with a dream to rule the subcontinent. Even the Muslim League leadership was not aware of the extent of the migration. However, the Sindhis welcomed them in 1947. The painful thing is that they want to make those people refugees who helped to rehabilitate them.

But why should they do this?

"The immigrants had a history of living in proximity with the State. If you allow me to say so, they had been the instrument of the central authority in India for centuries. Despite the fact that a majority who came were poor, they lived with an air of superiority and kept them away at a distance from the local population. They were ahead in education and were versed in the affairs of the State and have had a history of living in conflict with the Hindus. They came to Pakistan with a hyper-communal consciousness. I will say it is impossible for them to live without an enemy, and they treated Sindhi Muslims as Hindus who obviously had a different religious culture from theirs."

Osman does not agree that the Urdu-speaking live only in the main urban centres. "They are spread all over Sindh—Sukkur, Shahdadpur, Khairpur, Shikarpur, Dadu, Larkana, almost all of the cities of Sindh. But not in the 'goths' where the Sindhis live. I am not sure all those who came had a landed background, but they got in claims all the land and property left by the Hindus. Some of them even sold their lands and took money across the border. The Mohajirs participated in the economic and social life of the Sindh but maintained a distance from the Sindhis. They still have their "khadi key karkhanas" in Shahdadpur. They control most of the business in our cities. Look at Malir, which is predominantly a habitat of Sindhi Baloch. The Urdu-speakers control the business centre.

"They live here and claim themselves to be Mohajirs, though they have come to live here permanently. They have had a Mohajir attitude towards our soil. The

difference becomes clear when we look at the Punjabi settlers in Sindh. They live with us in our 'goths'."

But the Mohajirs believe that the Sindhis did not accept them.

"They have a mentality to distort history. The disinformation cells that the politicians talk about today were opened in Sindh some 40 years ago. They believe in sowing the seeds of hatred. The Urdu-speaking people from U.P. You will always find talking against the Urdu-speaking people from Hyderabad, Deccan. The Muslims of Agra and Lucknow have disliked people of Delhi for their cultural and religious practices. They disinformed the Muslims about the aspirations of the Bengalis. They labelled them as Indian agents. Not only Indian, but agents of Hindus, and sowed hatred. They accused the Bengali Muslims of destroying mosques and giving up Islamic values and culture. They have played an anti-Pakistan role in our history." In contrast, Osman Baloch said, "the Muslims of Sindh have a tradition of Sufi Islam. We are a peace-loving people. Violence and hate are not part of our religious culture. Our nationalist poets like Sheikh Ayaz have verified in Urdu. We accepted Obaid Ullah Sindhi, a Punjabi, as ours, because he loved our soil the way we did. We are emotional people. We love our soil. We love Islam. But we love our rights as well."

Osman sees that present situation as a "well planned" one and, as a worker of the late Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, also finds an explanation in the alignments and adjustments taking place in the ruling power blocs in Pakistan. "The Punjabis and Pakhtoons by the end of the 70s had adjusted themselves as senior and junior partners, and in the 80s the Sindhi waderas agreed to share power in a subordinate role. They took the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] leadership on a tour of Sindh when it took on its first fight with the Pakhtoons. When we said that this violence was wrong, the waderas said that let the Mohajirs, Pakhtoons and Punjabis fight. They thought they would get away with it. It was not possible. The waderas have made us to pay for their politics. The MQM has trained itself, perfected its techniques over these years, and they are now out in full swing."

When asked about the origin of the MQM, Osman Baloch said: "The MQM was founded in 1982. It did not have any mass following. But it had clear objectives to strive for—the control of the cities of Sindh. They communalised local politics in the 1983 local body elections and at the same time started consolidating the organisation by picking and recruiting the enthusiasts from the Mohajir youth—or perhaps they did so at the instigation of Gen. Zia. Seeing its potential, Mahmood Haroon and some other industrialists started funding the MQM. The retired Mohajir bureaucrats also were very active in those days. They used to come to the MQM rallies. They also financed the MQM. There are pictures in the newspapers showing the bureaucrats sitting on the stage.

"The Memon businessmen also started putting their stake in the MQM. At the same time, the Punjab Government's policy of industrialisation started encouraging the under-licensed industry in Daska, Lala Musa and other cities of the Punjab. Now the goods produced in Karachi started losing monopoly over the markets in the cities of Sindh. This threatened the interests of the businessmen from Lalukhet and New Karachi. All these factors led to the rise of a fascist organisation."

Dangerous for All

"The situation in Sindh is very explosive. The MQM has opted for a very dangerous path. This has shaken the people of Sindh on the one hand and, on the other, it has threatened the democratic process which has come after a long, dark night of violence against the people of Pakistan in general and the Sindhi people in particular."

So said Rasool Bux Paleejo, formerly with the ANP [Awami National Party] and now a leader of the Sindhi Ittehad. "I think these people are primarily interested in destabilising the democratic government. Otherwise I don't see any reason in creating a situation of communal frenzy similar to that at the time of Partition. They do not have any politics, except to dub their political opponents as enemies of Islam. Atrocities have been perpetrated on our people."

"We do not believe in religious intolerance. We have a long tradition of practising Islam, perhaps longer than the Mohajirs can claim, more deep-rooted than they can even think of. We do not believe in victimising anybody because of his religion or his creed, or his racial entity or his nationality. Even during the worst days of the Hindu-Muslim riots, Sindh remained free of communalism and I think that was very much in accordance with the spirit of Islam. The Mohajirs came to our land considering themselves purer than the rest of the world and they left India considering themselves to be superior to rest of the Indians."

Narrating the recent happenings in Hyderabad, Rasool Bux Paleejo said: "The MQM terrorists have raped not only women but even minor girls. Like all Sindhis, I do not believe in propagating our ordeal or wanting to gain sympathy by telling the world that we are weak or have been humiliated. Instead, we prepare ourselves to defend ourselves. At present, because we were taken unprepared, we are on the defensive."

"I can only tell you what has been imposed upon us. The Sindhi people have been butchered, irrespective of their age and sex. It is not men alone who are doing it. They have their female accomplices. Not only this. They have a trained group of women who help the terrorists to escape. I refuse to consider them as women. But none of our workers will ever treat Mohajir women as they have treated ours. We treat women as human beings and as our equals. You wouldn't find a single incident of a Mohajir woman being molested in area where we are in a majority."

"The administration is totally with them. It provides them cover. When Sindhis go with a complaint, the administration tells them off on one pretext or the other." I have complained about this to the President in a telegram.

"The MQM have threatened each and every Sindhi intellectual of being on their hit list. They announce threats to Sindhis, whom they call us "Raja Dahir ki Aulad" and "kafirs" and ask the Urdu-speaking people to loot their property. The irony is that all the law-enforcing agencies watch the show from the sidelines."

Why should they be doing this, Paleejo was asked.

"The terrorists hope that sooner or later democracy will come to an end and their masters will be ruling the country. They will be able to separate Karachi. They have put in \$2 billion to arm their people. This is an army in rebellion, like that of Katanga, against a legal civilian government. They can do whatever they want. Nobody can touch them. The ISI [Inter-Service Intelligence] supports them. They have a hold over our telecommunication system. There are Mohajirs in all departments of the Government and the MQM blackmails them to work for them. The MQM is treading a risky path which is dangerous for the Urdu-speaking people as well as for the Sindhis. The Sindhi people have a long memory. Like all other tribals, their history is transferred down from generation to generation and they don't forget or forgive their oppressors."

The committee set up by the Prime Minister, of which Mr. Paleejo is a member, aims, he said, "at restoration of normal conditions to restore peace by punishment of the culprits, to root out terrorisms and put it down with a firm hand, to restore respect of life and property of all people, irrespective of what language they speak." This, he believes, can be achieved by resisting terrorism and also the temptations of terrorism, with peace initiatives and the normalising of relationship. "I want the people of Pakistan and particularly that of the Punjab to realise they are being misinformed that they should not trust this so-called national Press and open their eyes to its anti-national role. The national Press wants to make saints out of killers."

Mohajir Attitudes

46000136F Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 pp 19,20

[Text] "For an understanding of the situation in Sindh, a reference to the Sindhi Press is essential. The so-called Urdu Press is reporting only one side of the story," said Ibrahim Joyyo, a Sindhi intellectual and writer.

Mr. Joyyo suggested if the Press outside Sindh wanted to inform readers, it should also read the Sindhi papers and should know the other side of the story before forming an opinion.

"One of the major reasons for the present conflict and the cause of our deprivation is that the language problem

in Pakistan has not been tackled properly. It was taken for granted. Hence, the Sindhi voice was muted and we were reduced to dumb and unthinking people."

Ibrahim Joyyo sees the roots of the present situation in certain set attitudes of the Mohajirs with which they had migrated to Pakistan and to the perception of their own role in the new State. The undemocratic rules which were imposed in Pakistan strengthened all sorts of important values and attitudes in our civil life.

"Because of that," he argued, "Mohajirs started politics of separatism, collusion, clash, communalism. I call their politics separatist because the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] do not allow its membership to any non-Mohajir. There is no such ban on membership even in organisations like the Jiye Sindh and the Sindh National Alliance."

Mr. Joyyo insisted that the MQM was a separatist anti-democratic and anti-national organisation. The People's Party members in the National Assembly from Sindh do not talk only in terms of Sindhis he said. They think in terms of the national interest whereas the MQM members do not see beyond the Mohajir interest; "such responsible attitudes are dangerous."

