


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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

***KOMMUNIST***  
***No 14, September 1989***

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**Soviet Union**  
**KOMMUNIST**  
 No 14, September 1989

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5 December 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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**KOMMUNIST**

No 14, September 1989

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

**RENOVATION OF SOCIETY -  
RENOVATION OF THE PARTY**

**Who Shares Responsibility?**

905B0008A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 14, Sep 89 (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 3-8

[Article by A. Valentinov]

[Text] Accountability and election activities in party groups and shop and primary party organizations in Rostov-na-Donu are in full swing. Naturally, we could cite statistical data and describe what it is that distinguishes them from those of only 1 year ago—participation of nonparty people, election of party secretaries with more than one nominee, and other features of our present. I believe, however, that it is much more important to look at the political and economic situation which has developed in the area, and the problems which the specific situation poses to the party members.

What characterizes the situation above all? A tangle of processes, which are quite typical of other areas as well, has developed in Rostov; however, their concentration within a relatively limited area here makes them that much more visible. This involves relations among nationalities: for a long time that city has been populated by different ethnic groups and any conflict, in the Transcaucasus let us say, is echoed here. The ecological situation is extremely grave. There is a shortage of water and the various city districts are supplied with water according to a schedule, but that schedule as well is being violated. Treatment systems are literally in a catastrophic state. Naturally, this also applies to goods and services, food, housing, etc. All of this has aggravated the sociopolitical atmosphere.

Unlike, shall we say, Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltic area or Moldavia, here this is manifested not in the establishment of informal associations or confrontations at meetings but through discontent with various aspects of the economic reform, the escalation of demands submitted to party committees and the authorities, and mistrust of the latter. The most typical manifestation of this frame of mind is the behavior of the people, based on the principle of "listen and do the opposite." Matters have gone so far that, as A. Abramov, head of the department of organizational-party and cadre work at the Rostov CPSU Obkom, said, in an accountability and election meeting it would suffice to say about a candidate that he is supported by the superior party committee for that candidate to be turned down.

Many party workers claim that currently meeting and discussing matters with informals is becoming easier than with labor collectives and primary party organizations, where people have no intention whatsoever to engage in a discussion but instead submit one-sided demands: What is there to analyze, when it is precisely you, the party secretary, who must provide food and housing, replace poor superiors, close down speculating cooperatives, etc. It is only then that we can discuss things. All of this confirms the existence of a very difficult situation within the city party organizations. Today any discussion among party members, be it verbal or in writing, or holding a meeting or a plenum must, in addition to its specific agenda, also have a "supera-genda."

This peculiar feature was accurately noted by V. Petrenko, first secretary of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Party Raykom, who addressed a raykom plenum the agenda of which included the unusually item "On the Political Aspect:" Whenever the results of the work of an enterprise for the first half of the year are discussed at party meetings (last July such meetings were held in 50 percent of the primary party organizations), as in the past, the urgent problems are debated in the halls, during cigarette breaks and in locker rooms. The moment the regular agenda is covered, the people take off their masks and no longer act as "extras," but become themselves. Correspondingly, they discuss different matters in a different fashion. It is precisely this "difference"—social tension, strikes, attitude toward cooperatives, etc.—that must be the first and prime concern of the party members today.

How are such problems interpreted and refracted in the course of accountability and election conferences in the party groups and the shop and primary party organizations? I attended meetings of several party organizations of railroad workers in Rostov, which is one of the largest transportation hubs in the country.

We are at an accountability and election meeting of the party group of the city freight yard, numbering 20 party members. The questions which were included in the report submitted by party group organizer L. Yasyukevich and in the debates which followed were entirely traditional: hitches in the construction of the new administrative building, labor conditions in the tallying and economic shops, implementation of permanent assignments by the party members, lack of personnel at the station, the territorially scattered nature of the subunits and the resulting difficulties in organizational work, etc.

The overall impression was that the same problems could have been discussed in the same tone of voice even 1 or 2 years ago. Elections for party group organizer were also essentially traditional, although new in form (there were two competitors: L. Yasyukevich and N. Silchenko). Neither the programs of the candidates nor even their views on problems of interest to the collective were discussed. It was only a question of establishing the load of social assignments carried by either one. As a

result of the open vote, L. Yasyukevich was reelected. Naturally, Inspector N. Silchenko raised the important topic of the need to enhance the authority of the party organization, so that it may be joined by younger people and to help them apply here their potential. These were good words but they should have been more closely related to practical matters. Also understandable is the concern shown by store clerk T. Grabovskaya about the fact that lecturers and propagandists who addressed the party group were aiming at some kind of abstract audiences. The people were unresponsive to their lectures. It was as though they were listening to them as unconcerned outsiders. Such propaganda does not convince anyone of anything and is obviously off the mark. But then this is an old and already diagnosed malady. What else concerns the party members at the freight yard?

What concerns them is real life with all of its current contradictions. Let us consider, for example, the following fact which was mentioned at the meeting: after an uneventful probationary period Candidate Party Member V. Golomazov, refused to become a full member. As he said, he had lost faith in the party. He could not understand its policies, particularly toward the cooperatives. He was opposed to cooperatives but favored a multiparty system. In an effort to understand this better, I spoke with the party members. Did they urge him to join the party? Apparently not, it was what he wanted himself. He was a good worker, with the highest level of education in his shop. It is true that in addition to his own version there was also another. Some party members believed that his present motivations were much more basic: he hoped that party membership would enable him to become chief of the tallying shop where he worked but was not appointed to that position.

It is not my intention to determine which of the versions was the right one or if both were right. I believe, however, that this example is very indicative of what is characteristic of the problem as a whole. Within a period of 6 months some 170 people have left the party in the city. Some of them are pensioners, who find it difficult actively to meet statutory requirements because of age and state of health. However, there also were others who indicated in their statements, as had V. Golomazov, their differences with party policies. Here again the likelihood is high that some of them used this "legend" which has an aura of respectability, to conceal considerations of a career failure or a completion of career aims, or else simply concern for their own peace of mind should they remain in the ranks of an acting, a fighting party. However, also obvious is the fact that some people left the party truly because of failure to understand or accept the course of the reforms, the economic reform above all, for with increasing frequency one could hear at meetings and gatherings and even read in newspaper articles accusations of retreating from the principles of social justice and connivance with the new "enemies of the people," the members of cooperatives.

Naturally, anti-cooperative moods today are nothing new. However, that which was heard at the meeting

between the secretary of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Raykom and the rayon executive committee chairman with the collective of the Electric Locomotive Engines Repairs Plant indicated that the next stage in that development had arrived. Unanimously all of them demanded the unconditional and immediate closing down of all cooperatives in the areas of trade, purchases and public catering. They based their support of the party on that item. It is a matter of concern that such feelings are also largely shared by the elected aktiv.

The feelings of the people can be understood: naturally, some cooperatives are merely a legal "screen" for a variety of machinations, while other may be working honestly but simply doing poor work. However, we must separate the wheat from the chaff. In the case of illegal activities one can and must "use force." In other situations one should act through economic means: taxes, interest rates and state orders. Mandatorily, one must always analyze, compute and back up one's feelings with arguments and facts.

In my view, also typical is the unnatural linking of economic conservatism (demands for social justice in a spirit of equalization, paternalistic interpretation of the economic role of the state, and antiprivate enterprise) with political "radicalism" (a multiparty system, control of the party by the soviets, etc.).

This state of mind, which seems to be affected by confusion, has a bad reflection on the daily practical work of the party organizations. Therefore, it is vitally important today for the CPSU to be a party of reforms and responsibility, a party whose members would not distance themselves from political leadership, using the grammatical barrier of "we-they," but would be ready to support their party and the course of renovation. That is why the time has now come to discuss not only production or intraparty problems, such as the party training system, the amount of party member assignments, payment of dues or level of attendance at meetings, but also the fate of perestroika. On the level of the primary party organizations, such problems are formulated, as a rule, in three aspects: solution of social problems, prevention of economic and political conflicts which lead to chaos, and the personal stance taken by the party member.

In this case priorities are defined by the time and place of action of the party members. The prevention of conflicting or, rather, of other situations leading to strikes has been, over the past several weeks, the main concern of the party organization in the locomotive engines depot.

The depot is the hub of the Rostov section of the North Caucasian Railroad, and if the work schedule is disrupted here, chaos may spread along the entire line. Although this was not the officially announced topic, it was the implied one at the accountability party meeting. However, the report submitted by I. Kirichenko, party committee secretary (who was elected last October but in the course of the 10 months of his tenure there have been

more sharp discussions and events than in the past several years. Incidentally, his transfer from a locomotive engineer to a member of the "nomenclature" (cost him more than 200 rubles monthly) was thorough and touched upon serious and truly vital problems for the collective, although the discussions it triggered were less sharp and active might have been expected. Why was that?

Most likely, as I was told by party members working on the railroad, it was due to the fact that the passion had already burned out at the previous meetings which were being held on a weekly basis in July and August. Everyone had already spoken out repeatedly and now people were only adding to their statements and continuing already started discussions.

Meanwhile, this is how events developed. The conflict situation began to develop in February. This was related to the 13th wage, the amount of which, under existing cost accounting conditions, turned out in the case of the locomotive engineers to be lower than that of any other professional group in the Rostov division of the North Caucasian Railroad. At that time reciprocal understanding was reached and the bonus system was corrected.

However, this was merely the beginning. The sequence was in June-July. By then the already difficult life of the engineers became even more difficult with the events along the Transcaucasian Railroad, and the difficulties which disrupted the work rhythm. For example, in the 8 days of the Sukhumi Blockade of the tracks, more than 150 trains piled up, abandoned as a result of the total breakdown in traffic. This was followed by a 1-week halt in the traffic between Azerbaijan and Armenia which entailed more dozens of abandoned trains. Naturally, such an emergency situation led to substantial idling along the tracks and, consequently, overwork by the engineers (shifts lasting 10 to 12 hours instead of 6 or 7, as per regulations). This intensified the atmosphere and triggered legitimate demands for material compensations.

Finally, there was the strike by the miners with whom the railroad workers of the Rostov department live and work side-by-side. This set the example of a solution of accumulated problems by forceful means. Something like a strikers' committee appeared at the depot. Interestingly enough, it was headed by two party members, one of whom in his time had been depot party committee secretary and is now an oblast soviet deputy. A variety of demands began to be formulated and discussed. In this case, a great deal depended on the political maturity, responsibility and extent of understanding of the worsening situation by both the administration and the party committee. It was actually a question of the danger, albeit temporary, of interrupting economic connections with the Caucasus.

Realizing maintaining the dialogue open was the main thing, and have a discussion rather than confrontation, a

tripartite conflict commission was quickly set up (administration-party-strikers' aktiv). A list of demands was drawn up. It was studied and demands were classified into realistic and unrealistic, into what problems could be solved within the collective and what to demand of the ministry, the obkom or other authorities. Some questioned whether party members, not to mention the elected aktiv, should become involved with such strike-related matters for what if "those at the top" were to misunderstand the situation, and what would happen then! However, where should the party members be if not among the people and what should they deal with if not things which strongly affect the collective? This must be the case even and particularly when the people are wrong or could go wrong, for if the party members do not seize the initiative it will be seized by someone else and who knows how the conflict would be resolved in that case?

It could have been proper for the party organization of the railroad administration to be in closer touch with the conflict and to put out the flames of the tension directly, through the personal participation of the party members. However, this was blocked by the existing procedure according to which party regulations separate the management from production units. The party members in production were members of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Raykom while those in management, of the Proletarskiy Raykom. It was no accident that this problem was brought out (not for the first time) at the accountability meeting. Locomotive Engineer N. Bulkin accurately said that this lowers the efficiency of the criticism of management by party members and, in general, brings a division in solving the accumulated problems.

While opinions clash and are closely studied, a battle is being waged for the people, for their stance in perestroika. In this case a great deal is based on trusting the people and total glasnost. For that reason both the course and the outcome of the talks were discussed without delay at party and trade union meetings. Above all, along with the work of the commission, talks were being held with each separate locomotive engine brigade and every locomotive engineer. The party committee secretary personally met each brigade returning from a run and not only explained and argued but also listened, for in order to reach agreement one needs less a loud voice than sensitive ears.

It cannot be said that the dialogue took place under favorable conditions. Rumors of a forthcoming all-Union railroad strike began to spread by the end of July. Rumors, however, sometimes have a stronger impact on the mind than reality. Anonymous telephone calls were made, threatening with strike and even with mining some parts of the tracks in Zheleznodorozhnyy Raykom and the rayon executive committee and the party committees of the big enterprises.

Under such circumstances it was important to act energetically yet calmly and patiently, in a comradely fashion. To the honor of the raykom, there was full trust

in the party members and they were kept informed of all aspects of the situation related to the strike. The convincing and thorough analysis of the real problems and separating real from fictitious ones and properly resolving them yielded results. By mid-August the tension eased and there was no strike along the North Caucasian Railroad.

The conflict commission of the locomotive engines depot drafted a packet of 47 suggestions (not demands toward anyone but suggestions, most of which could be implemented by the collective itself) and submitted them for consideration and approval at an open party meeting and, subsequently, at a general meeting of the collective.

At the meetings I. Kirichenko and Yu. Kimeyev (until recently a former party secretary but as of last year elected among other competitors to the position of depot chief) provided a detailed explanation on each point. They singled out a block of questions the solution of which could be achieved by the collective. They also drew up a list of suggestions for the Ministry of Railroads, consisting of 16 points. The discussion was sober, calm and without stress. Naturally, some of the demands were clearly impossible to meet such as, for example, immediately to provide to anyone who so wished it the possibility of buying a car. This was the exception. As a whole, the workers' collective proved its responsibility and realism.

The point is that the financing of the suggestions should come from two sources. The first is a subsidy by the Ministry of Railways, which was asked by the railroad workers (408,900 rubles per year). Naturally, this is a substantial amount and if one were to multiply it by the number of railroad collectives, a heavy burden would be put on our suffering budget. However, there were also a substantial number of questions the solution of which could be achieved with of the funds of the labor collective itself (to this effect 54,700 rubles will be spent every year from of the Sociocultural Measures Fund). This includes free food (dry rations) for people working the night shift, improved work of the food stands, organizing brigade rest homes where the engineers could rest between shifts, ensuring the availability of uniforms, overtime compensation, streamlining the system of free time (because of the stressed situation many locomotive engineers worked without a day off for 1 to 1 and a half months), ensuring transportation to their jobs for those taking over the night shift, and prompt washing and changes of work clothes. Obviously, these requirements were sensible and natural.

In this case realism and responsibility were manifested also in the independent search for sources for financing such measures. This involved, for example, reducing funds spent on red corners. In the course of the collective discussions the people learned not only to speak but also to estimate, to realize the implementation of the type of demands which would truly benefit the working person and those which would not.

Thus, at the latest party meeting, the party members raised the question that the recently "won" free food for the night shift should be given only to the fitters but not to the locomotive engineers, for the latter have the opportunity to eat in the locomotive brigade rest homes and thus spend their money for other purposes. Engineer V. Fursa said in his statement that the demand of paying an additional 1.5 rubles per engineer for unloading a freight car, as formulated by the commission, was too high: "A ruble will do. We are not grubbers, we are not scroungers!" The people at the meeting agreed.

The question of the 16 points within the competence of the Ministry of Railways, which the representatives of the depot presented at a meeting of the ministry's collegium was more difficult (the collegium resolved to study them as well as the suggestions submitted by other railroad collectives before the end of September and then inform the collectives of its decisions). Items such as demand of glasnost about vocational illnesses by railroad workers, and clearly defining the type of irregularities in locomotive engines, which the brigades have the right to repair along the way, are unquestionable. They are related to protecting the life and health of railroad workers as well as passengers. Another rational suggestion would be reducing the administrative apparatus by 50 percent, although in this case everything must be thoroughly weighed in order to avoid the kind of haste displayed in the application of the Belorussian experience in reducing the size of the personnel.

What about the demand of extending the leave of locomotive engineers from 24 to 40 workdays with the right to take it at two separate times? Many categories of working people in our country have paid leave of 18 or fewer workdays. What about the demand of granting the locomotive personnel 25 percent of the entire housing completed by the Ministry of Railways, of which no less than 16 percent should go to the locomotive engineers? Particularly if we take into consideration that locomotive workers at the Rostov department of the North Caucasian Railroad, for example, account for about 4 percent and locomotive engineers for less than 2 percent of all railroad workers.

Changes in social awareness do not occur suddenly. The railroad workers, the party members above all, are currently experiencing the difficult transition from the democracy of demand to the democracy of responsibility. A confirmation of their understanding of the difficulty of the situation and the need for reciprocal personal responsibility for its stabilization and, subsequently, resolution was the open letter which the collective of the Rostov Locomotive Engines Depot addressed to the railroad workers and to all working people in the Transcaucasian republics, published in the newspaper GUDOK. It calls for being reasonable and showing restraint and seeking reciprocal understanding. The good thing was that that this was a sincere initiative on the part of the workers themselves.

Do the present level of awareness of the problem, sober thinking and responsibility and the developed mechanism of dialogue and compromise provide guarantees against the outbreak of strike situations in the future? The aktiv of party members on the railroad believes so. I personally trust the words and actions of Valentina Aleksandrovna Petrenko, Ivan Petrovich Kirichenko and Yuriy Georgiyevich Kimeyev and their fellow-party members and their readiness not only to share difficulties and concerns but also to unite the people in solving them. This, today, is the core of party work.

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### **Continued Discussion of Letters From the Party Organizations**

*905B0008B Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 89 (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 9-14*

**[Text] P. Taov, chairman of the Kabardino-Balkar Oblast Trade Unions Council, doctor of economic sciences: Why Do the Trade Unions Need Extras?**

In the past few months the topic of trade unions has developed into one of the most pressing problems. Problems of perestroyka in the work of the trade unions have excited the public in the past as well. However, recent events, such as the miners' strike, the creation of standing strikers' committees, and the United Front of Working People have made it necessary to look at them differently. Why is it that public organizations, whose task it is to defend the interests of man, are failing to do so? The reasons are numerous and some of them have already been mentioned in the press. In his article "On Defending the Rights of the Working People" (KOMMUNIST No 12, 1989), A. Vasilyev justifiably points out that under the conditions of the administrative-command system the trade unions were unable to display their entire potential and, furthermore, they developed a bureaucratic work style. Naturally, the situation was also affected by the residual principle in training trade union cadres: frequently people who were not made members of a party or a soviet body were recommended for trade union committee membership.

A bureaucratic style means not only a bureaucratic indifference to people. It also means a quite clearly defined system for solving all problems in life. For many long years, zealously, pressure in using the instruments at the disposal of the apparat was applied instead of the study of phenomena and processes. If something was not in order, let us issue a "paper," which called for intensifying, strengthening and demanding more strictly. If a problem appeared, a ministry or committee was set up to resolve it. The worst part was the public organization with its very loose objectives and functions. Although it proved its inefficiency no lessons from this fact were learned.

Is this the first time now that we are discussing our trade unions? No, naturally not. As early as the beginning of

the 1970s it was obvious that something was wrong with the trade unions and that they were failing to fulfill their role. It was then that a serious analysis should have been made and the reasons for this situation determined. However, the familiar path was followed: yet another public administrative authority was set up, to take over part of the load. As a result of one such attempt, the standing production conferences were born.

The regulation on their organization, ratified by the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU, stipulated that their purpose was to involve the working people in production management and to solve basic problems of the economic and social development of the collectives. Annual statistical accountability on the results of the activities of this agency was demanded, thus reemphasized its significance. The importance of the role of the production conferences in the 1970s was mentioned at party plenums and congresses. Practical experience indicated, however, that these conferences turned out to be rather permanently inactive and wherever they functioned they involved themselves in solving the virtually identical problems dealt with by the technical-economic councils. They did not lead to the expected increase in "involving the working people in production management" and, essentially, outlived their usefulness.

In the period of broad-scale experimentation to improve the economic mechanism in the country, councils of brigade leaders and councils of directors assumed great importance. They were solving economic problems but dealt little with social ones. In accordance with tradition a new management authority was created which would do both. Labor collective councils appeared, immediately hailed by the press, radio and television. As happens in our country, production successes willingly began to be ascribed to the labor collective councils exclusively, without trying to determine who actually deserved the credit.

Article 7 of the USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) stipulates the following concerning the Labor Collective Council: "...It will pass resolutions on the use of the funds for the development of production, science and technology, material incentive, social development, on assigning funds for the building of housing, children's institutions and cafeterias, improving working conditions and labor safety and the medical, consumer and cultural services to workers and employees, and solving other problems related to the social development of the collective...." The councils would be totally independent and would be accountable only to the general meeting or the labor collective conference.

This should have been a first-rate, active and efficient management authority, something which the practice of socialist building has not as yet encountered and which it has sought for a very long period of time. But what was the reality? The labor collective councils frequently are either idle or else duplicate the activities of trade union

committees or else again begin to take over the functions of the administration. There are more than enough examples of this.

At the Nalchik Plant for Telemechanic Equipment, of the 12 meetings of the STK [Labor Collective Council] and its presidium 10 were held jointly with the trade union; in those held separately, topics not pertinent to the council were discussed. This included a labor dispute in one of the brigades. At the largest enterprise in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR—Sevkavelektropribor—the STK allowed the administration to assign people to work the second and third shifts which, as we know, is the exclusive prerogative of the trade union committee. At the Iskoz Combines, this social self-management authority dealt with the allocation of apartments and drafting and amending schedules for guard duty by members of the voluntary people's unit. This confusion of functions is the result not of the fact that the councils consist of uninformed people unfamiliar with the regulation on the STK. Frequently this is being done entirely deliberately, in the belief that this is the only right way to act. I recall A.I. Tanasheva, secretary of the labor collective council at the plant for telemechanic equipment trying to convince me that "we must not share functions with the trade union committee. We are solving the same type problems."

The close interweaving of the functions of the STK and the trade union committee complicates the work not only of these two public authorities themselves but also of the administration which must clear many of its actions with both. This can be felt on all levels. Matters have gone so far that the central committee of the trade union of cultural workers had to provide the obkoms with a special table comparing the rights of the STK with those of the trade union committee.

Here is something which, in my view, is quite indicative: the forced, the artificial nature of the creation of such understudies of the trade unions is realized by the managers of the new social self-management authorities themselves. This was frankly said to me in the course of a conversation with Yu.D. Ovdienko, chairman of the labor collective council at the Sevkavelektropribor Plant: "If the trade union committee is truly active, no STK would be needed. Think: anything which today is their prerogative has long been included in collective contracts, the creators, guarantors and supervisors of implementation of which should be the trade unions."

You know that to enhance the role of the trade unions we must return to Lenin's evaluation of their significance. In his work "Draft Theses on the Role and Tasks of the Trade Unions Under the Conditions of the New Economic Policy," V.I. Lenin wrote: "The trade unions must be the closest and mandatory assistants of the state authorities, which guide in all of its political and economic work the conscious vanguard of the working class, the Communist Party. As a school of communism in general, the trade unions must, in particular, be a school

of administration of socialist industry (and, subsequently, gradually, agriculture as well) for the entire mass of workers and, subsequently, for all working people" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 44, p 346). Let me emphasize the words "closest and mandatory assistant of the state authorities." For some reason many people forget this.

The role of the trade unions is not entirely reflected in the USSR Constitution. Article 7 reads as follows: "The trade unions and the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union, the cooperative and other social organizations, in accordance with their statutory tasks, participate in the administration of governmental and social affairs and in the resolution of political, economic and sociocultural problems." This interpretation does not include the most important function of the trade unions as defined by V.I. Lenin: to be a school of economic management, a training school.

But how can the trade unions become such a school for the working people if they have been essentially removed from the "administration of socialist industry," with the creation of the labor collective councils? Do we need two public authorities elected by the very same people: the STK, by the labor collective, and the trade union committee, by the members of the trade union who, in that same collective, account for 99 and, sometimes, even 100 percent of the people? Furthermore, practical experience proves that such a division of functions is very artificial. Let us remember that the strikers' committees during the miners' strike assumed charge for all aspects of life in the mines and considered the entire array of problems without classifying them into production and social. They were trusted by the workers, who saw in them the true defenders of their interests. Therefore, there is no need to restrict the sphere of influence of trade union committees. We must not have, we should not have a situation in which, turning for help, a person would hear from the trade union official: "This is not my concern." In order truly to defend the interests of the working people, the trade unions must play a much more active role in the implementation of the economic reform. No efforts should be made to replace them.

#### **V. Tarashchik, fitter, CPSU member, Chelyabinsk: Time for Action**

How and why did the richest country in the world in natural resources, with a progressive sociopolitical system, turn out to be technically backward, noncompetitive, and experiencing food supply difficulties? This is painful and hurtful for those who prepared and made the revolution and who are still alive. Could it be that this is objectively inherent in socialism? No, I do not believe so, and history is my witness. Twice, after the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, our country rapidly rose from the ruins. Yet today we find out that we are in a state of crisis.

Who is to be blamed? For more than 70 years the country has been ruled by a single party. Everything that is good



and everything that is bad is on its conscience, it is on our conscience. The years of stagnation triggered a terrible irresponsibility, from the general secretary to the little technician. Disparity between words and actions became a daily occurrence. Perestroika, democracy and glasnost instilled in the people hope for renovation. However, now the perestroika has begun to run idle. Antiperestroika forces have become consolidated and a substantial segment of people have assumed a position of expectation. This is understandable. For many long years we lived in a limited space, as though in a tunnel, marching on command: left, right, steady as she goes. And then, in April 1985, we came out of the tunnel and into the valley, but it was not a blossoming valley but a valley thickly covered with weeds and thistle and we did not hear the customary commands and we became confused.

The party promptly raised the question of the elective nature of managers and of labor collective councils. Today everyone must realize that it is not the collective that goes to the chief but the chief who goes to the collective. We must put an end to the popular "might is right." Only then would we be able to combine democracy by meetings with iron discipline in the course of the labor process. We must restore to the worker his rights, which means that we must enhance his responsibility.

The position of a manager, whatever his rank, in sociopolitical life is a special position. Such positions must be held by truly worthy people with an analytical way of thinking, people who can provide skilled and efficient management, people who are personally modest and respectful of others and of our socialist laws and morality, people who defend social justice. Such people will not be afraid of meetings and debates but will draw from them the kernels of collective wisdom and test through them his arguments and convictions. Now, however, some managers do nothing but accuse the press of looking for negative features. They have not become used to listening to criticism. They are unable to turn such criticism to the good of the matter and their feeling of hurt blocks their vision.

Good comes from what is good and trouble comes from what is false. Recall V.I. Lenin: he reminded us that attention should be paid to shortcomings not when we celebrate anniversaries. It is no accident that a characteristic feature of the Leninist party, while Vladimir Ilich lived, was debate, the comparison among different views in order to engage in a collective search for the truth.

No one questions the fact that the strength of the party lies in its living ties with the masses. However, it is time to abandon, once and for all, the ceremony of demonstrating love for leadership and convert to simple purely comradely meetings and talks. Without this the party's authority and that of managers will not be enhanced.

Managers should be chosen only on a free competitive basis. It is a matter of honor, duty and conscience for every party member and working person to see to it that

only the truly worthy are elected. If an error is made, they must find the courage promptly to correct it. They must have the opportunity to correct it quickly so that the projects do not suffer.

We are as yet unable to do so. All of us remember the old prescriptions. Someone sent a letter to M.S. Gorbachev: "...Issue the order to open fire at the staffs." He remembered this letter in his meeting with the workers in Norilsk and said: "We cannot solve today's problems with the methods of 1937 but only under the new conditions. We must act through elections in the party and the soviets, and through local elections lay foundations for the basic decisions of perestroika."

All of this is true but one should hasten with the application of the new methods. The people are tired of waiting. They are tired of words and programs. They demand serious measures and energetic actions.

**S. Kozlov, consultant, Kaliningrad CPSU Obkom, candidate of historical sciences: The Party Apparatus: A View From Within**

The criticism of the party apparatus which has developed of late has been, in most cases, scathing and superficially effective rather than businesslike and efficient, other than in cases in which it has been a question of some specific punished managers. The inefficiency of criticizing the party apparatus "in general," and claims about its excessive influence on the life of party and society and blaming it exclusively for being responsible for failures in domestic policy are founded, as a rule, on the premise that many comrades do not always have a clear idea of the meaning which is invested in this concept and of the function, place and role of the apparatus in the life of the party organizations.

In this connection, let us consider the "*Dictionary of Party Building*," which was published by Politizdat in 1987. The concept of "party apparatus" is interpreted here as a "working agency which is set up in all party committees, from the raykom and all the way up to the CPSU Central Committee, to perform the current work in organizing the implementation of party decisions and helping subordinate party organizations.... Based on it, the elected leading party authorities guide the activities of subordinate party organizations and collectives and organize party-political work among the masses."

Consequently, theoretically any member of the apparatus is an official appointed by the elected authority and must contribute to the fruitful work of the latter. In practice, at least on the level with which I am familiar—from the raykom to the obkom—the party apparatus does not have any special rights in terms of making independent decisions or issuing mandatory instructions different from the positions assumed by the elected authority to which it (the apparatus) is subordinate and accountable. In short, the criticism of the party apparatus, which has become widespread in recent years, blaming it for an alleged omnipotence, does not have sufficiently firm grounds in the majority of cases. As to seeking the culprits for

failures and even breakdowns in the work of party committees on different levels, it would be a good idea to begin with the study of the work of their elected authorities—the bureau and the secretariat—which are responsible for selecting the cadres of the apparat and for their activities.

But why is it then that the favorite target of public criticism are, in the majority of cases, the apparat and its personnel and not those who control their actions? There are many reasons for this but I shall discuss only a few, which I consider basic.

Above all, in the recent past the role of the elected authorities was indeed weakened in some party organizations, as a result of which, in a number of cases the apparat had to assume the implementation of some functions extraneous to it. The prescription for curing this "disease" is well-known: the need maximally to enhance the combativeness of elected party authorities, comprehensively to promote the growth of their influence on the apparat and more strictly to supervise the implementation of resolutions by them, resolutions passed by plenums, bureaus and secretariats.

Furthermore, as contacts with labor collectives indicate, many nonparty organizations and, alas, in frequent cases party members, cannot distinguish between elected and apparat party personnel. To many the raykom secretary, who was elected by the raykom members by secret vote, is little different from the full-time official such as, for example, the instructor, who has been appointed by the bureau to that position. In my view, this misunderstanding can be eliminated by repeatedly describing, verbally and in the press, the mechanism and the principles governing the structure and work of the "legislative" and "executive" party authorities. For the time being, the lack of such information is strongly affecting ideological work. For example, this was pointed out by about one-half of the propagandists at the Kaliningrad Railroad Cars Manufacturing Plant in a recent survey.

Finally, criticizing the party apparat suits those who are trying to conceal behind high-sounding statements, either their own incompetence and lack of serious analysis of the reasons for negative phenomena in various party organizations, or else their own fear of openly naming the managers of the party committee and the specific members of the elected authorities responsible for shortcomings in the work of the apparat. In either case, quickly and without any particular effort, this helps them to gain political capital and to develop a reputation as daring fighters for perestrojka. Efforts at approaching in a considered way the assessment of the party apparat could even damage the political biography of an individual.

In a number of cases the criticism of the apparat suits the party managers and the members of the elected authorities, for it enables them to ascribe some of their own errors to "careless" performers. How else can we otherwise explain the truly paradoxical fact that few of them

are in a hurry to take up the defense of the apparat as a whole or its individual members, in cases of unfair criticism? Very rarely does the central and local press or plenums and meetings of the aktiv express words of gratitude to conscientious and initiative-minded members of the apparat.

Why do the members of the apparat themselves keep silent, patiently enduring some groundless accusations and thereby somehow confirming the charges of some of their critics? The answer, I believe, is clear: it has become some kind of tradition among the personnel of the apparat and a feature of good behavior to act according to the principle of "do not stand out," and act "as though nothing happened." Naturally, this is no accident, for over many long years in the past it was precisely this approach that guaranteed, albeit slowly, their proper career advancement. Here the system of "personal dependence" of the personnel of the apparat on the heads of the elected authorities, which took decades to develop, also plays a role: suffice it for the committee secretary to submit a motion and the bureau would immediately dismiss the person in question from his position. Since the labor code does not apply in such cases, no trade union can defend someone unfairly dismissed. Briefly, the extent to which a member of the apparat depends on the management of the elected authorities is so great that it largely determines the behavior of the members of the apparat and occasionally governs their actions, based less on a creative attitude toward their work than on instructions from superiors. Here is a recent example: only seven of the 50 members of the apparat surveyed this year in our oblast answered the question about the type of qualities which are most needed in order to improve their job creativity; meanwhile, some 40 among them noted discipline, obedience, and so on. In such circumstances, independent actions by the party apparat are, understandably, more the exception than the rule.

Let us also mention the great importance of what happens to a member of the apparat after leaving party work. It is an open secret, for example, that a higher education diploma loses its value after several years if its owner has not worked in his field. This hinders the return of the individual even to the position which he left in taking up party work. Such a "prospect" does not contribute to drawing into the party apparat the most energetic, initiative-minded and independently thinking people who have proven themselves well in other areas. Their fate becomes even more uncertain under cost accounting conditions. Whereas in the past, let us admit it, it was possible to arbitrarily "promote" a party worker to economic work, today with increasing frequency, as is demanded by the Law on the State Enterprise, vacancies are filled on a competitive basis. This frequency becomes an insurmountable obstacle for someone who has not been in production work for several years.

Unfortunately, even when the party worker has maintained or upgraded his professional skills, he finds it quite difficult to resume his previous position. Thus, two

former first officers who had spent several years working for the Baltiyskiy CPSU Raykom in Kaliningrad were refused positions on the high-quality vessel on which they had spent many years at work before taking positions with the raykom. They were asked to start with the old trawlers and somehow once again earn the right to sail modern ships. These are not isolated examples.

Today many party committees are seeking independently nontraditional ways for recruiting personnel for the apparat and preserving their qualifications. In our obkom, for example, former VUZ teachers are allowed to keep 25 percent of their previous jobs. The Guryevskiy CPSU Raykom allowed two instructors to teach history in secondary schools. However, such help can be given essentially to people in the social sciences and culture; but what to do with members of the apparat with basic technical training?

As we know, recently some steps were taken to settle the material and living conditions of people released from the party apparat. In particular, they are being given separation pay from the party budget and time for finding jobs. There is nothing criminal in this case, so to say, for party workers, like all Soviet people, need social protection guarantees. Furthermore, I believe that the time has come to formulate, develop and enact a **system of steps aimed at strengthening the social protection of the personnel of the apparat**. Practical experience proves, for example, that relations between elected authorities and the party apparat must be regulated, particularly in terms of their reciprocal rights and obligations. Obviously, it would be useful to include also an annual trial period in hiring comrades to some positions within the apparat. The procedure itself of hiring and firing members of the apparat should be democratized: in my view, it would be expedient to do this at plenums of the respective committees and not at bureau sessions, as is currently practiced. Such sessions could include the active participation of members of organizations which direct the party members to work in a party agency. This would enhance the responsibility of the primary organizations and would make it possible to eliminate a certain secrecy in the choice of members of the apparat, a secrecy which has still not been lifted.

Naturally, other steps as well, aimed at drastically upgrading the efficient activities of the party apparat, are both necessary and possible. Therefore, my suggestions and views should not be considered as being the ultimate truth but rather as an invitation to discuss right problems of intraparty life.

#### Excerpts From Letters

##### Z. Bakhteyev, CPSU member, Rostov-na-Donu:

Is it not time to change the procedure for awarding the honorific title of "party veteran?" Above all, this should apply to age. Fifty years! What was the basis for establishing this "half a century minimum?" Was it the age of the old party leaders of the years of stagnation? Let us note that if a person were to join the party at the age of

25 (which, you will agree, is not all that late), he could become a CPSU veteran only at the age of 75. At that age it becomes difficult actively to participate in party life.

In many areas of human activities a veteran is a person who has worked for 25 years. I believe that the party as well should adopt this age limit.

##### R. Salykin, reserve captain second rank, CPSU member since 1959, Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast:

In our aspiration to make party life more democratic, in my view it would be worth to review the question of representation of party organizations in the respective election committees. Membership in a city or rayon CPSU committee could be based on the following principle: one mandate per, shall we say, 100 party members. This means that if a party organization numbers 200 people, it would delegate to the raykom two of its representatives. Smaller organizations could join forces and appoint a common delegate.

Such representatives should be accountable not only to the raykom or gorkom but also to the primary party organization which has nominated them. If a member of an elected authority fails to implement the instructions of "his own" party organization (naturally, not to the detriment of the common interest), it should have the right to recall him and hold another election.

I believe that such a step would make it mandatory for the members of elected authorities to adopt a more responsible attitude toward their party assignments and would help the gorkom or raykom most fully to take into consideration and to reflect the views of all party members in the city or rayon.

##### B. Utkin, CPSU member since 1968, Kayyerkan, Krasnoyarsk Krai:

How to organically combine centralism with democracy in party life? In my view, among others, it would be necessary to include in the CPSU Statutes the stipulation that the minority has the right to express its separate opinion which must be made part of the minutes along with the view of the majority. Furthermore, if the majority of members of the subordinate organization fails to support the resolution of the superior one, obviously, it would be expedient to halt its enactment in order to coordinate viewpoints and agree on a joint resolution.

##### A. Mikhno, senior engineer, nonparty member, Zheleznovodsk:

I recently read in the press that in many countries the fact that a citizen is a member of one party or another is a strictly personal matter. Even asking about such an affiliation is considered as impolite as it would be, for example, to ask him what is his religion (or if he has any).

In my view, our surveys, in the spirit of the "good old time," begin by asking whether the citizen is a member of the CPSU. The need for such information in the case

of people who will work in the party would be entirely reasonable. But is it necessary for other citizens to indicate this? To the best of my knowledge, the most important thing in hiring someone in any position of a nonpolitical nature, would be his moral and professional rather than political qualities. It may occasionally even happen that preference will be given to a nonparty comrade who is a good specialist compared to an "average" person who is a party member. In short, I suggest that the item on party affiliation be deleted from all forms and personnel sheets other than those dealing with the party-political area.

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### Taming the Majority

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[Article by Nikolay Ivanovich Batalov, special correspondent of the newspaper TYUMENSKAYA PRAVDA, and Vladimir Petrovich Chernov, contributor to *KOMMUNIST*]

[Text] Georgiy Aleksandrovich willingly agreed that we meet at his home. "Let us just set the time," he said. We wanted to see his home after studying Bikreyev's three-volume case filed with the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee. In reading the documents we could not fail to note a formula which, always the same, made its way from document to document: "...As interim enterprise director, he fraudulently exchanged his apartment for an apartment of equal value but located in the center of Surgut. Before that, single female workers who inhabited that apartment were hastily resettled, and within 1 week the apartment was repaired at the expense of the enterprise." The cost of the repair was added, drafted after the initial reports had found their way into the "case," sealed and signed by the investigators. The documents noted that expenditures, which were in excess of 500 rubles, had not been repaid by Bikreyev.

Let us admit that this fact immediately set us against the petitioner. We were not alone. The three digit amount had influenced many other investigators. Who would doubt? Moving, repair at the expense of the enterprise, all this was a fact. Yet, not entirely. However, we are as yet to take a look at Georgiy Aleksandrovich's apartment. Let us begin with a brief description of that man, and the actions which made him quarrel with the administration of the enterprise and the collective, which drew the attention of the party authorities and led to investigations by supervisory authorities. Many people developed the view that he was a hardened complainer. For a few years he regularly submitted petitions, letters and appeals. One such letter was to *KOMMUNIST* as well: "I beg the editors to investigate the unhealthy relationship which has developed in the Surgut City Party Organization. I have been hounded ever since I joined the party, by managers of the subdivision of the USSR

Minenergo. Initially the gorkom bureau assumed a principled position. However, under the pressure of Minenergo personnel it changed it. As a result, I was expelled from the party and fired from my job...."

Bikreyev has been a party member for 5 years. Within that time he was expelled from the party on three occasions; he has two party reprimands. He has been relieved from his position and twice dismissed from his job. However you may view such things, this is quite a lot for a single person to bear. What explains such unusual arithmetic? What could have occurred with this person within such a short time? Or else, if it was not with him, with the party organization which accepts him in its ranks one day and sharply changes its opinion on the next?

In 1980 Bikreyev was invited to move from the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant to the position of chief engineer at the Tyumenenergoremont Production Repair Enterprise. That collective was only being formed. Its tasks were difficult. The production capacities of electric power plants in Tyumen Oblast had to be maintained in operating condition. The enterprise was headed by the firm and energetic manager E.Ye. Medvedev. The new enterprise was organized quickly. The figures included in the statistical reports, side-by-side with the Tyumenenergoremont PRP, described a very successful situation. The enterprise earned its first banners for victory in the socialist competition, becoming first of the city and then the oblast. Medvedev's name was heard from the rostra. He was listed among the better production organizers.

"All possible means were used to create this favorable situation," Bikreyev says. "The following also happened: a superior would go to Moscow and ask for material support to solve a problem. At first I would pay for the project out of my own pocket. Learning about it, he would think: 'What, you cannot find money? You are the chief engineer.' At one point, after paying for yet one more rationalization suggestion, I decided that enough was enough! This also marked the end of relations of trust and the beginning of disagreements."

The reasons for mutual discontent and, therefore, for conflicts between the director and the chief engineer of the enterprise were numerous. In the recent past G.A. Bikreyev, as shop chief of the nuclear power plant, had firmly observed the principle that any violation of the rules and standards may lead to catastrophe. He opposed violations of technical instructions and deadlines for current and capital repairs. However, his objections were ignored by the director and the collective. All that was left was to criticize and complain. The drama of alienation, which is quite widespread but, nonetheless, difficult to withstand by any conscientious working person, was repeated. Today Medvedev categorically claims the following:

"I made Bikreyev one of the chief engineers. However, he turned out to be incompetent, pedantically trying to implement instructions."

