

JPRS-EER-91-017
6 FEBRUARY 1991

Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service



ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

JPRS Report

Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

East Europe

19980515 132

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-017

CONTENTS

6 February 1991

POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Baltic Council Set To Replace Nordic Council [*Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA 28 Dec*] 1

ALBANIA

- Berisha, Nano on Role of Debate in Democracy [*ZERI I POPULLIT 18 Nov*] 2

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Minister of Labor: Agenda, Future of Civic Forum [*FORUM 26 Dec*] 5
Approaches to Controversial Issues Discussed [*FORUM 26 Dec*] 6
'Slovakism' vs. Nationalism Discussed [*SLOVENSKE NARODNE NOVINY 18 Dec*] 7
Declaration of Slovak Republic's Sovereignty Urged [*LITERARNY TYZDENNIK 21 Dec*] 8
Author of Alleged Anti-Semitic Report Cited [*FORUM 8 Jan*] 10

POLAND

- Democracy Dependent on Working Self-Government [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 1-2 Dec*] 14
Emigre Leader on Consequences of Polish Disunity [*ZYCIE WARSZAWY 21 Dec*] 17
Influx of Refugees Burdens Border, Rail Patrols 18
Romanians Paralyze Rail Traffic [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 21 Dec*] 18
Crowds at Soviet Border [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 21 Dec*] 19

YUGOSLAVIA

- Report on 10 January Presidency Meeting [*DANAS 15 Jan*] 19

MILITARY

BULGARIA

- Possible Role of Chemical Troops in Persian Gulf [*NARODNA ARMIYA 13 Nov*] 31

POLAND

- Reasons for New Troop Deployment Offered [*POLSKA ZBROJNA 12 Dec*] 33
Role of Air Defense in New Europe Outlined [*POLSKA ZBROJNA 18 Dec*] 34

ECONOMIC

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Positive Response to VW Skoda Agreement Reported
[*Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 15 Dec*] 37

POLAND

- Polish Firms Represented in Minsk Business Expo [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 13 Dec*] 37
Local Government Provides Financial Aid [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 14 Dec*] 38
Farmers Laid Off From Secondary Jobs [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 14 Dec*] 38
Sugar Beet Crop: Domestic Consumption Down [*RZECZPOSPOLITA 11 Dec*] 39

SOCIAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Former Dissident Writer on Work, Present Goals [*LIDOVE NOVINY 8 Jan*] 41

HUNGARY

Jewish Community Revamped; Assimilation Opposed [*TALLOZO 21 Dec*] 42

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Council Set To Replace Nordic Council

91EP0193A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
28 Dec 90 p 7

[Article by Krzysztof Leski: "From the Hansa to the Baltic Council"]

[Text] The continuing disintegration of the Soviet bloc since the fall of 1989 has faced its former members with the question of what comes next. No one wanted to do his own thing alone, and the former people's democracies have in unison launched the slogan of a return to Europe. However, the traditional European institutions—the Council of Europe, the EEC, and especially NATO—have not been and are not in a hurry to admit new members.

As for Poland, ever since the day on which it has gained independence in its foreign policy, it has begun to operate on a dual track by both attempting to gain membership in the abovementioned pan-European institutions and exploring the possibilities for the formation of regional communities or membership in such communities that already exist.

Much has been said and written in Poland about our initiative for establishing a closely collaborating Budapest-Prague-Warsaw triangle. The issue has been protracted for a year already, but it does make slow progress, despite the explicit lack of enthusiasm in Prague. This also applies to a prospect which had seemed unreal as recently as less than a year ago, namely, the admission of Poland to the so-called Pentagone, a group also termed the Danubian-Adriatic group and associating at present Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Italy.

Much less has been said and written about another direction of action of Polish diplomacy, which has also been gazing toward the north and the northeast, toward the countries facing the Baltic Sea.

Like in the Middle Ages

The Baltic, that internal sea of northern Europe, has for centuries been a natural route linking the Scandinavians, northern Germans, Poles, and the regions where today Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are becoming reborn. The medieval Hanseatic League, an association of cities which grew rich from Baltic trade, demonstrates that these natural connections had already been perceived as far back as 500 years ago.

The Scandinavians are nowadays associated in the Nordic Council, which, in addition to Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, also includes the non-Baltic Norway and Iceland as well as islets in the North Sea. The integrative accomplishments of the Council need no trumpeting, considering that Scandinavia is viewed as a model of a common market and of the absence of borders to men

and of economic barriers. But the Nordic Council in its present composition cannot be transformed into a Baltic association. A new structure is needed.

A preliminary initiative was offered by Sweden in proposing last November the formation of a Baltic Council that would be concerned with culture, tourism, trade, transportation, environmental protection, and education. By contrast with the Nordic Council, which is formed by government representatives and which has decisionmaking powers in all domains with the exception of foreign policy and national defense, the Baltic Council would be, for the time being, formed from representatives of parliaments and social organizations, as well as from among prominent personalities, and its role would be confined to performing assessments and analyses and serving as a consultative body.

Waiting for the Balts

Nothing else is possible so long as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are not completely sovereign, and everyone agrees that without the Balts there would be little sense to the Baltic Council. Even now, however, there exists no obstacle to the designation by these three republics of representatives of their parliaments and various organizations to serve on the Baltic Council, since it lacks specific powers and its members do not have to represent their governments and thus this would not provide Moscow with a pretext for protesting.

Besides, Moscow itself is also to be represented in the Baltic Council, and in a dual role at that, as Russia and as the USSR. Other candidates are, of course, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and Poland, and also Belorussia, Norway, and Czechoslovakia, since, although the last three are not situated on the Baltic, they rely on it to a considerable extent as a route of transportation, and Czechoslovakia, in particular, is greatly contributing to the pollution of the Baltic.

But it is Poland, in particular, that has special reasons for becoming a major member of the Baltic community for not just geographical reasons. It is thus certain to support wholeheartedly the Swedish proposal, and it would be best if both these countries would act jointly in presenting a formal proposal and invitations to others.

Will Container Ships Be Cruising?

The Council may strengthen Poland's political position in the region, facilitate a joint rescue of the Baltic and its shores, and multiply regional trade. But the greatest boon to Poland could be caused by the streamlining of north-south transportation under the Council and with the cooperation of all of its members. Here again we return to the Pentagone, because implementing the idea of a trans-European north-south highway would require cooperation among the five members of the group.

In this connection Warsaw hopes that, as a member of both communities, it could be the liaison between them,

although Prague also has an appetite for it. It may be that as early as this coming May, at the regular meeting of Pentagonal ministers of state of the five countries in Rome, Poland will be wearing two hats as an observer applying for membership status and as a representative of the nascent Baltic community.

That community may be of a much more local nature, promoting cooperation among the neighboring—whether contiguous or linked by the Baltic—regions. While to Germany as a whole the Baltic Council is not a very important foreign policy objective, Schleswig-Holstein or Mecklenburg are highly interested in it. Poland too would like its northern voivodships to take part, more or less independently, in the work of the Council.

All this is for the time being still in embryo, but it is expected that as early as this coming January things will speed up. The establishment of the Baltic Council may be brought closer by the meetings of parliamentarians from Baltic countries in Helsinki and the visit of the chairman of the Nordic Council to Warsaw. Also in January, Polish and Swedish experts will discuss convening a conference of the region's ministers of transportation, scheduled offhand to begin in June in Szczecin. In September, in Gdansk, a conference of representatives of Baltic cities and counties is to discuss north-south routes and cooperation. Perhaps by then that conference could be organized under the auspices of the Council?

ALBANIA

Berisha, Nano on Role of Debate in Democracy

91P20103A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
18 Nov 90 p 3

[Roundtable discussion with Professor Alfred Uci, chairman of the Committee for Culture and the Arts; Professor Luan Omari, scientific secretary of the Academy of Sciences; Docent Petrit Skende of the Institute of Nuclear Physics; Dr. of Medical Sciences Sali Berisha; and senior scientific collaborator Fatos Nano]

[Text] A. Uci: The need for debate and for its extension arises from the new circumstances and demands of the times and from the efforts for the further deepening of the processes for the democratization of the life of the country. There were debates in the past. Now there are new requirements in regard to the forms, content and aims of public debate as a mode of the confrontation of opinions. These requirements can be satisfied by discarding narrow, outmoded views on debate. In the past, debate took place on the basis of guidelines from on high (from editorial staffs or other bodies) and was channelled according to stipulated aims. Therefore, its boundaries were narrow, within the limits of the affirmation of some ideas or viewpoints. Quite often, debate was not regarded as a fruitful form for seeking new solutions but was, instead, the approval and documentation of the

existing reality. On such occasions, it took the form of a decoration to create the impression that there was a debate.

A debate, in the true understanding of the word, is a direct expression of democracy and, at the same time, a powerful means for achieving democracy. If there is no debate then there is no democracy.

The debate needs tolerance of opinions expressed. It becomes productive when it is carried out without prejudices, when it serves as vehicle for the expression, freely and with feelings of high social responsibility, of opinions which people would like to liberate from outmoded, but sanctified, opinions. When there is no debate, the impression is created that there are no opposing opinions.

In reality, this is not the case. There are different opinions in the minds of people and the democratic debate is the means of confronting them, liberating them from erroneous ideas and bringing them to the truth.

The issue of the debate has often been considered to be an issue related only to the individual who participates in it. Actually, society has its own responsibility for it. If there is no debate, it is not only the fault of individuals but also of society.

L. Omari: In the atmosphere created after the most recent party plenums, the sphere of the debate has been expanded and deepened, especially in certain fields. But there are many other great problems which make a debate essential, for example, the new economic mechanism. Its possibilities and priorities are known. But it cannot be called completed. Therefore, it must be discussed in order to shed light on many issues. The same thing should be said about the drafting of the new constitution. Not only the jurists but all the people must discuss these issues in the spirit of debate.

For a broader participation of the masses in a debate on the important issues of the country, the need for extensive information on the issues which worry the people should also be noted. Recently there has been an improvement in the dissemination of information by means of the press and other forms. But this information must be enriched even further because you cannot enter into debate without being well informed on a subject.

We must admit that we lack the political education which is necessary for a real debate. Up to now, this education has existed for a debate in the field of science and the arts but it has been lacking in regard to political issues.

In the debate there can be opinions which contradict the current predominant political, economic, social, and artistic concepts. The debate recognizes the right of each person to question things, even if they are officially considered to be correct. The party line is very broad. It is composed of its principled, strategic guidelines and of

second priority issues, tactical issues. Therefore, the free discussion of people should not be hindered.

The debate requires broad participation. The same people should not always be seen in the press and on the television screens. There are young intellectuals who have innovative opinions.

A. Uci: Today, economic, political, psychological and other issues have come forth. The new attitudes of peasants toward cooperative and private ownership have stirred up contradictory concepts and mentalities. The writers or the poets cannot resolve these problems with some verses that they might write about them. Also they cannot be solved by discussions in offices. The opinion of the peasantry should be brought into the debate and should be given broad representation in the press.

S. Berisha: The motivating factor for debate is the diversity of opinion and I think that the key factor here is the acceptance of alternative and opposing opinions. Alternative and opposing opinions are not damaging. On the contrary, when they are documented, they can be transformed into a key motivating force of the debate; they can protect it from mistakes and help it to find and determine the best solution. I believe that everyone would prefer and respect an honest adversary, over a servile and sterile friend. I believe that alternative and opposing opinion is essential for all fields, not only when two or five persons are engaged in a discussion but also when the discussion takes place at the level of various forums and courts. Naturally, this opinion which exists cannot help in the case of movement in a chaotic manner like a molecule of water in the Braunian movement. This opinion can be transformed into a motivating force for debate and democratic processes when it is structured into specific organisms and organizations, which are legally recognized by the juridical state, without which, it seems to me, the free expression of pluralistic opinion would not exist.

Emancipated people are needed for the development of democratic debate. A democratic debate can be carried on by individuals, forums and courts which do not think a priori that they have a monopoly on the truth and which enter into the debate as equals among equals. Love of democracy is love of equality. It is obvious that no debate can be carried on with the acceptance of taboos. The latter, like tombs of thought, mortally paralyze the debate. Indeed, the press and the other information media do not properly present the debate which is going on in various meetings and forums. I am certain that our television viewers, who telephone in to talk about the damage caused by tobacco or hypertension, would call in with greater interest if there were roundtables discussing the market economy, the CSCE, the law-governed state, the CSCE and its demands, the multiparty systems, etc. I believe that a free and constructive debate in all fields will be able to be carried on when individuals freely express their opinions in the various forms and information media in the law-governed state, especially in the specialized organs, apart

from an "official" opinion or a given ideological framework. As long as they are not fascist, racist, war-mongering, or antinational, these opinions will serve the normal progress of the democratization and advancement of the country.

A. Uci: The debate is "war." But we know that war is carried out with pitchforks and it is also carried out with culture and tolerance.

The democratic debate demands the latter—a war using the means of culture, patience, and respect for the other person's opinion, not unchecked careerist passions, with blasphemies and insults of every type.

P. Skende: In science, the debate has its own specific character. When there is a discussion of aspects of a narrow professional nature, the debate cannot take on broad proportions as far as the participants are concerned, because of the high professionalism which it demands. However, when there is a discussion of the political, economic and social aspects of scientific problems, then all should take part in the debate.

The energy problem is one of the subjects of debate which has recently attracted the attention of the broad masses of the people. But, I do not think that there was always tact in this debate. There was a tendency for comrades with administrative duties to dictate to specialists on the basis of their jobs when we know that we are all equal at the scientific debate table.

There are problems from the past which radiate into the present, therefore they will continue to be the subject of debate. But I am opposed to debate just for the sake of debate. We should not artificially borrow problems from the past because they unnecessarily waste the intellectual energy and time of the people.

A. Uci: Comrade Ramiz has said that if we do not know where we are coming from we do not know where we are going. In this context, the debate should be three-dimensional. The problems of our current development should be at the center but they are connected with the road which we have travelled. The past is reflected in the present; it does not belong only to historians. The debate should also be centered around problems of the future because the future is linked with the problems of the present.

P. Skende: The opinion expressed in the debate is led into specific state instances, administratively. However, in a scientific debate, we must also stimulate opposing opinions. Today we have many collegial bodies of intellectuals. But it happens that, because of inertia or for other reasons, even today they are placed under the rule of the administration, even though they are not directly connected with it. After the initial enthusiasm at their creation, the administration assumes an oppressive dominance over these bodies.

At the mouth of the lake of Pogradec we built a factory for the enrichment of iron, considering only the economic factor. Now we are learning that we made a big mistake by not listening to the opinion of doctors and biologists in regard to the construction of the factory. It was a national mistake in the area of ecology and, in general, this work style continues to exist. The construction engineers have not been able to foresee the consequences of their work and the opinion of the doctors and biologists was not requested in any way.

The stimulation of opposing opinions is of prime importance. If we practice the same manner of debate that we have had, in which matters of a technical nature have often been politicized, even policy suffers damage. It had happened that when a specialist in a scientific field goes out of the country, not as an official representative of the state, they give him orders on how to behave, what to say, whom to meet with, etc., dressing him, wrongly, to the detriment of the state, and artificially, in the "costume" of a diplomat. The fact that the intellectual has an independent opinion does not concern the state and society which might have another opinion.

L. Omari: We have the fear that the attitude of the intellectuals is identified with the position of the state. This is the result of the politicizing of things and of the practice, existing up to now, according to which permission from on high must be obtained for everything.

F. Nano: the problems of the economy are naturally in the center of the debates, not only in our country. I think that the debate is and should be treated as an instrument of democracy, when the latter is conceived and developed as a road to progress. On the other hand, it is known that the level of development of democracy consists, considerably, of the level of the economic maturity of the society and of the material and cultural potentials which it creates, in a word, it consists of the productive force of social labor in every field.

It is a fact that a lack of arguments in a debate, or an inadequate cultural level are encountered, in general, in milieus in which there are low productivity, poor labor discipline, and weak creativity, despite the fact that "heated" debates might be carried out.

If we make a judgment on the basis of the current climate of the debates, it is characteristic that, in many directions, they are apparently politicized, in the constructive sense of this word. However, often the discussions are not developed in a directed manner and are even chaotic. Current and future economic problems have become so pressing that no one should be excluded from the debate.

Until recently, debates in the field of the economy, like those on other issues, have often been carried out along the paths of the execution of given solutions (without any variations) or for the harmonization of links set up for their connection. But today the legitimate demand is made that there be a discussion and debate on the alternative policies for development in every field.

Today there is still an unproductive gap between the collegial opinion of the scientific bodies and the attitudes of the organs which have the right to make the decisions, and a gap between the latter organs and the links which implement these decisions. The three links of a chain have kept a distance from each other. The intellectuals must become powerful conductors of the progressive scientific opinion of the times, from bottom to top, and vice versa, so that this will penetrate into all milieus of today's debates. I think that it is now necessary for the debate to become public and to become institutionalized, without being bureaucratized. On many issues, this will result in the reduction of bureaucratic distortions in alternative solutions to problems. What bad results would occur if, instead of the traditional lectureships on pressing problems in the economic, technical, social and political fields, debates were organized, whenever necessary, in public halls, where there would not be presidiums with "selected" people but roundtables of specialists and intellectuals who inform the listener and defer to his judgment with the weight of arguments exchanged in the "fire" of debate? In this way and by other means, the halls will be filled and people who, today, are not part of the public audience will narrow the distances between them and the intellectual circles and the clearest opinions and convictions will be created in regard to the problems and individuals which stimulate or prevent their solution.

It would be no less beneficial if the opposing opinion were to be institutionalized as an essential condition of the debate for the optimal solution of problems. I think that the power of qualified scientific opinion should replace the order of an apparat or the preferences of a functionary, and the appropriate departments of the University, the specialized scientific councils or the other professional associations should serve, in a legally ordained manner, as opposition to decisions which are made in ministries or other government organs for directing and ranking investments, for technological and technical-scientific solutions which provide the most scientific benefit, which protect the environment, etc. We have in mind the creation of such conditions by the institutionalization of the debate, which makes these conditions pass through the filter of scientific opinion and the opinion of the masses.

I think that the debate should be evaluated at the same time as the dialogue between the generations. When we debate with the youth we must keep in mind that they are our children and equal partners in the democratic dialogue. Whether or not they accept us depends on the position from which we enter into the debate with them. Therefore, without forgetting the intentions of the debate, it is necessary to get rid of the prejudices that others have always had in regard to the youth, once and for all, independently.

S. Berisha: The dialog between the generations should be carried out on all levels. For our country, the youth is not only the future in the broad understanding but also the present. It has been like this throughout history. This

historic fact is not taken into consideration as it should be. For a great dream to be transformed into reality, first of all, there must be an aptitude for great dreams; second, there must be confidence that they can be achieved; third, there must be the necessary energy for this purpose. The youth has more of these aptitudes than anyone else. Therefore it is necessary that our entire legislative, executive, scientific, and artistic pyramid take into account the democratic ideals and universal aspirations of the younger generation.

F. Nano: The important issue of the market economy cannot remain outside this dialog, since it is known that adults and intellectuals have a number of uncertainties and preconceived ideas about this issue. In western propaganda, for example, there is insistence that the present concept of the market economy is the same as it was at the beginning of the century, that is, the total privatization of the economy, free competition, etc. But the reality of the industrialized countries presents another picture. Our sickness, for various reasons, has been excessive centralization which caused the state to be the planner, responsible for everything. In other countries, there are many planning centers, which are the main subjects of economic life. Therefore, discussions cannot be closed, a priori, on such burning issues of today's debates. These issues have emerged both in the implementation of the new economic mechanism and in the process of preparing the new basic school textbooks. The debate will be a great help in the latter area, also.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Minister of Labor: Agenda, Future of Civic Forum *91CH0288A Prague FORUM in Czech 26 Dec 90 p 5*

[Interview with Petr Miller, CSFR minister of labor and social affairs; place and date not given: "Their Ideas Will Not Last Long"]

[Text] [FORUM] Will your attitude toward Civic Forum change if, as a political entity resembling a broader political party, it will shift toward a rightist orientation, if it can be expected that a more rightist or conservative ideology will strengthen the mobilization of the capabilities of an individual and his responsibility for himself and his family and will only then permit dependence upon aid by the state?

[Miller] This whole thing leaves me very sad. I would be interested to see what those 80 individuals, who began this whole thing at the Laterna Magika, think about this. I am almost contemplating asking President Havel to have these 80 people meet once more and to discuss this entire question again. As far as my position as minister of labor and social affairs is concerned, I do not see the results of the ensuing discussion as being so unambiguous. I do not favor the creation of a single party because the impacts which will come, and, unfortunately, I am obligated to know about them and also to predict them, will be mammoth. A party that will have proclaimed

such a program and will be realizing it will begin to be responsible precisely for these impacts. I expect that the effects of future events will cause a great decline in party membership. This means that, at present, I would favor that Civic Forum remain undefined, much as it has been thus far. I cannot find another solution nor another justification.

Moreover, I am a little afraid of the nonsensical and incorrect utterances today of certain invectives against the trade unions. Who was it that came to Wenceslaus Square anyway to make decisions regarding Civic Forum? It was also workers from the factories who were in the disproportionate majority over the others. They were the ones who decided. And, suddenly, one hears invectives against the trade unions out of the mouths of the leadership. I believe that this is imprudent.

At present, I am participating in working out the general agreement with the trade unions as secretary of the Council for Economic and Social Agreement. But in actual fact we will never be able to conclude this agreement this way. We have closed the door on the trade unions. Such cheap invectives will not produce anything for anyone and particularly not for Civic Forum.

[FORUM] It nevertheless appears as though there is some kind of fundamental dispute between people from the okres level and the membership base of Civic Forum activists in general who need a firmer structure and program and between the center, represented by deputies, members of the governments and collegiums. How can this dispute be overcome?

