


JPRS-NEA-93-084  
27 July 1993



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-93-084

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27 July 1993

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### **PLO Economic Plan for Palestine Infrastructure**

*93AA0093B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Jun 93  
p B2*

[Text] This month, several dozen Palestinian and international economists participating in the "UN Conference To Aid the Palestinian People," held at the residence of UNESCO in Paris, took up the subject of the Palestinian economy in the transition period after a permanent solution to the sovereignty problem is found. The main document presented to conferees was the PLO's central plan to promote the Palestinian economy. The person responsible for this plan on behalf of the PLO is an economist, Dr. Yusuf al-Sayyagh, who heads the Palestinian delegation in the economic development committee of the multilateral discussions.

This plan, entitled: "The Development of the Palestinian Economy, 1994-2000," is actually the current, main economic plan of the PLO and Palestinians participating in the peace talks. The plan's foreword states that the plan is concerned with overall strategy and does not purport to enter into the technical details of the Palestinian economy; those details will be the concern of a body of economists, most of them residents of the territories, which will be established in the future.

The document's very wording and date show it to be a political declaration of intentions and perhaps an expression of the Palestinians' heartfelt hope that they are now facing a real change in their status. Similar reports were formulated by the PLO and written by well-known Palestinian economists in 1988 and 1999, but they are not up-to-date. This time, however, the document was presented for implementation starting in 1994.

The document makes no reference to Israeli settlements in the territories or to the extensive Jewish construction activity in East Jerusalem. Thus, one receives the impression that the document is intended for political and public relations purposes laid down from above by the PLO, rather than practical, economic purposes. Also, the many technical difficulties bound to arise in the achievement of the plan's ambitious goals were not presented at the conference. Emphasis was placed on separating from Israel and breaking away from dependence on Israel. The formulators of the Palestinian document failed to understand that Israel's contribution could be one of the most important parameters in the furtherance of Palestinian rehabilitation.

The report also disregards the geographical proximity of Israelis and Palestinians to each other, while assuming the possibility of a geographical separation. As a point of departure, the PLO document speaks of a geographical Palestinian entity within the borders of only the territories, without mentioning confederal coordination with Jordan for example.

The document regards as self-evident that all Palestinians who emigrated from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their descendants, will be allowed to return to the

"transition entity" (read autonomy), and subsequently to the independent Palestinian state. According to al-Sayyar, in 1967, about 350,000 Palestinians left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; since then, the number has grown to an estimated 650,000, who will return to the Palestinian territory. It is not clear, according to the report, whether only the refugees of 1967 would return, or also those who took refuge in 1948 in Lebanon, for example. The plan accepts as a given that natural resources (including water) and all of the territory that was occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, will be returned to Palestinian control in 1994. The document states that 180,000 large housing units will be built by the year 2000 in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, based on the concept of building upward; new urban and industrial centers will be developed, an infrastructure will be established, the services sector will be modernized, and a secondary project to rehabilitate the refugee camps—mainly in the Gaza Strip—will be started.

All of these processes are to be supervised by an emergency committee of Palestinian economists that will receive its mandate from the transition government or the authorities of the Palestinian state to be established. This committee will also impose austerity measures during the years of the major effort in order to prevent inflationary erosion. The document contains no clear reference to the serious unemployment problem that would be created by a permanent separation between the Palestinian and Israeli markets and by the return of 0.5 million refugees.

Al-Sayyar calculated that \$11.6 billion in 1993 prices would be needed between 1994 and 2000 to complete the establishment of the economic infrastructure of a Palestinian state. Most of the money, he believes, will be mobilized through the Arab and Western countries, which will seek to contribute their share to solving the Palestinian problem. Palestinian communities in the diaspora will also contribute, and residents of the territories would also be required to make a financial effort. There is no reference to the possibility that the money will not be mobilized, and that the rehabilitation plan will collapse.

## ALGERIA

### **France's New Immigre Law Raises Concerns**

*93AF0691C Algiers EL WATAN in French  
5 Jun 93 p 32*

[Text] France's recent immigration measures have sparked great concern in the Algerian community which, by itself, accounts for 3 million foreigners in France. The psychological impact of the new law affecting our countrymen in France was the focus of an animated press briefing Thursday by Algeria's ambassador to France.

Ambassador Sid Ahmed Ghazali remarked that "heavy pressure now weighs on the Algerian community," particularly its young people, following the French government's initiative which he described as playing into the notion that "France's woes are foreign in origin."

Algeria's ambassador derided the new French Government's attitude as an expression of the natural tendency "to blame others for one's own unhappiness." He did not hesitate to state that "if there were not a single foreigner in France, the exact same problem would exist." Mr. Ghozali's press briefing was held shortly after the French minister of the interior announced that his government had set a goal of "zero immigration," which observers promptly interpreted to mean "zero immigrants."

The president of France's International Migration Office (OMI), a public organization that, among other things, enables immigrants to be reunited with their families in an effort to foster the integration of foreigners, disagrees with the Balladur government's plans and has resigned from his post in protest.

Mr. Louis Remy stated that he was shocked by the "general tone of the bills introduced and the talk that has accompanied them," describing this rather direct scapegoating of foreigners as "particularly dangerous."

The rector of the Mosque of Paris, Dr. Dalil Boubakeur, decried "these brutal measures," which are contrary to French tradition. Dr. Boubakeur noted that guest workers have made a positive contribution to the edification of French society. He remarked that "France has fared quite well by taking in foreigners many of whom have given their hard work for low wages. Some have given their blood and their lives to this country, which they learned about as of their first years in school." Usually a reserved man, the rector did not mince words in expressing his disapproval of the new laws, which threaten to create a rift between the communities living in France. In fact, Dr. Boubakeur is getting ready to meet with 300 imams from France's mosques in the coming days in an effort to heighten awareness within the Muslim community. Amnesty International [AI], for its part, has asked the French prime minister that the proposed legislation on entry and residence (approved by the Cabinet on Wednesday) not be submitted "as it currently stands" to the Parliament.

The French branch of AI issued a statement deploring the fact that "most of the provisions concerning asylum seekers and refugees would seriously undermine" the right to asylum. According to AI, the divisions of the Interior Ministry and prefectures, which the bill would make responsible for evaluating asylum requests "are not competent to assess whether a foreigner is a refugee or not, and possess neither the impartiality nor the training to assume such a weighty responsibility."

AI added that, "The debate over immigration control or the number of asylum seekers must take into account the need to identify and protect individuals who may be in danger." It is demanding "genuine consultations" before the bill is submitted to Parliament.

Yesterday, the human rights advisory commission, asked last Wednesday by the prime minister to study the bill, issued "an unfavorable opinion." It called the bill "inopportune, ineffective, and even detrimental to the social harmony of the country." It felt it had "no choice

but to condemn the spirit" of the bill which it sees as "restrictive of individual freedoms." In addition, nearly 100 organizations including the Communist Party, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the Movement Against Racism and Anti-Semitism, and SOS-Racism, have called for a week of action from 14 to 19 June and for demonstrations in Paris and elsewhere in France on 19 June to demand that the bill, sponsored by Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, be withdrawn.

These organizations, which have signed a communique, believe that the reforms will subject "foreigners residing in France to near total arbitrariness" and "would place foreigners in an even more precarious position than at present. This would amount to a policy of discrimination, exclusion, and banishment and can only lead to greater social tensions."

Other unfavorable reactions to the new French laws were expressed by the "Greens" (the environmental party), the left-wing magistrates association, and by Mr. Martin Malvy, leader of the Socialist caucus in the French National Assembly.

#### Pressure To Devalue Dinar Said Growing

93AF0691A Algiers EL WATAN in French  
13 Jun 93 pp 1,3

[Article by Khaled Mahrez: "Has Belaid Abdesselam's Tight State Control of the Economy Outlived Its Time?"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The presence in Algiers of a delegation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which arrived several days ago, has raised once again the question of a devaluation of the dinar, which Prime Minister Belaid Abdesselam had previously ruled out. The IMF has insisted on a 50-percent devaluation as a precondition to any discussion of further loans to Algeria. The question is said to be back on the table, despite Mr. Belaid Abdesselam's firm opposition.

According to concurring sources, the idea of devaluing the dinar has gained ground and the prospect of satisfying this IMF requirement is not as frightening as it had been.

Reports that Algeria and the IMF had reached a "secret" agreement to devalue the dinar have been denied in Algiers and Washington (see EL WATAN 25 May 1993). But, while prospects for an agreement appear remote, it seems that pressure from the IMF is increasingly felt.

Moreover, those who disapprove of Mr. Belaid Abdesselam's policy (not solely his declared opponents) put forward against arguments that are just as convincing. It is pointed out that several years of recessionary economic policy have had damaging social consequences as well a harmful effect on the country's economic fabric. In order to solve its problems, Algeria will have to adopt a policy of economic stimulation based on strong growth which is the only way to alleviate severe unemployment.

Along those lines, what was presented as an agreement with the IMF may be Algeria's proposal to negotiate a gradual devaluation of the dinar over a two- or three-year period during which the dinar would inch downward to its true value as determined by the market.

It should be noted that the government's recessionary policy is increasingly subject to open criticism. In its forecasts for this year, the government is banking on a 2-percent growth rate. Not only are the forecasts are "optimistic," but a member of the government acknowledged at the beginning of the year that economic recovery is impossible when the economy is growing more slowly than the population.

The economists of the FFS [Front of Socialist Forces] announced in a statement published on Thursday that they believe Algeria is now in the most serious recession in its history, with a negative growth rate of minus 7 percent.

That figure has not been officially refuted, and if it is confirmed, it would mean that Mr. Belaid Abdesselam's policy has been a total failure. According to trustworthy sources, Mr. Belaid Abdesselam—motivated by a desire to save his political career with a view to running for the presidency—raised the idea of resigning his post but the idea was rejected by the Higher State Council (HCE).

Whatever the case may be, if Mr. Belaid Abdesselam were to let go of the reins of executive authority, it would not surprise public opinion or economic circles at home and abroad which have been disconcerted by the bureaucratic approach he has taken thus far. Has his policy of tight economic management outlived its time?

#### **FIS Press Reappears Under New Name**

*93AF0691B Algiers EL WATAN in French  
12 Jun 93 p 3*

[Text] Two weeks after being banned by the French Government, the Islamist newspaper has reappeared under a new name.

LE CRITERE, banned by France's Interior Ministry for its "violently anti-Western and anti-French" nature, resurfaced yesterday morning in front of the mosque on Polanceau Street in the 18th arrondissement of Paris, under the new title of RESISTANCE. Like its predecessor, the new version bills itself in its masthead as the "organ of the Algerian brotherhood in France" (in reality, the mouthpiece of the banned FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]). Like the old format, it offers "news of the jihad," meaning the terrorist attacks in Algeria.

The new publication's address, typography, format, number of pages, etc. are identical to its predecessor's, although France's press laws state that a banned publication "cannot be revived, even under a different name."

A provocation or simply an attempt to resume publication under a different name? The French Interior Ministry claims to be unaware of the "startling" appearance of the newspaper despite the fact that it was distributed

under the noses of the state security police (CRS) in front of the mosque. It is too early to determine whether action will be taken, as "the first order of business is to establish a link between the two publications."

In other news, weapons and documents belonging to the FIS were discovered last week in the office in Nanterre of Impact, an association close to the FIS. The police found a pump gun, hand weapons, ammunition, and documents belonging to the FIS.

The association Impact filed for official registration on 21 October of last year as an organization whose goal is "to fight against delinquency and academic failure." Three of its officers, Frenchmen of Algerian origin, were known for their efforts to convert others to fundamentalism.

In questioning by the police, they stated that their intent was "to defend public morality and purity against drug dealers" in the name of the Koran.

Under the pretense of aiding young people, the association was hunting down drug dealers.

A reliable source states that a web of fundamentalist associations coordinated by Djaafar El-Houari and Moussa Kraouche, the second and third ranking Algerian fundamentalists in France and officers of the Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF), and whose mission is to engage in charitable activities and preach "the good word." [sentence as published]

That is the method used in Algeria and it has been effective. However, certain breaches of moral strictures are tolerated. The daily LE JOUR reported, for example, that a fight broke out between dealers of hard drugs and peddlers of "chique" [tobacco] who are supported by the Islamists.

Another association, the Martial Arts Association, was banned after a chase between drug dealers ended at the Chemin de l'Ile in Nanterre. The association is known to have committed a variety of crimes ranging from various assaults and shootings to death threats.

The public prosecutor's office in Nanterre has remained silent about the association Impact, but has not denied an affiliation. The police are looking into the origin and prior use of the weapons seized.

In addition, the police are attempting to establish a link between Impact and the now banned FIS.

#### **Survey: Fears of European Investors Identified**

*93AF0695A Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Jun 93  
pp 1, 3*

[Article by Mourad Hadjersi: "Why Does Algeria Cause Fear?"]

[Text] *European businessmen are not familiar with Algeria. Investing there would be an uncertain venture for many business executives in the European Community.*

Of 300 European business executives taking part in a survey, no fewer than 84 percent feel that political instability remains the most important obstacle when it comes to attracting EC investors to Algeria, and 42 percent consider it a "rather important" factor, but only 12 percent think it is not important.

Those figures are the result of a survey of 300 heads of European firms by the international consulting firm BDA/Deloitte and Touche of Brussels. The purpose of the survey was to learn how the heads of European firms feel about the attractions and disadvantages of European investment in Algeria.

The results of the survey were summarized at a seminar held at the Palace of Nations yesterday by Finalep [Algerian-European Financial Investment Company]. Besides the political situation in Algeria, European businessmen also argue that the cultural and religious environment is another factor discouraging them from wanting to invest in a country described by the Western media as a "second Iran."

That did not prevent 42 percent of them from ignoring that factor, which they said could not hamper investment in any case.

Concerning financial matters, nearly 72 percent of the sample sees the nonconvertibility of the dinar as a major factor that does not encourage a rush of European investors to the Algerian market. On the other hand, 14 percent of them do not assign much importance to that factor. The problem inherent in the repatriation of profits is an obstacle in the opinion of 50 percent of the European firms covered by the survey. For its part, the Algerian tax system has managed to produce a lukewarm response among the Community's businessmen. Besides the poor quality of banking services, 60 percent of those surveyed feel that the Algerian financial market is insufficiently developed, while 48 percent said that the problem was the state monopoly on consumer goods.

They also emphasized the constraints placed on imports of raw materials and spare parts, those being products that they consider indispensable to any firm that has just established itself in a country such as Algeria. The survey also reveals that 32 percent of European firms hesitate to come to Algeria "because they feel that they will be unable to export their products successfully." According to a good number of them, the "made in Algeria" label has a bad reputation.

Others (56 percent) sharply criticized Algeria's administrative system. The lack of coordination among the various ministries was also denounced.

What must Algeria do to erase that "gruesome" picture, as it was called by Reda Hamiani, who attended the seminar?

To begin with, the survey cannot be exhaustive regarding the true attitudes European investors have toward the Algerian market, at least statistically speaking, since of the 300 firms making up the working sample, only 24 are already established in Algeria. This may mean that

almost none of the firms are familiar with the Algerian market. Consequently, lack of information is probably largely responsible for the mistrust European firms feel toward Algeria. The issue of information provided the framework for the recommendations made by Mr. Branton, general director of the Deloitte and Touche firm, who noted that "the perception that European firms have of the situation in Algeria is quite negative. That perception is the result of unfamiliarity with the changes taking place in that country." According to that same expert, the lack of information is more the fault of the Algerians than it is of the businessmen. There is practically no source capable of promoting the Algerian market. "In addition, many European managers think that Algeria is hesitating to move toward a market economy," said Branton. Responding to those concerns, the Algerian minister of small and medium-size industry and business retraced the outlines of the government's economic policy, reiterating its rejection of rescheduling.

Hamiani was nevertheless careful to inform his audience that the new investment code, much desired and long in coming, "should come before the Council of Government this week."

#### **Boudiaf Memorial: Old Resentments Rekindled**

93AF0695B Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Jul 93  
pp 1, 3

[Article by Catherine Simon: "Algerian Government Seems Powerless To Protect Intellectuals"]

[Text] *The ceremony held to commemorate the first anniversary of the assassination of Mohamed Boudiaf did not bring out the crowds despite the esteem in which the former Algerian president is held. His widow continues to accuse the entire "system"—of negligence, if nothing else. For their part, Algerian intellectuals are being increasingly threatened and are afraid, not only of Islamic "terrorists." Following several recent murders, they feel that the government is powerless to protect them.*

Algiers—There were a few timid wails of mourning, a photograph was waved by someone, an anonymous rose was thrown among the ribbon-decorated sprays of flowers covering the marble slabs, and the crowd dispersed without further ado. Not many people—from 600 to 800 maybe—had made the "pilgrimage" to El Alia Cemetery in Algiers on Tuesday 29 June. Very early in the morning, the members of the Higher State Council (HCE) and the government had also come, as though on the sly, to bow before the grave of President Mohamed Boudiaf. For their part, the "people" did not take the trouble. It was a far cry from the massive crowds that had showed up at his funeral a year earlier to honor the mortal remains of the assassinated president. Beside the grave, which is bordered by a row of pines, was a banner demanding "the complete truth about the death of President Mohamed Boudiaf." "The evil is in us," sobbed one young woman as she was supported by her friends. "Take up the fight! Don't give up!" were the words repeated by the former leader's widow, Fatiha

Boudiaf, who was swallowed up in the procession. "You know who was behind this. It was an entire system that killed him!" she also shouted as her bodyguards tried to clear a path for her. "Why didn't you protect her husband?" a man yelled at them. And he added, to the crowd's applause, "Let her alone. Mrs. Boudiaf is the mother of the people, and the people don't mean her any harm! You are the murderers!"

By 1230 or so, it was all over. The El Alia Cemetery had not drawn a large crowd, and neither did the House of the People, where a memorial rally sponsored by the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and several other associations attracted a scant 1,000 members in the late afternoon. By assassinating President Boudiaf, his murderers were attacking "the double symbol of nation and state," according to a recent brochure published by the Provisional National Committee for Truth and Justice.

#### Distress of Intellectuals

But the misfortunes and tragedies affecting the ruling class, to which Mohamed Boudiaf had chosen to belong, have never really aroused the passionate interest of the Algerian masses, who are too busy trying to survive among the 1,001 hellish features of daily life. Seemingly even more breathtaking is the isolation of the intellectuals, whom the government seems powerless to protect.

The recent wave of assassination attempts, which cost the lives of writer Tahar Djaout, psychiatrist Mahfoud Boucebc, and sociologist M'Hamed Boukhobza in the space of a few weeks, has caused deep distress in their ranks. "My country, my own country, suddenly became incomprehensible. Everything became veiled in darkness, and for several days I remained in a state of confusion approaching panic," explains a professor of psychiatry. "But paradoxically," she adds, "it is that shock that is now giving me the will to remain."

The vast majority of Algerian intellectuals have made the same choice. "I'm not leaving. One must fight even if the situation is difficult," says a lawyer whose un concealed progressive convictions cause him to fear being the victim, "some day or another," of an assassination attempt. "I am much more afraid of being executed by the security services than by people in the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]—or what is left of it!" he says. On the other hand, there is another member of the academic community—also well-known in public affairs—who feels that the designated "enemy" is still the Islamic movement. She swears: "The terrorists—those who use Islam for political purposes—will have to give in! The pattern used to be 'I insult you but I love you.' But they have brought hatred into it," she emphasizes.

A reporter explains: "We no longer know where the blows may come from. We wind up distrusting everything." The men and women who have received threatening letters or telephone calls are protecting themselves as best they can. Which is to say, almost not at all. Some of them no longer sleep at home. They "camp out" at the homes of friends and change their hiding places as often

as possible. The others simply "take a good look at the people we pass on the street."

And while some dream of "holing up somewhere" outside the capital, they do not necessarily want to leave the country. "Our entire lives are here. And although they are difficult and distressing, our lives are going on!" says one famous historian in a calm voice. "Most cadres and intellectuals have chosen to stay. If Algeria is continuing to function, it is partly thanks to them," she observes. Then, with a smile tinged with derision, she adds: "Sometimes I wonder: is it because we are here that we end up nourishing a degree of hope? Or is it because we really have hope that we decide not to leave?"

#### Investment Code; Key Points Noted

93AF0711A Algiers LIBERTE in French 18-19 Jul 93  
p 4

[Article by K. Remouche: "Draft Investment Code Shows Serious Commitment to Market Economy"]

[Text] Intended to attract foreign investors, the draft decree on promoting foreign investment was adopted Wednesday by the Council of Government.

The most important features of the text are tax and customs advantages, investment guarantees, accelerated procedures, and creation of free zones. The measure introduces the principle of permanent guarantees and routine incentives.

There are separate incentives for general investments, priority investment zones, and free zones.

General investment incentives include tax breaks during the time the investment is under construction—exemption from transfer and property taxes; exemption from value-added taxes on goods and services needed for realization of the investment, whether imported or acquired locally; and a fixed rate of 5 per thousand on taxes for incorporation and augmentation of capital. Once the enterprise is in operation, tax advantages consist of a five-year exemption from IBS [tax on corporate profits], IRC [income tax], TAIC [tax on industrial and commercial activity], and VF [expansion not given].

Investments in special zones "may benefit from public sector provision of all the infrastructure needed for realization of the investment, exemption from property tax for a 10-year period from the time of acquisition, exemption from IBS, VF, and TAIC for a 10-year period, and total abatement of reinvested profits."

The draft investment code "allows for the possibility of reduced interest rates on bank credits needed to realize the investment." Transfer of income by nonresidents is guaranteed. The law also envisages creation of export-oriented free zones. An agency responsible for investment promotion is created. Called the Agency for Investment Promotion and Support, its mission will be "to centralize investment application forms and act on applications for benefits under the code, after consideration of the facts in the case." The agency will maintain



an all-purpose intake point for declaration formalities. It will be the "investor's exclusive interlocutor for consideration of eligibility for incentives."

It should be noted that adoption of the proposed investment code follows a number of measures already taken to create a favorable climate for investors, notably promulgation of the commerce code and Algeria's signing of international arbitration conventions and bilateral investment protection accords. There are also plans to deregulate the foreign currency market. But the investment code and steps already taken are not enough.

What is needed is to create an environment truly hospitable to investment, which would include, if the object is to attract foreigners, a favorable political climate, an administrative apparatus committed to public service, and comparative advantages (better than those offered by Tunisia and Morocco). It remains to be seen how investors will react to the new incentives.

### Participation at International Fair

#### Local Exhibitors Spurned

93AF0696A Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Jun 93  
p 2

[Article signed by L.A. and K.D.: "The 29th International Algiers Fair"]

[Text] Once again the halls in which Algerian exhibitors' stands were set up have been spurned by government representatives who came to open the 29th International Algiers Fair [FIA] yesterday.

Indeed the delegation headed by Belaid Abdesselam and comprised of, among others, the ministers of social affairs, education, religious affairs, youth and sports, and the commerce minister delegate, as well as several ambassadors from participating countries, visited only the foreign halls.

Leaders of Algerian businesses could not conceal their disappointment when, after a long wait, the rumor circulated that the officials had already left the SAFEX [expansion not given] enclosure. That is when you put away the video cam recorders meant to immortalize the opening and when the folk dancing troupe sent to the doors of the hall sends its dancers home.

Yet after the traditional walk around of the head of government and the delegation accompanying him, a note of urgency was sounded by Mr. Moghraoui, the commerce minister delegate, in which he emphasized the particular appeal of the FIA this year. Having listed the number of businesses exhibiting, both foreign and domestic, the minister went on to say that Mr. Belaid Abdesselam would come back to pay a visit to national exhibitors. Besides he explained that foreign attendance at this year's fair was an especial part of operational partnership. Besides that was the reason few European nations and very few African states responded to the invitation.

The exhibits of the latter related directly to national needs in the area of materiel and industrial machines.

"As for the poor Maghreb showing, which really does need to be pointed out, it is due," according to Mr. Maghraoui, "to purely financial reasons, inasmuch as some countries have long had to exhibit at the FIA without having to pay for services supplied by SAFEX," something which can no longer be accepted in light of "business autonomy," he added.

Finally, regarding the "Hilton" affair, the minister went on to state that everything is returning to normal and that the temporary receipt of any project inevitably leads to a detailed accounting process, as occurred in the case in question.

#### Absence of Maghreb Countries

93AF0696B Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Jun 93  
p 2

[Article by M. Hadjersi: "Attendance by Maghreb Countries: Absence Noted"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] It is now a fact accepted by businesses that attendance at the International Algiers Fair [FIA] is not an obligation. Gone is the time of prestige. It is time for pragmatism. Businessmen decided to exhibit their products at the 29th FIA only because they saw its commercial interest.

That was the same strategy that a many of Algeria's partners seem to have adopted. It was true of the Union of the Arab Maghreb's [UMA] member countries, which did not find it useful to attend this trade show. With the exception of Tunisia, which has never failed to show up at the FIA, the stands of other Maghreb countries, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, will not welcome any visitors this year. It is a major absence if you refer to the political discourse that has grown up in the Maghreb's five capital cities. Don't the authorities of these countries ever stop praising the greater Maghreb and the future Maghreb common market?

However, it is not the foundation of this building that is lacking. In addition to the dozens of projects that have been underway for several years, others are currently being studied. This is the case, for example, of the fifth session of the UMA's Council on Equipment and Public Works, which last met in Fes, which studied the plan for the Maghreb Unity Highway.

Beyond the political arguments, which could be used by Maghreb countries that did not attend the FIA, this lack of interest towards this trade show could be interpreted by certain observers as "being the expression of hesitation with regard to the building of the Maghreb Economic Union." This would be a hesitation aimed at a single UMA country at a time when Moroccan and Tunisian businessmen are going to meet by the end of the month to discuss the establishment of a free market between the two countries.

Those absent from the 29th FIA are not just Algeria's close neighbors. A large number of regulars at the Algiers fair did not come this year. Included were about 10 African countries, every East European country and especially certain Arab countries. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, and Lebanon are at the top of the list of "special absentees."

### Work Conflicts 'Reflect' Economic Situation

93AF0691D Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French  
9 Jun 92 pp 1,2

[Article by Youcef Rezzoug: "Labor Disputes: Symptoms of a Stalled Economy"—first paragraph is ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

[Excerpts] There may be fewer strikes, but they are more confrontational; outdated methods and injustice still prevail in human resources management.

A great deal can be learned about the economic and social state of affairs in a country by analyzing its labor disputes. In Algeria, that analysis is all the more relevant given the critical state of the economy, the effects of which are particularly evident in companies.

Even if the effects of economic troubles have expressed themselves in other forms and through other channels (notably political) since October 1988, companies are still the central focus for the workers. Moreover, companies offer concrete examples of the consequences of Algeria's economic policies. Beyond these general remarks, the sweeping changes brought on by reforms (modifications of the labor laws, in particular) must also be borne in mind. [Passage omitted]

[But the transition from central planning to collective bargaining has been slow.] One need only look at the number of companies that lack collective agreements with workers. Among those which do have such agreements, there are few innovations in relation to the old legislation and regulations; the same provisions generally apply, with only a handful of new social measures added here and there (retirement bonus, nonworking spouses...).

These few improvements would make good sense if they were part of a strategy of human resource management that balances social requirements and economic objectives over the short and medium term. But few companies have plans extending to the medium term, nor can they be expected to have such plans as long as the sector strategies called for in the reforms have yet to be drawn up.

There are still other indications of slow progress: Almost all companies have yet to institute mechanisms of economic control using company performance as a yardstick for labor conditions (including salaries). As a consequence, companies have all had to accept the wage hikes decided by successive governments in recent years, including increases inconsistent with the letter of the law in that they were not limited to the minimum wage.

In practice, however, it has been found that such mechanisms are dependent upon a strong sense of responsibility, greater accountability in management, and a more democratic approach to management.

To provide a more concrete picture, here are the available statistics on labor disputes and their causes.

### Strikes Becoming Less Systematic

A reading of the Labor Ministry's numbers and statistics on strikes in 1992 in the various sectors shows a decline in recourse to strikes as a tool of protest. (See table below.)

Strikes according to Sector				
Sector	1992		First Quarter 1993	
	Number	%	Number	%
Autonomous public enterprises	146	29.61	74	42.77
State-run companies	198	40.16	49	27.74
Public agencies	85	17.24	36	21.38
Private sector	64	12.98	14	8.09
Total	493	100	173	100

The declining number of strikes may be attributable to the provisions of Circular No. 6 of 1990 on company reform, which attempts to foster new working relationships through bottom-to-top negotiations (between labor and management and three-way talks).

Strikes have become the last resort of workers, to be used only after peaceful attempts to settle disputes have failed.

It is true that unemployment has had a considerable sobering effect on workers, making them more hesitant to strike over secondary problems. Rather than compound the difficulties their companies are already experiencing as a result of the economic crisis, they have good reason to limit themselves to priority issues.

The political climate and the security problem in Algeria have also had an attenuating effect on the number and nature of labor disputes.

Consequently, the fact that there have been fewer strikes than in previous years should not be taken to mean that the state of companies and the socio-professional situation of workers have improved.

### Worker Demands and the Sectors Most Affected by Strikes

Work stoppages have occurred in the construction, civil engineering, and water works sector more than in any other. Of a total of 493 strikes in 1992, 223 occurred in this sector. The figures for the first quarter of 1993 indicate that the trend will continue. Of 173 strikes

during the first three months of 1993, 73 occurred in construction, civil engineering, and water works.

Generally speaking, the strikes are related to remuneration, as evidenced by worker demands. Remuneration was cited in 376 strikes in 1992 and in 155 strikes in the first quarter of 1993.

But the weak state of the economy has pulled labor and management farther apart, resulting in more bitter disputes. In most cases, managers are unable to meet the demands of workers for wage increases or bonuses, primarily because factories have accumulated high levels of debt. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 2]

#### **Workers Indefinitely on Strike at Real-Sider in Annaba**

Workers at Real-Sider, a construction company in Annaba, went on strike for an unspecified period of time as announced in a strike notice filed 15 days ago by union representatives at the company. The union council at Real-Sider issued a communique yesterday to inform "all workers that company management had failed to give any encouraging sign of a solution to the dispute." It noted that "the 15-day advance notice of a strike expired on Monday 6 July 1993."

Most workers stayed away from their jobs on the first day of the strike, the union council said, with the exception of custodians, ambulance drivers, and security and transportation personnel who must ensure a minimum of service.

The strike was called when negotiations broke down between company management and the union over "the introduction of collective work agreements and demands for higher salaries and bonuses (food allowance, non-working spouses, a bonus based on experience, and supplements to family allowances)."

When the strike notice was filed, company management had stated that "to meet the union's demands would place the company in the position of having payroll obligations nearly equal to its business volume, on top of the company's enormous financial difficulties." Real-Sider employs about 2,800 workers. It gained autonomy from the state in 1991. Since then it has operated without a collective agreement, contrary to labor law.

#### **Bejaia Health District in Third Week of Strike**

The Bejaia health district is still at a standstill after three successive weeks of a strike by local health personnel who continue to demand the dismissal of the district's health director and the health director of the wilayah.

In essence, the health district director is the focus of the dispute. The union council cites performance bonuses awarded out of personal preference, hiring on the basis of regional origin, and a lack of consideration given to dissatisfied staff members. The director denies all of the accusations against him which he believes are an attempt at destabilization. "None of these assertions is borne out by the actual facts," he said. He believes that a handful of

doctors and nurses, reacting to cutbacks and regulations and spreading rumors in conjunction with budgetary difficulties at the hospital, have managed to draw their colleagues into the protest.

Health sector officials recently ordered the strikers back to work.

## **EGYPT**

### **Warning of Possible Use of Diplomatic Pouches for Smuggling**

*93WR0260Z London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 30 May 93 p 3*

[Article by Muhammad Naji from Cairo: "Security Reports Warn Against Diplomatic Pouches Used To Smuggle Weapons, Funds to Extremists in Egypt"]

[Text] Egyptian security reports intimated that terrorists and their leaders abroad could use diplomatic pouches to smuggle weapons to their aides in the country since diplomatic pouches are not subject to inspection because of diplomatic immunity. Authorities at Cairo's international airport and at other ports and airports are obviously worried, now that thwarted attempts to smuggle weapons and narcotics in the luggage of some diplomats and others who have diplomatic immunity are becoming a growing phenomenon.

The report advised that different countries be contacted and asked to reconsider the process by means of which diplomatic passports and pouches are issued. In some countries that process has been opened up, and many people are being given diplomatic passports.

Security authorities at Cairo Airport caught an Arab diplomat on 21 May who was trying to smuggle three handguns and several rounds of ammunition in his diplomat's briefcase. The diplomat wanted to carry the guns and ammunition on board a Yemeni airplane flying to Aden.

The device which detects the presence of explosives had indicated the presence of a firearm inside the briefcase of the first secretary of an Arab embassy in Cairo. When the diplomat refused to open his briefcase for inspection on the grounds of his diplomatic status, airport authorities summoned a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The presence of weapons and ammunition in the briefcase was then confirmed, the authorities took custody of the briefcase, and they delivered it to the pilot of the aircraft who was to hold on to it until the airplane's arrival in Aden.

Last year narcotics detectives in Cairo seized three kilograms of raw heroin in the briefcase of the bodyguard of a diplomat in an Arab embassy in Cairo. The heroin was hidden inside the diplomatic pouch.

The bodyguard acknowledged while he was being questioned that he was a bodyguard for an Arab diplomat working in Cairo. He said that he receives the heroin from an Arab personality who sends it to him in the

diplomatic pouch by way of the VIP lounge in Cairo Airport. He said that he had received heroin in this manner more than once.

Incidents involving diplomatic pouches and the VIP lounge at Cairo Airport are innumerable. An Arab diplomat was caught with one kilogram of heroin in his possession, and another was caught with five kilograms of raw heroin in his briefcase.

The facts on the ground in Egypt confirm that security men are capable of uncovering the strangest methods of smuggling in the world. However, they would be able to see more and uncover more in cases involving diplomatic pouches, especially if they were to have the mandatory authority that would give them the right to conduct inspections quickly, instead of having to go through the complicated procedures which are currently required by this process.

#### **Terrorists' Weapon in the Pouch**

Before talking about the procedures that were being followed for inspecting diplomatic pouches, it was important to find out what Major General al-Nabawi Isma'il, Egypt's former minister of the interior, thought about that subject. Maj. Gen. Isma'il said, "It all goes back to the fact that laws and regulations regulate all relations which dominate the movement of all life. The principle of affording immunity to diplomatic pouches is one which has been established for diplomats. All countries adhere to this principle, which is subject to all diplomatic relations and to the principal of reciprocity. We respect any kind of immunity established by law for diplomats, and we believe in good international relations. And yet, the immunity which has been established for diplomatic pouches is not absolute and does not mean that diplomatic pouches are not to be touched. If that were the case, they could be used to damage the interests of the state which observes its obligation to respect the right to immunity."

With regard to regulating such matters by law, it would be possible, according to Maj. Gen. Nabawi, to get a decision from a duly qualified prosecutor's office authorizing the inspection, provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is notified of the inspection and a ministry representative is present when the inspection takes place. The inspection must also be attended by a representative of the embassy with which the diplomat whose briefcase is to be inspected is affiliated. The diplomat is detained until the inspection is completed.

Maj. Gen. Nabawi Isma'il also states that "Information is received every now and then about some diplomats in Arab and foreign embassies using diplomatic pouches in operations that are harmful to the country's interests and security. The Ministry of the Interior did not stand idly by, unable to thwart any attempt to bring the contents of these diplomatic pouches into the country. The ministry applied the laws and regulations that are in effect in this regard, and it also took those measures which would guarantee the country's peace and security.

"When a diplomat is convicted, action on the matter depends upon the relationship between the states that are involved. It is sometimes possible to get the diplomat out of the country, or he may be put on trial to safeguard the sovereignty of the state. The embassies which are involved in the matter are notified of these measures."

Maj. Gen. Nabawi Isma'il, Egypt's former minister of the interior, affirms that "Taking advantage of diplomatic pouches and of diplomats' luggage to smuggle all kinds of weapons from abroad into Egypt is possible of course. It certainly happens that the cover of immunity is used to deliver weapons to terrorists in Egypt and that diplomatic pouches and diplomats' luggage are used for that purpose. Weapons are delivered this way to the terrorists by diplomats who sympathize with the terrorists or by diplomats whose characters are weak and who can be tempted with money. Diplomats' luggage is also used to smuggle narcotics, historical artifacts, currency, and valuable objects."

Regarding the possibility of altering procedures for dealing with diplomatic pouches, Maj. Gen. Nabawi Isma'il acknowledges that, "No change in procedures is necessary, because this matter is subject to international law and diplomatic conventions between countries."

#### **Inspection Procedures**

With regard to the treatment given to diplomatic pouches, Muhammad al-Samaan, director general of customs, said, "When diplomats who work in Egypt come into the country, the diplomatic immunity they enjoy must be respected. But when there is suspicion regarding the diplomatic pouch, the diplomat is asked to open his bag for inspection. The bag is inspected after permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is obtained, and the inspection is carried out in the presence of a representative of the ministry and a representative of the suspected diplomat's embassy. If no contraband is found inside, customs issues an apology to the diplomat. In that case customs is not held accountable as long as the inspection followed proper procedure and was called for by the interests of the state. But if the diplomat is caught smuggling contraband into the country, a report of the incident is drafted by customs at the airport, and the diplomat and the report are then turned over to the duly qualified prosecutor's office so that an investigation can be completed. The diplomat is turned over to the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the representative of his own embassy pending the investigation, and it is at that point that the role of customs officers comes to an end."

Muhammad al-Samaan affirms that customs might be conciliatory with a diplomat who was attempting to smuggle currency or jewelry in his bag, if the diplomat is leaving the country. Customs might also be conciliatory with an arriving diplomat who is trying to smuggle something into the country. [In that case] the diplomat would have to pay damages determined by customs.

Muhammad al-Samaan, the director general of customs at Cairo Airport, concludes by affirming that, "There are

many cases involving Arab and foreign diplomats trying to smuggle contraband out of Egypt who were caught by airport security and customs authorities. They also have caught others who were trying to bring into the country contraband that would hurt Egypt's security and safety."

#### Being Lax

Ambassador 'Abd-al-Mun'im Ghunaym, a former Egyptian ambassador, thinks that diplomatic immunity does not mean that international law can be violated. "A state has every right to inspect diplomats around whom a heavy cloud of suspicion hangs. The law requires the presence of a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a representative of the diplomat's embassy when an inspection is conducted to avoid the possibility of any claim being made that a charge against the diplomat was concocted as a result of political differences between some countries. There is, after all, a small number of people who are willing to put their future and the interests of their country at risk. These people use diplomatic immunity as a cover to smuggle goods, but they forget the fact that they will be found out."

Ambassador Ghunaym thinks that a solution can be found by not being tolerant with those persons. He indicates that "According to the 1964 Vienna Agreement, immunities and privileges are restricted to those members of a diplomatic mission who are accredited to the state. The privilege of immunity is also afforded to a diplomatic mission's means of communication. Accordingly, if this diplomat were to travel to any other country in the world, he would enjoy none of the privileges stipulated in the agreement, and the state he is visiting may treat him as it would treat any other ordinary person with regard to inspection and customs. We thank God that the history of Egyptian diplomacy shows that absolutely no such cases have surfaced. This is due to a set of solid rules and regulations which govern the profession of Egyptian diplomacy. Along with these rules and regulations there are rigorous reviews involved in the process of issuing diplomatic passports, there is a commitment among diplomats to numerous professional and ethical considerations, and there is continuous control by the ministry."

#### The Right to Immunity

"Diplomatic immunity and privileges were determined to make it easy for a diplomat to perform his missions secure from the threat of being arrested and searched, or subjected to having others find out about the papers he is carrying, or thwarting him from the performance of his duties." This is how Dr. Ibrahim al-'Inani, chairman of the Department of International Law at 'Ayn Shams University, started talking about this matter. However, Dr al-'Inani thinks that after immunity was extended to members of special missions charged with specific tasks, such as senior state officials who are sent on specific missions, these immunities were abused and used by those who have such immunity to evade the rule of law and the principles of diplomatic activity. This is considered a setback to the principles of international law

regarding the protection of persons who are afforded international protection. It gives each country justification for having doubts and suspicions about the diplomatic pouch because some countries allow those who are no longer serving as diplomats to keep their diplomatic passports."

#### Protection for the Diplomatic Pouch

By virtue of this immunity there are two kinds of protection afforded for diplomatic bags. There is immunity for diplomatic pouches and immunity for an envoy's or a diplomat's personal luggage. Basically, diplomatic pouches may not be searched, and their contents may not be examined by others. However, if the state has information and strong reasons to suspect that the pouch contains narcotics or weapons, for example, or if the size of the pouch exceeds the requirements of its mission, state authorities would have to notify the head of the official mission, and he would be summoned so that the pouches can be opened in front of him. If he declines, the authorities are to return the pouch to the sender.