A.P. Demenshin, deputy general director of the Tyumenenergo Association in charge of cadres, expressed himself more diplomatically:

"Bikreyev has engineering knowledge but did not apply it to the fullest extent as chief engineer. He paid excessive attention to safety equipment. He dealt insufficiently with the organization of repairs...."

At this point we shall not begin to argue whether the various assessments were right. What matters is something else: neither Medvedev nor Demenshin are showing a normal amount of sympathy for someone who yielded to their entreaties, who came to Surgut, leaving behind a good job in his field. How to assess the fact that it was E.Ye. Medvedev who personally invited this "incompetent official, who pedantically tried to observe instructions" to assume the position of chief engineer? Was this an error? If an error was made in such a complex matter as the choice of leading cadres, one should correct one's own error delicately, with utmost tactfulness. One should not reject a person like an worthless object. However, that is precisely the way the director of the repair enterprise and the leadership of the Tyumenenergo Production Association acted. They unceremoniously asked Bikreyev to resign. The chief engineer became senior foreman.

However, this demotion did not make this obstinate person come to his senses, and nor did it cool down his zeal to criticize. Conversely, this skilled engineer, finding himself in the thick of production life and coming across a mass of all sorts of shortcomings and violations which the repair workers themselves had long learned to tolerate, could not remain silent. Once again letters started flying out of Tyumenenergoremont to the control authorities in Surgut. Based on the results of an investigation of the statements made by G.A. Bikreyev, strict reprimands were issued to many workers at the enterprise, starting with the director. However, Georgiy Aleksandrovich himself did not remain in that collective long. A pretext to dismiss him was found. The illegal order was not voided even after the superior authority intervened.

He then found employment at the enterprise for combined boiler and heating systems of the house building combine. There his caustic attitude and irreconcilability were even liked at first. "He proved to be a knowledgeable specialist and identified a number of bottlenecks in the production process," we read in the reference which was approved at a meeting of the party bureau. However, the trouble was that the number of such "bottlenecks" turned out to be excessive. The exigent and strict engineer soon began to irritate everyone. Another conflict was not late in coming. Since then, Bikreyev has been looking for work and being rejected. Here is the answer, for example, he received from V.P. Sokolov, chief of the rayon Tyumenenergo Power Industry Administration: "Your request was considered. However, due to the fact that our rayon power administration enterprises have more personnel than planned, any additional hiring of

personnel is forbidden, including workers." He was offered only the clearly unacceptable option of leaving Surgut. In this large industrial city where he lives now he could not be offered even the position of ordinary worker, although he is a highly skilled specialist who has worked for many years in a nuclear power plant where he was advancing in his career.

Such is a brief sketch of the tribulations of engineer Bikreyev. The fate of Bikreyev the party member was not any simpler. He was accepted in the party in January 1984, at a meeting of the party organization of the Tyumenenergoremont Production Enterprise. As we may see, at that time the chief engineer was still being trusted. It is true that this trust already included some doubt: the gorkom had received an anonymous letter in which the new party member was seriously accused of having abused his official position for personal advantages. An investigation was made. The facts were not confirmed but Bikreyev described in detail to the bureau members the financial and technological violations in the association. He admitted that although he had not personally participated in them, he had not opposed them and he had shut his eyes at many things, for all of this was being done apparently "for the good of the project," and for improving indicators. N.G. Anikin, the gorkom's first secretary, presented Bikreyev with his party card and promised to investigate the unhealthy situation at the enterprise.

However, because of the series of major problems the story involving party member Bikreyev was forgotten and the promise to investigate was not fulfilled. Let us further point out that this matter, considering the scale of Tyumen, where traditionally losses and outlays are not very closely investigated, seemed petty. However, that which the gorkom considered insignificant, was not merely a matter of principle to Georgiy Aleksandrovich. It was an official obligation and a party duty. He considered the silence of the gorkom as a position of noninterference, for which reason he sent a letter to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee.

Today neither the party organization of Tyumenenergoremont nor the Surgut City Party Committee can recall (or else claim not to recall) who initiated the idea of discussing at a party meeting G.A. Bikreyev's letter to the Party CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee. This "forgetfulness" is quite easy to explain. No one is willing to assume responsibility for the grossest possible violation of the procedure for considering appeals by the working people to superior party and state authorities. The only clearly confirmed fact is that V.A. Bereznev the former instructor and now deputy head of the general department of the Tyumen Oblast Party Committee went to Surgut and met with the author of the letter. He is having trouble remembering details.

"I talked with Bikreyev. He did send that letter. The facts had not been confirmed. However, we did not

investigate financial and economic affairs. We discussed Bikreyev's relations with the personnel of Tyumenenergoremont...."

Strange: If he "did not go into," what was the basis for concluding that the "facts had not been confirmed?" Naturally, G.A. Bikreyev has a better recollection of the facts. Here is what he says:

"I sent the letter in March. In May I met with Bereznev, instructor at the Tyumen Party Obkom. He urged me to write no more letters."

However, Bikreyev ignored his advice and again addressed himself to the Party Control Committee, reporting that the investigation had been superficial and that no specific conclusions had been reached. For this he had to pay. His appeal was judged slanderous at a party meeting with an unprecedented agenda, which was "Discussion of the Letter Sent by Comrade G.A. Bikreyev to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee." By majority vote its author was issued a strict reprimand recorded in his party card, for pitting himself against the party organization. Following is the explanation by A.M. Shmakov, the current shop party bureau secretary:

"In making this decision the participants in the meeting were guided not by the facts cited in the letter but by purely human considerations: who does he think he is, to criticize...."

Yes, the party members at Tyumenenergoremont were not interested in the essence of the problem. They did not ask themselves questions which would be natural in this case such as, for example, how is it that a letter addressed to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee fell into the hands of the very same personnel it criticized? Was it proper for such a letter to be discussed at a party meeting? Could such a discussion turn into a review of the personal case of the author of the letter? Finally, was it admissible to consider the personal opinion of a party member on a given problem as pitting himself against the party organization. Was this not suppression of criticism?

"The party meeting could not have discussed the letter of the party member addressed to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee," insists N.K. Molodkov, party commission chairman at the Surgut Gorkom. "This would indeed have been a serious breach. What was rather discussed was not the letter but the results of the investigation."

This assumption which, incidentally, does not change anything essentially, is refuted by secretary A.M. Shmakov, S.A. Bashkov, shop party bureau member, and many participants in the meeting. The minutes of the meeting also stipulate that the letter was discussed, and that the meeting began with a reading of the letter. The members of the party commission and the other personnel of the Surgut Party Gorkom managed not to notice the obvious violations which become clear even

with a simple study of the documents of the personal file of this party member. Immediately after the party meeting, the management of Tyumenenergoremont dismissed senior foreman G.A. Bikreyev for absenteeism. The management rejected the reason: his trip to the gorkom to object to the resolution of the primary party organization. The party organization at Tyumenenergoremont expelled G.A. Bikreyev from the party. The matter was returned for review not once and not twice—to the gorkom, the okruzhkom and the obkom. Another investigation was undertaken. Amazingly, no faults were found and new accusations were added to the old.

Whenever they addressed themselves to G.A. Bikreyev's personal case, one way or another, the party commission and the members of the Surgut Party Gorkom demanded of him to repent, in the nature of "I will no longer do such things." The fact that he had nothing to repent about was not taken into consideration. He expressed critical remarks concerning his economic and party managers, which is his right. He did not listen to their view concerning his behavior. Is this not the fault of the management itself? For it was the management which gave sufficient grounds for questioning the fairness of such assessments.

If we compare party with official references of September 1986 and February 1988, one would think that they had been written by different people.

"At work he proved to be a knowledgeable specialist.... He was a propagandist at the party instruction school. He maintained proper standards in teaching his classes.... Elected deputy chairman of the people's control group, within a short time he did a great deal of organizational work. He displayed a very responsible attitude toward assignments. He strictly observes labor discipline and enjoys a good reputation in the collective of the sector and leads a healthy way of life." These are excerpts from the reference approved by the party bureau and signed by the party organization secretary.

"He has an irresponsible attitude toward the implementation of his obligations.... He makes use of his entire engineering knowledge to find shortcomings, totally failing to involve himself personally in their elimination. His work at the enterprise is senseless. Hiding behind lofty statements, he is distorting the party's political course, engaging in subversive activities in the collective and setting as his basic objective to promote a division between the administration and the collective." This statement was approved at the party meeting 1 and a half years later.

For a long time we had not come across such statements. If we accept them on faith, unwittingly the question arises: How was it possible for this type of person to manage to abuse the patience of society for so long? Furthermore, to demand to be reaccepted in the CPSU! But then little is left of such statements once we try to unravel them. For example, the "senseless nature" of Bikreyev's work implies his letter to the USSR State

Mining Supervision Authority, which resulted in forbidding a number of work practices which constituted gross violations of safety rules. What is meant by "distorting the party course" is reading critical articles in periodicals and the fact that he took down a poster which called for working one shift for peace. Incidentally, this was not done. The bonus from the socialist competition simply went into the respective fund.

All investigations and resolutions start with the charge that he violated the procedure in trading apartments and abused his official position, manifested in the fact that during his leave he had worked in a departmental Pioneer Camp as a physical training instructor while his daughter was a unit leader. These facts had been checked by the gorkom as early as 1984, at the time when Georgiy Aleksandrovich was being accepted in the party. The gorkom bureau even postponed a consideration of his acceptance while the investigation of the anonymous denunciation was under way. Nothing prejudicial was found. Why then was it necessary once again to discuss refuted rumors? If the party organization was truly concerned with the morality of the party member, what was simpler: take the trouble to determine the extent of accuracy of defaming information. It could have been easily established that he had not derived any benefit from his work as a physical instructor and that the history with the apartment had been inflated to the point of total distortion of the actual situation.

We went to see Bikreyev. We can confirm that no excess at the expense of the government could be found. The walls were cleanly whitewashed and the floors were made of planks with cracks in them.

"You can imagine what this apartment was like, after it had been a hostel for temporary workers," its owner explained. "I was unable to make the repairs myself for lack of time. The same applies to my wife, who is a teacher. We had to resort to the help of the enterprise."

He explained this apologetically. Actually, what did he have to apologize about? Anyone leasing an apartment should keep it in proper condition. Naturally, he should also repair it at his own expense. This requirement, which is part of the leasing contract, applies equally to state enterprises which lease apartments to be used as hostels.

The party organization did not try to study the facts. The categorical view of its majority had already been formulated by director E.Ye. Medvedev and his subordinates. This was done skillfully: initially there were hints and brief replicas. Subsequently, after the grounds had been prepared, the accusations were made in the open. In confidential talks which took place in the offices of the Tyumenenergomont management, at production conferences and meetings, with or without a reason, there was constant talk of the incompetence of engineer Bikreyev, his inability to make independent decisions and the fact that he was neglecting the interests of the collective; he was also slandered in letters addressed to

superior authorities. That is why the meetings took place on the crest of a wave of joint, unanimous condemnation. The speakers were eager to take the floor. The mood was so firm that the question asked by party member A.M. Lopatkin "why are we discussing this without having studied the materials of the investigations?" was heard only by the person who was keeping the minutes of the meeting.

"In an effort to throw filth on me, on the director, and on others, he forgot that he himself behaved improperly," indignantly said B.D. Baranchuk, the chief bookkeeper of the enterprise.

"I am sorry that I recommended Bikreyev for party membership. With his letters he has taken a great deal of time from the people," said indignantly shop chief V.A. Khusainov.

Statements in an approximately similar vein were made by N.I. Pulekhin, worker organizer at the construction and installation section, A.V. Serebryakov, deputy director in charge of consumer problems and cadres, and N.V. Tochilo, deputy director in charge of capital construction.

Whatever one may say, the collective is against Bikreyev; so is the party organization which expelled him and many, very many workers at the enterprise. This collective finds the rebellious Bikreyev inconvenient: because of his indefatigable nature, bonuses are being lost and arrhythmia disrupts a well-ordered life. We ask the question: He is your fellow-party member, albeit not now, and are you not concerned with his fate? This confused our interlocutors who showed a poor understanding of the meaning of the words "fellow-party member." It was only an imperceptible crack that could be noticed in this condemning unity. Nonparty workers who were present at the meeting stood up in defense of Bikreyev: electric fitter N.M. Ivanov, and boiler room operator F.R. Gilmiyarova. This is quite a significant fact! Naturally, however, this timid intervention did not change anything.

"Overwhelming majority." ...We say this without particularly thinking of its meaning. Even without this, a majority is a majority. If it is overwhelming, are we always capable of determining who precisely it is "overwhelming?" Not so long ago such majority easily influenced the lives of people who were not agreeing with the universally accepted limits in terms of their views, evaluations and outlook. This unanimity "suppressed" with its mass that which today we are having difficulty to revive: independent thinking and firmness of political and moral positions.

Today, as in many other areas, a process of which until recently one would not allow himself to discuss is taking place in the Surgut City Party Organization: people are voluntarily dropping out of the CPSU. They are surrendering their party cards for a variety of reasons. Frequently, unlike Bikreyev, these former communists had an impeccable past and successful lives. Here is one of

the statements considered by the party gorkom: Sergey Z., a worker with long party membership, holder of the medal "For Valorous Labor," writes that he was accepted by the party "as member of the worker stratum in order to maintain the necessary ratio between employees and the working class." He never actively participated in the work of his party organization and never spoke at meetings. After the 19th All-Union Party Conference he painfully realized his uselessness to the party. His request was accepted.

The situation at Tyumenenergoremont as well cannot be described as good: last year 15 requests for leaving the party were submitted to the party organization and granted. Since the beginning of this year another eight people have decided to give up their obligations as party members. They explained this action, in particular, with the fact that the enterprise managers have not eliminated the disparity between words and actions and are unwilling to accept criticism. Bikreyev's case and his long struggle alone, we believe, did not play the least important role in this decision.

No, we do not intend in the least to depict Georgiy Aleksandrovich as an impeccable person in everything. He is made of contradictions. He is too categorical and intolerant. He should be advised to display even a little bit of practical wisdom. With less maximalism a great deal would be settled. We understand, however, that this opposition to his surroundings and the people around him, which has lasted many years, could not fail to have consequences. Hardly anyone would be able to retain his composure and remain objective in such a situation. People at the party gorkom described indignantly the way Bikreyev pulled his party card from the hands of A.I. Yubin, the second secretary, while the bureau was considering his case. On that subject even a report was drawn up, signed by witnesses who were present at the bureau meeting. What did actually happen? Georgiy Aleksandrovich was asked to surrender his party card even before the decision had been reached. He willingly presented the card to the first secretary who demonstratively tore the cover of the red booklet and gave the contents to the second secretary, returning the cover to Bikreyev. The latter, however, suddenly tore the card from the hand of the second secretary.

"Did I act improperly? I may have," says Bikreyev now. "But was it proper to decide my fate, whether to expel or keep me in the party, by taking me out of the room?"

Subsequently, the bureau of the Khanty-Mansi Party Okruzhkom voided the decision of the bureau of the Surgut Gorkom on the expulsion of Bikreyev, pointing out the incomplete investigation of all the circumstances related to this matter. This report, dated last March, is the latest document in the "file." Was the conflict resolved successfully? Alas, this is not the end, for Bikreyev was punished not only along party lines but administratively as well. Once again he was dismissed for absenteeism, after a trip to the dental polyclinic. F.Kh. Ibragimov, people's judge and member of the

gorkom party commission, drew up the following resolution: "In my view, Bikreyev's absence from work because of a toothache is a case of absenteeism but should not constitute grounds for his dismissal as per Article 33.4 of the RSFSR Labor Code." Why this strange specification: "In my view?" The situation should have been considered from the point of view of the law.

The fact that he was fired twice for the same reason made Bikreyev's further employment extremely difficult. His labor record became a kind of hunting license. After a look at the entries, a personnel department chief would find a pretext to refuse a job to the "petitioner." Meanwhile, the managers to whom he addressed himself, demanded of Bikreyev restraint and calm and, at the end of the meeting, would wipe the sweat off their faces and reach for the decanter: Look at him, how intractable he is. Then came the rumor: "Look at him, how long he has been without a job. Four months after the first dismissal and 1 year after the second."

Tomorrow this man will once again remain alone with his trouble. The day after tomorrow as well. He will be unable to find a job. In personnel departments he is received like a hated person to be rebuffed.

Not so long ago, events suddenly took a turn. The resolution of the bureau of the Khanty-Mansi Party Okruzhkom on readmitting G.A. Bikreyev in the party and annulling the resolution of the bureau of the Surgut CPSU Gorkom was submitted for discussion at the party organization meeting. Once again the wheels started turning. The majority opposed the okruzhkom resolution.

"As you can see, the party members did not agree with the Khanty-Mansi resolution," we were told by N.G. Anikin, first secretary of the Surgut Party Gorkom, clearly hinting that "our own resolution was the right one."

This is one more difficulty in dealing with "majorities:" they find it very difficult to admit to being wrong. The unnaturalness of such an outcome becomes even more obvious today, when tolerating someone else's by no means alien thinking becomes the standard, thus opening the possibility of a permanent dialogue and cooperation with anyone who cares for perestroyka. However, to this day some party organizations tend to reject any independent view which may be different from the platform adopted by the majority. We see revealed here the old roots of our bad past aspiration to "bring to his senses" the recalcitrant person, to make him repent and, should he persist, to boycott him, to expel him from the ranks. This, however, hits the target: the reason for unpleasantness and concerns has been suppressed, and peace and order have been restored. Is this the case? We know that if today a wrong action taken against one person has been tolerated, tomorrow it will be easy to do the same to someone else, to others. It is thus that the diktat of sluggishness is established for the



reason that, by expelling dissidence for the sake of one's own tranquillity, the "majority" separates itself from the pressing problems knocking at its door.

We deliberately chose as the subject of these notes an "inconvenient" character. Yes, Bikreyev is difficult to get along with, caustic, intractable and demanding. Here is a new fact which poorly fits the ordinary reason: he was reaccepted in the party after the gorkom's decision was annulled, and yet he appealed. He appealed because he was readmitted with a reprimand and he believes that he does not deserve the reprimand. Judging by all available information he is right, but should he be that petty, the authorities ask. He should be happy that it was settled but there he goes again, asking for another investigation. Could it be that even those who supported him were short of generosity of spirit? In any case, those who persecute him lack not only generosity of spirit but also respect for the law. Last spring the city prosecutor appealed the order of Bikreyev's dismissal, for it had been issued in violation of the law. Nonetheless, someone saw to it that the oblast prosecutor's office annulled the decision of the city prosecutor. The reason? No reason. It was annulled, and that was all.

Dislike of those who fail to get along is consistent with bureaucratic logic. Have people still not understood that life itself is no longer consistent with such logic? Have the people learned nothing from the experience of the electoral campaign during which the words "party apparatus" sounded like a curse? While thousands of people were already resigning from the party, here comes one who grabbed his party card from the table and held it close to his body. This was classified as nonparty behavior....

Although without a job, Bikreyev is not idle. He has become an activist with the Surgut "Greens." He participated in the people's expert council on the construction project which had been initiated in the city and which was part of the "project of the century"—the Tyumen Petroleum and Gas Chemical Complex, which is being opposed by the public throughout the country. The city soviet of people's deputies agreed with the conclusion of the public expert evaluation, considering the substantiation for the initiated construction inadequate. The "Greens" judge Bikreyev by his actions; they like his corrosive attitude. Here he feels at home.

Will those who now consider themselves part of the majority not find themselves in the minority?

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## PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND PRACTICE

### Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Priorities and Development Alternatives

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[Text] The recent clashes among ethnic groups in Fergana, Novyy Uzen and Isfarinskiy Rayon in Tajikistan, which took human lives, once again drew the attention of the public to the situation in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. To most of us these events were unexpected. Not to the specialists, however, who had studied the problems of the area. They had long noted the fast growth of national tension and predicted the possibility of such events. The sober and objective analysis of the situation which developed in Central Asia and Kazakhstan indicated that in that area the difficulties which are characteristic of the present stage of perestroyka and the worsened relations among nationalities had reached unparalleled gravity.

This area, extremely rich in natural resources, with a 50-million population, turned out to be one of the most backward in the country in virtually everything. The main reasons for this should be sought, above all, in the unfinished nature of the three most important sociohistorical processes: industrialization, urbanization and the demographic revolution. The developing situation is truly critical. In the past this lag in regional socioeconomic development had been compensated at the expense of other republics. However, as the scientists have estimated, if by the end of the century the gap between them could at least become stabilized, the national income in Central Asia would have to increase at the unparalleled annual rate of 13 percent. If labor productivity were to increase at the rate of the national average, the number of people unemployed in public production and totally unemployed, would reach one-third of the local active population.

Today state and party authorities, collectives of scientific research institutes and specialists in a great variety of sectors are seeking a solution to this situation. Programs, concepts and alternate suggestions are being formulated. However wise they may be, now, when the economy must face first of all the individual, such plans can be implemented only with the support and extensive participation of the people. That is why it is so important for the public to be aware of them. It was precisely to this effect that last May *KOMMUNIST* and the republic party publications *KAZAKHSTAN KOMMUNISI*, *KOMMUNIST KIRGIZSTANA*, *KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA*, *KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA* and *TURKMENISTAN KOMMUNISTI* held a roundtable in Tashkent on topical problems of the region's socioeconomic development.

The most pressing problems in the areas of economics, social affairs, demography, labor resources, ecology and relations among nationalities were discussed. The roundtable meetings were attended by scientists, workers in industry and agriculture, representatives of planning and economic authorities and party, state and public organizations, and journalists from the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan and Moscow. Following is the abridged report on the meetings, prepared for publication by KOMMUNIST special correspondents A. Vasilyev and M. Krans.

**R. Nishanov**, first secretary, Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee (presently chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities):

We are meeting during a very important and, one could say, crucial time in the life of the Soviet people. Today perestroyka means not only politics, plans and wishes. It is the reality of our changing society. The party is intensively developing a new regional policy, which is a legitimate stage in the intensification of the economic and political reform. For that reason we expect of the roundtable participants an objective and principled assessment of the present situation and the prospects for the socioeconomic development of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

This area is the all-Union base for the production of a number of industrial commodities, agricultural machinery and textile industry equipment, and the extraction of natural gas and nonferrous and rare metals. It is a developed agrarian area. It accounts for nearly one-half of the irrigated land in the country; it provides nine-tenths of the cotton staple and karakul and more than 40 percent of the country's rice. It is a major supplier of wheat, rice, vegetables, fruits and grapes.

Nonetheless, substantial disproportions and even deformations may be found in the development of the productive forces of the republics. Major errors were made, for example, in the establishment and location of the various economic sectors in Uzbekistan. Priority was given to industry related to the extraction and primary processing of natural raw materials and agricultural commodities. No proper attention was paid to establishing science- and labor-intensive sectors oriented toward the production of finished goods with, a full technological processing cycle. We are processing no more than 8-10 percent of the cotton, while the remaining links in this technological chain are outside the republic. Therefore, the main economic sector virtually does not participate in generating national income. We have no specialized production facilities for the manufacturing of items needed in daily life.

A difficult situation has developed in the agrarian sector. Labor outlays and production costs have increased significantly. Yields of many farm crops and livestock productivity remain low. Cotton monoculture was excessively emphasized. It literally dominated agriculture. All of this reduced the possibility of increasing the production of

vegetables, fruits and berries. The result of this policy is that we have the lowest level of consumption of foodstuffs in the country. For the sake of planting cotton the kolkhoz members and sovkhov workers lost one-half of their private plots.

In short, we have more than enough problems. Many of them must be solved jointly, by joining efforts within the single national economic complex. Priority is currently given to problems of intensifying reciprocal cooperation among republics in the region and improving the forms of integration in economic and internal national relations. I believe that we must think of ways leading to the accelerated development of machine building sectors and, on this basis, make radical changes in the structure of industrial output. We must show particular concern for sectors which determine a qualitatively new standard in production organization: radio engineering, instrument making, electronics and electrical engineering.

We also need a substantiated concept for developing and improving the management of the fuel and energy complex, finding additional energy sources and organizing a unified gas extraction and distribution system.

Let me especially point out that, as in the past, priority is being given to the agroindustrial complex. In this area we must scientifically substantiate the parameters of specialization in cotton growing. We must determine the actual need for cotton staple and the possibility of replacing it with artificial raw materials.

Our roundtable will discuss problems of regional cost accounting. Let me emphasize that we consider as an unacceptable display of autarchy a number of suggested models, which we view as negating the historically developed community. Isolating the markets of the individual republics would slow down production and narrow the possibility of economic maneuvering by enterprises. We cannot tolerate parochialism and must approach such matters from national viewpoints.

Today we need the efforts of all of our peoples in solving economic and social problems and improving the material situation of the people. We must increase the variety of consumer goods and services. We must build more housing, schools and hospitals. Environmental protection must become a subject of particular concern and attention. Suffice it to mention the Aral, which is our common ache, our common difficulty....

Naturally, the implementation of all of these tasks will increase demands concerning the professional standards of cadres and the efficient deployment of manpower. The entire system of general education and vocational training of young people must be qualitatively renovated. Steps are being taken to solve a vital problem, such as providing jobs to the active segment of the population. Currently employment does not exceed 77 percent in Uzbekistan. This is one of the lowest indicators in the country. The solution rests in the creation of new jobs, increasing the shift coefficient, introducing flexible work schedules with partial workdays, and developing individual labor activity and the cooperative movement.

The problems of the further acceleration of the socio-economic development of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan demand a profound scientific analysis and substantiated recommendations.

#### Autonomy and Multiple Options

**O. Shkaratan**, doctor of historical sciences, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography:

Usually, both scientific and journalistic publications have noted the uniqueness and brilliant results achieved in the course of the development of our national republics. Our experience is described as profoundly Leninist and truly socialist. Actually, this is by no means the case. It was precisely on the eve of the founding of the USSR that Lenin was deprived of the opportunity actively to influence the process of shaping national policy. For decades this policy was defined by Stalin. The bolshevik cadres in the republics were destroyed. People like Yusupov and Rashidov replaced people like Ikramov. How could the Leninist line be followed under such circumstances?

I do not deny that certain successes were achieved, based on the principle of "regardless of...." However, we, scientists and ideologues, must reinterpret the measure of socialist changes. Today we must consider the situation also in the context of global experience. It is a fact that some former colonies are today developing faster than Central Asia.

Unfortunately, science is unprepared to answer the question of how to provide within a relatively short time tangible results for the peoples of this huge and rich area on the basis of restructuring the economy and the reorientation of scientific and technical and socio-economic policy. Usually, economists ignored national characteristics. They considered Central Asia and Kazakhstan as a combination of natural factors, infrastructure and manpower. Ethnographers dealt with the way of life, customs and traditions. Meanwhile, abroad an entire scientific trend developed, which studied ways of optimizing national economic development. It is time for us as well to concentrate on such studies. For the time being, this gap must be somehow filled through discussions and "brainstorming."

Nonetheless, it would be dangerous to concentrate on only one of the possible development models. We must try various options. Naturally, in this case we should take into consideration existing socioeconomic and cultural-ethnic prerequisites. I would single out among them the fact that it is a question of peoples which are somehow on the border between a traditional and an urban-oriented industrial culture.

We must also take into consideration the limited nature of resources in the USSR. The aspiration of a number of republics to develop a cost accounting-based economy (or, more accurately, independent economic management), which is justified, makes them rely essentially on

their own strength. To speak in such cases of beginning by equalizing the starting opportunities seems a waste of time. All it could bring about would be to hinder the development of growth, which would lower the overall dynamism of the progress of the Union, which obeys what I consider a universal law of uneven development. Redistribution relations, the paternalism of the center and the aspiration to standardize economic growth can only cause harm and hinder achieving a true competitiveness on the basis of an internal resource potential. I believe that we should bear in mind all of these features when we discuss the various options for regional progress.

#### Facts Without Comment

Whereas in 1960 the national income per employed person in Central Asia was 83 percent of the Union level, by 1979 this indicator had dropped to 76 percent; today it is 62 percent. Currently the per capita national income here is about 50 percent of the Union average.

**U. Baymuratov**, corresponding member, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Council for the Study of Production Forces:

Before undertaking to formulate a strategy for the future development of the area, we must objectively determine the situation in which we find ourselves. We must provide a realistic assessment of the level of production forces in our republics. Above all, we must establish the rights which we have or, more accurately, will have in the course of the perestroyka of the political and economic mechanism.

I am quite impressed by the idea of converting to self-management and self-financing. However, it is my deeply held conviction that this cannot be achieved without achieving an equality of economic conditions for economic management in the individual republics, without formulating the principles governing relations between them and the center and without establishing criteria for forming the Union and republic budgets. Let us consider the right to handle natural resources. If payment for the land and water becomes a republic budget revenue item, payments for mineral and raw material resources would go entirely into the Union budget. In my view, this is a clear contradiction. According to economic logic, payments for all types of natural resources must be distributed among the budgets on the different levels, regardless of the area of economic management.

The prevalent point of view among us is that state ownership is indivisible. I personally cannot agree with such a conclusion. I believe that it could exist in a variety of forms, including ownership by the local soviet authorities and the Supreme Soviet of a Union republic. I do not see any theoretical or practical obstacles to this.

The trend toward strengthening autonomy should make its way in the course of planning and filling state orders

in the basic sectors. What does this actually mean? Above all, the republics must be given priority rights to part of the output and total control over above-plan output. They should obtain higher profits in commissioning projects of Union significance. In that case the placement of state orders would be based not on directives but on economic methods. Organizing on a contractual basis procurements of the most important types of agricultural commodities and consumer goods to the Union stocks would also be in the interest of the territories. This would not make it mandatory for the republics but would interest them in increasing their contribution to the country's national economic complex.

The redistribution of management functions in the areas of economics and social affairs between the center and the territorial organizations and the conversion to self-financing also demand the optimizing of the Union budget. Currently, in terms of income, it exceeds by 24 percent the combined budgets of Union republics. In my view, its size should be directly related to the tasks assigned to the center. For example, in the past one of the most important items of the Union budget was expenditures for social needs. The maximal concentration in the management of the social area in the hands of the republic authorities and local soviets considerably lowers the need for centralized financing.

The same could be said of environmental protection and related outlays and the compensation for price differentials of republic consumption of meat, dairy products, sugar and canned fruits and vegetables. The area of centralized budget investments is being substantially narrowed also with the conversion of enterprises to self-financing.

We must abandon the existing approach according to which budgetary expenditures and revenue are being balanced on the maximally highest possible level. This is one of the stereotypes which conflicts with the new economic thinking.

**D. Bayramov**, doctor of economic sciences, director of the Turkmen SSR Gosplan Scientific Research Economics Institute:

It is an indisputable fact that under the Soviet system the state has made a tremendous contribution to the development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. However, at some point, starting with the 1970s, the aid which was being given stopped being efficient. Why? My answer would be the following: because of the lack of normal economic relations between the republics and the center.

Turkmenia is proud of the fact that currently it is producing 88 billion cubic meters of natural gas. However, it uses only 10 percent of this amount. The republic accounts for more than 14 percent of the Union's cotton production; however, 95 to 97 percent of it is being shipped out to other parts of the country for further processing.

It is thus that our "pride" turns into our poverty. One of the main reasons is the diktat of Union departments. They invest the lion's share of the funds earned through the extraction of our natural resources in the production area, leaving pitiful crumbs for the solution of the social problems of the local population. We are no longer willing to tolerate such a situation, which leads to the degradation of the republic. The system of raw-material specialization could be retained in order to ensure the normal functioning of the Union industry but only under qualitatively different economic conditions.

**A. Koshanov**, USSR Kazakh Academy of Sciences member and director of the USSR Kazakh Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

The irresponsible activities of Union departments are threatening the basic living conditions of the population in many areas in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The question is whether the price they are paying for the development of our territories is worth it. What kind of superior interests could there be when entire areas must sacrifice their present and their future? A conversion to republic self-management requires the elimination of the existing stereotype in economic decision-making and a major change in the concept of socioeconomic development, and substantiating and projecting the amount of available natural resources for use by future generations.

As a rule, in discussing long-term developments of processing industries in the raw material areas, obligations related to the interregional division of labor, the specialization of enterprises in the European part of the country and the need to supply them with raw materials are cited; they tell us of the impossibility of disrupting existing economic relations, for this would make capacities idle and cause unemployment. Such considerations are serious and understandable. However, we must also bear in mind that the all-Union and regional production processes and their interconnection and mutually complementary nature are not something static. The entire complex is being subjected to an intensive quality improvement on all levels. Particularly typical of it is the enhanced efficiency of regional subsystems. Without it we cannot have economic progress either in the republic or in the country at large.

**Ye. Khodzhayev**, editor-in-chief of the journal *TURKMENISTAN KOMMUNISTI*:

As in the past, the question of the actual economic inequality among the peoples of the USSR remains unsolved, although for many long years we have been celebrating the definitive solution of this problem. A view from the positions of perestroika revealed a different picture: it turns out that we are still far from having reached economic equality. Of late statements have been made to the effect that other areas are "feeding" the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, annually subsidizing them with up to 5 billion rubles. Is this the case?

Naturally, the economic, intellectual and scientific and technical potential in our republics is lower. However, this has its objective reasons. In Turkmenia, for example, the processing industry is poorly developed. This means that every year we lose hundreds of millions or rubles which we could earn by producing finished goods. Furthermore, more than 40 percent of industrial goods are produced by enterprises under Union administration, which contribute more than 600 million rubles to the Union budget. Meanwhile, all that the Turkmen budget receives from this is slightly more than 400 million rubles in subsidies! This is total absurdity. However, such is today's reality, as created by the command-administrative system.

**A. Akbarov**, director of the Armatures Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze, Dushanbe:

In my view, all of our problems now are related to the self-management of the republics, which should be real and not merely on paper. The fact that self-management could become also a purely formal action I judge from the experience of our plant. This is the 3rd consecutive year that we are allegedly working under conditions of self-financing and self-support. I say "allegedly," for with a strictly centralized management all that we have gained is playing at autonomy.

I fear that the same type of damaging model will be considered as a base in its republic variant. Why do I have this doubt? Remember what occurred with the Law on the State Enterprise? It may possibly work on the level of ministries but in our own plant we do not feel its effect. It was emasculated by departmental instructions and resolutions and suppressed by setting ceilings and by state orders. Therefore, the question should be formulated strictly: either the republics alone will determine their own economic policy and have guaranteed rights to handle their own finances and resources and determine with whom to trade, or else once again nothing will happen and everything will go back to where it was.

#### Facts Without Comment

In 1989 the Union budget subsidized the state budget of the Uzbek SSR to the amount of 1,960,997,000 rubles; the state budget of the Kazakh SSR, 2,698,267,000 rubles; the state budget of the Kirghiz SSR, 510,857,000 rubles; the state budget of the Tajik SSR, 321,381,000 rubles; and the state budget of the Turkmen SSR, 403,328,000 rubles, to finance measures stipulated by the state plan for the economic and social development of the USSR in 1989.

(From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Law on the State Budget of the USSR for 1989)

**K. Kagalovskiy**, candidate of economic sciences, head of department at the Central Interdepartmental Institute of Upgrading the Skill of Management Personnel and Construction Specialists:

Indeed, the administrative-command system created a new type of mutually unprofitable interregional relations. Each region believes that it is feeding another. Once such a view has been developed, all that remains is to substantiate it. I believe that without market prices and without a market balance it would be hardly possible seriously to compute the interregional balance.

We are now discussing subsidies. Given the existing structure and the present economic mechanism, such subsidies are merely a waste of money. We could increase them even 10 or 15 fold and still have the same inadequate results. On the other hand, subsidies are nonetheless necessary, for in many areas here a critical situation has developed and the region must be helped. The following question arises: How to do it? Unfortunately, we make no use whatsoever of global experience which includes a very interesting form: subvention, i.e., the allocation of financial resources for a specific purpose. Such funds should be provided but on the basis of specific programs: for health care, education, development of science-intensive technologies, etc. In my view, this would be the only sensible use of budget allocations.

**S. Cheshko**, candidate of historical sciences, scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography:

I fully agree with this. Nonetheless, I believe that it would be necessary to establish a certain hierarchy of objectives. This becomes even more necessary today, when we still lack an overall concept for regional development and, therefore, when the path which it will follow has not been traced. At this point let me immediately stipulate the following: it is hardly worth it to develop a single model, for the republics are quite different from each other in terms of natural conditions and historical-cultural and socioeconomic features.

Secondly, I have great reservations concerning the idea of accelerated industrialization of Central Asia. So far no proof has been proffered that this would yield unquestionable positive results and as to the negative consequences, albeit simply in terms of worsening the ecology, we are bound to have it. Let us not forget that industrialization does not mean simply the creation of new production capacities but a certain stage of social development, and that it is possible only with the availability of the necessary conditions. In all countries industrialization took place on the basis of the growth of labor productivity in agriculture. Therefore, I believe that initially the full attention should be concentrated on improving the agrarian sector. The most efficient means to accomplish this would be to make a real owner of the peasant. It is only then that we could undertake industrialization.

**A. Troshin**, doctor of economic sciences, USSR Gosplan deputy chairman:

I especially support Comrade Cheshko's idea of the multiplicity of options. It is precisely this type of approach that must be the foundation for the choice of a

strategy for the socioeconomic development of any part of the country. In this case I have in mind the Union republics of Central Asia and the Kazakh SSR. We must select the variant which would ensure high growth rates in the most important indicators of economic and social development and improvements in the structure of industry and agriculture in these republics. In order to implement this task, the programs should stipulate increases in the share of sectors producing finished goods. A substantial emphasis must also be put on increasing the role of the processing sectors in the agroindustrial complex, improving the efficiency of land utilization, creating conditions for normal crop rotation, reducing the share of land in cotton and, at the same time, increasing the production of cotton through intensive factors, such as increased and higher yields.

One of the most pressing problems of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, something which is today obvious to all, is increasing the employment of the active population. In our view, the main trend to be followed in solving it is to develop the machine building sectors and to organize a developed system of medium- and small-sized production facilities and branches which would make it possible to involve in industrial work the substantial reserves of young people of the native nationalities, who are concentrated essentially in the small and medium-sized cities and the rural areas in the republics, and the extensive use of traditional labor skills of the population for fine manual yet technically simple jobs.

Naturally, we must also build in the area modern science-intensive production facilities which require highly skilled cadres. The task is to provide conditions for their successful work: increasing the capacities of the construction industry and developing production and social infrastructures.

Steps are currently being contemplated to strengthen the financial base of the republics and to broaden their rights in planning and using their budgets on the basis of regulatory-economic and legal control over the budgeting process and a clear demarcation between republic and Union budget revenue and expenditures, and assigning as budget revenue above all the profitable sources which directly depend on the efficiency of the managerial activities of republic authorities and the work of their subordinate economic units. It is thus that the economic and, above all, social development and living standard of the people will depend above all on the efficiency of the work of all enterprises within a given territory. At the same time, naturally, we do not exclude the solution of a number of specific problems of social and economic development based on Union budget financing.

#### **In Search of a Strategy and Tactics**

**V. Perevedentsev**, candidate of economic sciences, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Workers Movement:

I have spent my entire life studying the problems of Central Asia and became convinced a long time ago that the main reason for the extremely difficult situation which has developed in that area is the result of a wrong strategy of regional development. Its essence was as follows: agriculture is the main thing. It is not mandatory for all republics to have a strong industry, let us have at least one strictly agricultural area. This viewpoint could be heard repeatedly from the highest rostra and it was heard here as well.

I am deeply convinced that the only possible way which the region should follow is that of accelerated industrialization and urbanization. The next question is how to achieve this? Consider our basic documents and directives on the 5-year plans: everywhere they are discussing the creation of huge complexes. As a rule, this leads to huge expenditures running into the billions, a worsened ecological situation and increased social tension. For example, the money which was invested in the South-Tajik Territorial-Production Complex could have provided jobs not for 15,000 people but for hundreds of thousands.

Instead of development, what we obtained was stagnation and, furthermore, regress. Following are data of the latest census in Tajikistan: in the past 10 years the share of the urban population dropped from 35 to 33 percent. I believe that this could have been avoided had we initially relied not on industrial giants but on medium and small enterprises.

**G. Mirskiy**, doctor of historical sciences, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations:

Unlike the speaker who preceded me, I am a specialist in the developing countries but I hope that you may find interesting the view of an "outsider."

Let me mention first of all the fact that for some time now we have noticed in the third world countries a crisis in the concept of "catching up development," the basic features of which are industrialization and urbanization. When those countries obtained their independence they naturally felt an unparalleled upsurge of strength and national self-awareness. On the other hand, there was a certain inferiority complex relative to the former mother countries which, naturally, were much richer. Hence the twin task: without losing one's originality and "national features" to try to catch up with those who had advanced far ahead in technical progress.

As a whole, this model failed as has now become universally acknowledged. Why? The concept of "catching up development" was viewed excessively simply and primitively. Why are the Western countries stronger and richer? Because they have industry, plants and factories. They produce modern equipment and good quality goods. Therefore, a course of industrialization was charted. Metallurgical and machine building combines, dams and electric power plants became the symbols of the new world toward which one should aspire. Gamal

Nasser proclaimed that the great Egypt will be built on iron and steel. Similar plans were drafted everywhere. It was believed that those who opposed the construction of plants and factories and the migration of the majority of the population to the cities were supporters of the preservation of backwardness and, in the final account, accomplices of neocolonialism.

