



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

China

People's Liberation Army

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19980518 167

China

People's Liberation Army

JPRS-CAR-90-005

CONTENTS

22 JANUARY 1990

40 Years of People's Liberation Army [Hong Kong MING PAO YUE KAN No 286]	1
Growth of Nuclear, Aviation, Space Industries	
[Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION No 43]	18
Development of Nuclear Weapons [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 206]	20
Military Relations With Western Countries [Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU No 274]	23
Reform in Second Artillery [Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU No 272]	31
PLA Training Reform [Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU No 273]	39
Evolution of Armed Forces' Uniforms [Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU No 273]	52
Military Mess Inadequacies [Taipei CHUNG KUNG YEN CHIU No 272]	58
Assessment of Military Position in Wake of Tiananmen [Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU No 273]	64
Problem of Aging Military Generals [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 205]	68
Chi Haotian, PLA Chief of Staff [Hong Kong MING PAO YUE KAN No 286]	69
Li Yaowen, Military Scholar [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 206]	74
Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission	
[Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 206]	76
Qin Jiwei, Minister of National Defense [Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI No 238]	77
Xu Xin, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 205]	81
Yang Baibing, Director, General Political Department [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 204]	82
Yang Guoyu, Creator of Naval Proving Ground [JIANCHUAN ZHISHI No 9]	84
Yang Shangkun, State President, CMC Vice Chairman [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 204]	86
You Taizhong, CMC Disciplinary Committee [Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING No 205]	90

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

40 Years of People's Liberation Army

90ON0121A Hong Kong MING PAO YUE KAN [MING PAO MONTHLY] in Chinese No 286, Oct 89 pp 3-15

[Article by Lin Tong (2651 0681): "Forty Years of the Chinese People's Liberation Army"]

[Text] Following the bloody massacre, Deng Xiaoping received a visit from martial law troop cadres at the level of group army or higher. During the visit he said that, "These troops are still carrying on the tradition of our old Red Army. They are truly the party's and the nation's Great Wall of Steel." This redoubled worries felt by people around the world caused by the gun barrel which preserves the Chinese Communists' political power.

The predecessor of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army. During the War of Resistance Against Japan it was reorganized into the National Revolutionary Army's 8th Route Army and New 4th Army. After civil war broke out, the term "People's Liberation Army" appeared in a JIEFANG RIBAO editorial from Yanan in September 1946. In October, leaders from the party's Central committee publicly used the term "People's Liberation Army" with reporters from XINHUA NEWS AGENCY. On 10 February 1947, Zhu De signed an order in his capacity as commander in chief of the People's Liberation Army. On 1 November 1948, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission issued regulations on unifying the entire Army's organization and

unit numbers. These regulations referred to various units within the People's Liberation Army as such-and-such Field Army or Military Region.

The Central Military Commission

The Central Military Commission is the highest organ of military leadership in the CPC and in the People's Republic of China. Its name is abbreviated as CMC. The structure and membership of the party's CMC is decided by the Central Committee. Until November 1987 the chairman had to be selected by the Politburo's Standing Committee. The "Constitution of the PRC," which was passed by the National People's Congress on 4 December 1982, mandated establishment by the state of a Central Military Commission that would lead the armed forces of the entire nation. The party CMC and the State CMC are, in fact, a single organ. The party's control of the military is thus ensured, while the government has been included in the effort to strengthen development of the military. The chairman of the state CMC is selected by the National People's Congress (NPC), and it is formally responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee. The CMC is composed of a chairman, vice chairmen, and the members, and it operates on the chairman responsibility system. The Ministry of National Defense (see Table I) is only one ministry under the State Council, and it is in charge of military administrative affairs, while the General Staff Department (see Table II), General Political Department (see Table III), and General Logistics Department are under the CMC and are at the same level as the Ministry of National Defense.

Table I. Defense Ministers

Name	Position in CMC	Term	Notes
Peng Dehuai	First vice chairman	Oct 54-Aug 59	Thrown into dark cell 7 years after being ousted; died of disease after 8 years in prison
Lin Biao	First vice chairman	Sept 59-Sept 71	Lost out in power struggle; died in plane crash while fleeing to Soviet Union
Ye Jianying	First vice chairman	Oct 71-Feb 78	Accused during Cultural Revolution as member of "516 Clique"
Xu Xiangqian	Vice chairman of Standing Committee	Mar 78-May 82	Accused during Cultural Revolution as member of "516 Clique"
Geng Biao	Secretary general	May 82-Nov 82	Criticized in public by Deng Xiaoping for "talking nonsense"
Zhang Aiping	Deputy secretary general	Nov 82-Apr 84	Subjected to close scrutiny by CMC's Security Bureau after June 4th Incident
Qin Jiwei	Committee member	Apr 88-	Forced to examine actions for not suppressing student movement with sufficient vigor

Table II. General Chiefs of Staff

Name	Position in Party	Term	Notes
Nie Rongzhen	Central Committee member	10/01/49-Sept 54	Accused during Cultural Revolution as member of "516 Clique"
Su Yu	Central Committee member	Nov 54-Oct 58	Dismissed from post after failure in 1958 battle over Jinmen
Huang Kecheng	Secretary in Central Secretariat	Oct 58-Aug 59	Ousted as part of Peng Dehuai's antiparty clique in 1958
Luo Ruiqing	Secretary in Central Secretariat	9/26/59-Jan 66	Broke under pressure of struggle sessions during Cultural Revolution, jumped from building, broke leg

Table II. General Chiefs of Staff (Continued)

Name	Position in Party	Term	Notes
Yang Chengwu	Central Committee member	Jan 66-3/27/68	Imprisoned for years during Cultural Revolution as member of Yang Yufu's counterrevolutionary clique
Huang Yongsheng	Politburo member	Mar 68-Sep 71	Sentenced to 18 years in prison for collaborating in Lin Biao's coup attempt
Deng Xiaoping	Vice chairman, Central Committee	Mar 77-Feb 80	Fell three times for taking Luo Ming's line, for being the number-two capitalist roader, and for being an unrepentant capitalist roader
Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807]	Politburo member	Feb 80-Nov 87	Criticized by Deng Xiaoping on eve of June 4th Massacre for "fanning the flames of counterrevolution"
Chi Haotian	Central Committee member	Nov 87-	

Table III. Directors of General Political Department

Name	Position in Party	Term	Notes
Luo Ronghuan [5012 2837 2719]	Central Committee member	Oct 49-1956	Died of disease on 16 December 1963
Tan Zheng [6223 2398]	Secretary in Central Secretariat	1956-1960	Dismissed for failing to attack the Peng-Huang antiparty clique with sufficient vigor
Luo Ronghuan	Politburo member	1960-1963	Died of disease on 12 December 1963
Xiao Hua [5618 5478]	Deputy Secretary, Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission	Dec 63-Jul 67	Dismissed for the Chen Zaidao incident in Wuhan
Li Desheng	Vice chairman, Central Committee	3 Oct 71-30 Dec 73	Kicked out of Politburo by Deng Xiaoping in September 1985
Zhang Chunqiao	Politburo Standing Committee member	Feb 74-10 Jun 76	Given suspended death sentence in January 1981 for participation in the Lin Jiang counterrevolutionary clique
Wei Guoqing	Politburo member	Mar 77-Sep 82	Dismissed in September 1982 for participation in the Zhao Yiya [6392 2496 0068] anti-Deng incident
Yu Qiuli	member, Politburo	Oct 82-Nov 87	Lost influence after fall of Hu Yaobang
Yang Baibing	Central Committee member	Nov 87-	Prime culprit of June 4th Massacre

When the CPC had first come to power, there was some discrepancy between the leadership of the two military commissions. For example, on 1 October 1949, the Central People's Government Committee held its first meeting and named the following members to the Military Affairs Commission of the Central People's Government:

Chairman: Mao Zedong

Vice chairmen: Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Cheng Qian [4453 3383]

Members: He Long [6320 7893], Liu Bocheng [0491 0130 2110], Chen Yi [7115 3015], Lin Biao, Xu Xiangqian [1776 0686 0467], Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen [5119 2837 5271], Gao Gang [7559 1511], Su Yu [4725 5940], Zhang Yunyi [1728 0061 6654], Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Rao Shushi [7437 3359 4258], Deng Zihui [6772 1311 1863], Xi Zhongxun [5045 0112 8113], Luo Ruiqing [5012 3843 0615], Sa Zhenbing [5646 6966 0393], Zhang Zhizhong [1728 3112 0022], Fu Zuoyi [0265 0155 5030], Cai Tingkai [5591 1694 6946], Long Yun [7893 0061], Liu Pei [0491 2431].

Of the five vice chairmen, one was a KMT general who had surrendered. Of the 22 regular members, there were six former KMT generals and former warlords.

In contrast, the party CMC at that time was homogeneous:

Chairman: Mao Zedong

Vice chairmen: Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai.


General secretary: Nie Rongzhen

After the movement against rightists, democratic parties were weakened, and the party and state simply ceased to separate themselves. The members selected to the two military commissions in the 1st Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee (12 September 1982) and the 1st Session of the 6th NPC (18 June 1983) were the same:

Chairman: Deng Xiaoping

Vice chairmen: Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Yang Shangkun

Figure 1 Chinese Communist Military Organization System Diagram



The Tradition of the Party Leader Controlling the Military

Before Mao Zedong became head of the CPC, party CMC chairmen Zhou Enlai and Zhang Guotao [1728 0948 3614] both held the post concurrently with such positions Central Committee member or Politburo member. Mao Zedong affirmed that "political power grows from the barrel of a gun," thus, from the time he assumed the chairmanship of the party CMC after the Zunyi Conference until his death 41 years later, he never gave up this power. With the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1959, Mao Zedong gave up his post as president, but he certainly did not yield the CMC chairmanship. During the 11th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, the faction of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping had gained the ascendancy in the Central Committee and the Politburo. The leaders from the various provinces, municipalities, and organs of the central government were all disgusted with the interminable "four cleanups" of Mao, Lin, and Zhou, whereby cadres at the grassroots level were continually becoming the target of actions to clean up the ranks. They wanted to use democratic procedures within the party to have Mao dismissed from his post as chairman of the party CMC. At a key juncture, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao brought in the 38th Group Army to surround Beijing. In addition, command of the Central Guards Division was held by Wang Dongxing [3076 2639 5281], Mao's trusted follower. Pincered from two sides, Liu and Deng were deeply worried that the forces of the Beijing Garrison Command, whose loyalty they commanded, could not withstand an assault. Thus, they were forced to compromise with Mao, Lin, and Zhou. The result was that Liu and Deng were ousted from power, and Tao Zhu [7118 6999], Chen Yun [7115 0061], Chen Yi [7115 3015], He Long, Li Jingquan [2621 0064 3123], Tan Zhenlin [6223 7201 2651], Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying (all members of the Politburo), Ulanfu [3527 5695 1133], Bo Yibo [5631 0001 3134], Li Xuefeng [2621 7185 1496], Song Renqiong [1345 0117 4522] (all alternate members), Peng Zhen [1756 4176], Lu Dingyi [7120 1353 0001], and Luo Ruiqing (secretaries in the Secretariat) all were ousted.

On 23 March 1971, Lin Biao instructed Yu Xinye [0060 2450 6851], a deputy department chief in the Air Force Headquarters, to draft the "Outline for Project 571," which Lin intended to use to have the 38th Group Army surround Beijing and force Mao to relinquish power. On 12 September, Mao Zedong suddenly took a special train back to Beijing from Shanghai. The train stopped at Fengtai, and Mao called in the leader of the forces in Beijing for a two-hour talk, after which the 38th Group

Army turned its guns on Lin Biao, who fled in haste and met with a premature death.

Mao Zedong died in September 1976. Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao were anxious to seize power, and had Mao Yuanxin [3029 6678 2450], Mao Zedong's nephew and political commissar of the Shenyang forces, instruct Deputy Commander Sun Yuguo [1327 3768 0948] to transfer an armored division to Beijing to intimidate any opposition. Li Desheng [2621 1795 3932], then commander of the Shenyang forces, felt that Jiang Qing [3068 7230] and the others were too hated by the people and would not be able to withstand the challenge of government, so he reported his concerns to the CMC vice chairman, Ye Jianying. Ye ordered the armored division to return immediately to its barracks. The gang of four then ordered the 38th Group Army to advance upon Beijing from Baoding. Ye Jianying urgently telegraphed all the officers of the 38th Group Army at the regimental level and higher, instructing them to remain stationary and await further orders. He also sent cadres from the Central Political Security Bureau to rush to Baoding during the night and apprehend several people in the 38th Group Army, including Deputy Political Commissar Zhang Qiuqiao [1728 4428 2890]. The 38th Group Army was given strict orders to remain stationary and await further orders, and Ye then sent a telegram in his capacity as a military leader and a political commissar to assure Jiang Qing that she had nothing to fear. Thus the palace coup of 6 October in which Jiang Qing and the others were arrested was executed smoothly.

After Mao died, the chairmanships of the party and the CMC fell to Hua Guofeng. In the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in June 1981, Hu Yaobang [5170 5069 6721] was named chairman of the Central Committee, but the holder of this post was no longer concurrently in the post of chairman of the CMC. Instead, the latter post was held by Deng Xiaoping concurrently with his post as vice chairman of the party.

Deng Xiaoping was the true successor to Mao Zedong. He knew that only by controlling the military could one maintain a grip on power, so when he withdrew from the Central Committee in November 1987, he made sure to have the party constitution amended to allow regular party members serve as chairman of the CMC (see Table IV). He said to the commanders of the martial law troops last 9 June that "This army of ours will always be under the leadership of the party." In reality, though, it is the gun that commands the party. During the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee on 23 June [1989], the military used its guns to force the members of the Central Committee to declare their support for Deng, Li, and Yang. This is the best evidence that the gun commands the party.

Table IV. Central Military Commission Chairmen

Name	Position in Party	Term	Final Fate
Mao Zedong	Chairman, Central Committee	1 Oct 49-9 Sept 76	Hall where Mao's corpse is stored subjected to repeated bomb blasts
Hua Guofeng	Chairman, Central Committee	7 Oct 76-June 81	Fell from power for upholding "whatever faction" viewpoints
Deng Xiaoping	Retired from Central Advisory Commission in November 1987	Sept 82-	Object of universal scorn after June 4th Massacre

From the Field Armies to the Army of National Defense

The history of the PLA, in terms of its course of development, can be divided into four periods: the Red Army period, the 8th Route/New 4th Army period, the Field Army period, and the Army of National Defense period.

The Field Army period of the Communist military ran from 1945 to 1954. On the day the Japanese Government surrendered, Mao Zedong used Zhu De's status as general commander of the 18th Army Group to issue in succession seven orders for the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army to move on all fronts to forcibly intercept arms and equipment left behind by the Japanese military and to initiate an all-out insurrection. In February 1948 the Communist forces were reorganized (see Table V) into four field armies, and one unit under the central leadership which commanded 19 army groups, 69 armies, and a total of 220,000 men. Before long, large military districts, large administrative districts, and party subbureaus were established in the areas occupied by the various field armies, and the commanders and political commissars of each field army wielded authority over either party, governmental, or military affairs (see Table VI) in a given area (several provinces). It was as if fiefdoms had been granted to the emperor's vassals. Then the incident of the independent kingdoms occurred, with Gao Gang in the northeast and Rao Shushi in east China. Mao Zedong grew determined to

cut the vassal states down to size. He abolished the field armies and the large military districts (the party subbureaus were not abolished until the Cultural Revolution), which were replaced by level-one military regions. A military command system of centralized power and limited authority for the local level was instituted, which has remained in place to this day. During the Mao Zedong era, the level-one military regions were referred to as "forces," and were named after major cities. Provincial military districts were referred to as "military region," and were named after provinces. After Mao's death, the appellation for level-one military regions and provincial military regions was changed across the board to "military region."

Table V. PLA Leadership Structure, 1949-54

Commander in Chief	Zhu De
Deputy Commander in Chief	Peng Dehuai
General Chief of Staff	Xu Xiangqian
Alternate General Chief of Staff	Nie Rongzhen
Director, General Political Department	Luo Ronghuan
Deputy Directors	Fu Zhong [0265 6988], Xiao Hua
Director, General Logistics Department	Yang Lisan [2799 4539 0005]
Deputy Directors	He Cheng [6320 6134], Zhang Lingbin [1728 0109 1755]

Table VI. PLA Order of Battle, 1949-50

	Date Established	Commander	Deputy Commander	Political Commissar	Chief of Staff	Political Department Director	Units Under Command			
							Level-Two Military Regions	Level-Three Military Regions	Military Regions Directly Subordinate to Central Government	Troop Strength (1,000's)
North-west Military Region	Feb 49	He Long	Wang Weidan	Xi Zhongxun	Zhang Jingwu	Li Zhuoran	1	4	8	70
South-Central Military Region	Dec 49	Lin Biao		Luo Ronghuan	Xiao Ke	Tan Zheng	3			210

Table VI. PLA Order of Battle, 1949-50 (Continued)

East China Military Region	June 49	Chen Yi	Zhang Yunyi	Rao Shushi	Zhang Zhen	Shu Tong	1	8		440
Northeast Military Region	June 49	Gao Gang		Gao Gang	Wu Xiuquan	Zhou Huan	4	5		320
North China Military Region	June 49	Nie Rongzhen	Xu Xiangqian	Bo Yibo	Tang Tingjie	Luo Ruiqing		9		310
Southwest Military Region	Feb 50	He Long	Chen Geng	Deng Xiaoping	Li Da	Zhang Jichun		8		390
Air Force	Nov 49	Liu Yalou	Chang Qiankun		Wang Bingzhang	Wu Faxian				198,000 in arms and services under central government
Navy	Apr 50	Xiao Jinguang	Wang Hongkun	Xiao Jinguang	Luo Shunchu					
Railway Army Groups		Teng Daiyuan	Lu Zhengcao		Li Shouxuan	Wang Hefeng				
20th Army Group		Yang Chengwu	Wen Niansheng	Li Tianhuan	Wen Niansheng	Xiang Zhonghua				
Qiongya Column		Feng Baiju [7458 4101 7467]		Feng Baiju						66,000 in various guerrilla units in southern China
Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Column		Liu Yongsheng		Wei Jinshui						
Guangdong-Jiangxi-Hunan Column		Lin Ping		Lin Ping						
Guangxi-Yunnan-Guizhou Column		Zhuang Tian		Zhou Nan						
Guangdong-Guangxi Column		Liang Guang		Liang Guang						
Guangdong Central Column		Wu Youhuan		Feng Shen						

When the CPC first came to power, it always trumpeted the fact that it had an army of six million, and it was quite proud that this made its army "the largest in the world." However, with time the heavy weight of military expenditures proved too much. Mao Zedong stated at a meeting of high-level cadres in the northeast on 3 March 1950 that there were fiscal and economic problems, and that the people's burden was too heavy. In April, the party's central leadership decided to make large military

cuts, and to establish a Navy, Air Force, and other military service arms. The total number of soldiers was cut by 28 percent.

The second reduction of military force was carried out in 1956. On 25 April, Mao Zedong expounded upon the 10 major relationships at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo. He stated that during the First 5-Year Plan, military expenditures accounted for 30 percent of all

expenditures in the state budget, and that this was too much. He stated that this figure would be reduced to roughly 20 percent in the Second 5-Year Plan. The number of PLA troops was cut by one-third in January 1957, and the five original military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Civil Defense, and Public Security) were reduced to three (Army, Navy, Air Force). Special stress was placed on strengthening the development of technical services. The 11 level-one military regions drawn up by Mao Zedong did not simply adopt provincial borders as their own boundaries; rather, the only consideration was military necessity. For example, the Urumqi Military District covered not only Xinjiang, but also the strategic high plains of northwestern Tibet which border on India and Kashmir. The Jinan Military District included only the single province of Shandong, but it was extremely important because it surrounded and protected Beijing, blocking off the eastern seacoast. The Beijing Military District included Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia, and it served to defend against a strike by Soviet tanks from Mongolia. The Fuzhou Military Region combined the provinces of Fujian and Jiangxi, and served to stand watch across the strait against Taiwan. The Chengdu Military District included Sichuan and most of Tibet, and was in charge of military operations against India. The military regions of Kunming and Guangzhou covered the five provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hunan, and were in charge of military operations against Vietnam (resistance against France and the United

States). The Nanjing Military District included the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui, and was responsible for East China's coastal defenses. The Lanzhou Military District covered the four provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi, and was responsible for the defense of one-third of the Sino-Soviet border. The Shenyang Military District was basically the three northeastern provinces, and was responsible for defending against incursions of the polar bear. The Wuhan Military District included the two provinces of Hubei and Henan, and was situated at the hub of north-south and east-west transportation routes.

Reduction and Merging of Military Districts, Elimination of Redundant Personnel

According to the 1982 national census, the number of personnel in the PLA totaled 4,238,210.

In an enlarged meeting of the CMC on 4 June 1985, Deng Xiaoping announced a troop reduction of one million people, and the 11 level-one military regions were merged into seven. The military regions of Fuzhou, Wuhan, Urumqi, and Kunming were abolished. The Fuzhou Military Region was merged into the Nanjing Military Region, Urumqi into the Lanzhou Military Region, and Kunming into the Chengdu Military Region. The Wuhan Military Region's Henan Province was merged into the Jinan Military Region, and Hubei Province was merged into the Guangzhou Military Region (see Table VII).

Table VII. Status of the Seven Large Military Regions

Name of Military Region	Provinces Within Jurisdiction	Troop Strength	Commander	Political Commissar	Task
Beijing	Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Shanxi	Six armies (24th, 28th, 33d, 38th, 63d, and 65th), 23 infantry divisions, five armored divisions	Zhou Yibing	Liu Zhenhua	Check the 15 mechanized infantry divisions in the Soviet Union's Outer Baikal Military Region and Mongolian Military Region
Shenyang	Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning	Five armies (16th, 23d, 39th, 40th, and 64th), 23 infantry divisions, five armored divisions	Liu Jingsong	Song Keda	Check the 15 mechanized infantry divisions in the Soviet Union's Far East Military Region
Jinan	Shandong, Henan	Three armies (57th, 20th, and 50th), two armored divisions	Li Jiulong	Song Qingwei	Responsible for East China naval defenses and for surrounding and defending the divisions in Beijing
Nanjing	Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian	Four armies (1st, 12th, 20th, and 26th), 16 infantry divisions, one armored division	Xiang Shouzhi	Fu Kuiqing	Responsible for naval defenses in the southeast and for standing guard against Taiwan
Guangzhou	Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi	Four armies (78th, 41st, 42d, and 31st), 16 infantry divisions	Zhang Wannian	Zhang Zhongxian	In charge of military operations against Vietnam
Chengdu	Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Tibet	Three armies (13th, 14th, and 43d), 15 infantry divisions	Fu Quanyou	Wan Haifeng	In charge of military operations against Vietnam and India
Lanzhou	Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xingiang	Five armies (21st, 47th, 54th), 13 infantry divisions, one armored division	Zhao Xianshun	Li Xuanhua	Responsible for border defense in the northwest

1. The best equipped armies are the 38th and the 27th. They each have three infantry divisions, one tank division, one artillery division, one division of high terrain forces, 1,000 tanks, and 1,200 armored personnel carriers.

2. In all, there are 30 armies, 118 infantry divisions, 13 armored divisions, and 17 field artillery divisions.




Figure 2 Chinese Communist Army Deployment Map

At the end of 1985, the CPC announced that conversion of the field armies into group armies had been completed. It was announced in 1987 that 410,000 military personnel would be cut, 320,000 redundant personnel would be placed in other employment, and quite a number of other redundant personnel would leave or retire. As part of the cuts, more than 30 units at the level of group army or higher were eliminated. More than 4,000 units at the divisional or regimental level were eliminated. Nearly half the personnel in organs under the headquarters of the CMC were eliminated. The number of persons serving in the second tier of command was greatly reduced. More than 70 types of posts formerly held by staff officers are now held by line officers. The average age of cadres at the level-one military region level fell from 65.3 in 1982 to 57.1 in 1986. The percentage of cadres at this level who had attended school at the level of technical college or higher increased from 4.1 percent in 1982 to 55.4 percent. The average

age of cadres at the army level dropped from 56.8 to 49.6. The percentage of cadres at this level who had attended school at the level of technical college or higher increased from 1.2 percent to 58.4 percent. In order to meet the demands of war, 50 percent of the military commanders and political commissars in combat forces have actual combat experience.

Just as with foreign relations, the degree of transparency in the Chinese Communists' fiscal and national defense affairs is very low. Every year during the National People's Congress, the minister of finance routinely reports on the budget for the current year as well as the final state accounts for the previous year, but the figures for national defense in the reports do not include expenditures for research on new weapons (the research and development expenditures for the first atomic bomb totaled 60 billion yuan, which was classified as scientific research), so half or even most of these expenditures are kept hidden. Of the figures listed in Table VII, only that

of 48 percent for 1951 is credible. That was during the Korean war, and foreign loans were required to fight it, which they did not finish paying back for 14 years. Until 1988, the so-called national budget included local budgets. There has been some improvement in the method of formulating the national budget in 1989. The budget of the central government and the budget of local government

expenditures have begun to be formulated separately. The income of local governments has nothing to do with military expenditures anyway, so when the former are cut out of the national budget, the military expenditures as listed account for 14 percent of the total, which is closer to the truth than last year's 8.2 percent. However, the real figure might be 30 percent.

Table VIII. Officially Announced Military Expenditures (in RMB)

Year	Total State Budget Expenditures (in billions)	Military Expenditures (in billions)	Military Expenditures as Percentage of Total State Expenditures
1951			48.0
1955	29.35	6.52	22.2
1956			20.0
1957		5.52	19.2
1959	52.77	5.80	11.0
1960	70.02	5.80	8.3
1978	111.09	16.78	15.1
1979	127.39	22.27	17.5
1980	121.27	19.38	16.0
1981	111.50	16.80	15.1
1982	115.33	17.64	15.3
1983	129.25	17.71	15.0
1984	148.00		
1985	182.594	19.148	10.5
1986	229.11	20.126	8.8
1987	242.692	20.977	8.6
1988	266.831	21.796	8.2
1989	174.175	24.33	14.0

Struggles Between Different Lines and Factions Within the Military

Struggles over power and wealth within the CPC over the last 40 years have had an enormous impact on the development of the military. These struggles can be divided into three stages.

The first stage comprises the friction between Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong when the former served as the first vice chairman of the CMC. After Peng returned from the Korean war, he devoted himself to modernization and regularization of the armed forces. He reorganized the system, issued a law for military service by regular soldiers, issued regulations concerning military service by staff officers, established a military academy, and implemented regular training. In 1955, military ranks were instated. Ten people were awarded the rank of marshal, 10 the rank of senior general, 50 the rank of general, 175 the rank of lieutenant general, 801 the rank of major general, and hundreds of thousands were made colonels, captains, and so on. Peng Dehuai emphasized regularization. He demanded "a unified command, a unified unit structure, a unified system, unified training, and unified discipline" to replace the guerrilla-style

operations and the party committee system in which the political commissars interfered with military orders that had prevailed for many years. He openly challenged Mao Zedong's "Three Red Flags" in 1959, and he fell from power in the ensuing struggle. He was replaced as CMC vice chairman and minister of defense by Lin Biao, and the military modernization that he had been working on was totally reversed. Peng's close associates Huang Kecheng [7806 0344 6134], Hong Xuezhi [3163 1331 2535], and other leading military figures also suffered for their identification with him.

The second period ran from 1959 to 1977. After Lin Biao became first vice chairman of the CMC, he pandered to the emperor's tastes by promoting a set of "revolutionary" plans for military development. He came forth with a string of far-left slogans, including, "politics comes before all else," "the four firsts," "the four-good companies," "the five-good warriors," and so forth. He abolished the system of military ranks and unleashed a campaign of feverish study of the works of Mao, established blind worship of such heroic images as Lei Feng and Wang Jie (most of whose purported exploits have since been proved to be fabrications), carried out a policy of keeping soldiers uneducated, and cultivated a

group of "slogan soldiers" of extremely inferior quality. Mao Zedong was quite vain, and he called upon the entire nation to learn from the PLA. During the Cultural Revolution, the military was responsible for "the three supports" (support the workers, support the peasants, support the left) and "the two militaries" (military administration of enterprises, military training of students), and its own training came to a virtual halt. In some provinces and districts, military forces became involved in armed conflicts and created many bloody

incidents. The Lanzhou forces sang the praises of Liu Xuebao [0491 1331 0202], a convicted murderer, calling him "a living Qiu Shaoyun [6726 1421 0061] and a breathing Yang Gensi [2799 2704 1835]. They held him up to the entire Army as a model student of Mao's works. This had a very negative impact upon the people. The flight of Lin Biao in the fall of 1971 marked the demise of the "revolutionary" line of military development, and officers and soldiers everywhere were tainted by a reputation for being self-centered, undisciplined, arrogant, covetous of luxury, and lazy.

Table IX. Members of Party CMC

CMC Position	Name	Age	Military Rank	Background	Position in Party	Concurrent Military Positions
Chairman	Deng Xiaoping	85		Political Commissar, 2d Field Army		
Vice chairman	Yang Shangkun	82		Secretary, North Bureau		
Member	Hong Xuezhi	76	General	Commander, 43d Army, 4th Field Army		
Member	Liu Huaqing	73	General	Director, Political Department, 11th Army, 2d Field Army	Central Advisory Commission	
Member	Qin Jiwei	75	General	Commander, 15th Army, 2d Field Army	Politburo member	
Member	Chi Haotian	61	General	Commander, 27th Army, 3d Field Army	Central Committee member	General Chief of Staff
Member	Yang Baibing	68	General	Younger brother of Yang Shangkun	Central Committee member	Director, General Political Department
Member	Zhao Nanqi	64	General	Ethnic Korean	Central Committee member	Director, General Logistics Department
Secretary general	Yang Shangkun	omitted				
Deputy secretary general	Hong Xuezhi	omitted				
Deputy secretary general	Liu Huaqing	omitted				

The third period began with the vigorous military reorganization that was initiated after Deng Xiaoping reappeared in 1977. Hua Guofeng's policy of "grasping the key link of class struggle to bring order to the military" was replaced by policies to make the military more revolutionary, younger, better educated, and better equipped with specialized skills. Within the military, members of the "Whatever Faction," such as Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian [7315 6932 5114], Geng Biao [5105 7374], and Xu Shiyu [6079 0013 0645], were rooted out and replaced by old members of the 2d Field Army, such as Qin Jiwei [4440 1015 0251], Li Desheng, Xiang Shouzhi [0686 1343 1807], You Taizhong [1429 1132 1813], Wang Chenghan [3769 6134 3352], Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], and Wan Haifeng [8001 31891496]. Military men loyal to Deng were thus able to take charge of key posts within the military (see Table IX). In view of the high cost of the War To Punish Vietnam, which was due to "unclear hierarchical distinctions and ineffective command," it was also decided to restore the system of military ranks. In September 1988,

the rank of general was awarded to 17 people, that of lieutenant general to 170, that of major general to more than 1,200, and various grades of colonel and captain were awarded to more than 600,000. As an appeasement to first-generation military personnel who had left the service, medals of honor were also awarded. In the process of lowering the age of cadres at every level, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in getting rid of his opponents and inserting his supporters. He also was able to rehabilitate those who had fallen in various political campaigns, such as Hong Xuezhi, Huang Kecheng, Luo Ruiqing, Yang Chengwu [2799 2052 2976] and Ye Fei [0673 7378], while consolidating his power within the military. However, that sort of factional grouping was necessarily fleeting and sure to crumble under any pressure. Prior to the massacre, two marshals and seven generals called on the Army to refrain from using military force, and several hundred officers in the General Staff Department, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department called on the National People's Congress to impeach Deng Xiaoping, which proves that the

forces of opposition to Deng within the military must not be underestimated. After the massacre, the power of the Yang family generals expanded quickly, and conflict between Qin Jiwei and Yang Shangkun came to the fore. If the political modernization and military nationalization of the Chinese Communists go nowhere, there will be a vicious struggle within the upper echelons of the military in the near future, and it will replay itself every few years.

The War To Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea: Exhaustion for the People, a Drain on Financial Resources

Article 29 of the Chinese Communists' Constitution stipulates that it is the task of the PLA to "resist aggression, defend the fatherland, participate in national reconstruction, and work hard to serve the people." In reality, the four foreign wars in which the PLA has participated over the last 40 years have either provided other countries with a chance to profit at China's expense or created monsters that have later come to haunt China. What has been gained has brought little glory, while the cost has been an exhausted populace and drained financial resources.

The Chinese Communists' first foreign war after coming to power was the "War To Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea."

Just before dawn, on 25 June 1950, 500 Soviet-built tanks crossed the 38th parallel, 2,000 large cannons blasted South Korean positions, and 10 divisions of well-trained, lightly armed North Korean Communist troops advanced rapidly south. In only 3 days the South Korean capital of Seoul had been captured, and Pusan was threatened. The United Nations Security Council thereupon passed a resolution to aid Korea, and 22 nations, including the United States, England, and France, organized the UN Forces. MacArthur commanded the UN Forces as they landed at Inchon on 15 September, recovered Seoul on 25 September, took Pyongyang on 21 October, and pursued the opposing forces north to the Yalu River border. On 25 October, Mao Zedong used the excuse that "the U.S. military was assembling its forces on the Sino-Korean border" to order the "Chinese People's Volunteer Army" to fight in the war. In reality, before invading the South, Kim Il-sung had already transferred the ethnic Korean officers and soldiers in Lin Biao's 4th Field Army to North Korea, and, in August, two PLA artillery army groups had crossed the Yalu River. UN commander MacArthur did not order the bombardment of northeastern China until he discovered on 23 October that there were already 600,000 Communist Chinese troops on North Korean soil. The Volunteer Army fought five battles in 2 years and 9 months. The first three battles were exterior-line operations which were fought from Unsan to Seoul. Every time siege was laid to a city or other locality, forces of eight to 10 times the enemy's strength were concentrated on the battle and human wave tactics were used to gain victory. During the siege

of Seoul, the general commander at the front line, Lin Biao, was injured and sent to the Soviet Union for treatment, and Peng Dehuai took over. The fourth battle was a counterattack by Ridgeway, commander in chief of the UN Forces. The Communist troops lost Seoul in this battle. In the fifth battle, Peng Dehuai occupied, then lost, Seoul three times, and was unable to even hold the seemingly impregnable Chorwon-Kimhwa-Pyongyang triangle, north of the 38th parallel. Mao Zedong's eldest son, Mao Anying [3029 1489 5391], was killed in an explosion. The UN Forces furiously bombed the Communists' supply routes, and they also scattered three-pointed spikes, puncturing the tires of countless Volunteer Army vehicles. This caused the Communist forces great logistic difficulties, and the hungry soldiers stole grain on many occasions, killing several North Koreans in the process. This war continued until a truce was signed on 27 July 1953. North and South Korea were divided at Panmunjom, and continue to stand at odds.

During the Korean war, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with more than 100,000 cannons, tens of thousands of tanks, hundreds of thousands of light and heavy machine guns, several hundred MiG fighters, more than 700,000 trucks, and bullets and artillery shells. The Soviets calculated the value in rubles of these items at exchange rates higher than international rates. They then tricked the Chinese Communists into signing an agreement to pay the debts, which they did, delivering agricultural products priced below international rates.

The amount of money wasted during the 3 years of support for Korea has never been made public, but according to an internal memo of the Volunteer Army, "The material and financial losses incurred by the 3-year War To Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea were equivalent to three times those of the 8-year War of Resistance Against Japan.

On 14 August 1953 XINHUA NEWS AGENCY reported the following military successes in the Korean war: 1,090,000 enemy vehicles destroyed or damaged, 390,000 of which belonged to the U.S. military; 11 aircraft captured; 374 tanks captured; 9,239 automobiles captured; 12,000 enemy aircraft shot down or damaged; 2,690 enemy tanks destroyed or damaged; 257 enemy ships sunk or damaged.

According to Professor Guo Tingyu [6753 1656 6877], author of *Contemporary Chinese History*, 1,540,000 officers and soldiers of the Volunteer Army suffered casualties. The United States announced casualties of 130,000 for the UN Forces. Their figure of more than 1.1 million casualties for the Volunteer Army does not include the officers and soldiers who suffocated when their tunnels collapsed during air raids, or the officers and soldiers of the logistics forces killed in explosions on the roads. Most noteworthy of all is the fact that, in prisoner exchanges, out of 3,600 U.S. prisoners, only 23 blacks refused repatriation, but of more than 21,000 prisoners from the Volunteer Army, only 5,000 were willing to return to the mainland. More than 14,000 went

to Taiwan. The saying at the time was, "I take my heart back to Taiwan, I dedicate my life to killing communists." Another 796 people went to Hong Kong and various Southeast Asian nations.

The War To Aid Vietnam and Resist U.S. Aggression: Creating the Monster That Would Come Back To Haunt China

The PLA participated three times in combat on Vietnamese soil. The first time was to help the government of Ho Chi Minh resist French aggression. At the time, 12,000 French troops had a tight hold on North Vietnam's strategically important Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese Communists mobilized 200 cannons and 50,000 coolies. The coolies marched 50 li [17 miles] per day for 2 months over mountainous terrain, each using a bicycle to transport 600 pounds of rice over narrow mountain paths. They flowed like endless streams into positions surrounding Dien Bien Phu. The French forces surrendered on 7 May 1954. France withdrew from Indochina, and the Geneva Convention set the 17th parallel as the dividing line between North and South Vietnam. From that point, North Vietnam continuously infiltrated the South, and in 1964 the U.S. Congress resolved to aid South Vietnam. At this point Zhou Enlai proclaimed that, "The vast territory of China is a rear base upon which the Vietnamese people can rely. The 700 million Chinese people shall serve as a strong backup for the Vietnamese people." Because of his meritorious contributions to the effort to aid Vietnam while serving as the political commissar of the Guangxi Military Region, Wei Guoqing [7279 0948 3237] was promoted to second secretary of the South-Central Bureau. The second war in Vietnam came to an end with the fall of Saigon in 1975, an achievement that has cost China dearly. According to the Beijing Publishing Company's recently released *History of the People's Republic of China*, China sent 320,000 troops to Vietnam, spent more than \$20 billion, and sacrificed more than 4,000 officers and soldiers during the War To Aid Vietnam and Resist U.S. Aggression. The Chinese-language magazine in the United States, TANSUO [SEARCH], revealed that casualties among the Communist forces reached 120,000.

After the Vietnamese Communists reunified the entire country, they quickly turned a cold shoulder to China, positioning troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border, stirring up trouble, and angering the Chinese Communists. On 17 February 1979, Deng Xiaoping, who had recently returned to power, acted to strengthen his reputation at home and abroad and attempted to curry favor with the United States by ordering three army groups in the Kunming Military Region and the Guangzhou Military Region that had originally been part of the 4th Field Army to launch a lightning attack on Vietnam. Unexpectedly, after the PLA troops fought their way into Vietnam, they were unclear even as to the enemy's major positions, so they met with severe attacks from troops hiding in the valleys and cannons concealed in tunnels. A staff member in Yang Dezhi's headquarters revealed that the first PLA unit to enter Vietnam was almost

completely annihilated, and the number of casualties surpassed 50,000. In the first 15 days of the War To Punish Vietnam, the invasion was carried 30 kilometers into Vietnamese territory and expenditures reached 16 billion. The result was poverty and financial exhaustion for the people in Mainland China. A storm of criticism broke out, which forced a troop withdrawal on 5 March.

Why was it that the PLA, which boasted of never having lost a war, proved so fragile? First, after the baptism of the Cultural Revolution, there was constant internal strife within the military, and fighting capability declined. Second, there was discontent in the 4th Army troops, the main force in the War To Punish Vietnam. They felt that Deng Xiaoping was using the war to kill off his opponents, so morale was extremely low. Third, assault troops received no air support, and, without a system of ranks, command over the troops was chaotic. Fourth, Deng Xiaoping broke the secret ahead of time in a speech in the United States, which enabled Vietnam to prepare thoroughly.

Troops on Sino-Vietnamese Border Exhausted

Large-scale fighting between China and Vietnam came to an end 10 years ago, but small-scale skirmishes have been occurring continuously since then. XINHUA NEWS AGENCY reveals that there were 4,200 armed incursions by Vietnam into Chinese territory, more than 10,000 incidents of provocation along the border, and more than one million rounds of mortar fired between late February 1979 and July 1986. In the first 3 weeks of January 1988, Vietnam fired more than 2,000 rounds of mortar against Yunnan Province's Laoshan. In the last 10 years, the silent border war has drained over \$10 billion more from the Chinese Communists' coffers, and caused the death of tens of thousands of ordinary civilians. According to JIEFANGJUN BAO, for the last 10 years the border defense forces have spent long periods of time in dark, damp cat's-ear caves, tunnel defenses, caves, and rocky crevices, suffering insect bites, hot sun, and rain. Many people have been attacked by miasmas or come down with malaria or fever, and the mortality rate has been very high. Supplies of grain and water to some front-line positions have frequently been interrupted due to enemy artillery fire or flash floods from the mountains, and personnel with serious injuries have not even been able to retreat from the front. As a result, troops on the front line have grown exhausted, and there have been widespread incidents of suicide, self-mutilation, violence, insubordination, and desertion. Military academy graduates refuse to be sent to the Vietnamese border, and officers on the front line in Guangxi and Yunnan are clamoring to take demotions in order to be transferred to work in the rear. In fact, the officers and soldiers sacrificed in the War To Punish Vietnam all were killed by guns manufactured in China.

At sea, the Chinese Communists took advantage of the imminent fall of the government of South Vietnam's Nguyen Van Thieu to send the Navy to recover the Spratly Islands in January 1974. They paid a price. A

minesweeper was heavily damaged, and more than 80 people were killed. At that time, the displacement of a single South Vietnamese destroyer was greater than that of six of the Chinese Communists' warships. The main warship of the Communist forces was, surprisingly, a newly built minesweeper whose main gun was only 37 millimeters. In combat, the Chinese Communists were forced to rely on machine guns and hand grenades to supplement their arsenal.

On 14 March 1988, the Chinese Communist Navy sank a Vietnamese Navy freighter and one landing craft in the Spratly Islands. Another cargo ship was damaged, and seven Vietnamese troops were killed. The South Sea Fleet cruised the Spratlys and took possession of six islands and reefs. Today, 32 of the 230 islands in the Spratlys have been encroached upon by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. They have used these islets to lay claim to 800,000 square kilometers of maritime territory, and they have collaborated with powerful Western nations to drill more than 120 oil and gas wells in this territory, allowing the oil and gas in China's maritime territory to flow into foreign tankers. According to international precedent, the illegal occupation of any territory becomes legal after 50 years. In the Spratlys, Feixin Island has been occupied for 19 years, while Nanwei (Vietnam), Zhongye, and Shuangzi (Philippines) have been occupied for 18 years. If the Chinese Communists are unable to recover those islets within the next 31 or 32 years, they will lose them forever, and the depth of China's sea defenses will be reduced by over 1,000 kilometers.

Last year the CMC drew up plans, codenamed "215," for punishment of Vietnam in the Spratlys. A combined attack by the Army, Navy, and Air Force was prepared for late June, just prior to the typhoon season, to recapture the islands and reefs occupied by Vietnam. The plan was later aborted due to insufficient military funds.

Cession of 90,000 Square Kilometers on Sino-Indian Border

The War of Self-Defense and Counterattack on the Sino-Indian border broke out on 20 October 1960. That was during the 3-year period of hardship, when disaster victims were everywhere, grain was being stolen in every province, and violent unrest was constantly breaking out. Chiang Kai-shek was preparing to attack the mainland, and 60,000 Uygurs in Xinjiang had fled across the Soviet border and attempted to establish East Turkistan. In order to free itself of pressure coming simultaneously from domestic sources as well as from beyond China's borders, the Chinese Communists used the war against India to calm the public mood in the mainland. *Reference Materials of the People's Republic of China*, published in 1986, indicates that in the War of Self-Defense and Counterattack on the Sino-Indian border, the PLA completely annihilated two Indian brigades and wiped out most of three others; and more than 8,700 Indian

officers and soldiers were either killed, injured, or captured. Among those taken prisoner was the Indian brigade commander Brigadier General Daville. At that time, Mao Zedong was in no position to sustain a long-term war, so he announced that China was withdrawing 20 kilometers from its actual line of control. China even voluntarily repatriated prisoners-of-war and returned its spoils, thereby tacitly recognizing the illegal MacMahon Line. India, though, showed little appreciation, elevating the status of the illegally occupied MacMahon district and calling it Arunachal Pradesh. In March 1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi took over the legacy of his maternal grandfather, Nehru, and concentrated two infantry divisions, one armored brigade, one artillery regiment, and five fighter squadrons along the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, from whence they made incursions into Chinese territory, attacking 37 Chinese sentry posts guarding the border, pushing 20 kilometers into Tibet, and killing or injuring more than 300 PLA troops, including one battalion commander. After this occurred, General Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi advocated punishing India again, but Yu Quili, director of the General Political Department, pointed out that the Indian military had brought in MiG-29's, while the Chinese military only had MiG-19's, which gave the opponents air superiority and meant that this war would not be nearly so easily fought as the one in 1960, so they decided it would be better to avoid conflict. In the end, Deng Xiaoping opted for a low-key solution to the problem. He had hoped to trade the 90,000 square kilometers at the eastern end of the Sino-Indian border for 30,000 square kilometers in the Ladakh region at the western end (thus ceding an area twice the size of Taiwan Province to India), but India, surprisingly, has refused to accept this formula, and the situation continues in a stalemate. The Chinese Communists have paid an astonishing price for making war on India. The 2,100-kilometer Qing-Zang highway and the 2,200-kilometer Kang-Zang highway were built with money and lives. The Qinghai-Tibet highway was so expensive that it was as if a line of silver dollars, four abreast, had been laid down from Xining to Lhasa. An average of one military construction worker was sacrificed for every kilometer.

The War for Zhenbao Island

The war between China and the Soviet Union over Zhenbao Island occurred on 2 March and 15 March 1969. According to Soviet accounts, 300 PLA troops advanced upon the island and opened fire, and, after an intense two-hour battle, the Soviet forces repulsed the PLA. The Soviets lost 31 officers and soldiers and suffered 14 injuries. The Chinese Communists, however, claimed that it was the Soviets who opened fire behind the protection of four armored vehicles, which caused serious casualties.

According to a broadcast by Radio Moscow, on 15 March an infantry regiment of the PLA employed human wave tactics to launch an attack. PRAVDA

reported that the invaders had been repulsed, and that a Colonel Lianov had been killed in battle.

Zhenbao Island belongs to China, a fact confirmed after Gorbachev's visit to China in May, but the larger Heixiazhi Island, in the middle of the Amur River, is still the subject of haggling. The Soviet Union wants to trade it for a large chunk of territory in Xinjiang, in the west. The Soviet Union is never willing to get the short end of the stick.

For a long time, the 48 divisions stationed by the Soviet Union in the military regions of Siberia, Outer Baikal, and the Far East, have been intended primarily to defend against the Chinese Communists. Before Gorbachev's

visit to China, there was some withdrawal of Soviet forces in Mongolia, but a retreat of a few dozen kilometers by mechanized forces did not have any substantial significance.

Using Military Force Against Taiwan and Tibet

On the combat maps of the General Staff Headquarters of the PLA, the main prospective enemy is still the Nationalist government, which has moved to Taiwan. For the last 40 years, thick clouds of war have hung continuously over the Taiwan Strait. Table X lists the announced military successes of the Chinese Communist Navy and Air Force, but failures have always been a taboo subject.