When asked whether the situation suggested that the MQM was the only party which had clarify of objectives—namely, the control of the cities—and whether the Sindhis were falling into their trap and facilitating what the MQM wanted to achieve, Mr. Joyyo said: "The question of falling into the MQM's trap is not there. The question is that we should be recognised. Everyone has a natural right of defence, political, national and private. The Sindhi people are not armed, they are on the defensive, they are not organised. The reason is that they did not have any militaristic aims in mind. They had a point of view and wanted to pursue it democratically. For that, in the last elections, they voted for a federal, democratic party instead of nationalist organisations like Jiye Sindh. The Urdu-speaking people, who call themselves Mohajirs, consider themselves to be superior, think that they have a birth-right to leadership. They have challenged not only the provincial government but also the federal authority.

"At the moment, identification of the persons responsible for the present situation needs to be done. The criminals need to be brought to book. Accountability comes much later. If we do not place responsibility, even justice can't be done. If we do not do that, the situation is going to aggravate."

Was there an end to all this in sight?

Ibrahim Joyyo said: "People in Sindh want justice to be done. If justice is not done they will be forced to fight. They can't tolerate their rights being taken away from them. They consider it to be their basic right to defend Sindh and its cities from bifurcation. An indivisible,

integrated, geographical unit was provided not only by the British Act of Independence but also by the Lahore Resolution."

PPI Concerns

46000136G Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 pp 20, 21

[Text] "The Punjabi Pukhtoon Ittehad [PPI] is equally affected by the situation. The Mohajirs have full control over the media. Our point of view is not being given proper projection. You wouldn't have seen the news that 21 bodies have been sent to the Punjab. Those buried in Karachi are beside this. The PPI can't remain aloof. There are seven million Punjabis and Pakhtoons living in Sindh. The present situation has affected us badly. Our rights are going to be affected if the present set up changes. We have to be watchful."

This was stated by Malik Ghulam Sarwar Awan, leader of the Punjabi Pakhtoon Ittehad, while talking about the prevailing situation.

MQM Blamed

He said that the situation was created by the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement]. "This organisation was formed with a definite objective. They want to divide Sindh and create a separate state for the Mohajirs. They want to keep Sindh in a perpetual state of unrest until they are able to achieve their objectives. All that they are doing has no justification. They should have shown faith in the assemblies. These assemblies are the product of a democratic process. Whatever the result was, they should have accepted it and should have adjusted their politics accordingly and should have brought an end to street politics. We have been saying since long that the MQM is a terrorist organisation. They wouldn't let peace prevail and will continue to disrupt the social and economic life on one pretext or the other.

"The MQM believes that with unrest and violence it will be able to force the Sindhis to move out of the cities."

Malik Ghulam Sarwar Awan believes that MQM leader Altaf Hussain has gone to Britain not for a medical check up but to provide a cover to the violence of the MQM and misinform Western public opinion. "He will try to distort facts and show to the world that atrocities are being committed against the Mohajirs and that the Mohajirs and Sindhis can't live together. Hence Sindh should be divided and the Mohajirs should have their own States."

The PPI's position, Malik Awan said, was "to fight for the solidarity of Pakistan. It may appear that we are fighting for the Punjabi cause, but in a broader perspective, we are fighting for the integrity of the country. Our presence, if one looks into the situation seriously, is a balancing factor. Had we not been on the scene, he (Altaf) would have created much worse trouble. The PPI will do its best to restore normalcy so that the people of Sindh can once again start living together like brothers.

"Those who are using violence and believe in achieving their objectives through force cannot be convinced by dialogue. They can only be controlled by force. In a democratic set up, there are set rules for politics. No one should be allowed to resort to violence and kill and murder people and make normal life impossible. This can't be called politics. This is terrorist activity, and it can't be allowed against a democratic Government."

Hyderabad

While talking about the situation in Hyderabad, Malik Awan said: "The Sindhis can't live in their own city. Now the situation is that they are evacuating the city in which they have lived for centuries. They can't freely wear their ajrak and caps in the city. I know many Sindhis. They weep."

The PPI leader also said that the MQM possessed rocket launchers, Klashnikovs and other sophisticated weapons which even the police did not have. He thought a big, planned operation was necessary. He stressed: "Half-hearted measures in the past, instead of controlling the situation, have led to further deterioration. The Mohajirs attack police stations, take away the accused to hide their deeds, and play on the emotions of our people; they bring out their women. This is what they did during the recent attempts in Hyderabad to apprehend the criminals."

Malik Sarwar complained about the role of the Press and its one-sided-coverage of happenings in Sindh. "In 1985, what the MQM did with the Pakhtoons was not less than the happenings during Partition. Women and children were burnt alive. These horrifying acts got no mention in the Press."

MQM Demands

46000136H Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 p 21

[Text] In an objectives resolution published in January 1988, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi movement] made the following demands:

1. Sindh domicile should be given to those who have 20 years of continued residence in Sindh. (Not including those who settled in the province after the fall of East Pakistan.)

2. Only focal people should man the police force from top to bottom.

3. Mohajirs and Sindhis should be given arms licences.

4. Afghan refugees should be confined to camps because their presence in Sindh is creating grave social problems.

5. To stop the exodus of people from other provinces to Sindh, employment opportunities should be created in the home provinces of the migrants.

6. Katchi abadis built since 1978 should not be regularised.

7. A fast and efficient transport (like electric trains) should be provided throughout the province.

8. For all government and semi-government jobs, preference should be given to locals.

9. The voting age should be reduced to 18.

10. A fresh and honest count should be taken of Sindhis and Mohajirs and jobs be given to them on that basis. Every province should be represented in the Federal administration and in the defence services on the basis of its population.

11. The Mohajirs should be given the status of an additional Pakistani nationality.

12. All public and private industrial enterprises in Sindh should prefer locals for employment.

13. There should be uniform service and retirement rules in all Federal and provincial departments and corporations.

14. Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh should be repatriated home as soon as possible.

15. The Khokhrapar route to India should be reopened.

16. Postal rates for India, now abnormally high, should be brought on a par with those with other neighbouring countries.

17. Locals should be preferred for admission to educational institutions.

18. A hospital should be attached with the Sindh Medical College or the Jinnah Hospital should be attached to the SMC.

19. All local families should be given plots of land on easy installments.

20. The Karachi Electricity Supply Company, now merged with WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority], should be revived as an independent entity.

21. The Motor Vehicles Tax should be made a municipal rather than a provincial tax.

22. The Fuel Adjustment Charge should be uniform throughout the country.

23. The Sindh Government should be empowered to levy Sales Tax.

24. Bhitai and Liaquat Ali anniversaries should be national holidays.

Television: The Sindh Challenge

460001361 Lahore VIEWPOINT
in English 7 Jun 90 p 38

[Text] "The scant coverage by PTV [Pakistan Television] of the gruesome situation in Sindh is ruining its credibility. Its news bulletins, instead of providing information, seem to be interested only in dishing out cheap propaganda of the ruling party.... Over the past year, the image of PTV as an information medium has been totally destroyed.... Wahab Siddiqi in his Peshamanzar, instead of discussing this vital issue (Sindh), chooses to discuss the People's Programme each Friday morning."

These are the comments of a prominent educationist who also writes a weekly review in a newspaper. I do not remember whether he was writing his review when the Sohrab Groth operation was carried out in the Zia-Junejo days. But none of the reviewers then urged PTV to have a discussion on ethnic and linguistic conflicts in Karachi and Hyderabad. The most devastating incident of that period was that of the Ojhri Camp, but PTV failed to arrange any discussion on that also. It would be better if an objective, comparative study of PTV coverage of the pre-December, 1988, and post-December, 1988, periods were to be conducted.

But it is a fact that those who were quiet in Zia's regime and could not speak out the truth are now becoming very daring. That is good. They should carry on this exercise.

All important Government figures, including the Prime Minister, have pointed out that the Sindh situation is not their creation, but one they have inherited. This is right. But no visual proof of this has ever been provided by PTV. It is to some extent true that PTV has been avoiding talking about Sindh but last Friday (June 1) Wahab Siddiqi in his Peshmanzar brought the situation under discussion. The participants were Sultan Ahmad, Hasan Abidi, and Anwar Rajai. None of them was a Sindhi. Therefore, it was a timid discussion. What PTV should do is add some visuals in such programmes. It should come out with whatever visual stocks it has about the situation in Sindh, particularly Karachi and Hyderabad. The news coverage of the Press conferences of Zia, Junejo, Ghaus Ali Shah and other films relating to the disturbances during the previous regime should be shown. That will keep those mouths shut who remained silent in that period and who are now fuelling the fire.

The Punjab Government, through an advertisement, has asked the people to monitor PTV programmes from the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad]'s point of view. These observations will be submitted to the Supreme Court where the Punjab Government's appeal for establishing a Punjab Television is being heard. I am sure that while the Punjab Government will come out with fresh facts in a big way, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government will fail to present a proper comparison between the performance of PTV before and after December, 1988. The IJI is a pack of non-political elements, but they behave politically while the PPP is a political party

but behaves as a non-political party. The bureaucracy of every hue has established its control over the party, and the proof is that the most sensitive media is controlled by thoroughbred bureaucrats.

Getting back to the Peshmanzar on Sindh, Sultan Ahmad, a non-Urdu speaker from southern India, was straightforward. He said that we had become almost indifferent to the murder of human beings. We were not involved in the situation as human beings but as "partisans" or as cynics. One remembers that when the Sohrab Goth operation was undertaken the Pathans had retaliated more furiously and some Urdu-speaking areas were attacked by them. This brought the intellectuals to the Press and there were big appeals and processions. But when the situation has tilted in favour of a particular ethnic group, there are no such appeals, Press statements or peace processions.

AJK Prime Minister on Meddling by Pakistan

46000127C Karachi DAWN in English 12 May 90 p 8

[Text] Peshawar, May 11—The Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, has called upon the Government of Pakistan to restrain itself from indulging in Azad Kashmir [AK] politics which, he said would weaken Pakistan policy at international forums. He said if occupied Kashmir was freed and the entire valley became part of Pakistan, any political party will be free to establish itself there.

