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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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Renovation of Society, Renovation of the Party

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[Text] Today problems of restructuring the work of the CPSU are the focal point of attention of party and nonparty members and are triggering lively debates in party organizations and labor collectives. The democratization of party life can be clearly seen against the background of the energetic renovation of our society, as clearly demonstrated by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet Session. Yet, as was emphasized at the recent CPSU Central Committee Conference, in a democratic society the party itself must be the manifestation of the highest and most consistent form of democracy. It must set the example of democratic development for the entire society. Otherwise it would find it extremely difficult to play a leading role in the perestroika which it initiated.

The current editorial mail is abundant and interesting. Rank-and-file party members, members of the elected aktiv, party apparat personnel, social scientists, party veterans and nonparty comrades are expressing their concern on the subject of the authority of the CPSU. They are trying to interpret its role and new functions in society and the new methods and style of its activities. In their letters they are expressing ideas on the way under present circumstances relations between the party and the soviets and different social organizations and movements should be structured, on its activities in the economic and social areas, party policy and ideology, and democratization of intraparty life. They suggest specific changes in the party's statutes and program. Control by the masses, under which the CPSU has voluntarily placed itself, opens extensive opportunities for a dialogue between party and society on all problems. Such an open exchange of views is a reliable guarantee for strengthening the party's democratic foundations and the revival of Lenin's view on combining freedom of judgment and viewpoints with unity of action.

With the publication of this first selection of materials, we are continuing the discussion on perestroika in party work, which was started at the CPSU Central Committee Conference we mentioned, and inviting the readers to contribute to the debates in the "Renovation of the Society—Renovation of the Party" section.

The Art of Political Analysis

B. Chernyshev, senior scientific associate, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, candidate of historical sciences:

Whenever it is a question of a political analysis, the very mention of this topic brings a condescending smile on the lips of some party workers. What kind of art of knowledge of the historical situation could one speak of if every day one is faced with urgent tasks, if a great deal of time is spent in collecting various types of information on the telephone and when, finally, for years one has been trained more to carry out orders rather than think....

Unquestionably, this is indeed true. However, it is also a question of the fact that today reality "is unwilling" to fit the existing mental set and stereotype. It is putting an end to a situation according to which one could work on the principle that "the bosses are doing our thinking for us." The revolutionary changes which have been initiated in life have revealed the inability of a large number of cadres to engage in independent analysis as well as their methodological defenselessness in the face of the tempestuous flood of events.

The inability of the party authorities to pursue the perestroika policy in accordance with the specific historical situation has become today the stumbling block on the way to mastering political management methods. It has triggered a negative trend of lagging by great many party organizations behind the dynamic processes occurring in society. Many of them are forced to adopt an attitude of "defense in depth," taking the position of observers, of recorders of events. Many of the materials discussed at plenums and by aktivs deal mainly with economic problems and it is difficult to find in them a profound specific historical analysis and the interpretation of experience in political leadership. This is not an isolated phenomenon. Sliding down the channel of the description of events, without determining the cause and effect relationship in occurring processes, creates favorable grounds for intuitive decisions and arbitrary actions. It triggers the illusion that all the problems which arise in front of us can be solved simultaneously.

Naturally, all of this is a subject of concern. How could it happen that the art of political analysis has been "dropped" in frequent cases from the theory and practices of party work? What is obstructing its comprehensive and efficient use? Let us consider the history of this problem.

We know that V.I. Lenin brilliantly mastered the art of analysis of specific historical situations. This is convincingly confirmed, for example, by the political reports of the Central Committee with which V.I. Lenin addressed party congresses, soviets and party conferences. In V.I. Lenin's views, the main aspect of the political reports submitted by party committees is the ability not simply to account for the work done, or to describe observed events, but to provide a study and explanation of the

sum total of facts under specific historical circumstances, to interpret the experience of the party's guidance of social processes, to be able to extract from it the necessary lessons and clearly to determine what to do and how to do it. Lenin developed the theoretical principles governing the summation and utilization of historical experience in the formulation of a scientifically substantiated party policy. Put together, they constituted the methodology of political analysis. What were its features?

Lenin's analysis was based not simply on thoroughly tested and unquestionable facts but on actual data, considered in advance, and looked at through the lens of historical experience. He singled out among the huge amount of events of the past and the present those which provided the greatest quantity of food for thought on the course of the revolution and the building of socialism, which linked experience with the tasks of the present and the future, and made the identification of successes and errors possible. It was precisely they which became the structural or central points in the study of occurring events in V.I. Lenin's reports.

How did the party subsequently apply the Leninist methodology of political analysis? Unfortunately, until the April Plenum, it remained virtually unused in party documents and at CPSU congresses and plenums. Between the 14th to the 18th VKP(b) Congresses, Stalin imposed upon the party his own way of presenting Central Committee accountability reports, in clear violation of the Leninist behests. Grossly violating the most important methodological principles of historical knowledge, above all that of scientific objectivity, Stalin replaced the study of the phenomena in real life with "ready-made" evaluations. As a result, live history with all of its problems, contradictions and sharp twists, was made somehow "by itself" to fit an accountability report prepared in advance. This approach eliminated the need to identify the dialectics of the specific historical situation and the search for a basic link in the chain of existing problems.

Unlike Lenin, Stalin did not draw up plans for the presentation of Central Committee accountability reports. Judging by documents available to us, his method was much simpler. In preparing the latest Central Committee report, Stalin took the text of his report delivered at the previous party congress, which had been published as a separate pamphlet and, pencil in hand, entered in it instructions to his aides as to where and how to change the headings of the individual sections, how to rearrange them, which tables to keep and which to delete; he refined previous assessments of the development of the various sectors in industry, agriculture, etc. He used this method in preparing the reports for the 16th, 17th and 18th Party Congresses. Lacking sufficiently complete information on the state of affairs, Stalin frequently misrepresented facts. Thus, drafting one of the variants of the text of his report to the 18th VKP(b) Congress, he instructed that different, greatly exaggerated figures, be included in the table on "Fleet of

Combines and Other Machines in USSR Agriculture." In that text he arbitrarily added 100 million poods of grain to the previous figure and also increased indicators of flax production in the USSR for 1936, 1937 and 1938. Such a loose handling of figures is explained, in particular, also by the fact that not one of the reports was discussed at meetings of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo.

Quite deliberately, in his speeches Stalin also avoided the use of the Leninist theory of the main link. Starting with the Central Committee reports to the 16th VKP(b) Congress, he began persistently to instill in the minds of the leading party cadres the idea of the possibility of simultaneously solving all problems of the building of socialism. Although subsequently this idea was rejected by life itself, it sunk deep roots in the practices of the party's leadership.

The result was that in the administrative-command system developed by Stalin, there was no place for Lenin's methodology of political analysis, the foundations of which were not even studied in the higher party educational institutions.

The speech "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences," presented at the 20th CPSU Congress by N.S. Khrushchev, was one of the first attempts to abandon the Stalinist stereotype of political thinking and to restore the principle of scientific objectivity in drafting Central Committee reports.

L.I. Brezhnev preferred to go back to the old approach. In his speeches the typical features of the Stalinist way of the formulation of Central Committee reports to CPSU congresses became widespread. Why, for instance, is it difficult to distinguish from each other the Central Committee reports from the 24th to the 26th Party Congresses? Above all because the established stereotype for the structuring of the reports and the artificial division of their sections prevented the presentation of an objective picture of historical reality. Such reality was replaced by a set of isolated slices of reality, consisting of parts of the development of industry, construction, transportation, consumer services, trade, etc. This made it practically impossible to determine the specific experience gained by the political leadership and to assess its consistency with historical circumstances in the case of solving various problems of social development and the possibility of drawing the necessary lessons.

As to determining the basic link in the chain of pressing problems, L.I. Brezhnev largely continued the tradition of arbitrary choice, relying on abstract-logical conclusions "equipped" with quotations from the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics, chosen out of context.

The stereotype of the Stalinist way of thinking left to us as its legacy above all a drastic insufficiency of specific-historical analysis. The study of the structures and ways of presentation of Central Committee reports to the communist parties of Union republics, plenums of CPSU raykoms and obkoms, accountability and election

conferences and meetings of *aktivs* at present indicates that they have largely retained the features and characteristics which were developed some 60 years ago. We can clearly trace in them the aspiration to provide precisely a report on all aspects of life without an analysis of the specific historical situation or an interpretation of the experience gathered in political leadership. Most of the reports systematically present the state of affairs in industry, capital construction, the agroindustrial complex, etc. In terms of their content, these traditional sections are essentially narrowly specialized, for they were drafted from the viewpoint of the sectorial department of the corresponding party committee and their purpose is not to analyze the events under consideration. The habit of drafting reports on the basis of the old established scheme has not been eliminated, listing successes, shortcomings and general stipulations.

Reality teaches us that in the area of party leadership one cannot remain indifferent for long to the experience of the past, related to the use of the Leninist methodology of political analysis. It is exceptionally dangerous to continue to write reports according to a stereotype, in a historical situation which changed a long time ago. This can only worsen the noted lagging by the party organizations behind the dynamic processes in society, which was pointed out with concern both at the April 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and at the July Conference of the party's Central Committee.

Mastery of the Leninist art of political analysis demands of the party worker to learn how to see the facts of life as they actually are. Neglect of the systematic evaluation of the facts of history and reality and unwillingness to look at truth in the eyes and to analyze the cause and effect relations of social phenomena directly lead to undermining the scientific foundations of the party's leadership and to a repetition of the bitter errors of the past.

The recent accountability and election campaign proved that an understanding of the negative sides of the existing practice in analytical work is gaining grounds among party workers. The shoots of the new political thinking include the rejection by the leaders of the Kaluga Oblast and Novovoronezh city party organizations of traditional style accountability reports and the use of "scraps" in structuring them. The return by the party committees to the Leninist methodology is necessary, so that they would not be "catching up" with events and phenomena but, anticipating their development, remain a step ahead. The Gorkiy CPSU Gorkom has converted from words to actions. Having realized that the state of development of material facilities in health care, education, transportation, trade, culture and sports may be linked by the same causal relations, they abandoned the traditional presentation of the report and took a first step from simple accountability of the accomplished work to the study of the specific political situation in the city.

In our view, it is exceptionally important today to support this initiative "from below," and to resolve once

and for all the question of introducing in the higher party educational institutions the study of the art of political analysis. Upgrading the methodological knowledge of party cadres would make it possible not only to surmount one of the existing stereotypes of political thinking but also substantially to upgrade the efficiency of the party's guidance of social processes and to strengthen the leading party role in *perestroyka*.

In Defense of Worker Rights

A. Vasilyev, docent at the Moscow Higher Party School, candidate of juridical sciences:

Let me begin by citing the following fact: In some construction administrations of the Main Moscow Oblast Construction Administration, which have converted to collective contracting, the workers themselves elect "full time" trade union leaders and pay their salaries out of funds earned by the collective. The main task of such trade union personnel is to defend the rights of construction workers in the area of labor relations. They must be concerned with working conditions, and special clothing; they must supervise the condition of production facilities, the legality in solving housing and consumer problems and fairness in granting paid leave and days off.

It may seem that the concerns of the trade unions are quite ordinary. Why did it become necessary for the workers to develop by themselves some kind of additional structures? The only possible answer is the following: because the existing trade union committees are not protecting their interests. They ignore many pressing problems affecting working and living conditions and the social and ecological circumstances. This lack of attention to the needs of the working people was what led, in the final account, to strikes and conflict situations in a number of parts of the country.

The administrative-command management methods, which are widespread in our society, have not bypassed the trade unions, as was sharply argued at the July CPSU Central Committee Conference. A bureaucratic work style has been established in the trade unions as well. In principle, this conflicts with the nature of the trade unions as the largest and most democratic organization. The concepts on the role, place and functions of the trade unions triggered by this style has been preserved to this day in the minds of many trade union workers, hindering *perestroyka* in the trade unions and slowing its pace down.

In considering the activities of the trade unions under capitalist conditions, V.I. Lenin noted that they were a nonpolitical class organization of the proletariat. United on the basis of their profession, the workers acted as an organized force demanding of enterprise owners improvements in labor conditions, higher wages, and so on. One of the main forms of regulating problems of wages and layoffs was the collective contract concluded between workers, united in their trade unions, and

entrepreneurs or their representatives. Under such circumstances, enterprise managers, not to mention owners, in principle neither were nor could be members of labor trade unions.

In Lenin's view, the nature of the trade unions as an organization of workers, remains under socialism as well. The socialist trade unions are the "comprehensively organized proletariat" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 208). They ensure "worker unity" and are not required to have "specific political views" (*ibid.*, vol 44, p 345). In a proletarian state all that is demanded of the members of the trade unions is an understanding of comradely discipline and the need for the unification of worker forces..., "the materials of the 11th Party Congress stipulate.

In characterizing the socialist trade unions as the organized social force of the workers, V.I. Lenin pitted such force not against the capitalist class, as had been the case in bourgeois society, but against the "bureaucratic distortions of the proletarian state," "departmental interests," or else the "managerial zeal" of managers, state officials and economic management authorities.

This Leninist concept was distorted under the conditions of the administrative-command management methods. The trade unions stopped being a class organization of the workers rallied according to professional, industrial or sectorial principles. Although officially this feature was preserved in the names of the trade unions (they were known as the trade unions of workers in the respective sectors), actually, they also included all economic managers, including ministers. In practice this led to the stratification of the trade unions, based on the different interests of the individual groups and social status, level of education and nature of the work of their representatives. Furthermore, as the official leaders of enterprises, associations and even sectors, professional economic managers with better education and knowledge of the production process began to play a leading role in the management of trade union authorities and organizations on all levels, from primary to all-Union. Actually, the chairman of the trade union committee was and is appointed by the director and is, as a rule, chosen among the plant economic managers. The studies made by this author in 1985-1986 at 100 enterprises in different sectors proved that about one-half of the chairmen of trade union committees had been, prior to their election, chiefs of shops, chief specialists, and deputy enterprise directors; slightly less than 40 percent were engineering and technical personnel and only 14 percent were workers.

Economic managers also head many of the permanent trade union commissions. What frequently happens is the following: the chief of the labor safety department is the head of the commission in charge of labor safety and improvements; the chief of the consumer services is head of the housing-consumer services commission. Need we say that such leadership of trade union committees and

their commissions defends above all the administration's interests rather than those of the workers?

Another study which was conducted at 200 enterprises indicated that economic managers are also heading the joint commissions set up by the trade union committees and the administrations to draft the collective contracts. This conflicts with the latter's nature. The result has been that the collective contracts have turned into a list of stipulations extracted from legislative acts and official instructions drafted by administrative workers and general statements and appeals such as "increase," "intensify," or "raise the level," the implementation of which cannot be controlled. No more than 11 percent of the measures included in the collective contract deal with improving the working and living conditions of enterprise workers. The bulk of such measures is borrowed from the plans for enterprise economic and social developments and their implementation in the current year is part of the plan. The suggestions of the workers themselves concerning improvements in their working and living conditions have been virtually excluded in the contracts.

Such relations existing between economic managers and trade union authorities violate the Leninist principle of the inadmissibility of the interference of the state, including the economic management authorities, in the activities of the trade unions, which are an autonomous social organization working under the party's guidance. The trade unions must act as the support of the socialist state and as the source of the power itself. V.I. Lenin noted that "the trade unions are a 'reservoir' of governmental power" (*op. cit.*, vol 42, p 204); they are "not only a department but a source from which stems our entire power" (*ibid.*, p 249). "...Without a foundation such as the trade unions... governmental functions cannot be performed" (*ibid.*, p 204).

This means that the trade unions must promote from among the workers the worthiest people who have displayed economic knowledge and practicality, and appoint them to leading positions rather than the opposite, as developed under the conditions of administrative-command management methods, according to which members of the administration were and are being appointed to positions of trade union leadership.

Having stopped being a class organization of the workers, structurally as well the trade unions began to resemble the state economic management authorities. Furthermore, the sectorial trade unions virtually duplicate the system of economic authorities. If new industrial sectors are set up or if sectors are merged, automatically the respective sectorial trade unions are either separated or else merged. As a result, starting with the 1930s, their numbers have ranged from 30-40 to 150-160. In order to ensure the theoretical substantiation of such changes, the concept of the need for parity between trade union and economic authorities in solving production, social and other problems was formulated. However, as practical experience indicated, there has never

been such parity, for the real power remained in the hands of the economic management. The actual result was that it had the trade union authority "in its pocket."

The sectorial structure of the trade unions was explained also by the requirement of interaction with the corresponding sectorial trade unions of foreign countries, capitalist above all. However, we believe, the level of such interaction was defined not merely in terms of the structure of the trade unions but also of political considerations and the level of relations among countries. Therefore, this could be achieved on a nonsectorial basis as well, the more so since the sectorial principle, both at home and abroad, was by no means always observed. Thus, for example, in addition to purely sectorial, we also have comprehensive trade unions which cover several industrial sectors, such as the trade unions of workers in the timber, paper and timber processing industries; workers in state trade and consumer cooperatives; workers in railroad transportation and transport building; and workers in the textile and light industries.

The situation involving the principle of trade union structure in the bourgeois countries is even more confused. For example, in the United States there are independent trade unions of longshoremen of the Eastern and Western seaboards; in addition to the garment workers trade union, there is an independent ladies garments' union. That is why the actual interaction between Soviet and foreign trade unions is by no means always based on sectorial affiliation.

The concept of the specific nature of trade union activities, based on sectorial differences in labor conditions, wages and benefits, was also formulated with a view to substantiating the sectorial principle. In this case, however, we believe that there is a confusion between two concepts: the specific nature of the sector and the specifics of the work of trade unions in that sector.

Unquestionably, there are sectorial specifics in enterprise activities. However, this does not mean in itself that similar features are found in the work of the trade unions. The study of such work indicates, precisely, that there virtually are no such specifics. The forms and nature of trade union work are one and the same and could not be otherwise, for the activities of absolutely all trade union organizations and authorities are regulated by the same documents: the Statute of USSR Trade Unions, the Regulation on the Rights of the Trade Union Committee of the Enterprise, Establishment and Organization, and other regulations applicable to all trade union organizations. For example, a study of the work of trade union committees at 30 enterprises in Moscow and Moscow Oblast and in Ryazan in five different sectors—machine building, the textile and light industries, construction, trade and consumer services—made in 1988 under the supervision of this author, indicated that they were engaged in solving the same type of problems.

No specifics were also found in the organizational forms of trade union committee activities. The main form of

work at all enterprises is the trade union committee session at which economic managers and trade union personnel report, and the holding of trade union meetings and conferences.

The deformation of trade union structures and the trade unions' adaptation to the system of economic authorities inevitably entail the changes and, in some cases, distortions in the nature of their activities.

V.I. Lenin provided the following definition of the significance of trade unions under socialism and their functions. He wrote that the trade unions are "a school for unification and cohesion, a school for the protection of their interests, a school of economic management, a school of administration" (op. cit., vol 42, p 292).

In practice, the trade unions have largely neglected the significance of this school. We believe that this occurred for two basic reasons: first, the nature of internal trade union democracy was distorted. The main role in the life of the primary trade union organizations began to be played by their elective authorities—the trade union committees—whose rights proved to be significantly broader than those of the primary organization itself. Together with the administration, they allocated funds for material incentives and sociocultural measures and housing construction; they determined the amounts of bonuses and other types of incentives, financial aid and rewards based on annual results of enterprise work. In other words they did (and, in some cases, still do) that which the primary trade union organizations had no right to do. The trade union committees replaced almost entirely the primary trade union organization, depriving the rank-and-file trade union members of the possibility of participating in enterprise management and learning this most important function.

Second, making use of the dependent status of the trade union committees and the fact that essentially they were headed by representatives of the administration, the enterprise managers assigned and continue to assign to them the solution of strictly production problems such as, for example, to deal with upgrading production quality, increase labor productivity, ensure the efficient utilization of the equipment and promote saving of material and other resources. As a result, to a certain extent the trade union committees became part of the enterprise's administration.

The performance by the trade unions of these and several other administrative functions was juridically codified in the Regulation on the Rights of the Trade Union Committees, according to which a trade union committee must participate in considering and solving approximately 70 different problems of the life and activities of the labor collective, some 60 of which are direct functions of the administration.

Furthermore, legislatively the trade unions were granted the rights of state authorities in some other areas, such as social insurance, and labor and equipment safety. As a

result, a certain statification of the trade unions took place, something which V.I. Lenin categorically opposed.

The most negative consequences of the statification of the trade unions were manifested in the area of defending the legitimate rights and interests of the workers. Said function not simply changed but was largely distorted, turning it into its opposite. Instead of supervising administrative activities and preventing violations of legitimate rights and interests of the workers, together with the administration the trade union committee would either independently time labor operations, set new higher norms and see to it that workers observed labor discipline and internal labor regulations. At some enterprises the trade union committees even penalized workers for labor discipline violations: they imposed fines and passed resolutions on firing them. As a result, the workers turn in defense of their rights not to the trade union committee but to the members of the administration. Surveys conducted at a number of enterprises indicate that in such cases 47.3 percent of those surveyed appeal to the foreman as compared with only 6 percent who appeal to the trade union authorities.

As justification of such a distortion in the activities of the trade union committees, some enterprise managers claim that the protective function of the trade unions has currently lost its significance, for many enterprise directors are former workers. For that reason there neither are nor could there be any contradictions between them and the workers today. This view, however, is by no means convincing. In substantiating the need for the protective function of the trade unions under socialism, V.I. Lenin considered it on the level of official relations, of relations between superiors and subordinates.

What should be done, above all, to restore to the trade unions their initial function, which is to defend the rights of the workers? I believe that we should convert to a unified regional trade union structure. The expediency of this step is confirmed by practical experience as well, which indicates that regional authorities—oblast, kray, republic and other trade union councils—act on a more principle-minded basis than the oblast, kray, republic and central committees of sectorial trade unions and do not obey the orders of economic managers. As a rule, the resolutions passed by sectorial trade union authorities abound in formulations such as "render assistance," "contribute," "support the petition," and "pay attention," which are of no practical value in solving various problems.

The idea of the inexpediency of sectorial trade unions is shared by a number of trade union officials as well. For example, 16 out of 18 oblast trade union committee chairmen in Orel Oblast believe that there is no need whatsoever for a middle-level of sectorial trade unions (oblast committees), for they are surplus appendages.

Under the conditions of democratization and intensified self-management of Soviet trade unions, as was noted at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, such trade unions

must display greater autonomy and creativity. I believe that restoring the tasks and nature of the trade unions in their Leninist understanding would ensure the perestroika of the trade unions and would decisively enhance their role and authority.

On the System of Political Responsibility

A. Chernysh, head of the Scientific Communism Department, Zaporozhye State University:

According to the resolution of the 1st Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the new constitution must embody the type of socioeconomic and governmental structure which would make impossible the appearance of a cult of personality, authoritarianism, and the preservation of command-administrative social management methods. This can be achieved only if we legally add to it as well as to other political-legal sources, such as the CPSU Program and Statutes and the statutes of the Komsomol and the trade unions, a system of mechanisms which would ensure the political responsibility of the power institutions and their leaders.

They would be responsible for the specific results of social development: for the moral-political atmosphere in society, the level of guaranteeing the constitutional rights and freedoms of the citizens, and the degree of development of self-management by the people. The overall result of their efforts would be a specific socioeconomic one: the well-being of the people and its condition, compared to the standards of human civilization.

However, we must not stop there. Positive results can be achieved, for example, at the cost of substantial material and moral outlays, deterioration of the work and unjustified sacrifices which lead to a lengthy subsequent decline and even a dysfunction of the social organism. They could become the consequence of a favorable development of circumstances independent of the subject such as, for example, the positive situation on the foreign market or an important discovery in the area of technology, through the efforts of other people. Therefore, not only the results but also the changes occurring in political and socioeconomic processes must be periodically subjected to a political evaluation.

Political responsibility inevitably presumes an evaluation of the extent of correlation between the guiding activities of socialist principles and the real needs of the working people. It is also inconceivable without the real influence of the sovereign people over those to whom it has entrusted the power.

Influence as the most important element in relations of responsibility which, expressing in legal forms the will of the people, would correct the course which is followed, has been virtually absent in our country, unless we consider spontaneous local acts of indignation expressed by the working people, as well as efforts by the intelligentsia in presenting its own methods for improving life. However, as a rule they have not had any whatsoever

tangible influence on the pursued course. Nor was there such a mechanism within the CPSU. As was noted at the 19th Party Conference, "...to a large extent the primary party organizations and the rank-and-file party members have lost any real possibility of influencing the nature of party activities."

Nor was there an efficient mechanism through which the people could rate their political leaders. Soon after Lenin's death free debates within the party, the influence of science on the choice of ways of social development, glasnost in the work of the authorities and taking public opinion into consideration in areas of general state problems, as we know, stopped being the norm of social life. Independently and, as it always believed, competently, the leadership assessed its own activities and the work of its own apparatus. Despite frank criticism, as a rule, there were no official doubts as to the unquestionable accuracy of the pursued course. Exceptions occurred only during periods of change in leadership. However, here again the initiative was that of the leadership. The masses were unable to do this independently, due to the lack of information about our achievements and errors and experience and, above all, the lack of legislatively established and practically tried ways of expressing their views and desires.

An array of methods must be applied in the struggle against the reasons for abnormal phenomena. In theory, this means scientifically substantiated concepts of social development. In political life, it means expanding the political autonomy of the masses. In the socioeconomic area it means the use in industry of forms which would eliminate the alienation of the working people from social ownership.

On the organizational and institutional levels, we believe that securing the gains of the political reform should consist, initially, with the help of legal and political standards and, subsequently, standards which have earned public approval and have become political traditions, of creating in society the type of system which would strictly regulate and ensure the lawful (responsible) activities of political institutions and their leaders and would prevent any abnormal development of frequently spontaneously developing and initially imperceptible negative trends. The formulation of such a system based on the current standards of basic political sources which determine the technology of political life is not possible today. Therefore, in itself the democratic idea—the right of the people to make any official accountable—is left hanging in the air. Managers are given the "legitimate" possibility of shifting responsibility for the negative consequences of their work to subordinates or, in general, to no one. That is precisely the way the problem was formulated by people's deputies Yu. Vlasov and D. Khudonazarov at the congress.

The 1988 draft of the USSR Constitution offers a very complete description of the leading subjects of responsibility, starting with the state, and virtually all of its subdivisions, and ending with the party and the people.

Nonetheless, no mention is made of the responsibility of the USSR Supreme Soviet with its chambers and their chairmen, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the sociopolitical organizations (represented by their all-Union authorities), as well as the mass social organizations and autonomous associations of working people. It is not only a matter that nowhere is it said directly that they are accountable. There is no system of responsibility which would make such responsibility real. The authorities to which the politicians are answerable are not always indicated. This applies to the deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet (Article 124), and to the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium (Article 132). The specific responsibility of the "socialist state of the whole nation" (Article 1) or else the "Soviet state" (Article 3) is not stipulated. No mention is made of the type of responsibility which its executive and management authorities have (Articles 91, 94 and 150) or that of the deputy chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Article 121), or else that of ministers and chairmen of state committees (Articles 113, 135).

The weakest and least undeveloped link in the system of responsibilities in the USSR Constitution is that of the ways and means of answerability.

To begin with, let us note the limited nature of the means. According to the Fundamental Law, they could be essentially chosen (prescribed); they may consist of accountability reports (reports) or informations (Articles 3, 91, 94, 113, 118, 152) and, less frequently, answers to queries (Article 105), summation of programs (Article 130), and controllability (Article 2). However, as a rule no time limit is set for such acts. No more effective steps are being postulated, such as daily control based on the initiative of the voters and the public organizations over the work of the people's deputies, the assessment of their work and the publication of such assessments, recommendations issued by labor collectives to the superior authority, and petitions on material incentives and rewards.

Second, what follows from the study of the mechanisms of responsibility is the virtually total lack of its manifestation in the guise of penalties. In three cases—in terms of the people's deputy, the official or the judge and the people's assessor (Articles 91, 107 and 152) it is stipulated that they could be recalled (relieved from their position). In this case, particularly in Articles 107 and 152, we find the clearest possible definitions as to how, when and for what reason this could take place: for failure to justify the confidence of the voters, at any time, and in accordance with the procedure established by the law.

Unquestionably, we cannot consider this situation as one which would satisfy political practices: every participant in political relations on the national level should be entirely included within the system of relations of responsibility, supported by a special mechanism. As a minimum, in terms of the leading institutions, it must be

clearly determined to whom, for what reason and in what form they can be considered answerable. To stipulate specific penalties for deputies and judges while, at the same time, excluding the main power institutions is not only illogical but simply dangerous, the more so since even in the cases stipulated in the regulations, mechanisms not supported by a comprehensive system of responsibility do not work. Thus, by the end of 1988 92 deputies lost their membership in the USSR Supreme Soviet. They held the rank of first secretary of Central Committee of Union republic or obkom, minister or individual in other types of high positions; however, not one of them was directly recalled by the voters.

The means of achieving responsibility could and should include criticism at meetings and assemblies of voters, reprimands, votes of no confidence in the representative authority, objections to resolutions, or appealing to a superior authority or court or else to the Committee for Constitutional Supervision. The forms of expressing lack of confidence in a deputy or official could include the latter's exclusion from the list of reserves for official promotion, denial of promotion, nonelection, public reprimand and warning, blocking by voters a decision made by the apparat, and a deputy issuing a warning to an official of his unsuitability for the job and relieving him from his position, and a prohibition of holding higher political positions in the future. The democratic state could adopt as its standards the system of voluntary resignation, resigning a leading position in the party or sociopolitical organization, disbanding the representative authority and even an entire institution, either independently or by decision of the majority of the voters, or as the result of a referendum. Most of these instruments are codified in the constitutions of the socialist countries and are used in their political life to one extent of efficiency or another (this is a separate question).

A similar situation is found in our Constitution in the study of the system of political responsibility supported by the CPSU Program and Statutes. Here we find an enumeration of subjects of responsibility: the CPSU, the party members, the party authorities and the leading cadres. Essentially, the authorities have been named: the people, the party organizations, the labor collectives and the party. As a rule, objective grounds have been defined for responsibility: work results, violation of party and state discipline, failure to fulfill obligations and party assignments, nonfulfillment of statutory obligations, violations of the laws and delinquency. Nonetheless, a more specific substantiation should be provided for the responsibility of entities such as party committees (Article 28 of the statutes), and party bureaus and their secretaries (Article 56). The terms "work" and "activities" are an insufficient ground for actions leading to substantial results.

The CPSU Statutes include a great variety of forms of responsibility. Essentially, however, this applies to the members of the CPSU (Articles 3, 8-13). The party responsibility to the members of elected authorities is mentioned negatively only twice: in Article 11 and in Article 3, which calls for "strict party liability" on the

part of people guilty of the suppression of criticism and of persecuting for criticism. However, the specific forms of such responsibility are not defined. In terms of all other subjects no forms of responsibility may be found either in a general or, even more so, a specific stipulation included in the statutes.

The structure, principles and norms in the statutes of the Komsomol and the trade unions of the USSR are essentially consistent with the ideas included in the party statutes. This is also why the shortcomings (incomplete enumeration of the subject of responsibility and authorities to which they are responsible, lack of definition of the range of problems for which they are answerable, poverty of forms of responsibility and means of its exercise, and lack of clarity or, more frequently, total absence of criteria on the basis of the specific measure of responsibility of the different subjects for different actions) are the same. Furthermore, neither statutes define the authorities or the responsibility of the political institutions themselves—the Komsomol and the trade unions.

Let us particularly mention the main shortcoming of all these documents: the fact that they consistently circumvent the question of the role of the apparat in party and state life. This applies to that same apparat whose officials sometimes try to issue orders to the deputies and to members of party committees and public organizations. Its relations with the elected authorities, and with those who elect them, its functions, and the range of problems for which they are responsible and the forms and extent of responsibility are, as a rule, not defined anywhere, not to mention in their detail. Article 23 of the party statutes merely stipulates that for purposes of current work in the organization and supervision of the implementation of party resolutions and helping subordinate organizations, the party committees on all levels must set up an apparat, whose structure and personnel are defined by the CPSU Central Committee. Articles 2, 3, 91, 105, 123 and 126 of the Constitution of the USSR mention "state authorities" and "officials" (which could include the regular personnel) who structure their work on the basis of regular accountability to the soviets and the population.

Nor do we find in the documents a definition of the basic authority to which the apparat should be answerable. The functions of the apparat are not stipulated in the Constitution and are partially stipulated in the CPSU Statutes. We can agree that the apparat can be used for "daily functions" and for "helping the subordinate organizations," but in no way for purposes of taking over the functions of the elected authorities. Ensuring the activities of the latter should be the main purpose of the auxiliary, the organizational-technical apparat.

None of these are accidental omissions. It is precisely here that we find the greatest secret of the command-administrative system which thus avoids its responsibility to society. Under conditions in which deputies and members of elected authorities carried out their assignments, in addition to their main jobs, i.e., not regularly and by no means their assigned obligations in full, and

when sessions and plenums were held several times annually and their draft resolutions were prepared by officials and the decisions to hold meetings were made by the apparat while the appointment or dismissal from position or setting up the tables of organization and, therefore, wages, were also determined by the superior authorities and, in practical terms, once again by the apparat, the role of the latter in exercising the "power by the people" became decisive. Officially anonymous but actually making the rules, the apparat thus became totally uncontrolled by the public and turned into a force superior to it.

On the surface, however, everything seemed quite proper: political, social and legal standards regulated quite fully, in words, the activities of the main but, in fact, the second-rate elected authorities. The lack of such regulations concerning the stationary apparat allowed it to replace, recall or re-elect its fictitious "bosses," and, if necessary, to bind them with instructions in such a way and to restrict their independence to such an extent that they had only enough strength and efforts to "approve," "support" and "consider for purposes of information." The lack of clarity in marking the nature and range of problems for which the apparat was responsible and the lack in the documents of standards which would define its responsibility in cases of unskilled or unconscientious implementation of its obligations, led to the fact that while performing extraneous functions it had virtually no responsibility for its activities and the decisions it made.

Perestroika cannot develop successfully under the influence of sociopolitical standards structured on the basis of a concept rejected by society of a simplistic-dogmatic interpretation of socialism. For that reason, the next step in the political and legal reform should be a profound revision of all current political-legal sources, not only the Constitution, something which has apparently already been undertaken by the constitutional commission. It would be better to do this on the basis of the new concept and not the method of patching the faded uniform of, let us hope, an age which has gone into the past forever.

Elections Without Choice?

K. Smirnova, engineer, labor veteran, CPSU member since 1961, Lipetsk:

Of late we have asked ourselves quite frequently the question of "who are we electing?" This occurred in connection with the election of delegates to the all-Union party conference and in the course of the recent accountability and election campaign. Yet the question of "how we elect" is heard much less frequently. This aspect of the elections is equally important in terms of the democratization of party life. So, how do we elect?

The method is stipulated in the CPSU Statutes. Let me point out the following statement: candidates for which more than one-half of the participants in a meeting, conference or congress have voted are considered elected. However, this has not always been the case. A

different stipulation was used in the instructions on elections as practiced until the 22nd Party Congress (at that time the question of elections was not stipulated in the statutes). Candidates who had garnered the majority vote in terms of the remaining candidates and more than one-half of the votes of those attending a meeting, conference or congress, with voting rights, were considered elected to the party authority. On the surface, such formulations seem similar. This impression, however, is very misleading. What did the change in formulations lead to?

It led to the fact that, above all, electiveness disappeared in our elections. Virtually anyone included in the ticket garners the necessary minimum of votes. This is not puzzling, for another outcome would require more than one candidate per mandate, which, to this day, is infrequent. In that case as well, however, there is no guarantee that even after the voting the election is completed, for the "passing number" could be garnered by more candidates than has been decided to elect as, shall we say, members of a party committee. At that point it becomes necessary either to expand the elected authority or to nominate new candidates and hold new elections. Therefore, in frequent cases, even at the nominating stage, pressure begins to be applied on the candidates to force the "surplus" candidates to withdraw. In such a case, naturally, there is no free manifestation of the will.

The old formulation of the election rules makes it possible to avoid the excessive complication of the electoral process. If the decision has been made to elect 15 members of a party committee, the first 15 (based on the number of garnered votes) will become committee members. Yet many more could be nominated. In my view, it is precisely this that would mean an honest struggle in which everything would be decided by the attitude of the people toward the candidate and his views.

The situation concerning elections to the superior party agencies is similar. Here as well, as in the past, only one option is possible: there must be as many candidates as there are mandates. Naturally, all the nominees will garner more than one-half of the votes and increasing the number of mandates is not allowed. Here is another "minus" of such a system: the delegates attending a rayon conference, let us say, in choosing the participants of the city party forum, by no means always express the views of the party organizations which have delegated them. Most frequently, they express either their personal views or the views of a small group of people.

Examples of other equally "successful" substitutions in the formulas could be cited. Let us recall one of the obligations of a party member: strictly to observe the party line in the choice of cadres on the basis of their political and practical qualities. The violation of such instructions and the selection of cadres on the basis of friendship, personal loyalty, place of birth or family ties are incompatible with party membership. This requirement is much more loosely formulated in the present

statutes: "To be irreconcilable whenever the Leninist principles of cadre selection and training are violated." Both nepotism and local patriotism blossomed under the cover of such a smooth formulation.

Let me mention yet something else on the subject of elections. The CPSU Statutes, which were adopted at the 22nd CPSU Congress, stipulated the following: "The principle of systematic renovation of their structure and the continuity of leadership must be observed in the election of party authorities. No less than 25 percent of the membership of the CPSU Central Committee and its Presidium must be renovated at each consecutive election. Members of the Presidium are elected, as a rule, for no more than 3 consecutive convocations.... The composition of the central committees of communist parties of Union republics, and kraykoms and obkoms must be renovated no less than by one-third at each consecutive election; the membership of okrug, city and rayon party committees and party committees or bureaus of primary party organizations must be renovated by 50 percent." This is an effort to eliminate the possibility of usurping the power. However, 5 years later, the statutes were nonetheless weakened: "The principle of systematic renovation of the membership and continuity of leadership must be observed in the election of all party organs, from primary organizations to the CPSU Central Committee." The moment the specific stipulations vanished, prerequisites were created for the lifelong holding of leading party positions, which led to uncontrollability, total permissiveness, and impunity and which triggered corruption and crime among many party leaders, committed against the party and the people.

To sum it up, I believe that the CPSU statutes should be amended. We must clearly determine the length of the mandate of an elected authority and the periodicity and percentage of updating the membership of leading party authorities and requirements facing the party members in matters of the choice and training of cadres. The instruction on elections (should such become necessary) should interpret the stipulations of the statutes and not be a suprastatutory document.

We must return to the previous system of determining electoral results. Candidates who have not only obtained more than one-half of the votes of the participants in a meeting but also who have come ahead of their competitors must be considered elected as members of the party committee. This rule should be applied in the election of party organization managers. Secretaries of primary party organizations should be elected by general secret vote and based on simple majority.

Delegates to party congresses and all-Union conferences as well should be elected by direct secret balloting. In order to observe the rates of representation, several party organizations of adjacent territories could hold joint elections.

I realize that the adoption of resolutions applicable to the democratization of party life will require a certain

amount of work and preparations. Naturally, no haste should be displayed in this case. However, nor should we remain idle. It would be proper for the election of delegates to the next party congress to be held already under the new rules.

Exceptions Which Have Become the Rule

A. Galesnik, jurist, CPSU member since 1948, Minsk:

The CPSU Statutes, which were approved at the 27th Congress, clearly stipulate that elective authorities are elected at a general meeting, conference or congress. This electoral procedure has remained virtually unchanged in party documents since 1919. Yet in practical terms we quite frequently have come and are coming across cases of co-opting new members in elected authorities in the intervals between congresses or conferences. As a rule, this involves leading party officials and is very similar to an ordinary administrative appointment.

Cases of co-opting are presented as exceptions from the rule, which do not change the overall situation. Statistics, however, prove differently. The following data were cited in an issue of the journal *GLOBUS* for 1988: In 1987 one-half of the more than 900 elected heads of party raykoms and gorkoms had been co-opted. During the period when the Azerbaijan party organization was headed by G. Aliyev, virtually all new raykom secretaries were co-opted. Therefore, I believe that it is high time to discuss this phenomenon in our party life.

During the period when our party was clandestine and internal party democracy was necessarily limited, co-opting was simply necessary in order for the work to be successful. It was no accident that as early as the 2nd Congress of the RSDWP, the following was included in its organizational statutes:

"All party organizations and all collegial party institutions must solve problems by simple majority of vote and have the right to co-opt.... The co-opting of new members of the Central Committee and to the editorial board of the Central Organ must be unanimous."

The same formulation was retained in the statutes after the 3rd Congress as well. However, as early as May 1917, when the party was no longer clandestine (although, essentially, it was semilegal), at the 6th RSDWP(b) Congress the paragraph on the right to co-opt to the leading authorities was not included in the statutes.

Despite all resolutions, such repeatedly censured practices have not been eliminated to this day. It has become something of a standard for first secretaries to resign on the eve of accountability and election conferences and for outsiders to be co-opted to replace them. In addition to the controversial nature of the system itself of such rotation of leading party cadres, the consequence is that the party members who have failed in their assigned work sector avoid (or are being taken out of) criticism. They do not have to submit accounts to the higher fora of the party organization—the congress, or the conference,

as to the reason for which they failed to justify the hopes placed on them in previous elections. Meanwhile, the new first secretary who has been on the job for a week after being co-opted, presents from the rostrum a report about work in which, he essentially, has not been involved in the least.

We should adopt a rule according to which any party committee secretary who is pensioned off or takes another job must report to the congress or the conference which will provide a political assessment of his activities. If the superior party authority believes that instead of the individual currently holding the job it should recommend a party member from the outside who would be able more successfully to head said party organization, this should be done at that same conference and congress. In such cases, said candidates should be summoned in advance. Incidentally, when a chairman of a soviet withdraws, his position is filled by general elections for the district and it is only then that the already elected deputy is recommended to assume the position of chairman of the soviet. Why should the same system not be followed in the party as well?

What Can the Elected Aktiv Do

One of the real ways of democratization of party life is that of broadening the activities of the elected authorities. This was discussed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference as well as by the journal's readers who ask to be told about the changes which are taking place in practical work. The questions asked by our special correspondent A. Leshchevskiy are answered by V. Nosov, member of the bureau of the Moscow City Party Committee and general director of the Gosudarstvennyy Podshipnikovyy Zavod No 1 Production Association.

[Correspondent] Valeriy Borisovich, the June Moscow City Party Committee Plenum was an extraordinary event in the life of the city party organization. Even the newspaper report was able to project the feeling of its intensity. To what extent did this sharp discussion reflect the quality changes in the elected party aktiv?

[Nosov] My impression of the plenum was complex. Little maturity was displayed in the statements. Occasionally it seemed that the speakers were simply trying to score points for the forthcoming elections to the local soviets. Six months have passed since the accountability and election party conferences and we are already hearing calls for having everyone re-elected. However, no serious discussion was held on the strategy and tactics of the city party organization under the new circumstances, although, I believe, it was precisely this type of discussion that the party members expected of us.

Nonetheless, this emotional discussion yielded a great deal. Within a short period of time we found out about each other more than we had in decades. Finally, frank views and positions were made clear. We found out more clearly who is who and what were the possibilities of the individuals. Now we must learn also how to fulfill that which we promised and to get used to being answerable

for our statements. Obviously, everything comes in time. However, the very course of the plenum indicates how greatly the elected aktiv has changed.

[Correspondent] This is your second term as member of the party gorkom. What are your impressions of the work with the new membership of the city party committee?

[Nosov] Let me begin with the following observation: membership in an elective authority has to a certain extent stopped being an honorary appendage to one's basic duties. I do not recall for an enterprise director to be a member of the bureau of the CPSU Moscow City Party Committee. This was not on our level. Yet now I have been elected to it. Furthermore, no one discussed this option with me in advance. Everything was decided directly at the conference.

[Correspondent] What was "your" level?

[Nosov] Member of the gorkom. That is what I was during my first term: I had hardly become general director of the GPZ-1 when I was elected and, naturally, not because of any special merits on my part. No credit could be earned in a period of a few months. Is the fact that we are beginning to abandon this kind of appointment bad?

The relationship between the members of the gorkom and the personnel of the apparat are changing. In the past we kept trying not to get in their way. Now, when meetings are held the discussions are what they should be between an elected authority and its apparat. In turn, the apparat is increasingly "involving" us in its work. There are those who realize that this increases the strength and possibilities of the city party committee; others consider that this is merely a "demonstration of collegial attitude." However, here as well I see a positive change. Until very recently the apparat openly ignored the views of the elected authority, imposing his own. I recall that at the beginning of 1987, cases of theft of products, irresponsibility and many technological violations had been detected at a big meat combine in Moscow's Taganskiy Rayon. Naturally, there were fines, firings and court cases. First Secretary R. Zhukova tried to talk the leaders of the city party organization into accepting the fact that one should not be limited merely to punitive measures and that the situation should be radically corrected, for otherwise the same situation would be periodically repeated (which, incidentally, turned out to be correct). Because of this opinion of her own, R. Zhukova found herself in disfavor and soon afterwards Yu. Belyakov, the then secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, together with several members of the apparat, went to the raykom bureau to "remove" her. No one intended to seek our advice (at that time I was member of the rayon party committee bureau). All we were asked to do was to support the charges. The bureau members voiced a number of critical remarks addressed at Rimma Vasilyevna but firmly stated that she could head the rayon party organization. Realizing that the bureau opposed the removal of the secretary, Belyakov phoned someone and left immediately afterwards.

[Correspondent] Is today such a pressure on the elected aktiv possible?

[Nosov] How can I put it.... It is not easy to change people and it is not all that easy to abandon decades of developed traditions in party work. However, the apparat absolutism is beginning to yield to the collective discussion of problems and the opinion of the views of the elected authority is becoming increasingly important. In my view, here it is a question less of the personality of one party leader or another than the intensified democratization of our society.

Recently the party gorkom bureau discussed the AZLK. Its collective is having a great deal of difficulty in organizing rhythmical and highly productive work. Once again suggestions were made of punishing the general director. However, the advice of the bureau members who called for not being in a hurry with sentences was listened to. A commission was appointed, which included competent specialists. I believe that a thorough study of the situation would be much more useful than hasty penalties.

[Correspondent] Could it be that it is precisely as a member of a commission that one could display one's capabilities most fully?

[Nosov] Here everything depends on the target and the competence of the study. In the past one-half of any commission appointed by the gorkom consisted of apparat workers. Today it includes only representatives of the elected aktiv. I do not wish to insult anyone but, in my view, this makes it possible to conduct various investigations on a more qualified basis. Unbelievably, in the study of the situation at the AZLK my 20 years of experience at the ZIL proved to be more useful than the work customs of the apparat.

This is the second time that I am a member of the party gorkom's commission on socioeconomic development. What is changing? In the past the work plan was issued to us by the Moscow City Party Committee Apparatus and we accepted it. This time both the commission members and the apparat personnel submitted their suggestions and discussed them jointly. The plan included questions which affect Muscovites today. At least the gorkom members are convinced that such is the case, for these are questions which are constantly asked of us by labor collectives.

[Correspondent] Nonetheless, Valeriy Borisovich, the Moscow Party Organization should play a much more noticeable role in the social life of the capital than it does today. Does it not seem to you that this criticism which was heard at the Moscow City Party Committee Plenum was addressed to the elective membership above all?

[Nosov] I agree. Our lack of readiness to act under the new conditions was manifested in the course of the numerous meetings which took place in Moscow during the congress of USSR People's Deputies. Essentially there were no speakers who could defend the party line.

Contacts with informal organizations which are sincerely concerned with the fate of perestroyka are being organized with difficulty and slowly. This is due to both objective and subjective reasons.

These days it is particularly difficult to engage in ideological work. It is not only a matter of the fact that the party assumes responsibility for everything that took place in the country during the periods of cult and stagnation. A great deal of errors are being made today as well. The passing of laws which were not properly considered or drafted has adversely affected the economic situation in the country and the social mood. Respect for skilled labor has become devalued: in 1 month a casting worker at the ZIL earns less than the janitor in a public toilet. The life of the low-salaried strata has worsened. It makes no difference at all to a person when he is being told about the inflationary spiral, if he can buy nothing with his money.

We cannot fail to see that in the course of this internal party discipline has substantially declined although without it no serious project can be completed. In my view, some party members forget the fact that they carry a party card. The members of the elected party organs should now become more principle-minded. Yet, for the time being, we are holding a defensive position. If we are personally affected we answer and if we are not, we ignore the case. I hope that this is a temporary confusion and that a systematic democratization of relations within the city party committee will help us eliminate it more quickly.

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PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Foreign Economic Mechanism—Unsolved Problems

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[Article by Anatoliy Gavrilovich Bondarev, candidate of economic sciences, deputy chief of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry Main Economic Administration]

[Text] Almost 3 years have passed since major governmental decisions were made, which marked the beginning of perestroyka in the mechanism of foreign economic relations. How to assess this period? If we were to approach it on the basis of the old yardstick, judging by the number of decisions which were made that period was quite fruitful. If we proceed from the results, obviously we should consider the extent to which the planned objectives were reached.