[Miller] The demands voiced by some okreses from South Moravia Kraj, as I heard them today, constitute a problem. They wish to solve a very radical exchange of leading workers. If you discuss this, particularly with Minister of Economics Dlouhy, he will certainly not consider it to be sensible if he had to, at this time, suddenly out of the blue replace a large mass of people who are in charge of enterprises here only because their past was such and such and to replace them with someone who does not have any great experiences in this regard.

[FORUM] Is this not a matter of a certain disproportion between the way matters are viewed and the responsibilities which exist on site and "up above" in general?

[Miller] Naturally, immediate responsibility on site is actually worse. The view on the part of a person in the government or one who is a deputy is somewhat more abstract than that of a specific mayor who has very specific problems. However, with respect to the majority of specific problems, we cannot adopt a position until our global policy will have been more clarified. We speak of structural changes, of requalification, of regional programs, of massive shutdown programs, and, at present, we do not have a clear idea of what these programs should contain. For example, what will be the

object of requalification, at what will future development be aimed? What is involved now is how to provide effective support for those people "below."

[FORUM] How do you regard the possibility of dividing Civic Forum into two groups which would cooperate and of which one would be capable of adopting a more social attitude toward problems which will arise?

[Miller] I would, naturally, be in that group which would attempt to work out social programs and would be adopting a more social attitude than the hard radical group which is being promoted here particularly by some mostly younger deputies. In contrast to them, I know that we shall soon be facing virtually 500,000 unemployed here, I can see that almost one million people will be living on the edge of social need, even though these social needs were defined sometime in 1985. By 1988, the cost of living had risen by 30 percent, now there has been a minimum increase of another 20 percent, which amounts to 50 percent. I see a whole series of impacts and I am saddened by them. So that I think that I would more likely be in the party promoting a more liberal social program. This is even expressed in our scenario for the social reforms which accompany the economic reforms. We have now created additional material which is entitled the "Social Safety Net." It is intended for people who have nowhere else to fall, who are truly at the bottom and will, somehow, be maintaining themselves at the surface. This is not just a social net which creates the conditions for some kind of special living standard.

[FORUM] It would seem that if at present a socially thinking minority were to separate itself from Civic Forum it would not enjoy a great deal of support among the membership (according to what one hears from the okres level).

[Miller] I see things just the opposite. I believe that that portion which could even splinter off in this manner, and I see that actually nothing other than a splintering can occur, would have support. I think, on the other hand, that the radical part of Civic Forum membership will not survive. Their ideas will not last long. That minority is only a minority here. In actual fact, they seem to be in the majority. And it will be that party which will then return to the original likeness of Civic Forum.

[FORUM] Which personalities might characterize it?

[Miller] Among others, for example, people like Ivan Fisera, Petr Kucera, certainly myself, perhaps even Deputy Jana Petrova. I think that even Petr Pithart is a moderate politician who realizes the possible impacts inherent in the future situation.

Approaches to Controversial Issues Discussed

91CH0274A Prague FORUM in Czech 26 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Petr Marek: "Politics as a Method"]

[Text] It could appear as though President Havel entered into the unglued Czech-Slovak game quite decisively and

clearly, but rather late with his parliamentary proposals. Similarly, the position taken by Czech Premier Pithart has for some time now been sniped at for being one of restraint, hesitation, and concession. However, matters are somewhat more complicated. The apparent crisis in the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks did not come into being as a result of the pressure politics practiced by V. Meciar in the role of the Slovak premier, nor as a result of the springtime war over the hyphen, nor even last year in November through the removal of the totalitarian lid which was choking the authenticity of the demonstrations. It is also not possible to blame it on the 42 years of conservation under Communist rule. The roots are far deeper.

They go back to the feelings of identity on the part of both nations as they were being formed and defined among Czechs at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries and among Slovaks during the second half of the 19th century. These roots are already present at the beginning as well as during the experience of the first joint state, the Czechoslovak Republic of 1918, which the Czechs accepted entirely as their own whereas the Slovaks had different feelings, based primarily on the hope that life with the Czechs would be easier after Hungarian bondage, that development of a national life would be simpler, in spite of any gratitude for economic, cultural, and state administrative aid, and ranged through to disillusionment and a feeling of living in a house which was not completely owned by them. The fact is that the political representatives of the first Czechoslovak Republic did not fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Pittsburg, dated May 1918. Czechs are not adequately aware of this today and therefore cannot understand "what it is that those Slovaks actually want." The Czechs also find the Slovak resistance to the former state doctrine of Czechoslovakism to be unclear. It is true that this conviction regarding two developmental branches of a single nation was implanted by force and, naturally, was not to the liking of many Slovaks. At the same time, however, in the beginning this was only a matter of an expedient thesis which the politicians of the foreign campaign, particularly Masaryk, made use of not because they were convinced of Czechoslovakism, but rather to facilitate argumentation in discussions with Western statesmen regarding historical rights, the character and borders of a nascent state in the territory of Central Europe which was saturated with multiple nationalities. However, the protraction of this initial diplomatic thesis essentially produced negative reactions.

This is also the main reason why a possible breakup of the federation into two independent states would be so dangerous. It would involve the first change of borders in Europe following World War II and it is impossible not to see that a very sensitive tectonic fault runs precisely through our Central European area where borders so imprecisely match the deployment of nations and it is

impossible to ignore the fact that in politics interests are exclusively decisive rather than ideals.

Be that as it may, these are the historical givens and what matters is the kind of goals and procedures contemporary politics will derive from them. All components of the federal coalition—at least judging by the constantly and ardently repeated assurances—are insisting on preserving the federation. They only favor its alterations to an authentic federation. I repeat once more that what is involved is the method by which a given entity will wish to achieve this goal. The prejurisdictional strident activities on the part of V. Meciar did not aid in the creation of confidence on the Czech side, but rather resulted in mutual distrust, specific opposition positions, and a maximally tense atmosphere. Even expressly pragmatic goals can be striven for through a more cultivated policy. Even Czech Premier P. Pithart, who, despite difficulties, had long maintained a conciliatory attitude because, like very few others on the Czech side, he has long been familiar with the actual depth of inflammation which besets Czech-Slovak wounds, withdrew. However, as a result of his actions, he unexpectedly contributed to the jurisdictional catharsis when he refused to tolerate the practices of the Slovak premier and publicly stated that it was precisely V. Meciar who, in dealing with the Czech Government, threatened that, in the event the jurisdictional law is not adopted, the Slovak National Council will proclaim the sovereignty of its laws over those of the federation. The very positive and, it could be said, even an exemplary role was played by the leadership of the delegate club of the Public Against Violence organization in the Federal Assembly, specifically by J. Baksay, when controversial questions dealing with amendment proposals were agreed upon in an exceedingly friendly and elegant manner. The law was approved with comments which were unacceptable to the Slovak side. What was decisive was the knowledge that politics is the search for and the finding of consensus in the presence of certain compromises which do resolve conflicts or at least mitigate them. The entirety of the Czech-Slovak matter did not end with the jurisdictional crisis; it will surely again begin to revolve around controversial questions; it is only a matter of the methods by which those legendary national interests will be pursued and what kind of an "impact" they will have.

'Slovakism' vs. Nationalism Discussed

91CH0292A Bratislava SLOVENSKE NARODNE
NOVINY in Slovak 18 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Drahoslav Machala: "The Essence of Being Slovak"]

[Text] The new people who showed up after November 1989 in the social and political movement brought to it a new language as well as new expressions. We are becoming used to the new words: to make visible, to articulate, meaningfulness.... It is true, even though some of them are beginning to show signs of wear and tear, particularly the last one—meaningfulness.

It is downright surprising to note the kind of cliches, the kind of stereotypes that are being used to designate the Slovak national movement, to note the number of labels and the number of marks of Cain which are burned into its forehead daily by publicists, politicians, but also by quite ordinary people who only parrot that which they heard and saw on television the night before. It is true that inventiveness is not a strong side of our political and publications scene. Seeing something in black and white requires an image of an enemy and if it is necessary to "make him visible," he is tagged with labels of nationalism, chauvinism, intolerance, Fascism, militant Slovakism, flashy clammering, or ancestral appeal in quotation marks. Manifestations of patriotism, which had been annihilated and driven into the deepest basements of the human soul, exploded suddenly and for that reason have the most varied forms. One person feels the need to show his feelings; another has remained an internalized patriot. I am not even bothered by the idea that some simply do not perceive a value such as the nation, despite the fact that they impoverish themselves by that....

The turbulent movement surrounding the adoption of the language law has resulted in floating to the surface a concept which expresses a totally different value. That concept is called Slovakism. I hope that you find it different from that queasy term used to designate nationalism. This concept first showed up in letters which were addressed to the Matica cultural organization and to its chairman by people from all over Slovakia with extraordinary diversities of feelings. Jozef Markus later characterized this concept as follows: "Slovakism means knowing how to connect common sense and feelings, the physical and the spiritual, by an original method; it means knowing in the depth of one's soul that the entire world is our terrestrial home for which we are responsible, but also knowing that our homeland, Slovakia, is our world without which we would be infinitely poor, perhaps not in material terms, but certainly, on balance, in human terms.... Because it is not only man, but the nation that is worth the amount of contemplation, the amount of struggle and suffering which has been experienced. To surrender cheaply and to have the plumes of Slovakism become the subject of 'worldly' ridicule would mean to give up this value which was created by generations."

Everyone who knows how to rid himself of partiality and stereotypes in regarding the Slovak nation must think very deeply about the content of the concept of Slovakism. According to people who think democratically, it is, after all, not possible to criminalize the manifestations of Slovak patriotism and to compare them with reminiscences which occurred virtually half a century ago. A wise and tolerant politician would utilize the value of Slovakism today as a dynamic force. It could, in the upcoming difficult period, unify the nation and direct its aims in such a way that it could measure up to its obstacles with courage. It is precisely this Slovakism, which is present as a unique noninterchangeable value

that could make it possible to provide the best capabilities to our fatherland and could teach us the responsibility of relying only upon ourselves!

Declaration of Slovak Republic's Sovereignty Urged

91CH0282A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 21 Dec 90 p 12

[Article by Igor Uhrík: "Slovak Sovereignty"]

[Text] The current discussions about the structure of the state are taking on an ever more technical character. And so it seems to me as if in the flood of technical details the original goal is being lost: To create conditions that would ensure a true equality of the Slovak nation with the Czech nation. That was one of the basic requirements of the democratic process that was to erase all consequences of the totalitarian regime.

The Slovak representatives realized from the very beginning that the main criterion of equality is sovereignty. It is a concept that is playing a dominant role in the emancipating process in the former Soviet bloc, under the noses of the Slovaks, so to speak, and therefore it is difficult to ignore it. And so it is not surprising that we come across it in all possible connections: In the positions of the government, in the programs of political parties, in the press. We hear about the nation as a resource, the carrier of sovereignty, how sovereignty is attained and how it progresses.

Sovereignty is the key to resolving the question whether Slovaks are or are not equal to other nations. The measure of sovereignty expresses the measure of political autonomy, and from it ensues also the measure of partnership with other nations. Without political autonomy, without the right to make one's own decisions on one's own territory there is no sovereignty. A nation without sovereignty cannot be an equal partner of those nations that are sovereign.

Similarly in the life of an individual: a person who is a minor cannot make basic decisions about his own life or enter into contracts with others: only his guardian can do that. And similarly an ethnic group without political autonomy—and that is why it is only an ethnic group—cannot be a partner to other nations. It cannot sit down with them at a table as an equal among equals. Its place is taken by the guardian, the nation which holds political power in its hands.

The loss of sovereignty or its limitation have serious consequences: political, economic, social, and cultural.

We need to strive for such arrangement in which the political autonomy and the status of a partner as the main characteristics of a sovereign nation are preserved. The federation, as it is beginning to take shape and be defined, is not such an arrangement. A federation itself is a sovereign state unit and its components have only an administrative character. They can be called states,

regions, or even "republics," but it does not change anything on the fact that they are not sovereign. A federation therefore cannot be a union of sovereign nations: the concepts are mutually exclusive.

American Federation—Model for Slovakia?

It would be ideal for the Prague center if it could refer, as it did in the past, to the example of multinational federations: the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. True, these configurations are in an irreversible state of disintegration, which only proves that a multinational federation which serves as an instrument of one nation to dominate and exploit others cannot function under conditions of real democracy. And when there are no appropriate examples, parallels are dragged in by the hair: Belgium, Switzerland, even Spain.

The representatives of the Prague center, however, are beginning to point to the American federation and the German federation as models for the arrangement between the Czechs and the Slovaks. But they could not have chosen a worse example. First of all, it should be clear to everyone that the United States is a unique phenomenon as far as the national aspect is concerned: It is a melting pot of more than a hundred nationalities from around the world and of the original Indian tribes. But even so, in the political sense the population of the United States is one nation, and therefore the American federation, same as the German federation, is a one-nation state.

The individual components of both federations, the states, are only regional administrative units. In spite of that, each American or German state has more autonomy, more legislative leeway, than Slovakia would have in the proposed federation. For example, individual states in the United States have diametrically opposing legislations on such important issues as abortion, death sentence, or criminal law. They have their own taxes, their own social institutions based on the social conditions in each state. Similarly, the German states, or *lander*, have broad autonomy for administering their own affairs, particularly in the area of economic development, tax policy, and education. In spite of the broad autonomy none of the American or German states can be called sovereign; the federation is sovereign.

For these reasons, neither the American nor the German federation can be an appropriate model for the arrangement between the Czechs and the Slovaks. When searching for a solution, it has to be kept in mind that each nation is individual and its eventual linkage with another nation requires an individual, unique approach.

Benes—Example for Slovak Politicians

It is worth while to note how a similar situation was handled by onetime President Benes, who was under pressure from the British and the Poles during World War II to have Czechoslovakia form a federation with Poland. When he informed the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov about this issue during his visit to Moscow in

1943, he said that it would not be a federation, it would be at the most a confederation, and it would be a unique confederation.

In his words: "I did not want the talk to be simply about a confederation, because that has a certain meaning in international law, and then lawyers could come and tell us that a confederation must be such and such. Therefore I said that a confederation between us and the Poles must be a special kind, *sui generis*, whose content must be established by further negotiations."

Benes took a cautious and levelheaded approach to this matter. He acted as a good representative of Czech national interests: He rejected a federation in which the more numerous Poles could impose their will on the Czechs. Perhaps it will seem to some people as a paradox, but I would like to recommend to the Slovak representatives to look to Benes as an example of a politician. Unfortunately, whether it was because of a lack of knowledge of basic history, political inexperience, or some other reason, the Slovak representatives took an opposite approach: They rejected a confederation as unacceptable, did not even allow a discussion about it to take place, and in advance declared allegiance to the federation without having defined its content.

Unclear Concepts and Playing the Sovereignty Game

Let us look at the preelection program of Public Against Violence [VPN], which before the elections "aimed at full self-determination of the Slovak nation" and proclaimed "the right to attain all aspects of sovereignty of a modern European nation." A program thus formulated is a program for independence, at most a confederation, and when VPN looked for the embodiment of this program "in a common democratic statehood," it was obviously a case of misunderstood concepts: VPN used the term federation, but talked about a confederation. It refused to give up the term "federation" which became a matter of blind faith. For former Marxists blind faith has not been a problem in the past; the present shows that blind faith is more a necessity than a problem. VPN held and is still holding on to this term regardless of the fact that the proposed federation has all the characteristics of a centralist, unitary state and therefore holds all sovereignty. In such an arrangement it is impossible to achieve a full, or even a partial, self-determination.

Under these circumstances a legal construct was formulated whose aim is to create at least a semblance of sovereignty. This idea is contained in the Principles of the Draft Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

"The constitution of the Slovak republic must be adopted before the constitution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, because it depends on the constitution of the Slovak republic what role it will play in the CSFR. The theory that the federal constitution is derived from constitutions of the republics is based on the time sequence of adopting the constitutions."

This construct does not pass muster, because nobody will inquire into how the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state was derived. The world will accept it as a single nation. As I already mentioned elsewhere: If Slovaks declare themselves in favor of the Czechoslovak state, it means that they are declaring themselves in favor of a Czechoslovak nation and are thus voluntarily giving up the status of a nation. Nobody is going to be interested in whether Slovaks gave up their sovereignty voluntarily or under pressure. The only thing that will count will be the final result: sovereign federation, subordinate Slovak minority.

But Prague does not want to give Slovaks even just the theoretical possibility of national sovereignty and rejects the sequential adoption of the constitutions. Thus fails the only, symbolic argument which the Slovak representatives had for maintaining the illusion about Slovak sovereignty.

The Slovak Government should stop playing the sovereignty game, a game that cannot be won. Also a part of it is the "agreement" on a joint approach in drafting the constitutions, to which "national specifics" are to be added later. But the constitution must be based on the internal needs and interests of the nation. Those are the specifics. We cannot take a prefabricated constitution, paste onto it several "national" sketches and pretend that it is the full-fledged constitution of a sovereign nation. It will be only a fictitious constitution, expressing a fictitious sovereignty rather than a real one. We play at being sovereign, at being a nation, at having a constitution, just as we played the game of the name and the hyphen. We are giving up reality and are satisfied with symbolism.

The road to achieving sovereignty and maintaining it when joined with another nation leads through adoption of a real full-fledged constitution. If the Slovaks wish to join with the Czechs, and at the same time want to maintain the status of a sovereign nation, they must do so in the form of a state treaty between two sovereign nations. That is the only acceptable way in which to partially relinquish sovereignty. We can guess why the Czechs are opposing the state treaty. But why are the Slovak representatives opposing it?

Slovaks as Internal Matter of the Czech State

Why is it important for the Slovak republic to maintain its sovereignty? As I already mentioned, it is not possible within the framework of the proposed federation because the adoption of a federation will lead to the loss of sovereignty, and Slovakia will then become just one of the provinces of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak question, that is, the degree of autonomy, the degree of the right to decide political and economic issues, will become the internal issue of the Czech state.

The Czech power circles have always strived for that, regardless of the political structure. In this respect Benes took an unequivocal stance already during his mentioned conversation with Molotov, when he asked the

Soviet Union to acquiesce to the punishment of the Slovaks: "I do not want the Slovak question to be an international question, it will be only our own internal matter." The current power center in Prague is acting in the same spirit.

Will We Be Able To Learn From History?

Slovaks must do everything to prevent becoming an internal matter of the Czech state, because any advantages and concessions they would get in a unitary state are subject to the will of the majority and could be taken away by a democratic process. Our own history provides us with many examples of that:

Three basic agreements which the Czechs concluded with the Slovaks, and which they never honored, were made under pressure of international events, under circumstances when existing relations and arrangements among nations change and when unbalanced structures are shattered. The Pittsburg Agreement was made in 1918, after the First World War ended. The Kosice Government Program in 1945, after World War II ended, and the Czechoslovak Federation in 1968, after the armies of five countries entered Czechoslovakia. Always, when the international situation became unstable, the Czechs were willing to make certain concessions to the Slovaks. But those concessions only lasted as long as it was unavoidable—usually only a few months. When the international situation changed, control over Slovakia was tightened—usually for several decades.

In the first instance, the concept of Slovak autonomy, anchored in the Pittsburg Agreement, never showed up in the first Czechoslovak constitution at all. In the second instance, the Czechs substantially limited within the course of a few months the federative principles of the Kosice Government Program, and gradually carried the process of a total extinction of Slovak rights to a successful end. In the third instance, when the situation stabilized following the military intervention, the Czechoslovak Federation was virtually abolished by a series of constitutional laws.

How were such regressions possible? Only because the Slovaks entered into these "agreements" as part of the Czechoslovak state. Under such conditions, the degree of autonomy, of self-government, was exclusively an internal matter.

This situation is being repeated for the fourth time. The external circumstances were never more favorable for creating Slovak sovereignty. The Slovaks can join the nations who demand sovereignty—a part of the decolonizing process which finally reached beyond the Iron Curtain. If they really want it and are able to express their will, nobody can prevent them, just as nobody can stop the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Byelorussians, or Slovenes.

The Prague power center is well aware that a unique historic opportunity has opened up for the Slovaks, and it is therefore willing to make concessions. True, same as in the past, these will be only temporary concessions

which will last only until the Czechs succeed in convincing the West that they have the right to continue colonizing Slovakia. At best the eventual concessions will last until the liberalizing process in the other nations of the Soviet bloc runs its course—then the network of mutual treaties and agreements will put Slovakia into a position of a nonnation for ages.

Abolition of Slovak Sovereignty

While other nations east of the Iron Curtain are getting rid of the nightmare of a colonial prison, the Slovaks are only asking for a better cell. This pathological inability of the Slovaks to place themselves in the ranks of the nations which are liberating themselves can be fatal at these critical moments. The Prague center is looking at an enticing opportunity to solve the Slovak question without any unnecessary delay.

The attitudes and pronouncements of Czech and federal representatives, which in recent weeks have showed a clear change of direction, can be interpreted in this light. The target of their concentrated attacks are the main attributes of sovereignty which they demand for the federation: the determining part of the legislature, foreign policy, economy, defense and strategic planning.

Among the attacks on Slovak identity belong also the newest variations of President Havel on the theme Czechoslovak nation: Czechoslovak people, federation people, Czechoslovak identity. But the greatest danger lies in his demand that the new constitution does not contain the right to leave the federation.

From among the three main protagonists of such attacks we are able to understand Mr. Pithart the best. As the premier of the Czech Government, he represents Czech interests the way he sees them.

We have to accept the views of the premier of the federal government, Mr. Calfa, who clearly represents the interests of the federation apparatus and his own, with a certain measure of understanding.

But President Havel is in a different position. As the president of both nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks, he must represent and protect the interests of both nations, he must be above them. The demand that the Slovak republic not be able to leave the federation threatens the vital interests of the Slovak nation and the entire Slovak republic, and therefore the question arises whether President Havel did not neglect his constitutional duties.

Under such circumstance, the only way out is to declare the sovereignty of the Slovak republic, sovereignty, that will serve as a basis for subsequently creating relations, based on equal rights, with other nations.