Addressing a breakfast news conference at a local hotel on Friday morning, he regretted that the Federal Government, instead of providing moral and material help to the Kashmiri freedom fighters, was "indulging unnecessarily in Azad Kashmir politics and creating problems." The system which the Muslim Conference government had been successful by running for the last five years, he said, would crumble if interference was not stopped.

He justified his party's association with IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] President Nawaz Sharif for electioneering campaign after what, he said, a corps of Federal Ministers started active campaigning in Azad Kashmir. He also justified President Abdul Qayum Khan's participation in Pakistan's politics.

Sardar Sikandar Hayat said that entire media resources including electronic media were in the control of PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and he and his party were left with no option but to expand their scope of meeting the people directly.

He predicted thumping success for his party in elections, but at the same time said that if it turned out the other way round he would happily garland the successful party and set a positive example by sitting on opposition benches.

Referring to defection by one of his female ministers to PPP, he said a Federal Minister openly said at the Press conference that he had made her to join PPP.

Dwelling on the Kashmir freedom movement, Sardar Sikandar Hayat said the sacrifices of Kashmiris had no precedent in human history and will bear fruit, but it was the duty of the Government and the nation to extend maximum help to them at this time of distress and despair.

He said if the "money which was being spent on horse-trading," was diverted to Kashmir, the valley could attain its freedom then it was destined because the movement was decisive and strong enough to beat Indian might.

Replying to a question, Sardar Sikandar Hayat said that his government was doing its best to help the Kashmiri refugees migrating to the free area, but it was beyond it to fulfil such obligations for an indefinite period. He appreciated the services of Jamaat-i-Islami in Kashmir freedom movement.

He said that not even one per cent of the people of occupied Kashmir were in favour of an independent state. The fact, he said, was that the Kashmir struggle now was no more a struggle merely for freedom, but it was a movement for Pakistan.

He said an independent Kashmir would not be viable because of its proximity to a big neighbour.

Responding to another question, the A.K. Prime Minister said he recognised Maqbool Butt's sacrifice as supreme, but there were ideological differences with these people who stood for an independent Kashmir. "We do not accept a liberated state, independent of Pakistan."

He accused the PPP government of delaying the People's Programme and releasing amounts to its candidates now to manipulate and win elections. He dismissed news reports that 3,000 schemes had been executed under the People's Programme.

He said he would see to it that at least 20 percent of AK budget was earmarked for the support of Kashmiris in case he won the polls.

Analysis Speculates on Cost of Indo-Pakistan War
46000133D Karachi DAWN (Supplement)
in English 16-22 Jun 90 p 8

[Article by Kingshuknag, Ranivshirali, courtesy of BUSINESS INDIA: "Economic Cost of an Indo-Pakistan War"]

[Text] Over the last fortnight, the war clouds that had gathered menacingly over the sub-continent have largely dissipated; the tension between India and Pakistan has eased perceptibly. Bellicose slogans like 'a thousand-year-war' and 'we won't yield an inch of our territory' have given way to guarded dialogue. But though defence analysts now feel that a confrontation between the two countries has retreated to being a slim probability, they don't rule it out altogether.

That this would be an unwanted war is evident. As in the past, both Delhi and Islamabad have succumbed to internal pressures and adopted hostile postures in the name of preserving national honour. In the heat of the moment, neither side seems to have taken full cognisance of the horrors of war. According to Indian Lt. Gen. A. M. Vohra, former vice chief of army staff, "A war is neither likely nor desirable. I do hope we do not stray into an accidental war."

Strain on Resources

Most importantly, neither country can afford the punishing impact on their fragile economies. Even a two-week war would grievously strain the resources of both countries. Most experts believe that like the earlier wars—1965 and 1971—a war would be short, not more than a month at the most. But such a prediction is well nigh impossible; other wars in recent memory, notably Vietnam and Iran-Iraq, dragged on for years.

The direct costs would be the actual expense on arms and ammunition expended; this would depend on the duration and intensity of the conflict. But there would be ripple effects. The government, for which deficit financing is already a major problem, would have to step up deficit spending further, this would affect both plan and non-plan expenditure. This would in turn effect inflation. A subsequent drastic increase in taxation, both direct and indirect, would be necessary. A resource crunch would also hit areas which are considered the most expendable—education and health.

A reallocation of resources, which a war at this time would surely necessitate, could also delay infrastructural projects in areas like power and irrigation. There is likely to be a diversion of foreign exchange towards arms purchases, leading to a further strain on already precarious foreign exchange reserves of the two countries. Increased defence spending, through boosting aggregate demand within the economy, would raise the prices of manufactured goods and render exports uncompetitive.

If the war hysteria has started dying out, it is also because of the realisation on both sides that taking to arms will not solve any problem. "A war this time could totally destroy the state of Pakistan, although Pakistan can inflict enough damage on India to put development back by a few decades," says Sreedhar, an analyst at the IDSA [Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis]. This inescapable truth is realised even by the Pakistani decision makers.

More Weaponry

If war does break out, most analysts agree it will be a bloody one. Since the last hostilities 19 years ago, both countries have acquired more destructive capacity in the form of more sophisticated weaponry.

As compared to the previous conflicts, this time around the strengths appear to be better balanced. On the ground, the troop deployment of the two countries is in

the ratio of 1:1 and the strike forces and strategic reserves are also nearly equal. In the air, both countries have deep penetration strike aircraft—India has the Jaguar, MIG-27 and the MIG-29 and Pakistan the F16—which can inflict heavy damage. At sea, India has superiority over Pakistan, though the former's advantage has diminished considerably since 1971.

Both countries have also increased the strength of their armed forces. How India beefed its military up is instructive.

- In the 17 years between 1971 and 1988, the number of tank regiments increased from 27 to 60, even as more sophisticated tanks were inducted.

The T-54/55 was standard in 1971. The T-72s were added in 1988, and now there is talk of acquiring the T-80.

The number of fighter squadrons have increased from 35 in 1971 to 40. Moreover, in 1971, half the Force consisted of subsonic fighters and bombers of varying capacity. Today the Indian Air Force (IAF) has the MIG-21, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, MIG 23/27 and MIG-29 and is comparable to any good air force in the western countries.

In 1971, India had eighteen 130 mm gun regiments. Now the more advanced 155 mm Bofors guns have been acquired.

In the Navy, bigger and more complex warships and submarines have been inducted.

This sophisticated weaponry will enable either side to target specific economic installations and cripple industry. Says a defence strategist: "The Pakistanis would find it very tempting to have a go at the oil structures at Bombay High. If they can successfully bomb it, India will be in a soup, its development will be put back by decades and the foreign exchange bill will go totally haywire."

In any case, a decision to go to war is never taken on considerations of cost, because if the sovereignty of a nation is perceived as being threatened, no cost is considered too high to protect its territories. Besides, most arms experts say it is difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, to compute the costs of war. Says G. C. Katoch, "It is a mind-boggling, highly time consuming, and very complicated exercise."

Small wonder then, that proper estimates do not exist to this day on the sums expended to fight the 1965 and 1971 wars. Says a retired official of the Indian defence ministry, "We started computing costs after both the wars, but abandoned it half way, according to an estimate the 1965 war costs Rs. 500 million and the 1971 war Rs. 3500 million. Needless to add, a confrontation in this decade would certainly carry a much higher price tag—both directly and indirectly—than the 1965 and 1971 operations.

Though the Indian defence ministry has made no calculations of the likely cost of war, officials informally suggest that a 14-day operation would mean a Rs. 100,000 million draft on the exchequer (allowing for both direct and indirect costs). Ravi Rikhye, well-known defence expert, estimated in a recent article that hostilities would cost the country a staggering Rs. 300,000 million.

Subrahmanyam projects a much lower figure. He feels a war now would cost us about "10-15 times the Rs. 350 crore we spent in 1971—about Rs. 3,500 to 42,500 million Sreedhar of the IDSA quotes an even lower Rs. 1,1500-1,2500 million. But, as he asks, "how can you compute the cost of a war even before it has taken place?"

High Routine Costs

Besides the obvious costs, there are others that the armed forces have to take into consideration, callous as some of them may seem. For example, a financial cost can be attributed to every soldier killed in action—the money spent, and now lost, on his training. This can be in terms of pensions and other indemnities to his family; and the cost of training a replacement.

There is also what the army quaintly calls the "wastage" rate of equipment. According to Lt. General E. A. Vas (Retd.) of India formerly general officer commanding Eastern Command, this rate covers three areas. First, equipment can be destroyed in battle. Second, when there are large scale troop movements a certain amount of equipment would be accidentally damaged. Finally, there would be a certain amount of behind-the-lines destruction that the enemy could inflict as a result of army action. "Any army has to estimate these rates of wastage. Otherwise, its guns would run dry," says Vas. He also points out that while these rates have been worked out, they are highly confidential, because they could be used to strategic advantage by the enemy.

Some inferences can be drawn from the Indian Army's recent operation in Sri Lanka. The routine costs of maintaining slightly over a division of infantry, in this low intensity conflict was estimated at approximately Rs. 1 crore a day. A war with Pakistan would be high intensity, with high wastage rates of equipment, and involve not only infantry, but the armoured regiments and the Air Force. Assuming that 20 Indian divisions are involved, this alone would mean a base cost of at least Rs. 20 crore a day. From here on estimates can be related to alternative scenarios.

Mind-boggling sums these, but the arithmetic behind them is sound. Says Bharat Karnad, editor of the tabloid INDIA WEEK and also a defence writer, "You can get an idea from the fact that 10 artillery guns firing a rapid burst salvo for six minutes—at the rate of three rounds per minute—would cost Rs. 20 to 25 lakh. And if you have to move one tank battalion consisting of 10 to 16 tanks 40 miles a day, it would cost Rs. 1 crore daily." A single Mirage on a sortie from Agra to Sargodha (the

nerve centre of the Pakistani Air Force) and back would burn up over 3,600 litres of aviation fuel. And Balachandran says, "in the event of a war you could be spending crores of rupees daily on firing shells alone."