The 19 August 1986 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On Measures to

Improve the Management of Foreign Economic Relations" listed as the main reasons for stagnation in the foreign economic area the obsolete methods applied in managing foreign economic activities, lack of coordination between industry and foreign trade and the removal of production associations and enterprises from direct participation in foreign economic activities. The term "obsolete management methods" referred to the system of administrative-order management of foreign trade, which had proved unjustified (not only in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Trade but other foreign economic departments as well). It was deemed expedient to convert to economic management methods on the basis of full cost accounting and self-financing. The "lack of coordination in industry and foreign trade" was to be eliminated by abolishing departmental monopoly in foreign economic relations and granting enterprises and organizations the right directly to engage in export-import operations. It was precisely by solving this double problem that the radical improvement in the efficiency of foreign trade was to be achieved.

All of these were projections. After 3 years of perestroika in this area, however, we must acknowledge that as in the past the main task remains unsolved. Administrative management methods continue to prevail. There is no real cost accounting in foreign trade, which is the basic foreign economic link; finally, there are no real ties between the domestic producer and the world's marketplace.

Obviously, no other results could have been possible if we bear in mind that the foreign economic area is the extension of the domestic economy and that its problems are a reflection, with certain modifications, of domestic problems.

What is preventing any substantial increase in the efficiency of the work of the foreign economic complex and its organic integration with the national economy?

Above all, as we already noted, it is the absence of real cost accounting in traditional foreign trade which, for the time being, is still the primary form of participation of our country in the international division of labor. Officially, as early as 1978 the associations under the former Ministry of Foreign Trade had been converted to cost accounting: they had their own balance sheets and met their maintenance costs out of their own income from their work as intermediaries, i.e., from the commissions they earned. However, as was the case with the rest of the economy, their cost accounting was fictitious. It did not allow a real economic autonomy of enterprises and did not contribute to establishing direct relations between domestic consumers and suppliers, on the one hand, and the foreign marketplace, on the other.

Ten years later, under the conditions of the reorganization of the system of managing foreign economic relations, the foreign trade associations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES), like the foreign economic organizations of other ministries and

departments, had already been converted to "full cost accounting." Unquestionably, the associations were given certain additional rights. Essentially, however, this "full cost accounting" was hardly different from the old "partial" one. There was virtually no real increase in the economic autonomy of associations. This applies, above all, to the planning of their economic activities. In order to become the owner not in words but in fact, the association should rely only on what it can earn and what it can spend, i.e., it must formulate its own work plan on the basis of its portfolio of orders. For the time being, no such thing exists in foreign trade (foreign economic) associations. As in the past, planning on the basis of orders from superiors is practiced. Now, however, it is codified in documents. According to the Methodical Recommendations on the Organization of Commercial-Economic Activities of Foreign Economic Organizations Under the Conditions of Full Cost Accounting (approved by the Commission on Improving Management, Planning and the Economic Mechanism on 22 November 1988. Protocol No 136, Part I), the associations have been given the right "independently to formulate and approve their 5-year and annual plans for economic and social development." The immediate stipulation which follows, however (!), is that "this must be based on initial data issued by the superior organizations (Article 3).

Reality proved the groundlessness of planning by directive in our economy a long time ago and quite convincingly. This includes foreign trade as well. Indicators of export-import and foreign currency plans were constantly amended, essentially upwards. Even with the stability of the initially established indicators, the plans were either overfulfilled or underfulfilled. Essentially, they were and are no more than guidelines, or control figures.

To the personnel of the foreign trade associations it has long become clear that the approach to planning economic activities of foreign trade organizations should be changed radically. It should be based on control figures not considered mandatory. Within the year the portfolio of orders of associations could change, sometimes considerably. In particular, additional orders may be placed and, for a variety of reasons, previous orders could be canceled. The constant changes in the situation on foreign markets could also be such as to amend the initial outlines (or plans) of the associations. Naturally, under such circumstances the volume of trade, the sum total of foreign exchange earnings and foreign exchange payments, as well as the amount of profits planned by the association itself before the beginning of the year, should be used only as guidelines, as control figures, and not accepted as a dogma. The only standards which remain fixed would be withholdings from profits for the state budget and for the budgets of the local soviets and the ministry.

At the present time one of the hindrances to perestroika in the economy, including the foreign economic area, is precisely the position taken by the superior management

echelons (the USSR Council of Ministers, the Gosplan and Gosstab, and the Ministry of Finance) concerning economic planning based on "initial data," which include control figures as well. What does this mean? If the direct producer, in accordance with the Law on the State Enterprise, formulates and approves his own annual and 5-year plans himself, how would the ministry, i.e., his superior authority, "issue initial data" such as, for example, control figures on income, profits and volume of sales? Where would the ministry obtain such "initial data?" From the enterprises themselves? In that case, what would be the role of the ministry? Would it be one of obtaining from the enterprises or associations a control figure which is then again "issued" by it to the enterprise? This is absurd! Let us assume that the ministry obtains its "initial data" from the Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance. The question then arises, where could such agencies obtain or be able to obtain information for such "initial data?" Obviously, only from customers, i.e., from enterprises and associations. What is the meaning of this pyramid? If it is to be simply a transmission unit between the customer and the manufacturer, the upkeep of such a "transmission" apparatus is both expensive and essentially unnecessary.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that this fog which has been developed concerning the mechanism of "initial data" and, in particular, of control figures suits the apparatus of all central departments without exception, from the Gosplan to the ministries. This enables them to become "involved" and to act as though they were guiding the enterprises. By this token, "the issuing of initial data" once again becomes an element of command-administrative management. This also preserves the old and inefficient economic mechanism which continues to dominate foreign economic relations as well. Naturally, reality will inevitably make its own corrections and put everything in its proper place. However, it should have already become clear that no one should "issue" or "submit" control figures to anyone else. The control figures are guidelines in the production program of enterprises and organizations. They can only be directed "upwards," i.e., to the ministry in order to draft an orientational balance for the development of a sector and transmitted from the ministry to the Gosplan and the Council of Ministers. It is on the basis of such "control" balances that the superior planning authorities can formulate programs which would correct the development of the various economic sectors through the state budget, on the basis of state orders.

A review of the approach to the interpretation of control figures would provide the necessary base for truly independent planning of economic activities by foreign trade associations and companies. However, such independence will remain blocked unless the mechanism of state orders is also radically reviewed at the same time. It is clear to virtually anyone that no state order was issued in 1988. This is the new name which the central planning authorities and ministries have given to the former mandatory plan, which excludes real cost accounting.

Whereas in the past, let us say, the enterprise was issued a mandatory plan for the procurement of goods for export while the foreign trade association was given, respectively, a mandatory plan for foreign exchange earnings, now the enterprise has been given a state order for those same export procurements of goods and foreign trade has been issued ceilings for foreign exchange earnings. Nothing has been essentially changed in 1989 as well.

Let us point out that in the drafting of legal documents on the conversion to full cost accounting of foreign trade associations, little attention was paid to defining the mechanism of state orders. In my opinion this indicates not only support for the old and ordinary mechanism for managing foreign trade associations but also a lack of clarity concerning the mechanism of state orders in general.

Allow me to express a few ideas on the formulation of this question. In my view, the following must be taken into consideration if we are to understand the question of the state order:

First, it is an order placed by the state through its authority—the ministry or department.

Second, it is the people who issue the order who must pay for it. This means that the state agency—ministry or department—in issuing its order, assumes an obligation to the performer to pay for it in full within the stipulated deadline. The state budget is the customer's source of funds. Third, the state order must be fulfilled in precisely the same way as the order issued by any company or organization, i.e., either on the basis of a contract or an agreement signed between the parties: the state authority and the performing company.

Fourth, to the performer the state order should be different from the order of a company or any nongovernmental organization only because it is more profitable. Such profitability is manifested not by the fact, as is sometimes simplistically understood, that higher prices are being set along with benefits and financing, supply of raw materials, and so on. This could be the case but by no means always is. The main attractiveness of the state order lies in the 100 percent guaranteed payment for the fulfillment of the order, based on the state budget. It is precisely such a guaranteed market that makes it possible to place state orders on a competitive basis and formulate quite strict requirements concerning quality and performance deadlines. Similar to the state orders are orders placed by regional and local authorities, financed out of their own budgets.

In other words, the state order is an order placed by the state authority paid out of state funds; any other order is an order of a company, enterprise or organization, paid out of its own budget. That should be the only difference. The mechanism is the same: contractual legal relations established between the customer and the performer with reciprocal material and financial responsibility of the parties.

We must point out that unlike the state authorities which cannot fail to meet their bills, the financial status and solvency of other economic subjects—enterprises, organizations and cooperatives—may vary. In our view, this necessarily presumes the appearance and development within the system of economic-financial relations within our economy of an institution such as customer's guarantees of solvency.

In considering the mechanism of control figures and state orders as a whole, it is necessary to take into consideration that these are the two most important elements in planning the economic activities of enterprises and organizations under the conditions of a socialist market. The following question arises, however: What must be done so that the control figures as well become useful and for the state order no longer to be mandatory? Obviously, this is possible only under the condition of having a truly complete cost accounting independence of enterprises and organizations and, in our case, of foreign economic associations. To this effect associations and enterprises must not be administratively subordinated to state authorities. The existing combination within the ministries of the functions of state and economic management, which developed in the course of decades, led to an "erosion" of their competence as the authorized management authority and their responsibility for end results.

The administrative subordination of enterprises, foreign economic associations in particular, to the state administrative authorities could be abolished, in our view, through two methods. First, if the ministry is preserved as an agency of state management, the associations must be totally freed from any whatsoever administrative subordination to it. They should become nondepartmental. Second, the associations may remain administratively subordinated to the superior authority, i.e., the ministry. In that case, however, the ministry itself must be reorganized from an agency of state management into an agency of economic management and, consequently, not be included in the cabinet. The entire personnel and the structure of the abolished ministry could be retained. However, this will essentially become a sectorial headquarters for the respective associations and enterprises. In other words, the ministry would become a concern, a trade entity, organically linked to the end results of the activities of the entire system.

In the area of foreign economic relations, the closest to the second variant is the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TPP). In terms of its status it is not a governmental but a social organization. In the last decade of the rule of the command-administrative system, like all Union and Union-republic social organizations, the chamber became actually statified and subject to the control of the Gosplan, Ministry of Finance, State Committee for Labor, etc. At the present time, however, when the administrative management system is being dismantled, the status of the USSR TPP as a social organization will inevitably be restored in full, i.e., the interference and control over the activities of its

economic organizations (associations and enterprises) by state authorities will be excluded. All that must remain (as is the case in all developed countries) is control over the observance of taxation discipline.

Essentially, sectorial ministries and departments which include foreign economic associations and companies are sectorial concerns. Their "governmental" nature is manifested more in its geographic aspect, i.e., in terms of the fact that their activities cover the entire territory of our country and not in the least in terms of the governmental combination of the interests of the various sectors of the national economy. Therefore, their elimination as agencies of state management and their conversion into concerns, into organs of economic management is, in our view, a topical task.

In terms of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, whose associations still account for most of the country's foreign trade, the second variant is unacceptable, above all because the ministry's function is to set trade policy. At the present time it has also been assigned the task of licensing export-import operations. It has other functions as well, specifically of a commercial-political nature, which determine the need for an authority of state management in the area of foreign economic relations. Nonetheless, we believe, this agency should be relieved of economic management functions. In other words, the foreign economic associations should be removed from the ministry's jurisdiction, granted extradepartmental status and reorganized as stock holding societies. Only thus can they become truly autonomous and independent economic subjects and regain their age-old status of highly qualified intermediaries.

The purpose of the country's economic perestroika is to upgrade its effectiveness on the basis of the development of the commodity market and competition among producers. No one at this point would question the fact that without competition the outlay mechanism in our national economy cannot be eliminated.

The most concentrated manifestation of this mechanism has been developed precisely in the area of foreign trade as a result of the retained monopoly held by foreign trade (currently foreign economic) organizations in the conduct of export-import operations involving various goods or services. What does such a monopoly mean in fact? From the viewpoint of self-financing, nothing other than a calm life led by the foreign economic associations, whatever the circumstances. The intermediary associations earn most of their income from commissions which are the fee charged for their intermediary services.

Therefore, whereas in the conversion of domestic producers to wholesale trade they are given the opportunity to compare prices such as, let us say, of a given machine tool or engine and, correspondingly, choose their supplier, our domestic producers are essentially deprived of the right to choose their foreign trade middleman. They

can trade only through certain stipulated foreign economic associations to whom a given variety of goods has been legally assigned. Consequently, they must simply pay the commission price which is set by the foreign trade associations "assigned" to them. One may object, saying that the size of the commission is regulated with the participation of the Ministry of Finance. Although this is true, it does not change the essence of the matter. At the present time such fees, to begin with, have been increased substantially, and are totally unrelated to any whatsoever real cost base; second, in practice they are always based on the need to cover all the expenses of the respective association. The unit dealing with foreign economic matters has no incentive to lower its fees, for there is no competition. Furthermore, as monopolists, the foreign economic associations (above all those under the jurisdiction of the MVES) have not only the possibility of preserving their income level, based on commission fees, but also to drastically increase their income by one-sided increase in rates and tariffs on a purely administrative basis. This is frequently done although it encourages inflationary processes, for tariffs and rates are part of the cost and the price paid by the users of services provided by foreign trade organizations.

The simple conclusion here is that as long as the foreign trade organizations keep their monopoly, the outlay mechanism will keep reproducing itself in the foreign economic units and a "carefree outlay cost accounting" will continue to blossom in the foreign trade associations. At the present time the MVES associations are not especially eager to be independent of their administrative subordination. This is understandable, for total autonomy also means total economic responsibility. The other side of independence is the absence of monopoly right on trade or intermediary operations in various areas. At that point they would have to shape their own portfolio of orders, competing with other intermediaries in proving their advantages. One could confidently say that many MVES associations are not ready for such autonomy and competition or fight for customers. This applies also to foreign economic associations and companies of sectorial ministries and departments, which have precisely the same type of monopoly as the MVES associations but only limited to their own variety of goods.

In this connection we cannot ignore two government resolutions concerning foreign economic relations: the 2 December 1988 USSR Council of Ministers Resolution "On the Further Development of Foreign Economic Activities of State, Cooperative and Other Public Enterprises, Associations and Organizations," and the 7 March 1989 Resolution "On Measures for State Regulation of Foreign Economic Activities." The expression "one step forward and two steps back" is quite apt in terms of these two resolutions.

The first stipulates that starting with 1 April 1989 the right directly to engage in export-import operations is given to all enterprises, associations, production cooperatives and other organizations, whose products are competitive on

the foreign market. In this connection export-import operations could be carried out by the enterprises directly (through their own foreign trade companies) or with the help of other foreign economic organizations, on a contractual basis.

In order to eliminate departmental monopoly on foreign trade, the resolution stipulated the possibility of creating, on a voluntary basis, a variety of foreign economic organizations (Article 3). In principle, this made it possible to create not administratively but precisely through voluntary participation, foreign trade companies which could compete with existing MVES and other ministry monopoly-holding associations in the area of their export-import operations. However, this possibility of eliminating the "outlay monopoly cost accounting" was essentially annulled by introducing the system of export and import licenses.

In principle, the existing stipulation on licensing is consistent with global practices. However, in the developed countries licenses are issued by the state regulatory authorities which do not have their own "subordinate" associations. Under our circumstances, the function of licensing exports and imports has been converted in fact from a function of defending the interests of the state into that of defending departmental interests and, specifically, protecting the monopoly status of foreign economic associations of the MVES and other departments, as codified in the 7 March 1989 Resolution. Furthermore, from our viewpoint, the state interest lies precisely in freeing MVES and other departmental associations from their administrative subordination and granting them (alongside any other organizations, companies or cooperatives) the right to engage in intermediary activities in the area of foreign economic relations applicable to any group of commodities without any whatsoever decrees issued by superiors. At that point everything would fall in its proper place: the mechanism of control figures and state orders will begin to function and licenses (if needed) will be issued not on the basis of the interests of departmental affiliation but on the basis of true governmental interests.

In the matter of the monopoly status of associations and organizations and of the preservation of the outlay mechanism in the foreign economic area, the following question must be considered as well: it is our deep conviction as well as the opinion of many practical foreign trade workers that the monopoly status of the USSR Foreign Economic Bank has become an anachronism. Its monopoly right to conduct foreign exchange operations, which was established decades ago, is no longer consistent with the needs of the economy. Naturally, it is satisfying that processes of demonopolizing the banking area and developing a market for banking services have been initiated. About 140 commercial and cooperative banks have been created, functioning not on the basis of fictitious but of true cost accounting. For the time being, their handle internal accounts and crediting. Nonetheless, an increasing number of enterprises are beginning to seek the services of commercial banks. It is

the natural assumption that quite soon foreign exchange accounts will become a natural extension of their activities. Here as well there should be no artificial barriers whatsoever. To this effect, to begin with, the USSR Foreign Economic Bank should be totally deprived of the right to issue licenses to other banks for engaging in foreign exchange-credit operations. The USSR Foreign Economic Bank is an economic authority which, under the conditions of the establishment of a market in the country, is protecting above all its own interest and use its the right to issue licenses simply to suppress competition. The USSR Gosbank alone—the country's central bank, which is a state authority and is not engaged in commercial activities in the foreign currency area—should have the exclusive right to issue licenses in the banking area, including the area of foreign economic activities. As abundant global practices prove, in banking, as in any other area, an efficient economic mechanism is possible only on the basis of competition among independent subjects. The Foreign Economic Bank should be one of them, no more and no less.

Let us assume that these problems have already been solved and that real cost accounting has been established in the foreign economic area, which makes it possible to have the direct producers benefit from the results of their foreign economic activities. Will they truly become concerned about the resulting financial indicators of the work? Let us openly say that under the existing account settling mechanism, these results will remain conventional. They will not reflect either the value of the share of commodities and services on the world market compared with our internal ratios, nor the real purchasing power acquired as a result of exports or foreign currency spent on imports. The reason lies in the mechanism of the conventional rate of exchange of the ruble. Without changing it we cannot hope for a successful perestroika in the foreign economic area.

The current mechanism of differentiated currency coefficients (DVK) proved to be groundless. Today the role of the main incentive in the development of domestic exports is assigned to the foreign exchange funds of enterprises and organizations. However, the mechanism of these funds, as that of the DVK, is a purely administrative "invention." To begin with, the amount of withholdings for such funds from export earnings is established as a directive from above which, as in the past, allows for a subjective formulation. Second, from the viewpoint of specific operations the mechanism for the creation of foreign exchange funds has no economic meaning, in our view. This can be seen with the following example: let us assume that an enterprise earned 1 million rubles in freely convertible currency from exporting machine tools. Let us say that its rate of having a foreign exchange fund is 40 percent. This means that the bank will leave at the disposal of the enterprise 400,000 rubles in foreign exchange while the balance will be credited in Soviet rubles, i.e., 600,000 rubles. If the enterprise were to keep the entire foreign exchange, i.e., 400,000 rubles, the amount left in Soviet rubles would be simply insufficient to settle all of its accounts related to said operation. To begin with, out of its earnings the

enterprise should cover the cost of the machine tools, let us say 700,000 rubles. Second, the profit (300,000 rubles) is distributed among the state budget, the ministry and the incentive funds.

Where would the enterprise find the necessary rubles so that, while keeping all its foreign currency, it could nonetheless settle all of its accounts related to this operation? Naturally, it could use funds from revenue (in rubles) from domestic market operations. This, however, narrows the possibilities for accumulations and, consequently, for expanded reproduction. Another method is that of selling the earned foreign exchange. But how to do it? What is the criterion of its real value, i.e., its real exchange rate with the ruble? Such a rate, like any price, could be defined only by the market, i.e., by comparing demand for a foreign currency with its supply.

Demand for foreign currency in our country is today quite high. We should realize the true situation. This situation proves that the real rate of exchange of the ruble is being depreciated under the conditions of the tremendous commodity scarcity on the domestic market and may turn out to be that a dollar is worth not 0.6 rubles (as rated by the USSR Gosbank) but 3 to 5 rubles, perhaps less but perhaps even more.

Currency auctions could solve the problem. They should become the first step in the creation of permanent foreign exchange and currency market in our country. We should not postpone the solution of the problem of establishing a true rate of exchange of the ruble. Such a rate of exchange may indicate to the domestic producer "what is what" and "who is who" on the foreign market.

To sum it up, let us note that, naturally, the new economic mechanism cannot be created in one fell swoop. However, nor should we remain idle and take nothing but administrative steps. As the discussions at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet indicated in the course of organizing the cabinet, perestroika in the foreign economic area has been so far largely reduced to organizational steps, hardly affecting the foundations of the old economic mechanism. True cost accounting in the foreign economic area is impossible without solving the problem of control figures, refining the role and place of state orders, and eliminating the monopoly status of foreign trade associations and the USSR Foreign Economic Bank. Without replacing the current outlay mechanism with the actual foreign exchange rate of the ruble and its convertibility into other currencies, the country's economy will not become part of the global economy and, as before, will be "stewing in its own juices."

Let us particularly emphasize that we cannot divide this entire range of problems into individual components, to be solved separately. All of these considered and closely interconnected questions are elements of a single economic mechanism, for which reason they must be solved simultaneously and comprehensively.

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Time Is Running Out

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[Commentary by Otto Latsis]

[Text] In the heated discussions which took place at the First Congress of People's Deputies, and at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, one question seemed to be ignored: How long were the people prepared to tolerate their unsettled way of life; how much time did the new legislative and executive authorities have? The miners' strike shed some light: no time was left. Substantial improvements are needed today.

Strictly speaking, this is not the first signal. On each such occasion outbreaks in various parts of the country have triggered press comments: we are faced with an extreme reaction to social difficulties. However, we could more calmly say that these are merely local phenomena inherent in a given city or region. Furthermore, the very forms of manifestation of protest focused attention on restoring order. The situation with the miners was different: there were neither violations of the law nor disturbances; furthermore, there was not even the slightest possibility of interpreting this situation as local.

Here is what especially concerns us: the workers acted **after** the Congress of People's Deputies, which, for the first time, provided the entire nation with the possibility of defending its interests in a normal, democratic and legitimate way. Therefore, the congress, which had unquestionably taken a huge and unparalleled step toward strengthening the rule by the people, was nonetheless considered insufficient. The workers demanded more and it is extremely important for us to understand the reason for it.

"The congress solved nothing," was the frequently heard accusation. However, its purpose was not to solve practical problems, was the legitimate answer. The congress elected a Supreme Soviet and its leaders; it appointed a head of the government and approved the government's program. The new legislative authority, for the first time elected on the basis of optional choices, was given the opportunity to work steadily and, therefore, more professionally. The executive authorities were renovated and, for the first time, placed under the real control of the legislative authorities. Their job is to solve specific problems and they have already undertaken the consideration of urgent draft bills.

Based on formal logic, all this is true. A great deal, however, was indicated by the miners' strike, which was not according to the logic of life. The voters saw—in the course of the elections and the congress itself—an overwhelming turn in the country's political life and subconsciously expected some kind of immediate improvements in their daily life. Was this a maximalist demand? Possibly. However, their common desire, which was entirely legitimate, was to determine when would there be improvements and what were the guarantees for

them, and what type of improvements would there be? Guarantees were a demand which was particularly persistently heard in the Kuzbass.

Could we find any guarantees in the unconvincing speeches made at the Supreme Soviet session by the ministers responsible for the production of and trade in consumer goods? Could we hope for a fast improvement in the situation on the market on the basis of the governmental program submitted to the congress? A sensation of the exceptional, of the intolerable nature of the situation in which even a bar of soap had become a problem, was obviously lacking in the speeches of many representatives of the executive branch. The governmental program itself, in the part affecting the most urgent matters—financial improvements and stopping inflation—essentially did not go beyond the familiar 15 March 1989 Resolution. Yet many deputies had substantively criticized this decree as being inadequate and as demanding too much time to reduce the budget deficit. The miners' strike confirmed yet once again that there was no longer any time to loose.

Several days after the strike, the report by the USSR State Committee for Statistics brought new proof that the situation was continuing to deteriorate. The trouble was not only that the growth rates of general economic indicators had declined—national income, public labor productivity, industrial output, etc. Today restoring the economic balance is particularly important. Have we come closer to this objective? As in the past, the production of goods and services continued to grow more slowly than the population's monetary income. The growth rates of monetary income outstripped the growth rates of expenditures for goods and services by 40 percent, which means that the inflationary surplus of money continued to grow. It was also manifested in the increased prices in cooperative trade and on the kolkhoz market, which is a clear confirmation of the further weakening of state trade. A negative balance developed in foreign trade with the socialist and developed capitalist countries. What is most alarming, perhaps, is that the printing of money for circulation was one-third higher compared with the same period of last year. Therefore, the printing press, which is devastating our stores, keeps working faster. At the same time, cases of delays in meeting payrolls because of the lack of money in the bank, have become more frequent.

How could the exhaustion of the state treasury be prevented if the main reason for the budget deficit is retained: the reason is the excessive, the unbearable and unnecessary volume of industrial construction. The plan calls for a 6-percent increase in construction projects compared to 1988 and the number of newly initiated construction projects is exceeding the number of those which were completed last year by roughly 25 percent. The volume of unfinished construction financed out of state capital investments increased 13 percent within a single year. Although a positive process was noticed in the sense that the amount of investments financed out of enterprise funds increased and budgetary capital investments declined, we cannot relax, for nearly one-half of

the increase in unfinished construction is in projects financed out of centralized funds. Does this not mean that sectorial ministries, which are losing their influence in the course of the reform, are hastening to seize as wide bridgeheads as they can by initiating construction projects?

Governmental waste through the departments opens the gate to enterprise waste. Freed from the obsolete administrative control, they feel no economic pressure, for they cannot be pressured by a ruined market. It is easy to raise prices, abandon the production of inexpensive goods and, one way or another, obtain unearned revenue.

The miners reminded us that we cannot stop with the usual measures which would have been sufficient to improve economic life 10 to 20 years ago. The 20 year period of stagnation has left perestroika a no-time situation. Today we must act more decisively and more accurately and prevent new major errors. The problem lies not only in the specific demands of the strikers. Some of them are local and can be quickly met. Some are more extensive and more difficult. However, the rightness of this large detachment of the working class is not manifested exclusively in the specific items of its requirements. In addition to organization and feeling of responsibility, which led to the use, with sensible caution, of the double-edged weapon of strike, the views of the strikers were expressed in a harsh reminder to deputies and ministers: speaking from the rostra of the Kremlin, remember us, think of our real situation; a minister could talk the deputies into believing the situation is not all that bad. However, it is impossible to change the minds of the workers about something which they know from personal experience.

We must not be slow. The speech by Yu.D. Maslyukov, prior to closing the session of the Supreme Soviet, already indicated that in drafting the plan and the budget for 1990, the government intends to make significant progress in improving the financial situation compared with the 15 March Resolution. This is an encouraging signal. Does everyone understand the vital significance of such an improvement? But as in the past, loud appeals are heard to increase expenditures for various good purposes without giving a thought to the sources for their financing.

Many strategic problems stand behind the July actions of the miners. The former academic tolerance and lack of haste are also no longer tolerable in the scientific development of such problems. Now as well, when the word "market" is no longer considered prohibited or insulting, we hear that a market for goods is all right but that manpower is not a commodity. Let us not anticipate the scientific argumentation needed in making a study of the question of the nature of manpower under socialism. Let us note the obvious fact that, without thinking about theoretical discussions on the subject, the miners are engaged in real talks on the conditions governing the sale of their manpower. Commodity or not, conditions are being discussed. Manpower is being assessed by eye,

without any knowledge such as, for example, of the cost of its reproduction. It is time to find out, to publish and to take into consideration the real cost of a consumer basket, and the price increase index (not the fictitious price lists in state trade, through which nothing can be bought, but the real cost of purchases) and the cost of manpower in other parts of the country and in other professions.

It is time to draw practical conclusions also based on the fact that strikes have become a reality and that the State Committee for Statistics is already reporting related substantial losses in working time. These figures are impressive in themselves and yet we should add to them losses from idling by customer enterprises because of breakdowns in supplies, caused by strikes. Obviously, we not only need a law on labor conflicts, something which has been repeatedly discussed, but also the application of a variety of democratic procedures. For the first time, in the talks with strikers, governmental commissions were formed and assumed specific obligations on behalf of the central authorities. The cost of this to the state budget is approximately known. However, the question of where to find such funds was not raised, or else, more accurately, from whom to procure them? At the expense of what should preference be given to the demands of the miners? Furthermore, has the government the right to make such a choice? Is this not a matter pertaining to the Supreme Soviet?

We had the First Congress of People's Deputies and the miners' strike. The history of our time will probably place these events side-by-side. Each one of them proclaims in its own way that the time after such events has changed compared to what it was before.

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The Social Choice: Changes in Social Psychology Mirrored in the Sociopolitical Discussions of 1989

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[Materials prepared for publication by Yu. Kudryavtsev, V. Nekhotin and A. Ulyukayev]

[Text] The electoral campaign and the proceedings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies provided a huge amount of information about many aspects of our life, the condition of the social awareness and its attitude toward the developing processes. The interaction among political structures, above all between the party and the party apparatus, on the one hand, and the population and the Soviet system, on the other, appeared in a new light. Populist moods and slogans and contradictory manifestations of national self-awareness which became widespread, need interpretation.

It was in that sense that a sharp discussion was held at a meeting of the work group of Moscow and Leningrad

sociologists, held in the editorial premises of KOMMUNIST last June. The following participated in the discussion: **S. Vasilyev**, candidate of economic sciences (Leningrad Financial-Economics Institute); **L. Gozman**, candidate of psychological sciences (Moscow State University Psychology Department); **Yu. Zamoshkin**, doctor of philosophical sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute); **L. Kesselman**, (Center for the Study and Forecasting of Social Processes, Leningrad); **Yu. Levada**, doctor of philosophical sciences (VTsIOM); **A. Levinson**, candidate of art sciences (VTsIOM); **A. Migranyan**, candidate of historical sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO); **L. Sedov**, candidate of historical sciences (VTsIOM); **B. Filippov**, candidate of historical sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences INION); **A. Chubays**, candidate of economic sciences (Leningrad Engineering-Economics Institute); and **V. Yadov**, doctor of philosophical sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology).

Following is a transcript of the exchange of opinions which was held in a spirit of frankness and free debate.

'The Choosing Person'

L. Gozman. The uniqueness of our time consists, obviously, of the fact that for the first time in several decades the emotions, the feelings of the simple person have begun directly to influence political life. His "I like-I do not like" was reflected in his behavior during the voting and determined who will go to the parliament, and became a factor of political life. Millions of people felt how pleasant and interesting it was to **choose**. That is why such a sharply negative reaction was triggered in electoral districts in which no choice was possible: a person who cannot choose a commodity in a store or a place where to live (and, frequently, a job) or else who his superior should be, was finally being given a real choice and immediate efforts were made to deprive him of it! Obviously, in this case it was a question not only of the attitude toward the candidates of the "apparatus" but also of the profound problems of our society which, consciously or subconsciously, are felt by everyone.

Furthermore, according to my observations, the programs of the candidates and their realistic and constructive nature were by no means of interest to everyone. The people voted less for those who "express my interests" than for the "person whom I trust." This trend was manifested both "from the right" and "the left." The morality of the candidates was clearly of greater interest to the voters than their professionalism.

A. Migranyan. Was this not due to the fact that we do not have a civilian society and clearly demarcated and established social interests? For even many of the deputies simply announced their presence and spoke for themselves.

L. Gozman. In the majority of districts there were two things which stood out: sharp criticism and radical suggestions, although generally speaking the people fear drastic jumps and changes. This took place because

initially radicalism was considered a moral action. When the first candidate expressed himself on television in favor of a multiparty system one could have expected that he would be facing unpleasant consequences. Many people were impressed by the very daring of the action and not so much by the nature of the suggestions. However, during the second elections, on 14 May, when many candidates already expressed their support of the principle of a multiparty system, this was no longer considered by the voters a risky moral act and, correspondingly, its effect was lesser.

V. Yadov. Our survey at the start of the electoral campaign indicated that more than 60 percent of the population of some cities where the survey was held, considered the personal qualities of the candidate as the most important. They were less interested in whether the candidate was a worker, a writer, etc.

L. Kesselman. We watched steadily the course of the electoral campaign in Leningrad, studying not only the orientation of the voters but also their socioprofessional and cultural status. In particular, it turned out that initially young candidates, who were known to few people, had the sympathy of the intelligentsia, the engineering and technical personnel and the bulk of skilled workers (about 75 percent of the electorate). People of with an unstable professional status and the retired (and, which is important, people who in general had a poor idea of the specific features of the present elections) supported candidates who were believed to represent the "apparatus." This accounted for about 15 percent of the voters. The results of the vote in Leningrad's Territorial District No 54 confirmed our conclusions.

A. Migranyan. In other words, here the dominant vote was that of professionally and educationally "advanced" voters. However, I do not believe that they expressed politically shaped and structured interests. This unity was concentrated more on support of the "antiapparatus" candidate, whoever he may have been.

S. Vasilyev. We can agree on the fact that in the various urban national-territorial districts in Leningrad and Moscow, the people voted not for a program but for a person whose image was well-defined and who benefited from a huge information platform. Therefore, the results of these specific elections do not fully characterize the deployment of social forces and interests. On the other hand, 25 percent of the ballots were cast for candidates in the Leningrad district who acted on the basis of different political slogans ("Western-oriented," "state-oriented," "national-revival," "green," etc.), which was a substantial number. Had the personality of the opponent been excluded, the breakdown would have been entirely different.

L. Gozman. The possibility of a recoil, of a weakening of democratic enthusiasm is not excluded, perhaps for purely "energetic" reasons alone. Millions of people cannot maintain for such a long time such a state of

excitement. The people of Leningrad "rolled back" the leadership of the city and the oblast but have there been any changes?

L. Kesselman. There have. Our empirical data confirm that population strata who do not tend to engage in deep reflections feel the social situation, as the saying goes, through their skin; their subconscious. They have realized that "the bosses have changed," as they say and have begun to behave differently. Meanwhile, the groups which have been "promoted" are being trusted not on the basis of feelings but logic. However, the situation is dynamic and logic frequently cannot catch up with it.

A. Chubays. In Leningrad there was a period of some shock caused by the March elections. A plenum was held in which there was criticism of the press and the people who were "bad," because they had voted "badly." But then real changes began to be made in the work of the apparat and there was a turn in the behavior of the Leningrad leadership toward a search for joint decisions. A constructive and supportive attitude appeared.

L. Kesselman. The main development of this process, in Leningrad at least, has been a gradual shift toward democracy and the crystallizing of institutions such as electoral clubs. I believe that 80 percent of the local authorities will consist of democratically oriented people. It seems to me that such positive trends are appearing elsewhere as well.

L. Sedov. According to the assessments of the VTsIOM, approximately 40 percent of the all-Union electorate feel no particular interest in political life (partly because of their calamitous material situation). About 20 percent may consist of conservatives with petit-bourgeois inclinations. This also applies to the passive segment of society which, however, is showing a noticeable liking of the mythology of "statesmanlike behavior." Another 20 percent are concerned and excited by populist slogans. These are people who reject the old standards and values but have no clear idea about what to do. Ten percent are "moderate supporters of perestroika," who fully accept the line of the country's leadership. Roughly the same percentage are "perestroika radicals," who hold "Western" views.

Yu. Zamoshkin. In other words, these are people who profess a certain liberal-intellectual-left-wing progressive set of ideas related to the concept of the "Moscow group." It is clear that this refers not to Muscovites alone.

L. Sedov. According to our estimates, such radicals among the elected deputies, together with those who represent the critical and excited mass, account for approximately 30 percent. Another segment, that of the "cautious perestroika supporters" and conservatives—are still in the majority (about 65 percent of the deputies). It is difficult to determine the reasons, both objective and subjective, for such a deployment of forces.

L. Gozman. We keep saying "conservatives," "democrats," and "radicals." In the past, however, they did not meet on the same battlefield. They had different audiences: offices for some of them, journals for others, television or meetings. At the congress they heard one another and began to talk directly to each other. It seems to me that a certain legitimizing of the conservative-authoritarian awareness took place. For the last 4 years it had become embarrassing to be a conservative. Here, however, they were thrown into the water and, it turned out that, generally speaking, they were able to swim. I believe that now the conservatives will be more frank. They are all for democracy and pluralism but where are those who, for many long years, led us "from one victory to another?"

B. Filippov. However, even in the cautiously conservative speeches, there was criticism of the system, when they discussed its realities and not simply shouted slogans.

A. Levinson. The congress reflected public opinion precisely like a drop of water: it is spherical; within it something may be exaggerated and something, conversely, compressed. On the second day of the congress we conducted a survey as to what views, "radical," or "moderate," which was supported by the voters. The results were as follows: for the country as a whole, approximately 60 percent supported the former, 22 percent the latter and 18 percent were unable to answer. When we asked the electorate whether the majority was always right and what was more important: total unity or the possibility of each group to support its own line, etc., the correlation of answers was virtually the same: 23 to 27 percent were in favor of the former and 62-65 percent, of the latter. We realized for the first time that more people than we could assume tended to support "radicalism." It is not excluded that this is a temporary, a situational result, and that such views are today simply fashionable. For the time being, however, it is precisely this picture that prevails.

V. Yadov. Yet another element which is described as "imperial" is present in the social consciousness. In my view, it would be dangerous for it to merge with an awakening of Russian national self-awareness. What is the reason for the tension? The capital of the RSFSR is also the capital of the Union; the Russian Federation does not have many authorities and structures indicating the status of a Union republic. Why does Moscow present the image of an "imperial capital" which, for a variety of reasons, has been established in the minds of the people? The United States or Brazil, for example, have found their own solutions to the problem. Why should we not seek them in our country as well?

Let me mention the situation of the Russian minority in other republics. We have some data for Estonia. The majority of Russians who live there can see their economic future in a light even better than do the Estonians themselves. Those who have lived in that republic for a long time are virtually unconcerned about the problems

of bilingualism, for it turns out that they can speak the language or do not aspire to positions which require an impeccable mastery of the Estonian language. It is only the "new settlers" who are worried. The calls for setting up autonomous districts with Russian language in Kokhtla-Yarva or elsewhere did not meet with mass support. In themselves, however, they are explosive.

As a whole, the attitude toward the new arrivals is quite polite unless it is excessively polite, but by no means does the opposite hold true.

L. Gozman. The situation in the Baltic area should be considered not only from the viewpoint of the economists or the sociologists but also from "within," as seen through the eyes of people who live there. The sympathetic attitude stems from the fact that everything is being given its proper name. There is also an understanding that a national revival as well as a normal economic life (including life in Russia itself) is being held back by the very same forces and mechanisms.

Yu. Zamoshkin. The "imperial awareness" is the result of arrogance, of the conviction that we are better than others, that we enhanced and fed everyone and that we set an example to everyone. However, there is also a frustrated, denigrated "imperial awareness." It is born when we feel poorly, when we feel that we ourselves are to blame for our own troubles, when we live worse than others, "benefiting" from the shortcomings of progress rather than its qualities. Something similar occurred among the British when they lost the British empire and among the Americans after Vietnam.

The logic of the frustrated awareness moves in different areas: in the cult of "statehood," isolationism, economic autarchy and cultural provincialism, as well as aggressiveness and apathy. We must struggle against this inferiority complex above all through culture and, most importantly, realize that, as it were, we are not about to reinvent the bicycle.

A. Levinson. Surveys conducted over the past 6 months have shown that 7-7.5 percent of the population claim that our country cannot set an example to anyone. The popularization of such a frustrated awareness, naturally, is fraught with a mass of unpleasant sensations.

V. Yadov. A recent international survey in which the USSR was represented by a city not far from Moscow (I shall not name it in order not to insult the people who live there) indicated that in terms of the level of national self-awareness and pride in our own country, we are at a low point. In the past the social awareness was different. We assumed that we were "ahead of the rest of the planet" not only in the area of ballet and rockets but in all other areas as well. Now we have a feeling of shame.

Yu. Zamoshkin. The Americans also went through a period of monstrous self-criticism, particularly after Vietnam.

V. Yadov. By the end of January we conducted a survey, which was not very representative (Yaroslavl and Kemerovo Oblasts in the RSFSR, Dagestan, the Daugavpils area in Latvia, Kirghizia, the Ukraine, etc.), which, nonetheless, provided a picture of opinions concerning the questions which the deputies should rise in the Supreme Soviet. The most important were considered the following: 53.2 percent of the respondents listed local problems; 27.7, problems of the country and society at large; 26 percent, individual groups and citizens; 23 percent, their own oblast or republic; and world problems, 6.1 percent. Thirty-four percent considered all problems of equal importance. In other words, the people are essentially thinking of their own concerns and interests of their own rayon, oblast and republic, and giving little thought to the fate of the country and the state. Incidentally, this was manifested at the congress as well.

Therefore, it is a question not of self-criticism but of a level of national self-awareness. Self-criticism is needed, shame is needed. However, few are those who think today that everyone must unite, must rally for the sake of the present and the future of the country. No such awareness exists. Against such a background, the promotion of general interests is extremely difficult.

Yu. Levada. We are not the first to encounter such problems. In one aspect or another, they have been manifested in different countries and under different systems and their experience could be instructive to us.

A. Migranyan. In the United States, however, there was an essentially different populism, speaking of phenomena which are more or less related to it. There they emphasized the "common man," his feeling of enterprise, freedom and opposition to "big government." In our country the trend is the precise opposite: toward well-being at the expense of the state and ensuring equality in consumption, paternalism, etc. Above all, behind the external similarity we find basic differences: Americans have had a lengthy period of bourgeois development which has been virtually lacking in our country.

L. Sedov. What we are discussing here is not populism. It is rather conservatism, the state-protective tendency which exists in our country now, in bits and pieces (which are by no means harmless).

A. Levinson. In my view, in our country the desire to "expropriate the bosses" is even less strong than the aspiration to deprive the members of cooperatives of the possibility to manage their farms and to show profit.

V. Yadov. One year ago a study was conducted in Leningrad which included the rather naive question: Would a person start working better if his work is paid more equitably? One-third of those surveyed answered in the negative. One of the main reasons was that people do not see where to spend the money they have earned.

The Cost of Progress

Yu. Zamoshkin. I am concerned by a phenomenon which has developed in our country: I am referring to the gap between the growth of social claims and the dynamics of labor productivity. Everyone wants to live better and this is a just demand. On the other hand, however, essentially labor productivity is not growing and there is no serious technological retooling.

In the 1970s a rather similar situation appeared in the United States on the crest of a wave of quite rapid growth in popular aspirations. This was noted in all surveys and was officially acknowledged. Each social group believed that it is precisely it that should live better. The problem of dividing the common pie became essential in the people's minds. Meanwhile, labor productivity began to decline, wages and prices rose rapidly, urging each other on. Inflation accelerated. This was added to the ecological problem the solution of which required huge funds. Outlays for education and health care increased significantly. In short, the progressive ideas according to which there would be enough for everything were devalued. It became clear that greater investments and greater coercion, less philanthropy and fewer promises were needed.

At that time America was able to change the social awareness and to assert the idea that the defense of the individual is not found in charity or free benefits but in the wealth of the country and its scientific and technical retooling. It is not a question of splitting the pie but of increasing its size.

Although today we see once again a sharp increase in the popularity of social programs, funds are being spent much more economically and the economic mechanism of competition is at work in all areas of social insurance. The moment the question of a drop in incentives for labor arises, symptoms of parasitism appear, for American public opinion immediately begins to vote against any social program.

Is this applicable to us as well? In our history we have worn out the slogan of "tightening our belts" for the sake of a better future. For all those 70 years we lived with the fact that each generation was promised such a future. In listening to all candidates for deputies and now to the deputies themselves, including our own leaders, nowhere did I find a mention of problems of "paying for..." or harsh alternatives: if you want increased competitiveness you must know that you shall have to pay for it. Equalization, the idea of social justice while being unprepared "to pay for..." predominate. This is a populist awareness, based on the idea that one could, as the Americans say, have your cake and eat it too.

V. Yadov. I agree that when a person is paying for something he respects it. In other words, the development of all kinds of paid services is also of moral and psychological importance and leads to shaping a new type of relations.

L. Sedov. In my view, it is time for us to abandon concepts that we are following the same routes as the West, and are catching up with it at all times. Let us realize that we live in an entirely different world. Our populism has nothing in common with the American populism. It is a sharply critical trend in terms of state structures.

A. Chubays. I would like to say a few words on the economic component of the mass awareness and the economic background of the electoral campaign, and about the congress itself. It seems to me that here one could single out two clearly distinct trends.

The first is the alienation of the electorate and public opinion from some neopopulist elements of a marketplace-oriented economic ideology, taking place under our very eyes. The moment it becomes a question, shall we say, of free price setting, the negative reaction of the general population masses becomes absolutely unanimous. The same attitude prevails, in general, toward all socioeconomic alternatives and not only on the subject of cooperatives, as is frequently thought. Hence the eclectic economic concepts voiced by the populist candidates for deputies. Their programs included contradictory components. For example, along with appeals for a strict price control (which means a rejection of market mechanisms) everyone welcomed a plentiful market.

There is also another trend however, which in a sense, operates in the opposite direction. I mean by this a certain increase in understanding the integral nature of economic ideology in mass awareness. Although there are obviously confirming data, let me cite practical examples. Thus, during the first stage of the elections, at least in our area, in Leningrad, the question of what specifically our deputies would do for our district was popular. On the other hand, almost always always we could hear from the candidates themselves: in order to solve the problem of easements in our district, I suggest thus and such.... One of the pamphlets which were distributed in support of the first secretary of the obkom stipulated that with his active assistance three food stores had been opened, the streetcar tracks had been extended by 3 kilometers, and a new bus line and been opened, so let us vote for our candidate.

During the second stage of the elections, in May, this type of argument had lost its attractiveness and most frequently triggered the precisely opposite reaction. Whenever a candidate said, I shall see to it that thus and such is built, he would be asked where did he intend to find the money, and would it be from the neighboring district? This, it seems to me, is quite indicative.

What is the projection for the development of the situation? Let me single out two main factors.

First, unless exceptional economic steps are taken in the immediate future and there is no change in the market for commodities and services populism, or at least its socioeconomic components, will become a predominant,

a mass phenomenon with possible grave consequences. The most "palatable" among them would be a rationing system.

The second factor is the politicizing of the population. It is precisely this factor that contributes to the growth of an integral social awareness and a more profound understanding of the situation, the economic situation in particular.

S. Vasilyev. Mass expectations that the sensitive problems will be solved, encouraged by the populist programs of the candidates, were tied to the congress. In that sense it largely disappointed the broad social strata. The consequence, it seems to me, could be an increase in federalism and communalism. The representatives of a number of national republics repeatedly said that unless the congress is able to deal with the basic problems of socioeconomic development, the republics would feel obligated to solve them themselves. The same, in my view, will obtain also for the various parts of Russia, in any case areas distinguished by a high degree of activeness.

In the discussions, frequent analogies were made with the situation in Poland and China. It seems to me that the events in those countries nonetheless are of different origins. In Poland the process of restructuring was essentially from below, whereas a reform from above was clearly lagging behind. In China it was the opposite. In our country, nonetheless, for the time being, there has been a certain balance (naturally, a relative one) between the reform from above and the growth of a democratic movement from below, which instills the hope of achieving a more or less balanced progress.

B. Filippov. The processes which are taking place in Poland are important in understanding our long-term development. I would like to draw attention to changes in the political awareness of the Polish citizens, above all the attitude of the young people toward socialism, skipping the comprehensive and complex studies which have been conducted in Poland over the past 15-20 years.

In the mid-1970s a concept developed in Polish scientific circles to the effect that the young people or, to use the familiar expression, the "unripped generation," which had not experienced the war, the postwar reconstruction and the Stalinist terror, which had been raised in the spirit of the concepts of a "consumerist socialism," which guaranteed to the loyal citizens everything they needed, would submit its bill to the party and the government. Why to them? Because in that country it was precisely the authorities that had guaranteed all the pledges given by socialism as a system. It was these young people who were the foundations for Solidarity, who demanded, during the first stage, the implementation of "real socialism." Sociological studies conducted at that time proved that the roots of the youth rebellion could be traced to the disparity between "real socialism" and the propagandized socialist ideals. Such an assessment of the reasons for the crisis was shared also by the

leadership of the PZPR, at the time when the Polish youth was proclaiming its links with socialism.

Such links were retained during the first years after the introduction of martial law, when the very image of socialism was linked more to the concepts of an ideal society than a specific Marxist socialism. After 1984, radical changes took place among the young people concerning the major components of socialist awareness. Until recently a steadily negative attitude toward private entrepreneurs existed in Polish society. Today many young people consider going to work or even living permanently in the capitalist countries the best choice in solving these vital problems and not an exception to the rule. Another part of the active youth has entered the private sector.

Why does the year 1984 stand out? The point is that by that time all the efforts on the part of the Polish leadership to carry out essential reforms had ended (they were resumed only by the end of 1988). The ideological reorientation of the young under those circumstances was largely stimulated by the unsuccessful struggle waged between the party reformers and the bureaucratic apparat.

The decision was made to interrupt the building of a number of major unfinished projects, which encouraged the growth of inflation and which were a heavy burden on the state budget. It is true that it was believed that in addition to easing the pressure on the budget, this would trigger certain negative social consequences and, particularly, the layoff of about half a million workers. In order to ease this stress, the right to take early retirement was granted. Thus jobs were being readied for people who had lost their own as a result of the halt in construction. Going into retirement was depicted as a possibility of working in the private sector from which certain restrictions were lifted. So-called "Polish companies" appeared (i.e., involving capital contributed by Poles living in the West), which were discussed in Poland in virtually the same terms as we refer to our own members of cooperatives ("speculators," "people who do not produce material goods," people who "launder dirty money," etc.).