Author of Alleged Anti-Semitic Report Cited

91CH0291A Prague FORUM in Czech 8 Jan 91 pp 4-5

[Interviews with writer Miroslav Dolejsi and Zdenek Kessler, a deputy in the Federal Assembly and member

of the Confederation of Political Prisoners, by Jiri Dolezal; places and dates not given: "Miroslav Dolejsi Testifies"—first paragraph is FORUM introduction]

[Text] It is not necessary to introduce Mr. Dolejsi; that was done by STREDOCESKY EXPRES. However, we did ask him about a problem which he mentioned in EXPRES only in passing. We asked him about the Jewish question.

[Dolezal] Do you have any specific examples to document the penetration of the Jewish influence in this country?

[Dolejsi] I am afraid that in the published text not too many obvious connections are indicated. It only states that people who created the political establishment are either Communists or the progeny of Communists or Freemasons or their progenies, and Jews. There are no other interconnections mentioned in the text. I consider the statements made by Mr. Zeman regarding the Judeo-Bolshevik-Masonic conspiracy to be intellectually infantile and morally ungrammatical and have no intention of dealing with them. As far as proof of these contentions is concerned—you know yourself that the Masonic Lodge has been revived, and the sudden appearance of people of Jewish origin in the government also requires no proof—everyone knows of it. They were here in 1948, in 1968, and are here again. That is obvious. I do not believe that that which was published by EXPRES could bring about any kind of special impulse leading to the posing of specific questions regarding international Jewry. When I was attacked for anti-Semitism, I asked some of my Jewish acquaintances (one of whom is a rabbi) and they did not see anything there that would be "objectionable" from the standpoint of their protection.

[Dolezal] I am not so much interested in what was in EXPRES, but rather whether you have any further proof regarding the penetration of Jewish and Masonic influences in this country?

[Dolejsi] Masonic lodges are secret and worldwide organizations. They do not publish either their goals or the names of their members. The concept "international Jewry," in conjunction with formulating the question, is very risky. It was demagogically profaned. From 1952 through 1968, Jews were deprived of their influence, both within the party and also within the state. They returned in 1968, lost after 1969, and are now reappearing. In and of itself, this is no proof of the penetration of international Jewry. "The international Jewish Mafia" which is striving for world domination—that is stupid. International Jewry represents a question which is incomparably more complicated. The problem is more delicate and, understandably, has its significance in world politics, particularly after 1949, when the State of Israel was established and when the maintenance of that state and its expansion was supported by the United States and resulted in echoes which once again evoked the question of international Judaism, its meaning, and its goals. However, I wish to decisively avoid profane

positions which can lead us nowhere and which would be harmful not only to Jews, but also to us. The Jews are making one giant mistake; they are avoiding questions which probably no longer exist as mass phenomena and they are therefore not reacting to this status when they attack me as an anti-Semite. I consider these positions to be morally illiterate.

[Dolezal] Thank you for this interview.

So much for Miroslav Dolejsi in contact with two newspaper reporters. Moreover, these were reporters of the weekly FORUM, reporters who were clearly of non-Aryan origin and who were equipped with a tape recorder. What does he say (or write) elsewhere? Here are at least some fragments from a letter:

"Another videocassette covering the visit by Havel to Israel shows him wearing a yarmulke and prayer thongs standing before the Wailing Wall saying Jewish prayers. I consider confidential reports that Havel has converted to Judaism to be unlikely.

"Within the framework of transferring Jews from Russia through Czechoslovakia, some 30,000 to 38,000 will remain on the territory of the state. These Jews will enter the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the university, they will enter political parties, they will engage in commerce, they will work at the stock exchange, they will enter politics, etc. These Jews will then receive all financial and international support from Israel and the United States aimed at the economic and political reconstruction of Czechoslovakia. This is part of an agreement between the United States and the USSR (KGB-CIA) regarding mutual participation in power, not only in Czechoslovakia, but in all former communist countries of Europe and, finally, even in Europe as a whole.

"The entire Prognostication Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, from whence Komarek, Dlouhy, Klaus, Klimova, etc., came, was a Jewish and Masonic matter as far back as 1986. When that institute was charged by the then government with working out a prognosis for economic development through the year 2000 (in 1987) it was already apparent that this was not a question of a prognosis, but rather of an economic concept to follow the political revolution. Komarek sent some 46 of his people on study trips to the United States, to West Germany, to Great Britain, to Japan, etc.—people who already then were conjecturing about an economic concept and economic aid, particularly with American presidential consulting institutions and in Israel. Last year, the former minister of the interior, Kincl, wanted to arrest them all (and Mr. Dolejsi is clearly unhappy that he did not do so—remark by J.D.).

"In 1968, the Jews attempted to break up Russian hegemony in Europe through a revolution in Czechoslovakia (Loebl, Pelikan, Goldstuecker, Vaculik, Kohout, London, Cernik, Lustig, etc.). The same group participated in the revolution last year. That is why the first action involves the rehabilitation of Jews, both in the USSR and also elsewhere."

So much for Mr. Dolejsi when he speaks openly. However, the roots of these views and the roots of the fact that the article in STREDOCESKY EXPRES aroused so much commotion are far more interesting than the statements made by a single racist fabricating some kind of "sensational revelations."

Let us first look at the author. Mr. Dolejsi is among those people to whom the communist regime did terrible harm. He survived many years in jail and was not allowed to fully apply himself in any discipline. At that, he is an immensely intelligent and capable person. That is why I think that the "report" came into being in the following manner: The entire life experience of the author, the entire volume of his frustration show him that a person alone can achieve nothing. It is, therefore, understandable that he created for himself the model of fate. Kismet, which people direct like puppets and against which the individual can undertake nothing. And this model is personified by several symbols. The first of these models is a member of "Charter 77." This can be explained by the simple fact that Mr. Dolejsi was jailed longer than most other signatories of the charter and is himself, today, not even an adviser. The second personified model is the agent. This is understandable. Mr. Dolejsi was pursued by real agents of Moscow and felt their influence in such a painful manner that he sees them everywhere today, even in our government. Moreover, he tends to combine the symbol of the "Charter 77" member and the symbol of the agent. The third archetype seen by Mr. Dolejsi in the background of history is the Great Jew who is pulling the strings of the leading politicians on the world scene from the center in Jerusalem. I have no idea how he arrived at this model. But he is not the first. Freemasons and Jews have been popular [targets] forever.

But how did Mr. Dolejsi create his "report," which was printed in part by EXPRES? I do not believe that he is an agent or even readily given to assumptions. In view of the well-known motives, which have existed for thousands of years, for a sort of dislike of Jews, which is caused by many and many factors, this leads to politically unappetizing consequences such as demagoguery involving international Judaism and Freemasonry. Matters are far more complicated. However, I do not feel that I am an expert in these things.

[Dolezal] In this connection, how do you evaluate the visit by President Havel to Israel?

[Dolejsi] In 1918, Czechoslovakia came into being as a result of decisions by the Great Powers as a wedge between Catholic Germany and Catholic Austria. This was a deliberate effort which was achieved gradually and not even in 1989 was anything new begun. As early as World War I, there were efforts to destroy the four principal ideas of trends in Europe ideologically—Catholicism, Protestantism, East Orthodoxism, and Islam. At the same time, the aristocracy as a bearer of economic power was destroyed. Concurrently, Bolshevism arose in the USSR with the goal of exploiting

Europe. There was also an implantation of ideologies which were supposed to wreck that which had been developing for millennia in Europe. In 1917, attention was captured by the fact that people who had implemented the revolution in Russia were people surrounding Lev Trotsky. Most of them were Jews. And this gave rise to all the profanity surrounding this problem. But at that time, a narrow financial oligarchy came into being in the United States which controlled 60 percent of the money in circulation throughout the world. As circumstances would have it, approximately 70 percent of this group were again Jews. This group of people caused a great economic crisis—some 22 percent of capital disappeared. After the crisis, the failed enterprises in Europe led to the establishment of Germany at bargain prices. And you know the consequences. But German anti-Semitism concealed, in itself, a struggle against the United States and Great Britain. Developments in Russia were noteworthy. After the death of Lenin, Stalin turned away from the people who had made the revolution. The trials of the 1930's. And that is why Stalin was close to Hitler. Here and all over East Europe, this scenario was repeated in the 1950's. Stalin persecuted the Jews for pragmatic reasons. Jews had become the center of attention and political attacks on the part of those Great Power officials (Stalin's Russia and Nazi Germany), because they had only themselves to blame. It was a disaster originating in the attitude of the Jews and resulting from the political orientation of some of their groupings. All of this is generally known and has been processed in the literature.

Today, as a result of changes in the world political situation, Czechoslovakia has lost its reason for being and the mission of our new political representatives will be to smash this state. That is what we are witnessing. The situation changed in part following the coming into being of Israel where the political orientation in the beginning was pro-Russian. Stalin expected that Israel would become leftist oriented—the kibbutzes, etc. But Israel was backed primarily by American Jews. That is why Russia began arming the Arab countries. Today's influence of American Jews in the Government of the United States is considerable and so the question of Israel and its political aggression—primarily the efforts to create a "greater Israel"—is becoming a question of world policy.

[Dolezal] And could you say something on the visit of President Havel in Israel?

[Dolejsi] The coming into being of Czechoslovakia in 1918 has its origin also in the influence of anti-Jewish sentiments in the United States. Then, Czechoslovakia was lost for many years and it is only now that American and obviously Jewish influences—these cannot be separated—can try to again penetrate in this country. President Havel could, understandably, not act otherwise—he is neither a politician nor a financier, in contrast to the politicians of Israel—if he wanted to seek information from the most credible sources as to what the probable

intentions behind European policy and its world inter-connection would be. That is why he traveled to Israel, that is understandable. That is one reason. A second reason involves the problem of the financial, economic reconstruction of Czechoslovakia. All over Europe, Jewish economic influence is extremely strong. And if Czechoslovakia wishes to distance itself from the USSR, it must tie in to this influence. This is understandable without any kind of auxiliary explanation. That is why Havel traveled to Israel. To the extent that anyone speaks of anti-Semitism, I have the feeling that they have slept away the past 50 years. Politics is rational and I have the impression that today there is no anti-Semitism in Europe. Primitive [passage missing] are subject to extortion. But I know that this year in the spring it was operating at the Ministry of the Interior in the civil verification commissions. It is clear that, despite being disbanded, the State Security apparatus was fully operational during this time. The State Security apparatus naturally knew of Mr. Dolejsi's function within the verification commissions and they knew about him personally also as an individual whom they had been surveilling for years. That is why I explain the origin of the entire report this way: Mr. Dolejsi discovered materials at the Ministry of Interior which were revealing and potentially scandalous. In view of the fact that his personality had been deformed by years of incarceration, he did not understand that this was a question of reverse subversion. He processed the materials and presented them within the Confederation. There, however, the disinformational nonsense of the State Security apparatus did not get by and the report was not published. Not long thereafter, it appeared in STREDOCESKY EXPRES. And two birds were killed with one stone. People who, in contrast to Mr. Dolejsi, were famous, were persecuted. And people began to talk about Mr. Dolejsi.

What were the beginnings of the report? We asked Zdenek Kessler, doctor of jurisprudence, a deputy in the Federal Assembly, a member of the Confederation of Political Prisoners, and a person who had been in touch with Mr. Dolejsi prior to the "sensational revelations."

[Kessler] I was previously not personally acquainted with Mr. Dolejsi, but I know that, until approximately in the summertime, he worked in the civil commissions of the Ministry of the Interior and that he then began to help out at the central offices of the Confederation. I became familiar with the material published by EXPRES some two to three months earlier. Mr. Dolejsi brought it to the chairman of the Confederation as confidential material and the chairman let me read it—with the approval of Mr. Dolejsi. I was entertained by the material, particularly that portion in which my friend Professor Povolny appears among foreign Zionists. He was listed in first place among the Jewish conspirators. He is my friend and I know that he comes from a little village which is 100 km away from the residence of any kind of Jew. When Mr. Dolejsi asked my opinion the next day, I defined the text as a mixture

of opinions which were published in ARIJSKY BOJ or in VLAJKA during the days of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. And I told him that I was most amused by the "Zionist" Povolny. I told him why. And in the EXPRES article, Povolny no longer appeared and his place is taken by Tigrid, who was in second place in the original material. Naturally, the leadership of the Confederation placed the entire contribution under lock and key, refusing to publish it as long as Mr. Dolejsi does not present any proof. The material had been marked on the first page to indicate that it had been processed by the Confederation of Political Prisoners. Thereafter, however, the material appeared all over Prague as a samizdat publication and was finally printed in EXPRES. Naturally, the Confederation immediately distanced itself from it. This was not merely a matter of Dolejsi, but of other individuals who wanted to use the Confederation to acquire some kind of job. Nevertheless, we gave Mr. Dolejsi the opportunity; we invited him to present proof. Naturally, he did not present any, so that we then published the proclamation. At the end of the week, we convened the leadership of the Confederation. The meeting was also attended by Dr. Malek. He is the historian and a young charter member who, I sense, is called Dejmek. It was he who identified the material as being partially processed by the 10th Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior—that was the disinformation group—and, judging by the style of the material, even identified several State Security officials to whose style it conformed. In the meantime, it turned out that similar material appeared in Switzerland in the hands of Evzen Hofman, who is a destroyer of the unity of political prisoners and considers his group to be the only "true" political prisoners. For the time being, I have not been successful in determining whether the material appeared first in EXPRES or whether the Swiss material was the first. What is very paradoxical is the fact that Mr. Dolejsi proclaims that his brother is some kind of a secretary in the Order of Maltese Knights. And it was this Order which gave Minister Dienstbier a high decoration....

It is clear that Mr. Dolejsi is a member of some kind of populist group. The only individuals who made it in his "material" are Bartoncik and Sacher. The material indicates that these are the only two daring and character-filled people, whereas the others are involved in some kind of conspiracies. But in any event, 18 people from the leadership of the Confederation voted for the opinion that publication of this material is an action which has caused the greatest harm to the Confederation during the entire period of its existence. Here, in parliament, the Communists were even laughing at us, telling us that we have a Dolejsi much like they have their Mohorita. Nevertheless, the material was published against the express wishes of the Confederation.

[Dolezal] Mr. Deputy, was Mr. Dolejsi, in his work within the civil commissions, able to lay his hands on materials which he himself felt to be genuine, but which were the work of the 10th Directorate—in other words, the disinformation section?

[Kessler] According to information provided by Mr. Dejmek, no one checked on the civil commissions in the beginning and everyone was able to take away and bring whatever material they wished. Any kind of material. The historian Dr. Malek, after analyzing the material, clearly stated that at least two-thirds of it had been compiled with a disinformation goal and that it had been done so skillfully that it would seem to be credible to a political illiterate. And one-third of the material—those connecting and augmenting fantasies—he designated as being the creation of Dolejsi himself.

[Dolezal] Mr. Deputy, with respect to Mr. Dolejsi, I was startled by manifestations of some kind of deeply rooted anti-Semitism. Did he exhibit similar special behavior prior to this time?

[Kessler] I was not in contact with him so frequently. But I was involved in processing some materials which he was preparing for parliament. He wanted to establish some kind of specialized commission within the confederation for 17 November, which he most likely wanted to head. He wanted to establish an organization which would undertake an investigation, despite the fact that, on the other hand, he claimed that 17 November was a Jewish-American-KGB plot. According to him, the commission was to have such authorities that it could virtually suspend the authority of the president of the republic. Everyone was to be subordinated to this commission, to testify in response to its summons.... Authorities which transgress all limitations of the imagination. And, on the other hand, we can read about him saying that there is nothing to investigate, that all had been prepared beforehand. And anti-Semitism—philosophically speaking, the entire published material resembles that published by Rosenberg, who based his assumptions also on similar ideas of a Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy as a Nazi philosopher.

Mr. Dolejsi claimed that the report was a result of the detailed analysis of about 2,000 pages of material which is deposited with his friends. To a certain extent, this was reminiscent of the "island of penguins"; he was not able to submit any material.

[Dolezal] Thank you for this interview, Mr. Deputy.

So much for the opinion of a person who can most likely be considered as being more initiated than others. The information regarding Switzerland is maximally evasive—the professionals in the 10th Directorate did not place their reliance on a single source and released the "sensational revelations" through numerous channels, much like they did in the case of the "dead student" on Narodni Trida Street.

Another aspect of this entire "scandalous background" is the manner in which the article was perceived by the broad public. It is certainly true that everyone likes to read gossip pertaining to "those above." But the entire popularity of this scandal has other roots. People in our country lived through 40 years without the right to make decisions regarding their persons. Without the necessity

to take responsibility for their actions and their future. As a result, they are no longer accustomed to doing so and the possibility that even today the daily affairs of this country are directed by a Jew or Freemason is very tempting. It again makes it possible to lose the awareness of being responsible for general matters, for the events in our country. After all, everything has been previously agreed upon and decided long ago.

I understand how the entire "report" could have come about and I do not condemn Mr. Dolejsi. That which he went through I would not be personally capable of surviving. But I do not understand the reaction of the readers of EXPRES. I had the same experiences regarding life in a communist country as they had. And yet I do not consider myself and do not wish to consider myself as having been broken and being controlled "from behind the scenes of history." That which is understandable and excusable with respect to Mr. Dolejsi is proof of only one thing with respect to the broad reading public. It is a laziness and inability to utilize a historic opportunity which is presented by the present day. For the first time after 50 years, we are masters of our affairs. However, the reaction to the article in EXPRES shows that we do not actually care.

POLAND

Democracy Dependent on Working Self-Government

91EP0196A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
1-2 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Senator Zbigniew Romaszewski by Jan Rogala on 25 November 1990; place not given: "Which Way to Democracy?"]

[Text] [Rogala] It has by now become customary to say that we are living in a democratic state. It seems, however, that that democracy is as yet absent in our country. At best, it is present only in embryo. At the same time, we have great expectations for its arrival.

[Romaszewski] Our views of democracy have been somewhat distorted, perhaps because we have been so far from it and therefore our views of how it should function are somewhat oversimplified. Now that we are about to introduce that democracy, it has become evident that even a democratic constitution, free elections, and democratic law cannot assure democracy for Poland within one year or even within five.

That is because democracy means not just legislation, and is not a question of law alone, but is above all a question of a certain habit, the evolution of certain organizational structures of the society, structures that have been absent in this country and that we have to patiently build. A society that is not organized and lacks such structures is a mere mob which can be either manipulated or ruled. For the society to assume the burden of power, it must organize itself. And the

meaning of the absence of structures, of absence of an exchange of views both among citizens and between citizens and the government, is demonstrated by the results of the recent elections. Today structures adapted to functioning in a democratic society are barely beginning to arise.

[Rogala] This means that democracy is a little like culture.

[Romaszewski] I am certain of this. Basically I believe that democracy is decided precisely by the infrastructure of the society, by such things as political parties, associations, social organizations, foundations, and also several thousand, or several tens of thousands, private enterprises. That is the foundation of democracy. For this creates a situation in which the government may "declare a strike" but the society will continue to function and will not even notice that strike.

[Rogala] Does such a situation exist anywhere in the world?

[Romaszewski] In the United States, for example, where the government may cease functioning but in Texas no one may be aware of it. That is because there all the functions important to the society are handled by local governments and independent social cultures. We lack such a situation and will not have it soon.

[Rogala] But after all we have local governments elected in free elections, several dozen political parties, associations, social organizations, foundations, and a growing number of private enterprises.

[Romaszewski] Of course, we have microscopic parties that lack any funds for engaging in political activity, along with foundations whose operations are impeded by a bad taxation system, and along with rachitic social organizations and trade unions whose power is declining.

[Rogala] And it does not look like their financial situation will improve.

[Romaszewski] Exactly. They will have no money. Yet this is very important to them, and to the society too. And how can the problem of financing culture be resolved? As known, the state's patronage transforms culture into a propaganda apparatus. Everyone knows this the world over. Therefore, the state's patronage of the arts has to be abolished. But then where can the young poet, the beginning painter, sculptor, or writer go? In the United States he can choose among thousands of large and small foundations sponsoring various directions of art. He can receive a grant from these foundations and do creative work. If his talent is not proved, his grant is terminated. But what matters is that he can apply and receive it.

[Rogala] In this country a cultural foundation may be established by, precisely, the Ministry of Culture, and receive special tax exemptions from the state, unlike the

other foundations, although it is not known whether such a foundation will accomplish anything big.

[Romaszewski] A state cultural foundation which will be funded from taxes on enterprises...I think that this must be a misunderstanding. I may not want to have the state's patronage of culture abolished all at once, because this is not possible given the underdeveloped infrastructure of [private] foundations, but I definitely support the establishment of small foundations at any price. A benign climate for the operation of associations also should be established. Yet I have been informed that, e.g., it is intended to "undercut the wings" of a consumer organization. Circles close to the authorities have responded negatively to the possibility that "consumers" would receive financial support from an analogous institution in the West. The issue now hangs in the air. In my opinion, given the existence of a free market, a consumer organization would be highly important and should be encouraged, not disbanded. After all, at present there is no monitoring of the market, no quality assessment. A consumer organization would exercise precisely such monitoring.

[Rogala] The absence of, or restrictions upon, organizations is a threat to the nascent democracy.

[Romaszewski] Yes, precisely. Because we are still stuck in the rut of old thinking. Bolshevism remains rooted in our mentality. It seems to both our authorities and our society that everything should be centralized. People stick to the belief that the authorities know best what to do and how, and that the authorities should say what we should do. This is of course simpler, but it does not accelerate the transition to democracy.

[Rogala] And does not teach democracy.

[Romaszewski] There is one thing that we had not realized, or did not want to be aware of: pragmatically considered, democracy, especially at its outset, is a relatively ineffective system. When effective and energetic action is needed, democracy displays definite disadvantages. It is not efficient and does not solve problems on the spot. No one, for example, can conceive an army or a police force that would be directed in a democratic manner. Democracy needs time for an exchange and reconciliation of views and for reaching a gigantic number of compromises. And only then can the best solution, the best compromise for a given moment, be found.