With regard to a diplomat's personal luggage, the state may ask the owner's permission before opening his bag if it has suspicions about its contents. If he declines, the state may refuse the entry of the diplomat's luggage into the country.

#### Terrorism in the Diplomatic Pouch

Dr. Ibrahim al-'Inani, professor of international law, affirms that diplomatic passports and diplomatic pouches are the means by which approximately 90 percent of terrorist operations and international smuggling operations are carried out. Weapons and narcotics of all kinds have been smuggled in this manner.

A proposal was advanced by Italy to the countries of the world to overcome the problem. The proposal, which was studied, called for subjecting diplomatic pouches to inspection by advanced electronic equipment to determine their contents in detail. But the proposal was opposed by some countries, who claimed that these devices can reveal facts in official papers and documents which are contained in the pouch.

It is an established fact that international law deals clearly with diplomatic passports and diplomatic pouches and the purposes behind them. If a diplomatic passport or a diplomatic pouch is used for any purpose other than those set by law, or if the diplomatic pouch is abused by any diplomat, the other state may take any measures it deems appropriate to protect its security and its economy. It is not the law that is at fault. The fault rather lies with those persons and countries that give diplomatic passports to corrupt people. Another fault lies with those countries which do not enforce the law against the corrupt. These states tolerate the corrupt, release them, and do not place them on trial out of deference to the countries with which they are affiliated.

### Confronting the Problem

Dr. Muhammad Isma'il, professor of international law at Al-Azhar University, sets forth two measures that can be used to confront the problem of diplomatic pouches, now that their use in smuggling operations has grown. [First], countries should not relax the process of issuing diplomatic passports, and diplomatic passports should not be issued to anyone but those who are being sent on an official mission for their country.

[Second], an international conference has to be convened to discuss the negative aspects of using diplomatic passports and diplomatic pouches so that the international community can find a way to prevent the occurrence of such violations.

Article 275 of the 1964 Vienna Agreement defined the diplomatic pouch by describing its contents. It is a bag which contains documents, papers, and other things which were prepared for use in official business. Closed and sealed packages, which are sent by a state to its mission or vice versa, are attached to diplomatic pouches.

The second paragraph of the same article pointed out that immunity is afforded to this pouch and that it may not be opened or impounded.

But if a state has reason to suspect an arriving envoy, it may either deny the bag entry into the country, or it may open the bag after getting permission from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The bag would then be opened in the presence of the chief of the diplomatic mission. If, however, a diplomat is caught while he is obviously violating the law, there is no opportunity then to obtain permission from the ministry, and the only thing the state can do to the diplomat who broke the law is deport him.

The opinion is unanimous that diplomatic passports and diplomatic pouches are misused by some diplomats whose character is weak. Such diplomats abuse their diplomatic status to smuggle weapons, narcotics, and other contraband. Because it is necessary to get this problem under control, all countries must follow the guidelines and must exercise control over those who carry diplomatic passports. If this is done, diplomatic pouches will not be used to commit crimes of smuggling.

### Missiles Proliferation Study

93AF0608A *Cairo AL-DIFA' in Arabic Apr 93 pp 40-47*

[Article by Major General 'Ala'-al-Din 'Abd-al-Majid Darwish: "End Ground-to-Ground Missile Proliferation"]

[Text] In the first article dealing with stopping the proliferation of ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, we touched on several secondary matters with regard to what distinguishes missiles, from the air forces, and a small bit regarding proliferation of missiles in countries of the world, and transferring missiles. We discussed the

peaceful space program and combat missiles, and presented an explanation of Cruise ground missiles. Finally, we mentioned some examples of proliferation and development of missiles in Third World countries, as well as the system to stop missile proliferation. In this article, we will complete an explanation in detail of the components of that system.

### International Components of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation System

#### Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]

In April 1987, the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom established a system to control missile technology, in order to stop the spread of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. A joint statement was issued on 10 February 1990 by American Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, which emphasized commitment to the present export policy pertaining to missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which weigh a minimum of 500 kilograms with a 300 kilometer range.

A joint communique by President Bush and President Gorbachev was also issued on 4 June 1990, which stressed unequivocal support for MTCR goals, and especially for specified materials as well as technology pertaining to missiles carrying at least 500 kilogram warheads. The communique called on all nations, which were not committed to these goals, to follow the spirit of this policy. The number of nations that are members of the MTCR had reached 16 by early 1991.

A summary of the MTCR includes an explanatory annex describing the equipment and technology, divided into two groups. The components of the first group, are stipulated as not exportable or transferable. This group includes the entire missile system and complete subsidiary groups. The second group's components, which are barred from export, include equipment and materials as well as the technology used in the missile or its production. The regime relies on a basic structure, represented by slowing down processes of missile development and increasing cost difficulties, resulting from improved rules to control missile technology. In this aspect, the regime is similar to the system used by a group of nuclear nations, the London Group (Nuclear Suppliers Groups), as well as the Australia Group to Control Chemical Exports, and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control.

The MTCR is considered a result of quiet diplomacy. There is confidence that this system can succeed in slowing down missile development in Brazil and India. Germany has enacted an export law and conducts required investigations by German experts with regard to the smuggling of missile technology, as well as nuclear and chemical technology, to certain Third World countries. Italy has also taken legal steps against companies and individuals who smuggle missile technology. Australia and Japan have laws to control their exports.

The MTCR is not comprehensive, as it does not provide a verification system. Many international dealers in missiles and their technology, for the most part, work among countries not committed to this system. At present, there is an increasing list of ballistic missile-producing countries, which currently have the necessary technology. Many of these countries are not dependant on importing components. These technology- and missile-exporting countries have established cooperative relations with other Third World countries for the purpose of developing or buying missiles.

#### **Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control**

This committee was formed by NATO nations (excluding Iceland), Japan, and Australia for the purpose of creating homogeneity in controlling the export policies of these countries, as well as to monitor the export of advanced technology to eastern nations. The committee has amended the lists pertaining to prohibited-for-export groups of technology, as a result of recent world events, and the decrease of tension because of the demise of the Cold War. The United States has reviewed the lists of technology exportable to western nations, especially nuclear and chemical technology, the missile programs, and the ban on re-exporting them to Third World countries, especially India, Pakistan, China, Brazil, Libya, and Iraq. American analysts have also outlawed the transfer of American exports from European countries to Third World countries, which have been forbidden to import them directly from the United States.

#### **United States Ground-to-Ground Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation Policy**

##### **Major Issues for Missile Nonproliferation Regime**

The international system to control the spread of missiles is still in its initial stages of development. Certain difficulties that have accompanied systems to control the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons may be more serious with regard to missile technology. Determining the specific types of missiles and technology, needed to be controlled, causes decision difficulties for policy makers.

America sees the importance of increasing the number of member nations in the MTCR and of formulating an agreement for that, which includes elements of necessary monitoring and inspection, and clarifying positive and negative incentives for countries that join and commit to the agreement. Examples of positive incentives are loans for merchants, developmental assistance, transfer of non-military technology, and assistance with space and artificial satellite programs.

American policy makers will calculate the benefits to national security, as a result of slowing down the development of missile systems contracted in adversarial countries, versus economic interests in exporting certain advanced technologies. They must also study the American objectives of a nonproliferation missile policy from

the perspective of American foreign policy and American national security, in terms of providing missiles to United States allies.

#### **Congressional Actions**

American congressional actions are aimed at enacting laws with regard to violations of the MTCR against countries, companies, and individuals who violate American export directives. On 19 September 1990, Congress approved the Law for Missile Technology Control.

#### **Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF)**

##### **Agreement to Limit Intermediate Nuclear Weapons**

The United States and the (former) Soviet Union signed this agreement on 8 December 1987, to be effective on 1 January 1988.

The two parties are committed to eliminate intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from the European theater of operations. With regard to Russia, the types are the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20, while the United States types are the Pershing-II, and the Cruise (GLCM) missile. Short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) include the Russian SS-12 and SS-23 and the United States Pershing-I. The commitment includes not developing, producing, or testing medium- and short-range missiles.

The agreement defined the IRBM range as 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers, and the SRBM range at 500 to 1,000 kilometers.

This agreement set three years for implementation in two stages (the first for 29 months and the second stage for seven months).

##### **Agreement to Limit Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM)**

This agreement was signed on 26 May 1982 between the United States and the former Soviet Union. It did not specify a period of time for its development or for negotiations concerning it. It became effective 3 October 1982.

The ABM agreement defined two areas (later amended to be one area) in which each party could have 100 launchers, 100 missiles in firing areas (silos), and no more than 18 radars. The agreement also banned each party from developing, testing, or deploying anti-intercontinental missiles (ICBM) in space. In view of imprecise language, the United States announced the space war system, or Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which, in essence, is the deployment of missiles and laser-guided weapons in space.

##### **Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)**

SALT I talks began in 1967, but were suspended as a result of the Soviet Union's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The talks resumed officially in April 1970 and the agreement signed in 1972.

The SALT II Agreement was signed on 18 June 1979, but has not yet been ratified by the American Congress.

The agreement gave each party the right to maintain 2,400 strategic missiles, with the number decreasing to 2,250 by the end of 1981.

#### Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

These talks between the United States and the Soviet Union began in 1982, were suspended in 1983, and resumed in 1988. Agreement was reached in 1990 to reduce by 50 percent the nuclear arsenal of both parties, including means of firing and warheads.

In July 1991, an agreement was signed in Moscow, which commits the Americans to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal from 12,086 warheads and bombs to 10,395, in exchange for the Russians reducing their arsenal from 10,841 to 8,040. The new agreement stipulates for the first time the two parties' commitment to a limited system of on-site inspection.

In accordance with accounting principles used in START discussions, the true number of warheads for each side was increased over a level of 6,000 by 30 percent for Russia and 50 percent for the United States.

- Accounting principles for numbers of missiles and warheads:
- Each ballistic missile warhead counts as one warhead toward the specified total of 6,000
- No increase in range for the SS-18 ICBM

#### Reductions

Russia must reduce the number of warheads and strategic nuclear re-entry modules by 45 percent. This means eliminating all ICBM's of the SS-II, SS-13, and SS-17 types and all underwater-launched ballistic missiles (SS-N-6, SS-N-8, and SS-N-17), during the first implementation stage. During the second stage, Russia must either announce the elimination of all SS-19 missiles, or all ground silos for SS-24 missiles, or ballistic missiles that are launched underwater (SS-N-18), if the program to develop the Delta-IV strategic submarine continues. The United States must reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by 30 percent, through eliminating its Minuteman-2 and Poseidon-3 missiles. Both sides will reduce nuclear submarines to 20 American submarines instead of 35, and 23 Russian, in accordance with figures announced in 1989.

#### Conclusion

Many Third World countries have advanced ground-to-ground tactical missiles, which can be developed into ground-to-ground IRBM's, capable of carrying a non-traditional (chemical or nuclear) warhead.

Since the end of the Cold War, the war to liberate Kuwait, and the recent events connected with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the world has seen many changes. These events have left their mark on strategic nuclear thinking vis-a-vis numerous areas, in view of the increase and development in numbers and capabilities of ground-to-ground missiles.

The MTCR has not succeeded in achieving its main goal of preventing missile proliferation, in view of the fact that the signatory nations to this system have not been committed to reducing or limiting their missile arsenals. This does not achieve credibility with regard to preventing real proliferation. Moreover, this system does not include measures for effective application, aside from the fact that it is not an official agreement or unambiguous pact, binding on all parties.

The war to liberate Kuwait clarified certain dangers resulting from the spread of ground-to-ground missiles. One of the main goals of Operation Desert Shield was to destroy Iraq's ballistic missiles. The Patriot missile was used in direct attacks against Iraqi ground-to-ground missiles. The United States considers direct military actions, air attacks, and increased reliance on missile defenses against ground-to-ground missiles to be one of its policies.

The agreement to curtail medium- and short-range nuclear weapons (INF) could be a useful example for curtailing the international proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially in areas where advanced ground-to-ground ballistic missiles have spread, because the INF Agreement establishes proof that confirms mutual curtailment of the systems.

Strategic analysts support applying the INF Treaty world wide, despite the difficulties such a process might face. The most important obstacle would be intense resistance from nations that consider missiles to be a part of their strategic forces. If the INF Treaty were applied to them, they would be required to dispose of their missiles.

Increased international cooperation might prove effective over the next few years, with regard to applying INF in areas where there has been widespread ground-to-ground ballistic missile proliferation.

The United States may be forced to intervene militarily to curtail the spread of ground-to-ground missiles, especially in areas of tension where U.S. interests were threatened, or where the strategic balance had been upset.

#### START II Treaty

Describing its accomplishment as historic, American President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement in Moscow during the first week of January 1993. This agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, known as START II or the "Treaty of Hope," contains the most comprehensive arms reductions in history, from submarine missile launching centers to nuclear-armed bombers. This agreement is considered an optimistic symbol and initiative, because it will bring about an actual reduction in nuclear weapon arsenals. It will also create a more secure world, after it reduces the two parties' strategic weapons by 75 percent over levels of two years ago. The agreement will be implemented over 10 years, finishing in January 2003. Reductions will be in two stages, with the Russians retaining 3,000 nuclear weapons and the Americans only



3,500 nuclear weapons. This means the elimination of 17,158 nuclear warheads currently in the two parties' arsenals.

The START II Treaty is aimed at stabilizing the two parties' stocks of nuclear weapons in 2003 as follows:

Russia would have 3,000 nuclear warheads, distributed as follows:

- 500 ground-to-ground ICBM's, within multiple warheads
- 1,750 missiles, launchable from strategic nuclear submarines
- 750 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, which can be launched from strategic nuclear bombers

The United States would have 3,500 nuclear warheads, distributed as follows:

- 500 ground-to-ground ICBM's, with multiple warheads
- 1,750 ballistic missiles, launchable from strategic nuclear submarines
- 1,250 multiple warheads ballistic missiles, launchable from strategic nuclear bombers

However, the START II Agreement cannot be implemented unless three of the former Soviet republics, which have these nuclear weapons on their territory, ratify the treaty. So far, the parliaments of the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have not ratified the START I Treaty, despite the fact that the American Senate has ratified this agreement and Russia has signed it. Without approval for START I, there will be no START II

American President Bush expressed his willingness for the Russians to maintain 90 SS-18 missiles. He also agreed to the Russians' request to monitor the reduction of nuclear warheads that American B-2 bombers may carry.

#### Summary

One may say that President Bush crowned his presidency by signing this agreement, which observers consider to be a most significant achievement by an American president. During his presidency, he signed three agreements to curtail armaments, put an end to the Cold War, and returned the arsenals of both parties to the level that they were in the sixties.

The following table lists the types and models of SRBM and IRBM ballistic missiles of the two signatory nations to the INF Agreement:

Table 1.

Types of Missiles Details	IRBM		SRBM	
	United States	Russia	United States	Russia
Deployed Missiles	429	470	—	387
Non-Deployed Missiles	260	356	178	539
Total Missiles	689	826	178	926
Totals for Second Stage	226	650	182	726
Launchers in Silos	214	484	—	197
Launchers out of Silos	68	124	1	40
Total Launchers	282	608	1	237

- The INF Agreement has achieved:
- Freeing the European theater of operations from medium- and short-range ground-to-ground ballistic missiles
- Defining a practical way for mutual verification and

inspection by the two countries, in order to confirm commitment to implementation of the agreement's terms

- Retaining 100 IRBM's outside of Europe for each party

Table 2. Minimum Permissible Missiles for Strategic Forces, START

Type	United States (launchers/ warheads)	Russia (launchers/warheads)	Totals Required by START, launchers/warheads
ICBM	2,450/1,000	6,545/1,498	
SLBM	5,376/624	3,636/924	
Strategic Bombers	1,854/306	815/185	
With Cruise Missiles	1,720/172	720/90	
Without Cruise Missiles	184/134	95/95	
Totals	9,680/1,930	10,966/2,497	6,000/1,600

**Table 3. Reduction Rates for Nuclear Warheads**

Date	Total Number of Various Nuclear Warheads		Notes
	American	Russian	
Before 1990	12,646	11,012	
End of 1991	8,556	6,163	
2003	3,500	3,000	

**TV, Radio Authority Bans Local Artists' Music**  
*93LD0018B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 1 Jul 93*  
p 23

[Article by Fatimah Hasan]

[Text] Cairo—The head of Egyptian Television, 'Abd-al-Salam al-Nadi, recently issued a decision banning the broadcast of 199 songs sung by 54 professional singers on any Egyptian television channel based on the recommendation of the Consolidated Audition Committee, which is chaired by Wajdi al-Hakim. The songs were banned because they were not presented to the committee for it to judge whether to allow them. Instead, they were snuck onto television "through the back door," according to Mr. al-Hakim.

The decision contains a detailed list of the banned songs, many of which are sung by famous young professional singers such as 'Umar Dayyab, Muhammad Fu'ad, Muna 'Abd-al-Ghani, Mustafa Qamar, and Iman al-Bahr Darwish.

The decision also bans the broadcast of existing or future songs by a number of well-known professional singers on the argument that these artists are not accredited. These artists are Ibrahim al-Wardani; Ahmad Jawhar; Layli Ghufran; the two Lebanese brothers, Muwaffaq and Hakam al-Hakim; Nagham Fattuki (the niece of the Algerian female vocalist, Wardah); Fadi Lubnan; Walid al-Husayni; Muhammad Fathi; Tariq Fu'ad; Hamid al-Sha'iri; the young Algerian singer, Khalid; Mugharrid Hijab; and 'Ala' Salam.

The head of Egyptian Television, 'Abd-al-Salam al-Nadi told AL-HAYAT: "The decision was taken out of concern for public taste, lest television become like a nightclub. The positive results of this decision will, I believe, appear clearly in the next few days."

He added: "The Consolidated Audition Committee (which is responsible for allowing songs on radio and television) was established in 1990. Everything broadcast and recorded before then was allowed unconditionally. Songs recorded and filmed after this date are permitted based on three criteria—performance, words, and tune."

He said that the decision to ban the broadcast of a specific group of songs is based on a report prepared by the committee headed by Mr. Wajdi al-Hakim. Since 1990, that committee has been inventorying most of the songs in the television library. It has found that 199 of them had not been officially approved for broadcast.

Wajdi al-Hakim said, "In view of the musical chaos which prevailed on television variety shows, we found that a decisive position was needed in the face of the stream of low-level songs." He added, "The broadcast of unpermitted songs leads to television's loss of enormous revenues from the advertising that would be bought by the cassette companies that supposedly produced these songs. As long as these companies know that the back doors are open for their production to be snuck onto television directly, they will not be compelled to spend on television advertising."

This "screening" of songs has generated a controversy among the artists who sing the banned songs.

The female vocalist Anushka [name as published] told AL-HAYAT: "I do not know what the purpose of this screening process is. The television library contains ten songs by me whose tunes and words are permitted. I am also officially accredited as a professional singer. I was surprised by the television head's decision, which bans seven of those ten songs. I have so far been unable to find one person to explain to me the facts about what is happening."

Hamid al-Sha'iri said, "My songs were disqualified based on the argument that I am not a member of the Egyptian Musicians Union. That decision is unfair. With my outstanding melodies, I have generated a revolution in the world of music and cassettes in Egypt. Millions of my albums have been sold, and my reputation as a professional singer and composer has been gained through cassettes, not television. I know that the variety programs on Egyptian television receive thousands of letters daily from viewers asking that my songs be broadcast." He added, "The head of the Musicians Union and the head of Egyptian Television will not be able to make the people forget my songs."

Iman al-Bahr Darwish said: "I was surprised by the decision banning the broadcast of eight of my songs based on the argument that they had not been permitted. The fact is that these seven [as published] songs were permitted by the Audition Committee. This was made clear to those responsible for the committee and they retreated from their decision. These songs are among the most famous of my works which made my reputation. They include: 'Nafsi,' 'Damini,' 'Wazaffu al-'Arusin,' and 'Ana Qalbi Hubbik.'"

Layli Ghufran, whose songs were prohibited from being broadcast by the decision, because she is not an accredited professional singer, said: "I am sad, because television made a reputation for me and my songs among

young people, and I hope that officials will review their decisions regarding me and regarding my colleagues 'Ala' Salam, Fadi Lubnan, and Mugharrid Hijab."

## ISRAEL

### Differing Ideologies Among Settlement Residents

93AA0103B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 11 Jun 93 pp 18, 19

[Article by Tzvi Gilat]

[Text] In virtually no house do they dare speak openly of the possibility of leaving. Not yet. In most cases, this threatening possibility is still deeply repressed and has yet to rise to conscious awareness. Outwardly, the residents are blessed with excellent interpersonal relations, and creative and ideational fulfillment. They also reinforce each other in their belief that their path is correct and that "everything will be fine."

Inside, in the bottom of the gut, the pain is welling up.

Some time ago, in the home of the [?Sklar] family in 'Ofra, the possibility of moving from this small, special communal settlement to Jerusalem was discussed. The family was contemplating such a move not for political reasons or fear of what is to come, but because of personal and professional difficulties being experienced by the family head, Moti, an educator. The children were surprising in their resolve to stay put, not so much because of the predictable content of their resolve, but because of its tone. "If you leave," protested Hanan'el, eight, "I would stay here anyway. Let me make that clear to you." The amused father tried to shake his son's resolve. "You are all of eight," he told his son. "If mother and I move to Jerusalem, who would cook lunch for you?" "What is the problem," responded the boy without batting an eye, "I will use the microwave."

'Ofra, the first settlement established in Judea and Samaria, has come a long way from the Gaziya in the temporary work camp to the microwave oven in the spacious home covered with marble. The microwave perhaps symbolizes the problematic comfort into which the Gush Emunim leadership has been thrown. Perhaps it also symbolizes the resolve and lack of political troubles of the younger generation, which grew up in the settlements. 'Ofra, which this week celebrated its 18th birthday, is also a microcosm in which to examine the mood and troubles of all settlers in the territories, at what appears to be the most problematic time in their history.

'Ofra is considered the "Mayflower," the flagship of Gush Emunim. It was the first settlement to be built in the territories after members of the Elon-More nucleus failed to establish a settlement at the Sebastia train station. Even 'Ofra was established semisurreptitiously. According to legend, Rahel Yana'it Ben-Tzvi first articulated the idea of establishing 'Ofra. While touring the peak of nearby Mount Ba'al Hatzor with Hanan Porat,

she suddenly asked her companion, a young leader in Gush Emunim, "Why not establish a working group here?"

Porat raised the idea in a meeting of the Gush Emunim secretariat. Another member of the secretariat, Yehuda 'Etziyon, immediately took it upon himself to implement it. Subsequently, 'Etziyon established the Jewish terror organization and provoked a crisis in Gush Etziyon. Today, he is among the staunchest opponents of the immigration of the Falash Mura [Ethiopians Jewish who converted to Christianiy]. 'Ofra, which is accustomed to waving flags, is among the leaders of the struggle to bring them to Israel.

'Etziyon and a handful of Gush Emunim members began to build fences at Ba'al Hatzor, returning each night to sleep in Jerusalem. On a suitable day, according to a plan worked out in advance, a meeting was arranged between Hanan Porat and Shim'on Peres, then defense minister. On that day, the workers did not return to sleep in Jerusalem. Instead, they took control of the Jordanian Legion's abandoned camp at nearby 'Ayn Yabrud and stayed there. When the Ramallah governor sought to evacuate them, they referred him to the defense minister's office.

The surprised defense minister was at that time sitting in his office with Porat. Porat advised him, according to the plan worked out in advance, to defer the evacuation until the end of the meeting. Porat suggested that some channel be allowed for the "true spirit of awakening underlying our repeated attempts to settle in Samaria." Otherwise, he warned Peres, a heated clash would quickly ensue. Porat told Peres that consent to the establishment of a workers camp at 'Ofra would help cool tempers. These people would work by day in the military camp and sleep there only at night. Porat promised that Peres' consent would not be exploited to loudly proclaim "we beat the government." Peres consented.

Peres' decision of 20 April 1975, even though the Labor Alignment government did not recognize 'Ofra and did not allocate money to develop it, was a milestone and perhaps a main reason for the change in government that occurred two years later. In any case, it established Gush Emunim as the body settling in the territories, and it helped 'Ofra to flourish.

Peres, the main patron, was of course absent from the impressive ceremony, which took place in 'Ofra on Monday of this week to mark the settlement's 18th birthday. He did not see the dozens of children on their parents' shoulders joining in to sing, at the top of their lungs, "Here I was born." He did not see the settlers with their chests inflated with pride.

The people of 'Ofra have something to be proud about. From the outset, Gush Emunim's top leaders have lived there, including Pinhas Wallerstein, Yisra'el Har'el, Uri Elitzur, and Rabbi Yo'el Ben-Nun. The first offices of the Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Council were housed there. The offices of the settlers' mouthpiece, NEQUDA,

were built and still exist in 'Ofra. The group living there is considered an ideological compass. The settlement has an abundance of educational institutions, a successful college, and a field school run by the Society for the Protection of Nature. 'Ofra also boasts industrial factories, private enterprises (from catering services to market research), and a flourishing partnership of farmers who grow excellent cherries there. The education level is also high. About half of the population of 1,216 is under the age of 18, the generation born there.

At the same time (and this is perhaps the secret of 'Ofra's strength and weakness), 'Ofra has never been a homogeneous settlement. It is indeed a religious settlement by definition. The settlement's rabbi occupies a respected position. The residents ask him if it is permitted to carry a coffee thermos on the Sabbath when on military reserve duty, and he issues guidelines for arrangements to transport nurses who work at the hospital in Jerusalem on the Sabbath. However, one sees in the settlement's streets all levels of religious observance. A example, which is obvious to persons knowledgeable in these matters, is provided by the women's attire. Some wear long dresses with head coverings, some do not wear head covers, and some even go out in public in tricots and pants.

Distinguished personalities of the Jewish underground matured there, including Yehuda 'Etziyon, Haggai Segel, and Uri Me'ir. In that difficult period, the entire settlement gave material and spiritual assistance to their families. However, even the leaders in 'Ofra who had reservations about the underground or sharply criticized it raised their voices, led by Rabbi Yo'el Ben-Nun, the director of the school for girls in the settlement.

In the microwave generation, and even among the founders' generation, some of the males no longer wear a yarmulke on their heads. Yedidya Segel is no longer religious, but he wears a cap in public, among other things, "not to upset the apple cart." When his religious daughter wants to hear the Kiddush on the Sabbath, she goes to her grandparents' home. Segel's son, a soldier, returned from the Army without a yarmulke on his head. His wife Le'ora has found an original way to reconcile her husband's heresy with her belief. I believe in the Holy One blessed be He, and also in my husband, she says.

In each cohort of young people who were educated in 'Ofra, there are a few who no longer wear yarmulkes. This is a problem in a small communal settlement defined as religious. The Haredi [ultra-Orthodox] mothers speak of this in the lanes. They fear erosion and outside influences. A week before their festive assembly, the people of 'Ofra devoted the Sabbath to a moral stock taking. They divided themselves into several discussion groups. One dealt with the settler's relations with the media ('Ofra has always been sensitive to the media, perhaps too much so). Another dealt with the dilemmas of parent-child relations and the dilemmas of a communal settlement ('Ofra absorbs Ethiopians and families

in distress, and it cares for a controlled but constant increment of families outside of its ranks).

Several of the younger generation blamed—not with a heavy heart—their parents' generation for neglecting them in the initial years.

When the parents were involved in public affairs and banded together to train people and encourage public opinion, they left some of the children at home, without proper education, unable to find friends easily, and feeling somewhat abandoned.

There was no note of complaint in their remarks. Everyone agreed that they made up for this lack through their pioneering life experience. However, some see the removal of the yarmulke as a sign of rebellion against the parents' generation. 'Amit Q. (his name is abbreviated here because he serves as a career officer in the Army), who led that discussion, has reservations about the use of the terms "erosion" and "rebellion." Each case has its own personal motivations, even among members of the same class, a third of whose graduates have become nonobservant. The young people who have remained religious and those who have stopped being observant religious maintain brotherhood and friendship ties among themselves. They meet on the Sabbath after services in the synagogue to exchange stories of their common experiences serving in the Army, usually in elite units. 'Amit Q. poses a difficult question: "If a rebellion exists, why is there no rebellion in the political sphere?"

It is indeed difficult to find a young person of 'Ofra whose views have moved leftward. Even those who have left the settlement usually did so to join younger settlements in Judea and Samaria. They may be even more closely connected to the land than their parents, because it is much more natural for them.

If God forbid an evacuation scene takes place in 'Ofra, 'Amit says, he is convinced that it will not be accompanied by violence against soldiers, not even verbal violence. As a soldier, if he is given an order to evacuate his neighbors, he will obey it without hesitation. He is certain that others would act similarly. But, at present, everything must be done, within the bounds of the law of course, to prevent this from happening. He is certain that this will not happen. Actually, he says, I must completely refrain from thinking that such a possibility could materialize. Such doubt might weaken me.

Many settlers in 'Ofra and elsewhere have the same attitude. They do not think about the possibility. They believe that the Arabs, in their stupidity, will ultimately foil any such possibility. They focus constantly on the hope that, at the moment of truth, the mean squire or his dog will die, and the—in their opinion—hostile government will be replaced. In a recent article in NEQUDA, Uri Elitzur equated the process of deliverance to riding a bicycle—you either keep moving or you fall. There is much fatalism in this view. The entire process of redemption and the so-called Zionist enterprise could come to an end if it a decision is made to dismantle the

settlements in Judea and Samaria. On the other hand, perhaps this is a sign of optimism, inasmuch as the bicycle continues to move.

A large segment of the settlers have no response to the problems of the hour, except to feel constant frustration. Yo'el Ben-Nun argues that the lack of a follow-through plan to properly contend with the current situation is a shortcoming of the Gush Emunim leadership, stemming from, among other things, the fact that the only plan drawn up by Gush Emunim was implemented too quickly.

In 1975, Gush Emunim's vision was the establishment of 60 settlements in Judea and Samaria within 10 years. After the Likud's ascent to power, the results were better than dreamed. Therefore, now, when the Rabin government "is settling" the settlements as a policy, Gush Emunim members are stammering. Hanan Porat demands in the Knesset, as he demanded from Peres, that "We not be pushed against the wall," but he finds it difficult to say what should be done to get away from the wall, and what the settlers would do if they find their backs up against the wall.

In the dialogue that they held among themselves on that introspective Sabbath in 'Ofra, Porat claimed that the entire redemption process is now in danger. Rabbi Ben-Nun sounds more confident. His attitude was that every process has its ups and downs. Perhaps we are now at a low point, which does not mean that the goal has disappeared without being achieved.

New organizations are filling the temporary void. Instead of NEQUDA (which is fluttering in an ideological debate that has already been rehashed, and persists in convincing the convinced with the same arguments), the popular mouthpiece is now Channel 7. Its offices and studios are housed in nearby Beit El, and it broadcasts from the sea. Beit El is also the home of the Committee of Rabbis of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, under the militant leadership of Rabbi Zalman Melamed from Beit El. This is a body that guides the public and issues guidelines, including on the use of arms, it warns.

Instead of the voices of Gush Emunim's offices, one now hears more and more the voices of a new movement, Emunim, whose leading figure, Rabbi Beni Elon, is also from Beit El. They are currently leading the war for public opinion. They are engaged in planning operations and alternate proposals to the autonomy plan, which they believe endangers them.

In Beit El, you will not find women in pants in the streets. There, the ideological identification is just as irrevocable, but its external manifestations are clearer. Residents of 'Ofra say they live there because of the social life, the rural setting, and the personal satisfaction. The essential ideological aspect is in the background. Each one has significant personal reasons for being precisely there.

Tzipi Luria, a theater person and art critic, rebels against the Israeli attitude of immediately defining someone's

personal identity in terms of Jewish-secular and leftist-rightist. She is religious and definitely not leftist. But she refuses to be pigeonholed into these restrictive definitions. She too does not know what she will do. She does not want to think about the possibility that she and her husband—a successful farmer who is taciturn like a farmer—will be ordered to evacuate. She is more interested in examining what is happening on the existential level of people like herself, who suddenly find themselves being presented as the enemies of peace, who are reminded that the homes in which they have been living for more than ten years are actually temporary, and whose bus travel—despite their fears of stones raining down on them from the direction of 'Ayn Yabrud—is presented as a security burden. How can it be that people like herself fortify themselves against the dread of stones being thrown at them, but fear that they will weaken in the face of what now seems to some of them to be treason on the part of the rear, for whose sake and on whose behalf they came there, so they maintain.

She does not say this plaintively in an attempt to apply to you the emotional extortion at which the settlers are sometimes so adept. She simply wonders what this is doing to her friends.

In 'Ofra, they have always been proud of their dialogue with the rest of Israeli society. 'Amos 'Oz devoted a chapter to them in his book *po ve-sham b-eretz yisra'el* " [Here and There in the Land of Israel]; Hayim Guri is a desirable guest; many groups come to the school; and they profusely give coffee, sandwiches, and much Zionism to the soldiers who protect them. One must wonder if this dialogue has indeed been open, or only a technical framework that has enabled the settlers to speak to others and make their view heard without being open to being convinced.

Today, with Rabin in power, their need for dialogue is more vital. It is difficult for them to understand how the Labor Party finds a common language with the supporters of the non-Zionist SHAS [Sephardi Torah Guardians] which lack a common past in field units. The Labor Party relates to them as to propellers that make wind. Many settlers interpret weariness with their arguments and political events that run counter to their positions as delegitimizing.

Dr. Simha Yagel from 'Ofra, a successful gynecologist at Hadassa Hospital, argues that such a dialogue cannot be avoided. "I bear no more responsibility than you for depriving the Arabs in the villages neighboring me of their rights, he tells me. "It must be clear that the Israeli Government, not I, negated their rights on 10 June 1967, and you are just as responsible as I am for that."

He arrived in 'Ofra in 1982, the year of the Lebanon war. The main conclusion of the Lebanon war, he believes, is that one does not wage war without a consensus. One must therefore also deduce that peace should not be made without a consensus. He wants the government to speak with him before it speaks with the Palestinians. For this purpose, he is willing to agree to an open discussion. He

is willing, with a pained heart, to also discuss the possibility of dismantling settlements.

On a personal level, he is willing to even discuss a possibility in which he does not believe, namely of remaining in 'Ofra under other than Jewish sovereignty "if there is a peace of hugs and kisses as they are describing to us." He acknowledges that he is apparently a minority at present in this regard.

### Teddy Kollek Views Mayoral Race

93AA0120B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 25 Jun 93 pp 14-15

[Article by 'Anat Tal-Shir]

[Text] "We are not here to sell Teddy Kollek, nor to sing his praises," Teddy Kollek's people say. Kollek does not need to prove anything except that he is alive, kicking, and doing his job. It is enough that they show us he is active, and remind us that the workday of this 82-year-old begins at 0730 and ends at 2300. This will be the public relations line coming from Kollek campaign headquarters. With his rival, Ehud Olmert, saying that Kollek was a success story, there is no sense in leaning on the past; the emphasis will be on the future. The residents of the city will be seeing him out in the streets soon.

Like an old lion with the smell of the prey driving him on: That is the way Kollek has been recently. The day before yesterday, he announced that he would not serve fewer than five years. "How can you make a commitment for five years?" I asked him. "How can anyone make a commitment at all in a country where 500 people a year are killed in traffic accidents?" Kollek answered. "I am running for another five-year term, and I am serious about it."

He has been looking good this week: energetic and vigorous. People who are younger than he is remark: "If only we could get as much done as he does!" But nobody knows what will happen in the coming weeks of the campaign. In his pocket is a note from Professor Hayim Stern who examined him when he collapsed the day after the Jerusalem Day events. The note says his health is good. "One thing bothers me," Kollek says. "They write that I do not work, that I sleep all the time, that I am a puppet, and that the whole city council is doing whatever they want to do. I am announcing right now that I do know what I am doing. I start my day early in the morning and do not finish until late at night."

Kollek seems very relieved this week, with the mess he and his aides managed to stitch together finally unraveled. Nahman Shai, who just a few weeks ago was designated as his successor, has dropped off the list. Shai demanded guarantees that when the time came, he would take Kollek's place as mayor—and when he did not get them, he got up and left. This week Mar-Hayim (at Kollek headquarters, they were calling him "back from the dead") reminded Shai that if Kollek left his job for any reason, the city council, where Mar-Hayim had a definite advantage over Shai, would decide who would

replace him. In the municipal arena, Mar-Hayim's political experience is worth more at the polls than Shai's attractiveness is.

Kollek calls this whole embarrassing episode "the fashla." 'Amos Mar-Hayim, who was his designated substitute, was abandoned and left out in the cold, and Kollek was forced to disavow announcements that he considered Mar-Hayim his successor. "For 27 years," Kollek said, "I have kept my promises, except for this one lamentable incident with 'Amos."

Shai's withdrawal puts Mar-Hayim back in the picture, but Kollek has announced that he will not be offering the position of designated substitute to anyone else at all. And so Kollek is running alone, and there are no heirs surrounding him to dim his glory.

The photos of Kollek and Shai at the press conference where Kollek announced that Shai would be his successor say it all. Kollek looks like the groom at a shotgun wedding. Shai is confused and distant. Kollek presented him in a forced and faltering way ("They have explained to me that he can bring votes") and could not hide the fact that he was really uncomfortable with the step he was taking.

Concerning the abandonment of Mar-Hayim, Kollek hung the blame on the press: "'Amos is a good man, but because of you he will not be my substitute, because you did not give him credit." In talks with his people, he grumbled: "If Shai comes across well on TV, does that mean he is qualified to be mayor?" The people who cooked up the step, Tourism Minister 'Uzi Bar-'Am and lawyer Roni Feinstein, head of the Kollek campaign headquarters, succeeded in convincing him to run again with a youth of 47, who looked good in the polls, at his side.

[Kollek] I am sorry about the whole business. There were constant disagreements between me and the people who recommended him. They saw him as an heir, while I never saw him that way. I felt that he should learn about the city, and then perhaps after several years, he could run for mayor.

[Tal-Shir] In September, '92, you said you would not vote for an old man of 83. . .

[Kollek] I brought the trouble on myself, because I did say that. That was right after my operation. Since then, I have become much stronger and today I feel I can do this.

[Tal-Shir] Once again you have proved that you cannot produce successors. Shai has deserted the arena like all the others who have left you over the years.

[Kollek] That is not true. With Meron Benvenisti, we actually quarrelled and he left. El'ad Feld left because he thought he would fit better in the Education Ministry. Efraim Dubek preferred the easy job of ambassador rather than the administration of this city. As for 'Amos Mar-Hayim, the fact is that he is still here. The war over the succession just began too early. We will start with a

collection of good people, and over the course of the term, it will become clear which of them will be the most successful.

[Tal-Shir] The idea of the "beehive" amuses anyone who knows you, because everyone knows that you keep power centralized and always go it alone.

[Kollek] I am ready to promise that in another five years I will not run. That means, though, that someone else will have to come along, and it will be better if he comes from this beehive.

[Tal-Shir] In the survey the local paper JERUSALEM made this week, Jerusalemites responded that if the elections were held today, you would get 43 percent of the votes, and Ehud Olmert would get 40 percent. The gap between you is narrowing.

[Kollek] I will come out better at the end of the race. These results are still influenced by the fashla we had. I know about other surveys that are no less reliable.

Just a year ago, there was talk that Kollek might retire even before the term ended. He was feeling weak then, after his operation. "We had the feeling," says one person close to him, "that some morning he would just show up and say that he was just sick and tired of it all." But then he began to feel better, and started his fund-raising trips again. Every time he returned, he said, "Who will do this if I go?"

At the same time, the question of Jerusalem has begun coming up at the peace talks. This has strengthened his feeling that he must be here during this period that will be so pivotal for the future of the city. He also recognized that the party needed him. Yitzhak Rabin said to him that the party must not lose control of the city. Kollek used that as an opportunity to get a promise that the government would set a policy that would give precedence to Jerusalem.

Kollek is the first to admit he feels his age. He is less able now, and his output is down. On the one hand, he has a list of goals he wants to accomplish, and this list lends him energy. Subsequent to the failure of the Shai option, his people will create a list that will assist Kollek in running the city, and from it his successor will presumably come. Kollek will have to fight to keep Labor Party bureaucrats from taking over. In the last elections in 198[8], his list, "One Jerusalem," had a weaker showing, (down from 16 to 11 mandates), and this embittered his life at city council meetings.

This week the composition of the beehive is becoming more and more clear, although some changes are still expected: in second place, Avraham Kahila, Kollek's vice-mayor, a party man who holds the planning and construction portfolio; in third place, 'Amos Mar-Hayim will again be fit in. He has been promised that he will still hold all his portfolios, including the powerful budget portfolio, something that has made his relationship with the religious and ultra-Orthodox factions in the city much warmer.