As we know, modern industry is capital-intensive but not labor intensive, for which reason the problem of employment could not be solved. This was the first but not the only failure. Practical experience indicated that planning was too hasty and that the actual raw material reserves were not taken into consideration. In a number of cases prestigious but totally unnecessary projects were built and the possibilities of the market were not assessed. Since the private entrepreneur preferred not to invest his capital in such projects, the entire financing was assumed by the state sector. In the final account, this led to a most severe crisis.

I am unwilling to draw straight analogies but, in my view, the lessons of this sad experience should be drawn by us in formulating an economic strategy for Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

**Zh. Zayonchkovskaya**, candidate of geographic sciences, head of laboratory at the USSR State Committee for Labor and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Socioeconomic Population Problems:

It seems to me that it is entirely wrong in discussing Central Asia to pit industrial against agrarian ways of development. Industry is needed above all in order to raise agriculture to the proper level. This involves the production of fertilizers and plant protection chemicals, small loading and unloading facilities, containers, processing technological complexes and many others, items which today are either totally not being produced or else are being produced in very small quantities.

Furthermore, we must develop production facilities oriented toward services. Without them how can we seriously speak of a fast increase in employment in the social area? Is it strictly a case of the number of workers? Furthermore, an area with such a huge population as Central Asia should be able itself to produce a number of goods in mass demand. Therefore, without industrialization we cannot even think of enhancing the living standard of the people. Those truths must be repeated until any doubt on this account has been lifted.

**A. Samadov**, candidate of economic sciences, deputy chairman Tajik SSR Gosplan:

Nonetheless, what kind of industry should we develop? Should we limit ourselves to consumer goods, the agro-industrial complex and the social area? It is not such sectors that make a revolution. Take the example of South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore: these countries had manpower surpluses and low manpower skills. Why is it that all of a sudden they have experienced an industrial boom? Because they relied mainly on

labor intensive yet progressive technologies. The developed capitalist countries began to build enterprises in them, which do not require extremely complex labor. Their labor is highly detailed and virtually anyone could master one or several different operations.

Take our own clothing company "50 Let SSSR." It was recently equipped with the latest West German machines. Now our workers are already producing with them excellent suits and mastering a technology which is totally new to them. One German specialist who is helping them in this said: "I would hire at least 40 percent of your workers to work in my own factory with pleasure." We must not proceed from the fact that initially one must train the person and only then equip him with advanced technology. This is a simultaneous act: combining manpower with means of production. In order for this to take place we must train the workers and, at the same time, promote new technology.

The fact that our country today is not ready to "assign" technology-intensive production facilities to Central Asian Kazakhstan is a different matter, for not all that many of them exist even in industrially more developed republics. What are we being offered? Let us create in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan a new all-Union textile center. Excellent. But then we must proceed from the fact that both republics are reducing their cotton production. Therefore, in order for the enterprises not to idle we should abolish the third shift of similar factories in Russia or else, let us say, close down their morally obsolete shops which cannot be technically reconstructed.

I believe that the final choice of priorities must be made by the republics themselves. We could act as an alternate customer to Union departments. If we are interested in locating on our own territory a given production facility, why not establish for it the most favorable situation? For example, let us free departments from paying for manpower and reduce for a few years withholdings from profits to our own budget. In other words, our problems must be solved not with directives from the top but by Central Asia itself, taking local interests into consideration.

**G. Muradov**, candidate of economic sciences, director of the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

I firmly believe one thing: taking into consideration the democratic situation in the area and its natural potential, all efforts must be concentrated on the creation of a powerful industrial base giving priority to the development of science-intensive and labor-intensive production facilities. Particular attention should be paid to the training of cadres for the new sectors. Naturally, nor should we forget agriculture. While retaining the specialization of the area within the national economic complex, more funds should be invested in growing food products and ensuring their full processing.

**U. Baymurov.** I am very happy to find someone who thinks as I do. I fully agree that the future of this region is closely related to the creation of science-intensive production facilities. Yes, we lack experience in this area but such experience will never come if we keep passively waiting for the good uncle from the center to build such enterprises for us. The fact that we must thoroughly consider and compute and only then draft a program for the creation of precisely the type of plant which, without competing, would assume a leading position in the country, is a different matter. In other words, we should try to avoid duplication.

**A. Akbarov.** I have repeatedly heard the view that developing modern production facilities in Central Asia is a groundless case of ostentation. It is claimed that there are no cadres which could be employed at such enterprises. The impression develops that we are populated by second-rate people if such a concept could be applied to individuals. The people of Central Asia are talented. There is an intellectual gap which is explained by no means in terms of the lack of capability. The reason here is much simpler: the linguistic barrier, for all technical specifications and most textbooks are published in the Russian language only. As a rule, people coming from the countryside poorly speak and understand Russian. I believe, therefore, that the problem can be solved only by training our own national cadres.

**M. Mirkasymov,** first secretary of the Tashkent Obkom, Uzbek Communist Party:

Until recently I worked in Khorezma. That area is almost entirely agrarian and has virtually no industry. Does this mean that Khorezma does not have the necessary conditions for the development of science-intensive industry? Let us recall perhaps simply the great scientists it gave to the world. I have realized from personal experience that our people have a tremendous potential. The task is to find a way to make use of it.

**A. Reteyum,** doctor of geographic sciences, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources:

We are discussing the type of enterprises which should be located in the area and which should not. What do the people want? No one seems to know this, for there are no scientific data concerning views and preferences. I am a native of Tajikistan and I am well familiar with its people. It is my view that above all they want others to stop ordering and dictating to them their will. Therefore, before formulating a development strategy we must begin by determining what the people think and what are their motivations and inner feelings.

**O. Shkaratan.** For the time being, we are dealing exclusively with the initiative of local managers and scientists. They may be superb specialists. However, this does not imply the initiative of the population, of the working people.

Thus, we heard here the suggestion of shifting the emphasis to the development of science-intensive production. However, the supporters of such a strategy seem to forget the numerous cases of failures involving such production facilities in the developing countries. They ignore the fact that most of them are not labor intensive or, in other words, that they are unable efficiently to influence employment under the conditions of actively rising unemployment. The cost of opening jobs is exceptionally high. According to some estimates, if we were to build a machine building plant in Central Asia, in order to train local cadre specialists who would operate on a contemporary technological level, we would need a period of 25 years. I am an optimist and I am willing to acknowledge the possibility of reducing this time by one-half.

I believe that in this respect we should also take the following into consideration: increasingly, small companies are assuming leadership in the world. It is precisely they that develop venture production facilities. The activities of small industrial cooperatives could become a major trend in dynamizing the economic growth in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Usually, this is not being mentioned; we are being oriented toward building large- and medium-sized (and strictly government-owned) factories and plants. Obviously, this requires the participation of the center. I believe that we should also raise the question of establishing direct relations with foreign companies.

Let us go back to more fundamental questions: we should recall, for example, that in Leningrad in some cases not one single native of that city could be found among 1,000 textile workers. We ship the cotton where there is no manpower to process it. Meanwhile, in Central Asia we have hundreds of thousands of idle hands. We should ship out of this area not raw materials but finished goods.

In the course of our discussion we should not ignore the question of the owner of the land, the peasant. Who will develop intensive agriculture and who will feed the nation? Will it be the serf, the landless person, forever trapped inside a clan-hierarchical system and frequently dependent on the "patrons" of the neighboring municipality, the group of native sons? People are speaking of contracting and leasing but, as before, it is the director, the chairman who remains the boss. For some reason we fear the private peasant farm. What is there here that is harmful to socialism? It would be possible to return to the peasant part of the land as his full possession, with the right to inheritance. Under the conditions of an agrarian overpopulation doing this, naturally, is no simple matter. However, combined with the development of crafts and artisan industries, it is entirely possible. With the help of the state the peasants will save the land from its destruction and solve the ecological crisis. I can assure you that if the peasant becomes independent in his choice, the state will obtain high profits and prosperous and educated farmers will appear in the area.



### The Cost of Waste

**M. Mukhamedzhanov**, member of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, chairman of the Uzbek National Committee for the UNESCO "Man and the Biosphere" Program:

Our Uzbekistan, which is extremely rich in natural conditions, could alone feed not 20 or 30 million people but several times more people and, furthermore, make a substantial contribution to the Union stock. Why is it therefore that in such a rich area the population consumes one-half less meat, milk, fruit and other agricultural commodities compared with the national average? The main reason is the single cotton crop. This is the origin of all our trouble. It is as though everyone has realized this on the highest levels of command, but to this day more than 70 percent of all areas are in cotton.

A monoculture dominates. Yet, as global practices and our own sad experience indicates, the excessive specialization of an area or a farm in growing a single crop is exceptionally harmful. Sooner or later, it leads to the exhaustion and degradation of the soil and the invasion of harmful insects, the appearance of infectious diseases, the spreading of weeds and other undesirable phenomena which, in the final account, destroy the crop itself. Therefore, we must radically review the sectorial structure and balance it within each individual kolkhoz and sovkhoz. This must become a law in agricultural production. Truck gardens, melon crops, orchards and vineyards must be restored on the land "occupied" by cotton.

Let me also point out that under conditions of full cost accounting and self-financing, the market and the situation involving specific products are the main regulatory agent in production. This would totally exclude both the principle of growing cotton at all cost as well as the rule of monoculture, for here is what happens: since 1976, cotton production in the republic has been steadily declining while material resources invested in cotton are being increased with every passing year. What is the point of growing cotton on rocky, sloped and saline soil? By planting such soil in cotton we know in advance that we can obtain nothing but losses.

Let me cite a few examples. At the Kommunizm Kolkhoz, Kuvinskiy Rayon, almost 2,000 hectares are in cotton, 600 of which are on slopes. The cost per quintal of cotton here is 80 rubles, as against 35 rubles on the other types of soil. Five sovkhozes in the former Mekhnatabadskiy Rayon have been growing cotton on the thick limed soil and have caused the state losses totaling 75 million rubles between 1981 and 1985 alone. The cost of the cotton they are growing has reached nearly 160 rubles! Therefore, we are spending 2 rubles with a return, at best, of 1 ruble. What sensible farmer would do this? Can we become wealthier this way?

I am convinced that within the structure of crops in specialized farms, cotton should not account for more than 50 percent. In order to achieve this, we must above

all begin by lowering the plan for the purchasing of cotton to 4 million tons and reduce the amount of land in cotton by no less than 600,000 hectares. The state order for cotton staple for 1989 is 1,710,000 tons or else that same 5.4 million tons of unginned cotton. Cotton production should be increased only through higher crop yields.

Such suggestions are not whimsical but a vital need for the consequences of such monoculture have been tragic to our area. They will lead to an economic and ecological crisis. The Union departments agree with this prognosis. However, they are unable to abandon their habit of "supercentralization," and imposing on the republics their own will. This means preserving our monoculture.

I have worked with cotton for more than 60 years and I am trying to protect and preserve cotton growing. I have always, however, opposed the imposition of its cultivation.

### Facts Without Comment

"Increasing cotton production and ensuring the availability of this valuable raw material for the country in ever growing quantities is the prime patriotic and international duty of the farmers and all working people in the republic and our main task and general line in economic building." (From the book by Sh. Rashidov "Sovetskiy Uzbekistan" [Soviet Uzbekistan], 1982).

"Comrade Rashidov's ignorance of life and lack of experience and insufficient knowledge began quite quickly and seriously to affect the management of the republic's economy, agriculture in particular. We are familiar, for example, with his hasty and subjective proposals and speeches at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on lowering the prices of unginned cotton.... His line of promoting cotton monoculture, restricting the growth of alfalfa and violating crop rotation has caused a great deal of harm" (from the letter by M. Mukhamedzhanov to L.I. Brezhnev, 1968).

**T. Koychuyev**, Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences member, vice-president of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences:

Cotton in our republic has indeed strangled the others. Its monopoly status in agriculture has resulted in the total exhaustion of the land. This is the tragedy not only of Uzbekistan but of Turkmenia, Tajikistan, Kirghiziya and Kazakhstan as well. The one-sided development of our agrarian sector has led to an unparalleled deformation not only of the economic but also the social area. That is what our extremely fertile Fergana Valley turned into! There, where gardens blossomed and brought fruit, to the admiration of the entire Orient, we now see exclusively a cotton field. What kind of social and economic harmony could one speak of in terms of Fergana? Yet how many more such places do we have in our country! We are not against the specialization of the area but do oppose the type of "specialization" which leads to the degeneracy of the people.

**K. Kagalovskiy.** "Cotton-mania" is an economic policy which has no economic objectives. Who needs today a single cotton crop?

Given this situation, how can we help the area? It is not mandatory in the least to channel to it ever new resources. The economic independence which was mentioned here today means, above all, eliminating or drastically reducing state cotton orders. On the other hand, we cannot leave the country without such an important raw material. Consequently, we must soften the blow and set aside in advance a certain amount of foreign currency reserves. It is precisely this that would give the region the opportunity and the time to undertake the structural reorganization of its agriculture.

**Yu. Khadzhiyev,** chairman of the Uzbekistan Kolkhoz, Shavatskiy Rayon, Khorezma Oblast, Uzbek SSR:

Our situation is turning catastrophic. The once extremely rich land of Khorezma cannot be viewed today without tears. The cotton which has been cultivated here for the past 20 to 30 years has drained its juices. However, even this weak and exhausted land is in short supply. There is no more than one-quarter hectare per person in the kolkhoz. Again and again we must plant it in cotton, allowing for no breathing spell. We cannot allow to be kind, for the plans which are being issued from above are huge and, furthermore, we must feed ourselves and our children. This becomes incredibly difficult when the kolkhoz member averages 120 rubles. All in all, this is a miserable pay for most difficult 15 to 16-hour days under the burning sun.

Women as well are forced to work in the fields. Do you think that we have hearts of stone and do not wish to protect our wives, sisters and mothers? But what can we do, for otherwise we would simply have no way to survive. The kolkhoz member found himself trapped by this structure in Uzbek agriculture. With every passing day our labor becomes cheaper and cheaper: the prices of equipment, chemical fertilizers and seeds are growing but not those of cotton.

**A. Safayev,** doctor of economic sciences, department head at the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

The results of many years of research conducted by the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, jointly with the USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economics-Mathematical Institute, with the participation of scientists from VASKHNIL and the academies of sciences of cotton growing republics, unquestionably prove that the strategy of development of the national economic cotton complex should be based above all on eliminating the monoculture and radically improving the ecological situation and sensibly and scientifically determining the optimal future cotton needs of the USSR and the members of the socialist community. We should take into consideration the long-term production of chemical and other staples and the possibility of combining agricultural sectors, particularly those which compete with

cotton growing, in terms of the utilization of natural, manpower and other resources. We must increase the production of fruits and vegetable crops and increase the interaction between socioeconomic and scientific and technical development.

The comprehensive democratization of social life which is taking place in the country also requires the democratization of the planning process and a dialogue among equals by central, regional and sectorial management authorities in the course of the formulation and implementation of the plans. This is particularly important under the conditions of Uzbekistan in formulating state orders for leading types of agricultural commodities such as cotton staple, silk cocoons, karakul and wool, which define the specialization of the republic. Obviously, state orders for such goods should not exceed 70-75 percent of their production and procurement, although now they account for all 100 percent. This would make it possible for the remaining part to be sold by the state to other republics or else to export at contractual prices and, in the final account, would increase the material incentive of kolkhozes and sovkhoses to improve their production capacities and to upgrade the quality of output. It would contribute to improving the economy and the well-being of the working people.

**D. Latifov,** candidate of historical sciences, editor-in-chief of KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA:

Probably in order to find a solution to the crisis situation we should determine what brought us to it and why. In its time, the purpose of monoculture was to gain cotton independence. Actually, it became a means of satisfying personal ambitions and obtaining rewards, ranks and privileges. Our former leaders showed little concern for the fact that the excessive development of cotton growing would worsen the economic situation of the working people. Here is what we now have: the lowest per capita income of the population, the highest infant mortality and the just about shortest life span. All of this is here, in Central Asia. Even the land has become a drug addict.

**A. Reteyum.** It must be realized with absolute clarity that a steady and accelerating degradation of the environment, which has already reached a dangerous level, is taking place in the area. Here the overall area of land turned into desert exceeds 100,000 square kilometers; on virtually its entire territory biological productivity has dropped by 30-50 percent or more. A number of lakes and rivers have disappeared and one-half of the irrigated land has become saline. We find all the symptoms of an ecological crisis in which the situation becomes uncontrollable.

The reasons for this situation are found in the profound disruption of the complex natural system which combines mountains with plains in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The overgrazing of mountain pastures led to the exhaustion of water sources which previously fed the foothills. The development of a hydraulic engineering

system based on an unprecedented building of dams and canals led to the concentrated effect of technology on natural complexes in the oases. The redistribution of huge masses of water for purposes of irrigated agriculture with a single cotton crop was achieved at the cost of the total destruction of the natural river system which performs in nature the vitally important function of arteries and veins. This destroyed the age-old natural mechanism for the removal of salts and ensuring their collection in river basins and transfer and accumulation in closed valleys (the Aral Sea) from where they were once again taken up by the wind back into the mountains. In the long-term, with blocked dams and river valleys deprived of their water because of the canals, the destruction of ever new areas of land as a result of silting and salinization, became inevitable.

Having diagnosed the severe illness in the regional environment, we must seek ways of curing it. We believe that if we seek a radical improvement, only one solution is possible. It is restoring the natural working of the "mountain-plain" system by planting trees and, in general, extensively cultivating the entire territory. The methods of agricultural and forest reclamation are well-known. They have been developed in detail by the local scientists and have proven their high economic and ecological effectiveness and reliability. They are distinguished by their relative simplicity and low cost. Over many years the republics of Central Asia invested billions of rubles in hydroeconomic development but only a few million rubles were channeled into planting forests and developing cultivated pastures. The time has come radically to change the approach to the use of nature. It is precisely the reconstruction of the vegetal cover in Central Asia and Kazakhstan that would make it possible drastically to upgrade the availability of water in the national economy and create conditions for the development of animal husbandry and crop growing, and provide jobs.

**T. Abdyldayev**, corresponding member, Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences:

For some reason, priority was given in our country to the economic aspects of the intensive restructuring of nature and changing the environment, whereas other equally necessary and important aspects—ethical, aesthetic, legal, medical, social and hygienic—were somehow ignored. Such an unjustified separation of economic from ecological aspects in the utilization of nature and sharply pitting the former against the latter and absolutizing of the role of the former while underestimating the significance of the latter led to most undesirable consequences. As a result of this one-sided and extremely utilitarian approach, some sectors of the national economy assumed not only a nonecological but also a noneconomic nature. Examples to this effect are numerous.

**Zh. Sydykov**, member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, academic secretary of the Earth Sciences Department, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences:

The present generation of people aged 35-40 and older received from the older generation clean water, clean air and land entirely suitable for farming but what do we have now in Kazakhstan, after nuclear devices were tested on the republic's territory, spaceships were launched, open-pit mines were developed, virgin lands were cultivated and industrial giants were built? We have had flooding, swamping, salinization of the soil in some areas, desertification and destruction of the natural soil cover in other, increased dumps of ore mining enterprises, the development of water and wind erosion, snow avalanches and seismic and other destructive processes. That is how we handled the wealth we inherited from our fathers.

How are we handling our water, rivers and lakes? In 1987 more than 80 cubic kilometers of sewage water were dumped in the republic's water reservoirs, containing approximately 600,000 tons of suspended matter, 30,000 tons of petroleum products and the same amount of nitrates, heavy metals, and cancerogenic and other biologically dangerous substances. The waters of the Syrdarya have become polluted. According to the Kazakh Ministry of Health, the nitrates contained in the water in the area of Kzyl-Orda exceed safety standards by a factor of 46. In its lower reaches agents of dysentery, typhoid fever, cholera and other acute infectious diseases have been identified.

A stressed ecological situation has developed also in the basin of the Caspian Sea. The level of atmospheric pollution with hydrogen sulfide and sulfur dioxide exceeds safety standards by a factor of 7-10. As a result, waterfowl are dying in the coastal area and mass illness of seals and valuable sturgeon species have been detected. I have cited only a small part of available data although I do not believe that this comes as a surprise to you. Future generations will not forgive us if we leave them such a ruined environment. Kazakhstan has developed a concept for a republic ecological program which includes many useful proposals. However, we anticipate that its implementation will be obstructed substantially by the various ministries, the industrial ones above all. This means that our health and the health of our children greatly depends on the will of the center.

**V. Nikolayev**, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member:

Nonetheless, the most dangerous sick area is the Aral. The ecological situation which has developed there is an indication of the extent of the illness affecting that entire area. There is a program for saving the Aral. However, we must determine the way we would like to see this unique lake. Should it be restored as a biological object or should we merely raise the level of the water and turn it into a dead sea? Naturally, everyone seems to prefer the former. Why then are collectors being built here along which the poisoned water will flow into it from the cotton fields?

There probably could be no question whatsoever of rescuing the Aral without developing an overall ecological concept of the area. Currently each republic is acting alone in an effort to solve, above all, its own local problems. The features of the ecology are such that it requires a comprehensive approach and the unification of all efforts and resources, for otherwise we cannot hope for any success.

#### Facts Without Comment

Whereas until the 1960s the overall water stock of the Amudarya and the Syrdarya flowing into the Aral was approximately 50 cubic kilometers of water annually, between 1961 and 1980 it dropped to 20 and, starting with the 1980s, it stopped entirely from the Syrdarya and was reduced to a purely symbolic trickle from the Amudarya. As a result, by 1988 the sea level had dropped by more than 12.5 meters and the water area shrunk by 25,000 square kilometers while the overall content of minerals in the water increased from 11 to 23 per thousand. By the year 2000 there will be a further increase in the salinity of the sea, which will kill even the new fish species which are being artificially acclimated here.

**B. Dzhumaniyazov**, first secretary of Amudarynskiy Raykom, Uzbek Communist Party:

The tragedy of the Aral probably affected Karakalpakiya more than any other area. For many years a significant portion of irrigated land and irrigation-reclamation networks in this autonomous republic were maintained in an extremely neglected condition. Sewage waters, finding no outlets into the Aral Sea, accumulated on our territory. This worsened land fertility and led to the loss of truck gardens and the destruction of buildings. The annual damage caused by this to the national economy is estimated in the hundreds of millions of rubles. How to measure the harm which was caused to the environment and the flora and fauna of the Aral area and the health of the people?!

Even in our own Amudarynskiy Rayon, which is considered one of the successful areas in the republic in terms of its soil and climate conditions, 40 percent of the land in crops has an average or a high level of salinization. The mineralizing of the irrigation water exceeds the standard by a factor of 2-3. The condition of the land is worsened even further by the salt storms. The humus stratum in the soil has been reduced sharply.

We welcomed with great hope the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers aimed at radically improving the economic, social and ecological situation in the area. However, our optimism was premature. The implementation of these resolutions is threatened with failure. How can we make ministries and departments understand that any delays could bring about unpredictable consequences?

**V. Perevedentsev**. I am one of the members of the "Aral-88" Expedition, for which reason I have first-hand

knowledge of the problems of the Aral. According to the familiar resolution, by the year 1990 the Aral Sea will be fed some 9 cubic kilometers of water with a gradual increase in the volume to reach 20-21 cubic kilometers by the year 2005. This means approximately one-half of the volume which evaporates annually. Furthermore, let us not forget that even this relatively small amount of water will go not only into the Aral but also into the vast deltas. Consequently, not all that much water will reach the sea itself. It is easy, under such circumstances, to predict the future: by the end of the next century the Aral Sea will disappear and we shall have three small dead lakes.

Can anything be done, given this situation? Naturally, in theory the Aral could be supplied with the 50 cubic kilometers of water it needs so badly. This can be achieved, however, providing that we use not 15,000 to 30,000 cubic meters per hectare of irrigated land but no more than 10,000. However, in order to apply these standards we must totally reconstruct the old irrigation systems, and we need huge capital investments.

**Yu. Khadzhiyev**. Who will argue against the fact that the Aral must be preserved! However, not at the cost of the life and health of the people living on its shores. What shall we do if the water for irrigation which we need so greatly goes directly into the lake? There cannot be even a question of reducing its amount: as it is, we are short of water, for our land is essentially salinized. It must be flushed two or three times annually, for otherwise we cannot grow any cotton on it. Where can we find this water?

**M. Mukhamedzhanov**. Are the comrades who have gathered here aware of the following fact: every year some 5 billion cubic meters of water are evaporated totally uselessly from the water reservoirs in our area. Could this water not constitute a substantial addition to the Aral Sea? In my view, the water reservoirs which have become the cause of the drastic worsening of the land and the environment as a whole should be eliminated and the thus released water resources channeled not anywhere else but into the Aral.

**I. Muratalin**, chairman of the State Environmental Committee of the Kirghiz SSR:

It is natural for us to be discussing the Aral so extensively today. It is true that it has created the type of metastases which have reached even the most distant areas of Central Asia. However, we have many such sick areas in the area. Is the fate of Issyk-Kul Lake any less tragic? Hundreds of thousands of people come to rest by its shores; numerous boarding houses and rest homes are being built there. However, the builders, as always, "forget" the installation of treatment systems. As a result, the lake is on the verge of an ecological catastrophe. There are many other areas whose situation is just as critical!

**A. Koshanov**. I am afraid that our republics will not be able to cope with this problem alone. In my view, a social

program must be drafted for each area in ecological difficulty, which would call for the creation of improved housing conditions, better nutrition, an improved health care system, and wage and pension compensations. Such programs should be financed above all out of the Union fund and only partially out of republic funds, for the situation which developed is the consequence of the irresponsible and narrow departmental solution of local problems.

**A. Chamkin**, candidate of philosophical sciences, department head at the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History:

It is now becoming clear that economics must be socially oriented. However, this objective is not stipulated in the system of indicators on the basis of which our production process is structured. Economics remains a closed area, as confirmed by the views of a number of very respected economists.

The plans for the development of the republics are based on the principles of economic balance and economic advantages; their target is to increase the volume and improve the quality of output and raise wages. However, what party and Soviet leaders, scientists and production organizers ignore is the following: increasingly, the development of the economy affects the health of individuals. I am referring not only to the physical but the spiritual aspects of the matter as well. In broader terms, this affects the social health of the republics in the area.

We should not have a one-sided attitude toward scientific and technical progress, for this can result not only in benefits but also in substantial socioeconomic and sociopsychological upheavals. Society is not always able to compensate for these costs.

I liked the statement made by Professor Mirskiy, and his analogy with the fate of many developing countries is not extraneous to this discussion. Unfortunately, we do not have to go far to seek examples which confirm this, for such examples are clear. If we take problems of reclamation and the use of irrigated land, the development of petroleum and gas deposits and the building of territorial-production complexes: everywhere we detect those same crisis-generating trends of extensive economic development. It was precisely technocratic approaches that led to the present complex situation. However, we failed to draw the proper lessons from this. Yet such lessons prove that an economy oriented exclusively toward economic efficiency cannot develop successfully and stably. Even if certain positive results have been achieved, they have been of very short duration. In my view, therefore, in formulating a strategy we must proceed on the basis of needs, of spiritual values and the ideals of the people for whose sake, actually, such a strategy is being implemented.

#### **The Region In its Social Dimension**

**U. Baymuratov**. Actually, all this time we have been discussing priorities in the development of our republics.

This is a rather complex problem, and it is obvious that we cannot solve it in a single roundtable meeting. As was already pointed out, there is no simple solution suitable to the entire area. In our republic, in Kazakhstan, for example, we have five economic areas each one different from the other: each one of them has its own conditions, specifics and problems. Therefore, the substantiation of priorities requires a profound study of the specific situations.

Nonetheless, there are problems which are common to all. They are related above all to choosing ways of development of the social area. The most pressing problems today are food, availability of consumer goods, population employment, health care and housing. Such problems can be solved only if our economy would once and for all address itself to the individual, i.e., if that for the sake of which perestroika is taking place finally comes about.

**A. Samadov**. Yes, we must acknowledge that the type of living standard which has developed for the population in our republics is far behind modern concepts. Furthermore, it is my conviction that, in general, we have found ourselves below the level worthy of a civilized person. Thus, housing availability in Tajikistan, per resident, is the lowest in the country and is less than 9 square meters of general area. Meanwhile, the number of school students attending the second and third shifts is perhaps the highest. Although in recent years certain positive changes have taken place in the nutritional structure, essentially flat cakes and tea remain the staple food of a significant portion of the population. The volume of output of consumer goods in the republic is 43 percent of the all-Union level; of these, 47 percent are durable goods. I could quote similar data concerning health care, culture and other social areas.

Naturally, we have a program for improving the life of the people, but can we hope for any radical changes even with this program? I am afraid that considering the present structure of the economy and the centralized allocation of funds, as before, appropriations for social problems will continue to be based on the residual principle. Here as well we go back to the question of territorial independence, which was already raised in the course of our meeting. In the area of social policy as well priorities must be defined locally. The soviets on all levels should have the opportunity to decide where they should spend their budget at any given time.

**O. Shkaratan**. Unquestionably, the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan need substantial aid and such aid should be oriented above all toward the social rather than the industrial area. Money must be invested in raising the new generations, in building kindergartens, boarding schools and schools for gifted children, opening institutes, developing health care, etc. Only thus, eventually, will cadres appear for the already existing and newly built enterprises and voluntary migration out of the republics will become possible.

However, it is time for us to realize that, as it were, on any level the budget alone will be insufficient to pay for solving even the most urgent problems. At this point I would like to mention a tremendous reserve which was forgotten under Stalinism and under Brezhnev: the self-organization and initiative of the local population. The skillful use of this potential will increase our opportunities substantially. However, in order to accomplish this we should rely more not on the state machinery but on public committees, foundations and movements, i.e., on what we know as the civil society.

**K. Urazbayev**, candidate of economic sciences, deputy director of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics:

The assessment of the social infrastructure in the area leads to the single conclusion of the need to accelerate its development at a faster pace compared with the Union average. Forgive me, comrades, but we have learned how to economize on what is most precious to us—our future, our children. One-third of kindergartens and nurseries in Kirghiz cities are located in adapted premises. In the rural areas the figure is even higher—43 percent. Because of overcrowding, the children are frequently sick. In Frunze, for example, there are 190 cases of illness per 100 children going to kindergarten and 290 among children in nurseries.

Everyone realizes that it is impossible to correct the situation in the social area simultaneously in all directions. That is why we need to develop a modern way of handling funds and resources. The optimal maneuver which would be consistent with the long-term and current objectives of socioeconomic development could be secured only on the basis of determining the urgency and, subsequently, the priority of needs of the population in the various areas. Naturally, we also need a differentiated approach, based on the specific conditions of the territories and the demographic situation, the national characteristics of the way of life, etc.

Is all this possible today? I doubt it. The reason is, above all, the lack of systems for setting scientific regional standards for infrastructural services and the low level of social statistics. Without this it would be difficult to rely on obtaining the so-called "passports" for the social development of cities and territories, and thus contribute to the implementation of a purposeful and balanced policy in a given area.

Modern Kirghiziya has developed a substantial infrastructural potential. In the 12th 5-year period increases in nonindustrial capital investments will total more than half a billion rubles. However, taking into consideration the long years of neglect and the economic and social difficulties, will this suffice? Furthermore, let us not forget that economic relations do not cover the entire range of social relations.

#### Facts Without Comment

No more than 16.3 percent of children in the Tajik SSR attend preschool institutions, compared with the national average which is 58 percent; in the countryside this percentage is even lower. Last year no more than one-third of general education schools were located in standard school buildings; 500 school buildings are subject to demolition and 280 have no electric power. The schools in the famous Nurek and the villages around it work in two or three shifts. The children study in primitive adjuncts and even railroad cars.

**S. Khakimova**, corresponding member, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, director of the Tajik Scientific Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood:

Our area is facing a large number of socioeconomic problems. However, some require the taking of urgent steps. Comrade Urazbayev said that we have learned how to economize at the expense of the children. I am an obstetrician and gynecologist by profession and have dedicated more than 40 years of my life to such work. Who if not I would be familiar with the accuracy of this statement?

Throughout the world infant mortality is considered a sensitive indicator of the socioeconomic development of a society. In turn, it is a mandatory corollary to a high birthrate. For centuries children were born and... died in Central Asia. "God giveth and God taketh away" was the formula of naive obedience voiced by mothers, insane with grief. Of 20 newborn children four remained alive, five at best. Having several children was considered an exceptional phenomenon which appeared in the area, in fact, after the last war. The policy aimed at rebuilding the size of the population brought to life a headlong and extensive rise of the demographic curve. This fact caught us unawares. During that period the worst possible error was made: when stimulating the birthrate they should have thought also of material facilities. Naturally, they subsequently caught on, but that which was done was obviously insufficient.

A recently conducted study revealed that more than 60 percent of the maternity-assistance institutions in Tajikistan should be immediately closed down. Nonetheless, they remain open for lack of better ones; the building of maternity clinics is proceeding with great difficulty. In a ward in which, according to standards, there should be three beds, we have seven. There should be 4 square meters per crib; in the clinic of our "model" institute, there are 0.2 square meters. The situation in the countryside is catastrophic. According to regulations there should be one midwife per 40,000 population; actually, there is one per 1,500 to 1,800 pregnant women. The "wisdom" of such mathematics makes one insane; it is as though a different kind of Soviet people live in the villages. Is it amazing, therefore, that in the valleys in the republic as many as 23 percent of pregnant women have not seen a physician even once during their pregnancy?

The situation in the mountain villages is even worse, for they have been simply cut off from medical establishments.

Ninety-five percent of future mothers coming from Tajik villages are either sick or seriously ill. This is a terrible figure but I would like all of you to hear and to feel it. They can no longer give birth! The problem, however, is not only medical but also socioeconomic. Look at the way our women live in the villages. They live as they did before the revolution, in mud houses, without floors. For years they have no access to meat and even fruits, for they sell them on the market. The water they drink is poor. The land and the very air are poisoned with toxic chemicals. The female population in the republics of Central Asia has paid dearly for the medals awarded to the leaders of the cotton growing republics. They have paid with their health and the lives of their children.

According to our data, infant mortality is 30 per 1,000 with first births, rising to 73 with the eighth or ninth. With such a ratio, the increased frequency of stillborn is the result of the exhaustion of the mother's body. Such is the truth of the consequences of uncontrolled birthrate in the republics of Central Asia. These figures are not inflated in the least. Is there a solution to this vicious circle? Yes, only one: we need an efficient program for the socioeconomic development of the Central Asian republics, followed by an organization of a family planning service, without which we shall not make great progress in infant mortality, which will remain high.

Let me immediately point out that the very term "family planning" triggers in our area a drastically negative reaction and bad feelings, even among educated people and, unfortunately, among scientists. For some reason this is associated with an almost mandated lowering of the birthrate. Yet throughout the world the concept of "family planning" has only one meaning, i.e., protecting the health of the mother and developing a healthy offspring by changing the intervals between births. What is the situation in our country? In some remote areas 15 percent of the women give birth each 11 to 12 months. At best the interval is 18 months. It is thus that in the course of 20 or more years, while breast feeding one child the mother is carrying another. She is short of sleep and food and she knows neither rest nor calm. At the age of 30 she is an old woman. When I come across such women I curse the day that I became a gynecologist, for I am totally unable to help them.

**Sh. Kadyrov**, candidate of historical sciences, leading scientific associate, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences Department of Philosophy and Law:

Comrade men, I am ready to prostrate myself at the feet of Sofya Khafizovna and to testify to the truth of every single word she said. I feel ashamed, as I look at her and at our women not only for the horrifying facts which she quoted to us but, above all, the fact that so far we have done nothing to solve, once and for all, such a grave problem in Central Asia.

I nonetheless would like to tell you, Sofya Khafizovna, that you are not alone in your efforts to organize a family planning service. As to our republic, this task is being shifted from the level of scientific discussions to actual implementation. The first family planning center has been opened in Ashkhabad at the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Health Scientific Research Institute for Protecting the Health of Mother and Child. What makes this fact even more noteworthy is that the age-old tradition of the Turkmen people was to have families with numerous children.

Yes, in terms of our area the time of a prophylactic softening of the "demographic blow" has been lost. However, the population of the Central Asian republics has already passed the peak stage in the dynamics of the birthrate: the birthrate is declining everywhere comprehensively and irreversibly. According to our assessments, which included a consideration of a number of factors, in the next century there will be a generation as a whole oriented not toward many children but toward an average family, which would be optimal in terms of the demographic development of society. However, the steps taken to limit the number of children will not solve the problem of the fast growth of the population in the next 30 to 40 years, for this will take place not only through the birthrate but through changes in the age structure, when a generation whose number is greater than the preceding one will grow to marital age. Therefore, let us be realistic and take this long-term trend as a fact which will prevail for the foreseeable future. This trend must be taken into consideration and cannot be corrected; instead, we must radically restructure our socioeconomic programs.

**V. Perevedentsev**. Allow me to interject. The entire country considers that the birth rate is continuing to raise in Central Asia. We, demographers, keep arguing that nothing of the sort is happening. The birthrate is declining in all of these republics, in some of them faster than in others. How did the view develop? It was the result, above all, of lack of information.

Last year Soviet demographers marked some kind of "anniversary." The last domestic demographic institute was closed down in 1938. Throughout the postwar years our science has been supported by a few dozen enthusiasts and despite all their efforts, in a great country with a 300 million population, there is no demographic institute while Hungary, with its 10 million population, has one. Is this why our government is improperly informed and why demographic policy is a failure?

**M. Tatimov**, candidate of pedagogical sciences, senior scientific associate, Center for the Study of National Relations and Relations Among Nationalities, Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and Law:

Let me caution you against one danger: demographic policy should not become the apple of discord in relations among nationalities. Therefore, it must be pursued

very sensitively, delicately and intelligently. There is no place here for hasty slogans. If we ignore the fact that it could affect the intimate aspects of life and the traditions of the Central Asian population, such a policy is doomed to failure from the start.

The line which marks the present behavior and way of life of our peoples can be clearly traced to the past. For example, nomad Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Turkmens cross the stages of the demographic transition faster. The settled Uzbeks and Tajiks are somewhat slower. It took no more than 30 years for our people to convert from a family with seven children to a family with four. Three decades in the case of a demographic transition are nothing. They are but a moment in history, and the Kazakhs did this twice as fast as the Russians had in their time. This can be explained partially by the characteristics of the way of life of the Kazakh women. We are gratified that in Kazakhstan there have been no cases of self-immolation. We must remember, however, that although a demographic conversion is an objective law and has its own speed, it could be accelerated or slowed down. In that sense the experience of Kazakhstan, I believe, could be useful to neighboring republics.

**S. Cheshko.** I have frequently heard it said that because of its increasing population compared to other areas, this allegedly balances the country's demographic situation. I believe that this thesis is absolutely groundless. Let me further say that not a single demographer or sociologist has been able to prove yet that the bigger the population in a given country is, the better.

Nor do I agree with the viewpoint which justifies having numerous children by quoting the traditions of reproduction of Central Asian peoples. At a conference, I even heard a Moscow scientist say that this was consistent with some kind of ideal of "socialist child raising." But what is more useful to the family and, in the final account, to society: Is it to use the available possibility of raising two children or eight? In assessing demographic policy we must take into consideration that we are reproducing not simply a biological being but also certain social structures, culture, types of behavior and value orientations.

**S. Islamov,** candidate of economic sciences, docent, Tajik State University:

Until recently the high growth rates of the population were considered an exclusively positive phenomenon. However, after it became clear that we are unable to provide a normal living standard for our children, a restructuring began. It is true that for some reason the solution which was found for the problem was purely medical: all that was needed, it was claimed, was the wide use of contraceptives and the birthrate would automatically decline. It was the reverse that happened. The moment we raised in our republic the question of family planning, the resistance which developed on the part of the population, including the intelligentsia, was such that to this day we are still reeling.

What was probably ignored was the fact that the birthrate is a synthetic indicator based on a number of factors: social, economic, biological, historical, etc. Consequently, the approach to this problem must be comprehensive and it can be solved only by taking all factors into consideration. It is in that case that without any whatsoever coercion or administrative measures the birthrate becomes stabilized at an acceptable level.

The opinion was voiced here that if our families have fewer children we would begin to live better. In that case my question is the following: Why is it that in a large part of the territory of our country, where the birthrate is almost down to the level of simple reproduction living conditions are so poor? Clearly, it should be a question not of the number of children but of the level of the development of the economy and the social infrastructure, i.e., the fact that demographic problems cannot be solved without it.

Let us take our agrarian sector as an example. Sometimes it is described as a "greenhouse for the reproduction of a large number of children." This is the absolute truth. The very conditions of rural life are such that if the parents do not have five to six assistants the family is doomed to a pitiful existence. How can we force people to have fewer children?!

**M. Tatimov.** I would like to point out that when we speak of demographic policy we must distinguish between two concepts: control over birthrate and family planning. The former is as though imposed from above, something coercive. The second stems from the initiative of the people themselves. Furthermore, I deem it necessary to draw the attention of the roundtable participants to the following circumstance: unless we lower infant mortality the struggle for lowering the birthrate would be not only erroneous but also antihumane. In general, it would be senseless, for it is a hopeless undertaking to struggle against a demographic behavior which developed in the course of millennia.

**S. Islamov.** This is absolutely true. Let me reemphasize that family planning is related to a major problem such as manpower resources. Under conditions of a high birthrate our area, which already now has a manpower surplus, may soon find itself in a state of crisis.

#### Time for Radical Decisions

**V. Perevedentsev.** It seems to me that Comrade Islamov raised a very timely question. Employment is one of the main problems in Central Asia. Considering the existing situation, do we have in our country any option other than accelerated industrialization? Currently the agrarian sector in this area employs more than one-half of the population. But then, eventually, our agriculture will begin to reach world standards or, at least, such is its task. What is the world standard? In Denmark 3 percent of the population feed the entire country; 2 percent in the United States. If we formulate a wrong strategy, after a while we are bound to be facing mass unemployment.