However, the social consequences of the steps taken by the reformers unexpectedly turned out to be different. To begin with, skilled workers who identified themselves with socialism went into retirement. Construction, which was ruining the economics of the enterprises under the pressure of various arguments brought forth by economic and local party leaders, was not halted. As a result, additional need for manpower arose in the socialist sector. The place of those who had left was taken by young workers whose social experience had already been shaped under the conditions of the crisis and the lack of the type of emotional ties with the socialist system which, until that time, had ensured social stability.

Second, emigration and the private sector were being essentially sustained by the socially most active young

people, those who had already proven that they were not linking their personal future to socialism. As a result, the ability of the PZPR to engage in internal restructuring was weakened. Its social base was reduced and the share of young people within the party dropped sharply.

A. Migranyan. In practical terms, there are two different processes occurring in our country: modernization and national consolidation. Unfortunately, the center does not have a clear program on this subject although this is a source of great tension which is threatening democratization.

In my view, republic cost accounting and other steps suggested by the Baltic area are a way to the creation of a federative system. This by no means contributes to the creation of a unified market as is frequently proclaimed. Democratization requires strengthening the institutions of the civilian society and weakening of the role of the state. In our country, however, the people want something else: a weakened role of the center and a strengthened role of the republics. The consequences of such a development of events are well-known, including taking a look at the Yugoslav experience.

V. Yadov. National consolidation and national interests are a reality which cannot be ignored. One year ago, Estonian sociologists made a survey on those who were "for" and "against" secession. At that time a significant percentage of the population was "for." Today, no more than 30 percent are.

L. Gozman. Republic and regional cost accounting are necessary so that a territory can be pitted against the departmental bureaucratic pressure and oppose inefficient decisions in the interest of the entire society. It is the natural right of the people, to defend "their own home" from the general breakdown of the market.

The most influential social forces in the Baltic republics, in my view, aspire neither toward secession nor even a confederation. They simply would like to pursue their national interests within the framework of the USSR, and we must meet them halfway.

Furthermore, it seems to me that many people today no longer consider themselves citizens of a single state but, in the feudal way, identify themselves on the basis of production characteristics. It is precisely this type of self-awareness that is replacing regional thinking. It is only through it that a civilian society can be developed, based on relations not among production collectives but of territories and social groups.

The System and the Society: Transformation Prospects

A. Migranyan. Today we are experiencing an absolutely unique process of conversion from traditional to a modern civilized society, and from a single to a multiple dimensionality. My view is that in our country, in general, perestroika should take place, so to say from A to Z in the economic, social, political and all other areas. This is first. Second is that if we proceed from global

criteria, for the time being we do not have the institutions of a civilian society and, therefore, we do not have the society itself, in the classical meaning of the term. Furthermore, we do not have a normal state as a developed system of institutions with the separation of powers. Meanwhile, for a long time the party developed under the conditions of the administrative-command system, which could not fail to influence its features, work style and methods, and its functions as a political party in the universally accepted meaning of the term.

Furthermore, populist moods of the antiapparatus and antinomenclature nature are gathering strength today. If we consider the programs of the candidates who lost in the elections, and were considered as the official line, we see that they are by no means worse than the programs which were popular among the electorate. This too indicates that we do not have any differentiated, any structured interests. In my view, therefore, we should begin with their identification. Capitalism developed not through democracy in the political area but through a differentiation, through the creation of a market and even through harsh authoritative decisions and it was only later that interests in the political area were shaped.

The situation in our country is entirely different. What the congress should do above all would be to give the power structure its proper configuration. Taking into consideration the crisis situation in the country, I believe that it should have granted the president emergency powers and the right to create a Committee for National Salvation which, in turn, would be given the right to disband any or block the actions of all existing power structures. A civilian society is created precisely through an authoritarian system. Look at Poland: General Jaruzelski acted through authoritarian methods and it was precisely they that led to the fact that today the country is converting to a democracy.

Yu. Levada. If we start talking about the ways of saving our country by such a method, we would never end with this discussion. I am unwilling to submit prescriptions and to moralize as to what we are doing. My professional obligation is to look at what is occurring in society. What is occurring is its politicizing, the awakening of a social political interest, triggered partially by conflicting reformist plans which were formulated during the electoral campaign.

This democratic awakening has, in my view, three aspects. One of them we already discussed: national revival. The second is the aspiration to recreate Soviet democracy in its Leninist understanding. The third is the populist, through which we develop an acceptance of political interests and a political awareness. The power and contradictory nature of this trend should be taken into consideration.

What is populism? It means orientation toward the opinions and feelings of the masses, it means turning to the crowd. It is natural, therefore, for our populism to be

antibureaucratic and opposed to privileges and corruption. Actually, democracy does not mean in the least a crowd or simply a majority but a functioning system of institutions broken down by the nature of their functions. If no such system is available, democracy is understood as the existence of popular leaders who speak out in public and who are welcomed enthusiastically in the hope that they would overthrow the corrupt clique in Washington, Buenos Aires, Moscow or anywhere else. At this point, however, populism must be interpreted as an existing trend and as a method of action. A populist method of action has existed under different systems and in different countries. If we take the latest history of our fatherland, it would apply to Kerenskiy, Makhno and a series of national leaders and some bolsheviks such as, for example, Trotsky. Stalin was unable to address public meetings. His activities, however, always included elements of populism: he abandoned some parts of the apparat to the mercy of the crowd, thus proving that he was a man of the people. Elements of populism existed under Khrushchev as well. Brezhnev and Chernenko were members of the apparat. They were unpopular people who did not use these methods.

Under our circumstances all kinds of populist figures are inevitable. However, they are less interesting in themselves than they are in terms of the structure which is established around them. In Moscow, since last spring, populism has existed not only as a certain hope but also as an aspect of organization: there are clubs, forms of support, means of information and communications, and so on. The point, however, is that populism is quite lacking when it comes to having a positive program. Under the conditions of an incredibly complex country with an ailing and conflicting economy, naturally, such people are unable to suggest comprehensive constructive measures, for which reason, for the time being, they can act only as a critical force.

L. Gozman. Here is what concerns me. Usually, an elected authority—whether it is the Senate in the United States or our own Supreme Soviet—claims that it speaks in the name of the people. This is virtually impossible to check. However, one of the features of our new Law on Elections provided for such an opportunity. I mean by this the electoral district meetings, the results of which could subsequently be compared with the results of the elections themselves. Let us recall in this connection the outcome of the confrontation between Brakov and Yeltsin in Moscow: at an electoral district meeting the former garnered more votes but the subject of the sympathy of the voters is well-known.

However, this also gives us the opportunity to speak about democracy and procedures in general. During the congress a feeling of impasse was bound to have developed among the voters: there was nothing that one could do and no problem could be solved! As a result, many people begin to consider procedures not as a prerequisite for normal work but as a hindrance. It is very important today to defend them, for democracy means above all rule by procedure. Remember that despite Reagan's

popularity no one would even think of suggesting that he be re-elected to a third term. It was impossible! A law also implies procedure.

Here is another observation. What does a democratic election mean? It means a horizontal tie: you and I sit down side-by-side, all of us equal, we all have one vote each, etc. However, there also are vertical structures: systems of hierarchical subordination. Sanctions within such structures become a means of controlling political behavior which officially appears totally uncontrollable. I was told of the way one of the non-Moscow deputies approached a colleague and said: "My dear, I would vote like you but next to me sits the obkom secretary. I must vote with him, for otherwise I would not survive."

A similar situation developed at Moscow State University, where two candidates clashed: University Rector A. Logunov, Central Committee member, Supreme Soviet deputy, etc., etc., and A. Sakharov, nominated by an initiative group from the biological department. Students, who had nothing to lose, supported Andrey Dmitriyevich. The faculty, i.e., the main force at Moscow University, kept silent, with few exceptions.

Therefore, a guarantee of political freedoms resides not only in good laws but also in the possibility of choosing between hierarchical structures. A conflict with superiors should not be the equivalent of professional and civil death.

A. Levinson. In my view, the situation is fraught with very serious problems. Both sociological surveys and our own observations indicate that society at large is more radical than the system, for which reason, metaphorically speaking, it will "push" the system the way a cart pushes a horse running down a steep slope.

Let me mention the matter of some projections. Today both an increase as well as a decrease in political activity and in the enthusiasm of the masses are possible. This danger is related, above all, to the fact that no results of their actions are apparent. Many candidates of the apparat, who were defeated at the elections, kept their jobs. The party, however, which acts as the vanguard, should rely precisely on those to whom the people have given their confidence.

Apathy, avoidance and alienation from political life in our country are fraught with serious consequences. All the problems which we have been able to solve so far have been solved, unfortunately, only through the use of power. Hence the illusion that a strong hand can accomplish everything.

Yu. Zamoshkin. I would like to ask the following question: Are we not influenced by some 19th century stereotypes which were inherent in Marxism, social democracy and liberalism?

What I mean by this, above all, is the idea of progress, according to which we expect a rather quick change in

the situation for the better, while the number of problems is increasing, problems which, as time goes on, will become increasingly more difficult. We must become accustomed to this and discuss it with the people. History does not mean an instant solution of all contradictions and the establishment of some kind of ideal society.

There is another question: Do our considerations not include some kind of revolutionism in the sense that everything should go upward and change radically? Under our own eyes a headlong change, similar to a tectonic upheaval, has taken place in the entire political language and in the vocabulary, concepts and images used by society. As a result, we learned a great deal of new things and, on the other hand, we totally lost the opportunity of speaking in the old language. However, we must not forget that in England it takes centuries to grow a proper lawn. Absolutely natural in history are declines, disappointments and even neurotic explosions of violence. We keep making promises and we do not clarify the entire complexity of civilization. Hence the prevalence of populist appeals: let us totally abolish everything to start with and then establish a strong system. Naturally, in general everything is possible, and history is open to even the most terrible scenarios. That is why it is very important to find civilized ways of solving problems.

A. Migranyan. Are civilized methods possible under our circumstances?

Yu. Zamoshkin. In the past few years we have been able to find them.

L. Gozman. However, it is precisely weakening groups that are capable of engaging in primitive and simple actions.

L. Kesselman. I understand the general political foundation of such fears: on the one hand, infinite power and, on the other, unwillingness always to learn. However, such is not the case. Consider again the Leningrad reality. After the plenum, where so many insults were heard, the apparat began to change its ways. Recent events have indicated that the authorities realize that their unlimited power has come to an end.

I believe that the future of Leningrad is quite optimistic. Naturally, dislocations are possible but they would be related more to the errors which could be made by the democratic leaders, particularly if they take the path of confrontation. The main prospect for development, in Leningrad at least, involves a noticeable shift toward democracy.

It seems to me that such trends are most likely found elsewhere as well. Under the power of inertia we frighten ourselves and we frighten those around us, unwittingly supporting with the old way of thinking the old system.

L. Gozman. We must not believe that certain circles are already powerless. They have enough power suffices to engage in primitive actions and acts of violence, I would think.

L. Kesselman. However, positive processes are taking place as well. In a meeting between the sociological association and the party obkom bureau we even agreed on helping to organize a meeting between it and the Leningrad organization of the Democratic Alliance. So far, however, this has not been considered acceptable by the alliance.

V. Yadov. This is truly a highly positive process. If we in the party wish to come out of the present difficult situation and establish normal relations and make use of our authority among the masses, this would be the only way to achieve it. We must decide to start a dialogue.

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Once Again on Food Imports

18020018e Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 12, Aug 89 (signed to press 4 Aug 89) pp 36-38

[Article by K. Katushev, minister]

[Text] KOMMUNIST No 6, 1989, published a letter by economist D. Bulatov on food imports. A number of different viewpoints exist on this most important problem. One of them was expressed in the previous issue; another is reflected in this article by Minister K. Katushev. The journal deems this problem so serious that it considers its continuing discussion necessary.

In principle, the question of the need for an efficient use of funds allocated for the purchasing of foodstuffs and securing the interests of the country from the viewpoint of variety, commercial conditions and organization of the work related to imports of said group of commodities is properly formulated in D. Bulatov's article.

However, an article which deals with such major problems and is published in an authoritative publication such as KOMMUNIST also requires a responsible attitude toward the materials which are presented, a substantiation of conclusions and objectivity in the presentation of the facts.

Unfortunately, regardless of the facts and the state of affairs, making use of rather loose "conclusions," the author provides a distorted idea of the work which is being done in the area of importing grain and foodstuffs.

Judging by the basic content of the article, the impression develops that all such work is being done day after day in violation of common sense, logic and the interests of the matter.

The author does not explain who is meant in the article by "soberly thinking" people and to whom this article is addressed. However, those who are informed in such

matters cannot remain indifferent to such a writing which distorts and misrepresents reality.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations does not consider possible to engage in a polemic on the question of the harm caused by the growing of a single cotton crop in the Central Asian republics or, conversely, the benefits of a more profound specialization of Krasnodar Kray in wheat growing. Possibly, said questions indeed deserve a serious discussion. However, what is totally unclear is why, in the words of the author, do they amount to a "sad register" of foreign trade "achievements." The foreign trade or foreign economic authorities have never shaped agrarian policy and have not dealt with said problems. In all such matters they perform a role only in terms of the implementation of their respective tasks relative to trade in individual goods and, as far as grain is concerned, essentially to imports aimed at meeting the needs of the population and the Soviet national economy which, unfortunately, for the time being cannot be secured through domestic production.

Imported foodstuffs and grain are an inseparable part of the country's resources and play a significant role in implementing the Food Program formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress, 19th All-Union Party Conference and March 1989 Central Committee Plenum, as the highest priority in our further socioeconomic development.

Let us note that food imports have never been or are a prerogative or initiative of foreign trade or foreign economic authorities. They have always been carried out strictly in accordance with governmental plans and assignments and approved by governmental authorities. Therefore, to classify the entire system of plans for food imports and the entire mechanism of their organization, as the author tries to do, as "a creation of departmental monopoly" is totally groundless.

A similar arbitrary approach to facts and conclusions is inherent in most of the remaining sections of the article. Thus, in accordance with the import plans, high-protein substances purchased in 1987-1988 (soybeans and soy cake) accounted not for 2 percent, as the author claims, but for some 13 percent by weight and 30 percent by value of the overall amount of grain and leguminous products which the USSR imported at that time. In assessing the volumes of purchases of high-protein substances, the economist should have taken even more into consideration economic reasons which, considering the correlation in world prices, despite the high feed qualities of soybean crops, make them unsuitable for purchases compared to ordinary feed crops. The impression is created that the author was quite eager to make figures fit an impressive conclusion about investing billions in "increasing the production of manure."

One cannot understand the critical remarks expressed on the system of settling accounts with Soviet customers of imported grain. The system of payments is absolutely identical to that of all other imported goods, i.e., based on wholesale prices used in the USSR and, naturally, in

terms of Soviet monetary units. We do not understand the way the author assesses the value of imported grain as being quadruple the price of the production cost of domestic grain.

The system followed in importing grain, as presented in the article, is inconsistent with the real situation. It includes the following assertions:

Purchases of multi-million shipments from a single supplier, which leads to a disruption on the world market and to higher prices;

Limiting the purchases of American grain to five companies, as enumerated in the article;

Failure to use grain commodity exchanges whose prices are, allegedly, lower;

Ignoring the possibilities of small and medium-sized grain companies.

Actually we, as other countries, do not purchase grain in multi-million ton shipments. Purchases are made gradually, depending on the situation and the prices on the global market, on the basis of standard delivery conditions and the use of teletype and telephone communications and subsequent concluding of the deals with contracts. In 1988, for example, 312 grain contracts were concluded this way. Naturally, such a system of purchases cannot provoke any kind of stir.

In contemplating purchases, existing offers and possibilities of all companies which have grain for sale at a given time, both large and small, are considered. However, deals are signed with those among them which are prepared to sell the same commodity at a better price. As long practical experience indicates, big companies (and not small, as the author claims) are able to offer more favorable prices by virtue of their greater possibilities. It is indeed true that a considerable percentage of American grain is purchased from the five multinational grain monopolies named by the author, for they hold a very important position in the grain trade. However, the number of such companies is by no means five but is several times higher and the role of said companies is not one of an absolute monopoly, as the author claims. In 1988, for example, far ahead of the others was the Italian Ferrucci Company. However, what matters most is not the name or the size of the company but the commercial conditions and the quality of the grain they are selling. It is precisely this that determines the choice of a seller and supplier of the grain.

The global grain prices are based on quotations on the most important world grain commodity markets, including the Chicago Stock Market. Again, the claims made in the article notwithstanding, purchases are made from specific companies and grain associations as well as at commodity markets, depending on the specific situation and the level of prices offered by companies and at stock markets. The most advantageous offers are chosen. Regardless of the claims made by the author of the

article, practical experience proves that the prices in deals with individual companies, with a proper use of competition among them, are more advantageous than commodity market prices. Furthermore, by virtue of a number of objective circumstances, it is not always possible to purchase grain, wheat above all, on stock markets.

Again ignoring the true situation, the author groundlessly tries to discredit the significance of long-term agreements we sign for grain procurements to the USSR which, incidentally, are of an intergovernmental nature. They are not signed on a regular basis, as he claims. Over the past 3 years no single such agreement has been signed. All that was done was to extend the 1983 agreement signed with the United States. As is the case with any bilateral document, naturally, they must reflect the interests of both sides, otherwise they would simply not be signed. Grain agreements concluded between the USSR and a number of capitalist countries provide specific guarantees to our partners that they will be able to sell their grain, which is consistent with their interests. However, said agreements never define when specifically in any given year or even over a longer period of time, this grain will be purchased. The volumes stipulated in the obligations remain stable for a period of several years and their level is such that it cannot disrupt the situation on the world market. Conversely, grain agreements provide the Soviet side with a number of advantages, such as the possibility of obtaining better prices (which, incidentally, has already allowed our country to save dozens and even hundreds of millions of rubles in freely convertible currency), and exclude the imposition of any whatsoever restrictions and prohibitions on grain exports to the USSR and make it possible to take steps within the framework of governmental (and not commercial) obligations to ensure the quality of the grain supplied to us. Specific requirements concerning the quality of the grain as well as legal and economic penalties in the case of their violation are detailed in the commercial contracts with procurement companies which are responsible for the proper implementation of the contracts they have signed and all the obligations stemming thereof. These requirements are the strictest possible applied in world practices.

The problem of shortfalls in grain production which, according to the author, escapes the foreign trade organizations has in fact been long solved by the fact that the acceptance of the grain from companies in the capitalist countries and payments for the grain take place on the basis of weight at the Soviet port of entry, at unloading. Nonetheless, the problem of the condition of the weight determining facilities in our ports remains very relevant. It is being solved very slowly despite existing governmental resolutions.

The information on the travels by representative delegations consisting of "high-ranking officials" for the conclusion of contracts does not correspond to reality. According to Soviet legislation, such delegations simply have no right to sign any contracts whatsoever. Contracts

are signed only on the level of the corresponding foreign economic association. Furthermore, as I pointed out, for a number of years, the overwhelming majority of contracts have been signed in Moscow on the basis of current agreements concluded as we already indicated.

Naturally, this does not mean in the least that the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations does not conduct any talks abroad. Delegations headed by the deputy minister of foreign economic relations (since it is a question of intergovernmental talks) go abroad as well, from time to time, when it is their turn to do so, to hold discussions with individual countries with which intergovernmental grain agreements have been signed, to discuss questions of control over their implementation, the condition of procurements, the quality of the grain in particular, and other problems of relations with suppliers in one country or another.

In assessing the condition of imported grain we must take into consideration that it is to be used not for sowing but for making bread and feeds. Its transportation from ports of entry and across Soviet territory is done mostly in special closed grain-carrying freight cars in order to prevent the dissemination of weeds along the way. In processing at enterprises, the grain is cleaned, ground and subjected to heat processing, as a result of which the possibility of any whatsoever harmful effect to the environment as a result of isolated quarantined plant seeds is excluded. As long as we are forced to import such significant volumes of grain as we do now it is impossible to avoid the existence of seeds from quarantined plants with the grain, coming from individual countries which are the largest suppliers and which, by virtue of natural conditions and ways of cultivation, have no other export commodity.

In expressing these considerations related to Comrade Bulatov's article "Once Again on Food Imports," the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations does not claim in any way that there are no serious problems and shortcomings in the organization of food imports. Despite the fact that virtually the entire amount of purchased grain, both for food and fodder, is fully used for the purposes for which it was purchased, and that significant markups are paid for the procurement of goods with higher quality indicators, nonetheless shortcomings remain which are justifiably criticized and noted in the press. This applies to the condition of imported grain from the viewpoint of the existence of pests in grain reserves and grain and weed mixtures, damaged and crushed grain and cases of batches with a higher moisture content. Another pressing problem is that of ensuring the preservation of the grain in shipment and transit within the USSR. A number of such problems are properly reflected in the article. However, let me assure you that these shortcomings are not the result of the incompetence of the respective officials and specialists. These are very difficult problems and their solution at the present stage requires taking steps unusual in terms of world practices and foreign producers and procurers in order to solve them at the

present stage, involving additional and quite significant expenditures, considering the fact that in frequent cases our requirements exceed the limits of the usual world-wide standards and concepts concerning the condition and quality of commodities.

Work in these areas is being persistently done with the participation of specialists and representatives of different interacting organizations within the Soviet Union.

In taking all this into consideration, I would like to express my regret on the subject of the publication of such an article by economist D. Bulatov, which distorts the true situation to such an extent.

If we assume that this expresses the pluralism of opinions and views on this matter, I would like to hope that the response as well will find its suitable place in your journal.

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The Path to Oneself: A Writer's Notes

18020018f Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 12, Aug 89 (signed to press 4 Aug 89) pp 39-47

[Article by Vasilii Vasilyevich Travkin, member of the USSR Writers' Union]

[Text] The Nonchernozem countryside.... In my mind's eyes I cover this flat area cut up by streams and rivers, with moist winds blowing and whispering forests (true, quite thinned out in recent years from logging). Driving an all-terrain vehicle I go through broken-down settlements, catching up with rare travelers and passing trucks and tractors stuck in the roadway mud. The familiar roads take me ever deeper into the Russian space, deep within this age-old land.

I am at the Rodina Kolkhoz, which is past Galichskiy Lake. After graduating from the agricultural institute in 1968, I was assigned to that kolkhoz, where I worked for 4 years. This was 16 years ago. It is interesting to compare what was then and what is now.

Kolkhoz Chairman N.P. Mikhaylov and I had a long talk on kolkhoz life, kolkhoz concerns and roads. He was not pleased with the overall state of affairs. How could he: year after year the grain crop averages 7 quintals per hectare (16 to 18 years ago the average was 10 quintals), and this is in terms of bunker weight. Let us point out that this notorious "bunker" weight, which is the general yardstick and which is mentioned in speeches, is the offspring of the administrative-command system which loves to wear beautiful clothing. However, is it not ridiculous to count as a crop water and grain trash! As I was told later by former warehouse keeper N.N. Mukhin, if the warehouse gets 4 quintals this is considered good. Kolkhoz milk production fluctuates between 1800 and 2000 kilograms per cow. Yet in 1969 we were amazed when we reached 1,969 kilograms. Can one forget such a

coincidence of figures! Naturally, the milk does cost more and is a losing product.

And so, what happened? I see in front of me a wide enclosed space: the Rodina Kolkhoz. Several 5-year periods have passed; what have they accomplished, what peaks have they conquered? In 16 years, which was a period of intensive and unparalleled investments in the agrarian economy, grain crop yields not only did not increase but, conversely, declined. Where have these substantial monetary subsidies gone? They have slipped through one's fingers, they have been absorbed by irresponsibility, depersonalization, a short-sighted outlook and waste makers.

Where could crops come from? The land is exhausted and has no more to give. For decades the organic matter extracted from the land along with the crops has not been replaced. The soil has become compacted and acidified, and its humus content is minimal.

How can we plan the development of the economy without planning increases in the fertility of the land and without taking care of this vitally important cycle: crop-livestock farm-manure-field-crop? Yet we keep planning! We are farming as though no such rotation exists. Without enhancing the fertility of the fields, however, we cannot upgrade the economy. If examples could be cited of enrichment, without bothering to organize farming (for example, Sudislavskiy Sovkhoz, which earns millions of rubles by producing otter pelts, buys fodder from almost all over the Union), any serious consideration of the matter clearly reveals that such wealth is, in general, fictitious.

By rights, a livestock farm is considered not only a factory for milk but also for fertilizer. These products do not exclude each other and are truly priceless. This seems to be an elementary truth but why are we so indifferent, so strikingly careless when it comes to the loss of manure?

Go to the cow barn, look in the corners and you would see a covered pile of years of accumulation of a manure swamp and a stream of manure flowing down to the ravine or to the river.

As a rule, livestock farms are built along the banks of rivers and streams as though for the deliberate purpose of throwing the manure in them. These facts prove more eloquently than anything else the type of masters of the land that we are. Are we the masters?

After visiting a farmer in Canada, writer G. Baklanov described the condition of the cow shed. Above all, he was amazed at the cleanliness. Some kind of pipes were burning under the roof, the flies would be drawn to the light and, radiated, would die immediately. The farmer goes to the tank, turns on the pump and the manure which has accumulated flows down a pipe into an underground manure storage bin, located not far from the farm. Part of the latest system of steps suggested by the management of the Agroprom, allegedly with a view

to increasing interest in milk production, are so-called subsidies. What kind of innovation is that, what kind of invention? Why did we not think about it earlier?

It turns out that the calculation is simple. The state price of milk does not exceed 38 kopeks per kilogram. Insignificant deviations may be based on quality. We cannot say that milk is inexpensive. However, its production cost in many farms considerably exceeds its purchase price, sometimes by several hundred percent. State subsidies have been introduced to compensate expenditures and even to make it possible to feel that milk production is profitable. It is thus that the Rodina Kolkhoz, for example, is selling its milk for 98 kopeks. But this is nothing! Turilovskiy Sovkhoz in Antropovskiy Rayon, sells it for 2.28 rubles while Pervomayskiy Sovkhoz charges as much as 2.96 rubles!

Such is the nature of this new invention. This system of subsidies, obviously, was adopted partially also as a counterbalance to the unexpected increase in the cost of farm equipment and fertilizers. We see here the aspiration once again to make the kolkhozes and sovkhozes fit the Procrustean bed of equalization. Is this not the case? It is profitable for one farm to sell milk at 38 kopeks which it earns per each sold kilogram, to cover its expenditures and even to show some profit. In the case of another farm, for the sake of appearances, it is given the opportunity to conceal its disorganization with subsidies and thus also allegedly show a profit.

I have no idea as to what is expected as a result of such generous gifts. Is it the hope that there would be a quick return and an upsurge in animal husbandry, which will increase the amount of milk and meat? But could it be that the exact opposite will happen? The money is a gift and so why think about economizing or production costs? Whatever the case, the subsidy covers all sins. One could live, as the saying goes, by repeating that the worse things get the more subsidies there will be.

What is it that encourages such a system of measures? Dependency, above all. Such undeserved and excessive subsidies can only weaken, and dull the willpower and the persistence of the person to survive. They dampen spiritual energy and corrupt the very nature of man. Pervomayskiy Sovkhoz, Antropovskiy Rayon, averaged subsidies of 680 percent for milk and 685 percent for meat! How much farther can one go! Does such an organization of the matter not affect our well-being? For such money does not fall from the sky. It is a property earned by society and the people have the right to demand an accountability on the part of those who handle it.

It is interesting to look at rural life through the eyes of a simple kolkhoz member. Does he feel himself the master? No, I think, he does not. In his view, the masters are the chairmen, directors and specialists. Furthermore, the members of the raykom and the obkom have even greater rights in the management of rural life. It is they who come to check and control and it is to them that the local "owners" bow and justify their actions.

For the past few years we have been chasing off the "representatives." The writer Valentin Ovechkin personally depicted them in their unseemly role. Despite all sorts of prohibitions, however, they keep appearing over and over again. To this day they exist although, true, in a concealed fashion. The old practice is still working. The structure of our administrative mechanism is such that without the representative and without his ubiquitous presence it seems, we cannot do, for otherwise that mechanism will begin to break down.

Take V.V. Afanasin, former first secretary of the Galich CPSU Gorkom, who told a correspondent of the oblast newspaper SEVERNAYA PRAVDA the following: "...Considering the conditions of the past year, sending political organizers to the farms was justified." He also said: "Today we are sending them not for purposes of checking but of organizing the work."

The words may be different but the fact that the representative is now described as a political organizer does not change anything. V.V. Afanasin realizes this and immediately calls such "political organizers" by their true names: "The sovkhoz-technical school or the Kirovskiy Sovkhoz do perfectly well without such representatives."

Thus, individuals authorized by the raykom go to "organize" the work. A great deal has been written about the way they "organize." It is through their efforts and their "organizing" role that food shelves have become bare and that in order to be able to celebrate something more or less decently the rural resident must go to Moscow to buy goods.

I recall my first sowing campaign at the Rodina Kolkhoz: I had neither experience nor confidence. The representative (an engineer from the rayon agricultural administration) was irked by my timidity. He threatened me with "a beating" for "dragging the sowing." On another occasion (this was my third spring in the kolkhoz) the assigned representative (high ranking—chairman of the rayon executive committee) assured me that "he will not dismount" until I finished sowing by the deadline set in the rayon offices. When I asked him what he would do if I did not, "he expressively remained silent."

The representatives are an organic unit of the administrative system. Perhaps they are not appointed to specific farms and perhaps they may not exist now, but the increasing number of representatives of rayon and oblast organizations (committee secretaries, instructors, inspectors, heads of departments, auditors, controllers, and others), are they not, in terms of their role and status, the same as the representatives-drivers? It took decades to organize this mechanism and everything was established and now the mechanism continues to work as it did in the past.

How can we struggle against the domination of these representatives? Should we do so? We cannot hope that a machine out of which a certain transmission mechanism has been removed would immediately slow down

and stop. One of two things: either we must improve and regulate the old mechanism or else we must dismantle it and install a new one.

Radical changes in the economic structure of agriculture are inevitable. The choice has been made and the direction has been checked quite thoroughly. In the future this will be a "system of civilized members of cooperatives." This will not be rightless farms, paralyzed by instructions, where frequently collective day-labor, waste, grub-biness, and waste-making prevail, where natural resources are being spoiled and wasted, but a system of cooperative farmers based on a concern, a personal interest in every bit of plow land and blade of grass, a bird's nest and a fish-spawning area.

In other words, there is urgent need to stop an irresponsible attitude toward the land and to stop this unnatural attitude toward it, according to which the land is considered "common" and "ours" but, when checked, turns out to be no one's.

Reality suggests and creates more efficient and more sensible ways of advancing toward a system of "civilized members of cooperatives." Leasing is one of them. The lessees are the immediate first hope for the restoration of a healthy order and a stable situation in rural life. What is hindering us to promote the leasing system which has already been tested in practice? Why are we slow? Why are we tolerating kolkhozes and sovkhoses which run aground and are costing us tremendous losses? It is clear that not even the most generous subsidies would restore within them a sober, reasonable and truly energetic type of life, worthy of our new times.

It is sometimes said that no one needs the land and that no one would take it away. Is this the case? Before even having moved a finger to seek, or agree on something, we already give up. No, people will be found, motivated not exclusively by material considerations. A strong proprietary feeling for the land continues to live in man despite all the devices used by the persecutors of "private farming." The real farmers are waiting for their hour to strike, not only in villages and hamlets but in urban districts as well. These are the people, the families of mechanizers who were removed from the kolkhoz and who found shelter in the oblast or rayon center. They, these hereditary farmers, felt bitter when they saw the scandals in their own or neighboring village. They were born and grew up here but did not become the owners but merely day-workers and their duty was to "obey" orders. How many soberly thinking people, who put the dignity of the grain grower higher than anything else, left? A great many did. A very great many. To this day, it seems to me, the people are being chased away from the villages not only by the lack of roads or lack of "sociocultural life," but by the insulting feeling that they are merely manpower, by the scornful attitude of superiors concerning peasant knowledge and experience.

To work under the supervision and control of a superior is one thing; but to work the way I personally want to,

and for my own account, is something entirely different. The gifted and daring person will pay a high price for such happiness.

For how many years was man likened to a cog, and the sole concern was to find a right place for him and to tie him more firmly so that he could "fulfill" his purpose and his destiny!

For example, the tractor driver may claim that it is too early to plow the land, which is being "cut into ribbons." However, he is advised "not to make waves." "When you get to my level you can then give orders!"

Do we need a thinking and independent mechanizer? Under the existing procedure, we need an obedient one.

A tractor driver is not asked to think. He has been assigned the "from" and "to," for the day and whether he agrees or not, what matters is to "carry it out." It would be difficult to invent a coarser order which paralyzes human initiative.

Naturally, the existing system of interrelationships, and a procedure already established and maintained "shaped" the character of the peasant. However, not everyone left and not everyone decided to abandon his roots. Those who remained were the most malleable and obedient. As long as they live there and work, willy-nilly, they must obey! In the final account, one could become used and believe that this order is infallible and that it is for the better. The order of life seems to be guaranteed: work instructions are given and if one happens to be depressed or if one skips work, this becomes accepted and wages will be paid regardless of end results. Arguing and getting uptight is worthwhile doing only when the pay is low.

It is thus that a type of indifferent worker was shaped, fearing responsibility and avoiding initiative. By no means everyone was pleased by the opened opportunity to assume the management of the land. Conversely, some people are afraid of such a possibility for they would have to think, assess and experience. No, still better to work as ordered.

I do not wish to imply that the leasing movement will expire the moment volunteers and daring and initiative-minded people will stop coming. Unquestionably, examples of successful work by lessees will encourage those who hesitate to follow their example. The movement has already been started and a great many examples of success can be cited. However, we should not expect that this should lead to a race toward the leasing movement.

In that case, one should also seek out the urban residents, i.e., those "refugees" who despaired and abandoned their native soil. Organizational efforts must be made and not with lesser but with even greater zeal, in order to redeem our sins, which was the case when the countryside was being wrecked. We must seek those dispersed cadres, persuade them, call upon them, and encourage their return. The aspiration toward a life of enterprise,

independent farming, I think, is still found within the individual, and is waiting to be freed.

Naturally, the unknown makes us cautious. It is only a person who does not think seriously, to whom it costs nothing to abandon the project, who would take up something new on the run. The thinking, the serious person, should weigh everything in advance.

Perhaps in order to avoid extraordinary occurrences and stupidities (in our Aleksandrovskiy Sovkhoz, lessees which came from far away, took up the raising of calves and, in an effort to save on feed, having caused the death of 20 calves in 1 week, ran off), we should open schools and courses for lessees, i.e., teach our farmers. This could be done by the agricultural institute. Perhaps, in general, the agricultural institute could be turned into a center for research and the practical application of the leasing system. One could direct into leasing even students. The school for upgrading the skills of kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhos directors, specialists and brigade leaders, sponsored by the institute, operates on a year-round basis. Over many years many hundreds of managers have taken such courses. But where are the returns? They were taught the fine points of zootechnology and agronomy and the scientific organization of labor and the latest technologies and cost accounting. All of this is good when the production mechanism is receptive to innovation. The point, however, is that the existing irresponsibility debases any initiative and that the internal cost accounting mechanism is indifferent toward scientific thinking and clings only to outside control and abuse. What kind of scientific organization of labor could there be a question of if not even a basic order has been established in the farms?

I remember how, 7 years ago, during a bitter February cold, the cattle in the livestock farms of Zhvalovskiy Sovkhoz was fed half-rations, for hay and silage were already being exhausted, and the straw was left under the snow. During that critical time the sovkhos director was taking a course at the agricultural institute, studying the various fine points of economic management.

One hears questions about cooperatives and leasing: What are they, how to assess them: Are they a retreat from the positions we have gained, are they a step back?

Naturally, kolkhozes and sovkhos which work reliably and efficiently and reorganize themselves as they go along and actively seek and find new forms of labor organization, understandably, should not be touched. However, farms which lead a pitiful existence based on state subsidies, deprived of manpower, with broken down roads, neglected farmland and unmowed pasture land should be closed down. We must stop this excessive waste, this true plunder of national resources. In my view, leasing collectives must be set up on the basis of the production facilities of these losing farms.

Even in kolkhozes and sovkhos classified as "strong," there will be distant villages and isolated areas and

farmland which the farm's leadership could quite profitably lease to families on a long-term basis. In general, it would be good to make an economic assessment and estimates for each kolkhoz and sovkhos: How much land is needed to do the work considering the existing resources (in men, livestock, technological) most efficiently? There are reasons to believe that most farms have a surplus of land.

In some areas such surplus may not be substantial. It may consist of a remote piece of land. Somewhere else, arable land even located in the vicinity of the central farmstead could be considered surplus, if it yields no more than 5 to 7 quintals per hectare. In any case, there would be a disparity, an inconsistency, and each kolkhoz chairman or sovkhos director, without burdening himself with complex computations, could make a decision as to what land should be kept and what should be leased without harm.

After the redistribution of the farmland, without any whatsoever additional investments and outlays, strictly on an organizational basis, economic benefits could be obtained. We cannot fail to see that a weak or even average-strong farm cannot cultivate distant and unpopulated areas located frequently 25 to 30 kilometers away. This means a ruinous waste of facilities—equipment, seeds and fertilizer—which leads to abandoning the land.

It would be expedient for kolkhozes and sovkhos to concentrate within new, more compressed boundaries, around the central farmsteads, and lease out the outlying farmland.

The only organizational obstacle that I can see is the lack of roads. Currently this is one of the main topics in discussions concerning leasing, held with mechanizers and peasant families. Actually, how can one settle in a village without reliable roads in all seasons? It is an old saying that lack of roads drives people to their grave.

Laying roads is the most important task. This involves financing and mobile and well-equipped road building detachments. Everyone needs help but, as the saying goes, one cannot be everywhere at once. One idea that seems to me encouraging, however, is the following: substantial funds could be released by reducing land reclamation while increasing the building of roads, housing, etc. Enough pouring tens of millions of people's rubles on the land. We must finally recognize that large-scale water reclamation—draining the old arable land, flooded areas and swamps and irrigating open fields (and all that in our area of surplus moisture!) and straightening out river beds has not yielded any benefits but, conversely, caused irreparable damage to nature.

Such funds now appropriated for draining and irrigation could be saved and, at that point, all facilities (the land reclamation department has quite a lot of equipment) could be used in road building to the villages and remote sites.

It is a tempting dream of putting this troubled land into the hands of the lessees faster, without making them wait. Let there be more daring and decisive people such as M.N. Onishchenko, a lessee from the Kolkhoz imeni Borisenko, Prilukskiy Rayon, Chernigov Oblast. At the 12 October 1988 meeting between the CPSU Central Committee and heads of kolkhozes, sovkhozes and other enterprises of the agroindustrial complex applying the leasing method, he spoke out with a fetching rough bluntness, creating a happy stir in the hall. Spontaneously, as though addressing a meeting at his kolkhoz, he said: "We felt that this was our land. There were those who were afraid that we would be cheated of our share (for some reason in the newspaper report this word was delicately replaced with the word swindled—author) and that would be all. We said: 'Boys, forward!' We are our own bosses, we do not have a brigade leader, a tally man, no one. There is just us."

But let me repeat, for the time being, few are daring and many are waiting. Yet this is the right and tried thing, and the results are encouraging. Should people be forced to go into leasing?

Even people with a weak character dislike coercion. This applies even more so to people who are independent, confident, who know their own worth and who are most suitable for becoming lessees. Such people are familiar with coercive methods. The moment pressure is applied on them they would immediately say: Once again? Once again being driven? Is this the new serfdom?

At this point we must analyze the situation more carefully. We describe today's grain grower as a day laborer, as someone who obeys orders. This is entirely accurate. The brigade leader or any other manager issues assignments: You, Ivanov, will go there; Petrov will come here and Semenov will go elsewhere.... The zootechnician goes to the calves barn and removes the underweight calves and wrecks the plan and the livestock breeders remain indifferent. They do not object.... This is happening everywhere: people are being goaded, ordered around. The role of the grain grower is denigrated, and his opinion and views are considered worthless. He is merely manpower.

Compared to such collective farming, what is leasing? What are the dangers of it? Is it a new, a more refined type of coercion? Is it enslavement on a new, a cleverly planned level? Does it have some kind of hidden catch? Prejudice against new developments and suspicion did not appear suddenly. Faith has been undermined: "We will be taken in," we will be swindled.

This makes even more valuable to us the courageous people who have firmly broken with a self-satisfying collective tranquillity which ties us hand and foot, and with the easy life of irresponsibility and lack of initiative, and who have dared to set themselves apart, as a small group of like-minded people. This is not a new enslavement but liberation, the emancipation of the physical and spiritual forces of man in the broadest and most

profound meaning of the term; it is a return to oneself. The core of the problem is not "driving" someone into leasing but freeing the peasant bread-earner through it.

The gates are open. Come, settle, become the full master of your land. But, let us repeat it once again, there are few candidates. The people, however, are not to be blamed and such blames would be out of place.

It is the administrative-command system and the modern "advocates of serfdom," people who, for decades, closely and vigilantly controlled rural life, who are to blame. It was they who felt the need to try to destroy, disperse, eliminate, uproot the age-old peasant aspiration to common sense, to good grain growers' thoughts and skills. They had to distort and vitiate the normal and self-arising aspiration to economic interest and reckoning to such an extent that even now, when it has become possible for the independent farmer to display his new worthy qualities under the new encouraging conditions which promote initiative and enterprise in peasant affairs, even now the rural resident is uncertain and does not trust very much the fact that such new developments would be to the common good and interest. Furthermore, the "supporters of serfdom" are still vigilantly on guard. The gates are open but these people stand at the entrance and zealously check the documents: are they in order, has all the necessary information been provided and everything been properly stamped?

Consider A.S. Osipov from Kirovskiy Sovkhoz, Galichskiy Rayon. For the time being, he is a "contractor," and head of a family animal husbandry collective. However, he is still looking at developments with puzzlement.

"Recently electricians from the rayon center came to our calf-house. Their job would not have taken more than 15 minutes. However, they found that amount of work unprofitable and the sovkhoz engineer said: You may just as well rewire everything. They rewired but in such a way that later three motors burned up.... I would take over the land and the equipment but I have no confidence that I will be supplied what I need. Last summer I mowed with my oxen, for the T-25 tractor that was given to me, had no cabin. So I walk around the countryside in the rain and force myself to smile at people I meet! We were given a YuMZ which broke down after a month. Furthermore, the land we were given for hay was 20 kilometers away, and it is up to us to get there. At the refueling station we would be told that there is no rule to fuel up lessees!

The blunt assessment of V.N. Lebedev, a lessee from the Sumarokovskiy Sovkhoz, Susaninskiy Rayon (also, incidentally, a participant at the 12 October 1988 CPSU Central Committee Meeting) was the following:

"As to specialists, they are a real stumbling block. We have specialists in our sovkhoz who are inveterate opponents of leasing, particularly the chief agronomist. It took us a long time to accept this but it is true.... The

point is that the specialists are well aware of the fact that leasing marks the end of their absolute rule and firm salaries. Willy-nilly they will have to serve the lessees and not order the people around as they have become accustomed."

V.N. Lebedev has personally experienced this technique of the opponents. No one can claim at this point that this is a fabrication, a fantasy. Emancipated and enterprising work by the lessees is proving its advantages and therefore put many directors, chairmen and specialists (with their institute diplomas!) in an unseemly position: compared to the stubborn and purposeful "Arkhangelsk muzhiks," the phrase-mongering managers pale and wither away.

Here is how the leasing collective headed by V.N. Lebedev worked last year. The lessees contracted for 190 hectares of land. From that land they obtained 535 tons of hay, 35 tons of flax and 25 tons of linseed. Previously the entire kolkhoz could not obtain that same amount of flax and, particularly, linseed. Furthermore, the lessees performed a variety of services worth 6,200 rubles. The average earnings per member of the link was 30,000 rubles, compared to the sovkhoz average of 6,200 rubles.

"You must understand, there is a wall separating us from the chief agronomist, the chief engineer and many other specialists," V.N. Lebedev went on to say. "What is the outcome? By the end of August three other boys came to us: Please take us in your group. These were good boys and we agreed. At a meeting, however, all of a sudden the chief agronomist spoiled those boys' mood. The NEP, he said, was also introduced but then was eliminated. Your project as well is temporary, of short duration...."

Leasing is having a hard time making its own way. How to ease, how to facilitate this movement?

At that same Central Committee meeting, the writer I.A. Vasilyev suggested that leasing relations be developed not only in kolkhozes and sovkhozes: "This right should be extended in full to the soviets. A full-power soviet must inevitably be a lessor."

This stipulation—full power—is quite essential. For the time being, the soviets, particularly the rural ones, do not have full powers. The fixed assets (land, buildings, equipment, etc.) are owned by the kolkhozes. If the right is now given to the rural soviets to sign leasing contracts, it would be of little use. On what would such a contract be based? What could the rural soviet do? Does it have equipment, fertilizers and seeds? It has absolutely nothing. Once again one must turn to the kolkhoz board or the sovkhoz's office. There one comes across pseudomanagers, who have neither knowledge nor initiative or sense of progress but only an envious zeal for personal well-being, obstructing the leasing system with all their strength, and trying to secure their position, backed by state subsidies.

In my view, however, it is possible to give the rural soviet the real power which it needs. Suffice it, let us say, to combine all local life—industry, social and cultural or

any other—under the command of the rural soviet. The soviet, we believe, should become the main and only coordinator of rural life.

It may seem on the surface that this burden may be too great and could the soviet handle it? A close study would show that this presents no danger whatsoever. All that is necessary is for the executive committee to set up departments by sector: zootechnical, agronomic, economic, mechanization, and so on. The executive committee of the rural soviet could, in that case, carry out organizing, guiding and controlling activities.

We must take into consideration that no expenditures whatsoever would be required for such reorganization but that a great number of favorable circumstances would appear. For example, the personnel could be reduced, a couple of buildings could be freed, and there would be less meetings, for quite frequently the rural soviet and the kolkhoz (sovkhoz) duplicate each other's functions; the amount of paper shuffling would decrease, etc.

What is most important, however, is that after such a reorganization the rural soviet would immediately assume its proper place and become the true center of all rural life.

It is at that point, under the aegis of the rural soviet, that the leasing system would be easier to establish. The rural soviet has nothing to fear from true owners. It would be pleased to have people who have undertaken to change a part of its territory.

One could visualize our Russian hills and valleys in their renovated aspect. For the time being, however, they show a joyless picture: a feeling of sadness blows from the abandoned villages. Neglected fields and pasture land are in the tens of thousands of hectares in our Kostroma Oblast. Byways and roads are overgrown with grass.... In Matveyevskiy Sovkhoz, Parfenyevskiy Rayon alone, only 1,600 of 3,600 hectares of plow land (plow land!) are being farmed; 2,000 hectares are neglected, abandoned, call them what you will. There are some 40 abandoned villages in the area. Verst after verst of escheated and neglected areas.... Add to this the northern and northeastern areas, such as Pyschug, Vokhma and Pavino. It is hurtful and bitter to see this wretched picture of life. In the 11th 5-year period Matveyevskiy Sovkhoz averaged a grain crop of 2.9 quintals per hectare! Let us say it again, in bunker weight! Was it worth plowing and sowing the land, when such a "crop" yields nothing but a Sisyphean effort.

Saddest of all is that the land is not warmed by the love of the farmer.

The hope rests on the lessees. We must find them and give them the land on a long-term basis, with the right to inherit it. Feeling themselves the owners, they will improve the land and the very quality of life will rise.

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INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

Lessons From a Banned Picture

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[Article by Semen Izrailevich Freylikh, doctor of art studies, USSR State Prize winner, USSR Union of Cinematographers board member]

[Text] Criticism of the mistakes made in the course of our development attests to the fact that society felt the need to dig down to the essence, to the original causes of the deformations that have occurred in it. Nonetheless, future historians will note two approaches to criticism in our time, two types of thinking; the difference between the critic-researcher and the critic-investigator is increasingly coming to light.

The critic-investigator allegedly settles the scores. He considers the mistakes themselves, even when they are not criminal, but only the fruit of delusion, grounds for punishment, for pronouncing a verdict without a right to defense. The narrowness of the position is manifested especially obviously when it is a question of Stalin's fault in our history. Reducing the causes of the tragedy suffered by us to Stalin's despotism, to the depravity of his nature, to his paranoia, is precisely profitable for Stalinists, since such an approach to history protects the system that Stalin personified and which we are overcoming with such difficulty in the course of restructuring. The investigator (I am not referring to the lawyer's profession, but to a way of thinking that took shape earlier) is intoxicated by criticism in itself. His fury with respect to social flaws is just, but his ambitious feeling is too obvious to settle scores with history, which he interprets as a chain of mistakes.

Today, critic-researchers are more important. They also realize the tragic nature of history, but their mentality is deeper and more penetrating. They see how a phenomenon develops through its own antithesis, how history is also capable of changing for the better through its own worst sides. The researcher's criticism is no less sharp, but it does not plunge us into a state of despair. The researcher criticizes that which happened, so as to know how to act further, how to protect future generations from repeating the tragedies people suffered in past decades.