On the other hand, it has turned out that no machinery of centralized command can function in the economy. We have already learned this painfully on our own skin. The amount of information that is needed by the economy and must reach particular places exceeds the possibilities of centralized command. Market mechanisms are not regulated by the mechanisms of an abstract economic plan. Thus on the one hand there is the need for rapid action and on the other the requirements of democracy. The authorities are facing a huge number of such dilemmas when deciding what to do. In a situation

like ours, hundreds of problems are resolved in isolation from their interdependent nature. But in such a vicious circle situation, it is easier to take decisions than to guide social organizations by means of subtle mechanisms.

[Rogala] But such guidance is not part of democracy.

[Romaszewski] Of course not. It is done differently; there is the mechanism of taxation, the tax exemptions, the system of development-promoting subsidies. That is practiced throughout the world and serves to promote the essential forms of life of the society. But in this country at present the situation is viewed onesidedly; we focus solely on combatting inflation and therefore we must avoid flexibility in wielding the instrument of taxation. The idea is to drain the money supply at any price and by penalizing everyone. This is the simplest way of forfeiting the opportunity for pursuing not only economic but also social and cultural policies.

[Rogala] Why are political parties forbidden to avail themselves of funding from foreign sources? This not democratic; this even restricts democracy.

[Romaszewski] As I view it, this is an agreement among the strong, who have the money, against the weak, who lack it, against the parties which still are not and will never be parties so long as they lack funds. And obtaining funds in this country is no simple matter. The heirs of the PZPR [Polish United Worker Party] and the groupings whose position has improved while in the opposition are not enthused about the growth of new political parties. Such an attitude is a threat to democracy.

[Rogala] But there is a chance that among these several dozen parties there will emerge several or a dozen strong prodemocratic parties.

[Romaszewski] I do not doubt this. But what we are witnessing now is a consequence of the absence of social communication over the last 45 years. Small parties proclaiming the same program are arising, often in different parts of the country. The lack of social communication is preventing them from learning about each other, meeting mutually, and reaching a consensus that would ultimately result in the formation of a stronger political alliance.

[Rogala] But the fragmentation of political parties also is a threat to democracy.

[Romaszewski] Yes. In my opinion, [the coming] parliamentary elections will be a threat. Presumably these small parties, as well as the parties that are heirs to the PZPR, will campaign for proportional elections. As a result, we may witness the birth of a Sejm that will be enormously unstable, so much that the resignation of several deputies from a coalition would suffice to topple the government. And those two or three deputies may decide to switch to the opposition in return for the offer of a ministerial portfolio in the new government.

[Rogala] It would suffice to specify a certain percentile limit on proportional elections.

[Romaszewski] Such a limit would make some sense by preferring strong parties, and then the Sejm would be more stable. That would also afford an opportunity for the formation of electoral blocs among parties.

Another threat to democracy is the ongoing depreciation of the Sejm's status. Consider that deputies are passing laws without even being sufficiently familiar with them. When you consider that on 28 December of last year the Senate had voted on 13 highly important decrees [bills] concerning the economy which were submitted to it for a vote barely six days earlier, on 22 December 1989, it becomes clear that no member of the Senate had the opportunity to study the drafts of these decrees in depth. Parliamentary voting should be by name; other deputies, the voters, the TV spectators, should be enabled to know how a deputy or a senator votes and whether he votes at all. In the end, the voters should have, in addition to promises, some criterion for evaluating their deputy or senator. What was the reason for discontinuing the publication of the DIARIUSZ SEJMOWY [Sejm Diary] in which any interested reader could check on the opinions of specific deputies concerning the issues being debated? This anonymity of the parliament is a threat to democracy.

[Rogala] It should be counteracted.

[Romaszewski] Surely. Democracy means rule by the people. In view of this, the rule should belong to the people, and the people should want it. This is, contrary to appearances, a serious problem. To me it is not at all obvious that the people want to rule. In my opinion, the public's attitude nowadays is: if the [authorities] are so wise, let them tell us what to do in order that things may be well. Let them rule. At the same time, though, the public complains that the authorities are not wise enough to rule well. Therefore, [a strongman] should come and say what to do. As for the citizens they do not have such an obligation of thinking. The citizens want to work and to protect their families against the economic crisis; they are waiting for a prescription telling them what to do. This also is one of the biggest threats.

[Rogala] Do you consider the growth of local democracy a safeguard of future democracy, since it could counteract the threats to democracy for the country as a whole?

[Romaszewski] Not just local. I believe that democracy would be strengthened by the growth of social awareness, by promoting that awareness and assuring the freedom of action of the institutions we mentioned at the beginning, of course including local governments. The public should be encouraged to join in, because there will be no democracy without the people. There cannot be democracy without popular participation, starting at the lowest

level at that. To take power means to accept responsibility too. If this is not acknowledged, it means relinquishing democracy, and such a relinquishment is being observed nowadays to some extent.

[Rogala] Are not the requirements posed too high?

[Romaszewski] Yes. We hit a high "C." We have begun to shout that democracy is here, and the people believed it. We are shouting that the law-governed state is here.

[Rogala] A state governed by the old law.

[Romaszewski] The state of the old law decreed by communists and for communists. In what way can we speak of a law-governed state? We lack the legal system needed for a democratic state. The entire legal system has to be changed. The revisions of law are causing contradictions among laws nowadays. It will still take a long time for a new legal system to evolve. Even the wisest deputies and senators and the most eminent lawyers will not create a good legal system while they are desk-bound. Law must be formed through contact with reality. Even now we are realizing that some of the recently passed laws are bad. They contain loopholes and fail to solve the problems they are designed to solve. Hence, my program for the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control], to whose chairmanship I have been nominated by the Senate, includes granting to that institution the power of initiating legislation. For it is by checking and monitoring that errors in laws can be caught and suitable corrections at once performed. Laws will be created by the method of trial and error. That is why it would not be a bad idea at all to grant to the government for a specified period of time special powers for enacting emergency laws for several or a dozen months. Of course, this does not concern systemic issues or those relating to the rights of man; it rather concerns the economic or social domain. After they are placed with the speaker of the Sejm or the Senate, the decrees would begin to be implemented under the watchful gaze of, e.g., the NIK and the Sejm. If they prove to function well, after six months they become law; if they turn out to be bad, the Sejm will not ratify them or, if they require amendments, the Sejm will introduce them on the basis of the experience gained. Would not this system be more democratic than engaging in abstract discussions and pretending that yet another decree is passed when in reality one is not even sufficiently familiar with its text?

The problem is that everyone is waiting for the legal system to stabilize somewhat, wanting it to consolidate rapidly, whereas in reality that will take a long time. We do not even have a law regulating the manner in which laws are legislated. We therefore lack an interpretation of the desirable form of lawmaking.

[Rogala] Even if the legal system becomes consolidated, it still would not be good.

[Romaszewski] That would be bad. At the moment certain occurrences are eliciting emergency reactions. We believe that one of the flaws of the government is

that it has not been reacting too rapidly or with sufficient flexibility. As a result of its obstinate adherence to that [shock-therapy] program, the decline in output has reached 30 percent. It should have been envisaged in advance that not only shoddy goods and goods not in demand would cease to be produced. This must be changed rapidly, because we are facing an extremely serious economic crisis which also is a threat to democracy.

[Rogala] So then when will we finally reach democracy?

[Romaszewski] To me one such harbinger would be that hypothetical "government strike." Let the government declare a strike for half a year and concern itself only with matters relating to the army or foreign policy, and social and economic life will continue on its own. In America they waited 200 years for such a situation. But in Switzerland it also is like that. Almost everything is handled by the cantonal authorities, and local governments are very strong there. I think that we will arrive at such a condition ourselves, but that is a very longlasting process that will be further protracted because building democracy is not only time-consuming but also costly.

[Rogala] It is my understanding that you advocate building democracy consistently, slowly, and in an orderly manner.

[Romaszewski] No. I would like it to appear here overnight, but that is not possible. We are living in very special times, which are not times of democracy. The idea that we have democracy here is a misunderstanding. We cannot jettison all our past just like that. We have somehow to transform that past. Then we shall reach democracy.

Emigre Leader on Consequences of Polish Disunity

91EP0185A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
21 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, emigre leader, by Kazimierz Woycicki; place and date not given: "Sharing Responsibility"]

[Text] [Woycicki] The election campaign had unexpected effects. According to many, it revealed a totally new image of the Polish society and also exposed challenges to the new Polish democracy that must be dealt with. How would you evaluate the results of the election campaign?

[Nowak-Jezioranski] In my view, the election brought defeat to both factions that emerged from Solidarity. The results of the first round make this perfectly clear. Mazowiecki's defeat showed that his camp could only rely on the support of intelligentsia in big cities. Walesa, on the other hand, had to realize that he did not have the backing of a majority any more. He was quite right in saying the votes cast for Tyminski indicated a grave threat for the future. They were the votes of frustrated

people, may be even extremely frustrated people, who had lost all hope that those forces which took power after the collapse of the communist regime would be able to better their lives. That was a blind and irrational reaction. This time, it found a vent at the polls, but tomorrow it may break out in strikes or even riots. It was blind, because it also expressed itself in a considerable diminishing of the Church's authority (if we are to believe the polls), a long time ally of Solidarity. I believe all the negative effects result from a self-destructive smear campaign conducted by both Walesa's and Mazowiecki's camps. It undermined people's support for the government elite that came out of Solidarity.

[Woycicki] In your opinion, do the election results allow Balcerowicz's economic reforms to continue?

[Nowak-Jezioranski] There will be no foreign economic aid without retaining Balcerowicz in his present position. Yet, Balcerowicz's program will not succeed if Walesa and his government do not regain social trust and acceptance. If the reforms fail, people's extreme frustration and hopelessness will increase. We may see a situation similar to what happened in the Weimar Republic: mass unemployment, hyperinflation, and termination of foreign aid. In this type of a situation any demagogue able to manipulate the emotions of the masses can win. You will recall that Hitler, a psychopath and murderer, was elected by a majority in a democratic election. I am not, at all, saying that the same should be repeated in Poland, but we have to face facts and see clearly the existing threats.

[Woycicki] During the last six months divisions in Solidarity were deepening. Were they necessary? Are they unavoidable now?

[Nowak-Jezioranski] In my opinion, divisions in Solidarity were not necessary. Opponents of Walesa's presidency should have realized that his presidency was unavoidable and should have modified their stance accordingly. That was my firm belief when I was leaving Poland in September. It is futile, however, to go back to what may have been. The important thing is what to do now. Considering the present threats, it is an absolute must that the whole Solidarity camp unite again. This may happen by creating a coalition government and a common electoral bloc. They are certainly called for to avoid continued mutual undermining in the parliamentary elections. A coalition is requisite for both factions, but, most of all, it is a vital need of the state itself. We are facing the possibility of chaos in the USSR. It may bring cutting off gas, oil, and other raw materials, and also shutting down Polish industries [which] supply the Soviet market. Besides that, there is an internal threat in the pressure of workers' claims intensified by election campaign promises. It is in the best interest of Walesa and his team to give a share of responsibility to the opposition camp of Mazowiecki. A coalition is also in the interest of Mazowiecki's group, because it is unlikely that they will win back lost positions in the parliamentary elections. If there is no coalition, the winner may be

that hostile third force constituted by people who voted for Tyminski. A coalition is necessary to have the backing of a majority and to face challenges in unity. Such a coalition is necessary to deal with emerging new threats. Most of all, however, such a coalition can win the support of a majority. A minority government will not succeed and it may become a governmental disaster.

[Woycicki] You have also followed foreign reactions. Has the image of Poland and the evaluation of changes in our country changed as a result of the last months' difficulties?

[Nowak-Jezioranski] After the first election round, the response of the press and public opinion was: "Poles are crazy". Poland's position, however, is still very strong. It is not based on some pro-Polish sentiments, because in international politics sentiments do not really count. The bold and consistent reform of Balcerowicz made our country a progressive force again, ahead of other Soviet bloc countries. In terms of democracy, Poland is already ahead of all the other former Soviet bloc states. The success of Balcerowicz's reform will make others follow. A failure will have negative effects far beyond Polish borders. It may become a death blow to democratic reform forces in the USSR and other countries of Eastern and Central Europe. A failure of the Polish reform will be proof to others that the restructuring of an economic and political system according to Western democratic models can not be done. That is why I expect Poland may count on much greater aid from the West, if her needs become crystal clear. I would not exclude even such aid as, for example, financing the development of public works, if the unemployment rate becomes catastrophic. It would be premature to come forth with such a proposition (at the moment). On the other hand, however, it would be wishful thinking to expect understanding from international financial institutions, if salary raises create again an inflationary spiral. Credits and possible debt amortization would be definitely stopped, and the Polish economy would be left alone. In this respect, there should be no illusions. I repeat, there should be no illusions here, because no one is going to pump capital into a barrel that has lost its bottom.

Influx of Refugees Burdens Border, Rail Patrols

Romanians Paralyze Rail Traffic

*91EP0184A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
21 Dec 90 p 2*

[Article by Z.L.: "From East to West: Bundles on the Tracks"]

[Text] Such an influx of guests from the east has not been recorded at the crossing in Medyka, even at its summer peak. After introducing further, stricter conditions for Romanian citizens entering Poland (a minimum of \$100 when crossing the border, even for a stay of less than five days, and no less than \$20 for each succeeding day,

entries in passports), their number has not decreased at all. At least so says Stanislaw Pisz, shift director at the Regional Customs Office in Przemysl. All of them have the required amounts, and customs officials have been able to turn back only those individuals who have been absentminded. Pisz surmises that the crowds in Medyka and Przemysl are the result of a rumor spreading in the Ukraine that as of 1 January, Poland is to close the gate more effectively. It is no wonder that all those loaded with bundles suddenly want to make it before the New Year.

At the Przemysl station infernal scenes are occurring these days. Wieslaw Rychlik of the Krakow District Directorate of State Railroads [DOKP] noted that if nothing changes, if no administrative dam is established, and new people continue to arrive at this pace, work at the Przemysl station will be paralyzed. Starting up an extra train to Lvov did not help, nor did hiring Railroad Security Service [SOK] staff to keep order during boarding. Compartments are loaded to the ceiling with baggage and train departures are being delayed more often because of the crowding.

On the platforms and in the depot hall, people are encamped continuously, making the normal movement of travelers impossible. Perhaps seasonal trains in the direction of the western border will relieve a rather tense situation. But a logjam has developed at the highway crossing as well. On the other side one waits 86 hours (passengers cars) or 36 hours (buses) for clearance to Poland. Here, the latter are cleared without delay, while passenger vehicles must wait in line nearly 24 hours.

Today there is practically not one station along the railroad route running east to west where Romanian Gypsies are not seeking shelter. Fortunately, says Stanislaw Jablonski of the SOK Main Headquarters, disturbances and crimes are rare. The Romanians return to the station in the evening, tired from daylong trading or begging. Then the women set about doing laundry and arranging their quarters. In Tarnow, even though the Polish Red Cross has set up free accommodations in the workers hotel there, few have been willing to take advantage of them.

The closer to the western border, the more wandering Romanians. In Slubice, for example, about 500 to 600 of them have set up housing in attics, outbuildings and sheds. Like other stations, the depot at the border town of Rzepin has been "settled." The group of Romanian citizens in Swinoujscie is even larger. But there the more resourceful have installed themselves, living mainly from their trading of articles bought at wholesale firms.

Grzegorz Siewiara, deputy director of the western DOKP, believes that the presence of permanent "lodgers" at border stations is indeed burdensome to passengers, but it will not cause particular disruption during the peak of holiday traffic. There has never been a shortage of homeless people and vagrants seeking shelter under

the roof of depot buildings. For all the stranded "household members" at the Poznan depot, a Christmas Eve supper will be organized this year, through the efforts of the clergy and trade unions.

Estimated counts, carried out recently by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, carry signals indicating an ebb in the Romanian tide. Will the coming weeks bear them out?

Crowds at Soviet Border

91EP0184B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Poland
21 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by S.P.: "The Road Through Torment in Ogrodniki and Kuznica"]

[Text] In Ogrodniki, in automobiles, in the byways, in the open air, and sleeping in them, wrapped up in blankets, trembling from the cold, [are] people. The great majority are citizens of the Soviet Union, from Lithuania, the Russian Republic, Latvia, even Georgia. Indisposed to conversation, caught in agitated drowsiness, they say they have waited on the Soviet side for 55 hours.

The line grows day after day; recently it fanned out six kilometers and was still lengthening. Automobiles arrived continuously. From the stories of those who came to Poland, it is apparent that they went through three detailed inspections, including the dismantling of automobiles. They were also subjected to a communal check by Sajudis inspectors. Every suitcase, every package was checked in search of vodka, since more and more often alcohol from the Soviet side has been turning up at bazaars in the Bialystok voivodship.

Polish customs officials can allow about 15,000 people to pass through each day, but every 15 to 20 minutes an automobile comes from the Soviet to the Polish side. Customs officials in Ogrodniki suggested joint inspections to their Soviet colleagues. They [the Soviets] do not even want to hear about it, explaining that it would not be a *tocznaja prowierka* [comprehensive inspection?].

YUGOSLAVIA

Report on 10 January Presidency Meeting

91BA0223A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
15 Jan 91 pp 9-14

[Unattributed article containing excerpts from the transcript of the meeting: "Buying Time in the Transitional Period"]

[Text]

Participants

The following participated in the 90th meeting of the SFRY State Presidency: Dr. Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY State Presidency; Stjepan Mesic, vice president of the SFRY State Presidency; Dr. Janez Drnovsek, Dr. Dragutin Zelenovic, Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski, Nenad

Bucin, Riza Sapunxhin, and Bogic Bogicevic, members of the SFRY State Presidency; Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia; Momir Bulatovic, president of the State Presidency of Montenegro; Alija Izetbegovic, president of the State Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Milan Kucan, president of the Republic of Slovenia; Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia; Vladimir Mitkov, president of the State Presidency of Macedonia; Hysen Kajdomcaj, president of the State Presidency of Kosovo; Jugoslav Kostic, president of the State Presidency of Vojvodina; Stojan Andov, president of the Macedonian Assembly; Ante Markovic, chairman of the Federal Executive Council [FEC]; Suada Muminagic, vice president of the SFRY Assembly; Anton Stari, general secretary of the SFRY State Presidency, and Nikola Tasic, Lazar Vracaric, Slobodan Marinkovic, and Dragan Musulin of the SFRY State Presidency.

The meeting lasted from 1000 to 1500 hours with two short breaks because of the subsequent invitation to Ante Markovic and Suada Muminagic to take part in the proceedings and in order to prepare the final statement for the public.

The meeting of the SFRY State Presidency in Belgrade aroused great attention from the public throughout the country because of the grave circumstances and profound crisis. Out of a desire to inform our readers as fully as possible about developments as the disturbed relations and lost confidence among our federal units play themselves out, the editors of DANAS are publishing from the transcript all the most important excerpts from the discussion in the meeting of the Presidency.

The meeting was opened by Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY State Presidency, who mentioned that the principal topic on the agenda, "Examination of the Country's Political Future," had been imposed by reality. "It arises out of the impossibility of the normal functioning of our state and its institutions, and we can also say the impossibility of normal life for citizens themselves.... Too many things have been happening and have happened to bring about the deterioration and result in the present state of affairs. Efforts to halt those developments have not been fruitful. This is the last moment for us to get out of this difficult situation by reaching a reasonable agreement.... The most important thing today is for us to conduct the discussion in an atmosphere of tolerance and frankness. It is not going to help us at all to argue over who began it and who is most to blame for the present situation. Nor will it benefit us to attribute to anyone bad intentions as to the future. Let us start with the blatant truth that no one can impose anything on anyone by force and we can choose the road we want to travel to our future. Our purpose is to seek a way to live together, but at the same time in such a way that we can part peacefully and in a civilized manner if we are unable to agree on our life together. The discussion today might be a good beginning if we approach it with patience, frankness, and tolerance."

Following these introductory words by Jovic, Janez Drnovsek took the floor and proposed that Ante Markovic also be invited to the meeting. Jovic answered that the invitations were sent out on the basis of the agreement at the last meeting, and if we want to invite all federal institutions "responsible for this subject matter, then we will invite both the president of the Yugoslav Assembly and also the chairman of the Federal Executive Council." That proposal was immediately supported by Stipe Mesic, Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodan Milosevic, and Jovic asked that Ante Markovic, chairman of the FEC, and Suada Muminagic, vice president of the SFRY Assembly (Gligorijevic, the Assembly's president, is undergoing medical treatment), be invited to the meeting.

We Are Not Burning Bridges

Following the break, Milan Kucan was the first to ask for the floor, remarking that he perceived this meeting as a beginning and an attempt to arrive at a discussion about the future of life together. "After all, probably all of us have had enough of living in a crisis and an unpromising situation, with constant worry, insecurity, chaos, and things out of control. Unfortunately, a minimal degree of mutual trust and sincerity is indispensable to such a discussion," Kucan said. Adding that after he received the invitation to this meeting, he asked whether it was still possible to speak of the necessary degree of trust after Serbia's assault on Yugoslavia's monetary system. "This is an act which has more far-reaching consequences for Yugoslavia's destiny than a whole series of political positions and actions. Our assessment is that this is the definitive end of Yugoslavia as it has been known in practice up to now. I wondered whether there was any point in coming to this meeting, especially because this is a formal meeting of the State Presidency. No, I do not believe that under these conditions this meeting, useful and necessary, can yield the anticipated and desired result in view of yesterday's meeting of the Presidency, which showed that the problems are being evaded, that separate criteria are continuing to be applied—on some things, a judgment must be made immediately, on others, not, attention is turned to other problems, and so on. Ultimately, I came to the conclusion that it would not be good for any of us, including myself, to stand in the way of an attempt to arrive at some result."