Table X. Brief Table of PLA Achievements in Sea and Air Battles

Time	Place	Achievement
14 Nov 1954	Zhejiang/Hainan	Naval forces sink Kuomintang (KMT) warship Peace
10 Jan 1955	In the sea near Dachen Island	Air Force sinks or destroys four KMT warships
6 Aug 1965	Southeast seacoast	Navy sinks large, U.S.-made KMT submarine chaser Jianmen and smaller class submarine chaser Zhangjiang
14 Nov 1965	In the sea, east of Chongwu, Fujian	Naval fleet sinks U.S.-made KMT escort Yongchang, damages U.S.-made KMT large-class submarine chaser Yongtai
14 Nov 1965	East China	East China air defense forces down or damage 17 intruding U.S.-made KMT aircraft
7 Sep 1954	Fujian front lines	Artillery forces down or damage 23 KMT aircraft raiding the Xiamen area
19 Jan 1955	Shantou	Down or damage eight KMT aircraft
12 June 1957	Shantou	Antiaircraft guns damage one intruding U.S. aircraft
13 June 1957	Shantou	Antiaircraft guns down two KMT F-84 fighters
Feb 1958		Naval aircraft down two U.S.-made KMT RB-57 reconnaissance jets
2 Aug 1961	Fujian	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT RF-101 reconnaissance plane
6 Nov 1961	Liaodong Peninsula	Air defense forces down one U.S.-made KMT P-2V aircraft
9 Sep 1962	East China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT U-2V aircraft
19 June 1963	East China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT P-2V aircraft
1 Nov 1963	East China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT U-2 reconnaissance plane
11 June 1964	North China	Naval air defense forces down one U.S.-made KMT P-2V aircraft
7 July 1964	East China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane
15 Nov 1964	South-central China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made unmanned high altitude reconnaissance plane
18 Dec 1964	East China	Naval aircraft down one U.S.-made KMT RF-101 reconnaissance plane
2 Jan 1965	South-central China	Air Force downs one U.S. military unmanned high altitude reconnaissance plane
10 Jan 1965	North China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT U-2 high altitude reconnaissance plane
18 Mar 1965	Southeast seacoast	Air Force downs one intruding U.S.-made KMT RF-101 reconnaissance plane
31 Mar 1965	South China	naval aircraft down one intruding unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
3 Apr 1965	South-central China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
18 Apr 1965	South-central China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
21 Aug 1965	South China	Naval aircraft down one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
20 Sep 1965	Haikou, Hainan Island	Naval aircraft down one U.S. F-104 fighter, capture alive U.S. Captain Smith
5 Oct 1965	Guangxi	Air Force downs one U.S. fighter
9 Jan 1966	East China	Air Force downs one raiding U.S.-made KMT aircraft
7 Feb 1966	Southwest China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
5 Mar 1966	South-central China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane

Table X. Brief Table of PLA Achievements in Sea and Air Battles (Continued)

Time	Place	Achievement
23 Mar 1966	Southwest China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
12 Apr 1966	Leizhou Peninsula, Guangdong	Air Force downs one U.S. A-3B heavy attack aircraft
9 Sep 1966	Autonomous counties of various ethnic minorities, Dongxing, Guangxi	Air Force downs two U.S. F-105 fighters, damages another
17 Sep 1966	Chongzuo, Longzhou, Guangxi	Air Force downs one U.S. military aircraft
13 Jan 1967	East China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT F-104 fighter
24 Apr 1967	Guangxi	Air Force downs two U.S. F-4B fighters
29 Apr 1967	Guangxi	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane
1 May 1967	Guangxi	Air Force downs two U.S. A-4B attack planes
12 June 1967	Guangxi	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane
26 June 1967	Southeast Hainan Island	Naval aircraft down one U.S. F-4C fighter
21 Aug 1967	Guangxi	Air Force downs two U.S. A-6 attack planes, captures one U.S. pilot alive
8 Sep 1967	East China	Air Force downs one U.S.-made KMT U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane
17 Sep 1967	Guangxi	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane
20 Jan 1968	Yunnan	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. military high-altitude reconnaissance plane
10 Feb 1968	Hainan Island	Naval aircraft down or damage one intruding U.S. Navy A-1H carrier-based attack plane
7 Mar 1968	Southwest China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane
16 Mar 1968	Southwest China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane
22 Mar 1968	South China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane
28 Oct 1969	South-central China	Air Force downs one unmanned U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane
10 Feb 1970	Hainan Island	Naval aircraft down one unmanned U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance plane

This table taken from *Reference Materials of the People's Republic of China*, p 187; accomplishments in air battles during the War To Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea not included.

According to *The War To Defend Jinmen*, published by the History Administration Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense in 1975, the Communist forces attacked Jinmen unsuccessfully on 25 October 1949. More than 6,000 prisoners were taken, and more than 4,000 men died. The Nationalist Army suffered 1,982 injuries and 1,267 deaths.

However, *Expedition Notes*, which was written by Ye Fei (who commanded the old 3d Field Army's 15th Army Group in its attack on Jinmen) and published last winter, stated that, "the three regiments in my first echelon fought bitterly for 3 days and nights. Nearly everyone was killed or injured, but no one surrendered. Those who were captured had all been injured. Enemy casualties were even heavier, totaling 26,000."

As for the battle of 23 August 1958, the Chinese Communists announced that enemy "casualties surpassed 36,000. Our forces lost two MiG-17's during the battle in Keluo Bay, two enemy ships and one boat received heavy damage, and one of our torpedo boats also sustained some damage." The Nationalist Army's war report, however, claimed that, "32 MiG's were shot down, and only three Jundao aircraft were lost. Over 29

of the enemy's torpedo boats and gunboats were sunk or damaged, while only two Nationalist ships were damaged."

Some engineers who were working at Shanghai's Jiangnan Shipyards in 1958 have revealed that the docks were full of gunboats that had been towed back, riddled with holes, from the front line in Fujian.

After the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued its "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" on 1 January 1979, the artillery war between Jinmen and Xiamen came to an end. On 30 September 1981, Ye Jianying issued a nine-point plan for peaceful reunification. However, in its concrete actions, China still lacks sincerity. In particular, once every few months a Chinese leader reiterates that they "will not rule out the use of force against Taiwan," thus the smokeless war in the Taiwan Strait continues unabated. The Chinese Communists are using a "1,000 swarming sails" strategy, employing fishing vessels to carry out harassment of Jinmen, Matsu, Taiwan, and Penghu on a daily basis. The large-scale maneuvers in the South China Sea that took place the year before last were a dry run of a blockade of the Taiwan Strait. In accordance with combat plans formulated by the General Staff, the PLA

has already completed its seventh exercise on Hainan and Chongming Islands in which an invasion of Taiwan was simulated. The actual steps are as follows: 1) Blockade the five big harbors; 2) bombard the four major inland bridges to divide the island, and cause destruction within each of the separate sections; 3) land in Yilan in the east and use war to force a peaceful settlement.

However, because in the last 2 years the flame of revolt has broken out repeatedly in Tibet and Xinjiang, frequent student movements have formed in Beijing and Shanghai, prices have soared, and people have difficulty even making a living, the execution of the plan to invade Taiwan has been postponed.

With respect to the PLA's domestic operations, the most brutal have been those aimed at quelling revolt in Tibet. On 20 March 1959, Tibet Military Region forces killed more than 3,000 lamas and injured 5,000 people, prompting the Dalai Lama to flee to India. According to "Tibet Today: Present Conditions and Future Prospects," a special report delivered to the Senate by the well-known U.S. scholar John Avedon in September 1987, more than 1.2 million Tibetans have died in 29 years in operations to quell revolt.

Incidents of Butchery Become Commonplace

The Chinese Communists frequently boast how "their soldiers move among the people as fish through water." They talk of how the troops assist the peasants every summer and fall with the harvest. This is not especially significant in the mainland, a place long on surplus labor and short of land, but the fact that the party commands the gun means that the military has played a brutal and violent role in one political movement after another.

In the spring of 1975, Communist functionaries in Yunnan Province's Mengzi County forced the Muslim population in Shadian Village to raise pigs and eat pork, sparking a revolt. The 14th Group Army, stationed in Yunnan, responded to orders to quell the revolt by using 155-mm grenade launchers to raze Shadian Village to the ground. More than 4,000 Muslim villagers were slaughtered. The 10,000-plus Muslims who survived fought bitterly for 3 months to defend their religious freedom, and nearly all were killed.

At midwinter in 1967, an internal rift occurred between two units of the Communist military in the Baoding district of Hebei province. They attacked each other with short-range missiles, killing more than 20,000 people. Poor young soldiers! Wildly screaming such slogans as "Defend Chairman Mao," they marched muddle-headed to their graves!

The most shocking of all was the Guangxi massacre, planned by Wei Guoqing. Materials published in July 1968 by the "422 Revolutionary Rebellion Command Post" reveal that at least 50,000 innocent civilians were slaughtered in Liuzhou Municipality alone. In carrying out Wei Guoqing's orders, the PLA tore out the hearts, dismembered the bodies, or buried alive the members of

the "422 Faction" whom they had arrested. They were even more brutal than the Japanese devils when they had been in China. Under Wei Guoqing's rule, 110,000 people were buried alive in Guangxi. In addition, there were the tightly bound corpses which floated down the West River to Hong Kong. In June that year, more than 7,000 floating corpses were taken from the river around Wuzhou alone.

Particularly noteworthy was the fact that the PLA, in slaughtering the people of Guangxi, made use of the most advanced tanks, double-barreled rocket mortars, and infrared guided missiles, all of which had been earmarked as military aid to Vietnam. When troops surrounded students who were holding out inside the Guangxi Museum, Wei Guoqing approved the use of fire to attack them. Homes surrounding the museum were set ablaze, turning the entire street into a sea of flame. From that point on, the inhuman tactics of burning and flooding were used by the military to overcome the "422 Headquarters" in every county of the province. They even euphemized that they were "overthrowing the old world, and building a new world."

In Wuhan, the commander of the Wuhan forces, Chen Zaidao [7315 0375 6670], got involved in an armed struggle between different mass organizations on 20 July 1967, ordering the 8201 unit to kidnap several key figures from the Cultural Revolution group, including Wang Li [3769 0500] and Xie Fuzhi [6200 1381 3112]. Then he organized 400 trucks, 30 fire trucks, and several dozen armored vehicles in a show of force. This is what was known as the Wuhan Mutiny. Afterward, the party CMC ordered the 8199th force, the East Sea Fleet, and the 15th Paratroopers Division to surround Wuhan, and Chen Zaidao built defense works and settled in to resist. After the mutiny was put down, various civilian factions used weapons which the troops had lost to carry their conflicts to frightening lengths. The entire province of Hubei was affected, and as many as 180,000 people died.

In Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Communists buried 4,000 tons of West German nuclear waste under the sands of the Gobi Desert in 1987, sparking a furious protest by ethnic Mongolians. Mongolian students in Hohhot attacked the autonomous regional government. Ulanfu's son, Buhe [1580 6378], transferred a regiment of the PLA from the commander of the Inner Mongolian Military Region, Cai Ying [5591 5391], to suppress the students.

As for the Tiananmen massacres of 5 April 1976 and 4 June 1989, the number of dead surpassed 10,000 on both occasions. Since they are so well known to the world, we shall not burden the reader with further description.

PLA Slides Into Official Speculation

Over the last 40 years, the most praiseworthy thing about the PLA are the huge advances achieved in its armaments. These rice-and-rifles, backwoods 8th Route troops of yesteryear have built a strategic missile force, a fleet of nuclear submarines, an arsenal of surface-to-air

missiles, and an electronic defense force. The PLA now has the third-highest number of tanks in the world. The Air Force also has the third-highest number of planes in the world. Once the indigenous F-8 fighter is equipped with the U.S.-built electronic navigation system, it will be on a par with the MiG-23. The Navy has succeeded in an underwater missile launch from a nuclear submarine. Missile-equipped escorts have been computerized. The scale of combined naval training exercises and maneuvers has become larger and larger, and the Navy's range has increased, stepping up from coastal defense close to home, to patrolling distant seas. The pace of indigenous development of aircraft carriers has been accelerated, too.

While armaments have been growing stronger, though, morale has been becoming weaker. It used to be that urban and rural youth were proud to serve in the military, and young girls fought for the chance to marry soldiers. However, with the swift development of the commodity economy, values have changed greatly, and the idea that "a good man doesn't become a soldier" has again become prevalent. Two years ago, out of more than 3,000 senior high school graduates who failed the university entrance exam, only three signed up for the military. In the Wenzhou area, with a population of six million, nearly all males eligible for military service have left the area to work as laborers or run a business. In some towns, no one has responded to calls for recruits for 2 years in a row. Males of the appropriate age would rather pay a fine of 500 yuan than perform military service. Some individual entrepreneurs have made a single payment to take care of 3 years of fines in order to escape military service. In some rural areas far off the beaten track, people are paying able-bodied young men to perform military service in their stead. Some provinces and counties even use convicts, mentally handicapped persons, and thugs to fill out the ranks and complete their conscription tasks. This has greatly lowered the quality of soldiers. The backbone of the 4 June massacre was a contingent of just such poorly educated rural soldiers.

Infected by the prevailing social climate, in which everyone "looks moneyward," the PLA has actively gotten involved in "military speculation." In the Hainan vehicle case, which attracted so much attention worldwide, the South Sea Fleet ships stationed in Yulin Harbor were used to ship Japanese cars to the north. This was done at the orders of none other than the old military leader, Wang Zhen. As the saying goes, "When the man on top is crooked, can his underlings be straight?" Some troops in Tibet have been trading bullets to the Tibetan people for musk, which the troops then have transported secretly to inland China to sell at a profit. The guns that the Tibetans have used in the last several incidents of unrest in Lhasa were all sold secretly to them by the soldiers. They feel that it is a great misfortune to have to serve in the military, so they try to make back the money they have lost before being discharged.

Adept at Selling Ammunition, Transporting Drugs, and Getting Rich

In Yunnan, there are already three divisions that are responsible for growing opium and smuggling drugs. Most of the products enter the international drug market via the Golden Triangle. Cadres from the regiment level and up in these forces have passports from Thailand, the Philippines, and other countries, and they frequently travel back and forth between Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila, and various places in Europe and the Americas doing business with international drug cartels. The PLA drug transport troops circulate freely in Thailand, Burma, and the Golden Triangle. Two years ago, in the fall, the Thai Government inadvertently got into a shootout with disguised PLA troops during an operation to encircle and suppress drug merchants. Afterward, Thailand dealt with the matter in a low-key manner to smooth things over. One cadre from Yunnan stated that the Communist military has at least three battalions of special forces that frequently cross over the border between China and Thailand. Hu Yaobang and Yang Shangkun have both met before with the leaders of the troops that carry out this special mission, and they have encouraged them to "do a good job with this special mission which the party has entrusted to you."

Under the guidance of the theory which holds that "the color of the cat doesn't matter as long as it catches the mice," the mainland's arms sales last year exceeded \$2 billion, thus making the mainland the world's fifth-largest arms exporter. Furthermore, the military keeps as much as 85 percent of the profits from these sales. This income has come to account for an ever larger proportion of total expenditures for national defense. The 8-year war between Iran and Iraq enabled the Chinese Communists to earn the equivalent of more than 10 billion Renminbi in foreign exchange. In addition, the Chinese Communists have also exported parts for the "Flying Fish" missile to Argentina, surface-to-air missiles to Afghan guerrillas, parts for Soviet-made weapons to Israel, and uranium processing technology to South Africa.

One of the main targets of arms smuggling is Taiwan. In the last few years, the Chinese Communists have used fishermen and the New People's Army in the Philippines to transport tens of thousands of various modern fire-arms into Taiwan. Enough has been smuggled to equip two divisions, which has become the biggest hidden danger to public order in Taiwan. The Chinese Communists have been selling modern weapons to underworld figures in Taiwan at a 70-percent discount. The motive behind this dumping is crystal clear.

According to materials made public by the Chinese Communists themselves, the mainland has 59 military airports, 20 military ports, 3,000 military rail lines, 257 military telephone lines, and more than 400 warehouses that have been put to commercial use, vying with the people for business. If this situation persists, the enterprises run by the military will inevitably become the

mainland's largest conglomerate. Given the added fact of military interference in politics and its suppression of the student movement, the military has gradually assumed greater importance in the Chinese political arena. This has undoubtedly impeded the democratization of Chinese politics. Since Deng Xiaoping has used the military to support his regime, after Deng's death, developments in the military will be a major factor limiting possible changes in the political arena.

Growth of Nuclear, Aviation, Space Industries

90ON0173A Hong Kong LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK]
OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese
No 43, 23 Oct 89 pp 3-5

[Article by Gu Mainan (7357 6701 0589): 40 Years of China's National Defense-Related Science, Research]

[Text] In the past 40 years, having started virtually from scratch, China's national defense-related research has grown to maturity and grown in strength, with brilliant achievements that have attracted worldwide attention. China has already joined the ranks of the advanced countries by reaching world levels in nuclear science and technology and in space technology, and is among the few countries in the world today possessing nuclear weapons and a comparatively complete nuclear industrial system. All of this amply reflects the ability of the Chinese people to stand on their own feet among the nations of the world.

The Development of Nuclear Science

In following the same path as the world's nuclear powers, China's nuclear industry has also sprung from the development of nuclear weapons. Due to the self-reliance of vast numbers of staff and workers on the front of the nuclear industry who engaged in difficult and arduous pioneering work, success was first achieved in the development of the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and nuclear powered submarines, greatly enhancing the strength of China's national defense. Under the impetus of development for military applications, China next proceeded to master the use of nuclear technology for civilian use, and established a complete nuclear industrial system, laying the material and technical foundation for the development and utilization of nuclear energy.

Entering the eighties, the nuclear industry has undergone a strategic adjustment, gradually shifting from giving primacy to military applications to a path of service to the national economy, and embarking on a course of civilian and military integration. This involves changing from the past situation of producing solely military products to a situation which, taking the nuclear industry as the primary given, involves the diversified and vigorous development of products for civilian use. At present, construction for nuclear power projects and a whole set of nuclear fuel projects is underway, and, of the 48 items on the country's key civilian use technological

transformation list, 25 have already been put into operation, more than a thousand civil-use products have been developed, and the average annual output value of civil-use products is more than 20 percent and increasing steadily. By 1988, the proportion of the output value of civil-use products in the gross value of industrial output had already gone from the 4.7-percent level of 1980 to a level of 33.7 percent.

At the same time, the administrative structure of China's nuclear industry was opening to the outside world—in 1984 China officially joined the International Atomic Energy Organization and became a member state. In recent years, the nuclear industry has strengthened foreign contacts and China's nuclear technology and its products have begun to penetrate international markets. By 1988, China had already concluded bilateral cooperation agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy with governmental departments or nongovernmental organizations in 13 countries, including Yugoslavia, Italy, West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, and was engaged in technical and economic cooperation in dealing with matters such as inspection of uranium mines, nuclear power plant construction, and handling of radioactive waste. China's nuclear industry and its science and technology have now ended their period of isolation, and entered a new period of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and expanded development of international cooperation.

Research associated with nuclear technology is related to a country's strength, position, and image. It is the foundation of a country's power and symbol of its scientific and technological level. In recent years, China's national defense-related military industrial development has made outstanding progress, modernizing China's national defense, strengthening China's strategic weapons capabilities, and making new contributions to safeguarding world peace.

In terms of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, on 1 March 1985 ground was broken for the construction of a Chinese-designed 300,000-kilowatt [kW] nuclear power station at Qinshan, a historical prelude to the development of nuclear power in China. The builders have overcome serious difficulties, creatively laboring to complete the task of hoisting the safety dome and nuclear island pressure vessel, and are at present speeding up installation and construction. Low-level power generation at the power plant will begin in 1990. At this time, two imported 90,000-kW nuclear power stations at Dayawan in Guangdong Province will also enter the most intense phase of their construction, as the reactor housing was sealed on 21 September of this year. The day is fast approaching when the Chinese mainland will put an end to their history without nuclear power.

In terms of the "light industries" newly emerging in the nuclear sphere, the use of isotopes and radiation processing has also seen rapid development. More than 800 types of such radioisotope products, such as cobalt-60

and americium-241, as well as various types of radioactive pharmaceuticals, radioactive chemical reagents, and marked compounds have been produced domestically. While in the past China relied mainly on imported isotopes, this is gradually changing as the majority become domestically produced. Isotopes and irradiation technology have become widely used in many fields. In terms of agriculture, China is among the world leaders in irradiative crop breeding, with more than 240 new varieties produced, more than one-third of the total produced worldwide. In medical treatment, more than 100 types of isotopes and 85 types of radioactive pharmaceuticals are being used in diagnosis and treatment at more than 1,000 hospitals nationally. In industry, the use of isotope meters is becoming popular in such light industry departments as oil, coal, water conservancy, metallurgy, and construction, and the output value of the 100 irradiation plants reached more than 20 million yuan in 1988 alone.

In terms of basic theoretical research in nuclear science, an outstanding success is the construction of basic facilities. In May of 1981, a high-flux engineering test reactor, which was domestically researched, designed, and built, had already achieved sufficient power to operate, reaching the level of similar foreign-built engineering test reactors and greatly increasing China's research capabilities in neutron radiation. China's domestically developed "Shanguang-1" high-current, pulsed electron accelerator has also been put into operation. Controlled fusion is a new energy technology being pursued by many of the world's advanced countries, and, in 1984, China's domestically developed Tokamak facility, Chinese Circulator No 1, was successfully started up, giving China the first large-scale serial accelerator nuclear physics laboratory, and allowing China to step forward into the advanced ranks of countries involved in international low-energy physics research.

The nuclear industry is a technologically dense and strongly integrated field of science and technology with many specialties, many disciplines, and many types of production work. In the process of development, China has created many high-grade precision and advanced technologies, for example, devices emerging from nuclear weapons development including detonators, sensors, microelectronic devices, remote control telemetry devices, and so on, which have shown their ability to be used in the civilian economy in many fields and have made special contributions.

Missiles and Rockets Strengthen National Power

After World War II, a missile and rocket industry rapidly sprang up in the United States and the countries of Europe, while in the old China, under a state of war, the development of any sort of modern rocket technology was simply out of the question.

Beginning in the fifties, the Chinese people took hold of their own destiny. At that time the United States and Soviet Union had already entered the "nuclear age" and

"jet age," while the recently founded New China still had to deal with the blockade, encirclement, and threat by the forces of imperialism. To avoid being bullied, it is necessary to possess modern weaponry. In order to move forward on the most important and most urgent fronts, China's highest leadership levels decided to emphasize the development of missile and nuclear energy technology as representative of the most advanced science and technology.

In April 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai personally presided over a meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee and listened to missile expert Qian Xuelin, who had recently returned from abroad, discuss a tentative plan for developing China's missile technology. The CPC Central Committee resolutely made a policy decision to develop missile technology, and after Nie Rongzhen was installed as director of the Aviation Commission, a Missile Management Office at the Ministry of Defense and the Missile Research Institute were also established. More than 30 technical specialists and over 100 university graduate students from all over the country were transferred to the institute, which used an abandoned sanatorium and hospital as a work site. It was here that work began on New China's space industry.

The historic commemoration day for the foundation of China's missile and space industries is 8 October 1956, when Institute Director Qian Xuelin, formally announced the establishment of the 5th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. After four years of hard work, Qian Xuelin and other founders of the missile industry, in accordance with the principle of self-reliance, which involves training qualified personnel and establishing research organizations, successfully launched the first reproduction short-range missile. In December of the same year, two successful test launches of the domestically produced P-2 missile were carried out. Subsequently, breakthroughs were also made in rocket design technology, and, on 29 June 1964, a Chinese-designed midrange rocket was successfully launched. Thereafter followed the successful research and development of the Long March series of carrier rockets, used for launching Chinese-made satellites into space.

After 30 years of hard work, China has established a number of research institutes and scientific research and production sites engaged in the research and production of strategic missiles, tactical missiles, carrier rockets, and satellites, with close to 100 general assembly, main engine, auxiliary engine, and specialized plants. There are more than 80 overall design, subsystem design, specialized technology, large-scale testing, and basic technology research institutes. The space industry has formed a complete research, design, trial-manufacture, testing, and production system, and has established a nationwide network of cooperation in scientific research and production, which undertakes the research, development, and production of various types of missiles, carrier rockets, satellites, and many kinds of products not used directly in space applications.

China has domestically researched and produced a number of types of missile weapons, strengthening the power of China's national defense. In terms of strategic missiles, China has already successfully developed not only short-range, medium-range, long-range, and inter-continental surface-to-surface missiles, but also under-water-launched solid water-to-surface missiles, and has tentatively formed an all-range strategic nuclear missile system with many types of launch methods, giving China a powerful nuclear counterattack deterrent force.

In terms of tactical missiles, China has researched and developed a number of air defense missiles which form the basis of an air defense weapon system for air space defense of the entire country, and strengthened the PLA's strategic areas and field operation air defense capabilities. For sea defense missiles, a weapon system with a number of types of attack methods has been initially established, basically possessing anti-amphibious, major water area blockade, and coastal water operational capabilities. At present, China's is now among the world leaders in supersonic sea defense missile technology.

China has already become a world leader in space technology, and successfully developed and produced carrier rockets including Long March-1, Tempest-1, Long March-2, Long March-3, and Long March-4, with the ability to launch near-earth orbit, solar synchronous orbit, and geostationary orbit satellites. By 1988, China had successfully launched 25 satellites, including scientific test satellites, technical test satellites, land survey satellites, weather satellites, and communication and broadcasting satellites. These satellites play an important role in China's economic, cultural, scientific and technological, and national defense development. China is the third country in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union, to master satellite recovery techniques, and, from 1975 to 1988, has successfully recovered satellites on 11 occasions. In terms of satellite survey control technology, China has also reached advanced world levels; China is the fifth country in the world to be able to independently launch a geostationary satellite; and, after the United States and France and before Japan, is the third country to master high-energy low-temperature fuel rocket technology.

Aviation Science and Technology in the Ascendancy

In China under the old regime, any sort of independent aviation industry and aviation scientific research system was simply out of the question. Although arrangements were made in 1910 for an aircraft building and repair facility, on the eve of the establishment of New China there were only 10 factories, with simple and crude equipment, capable of assembling and repairing a small number of aircraft. All relied on foreign imports for required materials, finished goods and equipment.

In the early fifties the CPC Central Committee decided to establish China's own aviation industry, and under the direction of Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou

Enlai convened a conference which, in light of the reality that China first had an Air Force and then established an aviation industry, formulated a policy of "Chinese design from repair to reproduction."

With the cry "Let the airplanes created by the Chinese people soar into the blue sky!" the arduous efforts of huge numbers of cadres and scientific and technical personnel on the front line of aviation, working with a will to make the country strong, in July 1954 successfully developed China's first aircraft, the FT-5; and in July 1956, China's first jet fighter, the F-5, made its first flight. The successful development of jet-type aircraft marked China's entry into the "jet age," and was the start of China's independent establishment of aircraft development teams, which went from copying to developing their own designs. A few years later, China had produced hundreds of first-generation jet fighters and supplied them to Air Force and naval troops. It took the New China only seven or eight years in all to go from mere repair to the independent design and manufacturing of aircraft, from being able only to produce piston-type engine aircraft to mastering jet-type aircraft manufacturing technology, and finally to enter the ranks of the few countries in the world able to mass produce jet-type aircraft.

Statistically, in comparing the year 1986 with the year 1952, the number of personnel involved in China's aviation industry has jumped to 27.8 times the number of 1952, there are 28 times as many metal-cutting machine tools, 35 times more construction space, 146 times as much total investment, 63.7 times the industrial gross output value, 13.7 times the realized profit, and the various types of aircraft, engines, and missiles produced number in the thousands.

Today, China's aviation industry has progressively become a comparatively complete industrial system in which scientific research, production, and education have all achieved a certain level of development, and it has provided the PLA with fighter planes, attack planes, bombers, helicopters, transport planes, reconnaissance planes, trainers, unmanned aircraft, and many types of tactical missiles, as well as various types of aviation engines and airborne equipment. Recently, it has also supplied civilian aviation and other departments with short-haul civilian aircraft and many general-purpose airplanes; at the same time, it is still using its own production capacity and technological superiority to develop and produce various types of civilian [consumer] goods, making a valuable contribution to the development of the country.

Development of Nuclear Weapons

90ON0230A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese No 206,
16 Nov 89 pp 64-69

[Article: "The Expansion of Communist China's Nuclear Weapons Strength"]

[Text] On 16 October 1964, Communist China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb, thereby elbowing its way into the nuclear club. Subsequently, with the refitting of aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, and the successful launching of nuclear missiles, Communist China's nuclear weapons became a real combat force. Next, the Chinese Communists further expanded their nuclear arsenal step by step to include strategic nuclear weapons and various kinds of tactical nuclear weapons, including land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

During the late 1950's, most of China's early-stage nuclear weapons research work was the responsibility of the Fifth Institute (the Fifth Research Institute) of the Ministry of National Defense and of the Nuclear Weapons Design Institute of the Second Ministry of Machine Building. The most esteemed scientist involved was Deng Jiaxian [6772 4471 0341], who was acclaimed the "father of China's nuclear bombs." At that time, the USSR unilaterally tore up an agreement, halting supply to China of nuclear technology assistance. In addition, foreign countries enforced a strict embargo against the mainland. Under these circumstances, the successful development within a period of several years of China's first atomic bomb by Deng Jiaxian and his colleagues was indeed no easy matter.

Centralized Planning by the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building in 1964

In November 1954, the Chinese Communist CPC Central Committee and State Council decided to form the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building using the Fifth Research Institute as its foundation, and transferring to it relevant departments from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Ministries of Machine Building, as well as various plants and units from provinces and municipalities in order to effect centralized control over missile and rocket industry research, design, test manufacture, production, and capital construction work. In January 1965, PRC Chairman Liu Shaoqi appointed Wang Bingzhang [3769 4426 3864] minister of the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building. In June of the same year, the State Council appointed Liu Youguang [0491 2569 0342], Qian Xuesen [6929 1331 2773], Liu Bingyan [0491 4426 1750], Gu Guangshan [6253 1639 0810], Zhang Fan [1728 0416], and Cao Guanglin [2580 0342 3829] vice ministers of the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building.

Even though technologies associated with nuclear weapons (such as nuclear bomb delivery aircraft) were by no means advanced, the Chinese Communist military continued to press ahead with the development of nuclear weapons to make them an effective second-strike force.

The Chinese Communist nuclear deterrent consisted principally of land-based ballistic missiles, but Beijing was also vigorously developing a submarine-launched system. In addition, the Air Force possessed the means to use nuclear weapons on a small scale.

Equipping the "Second Artillery Corps"

Today, the Chinese Communist Air Force has approximately 120 old B-6 medium bombers, which serve as the mainstay for delivering air-dropped nuclear weapons. It also has a small number of refitted B-5 light bombers and some F-5 fighter planes capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons in carrying out bombing missions.

The Chinese Communist's strategic missile force is termed the "Second Artillery Corps." Its leadership organ was founded on 1 July 1966. At that time, its commander was Xiang Shouzhi [0686 1343 1807], and its political commissar was Li Tianhuan [2621 1131 3562].

The Second Artillery's current weapons systems include mobile "Dongfeng-2" (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and "Dongfeng-3" (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM); fixed launcher "Dongfeng-4" (CSS-3) limited-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ltd-rge ICBM), and "Dongfeng-5" (CSS-4) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). All of these missiles use the technology of the 1960's and early 1970's. They use liquid propellants, and each missile carries only a single nuclear warhead. The most powerful and the longest range of the foregoing weapons is the "Dongfeng-5," with a range of 12,000 kilometers, and carrying a hydrogen bomb warhead equivalent to 4 million tons of TNT. On 10 May 1980, full-range testing of the "Dongfeng-5" began, the South Pacific being the splashdown point. Success in this test greatly strengthened Communist China's nuclear deterrent force.

In September 1981, the Chinese Communists successfully used a carrier rocket (the Fengbao-1) to put three space-physics exploratory satellites into earth orbit, thereby becoming the fourth country in the world to master "one-rocket, multiple-satellite" launch technology. This also meant that the Chinese Communists possessed the technical conditions for developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV).

The Chinese Communists are now developing first-generation nuclear missiles. According to Western analysis, MIRV's using solid propellants will be used to arm the Second Artillery in the mid-1990's. This new missile will have a longer range and higher accuracy.

The carrier missiles for tactical nuclear weapons include long range rockets similar to the USSR's Frog series, and short-range nuclear missiles similar to the American Pershing I. The Chinese Communists are also improving their tactical missile strength. According to Chinese Communist newspaper reports, a "supersonic, minimum-altitude flying, cruise missile possessing an over-the-horizon attack capability, and an automated and accurate guidance system is being researched and developed.

Successful Development of Submarine-Launched Missiles

Since the enemy cannot easily detect the exact location of nuclear submarines armed with tactical ballistic missiles prowling the vast oceans, they are able to hide themselves fairly well and survive. When they launch missiles in an attack on enemy targets, they can also achieve the benefit of surprise attack. Consequently, nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles are an integral part of the nuclear deterrent force, whose importance is rather high. For the enemy, they are also the most dangerous threat.

In mid-October 1957, Marshal Nie Rongzhen signed a "New National Defense Technology Agreement" with the USSR on behalf of the Chinese Communists. According to the terms of this agreement, Moscow would provide the Chinese Communists with a teaching model of an atomic bomb. In the naval strategic weapons field, the USSR would also provide manufacturing technology for G-class conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines, as well as for SS-N-4 [Sark] surface-launched ballistic missiles used with this class submarine, and for nuclear warheads for the missiles. However, in 1958, Moscow proposed to Beijing the establishment of a Sino-Soviet "joint fleet" and also asked that the USSR have absolute authority within the "joint fleet" command. Beijing maintained that it was unwilling to sacrifice its national sovereignty. As a result, the USSR halted the transfer to the Chinese Communists of advanced military technology, including nuclear technology. In 1964, Sino-Soviet relations were entirely broken. The Chinese Communists had to rely on themselves while simultaneously improving their combat capabilities to deal with encirclement by the United States and the USSR.

Deprived of technological assistance from the USSR, the Chinese Communists used the G-class missile submarine blueprints they had obtained before relations between the countries were broken. In mid-1962, they began construction of this class submarine at the Red Flag

Shipyard in Dalian. In 1964 the submarine was launched, and in 1965 it began trial runs. To date, the Chinese Communists have built only one G-class submarine for use as a platform for research, development, testing, and evaluation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the USSR did not turn over to Communist China any SS-N-4 (Sark) missiles before it unilaterally tore up the agreement and withdrew its experts. Thus, the Chinese Communists had to rely on their own capabilities to develop submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

In mid-October 1982, the Chinese Communist-developed "Julang-1" submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully fired underwater from the G-class submarine. It took a total of 25 years from the beginning of the submarine-launched strategic missile plan to this successful underwater launching of the "Julang-1."

The underwater launch test of greatest significance was successfully carried out in September 1988 when a Xia-class ballistic missile-carrying submarine fired a "Julang-1" missile. This marked the entry into the application stage of the Chinese Communists' submarine-launched strategic ballistic missile for the formation of a true underwater deterrent force. Western analysts believe that the major technical difficulties that the Chinese Communists encountered with their ballistic missile nuclear submarine, notably stability problems that the submarine experienced at the time of missile launch, delayed development plans.

Although Communist China's submarine-launched ballistic missile is operational, Western analysts do not foresee a switch from land-based missiles to submarine-launched missiles for the Chinese Communist's strategic nuclear main force. This is because, during the past 30 years of development of nuclear weapons, Beijing has invested a large amount of resources in land-based systems. The expense required to build a nuclear weapons main force based on submarines would be difficult for the Chinese Communists to bear.

Table Showing In-Service Chinese Communist Strategic Ballistic Missiles

Model	Western Designation	Type	Launch Mode	Estimated Range (Km)
Dongfeng-2	CSS-1	MRBM	Mobile launcher	1,000-1,200
Dongfeng-3	CSS-2	IRBM	Mobile launcher	3,000
Dongfeng-4	CSS-3	Limited-range ICBM	Fixed launcher	6,000-7,000
Dongfeng-5	CSS-4	ICBM	Fixed launcher	10,000-12,000
Julang-1	CSS-N-3	SLBM	Submarine firing tube	2,000-3,000

Trend of Chinese Communist Nuclear Submarine Development

The Chinese Communists will construct between four and eight Xia-class nuclear submarines in order to keep between two to four of them on regular sea patrol. The Chinese Communists will also further develop the

"Julang" series of submarine-launched missiles, lengthening their range, in particular. Because the "Julang-1" has a current range of only 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers, Xia-class submarines will have to sail close to the coastal waters of the adversary—the USSR or the United States. However, since both the USSR and the United States possess advanced antisubmarine technology, for

Chinese Communist submarines to sail so close to the enemy shores will not be easy by any means.

Increasingly Important Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Simultaneous with the step-by-step perfection of strategic nuclear weapons, Beijing is also beginning to invest resources in the research and development of tactical nuclear weapons. During the early 1980's, JIEFANGJUN BAO published an article suggesting that in a future war (against the USSR), the enemy (the USSR) would very likely use nuclear weapons in order to attain the goal of fighting a lightning-quick war to reach a quick decision. If the other side (the Chinese Communists) also used nuclear weapons in retaliation, corresponding strength would be used to contend with the enemy. The article also pointed out that tactical weapons might be used to a limited extent on the battlefield, but since both sides could threaten each other with strategic nuclear weapons, the enemy would not necessarily be so rash as to unleash an all-out nuclear war. This article showed that some people within the Chinese Communist armed forces have already looked squarely at the reality of tactical nuclear weapons, and it hints, to a certain extent, that the Chinese Communists already possess tactical nuclear weapons.

In fact, during recent years the Chinese Communists have successfully developed the deployment of their tactical missiles (M-series), and they have indirectly disclosed that Beijing already possesses tactical nuclear weapons and urgently needs delivery vehicles. From the recent monitoring of Chinese Communist underground nuclear tests, Western analysts note that there were low-grade tests below 20,000 tons of TNT.

The low-grade underground nuclear test conducted in September 1988 was even regarded as evidence that the Chinese Communists are developing neutron bombs. This was because, in reporting this nuclear test, the Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO used the term "third-generation nuclear weapon."

Neutron bombs are a third-generation nuclear weapon that contaminate only a small area for a short period of time, and that can kill people without damaging structures. They are particularly suitable for limited battlefield use. During the early 1980's, Zhang Aiping [1728 1947 1627], who was in charge of National Defense Science Committee work at that time, composed a Chinese rhyme that went: "What is so difficult about a neutron bomb?" which gave people something to think about.

Controversy still exists within the Chinese Communist Party about whether neutron bombs are needed. Those in favor maintain that the technology for developing the neutron bomb is not difficult if the Chinese Communists want it, and such a bomb would be very effective in dealing with a large-scale Soviet armored force offensive. Furthermore, since there is little radiation contamination from neutron bombs, the effect of their radiation on places such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, which may

become future battlefields, would also be limited. By equipping a small force with neutron bomb weapons the expense needed to equip thousands of tanks could be saved, and this would amount to a saving of several billion yuan.

Those opposed maintain that the expense of developing a neutron bomb would be great; furthermore, the use of a neutron bomb might lead to all-out nuclear warfare.

During the past five years, the Chinese Communist Second Artillery has conducted more than 120 training exercises, large and small. All of these exercises envisioned a war situation along the Sino-Soviet border. They were protecting the Shenyang Military Region, China's heavy industry heartland, and they were also directed toward studying the execution of division defensive operations under nuclear conditions, including how to protect defense works under nuclear attack. These exercises showed that the Chinese Communist armed forces believe that in a future large-scale war, nuclear warfare will be conducted on a large scale from the very beginning.

Since the beginning of the 1950's, the Chinese Communists have concentrated limited national resources on the development of a strategic nuclear force capable of playing a preventive and deterrent role. This strategy has been successful. Making the "Dongfeng-5" ICBM and the "Julang-1" submarine-launched missile operational also made both the USSR and the United States pay more attention to Communist China's strategic weapons strength.

Military Relations With Western Countries

90ON0212A Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU
[STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
No 274, 15 Oct 89 pp 87-95

[Article by Ch'en Ming-chih (7115 2494 4249): "Chinese Communist Military Ties to the West"]

[Text]I. Foreword

Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee adopted a policy of "opening to the outside world," Deng Xiaoping's so-called "orientation toward modernization, orientation toward the world, and orientation toward the future" has served as the guiding thought behind Communist China's policies for building "national defense" and the "modernization and regularization" of the armed forces. In order to accelerate military modernization, the Chinese Communists have also entered into active exchanges with foreign military forces in recent years. Take Communist China's high-level military contacts with foreign countries during 1988 as an example, when Communist China invited more than 70 military delegations from more than 30 countries to visit Mainland China.¹ The emphasis of their foreign military activity has been on the advanced countries of Europe and the United States. They desire to learn from the military training experiences of

advanced countries, and to introduce weapons manufacturing technology to advance their "military modernization." For their part, West European countries and the United States are also interested in military contacts with the Chinese Communists to gain economic benefits for themselves, or to resist the onslaught of Soviet global expansionist strategy. They seek to use these contacts to get the Chinese Communist weapons market and to oppose the USSR. From 1988 until the present, the Chinese Communists have continued to advance along various avenues to conduct military exchanges with the countries of Europe and the Americas, using relationships established in the past.

However, following the "Tiananmen affair" of 4 June 1989, exchanges began to slow because the countries of Europe and the Americas recognized the ruthless nature of the Chinese Communist Army. This article summarizes and analyzes pertinent data for reference.

II. Visits Back and Forth by High-Ranking Military Personnel

In June 1985, a strategic change was made in the guiding thought for building the Chinese Communist armed forces, and in October 1986, the Chinese Communist Navy drew up a 15-Year Overall Development Plan. In 1987, the Chinese Communist Air Force came out with "Air Force Plan for 2000." Therefore, from 1988 until the present time, mostly the Navy and the Air Force have been involved in the travel abroad of high-ranking Chinese Communist military personnel and in inviting military visitors to China. At the same time, Western countries have acceded to requests from the Chinese Communist armed forces in order to get on the good side of the Chinese Communists. They seek to use technology to influence the Chinese Communist armed forces and get the Chinese Communist weapons market. The Chinese Communist armed forces have also followed the principle of "learn from foreign armed forces" with regard to its Army as well, conducting more exchanges with European and American countries in order to draw on their experiences to promote military modernization. Mutual visits between Chinese Communist and Western countries high-ranking military personnel from 1988 to the present have been as follows:

A. North American Theater

1. Sent Abroad

a. On 2 May 1988, the Chinese Communist General Logistics Department deputy director, Liu Mingpu [0491 2494 3877], headed a "military medical delegation" on an eight-day visit to Canada. The delegation discussed bilateral cooperation with Lieutenant General Vance, Canadian National Defense Acting Chief of Staff, and it toured Canada's National Defense Medical Center, military medical equipment warehouses and logistics facilities, the military medical college, and some civilian hospitals and research institutes.²

b. On 19 November 1988, Lieutenant General Zhu Guang [2612 0342], Chinese Communist Air Force political commissar, led an Air Force delegation on a two-week visit to the United States, where they held talks with Frank Carlucci, U.S. secretary of defense, and Edward C. Alridge, Jr., Secretary of the Air Force. Discussions concerned matters pertaining to cooperation between the Air Forces of both parties, particularly various problems in improving the Chinese Communist "F-8" fighter plane. As a part of this visit, the delegation also arranged to visit the U.S. Air Force Academy and the Air Force Personnel Center, Air Force Headquarters, Pacific Air Force, and the Kennedy Space Center. From these visits, they learned about American Air Force training and personnel administration from which they could draw lessons for the modernization of Communist China's Air Force.

2. Invitations

a. On 10 June 1988, General Manson, Canadian National Defense Chief of Staff, visited the China mainland where he discussed with the Chinese Communist armed forces chief of general staff issues pertaining to bilateral cooperation. He also visited military facilities at Xian and Nanjing.

b. On 12 July 1988, General Maxwell Thurman, commander of the U.S. Army Training Headquarters, led a military delegation on a visit to Mainland China. There he met with Chi Haotian [6688 3185 3944], Chinese Communist armed forces chief of general staff, with whom he exchanged views on bilateral military cooperation and training experiences.

c. On 1 August 1988, U.S. Weapons Control and Disarmament Agency director Burns visited the China mainland where he met with Zhu Qizhen [2612 0796 2823], deputy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two sides discussed matters pertaining to arms control, nuclear disarmament, and reductions of space weapons and chemical weapons.³ In addition, Burns expressed to the Chinese the serious concern of the United States about Communist China's sales of large quantities of missiles to Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Iraq. This was the fifth meeting between the two parties on disarmament since 1984.

d. On 5 September 1988, Frank Carlucci, U.S. secretary of defense, visited the China mainland where he held talks with high-ranking leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Chinese Communist Central Military Affairs Committee, Prime Minister Li Peng, and Minister of National Defense Qin Jiwei [4440 1015 0251]. The two sides exchanged views on the international situation, including diplomatic relations, military cooperation, the Cambodian issue, the North and South Korea issue, and Chinese Communist sales of weapons to countries of the Middle East. On Chinese Communist weapons sales to Middle Eastern countries, Minister of National Defense Qin Jiwei assured Carlucci that "a more responsible attitude would be adopted in future

weapons sales."⁴ Consequently, the U.S. Government promised to continue to provide fighter aircraft navigational electronics equipment, radar, and torpedo weapons systems, and it agreed to have the Chinese Communists launch three U.S.-manufactured communications satellites.

e. On 7 October 1988, Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost, U.S. chief of naval operations, visited Mainland China for 10 days where he held talks with the Chinese Communist Navy commander, Vice Admiral Zhang Lianzhong [1728 6647 1813]; General Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], Central Military Affairs Committee deputy secretary; and General Qin Jiwei, minister of national defense. They discussed three main issues as follows: 1) The development of bilateral naval relations. Admiral Trost told Qin Jiwei that "the United States and China (Communist) have common interests in the Pacific about which both parties have ample reasons for cooperation. Leaders of the armed forces of both sides, particularly naval leaders, must visit each other regularly."⁵ 2) Transfers of military technology, particularly "mob" light antisubmarine torpedoes, and antisubmarine sonar. 3) Further visits of U.S. warships to the China mainland. Admiral Trost told General Qin Jiwei that he "hoped that U.S. warships would have the opportunity to visit China again." Qin Jiwei consented to this request, declaring that "military relations between China (Communist) and the United States already have a very good foundation. We welcome another visit by U.S. warships."⁶

f. On 17 April 1989, General Lawrence D. Welch, U.S. Air Force chief of staff, visited the China mainland. This trip had two main purposes as follows: 1) To return the invitation of Air Force Commander Wang Hai [3769 3189] during his visit to the United States on 15 April 1987; and 2) to discuss with Wang Hai matters pertaining to bilateral Air Force cooperation. On 21 September 1987, U.S. Air Force Secretary Alridge also led a delegation to visit the Chinese Communists. The visits to the China mainland of two U.S. Air Force military and civilian leaders and military commanders within a period of two years showed that after the United States agreed to help the Chinese Communists improve their "F-8" fighter plane, air force cooperation became an important focus of military exchanges between the Chinese Communists and the United States.

B. European Theater

1 Sent Abroad

a. On 18 October 1988, after completing his visit to Pakistan, Lieutenant General He Qizong [0149 0366 1350], Chinese Communist deputy chief of General Staff, visited West Germany and the United Kingdom for seven days, from 18 to 25 October. During his visit to West Germany, he met with Rupert Scholz, West German minister of defense; Lothar Ruhl, national defense and state secretary; and Shitingde [phonetic], Bundeswehr deputy controller. They discussed bilateral

military cooperation, and he visited West German military units and schools. During his visit to the United Kingdom, he had talks with Lord Trefgarne, the deputy in charge of procurement and sales affairs in the British Ministry of National Defense, and with the chief of staff, Sir Tapuer [phonetic]. The two sides discussed military cooperation, and he visited military bases and schools.

b. On 3 December 1988, General Li Desheng [2621 1795 3932], the Chinese Communist armed forces National Defense University political commissar, visited Italy where he toured Italian military schools and bases.

c. On 23 April 1989, Lieutenant General Ding Henggao [0002 5899 7559], Chinese Communist National Defense Scientific Work Committee director, visited Italy where he signed a "Memorandum on Cooperation on Military Technology" with Italian Defense Minister Shitefa [phonetic]. In April 1985, the two parties had signed a "Military Technology Exchange Accord."