The likely costs will rise substantially if the replacement costs of weapons destroyed in hostilities are taken into account instead of mere book values. Says Balachandran, "Weapons worth Rs. 300 to 400 crore destroyed would need Rs. 2,500 crore to replace."

Defence experts, however, differ on the methods used to compute battle costs. K. Subrahmanyam, for instance, thinks that it would not be methodologically correct to take the replacement costs of weapons into account when arriving at such costs. "First of all, the weapons will not be replaced in one day but staggered over a period of time. Moreover many of the weapons destroyed would already have depreciated: Most of them would anyway have been due for replacement sooner or later, as part of the military's modernisation programme."

But Katoch points out that this may not be the correct approach, because "the balance of life" of a piece of armour or equipment which is being phased out, is cut off on destruction.

Another long term direct cost of a war will be pay-outs on account of pensions and compensation arising out of casualties and injuries. Dependents of a soldier or officer killed in action are bound to receive his full pay as pension until the day he would normally have retired. If the average monthly salary is assumed to be Rs. 2,500, it would mean a total of Rs. 30,000 per year in pension for every casualty. If full pay pension has to be paid for 20 years, a sum of Rs. 6 lakh will have to be spent for every soldier killed.

If the number of casualties amounts to 1,000 (875 soldiers died in the limited IPKF operations) this amounts to an extra Rs. 60 crore. This payment would be in addition to the pensions payable on account of retirements in the normal course.

Though the increased outlay due to pensions payable to soldiers dying or disabled in action may be computable, this may not be true of losses due to destruction of human resources. Asks Katoch, "How do you value the loss arising from the death of a soldier? Also, do not forget the enormous sums spent in training him."

No Proper Norms

Valuing the depreciation of weapons used in warfare, but not destroyed is also a difficult task. "Weapons, fighter planes, etc, are over-used and subject to rapid wear and tear. But there are no proper norms to value this wear and tear, which is likely to be considerable," says a defence official.

The scale of destruction is likely to be all the greater if civilian installations are made targets. The loss of a factory, a bridge or houses would entail not only extra

costs to rebuild them but also loss of production if factories or installations like power stations are attacked and damaged. There is no simple method of valuing such costs.

One of the indirect consequences, in the short run, of a war is the requisitioning of both rail and road transport for the movement of troops. This would lead to a bottleneck for freight and passenger movement and is likely to have an economic cost which is not quantifiable.

Quite obviously, a war would also lead to uncertainties that affect the economic adversely. Prices would rise and there would be shortages of all essential commodities. Hoarding and speculation would be rife, even as the stockmarket takes a downward dip. "More than this," says Subrahmanyam, "there will be a postponement of decisions. This would have an economic cost." The entire governmental machinery would be engaged in the war effort and decisions regarding investments, licences, etc, are likely to be delayed. Worse still, entrepreneurs themselves may postpone investment decisions.

If the strife is prolonged, factories in the civil sector may be requisitioned for production of goods needed by the armed forces. Government purchases of goods needed by it for purposes other than defence may be stopped, leading to a demand recession in many industries catering heavily to the government. One possible example of such an industry is cement.

Similarly, items like steel and aluminium may have to be diverted from civilian use to ordnance factories which would be stepping up production. Civilian units in these sectors may also be requisitioned for the defence effort. Power may similarly have to be diverted, leading to losses in industrial production. But some industries may have a boom time. A prime example is the automotive industry, which may be requisitioned for supplies of tyres and vehicles to the army.

Quantifying the costs of a war on an economy is problematic at the best of times. Even India's experiences in the 1965 to 1971 wars offer little by way of pointers to what the country may experience now. They were short wars—and both sides are more heavily armed today. In the 1971 war with Pakistan, India lost 45 war planes, 73 tanks and one warship. At today's prices, replacing these alone would cost around Rs. 3,000 crore.

Besides this there is still some disagreement about what the impact of the earlier wars on our economy was. Real national income fell by 5.9 per cent in 1965-66 and by 1.4 per cent in 1972-73. But whether this fall was due to the war or other factors is not clear.

Unclear Economic Impact

India was plagued by droughts in the mid-sixties and the agricultural growth rate was stagnating. In the early seventies, Indira Gandhi's ill-conceived decision to take over the wholesale wheat trade had led to a spurt in

inflation. But most analysts agree that one reason for the buoyancy of the economy in the eighties was that the country had never been forced to go to war.

At this time, however, the economy is precariously placed to take the impact of a war. Even a 15-day high intensity war could cost upwards of Rs. 7,500 crore (taking an estimated expenditure figure of Rs. 500 crore per day). This would be in addition to approximately Rs. 15,750 crore budgeted for defence for the year. And following a war, any attempts by the government to lower the budgetary deficit would be doomed to failure unless it took almost draconian steps.

E. A. Majumdar, former economic advisor to the Reserve Bank of India, points out that the government would have to institute severe austerity measures.

These would include demand management where income tax surcharges would be levied to reduce disposal income, an across-the-board hike in corporate taxes and a freeze on all price hikes and salaries and all expenditure on what could be termed as luxuries. By the same token, the government's administrative expenses would have to be cut sharply. In addition, stringent measures for price control would have to be instituted.

Even with such measures, there is likely to be an adverse impact on India's already precarious external trade position. A war would mean higher defence related imports. The import bill would have to be stripped by "inessentials" like edible oil and sugar, as also other products like petroleum, fertilisers, various raw materials for industrial and capital goods.

Worst Affected

Says Vas, "Given our situation, Clausewitz's famous dictum about war being 'a mere continuation of policy by other means' is a grotesque mockery of reality." In today's context, a war would mean that both India and Pakistan would emerge more impoverished.

The economic progress that India has made through liberalisation of its economic policies over the past few years would receive a severe setback. Besides, a war at this stage would bring to a halt the effort towards controlling the balance of trade gap by reducing the gap between aggregate demand and supply in the economy. The worst affected, besides the families of those who die in the conflict, would be the poor in both countries because development would be retarded.

In an age when the superpowers have demonstrated an ability to bury seemingly irreconcilable differences and come together, there is no reason why conflict should persist in the sub-continent. As developing nations, we can ill afford the ruinous impact of war. It is time for both governments to give up the rhetoric of national honour and consider whether their nations can afford the wages of war.

'Quick Redressal' of Economic Problems Urged

46000127A Lahore THE NATION in English
12 May 90 p 6

[Article by Anjum Ibrahim]

[Text] It seems almost a certainty that the government intends to levy higher taxes than ever before in the forthcoming budget 1990-91. And considering that the present government has done little to break away from past traditions as far as economic policies are concerned it is fairly obvious that more indirect taxes will be levied. Ignored will be the negative social aspects of such taxes, which invariably fall more heavily on the poor than the rich, eroding real incomes, and increasing distortions in the economy.

Whatever the rationale given for increasing taxes and the prices of utilities it is equally obvious that the present government has two clear cut policies namely incurring as many loans from international creditors as is possible; and its corollary that is balancing the budget deficit through shifting the burden from itself onto the people as part of aid conditionalities. This implies that the public is expected to pay higher taxes. At the same time the government has no intention of passing on even a modicum of financial benefits it enjoys, to the public. Or to put it another way the government will continue to keep the financial control it exerts like a vice by refusing to denationalise banks. It will refuse to give over control of public utilities even though its own financial shortage will lead to the adoption of disinvestment policies; thus the government will take money from the public and by quickly reinvesting in the same corporation do little to increase the efficiency of the bureaucratic management. On the contrary such large injections would increase the velocity of the circulation of money supply, or the number of times a rupee changes hands, fuelling the inflationary spiral. Consequently both higher taxes and disinvestment would increase the inflation rate by at least 2 to 3 percentage points.

The government also does not intend to change its own expenditure criteria and its attempts to control corruption have fallen by the way side. To reiterate the burden will be shifted more squarely on the shoulders of the public in the forthcoming budget whereas the government has little intention of giving up any benefits, even its wasteful expenditure will continue as before. It is no wonder then that prior to the budget organised pressure groups are involved in voicing discontent over the expected increase in taxes. The consumers themselves are so far quiet, simply because in Pakistan they are not organised. But once the policies are being implemented and their true inflationary impact realised by the public then it is only a matter of time when the silent majority will be forced to express its discontentment as well. Such a state is nothing new. It has happened again and again in several Third World countries which have meticulously followed similar policies as those followed by Ms. Bhutto under the direction of organisations like the IMF.

And street riots due to an erosion of real incomes are the fastest way for the public to forget their past political loyalties.

It is equally true that our Opposition has no viable alternative to the policies being followed by the present government. Organising protests against the withdrawal of fertiliser subsidies on the Mall Road in Lahore in tractors is viewed as a nuisance by the public and consequently ignored by the federal government. What every one fails to realise is that when the food prices rise as a response it is then that all hell will break loose; and considering that the government and the Opposition will bicker about one aspect i.e., of subsidy withdrawal instead of looking at the whole policy package it is perhaps unfortunate that all political parties in the country relegate economics to a tertiary aspect of governmental duties. And once again it is the people, and more specifically the common man who will have to pay for this attitude of the politicians.