Then Kucan read Slovenia's initial positions for future talks, including this passage: "Yugoslavia has completely disintegrated in political and economic terms as a joint federal state, the system is blocked, the crisis is extreme. True as it may be that we have all contributed to this, each in his own way, there is duality of government; the constitutional-legal, legislative, economic, and political powers of the republics and of the federal state are overlapping and are being blocked more and more...." Kucan went on to emphasize that the future talks must have two aims. The first has to do with an agreement on assuming or distributing rights and obligations that arise out of our life together in a common state up to this

point. That would be a discussion and ultimately an agreement on regulating mutual relations "retroactively." The second task is an "agreement (on the subject of) whether it is possible—through qualitatively new relations and interests, above all economic, not political or ideological—for the republics to set up a new community, the kind which we and the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia have proposed as a model for confederal realignment of Yugoslavia." Kucan went on to say that the talks could be conducted and the agreements reached only by republics which are "independent and sovereign, with a democratic government installed on the basis of elections," on whom "no one can impose his interests and whose rights cannot be infringed." Remarking that it is the position of the Slovenian Assembly that federal authorities are not appropriate partners for an agreement, nor is their arbitration acceptable in these interrepublic agreements, Kucan added: "We do not, of course, think that the role of federal bodies is not important in this 'empty' period. But, in our opinion, those bodies can only serve as organizers and, if you like, moderators in those direct talks and agreement among the republics." Kucan finally emphasized that even after the plebiscite, and it will still be the case when it is an independent republic, Slovenia is interested in preserving good relations and good cooperation with the other nationalities and republics of Yugoslavia. "The policy of burning the bridges which up to now have linked us together in Yugoslavia, in a joint federal state, is not in our interest.... Our goal is not to strengthen the border on the Kupa and Sutla, but to abolish all borders in that political sense and cross European borders to arrive at all the essential features of economic, political, and nonmaterial life, to join the group of peoples and countries creating a new Europe.... For us, the severing of old relations and the institutional framework which have restricted Slovenia's independence and sovereignty is at the same time an attempt to establish and seek new ties with all those who wish it on the basis of real interests and straightforward accounting...."

Slobodan Milosevic: We Have To Breathe

Excuse me, I have only one response to make in this connection; in my opinion, it is altogether unacceptable to substitute arguments and say that Serbia "assaulted" the monetary system.

I think at the beginning of this discussion there is no purpose at all in making that switch, especially because there was no assault on the monetary system at all and I would say that this is an utterly incompetent description of this problem. The entire issue can be discussed only when we put on the table the facts concerning the situation throughout Yugoslavia, certainly not the facts pertaining to one republic. As you know, the National Bank of Yugoslavia is preparing a report on this. We have information that all have done this, especially Slovenia. So much for confidence. As to whether or not there is a legal basis, the legal basis does exist, above all in the Law on the National Bank. It is not a question of

an assault, but there can only be the debatable question of the limit on the use of credit created from primary note issue. As you know, credit and monetary policy for this year was not adopted in the SFRY Assembly. Accordingly, in the proceedings to adopt the limits, we feel that we should propose and try to get those limits to embrace the appropriate needs for the normal functioning of the process of reproduction in Yugoslavia. We cannot at this point "take a big breath and hold it" until that decision is adopted.

Accordingly, I think that we should examine the facts quite calmly and composedly, whenever they are made available to us, rather than raising this problem as we begin a discussion of how to regulate Yugoslavia. What I really want to say, then, is that I cannot accept this approach at all.

Milan Kucan: I will say only three sentences. Perhaps note should be taken that each of us has the right to think his own thoughts about the actions of others. I have become accustomed to this type of discussion over long years, and that is in my interest, it is all fine and in the interest of the country; what you are doing is not in the interest of the country. So, I spoke about that experience. The question is whether there exists the necessary minimum level of trust which in my opinion is necessary for this discussion to take a successful course.

I would not ask for the floor in order to reply if it had not been said that this had been done above all by Slovenia. Slovenia has not yet done that, but tomorrow it will do the same thing on the basis of a resolution of its Assembly.

After this exchange, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Croatian president, spoke, elaborating at length on the internal and external circumstances governing the outcome of the crisis of relations in Yugoslavia. Because Tudjman's speech was made public immediately after the meeting of the SFRY State Presidency, we are giving only a few of the more important passages from it. Tudjman recalled that the peoples inhabiting these parts for about 1,300 years now have lived together for only about 70. The result of that life together is manifested in many disturbing facts. First of all, the nationalities of Yugoslavia have not, during that period, corrected their position on the ranking of European peoples with respect to the level of development, but have lagged behind. What is more, in the time that has passed there has been no unification or decanting into some new unified nation, but all the historical nationalities making up Yugoslavia have matured and undergone ethnic homogenization, which is why, along with the historical changes in the SFRY and the world, that the present federal system is no longer satisfactory.

Furnishing a framework for a possible minimal consensus, Tudjman also had this to say:

All members of the Yugoslav Federation recognize each other's right to sovereignty and thereby also the right to self-determination, which includes both the right to

come together and the right to move apart in accordance with international law. In practice, this means that the existing institutions and bodies of the federal state cannot have a role of arbiters, but they have an important role as intermediaries. This point of view pertains to this Presidency, which, incidentally, has not been completely made up of representatives of republics elected in free elections.

Second, all members of the present Federation accept the view in their relations with one another that all citizens and peoples living on the territory of the present SFRY are equal and equally valuable in every respect....

Third, all members of the present Federation and federal institutions refrain from the use of violence and force in politics and in resolving mutual disputes. This means above all abolishing all political authority for use of the Yugoslav People's Army....

Fourth, recognition of the status quo of the boundaries between republics, with full respect for the right of every state and republic to regulate relations with other states and republics on the territory of the present SFRY and in Europe.

Fifth, all members of the present Federation will help one another in the process of building their own states and societies, and in particular they assume the obligation that they will not cause one another harm with respect to gaining recognition of sovereignty in mutual and international relations.

Sixth, before conclusion of a historic new agreement the member states of the SFRY assume an obligation to fulfill obligations to the Federation by agreement, but no later than within six months.

Seventh, the transition from the present semiconfederalism to the new status, the status of an alliance by treaty, to put it vaguely, must be programmed and gradual. The present situation is leading us to ruin....

Hysen Kajdomcaj: Every tendency and attempts to exclude Kosovo—citizens, nationalities, and ethnic minorities—and Albanians from this activity of agreements and acts would be politically unacceptable and constitutionally impermissible. Kosovo is a component of the Yugoslav community. All citizens in it, Albanians and all others, are equal entities, together with the other nationalities of Yugoslavia. Those facts should be consistently honored during any discussion of the country's future and its emergence from the present deep political, constitutional, economic, and general social crisis.

Jugoslav Kostic: We believe that the mood is such that we can no longer wait and anticipate, but must really seek a solution—either together or separately. When it comes time to separate, how at that point will we work it out so that "all the sheep are accounted for, and yet the wolves are well-fed"—that will be difficult. That is why everything should be done so that we guarantee certain minimal functions at the level of our country, with full

respect for the sovereignty of the republics because they will also have enough that remains as their sovereign right.

Vladimir Mitkov: Sovereign Macedonia

I would like to say that we have been given a kind of imperative mandate to communicate the basic premises as solutions are explored for the country's political and constitutional crisis.

The document first states that the Socialist Republic of Macedonia favors preservation of Yugoslavia, whose future system will be agreed on by the sovereign republics.

The Socialist Republic of Macedonia opposes all forms of undermining and destruction of Yugoslavia such as blocking and destroying the credit-and-monetary and financial system of the country by unilateral and unlawful measures of individual republics. Until a new agreement is reached on the future of the country, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia favors consistent and integral functioning and respect for the country's legal and economic system, consistent and urgent discharge of obligations established between the Federation and the republics, that is, specifically those obligations of the Federation to the Socialist Republic of Macedonia.

In the establishment or in the process of establishment of the future system of Yugoslavia, the point of departure must be the interests of the republics as sovereign states and the enduring right of peoples to self-determination, including the right to secede.

In that context, we favor a sovereign democratic Republic of Macedonia, which independently decides on the joint functions at the level of the country within the framework of its competent bodies and on the basis of the will of the citizens of Macedonia.

Slobodan Milosevic: The approach that Yugoslavia does not exist, that is, that only the republics exist, and that possible solutions are to be found only in bilateral or multilateral negotiations among the republics, is not acceptable to us. On the contrary, Yugoslavia does exist, it has its own institutions, and the changes should be carried out in a legal manner through Yugoslav institutions, in which the republics are free to act in keeping with their own positions, which no reasonable person has ever questioned.

Second, the destiny of Yugoslavia can be decided only by the nationalities of Yugoslavia because the nationalities of Yugoslavia created Yugoslavia, it was not created by the republics, the republics did not exist in either 1918 or 1943. The administrative boundaries of the republics cannot be simply proclaimed national boundaries, nor are they the limits in which the various nationalities of Yugoslavia live.

Third, we feel that every nationality has an equal right to decide freely on its destiny. That right cannot be limited except by that same equal right of the other nationalities.

As far as the Serbian nationality is concerned, it wants to live in a single state. So, any division into several states that separates the parts of the Serbian nationality and puts them in the limits of different sovereign states cannot be acceptable from our standpoint; that is, to be more precise, it is altogether out of the question. The Serbian nationality will live in one state, and every nationality which wishes to live on equal terms with the Serbian nationality in the same state is welcome. For us, I must say, a confederation is not a state.

Under present circumstances, we feel that only a democratic federation is the right solution. We, of course, agree that we should talk about the functions of such a state, that is, of such a federation. But, as far as the Serbian nationality is concerned, there can be no discussion of a solution whereby it would live divided among several states.

I am through.

Alija Izetbegovic: Names Are Not Important

It will not be possible to do anything if we wed ourselves to the position that Yugoslavia must be a federation or will not exist at all, or that it will be a confederation or will not exist at all. If it survives at all, Yugoslavia will probably be something in between the two. That is our position, or, better put, that is our assessment of things.... When it comes to the viewpoint of us from Bosnia-Herzegovina, we believe in Yugoslavia, we believe in that Yugoslav integration, and we will support its survival. Another thing, we believe that it will be constituted of sovereign republics. That is, there obviously is some dilemma, there are disagreements. We feel that the sovereignty of the future integration is actually what the sovereign republics will pass on to that future integration.

The bodies of the future integration, in view of the present situation of which we are witnesses, regardless of what powers we give it, must in my opinion have the necessary authority and some real power so that it can actually exercise the powers it might have, so that it can implement them. This must not be a treaty—after all, there is talk here about some treaty—which every side and every participant can violate whenever he considers it advantageous to himself. So, we will do nothing if we arrive at some loose treaty which does not compel anyone. If that future Yugoslav integration exists, then those bodies must also have real power to back up their authority so that they can exercise it when they find it necessary, when they see that those authorities are being violated.

Momir Bulatovic: On the Verge of War

The course of the discussion up to this point demonstrates that we are very far from any possibility of an

agreement. That is my personal judgment because it seems to me that two or more worlds are colliding. In that context, I like the approach of Mr. Izetbegovic. We must be prepared for compromise because these viewpoints and attitudes that are so far apart from one another face us with a great responsibility.

What do I mean by this? We have here—I am not generalizing, but I am saying what I feel—colliding views on numerous issues that are closely bound up with one another. Our views on internal borders are opposed. I would like everyone to confront the possible consequences. We in Yugoslavia are on the verge of civil war, and, if we want to avoid those consequences—and I hope that we all want to make efforts to that end—we should see what has brought about this state of affairs. Of course, no war or conflict begins in the rational sphere. But intelligent people also take into account the irrational sphere which is profoundly present in this region of ours. Firm positions on both sides will not be helpful. We are not in a position to decide anything separately. But it is our obligation to present the differing views to our parliamentary bodies of government and to offer a reconciled approach.

Bogic Bogicevic: We Are Not a Rubik's Cube

I would recall what the Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney recently said: "The world is not a Rubik's cube or something made from Lego blocks that is pulled apart and put back together every moment." The occasion for that statement is in a way similar to ours.

I therefore think that no one in this country can claim that he holds the sole monopoly to the truth, that only his visions and his interests must be respected. Regardless of the real differences in interests and regardless of what anyone thinks about Yugoslavia at this moment, regardless of what good or bad experiences he has had up to now, or how much he cares about this country, we must all enter into a peaceful and tolerant discussion and find the best solutions for getting out of the social crisis.

I would emphasize two other issues which I feel are very important and crucial in the upcoming discussions of the country's future. They are preservation of the integrity of Yugoslavia and prevention of its disintegration, and second, the conduct of a dialogue on an equal footing among all the republics and the nationalities and ethnic minorities that live in them. I likewise think that Yugoslavia's disintegration could have only undesirable consequences which are difficult to foresee. That is why my basic thesis and point of departure—when we began the discussion of the country's future system and also today—is that the important thing in this phase is to preserve the country's integrity. That is for the moment our obligation: to create conditions for it to survive as an entity within the present framework—as an international entity; to agree on the basic common interests and functions of the federal state which are acceptable to all the nationalities and republics; and at the same time to set up a modern and global market model of an economy

that will be the basis of future relations in the country; (and to build) a law-governed state that will be able to guarantee human, political, and ethnic rights and freedoms. All other issues (should) be left to the republics to regulate themselves and to reconcile according to their specific features and particular interests. I do not advocate either a centralized nor a unitary state, nor a "pure" federation, nor a "loose" contractual federation, but a modern flexible system of relations in a state that will keep us all together.

Nenad Bucin: Europe, the Mean Old Stepmother

The agencies and bodies of the Federation, including the SFRY State Presidency, are the most competent places for meetings and discussions of this kind....

Sound human reason, "infected" though it may be with the idea of the Yugoslav state, can and does also appreciate the greater or lesser dissatisfaction with the quality of Yugoslav community life that has been achieved. It would seem that basically we are all more or less dissatisfied, especially when certain of its debatable segments and characteristics are soundly and specifically pointed out and an effort is made to correct them. But that same sound reason cringes from the abysses and darkness of enmity and intolerance being expressed from many quarters in a shameless and uncivilized way, and when those who are most dissatisfied are precisely those who have had the greatest benefit from this "imprisonment" in Yugoslavia, including in the most literal sense physical survival on the windswept terrain of Europe, and especially in the face of the onslaught of Austro-German, Hungarian expansionist, Bulgarian expansionist, Albanian expansionist, Italian expansionist, or dangers of every imaginable kind.

And thus those few remaining sensible and cool heads are beginning to get ahold of themselves and become frightened of this flood of self-satisfaction of spiteful independents.

In the face of a half-realistic and in many respects deceptive vision of the Europe of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, people forget the old Europe of the poets, which was cruel and intolerant like a stepmother toward all of us in this region; always filled with scorn and hatred toward us, rather than with historical gratitude for the blood we shed over the centuries and our vigilance to protect their peaceful progress; and that Europe which did not know, nor did the world for that matter, how to finish in a legal and reasonable manner that second universal slaughterhouse, World War II, in which it was we who suffered relatively the most, but it did know how to create a new great Germany, not a single one of whose historic sins was punished as it should have been, and it was inevitably given in advance—first, economic supremacy and superiority, and then inevitably dictates and aspirations of all other kinds....

Although involuntarily, the SFRY State Presidency, along with other bodies and agencies of the Federation,

has largely accepted a relation in which it was ignored, skipped over, and frustrated from various quarters and has reconciled itself more and more to its true powerlessness and ineffectiveness, vainly waving in the air its announcements, appeals, invitations, and so on. The neglect and deprecation of our attempts have never been sufficient unto themselves. On the contrary, they have always been accompanied by arrogant disinformation, unfounded accusations and insinuations of all kinds, and there have always been new practical "steps." The examples are very numerous. I will not mention any in particular.

Alija Izetbegovic: I apologize for taking the floor once again, but I would like to present an idea, actually a proposal to think about, one that is a bit heretical. It is the question of our reflecting on the possibility of nevertheless including an international body in resolution of our problem. I know that such a proposal does not really sound good in the ears of some people, but I do not know why we would not seek the services of a goodwill mission that would help the Yugoslav nationalities and republics overcome the problem. I personally am not convinced that we will overcome it after what I have heard here.

Finally, we do not risk losing the "crown from our head," we have not had it anyway for a long time, our prestige is not so great that we ought to be shy about asking for help. After all, we are not seeking the help of some army, but the help of perhaps 10 intelligent heads from Europe. And why do I think this would be beneficial? First of all, this is a friendly environment, friendly peoples, not enemy peoples, who have given evidence of their friendly attitude toward Yugoslavia. The point is that all of us are referring to Europe and European standards on questions of human rights, we would all like to join Europe and feel ourselves an integral part of that Europe.

Later in the meeting there was a debate between Borisav Jovic, Ante Markovic, and Slobodan Milosevic which we are giving separately as a part of this article.

Borisav Jovic: Far From Unity

Offering a summary of the meeting, Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY State Presidency, noted that "at this moment we are very far from a unified decision as to our future." The key problem, Jovic believes, is "whether we can or cannot agree to live in one state." Referring to the two general approaches to solving the crisis, Jovic said that that approach which wants to establish what the joint functions of the future state would be might be called "rational and acceptable." There is also another approach, one advocated, certain differences apart, by Tudjman and Kucan, which wants to draw borders of Yugoslavia and delineate its present functions, to return those to the republics which would talk to one another about future integration. "I think," Jovic mentioned, "that that is legitimate and that we should talk very honestly, that we need that kind of approach, because it could easily happen that we have a combined solution." Jovic therefore wants things not to

be interpreted along the lines of "only one or only the other is possible," adding that as far as he is personally concerned, the first solution is "more sensible and better." When it comes to the participation of federal authorities in the future negotiations, the president of the Presidency emphasized that he did not see a reason for excluding them from that task because they do not stand in the way of expression of the will of the republics. "But if the reason is thereby to note de facto that the Federation no longer exists, then we cannot agree with that.... As for the legitimacy of the State Presidency, its members are proclaimed by the Yugoslav Assembly. Go ahead, put the question of the legitimacy of your representatives in your republics." Jovic also turned to the initiatives about seeking international help, saying that this would be "degrading for us who are responsible to our people." He also noted: "If we have come to the point where we who represent those nationalities think we are unable to do so, then we should submit our resignation and let others take over."

Franjo Tudjman: I think that there have been three proposals for initiating bilateral talks concerning the exploration for overall solutions. You have not referred to that.

Borisav Jovic: I said with respect to bilateral talks that they absolutely would be beneficial in the context of the overall search for solutions, assuming the institutions are respected.

Franjo Tudjman: I personally feel that until bilateral talks are conducted, there is no purpose in any kind of joint meeting to that end.

Borisav Jovic: What do others think?

Milan Kucan: There are two approaches. I would not spell them out. I see that as far as the actual procedure of the talks is concerned things can be connected, if we accept, of course, the approach now referred to by Mr. Tudjman that bilateral talks and holding them be a condition so that our next discussion of this kind might offer at least some results....

The important thing for me, and I think for all of us, is who the participants are. The participants could only be the republics. I must conduct them with everyone, assuming, of course, that others accept, with those who agree to discuss all these issues, I agree, not based on one conception, because I assume that we and Serbia have quite differing views. This is a discussion of our conception and of their conception, should there be a discussion. Let us hear the arguments. Let us see whether there can be any rapprochement. The same with the others. But the important thing for me is who the participants are to be.

Borisav Jovic: That means, if I have correctly understood Messrs. Tudjman and Kucan, that they still do not accept talks within the framework of federal bodies?

Milan Kucan: No, you did not get it right. When I spoke the first time, I explicitly said that talks related to definition of our rights and obligations arising out of our life together should be conducted within federal bodies; that the FEC is one body that could prepare this, it has all the data, and regardless of whether Yugoslavia will remain, or whether there will remain a federation of the most centralized and unitarian type, we cannot take this up without settling accounts. So, I did not exclude that at all, but I said what purpose I see for federal authorities concerning this other problem which is called, say, the discussion or agreement about future life together or life not together. But I do not see that that is possible unless we do this first thing.

Borisav Jovic: What do the other comrades think?

Vasil Tupurkovski: One dimension is the settlement of accounts, and I agree that this should be done, but the other dimension is how to get through what is happening currently.

Milan Kucan: Within the bodies of the Federation.

Vasil Tupurkovski: That is what I wanted to say, but a proposal to that effect has been made here, and I only want to comment and support that proposal.

The second thing is how to get through what is happening currently. Both on 27 December and today all the participants, almost without exception, say that the system must be reintegrated, at least on some minimal foundation. You proposed that today in your statement—I do not know whether it was a proposal or a comment—but this is very abstract and will not yield any results whatsoever because we have had an evident further erosion since the 27th.

That is why today we should support the proposal of the chairman of the FEC for the FEC and republic governments to agree on that minimum, and for us to sponsor it today; that would be a good conclusion. That would have the best response with the public.

I do not want to keep the floor any longer, I think that the attitude toward the problem of the breach of monetary policy and the monetary system is also on the agenda....how to create a climate for continuation of talks.

Slobodan Milosevic: Both One and the Other

I think that the further effort—I do not speak about the content—is not a question of "either or," or bilateral talks, or talks within the SFRY State Presidency. No one is preventing anyone, nor could he prevent anyone, from conducting bilateral talks, nor up to now has anyone stood in the way of anyone conducting bilateral talks. Everyone here is free to conduct bilateral talks, and they certainly will help to clarify relative positions. I can say that we will be very happy to talk with anyone about our own views and theirs, and there is no debate about that. Dialogue must be carried on.

It seems to me that progress along both lines...would be quite favorable.

Franjo Tudjman: I think that that approach can be accepted if we agree on the content of those meetings: Truly, for us to conduct some kind of talks first on a bilateral basis, and then where we see the differences are greatest to seek solutions, and we do not seek any content for those meetings, but not once again for us to find that we are listening to monologues and wasting our time.