Number 4 on the list is historian and journalist Meron Benvenisti, who was Kollek's vice-mayor in the distant past. After years of stormy quarrels and ideological differences, the two have patched things up. Benvenisti announced last week that he was considering running as part of the independent "Green Jerusalem" list, an idea that he dropped when he joined the beehive. "I am comfortable with the decision I have made," Benvenisti told us. "The danger that the city will fall into the hands of the Likud is greater than ever. For me, this is a kind of comeback. I want to be the candidate for mayor in 1998. I am not in a hurry, and so my sharp edges are rounding off."

Fifth place is reserved for a woman, presumably a member of the party. In this context, the names of Nurit Yardeni and Shuli Haimson have come up. Kollek himself is actually suggesting Simha Si'ani, president of the Senior Secretaries Association. Si'ani is not a party member; she is both a woman and a Yemenite.

The general director of "Youth Aliya," author Eli 'Amir, is weighing Kollek's request to join the list. ("I am very flattered by the offer.") He would probably be in sixth place. Philosopher and Shalom Ahshav member Menahem Brinker has also been mentioned, as has Reuven Merhav, director general of the Absorption Ministry. First he was offered the position of head of the election headquarters. Later, there was talk of his becoming involved in international topics—Islam and the status of Jerusalem. In the next few days, he and Kollek will be having a talk and discussing concrete details. Jerusalem arouses Merhav's curiosity, and for this chance, he is ready to consider quitting his present job "when the time is really ripe."

With five months to go until the elections, Kollek and his people are convinced that the Shai incident will be forgotten by November. Everything is back to normal, they say, and light is beginning to appear on the horizon. Shai is back to Channel 2; Mar-Hayim, strengthened and placated, has won positive media coverage and excellent exposure, something he never had in all the years he spent in Kollek's shadow. The city council was flooded with angry letters and protests, and Mar-Hayim won acclaim in the role of the underdog. Kollek says that he sent him on a consolation tour to Moscow: During the interview in Moscow, Mar-Hayim said, "I was already the successor, I was already No. 2, and nothing has come out of all this. We will go back to work and see where things lead."

Nahman Shai, after a very short stab at politics: "They did not trick me, I was not pushed out, I am not a robbed Cossack or a wounded bear who is going to go wild. I did not receive any promises about anything. I said that I was ready to be No. 2 if it meant that some day I would be mayor, and I asked that it be made clear who would take Teddy's place. After he presented me as his successor, Teddy said they gave him the wrong advice and the indecisive message was leaked. I took an important step in my life when I entered this dangerous arena, and suddenly I understood that instead of helping to run the

city, I would be in the middle of other people's quarrels with everyone's gun aimed at my head. If all there is to all this, is this 'dirt,' then thanks a lot, but I am out of here."

[Tal-Shir] Some say you simply panicked.

[Shai] I am not an idiot. I knew what I was doing. If I had panicked, I would have quit after two days.

[Tal-Shir] What damage has this whole business done?

[Shai] It has hurt everyone involved, including me. The damage is not irreversible, but it is a shame.

The beehive is in an uproar: how could the junior officer get the commission and jump over the heads of his superiors? That is how it turned out. Things were presented as though Kollek had been dragged into it by his advisers. But he is an experienced politician, and there are some who say he sabotaged the whole thing because he does not want an heir. If he runs, he wants to run alone, with nobody dragging along behind him.

His advisers are not shaking off responsibility. They understand now that they have actually been trying to sell two opposite things at the same time: if Kollek is at his best, then why is the successor already breathing at his neck? 'Uzi Bar'am: "Nahman got everything possible, second place and designated replacement. How could anyone promise him that Mar-Hayim would not compete with him when the time comes? We could bring Shai up to the water's edge, but once in the river he would have had to swim alone. He was afraid to jump in. He wanted assurances from all sides, because in the political world he is still a novice."

Roni Feinstein, head of campaign headquarters: "When the time comes to vote, people will vote for Kollek. They love him."

[Tal-Shir] When did Kollek decide to run again?

[Feinstein] He already knew 27 years ago that he would. In 1965, he bowed to the will of the movement and ran for office. After the unification of Jerusalem in 1967, he decided he would die in office.

Reuven Rivlin, who competed in the Likud primaries and was beaten by Olmert: "Teddy has always been a winner, not someone who gives excuses; someone who gets things done and has little patience with those who just talk and talk. If Teddy needs to apologize, it is a sign that his case is failing. If that is so, Olmert will get the city on a silver platter. Teddy will expose the city to manipulations that will bring an end to Ma'arakh rule, and an end to a fine career in office."

Elisha' Peleg, opposition council member from the Likud: "Teddy's people are making cynical use of an old man just to satisfy their lust for power. I honor the man and I feel sorry for him. He has already worn himself out in this term."

Feinstein said that this time they have dropped the pied piper approach, and adopted the beehive one instead. Benvenisti, with his historian's viewpoint, spoke of the

end of empire, and the beginning of the time of uncertainty. He wants to be there in the post-Kollek era. He expects a difficult transition period, and great tension among the members of the beehive. Kollek: "A little tension among them will not be so bad."

The great unknown, which may determine the elections, is how many Arab voters will come out to vote. Their massive presence at the ballot box can only strengthen Kollek. In 1983, approximately 10,000 Arabs voted, but since the intifadah only a third of them have showed up at the polls.

A survey taken by Kollek headquarters shows he will receive 53 percent of the vote, yet despite these encouraging results, it looks like this will be a case of beating back the competitors, not a sales campaign. The advisers are looking for a sophisticated way to show that a vote for another candidate is a betrayal of Kollek. Uzi Bar'am: "Olmert has not proven himself as a real force to be reckoned with. I am not putting him down, but there are still going to be problems for anyone running against Teddy."

Next week, Olmert headquarters will be releasing a short propaganda film to the movie theaters, starring people who are disappointed in Kollek. They will present Kollek as someone who sleeps when he is supposed to be working. Kollek's response: "I promise that I will keep on sleeping through boring speeches."

#### Report on Leftist-Rightist Dialogue

93AA0120C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 25 Jun 93 pp 20-21

[Article by Tzvi Gilat]

[Text] "Nu?" the editor asks me from the other end of the line in Tel Aviv, during one of the breaks in the conference, "What do we have there?"

"It is hard to say. About 40 people, leftists and rightists, trying to carry on a dialogue."

"Then do we have a sense of where this dialogue is heading?"

"Apparently not. So far, the dialogue is not exactly taking place."

"Then do we have a picture of the present situation?"

"Not exactly. It seems that this is more about personal feelings and all sorts of hangups."

"Do you people there at least agree about what is going to be on the lunch menu?"

"Luckily, they didn't ask us about that."

"Then how would you describe what is happening there?" the editor asks, getting pretty desperate now.

It is hard to really describe what happened at the conference held at Hebrew University this week, even though "definition" was one of its central topics. [?Besod Siah], an association of clinical psychologists, which has



taken on the goal of furthering the dialogue between left and right in Israel using psychological tools, presented a concentrated, theoretical, and experiential workshop for approximately 40 participants.

The people registered—mainly educators, therapists, group leaders, and teachers in various branches of the arts—were asked to specify their political-intellectual affiliations as either “left” or “right.” These stereotypical definitions, it turned out by the end of two days of attempts to carry on a dialogue, are very fluid and sometimes misleading. Admittedly, this is not exactly a shocking revelation. Less trivial was the discovery of how much both left and right use each other’s identities to define themselves; how they actually are afraid to enter into dialogue for fear of losing their independent identities; and the discovery that it is not so much political differences, but rather mental blocks, that make it difficult for this dialogue to exist. In the light of what is happening in politics today—seeing the great and frightening chasm that is appearing between the thinking of left and right—it is interesting to follow what happened in that conference: Perhaps it is a little like looking into a mirror.

The first meeting, Tuesday morning. The team of leaders sits in a row opposite the three rows of chairs where the participants are seated. The participants are supposed to express their expectations and feelings at the beginning of this session. A group of religious women from Karnei Shomron arrives a little late. “We were held up at the roadblocks of the closure,” they murmur apologetically to the others present.

The description of what people are hoping to achieve sounds like a medley of collective phrases and personal pressures. Brakha, a veteran social worker from Herzlia: “I am very active in organizations and groups that bring Arabs and Jews together to promote Jewish/Arab dialogue and work to prevent violence. So now I am here too.”

Sa’id, an Arab hydraulics engineer from Haifa: “I was at a conference like this last year. This time I am not expecting anything; that way I will not be disappointed.”

Hoshea’, a religious man with a thick beard, is a kind of stereotype of the right—who actually turns out to be a moderate leftist from an urban kibbutz in Jerusalem. “The order of the hour is communication and pluralism. I have experience from the army as a counsellor and from participating in meetings that brought together soldiers from the two poles. We have to bridge the gulf between hearts.”

Shoshana Shpitz from Karnei Shomron: “I want to meet the left on the human level, so we can get closer to one another, and see that nobody has horns.”

Rolli, a journalist who defines herself as a leftist: “I have taken part in meetings between Jews and Arabs, and I have also lead groups like that. I do not think much is going to come from this meeting. I feel a lot of anger towards the right, because of what it is doing to me, and

to the State. This desire to be together is just sticky and despicable to me. I am not sure I want a dialogue.”

There is no dialogue. The participants prefer to talk about their pasts instead of about what is ahead for them. It is also hard to talk to each other because of the way the seats are arranged in the room. The group creates a circle that also includes the group leaders, but the change in seating arrangements does not change the way people talk, nor does it lessen the tension. The situation is tense and nerve-racking.

Mark, a member of a moshav in the Golan Heights, seems like [Yuppy Shinkinai], with a stylish bald spot on the back of the head hidden by a little ponytail, round eyeglasses, dressed in black: “I feel threatened here. It is hard for me to define myself, anyway, and you can see this in my appearance, too. To leftists I am a rightist, to rightists I am a leftist, when I am with vegetarians I am a natural foods person. But inside myself I feel great aggressiveness right now, alongside hopelessness. I want to clarify for myself where I stand between left and right, and understand why I am reacting right now with a sense of anxiety and fear of losing control.”

Avi, who works in the theater in Tel Aviv: “I think there is no answer to the quarrel between left and right. I am busy finding my inner self. I am looking for a personal direction and do not know how to talk to others through a sea of stigmas and stereotypes.”

Maya: “It is easier for me to talk to Arabs than to Jews like you. Here, you, Shoshana Shpitz from Karnei Shomron. Your name alone represents everything that disgusts me. The Shpitz, the horns, the arrogance: I was held up by the closure.’ Maybe the Arabs are the ones who were held up there, and not you? But you simply do not see them.”

Dina, who works at Bar Ilan University: “I am ready to give up a lot in order not to endanger relations. I suggest that we not put up fences here, and we not just come at each other with gut responses. Your anger, the anger of the leftists, hurts me. I am also sometimes angry at the left, but I try to control my feelings and be moderate, and it upsets me that others do not do the same for me. What are you so angry about?”

Rolli: “I am angry at what you are doing. I do not at all wish for us to leave here as friends.”

The basic discomfort of the participants, who are forced from the beginning—as in society at large—into the stereotypes of left and right, grows in the next meeting. As they come into the room, everyone blindly chooses one piece from a pile of slips of paper. The slip determines what role each will play: leftist or rightist. According to what is written on the slip of paper chosen, he or she must sit in the correct circle of seats, either under the sign saying “Left” or under the one marked “Right.” There is also a row of empty chairs with “The Government” written over it. Opposite is an empty circle of chairs over which is inscribed “Town Square.”

A kind of simulation of society-at-large. The goal: through the role-playing game, to begin a dialogue between left and right.

It does not work, of course. In one circle, they are busy the whole time with procedure—who will be the moderator, how will we be organized, what rules will we follow when we talk? Sterile debate. In the other circle, they prefer to ignore the instructions and just go on airing their personal positions: Shpitz complains about the stereotypical way she is treated. Ofra, a teacher from Karnei Shomron with curly blonde hair and a flowered dress, complains that exactly what she expected to happen is happening: She usually avoids mentioning she is from Karnei Shomron, because when she does, people immediately define her and tag her, before they get to know her. (Rolli: "The truth is, until this moment I thought you were a leftist, based on the way you look.")

No one tries to take over the "Government" table. The town square remains empty; anyone who goes there comes back abashed. People feel uncomfortable inside their circles, but there is no alternative outside them. One rejectionist does remain outside the two circles, unwilling to enter the mold of either the "left" or "right." The rightists in my group have trouble accepting his presence outside. They say it is uncomfortable for them for "one of us" to be outside. The "one of us" declares that he is comfortable, but he does not really seem to be. From outside he carries on a loud dialogue with the circle. He refused to accept the definition, but now also refuses to accept his isolation.

The rightist women continue to complain about how they are treated as stereotypes. The leftists in the rightist circle complain about how the right wants to win legitimacy, by appropriating the rights of others. The Arab hydraulics engineer from Haifa suggests to his group that they at least agree that "we are all human beings," to create a basis for communicating with the second group. No, no one wants to blur the distinctions. Somebody suggests another basis: that we all sign the declaration of Israeli independence. They do not buy it. Perhaps there is some hidden manipulation here: (a Jewish State, for example. You know.)

The whole business just never gets going. The noise hurts your ears, but there is no real communication. The leaders give their impression: The groups are preferring to turn inward, not to carry on a dialogue together that seems threatening to them.

The next time the entire group gets together, the group leaders, who are perceived here as a source of authority, are hit from all sides. You are not guiding us enough, you are not helping us get there, you are treating us like babies. A settler from Karnei Shomron calms himself down by expressing his trust that the leadership (the moderators) will give us the right tools to live together despite the lack of agreement. He trusts in their experience and professionalism. Tomorrow he will express bitter disappointment.

It is clear that we are seeing here a difficulty in relating to authority, to government. It is not clear what its status is and who accepts its authority, but there is great desire to shelter in the shadow of its wings, and the demands on the leaders sound exactly like the demand in the street for "a strong man" in times of crisis. But do the left and right agree at all on what the authority is? "Friends, friends," calls out a veteran Kibbutznik from 'Eyn Harod, who defines himself as on the right within the Labor movement—"So what if we do not have a government or an authority, we do have a society of people who feel they are one, and we do have common interests. Here we have the chance to create a little utopia, but time is flying and we are not doing a thing!"

Under the shadow of this feeling that time is flying and we just cannot carry on a dialogue, the participants divide into smaller groups that allow us to talk a little more freely and intimately. "I am afraid here to say everything I am thinking," says Rivka, a settler from Shavei Shomron. "It is hard for me to deal with the hatred I see on the side of the left toward the right," says Haya, from Yakir in Samaria. She knows what hatred is. She sometimes feels hatred, for example, for the ultra-Orthodox. "We have a lot in common with you," people on the right try to say to those on the left in all the groups. "There is no real reason for us to hate each other. Surely, we can at least reach an agreement about where the red lines are that we will not cross."

"You say you want a dialogue, but you really intend to swallow us up," the leftists answer. "I do not understand what this 'Jewish People' and 'Land of Israel' are," says one. "I am empty of those values. I am trying to find, in my darkness, my own private values, and I am afraid to join you and be dragged after you." "But I do not see darkness, I see a great light," says Tzipi, from a settlement in Samaria.

"We all have our shoulders under the same stretcher," Elhanan Rotenheim from Kedumim tries to convince the others, still emphasizing the shared life experiences that the left and right, everyone except the ultra-Orthodox, share. "Forget that," his group tells him. "It may be that this unit, which it seems to you that we all belong to, and where we are all carrying the same stretcher, is still registered somewhere with the general staff, but the truth is that it really broke up a long time ago."

The next day, Wednesday morning, there is another try at furthering the dialogue. The participants are presented with a sheet of paper with a list of leftist and rightist slogans mixed randomly: "For peace, we will have to uproot the shoots" and "Everyone is equal before the law" and "Protecting human life is a supreme value"—but also: "There exist sacred values that there is no way to examine" and "The security of the state is a supreme value." The goal: to at least create a document of principles, agreed upon by left and right, which can provide a framework for dialogue.

This try fails too, of course. One group gets involved in procedure, the other gets into an argument about whether or not to adopt the principle: "If someone is coming to kill you, rise and kill him first." To the rightists this is clear and easy to understand. There are also some leftists who have no trouble accepting it as a principle that is necessary for survival, but some of the leftists fear that its adoption will give the settlers legitimacy for applying it whatever way they understand it: to kill stone throwers, or to take aggressive action even when they only think they are in danger.

Someone suggests an cumbersome text bordering on the ridiculous: "If someone is coming to kill you, rise and kill him first only after you have tried all other legitimate avenues and have no other choice."

"Let us at least agree," Tzipi from Karnei Shomron suggests in despair, "that all of us here want the good of the whole." "Let us agree," one settler says, "that we are disagreeing here on the basis that we are all one people." But Maya, the leftist, rebels at the request for a declaration of loyalty. She feels this shows a lack of trust in her. She is ready to join in accepting some sort of principle only if she is promised that she will be able to remain with her differentness within the "good of the whole."

Haya Schachner: "I am not demanding any declaration of loyalty from you, but I am also not ready to give you an insurance certificate saying I will not want to leave you in the future. Why do we have to set up any preconditions at all?"

It seems as though the right constantly needs the feeling of "togetherness," maybe because of the sense it has now that it is about to be abandoned. The left actually needs its separateness, so that it can feel that it really has an identity of its own. The joint dilemma: how to talk to each other, and still keep their own identities, without "selling themselves out." It becomes more and more clear that both left and right need each other, but mainly as something that will let each one define itself as the antithesis of the other.

When the whole group meets again, to sum up the results of the latest experiment, no one talks about writing a declaration of principles. Elhanan, the settler who earlier expressed his trust in authority, says now that they are not authoritative enough, that they are not worth the money. The question comes up of whether the inability to carry on a dialogue was because we were not led well enough or because the gaps are so great.

Criticism is also suddenly directed at me and at Gid'on Levi, the HA'ARETZ reporter who is also taking part in the conference, because we, the press, "have one foot in and one foot out," and after this, will "go out and give a report—distorted, of course—to the whole of the Jewish people about what happened here." And the implication for the street is clear: The feeling of frustration at the inability to communicate leads to the search for someone to blame: the government, the newspapers....

"Maybe we do not need a dialogue at all," says Sa'id, the hydraulics engineer from Haifa. Perhaps he, who wanted a dialogue so much, says this because if a dialogue does open up between left and right, he will find himself, as an Arab, left outside the game. Rolli admits: "When I came I was very angry, but your need, the need of the right to be together with me, quieted my anger."

"I am angry at the right," one of the participants says, "but it seems to me that I am projecting on them my anger at myself as a leftist. I am angry at the right for dragging us into the terrible situation of the occupation, but really I am angry at the impotence of the left. We have been talking and talking for 25 years while human rights were being crushed underfoot, and our own responses have become dulled. Maybe my anger toward the right is actually a coverup for my envy at their tenacity and determination."

The psychologists, members of the Besod Siah association, base the rationale for the session on the idea that history, memories of the past, and current events are all awakening anxiety about survival and leading people to see the political positions they hold as the only hope for existence here. Opposing political beliefs are perceived as dangerous, and a sense of isolation and conflict is increasing, as are feelings of being threatened and of aggression. But, the two days of meetings made it plain that both the left and the right, despite their difficulties, believe that a dialogue between them is necessary. The real problem, it seems, is how to keep talking and still retain one's own identity: how to change, and yet keep one's own unique place. Now, with political reality to a great extent crumbling the ground from under the traditional approaches of both left and right, this problem is worsening on both the national and personal levels.

"I really just came here to vent my despair," Avi from the theater sums up the two days. "Once, when I lived in Manhattan, I had a dog. An absolutely psychotic dog. He was closed up in the house all day, and really went crazy. Then I would take him out into the street, let him smell other dogs, let him get some fresh air. When he came back home after that, he was still psychotic, but maybe not quite as much."

#### **Sari Nusaybah's Statement of Principles Viewed**

*93AA0119A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
22 Jun 93 p 3*

[Commentary by Shlomo Gazit]

[Text] About a week ago, in an article published by HA'ARETZ, Sari Nusaybah presented the conditions for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Peace, according to Nusaybah, who has been appointed over the moderate circles in the Palestinian leadership, is tough news for anyone who hopes, and is hoping, that there are moderate Palestinians who are prepared for a reasonable peace, a peace with which Israel, too, can live—a bitter disappointment for anyone who has repeatedly been saying that, if we do not hurry up, the current leadership will change, and a radical leadership will rise that will refuse any political

solution entirely. Nusaybah presents us with conditions that no Israeli, even the most moderate, could accept. And the saddest of all—after 26 years of living together and with active involvement in Israeli society, Nusaybah apparently does not understand this.

What is the peace that Nusaybah is striving for?

- Autonomy, or a transition period, must be dealt with as a bridge, and, in order for the peace process to be crowned with success, it is appropriate that this bridge lead, in the end, to the conclusion of the occupation.
- The agreement on the transition period must ensure the execution of a plan with a timetable for ending the occupation, administrative and military.
- The transition period agreement will result, sooner or later, in the bursting of the peace process, if it does not guarantee the Palestinians: The establishment of a Palestinian state; a solution to the refugee problem; and realization of the right of return and Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

If, indeed, these are the conditions, or, perhaps, this is the Palestinian dictate to Israel, I fear that the two sides are, indeed, wasting their time, and the question is asked: Are those numerous Israelis who said and are saying that there is no one to talk to and nothing to talk about, indeed correct.

The idea that stands at the base of the current process—negotiations over an intermediate period, for starters—is not new. The principle was already agreed upon in the Camp David accords. An intermediate period that has no definition ahead of time of the final goal is essential for a number of reasons:

The gap between Israel and the Palestinians, and more than this, the gap in the reciprocal mock-ups are so large that there is no chance of reaching an agreement without the stated transition period to bring about a change in atmosphere; the transition period must serve as a period of experimentation and trial, at least from Israel's aspect. (Is an Israeli-Palestinian co-existence feasible? Does a Palestinian leadership exist that Israel can depend upon?) The transition period, in the hope that it goes well, is likely to help both sides flex their positions and agree to conditions and agreements which, today, appear completely impossible.

Sari Nusaybah is not only refuting the way to an "open" transition period, with no agreed upon definition of a goal, but he is also demanding that Israel already agree now, in advance, to conditions which I fear we will not be able to accept in the future, as well, even after a successful transition period.

Israel will by no means accept the Palestinian demand to realize the right of return, and it will not agree to Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

If Nusaybah and the Palestinians want peace, they, too, should sober up from their dreams and delusions. And what is more important—it is essential that they talk to us in an entirely different language.

### Frenkel: Positive Statistics for 1992 Economy

93AA0092C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 4 Jun 93 pp 6-7

[Article by Sever Plotzger: "The Frenkel Report: The Successes, The Failures"]

[Text] The Annual Report of the Bank of Israel that was published this week—a book of 330 pages, printed on bright white paper and written in a grey and obscure language—is like burnt dough, in which raisins and cubes of fine chocolate are scattered: in order to get to them, you have to fight with your teeth through the hardening dough. Underneath the forbidding professional style, deep at the bottom, are hidden many wise economic statements, surprising analyses, and unexpected results.

Here are a few of them:

- **The fathers of the success:** Perhaps you did not pay attention, but 1992 was a year of impressive achievements for the economy of Israel and its citizens, at least according to the Bank of Israel Report. The foundations for the success, adds the report, were laid precisely a year or two previously. The Bank of Israel now looks backward like a taxi driver who has shot forward up a hill after putting the car in gear and stepping on the accelerator while simultaneously releasing the parking brake. We did it, he says, but we could have done more, if we had stayed in third longer. And it is a pity.
- **There is no deficit:** When there is mass immigration and the danger of unemployment—what should the government have done? Increase the budget, no? Not our government. The government budget had a surplus last year, not a deficit, states the Bank of Israel Report. It had a current cash surplus, the first in six years, and positive economic saving. The government had net savings of money, and therefore its influence was for restraining economic activity, not expanding it.

The Bank of Israel notes this with regret, because that is the opposite of what was needed. There also was no need, the Bank stated, for so high a tax burden as there was last year. And the government could have invested much, much more.

- **An unnecessary festive law:** The law for the reduction of the government deficit, which was passed with great celebration in the Knesset more than a year ago, died. The government, as was stated, is much more frugal than was required by the law, the immigration to Israel was much smaller, the growth was much more rapid, and, in general—says the Bank of Israel, the budget is not an exact measure for determining the influence of the government on the economy.
- **A couple from heaven:** The two best years in the history of the Israeli economy in the past decade were 1986-87. According to the report, the business product then went up at an average annual rate of more than 8 percent, and the product excluding construction rose

8.5 percent per year. Labor productivity went up approximately 5 percent annually. All this almost without immigration.

We cried and cried, and now it becomes clear that we were nearest then to being an Asian tiger. The wonderful success will not repeat itself.

- **Not this year:** According to Bank of Israel Governor Ya'akov Frenkel (his statement was published separately from the report), 1993 was very different from 1992. Per capita product will grow this year by only 1 percent, in contrast to an increase of approximately 5 percent last year. Inflation will not slow. Interest rates will not go down. Exports will creep along. What is to be done? This is the prescription: increase the deficits! The government should invest more, in education, not only in intersections. Let it borrow more abroad, for it has 10 billion dollars in guarantees. Let it reduce taxes. And let there be peace.
- **Big hopes:** The investments that have already been made in the Israeli economy over the last three years have increased the stock of productive capital by 10 percent and ensure the continuation of rapid growth, of 7 percent per annum, 3 percent per capita. In the Bank of Israel they think that this is also what is expected by the business sector. Now it is only necessary to wait for the expectations to be realized.
- **20,000 in 2,000:** Per capital product in Israel reached NIS [new Israeli shekels] 32,000, or approximately \$13,000, last year. The Israeli Government must set a target for the citizens of Israel—to attain a per capita product of \$20,000 by the year 2,000.
- **More crowded:** How much are all of Israel's roads worth? Approximately NIS20 billion, says the Bank of Israel. How much must be invested each year in order to maintain them? Two billion. And how much is being invested? One-tenth of that. In all, only approximately NIS1 billion were invested in the roads last year, a very disappointing increase, one-third of what is necessary. And crowding on the roads continues to increase, by another 6 percent—a world record for crowding.
- **Export miracles:** Last year, a miracle occurred in exports, which went up approximately 14 percent, and it is not clear why. For there was a real revaluation of the shekel, and a worldwide recession. The Bank of Israel's answers: Israeli exports stormed into new markets. Exploited opportunities that developed following the stagnation of the Gulf war.

And, generally, export profitability is good. Exports of radio, communications, electronics devices, exact devices, optics, and aircraft hit approximately NIS3 billion last year, as against NIS2.4 billion in 1991. Everything grew.

- **Autonomy, the target country:** What is the economic entity to which Israeli exports doubled since 1989? Poland? Kazakhstan? South Africa? You are wrong: the state of the territories. Israeli exports to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza doubled: from \$700 million in 1989 to \$1.4 billion last year. Was there an intifadah?

- **Agriculture shrank:** 1992 was a good year for agriculture, but that is not big economic news, as the share of agriculture in the national product of the State of Israel is only 2.2 percent. Yes, only 2 percent—that is all of the contribution of Israeli agriculture to Israeli product. What is left of the Zionist-pioneering vision of the return to the soil? A branch of the magnitude of a statistical error.
- **There are no unfortunate industrialists:** From 1990 to 1992, the industrialists got rich, in complete contradiction to their assertions. Labor productivity in industry rose, on the average, by approximately 4 percent per annum, and wages fell, on the average, by about 2.5 percent annually. The result—an unprecedented spurt in profits. Net yield on industrial capital hit 20 percent last year, as against 14 percent in 1989. There is no profitability like that in the world. It is a fact.
- **Twenty billion:** In the three years, from 1990 to 1992, the Israeli economy invested another \$20 billion in machinery, equipment, and construction. Where did the money come from?

The Bank of Israel Report: We increased private saving. Companies invested their additional profits in the business, and raised money on the Stock Exchange. Last year, Israeli industrial companies raised on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange and in the United States amounts totaling NIS3 billion, about 41 percent of the investments in industry. Even more than was necessary, as they had nice profits. Therefore we do not have (see the following paragraph) a deficit with the foreign sector.

- **There is independence:** Israel's national saving sufficed last year for financing all of the national investment. Astounding, but economic independence is already in our hands, and we did not know it. Only what? Israeli national saving, according to the Bank of Israel's definitions, included the gifts, the transfers, and the foreign aid that we received.
- **Money came in:** We received from abroad, without the necessity of repayment, gifts and transfers of approximately \$7 billion—a bundle of foreign exchange, which large Ukraine can only dream about. That includes American aid, contributions of Jews, German restitution payments, and all kinds of "personal transfers," a murky item, liquid, estimated. For example, according to the report, foreign citizens and immigrants transferred last year to Israel cash in the amount of approximately \$1.8 billion. In suitcases?
- **Money was taken out:** Were there foreign investments? There were investments by Israelis on foreign stock exchanges. According to the Bank of Israel Report, investments abroad by residents of Israel came to \$2.7 billion—an increase of 800 percent from 1990.

In foreign securities, that is, on foreign stock exchanges, approximately \$2.1 billion were invested last year. In

contrast, foreign residents purchased shares on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in the astounding sum of \$160 million.

- **Discriminated against by preference:** The myth is that immigrants are given preference in housing assistance. According to the Bank of Israel Report, an Israeli young couple is likely to receive from the government a housing subsidy that equals approximately 30 percent of the price of the apartment; an immigrant couple will receive at most a subsidy that is equal to 20 percent of the price of the apartment. That is, it is discriminated against. By the way, and not unrelatedly—the profits of the contractors continue to rise, says the Report.
- **The bankers trial:** Business services, from commerce to insurance and bankers, are a new chapter in the report. A diverse branch, which generates 45 percent of the product. It is not good to be a wage earner in services—real wages are declining most of the time—but it is good to be an attorney. The volume of legal services already equals that of banking.
- **Where is the percent:** Do you remember that at the beginning of the year they reduced the value-added tax, in order to halt inflation, and inflation, afterwards, jumped up a notch? Without risking too sharp a frontal attack by the government, the Bank of Israel Report hints that it was unnecessary and undesirable to act in that way. It would have been preferable to reduce the income tax rates, or to invest in employment. One percent went: 1 billion shekels.
- **The stories that the tourism supplements told us:** A quote: “The Israelis have filled completely all the hotels in the country, and therefore rooms are being added all the time to the hotels.” Right? Wrong. According to the Bank of Israel Report, the number of nights by Israelis in hotels in the country fell in recent years by between 2 and 2.5 percent per year, and the number of hotel rooms has dropped even faster—by about 4 percent annually.
- **Desperate:** In the past two years, a hard kernel of desperate unemployed persons developed, who are seeking work for a long time. They have been unemployed for many months. “Irreversible economic and social damage,” states the Bank of Israel.
- **A scoop:** You will not believe it, a stunning discovery: The main reason for the high level of unemployment, writes the bank, is the lack of jobs, and not the refusal of the unemployed to accept work. Therefore, economic activity must be increased and criteria of eligibility for unemployment compensation should not be tightened too much. If the Bank of Israel writes that, that is really the end of the liberal economic world.
- **The profits of peace:** The army is shrinking and becoming more efficient. The defense burden in the Israeli economy fell last year to only 10 percent of the national product. Half of the burden of 10 years ago.
- **Cheap intelligence:** The Israeli brain became cheaper last year, but the machine became dearer. The large

immigration from the former USSR, in the framework of which readymade educated individuals arrived in the country, “greatly lowered the return on human capital relative to physical capital,” states the Bank of Israel.

- **A year of getting equipped:** 1992 was a year of business and private investments in real assets—industrial and household equipment, machinery, and automobiles—and not a year of financial investments. Despite the contrary impression. “we are witnessing a transition from financial property to physical property,” writes the Bank of Israel. This happens whenever the population grows, that is, when there is immigration.
- **The passage of time does not resolve everything:** We are sure that we improved the conditions of absorption in the country, and that it is easier for the immigrants who arrived recently to be absorbed than it was for those who came first. The opposite is true. Over time, according to the Bank of Israel, precisely a worsening in the situation of immigrant absorption has been noticeable, the difficulty of finding work in their original occupation especially is increasing.
- **Without any favors:** We took guarantees for absorption? We did not take [any]. And what is our situation with regard to the outside? Excellent. The net external debt (that is, the debts of the government and the citizens abroad) fell last year by another \$400 million, to a little more than one-fifth of our national product.

This is a very low debt/product ratio, the likes of which was last recorded in 1965, before the Six-Day War, before the War of Attrition, before the Yom Kippur War, and before the Lebanon War. Net interest on the external debt now eats up five percent of exports. In 1987 we had to budget 11 percent of exports for that. For foreign capital we are not a dangerous country, very much not dangerous.

- **Punished itself:** The Israeli public is a little bit nuts. Our foreign exchange situation is (see above) excellent, yet since last May it has been purchasing precisely dollars and dollar-linked [assets]. Why? Because, on the one hand, the profit on equity of companies listed on the Stock Exchange rose from 3 percent in 1989 to 7 percent in 1991 and to 11 percent last year. But on the other hand, there has only been a “miniscule” increase in the current cash flow of these companies.

Consequently, the Bank of Israel concludes, there is a fear that the positive phenomenon of the profitability is liable not to continue.

- **And another warning:** Investors on the Stock Exchange and in provident funds, take heed, you have been warned again. The Bank of Israel notes with open anger that the provident funds behaved last year like speculators. The funds’ managers poured demands of more than 1 billion shekels into the market for shares, and increased their holdings of shares at a rapid pace, “beyond what was desirable,” writes the Bank of Israel.

- **And, like we said, a bubble:** What is the Governor of the Bank of Israel called in the Report? They call him "an economic factor": "At the beginning of 1993, estimates were heard from economic factors," it is written there, "that the investment in shares involves risks, and that investment should be avoided at the price level that was reached." A bubble, he said.

### **Aircraft Industry To Lay Off Workers**

93AA0120A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 24 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Arye Egozi]

[Text] The management of the aircraft industries has decided to lay off another 1,500 employees. This is in addition to all the workers who have already been laid off in the context of the company's recovery plan. The decision is explained as due to the deep, continuing recession in both the civil and military branches of the world aviation industry.

The aircraft industries union has already announced that it will not agree to any further layoffs, and has threatened to take action if management takes a unilateral step without completely coordinating with it.

A source in the IAI [Israel Aircraft Industries] management explained yesterday that notwithstanding the fact that the company discharged 1,100 workers last year, there is still a surplus of workers; they simply have nothing to do. "The crisis is tougher and more extended than even the naysayers predicted, and we simply have no choice," he said.

The plan for additional layoffs will be brought up soon for approval by the IAI management council, and then for government approval. The company intends to request government aid to cover the costs of severance pay.

As part of the framework of their fight against the IAI cutbacks, the union recently demanded that the prime minister and the finance minister take five members off the company's management council, because of conflicts of interests.

In the letter it sent, the union lists the names of 'Uzi 'Eylam and Imri Tov from the Defense Ministry; David Barodt, chief of the budgetary branch of the Finance Ministry, and his deputy, Nir Gil'ad; and Ya'akov Ben-Best, general manager of the Ordan company.

The first two, the union claims, supported the decision to transfer the management of the "central project" of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] from the aircraft industries to the Elbit company. The head of the budgetary branch and his deputy are responsible for the financial interests of the Defense Ministry, which is the aircraft industries' main customer. As to Ben-Best, union representatives argue that because he is general manager of Ordan, which is in competition with the aircraft industries, he should not continue to serve on the management council.

IAI union representatives burst into the meeting of the company's management council about three weeks ago, demanding that 'Uzi 'Eylam and Imri Tov get out of the place immediately. As a result, the meeting was adjourned, but the members reconvened about an hour later in another location. A union source told us yesterday: "We will not allow a conflict of interests like this to go on, when we are fighting for the survival of the aircraft industries."

### **Breakthroughs in Arrow-5 Test Detailed**

93AA0058A Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Apr 93 pp 14-19

[Article by Kobi Merinko: "Breakthrough"]

[Text] If the success of the fourth test of the Arrow put the project on course, then the success of the fifth and last test constitutes a real push forward. The interception stage, which is the essence of the Arrow, was deemed successful in that test. There is still a long and winding road to travel to the completion of the project, a road that is full of question marks and replete with technological challenges that have yet to be tested anywhere else in the world. Still, the last test was a significant step along that road full of hurdles, based entirely upon technological know-how. The continuation of the project requires U.S. and Israeli investments along with answers to a multitude of questions: about financing, equipping, scheduling, the character and development of auxiliary systems, and the technique of incorporating the Arrow into the national warning array. Behind all of these question marks stands one certain fact: The technological breakthrough that the Arrow project is based upon will serve the defense establishment in the future, regardless of the future of the Arrow.

Second comes the interceptor: the Arrow missile, red-white-black, solid propellant motor, acceleration from zero to Mach 8.

Several minutes earlier, the target missile was launched from the same ship. It took off vertically, accumulated speed, exited the atmosphere, reached its maximal height, turned around, and began its flight toward earth.

The interceptor also took off vertically. Within seconds, it angled in the direction of the encounter. It crossed the kilometers that separated it and the success of the test within less than a second. It passed by the target missile at a distance of only several meters.

Afterwards, the employees of the Malam plant at Israel Aircraft Industries broke out the champagne. Actually, the article could end here. The fifth test was successful.

At the table where the Americans sat, they took out paper and pen and started to calculate. Someone rewound the films, and it was possible to clearly see the two missiles passing by each other very closely. Lieutenant Colonel A., the commander of the test branch, relaxed on his chair and gave an initial assessment: "The paths were nominal and it appears that they passed by pretty close. The goal of the test was to obtain proximity

in the flight of the two missiles and, from a first glance in real time, it succeeded. They were exactly on top of one another."

Afterwards, everyone left the control room. Thus, test number five of the Arrow antimissile missile, which took place on Sunday, 28 February 1993 at one in the afternoon, was completed.

Earlier, on Wednesday, 24 February, I arrived at the control room at seven in the morning. The countdown was under way. Two more hours until the planned launching. I asked Capt. Yehuda, the commander of the test, what the chances were that we would see a launching today. His response did not allow for much of a likelihood: "Statistically, on the basis of the previous Arrow test, the missile has never been launched on the first try. Besides, the weather is too good."

He was right, as stated. No missile was launched that day. A fault was detected in one of the missile's operating systems. The Israel Aircraft Industries personnel on the ship open a screw, tighten a screw, make slight changes. In the interim, the countdown is halted. No doubt about it, this clock is one of the biggest liars in the Middle East. Even though it shows two hours, or an hour and a half, or half an hour, it is impossible to believe even one minute that it shows. Until it is reset, and the launching stage is actually reached, they will stop it a thousand more times.

And when the clock is stopped, the test staff goes out to play basketball. They release some tension. Outside of the testing room, there is a basket. Not like the one at the Yad Eliyahu Stadium, but Yehuda is not exactly Doron Jamchi [famous Israeli basketball player], either.

Between baskets, Capt. Amir, the safety officer for the test, explains the difference between a normal missile, a dangerous missile, and a faulty missile. "A missile becomes dangerous whenever it reaches the point where, if we destroy it, fragments will fall on a settled area. The Arrow is a very energetic missile, and if it changes its angle of flight, tremendous danger is likely to occur within seconds. Fragments of the missile can cover a huge range. If the missile is faulty but not dangerous, it is preferable to allow it to continue to fly in order to obtain further information."

"In situations like that, I am very much more afraid that we will destroy a normal missile, as we did in the first test of the Arrow. We were dependent upon one pair of radars. They lost the missile and we were forced to destroy a normal missile back at the outset of the test."

The tracking of the missile is performed through several means: radar, television camera, and movie cameras. The radars tracking the missile transmit the data to the safety computer. At any given moment, the computer shows where the broken fragments of the missile might land if the missile were destroyed at that moment. The safety officer sits next to the destruction switch, in case destruction should prove necessary.

"We have developed a method of computing the length of time a missile is dangerous," says Amir. "If a missile

flies for long enough in the expected path, then at a certain stage it cannot be considered dangerous any more. It was said that five seconds prior to interception, all of the radars lost their tracking after the missile. In principle, it is necessary to destroy the missile; if we computed and saw that at that stage the missile can no longer be dangerous, then we can continue the test. In fact, in the second test of the Arrow, we worked the data in the final stage that way, and we gave the missile another 10 seconds of flight. The information that was produced from this test showed what the problem was that caused the failure."

The next day, Thursday, the sun packed up and disappeared behind the clouds. Just the day before, it had behaved as if it were an employee of Israel Aircraft Industries. Although I am no great weather expert, I said to Yehudah in a disappointed tone of voice: "Am I right in assuming that there will not be a test today?"

Right. There was no test. And this is the place to explain the issue of the weather. This does not mean that the Arrow will work only against Scuds that come decorated with flowers and in spring weather. Not at all. The Arrow is suited for all kinds of weather. The problem is actually the test site. When the sun disappears and the clouds come, it is difficult to supervise the test and to collect all of the data that the developer requires. When it is very cloudy, the field cannot track the missile with the cameras.