To illustrate this type of thinking, let me give the following example. At the end of last century, a serious accident occurred in the Moscow water pipeline system. In such cases, a culprit is sought. However, the remarkable scientist Nikolay Yegorovich Zhukovskiy headed the governmental commission. Studying the causes of the event, he made a noteworthy discovery which is now known in science as the "hydraulic shock effect."

Not only technical systems wear out: this also happens in society's political system, as well as in economics and in culture.

However, when a crisis is imminent, above all, as is our custom, we look for culprits. Most often, they turn out to be precisely those who, possessing a sense of the new, would be able to bring us out of the crisis through their own efforts. All of Zhdanov's resolutions on ideological questions were aimed precisely against the new in literature and art. The same is true of movies: pictures banned in the period of stagnation, as a rule, carry ideas from new, modern cinematography. As a member of the USSR Union of Cinematographers' conflict commission, I have sufficient material at my disposal for an opinion on this, since one must write a conclusion each time about what the picture represents and why it irritated conservative thinking. Each time, it is precisely the conclusion's telegraphic brevity that leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction. One writes about why the picture did not come out, and why it should be shown. Yet later, at home, one worries that one essentially said nothing, especially when the author did not live to see his work rehabilitated or simply broke down and has not worked all these years. Nonetheless, the point lies not only in one or another specific human injustice. If one takes the 100 pictures returned to life, it is easy to imagine the level that we could have reached 20 years ago.

I will not dwell on all 100 pictures. Tolstoy said: if you want to talk about a person's life, you do not have to describe his life from birth to death. It is better to take one moment, a kind of knot in his life, in unwinding which you will see him entirely, in his full growth. I will take Tolstoy's advice and analyze the fate of one picture.

So, a retrospective on the films of Alov and Naumov was held quite recently at the "Povtorny Film" [Rerun Film] theater. The film "Rude Anecdote" was shown first. The paradox of the situation was that this was no retrospective showing. This was a premier in the literal meaning of the word, since the film was shown on the big screen for the first time after its 22-year incarceration.

Happiness that the truth had finally triumphed was dimmed by the fact that Aleksandr Alov did not live to see it.

We experience the same feeling while reading "Life and Fate" by Vasilii Grossman or Andrey Platonov's "Chevengur."

Works that did not see light in their day are now contributing to the acceleration of social development, and were they not subjected to persecution because they glanced into our present day, helping approach it?

The new thinking does not fall suddenly from the sky along with instructions and resolutions. It is born in the depths of the people's life as a protest. An artist senses this and tries to reflect it.

"Rude Anecdote" was no accidental event in the life of Alov and Naumov, but quite the contrary. Their creative fate is tied into a knot here. It is impossible to see the ends and beginning of the subject of our conversation without untying it.

The artistic concept with which Alov and Naumov went into cinema is reflected to the utmost (and almost stopped short) in this film. This was in the mid-1950s, which we now consider crucial in the history of Soviet society. Whereas before this, in the period of the so-called "little picture," only famous masters received the privilege of staging, now young people, thirsting for creativity, had broken into movies.

These years were precisely a slaking of the thirst, when the viewer could watch, one after another, the pictures "The First Forty" by Chukhray, "Spring on Zarechnaya Street" by Mironer and Khutsiyev, "The House Where I Live" by Kulidzhanov and Segel, "Fate of a Man" by Bondarchuk, "Lurdzha Magdana" by Abuladze and Chkheidze, "Strange Kin" by Shveytser, "Sisters" by Voinov, "It Happened in Penkov" by Rostotskiy, and "A Person Was Born" by Ordynskiy.

In this situation, many masters of the old generation caught their second wind. After the films "Hostile Whirlwinds," "Country Doctor," "Mikhailo Lomonosov," "Day of Joy," and "Cavalier of the Golden Star," which attested to the cinema crisis, they made, respectively: Kalatozov—"The Cranes are Flying," Gerasimov—"Silent Flows the Don," Ivanov—"Soldiers," Kheyfits—"The Rumyantsev Affair," and Rayzman—"Communist."

In these pictures, life was allegedly captured unawares. The camera started looking at areas of life until then forbidden. Seemingly accidental, but also paradoxical moments which nonetheless had social meaning were extracted from life. Cinematographers, for whom film was not a way to artistically illustrate ready-made ideas, but a medium for self-expression, increased in value. The definitions "subjective camera" and "author's cinema" came into use precisely at that time. People of the old thinking took up arms against the dangerous, it seemed to them, subjectivism, "not taking it into account that art is always subjective, since each artist finds his own path to the truth and that it why he is capable, in his own way, of seeing that which finally becomes generally significant."

Alov and Naumov devoted their own first three pictures to depicting the events of the civic war. They were not planned as a trilogy, but after "Troubled Youth," a lyrical confession, the directors sensed an opportunity to consider the theme more thoroughly and produced "Pavel Korchagin," and after it—"Wind."

In the revolution trilogy, Alov and Naumov almost publicistically sharply raised problems topical for the latter half of the 1950s. Those were years illuminated by the ideas of the 20th Party Congress. The dethroning of the cult of Stalin's personality was approved by society, which had decided on serious reforms. There were also shifts in aesthetic thinking which were displayed, above all, in the hero concept.

A person is a means—this was asserted in the official thinking, now known as Stalinist.

The restoration of the Leninist standards of life in this plane, returning to the idea that the "person is the purpose," to winning spiritual freedom for him, is the meaning of the revolution.

A generation of Soviet cinematographers, having devoted themselves to the expression of this idea, were called the "new wave" by foreign critics. Of course, each did this his own way. In the films of Alov and Naumov, a form of road that the heroes must cross appears. These heroes are young people, Komsomol members, as yet unburdened with prejudices, either family or social. They are not intoxicated by power, and if they happen to be in command of others, they do not know how and are resignedly subordinated. In addition, freedom is not an anarchistic state for them. A wind always springs up on their path: it blows in their faces and they must overcome it. Overcoming is Alov and Naumov's theme. It was declared in the trilogy especially clearly in its central part, "Pavel Korchagin."

The film was new in terms of its concept itself. It raised the problem of the revolutionary after the revolution. Korchagin rejected personal happiness, horrified by the degeneration of people who have plunged into domestic well being. He did not tolerate the idea that he had a right to live better than others only because he took part in the revolution. He did not stop being a revolutionary in interpreting the idea of "how to live" itself. Alov and Naumov made this motif taken from the novel central to their movie.

The revolt of the generation of "angry" cinematographers was aimed against the dogmas of narrowly interpreted socialism, rebuking cinema for the meager illustration of ready-made ideas. Cinema returned concepts to its own bosom, such as suffering, fanaticism, sacrifice, and tragedy, and the revival of the high plastic culture of the screen also related to this.

The figure of Pavel Korchagin was cast on the screen by the troubled light of the revolution. I see Sotnikov, hero of Bykov's frenzied story and Larisa Shepitko's film "Ascent," as his predecessor.

"Pavel Korchagin" became a major phenomenon in Soviet cinema. "Incoming Peace" received an international response. It touched on problems that troubled mankind, who had endured unheard-of sacrifices in the bloody mincing-machine of World War II. The style characteristic of these directors was clearly displayed precisely in such a view of the war. It did not contradict the artistic methods developed in the Komsomol trilogy on the revolution. However, here they gave their creative nature complete freedom, although they had to pay for this.

In the film "Incoming Peace," the directors (this time they wrote the script with L. Zoriny) were interested in the moment when the course of history turns. They showed the last day of the war. Not even day, but the last hours. They compressed time, and that is why objects

become symbols while not losing their material nature. So appeared the upended bridge, which had lost its original meaning.

Not only Alov and Naumov's things were at a dangerous limit, but also their people. They did not place their heroes in customary, typical circumstances. They needed allegedly atypical circumstances. The inexperienced junior lieutenant Ivlev, who arrived from the school where he took an accelerated course of instruction, was anxious to receive a platoon (the war was ending, it might be too late), but received a humiliating assignment instead—taking a pregnant woman to the hospital. The paradox of the situation is that the woman is German. Stunning novelty was hidden in the idea itself, but the new always has opponents. The "improper" ending particularly dismayed them: the newborn is brought out during the victory salute, and he wets a weapon that had been thrown to the ground. Not long ago, even "Ballad of a Soldier" was accused of de-heroization and pacifism. Then—"Incoming Peace." They soon made such claims against "Ivanov's Childhood." These films, entirely different in terms of tone, were elements in shaping a new artistic thinking. It related to a philosophical attitude toward the war: war not only made ruins of cities, not only annihilated millions of lives and maimed millions, but it destroyed the integral perception of peace, and it is impossible to restore this without acknowledging non-war as a common human ideal. Later, politicians, having evaluated the destructive force of a nuclear weapon, are admitting that in a new war, were such to occur, there would be no victor. Art, capable of advanced reflection (Academician P. Anokhin's definition), even promoted this idea in Picasso's "Guernica," and later, with a no less gigantic force, in Tarkovskiy's "Ivanov's Childhood." Forced to kill, Ivan destroyed himself. What, the moralists ask, strutting their own showy patriotism: does this mean that we should not sacrifice ourselves to defend the Homeland? We should: the point is only the fact that it is not they, the moralists, who sacrificed themselves, but millions like the hero of "Ivanov's Childhood," like the soldier Yamshchikov in the picture "Incoming Peace."

The more original Alov and Naumov's films became, the more difficult it was for them to get through. The start was easy—"Troubled Youth." A picture without pretenses, it did not go against either the traditions of cinema, or inculcated concepts about the crucial years of the civil war.

The fate of "Pavel Korchagin" was difficult.

The film "Incoming Peace" was even more difficult. Success abroad (a prize for directing at the 22nd Festival in Venice and the Pazinetti Cup held there, an award from the Italian Critics Association, and a high audience evaluation at the Soviet Film Week in Paris) did not affect its slated fate in our country. The film came out with altered patches, in a reduced circulation: someone did not want it to have a broad audience.

Resistance to Alov and Naumov's work not only failed to weaken, but increased. The ban of "Rude Anecdote" was a tragedy for the directors. At that time the glasnost problem was solved uniquely: the film did not come out, but devastating articles about it were published. The situation became even gloomier with the ban on the script for "Law," already prepared for filming, in which Alov and Naumov (they wrote the script jointly with Zorinyy) addressed a contemporary theme for the first time. Alov's injury from the front, which was the result of a contusion, intensified and he soon began to use a cane, which he did not part with up to the last day of his life. How easily and unthinkingly we utter: "Art demands sacrifices." Are these always justified and is any kind of sacrifice permissible? I remember how Marlen Khutsiyev changed in those years: he turned gray as a result of the reprisal for his picture "Ilich's Outpost."

Or the siege, in the literal meaning, that Tarkovskiy endured for 4 years while vindicating the picture "Andrey Rublev"?! How many other pictures were beaten down hard and fast at the time? How many other talents were forced to be idle! Klimov, Muratova, Kalik, German, Paradzhanov, Ilyenko, Osyka, Khamrayev, Mansurov, Narliyev, Kalnin, Kiysk... At the 1988 All-Union Film Festival in Baku, a film by A. Mikhalkov-Konchalovskiy, "The Story of Asa Klyachina, Who Loved But Did Not Marry," made in 1966, received the main jury prize, as well as the film critics' prize. The same year, the jury at the International Film Festival in West Berlin awarded the "Silver Bear" to A. Askoldov's "Komissar." The director has been idle... for 20 years and in his 60's had refused to make a single picture.

As we see, Alov and Naumov's drama is hardly an individual case. It is related to the crisis that cinema endured, which was rooted, in turn, in the contradictions of social development. Attempts at reform in cinematography (G. Chukhray's experimental studio) were defeated. The forces that opposed reforms in other areas of life as well gained the upper hand. This stagnation, which lasted 2 decades, is the object of especially intent attention today, in the period of restructuring.

The bitter feeling of lost illusions is felt in each picture by Alov and Naumov after the banning of "Rude Anecdote." "This is not just a question of a picture," says Naumov, "it is a question of our life, of our understanding of art, of what we live by..."

The subsequent "Run" and "Legend of Tille" were brilliant pictures, but there is more craftsmanship in them than inspiration. The critics who had supported Alov and Naumov during their quests lost interest in them.

However, are we really studying only what we like? Is the history of cinema really an exhibition of achievements, which we select for analysis?

A crisis began for Alov and Naumov with the brilliant picture "Run." In terms of its subject, one cannot say

"either—or," "yes" or "no." The virtues and flaws spring from a single root here. They are interlaced, and one cannot prepare shortcomings without injuring the merits of the picture.

Bulgakov's "Run" did not appear in the work of Alov and Naumov by accident. Dostoyevskiy's fantastic realism is akin to Bulgakov's. General Pralinskiy of "Rude Anecdote" and General Khludov of "Run" are grotesque figures, and reality is confused with phantasmagoria in their actions and thinking. Here, Alov and Naumov were also, so to speak, not quite themselves. Their unbridled fantasy with its sudden falls from the eccentric to a penetrating psychologism was magnificently embodied in the performance by the actors—Ye. Yevstigneyev (Pralinskiy) and V. Dvorzhetskiy (Khludov).

The figure of Khludov enabled the directors to approach the theme of revolution from a new side. Pavel Korchagin represented it. Khludov opposed it. Thus art, returning to an object already depicted, now gains the opportunity to elucidate, in Chernyshevskiy's definition, the "opposite content" within it.

So it was with Mikhail Romm: at first he showed the lofty moment of the century (October, Lenin), and later—its lowly moment (fascism, Hitler). However, a narrow understanding of a typical problem and of the term "realism" itself set a trap with regard to films, such as "Ordinary Fascism," "Run," and "Agony," in which the chief heroes acted as the bearers of ideals that the artist did not share. In the film "Agony," whose main characters were Nikolay II and Rasputin, a revolutionary chronicle was introduced as the historical background.

In "Run," a historical background is created not by a chronicle, but by scenes, the motifs for which were borrowed from other works by Bulgakov—the novel "White Guard" and the "Black Sea" libretto. In adapting the play to the screen for the purpose of expanding the range of action, the authors embellished Bulgakov with Bulgakov.

Where, then, is the picture's contradiction?

In "Rude Anecdote," each frame came from a story by Dostoyevskiy and simultaneously from the inner, frenzied conviction of Alov and Naumov.

They glanced back in "Run." They had broached this idea for several years. The ban of the film "Rude Anecdote" and the script for "Law" put them in the false position of seditious people. Mikhail Bulgakov himself still "got through" with difficulty, and in any case, it was put on film for the first time. Here we see a broad-format spectacle in which everything is first-class: the camera, music, and a brilliant ensemble of movie stars. Every character in the picture and every scene is unforgettable. The flight of the White Army was shown as the outcome and, in addition, was compared to the run of cockroaches, which the "cockroach king" Artur demonstrates at his Istanbul theatrical attraction. The method also

comes from "Rude Anecdote:" at the wedding, Pseldoni-mov's guests, to a man, were turned into pygmies during the dance. History turned, and people were turned into cockroaches or pygmies. These transformations are grotesque. They stick in one's mind.

During the period of bureaucratic domination in cinema leadership, the banning of a picture, strange though it may seem, was a blessing compared to whittling away at it with corrections. As a consequence, a banned picture could still come out in its original form, but forced revisions ruined it forever.

Cinema historians still not only list who specifically destroyed the cinema, but are also exposing the aesthetics of demagoguery, which had its own conviction, its own rules, elevated to the laws of art by the power given to it.

"It seemed to us," V. Naumov bitterly recalls, "that those on whom the acceptance of a picture depended should have simply insisted that Khludov be returned to Russia. However, the labyrinths of bureaucratic thinking are inscrutable! A terrible wall rose up on Khludov's way home—they forbid him to return under any circumstance. To this day, for me, Khludov's "failure to return" is an unhealed wound in the picture, no matter how we tried to veil this circumstance (Khludov goes to the port, and maybe he will leave on the next ship). However, to this day I regret the frames we discarded most of all: in the scene on the steamship, Khludov... cried."

Such a frame would have been a touching denouement, worthy of the idea of the picture. From what did those who categorically banned this frame proceed? They thought that if Khludov cried—we would pity him, and if we pitied—we would justify him, a cruel White Guard.

However, this ending did not come from a sentimental pity for Khludov. We interpret the terrible fatigue of Khludov, doomed to loneliness, as a tragedy of the spirit of history itself, which ended up in an impasse. Art in this kind of scene provides an outlet for catharsis, since an non-vindictive attitude toward the past is our superiority over him.

Defense mechanisms are developed in psychology, as though amortizing shocks from outside. This also applies to the psychology of creativity. Against rigid censorship, an internal censor was formed in the artist's consciousness and even his subconscious. It proposed the same murderous poison in small doses which seemed life-saving.

In the next picture (the "Legend of Tille"), it seems, Alov and Naumov did not run away from the good life to 16th century Flanders.

To this day, Alov and Naumov had enough regular footage: in one series they produced "Pavel Korchagin," "Incoming Peace" and "Rude Anecdote." Now they

shoot epic sheets. "Run" was in two parts; the "Legend of Tille" was in four parts and takes more than 5 hours to watch.

The academic style (not without the mannerism and pretentious novelty inherent in it) of the last two films pacified the cinematic leadership, and Alov and Naumov were no longer feared. Now they no longer had to broach a new theme, and for the first time a staging was suggested to them—a political detective story about the attempt on the "Big Three" in Teheran.

So life turned. The script for "Law," devoted to rehabilitating victims of the Stalinist terror, was banned. Instead of this, a hit was filmed about Stalin as the object of terror. I do not want to say that the Teheran incident in itself was far-fetched (historians, having revealed all circumstances of the events that occurred in 1943, should have something to say about this). However, it is entirely obvious: in the first case, the idea was born through the artists' civic feeling. In the second, they fulfilled an order. The film was made with a flourish, and the filming was done here, as well as in Paris, Berlin, London, and New York. Besides Soviet actors, foreign movie stars were employed in it.

There is a love intrigue in this film, but it seems strained and is even annoying. Why? In order to answer this question, we must turn to the psychology of creativity, in particular to the problem of unrealized ideas. Art is organic, and an idea stifled inside oneself, i.e., not embodied in its true form, will nonetheless display itself later, albeit distortedly, even deformed, but it will manifest itself. In the banned script of "Law" (it has now been published in ISKUSSTVO KINO, 1987, No's 6, 7), this idea was resolved organically. In the stagnant years, such things were written for their own sake, and success accompanied the hit "Teheran-43," fulfilled on a level corresponding to "world standards."

"The Shore," later produced by Alov and Naumov from a novel by Yu. Bondarev, revealed the contradiction in their work in this period to the utmost. In a large, once again two-part picture which had a loud success, there is another picture within, genuinely Alov and Naumov's, which could have lived independently and which is just as perfected as "Incoming Peace."

It is no accident in the picture that a quotation appears from "Incoming Peace:" the soldier Yamshchikov wipes his face with a sheet, hung out in a ruined building.

Right now, I am thinking of Aleksandr Alov, who sharply answered the minister of culture, an elegant woman. She disliked Yamshchikov's worn-out, dusty greatcoat, permeated with soldier's sweat. He told her: "You saw soldiers from the Mausoleum, but I spent the war in such a greatcoat."

He died, shooting the war scenes of "The Shore." This happened in the Latvian town of Kuldiga on 12 June

1983. Alov lacked only a few more years of life until the rehabilitation of "Rude Anecdote" and the script of "Law."

A new era began, and the films that had been created in this period seemed to be between the past and the present. These also include the film "Choice" (from a novel by Yu. Bondarev), which Naumov made without Alov.

Cinema has known flights and falls, ups and downs, but we movie critics are making a mistake if we divide its periods with partitions: "cult of personality," "thaw," "era of stagnation," or "restructuring."

History moves such that one period ripens into another. So moves human history, as well as the history of art.

The films of Alov and Naumov—successes and failures—are interrelated. In each picture, that which they did not manage to say in the previous one is brought to an understanding. In "Choice," Ramzin in his constant long coat is reminiscent of Khludov, who never took off his greatcoat. As before, the director draws a figure from Bulgakov's "Run." Then was something left unsaid, or maybe this was already a call sign for other films? What torments Vladimir Naumov? He has enough strength to realize that "Choice" relates to a period that has passed, when life's tragic nature was blunted in art, and failure to express a social conflict momentarily turns into the prevalence of style over content.

Like the irony of fate, "Choice" came out on the screen simultaneously with "Rude Anecdote." The first was made today, the second—22 years ago. The first is about contemporary life, the second is a screen adaptation of a story by Dostoyevskiy. The paradox is that the second is more topical for our time, and not just in terms of form. The idea within it is topical, just as it was topical in 1862 when Dostoyevskiy wrote the story, as it was topical in 1966 when the film was made, and as it is topical today, when the film came out on the screen.

Ideas do not fade away along with the time that gave rise to them.

Why does Dostoyevskiy set forth a large historical theme in an anecdote and, moreover, a rude one? The writer, resorting to black humor, ruthlessly describes not only the liberating General Pralinskiy, but also the poor bureaucrat Pseldonimov. Alov and Naumov flawlessly defined Dostoyevskiy's opinion of the little person in "Rude Anecdote," as opposed to the writer's approach to this theme in "Poor People" or "Humiliated and Insulted." From our school days, we remember Dostoyevskiy's phrase: "We all came out of Gogol's 'Greatcoat.'" This does not mean that Pseldonimov came out of Akakiy Akakiyevich."

Akakiy Akakiyevich Bashmachkin evokes a feeling of sympathy in us, but Pseldonimov—a feeling of disdain.

Alov and Naumov found a form suited to the content of Dostoyevskiy's story: they made the film in the genre of the satirical grotesque. With the ban of the film, essentially, an entire trend was closed, and today it is important not simply to rejoice at the picture's rehabilitation, but to make it work in the contemporary cinematic process. In the method of art itself, as it has taken shape here, the stereotypes and blinders have not been overcome, as a consequence of which it has also become possible to classify a people's work as "anti-popular."

The error in evaluating "Rude Anecdote" was only an individual case of the general deviation from realism and the correct understanding of national nature; a stereotype took shape in thinking: the little person means the masses, and the masses—the people.

Critics of the picture defended Pseldonimov from Alov and Naumov's attacks, thus ignoring Dostoyevskiy, who unambiguously showed: 100 years of slavery has deformed the consciousness not only of the tops, but also of the bottoms of society, i.e., not only of the enslavers, but also of the enslaved. In the film, as with Dostoyevskiy, General Pralinskiy and the little solicitor Pseldonimov are two sides of the same coin.

So, does Pseldonimov represent the people or not?

Pushkin had a concept of "the people" and a concept of the "common people." In the finale of "Boris Godunov," "the people" stay silent: they are interpreting and will still have their say. Pushkin's "common people" are the "senseless people." The common people are the crowds, the "time-workers, slaves to need and worry."

This contradictory concept of "the people" was intensified to the extreme in the 20th century. The fair "people—the creator of history" is combined with Lenin's thought: "The force of habit of millions and tens of millions is the most terrible force" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 27).

Romm produced the film "Ordinary Fascism" on this theme.

The same year, about the same thing, and in the very same studio Alov and Naumov shot the film "Rude Anecdote." They announced this programmatically: "Pseldonimov, of course, is the 'little person,' but he is also 'frightening'... Pseldonimovism as a social phenomenon has all of the features—spiritual servility, ignorance, slavery, and pedantic thinking—which make a rich environment for ripening fanaticism and fascism. Mankind has already paid enough for only one indulgence in Pseldonimovism. This work aims a blow against the insincerity and hypocrisy of those who have power, against false bourgeois liberalism... and simultaneously, against spiritual boorishness, servility and slavery."

The problem of the alienation of the personality is formulated in the picture, hence the Kafkaesque motifs in it. Motifs, but nothing more, since here, above all, the artistic principle of Dostoyevskiy himself is adapted to cinema,

about which he said: "I have my own special view of reality (in art), and that which the majority call almost fantastic or exceptional, for me sometimes comprises the very essence of reality. The ordinariness of phenomena and the conventional view of them, in my opinion, is not quite realism, but even to the contrary." These words could have been an epigraph for the film "Rude Anecdote"—both for its content, as well as for its style.

In addition to "Rude Anecdote," other cinematographic masterpieces created by Soviet and foreign masters, taken away from society, have been returned to it.

Will this process become irreversible? To what extent does the artist now depend on circumstances, and to what do circumstances now depend on him? Here the problem of freedom, about which the script of "Law" was written, begins. It was written then, but Naumov is starting its production today.

As we see, the removal of undeservedly banned pictures from the "shelf" is not an individual case in the cinematic process. The law of the stagnant times was manifested in the ban itself, just as the opportunity to watch and openly judge them today is also a law, but of the present-day, radically changed situation. So, the formula "art belongs to the people" can be an empty phrase, or it can be full of real content.

Success in art is unpredictable. Creativity is unique and that is why it is concealed in any field. This relates to an even a greater extent to art, than to science. If Einstein had not formulated the theory of relativity, inevitably a different genius would have arrived at this. If Mendeleyev had not discovered the periodic table of the elements, someone else would have done this, although it would not have been called Mendeleyev's. However, if Blok had not written the poem "Twelve," if Eyzenshteyn had not produced the "Battleship Potemkin," if Shostakovich had not composed the opera "Katerina Izmaylova"—this would never have been done, for no one else would have been able to create this, either before them, or after.

Art can be guided, noted V.V. Vorovskiy, by people capable of yielding to its fascination. Anatoliy Vasilyevich Lunacharskiy, on the scale of the country, and the highly educated Adrian Ivanovich Piotrovskiy, on the scale of the "Lenfilm" Studio when it flourished, were such. In the future, the bureaucratization of the art leadership system went so far, and cadre policy became so rigid, that the Lunacharskiys and Piotrovskiys could no longer be appointed to any post whatsoever in it. Incidentally, imagine: such leaders having appeared, they would no longer play their former role, since the system has started to operate regardless of the personal qualities of one leader or another. After all, we have tried before, repeatedly, to carry out very reasonable and extremely necessary reforms of society. However, they were carried out exclusively from above, via instructions and orders. This was bureaucratic idealism, which imagines that history itself moves according to orders. When we ended up in an impasse (mildly called stagnation) and

started determining the causes of this, it was revealed that we got stuck in the impasse because spontaneous mass forces had stopped operating, and these are the motor of history, its engine. To this day, the superstructure has implemented reforms for the sake of its own salvation. That is why we call restructuring revolutionary, because it is carried out in the name of the masses and by the efforts of the masses.

Of course, the spontaneity of the masses is fraught with critical moments, but one cannot guard against them with spells. We must pass through them to a new understanding of the role of the masses and the role of competent leaders, to a new understanding of the ties between politics and economics, market and plan, the elements and awareness. Our society has laid a new track precisely on these support points. Precisely here, the main impulses of development have been revealed, and here the forces of obstruction and conservatism, which created favorable conditions for the abuse of power, have manifested. Many minds have realized this dialectic between good and evil. I do not remember exactly in precisely what year, even before Brezhnev's time, I heard Petr Mironovich Masherov say: "Positive and negative come from a single root." It struck me that I heard this precisely from a political leader, even back in the years when we rushed about from side to side, first falling into "idealization," then, have barely jumped out of its zone, getting the other leg stuck in the "swamp of slander." However, then, in the period of rigid dogmatism and regular cultism, a candidate CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, Hero of the Soviet Union, who had received a Star for his work, when asked if I could quote him in an article on which I was working, asked me not to do this.

Since that day, I have thought a great deal about this answer from Petr Mironovich Masherov. During the period of the cult of personality, the energy of the generation that bravely won the war was frozen. A fearless, initiative-minded partisan leader was now unable to express an idea before the one who was considered "first" did so. Yet, after all, it was put so simply: merits and shortcomings spring from a single root. That is, do not seek our shortcomings in a separate box, because our flaws are the continuation of our merits. This applies not only to man, but also to society.

Are those faced with writing new history textbooks, which are badly needed, aware of this? Indeed, history must be written anew, but nonetheless, in what sense? In what sense rewritten? We already have sad experience with rewriting, for example, the history of the CPSU. Each regular congress is declared historical and crucial, crucial to such an extent that the path already crossed is not seen, and the people have stopped understanding what they lived for before this. Here, in my opinion, historians made two mistakes. First, with regard to leaders. No matter who they were, they were. There is no need to whitewash or to slander them. The dialectics of the time is displayed in their actions themselves. In any case, it is a humiliation of history and humiliation of the

people to erase them from history, if in the leader's life they had agreed to bow down to him, but after his death—to revile him. Second, the lack of understanding of the meaning of the people's life is telling in this rewriting of history. The life of the people is a natural historical process. This also relates to the history of art, and that is why one critic's assertion is more than strange, and even shocking: "Lyubov Orlova is a star of the Stalinist era." The feeling of what is primary here, and what is secondary, is lost. Meanwhile, this is a manifestation of metaphysical thinking, which puts history in boxes—Stalinist, Khrushchev's, Brezhnev's.

Just as the life of the people does not serve as an illustration of one or another philosophical idea, art is not a mirror of history in the literal meaning of the word. History and art have their own internal laws. Each has its own periods, and the connection between them is mediated.

The history of Soviet cinema is also a natural historical process, and even Dovzhenko noted that the history of cinema should not be examined "by the quarter."

Technical progress and artistic progress do not always coincide. Today, when pictures are coming out which were produced in stagnant times, but were banned then, a question arises: why today, when everything is permitted, are there so many mediocre and so few good pictures?

The critic can contribute to freeing cinema from the path of conformity, but cinema itself must free itself of prejudices. The critic-researcher acts simply: he believes everything formerly considered good to be bad. For the critic-researcher, yesterday, today and tomorrow are only moments in a single process, in which there are different periods, light and dark, upswings and crises: all of this together comprises history.

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DEBATE AND DISCUSSION

On Economic Independence of the Republics

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[Article by Vladimir Konstantinovich Andreyev, doctor of juridical sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law]

[Text] A broad debate has developed in *KOMMUNIST* on harmonizing relations among nationalities. This has included problems of economic sovereignty, including from the viewpoint of the restructuring of the state-legal foundations of Soviet federalism. Let us concentrate on a single exceptionally important aspect of this problem, i.e., that of increasing the autonomy and responsibility of republics in the area of economics, and on implementing the idea of converting the various areas to the

principles of cost accounting, clearly defining their contribution to the implementation of all-Union programs.

The draft general principles of restructuring in the economic and social areas in Union republics by broadening their sovereign rights, self-management and self-financing note that the further strengthening and development of state ownership as the common property of the entire Soviet people is a reliable economic foundation for strengthening the multinational Soviet state. "Nonetheless," the document states, "democratization of the management of the national economy requires improvements in the ways and means of managing socialist property on all levels, proceeding from its variety (author's emphasis) and the possibility of efficient utilization.... The need has now appeared to grant Union republics and regions and legislatively to codify new rights in terms of handling property and natural resources as a decisive prerequisite of perestroika in the management of their economic and social areas on the basis of self-government and self-financing."

The statements at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, particularly those of A. Brazauskas, A. Gorbunov and I. Toome, justifiably pointed out that the draft general principles failed to eliminate excessive centralism which triggered the clash between the center and the republics. Naturally, providing opportunities for greater republic autonomy and incentive to improve the end results of their economic activities is impossible without a radical review of constitutional legislation and without passing USSR laws on broadening the socioeconomic rights of Union republics and local self-management and the local economy.

The fundamental regulations for the radical restructuring of economic management, which were approved with the resolution of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, acknowledged the need for strengthening the territorial aspect of planning and upgrading the comprehensiveness of plans for the economic and social development and restructuring of Union and autonomous republics, krais, oblasts and large cities on the basis of legal principles governing the shaping of republic and local budgets. However, the course of preparations and discussions at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the 12th Extraordinary Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet intensified the problem of strengthening the economic sovereignty of Union republics and noted the inadmissible slowness displayed in solving related problems. It turned out that scientists as well, economists and jurists above all, were simply unprepared for providing a scientific resolution to many problems of strengthening the economic autonomy of republics, including territorial cost accounting, within the overall concept of the radical economic reform. It was no accident that in a number of Union republics discussions of such problems were crowded with spontaneous judgments and emotionally colored "national" resolutions on upgrading the efficiency of public production. Thus, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet acknowledged as a mandatory element of regional cost accounting the

exclusive republic ownership of all means of production on its territory. No claim by the Estonian comrades to the effect that by this token they wanted to block the diktat of Union ministries and departments can justify such a major step which means removing the republic's national economy from the single national economic complex of the country.

The statements made at the Congress of People's Deputies by the representatives of the Baltic Republics indicated that they had been listening to the critical remarks addressed at their concept of republic cost accounting. Unfortunately, in turn, their objections were frequently of a general nature: they cited the need to live according to one's means and not to spend more than they themselves were able to earn, etc. The specific solutions of problems of republic self-financing and self-management ignore the existence of the USSR as a sovereign state (transferring under its ownership all property on republic territory and closing down all Union ministries, establishing relations among republics and between the Union and the republics only on the basis of treaties, etc.). Other suggestions simply reject the federative principle of the country's structure, shifting all attention to a treaty on the basis of which Union republics could transfer rights to the USSR but could also demand their return as well. This ignores the axiomatic stipulation that the USSR as well must be a sovereign state and have its own territory and ownership of the land and natural resources as well as the other attributes of full governmental power. In the views expressed by the people's deputies from the Baltic, universally accepted scientific concepts were frequently replaced by words borrowed from the terminology of the electoral campaign and the promises given to the voters. For example, the native nationality of a republic was replaced with the term republic; handling property and natural resources was identified with republic ownership, etc. In defining the competences of the USSR and the Union republics, the attention was concentrated on the sovereign rights of the latter and not on the fact of their voluntary transfer to the Union and the existence of such rights throughout the country. Yet absolute sovereignty does not exist or could not exist even in intergovernmental relations.

The renovated structure of the soviets of people's deputies and the procedure for the organization and activities of the superior state authorities and of the electoral system did not resolve the entire problem of harmonizing relations between the USSR and the Union republics, for in defining the competences of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, its presidium and the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, the entire matter was nonetheless reduced merely to a redistribution of functions and rights which already were in the hands of the previous supreme state authorities. At this stage the rights of Union authorities were not redistributed in favor of Union republics which, naturally, triggered in them feelings of an entirely explainable dissatisfaction. The introduction of amendments and supplements to the USSR Constitution by essentially

redrafting chapters 12, 13 and 15, and slightly amending the other articles is a politically justified method. It was called upon by the need not to halt the advancing process of perestroika of socialist society. However, it is inevitably related to serious legal-technical omissions and shortcomings, which led to the development of a certain disharmony in the Fundamental Law as a document integral in terms of its spirit. It turned out that a number of its articles had converted into regulations which had already lost their practical effect. However, they could not be excluded for otherwise gaps would appear in the Constitution.

Let us take as an example Article 73 which defines the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as represented by its supreme state power and management authorities. In terms of the supreme authorities, it is concretized in a new fashion in Articles 108, 113, 119 and 121. In terms of the USSR Council of Ministers, Part 1 of Article 131 has been subjected to a purely terminological amendment, ignoring the expanded rights of Union republics. The study of such articles indicates that the new drafts of some parts of the USSR Constitution do not exactly define the rights of Union republics in solving problems of their economic and social development. What kind of specific conclusion on their competence could be drawn from Point 7 of Article 113, which stipulates that the USSR Supreme Soviet provides, within the range of the competence of the USSR, legislative control of relations of ownership, of the budgetary-financial system, etc.? Where if not in the USSR Constitution should such rights be defined? (At this point we do not discuss the question of whether or not this should be part of the updated Union treaty on the voluntary unification of republics or a special chapter as a preamble to the USSR Constitution.)

In undertaking the second stage of perestroika in the political system—harmonizing relations among nationalities—it would be necessary, we believe, above all on a scientific basis to stipulate in the Constitution the competence of the USSR and Union republics, guided by the principle included in the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference "On the Legal Reform:" anything which is not prohibited by law is permitted. Therefore, the Fundamental Law should indicate the problems of ownership, the budget-financial system, taxation, wages, price setting, etc., which are the prerogative of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Other than that, the rights should be given to the supreme soviets of Union republics, which have the right to pass any laws without asking the permission of the USSR. What follows from this principle is also the opposite rule of the federal structure of the state: Union laws passed within the competence stipulated in the USSR Constitution are mandatory on the territory of all Union republics without having to be registered advance. As to problems pertaining to the joint competence of the USSR and the Union republics, it is also possible to adopt the variant of registering Union laws in advance as a prerequisite for their enactment on the territory of a given republic. This would be a way of protecting the sovereign rights of the republics.

In coordinating the rights of the USSR and of Union and autonomous republics and other national-state formations, we must proceed from the view of strengthening our federative socialist state. The restructuring of the higher state power echelons highlights the stagnation phenomena in the development of the very concept of Soviet federalism and the lack of scientific criteria for a national-state structure and for the correlation between the latter and the administrative-territorial division of the country. It is extremely relevant today to establish who is a subject of the Soviet Federation: is it exclusively the Union republics or does that include also the other national-governmental formations. It must also be acknowledged that large Union republics such as the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan should have the right to set up special constitutional authorities in charge of administering vast economic areas.

In emphasizing improvements in the national-state structure in the country, we must not forget that the administrative-territorial units, krais, oblasts and large cities do not have a homogeneous ethnic population. On the economic level, the interpretation of a Union republics in which a single ethnic group predominates as a nationally separated economic unit would be erroneous, leading to autarchy and national exclusivity. Clearly, it would be more expedient to think of granting the large administrative-territorial units (such as Krasnodar Kray or Gorkiy Oblast), whose economic potential perhaps quantitatively alone, is significantly greater than, shall we say, Turkmeniya or Estonia, additional rights in the area of economic activities. Such rights could be contemplated in the currently drafted law on the socioeconomic rights on Union republics. This suggestion should not be viewed as harming the sovereign rights of individual Union republics. It proceeds from the fact that large areas, by virtue of their economic potential, must be given additional rights in managing the economic and social areas.

Delegates to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies noted that the efficient assignment of rights among Union and republic authorities is the most important prerequisite for the solidity of our multinational state. The main emphasis must be (while preserving the center's rights in solving the most important general governmental problems of the country's development) on granting Union republics the necessary rights in developing their regional economies. We believe that such a viewpoint should be adopted in radically revising the concepts of the country's unified national economic complex and the correlation between the sectorial and territorial aspects of economic management and including cost accounting and self-financing of republics within the overall concept of the radical economic reform.

The broadening of the rights of republics in the economic area should, in my view, start with a restructuring of ownership relations. A simple transfer of administrative functions to the republics cannot solve the problem of increasing their interest in improving the end results of their economic activities. We cannot include regional cost accounting and self-financing in the functioning of

the unified national economic complex without dividing the currently single state (nationwide) ownership above all among the USSR, the Union and autonomous republics and the local soviets of people's deputies on a truly democratic basis. State ownership assumes a truly nationwide nature only as a result of the distribution of the means of production between the USSR and the Union republics. In this case it does not lose any of its nationwide nature. It is not converted into group ownership; all that occurs is its classification on different levels: USSR, Union and autonomous republics, and local soviets of people's deputies.

It would be expedient to stipulate that the USSR has the right to own the rail, air and sea transportation systems, the mails, the power industry, the petroleum and gas supply systems, the enterprises of the defense and machine-building complexes and any other property needed in fulfilling the obligations of a federal state. Union republics would be the owners of means of production which do not belong to the USSR. The USSR Constitution should stipulate the right of Union (and, perhaps, also autonomous) republics to determine which means of production belong to the local economy.

The solution of the problem of ownership of the land and the subsoil is particularly difficult. Obviously, these natural resources cannot be physically divided between the USSR and the Union republics. In this case one could use the structure of "double" ownership, according to which both the USSR and each Union republic is the owner. Timber and water resources should be the exclusive property of Union republics. Should rivers flow on the territories of several republics, their economic use would be based on contracts concluded among the state authorities of the respective republics.

At the same time, in order to create relatively equal starting conditions for the simultaneous introduction in the country, as of 1991, of regional republic cost accounting, we should close down the Union ministries of the metallurgical, chemical-timber and fuel-energy complexes. It is only thus that in the cases of the RSFSR, the Kazakh SSR and the other Union republics on whose territory petroleum, coal and ore are essentially extracted and timber and other raw materials are procured, will be given a proper foundation for the self-financing of their territories. Based on the draft general principles, the RSFSR would be allowed to manage industry which accounts for no more than 27 percent of the entire output, whereas the republics of the Baltic area would have 57 to 72 percent and Moldavia would have 75 percent.

Regional republic cost accounting systems could be organized in the course of restructuring the USSR State Budget and planning the country's economic and social development.

The concepts we noted, included in the draft general principles of granting Union republics and regions new rights to handle property and natural resources, failed to

weaken centralism to the necessary extent. No full democratization in national economic management occurred. According to Article 10 of Section III of the draft, as in the past state budgets are structural components of the USSR State Budget. Nonetheless, the additionally earned income is left in its entirety at the disposal of the Union republics. Losses in income or additional expenditures are not compensated out of the Union budget. In my view, we must more clearly demarcate between the rights of the USSR and those of Union republics in the areas of state budget expenditures and revenues. The Union and republic state budgets should operate as relatively independent budgets, although with internally coordinated income and expenditures balances. The USSR State Budget includes the financing of all-Union needs exclusively (sectors under Union administration, defense, management, etc.) and the most important governmental programs. The state budgets of Union republics should not be included in the Union budget and the Union budget should not be used to compensate for errors and irresponsibilities in the individual republics.

The state plan for the economic and social development of the USSR should, in my view, stipulate ratios and a pace of development on the scale of the entire state and of sectors of Union significance as well as general governmental programs for economic and social development.

As the owner of certain means of production and natural resources, the Union republic independently drafts and adopts a plan which is subordinate to the national economy. No Union authorities, including the government of the USSR, has the right to interfere in the formulation of the state plan for the economic and social development of a Union republic. On the Union level the participation of the Union republic is stipulated only in terms of the implementation of all-Union and interregional programs. In my view, the initial planning data for economic activities of enterprises (associations) and those stipulated in Point 2 of the subsection "Planning" of Section IV of the draft general principles cannot be extended in their entirety to Union republics. We should select among them those which make it possible truly to define the contribution of the Union republic to the solution of general governmental programs such as, for example, rates of contributions to the Union fund. In my view, such an approach would lead to the elimination, in general, of comprehensive plans for economic and social development on all levels (Point 4). The draft does not indicate who is to approve this plan and what is its legal status. The purpose of coordinating plans for the subordinate economy and plans of enterprises under superior administration could be achieved by granting real rights to Union and autonomous republics and local soviets of people's deputies in controlling the efficient and ecologically safe economic activity of all enterprises within the republic or the region.

It is only in observing such fundamental principles in the federal structure of the economy that the question could be raised of the formulation and implementation of regional cost accounting and self-financing of Union

republics. In itself, the unification of all enterprises and cooperatives on the territory of a republic does not constitute a single economic system for the region, as is the sectorial system of a ministry. Absolutizing the territorial aspect of economic management means taking a step back to the sovnarkhozes and a total loss of the sectorial principle in enterprise management.

Expanding the rights of republics in the economic area and, on this basis, the creation of the concept of regional cost accounting lead to a radical revision of relations between Union republics, on the one hand, and USSR ministries and departments and the Union government, on the other. The reassignment of governmental ownership between the USSR and Union republics would in itself lead to a significant reduction in targets of Union management and would narrow the realm of activities of Union authorities and drastically reduce their number. We believe that in the immediate future the number of ministries should be substantially reduced in the production area, compared to those submitted by N.I. Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, for approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet. The structure of the government should be made consistent with the view that the state is the economic center distinct from direct economic management as stipulated in the resolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. The functions of economic management, currently performed by the ministries, must be transferred to unions and associations created by the enterprises themselves. The preservation of 32 all-Union ministries is incompatible with the actual broadening of the rights of Union republics. It would be expedient for the USSR Supreme Soviet to take up this question once again in 1 year, after reworking it thoroughly.

At the same time, this step must be supplemented by granting significantly greater rights to Union republics in the areas of economic and sociocultural development. It will be necessary to review the functions and rights of the USSR government, which will be responsible for and accountable not only to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet but also, to a certain extent, to the supreme authorities of Union republics. In other words, the USSR Council of Ministers cannot set assignments to enterprises under republic and local jurisdiction bypassing the Supreme Soviet of a Union republic. We should abolish stipulations equating the council of ministers of a Union republic with USSR ministries and departments. It would be expedient for the new constitution of the USSR to stipulate the right of the supreme soviet of a Union republic to raise the question directly with the USSR Supreme Soviet on annulling any resolution of the USSR government which violates the republic's rights.

The concept of territorial cost accounting should include economically substantiated standards which would ensure conditions and opportunities for the development of the production and social infrastructure equal for all republics. We must bear in mind in this case that the republics, like the other areas, should "earn" their

funds for the self-financing of their territories. Why put the word "earn" in quotation marks? Because territorial cost accounting is a rather conventional term. One can speak of the true meaning of the terms cost accounting and self-financing only in terms of the basic economic unit. Authorities and self-managing areas must create conditions for the efficient work of enterprises and cooperatives. It is important to establish the legal mechanisms which would make it possible directly within the area to guide capital investments in the development of the various economic areas, bypassing the redistribution of withholdings obtained from enterprises on a given territory through Union and, occasionally, also the republic budgets.

The system of regional cost accounting should in no case harm the economic autonomy of state and cooperative enterprises which could actually function only as socialist commodity producers. In developing this concept, we should remember that it is not a question of the economic management of the nation or the fact that it has the right to own all the resources on republic territory. The participants in regional cost accounting are all citizens of the republic regardless of their national origin, as are all collectives of enterprises and cooperatives.

Currently a unified national economic complex has developed for all production, distribution and trade levels and sectors and parts of the country. It is difficult in practice, if possible at all, to determine the contribution of any given ethnic group in its creation. Therefore, on the basis of their specifics, the Union republics could achieve a system of regional cost accounting and self-financing, contributing, on a priority basis, their own share of the national development programs.

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PUBLIC OPINION

Surveys, Letters to the Editors

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[Text]

Readers Consider, Argue, Suggest

Reach All Strata....

I. Matyushina, candidate of historical sciences, Moscow:

The electoral campaign and a number of speeches and rejoinders at the Congress of People's Deputies, and some subtle statements addressed to "backward" or, let us say, not entirely progressive strata of the working class has lead me to the idea that we have somehow lost one of the fundamental principles on the basis of which our party was created: the need for instilling a scientific outlook in all social classes and strata.

The words "we are not professors, we are bolsheviks," which were typical during the Stalinist age, can be heard today as well in a somewhat veiled manner. Above all, as in the past, they are firmly set in some minds. The period of "punishing" the intelligentsia in our post-October history lasted quite a long time. The saddest part of this situation is that it is also insulting to the workers and the peasants.

Let us remember that G.V. Plekhanov drew attention in his early work *"The Russian Worker in the Revolutionary Movement,"* to the education and intelligence of the progressive Russian proletariat with whom he was familiar since the populist period in his revolutionary activities. It was no accident that he quoted statements from worker letters: "We are not Sysoyki" ("the wild man," a character in a novel by F. Reshetnikov—author). Why do we have today to turn the workers into such "wild men?" Is this not the origin of the various simplistic views on social justice and a negative attitude toward cooperatives, including exclamations at the congress to the effect that someone had "palmed off" the leasing method to M.S. Gorbachev?

Functions relative to solving economic problems, including those of soap and detergent, which are not inherent of the party, have pushed into the background one of the most important party political tasks, described by V.I. Lenin as follows: go to all strata and to all social classes as a propagandist, an agitator and organizer. Be theoreticians, propagandists and agitators, be familiar with the thoughts of the university professor, the student, the worker and the peasant. Today all of us should once again reflect on Lenin's work "What Is To Be Done?"

What Was Lost

L. Samsonov, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow:

Today the cooperative movement is largely forced to begin literally from scratch. This is due to the fact that for a long time an unnatural economic policy of suppressing cooperatives was pursued. The hardest blow to its development was dealt in the 1950s and 1960s, when industrial cooperatives were closed down. Yet they were of major economic and social significance, and they numbered in excess of 200,000 enterprises with 1.8 million members of cooperatives who, already then, worked on the basis of the principles of full cost accounting and self-financing. The members of the cooperatives were responsible for their losses, paid out of by their share of contributions, earnings or the next year's profits. The members of the cooperatives earned nothing if the enterprise idled.

It was characteristic that most of the goods were sold at government prices. Also most of the raw materials (over 60 percent) came from the state. The cooperatives accounted for more than 13 percent of the overall volume of consumer goods. The industrial cooperatives accounted for about 40 percent of furniture production. They produced more than 30 million pairs of shoes as

compared to 0.6 million today and, respectively, knitted goods in excess of 130 million pieces, compared to 0.3 million in the mid-1980s. The cooperative was one of the main producers of containers in the country.

The successes of the industrial cooperatives were not accidental. They were based on serious scientific research. Work on such problems was done by two scientific research institutes, more than 100 design bureaus and 22 experimental laboratories. Publications for the cooperatives included the newspaper KUSTAR I ARTEL and the journals VESTNIK PROMYSLOVOY KOOPERATSII and PROMYSLOVAYA KOOPERATSIYA. There was a cooperative publishing house as well and more than 100 different books were published annually.

In the period of stagnation the design collectives of the cooperatives were methodically let go by the former Ministry of Light Industry Machine Building. This led, for example, to interrupting the development of refrigeration equipment for stores at the Estonian Rakvere Association. This output was distinguished by its particular reliability. It met the requirements of handling small volumes of non-durable goods sold in rural stores. Its quality parameters were an open challenge to the goods produced by the ministry.