I was recently assigned to Central Asia. I met with chairmen of kolkhozes and sovkhoz directors and was interested as to why it was so difficult to develop the leasing system. I was given roughly similar answers: If we allocate land to those who want to have it, what would we do to employ the others? This is the pure truth. On the other hand, in any case, we shall have to develop contracting and leasing, for without it we cannot have an agricultural upsurge.

**A. Safayev.** I fully share this opinion. Currently surplus labor in Uzbekistan is assessed in the hundreds of thousands. Essentially, these are people who live in rural areas. How do we intend to provide them with jobs? The 13th 5-Year Plan calls for significantly increasing industrial production essentially by opening small and medium-sized enterprises which would produce consumer goods. It is precisely they that will provide additional jobs.

#### Facts Without Comment

"In 1987, the number of active-age population in the Uzbek SSR, not employed in the national economy, was estimated at some 2.5 million people. At the present growth rates of the population and jobs, by the year 2000 the manpower surplus in the republic may reach almost 6 million people or, in other words, every second person in the active age group will not be involved in public production." (From a letter by T. Akhmedov and N. Gorelkin, associates, Political Education Club, Syrdarya Obkom, Uzbek Communist Party, to the editors of KOMMUNIST).

**V. Perevedentsev.** Are you confident that all these jobs will be filled? It is no secret whatsoever that in Central Asia, in addition to a labor surplus, there is also a labor shortage. All of us have seen ads placed by plants and factories which begin with the words "needed," or "workers needed." It seems to me that the main trouble is that by opening any given new production facility, most frequently neither local customs nor national traditions are taken into consideration. At one point I visited a knitted goods factory in Ura-Tyube. It was staffed by natives of that city. Had one more such enterprise been built there, all jobs would have been filled. The point is that the factory worked in only two shifts and, as custom requires, the women went home at night.

The question of involving the rural youth in industry is even more difficult. To solve it one must begin in childhood an orientation toward urban values and urban traditions, and give to boys and girls the opportunity to acquire urban skills. However, this must be done directly in their villages. You will agree that no sensible parent will send his 15-year old daughter to the city to attend a vocational training school and live in a hostel! We in Russia well know what the results of such a step are. Furthermore, after training a specialist, we must help him to move to the city both materially and organizationally. Finally, we must see to it that these people

become more easily and faster adapted sociopsychologically to the new circumstances, for when the peasant moves to the city there is a destruction of the rural personality and the urban personality develops on the basis of those "shards." Naturally, this is a very difficult and painful process. In order to make it successful, help is needed which is currently not being provided.

**M. Salikh,** secretary of the board, Union of Uzbek Writers:

We actually have no national working class. The Uzbek rural population accounts for 80 percent of the nation. This situation has always contributed and will contribute to artificial migration: bringing in skilled manpower from the outside. We have in our rayons hundreds of thousands of unemployed but no one, for the time being, intends to give them a skill and to use this manpower in the cities.

When the Aral began to die people who had come from other republics and had worked by the Aral began to leave. Now there are a few thousand Karakalpaks and Uzbeks in that area, to whom the Aral was not only a lake where one could catch fish and swim but also part of their homeland. These people are as sick as is their sea.

I do not mean by this that those who worked at the fish plants should have remained there and been sick together with the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks. God give them good health. I would like to note that it is we ourselves who must assume responsibility for our land above all, for if something happens to it we have nowhere to go. We cannot take our homeland with us.

**Zh. Zayonchkovskaya.** Despite its extreme gravity, the problem of jobs in Central Asia has not been properly studied. A number of "popular truths" prevail here, which are by no means truths but to which everyone has become accustomed. For example, the view is widespread that the local population is unwilling to work in industry, which blocks the building of new enterprises. Actually, the mobility of this population is increasing quite quickly. No more than 25 years ago the percentage of national cadres was lower even in trade, not to mention in areas which now have become almost totally ethnic, such as education and health care. This was followed by the "mastering" of transportation. Currently the local cadres are intensively entering industry. There already are entire sectors, the light and food for instance, where national cadres not only account for the entire increase in employment but also fill all available vacancies. In machine building the number of workers of the local nationalities is increasing approximately 50 percent faster compared with the Russians.

The question of skills and professionalism is a restraining factor. This is directly related to the time needed for commissioning enterprises and to the initial efficiency of their work. The solution is seen in a policy of industrial protectionism developed on the basis of the economic autonomy of the republics.

The problem of youth employment is particularly pressing, for new jobs can accommodate only about one-half of young people entering the labor market. That is one of the reasons for the instability of the social situation in the area. Some 10 percent of the young people have the possibility of finding jobs in industry. How could anyone doubt the need for accelerated industrialization? In agriculture the young people are unable to find jobs because of a tremendous labor surplus. Nor is it possible to expand the service industry endlessly.

The general view is that the young are not all that willing to move to the city. However, possibilities for such moves are also extremely limited. This is due, to begin with, to lack of housing. Second, a family with five or even three children, in which the wife does not work, is simply unable to survive in the city on the husband's wage. Furthermore, the cities in the rayon can absorb very few migrants from the countryside, for the inflow of urban manpower is quite high while the employment rate is growing slowly. It takes no more than five to seven migrants from the thousands of rural residents every year to meet the manpower needs of the cities of Central Asia. In other areas this figure is higher by several hundred percent. The conclusion is simple: the cities of Central Asia are not prepared for absorbing the rural population.

**A. Samadov.** Obviously, our Moscow colleagues are worried by the difficulties which parallel the urbanization process. Let me point out, however, that we are aware of those problems as they. That is why we are currently formulating a concept for the development of medium-sized and small towns, which has been approved by the USSR Gosplan. It is in such towns that we intend to open new enterprises and draw manpower from the countryside.

**G. Mirskiy.** The concern you mentioned is related, above all, to the social consequences of urbanization. Once again it is the third world that provides convincing examples of this fact. Unable to find their place in modern industry, the masses of people who have left the countryside form the so-called marginal strata. These are urban lumpens without permanent jobs or who are semiemployed. On the social level, marginals are a dangerous stratum. They have seen the contrasts of the big city. They have been corrupted by them. They have not had a proper education and have not become part of contemporary civilization. They are partially loyal to their old traditions, without having mastered the new ones.

Industrialization does not solve the problem. Think of Iran. Despite the widespread opinion, the Shah had done a great deal for his country: he had created a modern industry, given the land to the peasants and helped to upgrade the living standard. However, it was the fact that he tried to force it, to convert Iran into a highly developed country within the life span of a single generation, that led to his downfall. The Shah was a rational materialist, a practical man. However, he ignored the

mentality of his people. The human masses, which had moved to the cities, were unable to tolerate what was taking place there: the country was being turned into a caricature of America, with a loss of the old values, increased prostitution, alcoholism and drug addiction.

Why do I mention the third world now? To the best of my knowledge, there are various options in the strategy for the development of Central Asia. They include the revolutionary model. It is precisely against it that I would like to caution you most urgently. Today it appears quite tempting: let us raise this area to the level of the other republics and move the rural population to the cities. However, any coercive destruction of classes and communities is avenged sooner or later (all of us know the high price we paid for the fact that Stalin and his circle destroyed the peasantry as a class). The use of the "power" approach here would lead to the fact that the cities would be crowded with unemployed angry youth. We would be facing an incredible increase in the crime rate and what sociologists describe as frustration, i.e., the lack of hope and prospects, with explosions of an extremist, nationalistic and religious nature, and with the total loss of the old values, social cynicism and corruption.

The country is in a state of perestroika, which has shifted huge human strata, and which broke the ring which artificially held back our society. Fear of superiors disappeared. The people started moving, in the good and bad meanings of the term. This was manifested, in particular, also in the growth of discord among nationalities. Let me point out that we should expect a further aggravation of national problems, for it is precisely in that area that, above all, discontent, impatience, despair, dissatisfaction and extremism are manifested. Are we prepared to prevent such upheavals? Could we guide the people, who have finally realized how poorly they live? We must think about all of this.

#### Facts Without Comment

According to sociological data, the main reason for the tragic events which took place in June in Fergana Oblast, are of a socioeconomic nature. This is believed by more than 94 percent of those surveyed. More than 80 percent listed growing youth unemployment as one of the main reasons. The number of unemployed in the Fergana Valley is increasing by 22,500 every year. The sociologists point out that at the meetings during the troubles there were demands to end the growing of cotton as a single crop, to increase purchase prices and to solve ecological problems.

**M. Tazhin,** candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, Kazakh State University:

In Kazakhstan and Central Asia we have already encountered the problem of the marginals. Currently data has been made available on the number of jobless people in Uzbekistan; in neighboring Turkmenia there are some 200,000; in the Chimkent Oblast in Kazakhstan alone, according to most conservative estimates, there are

120,000. As assessed by the republic committees for state statistics, the overall number of people who can honestly be described as unemployed in our five republics totals approximately 1.3 million people. According to our own data their number is even higher. Without discussing the economic reasons or social justice, from the political viewpoint one must most clearly note that this is the real base for a great variety of political actions.

Another important problem which is no less explosive is that of migration flows. We must not present matters as though this is nothing but the result of labor surpluses in the area. Migration has its historical dimension. As we know, Kazakhstan has had two powerful migration waves under Soviet times. Despite the entire positive significance of such processes, like any other social phenomenon on such a scale, they also had negative consequences which have not been scientifically analyzed so far. Yet such an analysis is urgently necessary, for we are undergoing a destruction of the traditional mechanisms of economic support and way of life, and family and communal behavior, precisely among the peoples of Central Asia, mechanisms which are of great social significance. Given the existing administrative-territorial division of the country and, particularly, within the context of recent events, migrants frequently lose institutional protection. However, we must also take into consideration the regions which accept them. They by no means coincide with the interests of departments which direct manpower to the various republics.

These problems are not new. In the past, however, we tried to "ignore" them. Such a policy led to most disastrous consequences and we have no right to repeat the errors of the past.

**A. Koshanov.** The fact that Union ministries are bringing workers and specialists from the outside into our republics is aggravating the already stressed national and social problems. Meanwhile, a number of departments, in the Caspian area for instance, are totally oriented toward the shift method and do not hire local skilled manpower. Industrial progress in those areas bypasses the native population. I believe that this is a violation of the economic sovereignty of the republics in the area, and the source of the present and future serious difficulties, the more so since wherever there are disproportions in manpower supply and demand and direct neglect of the interests of the local population, the fact is reflected in the group consciousness and could assume grave repercussions affecting the nationalities.

**Ye. Khodzhayev.** It is probably no accident that we have switched to a discussion of relations among nationalities, for virtually everything which has been discussed in the roundtable, one way or another, ends with that problem.

How did it happen that although the tasks which were set at the 2nd Party Program were carried out—national oppression was eliminated, there is a voluntary union among peoples and a great deal was done to eliminate actual inequality—today we are facing an aggravation of

relations among nationalities in some areas? There are numerous reasons for this but I would single out three: first, no attention or, in some cases, obvious neglect of the specific socioeconomic and spiritual demands of nations and ethnic groups. Second, there was no proper control by the masses over the activities of the leading cadres, as a result of which abuses of power became widespread and of scornful attitude toward the people, ignoring their needs and interests, boastfulness and chauvinism developed. Third, in a number of areas corrupt groups channeled national feelings into a nationalistic bed to serve their own selfish purposes.

Today, in order to avoid conflicts, all social organizations, anyone related to the upbringing of the people, must approach the increased national self-awareness of the people respectfully and with consideration and promptly resolve problems which arise in the areas of culture, language, social affairs and the economy.

In my view, the time has come to develop a qualitatively new mechanism for a division of labor among republics, which would contribute to radically improving intrasectorial cooperation and production specialization. It is time jointly to seek sensible solutions rather than blame each other for economic "dependency" which can yield nothing other than aggravation of relations among nationalities.

**K. Kazybayev,** editor-in-chief of KAZAKHSTAN KOMMUNISI:

Yes, the problems of the socioeconomic development of Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia cannot be separated from relations among nationalities. They are closely interrelated and have become particularly relevant today. A great deal depends on the ideologues in terms of solving them. Recent events have clearly indicated the results of any hastily written article or a scornful epithet in the press.

In this connection, I would like to draw attention to the need to put an end to the practice of tacking labels such as "nationalism." In my own lifetime a campaign for the struggle against "nationalism" took place on three occasions in Kazakhstan. It destroyed the best members of our intelligentsia and noted government leaders. Today perestroika is rebuilding justice and restoring names cherished by all Kazakhs. However, the people cannot be brought back to life. That is why today, when we speak of a new thinking, it is particularly bitter to listen to unsupported accusations of nationalism, when it is a question of the growth of national self-awareness.

**Yu. Khadzhiev.** In the kolkhoz which I manage members of many ethnic groups work and live together. There have never been differences or arguments concerning the national problem among them. What difference does it make whether you are an Uzbek, Turkmen or Karakalpak? They all have mothers, they all have to work hard to earn a living. We have no claims and no one has any claim on us in neighboring Turkmenia. Furthermore, had there not been the help of the kolkhoz imeni

Chkalov, Tashauzskiy Rayon, from which we are leasing land, I do not know whether we would have been able to provide jobs for all of our kolkhoz members. What is then the reason for events similar to those which took place in Nagornyy Karabakh? I am convinced that it is not the people who are to be blamed in such cases.

**Sh. Ziyamov**, doctor of historical sciences, head of the ideological department of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee:

The situation in our region is quite difficult today. Problems among nationalities have been added to economic, social and demographic problems. It is precisely under such circumstances that the role and responsibility of the party organizations and the need for them to change their work style increases. Perestroyka in that respect is advancing but not at the required pace. It is difficult to break the customary stereotypes and the obsolete command-administrative methods of communicating with the people.

We must not forget that today a process of politicizing of the masses is under way. We realize that the activeness of the people will be steadily increasing. This requires a differentiated approach. We must learn to work with all population groups and informal associations, regardless of their orientation, in order to channel their activities along constructive rather than destructive directions. We must help to restore in the people faith in justice and in the fact that their views will be mandatorily heard. We must convince them that it is precisely on them that the success of perestroyka in their republic, region and country depends. That is why it is necessary, above all, to know and take into consideration the real demands and needs of the individual. In our efforts to find the optimal variants for the development of our region we must always remember this and check our plans with the interests of the people for whose sake, in fact, such plans are being drawn up.

In holding this roundtable in Tashkent, its organizers did not set themselves the task of developing prescriptions for the solving of all the problems of the area or formulating the definitive options for a strategy of socio-economic development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Nonetheless, such meetings indicate that identifying priorities and sensitive areas and comparing and confronting a variety of opinions and views makes it possible better to understand one another and, therefore, to take a step toward the formulation of such a strategy.

For all too long we were trapped by plans and programs with no options. As a rule, there was a single viewpoint which dominated, a viewpoint which was not to be questioned or criticized, in the discussion of social, economic, ecological and other problems. There was no alternative to the single cotton crop. There were no alternatives to accelerating the extraction of petroleum and natural gas and the building of industrial giants and new water reservoirs. Actually, there always exist alternatives and on each individual case we must consider

them, remembering that this affects the destinies of countries, peoples and individuals.

Today we have realized the need for alternate choices which requires a comparison and study of the different solutions and assuming, in the final account, full responsibility for making them. This precisely was the approach which prevailed at the meeting in Tashkent, along with the understanding that there neither is nor could there be any universal concept which would suit all republics, oblasts and rayons. Naturally, those who met at the roundtable meeting merely sketched the main problems and some ways of solving them. We hope to continue this discussion in this journal and we are relying on the active and interested participation of the readers.

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## DEBATE AND DISCUSSION

### Union Plan and Departmental Interest

*905B0008E Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 89 (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 44-47*

[Article by Yuris Izidorovich Prikulis, candidate of philosophical sciences, and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Fedotov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] Questions related to optimizing the sectorial structure of the national economy and, above all, trends and prospects for the further growth of the industrial potential of the area are among the problems of the economic development of the Baltic republics, which have obviously become aggravated in recent years. The study of the specific history of the development of the national economic structure of the Soviet Baltic allows us highlight more with greater depth the origins and nature of the developing situation.

At the time that they joined the USSR in 1940, Latvia and Estonia had already reached a significant standard of industrial development. They had attained high indicators of industrialization and urbanization and, in any case, could not be considered backward outlying areas. Lithuania's level of economic development was lower, something to which we shall return later.

In the postwar period the development of heavy industry was of vital importance. Under the then prevailing conditions a faster return on capital investments was, naturally, to be expected in areas which already before the war had been quite developed industrially and which, furthermore, had suffered from fewer destructions in the war. Here outlays for ensuring the upsurge of output were substantially lower, for they did not involve new construction.

Indeed, the harm caused to industry in the various parts of the country during the Great Patriotic War was not the same everywhere. In 1945 the overall volume of industrial output, compared to 1940, was as follows:

Belorussia, 20 percent; Ukraine, 26; Northwestern RSFSR, 32; Lithuania, 40; Northern Caucasus, 41; Moldavia, 44; Latvia, 47; and Estonia, 73 percent. The damage caused by the war to production enterprises in Estonia and Latvia was tangibly lesser. Other circumstances as well contributed to the fact that in the first postwar years Estonian and Latvian industry developed at an exceptionally fast pace. In this case factors, such as the partially preserved cadres of skilled workers and specialists, essentially undamaged housing, existing labor traditions, and a satisfactory production infrastructure played an essential role. Therefore, Estonia and Latvia, which were the industrially most developed Baltic republics, were, by the end of the war, in a situation which required relatively fewer outlays for the rebuilding and further development of industry not only in the interest of the area but also of the entire Soviet economy.

Similar conclusions were reached by Western authors as well. For example, T. Parfing reminds us that Estonia and Latvia had a production potential in sectors which were exceptionally important in terms of the overall rebuilding of the economy of the entire Northwestern USSR in the areas of power industry (Estonia) and machine building (Latvia). Therefore, the postwar growth of industry here was based on existing prewar specialization.

Actually, the 4th 5-Year Plan called for an increase in industrial production in the following amounts (1950 in percent of 1940): for the USSR at large, 148; on an average for all the areas which had suffered as a result of enemy occupation, 115; Latvia and Lithuania, 180 percent; and Estonia, 300 percent.

Lithuania held a special position in the Baltic. Its industrial base was weak and its infrastructure was not prepared for the development of heavy industry. Naturally, it was impossible to hope for obtaining tangible results within a short time in this republic.

Some Western authors have mentioned as one of the possible reasons for the accelerated postwar industrial development of the Baltic area the existence of political considerations, i.e., the concept of the building of socialism in the new Soviet republics which, at that time, was related above all to industrialization and to increasing the size of the working class. Such considerations indeed existed. However, their significance should not be overestimated. Even less substantiated is the effort to use the example of the industrialization of the Baltic area during the first postwar period as a direct manifestation of a policy aimed at rapprochement and equalization of the levels of economic development between the previously lagging republics and the more developed ones. Both hypotheses would have to be supported by the faster industrial growth of Lithuania as the least developed of the three Baltic republics; however, it was precisely this that was not noticed in the initial period. Compared to the average Union level, by

1955 the volume of per capita industrial output had reached 124 in Estonia and 119 in Latvia but only 59.7 percent in Lithuania.

In noting the objective circumstances which, in the postwar restoration period justified the accelerated industrial development of Estonia and Latvia, we should nonetheless point out yet another characteristic phenomenon. It was that the development of industry in the two republics we named, starting with the first postwar years, began significantly to outstrip the already high plans. All the right reasons exist to assume that the main role here was played by the system of economic priorities, which was the result of the economic mechanism.

In that connection the views expressed by T. Danne-more, are interesting. He was a foreign researcher who supported in his works the idea that the Soviet economy, which was known as a "command" economy in the West, had by no means obeyed all commands even in the 1930s to the 1950s, but had developed according to its own inner logic. Indeed, taking the 4th 5-Year Plan as an example, a plan which called for the restoration and development of the Soviet national economy (1946-1950), one could see that making plans and passing resolutions, and appropriating funds and resources for the implementation of the programs was one thing, and the actual implementation of the plans through the bureaucratic labyrinth, something entirely different.

In the final account, it was the Union ministries that assumed a decisive role in the implementation of the 5-year plans. Although the development of the lagging areas would have, in the final account, unquestionably contributed to the subsequent faster and more proportional development of the entire country, the ministries were concerned above all with the fulfillment and over-fulfillment of their own quarterly and annual plans. In order to ensure the implementation of the overall planned assignments within the shortest possible time in terms of the volume of sectorial output, they concentrated their meager resources on the existing enterprises in the developed areas, where returns would be faster. This included the Baltic republics. "In order to redirect the resources in this manner," said author emphasizes, "the ministries had to make maximal use of their power.... In the course of the exercise of this power, they used both their legitimate rights as well as the inability of the controlling authorities to force them to observe the letter of the law and the letter of the plan."

This description of the situation is quite consistent with reality. Under the conditions we described, there was an accelerated and largely unsystematic industrial development in Latvia and Estonia. The already high level of industrialization and urbanization of these two republics contributed to the aspiration of the Union ministries, ignoring lagging areas, intensively to develop industrial production in Latvia and Estonia. Meanwhile, the Western areas of the RSFSR, which covered a vast territory between Moscow, Leningrad and the Baltic area were being obviously neglected.

One of the results of the 5-year plan was the major overfulfillment of planned assignments for Estonian and Latvian industry (but, at the same time, a substantial underfulfillment in many other parts of the country). Whereas in 1950 the actual gross volume of industrial output for the USSR had reached 172 percent compared to the prewar 1940 level, it was 191 in Lithuania, 303 in Latvia and 342 percent in Estonia.

By the end of the 1950s the indicators of industrial growth, compared to 1940, were considerably below average in areas of the RSFSR which had been severely damaged by the war, such as Kalinin (120 percent), Kaluga (126) and Kursk (128).

This proves that in matters of the restoration and development of industry, major deviations from the law on the 4th 5-Year Plan (1946-1950) adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, were taking place.

This could not fail to affect migration processes. The exceptionally fast growth of industry in Latvia and Estonia was largely secured through the exclusively high pace of mechanical increase in labor resources. Ignoring both plan and propaganda appeals, many residents of the lagging areas left their native places (or else did not return to them) and moved to work and live in the Baltic area. In their majority they were essentially refugees who were trying to find here some kind of salvation from the terrible material privations. People wishing to leave their native places were found in particularly large numbers among the kolkhoz members of the weakest farms. As a result, soon after the war an abundance of labor resources developed in Latvia and Estonia, which continues to increase. These were the only republics in the European part of the USSR where during the 4th 5-Year Plan (1949) the prewar size of the population had been attained and surpassed.

The faster pace of development of the Baltic industry, compared with the average for the Union, continued in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, during the 5th 5-Year Plan (1951-1955) the volume of industrial output increased for the USSR as a whole by 85 percent; it increased by 79 percent in the RSFSR, 93 percent in Latvia (average annual growth rate of 14.1 percent), 96 percent in the Estonian SSR and by a factor of 2.6 in the Lithuanian SSR (a 21 percent average annual growth rate). Meanwhile, the factors which favored the fast pace of growth of Latvian and Estonian industries began increasingly to yield to opposing factors, the most obvious among which was the limited amount of local manpower. Nonetheless, the Baltic area continued to be considered part of the country suitable for the development of industry. Investors—Union ministries and departments—were drawn by the geographic proximity of the Baltic, the economic development of its territory, its developed transportation and communications facilities, the relatively high quality of ordinary and scientific services and the developed social infrastructure, particularly in terms of training skilled manpower. Such a combination of conditions provided the ministries with the opportunity,

within a relatively short time, to organize the production of the necessary goods and meet stipulated gross output indicators. In other words, the reasons which, from the departmental viewpoint, had given preference to the growth of output in the Baltic area compared with many parts of the country, remained. A kind of inertial accelerated industrial development of the Baltic republics appeared.

The high level of Latvian industrial development which had been reached by 1940 compared with the "old" Soviet republics determined in the subsequent years the small volume of capital investments in the further development of Latvian industry. Thus, during the 4th 5-Year Plan the share of all capital investments in Latvian industry did not exceed 0.49 percent of all capital investments in Soviet industry, although by the start of 1950 Latvia accounted for 1.09 percent of the Soviet population. Therefore, in 1950 capital investments by state and cooperative enterprises in Latvian industry on a per capita basis were lower by a factor of 2.5 compared to the average for the USSR. The tremendous increase in planned assignments in Latvian industry, which violated the law on the 4th 5-Year Plan, was largely the result of the intensified exploitation of production capacities which had been created before 1940, the infrastructure and the unplanned influx of manpower. This made Latvia and Estonia quite different from the remaining areas of the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia, where a significant lagging behind the planned assignments was partially the result of the lack of manpower.

Relatively low capital investments (per capita, compared to the USSR as a whole), as well as substantial unplanned influx of manpower from other areas, were characteristic features in the development of Latvian industry in subsequent years as well. A certain tradition even developed for Latvia (and the other Baltic republics) for the 5-year plans for increasing the volume of industrial output to be steadily and greatly overfulfilled, while those in the lagging regions of the RSFSR and in many other republics remained regularly unfulfilled. Our publications usually mention that taking into consideration the virtual exhaustion of local manpower, starting with the 9th 5-Year Plan (1971-1975) the plans called for a slower growth of industry in Latvia and Estonia, compared to the Union indicators. Essentially, this concept is accurate. Nonetheless, it demands a certain clarification. The point is that the directives on the 6th 5-Year Plan (1956-1960) already stipulated for Estonian industry a relatively low growth in the overall volume of output (60 percent over the 5-year period). Therefore, the changed reproduction conditions were reflected in overall state planning as recommended by the economists. In practice, however, the proportions in the growth of industry in the individual republics, as stipulated in the plans, were distorted beyond recognition. Behind the average figures of the fulfillment of plans as a whole for Soviet industry, there was an overfulfillment by 20-30 or 50 percent and even by two-thirds in the Baltic republics, while, at the same time, there was an underfulfillment by

20-40 percent or more, as a whole, for many other republics (essentially in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Transcaucasus). Instead of having the lowest increase in industrial production, invariably the Baltic republics had some of the highest. With the dominating extensive type of economic development, such a growth rate of industry, given the specific conditions prevailing in Latvia and Estonia, could be maintained only through a mass influx of manpower from the outside. Lithuania's development was somewhat different as a result of a higher level of natural population growth and a higher share of the rural population which provided local manpower resources.

As recognized today by the Latvian scientists and the planning authorities in the republics, starting with 1950 there was no expert economic substantiation and adequate assessment of local possibilities for the building of or substantially expanding many enterprises in the machine building, light and chemical industries. A similar situation developed in Estonia as well.

The lowest growth of industrial output (approximately 50 percent), roughly equal to the average Union indicators (70 percent for the Lithuanian SSR) was contemplated for the Latvian and Estonian SSRs, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR during the 8th 5-Year Plan. The 9th 5-Year Plan called for lower rates of industrial development compared to the average for the Union for Latvia and Estonia, and the entire increase in the volume of industrial output in these two republics was to be achieved through higher labor productivity. Starting with the 10th 5-Year Plan (1976-1980) the growth of Lithuanian industry was planned on a similar basis. As we can see, there was a change in planning approaches.

Nonetheless, we cannot fail to note that the implementation of the recommendations of the economists and the mandatory planned stipulations concerning the development of industry in the Baltic republics took place with substantial delays. This also applies to limiting the pace of industrial growth and the subsequent orientation of industry toward low-material and low energy types of output and a beginning of the conversion of the economy to intensive development. The trends we noted of deviations from 5-year plans in the development of industry in the republics remained.

Currently the volume of industrial output, compared to 1940, is higher by a factor of 59 in Latvia, 61 in Estonia and 85 in Lithuania, as compared to a factor of 29 for the USSR as a whole.

Such an intensified saturation of the Baltic area with industry was essentially the effect of incentives oriented toward the "gross output" by the economic mechanism. The immoderate development of Latvian and Estonian industry was a manifestation not only of departmental interest on the part of sectorial ministries. The local bureaucratic interest (some of the higher leadership in the republics and enterprise managers), as the Baltic economists have noted, also relied on the industrial

"gross output" and the overfulfillment of the plans. The efforts of many of the republic leaders and economists to oppose such a development were qualified, as a rule, as manifestations of parochialism and nationalism. Many of the decisions also revealed a lack of competence and the fact that in the 1960s and even at the beginning of the 1970s, although not in their present manifestation, the ecological and demographic long-term developments were becoming apparent. In the final account, however, all of this had adverse consequences in the area of socioeconomic development.

The main way for the development of Latvian industry today should be the reconstruction of enterprises and their technical retooling and, in a number of cases, making improvements in the industrial structure. These ideas are being included in the plans for the republic's economic and social development.

Unfortunately, so far this approach has met with little understanding on the part of the Union ministries and departments which have been promoting, by hook or by crook, the building and expansion of their production facilities in Latvia. Support by the center is needed in the struggle against departmental pressure applied on the republic.

Therefore, the study indicates that instead of the typical formula suggested by Sovietologists "The Center (Moscow, Russia, the USSR as a whole) in serving its own interest is imposing on the Baltic republics an economic structure inconsistent with their needs," it would be more accurate to say the following: under the conditions of the still operating economic mechanism, a greatly distorted economic structure, inconsistent with the interests of the Baltic republics or the USSR as a whole was imposed, on the former primarily for the sake of departmental interests (and despite governmental resolutions). Although a certain disparity existed (in assessing the long-term development and expedient ratios and pace of development of industry by individual republic and area) between Union ministries and departments, on the one hand, and the USSR Gosplan and economic scientists, on the other, in practice, under the conditions of a centralized command-bureaucratic system the former prevailed.

The overall concept of industrial growth in the Baltic area was the development of low material-intensive and low energy-intensive but science-intensive production facilities based on the use of skilled manpower; and limiting the mechanical increase in manpower. This concept has existed for quite some time and not caused any objections. However, its practical implementation, in the course of decades, has been obviously unsatisfactory. This became one of the sources for the aggravation of difficult economic, social, national, ecological and other problems. The elimination of worsening regional disproportions in the development of the Soviet economy is becoming an increasingly pressing task.

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**Excerpts From Letters**

905B0008F Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian* No 14, Sep 89 (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 48-49

[Text] **F. Konstantinov, professor, honored worker in sciences of the RSFSR, Moscow:**

Under contemporary conditions, the platform of the party's national policy should reflect more fully the socioeconomic aspects of relations among nationalities, setting them in a separate section or else making substantial changes in the present structure of the draft, for the main source of tension in relations among nationalities is, in my view, the unsolved nature of many socioeconomic problems. Crisis phenomena in the economy, neglect of the social area, the empty shelves in stores, increased inflation and major shortcomings in health care and public education, difficulties with housing, and so on, are triggering the discontent of people who can be easily directed along the false path of conflicts among nationalities. That is why it is so important to take real steps to ensure the radical improvement in the situation of the broad popular masses and, therefore, the decisive updating of relations among nationalities as such, without adding to them the burden of other problems.

The part dealing with the ideological and theoretical aspects of the national problem could clearly state and substantiate the fact that socialism and communism do not threaten in any possible way the existence of nations and ethnic groups. This is of very important practical significance for, based on the old concept that nations are short-lasting and that they should become "dissolved" in the future "non-national" communist societies, one would not waste forces and funds, as indeed was the case, for the development of national culture and language and support various social and cultural organizations and movements which promote the shaping and development of national self-awareness.

**G. Gamzatov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Dagestan branch of the Institute of History, Language and Literature imeni G. Tsadasy, Makhachkala:**

Many essential problems of the people's social and national development are related to their life "outside" their national-territorial formation. The appearance of national egotism and arrogance directed against ethnic minorities is both unethical and unconstitutional. We are encountering such an attitude not only in the Caucasus but also in the Baltic area, in Central Asia and other parts of the country where the problem of ethnic groups living outside their own territorial formations may be found, which include (based on the 1979 Census) 34 percent of all Armenians, 23 percent of all Tajiks, 20 percent of all Belorussians, 19 percent of all Kazakhs, 17 percent of all Russians, 15 percent of all Uzbeks, etc. All of them, one would think, will support the stipulation in the draft platform to the effect that "all rights and conditions must be provided for the preservation of

national traditions and the development of the cultures and languages of the peoples living outside their own national-territorial formations or else lacking such formations...." This must truly be accomplished within the conditions of the "statification" of languages, which actually gives priority to one language over another on the territory of a Union republic.

The problem is by no means simple. The arousal of passions on this subject has become so strong as to lead to unexpected and, in some cases, destructive solutions. We are concerned by the trend of replacing the normal search of ways to meet the natural cultural and linguistic demands of national minorities with suggestions of confiscating or "buying" their lands and housing. We must not allow for the process of democratization in the country to be paralleled by a high cost to and violations of the humanistic traditions and principles of accord among nationalities! Need we mention the extent to which national egotism, whatever its manifestations, conflicts with the legal aspect of the community of nations and nationalities in the country and the rights of the individual and the citizen?

**V. Ivanov, candidate of juridical sciences, Moscow:**

In many aspects of the ownership law, land and its subsoil are the most important. This also includes means of production which are both an object of ownership and a territory over which the state maintains sovereignty. Sovereignty and the right of ownership are essentially different things. If a sovereign republic acts as the owner, it has the prerogatives of the owner, i.e., the right to possess, use and handle property, which constitutes the right of ownership only if it is not shared; in the draft, however, such rights have been divided: the republics have the right to ownership and management of the land and the subsoil; the USSR has the right to determine the foundations on the basis of which they can be used. Consequently, neither the Union nor the republics will be subjects to the right of ownership in the strict meaning of the term.

We could accept, as a basic right, for ownership of the land and the subsoil be made the exclusive prerogative of the republics. As members of the USSR, the republics will grant the USSR permanent use of parcels of land to meet all-Union needs such as, for example, the building of military bases, areas for laying Union railroad tracks, lines for the all-Union electric power system, land for enterprises under Union jurisdiction, the border area, the territorial waters, the continental shelf, economic zones and the airspace within the boundaries of the USSR. Such precisely stipulated objects of the law of ownership, related to the land, will be the ownership of the USSR on the basis of a treaty which will limit the sovereignty of Union republics to the extent to which they have deemed it acceptable by joining the USSR.



The current legal acts make it very difficult to understand the demarcation between the competence of the USSR and the individual republics concerning entirely specific objects of exclusive ownership rights.

**N. Gurov, candidate of philological sciences, Leningrad:**

Considering the exceptional importance of "reciprocal linguistic understanding" in terms of the cultural and social integration of our society, the USSR Supreme Soviet should not only pass a resolution on the study of the languages of the peoples of the USSR and the language for international communications, but also steadily supervise the development of this process. This is particularly necessary today, when in many republics a struggle is under way for changing the status of the language of the native population. Consequently, we need an institute of languages of the peoples of the USSR.

In creating such an institute, we could rely both on the experience of the scientific research organizations which, in the 1920s and 1930s, undertook the study of underdeveloped languages and the development of literacy and publication of training manuals, as well as the experience of foreign countries, India in particular, where for the past several decades there has been a Central Institute of Indian Languages (Mysur). The comprehensive study of the question of underdeveloped languages is combined in that institute with intensive work on "mutual linguistic acquaintance." The institute successfully works on the formulation of specialized language programs, textbooks and school aids aimed at training within a short time the population of one state in the language of another, where such a resident may wish to go. In our country, let us say in Kiev or Novosibirsk, it is easier to learn Japanese than to acquire a basic knowledge of Georgian or Estonian. Furthermore, in the national republics themselves the training of newcomers in the native language is not much better.

Such an institute of languages of the peoples of the USSR should be under the direct jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities. It should supply the deputies with the necessary information materials and recommendations on various problems of linguistic relations and provide specific assistance in the formulation and implementation of the linguistic program of the Supreme Soviet.

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## SOCIAL PROTECTION

### Crime: Not Panic But Understanding

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[Article by Stanislav Vladimirovich Borodin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, and Yuriy Vladimirovich Kudryavtsev, candidate of juridical sciences]

[Text] Crime has become quite noticeable among our other numerous difficulties, in terms of quantitative growth and qualitative changes, if one may say, for the worse. Like other negative processes which have been noted in recent years, the crime rate and its scale have been assessed differently and different interpretations have been given to the reasons for changes in criminality. There are those who tend to blame perestroika as such, democratization and the course of humanizing criminal legislation and judicial practices for everything. Others fall into a state of panic at the wave of violence and the "exploits" of racketeers or daring robberies; others again, by force of habit, blame the militia.

Naturally, it would be wrong to deny the existence of a certain connection between changes which characterize crime (as other social ills) and perestroika processes. However, it would be even more wrong to consider perestroika as the prime reason for all difficulties. The real prerequisites for such troubles lie much deeper, rooted in our distant and not so distant past. The main thing, we believe, is calmly to analyze the objective information and, as we bring to light these concealed reasons, to earmark practical steps in this area and find social reserves and, above all, develop a system of criminal justice which could efficiently and quickly react to the changing situation.

## I

Until relatively recently it was claimed that a stable trend toward a lowering of the crime rate dominated in the country. Such statements were based, among others, on the articles published in the press by the heads of the law enforcement authorities who, since statistical data were kept secret, took for purposes of their claims arbitrarily set figures and "appropriate" time frames. Actually, there was a significant increase in crime, severe crime in particular, during the period of stagnation. In the decade from 1973 to 1983 the total crime rate nearly doubled, including severe crimes against individual persons by 58 percent, a doubling of the rate of robberies and thefts, and a tripling of cases of break-ins and bribery. The number of crimes in the economic area increased within that same period by 39 percent.

Today's anomalies include, to one extent or another, the long negative experience of the past. In terms of Soviet history, we consider the following as the main features of this experience, most closely related to the development of an antisocial feeling, scorn for the law, mistrust in the legal system and justice and, on this basis, the appearance of motivations to commit a crime:

The conflict between ideological dogmas and slogans, on the one hand, and the actual situation in the various areas of life, on the other, which, in the final account, led to disappointment, a loss of reputation of the authorities, and the people's disorientation and bitterness. Thus, the aspiration to improve the living standard and real equality, which had been proclaimed for decades led, under the conditions of the suppression of economic

methods of management, to equalization of wages on an exceptionally low level. At the same time, some small social groups lived significantly better than the majority of the population, which could not be conceived as other than hypocrisy and injustice;

The methods applied in the leadership of society both centrally and locally, as well as interrelationships within the Stalinist apparatus, cultivated by Stalin and his lackeys. This pertains to the strict hierarchy, and secret or even individual decision-making, informing, scorn of individual destinies, gaining the good disposition of superiors through personal loyalty and services and, subsequently, money;

The cruelty of Stalinism toward its own people. This applies not only to the bloody repressions which lasted from the end of the 1920s to the beginning of the 1950s and which distorted the mentality of more than one generation but, in general, to criminal legislation and the way it was applied (what is the good, for example, of the 7 August 1932 Law which allows the use of the death penalty, and the ukases of 4 June 1947 which stipulated severe punishment for gleaning on the kolkhoz fields). The cruelty toward people who had fallen between the cogs of the punitive system and the disproportionality between crime and punishment, changed values and moral guidelines of the broad toiling strata, triggering a reaction of cruelty;

The destruction of the traditional system of morality and replacing a number of universal human values with dogmatic stereotypes, frequently brought to a point of absurdity, the cultivation of command, diktat and violence as the allegedly proper means of solving all problems. It was precisely this that was the origin for mass hysterias expressed in the demand to execute the "enemies of the people," or else to "eliminate the kulaks as a class," and an insulting attitude toward religion, encouraging informing and persecution of dissidents. The extreme vulgarizing of Marxist concepts of the class struggle led to the easy acceptance by the ignorant population strata of the barbaric classification of criminals themselves into those "socially close to us" (general criminal articles) and "socially alien" (political articles). Subsequently this turned into an overall mistrust toward anyone who had been in jail and, in state policy, a discrimination for many long years (having a police record, obtaining a residence permit, jobs, etc.). This made incredibly more difficult the social rehabilitation of individuals who had been released from incarceration, encouraging them to commit new crimes;

The tremendous number of prohibitions, restrictions and stipulations (which frequently conflicted with each other or were totally senseless), which ran through the entire social life. Under those circumstances, it was simply impossible to live a normal life without violating legal restrictions. All of this, superimposed on the remaining "mistrust of the masses toward anything

pertaining to the state" (V.I. Lenin) also explained the increasingly negative attitude toward the authorities and their regulations.

Obviously, there also were and still are other factors, economic above all. The limitations of this article do not allow us to analyze them in detail. However, even those we enumerated would suffice to describe the atmosphere in which generations of our fellow citizens were raised.

Naturally, the overall social situation did not remain static. The negative processes, as they changed, stubbornly remained and even worsened. Organizational reasons for negative phenomena were added to the economic and moral ones. As a result of the continuing decline in discipline and weakened exigency and worsened crime records, violations of the principle of the inevitability of responsibility and punishment, the belief that some delinquencies could remain unpunished became widespread, particularly petty theft, black-marketeering, extortions, violations of labor and equipment safety rules, negligence and abuse of official position. Groups of people with clearly expressed ownership aspirations, scorning the social interests, developed in the country. The amounts of thefts and bribes increased. During the time when the country was essentially sliding toward the precipice of an economic and political crisis, all such changes were entirely natural.

A significant gap developed between the levels of noted and latent (covert) crime. Selective studies indicated that no more than one-half of the overall number of violent crimes and crimes against the health and the inviolability of the individual were reported; no more than 10 percent of economic crimes (theft of government and public property, bribery, abuses, speculations and others) were recorded. The press reported that as late as 1989 the number of unsolved crimes was 350,790 (an 8.5 percent increase over 1988).