On Friday morning, with the sunrise, I looked up and understood that the only launching that would take place that day was my own launching to the flight-test unit. And in fact, the atmosphere in the command room was pessimistic. Capt. Yehuda, the director of the test, had just gotten a haircut that day. Someone said to him: "I see that this test is making you bald."

This day, Lt. Col. R., the head of the test area, proposes that I give up. "Forget about it," he says, "why should you come here every morning? In a few days, I will show you a videotape of the test. Afterwards, you will write that you were here. Who will know that you were not?"

The meteorology officer reports that the lookout plane has reported: "The clouds are covering the entire sky and there is not even one hole. But this is only to the end of the horizon. Beyond that, everything is okay." After 15 minutes, the end of the test is declared. I do not give up, arriving again on Sunday, with the feeling that this time it will work. In the control room, it is hard to find a place to sit. Apparently, everyone now has the same feeling.

"Ten, nine, eight...three, two, one, top, the missile is out," Lt. Col. A.'s voice echoes throughout the test field. And then, a jet of smoke comes out of the rear end of the missile. On the huge screen, I see what I have waited three days for: the target missile is launched toward the sky.

The test room is completely dark. Everything is conducted as if in a silent movie. The tracking systems do not broadcast voices, only a picture. The rear bench,



designated for guests, is full of everyone who has played any part in the test. All of the positions are manned. Every second that passes fills the audience with happiness. Capt. Yehuda pleads with those present to keep quiet, because: "There is no need to tell you, we have another missile."

The people from the Malam plant at Israel Aircraft Industries, the developers of the missile, are sitting in another room. The tension there is slightly less than one might expect during such a test, and slightly more than a regular test at the unit. The last three days have tried everyone's nerves, to the point where someone even said that if the missile did not go up today, he would push the button and launch it himself.

"End of supervision stage of target missile," announced Capt. Amir, the safety officer. In translation to Hebrew: the target missile passed the stage in which it is dangerous, and within several seconds it would exit the atmosphere. When the speed expires, it will make a hoof-shaped turn and return in the direction of the earth.

Now whispers begin in the room. Will it succeed or not? Two missiles are still on the ship, both of them interceptors. If there is a fault in one of them, they will launch the other one.

The unit personnel are standing on the roof of the control room, looking at the ocean and searching for the missiles. For them, the test commenced at one in the morning, rather than one in the afternoon. Although the official countdown is only two hours, the informal part is the longest. Dozens of actions undertaken simultaneously, at any given moment: accumulation of meteorological data, direction of the ship, calibration of the instruments, calibration flights, etc.

More than 100 people, all of them belonging to the flight-test unit, participate in such a test. They include an extensive crew of reservists.

Tension rises in the launch room. All of the indicators say that the target missile, knock on wood, is working exactly as the engineers dreamed it would. "Interception missile number one is normal." That is it. They no longer need the backup missile.

"Ten, nine, eight...three, two, one, top." The interceptor takes off vertically. Within a few seconds, it assumes its direction at a 45-degree angle. These are the critical seconds of the test. The ground radar transmits general data to the missile on the direction from which the target is likely to arrive and directs the Arrow toward the expected meeting point. Thus, the final homing stage begins, in the course of which the missile "sees" the target.

I look at the screen, which displays the radar picture. The target descends from the sky in an arced path. Suddenly, the interceptor is also on the screen. It is traveling fast in its direction. Exchange. The distance is very close. Another few seconds of flight. The safety officer destroys both of them and finalizes the test. Silence in the room.

Suddenly, someone rises and then everyone understands that it is it, everything is finished, although only several moments have passed since the beginning of the test. They turn on the light. Silence is still maintained. Perhaps everyone thinks that the third missile is supposed to launch, as well? Or perhaps they do not understand that it is over and that they will meet again during the next test?

Someone rewinds the films, in which it can be clearly seen that everything apparently went well. Within several minutes, the room empties. Lt. Ziv, the deputy director of the test, goes outside and lights a cigarette. He releases the tension.

"From first glance, everything looked good," he determines. "The field worked well, and from what can be seen in real time, all of the systems tracked. Only the decoding work remains. They need to give the industries the missile paths, special events, and the main information that it is waiting for: the passing distance. It initially appears that they were on the same axis of movement."

It can be said that this is it. The test is over. A debriefing is scheduled for 1415. In the interim, someone else comes and says that they have broken open the champagne at Malam. Finally, they can celebrate.

Yehudah directs the debriefing. From the sidelines, one could think that this test, which had taken place just over an hour before, had been one of the greatest failures in the annals of the test field. Every person responsible for a system gets up and presents the problems that he encountered during the test. The Malam representative, who rose to thank everyone at the end of the debriefing, was the only one who led me to understand that all of these are problems that it is hardly worthwhile to speak about. "According to our initial data, this is a great success. The interceptor passed by the target missile at a very close distance. We wish to thank all of you for your hard work. We know that you went to great effort for this test to succeed and we are sorry if this came at the expense of your sleep. Thank you very much from Malam."

Lt. Col. S., the commander of the unit, finishes up the debriefing: "This test is built very strongly on people. The unit invested a great deal of work and the results speak for themselves. I must say that Yehudah demonstrated a very high level of test management."

They turn out the light, press PLAY on the VCR and watch the film. "Arrow-5". The first scene—a picture of the control room and the voice of Lt. Col. A. performing the countdown. The target missile takes off and is filmed by the television camera. The radar follows it. Again, the countdown. The interceptor goes out. The radar follows it and here is the picture that everyone wants to see: the two missiles—one next to the other—at a very close passing distance. They stop and rewind it. And again. And again. And again. Now, the only thing remaining is to analyze the results.

The main result of this test is that Israel Aircraft Industries has indeed solved the serious problems that were revealed in the second and third tests of the missile, which derived from the high temperatures created during the rapid flight of the missile.

In order to protect the missile from the tremendous heat created by flight at a speed of Mach 8, they coated it with a protective coating, and prevented that fault.

The next test of the Arrow is expected to take place within the next two months. Only after the second stage of the tests of the Arrow missile has been completed will it be possible to assess performance more precisely.

[Box, p 18]

#### Five Arrow Launches

##### First Launching—Systems Check

Performed on 9 August 1990. Intended to check the missile systems during launching. The objective of the test was to examine the control system and the sensors that are carried by the missile and guide it to its target. The test was terminated several seconds after takeoff and the missile was destroyed pursuant to a command from the ground, due to a fear that it would deviate from its path and hit a settled area. The reason for the fault: The ground tracking radars could not track the flight of the missile.

##### Second Launching—Launching From a Ship

Took place on 25 March 1991. Like the first test, it was intended to check the missile systems during launching. In this test, the missile was launched from a ship in midsea. A fault in the missile caused the termination of the test.

##### Third Launching—Testing of Interception Ability

Took place on 31 October 1991. In this test, they tried to examine the Arrow's interception ability. This time, as well, it was launched from a ship toward a target missile. The fault which had caused the failure of the second launching occurred again. In this test, in contrast with the previous one, the target missile was launched successfully.

##### Fourth Launching—First Success

Took place on 23 September 1992. As in the first and second tests, it was intended to test the missile systems during launching. The systems acted as planned, and the Arrow arrived at the designated point in the sky. The missile was destroyed, as planned, after 45 seconds. This test ended the stage of initial tests of the system.

##### Fifth Launching—Interception Capability of Ground-to-Ground Missile

Took place on 28 February 1993. Intended to test the interception capability of the missile. The Arrow successfully passed the target missile that was launched against it at a very close distance. For the first time, capability of intercepting a ground to-ground-missile was proven. [End of Box]

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Mikha Kohen, former commander of the equipment division, analyzes the last test:

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] What can be learned from the last test of the Arrow?

[Kohen] The Arrow is a missile that flies and maneuvers inside the atmosphere, at speeds ranging between Mach 8 and 9. At such speeds, a very high temperature develops on the missile. In the last test, the Arrow succeeded, for the first time, in flying at these speeds in spite of the high temperature and, in my opinion, created a worldwide technological breakthrough by doing so.

A second breakthrough is that, in spite of these difficult conditions, the Arrow operated all of its sensor systems. By doing so, the Arrow became the first missile in the world that succeeded in flying at such high speeds and to maneuver, to operate sensor systems, and to pass by a target at a very close distance.

The last test examined whether the Arrow is indeed successful in intercepting ground-to-ground missiles. The inventors of the idea of the Arrow chose a method in which the meeting with the target is created at a near-miss distance, and then an explosion is created, causing the warhead to be hit by fragments. The success of the test proves unequivocally that the method chosen by those who initiated the idea of the Arrow is the correct one.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] What is the difficulty involved in intercepting ground-to-ground missiles?

[Kohen] The difficulty refers to several areas. First of all, it is necessary to bring the missile, which is very hard to maneuver, to a hypothesized meeting point. That is a problem in and of itself. The second difficulty derives from the extremely high passing speeds between the two missiles. The target flies at a speed of 2,000 meters per second, as does the interceptor. Every second, each of the missiles flies 2,000 meters. Therefore, it is necessary to initiate an explosion within a very short period of time, so that its fragments will cause the warhead to be hit. That is a difficult task that has not been performed anywhere else in the world, to date.

[BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR] Do the initial failures of the missile cast a shadow on the success of the last test?

[Kohen] If the first test had concluded successfully, I would have been very worried. That would have been a sign for me that the failure would occur during the more expensive and significant tests. In complicated systems such as these, it is impossible for everything to be all right in the initial tests. There is no such thing.

We must not delude ourselves. As long as the system is being developed, there may be additional failures. Tests take place in order to check the system and, usually, such sophisticated systems do not operate properly the first time. The community of developers gains much more from failures than from success. If they know how to investigate the failure, they derive much benefit from it. The success of the last test proves that all of the lessons

from the failures were indeed learned and that the mission has has been started on upon the right road.

I must say that the success of the last test is a significant technological achievement on the part of the engineers, the technicians, and the scientists involved in the project. The time has come for us to start being proud of our technological capability. We have proved to ourselves that we are capable of developing a system that has no parallel in the world and, to date, none is anticipated.

### Kibbutz Plans Privatization

93AA0112E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
17 Jun 93 pp 10, 11

[Article by Aryeh Qizal: "Where Is the Kibbutz"]

[Text] The founders of Hanita certainly did not dream of the day when they would speak in the kibbutz about privatization; certainly not about privatization of the dining room. On 21 March 1938 when it was founded, in the period of the bloody disturbances between Arabs and Jews, they spoke about acts of heroism. Poems were written about it, and girls throughout the Jewish world were named after it. Today, new tunes are heard.

Today, they are talking about money, about the fear of economic collapse, about the entry to a kibbutz of another type. The secretariat, which was elected a year and a half ago, has inscribed privatization on its banner, with the aim of changing from a kibbutz mortgaged to the banks to a settlement that is attractive to its members, flourishing and successful.

"There is no choice," says Simon Qanton, 36, who has been in Hanita for 17 years. "At the beginning of the 1990's the walls in the Soviet Union fell. Communism died, and with it all of the outdated and old ideas. If communism died in Russia, it cannot live here, on the border with Lebanon, in this beautiful place. We must abandon the failed Russian model and turn West."

In certain rooms at Hanita they are made anxious by these sentences. The veterans stand up on their hind legs and complain, but their voice is weak. They fear first of all for themselves, and afterwards for the loss of the kibbutz idea. They fear that the beautiful point, in a landscape that looks out over Wadi Namer in Lebanon, will lose its bearings and become an economic enterprise that eats up its workers.

One of them is Moshe Zaltzman, 72. He arrived at Hanita 52 years ago and established his home there, when there was still no running water and no shack had been connected to electricity. He is one of the main opponents of privatization. Yes, he is for a moderate economic reform that would allow the members a certain independence, but he seeks to protect closely the idea of the kibbutz and its characteristics.

"Throughout the years, we made difficult decisions and we liquidated branches," he says. "We liquidated the barn before Levi Eshkol said that the cow was the enemy of the state, we liquidated the sausage factory. We made

changes, but we did not liquidate Hanita. I fear that privatization, as a goal, will liquidate the kibbutz. True, we are carrying heavy debts of millions of shekels. True, we are mortgaged to the bank and it is managing us, but we must understand that the mutual responsibility in the kibbutz is our national bank. The idea of privatization began a year and a half ago. A new secretariat was elected at Hanita, the first time for four years, instead of for two years as had been the custom until then. The secretariat crystallized a novel line of action and formulated a working paper with a very detailed proposal to transfer consumption items from the kibbutz budget to the member's budget. In addition to these subjects—it was decided that the secretariat would operate as the executive committee of the kibbutz, headed by a secretary who is a kind of "director-general of the kibbutz."

This committee would be able to approve a process of personal initiative of the members in the establishing of additional business systems. Thus approval was given to a female member of the kibbutz who works in physical therapy and in the shiatsu method to establish a mobile business between the kibbutzim, whose profits would go into the kibbutz kitty. Thus it was decided to establish a rural hospice branch in the kibbutz, including meals in the dining room, and use of the swimming pool. Thus it was decided to commercialize the kibbutz pub, and thus it was decided to commercialize the kibbutz vocal group and to make it professional.

This plan was approved by a majority of the members of Hanita, which today numbers 650 persons, 290 of them members. But the secretariat presented last March an additional plan to intensify the privatization. In this framework, it was decided to transfer as many branches as possible to the members, on the assumption that the consumption of the member is composed of a thousand and one needs and aspirations, and every person has his own taste. And that is a revolutionary change: up to now, it was the secretariat that decided what was more legitimate for a member and what was less so.

The collapse of the kibbutz? "No," says Roni Solena, 49, one of the members of the secretariat, 28 years in Hanita, "the fundamental assumption is that kibbutz Hanita is a cooperative company. Therefore, we shall continue to maintain common ownership of the infrastructure and the means of production, and we shall continue to distribute the budget equally between the members. But we must demand of the members that they adjust their expenses to the income of the kibbutz."

"We will not make cuts in education," says Mazal Landau, 27, the teacher, "but in the area of gray education, every parent will have to finance from his own pocket extracurricular activities for his children. In contrast, we will open our children's houses to absorb outside children in order to make them profitable."

"We will provide health [care] to our members, but not all of it. There are items that we will privatize and we will require that the member pay himself—for example, mental health, alternative medicine. Formerly, we

approved automatically every request for alternative medicine. Today, every member is on his own and his own budget in this matter.”

Zaltzman, from the veterans, fumes. “I will raise a ruckus so that there will not be privatization of health and education. I say that if a child is more talented than the others—it is impossible to impose his special education upon the parents.

“Mati Kaspi is a son of Hanita, and he was a pupil in my wife’s kindergarten and was talented and was cultivated here. I think that the society must leave itself a large measure of responsibility and it is important that individuals do not relieve themselves [of responsibility]. I think that relieving the kibbutz of concern for health and education is a red line.”

The idea of privatization has also reached the dining room—the heart of the kibbutz—and has started a brush fire. Iris Atali, 27, who was born on the kibbutz, is responsible for the dining room, is demanding that it be privatized. “There is tremendous waste in the dining room. People take food far beyond what they need. I am for turning it into a restaurant.”

“Out of the question,” says Zaltzman, from the veterans. “I am opposed. The dining room is more than a dining room. It is a symbol, it is a meeting place. It is a red line that will lead to the destruction of the kibbutz. I am opposed to the privatization of the shoe repair shop. Soon they will ask me to pay for going to the swimming pool and to present a magnetic card at the entrance to the laundry.”

Simon Qanton is not disturbed by the idea. “The dining room should definitely be turned into a restaurant,” he says. “If we will pay in the dining room—we will give the members the possibility of choosing whether they want to eat there or not. Whoever does not want to—will have a budget to eat somewhere else. The dining room is no longer part of the kibbutz ideology. In the 1990’s we have to allow people a choice.”

The veterans are enraged by the economic-quantitative translation of the communal idea. In a document that was submitted to the members, the sums of money that the kibbutz would save by implementing privatization were specified: NIS[new Israeli shekels]1.4 million per year in the dining room, NIS60,000 on hair care and cosmetics expenses, NIS 50,000 on whitewashing and painting, NIS30,000 in the electric shop, NIS300,000 on energy expenses, NIS40,000 on sports, NIS93,000 on culture, and NIS605,000 on health.

“It is impossible to translate everything into money,” says Zaltzman. “I fear that we will lose the idea that we inscribed on our banner, ‘to demand of each according to his ability and to give to him according to his needs and the possibilities of the kibbutz.’ I think that we must learn—even in the 1990’s—how to live together and to seek the common ground—and not merely the lowest [common denominator].”

Robi Solano, of the secretariat, says that the change is acceptable to a very large majority in Hanita. “Every change is accepted democratically,” he says. “We hope to conclude the main portion of the process by the end of 1993.”

And Zaltzman the veteran concludes: “I want there to be a debate here, and a move that would be a mistake must not be imposed, because there are things that cannot be corrected.”

**Apartment Purchases, New Construction Reported**  
*93AA0102C Tel Aviv YEDI’OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 2 Jun 93 pp 8-9*

[Text] Most people—48 percent—who buy secondhand apartments do so to improve their living conditions in the city they are already living in. For 32 percent, investment is the main reason. The rest—20 percent—have moved from other cities and buy the apartments in order to “drop anchor” in their new homes.

These findings are based on a survey carried out especially for “Mammon’s” readers by real estate assessor Levi Yitzhak’s team of experts, who relied on a representative sampling of 1,882 transactions, carried out all across the country over the last month.

**Why Do People Buy Secondhand Apartments?**

The Reasons for buying	Jerusalem	Tel Aviv	Haifa	Ramat Gan	Eilat
For investment	40%	34%	7%	22%	58%
To improve standard of living in the same city	42%	36%	83%	63%	24%
Because of a move from one city to another	18%	30%	10%	15%	18%

(According to the Findings of Assessor Levi Yitzhak’s Survey)

Below are some additional characteristics the survey found:

- Most of the people coming from other cities to buy apartments in Tel Aviv are either young singles or couples, or single-parent families.

People in their golden years are pouring into Tel Aviv, too. They prefer apartments that are small, but improved to suit the living standards they are accustomed to. The lion’s share of the apartments that changed owners during the time covered had two to two and one-half rooms.

It also appears, as the table also shows, that in Tel Aviv there is a relative balance between the three main reasons for buying secondhand apartments: 36 percent of the transactions were made by local residents in order to improve living conditions; 34 percent of the buyers in the city bought their apartments as an investment, and just 30 percent of the apartments were bought by people who had moved there from other cities.

- In the Ramat Gan and Giv'atim region, 63 percent of the apartment buyers are "immigrants" from other cities; most are young families who for various reasons have abandoned Tel Aviv.

Because of the price difference of 10 to 20 percent, these young families have been able to improve and expand their apartments.

- Haifa is unique on the map of apartment purchases, because the overwhelming majority (83 percent) of apartment buyers are original Haifa residents, making the purchases to improve their living conditions there.

Haifa had the lowest rate of apartment-buying for the sake of investment (7 percent). Other local indicators: In Haifa, cottages and apartments in cottages have a relatively significant market share.

- The survey also revealed that during the period covered (one month, from mid-April to mid-May), the largest segment of apartment buyers in Jerusalem were actually foreign residents—with a very noticeable presence of ultra-Orthodox families.

Eilat is the main attraction for people looking for real estate investments. The proof: 58 percent of the apartment sales transacted in the city were for the sake of investment. Here, we are speaking mainly of one-to-three-room apartments, most of them purchased by people who are not residents of Eilat.

From the apartment brokers' reports, it is evident that there has recently been a noticeable improvement all over the country in the demand for secondhand apartments.

Hayim Kaufman, chairman of the apartment brokers association Malda'n, believes that over the last few months there has been a rise of about 30 percent in the demand for secondhand apartments, although prices for these apartments have risen on the average by only five percent.

#### Lots

#### The Administration Has Land Available for Building 60,000 Apartments

The Israel lands administration has land available for building 60,000 housing units. Most of the reserve land is in the center of the country or the Jerusalem region. In addition, the Israel lands administration has lower-priced land available, another 63,000 housing units, most of them in the center and in Haifa. This was the report of the administration's assistant director, Moshe Gat, who emphasized that for purposes of industry, trade, and hotels, the administration would be able to put three million square meters of land—in the south, the center, and in Jerusalem—

on the market immediately. This is in addition to another 5.5 million square meters that have been set aside for sale at a later stage in the Haifa, central, and southern regions.

Following are some recent transactions:

#### Ri'shon Letzion: 20 Dunams for 126 Apartments Were Sold for 20.5 Million Shekels

The lands administration will receive 20.5 million shekels from the government company Shikun Upituah [Settlement and Development], in return for 20 dunams in the "Holot C" section of Ri'shon Letzion, on which 126 housing units will be built. The price is much higher than the minimum price, which was set at just 7.7 million shekels.

The area of each housing unit will be about 160 square meters, and each unit will cost about 163 thousand shekels: 1,030 shekels per square meter.

At the auction, 70 offers were presented, including ones from large construction companies such as Dankner, Ezra' Yosef and Sons, Ramat, Sharvet, and Yeshko, etc.

#### Tirat Hakarmel: Four Lots for Industry, for 6.7 Million Shekels

The administration has leased out four lots for industry in Tirat Hakarmel, outside Haifa, for 6.7 million shekels. The tenants are a government institution, the Kal Vahomer [All the Better] Company, and The Construction and Development Company.

#### A Call for Bids To Build 78 Housing Units in the Ezra' Neighborhood of South Tel Aviv

The lands administration is putting up for auction three lots in the Ezra' neighborhood of south Tel Aviv, in the section between Herutenu and Tishrei Streets, for the building of 78 apartments as part of the neighborhood renovation.

- An 847-square-meter lot is being offered at a minimum price of 653 thousand shekels;
- For the second lot, 986 square meters, a minimum price of 787 thousand shekels has been set;
- The third and largest lot, 5.5 dunams, was offered for auction at a starting price of 3.2 million shekels plus 1.3 million shekels for development expenses.

The latest date to send in bids for the auction is the end of June.

[Box, p 8]

#### The Immigrants From the Confederation of Independent States

##### How Crowded Are Housing Conditions?

Year of Immigration	Have Bought Apartments	Number of People Per Apartment
1990	32%	3.7
1991	4.0	
1992	10%	4.3

**The Immigrants of 1992: 4.3 People per Apartment**

Since 1990, 475,000 immigrants have arrived in Israel; about 80 percent of them are from the former Soviet Union. A housing ministry survey reveals that 26 percent of them have already bought apartments. The longer the immigrants have been in the country, the greater the proportion who have bought apartments. Of those who arrived toward the end of 1989 and during 1990, 32 percent have already bought apartments of their own, while, so far, only ten percent of the 1992 immigrants have a roof of their own over their heads.

The 1990 immigrants have 3.7 people per apartment, or 1.3 people per room, while the 1992 immigrants have 4.3 people per apartment, or an average of 1.5 per room. For the sake of comparison: Among veteran Jewish residents, the average is just 1.05 people per room. [End box]

Holon, the bedroom suburb south of Tel Aviv, enjoys easy access to the neighboring metropolis, either by way of Levi Eshkol or by way of Tel Giborim and Tel Kabir. Completing the rest of Moshe Dayan Road and connecting it to the Tel Aviv-Ashdod Highway (Highway No. 4) will also considerably improve access to the city.

The population of Holon is concentrated in the western and northern parts of the city. Most of its 180,000

inhabitants are middle class or well-to-do. For the most part, the southern part of Holon is mainly undeveloped sand, and it is where most of the land available for future development is.

The regions most desirable right now from the viewpoint of the real estate market are the Agrovenik neighborhood and the "Rasco A" neighborhood, whose buildings are not so tall.

In the eastern and northern sections of the city lies the country's second-largest industrial zone, which provides a stable source of employment. The main industrial sectors are along Sokolov Street. There, in certain sections of Holon's main street, the price per square meter sometimes goes as high as \$10,000, indicating solid business activity and very limited availability.

Apartment prices in the city (see table) have been relatively stable for the last few years; changes have not been extreme, according to the experts of [?Gemolev-Nadlan], who, headed by deputy general director Yitzhak Heresh, did the survey of the city.

Holon's appearance will change when Kiryat Ayalon, which is expected to become the largest neighborhood in the city, is built. On this spot, following "the 300 Plan," 6,600 housing units will be built on an overall area of 1,340 dunams, and work has already begun on development of the infrastructure.

**Holon: Secondhand Apartment Guide**  
(approximate prices, in dollars)

Apartment Size	In the Center		In the Neighborhoods	
	Sale	Rent	Sale	Rent
2 rooms	90,000	450	75,000	400
3 rooms	130,000	500	110,000	450
4 rooms	180,000	600	140,000	550
5 rooms	210,000	700	170,000	—

The project has been going through labor pains for 15 years because, among other reasons, it has been necessary to find a solution to the status of 4,500 owners of lots, and then to reparcel the whole area.

The main construction in the new center—which will be divided into square sections and include a mix of high rises and lower structures—will be carried out by private entrepreneurs. After a maximum of 95 square meters was set as the area for cottage-apartments that will be erected there, the city council's subcommittee for planning and construction recommended enlarging the area of these apartments to 125 net square meters—that is, about 170 gross square meters.

**SHAS Kindergarten System, Growth Described**

93AA0123A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
11 Jun 93 pp 14-16, 72

[Article by Yosi Bar-Moha]

[Text] "Give me an eight-year-old boy and he is mine for life." (Jesuit proverb)

With dizzying speed and exemplary thoroughness, far from the usual places that draw press attention, the SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] movement is completing one of the greatest revolutions in education ever seen in Israel: the establishment of a haredi system of preschools and kindergartens that will attract both observant and secular children. The name of the system, based on the name of its parent foundation, is "The Source for Torah Education." It charges secular parents much lower fees than do ordinary public kindergartens, offers far longer hours, provides free transportation to and from home, and takes into account the problems of working mothers—over and above the benefits that WIZO [Women's International Zionist Organization] and Na'amat together can provide.

The signal to start was given just two years ago, but a HA'ARETZ investigation reveals that more than 30,000 children, one-third of them from totally secular homes, are already studying at SHAS schools. Six years ago, just 1,000 children, all in nursery schools, attended SHAS educational institutions. Fewer than 15,000 attended

three years ago. In certain neighborhoods of Ashdod, 'Akko, Nahariya, and Ashqelon, an increase of more than 25 percent is expected in the number enrolling with the start of the new school year. "The Source for Torah Education" system is maintained by state funds, which provides the SHAS movement with a stable economic foundation by virtue of the allocation it receives from the Ministry of Education for each new child entering the system.

In addition, the system indirectly expands SHAS' electoral base into areas that the movement considers prime long-term targets, the development towns and poorer neighborhoods. The children, it is true, are required to put on skull caps only when they enter school, but they are steadily fed a message that they have a responsibility to stop their parents from kindling lights on the sabbath and to have them vote for SHAS in every election. Incidents have occurred in which children told their parents that if they did not vote for SHAS, "we'll all go to hell." The teachers also sometimes meet with parents, often in a direct attempt to persuade them not to watch television on Saturday "in order not to wreck their child's education."

In some places, SHAS' educational system is taking children over kindergarten age, but its main success is in the nursery schools and kindergartens. Here is where the movement exploits the weak points of the state educational system (both religious and secular): steep school fees for facilities for children below school age and the woefully short hours that city day-care centers are open. Tiqva Gutman, director of the Na'amat facility in Ashqelon's Samson "C" quarter, says, "We can't compete with them. They go from house to house in the neighborhood, talking the parents into sending them their children, offering low rates and taking children for less than it costs them. They also drive children to and from school for free. The parents are won over."

Whatever SHAS day-care center you visit—in Ashdod, Ashqelon, Migdal Ha'emeq, 'Akko, Rekheshim, or Tel Aviv—the picture is the same. Haredi children play alongside children who clearly are not accustomed to wearing yarmulkes. The centers are housed in temporary structures or mobile homes, for which operating expenses are far lower than those of public or other private centers in the same community. Gabri'el Ribuah, director of SHAS' "Nahalat Me'ir" Foundation, says, "The secular centers kill parents with their fees. On the budget of a single Na'amat center, we can run five. Praise the Lord, next year we're doubling the number of children studying with us, and we'll continue growing in the years to come. No one can stop us."

Most secular parents with whom we spoke claimed that they intend to send their children to the state educational system as soon as they finish kindergarten and start first grade, but the figures we collected show that the great majority of children stay in SHAS schools even at age six and above. The main reason is that it is difficult to switch suddenly from a system that cares for children late into the afternoon to one that requires parents to

pick up children at noon. Second, parents related that the children simply refuse to leave the SHAS system. "The secular educational system is collapsing," says Ribuah. "Teachers there just give children knowledge, mathematics, and engineering. We provide values and transform the child."

Paradoxically, SHAS' new-found momentum is attributable to the NRP's [National Religious Party] leadership. Until 1991, SHAS' nursery schools and educational institutions were not recognized by the Ministry of Education and classified as "exempt." The state funded these institutions "per head," but compensated only 70 percent of the estimated costs of each student. These funds enabled SHAS' leaders to maintain an educational system for their own members but not to pull in students from outside. They lobbied for a supplementary budget—from allocation funds. Knesset member Ya'ir Levy, who served then on the finance committee, was one of those who led the fight. The money was funneled through the Ministry of Education, and SHAS demanded that Yitzhaq Shamir, who was then prime minister, approve creation of a haredi administration within the Ministry of Education through which the money would be conveyed to "The Source of Torah Education." The NRP and its chairman, Zevulun Hamer, who was then Minister of Education, bitterly opposed this demand.

A compromise was found. The haredi education administration would be scrapped but, in return, all of SHAS' educational institutions would be officially recognized and entitled to receive 100 percent compensation for every student. The result was that this new status afforded SHAS absolute independence, and its institutions flourished. Today, the state underwrites not only the educational institutions themselves but the system's administrative board, and the institutions are entitled to a range of support services provided by physicians, nurses, social workers and special education teachers. That was the starting point for the opening of dozens of nursery schools and religious academies in order to accumulate the maximum number of registered students. Because the cost of each student to SHAS was less in practice than the allocation it received from the Ministry of Education, the enrollment of thousands of secular students into SHAS institutions was a matter not only of ideology but of pure economic interests as well.

SHAS employs a variety of techniques for enrolling students. Helped by parents who are willing to convince other parents, SHAS workers go from house to house, registering students for the coming school year and distributing flyers. A flyer recently left in Tel Aviv's Tiqva quarter announced, "Dear parents: Good news. Our team of distinguished and devoted educators has gotten off to a good start registering children, ages two to fifth grade, for the coming school year. We offer classes until 1600, hot lunches, transportation to school and back in all parts of the city, a renovated facility, and spacious grounds with sun and games. For children of tender years, we have an afternoon program, including transportation.... Places are limited, first come, first

served. Remember: The future of your children is in your hands. N.B. The facility is recognized by the Ministry of Education."

Apart from the 30,000 children registered for classes in its institutions, SHAS cares for thousands of children who spend time in these institutions during the afternoon and evening hours when they are run as clubs. Neighborhood children have already gotten used to going to these institutions for educational and cultural activities, usually accompanied by enticements, like candy, of the traditional sort. A large portion of these children are Ethiopian immigrants, but the sight of Russian immigrants is by no means rare. Similar activities take place on Saturday, with the same goal. Rabbi Shmu'el Levy, director of SHAS's institute in the Tel-Kabir quarter of Tel Aviv, says, "Children from nearby neighborhoods come here for activities and classes every Sabbath. We give the children candy and popsicles to bring them in."

To the extent that the number of children in its institutions has grown, SHAS has been able to increase the number of its teaching positions and provide an income for its members. SHAS workers who taught school in the past, generally yeshiva students, received low salaries of 800 to 1,000 shekels per month. The opening of schools and religious academies is enlarging the scope of employment and, accordingly, of salaries. Paychecks for workers now are 1,800 to 2,400 shekels per month, with a bonus of approximately 1,000 shekels for teachers in the afternoon programs. The state now employs hundreds of SHAS workers as teachers, kindergarten teachers, teaching aides, administrators, and tutors. All of them receive their salaries from the Education Ministry's budget.

One of the unforeseen consequences of this trend is the enlistment of thousands of SHAS workers in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. The reason for this sudden burst of patriotic fervor is the transition to the Ministry of Education's employment rolls. Young Torah scholars usually received an exemption from military service because of their studies, and those of them who also held jobs—while studying at a yeshiva—did so without registering for fear that the tax bureau would report them to the military authorities. From the moment that every recognized haredi educational institution had to provide a full report, including the names of teachers and the scope of their duties, yeshiva students preferred military service to giving up handsome secondary incomes. We are speaking, of course, of abbreviated service of three to four months during which they go through basic training to level "B." Most of the yeshiva students are already fathers with children by the time they walk inside a draft office.

How much money does the state of Israel provide SHAS' kindergartens and educational institutions? It is impossible to arrive at an exact figure; the money flows in from a number of budgetary sources, from different government ministries, and through sudden and complex transfers of sums among the various budgetary designations.

Officially, SHAS' "The Source for Torah Education" is to receive 16.5 million shekels from the Ministry of Education during the current fiscal year. But the foundation will also receive funds for "independent educational activities" and will share with Habad and Agudat Yisra'el a budget of 55 million shekels. On top of that, the foundation is eligible for a slice of the independent education budget, which amounts to another 128 million shekels.

Yet another channel of funds from state coffers to the "The Source for Torah Education" is concealed between the budgetary lines applying to assistance to students. The size of the allocation indicates an extensive system of student aid for haredi preschools. In 1991, the budgetary allocation for "assistance to students in independent education" for SHAS and Agudat Yisra'el amounted to 114 million shekels, plus 4 million for assistance to teachers. For purposes of comparison, the allotment for assistance to students in the state system amounted to 176 million the same year.

In the Ministry of Religious Affairs, too, a large portion of the budget is reserved for SHAS institutions. The ministry provides the movement's various associations allocations of millions of shekels. The yeshivot that receive these funds are often associated with nursery schools and religious academies, and they usually are gathered under a single economic framework. The yeshiva students generally serve as "To the Source" club counsellors during the evening, and it is impossible to identify the budgetary designation from which they receive their salaries.

The Ministry of Education is preparing an increase in the allotments to SHAS educational institutions in light of the expected rise in student registrations for the coming school year and in the number of people employed. SHAS is now also requesting an allocation of 30 million shekels for development and construction of classrooms—a sum that does not include the share to be borne by local authorities from their own development budgets. In addition to all this, Finance Minister Avraham Shohat asked the Knesset's finance committee two months ago for 6.8 million shekels as a supplementary budget for "The Source for Torah Education" from the 1993 budgetary reserves.

The day-care centers run by Na'amat, WIZO, and others charge 330 to 700 shekels per month. At SHAS centers, the maximum is 350 shekels, and that includes transportation. These day-care centers do not make a fuss when a parent arrives at 1700 to pick up a child instead of at 1600; nor do they charge extra. The facility often goes so far as to bring the child to the parent's place of work or take him home when it would be inconvenient for the parent to pick him up.

City day-care centers do not always stay open in the afternoon. When there is an afternoon program, parents have to pay extra, as much as 350 shekels per month, for lunch, transportation, and the additional hours. SHAS facilities charge 80 to 120 shekels for the afternoon



program, which includes both transportation, if needed, and lunch. The afternoon program usually is located in the same building as the day-care center.

There is no afternoon program at all for grades one and two in the state system. SHAS offers afternoon programs for these grades, too, and runs them until 1600 and even 1700.

Both in flyers distributed by SHAS institutions and in conversations with its activists, we were reminded again and again that there are no strikes in these educational facilities. "We give education, pure and simple, and our big vacation is very short, just one month, from August to September," Ami Ayloz of 'Akko told us. There are classes on Independence Day in some of the institutions; the staff considers that an optional day. In Ashdod, hundreds of children in black yarmulkes were seen this past Independence Day playing in the "Nahalat Me'ir" school yard, and we were told that the facility had allowed its students to decide whether they wanted to go to school or have a day off.

#### Ashdod: Considerate of the Wealthy

When the "Nahalat Me'ir" Foundation was established six years ago in Ashdod, no one imagined that hundreds of the city's students would attend its facilities. At the most, they thought they might run one or two religious academies in the afternoon, serving dozens of students. What happened, however, surprised them. The site today is a magnet for hundreds of city students, religious and secular. If they thought only of afternoon religious academies, they now run day clubs, day-care centers, and classes.

The foundation was established following the death of Rabbi Me'ir Ribuah. His children and relatives decided to perpetuate his memory by establishing a foundation that would raise money for the purpose of opening religious academies and offering Torah lessons to adults. His son Gabri'el and Rabbi Yosef Elgarbeli, who lives in Bnei Braq, founded the association. Both are SHAS activists and won support and encouragement from the heads of the movement, which was itself founded three years earlier.

Approximately 700 students now study in "Nahalat Me'ir" schools in Ashdod and the foundation expects another 800 to register for the coming school year. One hundred twenty attend day facilities, 250 are in the nursery schools, and 250 study in classes. All this does not even include the 56 children who attend three nursery schools that opened this year in nearby Yavne. The staff at the Ashdod institutions now numbers 52, including teachers, kindergarten teachers, and aides. Their salaries are paid from "The Source for Torah Education," which provides "Nahalat Me'ir" tens of thousands of shekels each month for activities and regular expenses. Income from fees for day and afternoon programs goes to the foundation's account. "To the Source" also directs money to the foundation to support afternoon activities.

"Nahalat Me'ir" has also opened a day-care center and a nursery school in the swank 16th district, where most of the children are secular. Many of these children have gone to a haredi day-care center. "Look, we're considerate of parents. Even though they have high incomes, we charge them less if they agree to send their kids to our centers and nursery schools," says Gabri'el Ribuah.

Throughout Israel, most of SHAS' day-care centers and nursery schools are located in mobile homes and temporary structures; so it is with "Nahalat Me'ir's" facilities in Ashdod. The day-care center and the nursery school in the 16th district are in mobile homes surrounded by a fence. So are the school classes in the 5th district and the mobile home park near the 3d district. Like other cities and local authorities, Ashdod is not inclined to approve the construction of buildings for these institutions. Out of 300 class rooms approved for construction in Israel this year, the Ministry of Education has approved only 12 class rooms for use by institutions of "The Source for Torah Education." These restrictions do not stop SHAS activists from creating facts on the ground. "First we'll open the classes and nursery schools. After a while, they won't be able to ignore us. Both the government's offices and the local authorities will be forced to see that we get permanent buildings," says Avishai Yigali, administrative director of "Nahalat Me'ir's" facilities.

#### Tiqva Quarter: Blatant Neglect

The expansion and growth in SHAS institutions is visible all around the country, especially in development towns and depressed neighborhoods. In Tel Aviv's Tiqva quarter, a religious academy was established 10 years ago; it originally had just seven children. Now 300 children study there in 12 classes, from nursery school for two-year-olds to eighth grade. The "Tiqva Quarter Religious Academy" is also financed by "The Source for Torah Education."

A peek into the building, located in the quarter's 'Ezra neighborhood, reveals dilapidated physical conditions. I went through a rigorous process to enter and visit the school. A guard searched me at the gate. After I presented my press card, he went inside and locked the gate behind him to make sure that I did not enter, god forbid, before he had given me permission. Long minutes passed before a bearded yeshiva student wearing a large, black yarmulke came out. "I'm Rabbi Gid'on. What do you want?" he asked. When I explained that I wanted to look around the school, he invited me into the office, located in a run-down building and flanked by two mobile homes. The two mobile homes contained five classes and the building another seven. On our way in, we passed the dining room, obviously in a state of neglect. The children were eating lunch on splintering, filthy wooden tables lacking a table cloth, joined by a cloud of flies. "It just happens that we didn't put a cloth on the tables today," explained the yeshiva student, who now identified himself as "Gid'on Rabin, secretary of the educational institute."

Meanwhile, children in class were receiving religious instruction. I peeked inside and saw ceilings festooned with spider webs and walls that had not been plastered in years. The walls bore photographs of Rabbi 'Ovadia Yosef, SHAS' patron, and one of Rabbi Abba Sha'ul, a member of the Council of Sages and the institute's president. This religious academy also expects a rise in the number of students next year. They estimate that 100 children will join the 350 who have already registered. The staff now numbers 30 teachers, kindergarten teachers and tutors, with eight more to be added because of the larger student body. Gid'on Rabin, like other SHAS activists, believes that other schools will open around Tel Aviv in the coming years. "We give children values. Aside from that, they study everything here, including math and history."