The transfer of cooperative enterprises to the local industry system, which took place in the mid-1950s, essentially meant their expropriation. Subsequently as well, various forms of expropriation were not abandoned. Thus, for example, quite recently the cooperative general stores in Belorussian cities were "expropriated."

Estimates have indicated that today the annual volume of activities of industrial cooperatives could have reached 25 to 30 billion rubles. This means that in the period since their liquidation goods worth several hundred billion rubles were lost. Such is the price which society paid for this administrative step.

The economists had estimated that the higher level of socialization we reach and the more obvious our successes become, they could become even greater if we were to act as the familiar Sholokhov character, who socialized the chickens. Today, however, we have become aware of the bitter truth that socialization, like all phenomena in nature and economics, has its limits. It is no accident that in recent years there has been so much talk about minimizing, as the opposite of excessive socialization and concentration. Indeed, where an elephant would only trample the grass, a bee would gather honey. In our country, for example, the largest-possible bakeries have been set up but in some areas in frequent cases bread cannot be bought. We must develop small bakeries and small enterprises in the food industry.

Kolkhoz markets were the targets of real persecution. Their very condition is depressing. Less than one-third of them are equipped with warehousing facilities and less than 10 percent with refrigerated storage areas. More than one-half have no running water.

All such cases are not isolated but manifestations of obvious anti-cooperative trends in the theory and practices of the recent past. That is why it is so difficult today to revive the cooperative. This is largely related also to accusations against it. The negative phenomena in the development of the cooperative movement, justifiably noted today, are partially the consequence of previous deformations. Today we must restore both the volume of cooperative output and a respectful attitude on the part of society toward the cooperative members and encourage their self-respect. We must revive the cooperative traditions and ethics, without which we cannot have a normal socialist market.

Personal Guilt and Historical Inevitability

V. Dombrovskiy, doctor of technical sciences, head of the scientific research sector of the Elektrosila LPEO:

In recent months articles appeared in our press in which efforts were made to sum up, to some extent, the huge material of personal recollections and actual data on the unfairness and cruelty committed by our state, introduced, as the historians say, in scientific circulation. We can single out two main trends, excluding intermediary situations, in the variety of opinions on the reasons for illegalities and personal responsibilities for various actions.

Such opposite trends can be most clearly traced in the efforts to answer the question not of the reasons for the evil but of the responsibility, the culpability for it. The first trend is a search of personal guilt on the part of every active contemporary to the events. This trend can be conventionally described as "the call of the conscience." It was quite typical in the works of Russian classical writers, such as Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy or Chekhov. This trend was most clearly expressed in the article "Life Is Always Lived Today," which was published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and which is a literary presentation of memoirs of hereditary peasant and communist A.I. Maystrenko. The sincerity and power of these recollections cannot leave a person indifferent.

Aleksey Isayevich frankly writes that he was aware of the unfairness of the persecution as kulaks of many of his fellow villagers. He instinctively felt the inhumanity of the Stalinist "revolution from above," which was carried out with the help of people like him, kolkhoz chairmen and sovkhos directors. "My pain was indescribable," he writes. "I believed in the kolkhoz revolution. However, I could not see the people only as a 'building material.' I pitied the people." He was also familiar with the falsehood of the accusations made by his party comrades in 1934-1937 and also learned about the means used to make people admit to such accusations. Amazed at his blind faith, he nonetheless has not sought to justify his participation in the stormy events of the age, although he himself created more than he destroyed. "What kind of right idea was it," he writes, "that drove Stalin on, and did he believe in it himself, in its accuracy, by destroying everything that was 'not with him,' or even simply

'independent,' whether people, ideas, thoughts, books or words. However, together with Stalin and after Stalin, we followed. There is no justification for us as well."

Conscience is the supreme judge of man and the result of many years of difficult work and mental learning and painful elimination of stereotypes. How important it is today to let those whose conscience was always with the people speak, people who were not always able to speak out. A.I. Maystrenko pities all the victims of the end of the 1920s and the 1930s, making no distinction between the peasants persecuted for being kulaks, and the rural activists who became victims of repressions although it was thanks to their efforts that collectivization took place. Without the support of the rural aktiv and a considerable share of the poor peasantry, collectivization would not have taken place, and nor would have any other mass movement. This historical pattern was understood by P.A. Kropotkin himself, who wrote in an unfinished review of the book by H. Taine that "Slosser, a political historian and statesman, naturally, considered Robespierre the embodiment of the revolution." However, he was totally unable to understand how a single person could have such a tremendous power as Slosser had given him, and he asked Gregoire: "Tell me, once and for all, how was Robespierre able to control the entire France?" Gregoire quite calmly answered: "Each village had its own Robespierre!" He could have answered even more accurately by saying that "Robespierre is only your embodiment of that which was being created at that time within each village."

Without the open or silent support, without the indifference or, at worst, the fatigue of the masses, i.e., the majority, not only revolutionary but also reactionary movements which occur not locally but on a national scale would be impossible. One could not imagine that a few tens of thousands of active bolsheviks would have been able to assume and retain the power in 1917 had they not been supported by the majority of the people whose demands and dreams of the future were reflected in the bolshevik program.

It is at this point that we should try to understand what precise features of the national revolutionary awareness subsequently became the support of the pseudoscientific ideology which, under the guise of science, substantiated the restructuring of society by force, to fit a certain a priori established ideal in which, in fact, there was also a place for huge concentration camps. Let us note, to begin with, that the great right of any nation to a revolution and uprising against the arbitrariness of the authorities, so eloquently presented as early as the General Estates of Flanders in the 16th century, cannot be disputed without abandoning the framework of historical thinking and ordinary human ethics.

The fact that the people's uprising is always accompanied by cruelty on the part of revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries is confirmed by history, from ancient Greece to the present. We find an accurate description of the cruelty itself in the story by I. Babel "Life of

Pavlichenko, Matvey Rodionych" (as well as in other stories of the Civil War, the characters in which, as those of A. Serafimovich, are based on real prototypes) (for an hour or more the character is mauls his former master) and the reasons for it. To accuse of cruelty the people, when many thousands of soldiers and peasants died in the hands of the Whites, the left S.R. or the Greens in this merciless struggle to death would be a sham. Let us recall the children who were killed on 9 January 1905 on the streets of Petersburg. Let us remember that the soldiers in the "Iron Stream," asked to spare the children of the village ataman, answered that their own children had not been spared.... Recently YUNOST published the story by V. Ropshin (B. Savinkov) "The Black Stallion," which describes quite well the terror of the Whites, the Greens and other opponents of the bolsheviks. Unfortunately, however horrible terror may be, it is present in all popular uprisings.

Social inequality, which triggers social envy and, as a consequence, equalization trends in public awareness, is one of the motive forces of any revolution. Such trends are particularly strong among the poorest population strata and are aimed at the further intensification of a revolution aimed at equality. In all revolutions, starting with the religious wars of the Reformation, there have been left-wing and most radical trends of equalization, which were routed toward the end of the revolution, once its objectives had been attained.

Another characteristic feature of the people's revolutionary awareness is faith in fast changes for the better. Historical examples of such faith are the statement by Marat on the need to cut off several thousand heads to ensure the final victory of the revolution, and, in literature, the dream of Makar Nagulnov of the instantaneous solution of the national problem after a world revolution, or else the belief of the population of Chevangur that communism will come to them quickly. Finally, the third feature of the revolutionary people's awareness is belief in the possibility of solving all problems through violence, and faith in force, resembling a belief in miracles. Yet even a full political victory of any revolution can create only prerequisites for future development, achieved not by force but through persistent labor and thinking, the results of which, as a rule, are harvested by the subsequent generations.

It was these features of revolutionary awareness that made it possible, subsequently, ideologically to involve in the building of an administrative system huge masses of honestly feeling and gifted offspring of the people and thus to ensure the successful building of this political-economic monster which can exist, as it became clear, only with forced labor and forced distribution and which is doomed to a natural death as were the military settlements established by Aleksander I.

The increased discontent with inequality after the Civil War and as a result of the NEP, as well as the bureaucratization of economic and political life by the end of the 1920s revived in the masses the aspiration for further

intensification of the revolution leading to equality and the fast reaching of the lofty objectives (with the use of force). Unquestionably, this facilitated the manipulation of the awareness of the masses in the direction which was needed by Stalin's circle. The main prerequisite for the success of such a fraud was the lack of political freedom and the preservation, even under the liberal economy of the NEP, of a policy of ideological and political terror, i.e., the suppression of any political dissidence.

Do we have the right to blame the best representatives of the people for the fact that they were cheated? The building and successful functioning of the administrative system required more than a person such as Ignakh Sopronov, who is depicted in the novel by V. Belov as the main culprit for violence and arbitrariness on the lower levels of the system. Frequently, excellent specialists, who averaged 3 to 4 hours of sleep nightly, who wished nothing for themselves and, even under those circumstances, were able somehow to feed and clothe the country, became organizers and promoters of violence. Some of them intuitively found themselves opposing the system, for during those years (and until recently as well), not seeking anything for themselves personally, not acting as informers or using leaks, already meant being in opposition in the eyes of the command and the toadies and talentless personalities surrounding the commanders. These working people, who frequently also fell victims to the system, until quite recently at that, felt, in their majority, a feeling of guilt and repentance (similar to A.I. Maystrenko's) for their participation in the violence committed over the people (unlike them, people like Sopronov do not repent) and are actively supporting perestroika.

At the start of the 1950s, while in Siberian exile, this author met hereditary proletarian Pavel Fedorovich Litvinov who, at the age of 14, in 1908, was handling a lathe and, at the age of 18, had participated in the revolutionary movement. I remember the beautiful movements of his hands, which were able to do anything, and the pleasure which I had in talking to him in the smoky workshop of the machine tractor station, where both of us worked. He had been a member of the party before the revolution and had fought in the Civil War, was the recipient of an order and, by the end of the 1920s, had organized in Kharkov a demonstration with a demand for internal party democracy and, after his detention, when he was released from jail for having abandoned the opposition, had left the party. Litvinov also managed to do some fighting in the Patriotic War and it was after it, by the end of the 1940s, that he was exiled for his old sins, in a place several hundred versts away from the nearest railroad. His intelligence and tolerance in arguments were striking. He apologized for himself and for his class comrades for the fact that they had allowed Stalin to come to power. However, he disagreed with Plekhanov who had cautioned that Russia had not as yet milled the flour from which the pie of socialism could be baked....

As one can easily see, we unwittingly shifted to a discussion of the other trends in recent political journalism,

which could be described as seeking "scapegoats," seeking enemies who could be blamed for the calamities of the people. The fact that such a search is also a characteristic feature of mass, including revolutionary, awareness has is found in hundreds of historical examples. At some point this involved Christians, heretics, pagans, foreigners and nihilists; later it involved saboteurs, Trotskyites, opportunists and Zionists. Today we quite clearly hear the following refrain: Here is the just desert of the revolutionaries who destroyed the "softer, authoritarian but not totalitarian" rule of the Romanovs and of Purishkevich, with their physical punishment for peasants and hard labor inmates, with their black hundredths and their national pogroms, with shooting at demonstrations and ritual trials, and the age-old burden of oppression and excesses which created the terror from below of which the journalists occasionally accuse the leaders of the revolution. A. Blok, the nobleman, had a better understanding of why 100-year old linden trees were being cut down and houses in the estates of the nobility were being burned down.

There have always been a great deal of people willing to accuse the revolutionaries of unleashing terror. Nonetheless, it is difficult to accept such type of accusations if they apply, let us say, to Ovod, who was executed by a firing squad, although he too threatened, in case of victory, to use guns, which is something which indeed happened. Lenin's life which, as Gorkiy said, was one of modest support of an honest Russian intellectual-revolutionary, as was the life of Dzerzhinskiy or, let us say, Kovtyukh, who was the literary hero drawn up by Serafimovich, does not give grounds to suspect these people of selfishness, revenge or thirst for power or other base motivations, to use legal terminology. As to Stalin and his circle, by the end of the 1920s and in subsequent years they acted only on the basis of considerations of personal advantage, personal power and fear of possible retribution.

The impression is created that some journalists are trying to remove the guilt from their own generation by, coarsely speaking, laying it on the previous one. However, to this day the healthy and actively writing generation (with very rare exceptions) did not, in its majority, raise its voice in protest against Brezhnev. Virtually not one of those who publicly condemned the terror of the Civil War and its culprits, who were subsequently killed by Stalin, would even conceive of acknowledging his own guilt for the monolithic support of stagnation, the way A.I. Maystrenko admits to his guilt for supporting Stalin. Furthermore, to this day trying to please the leadership, precisely as during the age of stagnation, is not such a rare phenomenon.

Obviously, setting aside the question of the definitive search of personal guilt and responsibility for the difficulties of the past 70 years, which will be determined by the court of history (in the participation of which no one can be removed but also the definitive sentence of which does not involve a personal opinion), we must consider the inevitability or the possibility of a repetition of such events in the near future. This is important, for neither a governmental system which makes this possible nor public awareness, which is still greatly subject to the influence of

simplicistic concepts, and which is still applauding force and cruelty, and demanding prohibitions and suppression, do not, alas, guarantee us today against such a turn of events. Could we refuse to the people the right to an uprising which, as practical experience indicates, is the mother of terrorist awareness and, in the majority of cases, terror in action? Will mankind be able to develop a kind of immunity to the aspiration to solve national, religious or class conflicts through force which is destructive in terms of the law? What other harsh trials should our country experience before most of us stop believing in the possibility of an easy solution to difficult problems and become unused to the use of force and weapons as instruments of politics? How to raise a generation which will have the courage not to obey criminal orders even at the cost of its own life? "...What kind of power," D. Granin writes, "prevents the person from yielding to evil... cringing, behaving like scoundrels?"

It seems to us that the difficult process of restoring and developing a social morality, social wisdom and civic-mindedness is impossible without the complete and impartial publication of all materials and recollections about abuses in the past and the present, paying particular attention to the still timid efforts at scientific analysis of the reasons and consequences, and to works which provide a moral self-assessment of deliberate or unwitting actions (or inactions) on the approaches to history. The best example of such a literature, the author of which does not separate himself from the people or from his age is, probably, A. Chekhov's "*Sakhalin Island*."

In conclusion, I would like to quote an example from my own past. In 1951 I was being transferred as a prisoner from Leningrad to Siberia. In the common cell at one of the stops, I saw two youngsters, aged 9 or 10, among the hundreds of prisoners: Algis and Paulyukonis. These children of a former Lithuanian kulak had avoided being exiled together with their parents, for they were attending in the winter a school in another rayon and lived with their aunt. This aunt agreed with another aunt that the children would spend the summer in her village and help in farm chores. However, in their own rayon the youngsters were arrested on the basis of someone's report. They spent 3 months in the internal jail of the MGB and at that point the Special Conference (like us, sinners) was exiling them to Altay Kray, to be with their parents.

A boil on one of the children burst while he was in jail. He could not sit down yet daytime it was forbidden to lie down in the internal prison. The physician gave the boy special permission to lie down on the cot. However, the moment the shift changed, every supervisor deemed it his duty to get him up. The feeling of shame for the fact that I was unable to prevent this has remained in me to this day. Yet the executioners of those children belonged to my generation and it is not excluded that had I been free I may have even shaken their hand. All generations are involved in our history. The awareness of our own responsibility for everything that occurred yesterday and today in our homeland will perhaps develop within us high civic-mindedness, political courage and tolerance.

After Publication in KOMMUNIST

The Problem is Being Solved

A. Lepskiy, worker, CPSU member, Kharkov:

"I noted in KOMMUNIST No 8 a small article 'Two Rubles 14 Kopeks Per Kilogram,' which was a complaint voiced by a pensioner. I can imagine what amount of hurt must have piled up in a person to make him write to the journal. Possibly someone will read this and draw the conclusion that these are petty matters. I personally reached a different conclusion: a problem may be seen behind such a petty fact. Naturally, the journal cannot help everyone. However, it is quite important to draw the attention of the public and the leadership to existing problems. I quoted this at a party meeting. Sometimes we fail to note the concerns and frustrations of a person. Yet, the journal did...."

As A.P. Makarov, chairman of the Staroshaygovskiy RAPO, Mordovian ASSR, reported to the editors, the kolkhoz members were paid a long time ago the money which was owed to them for the cattle, or a total of 86,000 rubles. This includes Leontiy Yakovlevich Vasyakin, who had asked the journal for help, and who received his 724 earned rubles. Therefore, this specific problem was solved. But are there guarantees that this situation will not be repeated? What type of mechanism should exist which would strengthen rather than undermine the confidence of the peasants in the new forms of economic management which would include, something important, a system of just account settlement?

This question was answered by the chief of the planning-economic management and deputy chairman of the board of the Russian Republic Bank of the USSR Agroprombank, Mikhail Vladimirovich Belokopytov:

Above all, what was the kolkhoz which had no money relying on, when it accepted from the people the cattle they had raised (as was mentioned in the journal)? The point is that the farm drew moral and economic advantages from this. It had not suggested to L.Ya. Vasyakin to deliver the calf to the consumer cooperative which would have paid him immediately, for the kolkhoz included in the implementation of its plan the cattle, poultry and milk purchased on the basis of contracts with the population. At Vertelinskiy Kolkhoz, the share of such cattle is 75 percent.

Differentiated markups added to the prices of delivered farm commodities were introduced with the conversion of enterprises, sovkhozes and kolkhozes to total cost accounting and self-financing. In particular, in the case of Vertelinskiy Kolkhoz, in addition to the money which it paid to Leontiy Yakovlevich and his fellow villagers, the kolkhoz obtained from the state a 140 percent markup, or 192,000 rubles. However, even this did not save the farm. Its last year's losses totaled

106,000 rubles. The bank declared the kolkhoz insolvent. There is a calendar sequence of payments introduced in accordance with the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) and the Law on the Cooperative in the USSR, according to which all economic authorities are equally responsible for their debts, as stipulated in the law. This is a manifestation of the realistic nature of cost accounting.

The March Central Committee Plenum deemed it necessary to introduce steps to improve the financial situation of enterprises and organizations in the agroindustrial complex and to strengthen the economy of underprofitable and losing kolkhozes, sovkhozes, processing and other enterprises, and to improve payment discipline in order to achieve within the next 2 years their work without a loss. Each one of them must have a specific development program.

The program of Vertelinskiy Kolkhoz stipulates a profit of 163,000 rubles this year. If the steps which are taken do not ensure the profitable work of the farm, in accordance with proper procedure it could be reorganized or closed down and its land could be transferred to other kolkhozes, sovkhozes, industrial enterprises, cooperatives of leasing collectives and peasant farms.

However, a serious problem must be solved, one which hinders the development of leasing and cooperative relations in the countryside. The point is that economically weak kolkhozes and sovkhozes have piled up a great deal of debts which must be repaid in the next few years. In developing leasing collectives and cooperatives, such farms include in the leasing payments a certain sum for the repayment of the debts or else surreptitiously pass the debts on to the cooperatives. Naturally, not each one of them would assume such a burden. Yet it is precisely the losing and unprofitable farms that need the development of leasing more than the others. That is why we submitted a proposal of providing such kolkhozes and sovkhozes with financial aid by postponing the repayment of some of their loans. If lessees and cooperatives begin to work properly, the possibility of settling accounts with the bank will appear.

Furthermore, with the 5 April 1989 USSR Council of Ministers Resolution "On the Radical Restructuring of Economic Relations and Managements of the Agroindustrial Complex in the Country," the procurement organizations were given the right to stimulate the sale of goods on the basis of contracts for the fulfillment of the state order, issuing to supplying farms advances (up to 40 percent of the value of the grain and up to 25 percent of the value of other commodities as stipulated in the long-term contracts). The USSR Agroprombank will offer procurement organizations loans for such purposes. This procedure will be introduced as of 1990. We have proposed that a stipulation be introduced according to which, based on agreements between kolkhozes, sovkhozes and procurement organizations, some of the monetary advances could be deposited in a separate

bank account for settling accounts with individual suppliers of goods. This would make it possible to protect the rural population from various financial breakdowns in kolkhozes and sovkhoses.

Departmental Response and Actual Practices

Political Economy and Economic Policy Department:

A short while back a correspondence was published from Zaporozhye (A. Vasilyev, "There is a View," KOMMUNIST No 6, 1989), which dealt with the implementation of the basic principles of economic reform in the power industry and democratization of the sectorial management. One would assume that in recent months these processes have begun to develop much more energetically, for that is the conclusion which can be drawn from the study of the answer provided by A.N. Makukhin, USSR first deputy minister of power industry and electrification, which was received by the editors. It stipulates clearly and encouragingly that "the sector is continuing to seek efficient cost accounting relations and autonomy is being granted experimentally to some electric power plants and enterprises in the electric power system." It goes on to say quite optimistic that "by Order No 26 of the Ukrainian SSR Minenergo, dated 20 March 1989, six hydroelectric power plants, including Dneproges, were removed from the association and set up as autonomous enterprises directly under the Ukrainian SSR Minenergo."

Nonetheless, one of the participants in the "movement for autonomy," Dneproges Chief Engineer A.I. Popov, assesses the situation somewhat differently. In his letter to the journal he notes the following: "While this material was being prepared for publication, changes took place in the life of the power industry workers at Dneproges and, actually, of that of all power workers along the Dnepr which, unfortunately, worsened their situation even further. The Order 'On the Creation of the Ukrainian Association of Hydroelectric Power Plants of the Ukrainian SSR Minenergo' mandated the separation of four hydroelectric power plants and two hydroelectric power plant systems, located in six Ukrainian oblasts and at distances ranging up to 700 kilometers, from historically developed power systems, and artificially reduced them to the status of a totally senseless association. The enterprises within this association are totally unrelated except by virtue of this order, and the joint functions, as proclaimed in the order, can never be carried out. This new development will only hinder their work. Even unknowledgeable people would realize quite clearly the purpose of this action. Someone wanted to set up in Kiev an office to which he could partially transfer some personnel of the excessively inflated ministry apparatus. This way management was supposed to come 'closer' to production."

The result of the discussion on the participation of departments in the activities of enterprises within the power system in the country is described in his response by V.I. Bryzgalov, director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya

GES: "In my view, we need neither territorial nor production associations nor any intermediary formations. In our country the task of the distribution of power is successfully solved by joint and rayon dispatcher administrations. As to the ministry, its prerogative should be the formulation of a unified technical policy and the consolidated planning of scientific and technical progress. It is only in this case that the two-step management system of enterprise-ministry could work as it should."

Nonetheless, the question of the relationship between power enterprises and departments remains unanswered. We must admit that although the Law on the State Enterprise stipulates that the labor collectives are the owners, it does not ensure their economic independence. As in the past, enterprises remain dependent on the superior authorities. Possibly, as both Popov and Bryzgalov believe, leasing could resolve this situation. This should be real leasing in accordance with which earnings will go into a bank account and not to the ministry and the enterprise will be dealing directly with the budget. It is only then that labor collectives will acquire not the fictitious but the real right to manage their life.

Excerpts From Letters

E. Kovalev, Lvov:

Today a great many things are being questioned. Various publications—literary, sociopolitical, or popular science—are offering their interpretations of various economic, philosophical, historical or cultural problems. The readers of KOMMUNIST and, above all, its subscribers, have the right to expect that their theoretical and political journal will provide a scientific analysis and assessment of the changes occurring in our society.

A. Korotayev, war and labor veteran, CPSU member since 1949, Voronezh:

For the time being, in our country democracy and glasnost in matters of economic activities are of a general-lulling nature. The past is being indiscriminately criticized and today's difficulties are being tolerated. As a result, little is changing for the better. What are we to do? In my view, we must stop wasting government and public money by publicizing the names of those who are disrupting the economy and who base their work on the prestige of their departmental offices and bureaucratic structures. The economic affairs of all departments must be placed under scientific and broad public control.

N. Mishin, CPSU member since 1945, Chernigov:

Party committees, soviets and trade union authorities are making a great deal of relevant and constructive decisions. Reality proves, however, that many good things are not being done, a large number of useful and specific initiatives are not being carried out and that the confidence of the people in the decisions which are being made is being lost. This is both concerning and

depressing. In my view, all party meetings and sessions of party committees and soviets should open with mandatory information on the implementation of previously adopted resolutions and decisions. Let there be fewer of them but greater responsibility for their implementation.

A. Cheremskaya, Beslan, North Osetian ASSR:

The personnel in our libraries were instructed to remove materials on CPSU Central Committee plenums and sessions of USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets and works by party and government leaders written between 1953 and 1973. Why is this being done? Will "blank spots" once again appear in our history? Would it not be better to publish more works which would accurately reflect the country's life at that time?

Yu. Muromskiy, worker, ReaktivElektron Scientific-Production Association, Donetsk:

Letters to the editors expressing their puzzlement concerning the activities of various voluntary societies have begun frequently to appear in the periodical press, including the central newspapers. The electoral programs of many candidates for USSR People's Deputies included, expressed in one way or another, the thought either of eliminating or streamlining the structure of the management of such societies. What will actually happen, obviously, will depend on us, voters. Personally, I believe that it would make sense to provide on a voluntary basis material aid to the Army, Navy, environmental protection and the Red Cross. I categorically oppose, however, the existence of various instructors, inspectors and other individuals who do not personally participate in practical affairs.

I dare to claim that my opinion is shared by the majority of workers and employees. Let me repeat that neither I nor my fellow workers oppose giving material aid to any society. With a well-organized and objective explanatory work, even greater withholdings could be made. However, they should be spent only on specific targets and for specific purposes, and be used to strengthen the material and technical facilities and increase the wages paid to those who do the actual work.

I. Khatuyev, history teacher, party organization secretary, Alkhanchurt Secondary School, Checheno-Ingush ASSR:

I believe that today we should also discuss the principle of participation in holiday demonstrations. Officially this is not mandatory but managers of various enterprises, and this is no secret, make use of various means of pressuring their workers. Is this necessary? Let the people decide for themselves. Excessive organization and coercion can only irritate the people. Frequently the sole purpose of a demonstration is to march by a rostrum in straight ranks, and it is important "properly" to cross the "main" sector in front of the local leadership. Somehow, however, the people forget the reason for which they are marching down the main streets of the city. Why should such demonstrations take place? They should not be held for the sake of formality.

Let me cite a familiar example. Everyone probably remembers the natural catastrophe which occurred last spring in the mountain areas of our republic. Landslides left thousands of families without roof and home. Under those circumstances, was it worth it to have a grandiose May Day demonstration when literally 10 to 20 kilometers from us there were victims who lived under open skies? Perhaps it would have been better to hold no more than a meeting. A variety of forms could be applied as indicated by reality itself. This is my opinion. I would be interested in hearing someone else's.

G. Gutkin, Chelyabinsk:

I suggest that the section "Public Opinion" include a sociological analysis of readers' responses to specific journal materials. Such a study should include a statistical interpretation of the letters which were received and the opinions they express, and a publication of survey data. To this effect, I believe, the readers should be asked to evaluate the most important concept in the published articles. This approach would be useful in realistically determining the range of opinions of the majority of party and nonparty members.

Responses to our Publications

Two Letters—Two Approaches

A. Pika and B. Prokhorov. "Big Problems of Small Nations." KOMMUNIST No 16, 1988.

B. Lashov, doctor of economic sciences, professor, Political Economy Department, Leningrad Agricultural Institute:

Some researchers, including the authors of this article, tend to interpret many of the difficulties of the peoples of the North in terms of the concentration of the native population in settlements and cities, where they are frequently removed from their traditional occupations, inadequately provided with jobs, have an improperly organized way of life, etc. Although this movement by the native population has a much broader and objective foundation, it is frequently related only to the policy of settling nomad peoples. For example, A. Pika and B. Prokhorov claim, in general, that such a policy is not scientifically substantially without, however, presenting the nature of the problem and identifying the very concept through the practice of its implementation.

Nonetheless, the essence of the concept of settling national groups is not to destroy the traditional economy but to develop it on a new technical and organizational basis while preserving, to a certain extent, its nomad forms. It also presumes the development of an internal transportation system and a system of settlements, ensuring full and efficient employment in traditional and new sectors of activities, availability of housing and improving sociocultural services to the population. Within the framework of the comprehensive solution of the problem of converting to a settled way of life,

possibilities of improving living and sociocultural conditions become immeasurably broader. However, equally unquestionable is the fact that freedom in choosing a way of life should be retained by the native population. It is true that for objective reasons the possibilities of such a choice are becoming increasingly limited.

The forecasts made with the deliberate assumption that the ecological situation and the raw material base of the traditional sectors will remain unchanged and that technical facilities and labor productivity will increase by no more than a factor of 1.8 indicate that in the next 20 to 25 years the share of the native population related to traditional industries will drop approximately from 50 to 25-30 percent. Correspondingly, the share of the native population living in cities and urban type settlements will increase. The continued development of the North will only shorten this time. Therefore, in the future the separation of the northern ethnic groups from their traditional industries will intensify and the problems of activities will become problems of labor and a settled life under conditions new to them.

In my view, the free development and self-expression of the ethnic groups of the North presume a radical expansion of the autonomy and self-government of the native population under different economic and administrative conditions. Despite the insignificant share of such population in many rayons (okrugs) of the North, the use of the principle of proportional representation does not allow the local soviets to act as proper defenders of the interests of northern ethnic groups. On the level of autonomous okrugs, a two-chamber structure of soviets of peoples deputies should be introduced.

Nonetheless, the creation of associations of ethnic national groups—a supranational authority which, by virtue of its status would hardly have any real economic and administrative power—is not, in my view, the radical way of solving the problem. Progress along the established trends of perestroika of the economic mechanism and the development of the democratic process is much more important. Obviously, it is necessary, above all, to convert to full cost accounting by primary production units in the traditional area of activities of the native population so that they may become the true masters of their land and other resources and structure their relations with other users such resources on the basis of payments, compensations, etc.

L. Gumilev, doctor of historical sciences; K. Ivanov, candidate of geographic sciences; and S. Khrushchev, associates at the Scientific Research Institute of Geography, Leningrad State University:

The basic and by no means ecological problem which is on the agenda today is whether to “develop” further the ethnic groups of the North, surmounting their “age-old cultural and economic backwardness” or preserve their national-culture originality and autonomy? It is not for nothing that we put the word “develop” in quotation

marks, for in fact the experience in surmounting the age-old backwardness of the northern peoples would bring results which would be totally unexpected in terms of the theory of cultural construction. Separated from their traditional occupations (reindeer breeding, hunting, fishing) and being put through the equalizing system of universal education in boarding schools, the overwhelming majority of the Mentsy, Khanty, Mansi, Chukchi, Koryaki, Evenki and Saamy have become, in their overwhelming majority, not even second-rate but third-rate Russians who can no longer go back to their native tundra and tayga and are unable to compete with Russians in industry.

The conclusion drawn by Pika and Prokhorov to the effect that, as a rule, they have to be satisfied only with low-paid nonprestigious jobs is fully confirmed by the results of our field studies in three autonomous okrugs: Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi. Yes, the native population of the North is becoming “lumpenized,” which leads to deep social alienation, passiveness and pessimism. The viewpoint that we are facing a new progressive phenomenon of internationalization is, in our view, not only erroneous but also fraught with even more profound irreversible consequences for the northern peoples.

Another very important concept, to the effect that the policy of converting the nomad population into a settled way of life is based on spontaneously developed views, is not scientifically substantiated and leads not only to the destruction of a traditional economic complex but also to the disappearance of the native population as a sum total of original ethnic groups, is also unquestionable.

On the assignment of the RSFSR Gosplan, our scientific collective made a special study of the consequences which, for a number of decades, led to the conversion of nomads (Mansi, Khanty, Selkupy and Komi-Izhemtsy) to a settled existence. It cannot be said that the Gosplan was entirely pleased with the results. Facts, however, are a stubborn thing. As a result of the conversion to a settled way of life of the native northern peoples, which took place in the reindeer raising areas under the guise of applying the shift-link method for reindeer breeding, there was a substantial reduction in the number of reindeer breeders as well as their brigades and the load per shepherd increased. Presently reindeer shepherds are in short supply in virtually all farms in the North with the exception, perhaps, of Yamal, where a skeptical attitude toward converting to a settled way of life was adopted despite the orders issued by the center.

The shift-link method inevitably led to a lowering of the quality of the reindeer products delivered to the state (maximal weight from 37 down to 26 percent in 20 years, according to YANAO). There has been a loss of jobs among the native population in traditional sectors, not only reindeer breeding but hunting and fishing. Traditional occupations have lost half of their prestige among secondary school graduates. The young people are continuing the work of their fathers and grandfathers only in

areas in which domestic reindeer are being bred in private plots. The labor skills of the reindeer breeders, fishermen and hunters can be mastered by the youngsters only within the family. Conversely, to an even greater extent the boarding schools are driving a wedge between the generations among the northern peoples.

As the level of nomad life drops, so does the birth rate among the native population. A conversion to a settled way of life increased sexual disproportions in the tundra (a shortage of women) and reduced the number of children born to nomad families. It is becoming increasingly difficult for reindeer breeders in the tundra or hunters in the tayga to raise a family. A social division among the sexes is taking place: the number of women engaged in traditional industries is declining while it is growing in the nonproduction area in the settlements. As a result of this self-accelerating process the Saamy in the Kola Peninsula have become virtually extinct as an ethnic group.

A conversion to a settled way of life drastically increased the number of the unemployed native population. Problems of job finding, the stress caused by a forced change in the way of life, and the idling of people in the almost semi-annual shifts in the shift-link method for grazing reindeer are leading to an increase in alcoholism, and the mortality rate; the crime rate is increasing as well and it is higher in areas in which a higher percentage of the native population have been converted to a settled way of life.

The results we obtained confirm the need for the preservation of the nomad population. Demographically, economically and socially it is the more active segment of the native population that ensures the stable development of all key areas in the traditional way of life of the peoples of the North. For that reason alone it would be necessary to take a new look at the claim of cultural deficiency of the traditional way of life of northern ethnic groups. It is this difficult task which these authors have assumed.

T. Zaslavskaya. "Live With Open Eyes," KOMMUNIST No 8, 1989.

I. Zhilinkova, Kharkov:

Obviously I must explain the reason for which I am particularly interested in this material. I have legal training. I do scientific work and teach at Kharkov's Juridical Institute. Even my small experience indicates that there simply is a catastrophic gap between theoretical elaborations in jurisprudence and the actual exercise of rights. It is not for nothing that former students say that in the course of practical work they are advised to forget sooner all they learned in the VUZ. Citizens have certain rights codified in the law but in fact their use is sometimes impossible. Furthermore, quite a large number of legal norms are simply "hanging in the air!" As the saying goes, there is the law in the books and the law in life. For example, indicative of this are facts of the practical unsuitability of many laws passed of late. Yet

these are not some kind of departmental instructions but laws! Sometimes one is simply ashamed for the sake of the jurists although, I understand, that they are not the only ones to be blamed. I believe that the recently held First USSR Congress of People's Deputies also highlighted a number of our errors of this kind.

I am saying this because the real state of affairs can be clarified only through the use of sociological methods. Unfortunately, the sociology of law shares the destiny of our general sociology and, possibly, is in an even worse situation. I, who am a specialist in the field of family law, have seen extremely few knowledgeable specific-sociological studies and works in the area of my professional interests. The statements made by T.I. Zaslavskaya and other sociologists in the press and on television always make me feel optimistic. It is quite regrettable, however, that there is virtually never any mention of the sociology of the law. Could it be that no one is interested in such problems? I cannot even dream of making a comprehensive study of the functioning of the legal system but perhaps the studies of public opinion concerning the law as a whole and specific legal acts and the knowledge, understanding and support of the law, undertaken by T.I. Zaslavskaya's VTsIOM could do so. On these matters we are simply like blind kittens. I do not understand at all how one can seriously speak of any kind of legal policy if nothing is known about those to whom it applies and those who are implementing it.

In his time Vyshinskiy covered all areas of sociolegal studies and reoriented them into the channel of abstract theorizing. We cannot deny that in this area we have been quite successful. But what will be the situation with the sociology of law? There are extremely few noted jurists working on this subject. Therefore, familiar with the persistence shown by Academician Zaslavskaya in supporting our right to live with our eyes open, I turn to her with the appeal to listen to the needs of practical jurists.

V. Bokhovkin, V. Ganzhin, Yu. Lisitsyn and P. Sidorov. "Soberly on Sobriety," KOMMUNIST No 7, 1989.

V. Kagan, candidate of medical sciences, associate, Leningrad Pediatric Medical Institute, member of the VDOBT:

It would be no particular exaggeration to consider this article an event in the formulation of efficient approaches to antialcohol and antidrug policy and its implementation. What makes this material all the more topical is that the practical implementation of the 1985 USSR Council of Ministers Resolution clearly proved that the sum of hasty actions is by no means an efficient policy. The distortion of the idea of the advantages of a sober way of life into the idea of the "struggle" for sobriety leads to a search for an "enemy" who is presumed to exist by the very logic of such a struggle, and this enemy has become the person in whose name this struggle is being waged.

The authors of the article (who are specialists who have not simply made a major contribution to antialcohol work but also have blazed many new paths in it) are absolutely right in saying that the existing situation and the results of its study leave no hope for success for the "Storm und Drang" tactic. The formulation of the optimal paradigm and the policy following from it and, perhaps, the means for its implementation are impossible without a critical analysis of the currently existing antialcohol ideology, an analysis which the authors provide in their article.

The typology of alcohol consumption raises the question of a differentiation in propaganda targets. As a medical psychologist and psychotherapist, I claim that the present "propaganda" leads to the active or passive resistance on the part of the public which, furthermore, for decades witnessed a steady disparity between words and actions. A profound psychological substantiation is needed to humanize antialcohol propaganda: an orientation toward the real concerns of the people and methods which make it possible to appeal to "the heart" and convert such information into personal convictions and concepts which motivate man's behavior.

This line of psychological attuning goes not only through man but also through his microsocial environment, sociopsychological processes, social organizations, culture and ideology. In this connection, the authors are perhaps the first to address themselves to the extremes of a mythologized awareness which pits "alcohol" myths against antialcohol ones, which intoxicate with the opportunities they provide and which eliminate a sober and healthy view on matters. It is precisely the mythologizing that allows antialcohol propaganda, unsupported by providing opportunities for an alternate type of behavior. We are forced to agree with the authors about the need to eliminate alcohol from mass behavior above all through the use of social methods, which would not only eliminate the social reasons for becoming an alcoholic but would also broaden the range of socially acceptable methods for the satisfaction of needs.

Human ecology faces the threat of alcohol—the relay race of alcoholic heredity—and alcoholic upbringing threatens to become a vicious circle. On that level the assessment made by the authors of the initial steps of the All-Union Voluntary Society for the Struggle for Sobriety (VDOBT) sounds like a serious warning of the wastefulness of any further quantitative increase of antialcohol efforts unless the quality of such efforts changes. All historical experience indicates that outbreaks of alcoholism accompany periods of upheavals in social life. Since we are experiencing precisely such a period, do we have the right to ignore and, therefore, not compensate for the shady and potentially destructive aspects of it? The negative answer to this question and the formulation of basic questions in substantiating the tactics and strategy of the sobriety movement, I believe, constitute the significance of this article. In my view, together with the materials of the roundtable, carried in

No 11 of KOMMUNIST for 1987 could serve as a starting point for a broad social exchange of views on such a serious problem.

The Documentary Movie—"The New Wave." KOMMUNIST No 3, 1989.

L. Gabay, Kemerovo:

I read with interest the roundtable meeting on problems and difficulties of our documentary motion pictures. It was essentially a question of the complex interrelationships between cinematographers and state and party organizations and about organizational matters. Let me make a substantial addition. The movies which reach the audience concentrate the public attention on sensitive problems. That is why it is very important to know how the respective governmental or economic organizations react to criticism from the screen and what steps are taken to correct scandals depicted. I suggest that the cinematographers consider the form in which this can be achieved. This must be done for otherwise the documentaries (which are today displaying quite a critical mood) would lose their effectiveness.

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SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

'Measure of Science' or the Dusk of Delusion?

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[Article by V. Kiseleva, doctor of economic sciences; T. Kuznetsova, candidate of economic sciences; L. Mindeli, candidate of economic sciences; and A. Fonotov, candidate of economic sciences. USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress]

[Text] Until recently our science held one of the most honorable places in the ranks of the proper images which maintain in the press, among the multimillion strong Soviet readership, the necessary civic tonality, for the fact that it had "conquered," "transformed," "refuted customary ideas," and, as a result, "embodied the most daring dreams." The search for the culprits was started when it became clear that such news of comprehensive successes had been grossly exaggerated. The ranks of such culprits are being steadily increased, including managers, party workers and members of cooperatives. Scientists have assumed a "place of honor" among them. Professionals, alongside amateurs, are joining this captivating and fruitful search. The substantiation of conclusions (or, better said, organization conclusions) of the latter are not amateurish accusations but virtually complete prosecution indictments. It has already been "proven" that the ruination of our countryside in the 1970s was the fault of T.I. Zaslavskaya; the Chernobyl tragedy is on the conscience of nuclear physicists; the low

level of domestic computers should be blamed on slow-witted engineers, and economic difficulties are the result of the activities of careless economists. People who have a difficulty in distinguishing between a scientific idea, theory or hypothesis and their administrative implementation should be reminded that we already walked down this road. Where it took us is well-known. It is obvious, however, that today not everyone realizes that looking for the reasons for our difficulties and seeking the culprits are different things. No progress is possible without the former. The latter involves impasses such as the "Shakhtino trial," the trials of saboteur-engineers," and numerous campaigns, such as the struggle against "stateless cosmopolites," Weismanists-Morganists, cyberneticians and other "enemies" of social progress.

In his not quite fictional description of Gradov City, A. Platonov provided a formula of the results of the second way: "The city had no heroes. It unanimously and submissively passed resolutions on world problems. There may have been heroes in Gradovo as well but they were driven away by strictly legal proper measures." The idea of the need for such "measures" seems to be hovering in the pages of articles recently carried by our press on problems of the development of basic and applied research in the country.

Science is the most valuable capital of society. It is the wealth of any country and largely determines its present and its future. That is why the sharpness of the discussions on its role in the development of the country and the profound interest shown by all social strata in the soonest possible resolution of the difficulties standing on its way are by no means amazing. However, whereas virtually all participants in discussions related to scientific problems and senior personnel who make various decisions which determine its future fate are, as a whole, agreed on the fact that the status of science is unsatisfactory and that its effectiveness is low, ways of solving this crisis and key problems requiring first-rate decisions are assessed in entirely different ways.

Typical in the discussion of the problems of the low efficiency of Soviet science is the fact that many members of the superior echelons, as the fashionable phrase is today, of the administrative-bureaucratic system and quite broad circles of the reading public are engaged in it with the help of the well-familiar method, as has frequently been the case in the past, of charging the scientists with responsibility for the numerous "sins" committed by the mechanism governing the functioning of our economy. How can it be otherwise? Practically all of them in the contemporary world can be easily reduced to a decline in the growth rates, the "sliding" of scientific and technical progress and low public production efficiency. Who if not scientists are involved in this, most of all? The more so since the opinion that the Soviet scientist is less efficient than his foreign colleagues became deeply became deeply instilled, a long time ago, in the public awareness, and failed to "redeem" for the significant funds spent by the state in support of science (there even are assessments of the level of this gap as

being no more than 25 percent that of his American colleagues). Let us add to this the still popular idea of the free, highly paid and irresponsible nature of scientific activities, which not only survived but was strengthened in the recent past. Many such popular "truths" have been repeatedly written about in the press. Let us try to understand the nature of the processes which are taking place and assess the accuracy of such arguments and conclusions. Where is here the measure of guilt and the "measure of truth?" Is it as easy as it sometimes seems to assess the possibilities and needs of science and to determine the real results of scientific activities? Is it possible to make a straight judgment of the efficiency of science on the basis of end economic results while science is merely the first link in the way of the creation and materialization of knowledge?

Unquestionably, the scientists share the responsibility for the present condition of society and the economy. Science is part of society and inevitably bears its "birthmarks." However, it is precisely in science, as one of the areas of intellectual activities, that requires not only professionalism but such a high level of morality that manifestations of conformism, administration by fiat, bureaucratism and departmentalism are particularly intolerable.

It is a well-known fact that departmentalism in science has a variety of manifestations and is extremely harmful, and that frequently the scientists themselves become its first victims. We also know that in frequent cases the signatures of our leading scientists may be found under important economic, political and social documents which may contain erroneous resolutions. However, the real participation of the scientists in selecting ways of development of our society is more the exception than the rule. It is high time actively to involve them in the administration of the country and to consider their recommendations in decision drafting and making, promptly and purposefully, rather than running to scientific "first aid" when the time for formulation of radical decisions has been lost forever, as was the case with the price reform which economists had suggested 10 years ago, when the socioeconomic situation was less stressed than it is now.

We can only agree with the fact that the state of affairs in Soviet science is unacceptable to the country. *Perestroyka* in this area of social activities is vitally necessary! What is the reason for stagnation in science and what are its difficulties? Naturally, they are not found in the fact that excessive funds with low returns have been wasted on its development. The difficulties of our science are the difficulties of the entire society which are worsened in science precisely because, neglecting the story of the familiar Pushkin character, we all that frequently "tried to be cheap."

In order seriously to discuss the problems and key trends in the development of science, we must know, above all, how truly serious are the intentions of society. On the state level they are manifested precisely in the resources

appropriated for the development of science, above all in terms of money and personnel. In this connection, we would like to take up once again the problems of our statistics (once again because our scientists not merely speak but shout on the subject of such problems in the newspapers and journals, including KOMMUNIST).

What do the data in statistical sources say or, more accurately, what do they conceal? The total cost of research and development in our country amounts to 33 billion rubles. In many statements this figure, based on Western evaluations, is measured against the gross national product (GNP). The result is that the USSR spends some 3.7 percent of its GNP on science, i.e., the highest percentage (even compared to the United States) of the social product. The question of the reasons for the widespread reference to Western evaluations in our scientific and journalistic publications is more of a rhetorical nature. Special files have already been opened for inspection, KGB personnel are holding press conferences for Soviet and foreign journalists, and meanwhile the true statistics of our development remain inaccessible to scientific workers, not to mention the public at large. It has long been established that our statistical data cannot be directly used, compared to other countries, for they have been structured in such a way that they cannot be compared to anything else!

If we are forced to use Western estimates, we should nonetheless do this cautiously, the more so since they are an eclectic combination of straight figures taken from our statistical collections (expenditures for science) and estimates.

In terms of the national income, as used in Soviet statistics, the amount of expenditures for scientific research and experimental design (NIOKR) is insignificantly behind U.S. expenditures.

The main thing is found not in relative assessments but in the "cost" of our information, so to say, its internal use. Naturally, the nonspecialists could naively use statistical data for NIOKR in the USSR; specialists, however, both officials and managers, must know that these are "tricky" figures, for they are so very pleasing to the eyes and ears of the leading personnel, while the simple mortals are shown tricky mirrors. Thus, the set amount (33 billion rubles) hides, to begin with, a double accounting. All this means is that a great volume of contractual scientific research projects are counted both by those who have performed them and those who pay for them. Even at the lowest estimate, this would amount to 7-8 billion rubles. Second, this amount does not include a number of activities related to NIOKR in particular, and the fact that outlays in the plant scientific sector are only partially included.

The "tricky" figure does not tell us what amount of this 33 billion went to so-called civilian science: one-quarter, one-third? (In the report submitted by N.I. Ryzhkov at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the sum of military NIOKR was assessed at 15.3 billion rubles).

Also not mentioned is the real amount of funds which, from the sum of defense NIOKR goes to basic research (i.e., to an increase in knowledge) rather than applied research, which has entirely specific targets. Nonetheless, let us reveal the secret to the reader: the entire annual budget of our academy could pay for one or two modern airplanes, and the budget of the entire civilian science, could pay for slightly more.

We know that by decision of the government the defense sectors are already now turning to a civilian economy. However, also clear is the fact that the development of "auxiliary" output and that the production of "frying pans made of titanium" is easier to achieve than to convert military NIOKR into civilian. Even the practical Americans assess the step of utilizing military technology for civilian sectors as taking at least 10 years. To hope for such a narrowing of the gap in our country, considering the unsurmounted passion for secrecy, departmentalism and rigidity would be unrealistic (in any case for the next few years). That is why society should know that an entirely different picture comes much closer to reality: our civilian science, which is turned above all to face the needs of society, is simply poor, not to say unfortunate.

One of the reasons for its insufficient effectiveness is precisely the lack of that which in many articles and speeches on stagnation in science is merely hinted at (material and technical facilities, quality of tools and instruments, low wages, lack of auxiliary personnel, etc.). If we use those same Western sources we like, we could report to the readers that in 1987 the capital-labor ratio in "science and scientific services" in our country accounted for approximately 10,000 rubles, which is less than half the figure in industry. In the United States the capital-labor ratio per person in NIOKR is some \$60,000 and is approximately equal to the amount in industry.

Here is something else about the figures: their study is a good thing. However, we must not forget what lies behind them. Based on the GNP indicator (on the basis of which many indicators in Western statistics are structured) both Japan and, naturally, the United States are far ahead of our country. Consequently, the amount of resources they channel into science is entirely different. Each percent of the GNP they invest in science represents a progressive material and technical base and excellently trained and highly paid cadres, who value their work and enjoy social protection.