2. Invitations

a. During March and April 1988, a Spanish national defense industries touring group organized by the Spanish Ministry of National Defense visited the China mainland for a week. This touring group was headed by a Spanish official and it was made up of a total of 13 national defense industry firms. During its visit to the mainland, the group paid an official call on the Chinese Communist minister of national defense, and it inspected arsenals in various places. It also discussed with units concerned plans for cooperation in the production of weapons.

b. On 5 May 1988, British Royal Air Force Chief of Staff, Sir David Craig visited the China mainland where he held talks with Chi Haotian, Chinese Communist chief of general staff. Sir David said "this trip will help advance friendly relations between the Armies of the two countries." Chi Haotian responded that the Chinese Communist armed forces "will strengthen friendly ties, and scientific and technical cooperation with the British armed forces." The British chief of staff also visited Chinese Communist Air Force training bases and aircraft manufacturing plants.

c. On 16 September 1988, General Laishi [phonetic], French Air Force chief of staff, visited the China mainland where he conducted talks with Chinese Communist armed forces Chief of General Staff Chi Haotian, and Air Force Commander Wang Hai. He also visited air force bases in Beijing, Shijiazhuang, and Shanghai.

d. On 13 February 1989, Admiral William Staveley, British Navy chief of staff visited the China mainland for 10 days where he discussed bilateral military cooperation with Vice Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, Chinese Communist Navy commander. He also went to Shanghai, Xian, Guangzhou, and Zhanjiang to visit Chinese Communist Navy surface craft forces and Marines. This trip by General William Staveley marked the third time that a British Navy chief of staff had visited the China

mainland. Both the former chiefs of staff, Admiral Leech and Admiral John Fieldhouse also went to the China mainland. Liu Huaqing, The former Chinese Navy commander, also visited the United Kingdom in September 1984. This showed that cooperation on naval matters was a main focus of bilateral military exchanges.⁷

e. On 24 April 1989, General D. Madingnuo [phonetic], Italian Armed Forces chief of general staff, visited the China mainland. During his visit, he held talks with Chinese Communist armed forces Chief of General Staff Chi Haotian, and with Minister of National Defense Qin Jiwei about bilateral military cooperation. He also visited military facilities in Beijing and Xian.

III. Military Technical Transfers

In 1977, the Chinese Communists began to break away from their pattern of weapons development in isolation to send large number of military procurement groups on visits to advanced Western countries. After 1989, as a result of a shortage of foreign exchange, they reduced their military budget, and shifted mostly to "self-reliance" in weapons development augmented by "importation of technology," and "a small amount of procurement." Since 1988, the Chinese Communists have continued to follow this principle, the pertinent aspects of their technical exchanges with foreign military force being as follows:

A. North American Theater

1. Satellite Technology

On 9 September 1988, the U.S. Department of State announced approval for three satellites that the U.S. Hughes Company had manufactured to be launched from the Chinese Communist Xichang Satellite Launching Center in Sichuan Province using "Long March" carrier rockets. In this connection, on 17 December of the same year, a "Satellite Technology Security Guarantee Agreement Memorandum" and a "Responsibility Agreement Memorandum" were signed in Washington, D.C., by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Eugene McAllister, and Sun Jiadong [1327 13657 2767], deputy minister of the Chinese Communist Ministry of Aerospace Industry. On 24 January 1989, both sides signed a formal agreement. This made the Chinese Communists the first non-Western regime that the United States permitted to launch an American-manufactured satellite.

2. Tank Technology

a. In November 1988, the United States and the Chinese Communists agreed to produce the Model "M-60A" tank, which was an improved model of the U.S. Model "M-60" tank. If both parties cooperated well, the first prototype was slated to be completed during the first half of 1989.

b. In January 1989, the Chinese Communist China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export

Corporation and the American Cadillac Gage Textron Group cooperated in the manufacture of the first "Jaguar" tank. This tank is equipped with an armor system and a 105-mm rifled chamber gun with a smoking device [dai chouyanqi 1601 2132 3533 0892]. Manufacture of the second prototype was to be the responsibility of the Chinese Communists.⁸

3. Navigation Technology

a. On 14 November 1988, the American Grumman Aircraft Corporation reached agreement with the Chinese Communist Navigation Technology Import-Export Company to improve the Chinese Communist "F-7M" fighter, making it a "Super-7" single-engine fighter plane. This plane was to take over the American F-5, Russian MiG-21, and the Chinese Communist "F-6" and "F-7" fighter aircraft market. The Chinese Communists expected to be able to sell this fighter for less than \$10 million.⁹

b. On 26 January 1989, the Chinese Communists ordered six CH47DS helicopters from the American Boeing Corporation at a total cost of \$1 billion. The Boeing Corporation also undertook responsibility for training Chinese Communist military pilots and maintenance crews. When these crews returned to the China mainland upon completion of their training, Boeing Corporation technical personnel would continue to help them train other related personnel. In August 1988, this model helicopter conducted performance flights in the mountainous region around Lhasa in Tibet. Since it met the rapid deployment, combat materiel transportation, and rescue needs of the Chinese Communist armed forces rather well, they decided to purchase this model helicopter. This agreement was one of the major armaments exchanges between the Chinese Communists and the United States. Another one was a \$245 million agreement signed with Grumman to improve the Chinese Communist "F-8" fighter airplane.

4. Torpedo Technology

On 3 January 1989, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Dan Howard confirmed that the United States had sold four MK-46 light torpedoes to the Chinese Communist navy to strengthen its antisubmarine capabilities in order to counter the USSR's enormous Pacific Ocean submarine fleet. This torpedo has a range of approximately 11 kilometers and can be fired from a surface vessel, a fighter aircraft, or a helicopter.¹⁰ As part of this transaction, the United States provided precision antisubmarine equipment and torpedoes to improve the Chinese Communist Navy's destroyers, corvettes, as well as various things pertaining to bilateral joint military exercises.¹¹

5. Thermal Imaging Technology

From 21 through 23 March 1988, William P. Klink, infrared equipment sales manager from the Hughes Aircraft Corporation's Industrial Products Division, visited Beijing in a party of five to attend a thermal imaging

technology exchange conference. Participants from the Chinese Communist armed forces included those concerned from the General Staff Department, the General Logistics Department, the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Ministry of Aerospace Industry. During the conference, the Americans showed the Chinese Communists the Probeye 7300 thermal video frequency system and the Model 699 all-electronic thermal data viewer.¹²

B. European Theater

1. Satellite Technology

On 19 September 1988, at the United Nations International Conference on the Application of Developments in Satellite Communications, Ma Junru, [7956 0193 1172], director of the Chinese Communist National Science Commission New Technology Bureau said that the Chinese Communists were currently working together with West Germany in researching and developing a 24-transponder communications satellite, which was slated to be launched during 1992.¹³

2. Aviation Technology

a. On 15 March 1988, Bulumengte [phonetic], business manager of the French Yingte [phonetic] Technology Corporation, visited Beijing where he discussed with persons concerned in the Chinese Communist Air Force and Navy the retrofitting of aerial refueling aircraft. This corporation produces mostly small refuelling pods measuring 2,900 mm in length and 660 mm in diameter, with a hose that is 15 meters long and 51 mm in diameter. The pods hold 120 liters of fuel, and they are mostly installed on fighter aircraft, fighter bombers, small transports, and helicopters. The corporation is currently researching and developing large aerial refueling pods. In addition, the corporation possesses expertise in the refitting of aerial refuelling aircraft.¹⁴

b. On 15 April 1988, the Italian AerMachi S.P.A managing director, Dr. Aiermanuo Bazuoji [phonetic] attended a Technology Exchange Conference in Beijing with a party of six. More than 50 experts and engineers from the Chinese Communist National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission, the Ministry of Aviation, the Ministry of Aerospace Industry, and the Air Force and Navy attended the conference. At the conference, Dr. Bazuoji and other Italian experts presented academic reports on basic principles for the training of military flying personnel, the MB-339 training machine training process, and the use of wind tunnel spinning balances.¹⁵

c. On 30 August 1988, an improved model of the Chinese Communist Air Force's "A-5" attack plane, the "A-5M" was successfully test flown at Nanchang in Jiangxi Province. This aircraft was jointly reequipped by the Chinese Communist Nanchang Airplane Manufacturing Company and the Airplane Company of Italy. The Airplane Company of Italy was responsible for providing

electronic navigation and fire control systems. The Nanchang Airplane Manufacturing Company was responsible for assembly, testing, and test flying.¹⁶ However, on 21 October of the same year, the attack plane was destroyed in an accident during a flying demonstration at Nanchang.

d. From 7 through 9 November 1988, the Italian Agusta Company's S-211 jet trainer put on a flying demonstration at the Chinese Communist Airforce's Shahe Airfield. Chinese Communist Chief of General Staff Chi Haotian, Chinese Navy Commander Zhang Lianzhong, Navy Deputy Commander Li Jing [1621 2529], and the former political commissar of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission, Wu Shaozu [0124 4801 4371] came to the airfield to observe the demonstration.

e. In November 1988, the Chinese Communists signed an agreement with the West German Space Navigation Academy to build a wind tunnel proving stand on the China mainland to be completed in 1990.¹⁷

f. In early 1989, the Chinese Communist Aviation Technology Import Export Company and the French National Engine Company (Sencma) signed a 3 year research agreement worth 2,262,000 French francs, the French assisting the Chinese Communists in researching and improving its "F-7" fighter plane and training associated Chinese Communist technical personnel.

g. In May 1989, the British General Electric Aviation Electronics Equipment Company obtained through its Beijing representative, the Jardine Matheson Company, an order from the Aviation Technology Import Corporation to provide head-up display units, atmospheric data computer systems, and radar detectors for Chinese Communist "Yun-7" transport planes, the total value of the order exceeding 30 million British pounds.

3. Naval Vessel Technology

a. From 31 May to 14 June 1988, the Chinese Communist China Shipping Industry Corporation sent a delegation to Italy headed by naval gun expert Xie Qun [6200 5028]. The delegation visited the factories and research organizations of five companies, namely the Italibu [phonetic] Radar Company, the Oto Melara Company, the Siniya Bipidi [phonetic] Company, the Sailainiya Shenqiaozhiao [phonetic], and the Italy Electronics Company. Naval gun personnel from both sides held an academic discussion meeting on "dual-layer impact systems." At the meeting, Xie Qun delivered a paper titled, "Developing Dual-Layer Impact Systems," which maintained that dual-layer impact will be an important direction of future development of small bore naval guns.¹⁸

b. From 14 through 17 June 1988, the naval ship division of the Chinese Communist Baoli Science and Technology Company, the Ruida Systems Equipment Company, and the International Science and Technology Service Center held a Navy Weapons Technology Seminar in Beijing. Participants from western countries

included 28 companies and firms from seven countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada. Participants from Communist China included the Navy and scientific research units, as well as units concerned with navy weaponry technology work. The seminar particularly stressed thinking about the combat use of naval weapons, research and development, and design.¹⁹

4. Electronics Technology

From 18 through 22 April 1988, the Chinese Communist National Defense Scientific and Technical Information Center, held an Electronics Technology Exchange Meeting in Beijing with the West German "AGE" Company. Radar and electronics warfare systems experts from the "AGE" Company, and engineers and technicians from the Chinese Communist General Staff, Air Force, Navy, and Shipping Industry Corporation took part in the meeting. In mid-May 1987, both parties held another such meeting at Shenzhen.

5. Other

a. On 8 July 1988, the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls removed restrictions on the shipment to China of 12 products from Western countries, including electronic computers, communications devices, and optical fiber communications.

b. On 6 October 1989, in the aftermath of the "4 June" Tiananmen incident, the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls froze the measures relaxing the export to the Chinese Communists of high technology.

IV. Hosting and Attending International Weapons Exhibitions

As an "exporter of revolution," the Chinese Communists formerly provided weapons without compensation to Communist Party rebel organizations and their fellow travelers everywhere. After the Deng faction came to power, in view of the need to earn foreign exchange, a change was made to a policy of selling weapons for compensation, and participating in or holding weapons exhibitions was one way it used to sell weapons. Since the Chinese Communists first participated in the International Exhibition of Defense and Security Equipment at Canberra, Australia, in May 1984, each year they have either taken part in international weaponry exhibitions elsewhere, or have held them in Mainland China. Cases in point are as follows:

A. Participation Abroad

1. In February 1988, the Chinese Communist Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation took part in a military and civilian navigation equipment exhibition held in West Germany at which models of all sorts of Chinese Communist air weapons, photographs, and actual devices were displayed, a rather special one of which was the new successfully developed "FM-80" low-altitude air defense missile system.

2. On 4 September 1988, the Chinese Communist China National Aero-Technology Import-Export Company took part in the British Farnborough International Air Show in which they displayed models, photographs, and actual specimens of Chinese Communist air weapons, a fairly special one of which was an "A-5" ground-attack aircraft that the Chinese Communists developed jointly with Italy, and an "F-7M" fighter plane produced specifically for foreign sale.²⁰

3. As a result of the "4 June" Tiananmen affair, Chinese Communist credentials to attend the British Portsmouth International Navy Weapons Exhibition on 25 September 1989 were canceled.

B. Mainland Exhibitions

1. The Chinese Communists held the Second International Defense Technology Exhibition in Beijing from 15 to 20 November 1988. A total of 130 plants and firms from 13 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, took part in the exhibition, which exhibited models, photographs, and actual specimens of all kinds of military weapons and logistics department materiel. The main items that the Chinese Communists displayed at the exhibition were Long March rockets, nuclear submarines, the model "HY-1," "C-301," and "C-902" shore-to-ship missiles, and an estimated 260 ground-to-air "vehicular-mounted Red Flag Model 2-B," and "Model FM-80" ground-to-air missiles, "M-1" and "M-1B" free-flight rockets, and other weaponry. During the exhibit, the Chinese Communists also conducted demonstrations at the Langfang Range in suburban Beijing of the operation and firing of conventional weapons including tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled guns, and rocket-firing vehicles.

2. From 5 to 10 December 1988, the Chinese held the 1988 Shanghai International Aviation Exhibition at Shanghai at which 40 aircraft manufacturing companies from the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland placed exhibits, including photographs, videotapes, and actual specimens of all kinds of military and civilian aircraft, airfield guided missiles, and communications gear.

3. From 17 through 22 March 1989, the Chinese Communists held an International Helicopter and Light Airplane Technical Equipment Exhibition in which more than 10 helicopter and light aircraft companies from the United States, the USSR, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Communist China placed exhibits. The exhibition showed engines, on-board equipment, maintenance equipment, and ground facilities.²¹

V. Reciprocal Warship Visits

By way of advancing the modernization of their navy, the Chinese Communists arranged to have warships from advanced countries visit the China mainland each

year in order to be able to observe and benefit from the training experiences of foreign forces, and their deployment of weapons. Moreover, following the 1985 visit of Chinese Navy ships to four countries of Southeast Asia, in April 1989 the Chinese Communists sent warships on a visit to the United States for the first time in order to improve the long-distance combat capabilities of its cadres.

A. Visits to Foreign Countries

The Chinese Communist Navy training ship "Zhenghe" visited the United States for the first time at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, from 11 through 18 April 1989. The principal naval personnel aboard the ship were the North China Sea Fleet commander, Ma Xinchun [7456 6580 2504]; Li Zheyuan [2621 0772 6678], Dalian Surface Vessel Academy deputy director; and cadets from that academy. During their visit, Ma Xinchun and Li Zheyuan departed on 13 April via special aircraft for Washington, D.C. to pay a call on high-ranking U.S. Navy personnel, and to visit the U.S. Naval Academy. From 12 to 14 April, the officers and crew of the ship visited the U.S. Third Fleet's guided missile destroyer, "Yanggezuoer," [phonetic] and the flag ship of the Seventh Fleet. They also visited the U.S. Fleet Training Center to receive instruction on weapons launches.

B. Invitations to China

1. On 3 June 1988, the commander of Canada's second destroyer squadron, Captain Jianaite [phonetic] visited Qingdao in command of the destroyers Huron and "Leisitigushi" [phonetic]. There, he was entertained by Ma Xinchun, the North China Sea Fleet commander, and he visited the North China Sea Fleet Base.

2. From 19 to 22 May 1989, the U.S. Navy's amphibious command ship Blue Ridge, the guided missile cruiser Sterret, and the guided missile escort ship Rodney M. Davis visited Shanghai. During their visit to Shanghai, U.S. Seventh Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Mauz and principal officers from the ships paid a call on the mayor of Shanghai and the commander of the East China Sea Fleet. This visit just happened to occur at the conclusion of the summit conference between the Chinese and Soviet Communists on the day that Gorbachev left Beijing. It seemed the Chinese Communist authorities handled their relations with the United States and the USSR with equanimity. This was also the second visit of U.S. warships to Communist China. The first time was in early November 1986 when they visited Qingdao.

VI. Overall Analysis

A. The reciprocal visits of high-ranking Navy personnel were a principal way in which the Chinese Communists advanced bilateral military exchanges with the countries of Europe and America; however, because of the different circumstances of both parties to these visits, the goals of the visits differed. For the Chinese Communists, because of the retrenchment of military expenditures,

following completion of "system reform, reduction, and reorganization" of the armed forces, the weapons and technology of advanced countries were imported in order to improve Communist China's outdated weapons systems. Cadres at all levels were also required to actively study foreign military forces' combat theories to improve cadre quality. They hoped thereby to improve the combat capabilities of the Chinese Communist armed forces. Therefore, the goal of high-ranking Chinese Communist military personnel in visiting European and American countries was to discuss military technology transfers and to visit military bases to advance the modernization of military equipment, to draw on the experiences of foreign armed forces, and to draw up corresponding tactics and campaign theory. From the standpoint of the European and American countries, the United States focused on countering the USSR's global strategy, and hoped that the visits of high-ranking military personages would promote bilateral relations and common resistance to the USSR. The visits to Communist China of high-ranking military personages from European countries focused on real benefits, namely the building of bilateral military relations, and gaining a deep knowledge of Communist China's needs for military and technical equipment as a basis for weapons sales. However, following the "4 June tragic incident" at Tiananmen, when the governments of European and American countries saw clearly the ruthless nature of the Chinese Communist armed forces, they hurried to announce the breaking of military relations with the Chinese Communists. For example, U.S. President Bush declared a halt to weapons exports to the Chinese Communists as well as to the reciprocal visits of military personnel. Sweden's national defense minister, Roine Carlsson, canceled his visit to Communist China. In view of these changes in the situation, China's military relations with the countries of Europe and America will not revive until after the Chinese Communists cancel marshal law in Beijing and halt the arrest of demonstrators.

B. Following the 1980 visit to Beijing of the U.S. secretary of defense, the United States began to loosen restrictions on the export to the Chinese Communists of arms and science and technology, allowing the transfer to Beijing of technology for "both military and civilian use." When the secretary of state at that time, Alexander Haig, visited Beijing in June 1981, the United States further announced that it would sell lethal weapons to the Chinese Communists on a "case-by-case (FMS)" basis. In December of the same year, it revised the International Munitions Trade Regulations, changing Communist China from a "Y-category regime" in the Warsaw Pact to a "P-category regime." Next, in 1983 it again changed Communist China from a "P-category regime," which ran contrary to U.S. interests, to a nonally "V-category regime." In May 1987, Yang Shangkun, Chinese Communist Central Military Affairs Committee deputy chairman, visited the United States. He asked the Reagan administration to loosen restrictions on the export to the Chinese Communists of high

technology. In June 1987, the president's science adviser, William Graham, visited Beijing, where he announced that the United States would loosen restrictions on the sale to Communist China of technology having military applications. In August of the same year, the U.S. Air Force reauthorized the Grumman Corporation to sign a \$245 million contract with the Chinese Communists for combat aircraft electronic navigation equipment. With this, the Chinese Communists' military relations with the United States reached their peak. Thereafter, relations between the two slackened because the Chinese Communists constantly sold weapons to Iran despite U.S. opposition, thereby intensifying the tense situation between Iran and Iraq, in addition to which Iran used Chinese Communist-manufactured "Silkworm" missiles in an attack on an American merchant ship and on a Kuwaiti petroleum terminal in October 1987, thereby damaging U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, the United States and the USSR were discussing the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The strategic position of the Chinese Communists in relations between the United States and the USSR no longer rose to the importance it held in previous years. Thus, on the 23d of the same month, the United States announced a temporary halt to plans for the removal of restrictions on shipments of high technology to the Chinese Communists. However, because of the Chinese Communists' urgent need for foreign exchange to improve their military equipment, they did not halt the sale of munitions to Iran despite U.S. objections. In January 1988 the United States further announced a halt to the supply of equipment and technology to improve the Chinese Communist "F-8-2" fighter plane, and the U.S. Department of Defense placed the Chinese Communists on the open list of "hostile countries" within the meaning of the "personnel security regulations." Bilateral military relations sank to a low ebb. However, the Chinese Communists felt profoundly that the United States was an important source of advanced technology for their "military modernization," so during U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci's visit to Beijing in September 1988, they guaranteed to "adopt a more responsible attitude in future weapons sales." The United States then permitted weapons technology, such as combat aircraft equipment, to continue to be provided to the Chinese Communists. However, after the Chinese Communists mobilized troops to suppress a civilian demonstration and butchered the people in May 1989, the United States categorically halted the sale of weapons to the Chinese Communists. This was bound to hurt future Chinese Communist progress in military modernization.

C. Since the Chinese Communists adopted a policy of "opening to the outside world," the countries of Europe have become the focus of the Communist armed forces in winning cooperation. Beginning in 1977, they sent military delegations to discuss weapons purchases with France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy; however, deals made included only a small number of French "Super Wasp," "Skylark," and "Dolphin-2" helicopters,

rapid-fire naval guns, and British tank night-sighting equipment. European munitions industry exports have dwindled in recent years, sinking into a desultory period. For example, the French Thomson Radio Company has announced 2,500 personnel cuts. The Dassault-Breguet Aircraft Corporation closed four plants, and cut 1,261 employees. For this reason, the China mainland has become a weapons market that European munitions industries actively covet. In April 1989, after Italy signed the first "weapons technology business agreement" with the Chinese Communists, repeated increases in the amount of money Italy obtained from the sales of weapons to the Chinese Communists impelled all the countries of Europe to compete in holding talks with the Chinese Communists on the sale of weapons. In September 1986, British Defense Minister George Younger took the occasion of the visit to Britain of the Chinese Communist Minister of National Defense Zhang Aiping [1728 1947 5493] to sign a "Memorandum of Understanding between China and the United Kingdom on Defense Equipment Cooperation." In August 1987, French Minister of National Defense Yakebu Yuen visited Beijing where he signed a "Military Cooperation Agreement" with the Chinese Communist Minister of National Defense Zhang Aiping. In April 1989, the Chinese Communist National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission director, Lieutenant Ding Henggao [0002 5899 7559], signed a "Memorandum of Military Technical Cooperation" with France's Minister of National Defense, Shitefa [phonetic]. In addition, as a result of the eagerness of the countries of western Europe to export weapons technology and to get the Chinese mainland munitions market, the Chinese Communists have enticed European governments to remove restrictions on the export of weapons technology. Taking advantage of military technological cooperation agreements reached with western European countries as a basis for bilateral technological exchanges, Chinese Communist procurement units pick a target, and make a request through diplomatic channels to the country concerned. After receiving approval, they enter into talks with the firm concerned. If discussions are fruitful, the firm requests an export permit directly from the government of the country concerned. When the Chinese Communists seek approval from the government concerned, both parties enter into a tacit business agreement; thus, when such exports are sent to the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls for examination an approval, most pass without a hitch. Moreover, because of the trend of the times, the committee even took the initiative in July 1988 to remove the ban on the export to Communist China of 12 high technology products. However, this trend toward helping the Chinese Communists introduce advanced military technology from advanced European countries was dealt a setback by the "4 June" Tiananmen incident.

D. Currently, the Chinese Communists have adopted a policy that emphasizes both "import of technology and export of technology" with regard to external technology exchanges. Thus, all Chinese Communist military

industry technology import companies such as the Precision Machinery Export Import Company, the Aviation Technology Import-Export Company, and the Baoli Science and Technology Company participate actively in weapons exhibitions that Western countries hold in order to sell more weapons abroad. In this way, not only can they spur countries in Europe and America to buy their Russian-style weapons for use in simulated enemy military unit training, but they also hope to expand their arms market to the countries of Europe and America, which has been limited to the Third World. In addition, all the countries that hold these exhibitions maintain good relations with Third World countries, so, by taking part in the exhibitions, they are also able to increase weapons sales through Third World pipelines to attain the goal of earning foreign exchange through the "export of technology." In addition, in order to import foreign countries' advanced weapons technology, all Chinese Communist military industry departments hold international weapons exhibitions on the mainland together with Hong Kong's Huajin Company Ltd., Modern China Company Ltd., and Xianda Company Ltd. In this way, not only are they able to penetrate different types of weapons technology seminars, technology exchange conferences, academic report meetings, and on-the-ground demonstrations to gain an understanding of advanced foreign weapons technology to improve the quality of Chinese Communist weapons research personnel, but they are also able to compare at close range the quality of foreign weapons to decide which ones they want to import.

E. On the basis of short-term interests, the countries of Europe and the Americas vie with each other to gain the Chinese Communist weapons technology market. This not only helps to improve the quality of Chinese Communist weapons, but also increases Communist China's ability to sell abroad, winning the world weapons markets away from European and American countries. In 1988, Chinese Communist weapons sales amounted to approximately \$2.1 billion, surpassing the United Kingdom to take fourth place in world arms sales. Furthermore, Communist China's weapons sales in Third World countries have intensified the turmoil in all parts of the world, seriously affecting the security interests of the free nations. In addition, Chinese Communists' use of modern weapons to suppress civilian demonstrators, which added to the suffering of the Chinese people, merits the attention of the world.

Footnotes

1. RENMIN RIBAO (OVERSEAS EDITION), 30 December 1988.
2. NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, Ottawa Dispatch, 2 May 1988.
3. Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO, 4 August 1988.
4. Voice of America Broadcast, 13 September 1988.
5. Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO, 17 October 1988.

6. Ibid.

7. Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO, 14 February 1988.

8. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], February 1989, p 8.

9. Hong Kong WEN HUI PO, 15 November 1988.

10. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], March 1989, p 5.

11. Taipei LIENHE PAO, 15 January 1989.

12. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], May 1989, p 6.

13. Hong Kong WEN HUI PO, 20 September 1988.

14. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], June 1988, p 14.

15. Ibid., p 10.

16. Hong Kong WEN HUI PO, 27 September 1988.

17. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], October 1988, p 79.

18. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], September 1988, p 4.

19. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], October 1988, p 79.

20. XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, London Dispatch, 3 September 1988.

21. Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [MODERN MILITARY AFFAIRS], May 1988, p 90.

Reform in Second Artillery

900H0051A Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU
[STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
No 272, 15 Aug 89 pp 87-95

[Article by Ch'en Ming-chih (7115 2494 4249): "Military Reform of the Chinese Communist's 'Second Artillery'"]

[Text] I. Introduction

The Chinese Communist's "Second Artillery," formed in 1966, is a nuclear strike force which was organized under Mao Zedong's policy of "if we have the atom, we don't need pants" without regard to the national economy and people's livelihood.

Through more than 20 years of growth, the unit has become equipped with all models of strategic guided missiles and different launching methods, can attack or defend, and basically has become a complete combined-arms military force.

In June 1985, after the Military Commission of the Central Committee announced at a plenary session that military units were to undergo a strategic change,

because the past military training of the Second Artillery was rooted in "early strike" and the training was insufficiently systematic and scientific, regularized training would be implemented to adapt to the strategic change in the guiding thinking of military construction, therefore, it was decided to carry out reform work to achieve the goal of "modernized, regularized" army building. Here we have comprehensively studied and organized some materials related to the military reform of the Chinese Communist's Second Artillery for consideration.

II. Academic Reform Measures

The Second Artillery currently has two schools: the Command College and the Engineering College. The Second Artillery Command College is a command school that stresses training of military affairs, political, and logistical cadres; the Second Artillery Engineering College is a specialized technical school and stresses training specialized technological cadres. In recent years these two schools have proposed various reform measures in response to the Second Artillery's needs of modernization and future wars. These measures are as follows:

A. Second Artillery Command College

1. Reform of Instructional Content

a. The overlapping of specialized military, political, logistical, communications, and engineering command courses. While each specialized course will focus primarily on its own specialization, other courses will also be created. The new courses will take up about 30 percent of the study time of the specializations.

b. Enrichment of teaching materials in line with the principle of "combined command." Currently the college has deleted 50 percent of the old courses, which were not suited to combined command, has created more than 20 new courses, such as strategy of nuclear war, systems engineering, modern management, and guided missile mathematics, and has written more than 300 sets of new teaching materials.

c. Reduction of instructional time and increase in hands-on training activities. Arrangements have been made for students to be trained on real equipment and to go to their units for simulation training; a guided missile brigade tactical training simulator system, guided missile battalion combined tactical training simulator system, and communications tactical training simulator system have been developed to provide the specialized command students with group activities so that they can be trained in an environment close to that of actual combat in order to accelerate the honing of their abilities and improve their understanding of combined command.¹

2. Instructional and Administrative Personnel

a. Instructional and administrative cadres were selected to participate in television university, self-study examination, and the college's correspondence classes, and the best were sent on for advanced study.

b. Such single-subject advanced university courses as higher math, engineering math, general physics, English, and principles of microcomputers are offered for instructional and administrative cadres.

c. Such books as *Education*, *Educational Psychology*, and *Outline of Leadership Science* are provided to instructional and administrative cadres, and professional studies and academic lectures are held.

d. "Regulations for Second Artillery Command College Staff and Administration at All Levels" have been issued as a basis for the school's cadres at all levels in carrying out their work.²

B. Second Artillery Engineering College

1. Reform of the Student Status and Graduation Assignment System

a. In terms of student status, it is clearly stipulated that, at the end of each semester, the student corps is comprehensively examined in the four areas of politics and ideology, specialized technology, work style, and discipline and physical fitness, and graded as excellent, good, fair, pass, or fail, respectively. On graduation, an appraisal is made and a graduation appraisal and assignment recommendation is issued.

b. Postgraduation assignment is based on the principle of assignment determined by comprehensive appraisal standards and assignment preference; and assignment plans are then made public. Graduates declare their assignment preferences in accordance with the assignment principle in combination with the results of the comprehensive appraisal.³

2. Innovation of Specialization Deployment and Instructional Content

Formerly, the school's specializations were divided according to the model of weapon so that while at school the students studied only a specialized course on one model. After graduation, when a unit shifted to a different model of equipment, it was often impossible to make up for this deficiency. After 1983, in line with the principle of "shift from a single specialization model to a comprehensive model that integrates technology, management, and command," the school reorganized specialization deployment and instructional content. The students focus on one specialization, but also study two or three other specializations so that the ratio of basic courses to specialized courses changed from 7:3 to 8:2, giving the students more time to acquire basic knowledge in physics and engineering disciplines. At the same time, four series of more than 40 elective courses in such areas as technology and modern management were started.⁴

3. Raising the Quality of the Instructors

The 10 years of the Great Cultural Revolution created some serious anomalies in the makeup of the instructional staff at the colleges. Instructors above the age of 45

made up 51 percent of the staff, instructors under the age of 35 made up 41 percent, while instructors between the ages of 35 and 44 made up less than 8 percent, indicating discontinuity in age distribution. Thus, in 1984 the school drafted a Five-Year Instructional Staff Building Plan and implemented a system of promoting the best and weeding out the poor and promoting strictly in accordance with the proportional quotas by technical specialization at each level after job title reform. At the same time, a work quantification system was implemented, converting quantity of work into comparisons with outstanding instructors, material rewards, being sent for more education, enrolling as a graduate student, promotion to technical grade and technical job title conditions.⁵

III. Unit Reform Methods

In the past few years, with the "three orientations" of "oriented toward the modern era, the world, and the future" as its guiding principle, and with "increase nuclear counterstrike combat ability under modern conditions" as its goal, the Second Artillery has studied foreign military experience and carried out reforms in terms of training, logistics, combat readiness, and weapons and equipment. The primary measures are:

A. Training

1. Reorganization of the Authorized Strength and System of Organization

a. Reorganization of units

After the Chinese Communist military implemented "streamlining and reorganization" in June 1985, the headquarters, political, logistical, and technological equipment departments subordinate to the Second Artillery and 13 guided missile launch regiments deployed at six army-level bases were all reorganized into brigades as follows:

- (1) Offices: headquarters, political, logistical, and technological equipment departments.
- (2) Guided Missile Launch Units: include four guided missile launch battalions, with the elements of command, measurement and control, loading, calculation, and warhead integration subordinate to the battalion.
- (3) Support Units: include communications company, transport company, transfer company, technological company, engineering company, anti-chemical warfare company, tunnel company, guards company, medical company, and weather office.
- (4) Training Units: include a teaching battalion refashioned from a launch battalion and a rotational training brigade.

b. Establishment of the Training Organization

After "streamlining and reorganization" in 1985, the Second Artillery converted a launch battalion in each

launch brigade into a training battalion to implement the principle of "train first, then supplement." The training system that has now been adopted is a three-level training organization of training dadui at army-level bases, training battalions, and rotational training teams at brigade level. Their responsibilities are as follows:⁶

- (1) Army-level base training dadui are responsible for the task of assembling for training held by the organization.
- (2) Brigade training battalions undertake training of specialized technical troops within the range of the guided missile launch battalion.
- (3) Brigade rotational training teams take on the task of secondary-level training.

2. Improving Training Content

a. Integration of Drill and Training

In 1988, to save on training costs and improve training results, because the manufacturing costs of strategic guided missiles are high and they are one-time use weapons, the Second Artillery proposed the guiding thinking of "integrate launch drill and training to reap benefits in many regards from one launch" for military training. Further, in September of the same year, they formulated the principle of "integration of yearend appraisal, drill, and live missile launch" so that by holding a strategic guided missile launch test drill and by using on-the-spot teaching, they assembled launch battalion commanders for the first time in order to resolve the lack of live missile launch experience in some units and declining command cadre quality that have been longstanding problems.⁷

b. Improving Rapid, Motorized Combat Training

Using the "guided missile, motorized, rapid-launch plan" developed in 1986 by the Second Artillery Engineering College as a source, operations from "vertical-echelon formation" to "lateral arrangement" were improved so that, in addition to making guided missile launch work preparations "advance in many areas in parallel and be carried out simultaneously," guided missile launch time was also shortened by a third over the original plan. At the same time motorized combat training was carried out in coordination with towed and rapid setup launch pads.

c. Revision of Training Rules and Regulations

In line with the demands of modern nuclear counterstrike combat, the Second Artillery revised the "Outline of Military Training" to improve the system of military training rules and regulations to deal with trends of future wars and put the outline into effect on a trial basis in January 1988. The "Outline" stipulates that the Second Artillery will have four levels of training: individual basic training, specialized technical training, combined tactical training, and battle training. It details

the training content for each model guided missile specialization, equipment setup, and inspection specialization, and such security specializations as communications, reconnaissance, computers, antichemical, engineering, and sentries. The main feature of the "Outline" is that it follows the training pattern of moving in step from individual to unit, technical to tactical, separate to combined training, and from low levels to high levels. It emphasizes improving cadre training, specialized technical training, and operational applications training; military, political, cultural, and civilian technology are developed synchronously.⁸

In addition, the unit also wrote "Second Artillery Science of Campaigns," new combat ordinances, regularized operational standards, and a combined tactical training outline to coordinate with the "Training Outline" and form a systematic training content system coordinated from launch battalion bugler to combat command organization.

d. Carrying Out Depleted Force Operations Training

So that it can still mount a nuclear counterattack under depleted force situations that may occur in a future war and ensure the completion of missions, the Second Artillery has actively carried out training of "versatile soldiers," demanding that each officer and soldier must become proficient in at least two or three specialized technologies while mastering his own occupation. Political work cadres can also assume the tasks of any military command cadre; cooks, drivers, and sentries can join a combat element at any time as soldiers in order to meet the demand that "there are no idle personnel in the field even if forces are depleted by half."

e. Stress on Field Operations Training

In the past few years, unit launch drills to respond after a future surprise nuclear attack have placed particular stress on carrying out field operations adaptability training under conditions of severe cold, sweltering heat, heavy rain, strong winds, high plateaus, hilly and mountainous terrain, and have enriched their experience in engaging in combat and training under severe natural conditions so that they can seize the opportune time for combat at any time and any place.

3. Development of Training Simulation Devices

a. Technical Training Simulation Devices

(1) "Dongfeng-3 Guided Missile-Loader Simulation Device"

This device is made up of a loader component, pump car, and trough vehicle. According to operational procedures for the "Dongfeng-3 Guided Missile," operational training in opening up, connecting, loading, priming, pumpdown, and rotation [zhuanzhu 6567 3137] and are not restricted in terms of frequency.

(2) Dongfeng-5 Platform System Simulator

This device consists of a microcomputer control system, CAMAC [computer-automated measurement and control] standard interface, and a platform; it can simulate the attitudes of a real platform and the measurement data of a guided missile's flight speed and attitude.

(3) Dongfeng-3 Control System Microcomputer Simulator

This device is made up of a microcomputer, CAMAC standard interface, and sound equipment. It can store all the commands and parameters of the instruments on a Dongfeng-3 guided missile; it contains the commands and parameters for the common breakdowns and errors of the weapons equipment. It can substitute for the control instruments and ground telemetry equipment on the Dongfeng-3 guided missile and can be used for operations training.

(4) Strategic Guided Missile Basic Training Simulator

This device uses computer control technology and, in addition to simulating guided missile operation training for the actual weapon and equipment, can also measure and assess trainees automatically. Manufacturing costs are one-tenth those of the actual weapon and equipment.

(5) Audio-Visual Guided Missile Simulator Operating System

The programming, content, physical appearance, signal display, commander commands, controller operations, device noise, and launch position laser frequency display are similar to actual operational effects. At the same time, it can also simulate the breakdowns that appear in guided missile operation to improve operator analysis and the ability to eliminate breakdowns so that in the training process it takes only a second to adjust any of the 100,000 screen images. After the completion of training, the computer also automatically grades each operator.⁹

b. Tactical Training Simulation Devices

(1) Dongfeng-3 Guided Missile Detachment Tactical Training Simulator System

This system is made up of a CROMEMCO [expansion unknown] system, microcomputer network system, control and monitor system, information display system, sound simulation system, and video recording and projection system. It is used primarily for training Dongfeng-3 guided missile detachment commanders and staff officer personnel to carry out the operational functions of information collection, processing, planning, revision, and command relay of organization of command and rapid decisionmaking under nuclear and chemical conditions.

(2) Surface-to-Surface Strategic Missile Simulation Training System

This system uses microcomputer artificial intelligence and laser-imaging technology to simulate on-site sound, light, and electrical effects of the launch, control, and detonation components.

(3) Strategic Guided Missile Launch Element Combined Training Simulation System

This system is a combination of data processing and digital display technology supplemented by a safety element and has the capability of recreating a complex battlefield situation and combatant battle scenario under nuclear and chemical conditions. It is used primarily for training commanders to analyze and eliminate breakdowns and to deal with special situations and arranging for command capabilities.¹⁰

B. Logistics

1. Improving Equipment Maintenance Capability

Although the repair plants (offices) of subordinate units were organized after the Second Artillery was established, because repair plant (office) facilities were crude and their technical forces were weak, they had to rely on local plants to carry out the large annual volume of special equipment repairs. After 1984 the unit began to explore independent repair of special equipment, with a division of labor among the repair plants for repair specializations, thus unifying the repair capabilities at various levels of the Second Artillery. Technological transformation, equipment updating, and personnel training were carried out with special emphasis in the plants, and, at the same time, they took the initiative to establish a cooperative relationship between schools, research institutes, and plants related to the specializations of plant inside and outside the military with the expectation that the plant would develop in the direction of specialization.¹¹

2. Emphasizing Scientific Position Management

In 1985, after conducting eight months of survey, research, and pilot projects with regard to the positions, the Second Artillery position management department adopted three measures:¹²

a. To improve such situations as the fact that unit position management system regulations were not unified, "the most important had their way," and there were too many individual subjective ideas, it was announced that a Second Artillery position Safeguard Management System would be implemented as a basis for action in the expectation that position management would come in line with scientific management.

b. Position management by level and classification was implemented. In line with such conditions as different models, classifications, applications, and preparedness demands, the three management models of key management, semiclosed management, and fully closed management were adopted and on this basis equipment was added, use was intensified, and management expenses were allocated.

c. A goal management responsibility system was implemented to give rights and responsibilities to position managers at various levels.

d. The hardware and software management method was changed, with an emphasis on intelligent investment.

3. Improvement of the Materiel Supply Management System

The equipment of the Second Artillery units is complex, there are many classes of specializations, and deployment is highly decentralized. The machinery and equipment alone amount to about 5,000 products, and they are handled by 28 ministerial committees of the State Council. In the past, a unified purchasing, storage, and supply system was implemented for this enormous and complex materiel task, which prompted some units to plan willfully, resulting in the accumulation of a great deal of materiel. Beginning in 1985 a materiel purchasing and sales reform was actively explored. The primary methods are:¹³

a. Materiel is divided into two types: general purpose materiel and special use materiel. Unified planning, distribution, purchasing, stocking, and account settlement was implemented for general purpose materiel; unified planning, unit stocking, and account settlement was implemented for special use materiel.

b. A three-level purchasing system was implemented for Second Artillery organizations, army-level bases, and using units. Rights to purchase and order some materiel were granted to agencies to improve the sense of responsibility of units and specialized departments and to avoid the reckless ordering of materiel and the expense of stockpiling caused by centralized purchasing by supply units.

c. In terms of raising money for materiel, the past unitary allocation method was changed into a method that combines the state plan and self-raised funds. Market regulation is fully exploited, materiel sources are expanded, and needs are supplemented outside the plan in order to ensure the completion of missions such as unit construction and training.

d. In terms of materiel and finance management, there is "dual management of money and materiel" by materiel departments, a commodity circulation management method was adopted, and a turnaround fund was established so that the composition of warehoused materiel and materiel prices can be adjusted in a timely fashion on the basis of changes in the market in an attempt to keep from stockpiling materiel, to accelerate materiel turnaround and balance in revenues and expenditures, and to reduce waste and improve benefits.

C. Combat Readiness

1. Readjusting Unit Deployment

Encampments and positions are separated to resolve the longstanding problem of employment for dependents

and the difficulty of arranging for schooling of children to establish a firm foundation for military preparedness in peacetime and war.

2. Improving Building of Specialized Detachments

Building of such technical specializations as communications, geodetics, meteorology, and antichemical technology, and especially of warhead detachments has been improved, keeping in mind that this unit is characterized as a very mobile system.

3. Proposals To Explore Building of Effective Engineering Projects

On the basis of key problems in motorized positions, proposals for rapid advance, rapid attack, rapid withdrawal, small-scale engineering projects, and short construction time are being explored.

4. Strengthening the Combat Readiness System

Second Artillery Combat Readiness System and Guided Missile Combat Readiness Standards have been issued, stipulating the combat readiness status of all types of guided missile detachments which are responsible for different missions in order to establish regularized combat readiness order.¹⁴

D. Weapons and Equipment

1. Improving and Developing Strategic Guided Missiles

The Second Artillery currently has various strategic guided missile models, including Dongfeng-2 strategic guided missile (model CSS-1 is withdrawn from service), a short-range strategic guided missile with a launch range of about 1,200 km; Dongfeng-3 strategic guided missile (model CSS-2), a medium-range strategic guided missile with a range of about 2,800 km; Dongfeng-4 strategic guided missile (model CSS-3), a long-range strategic guided missile with a range of about 7,000 km; Dongfeng-5 strategic guided missile (model CSS-4), an intercontinental strategic guided missile with a range of 12,800 km. In the past few years this unit has started improving existing weapons and developing new models of tactical guided missiles to increase its nuclear strike capability, and in 1984 and 1985 enhanced program tests of two models of tactical guided missiles were conducted successfully.¹⁵ In July 1988 Lin Zongtang [2651 1350 2768], minister of Aeronautics and Astronautics announced "plans to develop a modern strategic guided missile."¹⁶ At the end of 1984 a "New Model Guided Missile Test Regiment" was created and it was announced in August 1987 that "model testing of a new tactical guided missile was completed and a launch mainstay for the new guided missile has been trained."¹⁷ We have not yet discovered, however, the model designation the Chinese Communist Army has given to this new guided missile. Western military specialists call this new strategic guided missile the CSS-5. It is a medium-range strategic mobile combat guided missile and has a range of about 2,400 km.

2. Continuing Nuclear Tests

From the time the Chinese Communists conducted detonation tests at the Yanshan Atomic Bomb Test Site in Hebei on 21 April 1960, and subsequently began the first formal nuclear test on 16 April 1962 at Lobubo in Xinjiang, up to the present there have been a total of 33 nuclear tests, but the nuclear test of September 1988 was of most international interest. According to dispatches from foreign news agencies, in this test the Chinese Communist Army developed their first neutron bomb.¹⁸

3. Development of Related Equipment

a. Automated Combat Command Network

In the early period after the establishment of the Second Artillery, command, control, and communications depended on wired telephones and written documents, intelligence gathering and atmospheric norm chemical testing depended on helicopter reconnaissance, and combat command techniques were very backward. Thus, in 1973 the unit created the Combat Command Automated Equipment Use Institute which, from 1973 to 1984, developed the first Chinese-character terminal. In terms of software, the communications security section developed a "facsimile and character processing system," color Chinese-character display system, and data communications system. These systems are used primarily for transmitting information between first-line guided missile combat units and various command organizations. The guided missile trajectory information reconnaissance section developed a guided missile remote telemetry system, infrared measurement system, and visible light measurement system, whose primary function is guided missile flight report technical observation. They use transfer and language text and map technology for combat unit command and control. The above hardware and software were used to create a Second Artillery headquarters, army, and brigade "first-line", first-period project. Subsequently, the second-period network project began to construct such items as network interconnection of dissimilar devices, graphics and image processing, comprehensive digital exchange, microcomputer compatibility, and man-machine interfaces.

b. Automated Management System for Communication Engineering Construction Drawings Budgets

In July 1988, the Second Artillery Headquarters Communications Department developed the first automated management system for communications engineering construction drawings budgets; inputting such resources as men, equipment, materials, funds, and information into a microcomputer for processing for scientific management of budget quotas, prices, and construction drawings budgets. The relevant situation is as follows:²⁰

(1) The operator need only input the corresponding quota codes, size of project, and relevant parameters into the computer on the basis of the construction blueprints and the computer automatically prints out the project

title page with table of contents, instructions, explanations, general view of expenses, table of expenses, table of materials, and table of equipment.

(2) The entire process from inputting data to obtaining the project budget takes only two hours and it is more than 30-fold more efficient than the manual process.

c. Model KDY Atmospheric Electrical Field Instrument

The Second Artillery meteorological department and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Space Science, and Applied Research Center jointly developed the "atmospheric electrical field instrument" which is an instrument which provides warning to prevent lightning strikes when launching rockets and guided missiles under unfavorable climatic conditions. At the same time, it can also be used to prevent explosions in textile mills, refineries, and explosives plants, as well as preventing lightning strikes on airplanes and preventing forest fires.

d. Environment Model 2 Automated Position Management System

To improve technical protection capability and rapid combat response capability of units, in March 1988 the Second Artillery developed the environment model 2 automated position management system which not only is used for unit automated management but can also be used for large-scale military facilities and warehouses.²¹

e. Si-Target Oscilloscope

The Si-Target Oscilloscope which the Chinese Communists developed in November 1987 is an important, slow constrained fusion, thermonuclear test measuring instrument which uses laser technology.²²

IV. Overall Analysis

A. Improving the education of Chinese Communist military academies is a key demand of Deng Xiaoping's reorganization of the military. In line with Deng's principle that "education should be oriented toward modernization, the world and the future" and the principle of "regularized and modernized" education, the Chinese Communist military made the traditional method of "the three elements and one management" of personnel, teaching materials, instruments, and instructional management the starting point for military academies. Because the Second Artillery Command College School and the Second Artillery Engineering College are members of the Chinese Communist military schools system, they will also carry out educational reform in line with Deng Xiaoping's principle of operating schools. In terms of personnel, the Second Artillery Engineering College has formulated a five-year plan for building the instructor corps that emphasizes raising the quality of young instructors and reforming the registered student and graduate assignment system. In terms of teaching materials, the Second Artillery Command College overlaps the command specialization curricula of military

deployment, politics, logistics, communications, and engineering, eliminating the old curriculum and creating a new curriculum. In terms of equipment, various types of technical and strategic tactical guided missile simulator training equipment have been developed. In terms of instructional management, the Second Artillery Command College arranged for instructional management cadres to participate in various correspondence instructional agencies and advanced classes, and to study various related books. In implementing the "three elements and one management" educational reform, the most important is the reorganization of all types of specialized deployment and enrich the content of teaching materials based on combined command with the aim of providing students with command, management and technical knowledge to become well-rounded personnel in order to improve their ability to switch to different tasks within the unit in the future.