The main, the conceptual factor which was realized during that time by the scientists and the public was that in speaking of crime and its reasons in our country it was time to stop referring to the "vestiges of the past" in the minds of the people. It is true that it was not our system that created crime. However, under the conditions of socialism as well, in which, as is the case of any society which is far from ideal, a number of grave social contradictions remain; under the conditions of deformed socialism reasons for social anomalies, inherent in that type of system, become all the stronger. During the period of stagnation phenomena such as the alienation of the working people from the ownership and products of their toil, statification of the economy and many areas of social life, removing the citizens from the solution of vitally important problems and from the country's management, a gap between words and actions and between slogans and reality, the blossoming of bureaucratism, callousness, lack of attention toward the people, and lies and illegalities assumed a particularly critical and explosive nature. The unpredictability of the actions of the authorities and inconsistency in decisions and actions

both in the center and in the local areas, inherent in any administrative-command system, played a major role in the "decline of mores." There was a decline in morality, largely related to corruption and theft within the governmental and economic apparatus. The severe deformations of socialism and the "rejection" of men to the periphery of the domestic policy of the state were the main, the overall reason for the growth of aggressive and mercenary criminality at the beginning of the 1980s.

Antisocial phenomena do not appear suddenly or disappear immediately. Obviously, even with the dynamic changes in the social awareness, which are taking place under our own eyes, some of the most distorted aspects of the administrative-command socialism, which have left deep traces in the minds and mentality of the people, will still be felt, acting like a hidden spring in triggering antisocial behavior.

The growth of crime, although with fluctuations, has continued in recent years as well. The figures have been extensively publicized, for which reason it would be pointless to repeat them. What is noteworthy is a significant increase in the number of crimes committed against individuals and mercenary crimes of violence, and the growth of organized crime. What created this? The factors are numerous. Let us first point out those related to the work of the law enforcement authorities. To begin with, let us pay attention to the increased number of reported crimes, such as inflicting severe bodily harm, robberies, plunder and theft. The increased recording of such crimes put an end to previous attempts at concealing them or classifying them as "petty" delinquencies. The number of cases instigated on the basis of such reports has increased substantially.

Second, the type of criminals has changed. Clearly, this is related to the imposition of fewer jail sentences. This, added to the amnesty which was granted at the end of 1987, led to the fact that the number of people sentenced to serve time in corrective labor institutions had declined by 40 percent at the start of 1989. Several hundred thousand people, previously isolated from society, were turned loose.

Third, the level of detection of many crimes remains low. This enables unknown individuals, including recidivists, to pursue their criminal activities. For example, during the first half of 1989 alone, criminals guilty of committing 941 crimes, inflicting more than 5,500 severe body damages, and more than 1,000 rapes, nearly 3,000 robberies, and 196,000 thefts of personal property of the citizens, remained unidentified. The overall weakening of the activeness of militia and prosecution personnel in halting the criminal activities even of known criminals played a role. Despite an overall improvement in the reporting of crimes, in a number of republics and oblasts the commission of crimes continues to be concealed.

This may be explained with the complacency of the personnel of the criminal justice system: in 1986-1987

the percentage of dangerous crimes dropped substantially. Furthermore, under the new circumstances (the course toward democratization, glasnost, humanism in the justice system, etc.) found the militia unprepared quickly to react to the active efforts of experienced criminals. Many members of the internal affairs and prosecution authorities either could not or were unable to find their way, to assume responsibility, and to show initiative. They simply became confused. The result was a crime crisis: the militia became less active in identifying and exposing individuals who had committed crimes, while the prosecutors tried to avoid the filing criminal indictments. Dashing and going to extremes seemed to be our constant difficulty: instead of strictness, cruelty; instead of humanism, powerlessness and blanket forgiveness.... Given this situation, we believe, all the proper reasons exist to speak of a crisis in the criminal justice system, as part of the crisis of the entire administrative-command system.

Nonetheless, the basic reasons for changes in the dynamics and structure of crime are explained not in terms of legal but social factors. The initial years of perestroika, the awakening of the people's energy, the headlong development of glasnost, the major reassessment of the old values and other processes led to sharp changes in the country's economic, social, psychological and political situation. Historical experience proves that, in general, any major change is fraught with social stress and cataclysms. A transition from the old to the new is never simple or one-dimensional. Changes in the state of crime as in other social phenomena reflect, to a certain extent, the processes which take place, although in a specifically distorted manner.

The sharply critical assessment of all previous Soviet history, ideological cliches, unsuitable methods of economic management and administration triggered initially a certain confusion among economic managers, administrators, party workers and the population. There were more important things as well: a major shift in social and moral guidelines, and a feeling of insecurity about the future felt by some working people. The loss of reputation of the authorities lowered the already low restraining potential of legal and other social standards even further. Nor should we underestimate a certain mental stress triggered by the flood of information about strikes, violence, and the psychology of "after us the deluge," resulting from the difficult economic situation and the appearance of hotbeds of social and national conflicts. Democratization entailed a large number of initiatives and undertakings most of which were healthy and constructive but, to some extent destructive as well. In a situation of low political standards and lack of democratic experience, the interpretation by a certain segment of the population of democracy as meaning total permissiveness became a widespread phenomenon. Discipline declined at work and in society. Suffice it to say that whereas during the first quarter of 1989 the number of crimes committed in a state of intoxication, was 19.6 percent higher (compared with the same period of last

year), fewer people were punished for excessive drinking and for appearing drunk in public places by 13.2 percent, while for making and selling moonshine 45.9 percent fewer were punished, compared to the first quarter of 1988.

The "negative" energy of adolescents, declassed elements and former felons, which had been accumulating for years, broke on the surface. Some of it assumed a national coloring. Whereas at the beginning of the national tension, in a number of areas it was only the criminal and declassed elements acted as "street fighters," the subsequent course of events leads us to assume that the roles changed. Ever better organized and united, and supported by black marketers and conservative forces, the criminal world began itself to exploit the upsurge of national feelings for its own mercenary interests. Naturally, the mechanism of such actions is as yet to be studied closely.

With a change in the attitude toward the old economic management system, the development of cooperatives and individual labor activity, there occurred (after the excesses which were committed in the struggle against "unearned income") a noticeable weakening of control over sources of income and their amount. All of this occurred against a background of worsening economic situations and polarization of interests. In a 4-year period only a few small groups of people were able to improve their material situation: above all the members of cooperatives and the operators in the underground economy, as well as a small segment of workers and managers. The living conditions of most people worsened, above all because of inflation, price increases and scarcity of prime necessity goods. The increased number of mercenary crimes is inevitable when the living standard of the population drops, when there is inflation and increased scarcity of a larger number of durable goods and foodstuffs. In 1989 the share of mercenary crimes reached its highest level—57 percent.

Finally: naturally, the people want a fast improvement in living conditions and economically tangible results which, for the time being, are not available. One could hardly continue to rely on the restraining potential of the previous standard behavioral regulators. Recidivism is high. What is much more alarming, in our view, is the increased number of first offenders.

It is self-evident that the various criminal actions are as different from each other in many ways, as are the people who have committed them. However, the main question is that of the reason for the leading trend: increased aggressive, and the cruel and cynical nature of both violent and mercenary crimes against a background of their overall increase.

The crime level has created among the population entirely justified concern and alarm. Clearly, any serious improvement in this area can be related, in the final account, only to the implementation of long-term large-scale measures in restructuring the economy and the

political and social areas. The point is, however, that their effect will not be immediate. What must we do as of now? What should be the basic principles and trends in contemporary criminal policy and what do we have the right to demand and expect of the legal authorities?

## II

In the 1930s to the 1950s the criminal justice authorities were described as punitive. This fully reflected the nature of their activities. It was believed that the task of the militia, the investigators, the prosecutors and the courts was to punish, the harsher the better. Cruelty was considered a necessary attribute in the way society assessed crime and a manifestation of an intolerance of it. Frequently the quality of the work of the militia and the investigators was rated according to the number of detentions.

This approach weakened by the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, after the 20th CPSU Congress. The criminal justice authorities abandoned the most hateful ways and means of the struggle against crime. This was assisted by the new criminal legislation which, in particular, rejected the concept of analogy by eliminating the criminal liability of relatives of traitors, the concept of "socio-harmful element," and others. However, no radical changes were made, and the overall punitive trend of our penal policy did not change.

The main features in the criminal policy of the postwar years was the systematic intensification of penal repression and, at the same time, the inadequate guarantees of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, both victims and criminals or, in general, of individuals not involved in crimes. The reasonably weighed and efficient penal legislation, which was adopted by the turn of the 1960s, was substantially changed in subsequent decades, generally speaking for the worse. For example, more than 350 amendments were made to the 1961 RSFSR Penal Code, the result of which was that 86 percent of the punishments listed in the special section of the code called for prison terms. Although the maximal length of such penalty (15 years) was not extended, deprivation of freedom proved to be the most frequently applied penal sanction. Thus, in 1981 as many as 80 percent of sentenced individuals were given prison terms.

The law enforcement authorities retained their predilection for accusations which frequently led to groundless charges and the sentencing of innocent individuals. The psychological orientation not toward justice but repression, with an inadequate standard of overall and professional knowledge, remaining from Stalinist times, led to the fact that many members of the law enforcement authorities frequently neglected the quality of investigations and consideration of cases. A preventive measure such as detention was quite extensively applied. Defense attorneys were not allowed to be present at preliminary hearings; actually, in the majority of criminal cases it is not stipulated to this day. Acquittals were an extremely rare phenomenon. The principles of legality, proclaimed

in the USSR Constitution (independence of judges, equality of citizens in the eyes of the law and the courts, etc.) were distorted. We know that a number of criminals, particularly members of the local "nomenclature," escaped criminal responsibility while their colleagues in the superior echelons of the apparat remained out of the reach of the investigative authorities and the courts.

Understandably, the penal policy in the period of stagnation neither yielded nor could yield positive results in the struggle against crime. Its radical change was necessary. The 2 April 1988 CPSU Central Committee Decree "On the Condition of the Struggle Against Crime in the Country and Additional Steps to Prevent Delinquency" directed the law enforcement authorities and the public to restructuring the work for the prevention of violations and the efficient protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens.

The overall perestroika process in that area has begun. However, it is taking place extremely slowly and only in some areas. A draft Foundations of Criminal Legislation was submitted to the USSR People's Deputies, in which a number of criminal law stipulations have been amended with a view to upgrading the efficiency of the law, democracy and humanism. Draft penal codes are being compiled in Union republics, stipulating just and weighed penalties; the struggle against organized crime and the protection of the life, health, honor and dignity of the individual is intensifying. The USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law developed a theoretical model for a new criminal procedure code. The Institute of Problems of Legality and Law and Order of the USSR Prosecutor's General Office and the USSR MVD All-Union Scientific Research Institute drafted a model new Foundations of Penal-Executive Legislation. Such scientific works will have a practical application as well.

However, the gap from the new laws (which have not even been passed as yet) to real practice is huge. Alas, few real changes have been made in investigation, prosecution and trial practices. It is true that the rights of prosecutors in preventing the violations of the law were broadened; they have been assigned the obligation to make a direct study of the materials related to complaints filed against actions by inquest and investigation and prosecution authorities and in the detention of suspects. The courts have reviewed and tried a number of cases involving people charged with stealing socialist property and bribery, who were previously untouchable by the law enforcement authorities. Although with difficulty, the principle of independence of the judges, who must obey exclusively the law, is making its way. The number of acquittals increased in 1987-1988. The adoption of the Law on the Status of Judges by the USSR Supreme Soviet was of major importance.

However, many of the old deformations in the juridical system have not been eliminated. To this day defendants are kept under guard for years on end, although quite some time ago the law stipulated that this time must not

exceed 9 months. Many members of the militia, in conducting investigative activities, seek loopholes so that, under the pretext of intensifying the struggle against crime, "simplify" the penal process by violating the rights of accused or lowering the level of reliability of proof of guilt. However, a law-governed state is a state in which crime must be fought through legal means.

In formulating penal policy, as in any type of planning, in the recent past we frequently hurried. Suffice it to remember that the stipulation of the CPSU Program (1961 draft) on "uprooting" crime in our country was accepted by both scientists and practical workers as an immediately attainable objective. Practical experience proved that this objective cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future (incidentally, that is why said stipulation has been deleted from the 1986 CPSU Program). Bearing in mind the ideological substantiation of perestroika in the juridical area, today we need a concept not of "elimination" of crime in the immediate future, not to mention through "exceptional measures," but its stabilization and, subsequently, its reduction.

In that area our policy must abandon the existing stereotypes, secrecy, departmentalism and lack of objectivity in evaluating people and their actions. It must adopt and actively implement the positive trends of democratization, the principles of humanism, social justice and the supremacy of the individual, which are developing in our society. It is only on this basis that the struggle against crime can be efficient. Circumstantial "exceptional measures," regardless of their entire local or temporal substantiation, should not set aside this overall strategy which, as it improves social mores, will be redeemed a hundredfold. Let us provide somewhat greater details of what we believe would be the main future trends in this area:

**Democratization and rationalization** of the entire system of the struggle against crime, including criminal, penal-procedural and corrective-labor legislation and the practices of its application, the activities of the militia, investigators, prosecutors and judges; the formulation of procedures which would ensure the extensive participation of labor collectives and the public in this work through the development of self-management;

**Humanizing** of legislation and the practical activities of the criminal justice authorities, with a view to protecting the individual and his legal interests in the criminal justice system, the serving of sentences and the social adaptation of individuals who are serving a prison sentence; the methods of prevention, aimed at eliminating the reasons and conditions which contribute to crime must become fundamental; particular attention must be paid to securing the rights of crime victims;

Ensuring **justice** in the application of the law toward every person who finds himself involved in court procedures, whether as an accused, a victim or a witness, and guaranteeing true equality of the citizens in the eyes of the law and the courts regardless of their position, party

affiliation, attitude toward religion, nationality, place of residence and other circumstances;

Ensuring *glasnost* in the activities of the criminal justice authorities; regular and full publication of statistical data on the course and results of their activities; granting members of the public the right to supervise the work of any juridical institutions and subdivisions, free discussion of their work, and coverage by mass information media (taking into consideration the specific nature of investigative and court activities);

**Reorganization** of the criminal justice system on the basis of the clear demarcation between operative investigation, indictment, supervision (by the prosecution), and court, corrective-labor, and protective functions (by the defense attorney), and elimination of departmental combination of duties.

The following question arises: Are democratization and humanizing of the struggle against crime pertinent while crime is increasing? We are convinced that they are more than pertinent. Long years of domestic and global experience in the struggle against crime proves that success is achieved not through the harshness of punishment but by its inevitability. It is obvious that softening the harshness of criminal legislation and humanizing the practices of its application should be properly weighed and common sense should not be ignored. Responsibility must be strictly differentiated. Reducing the use of prison sentences could save hundreds of thousands of nondangerous violators from attending a "school for crime." At the same time, it must be made clear that murderers, rapists and extortionists should be reliably isolated from society for long periods of time and must inevitably serve their deserved sentences.

Let us not forget that the renovation of socialism means, in addition to everything else, a humane and fair attitude on the part of the state toward all of its citizens. Those who violate the law are also citizens of their country. It is not a question of universal forgiveness and even less so of weakening the struggle against crime. In this struggle we must act decisively but on the basis of universally accepted human standards worthy of a socialist law-governed state.

Naturally, in this case we must accurately assess the possibilities of the criminal justice system in influencing the crime rate. Such possibilities are not limitless in the system of social factors which determine the dynamics of antisocial behavior. It would be hardly proper to assess the level of efficiency of the activities of the criminal justice authorities on the basis, shall we say, of direct indicators, such as the condition or dynamics of the crime rate, not to mention the number of individuals brought to trial. Naturally, there are insufficient grounds to assign to them the entire responsibility for the level of the crime rate in their city, rayon, oblast or the country. Such responsibilities, as practical experience has indicated, not only failed to yield positive results but can only lead to failure to report crimes or unjustified

refusals to draw up criminal indictments. These authorities can and must influence the level of the crime rate more efficiently but only one way: by honestly fulfilling their duties: quickly and qualitatively investigating and exposing crimes, passing just sentences, and taking all the legal steps necessary for the re-education of the delinquents.

In our view, the most important among the prerequisites for improving the activities of the criminal justice authorities is their independence from local and departmental influences. The changes made in the procedure for the election of judges to kray, oblast, city and rayon courts, and the introduction of certain guarantees of their independence with the Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR were steps in that direction. However, this problem has still not been entirely resolved. As in the past, the local party committee may summon a judge and hold a "hearing" on the results of his work. Courts and judges remain materially dependent on the local authorities. We must regretfully note that the regulations adopted by the Supreme Soviet on the status of judges and on decisively intensifying the struggle against crime conflict with each other in at least one very essential point: judges are members of the provisional committees for the struggle against crime, which are headed by the chairmen of executive committees. What kind of strengthening of their independence could there be a question of? As to the nature of activities of the provisional committees, they could be useful only if investigators, prosecutors and judges are guaranteed against outside interference in specific criminal cases. The decree "On Decisively Increasing the Struggle Against Crime" emphasizes that the committees must operate on the basis of the strict observance of the USSR Constitution and the law. However, as our own experience indicates, such declarative statements do not block interference in investigative and prosecutorial work and judicial activities, the more so since the prerogatives of committees are not stipulated in the resolution, whereas the rights of the investigator, prosecutor and the court are specifically stipulated in the law.

What worsens the problem further is that the evaluation of the quality of the work of prosecutors, investigators and heads of internal affairs authorities and, therefore, their job security, depend to a significant extent on the opinion of the local party leadership. Obviously, the law enforcement authorities should set up their independent party committees which should report directly to the superior territorial party committees. For Union republics such party committees could be headed by the CPSU Central Committee party organizers.

A fact which contributes to interfering with the activities of the criminal justice authorities is the practice of prosecutorial (departmental) coordination of the activities of courts, prosecution offices, investigators and internal affairs organs. This obligation of the prosecutor's office is included in Article 3 of the Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR. It is difficult to agree with this approach. If the prosecutor coordinates law

enforcement work in the rayon or city, for example, he acts as though he is the "senior operative chief." Therefore, one way or another, he assumes responsibility for the work of all criminal justice authorities and it is he who is responsible above all to the local authorities for the condition of crime in the rayon or city. The situation on the higher levels—oblasts and republics—is the same. All of this conflicts with the main task of the prosecution—to watch over legality.

A coordination of activities is necessary but, from our viewpoint, above all and mainly in order to organize the prevention of crime, i.e., to solve social problems. In addition to the criminal justice authorities, such work must involve the other governmental and economic authorities, labor collectives and public organizations. Clearly, the job of directing such activities should be assigned to the soviets of people's deputies. Possibly, this should also be one of the functions of the provisional committees for the struggle against crime.

Furthermore, under the conditions of an aggravated crime situation, we must immediately solve the problem of strengthening the law enforcement protection services, above all the militia patrols and the criminal investigations personnel. As we know, this is stipulated in the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Decisively Intensifying the Struggle Against Crime." It is a question of ensuring quality improvements in the technical facilities (weapons, ammunition, means of self-defense, communications, automotive transportation, etc.); upgrading the level of knowledge of special means of struggle against criminals, amending the rules governing the use of weapons, improving the selection and professional training of cadres, and developing new methods for their training. It is high time to make a more thorough study of the experience of other countries in the struggle against crime and to organize exchanges of experience and practical training.

A major problem is that of upgrading the living standard of judges, prosecutors, investigators and militia personnel (wages, housing, children's institutions, etc.). Meanwhile, many members of the militia are resigning and going to work in economic enterprises and cooperatives where wages are much higher; between January and May 1989 alone vacancies in the MVD system increased by 10,000 people. Why not make use of the reduction of the Armed Forces to reinforce the militia? As we know, state security personnel, who act jointly with the MVD, are becoming a major force in the struggle against crime, organized crime in particular.

The importance and urgency of these steps were emphasized also by M.S. Gorbachev in his 9 September television address. These steps, naturally, call for amending legislation and require substantial funds. However, the time has come to make decisive progress, for otherwise the sharply growing crime rate will soon be simply difficult to oppose altogether. At the same time, we must

accelerate the legal and judicial reforms and truly put such authorities under the control of the deputies and the entire people.

The successful implementation of the strategy of the struggle against crime requires a systematic long-term approach to this work. Meanwhile, studies have indicated that neither the internal affairs organs nor the prosecution and the courts have long-term programs.

The National Comprehensive Program of the Struggle Against Crime should be an instrument for the implementation of the strategic approach. Its theoretical model was formulated by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law and submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the party authorities and the law enforcement departments. The idea of such a comprehensive program, as we know, was approved by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. A corresponding instruction was issued to the USSR Council of Ministers.

The study indicated that the optimal program would be one covering a period of 10 to 15 years, which would take into consideration the forthcoming radical changes in the economy and the social area, and in the entire superstructure of Soviet society. In addition to the formulation of a long-term program we also need a variant which would include the necessary measures which must be adopted as of now and in the immediate future. We must formulate clear stipulations concerning the organization of the struggle against crime so that it may not assume the nature of "fire fighting steps." Such a program could improve the interaction among state authorities and the public in the prevention not only of crime but also of other violations and social deviations (alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution, etc.), which are the companions of crime. It should have sections on improving crime prevention and the exposure and investigation of crimes and restructuring the work of the courts and of corrective labor institutions. We must particularly thoroughly plan steps in the struggle against organized crime, juvenile delinquency and threats to the safety of individuals.

We must point out that in the 1970s and beginning of 1980s efforts were made to draft programs for intensifying the struggle against juvenile crime and recidivism which, however, were not carried out. These programs were drafted hastily and without the necessary scientific preparations; they were of a departmental nature and did not provide for resources; nor was the mechanism for their implementation considered; they were virtually forgotten the moment they were ratified. All of this must be avoided today. As we know, the financial situation of the country is difficult and a good criminal justice system is expensive. However, our lives, health and tranquillity are immeasurably more valuable.

In considering negative phenomena, it would be naive to assume that perestroika with its difficulties, problems

and trials will pass us by and will not affect us "personally." Nor should we have any delusions also in the sense that this process will be easy. Crime, like inflation, scarcity, ethnic discord, and others, will one way or another be with us for a while and occasionally assume acute and unexpected aspects, under the influence of the cleansing and revolutionary processes which are taking place in the country, and parallel new and progressive phenomena. We must be able to separate the wheat from the chaff. We must have the courage and firmness to go through the trials without panicking or becoming depressed but by strengthening our efforts in opposing negative processes.

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### Militia and Democracy

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[Article by Lieutenant General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Anikiyev]

[Text] In seeking ways of efficiently counteracting the growing amount of crime, we turn naturally to the Soviet militia. Today its situation is difficult. Democratization, pluralism and glasnost are a test of its maturity. The resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Decisively Intensifying the Struggle Against Crime" emphasizes the militia's professionalism.

The way the political leadership of the USSR MVD considers this range of problem is described by the chief of its Political Directorate, Lieutenant General of Internal Services and Candidate of Economic Sciences Anatoliy Vasilyevich Anikiyev.

The principles of the law-governed state are consistent with the expectations of millions of working people. The people want not simply to live well but also to be confident that they are being protected from any arbitrariness. This can be achieved only through a profound reform in the political system and the systematic democratization of all aspects of social life, in the course of which priority is given to the self-management of the people, while the power of the state is given a firm legal aspect.

All of this reformulates the position of the internal affairs organs in society, as a law enforcement and law exercising institution. Obviously, we must broaden their functions related to the development of the territories and the establishment of local self-management. This also presumes substantial improvements in the traditional areas of their activities and, above all, something which is particularly obvious today, in ensuring public safety. The internal affairs organs must have a range of rights and ways and means for law enforcement activities well-known by the population and legislatively (and not departmentally) established. Finally, the question of more efficient control over the work of these organs

arises, from the USSR Supreme Soviet to the control mechanism within the system itself (including Union and republic ministries) and the local soviets.

Of late the question has been asked whether the MVD system is capable of restructuring in order to engage in an efficient struggle against crime while, at the same time, eliminating from law enforcement practices any violations of legality. We can most firmly claim that it is. However, this is a matter not only for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as is clearly stipulated in the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution "On Decisively Intensifying the Struggle Against Crime." The reason is that the condition of criminality and the level of legal awareness of the people and legality one way or another reflect the overall situation in the country and, therefore, demand the joint efforts of the various social forces and institutions.

Nonetheless, considering the results of a survey conducted in Smolninskiy Rayon in Leningrad, 58 percent of the respondents believe that the militia alone has the duty of fighting negative phenomena. Unfortunately, this view is quite widespread, and as long as such an attitude toward the problem has not changed, it would be difficult to expect any success. The behavior of the citizens in accordance with the laws is an equally important prerequisite for the triumph of legality as is its protection, the full exposure of crimes and the inevitability of punishment. The destatization of society, which is understood as broadening the self-management of the people, also affects the area of law and order. Its strengthening must become the concern not only of the law enforcement authorities but also of the entire society.

It is on the basis of such positions that we must also consider the question of the place of the internal affairs organs within the state management system. At the present time they are under dual command: horizontally, they are one of the departments of executive committees of local soviets; vertically, they are subordinated to the superior internal affairs authority. In practice, this means that they are subordinated to the local executive (administrative) authorities and are only partially and, as a rule formally, controlled by the center. This contradiction must be eliminated. Clearly, the city and rayon internal affairs departments, whose functions are essentially limited to keeping and maintaining public order, must indeed be subordinate to the local authorities. However, they must be under the jurisdiction directly of the soviets and not of their executive apparatus. On the other hand, the management of a number of services, the operative services above all, whose activities require a high level of coordination, should be centralized. We are convinced of this, based on the objective study of the situation.

Within a 30 year period, from 1956 to 1985, the situation in the struggle against violations of the law was characterized by a steady increase in the crime rate, the pace of which outstripped the growth of the population



by a factor of nearly 7. The number of recorded crimes increased by a factor of 2.9 and criminal acts per 100,000 population by a factor of 2.1.

The moral healing of society, which was initiated in the country after the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, seemed to have opened new opportunities for exerting a more efficient influence on the condition of law and order. There was even a drop in the crime rate in 1985-1986. In 1987, however, it became clear that the situation had worsened once again. In the first half of 1989 more than 1 million crimes were reported, or 32 percent increase compared to the same period in 1988. Organized crime is greatly aggravating the situation. This year alone 1,320 groups and bandit units, which have committed nearly 9,000 dangerous crimes, have been identified. The unsatisfactory organization of the social rehabilitation of former delinquents has resulted in the fact that more than one-third of them had resumed their criminal activities in the first year after their release from jail. The level of exposure of crime and the quality of investigations are worsening noticeably.

It is obvious that the adverse circumstances which have developed in the country at large cannot be eliminated in any individual area. There is heavy reliance on the national program for the struggle against crime, which would make it possible to concentrate the efforts of all interested authorities, departments and public organizations. We also need standardized, aggressive and well-organized efforts on the part of the internal affairs organs, concentrating on common objectives and tasks, and adopting a work style free from professional dependency and the habit of automatically handling matters with the old means and routine methods, with references to the specific situation in "their own" city or rayon.

In this connection, let us note the features of a situation which has intensified of late, concerning the internal affairs organs; the leaders of nationalistic and anti-Soviet segments of a number of informal associations have become noticeably more active in terms of these authorities. In an effort to reduce the professional activeness of our personnel, particularly in cases of unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations, they are making greater efforts to discredit the militia, to promote its ideological disarmament, to encourage within militia detachments national hostility; they try to create within them their own support centers and insist on the removal of the political authorities within the MVD.

Specific proof is available. Thus, in Lvov militiamen have been urged to "take the side of the people or resign." The slogan "The Militia With Us, the Militia Among Us" was heard at a meeting in Kishinev, and two members of the Yalovenskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, in Moldavia, did not obey the order of their commander because it was issued in the Russian language.... Are these petty matters or random cases? The

effect of all this should be seriously considered, particularly by those who some times fall under the influence of demagogues and amateurs of pseudodemocratic thinking.

The Communist Party has initiated revolutionary perestroika so that, after learning the bitter but necessary lessons from the errors of the past, it can build a truly democratic socialist state. Such work is being done under the conditions of a real political struggle, when glasnost and pluralism are frequently used also for attacking the party and socialism, undermining the reputation of the authorities, and speculating on occasionally aggravated circumstances with a view to the satisfaction of personal ambitions. The MVD organs can be true defenders of developing democracy only by firmly standing on the positions of Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist internationalism. They must do their work on a highly professional level. They must reliably protect society and the rights and freedoms of every citizen regardless of his origins, religious convictions or affiliation with various social movements. The following question, therefore, becomes logical: Can we allow for collectives of internal affairs organs to be classified on the basis of their sympathy for various informal organizations or ethnic origins? Naturally, we cannot.

Under the conditions of the systematic broadening of democracy, the militia is constantly faced with dealing with criminal initiatives as well, which are characterized by a disdainful or openly scornful attitude toward the interest of the citizens, hooliganism and excesses in pursuing clearly extremist objectives. The militia does not have the right to stand aside and not interfere. It must not allow for the foundations of the law-governed state—as the executors of the law and upholders of its mandatory nature for all—to be undermined. It has long stopped being a secret that the intervention of the militia frequently provokes discontent. The ordinary person considers any one of its actions, even those which are absolutely legitimate, sometimes as a blow at democracy, although the true blow is frequently dealt from an entirely different side. Who, in such cases, bears moral responsibility: Is it only those who decide to use the special subunits or the organizers of a unsanctioned meeting, for example, who would be perfectly aware of the possible use of force?

Today all of us are learning democracy. As long as the people who are aspiring toward democracy, and the militia which is defending this democracy, are pitted against each other, we would learn little. As a result of such opposition, the militia personnel increasingly find themselves in unusual situations and are experiencing many difficulties. Frequently force is used against the militia, which must be opposed by suitable means. Last year the militia used weapons more frequently than in the past. Nonetheless, in the past 2.5 years, more than 500 of our personnel have died in the line of duty.

In this situation, the restoration and development of strong relations with labor collectives and the public, and

strengthening the interaction with the population in preserving law and order and preventing violations become the most important political task. The position of the MVD organs must be principle-minded in their relations with the population and the mass information media: there should be no display of ambition or boastfulness; there must be an honest reaction to criticism and an aspiration to cooperate for the sake of reaching the common objective, which is strengthening law and order and legality. Critical remarks are useful and necessary for the internal affairs authorities. They make it possible for the personnel to check their actions more accurately against the law, and take a fresh look at the way their work is evaluated, through the lens of the changes which are taking place in society. The militia does not need any kind of inflated authority. However, nor can it do efficient work if it is discredited. Respect for the militia, which is instilled from childhood, is an inseparable element of legal standards, without which there can be no law-governed state. Public opinion is the most important criterion in assessing our work. It must be objective in the full meaning of the term.

In determining the legal framework for militia activities, we must not forget the significance of operative investigations: always and in everything we must fight crime, above all with high-level professionalism.

The material and technical facilities of the militia must be substantially improved and updated and raised to the level of today's scientific achievements. The decision to do this was made and it is the right one. However, even a perfectly equipped militia will fall behind current developments if the focus of all of its activities is not crime prevention and if it fails to learn how promptly to prevent crime and to block it at the stage when crime has still not become irreversible or caused irreparable damage.

It is very important to train the personnel to maintain a high standard of culture and morality, have broad political outlook and knowledge of life, and master excellent legal and specialized knowledge. Unfortunately, so far rudeness, indifference, and a low general cultural standard are still quite widespread among us. This is confirmed, in particular, by public opinion surveys on the work of the militia. That is why the collegium of the USSR MVD especially considered the question of restructuring the entire system for the training and retraining of its personnel.

The strict controllability of the internal affairs organs and their activeness in the area of crime prevention and high professionalism as well as providing a constructive solution to organizational and material and technical problems and the ideological and political unity of the personnel, strengthening the ties with the public and shaping the new image of our members are all, in my view, the main trends in perestroika within the MVD organs, so that they could become an organic part of the structure of the socialist law-governed state.

The party-political support of perestroika means, in my view, knowledge of the essence of phenomena taking place and their forecasting and, therefore, the accurate choice of priorities and primary steps, and the ability to note and develop what is new and to open the way to progressive experience and rely on practical experience extensively and boldly. What does this mean in terms of the MVD?

The most important thing is to make skillful use of glasnost in the interest of the struggle against crime. It is above all a question of the legality of militia work. In 1988 a total of 10,500 violations of the law were reported (some of them thanks to the letters of citizens and with the help of mass information media), which is 17.5 percent above the preceding year. A total of 1,890 people were dismissed for violating the law and for criminal activities (25.6 percent more); as a whole, 26,900 members of the militia were fired for negative reasons. The USSR MVD has followed and will continue to follow this principled line and, let me repeat myself, will be ready to welcome any constructive criticism. However, we must not allow isolated cases, facts or events to defame thousands of conscientiously working personnel. I have never justified nor do I intend to justify any improper action on the part of our personnel. However, public opinion should not extend such actions to the militia as a whole. The statement made by one of the heads of Scotland Yard is noteworthy: "The police can be successful in its activities only if it enjoys authority among the population. We have shortcomings but all of them are the result of individual deviations (errors) on the part of one member of the force or another. As a whole, as a social institution for the defense of society, the police must not develop a bad reputation."

Incidentally, the police abroad make methodically and knowledgeably use of the press, radio and television in shaping public opinion and convincing the populace that their personnel are constantly engaged in the difficult and dangerous work of protecting the honor, life and health of the people and that in this important matter they need the help of their fellow citizens.

I can state most responsibly that our personnel as well carry out every day and every hour an equally difficult and dangerous work. They too need the help of the public and the labor collectives. Incidentally, the Social Defense Fund—a self-financing organization which rallies the voluntary people's units, comrade courts, prevention councils, public centers for the preservation of order, and so on—could become a major social power in the area of the protection of order and legality. The interaction between the fund and the MVD would make it possible to find an optimal solution for many problems. It is precisely such a social fund, rather than yet another specialized governmental authority, that could assume, among others, some obligations relative to the social rehabilitation of individuals released from prison, improving prevention and organizing the treatment of drug addiction and alcoholism, and protecting the personal property of the citizens (apartments, cars, etc.).

Furthermore, we need glasnost in order objectively to inform the population about the state of crime and the results of the struggle against it. Informing, however, does not mean frightening the people or satisfying the philistine demand for titillating plots. It is a question of developing a conscious interest on the part of society toward a grave social problem such as crime and thus consolidating our forces for surmounting it.

Finally, glasnost is also necessary within the MVD system itself, in order to be able collectively to discuss decisions made on essential problems, in which an error could cost a great deal to the state and the citizens. That is why, I believe, the work of the USSR MVD Public Council will be of great importance. The council was set up for the purpose of more efficiently combining one-man command and collective management and discussing the topical problems of the struggle against crime as well as the long-term problems of the operative and official activities, the scientific and technical and social development of the internal affairs authorities, and the extensive use of practical experience. The council consists of the ministers of internal affairs of Union and autonomous republics, the most experienced heads of internal affairs administrations, leading members of the primary subunits and specialists in the basic services, leading scientists from scientific research institutes and VUZs of the ministry, political personnel, and representatives of party and soviet authorities, public organizations and mass information media.

Glasnost must also help us to eliminate a passive attitude and the custom of relying on "superiors," to surmount the mentality of "the people as cogs," and to develop true civic activeness. It is particularly important now for every single one of our associates to feel that he is an individual, for social acknowledgment of personal initiative to be strengthened and for the people not to be afraid to display it. If we achieve this we shall find the main link in tying party-political with operative-official activities, something which we are so short of today.

The party-political support of the struggle against crime demands comprehensive improvements in the ideological upbringing of the militia personnel, providing a true understanding of the problems of perestroyka, the features of our time and the vision of the future, avoiding quotation mongering or stereotypes. The internal affairs organs are guided in this case by the law and the political line of the CPSU. We need members who consider their service not merely a profession but also a way of life and to whom professional duty is their only credo. The practical work of the personnel is always affected unless they have been trained in that spirit.

The most important trend in our activities is to harness the efforts of services and subunits in identifying unused possibilities through a skillful organization of labor, bringing to light the creative potential of every person and upgrading the vanguard role of the party members. Let me quote as an example the work of the

political department of the Stavropol Kray Executive Committee Internal Affairs Administration in the resort cities of Kavkazskiy and Mineralnyye Vody. With the support of the party gorkoms and raykoms the political department made a close study of the situation of individual educational work in the Kislovodsk and Lermontovsk Internal Affairs Departments; it studied the problems of young personnel in Pyatigorsk and Zheleznovodsk Internal Affairs Departments; together with the state-legal department of the CPSU Kraykom it heard reports by political units and party organizations of the Yessentuki City Internal Affairs Department and drafted measures to eliminate shortcomings; it provided practical assistance to these authorities. This quickly influenced the results of their work. No single violation of the law occurred in four out of six departments. In the last 2 years the overall number of committed crimes declined by 9.2 percent.

As they have done in the past, fearing to make independent decisions, some managers have tried to sit it out, as the saying goes. This, however, will not take place under the new moral and political conditions. Unfortunately, in promoting cadres we frequently do not take into consideration what the person has done by himself; we analyze the references and not the real possibilities of the future leader, for which reason we frequently err. In frequent cases the political apparatus, the party committees and party bureaus customarily bypass the "leading individuals," protecting them from party criticism. Yet the party members increasingly raise questions of the possibility of promoting or the expediency of using one member of the force or another in a specific position. For example, at the Uglich City Internal Affairs Department, Yaroslavl Oblast, after hearing a report submitted by the department head, in the course of their debates the party members changed the suggested reference, pointing out the incompetence of the manager. The conclusion was unanimous: his further work in that position was considered impossible.

Today's difficult situation in the country sets new requirements concerning the party's leadership and, consequently, those of the political authorities as the most important instrument within the USSR MVD system. They were drafted precisely for this purpose, to support through party democracy the unity of objectives, to prevent the development of parochialism, to block substituting lack of ideas with party membership, to strengthen interaction with the local party organizations, firmly to follow a course of intensifying the struggle against crime and other delinquencies, and to reliably safeguard the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens and Soviet democracy.

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## PUBLIC OPINION

## Readers' Correspondence

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[Text] Readers Consider, Argue and Suggest

**E. Pirumov, docent, Rostov State University: 'Not With This Kind of Bureaucracy'**

Let me share with you some observations which make me both hopeful and concerned.

The recent events in the mining areas and the reaction to these events on the part of the central authorities most likely are an indication that our political system has finally begun to develop a feedback. It is true that, for the time being, this feedback is taking unusual aspects. The reasons for this are less the worsened economic situation than the fact that the people frequently do not see how they can influence the situation through the application of ordinary social mechanisms.

How can the inertia of the local authorities be explained? Why are the trade unions so passive and helpless? Apparently, on the one hand, it is a question of their limited legal and material possibilities (which, in its way, is confirmed by the fact that the miners directly address themselves to the "tops") and, on the other, the fact that many officials who have the necessary rights show indifference and incompetence.

Let us recall the exceptional attention which V.I. Lenin ascribed to the renovation of cadres and to decisively purging the managerial corps of all kinds of bureaucrats and blabbers. In his mind, such a cleansing was not merely a prerequisite for improving management activities but also for purposefully involving millions of people in the struggle for upgrading labor productivity. Outside of this, Lenin considered all sorts of slogans of "production democracy" bare "form shuffling," about which the ordinary working people could justifiably say "we, the middle stratum, the mass workers, say that one must update, one must correct, one must bend the bureaucrats, while you talk through clenched teeth about production, and manifestation of democracy through production successes, whereas I would like to deal with production but not with a bureaucratic board, main administration, and so on, but with different people" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, p 218).

The experience we have gained in perestroyka confirms that the forces of obstruction in the managerial stratum have by no means been surmounted. However, it is not exclusively a question of the covert but also the overt opposition to radical reform. The adverse moral and psychological atmosphere also leads to the nonreplacement of people in various positions and ranks, to a "cadre stagnation." Let us recall the view cited by Lenin: "I want to deal with production, not with this kind of

bureaucratic management... but with a different kind." This demand, formulated by an honest working person, is topical to this day. To ignore it means to hinder the process of change.

**S. Korobov, senior scientific associate, Penza Regional Museum: Choosing the Way**

It is no secret that if not publicly at least in private talks some scientists have expressed the view that a capitalist development would have given our country much more or, in any case, would not have brought about many of our present difficulties. One can also hear the following: "There were no prerequisites for converting to socialism, we were still far from it." Or else, "we lacked an adequate potential of production forces and the necessary cultural standard."

Why must we "rediscover America," and pursue an argument which has already been settled? Read Lenin's final writings and his article "On Our Revolution." In objecting to the menshevik Sukhanov, who also claimed that "Russia has not achieved a level of development of production forces which would make socialism possible," and that we had not grown up to the level of socialism and lacked objective economic prerequisites for it, Lenin answered: "No one would even conceive of asking himself: Was it possible for a nation which was exposed to a revolutionary situation, such as the one that developed during the first imperialist war, under the influence of the hopelessness of this situation, to hurl itself in the type of struggle which gave him a certain chance to acquire for itself not entirely ordinary conditions for the further growth of civilization?" (op. cit., vol 45, p 380).

"Under the influence of the hopelessness of this situation...." Let us recall a few facts of the economic crisis which spread in Russia during World War I. It struck a blow at various industrial sectors (metallurgy and coal mining in particular); the railroads were unable to cope with their work because of lack of fuel and personnel. Agriculture was in a difficult situation. Approximately 48 percent of the adult male population was drafted in the Armed Forces from settlements and villages. In 1916 15 percent of the areas in grain were not harvested. As a result of manpower scarcity, the prices of all agricultural commodities rose sharply and the herds of horses, cattle and sheep diminished. It was no accident, therefore, that the food crisis was extremely grave.