Another aspect of our economic system, heavily regulated by the federal government, is that there is tremendous scope for misuse of these powers. And allegations by the Opposition that there are irregularities is at least a possibility. There is no intention of implying that during Ziaul Haq's reign the Opposition was not using the same financial powers. But the fact remains that the only complaint one can have with Ms. Bhutto, apart from disagreeing with her policies and her refusal to hire qualified and innovative economists instead of drawing on past bureaucrats, is her appointment of Hakim Ali Zardari to head the Public Accounts Committee. This has formed an association in people's minds which was unnecessary. Once again the implication is not that there is corruption but that the scope exists and instead of relying on the good-will of party leaders or relatives it is better to rip the cords of power so that no one individual or a group can have the power to be corrupt. For Ms. Bhutto it is essential that she privatises by handing over control to the private sector instead of disinvestment and the financial sector and public utilities have to be privatised as well. She has to deregulate the economy and once again withdraw financial powers that are indirectly under her control. Such policies would also ensure that her legacy would be one to be remembered and applauded as she would take away powers that will never be abused by subsequent governments. This would also make more realistic prices of utilities acceptable as the government will not be in a position to interfere.

As the economy picks up due to the above stated policies so will the incomes and employment levels. In other words the crisis expected after the announcement of the Budget 1990-91 will be defused. And if Ms. Bhutto cuts down public expenditure by making the federal government responsible for defence, and the development of social sectors through financial incentives alone it is to be expected that increased business activity would propel the economy forward.

So far the economy of Pakistan has not performed well. And the fault can be blamed on all past governments as well as the present one. Unfortunately the actual sufferers have been the people. The budget 1990-91 will tilt the balance in such a way that the people of the country will be unable to feed themselves, and the government will continue with its expenditure under non-development listing while attempting to increase its revenue at all costs. This is an unacceptable solution to both academics and the public and severe social problems are expected to arise as a result.

Apart from corruption perhaps the single most disturbing problem being faced by our economy today is the large scale smuggling activities which not only have an adverse impact on our domestic savings rate but also lowers industrial activity while raising unemployment levels. Once again the government is held responsible for this by its policy of imposing taxes on domestic industry which are indirectly encouraging smuggling while failing to police our borders effectively. In such a scenario it is virtually impossible for domestic industry to boost its production. If decontrol policies are implemented and our borders strictly patrolled domestic industry will receive a boost.

Regionalism is another aspect of our economy. Punjab has not accepted the major role played by Karachi as it is the headquarters of all financial institutions in the country. Considering the law and order problems in Karachi perhaps Punjab is justified in saying that the government should not have put all its eggs in one basket. All industrialists periodically attack as unfair the government's incentive policy which differ in different industrial estates around the country. Once again decontrol policies would even out differences in incentives. But to implement such a policy it is essential to have faith in the private sector, which is lacking. And it is true that our industrialists want to be molly coddled to produce but surely without undue incentives and in order to survive, the competitive spirit would ensure high output, aggressive marketing and lower prices for the people.

The foregoing points to the urgent need to change the socioeconomic patterns in the country. This is not only true for the agricultural and industrial sectors but also for the government. A popularly elected government has a duty not only to create a free political climate but also to lay the ground work for a free economic environment. The latter commitment has so far been lacking in the government of Ms. Bhutto. Amends must be made in the forthcoming budget. Unfortunately though there is every indication that the status quo will be maintained and little changes are expected in the policy trends. For example taxes will be raised but not direct taxes based on the ability-to-pay principle, but indirect taxes.

[Boxed item] The public is expected to pay higher taxes. At the same time the government has no intention of passing on even a modicum of financial benefits it enjoys, to the public. Or to put it another way the

government will continue to keep the financial control it exerts like a vice by refusing to denationalise banks. It will refuse to give over control of public utilities even though its own financial shortage will lead to the adoption of disinvestment policies; thus the government will take money from the public and by quickly reinvesting in the same corporation do little to increase the efficiency of the bureaucratic management.

MWFP Unhappy Over Financial Allocations

46000137B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 26 May 90 pp 1, 7

[Article by Rahimullah Yusufzai]

[Text] The PPP [Pakistan People's Party]-led coalition government which was expecting preferential treatment in terms of Federal Government's financial support to underwrite its development needs has not been amused by the lukewarm response from the Centre to its demands.

Knowledgeable sources said Chief Minister Aftab Sherpao's Government was not happy with the proposed 14 percent increase in special development programme for the province. The provincial government was hoping for a 20 percent increase in allocations under the programme to enable an underdeveloped province like NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] to try and catch up with the developed provinces. The fact that NWFP is unlikely to receive even its 17.2 percent share from the Special Development Programme came as a shock to Frontier planners who had drawn up several much-needed development projects in anticipation of these funds.

NWFP politicians and planners have often pointed out that the province deserved a better deal in view of the suffering inflicted upon its people due to the fallout of the Afghan war. Still no funds were provided to NWFP to offset the damages caused to it by the presence of 2.2 million Afghan refugees and an equally high number of cattle and sheep. The much-publicized plan for NWFP's reconstruction and rehabilitation in the wake of repatriation of Afghan refugees have yet to see the light of the day.

It is pertinent to recall that the Special Development Programme was initially launched for underdeveloped areas like FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and PATA [Provincially Administered Tribal Areas] while NWFP and Balochistan too were included subsequently. But later Sindh and Punjab also received allocations under this programme and most funds were utilised for mundane projects such as construction of police barracks. Special Development Programme funds during late Gen Zia's rule were often doled out as a political favour rather than taking into consideration certain priorities.

"We behaved as the good boys and used special development funds for critical projects unlike other provinces

and still it seems the Federal Government is penalising a province which has played a crucial role in sustaining PPP in power," complained a Frontier government official. Pleading anonymity, he recounted how the Sherpao Government foiled several opposition efforts to topple it and thus saved the PPP Government in the Centre.

Instead of getting a special treatment at the hands of the Federal Government, the list of complaints in Peshawar against Islamabad is growing. NWFP's long-standing demand that it should be granted its constitutional right by paying the province its shares in net profits generated by hydroelectric projects sited here hasn't been accepted even after the passage of 17 years. The Federal Government's unwillingness to convene a meeting of Council of Common Interests (CCI) which must finalise the award before NWFP is granted its due has affected this province the most. Both Mr Sherpao and the NWFP Assembly have demanded a CCI meeting so that NWFP is provided its constitutional right but Islamabad is unable to do so owing to political compulsions.

In desperation, the NWFP Government reportedly sought permission to float a bond to raise around Rs 3.5 billion to undertake certain big projects but the Federal Government refused on the grounds that it would trigger inflation. Another NWFP Government proposal that the centre pick-up its budget deficit at the 1986-87 level also fell on deaf ears.

The 13 percent increase in annual development programme proposed for NWFP this year also fell below local expectations, especially in the wake of poor allocations last year. The ADP in real terms is not more than 3 percent and keeping in view the official inflation rate of 6.5 percent and the 3.5 percent population growth. It is peanuts compared to the 35 percent increase in ADP [Annual Development Program] for the province in 1986-87 remarked a government official. He said the provincial government expected a lot more this year as it was under tremendous pressure from the electorate which voted PPP into power.

The NWFP Government has apparently been disappointed that the centre was reluctant to fund some of its bigger projects aimed at accelerating development and generating industrial activity and jobs.

Federal investments in the province have remained static at a little more than 4 per cent which was grossly inadequate keeping in view NWFP's 14.7 per cent share in the country's population. The two big projects presently being executed in NWFP with federal funds are the Locomotive Factory in Risalpur and the Heavy Electrical Complex in Hattar Industrial Estate in Abbottabad district. The Locomotive factory, for which the latest allocation of Rs 260 million has not yet been paid, has often aroused controversy due to reports that it may be shifted to Lahore. The electrical complex too has taken long to mature.

The Ayub Medical College Complex in Abbottabad, another federal government project, is still incomplete while the Chashma Right Bank Canal project in Dera Ismail Khan is proceeding at a snail's pace. The provincial government has still not been able to "sell" the Gomal Zam Project to the Federal Government even though it is ripe and promises a lot of development.

The scrapping of the Federal Government-funded scheme for providing subsidy to irrigation tubewells has also come as a blow to NWFP where tubewells are the only hope to pump out water for irrigation purposes in parched areas like its southern districts in absence of canals.

More irritating for NWFP is the refusal of the Federal Government to allow construction of the Pehur High Level Canal till a decision on the apportionment of Indus River waters. The NWFP Government's argument that the water dispute would hopefully be resolved in the next four to five years by the time the canal is built has not found a responsive chord in Islamabad.

Mr Sherpao's government also tried, again unsuccessfully, to convince the federal authorities to allow the project since its share in Indus waters was undoubtedly more than the 1,000 cusecs of water to be discharged in the Pehur canal.

The list of complaints against the Centre does not end there as most people here feel that NWFP has been treated like the proverbial tailender which extending Sui gas supply in the country. Only Abbottabad and Mansehra in Hazara division would get gas in NWFP despite Federal Government's generosity in this regard. Many educated people argue that NWFP exports bulk of its hydroelectricity to other provinces owing to its meagre power consumption while it receives only a fraction of the natural gas which is presently available through the country both to domestic and industrial consumers.

The Lowari Tunnel project, which would provide Chitral with an all-weather road link with the rest of the country is another sore point. It is the biggest vote-catcher in elections in Chitral but the PPP is being accused of forgetting its election promises now that a meagre amount of Rs 30 million has initially been allocated for a tunnel which would cost around Rs 2.8 billion. It is understood that the NWFP Government has rejected a proposal to build a pilot tunnel at Lowari at a cost of about Rs 450 million instead of executing the original project. Instead, the Provincial Government has proposed that a one-lane tunnel be built at a cost of Rs 800 to 900 million. It argued that the Federal Government scheme would cause inconvenience to commuters since trucks would have to be unloaded at one corner of the tunnel and the goods carried in smaller vehicles. It stressed that the tunnel should allow trucks to pass through even if it is one-lane.