B. The Chinese Communists' Second Artillery is currently equipped with various models of medium-range, long-range, and intercontinental guided missiles and some nuclear strike capability, thus it is made up mostly of position-type launch units. The liquid fuels used in guided missiles require injection time and lack mobility and speed; in wartime they are easily detected and destroyed and can miss combat opportunities. Thus, in recent years particular emphasis has been placed on rapid, motorized combat capability and launch pads have been developed that can be towed behind a vehicle and set up quickly to increase the concealability and speed of strategic guided missile units. At the same time, training in undermanned launch demanded of cadres and troops has been increased to reach the level of "multiple capabilities of one specialization" and "multiple capabilities of one soldier" in order to master the operation technology of fields other than their own and have the operation level of the personnel of their authorized strength so that in the event of a reduction of fighting personnel in a future war a nuclear counterattack still can be mounted. In addition, in terms of position construction, in June 1987, Li Xuge [2621 2485 7041], the unit's commander, announced "China's strategic guided missile unit has developed 'underground palaces' to hide leinadian [7191 4780 7193] in our 9.6 million-square-kilometer territory, and it has built a set of positions that can attack, defend, and store."²³ It is thus clear that the Communist Army's Second Artillery units have adopted construction of underground positions to prevent foreign satellites from detecting the position of guided missile launch positions and to avoid thorough destruction by enemy nuclear guided missiles in a nuclear war.

C. The Second Artillery's current three instructional organization levels are the base instructional dadui, the brigade level instructional battalion, and the rotational training teams. The mission of the base instructional dadui is only classes assembled for training by organizations; the brigade-level rotational training dui has neither facilities nor instructors and is a nominal unit only.

And the brigade-level "instructional battalion," which maintains fairly regular activity, has four major weaknesses:²⁴

1. It can only train soldiers for the launch battalions and cannot undertake the training of new soldiers.
2. It does not have its own expense budget.
3. It lacks training resources and equipment.
4. Although it is termed an instructional battalion, in fact, its authorized strength is that of a launch battalion, training organization is weak, and the cadres and instructors are all on temporary assignment.

On the basis of the above-described weaknesses of the instructional units at various levels, the unit is planning to create an "instructional regiment" for intensive training of various types of new soldiers. Apart from using this opportunity to lessen the burden of combat units which have to train new soldiers the better for them to concentrate their energies in training cadres and older soldiers, and for unified planning of expenses and intensive use, living facilities have been made part of the long-range construction plans, thus prolonging the resource use cycle and ensuring the systematic nature, continuity, and stability of training new troops.²⁵

D. In the past, the Second Artillery's combat readiness was directed only toward emergency and temporary construction, which made "the foundation insufficiently sturdy, management not very regular, and the system setup level not high" and affected normal combat readiness. After the Chinese Communists implemented the strategic shift in military construction thinking, the unit reorganized its deployment, separated encampments and positions, improved comprehensive construction of technical safeguard specializations, explored effective laws and regulations for engineering construction proposals, and improved combat readiness and hoped to take advantage of this to gradually change the past combat readiness system of emergency demands to a "combined peacetime-wartime" combat readiness system.

E. In 1950 the Chinese Communist military began to develop training simulation devices, but since the science and technology of that time was backward, most of them were manufactured in a rough and slipshod way and were technologically simple mechanical and electro-mechanical simulators. In 1977, measures to study foreign armies were proposed and units in various areas adopted the developmental principle of "do both native and foreign, but make the native predominant" to learn the simulator training of foreign armies. In 1984, based on such considerations as economizing on training expenses and increasing training opportunities, they decided to appropriate 650 million yuan in the five-year plan beginning in that year to expenses for developing simulators and actively adopted laser and electronics technology. Thus, the unit's simulation training could develop from electromechanical and mechanical to laser

and electronic simulation; from unitary simulation for soldiers to combined command and combat simulation; from technical simulation to tactical simulation, and thus achieve the goal of "modernized, serialized, and standardized." The Second Artillery's technology is complex, equipment is expensive. At the same time, strategic guided missiles are also one-time use weapons so live missile training is restricted and offers few training opportunities. Thus, in modernizing training techniques, the unit has proposed "automated, electronic, simulated" techniques and is using computer and electronic technology to develop simulators suited to individual technology and cadre tactical or command training. By June 1988 it had developed 117 training simulator devices. Training of units below the guided missile brigade level are based on simulation²⁶ and this has been beneficial to improving quality of training.

F. Current Second Artillery weapons development trends emphasize development of the CSS-5 motorized combat strategic medium-range guided missile to improve the unit's concealment and speed to avoid total annihilation in a nuclear war and thus to ensure their retaliatory strike capability. In addition, they are developing such equipment related to launching strategic guided missiles as the automatic combat command network, model KDY atmospheric electricity instrument, and environment model 2 position automated management system to improve the unit's combat efficiency. And, according to foreign dispatches, in September 1988 the Communist Army successfully tested a neutron bomb, making China the fourth country after the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, to have the neutron bomb. If these reports are true, since the cost of making one neutron bomb is between \$450,000 and \$900,000 and since China has a limited military budget and small output of plutonium-239, it cannot produce a large number of neutron bombs, not to mention that it currently still does not have precise and effective carrier and launch equipment to deliver a neutron bomb, and if the neutron bomb is used on the battlefield it won't necessarily be able to fully achieve its combat effectiveness.²⁷

V. Conclusion

In the past few years, in order to achieve its army-building goal of "modernization and regularization," the Chinese Communists' Second Artillery has implemented various educational reforms in its schools to establish a solid foundation for training the unit's cadres and has carried out reforms in the authorized strength system, training content, training techniques, logistics, and combat readiness to improve the unit's combat strength and, in weapons in particular, new models of motorized combat strategic medium-range guided missiles have been developed and a nuclear strike combat capability has been established in a preliminary way.

The development of the Chinese Communist Second Artillery still cannot be compared with the nuclear weapons strength of United States and the Soviet Union,

but without regard to the national economy and the people's livelihood, the Chinese Communists have done their best to develop nuclear weapons and guided missiles with the primary goal of catching up with the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of strategic weapons and thus conduct political blackmail. On the eve of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit and eliminate some strategic weapons, the Chinese Communists continually strengthened the Second Artillery's education and training in an attempt to establish a crack strategic guided missile unit with quality training, outstanding organizational cadres, and agile command and which has a definite nuclear counterattack capability as well as a political function. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that it poses a serious threat to the world .

Footnotes

1. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 June 1988.
2. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 12 July 1988.
3. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 September 1987
4. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 2 August 1987.
5. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 March 1988.
6. Chinese Communists' JUNSHI JIAOYU [MILITARY EDUCATION] No 1, 1988, p 30.
7. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 October 1988.
8. Chinese Communists' JUNSHI JIAOYU [MILITARY EDUCATION] No 3, 1988, p 7.
9. Chinese Communists' KEJI RIBAO, 17 December 1987.
10. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 April 1987.
11. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 7 December 1987.
12. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 24 December 1987.
13. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 28 September 1988.
14. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 16 December 1987.
15. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 28 September 1985.
16. Australian Broadcasting Network broadcast of 4 July 1988.
17. Chinese Communists' "Central Broadcasting" broadcast of 17 August 1987.
18. Hong Kong TA KUNG PAO, 8 November 1988.
19. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 May 1988.
20. Chinese Communists' ZHONGGUO DIANZI BAO, 3 July 1988.
21. Chinese Communists' Haixiazhisheng Broadcasting Station broadcast of 13 March 1989.
22. Chinese Communists' RENMIN RIBAO (Overseas Edition), 20 November 1987.
23. Hong Kong WEN HUI BAO, 1 June 1987.
24. Chinese Communists' JUNSHI JIAOYU [MILITARY EDUCATION] No 1, 1988, p 30.
25. Chinese Communists' JUNSHI JIAOYU [MILITARY EDUCATION] No 1, 1988, p 30.
26. Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 June 1988.
27. Liu Huaqiu [0491 5363 4428]: "Does China Need the Neutron Bomb?" (part two), Chinese Communists' JUNSHI SHIJIE [MILITARY WORLD] No 2, September-October 1988, p 60.

PLA Training Reform

90ON0170A Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU
[STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
No 273, 15 Sep 89 pp 79-91

[Article by Shao Huang (4801 2515): "Chinese Communist Military Training Reform"]

[Text] I. Foreword

Ever since the Chinese Communists occupied the mainland, in order to maintain tight control over the military (the so-called "pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat") and consolidate the power of the Red regime, they have only placed importance on strengthening the military's ideological and political work, while neglecting long-range planning for military training. In addition, struggles within the party between different factions and different lines, and among different military philosophies within the Army, have meant that for a long time, military laws and regulations have been lacking, training has been underfunded, and training sites and facilities have been most rudimentary. This has caused training of troops for a long time to be chaotic and out of date, and the quality of the officers and men to be very deficient.

In 1979, the Chinese Communists' poor showing in the war with Vietnam fully exposed the fact that their military training was out of date, its operational capability was low, and it was incapable of meeting the demands of modern warfare. For this reason, the slogan

"education and training must be awarded a position of strategic importance" was once again introduced, and training reform was called for. In November 1983, the Communist military called the "Meeting To Discuss Education and Training Reform Throughout the Military," in which it clearly proposed a program for reform of military training and set forth tasks and goals. Training reforms were thereupon launched across the board. With respect to the training system, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps have all established new military instruction (training) organs, and have implemented on a trial basis a training system of "training first, assigning later" in order to begin the training of troops at a higher level. The training includes the promotion of military and academic research, the launching of training of individuals and units in joint combat operations, and improvement of the military capability of the Communist military's cadres, in order to raise the overall combat strength of the troops. With respect to training methods, they have set about the task of upgrading and developing simulation training equipment. They are using laser and electronics to carry out simulated combat maneuvers in order to train more effectively. An article in JIEFANGJUN BAO on 20 August 1989 entitled "A Retrospective of China's Military Training Reforms" boasted that the training reforms carried out between 1979 and 1989, aimed primarily at raising combined operational strength, had already brought the Communist military's strength to a new level. The present article intends to describe the Communist military's reform of its training system, the content of its training procedures, and its training methods.

II. Reform of the Training System

The Chinese Communist military training has, for a long time, basically followed a policy of "training the old and the new all together," with the result that personnel have repeated "basic training" every year, thereby stagnating at a low level. In recognition of this fact, the reform concepts of "training the new and old separately" and "train first, assign later" were introduced in 1978. Instruction and training units were established in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corps. New soldiers, pilots, and equipment operators are set apart for standardized, rigorous, and systematic training. After they have been firmly grounded in the basics, they are assigned to their units, where they receive specialized training alongside veteran soldiers, pilots, and equipment operators, as well as training in topics at the squad level or higher. Thus, a new training system has begun to form. Basic training for new soldiers and additional training within the units are both independent and coordinated.

A. Army

1. Establishing Instruction Units for New Soldiers

After the Communist military convened the "Conference for Military Training Throughout the Armed Ser-

vices" in October 1984, it directed the Wuhan, Beijing, and Kunming Military Regions to establish "new soldier training divisions" and to carry out experiments in the training of new soldiers. After one year of "experimenting and evaluating," a group of "instruction regiments" were established within the "group armies" in the Army in November 1985. Then, in order to increase the number of new soldiers being trained, and to correct the insufficiency of instruction units for soldiers with special skills, the "Notice Concerning the Readjustment of Group Army Instruction Units" was handed down at the end of 1986. "Infantry divisions" were changed to "instruction divisions" on an experimental basis, and their subordinate services, including artillery, engineer, communications, chemical defense, and reconnaissance units were changed from their original designations as specialty units to specialty instruction units. At the same time, "artillery regiments (battalions)" subordinate to these "group armies" were changed to "instruction regiments (battalions)."¹

2. Establishing a Sound Training System

"Group armies," divisions, and regiments were enabled to assemble all their forces in one place to carry out joint campaign and tactical training after the Chinese Communist Army established "instruction divisions and regiments" across the board in order to take responsibility for the basic training of new soldiers. A system was thus formed in which "instruction divisions and regiments" played the primary role in training new soldiers. "Type-A divisions" played the primary role in joint tactical training, and "group armies" played the primary role in high-level campaign training.

3. Readjustment of Methods of Organizing and Training New Soldiers

At the beginning of this year (1989), the Communist military authorities announced that training of new soldiers for units in the Army would be carried out by combining the principles of "training first, assigning later" and "units do their own training." Depending on the situation of various units, some new soldiers were trained by "instruction divisions and regiments," while most were trained by their various units. The method of organizing and training was as follows:

a. Instruction units were the primary unit, and their instructors, training sites, and equipment were used.

b. Units that are in relatively crowded conditions and lack instruction departments will have their brigades or regiments establish battalions for new soldiers. Units whose principal unit is the battalion will establish companies and platoons for new soldiers.

c. In units where forces are relatively scattered, companies shall organize platoons of new soldiers.²

B. Organizing Units To Train New Soldiers

1. In order to carry out the policy of "train first, assign later," the Chinese Communists' Navy began in 1982 to

organize training regiments (battalions) and training bases for its ships, coastal defense units, and airborne units in order to meet the task of training new soldiers. However, because the training units were relatively scattered, and instruction facilities and capability were insufficient, many new specialty soldiers continued to be thrown in with veteran soldiers, where they were "assigned to the same units and trained together." For this reason, a reorganization was carried out in late 1986. While training regiments continued to be run, a group of "training sites" was established, and the new soldiers who were originally trained in scattered locations were brought together to be trained at a single location.³

2. Establishment of "Training Centers Aboard Ship"

For many years, the Chinese Communist Navy's category-two naval ships have been organizing and carrying out their own training. However, due to the burdens of patrolling and combat preparedness, and because of limited vigor of leadership, limited training equipment, limited instruction capability, and limited ability to achieve priorities, it has been difficult to find enough time or personnel to carry out training. For this reason, the Chinese Communist Navy, having learned a lesson from the experience of foreign navies (which have established training fleets), on a trial basis created "training sites," "training centers," and "training squadrons." On the basis of this experimentation, the Navy first organized a trial "Training Center Aboard Ship" in March 1986 in the Northern Fleet. The sole responsibility of this center was basic tactical and technical training for category-two naval ships. The goal was to enable the entire ship's personnel to successfully complete training within one year, whereupon the ship would enter the order of battle. In August 1988, the Central Military Commission (CMC) instructed each of the Navy's fleets to organize a "Training Center Aboard Ship." The centers were solely responsible for individual-ship training tasks for the category-two ships in their fleets, and for implementing the "train first, assign later" system for all ships.⁴

3. Implementing the "System of Dividing Training by Subject and Grade"

In the past, the Chinese Communist Navy's ships operated under system of "assigning veterans and new men to the same units and training them together." Veteran soldiers underwent training alongside new soldiers, and the entire ship's personnel trained right along with a new ship captain, which meant that training had to start from the beginning every year. The result was that some ships were unable to complete all the subjects included in the "training outline" even after having been in service for more than 10 years. For this reason, all naval ships began in 1982 to implement the "system of dividing training tasks by subject and grade." Ships were divided into three classes for training purposes. Patrol ships were grouped in class one, and they generally performed joint

deep-sea training. Ships that had been recently placed on the roster, had recently come out of dry dock or needed to repeat the individual-ship system training, performed primarily single-ship basic tactical and technical training, and were grouped in class two. Ships in dry dock were grouped in class three. In this manner, a training schedule was established. A state in which a rational balance existed between the three classes thus came about, and contributed to greater effectiveness in the training programs on board the Navy's ships.⁵

4. Perfecting the Training System

By organizing training units for new sailors, establishing "shipboard training centers," and implementing the reform measure of "dividing training tasks by subject and grade," the Chinese Communist naval forces were able, through the experiments of each of the fleets, to further organize the combat preparedness forces, class one ships, and class A airborne regiments into "joint mechanized formations." By so doing, they were able to provide joint campaign and tactical training to the various services of the deep sea forces. This brought about the formation of a new system in which training regiments played the primary role in training new sailors, shipboard training centers played the primary role in training all aspects of individual-ship tasks, sea-based garrison districts played the primary role in carrying out training of formation tactics, and the fleets played the primary role in joint training involving integrated formations.

C. Air Force

The Chinese Communist Air Force is carrying out its reform of the training system in accordance with the principle that "there must be an overall program, reforms must be systematic, there must be priorities, and the program must be carried out one step at a time." Reform of the system for training pilots as well as the system for training technical arms on the ground is being carried out concurrently.⁶ For instance:

1. Pilots

a. Reform of the Pilot Recruitment System

The Air Force addressed the problem of low-quality trainee pilots and high attrition rates (which used to plague the system when "local governments" and "people's armed forces departments" were in charge of recruiting Air Force pilot trainees) in 1987 by establishing its own "pilot recruitment unit," which systematically chooses the best trainee pilots from local schools, thereby assuring high-quality recruits. At the same time, recruitment and training have been coordinated to alleviate the imbalance between supply and demand.

b. Implementing Three Levels of Training

In the past, the Chinese Communist Air Force air units took flight school graduates and sent them directly to their fighter divisions to be trained in the operation of refitted aircraft. Since 1980, in accordance with the

principle of "training veterans and new pilots separately," the various fighter regiments within the fighter divisions have been taking turns training the new flight school graduates. Because the "instruction regiments" also belong to their divisions, the problem of "new men and veterans training side by side" still persisted, so the Air Force formulated the "Five-Year Program for Development of the Air Force" in the latter half of 1985, in which a plan for reform of the pilot training system was set forth. In March 1986 the operational division of a certain air unit in the "Guangzhou Military Region Air Force" was redesignated as a "new pilot training division." It served as an experiment in training reform, gathering new pilots together for training at a single site. In early 1987, the "Air Force Program for the Year 2000" was formulated. It stated that "pilot training must move toward specialization, division of labor, and cooperation, and that a three-tiered training system with a "pilot school, a training base for teaching pilots to operate aircraft that have been refitted, and operational forces" must be created. The policy of "training new men and veterans separately" must be fully implemented. The Air Force officially began to implement this system in July 1988. The Air Force units in each of the Chinese Communist "military regions" have established "training bases for new pilots," where flight school graduates are gathered to learn how to operate new or refitted aircraft, and to undergo training in fighter-related topics. The goal is to turn out fighter pilots qualified for combat in three types of weather, who are then assigned to various operational units.

2. Technical Ground Crews

The Chinese Communist Air Force began in 1986 to establish training units for new men in several technical services, including surface-to-air missiles, radar, meteorology, antiaircraft, communications, and maintenance units. For example, an "instruction brigade" has been organized for paratroopers, a training regiment for radar personnel in surface-to-air missile units, and a ground crew training regiment for personnel in the Air Force ground crews have all been set up. The purpose is to carry out the task of training new men in more than 300 different types of technical units and to make the training of new men professional and standardized.

D. Second Artillery Corps

1. Organization of Instruction Units for New Men

In order to achieve the "train first, assign later" principle, the Chinese Communists' "Second Artillery Corps" has implemented a system in which veterans and new men are "separately assigned and separately trained." A launch battalion from each brigade has been converted into an "instruction battalion for new men." These units' only responsibility is the training of new men.

2. Implementation on Trial Basis of "System of Dividing Training According to Subject and Different Tiers"

In order to deal with the differences between various units, and the different tasks and standards demanded of these units, the "Second Artillery Corps" has aggressively launched into research and experimentation in training based on the "system of dividing training according to subject and different tiers." The Corps has divided training into three types. Comprehensive training brigades (regiments) responsible for combat preparedness have been grouped in class one. Other brigades (regiments) that carry out comprehensive training have been grouped in class two. Brigades (regiments) that are only partially equipped and that are changing designation have been grouped in class three. This has been done to enable the corps to concentrate training on the most important points by keeping personnel and material resources relatively concentrated. At the same time, the system for grading launch battalions (stations) and assigning them grades (one, two, and three) has been perfected. Comprehensive training launch battalions which have 90 percent of their equipment in working order, have 85 percent of their personnel available for combat, and have completed all of the tasks in the annual instruction and training schedule are awarded the rating of class-three launch battalion. Class-three and class-two launch battalions that meet the above requirements can apply to have their status raised to class-two or class-one launch battalion.⁷

III. Rounding Out the Content of Training

A. Establishing a Complete Training System

In recent years, the Communist military has reformed its military training in order to raise its forces' operational capability in terms of overall coordination between units, taking as its focus joint campaign and tactical training. They have coordinated such aspects as techniques and tactics, individual personnel and entire units, and individual services and integrated services, thus establishing a new system in which the emphasis in training is placed on entire units and integration of multiple units. The Army is carrying out training reform on four levels: individual training, tactical training at battalion level and below, joint tactical training, and campaign training. The Navy is carrying out training on four levels: individual training, single-ship training, tactical formation training, and joint training involving integrated formations (joint formation deep-sea training). The Air Force is establishing a three-tiered training system: technical training for new pilots, training in fighter skills for veteran pilots, and joint tactical training. The Second Artillery Corps is carrying out training of new men in technical skills. The joint training that they are carrying out takes the launch battalion as the principal unit, and is occurring at four levels: battalion, brigade, base, Second Artillery Corps. The corps is also carrying out training in organizational and command skills focused on the battalion commander.

B. Readjusting the Training Schedule

The Communist military's yearly training schedule is divided into three periods: training in individual skills, training of entire units, and the annual discretionary period. In order to facilitate the training of new men and yearly winter training, conscription work was shifted from the winter season (October, November) to the spring (March, April). For this reason, the Communist military's annual training schedule has also been readjusted as follows:

1. Individual training—The four-month period (May-August) formerly used for this purpose is now used for basic training of a new men.
2. Unit training—A period of approximately one-half year (September-February) will be used for tactical training at the battalion level and lower, for joint tactical training at the divisional and regimental levels, and campaign training at the "group army" level.
3. Annual discretionary period—The period of approximately two months in March and April is used primarily to prepare for training; for discharges, assignments, and other personnel adjustments; and to test the organization.

C. Launching Military Research

In recent years, the Communist military has cast its eyes on future development and has aggressively launched military research. Various departments, units, and academic institutions have established military research organs, formulated research programs, held academic symposiums, organized training sessions in campaign command, invited specialists to give speeches, and created scholarly military publications. They have reinforced requirements that cadres study Marxist-Leninist military theory and Mao Zedong's military thought, and have targeted research topics based on their particular combat duties. They have explored issues involving modern campaigns and tactics in hopes of using what they learn to guide and improve troop training and teaching, and in hopes of enabling troops to better adapt themselves to the demands of future wars. Another aim is to improve cadres' grasp of theory as well as their organizational and leadership ability. An example is the "Regional Military Research Program for 1987-90," formulated by the Lanzhou Military Region. Its research topics run from strategies for the development of national defense, models of future warfare, and the guiding philosophy and principles of campaigns, to combat on the loess plains and in the deserts, and offensive and defensive tactics for units at division level and lower. The program set different goals for research done at different levels—military region, group army, provincial military region, academic institution, and units at division level or lower. The military region and the group armies primarily research issues related to strategy and campaigns, and their subordinate units research topics relevant to the various tasks for which they are responsible.⁸

D. Reform of Joint Campaign and Tactical Training

1. Cold Weather Training

Last year (1988), when the Chinese Communists readjusted the conscription schedule, they postponed repeat and make-up training for infantry from October and November to March and April of this year (1989). For this reason, the Communist military, in accordance with the "Instructions of the General Staff Regarding Launching Winter Training for Most of the Military," utilized the period of more than five months before conscription to launch winter training throughout most of the military. Apart from scheduling certain time periods for repeat and make-up training, and increasing the troops' mastery of technical and tactical fundamentals, which all units did, some units put their campaign and tactical training into practice by carrying out camp and field training, which enabled them to improve the troops' ability to move, fight, find nourishment, secure shelter, hide themselves, and manage themselves. At the same time, the various units took their different tasks and geographical locations into account and, in a focused manner, further adapted themselves to concrete conditions. For example, troops in the "three northern" regions trained primarily in conditions of bitter cold. Troops in the south trained in high mountains, dense forests, swamps, and rice paddies. Border defense units and guard detachments carried out training in accordance with their local conditions. The Navy carried out several types of drills, including combat between ships and aircraft. Air units in the Air Force organized training in several tasks. The Second Artillery Corps had its launch battalions carry out drills at night on unfamiliar territory.⁹

2. Campaign Maneuvers and Training

The Communist military readjusted its structure in June 1985 by establishing the "group army" as the basic campaign unit. Afterward, in order to expand the strategic awareness of campaign commanders and leading organs, a series of lectures were held beginning in 1986, including "A Strategy for the Modernization and Development of National Defense," and "Forms, Tasks, and Strategies in Military Conflict During the New Period." At the same time, each military region chose a group army for the launching of a pilot project. At the same time, the various military regions, the various arms and services, and academic institutions organized campaign training sessions for high-level cadres in order to strengthen theoretical research and study. In September of that same year, the first "Armywide Symposium on Campaign Theory" was held. Wide-ranging research and discussions were carried out, and an outstanding body of literature and teaching materials on campaign theory was produced.

In 1987, most group armies launched campaign training programs. They carried out hypothetical exercises on maps and sand tables, organized drills in which leadership organs carried along communications equipment, and carried out maneuvers to evaluate performance in which leadership organs were accompanied by small

numbers of soldiers. The Communist military's "National Defense University" held two courses concerned with campaigns to provide training for group army commanders. In March of the same year, the "Armywide Symposium on Campaign Theory" was held again, and the participants discussed the system of campaign theory and the basic philosophy and principles of campaigns.

In 1988, the Army's group armies launched into campaign training across the board. The great majority of the Navy's fleet, the Air Force's army and army-level command posts, and the Second Artillery Corps' bases also carried out campaign training. At the same time, in order to meet the requirements of future warfare and to deal with border conflicts, rapidly developing incidents, and limited wars, the various units readjusted their military training topics, moving beyond the one-track training model which assumed large-scale war and had remained unchanged for years. Campaign training was launched based on the assumption of different tasks in different theaters. The training took into account the operational duties, battlefield circumstances, and conditions in surrounding territories that present themselves in different theaters. A series of campaign maneuvers designed to study limited warfare were carried out. The Lanzhou Military Region organized the "Western Maneuvers 88," whose topic was the defense of the western border. The Guangzhou Military Region carried out the "Guang 15 Maneuvers," targeted toward defense of China's sovereignty in the South China Sea. The Beijing Military Region carried out its "Winter 88 Maneuvers," and the Shenyang Military Region organized its "Advance 88 Maneuvers." The Communist military thus strengthened its practical and theoretical grasp of limited warfare, and elevated its campaign training from the group army level to the sphere in which decisions are made about the campaign goals.¹⁰

3. Coordinated Maneuvers and Drills With Army Airborne Helicopter Squadrons and Ground Forces

Responding to the demands of integrated operations, in early 1988 the Communist military established "helicopter squadrons" in the Beijing Military Region's 38th Group Army and in the Shenyang Military Region's 39th Group Army. Since they established these airborne units, whose main element is the helicopter, they have aggressively launched into training in skills and tactics, and have participated in the joint tactical maneuvers of various services. After the winter of 1988 began, they carried out winter flight training and theoretical discussions. How to deal with an emergency in which a plane has wandered into clouds or an area where icing occurs, emergency movements under conditions of bitter cold, flight training in windy and cloudy conditions, and switching battle sites and landing aircraft in conditions of bitter cold were among the training topics covered. In the 1988 campaign maneuvers carried out in the Lanzhou, Shenyang, and Beijing Military Regions, the Army's airborne units were all responsible for providing combat support, and their training was coordinated with

that of the ground forces. Their role was especially prominent in the maneuvers of the Lanzhou Military Region, in which the aircraft in the Army's airborne units worked with the "red" and "blue" armies, carrying out reconnaissance, aircraft landings, and transport tasks in the desert, providing effective support to the ground troops.¹¹

4. Coordination Between Army and Air Force in Training

In order to concentrate on the conditions of modern, three-dimensional warfare, the Communist military has broken through the barriers between the different arms since 1986. An "Army-Air Force Cooperative Tactical Training District" has been set up step by step. The Army and Air Force have formulated plans for side-by-side training, instituted appropriate readjustments of training programs and sites, set interactive training conditions, and carried out coordinated training exercises with all services. In 1987, they graduated from training in simple confrontations between aircraft and anti-aircraft to complex tasks with many services involved. The ability of the various arms and services to coordinate operations was improved by combat maneuvers in which Air Force units interacted broadly with the Army's artillery, armored, and infantry units, and by enhancing the difficulty of the training exercises and the degree to which they approximated real-life conditions.

5. Deep-Sea Naval Formation Training

In order to improve the Navy's deep-sea operational capability, the Chinese Communist Navy began in the late 1970's to concentrate its efforts on overcoming three big problems: supplying ships at sea, long-distance communication, and global navigation systems. From that point on, the Navy's ships have gradually extended their activities farther and farther into the open seas. Since 1980, anywhere from 10 or more to several dozen Chinese Communist Navy ships have participated every year in deep-sea training. In order to accelerate the development of deep-sea training, apart from the regulations contained in the "Training Outline," the Chinese Communist Navy in recent years has handed down orders specifying training topics and tasks for the various fleets, as well as the standards and goals that must be met.

In late 1985, the Chinese Communist Navy began on a trial basis to form from among the Navy's various fleets a "joint mechanized naval formation" whose key elements are class-one ships and class-A airborne regiments. This was done in accordance with the requirements of "cutting the size of units, combining units, preparing for war in peacetime, and increasing effectiveness. The ships have departed the island chains and voyaged to the Western Pacific, the South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean to carry out multitask, comprehensive maneuvers, as well as joint training with various services on the open seas. They have performed "three-dimensional (submarine, surface, air) joint offensive and

defensive maneuvers," "maneuvers involving long-distance transportation of landing forces," "deep-sea logistics and supply," and "very extended nuclear submarine voyages." The scope of the Chinese Communist Navy's deep-sea training has now graduated from single ship, single aircraft, and single naval service, to multiple naval services and multiple armed services joint formations. The content of training has also graduated from simple hands-on practice at maritime navigation and a primary emphasis on long voyages aimed at improving the ship-handling skills of ship captains, to cooperative and comprehensive training intended primarily to improve operational capability.¹²

6. Air and Ground Coordinated Tactical Training

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Air Force's air units have reformed their tactical training. They have vigorously initiated coordinated training, which involves conflict, under certain assumed tactical circumstances, between "red" and "blue" air units, which include division-level leadership organs and smaller tactical fendui. Training that used to be oriented primarily toward teaching pilots flying skills now emphasizes the tactical training of pilots and the training of leadership units. Training in the coordination of logistics and maintenance is carried out at the same time. During the course of training much attention is paid to the creation of realistic tactical situations and the degree of difficulty. From separate training to comprehensive maneuvers, everything is carried out in strict observance of the course of combat. Pilots, commanders, and ground crews must all work on a single task. They must start with low-level problems and work up as well as start with shallow issues and work toward deeper ones, forming at last an integrated operational force. Commanders at the division and regiment level perform drills of various tactical movements in order to improve capability of dealing with complex, changing situations. In the area of communications, radar, maintenance, and logistics, coordinated maneuvers are performed under the assumption of various situations that can arise in war time.¹³

7. The Integrated Training of the Second Artillery Corps

Based on the characteristics of training in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Second Artillery Corps raised the issue in 1984 of integrated training and coordinated development at the battalion, brigade, base, and Second Artillery Corps levels, taking the launch battalion as the key unit. A guiding philosophy of training that takes technical skill as its foundation, integration and coordination as its focal point, and cadres as its emphasis, was established. The various units in the Second Artillery Corps initiated integrated training to improve the ability of launch battalions and support fendui to act in coordination. The Communist military revealed during the "Conference of the Second Artillery Corps for the Exchange of Training Reform Experience" in May 1988 that the various units in the Second Artillery Corps had organized more than 120 integrated maneuvers of all

sizes during the previous five years, and that in 15 important areas there had been tests performed and improvements made, including quick launches, launches with reduced personnel, and automated testing of mechanized launches.

In addition, the various units of the Second Artillery Corps have performed test maneuvers under the assumption of certain tactical conditions. In November 1987, a certain missile brigade, in the form of a test maneuver, underwent evaluation by [headquarters] as a representative of the Second Artillery Corps. The brigade-level organ was fully equipped and led a launch battalion and a support fendui as it carried out long-distance, mechanized operations at night, assuming a sudden nuclear attack and taking as its primary focus the performance of combined tactical operations. Training was carried out in 34 technical and tactical tasks related to nuclear counterattack.¹⁴ From early September to mid-October 1988, a certain unit in the Second Artillery Corps held a 1-and-1/2-month test maneuver aimed primarily at improving the overall operational capability of the Second Artillery's forces, whose primary unit is the launch battalion. This unit carried out training in several tactical tasks, including defense against air raids, defense against nuclear attack, highway marching, railroad transport, and analysis and avoidance of breakdowns. The maneuvers have included tests of eight technologies that have resulted from scientific research in recent years, including automated testing and launch control equipment, missile transportation and testing systems, and communications receiving devices. At the same time, a group of launch battalion commanders was gathered together for training by an on-site instruction team.¹⁵

8. Training of Rapid Response Units

In order to respond to the demands of limited warfare and rapidly developing incidents, the Communist military has aggressively strengthened its training of the Marines and of the Air Force's airborne and paratrooper units.

a. Marines

After the Chinese Communist Navy reestablished the "1st Marine Brigade" in 1980, it established a modern land-water comprehensive training facility at Zhanjiang in order to improve the physical conditioning, overall quality, fighting performance, technical skills, and rapid-response capability of the Marines. In order to drill the men in combat survival skills under frequently changing weather conditions, they went in the middle of the summer to the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, where they were trained to cope with local conditions. More than 20 training tasks in coordinated operations were dealt with on the beaches there, including defense against air assaults, defense against nuclear (chemical) assaults, and defense against landing forces. In the middle of winter they left the South China Sea by ship, crossed the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the

Yellow Sea, and the Bo Hai, arriving in the frozen north to carry out training in long-distance sea transport and cold-weather activities. They carried out training in many skills, including climbing in snow and ice, cross-country movements, long-range raids, camouflage techniques, camping, sleighing and skiing, building defense works, and survival in conditions of scarce food and water. At the same time, in order to improve the operational and rapid-response capability of the units as a whole, various combat drills with actual troops are carried out every year. Amphibious tanks, amphibious armored vehicles, engineering corps, anti-chemical warfare corps, and missile corps were all called into action. Training aimed at improving the command techniques of cadres and joint tactical training for troops were carried out, and the marines also participated in test maneuvers along with various types of naval ships and naval air units in which they performed coordinated, large-scale landing and antilanding combat test maneuvers.¹⁶

b. Air Units

In recent years, all of the air units in the Air Force have established "small combat fendui" (also known as "fist combat fendui") in order to reform tactical training. Pilots who are young, skilled, quick, and adept at combat are given fixed assignments, and they are given priority in terms of arms, equipment, and training conditions. In training, they come first. They fly more and train more. They get 30 percent more flying time than their unit's average, of which 60 percent is used for tactical training, and the content of training is determined on the basis of the characteristics of modern limited warfare, taking into account the tasks of combat. The emphasis of training is placed on tactical thought, fighting styles, and operational command. For example, in their training, small fighter fendui emphasize air fights, air incursions behind enemy lines, and patrolling. Small fendui of attack planes and bombers train primarily for sudden attacks on airfields, transportation hubs, missile and antiaircraft positions, and large tank concentrations. At the same time, they frequently participate in combat maneuvers with actual troops organized by group armies or divisions in order to be able to fulfill the role of a "fist fendui," carrying on combat in limited, rapidly developing incidents.¹⁷

c. Paratroopers

In order to strengthen training of paratroopers aimed at teaching skills in adapting to harsh conditions, and to raise their operational and rapid mechanization capabilities, various paratrooper units in recent years have trained for field combat and survival in difficult places, such as virgin forests, deserts, swamps, mountains, and areas of extreme heat and cold. In July and August 1988, a paratrooper unit performed the first high plains paratrooper training in the Kunlun Mountains, which are more than 4,000 meters above sea level, in an effort to work out methods for paratroopers to perform reconnaissance and harassment, seize sites, and hold strategic

points on the high plains.¹⁸ In particular, these troops, building on the foundation of the "Combat-Ready battalion," organized a "Fist Battalion." This unit has been given strict guarantees of priority access to training funds and equipment, under which conditions the Communist military claims that the "Fist Battalion," without advance warning, can perform combat duties in any area in China within 10 to 20 hours.¹⁹

9. Combat Maneuvers With Real Troops

Combat maneuvers are the most effective form of tactical training. For a long time, however, the Communist military's real troop combat maneuvers have required the supposition of "imaginary enemies" and "hypothetical situations" in order for training to be carried out. Even if there were real troops to serve as "the enemy," they were rounded up only on the spur of the moment. It was not very realistic, and the benefits were not great. In light of this fact, the Communist military established for the first time a unit of "mock foreign troops" and an "Air Force Flight Testing and Training Center" in early 1987. This unit simulated the combat philosophy and tactics of foreign armies, and was responsible for simulating foreign forces during real troop combat maneuvers of the air units of the Army and the Air Force.

a. Establishment of the First "Mock Foreign Troops"

In early 1987 the Communist military's "General Staff Department" redesignated a certain armored infantry regiment as a "foreign troop simulation unit." This unit took responsibility for training in which simulation is used, and was reorganized in a manner consistent with the organization and equipment of a foreign army's reinforced motorized infantry battalion. At the same time, it carried out seven months of simulation training in accordance with foreign military tactical principles and tactical military technology. In October of the same year, the unit moved into the "Joint Tactical Training Center" to play the role of the "enemy forces" in joint training, carry out live combat maneuvers, and change the wishful way maneuvers always resulted in a "red" victory and a "blue" defeat, thereby enabling troops to receive higher quality training in warfare.²⁰

b. Establishment of the "Flight Testing and Training Center"

In order to enable its air units to achieve a higher level of technical and tactical mastery, the Chinese Communists' Air Force established the "Flight Testing and Training Center" in northern China in February 1987. This center is responsible for research by the Air Force's air units in flight technology and tactics; for test flying, using, and testing of new aircraft, new equipment, and new technologies; for needed scientific research flights; for teaching air and ground crews how to operate and maintain aircraft that are new or that have been refitted with new technology; and for writing teaching materials and manuals for the use of the air units' air and ground crews. In addition, the center also uses the arms and equipment already at its disposal in simulating the

tactical philosophy and combat methods of the "enemy," carrying out air combat maneuvers with Air Force air units in order to advance the reform of training for Air Force air units, and to push the modernization of the air units' arms and training methods.²¹

IV. Overhauling Training Methods

A. Readjustment of Training Priorities

In order to deal with the shortage of funds for training and the fact that there was no way to achieve the training priority policy then in place, the Communist military decided, in the "Armywide Conference on Military Training" in January 1989, to switch from the policy of "giving more to those units that train more and less to those that train less" to one of "distinguishing between different priority levels, providing guarantees for key areas, encouraging advanced technology, and increasing returns." That is to say, they decided to differentiate several different levels of priority based on the different training tasks performed by different types of units, directing funds first of all to key units, and using the purse strings to reward units and individuals that use advanced training practices. According to the new principles, effective control measures must be taken to ensure the availability of funds, sites, equipment, and teaching materials for training. Standard training fees must be issued in accordance with the standards applied to units that carry out comprehensive training. Group armies must act in accordance with the training tasks performed by their subordinate units. Units that carry out comprehensive training get 100-percent funding; those that carry out partial training get partial funding; and those that carry out short-term training get short-term funding. Whatever funds are left over are subject to unified management by the "group army" and are to be used primarily to subsidize units that carry out comprehensive training.²²

The Chinese Communists' Guangzhou Military Region called the "Regionwide Conference on Supporting Work Priorities" in May 1989 in order to meet the demands listed above. It was decided during the conference to increase training funds and to implement a standardized scheme of priorities, the details of which are as follows:

1. Beginning in 1988, new standards for training funding levels will be raised according to the base from previous years. The increase for territorial defense forces, specially created instruction units, and provincial military districts responsible for coastal and border defense will be relatively large. The total annual training funds for an infantry regiment that carries out comprehensive training can be raised from the 1988 figure of less than 20,000 yuan (monetary unit throughout article: Renminbi) to 30,000 yuan.

2. This year's training priority has been placed on on-duty operational forces, territorial defense forces, and specially created instruction units.

3. First priority in the setting of norms and allocation of training funds, equipment, and ammunition has been granted to key work units and key projects.

4. In addition to the 17 types of general purpose training equipment that are currently supplied to class-A divisions and territorial defense forces, it is planned that norms for training funds, specialized training equipment, and ammunition shall be raised to an appropriate degree.²³

B. Experimenting With Coordinated Training Priority Systems

In order to establish a training priority system appropriate to the actual goals of training, the Communist military's "General Staff Military Training Department" formulated a program in early 1988 that calls for "long-term plans and gradual development." Scattered financial and material resources were gathered together into a "fist." First priority was granted to a part of the units that carry out comprehensive training. Support is given to one group in one year, and it is shifted to a different group every year thereafter. "Nine divisions and one brigade" were first chosen from among the entire military to set up a coordinated system of training priorities on a trial basis. A training center for division-level military officers was established, as well as a work office for regiment-level military officers. A warehouse was built to store training equipment used for divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies. Training sites were improved, simulation fendui were trained, and the system for and the management of the overall training support work were organized.

These facilities can be used by leadership organs at the division or regiment level to engage in their own exercises, to carry out combat maneuvers with other units, or to train the division's various services (sections). Leadership organs at the division or regiment level can also carry out continuous day-night, short-range field operations and simulated maneuvers. Furthermore, the "simulation companies" that have been established, besides taking responsibility for using and taking care of advanced laser and electronic simulation equipment, also take turns carrying out real troop simulated combat maneuvers with various infantry companies after playing the role of the hypothetical enemy simulating a "blue army" in training exercises. In addition, they also play the role of "hypothetical enemy fendui" in real troop tactical maneuvers at the battalion level or higher and serve to heighten the benefits of tactical training.

After a one-year trial run, the Communist military boasted that significant success had been attained. It was therefore decided to build upon the efforts of 1988 by having the entire military again assign several divisions and brigades to continue building the coordinated system of training priorities.²⁴

C. Establishing the "Joint Tactical Training Center"

In order to accelerate the modernization of training methods, the Communist military in April 1986 established on a trial basis the entire military's first large-scale, multifunction "Joint Tactical Training Center" in the Nanjing Military Region. It tests and assesses the proficiency with which leadership organs at the division and regiment level organize and command their troops' joint tactical training. It also carries out scientific research and tests new organizational structures, new equipment, and new methods of warfare. The center has built five big systems, including a computer-controlled tactical simulated combat maneuver room, a real troop combat site, a direction and control center, and computerized tactical simulators, laser and electronic weapons, and information and communications systems. At the same time, the center has also established the previously mentioned "foreign troop simulation unit," which performs real troop combat maneuvers with troops that are going through training. Three to four divisions and regiments per year can perform maneuvers (involving their leadership organs and real troops) and undergoing testing under the auspices of this center, and the leadership organs of eight to 10 divisions and regiments can carry out indoor computerized tactical simulation combat.²⁵

D. Developing Training and Simulation Equipment

In order to implement instructions by Yang Shangkun, Central Military Commission deputy chairman, on "developing simulation equipment and modernizing training methods," the Communist military began in 1984 to appropriate funds in a vigorous effort to develop training and simulation equipment. After more than five years of effort, research and development work on training and simulation equipment for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Second Artillery Corps has been completed. Simulation training using lasers and electronics has been carried out in the Army, Air Force, and Navy since 1985. The Communist military has developed and put into use the following simulation training equipment:

1. Army—has developed a laser and electronic combat simulation system, a computerized unmanned aircraft system, and a command and display system, as well as 1,300 components in 26 categories for combat simulation training equipment.

2. Navy—has developed nine big systems, including cannon that can strike targets at sea and in the air, ship-to-ship and air-to-ship missiles, submarine combat equipment, torpedo boats, antisubmarine systems, mine layers and mine sweepers, aircraft bombing and attack systems, electronic warfare equipment, and transport and display control systems. The Navy has also developed 1,900 components (in more than 20 categories) for simulation training equipment.

3. Air Force—has developed six large systems, including an air combat system, an air-to-ground attack system, a

ground-to-air attack system, paratrooper combat equipment, and a tactical command and result-display system, as well as 220 components (in 36 categories) for simulation training equipment.²⁶

4. Second Artillery Corps—has developed simulation training equipment to teach specialized technical skills and tactical knowledge needed for the various types of missiles now in use, as well as simulation training equipment needed to teach specialized skills in the corresponding combat support units. A total of 117 systems have been developed.²⁷

E. Allocating Training Equipment

In order to alleviate the shortage of training equipment and improve backward methods of tactical training, the Communist military has allocated training equipment in recent years to various units to enable them to perform combat training under conditions very similar to those of actual warfare.

1. In April 1987, the General Staff Military Training Department allocated to various units complete sets of training equipment, which included the "Tactical Laser Simulation Combat Training System for Fendui at Battalion Level or Lower." This has enabled every division in the Army that carries out comprehensive training duties to receive a set of equipment that its companies and platoons can use in tactical combat training, and every infantry "instruction regiment" to receive a set of equipment that its squads and platoons can use in combat training. In addition, some infantry regiments were also allocated an "Infantry Squad Tactical Target-Display System" and three "Cloud Sparrow Remote Control Unmanned Aircraft."²⁸

2. Since winter 1987, the "General Staff Department" has been issuing electronic and laser simulation training equipment to infantry regiments that carry out comprehensive training, as well as tactical display systems for infantry fendui at battalion level or below.²⁹

3. In the first quarter of 1989, the Guangzhou Military Region issued to its units 160,000 pieces of training equipment (in 17 categories), raising the average number of pieces of training equipment from the 1988 figure of less than one person, to the current level of three or four per person.³⁰

4. The Chinese Communist Air Force has issued every flight regiment eight types of aircraft, including fighters, attack planes, bombers, and transports, as well as 16 types of medium-size and small flight simulators capable of simulating takeoffs and landings, instruments, navigation, bombing, shooting, acrobatics, flying in formation, and attacks. The equipment has been very beneficial in enabling pilots to familiarize themselves with cockpits, to sharpen their powers of concentration, and to improve their skills in manipulating landing gear, instruments, handling aircraft, and dealing with special conditions.³¹

F. Establishing "Simulation Fendui Across the Board"

In late 1987, at the same time that the "General Staff Department" was issuing electronic and laser simulation equipment to infantry regiments throughout the military that carry out comprehensive training, and was allocating tactical display systems to infantry fendui at the battalion level or lower, it required that every infantry regiment carrying out comprehensive training and every artillery regiment with simulation equipment establish a "simulation company" to perform tactical combat maneuvers and to train people in the use, storage, and maintenance of simulation equipment. The Guangzhou Military Region then established "simulation companies" in its subordinate infantry and artillery regiments. In early 1988 it began to run simulation combat training on a trial basis in a certain division, and held a "Training Course for Key Blue Army Simulation Personnel." It carried out standardized training of more than 50 key "blue army" cadres in 14 infantry and artillery simulation companies. They studied the offensive and defensive tactical philosophies and combat characteristics of the red and blue armies, observed demonstrations of the trial-basis training of fendui at the level of battalion or below, and took part in actual exercises.³²

G. Use of Electrical Appliances in Education

In order to respond to the need for difficult training that teaches high-level skills, the Communist military has been aggressively developing audiovisual education since 1982. "Audiovisual Education Centers" and "Audiovisual Education Rooms" in various academic institutions and military units, as well as 11 "Audiovisual Education Coordination Teams" have been established throughout the military. More than 30 million yuan have been appropriated for the purchase and improvement of audiovisual equipment. Currently, basically every unit in the military at the company level has a television set, a tape recorder, and a slide projector. More than 80 percent of the regiments have a video cassette recorder, and over one-fourth of all regiments have closed-circuit television educational systems. The entire military has laid the foundation of an audiovisual education system with multiple levels and channels, which is playing a vital role in improving military education and training.³³

V. Conclusions

A. The overall characteristics of the series of training reform measures promoted by the Communist military in recent years are as follows:

1. The training system has been reformed. A system of "training first, assigning later" has been established throughout the "entire military," enabling a switch from "mixed assignments and mixed training" of new men and veterans, to "separate assignments and training." "No distinctions in training" has been abandoned for "training based on categorization and grouping in different tiers." This has enabled the military to escape the cycle of low-level training, and has enabled units at all

levels to begin training at a higher level. A new training system, in which basic training for new men and other training of entire units are mutually independent yet mutually coordinated, has begun to take form.