SHAS' educational institutions are subject, as previously noted, to the Ministry of Education's supervision, and their instructional programs must meet the Ministry's guidelines. Most of the teachers are SHAS workers who have received a rabbinic degree from a yeshiva or a seminary where they studied. People who know the religious establishment's power relationships estimate that SHAS is now very influential in the country's official rabbinate thanks to the assistance that it bestowed on the chief rabbis, Yisra'el Lau and Eliyahu Baqshi-Doron, in getting selected. One of the results is a wave of rabbinic certificates given to SHAS activists around the country. These activists will also receive a technical rating and a commensurate salary. Teachers today are paid 2,000 to 2,500 shekels per month, not including payment for overtime and training in facilities of "The Source for Torah Education." A SHAS activist who until two years ago received a monthly salary of 800 shekels in total will boost his income to 3,000 shekels per month. It is thus no wonder that many SHAS workers have put their heart and soul into enrolling students in the movement's institutions.

The "Rashi" school, which is a school, day-care center and nursery all in one, operates in Tel Aviv's Tel-Kabir quarter. Part of it is housed in a building that once served as a state religious school. That school closed some years ago, after which the city transferred the building to the "Eli Ve'ezri" association. This association manages the Tel-Kabir facility and a girls' school attended by 250 children. Yet another school, which 56 students attend, opened this year in Holon. The Tel-Kabir school is directed by Rabbi Sha'ul Levy. He oversees a staff of 60, all of whom are paid by "The Source for Torah Education."

[Bar-Moha] Rabbi Levy, are you active in SHAS?

[Levy] I am an activist for Rabbi 'Ovadia Yosef. Whatever he tells us, we do. He told us to open schools, so we do. He told us to get busy enrolling students, so we're enrolling them. The Lord be praised, the "Eli Ve'ezri" schools have about 700 children and I believe that we'll have more than a thousand by next year.

[Bar-Moha] Aside from payroll funds, do you receive additional budgets from "The Source for Torah Education"?

[Levy] We get small sums but most of our activity is financed by fees paid by parents. "The Source for Torah Education" gives us the equipment and the class materials.

[Bar-Moha] Are there children from secular homes here?

[Levy] Certainly. We take any Jew; it makes no difference what home he comes from. That way, we believe, the people of Israel will return to their faith. Through children, we'll also bring the parents back to the Lord.

Half of the students at Tel-Kabir are the children of Bukharan immigrants and most of them stay there until 1800. An "evening seminary" also operates on the premises, serving some 100 adults, natives of Bukhara. There are also sabbath activities.

It is plain that drawing students into the bosom of haredi Judaism does pull in their parents, too. Dozens of students whom I met last Wednesday at the door to Tel-Kabir told me that their parents had become observant or at least begun to keep the sabbath after they—the children—had started their studies at the school. Some of the children even said that they had convinced their parents to vote for SHAS. "The teacher told us that the Lord would punish anyone who didn't vote for SHAS," one of the students disclosed. According to this student, he managed to convince his mother but "dad voted for Likud." A friend standing nearby said that "my parents swore to me that they voted for SHAS."

#### 'Akko: Undisguised Discrimination

SHAS has an active branch in 'Akko, where 1,400 people voted for it in the last Knesset elections. SHAS has also placed one of its members on the town council. The movement's most prominent figure in the city is Rabbi Shmu'el Sabah, a neighborhood clergyman. His son-in-law, 'Ami Ayloz, coordinates the activities of the "Birkat Yisra'el" educational institutions, named for the Baba Sali. These institutions teach 166 children in kindergarten and first grade; so far, 240 have registered for the coming school year. The facility also operates an afternoon program for children of working parents that provides lunch and transportation. Classes are taught in three very crowded mobile homes. Twenty-one children are packed into a first-grade classroom of 12 square meters.

"Fees for the afternoon program are no more than 150 shekels per child," says Ayloz, "and there are families whom I charge only 50 to 80 shekels. It's important to us that the children come here. We believe that a child's religious education has to begin at a young age." Ayloz, who also serves as regional coordinator for "The Source for Torah Education, which pays his salary, says that the 'Akko municipality paid for the purchase of one mobile home as an expansion. He has a staff of 20 at his service and estimates that it will grow to 30 next year. "Because of higher number of students, our staff and our expenses

will increase as well. Each of our employees receives 2,000 sheqels per month, while our teachers' aides get 1,000 as half-time workers."

The activists, instructors and teachers are not unduly disturbed by the primitive physical conditions in which they work. One of the teachers said, "We make facts on the ground and the problem will be solved with the Lord's help. The situation as it is just adds to the feeling of discrimination against the Sephardi public. The public sees how we're discriminated against, and votes for SHAS. So we'll get stronger in the Knesset and have the opportunity to demand that normal schools are established and opened."

#### Ashqelon: Enticing the Secular

Rahel Yanuv, Na'amat's secretary in Ashqelon, says that the expansion of SHAS institutions is hurting her. "The parents look only at the financial angle, not at the educational aspects. I see the drop in fees as unfair competition. They have substandard education and health conditions." Yanuv reports that many parents with whom she speaks have told her that they intend to switch their children to secular schools after they finish at the SHAS kindergartens. "They don't realize they're causing future problems for their children. Even secular families in good financial shape give priority to money over the welfare of their children."

Altogether, 600 children now attend SHAS day-care centers, kindergartens, and schools in Ashqelon. The system was established six years ago by Rabbi Yitzhaq Cohen, who is now and adviser to Minister [of the Interior] Arie Dera'i. Cohen founded an association called "The Source of Life and Peace," which began by opening first a kindergarten and then classes in a school. The kindergartens are located in shelters provided to SHAS by the municipality. For the classes, the city made available a building that once had been a state religious school. Close to the building, in the Samson quarter, some mobile homes, which serve as the association's offices, have been set up. Rabbi Cohen estimates that 400 children will enter the schools under his jurisdiction next year. A flyer distributed in the city states: "Don't compromise on education. Take the best—a unified religious academy, a school for boys with special religious studies at an advanced level along with secular instruction, a high-level school for girls under full spiritual supervision. A school day until 1700, lunch and a snack at 1600, an afternoon program, morning day-care, transportation from all points in the city with adult on board." The flyer takes pains to emphasize that the institutions are recognized and under supervision by the Ministry of Education and Culture, but it does not point out that the supervision is under the auspices of "The Source for Torah Education."

Rabbi Cohen complains about supervision of SHAS institution as it bears on development. "The state must immediately build 450 classes for facilities run by "The Source for Torah Education" throughout the country as

an emergency operation. You have to remember that each child is a diamond for us."

#### Migdal Ha'emeq: Grossman's Efforts

SHAS has installed two emissaries in Migdal Ha'emeq, where it received 1,000 votes in the 13th Knesset elections. Unlike other places with a similar demographic profile, SHAS has managed to open just one day-care center in this city and only a few dozen children study in its educational facility there. The reason for this meager showing is that the dominant religious factor in Migdal Ha'emeq is not SHAS but the city's rabbi, Yitzhaq Grossman. He established the "Migdal Or" educational institutions, in which some 800 boys and girls study, as well as nursery schools and day-care centers attended by 300 children.

At the SHAS day-care center, most of the children come from secular families. When I presented myself as a father seeking to register his son there, the kindergarten teacher told me, "This isn't the place for you. You wear a yarmulke. You'd be better off sending your son to the day-care center next to the rec hall. All the children there come from religious families."

Yafa Helem, Na'amat's secretary in Migdal Ha'emeq, says, "The nursery schools and day-care centers run by Rabbi Grossman, the city's Ashkenazi rabbi and the winner of the toleration prize awarded by 'The Council for a Beautiful Israel,' are a constant threat to day-care centers administered by Na'amat and other organizations. They charge low rates and, to my great regret, even secular parents with money in their pockets send their children to these facilities. Rabbi Grossman can allow himself this because he gets budget funds from the government on top of contributions he solicits from abroad, and he buys the parents with free meals and transportation. SHAS learned its techniques from him but still has trouble competing with him."

#### Jerusalem: Open Them First

Knesset member Dalya Itziq, who serves on the Jerusalem city council and holds the municipality's education portfolio, refuses to approve opening SHAS educational facilities and directing budget funds to SHAS. "It's my feeling that they play the game by entirely different rules. They're in the habit of complaining about discrimination but most of their activity is contrary to established standards; the very idea of criteria is a mystery to them. They have an odd practice. They open an educational institution first, in a temporary structure, and then raise the cry of discrimination. It's not just SHAS that does this; Aguda does it, too. But SHAS employs this tactic on a larger scale."

[Bar-Moha] Do these institutions seek budget funds from the city?

[Itziq] They sure do, but I demand lists of students. In most cases, they don't supply these lists. The average number of students in a class must be 27 but they open classes with just 10 or 15. They now get paid both from tuition fees from parents and the education system.

[Bar-Moha] Are SHAS' facilities expanding in Jerusalem, too?

[Itziq] Yes, the trend is clearly towards expansion because of the inducements they offer, such as free transportation and hot meals at nominal cost. For example, they recently opened a religious academy in the Talpiot section, which is secular, and I also know of secular parents in the Ir Ganim section who send their children to SHAS day-care centers. When I asked them why they were doing this, the answer they gave was that it's free. Some parents told me, "Listen, they're our kind. So what if the kids will be a bit Jewish?"

All this activity without a doubt advances SHAS' general political-electoral standing. You have to remember that SHAS still feels the pain of what Agudat-Yisra'el and the NRP did to them in their educational institutions. If Zevulun Hamer sinned, then Arie'el Dera'i is his punishment.

[Bar-Moha] Does the Jerusalem municipality provide funds to SHAS facilities?

[Itziq] I am fighting tooth and nail so that budgets for facilities won't be fixed on the basis of communal affiliation or that children will be accepted in them on the basis of their color. Just three weeks ago, Reuven Dangor, who represented SHAS on the city council, resigned claiming that he can't get budget funding for SHAS institutions. He wrote in his letter of resignation that he was stepping down in light of the failure to achieve the goals for which he had joined city council.

### Rami Dotan Gives Version of Bribery Affair

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[Article by N'omi Levitzki: "I Wanted To Prepare a Soft Landing for Myself and Business in the Future"]

[Text] In a small alley in the Qiryat in Tel Aviv, in the special military court, an extraordinary trial has been proceeding for more than a year now. A military trial behind closed doors, without an audience. In Building A, a nondescript shack, before three uniformed judges, is being told—for the first time in court—the complex case of corruption that has become known as the Rami Dotan affair.

Colonel Yitzhak Sa'ar, the former chief of the Quartermaster Department in the Air Force and one of Dotan's boys, is only a small afterthought in this story. A marginal affair in the gloomy picture that crystallizes of what happened for years in the Air Force high command. But it was precisely he who chose to fight it out in court and not to close a plea bargain with the prosecution.

Sa'ar is accused of accepting a bribe, conspiracy with Dotan for committing a crime, and improper behavior. Eight dry counts of indictment, worded in legal language, and, finally—a list of the witnesses. The first of them: Private Rami Dotan.

The truth is that the defense establishment did not want to hold this trial. It wanted even less that something from it would be exposed to the public. Not only that it is being held, finally, behind closed doors, under a sweeping order by the chief of the Manpower Branch—a strange move in itself—but even the defense attorney, Dani Sheinman, must conduct a legal struggle in order to receive the material of the Dotan affair investigation. He had to get a special order from the judges for that.

The Air Force called Rami Dotan "tata": that is, big daddy. After that he got the nickname "R and R", which means a Romanian squared. He who was once a brigadier general indeed arrived at the special military court as a private. But it became clear very quickly that he continues to act like a general. No sooner had he arrived, when he first cast a scornful glance towards the prosecution table and, afterward, towards the defense table. "What," the veteran defense man asked nonchalantly, "is everyone here necessary? Good, then perhaps certain things should not be discussed."

In the course of his testimony, which continued for several days, the same known Rami Dotan was revealed: one moment in a rage, one moment ingratiating, one moment mocking, one moment flattering. And, of course, he did not forget to breathe heavily, to suck in air, and to request, for reasons of health, of course, five minutes recess. A one-man show.

And this is how Pvt. Rami Dotan presented himself: "I was drafted in 1963 into the Academic Reserve. My professional training is in mechanical engineering and aeronautics. I completed my first degree at the Technion and the second in the United States of America. In 1968 I completed the Reserve and I began active duty."

"I arrived at Tel Nof, and I served there until 1977. My specialty was vehicles. Mechanical engineering in general, aerodynamics, and, afterward, jet engines, fighter airplanes, and their performance. Missile systems, development of new weapons."

From here Dotan went on to describe the line of jobs that he carried out. Beginning as chief of the technical department in the Kfir project, through chief of the Lavi engines, chief of the Propulsion Branch in the Equipment Wing, chief of the Aircraft Department, up to his unfortunate appointment to the position of chief of the Equipment Wing, the position in which he was finally exposed and arrested. Dotan testifies here for the first time about the thefts, the monies, his relations with those under his command, especially with Ya'akov Franq, who described himself at the trial as his right hand.

Dotan: "I was a lone wolf. I had no need of a right hand, and Franq was not my right hand. Perhaps it is convenient for him to present himself as one who has access to me, who gets my automobile when I want. When I traveled abroad, he watched over my automobile. He was not my right hand. He did not know much about my legal and criminal activity. I was not afraid of anyone, and particularly not of him. Today, as well."

The prosecutor in the trial, Col. (Res.) Shevet Levi, the man who made the plea bargain deal with Dotan, had to cope with difficult moments at this trial. In the framework of that deal, Dotan admitted at the time to violations about which he was now called to testify. His willingness to testify was, of course, part of the agreement.

The reference is to conspiring with Sa'ar, who was then his subordinate in the Air Force, and also with Jerry Korn, a businessman from the Logistika Company, which built storage facilities for the Air Force. Dotan stated in the framework of the plea bargain that he and Sa'ar had given projects to Korn, and in exchange, were supposed to work with him in the company after their discharge. Three million dollars was the size of the booty that was to be split between them, according to Dotan.

But when he stood finally on the witness stand, the prosecution received a very unpleasant surprise. Dotan now told a completely new story. Sa'ar, Dotan now asserted, was not present at the "3-million conversation." The prosecutor was dumbfounded and was compelled to request that Dotan, his main witness in the trial, be declared a hostile witness. The court agreed, Dotan was declared a hostile witness. And then he suddenly gave a third version, which contradicted the two previous ones.

When the prosecutor asked him to explain the first change in his testimony, Dotan sounded as follows: "I was arrested, and for five days I remained silent. The supposed accusations against me were published in December. Theft of monies in the Ministry of Defense and attempted murder. That is what was said to everyone, before I opened my mouth."

"With the signing of the agreement, I began to talk. There were negotiations concerning the bill of indictment, and at the same time the prosecution prepared additional details. There were places where we succeeded in convincing the prosecution and places where we did not. The choice was to agree to the facts or to go to trial. Krokmal (the chief of the investigation team of Military Police Investigations—N.L.) interrogated me on this subject. There was a general conversation, without minutes. After the conversation, the investigators wrote.

"I said that I do not know how he (Jerry Korn) intended to gain 3 million from a project of 6 to 10 million dollars. Krokmal asked if the calculation was padded. Then I said: how can it be padded...an argument began between us. Even if you want to take 10 million from a project and to make a roundabout deal through American contractors, then nothing will be left over...."

"When Krokmal pressed me on the swollen profits, then I said, 'Perhaps.' At that stage, I was after cardiac catheterization, and it was very easy to get anything out of me. I argued, and I said that it was not logical. I could have insisted, and gone to trial, but I got legal advice to give in. Krokmal did not want to write down what I had said."

And here, with a dramatic movement of his head, Dotan turned to the chief judge, Col. Nili Peled, and said as follows, without becoming confused: "There is a moral matter here of a norm. In the condition that I was in then, and what I saw around me, officers who are discharged and work in the projects that they initiated—for example, Israel Aircraft Industries—normatively, it did not seem to me to be a violation. Even the money did not seem to me anything special."

"There was a very hard struggle between me and the investigators. I was interrogated in the hospital. I tried to record the testimony, and Krokmal told me that it was forbidden.... Today, as I am speaking, I am strong. It is already two years later. In the period that I was hospitalized, I was in shock, and I had a limited ability to comprehend the process of interrogations...."

"Korn did not need me. The work was sure to go to him, because there is nothing else. He paid me off so that I would help him expedite a project in the Air Force. Foreign firms draw out the best people from the force. Air Force people went to work in Israel Aircraft Industries and for Eisenberg...." "So it did not seem to me to be a deviation. Because everyone around me prepared for himself a job after retirement. My former commander, Avner Raz, is today in the Aircraft Inspection Division. Six months before he went to Aircraft Inspection, he already knew about it, and three months before that he was selected by the board of directors there. And suddenly I received announcements about entire projects that were transferred."

Dotan's war of attrition with the prosecutor continued for hours. Prosecutor Levi asked, "Why did you confess?", Dotan did not relent, and said that he had been pressured, that the interrogators did not record correctly.

Finally, with a dramatic gesture of forced submission and cynically, he recanted and said that everything that is written in his confession at the police is correct ("What, for that I would cancel a plea bargain?")—and immediately requested five minutes recess "in order to calm down."

After he calmed down, he returned to the witness stand. "It should not be forgotten what state I was in," he said, "from the viewpoint of health and the pressures on me. They exploited all of that. I signed because I did not have a choice. I arrived twice at intensive care. It was not necessary to beat me, because I arrived at intensive care from two interrogations. They called the doctor, and transported me, and I underwent cardiac catheterization."

"If I had been solid enough, maybe they would also have beaten me. I signed the deal, because I did not have a choice. I signed the testimonies under severe threats. The real plea bargain was that they would not harm my wife. That is the deal that I made with the complex that is called the State of Israel. So that they would not arrest her, so that they would stop harming her."

"That is the strongest and the main threat. I do not speak about other things: that I could not stand trial, and that I did not have money for such a trial. Because of the threats, I arrived at intensive care, and because of that I signed the deal, and the prosecutor knows that well."

All of this was only the appetizer. The full details came in the cross examination of the defense. Sheinman almost did not have to ask questions, only to let Dotan speak. Dotan did that generously, and, for a moment, one had the impression that he was the person who was leading the proceedings.

In the beginning, he tried to please the prosecutor. Afterwards, in the cross examination, he also tried to please the defense attorney. He flattered Sheinman, was ingratiating, like one who says, It is not worth it, for you, learned sir, to attack me, I am on your side. Be nice to me, and in exchange I will also be nice to your client.

But Sheinman did not fall into Dotan's trap. He chose to broaden the sweep of the trial. And thus, in the cross examination, the big story was opened up.

Dotan: "I was an authoritative commander. That does not mean that there was no criticism or argument. Rather, it stemmed from the professional side, and there, there is no funny business. Either it flies or it does not. I was not outspoken. I did not lick up to people."

"When they said something correct, I gave backing. I knew that people were hurt by me, I heard this story that they were afraid of me. So maybe it was convenient for certain persons to explain it that way, but no one was afraid."

Sheinman: "For a year and a half there were committees of inquiry. Senior officers...were prepared to hide material, to lie, to interfere with processes."

Dotan: "They were prepared to cooperate on the subject of the effort against the testimony of 'Ofer Pa'il (Pa'il, a former employee of the Defense Ministry delegation in New York, sent the letter of complaint against Dotan, following which the first committee of inquiry in the affair, the Tzelnir Committee, was appointed—N.L.). On the subject of hiding testimony, those were not documents connected with me or those in which there was nothing incriminating."

"There was exaggeration in that they hid [them].... In the atmosphere at the time, if someone would have read them, they would have made a story out of it, they would have said: an officer in the Air Force concludes [an agreement] with a contractor without the Ministry of Defense being involved. So I told them to hide [them], so that they would not get into trouble. But they did not have to lie regarding the committees of inquiry. They were acquainted with ('Ofer) Pa'il. I asked them to protect themselves."

Among the material that Dotan hid with his officers—that was called, by the way, "the treasure," after it was discovered—was also found Dotan's will. Monies, bank

accounts, dummy companies, and deals with contractors of the Force were specified there. Yoram Ingbir, for example.

Dotan: "What I wrote in the will are not things that actually are coming to me. My plans regarding those persons were in the future. I intended to work for Ingbir, and those are monies that I would earn. That (in the will) is the style that I used regarding monies that I did not have...."

"I wanted to give the impression that I had these things, in order to obtain a certain effect in my family. My first wife knew about the will, which was drawn up after my divorce in October 1988. It is not a real will. It gave things that do not exist, in part. It was intended to create a certain impression that I have property and that my children are not neglected."

Harold Katz, the attorney who managed Dotan's financial affairs abroad, and Sergeant Major Ya'akov Franq were the executors of that will.

Attorney Sheinman pointed out to Dotan the fact that his greatest secrets were entrusted to Franq. "Franq," said Sheinman, "has here a role with responsibility and discretion of the highest order." And Dotan was surprised: "I do not think that I thought the matter through. The children did not know Katz. The serious secrets of which Franq could have become aware were my mother's money and the apartment. What could Franq have found out?"

Sheinman: "The account in Belgium and in the Swiss bank, the monies from the test flights..." [sentence as published]

Dotan: "All of the persons with whom I was involved in the deals, and whose names the children knew, I listed. In the framework of my plea bargain, I did not return monies. Katz took the money that was in Switzerland, which was intended for a different purpose, and returned it. Brought it to Israel. The accounts were in the name of a company by the name of 'Kingstreet'. I had the number-two position regarding money, and Shteindler (of "General Electric," who cooperated with Dotan) was number one. Katz made withdrawals and deposits in the accounts without my signature."

"The monies that were there (in the account) were given by 'General Electric' to a company by the name of 'G.S.P.'. The work that this company was supposed to do for the money (flight tests) was delayed. There was a problem of how to safeguard the money, and 'General Electric' preferred to transfer it."

"It was impossible to carry out the flight tests because there was no engine. To keep the money from losing its value, said Steindler, if it is possible to invest it, why should we not profit from that, and when the engine arrives—continue with the work."

"It is necessary to put the money in the bank, and you get 15 percent interest on \$8 million, and in four to five years you double the amount. In Switzerland it is interest

of 15 percent, and also in England. The company that owned the account was 'Kingstreet', it is my Panamanian company. Shteinberg could sign and withdraw monies. Vis a vis the Swiss attorney, Katz handled it."

"In my first interrogation, I admitted that the flight-test plan was fictitious, but it was not that way. I admitted that, because that was my agreement with the prosecution. When I began to explain to Krokmal, he said that he did not understand, so I asked what he proposed, and he said: Let us say that the plan is fictitious."

[Box, p 14]

### The Struggle Over Making the File Public

For four months, YEDI'OT AHARONOT waged a struggle against the defense establishment in order to allow the publication of this article. Some time in January, I was informed that the trial of Col. Yitzhak Sa'ar was being conducted behind closed doors, and that the main witness for the prosecution was Rami Dotan. It was the first time that the public could hear his version.

A quick check showed that the trial was closed by a sweeping order of the chief of the Manpower Branch. The newspaper's lawyer, Attorney Mibi Mozar, sent an urgent letter to Maj. Gen. Yoram Ya'ir. "Suddenly, in a manner that is inexplicable in a democratic regime, the trial of Sa'ar disappeared from public knowledge," wrote Mozar and demanded that the proceedings be opened.

It was the beginning of four months of frustrating discussions that we carried on with various factors in the defense establishment. When it became clear to the judge advocate general's office that the newspaper was ready to go to the High Court of Justice on the matter, they recommended that the proceedings be opened.

The chief of the Manpower Branch opened, the defense establishment closed. The judge advocate general, Ilan Shiff, gave an opinion to open, the Ministry of Defense whipped out an opposing opinion: not to open. Nice, they said in the Ministry of Defense, now we have a legal dispute, and we do not have to open up.

But Shiff did not give in. He brought the matter before the legal adviser to the government, Yosef Harish, for a decision. And Harish indeed decided: to open. But they kept this decision secret from the newspaper. Meanwhile, a few more weeks passed, and finally, this week, permission was granted.

Now only the bureaucracy remained, and that also was not a simple matter. Is there a permit from the judge advocate general? Yes. Is there an order from the chief of the Manpower Branch? Yes. Was there a security check? There was. It seems that in addition to all that, a permit from the special court also must be received.

And the court, what to do, will go on vacation to Eylat on Wednesday. Only with the gracious assistance of Maj. Gen. Ben-Tziyon Farhi, the president of the court, and the readiness of Nili Peled to sign the request on the eve of the trip, at her home, was the tangle solved. [end of box]

"The most important thing to me is my wife. They explained to me that she knew that I had monies abroad and that she is signed for the purchase of the apartment and on one account abroad, and that they would arrest her for 48 (days) and would easily get an order for 15 days and another 15 days. Krokmal told me that after 32 days in detention, I do not have a home and I do not have a wife."

Here, Dotan directed his words to the judges. The chief judge, Col. Peled, is the judge who approved the plea bargain with Dotan. Now he was retreating from it step by step. "We are now discussing," he explained to the judges, "the price that I was willing to pay so that my wife would continue to live as she lives, to work in her profession. After two days in detention, she would be finished."

"In order to build credibility, they told me: What, you do not believe that we will arrest her? Then come and see. And one day they told me that she will be thrown out of work, and, indeed, a few days later she was suspended. My wife had signed an account with the name of 'C.I.R.' and on the apartment purchase transaction. There were a hundred and some thousand there. I cannot prove that she was not involved...."

"Krokmal said to me: Even if you win in the trial—if I am acquitted or if I sit maybe two or three years, still I will not have a place to which to return. A few days before the plea bargain, Dani Friedman arrived (Dotan's attorney for the plea bargain—N.L.). I told him about the matter of my wife. He also transmitted a threat to me from someone in the judicial system."

"Someone told him that in order to persuade me to talk, my wife had to be arrested and I would break and confess. So I said that if that is the way it is, I am already broken and I confess whatever they want. Friedman tried to persuade me several times not to do the deal. If they had told me that I murdered Arlozorov, I would have confessed to that, too."

Here, one of the judges noted to Dotan that he had stood at the head of a system, that everyone saw what he was doing, that he gave an example to those around him, that he radiated corruption downwards.

"It is not only that I am Raltzad (Chief of the Equipment Wing)," Dotan replied, "there are also Raltzads who radiate precisely the same thing. Because they are discharged from the Air Force and change jobs, and I see how they sew up things before the discharge...."

"I see housing assistance to a certain brigadier general.... When he is a brigadier general, he receives assistance from a private person with whom he is involved in business, in order to buy an apartment. I saw others and I acted the same way. Afterwards, my subordinates saw me and they acted that way. That was the atmosphere. I did not see anyone among us who went around with clean hands. Not one."

Finally, there remained the 'Ofer Pa'il affair. That "minor matter," in which Dotan paid \$50,000, through

Ya'aqov Franq, so that someone would make 'Ofer Pa'il "disappear," as was stated in the testimony. Dotan denied this. What he did, he did for the sake of the security of Israel, he says, without blushing. Not for himself.

Dotan: "Franq was abroad on an assignment, and he said that he would look into the matter. Franq said that he thought that there was a way to take from him (Pa'il) the documents and to act so that he would not talk. I told him that is very good, that he should look into what could be done. He returned and said that there is an Orthodox man, who could arrange that they could both take the documents from him and also tail 'Ofer, to see if he is speaking with government officials. They would harass him, and also beat him if necessary, and that would cost \$50,000.

"I told him that is completely all right, I brought him \$50,000 and said: Go on your way. He went on official business, returned, and said: 'I made contact, the contact has been made, just know that they will take the documents and in addition will beat him, will kidnap him, and will drug him.'"

"I said: 'Wait a minute, who spoke about all these things? This is leading to a conflict, to risk of life.' Franq said to me that in such operations it is impossible to be exact. I said that I do not like that and that I demand to stop it. Two weeks later, he told me that they saw 'Ofer in an automobile with the police, F.B.I. I said that they have to stop. That if it is the money, I give it up and add another 50,000 in order to stop it. Two days later, Franq told me that it was stopped. I did not add \$50,000."

The real story, of course, is a little different. The police heard a telephone conversation between Franq and that religious fellow, a Habbad Hassid, who was given the assignment of "disappearing" Pa'il. Now Dotan can say in court in comfort: "That is the end of the affair and nothing happened to 'Ofer."

Throughout the discussion about Pa'il at the trial, Dotan insisted on asserting that he did what he did to protect the security of the State of Israel. Not, heaven forbid, for himself, not, heaven forbid, in order to keep Pa'il from testifying against him. He did what he did, according to him, only because Pa'il had documents that would endanger Israel's relations with the United States. Only because of that, he volunteered to stop him, to help the State.

Dotan: "To the question of why I took \$50,000 of my own money in order to solve problems of the State of Israel, I answer, that as I did not differentiate between my private side and work in one direction, I also did not differentiate on the other side. I grew accustomed to thinking that the system and I were one and the same, and I spent a lot of my own money throughout my service. I did not regard my expenditure for something military as a deviant act. It did not matter that the \$50,000 was so much money."

"The entire affair of 'Ofer Pa'il was not for my personal interests, but concern for the State of Israel. 'Ofer thought that I was corrupt, but he did not know anything about my deals...."

"What happened was that Willy Rostoker (the courier that Harold Katz used to transfer Dotan's money from bank to bank)—whom Katz did not pay—talked and the matter opened up. Were it not for that, everything would have ended. I went through two Tzelnir committees and part of the way with 'Eynan. And one day he said to me: listen, until today I believed you, but new information has arrived. The new information was from Willy Rostoker, who worked together with Katz on transferring the funds. That is proof that 'Ofer did not endanger me."

Thus, Dotan justified putting out a "contract," straight out of the Costra Nostra school. Afterward he told the court how he "burned up inside." The defense attorney was already no longer able to pass over that in silence. "Wait a minute," he said to Dotan, "I want to understand what this 'burned up inside' means."

Dotan: "I meant that I was burned up inside because they caught me. From the moment that I was caught, every second that I pay, I am burned up. Before that, certainly not. What I did seemed normal to me. I am sorry about how I injured myself and the name of the Air Force and of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. "My spiritual torment began after I was caught and I paid a price. If there were no Willy Rostoker, then I would be today a private person, and I would be rich and everything would be all right. That is how I saw the matter. I did not then want to harm the Air Force or the State. The principle that guided me was that what had to be done for the Air Force, one does in the best way, and if it is possible out of that to arrange for a soft landing and business in the future, you also do that."

"I did the things, because in my opinion, at some point I went loco. Too many tensions built up in me on the family level. I had megalomania. A feeling of power, and I thought about how to translate the power in the army into money outside."

The plea bargain with Dotan—13 years imprisonment—was built, according to him, in stages. First they talked about seven years, then 10, and after the plan to kill Pa'il was uncovered, after Franq's testimony in the police, they added another three years.

It is hard to believe, but at the end of the trial, Dotan felt an urgent need to sum up the deliberations, to make a speech to the nation. "I arrived at this trial," he said festively, "and it is not easy for anyone. I apologize for the nature of the things that we had to discuss."

"It is inside and it is very weighty.... I did not come for the sake of Itzik (Sa'ar) and I did not want to have a confrontation with the prosecution. I came in an attempt to explain. I thank the court for its patience and the opportunity that was afforded me to explain things, without contradictions and in the best manner."

If it were not so sad, one could laugh.



### Cancer Cases Said Due to Dimona Radiation

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[Article by Shlomo Abramovich; first paragraph is YEDI'OT AHARONOT introduction]

[Text] Is it true that waste water polluted by radioactivity is flowing from the nuclear research center [NRC] in Dimona into the Makhtesh Katan [Little Crater], a popular hiking site? The atomic energy commission [AEC] and the ministry of environmental affairs both deny it, but "Seven Days" sent an investigative team to the region and discovered radiation higher than international norms allow, radiation that is likely to endanger people who stay in the area for any extended time. Shlomo Abramovich writes on the web of silence and silencing, and on the NRC workers who claim that they contracted cancer on the job because of lack of proper safety precautions. Radiation!

After three and a half hours of walking, we see a startling strip of green on the arid landscape. A twisting wadi, covered by rustling cane and rich foliage. But the pastoral landscape cannot lighten the heavy feeling: The dial of the Geiger counter climbs steadily until it shows a level of gamma radiation 15 or more times higher than it had measured two hours earlier in Jerusalem. At one point, it also measures gamma rays at a rate of 120 milliroentgen per hour—24 times the average radiation in most parts of the state, and above the permissible level of exposure for human beings who do not work at a nuclear installation.

To the west shines the rounded dome of the nuclear reactor outside Dimona. To the east winds one of the most stunning landscapes in the state of Israel—the Makhtesh Katan, with its wide variety of scenes and hues. From the Makhtesh, the threatening strip of vegetation—with the round blue pool at its center—climbs westward.

The "Seven Days" team has succeeded in reaching the place that has been occupying the minds of the Israeli public for a month now, since they first heard of the stream of waste water from the NRC. The stream has succeeded in worrying many residents of the south, and it has brought groundwater experts and environmentalists scrambling to the area.

"Seven Days" took its measurements at a point where no outside entity, unconnected to the NRC, has ever measured before. Even the ministry of environmental affairs has not taken measurements in this location but has made do with points farther away within the Makhtesh, despite the fact that hikers regularly come to this spot. The "Seven Days" test was done as part of an attempt to clear away the fog surrounding the incident of the stream of waste water from the NRC. Its main message: the truth, revealed by an autonomous factor and presented without interfering with state secrets. Still, people who

considered helping the investigation received guarded threats from various sources and decided not to cooperate with the newspaper.

The ministry of environmental affairs, headed by Yosi Sarid, has adopted the approach of "openness, revealing the whole truth," according to its own definition of this. But when it is a case of anything to do with the reactor in Dimona, these declarations are forgotten. For example, people at the ministry are unwilling to reveal in which part of the Makhtesh Katan the "calming" tests, which allegedly revealed "levels of radiation which are not worrisome," were made. The ministry people avoid answering the elementary question of whether the tests were made in that particular wadi into which the waste water from the NRC was flowing, and they refuse to reveal what the levels of radiation were, in the 14 spots where the measurements were made.

The flow of waste water was just one example of the way the NRC pulls out the excuse of a threat to state interests in order to avoid facing safety problems inside the institution and ecological problems outside of it. Under the "umbrella" of secrecy, it is permissible to hide information, use military authority to cover up environmental pollution, threaten anyone who dares to protest, and ostracize anyone who tries to stand up for their rights.

Even more serious—the national security excuse is recruited cynically, even when it is a case of damaging workers' health. The NRC workers who contracted cancer have received no answers to their claims. The rules of secrecy that they have all signed forbid them to turn over any detail from their workplace, and the punishment they can expect if they do so is 15 years in prison. Accordingly, even those around them, including their wives, run into a thunderous silence when they try to ask anything about their working surroundings. Most of them slammed down the phone or slammed the door shut after the first question I asked about the disease.

The widows of workers who have died of cancer have run into a wall of silence and silencing, too. Those relatives of deceased workers who dared to sue the atomic energy commission are ostracized, and their claims, even if they are fair, place them into the category of traitors.

Except that the workers know that the safety level is not what it should be. They have petitioned the high court of justice in an attempt to improve the place's safety levels, and they have demanded to be put under the same kind of objective external inspection that is applied in other workplaces where there is dangerous radiation. Also, a number of widows of NRC workers have presented claims in court that reveal a little bit about the defects in the work procedures there.

And over everything hang the warnings of American experts who say that the reactor in Dimona is outdated. In the Western world they know that reactors that age are prone to accidents. There are experts who believe that the time has come to close down the reactor in Dimona.

The first reports of waste water flowing into the Makhtesh Katan first began to "leak out" more than two years ago. Menahem Ivri, an official from the nature reserves authority in the south, discovered unexplained streams of water in rock crevices in the western part of the Makhtesh, and atypically thick plant growth in one of the wadis.

When inspectors from the authority tried to speak to someone from the NRC, they were turned away again and again, and they never did receive sufficient answers. Among other things, they received no answer to the question of how long the waste from the NRC had been flowing into the Makhtesh. The director of the nature reserves authority, Dan Peri, says that he was shocked when he learned that they had also been unable to get the precise results of the tests in the area of the Makhtesh from the ministry of environmental affairs. Unequivocal demands by the authority's inspectors to halt the stream of water into the wadi went unanswered. But the inspectors of the nature reserves authority, like many others in Israel, are slaves of the concept that it is forbidden to talk about anything that concerns the nuclear reactor. They told nobody about what they had discovered. General Director Peri says that after his people began to show an interest in the stream of water coming from the direction of the reactor, they were ordered not to enter those areas on the rim of the Makhtesh Katan, which has been a favorite tourist site for years.

During the visit of the "Seven Days" team, it turned out that a fence had been put up around the problematic stream. Officials from the NRC claimed this week that civilians are forbidden to enter the place, and that the fact that we were in there is a very serious violation. This, despite the fact that nowhere on the rim of the Makhtesh is there any fence or sign announcing that the place is closed to tourists. The NRC has preferred not to respond to questions on this subject.

Something that may suggest the quality of the water from the reactor in Dimona can be seen in the book by Dr. Frank Branby, a British nuclear physicist who was a member of the team that investigated the reliability of the information received from Mordehai Vanunu, the NRC worker who sold Israel's atomic secrets. Dr. Branby writes that the reactor was originally built with a capacity of 26 megawatts, cooled by carbon dioxide. Later on, apparently in the late 1970s, Israel enlarged the reactor and changed the cooling method from gas to heavy water.

If Dr. Branby's assessments are accurate, the water comes into direct contact with uranium bars at the core; that is, the core constantly creates water contaminated by radioactivity. Nobody knows what is done with this water. No external, autonomous body—including the ministry of environmental affairs—is given the chance to inspect the way the nuclear research center disposes of the water.

Last July, TV correspondent Shlomi Eldar was notified about the stream of water coming from the reactor in the

direction of the Makhtesh Katan. He reported it to Elimelekh Ram and began to check out the details. "The next day," Eldar later told colleagues, "a dance of the ministers' began that would be hard to describe. In between telephone warnings, an invitation' also arrived, asking me to come have a talk with Environment Minister Ora Namir. I discussed this with Elimelekh Ram. I told him, I do not work for her. Why did I have to go? But Ram told me I had better go."

At the meeting, Eldar was told that the affair had developed to unexpected dimensions. It turned out that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had ordered Namir in no uncertain terms to take him off the story.

Eldar: "I tried to argue. I asked the minister whether anyone was thinking of examining the groundwater in the vicinity of the Makhtesh and in the aquifer of the plain, but she was not too expert on the subject; she just warned me not to get involved in the case. In answer to the question of why waste water from the NRC was flowing into the Makhtesh, the minister gave the answer she had received from the NRC, by way of Rabin's office: A problem has developed with mosquitos, and it has been necessary to let out quantities of water." Toward the end of the talk, he says, the minister said to him: "I hope you do not want to be the second Vanunu."

After the talk with Namir was over, Eldar returned to the TV station's editorial office, where he says he was startled to find people in his room, rifling through the news editor's papers. Eldar was not allowed to print the story that Menahem Ivri, inspector for the nature reserves authority, and Arik Bar-Sadeh, the southern regional director of the ministry of environmental affairs, had gotten hold of a Geiger counter on their own and tried to examine the levels of radiation inside, and near the rim, of the Makhtesh.

Following their tests, other ministry of environmental affairs people arrived, among them Ehud Ne'eman, the person responsible for radiation levels. They carried out radiation tests and wanted to take samplings of soil and plant life out with them. All during the testing, the environment ministry people were watched by the NRC security guards. At the end, the center's security officer demanded the samplings. The environment ministry people refused, but it was made clear to them that they would not leave the area unless they yielded to his demand.

Shlomi Eldar, who wanted to carry out his own sampling, asked the nature reserves authority to help him reach the place where the measurements had been taken. They told him they would help, and even promised to lend the TV station one of the authority's jeeps. He turned next to the physics department at B'er Sheva University, to borrow a Geiger counter. His request was leaked to the security men at the NRC, and the next day Eldar was called in for the meeting with Minister Namir. The same day, the minister also called the director of the nature reserves authority to her office, and warned him not to help Eldar.

The day after the meeting, on August 2, the general of the southern command renewed the "general order" forbidding entrance to the entire Makhtesh Katan. This general order concerning the Makhtesh Katan has existed formally for 25 years. In reality, however, hikers have been allowed to move around on certain specified paths, the most important being the Wadi 'Ali and Ma'ale 'Ali, which leads up to the marvelous lookout point on the rim of the Makhtesh. The rest of the wadis of the Makhtesh do not lead to any point that allows access to the NRC or overlooks it, but still, movement in them is forbidden.

What is the real reason? Why has the general in command forbidden hiking in most of the wadis in the Makhtesh? Is the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] closing order meant to protect hikers from the wadi, because radioactive waste has been flowing through it? An IDF spokesman would give us only a formal answer: "The area was closed by order of the military commander to ensure public safety, defend the state, and ensure public order."

Toward the end of March of this year, the new environment minister, Yosi Sarid, visited the nuclear reactor in Dimona. After the visit, Sarid achieved something worthy of mention: The NRC people agreed to let the ministry's people—an outside entity—carry out radiation tests in the Makhtesh Katan region. On April 19, the ministry's radiation unit arrived at the Makhtesh, carried out tests of the level of gamma-radiation, and took samplings of soil and plant life.