Reports by the secret service noted that the long hours spent in waiting in line for food were turning into some sort of political clubs which "in terms of their influence were the same as having meetings and tens of thousands of revolutionary proclamations."

The war led to a disruption of the financial system. The war cost 50 million rubles daily. The tax burden of the population increased. Whereas in 1913 direct taxes yielded a revenue of 251 million rubles for the treasury, by 1916 the figure had risen to 359 million. Indirect taxes were increased as well.

It is only familiarity with the actual situation that can enable us to understand the essence of the problem as well as much of Lenin's legacy, particularly his words that "If the creation of socialism requires a certain cultural standard..., why not begin by acquiring in a revolutionary way the prerequisites for such a standard and only then, on the basis of the rule of workers and peasants and the Soviet system, undertake to catch up with other nations." "In what booklets," Lenin asked, "have you read that such changes in the usual historical order are inadmissible or impossible?" (ibid., p 381).

Led by Lenin, the party assumed the heavy burden of responsibility for the destiny of the people and rescued the country, which had sunk deep in the mire of inter-imperialist contradictions, from national catastrophe. In my view, the events should be assessed according to their merit. Any somewhat soberly thinking person would agree that the October 1917 events should be considered in relation to what the revolution provided, compared with what was missing before it happened.

It gave the muzhik the opportunity of learning how to be the true master of the land and brought peace to the people. This was real humanism, a specific feature of life which was part of the flesh and blood of many people. It included the sincere aspiration to help the worker and the peasant to improve their lives. No, we should not speak of any "political adventure" but of the fact that bolshevism was able to offer a substantiated program for building socialism on the basis of the then prevailing Russian reality. The fact that the Leninist principles and methods of socialist building were subsequently distorted, sometimes unrecognizably, is a different matter. However, it is precisely this that also supports the view that today we must get rid of such accretions.

Why do we not try to understand the seemingly simple yet essentially basic Leninist thought (anything that is brilliant is simple)? Could it be because we thoughtlessly used quotations in order to sanctify our "great" common victories, forgetting that society consists of individuals and that it is only through the interests of every one of them that we can organize truly healthy relations?

We failed to master the entire wealth of Lenin's legacy. We failed to do this in the 1920s and the 1930s when under the cover of Leninism a sharp internal party struggle for power was being waged and a considerable segment of the party, influenced by this struggle, was openly becoming corrupted. This did not occur in the subsequent period as well, the period of the total Stalinist cult, including in the field of political science. Nor did it happen under Brezhnev, who led the country with the 9-volume "*Leninist Course*" into a triumphant marking of time....

Let us repeat once again after Lenin: "They totally failed to understand the decisive feature of Marxism: precisely, its revolutionary dialectics" (ibid., p 378).

Meanwhile, the revolution goes on....

#### V. Shlike, Frunze: Does This Not Happen?

In connection with the present heated discussions on problems of relations among nationalities, I think of the latest population census. We carefully answered the questions, realizing that in order to ensure the practical implementation of social policy one must know how many of us there are, classified by age, sex, occupation and ethnic origin.

However, there were gaps in the census rules, which seem to have been borrowed straight from the period of stagnation or from even earlier times. What do I mean by this? Let me explain it with a few examples from our family, but which also apply to thousands of people like us, people with mixed marriages. In the census we, the elders must, it turns out, "register" our multinational offspring exclusively as belonging to a single nationality: we must select for babies and adolescents one of the nationalities of their parents. Why?

National self-awareness is tempestuously rising today and assuming a variety of forms, ranging from a noble struggle for the protection and development of national culture to the egotistical defense of the privileges enjoyed by one's people alone, combined with indifference or even scorn toward others. Under such confused circumstances it is precisely the children, in whose veins flows the blood of different ethnic groups, who could probably become one of the "medicines" against the growth of nationalistic ambitions. However, according to the census such children simply do not exist! We are faced with the immediate need to hide the "sin" of love between people of different nationalities from the boys and girls by statistically segregating the offspring of such people.

We are internationalists not only by spirit but also by blood and we do exist in reality. You must include our children and grandchildren in statistical reports as they are and not as is more convenient to "feed them" into a computer!

Let me describe a few small cases in which occasionally innocent children of love between nationalities find themselves. I will describe them so that we can realize more seriously that today we must understand and protect not only the national but also the international feelings of the people.

On one occasion, my then 7-year old son went to register for membership in the children's library of the city of Osh, which is in the southern part of Kirghiziya. He went by himself, showing the necessary courage for such a responsible and independent act. He returned home in tears: he was not registered. Why? Between sobs my son said, quite puzzled and tearful:

"The auntie asked me my nationality. I said: 'I am half Jewish and half German.' She said: 'This cannot be.' 'It can,' I said. 'No, it cannot. Go back home and ask your parents what is your nationality. I can then register you'."

Why was the child insulted? What is this, is he not allowed to borrow books if he is "mixed?" Yet the forms in the children's libraries stipulate for some reason that a child must have a single nationality. Why? Why not consider the fact that thus, with a single cut with an invisible knife the person is "sliced" into parts, one of which becomes legitimate and the others fall as though outside the law and are rejected? In general, I cannot understand what has the nationality of the child to do with a library.

Here is another case which occurred in our family, this time involving the Osh School. On one occasion my husband was summoned and angrily told: "Since the first grade your children have declared themselves to be Russian. Yet we know that this is not so. Please settle this matter." My husband returned home disturbed. What difference does this make for the children? They play in the yard with all other children at war and peace; to them this is natural. When they grow up, they will see what is what, for the nationality of their parents has been known to them since childhood. If they feel themselves to be Russian, let it be so. Why not?

According to the rules of the census, anyone may choose the nationality he wishes. In any case, such are the instructions if I understand them correctly.

But then here is what happened with us, in Frunze, during that same 1989 Census. My eldest son is married to a German. They have both adopted and children and children of their own, all of them loved. The boy is Russian the girls are Dunga and Kirghiz. They speak German at home and Russian on the street, with the other children. When they start school, we hope that they will learn Kirghiz as well. Is this normal? To us it is and, I am confident, it also is to millions of marriages between people of different nationalities. Yet it is not normal for the census taker!

When it came to the children—a Russian, a Dunga and a Kirghiz, the eyes of the census taker opened wide and he categorically said: "This cannot be." "It can," softly objected their mother, unwilling to enter into details, and showed him the children: a blond blue-eyed little boy and two dark brown-eyed girls. "Nonetheless, this is impossible!" the census taker insisted. "What language do you speak at home? German? So, register your children as German." "All right, German," the wife agreed. "What is the difference?"

However, one of the rules of the census stipulated that she had to declare and record all living languages of the peoples of the USSR, as long as a person spoke them, whether spoken by no more than a few thousand or even a hundred people. That is not what happened.

I told the census taker what my native language was—Russian. This is true and that is the language I use when I think, write and deliver lectures. Asked "what languages of the peoples of the USSR do you speak?" I answered, German. This was immediately followed by a brief answer, the same given to my son in a similar

situation as early as 1979: "German is not a language of the peoples of the USSR." "How come? What about the 2 million Soviet Germans? Are they not part of the Soviet people?" I exclaimed. "They are," the census taker answered. "However, we can enter in this line only the languages of peoples who have their own statehood in the country. That is the way we were instructed." "Tell your instructors that this could insult members of small ethnic groups, can they not understand this? Now, when there are appeals to show some sensitivity?" The census taker hesitated. Nonetheless, he somewhat hesitantly wrote in fine pencil that my language was German. Will he later erase it? He will thus make me a monolingual, although I in fact am as fluent in Russian as in my own national language.

Am I alone in this situation? Has this happened to me only? Would it not be more accurate to have the right to list not one but two native languages if in the soul of a person they are truly equal, truly loved and truly native?

No, here as well one must tear oneself into parts and fit the Procrustean bed of a single language, a single parent, a single people, a single national origin.

That is how we augment our problems today, for we have not learned how to see the variety of our multinational and international life.

We do not allow the statistical existence of individuals who tirelessly, year after year, suggest that those who so desire could answer the question of "nationality" by entering "Soviet." Anyone who wishes differently, let him enter his own nationality. Should it be necessary to force the Soviet person, at all cost, to find his own national niche? Many such people find no niche and many of them, even those of a single nationality, find themselves restricted within it while others find this niche good and comfortable. Let it be so. People are different. This is as it should be.

When shall we learn not to equalize everyone so that all the mixed nationalities appear as though having the same nationality?

This should not exist....

#### Excerpts From Letters

##### R. Burkova, Karaganda:

Perestroika in the USSR will advance only if the people can see changes for the better in the immediate future. Whatever the efforts or superefforts this may cost, the government must do something, for those same washing detergents or sugar are vitally necessary today and not in the distant future. Naturally, a solution could be found to this situation by purchasing soap from speculators and dunk candy in our tea. However, not everyone can afford this. The people are becoming embittered. Whereas previously I was indignant because many people were showing an indifference toward the past, I have now realized that this was not because of tiredness but

because of the existence of problems today which absorb the individual totally. People have many concerns and no longer have an interest in "sharp turns." That is why we hear angry statements, such as "let them leave Brezhnev to rest in peace, whatever he may have been, there was sugar and soap." Or else, "today we need not one Stalin but dozens of Stalins to bring order." No arguments or proofs would influence people who think this way. I therefore say, do something! Buy that wretched sugar and soap abroad, even at high prices, for otherwise the people will become extremely embittered.

**A. Stepanov, Gay, Orenburg Oblast:**

The helpless and failed old management methods are being stubbornly reanimated. For example, to this day the Soviet citizens are forced, despite their will and desire, to work at food and vegetable bases, to unload freight cars, to clear construction sites, areas, work places, cafeterias, etc. The reason is that under our economic management system, with increasing frequency exceptional measures become necessary and many departments try to involve in the solution of their problems the so-called sponsors, thus shifting their own obligations and responsibilities to the workers in other areas and professions. These are not economic methods at all. As long as we keep assigning responsibility to everyone we shall never resolve even a single problem. Everyone must do his work as a professional. Nothing could be more ruinous, senseless and irresponsible than to urge people to work under the threat of a stick. It is totally unsuitable to resort to the party's authority to this effect. For the time being, it is like in the story: the pies are being baked by the shoemaker while the pie maker is making shoes....

**M. Kuzmin, sector physician, war and labor veteran, Orekhovo-Zuyevo:**

Why have moral incentives totally disappeared from the life of labor collectives? It is very regrettable that gratitude, honor rolls, titles and awards are valued only when they are "backed" with cash bonuses, higher pensions and other benefits. Naturally, the devaluation of moral incentives comes from the period of stagnation, when day after day we were seeing the stars of Hero of the Soviet Union, reward badges, and honor titles awarded to the "great builders of communism," and when myths of "frontrankers" were being artificially created, of people who could do the work of almost 20 years in 5.... What if we were to cleanse moral rewards from formalism and injustice? People do not live by money alone! They need something for their hearts as well.

**V. Ulyanov, history teacher, Alapayevsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast:**

I had always nurtured a bias against the journal KOMMUNIST. Not being a party member, I did not see why I should read it. I accidentally opened it and was amazed above all by the frankness of the judgments of the authors. A number of articles in the journal strengthened my hope that there are a number of properly thinking

and self-critical people in the party, people who can see perestroika as broadening the process of democratization of society. Let me particularly point out the section "View From the Outside." In my view, the editors accurately realize the need for comparing various viewpoints and for pluralism of opinion.

**A. Rimeyskiy, doctor of technical sciences, Obninsk:**

It was with pleasure and, for the first time without being instructed, that I subscribed to KOMMUNIST for 1990. I could list a number of articles which have drawn my attention of late but let me limit myself to expressing a wish for the future. I hope that next year our party journal will satisfy our curiosity, which is by no means empty, in making projections on the reform. Furthermore, why not sum up the valuable experience of Yugoslavia, China and Hungary? I believe that the lack of a qualitative projection is a great loss to the party.

**Responses to Material Published in KOMMUNIST**

**V. and Ye. Zolotukhin, doctors of philosophical sciences, Rostov-na-Donu:**

*O. Bogomolov. "The Changing Appearance of Socialism." KOMMUNIST No 11, 1989.*

The removal of the ideological "blinkers" of the Stalinist period and the subsequent stagnation, and the initial attempts at adopting a sober and strictly scientific approach to the most complex problems of our time made it possible for our social scientists to draw the essentially important conclusion, the theoretical interpretation of which remains obviously inadequate, to the effect that already now there is only one although not uniform mankind. Incidentally, in the past as well the world extremely rarely presented the image of some kind of cluster of socially uniform countries and areas. It has always been quite many-faceted with complex transitional structures and conditions.

In the words of Marx, the world system today (as is the case, actually, with any organic system) is trying to become integral, by finding its missing parts and, at the same time, eliminating or changing extraneous elements and structures. The unusual nature of the situation in this case is, above all, that instead of the customary "country-centrist" or "region-centrist" way of development, which was typical of previous stages in universal history, today's global community is being governed above all by the laws of integral systems. In other words, today we urgently need a "system-centrist" approach to the contemporary world. Any other system would simply prevent us from fully understanding the realities of the end of the 20th century and the trends of future social development. What this actually means is the practical implementation of the brilliant Marxist prediction that mankind has but one destiny. The difference is that the founders of Marxism spoke in this case about a global socialist revolution of the classical type, which would take place at roughly the same time throughout the

world, whereas we are witnessing a universal process of socialization, which is taking place in four basic aspects:

The building of a socialist society as such in countries of previously average or underdeveloped capitalism, starting with a political revolution which subsequently develops into a comprehensive socialist revolution (the socialist countries);

A broad process of socialization of all areas of social life without a political revolution of the classical type in the countries of so-called "democratic socialism" and those like them (Sweden, Finland, Austria, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and others);

A less clearly manifested but nonetheless unquestionable quality leap toward comprehensive socialization of social life in countries with "liberal capitalism" (United States, FRG, France, Japan, Canada, and others);

Finally, a conflicting process, with major retreats and turns and characteristic numerous transitional forms, of socialization of social life in third world countries.

Therefore, other than the most hateful undemocratic regimes of our time, and in a variety of ways, the entire world is advancing toward the broad democratization and humanizing of social life and the enhancement of man, although in qualitatively different aspects. Therefore, in our view we can no longer identify, strictly speaking, Western society with capitalism of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, although it retains many of the elements of relations remaining from the classical bourgeois society. Nonetheless, we do not always have the real right to describe countries which are building socialism as being entirely socialist. In both situations, in our view, if we proceed on the basis of facts rather than emotions and habit, we see countries belonging to the transitional type: in the former case these are countries which are no longer capitalist but also not socialist as yet; in the latter, we see a gradual and still unfinished transition to mature socialism through the classical type of revolutions. The "culprit" for such transition is, precisely, the logic of the development of the world as a whole with the specific features of the scientific and technological revolution, a global market, and universal sociopolitical processes taking place through the United Nations and other organizations. The entire world is in a state of transition and, naturally, not a single one of its individual parts has matured. This approach, although it may seem unusual, is not a retreat from Marxism but rather its contemporary nondogmatic application to the real course of world history. For decades on end we have been talking about the transitional and the revolutionary nature of the contemporary historical epoch. Therefore, this is confirmed by actual facts, although the conclusions which may be drawn are not entirely traditional. However, it is necessary to draw them, as it is equally necessary accurately to understand the logic of global developments and our own place within them.

**P. Lyakhovskiy, student, Kherson Industrial Institute:**

*G. Arbatov and E. Batalov. "Political Reform and Evolution of the Soviet State." KOMMUNIST No 4, 1989.*

I read this article by chance: my instructor in the course on scientific communism assigned to me to describe its contents to the other students. Having studied this article, I would like to express a few considerations.

The fact that we live today in a supercentralized state needs no particular proof. It is much more interesting to consider why this took place. According to the authors of this article there were two basic reasons: on the one hand, the stratification of society was needed by Stalin and his circle in order to preserve the existing political system and, therefore, the stability of their own power; on the other, the statist trend may be traced to prerevolutionary Russian political culture. I consider these explanations insufficient.

To begin with, it is not merely a question of the aspiration of individuals to acquire unlimited power. The authors themselves note that the course of stratification of society was charted as early as the 1920s, for it is no accident that already then Lenin had mounted a decisive struggle against bureaucrats, who had become the "harbingers" of comprehensive statism. Stalin merely accelerated and strengthened this stratification process but was not its creator in the least. Today we quite frequently ascribe our sins to Stalin's evil nature. This is quite convenient and allows us to not particularly burden ourselves with the study of the essence of various problems. We sometimes seek very subjective explanations for totally objective facts.

Secondly, if we are referring to tradition, let us acknowledge that in our country we relied less on the "good tsar" than on force. Metaphorically speaking, the fruits hanging on the tree began to overripen. Some of the fruit fell with the slightest whiff of wind (elimination of serfdom). Instead of picking the fruit, the tree was lightly shaken and the fruit poured down. The tree was shaken once again and once again there were results. We began to believe that this is the only way to pick the fruit. Is this not the origin of our trust in the command-administrative methods? The time came when all the fruits which one could "shake off" even if underripe, came to an end. Now we must spend a great deal of time taking care of the tree before the new crop will ripen....

Our belief that with the help of force a just order can be established and a happy life can be built for everyone turned into a great deal of trouble. It was precisely that confidence which lifted all obstacles for people such as Stalin in their grab for power. In my view, it was less Stalin that grabbed society than society itself, unfortunately, that proved ready to accept him.

In my view, there is yet another reason which prevented us from developing a restraining mechanism. In the past physicists were convinced that they knew all the laws which governed the structure of the world. Therefore, in order to explain everything, all they had to solve were petty problems: to describe and solve all equations, to



compute the vectors of speed and force, and the model of the world would be prepared. Something similar occurred in our social sciences, particularly in economics. Since all of us know that production and consumption can be organized on the basis of the laws and trends familiar to us, all that mattered was for everyone to perform his role properly. We did not accept the idea that something in science may still be unknown and that some of its apparently eternal postulates may become obsolete and unable to withstand any comparison with real life.

I fully agree with the authors that the main way to surmount the developing situation is the democratization of society. However, I would like to ask them and other scientists to pay greater attention to the question of the objective necessity of the state under socialism: What should be eliminated? What should be surmounted? What is an intrinsic part of socialism, whether we like it or not?

**R. Ayzenshtat, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, Kaluga:**

*Ye. Yumatov. "Scholarship: I Suggest an Experiment." KOMMUNIST No 4, 1989.*

I agree with the author of this letter who has expressed the idea that material and moral incentives for conscientious students are virtually down to the "zero" mark. However, the quality of training of future specialists does not depend on them alone. Many higher school teachers are uncritical dogmatists who do not burden themselves with engaging in scientific or methodical work and who, for decades, have not updated their knowledge. This especially applies to the social scientists, many of whom teach their classes with the help of yellowed summaries in half-empty classrooms. In frequent cases educators displaying creativity find themselves helpless in the face of the machinery of certification commissions.

What if we were to allow the students freely to choose their lecturers and give them the right to "remove" teachers who lack authority? In that case, encouraging the students to study properly well should be combined with teacher incentive. A docent whose classes are packed and who, furthermore, publishes five or six scientific articles per year, should not receive the same salary as someone whose lectures are attended by three or four people, who take turns in attending his lectures. Equalization hinders perestroika in the VUZs by concealing the loafers and creating grounds for retaining a pseudoscientific ballast. Is this not the reason for which, as a result of the current certification of higher educational institutions, some of them must be simply closed down, for they fail to provide their students even with a minimum of necessary knowledge?

Therefore, we must see not only the tip of the iceberg (low attendance, student carelessness) but also its base:

the level of lectures and seminars. A cosmetic repair at the top would yield few results without any capital repairs at the bottom.

**V. Burko, Novosibirsk:**

KOMMUNIST No 7 for 1989 publishes questions asked by L.A. Zhdanov, CPSU member since 1946. He asks:

"Why is the 'Marxist' Bukharin given the green light under pluralism, while the 'dogmatist' Stalin is filed away?" He also asks: "I would like to see how the journal assesses the current clandestine and legal millionaires? Why were there no such millionaires in the 1930s and 1940s (perhaps with the exception of Utesov and Sholokhov)?"

I would like to answer these questions. Let me start by advising my opponents to think when they sit down to eat and takes a piece of bread, as to who made it possible: if not an American then a Canadian farmer? Let them determine who is to be blamed for this: Was it the "Marxist" Bukharin or Stalin the "dogmatist?" Bukharin favored the "involvement of the kulak in socialism," whereas Stalin favored the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class." But for this savage elimination of the kulaks today we would have raised our own grain by our own peasants. I can hear the objection: but then Stalin did not purchase grain abroad but, conversely, exported it. Let me add to this that he did so dooming millions of people to a hungry death.

What is most striking is that L.A. Zhdanov does not see the difference between illegal and legal millionaires. A speculator and bribe-taker or thief is compared to Sholokhov and Utesov; according to that same logic, the Canadian farmer who, with sweat on his brow, works night and day, A. Einstein and I. Kurchatov are all millionaires and, therefore, enemies.... Those who think this way, in my view, are enemies themselves. I believe that had there been no Stalinist "liquidation of the kulaks," mixed with ignorance, envy and hatred, we would have lived today better and more happily.

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## PAGES FROM HISTORY

### Obedient History or a New Publicistic Paradise. Sad Comments

905B0008J Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 89 (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 74-87

[Article by Gennadiy Arkadyevich Bordyugov, senior scientific associate, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, candidate of historical sciences; Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kozlov, head of sector at the same institute, candidate of historical sciences; and Vladlen Terentyevich Loginov, professor at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Contemporary historical journalism is having a holiday. It is a holiday of disobedience, dizzying ideas and hypotheses. Half the country has turned into informal historians while the other half, into their closely listening and grateful students. It is only the tiresome professionals, driven to ground, who are keeping a long list of confused dates and garbled names, unchecked facts and inaccurate quotations. But who is listening to them, to such tiresome people? A newspaper comes out some questionable testimony; the next day another newspaper will quote it as an accurate source. The generators of historical ideas are working tirelessly, drawing inspiration from as yet inaccessible foreign publications, accidentally acquired old newspapers and hastily perused memoirs. How quickly pluses turn into minuses and minuses into pluses in the evaluation of the past. Good! How intoxicating is this long awaited intellectual freedom! In the past we wanted to say what we thought, today we want to think what we wish. Once again the past becomes obedient to our will. We could instill in it sensible truths or else threaten it.

The genre of emancipated homilies and sermons has become widespread in our present journalism. In works such as the worn-out stereotyped portraits of dull and stupid people who made wrong decisions, the question marks of doubt have been replaced by impeccably confident exclamation points. We find in such works a great deal of thoughts about the sources and origins of distant events, some of them interesting but most frequently simplistically "providential." It is as though a different mythology has come to replace that of the "purity" of the revolution, according to which every step taken by the bolsheviks was proclaimed and considered as the only accurate one: the mythology of the "original sin" of the revolution. At that point all subsequent evils, from Stalinist illegalities to Brezhnev's stagnation are directly derived from the actions of the bolsheviks during the initial postrevolutionary period.

Works on this topic are being written on the basis of a technology for converting the real drama of history into a terrible morality tale. This fabulous world is inhabited by people who speak and act not as they actually did but as the author wants them to. Its characters could change names and even features, and say things they never actually said.

In this fictitious world, the power of the bolsheviks is omnipotent and endless while historical reality is malleable. Stalin's view that there are no fortresses which the bolsheviks could not conquer is not dead. Now, however, it leads to other conclusions: if a fortress such as the creation of a law-governed state could not be captured by the omnipotent bolsheviks, the reason is that they (or, a certain segment of them, the "people with boots," who subsequently assumed the upper hand in the party) were not all that willing to do so. If they wanted to, events would have developed differently. However, history consists not of arbitrary actions committed by one party or another, even the most powerful and strong and even if it wears boots and is armed with missiles. History is

created as a result of the interaction and confrontation among different forces, for which reason the bolsheviks as well were not absolutely free to act. They experienced the same things which the makers of the French Revolution experienced in their time, and could repeat with Saint-Juste: "...The force of things leads us apparently to results which we could not even suspect." In his works written after the October Revolution, Lenin repeatedly emphasized this paradox: we wanted to achieve one thing but were forced to do something entirely different. If today we realize this, historical facts no longer fit. We begin to feel the live struggle behind each historical event. We no longer consider convincing the categorical nature of assessments and that of issuing prescriptions to history which, if followed, would have led to different developments while the "people with boots" would have been wearing slippers.

#### 'Today One Cannot Rule Otherwise'

The awareness and the actions of the people of the age of revolution could be accepted or rejected. However, it would be useless to assess them with the yardstick of a postrevolutionary life, in the same way that it would be senseless to try to prove to someone who is drowning that he was not zealous enough in learning how to swim. The personages of the revolution themselves understood the entire difficulty of events and their role in those events, as well as their present accusers do. However, unlike the present abstractly thinking critics, to them the problems of moral choice and way of action were literally problems of life or death. Naturally, we could accuse them of not voluntarily putting their neck on the guillotine in order to deserve the approval of future historians. Nonetheless let us try to analyze their arguments and the logic of that complex struggle which forced people who felt very strongly that they were civilian to turn into military.

Two thousand years ago Christianity issued the greatest humanistic order: "Thou shalt not kill!" Lenin remembered it, for, as we know, he had studied catechism in high school. Why is it that nonetheless for those 2,000 years the history of mankind has been a history of some people killing other? Why did the greatest good—human life—become depreciated, century after century? Marxists, including Russian Marxists, thought a great deal about this problem. "...In our ideal," Lenin wrote, "there is no place for violence over others" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 30, p 122). It was also axiomatic for all Marxists that any war among nations is essentially an inhuman "barbaric and beastly act" (op. cit., vol 26, p 311). However, when nonresistance to evil could only bring the triumph of evil and when there is no cure from such evil other than evil, at that point one must resort to means which are not the specific, the inner objectives of the movement but have been imposed by the specific correlation of forces and specific historical circumstances. If terrorist methods of struggle are being used against the revolution, the revolution must defend itself by resorting to force. The only thing one must not do is try to lay under such methods a "highly moral"

base, something in which, for quite some time, our official historiography specialized, or else look for "Judeo-Masonic" intrigues, something which is now the occupation of "patriotic" journalism, or else the intrigues of militarized "apparatchiks in boots," as they dimly appear to the "left-wing radical" supporters of democracy.

Repeatedly, our periodicals have been presenting the picture of a person "in civvies" with "worn out shoes and a funny hat," and a "worn out jacket," who rejects violence and dreams exclusively of civil peace. For some reason, this person has been given the name Lenin.

However, if we look closely at Lenin's works, even not those which have been filed away, it will become clear that he was not in the least such a goody-goody, but a harsh and firm person who was able, in June 1918, to send a cable which read as follows:

"Comrade Zinovyev! It was only today that we heard in the Central Committee that in Peter the workers wanted to retaliate for the murder of Volodarskiy with mass terror and that you (not you personally but the Peter members of the Central Committee or the Petersburg Committee) restrained them.

"I firmly object to this!

"We are compromising ourselves: we are threatening mass terror even in the resolutions of Soviet deputies but when it comes to action we are blocking revolutionary initiative of the masses, which is absolutely right.

"This is im-pos-sib-le!

"The terrorists will consider us spineless. These are supermilitary times. We must encourage the energy and the mass nature of terror against the counterrevolutionaries, particularly in Peter, with an example which must be decisive" (op. cit., vol 50, p 106).

Lenin was able to speak of proletarian dictatorship, adding that "dictatorship is a power directly based on violence" (op. cit., vol 37, p 245), and say many more things in the same spirit. Therefore, without trying to be cunning or to delude ourselves, during the period of the Civil War we should classify Lenin as one of the "people in boots." This wrecks the system and the reality of life eliminates the universal division of political leaders into lovers of boots and shoes.

In order for history, classified into "pure" and "dirty," to have a spot for the canonized Lenin, created in the spirit of the new iconographic school, as the embodiment of "absolute goodness," we also need the "absolute evil"—Trotsky, that same Trotsky who, in 1919, was described by Lenin as follows: "Comrades! Familiar with the strict nature of the orders issued by Comrade Trotsky, I am so convinced, I am absolutely convinced of the accuracy, expediency and need for the order issued by Comrade Trotsky, for the good of the cause, that I support his order entirely. V. Ulyanov (Lenin)." At the 8th RKP(b) Congress of March 1919, emphasizing the

entire absurdity of accusing Trotsky of allegedly failing to implement the war policy of the Central Committee, Lenin said: "If you can raise such accusations, and if you... can accuse Trotsky of his failure to implement the policy of the Central Committee, your accusation is insane. You cannot provide even a shadow of an argument. If you can prove this, then neither Trotsky nor the Central Committee is any good" ("*Leninskiy Sbornik XXXVII*" [Leninist Collection No 37], p 136). It is not our purpose now to evaluate or re-evaluate this historical personality. If anyone opposes Trotsky's policy in the war department, in that case he must be consistent and open. One must not defame Lenin under the pseudonym of "Trotsky."

The logic of the struggle dictated its rules to the bolsheviks. "Yes, we ruled with the help of a dictatorship," L.B. Kamenev said in 1920. "If, considering the tremendous events we were experiencing, we held plenary sessions and solved problems in a parliamentary fashion, we would have unquestionably lost the revolution, for to us gaining time was of exceptional importance.... Today we cannot rule by any other means." Or else let us take such a civilian person as A.I. Rykov. As we know, he was one of those who supported democracy and collective rule and opposed one-man command and dictatorial work methods. Yet, he was appointed the extraordinary representative of the Defense Council in charge of army procurements (Chusosnabarm). What happened? At the 9th Party Congress, in 1920, Rykov's activities were assessed as follows: "When... Comrade Rykov was appointed dictator of military supplies, at a time when we were threatened with total doom and when we had to dole out every cartridge and when we were suffering defeats because of lack of bullets, Comrade Rykov perfectly coped with his assignment! He set as the prime condition the promotion of... one-man command.... It was to him, comrades, that the entire apparatus of the Sovnarkhoz was subordinated; entirely; there was no question of collective leadership. The Chusosnabarm was the dictator. He sent his own special representatives to the individual areas, taking over the military procurement centers and guberniya Sovnarkhozes and in the local areas everything cracked from this, but this was necessary. These special Rykov representatives in the Urals sent their own special representatives to factories and plants and these special representatives of the representatives of Comrade Rykov went to plants and factories where there were weakened collective managements and promoted one-man command, and it was thanks to this that Comrade Rykov had access to information and wrote articles in favor of collective leadership."

Probably it is important, in general, to see behind the events of the Civil War what was taking place in the hearts and minds of the bolsheviks and that this was not the ill will of people who, since childhood, had been predestined to create evil. Above all, behind all this we must see the drama of those people who believed in the bright ideals yet were forced to resort to violence in order

to create conditions for the embodiment of such ideals and to defend that which October 1917 had already provided. The fact that it was a real drama can be seen by the complex processes alone which took place within an organization which remains the least known to the modern reader, the VChK.

The old and somewhat idealized attitude toward the VChK is now being subjected to criticism, some of which justified. Indeed, this organization—the sword of the revolution—had a tendency to turn, as N.V. Krylenko said, into an entire people's commissariat, "terrible because of the mercilessness of its repressions and absolute impossibility for any outsider to see what was happening within it." But what were the feelings of party members working in the VChK and its widespread network in those tragic times when the feeling of duty clashed with other feelings and emotions and when one had to "restrain one's soul?"

Let us quote from the still unfamiliar statement by a group of party member associates of the Turkestan VChK to the RKP(b) Central Committee, drafted in March 1921. "...Sad though this may be, we must realize that a party member who becomes a member of a punitive authority stops being a person but turns into a machine which can be automatically activated. He must even think like a machine, for he is denied the right not only freely to speak but also freely to think as an individual. He does not have the right freely to express his views and present his needs, for he is being constantly threatened with the firing squad...." The declaration stated that the members of the VChK "are outside the republic's political life. They develop bad habits, such as arrogance, ambition, cruelty, callous egotism, etc. Gradually, and imperceptibly they separate themselves from our party family, establishing their own caste which is terribly remindful of the caste of the old gendarmes. The party organizations look at them like they did the old security services, with fear and scorn.... As the armored fist of the party, this fist is hitting the party on the head."

Naturally, the simplest thing in the world would be to condemn those people. However, is it not clear that the chekists who wrote such a bitter letter became neither "gendarmes" nor "machines?" We cannot fail to see their drama; we cannot fail to see once again how the force of circumstances is leading the people to results which nobody though possible.

Someone may object saying that not all were like this. Yes, that is true! The party struggled against those who had "sneaked in," those whom Lenin described as the "rogues in the revolution." The party subordinated the VChK to its political will and demanded the strict observance of legality within this organization. After the explosion at the Leontyevskiy Lane, F. Dzerzhinskiy, a man of complex destiny doing complex work, suggested in 1919 to the Central Committee to mount a real campaign of "red terror." Without officially stating its view, the Central Committee rejected his suggestion. This was done precisely in order to avoid mass excesses

and abuses of power in the local areas and attempts at using the heated atmosphere of "red terror" for settling private scores.

In 1918, when the threat that the VChK could get out of control arose for the first time, PRAVDA opened its pages to letters imbued with concern for the fact that the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" was being replaced by the slogan "All Power to the Extraordinary Commissions!" It was precisely then, on the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee, that the regulation was drafted "On the All-Russian and Local Extraordinary Commissions" (ratified by the VTsIK on 28 October 1918), which stipulated that the extraordinary commissions were to be subordinated to and controlled by the local soviets. Naturally, it was not always possible to implement these resolutions. There was no clear regulation governing the rights and prerogatives of the extraordinary commissions.

Dzerzhinskiy himself sought guarantees for the healthy functioning of the VChK. This is confirmed by one of his letters to the Central Committee related to the declaration of the Turkestan Chekists: "...The VChK must be healed... by truly more frequent change and renovation of the personnel, increasing the closeness with the party and making the party itself more interested. If the comrades view them as policemen this would mean the death of the VChK. We must fight this within the party itself and assign to the VChK not "gendarmes" but comrades who will be supported by the party along every step of the way and whom the party will trust."

We are familiar with Dzerzhinskiy's attitude toward members of the VChK who "loved to wear boots." He simply tried to remove them from the VChK. The fact that he was unable to remove all of them is absolutely unquestionable. The fact that many future leaders and organizers of Stalinist terrorism had worked within the VChK under Dzerzhinskiy is also not anything new to us.

However tempting and titillating the accusations addressed at the bolsheviks may have been, they do not provide an answer to the main question: Where did such "people wearing boots" come from and why, and also why did Russia find them suitable? Did all of Russia at that time not wear boots? In that case, where did the boots worn by the generals such as Denikin, Kolchak, Yudenich and Vrangal disappear? Had the intervention forces come to Russia wearing civilian shoes?

In order to counter all this, the bolsheviks had to put on boots themselves, even if they did not like it. One of the merits credited to Lenin and many of his fellow workers was the fact that they were able to suppress their own feelings and turn into a fighting party which was able to preserve the gains of the October Revolution and oppose the counterrevolution and the intervention.

### On the 'Original Sin' and the 'Immaculate Conception'

The criticism of the "people wearing boots" was only the initial step in condemning the revolution as a whole. Violence and the "conception in blood" increasingly are being ascribed to the party as its "original sin." A sterile and "immaculate conception" is being demanded of the revolution. Let us not depress the readers and ourselves. Strictly speaking, however, in order to be successful the revolution precisely demands an "original sin." This is due, above all, to the fact that violence was the most important feature of the revolution, its inevitable attribute given the specific historical conditions of that time.

One may reject the revolution (after all, this is a matter of personal conviction). One could speak of the suffering and difficulties in which the history of any revolution is rich. One could regret the fact that people, classes and parties, in an effort to eliminate their hardships and difficulties, join the revolution and take the path of struggle, the path of violence and that this path is inevitably fraught with very grave excesses and tragedies, and the lower the standards of a country are, the more such excesses and tragedies occur. One could even say that at the end of the 20th century the world has developed a different understanding of the role of violence. Be that as it may, and whatever our attitude toward violence may be, we must accept the fact that at that time the revolution could not be made without violence. One cannot accept the revolution with its bright ideals and reject violence. This is impossible. Furthermore, it is only the age of the great revolutions and the gains and losses of that age that have brought us to our current understanding of universal human values, democracy based on reciprocal tolerance, etc. Now we must learn all of this in the course of our daily political practices.

Be that as it may, it would be hardly suitable to blame the people who made the revolution for lack of decency and moderation and imagine that in 1917 the class struggle in Russia could have been stopped, and in order to achieve this one simply had to understand a few things. Also, in order for history to have taken a different road, the leaders of the revolution should have had wise counselors; otherwise a false image appears, which is only tempting us and insinuating to us that the revolution could have been avoided or else that the revolution could have been different, almost like a Christmas gift to a Russia torn by contradictions. If in reality we do not find such a revolution, it seems to us that it has violated some kind of order, at which point we speak of its "original sin," of retribution and making the leaders of the revolution pay.

Did those against whom the bolsheviks fought accept the latter's victory and did they acknowledge bolshevik justice? Naturally, they did not!

One can also understand the tragedy of both camps, the tragedy of the people who found themselves torn

between the two camps. At least one should not speak of the "original sin" of the revolution, ignoring the obvious facts and admissions of people who were eyewitnesses to the events of October 1917. It was the strength of the opposition to the revolution that triggered its response.

Naturally, today no one would even conceive of claiming that, as Engels said in his time, every time that a hostage was executed everything was done absolutely according to the rules. Alas, this was not the case. To modern man executing a hostage whose guilt has not been proven in court is a horrible thing. However, the people of those times had a different psychological makeup and a different historical experience.

"Lenin and I frequently discussed the cruelty of revolutionary tactics and actions," M. Gorkiy wrote in his memoirs. "What do you want?" he asked, astonished and angry. "Is humaneness possible in such an unparalleled fierce fight? Where is there a place here for gentleness and generosity of spirit? Europe has blockaded us. We are deprived of the expected assistance of the European proletariat. The counterrevolution is coming at us like a bear, from all sides, and what are we to do? Should we not have the right or the obligation to resist? Forgive me, but we are not idiots. We know that that which we want no one can do but us. Do you assume that had I believed differently I would have been sitting here? What yardstick do you use in determining the amount of blows which one must strike or must not strike in a fight?" he asked me once after a heated conversation. "I could answer only in lyrical terms to this simple question. I believe that no other answer was possible."

This was probably indeed the case, whether we accept it or not. No other way was possible. There may have been more or less excesses. However, they were not the result of the bad character of the bolsheviks or their "innate" thirst for violence. Actually, in an obedient world, from a tale of terror the revolution can easily be converted into a fairy tale.

How? Quite simply.

It turns out that, having seized the power, the bolsheviks should have preserved the bourgeois parties which opposed them fiercely and which were preparing for an armed restoration of the past. The bolsheviks should have allowed the opposition newspapers to exert a powerful influence on public opinion and become a tool for the organization of counterrevolutionary forces aimed at overthrowing the power which had been constituted at the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The bolsheviks should have rejected the experience of all preceding revolutions and, having assumed power, should have acted like any ordinary reformer.

In that case, perhaps, the bolsheviks should not have seized the power at all.

There are as many opinions on this subject as there are people. However, such opinions should be followed to their logical end. The fact that the power was seized

illegally from the viewpoint of the Provisional Government is unquestionable. However, the fact that the revolution does not recognize the laws of the old world and that it denies and rejects them, is equally unquestionable. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that the revolution could have been "immaculate." At that point we should be saying that the revolution should simply not have taken place, for we did not like what went on with it.

### The Symbols of 'Original Sins' and the Real Facts of History

As a rule, articles which condemn the revolution do not deal in the real facts and specific circumstances such as, for example, the closing down of opposition newspapers or the murder of deputies to the Constituent Assembly, the Cadets A.I. Shingarev and F.F. Kokoshkin, or the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly itself, but applying some kinds of symbols, with hieroglyphs which could fit their author's arguments only if deprived of their historical base and losing their tie to reality. Such articles deal not with the real facts, with all their connections and sequences, but with symbols which are structured in a specific sequence and which assume the shape of "intellectual mosaic" from which one could draw whatever conclusion one may wish. The ease with which this structure can be assembled is explained precisely with the fact that we are dealing not with the assassination of Shingarev and Kokoshkin but with the hieroglyph depicting the "assassination of Shingarev and Kokoshkin;" not with the fact of closing down the opposition press but the hieroglyph of "closing down the opposition press."

The hieroglyph of the "closing down of the opposition press on the second day of the Soviet system," for example, should be a proof of the fact that democracy and freedom were restricted during the very first days of the revolution. In itself, however, this fact makes absolutely no sense if taken out of its true historical context.

Here is what O.V. Naumov, senior scientific associate at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, whom we consulted has to say: "Indeed, the decree on the press was passed by the Sovnarkom on 27 October 1917; on 28 October, the Sovnarkom passed a resolution to ban the publication of the newspapers which had been closed down by the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRK). Please pay attention to the end part of the decree." Considering, however, that this means that restricting the freedom of the press, even at critical times, is admissible only to the extent to which it is absolutely necessary, the Council of People's Commissars resolves the following: ...It is only the following organs of the press that are subject to closing down: 1. Those which call for open resistance or disobedience to the worker and peasant government; 2. Those which sow discord by publishing clearly slanderous distortions of the facts; 3. Those which call for obviously criminal actions, i.e., actions which are criminally punishable." This is immediately followed by the statement that "the

present regulation is temporary and will be lifted by special ukase the moment normal conditions for social life have been established."