2. The content of training has been made more complete. A new system takes joint campaign and tactical training as its focus and coordinates training of technical skills as well as tactics, individuals as well as entire units, and single services as well as integrated units. The aggressive launching of military research and the strengthening of joint campaign and tactical maneuvers has caused the content of military training to develop in the following directions:

a. The focus of the Communist military's training has shifted away from the one-dimensional model in which China must "strike early, strike hard, and use nuclear warfare," and has started to emphasize research and training in methods of dealing with the conditions of limited warfare.

b. Training of Communist military units is shifting from its former focus on a single service toward integrated groups of many services, and even joint maneuvers involving more than one arm of the military. At the same time, training has developed past integration on the ground toward a three-dimensional integration. This development will continually strengthen the ability of units in the Communist military to engage in coordinated operations.

c. The Communist military has established its first "foreign troop simulation unit," which troops use to carry out real troop combat maneuvers. This has enabled the creation of conditions approximating actual warfare. Troops can now receive training in actual warfare, and they will be able to escape the cycle of low-level tactical skills. The actual fighting strength of the troops has been raised.

3. The development and utilization of modern simulation equipment to complement training and the launching of audiovisual education have proved beneficial in reducing training expenses, shortening the training cycle, and increasing the benefits of training. In particular, the concentration of financial and material resources, and the priority given to key units such as the "first units," will improve the actual combat ability and rapid-response capability of the troops.

B. For a long time, the Chinese Communists have operated on Mao Zedong's military philosophy of the "people's war." Strategy has been based on the basic program for military development and preparedness that calls for China to "strike early, strike hard, and use nuclear warfare." After Deng Xiaoping reappeared and resumed control of the military, he felt that international tensions were easing and that the probability of large-scale military conflict had decreased, so he brought about a strategic shift in the guiding philosophy of China's military development. He proposed the strategic

objective of "winning small wars and limiting medium-size wars." The launching of campaign maneuvers beginning in 1988 that assumed different tasks for different theaters is an indication that the content of military training is coordinated with the implementation of readjustments. The former one-dimensional model, geared toward responding to large-scale war or a large nuclear conflict, has been discarded in favor of a multifaceted model geared toward dealing with border conflicts, rapidly developing incidents, and limited warfare. Another observation concerns the Chinese Communists' various principles for readjusting training priorities, by which first priority is given to key units. A "Fist Battalion" was established among the paratroopers, and a "Fist Operations Fendui" was established among the airborne units. The Guangzhou Military Region established its first "Special Operations Unit" early this year (1989). All of these actions are sufficient indication of some developmental trends.

C. In order to correct problems such as training only in basic skills and low benefits, which have resulted from the fact that for many years the operational fendui in the military have also carried out training, the Communist military in recent years has aggressively carried out reform based on observations of the "training bases" and "boot camps" currently being used by foreign countries, which are based on the principal of "separating operations from training." Starting by carrying out experiments in "separating assignments and training," then moving on to the establishment of "instruction regiments," and gradually expanding to the establishment of "instruction divisions," a training system in which the basic training of new men and the training of entire units are both mutually independent and mutually coordinated has begun to take form. However, because reform of the training system has not been carried out in coordination with reform of the management and operations systems, serious conflicts have arisen. The current "instruction divisions and regiments" have turned out to be both training units and operational units, thus they have not been able to overcome the limitations of the old system. There are conflicts between the staffing of the "instruction regiments" and their education duties; between education and training priorities and training duties; and between the objectives of the "instruction regiments" versus those of the policy of "preparing for war in times of peace." This has caused an imbalance in the system. Functions have become chaotic, and the number of new men trained by the "instruction regiments" in recent years has been going down. For this reason, the Communist military has been readjusting the method by which Army units organize and train new men this year (1989), combining the principle of "training first, assigning later" with that of "units train their own." This action signifies that the policy of "training first, assigning later" is on the verge of disintegrating. At the same time, this also shows that after nine years of experimentation, the system of training new men will return to the prereform model in which "units trained their own men." It is beyond doubt that the Communist

military's training system will again experience the cycle of low-level training that plagued the old system of "assigning veterans and new men to the same units and training them all together."

D. The Communist military's efforts in recent years toward training reform have brought some preliminary success, and it is apparent that, building on a base of "consolidated, internalized, and perfected" reform success, the immediate future will be spent working out the kinks in the training system, strengthening the content of training, perfecting the training system, strengthening the ability to achieve training priorities, establishing a training system with the characteristics of a Communist military organization that meets the need for development of preparedness training, and improving the ability of troops to handle limited warfare and rapidly developing incidents. The developmental trends are the following:

1. With regard to the system, the training of new men will still be based primarily on the principle of "training first, assigning later," and secondarily on that which calls for "every unit to train its own." Different types of training systems in which various forms coexist will be explored. The "Second Artillery Corps" will develop "instruction regiments" on its bases to replace the "instruction battalions" that had been set up temporarily under the missile brigades. The "instruction regiments" will specialize in the training of new men.
2. With regard to training content, there will be a continuation of military research, new warfare methods and tactics to "achieve victory with inferior forces" will be explored, and a system of campaign theory with the characteristics of a Communist military organization and appropriate for the demands of future warfare will be established. The army is going to deepen campaign training so that basic level "group army" campaign training will develop in the direction of higher level campaign training of front armies (campaign objectives) and even combat theaters. The Navy, with an eye to the characteristics of operations in the Spratly Islands, has coordinated strategic patrolling with deep sea training. It has initiated and pushed the establishment of "joint mechanized formations," enabling the joint operations and deep-sea training of the submarines, air units, and ships to gradually become routine. The Air Force will be integrating operational and training duties and will establish interdepartmental cooperation among multiple forces, multiple services, and multiple armed services and coordinated training programs involving air and ground units and will also continue to expand the scope of cooperative training and explore the feasibility of multiple services in the Army and Air Force working together to organize joint tactical training, thereby strengthening cooperative training involving more than one arm of the military. The Second Artillery Corps is building on the foundation of strengthened integrated training, which takes the launch battalion as its basic unit and the launch battalion commander as its focus,

and is developing gradually toward high-level forms of integrated training, such as the missile brigade.

3. With regard to methods, in addition to improving the training sites of various units and adding to training facilities, the Army is going to aggressively develop simulation equipment for campaign training while continuing to perfect and coordinate the simulation training equipment it already possesses. The Navy is going to start developing electronic and laser simulation training equipment for its coastal defense units and the Marines. The Air Force is studying the issue of establishing a flight simulation training center, is developing and equipping the necessary simulation systems, and will take turns training or testing different units. The "Second Artillery Corps" is going to develop simulation training equipment for second-generation weapons. At the same time, they are studying how to organize the simulation equipment of the Army, Navy, and Air Force into one big system, to carry out joint simulation combat maneuvers among the three arms of the military, and to modernize training methods.

E. In order to carry out Deng Xiaoping's instruction that "education and training must be considered an issue of strategic importance," the "Enlarged Session of the Central Military Commission" that was called in 1985 stressed that "the military must take education as its focus and military training as its top priority." However, when military development was placed on a "peacetime" footing in order to accommodate the need for economic development, it caused a huge change in the thinking of officers and men. A peace paralysis and loathing of war flourished, producing the mistaken view that "training is useless." Furthermore, under the onslaught of the policy of "opening up to the outside world and reinvigorating the domestic economy" and the public mood, in which people "in all things look toward money," the troops to a greater or lesser degree have lost their sense of priorities with regard to their work. Training has been weakened. An extremely prevalent view now is to "first grab the money, second keep safe, third do public construction, fourth train." Military training has fallen from its position of "strategic importance," and those who are concerned with training can only "make strategies to retain some importance." In addition, after the Chinese Communists sent 200,000-300,000 troops to occupy the Beijing area and carry out the massacre and suppression that accompanied the 4 June incident in Tiananmen Square, an intense political education campaign involving study of the documents of the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee was launched throughout the military. This will undoubtedly take up the greater part of the troops' time and energy, causing the military to pass up an opportunity for training reform.

VI. Final Comments

Overall, although the series of measures taken by the Communist military in recent years with regard to the system, content, and methods of training has achieved

some preliminary success in raising the quality of troops and in training, strengthening the operational capabilities of units as a whole, and improving rapid, mechanized response, the training system is still not sound, and the system of "training first, assigning later" is facing renewed scrutiny and readjustment. The content of training is weighted toward joint campaign and tactical training, which has meant less thoroughness in basic training. The scarcity of training funds and the fact that training priorities cannot always be achieved will seriously impede the promotion of training reform. In particular, the Chinese Communists have again been stressing ideological and political education due to the influence of the 4 June tragedy in Tiananmen Square. Studying the documents of the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee has become the top priority of the Communist military, causing military training to fall from its "position of strategic importance." It now merely "schemes to retain significance" or "has lost all significance." Therefore, it is doubtful that the results expected of military reform will be achieved.

Footnotes

1. 2 September 1987, Chinese Communists' ZHANSHI BAO.
2. 12 April 1989, Chinese Communists' RENMIN QIANXIAN [PEOPLE'S FRONT].
3. 13 December 1986, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
4. 30 March 1986 and 6 August 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
5. 12 July 1986, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
6. 15 February 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
7. 1988, No 7, Chinese Communists' JUNSHI JIAOYU [MILITARY EDUCATION], and 29 December 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
8. 8 July 1987, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
9. 25 October 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
10. 8 November 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
11. 13 October 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
12. 31 May 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.
13. 13 December 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

14. 21 May 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

15. 20 October 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

16. 8 September 1986, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

17. 1988, No 1, Chinese Communists' HANGKONG ZAZHI [AVIATION MAGAZINE] p 9.

18. 30 September 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

19. 14 June 1988 and 6 August 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

20. 24 November 1987, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

21. 15 February 1987, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

22. 16 January 1989, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

23. 14 June 1989, Chinese Communists' ZHANSHI BAO.

24. 31 March 1989, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

25. 13 October 1987, Chinese Communists' RENMIN RIBAO.

26. 4 September 1987, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

27. 30 June 1988, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

28. 30 April 1987, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

29. 14 March 1988, Chinese Communists' ZHANSHI BAO.

30. 19 May 1989, Chinese Communists' ZHANSHI BAO.

31. 12 August 1989, Hong Kong, WEN HUI PO.

32. 14 March 1988, Chinese Communists' ZHANSHI BAO.

33. 11 March 1989, Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO.

Evolution of Armed Forces' Uniforms

90ON0171A Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU
[STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
No 273, 15 Sep 89 pp 92-98

[Article by Wang Shu (3769 4782): "New-Style Uniform for Chinese Communist Armed Forces"]

[Text] I. Foreword

On 1 October 1988 the system of military ranks was restored for the officers and men in the Chinese Communist armed forces, and at the same time they changed to a new uniform on which military rank insignia were worn.

The colors of the new-style uniform of the Chinese Communist armed forces basically continues to be the old traditional mix of brownish green, dark blue, and white. The only change in accessories is a small Western-style necktie; at the same time, a training uniform and a full dress uniform have been added.

Because of the partial modifications in the new uniform, there are many changes in its outward appearance. This article provides for reference an introduction to and explanation of the relevant situation.

II. Evolution

The first uniform for the Chinese Communist armed forces was designed on 1 May 1929, at a time when they were roaming about in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian. The uniform consisted of a gray octagonal cap (later usually called the "Liberation cap"), gray Lenin tunic, and gray trousers.

From 1 May 1929 to 1 October 1988, the Communist Army modified the style of its uniform an aggregate of 6 times.

The first modification was in 1937. At that time the Chinese Communists, pretending to "resist Japan," were organized by the Nationalist government as the "8th Route Army," and its uniform was changed to be identical with the Nationalist uniform of that time. The distinguishing feature of this uniform was that on the left arm was sewn a large armband, reading "8th Route."

The second modification was in 1945, when the Chinese Communists, after the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, openly rebelled and, starting out from Yanan, roamed about in an area in northeast China and north China. Because this area was in the northern part of the mainland, they changed their uniform to a gray, cotton-padded jacket as the upper outer garment and gray trousers as the lower outer garment. On the front of the chest was worn an emblem with a white background and red borders between which were printed in black the seven Chinese characters reading "Chinese People's Liberation Army."

The third modification was in 1949, after the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime. The Soviet Russian military uniform was imitated, and the style, which in the past had been only the Army style, was increased to Army, Navy, and Air Force styles. The Army uniform consisted of a green Lenin tunic and green trousers; a large-brimmed cap was worn, and only in peacetime was the "Liberation cap" still used. In the Navy, the officer's summer uniform was a white Lenin

tunic, blue trousers, and white large-brimmed cap; the enlisted personnel's summer uniform consisted of a white jumper, blue trousers, and sailor hat; the enlisted personnel's winter uniform was a blue jumper, blue trousers, and flannel cap. The Air Force uniform consisted of a blue Lenin tunic, blue trousers, and blue large-brimmed cap.

The fourth modification was in 1955, when the Communist armed forces for the first time instituted the system of military ranks. The original uniform was partially modified, as follows:

1. For men, the uniform for "field-grade" officers and above was a large-brimmed cap and dress suit; for "junior-grade" officers and below, including cadres and enlisted men, the change to a boat-shaped cap was made.

2. A collar insignia was added to the uniform of officers and enlisted men—red for the Army, black for the Navy, and blue for the Air Force; to the uniform of "field-grade" officers and above were added yellow epaulets.

3. For women—officers and enlisted women—the uniform was a skirt and brimless cap.

4. The cap insignia for the Army, Navy, and Air Force was "five stars and 8.1 [August 1—PLA Day]."

5. For "field-grade" officers and above, the military rank was indicated by "red lines" and "five stars" on the epaulet: 2, 3, and 4 "red lines" respectively representing the three grades of officers [and the corresponding ranks in the Navy]—"field," "general," and "marshal"; stitched above the "red lines" were 1, 2, and 3 "five-star groups," respectively representing for field-grade officers major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel, and for general officers major general, lieutenant general, and general, the rank of marshal being indicated by a large "five-star group" stitched above 4 "red lines." "Junior-grade" officers were indicated by a "blue line" on the collar insignia, with 1, 2, 3, and 4 "five-star groups" stitched above the "blue line," respectively representing second lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and senior captain. As for enlisted personnel, in the Army and the Air Force 1, 2, and 3 "five-star groups" on the collar insignia represented the three enlisted ranks.

The fifth modification was in 1965, when the Communist military abolished military ranks and replaced the old uniform, on which ranks were worn, with a new uniform, in which "the uniforms of the three armed services were the same and the uniform of the officers and men were the same." The features of this modification were:

1. Members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Public Security units without exception wore the new "all-red five-pointed star" cap insignia and red collar insignia. The former cap insignia, rank indicators, epaulets, collar rank insignia, and insignia of branch and arm were abolished.

2. Officers and men without exception wore the "Liberation cap." The large-brimmed cap, the women's brimless cap, and the sailor's large-top cap were abolished.

3. The Navy's uniform was changed to be identical with that of the Army and the Air Force, the color being a dark gray.

4. The former Western-style suit for officers of field grade and above and the women's skirt uniform were abolished.

5. After 1974 the Navy restored its former blue and white uniform, but there were still no rank indicators or branch and arm insignia worn.

The sixth modification was on 1 May 1985, and it focused on rehighlighting the uniform's class nature as well as the different natures of the various uniforms, including:

1. The uniform material was divided into three grades: at the first grade, for cadres at the level of "deputy army post" and above, pure wool was used; at the second grade, for "division-" and "regiment-level" cadres, a woolen blend was used; and at the third grade, for cadres at the "battalion level" and below and for enlisted personnel, cotton was used.

2. The original "Liberation cap" was changed to a large-brimmed cap (Navy enlisted men wore the sailor hat), and a brimless soft cap was additionally issued to women cadres and enlisted personnel.

3. The same "all-red five-pointed star" cap insignia for the armed services was changed as follows: Army—the background of the "five stars and 8.1" symbol became aquamarine; Navy—the background of a naval anchor on the lining of the "five stars and 8.1" symbol became purplish blue; and Air Force—the background of two flying wings on the back lining of the "five stars and 8.1" symbol became sky blue.

4. The former "all-red collar insignia" for cadres and enlisted personnel was changed to: Army, red collar insignia; Navy, black collar insignia; and Air Force, blue collar insignia. To the collar insignia of cadres of each armed service was sewn a golden yellow border, and in the center of the collar insignia was sewn a "five-star" emblem.

5. Semisoft epaulets were added, those of the Army and the Air Force being brownish green and those of the Navy dark blue. The epaulets of military bands and cultural troupes were red with top and bottom yellow borders.

6. Army and Air Force cadres and enlisted personnel were issued garrison uniforms with yellow shirts, and Navy cadres were issued white shirts.

7. After the change in establishment, the uniforms of the branches and arms of the Communist military were:

a. Army: Cadres (including volunteers) wore a brownish-green large-brimmed cap, Lenin tunic, and trousers. The uniforms of enlisted men and officers were the same, the only difference being that the cadre's cap was rimmed by yellow silk braid and he wore brownish-green epaulets, neither of which the enlisted men had.

b. Navy: The summer uniform worn by cadres was a white large-brimmed cap, Lenin tunic, and dark blue trousers; the summer uniform worn by enlisted men was a white sailor hat, jumper, and dark blue trousers. The winter uniform worn by cadres was a dark-blue large-brimmed cap, Lenin tunic, and trousers; the winter uniform worn by enlisted men was a brown flannel cap, dark-blue jumper and trousers.

c. Air Force: Cadres and enlisted men both wore brownish-green large-brimmed caps, Lenin tunics, and dark-blue trousers. The cadre's cap was circled by dark-blue silk braid, which the enlisted man's cap did not have.

III. Course of Development

For a long time only one style was designed for the Communist military uniform. When designing it, the requirements for wearing it in combat, training, and labor had to be taken into consideration, and also the requirements for wearing it in peacetime and on full-dress occasions had to be taken into consideration. As a result, the demands for wear and use on different missions could not be met completely. Therefore, in the Communist military it was widely thought that the uniform for formal occasions was not grave and grand enough, and that it was detrimental to the military man's discipline, appearance, and bearing. In particular, the winter uniform was heavy and cumbersome, and did not meet the demands for combat. There was arbitrary uniformity in the style of the clothing, with summer and winter uniforms being the same and the girth of the fighters' clothing being the same, all of which lessened the clothing's utility.¹

For this reason, in 1986 the Chinese Communists' "Central Military Commission" issued a directive "on implementing a series of full, ordinary, and training dress," and the Communist military's "General Logistics Department" and "Military Supplies and Equipment Research Institute" planned and designed the series. It was said that scientific researchers of this institute, including Li Renxin [2621 0088 2946], analyzed the characteristics of the military uniforms of more than 20 countries. They surveyed 83 units at the regimental level and above of the Chinese Communist Army, Navy, and Air Force, taking samples of the measurements of the human body in proportion to the number of field-grade officers, junior officers, and enlisted personnel; more than 2,000 persons were measured, and more than 700,000 pieces of data were gathered² as the reference materials for the final designs.

Within the armed forces opinions were solicited on the plans for reform of the uniform, relevant departments were invited to discuss modifications, and local clothing

experts were called in to appraise the plans. A clothing and equipment general demonstration meeting was held, at which the CPC Central Committee, "NPC [National People's Congress] Standing Committee," and "State Council" were invited to examine clothing samples. In the end, the "Central Military Commission" approved the finalized designs and designated them the "Liberation Army Series 87 Clothing."

IV. The Current "Type 87" Military Uniform

Besides introducing the "Series 87" clothing currently worn by the Communist military, this part will also describe the "People's Armed Police" clothing made standard after the Chinese Communists on 1 January 1989 implemented the "police rank" system, as follows:

A. Communist Armed Forces:

1. Categories:

The Communist military's "Series 87" clothing, in line with different functions, is divided into three types—full, ordinary, and training dress:

a. Full dress: This is clothing specially provided for officers to wear when taking part in ceremonies and outside activities. It is divided into officer's winter full dress and officer's summer full dress, both being in the Western suit style with the armed service's piping on the sides of the collar and down the middle of the trousers.

(1) Officer's summer full dress: The color in the Army is cream, in the Navy white, and in the Air Force sky blue. The material is valitin.

(2) Officer's winter full dress: The color in the Army is aquamarine, in the Navy white, and in the Air Force sky blue.

(3) Armed service piping: The color in the Army is pure red, in the Navy white, and in the Air Force sky blue.

b. Ordinary dress: This is the clothing issued to military men to wear at ordinary times and at general protocol occasions, and it is divided into summer ordinary dress and winter ordinary dress.

(1) Summer ordinary dress: Except for the pullover-style jumper worn by the Navy's sea-duty male sailors, in the other armed services this is the open-neck small Western-style suit. The color of the officer's summer ordinary dress in the Army is brownish green; in the Navy the officer's jacket is white and his trousers are dark blue; and in the Air Force the officer's jacket is grass green and his trousers are dark blue. The officer's summer ordinary dress is made of woolen cloth; the summer ordinary dress of noncommissioned officers, enlisted men, and military school cadets is made of blended cloth.

As for accessories, matched with the officer's summer ordinary dress are a white shirt and a necktie (black for male officers and red for female officers; for noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, there is a

matching round-neck knit shirt. For extremely hot summers, officers and enlisted personnel are issued a custom-made shirt, and women in the military are issued a dark-blue Western-style skirt.

(2) Winter ordinary dress: For military men there is the upright turnover collar (in the Navy for sea-duty male sailors there is the pullover jumper), and for military women there is the open-neck small Western-style suit with a double row of buttons. As for color, in the Army and the Air Force it is the same as the summer ordinary dress, and in the Navy the jacket and trousers are dark blue. The material is divided as follows: for general officers and field-grade officers, the winter ordinary dress is made of woolen cloth; for junior officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and military school cadets, the winter ordinary dress is made of blended cloth. General officers and field-grade officers have a woolen overcoat; junior officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and military school cadets have a cotton overcoat (in high, cold places this becomes a fur coat). In the Navy, noncommissioned officers and seamen have a woolen overcoat.

c. Training dress: This is the uniform worn during combat training, construction, and the performance of other duties. It is divided into ordinary training dress, camouflage training dress, and special-purpose training dress.

Ordinary training dress: The color in the Army is grass green, in the Navy purplish blue, and in the Air Force the jacket is green and the trousers are purplish blue. The camouflage training dress is divided into summer and winter camouflage patterns. As for shape, the officer's training dress (ordinary and camouflage) for summer is the open-neck style, and for noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel it is the jacket style. The winter dress for everyone is in the open-shut style. The material for the summer training dress is plain washed-cotton cloth and for the winter training dress it is khaki washed-cotton drill. To the winter training dress, depending on the region, are added cotton interlock jersey and trousers, clear synthetic down jacket and trousers, cotton-wadding and cotton-padded clothes, cotton-wadding vests, and ordinary dress overcoats. The ordinary and camouflage training dress comes with a broad-brimmed training cap, and military women wear a brimless cap.

In addition, for special requirements the Communist military has designed several kinds of training dress to be specially provided for particular uses:

(1) Flyer's leather dress: Divided into summer and winter types, this includes a brown leather flight jacket, brown leather trousers, brown leather helmet, and black leather boots. The winter leather flight jacket and trousers have a cold-resistant layer.

(2) Navy ship seagoing dress: This is a training dress that has a special waterproof function, and includes a silver-gray plastic-leather top hood hat, jacket, and trousers and black rubber boots.

(3) Navy submarine cold-resistance dress: This is special-purpose dress designed for multiseasonal wear by officers and men on a submarine, and it includes a dark-blue attached-hood jacket, dark-blue tight-leg trousers, and black, tie, cold-resistant boots.

(4) Type-82 gas protective dress: This is an all-body sealed-type suit with silvery white gloves, gray gas mask, and plastic-leather protective straps connecting the trouser legs to the shoes.

(5) There is wind and rain dress provided for general officers and field-grade officers (the color in the Army is brownish green, in the Navy black, and in the Air Force dark blue); there is a cotton-padded overcoat provided for enlisted personnel (the color in the Army and the Air Force is brownish green and in the Navy dark blue) and rainwear for them (divided into three types: breakdown, cape, and belt and sleeve).

1. Accessories:

a. Epaulets: The epaulets on the new uniform are coordinated with the military rank system put into effect by the Communist military, and major changes have been made in the epaulets, including:

(1) The color on the surface of an officer's epaulets has been changed from the past—brownish green for the Army, black for the Navy, and blue for the Air Force—to being golden yellow for all armed services. The epaulets are edged with pure red (Army), black (Navy), and sky blue (Air Force). Stitched on the face of a general officer's epaulet are imitation embroidery golden yellow stars (for major, lieutenant, full, and one grade higher than full general, there are, in order, 1, 2, 3, and 4 stars). Stitched on the two vertical bars of a field-grade officer's epaulet are silvery white stars (for major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and senior colonel, there are, in order, 1, 2, 3, and 4 stars). Stitched on the one vertical bar of a junior officer's epaulet are silvery white stars identical to those of field-grade officers (for second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain, there are, in order, 1, 2, and 3 stars). The colors of the vertical bars on the epaulets of field-grade officers and junior officers are: Army, red; Navy, black; and Air Force, sky blue.

(3) The colors on the face of the epaulets of the ordinary dress and overcoats of senior noncommissioned officers, specialists, and military school cadets are: Army, pure red; Navy, black; and Air Force, sky blue. In the middle of the face of the epaulet of a senior noncommissioned officer are two thin golden-yellow vertical bars; in the middle of specialist's epaulet is one thick golden-yellow vertical bar; and the face of a cadet's epaulet is edged with golden yellow.

(4) Enlisted personnel wear sheath-type soft epaulets, the face's color being brownish green for the Army and the Air Force and black for the Navy. Golden-yellow horizontal bars on the epaulet show the rank. For the senior sergeant there are 1 thick and 3 thin horizontal bars; for the sergeant there are 1 thick and 2 thin horizontal bars;

for the corporal there are 1 thick and 1 thin horizontal bar; for the private 1st class there are 2 thin horizontal bars; and for the private there is 1 thin horizontal bar.

b. Military emblems (worn on the collar):

(1) Army: red "five stars and 8.1" backlined with a golden five-pointed star.

(2) Navy: red "five stars and 8.1" backlined with a golden anchor.

(3) Air Force: red "five stars and 8.1" backlined with a golden pair of wings.

c. Cap insignia: they are divided into two standard sizes—large and small.

(1) Large cap insignia: This insignia has a diameter of 5 centimeters. Its main part is the "five stars and 8.1" emblem around which and on the lower part of which is a general design composed of a golden ear of wheat, Tiananmen, pine branch with needles, and a gear wheel, all of which are stitched on the large-brimmed cap, the sailor hat, and the flannel (fur) cap.

(2) Small cap insignia: This insignia has a diameter of 3 or 5 centimeters. The main design is the same as that of the large cap insignia, except that there is no pine branch and needles on the lower part. It is stitched on the training cap, Liberation cap, and brimless cap.

d. Collar pattern: This is divided into three types—general officer, field-grade officer, and junior officer:

(1) General officer: The background cloth is made of the same material as the full dress. The pattern is a hand-embroidered five stars and pine branch with needles made of metallic-like raw silk fabric and other materials.

(2) Field-grade officer: The pattern is an imitation embroidered "five stars" and an ear of wheat made of metallic material.

(3) Junior officer: The pattern is an imitation embroidered "five stars" and double-edged swordlike shining rays made of metallic material.

e. Cap bands and clothing buttons:

The cap band of a general officer is a golden-yellow braid made of artificial silk; that of field-grade and junior-grade officers is a silvery gray braid made of artificial silk; and that of enlisted personnel is a black band made of artificial leather. The clothing buttons have been changed, now being made of metallic material and having in the middle of the button the "8.1 and five stars" design.

B. "People's Armed Police"

The "People's Armed Police" uniform is a carryover of the past olive green jacket, trousers, and large-brimmed

cap. Certain modifications have been made in the uniform accessories in line with the "police ranks" promulgated by the Chinese Communists:

1. Epaulets:

The color of the face of the ordinary dress epaulet of "People's Armed Police" officers is golden yellow edged with gold. The designs are:

a. General officer: On the face of the epaulet are metal filling handmade embroidered five stars and pine branch with needles. For the lieutenant general, two golden-yellow stars are stitched on the epaulet; for a major general there is one star (the highest rank in the People's Armed Police is lieutenant general).

b. Field-grade officer: On the face of the epaulet are two red vertical bars. In the middle of a senior colonel's epaulet are stitched 4 silvery white stars; in the middle of a colonel's, 3 silvery white stars; in the middle of a lieutenant colonel's, 2 silvery white stars; and in the middle of a major's, 1 silvery white star.

c. Junior officer: On the ordinary dress epaulet is a red vertical bar. Stitched in the middle of a captain's bar are 3 silvery white stars; in the middle of a first lieutenant's bar, 2 silvery white stars; and in the middle of a second lieutenant's bar, 1 silvery white star.

d. The color of the face of the epaulet for "People's Armed Police" cadets, senior noncommissioned officers, and specialists is red. On each of the two sides of a cadet's epaulet is stitched an olive-green vertical bar; in the middle of a senior noncommissioned officer's epaulet are stitched two thin olive-green vertical bars; and in the middle of a specialist's epaulet is stitched a thick olive-green vertical bar.

e. "People's Armed Police" enlisted men wear red sleeve-type soft epaulets. Stitched on a senior sergeant's epaulet are 1 thick and 3 thin golden-yellow horizontal bars; on a sergeant's epaulet, 1 thick and 2 thin golden-yellow horizontal bars; on a corporal's epaulet, 1 thick and 1 thin golden-yellow horizontal bar; on a private 1st class' epaulet, 2 thin golden-yellow horizontal bars; and on a private's epaulet, 1 thin golden-yellow horizontal bar.

2. Cap insignia: The "People's Armed Police" cap insignia are likewise divided into large and small ones. The diameter of a large cap insignia is 5 centimeters, and its design comprises a shield, "five stars," Tiananmen, rifle, and pine branch. The diameter of a small cap insignia is 3 or 5 centimeters. Except for the absence of the pine branch, the design is the same as that of the large cap insignia. It is worn on the training cap, Liberation cap, and brimless cap.

3. Collar designs:

a. The ordinary dress-collar design for officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel is a shield, "five stars," rifle, and pine branch.

b. The collar design for technical officers is a shield, satellite orbit, and pine branch.

c. The collar design for the training dress is the above-mentioned two designs directly embroidered by computer on the training dress.

4. Cap bands:

The color of the cap band of a "People's Armed Police" officer is gold; the noncommissioned officer and enlisted man wear a black rubber band.

V. Comparison With the Old Military Uniform

A. Although the Communist military uniform has been modified six times, there still exists the old problem of the single and the series not being integrated in the system. In the new military uniform designed this time, for the first time the series of "full dress, ordinary dress, and training dress" has been established. At the same time, multilayer complete sets have been adopted, and chemically blended materials have been widely used in order to reduce the weight of the clothing and improve its cold-resistant, rainproof, and detection-resistance properties so that the uniform meets the requirement for wear under all conditions. Therefore, generally speaking, the new uniform, both in quality and usability, is better than the old uniform.

B. Observing the clothing's color and luster, we see that the "Series 87" clothing basically carries on the colors of the original uniform. With neutral colors made primary, the main hues are green (grass green and brownish green), blue (dark blue), white (base white and bleach white), and blue (purplish blue, sky blue, and sapphire blue). Red, black, yellow (cream and golden yellow), and other decorative colors (including piping, cap walls, and bottom colors) mark and differentiate the different armed services. For the clothing of junior officers and the clothing of noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel, as well as for the training dress of officers and enlisted personnel, the primary hues are grass green and purplish blue, with the objective of harmonizing the clothing colors with the sentry duty, combat, and training environments.

C. There are distinct differences between the "Series 87" clothing style and the old style. The summer ordinary dress for officers and enlisted men has been changed from the traditional Lenin-style jacket to the small Western-style jacket, and for officers a necktie and a white shirt have been added (the necktie is black for male officers and red for female officers). Army and Air Force enlisted personnel wear a grass-green round-neck knit shirt (Navy enlisted personnel wear a jumper) without a necktie. In the past, the officer's uniform had four pockets and the enlisted men's two; now both officer and enlisted men uniforms have 4 pockets. The women's uniform continues to have the original 2 pockets. With regard to trousers, the old style of loose-fitting trouser legs and large trouser crotch has been changed to the new style of tailored and fitted trousers.

D. When the Communist military in 1985 changed to wearing the "Type-85 Uniform," it was precisely at the juncture when the "streamlining and reorganization" were put into effect and preparations were made to restore military ranks. Therefore, this uniform was designed with epaulets for officers. At that time, because of the problem of inequality posed by military ranks, ranks were not indicated on the epaulets, only the armed service insignia. In the existing "Series 87" clothing there is complete implementation of the military rank system. Not only do officers as well as noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel wear epaulets, but the insignia indicates the military rank.

In addition, in the "Series 87" clothing epaulets the original semisoft officer epaulets are retained. At the same time, an artificial silk machine-knit sleeve-type soft epaulet has been added to the ordinary dress and training dress of enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers. This sleeve-type soft epaulet possesses the characteristics of being convenient to wear, easy to remove and wash, light in weight, pleasing to the eye, clearly discernible, not hampering to movement, and advantageous for concealment.

E. Another characteristic of the new uniform is that the original collar-badge insignia has been changed to collar insignia. In the old uniform collar-badge insignia, the colors red, black, and blue, respectively, represented the Army, Navy, and Air Force. At the same time, whether the collar insignia had a yellow side distinguished the officer from the enlisted personnel. The new uniform does away with the collar badge, changing it to three different collar insignias according to whether they are general, field-grade, or junior officers (as described in Part IV), and enlisted men wear the armed service insignia.

F. In the new uniform, the fairly big changes are at the enlisted level. In the past everything that the noncommissioned officers wore was in line with what the officers wore, namely, the silk braid on the large-brimmed cap wall were in line with the officer's uniform colors (Army, red; Navy, black; and Air Force, blue), and the style braid was in line with the officer's silvery white silk braid. At the same time, noncommissioned officers wore officer-type epaulets and collar insignias. In the existing uniforms of the Communist military, there is a distinct difference between the officer's uniform and the noncommissioned officer's uniform. Except for the fact that the ordinary dress collar insignia is still the same for the junior officers, in the epaulets on other uniforms the officers keep the original semisoft epaulet, and the rank is indicated by the metallic "five stars" symbol and the armed service is indicated by the colored vertical bars. The noncommissioned officer's epaulets have been changed to soft epaulets, and rank is indicated by the golden-yellow vertical and horizontal bars on the epaulet. In particular, the officer now wears a white shirt and a necktie with the small Western-style suit. The noncommissioned officer's uniform has been changed to

be in line with the enlisted personnel's small Western-style suit with a round-neck knit shirt. In other words, the noncommissioned officer's uniform has broken away from the past uniform, which was the same design as that of the officer, and tends to be identical with the enlisted personnel's uniform.

G. As for the other military insignia on the uniform, in the old uniform the Army designation was a red "five stars and 8.1" symbol; in the new uniform this is changed to a red "red stars and 8.1" backlined golden five-pointed star. In the Navy and the Air Force, the original design has been retained (respectively, a golden anchor and a golden pair of wings on red "five stars and 8.1" backlining).

As for the large cap insignia of the current uniform, besides adding one centimeter to the diameter of the cap insignia of the old uniform, on the lower side of the cap insignia is added the design of a pine branch with needles and Tiananmen.

VI. Afterword

A military uniform is the outward sign of an armed force's morale and combat effectiveness. In the past, the Chinese Communist armed forces, carrying on the habits and characteristics of rebels and guerrillas, never paid much attention to the uniform they wore, and as a result it looked casual and slovenly. Therefore, after a little more than 60 years of existence, the Chinese Communist armed forces were still thought to possess a strong guerrilla flavor. After the Communist armed forces began their "modernization and regularization," the reform of the uniform gradually drew their attention. In the three years from 1985 to 1988, two sets of uniforms were designed and worn in the Communist armed forces. This time the Communist armed forces threw an unprecedented amount of manpower and material sources into the work of designing a new uniform, and obviously they made this work a major link in their "modernization and regularization."

However, the Communist armed forces had been wearing the new uniform only eight months when the Tiananmen incident, in which the armed forces carried out a bloody suppression, broke out, and the armed forces were regarded by the people with bitterness. Therefore, the officers and men of the Communist armed force no longer pay attention to the new uniform, and they are reviled and loathed by the populace on the mainland. The Chinese Communists' hope that, after the armed forces put on the new uniform, their image as rabble would change, has now completely fallen through. The army-people relationship will worsen, and a new crisis within the Communist armed forces will occur and deepen.

Footnotes

1. 9 August 1988, RENMIN HAIJUN [PEOPLE'S NAVY], published by the "Political Department" of the

Chinese Communist Navy, page 2, "On the Significance of Wearing the New-Style Uniform."

2. 1 August 1988, Chinese Communist JIEFANGJUN BAO, page 2, "Developers of the Series 87 Clothing."

Military Mess Inadequacies

90ON0052A Taipei CHUNG KUNG YEN CHIU
[STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
No 272, 15 Aug 89 pp 96-102

[Article by K'eh Hsuan (0668 5503): "Chinese Communist Military Mess Questions"]

[Text] Chinese Communist Military Mess Problems in Perspective

I. Introduction

The Chinese Communist push for "reforms and openness" and "commodity economy" in recent years have resulted in severe inflation and a general soaring of prices, particularly of supplemental food products, directly threatening the daily living of troops. Beginning in February 1988, the Chinese Communist "Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party" repeatedly raised the mess allowance, but still fell short of requirements. Quality of troop rations continued to deteriorate, arousing general discontent among officers and men. A general view of the mess situation held that "a soldier today 1) can't talk about the cadres; 2) can't join the party; and 3) gets no respect from society. Now with bad meals, there is not much to hope for, let alone a reason to accomplish anything." This kind of "one starts to worry upon entering a mess hall" type of reaction is a reflection of the problems springing up in Chinese Communist military mess management.

Facing an increasingly serious decline in the quality of rations for the Chinese Communist forces, the "three headquarters" had jointly issued directives for tighter mess control, tasking the "all-Army" leadership cadres at every level to deal with mess management as a priority mission, employing "regeneration through self-reliance"; "beefing up supplemental food production"; "promoting plans for extra income"; and "adjusting for appropriate subsidies," to improve the mess situation. But Chinese Communist military mess management has many loopholes for corruption and profiteering, money goes into private pockets, thus severely affecting the troops' quality of life. This article organizes the relevant material revealed by the Chinese Communists to provide an overview of the disarray of Chinese Communist military mess.

II. Mess Allowance Adjustments Lag Behind Soaring Prices

After the Chinese Communists' push for a "commodity economy," inflation reached a critical level, prices went out of control, prices of supplemental foods spiraled

upward many times over. The Communist forces' mess allowance could not buy needed supplemental foods, and the quality of rations toppled rapidly. Relevant events were:

A. According to data published by the Chinese Communist "National Bureau of Statistics," the average mess allowance Communist armywide in 1985 was 1.05 renminbi (referred to as RMB hereafter in this article) lower per soldier than that of the urban civilian. By 1986, it had dropped to 5.11; at the end of 1987, to 6.04.¹

B. Guangdong's Guishan Island saw an upward spiral of prices with a catty (half kilogram) of green vegetables normally going for 1.7 RMB, but the local garrison's daily mess allowance was 1.6 per soldier. Some units could not afford to buy vegetables and were forced to send members in civilian clothes out to the streets to pick only the outer leaves.²

C. The Chinese Communist have high regard for its "air logistics kitchens," adjusting and readjusting its mess allowance five times so as to increase it by 93 percent; yet, in 4 years, prices for supplemental food items near its airbases increased 198 percent. Malnutrition accounted for 1.4 percent of aviators being taken off flight status in 1985, which went up to 5.6 percent in 1986, 6.9 percent in 1987, and continued upward in 1988.³

D. On 12 December 1988, the JIEFANGJUN BAO revealed that certain units at the lowest level were forced to cut back from three daily meals to two because of depletion of mess funds, driving soldiers to local small food shops to "replenish their calories."

E. In July 1987, market prices in the area where a signal company in the "Nanjing Military District" was stationed were as follows: (per 500 grams) choice meat 4.00 RMB, flank steak 2.50, rump steak 2.07, eggs 2.06, small greens 0.50. Yet each soldier's daily mess allowance was just 1.15 RMB, creating an increasingly dissatisfied soldier and worsening food management. The mess squad was equally resentful because "a clever housewife cannot make a foodless kitchen work."⁴

F. On 5 May 1988, "Nanjing Military District's" political commissar, Fu Guiqing, acknowledged that on the Nanjing public market, half a kilogram of lean meat cost 6.00 RMB, live fish 2.30, about 10.0 for a chicken, and, yet, each soldier had only 1.38 to buy food.⁵

G. In May 1988, although the quartermaster general of the General Logistics Department had raised the mess allowance, there was still a considerable gap between it and market prices.

Using a class-1 kitchen as example, each soldier's daily allowance went up to 1.60 RMB, yet, based on the calculations of the supplemental foods' prices allocated for October, each man needed 2.50 daily, a difference of 0.90. The shortfall of the entire Chinese Communist forces for this item was 900 million RMB annually.⁶

III. Slack Management Makes Getting Well Difficult

Chinese Communist military food management and supply have been slack and guidance inadequate, providing loopholes through which corruption sprouted. The following were relevant events:

A. The "Catty and One-Half Plus Four Ounces" Slogan

In December 1985, an "Armywide Logistics Conference" was held. In order to resolve the problem of the continuing decline in mess quality, the General Logistics Department requested that all units improve, proposing an objective of "catty and one-half plus four ounces" in supplemental foods within 2 to 3 years (Note: This meant guaranteeing each soldier a daily ration of 1 and 1/2 catties of vegetables, 1 ounce of meat, 1 ounce of poultry, fish, or eggs, 1 ounce of bean products, and 1 ounce of animal or vegetable oil). But today, it is still a mere slogan not yet implemented.

1. At the start of 1988, the inspector general's office of the General Logistics Department's quartermaster general reported after an exhaustive investigation that the "one and one-half catties plus four ounces" program had not hit reality. Pertinent details were:

a. Hidden corners and blind spots. Of 10 companies investigated, only 2 had reached the goal. Of 24 air logistics kitchens, most people were given an average additional allowance of 0.18 RMB daily. The Second Artillery and the National Defense Science and Technology Commission jointly investigated 16 class-3 and -4 kitchen companies in the ground logistical forces. Billeted in isolated areas and lacking satisfactory production conditions, their average living standard was comparatively lower.

b. Some of the units received unrealistic subsidies for their own production. Of 35 divisions studied, in 1986, only 13.6 percent used proceeds from their own production to subsidize subordinate units. Twenty-four divisions had no standard operating procedure for subsidies for their companies. Of 200 companies, 22 percent never received any help from higher headquarters. Only approximately 55 percent of company-level spare-time production was used to supplement the mess, the balance went toward purchasing or replacing general goods, kitchen utensils, and so forth.

c. Top-heavy distribution. Units above the corps level were able to invest more, acquire more loans, and thus be better able to produce big-ticket items earning higher receipts. But they gave little help to the company level. Of 22 group armies investigated, only three gave their companies some help. Yet at the production-weak regimental levels, gave their companies comparatively more help.⁷

2. On 7 January 1989, JIEFANGJUN BAO admitted that the need to emphasize the "catty and one-half plus

four ounces" goal had become critical. Of 31 companies in two group armies studied, only 45.8 percent had reached the goal.

B. The Cadres Expropriated at Will

The Communist cadres exercised their special privileges by operating their own small kitchens, expropriating the soldiers' mess allowance, or skimming off the top of the companies' profits:

1. Many soldiers of Unit 83863 reported that, from December 1986 to September 1987, on the pretext that few people ate at the battalion mess because the mess allowance was not enough, members of the battalion cadre extracted funds from the soldier's mess allowance to "improve the companies' quality of life," using the money to buy high-quality consumer goods. Six companies successively bought wide-screen color television sets, VCR's, cameras, washing machines, bicycles, and so on, spending more than 5,500 RMB of the mess allowance. Except for the television sets, all went into the cadre quarters for their own use. As a result of such creative appropriating, the soldiers' actual mess allowance dropped noticeably; in nine companies it came to less than 1.00 RMB per soldier daily.⁸

2. On 5 January 1987, ZHANSHI BAO [FIGHTERS] published two articles as examples of the cadres' abuses:

a. In the several months since the company commander and its commissar had been with the 11th Company of Unit 53508, their dependents never paid any mess allowance. Not only did they freely go to the kitchen to procure vegetables, rice, oil, and salt without paying, but they chose the best. The cooks could only stand by helplessly with anger.

b. A soldier of Detachment 79, Unit 54253 reported that, aside from usually eating and drinking with the other cadres, his company commander told his signalman, medic, and cooks to fish furtively but regularly in the company fish tank and use the catch to prepare dishes to go with their wining. Some of the platoon leaders began emulating them, telling the cooks to help pick lean meats for their own small kitchens.

3. On 7 January 1989, JIEFANGJUN BAO printed letters from two soldiers of Unit 81389 named Sheng Shimin and Liu Wanchang: "On New Year's Eve, just as our unit had cleaned up after slaughtering a pig, the commissar apportioned the meat, telling the cooks' squad leader to send the pig's feet to the xx regiment commander, the liver and heart to the family of the newly arrived xx battalion commander, the head to the xx battalion commissar, and the best parts of the flanks to be cut into five pieces intended for various chiefs and superiors. In all, 11 portions were given away. Very little choice meat was left on a hog that had weighed 300 catties." It was understood that other companies had similar flagrant incidents. Some companies bought chickens and eggs on the street only to have the cadres

give them away. Sometimes less than half the amount actually wound up in the soldiers' stomachs.

C. Improper Use of the Mess Allowance

The mess allowance had become an all-purpose slush fund to be charged for any disbursement at will:

1. On 25 November 1988, JIEFANGJUN BAO published three examples of fund misuse:

a. 5th Company, Signal Regiment of a certain group army conducted an open house. It gave a complete facelift to the entranceway, the yard, kitchen, mess hall and service club, using 4,000 RMB in the process. As no money had been allocated from higher headquarters, the company had to use the 3,000 RMB in its production proceeds and still dip into the soldiers' mess fund for 1,000 RMB to make up the difference.

b. A certain group army installed an antiburglary system in its companies, consisting of a coded television cabinet and safe alarm systems, the two items totaling 420 RMB. Some companies reported that they had no funds, but were issued the sets. The regimental vocational office was told take the money out of the mess allowance.

c. In a contest for best financial audit conducted by higher headquarters, an artillery battery moved 1,600 RMB from the mess allowance into a miscellaneous slush fund and one for club activities, getting an award banner.

2. On 17 September 1988, JIEFANGJUN BAO published a letter from "Wang Guomi" of Detachment 70, Unit 54853: "My company, wanting exceptional performance and best training awards, took 0.15 RMB from each soldier's daily meal allowance, which was used at the end of each month to buy a gift for the awardee." While this undoubtedly enhanced training and work performance, the rations situation was adversely affected.

3. In May 1987, the Communist "Guangzhou Military Region" investigated its lowest subordinate units and found that many regarded the allowance as a "catch-all" fund—temporary duty expenses, club activity needs, buying production tools and for maintenance or addition of production equipment—all could be charged to the fund. There was even more flagrant spending, such as for tobacco or wine; one company spent 1,900 RMB on these items in 1 year alone.⁹

D. Wanton Spending Habits Are Hard To Curtail

Although the situation is serious, the Communist military have not yet learned to conserve, but waste food:

1. On 26 October 1987, ZHANSHI BAO [FIGHTERS] published a short expose. A certain company had no dining tables; at mealtime, soldiers and cadres alike filled their big bowls and went back to their quarters to

eat. Bowls only half empty with food were dumped outside the door. Soon a snow-white layer of rice covered the ground.