The calming announcements from the ministry of environmental affairs raise the question of whether the officials there represent the interests of the citizenry and the environment—or those of the NRC.

The ministry officials vehemently refuse to report the levels of radiation they have discovered, saying only, "They are not meaningful." Another suggestion of "the autonomy" of the workers in the ministry of environmental affairs who deal with radiation can be seen from the following fact: Someone in the ministry was informed two weeks ago that we were looking for an expert to measure the radiation levels in the Makhtesh, and he hurried to report this to the NRC security forces. As a result, pressure was put on those who were considering cooperating with "Seven Days." In some of the talks, the veiled threat was brought up again: "We hope you do not want to be the second Vanunu"—a threat which has turned out to be very effective, and has kept away most of those who might have cooperated with us. Even in the society for the protection of nature they ran as though from a fire at the idea of doing independent measuring in the Makhtesh Katan.

After the call to the ministry of environmental affairs, Minister Sarid ordered the ministry's deputy general manager, Dr. Shmu'el Brenner, to have "a candid meeting" with me, "to tell all." Dr. Brenner showed up at the meeting with a printed answer sheet, attached to the written text. The ministry's printed answer sheet says,

among other things: "The levels of radiation in the points where we checked are tiny, and could not harm hikers. The amount of radiation we found is such that if a hiker stayed in the Makhtesh for 100 hours, he would be exposed to the level of radiation that travelers are exposed to during two trans-Atlantic flights."

But Dr. Brenner became confused when we asked: "If the levels are so low, and so far from the minimum threshold for danger—why did you not just tell us exactly what they are?" Dr. Brenner stuck to the version he had come prepared with, according to which "employees of the NRC check within the boundaries of the reactor, and environment ministry employees check outside the fence." In addition to this, it was hard for him to define what is considered "outside the fence," taking into account the fact that the NRC periodically changes the territory defined as off-bounds to hikers.

In the test "Seven Days" made inside the Makhtesh, in a wadi about a kilometer away from the place where the waste water from the NRC flowed, gamma-radiation of 25 micro-roentgen per hour was found—five times the average background radiation in Israel. On the rim of the Makhtesh, we measured radiation levels of 30 micro-roentgen, and—near the wadi where the waste water flows—radiation levels of 100 micro-roentgen or more. In the wadis farther away, the level of radiation was similar to that of Jerusalem.

The levels of radiation that the "Seven Days" test found are considered high, and do not gel with Dr. Brenner's soothing words. If the tests we carried out are accurate, this level of radiation is a threat to the health of anyone who stays in the area for an extended time.

During our tour of the Makhtesh Katan, we discovered that in the eastern part of it, near the end of the wadi leading to the area where the reactor is, there is a large well of water operated by the "Mekorot" company. In this location, we measured levels of 20 to 25 micro-roentgen per hour. The ministry of environmental affairs refuses to answer the question of whether their tests included also the area around the well or the well's water. Similarly, it is not clear whether depth specimens were taken from ground which the water has penetrated, and whether there is fear that the radiation-polluted water has reached the well of water at the entrance to the Makhtesh, or whether it has reached other wells.

It should be added that, besides the penetration of the polluted waste water, there is a concrete danger that the NRC's radioactive waste treatment site—Building Four, according to Vanunu and Dr. Branby—will also pollute both the immediate vicinity and the groundwater in the rest of the Negev region.

In the past, bits and pieces of information have been published about two doctoral dissertations, one in botany and one in zoology, which reported the discovery of abnormalities in certain plants and animals in the vicinity of the reactor. Animals. The contents of the doctorates was not published, and the NRC claimed that

the entire region is affected only by radioactivity which originates from minerals in the vicinity.

Prof. Lev Fishelson of Tel Aviv university, a specialist in ecology, says: "I am amazed again and again at the behavior of the NRC officials. Their policy just heightens fears about the reactor and what goes on inside. It is all right for them to keep secret what happens inside the research center, but the territory outside the center has not been expropriated from the state of Israel.

"As an expert in ecology, my opinion is that none of the substances liable to be emitted from the NRC should be allowed to reach groundwater, but I certainly do not know whether that has happened or not, because they have never allowed anyone to carry out such a test."

Dr. Eshel Ben-Ya'akov, of Tel Aviv University's physics department, says: "In the state of Israel, people think automatically that the entire nuclear realm is outside the public's right to know. Revealing the methods the NRC uses to dispose of waste cannot harm the interests of the state, but there is a tendency to insult the public's intelligence and start from the assumption that they will not understand no matter what they are told.

"Israel is characterized by an anachronistic tendency to pull a curtain over everything connected with the atom and radioactivity. The height of this absurdity came when the entire world published the radiation levels measured in the rainwater after Chernobyl, while only in Israel was it kept a state secret."

In the atomic energy commission, they are having trouble understanding what the fuss is all about. The commission's response included: "The waste in question is strictly sanitary waste. It is treated through oxygenation and evaporation pools, without allowing it to flow into the Makhtesh. Atomic energy commission experts regularly monitor all parts of the Makhtesh. The results in our hands, as well as those held by the ministry of environmental affairs, show no health or ecological problems. We want to emphasize that samplings have been taken in the region for years, and its background radiation remains very low."

The case of the NRC waste is only one example of the extent of the immunity the NRC has built up around itself. Every attempt to crack the exaggerated cover of secrecy around the subject of Israeli nuclear power is read as treason. There have even been cases where workers' widows who tried to sue the NRC heard this kind of threat.

Hayim Itah, may he rest in peace, worked in the NRC from May 1963 until his death from leukemia in June 1989. His friends and even his family knew very little about his work except that he was a maintenance mechanic inside the compound.

"Hayim was a very closed man," says Miryam Itah, his wife. "He said next to nothing about his work, and if we asked, he would insist on changing the subject. In 1982, after he had worked there for 19 years, he started having all kinds of spells of exhaustion. Then he began to have

strange aches in his legs, and a little while later, they found out during a routine examination at the NRC that he had a problem with his white blood cells. After an examination of his lymph cells, they diagnosed him as having leukemia."

The discovery of the leukemia, which is known as a disease likely to be caused by radiation, did not change anything in the NRC's policy toward Itah. He went on working as usual, in the same division where he had worked all those years, and he continued to be exposed to the same kinds of radiation that, according to the claim, had caused the disease. On Friday, his day off, he used to go to Soroka Hospital to get blood transfusions and other treatments.

"Looking back," says Itah, "I do not understand how I let him keep going to work in that place where he got the disease. Maybe it was because Hayim was so full of optimism. But even more than I am amazed at myself, I am amazed that it did not occur to his employers to get him away from the source of the disease. Maybe it's because they did not want to admit the connection. On the other hand, the doctors at Soroka did say, right at the beginning of the treatments, that there is a connection between the kinds of radiation found at the NRC and leukemia.

"The doctors told him that with leukemia there is a five-year threshold. If Hayim succeeded in passing it, his chances to stay alive would grow. When we had gotten past the fifth year, we were encouraged." In the sixth year, there was a serious deterioration in Itah's condition. All through that time, on days when he was not in the hospital, he went to work. "The cynicism in the NRC's approach to Itah," say people who knew him, "reached its height when his illness was in the advanced stages. They took his weakness into account' and let him leave work ten minutes early, so he would be able to walk the distance from his division to the shuttle bus."

In the written claim, Attorney Ilan Kener argues: "The deceased worked in the NRC, where he was exposed to high levels of nuclear radiation. This exposure was the result of the defendant's negligence, which expressed itself in the following ways: Safety procedures were defective; proper safety precautions were not seen to; on occasions when the deceased came into contact with poisonous or radioactive substances, he was instructed to wear tags for measuring radioactivity—but only when he was in direct contact with these substances, even though he was also exposed to radiation when he was in indirect contact with them."

Attorney Kener goes on to raise serious charges about the working conditions in Itah's division, and argues: "Radioactive materials were stored in the halls of the plant, and at various sites that the deceased was near, without suitable safety precautions being taken. In some branches of the plant, work was carried out which released radioactive particles into the air, and the ventilation conditioning system did not succeed in expelling them and sufficiently purifying the air."

Miryam Itah's claim is not the first one. In the past, claims have been presented to the court and to national insurance for various kinds of cancer that was caused, according to the workers' claims, by working conditions in the NRC. A portion of the claims were accepted; in some, the sides reached a compromise.

Yosef Eilenberg, a chemical engineer who worked in the NRC for 23 years, set a precedent when he claimed compensation after one of his kidneys was removed due to cancer, and the other damaged by chemical substances and radioactive contamination. Eilenberg's complaint, similar to that of Itah's widow, was that the center was not careful to completely isolate the sector that contained radioactive contamination from the places which were supposed to be free of contamination. He said that in his work he was exposed to no fewer than 24 substances that were poisonous or radioactive, yet in spite of this his division was defined as a "cold zone."

He also claimed that the center did not provide sufficient medical examinations, but made do with just a yearly checkup. Also, according to his claim, when there were accidents and he was exposed to radiation, he was not sent for medical tests.

In its defense plea, the nuclear research center denied most of the claims, but in the end the sides came to a compromise, and Eilenberg won compensation. At the same time, social security recognized his claim and gave him disability insurance.

In May 1991, the claim of Ya'ish Ashraf, a father of seven in Dimona, was presented to the court in Tel Aviv. Ashraf sued the reactor, claiming that in the 11 years he worked there, his head had been affected by radiation and exposure to radioactive substances.

There are legal cases pending right now, of additional cancer victims who worked in the NRC for many years and believe that their illnesses are due to exposure to high levels of radiation. "Seven Days" was told that three lawyers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are being kept busy working on six more claims from the widows of NRC workers who died of cancer.

Most of the cancer patients and widows were afraid to be interviewed. The sick workers explained that any cooperation with the newspaper was likely to be considered as handing over secrets. The widows told us that if they allowed themselves to be interviewed about the reasons for the deaths of their dear ones, it would be considered by their husbands' friends as betrayal.

Miryam Itah understands well what they are talking about. She has felt on her own skin the total ostracism that awaits anyone who dares to criticize the nuclear research center. "After Hayim died, all his friends from work used to come to visit us; the social worker from the NRC came too, sometimes. From the moment I presented the claim against the center—everything changed. Nobody comes to visit; they do not even call. They have all suddenly disappeared."

Dr. Reuven Lester, an attorney from Jerusalem, and Attorney Hen Somekh of Tel Aviv are handling a number of claims of cancer patients who worked at the reactor, and of widows of workers at the reactor. All the cases being prepared are filled with repeated requests for information about the types of radiation the worker was exposed to up until his death, or the amounts of radiation he absorbed over the years. The answers usually come after great delay, and the information in them is incomplete or inexact.

In the claim being prepared for Leon V., Attorney Lester wrote in October 1991 to the NRC's legal counsel: "I request the following information: all the substances to which he was exposed, the levels of exposure, and his medical records from the plant."

On December 14, the NRC's legal counsel, Attorney G. Netiv, responded to Attorney Lester's request in these words: "Within the normal course of his work, the deceased did not come into direct contact with dangerous substances and was not exposed to substances such as . . ."

"Seven Days" was informed that after this letter, a top administrator in the NRC sent an internal memo to another top administrator, and that, among other things, this internal communication included:

"I have a letter in my possession, written to Attorney Lester by the NRC's legal counsel on the subject of Leon Vaknin, may he rest in peace. Paragraph One of the letter is serious, and I would describe it as [not reproduced]. For as you well know, this worker worked under me, and I know exactly where he worked and what substances he was in contact with. Concerning that, I am asking you to give a true report, because I estimate that this is something that will keep coming back to you like a boomerang."

In Miryam Itah's claim, Attorney Kener mentions the NRC's refusal to authorize Professor Barukh Modan's appointment as [an expert qualified] to judge the connection between the radiation in the reactor and Itah's cancer. This despite the fact that Professor Modan is a world-famous scientist in the field of radiation risks, and despite the fact that he is a former general director of the ministry of health, and that from the point of view of the need for secrecy he is somebody to whom facts can be revealed.

The lack of trust the workers feel toward the NRC management can be seen in the petition they presented to the high court of justice in June of last year—against the atomic energy commission and against the minister of labor. In this petition, the workers demand that the labor minister cancel the NRC's exemption from external inspection, inspection that exists in other workplaces where there is radiation. The workers assert that they found out only by chance that the safety regulations for radiation do not apply to the NRC, and that this was only after the NRC refused to provide to workers who had become ill information about examination results

and medical records that radiation regulations would have required them to turn over.

The petition cites as an example the claim of NRC worker Yehuda Kalifa', who fought for several months before winning permission to see the contents of his medical folder and details on how much radiation he had been exposed to.

The workers' petition to the high court of justice was turned down because—after it was presented—the regulations were suddenly changed and new regulations put in place that had not been mentioned in the petition. Attorney Lester: "They played a game with us and succeeded in having our petition dropped because of a technicality. But this still does not change the basic situation at the NRC. The workers still do not trust the staff responsible for their safety, and it can be assumed that we will be presenting an updated petition to the high court of justice very soon."

None of the NRC workers dared to be interviewed for this article. Instead of answering, workers referred me to one of the passages in their petition to the high court of justice, which reads: "As long as there is no external and autonomous inspection by the ministry of labor, the ministry of health, and the ministry of environmental affairs, not a thing can be known about work safety. Today, the center oversees itself. The person responsible for safety is one of the workers at the center, who gets his orders from the boss who can fire him. The petitioners are aware of the need for secrecy, but believe that this problem can be overcome if the inspectors are appointed with the prime minister's authorization."

And the NRC workers write in conclusion, "It makes no sense for the regulations—whose entire purpose is to protect workers from the dangers of radiation—not to apply to the workplace where there is the greatest danger of all."

[Box, p 4]

#### **The Atomic Energy Commission: There Is No Radiation**

The response of the atomic energy commission: Shlomo Abramovich's article brings up material that has already appeared in the media over the last few months (the Makhtesh Katan, nuclear waste). We want to repeat, first of all, that all tests by qualified experts—from the NRC, the atomic energy commission, and the ministry of environmental affairs—have found that there are no health or ecological problems in the region; and that the Makhtesh Katan is open for hiking.

The main thing that is new in this article is the reporter's tour of the Makhtesh Katan region with an instrument for measuring radiation, and the "discovery" of levels of radiation that are seemingly higher than what he believes to be the national average.

In a discussion he had with the reporter, Dr. Dan Lita'i, head of the licensing and safety department of the AEC, explained to him that the levels of radiation he had "discovered" were typical for that part of the country,

and that if he had taken the trouble to go to other locations in the region, he would have found, here and there, levels of natural background radiation that were higher. The reason for this is to be found in the tiny, irregular concentrations of uranium found in the phosphates in the vicinity. It should be emphasized that background radiation like this is not dangerous to the population, and is typical of many regions in the world (like Colorado in the United States, or the granite mountains in France).

We want to emphasize at this point that the NRC's contribution to the levels of radiation in the surrounding area is minimal, and someone who is in the NRC or its vicinity all year round is exposed to about the same radiation as are residents of the region who do not ever come close to the NRC. In this context, it should be mentioned that the water in the wells in the region is sampled regularly and is clean of radioactive substances. Concerning the flow of waste water into the Makhtesh Katan, it has already been clarified that these are strictly sanitary wastes, and that the flow has been stopped.

Another topic the reporter discusses are the cases of the NRC workers who contracted cancer. It is known that close to 20 percent of deaths in the Israeli population (as in many other countries) are from cancer. The overall incidence of cancer among workers in the AEC and the NRC is no different from the national average. The NRC is very careful and thorough in protecting the safety of its workers, following international norms, and is also monitored by autonomous entities.

The article also discusses the closed area around the NRC. This area is defined by decision of the military for the needs of effective security and to prevent entrance by hostile elements, for the NRC is a declared target of these elements. In the closed area, too, there are no health or ecological problems. The Makhtesh Katan and the hiking paths are open to the general public, and there is no danger to their health or safety there.

In conclusion, we wish to emphasize the following points:

A. There is no health or safety hazard for hikers in the Makhtesh Katan. This conclusion is also supported by tests the ministry of environmental affairs has made.

B. There is broad oversight of the activities of the NRC and the safety of its workers. In the realm of safety, this is by the department of licensing of the AEC and the advisory commission for nuclear safety, which is an independent and autonomous entity that reports to the prime minister. The activities of the AEC, including those of the NRC, are overseen by the state comptroller and are under the supervision of the Knesset, like all other government activities. The area surrounding the NRC is also under autonomous supervision by the ministry for environmental affairs.

[Box, p 5]

**The Groups in Danger**

The International Atomic Energy Agency, together with the World Health Organization, will soon be publishing a new standard for protection from radiation. In the section that deals with "public protection" (as opposed to industrial exposure or exposure as a result of medical treatment), the standard sets the limitation of exposure of 1 millisioret per year (1 millisioret=100 milliroentgen=about 100,000 microroentgen). That is to say, figuring per hour, the new standard allows maximal exposure of 11.4 microroentgen—far below the levels measured by "Seven Days," which means: Extended exposure is likely to be dangerous.

Assuming that the levels of radiation we measured are accurate, there is a large group of people likely to absorb cumulative radiation above that standard. Included are soldiers on regular or reserve service who serve for extended periods in the region, "Mekorot" and Israel water authority, employees who work at the nearby wells of water, tour guides from the society for the preservation of nature, and inspectors from the nature reserves authority, as well as others. Women of childbearing age and pregnant women are even more limited in the amount of exposure they can safely accumulate, and according to the standard, they are liable to be harmed by levels lower than those which endanger others.

The surprising refusal of the ministry of environmental affairs to supply numerical results makes it impossible to discover on what standard the ministry's soothing declarations are based. It is also not clear how much the accumulation of exposure to radioactivity was taken into account in their tests. Accordingly, it is impossible to know whether the qualified experts of the ministry also believe that the population groups specified here are in danger.

The results of exposure to ionizing radiation (radiation that creates ions at a noncatastrophic level), are not immediately evident. The ions attack the genetic material of the cells and interfere with their functioning. The most vulnerable tissues are those where there is cell division: bone marrow, ovaries, testicles, and intestinal fluids.

Possible malignant growths as a result of radiation do not show up until from eight to thirty years after exposure. Similarly, genetic damage and birth defects are also likely to take time to show up.

The atomic energy commission's information brochure also admits that expert opinions are divided. Some believe that the danger of malignant growths, leukemia, and genetic defects exists only after exposure to high-level radiation. Other experts claim that low-level radiation also causes biological damage and is likely to cause cancer.

**SUDAN****Foreign Minister Discusses Differences With U.S.**

93AF0627A London AL-KHARTOUM in Arabic  
22 Apr 93 pp 3, 6

[Interview with Husayn Sulayman Abu Salih, Minister of Foreign Affairs; in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] Anyone who considers Sudan's foreign relations with the world would find numerous areas of tension in those relations. That person would then wonder about the reasons for this tension. Do these reasons lie in the world's perceptions of what is happening in Sudan, or do they lie in Sudan's perceptions of what is happening in the world, very close to its borders in areas that are off limits?

What is wrong here? Is it the idea which others have about the regime, or is it the idea which the regime has about others that is wrong? Is the approach used to settle problems that result from a clash of wills the wrong approach? Is there something inherently wrong here, or is what is wrong here an accident of fate?

It is not normal for a country the size of Sudan, a country with Sudan's location, role, and history, to have an adversarial role and to assume a confrontational posture with countries that are closer to it than any others, namely, Egypt, the Gulf states, Tunisia, and Algeria.

Was it the wish of the world's dominant powers that there be a rift between Sudan and these countries?

We posed these and other follow-up questions to Dr. Husayn Sulayman Abu Salih, Sudan's minister of foreign affairs, who had come to Cairo to attend the meetings of Arab ministers of foreign affairs. We talked with the minister about numerous subjects: international, regional, and local. And the minister was candid as usual.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Can we find out about any new foreign policy approaches that are being pursued at this stage?

[Abu Salih] Fortunately, now there is a written document which defines the overall national strategy in all areas, and that includes foreign activity. The general guidelines we drew up have wound up as programs. But the guiding principle, as far as foreign policy is concerned, is to consider Sudan's geographic location and its position to be attributes that give the country its well-known importance and its ability to become a link between the East and the West. But regardless of the geographic and historical significance of Sudan's location, the country's real strength lies in the strength of its historic affiliations with Arab, African, and Islamic countries. That is why we think that restoring relations with the Arab, African, and Islamic group is a strategic must.

[AL-KHARTOUM] In your movement toward these groups are you placing any priority on any one of them?

[Abu Salih] Certainly, our neighboring countries have first priority in our attention. That is why I announced that we were to start first by restoring our relations with the Arabs, and I issued a directive to that effect because the situation which we have now on the Arab scene is satisfactory to no one. We believe that we are living now, whether we like it or not, under a new world order that is in the making. Some think that this new world order has not been created yet; others think that it is in the making; and still others think that its characteristics are beginning to emerge.

[AL-KHARTOUM] In your opinion, what are the characteristics of this world order?

[Abu Salih] I think that there is now one center of power in the world, now that the Soviet Union has collapsed and the United States of America has become the dominant power. Western civilization is now the dominant civilization, and that may be the reason why it has risen above other civilizations and is, consequently, trying to thrust upon the remaining countries the one way of life that they would follow. I wonder, will the Arab world accept this Western way of life with its flaws? Will Sudan in particular accept it? In Sudan, our approach is different, especially after Islamic law was proclaimed in the country.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Your excellency, do you think there is a big difference and a major contradiction between the two models?

[Abu Salih] We think that the new world order can be judged by six elements.

- 1. By the liberal democracy it is advocating for the political system;
- 2. By the market economy it is advocating for the economy;
- 3. By the secular system it is advocating;
- 4. By advocating that religion be separate from life and that human rights become a new religion; and
- 5. By turning a blind eye to the breakup which is taking place in places like the Soviet Union and Europe despite the fact that there is a call for disarmament.

These are the characteristics of the new world order, but the Islamic system which we are proclaiming is still a system in the making. It is in its infancy, that is, it is a new system that has its own nature. We think that just as Western civilization has its own way of life, the system we are seeking in Sudan is one that has its own way of life.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Where then does the difference lie?

[Abu Salih] We are facing a Western system which is advocating political party pluralism. We, however, are advocating a pluralism of ideas. We are advocating a pluralism of viewpoints under national unity. There is a difference then between the system they have and the one we have. As far as the economic system is concerned, applying the free market economy, with the competition that comes along with it, would not be enough. Social

equilibrium will have to accompany the application of a free market economy. This means that putting a free market economy in place must be accompanied by calling for the achievement of social justice. And herein lies the difference—it is our opinion that thought should be given to the introduction of a human element into development activity which is carried out under all economic systems, even the Western economic system.

[AL-KHARTOUM] If we go back to what is being given priority in foreign policy, which is the restoration of relations with neighboring countries, what new actions have been taken for the purpose of improving relations with Egypt?

[Abu Salih] The present situation between us and Egypt is neither normal nor right. It is sad. We believe that the only way to settle the dispute and dispel the doubts is to sit, to talk, to negotiate, and to turn over unresolved issues to arbitration. The dispute now lies in the fact that these methods have been set aside, and force is being used to impose an accomplished fact, and that will not stand. I am referring here to the problem of Hala'ib, but I will not go into its nationality and talk about whether it is Egyptian or Sudanese. What matters is that this triangle is being disputed, and the problem is being considered by a technical committee made up of scientists, experts, and researchers. A decision on the matter was to be made by that committee, but while this committee was going about its business, Egyptian forces entered Hala'ib. We think that the use of force to impose a solution is something that we find unacceptable.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What is the solution then to this problem?

[Abu Salih] I have been emphasizing the need to talk and to negotiate in all the statements I made, and I did not talk about occupation. I think that the first step toward a solution would be to restore Hala'ib to the status it had in October 1992. After that, a decision would be made to determine whether this territory is Egyptian or Sudanese, or whether it will become an integrated region. I told our Egyptian friends before, "Let's drop this Hala'ib problem, and let's talk about inviting millions of Egyptians to Sudan to work. We have surplus land. What was done in Hala'ib was the wrong approach to dealing with the crisis."

[AL-KHARTOUM] What has become of Libyan, Palestinian, and Syrian mediation efforts to improve relations between the two countries?

[Abu Salih] These mediation efforts took us back to the stage of the technical committee, and that committee is not up to the task because the matter requires a certain political level so that a solution can be put into place. If, however, the matter were to be left to the professionals, a political decision would ultimately be required.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Then, have these mediation efforts failed?

[Abu Salih] No, they did not fail, because the technical committee went back to work again as a result of these



efforts. The committee continued to do its work until it got to the stage of making a decision on the entry of military forces into Hala'ib. I think that contact between politicians on a chosen level is a must so that the problem can be set forth and a solution determined.

[AL-KHARTOUM] There are other problems with neighboring Arab and Islamic countries. Did ...? His excellency, the minister, interrupted and said:

[Abu Salih] There are four reasons for Western bias against Sudan, three reasons for our Egyptian brothers' bias against Sudan, one reason for the bias in eastern Arab countries, and one reason for the countries of the Maghreb.

The reasons for Western bias against Sudan go back to 1990, 1991, and 1992. The question of the south was one obvious reason why the West was biased against Sudan before 1990. I was minister of foreign affairs before 1990, and the West was biased against us then. There were also charges against us then that had to do with human rights. The rebel movement which was led by Garang was the recipient of special treatment, and Garang was being received then as though he were a head of state.

The second reason for Western bias against Sudan goes back to the time of the drought and the food shortage which occurred then. We were asked by the West to declare famine in Sudan, but we declined to do that. The West had wanted to use food as a political weapon which would enable it to impose its will on us.

The third reason for the bias, and that is a major one, goes back to the position we took on the Gulf War. The West did not accept our position.

The proclamation of Islamic law is the fourth reason for the bias. The West took a dim view of that and found it unacceptable.

The problem with the Gulf arose because of our position on the Gulf crisis and its aftermath.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Steps have been taken in the movement that is afoot to appoint an international relief coordinator in Sudan. What do you think about this matter?

[Abu Salih] We've made significant efforts during the past years with various international organizations involved in the area of relief, and we reached many agreements with the different parties. Now that a cease-fire has been declared, there is a state of peace in the south. That is why a safe passage order and the determination of safe areas for transporting relief supplies to the victims of the war are no longer necessary. Such a step is tantamount to a Trojan horse. The entire south is now a safe area.

In taking these steps the Americans have other goals, and they intend to interfere. This is an invitation to interfere. The Americans want a UN decision to interfere and to create safe areas. This is neo-colonialism, and it involves

breaking up the south. It is the most serious thing we are facing, and we will strongly resist it.

[AL-KHARTOUM] There are talks which are scheduled to be held in Abuja, and opposition forces are now engaged in meetings which are being held in Nairobi. The Nairobi Declaration, which includes essential points, was issued. Can you comment on this declaration?

[Abu Salih] First of all, the Nairobi Declaration does not concern me at all. It is mentally unacceptable to me that parties from the north, such as the Democratic Unionist and Ummah parties, take sides with John Garang. These are parties that are calling for an Islamic republic and an Islamic awakening. Can these parties side with Garang who is calling for a secular Sudan? They have absolutely nothing in common with each other. And after all these differences between these parties, it would not be possible for Garang to come along and become an ally. As far as this alliance is concerned, I think that it will lead to nothing.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What are your expectations as to the outcome of the Abuja talks which will be held on 26 May?

[Abu Salih] We will be encouraged when the peace process starts, and especially if there is a cease-fire. I wish to say that we decided to deliver food to all areas and to do so according to our ability. We are willing to accept any assignment that will be entrusted to us to deliver this relief. At the same time we will continue to pursue the peace talks. No one can say that these peace talks will end in a day or two. Once the serious talks are started and there is credibility, especially since considerable progress has been made in the Abuja talks, I believe that an agreement will be reached about the period of transition and about all the ideas which will be put into action during that period. These ideas—and all of them are now theories—are ideas like the division of power and balanced development. They are issues which have to be studied and looked into during the period of transition. But the possibility that the Abuja talks will succeed depends on those who are supporting the rebellious movement—will they stand for peace or will they take the opposite stance?

[AL-KHARTOUM] What will be the consequences of the failure of the talks?

[Abu Salih] We are taking the road to peace, and I don't think that anyone wants to fight. I don't think anyone wants war, not even the soldiers who carry weapons. They perform their duty, and they defend themselves. We will not abandon this course. We will not abandon the course that would lead to a peaceful solution.

[AL-KHARTOUM] An American official who spoke about expectations said that he was not optimistic about the outcome of the Abuja talks.

[Abu Salih] Those who say they are not optimistic are those who want the talks to fail. They want another outcome, and they have something else in mind. What

I'm wondering about is what information did this official rely on when he said that these talks would fail or succeed? What was said indicates that America intends to intervene in south Sudan. As far as we are concerned, this constitutes neo-colonialism, and we will strongly resist it.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Sudan is living in isolation. What power is the government relying on in resisting these intentions?

[Abu Salih] Sudan is not isolated; it is under a vicious attack by the West. We are self-reliant. We're relying on ourselves and on devoted people in the world, in the Arab and Islamic nation, and in other areas as well. There are devoted people in Asia. We also have good relations with many countries, and many of them are Islamic countries in Asia. We have good relations with China, and with many outstanding individuals and friends. We are not isolated, but we are under attack by the West.

[AL-KHARTOUM] There is a careful tendency that we've noticed to improve relations with the West and to ignore neighboring countries.

[Abu Salih] First, there is not a soul in the world who would advocate hostility. We are human beings, we are humanitarian, and we are civilized. Ours is the latest civilization. We did not try to provoke the hostility of the West, but we are trying to benefit from the West; we are trying to benefit from western technology and science, for example. This is something that we have to do. Also, the West has interests in Sudan. It follows then that there would have to be common interests and relationships which are favorable to these interests. But we are against this bias and these preconceived ideas. That is why talks with the Europeans have been difficult, whereas talks with the Americans have been making progress. However, we are not saying this publicly, because whenever we say that one step forward has been taken, a statement that undermines that step is made.

[AL-KHARTOUM] It is being said that foreign policy is formulated in many centers. How would you comment on that?

[Abu Salih] I deny it. I am the one who is responsible for foreign policy.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Does the Sudanese media help in implementing your foreign policy?

[Abu Salih] There is much in the media which I do not like, and we are always calling attention to that fact, but I cannot do anything singlehandedly.

### Garang Seeks Southern Separation

93AF0627C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 2 Jun 93 p 6

[Article: "Muhammad Ibrahim Khalil, Former Speaker of Sudan's Parliament Says: 'Garang Informed Opposition He Wants Separation of South, Annexation of Three Large Northern Regions to His State'"]

[Text] A Sudanese opposition politician charged the leaders of Sudanese parties who participated in a meeting that was held last April in Nairobi of concealing important information from the Sudanese people. This information is about the details of the talks which they held with Colonel John Garang, leader of the Sudan Popular Liberation Movement. The opposition politician said that Garang assured him in Washington that he had made it clear to opposition leaders before the onset of peace talks in Abuja that he wanted to establish a separate state in south Sudan that would include three of the largest regions of north Sudan.

Professor Muhammad Ibrahim Khalil is chairman of the board of the Ummah Party in the United States. He is also a former minister of foreign affairs and a former speaker of Sudan's parliament. In a statement addressed to leaders and members of the Ummah Party, Professor Khalil said that the Nairobi Declaration, which was issued last April, pointed out that Garang, who was the one to call to order the meeting of the opposition Democratic National Grouping Party, had affirmed his absolute commitment to a democratically based unity of Sudan. And yet, the following sentence in that same declaration referred to that commitment as a preferred choice.

Khalil, who is a highly regarded legal expert, added, "After the Sudanese government announced its refusal to consider a demand put forward by Col. Garang's delegation for the application of a confederation, the people of Sudan started wondering about what had led participants in the Nairobi meeting to issue a final communique expressing enthusiastic support for the Sudan Popular Liberation Movement. The people of Sudan started wondering why those participants went overboard in invoking a blessing upon the Popular Movement for entering into negotiations with those who usurp power and thwart democracy."

Khalil wondered, "Shouldn't they have asked Garang what he meant by saying that advocating unity was the preferred choice? Is there another choice? If there is, what is it? Before issuing such a final communique, shouldn't they have been compelled by their sense of national responsibility to get from Garang a positive pledge that was neither ambivalent nor equivocal? Shouldn't they have taken from Garang a pledge that the unity of Sudan was the one and only choice? Shouldn't they have asked him to pledge that the delegation of the Popular Movement would adhere to promoting unity at the Abuja talks?"

Khalil stated that he had asked Garang himself in Washington 10 days ago to tell him specifically what he meant by the confederation which he was advocating. He said that Garang told him that he wanted the establishment of two independent states, each with its own constitution and its own army. "Garang said that he considered the Nubian Highlands and the highlands of Anqasna part of the southern tip of the confederation and that in the future the area of al-Bijah could be subordinate to them."

Khalil said that the south Sudanese leader told him that he had given notice to leaders of the opposition grouping in Nairobi about his movement's decision to call for a confederation. "Garang was asked about the difference between a confederation and a total separation, and he said that the confederation would not involve a total separation. He said, however, that such a total separation was possible if what happens during the period of transition shows the failure of the confederation."

Khalil said that Garang assured him that he had made his position quite clear to leaders of the grouping and that he briefed them on the position which the Popular Movement's delegation will take in the Abuja talks.

Khalil then accused opposition leaders of concealing what Col. Garang had told them. "They not only concealed the proposal for separation, which the Popular Movement had made at the Nairobi meeting, but they also went beyond that and took the liberty of singing the praises of what had been accomplished at the meeting, which they tried to portray to the people of Sudan as a historic meeting which had affirmed that the unity of Sudan would be adhered to."

To that end Mr. Nasr-al-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi, vice president of the Ummah Party, and Ahmad 'Abdallah, chairman of the party's Executive Committee in Britain, issued two statements, which were received by AL-HAYAH yesterday, in which they appealed to Arab, Islamic, and African governments as well as human rights organizations to ask the government of General 'Umar al-Bashir to withdraw its armed forces from the mosque of Imam al-Mahdi in Umm Durman. Khartoum had announced last week that the mosque was being annexed and that it would be considered state property.

The vice president of the Ummah Party, who resides in London, warned the government that party supporters were confident that they would get back their mosques.

In a related matter Gen. al-Bashir and Yasir 'Arafat, the Palestinian president, participated in religious services which were held in Imam al-Mahdi Mosque the day before yesterday for al-Adha Feast. It was not clear after the service whether the worshipers who had come to the prayer service in the mosque were supporting the party or the government. The government is supported by the National Islamic Front which is led by Dr. Hasan al-Turabi.

### Justice Minister Favors Cooperation

93AF0627B London AL-KHARTOUM in Arabic  
26 Apr 93 p 5

[Interview with Mr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Shiddu, Minister of Justice and Attorney General in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] The question of human rights in Sudan has been in the spotlight during the past three months inside the country and abroad. Everyone has been preoccupied with that question, and much political and legal "literature" has been written about it. Because it is such an important issue, it was the subject of our interview with

Mr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Shiddu, Sudan's minister of justice and attorney general. Mr. Shiddu visited Cairo in the past few days to attend the meetings of Arab ministers of justice.

There were many points to be covered in the conversation on human rights, but the minister's time did not permit all of them to be covered. Those that were not fortunate enough to be covered are points about members of the opposition who remain in custody without trials. Time did not allow us to talk about the fate of the fact-finding committee in the Juba incidents, and the new Press and Publications Act. We had many questions about the Attorney General's Special Committee on Human Rights, and we started our interview with that question.

[AL-KHARTOUM] You spoke recently about the formation of a committee that would devote its attention to human rights issues and whose members would be the staff who serve in the attorney general's office. What is its mandate?

[Shiddu] This is a committee that has been entrusted with the task of receiving and responding to all grievances and inquiries which have to do with human rights. At the present time this committee is the executive committee of a high-level coordinating committee. The Council of Ministers authorized the formation of this committee under the chairmanship of Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, speaker of the interim National Assembly. The minister of justice and attorney general serves as the reporter of the committee. All sectors involved in the field of human rights, including the ministers of the interior, foreign affairs, security, information, and housing, and all those who have something to do with human rights serve on this committee and are represented on it. We set up a high-level coordinating council, and the committee of the Ministry of Justice and the attorney general became its executive body. And the minister of justice has been authorized to coordinate everything that has to do with human rights inside the country and abroad.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What is the mandate that has been given to these committees and these bodies?

[Shiddu] The committee is accountable to the president. It has a mandate, derived from the Council of Minister's decree, to take action and to deal with everything that pertains to human rights. We are facing an extremely vicious attack from abroad, and that attack is being fueled by the opposition. We are striving to affirm categorically that it is not the policy of the Government of Sudan to violate human rights or minimize the importance of citizens. The government of Sudan is rather striving to affirm a citizens' rights and the rule of law.

[AL-KHARTOUM] You spoke earlier about transgressions against the detainees. Have these transgressions been brought to an end?

[Shiddu] They've almost ended. At the present time Sudan's doors are open to the whole world, to all those who want to come. The special reporter will come, and Sudan will cooperate with him. A delegation from the European Community will come and a fact-finding delegation from the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of nations will come also, and we will cooperate with it. We extended an invitation to the Committee on Human Rights in the European Parliament, and we will cooperate with it. We also extended an invitation to all those who wish to know the facts in this matter, and we invited them to come to Sudan.

[AL-KHARTOUM] In this regard we are still hearing reports that many politicians and members of the opposition are being arrested. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was one of those who were arrested. What has changed then?

[Shiddu] What I said earlier does not mean that people are no longer being arrested. People are arrested because of their activities. If someone is engaged in suspect activity or activity that threatens the security of the state and the regime, he has to be dealt with. What I can say at the present time, however, is that we've put restrictions on arresting people and we've brought this activity under the supervision of the courts. Every person who is being detained has the right to file a grievance. We laid down principles which would allow a detainee to inform his family that he has been detained and to tell them where he is being held. The detainee's family is also allowed to visit. The fact that people are being detained is not in our hands, and I cannot say that we will not detain anyone, because people are detained as a result of their activities.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Why is al-Sadiq al-Mahdi taken into custody every now and then?

[Shiddu] It is certain that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was arrested or—I would rather say—summoned so that he can be questioned about some of his recent activities. There is nothing wrong with that. In America, the authorities ask and question anyone they wish to ask and question. And the same holds true in Europe and in all the world. There are now guidelines to be followed when people are arrested in Sudan, and that process is subject to judicial oversight.

[AL-KHARTOUM] By judicial oversight do you mean that no one is arrested without an order from a judge?

[Shiddu] No, not when someone is arrested without being charged. This does not apply to cases when someone is arrested for security reasons. In those cases security authorities have been given certain powers. Court oversight applies to those who wish to file a grievance, but it does not require that a court order be obtained before someone is arrested and detained.

[AL-KHARTOUM] But there can be transgressions when people are being detained for security reasons, isn't that right?

[Shiddu] Transgressions occur sometimes, and that is why this process has been brought under judicial oversight. This means that if proper bounds were exceeded,

and if someone were arrested for no reason—if that happened in any other way—the person who was hurt can seek redress from the court, and the court would rule in his case. If the court rules against upholding the decision to detain that person, it would order his release.

[AL-KHARTOUM] With which judicial entity would a detainee file a grievance against his detention?

[Shiddu] The Supreme Court has designated a judge for these cases. He is Justice Hashim Muhammad Abual-Qasim, the deputy chief justice. He is the one who will deal with everything that has to do with these detentions, and he serves on the Judicial Board.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What then is the function of the representative of the attorney general's office in the security agency?

[Shiddu] The legal office which was set up in the Security Agency is that of legal counsel. The purpose of this office, which will be staffed by more counselors, is to regulate security practices.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Now we come to the matter of expropriating the property of those who are in the opposition. What are the legal grounds for these expropriations?

[Shiddu] Not every member of the opposition has his property expropriated, but those whose opposition turns into high treason do have their property expropriated. The second article of the Constitution sanctions the expropriation of such a person's property. Property is expropriated in accordance with that article. At the present time we are trying to lay down principles which would enable us to distinguish between legitimate opposition, which we believe everyone is entitled to, and high treason. It is not opposition to summon the outside world and ask it to interfere in the affairs of Sudan. Those who are calling for the fragmentation of Sudan and asking other countries to interfere in its affairs are not engaged in opposition. What they are engaged in is treason. This distinction will be made, and legal procedures will be laid out on the basis of that distinction.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Will there be a difference between internal and external opposition?

[Shiddu] No, but there will be a difference between meaningful and non-meaningful opposition.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What do you mean by meaningful opposition?