"Let us now follow the actions of the Petrograd VRK. On 26 October 1917, it instructed the commissars to close down the newspapers RECH, NOVOYE VREMYA, VECHERNEYE VREMYA, RUSSKAYA VOLYA, BIRZHEVYYE VEDOMOSTI, NARODNAYA PRAVDA, DEN and NASHE OBSHCHEYE DELO, newspapers the nature of which was either one of instigation or of an obvious reactionary and pogrom-oriented variety. By no means were all opposition newspapers closed down. Menshevik, S.R. and even bourgeois satirical publications were allowed to continue publication.

"The stipulation in the decree to the effect that the closing down of the newspapers is a 'temporary and extreme step' naturally proves little, the more so since the bolsheviks subsequently abandoned their initial understanding of the freedom of the press. Essentially 'normal conditions for social life' are developing only now. If we look now at referential works, we would nonetheless see that many of those newspapers continued their publication until the country found itself in the flames of the Civil War and intervention (the Cadets' RECH continued publication until August 1918; the newspaper DEN until May 1918, etc.). One would also find out that in a certain sense the 26 October 1917 VRK Resolution was legalizing an already existing situation. Let me remind you that the closing down of the newspapers and the seizure of the printing presses were initiated by decision of the Provisional Government. On 24 October not only the bolshevik newspapers RAB-OCHIY PUT and SOLDAT were closed down but also the obviously counterrevolutionary ZHIVVOYE SLOVO and NOVAYA RUS. However, the Provisional Government was not alone in realizing the importance of the periodical press during the decisive days of the revolution; on 25 October, even before the VRK passed its resolution, soldiers from the Semenov Regiment occupied the presses of the newspaper RUSSKAYA VOLYA. The All-Russian Military-Peasant Alliance faced the VRK with the fact, by announcing on 26 October that it had occupied the presses of the newspaper NARODNYY TRIBUN (Purishkevich's newspaper)."

Therefore, the real fact, taken out of the context of historical reality of that time, could be made to serve all sorts of imaginary ideas. If we consider this fact in the context of the events, it becomes clear and understandable: the bolsheviks had their own logic, the logic of the revolution. Let us furthermore note that as early as 12 July 1917, the Provisional Government had granted the minister of war and the Ministry of Internal Affairs the right to close down periodicals and, on 28 July, the right to ban assemblies and congresses. Therefore, in the true Russian reality of 1917, there simply did not exist the type of ideal "civil society" with "unrestricted freedoms" which the bolsheviks abandoned in favor of dictatorship.

If the closing down of the opposition press was indeed the work of the bolsheviks, they had absolutely nothing to do with the assassination of the Cadets A.I. Shingarev and F.F. Kokoshkin, who were arrested on the basis of the Decree on Detaining the Leaders of the Civil War Against the Revolution of 28 November 1917. Suffice it to open Volume 50 of V.I. Lenin's Complete Collected Works. It was on Lenin's instructions that an investigative commission was immediately set up; or else turn to the memoirs of V. Bonch-Bruyevich, which came out in 1934 in the journal KATORGA I SSYLKA (these documents were selected for us by N.V. Pastukhova, an IML associate), to realize that the bolsheviks were as indignant by this act of summary justice as were the other political leaders in Russia. They did everything they could to identify and punish the perpetrators. It was no accident that in its 9 January 1918 issue, IZVESTIYA TsIK published the following: "Navy announcement. 7 January 1918. On the night of the 6th of January Shingarev and Kokoshkin were killed at the Mariinskaya Hospital in Petrograd. According to hospital personnel, the assassination was the work of several individuals wearing Naval uniforms. The matter must be most strictly investigated. The honor of the revolutionary fleet must not be smeared with the accusation that revolutionary seamen kill helpless enemies in jail. I call upon anyone who participated in this assassination—providing that he may be a mistaken person rather than a violent counterrevolutionary—voluntarily to surrender to the revolutionary tribunal.

"I also call upon all comrades who may have any information about this affair immediately to report it to the Supreme Naval Investigation Commission. Dybenko, people's commissar for Navy affairs."

We know that Lenin was furious when told of the assassination of Shingarev and Kokoshkin. He demanded that the seamen be categorically told that whatever Kerenskiy may have tolerated we would not. The people demanded law and justice.

Frequently people prefer not to know or mention such uncomfortable facts, for this makes it very easy to trace the origin of Stalin's crimes to the "little blood" shed by Shingarev and Kokoshkin.

Of late claims to the effect that as early as 1918 the bolsheviks had started fighting the people and virtually classifying them as the "enemies of the people" (it becomes puzzling how the bolsheviks were then able to retain their power in the struggle against the white generals, conspirators and interventionists) have become exceptionally popular. It turns out that even the workers disliked the new system because it "curtailed freedom." All sorts of proofs are being brought forth to this effect! It is being claimed, for example, that the disorganization of industry was a deliberate proletarian protest against the political arbitrariness of the bolsheviks! What were the true facts?

N.K. Krupskaya recalls: "Initially the plant organizations quite readily allowed factory workers to attend various meetings. I recall the following case: on one occasion a worker came to see me at the People's Commissariat of Education.... I asked her what shift she worked.... 'No one at the factory works today. There was a general meeting yesterday and then I had quite a lot of work to do at home. We also voted not to work today. Well, we are now the bosses.' ...They had expelled the exploiting bosses... but the fact that the factory had become public property and that such public property had to be preserved and strengthened and that labor productivity had to be increased, no awareness of this fact had developed as yet."

In order to be accurate, let us make clear that the worsening of the situation in industry had begun long before the bolsheviks had come to power and had intensified on the crest of that "spontaneous socialism" of the oppressed, which contains not only constructive but also destructive features. For that reason M. Tomskiy, the head of the trade unions, in complaining about the critical decline in production forces, in May 1918 sadly acknowledged that the worker "is turning into a pensioner of the state, a parasite who lives at the expense of others."

Ways had to be found to come out of this situation and to keep this element under control. Otherwise it was impossible to make use of the freedom. Turned into anarchy, such freedom led to the drop of labor productivity and chaos. The people were losing the last remaining assurances for leading a normal life.

Naturally, history is familiar also with entirely real cases of workers acting under the motivation of anti-Soviet slogans. However, these are precisely facts which are part of the true historical process and not hieroglyphs painted in a conceptual structure. If workers take to the street to demonstrate and if they participate in a mutiny, in such a case we must quite clearly distinguish between the different reasons, the motivations which led to this. Are we not familiar with the fact that people are by no means always able to realize and formulate their real interests and that they can yield to emotions and be used in the political games played by others?

Are the workers always right? Is this axiomatic? If such is the case should we consider that General Kolchak was right only because until the very end he was followed by an entire division formed of Izhevsk-Votkinsk workers? And why should we not consider them to be right if they supported the Soviet system?

The workers' protests which took place on 10 March 1919 in Astrakhan have drawn of late the increased attention of our journalists. Some of the basic reasons which led the workers to participate in an anti-Soviet mutiny include the militarization of jobs and of the workers. Actually, usually such actions improved the food supplies to the workers and they themselves were asking for the militarizing of their enterprises. It was

precisely in connection with the militarization of the workers that the defense plants in Astrakhan initially enjoyed a number of food advantages. By the end of February 1919 the Astrakhan Provisional Military-Revolutionary Committee set a uniform bread ration for all workers employed in military and other jobs. At the same time, the rations were reduced because of food difficulties. The entire course of subsequent events, as published, is presented on the basis of sources coming from the political camp hostile to the bolsheviks: the 10,000-strong meeting held by the Astrakhan workers was surrounded by troops. Machine guns started firing.... If anyone would undertake to analyze the depressing and sad facts which may be considered a shameful spot on the conscience of the revolution, he would nonetheless have to hear out the other side as well.

Addressing itself to the participants and eyewitnesses of these events, at a time when it would have been difficult to distort facts to the point of making them unrecognizable, in its 16 March 1919 issue the newspaper KOMMUNIST (organ of the Astrakhan Guberniya Party Committee) wrote: "What happened in Astrakhan on 10-11 March is this: ...In the past 2 weeks a number of closed meetings had taken place, held by a certain unconscientious segment of Astrakhan workers employed at "Kavkaz i Merkurii," "Kama," and "Nobel," on Zayachiy Island, at the former Norem Plant and elsewhere, at which the communists were not allowed to speak. Some kind of resolutions were passed at these meetings and, subsequently, demands were presented to the Soviet authorities in the nature of an ultimatum concerning free trade, increasing the ration to almost 3 pounds, and so on.

"...By 10:00 a.m. on Monday, 10 March, the siren at the "Kavkaz i Merkurii" workshops signaled gangs of hooligans to get moving. The seamen immediately blocked the port and closed the gates. The mutineers resisted and tried to join a questionable crowd coming from the customs shed. A disorderly fire was opened by the crowd and immediately, the first victim to fall at the port was a seaman who was on guard at the gate.

"Learning of the death of their comrade, the seamen raised some units, fired in the air but, as the crowd continued to commit excesses and did not disperse, opened fire.

"At that time the crowd consisted of deserters from the 45th Regiment, recently mobilized riffraff off the street and other disreputable characters. That same crowd attacked the patrols of the 45th Regiment at the slipway, captured weapons and, shouting 'hit the commissars' and 'down with the communists' advanced on the Tatarskiy Marketplace. Here a clash occurred around noon with the third battalion of the blocking detachment; another part of the advancing crowd marched toward the second Bakaldinskaya Street and attacked the Bakaldinskiy Rayon Party Committee. The committee resisted but, because of its small numbers, was forced to clear the premises and wait for help from other rayons. Another

part of the crowd concentrated on the square in front of the Ivan Zlatoust Church and, seizing the belfry and the fire observation tower, opened fire.

"One hour later combat forces had been brought up, the party was mobilized and the mutiny began to be localized. The troops were forced to use machine guns and artillery fire in order to expel the bandits from the Ivan Zlatoust belfry. Everything came to an end by 10:00 p.m...."

The Astrakhan events were part of other counterrevolutionary activities related to a new outbreak of the civil war. Once again the question arises: Did the bolsheviks have the right to suppress them? An unprejudiced look at the situation would lead to the simple answer of yes. Perhaps more essential in this case is something else. The fact that even then the bolsheviks tried to determine what was taking place and to establish what were the reasons for the discontent of the workers. Actually, the workers and peasants who had participated in the mutinies were granted amnesty by decision of the VTsIK and the Sovnarkom with their resolution dated 25 April 1919.

#### The Illusion of the Wasted Opportunity

Among the historical ideas formulated of late and directly related to the present, the key idea is that, after having disbanded the Constituent Assembly and rejected the "homogeneous socialist government," the bolsheviks lost the opportunity to cooperate with the left-wing forces in Russia within the framework of a democratically elected parliament. We believe that this accusation addressed at the bolsheviks of 1917 and the present-day communists, contains a heavy dose of utopia. It proceeds from the fact that the good will of a single party is able to open the way to compromise and to reciprocally acceptable solutions. The readiness and ability for a dialogue with political enemies and opponents or temporary allies is ignored. These two, according to such views, they do not have an independent political feature or independent political platforms or their own political objectives. Was it all that easy for the bolsheviks to reach an agreement with the other socialist parties?

Suffice it to look at the minutes of the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, where the question of the regime was discussed. At the 25 October 1917 Session, some mensheviks and right-wing S.R. deemed it necessary to distance themselves from anything that was taking place at that time on the streets of Petrograd and called for "gathering the social forces firmly to oppose attempts at seizure of power." In the final account, what happened was that mensheviks and S.R. walked out of the congress of soviets. The members of the Constituent Assembly themselves showed no greater desire for compromise and flexibility.

Today's reader, unfortunately, has a very poor idea of what 1917 was like. Please note that the first session of the present Supreme Soviet lasted 2 months. During that time the editors of IZVESTIYA received a huge number



of letters with a variety of reactions. A substantial portion of them were letters by people who openly said, enough blabbering, enough procedural problems, do something specific, and pass at least one specific resolution. Look at 1917 from that same point of view. There were endless congresses, meetings and assemblies. There were all-Russian, guberniya, uyezd and volost congresses. At that time, there were more than 100 parties in Russia.... All of them were discussing the same problems: the war and the question of the land, although it had already become clear to everyone how to solve them. It was clear to everyone but, nonetheless, no one made any decision. Right-wing Cadet V.A. Maklakov complained: "We can see a large number of base instincts which have come to the surface: we see unwillingness to work, unwillingness to realize one's duty to the homeland. We see that while a cruel war is being fought in the country, there are all sorts of celebrations, meetings and discussions, we see a country which rejects the authority and is unwilling to obey it."

It was after such dozens and hundreds of congresses, each one of which passed an appeal or a manifesto addressed to the uyezd, the guberniya or the country or, finally, the entire world, that the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets gathered and instantly passed the decisions which had already been formulated by the popular masses themselves. Everything was resolved! Everything was accomplished! Not quite, though. Once again an all-Russian forum was convened—the Constituent Assembly—and the procedural-parliamentary game started, in which these decrees were rejected and their discussion assumed a protracted nature. Look at the minutes and see for yourselves. What could the reaction to this be? The decrees of the 2nd All-Russian Congress had been welcomed with a sigh of relief: Finally! But then what, all this all over again? That is why the masses did not react at all to the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly.

Historian S.P. Melgunov, an eyewitness to the revolution, and a person whose views were openly anti-Soviet, frankly spoke of the sterility of pitting the real slogans of peace, land, worker control and others, which had been proclaimed by the bolsheviks on behalf of the Soviets, and were understood by the masses, against the abstract hopes of the Constituent Assembly, which was to implement "those essential expectations of the popular masses." Melgunov believed that this question largely dealt "only with the methods to which the people's awareness, most likely the majority, was quite indifferent. One had to struggle to have a Constituent Assembly. Perhaps at the start of the revolution the idea of a Constituent Assembly was welcomed by the masses or, rather, the intelligentsia "with a sacred anticipation." However, this fetish lost its glitter after a 9-month wait. It was hardly possible to raise the masses against the soviets in the name of the Constituent Assembly, for

none other than the party leader S.R. Chernov demagogically whispered, as early as on 5 May, at the Council of Peasant Deputies: "The soviet is our own 'socialist Constituent Assembly'."

What mattered to the masses was that the problem be solved. As to whether parliamentary procedures and legal standards had been observed or not, to them this was a matter of profound indifference. Furthermore, according to the personal observations of right-wing S.R. I.Ye. Pyanykh, a member of the Constituent Assembly, in January, after the Constituent Assembly had been dismantled, the people in the countryside were taking the law into their own hands in the case of representatives who had spoken against the Soviet system. Yes, the bolsheviks dismantled the Constituent Assembly and arguments about this fact today may be given a free rein. This topic, however, is merely the first part of a film series. What was to happen subsequently?

After the failed attempt to set up a government in Samara and test their strength against the Soviet system, some members of the Constituent Assembly moved East, to Yekaterinburg, under the protection of General Gajda, the commander of the White Czechs. However, they did not find in that city the security they desired. On 19 November Kolchak officers rushed inside the Palais Royal Hotel, where the Constituent Assemblymen had settled. Failing to find the chairman of the Constituent Assembly, the S.R. V. Chernov, just in case they shot and killed another S.R., Maksudov, and detained the others. The next day they were freed but expelled from Yekaterinburg. On 20 November, on a moonlit night, loading their suitcases and trunks in private coaches and carts, the caravan of Constituent Assemblymen, one verst long, left the city, accompanied by soldiers.

"Who are those people in the carts?" one of the witnesses of this exodus asked. "The first people's deputies of Russia! Who are they running away from? From Russian soldiers! Who is protecting them? Foreigners, some Czechs.... Indeed, there is something to be amazed at in Russia, in this country of unlimited opportunity!"

Obviously, it would be difficult for today's reader to realize (there is nothing amazing in this, those were different times, different outlooks and different mentalities) that with such a fierce differentiation among the fighting forces which are triggered by civil war, individual choices are obviously limited. You may not like something in any given group.... However, the line of barricades destroys any other "third dimension," and you are forced to take one side or the other, to select one of the available options. The history of civil wars, not only in Russia but in many other countries, abounds in spiritual, human, and political dramas and tragedies which occur precisely by the force of this type of situations.

Therefore, there was no "third dimension" for the members of the Constituent Assembly as well. The real strike

force—the White Guards—which were opposing the Soviet system did not need “democrats.” One of the “theoreticians” of the White Guard movement, frankly said, with a kind of “black humor:” “You are working for us by hitting at the bolsheviks and weakening their positions. However, since you cannot stay in power long or, rather, since the revolution, as it is hurled back, will inevitably go back to where it started, it will not be stopped by you. Therefore, why should we ally ourselves with you? We will occasionally urge you on and after you have done your job and overthrown the bolsheviks, we shall then drop you in the same pit as they.”

That is a most interesting document, true? But, let us go on....

By the end of 1918 the counterrevolutionaries rejected the Constituent Charter. After long tribulations, the members of the Constituent Assembly, starting from Yekaterinburg, reached Ufa. On 2 December, however, a special Kolchak detachment, which mounted a sortie out of Omsk, interrupted a meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Chernov and others were once again able to hide. However, more than 20 people were detained and sent under guard to the Omsk jail where bolsheviks, mensheviks, and S.R. had been sitting for a long time.

On the night of 22 December the bolsheviks attempted an uprising in the city and all prisoners were freed. However, after killing more than 1,000 people, the Kolchak forces suppressed the rebellion and announced that anyone who would voluntarily go back to jail would have his life guaranteed.... The majority of this group of Constituent Assemblymen returned to jail obediently and without a murmur. That same night, along the bank of the Irtysh, some of them were executed along with the rearrested bolsheviks, mensheviks and S.R., while others were simply bayoneted.... In the Civil War cartridges were more valuable than bread.

By October 1917, the bolsheviks and their opponents, most of whom belonged to the petit bourgeois parties, no longer understood each other well. Whereas debates on a homogeneous socialist government could be considered a political problem and not “family quarrels,” the government nonetheless had to include not everyone who “so desired,” but only those who were truly supported by the masses. The left-wing S.R. alone were such a force. Their dominant influence among the peasantry was unquestionable. It was with them, that in the final account, the bolsheviks formed a government block. Subsequently, the ways of the two parties parted. However, this break was preceded by cooperation, which defeats the thesis of the initial unwillingness of the bolsheviks to share the power with the other socialist parties. This fact does not fit the concept of the historical opportunity lost by the bolsheviks. However, nor should we pretend that it did not exist at all.

#### **Did the Bolsheviks Enjoy Unlimited Power?**

The “democratic” and “free” period of the Provisional Government ended with the dramatic picture of a

national crisis: “Millions of people thrown out by the country are on the verge of extreme despair, when they can no longer think or feel and when the entire being is grabbed by the aspiration to flee from this hell,” eyewitnesses certified in October 1917. “Other millions of people behind the lines, confused in the chaos of tragic events, confused by provocations and demagogy, are destroying in this pogrom the final possibilities of saving themselves from the horrors of war and anarchy.” In this country which was collapsing in front of their own eyes and by no means in a “civil society,” operating with full democracy, the bolsheviks had to create a new statehood. At that time they hardly thought of the unlimited power which, according to many political journalists, had intoxicated them. Whereas at the start of 1918 the heads of the bolsheviks may have been turning, this was caused by more a feeling of weakness than power. They were as yet unable systematically to implement their decisions. They were unable to put an immediate end to anarchy. In the spring of 1918 Lenin described the new system as excessively soft, looking more like kissel than steel.

The lack of a firm central power triggered paradoxical phenomena. A mass of various independent groups appeared: local “sovnarkoms,” “labor communes,” federations of “labor communes,” etc. Just try and bring order in the country, try to meet basic survival needs when each guberniya executive committee, like the “soviet of people’s commissars” of Pechengskiy Uyezd, Arkhangelsk Guberniya, could say that “we are the local authorities. We shall accept the decrees of the central authorities only to the extent to which we find them acceptable.” A stable authority (the process of establishing it was by no means fast in revolutionary Russia) was needed in order not even simply to bring order but to prevent perhaps the gross arbitrariness and anarchy in the localities, and the excesses.

It was precisely the initial weakness and shakiness of the authorities, combined with the active and organized counteraction of anti-Soviet forces that led the bolsheviks to resort to emergency actions and to “curtailing freedoms.” Generally speaking, whenever people resort to “emergency measures,” this is a first indication of the instability of a system.

Lenin perfectly realized that not very much could be accomplished with naked force or “red terror.” It was not the food detachments that solved the question of grain. Victory in the Civil War was possible above all because of the right way in which the problem of the peasantry was solved, when the peasantry made its historical choice. The choice between the bolsheviks with their tax-in-kind and military-communist raids and the White generals, which were taking the country back, was made.

Naturally, the bolsheviks aspired to the creation of a firm and stable central power. The masses as well wanted the type of system which could ensure the implementation of its own resolutions. Could such a strong stable power immediately assume consistently democratic

forms? We believe that out of the tempestuous and uncontrolled stream which flowed from February through October, democracy could not develop directly. All that could come out of it was a dictatorship. The question is, whose dictatorship specifically? Was it of the bolsheviks or the White generals? It was only victory in the Civil War, the scope of which was defined by the intervention of foreign forces, by no means on the side of the bolsheviks, that let the question appear of the next steps to be taken by the authorities and the direction they would take. In the 1920s there was a complex transition from civil war to civil peace. However, the evolution of the system toward democratic forms of government was halted by the end of the 1920s. This, however, is an entirely different story.

There are a great many things that we do not like about the past. We would like to strike out a great deal and reject a great deal as well. We sometimes feel that if we were to turn the calendar back by slightly more than 70 years and start at the point at which no blood had been shed yet, everything would have developed better and more intelligently. In real life, however, we must deal with a past which nothing can change.

As Engels said in his time, any social revolution must "begin by taking things as it finds them and fight the worst evil with the help of available means" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 18, p 239). We cannot go back and start anew. In order to move ahead and change and improve our life we must not reject our past and strike it out or prove that it could have been different, brighter, happier and more beautiful, but understand it.

What is most amazing is that this "fairy tale" type of thinking, which we encounter with increasing frequency in "fat" and "slim" journals seems to be inherent to both authors who support conservative "patriotic" views and who moan after Stolypin's Russia and reject all revolutionary values, as well as those who try to assert truly progressive ideas. The simplistic and primitive perception of reality, which we have inherited, and the division of life into "black" and "white" is essentially aggressive and basically destructive. Do we need, even for the sake of proving the existence of progressive ideas such as, for example, the intrinsic value of democracy and pluralism, resort to historical forgeries and self-delusion? Naturally, we do not. It is only a sober look at the past, an awareness of the limits and obstacles which stand in front of the people in the course of their expedient (as well as inexpedient) actions that open the road to understanding the future and free us from illusions and naive rosy-tinted optimism, that enable us to experience the real clash of interests, aspirations and political will in history. Without such an understanding the danger arises of once again starting to chase the bad people, the "enemies of the people."

All too frequently of late our historical publications begin to look like lessons in arithmetic, in which the students are zealously trying to find already known

answers. Such an obedient history is hardly different from Stalin's. In any case, such an opinion of history instills in society the idea of an obedient future, at which point history can no longer provide answers to the question of today.

Perhaps anyone who, in the intoxication of freedom, is trying to pour the wine of the new truths into the old bottles of the old "providential" way of thinking, should remember the good intentions with which is paved the road... to paradise?!

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### IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALISM: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, ASPIRATIONS

#### Loyalty to Revolutionary Behests

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[Article by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, chairman of the state council of the GDR; article simultaneously published in *EINHEIT*, journal of the SED Central Committee]

[Text] The 40 years of stable and dynamic development of the first socialist state of workers and peasants on German soil and all of its accomplishments during that time lead to the conclusion that the GDR, a country in Central Europe, has passed the historical test of time. Together with the people, through the efforts of the people and for the good of the people, under the leadership of the SED, tremendous constructive work was done after the wreckage left from World War II. In the course of the revolutionary renovation of all life, including antifascist democratic changes, laying the foundations of socialism and the subsequent building of a developed socialist society, the way of life of the people changed for the better more than at any other time in the past. Peace and friendship among nations were given a permanent pass in our country.

#### The Greatest Achievement of the Revolutionary German Working Class

The GDR is the most significant gain of the revolutionary German workers movement. Its founding marked the conclusion of the struggle waged by all the progressive forces of the people, the purpose of which was to create a Germany free from the exploitation of man by man, from imperialism and reaction and from the national mania of grandeur and aspiration toward aggression: a new, a socialist Germany. This objective became reality thanks to the fact that the working class seized the power in its own hands and is exercising it allied with the cooperative peasantry, the intelligentsia and the other toiling strata. The founding of the GDR was a turning point in the history of the German people and Europe. The far-reaching significance of this fact

became universally obvious over the past 40 years. The process of strengthening security and cooperation was given additional support. The existence and development of an antifascist socialist state in the GDR means happiness for the peoples which had suffered such a great deal as a result of the repeated aggressive campaigns launched by German imperialism and militarism. Few people doubt this today.

After the victory of the anti-Hitlerite coalition over the brown plague, the driving force in which was the Soviet Union, and as a result of our liberation, we used the opportunity for radical social renovation on a new basis. In accordance with the 1945 Potsdam Accord, fascism, militarism, imperialism and racism were totally uprooted; the grounds for their restoration in any form was removed. Our people took the path of building socialism and thus made the choice in favor of freedom and human dignity and, consequently, of firmly rejecting all reactionary elements of the past. Linked by unbreakable ties of friendship with the Soviet Union, and constituting an inseparable component of the community of socialist states, over the past 40 years, in the course of intensive work and occasionally difficult struggle, and with international openness, our country was able to achieve accomplishments of which it can be proud. The GDR earned international recognition. Today it is equal to the other countries in the world and a member of the United Nations; it maintains diplomatic relations with 135 countries.

The Socialist Unity Party of Germany hammered out the alliance among the working class, the cooperated peasantry and the members of the intelligentsia and all working people, without which the consequences of the war could not have been eliminated, and assumed a worthy position among the industrially most developed nations. It created a modern agriculture and ensured the blossoming of science and culture. This equally applies to the comradely and trustworthy cooperation with all parties and mass organizations within the GDR National Front. We consider as a reliable compass of our policy the doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Its creative application under the conditions of our country makes it possible to find the most expedient solutions to the problems of its development and to formulate our tasks in domestic and foreign policy. Thus, since the beginning of the 1970s we have been able to achieve significant successes in building a developed socialist society in the interests of the people, successes which we are multiplying on the basis of the resolutions of the 11th SED Congress.

The GDR is welcoming its 40th anniversary as a country with an efficiently functioning socialist social system. This system guarantees human rights and is consistent with the requirements of the 1990s. A high level of material and cultural standards of our people has been attained. The system of social insurance has developed to an extent to which one could only dream of the year

the republic was founded. Full employment, social protection and equal educational opportunities for all children have become the daily reality of our working people. All of this is taking place at a time when in other countries one-third of the citizens live in a state of semipoverty, where the exploitation of man by man has not been eliminated and where everything is subordinated to the purpose of earning higher profits.

The citizens of the GDR are justifiably proud of their successes achieved through collective toil. They see in their active participation in the life of the Socialist German State their own personal contribution to the achievement of their own interests. All of this was convincingly confirmed in the course of the communal elections held last May, when millions of citizens voted for the candidates of the National Front and for a policy of socialism and peace.

Political stability, a dynamically developing economy and social protection are frequently used concepts in describing our reality. In the tempestuous contemporary events they are more valuable than ever. All social structures and areas of life in our country are of a clearly manifested socialist nature. The material and technical foundations of our planned economy are based today on the obvious successes in the practical utilization of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. Microelectronic products—chips and computers, robots, automatic lines and other high technology goods—are increasingly defining the nature of our industry, making the work of the people more productive. Naturally, this process does not develop evenly everywhere. There is no country in the world not facing problems and difficulties in the course of making profound changes in its economic structure. In this case as well we are no exception. Equally unquestionable is the fact that in our country the results of the major efforts which were made in this respect in the course of several 5-year periods are now bearing fruit.

The national income of the GDR, which averaged 4 percent in the 1980s, has been achieved entirely as a result of production intensification and higher labor productivity. Increasingly, the scientific and technical revolution is becoming its major source. It is on this basis that our worker-peasant state was able to acquire good positions in the economic competition in the world arena.

In 1989 GDR industry produced in 3 weeks as much output as it did during the entire first year of its existence. In the past 40 years the national income has increased more than tenfold. In 1949 one could still see the wreckage of the war. Today our economy is working under entirely different conditions compared to that difficult first year. Even looking at a more recent past, again we cannot fail to see the strong economic dynamism, above all in sectors which determine contemporary economic progress. Thus, for example, the production of integrated microelectronic circuits increased by a factor of 14 between 1980 and 1988 while the number of

industrial robots increased tenfold. From 1986 to the end of 1988 alone the number of automatic control and engineering systems in the national economy increased by a factor of more than 6. The list of similar examples could be extended.

#### **Growth of Production Forces for the Good of the People**

As the reality of life indicates, the powerful growth of production forces in the socialist GDR serves the good of the people, for these forces are inseparably linked to social guarantees and to the steadily growing material and cultural standards of the life of the people. We do not belittle in the least the scientific and technical and economic achievements of the industrially developed capitalist countries. However, it would be an error to ignore the fact that in those countries such development was paralleled by unemployment, new poverty and increased number of homeless people—those inseparable features of a system the main value of which is not man, as is the case in our country, but profit. We have become even more firmly convinced that the essence of socialism—to do everything for the people—is achieved above all in the process of mastering the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution. This is convincingly confirmed by the unity between economic and social policy, which is the pivot of our economic strategy. Accordingly, there has been not only an improvement in the quantitative indicators of working and living conditions (in particular, real population income rose from 79.4 billion marks in 1970 to 162 billion in 1988), but also major social problems were solved in a spirit of humanism.

The right to work as the basis of a decent human existence and a secure future is guaranteed in the GDR. We grant no privileges in terms of providing an education to the few, and all children have unparalleled opportunities to learn. The 9th Education Congress earmarked the future prospects for the development of the general education polytechnical secondary school and the unified socialist education system. In our country there are no separate medical services for the rich and for the poor; health care, the cost for which is borne by society, is accessible to all. The equality of men and women in society has become reality. Our gains include also social benefits, such as aid for children, leave to care for children for 1 year, material assistance to young families, and others. These provide women with facilities to combine motherhood with work in their profession.

As to the young, they hold a central position in the life of the republic. The attitude toward young people in science, production and all other areas of social life is based not on declarations but on trust and responsibility. Proof of how highly our young generation values it and how it links its present and its future to the socialist fatherland was the rally of the Union of Free German Youth, last summer, in Berlin, the capital of the GDR. Characteristic of our socialist society are also respect and concern for labor veterans. This is manifested in periodical

increases in pensions and a broad range of steps for social security. As in the past, with their rich experience and active efforts, the veterans make an important contribution to the well-being of the republic.

A housing market and considering an apartment as a commodity which is difficult to purchase are to us alien concepts coming from the other, the capitalist world. We will eliminate the housing problem from the agenda as a social problem by 1990, thus having solved one of the traditional problems which have faced the labor movement. By the end of 1989, starting with 1971, the number of built or modernized housing units has totaled 3.27 million. Of these, 1.85 million were built since 1980. Thanks to this, the housing conditions of nearly 10 million citizens have improved since the beginning of the 1970s. Since then the state has appropriated for housing construction the huge sum of 386 billion marks, which is 10 percent of the generated national income. At the same time, the construction of sociocultural projects was carried out on a broad scale. In terms of places in nurseries and kindergartens and the number of sports facilities in schools, the GDR is one of the best equipped countries in the world.

As we know, the rent which the citizens of the GDR pay for the new comfortable apartments is low and does not average even 3 percent of the real income of a worker or employee family. We are keeping rates and prices of prime necessity goods on the same fixed low level. All of this is a manifestation of the characteristic aspects of our concept of socialism, which is absolutely incompatible with any whatsoever restriction in social guarantees, unlike a society in which no more than two-thirds of the citizens can make full use of them. In our country socialism guarantees the satisfaction of the basic needs of the entire people. Social insurance in our country is already now related to the incentive principle. This will be manifested to an even greater extent in the future. In order to implement this principle, in addition to differentiated income, based on labor results, we must produce a greater amount of high quality consumer goods. Anyone who achieves corresponding results should be paid adequately and have the possibility to spend his money as he wishes.

We invariably pay attention to both aspects of our policy—economic and social. Constant efforts are needed to maintain a rather high living standard. In turn, this requires a further dynamic growth of labor productivity. We must improve the efficiency of the production structure and struggle more firmly for the competitiveness of high quality goods stamped "Made in the GDR." In this spirit we are steadily improving the socialist management and planning system.

In this area, however, there will never be any self-regulating automatic development. The functioning of this system will always depend on the party's efficient implementation of its leading role. The full use of the possibilities of the economy and the dynamic growth of labor productivity depend on the people. In the period of

the scientific and technical revolution the responsibility for actions, creativity and individual initiative becomes even more important, for which reason all the demands which the future could make on us are, above all, demands addressed to the people.

### Continuity and Renovation

If we think back at the distance covered since 1949, we can tangibly feel the essence and scale of the revolutionary changes which have been made in the country. This applies above all to the land reform, transferring the leading enterprises to public ownership, the school reform, the reform of the higher schools, the reform of industrial prices and structural changes in the national economy. Today we are building a developed socialist society. However, this is a long-term project. As was noted in the SED Program, which was adopted at its 9th Congress, it is a question of a historical process of deep political, economic, social and cultural-moral changes. Despite the recommendations of some advisors, the GDR is progressing, thanks to such changes, not back toward capitalism but forward, in the interests of strengthening socialism, increasingly broadening its potential, making it increasingly more attractive and using ever more extensively its advantages and results for the good of the people.

In pursuing a policy of continuity and renovation, we are guided by the overall laws governing the building of socialism and proceed from the need steadily to enhance the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, and to establish even closer relations with the people's masses, public ownership of the basic means of production, and to extensively involve the working people in planning and management of social processes on the basis of the dominant socialist ideology. Such work is being done creatively, in accordance with the specific conditions of the GDR and its own experience and the experience of the other socialist countries. As was pointed out once again at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Members, which took place last July in Bucharest, each party is responsible to its own people and must be on the level of such responsibility. More than 40 years ago we stated that we do not intend to apply the Soviet system in Germany. It is self-evident that mutual solidarity, exchange of experience and studying the experience of others are useful. The slogan "Workers of the World, Unite!" with which the greatest German scientists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ended their "Communist Party Manifesto," is a sacred slogan for us, which inspires us in all our actions.

The start of the 1970s, when at its 8th Congress the party set itself the strategic task of further improving developed socialist society, was a major landmark along our successful way. Already then we chose the systematic line of development of contemporary production forces which determine the scientific and technical revolution. The implementation of that revolution in the interests of the people, with the aspiration toward achieving significant results meeting world standards are, in the final

account, the markings of revolutionary changes on the scale of values. The developed socialist society cannot be built without a high and dynamically growing labor productivity. This is a key problem of our economic and social policy, for which reason we cannot borrow prescriptions for a market-oriented economy, according to which everything is concentrated increasingly in the hands of a few.

Many examples can be found in the capitalist world of the way scientific and technical progress is paralleled by a growing antagonism between rich and poor and the apprehension experienced by many people concerning their own survival. To agree with such paralleling phenomena would mean to lose the basic social values of socialism without, meanwhile, achieving the necessary production efficiency. Our task is to preserve what has been achieved, to develop the "virgin land," and to find socialist solutions on the basis of public ownership and a socialist planned economy. That is why combining the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of socialism is considered by us as a starting point in economic strategy and social policy. We also consider mandatory the extensive development of socialist democracy.

Some people may consider that making our combines the foundation of a socialist planned economy and consequent developments, from the point of view of central management and planning, was simpler than was the actual case. We moved ahead step-by-step, never converting the entire economy into an area for experimentation, but gradually gaining experience, correcting our activities and involving in this process ever new economic sectors. It was thus that we were able to achieve firm and efficient relations among combines, on the one hand, and between them and universities, institutes and establishments of the GDR Academy of Sciences, on the other. Therefore, production and science have become increasingly intertwined. Meanwhile, in agriculture we began to make better use of the potential of cooperative ownership. Cooperation between agricultural production cooperatives opened the way for combining science with farm labor and for the creative development of the Leninist agrarian policy. This yielded substantially higher crops. The combination of organizations for peasant mutual aid with the trade cooperatives is steadily providing new impetus in our development. Strong support to members of cooperatives and private craftsmen and private retail trade is also considered of great importance in the party's agrarian concept.

Those who would like to use the achievements of contemporary science and technology must be concerned with the faster development of the educational system, as is taking place in our country, by steadily improving the unified socialist education system. The following fact speaks for itself: since the founding of our state 1.9 million citizens of the GDR have acquired higher or secondary specialized training. A society which invests so heavily in arming people with knowledge should

aspire to make full use of such people in all areas of life. This need is also consistent with the fact that the basic trend in the development of our socialist state is the further development of socialist democracy. This is reflected in all important steps taken in political and legislative activities, from economics to the communal economy. In the course of the past decades we developed a major code of laws which include a civil code, laws on the protection of mothers and children and on people's enterprises, local people's representative authorities and cooperatives. All of this enables us to speak of a socialist law-governed state.

In our country socialism is for all. It needs every one of us and opens for every person a broad field for creative participation in solving social problems benefiting one and all. Working together and jointly planning and managing is a principle which has fully confirmed its validity. Naturally, the GDR is not a fairy tale country in which flow rivers of milk. Nor is it an idyllic place isolated from the rest of the world. Whatever we may have achieved we have never believed it to be a reason to rest on our laurels. On its 40th birthday, the reason for the viability of our republic is found precisely in the steady further advancement of socialist society and its progress from a lower to a higher standard.

#### **A Firm Combat Alliance for the Sake of Strengthening Socialism**

In the course of our meeting on 28 June of this year in Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev characterized the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR as an important event in the social life of both our nations. He emphasized that the existence of a socialist German state, which is pursuing a systematic and initiative-minded peaceful foreign policy and firmly promoting respect for the political realities of Europe, is having a beneficial influence on the situation in Europe and the rest of the world. It was pointed out that the stable and dynamic development of the GDR, based on the resolutions of the 11th SED Congress, plays a major role in strengthening socialism as a whole.

This meeting, which took place in a spirit of unity of views on basic problems of foreign policy and building of socialism, was yet another landmark on the way to broadening and deepening relations between the GDR and the Soviet Union. It became yet another confirmation of the firm combat alliance between the SED and the CPSU and the inviolable friendship between our two peoples, the fundamental significance of which is confirmed by the 40 years of existence of the GDR. Therefore, our bilateral relations, unique in terms of their intensive and varied nature, were given yet another strong impetus thanks to the Moscow meeting.

As we know, the USSR is the most important foreign trade partner of the GDR. In turn, our republic is the biggest foreign trade partner of the Soviet Union. The extensive use and application of key technologies, microelectronics and modern computers in particular, are

increasingly defining the nature of their cooperation. The concept of economic and scientific and technical cooperation until the year 2000 covers the basic areas of division of labor between the two countries. The coordination of plans for the development of the national economy for 1991-1995, taking into consideration the growing tasks and the newly appearing economic conditions, make it possible to lay a stable foundation for the further intensification of cooperation. So far 160 agreements have been concluded on direct relations between combines, enterprises and scientific establishments, to be followed by new agreements. Some 50 percent of the working people in the GDR are directly involved in cooperation with the Soviet Union. In our interaction in the ideological and cultural areas we are guided by the long-term program for the period until the year 2000.

In my talk with M.S. Gorbachev I asserted that the SED and the entire people of the GDR unanimously support the course of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th Party Conference on the renovation of Soviet society. I said that, in carrying out perestrojka, the CPSU laid the beginning of an exceptionally difficult and complex yet necessary process which will be of decisive significance to strengthening socialism and ensuring peace on earth.

My visit to Magnitogorsk, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of that city, became a demonstration of friendship and of the great traditions of inviolable unity with the country of Lenin. Here, in the Urals, where the "heart of steel" of the Soviet Union began to beat at the start of the 1930s, where the weapons for victory over Hitlerite fascism were hammered subsequently, and where today more steel than ever before is being smelted for the good of the people, the forces of renovation of socialism are particularly impressive.

Cooperation with the other members of CEMA plays an essential role in GDR socioeconomic strategy. In the past decade close relations have developed and commerce has increased, bringing major benefits to all partners. As is the case with relations among socialist countries as a whole, in this area as well we must intensify cooperation in the interest of strengthening socialism, despite the increasingly clearly manifested variety of specific forms taken by the new social system. In the future as well, the GDR will play an active role in this process and will try to achieve the most efficient consistency between the structure of cooperation and the exchange of results of contemporary science and technology. To this effect we must use the already proven and the new forms of interaction. In this connection the mutual benefit for all partners must be a decisive factor. We consider the integration of our countries within CEMA an achievement of socialism which is of great importance to the future.

### **Cornerstone of Peace and Security in the Heart of Europe**

The fact that Europe is currently experiencing the longest period of peace in this century has profoundly affected the history of the GDR. By virtue of its very existence and development and comprehensive political actions, our socialist state has significantly contributed to the fact that this period was initiated and is continuing to this day. Allied with the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the other members of the Warsaw Pact, it is a cornerstone for peace and security in the heart of the continent.

War must never again break out on German soil. This has been the credo of the GDR ever since it was founded. The best thing that we can do for the good of the people is peace. This thought was clearly confirmed at the Extraordinary Session of the People's Chamber, held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II as a result of the attack on Poland by the German Reich. More than 50 million human lives were lost in this most devastating war, more than 20 million of whom were the sons and daughters of the Soviet Union, 6 million Poles, 6 million citizens of Jewish nationality, 6 million Germans, 1.7 million citizens of Yugoslavia, 650,000 Frenchmen, 390,000 citizens of Great Britain, 500,000 citizens of the United States, 10 million Chinese and 2 million Japanese. Incalculable material and cultural values were lost in the flames of the war. In order for the victims of this apocalypse not to have died in vain, today all efforts must be concentrated on the single objective: freeing mankind from the threat of nuclear self-destruction and eliminating war from human life.