2. In August 1987, the food supply office of the quartermaster general, General Logistics Department learned of severe food wastage in some units and identified 80 percent of one division's companies as having uneaten cooked rice, steamed rolls, and so forth, in pots supposed to hold spoiled foods, thus creating an 11-percent spending excess. The entire Liberation Army's 1986 excess spending was 27.4 percent higher than for 1983.¹⁰

3. On 25 November 1988, the JIEFANGJUN BAO revealed that a small, impoverished village near a regimental garrison area had recently become prosperous raising hogs. The secret was in the spoiled food pots being a limitless source of choice feed for the hogs. The pots contained uneaten steamed rolls, gleamingly white rice, and leftover cooked vegetables, noodles, and so on. Some locals caustically commented that "these soldiers sure aren't starving!"

E. Economizing by Tightening the Soldier's Belt

Trying to cut costs, the Communist military "jumped out of the fire into the frying pan." Units tried to out-economize each other at the expense of the soldier in order to look "wealthy on paper."

1. On 7 July 1987, "Guangzhou Military District" sent investigators to look into one regiment's company messes. They found a troubling picture:

a. One company reported that the breakfast congee was diluted to the point of being plain hot water, hardly any rice was visible. There were few steamed rolls. On a trip to the latrine after eating would flow out whatever was inside. The remaining meals of the day consisted of hollow vegetables and boiled bean curd with no meat or oil. The usual dish was "sea-land-air" (bean curd soup-greens-tubular vegetables). The mess officer also reported rather sadly that, between funding and food problems, with a lackluster supplemental production program and the necessity to economize and plug loopholes, it was small wonder the soldiers had little extra to eat.

b. Two companies were relatively well off. Vegetable gardens were green, ducks and geese plentiful, and there were fat hogs and lively fish. And spending limits were observed. But some soldiers reported that they ate mostly pumpkins and tubular vegetables. It seemed that when the companies were busy, the messes were well run. But when there was a slack, a portion of the mess allowance was frequently spent to show paper wealth. Some of the fish and ducks had been raised solely to raise cash for this and not for feeding the troops.¹¹

2. On 25 November 1988, JIEFANGJUN BAO published a letter alleging that "we were eating in a 'tank kitchen.'" The daily meal allowance was 2.50 RMB which, even without supplemental food production,

should have made the "catty and one-half plus four ounces" goal with money to spare. But the soldiers still did not see any extras. Where did the money go? It turned out that superiors had made the "10,000 RMB company" award designation a prerequisite to be judged the lead unit in a competition. Those companies constrained by production management conditions became rather creative, using mess fund conservation as a dodge to get there. At first, some cadres did not want to go along with belt-tightening to get the award. But as other units did the same, they did not want to lag behind ("if you save 12,000 RMB and become 'number one,' then I'll pass you by saving 13,000"). Facing such a competitive wind, some units squeezed enough to surpass 20,000 RMB.

F. Severe Cases of Private Purse Fattening

The Chinese mess management system was not practicable. Essential supervision of the mess officer and those assigned to buy food was lacking, buyers had plenty of opportunity to satisfy greed:

1. In January 1988, the "Guangzhou Military Region's" Taishan Farm investigated companies under its control; eight of 12 established no kitchen or financial management procedures, had not even set up an "economic democracy section." While some did have a management system, it lacked practicality. Loopholes existed, such as having no procedure to verify weight of purchased foods, thus giving others a chance to skim off the top.¹²

2. On 25 November 1988, JIEFANGJUN BAO pointed out that the mess allowance went into the pockets of mess officers and buyers:

a. Statistical data compiled at an artillery regiment's cantonment entrance showed that the weight and quantity of 90 percent of the purchases did not match figures on the vouchers, with the cost exceeding market prices.

b. One irresponsible mess officer even used the food allowance for pleasure. To curry favor with a young woman selling bean sprouts, he paid 0.40 catty instead of the offered price of 0.35 RMB.

3. Li Xincal of Unit 51115 alleged on 7 January 1989 in JIEFANGJUN BAO that some of the corruption of certain companies was traceable directly to lack of supervision. "For example, it was very easy to make out a bill for a market near our unit, just pay a 0.10 'bill fee,' and the buyer could state any price and weight he pleased; a bill could be made even without a purchase. This was exploited by the buyers. Some inflated the stated price and/or overstated the weight. The unit must take effective supervisory steps, such as sending people to the market to observe. Quartermasters should check weights periodically and also set up a system for mess hall inspection duty."¹³

G. The Mess Section Lacks Cooking Expertise

The Communist military have been neglecting the instruction and training of cooks. Their skills are mediocre; they can't prepare good meals even with good ingredients:

1. The 10 October 1987 JIEFANGJUN BAO carried an article referring to a common complaint by various companies. Good cooking was lacking even when there were good ingredients. Units had spent hundreds of RMB to train "qualified cooks," only to see them grabbed one after another by high headquarters. For example, one division had 32 "qualified cooks." Division, regimental elements and guest houses took 22 or 68.7 percent of the total, leaving only 10 for almost 100 companies.

2. On 25 November 1988, JIEFANGJUN BAO reported that, in mid-October, an Air Force transportation regiment in the "Lanzhou Military Region" had a standard daily mess allowance of 10.03 RMB per man, but there was only one primary dish, which was bland to the point of being tasteless. The main reason was lack of skill. There was only one master cook in the air kitchen and he had started out as a noodle cook before switching along the way. The entire regiment had fewer than 20 cook spaces. Of more than 130 cooking personnel, almost 90 percent had had no special training or instruction.

From lack of skilled cooks, the 6th Company of a regiment in the "Guangzhou Military Region" saw its soldiers snacking because they lacked full meals.

IV. Remedial Measures That Treat Symptoms

A. Apportion Special Funds in Subsidy

In February 1988, the Communist forces raised the standards of all mess allowance categories by 0.10 RMB daily for each soldier. On 1 May 1988, after an investigation, money was released to align the allowance with the prices for supplemental foods such as pork. Also, class-1. Ground Force kitchens had a daily increase of 0.35 per soldier; class-2 0.22; class-3 0.29; class-4 0.36; and class-5 0.66. Sea, air, and land forces each were raised by 0.35 to 2.80 in January 1989. As a reflection of the sharp contradictions of supply and demand and lowered living standards, special funds were provided to raise the daily allowance standard to 0.30.¹⁴

B. Beef Up Supplemental Food Production

On 7 March 1989, an "All-Army Supplemental Farm Production Teleconference" was convened. Zhang Bin, deputy chief of the General Logistics Department, noted that some units had been emphasizing industry over agriculture to varying degrees and had slacked off on food production. Units were required to step up production on mid-sized and large farms, step up construction of regimental food products bases and, in 1989, an all-Army increase of 30,000 acres for food production to go over 1 billion catties.¹⁵

C. Require Local Guarantee of Food Supply to Troops

In September 1988, the Chinese Communist Finance and Commerce Ministries and the General Logistics Department issued a joint notice requiring local food and finance agencies to adhere to Army requirements and guarantee supply of food, oil, and beans. The key points were:

1. All local food agencies must observe the principle of "Front First, Rear Second. Troops First, Others Second" without exception, guaranteeing to meet troop requirements so they could perform assigned missions.
2. As each area carried out its regional reforms, it should continue implementing the "military food supply and management" plan. No changes may be made on its own.
3. Each commercial (food) agency must organize the supply of food based on required fixed amounts and according to centrally set prices. They may not be raised locally for any reason.
4. Any increase in the required amount of oil and beans due to different or reclassified kitchens that require raising prices, subsidies, or payments would be resolved by the local finance office according to regulations.¹⁶

D. Local Subsidies

To insulate troops from rising prices, local governments must subsidize.

1. In June 1986, the Communist "Guangdong provincial government" took the following steps:

- a. Continue supplying at pre-adjustment prices of food and oil for all land, sea, air, and Armed Police units in the province and subsidize the difference with provincial funds. Based on statistical data, this came to about 20 million RMB. As the province was not self-sufficient in food, it would have to pay 100 million annually to buy food and oil from outside sources.
- b. Continue supplying some of the units with meat. Starting in 1982, Guangdong Province began supplying units at Gaoshan, Haidao, Chuhai, and Shangtian with the meat at the rate of half a catty per man daily. This came to 4.5 million RMB annually.
- c. Continue to perfect service bases raising chickens and fish, providing preferred service in supplying poultry, fish, eggs, and so forth to troops.¹⁷

2. In 1988, the Communist "Fujian provincial government" paid out more than 2 million to help troops establish or expand more than 30 planting or growing bases and supplemental food production bases, letting units in the province reach a self-sufficiency rate in excess of 88 percent in vegetable growing. Plans for 1988 entail additional millions to help continued expansion.¹⁸

3. In the first half of 1988, to support the "Food Basket Engineering Project" and to solve any difficulties the

troops had in raising hogs, the "Zhejiang provincial government" allocated 30,000 hogs from provincial hog farms for troops' consumption and provided, at parity, 1 million kilograms of feed.

E. Develop a Food Conservation Movement

In response to a lack of strict food management giving opportunity for falsified reports, fraudulent requisitions, corruption and theft, reselling food stocks, exchanging food for goods, and general wastage, and so on, a food conservation movement was started. Highlights were:

1. "Nanjing Military Region" developed food consumption and conservation plans. From the start of 1987 to October of that year, the entire area conserved over 14 million kilograms of food. Enough of a surplus was gained to feed all the troops in the district for more than 2 months.²⁰

2. October 1988, "Jinan Military Region" required all troops in the district to start conserving food. Contents of the notification were:

a. Strengthen plans to use and manage food. Carry out storage area antirats, antitoxin, antitheft, anti-overflow plans. Stop using grain rations in exchange for labor services, goods, or personal favors.

b. All agencies at all levels, farms, and troops in general must actively encourage conserving food, overcome the "leave a little in the rice bowl, stick a little to the flour bag, leak a little in the rice rinser" phenomenon, so that the saving of even one grain becomes part of a soldier's self-awareness.²¹

While the Chinese Communists might be able to delay a collapse of the mess situation or ignore reality, the above measures do not address basic ills, such as weak mess regulation, frivolous or poor mess and financial management. It would thus be difficult to expect any fundamental improvement.

V. Conclusions

A small number of cadres have, on one hand, enjoyed living high on the hog, eating the finest rice, the best fish, and savoring rare tastes and flavors. A small feast every 3 days, a big banquet every 5. They have become experts in waste and extravagance. On the other, most of the troops' food tables, day after day, present the "old three varieties" (potatoes, radishes, and Chinese cabbage). Sometimes the troops even lack three consecutive meals and must rely on "convenience noodles" to fill their stomachs and stave off starvation. At present, mainland inflation and soaring supplemental food prices are depressing the value of the mess allowance even further, accentuating even more the polarization between the lifestyle of the high-level cadres and that of the troops. The Communists are forced to face the problem and take emergency remedial steps. But their measures have yet to catch up with inflation, and probably, in terms of rations, further depress the quality of life.

Since 1986, with emphasis on using expenditures to "modernize" the military, the inclination has been to ignore the need to fund troop living needs. Thus, looking at price increases and inadequate rations without passion, the soldiers are encouraged to increase supplemental food production via "catty and one-half plus four ounces" and a goal for "regeneration through self-strengthening." Planning, however, has not been easy. To have enough food, troops toiled in the fields at the expense of readiness, discipline, and training as they have had to suspend normal military duties during planting and harvesting. Soldiers were not soldiering; they were civilians and yet they were not. Sacrificing the best to get the least. What is gained cannot make up for what is lost.

"Man is iron, but food is steel." The quality of rations impacts directly on the strength and health of troops. Without enough calories and nutrition, combat power would, of course, be affected. But, indirectly, so would troop morale as can be seen by this: "Three meals of soup a day, two teary eyes, three same old varieties on the plate, I miss my folks every day." While acknowledging the importance of food to morale and mouthing things like "good food preparation is worth half a leader," the heavy burden is hard to lift, the sore too deep to heal, healing symptoms with money will not fix anything. Looming far ahead seems to be a serious deterioration of troop morale.

Footnotes

1. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 November 1988.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 23 October 1987.
5. Chinese Communist XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, 15 May 1988.
6. Footnote 1, op. cit.
7. LOGISTICS magazine, Issue No 1, 1988.
8. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 19 September 1987.
9. ZHANSI BAO [FIGHTERS], 1 June 1987.
10. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 22 August 1987.
11. ZHANSI BAO [FIGHTERS], 20 July 1987.
12. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 January 1988.
13. ZHANSI BAO [FIGHTERS], 2 January 1987.
14. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 11 January 1989.
15. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 March 1989.
16. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 21 September 1988.
17. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 June 1988.

18. Central Broadcasting Station, 20 January 1989.
19. JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 March 1989.
20. Jiangsu Broadcasting Station, 16 October 1987.
21. Shandong Broadcasting Station, 4 October 1988.

Assessment of Military Position in Wake of Tiananmen

900N0169A Taipei CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU
[STUDIES ON CHINESE COMMUNISM] in Chinese
No 273, 15 Sep 89 pp 1-5

[Article by Pen She (2609 4359): "Looking at the Chinese Communist Armed Forces From the Angle of the 4 June Great Massacre"]

[Text] If the modernization of the Chinese Communist military lacks the political restrictions of democracy, and if the military continues to insist that "war solves problems" and that war is the "highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions"—these military thoughts of Mao Zedong—then its successes in military modernization will be a case of "bad fortune lurking within good fortune." This statement was this writer's conclusion in a September 1981 article entitled "Several Difficult Problems in the Work of Modernizing the Chinese Communist Armed Forces" (CHUNGKUNG YENCHIU, Vol 15, No 9).

In the Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese Communists started up their modernized war machine and massacred unarmed students and masses. Although they suppressed the development of the democracy movement and received Deng Xiaoping's favorable comment that they had "passed the test," the ancient teaching that "bad fortune lurks within good fortune" was confirmed. The direct consequence of the bloody massacre has seriously affected the "stability and unity" of the Chinese Communist regime and has further deepened the mainland people's feelings of being at odds with the Chinese Communists. At the same time, it has seriously damaged the international image of the Chinese Communist regime. As for the Chinese Communist armed forces themselves, it has completely eradicated the 10-year reform in which giving prominence to politics was opposed, factionalism in the armed forces was smashed, the armed forces were required to have ethics and culture, and civilized behavior was stressed, thereby establishing good morale, discipline, and team spirit.

A Discussion of the Chinese Communist Military Forces That Performed the Martial Law Mission

For the Chinese Communists' imposition of martial law in some areas of Beijing Municipality, 12 divisions and two brigades from nine group armies belonging to 4 military regions—Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, and Nanjing—were transferred to Beijing.

With the four divisions of garrison troops of the Chinese Communists' "Beijing Garrison Command" and the one

People's Armed Police column, together with the 38th Group Army stationed near Baoding, which could be transferred at any time, the military force amounted to 90,000 men. This military force should have been enough and more for controlling the situation in Beijing Municipality and for performing the martial law mission. The reason that the Chinese Communists transferred large forces from various places and sent them into the capital was, first of all, they thought that the contradiction had developed to its highest stage, endangering their (actually Deng Xiaoping's individual) ruling authority and that only by setting the war machine in motion could they solve the problem. In two speeches, on 25 April and in the first part of May, Deng Xiaoping said: "We cannot retreat, the problem comes from within the party, and martial law must be imposed," "we must prepare for a nationwide struggle," and "there is no need to fear the people's censure or international reaction; we have the several million-strong People's Liberation Army, and we fear nothing." These statements by Deng Xiaoping reflected the idea that only by setting the war machine into motion could the problem be solved.

The purpose of the Chinese Communists' imposition of martial law, on the surface, was to deal with the daily expanding student movement; actually the crucial part in the above statements made by Deng Xiaoping was "the problem comes from within the party." This meant that in the power struggle within the party use was made of the mass movement to prepare a coup, and also meant that Zhao Ziyang was trying to shake off the containment and disruption of his administration by Deng Xiaoping and the so-called "eight elders." On this point, the objective in mustering the troops was to make preparations to depose Zhao Ziyang. In history this is the usual measure taken by a dictator to launch a coup or to prevent a coup.

Another reason that the Chinese Communists transferred large forces from various places to the capital was that the troops' morale was unstable. Some troops, especially the original ones in the Beijing Military Region, tended to sympathize with the students and with Zhao Ziyang, and they resisted the idea of carrying out the martial law mission, which forced the Chinese Communists to transfer forces from other military regions to the capital as reinforcements to prevent a mutiny.

Although the Chinese Communists argued time and again that it was "sheer nonsense" to say that because the 38th Group Army resisted carrying out a bloody suppression of the students a battle broke out between it and the 27th Group Army. However, various signs indicate that clashes occurred within the martial law troops and that fire fights between them actually occurred. JIEFANGJUN BAO has also admitted that there were ideological differences within the military and sympathy for the students, and an "inability to understand" the necessity of imposing martial law—an extremely serious situation. In my next article I will go into this in a fairly detailed manner.

As for what the Chinese Communists announced about the number of officers and men of the martial law troops who were wounded, there are parts in the announcement that do not conform to common reason. The numbers announced by Yuan Mu [5913 2606] at a 6 June press conference were that more than 5,000 officers and men were wounded and more than 400 were missing. Chen Xitong's [7115 1585 0685] 30 June report at the NPC Standing Committee said that more than 6,000 officers and men had been wounded.

According to the martial law posters, the Chinese Communist martial law troops began moving into the city proper from the outskirts of Beijing before dawn on 3 June. In the early morning of 4 June, they entered Tiananmen Square to complete the mission of "clearing the square," which took a little more than a day and a night. The number of wounded officers and men was not less than that of a meeting engagement that lasts for several days on the battlefield. This number of wounded certainly could not have been caused by the firing of several sniper shots, the hurling of stones, and the throwing of Molotov cocktails. Fairly rational explanations are: First, there were fire fights on a considerable scale between the martial law troops and, second, some officers and men inflicted bloody wounds on themselves so as to evade carrying out the massacre mission.

Especially during the imposition of martial law in Beijing proper, when more than 400 officers and men were missing, it is really difficult to explain this except by saying that these officers and men, because they were unwilling to carry out the mission, went "missing" on their own and deserted.

The above is an analysis made of the surface phenomena during the process in which the Chinese Communists imposed martial law. Looking at the phenomena on a deeper level, we see that they are related to the fundamental system of the Chinese Communist armed forces.

The Relationship Between the Fundamental System of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces and the Struggle Within the Party

The essence of the Chinese Communist military system is far from being the essence of the armed forces defined in two formulations by Mao Zedong at the Gudian Conference at the end of 1929, namely, "the armed group that carries out the political mission of the revolution" and "the sole aim" in building the armed forces "is to serve the people wholeheartedly." The former formulation produced the idea that "politics builds the Army," which demands that "prominence be given to politics"; in the latter formulation, because "the party is the representative of the people's interests," the so-called "serve the people wholeheartedly" actually means serve the party wholeheartedly.

These two formulations are the theoretical foundation for the Chinese Communists' military system. The most primary of the special emblems of the entire system erected on this theoretical foundation is the party's

"absolute leadership" over the armed forces. In the political work system in the armed forces, under the unified collective leadership of the party committee, there are the senior officer responsibility system as well as the political committee member system, both of which were set up to ensure the party's absolute leadership over the armed forces.

Other "well-known sayings" of Mao Zedong's are "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and "with the gun one can create a party." Under the circumstances in which there are factions within the CPC, "with the gun one can create a party" has become with the gun one can create a "faction," and whoever controls the armed forces controls the party.

In recent years, the Chinese Communists' military reforms, although making many "developments" in Mao Zedong's military thought, such as the redivision of the large military regions and large-scale streamlining and reorganization, and also the reforms in the armed forces' education and training system, logistics system, and many other fields, the reforms have all been reforms in the guiding ideology and method at the level of military strategy and have not been changes in the essence of the military system.

Because whoever commands the gun controls the party, the Chinese Communist armed forces are not only a war machine for carrying out foreign military operations, they are even more the basis on which the powerholders within the party rely to get rid of dissidents and to control the regime, and they are also the objective for which two sides contend in the power struggle within the party. The crucial reason for the Peng Dehuai incident and the Lin Biao incident of the past was simply that Mao Zedong wanted to prevent the weakening of his direct control of military power, and the "three supports and two militaries" during the Cultural Revolution even more displayed the greatest function of the armed forces, namely, striking down dissidents in a power struggle.

As everybody knows, the Chinese Communist armed forces are the supreme headquarters of the conservative forces, and in the struggle within the CPC over the last several decades between the conservative forces and the reform forces, from first to last, the armed forces have held the decisive position. At the expanded session of the Chinese Communists' Central Military Commission at the middle and end of December 1986, during the process of forcing Hu Yaobang to retire, the armed forces played a definite role.

On 1 March 1987, after Hu Yaobang left office, the office of the Chinese Communists' Central Military Commission transmitted to all the armed forces a speech made by Guo Linxiang [6753 2651 4382], deputy director of the General Political Department of the Chinese Communist armed forces, in which he stressed that the Chinese Communist armed forces must "from

first to last be placed unconditionally under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and it is absolutely impermissible for other political forces to share in the leadership over the armed forces." By the so-called other political forces he obviously meant the political forces of the different factions within the party, and did not mean the political forces outside the party.

After Zhao Ziyang became CPC general secretary and, concurrently, first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, in name he could share in the leadership over the armed forces, but in reality he was resisted by the conservative forces in the military. After the 27 November 1987 RENMIN RIBAO published Zhao Ziyang's speech on party-government separation at the 7th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee, JIEFANGJUN BAO on 30 November published a commentator's article that stressed, "Our Army is an armed group, and to control the gun barrel it must be put under the absolute leadership of the party," and "the reform of the armed forces, no matter whether in specific goals and content or in ways and means, cannot copy local patterns." This reflected a strong stand in opposition to party-government separation and in opposition to the "transformation" of ideological and political work. It also reflected that, in the minds of conservative forces in the military, Zhao Ziyang still belonged to the "other political forces" that were not permitted to share in the leadership over the armed forces.

Above is an explanation of the party-government essence of the Chinese Communist armed forces, which made it impossible for him to get out of the political struggle whirlpool within the party, to stay aloof from the factional power struggles, and to be specifically responsible for the national defense mission. Below is an explanation of the contradiction between a party army and a national defense army.

The objective of Deng Xiaoping's reform of the armed forces was to transform them into armed forces that both possessed the appearance of a national defense army and were able to maintain unchanged their essence as a "party army." However, the basic mission of a "party army" is to represent the party's interests and be the mainstay of the people's "democratic dictatorship." When the CPC's interests and the state's interests are identical, the mission performed by this kind of armed forces can take on the double meaning of that of a party army and a national defense army. If the party's interests and the state's interests are separate, and even when they go so far as to clash, especially when the inner-party leadership is not united, the question of for what to fight and for whom to fight wells up in the heart of each officer and man.

During the 4 June Tiananmen Incident, the clash between the Chinese Communists' 38th Group Army and 27th Group Army may be said to have been caused by the factionalism of the high-level leading cadres on the two sides. However, in the television scenes in which the soldiers of the 27th Group Army were pinned down

by the students, on their faces were expressions of stupefaction and of not knowing where to turn, which precisely could not but reveal the contradiction in these soldiers' hearts. That the number of wounded and missing officers and men in this bloody massacre exceeded what common logic would have expected is also related to the clash between the officers' and men's "party character" and "people's character." This point has been explained previously in this article.

Currently, in the Chinese Communist armed forces, the greater part of the cadres have had a fairly complete military education, and most of the soldiers have had a junior middle school education. All of them have the ability to receive advice from outside and to think independently. If the Chinese Communists continue to stress that the armed forces' essence is that of a party army and make the armed forces a tool in the power struggles within the party, I believe that this contradiction in the armed forces will continue to expand.

Manifestations in the Chinese Communist Military of "Bourgeois Liberalization"

In a 22 June editorial, the Chinese Communists' JIEFANGJUN BAO frankly admitted that, during the peak period of the student upheaval, in the military "there were those who assumed an ambiguous attitude and wavered," those who echoed the views of others and made thoughtless comments, those who did not distinguish true and false and who believed and spread rumors, and individuals who strayed far. Some persons regularly stressed "maintaining unity with the party Central Committee, but at critical junctures handed in examination papers that were not too up to the mark or even not up to the mark at all."

The 2 August JIEFANGJUN BAO also revealed that, when the Chinese Communist military's General Staff Department party committee was studying the spirit of the "4th Plenary Session" and analyzing the ideological state of the troops, it discovered that "in the period of 'turmoil,' a small number of young officers and men were, like some youths in the localities, confused about whether they wanted the party's leadership or not."

After the June 4th Incident, the Chinese Communist armed forces also launched activities to study the spirit of the "4th Plenary Session" and Deng Xiaoping's speeches, called for integrating ideology with reality, and working to "check (ideology) and purify (the organization)." However, after more than a month of studying and of "checking and purifying," they discovered that the problem was still serious. A commentator's article in the 29 July JIEFANGJUN BAO pointed out, "In the previous stage of study, there was a very big improvement in everybody's ideology.... But this was only an initial, shallow improvement. Speaking of the majority of comrades, in the study their close integration with reality, their truly getting into the swing of things, and

their touching of ideological depths are still very inadequate.... Among some comrades there still exists this or that kind of misgiving, and they do not dare to show their true thoughts."

The 20 August JIEFANGJUN BAO even further pointed out that, with regard to the study of the spirit of the "4th Plenary Session," some people "only take a simple position, handle it perfunctorily, think in one way and behave in another, and speak insincerely."

On the question among the officers and men of the Chinese Communist armed forces of "whether the leadership of the party is wanted or not," there is "confused thinking." In studying the spirit of the "4th Plenary Session," they think in one way and behave in another, and speak insincerely. The reason is that these officers and men already understand that a party that demands that the armed forces serve its interests deviates from the state's interests, and thus they are unwilling to again act as a tool in the struggles within the CPC.

Speaking of this point, with regard to the clashes within the armed forces during the June 4th Incident, they cannot be explained by the existence of the traditional mountain-stronghold faction of the Chinese Communist military. In them is mingled the fact that more officers and men are politically awake. These clashes and splits were not ones clearly demarcated by mountain-stronghold alignment, but in every military unit and in every administrative unit there could be clashes and splits; only in the degree of their manifestation were they clear or unclear.

In fact, the ideas of "bourgeois liberalization" among young military men in the Chinese Communist armed forces are definitely not inferior to those among ordinary college students and youths in society. A manifestation of this "bourgeois liberalization" in armed forces reform is that the struggle between "revolutionization" on the one hand and "modernization" and "regularization" on the other has not let up for 10 years now. Especially since 1988, the main body of armed forces theoretical workers of the Academy of Military Science have proposed that, for a "deepening of armed force reform, the traditional ideology and theory must be broken through and the basic doctrines of "people's armed forces" and "people's war" must be changed.

In the news transmitted by the news agency XINHUA SHE on 15 July 1988 on the "Theoretical Symposium on Armed Forces Reform," it was said, "This 5-day symposium discussed the question of how to deepen armed forces reform. The theoretical workers at the symposium held that to deepen armed forces reform political reform must be switched to total reform, and armed forces reform switched to the coordinated development of reform by the armed forces and the state. These theoretical workers pointed out that conceptual change is the precursor of armed forces reform, and it requires that, with regard to the purpose of building the armed forces, we must get rid of the concept of 'the purpose is for the

people' and the concept of national defense interests be put in its place. With regard to the principle of building the armed forces, we must get rid of the concept that 'politics builds the armed forces,' and put the concept of military functions in its place. And, with regard to the overall goal of reform, we must get rid of the narrow, closed concept of 'defense of the territory of one's country,' and the open concept of 'defense of the land and the sea' be put in its place."

Of these three concepts that must be done away with, the first two ("the purpose is for the people" and "politics builds the armed forces," as explained previously in this article, are the entire military system of the Chinese Communists and are also the theoretical foundation of the "People's Armed Forces"; the third concept is the basic concept of "people's war." Getting rid of these concepts in essence will enable the Chinese Communist armed forces to get out of the whirlpool of political struggles and become a "national defense army" of purely military significance, and will also change "the party's absolute leadership over the armed forces."

As these armed forces theoretical workers pointed out, if changes are not made in these basic concepts and principles for building the armed forces, it will be difficult to get results in the modernization and regularization of the armed forces. Also, under the circumstances in which the "people's character" and the "party's character" depart from each other and the state's interests and the party's interests clash, it is difficult to establish a common faith among the officers and men, and it will also naturally be difficult to heighten their morale, discipline, and team spirit.

Qin's Well-Drilled Troops Could Not Match Huan Wen's Control

In an article on war, Xunzi said, "Qi's art of attack and defense could not cope with Wei's soldiers, Wei's soldiers could not cope with Qin's well-drilled troops, and Qin's well-drilled troops could not match Huan Wen's control." That is to say, victory and defeat on the battlefield are not determined only by the combat skills and the valor and vigor of the individual fighter, but are even more determined by whether the entire body of troops is a controlled army. This means whether all the troops, with regard to the objective of the war and the goal of their actions, have a common, identical understanding, will for fierce and indomitable struggle, a good tacit understanding between themselves, as well as the morale, discipline, and team spirit that this common understanding cultivates. At the same time, the foundation of Huan Wen's controlled army was its political soundness.

Observing the behavior of the Chinese Communist armed forces during the June 4th Incident, we see that they lacked a common understanding of the objective of their actions and that they really exposed the unjustness of their actions. Not only could they not be said to be a controlled army, but also splits appeared among them.

Because of ideological differences and confusion, the actual current situation of the Chinese Communist armed forces is that the high-level military chiefs are immersed in the whirlpool of the struggle for power within the party. Although investigation has revealed no evidence that after the June 4th great massacre there was a struggle between Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492] and Qin Jiwei [4440 1015 0251], there should have been good reason for such a struggle. The basic-level young officers and men are in a dilemma: They are unwilling to act counter to their intuitive knowledge, and they also have difficulty defying orders. Thus, in action they can only, as the above JIEFANGJUN BAO said, "waver and assume an ambiguous attitude," and in their political stand they "think one way and behave in another, and speak insincerely." Such troops cannot maintain good morale and discipline.

Although during the Tiananmen Incident the split in the armed forces did not yet become a clear fact, because of Deng Xiaoping's individual prestige among the military, Deng Xiaoping does not have much time left, and the contention for military power among the Chinese Communists will become more fierce. Once Deng Xiaoping dies, there will be the possibility that a mutiny in the armed forces will occur at any time.

(Manuscript completed on 6 September 1989.)

Problem of Aging Military Generals

90ON0136A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese
No 205, 16 Oct 89 pp 22-23

[Article by Chen Ruixia (7115 3843 7209): "China's Generals Are Aging; Succession Question Attracts the Attention of Many"]

[Text] Generals Are Aging

On 14 September 1988, in Beijing's South China Sea Huairan Hall, 17 high-ranking commanders of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] were awarded the rank of general.

After that, more than 1,000 high-ranking PLA commanders in succession were awarded the ranks of lieutenant general or major general. This was against a backdrop of 23 years during which ranks were abolished. From this one can see that the generals' star is bright, but it is also obvious that they are aging.

One of those awarded the rank of general was Hong Xuezhi [3163 1331 2535], who received his first rank 33 years earlier, and the rank of general from the hand of Zhou Enlai. At that time he was only 42; now he is still a general, but has reached the age of 77.

The other 16 promoted to general in 1988 included: Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], member of the CPC Central Military Commission and deputy secretary general of the Commission; Qin Jiwei [4440 1015 0251], member of the Military Commission and minister of defense; Yang

Baibing [2799 4101 0393], member of the Military Commission and director of the General Political Department; Zhao Nanqi [6392 0589 6386], member of the Military Commission and director of the General Logistics Department; Xu Xin [1776 0207], deputy chief of the General Staff; Guo Linxiang [6753 2651 4382], member of the Military Commission and deputy director of the General Political Department; You Taizhong [1429 1132 1813], second secretary of the Commission; Wang Chenghan [3769 6134 3352]; Zhang Zhen [1728 7201], headmaster of the National Defense University; Li Desheng [2621 1795 3932], member of the Political Commission of the National Defense University; Liu Zhenhua [0491 2182 5478], member of the Political Commission for the Beijing Military Region; Xiang Shouzhi [0686 1343 1807], commander of the Nanjing Military Region; Wan Haifeng [5502 3189 1496], member of the Political Commission for the Chengdu Military Region; Li Yaowen [2621 3613 2429], member of the Naval Political Commission; and Wang Hai [3769 3189], member of the Air Force Political Commission.

He Pengfei Is Now the Youngest General

Of these 17 generals, other than Hong Xuezhi who was a general previously, 12 were formerly lieutenant and major generals.

He Pengfei [6320 7720 7378], head of the PLA General Staff's Equipment Department, is 45 years of age, which makes him China's youngest major general. In 1955, when he was awarded the old-time military rank of general, he was still an 11 year-old child. Also, of this group of generals who are in the prime of their lives, all were working at battalion or company levels when military ranks were abolished in 1965. Jiang Yizi [1203 1355 6327], commander of a certain naval alert district and a newly appointed rear admiral, at the time of the "9-6" naval battle was still commander of a gunnery section on a naval vessel. In that naval battle he was brave and tenacious, distinguishing himself in action, and afterward preserving his honor, steadily rising to become a commander at the division level. In 1987, during the great Anlingpu fire disaster relief, he made contributions. The famous "great tiger commander" Wu Zhangfu [0702 7022 1381] also was selected as a major general because of his outstanding performance.

Among these numerous generals, there is a group of intellectuals who are specialized military officers, and deserve to be called "scholar-generals." Some of these work in military scientific research, some have been teachers in military academies for long periods of time. These intellectuals were appointed generals, reflecting how the position of intellectuals in the armed forces has developed, and is in accordance with the needs of military modernization and specialization.

Among the new generals, there is one large group that specializes in modern military affairs. The great majority of these have had academic training, have a higher

cultural level, and are in a superior position for the march toward a modernized military. They are a force worth watching in the future development of the PLA.

The Urgent Question of Turnover in High-Level Military Positions

At present, of the 17 generals in the PLA, other than Chi Haotian [6688 3185 399] (60 years old), Zhao Nanqi (62 years old) and Wang Hai (63 years old), the other 14 have all reached or are going on 70 years of age. The years do not treat people kindly, and the military is even more like this. Therefore, other than Deng Xiaoping's designated successor as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission who has attracted everyone's attention, the designated successors for every large military district, every major department, are similarly worth noting.

After next year, there will be an adjustment in the procedure for moving up to the higher ranks in the PLA. There is news that Lieutenant General Liu Jingsong [0491 4737 2646], commander of the Panyang Military District; Lieutenant General Fu Quanyou [0265 0356 2589], commander of the Chengdu Military District; Lieutenant General Ding Henggao [0002 5899 7559], director of the National Defense Working Committee on Science and Arts (son-in-law of Marshal Nie Rongzhen [5119 2837 5271]); along with naval commander Rear Admiral Zhang Lianzhong [1728 6647 1813]; deputy naval commander Rear Admiral Li Jing [2621 2529]; Major General He Qizong [0149 0366 1350], deputy chief of the General Staff; and Major General He Pengfei, head of the PLA Equipment Department, are all gathering momentum in their rise and have the possibility of promotion to still higher positions.

Chi Haotian, PLA Chief of Staff

90ON0122A Hong Kong MING PAO YUE KAN [MING PAO MONTHLY] in Chinese No 286, Oct 89 pp 16-21

[Article by Chao Wei (6392 5588): "Chinese Communist Chief of Staff Chi Haotian and the 27th Army"]

[Text] Chi Haotian [6688 3185 3944], current CPLA [Chinese People's Liberation Army] chief of staff, is a figure with real power who is now in the limelight in contemporary China. He has the important post of chief of staff, which means commanding and mustering the armed forces and he is also a trusted follower of Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, respectively chairman and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. He came from the world-famous 27th Army of 4 June this year and was one of the main plotters of the great massacre in Beijing. Students from the mainland, in a demonstration in Boston, USA, once shouted the slogan "Down with Deng, Li, Yang, and Chi—the new gang of four," which makes clear the position of Chi Haotian in people's minds. In the final analysis, how did Chi Haotian rise to power in the Chinese Communist military? What is his relationship with the Chinese Communist 27th Army?

After Joining the Army

Chi Haotian, from Zhaoyuan County, Shandong Province, was born in July 1928 to a middle peasant family. In his youth he attended elementary school and junior middle school in Zhaoyang and Laiyang, receiving a certain amount of education. For a child from a peasant family on the Jiaodong Peninsula, his record of formal schooling was not inconsiderable. Fortunately, his was a middle peasant family, with the economic strength to let him go to the county seat to attend school. Many children of peasant families, if they were to put down the carrying pole, would be so illiterate that they would not know the character "one." However, if Chi Haotian had lived in a landlord's or wealthy peasant's family, it naturally would have been difficult for him to join the Communist army and have a meteoric rise in the future, and I'm afraid that it would not have been possible earlier to have preserved his life. According to records, in the period of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists, the class struggle on Jiaodong Peninsula was extremely ruthless. In the Communist army-controlled "liberated areas," entire families of landlords and wealthy peasants were killed. At the same time, the landlords' Restitution Regiment, following the Nationalist army's recapture of villages, also frequently wantonly murdered the procommunist activists in the poor peasant associations and the Communist cadres in the countryside.

In June 1944, at the age of 16, Chi Haotian joined the CPC-led 8th Route Army. His contingent was subordinate to the Jiadong Military District of the 8th Route Army, which was commanded by Xu Shiyou [6079 0013 0645]. Xu Shiyou was a brave warrior in Chinese Communist military circles. In his early years in Wutaishan he left home and became a Buddhist priest. Later, he returned to his hometown, and, in the border district of Yuwan in Hubei Province, he joined the Red 4th Front Army. Accumulating merit, he rose from private to army commander, and became a high-ranking officer under Zhang Guotao. In 1937, in northern Shaanxi Province, Mao Zedong purged Zhang Guotao, and at the same time he launched a struggle against the high-ranking cadres of the Red 4th Front Army. At that time Xu Shiyou was relieved of his military command and transferred to the high-ranking cadre class at the "Red Army University" to study. Fiery-tempered Xu Shiyou, resentful of being criticized and denounced, mustered several dozen high-ranking cadres of the original Red 4th Front Army in an attempt to escape into the hills and wage guerrilla warfare. This plan was reported by confederates and all those involved were arrested. Xu Shiyou and other leaders were sentenced by the Chinese Communists' own "court" to terms of imprisonment. Unexpectedly, soon afterward the July 7th Incident broke out and the Sino-Japanese war was on. The Red Army reorganized the 8th Route Army and sent it to the battlefield. Circumspect and far-sighted, Mao Zedong, to "rally" the cadres of the original Red 4th Front Army and to buy popular support, personally went to the prison and released Xu Shiyou and the others, and he

permitted Xu Shiyou to lead troops to the front line. Xu Shiyou was deeply grateful to Mao and prostrated himself before Mao in admiration.

When Xu Shiyou came to Shandong he first was a regimental commander in the Shandong Column of the 8th Route Army and later became commander of the 5th Brigade. Xu was worthy of being called a valiant general who could attack and fight battles. He very quickly opened up the situation on the Jiaodong Peninsula and wrested control of most areas in Jiaodong from the Japanese and Nationalist rear area units. In 1945, when the Japanese invaders surrendered, there were a little more than 20,000 men under his command. At this time Chi Haotian was just a private under Xu Shiyou.

Promoted From Fighter to Deputy Squad Leader

After Japan's surrender, the contention between the Nationalists and the Communists began. Under orders, the 8th Route Army's main force, which was in the Jiaodong area, crossed the sea into Liaodong at top speed in order to contend with the Nationalists for the three northeastern provinces—Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. Xu Shiyou was left behind. He remained the commander of the Chinese Communists' Liaodong Military District. Almost all of the main force was transferred, leaving only one main regiment, namely, the old 13th Regiment, in which Chi Haotian was a fighter. Seeing the greater part of his own contingent moving east, Xu Shiyou was naturally dissatisfied. Fortunately, the Soviet Red Army, which entered the three northeastern provinces, responded by supplying the Chinese Communist armed forces with munitions and weapons. Therefore, the Communist army that entered the northeast left most of its weapons behind and Xu Shiyou had the amount needed to expand his force.

In 1945 and 1946, Xu Shiyou made use of the opportunity presented by the Nationalist-Communist cease-fire to expand his force in a big way. In the Shandong Military District he quickly formed the 5th Division, the 3d Garrison Brigade, and the 4th Garrison Brigade. Almost all the officers and men of the old 13th Regiment were promoted one or two ranks. Because Chi Haotian was just 17 or 18, he was promoted only to deputy squad leader, and he always put after his name the character for "senior."

In 1947, to fight a decisive battle with the Nationalist main force, the Chinese Communists' East China Field Army marshalled its units, and the Communist main force in Jiaodong became the 9th Column of the East China Field Army, with Xu Shiyou as its commander. At that time, the commander and the deputy commander of the East China Field Army were Chen Yi and Su Yu [4725 940], respectively. The 9th Column was the predecessor of today's 27th Army.

The Jiaodong people are noted for their intrepidity. Coupled with the very severe class struggle there, the combat effectiveness of the 9th Column of the East China Field Army was especially high. Of course, this

had a great deal to do with Xu Shiyou, this brave general, and it was precisely a case of "under a strong general there are no weak soldiers." Within the borders of Shandong, in the Laiwu, Menglianggu, Jiaodong, and Jinan campaigns, the 9th Column of the East China Field Army charged in the front. At the beginning of 1948, Xu Shiyou was promoted to commander of the Shandong Army Group of the Chinese Communists' East China Field Army. Under his command were five columns (equivalent to armies). At the same time, he was concurrently commander of the 9th Column, which was naturally the main force of the Shandong Army Group. The Shandong Army Group once independently held Jiaodong and fought a bloody battle with the Nationalists' Fanhanchieh Army Group to a standstill.

Steps to High Official Positions

What showed Chi Haotian's talent to the Chinese Communist military circles was the September 1948 Jinan campaign. This campaign was the overture to the great clash for supremacy between the Nationalists and the Communists. At that time Wang Yao-wu [3769 5069 2976], general of the Nationalist garrison in Jinan, commanded 100,000 troops entrenched in Qiancheng. The Communists, with Xu Shiyou's unified command of 200,000 men in seven columns, formed a siege group, and with Su Yu's command of a little more than 200,000 men in eight columns formed a group to attack reinforcements. With Xuzhou as the center, the Nationalists concentrated three army groups in preparation for reinforcing the north. The 9th Column, which was under Xu Shiyou's direct control, was the main attack force. At that time Chi Haotian was the deputy political instructor of the 7th Company, 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment, 1st Division, 9th Column. As chance would have it, the 7th Company was selected to be a "dagger company."

The Battle of Jinan lasted 8 days and 8 nights, during which the two sides killed amid chaos and darkness. The city of Jinan finally fell because Wu Hua-wen's [0702 0553 2429] unit of the Nationalist forces was persuaded to defect by the Communist forces. The military successes of the 3d Regiment, 9th Column, of which Chi Haotian was a member, were outstanding, and the regiment suffered casualties amounting to more than half its number. The CPC Central Committee bestowed on it the title of "Number One Regiment at Jinan." After the fighting, the 7th Company, of which Chi Haotian was the deputy political instructor, had only a third of its number left, and the East China Field Army bestowed on it the title of "Heroic Company at Jinan." This title became the flight of stairs on which Chi Haotian climbed up step by step in promotions. People who know very well the internal situation in the Communist army understand that cadres associated with "models" and "heroic companies" rise particularly quickly and get special attention. What they do is easily selected as an "experimental point." Chi Haotian rose in the ranks so fast because he was associated with this company.

After the Battle of Jinan, Xu Shiyu no longer held the post of commander of the 9th Column. Nie Fengzhi [5119 7685 5267] became commander and Liu Haotian [0491 3185 1131] became political commissar of this column. Afterward, the 9th Column took part in the Huai-Hai Battle, which was the decisive battle in the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists. At the end of 1948, the CPC Central Committee rearranged, in a unified manner, the Communist army throughout China. The 9th Column became the 27th Army and was put under the 9th Army Group of the East China Field Army, with Song Shilun [1345 2514 6544] as army commander and Guo Huaruo [6753 0553 5387] as its political commissar. Three armies were put under the 9th Army Group, the other two being the 20th Army and the 33d Army. The 20th Army was originally the 1st Column of the East China Field Army. The 33d Army was composed of the former 1st Division of the Bohai Column and the former Nationalist unit of Chang K'o-hsia [1728 0344 0204], which had surrendered in the Huai-Hai Battle. Xu Shiyu was appointed commander of the Shandong Army Group, which was left in the rear, and his connection with the Field Army was severed as was his connection to the 27th Army, which he had personally led.

After this, the 27th Army, led by Nie Fangzhi, took part in the Changjiang River Crossing Campaign and the Shanghai Campaign. In the Battle of Shanghai, the 27th Army was responsible for the main attack mission, and for the Chinese Communists it performed deeds of valor in battle throughout China.

When the Chinese Communists established their state in 1949, the 27th Army was on garrison duty in southern Jiangsu. Chi Haotian was then 21 years old and had been promoted to political instructor of the 7th Company. Because he was wounded five times during the war and at the same time was the political instructor of the "Heroic Company at Jinan," he was awarded the title of "People's Hero, Third Class, of East China."

Taking Part in the Korean War

In October 1950 the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean war. With Peng Dehuai as commander of the "Chinese People's Volunteers," six armies entered Korea to fight, concentrating on the western line of the Korean Peninsula. In November the Chinese Communist 9th Army Group entered Korea and became responsible for operations on the eastern line of the Korean Peninsula. In the Chongsin Reservoir area, the 9th Army Group surrounded the 1st Marine Division. After fierce fighting for several days and nights, the U.S. forces broke out of the encirclement, but with heavy casualties. The Communist forces then stormed and captured the port of Wonsan. The 27th Army, as the main force of the 9th Army Group, took considerable casualties in this operation. Chi Haotian took part in this campaign, and on the Korean front line he was promoted to commander of the 3d Battalion. At this time, although the Chinese Communist forces had forced the UN forces to withdraw,

their own vitality was sapped and there had been depletion in their numbers of a little over 40,000 men. The 9th Army Group rested and replenished itself within North Korea's borders for one winter, after which its combat effectiveness was restored.

Stepping Stones to the NPC

In the summer of 1952, the 27th Army returned to China from Korea and was put into the Nanjing Military Region. In 1955 Mao Zedong, for their outstanding services, made the aged generals Chen Yi and Su Yu, respectively, one of the 10 marshals and the 10 senior generals; Xu Shiyu became one of the 50 generals, Nie Fengzhi became a lieutenant general, and Chi Haotian became only a senior captain. In the old 8th Route Army there were many veterans but almost no generals, so it was not incorrect for Chi Haotian, who had joined the "late-stage 8th Route Army" in 1944, to be promoted only to senior captain. After being trained in the Nanjing Higher Infantry School, Chi Haotian was promoted to major and deputy commander of a regiment. It took nine years for Chi Haotian to advance from battalion commander to regiment deputy commander, but afterward his official career proceeded smoothly.

In 1964 Chi was promoted to lieutenant colonel and regiment commander, and later his post was changed to that of the regiment's political commissar. In 1965, to "revolutionize" the Army, the Chinese Communists abolished the system of military ranks. In 1966, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Chi was appointed deputy director of a division's political department. In addition, what is noteworthy is that in the 1959 and 1964 National People's Congresses, Chi Haotian was "elected" by the armed forces to be a people's representative. For Chi the meaning of this status of "representative" was definitely not inferior to the addition of one star or two beans on his epaulet. It showed a person's political position. With this "representative" status, a man with a higher military rank would regard him with special respect, and the senior officers of the military region on up to the Military Commission would take note of this field-grade officer. At the same time, this status enriched Chi's experience, and political ambition welled up in his breast. After all, he had the power of a representative concerned with "affairs of state."