Janez Drnovsek: I think that no one has been contesting a bilateral effort, at least as one of the ways. I think that we should arrive at a very practical agreement, without creating any fundamental differences even on this issue.

Alija Izetbegovic: In any case, we ought not to leave the next meeting open. These are real discussions. They are only additional means. Bilateral talks are for me discussions, but not agreements; it is only here that an agreement can be reached.

Borisav Jovic: Since it is very likely that something also needs to be done in practical terms—should we commission some federal agency to try to draw up a concept of this legislative approach to the question of demarcation, should it occur, so that we do not waste time; or draw up a concept of an approach concerning the minimum powers we can discuss; if you like—if not, we will see.

Alija Izetbegovic: The latter—to draw up a concept of the minimum.

Borisav Jovic: In actuality, there are demands for both to be done. How about it, Ante, you have proposed several things, let us see about that.

Ante Markovic: I would like to state a proposal in specific terms. All the rest that we will discuss is still the subject matter of lengthy and important discussions because the initial positions are frequently at altogether opposite poles. What we can and also must agree on, I believe, in a relatively short time, that is some minimum of the powers without which we cannot survive at all.

My proposal is that in two weeks...we try, along with the republics, that is, the executive councils of the republics, to agree on that minimum, and then that that minimum, or rather the points at issue concerning that minimum, be the subject matter of a joint discussion here. At this point, we already have—what Tudjman proposed—the content of such a discussion, regardless of how it will come out. Either we will agree or we will not on the points that are at issue. But it seems to me that this is the most urgent.

We must—allow me to use this harsh word—“buy time” so that we can conduct the discussion. This is a “buying of the time” to conduct discussions. We might be able to do it faster, but we still do not have defined governments or at least elected candidates in certain republics: Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro are left. We do have elected candidates in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The future

officeholders must discuss this with us, not those who are leaving now and do not carry any responsibility.

Franjo Tudjman: Without Federal Arbitration

We are faced with the task, on the one hand, of holding meetings to resolve these urgent issues of survival, if I may put it that way, but we also face the task of debating the essential issues concerning the future of this community.

Accordingly, I accept Milosevic's proposal that both are necessary, that we can meet here, but the essential thing—and this is the issue where it seems to me that we differ the most—is where the specific gravity of sovereignty is located. But I do not want to initiate that debate.

Accordingly, I propose that we end the talks. If this is the point, Milosevic, can we agree on a meeting of delegations of Croatia and Serbia?

Slobodan Milosevic: Of course.

Franjo Tudjman: Please let us issue the report, and do so within this period of time, before the next meeting in 13 days. And that is something that represents seeking a way out of the crisis. Accordingly, both things: to explore what we think is indispensable to retain in the republics, and what is indispensable for that possible alliance of the republics, and so on. Then we can recruit experts for the various issues, and so on. That is what we said in our proposal.

Milan Kucan: Have we agreed that it is in fact a question of three types of talks: on the functional minimum, on delineation of rights and obligations, and on the future, to put it as simply as I can? They need not be technically separate, but the essence is nevertheless related to three different sets of issues. It is not the essential thing just to agree on what the minimal powers will be. The question is whether there should be any at all. But the important thing for me, regardless, even in that frame, is whether we will enter those talks with accounts settled, that is, with obligations and rights defined, or we will not? I proposed in our name that those talks be prepared by the FEC.

Borisav Jovic: Have you heard this, comrades? I have repeated the same thing that Comrade Kucan said, that he proposed preparing a document that will make it possible to delineate the functions among the republics and restoration of those functions.

Milan Kucan: Not functions, that is clear. But rights and obligations, comrades, property.

Borisav Jovic: Once again, those are rights and obligations in case the country falls apart.

Milan Kucan: Not only falls apart.

Borisav Jovic: How will the delineation be made?

Milan Kucan: I want to enter the centralized federation knowing what my obligations are, what the debts are, what the holdings of foreign exchange are.

Borisav Jovic: If it remains the way it is.

Milan Kucan: Even in that case. Unless accounts are settled, I no longer have authority to do anything.

Borisav Jovic: For the future, that is a normal thing: If we talk about some form of state and about its powers, then we will also talk about that list and about obligations. But I do not understand at all why this issue is then separated from drawing up the minimum powers for the future?

Milan Kucan: Powers are one thing. The power of defense, the power of the National Bank, monetary policy. But my debts, and my material rights?

Borisav Jovic: Debts which arise out of the past?

Milan Kucan: I am doing all the talking here—out of our life together up to now, on the basis of decisions made in federal bodies. Those were our bodies, based on powers which we gave them, all of us together. But we have to enter a situation in which accounts are settled, including the property of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Borisav Jovic: This is possibly a liquidation status?

Milan Kucan: If you like. As a matter of record, if nothing else. This does not have to be technically stated.

Borisav Jovic: Fine, we understand....

At this point, we should agree on making the transcript public. This issue is rather sensitive. Some comrades had something written down, so perhaps they are not afraid for it to be published; some spoke off the cuff, and it is a question of how that will look. If you feel that we should make this confidential in some degree, we can do that. Personally, I do not believe that this can be protected, and we have to give it out to everyone so that they can use it.

Franjo Tudjman: Why should it be confidential? We should conduct a public discussion.

Borisav Jovic: Yes, if anyone wants to edit his statements, he can do that.

Stojan Andov: The meetings of the Macedonian Assembly are public. Unless someone of you explicitly demands that something be kept back, then fine.

Borisav Jovic: We have agreed—what was said here is not secret.

[Box, pp 11-13]

Markovic-Jovic Exchange: Sabotage Is Putting It Mildly

When Ante Markovic, subsequently invited, began to speak about the FEC program attempting to halt adverse

processes in the time necessary to make the transition from the old disintegrated system to the new relations and the new institutions, including a convertible currency and a monetary policy, Slobodan Milosevic interrupted him, and immediately afterward there were sharp exchanges between Jovic and Markovic which came close to bringing the meeting to an end.

Ante Markovic: The Federal Executive Council points out that it is necessary to immediately halt the adverse processes and guarantee the conditions for the life of society in the time necessary to make the transition from institutions and relations of the old system, which are disintegrating, to the new system, new relations, and new institutions, but on the basis of a historic new agreement among the Yugoslav nationalities. For the stability of the period necessary for an agreement, we need agreement constituting that minimum. It is listed here: from a convertible currency to a monetary policy because we cannot have two such policies nor six.

Slobodan Milosevic: That is what we said, and that is exactly what we were in favor of.

Ante Markovic: But you have been acting otherwise.

Slobodan Milosevic: But you did not want to agree.

Ante Markovic: I will document it, do not worry.

Borisav Jovic: Ante, you read that at the last meeting here and in the Assembly, so you can only comment on it.

Ante Markovic: No, I will not read it, I am only alluding to it. There are 11 points written down. I must say the following: The Federal Executive Council will favor adoption of those commitments, but at the same time it is ready to take part in the search for any other solution which leads toward attainment of the goals stated. I think it would be good by way of a minimum agreement from this meeting if the presidents of the republics or state presidencies should agree, together with the Yugoslav State Presidency, that the governments or executive councils of the republics be given a mandate to join the Federal Executive Council in attempting to debate all these issues and agree on that minimum required for the country to function, which will make it possible to carry out that agreement. Afterward, when we establish that, we can all get together on the points that might be at issue and try to possibly resolve those points at issue or, if they are still at issue, remove them if they are not a sine qua non of that minimum required for the functioning of the system, and then to make it possible for life to be able to continue in some fashion in this country until that agreement is reached.

If it is to be possible to work on this at all, it is indispensable—this is not a should, this is a must—that the Serbian Assembly rescind the law and the decisions with which the sabotage was carried out. I use that expression, which is quite mild; otherwise, one might use

the right expression, which is much worse. Sabotage, of the country's monetary system and policy.

I would say something by way of introduction and explain what we are doing now and what we should do in the coming period.

One of the first things which the Federal Executive Council did, introducing macroeconomic monetary policy into the life of our society, is to separate the monetary from the fiscal sphere. Never has any socialist country, including Yugoslavia, had problems with the budget. Behind that budget there was always monetary policy, which printed as much money as was necessary. Besides feeding the budget, it covered public debts, exchange rate differences, subsidies to agriculture and for exports, but the result of that was the country's disastrous situation and the still more disastrous inflation.

During the past year, not only has the burden of all that been removed from the monetary sphere, but all the obligations—which were previously covered out of monetary policy—have been exposed and transferred to the federal budget. Real sources have been sought for this purpose. The modern thing now—once you have shut yourselves off, not all of you, but most, in your own information systems, and here things are happening for which people should not just be taken to court, but should be put in jail—is to express intolerable lies. The Federal Executive Council did not borrow a single dinar last year from primary note issue to finance its own purposes.

Borisav Jovic: Some of the comrades have asked that we finish by 1600 hours because they are traveling. We have a definite topic, and I would ask you to summarize this so that we can agree on our further work.

Ante Markovic: Fine. Please allow me to speak.

Borisav Jovic: This is now a discussion covered by the newspapers—another topic. I realize that this is important, but it is not on the agenda.

Ante Markovic: You are already accustomed to that. I can walk out of the meeting. You did not want me to attend it anyway. Please, either let me speak or I will leave, just as I did once when you rudely took the floor from me.

Borisav Jovic: You were not here at the beginning when we agreed on discussion of this topic.

Ante Markovic: Fine.

Borisav Jovic: Go ahead, now.

Ante Markovic: By the way, I must ask for better communication to be established between the State Presidency and the Federal Executive Council.... For instance, a document which the Federal Executive Council sent to the Presidency on Saturday, yesterday, concerning everything done in Serbia, was not put at

your disposal. There is a document—I had everything checked. I delivered that material to you on Saturday.

I must say this—I am going back to a quite specific topic—that the encroachment on monetary policy to cover deficits in the entire country or a part of the country from its sources, is absolutely unacceptable from the standpoint of carrying out a reform in our country.

What has now been done in Serbia amounts to passing on its deficits to all others in the country. This is clear to any economist who thinks in terms that are at all economic. This cannot be done. I must say that the Republic of Serbia must suspend those laws and must return all those funds. The other way out is for everyone to do the same thing.

Do that—inflation in March-April was 30-40 percent per month—and everything that we have done up to now will be annihilated. Accordingly, there is no alternative—not whether others are to do that, but for this to be returned.

Something has already been done so far. Not all the funds, according to the figures which I have....

Borisav Jovic: We will ruin the meeting which we convened. We have called a new meeting of the FEC on this issue—when we receive the material.

Stjepan Mesic: Not of the FEC—of the Presidency.

Borisav Jovic: Of the Presidency.

Ante Markovic: You have received that material.

Borisav Jovic: Please, Ante, this issue is not on the agenda, but rather the future of Yugoslavia, its constitutional system.

Ante Markovic: Well, this is a part of Yugoslavia's future.

Borisav Jovic: I ask you nicely to stick to the topic and do not take up our time because people have to go at 1600 hours.

Ante Markovic: Fine.

Borisav Jovic: Go ahead. Everything that you have said about the future system we will very mindfully take into account. We are putting this on the agenda as a separate point. We are all interested, and it is very important, but it is not on the agenda. After all, now the discussion will go from one thing to another endlessly. We cannot finish what we came here for. If the purpose is to prevent the completion of this point on the agenda, then let us have it out in the open. Please.

I think you can be satisfied that we will put this on the agenda.

Ante Markovic: If I have to say what I think, then I have no use for you here at all.

Borisav Jovic: Well, we will put that on the agenda. But that is not on the agenda now.

Ante Markovic: No? In the context of what I said before, that the governments be given a mandate to agree on that minimum? That minimum does not exist unless this is canceled. It does not.

Borisav Jovic: Say it in one sentence, so that we do not lose the whole day over this, because this way we cannot finish the meeting.

Ante Markovic: Fine.

Borisav Jovic: Do not get angry. Please.

Ante Markovic: I am not angry at all. I am very calm. It is hard to make me angry.

Borisav Jovic: The Presidency stands firmly on the position of a law-governed state and respect for the constitutional and legal order. That applies both to returning money and to returning weapons—to everything. There is no question about this—in the Presidency.

It is not on the agenda now.

Ante Markovic: Please, are you giving me the floor or are you not giving me the floor?

Borisav Jovic: Certainly, I am. I have merely asked you to stick to the topic.

Ante Markovic: Fine. Thank you.

Along the line of seeking the solution, the Federal Executive Council held a meeting yesterday—Vice Chairman Mitrovic and Finance Secretary Zekan, with all the deputy prime ministers and ministers or secretaries for finance—on how to regulate these relations now so that the common state can function in some fashion. Although they did not agree on everything, the result of the talks still was not bad, and it indicates that agreement is possible, that these talks should continue.

Aside from what I have said, that that law must be annulled and suspended and the funds returned, the Slovenian Executive Council must suspend its memorandum. After all, that memorandum which was delivered to us last night—we are now going over it, in this meeting of the FEC—prejudices relations in the country. Let it be for half a year or nine months or for one year—when these relations are agreed on. Not now. As its response, the letter states, to what was done in Serbia, the Slovenian Executive Council adopted a memorandum in which it also suspends those relations in four basic areas: financial, fiscal, monetary, foreign relations, and so on. I propose that we be given a certain period—I think it must not be a long time, it would have to be agreed on in a week or two weeks—for us to go over all this and to agree or attempt to agree on that minimum which the country needs to function until the agreement

is reached, and then we should proceed on the basis of the basic commitments, on how to arrive at that future agreement. Thank you....

The chairman of the FEC will respond to the president of the Republic of Serbia that the FEC possesses the corpus delicti.

Slobodan Milosevic: I am speaking about the material effect, not the formal effect.

Ante Markovic: There is no other corpus delicti. Even on the principle that a man is innocent until proven guilty, but the accused has no right to be freed of conviction because he says that someone else is to blame.

Slobodan Milosevic: I am not speaking about the formal aspect of the thing, but of the material aspect. And the question is whether the FEC has knowledge of exceeding the limit on use of credit for liquidity or any other manner of exceeding those limits in any other republic or only in Serbia?

Ante Markovic: Under the resolution of the Federal Executive Council, page four, Point two, "The National Bank of Yugoslavia should most urgently check the use of resources from primary note issue in the remaining national banks of the republics and provinces." If the check establishes that there has been an unjustified use of primary note issue by the national banks in other republics or provinces, the National Bank of Yugoslavia will take the same measures to protect the country's monetary and foreign exchange system, dinar convertibility, and foreign exchange reserves that it is taking against Serbia.

Dragutin Zelenovic: Might I just ask a question? That was not the question. The question was whether the FEC has that knowledge or not? Does that mean that you do not have knowledge of this?

Ante Markovic: I think that it has been clearly stated here, that there is no knowledge and that an investigation is being conducted.

Borisav Jovic: Please, comrades, this is not an insignificant problem, but it is not on the agenda. We have simply agreed to put this on agenda as soon as we receive that report from the inspectorate. The FEC is working within its jurisdiction. We have received the information, but we have not received the proposal that the Presidency make some decision concerning it, but we have merely been informed what the FEC is doing within its competence. And we concluded in the Presidency that we receive the entire report after that inspectorate and then make an assessment, from our point of view, whether we should do something to help here. And that is settled.

Ante Markovic: It is not settled. Regardless of that, what has been detected must be prevented.

Borisav Jovic: Thank you for the coercion. We know what we must do and what we need not do. We feel that the Federal Executive Council is responsible even for

preventing it before the fact, not only after it. And then we will discuss why the possibility was left open for doing this in the first place.

Fine, it is not good for us to switch to topics which are not on the agenda.

BULGARIA

Possible Role of Chemical Troops in Persian Gulf

91BA0135A Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
13 Nov 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Major General Lyubomir Dinev by Major Georgi Vuchev; place and date not given: "Are There 'Desert Rats' in the Bulgarian People's Army?—Conversation with Major General Lyubomir Dinev—Chemical Troops—What Are They?—Under 'Home' Conditions and Abroad—There Is a Program; An Order and On-the-Spot Reconnoitering Are Awaited"]

[Text] At the end of the week before last, Major General Lyubomir Dinev received the presidency's decision regarding the dispatch of a Bulgarian military contingent to the Persian Gulf region that read: "Under the leadership of the president of the Republic, the competent state bodies are to take the necessary actions to train for dispatch to the Persian Gulf zone a military medical formation with an antichemical defense subunit made up of volunteers." This was the occasion for a representative of the editors to have a meeting with Maj. Gen. Dinev.

[Vuchev] Major General, sir, if you please, will you at the beginning of our conversation acquaint our uninformed readers with the Chemical Troops?

[Dinev] They are special troops within the Bulgarian People's Army of a profoundly humane character. Whereas hitherto we have mostly associated the Chemical Troops with chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons, during the past decade, attention has been paid more and more to their association with the ecology, and it will not be long before the Chemical Troops will become the country's ecological troops. This is the prospect for them, but, for the present, our Chemical Troops are training and are going to train to carry out missions in a complex radiation, chemical, and biological situation. This is the connecting thread running through their combat training.

[Vuchev] Are you disturbed by anything in the presidency's decision to dispatch a chemical and medical formation to the Persian Gulf region? Is the formulation of the missions amply clear, and would you comment on the chance of their accomplishment in a region so remote from Bulgaria?

[Dinev] Whenever a mission is assigned to us military men, we have to be clear about what we are going to do, with what forces and resources, in whose interest, and when the actions begin and end. In this respect, I believe that there are certain ambiguities and that, for a time, they will hamper manning and outfitting the detachment. It has not been specified, for example, in whose interest we are going to be acting—in the interest of our medics or of exposed service personnel from among the personnel of the multinational forces. Therefore it is imperative that the detachment be outfitted with just

about everything. This applies to the medical aid group. Whom will it service—refugees or others affected by combat operations? If refugees, we shall have to think about a maternity ward, for example. The specific beginning of the mission will be determined by the specific time limits for training, whereas the end of the mission (possibly approximate) will be determined by the supplies that we have to take with us, the number of decontaminating and deactivating charges. Thus, if we add, besides, the fact that other than the Czechs there will be nobody for us to work with, supply will, on the one hand, be complicated and, on the other, expensive.

Any mission assigned for execution in another region of the world gives rise to a number of complex problems to be solved. These involve the performance of the technology, armament, and equipment of the Chemical Troops, as well as their training and outfitting, plus logistical backup and control of personnel.

[Vuchev] As regards the technology, I understand that its effectiveness under desert conditions is doubtful.

[Dinev] Our technology, as well as that of our entire Army, is effective in operation under "home" conditions—that is, in Bulgaria's moderate continental climate. The entire scope of standing operating procedures in the maintenance, operation, and repair of our technology is adapted to this climate. Likewise, all standards and duties of our specialists have been defined on this basis. In this sense, I believe that the performance of our resources under conditions significantly different from ours will be a riddle. Of substantial significance, for example, are the hardness of the water and how lubricants will react at operating temperatures of the apparatus of up to + 50° C. We must not forget that, under desert conditions, we will have to operate at the upper limit of the technology's performance, under sharp variations in the temperature gradient (from - 50° to + 50° C and more). Our industry is not ready to produce the necessary lubricants, and they will have to be imported, something that will be a blow to our pocket.

Personal gas protection outfits will also raise a serious problem. Proceeding from our specific climatic conditions, we have developed and supplied the Bulgarian People's Army with personal gas protection outfits without induced ventilation. During work at high temperatures (over 30° C), there will be a sharp reduction in the time one can spend in them, and this will adversely affect the execution of missions. But their use is mandatory for the simple reason that chemical warfare agents (most likely Iraq will use yperite, sarin, and tabun) at high temperatures will be in vapor form, and their casualty effect will prevail through the clothing of personnel....

[Vuchev] Which, if the limits for staying inside the personal gas protection outfit are not observed, may result in heat strokes....

[Dinev] Yes. And anybody who finds himself in such a situation will be faced with the dilemma of choosing

between a reasonable stay in the personal gas protection outfit, a heat stroke, and exposure to the chemical weapon. Therefore, I think that, at high temperatures, only highly trained, mentally stable, strong, healthy, and well-conditioned men can stand the protective clothing, and, as far as I know, only eight of the volunteers enrolled so far have the specialty of chemical soldiers!?

The Chemical Troops are a very complex system of specialists, beginning with vehicle operators, extending to highly qualified people engaged in physics, physical chemistry, and automation, and extending as well to conventional chemistry. This calls for high professional training, and the volunteer principle for the setting up of the chemical defense detachment will hamper its formation, assembly, and training, especially considering the innovations in the armament and equipment of this branch of the Army.

[Vuchev] So can we compare our chemical soldiers' training with that of the so-called desert rats or foxes?

[Dinev] Our specialists have always trained and conditioned themselves under our climatic conditions. Our whole outfitting, the color scheme of clothing and accoutrements, the technology and auxiliary equipment, not to mention field and military practices, do not match other conditions, and the least naive thing would be to compare them to "desert rats" or "foxes."

[Vuchev] The Chemical Troops work with large quantities of solutions, including water. Under desert conditions, this would be a very complex problem.

[Dinev] Absolutely true. For that reason, logistical backup will be unbelievably hampered. The separation of the Chemical Troops contingent by great distances from the main supply bases fails to envisage the creation of complex lines of communication from either supply agencies and resources or from agencies and resources of precision technical maintenance.

[Vuchev] What else would hamper execution of the chemical defense detachment's mission? What would you say about control, the language barrier, criteria?

[Dinev] In operations within a coalition, the different language barriers and the discrepancies in tactics and principles in approaches to the execution of missions, as well as discrepancies between the criteria adopted in the respective armies concerning "safe concentrations," "maximum permissible doses," "completeness of decontamination or deactivation," and so forth, and so forth will present great difficulty. Control is also a matter not to be underestimated, especially when it is a question of commanding a subunit, dispatched to execute an independent mission at a very great distance. Obviously, this has to be accomplished in centralized fashion, by nonorganic means.