The NWFP is certainly a deficit province and has a narrow revenue base. The provincial government is also

unable to impose an agricultural tax owing to the small landholdings in the province and the poverty of the farmers. Suggestions that it impose taxes on entrepreneurs in the upcoming Gadoon-Amazai Industrial Estate would not raise more than Rs 80 to 100 million if implemented. The subventions formerly given to NWFP are also not forthcoming. NWFP Government's willingness to honour and implement all Federal Government measures have also placed fresh burdens on the provincial exchequer. All this has added to the woes of the provincial government but Federal Government's reluctance to bail out Mr Sherpao from his financial crisis seems to be the unkindest cut of all.

Balochistan Views Bugti's Predicament

46000133B Karachi DAWN in English 16 Jun 90 p 7

[Editorial: "Realignment in Quetta"]

[Text] The Balochistan Chief Minister, Mr Mohammad Akbar Khan Bugti, is an increasingly isolated person these days. Deserted first by the Balochistan National Movement (BNM), he has now been deserted by his biggest coalition partner, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). (The only difference is that whereas the BNM continues to support Mr Bugti from outside, the JUI will sit in the Opposition. It is quite possible there may be no immediate threat to Mr Bugti's chief ministership but his coalition is now in place only by virtue of the fact that almost everyone with him on the Treasury benches is now a minister. It is no accident that, anticipating the JUI move, Mr Bugti hastily installed six new Cabinet ministers a few days ago. This is government Aftab Sherpao-style. The Frontier Chief Minister, whose PPP [Pakistan People's Party] is a minority party in the Provincial Assembly, has blithely expanded his Cabinet whenever he has felt threatened or has felt the need of winning over a doubtful MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly]. In a House of 87 members, Mr Sherpao has a Cabinet of 25. In a House of 44, Mr Bugti has a Cabinet, not counting himself, of 18. Mr Sherpao should be proud of the fact that the example he has set, and for which he has often been criticised, is being surpassed by the chieftain of the Bugtis.

At any rate, the JUI which represents the conservative end of the Baloch political spectrum, claims to have fallen out with Mr Bugti on two counts. First, because of his heavy-handed personal style. In the Press conference he addressed in Islamabad in order to explain the JUI's departure from the provincial Government, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the party chief, alleged that Mr Bugti was in the habit of threatening his ministers as his 'personal servants'. This may be an exaggerated charge but no one can accuse Mr Bugti of excessive meekness or humility. Second, because of Mr Bugti's lack of sympathy for the JUI's evangelical zeal. Being a religious party, the JUI holds strong views on Islamisation. Mr Bugti, to say the least, has not been very receptive to these views. He has never claimed to subscribe to a set of

religious doctrines which can be readily applied to political life. Will the JUI now go and join hands with the PPP in a bid to replace Mr Bugti's Government with a new one? It is hard to say. While the possibility of under-cover contacts between the two parties cannot be discounted, an alliance between them, barring a miracle, seems quite unlikely. The fact of the matter is that the composition of the present assembly and the disposition of the parties represented in it make a stable ministry a near-impossibility.

Be that as it may, Mr Bugti is now walking a razor's edge in Balochistan with his majority cut to the bone. He can afford no more desertions. Nor a cut in his over-sized Cabinet, for the way things are, the departure of a minister would mean the loss of an MPA. This is no way to run a province but with over-sized cabinets everywhere, including Islamabad where more than 40 ministers roam, a cynic might say this is no way to run a country. And Mr Bugti might add that what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. That being so, short of a constitutional amendment restricting the size of cabinets and making them proportionate to population or assembly size, there seems no early end in sight to government Sherpao-style.

JKLF Leader Amanullah Khan Interviewed

4600133A Jeddah ARAB NEWS
in English 29 May 90 p 9

[Article by Faiza Ambah: "Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front Leader Amanullah Khan Talks to ARAB NEWS"]

[Text] "When I was a young boy living in Indian-held Kashmir, I could feel that we should get out of India. I could see all the injustices going on. Any Muslim raising his voice in support of his rights used to be arrested. Right from the beginning I became a political-minded young man," says Amanullah Khan.

Today, Khan, a wanted man in Indian-held Kashmir, is the leader of the Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), one of the oldest and most militant of the independence groups.

The JKLF which is based in Pakistan-held Kashmir, was founded in 1977 in England, and it was this organization that started armed struggle against India. Now the JKLF has branches in England, the United States, Holland, Pakistan-held Kashmir and Pakistan.

For the first time since the situation deteriorated in January, Hindus and Muslims attacked each other during a strike called by Hindus to protest Jaggmohan's resignation as governor last week. The relationship between the two communities, on which Kashmiris had always prided themselves, will be an important issue in the independence groups' quest for the creation of an independent Kashmiri state.

In the following interview Khan discusses Hindu-Muslim relations in Kashmir, the impact of Kashmir's

quest for independence on India's Muslim minority, and the effect of Jaggmohan's resignation on the independence movement.

Kashmiris Prepared To Fight Till the End

[ARAB NEWS] Do you think that war between India and Pakistan is imminent?

[Khan] There is a possibility because Indians have assembled troops on Pakistan's border but I don't think there should be a war. None of the two sides can afford it. There will be no winner in this war. A war will push our issue into the background and we don't want a war.

[ARAB NEWS] You are for an independent Kashmir or a Pakistani-affiliated state?

[Khan] As far as our organization is concerned, we want an independent state. We think we could become a better Muslim country as an independent state rather than as part of Pakistan, but if the majority of the people want, after independence, to go with Pakistan we won't stand in their way.

[ARAB NEWS] Would an independent Kashmir be a democratic secular country?

[Khan] It will be a democracy but since we are 80 percent Muslim, naturally there won't be any laws against Islamic principles. There will be every sort of protection to our identity as Muslims. That's why we are fighting against India. Kashmiris are giving their lives for the protection of their identity as Muslims, which is in danger. If India continues occupying our country for another 10 or 20 years or 50 years, we will not remain real Muslims.

[ARAB NEWS] Muslims in Kashmir are not being allowed to practice their religion or worship as they see fit?

[Khan] Since January there has been curfew and people have not been allowed to attend Friday prayers.

[ARAB NEWS] This is only for the last three or four months?

[Khan] Yes. But actually Indians have been trying their best, in the name of Indianization, to impose Indian culture on us.

[ARAB NEWS] What actions by the Indian government made you think that if you stayed with India you would lose your Islamic identity?

[Khan] We use the Islamic greeting 'Assalaam Alaikum' (peace be upon you); they compel us to say 'Jai Hind' (long live India). We say 'Walid Saheb' to our father, and they want us to say 'Pitaji' which is a part of Hindu culture. We don't bow before anybody in greeting but they make Kashmiri Muslims bow before others because that is part of their culture. Tomorrow they may not allow us to even perform our prayers.

[ARAB NEWS] There's a law prohibiting Muslims from saying Assalaam Alaikum?

[Khan] They want us to say Jai Hind instead because that is a part of their culture. We can't bow before anybody because it is against Islamic principles. If we continue under India, the future generations will lose their Islamic identity. They have stopped teaching Arabic to study Arabic so that they can study the Holy Qur'an.

[ARAB NEWS] Isn't the JKLF a secular organization?

[Khan] Secular, but not in the sense that we have an Indian sort of secularism, where being Muslim is almost a crime. As far as we are concerned, we think that Kashmiri non-Muslims also have a right to live there but Kashmir being an overwhelming Muslim majority, there won't be any law against Islamic principles. That is a basic principle of our organization.

[ARAB NEWS] Would you accept a compromise with India where it would administer Indian-held Kashmir the same way Pakistan administers Pakistan-held Kashmir which has a separate constitution, a president and prime minister and where the central government's jurisdiction is limited to foreign policy, defense and currency regulation?

[Khan] No we won't accept it at all. In Indian-held Kashmir, there was a government like that till 1953. When Sheikh Abdullah was there, we had a separate president, prime minister, separate national flag and all that but that was done just to kill time by Indians and we don't trust them. So long as a single Indian soldier is there, or so long as our foreign policy is in the hands of Indians, we won't be safe.

[ARAB NEWS] George Fernandes, Indian minister of railways and Kashmir affairs, said in an interview in Cairo this week, "I have been trying to contact anyone who has links with the separatists so that we can talk to put an end to the killings, but with no success." Are you willing to talk to India?

[Khan] Actually, as far as Mr Fernandes is concerned, I believe that he is a gentleman. I haven't met him but I have heard that he is a man of principle but he is helpless.

He was trying to make compromises while on the other hand Jagmohan, that beast, was killing people. When Maulana Farooq was assassinated, about 300 people were killed and 700 people injured. How can anyone talk to them when all that nonsense and savagery is going on?

[ARAB NEWS] You would be willing to talk to them if they stopped the bloodshed?

[Khan] We are willing to talk to India unconditionally. They say, "You accept our sovereignty first and then we'll talk." How can we accept Indian sovereignty over Kashmir when we are fighting to eliminate it? They want us to concede that Kashmir is a part of India as a

condition to talk to us. That is complete nonsense. Kashmir is not a part of India. Once we accept that, that is the end of all our struggle.

[ARAB NEWS] You are a wanted man in India?

[Khan] Yes, if I go to India, they will hang me just like they did to my friend Maqbul Butt. He has hanged there in 1984 on a very baseless charge. They tried their best to kidnap me or have me arrested during my recent visit to the United States and they were also after me in Holland, but I came back safely with the grace of God.

They've already issued two warrants for my arrest, one in Delhi and one in Jammu.

[ARAB NEWS] In April in the United States, when you condoned the killing of the vice chancellor of Kashmir University and accepted responsibility by the JKLF, your visa was revoked.

[Khan] That was a complete misrepresentation of facts, I have simply stated the facts, and the Indian press, as usual misinterpreted them and said that I had ordered the killing of the Muslim vice-chancellor from the United States. That was just to provoke the United States government to revoke my visa.