Behavior During the Cultural Revolution

When the hurricane of the Great Cultural Revolution suddenly struck, Chi Haotian was deputy director of the Political Department of the 79th Division in the 27th Army, and was only a cadre with a full regimental post. In January 1967 Mao Zedong and Lin Biao ordered the Liberation Army to intervene in the Cultural Revolution in support of the leftist masses in the localities. Chi Haotian's unit was stationed in Suzhou, a city known as a paradise. As a political officer, Chi Haotian naturally responded actively to Mao's and Lin's call, and he threw himself into the "three supports and two militaries" movement. Mr Chi's department in Suzhou supported

one mass organization, deeming it "leftist," and attacked another mass organization, denouncing it as "rightist." He also winked at the armed struggle between the two organizations and their race to control territory, which turned Suzhou into a seething mess. After a year of tangled fighting in 1968, the establishment of Jiangsu Province's "revolutionary committee" was proclaimed in Nanjing, and the situation became a little more stable. In January 1969 Suzhou City's "revolutionary committee" was established. With his status as an active duty military man, Chi Haotian became vice chairman of the Suzhou City "revolutionary committee."

At that time most of the power was held by military men. The chairman of the Suzhou City "revolutionary committee" was only a puppet. What Vice Chairman Chi Haotian said counted, and for a period of time he was the one with real power and prestige. Since the beginning of the sixties, Xu Shiyu had been commander of the Nanjing Military Region. The 27th Army was Xu's old outfit, and he naturally viewed it in a favorable light. Cadres with a background in the 27th Army were promoted fairly rapidly, which was only logical. In 1970 Chi Haotian returned from the locality to his unit and became political commissar of the 79th Division of the 27th Army. The next year he became deputy director of the 27th Army's Political Department (a full division post), which was Mr Chi's highest post in the 27th Army. Recently, some outsiders have said that Mr Chi was the commander or the political commissar of the 27th Army, but that is incorrect.

Getting Deng's Favor and Rising Several Grades

In 1971, after the September 13th Incident, Lin Biao was defeated and overthrown. The forces within the military were readjusted: the cadres in the 4th Field Army system, who had all along been "Red," began to go down the slope; the cadres in the 2d and 3d Field Army systems began to gain ground. Taking advantage of the wind to gain ascendancy, Mr Chi became a beneficiary.

At the beginning of 1975 Deng Xiaoping, making a full admission of his mistakes, made a second comeback. He was appointed by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai as vice chairman of the party Central Committee, vice premier, and PLA chief of staff, and in reality he took charge of the work at the center. At this time, on the extremely warm recommendation of You Taizhong [1429 1132 1813], Deng's old comrade-in-arms, Chi Haotian in one leap rose from deputy director of the 27th Army Political Department to deputy political commissar of the Beijing Military Region, rising three or four grades in succession. At that time, You Taizhong was the commander of the Beijing Military Region and, as Chi's superior, he highly appreciated Chi's competence. This was a big "leap" in Chi Haotian's official career, at one stroke rising from a cadre with a full division post to a "senior officer" with a deputy post in a large military region. How should this phenomenon be interpreted? Actually, in the Chinese Communist party, government, and military, cases where a person in power unconventionally

promotes people by skipping grades are a common occurrence. Only in this way can the person in power make the person promoted deeply grateful and devoted heart and soul to him as an individual. Just think, if a promotion followed the prescribed order, the one being promoted would think it only natural, and then what would be its significance? In addition, the person in power by this means tells his subordinates that the people he himself likes can be put in important positions, and thus he makes his subordinates ready to render service to himself at the cost of their lives. Before Chi Haotian was promoted to deputy political commissar of the Beijing Military Region, he was "temporarily transferred" to JIEFANGJUN BAO, where he took charge of the work there for a short period of time, being responsible mainly for the exposure and criticism of Lin Biao's "antiparty" crimes. This experience was highly beneficial to his future development. JIEFANGJUN BAO had been a "major disaster area" controlled by Lin Biao. During the Cultural Revolution, many editorials were published in the name of the "two newspapers and one periodical" (the "two newspapers and one periodical" were RENMIN RIBAO, JIEFANGJUN BAO, and the magazine HONGQI [RED FLAG]). Li Na [2621 6077], Mao Zedong's and Jiang Qing's only daughter, with the status of an editor of JIEFANGJUN BAO, rose in revolt against the chief editor of the army newspaper at that time. Xiao Li [5618 0500] (whose name is a homophone of Xiao Li [1420 2621]—Young Li) became the chief editor of the army newspaper. Afterward, Lin Biao's forces entered the premises of the army newspaper, and Li Na, who had other important tasks, left the army newspaper. From this can be seen the important position of JIEFANGJUN BAO in the eyes of the persons in power. After the great massacre of 4 June in Beijing, JIEFANGJUN BAO, with a murderous tone, encouraged acts of repression, and also sent a large number of personnel to take control of RENMIN RIBAO and other newspapers and periodicals.

On 6 October 1976, when Mao Zedong's corpse was not yet cold, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing [3076 2639 5281] launched a coup d'etat, "with one blow smashing" the Jiang Qing clique. On 8 October, leading some military men, Chi Haotian entered the premises of the Chinese Communist party newspaper RENMIN RIBAO and took control of its leadership. Mr Chi became the actual person in charge of RENMIN RIBAO. He personally had the power over administrative and personnel matters and was responsible for reshuffling the leading group there. In the one year's time that Mr Chi was at RENMIN RIBAO he had many contacts with important members of the CPC Central Committee. For taking charge of the work of "bringing order out of chaos" at RENMIN RIBAO, he was commended repeatedly by the CPC Central Committee. The RENMIN RIBAO of that time had basically not developed its later "tendency toward liberalization"; on the contrary, it exposed and criticized the gang of four and rehabilitated the older cadres.

Taking the Post of Deputy Chief of Staff and Winning the Favor of Yang Shangkun

In 1977 Deng Xiaoping, indicating support for his third comeback, this time after Hua Guofeng, recovered the posts of vice chairman of the party Central Committee, vice premier, and chief of staff. In the same year Chi Haotian was appointed deputy chief of staff, as a reward for his hard work. Obviously, Deng Xiaoping at this time regarded Mr Chi as his trusted subordinate. That Mr Chi, from being a political work cadre at the regimental level and above would, unexpectedly, be appointed appointed deputy chief of staff was really a surprise. Mr Chi—this deputy chief of staff—did not take charge of military affairs, but rather took charge of political work in the General Staff Department.

At the beginning of 1979, after outbreak of the war to "punish Vietnam," the elite 27th Army took part in the war of counterattack on the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Chinese Communist armed forces, which had been damaged by the Cultural Revolution's "three supports and two militaries," did not behave satisfactorily in the war against Vietnam, and they basically did not attain the predetermined goal of "punishing" Vietnam. The 27th Army was no exception. During the Sino-Franco War of 1885, the Qing army general Feng Zicai in one night went through Zhennan Pass and attacked Long San; but, nearly a hundred years later, a Chinese Communist 200,000-strong army took a full 15 days to attack Long San after coming through Friendship Pass, advancing an average of only one kilometer per day, a rate of speed that really cannot be justified. The Sino-Vietnamese border war at the beginning of the eighties was one in which both sides repeatedly made "meat grinder"-type charges for commanding heights on the border, shedding a lot of blood in vain. The 27th Army, after taking part in the war against Vietnam, returned to China without gaining merit, but it used its participation as capital to assert that it had performed meritorious services for the state, which could only deceive the good and honest people who did not know the inside story.

After 1981, Deng Xiaoping asked Yang Shangkun to take charge of the daily work of the armed forces, and Yang first took the post of secretary general of the Central Military Commission, and then that of its permanent vice chairman. As deputy chief of staff, Chi Haotian was close to Yang Shangkun, toward whom he was reverent and respectful, asking for instructions in the morning and reporting back in the evening. Gaining Yang's favor, he became Yang's trusted follower.

Shielding the 27th Army

In 1985 Chi Haotian was sent out to be the political commissar of the Jinan Military Region, which was one of the Chinese Communists 10 major military regions at that time. The commander of the Jinan Military Region at that time was Li Jiulong [2621 0046 7893]. Chi is a Shandong man, and he fought in war in Shandong all year round. This appointment as political commissar of

the Jinan Military Region could be called a "return home after making good." The 27th Army at this time was on garrison duty in the Jinan Military Region. With Chi's background in the 27th Army he naturally became an "old senior officer" of the Army and took a lot of interest in it. At the same time he changed the leading group at his discretion, making the 27th Army into a unit that he could control directly. During the streamlining and reorganization of the Communist Army throughout China, the Jinan Military Region not only was not dismantled but rather expanded its forces because of the dismantling of the Wuhan Military Region, annexing Henan Province, which had formerly been under the jurisdiction of the Wuhan Military Region. Also, the 27th Army was not streamlined; on the contrary it was expanded into a group army, its equipment was upgraded and its strength was increased. Some military regions (like the Kunming, Yangzhou, and Wuhan Military Regions) and units that had no backstage supporters had their military designations removed and were reorganized. Without a doubt, the 27th Army's close relationship with the "old senior officer" not only meant that it escaped unscathed; on the contrary, it was expanded and strengthened, for which the cadres in the Army from top to bottom were deeply grateful.

Taking the Post of Chief of Staff

In October 1987 the 13th National Party Congress was held. Deng Xiaoping kept the post of chairman of the Central Military Commission. Zhao Ziyang was elected general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and at the same time he became the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and it seemed certain that in the future he would become chairman of the Central Military Commission. Noting this situation, Yang Shangkun, who deeply feared that in the future his own position in the military would be unstable, and hurriedly taking advantage of the fact that Deng Xiaoping was still in office in the Central Military Commission, strengthened his own forces. First of all, he replaced Yu Qiuli [0151 4428 6849], whom Hu Yaobang intended to promote, with his younger brother Yang Baibing [2799 4101 0393], who took the post of director of the General Political Department of the Chinese Communist armed forces. In the sixties Yang Baibing was just a field-grade officer, but after Yang Shangkun took charge of the armed forces he was promoted to deputy political commissar and then political commissar of the Beijing Military Region. At the same time, soliciting Deng's consent, Yang Shangkun promoted Chi Haotian to the powerful post of chief of staff in order to deal with a possible challenge in the future from Zhao Ziyang's forces.

Of course, given Chi Haotian's experience, he was not fit to be chief of staff in charge of the military profession. His main experience was that of an officer in political work, and he was not very familiar with the general staff profession. A chief of staff of a great country should have a profound mastery of military affairs, and should be well versed in world strategy and advanced military

science and technology. Obviously, Mr Chi did not meet these conditions. To protect their own power and influence, Deng and Yang, when appointing the chief of staff, did not at all consider the country's interests. From this can be seen the harm done to a country by dictatorship. Ordinarily, if Deng and Yang were bent on promoting Chi Haotian, it would seem to be more appropriate to let him become director of the General Political Department. However, Yang Baibing was also a political cadre, and was even less than Chi a model in military affairs. By comparison, Chi Haotian had been the type of officer who had been a battalion commander and a regiment commander. He had been deputy chief of staff (although just in charge of political work). Therefore, from this selfish motive, they could only let Chi be chief of staff and Yang Baibing be director of the General Political Department. Thus, in November 1987, Chi Haotian was appointed to chief of staff immediately, the most powerful post in the Chinese Communist Army, replacing the old General Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807]. On the day he assumed office, Mr Chi, enormously proud of his success, was visibly pleased. He said that on "the day I received this appointment I slept uneasily and ate without tasting the food," and that "weather is not as good as terrain advantages, and terrain advantages are not as good as the support of the people." Actually, this statement of Mr Chi's was not wrong, only "support of the the people" should be understood as the backstage support of the "old men's party." At that time Chi Haotian was just 59 years old.

Future Trends, Attracting Attention

In 1988 Chi Haotian and Yang Baibing were among the first group of generals when the Chinese Communists restored the system of military ranks. Chi and Yang, both field-grade officers in the sixties, were the ones in this group of generals who were promoted the fastest. The great majority of this batch of generals had held the rank of general before. For example, Hong Xuezhong [3163 1331 2535], permanent member of the Central Military Commission, was a general in 1955, and after an interval of 33 years was still a general. Also, for example, Qiu Jiwei [4440 1015 0251] in 1955 was made a lieutenant general, and this time he was promoted to general. By comparison, the sudden promotions of Chi and Yang were dazzling. Undoubtedly, their fast promotions were resented by many military figures, but out of fear of the backstage support, they did not dare to show their resentment.

Precisely because Chi Haotian came from the Chinese Communist 27th Army, and also because he was the Chinese Communist chief of staff who commanded the armed forces, it may be inferred that he was deeply drawn into the 4 June great murder case that shocked the whole world. Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun are both old men over 80 years old, and no matter what they say, within a few years they will "enter the coffin." Today on the mainland the situation of "the gun commands the party" has already appeared. The other executioner in the murder case, Li Peng, is also a role player

"who does not know the military." Jiang Zemin, the newly appointed general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, also does not have the slightest roots in the armed forces. Therefore, Chi Haotian's movements in the future are more worthy of attention. We can even more boldly conjecture that once Deng, Yang, and the other members of the old men's party withdraw from the stage of history (not necessarily by dying; they could turn into vegetables), Mr Chi's role will become more notable, and the 27th Army, whose hands are stained with blood, will take orders from their "old senior officer." When the time comes, the forces of the people and the healthy forces within the CPC, if they want to obtain victory, will have the top-priority task of getting rid of Chi Haotian, whose backstage supporter is the 27th Army. Once Mr Chi is gone, Li Peng will become a "turtle in a jar or a dragon in an engraving"—bottled up or trapped—and it will certainly not be difficult to get rid of him. With regard to Jiang Zemin, the new general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, although he was selected by Deng Xiaoping and although politically he is an enemy of the people's democratic movement, after all there is no blood on his hands and he has a fairly large leeway to trim his sails. Again, with regard to Wan Li [5502 6849], chairman of the Standing Committee of the "National People's Congress," and Hong Xuezhong, Qiu Jiwei, and Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], members of the CPC's Central Military Commission and powerful high-ranking military officers, their hands are not stained with the blood of this great massacre, and the aforementioned possibility is not just a fond illusion.

Of course, history is a living thing, and its development is determined by the balance of many-sided, comprehensive forces. A specific forecast made today cannot attend to each and every thing, but it may be affirmed that, in China's current political situation, after the great massacre in Tiananmen the struggle has not yet ended. A great change is brewing. Good will be rewarded with good, and evil with evil. Once the time comes, everything will be rewarded. Let us raise our heads and look forward, waiting for the morrow when the people's forces will be victorious and the executioners will be executed!

Li Yaowen, Military Scholar

900N0234A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
(WIDE ANGLE) in Chinese
No 206, 16 Nov 89 pp 46-48

[Article by Liu Fuyuan (0491 4395 6678): "Military Scholar, Admiral Li Yaowen"]

[Text] The CPC Navy is working hard to speed up the pace of its modernization. Li Yaowen [2621 5069 2429], who is now serving in the CPC military as a naval admiral, a member of the CPC Central Advisory Commission, and Navy political commissar, has always been dedicated to the job of long-range naval development. Admiral Li has assumed greater importance to the CPC

science and technology. Obviously, Mr Chi did not meet these conditions. To protect their own power and influence, Deng and Yang, when appointing the chief of staff, did not at all consider the country's interests. From this can be seen the harm done to a country by dictatorship. Ordinarily, if Deng and Yang were bent on promoting Chi Haotian, it would seem to be more appropriate to let him become director of the General Political Department. However, Yang Baibing was also a political cadre, and was even less than Chi a model in military affairs. By comparison, Chi Haotian had been the type of officer who had been a battalion commander and a regiment commander. He had been deputy chief of staff (although just in charge of political work). Therefore, from this selfish motive, they could only let Chi be chief of staff and Yang Baibing be director of the General Political Department. Thus, in November 1987, Chi Haotian was appointed to chief of staff immediately, the most powerful post in the Chinese Communist Army, replacing the old General Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807]. On the day he assumed office, Mr Chi, enormously proud of his success, was visibly pleased. He said that on "the day I received this appointment I slept uneasily and ate without tasting the food," and that "weather is not as good as terrain advantages, and terrain advantages are not as good as the support of the people." Actually, this statement of Mr Chi's was not wrong, only "support of the the people" should be understood as the backstage support of the "old men's party." At that time Chi Haotian was just 59 years old.

Future Trends, Attracting Attention

In 1988 Chi Haotian and Yang Baibing were among the first group of generals when the Chinese Communists restored the system of military ranks. Chi and Yang, both field-grade officers in the sixties, were the ones in this group of generals who were promoted the fastest. The great majority of this batch of generals had held the rank of general before. For example, Hong Xuezhi [3163 1331 2535], permanent member of the Central Military Commission, was a general in 1955, and after an interval of 33 years was still a general. Also, for example, Qiu Jiwei [4440 1015 0251] in 1955 was made a lieutenant general, and this time he was promoted to general. By comparison, the sudden promotions of Chi and Yang were dazzling. Undoubtedly, their fast promotions were resented by many military figures, but out of fear of the backstage support, they did not dare to show their resentment.

Precisely because Chi Haotian came from the Chinese Communist 27th Army, and also because he was the Chinese Communist chief of staff who commanded the armed forces, it may be inferred that he was deeply drawn into the 4 June great murder case that shocked the whole world. Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun are both old men over 80 years old, and no matter what they say, within a few years they will "enter the coffin." Today on the mainland the situation of "the gun commands the party" has already appeared. The other executioner in the murder case, Li Peng, is also a role player

"who does not know the military." Jiang Zemin, the newly appointed general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, also does not have the slightest roots in the armed forces. Therefore, Chi Haotian's movements in the future are more worthy of attention. We can even more boldly conjecture that once Deng, Yang, and the other members of the old men's party withdraw from the stage of history (not necessarily by dying; they could turn into vegetables), Mr Chi's role will become more notable, and the 27th Army, whose hands are stained with blood, will take orders from their "old senior officer." When the time comes, the forces of the people and the healthy forces within the CPC, if they want to obtain victory, will have the top-priority task of getting rid of Chi Haotian, whose backstage supporter is the 27th Army. Once Mr Chi is gone, Li Peng will become a "turtle in a jar or a dragon in an engraving"—bottled up or trapped—and it will certainly not be difficult to get rid of him. With regard to Jiang Zemin, the new general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, although he was selected by Deng Xiaoping and although politically he is an enemy of the people's democratic movement, after all there is no blood on his hands and he has a fairly large leeway to trim his sails. Again, with regard to Wan Li [5502 6849], chairman of the Standing Committee of the "National People's Congress," and Hong Xuezhi, Qiu Jiwei, and Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], members of the CPC's Central Military Commission and powerful high-ranking military officers, their hands are not stained with the blood of this great massacre, and the aforementioned possibility is not just a fond illusion.

Of course, history is a living thing, and its development is determined by the balance of many-sided, comprehensive forces. A specific forecast made today cannot attend to each and every thing, but it may be affirmed that, in China's current political situation, after the great massacre in Tiananmen the struggle has not yet ended. A great change is brewing. Good will be rewarded with good, and evil with evil. Once the time comes, everything will be rewarded. Let us raise our heads and look forward, waiting for the morrow when the people's forces will be victorious and the executioners will be executed!

Li Yaowen, Military Scholar

90ON0234A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
(WIDE ANGLE) in Chinese
No 206, 16 Nov 89 pp 46-48

[Article by Liu Fuyuan (0491 4395 6678): "Military Scholar," Admiral Li Yaowen"]

[Text] The CPC Navy is working hard to speed up the pace of its modernization. Li Yaowen [2621 5069 2429], who is now serving in the CPC military as a naval admiral, a member of the CPC Central Advisory Commission, and Navy political commissar, has always been dedicated to the job of long-range naval development. Admiral Li has assumed greater importance to the CPC

Navy since the Beijing Massacre on 4 June 1989, when the CPC began to attach special emphasis to the role of political work.

I. Admiral Li Yaowen Was Originally Named Zhang Xishen

Li Yaowen was born in Jungcheng County, Shandong Province in 1918, and is now 71 years old.

Li Yaowen was originally named Zhang Xishen [1728 6932 4800]. When the full-scale War of Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937, Han Fujun [7281 1788 2829], the warlord who illegally occupied Shandong, fled without a fight and the CPC forces in Shandong called for the people to rise up and fight Japan. Whereupon 19-year-old Li Yaowen joined the CPC during the national calamity in 1937, and then joined the 8th Route Army in 1938.

II. Li Yaowen Was an Outstanding Political Work Cadre in the 8th Route Army

Since Li Yaowen had a pretty good education and "firm convictions," he very quickly became an outstanding political work cadre in the 8th Route Army.

From August 1938 to September 1940 Li served as political commissar of the 3d detachment of the people's guerilla forces that were fighting Japan in Jiaodong, Shandong, and of the 62d Regiment of the 5th detachment of the 8th Route Army's Shandong Column, and deputy director of the Political Department of the 5th detachment of the 8th Route Army's Shandong Column. From September 1940 to March 1943, he served as head of the Organization Section and deputy director of the Political Department of the 5th Brigade of the 8th Route Army's Shandong Column, and helped to found and consolidate the CPC's Jiaodong Base Area in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

After March 1943, Li helped to consolidate and develop the Central Shandong Base Area in the War of Resistance Against Japan, and served as deputy political commissar of the 4th military subarea of the 8th Route Army's Central Shandong Military Area Command.

After the War of Resistance Against Japan was won, civil war broke out again between the KMT [Kuomintang] and the CPC. During the civil war, from January 1946 to January 1947 Li served as political commissar of the 8th Division of the New Fourth Army's Shandong Military Area Command, and took part in the Southern Shandong Campaign. From January 1947 to February 1949 he served as political commissar of the 23d Division and director of the Political Department of the 8th Column of the East China Field Army (under Chen Yi [7115 3015]), and took part in the Laiwu, Menglianggu, Luoyang, Suiqi, Jinan, and Huai-Hai campaigns. Beginning in February 1949, he served as political commissar of the 8th Army Group of the PLA's 3d Field Army and director of the Political Department of the PLA's 26th Army, and took part in the Dujiang Campaign.

III. Li Yaowen Fought in the Korean War With Outstanding Military Success

After the founding of the PRC, Li Yaowen was promoted to political commissar of the 26th Army in January 1950, and commanded troops in the Korean war in November 1950. He commanded troops in the Changjinhu Campaign in the winter of 1950, and organized strikes against the U.S. armed offensive in June 1951 with outstanding military successes. After he returned to China in 1952, he was appointed director of the Political Department of the Shandong Military Command. He was appointed director of the Political Department of the Jinan Military Command in March 1953, was awarded the military rank of major general in September 1955, and later held concurrent posts as deputy political commissar and director of the Political Department of the Jinan Military Command.

Li Yaowen was vice minister of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1970 to 1972, China's ambassador to Tanzania from April 1972 to December 1976, and political commissar of the PLA's National Defense Science and Technology Commission from 1977 to August 1981. He was appointed Navy political commissar in September 1981, and awarded the military rank of admiral in September 1988.

IV. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Defense Science and Technology Commission

Although Li Yaowen was not publicly criticized and denounced during the Cultural Revolution, his "best years" were lost to the military. He became China's first vice minister of foreign affairs to wear a military uniform during the Army's campaign to "support the left" in local governments and the State Council while, as luck would have it, it was his former superior, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi, who was subjected to criticism. Instead of wasting his energy in political struggle, he began to study foreign affairs, and later held concurrent posts as China's ambassador to both the Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. He was not censured during his tenure in foreign affairs for being "an outsider leading experts," which was very hard to accomplish in the foreign affairs sector, in which there were so many tasks to perform and policies were so sensitive. After this, he was crowned with the title of "Military Scholar."

After Deng Xiaoping reappeared as vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, Li Yaowen was recalled to the military as political commissar of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, which was very fortunate since he was so familiar with modern military affairs. He was appointed political commissar of the CPC Navy in October 1980, a post he still holds.

Li Yaowen has always been considered as a serviceman who knows how to exercise self-control. The proof of this

is how well he has been able to work with naval commanders Ye Fei [0673 7378], Liu Huaging [0491 5478 3237], and even Zhang Lianzhong [1728 6647 1813].

Li Yaowen has been firm in his naval work, and has always impressed his subordinates as being modest, prudent, amiable, and easy to approach.

In the summer of 1988, Li Yaowen went to the South China Sea to visit the naval officers and men who were engaged in the Spratly Islands conflict, where he proposed the slogan of "Displaying the Spirit of Nansha [Spratlys]." Since he had fought in the Korean war, had complicated foreign affairs work experience, and also had much courage and insight into the Spratlys territorial conflict, he was able to give many valuable suggestions to Naval Commander Chang Lienchung.

Li Yaowen was appointed as an alternate member of the CPC Central Committee at the 11th CPC Congress in August 1977, a full member of the CPC Central Committee at the 12th CPC Congress in September 1982, and a member of the CPC Central Advisory Commission at the 13th CPC Congress in November 1987.

Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission

90ON0235A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese
No 206, 16 Nov 89 pp 50-51

[Article by Li Guoqiang (2621 0948 1730): "Liu Huaqing, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission"]

[Text] As part of the reshuffle of the Central Military Commission [CMC] as announced at the 5th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, Admiral Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], 73, was promoted to the vice chairmanship of the commission. A former navy commander, he was eased out of the CPC Central Committee at the National Party Congress and was given a seat on the Central Advisory Commission in September 1985. In late 1987, however, he was promoted to deputy secretary general of the Central Military Commission. In September 1988 he was made admiral and, now, vice chairman of the CMC. This is an unusual move and is indicative of Deng Xiaoping's high regard for him and the importance he attaches to naval work. Clearly, Deng Xiaoping made this arrangement with the hope that Liu Huaqing can help the commission's new chairman, Jiang Zemin, in military affairs.

A Brave Warrior in the Army of Liu Baicheng and Deng Xiaoping

The newly appointed vice chairman of the CMC began his career in the 4th Front Army of the Red Army and is a veteran of the Long March. Between 1946 and 1948, he was political commissar of the 8th Division of the 3d Column (Chen Xilian [7115 6932 5114] and Peng Tao

[1756 3447]) of the Central Plains Field Army (subordinate to Liu Baicheng [0491 0130 2110] and Deng Xiaoping), as well as director of the Political Department of the 3d Column.

Born in Dawu County, Hubei Province, in 1916, Liu Huaqing joined the CYL [Communist Youth League] in 1930, enlisted in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in 1931, and joined the CPC in 1935. During the days of the soviet area in Jiangxi Province, he served as secretary of the Zhongxin County CPC Committee, head of the enemy infiltration section of the Political Department of the 15th Red Army Group, and head of the confidential work section at the headquarters of the 31st Red Army.

During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he was head of the propaganda and education section of the 129th Division of the 8th Route Army, director of the political office of the divisional supply department, director of the Organization Department of the Southern Hebei Military Region, director of the Organization Department of the Plains Military Region, and deputy political commissar of the 6th Army subregion of the Hebei, Shandong, and Henan Military Region, among other things.

In the early years Liu Huaqing followed Chen Xilian in taking Dabeishan and made a name for himself throughout the military by performing well in the bloody battles of Yangshanji and Guoshanfu.

In 1947, he became political commissar of the 6th Brigade of the Second Division in the Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan Military Region and director of the Political Department of the 11th Army of the 2d Field Army.

Between 1948 and 1950, he served as deputy political commissar of the 11th Army (Ceng Shaoshan [2582 4801 1472], Bao Xianzhi [7637 0341 1807]) of the 3d Field Army and took part in a series of bloody battles, including Huahai, Dujiang, and Sichuan.

Switching to the Navy in 1950; Studying in the Soviet Union

After the PRC was founded, Liu Huaqing became director of the Political Department of the Military and Political University of the Southwestern Military Region as well as deputy political commissar of the military region in 1950.

When the 32d Division of the 11th Army was reorganized as the Navy in 1950, Liu Huaqing switched to naval work, taking with him such divisional-level cadres from the division as Ma Zhongquan [7456 1813 0356] and Ma Guansan [7456 0385 0003].

Held Various Posts in the Navy

When the Chinese Navy was first created, a large number of cadres were transferred into it from the Army. In early 1950, Liu Huaqing was appointed vice president and deputy political commissar of the Dalian Naval

Academy. Known as the cradle of Chinese naval officers, the Dalian Naval Academy has turned out a host of outstanding soldiers. General Xiao Jingguang [5618 0513 0342], a former navy commander, and Rear Admiral Zhang Xuesi [1728 1331 1835], a former navy chief of staff, have previously served as president and vice president, respectively, of the academy.

In 1955 Liu Huaqing was made rear admiral.

In the 1950's, the Chinese Communists copied the Soviet Union in every way. Along with Fang Qiang [2455 1730], Liu Daoshang [0491 6670 3932], and Zhang Xuesi, all of whom held top positions in the Navy, Liu Huaqing was sent to study in the Soviet Union and graduated from the Voroshilov Naval Academy [as published] in 1958. During his stay in the Soviet Union, he not only learned the theory of modern naval warfare but also acquired a deep understanding of the Soviet Navy. Afterward, Liu Huaqing continued to pay close attention to the study of Soviet naval theory. *Sea Power of the State*, a work by former Soviet naval commander Gorchakov, was required reading for senior Chinese naval officers at one time.

Returning home from the Soviet Union, Liu Huaqing became successively assistant commander of the Beihai Fleet, director of the Seventh Institute of the Ministry of Defense, and deputy chief of staff for the Navy.

In 1958 Liu Huaqing was appointed political commissar of the Lushun Naval Base (its commanders were Zeng Shaoshan and Ma Zhongquan).

In 1963 Liu Huaqing was made assistant political commissar of the Nanhai Fleet (commanding officer, Wu Ruilin [0702 3843 2651], and political commissar, Fang Zhengping [2455 2973 1627]).

In 1965 Liu Huaqing was promoted deputy political commissar for the Navy (commander, Xiao Jingguang; political commissar, Su Zhenhua [5685 2182 5478]). In January 1967, soon after the Cultural Revolution broke out, Liu Huaqing served concurrently as a member of the armywide Cultural Revolution group (group chairman, Marshall Xu Xiangxian [1776 0686 0467]). In April 1967 he was removed from the Cultural Revolution group and was appointed vice chairman of the National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission (chairman, Nie Rongzhen [5119 2837 5271]). In August 1968 he attended Beijing rallies on behalf of the commission and had an important place in the defense science and technology community.

Appointed Naval Commander in 1982

In 1972 he was transferred back to the Navy as chief of staff at the naval headquarters.

During the Cultural Revolution, Liu Huaqing was appointed vice chairman of the National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission, which was

in charge of the development of weapons and equipment, and at one point served as a leader at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Later, he was transferred to the headquarters of the General Staff, first as an assistant to the chief of the General Staff, and then as a deputy chief of the General Staff.

In March 1980 he joined Hua Guofeng and Kieu Samphan in a meeting on the Cambodian issue.

After the Cultural Revolution, the mainland drifted for a few years under the leadership of the "two whatevers." In the armed forces, likewise, no fundamental changes took place. After the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee laid down the party line, Deng Xiaoping replaced Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CMC in June 1981 and set about reorganizing the military by putting a host of new people in key positions.

In 1982, Liu Huaqing became commander of the Chinese Navy, succeeding Xiao Jingguang and Su Zhenhua. In late 1986, it was Liu Huaqing who received the first U.S. fleet to visit the PRC. In November 1987 he was made deputy secretary general of the CMC.

In 1982 Liu Huaqing was elected to the 12th CPC Central Committee, and he joined the Central Advisory Commission in 1985. In September 1988 he was made admiral.

Deng Xiaoping knows Liu Huaqing very well because of the latter's long years of work in the 3d Field Army. The elevation of Liu Huaqing, who advocates open thinking and taking a long-term view, and who has always stressed the importance of marine development for the 21st century, to Jiang Zemin's right-hand man as the aging Deng Xiaoping resigned from the CMC chairmanship is a critical move, one that bodes well for Jiang Zemin's effort to establish a military base, for the long-term stability of the third-generation core leadership, and even for China's reform and open policy.

Qin Jiwei, Minister of National Defense

90ON0213A Hong Kong *CHIUSHIH NIENTAI* [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 238, Nov 89 pp 59-61

[Article by Zhao Wei (6392 5588): "Qin Jiwei: Focal Person in Chinese Military"]

[Text] General Qin Jiwei, the minister of national defense, also holds the important posts of a state councillor, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and a member of the Central Military Commission. He is also a battle-tested veteran. Now that Deng Xiaoping is advancing in age, his successor constantly changing, and there being no end in sight to the turbulent political situation, Mr. Qin is a person from the heart of the military who is sufficiently capable of being compared with the Yang Family Generals. In this article I have made an appraisal of the experience, political inclinations, and ideological nature of Qin Jiwei.

His Experiences With the Red 4th Front Army.

Qin Jiwei was born in 1914 (third year of the republic) to a poor peasant household in the Dabie Mountain area of Huanggan County in Hubei Province. He joined the Red 4th Front Army at 15 years of age and became a party member at 16. During the bloody battles of encirclement and suppression and counterencirclement and suppression in the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists, Qin Jiwei rose from the position of a soldier to a squad leader, platoon leader, and finally a company commander. His bravery in combat was noticed by the commander of the Red 4th Front Army, Xu Xiangqian, who assigned him as a company commander in the General Headquarters Pistol Battalion, which was directly subordinate to the commander. The Red 4th Front Army was attacked by Nationalist forces in November 1931, injuring Xu Xiangqian. Qin Jiwei led his pistol company in a counterattack to bring the headquarters out of danger. After this episode Qin was looked on even more favorably by Xu Xiangqian, who assigned him directly to the Red 4th Front Army Headquarters. Following this, the Red 4th Front Army was in successive battles from the Dabie Mountains of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui to the Daba Mountains of Northern Sichuan in which Qin attained more merits and successes with the garrison command.

During the Long March, Qin Jiwei accompanied Xu Xiangqian across vast grasslands and barren mountains. After the Red 1st Front Army (Chinese Workers' and Peasants Red Army) commanded by Mao Zedong joined forces with the Red 4th Front Army of Zhang Guotao and Xu Xiangqian at an area in Western Sichuan, because of apprehensions, the forces were again split. At this time Qin's status was fairly low, being subordinate to both Zhang and Xu. As a result, he was not known by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and other important members of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

In the fall of 1936 Qin Jiwei was appointed section leader of the 4th Office of the Red 4th Front Army Headquarters for the long journey through the Hexi Corridor. The purpose of this action was to open up an international path through Xinjiang in order to link up with support from the Soviet military. The majority of this force was made up of crack troops from Zhang Guotao's Red 4th Front Army, although Zhang himself did not participate. The Red 4th Front Army consisted of five armies, three of which comprised the West Route Army commanded by Xu Xiangqian, with Chen Changhao as the political commissar. The other two armies were blocked by Nationalist troops and were unable to cross the Yellow River and were taken by Zhang Guotao and Zhu De to northern Shaanxi.

The Red Army's West Route Army was finally defeated by the troops under warlord Ma Bufang after several months of intense fighting in the Hexi corridor and the northwest. Qin Jiwei commanded the headquarters security force in fierce battle with the cavalry of Ma Bufang

at Yongchang, Gansu, and was wounded while breaking out of an encirclement in order to join up with the main force. In March 1936, the West Route Army, ammunition exhausted and supplies cut off, was annihilated in the Qilian Mountains. Due to his wounds Qin Jiwei was captured and forced to march with several thousand other prisoners of war to Qinghai; during this march many died or were injured and the soldiers were made to undergo great suffering.

The defeat of the Red Army's West Route Army in the Hexi corridor was the worst single defeat of the Red Army since being created by the Chinese Communists; more than 20,000 troops, nearly the entire force, was annihilated. Only 700-odd soldiers of the Li Xiannian-commanded 30th Army escaped into the Qilian Mountains and only with the active support of the Soviets were they able to take control of Xinjiang.

During his incarceration at Qinghai Qin Jiwei secretly organized resistance against Ma Bufang's training personnel at the camp and even set up a Communist Party branch during his captivity. In June 1937, the Nanjing Nationalist government ordered Ma Bufang to form the more than 1,300 Red Army prisoners of war into a replacement regiment and move them through the outskirts of Xian to northern China. This presented a good opportunity for the Red Army soldiers to escape. When this replacement regiment was passing through a Shaanxi border area the majority of the unit, under the instigation of Qin Jiwei and others, escaped into northern Shaanxi.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan He Became a Protege of Liu and Deng

Right after Qin Jiwei and the other prisoners of war returned to northern Shaanxi, the July 7th incident broke out and the Nationalists and Communists began cooperating in their resistance against Japan. The Red Army was redesignated the 8th Route Army and sent to northern China to fight in the War of Resistance. Mao Zedong utilized this time to organize his people and assign work to key members of his military who had gone through combat.

Since Qin Jiwei was a fairly high-level cadre (assistant instructor), he was put into the third term of study at the Yanan Chinese Peoples' Anti-Japanese Military and Political Affairs University in September 1937. He graduated in March of the next year and was again assigned to the front lines with the 8th Route Army's 129th Division in the Taiyang Mountains.

The 8th Route Army's 129th Division was formed from the former Red 4th Front Army. The division commander was Liu Bochong, who had experience with the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, but who had worked with the Red 4th Front Army since the Long March. The division political commissar, Deng Xiaoping, an intelligent and knowledgeable representative of Mao in the Jiangxi Soviet Area, had by this time become

a trusted follower of Mao Zedong. The deputy commander of the 129th Division was Xu Xiangqian, the former Red 4th Front Army Commander who had returned following the Qilian Mountain defeat. From this time on Qin became more of a protege of Liu and Deng, which would have a profound effect on Qin's future military and political career.

After Qin Jiwei arrived at the 129th Division he was given between 100 and 200 veteran troops and between 200 and 300 new recruits by Liu Bocheng to form into a guerrilla detachment in the Taihang Mountain area and the border areas in the provinces of Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan. At this time the 8th Route Army was conducting a strong program of awarding people according to their contributions, so those who fought well in battle were rewarded with more troops. Qin Jiwei participated in several small-scale battles with the Japanese that resulted in his unit gaining a reputation and being rapidly expanded, so, by the spring and summer of 1940 it had grown to a brigade-size force, and Qin Jiwei assumed command of the Taihang Military Region's 1st Military District. During this same year the three regiments under his command actively participated in several large battles by the 8th Route Army. Due to these successes, he was presented awards by Liu and Deng.

In 1941, the Japanese conducted a ruthless mopping up operation and the Chinese Communist Taihang Mountain Anti-Japanese Base was put in a difficult situation. Qin's forces could not be reinforced and were maintained as a force of three regiments. At this time, the CPC Central Committee started conducting a "rectification." Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Xu Xiangqian, and other commanders in the 129th Division returned to Yanan, but Qin Jiwei did not leave the Taihang Mountains. In 1944 he was promoted to chief of staff of the Taihang Military Region (the former chief of staff, Li Da, was promoted to commander and the former commander, Liu Bocheng, was recalled to Yanan to participate in the "rectification.")

Played an Important Role in the Major Battles Between the Nationalists and Communists in the Central Plains

When victory in the War of Resistance was achieved with Japan's surrender in August 1945, the struggle between the Nationalists and Communists started up again. In the fall of that year the troops under Qin's command, under the direction of Liu and Deng, participated in the southern Hebei Campaign which annihilated the Nationalist Army's Mafa 5th Unit and destroyed the Gaoshuxun Unit.

In 1945, the units under Qin were organized into the 11th Brigade, 4th Column of the Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Henan Field Army commanded by the famous Chinese Communist General Chen Geng. Qin became the brigade commander and Huang Zhen the brigade political commissar.

In the spring of 1947, Qin was assigned as the commander of the Taihang Military Region and remained

behind to take care of the garrison. During the summer of that year Qin also assumed command of the newly organized 9th Column, which was combined with Zhou Xihan's 4th Column and Kong Congzhou's 38th Army to form Chen Geng's Army Group. This army group crossed the Yellow River and entered the mountain area of western Henan.

Soon after this move by the army group a major battle between the Nationalists and Communists unfolded. Qin, commanding his units, attained repeated victories while accompanying Chen Geng in the attack of Luoyang and the capture of Zhengzhou and Kaifeng. Following this he also participated in the Shuangduiji battle in the attack of the crack Nationalist Huangwei Army Group and performed many deeds of valor in battle for the Chinese Communists.

In September 1949, the units under Qin were reorganized as the 15th Army of the 4th Army Group, 2d Field Army, People's Liberation Army. Qin was the commander of the 15th Army and the political commissar was Gu Jingsheng. During the large offensives of the Communists throughout the country in this same year, Qin's 15th Army broke through the strategic pass on the Chang Jiang and made a deep thrust into Zhejiang and Jiangxi. After this, his army also accompanied Chen Geng's army group in its advance to the southwest. From Jiangxi they entered Guangdong, took a tortuous route to Guangzhou, made a clear sweep through Guangxi, passed through northern Guangxi into southern Guizhou, entered Yunnan, and occupied Kunming. At the beginning of the next year they passed through northwest Yunnan and attacked Xichang. This army traveled a total of over 10,000 li. Qin's 15th Army often acted as the vanguard for the 4th Army Group during these advances, and many times Chen Geng made Qin the front-line chief of staff and sometimes gave him joint command of the 6th and 7th Divisions.

Gains Fame in the Shanggan Mountain Campaign During the Korean War

The CPC was established throughout China by the summer of 1950. Qin Jiwei was deputy commander of the southern Sichuan Military District and also the commander of the 15th Army. He was 36 years old by the time he became acquainted with 20-year-old Tang Xianmei, a graduate of Huaxi University. Army Commander Qin had been in combat without a break, even while at Yanan, since he joined the army at 15 years of age and, since he was sent to Yanan to fight in the War of Resistance at an early age, he didn't have a chance to meet young ladies. Commander Qin actively courted her, resulting in another story of a hero and a beautiful girl.

When the Korean war began to intensify at the end of 1950, the 15th Army commanded by Qin left Sichuan and went to Hebei to become a national defense army, and in the spring of the following year it went to Korea

to take part in the fighting there. The 15th Army participated in its fifth campaign in April 1951; its mission was to defend against the frontal attack from Seoul. In May the 15th Army used one division to thrust and divide the U.S. 2d and 3d Divisions. The greatest fame came to the 15th Army at the end of 1952, during battle in the Shanggan Mountains. By this time, negotiations to stop the war in Korea had been going on for some time, but both sides still harbored thoughts of military actions. The ground held by the 15th Army included the Tiejuan-Sanjiao area. The army was resisting the U.S. 7th Division and the South Korean 2d and 9th Divisions. After a month of bloody fighting the Shanggan mountaintop had been lowered by two meters by artillery fire, ground positions were taken in the attack, and the Chinese Communist Volunteer Army was reduced to defending in tunnels, but in the end they withstood the attack. During this battle for Shanggan Mountain, Qin Jiwei was the front-line commander.

Upon his return from Korea, Qin was named deputy commander of Yunnan Military District. He was later promoted to deputy commander of the Kunming Force (which had the provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou under its command). The 15th Army was reorganized as the CPC's first airborne unit and stationed for a long period in the Central Plains. The 15th Army received its assignments directly from the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC.

In 1955, Mao Zedong, who at that time was generous in promoting veterans to the rank of general, named Qin Jiwei a lieutenant general. This rank seemed to be a little less than Qin deserved, but the rank of full general seemed to be a little too high. This could have been caused by his early experience in the Red 4th Front Army, the defeat in the Qilian Mountains, and because during those years he was not known to Mao, Zhou, Peng, and others with power in the party. In October 1958, Qin was appointed commander of the Kunming Force. At that time the Kunming Force was responsible for assistance to the Southeast Asian region. With the start of the conflict in Vietnam this position became very important. In January 1965, Qin was appointed a member of the National Defense Council as a lieutenant general (an exception was made for him), and he was an important source for the coordinated support of Vietnam.

Downfall and Revival During the Cultural Revolution

In 1966 a sudden hurricane—the Cultural Revolution—struck. In the beginning, the “front-line” Kunming Force did not feel much direct effect because about that time the war in Vietnam began to escalate and the several hundred thousand U.S. soldiers stationed in the Indochina peninsula caused some worry in Beijing. In addition, Qin Jiwei's former commander, Xu Xiangqian, had in 1966 taken the post of leader of “the leading group in charge of Cultural Revolution for the entire military.” In order to keep the military stable, Xu did not have it engage in Cultural Revolution activities.

However, this good outlook did not last. The abrupt rise of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing brought about the chastising of Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Chen Yi, and other leading figures as members of the “February Counter-current.” In the summer of 1967 Chen was depicted as one involved in “mutiny” in the Wuhan Military Region. Following this, former high-ranking officers of the Red 4th Front Army were generally not trusted. Qin was also recalled to Beijing to undergo a “study class” as well as to be criticized and relieved of his post. The only thing Qin could do was return to his old home in Dabieshan and wait to see what happened. Qin turned 53 years old in that year and was the only one still living of the several score who had joined the Red Army the same year as he did.

Following the Cultural Revolution, along with the comeback of his former commander, Deng Xiaoping, who became vice premier and chief of the general staff, Qin was also reassigned to a position, this time as deputy commander of the Chengdu Military Region. The Chengdu Military Region and the Kunming Military Region had always been the “domain” of the 2d Field Army, so it was only natural that Qin be sent back to this southwest area.

Around 1980, with Deng Xiaoping's third assumption of power to support the work of the Central Committee, Qin and other cadre in the 2d Field Army system were put in even more important positions. Qin successively held the important posts of commander of forces in Chengdu, political commissar of forces in Beijing, and commander of forces in Beijing. During the 12th CPC Central Committee, Qin was elected as the alternate member to the Central Committee's Political Bureau.

When Deng Xiaoping returned to power he placed cadres from the former 129th Division and 2d Field Army into even more important positions in the military. The three original army group commanders of the 2d Field army were Chen Geng, who had the most outstanding military achievements, but who died in the early 1960's; Chen Xi, who had maintained the normal operations of the Central Committee's Military Commission since 1976, but he was considered to have made some serious mistakes because of a dubious relationship with the gang of four; the other commander, Yang Yong, was a member of the Central Committee's Secretariat but died of an illness not long ago. As a result, Qin Jiwei who had experience in the 2d Field Army became the choice of Deng Xiaoping.

In Contention With the “Yang Family Generals”

In 1984, Qin Jiwei assumed the extremely important position of Beijing Military Region commander. Qin was the overall commander of the 35th National Day Anniversary Parade in October 1985, which was the pinnacle event of Deng Xiaoping's entire life's undertaking. During the 13th CPC Central Committee in October 1987, Qin became a member of the Central Committee's Political Bureau, and is its only military member. The

next year he replaced Zhang Aiping as minister of national defense and was one of the first to attain the rank of general when the CPC restored the military rank system. However, this did not excite him much, as he had waited 33 years for one promotion.

It is worth noting that, during the 1989 student and people's movement in Beijing, Qin generally showed moderate support for the movement and did not approve of suppressing it. Because of this, his status was put in danger, but because of his long relationship with Deng and because Deng did not want the "Yang Family Generals" to get control of the military, his position was looked on as very important.

It is expected that if Deng Xiaoping's health deteriorates or if "he goes to see Marx," that there will be a competition between Qin's backbone 2d Field Army system in the military and the "Yang Family Generals." Although Yang Shangkun is in good health, he is still only two or three years younger than Deng. In his early years he was a political commissar of a regiment in the Red 3d Army, but he did not hold any other important military positions until he started supervising the military after 1981, and his military service has not been outstanding. Even though his younger brother, Yang Baibing, is director of the PLA General Political Department and a general, his qualifications and record of service are even less impressive than his brother's. Chi Haotian, chief of staff of the General Staff Department, only entered the service in 1944, and his qualifications and record of service are not equal to Qin's, however, he does hold the military leadership of the 27th Army.