Let us consider the question of the number of Soviet scientists. The situation here is the following: to begin with, we must explain to the readers that a comparison between Soviet and foreign scientists is difficult because our statistics consider this figure in terms of "physical individuals," whereas foreign statistics consider it in terms of "equivalent of full employment." Physical individuals means counting scientific "heads," regardless of the amount of time they spend on science. The full employment equivalent presumes that the number of scientific cadres is determined on the basis of the actual

time they spend on NIOKR (if a scientist spends half his working time in a laboratory and the other half as member of the council of directors of a corporation, his actual employment in science is assessed on the basis of the 0.5 coefficient). To use the equivalent of full employment in assessing the number of scientific cadres would be more accurate. In our country, however, no such statistics are being kept. If we compare the number of scientific cadres in the USSR and the United States in terms of physical individuals, we could speak of a rough parity between the figures.

Furthermore, there also is, as we pointed out, a disparity in wages. In the developed capitalist countries scientists are paid quite highly: the salaries within the structure of scientific outlays account for 50 percent, compared with 40 percent in the USSR. Even in "thrifty" Japan, scientific labor is double or triple the payment for labor in industry and other economic sectors. Furthermore, active use is made of additional methods for economic incentive. In the USSR science is fourth in the economic sectors (it is followed by trade, the low level of salaries in which has been a subject of permanent interest on the part of the OBKhSS), which leads only to the disappearance of the most active and talented people capable of engaging in scientific activities. Over the past 10 years the percentage of doctors of sciences under 40 has declined in the USSR by a factor of 3 while that of candidates of sciences has been reduced by one-half. The share of people with degrees in said age group is approximately 25 percent of their total number in our country and about 40 percent in the United States.

Let us note that science is in fourth place in terms of salaries only thanks to the very narrow stratum of a highly paid "elite." Even in the USSR Academy of Sciences scientists who earn an average of over 400 rubles per month account for no more than 7 percent while the number of full and corresponding members is some 0.6 percent.

We are behind the Western countries in the amount of outlays per person employed in science (which includes salary and work facilities) also in terms of the percentage of scientific workers out of the overall number of people employed in science. Naturally, the Soviet population is bigger than that of other countries, for which reason people who are potentially capable of engaging in scientific activities are more numerous: natural talent is distributed evenly.

The lack of information becomes particularly clear in assessing the "efficiency" of scientific work. This category is so complex and heterogeneous that determining it with the help of a single indicator (rubles or percentages) is impossible. Prices of scientific and technical output are arbitrary and the income of a scientific organization is most frequently a temporary economy of outlays compared to the initial assessment. Therefore, any "gross" evaluation of the efficiency of science on the basis of direct comparisons would indicate only that the Soviet scientist costs society several hundred percent less

than would the American scientist. To this day the outlay economic mechanism and the lack of interest shown by the economy in novelties, the economic rightlessness of the innovator, and the "consumerist" approach to science displayed by economic managers who would like to have the scientist eat for three but work for seven and is engaged, as they now say, in a broad front of projects, is to this day blocking reliable increases in the real efficiency of science. This must not be! Pursuit of thrift has taken our science to a level at which the efficient use of the allocated funds has become simply impossible.

It is frequently suggested to us to borrow the experience of the "economical model" of science as practiced in Japan. Well, to learn from the Japanese how efficiently to invest our resources would be useful not only in science but in other areas of activity as well. However, it is also necessary to remember that in the 1950s and 1960s, when Japan was behind the other countries in its scientific and technical development, spending on it no more than 1.5 percent of its GNP, it generously "purchased science" abroad. At that time as much as 25 percent of its capital investments in the processing industry were used to import the latest technology, i.e., economy in the development of its own science was compensated by resources spent in purchasing, improving and mastering the latest achievements of science and technology. After this strategy had exhausted its possibilities, Japan converted to the intensive development of its own potential, "without forgetting" basic research in which today it is as good as the other countries.

Since the question of the significance of basic research is being quite extensively discussed in the press, we deem it important to note the following: in all countries on earth, basic research means research the result of which is not directly used in technology or economics but is expressed in an increase in the sum of acquired knowledge. Funds for financing basic research in corporations in Western countries are not, as a rule, of a "contract nature." It is simply that practical Americans, Japanese and French see the usefulness of such research less in solving specific problems than in attaining high profitability in the so-called nontargeted discoveries which, in their view, are a prerequisite for a healthy economic growth and high competitiveness on world markets. Great importance here is also ascribed to prestige. In other words, the leading foreign companies have switched from the concept of "knowledge for the sake of profit" to the concept of the profitability of knowledge. By the turn of the century the noted British economist A. Pigou wrote that the ideas which are created in science and mastered through the education and upbringing of a given generation can not only reconstruct the environment in which subsequent generations will live but also prepare the grounds for further social progress. In that sense accurate assessments of the effectiveness of basic research could hardly be obtained. However, some indirect data indicate that they are greater than the efficiency of research directed at achieving specific results by a factor of 2 or 3.

The experience of the developed capitalist countries indicates that at the present stage of scientific and technical development a sufficiently stable structure of outlays seems to have been established, based on the stages of research. The inner logic of development of contemporary science calls for concentrating resources on the first (basic research) and the last (practical development) stages. They account, respectively, for 13 and 60 percent of all funds. Applied research belongs to the intermediary stage of the scientific process (and, in the view of many scientists, it is the most "ineffective"). In some countries such research is even combined with developments within unified target research (unlike basic which has no specific target). The structure of outlays in NIOKR which has developed in our country is essentially deformed.

Indeed, about 80 percent of NIOKR resources in our country are concentrated in sectorial science. This means essentially applied science or, more accurately, science which has the most developed departmental emphasis. Naturally, sectorial institutes are engaged in research and some development. However, what kind of development is this and how could it allow science to come closer to the production process if 37 percent of the sectorial institutes lack their own experimental production facilities and bases (67 percent in the USSR Academy of Sciences and 76 percent in the VUZs). This, as well as the lack of economic incentives to use scientific results, are the main obstruction to the development of scientific and technical progress in our country.

We are still unable to eliminate the excessively utilitarian approach to scientific research. Francis Bacon himself, almost 400 years ago, feared for the sake of science targeted at instant benefits. "I perfectly realize the extent to which this would hold back the development and progress of science and would be like the golden apple offered to Atalanta: she bent to pick it up, which prevented her from running..." wrote the discoverer of the scientific method. In implementing the cognitive function of man, the deliberate and purposeful exercise of which has enabled man to separate himself from the animal world, science has its own permanent value. This value does not need any investigation or confirmation through the "latest assignments." It is precisely with such an attitude toward research that the scientist becomes an objective and independent participant in the decision-making process. He determines and shapes possible alternatives. He analyzes pluses and minuses related to their implementation and thus forces the politicians and other decision makers, metaphorically speaking, to play in the field of facts and not of illusions.

Conversely, with a narrow pragmatic attitude to science one can easily cross that invisible line beyond which the scientist is assigned the role of a refined interpreter who seeks ways for the approval and support of the loftiest objectives.

Soviet researcher Yu.P. Mikhaleiko noted, in this connection, that "the more science is considered only a practical means the less it is able to be one." And, let us add, the less it is capable of being strictly science.

Against the background of accusations heard from all sides concerning the low efficiency of Soviet science, such views may appear almost seditious but, in any case, untimely. The question, however, arises: Has technical progress not outstripped our production machinery? New plants were built, progressive production facilities were opened, progressive technologies were mastered and improvements and inventions were applied. The effect of scientific and technical progress, however, was neutralized by increasing the area of the inefficient use of resources, above all in the agroindustrial complex, construction, transportation and the extracting industrial sectors. As a result, instead of concentrating the country's scientific and technical potential on the solution of the problems which indeed can be solved only through scientific and technical means, the resources of science and technology were directed toward patching the tears of an unplanned structural policy and at compensating for the lowered labor activeness and the worsened quality of manpower caused by shortcomings in social policy and the decline in the consumer sector of the economy.

As we may see, the reasons for the difficulties in science go far beyond the lack of concern of scientists.

In discussing on a professional level problems of financing science, we do not consider it possible to stop at proofs of its insufficiency. The problem of poverty lies on the surface of events in our life: the Soviet kolkhoz member lives worse than the farmer; the Soviet hockey player is driven to poverty by the State Committee for Sports; the Soviet inventor has no right to own his invention.

What does eliminating poverty in science means: Is it an act of social charity, such as increasing pensions and abolishing taxation for low income or destroying obstacles on the way to changes in economic and social relations? The answer to this question essentially determines the policy of NIOKR financing. Perestroika in science must be an organic part of the overall socioeconomic strategy of the party and the government. Scientists who proclaim today the need for a substantial increase in resources channeled into science assume a tremendous civic responsibility, for this is taking place under the conditions of a continuing budget deficit. We cannot create an ecological niche for the scientist anymore than we can build a separate mechanism for the practical application of scientific results. Therefore, within science itself we must single out areas of priority improvements and determine the possibilities of "resource conservation" in that area.

What should be done to ensure perestroika in scientific and technical policy? Prescriptions in this case should be sought within the channel of the overall radical reform of

our society: a new model of scientific management, democracy, true academic self-management and not a ministry of academic sciences, independence and responsibility of scientific collectives, cadre mobility, economic and moral incentives, integration of scientific sectors, real competitiveness, and competition (which also requires funds) and a variety of scientific organizations.

All of these problems require an honest and serious discussion. We cannot solve them in one fell swoop, considering that perestroyka in Soviet science will largely determine the long-term prospects for the development of our entire society. This should increase even further the responsibility of those who would like to voice their opinion in this discussion.

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PAGES FROM HISTORY

A Committed Rebel

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[Article by Genrikh Nikolayevich Volkov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences]

[Text] In the "hot summer" of the memorable 1986 I was a member of the Soviet delegation to the World Youth Festival, which was being held in Sofia. Many of those attending the festival were members of the "new left" from France, West Germany and Italy. There were sharp discussions at the university. I shall never forget the following: a strange procession walking down the crowded streets. Long-haired boys and girls in jeans did not simply walk but rather ran, clapping their hands and chanting something. They carried four portraits. Those of Che Guevara, Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg and Bakunin.

One could understand Che Guevara and Rosa Luxemburg. Also Trotsky. But Bakunin! This was a name believed to have been long and firmly forgotten. In Moscow it could be found on Bakunin Street and an obelisk at the wall of the Kremlin, where the names of Marx, Engels and Bakunin were engraved on the same post.

In his time, Plekhanov had buried Bakunin's legacy, describing it as a "decaying corpse." Nonetheless, Bakunin turned out to be alive! Today, along with other undeservedly buried names, his name comes back to us as that of a legendary Russian revolutionary. Once again, after a gap of 25 years, his works are being published.

It would be worth it, perhaps sketchily, to recall the character of this unusual person, the 175th anniversary of whose birth is noted today.

Like his ideas, Bakunin's life was full of paradoxes. Who could think that this scion of a noted noble family, who spent his childhood and adolescence in the quiet and idyllic estate, among his numerous brothers and sisters, would later start calling upon peasants to rebel and set afire and destroy the centers of the nobility? Who would have thought that this modest and God-fearing youngster would become a fierce enemy of God and religion? Who could have thought that he, who tended to engage in profound philosophical thoughts, who honored Fichte and Hegel, would soon firmly break with the "philosophical unintelligibility" and become a man of action, of firm and recklessly daring actions? Who would have thought that Hegel's formula that "anything that is factual is sensible," which he interpreted literally and conservatively, would be rejected by Bakunin in favor of the Mephistophelian formula that "anything that is real is worth destroying?"

Yet such precisely was the dynamics of his life and thoughts.

After graduating from artillery school, for a while he served in a regiment, then resigned, and found himself a member of Stankevich's circle. He met Granovskiy. Belinskiy became his best friend. He was surrounded by Herten, the Aksakovs, Botkin, Annenkov, Turgenev, Panayev and others.

There was something in Bakunin which irrepressibly drew to him the best young minds and hearts. He was able to contaminate others with his enthusiasm, intellectual temperament and passionate conviction that he was right. Ever since his adolescence, one could feel his character "like a lion, a powerful and deep spirit," as Belinskiy said.

Bakunin's influence was particularly strong on Belinskiy. He "contaminated" Hegel with it, and Belinskiy became most seriously ill with Bakunin's idea of "reconciliation with reality," and the fact that "to understand and love reality (the Russian, i.e., the reality of Nicholas—author) was the sole purpose of man."

However, while giving its due to Bakunin's intellectual power, Belinskiy also opposed his influence and bluntly spoke of his monstrous arrogance, pettiness toward his friends, childishness, laziness, lack of warmth and tenderness, and the fact of the high opinion he had of himself and the desire to conquer and dominate and to speak out but not listen to others. Even Herten did not escape Bakunin's influence.

Relations with Herten as with Belinskiy and many others were uneven, within a wide "love-hate" range. Such is the lot of eccentric and egocentric characters.

Bakunin went abroad in 1840. In Berlin he plunged into the mysterious depths of German classical philosophy and listened to Schelling's lectures. He had already mastered Hegel.

In his "*Confessions*" he recalled this period: in the area of German metaphysics I was "absorbed exclusively, almost to the point of madness, and night and day could see nothing other than Hegel's categories.... Becoming more familiar with metaphysical problems, I quite soon realized the insignificance and vanity of all metaphysics: I sought in it life whereas it contained death and boredom. I sought action and found in it absolute idleness." As a man of extremes, in studying philosophy Bakunin totally ignored politics. Now, plunging into politics, he firmly ignored philosophy and plunged into political articles and the works of the utopian socialists. He became close to the left-wing Hegelians.

From a "monastic" and abstract speculation he firmly turned to revolutionary democracy. The result of this turn was his article "Reaction in Germany," published in A. Ruge's "*German-French Yearbook*," signed Jules Elizar. The article was imbued with a feeling of the approaching revolution. "...Around us symptoms are appearing which announce to us that the spirit, this old mole, has almost completed its work underground and that it will soon reappear to pass judgment.... All nations and all people are filled with some kind of premonitions and anyone whose vital organs have not become paralyzed is anxiously waiting for the future which is coming to us and which will pronounce the word liberation. Even in Russia, in that endless snow-covered kingdom, with which we are so little familiar and which, perhaps, has a great future, even in Russia dark thunderous clouds are gathering! Oh, the air is heavy, it is fraught with storms!"

The article ended with the inspired call: "Passion for destruction is also a creative passion!" This would become the slogan of Bakunin's entire life.

Bakunin became acquainted with Marx at first by correspondence—through the pages of the "*German-French Yearbook*." It was there that their articles were published. Both of them opposed Ruge's whining pessimism. Bakunin wrote, "We live in the Germany of Rousseau and Voltaire" and predicted for the Germans the events of 1789. He exclaimed: "...I, the Scythian will break your chains, Germans who wish to become Greek."

Soon afterwards Bakunin and Marx met in person. "We were quite close," Bakunin recalled. "At that time he was more extreme than I was and to this day, if not more extreme, he is incomparably more learned than I am. At that time I did not give national economy a thought and I had still not been freed from metaphysical abstractions and my socialism was purely instinctive. Although chronologically younger, he was already an atheist, a materialistic scientist and a thinking socialist.... We met quite frequently, because I felt a great deal of respect for his learning and seriousness and passionate loyalty to the cause of the proletariat, although this loyalty was always combined within him with personal ambition; I eagerly sought to talk with him. These talks were always instructive and witty.... However, we were never truly close. Our temperaments were not suited to each other. He

described me as a sentimental idealist, and he was right; I described him as a treacherous crafty and vainglorious person, and I too was right." Let us allow Bakunin to deal in his conscience with his "rightness." Already then his usual "love-hate" was clearly apparent in his relationship with Marx.

At that time Bakunin also met the German poet George Herweg, Weitling and Prudhon. The latter attracted him with his conscious anarchism. Bakunin instructed Prudhon in Hegelian dialectics.

However, unlike Weitling and Prudhon, who were wrecking the old world in words and on paper, Bakunin thirsted to accomplish this immediately and through action. He was not satisfied with "doctrines and theories." Nor was he satisfied with Marx's scientific communism. On Marx's suggestion to join the Alliance of Communists, he answered with a refusal. Bakunin believed that communism proceeds not from theory or from the laws of social development but from the "popular instinct which is never wrong."

The revolution which broke out in 1848 grabbed Bakunin. He rushed to Paris. He was at the barricades, he was among the rebels, spending his days and nights in the barracks of the guards of the courageous Cossidier. Bakunin recalls this period of "spiritual drunkenness" as the best time of his life. "I rose at 5:00 or 4:00 in the morning and went to bed at 2:00; I spent my entire day on my feet and firmly participated in all meetings, rallies, clubs, processions, walks and demonstrations; briefly, I imbued through all my feelings and all the pores of my body the intoxicating revolutionary atmosphere. This was a feast without beginning and without end...." The witty Herten quite accurately described Bakunin as "an old Joan of Ark," an anti-Orleans virgin.

In the spring of 1849 we saw that same Joan of Ark in Dresden. Here Bakunin's knowledge as an artillery man came in handy and essentially he was the leader of the rebel headquarters.

At that time, strange though it might seem, Richard Wagner, the great composer, who was by then already quite well-known, became one of his closest friends. Wagner has left curious recollections of Bakunin and his character and actions. "For quite some time," Wagner writes, "I had become interested in this unusual person.... In Paris he spoke out in one of the Polish meetings, stating that he ascribed no significance whatsoever to differences between Poles and Russians and the only thing that mattered was whether a person wanted to be free or not."

Bakunin loved to discuss the Russian people. He considered their main feature a "naive feeling of fraternity." He also relied on the hatred of the Russian muzhik for his torturers, the nobility. In the Russian people, he said, there lives not a childish nor a demonic love for fire. It was on the basis of this love that Rastopchin had developed his plan for the defense of Moscow in Napoleon's invasion. The Russian muzhik, Bakunin raved,

can be easily convinced that burning down the castles of the nobility with all their wealth was just and pleasing to God. A fire, which would spread across Russia, would spread throughout the world. The overthrow of contemporary civilization was an ideal which filled him with enthusiasm. To bring into motion the destructive force was the only objective worthy of a sensible person. All he could talk about was how to use to this effect all the instruments of a political movement.

People who would organize a world order, Bakunin claimed, will always be found. Now we must think only of how to find forces ready to destroy everything. The entire European world, including Petersburg, Paris and London should be set afire. "All of these horrible speeches," Wagner further wrote, "were disturbing particularly because, on the other hand, Bakunin appeared as a person who displayed a fine and tender sensitivity to everything. My desperate concerns about art, my ideal aspirations in that area, he could understand." Let us note that Bakunin had excellent musical training and that he could play music and paint.

When Wagner depicted to Bakunin scenes from his opera "Jesus from Nazareth," entirely consistent with his "criminal" ideas, Bakunin advised him to change in his composition one topic: let the tenor sing "cut his head off!" The soprano should sing "hang him!" and the basso should sing "burn him, burn him!"

The following scene may appear somewhat comical but was typical of Bakunin. Wagner once invited Bakunin, who was always hungry, to dinner. Wagner's wife Minna served sausages and meat cut in small bits. Bakunin eagerly started eating, shocking his hosts. "...Instead," noted Wagner horrified, "economically to put the pieces of meat on the bread, as was the custom in Saxony, he immediately swallowed everything.... I cautiously began to instruct him in how to eat this dish in our country." Bakunin answered with amazement that there was a lot of food and enough for everyone.

Wine was then served. Wagner sipped it. Such a "philistine" custom was repellent to Bakunin. He pointed out that a good glass of vodka would have the same results more quickly and decisively.

At this point, clearly, two national characters clashed: the Russian and the German. This difference was manifested in actions as well. Wagner cautiously followed the revolutionary events in Dresden, sympathizing with them but not becoming involved, remaining on the side. Bakunin was always in the very center, recklessly throwing himself into most risky projects. Thus, all of a sudden it appeared to him that a strong revolutionary ferment was brewing in Prague and that this volcano would become active the moment he, Bakunin, would show up. Disguising his appearance, and at the risk of his life, he went to Prague. His friends in Dresden thought that they would never see him again. Soon afterwards, however, Bakunin returned, disappointed and somewhat

cooled off. It turned out that in Prague all he had at his service was a handful of exalted semi-adult students.

Dresden was soon afterwards surrounded by the Prussian forces. Bakunin taught military skills to professors, musicians and pharmacists who had taken up arms. He advised them to put on the walls of the city Raphael's "Madonna" and Murillo's paintings, in defending themselves against the Prussians. The latter would not dare to fire at Raphael!

Nonetheless, the Prussians entered the city. Along with Bakunin, the provisional government hid in city hall. Here "only Bakunin retained his clear confidence and total calm. Even his appearance did not change by an iota, although throughout that time he never got any sleep. He received me on a mattress placed in the hall of the building, with a cigar in his mouth," Wagner recalls.

Bakunin suggested that the entire supply of gunpowder be put in the basement and when the troops would come closer, to blow up city hall along with everyone in it. To his amazement, no one supported his idea. Bakunin insisted that they had to sacrifice their lives and their honor should remain unspoiled so that in the future the people would not lose their hope for freedom. He was outsmarted and the entire supply of gunpowder was removed from the building.

Finally Bakunin and one of the leaders of the rebels, Geibner, went to neighboring Hemnitz, to start an uprising there. However, the orderly local philistines betrayed him and Bakunin was arrested.

Giving Bakunin his due, Marx and Engels referred to him in their work *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany*, as a "capable and cool-headed Russian emigre commander."

The fettered Bakunin was sent to a fortress. He was twice sentenced to death: first by a Saxon court and then by an Austrian court. However, what happened was that which he feared more than death: after a while he was put into the hands of the Russian authorities and locked in the Petropavlovsk prison. In his homeland he had long been considered state criminal number one.

Nicholas I, having recalled, apparently, the confessions of some Decembrists demanded that Bakunin as well write a confession. This is particularly worth mentioning. It is usually considered a shameful spot in his biography. However, this work was like a suitcase with a "false bottom." On the surface it could be viewed as a self-denigrating repentance. Bakunin even signed his "Confession" as "Repentant Sinner." A close reading of the document, however, leads to the conclusion that Bakunin was not repenting of his "crimes" in the least but was rather justifying them, and had even less of an intention to revise his revolutionary convictions. In the very first words of his "confession," he declares: Do not demand of me to confess the sins of others. I have never been a traitor. "...I would rather be a criminal deserving the most cruel punishment than a scoundrel."

It sometimes seems as though Bakunin nurtured the "Quixotic madness" of trying to convert Nicholas. He explained to the tsar the reasons for the 1848 Revolution by saying that public order and the social system had become totally rotten: "Everywhere one can see poverty, weakness, faithlessness and corruption." The classes and the authorities are barely holding on with the help of egotism and habit, which are poor obstacles to the arising storm. His conclusion was, "that is, in my opinion, the nature and force of communism, not to mention the growing poverty of the working class...." Strange though it may seem, Bakunin's expository words concerning the European bourgeoisie were liked by Nicholas. His note on the margin was "a striking truth."

Bakunin continued to propagandize Nicholas in a spirit of communism, describing the Paris workers during the 1848 Revolution: "Sire! I assure you that never have I seen in a single class, ever, such a noble self-denial, such truly touching honesty, such warm delicate feeling in addressing others and such pleasing gayness, compared with such heroism as I found in these simple uneducated people who have always been and will be 1,000 times better than anyone among their leaders!"

Bakunin then turned to Russia and drew up a real indictment of the tsar and his state based on serfdom and despotism. The Russian government "does not wish either freedom or education or else the ennoblement of the Russian people, seeing in them only a soulless machinery for European conquests!"

Openly proclaiming that he had believed in and convinced others of the possibility and need for a revolution in Russia, Bakunin exposed the Russian order, comparing it with the European. "Western Europe, for that reason, sometimes seems worse, because in it all the evil comes to the surface and little remains secret (public opinion, publicity, freedom—author). In Russia all illness goes inside, corroding the inner structure of the social organism."

In Russia, Bakunin kept pouring it on, the tsar is the truth. The main engine is fear and fear kills all life, all intelligence and all noble movement of the soul. It is difficult and depressing to live in Russia for a man who loves his neighbor, who respects equally in all people the dignity and independence of their soul. Russian social life is a chain of mutual oppression. The worst off of all are the simple people, the poor Russian muzhiks, who are at the bottom of the social scale and who can oppress no one else!

No such heartfelt words about Russia had been heard since the times of Chaadayev and Pushkin. "Everywhere there is thievery and bribery, and injustice is committed for money! This applies to France, England and honest Germany. In Russia, I believe, this happens more than elsewhere. In the West it is rare for a thief of public property to remain hidden.... In Russia sometimes everyone knows who the thief and the oppressor is and about an injustice committed for money; everyone

knows but nonetheless remains silent because of fear; the bosses remain silent, aware of their own sins...."

Is this the language and tone of a "repentant sinner?" Rather, it is that of a frightening and fearless accuser. Bakunin bluntly described his "evil" objectives. "In a word, Sire, I became confident that in order to save its honor and its future, Russia must make a revolution.... It must destroy the monarchic rule and, thus liberated from internal slavery, take the head of the Slavic movement...."

In what did Bakunin repent? Essentially, he repented for being Quixotic, for underestimating the "infinite power of the government" (Pushkin), and for building in his imagination utopian plans and his inability to carry out anything planned. It is true that he also wrote that "...more than anything else I am a criminal against you, Sire, a criminal against Russia...." However, all that follows from the overall content of this "Confession" is that he considered himself a criminal from the viewpoint of the tsar and not his own. In the conclusion of his manuscript he did not ask for amnesty. He would accept the death penalty "almost with joy," but only begged for one thing, not to be kept rotting in jail. Better to be sent to hard labor, the harder the better.

Marginal notes prove that Nicholas read the manuscript carefully. He liked Bakunin's sincerity: "A clever and good youngster but a dangerous man, who must be locked up." To Bakunin's request he answered with an order that they keep him in solitary, where Bakunin spent long and painful years.

Bakunin was exiled to Irkutsk only after Nicholas' death. There he was able to organize his life soon, in a more or less human way. He found a job and even married. In 1861 he was able to escape from Siberian exile by following the Amur River, then on to Japan and, on a merchant ship, across the Pacific, to America. Finally, he was once again in Europe, in London, with Herten and Ogarev.

"By the new year (1862—author)," Herten wrote, "there also appeared Bakunin's exotic figure in person.... Bakunin looked the same, he had only aged bodily but his spirit was young and enthusiastic...." As before, he preached destruction, the total destruction above all of the Austrian empire. For this cause, he wrote, "I am ready to become a drummer boy and even a scoundrel."

Soon afterwards Bakunin resumed his relations with Marx, relations which had been spoiled since 1848. It was at that time that a dirty rumor was floated, obviously by tsarist stooges, with a view to compromising Bakunin, claiming that he was an agent of the tsarist government and had betrayed the Polish revolutionaries. Perhaps by virtue of Marx's prejudice against Russian landowners, who were traveling around Europe or, perhaps, as a result of his lack of information, a report from Paris was published in the NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG,

claiming that Georges Sand had in her position documents ascribing to Bakunin the main role in the detention of the "unfortunate Poles."

This was a terrible accusation. Enraged, Bakunin turned to Georges Sand for an explanation. She sent a refutation to the newspaper, which was immediately printed with the apologies of the editors. Later, Marx and Engels repeatedly defended in the newspaper "our friend Bakunin."

One way or another, this slander was spread around and made a most painful impression on Bakunin.

In his first meeting with Marx, Bakunin personally explained everything and the friends of both asked them to embrace. The embrace was hardly sincere on either side. Marx continued to disapprove of Bakunin's conspiratorial and rebellious activities carried out without any clear positive program. For the rest of his life, Bakunin felt a deep resentment of Marx, all the time encouraged by bitter hatred. He was able to contaminate Herzen with this bad feeling.

In 1853, while Bakunin was in jail, a note was published in the British press according to which Tsar Nicholas had welcomed Bakunin with open arms and had offered him wine and women. The note was signed by someone called Marx. However, this was one Francis Marx, who had nothing in common with Karl Marx. This was yet another annoying misunderstanding which had severe consequences in the relationship between Bakunin and Marx.

In 1864 there was another meeting with Marx. The old insults, it appeared, had been eliminated. Marx wrote to Engels the following:

"Bakunin sends you his regards. Yesterday I saw him for the first time after 16 years. I must say that I liked him very much, more than in the past.... He now... after the failure of the Polish movement, will participate only in the socialist movement.

"Generally speaking, he is one of the few people who, in my view, in those past 16 years, have not retreated but, conversely, have developed further" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *Soch.* [Works], vol 31, pp 13-14).

Marx hoped that Bakunin would actively participate in the work of the International. Bakunin promised to work "tirelessly." Indeed, he plunged into agitation and the dissemination of his views, into conspiratorial activities and the creation of the secret organization "Sacred Alliance of Freedom" or the "International Brotherhood."

What did Bakunin preach? At this point his anarchism had already assumed a specific shape.

Virtually all social thinkers considered that the main reason for all the faults of society was private ownership. They turned their anger to it and considered that its elimination would be the salvation of mankind. To Bakunin, the main obstacle on the path of the progress of mankind toward freedom, equality and fraternity was

the state. He had had a few predecessors (W. Godwin, M. Stierner, J. Prudhon). However, no one had as yet suggested so firmly and zealously the destruction of the state down to its foundations, and that this be done immediately. Any state and any power, any domination of a minority over the majority was the worst enemy of freedom, the reason for exploitation and for the suppression of the individual. "We must totally destroy both in principle and in fact anything known as political power, for as long as political power exists there will always be rulers and ruled, masters and slaves, exploiters and exploited."

According to Bakunin, the state is the equivalent of war. "As long as the state will exist there will be no peace. There will be only breathing spells, more or less long, armistices concluded among states, among these eternally fighting sides. The moment any given state feels itself sufficiently strong to disturb this balance in its favor, it will do so immediately."

As we know, Marx and Engels had also reached the conclusion of the need to destroy the bourgeois state machinery. However, it was to be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat, called upon to suppress the opposition of the exploiting classes. It was only after the new system had been strengthened that the state could be relegated to the museum of antiquity, alongside the spinning wheel and the stone ax.

For a while, Bakunin as well accepted the temporary necessity of a strong revolutionary system. However, he had no patience. He wanted to abolish the state the very next day after the revolution. He rejected not only the bourgeois but any other type of state, any dictatorship, any coercion. "However popular a state may be in form, it will always remain an institution of domination and exploitation and, consequently, in terms of the popular masses, an eternal source of slavery and poverty."

"The state," this fiery preacher proclaimed, "by its very nature is a huge cemetery in which any manifestations of individual and local life, all interests of the parts which, put together, form society, are self-sacrificed and await death and burial. It is the altar on which real freedom and prosperity of the nations are sacrificed to political greatness; the more perfect the state is, the fuller is this sacrifice."

Bakunin fiercely opposed the participation of people's representatives in parliament and constitutional illusions which were nurtured at that time by the Russian intelligentsia and the German social democrats. Power corrupts everyone, regardless of class affiliation. "...If tomorrow a government and a legislative council or a parliament consisting exclusively of workers would be formed, these workers who are presently such convinced social democrats would become, the day after tomorrow, aristocrats, supporters, whether daring and open or modest, of the principle of power, oppressors and exploiters."

What does it mean for the proletariat to become a dominant stratum? Bakunin asked. Would the entire proletariat become the head of the administration? But if there are people who manage there will also be slaves. Therefore, he believed, we need an organization not going from the top to the bottom but from the bottom to the top. Marx objected to this in the sense that the principles of organization from below upward is the principle of any bourgeois democracy.

Unlike Marx's theory of the revolution, which proceeded from socioeconomic and political prerequisites, Bakunin relied on spontaneous rebellion, even if it were to be, as Pushkin said, "senseless and merciless."

Like Marx, Bakunin saw the proletariat of the developed countries in Western Europe as the leading revolutionary force. But what about Italy, Spain and the Slavic countries? Here the entire "flammable material" could be used. It consisted of declassed elements, the lumpen proletariat, the disoriented student youth, the rebellious intelligentsia and the bankrupt petit bourgeois. Bakunin truly sympathized precisely with them.

But what about Russia? After the land reform, Bakunin listed three forces: the "zemstvo tsar," the revolutionary post-Decembrist nobility and the rebellion of the peasantry. The title of one of his articles was "The People's Cause. Romanov, Pugachev or Pestel?" However, his illusions were dissipated soon afterwards. All that was left was Pugachev. It is true that there were also the *raznochintsy* and the student youth. "And so, throw away as soon as you can this world doomed to perish. Throw away these universities, academies and schools, go to the people to become the "swaddling grandmother" for the self-liberation of the people, the rescuer of the people's forces and efforts." Herten ironically pointed out that Bakunin confused the second month of revolutionary pregnancy in Russia for the ninth. One way or another, however, Bakunin's appeal met with a response among "young Russia."

In appealing for a rebellion and terror, Bakunin also promoted the "release of passions" and instincts, anything that was restrained, and anything "in which the devil resided." He was not always able himself to distinguish between honest and loyal revolutionaries and "raving" fanatics. This was the case of Sergey Nechayev, who subsequently bitterly disappointed Bakunin.

In this case, as in everywhere else, the extremely conflicting nature of Bakunin was manifested in particular, and the contradictory nature of his views which fluctuated within a huge range from petit bourgeois rebelliousness to proletarian revolutionism, from activities in the International to the organization of secret, conspiratorial alliances and committees opposing the International.

In Geneva Bakunin founded an open society: the Alliance of Socialist Democracy, behind which was concealed another alliance which, in turn, was headed by an even more secret Alliance of International Brotherhood.

In criticizing the leadership of the International for assuming "dictatorial" rights, the anarchist Bakunin organized his own alliance as an alliance of free and autonomous sections. However, this alliance was headed by a central committee of selected founders of the alliance who, in a somewhat mysterious way, had surrendered their powers to the citizen Bakunin, whose rule would be like that of a president of a federal republic. In mentioning this, Marx and Engels proved the way the antiauthoritarian Bakunin had assumed in an authoritarian way dictatorial functions. His alliance smacked more of a Jesuitic or a Masonic order. During the revolution as well, however, Bakunin was forced to admit to the need for a "council of the commune" which would be granted executive power. What was this if not an "authoritarian state?"

Naturally, it would be an error to believe that the clash between Bakunin and Marx in the International was based on desire for power, dictatorship or personal insults and dislikes. Bakunin was sincerely convinced of his rightness and the fact that his position would contribute more to the success of the revolution than the "doctrinaire" views of Marx the "supporter of the state." According to the impatient Bakunin, Marx was postponing the revolution forever instead of making use of the International for immediately starting a universal revolutionary conflagration.

This was a struggle between diametrically opposed views on the destinies of the revolution and the fate of mankind. On this matter neither side could retreat by a single step. An entire precipice separated Bakunin's party from that of Marx. After the Basel Congress of the International, with extreme frankness Bakunin described his attitude toward Marx. While acknowledging his unquestionable merits in the International, he said: "...I will never forgive myself if, for the sake of satisfying a personal feeling of revenge I would destroy or even belittle his unquestionably beneficial influence. It may happen, and it probably will, that soon I will have to enter into a struggle against him, not because of a personal insult but on a matter of principle, on the subject of state communism which he and the party he leads, the English and the German, are warm supporters. At that point, we shall fight to the death."

The events of Bakunin's divisive activities are well-known. Such activities ended with his being expelled from the International at the congress in The Hague and, subsequently, his removal from the leadership of the Alliance. This was the total collapse of Bakunin as a sectarian and a conspirator.

However, a different Bakunin lives in the grateful memory of the generations. Once again he was able to "revive the good old days," and once again find himself on the barricades and once again catch "revolutionary fever."

In 1870 France suffered a defeat in its war against Germany. The workers in Paris stirred and so did the

population of Lyon, Marseille, and Toulouse. So did Bakunin, sensing a pre-storm atmosphere. He wrote letters to various parts of France, Italy and Spain, calling for immediate action. In Lyon Bakunin organized headquarters, participated in numerous meetings, called for an armed uprising, proclaimed the assertion of an administrative and moral system and the existence of a revolutionary commune. At the head of the rebels he entered city hall. However, the building was surrounded by the National Guard and Bakunin barely escaped.

Marx and Engels described this event in sarcastic tones: "Bakunin entered it (city hall—the author); and then the critical moment came..., when he was given the opportunity to take the most revolutionary step ever seen by the world: he decreed the **abolition of the state**. However, the state, represented by two companies of bourgeois national guardsmen, went through the gates at which someone had forgotten to post guards, cleared the room and forced Bakunin hastily to retreat to Geneva" (op. cit., vol 18, pp 348-349).

Despite the defeat of the Lyon uprising, it was a courageous action the purpose of which was to awaken the dulled energy of the French proletariat. In a certain sense, it was the prologue and preparation for the Paris Commune.

Both Marx and Bakunin warmly welcomed the Commune. It was precisely by summing up its experience that Marx reached the conclusion of the need for the destruction of the entire governmental machinery of the old society. However, that which to Bakunin was self-seeking to Marx was merely a necessary prerequisite for the creation of a new type of statehood—the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Yes, the revolution is the most authoritarian thing on earth. Had the Communards accepted Bakunin's advice and abolished all centralized leadership of the revolution, the Commune would not have lasted a single day. Bakunin's utopianism was manifested in particular on the question of the state.

Organizationally, Bakunin also ended his activities in the now obsolete time of conspiracies and secret societies. He was somewhere on the crossroads, between the heroic petit bourgeois revolutionism, which was becoming a thing of the past, and the organized and heroic proletarian revolutionism which was gathering strength. Here as well we find the origins of the disjointed, the conflicting nature of his theories and revolutionary activities. Under the new conditions of the new age he was trying to wage the struggle through the old methods.

In a number of aspects Bakunin was the opposite of Marx's integral character. However, there was also a feature which linked them. Despite all hesitations and plunging from one extreme to another, what burned in Bakunin was the angry, unusual fiery passion of the fighter for the liberation of the working people, hatred of all oppression and exploitation and of the suppression and denigration of man.

In Bakunin's views on the society of the future we find a great deal of equalizing, utopian communism. However, we also find a great deal of something which is particularly close to us precisely now.

This includes Bakunin's annihilating criticism of statism and bureaucratic centralism, that which we describe today as the command-administrative management system, inherited from the period of the cult of personality and which has proved to be exceptionally durable.

It includes the search for new forms of organization of society and new principles of interrelationship between society and the individual through the creation of associations of labor unions, "socialist cooperatives" and "communities," which would help to emancipate the individual and ensure the full manifestation of individual enterprise and initiative.

Finally, this includes efforts to solve the national problem on the basis of a free alliance, autonomy and federalism.

The true revolutionaries will always feel close to Bakunin's behest: Be free and fight for the liberation of others. Bakunin's life and faith themselves were the embodiment of this slogan.

Like Marx, Bakunin saw the future society as a society in which the free development of the individual will be a prerequisite for the development of all (and not vice versa!). "I have in mind a type of freedom for everyone which, in contact with the freedom of other people, will not stop there as though being the limit but, conversely, will find in the freedom of others its own confirmation and possibility of expanding to infinity..." was what Bakunin wrote in one of his last works.

In that same work he asks himself the following: "Who am I and what motivates me to publish this work? ...I am a fanatical supporter of freedom who considers it the only environment in which the mind, dignity and happiness of the people can develop and blossom...."

Naturally, we shall always honor Bakunin not only as a man not only of fiery words but, above all, for his revolutionary actions. He never sought for himself in the revolution anything "personal." He was always ready to take a mortal risk and for self-sacrifice. He believed this to be not any kind of heroism but something self-evident.

He was properly described by Frantz Mehring in 1918: "Despite all of Bakunin's shortcomings and weaknesses, history will give him a place of honor among the leading fighters of the international proletariat, despite the fact that this place of honor will be always disputed as long as there are philistines on earth, whether they try to hide their long ears under a police helmet or their shaking bones under Marx's lion's skin."

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August 1939: Lessons From the Past

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[Text] This year marks the 50th anniversary of the start of World War II. On the eve of that date the editors turned to a group of Soviet scientists engaged in the study of political history of prewar and war times, with a request to express their views on the key problems of international relations and Soviet foreign policy during the critical 1939. The questions asked by V. Bushuyev, editor of the history department of *KOMMUNIST*, were answered by V. Berezhkov, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute; M. Narinskiy, head of the department of most modern history of Western Europe, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History (IVI); N. Smirnova, leading scientific associate, IVI; and A. Chubaryan, director of the same institute.

Question. These days scientists are reinterpreting entire areas of domestic and world history and eliminating numerous "blank spots" in the interpretation of the past. Essentially a new history of World War II is being written. The events of August 1939 are raising many exceptionally important and pressing questions. The political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty, which was concluded half a century ago is being made by a commission which was set by the USSR Congress of people's Deputies. Which are the scientific concepts and theoretical problems related to the eve and start of World War II are being particularly closely studied by scientists and the public at large?

A. Chubaryan. Let me note, first of all, the increased emphasis on problems of morality. Soviet historians and journalists have made serious progress in exposing the immoral nature of many of the foreign policy acts of the Stalinist leadership on the eve of and at the start of World War II. The question of the interaction between national-governmental interests and universal human values has made itself felt with new emphasis. Actually, this is a general historical problem which must be solved on the basis of the study of domestic and external factors during different historical stages.

A noteworthy aspiration of late has been that of including within our study new extensive sources, both Soviet and foreign. This puts the study of international relations on the eve of the war on a more solid and scientifically substantiated basis. This approach makes it necessary to engage in a multiple-factor analysis, taking into consideration the views held by the different countries and the various aspects of Soviet policy.

However, a certain paradox has appeared as well. This approach frequently irritates many journalists and part of the public, who believe that this means that Stalinism is being justified and that a strictly negative assessment of Stalinist policy on the eve of and at the start of the war is being denied. In this connection, let us emphasize that the intensified the study of historical phenomena should in no way be pitted against emotional and moral evaluations. By

the nature of his activities, the historian must weigh the various viewpoints and see events in their entirety.

Naturally, based on the present level of knowledge, we can and sometimes must formulate various accusations against the leaders of the past and consider the interests and considerations that guided them in different and entirely specific situations, as wrong and even false. Nonetheless, in order to have a proper and objective assessment, it is important to understand the views held by the participants of events in those years and proceed from the circumstances which developed in front of them and, frequently, as a result of their own actions. Otherwise it would be simply inconceivable to understand either the development of these events or the motivations for the decisions made by their participants.

Unfortunately, despite the increasing assertion of glasnost in the interpretation of the past, to this day there has been no whatsoever substantially increased access to foreign policy archives. The study of articles published of late reveals that an obviously insignificant number of new documents have been put in scientific circulation. A change in this area was noted among the Baltic area historians, who have actively begun to study their own archives for 1939-1940. This is indicated by the works of a number of researchers from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, submitted at this year's conferences.

Now as to the questions which are currently drawing the greatest attention. As in the past, most of them are related to the events of the second half of the 1930s. This includes questions of the possibility of creating an anti-Hitlerite coalition, the concept of collective security and its embodiment in the real practices of that time. This also includes the problem of the antiwar and antifascist unity of social forces. It has also become possible to study the way at that time the concept, still favored in some circles, of a global revolution had evolved and the place it held in the activities of the Comintern and the USSR.

The question of the interrelationship between the USSR and the Comintern during that time becomes even more important and interesting to science by the fact that the development of Soviet-German cooperation, particularly after the 23 August 1939 Pact, seriously undermined the positions of the Comintern and the leftist forces in the world. In this connection, the question arises as to the extent to which Stalin was relying on the Comintern and was taking into consideration the role of the international communist movement in his foreign policy at the turn of the 1940s.

M. Narinskiy. The most important feature in the new approaches to these events is the rejection of the rigid determinism and the almost teleological view on the development of processes which preceded World War II, which prevailed for such a long time in our historical science. Essentially, we have begun to understand more profoundly the dialectics of objective and subjective, and random and necessary factors. Hence the currently

initiated serious study of the then existing alternatives facing Soviet foreign policy and international relations as a whole. Equally unquestionable, however, is the fact that a truly scientific study of various alternatives is possible only on the basis of taking the real trends and phenomena in international life at that time into consideration, as well as the way of thinking and the fixed views of the participants in the events.

So far, one of the least-known aspects of the past is the mechanism of decision-making of the Soviet leadership and the amount of information on the basis of which its decisions were made. We are still unable to say confidently whether Stalin was aware of the fact that Hitler was not ready to start a war against the USSR. The answer to this most important question requires an entire array of documents which were at Stalin's disposal, such as diplomatic and intelligence reports, etc. Without this entire documentation which could explain the actions of the Stalinist leadership it remains difficult to assess them accurately on the basis of the overall moral and political features of the Stalinist course, which would also be based on the accurately conceived vital interests of the Soviet and the other European nations under the developing circumstances.

A. Chubaryan. Clearly we must recall once again that as early as the mid-1930s some opportunities appeared for signing an agreement between the USSR and the Western democracies for jointly opposing fascist aggression. The idea of collective security was gradually making its way. Slowly, surmounting tremendous difficulties, step by step it was being embodied through the efforts of an entire array of political leaders in France, Romania, Yugoslavia and other countries. In our country M.M. Litvinov in particular, who headed the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs until May 1939, was its systematic and convinced promoter. The European public as well acted in that direction. There were dozens of large and small antifascist congresses and passionate appeals were made calling for the unification of antifascist forces. Naturally, their significance must not be exaggerated, but it would be equally mistaken to neglect the role which they played in shaping the public mood throughout Europe.

Nonetheless, it is a fact that, in the final account, the idea of collective European security bogged down. The British government unequivocally let it be understood that it would not accept any binding treaties. After the assassination of J.-L. Bartou, the French minister of foreign affairs, the course changed in Paris. Anticommunist bias prevailed in the ruling circles of the Western democracies, and hopes that it would be possible to direct aggressive German aspirations against the Soviet Union prevailed. The idea of collective opposition to such aspirations was replaced by the idea of "pacifying" the aggressor.

The reaction of Hitler's Germany was not long in coming. Sensing the change, it went into action. One after another there followed the remilitarization of

the Rhineland, the intervention in Spain and the Anschluss with Austria. The Munich Accord, as a result of which England and France gave Hitler some of the territory of sovereign Czechoslovakia, crowned the policy of "pacification."

At that time the peace-loving public in Europe found itself in an exceptionally difficult situation. This was the result of an entire number of factors. To begin with, it was above all the European intellectuals who became involved in the antifascist struggle in the second half of the 1930s (unless, naturally, we include Spain where a war was going on), whereas among the broad popular masses one could notice a certain passive attitude. Second, the consequences of the split in the leftist forces, triggered both by the extremely negative line followed by Stalin and the Comintern toward the social democrats and the pacifists in the West, as well as the firm anti-communist prejudices of the right-wing social-reformist leadership, had very difficult, not to say tragic, consequences. Reciprocal intolerance and the unwillingness to listen and to meet one another did their fatal thing at that time. Third, we must not ignore a very essential factor, such as the changed attitude on the part of a significant segment of the Western public toward Stalin's policies in the second half of the 1930s. The mass repressions in the USSR, which had distorted the image of the socialist country as the bulwark of the struggle against fascism could not fail to be reflected on the former sympathies felt by many people toward the Soviet Union and their unquestionable solidarity with it, despite the tremendous efforts to fight this trend by noted culture personalities, such as Romain Rolland, Henri Barbusse, Theodore Dreiser and others.

Munich became a kind of turning point in the entire situation in Europe. It created a precedent of the seizure, as a result of a secret conspiracy among a group of countries, initially part of the territory of a European country, followed by its liquidation. The system of blocs and pacts which had developed after Versailles collapsed. The situation on the entire continent became destabilized. Therefore, to public opinion at that time the following question was entirely legitimate: Who will be the next victim of aggression? The documents currently at the disposal of the historians convincingly prove that this was hardly a rhetorical question. Military staffs in Hitler's Germany were actively formulating plans for new conquests.

Munich had a major impact on Soviet policy. Even politically naive people conceived as entirely possible and even real the possibility of an agreement between the ruling French and British circles and Germany, this time not at the expense of small European nations but of the USSR. Under those circumstances one could hardly consider unexpected or unnatural the Soviet search for a possible foreign political breakthrough and, particularly, establishing contacts with Germany.

N. Smirnova. In my view, whereas the danger of an agreement among the main capitalist countries on an

anti-Soviet basis existed, it was more on the theoretical level. I realize that I may be attacked by what is known as both the "defamers" and "supporters" of Stalinist policy. Nonetheless, I would like to say that the virtually only point of agreement shared by both was, and remains, the fact that Munich was an imperialist conspiracy against the Soviet Union and that the threat of such a conspiracy was clear.

I dare to claim that, according to the anticipation of its promoters, Munich should have indeed become such a conspiracy. To the profound disappointment of Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini, however, their hopes were not justified. What won in Munich was a trend which can be traced throughout the entire period between the wars, either abating or again gathering strength, i.e., the creation of a European directorate consisting of the four main capitalist powers excluding the Soviet Union and, whenever convenient, also aimed against it. However, the Western democracies realized quite quickly the futility of their hopes of any possible way of restraining Nazi Germany by granting ever new concessions and directing its aggressive activities toward the East. In this case the Western politicians showed their inability to anticipate the game several steps in advance. Less than 1 month after Munich, on 21 October 1938, in his instructions to the command of the German armed forces, Hitler set a number of tasks related to the preparations for and waging a war for world domination. In planning the attack on Poland he had in mind, above all, England as his main rival holding strategic positions in areas which fascist Germany considered vitally important for its self-assertion in the world.