One of these Indian newspapers, published from New York, said that I should be bundled into a crate and taken to India by the first available Air-India flight. Another accused Indians of being a bunch of idiots because I was still alive.

[ARAB NEWS] Wasn't the JKLF responsible for the kidnapping of the Indian home minister's daughter and the death of the vice-chancellor of Kashmir University and a Hindu industrialist?

[Khan] We are not there to kidnap people or do things like that but they force us to do it. That vice-chancellor, he was an informer. He used to inform the Indian Army about the activities of the students and anybody whom he didn't like, he used to accuse them of being a freedom fighter, and they used to arrest them.

The Hindu industrialist was an informer working for the Indian Army against Kashmiri Muslims. On the basis of his information, they used to arrest innocent people.

[ARAB NEWS] Why was your visa to the U.S. revoked?

[Khan] The pretext was the statements I made but that was merely an excuse. I made no statements in Holland and still the Indian government was after me there. I had never been to Bangladesh and they've asked Bangladesh not to issue me a visa.

The real reason was that there was some politics going on. I was told that there was some pressure from the Soviet foreign minister on the American secretary of state that they should not annoy India and the first demand of India was to revoke my visa.

The Indians were scared about my telling the truth to the world. When I showed the press the world map published by the United Nations which shows Kashmir completely separate from both India and Pakistan, they were stunned, they didn't know.

When I read them the record of the United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning Kashmir, they were surprised that India was covering up these facts. The entire Indian Embassy and Indian Foreign Ministry spent all their energy trying to see to it that my visa got revoked and they succeeded but I did my job over there. I addressed three press conferences, and I was interviewed by many newspapers and radio and television channels.

[ARAB NEWS] Were you implicated in the death, in 1984, of Indian diplomat Ravindra Mahatre in London?

[Khan] I was arrested in that case but after 72 hours they found nothing against me and I was released but I was again arrested one and a half years later and imprisoned for one and a half years. The reason for the second arrest was that the British wanted to sell helicopters to India but India's condition was that I should be expelled from Britain.

I was kept in prison for about one year without trial and then I was acquitted by the court. Within three minutes of my acquittal, Douglas Hurd who was Britain's home minister at that time had already signed my deportation order and I had to leave. Hurd, who is now foreign minister, issued a statement that my presence in Britain was against the British national interest even though all I was doing was explaining the Kashmir issue in England.

[ARAB NEWS] The assassinated cleric Moulvi Farooq's last wish was a united front to fight for an independent Kashmir. Subsequently, seven of the thirty plus independence movements united. Do you think, if the resistance was able to remove the Indians, they would unite or would there be infighting like in Afghan's resistance movement today?

[Khan] The Afghan issue is far more complicated. In our case there are only two ideologies, either total independence or affiliation with Pakistan.

Unity for us won't be too difficult because we'll do whatever the people decide.

[ARAB NEWS] What about the Hindus of the area?

[Khan] I was telling a Hindu interviewer the other day that Islam gave more rights and protection to non-Muslims than your so-called secularism. Kashmiri Hindus will remain in Kashmir but they will be protected by Islamic laws. In countries where real Islam is practiced, the minorities are very happy.

[ARAB NEWS] What about branches of your movement, like the Allah Tigers, who are closing cinema

houses, video shops and liquor stores. Some of these things are un-Islamic but not prohibited by the Hindu religion for example.

[Khan] I didn't like the closing of the cinema houses because that is going to affect the economy, will leave people jobless and is not according to the needs of the time. What they should have done is to have banned all films produced by India and those should not have been allowed to be exhibited in the cinema houses.

[ARAB NEWS] Do you think the situation in Kashmir will return to normal now that Governor Jagmohan has resigned?

[Khan] Jagmohan has already done his job, he has already massacred so many people. Now that he has left, it won't make any difference because the hatred has gone so deep, in the minds of the people, that it will stay for at least another 50 to 60 years. This generation will not forget the atrocities and the savagery done by Jagmohan. In the first place he should not have been appointed at all in light of his dirty record during his previous tenure from 1984 to 1986.

He is a very cruel sort of man. In the 70s, as lieutenant governor of Delhi and head of the Delhi Development Authority he joined hands with Sanjay Gandhi and bulldozed slums in the Muslim areas of the city around the Jama Masjid. He is a very staunch fundamentalist Hindu, full of hatred for Muslims. He should have been the last man to be appointed governor of Kashmir.

[ARAB NEWS] What is your relationship with the Sikhs?

[Khan] We support the Sikh movement of Khalistan in principle because we know they are being treated as second-class citizens in India. The six conditions spelled out by the United Nations to be fulfilled by a community for entitlement to a right of self-determination apply to Sikhs.

[ARAB NEWS] Do you think that their bid for a homeland will make India more reluctant to grant independence to two different states and will make your bid more difficult? India will be more reluctant to give up two separate states rather than just one.

[Khan] First of all Kashmir is a completely different issue.

[ARAB NEWS] Yes, but not from the point of view of India.

[Khan] If India tomorrow stopped treating them as second-class citizens there would be no Sikh movement and no Amanullah liberation front to support them. It is up to India. If India had treated us in a civilized way this situation would not have arisen and the liberation movement would not be struggling for independence today. India, by its actions, is responsible for any future disintegration of their country.

Practically, giving up two states will be difficult but as a matter of principle, I support the Sikh movement. We have a common enemy, if we join hands with the Sikhs, we can be more powerful.

[ARAB NEWS] How do you think the election results in Pakistan-held Kashmir will affect the freedom movement?

[Khan] It won't make much difference. To be very frank, both the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) are more into politicking among themselves than into helping Kashmiris. The only thing the IJI has done so far for Kashmiris is making speeches.

[ARAB NEWS] How long do you think it would take for Jammu-Kashmir to gain independence?

[Khan] That is a very difficult question. There is a lot involved. The superpowers are involved. Bush and Gorbachev are going to discuss the issue during their meeting on the 30th of May. There is a lot going on in Delhi and in Islamabad. You see everything is not entirely up to us. If it was up to us I would have given a time frame.

The superpowers are involved the way they were involved in Afghanistan. You know how the Afghans have been betrayed by the superpowers and the same thing could happen to us. It could take more than ten years or less than one year, but we are prepared to fight till the end.

[ARAB NEWS] Will the advent of summer and the melting of the snows separating the two Kashmirs make a difference in the situation?

[Khan] Definitely. On one side it will make the movement of Kashmiris into the Indian-held Kashmir easier, on the other, it will make it easier for the Indian Army to tighten its grip on the area.

[ARAB NEWS] Why are so many Kashmiri Hindus leaving the area?

[Khan] This is a complete brainchild of Jaggmohan. He instigated the migration of Hindus just to show to the world that there was a communal problem and that Hindus were being mistreated. We would like those who have left to return. Kashmiri Hindus are residents of Kashmir and are welcome as long as they don't act as agents of the India Army or government.

[ARAB NEWS] If Kashmir becomes a country solely on the basis of religion what will happen to the 100 million Muslims inside India?

[Khan] Why should we be made hostages for a 100 million Muslims? The India Muslims are nationals of India and when Nehru gave us the right to self-determination, didn't he think at that time of the fate of the Muslims in India? Our independence should make no difference for the Indian Muslims. They are Indians first and foremost. They are as Indian as V.P. Singh.

[ARAB NEWS] What about Hindu backlash against the Sikhs when they demanded a separate homeland. Couldn't something similar happen to the Muslims there?

[Khan] That was due to one incident. Since a Sikh murdered Indira Gandhi, naturally there was a backlash from Hindus. We are not murdering anybody, we just want our rights which were granted to us by the very laws under which India became a free nation.

[ARAB NEWS] What about the recent proposal of some Hindu leaders in India who are asking the government for a separate Kashmir where they could also send the rest of the India Muslims.

[Khan] That is complete nonsense. We didn't say that all the Kashmiri Hindus should be sent to India. Kashmir is for Kashmiris. Kashmir cannot absorb 100 million Muslims.

[ARAB NEWS] Would you say that Kashmir's neglect by India for so many years and a resurgence of Islam are the main reasons for Kashmir's discontent with India?

[Khan] The basic reason of our fight against India is because we want to protect our Islamic identity. At the same time, we have our own culture and we have been a free nation for three quarters of our history. From the 13th to the 17th century, we were a free Muslim nation and one of the most prosperous and advanced nations in the entire subcontinent. Our history teaches us that it is to our own advantage to be free.

I would like the Muslim world to realize that this issue is basically a Muslim issue, that's why we deserve support from the Islamic world. The way the Indians are killing the Muslims requires every Muslim in the world to rise in our support, condemn India for their savagery and support, condemn India for their savagery and support our struggle for freedom.

[ARAB NEWS] The Indian government has tried to convince people that the issue is not a Muslim issue because there are already 100 million Muslims living in India.

[Khan] Well you can see the plight of Indian Muslims. They are treated as third-class citizens already. We don't want to remain with India and be treated the way Indian Muslims are treated over there.

Article Views Agricultural Tax, Islamic Law

46000138B Islamabad THE MUSLIM
in English 27 May 90 pp 4,5

[Article by Rafiullah Shehab]

[Text] The upholders of the Private Shariat Bill just passed by the Pakistan Senate are very happy over this achievement. They have claimed that now it has become possible to enforce Shariah in our country. However keeping in view the attitude of these Ulema about

various issues, it can be said that they had never been honest in the enforcement of the Islamic system in the country. But instead they proved a hindrance in this respect. The Constitution of 1973 provided for the Islamisation of our society but these Ulema opposed this Constitution on one pretext or the other till its shape was completely disfigured by the Martial law authorities.