Qin Jiwei's old home of Hongan County, Hubei (after the founding of the PRC its name was changed from Huangan to Hongan) is China's famous general county; this one county has produced over 230 generals since military ranks were bestowed starting in 1955. Cadres from the Red 4th Front Army make up most of these, and Deng Xiaoping has been actively putting cadres from the 129th Division and 2d Field Army into important positions since he assumed power. Of the 17 generals in China today, in addition to Qin Jiwei, generals such as Hongqezhi, Liu Huaqing, Xiang Shouzhai, Li Desheng, You Taizhong, Wang Chenghan, Guo Linxiang, and Wan Haifeng have experience with either the Red 4th Field Army, 129th Division, or 2d Field Army. Several of these generals have a background with two or all three of these units. They constitute a force that cannot be underestimated.

Zhao Ziyang, the former general secretary, who was dismissed for his connection with the movement, was also previously a cadre with the 129th Division and 2d Field Army. Zhao was the deputy political commissar for the 2d Field Army's subordinate Tongbo Military District which was a position equivalent to the deputy army level.

By taking an overall look at Qin Jiwei's experience, it can be seen that he is a battle-tested professional soldier who

has not been overly involved in politics. During the student movement he showed moderate support and did not agree with suppressing it, but the situation rapidly deteriorated due to the expectations of the overwhelming majority of people. At any rate, Qin Jiwei has now been pushed into contention with the "Yang Family Generals," and his future actions will be worth keeping an eye on.

Xu Xin, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff

90ON0136B Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese
No 205, 16 Oct 89 pp 38-39

[Article by Li Lixian (2621 4539 6343): "Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff"]

[Text] Xu Xin Reaffirms That There Was No Fighting Among PLA Factions During the "4 June" Events

In mid-August of this year, General Xu Xin [1776 0207], PLA deputy chief of staff, was interviewed by He Yun [0149 7301], reporter for the XIN ZHONGYUAN BAO of Thailand. At this time, Xu Xin disclosed that the clearing of Tiananmen Square involved soldiers from both the 38th Army and the 27th Army, and these soldiers carried out their mission jointly..

Speaking of factional disputes between the military units, Xu Xin stated that there not only is no evidence of this, it is simply rumormongering. He said that the PLA is very united, and orders from superiors are promptly carried out. It was this way before suppression of the rebellion, and it has been still more so since. The supreme commanders of the PLA are Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492], and the PLA is very united under their leadership. For outsiders to say that there are contradictions between one army and another is total nonsense.

China's System Makes It Difficult for Dissension To Occur

Xu Xin emphasized that it is impossible for dissension to crop up in Chinese military units, for the PLA is a disciplined army, and it is difficult for dissension to occur under the Chinese system.

As for the statement by Hong Kong writer Liu Baoyan [0491 1405 7159], in which he predicted a great many conflicts between the government and the Army in China and chaos within 2 years, Xu Xin pointed out that these comments have absolutely no basis in fact. Certain foreigners are using Liu, that is, exploiting his nonsense. It is the same with Wuer Kaixi [0710 3643 7030 1585]: if the problems they complain of actually existed, then he would be of no value whatever to the Western nations that are using him.

Resume of Xu Xin

General Xu Xin (1921-) was originally named Xu Lianchen [1776 6647 2525]. He enlisted in the 8th Route Army in 1937, and joined the CPC in the same year.

Active in the Shanxi Chabei Military District

From December 1937 to September 1944 Xu Xin served as political instructor in the Shanxi Chabei Military District's 1st Military Subdistrict's 1st Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 4th Company, and as political instructor for the 1st Subdistrict Guards.

From September 1944 to August 1945, Xu Xin served as commander of the Chazhong Military District's 6th Military Subdistrict's 44th District Group, and as commander of the 6th Subdistrict's 32nd Regiment. Xu Xin took part in beginning the anti-Japanese base area campaigns at Beiyue and the resumed campaign at Beizhong.

After civil war erupted once again in 1946, beginning in March 1946 Xu Xin served as regimental commander in the Shanxi Chabei Military District's Huabei Military District 3d Column, 8th Brigade, 23d Regiment. He participated in battles at Datong, Jining, Baobei, Qingfengdian, Shijiazhuang, Jinan, Pingjin and Taiyuan. After February 1949, Xu Xin assumed the post of deputy commander and, concurrently, chief of staff of the PLA's 19th Army Group, 63d Army, 187th Division.

Served as 187th Division Commander During the Korean War

From February 1951 to September 1953, Xu Xin was in Korea, participating in the Korean war in the posts of acting division commander and then division commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer 63rd Army, 187th Division. After returning to China at the conclusion of the Korean war, Xu Xin studied at the PLA Military Academy, after which he accepted the post of first deputy director of the academy's contract tactical faculty, and assistant head of the Training Department.

Awarded the Rank of Senior Colonel in 1955

In 1955, under the PLA's first system of military ranking, Xu Xin was awarded the rank of senior colonel. He was serving as deputy commander and chief of staff of the PLA's 63d Army.

After the CPC established the capital at Beijing in October 1949, Xu Xin served as a PLA deputy division commander and concurrently chief of staff; acting commander and commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army; first deputy director of the PLA Military Academy's contract tactical faculty and assistant head of the Training Department; deputy Army commander and concurrently chief of staff; commander; Beijing Military District chief of staff; assistant to the PLA general chief of staff, and deputy general chief of staff.

In 1964, Xu Xin was promoted to major general.

During the Cultural Revolution, Xu Xin served as commander of the 63rd Army. In 1971, he assumed the concurrent post of secretary of the party committee in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In 1975, he served for a time in the concurrent post of secretary to the Tianjin municipal CPC Committee.

Xu Xin was a delegate to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC, and an alternate to the 11th and 12th CPC Central Committees. In September 1988 he was awarded the rank of general.

Yang Baibing, Director, General Political Department

90ON0124A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese
No 204, 16 Sep 89 pp 88-89

[Article by Jin Bo (6855 1591): "All PLA Commanders in Chief Were Political Commissars; Enigma of Yang Baibing's Experience Revealed"]

[Text] Forty years ago, the Chinese Communists relied on a "rice-and-rifles" People's Army of three million to defeat the eight million-man, U.S.-equipped army of Chiang Kai-shek, to liberate the mainland, and to assume national power. In the 40 years since then, this Army has continued to be a pillar of the Chinese political situation. It might aid the reader's deeper knowledge and understanding of the Chinese military and political situation to take a look back at the journey traveled by the Chinese Communist Army in that time between the founding of the PRC and its 40th anniversary.

The Four Historical Stages in the Development of the PRC Military

The course of the PRC armed forces can generally be divided into four stages:

The first stage, 1949 to 1955, after the whole nation was liberated, saw a continuation of what was called the "bandit extermination campaign," in search of a stable government. The Korean war began not long afterward, and several hundred thousand troops of the Chinese armed forces, divided into three routes, crossed our borders to aid Korea, oppose the United States, protect our homes, and defend our country. During this period, all of the armed forces and even the entire nation could be regarded as on a war footing.

The second stage was from 1955 to 1965, after the conclusion of the Korean war. The Chinese armed forces began in 1955 to carry out large-scale reorganization, and soon afterward shifted to peacetime construction. During this period, the PRC armed forces were totally along the lines of the Soviet military model in such matters as organization, military training, and military management theory.

The third stage was 1966 to 1978. During the 10 years of turmoil, the military's emphasis was to "heighten our

vigilance and defend our country," "dig deep shelters," and "store up rations widely." But aside from these, overall military construction was unchanged.

The fourth stage was 1979 to 1989. This was the time of greatest overall change in the Chinese armed forces, completing a transformation in strategic thinking, a force reduction of one million, and redeployment, traveling the self-development road of having a "modern military with Chinese characteristics."

Four Reorganizations, Four Wars

During these 40 years, the Chinese armed forces fought four wars, namely, the Anti-U.S. War To Aid Korea in the 1950's; the Sino-Indian war of the 1960's; the Sino-Soviet border self-defense firefights of the 1970's; and the self-defense skirmishes with Vietnam, which have been going on since 1979. In addition to these there have been air and naval actions taken in self-defense. There have been four reorganizations: The first was in 1955, when the six national military regions were redrawn into 12 military regions; the second was in 1962, from Zhou Enlai's proposal for "total military preparation for war"; the third was in 1982, when the adjustment of the national economy forced cancellation of the merger of the Capital Construction Engineer Corps and the Railway Engineer Corps with the Ministry of Railways. The Artillery Corps, the Armored Corps and the Engineer Corps were changed from the leadership of the CPC Central Committee's Military Commission to that of the Headquarters of the General Staff. The fourth reorganization was in 1986, with a force reduction of one million, amalgamation of 11 military regions into seven, and elimination of the system of over 40 military ranks. These four reorganizations reduced the PRC's total military strength from the more than five million it was when the nation was founded to a bit over three million.

Three Commanders in Chief, Two Systems of Military Rank

During these 40 years, China's armed forces had three commanders in chief: From first to last, these were Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng, and Deng Xiaoping. There were two systems of rank implemented: The first was put into effect in 1955; in 1965, ranks were held to be an "article of revisionism," so were eliminated. In 1988, they were suddenly reinstated by Deng Xiaoping. There have been two instances of PLA intervention in political struggles: "Helping the left" during the Cultural Revolution, and the recent "suppression of the rebellion" in Beijing. Although military and political circles in the PRC are closely interwoven, still, in the party's internal political struggles, the military has frequently been the party's weapon of control, of a very strong disciplinary nature.

The Way to Military Modernization

For 40 years, the changes in China's military strength have also been the focus of attention. The Army has already developed from a single-arm military force into a group army force with combined-arms, compound

combat capabilities. The extent of constant conventional weapons replacement, mechanization, and motorization is clearly higher. According to official sources, motorized units now make up 10 percent of the total military personnel. Several army groups are air units equipped with helicopters. The use of electronic simulation equipment for military training is widespread throughout the armed forces. In its earliest years the Chinese Navy had only four old submarine units, but now possesses every type, class, and model of submarine for a strong underwater attack force. Not only are they equipped with Chinese-developed controlled power submarines, they have also successfully test-fired carrier rockets. China's nuclear weapons development has from the first received serious attention from high-level personages, and did not come to a halt even during the Cultural Revolution. At present, the PRC armed forces have strategic ballistic missile units which include intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched and bomber-carried ballistic missiles. Although the level of military modernization is not yet up to that of the Western superpowers, there is still plenty of military power when compared to the time before these 10 years of building.

Given its limited funds for military expenditures, it has been by no means easy for China to support the world's largest military force in terms of personnel, while successfully achieving so high a standard. It is clear that even though 40 years of political upheaval have caused considerable damage to the national economy, affecting military construction to a certain degree, still the Chinese armed forces were unswerving in having no chaos, no disturbances and not even a mutiny. This even reached the extent of there being no incidents of orders being disobeyed. Moreover, the military has functioned as a midstream anchor in the tide of Chinese society, and was of fullest use during the time the country was closed to the outside. This point is particularly noteworthy.

"The soldier considers it his duty to obey orders" is a belief commonly held by soldiers of all nations. It is not only in the Chinese armed forces that the spirit that soldiers adhere to as their code of conduct goes beyond this. In the past we had the spirit of Lei Feng, the spirit of Wang Jie and the spirit of the great 8th Company. Now we have "the spirit of Lao Shan," "the spirit of Nansha," "the spirit of the guardians of the republic." For the armed forces, every time period has its own "spirit," and it is the duty of political personnel within the armed forces to find these "spirits." After they have been summarized and refined, the political personnel spread them among the entire rank-and-file for study. The so-called political superiority of the Chinese armed forces is of long standing: At the time of the PLA's founding, Mao Zedong invented the "branch within the company," which also originated with the Chinese armed forces. Over several decades, the Chinese military established a tight political work system, including departments of personnel, organization, propaganda, mass work, culture, and so forth, which have been

formed into the tripartite balance of forces of the General Political, Staff, and Logistics Departments. In wartime, political work fulfills an important function in such areas as mobilization for battle, boosting morale, coordinating relations between the military and the government and between the military and civilians, becoming an irreplaceable unarmed fighting force.

Those Who Served as Commander in Chief Have All Been Political Commissars

After the founding of the PRC, political theory was taken more seriously in military thought. In his dual capacities of PLA political commissar and party chairman, Mao Zedong was personally in control of the "commander in chief's seal." On many occasions he stressed that political work was the lifeblood of all work. During his era, grassroots military companies often devoted more time to political studies than to military training. The person now in charge of the routine business of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee is Yang Shangkun, who was political commissar of an army group during his Red Army days, then director of the Red Army General Political Department, and during the Yanan period, was secretary general of the Military Commission.

Secure the Troops' Morale Against Confusion, Ensure That Orders Are Uniform

Political work in military thought takes shape chiefly along the lines of the needs and realities of military construction. Rank-and-file soldiers are given positive education, so that they will maintain strong spiritual support. To put it precisely, "pursue lofty ideals, have steadfast revolutionary beliefs, good moral habits, and an unselfish spirit of giving." During the past 40 years, the Chinese armed forces have depended upon this lifeline, securing the troops' morale against confusion, and making sure that their orders are uniform. In his prime, Lin Biao could be said to have had a very deep military base, but his mutinous plot was still unsuccessful, which is powerful evidence.

At a recent forum, Yang Baibing, director of the General Political Department of the PLA, said that, in the past two years, there has existed in the party and society a sort of desalination of the party's leadership, relaxing the spirit of building culture, and crippling the trend to ideological political work. However, since the rise in opposition, under the leadership of Chairman Deng and the Military Commission, our armed forces have all along held high the banner of ideological political work, upholding the principled nature and militancy of this work.

Yang Baibing Is Really the Younger Brother of Yang Shangkun

Yang Baibing, who will be 69 this year, is the blood-relation younger brother of Yang Shangkun, and his position is daily attracting closer attention. The Yang clan is a large family in Tongnan County, Sichuan

Province, with a considerable number of brothers and sisters. Their eldest brother, Yang Angong [2799 unavailable 0361], studied in Japan during his early years, joined the CPC in 1925, and served as first secretary of the Sichuan party commissariat, and recruited the Yang brothers to join the revolution.

How Did Yang Baibing Rise?

Yang Baibing joined the Red Army in 1938, studied at the Northern Shaanxi College and the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College. Later, he served as a clerical worker in the organization unit of the 129th Division's Political Department, 8th Route Army, followed the Liu [0491] and Feng [6785] Armies from one battle to another in Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan, engaging in party work all along. After the founding of the PRC, Yang Baibing served for a long time in the Southwest China Military Area, and later joined the Chengdu Military Area Command, holding such posts as director of the Organization and Cadre Departments, deputy director of the Youth Department, and deputy head of the Political Department. During this time, he spent two years in advanced study in the philosophy class at the Political Academy of the PLA. During the Cultural Revolution, because of the crimes of Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang, Yang Baibing was also implicated, and was imprisoned for eight years. In 1979 he was transferred to the Beijing Area Military Command, serving successively as head of the Political Department, then deputy director and political commissar. In 1987 he was promoted to the post of director of the General Political Department of the PLA, and was elected a member of the 13th Central Committee of the CPC.

After Yang Baibing joined the General Political Department, he became the right-hand man in actively promoting the Deng-Yang military reforms, in rectifying the military establishment's system of organization, disarmament, and reform of the cadre system, as well as putting a considerable amount of work into cutting expenditures in the civilian cadre system. He regularly goes down to the lower-level units to experience and observe the military situation, paying close attention to studying trends in military thought and emphasizing the importance of political work. After the "Beijing incidents," he and such others as Shao Huaze [6730 5478 3419] worked even harder to mold public opinion. They proclaimed that martial law performed a vital service in stabilizing the people's feelings, the soldiers' morale, and the political situation. Looking to the future, he could possibly advance to still higher rank. [At the 5th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in November 1989, Yang Baibing was named Secretary General of the Central Military Commission.]

Yang Guoyu, Creator of Naval Proving Ground

900N0228A Beijing JIANCHUAN ZHISHI [NAVAL AND MERCHANT SHIPS] in Chinese
No 9, 8 Sep 89 pp 2-3

[Article by Shen Shungen (3088 7311 2704): "China's Naval Weapons Proving Ground—A Visit With Former Navy Deputy Commander Yang Guoyu (2799 0948 1342)"]

[Text] Who has the ultimate authority to certify that all new missiles used aboard people's Navy vessels and all underwater weapons meet specifications? The Naval Weapons Proving Ground. Born more than 30 years ago, it has gone through a bumpy yet glorious history. On the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Navy, it was with a feeling of reverence that I paid a call on the founder of the first proving ground, former Navy deputy commander Yang Guoyu [2799 0948 1342].

All Types of Testing Begin To Take Shape

Admiral Yang Guoyu welcomed me in a lounge decorated with green plants whose walls were covered with paintings. He vividly recalled the arduous and mysterious situation when the proving ground began to be built. During the summer of 1958, he was a mysterious "barracks commander," which was all he could tell his wife, children, and old comrades-in-arms. Actually, he was involved in taking Soviet experts all over the country to select an optimum location for a proving ground. The experts' requirements were very strict at that time: First, the site had to be near a railroad; second, there had to be an airfield nearby; and third, there had to be a fan-shaped bay suitable for missile launches, and the terrain had to favor radio security. The experts selected three sites, listing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Following complete verification and more than a week of controversy, the current location was finally decided on. Yang Guoyu said that the site was not selected on the basis of the leading cadres' desires, nor was it a so-called democratic decision, but rather a scientific decision. Consequently, the site is an ideal one that has stood the test of time. Everything invested in it yielded benefits. There was no endless thrashing around, moving earth from one side of the site to the other, or removing a hill here to fill in a hollow there in a waste of resources.

Yang Guoyu said that the sole interest at the time was in coastal defense missile testing. Now, more than 30 years later, the site has developed into an integrated proving ground for the testing of all naval weapons and equipment systems. There are presently four testing areas: The first testing area tests aerodynamic missiles, artillery systems, and navigation equipment. The second testing area is responsible for the testing of subterranean missiles and underwater weapons. The third testing area tests electronic countermeasures and radar. The proving ground has extensive firing range facilities and testing equipment capable of providing instantaneous three-dimensional fixes and required physical measurements for new technical equipment tests. The proving ground provides complete assessments of and conclusions on tactical and technical performance for use in finalizing the design of new technical equipment, thereby providing leading organs data on which to base decisions.

Yang Guoyu said that practice has shown that a dedicated scientific testing base is an authoritative organization for the testing of naval weapons, an important link in weapons quality control, and a bridge that links

scientific research units with applications units. It holds an extremely important position in the modernization of the Navy.

The Shift to Missiles—From the Surface to the Bottom of the Sea

After becoming deputy commander of the Navy, Yang Guoyu continued to be in charge of scientific research work. He was extremely interested in the test base, and no matter whether Pacific Ocean intercontinental missile tests or underwater submarine missile launch tests were being conducted, he almost always visited the proving ground. He had the greatest understanding and most profound appreciation of the development of a missile navy. He said exuberantly, "Why is it that the Navy spends the least on scientific research, gets the highest results, and has produced more sophisticated products than any service arm? The key lies in proceeding from basics and beginning by copying. After assimilating and digesting advanced foreign things, one has to modify them and be creative. You cannot expect to put on weight by eating a single mouthful. If you do, the more you hurry the less headway you will make."

The missiles purchased from the USSR back then were very backward. On the first test firing, one exploded in midair, causing the Soviet experts great embarrassment. They wanted to fire a second one. Yang Guoyu asked Commander Xiao Jinguan's [5135 0513 0342] advice. Commander Xiao said humorously, "Didn't we fire one! This was a success; there is no need to fire another." Commander Xiao was probably concerned about economy; besides, if the second launch failed, how would the Soviet experts be able to get out of their embarrassing situation? No sooner did matters begin to be straightened out than Sino-Soviet relations worsened, and the experts left. At that time, a wave of enthusiasm rose among the comrades. They said, "Chinese are not more stupid than other people. We will rely on our own resources to win glory for the country. Let's begin modernizing the Navy by pulling on our own bootstraps!" A number of intellectuals gathered at the mysterious bay and began to struggle with the problems.

Launching a missile from the land is fairly easy, but launching a missile from a ship is much more complicated. In order to recover the wreckage of the new-type missile, making sure it did not fall into the sea where it could not be found, everyone thought about using a "sea of sand" instead of the ocean. A model resembling all the equipment above a ship's deck was built in the desert. Around it various kinds of animals were placed. Tests were conducted to determine damage to the deck caused by the high temperature at the instant of the launch, noise damage to the human body, and well as to obtain various technical data. During the first test, many of the animals were turned into pulp. After repeated tests, the needed technical parameters were finally attained.

Nevertheless, this was just a simulation after all. On 15 November 1965, the first decision was made to move a

missile to a ship for launch, and to have people aboard to monitor the experiment. This was dangerous. Who would go aboard? A written call for volunteers brought a flurry of replies, and after repeated study, the leaders approved Wang Zhaofeng [3769 3564 1144] to go aboard. He had previously requested permission to marry, but the leaders had turned down his request. Subsequently, they permitted him to have a wedding ceremony at once. The leaders were in a quandary about what to do at that time. Suppose they allowed him to marry and he was killed or maimed; or suppose they did not allow him to marry and he was maimed and consequently never able to find a wife. On the appointed day, Wang Zhaofeng said good-bye to his new wife, shook hands with each of his comrades-in-arms, and went into the ship to his station. He never imagined that political commissar Shen Aihua [3947 1947 5478] and staff officer Zhu Yaozhou [2612 5069 3166] also remained quietly on board. This missile launch test succeeded; no one was hurt; everything went well. The first ship-to-ship missile began its journey in the same way, but problems occurred midway. Several comrades were wounded and some of them had their eyebrows singed. A commander at the base has kept to this day a small piece of blood-stained glass. He said, "Look at it. we can never forget the tortuous, difficult, and extremely dangerous course!"

Once the surface vessel launches succeeded, they began underwater missile launch research. At that time, many people said conditions were not ready for such tests; there were no underwater launching ranges. Some people talked about the special equipment at modern U.S. and Soviet underwater launching ranges. Building such facilities would require a huge amount of money and would go on for a good number of years. After everyone discussed the matter over and over, a decision was made to strike out on our own road, spending the least amount of money to obtain optimum results. Testing was to be done first in a concrete silo, and after more than 2 years of effort, successful development of an ignition device and a launch device were in prospect. The first underwater missile launch was successful. When he received the report, Qian Xuesen was very happy. He said: "This was not simple! This shows the ingenuity of the Chinese!" Thanks to the early beginning, the early solution of technical problems, and the expenditure of a small amount of money, the underwater launching of a missile from a submarine was successful in October 1982! And the launching of a strategic missile from a submarine was successful in August 1988!

New Goals—Producing Results and Skilled Personnel

Yang Guoyu said that, naturally, very many reasons account for the Navy test base beginning to take shape, and for its great achievements; however, the most important was the devotion of a number of intellectuals to national defense modernization. Most of these people entered the Navy during the late 1950's. During the past 30-odd years, they have struggled arduously, constantly improved their skills, successfully tested, verified, and finalized designs for multiple series of Navy missiles,

and conducted experiments in the launching of underwater carrier rockets, making major contributions to advance the modernization of naval weapons. Because of various security regulations, society did not know about their work and life, which seemed to have a mysterious aura. Yang Guoyu said, "They are the hope for Navy modernization, and they are the most wonderful people of the age." Yang Guoyu told me with great feeling moving stories about many of the scientific and technical cadres at this base.

One comrade did not take off a single Sunday or holiday in 4 years while he was designing a safe trajectory for a missile flight test to prevent the missile from flying into a city or harbor, and equipping the missile with an on-board self-destruction device. He wrote a total of 28 design plans, each of them more than an inch thick. Imagine how much effort he put into it! Some female scientific and technical cadres had to have induced abortions in order to be able to take part in the testing work. In order to be ready for any emergency, all of the female comrades taking part in work inside submarines had to participate in submarine torpedo tube underwater escape training. This was a rather dangerous and highly difficult course, but they, like the young lads, braved risks to learn shallow-water diving, and how to crawl through torpedo launching tubes. They were the only ones in the country able to do this. Some people broke down from overwork; others lost blood or became crippled in tests; and some were left with incurable tumors in their bodies as a result of prolonged contact with toxic substances. Over the past more than 30 years, so many soul-stirring tests were conducted, and so many epic feats were performed here. When many people arrived, they were in the prime of their lives, but now the hair on their temples is frosted; their beauty is gone, and the charm of young women has vanished. The golden age of their lives has dissolved into the azure void of the sea.

Yang Guoyu said, with feeling, "The republic will never forget them and, as an old soldier, on this occasion of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Navy, I salute them!"

Yang Shangkun, State President, CMC Vice Chairman

90ON0123A Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese
No 204, 16 Sep 89 pp 14-18

[Article by Sung Li-chun (1345 7787 0689 0689): "Yang Shangkun and Today's China—The State President's Influence in the 3 Million-Strong Army"]

[Text] In contemporary China, except for 85-year-old Military Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping, 82-year-old Yang Shangkun may be reckoned the figure with the most real power in the Army.

Recently, the whole world followed with interest the figures concerned with the China issue and paid a great deal of attention to recent developments concerning

Yang Shangkun. Actually, Yang Shangkun is a figure who occupies a decisive position in China's political circles. He is president of the Chinese state, a member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo, and the head of the CPC Central Committee's Taiwan Affairs Group, and is the senior statesman with the best qualifications and record of service still in office. What is more important is that he holds military power, is the real leader of the 3 million-strong Chinese People's Liberation Army, and is the only vice chairman to be concurrently secretary general of the Central Military Commission [CMC]. [At the 5th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in November 1989, Yang Shangkun was named first vice chairman of the CMC.]

At the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee held in June of this year, Yang Shangkun and six newly appointed members of the Politburo's Standing Committee had a group photograph taken, and his position was right in the middle. By giving prominence to Yang Shangkun, this photograph showed his important position in contemporary China.

He Knows the CPC's Core Secrets and His Strength in the Army Is Extremely Solid

Like Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun is one of several senior statesmen in the CPC, with the best qualifications and record of service. He has been a member of the CPC for more than 60 years. In his early years he played an active part on the battlefield. He was in the military for a long time, after which he assumed personal command at the center, becoming responsible for important matters concerned with the central authorities' core secrets. During the Cultural Revolution he was imprisoned for 12 years on a trumped-up charge. There have been many complications in the course of his life. His strength in the Army is particularly solid.

In His Early Years He Studied in Moscow and Was One of the 28 Semi-"Bolsheviks"

His ancestral home is Dongnan County, Sichuan Province. Born in 1907, he is the younger brother of Yang Angong, who was a first-generation senior statesman of the CPC. At the age of 18 (1925) he joined the CYL [Communist Youth League], and at the age of 19 (1926) he became a Communist Party member.

At the end of the twenties Yang Shangkun went to the Soviet Union, where he studied at Sun Yat-sen Labor University in Moscow. He was a schoolmate of the late Chiang Ching-kuo. At that time Yang Shangkun was one of the activists among the Chinese Communist students. It is said that for a time he was one of the "28 semi-Bolsheviks" who had a major influence in the Central Committee.

After Yang Shangkun returned to China in 1930, he held a leadership post in the CPC. At that time the CPC divided the rural base where he was stationed in a central soviet and five special soviets. Yang Shangkun did political work in the Red Army in the central soviet in

Ruijin, Jiangxi. At the Second Soviet Plenary Session held in 1934, he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee.

With Peng Dehuai He Jointly Commanded the 3d Army Group

In October 1934 a column more than 80,000 strong, composed of the 1st, 3d, 5th, 8th, and 9th Army Groups of the 1st Front Army of the Red Army separately moved north from Changting and Ninghua in Fujian and from Ruijin and Yudu in Jiangxi. Thus began the world-famous Long March.

At that time the commander in chief of the Red 1st Front Army was Zhu De and its general political commissar was Zhou Enlai; Lin Biao was commander of the 1st Army Group and Nie Rongzhen was its political commissar; and Peng Dehuai was commander of the 3d Army Group and Yang Shangkun, who was then 27 years old, was its deputy political commissar. Deng Zhentang [5516 2182 1016] was commander of the 5th Army Group and Li Zhuoran [2621 0587 3544] was its political commissar; Zhou Kun [6650 2492] was commander of the 8th Army Group and Huang Su [7806 5685] was its political commissar; Luo Binghui [5012 3521 6540] was commander of the 9th Army Group and Cai Shufan [5591 2885 5672] was its political commissar. The commander in chief of the Central Column was Liu Bocheng, Chen Yun was its political commissar, and Ye Jianying was its deputy political commissar. The famous American correspondent Harrison Salisbury, who once worked for THE NEW YORK TIMES, in the introduction to his book *The Long March: the Untold Story*, published in 1985, said, "At that time a so-called 'army group' in the Red Army was in reality just one army, in which a general was responsible for military affairs and a political commissar exercised joint command; normally, the political commissar's position was a little higher than the army group commander's." From this it is obvious that at that time Yang Shangkun had a position in the CPC comparable to Chinese Communist leaders like Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yun, and Ye Jianying, whose names are familiar to the common people.

Yang Shangkun said that when the Red Army was forced to leave the central soviet, it did not do what Mao Zedong wanted. It carried away with it cumbersome machines such as banknote printers. Because it was slow-moving, the enemy army was able to transfer troops to intercept, pursue, and attack it. The crossing of the Xiang Jiang, which was a bitterly fought crossing in which there were huge losses, was an abrupt turn of events, which caused many people to recognize the problem of the military itinerary.

As a Leader of the Armed Forces He Took Part in the Zunyi Conference

In January 1935 the Red Army broke through the Wu Jiang line and it stormed and captured Zunyi City, a place of strategic importance in Guizhou. Here was held

the 3-day expanded session of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, namely, the famous "Zunyi Conference." At this conference, the "leftist" military line of Otto Braun (alias Li Teh and also Hua Fu), the Internationale's military adviser stationed in China, was exposed and criticized, which led to Mao Zedong's obtaining the power of command over the Red Army. Therefore, the Chinese Communists call it a "historical conference that decided the future of the revolution."

According to CPC records, a total of only 20 men took part in this important conference that decided the destiny of the CPC. Of them, 17 attended the conference as formal members. They were party Politburo members Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Luo Fu [3157 3940] (Zhang Wentian [1728 5113 1131]), and Bo Gu [0590 0657] (Qin Bangxian [4440 6721 2009]); Politburo alternate members Wang Jiaxiang [3769 4471 4382], Zheng Fa [6774 4099], and Liu Shaoqi; Communist Youth League leader Kai Feng [0418 unavailable] (He Kequan [0149 0344 0356]); and Red Army leaders Liu Bocheng, Li Fuchun [2621 1381 2504], Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Li Zhuoran, and Yang Shangkun.

Who were the other three men? One was Braun. He was a nonvoting delegate for whom was arranged a place to sit near the door of the conference room, so that he was kept a certain distance from the members attending the conference. Another one was Wu Xiuqian [0124 0208 2938], Braun's interpreter at that time. Finally, there was Deng Xiaoping. At that time he was editor in chief of the Red Army newspaper HONG XING BAO and had just been appointed secretary general of the party Central Committee. In his book, Salisbury described the scene: "Deng Xiaoping sat in a corner of the room, busily recording the conference. If he did not write an article for HONG XING BAO it was because he was the secretary general."

A Bomb Fragment Remains in His Leg to This Day

After the Zunyi Conference the Red Army's 1st Front Army, under the command of Mao Zedong, moved forward in an outflanking maneuver. In April 1935, when the 3d Army Group had just crossed the border into Yunnan, Yang Shangkun was wounded in a bombing raid by KMT [Kuomintang] aircraft. Three bomb fragments were lodged in his thigh. At that time there were no conditions for timely treatment. Also, because the path was rugged, a stretcher could not be used, so for a time he had to walk with great difficulty and reluctance. The KMT quickly found out about Yang Shangkun's condition and published the news in newspapers. Tianjin's TA KUNG PAO mistakenly reported that Yang Naikun [2799 0535 2492], political commissar of the 1st Army Group, had been killed in a bombing raid. Yang Shangkun was not dead. After this dangerous experience he resolutely squared his shoulders and walked to complete the arduous path of the Long March. To this day a bomb fragment remains lodged in his thigh.

He Extricated Himself From the Headquarters of the 4th Front Army

In June 1935 the Red Army's 1st Front Army and 4th Front Army joined forces at Maogong in Sichuan. Immediately a unified command organization was set up, and the troops of the two front armies formed a composite establishment. Because of the differences between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao, the two fraternal forces almost began a factional fight, and in the end they separated and went their separate ways. About this stage of history there are all sorts of different formulations, and explanation of its intricacies would require the writing of several tomes. In this article the writer can discuss only a little of Yang Shangkun's dangerous experiences at that time.

When the two Red armies joined forces, Yang Shangkun was highly excited. His wife, Li Bozhao [621 0130 6856], who passed away from illness several years ago, at that time collaborated with Lu Dingyi [7120 1353 0001] (before the Cultural Revolution he was an alternate member of the Politburo and chairman of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, and he is now the chairman of the Central Advisory Commission) in writing a song commemorating this event. The entire Army was divided into left and right routes. Yang Shangkun became director of the Political Department of the Right Route. In commanding this four-army force he was the fourth senior officer, subordinate only to Commander in Chief Xu Xiangqian [1776 0686 0467], Political Commissar Chen Changhao [7115 2490 3185], and Chief of Staff Ye Jianying. However, because at that time the military strength of the 4th Front Army was several times that of the 1st Front Army, in the entire command system there were many more personnel in the 4th Front Army. Because Yang Shangkun was separated from his familiar unit, even from his wife, and because he was director of the Political Department, almost all the members of which came from the 4th Front Army, his work, without a doubt, did not go all that smoothly. In particular, the friction between the two armies steadily worsened, and his predicament became more and more difficult. Fortunately, Chief of Staff Ye Jianying was an old colleague from the 1st Front Army, and the two men could consult on some problems.

In September 1935, when Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong publicly clashed over the question of whether the Red Army should go south or north, Ye Jianying and Yang Shangkun received an order to lead the personnel of the original 1st Front Army in a movement to concentrate in the north. Because the 4th Front Army, which was superior in military strength, could obstruct this movement, it was best that the movement be kept secret. Notices to relevant personnel were passed by individual word of mouth, and the personnel's movement was silently made at midnight. After all the others had left, at two hours past midnight on a certain day in the autumn month of September, Yang Shangkun and Ye Jianying stealthily slipped out of the Right Route headquarters and, as though marching at double time, rushed toward

the 3d Army Group headquarters. Suddenly, behind them, came the sound of hoofbeats. After discovering their flight, Chen Changhao had sent men on horseback after them. They quickly hid by the side of the road to evade the pursuing troops, took a detour, and at dawn arrived at their destination, where they met with Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Peng Dehuai.

Snow's *Red Star Over China* Mentions Yang Shangkun

After the Red Army completed the Long March and arrived in Yan'an, Yang Shangkun became director of the Political Department of the Red 1st Front Army. In his famous book, *Red Star Over China*, Edgar Snow mentions Red Army leader Yang Shangkun, who was then 27 years old and who could speak Russian. To analyze the age, background, experience, and education of the Red Army fighters, Snow wanted more data. From his files Yang Shangkun came up with a lot of material, which quite satisfied Snow.

In the War of Resistance He Became the Secretary of the North Bureau

The "July 7 Incident" in 1937 touched off the raging flames of the War of Resistance Against Japan all over China. In the second period of KMT-CPC cooperation, the Red Army became the 8th Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. On the namelists of leading personnel of the 8th Route Army and its divisions, Yang Shangkun's name did not appear. Where had he gone?

A piece of data shows that, at that time, the North Bureau, which had originally been in Beijing leading the party's secret activities, had been moved to Taiyuan. In February 1938, under the leadership of Deputy Secretary Yang Shangkun, it again moved, this time to western Shanxi. It appears that at that time Yang Shangkun had already taken charge of leadership work in the north.

In November 1938, after Wang Ming's "right capitulationism" was criticized at the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th CPC Central Committee, the CPC reorganized its leadership organizations. The North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee had a Standing Committee composed of Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Yang Shangkun, who was its secretary. This was an extremely important post. At that time there were two bureaus on an equal footing with the North Bureau: the Central Bureau, the secretary of which was Liu Shaoqi, and the South Bureau, the secretary of which was Zhou Enlai. Peng Zhen was the secretary of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei subbureau, which was under the leadership of the North Bureau.

In the Later Stage of the War of Resistance He Returned to the Armed Forces and Became Secretary General of the Central Military Commission

In August 1942 Yang Shangkun returned to Yan'an, and Peng Dehuai replaced him as secretary of the North Bureau. Reference materials say that Yang Shangkun did

not take a firm enough attitude toward the relationship with Shanxi's "local emperor," Yen Hsi-shan [7051 6932 1472], so that when Yen Hsi-shan conducted military actions against the communists the CPC-led Shanxi New Army suffered undeserved losses. After he returned to Yan'an he was criticized for this.

After the Founding of the PRC, He Became Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and Took Charge of the Information and Trends at the Highest Level

After the Chinese Communists founded their state, Yang Shangkun became director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and, concurrently, secretary of the party committees of organs directly under the Central Committee. This post appeared to be one that handled only specific affairs, but in reality it was highly important, because not only was the administrative work of all central organs under the control of the General Office, but it also handled and stored the Central Committee's documents and files. More worthy of attention is that the important political activities of the central leading figures and their daily lives could not be separated from the arrangements made by the General Office. Therefore, as director of the Central Committee's General Office, Yang Shangkun in reality was the general manager of the CPC's central organs. He had a clear and timely comprehension of all information and trends at the highest levels of the CPC, and knew very many top secrets.

In September 1956 the 8th Central Committee Plenary Session decided to set up a Central Secretariat, which, under the leadership of the Politburo, would handle daily work. Deng Xiaoping became its general secretary, and Yang Shangkun was appointed alternate secretary of the Central Secretariat.

During the Cultural Revolution He Was Labeled a "Foreign Spy" and Imprisoned

Because Yang Shangkun knew too many core secrets of the highest level of the CPC, he became one of the first victims at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. At the general meeting of the Politburo in May 1966, on the basis of accusations made by Lin Biao and Kang Sheng [1660 3932], Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing [5012 3843 0615], Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun were labeled an "anti-party clique" and criticized. It was said that Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang in collusion conspired to launch a coup d'etat to overthrow Mao Zedong. The Central Committee's General Office, which Yang Shangkun headed, was responsible for recording Mao Zedong's speeches and for storing files. This became evidence that he had conducted espionage and wiretap activities. In this way Yang Shangkun, who had been dedicated all his life to the cause of the Chinese Communists, suddenly became a foreign spy. That he had studied in the Soviet Union when young became a basis for charging that he was a Soviet spy; that he had once had contacts with Americans in Yan'an became the basis for charging that he was an American spy.

Because Yang Shangkun knew too many high-level secrets, he endured more misery in the Cultural Revolution than certain colleagues of his. In July 1966 he was imprisoned. While in prison he was once conveyed to a struggle meeting, where he was exposed and criticized by Red Guards, but because of the obvious need to prevent secrets from being divulged, the meeting was aborted and he was returned under guard to prison. Thus he did not suffer excessive bodily torment. By comparison, his wife, Li Baozhao, encountered a lot of adversity. For a good many years she was compelled to clean all the laboratories in a six-story building. Because she was old and her health had been damaged during the Long March, she walked with great difficulty and she had to go up and down the stairs of the building on her hands and knees. This seriously damaged her health, and she died of illness in the eighties.

After Being Rehabilitated He and Xi Zhongxun [5045 0112 0534] Took Charge of Guangdong's Administration

Yang Shangkun remained in prison until the end of 1978. His unjust case was redressed. Not long afterward he was appointed second secretary of the Guangdong Provincial CPC Committee and vice governor of Guangdong Province. Together with Xi Zhongxun (first secretary of the Guangdong Provincial CPC Committee at that time) he took over the work in Guangdong.

It looks as if having two important high-ranking officials like Xi Zhongxun and Yang Shangkun take charge of Guangdong's administration was an arrangement made in order to make Guangdong a place for testing the promotion of reform, opening to the outside world, and invigorating the economy. It was precisely during this period that Guangdong took a series of reform measures that were quite controversial at the time, and also set up the special economic zones of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou.

It was also while Xi and Yang administered Guangdong that the relationship between Hong Kong and Guangdong developed day by day. Hong Kong Governor MacLehose visited China for the first time from the end of March to the beginning of April 1979. In Beijing, where he met with Deng Xiaoping, Deng said he wanted to encourage Hong Kong entrepreneurs to invest in Guangdong, and he also answered questions about Hong Kong's future. On his way back to Hong Kong, MacLehose stopped over in Guangzhou, where he exchanged opinions with Xi Zhongxun and Yang Shangkun; they got along very well. Later, at a press conference held in Hong Kong he said, "I spent a happy evening in Guangzhou City." In October 1980 MacLehose again went to Guangdong, where he held talks with Yang Shangkun on the questions of illegal immigrants and Guangdong-Hong Kong economic cooperation, in which results satisfactory to both sides were obtained.

Since the 12th CPC Congress He Has Remained in Charge of the Daily Work of the Military Commission Up to Today

After the Chinese Communists held their "12th CPC Congress" in September 1982, at the 1st Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee Yang Shangkun was elected a member of the Central Committee Politburo and permanent vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and he also took a leading post at the highest level in Beijing.

As a Politburo member Yang Shangkun takes part in the CPC's core-level decisions on major issues. At that time Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Central Military Commission, had already withdrawn to the second line, and he himself disclosed that he only worked two hours a day; of the vice chairmen at that time, Ye Jianying passed away at the age of 86, and Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangqian are old and infirm, and they handle very few affairs. Therefore, the major policies of the Military Commission were naturally decided through joint consultation between the CPC's Politburo Standing Committee and the two old teachers, Nie and Xu, and its daily work in reality was put totally under the control of Yang Shangkun, permanent vice chairman of the Military Commission. At a later stage Yang Shangkun has exerted more direct control of the PLA's affairs, a situation that has continued to this day.

You Taizhong, CMC Disciplinary Committee

900N0136C Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING
[WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese
No 205, 16 Oct 89 pp 40-41

[Article by Liu Ying (0491 5391): "Second Secretary of the Central Military Commission's Disciplinary Committee: General You Taizhong"]

[Text] Of the 17 PLA generals on active duty, 14 are at or nearing the age of 70; aging is a serious problem. Over the next several years, there will be a changing of the guard at the highest levels of the PLA. But right now, their position and influence within the PLA is exceptionally great, and those who follow China's political affairs closely should study the new trends in the PRC military.

Experience in the Red 4th Front Army

General You Taizhong [1429 1132 1813] was born in 1918. He is presently serving as a member of the Central Advisory Commission of the CPC Central Committee (CPCCC), and as second secretary for the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Military Commission of the CPCCC.

You Taizhong is a native of Guangshan County, Henan. In 1931 he enlisted in the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army, and joined the CPC in 1933. When he was 14 or 15, he risked death as the Chinese civil war flared up again, taking part in the third and fourth anti-"surround and destroy" battles in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui soviet

area. After October 1932 he participated in the battle to open up the Sichuan-Shaanxi soviet area.

From 1933 on, You Taizhong served as a platoon leader in the Red 4th Front Army's 279th Regiment, 93d Division, 31st Army; company political instructor; and acting battalion commander in the 274th Regiment, 92d Division, Red 31st Army. He took part in the Red 4th Front Army's March 1935 to October 1936 Long March. In 1936, You Taizhong was promoted to battalion commander in the 4th Front Army.

In 1937, You Taizhong entered the third stage of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political College at Yanan. After August of that year he served as company political instructor, company commander, and deputy battalion commander of the 772d Regiment, 386th Brigade, 129th Division of the 8th Route Army, and deputy regimental commander of the 17th Regiment, 386th Brigade. He took part in the battles to open up the Taiyueh anti-Japanese base area.

In 1942, You Taizhong was appointed regimental commander of the Red Army's 17th Regiment, 386th Brigade, and took part in the war effort of consolidating and expanding the Taiyueh anti-Japanese base area.

After the War of Resistance Against Japan was won, in November 1945, You Taizhong was appointed deputy brigade commander of the 17th Brigade, 6th Column, in the Shanxi-Hobei-Shandong-Henan Military District. In November 1946 he was transferred to the post of deputy brigade commander in the 16th Brigade of the same column, where he took part in such campaigns as the attack on the Daji sea route, Dingtao, and north Henan.

In 1947, You Taizhong assumed the post of commander for a brigade in the Shanxi-Hobei-Shandong-Henan Field Army (those in charge were Liu Bochong [0491 0130 2110] and Deng Xiaoping), 6th Column (under Wang Hongkun [3769 1347 0981]). In July, he was with the main force of Liu and Deng in crossing the river, and was promoted to commander of the 16th Brigade, 6th Column, Central Plains Field Army (Wang Jinshan [3769 6602 1472], Du Yide [2629 5030 1795]), and when Liu and Deng pushed forward to Mt. Dabie, You Taizhong assumed the responsibility of advance guard for the entire Army, and in an arduous struggle at the Ruhe ferry, broke through the blockade thrown up by the KMT [Kuomintang] forces, performing exceptionally meritorious service.

Beginning in May 1948, You Taizhong assumed the post of commander of the 16th Brigade, 6th Column, of the Central Plains Military District Field Army, and was a part of the Wanxi, Xiangfan, and Zhunhai Campaigns.

The Capture of Song Xilian

At the end of 1948, You Taizhong was a part of the 6th Column (under Wang Jinshan and Du Yide) in the battle of Zhunhai, beating back the KMT's Huangwei Army.

In February 1949, he was appointed commander of the 34th Division, 12th Army, of the 2d Field Army, and took part in the campaign to cross the river and liberate Sichuan.

After the March 1949 changes in military units, You Taizhong was appointed commander of the 34th Division, 12th Army, 3d Army Group, 2d Field Army (Wang Jinshan, Du Yide). In April, they crossed the river to thrust deep into the enemy forces' Zhejiang-Jiangxi railway. In the autumn of 1949 they crossed the Sichuan border on the west and attacked Chongqing. These forces were the first to enter the city, pursuing and attacking the KMT troops of the famous general Song Xilian [1345 1585 3425]. Song Xilian was captured by the 100th Regiment under You Taizhong (in concert with the 18th Army), and the whole country was informed.

In 1950, You Taizhong became a member of the Chongqing municipal government.

In January 1950, he became commander of the Chongqing garrison.

In March 1951, You Taizong went to fight in the Korean war, as commander of the 34th Division, 12th Army, Chinese People's Volunteer Army.

At War With the United States

At the end of 1950, the 12th Army was secretly moved to Hebei, and changed over to Soviet-supplied equipment for entering Korea. In March 1951, the troops crossed the Yalu River and joined the 12th Army units commanded by Zeng Shaoshan [2582 4801 1472] in advancing on a Seoul city district. In May 1951, You Taizhong led the 34th Division in attacking the center line at Karisan. After reorganization, at the end of the same year they relieved the garrison at the Kimsong front, and blocked the U.S. 9th Army's autumn offensive, with great losses to those forces. In 1952, after being reequipped, they engaged the U.S. 40th Division in combat; the latter force was for the most part composed of fresh troops, but was no match. After this, they fought the South Korean 6th Division on the original battle line, and in September 1952 captured Capital Hill, which the South Koreans had garrisoned. In November of that year, they relieved the garrison at the Sanggamryong battlefield, routed the South Korean 6th Division's counteroffensive, and gradually gained command of regular warmaking capability.

In April 1954, after You Taizhong had returned to China, he became deputy commander of the PLA 12th Army.

He was awarded the rank of Major General in September 1955, and began study at the PLA Military Academy. After graduation, he assumed the post of commander of the 12th Army.

During the Cultural Revolution, he served as commander of the PLA 217th Army. From 1970 to 1980, he

held posts as deputy commander of the Beijing Military Region and commander of the Inner Mongolia Military District. Between May 1971 and October 1978 You Taizhong also served as first secretary of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region CPC Committee and director of the autonomous region's Revolutionary Committee. From January 1980 to November 1982 he was transferred to the post of commander of the Chengdu Military Region. Between November 1982 and November 1987 he was commander of the Guangzhou

Military Region. After November 1987, he served as second secretary of the CPC Central Military Commission's Discipline Committee.

You Taizhong was a delegate to the Fourth and Fifth National People's Congresses. From April 1969 to August 1978, he was an alternate to the CPC Central Committee, and since November 1987 he has been a member of the Central Advisory Commission of the CPC.