In making their preparations for war the Nazis dulled the vigilance of their western opponents, as confirmed by the brief Anglo-German 30 September 1938 declaration stipulating their reciprocal wish to live in peace, and the similar but longer Franco-German declaration of 6 December 1938. London and Paris realized that Hitler had no intention of observing the Munich accords only at the start of 1939. As was noted in the accountability report of the VKP(b) Central Committee to the 18th party congress, which was held in March 1939, the "pacifiers" were disappointed by the fact that instead of the expected further advance to the east, against the Soviet Union, the Germans had "tricked" them by turning to the west and demanding colonies.

The primacy of Hitler's actions against the Western democracies was manifested in the process of the Italian-German talks on concluding military alliance of October 1938. Whereas before Munich Mussolini had reasons to think that his "Axis" partner would spend a considerable amount of time "uprooting" communism in the East, leaving to him the Balkans and the Mediterranean, less than 1 month later he was informed of Hitler's intention to initially destroy the British empire and only then to turn to the East, against the Soviet Union.

As published documents reveal, Soviet diplomacy believed that at that time an attack on the USSR was

unlikely. This fitted Stalin's theory according to which interimperialist contradictions are stronger than inter-systemic ones. For that reason the main task of Soviet foreign policy, as seen by Stalin, was the use of such contradictions in order to avoid the involvement of the USSR in an imperialist war. For that reason the option of establishing a united imperialist front against the USSR was not developed in terms of both theory and practice, and was not taken seriously into consideration by the Soviet leadership.

Question. Of late Western historiography and some Soviet publications have drawn parallels between the Munich accord and the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact. The concept is being formulated that the conclusion of this pact was just about the decisive step leading to the outbreak of World War II. Nonetheless, as an argument in justification of the pact, frequent references are being made to the fact that it put an end to the possibility of having a political isolation of the USSR, threatening it in a Munich style. What are the views on this matter guided by historians in their present analysis of this most complex tangle?

M. Narinskiy. Let me above all note the exceptionally important fact that as early as the spring of 1939 major changes had taken place in the international situation. In connection with the elimination of Czechoslovakia and its dismemberment, the ruling British and French circles had realized the futility of the policy of "pacification," and the growing aggressiveness of Nazi Germany which was creating an increasing threat to their own interests in Europe. The spring and summer of 1939 were marked by the objective increase in contradictions between fascist Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other. As subsequent events confirmed, under those circumstances a new Munich was no longer possible. That is why in March 1939 the British government offered to guarantee Polish independence (the same was applied in April toward Greece, Romania and Turkey); subsequently, France gave the same guarantees to Poland. That is why they turned to a real exchange of opinions with the Soviet Union on political problems and, subsequently, to trilateral military talks. At the same time, the leadership of the Nazi Reich began persistently to promote the intensification of contacts and the reaching of an agreement with the USSR.

The question is, what kind of isolation could there be at that point of the Soviet Union? Conversely, the USSR was being presented at that time with a broad field for political maneuvering and skillful diplomatic play.

A. Chubaryan. Munich was indeed a shock to Europe. The suicidal shortsightedness of the British and French politicians undermined, to a certain extent, the roots of the collective security system and faith in the policy of the Western democracies and their ability to counter the aggressive intentions of fascism. It is true that today some researchers believe that at that time the balance of power was, in principle, not in favor of collective security. However, this is a post facto conclusion based on a

knowledge of all subsequent events. Yet we must not reject the alternate solution as well. This could have been the creation of an instrument to counter aggression as a result of the tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks of the summer of 1939. Furthermore, in my view, the very statement by the participants in the talks, albeit formulated in general terms, of their readiness, under certain circumstances, to oppose aggression could have had a major impact on the course of events and provide conditions for creating an anti-Hitlerite coalition. The participants in the talks did not do this.

Naturally, nothing is easier, from the positions of today, on the basis of the experience we have acquired, to blame the characters on the stage at that time for blunders and errors. However, even if we were to agree with this, it nonetheless remains difficult, in the study of the minutes of the Moscow talks of the summer of 1939, not to notice that their participants either did not understand nor sensed the fact that it was actually a question of the fate of Europe and that literally with every passing day and hour a mortal threat to their own peoples, to all mankind, was arising. Nor can we fail to see also that these vitally important talks were being conducted by primarily second-rate personalities or else people without diplomatic experience (such as K. Voroshilov) and that some of them were not even authorized to sign a military convention. The very course of the talks kept leading its participants to the discussion of technical problems that were totally incommensurate with the very alarming situation in Europe and the powerful imperatives of the time. Furthermore, each side seemed to be trying to deliberately demonstrate rigid and uncompromising positions.

For the time being, we do not have additional Soviet archival documents related to the tripartite talks. Obviously, we must undertake their more comprehensive study. We have already accomplished a great deal (essentially on the basis of British and French documents) to prove the insincerity and unconstructive position held by the British and French sides in those talks. However, I would deem promising the study of their development from the viewpoint of the lost opportunities and the determination of what was not undertaken by the participants in the talks to erect a political and military barrier to fascism. This would make it possible to formulate the broader (and, furthermore, the exceptionally relevant) question of the need for compromise and a rejection of taking exclusively one's own egotistical interests and needs into consideration but look at events in terms of the conditions of the extreme situation related to the mortal threat presented by fascism.

In my view, the historians should once again thoroughly analyze the positions held by all the participants in the talks, including the Soviet, to determine when and why was the opportunity of creating an anti-Hitlerite coalition lost or perhaps even its prototype, which could have countered through a common will the overall intentions of the German plans for the subjugation of Europe.

Some historians have expressed the thought that initially Stalin had programmed his agreement with the Germans, for which reason the tripartite talks were no more than a screen. Others, conversely, are proving that until the very final hour, the Soviet leadership was oriented toward continuing talks with England and France and it was only after their collapse that it agreed to sign a treaty with Germany. I believe that both viewpoints sin from one-sidedness, naturally not because I am the supporter of some kind of golden middle. It is simply that the reality of that time was much more variegated and complex; there was an interweaving of many and very varied factors of domestic and foreign policy nature.

Everything seems to indicate that it is true that since May 1939 Stalin had begun to initiate active contacts with Germany which involved economic as well as political factors. It is equally true that it was only subsequently, in July and August, that intensive talks were being held with England and France. All participants in the talks held irreconcilable and rigid positions. Incidentally, many Soviet historians justifiably note the British unwillingness to reach extensive and binding accords with the Soviet Union.

Although dozens of works on the history of these talks have been written in our country, I believe that it is precisely a case which requires new extensive studies which would take a multiplicity of factors into consideration and will be unbiased.

V. Berezhevskiy. It seems important to me to answer now the statements by some historians according to whom had Moscow refused to sign a Soviet-German treaty World War II may have been prevented. At that point, it is claimed, an agreement could have been reached between the USSR and the Western democracies on blocking the Nazi aggression.

However, the following question arises: If England and France so stubbornly declined to sign such an agreement as late as August 1939, what proof is there that they could have changed their position after the breakdown of the Soviet-German talks? The international situation remained unchanged. There are all the proper reasons to assume that the line of behavior followed by the British and French leadership would not have changed as well. Having agreed to Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, and the forced unification with Austria, they surrendered Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. All of this was being done in the hope that Hitler would fulfill his promise of destroying bolshevism and would turn his aggression to the east.

As to the lack of conditions for a new Munich, aimed at the USSR, let me mention that in the second third of August 1939, according to some sources, an airplane was standing by in Berlin, which was to take Goring to London should the Ribbentrop mission to Moscow fail. Even after the Hitlerites had attacked Poland, and although they had declared war on Germany, the British and the French had not mounted any aggressive actions

against it. Meanwhile, during the conflict between the USSR and Finland, efforts had been made to organize an Anglo-French expeditionary corps. If no peace had been concluded with Finland in March 1940, who knows, perhaps we may have had to fight British and French troops while on the West, as before, the quiet "funny war" was going on.

It was only after Hitler had conquered virtually all of continental Europe, after the defeat of France and the bombing of British cities and the advance of fascist armies in North Africa toward Egypt and the petroleum sources of the Middle East, that the politicians in London and Washington finally realized the threat which Hitlerism presented to them. It was only then that, although without any special enthusiasm, they made a military alliance with the USSR. Winston Churchill said that had the devil been fighting Hitler, England would have allied itself with him!

M. Narinskiy. I do not believe that a compromise between Germany and England in August 1939 was possible even had the Soviet-German Pact failed. On the other hand, let me draw attention to a number of questions the study of which for decades has been truly taboo. Critically assessing numerous foreign policy actions of the Stalinist leadership in 1939, it should also be worth it, it seems to me, to speak not of individual tactical errors and blunders but of essentially wrong concepts held by the USSR in its international activities on the eve of the war.

To begin with, this implies a lack of understanding of the nature and scale of the threat presented by fascist Germany which laid a claim to enslaving Europe and to world domination. It is obvious today that neither Stalin nor those around him believed that there were essential differences between the two groups of capitalist countries. Furthermore, the policy of Nazi Germany seemed to them to be more consistent and predictable and not subject to the type of fluctuations related to the domestic political struggle characteristic of bourgeois-democratic regimes. Therefore, at a given stage the Hitlerite leadership was conceived as a more suitable and reliable partner in the international arena while the possibilities of achieving an agreement with England and France were not used to the fullest extent.

Second, this was an essentially geopolitical type of thinking and an aspiration to ensure the safety of the country through spheres of influence and territorial acquisitions. In reality, considering the situation of a grave international crisis which prevailed in the summer of 1939 (taking, furthermore, into consideration the characteristics of the arising mechanized war), it was much more important in terms of true safety to ensure the unity of all potential opponents of the bloc of the aggressors. Clearly, concessions and compromises were inevitable and necessary to achieve this purpose. However, neither the Soviet leadership nor the ruling British and French circles showed any consistent aspiration to do so.

The major, the basic errors of the Stalinist leadership were the foundations for the course of Soviet-German rapprochement, the expression of which was the 23 August 1939 Nonaggression Pact and, subsequently, the 28 September Treaty on Friendship and the Border.

N. Smirnova. I do not consider substantiated the efforts to chart a single line representing the policy of the then Soviet leadership (or Stalin personally, which, in that case, was one and the same). It would be hardly accurate to link Soviet-German talks, which were functionally clearly demarcated and which were concluded with the signing of the Nonaggression Pact on 23 August, and a Soviet-German rapprochement under the banner of Friendship between a socialist and a Nazi country and the war which had broken out on 1 September, and which included an entire series of steps and actions.

The critics of the Soviet foreign policy course in the prewar period frequently compare the 23 August Pact with Munich, believing that both agreements equally pushed the world to war. This conclusion, which is exclusively based on emotions, is not based on serious arguments. The only vulnerable point of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact in this respect which, allegedly freed the hands of the Germans, was the obligation assumed by the contracting parties not to participate in any group of countries directed against either of them. However, by August 1939 it had already become obvious that under the existing circumstances the creation of an anti-Hitlerite coalition, even in the limited variant which had been suggested during the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, had become impossible because of the irreconcilable position held by the British government. In my view, there is no doubt that the war would have broken out regardless of whether the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact had been signed or not. A characteristic feature was that neither the German nor the British or French publications of that time promote the idea of a similarity between the Munich accords and the 23 August Pact. Some political commentators believed that the signing of the treaty marked the revival of Bismarck's tradition in relations between Germany and Russia.

M. Narinskiy. There are truly no indications whatsoever to believe that the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact was a decisive step leading to the outbreak of World War II. It is well-known that as early as 3 April 1939 the Hitlerite leadership had intended to attack Poland by no later than 1 September. Therefore, this decision had been made before serious political contacts had been established with the USSR. The question, as I understand it, was not whether or not such an aggressive German act would be carried out but under what deployment of military-political forces this was to take place. The reaction to the initial news of the forthcoming conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact in Polish government circles was quite typical. L. Noel, the French ambassador to Warsaw, reported to Paris on 22 August that "Mr. Beck, calmly accepted the news of the Soviet-German Pact. He believes that essentially this does not change the problem in the least but that it justifies the

mistrust felt the Poles of the USSR." Even in such a most dangerous time, the then Polish leaders were motivated above all by their anti-Soviet syndrome which did not allow them realistically to assess the scale of the threat of German aggression.

Unquestionably, it was precisely Nazi Germany and its allies who were the aggressors and it was precisely they who started World War II. It was precisely the fascist aggressors who eliminated the existing territorial-political structure of Europe and initiated its restructuring. It was precisely they who made military power the basic means for the implementation of ambitious political plans. The aggression committed by fascist Germany toward Poland marked the beginning of World War II.

Question. Hardly any other document in the global history of the 20th century has triggered such different and occasionally diametrically opposed assessments as the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact. The circumstances related to its signing, the analysis of its influence on international public opinion and the consequences of its conclusion to our country and to the situation throughout the world as a whole have been subjects of extremely extensive publications. An equal number of interpretations are provided by the question of the existence of a secret protocol to the 23 August 1939 Treaty. On the basis of our present level of knowledge, how inevitable does the conclusion of this treaty seem? Was there any somewhat realistic alternative to it? Furthermore, did it fulfill its purpose by delaying for a while the threat of German attack on the USSR?

V. Berezhkov. I believe that there was no alternative to the treaty of nonaggression with Germany. Possibly its conclusion may not have been the best decision but in August 1939 the Soviet government simply had no other choice. The question stood as follows: Would the Soviet Union become the first target of Hitlerite attack, toward which the politicians in London and Paris urged Hitler, or would Nazi Germany initially strike at the Western powers? Obviously, the task of any leader, even one who did not spare his people, such as Stalin, would be to protect the country, albeit for a while, from the horrors of war.

M. Narinskiy. No documents whatsoever exist to confirm the fact that Germany was planning a war on the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939. At that time the Nazi Reich was simply not ready for such a war. Nonetheless, the history of the formulation of the Barbarossa Plan has been thoroughly studied. It is clear that Hitler mounted his aggression against the USSR precisely when he wanted it, when he had planned it, and when the most suitable conditions to this effect had appeared. For that reason the argument which was officially proclaimed by the Stalinist leadership and which, for many long years, had been promoted by our historiography, according to which Stalin tried to avoid giving the Nazi leadership in June 1941 an occasion for attacking the USSR, seems, to say the least, naive. As the saying goes in such cases when

there is a wish the occasion can always be found. The Hitlerites did without any occasion altogether.

In my view, efforts to separate the nonaggression pact (as being a forced yet necessary action adopted in political-diplomatic practices) from the Treaty of Friendship and the Border and the subsequent steps aimed at a rapprochement with fascist Germany, is unconvincing. Actually, it is a fact that the 23 August Pact, with its secret appendix, became merely a link in the implementation of the course toward reaching broad-scale agreements with the Nazi leadership and for cooperation with it. The USSR did not assume a position of strict neutrality. Its neutrality was favorable to Germany from the economic, political and ideological viewpoints. Soviet policy assumed an anti-Polish trend and a clearly negative character toward England and France.

By this token Stalin and the then Soviet leadership made a most serious error, and so did, actually, the British and French leaders who, in particular, assumed a short-sighted and unconstructive position in the course of their talks with the USSR in the summer of 1939. The British and French ruling circles, on the one hand, and the Soviet leadership, on the other, created through their actions favorable conditions enabling the Nazi Reich to implement its aggressive plans.

A. Chubaryan. I would describe the 23 August Pact above all as an equivocal document. Generally speaking, nonaggression treaties were popular in diplomatic practices of that time. In that case it blocked the possibility of an agreement between Germany, England and France at the expense of the USSR. We were thus avoiding fighting a war on two fronts, for we had to take into consideration the constant military tension and even clashes with Japan in the Far East at that time.

Dialectics, however, is such that the very fact that the land of the soviets had signed a treaty with fascist Germany had an immoral aspect. The pact and its appendixes, like many other diplomatic documents of that time, indicated that cynicism and national egotism had begun to imbue on the eve of World War II the entire system of international relations. This immorality was manifested in full also in the 23 August Pact and in subsequent documents related to it one way or another.

Furthermore, there is yet another separate and very important matter: how was the treaty used and what did it yield to the Soviet Union in the final account, on the political and military levels? This question must be thoroughly studied by the historians.

To go back to the treaty itself, let me point out that in the past few months there has been a drastic increase in debates on the so-called secret protocol to it, which discussed the division of spheres of influence (or interests) between the USSR and Germany should any territorial-political changes take place in that part of Europe. Recent events have indicated that avoidance of the discussion of this aspect of the protocol has clearly

hindered our progress in the study of the history of international relations on the eve of and the beginning of World War II.

The secret protocol is always present in German diplomatic documents and in Western historiography. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (No 5, 1989) published an article by Soviet historian V. Sipols, who quoted excerpts from documents kept in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They reveal that the Soviet side, in agreement with the German, raised in the protocol a question of the anticipated pact several days before it was signed and that, in general, this question had been settled between the two sides between 18 and 21 August 1939. The text of the photocopies of the protocol were recently published in the journals NOVOYE VREMYA and VOPROSY ISTORII.

Nonetheless, let us emphasize that, as we know, the originals of the protocol have been located neither in Soviet nor German archives. A variety of versions exist on where they went. Nonetheless, today most Soviet historians seem to agree that the subsequent development of events, materials, including those published in the Soviet press in September 1939, and diplomatic correspondence prove that in August of that same year an agreement was reached between the USSR and Germany on a demarcation of the spheres of interest roughly along the Narev, Vistula and San Rivers.

The documents also prove that it was precisely then that the Kremlin obtained information to the effect that the attack on Poland was a matter of days. This was hinted by the Germans and this was also mentioned by French sources which even named a specific day: 26 August.

V. Berezhkov. The question of an additional secret protocol is indeed a rather grave one. Personally, I have no doubt that such a document was signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop along with the Nonaggression Pact. I heard of it for the first time in November 1940, when I attended the talks between Molotov and Ribbentrop in Berlin in my quality as an interpreter. Furthermore, subsequent events in Poland, the Baltic area and Moldavia proved consistent with the now familiar stipulations of the photocopy of the 23 August Protocol as well as the additional secret protocol appended to the Soviet-German Friendship and Border Treaty of 28 September 1939. Finally, in addition to other documents of that period, the archives of the U.S. Department of State include a cable sent by the U.S. ambassador to the USSR Steinhardt, which was dispatched from Moscow on 24 August 1939. It contains the full text of the additional secret protocol. The Americans had their agent in the German embassy in Moscow, and it was he who gave them a copy of the protocol the very next day after it was signed. This agent or Ambassador Steinhardt himself could not have put together in a matter of a few hours a forgery which, furthermore, is fully consistent with the currently circulated photocopy.

N. Smirnova. In order to have a clear idea of the atmosphere in which the 23 August Pact was signed, let us recall the events which took place on the eve of and immediately after its conclusion. As early as 22 August, addressing the leadership of the Wehrmacht, Hitler said that he had decided to initiate operations against Poland on 26 August. "The only thing I fear," he said, "is that at the last moment some pig or other would present me with a suggestion of mediation." Such a mediator was found. Mussolini who, since the middle of August, had been trying to organize a conference of the four powers, of the Munich type, reported to Hitler on 25 August of the final decision he had made: Italy could enter the war providing that Germany would meet Italian needs for strategic raw materials and armaments. The list which was submitted exceeded Germany's possibilities.

It was then that the information was received that Poland had been given military guarantees by England. Hitler summoned Keitel and ordered that the beginning of the combat operations against Poland be postponed because of the unexpectedly appeared political circumstances.

A period of most intensive talks began. The Nazi politicians were pressuring the British government to abandon its plans of interfering on the side of Poland. Mussolini as well became more active, resuming his attempt to organize a conference on the Danzig problem. He even set a time for it: 5 September. A most complex tangle of various intrigues developed. Every participant in the talks was playing a double game, concealing from his allies his own contacts with eventual enemies and real allies.

Hitler failed to obtain a British refusal to fulfill its promises to Poland. However, he became convinced that the war on the part of the Anglo-French allies would be purely symbolic. This enabled him to make his final decision and, on 31 August, he ordered that military operations against Poland begin at dawn on 1 September.

Question. How, based on our present knowledge, can we assess the main trends in the development of the international situation subsequent to the August 1939 events and the results they brought about? What are the tasks facing today researchers studying the eve and beginning of World War II?

A. Chubaryan. Soon after the Hitlerite troops invaded Poland, England and France declared war on Germany, on 3 September. However, the Anglo-French allies behaved strangely, to say the least. They essentially abandoned Poland, having decided not start combat operations against Germany. The reflexes of the policy of "pacification" of the fascist aggressors continued, therefore, to act even after the formal declaration of war.

M. Narinskiy. Both allies turned out unprepared for active armed operations for sociopolitical, military and psychological reasons. The British and French leadership

tried, rather, to apply military-political pressure on Hitler. The result was the phenomenon of the "funny war." Nonetheless, in my view, the "funny war" could hardly be considered a simple continuation of the policy of "pacification." There was a conversion from the policy of "pacification" to the policy of containment, of opposition. The fact that the British and French ruling circles were unable accurately to assess either the nature of the aggressive aspirations of the Nazi leadership or the military-economic potential of Germany or else the striking power of the Wehrmacht, is a different matter.

The Soviet leadership as well committed similar extremely gross errors. In the final account, the steps taken to strengthen Soviet security proved ineffective. The tactical gain turned for the USSR into a strategic loss. France—the main potential ally of the USSR on the European continent—was routed. The fascist aggressors were able to divide the possible enemies and establish their domination over Central and Western Europe.

A. Chubaryan. On 17 September, in crossing the Polish border, the Red Army entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. The population of these areas welcomed the Soviet forces. However, we also know that at that time the short-sighted and immoral policy which we justifiably relate to the Stalinist deformations of socialism, was gathering strength. As a result, exposures of fascism totally vanished from the pages of our press. Furthermore, materials were published blaming the British and the French for having tried to suppress Hitlerism by force.

N. Smirnova. An expression of this new approach was found in the reports which Molotov submitted at the 31 August and 31 October 1939 sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Whereas in the former the conclusion of the 23 August Pact was substantiated by the need to establish good neighborly relations with Germany, the latter already dealt with establishing friendly relations between the two countries, embodied in the Soviet-German Friendship and Border Treaty of 28 September. Molotov's speeches contained insulting attacks on the overthrown Polish state and accusations of the aggressiveness of Britain and France, who were "seeking a new justification for continuing their war against Germany," having set as their objective the destruction of Hitlerism. "But anyone can understand," the people's commissar said, "that ideology cannot be destroyed by force, it cannot be ended by war. Therefore, the waging of a war such as one for the 'destruction of Hitlerism,' concealed behind the false flag of the struggle for 'democracy' is not only senseless but criminal." Therefore, the deformations in domestic policy, which were inherent in the cult of personality, were reflected in the foreign policy area as well.

V. Berezhkov. As to the consequences of the 23 August 1939 Treaty as they affected the Soviet Union, in my view, three aspects should be singled out. The first is that our country was given the possibility of staying out of the war for almost 2 years. The fact that this breathing spell was not used by Stalin properly is a different matter which should be discussed by itself. Second: The line which marked the Hitlerite invasion of 22 June 1941 had moved

substantially to the West. It is easy to imagine how much less favorably would events have developed for us in the summer and autumn of 1941 had the Wehrmacht started its offensive virtually at the gates of Leningrad, Narva and Minsk, and in the immediate vicinity of Kiev and Odessa. Third: The peoples of Moldavia, the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia and the Baltic did not fall under the Hitlerite yoke as early as 1939. Anyone who recalls the events of the autumn of 1939 knows that the population was fleeing from the areas of military operations not to the west but to the east, hoping to find salvation from Gestapo terror on territories under the protection of the Soviet forces and the Baltic states.

Today some historians and public personalities demand that the Soviet-German documents of August 1939 be denounced in their entirety. It seems to me that in this case a certain caution is called for, for the then agreements created prerequisites for the reunification of Western Belorussia with the Belorussian SSR and of Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR. This was a confirmation of the ethnic principle according to which the eastern Polish border, after Poland had appeared as an independent country after the October Revolution, had been established by the Supreme Council of the Entente in 1919, along the so-called "Curzon Line," which roughly coincided with the western border of the USSR as of September 1939. The denouncing of various historical documents will not change subsequent events. Obviously, we must proceed from the actually existing present situations and provide a practical solution to the pressing problems of our days.

N. Smirnova. The text itself of the pact—something which must mandatorily be taken into consideration—included nothing which inevitably predetermined the further development of events in the direction which they followed in fact in September and in the subsequent months of 1939. Even the content of the additional secret protocol on a demarcation of "spheres of interests," which is the subject of such extensive debates today, did not bear, if we can rely on the photocopy available to the scientists, any other intent or juridical obligation other than an agreement on the range of movement of the German forces in the East, as was vaguely mentioned in that document "of a territorial-political restructuring of areas included in the Polish state."

This was a declaration which stipulated the views of the individual sides and which, in my view, had no juridical force. The first item of the Soviet-Polish Accord, which was signed in London by Ambassador I.M. Mayskiy, for the Soviet government, and W. Sikorsky, the Polish prime minister, on 30 July 1941, read: "The government of the USSR considers the Soviet-German 1939 pacts concerning territorial changes in Poland as invalid." This accord, however, did not mean in the least that the prewar status quo was thus being restored, for the statehood of Vilnius, the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia was legitimized with the acts of 1939-1940, which were only indirectly related to the Soviet-German pacts. Naturally, however, we must emphasize that whereas legally the secret addenda had no power, their moral-political significance

as an unseemly deal between a socialist and a fascist state had most negative consequences in terms of the Soviet reputation.

M. Narinskiy. Unquestionably, the development of international events in 1939-1941 was exceptionally complex and contradictory and, which is quite important, an inter-related process. It is equally obvious that in analyzing it we must not ignore the variety of military-political actions which were taking place under the extraordinary conditions of an already initiated war, when the power solution to international problems had triumphed.

In the study of this comprehensive process it becomes exceptionally important to adopt a considered, scientific and objective approach. History cannot be remade. No one has the right to return to the prewar situation and to turn it in a different direction. One can only study the events fully and comprehensively.

Clearly, it would be expedient today once again to consider a reassessment of the nature of the war as waged by Britain and France in 1939-1941. The view of historians who claim that objectively the war which Britain and France and other countries waged against the aggressors' bloc was antifascist and, consequently, just, appears quite convincing. Naturally, this is not to say that their policies did not reveal a reactionary imperialist trend. It would be more accurate to say that within the ruling circles of those countries a variety of aspirations coexisted and interacted. A further debate would help us formulate the present Marxist approach to this matter.

A. Chubaryan. The events of August-September 1939 face the historians with complex problems of interconnection between domestic and foreign policy. They indicate the exceptionally complex and contradictory nature of development of international relations on the eve and the start of World War II and the fact that we must take into consideration a great variety of factors—political, diplomatic, military, legal and moral.

Let us not forget that the situation in 1939-1941 was indeed extreme although this truth, which appears today axiomatic, was at that time obviously not perceived as such by the majority of politicians. Correspondingly, the methods of action which prevailed at that time were, to begin with, characteristic of that age (we already noted here national egotism, the cynical evaluation of events and the inability to rise to the awareness of universal human interests); second, they reflected an obvious underestimating of the threat of fascism to all countries involved in the whirlpool of events, and to the world at large.

Historians, therefore, are faced with the exceptionally important task of studying, on the basis of full set of documents, the international situation which existed after August 1939 and until the attack by Hitlerite Germany on the Soviet Union. We can and must openly say that so far we have at our disposal only a minimal number of documents on such most relevant problems as the Soviet-Finnish War, and Soviet-German relations from September 1939 to June 1941 (incidentally, researchers have not been granted access not only to most Soviet archives but also to some very important files in the archives of

France, England and other countries). The events on the Balkans, where during that time significant foreign policy activities were taking place, have been obviously insufficiently studied. It was precisely there that in 1940 and beginning of 1941 the conflicts and interests of all the main participants in the drama which was developing in Europe by the turn of the 1940s had become interwoven.

In terms of the events of 1940 we must bring to light particularly thoroughly and extensively the dialectics of domestic and foreign policy. I am mentioning this also because we now notice a trend toward separating domestic from foreign factors (or else exaggerating some to the detriment of the other) in connection with the events in the Baltic area and in many other questions.

In short, the 50th anniversary of the start of World War II must become an incentive for new scientific studies in order to determine the truth of the tragic events which shook the world and led it into the catastrophic abyss.

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IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, ASPIRATIONS

A Turning Point in the History of the Romanian People

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[Article by Constantin Olteanu, member of the Political Executive Committee, Romanian Communist Party Central Committee secretary; article printed in accordance with the exchange of materials between the party publications of the USSR and the Romanian Socialist Republic]

[Text] On 23 August the Romanian people will be celebrating the 45th anniversary of the victory of the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation. This is a historical event of profound internal and international significance, which opened the way to major revolutionary, democratic and socialist changes in the country.

The August 1944 uprising marked the beginning of a broad revolutionary process in all areas of economic and socio-political life, which became a program for action for the working class, ever since the founding, in 1893, of its political organization, the Workers Social Democratic Party of Romania. The labor movement and the Romanian Communist Party, which was democratically founded on 8 May 1921, the day when the delegates to the congress held by the Socialist Party voted to rename it communist, assumed the lofty mission of defending the unity, independence and sovereignty of the country, to eliminate exploitation and oppression of man by man and to build a society of social and national justice, socialism and communism in Romania.

At the very dawn of its existence, the Romanian Communist Party was already subjected to fierce persecutions and repressions on the part of the exploiting classes. In the course of 2 decades (starting with 1924) it was forced to work under clandestine conditions, using a variety of legal and clandestine forms of work and a wide network of mass organizations, newspapers and journals. The party promoted the strengthening of the unity of action in the working class and the gain of democratic rights and freedoms. Under the conditions of the development of fascism on an international scale and, particularly, after Hitler's advent to power in Germany, showing political farsightedness, it mobilized the working class and the people in the struggle against fascism and war. The creation of the National Antifascist Committee in June 1933 was of great importance. It was within it that Nicolae Ceausescu, the present great leader of the party and the Romanian state displayed the qualities of revolutionary fighter and ardent patriot.

The 1929 actions of the miners, joined by other worker detachments, and the major revolutionary battles waged by the railroad and petroleum workers in January-February 1933 had a major impact on the struggle waged by the working class, headed by the Romanian Communist Party. Noteworthy in the development of this revolutionary process was the powerful patriotic, antifascist and antiwar demonstration of 1 May 1939, to which comrades Nicolae Ceausescu and Elena Ceausescu made a decisive contribution. The mass demonstration in Bucharest met with a broad international response and was, after Hitlerite Germany seized Austria (March 1938) and Czechoslovakia (March 1939), the first impressive action in Europe, which called upon the Romanian people and the working class on the entire continent to fight fascism and in defense of the independence of all countries.

Under the conditions of the outbreak of World War II and the expansion of Hitlerism in Europe, on 30 August 1940 the Vienna fascist arbitration was imposed upon Romania, according to which the Northwestern part of its territory was given to Horthy's Hungary.

German forces entered Romania in the autumn of 1940; despite the will of the people the country become involved in the war waged by Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union.

The Romanian Communist Party remained the only political force which firmly opposed the war, the rule of Hitlerite Germany and the Horthy occupation. It formulated a strategy of unity of action among all democratic, patriotic and antifascist forces and worked for its implementation. Gradually, as a result of the forming of a Patriotic Anti-Hitlerite Front in 1943, the United Workers Front of the Romanian Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, formed in the spring of 1944, and the National Democratic Bloc, which was formed in June of that same year, a national consensus was reached. It was thus that a broad front rallying the struggle of all patriotic forces in the country was created, the nucleus and motive force of which was the Romanian Communist Party. In the course of this process active ties were established and broadened with the army, the leading cadres in its high

command and members of the king's retinue. It was thus that the broadest possible coalition of political forces ever known in Romania was formed.

On 23 August 1944, under the circumstances created with the powerful offensive launched by the Red Army in the Iasi-Kishinev direction, the Romanian people and their armed forces overthrew the Antonescu government and turned their weapons against Hitlerite Germany.

This outstanding event, which took place 45 years ago, was a manifestation of the will of the Romanian people to put an end to the Antonescu regime and the domination of the Third Reich and ensure the withdrawal of Romania from the war unleashed by Hitlerite Germany against the Soviet Union and its joining of the United Nations. As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu emphasizes, the event which took place on 23 August 1944 put an end to foreign imperialist domination and opened the way to the implementation of profound revolutionary changes and a turn to the building of socialism in Romania."

This military-political event of tremendous importance, which occurred in Romania in August 1944, had a noticeable impact on the outcome of World War II. It triggered a broad international response. On 23 August 1944 Radio London noted that "Romania has carried out an exceptionally daring action which will bring the end of the war closer." On the next day, the Swiss newspaper BAZLER NACHRICHTEN wrote: "Romania made a decision which will greatly influence the course of the war in Southeast Europe. Following the surrender of Italy in September 1943, no such severe blow had been dealt on Germany on the political and military levels. As a result of the Romanian coup a lethal breach has opened in the defense system of "fortress Europa." In its 27 August 1944 issue PRAVDA wrote: "Romania's withdrawal from the fascist axis is of significance not only to the Romanian people. The foreign press is accurately pointing out that it was the entire German defense on the Balkans that collapsed."

Starting with 23 August 1944, rallying all of its economic, manpower and military potential and all of its forces, Romania took part in the war on the side of the Soviet Union for the liberation of the Northwestern part of its territory which was still under Horthy-Hitlerite rule and, subsequently, for the liberation of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and part of Austria and until the total routing of Hitlerite Germany. In terms of significance and consequences, the August Revolution was a noteworthy act thanks to which the Romanian people made a substantial contribution to the victory over fascism.

A total of 538,000 Romanian military servicemen took part in the war, advancing in combat from the shores of the Black Sea to Bohemia, crossing 12 rivers and liberating 3,921 settlements, including 53 cities. The casualties of the Romanian Army totaled nearly 170,000 men (killed, wounded or missing in action). The Romanian troops were cited by the Soviet supreme command in 7 orders of the day and 21 military communiques for combat exploits on the anti-Hitlerite front. More than 300,000 Romanian military servicemen were awarded Soviet, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Romanian combat orders and medals.

The heroic struggle waged by the Romanian Army, side-by-side with the valorous Red Army—the main force which suffered the greatest casualties and played a decisive role in the defeat of Hitlerism, and the liberation of Europe and the world from fascism—strengthened the fraternal cooperation between our countries and peoples. In emphasizing this fact, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu noted: "The struggle waged by the Romanian and Soviet soldiers on the anti-Hitlerite front contributed to the development and strengthening of the Romanian-Soviet comradeship in arms, through the jointly shed blood. It laid the foundations of relations of fraternal cooperation between our countries and peoples. The memory of the heroes who fell in the struggle against fascism and the immortal exploits of Romanian and Soviet troops on the anti-Hitlerite front and the contribution made by all Romanian patriots who fought against fascism and for the liberation of the homeland will never fade in Romanian history."

The August 1944 victory marked the beginning of a consistent revolutionary process of Romanian advance on the path of democracy and socialism. As the main force of society, the working class made a determining contribution to the implementation of the revolutionary changes, rallying around it all popular strata. Answering the appeal of the Communist Party and with the direct support of the working class, the peasant masses made a revolutionary agrarian reform which eliminated the class of landowners, undermined the positions of the reaction and laid firm foundations for the new social system.

The creation of a worker-peasant democratic government on 6 March 1945 was of exceptional importance in the development of the revolutionary process under specific Romanian conditions; this government concentrated on rebuilding the national economy dislocated by the war and on implementing economic and social changes consistent with the vital interests of the masses. The definitive elimination of the members of the bourgeoisie from the mechanism of political power, the overthrow of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic on 30 December 1947 marked a new major victory of the revolutionary forces.

All of this prepared for and made possible the conversion to the making of a socialist revolution in Romania. As a result of the 11 June 1948 nationalization of the means of production and the cooperativization of agriculture, which began in March 1949, conditions were secured for the development of state and cooperative socialist ownership and socialist production relations in the entire economy. Naturally, this process was marked by an active struggle waged against reactionary forces, the sabotage of the exploiting classes and the actions of imperialist circles. The total elimination of the exploitation of man by man and the steady development all areas of life on a socialist basis secured the victory of the new system in Romania.

The July 1965 9th Romanian Communist Party Congress was an act of historical importance, and a powerful manifestation of the creative potential of the people. It analyzed critically and self-critically, on the basis of the theory of scientific communism, the course of the building of socialism and earmarked the tasks of the new stage in

socioeconomic development. Alien concepts which included an underestimating of the forces and capabilities of the Romanian people and their history, language and culture, were rejected. The congress pointed out the need to eliminate a number of shortcomings and even violations of legality, which had severely harmed the socialist development of the country. Under the influence of the innovative thinking of the Romanian Communist Party, headed by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, a policy was formulated of developing a powerful socialist industry on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology, the fast development of the other sectors and the strengthening of agriculture. Particular attention was paid to scientific research, to cultural and political-educational activities and to improving education.

The formulation of the tasks of building the new society in the spirit of the resolutions of the 9th Congress, the study of the dialectics of production forces and production relations, socialism and democracy, forms of implementation of the party's leading role, determining the active function of socialist awareness, the interconnection between the general and the specific and the national and the international in social developments, the basic trends of international life, and ways of ensuring peace and cooperation were adequately reflected in a number of new approaches. The Romanian Communist Party proceeds from the fact that the principles of socialism are not applied mechanically, automatically and uniformly but are constantly improved and enriched under the influence of the new achievements and progress of human knowledge, that the forms of socialist building are not given once and for all, that there is no specific stereotype or single model, and that each nation and party should define the forms of building socialism in accordance with specific socioeconomic conditions and the new stage in the dynamics of revolutionary thinking.

The systematic observance, particularly after the 9th Congress, of the objective law of accumulation and expanded reproduction, manifested during that period in setting aside approximately one-third of the national income for development, is of decisive significance to the country's progress. Constant attention is being paid to the strengthening and broadening of socialist ownership, the form of ownership which the founders of scientific socialism considered as the only one capable of securing new social relations, real equality among people and the establishment of the working people in the new social quality of producers, owners and consumers of the national resources, the thrifty utilization of this wealth and improving the system of national economic management and planning socioeconomic development. In the opinion of the Romanian Communist Party and its general secretary, all of this should contribute to improving the management of socioeconomic life on the basis of a single national plan, which has confirmed its expediency and efficiency to the fullest extent.

Proceeding from the need to improve the role of the working people and to ensure the enrichment of democratic forms of managing activities in all areas, in the past 20 years the financial-economic mechanism has been

steadily developing and improving and so have the principles of self-management, self-financing and self-support of each economic and social unit, while ensuring the steady implementation of the program for the development of the country.

Almost 180 industrial programs have been drafted since 1965, in accordance with which 2,000 new production capacities were installed. Their balanced territorial location stimulates the full use of material and manpower resources. Thanks to priority in steel production, the chemical industry, machine building and other leading industrial sectors rapidly spread throughout the country and provided a powerful impetus for renovation and for substantial changes in the life and activities of all categories of working people. Meanwhile, socialist agriculture regained its place and role as one of the basic national economic sectors and the broad implementation of the tasks of the new agrarian revolution was ensured. This made it possible to achieve an unprecedented increase in agricultural commodities, the harvesting of 30 million tons of grain per year and the steady increase in the size of the cattle herds and all types of agricultural commodities.

Reality continues to prove that it is only by strengthening and developing socialist—state and cooperative—property that conditions can be created for further socioeconomic progress and that these forms of ownership are the foundations for building the new system and substantially building and steadily improving socialist society.

Science, scientific research and technological developments, closely related to industry, make a substantial contribution to the development of the Romanian economy toward high quality and efficiency. In that area, coordinated by Academician Elena Ceausescu, member of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee Political Executive Committee, first deputy prime minister of the government and chairman of the National Council for Science and Education, in recent years great progress has been made, materialized in terms of world standard indicators in numerous areas of activities.

Based on the profoundly humanistic concept of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, according to which anything which is accomplished in Romania should serve man and the steady enhancement of his material and spiritual standards, the party systematically works on the optimal solution of all problems with a view to ensuring the well-being of the people and the comprehensive development of the personality. Compared to 1965, the wage fund has increased by a factor of almost 6; average wages have more than tripled. Systematic efforts have been made to develop the best possible working and living conditions for all citizens. Today more than 80 percent of the population live in new housing. All Romanian settlements have changed their appearance. Concern is being shown to preserve the valuable historical fund. New buildings have been constructed. A process of real and universal revival is developing.

The efficient deployment of production forces throughout the territory of the country, the harmonious development of all districts and settlements and ensuring the true equality of all citizens have been the target of particular

attention in the program of revolutionary measures the implementation of which was initiated 21 years ago.

The Romanian people note the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation with an exceptional accomplishment unprecedented in its history: by the end of March of this year the foreign debts of the country were paid up entirely. A convincing proof of the strength and viability of the Romanian economy and socialist society and of the profoundly scientific policy of the Romanian Communist Party was the proposal submitted by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu not to resort any more to foreign loans and to ensure the development of the country through its own funds and extensive international cooperation, which was unanimously approved and codified by the Great National Assembly.

The repayment of the foreign debt in less than 10 years despite exceptionally difficult international conditions required tremendous efforts. We were able to achieve this along with the continuous socioeconomic development of the Romanian Socialist Republic and while upgrading the material and spiritual standards of the people. More than 2 trillion lei were invested in economic development between 1981 and 1989; industrial output increased by more than 50 percent and agricultural production by a factor of almost 1.5. The overall wage fund increased by approximately 60 percent. Major industrial and agricultural projects were completed. Infrastructural projects of republic significance were created. This includes the completion of the Danube-Black Sea Canal and its branch—the Poarta-Alba-Midia-Nevodard Canal, some 100 kilometers long; the construction of the Bucharest-Danube Canal was undertaken; major sectors of the Bucharest subway, totaling 60 kilometers, were completed; the bed of the Dumbovica River, which runs through the country's capital was corrected; work to modernize and systematize Bucharest was carried out; here a new administrative-political center was built and the same was done in virtually all cities and communes in the country.

Proceeding from the principle according to which socialism is built by the people and for the people, while providing equal conditions for all people on the basis of socialist ownership, the party created and is improving a system of revolutionary worker democracy. This makes it possible for the working people to participate most directly in various ways of the formulation, adoption and implementation of resolutions in all areas of activity.

In the course of improvements in the structure and methods of democratic leadership of the socialist society, new forms have been created, such as councils of working people at enterprises and establishments, and their district and national authorities. This which makes it possible to ensure the organized participation of all classes and social groups, of the entire people, in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. Each 5 years the working people in industry and other areas of activities hold congresses attended, as a rule, by 11,000 delegates; congresses are held by the peasantry and agricultural workers and workers in other sectors, with the participation of another 11,000

delegates. They elect national councils of 1,200 to 1,500 members, which do the work in the period between congresses.

Each 5 years, furthermore, congresses are held in the science and education, and culture and socialist upbringing, with the participation of approximately 7,000 and, respectively, 5,000 delegates. Bearing in mind the important role played by the people's councils in the self-management and self-support of the settlements, each 5 years after the elections of deputies for people's councils, the people's councils hold congresses with the participation of approximately 7,000 delegates. Here the basic problems of activities of local and territorial significance are discussed and members of the legislative chamber—the Parliament of People's Councils—are elected. This chamber functions in the periods between congresses and issues conclusions on all laws affecting the activities of local territorial authorities as well as general laws and plans for socioeconomic development. The democratic authorities form a solid system of direct revolutionary worker democracy, which ensures the extensive participation of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the entire people, in the formulation of the general political line and of all plans for socioeconomic development.

Furthermore, measures were taken to improve and strengthen the role of the state as the state of a revolutionary worker democracy, and of its authorities in the management of economic and social life. By working in that direction, the Romanian Communist Party has always believed that it will preserve and, for a long time to come, retain its role in the socialist society, probably even at the initial stage of a communist society. Today our state can no longer be characterized as a dictatorship of the proletariat. It is a state of revolutionary worker democracy. In accordance with this theoretical historical-materialistic concept, the democratic authorities have been steadily improved, with a view to upgrading their role and social efficiency. Electoral democracy has been intensified thanks to the introduction, starting with 1968, of the practice of having several candidates compete for one seat in the Great National Assembly and in the people's councils, the nomination of candidates by political, mass and social organizations and the ratification of the candidacies at working people's meetings.

Under the conditions of an active social life, dynamism and prosperity of contemporary Romania, the stipulations of the Romanian Communist Party on the objective need for the enhancement of its leading role are of major importance. In the period of building socialism and particularly after the 9th RCP Congress, the party steadily developed organizationally and quantitatively, as well as from the viewpoint of its theoretical and ideological potential and ways and means of political leadership, carrying out with a high feeling of responsibility, its mission as the political leader of the entire nation. It became the vital center, the embodiment of the highest awareness of the people. "Everything we have achieved," Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu points out, "is closely related to the party's political leadership in all sectors of activity. Improvements in the management of the building of socialism and the democratization of socioeconomic activities presume not

the weakening but the strengthening of the leading political role of the party and the close unity between party and people. This is an objective necessity and the highest possible guarantee that Romania is firmly advancing toward socialism and communism."

Therefore, practice and experience in building socialism in Romania fully confirm the vitality of one of the fundamental truths of the theory of scientific socialism: the concept of the party's leading role in building the new society. In heading the complex processes of building the new system, the revolutionary party must implement this leading role in all areas of socialist building. To limit the party's leadership in one way or another in some areas of life would mean, as Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu emphasizes, to deprive the concept of the party's leading role of its political content and to open the way to erroneous and totally wrong and harmful and essentially liquidationist interpretations which, in the final account, are bound to weaken the party and threaten the building of socialism itself.

Guided by the RCP, in the period after the historical event of August 1944, profound changes have also taken place in the realm of social awareness and in the molding of the new man—the conscious and inspired builder of the new society. Proceeding from the basic stipulation of ensuring the consistency between material and spiritual life in society and the need to eliminate the lagging in ideological, political and educational work behind the level of development of production forces and society as a whole, decisive steps are being taken to ensure the steady implementation of the ideological program, which is a structural part of the party's program.

The prospects for the full assertion of national independence and sovereignty and for a free and worthy participation in the life of the global community, which became possible 40 years ago for Romania, was given an suitable framework and means for materialization, thanks to the decisive contribution made by President Nicolae Ceausescu. The Romanian people, who are showing a high degree of constant concern for the model implementation of the tasks for building a comprehensively developed socialist society and the all-round utilization of its creative potential and development of active cooperation with all countries in the world, are fully resolved to continue to implement a constructive foreign policy of peace and cooperation and broad openness and, in the spirit of the new political thinking, to make a contribution to the solution of the central problems which are of concern to all mankind. The Romanian Communist Party and socialist Romania will continue to broaden their cooperation with the other socialist countries and with the developing and developed capitalist countries on the basis of the principles of full equality, respect for national independence and sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs and mutual advantages.

In his April 1989 address to the party's Central Committee, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, who rated particularly highly the important role of CEMA in the socioeconomic development of the socialist countries, emphasized that "we are fully resolved actively to participate in

improving the activities of this organization for cooperation with a view to implementing the jointly agreed upon programs until the year 2000, which will ensure the balanced development of all member countries on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology."

Proceeding from the fact that under the conditions of the stockpiling of a huge quantity of armaments—nuclear, conventional or other—war has become inadmissible, Romania and its president have taken numerous specific actions on the international level by formulating a realistic program for peace and disarmament. Romania is firmly in favor of the use of political means and talks in solving any controversy among countries and all world problems. It is actively contributing to the establishment of a climate of security, cooperation and peace in Europe and throughout the world. Life and its realities have confirmed the accuracy of the views and suggestions made by Romania on eliminating underdevelopment and organizing a new global economic and financial order, democratization of international relations and formulation of new principles of relations among governments.

Particularly important among the steps taken by the RCP and the Romanian Socialist Republic with a view to asserting a new way of thinking and acting in international life are the development and strengthening of cooperation and combat solidarity with the communist and worker parties and with all revolutionary, progressive and democratic forces aimed, through joint actions, at creating a better and more just world founded on respect for national independence and the right of each nation to determine its own fate.

The 45th anniversary of the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation of 23 August 1944 is an occasion for us to express our deep satisfaction with the fact that Romanian-Soviet relations, which have rich and old traditions, are steadily developing in various areas, in the spirit of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, in the interest of and the benefit of the Romanian and Soviet peoples and the cause of socialism, peace and progress throughout the world.

Summit meetings and agreements which, on each occasion, provide a new powerful impetus to reciprocal cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and technical, cultural and other areas and are making an important contribution to the broadening and diversification of fruitful cooperation and are of decisive significance in the forward development of Romanian-Soviet relations, play a particularly major role in strengthening friendship and cooperation and in developing Romanian-Soviet relations. A clear manifestation of the strength of relations between our parties, countries and peoples and their common wish to give them a new scope were the topics of the summit meetings held in Bucharest and Moscow between Comrade N. Ceausescu, RCP general secretary and president of the Romanian Socialist Republic, and Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet chairman. These events opened new prospects for fruitful and mutually profitable cooperation between the two countries.

Relations between our parties are developing along the lines of governments and parliaments and between mass and public organizations; the exchange of experience in a great variety of areas of building socialism is intensifying.