Islamisation

As a part of the Islamisation of Pakistani society, the government enforced the Pakistan Family Laws. In these laws the interpretation of the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence which were in accordance with the changed circumstances of modern times were adopted. In these laws, the law regards divorce as codified by the jurists of the Jafriah school, was adopted. The interpretation of the Jafriah school was in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. But it was rejected by the upholders of the Shariat Bill, as according to them it was against the Hanafite jurisprudence.

According to the Hanafite jurisprudence innovation regards divorce (pronouncing the word divorced once thrice in one sitting) is a lawful form of divorcing one's wife. This form of divorce was actually introduced by the Muslim monarchs for their ulterior motives. The jurists of the Jafriah school opposed its enforcement as it was against the teachings of the Holy Quran. On account of this it was replaced by Talaq-e-Sunnah in the Pakistan Family Laws. But the Hanafite Ulema refused to accept this interpretation of the jurists of the Jafriah school which even according to them is the correct interpretation of the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

The upholders of the Shariat Bill had been demanding from the government the establishment of the Islamic system in the country since its very establishment. But whenever any step was taken in this respect, they opposed it on one pretext or the other. Their attitude towards the Pakistan Family Laws bear ample proof of their intentions in this respect. They had also been claiming that Islam is a complete code of life and contains instructions concerning every aspect of life. It has its own financial system on the details of which jurists of all the schools of the Islamic jurisprudence totally agree.

The enforcement of Islamic law would have facilitated the establishment of the Islamic system in the country. But strangely enough, these Ulema neither presented the details of the financial system of Islam before the masses nor demanded from the government its enforcement. Instead they practically supported the capitalistic system of economy which is totally different from the teachings of Islam.

According to the financial system of Islam, agricultural tax had been the major source of revenue of the Islamic States in various periods of Islamic history. Its introduction in our country can also revolutionise the economy as it will relieve the masses of the hundreds of unjust taxes of the capitalist system which had made their life

miserable. Side by side, the enforcement of the Islamic financial system will eliminate absentee landlordism from the country. It is alleged that these absentee landlords are the benefactors of the Ulema and to save them from elimination, they have ignored the Islamic law which would prove beneficial for the masses of this country.

The history of the agricultural tax goes back to the time of Hazrat Umar when a number of countries had been conquered by the Muslims. To defend the frontiers of the country, the Muslims had to maintain a regular army. To meet its expenses, Hazrat Umar, after consultation with the Companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUM) declared the lands of all the conquered countries as the property of the Islamic State (Kitab-ul- Kharaj, p-25 by Imam Abu Yousaf).

Possession

These lands remained in the possession of the actual cultivators whether Muslims or non-Muslims and they paid a part of the produce of their lands as Kharaj (which literally means agricultural tax) to the Islamic Bait-ul-Maal. On this account these lands were known as the Kharaji lands. All the great Muslim jurists of all the schools of Islamic jurisprudence including those of the Jafriah school unanimously accepted this Kharaj as the major source of revenue of the Islamic State. In this respect even Imam Jafar Sadiq, the founder of the Jafriah school, who opposed the monarchy, did not differ with the verdict of the other jurists. In this respect he declared:

'Jurists of all the schools have agreed that all the lands conquered by the Muslims, would remain the joint property of the whole Ummah including the soldiers and the non-soldiers of this generation and all the generations to come. (Fiqh Al-Imam Jafar Sadiq, vol:II, p-277, Beirut Edt).

As the revenue from agricultural tax (kharaj) was sufficient to meet all the public expenditure of the Islamic State, all the great Muslim jurists issued an unanimous verdict that no mundane tax should be levied in the Islamic State.

Later when the Muslims conquered the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, the Muslim Jurists, keeping in view the above mentioned decision of Hazrat Umar declared all the lands of the country as Kharaji lands. They also issued verdicts that nobody, not even the Islamic government, can change the Kharaji status of these lands. These will remain Kharaji forever. If and when the enemies of the Muslims conquer any part of these lands, the Muslims are duty bound to take back these lands from the enemy which on being recaptured from the enemy will automatically revert to their original status of Kharaj. (Fatawa Alamgiri Urdu, vol:III, p-528).

The British Government, after the conquest of the sub-continent changed the Kharaji status of these lands by enforcing the law about the Permanent Settlement of

Bengal in 1793. This law converted the supervisors of these lands into their owners. In this way a class of absentee landlords was created. The Kharaj (agricultural tax) of these lands which previously was paid to the government, was not misappropriated by these absentee landlords in the shape of batai (share of the crop). After the establishment of Pakistan, the lands in the country, according to the Islamic Law, have automatically reverted to their Kharaji status. The share of produce of these lands which is being misappropriated by the absentee landlords, is actually the revenue of the Islamic State of Pakistan.

Income from this single source which may consist of share of the government from the produce of these lands whether agricultural or industrial may be so huge that it could well be sufficient to meet all the expenses of the government of Pakistan in this modern age. It is strange that the upholders of the Shariat Bill are still silent on this important Islamic Issue which might prove beneficial for the majority of our countrymen.

In the light of these observations it is submitted that if the upholders of the Shariat Bill are honest in their claim of establishing the Islamic system in the country, they should discuss the details of Islamic Law about agricultural tax and demand its enforcement by the government which will, as already explained above, relieve the masses of the burden of taxes of the capitalistic system which have made their life miserable.

Editorial Condemns Intimidation of Newsmen

46000127D Karachi DAWN in English 4 Jun 90 p 7

[Editorial: "Excesses Against Newsmen and the Press"]

[Text] It is now becoming increasingly risky to be a journalist in Pakistan. The crescendo of violent deeds against newspapers and newsmen continues with the increase in political extremism and intolerance. Now it has come to premeditated killing of journalists thought to be on the wrong side. The murder in rapid succession of three newsmen in Shikarpur and Larkana will send a wave of shock throughout the country. Mr Rahat Kazmi, Mr Ahmad Kamal Khan and Mr Mutahir Ali Naqvi, correspondents respectively of JANG, PPI [Pakistan Press International] and NAWA-I-WAQT, were murdered in cold blood for no other reason than that they were performing their professional duty under very trying circumstances. Our hearts go out to the bereaved families. We hope the government will spare no effort to trace the killers and bring them to justice. Until some time ago much of the threat to the freedom and normal functioning of the Press came from the powers that be. Now increasingly it comes from chauvinists and bigots belonging to the political forces. Injury and death in situations like wars and internal armed conflicts are among a journalist's occupational hazards. Though no such situation obtains in Pakistan, threats to the physical safety of journalists emanate from the immaturity, pettiness and combative spirit of most of our political

leaders. Newspaper offices have been ransacked and burnt and journalists manhandled and beaten up by armed political activists for publishing or not publishing a certain item or for a comment which they did not like. There have been complaints virtually from every political party and student group that it is always the other side that gets better coverage but that its own news is played down or suppressed. Recently, several government functionaries have also levelled sweeping charges of "sensationalism" against the Press and appealed to it to play "a constructive role" as if all or most newspapers have so far been doing something quite the contrary. No wonder, political extremists have felt encouraged by irresponsible charges of the kind levelled by government functionaries.

The fact is that, all said and done, the Press in Pakistan has acquitted itself reasonably well through the crisis the country has been faced with now for several years. In Sindh especially, the Press has lived through harrowing times and yet managed to discharge its professional responsibilities satisfactorily. It can also be claimed without any exaggeration that the vast majority of journalists have been true to their profession, and that, in the performance of their duties, and in matters of reporting, they have not been swayed by ethnic or other parochial considerations. Which cannot be said for all the politicians. Of course, there is room for improvement, and journalists will only be too glad to respond if they are told of their deficiencies in a friendly spirit. Yet it must be understood that in a democratic society it is only normal for newspapers to have different policies, reflecting as they do different ownership patterns with diverse political opinions and philosophies. Were newspapers to "fall in line," democracy would cease to exist. A newspaper's policy is reflected in its opinions and in the kind of treatment it gives to the news, without impairing the objectivity of reporting. This principle—of plurality of opinions—is of the essence of democracy, and the Government and political parties would be striking at the roots of freedom of the Press if they were to fail to uphold this sacred principle. As for those who feel offended by a newspaper's policy and manner of reporting, they have the option not to read that particular newspaper and switch over to another they consider more agreeable for their purposes. They can also demand the printing of their version of a given incident if in their opinion it was not correctly reported. If the newspaper refuses to publish their version, they have the option to sue the paper for libel. However, to intimidate a newspaper and its workers, to attack its offices or to murder journalists to demonstrate disapproval of a newspaper's policy is clearly a fascist approach and poses a threat to democracy.

We agree with the Government that we must all try to help normalise the present situation. A perusal of newspaper editorials of all responsible dailies will make it clear that they have consistently pleaded for sanity, peace and ethnic reconciliation. All along the last four or five years of ethnic strife and political violence, all

newspapers have denounced violence of every kind and pleaded with the government of the day and the opposition to find a political solution to all problems and eschew the path of violent confrontation and politics of mutual destabilisation. But, regretfully, the political parties, whether in government or in opposition, have turned a deaf ear to such pleadings. If the political parties had shown the maturity and restraint expected of them and if they had not aroused primordial passions and ethnic jingism in a spirit of blind antagonism against one another, things in Sindh would not have taken the frightful turn they have. We earnestly plead with the parties in power at the Centre and in the provinces as

well as those in opposition at various levels to eschew violence, to restrain their cadres, and avoid taking extremist positions in order to calm passions and relax the overall atmosphere. The newspapers alone cannot check the trend towards violence. In the meantime, we demand of the Government to provide full protection to newspaper offices and journalists whether in the interior or in the cities. Equally, we appeal to leaders of all political parties and groups to stop the campaign of denigration against the newspapers, help the Press correct its mistakes when these occur and create an atmosphere in which the Press will be even more mindful than it is now of the need to serve the cause of objective truth.

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