[Shiddu] It means that in Sudan you now have the right to talk about everything that is happening in the country. You have the right to express your opinion even if that opinion contradicts state practices. No one would object, not even if that opposition came from within existing agencies, be they conferences or a national assembly. Every individual is free to say what he wants to say.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What are the channels of opposition which are available now and which would enable citizens to express their opinions frankly?

[Shiddu] The conferences are the vehicle through which all opinions may be expressed. At these conferences any person may say anything he wants. The same thing applies to the National Assembly: any member can say anything he wants to say.

[AL-KHARTOUM] But what if one is opposed to the conferences themselves?

[Shiddu] He can express that opposition from within. Who is going to stop that person from saying what he thinks in these conferences or outside their framework? Who is going to stop him from criticizing the regime as many who speak outside the framework of these conferences do? Many people have spoken, and no one stood up against them, arrested them, or took any measures against them.

[AL-KHARTOUM] This brings us to the subject of the Press and Publications Act.

[Shiddu] This is an excellent law, and it will create quite a stir because it was drafted at a high level. In drafting this law we were seeking freedom of the press and the establishment of a high-level, 21-person board that would be subordinate to the head of state. There was one opinion for making the board subordinate to the National Assembly, but it was our opinion that it should be subordinate to the head of state. The law talks about press institutions in terms of their being corporations. We don't want the press to be under the control of one individual or group. We don't want it to be controlled or contained by any one faction, tribe, or family. The law affords the press the freedom to publish anything it wishes pursuant to an honor code. It fixed the capital of a press corporation at 50 million pounds as proof of earnestness. I think this law is a good law. It was approved by the Council of Ministers, and it was amended in accordance with the discussions which took place in the Council of Ministers. It will make a major statement and create quite a stir in the world of journalism.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What guarantees does this law provide that the press will continue to enjoy this freedom?

[Shiddu] The law provides all the guarantees for freedom with the exception of certain areas, as stipulated in the law. These are areas which have to do with morals and public conduct. A journalist may not interfere with sensitive agencies such as the armed forces, and he may not meddle in court procedures that are pending. Otherwise, he is free to publish what he wishes to publish in accordance with the code.

[AL-KHARTOUM] One issue of AL-KHARTOUM newspaper was confiscated recently.

[Shiddu] What was published in AL-KHARTOUM may have been misunderstood at first glance. When I perused the newspaper—and I think it was the second issue—I thought it was an opposition newspaper. But when I read subsequent issues, I found out that it was a newspaper that dealt with things on the level at which it was being

published. I found out that it is an objective newspaper even though it publishes what members of the opposition are saying.

[AL-KHARTOUM] The talks in Abuja are to take place in a matter of hours. What do you expect will be the outcome of these talks?

[Shiddu] We are extremely optimistic. It is true there are many obstacles, but the mere fact that Garang has agreed to come to the talks is reason for optimism. We hope that all the obstacles will be removed and that the talks will succeed. But if they fail, we will not give up on our conviction that negotiations are the only way to settle the question of the south.

[AL-KHARTOUM] What do you think will be the shape of the legal agreement that can provide a framework for reaching a peace agreement?

[Shiddu] You can call whatever will be achieved anything you like: a federation, a confederation, or autonomy. Our discussions in Abuja will be conducted in a framework that guarantees the unity of Sudan and takes into consideration the circumstances of the south. The framework of our discussions gives the south all the elements which would enable it to settle its differences with the north in two stages: a short-term stage and a long-term one. During these stages the provinces will be able to find an appropriate common ground. What matters is that we are going to Abuja without a pre-set agenda. Our purpose is to see to it that any agreement which is reached is one that keeps in mind the unity of Sudan and takes into consideration the special circumstances of the south. And these circumstances will be taken into consideration when the agreement is signed.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Is it likely that the country will have two sets of laws?

[Shiddu] In a federation each province can have its own laws. We are striving now to draft a special law for the south exempting it from the application of the canonical law of Islam. We are putting in place what may be called alternative penalties which will be used in cases where Islamic law is not applied.

[AL-KHARTOUM] Are there amendments to the Public Security Act that have been published?

[Shiddu] First, let me say that the Public Security Act has been published. It was amended, and I talked about these amendments when I discussed judicial oversight of detention activity. In fact, the press and correspondents have been given copies of the act. Copies of the act are available.

### **Economic Failure Behind Emigration's Increase**

*93AF0627D London AL-KHARTOUM in Arabic  
17 Apr 93 p 6*

[Article: "Emigration Rates Rise Because of Deteriorating Economic Conditions; Rural Sector's Contribution to GDP Drops"]

[Text] The Sudanese economy, which declined continuously during the eighties, continued its decline into the early nineties. Now the economy is in a crisis. A number of programs to treat the economy were carried out by some governments during those years to stop this deterioration. Before too long, however, and soon after implementation was begun, these programs were replaced by others. Consequently, there was a lack of constancy in the way the economy was viewed and in the economic policies that were devised to deal with the crisis. The changes which ensued as a result of that situation manifested themselves in the migration of the population. Some people migrated from one part of the country to another—from rural to urban areas—and others emigrated from the country.

Migration was strictly a seasonal phenomenon at the outset. People migrated to agricultural areas, especially when the time came for harvesting cotton and other crops. In the early eighties, however, economic and natural changes played a major role in shaping the magnitude and the directions of this migration. These changes may be listed [as follows]: drought and desertification resulting from the sparse rainfall; neglect of the traditional farming and pastoral sectors; the high rates of wages in large cities and regional capitals; the presence of industries and services in cities; and the brisk demand for marginal businesses which provide quick returns. The magnitude of this migration grew in the early years of this decade at a rate that was faster than it was in the past. This was because of the civil war in the south, armed robbery in some areas, the lack of services in rural areas, the lack of plans to undertake rural development, and the lack of means of subsistence in some rural areas that are far away from urban areas.

The annual economic report published by the Ministry of Finance contains official statistics indicating that more than three million citizens left rural areas and migrated to urban areas because the civil war in the south has been getting worse. In addition, these statistics show that 1.5 million citizens left rural occupations (traditional farming and tending animals) to work in marginal occupations in regional capitals and major cities where health services as well as educational and security services are almost totally lacking because of the unexpected increase in the number of residents in those areas. These regional capitals and cities are now ringed by makeshift homes and villages.

Since rural residents make up approximately 75 percent of Sudan's total population, most agricultural and pastoral projects—those that are traditional as well as those that are mechanical—are carried out in that sector. This means that any migration from this sector to the urban sector that is carried out without proper consideration will have a negative effect on production. The report of the Ministry of Finance indicated a 40 percent drop in the traditional sector's contribution to the GDP in 1990-1991.

Domestic migration of the population in a developing country like Sudan puts that country's social, political,

and economic makeup at risk. The economic review conducted by the Ministry of Finance defined those dangers and the form they took. Domestic migration causes a lack of balance within the state and outside the state, and it causes a large deficit in the general budget due to the decline in the rural sectors' contributions to the GDP. The budget deficit is also due to a decline in production, savings, and investment rates, and it is also due to a rise in inflation rates. With regard to the social makeup of the country, the rise in migration rates to urban areas creates unrest in Sudanese society because rates of unemployment, poverty, crime, and prostitution rise when that happens.

#### Emigration from Sudan

After 1973 emigration from Sudan occurred regularly, and Sudanese citizens went to the Gulf countries in droves because the economy in those countries was thriving as a result of the rise in oil prices and the development activity which accompanied that. During the early stages of this emigration most of the work in which the Sudanese were involved was in infrastructure projects. Now, however, Sudanese expatriates are employed in a variety of production and services sectors.

Among the most important reasons why people have been emigrating from Sudan are economic stagnation and the high rate of unemployment. The decline in employment opportunities created economic and social pressures on people. Governments could not deal with the deteriorating economic conditions, and living conditions got worse in the early years of this decade. The spread of the conspicuous consumption phenomenon also contributed to increasing the rate of emigration from Sudan in recent years.

There are many people who work in the Gulf countries under contract and whose contracts are beyond the domain of the Labor Office. That is why it is difficult to get accurate statistics about the number of Sudanese citizens in those countries and their distribution in accordance with the professions in which they are employed, their annual incomes, and their savings. Sudan's Ministry of Labor estimated the number of workers who are employed abroad beyond the domain of the Labor Office to be approximately 500,000 citizens. The ministry estimated that approximately two million citizens were working under official contract. After the Gulf War that number fell to 1.5 million because of the government's position on the Gulf crisis.

Some of the negative effects of emigration from Sudan have been seen recently. The manpower sectors in Sudan have been affected by the emigration of large numbers of trained and skilled workers. Many state-owned factories as well as those owned by the private sector were affected. There was a partial decline in productivity at those plants (the oils, soap, and textile plants), and that decline in productivity resulted in some revenue losses and a decline in public sector contributions to the GDP.

That led the government to stop retooling programs at some plants. Besides, there were other reasons why the government was obliged to change its policy regarding the privatization of these plants (Sudan's Textile Factory, Port Sudan Oils, and the White Nile Tannery).

It was estimated that emigrants who can work in professional occupations are approximately 50 percent of those

who are between the ages of 20 and 29 and approximately 40 percent of those who are between the ages of 30 and 39.

The number of students who left the country in search of knowledge in the United States and Europe was small. In recent years, however, the number of immigrants to these countries rose after economic conditions got worse, and Sudanese citizens who are not employed in education have immigrated to these countries.

Table Showing the Number of Sudanese With Contracts To Work Abroad

Country Year	Saudi Arabia	Libya	Kuwait	United Arab Emirates	Qatar	Sultanate of Oman	Yemen	Iraq	Total	Difference: less or minus
85/86	5,276	440	23	15	359	25	10	1,006	7,154	—
86/87	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7,259	0.015%
87/88	20,100	22	—	334	684	352	22	—	21,614	0.202%
88/89	23,864	—	—	210	1,254	—	—	—	23,868	233%
89/90	17,971	29	—	6	899	—	—	—	18,905	164%

Source: Sudan's Ministry of Labor

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Biographies on New Government Officials Revealed

93LH0008A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
13 Jun 93 pp 26-28

["New Yemeni Government Formed With the Agreement of Coalition Parties, After Denial of Reshuffle Reports"]

[Text] Despite talk of cabinet reshuffles in the government of Engineer Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas, and the denial of these reshuffles, it has been confirmed that the present form of the new Yemeni government was the result of the three coalition parties. The government has added prominent Yemenis and some that are traditional. It is interesting to note that some of those who stood by President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad during the events of January 1986 received one of the cabinet portfolios ('Abdallah Ghanim) from the Conference Party.

A summary of new government members follows.

#### Engineer Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas, Prime Minister

- Born in Hadramawt Province.
- After his intermediate schooling in Hadramawt, he moved to Aden Province to study electricity and mechanics, graduating from the Institute in 1959, receiving a British technical degree with honors.
- Prevented from studying in Britain because of his nationalistic views, so he had to return to Hadramawt.
- He went to Egypt to study engineering with 'Ali Salim al-Bidh, and subsequently took short courses in Britain.

- He worked as Director General for Electricity and as an engineer in the Ministry of Works and Communications in Aden. He was then appointed Minister of Works and Communications in 1969.
- Became Prime Minister in 1984.
- Became Speaker of the Supreme People's Assembly after the events of 13 January 1986, until the proclamation of Yemeni unity on 22 May 1990.
- He assumed the presidency of the first unified government of Yemen until the elections of 27 April 1993, when he was appointed prime minister in the new government.
- Member of the Yemeni Socialist Party politburo since 1984.
- Described as a moderate or centrist for his practical achievements. He is considered a statesman who enjoys the respect of all political tendencies in the country, and esteem in Arab and global circles.

#### Dr. Hasan Makki First Deputy Prime Minister

- Born in al-Hudaydah Province
- Earned a doctorate in economics.
- Worked in the Ministries of Economy and Development.
- Has served as deputy prime minister since the early 1970s.
- Member of the General Committee (politburo) of the General Popular Conference.

#### Muhammad Haydarah Masdus Deputy Prime Minister

- Born in Abyan Governorate
- One of the Socialist Party's most prominent leaders after the events of 13 January 1986. Assumed the Secretariat of the Party after the events.
- Graduated from the Military College with the rank of Brigadier General; also earned a bachelor's degree in commerce.

- Member of the Party politburo, considered one of its moderates, as he supported the unification of the Socialist Party with the General Popular Conference.

**Dr. Muhammad Sa'id al-'Attar** Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry

- In his sixties, he holds a doctorate from the Sorbonne.
- Served as director of the Regional Office for East Asia in the United Nations. He returned to Yemen and took over the Ministry of Economy after the revolution.
- Served in various economic capacities, in the Minister of Planning and Development.
- Member of the Permanent (Central) Committee of the General Popular Conference.

**Brigadier General Mujahid Abu-Shawarib** Deputy Prime Minister

- Belongs to an offshoot of Hashid tribes; related to Shaykh 'Abdallah bin-Hasan al-Ahmar.
- In his fifties. A national figure with a history of struggle for the revolution and against the Emamate.
- Has served in official capacities, most prominently as Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Internal Affairs.
- Member of the Command Council after the June 13 Movement of 1974 led by Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi.
- A leader of the pro-Iraqi Ba'th Party; member of the Permanent Committee (Central Committee) of the Popular Conference.

**Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah Muhsin** Minister of Housing and Urban Planning

- In his late forties, from the Sharjab region in al-Hajariyah in the Ta'izz Province, but born in Aden.
- One of the main supporters of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il; took part in National Front activities and in the Liberation War in the South.
- Served in various party and government capacities, most prominently as Minister of State Security from 1974 until the early 1980s, then as ambassador to Bulgaria until late 1985. Then he served as Minister for Local Government, and, after unification, as Minister for Local Administration.
- Member of the Socialist Party politburo, as part of its hard-line wing. Observers say that his leadership of the militias in the 1970s has given him influence down to the present. He was vice-president of the Supreme Election Council.

**Engineer 'Abdallah Husayn al-Kurshumi** Minister of Construction and Repair

- The government's oldest minister, he has served as Minister of Municipalities, Minister of the Economy, and Minister of Public Works and Municipalities after the revolution.
- During the administration of Judge 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Iryani in the early 1970s, he served briefly as Prime Minister, Minister of Works and Municipalities, and President of the Public Roads Authority.

- He served as Minister of Construction and Repair after unification.
- Member of the Permanent (Central) Committee of the General Popular Conference.

**Dr. Muhammad Ahmad al-Kabab** Minister of Youth and Sports

- In his late thirties.
- Born in the Hadnan region in al-Hajariyah, into a wealthy family from Ta'izz Province.
- Became Minister of Health in the early 1980s, then Minister of Youth and Sports, a post he still holds.

**Dr. Abu-Bakr al-Qurbi** Minister of Education

- In his thirties
- Earned a doctorate in biochemistry, and studied medicine in Canada.
- Worked as a teacher at Sanaa University's College of Medicine.
- Member of the Yemeni Reform Bloc.

**Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Qadir Ba-Afdal** Minister of Supply and Trade

- Born in Hadramawt, into a family that were members of the Islamic Movement in Yemen. He began his education early, earning a doctorate in economics.
- In his late thirties.
- Worked in the Islamic Bank in Saudi Arabia.
- Member of the Yemeni Reform Bloc

**Sadiq Amin Abu-Ras** Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources

- Son of of Shaykh Amin Abu-Ras, shaykh of the Bakil tribes; born in the al-Sayani region in Ibb Province.
- Earned a bachelor's degree in military sciences.
- Played a major role in the Cooperative Movement and served as President of the Higher Commission for Local Councils.
- Appointed Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources after unification. He was also a member of the Supreme Election Council.
- Member of the Permanent (Central) Committee of the General Popular Conference and the Ba'th leaders who severed relations with him.

**Ahmad Muhammad al-Anisi** Ministry of Communications

- From Sanaa Province, but originally from the Anis region in the Dhamar Province.
- Studied electrical engineering and communications in the Soviet Union.
- Moved up in numerous posts, finally becoming Minister of Communications in the late 1970s.
- Became Minister of Education for two years in the late 1980s.
- Returned to the Communications and Transport Ministry after unification, retaining the Communications Ministry when Transport was split off.



- Elected member of the Supreme Council of Deputies in Constituency 3 in the Municipality of the capital, Sanaa.
- Enjoys an excellent reputation and acceptance among diverse political directions; member of the General Popular Conference.

**Dr. Ghalib 'Abd-al-Kafi al-Qirshi** Minister of Awqaf and Guidance

- In his late thirties. Born in the Shar'ab region in Ta'izz Province.
- Earned a doctorate in Islamic law policy in the University of Madinah [Saudi Arabia], working as a teacher in that subject in Sanaa University's College of Islamic Law.
- Served as head of the Information Office in the Yemeni Reform Bloc, and writes frequently in Islamically-oriented Yemeni newspapers.

**Yahya al-Mutawakkil** Minister of the Interior

- Graduate of the Military College with the rank of Colonel. Was most prominent in the time of former President Ibrahim al-Hamdi.
- Served as member of the Command Council in al-Hamdi's time, then joined the diplomatic corps.
- Was a member of the Ba'th Party (Iraqi wing), but left it years ago.
- Member of the General Committee (politburo) of the General Popular Conference. Seen as a capable, organized, decisive figure.

**Muhammad Hasan Damaj** Minister of Local Administration

- In his fifties, born in the al-Sayani region, Tahlan district, Ibb Province.
- Of a highly-regarded Bakil family, politically active in the early days after the revolution.
- Held several official government posts, among them Governor of Sanaa, Governor of Dhamar, then as Governor of Mahrah.
- He had a prominent role in the Cooperative Movement in the 1970s.
- Member of the Yemeni Reform Bloc.

**Jarallah 'Umar al-Kahali** Minister of Culture

- A leader of the anti-Sanaa National Democratic Front, and a top official of the Popular Unity Party.
- A graduate of the first post-revolution class from the Sanaa Police College. From Dhamar Province.
- Member of the Socialist Party's politburo; one of the most prominent leaders capable of dialogue, and member of the Party's Political office.
- Member of the six-member Committee for Dialogue between the Socialist Party and the Popular Conference.

**Muhammad Salim Ba-Sandawah** Foreign Minister

- member of the Liberation Front in the South; moved to the north during the formation of the Front. Worked jointly with 'Abdallah al-Asnaj.

- Has served as President of the Central Planning Authority, Minister of Development, Minister of Information, and presidential political advisor.
- Has represented both North Yemen and South Yemen at the United Nations before unification.
- Member of the Consultative Council, and of the Council of Deputies after unification.
- A union and political leader, and member of the Permanent (Central) Committee of the General Popular Conference.

**'Abdallah Ahmad Ghanim** Minister of Justice

- Born in Aden.
- Aligned politically with the group that supported former South Yemeni President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. Served as Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs.
- Emigrated to the north after the events of 13 January 1986. Decided, with a group of colleagues, to join the General Popular Conference.
- Member of the General Committee (politburo) of the Popular Conference, official of the Media Office, and editor-in-chief of the newspaper AL-MITHAQ ["The Charter"].

**Ahmad 'Ali al-Salami** Minister of Electricity

- From the al-Bayda' Province in the north.
- A graduate of the Military College; worked in the Armored Corps.
- Defended the revolution, then joined the opposition in the November 5 Movement of 1967.
- One of the most prominent leaders of the National Democratic Front and its the People's Revolutionary Army. Battled the northern regime before unification.
- Member of the Yemeni Socialist Party's politburo.

**Muhammad 'Ali Haytham** Minister of Social Security and Social Affairs

- A prominent figure in the liberation of the South.
- Became Interior Minister in the first government following independence in 1967, the head of government in 1969 after the ouster of President Qahtan al-Sha'bi.
- Relieved of his post and exiled to Moscow for study; fled to Cairo as a political refugee.
- The target of more than one assassination attempt, but still a figure enjoying respect.
- Member of the General Popular Conference, Chief of the Security Committee, the Supreme Election Commission, and member of the six-member Committee for Dialogue between the Conference and the Socialist Party.

**Brigadier General Haytham Qasim Tahir** Minister of Defense

- From the al-Dali' region in Lahij Province; prominent in the events of 13 January 1986, when he led the Armored Corps and played a major role in deciding things in favor of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's wing against that of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad.

- Later appointed Deputy Defense Minister; elevated to membership in the politburo of the Yemeni Socialist Party.
- After unification, served as Defense Minister; has held this post until the present. A military leader who enjoys great respect and admiration.

**Dr. Najib Ghanim Minister of Health**

- A figure with no previous political record.
- Physician and member of the Yemeni Reform Bloc.

**Salih 'Ubayd Ahmad Minister of Transport**

- Served as Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Affairs; nominated member to the politburo of the Socialist Party.
- Member of the moderate wing supporting unification between the Socialist Party and the Popular Conference.
- Served as Minister of Defense in the South after the events of 13 January 1986 in the South.

**Fadl Muhsin 'Abdallah Minister of Fish Resources**

- From the Yafi' region, Lahij Province. Played a celebrated role in the National Front and in stages of its evolution, until it became the Socialist Party in 1978.
- Member of the Socialist Party politburo.
- Assumed the post of Ministry of Supply and Trade in the first government after unification. He broadened his relations with businessmen. Despite what was said in previous years about his involvement in commercial deals, especially as related to imported wheat and flour, he held on to his post in the new government. He belongs to the moderate wing supporting the unification of the Socialist Party with the General Popular Conference.

**Hasan al-Lawzi Minister of Information**

- Graduated in the 1970s from al-Azhar University [Cairo]; worked in a number of government positions, then held various media posts until he accepted the post of Information Minister in the North in the early 1980s.
- Writer and poet, with several published collections of poetry.
- Member of the Permanent (Central) Committee of the Popular Conference. After unification, he served as Minister of Culture and of Tourism.
- He is known to be serious, decisive, and dedicated. Al-Lawzi is from Sanaa Province, from a family originally from Jabal al-Lawz in the Khawlan region.

**Salih Abu-Bakr Bin-Husaynun Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources**

- He is from Hadramawt Province. During the events of 13 January 1986, he was part of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's wing. He is a military man who has served in military capacities in the South, including Army Chief of Staff, among other ministerial government posts such as Minister of Petroleum and Mineral

Resources. He retained this post after unification, until the present day.

**'Alawi Salih al-Salami Minister of Finance**

- Member of the Permanent (Central) Committee in the General Popular Committee.
- From Rida' Province.
- Minister of Finance since the early 1980s

**Yahya Husayn al-'Arshi Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform**

- From Sanaa Province. Member of the Permanent (Central) Committee of the General Popular Conference.
- Previously held numerous government posts, including Minister of Information, then served in the diplomatic corps as Yemen's ambassador to Morocco.
- Appointed Minister of Unification Affairs; after unification, appointed Minister of State for Council of Deputies Affairs.
- Enjoys a reputation for uprightness, honesty, and dedication to his work. Has served as President of the Yemeni Red Crescent Society.

**Al-'Ansi Views on Obstacles to Constitutional Reform**

*93LH0014A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
14 Jul 93 p 7*

[Interview With 'Abd-al-Salam al-'Ansi, GPC General Committee Member, by Faysal Mukarram; date and place not given: "Al-'Ansi: Allied Yemeni Parties Disagree on Three Main Issues in Proposed Constitutional Amendments"]

[Text] Sanaa—The past three weeks have witnessed strong political discussions in Yemen on the proposed constitutional amendments, which are the subject of consultations among the parties to the ruling three-party coalition: The [General] People's Congress [GPC], the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP], and the Yemeni Grouping for Reform [YGR]. But fundamental disagreements have developed among the three parties over some proposed article amendments. Sources close to the consultations have confirmed this fact.

To find out the true nature and the background of this disagreement, AL-HAYAH has interviewed 'Abd-al-Salam al-'Ansi, a GPC General Committee (Political Bureau) member. Because the GPC is the biggest partner in the coalition, AL-HAYAH posed to al-'Ansi these and other questions connected with the constitutional amendments, so he will shed light on them. Al-'Ansi proceeded to say:

"In fact, there are ongoing debates and consultations among the three allied parties, namely the GPC, the YSP, and the YGR, on the constitutional articles proposed for amendment. I believe that the dialogue has come a long way and that agreement has been reached on all the ideas based upon which these articles can be

amended constitutionally. But despite all this, there is disagreement (and this is normal) currently over three out of four issues on which each of the three parties has an opinion, either unilaterally or bilaterally. These issues are centered around:

"First, the nature of the procedures and mechanism in whose light the presidency of the state will be transformed from a presidential council into a president of the republic, as well as some affairs connected with this issue, such as the status of the vice president and whether it is necessary to elect him concurrently with the president, whether the two have to be from the same list, or whether it is enough to elect the president and then let him select his own vice president afterward. The issues also concern whether the election should be by the Chamber of Deputies or by direct popular referendum. This is one of the main issues over which disagreement exists.

"The YSP proposes that it is essential that the vice president be elected by the people with the president on the same list. The YSP also says that the vice president should assume the president's duties in case the presidency becomes vacant for any reason.

"The GPC viewpoint is as follows: The question of a popular referendum on a list carrying the names of the president and the vice president should be disregarded because this is deficient democracy. If necessary, let each party nominate its own candidates for president and vice president. Submit three or four lists to the people and let them choose whomever they want. Moreover, a list may not include a candidate for president and one for vice president unless they are both from the same party, because this is what is logical and reasonable. The GPC refuses to give the vice president (whoever he is) the power of president for the rest of a presidential term if the presidency becomes vacant. Rather, the vice president is to be allowed a period of 60 days during which he performs presidential duties while the presidential post is vacant. This is the first alternative proposed by the GPC."

Regarding this point, al-'Ansi added another alternative, saying:

"The second alternative is to nominate the president independently and submit to the people or the parliament several candidates from among whom they select or elect the president who, in turn, selects his own vice president, if the brothers in the YSP so wish. But they insist, for unclear reasons, on their previous opinion, even though the YGR agrees with the GPC on this particular point."

[Mukarram] What are the other points of disagreement?

[al-'Ansi] The second point of disagreement focuses on the YSP's proposal in the amendment bill that it is impermissible for the president and the vice president to be engaged in any party activity. The YGR supports this proposal, whereas we find that it is strange and, by God,

ridiculous, because it contravenes the rules of democracy. Why should the president and vice president be prohibited from engaging in any party activity even though they are going to be elected on a partisan basis? Why should we deny them this activity and permit it to the prime minister, the Chamber of Deputies speaker, the ministers, and the executive leaders? It has been, and it continues to be, the GPC's opinion that the president, his vice president, and high-ranking officials should be prohibited from utilizing the state's and the people's resources in the interest of their parties and that controls should be established to ensure this end.

The third point of disagreement focuses on the character of local government that was promised by the election platforms of the three allied parties. The disagreement here isn't over the principle of local government or over the citizens' election of their officials and governors in the provinces, but over the method to accomplish this goal. We in the GPC believe that legal controls, rules, and procedures must be established to ensure that this right is exercised according to a province's or governorate's circumstances, to its cultural and intellectual development, and to the nature of its social make-up which enables it to accomplish this goal.

We believe that projecting the local government issue in a binding constitutional provision, without regard for the above factors, is some sort of one-upmanship, or perhaps of wagering on Yemen's unity. Consequently, the GPC refuses to be drawn into this dangerous game. These are the most important points of disagreement. Excluding these points, we have almost reached agreement on the other proposed amendments.

[Mukarram] If these issues aren't settled, what is your vision of the solution?

[al-'Ansi] The fact is that the GPC has a clear vision of how to deal with and tackle such issues. This vision is governed by several factors, most important of which is that the GPC will not go chasing these amendments. If the allied parties don't develop full agreement on the amendments, this shouldn't stop us from giving the Chamber of Deputies enough time to consider and debate these amendments, provided that we all adhere, without any reluctance, to applying provisions of the current constitution, which was subjected to a popular referendum. What I mean is that we see that a decision on the constitutional amendments can be postponed. The current presidential council and the Chamber of Deputies, the country's sole legislative authority, must begin making arrangements immediately to elect a new five-member presidential council so that no constitutional void will develop in the country in about three months.

All parties and independents should submit to the parliament the names of five candidates to form the presidential council and then to elect their chairman from among themselves in application and enactment of provisions of the current Constitution. The GPC believes that this is the ideal solution to overcome the expected political crisis.

[Mukarram] What is the position of the GPC parliamentary bloc on the GPC viewpoint, and will the bloc adhere to this viewpoint in the parliament?

[al-'Ansi] The GPC parliamentary bloc has been informed of this issue and an understanding has been developed with it in a mature democratic climate. Our parliamentary bloc has committed itself to this viewpoint.

I should point out, however, that the parties to the trilateral coalition have become convinced that the proposed constitutional amendment calling for the creation of another legislative council, namely a consultative assembly, is unfeasible. They are content with the Chamber of Deputies as the country's sole legislative authority.

[Mukarram] What is your position on the proposals made by some political figures, namely the figures who held a special symposium on the amendments two days ago and who proposed forming a popular committee to manage the dialogue on this issue?

[al-'Ansi] Despite my respect for them, those who met represent themselves only. If some party figures attended the symposium, then it was out of the desire to get acquainted with other people's opinions and to probe what is being hatched in the dark by tendentious forces that were wounded and defeated abysmally in the election battle. These forces are now trying to create for themselves a new role with which to cover up their abysmal failure and their evidently destructive intentions.

I urge all the patriotic forces that are committed to the Constitution and to democracy not to be trapped by this snare and not to allow their presence in such suspect meetings to be utilized to divide the united national ranks. I say at the top of my voice to all those who believe that they can swim against the current: Take it easy. The people have tested you and they know your true character.

[Mukarram] Don't you think that disagreements among the parties to the coalition in power could create political crises, and perhaps proclaim the plan to merge the GPC and the YSP to be an abysmal failure?

[al-'Ansi] Disagreement among the parties is a democratic manifestation. We have to believe in this principle. As for the issue of a merger with the YSP, it is something for which we aspired prior to the elections because of numerous apprehensions. But now, we in the GPC aren't eager for it and we agree to discuss another coordination formula, whether with the YSP, the YGR, or other patriotic parties.

#### **Ma'rib-al-Jawf Field Gas Reserves Estimated**

93LH0008B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 23 May 93  
p 10

[Text] There is an abundance of gas in the al-Ma'rib fields, in the Yemeni interior, providing a preliminary

average of up to 40 million cubic feet per day marketable beginning with the second half of 1993. Maximum production in these fields is estimated at about 200 million cubic feet by the year 2018. Technical studies confirm that Ma'rib's gas fields could provide about 5 million tons of liquid gas for export to the foreign market beginning in 1999.

A source in the Supreme Council for Economic, Petroleum, and Investment Affairs said that there may be marketing opportunities in line with production volume by that year in countries such as Japan, Korea, Thailand, and perhaps Italy as well.

The companies that conducted studies on exploiting natural gas in Yemen have encouraged projects that would rely on this substance for fuel, especially in the event that prices for oil and natural gas rise steadily. Experts point out that the important issue is that the development of the liquid natural gas project on a global scale would impose major long-term commitments on Yemen.

They say that Yemen's interest in using the natural gas and chances for exploiting it go back to 1988 after the Dutch engineering firm Gasunie undertook a detailed study of the gas exploitation project, reaching the major conclusion that it must be used basically as a fuel for electrical power generating stations and cement plants.

After the unification of Yemen, a review of the natural and associated gas (LPG) was needed, and in 1991 both the Dutch firm mentioned above and the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) were assigned to review the existing study. The view of the experts was that Yemen should set up gas-based power generation projects.

At the same time, the experts warned that there were limits to the amount of gas Yemen could depend upon for local use for a number of years. This was because most of the gas now extracted is retained in oil wells in Ma'rib with the aim of preserving production levels so that it will have a greater economic value than if it had been used as local fuel. Here we must point out that any natural gas project requires investments in the billions of dollars over years, to be spent on essential installations such as pipeline networks, land and sea transport, and special stations and ports.

It said that an American firm, Hunt, discovered large quantities of natural gas in Ma'rib in the early 1980s, or with the beginning of oil exploration. The use of associated gas for local fuel consumption amounted to 196,000 metric tons per year.

Official estimates made public indicate that the commercial amount of gas that can be held at Ma'rib-al-Jawf is as much as 8.6 trillion cubic feet distributed among 17 fields, the largest of which is the al-Rija' field, which contains 14 wells.

Experts believe that the Ma'rib region is rich in gas reserves, and that projected new discoveries will boost the region's reserves to 10 trillion cubic feet.

As to the practical steps taken to benefit from the natural gas and associated gas discoveries, Mr. Rashid al-Kaf, Chairman of the Yemeni Petroleum and Mineral Investment Company, told AL-HAYAH that many American and European companies have submitted plans to the government for exploiting the gas fields in two ways: as fuel for electrical generating stations, and home use, with the surplus exported. The Hunt/Exxon Co. submitted a study to Yemen on this subject, but no action has been taken yet.

It is expected that a serious dialogue with the companies involved in gas exploitation will begin in the immediate future, because the reserves that have been discovered may represent a basis for an export project for many years from the Ma'rib region principally, and from three areas in the Jannah field in Shabwah Province.

With regard to the former transitional period, which lasted for about three years, and whether it in any way affected economic performance in the field of oil and gas, al-Kaf said, "Activity in the oil sector has an effect upon political decision making. We hope now and after the end of the transitional period that there will be ample possibilities for taking serious measures speedily."

As to whether the quantities of oil and gas discovered can cause an economic recovery in the visible future, a Yemeni oil expert said that "I think that in the short term future current production will not be sufficient to bring about a quick revival in the economy. It is not possible to prove the existence of this quantity, unless there are surprise discoveries, or giant discoveries. Nor do I imagine that oil alone can mean a quick solution without a revival of the other economic sectors."

He cited the fact that emphasizing oil and gas exportation "was the best short-term solution as it is well known that gas projects require large capital and huge capabilities."

Turning to gas markets, he said that "they are secure for the time being as long as the export field is entered into quickly, as there are only two major countries in the region exporting that product. If Yemen is very slow, it may lose its markets, because other countries will get into the market and will be intense competitors. They might get control of the markets we had thought secure."

As to the means of achieving this quick action, with Yemen still at the start of the game, al-Kaf said, "We must make a fast decision with a certain party regarding investment in this area. At the same time, if we export with, or better before, the other exporting countries, we will secure the market. Even so, we will secure a market. If we are behind the others, that means that our ability to get markets will be limited, if there is intense competition from neighboring countries. And it must be said that they have signed investment deals, and the first steps of the projects have actually begun."

### Writer Discusses Effects of Yemen Elections

93LH0008C London AL-JAZIRAH AL-'ARABIYAH  
in Arabic Jun 93 pp 33-35

[Analysis by Fu'ad Ibrahim: "The Yemeni Elections' Message to the Kingdom"]

[Text] What did the editors-in-chief of Saudi Arabia's newspapers and magazines intend by showing pictures of Yemeni women casting ballots in Yemen's legislative elections? Was there a message or impression the editors-in-chief wanted to give citizens?

More than one Saudi editor-in-chief said that he really did mean something by printing photographs of Yemeni women casting their votes in the ballot boxes. "I wanted to raise a question in the citizens' minds," said one, "about the lack of elections in our country being unjustifiable while they exist in Yemen."

This question aids the prevailing impression of local and international observers that the Kingdom is the party most hurt by the successful Yemeni elections, and that the success or failure of Yemen's democratic experiment will have its effect on Saudi Arabia's domestic scene, and on the nature of its political change, in the long range at least.

TIME magazine, in its issue of 17 May, before the announcement of the final results of the Yemeni elections, wrote that "the results recorded by last week can hardly be said to have delighted King Fahd, who delayed his promised step toward power sharing, by announcing the Consultative Council."

TIME concluded by saying that "the transition from individual rule to pluralistic party democracy may subsequently encourage political reform in Saudi Arabia and strengthen chances for stability in both countries—Saudi Arabia and Yemen."

Perhaps the fear of the repercussions on Saudi Arabia of the Yemeni experiment was the principal motive for the Saudi government to seek out assurances with regard to the effects of the Yemeni experiment and its ripples inside Saudi Arabia. The latter is surrounded by the cloud of democracy, which is soaking Yemen, Jordan, and Kuwait with its rains, and stands aloof from the center: "God be with us and not against us."

The democratic experiments of these three countries were terrifying to a country struggling to maintain its old ways. It is clear that any democratic experiment in this region surrounding the Kingdom, must send soothing messages to the Kingdom, telling it that it is not threatened by the success of the democratic experiment; that it was limited to its own, and no one else, to assuage the fear of the king and princes.

In an interview with the UAE newspaper AL-KHALIJ on 4 May, Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih said that "Yemeni democracy is the concern of the Yemeni people. We are not exporting theories or experiments to anyone else." This is a message the Yemenis have tried to send out on more than one occasion after the Yemeni

elections, especially as regards settling the disputes between them and the Saudi government. They are fully aware that democracy is one of the greatest obstacles to political settlement between the two countries.

The U.S. Government is the other to have sent a reassuring message to the Kingdom; it even sent one of its officials to stop in Riyadh to inform the king that the Clinton administration was committed to the American-Saudi alliance. A Saudi source has said that President Clinton reassured King Fahd that the United States would not encourage the export of democracy to the Kingdom; that it would stick to the old model of partnership between the two governments.

This was confirmed in a statement from the U.S. State Department on 16 May on the ban of members of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights from going about their business. The statement said that the U.S. State Department "did not interfere in any manner whatsoever in Saudi Arabia's internal affairs."

American sources quoted a human rights official in the U.S. State Department as saying that the United States had agreed with Saudi Arabia that the Clinton administration would turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the Kingdom in exchange for the Kingdom's active participation in the Middle East peace process.

The problem is that the government still deals with democracy as a toy that can be exported, and as a palpable, material thing that can be controlled. Thus it has been banned from import into the Kingdom, but the Saudi censor has forgotten that democracy is an inner interaction, a hidden movement that passes through borders, means of communication and transport, the media, cultural encounters, civilized continuity, and social interaction; these cannot be censored. Because of this, the fear of Yemeni democracy spreading into Saudi Arabia has been realized; the Yemeni message has been received loud and clear. The Saudi media has carried details of the Yemeni elections and the results, from the early preparations, to the setting up of ballot boxes and the swarming of Yemeni men and women voters to vote. "Nearly 700,000 women registered as voters, and there were more than fifty women candidates."

Citizens of the Kingdom felt deeply—as the Yemeni message made clear—the necessity of a transition of the Yemeni election experiment into Saudi Arabia. One of the beautiful coincidences was that the same day the press published President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's statement that the special nature of the democratic experiment is limited to the Yemeni people, the BBC was broadcasting an interview with Dr. Mis'ari, Secretary of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights, in which he expressed his admiration of the Yemeni election experiment. He said that the rate of educated people was greater in Saudi Arabia than in Yemen, and that middle class people were well suited to elections; so why should there not be elections in our country?

What was very clear, too, was the systematic attention and great admiration on the part of public opinion in the

Kingdom. This became clear after the announcement of the results, when some religious and political figures sent messages of congratulations to the successful candidates. Shaykh Salman al-'Awdah sent a cable of congratulations to 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, President of the Yemeni Reform Grouping, in which he indicated that Muslims everywhere supported the Bloc. Other Saudi figures sent letters of support to President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and his deputy, 'Ali Salim al-Bidh, among them the King's letter to the Yemeni president and a large number of positive press notices about the Yemeni elections printed by local newspapers or Saudi newspapers abroad.

#### Significance of the Yemeni Event

The experiment of Yemen's first legislative elections was extraordinary by any standards. It represented the extra phase of a cultural transformation, after the unity experiment of 22 May 1990. The election experiment grew out of an experience unique in the Arab world, with the exception of limited experiments in Lebanon and Egypt. It is also an experiment encircled by every type of obstacle—the extremely complex tribal social structure, and simple intellectual structure, illiteracy in Yemen at approximately 70 percent, and an uncertain economic structure, especially in the last three years (the same period as unification, to say nothing, temporarily, of the promised economic outburst after the discovery of oil, the unstable political structure, especially after unification, both internally and externally, conservative Yemeni traditions, and tense security conditions.

It might have been possible for these hindering factors all together to cause the Yemeni elections to fail, and for the Yemenis to have been frustrated because they did not walk through the gates of democracy, as part of a process of natural transformation in societies, because Yemenis lacked the qualifications for democracy, as everyone had thought.

But the impressions of international observers watching the details of the Yemeni election process from the beginning to the end, were exactly the opposite. They were unanimous in their view that the elections were well conducted. The Yemenis had shown a great awareness of the subject of democracy. Everyone wanted the experiment to succeed, regardless of the results, though Western diplomats' expectations as regards the likelihood of armed conflicts between larger political forces in Yemen, especially between the socialist and reform blocs, were also the opposite. 'Abdallah al-Ahmar announced a few days before balloting started, in an interview with AL-HAYAH on 24 April, that he would accept the election results, whatever they were, and that he would do so from his "love for the country." 'Ali Salim al-Bidh said, in an interview with AL-HAYAH on 5 May, that the achievement of the election at their set time on 27 April, was "a gain for us all, regardless of whichever parties' shares."