Together with the other socialist countries and all progressive and realistic forces, Romania and the Soviet Union are closely interacting with a view to promoting disarmament, nuclear above all, and for the constructive solution of all pressing and difficult problems which affect mankind and for building a better and more just peace on earth.

In the year of the 45th anniversary of the historical act of August 1944, Romania is a modern and blossoming socialist state, following a path of comprehensive development. The thought expressed by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, of great theoretical and practical significance, to the effect that the forthcoming 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party could already now be characterized—bearing in mind the outstanding achievements of the Romanian people in building socialism and the further development of the country—as a congress of the definitive victory of socialism, the triumph of the principles of scientific socialism in the revolutionary reorganization of Romanian society and the full economic and political independence of Romania, triggered a powerful response in the ranks of party members and all working people.

In promoting the strict implementation of the party program, our people are filled with the firm resolve of ensuring, under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party and its general secretary, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the steady progress of the country on the path of socialism, progress and well-being, in accordance with its superior interests and aspirations for peace, reciprocal understanding and cooperation with all nations.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

A Chance for Europe

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[Article by Nikita Ivanovich Maslennikov, consultant, *KOMMUNIST* department of international life]

[Text] On the eve of its third millennium, mankind finds itself at a turning point, when the very meaning of progress in the world must be re-evaluated and reassessed. Reality is such that as a result of the intensification of interdependence, the global consequences of the actions of individual countries and their unification in any area of social life have drastically increased and reached a qualitatively new level. Under these circumstances, priority is given to a set of contradictions between the objective ability of civilization to place such consequences under reliable and sensible control, on the one hand, and the lack in international relations of efficient mechanisms, means and agreements aimed at ensuring the universal survival of an interdependent world, on the other. It is precisely here that we see

manifested today the basic conflict in global developments, the resolution of which is possible only by developing, step-by-step, a universal mechanism for managing the global community.

This general trend is beginning increasingly to define the nature of international relations in the main areas on earth. It is most clearly visible and convincing—by virtue of specific historical reasons—in the European process, a new impetus to which was made public in the course of the visits paid by M.S. Gorbachev to the FRG and France in June and July 1989. The talks which were held in Bonn and Paris and the nature of the agreements and other documents which were signed (the most important among which was the Soviet-West German joint declaration) indicated that the level of reciprocal exigency shown by the interested partners in new prospects and opportunities for bilateral relations and European cooperation has been raised today to a level consistent with the profound and responsible philosophical thoughts on the meaning of the present historical moment.

The treaties and legal results of the visits are of particular importance: 12 new agreements between governments and joint documents were added to the credits of Moscow and Bonn and 22 were added to the strengthening interaction between the USSR and France.

Another important result was the deepening of the conceptual vision of a European home and the achievement of a broader understanding of the variety of conditions and prerequisites for joint European building. This applies above all to an awareness of the crucial stage in European history. As M.S. Gorbachev noted at the Elysee Palace, "the postwar period has ended. However, whereas in the past such periods preceded a prewar period, today we have an opening to a durable peace, based not on the balance of forces but on the balance of real and properly understood interests." This is a chance for Europe. The chance to begin by leading civilization into a new, a peaceful period of development, mobilizing the efforts of all participants in the process initiated in Helsinki and of building a "common home."

A crucial period always hurls a challenge to its contemporaries. The problems of vital importance to all can be solved by all states and peoples only jointly. Joint actions also presume common objectives. The new historical age brings to light new laws of social progress and makes it necessary to reinterpret its very criteria. The need for a joint search for common criteria for progress under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution in the nuclear and, subsequently, the postnuclear age, are becoming the starting point for contemporary European policy. Furthermore, a great deal of these new guidelines are now becoming quite clear.

It is clear, for example, that progressive changes in society presume their joint management, the purpose of which is to reduce to a minimum the uncontrolled risk of spontaneous processes. They are inseparable from the solution of global problems related to the formulation of some criteria for sensible needs of mankind, taking into consideration energy and raw material resources and ecological and demographic requirements. The very idea of progress—the

enhancement of man—requires a revision of many traditional technocratic approaches and the abandonment of concepts concerning future civilization as some kind of single monolith. In discussing this at the meeting with the representatives of the French intelligentsia at the Sorbonne, the head of the Soviet state emphasized that the viability of civilization lies in its multivariance and multiple facets: spiritual, national, social, political and cultural. "Since such is the case, one of the prime prerequisites for progress is tolerance of different ways of thinking and different ways of life. That is why we require the absolute recognition of the freedom of sociopolitical choice as made by each nation. This must become the universal imperative of the age."

This leads to two most important parameters of progressiveness in global and European development. First, today progress can be achieved only through coexistence, cooperation and peaceful rivalry among countries and socioeconomic systems. Second, no solution of any confrontation between specific and common interests is possible outside a context of universal human values and outside the framework of the search for peaceful political means of solving contradictions and settling conflicts.

Such an understanding of progress and the search for common criteria for progress through universal human interests is beginning to play the role of a "philosophical stone" in European policy. It is on this basis that collectively a system is being developed for evaluating the success in the development of the general European process, the strengthening of its stability and the number of internationally accepted standards governing the "common home."

A great deal has already been achieved in this area. As M.S. Gorbachev noted, in his speech on foreign policy problems, delivered at the 1st Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, despite all differences in views and evaluations we find a similarity existing on a number of conceptual problems directly related to global politics. This includes the unacceptability and absurdity of seeking a military solution to intergovernmental problems and contradictions; the primacy of universal human values; freedom of choice; reducing the level of armaments and eliminating military confrontation; the need for the reciprocal economic adaptation of East and West and the internationalization of efforts in the area of ecology; the link between politics and morality; the role of the humanitarian and cultural factor in the political process; and the significance of direct contacts among citizens of different countries.

European values, which developed in the course of centuries, have deep historical roots. Essentially, it is a question of a synthesis of the principles of 1789 and 1917, with universal human priorities and interests triggered by our time. The French Revolution proclaimed the freedom of man and the citizen, the freedom of the individual. The October Revolution marked the next step of the greatest possible significance to history, by proclaiming the freedom and rights for the working people and all exploited masses and oppressed nations. The events of the second half of the 20th century added to this system a

hierarchy of values. A dramatic and life-asserting problem arose: ensuring the rights of mankind.

The dialectics of progress is such that without ensuring such rights (survival, restoration of harmony with nature and normal conditions for the enhancement of man) the rights of nations and individuals cannot be fully guaranteed. The solution of this problem lies in the creation of an international democratic mechanism for the solution of global problems, in which a general European home must become a structural component.

What kind of home should this be? What elements should constitute a general European building? What is lacking for laying reliable foundations? The comprehensively substantiated answer to such questions, as both visits indicated, requires collective cooperation with all European nations in rethinking the idea of European unity. A very broad vision is needed for the processes of reorganization of the existing international order in Europe, which would give priority to general European values and replace the traditional balance of power with a balance of interests. That is why, it is the view of the Soviet Union, that increasingly a task on the agenda is that of holding yet another conference, such as the one in Helsinki, in the course of which the new generation of leaders of European countries, the United States and Canada, would discuss subsequent stages in the progress toward a European community of the 21st century.

Furthermore, substantial opportunities for broadening and intensifying the European process could be activated as of now. The view of the USSR on such problems was formulated, in a concentrated aspect, in the Soviet-West German joint declaration and in the speech delivered by the Soviet leader to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strassburg. The Soviet Union is approaching the concept of the European home as a **new system of security and cooperation**, organically stemming from the objectives and ideas of the Helsinki accords and the concluding document of the Vienna meeting of the Conference on European Security and Confidence on ways of solving the main European problem—surmounting the military-political and economic division of the continent.

The structuring of such a system is possible by steadily following the principle according to which a prerequisite for the well-being and free development of each European nation and every person is the free development and well-being of all. The enumeration of the specific areas of building a Europe of peace and cooperation is virtually unlimited. In principle, the area of international cooperation in Europe could include any progressive phenomenon in social life.

As to the Soviet Union, we have already made our choice. We see our future as part of a unified Europe, peaceful and democratic, retaining its full variety, supporting common humanistic ideals and open to the rest of the world for cooperation and mutual aid. The way to such a Europe passes through political and economic perestroika which leads to a qualitatively new condition of our socialist society. Perestroika, projected in the area of international relations, means a course toward strengthening the healthy trends in the growing richness of the world. Perestroika is

our involvement in its intensifying unity and interdependence. It is also the steady following of reinterpreted national interests consisting, in particular, in the fact that by strengthening our original socialist individuality and nature, remain at the same time a force which would maximally contribute to the implementation of the consolidating principles in international and intergovernmental interaction.

The principles proclaimed in the message of the Congress of People's Deputies to the peoples of the world, which should guide our state in international affairs, do not include a single one which would conflict with the objectives of the European process. The idea of a common European home is organically consistent with our thinking on domestic problems, and approaches to processes of change, which are developing on different levels of depth and significance, according to the conditions, traditions and needs of the various European socialist countries. We cannot fail to see that the sum of these processes of socialist renovation is a type of guarantee for the building of a common European home. Internal changes in the USSR and the fraternal countries should be consistent with new methods and new and more flexible approaches to bilateral and multilateral cooperation within CEMA. The forthcoming CEMA session (November 1989), scheduled to be held in Sofia, should contribute to a decisive change in relations within it; it should become a turning point. The open and interested discussion on this topic took place at the July Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Members, in Bucharest.

The documents it adopted express the resolve of ensuring further progress toward a stable and safe Europe, the main support of which should remain the general European process. Along this way as well, as a new atmosphere, free from recurrences of confrontation, developed in European and global affairs, one could as of now anticipate the transformation of the union of socialist European countries from a military-political into a political-military alliance.

A major guarantee for the success of European building lies in the proper understanding on the part of the West of the universal human meaning of our perestroika and the reform in the fraternal countries and their positive consequences for all of Europe and the rest of the world. It must become clear that one of the most important objectives of the new political thinking is to eliminate the alienation of socialism from global developments and the growing understanding that further social progress is impossible without mastering all available global experience and taking into consideration the laws of interdependence and the developing global integrity.

The message addressed by M.S. Gorbachev to F. Mitterrand on the occasion of the 15th annual economic conference of the leaders of the seven leading Western countries, was yet another manifestation of this approach taken by socialism to global affairs. It stipulates that the tempestuous progress of integration trends in various parts of the world could be channeled into the stream of a universal partnership. The first step in this case could be an agreement on a methodology, acceptable by all countries and

universally applicable, to harmonize economic processes (and, above all, to settle the debts of developing countries). Naturally, in the forthcoming multilateral dialogue on such questions all Western European integration associations will play a very important role. However, this also provides new incentives for ascribing new, more developed and mature aspects to general European cooperation.

We may assume that the summer of 1989 will enter the history of international relations as a confirmation of the fact that the general European process is a live and developing reality and not a fictitious structure. Europeans are offered a unique opportunity for making the turn toward a guaranteed future of the continent irreversible.

Nonetheless, the threat remains that the positive trends which have appeared and are strengthening could collapse. We cannot fail to be concerned by the aspiration of some circles to update tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and to retain at all cost, as was confirmed by the recent session of the NATO Council and the meeting of the "seven" in Paris, the strategy of nuclear containment. Nor is the growth and updating of conventional armaments being halted. The concept of confrontation, the mentality of confrontation and reliance on force, which developed during the cold war, are difficult to surmount. Nor have their material foundations been eliminated.

Something else is true as well, however. It is encouraging that in the political space from the Atlantic to the Urals a common work is being initiated for the building of a new Europe which will not be burdened by stereotypes, mistrust, stockpiling of armaments and confrontation. No one can any longer ignore this reality.

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The Second International: Legacy and Present

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[Text] One hundreds years have passed since the International Socialist Congress, which was held in Paris in July 1889, laid the beginning of the founding of the Second International—the international unification of parties and organizations defending the interests of the working class. This event is considered, with full justification, one of the most important stages in the establishment of a mass organized labor movement. As we know, F. Engels actively participated in the preparations for its opening.

By the end of May an international seminar was held in Moscow on the occasion of this anniversary, in the course of which a roundtable was held, attended by noted scientific, political and trade union personalities and representatives of communist, socialist and social democratic parties and trade unions from 25 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was sponsored by the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement, jointly with the AUCCTU.

Unlike the recent past, when such events were reduced essentially to making solemn declarative statements, the

Moscow forum took place under circumstances of an open, occasionally sharp and unbiased joint discussion by communists and social democrats not only of the theoretical lessons of the Second International but also the fundamental problems facing global socialism and the international labor movement on the threshold of the 21st century. Virtually all reports and communications (more than 40) dealt with phenomena and processes which determine the aspect of contemporary civilization and the need for a more profound understanding of the history and theory of Marxism and its further enrichment and, at the same time, a rejection of a number of obsolete concepts and dogmas. Topics which were discussed included "Universal and Humanistic Values in the Global Concepts of the Labor Movement," and "Ways of Development of the Liberated Countries and the Working Class." We asked the participants in the seminar who, in our view, had come out with the most interesting communications, briefly to present their basic ideas. The material was prepared by N. Yermoshkin, candidate of historical sciences, and editorial associate.

On the New Prospects of the Social Democracy in Western Europe

Etienne Mange, director of the Emil Vanderwelde Institute, Belgium:

I am glad to be able openly to discuss both the achievements of socialism as well as its problems with comrades from different countries and parties. Only 1 year ago I could not even conceive of such a meeting. The papers submitted for discussion and the communications were noted by their broad approaches and rejection of stereotypes in perceiving the historical experience of relations between social democrats and communists. In my view, this is the most important thing, for in the joint process of the assertion of new ideas and the daring solution of the complex tangles of global politics, the renovation of our traditional concepts of trends and prospects of social development and the respective reinterpretation of a number of concepts for the development of the socialist movement are tasks of prime importance.

In assessing the events of the last 100 years, I can say that the socialists have achieved a great many of their objectives in Western Europe: universal electoral rights, a maximal 8-hour workday, paid leave of 3-4 weeks and social security. In a number of respects this is the result of the so-called social democratic compromise. Actually, the strength of the social democracy has probably always been its ability to make a compromise acceptable to all sides (along with other groups, in power, or as member of the opposition).

Today, however, the conditions for such a compromise have drastically changed and, consequently, so has its very structure. Social progress can be achieved not only through the rejection of "eschatological" dreams of a "socialist society," but also the type of faith in progress which reduces the efforts of the social democrats to an excessively artificial technocratic progress.

The search for a new future for the social democratic movement in Western Europe should be focused on seven basic problems:

1. *Establishing relations between the environment and the economy.* Economic progress can no longer be considered "progress" for, as was the case in the past decade, it is exhausting to a tremendous extent natural resources and destroying the habitat. This means that the social democrats who, starting with 1945, considered as their main task to achieve a high pace of economic growth, are now asking themselves whether the time has not come to renovate the aspect of social progress. The objective of the social democrats (and the trade unions) should be to combine the "argument of quality" of the environment with methods of social organization.

2. *Restructuring of the labor system.* "The social democratic compromise" is threatened not only from the outside, on the part of internationalization of capital, but also from within, from the individualization and computerization (with its extensive influence on the organization and quality of labor). Under these circumstances, now the social democrats try to pursue a "policy of a manpower market" rather than a "policy of full employment."

3. *Effective struggle against poverty.* One of the most significant problems of the social democrats is the struggle against a more or less widespread (structural) poverty.

4. *Intensification and assistance for the ever greater dissemination of knowledge.* Since we must pay great attention to natural resources, taking into consideration long-term industrial developments, a significant increase in our knowledge must become the most important prerequisite to this effect.

5. *Reassessment of the state.* Now the social democrats must consider a possible revision of their views which are oriented to a great extent on the ability of the state to solve problems. This is not only because a process of internationalization in decision-making of an economic and social nature is making its way but also because the citizens have developed a different attitude toward the state and the bureaucracy.

6. *"Europeanization"* and, with it, the idea of a single European market and giving power to the European authorities are considered a significant opportunity for the reacceptance of Keynesian methods. This will make it possible for the social democrats and the trade union movement to assume positions comparable to the power of multinational monopolies.

The political integration of Europe is important also in order to create a more efficient front in the military protection of Europe and allow our movement to play an active role in bilateral disarmament and gradual detente. The independent status of Europe blocks the conversion of the economic and military division of Europe into a permanent cultural watershed.

7. *International cooperation based on true cohesion.* Relations between countries of Eastern and Western Europe must be improved. The latest political and economic reforms made in the Eastern European countries, in the

Soviet Union above all, are bringing to us historical changes. Actually, we must achieve that which Gorbachev described as a "common European home," a peaceful home with prosperity in all "rooms" and in which the people in all "rooms" could freely say what they want.

This also presumes the unification of the efforts of Europeans with a view to putting an end to an unacceptable economic inequality in the world between North and South.

Ensuring the Priority of Universal Human Interests

Jurgen Reusch, deputy director of the Institute for Marxist Research, FRG:

As we celebrate the centennial of the Second International, we must interpret the lessons from the history of the labor movement. What makes this even more important is that today, on the threshold of the third millennium, mankind finds itself facing an unprecedented challenge. We simply must apply the experience of the Second International, an experience of permanent significance. It was thanks to its congresses, the activities of the International Socialist Bureau, the international committees and conferences, and the organization of mutual aid and joint actions on the part of the socialist parties, the trade unions, and the socialist women's, youth and journalistic organizations that a broadened flexible mechanism was created for international interrelationships and international cohesion. That is why it is possible to say that the 100 year which separate us from the events of that time do not distance but bring us closer to one another and make this anniversary extremely topical, for the present situation as well requires unity of action on an international scale and new serious approaches. The global threat of an interdependent world has led to the fact that the survival of mankind has become the objective which has absolute priority over any class interest.

It is no secret that over the past 20 years Marxism has reacted to many changes with great delays; its answers in frequent cases were influenced by stagnation and dogmatism and the aspiration to cling to views which, in reality, had long become obsolete. It was only perestroika in the USSR and in a number of other countries, starting with 1985, that provided a decisive impetus to the further development and renovation of Marxism.

The new thinking is based on the intellectual potential of all classes in all social systems. To the same extent Marxism must not only make its contribution to new thinking but also learn from the systems which have already made their contribution.

The integrity and interdependence of the world under the conditions of the existence of global problems require substantially more than simply attaining a coexistence which, based on cooperation, has become the main trend. Development processes are becoming the center of the individual social systems.

Therefore, the following remains true: 1. The fact that universal human interests stand above class interests. In the world arena each class-oriented action, aimed at the

long-term, can become rational only if it is consistent with universal human interests; 2. Universal human interests must be ensured priority. They must not depend on class interests. In this case the working class and its organizations must consider their own interests not only as objectively existing but also as a tangible area for conscious action; 3. The class interests of the working class are an organic component of universal human interests. The class consciousness of the working class, consistent with the spirit of our time, is possible today only if it includes the interpretation of global problems. The problem of the survival of mankind becomes, therefore, an essential political feature for the Marxists. The interest of socialism as well must be based on this prospect.

Given the existence of global problems during the crucial period, Marxist policy must consist not of exposing the inability of capitalism for reform but of becoming the ideological and mobilizing factor in the reorganization of existing—civic, ecological and social—relations, the radicalizing of which, in general, has no bounds.

Socialism and the Contemporary World

Sava Zivanov, professor, political science department, Belgrade University, Yugoslavia:

The anniversary of the Second International does not require an anniversary celebration or an essentially anthological treatment but an objective analysis of its rich historical experience, the more so since socialism has always been and remains the focal point of numerous ideological and political arguments. In this connection, I would like to discuss two aspects:

a) As a whole, socialism was able to achieve significant historical successes. At the turn of this century it was no more than an idea, a concept for the reorganization of society, backed by numerous but, on a global scale, insufficiently influential social and political forces. Now, by the end of the century, it has become a dynamic universal-historical process in which powerful and varied social and political forces have become involved, which act through different means and exerting their influence on the present and the future. All of these forces and movements objectively merge within a single stream which substantially determines historical trends in the development of the contemporary world and influences the future of mankind. This mass offensive mounted by the ideas of socialism and the organized forces and social practices of socialism in the arena of world history are an outstanding historical accomplishment which gives the contemporary world a new direction and content. We can claim with full justification that socialism as it is, with all of its contradictions, weaknesses, unfinished aspects and deformations, is nonetheless the only serious historical challenge and alternative to capitalism.

b) Although the achievements of socialism are universally acknowledged, they nonetheless remain significantly fewer than those expected and those which are really possible. Within the ranks of virtually all socialist movements and among all leading theoreticians, ever since its appearance and until recently, the firm conviction existed that its achievements would be more impressive, its breakthrough

more powerful and its final triumph closer. Such a triumphalist approach and forecast predominated even when all indicators confirmed the opposite.

The ascending historical development of the global socialist process has been extremely uneven, an unevenness that was manifested in three basic parameters: time periods, geographic areas, and the development of ideological-political groups of socialist forces. In other words, there have been periods (and areas) noted by great victories and major accomplishments by individual socialist detachments; however, there also have been periods (areas) of stagnation, failures and defeats.

The relatively modest successes achieved by socialism in the world compared with those which were expected are the result of the interweaving of a variety of circumstances and factors. Let us single out among them the following:

The forecasts themselves lacked adequate grounds and a real "support" in terms of the correlation of forces and the real trends of historical ascent;

The historical processes in the development of mankind were subjected to more significant changes than expected and did not develop as had been projected by the theoreticians of socialism and the leaders of socialist movements, particularly when their projections assumed an increasingly schematic, bookish and dogmatic nature;

The quantitative growth of the power of socialist forces did not lead to a new quality of life: socialist and social democratic governments managed the capitalist system more efficiently. Communist parties in power, in their desire to "put an end to capitalism" as soon as possible, engaged in an arbitrary economic policy of "historically shortest ways," in the course of which they ignored the achievements of human civilization. As a result, despite the initially high pace of economic development, this led to the creation of ineffective economic and insufficiently democratic political systems which contributed to stagnation;

World capitalism, the main opponent of socialism, was and remains viable. It is adapting more flexibly to the new circumstances. It is stronger economically than projected by the theoreticians of socialism. World capitalism proved its ability to learn from the past, including the past of socialism. Under the conditions of a crisis it was able to reorganize itself on a state-capitalist basis (having included in its system some ideas, elements and mechanisms borrowed from socialism). While retaining its leading role in the development of production forces on the basis of the scientific and technical and information revolutions, capitalism continues to exert economic diktat in the contemporary world.

Let me complete my views on an optimistic note. Socialism, unquestionably, has a future but only if it is a socialism which is facing its future and is advancing to meet it. History and time are "working for socialism" only when and to the extent to which it is itself capable of extracting everything that is most instructive from history.

Renovation of Socialism and the World Labor Movement

Pekka Korpinen, director of the Labor and Economic Research Institute, Finland:

The celebration of the bicentennial of the French Revolution and the centennial of the founding of the Second International and the beginning of the May Day demonstrations coincided with a profound reinterpretation of the nature of socialism, the state of "universal prosperity" in the capitalist countries, and the role of the socialist movement in the contemporary world.

As a social democrat, I am convinced that the principles of perestroika can be used also in reforming the "universal prosperity" state. In the developed capitalist countries nearly one-half of the national income flows through state channels, a share which is continuing to increase. The statist development was important in a period when class contradictions were being reduced and the proletariat was coming out of a condition of poverty and cultural slavery. Today, however, this method could become an obstruction to development, for which reason the ideas of the withering away of the state and advancement of a civilian society are becoming quite topical. The "universal prosperity" society can wither away with the introduction of a universal civil income and social services, such as health care, education, and so on, organized as the self-managing subunits on the basis of total self-support. The capitalist states of "universal prosperity" could, possibly, convert into socialist states with a market-oriented economy and worker self-management.

As to the problem of the socialist countries, I would like to present my views on the nature of the economic problems of socialism as seven sins which have become deeply rooted in Marxist tradition and are largely shared by the social democrats.

The "seven sins of socialism" are the following:

1. Ignorance of the role of money and markets in the development process.
2. Ignorance of the cost of time, manifested in the lack of a substantiated rate of accountability.
3. Unjustifiably high faith in the ability of machines to bring technical progress.
4. Belief that business and the monopolies will create a positive economy with broad results.
5. Faith in the artificial separation of a production (commodity) from nonproduction (services) sectors.
6. Underestimating the role of the authorities.
7. Underestimating the significance of motivating incentives as opposed to administrative methods and a voluntary distribution of income.

Perestroika raised this question and now all that is needed is time to find the right solutions. The renovation of socialism will become the most important social movement of the next century.

Finally, a constant dialogue between social democrats and communists, and exchange of opinions such as this one, will help us restore—on the basis of openness and compatibility of the pluralism of opinion—the unity of action for the sake of creating a new more perfect world.

Cooperating Without Dramatizing the Past

Yu. Krasin, rector, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences:

The history of the Second International is an entire age in the life of the labor movement. The anniversary provides a good occasion for its various trends to take a new look at themselves and at relations among them and to try to single out in the legacy of the Second International all that is of value in terms of cooperation in solving contemporary problems.

Speaking of its main gain, it consists of the formation of a broad and flexible mechanism of international relations and international cohesion within the labor movement. With the help of the International many worker parties strengthened and became a major political force; the trade unions and the cooperatives became stronger and millions of working people became involved in the struggle. The ideas of socialism became widespread. The influence of the working class on the development of society and the entire political climate in Europe increased sharply; the bourgeoisie was forced to take them into consideration.

The Second International made a noticeable contribution to the elaboration of the ways and means of struggle waged by the working people: the organization of a striking movement and political strikes and demonstrations; use of bourgeois-democratic freedoms and of parliamentary and local elections. All of this brought about improvements in the situation and an increase in the rights of the working people and the enrichment of the political culture of the labor movement. The ideas of the International on reducing armaments, armed forces and military budgets, support of liberation movements of oppressed peoples, peaceful resolution of international conflicts with the help of laws, struggle against wars of conquest and the connection between the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism, are very topical. In short, we can repeat after Lenin, with full justification that the activities of the Second International include historical merit and a gain "which will never be denied by the conscientious worker" (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 101).

Naturally, the activities of the Second International were not idyllic. Historicism and scientific objectivity do not allow us to give it a one-sided assessment. Its activities were influenced by both the strong and the weak sides of the labor movement of that time. Nonetheless, we could note that, as a whole, it played a positive role in the history of the organized labor movement.

Having experienced the tempestuous events of our restless century, we became wiser in explaining the reasons for the truly tragic event in the labor movement, known as the "collapse of the Second International." It is not sufficient to reduce everything to the subjective factor, to the errors

and mistakes committed by the leaders of the worker' parties. In reality, everything was much more complex. The wave of chauvinism which divided proletarian solidarity reflected the predominant level of mass consciousness. The profound differentiation within the universal labor army, the objective variety of its interests and the different priorities assigned to the tasks facing the national workers detachments were clearly manifested. Also manifested was the entire gravity of the problem of the correlation between class and national factors. The crisis in international solidarity indicated the inadmissibility of ignoring or underestimating national feelings and interests.

The first act of the tragedy of the division within the labor movement in 1914 was followed by other, which intensified the diverging course of the two trends. Could such a separation have been avoided? At the point of division of universal history, when the Great October Socialist Revolution faced the labor movement with an inevitable choice of alternatives, this seemed impossible.

Equally important is another question. Bearing in mind that the division both on the national and international levels unquestionably weakened the labor movement, it would be legitimate to ask the following: Could the negative consequences of this division have been reduced and could the necessary steps be taken to move toward its elimination? Looking back at the entire path that was covered and summing up the achievements along its way and the omitted opportunities and severe consequences, obviously, the answer to this question must be in the positive.

We cannot say that in this respect nothing was undertaken. When the initial signs that the October breakthrough was localized and that the capitalist system had stabilized became apparent, Lenin formulated the long-term idea of a single labor front, the historical significance of which at that time could not be appreciated either by social democrats or communists. Among the social democrats as well fruitful ideas were generated, which, had they been properly assessed, could have stimulated unification processes. One could recall the daring approaches taken by O. Bauer, which were rejected both by communists and social democrats.

If we look back at the entire dramatic sequence of events marking the relations between communists and social democrats, three essential conclusions become possible. First: the division between the two trends in the labor movement was triggered by profound objective reasons based on the dialectical nature of social development, which took place within and through contradictions. Therefore, the division proved to be stable and lengthy. It would be useless to ascribe the responsibility for it exclusively on the subjects of the political process, and even less so on any given trend within the labor movement, ignoring the objective basis of its positions and political behavior.

Second. However tense the passions and the confrontation may have reached between the two trends in the labor movement, objective developments constantly motivated them to cooperate. This need was felt particularly strongly

during sharp critical situations. At such moments cooperation prevailed over confrontation.

Third. Under different circumstances and at different stages a kind of pattern was manifested: separate actions weakened the labor movement and the entire democratic movement, which achieved their greatest successes only when acting together.

It seems to us that these conclusions were not merely accepted as an abstract theory. Gradually surmounting the inertia of hostility and dislike, which had accumulated over a long period of time, they were mastered in the political practices of the labor movement. To realize this, suffice it to pay attention to the changes which both trends in the labor movement experienced after World War II.

The communists covered a lengthy and, let us be frank, difficult path in reassessing, sometimes painfully, a number of values. The first was to surmount the Stalinist concept of capitalism and socialism and the class struggle and the revolution; the second was the theoretical interpretation of the new realities and a political adaptation to them. The 20th CPSU Congress provided a strong impetus to such processes. The new assessments and approaches were formulated in the course of difficult searches. While acknowledging the seriousness of the differences with the social democrats, the communists nonetheless raised the question of cooperation with them in the struggle for peace, democracy and the socialist reorganization of society. They acknowledged the variety of ways of conversion to socialism and of its forms of development, and the possibility of achieving socialist objectives through peaceful ways. One could say that the outlines of the new forms of cooperation in the labor movement became apparent. Unfortunately, work in this direction was not noted for its consistency, and at a given stage it bogged down and, in some areas, there was even a back-pedaling. Stagnation was becoming increasingly strong in Soviet society. Economic development was obstructed and the influence of the ideas of socialism throughout the world weakened. All of this had negative consequences, including for the labor movement as a whole.

We cannot fail to note the changes which took place in the views of the social democrats, who had also covered a long and complex path from the concept of the cold war to acknowledging the need for peaceful coexistence and cooperation between capitalist and socialist countries. They played an important role in the establishment of detente between East and West. The Socialist International, it is true not without hesitations and not immediately, supported the national liberation struggle of the peoples and favored a new type of "North-South" relations. In surmounting Eurocentrism, it began to organize cooperation with many parties in the developing countries. From banning cooperation with the communists, the Socialist International converted to the admissibility of joint actions. The most promising among them were joint steps taken for detente and disarmament.

Changes in the positions and views of the two trends in the labor movement are laying the foundations for further progress in their interrelationship. The discussion of such problems revealed broad agreement on the need, above all,

to replace the concept of peace based on power or the threat of its use with the concept of a stable and consciously regulated peace on the basis of the balance of interests and reciprocal security, identical for all. Readiness to engage in joint efforts for the solution of the global problems in the economic, ecological and humanitarian areas is ripening. A far-reaching unity of views is developing on the need to take decisive steps to put an end to the widening gap between developed and developing countries. The left-wing has developed an understanding of the fact that the many faceted Europe, divided by a social barrier, ranging from the Atlantic to the Urals, has major opportunities for cooperation in the areas of economics, ecology, politics and culture. Another rallying factor here is the reciprocal readiness to engage in the defense of human rights and the acceptance of the ideas of democratization and humanizing of international relations.

Problems specifically related to the labor movement are also becoming a subject of constructive cooperation. The technological revolution demands of this movement a search for a democratic alternative to neoconservatism which, in aspiring to economic rationality, sacrifices the vital interests of the working people, violates social justice and justifies the growth of social inequality. The common concern of the worker parties is to answer this challenge, taking into consideration the new realities, stimulating the renovation processes they have triggered. In the broad meaning of the term, this means a search for a humanistic answer to the requirements of technological progress as a counterbalance to the strong trends caused by this progress toward technocracy and callous economic rationalism. Today's dynamic reality, without eliminating differences among the trends within the labor movement, provides a scope for comparing experiences and seeking optimal solutions to the problems of our time on the basis of the socialist tradition. The differences themselves, including the ideological ones, are not being mandatorily seen through the lens of confrontation.

We believe that both trends in the labor movement are facing the task of renovating their ideological-political baggage. They are engaged in active creative work within their ranks. Let us try to formulate some of its main trends, which are consistent with the socialist tradition and are of common interest to the entire labor movement. Let us name among them the following:

Changes in the obsolete ideas of socialism and the formulation of its contemporary concept;

Study of the nature and ways of global social progress under the conditions of an integral, interdependent and conflicting world;

Formulation of essentially new views on the system of international security and a global political and economic order;

Substantiation of the democratic alternative to neoconservatism and economic rationalism, oriented toward socialist and humanistic values;

Ensuring the irreversibility of the process of democratization of society and its dissemination among all areas of life;

Identification and implementation of a more efficient model of social change in the developing countries;

Formulating the ways and means of international interaction among the forces of the labor and democratic movements.

The profound qualitative changes which are taking place in the socialist world (perestroika in Soviet society and renovation in the other socialist countries, democratization and glasnost, a constructive foreign policy in the spirit of the new political thinking) are helping to cleanse the spiritual and political atmosphere from prejudices toward the communist movement and its objectives. A more favorable climate is being established for the development of contacts among democratic forces and movements, above all among parties and organizations within the labor movement.

The meeting of representatives of 178 communist, socialist, social democratic, revolutionary-democratic and other left-wing parties, which participated in the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in Moscow (November 1987) was a major event in the implementation of such opportunities. This marked the beginning of a broad dialogue among left-wing forces. It reflected the way of thinking and approaches of the different parties to the realities of today and their interest in the creative study of the world and in cooperating in solving its gravest problems. This clearly shows the continuity with one of the most valuable traditions of the Second International: the tradition of democracy and pluralism, of unity within variety.

At the end of this century, the centrifugal forces are once again gaining the upper hand over the centripetal ones. The forming of an integral and interdependent world requires the close interaction among all trends in the labor movement. A steady lively dialogue between communists and social democrats could help the international labor movement to restore such vitally important features as openness to the present and aspiration toward the future. This would enable the labor movement to rise to the level of contemporary requirements and to display historical initiative in seeking solutions to the topical problems encountered by human civilization.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Study of Military-Political Problems

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[Review by Lieutenant General V. Starodubov of the book "*V Poiskakh Vykhoda*" [In Search for a Solution]. Military-Political Aspects of International Security. By A.A. Kokoshin. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 271 pp]

[Text] The title of a book by the noted Soviet student of international affairs A.A. Kokoshin is "*In Search of a*

Solution." It is a search for a solution to this dangerous and risky situation in which mankind has found itself as a result of the arms race, the nuclear arms race above all, which is threatening today its very existence. The author considers the military-political aspects of the threat, using to this effect the method of a military-political study which, in his view, can "contribute to the formulation of a better integrated approach to the solution of foreign political and defense problems of our state while giving primacy to domestic tasks" (p 4).

Among the entire variety of aspects, he has concentrated on the most important ones, such as the nature and structure of the contemporary military-strategic balance and its influence on intergovernmental relations, problems of strengthening the strategic stability and reducing nuclear weapons and preventing the arms race in outer space, as well as reducing the size of the armed forces and conventional armaments.

On the basis of thoroughly selected data, which are valuable in themselves for those who are interested in tracing the historical origins of the arms race, the researcher convincingly proves that invariably the United States and NATO have been the initiators of this race. He nonetheless questions the justification of the "straight line reaction" of the Soviet Union to the challenge of the West, particularly in the 1970s and beginning of 1980s. He believes that "with a more profound consideration of the problem of the military-strategic balance, understanding its dynamic range and creative utilization of systems-analysis methods our cost of maintaining this balance could have been substantially reduced" (p 57). This is obviously an accurate assessment of the situation of that time.

In almost all sections in the book, the author studies the problem of strategic stability which, justifiably, is one of the most important factors in the military-strategic situation and a barometer of the level of security. Its prime prerequisite is, as we know, the military-strategic balance. However, we also know that if the balance is achieved on an increasingly higher level of military confrontation, strategic stability is diminished. A drastic blow at it would have been dealt had the United States implemented its SDI Program. This applies also should the USSR take corresponding actions and develop space systems of equal efficiency as the American.

The main way of strengthening stability is limiting and reducing nuclear armaments until they have been totally eliminated and preventing the proliferation of the arms race in other areas. By the turn of the 1970s the need to enhance strategic stability was realized in Washington as well. This became one of the main motivating reasons for the initiation of Soviet-American talks on problems of nuclear armaments.

The author analyzes the situation in this area as it was in the middle of last year (the book was signed to press in August 1988). However, life is dynamic and, naturally, since that time significant changes have taken place, such as the signing the implementation of the Soviet-American Treaty On the Elimination of Medium and Shorter-Range Missiles. Progress was made on drafting a treaty calling for a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments

(SNV). New talks opened in Vienna on conventional armed forces and confidence-strengthening measures. Some progress was made in limiting and subsequently banning nuclear tests.

All of this instills optimism. However, on the way to achieving a treaty on a 50 percent SNV reduction, as before, two problems sharply stand out: reaching an agreement on the observance for the duration of the agreed upon term of the ABM Treaty (as signed in 1972) and the question of limiting long-range sea-based cruise missiles (SLBM). Despite the seeming difference between these questions, they are connected by the main thing: if the limiting of the ABM and SLBM treaties are rejected, the direct possibility arises of circumventing any future SNV treaty which, essentially, should guarantee a firm strategic balance between the USSR and the United States on a substantially reduced level of strategic armaments.

As a rule, the author points out, the dialectics of development of the strategic balance is such that the appearance of any new "defensive" weapon, aspiring to efficiency, could trigger no lesser (or perhaps even greater) "disturbance" in the balance, compared to the development of a new offensive weapon. This alone would prevent reaching an agreement on limiting the SNV if no agreement is reached on observing the ABM Treaty. As to the SLBM, their uncontrolled development on which, essentially, the United States insists, would make meaningless the reduction of all the other SNV: ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers. In that case the race in one type of armaments would replace the race in another.

The stability of the military-political situation in the world unquestionably depends on the extent to which the situation in the individual areas is stable such as, for example, on the European continent, where the most powerful military-political alliances are confronting each other: the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

In recent years, the political climate in Europe has substantially changed for the better. The RSMD Treaty, the unilateral steps taken by the USSR and its allies to reduce their armed forces and armaments, and the other Warsaw Pact initiatives made it possible substantially to ease the tension remaining from the cold war period and to initiate a dialogue on the radical reduction of conventional armed forces and on confidence-strengthening measures. Problems, however, remain.

The Brussels Declaration, adopted by the NATO Council last May and the fact that it included the suggestions submitted by George Bush, the U.S. President, as an answer to the far-reaching proposals submitted by the Warsaw Pact, seem to take into consideration the new situation developing in Europe. However, unfortunately, a great deal within this declaration remains from the period of confrontation: the intention to disarm, above all, at the expense of the Warsaw Pact members, the aspiration to maintain a reliance on the policy of nuclear "containment" and the "flexible reaction" concept. It is as though NATO does not understand that any "reaction" to nuclear weapons is a fuse leading to a universal nuclear catastrophe.

That is why in their April 1989 Berlin Declaration, the Warsaw Pact members, having expressed their conviction that ensuring European stability and security is impossible while tactical nuclear weapons remain on the European continent, suggested to NATO to initiate in the immediate future separate talks aimed at the gradual reduction of such armaments.

Understandably, such talks are not self-seeking. They are merely a means of eliminating the threat of war and strengthening the strategic stability and security of states and peoples. All of this can be achieved by structuring intergovernmental relations and maintaining the combat readiness of one's own armed forces on the basis of the new political thinking which imperatively demands that military doctrines of the countries be strictly defensive.

In May 1987 the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact members adopted a new military doctrine aimed at solving the dual problem of the prevention of war and the protection of socialism. It is based on three organically related concepts: the need to maintain a balance between military forces on a lower level; the reduction of military potentials to a level of sufficiency needed for defense; and the inadmissibility of using under present circumstances military means in solving any international dispute.

The search for optimal ways for making the Soviet Armed Forces consistent with the stipulations of the new military doctrine is an exceptionally important and difficult task. In his book, the author repeatedly discusses this problem. In particular, in the last chapter he draws the conclusion that the national security of the USSR, based on the sum total of economic, political-diplomatic and military steps, should be achieved, in terms of its strictly military part, by abandoning the outlay approach. He favors armed forces which would be more compact and a more professional and flexible organism, actively imbuing anything that is new in military-political and military thinking and technological development. Judging by the reaction of Soviet military authorities, work is taking place precisely in that direction.

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'The Baptism of Rus': Facts and Interpretation

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[Survey of publications by Yu. Kryanev, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and T. Pavlova]

[Text] Today's "demand of history" has brought to light the understudied nature of many key problems not only of the recent but also the distant past of our country. This applies to the history of religion and the church, in which for many long years the evaluations of the scientists were based rather on a priori formulated ideological postulates rather than on arguments and conclusions based on scientific research.

A good incentive for the intensification of our knowledge in this area and the renovation and refining of conceptual

guidelines and methodological stipulations and historical-cultural concepts was provided by the 1,000th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity in Rus. We believe that it would be useful to sum up and compare the various viewpoints reflected in historical-philosophical and religion-oriented publications timed for this anniversary.

The majority of works reveal the aspiration to bring to light the entire complexity and contradictoriness of the process of the conversion to Christianity of Kiev Rus and to depict its progressive nature in terms of the shaping of new social relations, the establishment of a centralized ancient Russian state, the formulation of new moral principles and the development of national culture. This applies to the books "Kak Byla Kreshchena Rus" [How Rus Was Baptized] (Politizdat, 1988); "Kreshcheniye Rusi v Trudakh Russkikh i Sovetskikh Istorikov" [The Baptism of Rus in the Works of Russian and Soviet Historians] (Mysl, Moscow, 1988); "Khristianstvo i Rus" [Christianity and Rus] (Nauka, Moscow, 1988); "Pravoslaviye i Sovremennost' (Filosofsko-Sotsiologicheskii Analiz)" [Orthodoxy and Our Time (Philosophical-Sociological Analysis)] (Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1988) and many others. Somewhat out of step is the book by P.M. Stepanov "Russkoye Pravoslaviye: Pravda i Vymysly. K 1000-letiyu Vvedeniya Khristianstva na Rusi" [Russian Orthodoxy: Truth and Fiction. On the 1000th Anniversary of the Introduction of Christianity in Rus] (Krasnodar, 1988), which claims that "there are no reasons to take this event outside the limits of the church and convert it into a nationwide celebration" (p 95). The author, who does not follow in the best traditions, also uses the popular cliches of the past: "church badgering," "religious means of suppressing the mind," "parasitism on the earthly affairs of people," and so on (see pp 53, 62, 85).

The work by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy "Vvedeniye Khristianstva na Rusi" [Introduction of Christianity in Rus] (Mysl, Moscow, 1987), which presents the problem as going far beyond the framework of the 10th century, closely related to the totality of social processes, is an effort at a comprehensive study of the process of Christianization. The scientific novelty of this approach led to including in the study polarized views, debatable viewpoints such as, for example, the correlation between Christianity and paganism, the extent of Byzantine influence, and others.

Various views would be possible on the idea formulated here according to which orthodoxy brought Rus closer to Byzantium, which was in a state of profound decline and which had fallen behind developing Western Europe, something which had far-reaching consequences to Rus. A different viewpoint is found in the pamphlet by A.M. Klibanov and L.N. Mitrokhin "Kreshcheniye Rusi: Istoriya i Sovremennost'" [The Baptism of Rus: History and Contemporaneity] (Znaniye, Moscow, 1988): the "choice" of Christianity by Prince Vladimir objectively predetermined the affiliation of ancient Rus with European civilization (see p 25). Original views are expressed by I.Ya. Froyanov in the book co-authored with G.L. Kurbatov and E.D. Frolov, "Khristianstvo: Antichnost, Vizantiya, Drevnyaya Rus" [Christianity: Antiquity, Byzantium, Ancient Rus] (Lenizdat, 1988), who claims that the introduction of the

new faith in Russia was somewhat "hasty," for it lacked adequate sociopolitical grounds.

We believe, however, that in the case of ancient Rus and many other ancient Slavic states, the question of the choice of religion was, above all, political. Byzantium and the Western countries at that time were not always tolerant of peoples which were still loyal to pagan cults. They refused to recognize their right to statehood. For that reason many Slavic peoples, one way or another, were interested in adopting Christianity. However, this "coercion" did not contain any whatsoever mystical predetermination. There are no reasons, we believe, to say that it was only as a result of the "external influences and impulses" that the ancient Russian state and its culture developed.

Christianity found in Rus a significant pagan culture, with its own mythology, main deities, priests and, according to some hypotheses, even pagan chronicles. This is pointed out by Academician B.A. Rybakov in the book "*Yazychestvo Drevney Rusi*" [Paganism in Ancient Rus] (Nauka, Moscow, 1987). With the help of extensive empirical data, the author proves that by the time of baptism, the Eastern Slavic polytheism had had a long history. The spiritual culture of the pre-Christian era developed independently. It was determined by the specific way of life and shaped a way of thinking and views on phenomena in surrounding reality.

The correlation between paganism and Christianity is the subject of sharp polemics in religion-oriented, historical, philosophical and theological literature. We believe that we should consider as contradictory the dialectical correlation between the two elements of culture. Initially it was precisely paganism, a system of folk religious beliefs, customs and ceremonies, that was at the foundation of all social structures in Rus. After the introduction of Christianity, paganism and the orthodox church found themselves in a state of antagonism, which reflected the struggle among the different strata in feudal society. The forming of a Christian-pagan cult synchronism took a number of centuries and at each historical age this process had its characteristic features. Wherever Christianity appeared later—in Bulgaria and ancient Rus—pagan ceremonies in their individual manifestations were retained until the 16th century and, in their Christian-pagan modification, even until the 20th century.

Unlike Western Europe, where the dominant papal church had introduced Latin not only for religious services but also as a basis for literacy, Rus was able to reject the efforts of Byzantium to establish the Greek language here. Furthermore, Byzantine orthodoxy itself, in terms of its ceremonies, had accepted some additions consistent with the concept and customs which existed in Rus. These problems were reflected in the works of Ukrainian and Belorussian scientists, particularly the book by G.M. Filist "*Vvedeniye Khristianstva na Rusi: Predposylki, Obstoyatelstva, Posledstviya*" [Introduction of Christianity in Rus: Prerequisites, Circumstances, Consequences] (Belarus, Minsk, 1988) and the book by K.Ye. Glomozda "*Kreshcheniye*

Rusi v Kontseptsyakh Sovremennoy Burzhuaznoy IstorioGRAFIi" [The Baptism of Rus in the Concepts of Contemporary Bourgeois Historiography] (Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1988).

According to G.M. Filist, who considers the extent to which literacy is borrowed, based on the level of spiritual culture, foreign relations and historical way of development, the missionaries—Cyril and Methodius—tried to develop a special alphabet for the Christianizing of the Slavs. The alphabet they suggested was not popularized. However, the success of the missionaries was their extensive use of ancient Slavic literacy which became the base of the Cyrillic alphabet. The latter is confirmed by the fact that new letters unfamiliar either in Latin or Greek alphabets, appeared (see pp 78-79).

Alternate viewpoints on the question of the origins of ancient Russian philosophical thinking may be found in historical-philosophical publications. In the book "*Introduction of Christianity in Rus*" we mentioned, one of its authors, V.F. Pusdarnakov, expresses the view that this process was virtually identical to the Western one in the typologically corresponding and equal period in history after the adoption of Christianity. However, the establishment of philosophy as a separate area of knowledge and a scientific discipline in Rus was "delayed" compared to a number of other Christian countries (see pp 256-258). The study of the outlook of the main representatives of ancient Rus thinking leads the author to the conclusion that it was precisely Christianity and not paganism that was the basic ideological factor in the establishment of ancient Russian philosophical thinking, for it was within the Christian variety of the religious form of awareness in ancient Rus that we find a multiplicity of important ontological, gnosiological, nature-philosophical, anthropological and ethical "philosophies," which bear no comparison to the number and significance of the "philosophies" of the pagan variety of religion. The role of the pagan legacy, Pusdarnakov notes, was manifested in the outlook of the broad popular masses and in the "popular philosophy."

A different point of view is held by A.F. Zamalev in the book "*Filosofskaya Mysl v Srednevekovoy Rusi (XI-XVI Vv.)*" [Philosophy in Medieval Rus (11th-16th Centuries)] (Nauka, Leningrad, 1987). He believes that "in terms of its content and trend..." ancient Russian philosophy "was above all anti-Christian and antireligious" (p 239). He formulates the concept according to which the orthodox church brought to our country essentially an Athenian-Byzantine monastic ideology and, on this basis, philosophy which was developing in Rus was bound to clash with the official ideology and become its opposite—heresy.

For a long time many of our scientists showed very little interest in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, although this topic is closely interrelated to the history of the people and its statehood. Today efforts are being made to provide an objective study of the evolution of Russian orthodoxy and to undertake the scientific study and evaluation of the place and role of the orthodox church in the life of our country during the various historical periods. One such study is the book by O.M. Rapov "*Russkaya Tserkov v IX-Pervoy Treti XII v. Prinyatiye Khristianstva*"