[Vuchev] Major General, sir, do you have a specific mission assigned by the MNO [Ministry of National

Defense] leadership regarding the formation and training of the chemical defense subunit?

[Dinev] As yet, no, though in the very near future I expect an order from the minister of national defense or from the chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army in which some obscure points will probably be spelled out more precisely and, therewith, a start will be made on the recruitment of volunteers from among the Bulgarian People's Army by specific specialties: decontamination chemical soldier, laboratory-assistant chemical soldier, medical aidman-chemical soldier....

[Vuchev] Does this mean that so far nothing has been done?

[Dinev] On the contrary, we have already roughly worked out the detachment's table of organization, and an investigation has been made of volunteers from the reserves. A plan has been drawn up for our further operation, including the following: a training program; determination of sites and specific activities involved in making ready personnel and technology; such questions as outfitting with clothing and the resources for transportation of the detachment (by air, sea, or intermodal) have been given consideration....

[Vuchev] What will be the principal points in the personnel's training in view of the particular features of the missions?

[Dinev] The topics in the training program will involve mostly the specifics of radiochemical reconnaissance under desert conditions and the carrying out of special chemical treatment with variation of the vehicles' operating conditions. Emphasis will be placed on maintenance of the technology because strong winds and a dispersed sand system will hamper operation of the machinery to a great extent. Thought must be given to the method of storing the technology in special cases. But we must give special attention to training personnel to live and work under desert conditions.

[Vuchev] How do you figure on collecting more information so that this personnel training will be actually concrete rather than abstract?

[Dinev] We intend in the near future to send to the Gulf region a reconnaissance group that will include specialists in various areas—chemical soldiers, combat engineers, medics, signalmen.... They will investigate such questions as possibilities for the supply and storage of water and food products, meteorological conditions, where and how the camp should be set up....

[Vuchev] How much time, in your opinion, will the detachment's training take?

[Dinev] Considering that it first has to be formed and assembled, that the personnel have to get to know each other and master to perfection the technology (which to

some of them may also be unknown) plus the considerable volume of activities in specific training—we will be ready to depart in not less than a month or a month and a half.

[Vučev] What will be the approximate composition and strength of the detachment? Under whose command will it be?

[Dinev] The detachment will consist of a command, a subunit of chemical soldiers, and a medical aid group. Its strength will be about 200, and I think its commander should be an all-arms officer with deputy specialists—a chemical soldier and a medic. Knowing as we do the distance at which we shall be operating, the detachment will include quite a lot of technical and logistical backup. I personally do not believe it, but, because of the possibility of the use of radioactive substances, we envisage also the inclusion not only of a chemistry laboratory but also of deactivating charges.

[Vučev] The probability that real combat actions will be conducted in the Persian Gulf is great. Our troops thus far have not participated in a war; we have no practical experience. In short, the expedition is worth portraying on a larger scale. In this sense, can military journalists be sent as members of the detachment?

[Dinev] Why not? I would even expand the formulation of the question. Precisely for the reasons enumerated by you, I consider it advisable to conduct scientific research work on the performance of personnel and technology under such extreme conditions. And, remembering that we are moving toward all-European security, we are witnesses of joint actions composed of UN forces, and, not forgetting that there are very many atomic power plants in the world and it is completely possible that multinational efforts may be necessitated to clean up the consequences of accidents at them, we will have to summarize and popularize the experience we accumulate lest we remain “in the dark” in situations identical with the present one.

[Vučev] Instead of concluding with this vague scenario and with so many difficulties facing us, are you more of a skeptic or an optimist?

[Dinev] We are military personnel. If we are assigned a mission, we must execute it, whatever it is. If the detachment is properly trained, I believe that we will perform our duty with honor.

POLAND

Reasons for New Troop Deployment Offered

91EP0188A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
12 Dec 90 p 1

[Statement made to POLSKA ZBROJNA by Gen. Div. Franciszek Puchála, first deputy chief of the General

Staff, Polish Armed Forces; recorded by Lieutenant Colonel Marek Sieniawski: “Our Reasons of State Suggest So”]

[Text] “Reasons for which changes are being made in the deployment of our armed forces are due to several causes. First of all, we have found ourselves in a qualitatively new situation. We are a signatory of the declaration of 22 states recently signed in Paris. The declaration suggests that in a new era of European relations these states are no longer adversaries, and that we are building a new partnership. As is known, the national interests and the Polish reason of state, pursued in keeping with the dictates of morality and international law, are the basis of Polish foreign policy. Participation in creating a European security system and close coexistence with our powerful neighbors, i.e., the USSR and Germany, are among the priorities of this policy. Besides, so far the main part of our armed forces has been concentrated on the western and northern borders of our state which was the result of the defensive-offensive nature of our doctrine and the assumption that armed combat will be immediately shifted beyond the borders of our country.

“The defensive doctrine of our state is based on the assumption that the Republic of Poland does not have any territorial claims and does not consider any state to be its enemy. The main task of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland is to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the people, as well as the inviolability of all borders. Any aggression or attempt to impose a nonsovereign solution on Poland should be unprofitable for an aggressor even at the stage of calculation. The defense of its own territory, rather than participation in large-scale operations outside the borders of the country, is unequivocally becoming the task of the army. The doctrine requires that the structure of the Polish Armed Forces be transformed from offensive-defensive to strictly defensive. The structure of a new model of armed forces is based on precisely this assumption. It will consist of mobile troops which are highly maneuverable and regional defense troops. The mode of deploying troops is one of the criteria of the defensive nature of military doctrines. An even deployment of troops in the territory of a country does not threaten anyone, whereas their concentration in a particular sector may give rise to apprehensions. Hence the division of the territory of Poland into four military districts. In addition, after the dissolution of the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty and the pullout of the Western Group of Forces of the Soviet Army from Germany and the Northern Group of Forces of the Soviet Army from Poland, the system of air defense will have to be structured differently. The doctrine calls for preparations to rebuff any possible aggression regardless of the direction from which it would come. Hence the need for a more even location of forces and the creation of reserves in the form of [large] tactical units and units designed for rapid response.

“Meanwhile, 40 percent of our armed forces are stationed on western borders of Poland. 35 percent are in

the central part, and 25 percent in the eastern part. However, the degree of their complement, and therefore, their combat readiness in peacetime is more essential. In this sphere, the proportions are more distorted. Recently, we have been upgrading the degree of complement of military units in Przemyśl and Lublin. As far as the physical, properly conducted redeployment of large units from one set of garrisons to another is concerned, it is costly and requires considerable time. These costs consist of necessary investments (in particular housing, technical, training, and social), major repairs and remodeling of existing buildings, the cost of transport, temporary benefits to the cadres for the lack of permanent quarters, and the departure of some of the people who do not agree to transfers to other garrisons. We should also look at the economic factor from a different angle. In implementing the postulate of the even deployment of troops, the objective also is to restore a cheaper, territorial system of draftee induction and training, to use reserve contingents located in the territory of the entire country in order to form the units of regional defense, and to use properly existing barracks buildings.

"No action undertaken by us threatens the strategic interests of the USSR, or the interests of Soviet republics bordering on Poland, or those of a united Germany.

"The feeling of security in contemporary Europe does not directly depend on the quantity of armaments and the numerical strength of the army. In addition, we are having to do with the comfort of international security and the discomfort of local security. These are realities which should be taken into account.... As far as military security is concerned, I might say that under current conditions we may feel secure. Combined with other factors, the levels of basic armaments provided for our country in the Vienna-1 Treaty make it possible for us to have a numerically smaller, but more modern and maneuverable army (I will recall: 1,730 tanks, 460 combat aircraft, 130 combat helicopters, 2,150 armored fighting vehicles, and 1,610 artillery systems of calibers above 100 millimeters). It would be good for this army to be at least 50 percent professional. This does not depend on either the Vienna levels or our common wishes, or our better or worse frame of mind; it depends mainly on the performance of our economy. As long as the economy remains the way it is we should safeguard the cohesion of the army together. It is gratifying that a consensus in this matter of all Poles, regardless of their political views, is emerging. In addition, the feeling of security is now influenced in a major way by the condition of the public mood against the background of changes occurring around Poland, the course of building national accord, and the condition of our state.

"In times of peace, our borders are guarded by the Border Guard Troops (soon to be the Border Guard) reporting to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In turn, the task of the armed forces is to counter possible aggression. However, it is not necessary to maintain armed forces directly on the borders to this end. However, we are aware of new challenges, new needs, and the tasks they

entail. If the need arises for help to our colleagues from the Border Guard, they can count on it. The factor of troop mobility should be primarily used to accomplish this task. However, in the longer term we should envision a more even deployment of our troops, which we have discussed above. Certainly, properly organized means of temporary housing, groups maintaining order and providing help with food distribution and treatment, ensuring social conditions and providing transportation, including by air, will be needed. The army has considerable experience in this sphere."

Role of Air Defense in New Europe Outlined

91EP0189A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
18 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by Colonel Dr. Witold Pokruszynski, National Defense Academy: "Four-Dimensional Defense"]

[Text] There is no doubt that we, the Poles, are facing radical changes in the basic assumptions of our defense system, including the air defense of the Republic of Poland.

Changes under way in the political and military situation in Europe necessitate changes in, among other things, views on the threat from the air.

The progressing decay of the Warsaw Treaty does not at all mean that the security of our borders is guaranteed without any endeavors on our part. It is true that from the point of view of global security the situation has considerably improved after the unification of Germany. Yet, despite all assurances, the fact that a sovereign and independent Poland remains between two great powers in the center of Europe should not make us excessively optimistic and lower our military potential to an unreasonable minimum.

We must be aware that we are already on our own and we should not underestimate a situation in which even a shade of any threat exists.

I would like to respond to the question of who is threatening us and to what degree, and, in addition, from what directions.

Personally, I believe that answering the above question, while necessary, will not be easy either now or in the several years to come, for various reasons.

Due to the geopolitical situation of Poland, as well as the political and economic disintegration of its allies to date, united in its structures, the issue of threat to the territory of the Republic of Poland should be considered at present and in the future in many variants, and mainly with regard to the neighboring states, each of which may become our potential adversary due to a failure of our diplomacy. If so, a threat from the air may come from any direction (though not at the same time) and have considerable firepower.

This statement is prompted by many circumstances.

First, it is difficult to conceive of an adversary, possessing a modern and well-equipped air force, beginning an action of even local extent solely with ground forces, without control of the air or air support.

Second, the development of the means of air attack indicates their increasing perfection from the point of view of range, speed of flight, and effectiveness of destroying targets and defeating air defense.

Third, the theory of air-land battle is becoming increasingly significant, and not only in armed conflicts on a macroscale; after all, in this theory air forces, i.e., manned and unmanned means of air attack, play an essential role.

Proceeding from the new geopolitical situation of Poland and the predicted threat from the air, as well as the defensive nature of our doctrine, which does not provide for us to be the first to begin hostilities or deliver preemptive strikes, in my opinion, it is necessary "to show" to the public audience the modern role of air defense of the Republic of Poland in this new, more difficult situation.

To begin with, I would like to state that instructive examples are known from history when states, which failed to solve or underestimated the issue of air defense, had to capitulate in the very first weeks of war or lose substantial parts of their territory. Will this really be repeated?

It turns out that the role of air defense is linked only indirectly to the nature of the military doctrine; it grows in direct proportion to the threat from air and space. If this is not all that visible today it will definitely be noticed tomorrow. However, will there still be time? Strangely, nobody wants to make a public statement on this in the mass media, with the exception of generalities along the lines of "we must have a strong army," "be prepared [for action] in any direction," or something else of this nature. Showing the MiG-29 aircraft, or a rotating missile launcher, on our TV from time to time does not resolve the issue of air defense even from the propaganda angle because this is done in an incompetent and not exactly convincing manner.

Being aware of many aspects of the issue of air defense and the essence of the phenomenon of combat in air-space, I would like to outline, in the form of a creative discussion, my view on the issue on the basis of research, experience, and my knowledge of the subject.

I would like to begin this discussion with several conceptual points of fundamental significance which will help our readers to understand why air defense is so important as an element of the defense system of the country.

First, in the 70 years of development of the air defense of our country, that is, after World Wars I and II, its authors made little use of scientific discoveries. Conceptual assumptions themselves were based on intuition, the experience of "great leaders," or guidelines set forth

outside the borders of our country in which the interests of Poland, in particular of its eastern part, were not taken into account.

Before World War II, the concept of air defense, which was not implemented anyway, was entirely national, whereas after its end, since as early as 1948, it was always an integral part of East European air defense which was dominated by Soviet military thought.

Should we approach the issue of air defense at present as we used to? Perhaps, we should not. However, both traditions and stereotypical thinking are getting the upper hand at various levels of command which still does not guarantee an objective approach to the problem. Personally, I believe that we should approach the development of the air-defense system of the republic in a creative, scientific, and forward-looking manner, taking into account future internal and external conditions for it, that is, at least until 1995, rather than current conditions.

Second, the concept of an air-defense system should take into account the fact that rebuffing possible surprise air raids and strikes of an adversary (aggressor), especially in the initial phase of an armed conflict (regardless of its scale), will depend not only on the quantity and quality of air-defense forces and means, but also on their combat readiness, the effectiveness of actions in the defense system of the state and air defense, the structure of defense, and the manner of using combat arms, as well as the quality of intelligence and command of the troops.

It is obvious that requirements which air defense should meet change along with an increase in its significance, not only at present, but also in the long term. These requirements are the result of the existing and future degree of threat, views on the use of ground forces and the navy in a defensive operation, and the adopted concept of conducting the first defensive air battle.

The following should be considered basic requirements which should be taken into account in conducting combat in the future: an opportunity to destroy means of air attacks in all directions of threat and in the entire range of flight altitudes; permanent impact on the adversary over the entire territory of the country and outside its borders; high efficiency of destruction under various possible conditions, including radioelectronic interference; and opportunity to quickly concentrate efforts on directions, points, and lines.

Taking into account these and other (nonbasic) requirements entailed by new conditions, development trends of the means of air attack (also including "invisible" aircraft), and present considerations at the National Defense Academy, among other places, we may venture a statement that the air defense of the Republic of Poland should be unified, maneuverable, resistant, and effective.

To my mind, these four features of air defense should lay the foundation for building a futuristic air-defense system.

Third, building a new system of air defense calls for reevaluating the hierarchy of tasks in the area of points defended. The fighting troops should be placed first, followed by the system of communications and control, and only then ports, naval bases, and industrial areas. In a word, Poland should be treated as a single large object of air defense which needs an effective, multilayered "umbrella" against an attack from above. If this is a unified air-defense system its functions with regard to a future threat from the air and space should be specified. I believe that the future system should take over the role of both an anti-aircraft and an antisatellite system. After all, as soon as the 2000's, it will be difficult to distinguish what is what when hypersonic aircraft achieve flight altitudes of 60,000 meters and more; their identification will be exceptionally difficult. Besides, at issue here is not only active antisatellite defense but also passive defense (perhaps, first of all, passive in the beginning).

Fourth, our air defense should rest on two basic means of combat, i.e., a fighter force and small, short, and medium-range anti-aircraft missiles. All other means should complement them, mainly at low altitude. This consequence results from the previously mentioned four features of the system and three basic requirements which are posed for it in the defensive version, namely:

- Destroying major groups of the means of air attack at distant approaches to the borders and points protected.
- Concentrating air-defense efforts on the main [directions of] air operations and the indirect defense of the most important points.
- Ensuring continuous and vigorous air defense throughout the depth of the operational grouping of troops and the territory of our country.

Besides, I would like to recall that the destruction of the means of air attack should begin on land and at sea, that is, before they take off, when they are very vulnerable to

air attack, rather than in the air, in flight. Air defense should also include offensive elements in which the air force plays the basic role.

I believe that in the process of perfecting the air defense system in Poland we should assign equal significance to both fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles in recognition of the fact that only their joint operation will eliminate the weaknesses of both.

Fifth, broadly defined command is yet another problem which cannot be omitted from the discussions held. The efficient use of available forces and means operating in the air-defense system depends to a considerable degree on the command subsystem. The issue of command is not as acute in any kind of armed services or combat arms as it is in air-defense troops due to the required response time (measured in seconds), if for no other reason.

A more profound analysis of the development of the means of air attack and the geopolitical situation of Poland leads us to conclude that requirements posed for the command system will become higher, and will have to be met if we refer to the nearest future. I think that the number of command levels in the command system of air defense and their response times should be reduced to a minimum by automating decisionmaking and executive processes. Only a centralized, multichannel, automated (automatic) [system] with time and operational requirements enhanced many times may improve the efficiency of the system of air defense. The assertion that decentralization, or a great number of levels, increases effectiveness, which comes up in discussion, is erroneous. This assertion may only be correct in one case—if we have an imperfect, unreliable, single-channel, centralized command system with a long response time.

In summation, I would like to recall that the words about air defense which I have now written many times on the pages of military periodicals derive from a profound concern with the feeling of national security, which in my perception is the supreme value.

Not only professionals but also all of those who will require defense and determine its effectiveness should be mindful of this.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Positive Response to VW Skoda Agreement Reported

91CH0220A Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 15 Dec 90 p 15

[Unattributed article: "Tatra, Too, Is To Come Under the Volkswagen Umbrella"]

[Text] Although the Germans, for good reason, are not particularly popular in Czechoslovakia at the moment, thousands of workers recently went on strike for them. It is unlikely that the brief walkout of the automobile workers in the Bohemian city of Mlada Boleslav was decisively influenced by the fact that the Volkswagenwerk AG, in Wolfsburg, as reported, was awarded the participating share in the long-renowned Skoda Vehicle Works, but a great deal emerged about the psychological background of the struggle of the Titans between VW and the Renault-Volvo group. There is satisfaction in Koprivnice in Moravia as well: the VW subsidiary Audi will take over the factory there for the full-sized Tatra sedans.

These beautiful, unusually comfortable vehicles—their fin-bedecked, futuristically styled predecessors from the 1930's are the pride of any automobile museum in the world—are sunk in a particularly severe crisis: To start with, their thirst for fuel is so great that the government of the CSFR banned new sales of this classic staff car for the higher official echelons because of its poor fuel economy; furthermore, they symbolize the old apparatus, because everyone knew that it was a bigwig in the nomenclatura, if not a state security officer, who was being chauffeured around in a black Tatra with the AA license plate.

A Compliment to the West

Of course the enormous investment, the promise that no one was to be let go in the short term and that salaries would rise over the long term, were significant in the overt feelings of affinity with the future German "parent," instead of the French, but beyond that it is an expression of the old ties, with roots in the shared pride of the engineer and the skilled worker and a common tradition. All of Czechoslovakia felt flattered when the men from VW attested to a training level of Western quality among the employees and gave first place to their products in the East bloc. The unions noted that the VW negotiators had inspected the plant "with German thoroughness", while the French were observed to be strangely superficial, according to factory secretary Jan Mueller.

World Automobile Nations

One could read in newspaper commentaries that the link was so to speak "natural," because it would be a union of the two countries with the greatest automobile tradition in the world. "Self-propelling vehicles," as they were

called then, have been manufactured right in Mlada Boleslav since 1894. And the new "subsidiary" from the Czech perspective is in actuality the grandparent of the Volkswagen works. The Beetle's fame and durability originated from its heart—which was beating at the rear: the air-cooled horizontally opposed engine. In contrast to the Austro-German legend, it was not invented by Ferdinand Porsche, but by Hans Ledwinka in Mlada Boleslav, where it had been propelling Skoda and Tatra cars since 1923, before the Beetle had even been designed. The gifted designer Porsche himself sought equipment from Ledwinka in Bohemia and, later on, advice during the construction of the Beetle.

Beetle Roots

Both models, the big Tatra and the little Skoda, are mostly still running with this engine today. The new Skoda "Favorit" is the first to have a completely new water-cooled, in-line engine. The Skoda factory in Plzen actually has nothing really to do with the cars. The men at the then famous automobile manufacturer Laurin & Clement liked the eye-catching company emblem of the Western Bohemian machine builder so much, that they adopted it: Even today Skoda in Plzen is paid 10 heller that is, 0.1 koruna (by today's—unrealistic—conversion rate 0.5 pfennig) for every passenger car of the same name that comes off the assembly line.

Audi Passenger

Audi's participation in Tatra has a bitter side for the Upper Austrians: An engine factory that was planned there will not be built as a result. With a certain amount of malicious satisfaction [Schadenfreude], the Czechs are seeing the first negative fruits of the nationality conflict with Slovakia. Wolfsburg would also have liked to secure for itself the factory located near Bratislava for the East Bloc Unity Small Pickup Truck. Like the other factories, entry here would be the ideal point of penetration into the enormous market opportunities of changing East and Central Europe.

POLAND

Polish Firms Represented in Minsk Business Expo

91EP0187A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 13 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by Marek Zygmunt: "Partner-Bis, Polish Fair in Minsk"]

[Text] On 11 December, the Polish fair, Partner-Bis, opened in Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia. More than 150 Polish firms, representing various areas of our industry, participated. This is the second exposition of this kind organized this year in Minsk by the Gdansk partnership, Perfect Agio. This fair was organized by the

Center for International Fairs, Minsk Expo, which provided very good conditions for Polish exhibitors to present their export-import and cooperative potentials.

Among the participants were not only such representatives of industry as Rolimpex and Agros of Warsaw, Prekton and Alpol of Poznan, Budostal-8 of Krakow, but also small and midsized enterprises not yet known in this market.

Interest in the fair leads to the assumption that the results of this undertaking will be very beneficial for both sides (several hundred representatives of various firms, not only Byelorussian, but also from several other Soviet republics, visited the fair on the first day). This opinion was expressed by Wiczeslaw Niekraszewicz, a representative of the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Byelorussia, during a visit to the exposition, adding that our mutual contacts would be greatly facilitated by the order permitting the creation of joint ventures that was issued by President M. Gorbachev.