What was even clearer was the competence of the leaders of the three major parties, their flexibility in dealing with

one another, and acceptance of one another. Secondly, they relinquished in case of victory, in submission to one thing only, "the national interest." President 'Ali Salih showed that he was ready to relinquish his presidency if that would serve the public interest, and 'Ali Salim al-Bidh showed flexibility in giving up leadership of the party and then the vice-presidency. Al-Ahmar, too, made clear his readiness to accept the results despite some inroads in various election offices.

Something else must be decided, despite what was said about irregularities in some polling places, attributable to technical and administrative problems, such as the fact that some election committee members wrote in for illiterates while not allowing their families or dependents to write for them. There were armed security and army personnel at polling centers and other technical and administrative problems, though the fact is that Yemen's electoral experiment proved the honesty of the Supreme Election Council, and the results vindicated it as well.

The question remains: What do the Yemeni legislative elections offer at the local, Arab, and global levels; is what happened in Yemen an acceptable model to be emulated in the Arab countries, putting aside the particularities of the democratic experiment in Yemen?

It may be said in response that there is a greater significance that came out of the Yemeni electoral experiment, which we might consider:

#### **First: the Balance of Power**

One of the provocative surprises of the Yemeni elections that stirred the internal balance of power was the fact that the Conference Party won 40 percent of the seats in Parliament, or less than an absolute majority; in another sense the Conference has not become the ruling party, or the predominant political power in Yemen. However, the major political parties divided their shares in a moderate fashion—something that has not been seen before in the Arab world.

To be sure, this balance offers a natural and suitable climate for the process of political transformation. The Conference Party held on to the presidency, the Socialist Party the prime ministership, and the Reform Bloc the Parliament. In accordance with this base for political balance, a pluralistic ruling coalition can be set up, with each side preserving its rights and its share of power, without the outright victory of any one party, family, or individual.

#### **Second: Popular Representation and Political Stability**

Those who spoke of the Yemeni question have always had to address the topic of domestic stability, and to link it to the ruling regime. Yemen, with its regional and provincial divisions, its parties, its economic conditions and regional and global alliances, cannot be stable under the rule of an individual, a movement, or a party, to the exclusion of other elements—thus the agreement of all upon mutual recognition among the collectivity of the country's workforce. The recognition embraced all citizens, men and women, and all provincial, partisan,

sectarian and tribal affiliations, because the establishment of a new affiliation must include the start of recognition of the previously existing private affiliations, and from there forge a mass and comprehensive affiliation in which all may put aside their private loyalties for the good of the new, public, comprehensive affiliation. This would provide domestic stability and make everyone feel that they have a stake that can be preserved in the framework of the national or governmental authority. This was the subject of great interest to the Yemenis in order to eliminate the option of arms in the language of domestic dialogue.

#### **Third: Sharing Power**

Outside interference in Yemen's internal affairs is one of the wide gaps in the wall of government in Yemen; it is also one of the country's major weak points. The reason for that is that there are political or social forces absent or absented from power, which find their own power in the weakness of the political system. This meets with a desire abroad, for the royal family—represented by [Saudi] Prince Sultan, who is in charge of the Yemen subject—uses some tribes as its long arm of influence in Yemeni domestic affairs.

Hence the lament over the establishment of a pluralistic, democratic system embracing all sides by holding general elections, achieving fair power sharing, which is followed by popular rule through the representatives of the people. One of the results is the participation of all in the profit, loss, and awareness of Yemeni citizens that they have a stake that must be protected and defended, the opposite of what is obtained in many Arab countries, which depend on the rule of an individual, a clique, or a tribe.

#### **The Country's Reputation**

Democracy has benefited Yemen's good reputation at the global level more than billions of dollars have done for a country like Saudi Arabia, which is still, every day, losing its reputation at the Arab, Islamic, and international levels.

The democratic experiment has demanded its respect from the world. That is what moved the media of the West and the east to cover the Yemeni elections, and to print reports full of praise and admiration, all of which made Yemen appear a civilized country.

An American journalist stopped speaking, unable to summon from his English vocabulary the words to express his surprise at what had occurred in Yemen. He did not need fluency to state his position on the Yemeni elections. We are not from Yemen, and no one has been waiting for our opinion, but we would like the Kingdom to try this kind of experiment, instead of devoting money to buy a synthetic reputation. This was truly an experiment worthy of the respect of all.

On 10 May, President Clinton sent a message to Yemeni President 'Ali Abdallah Salih through David Mack, America's Assistant Deputy Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, in which he voiced his congratulations on

the success of Yemen's general elections. He also expressed his hope that "the Yemeni people and government would continue the process of building upon the basis of high democratic principles in unified Yemen." He said that "the democratic process may sometimes be difficult. Most of the time it calls for courage, patience, and perseverance, and yet the price and the rewards of democracy represented in political legitimacy and the growing respect for human rights and honor, and a citizen's feeling that he has a stake in his country, make it all worthwhile."

Without a doubt, Yemen's democracy was more useful than financial resources in improving Yemen's image. The world spoke of Yemeni democracy for free, and it was not political toadying or hypocrisy. The world speaks of it because it truly is an event that deserves praise and respect.

It was regrettable that, when the foreign media reported the news of the Yemeni elections, they constantly referred to the Kingdom's role in hindering democracy in Yemen. They also referred to the Saudi Government's anxiety at this democracy. The TIMES headline said, "Yemeni Elections Rouse Saudis' Anxiety." TIME magazine said that "the Saudis' scorn for democracy will not deter the Yemenis." The FINANCIAL TIMES editorial of 14 May was more direct; it touched a nerve with the Saudi ambassador in London, especially what Eric Watkins said—that the last thing the royal family wanted to see was a relatively successful democracy in Yemen.

In any case, the democratic experiments that have started around the Kingdom's perimeter have actually flowed into the desert, to join the rising river of popular demands.



## IRAN

### Roundup of Illegal Afghans Planned

93LA0100H Tehran ABRAR in Persian 23 May 93 p 9

[Text] About 850,000 Afghans are now living in Iran illegally and without any kind of documents, and a project to round them up throughout the country and determine their status, and also to deal with unauthorized Afghan workers, is being implemented.

Hoseyni, the Ministry of the Interior's general manager of alien and emigrant affairs, announced the above in an interview with IRNA. He added: Currently more than 2,042,000 Afghan nationals are living in Iran, and 518,000 of the Afghans living in Iran returned to their country last year.

He said: Of the total number of Afghans who have been identified living in Iran, 160,000 are living in the "guest city" and 1.68 million are living in the city.

Hoseyni said: Based on the trilateral treaty between Iran, Afghanistan and the United Nations, the Kabul government is required to maintain security and protect the rights of Afghans who return to their country.

He also discussed the process of Afghans returning to their country under current conditions in Afghanistan. He said: The current conflicts in Afghanistan, in view of the fact that most of them are taking place in Kabul, do not have a serious effect on the return of Afghans to their country.

He added: The statistics on emigrants who are returning to Afghanistan from Iran, unlike Pakistan, where Afghan emigration has been stopped, are significant.

He said: At the trilateral meeting attended by representatives from the High Council on Refugees, both Iran and Afghanistan emphasized the insufficiency of the aid from this organization to the Afghan emigrants, and the matter is being studied by the United Nations.

He added: In view of the planning done this Christian year, about 700,000 Afghan emigrants living in Iran will return to their country.

### Official Details New IRGC, Army Missions

93LA0100A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 May 93 p 8

[Text] In dealing with counterrevolutionaries, we recognize no borders. If Iraq or the officials of Iraqi Kordestan cannot stop the terrorist activities of the hypocrites, we consider it our right to destroy them on Iraqi soil.

Brigadier General Guard Commander Mohammad 'Ali Ja'fari, commander of the revolution guard infantry forces stated the above in an interview with news correspondents. He said: After the Islamic Republic of Iran's air attack on the hypocrites' positions on Iraqi soil, this group lost its operational capacity. The new movements by this counterrevolutionary group are quite minor and have more propaganda value than military value. He added: With the increased presence of revolution guard infantry forces and their new mission, by the end of the

month of Khordad [21 Jun], the nation's western borders will be completely secured and the harassing attacks by the hypocrites will be ended.

The commander of the revolution guard infantry forces said that the hypocrites are responsible for the violation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. He said: The entry of Iran's military forces into Iraqi soil was a defensive measure and it is necessary to defeat the counterrevolutionaries. He continued: Talks are now being held between the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and officials of Iraqi Kordestan to stop the hypocrite attacks on Iraqi soil.

Brigadier General Guard Commander Ja'fari discussed the new mission of the revolution guards, stated by the exalted leader. He said: After the end of the imposed war there was a division of labor between the military and police forces. In this, the army has the job of dealing with the enemy's regular and mechanized forces at the borders, and the revolution guards have the duty of dealing with irregular forces and domestic enemies. He added: Wherever necessary, the revolution guards will help their army and police brothers achieve security.

The commander of the revolution guard infantry forces assessed the work of the revolution guards in the southeast part of the country as quite positive. He said: Since the middle of the year 1371 [23 Sep 1992], the responsibility of dealing with smugglers and insurgents in the southeast and likewise of putting down the counterrevolutionaries has fallen to the revolution guards, and during these few months the responsibility of security in this area has been carried out well.

Brig. Gen. Guard Commander Ja'fari discussed the maneuvers of the revolution guard infantry forces on the occasion of the anniversary of the liberation of Khorramshahr on 3 Khordad [24 May]. He said: To keep alive the memory of the brave combatants of Islam in Operation Beyt al-Moqadas, which led to the liberation of Khorramshahr, a maneuver will be carried out in Khorramshahr in which a number of those who took part in Operation Beyt al-Moqadas will be present. He continued: The number of forces participating in these maneuvers will be between 8,000 and 10,000, and will include an armored brigade with new equipment.

### Industrial Factory Census Planned

93LA0100G Tehran ABRAR in Persian 23 May 93 p 4

[Text] Economic Service. The Training and Justification Seminar for the National Census of Large Industrial Factories convened yesterday at the Iran Statistics Center. During the seminar issues pertaining to the project will be discussed and studied.

The Public Relations Office of the Iran Statistics Center will study issues related to the project at this justification and training seminar, which will last until the end of five Khordad [25 May] and be attended by a group of experts from the Plan and Budget Organization, who will be responsible for carrying out the project in the nation's various provinces.

A spokesman for the Public Relations Office of the Iran Statistics Center announced that the census of the nation's large industrial factories will begin simultaneously throughout the country in the second half of the month of Khordad [6-21 Jun] and will continue for two and one-half months.

In this census, information on the number of industrial products, the value of the products, employment, wages and salaries and investment by the nation's industrial factories will be collected and the results made public in a statistical publication.

#### Official Says Rustling Cause of High Meat Prices

93LA0100F Tehran ABRAR in Persian 22 May 93 p 9

[Text] Tabriz—IRNA. With increased livestock exports through the nation's northwest borders to Turkey and Iraqi Afghanistan, the price of red meat has increased in the province of East Azarbaijan.

Because of the scandalous difference between prices for fresh meat in Turkey and in our country, in the last few months livestock rustlers have taken hundreds of head of live cattle and sheep out of the country and sold them.

Dr. Mohammad Reza Khodavardizadeh, chief of the province of East Azarbaijan Livestock Veterinary Organization, in announcing the above, warned about the frightening consequences of the effects to prices and the area's livestock population caused by the removal of livestock.

He called upon police and border agents to prevent the removal of livestock by increasing the number of border control agents.

Dr. Khodavardizadeh discussed the import of livestock from the Republic of Azerbaijan to the province of East Azarbaijan. He said: Since early this year, due to some domestic and economic problems in this republic, the import of livestock, which is said to have been the cause of the spread of livestock diseases, has been stopped.

He said: Based on reports received from the northern border areas, the smuggling of livestock from the Republic of Azerbaijan into the province of East Azarbaijan has already been stopped.

He added: In this regard, with respect to imports and exports of livestock and dairy products in the northern part of the province, the Bileh Savar livestock quarantine station, with modern laboratory equipment, will be used until the end of the month of Khordad this year [21 June].

It is worth mentioning that concurrent with the onset of the livestock smuggling in the northwestern areas during the last month, the price of mutton and beef has increased at least 1,000 rials [RIs] per kilogram.

Already mutton and beef are being sold at RIs5,000 and RIs5,200 rials in Tabriz, respectively.

Yet because of the arrival of the livestock grazing season, most livestock keepers are not selling their livestock on domestic markets, and this is also leading to higher prices for meat.

#### Syringe Factory Inaugurated

93LA0074A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
9 May 93 p 2

[Text] Yesterday, simultaneous with the anniversary of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, inaugurated the Crescent Syringe Factory of Iran and underlined the necessity for the expansion of the plant.

This unique factory, from the viewpoint of production capacity in the Middle East, can produce 520 million syringes and needles; thus after meeting domestic needs it will be able to export as well.

Mrs. Rahideh is the director of the Crescent Syringe Factory of Iran and this complex became a reality through her perseverance.

The Crescent Syringe Factory of Iran, which is located in the vicinity of Karaj, occupies 28 hectares of land of which 30,000 square meters of space is occupied by the building. The factory took less than 20 months to build and is affiliated with the Islamic Republic Red Crescent Society.

At the inauguration ceremonies of this production unit, in which deputies of the president; the ministers of health, Treatment and Medical Training; and that of Industries and Hojjat ol-Eslam val Moslemin Ghayuri, representative of the Velayat-e-Faqih, Dr. Vahid Dastjerdi, secretary general of the said organization together with some other state officials were present. Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, at first visited various sections of the production assembly of syringe and needles. Thereafter, in a gathering of the engineers and directors of the various units of the factory while expressing his appreciation for Mrs. Rahideh's efforts for self-sufficiency in this specific area also, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, extended his congratulations to the workers of the said factory and thanked all the responsible officials for expediting construction of the assembly and saving of foreign exchange as well. Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani further expressed the hope that Iran will soon become a major exporter of this particular product.

Later the president suggested guidance for better operational procedures of the factory and underlined the necessity of production volume in the future as well.

Likewise, in an interview the president stated: This particular industry whose raw materials are secured domestically and is not a dependent industry, is very important to us. In addition to providing our own domestic needs we can also be an exporter, too.

Furthermore, Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, expressed his appreciation to Mrs. Rahideh for reality to this plant and emphasized that women can be effective and prominent

managers in our country; however, as a result of historical cruelty to women, even in many so-called developed countries, which claim complete freedom, women get little chance to blossom.

Also Mrs. Rahideh, the director of this production unit, in a speech noted that the plant has been realized through the use of \$13 million of foreign exchange quota available to the president and likewise, its equivalent rial credit of 750 million tomans have been secured by the Red Crescent Society of Iran.

She further explained the construction of the assembly to the president and added: In its first phase of production this factory can save the country 6 million dollars in foreign exchange.

Moreover, at these ceremonies, Dr. Vahid Dastjerdi, secretary general of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran explained various installation phases of this large medical complex to the president.

#### **Official Details Shipping Company Activities**

*93LA0074B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
11 May 93 p 3*

[Text] Last year the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic carried a total freight of 6 million tons by its own and other chartered vessels.

Yesterday, Mohammad Hossein Dajmar, executive director of the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic of Iran while making the above statement at a gathering of the reporters, on the occasion of the 26th anniversary of the said company, also started: Last year the company had \$500 million of foreign exchange income.

He further said: The highest record of carried freight was reached in 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] whereas each ship made a 4.2 median voyage.

With respect to the payment of demurrage he further said: Last year a total of \$20 million of demurrage was paid as a result of delays in unloading shipments, while at the same time the payment of bonus for prompt unloading of cargo approached 5 million dollars.

According to the same source, the Val-Fajr Shipping Company made 246 trips in the same period and carried 100,000 tons of cargo and 64,000 passengers to and from the various countries of the Persian Gulf. This was in addition to ferrying 47,000 tons of freight and another 65,000 passengers to the interior ports and islands of our own country as well.

On the other hand, a regular shipping line has been put into operation in the Caspian Sea for carrying freight and passengers between Iran and the Republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, by which 49 trips a total of 134,000 tons of cargoes were transported in a short time.

Dajmar further added: Last year the aforementioned company also used the services of the Amir-Kabir vessel for shipping containerized refrigeration trucks in the Persian Gulf region and the passenger vessel of Mirza

Kuchek-Khan in the Caspian Sea; it also established new shipping line between Iran and Brazil.

With regard to the company's other activities, he said: In order to facilitate the transfer of passengers to Iran, it was also decided to ship the vehicles of the passengers traveling to Iran from the neighboring Persian Gulf regions on the same vessel as well.

In a similar fashion, Kuwait has agreed to allow annually, 10,000 Iranian passengers to take their vehicles onboard ships to traveling to Saudi Arabia by sea or going through its border by land.

Regarding an increase in the capacity of the shipping fleet of the country he said: A contract for the purchase of four multipurpose vessels has been signed with China and they are to be delivered two years from now. These freight ships will each have a capacity of 22,000 tons. According to Dajmar, a contract for the construction of a container truck carrier was signed with Sadri Ship Building Company of Bushehr, which will be delivered in two years. At the same time, a faster passenger vessel called Katamara is under construction in Australia, which is due for delivery in eight months.

He went on to emphasize: By next year a new shipping line between Iran and Kazakhstan and another line between Iranian ports and those of East Africa will also be established.

With regard to the further popularity of the company, the executive director stated: With due respect to the fact that under a system of government control this company will not be able to compete with major foreign shipping lines, in order to enhance its efficiency it has been decided therefore to offer shares to the public through stock exchange in the future.

In conclusion, he said: The freight capacity of the vessels of the Shipping Company of the Islamic Republic is 2.4 million tons.

#### **Imports of Red Meat To Decrease**

*93LA0074C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
15 May 93 p 3*

[Text] The Minister of Reconstruction Crusade announced: In order to support domestic products and the stockbreeders of the country, during the current year there will be an appreciable decrease in the import of red meat.

Foruzesh, while pointing to the capacity and favorable production possibilities of the country, emphasized the necessity for investment and support of domestic meat producers.

The Minister of Reconstruction Crusade said: Along with the execution of the government's support policy it has been decided during the current year, instead of importing 240,000 tons of red meat as was ratified, to import only 90,000 tons.

Foruzesh, the Minister of Reconstruction Crusade, who was being interviewed by IRNA's correspondent at the

end of his trip to the East Azerbaijan Province, stated: During the current year the production level of chicken and eggs will reach 900,000 tons, and on this level we will no longer need to import chickens.

The Minister of Reconstruction Crusade noted that during the current year, the credits available to his ministry stand at 100 billion tomans. He said that half of this credit will be used for the development and reconstruction of the rural areas.

The Minister of Reconstruction Crusade on his trip to the East Azerbaijan Province also visited other ongoing projects and plans of the reconstruction crusade in the towns of Maragheh, Hasht-Rud, Mianeh, and Sarab. On his visit to the township of Hasht-Rud and Mianeh he broke grounds for the construction of two rural industrial compounds as well. On these two compounds will be assembled 38 rural industrial workshops in order to provide employment and support for the local residents.

#### **Food Imports Not Proportionate to Population Growth**

*93LA0100E Tehran ABRAR in Persian 20 May 93 p 9*

[Text] In view of Iran's population growth, foodstuff imports have decreased, so that the amount of imported rice decreased from 600,000 tons in the year 1355 [21 Mar 1976-20 Mar 1977] to 400,000 tons last year.

In announcing the above, Engineer Raheb, chief of the Gilan Agricultural Organization, called for basic attention to the agricultural sector.

He said: This province produces more than 10 percent of the nation's agricultural products. In doing this, it allocates 60 percent of its lands to grow rice, and this is 40 percent of the nation's total land allocated to grow rice.

The chief of agriculture for the province of Gilan mentioned this organization's basic programs, including retaining water, creating strong dams, building a bridge over the Shafarud River, providing agricultural health insurance with family coverage, setting a guaranteed price that is appropriate to the cost of production and inflation, and creating projects for the supervisory network. He added: I hope the agricultural sector will reclaim its true place.

#### **Official Details W. Azerbaijan Mining Activities**

*93LA0074D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 13 May 93 p 5*

[Text] During the current year 1.4 million tons of mineral products were excavated from the active mines of West Azerbaijan.

Gharebaghian, the director general of the Mines and Metals of West Azerbaijan, in a conversation with IRNA's correspondent further added: With continuing exploration operations, the gold mine of Takeb and the bauxite mine of Bowkan will become operational in the near future.

He further stated: The principal agreements for 11 production mineral units were issued last year. These mines contain varieties of quarry and flagstones, field stones, aluminum ores, industrial salt, coal briquettes, oxide minerals, and micronized powders. In addition, the extraction of magnesium and other minerals from Lake Urumiyeh is also included in the aforementioned agreements.

He also noted that there were 11 principal agreements for the exploration of iron ore mines, silicate, argil, chromite, dolomite, and talc as well. Furthermore, an expanse of 780 km containing ferromanganese and perolite in the regions of Khoy and Siah-Cheshmeh has been discovered during the current year.

Similarly, he noted that from the 26 active mines of lime, gypsum, and building-stone quarries of West Azerbaijan more than 1.3 million tons of materials are excavated annually, which are put at the disposal of cement and gypsum plants. While pointing to the exploitation of new mines he said: During the current year utilization of talc mines with an annual production capacity of 5,000 tons, three kaoline mines with a total production capacity of 16,000 tons, one mica mine with a 1,000-ton capacity and one arsenic trioxide mine with a production capacity of 2,000 tons will begin.

He added: Right now proper use is being made of several mines containing ornamental building stones such as granite, marble, and travertine. Moreover, 38 more permits have been issued for the exploration and discovery of new decorative-ornamental building stones.

With proper utilization of the rich mines of West Azerbaijan a major portion of the mineral needs of the petroleum industry, rubber manufacturing and steel plants and those of cement and gypsum factories will be secured accordingly.

#### **Semnan Mineral Exports Totaled 80,000 Tons**

*93LA0074E Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 17 May 93 p 7*

[Text] Semnan—IRNA—Last year the volume of exports of minerals from the province of Semnan reached 80,000 tons. Compared with the same period of a year ago, this figure shows an increase of 55,000 tons. Engineer Hamedian, director general of the Mines and Metals of the province of Semnan while making the above statement to the IRNA's correspondent, further added: The extracted materials comprise chromite and mineral salt.

#### **Official on Sugarcane Factory Production Plans**

*93LA0074F Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian 13 May 93 p 5*

[Text] Shushtar—JAHAN-E ESLAM's correspondent: More than 7,000 individuals will be provided with employment after the large sugarcane factory of Sha'ibieh in Shushtar becomes operational.

Engineer Hossein Amili, director of the plantation unit and sugarcane industry in an interview with the correspondents while making the aforementioned remarks also explained other programs under consideration for this great complex in the country.

At first he addressed the issue of plantation unit and sugarcane industry in the village of Sha'ibieh and noted that all the contracts for development projects of the agricultural sector of this large complex have been duly awarded and the relevant contractors have accordingly begun their share of work on the project. He further stated: The plantation and sugarcane industry of Sha'ibieh, which is located 30 km southwest of Shushtar township is one of the seven sugarcane units of the Sugar Cane Expansion Company and its subsidiary industries, of which all three pertinent sectors of agriculture, housing and urban development together with the sector of industry studies have been completed.

Regarding the financial resources of this important plan, he said: The financial resources of this project have been secured by the difference in the revenue in the purchase of sugar at government-stabilized prices and the sale of the same at industrial and guild prices. Similarly, the foreign exchange resources of the project have been secured through savings in the exchange rate of production goods and thus in no way has it had any impact on the regular state budget or foreign exchange resources of the country.

He cited the total investment of this project in the area of agriculture and industry at about 243 billion rials and that for the sector of housing and urban development at close to 54 billion rials.

Engineer Amili went on to explain the particulars of plantation unit and industry of Sha'ibieh: This unit contains 12,000 hectares of land for the plantation of sugarcane, of which 10,000 hectares will be used for regular annual cultivation and the remaining 2,000 hectares will be set aside for rotation farming.

He further added: The sugar production and refinery with a total capacity of 100,000 tons, on an annual basis; the livestock food plant with a total capacity for the production of 100,000 tons of food per year; and neopan plants with 100,000-ton capacity per annum are some of the factories that will be constructed in Sha'ibieh.

Furthermore, he pointed to the subject of employment and said: About 3,500 jobs will be directly created while close to 2,500 indirect jobs related to the factory will benefit from this complex as well.

In conclusion, with regard to the founding of the Sugar Cane Expansion Company and its subsidiary industries Engineer Amili said: The execution of the sugarcane expansion and its subsidiary industries began with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly on 31 January 1990 and thereafter the Ministry of Agriculture in pursuance of the execution of the context of Paragraph H of the Addendum 29 of the laws pertaining to the First Plan of Economic Expansion, was charged to carry out

the plan, therefore in order to execute the said plans, the Sugar Cane Expansion Company and its subsidiary industries were formed, based on the laws ratified on 1 June 1991.

### **Construction of New Power Station Begins in Shiraz**

*93LA0074G Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
13 May 93 p 5*

[Text] Construction operations of the new compound-style power plant of Shiraz has begun.

With regard to the aforementioned activities, at a ceremony that was attended by Zangeneh, Minister of Energy, Engineer Eskandari, director of the project said: With the utilization of the compound cycle power plant of Shiraz, a total of 1,110 MW electricity will be added to the network of the country.

He further added: This power station, which consists of six gas and 3 steam turbines, will be constructed with a total credit of 350 billion rials and occupy 220 hectares of land.

Eskandari went on to say: The principal fuel for this station is gas and so far contracts have been signed with several foreign countries for the purchase and manufacture of various components of the plant in question.

### **Metal Galvanizing Unit Begins Operation in Mashhad**

*93LA0074H Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
16 May 93 p 5*

[Text] Last Thursday the first metal galvanizing unit, with an annual capacity of 3,000 tons was put into operation in Mashhad.

According to IRNA's correspondent this unit will be able to galvanize small metal pieces such as bolts, nuts, piping connection fixtures, and similar components used in the splicing of power lines and communications networks, thus avoiding the problem of rusting or oxidation of these pieces.

This unit occupies 4 hectares of land while the building proper employs an area of 1,000 square meters. The construction cost of the project was \$380,000 plus 420 million rials. The quality of the products of the said plant will equal international standards and thus save the country 8 million Deutsche marks [as published].

The executive director of the galvanizing liner unit of Mashhad while making the above statement also said: Every year billions of dollars of damage is caused to the various organizations throughout the world as a result of oxidation of unprotected metal parts.

At the inauguration ceremonies of this unit a number of artisans and industrialists were also present.

### **Expansion of Rural Industries Planned**

*93LA0074I Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
16 May 93 p 5*

[Text] In the current year a total of 42.4 billion rials of development credit and 230 billion rials of bank credit have been allocated for the expansion of rural industries.

According to the public relations office of the Ministry of Reconstruction Crusade, during the current year the said ministry will, with the allocation of 5 percent of the development, national, provincial credits, together with 230 billion rials of bank credit, take steps in issuing 1,500 principal agreements and 600 permits for exploration, exploitation purposes.

Meanwhile, during the current year the second phase of 34 industrial units in the rural regions will reach completion. Similarly, proper measures will be taken to create and expand carpet-weaving cooperatives.

In a like manner, with due regard to the floating of foreign exchange rates, in the current year, principal agreements will be issued for those kinds of rural industries, which in addition to their access to the raw materials such as agricultural products, will also need less foreign exchange credit as well.

The aforementioned ministry cited the main purpose of the expansion of rural industries as the creation of employment opportunities, an increase in the income level of rural inhabitants and discouraging their migration to the cities.

Here it should be noted that the priority of the issuance of principal agreements includes such industries as dairy products packaging and proper refrigeration units, industries related to the production and repair of agricultural tools and equipment, stockbreeding, hunting, lumber industries, mineral and nonmetallic industries, clothing, leather manufacturing, and other rural job-producing industries as well.

### **Lack of Customs Hurting Central Province Exports**

*93LA0074J Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
16 May 93 p 5*

[Text] Lack of custom facilities in the Central Province is the biggest obstacle in exports of the province.

According to IRNA, Engineer Yazdani, deputy director for planning at the central governor general's office, in a meeting of the foreign trade committee of the province criticized the lack of cooperation of the Customs Organization of Iran for constructing a customs house in the Central Province.

He added: A nice piece of land was selected for the construction of the customs house, but the Customs Organization of Iran opposed the execution of the project for the mere reason that this piece of property was located about 40 km from Arak.

He further added: This year it is planned that the National General Warehouse Company will begin construction of the customs house on the said property.

Likewise, Zamani, general director of trade of the province in this regard stated: As a result of a lack of a customs house, proper control of the Central Province exports and attainment of statistical reports in the area of exports have faced some difficulties.

He went on to add: In the opinion of exporters, lack of customs facilities in the Central Province together with a lack of established rules and regulations dealing with exports, a lack of cooperative spirit between and among various governmental departments and exporters, and nonfamiliarization of the merchants with the world markets are considered as some of the existing difficulties.

He further said: Right now, on a daily basis, world trading and commercial data are put at the disposal of the General Commerce Chamber of the Central Province and this office is prepared to pass the same information to the exporters.

### **Funds Allocated for Highway Maintenance**

*93LA0074K Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
10 May 93 p 3*

[Text] In the current year 140 billion rials have been allocated to maintain the country's highways.

Engineer Hava'i, deputy minister for Road and Transportation, on Saturday in a meeting with the responsible officials of the road departments made the above statement.

He further said: This figure shows an increase of 50 billion rials over the credit allocation of last year. In order to execute the new method of road maintenance on the axial basis, in the current year a credit of 20 billion rials has been set aside accordingly.

Engineer Hava'i further stated: In the new method of road maintenance all personnel and possibilities of the various road and transportation departments have been put to work with regard to road repairs, reconstruction, and elimination of accident-prone segments of the roads throughout the country.

He went on to add: Work on the elimination of accident-prone segments of the frequently used roads began two years ago, with a view to decreasing the number of collisions, thus the same pattern of work, on a larger scale will continue during the current year.

### **Mahan Air Airline Company Begins Operations**

*93LA0074L Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian  
17 May 93 p 5*

[Text] The first scheduled flight of Mahan Air Airlines Company from Kerman to Mashhad was completed yesterday.

According to IRNA, the first scheduled flight of Mahan Air Airline was carried out by a Topolov passenger

plane, with a capacity for 168 passengers. On this flight a group of the respected families of the martyrs, self-sacrificing and invalid individuals together with some of the responsible officials of the province were present.

### Shahriar Maternity Hospital Inaugurated

93LA0097A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 May 93 p 9

[Text] Shahriar—ABRAR Correspondent: A 70-bed hospital and maternity ward in the Municipality of Shahriar was opened yesterday morning on the eve of the anniversary of the liberation of Khorramshahr, in ceremonies attended by Dr. Malekzadeh, minister of health, health care and medical education, the Friday imam, the governor of Shahriar and local officials.

This hospital is located on a 6,000 square-meter plot and has a foundation of 2,100 square meters. It has an emergency ward, a gynecological and maternity ward, general surgery, a laboratory, radiology, a blood bank, and three operating rooms.

It cost 2 billion rials to build and equip the aforementioned hospital, which has four stories. Part of the costs was met by the governor's office, and the rest by credits from the Ministry of Health, Health Care and Medical Education.

During his trip to Shahriar, Dr. Malekzadeh also attended ceremonies to begin construction on the 300-bed hospital in Shahriar.

This hospital will be built on a 80,000-square-meter site using aid from the public and government credits.

Because the municipality of Shahriar, with a population exceeding 70,000 people, lacked a hospital the citizens and rural people in this municipality were obliged to go to Tehran and Karaj for medical treatment and cures. It is worth mentioning that Account no. 36200 at the Shahriar branch of the National Bank was opened for charitable contributions to this hospital.

### Sale of Farabi Factory Pharmaceuticals Begins

93LA0097B Tehran ABRAR in Persian 22 May 93 p 10

[Text] Esfahan—IRNA: The first series of products produced by the Farabi Pharmaceutical Factories in the Middle East, including antibiotics for oral consumption and injection, came into the nation's drug markets on Thursday.

This factory produces 1.2 billion capsules and 25 million ampules of dry suspension liquid, which account for 66 and 65 percent of the domestic market, respectively.

The Farabi Pharmaceutical Factories were established with an investment of 14 billion rials. In the first phase they will save \$24 million and in the second phase they will save \$52 million in foreign exchange.

The added value of this factory is 26 percent and its shareholders are the Iran National Industries Organization, the Pars Drug Company, the Sepah Bank, and the Kusar Company.

### Hormozegan Customs Releases Import, Export Figures

93LA0100D Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 May 93 p 4

[Text] Bandar 'Abbas—IRNA. In the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] 1,693,163 tons of goods valued at 31.221 billion rials [Rls] was exported through customs in the province of Hormozegan.

This was announced by Bagh 'Enayat, customs supervisor for customs in the governor-general's offices in Yazd, Kerman, and Hormozegan at a meeting of the Administrative Council for the province of Hormozegan. He added: These goods include machine-made carpets, architectural and decorative stone, vegetables, fresh fruit, oil-bearing seeds, various kinds of rods, pistachios and dried fruits, tiles and ceramics, clothing and knitted goods and handicrafts.

He said: Likewise, last year 11,915,021 tons of goods valued at more than Rls19.07 billion was imported through the ports and islands of the province of Hormozegan.

The supervisor for customs for the province of Hormozegan said: In the year 1371 the general revenues for customs in the province was Rls1,027,763,000.

He added: Last year a large amount of smuggled goods valued at Rls9.224 billion was seized from smugglers in the province of Hormozegan.

### Shahr-e Kord Airport Construction Activities Begin

93LA0100B Tehran ABRAR in Persian 19 May 93 p 4

[Text] Shahr-e Kord—IRNA. Finally, 20 years after the preliminary studies began for the construction of the Shahr-e Kord airport, the executive operations for this project began this year on a 300-hectare site.

When this project goes into operation, in addition to its valuable role in the economic and cultural development of Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari, it will also help get this area out of its current deadend.

The governor-general of Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari, who inspected the construction progress for this project on Monday, announced that this year's credits for this project will be 1.5 billion rials [Rls].

He expressed the hope that with favorable weather and after solving some of the problems arising from ownership claims by farmers on the lands in the airport area, the work will progress according to plan.

The Shahr-e Kord airport project, which is a type "B" project, has a 3-km runway that is 45 meters wide. It has been under study by experts since the year 1352 [21 Mar 1973-20 Mar 1974].

In the month of Dey last year [22 Dec 1992-20 Jan 1993] this project was turned over to the Iran Roads Development Organization, affiliated with the Ministry of Roads and Transportation.

Based on the existing contract, the allotted time for completing this project has been set at four years. Although the final costs for this project have not been announced by official sources, some experts say this airport will cost about Rls10 billion.

If the annual credits for this project are not increased, it will take eight to nine years before this airport can be used.

According to him, the available raw materials for the nation's mining industries is in good shape, and it is necessary to make investments to improved the quality to make it possible to export these products.

### **Mazandaran Agricultural Production Increases**

*93LA0100C Tehran ABRAR in Persian 22 May 93 p 4*

[Text] More than 3.1 million tons of various agricultural crops, including rice, wheat, oil-bearing seeds, dried fruits, and cotton were produced on 500,000 hectares of land in Mazandaran, with the exception of Gorgan and the desert.

Engineer Basiri, chief of Projects and Studies in the province of Mazandaran Agricultural Organization, announced the above in an interview with IRNA's correspondent. He said: While in the 1369-1370 agricultural year [1991] the above crops weighed a total of 600,000 tons, last year production increased by 500,000 tons.

### **Bus Transportation Network Expanded**

*93LA0100I Tehran ABRAR in Persian 20 May 93 p 3*

[Text] Tehran—IRNA. Yesterday (Wednesday) the president of the republic said that one of the government's special priorities is to remove the bottlenecks in the nation's transportation capacity. While praising the progress made improving the transportation situation in the cities, he expressed the hope that the implementation of the infrastructure programs in the sector would but an end to transportation problems.

Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaking at ceremonies putting into operation 300 new buses for Tehran's Vahed Bus Company, praised the efforts and activities of the drivers and workers in this company. He said: While activating the ports and ships, putting industry into action and making economic efforts during the period of reconstruction, we have been trying to strengthen urban and intercity transportation.

The president of the republic said: We were trying to solve the transportation problem using vehicles made inside the country, but because there were not enough, we procured some of the vehicles outside the country and fortunately today we have reached equilibrium.

The president of the republic emphasized: Attention also was not given to the workers in the Vahed Company. We had no drivers applying for work. The drivers preferred to work in the deserts. I asked the management of the Vahed Company to pay attention to the problems of this

toiling class and to wages. The problem has now been solved to a great extent and has reached an acceptable point.

Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani said: The problem of insurance for workers in the transportation sector, which was a serious need, has been solved.

The president of the republic expressed the hope that with the use of the 300 new buses, the face of the city and transportation for citizens will improve. He added: When operations begin for the metro, which is now in the equipment and line equipment purchasing phase, the problem of citizen transportation will be solved and the people of Tehran will be comfortable with the important issue of transportation.

The president of the republic discussed the fact that every trip by a passenger with the Vahed company costs 108 rials [Rls] in Tehran, and Rls75 in the municipalities. He noted that the government pays a significant subsidy for bus passengers who are mostly from the needy class, and likewise free fuel has been delivered, and that he will continue with this correct policy of his.

Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani also discussed his visit to the display of spare parts needed by the Vahed Company. He added: Imported parts was one of the improper needs of the Third World, and sometimes they cost more than the cost of building the vehicle. The work of building parts needed for vehicles must be strengthened.

In these ceremonies, Mr. Karbaschi, mayor of Tehran, gave a report to the president of the republic on the activities of the municipality in the area of urban transportation.

After his visit to Tehran's Vahed Bus Company, the president of the republic visited the television traffic monitoring center and the air pollution measurement system at the Traffic Control Organization's headquarters.

During his visit to this center, he praised the efforts of specialists in putting this center into operation, and he emphasized the need to establish traffic order and make more use of technology and today's equipment and resources, to alleviate urban transportation problems.

### **First Gas-Powered Bus Operational**

*93LA0100J Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 May 93 p 2*

[Text] Today, Tuesday, the first gas bus went into operation in the Tehran bus system.

At ceremonies to be held this morning, Tuesday, at Bayhaqi Park, the first gas bus will be officially added to Tehran's bus fleet.

### **Officials Discuss Antinarcotics Efforts**

*93LA0097C Tehran ABRAR in Persian 24 May 93 p 10*

[Text] Zahedan—Central News Unit: The three-day seminar for police precinct antinarcotics managers throughout the country began its work in Zahedan with



the goal of studying practical ways to fight narcotics smuggling and merchants of death.

In this seminar the Friday imam of Zahedan emphasized that the narcotics problem is a political plot to weaken and undermine the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He regarded narcotics as one of the major problems in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan, and he called upon officials and insiders in the antinarcotics campaign to plan more and make more efforts in cultural matters, along with their armed struggle against smuggling caravans.

At this seminar, the commander of the Sistan va Baluchestan police precinct discussed the investments and successes of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran campaign against narcotics and those who buy and sell them. He said: Since the beginning of the triumph of the Islamic revolution, there have been no more than 37 border bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, while the Islamic Republic has established four times that many bases and guard stations.

He added: The construction of 448 border asphalt roads, the blocking of 18 entry passages and passes, the expulsion of smuggler caravans at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the creation of 62 km of earth works are among the basic measures taken to fight narcotics in the border areas of the province of Sistan va Baluchestan.

The commander of the Sistan va Baluchestan police precinct said that the Islamic Republic of Iran is the only

country that has been able to seriously confront narcotics in the world. He announced: Last year the Sistan va Baluchestan police precinct confiscated more than 17 tons of various kinds of narcotics from the merchants of death.

As the seminar continued its work, the general manager of the National Antinarcotics Office characterized the record of the police precincts in the fighting narcotics smuggling and putting down the buyers, sellers and distributors, and he noted the necessity for planning and continuous and increased effort by antinarcotics officials in the country.

#### **Hashish Concealed in Truck Carrying Watermelons**

*93LA0097D Tehran ABRAR in Persian 22 May 93 p 10*

[Text] Tabriz—ABRAR Correspondent: With the awareness of police agents in the East Azarbaijan precinct, 70 kg of hashish was confiscated from a truck hauling watermelons.

In addition to the above amount, the public relations office of the Political and Ideological Office of the East Azarbaijan Precinct also seized 2 kg of opium from the driver of the truck, and after interrogation and the preparation of a file, the defendant was turned over to the competent authorities.

This report states: From a foreign freight truck in Tabriz, 580 bottles of alcoholic beverages of the whiskey type, which had been skillfully stashed, were also found and confiscated.