Local Government Provides Financial Aid

91EP0191A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 14 Dec 90 p II

[Article by Iwona Czechowska: "Housing Payments: Who Received Aid?"]

[Text] It has been forecast that from July to December one-third of all families were receiving rent assistance. During the first three months, gmina social welfare centers helped 256,000 families pay their rent, gas, electric power, and fuel bills. But it was summer, a time of leave, vacation, and work in the field. Furthermore, information about the possibility of financial subsidies to pay for living expenses had not been adequately disseminated yet. The applications did not begin to arrive until October. Bills with the new, higher rates had reached households in September.

This year 500 billion zlotys was allocated for the government assistance program being implemented by the social welfare centers. In January, we will learn how the funds were spent and how many families were helped. The funds will not run out, however, not because the needs were estimated with growth in mind, but simply because the drive got off to a late start and the rent increases were below the preliminary estimates.

At first, 84 percent of assistance went for paying fuel, gas, and electric bills. The average family subsidy was 307,000 [zlotys], or about 100,000 per month. The information reaching the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy [MPiPS] shows that energy bills still account for the lion's share of the subsidies. In Kielce Voivodship, for example, 12,000 families received funds for such purposes, but only 2,700 families received rental assistance. Six thousand of them had not previously received social assistance. In Ostroleka Voivodship, four times as much was paid for energy subsidies as for rental assistance. Assistance was given to 19,000 families. In

Czestochowa Voivodship, one-quarter of the 8,000 families helped were first-time applicants.

During the implementation of the government program conventionally called "housing assistance," the gmina centers registered many new families in difficult economic straits. Social organizations and employers helped in the search. Priests also told parishioners from the pulpit how to obtain help and where to go to get it. Announcements appeared in the local newspapers, on television, and attached to apartment house gates. We can therefore suppose that not a single family in need of this sort of assistance will be overlooked.

The statistics show that families with retired people, pensioners, or many children were in greatest need. Such families account for over half of all the families that had trouble paying for rent and electric bills. Broken families and the sick account for 25 percent. The rest are unemployed persons or victims of fate.

The statistics also show that rural residents are taking greater advantage of help to pay their electric bills than urban residents.

The MPiPS is planning to budget 2 trillion zlotys in 1991 to assist with housing, heat, water, central heating, gas, electric power, and coal bills. On the other hand, if, as projected, the aid is also extended to subsidize the repayment of credit on new housing, a category presently excluded, then more money will be needed. No decisions have been made yet, however.

Farmers Laid Off From Secondary Jobs

91EP0191B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 12 Dec 90 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Jobless, They Still Have Hobbies: The Drama of Employees With Two Jobs"]

[Text] A large subgroup of people recently laid off consists of people called "farmer-laborers." Because this term has not been entirely correct for some time now, it would be better to use the term "dual-vocation farmers." Plant managers consider such a solution more humanitarian. After all, those let go have a farm, that is, another source of income. The union organizations are not protesting against the practice either.

It has therefore become a fixed practice for a plant to let a person go, even though better qualified, simply because "he can take care of himself," while retaining a person who is actually a poorer employee, "out of humanitarian considerations," merely because the person has no other source of income.

The Polish Association of Dual-Vocation Farmers was formed on this past 9 June, as a sort of protest against this sort of action. After all, there had been no other displays of discrimination against this group of the population before.

The association wrote into its statute that the goal of its activity included sanctioning the durability and usefulness of dual employment, protecting the material, social, and cultural interests of dual-vocation families, and working for proper organization of labor in such households.

In refusing to register the association, the Voivodship Court in Warsaw (Judge Maria Szteker) justified its decision by saying that the statute indicates that it will be not an association but a trade union.

Meanwhile, "The Law on Associations" (DZIENNIK USTAW, 10 April, 1989) indicates: "An independent association establishes its own goals, programs of action, and organizational structures and ratifies internal documents concerning its activity." The registration issue for the moment has been passed up to the next court on appeal.

The problem lies not so much in the definition of association versus union as in the doctrinaire treatment of a large group of workers, about 2 million, who are let go based on a single criterion, owning land.

Because the farmers with two vocations are not even considered unemployed, they have no right to unemployment assistance. Most are, therefore, left with practically nothing to live on. There are nearly a million farms in Poland run by people with a second source of income which is usually the major source. There are over 2 million more family members also working at a job off the farm.

Association Chairman Stefan Lewandowski, who is a both a farmer and a historian with a doctorate says: "The people who have been let go don't know what sort of rights they're entitled to, such as nonrepayable assistance or credit and the right to set up companies, and the labor ministry doesn't know who's a dual-vocation farmer. That's why there's an urgent need for the group to organize legal self-defense."

Both social and economic aspects call for such action. Most of the farms of dual-vocation farmers are those which have traditionally had many different crops, suffer from low-scale production, and operate at a negligible profit. In many instances farming is more an expensive hobby than a source of added income. To adapt the type of production to fit the size of the farm or to engage in specialization would require the corresponding investment outlays. Time and knowledge are also necessary. After all, not all the dual-vocation farmers who have been let go will be able to remain on the farm exclusively, even with intensive farming. Most such farmers must be provided with an additional source of earnings, preferably at the place of residence.

These people usually have some sort of qualifications (often high ones) and have quite a bit of space in which they could set up a service facility or production workshop. Could the previous employers that let them go not provide the farmers (for a fee) with some machinery or

lease it to them? So much is said about the need to break up industry, but in practice this is still an empty phrase. Naturally a miner or mill worker who has been let go will not be given a piece of the mine or steel mill, but would it not be possible to sell a lathe to a turner?

The phenomenon of working at two vocations is a lasting one in agriculture and is nearly independent of the agrarian structure. Japan, the FRG, France, and even the United States provide convincing examples. People who decide to take a second job in agriculture, one that is arduous and very unprofitable, should not be deprived of the right to a job in their basic vocation. To do so runs contrary to the laws of both God and man, as people have been writing for a long time.

Lewandowski asks, not without justification: "Why aren't unproductive bureaucrats, people who have been working in two places up until now, first among the ranks of the unemployed?"

Well, probably because they are usually the ones to determine who is to be let go.

Sugar Beet Crop: Domestic Consumption Down

91EP0187B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 11 Dec 90 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "The Sugar Factory Campaign at the Finish Line: A Sweet Lesson"]

[Text] This year's sugar-factory campaign is coming to a close. With one exception, it went forward without any great problems in either production or transport. Daily processing of 172,000 tons of raw material exceeded last year's production by 7,000 tons. Climatic conditions were favorable. In most of the enterprises, the processing of beets is concluded by the third week of December, but some sugar factories finish sooner. Only the Lubna Sugar Factory (Kielce), which was beset this year by breakdowns and layoffs, will work to the end of February.

This year, a total of approximately 16.6 million tons of sugar beets was purchased, that is, about 2.2 million tons more than a year ago. Up to 10 December, 12.6 million tons of raw material was processed from which 1.6 million tons of sugar was produced. Approximately 4 million tons of beets remain to be processed, and total production of sugar may reach the 1950 level of 2 million tons. This would be the second highest (or the first) yield in the history of the Polish sugar industry. This may be the most; 1.982 million tons was produced in 1983. At that time, however, beets were grown over a wider area than at present (440,000 hectares). The yield, that is, the number of kilograms of sugar per 100 kilograms of beets processed, was also smaller. This year it is 12.62 (last year, it was 12.46).

But jubilation over this year's good results in the Polish sugar industry is restrained. Sugar consumption in Poland has decreased markedly. Where in past years 1.2 million tons were retailed and the food industry bought

0.46-0.50 million tons, today the total Polish market demands are estimated at 1.40-1.45 million tons. In other words, it will be necessary to sell 0.5 million tons of sugar abroad where sugar prices are such that each kilogram exported will cost an additional 1,300 zlotys on the average. (The sale of approximately 1 million tons of sugar to the Soviet market was anticipated, but at the moment, nothing has come of this.)

The world price of sugar is foredoomed by the cheaper price of sugar produced from sugar cane, which accounts for more than 60 percent of production. Tadeusz Dabrowski, director of the Service-Development Enterprise of the Sugar Industry, estimates that the cost of production of sugar in the EEC countries is \$800 per ton, in Poland, it is approximately \$600 per ton, while the world price of sugar, on the London market, for example, is \$304-310 per ton. The result is that the cost of sugar production is greater than the demand for this product.

In 1989, the sugar campaign sold 190,000 tons of sugar abroad. The exporter, the enterprise for foreign trade, Rolimpex, denying the invention of the telephone, does not provide information on this year's sugar export; from other sources, we know that approximately 180,000 tons have been sold (in 1987, 296,000 tons of sugar were exported).

From this year's difficulties, with the surplus of sugar both here and abroad, we should draw a few practical conclusions. Sugar factories that were made independent have already started to draw these conclusions. Specifically, they have started to check on their contractors, dropping those who produce the lowest yields or who grow beets on very small areas. It is mainly these groups that produce the ranks of idlers who block approaches to the sugar factories with the intention of forcing higher prices for the beets. A beneficial selection of sugar-beet producers may, in time, result in producers getting greater yields from smaller planting areas and beet production may become more profitable for them in this way.

Naturally, we should not resign completely from sugar beet production. This is a plant that is indispensable in crop rotation and it increases the fodder supply for cattle. Moreover, if our country were to give up sugar production and depend wholly on import, the world price of sugar would rise to a very high level immediately. At the moment, we should be glad that we do not have to, as we did in former years, import raw "sugar of friendship" from Cuba where we bought 80,000-150,000 tons of this product at prices higher than world prices.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Former Dissident Writer on Work, Present Goals

91CH0275B Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
8 Jan 91 p 8

[Interview with Hana Ponicka, Slovak author, by Jaroslav Kuchar and Kristian Chalupa; place and date not given: "If There Were No Czech Dissidents..."—first paragraph is LIDOVE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] The Slovak author of stories, romances, and books for children, the translator and publicist Hana Ponicka was deprived of the possibility of publishing in her country in 1977 when, at the Congress of the Union of Slovak Writers, she came out undaunted in defense of her persecuted colleagues. Since that time, she has been active in numerous independent initiatives. In 1989, together with Miroslav Kusý, Dr. Vladimír Manak, and others, she was hauled into court in Bratislava and accused of incitement. Currently, she is a member of the Commission on Czechoslovak Statehood in the Office of the President of the Republic.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] The Atlantis Publishing House in Brno is about to publish your book of recollections of the Lukavice Notes. Why are you publishing your memoirs in a Brno publishing house?

[Ponicka] I decided to publish the book through Atlantis because this publishing house was established as a result of the contributions by Vaclav Havel before the time the turnaround occurred in our country. I figured from the very beginning that I, too, would be publishing books through Atlantis—books which I had written during the period of my dissident activity. In Slovakia, the publishing houses are in such a state that they do not provide me with a feeling of security and I feel a certain aversion with respect to those publishing houses, some of which rescinded their contract with me or which scrapped my books. I have every confidence in the Atlantis Publishing House. I am much concerned with the culture of publication; Czech and Moravian books were always at a high level.

And as far as the book itself is concerned, these are not memoirs, but a novel based on fact. I reworked the book six times, not with words and I did not even prettify it, but I reworked it from the beginning and experienced it all again as my new artistic factual experience. It was difficult for me to write as long as I was unable to find a different style from my previous books and as long as I did not have the feeling that it sounded right, that the plot was flowing smoothly, and that it was the real thing.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Last year, you visited the United States and Canada. What were the impressions that you brought back with you?

[Ponicka] This was the first time I was in the New World and the first time in 20 years that I was able to leave my

country. I was in San Francisco, Detroit, Toronto, Cleveland, Niagara, and New York. The countryside and the cities are well maintained; everything inspired me. For me, who had lived for so many years in a certain isolation, it was very liberating to breathe the air in a broadly open free society.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] And how were things with the Skvorecky's?

[Ponicka] I did not directly visit their home environment—I was only in the building where they work. I felt like I had come from the neighbors'. They received me as though we had seen each other yesterday, but we had already met in Bratislava on the occasion of their visit to Czechoslovakia so that we knew each other personally. I was surprised by the sobriety, the simplicity, and even the modesty of their working environment. I became intimately familiar with their life which is, literally, inundated with work.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What does Czech literature mean to you?

[Ponicka] You have asked me a question about which I could write a book. For me, Czech literature is everything. It is one of the main reasons why I am so ardently striving to see to it that the unleashing of nationalist sentiments would not lead to separation—or even to confederation. Of all the literatures of the world, I love the Slovak and Czech literature best because the small size of nations does not mean that their literature is not on a world level. For me, Czech literature augments the human universe, but also the intellectual and civil universes.

Look back into history. Our Slovak literature and our literary language in general, these are very fresh and young. It is a modern era. Prior to that time, we had a language which was similar to being biblical and was, essentially, shared with the Czech language. But it was different from the Czech language. The differences can be traced. I have read the letters of the Slovak grandees who used to exchange letters with their wives in this Slovak-Czech language.

I love Božena Němcová, I worshiped Jirasek through whom I fell in love with Bohemia and its history as early as my childhood—and then I loved modern literature. My father was a friend of Vladimír Vancura and of Dr. Simerá. Both were executed by the Nazis during the occupation. In our country, even during the period of the seasonal Slovak state, there were people who knew how to bring out Czech books, despite the fact that we were separated by a border at that time.

And ask for dissident literature? If there had not been Czech dissidents, I would most likely have vegetated. It was not by happenstance that I spoke up at the Congress of Slovak Writers. I believe I got that far even by following as everything which the Czech dissidents were doing—as a result of the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe [RFE], to whom I am grateful for much. I am

even grateful for the fact that RFE did not let me fossilize and that they helped me to develop further as a writer.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What are you writing now? What are you working on now?

[Ponicka] I have a bad conscience right now because I am writing very little; I am doing interviews, I attend meetings, I am working out concepts for various commissions. But life is the greatest of artistic works. Except that, in the special situation which has come into being here and in which a person is a direct participant, no other provides such an opportunity for concentration as was the case heretofore. That was actually an ideal situation, when I could write and when there was only occasional company, be it welcome or unwelcome. However, I know I should write. I am working on the second portion of the biography of Stefanik, the first part of which was broadcast by Radio Free Europe in 1988-89. I have now promised Mrs. Cerovska in the Prague editorial offices of Radio Free Europe that I will continue the serial covering the period of activity of M.R. Stefanik during World War I. Perhaps the serial will already originate directly from the Prague editorial offices of Radio Free Europe beginning at the end of November.

HUNGARY

Jewish Community Revamped; Assimilation Opposed

91CH0271A Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian No 51, 21 Dec 90 p 2422

[Transcript of 16 December 1990 television broadcast of interview with Gusztav Zoltay, head of the Association of Jewish Congregations in Hungary, by NAP [Nouvelle Agence de Presse] TV reporter Henrik Havas; place and date of interview not given: "We Will Not Become Assimilated!"—first paragraph is NAP TV introduction]

[Text] Fortunately, the debate concerning anti-Semitism is abating. Perhaps as a result of this, calm Jewish organizations in Hungary were able to reorganize themselves. Reporter Henrik Havas asked questions of Gusztav Zoltay, head of the new representative organization; Ferenc Szekely served as editor.

[Havas] Our guest is Gusztav Zoltay. He was elected head of the Association of Jewish Congregations in Hungary and of the Budapest Jewish Congregation. Previously you were one of the leaders of the National Representation of Hungarian Israelites. Why the reorganization?

[Zoltay] At their 9 December joint meeting, the representative body of the National Association of Hungarian Israelites and the Budapest Israelite Congregation repealed its bylaws—the constitution of earlier years—and adopted new, democratic bylaws as well as a new

constitution. Based on this, the Budapest Jewish Congregation has become the legal successor to the Budapest Israelite Congregation. The National Representation of Hungarian Israelites ceased to exist without a legal successor, and the Association of Jewish Congregations in Hungary was formed. This change took place based on the will of the majority. The term "Jew" that you may find in the new name expresses the recommendation made by, and in view of the majority, because the word "Jew" unequivocally expresses the communal belonging. The fact that previously, the word "Jew" was used in public only in a pejorative sense was offensive. We would also like to give substance to this new name.

[Havas] What kind of structure exists relative to organizations which represent Jewish citizens in Hungary?

[Zoltay] We cannot speak of unified representation. Accordingly, we, the Association of Jewish Congregations in Hungary represent the Jewish congregations. The Budapest Jewish Congregation includes members of the country's largest Jewish community.

[Havas] On what foundations do these congregations organize?

[Zoltay] On religious foundations.

[Havas] Some organizations recruit our fellow Jewish citizens on an ethnic basis.

[Zoltay] It is a fundamental right in a democracy for everyone to identify himself in the manner in which he chooses. Accordingly, if one wants to manifest one's Jewishness on a religious basis, let him do so. The same applies to others who want to manifest their Jewishness on ethnic or cultural foundations. This is the sovereign right of every person.

[Havas] What relationship does your organization have with the National Association of Jews in Hungary, who wants to have the Jewry recognized as an ethnic group?

[Zoltay] That is an entirely new organization. As with any other Jewish organization, the congregation enjoys good relations with that organization as well.

[Havas] What institutions do you have? The Budapest Jewish Gymnasium was established with foreign support, and then one hears things about the Szabolcs Street hospital being returned to you. In earlier days, that was the Jewish Charity Hospital. Is it possible that this hospital will be transferred under your management?

[Zoltay] At present, we have a high school, the Anne Frank High School. This is not new, it has operated during the past 40 years. The one you pointed out, the school in Wesselenyi Street is new. In addition, we also operate the Jewish school, the Javne Association School. It is located on Lendvai Street. As far as the Szabolcs Street hospital is concerned, it indeed belonged to the congregation, it was the famous Jewish hospital. We have a hospital, and the congregation has a hospital. We primarily care for and treat our old, tired pensioners

there. The Szabolcs Street hospital is on the list of real property that we rerequisitioned, the same list that we handed to the government.

[Havas] I am asking all of this because questions may arise in which you want an infrastructure, or that you are simply establishing an infrastructure—because you are reaching back to the roots and rerequisitioning old institutions—which constitute a complete infrastructure, and therefore is rather unique in the country.

[Zoltay] Quite naturally, the leadership of the congregation endeavors to broaden its tasks, and to draw under this umbrella Hungarians who profess the Jewish faith, but who for one or another reason were left out thus far.

[Havas] Perhaps this also suggests that you will not choose assimilation, but segregation as the future path....

[Zoltay] Under no circumstance would assimilation lead us to our goal, or what we would like to see. The Jewry can only survive if it does not become assimilated.

[Havas] To what extent do Hungarian Jews share your opinion? I think that the majority would rather choose assimilation.

[Zoltay] This is erroneous information. That's not what they would choose. Jews insist upon their being Jews. After all, the associations which were formed alongside the congregations share the same interest: To halt the assimilation process.

[Havas] What proportion of the Jewry of Hungary do you represent? Because, forgive me, if you did not choose assimilation, and if according to you, I do not understand the matter of the majority of Jews wanting to assimilate correctly, this question arises: Who represents the Jewry?

[Zoltay] The roots of the Jewry are able to find only fertile soil, and the Jewry can survive only if it does not take part in the assimilation process. I do not know, and I do not like to make statements as to whether this is a minority or a majority. After all, for known reasons, the data concerning the number of Jews in Hungary constitute only estimates.

[Havas] We had the memorable "soap box" dispute during the summer. At issue was whether the expression "put a soap box under the Jew" was used. At that time you said that you would expect the supreme prosecutor to take an action which would produce appropriate results. This did not take place, nor was KURIR condemned, nor did they find the representative [who would have made that statement]. You made a statement in that rather tense situation to the effect that thousands of Jews would start a hunger strike if the supreme prosecutor's proceeding failed to produce results, or if it simply did not take place.

[Zoltay] I was not the one who made that announcement, and I did not ask, rather did not demand, that the office

of the supreme prosecutor initiate an investigation. My announcement did not alter the outcome of the investigation. We only requested that there be an investigation. An investigation took place, and thereafter the announcement became immaterial.

[Havas] But hints were made about some upcoming demonstration—a hunger strike.

[Zoltay] The telegrams and letters we received clearly showed that many people joined this action, just in case they had failed to initiate an investigation.

[Havas] Would that have helped the Hungarian Jewry? I believe that precisely at a time when many claim that anti-Semitism is on the increase, this might have resulted in disapproval. Would it not have produced that result?

[Zoltay] This is another accusation against us which they used to make. Why should it increase anti-Semitism if someone demands the investigation of possible offenses in this country, in a democracy?

[Havas] I am a bit confused, because the things I know appear to contradict what you are saying. During the 19th century there was a strong Jewish immigration from Galicia, Russia, and Poland to Hungary, and the country received Jewish masses in a manner that was unparalleled in Europe. Everyone recognizes the fact that this Jewry of Hungary took part in Hungary's development and in its evolution as a civil society. This Jewry received its strength to accomplish this precisely from its preparedness to assimilate. Here you are stating that assimilation is incorrect, and that you do not agree with that idea. By saying so, it appears that you retroactively question those efforts and achievements that the Jewry of Hungary contributed to the benefit of the nation.

[Zoltay] Well, this is an odd approach to what I said and what I would like to say. Specifically, it continues to be our unchanged task and goal to help this country in the same manner as any other citizen. This does not contradict the idea that we may live in a closed religious community in which we preserve our one-thousand-year-old traditions. As a result of this, we remain full-fledged citizens of the Hungarian Republic.

[Havas] What is your view of emigrating?

[Zoltay] It is the same as my view on the nationality issue. It is everyone's right to find his own happiness in the land of his ancestors or in this country.

[Havas] If you are correct, then those who assimilate are incorrect, and that constitutes exclusion.

[Zoltay] We do not regard this as an exclusion. Determination of nationality, emigration, and assimilation are issues to be determined on the basis of individual decisions. Accordingly, we who adhere to our religion and traditions are of the opinion that the survival of the Jewry may be ensured only if it resists the process of becoming assimilated.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.