In past decades peace frequently hung on a thread and, for a long time, the cold war which existed in Europe threatened to turn hot. Repeatedly imperialism resorted to adventurist attempts to turn back the clock of history which elsewhere in the world and, as seen in the GDR, on German soil, is indicating a transition from capitalism to socialism. All of these efforts failed and are doomed to failure in the future as well. Now, when a turn has been initiated from confrontation to cooperation, respect for the realities which appeared as a result of World War II and postwar developments must be asserted. We must proceed from the full respect of sovereignty and the territorial integrity and independence of each country in its present borders. The need to respect such international-legal stipulations is confirmed by the actions of FRG circles who consider precisely this period as being favorable for once again spreading the lie of the "existence of a German Reich within the 1937 borders." Such efforts are triggering just protest throughout the world, and serious concern caused by the increased neo-Nazism on FRG soil.

Many positive changes have taken place in the international arena, which give us confidence in the struggle for securing the peace. This is confirmed by the fact that the policy of dialogue, which we did not interrupt even under conditions of increased international tension, yielded results. Our efforts are directed toward working

together with anyone who, regardless of differences on other matters, is fighting against the threat of nuclear war. We are right in claiming that real possibilities exist, particularly in Europe, which has frequently become the arena of horrible wars, for ensuring a long peaceful future.

During his trip to the FRG last June, M.S. Gorbachev said that the contributions of the allies and the friendly countries, including the GDR, to creating prerequisites for a turn in the development of Europe, are unquestionable. "The awareness of its particular responsibility for the destinies of peace and progress in the center of our continent, which is characteristic of the GDR," he said, "is a steadily increasing factor in the Helsinki process." We assess M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the FRG and its results as a considerable contribution to further improvements in the European situation. We fully support the objectives and principles of ensuring peace, disarmament and detente as presented in the joint declaration by the two countries.

### **Energetic Actions for the Implementation of a Joint Socialist Program for Securing Peace**

Today, when the power of nuclear weapons can destroy life on earth several times over, all policy must proceed from the fact that security can be achieved not through confrontation but only through joint efforts. Reason and realism must gain the upper hand over the false thinking which has been manifested in supporting the concept of the "policy of strength" and "nuclear threat." Disarmament is urgently necessary and possible. This is convincingly confirmed by the Treaty on Eliminating Soviet and American Medium-Range Missiles, to the conclusion of which the GDR actively contributed. The world public and far-sighted politicians in the Western countries energetically insist on not losing this opportunity and not halting the disarmament process.

The GDR is actively struggling for the implementation of the joint program formulated by the Warsaw Pact members for ensuring peace. It is formulating its own suggestions and participating in bilateral initiatives with a view to accelerating this process and making it irreversible. Thus, for example, along with the other members of our alliance, the GDR undertook a unilateral reduction in its armed forces regardless of the outcome of the talks. We are familiar with the respective steps concerning our own National People's Army, the implementation of which is scheduled for completion by the end of 1990. They once again emphasize the exceptionally defensive nature of the National People's Army. In general, we are aspiring toward changes in the size and structure of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO which would exclude the capacity for launching a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations by either side. Naturally, this would be of exceptional importance in terms of the future peace prospects in Europe. From this viewpoint equally important are the initiatives of the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland on



the creation of zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons, and zones of confidence.

The conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact Members in Bucharest provided a new powerful impetus to continuing the process of disarmament in nuclear and conventional weapons. The declaration "For a Stable and Safe Europe Free From Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and for Substantially Reducing Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Expenditures" emphasizes that putting an end to the arms race and promoting disarmament are the main tasks of our time. As to conventional weapons in Europe, our alliance is trying to achieve positive results at the Vienna talks as rapidly as possible. With a constructive approach by all the participants, the initial agreements could be reached in 1990. We must ensure permanent guarantees for the equal and full security of each country of either military group. Despite progressive changes in the international situation, we must not forget that so far no radical turn toward improvements has taken place. NATO is hindering the disarmament process and the corresponding talks with the clear intention of changing, by increasing armaments, the situation, imposing on socialism an accelerated arms race, and attaining military superiority. The fact is indicative that the "Global Concept in the Area of Disarmaments and Control Over Armaments," which was drafted at the Brussels meeting of NATO members in May 1989, supports the strategy of "nuclear threat." Its mandatory prerequisite is the "further modernization of conventional and nuclear armaments." Although agreeing to hold talks on short-range nuclear weapons, NATO tries to postpone them indefinitely. The threat of war cannot be reduced by ignoring tactical nuclear weapons. New asymmetries develop and thus obstacles are erected blocking the reduction of conventional armaments. Furthermore, the logic of things is such that the renovation of tactical nuclear weapons leads to the modernization of the other armament systems. To become involved in modernization and modernization would mean a new arms race and a return to the cold war.

We favor simultaneous talks on reducing conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons on the European Continent. A Europe free from nuclear weapons, which is something which can be achieved gradually, would be of tremendous importance in freeing the world from nuclear weapons, i.e., for implementing objectives consistent with the interests of all nations. Mankind would be relieved of a tremendous burden. At the same time, the funds which would be released in the process of disarmament, could be used to solve such pressing problems as the development of the third world and eliminating hunger, disease and illiteracy, for environmental protection and others.

As the joint communique on the results of my trip to Bonn in September 1987 emphasizes, taking into consideration their common historical responsibility, the GDR and the FRG are called upon to make special efforts to ensure the peaceful structure of Europe. We

value the contribution made by the PRC to the conclusion of a treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on medium-range missiles. This is related to expectations for further active steps aimed at accelerating the disarmament process in nuclear and conventional armaments. The implementation of the stipulations contained in the joint communique, with respect for the territorial realities of Europe, would make possible the further development of normal good neighborly relations between the two German states and provide a positive impetus to peaceful cooperation and dialogue both in Europe and beyond it.

The next millennium is not all that distant and, quite understandably, we link our thoughts on the prospects of the GDR to those concerning the future of the European Continent. The more radically we reduce the arsenals of weapons stockpiled here in greater amounts than anywhere else on earth, the greater will become the security which we shall be able to develop, and the more bountiful will become the future of the peoples. The common European home in which both socialist and capitalist countries will live is today something more than a simple inspirational idea. Peaceful coexistence and normal relations among countries and cooperation and trust in the spirit of the Helsinki final act would embellish this home.

Proud of our achievements and aware of the strict requirements related to the further advancement of a developed socialist society, our people are boldly entering the 5th decade of the GDR. The 12th SED Congress, which will be held in May 1990, will formulate the tasks for the future and their implementation will unquestionably serve the strengthening of socialism, its attractiveness, and the strengthening of peace. Along with the people, through the efforts of the people and for the people, let everything be for the good and happiness of the people in our Socialist German Democratic Republic!

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#### **Forty Years of PRC: Some Results, Problems, and Prospects**

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[Article by Sergey Sergeyevich Razov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The People's Republic of China will celebrate the 40th anniversary of its founding on 1 October. The 1949 revolution crowned the long years of struggle waged by the Chinese people for their national and social liberation. The fact that the most populous country on earth took the path of socialist development, after throwing off the yoke of semi-colonial dependence on the imperialist countries, was of historical significance. The complex and torturous progress of People's China along this path does not change the essence of this evaluation.

An anniversary is a time for the summation of results and for weighing achievements and prospects of further development. This is made even more relevant by the fact that in our country, for many years, the approach to China and to its very complex processes was not free from the influence of the political situation, the perception of which, depending on the status of Soviet-Chinese relations, was dominated either by dark or rosy hues. On the other hand, many of the trends in the renovation of socialism in the PRC through reform are consistent with the ideas of perestroika in the USSR. Therefore, the real experience of China, and its achievements and solutions to arising problems are of true practical interest to us.

During those 40 years the country achieved many successes. It scored substantial progress in all areas of socioeconomic and cultural construction. China's prestige in the international arena increased. However, in the course of its 40-year history, in addition to successes, the PRC also had major errors and failures; the low level of development of production forces, mass population illiteracy (20 percent of the people in the country are illiterate), and the vestiges of the old society, inherited from the past, are making themselves felt. The Chinese people also paid a stiff price for the "great leap" and the "cultural revolution" (direct losses to the national economy are assessed respectively at 100 and 500 billion yuan), left-radical phraseology and extremism, gross violations of socialist legality and the democratic rights of the working people, triggered by the lack of experience in building socialism, and the lack of a clear idea of its laws and humanistic errors, to which subjectivistic deviations may be added.

In order to turn this page in the history of the Chinese people, the Chinese leadership had to display a great deal of political courage and realism. The holding of the Third CPC Central Committee Plenum, 11th convocation (December 1978) marked a major turn in favor of adopting a practical approach to the problems facing China. The congress' resolutions (above all on shifting the center of gravity of party work to socialist modernization) played an important role in surmounting the political and socioeconomic crisis in the country.

The last decade has been a period of intensive search conducted in China for developing its own model of social system, which would adequately reflect national specifics and which meet the challenge of the scientific and technical revolution, a period of theoretical interpretation of the contemporary problems of socialism, and of looking for practical approaches to their resolution. It has been noted by a substantial dynamism in social development, major social shifts, and changes in the social awareness and the mentality of the population, and in the aspect of the country itself. The greatest results were achieved in economic building. There was a turn from extensive to intensive types of economic management and from the former command-distribution model to a socialist planned commodity economy.

Within that period the GNP and state income and the income of the urban population doubled. The annual growth rates of gross industrial output averaged 12 percent; agriculture output averaged 6.5 percent; and foreign trade, 17 percent. In terms of the pace of economic growth, China outstripped the average world level by approximately 400 percent.

The question of securing the billion-strong population with food and clothing was resolved in its essential features. It would be difficult to rate this as anything but a historical accomplishment. The average consumption of food products in the cities doubled; the rationed distribution of products was reduced substantially; the level of unemployment was reduced by more than one-half (about 150 million people were found jobs); the percentage of poor peasant farms was reduced by a factor of almost eight.

How was all of this achieved? What was the main content of the processes which developed in the country? People in the PRC provide the following explanation:

First, changes were made in ownership relations. Unlike the previous forecasts which anticipated a gradual restriction of nonsocialist systems and forms of economic management and the advance of socialism toward a unified nationwide ownership and the post-reform practices in China itself, when ownership was unified through its statification, the PRC reached the conclusion that the only criterion for the advantages offered by one form of ownership or another is not the level of socialization but the extent to which it contributes to the development of production forces, the initiative of the working people, and the efficient utilization of resources.

The pluralist structure of ownership and the mixed nature of the economy were revived, taking into consideration the multiple stratification of production forces. The socialist economic system, as in the past, holds a dominant position and is the foundation of the economic structure. Nonetheless, the existence of individual, private ownership, and a state-capitalist systems is considered a necessary and useful supplement to the socialist economy on a long-term basis.

This concept also includes admitting, to a certain extent, the capitalization of added value, the hiring of manpower, exploitation, bankruptcy, unemployment, and other "nonsocialist phenomena in the socialist economy." In that context, an original and, we believe, not entirely uncontroversial conclusion was drawn in China: "Anything which factors the development of production forces and is consistent with the basic interests of the people is, therefore, dictated by socialism and allowed by it."

Major structural and functional changes are occurring within the area of public ownership itself, within the limits of the new concept of the possibility of separating the right to ownership and the right to economic management. In the past decade the share of the state sector declined from 78 to 69 percent in gross industrial output

and from 90 to 40 percent in retail trade. A division of land was made and public land was leased on a long-term basis (20-50 years) for use by peasant farmsteads on a contracting basis. The concentration of the land in the hands of "skillful farmers," which includes acquiring the right to land utilization, has been welcomed. The main economic unit in the village has become the peasant farmstead (no more than 40 percent of rural capital assets have remained collectively owned). The hiring of labor is allowed.

The conversion to family contracting and the closer combination of personal interest and initiative with the economic interests of the state set into motion huge social strata of the Chinese countryside and contributed to the fast upsurge of the rural economy, the strengthening of the resource foundations of the national economy, a shift from barter to commodity farming and from a primitive and essentially grain-growing production structure to a multisectorial one.

The active introduction of contracting and leasing are major aspects of the reform of ownership in industry and other sectors. These forms apply to three-quarters of state budget enterprises in industry, 95 percent of industrial enterprises in districts and settlements, and about 80 percent of small and 40 percent of large and medium-sized state commercial enterprises.

Enterprises in eight sectors in industry, transportation, and communications (ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, coal industry, chemistry and petrochemistry, railroad and air transportation, and mail and telegraph communications) were converted for a certain period of time to a contracting system based on fixed rates.

Shareholding forms of enterprise organization are becoming increasingly widespread. A market for stocks, bonds, promissory notes, and other securities is being gradually developed.

As to the cooperative (collective) sector in the urban economy, currently it accounts for 29 percent of the gross industrial output and 36 percent of the retail trade and services. It plays a substantial role in population employment, which is particularly important under the conditions of a tremendously heavy demographic pressure.

In the past decade the number of small enterprises based on the private ownership of means of production and, essentially, the individual labor or the labor of family members, has increased more than a hundredfold. Such enterprises are allowed to use mechanical labor tools, motors, and transportation facilities and to hire one or two assistants and between three and five apprentices. The PRC has 280,000 private enterprises which employ an average of 12 to 15 hired workers. Entrepreneurial unearned income and inheriting private property are allowed. The state-capitalist system is represented by

enterprises with different forms of participation of foreign capital or enterprises fully owned by foreign entrepreneurs. About 18,000 such enterprises have been registered. They account for 1 percent of the GNP.

Second, China abandoned the concept that the socialist economy can be only planned and that a commodity economy and market control are attributes of capitalism, reaching the important conclusion of the need to broaden the area of action of commodity-monetary relations and the creation of a model of economic functioning which would ensure the organic combination of the plan with the market ("the state controls the market and the market guides the enterprises").

A new concept of the socialist market has developed which, in addition to consumer goods and services, includes production factors: means of production, labor resources, funds, scientific and technical achievements, and information devices. A line was charted of broadening the autonomy and self-financing and strengthening the viability of state production enterprises and abandoning the detailed regulation of their activities, with a view to converting them into relatively independent commodity producers and stimulating competition.

A reform was carried out in the planning system, aimed at combining direct with indirect methods of issuing planned assignments to enterprises, while drastically reducing the number of specific mandatory indicators and ensuring the more active use of prices, taxes, payments for resources, and other economic instruments. Currently centralized planning applies to no more than 20 percent of the value of the gross industrial output, mainly in the basic sectors. The rest is under so-called directing (indicative) planning and market control. The number of items included in the state plan has been reduced by more than one-half and the variety of items included in the unified state distribution of material and technical resources, by more than tenfold. Currently there are 1,300 markets for means of production. More than one-half of rolled metal items, 70 percent of the timber, 84 percent of the cement, and 58 percent of the coal are traded via the market.

A conversion has been made from free budget financing of capital construction to its crediting and transferring the functions of handling the appropriated funds to special cost accounting investment companies (the budget finances only the most capital-intensive long-term recovery projects).

Traditional concepts of prices being merely an instrument for accountability and the fact that price stability and rigidity are one and the same have been revised. The theoreticians of the Chinese reform reached the conclusion that while retaining macrocontrol and regulation by the state over the overall price level (with the exception of prices of the most important goods and labor), prices must be set in accordance with market supply and demand. A characteristic two-step system has been developed, combining planned with free market prices.

It has been estimated that the gap between them is about 200 billion yuan (20 percent of the national income), reaching 40-50 percent in agriculture, 190-260 percent in coal and coke, 190-210 percent in timber, etc. About one-half of the commodities are sold at market prices, including 65 percent of agricultural output and auxiliary industries, 40 percent of means of production, and 65 percent of industrially produced consumer goods.

Third, the territorial structure of management has been noticeably decentralized. The bulk of enterprises (with the exception of the most important) are under the jurisdiction of the urban authorities. As a result of the introduction of the new system for splitting the revenue between central and local budgets, the local authorities have at their disposal a significant percentage of the funds. A system of total self-support has been introduced in 37 provinces, cities under central administration, autonomous areas, and other administrative units.

Fourth, changes have been made in distribution relations. China has abandoned identifying the principles of equality and social justice with equalization, and socialism with egalitarianism and "feeding from the common trough," and accepted the possibility of obtaining, in addition to labor income (the wages of blue- and white-collar workers, compensation for labor outlays of contracting peasant farmsteads and individual workers), unearned income as well (interest, dividends, bonuses, and revenue from leasing).

A conversion is being planned from administrative to economic distribution methods: labor units are no longer computed in the countryside and one-half of industrial enterprises use a floating system of regulating the wage fund, the size of which is linked to gross profits or the overall volume of output.

Fifth, major structural changes have been taking place in the economy, aimed above all toward the development of sectors and production facilities which could saturate the consumer market. In 10 years production has increased by a factor of nearly 130 of color television sets, 46 for refrigerators, and 37 for washing machines. As a whole, gross light industry output increased by a factor of 3.4 and heavy industry, 2.5. Also important was the conversion of defense industry output. The number of agricultural industry enterprises which currently account for 20 percent of the gross industrial output, including about one-third of the clothing, shoes, and paper produced in the country, 20 percent of textiles, and more than one-half of construction materials and a significant percentage of goods for export, has quintupled.

The streamlined structure of public production substantially ensured maintaining a high pace of economic growth and easing the problems of market supplies.

Sixth, a breakthrough was made from a state of self-isolation from the system of global economic relations to the accelerated development of foreign economic cooperation and involvement of foreign capital within the

framework of the so-called open policy. According to certain assessments, in the past decade this factor accounted for an additional 3-4 percent increase in the rate of economic growth and imported machines and equipment, and for 10-15 percent increase in fixed industrial capital. The volume of foreign investments totals \$27 billion (of which \$10 billion was actually used); this makes it possible to compensate for the lack of domestic funds, to combine various sources of financing, and partially to compensate for the backwardness of domestic equipment and technology.

The local authorities and commercial, trade-industrial, and other companies and enterprises have been given a certain amount of independence in engaging in foreign economic relations, including on a contracting basis (the right to conduct foreign economic operations has been granted, in particular, to more than 4,000 state enterprises). Currently 15 to 20 percent of the industrial and agricultural output is exported.

A multiple-step system of open policy is being gradually developed, including the opening of five special economic zones, 14 open maritime cities, and several open maritime and internal economic areas in the country. It is contemplated that in the future the entire coastal section of China, with a population of some 200 million, will become an open area largely oriented toward foreign economic relations and integration with the economic structures of the Asian-Pacific area. The objective of this idea is to ensure the fullest possible utilization of the natural and manpower resources of the PRC under the conditions of a continuing transfer of labor-intensive and traditional sectors and production facilities from developed to developing countries.

Seventh, the formulated concept of reform in the political system is aimed at creating a highly efficient and viable socialist society, and implementing the principles of well-being, democracy, and justice and, on a more restricted level, resolving the aggravated contradiction between the highly centralized political-administrative system and the establishment of a socialist commodity economy under the conditions of a growing openness of the country to the outside world.

The formulation of such tasks in a country such as China, with its low educational standard of the population, undeveloped democratic traditions and legal awareness, a dominant peasant mentality, and more than 2,000 years of feudal despotism and firmly established stereotypes of authoritarian power is, in itself, a step of a revolutionary nature.

The reform of the political system, which will be implemented gradually, with the consolidation of social stability, includes the following basic components: separating the functions of party from those of the state authorities, and focusing party work on the development

of the essential problems of the strategy of social development and cadre policy; creating a flexible and highly-efficient management structure, and refining the functions and rights of governmental authorities; improving the electoral system in the direction of its democratization and enhancing the role of assemblies of people's representatives as the main political institution; creating a socialist legal system and strengthening law and order; gradually developing a system of political democracy with Chinese features, radically different from bourgeois democracy and the so-called broad democracy of the period of the "cultural revolution;" improving the mechanism of social consultations and dialogue—informal ties among leading structures and popular masses; upgrading the role of democratic parties (there are eight such parties in the PRC) and pursuing a line of multi-party cooperation, reciprocal control, and consultations under the leadership of the communist party; enhancing the authority of the mass public organizations; finding optimal forms of cadre selection and placement, emphasizing decentralization of the cadre system and its conversion to the principles of competitiveness and public control.

Naturally, these trends of economic and political changes do not cover the entire depth and variety of restructuring processes in China which are aimed, as is pointed out in the PRC, toward the fuller realization of the potential of socialism. The main thing is that, in general, they have been able to draw up a theoretical model for reform and convert its implementation to the level of practical policy. All of this became possible as a result of the noticeable changes in the ideological area, the emancipation of public awareness, and sober assessment of historical experience and the realities of contemporary China, as well as a flexible reaction to changed circumstances and search for bold innovative decisions.

One of the essential stipulations, which is in the nature of a theoretical breakthrough, was the conclusion recently drawn by the party to the effect that China is currently at the initial stage of socialism, which will last until the middle of the 21st century.

It is important that the interpretation of the problem of renovation of socialism is based on the development of Marxist theory and the rejection of abstract and speculative interpretations and concepts created by the dogmatic understanding of Marxism. On the other hand, there is talk of the inviolability of basic features of socialism, such as the leading role of public ownership and distribution according to labor, planned management of a socialist commodity economy, etc. Also emphasized is the importance of supporting the four basic principles formulated in CPC documents: the socialist path, the democratic dictatorship of the people, the leadership of the communist party, and Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong.

Frequently the radical changes taking place in various areas of Chinese society are conflicting. By no means have all problems been solved, including some which are

quite pressing and serious. Despite unquestionable achievements, the practices of the last decade provide no justification for the conclusion that the reforms in China are painless and uniformly productive (the same, actually, as in any other socialist country). For the time being an integral and harmoniously functioning social organism has not been developed, an organism which could be viewed even as an outline of a qualitatively new condition of socialism. Painstaking work is needed for the theoretical substantiation of an entire series of reform stipulations and the elimination of the inevitable hitches in its translation into the language of practical politics. Furthermore, the reform highlighted and, in some cases aggravated, many shortcomings and faults in the Chinese economy, which were by no means eliminated in the course of repeated attempts to improve and stabilize it.

Under the conditions of the increased growth rates and the overall "overheating" of the economy, the imbalance between public demand and supply intensified. A paradoxical situation developed in which despite unusually high production dynamics commodity hunger and scarcity of material resources continued to worsen. This has been linked above all to the excessive increase in overall public demand. The genie of material incentive, released from the bottle, proved to be difficult to control. Increased wages, which doubled on an average in recent years, rose even faster than the growth of labor productivity in industry in the first half of this year. The amount of money in circulation increased by 40 percent in 1988 alone. The volume of postponed demand rose to the three-quarter level of annual retail trade. Inflationary trends sharply intensified (particularly starting with the second half of last year). The rates of inflation exceeded those of the growth of the national income, greatly depreciating the real results of economic development.

The efforts to eliminate distortions in price setting, one of which was narrowing the area of governmental control, led to a chain reaction in price increases under the conditions of an economy operating on scarcity (18.5 percent in 1988). A recent conclusion drawn in party-state documents is that price increases are "unbearable to the people, the enterprises, and the state." Unquestionably, compared to other countries, some of them socialist, in which price increases have occasionally been in the tens and even hundreds of percentages, objectively speaking they have not been all that dramatic in China. However, the peculiarity of the situation is that even such price increases have been unusual in Chinese economic practices of the past 40 years. In 1988 the living standard of 40 percent of the urban population declined, which is triggering the discontent of the working people.

The gradual lagging of the power industry and the entire fuel-energy complex intensified disproportions in the sectorial structure. The noticeably faster increase in the growth of output in the processing sectors, compared with the production of energy, fuel, and raw materials led to the fact that as much as one-third of production capacities in industry idled.

The increased economic autonomy of enterprises and local power authorities, unsupported by an efficient control and financial self-regulatory control, was one of the reasons for the excessive boom in investments. The growth of funds invested in fixed production capital in recent years exceeded the growth of the national income by a factor of almost three. The building of a record number of new projects—some 12,000—was initiated in 1988 and 80 percent of investments were financed out of non-budget allocations. Some quality indicators in the work of the national economy worsened (production costs, capital returns); the state budget deficit increased.

The grain harvest, which had reached a record-setting level in 1984 (407 million tons) has not been increasing for the past few years. Under Chinese conditions, where the annual population increase averages 15 million people, any stagnation in agricultural production is particularly alarming. The scarcity of food grain in the cities is currently estimated at 20 million tons. Here and there, once again it has become necessary to go back to the previously abolished rationing system in the distribution of meat, sugar, and eggs.

All indications are that the possibilities of the self-development of small farms (averaging 0.5-0.8 hectares) had been somewhat overestimated, farms which were established as a result of the comprehensive conversion to family contracting. With an overall scarcity of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural equipment, and fuel, the weakened attention of the center toward the agrarian sector was unjustified and so was the reduction of state capital investments from 18 percent of the state budget in 1981-1985 to 5 percent in 1986-1990. Currently purchase prices of grain and cotton have been raised once again and investments in agriculture increased. The logic of development are indicating a trend toward the creation of larger farmer-type units, combined with marketing-supply and other forms of nonproduction cooperativization in the countryside.

The situation in the area of foreign economic cooperation is also by no means without problems. China's foreign debt has reached several dozen billion dollars and the maximal repayment of foreign loans will come at the start of the 1990s, when annual payments will exceed 10 billion. Furthermore, the wide opening of the gates to the outside world was paralleled by the invasion of Western mass culture and bourgeois ideology in the country.

Even such brief "features in the portrait" of the Chinese economy of today make it clear that the situation here has substantially worsened. Furthermore, a tangible gap has opened between changes in the political and economic areas, for the implementation of the political reform encountered major difficulties. No familiar cases of abuses, above all corruption, in the party-administrative apparatus triggered a sharp reaction in the population.

Against the background of increased social instability, the hopes and expectations nurtured by the reform were replaced by doubts and disappointments, a decline in party authority, and a revival of alternate political views and trends. The logical question arises: Are the worsened situation in China and the appearance of crisis factors consequences of the restructuring process or, conversely, the results of the insufficiently systematic and comprehensive implementation of the reorganization? No simple answer to this question is possible. It is obvious that this is largely related to the changes taking place in economic systems and types of development, the parallel coexistence of different economic mechanisms, one of which—the old—is being dismantled, while the new is only now taking shape.

As in the past, the traditional strategy and model of development remains, characterized by extensive outlay-based production with a tremendous overexpenditure of labor and materials, low efficiency and low productivity. Hundreds of millions of inexpensive laborers are China's main wealth and a tremendous resource for the growth of its economic potential. However, they also are the basis of the obstruction to a conversion to intensive economic management. The expanded area of commodity-monetary relations which, furthermore, is taking place so far primarily at the expense of petty commodity output with its paralleled elements of uncontrolled development, narrowed the range of action of natural-economic relations without as yet weakening them in the least.

State production enterprises have still not become self-managing commodity producers. They have not abandoned their status as appendages to administrative structures. They have been unable properly to react to the demands of the market and to develop true competitiveness. The law on enterprise bankruptcy has been virtually abandoned.

The comprehensive reform of prices, taxes, finances, and monetary circulation, which was scheduled to take effect in 1987, is being postponed. A project for reorganization of prices and wages was adopted in principle last autumn. However, its implementation is planned to take 5 years or longer. What this means is a further preservation of an essentially transitional dual-level price system which, according to the general view, is beginning to play an increasingly negative role from the viewpoint of the increased cost of living and the spreading of economic violations of the law. Under the present situation the idea of converting to market prices for most commodities does not appear entirely realistic. The state continues to subsidize unprofitable enterprises and the population, to an amount which has reached 77 billion yuan, i.e., 30 percent of state budget expenditures.

It appears that internal contradictions have also affected the decentralization of management and, particularly, the introduction of a regional contracting system. Initially, delegating rights to the local areas and significantly increasing their production and financial autonomy revived economic activities and unburdened

the central authorities. Subsequently, however, this increasingly turned into violations of interregional cooperative relations, the development of parochial autarchic trends, and the intensification of the traditional gap in the levels and pace of development of maritime and internal parts of the country and, in the final account, began to hinder the idea of a socialist commodity-based economy and of a unified national market.

By now it has become obvious that the task set in the Seventh 5-Year Plan of establishing the framework of a new economic system by 1990 will not be met. A situation has developed in which neither the old planning and state regulation system nor the new market mechanism, which is being developed with some difficulty, can fulfill the functions of effective economic management and of ensuring social stability. Their shortcomings somehow began to be superimposed on each other, thus multiplying the difficulties. All of this required fast intervention, including the adoption of emergency measures, which frequently clash with the overall logic of the reform.

According to the resolution which was adopted at the CPC Central Committee Plenum of September 1988, the emphasis was to be switched from reform to regulating and improving the national economy and bringing order in its most "overheated" sectors and tightening up the basic sectors in agriculture, while holding back the growth of consumption funds, improving the financial situation, and restraining inflation with a view to creating more favorable conditions for the continuation and intensification of the restructuring process.

Strict steps were taken to strengthen centralized control over the condition of the economy. The building of thousands of capital construction projects was halted. The autonomy of enterprises and establishments in spending funds was reduced. Marketplace trade in some of the most scarce material resources was eliminated. Control was intensified over the quantitative growth of enterprises in the collective and private sectors. A largely forced reanimation of the tried administrative management methods is taking place.

We must point out that overall characteristic of the reform process in China is an "undular" development, in which its acceleration is replaced by a temporary obstruction and, sometimes, a movement backward, partial retreats of a tactical nature in the interest of stabilizing the situation (as occurred in 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1988).

Today many people throughout the world are also worried by the impact which recent events in China, related to student actions and described by the country's leadership as an "attempt at counterrevolutionary mutiny," will have on the country's further development. Will this lead to a dampening of the renovation processes, above all in the political area? Without engaging in any expanded evaluations and judgments on this account, let us refer to the statement by Deng Xiaoping to the effect

that "except for the reshuffling of some statements, the main line, course, and policy should remain unchanged;" "The question is not whether the policy of reform and expanding relations with the foreign world is erroneous and whether it should be pursued, but how to pursue it."

In any case, it is clear that the reform in China has largely exhausted the possibility of applying relatively easy superficial decisions, capable of providing an explosive effect (material incentive, new economic relations in the countryside and, partially, in the towns, and an open foreign economic policy). It has reached the point of more radical and socially significant decisions which could indicate a profound restructuring of social interests and correcting many basic guidelines and moral ideals. The nature of such resolutions will largely determine the future shaping of a planned commodity economy, the creation of a democratic state, and the implementation of socialist modernization.

The reform has reached a stage in which each new step forward will obviously be more difficult and each new result will require greater efforts, active theoretical support, and thorough practical development of the various transitional forms and alternate changes and a prompt amortization of the possible discontent on the part of individual social strata and groups.

The experience of the last decade has indicated that the dismantling of the command-administrative system is a lengthy and painful process, fraught with twists and breakdowns. This applies to any country which takes the path of reform and to an even greater extent to China, which is a relatively underdeveloped agrarian-industrial country subjected to tremendous demographic pressure.

Another more general conclusion is that the reform is not only the implementation of a set of specific decisions and even not the implementation of the previously earmarked abstract models for the functioning of society but rather a form of existence of socialism and its continuing advancement, renovation, and adaptation to new conditions. This is a dialectical movement with a beginning but without an end. At the present stage of this movement, it appears, the method of trial and error applied in China so far in making changes or, as they say in China, "crossing the river by feeling the stones at the bottom" is becoming increasingly inefficient.

The initial major successes of the reform process at the beginning of the 1980s, particularly in agriculture, gave restructuring a certain reserve of strength and the Chinese leadership a substantial credit of trust. However, as is now being self-critically acknowledged, in the course of its constructive work "the party made many errors, some of which quite grave."

Currently the PRC is experiencing a critically important period in its development and is facing a choice of path into the future. This raises with increasing relevance the question of the formulation of a comprehensive and interrelated program for the further implementation of reforms, capable of consolidating the forces of the party

and society on the basis of a constructive platform, and protect the reform from intensified attacks from the left and the right.

Forty years of development of socialist China, the experience of the last decade in particular, provide rich food for thought concerning the historical destinies of the new society and the overall laws and national characteristics of the transition to socialism. It also provides extensive material for theoretical analysis and practical conclusions on key parameters of the restructuring process, such as the correlation and combination of economic with political changes, economic efficiency and social justice, progress and sociopolitical stability, and loyalty to the theory of Marxism-Leninism and its creative development.

Many trends in the reform in the PRC are consistent with the overall trend of the processes of renovation taking place in the socialist countries, including the USSR. This offers significant and as yet not fully used opportunities for broadening contacts on a mutually useful basis, and exchanging experience in building the new society, surmounting crisis phenomena, and engaging in creative constructive discussions which could contribute to the enrichment of socialist theory and practice.

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### **Vector of Change; Economic Reform in the Bulgarian People's Republic**

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[Article by Aleksey Valentinovich Ulyukayev, candidate of economic sciences, consultant, Department of Political Economy and Economic Policy]

[Text] **The Bulgarian people celebrated their Freedom Day on 9 September—the 45th anniversary of the socialist revolution. This anniversary is being celebrated under essentially new circumstances: A restructuring of economic, social, and political life was initiated and is taking place in the Bulgarian People's Republic. Like any revolutionary change, it is not simple. A number of problems have accumulated in the country's national economy. How are they being resolved? This KOMMUNIST correspondent answers the question.**

One cannot learn about a country and understand the nature of its specific problems in 10 days. Then, why go? Perhaps so that on the basis of comparisons one could better understand one's own problems. Similar essential conflicts may be found behind the variety of surface differences. It is quite useful to look at a different practice as in a mirror, a practice cleansed from the excessively customary details of economic reality, which frequently can mislead, and thus enable us to see ourselves in a new and sometimes unexpected light. In speaking of our own economic problems, willy-nilly we

analyze and assess them as they are refracted through our daily experience. In other words, we fail to notice a great many things by virtue of their ordinariness and something may appear important to us only because it is within the range of our customary affairs and concerns.

That is why the method which B. Brecht described as distancing is useful in analysis and evaluations. If we consider a phenomenon with the impartial eyes of the "outsider," we can identify its unexpected new facets. I believe that the development, problems, and prospects of the economic reform in Bulgaria could precisely become that type of mirror which will reflect the course, problems, and prospects of our own reform in greater relief.

It is above all three aspects that draw the attention in assessing the condition of a country's economy: indicators of economic growth, situation on the consumer market, and the trend and dynamics of reforms. Looked at with the naked eye, the quantitative parameters indicate that the situation is quite good. Actually, in 1988 the national income increased by 6.2 percent and labor productivity by 6.5 percent; in other words, the entire increase was exclusively the result of higher labor productivity; the cost of industrial output dropped by an average of 1.8 and material outlays by 2.7 percent. Profitability increased by 5.6 percent. Exports increased by 4 percent while imports declined by 1.8 percent. The production of consumer goods increased by 12 percent. It is true that if we look more closely, it will turn out that the cost of agricultural output has been somewhat different from that in industry and that the lowering of material outlays is recorded in official statistics regardless of the influence of the dynamics of amortization and that the gross national product is not estimated at all, although such an estimate would somewhat amend these high figures.

An entirely different conclusion is drawn by people who are unwilling to trust the dispassionate and sometimes excessively formal statistical data and who prefer the testimony of eyewitnesses, whether Bulgarian or of the frequently visiting foreign specialists: the economic situation in the country has worsened and is continuing to worsen. Virtually all respondents clearly emphasized that 3 to 4 years ago food and durable goods were much more available, prices were significantly lower, and there were virtually no lines.

However, could serious conclusions be based on such testimony? People tend to idealize the past and concentrate on negative changes, feeling that positive developments are their due.

There probably are reasons both for the dryness of figures and the live testimony. The major successes achieved by Bulgaria's economy are clear. Equally clear, however, are the growing problems. Efforts to surmount them are triggering one wave of economic reorganizations after another.



Such efforts began a long time ago. They were more or sometimes less successful and yielded not only immediate material results but also an understanding of the need to radicalize them. Subsequent reforms went farther and became deeper. Initially there was a revision of the system of indicators, followed by organizational structures, management systems and procedures, and the economic mechanism. Finally, today, there is a radical reform of the entire economic management method.

Repeatedly, the ways of transformations piled one on another, blending or clashing with each other, triggering phenomena of "economic harmonics." Occasionally the impression developed that the reformers were more interested in the novelty itself and that their slogan was that the new is good simply because it is new. However, with such a philosophy inevitably anything new must be followed by something newer. Changes become so frequent that the subjects of economic management are initially unable to adapt to them although they try to do so; subsequently, they no longer even try, knowing in advance that the latest resolution will be replaced by another one. Those who accept the task of converting to the new conditions quite seriously, whenever this occurs, risk to leave the "hall of adaptation," i.e., the area of admissible values of economic behavior in which the managing subject has adequate opportunities to engage in organizational-economic maneuvering in any direction. Adapting the conditions to the latest proclaimed reform, such people become strongly "involved" in them, which hinders prompt restructuring to meet the requirement of the next reform.

Such reform activities could become the reverse of stagnation. The resultant of pulses in different directions ends up being much lesser than expected. Furthermore, socioeconomic efficiency in a constantly restructured national economy begins to drop.

However critical the observer may be, he cannot fail to see that by following this path, step-by-step, the potential of a reform ideology gathers strength.

To begin with, the method of gradual approximations (for the time being the only real one) of the economic reform as a concept, process, mechanism, and procedure and, finally, an institution, comes closer in terms of its targets, objectives, and motive forces and content to a level consistent with the gravity of the problems being solved.

Second, and probably more important, the ideology of economic reformism is surmounting (I believe that in Bulgaria it has already surmounted) the numerous political and ideological taboos within which the command-sacramental economy is tightly bound. That which earlier triggered a sacred apprehension, now becomes an entirely ordinary economic instrument. On the other hand, that which was part of the rather large "herd of sacred cows," turns out to be an easily abandoned prejudice. The philosophy of economic management is being rid of a virtually religious dogmatism and subject

to rationalization. Naturally, to this day this does not hinder reformers occasionally to fear their own shadow and to accompany new steps with shy stipulations and ritual exhortations and, sometimes, the customary two steps back. However, this is a due paid to the existing economic-political standard, a due which must be paid.

As a whole, I repeat, economic institutions, public opinion, and the power structures in the reformed economy are changing in their essence.

Let me explain this with the example of the new and truly important economic reform in Bulgaria: the conversion to the organization of the national economy through companies. It was based on the Bulgarian People's Republic State Council Ukase No 56 of 9 January 1989 "On Economic Activities." According to official statements, the company organization of the economy is a means of implementing the stipulations of the unity and variety of socialist ownership. Structures developed within the various forms of ownership—state, municipal, cooperative, ownership by public organizations and citizens (private), by foreigners or mixed—are equal in the eyes of the law and are being granted equal conditions for pursuing economic activities. It is presumed that they will act as self-managing organizations, which will independently formulate their internal relations, structure, and extent of economic autonomy of their subdivisions. The state will not interfere in the direct economic activities of the companies, merely regulating such activities through economic instruments: prices, tariffs, taxes, interest rates, subsidies, custom fees, etc. All of this should help to surmount the alienation of the working people and monopoly status and develop competition.

Ukase No 56 includes the important stipulation that the state is not responsible for the obligations assumed by the companies; nor are the companies responsible for the obligations assumed by the state or by other companies. The creation of a company does not require a permit. All it must do is register.

In my view, the most important feature in the company system is not even the pluralism of forms of ownership but the pluralism of the principles of economic organization and the scale of economic activities. Ukase No 56 presumes the creation of shareholding companies and companies with limited and unlimited liability. Restrictions have been lifted from the activities of private companies in which, according to the law, as many as 10 hired workers may be employed on the basis of labor contracts; the number of seasonal workers is not restricted.

From viewpoint of the ideology of the reform, the conversion to a company organization of the economy is a feature of its maturity and wholeness. The establishment of a normal economy, based on the laws of rational

economic management, activated by commodity-monetary transmission mechanisms, is now totally unrestricted. This, however, is in the realm of ideas. In real life matters are much more complex.

By 1 September, i.e., in less than 8 months, 441 state companies had been created, along with some 70 cooperatives, 20 companies belonging to public organizations, 30 mixed, and 406 municipal, 51 associations, and 5,520 private (companies of citizens, owned by single individuals or collectives).

Such is the reality. However, equally real is something else: At the start of June a decision was promulgated forbidding the creation of companies in the trading area by private citizens. It is true that it was voided soon afterwards. However, who could guarantee that there would no longer be such obstructions in the future?

However, it is not a matter merely of the inconsistency of practical steps and their deviation from the theoretical concept. The widespread view is that a "good" reform means the formulation of a strict and nonconflicting program of systematic steps and its steadfast implementation, step-by-step, starting with the "first," followed by the "second," "third," and so on, steps, cannot withstand a confrontation with the history of all major reforms. Neither the changes made by Peter the Great nor the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s or else the NEP were of this nature. Furthermore, there are reasons to assume that any "accurate," reform i.e., one that is theoretically developed in its detail and methodically implemented, is doomed to failure, for its formula includes an excessive number of variables and unknown factors: the level of knowledge of the condition of society, social interest, the dynamics of public opinion, a variety of external factors, and the side effects of the changes themselves. All of this leads to a very dynamic and unstable situation. For that reason, the sensible strategy of the reform requires not the stubborn implementation of the various points in the program but flexible reaction to changes in the deployment of the actual factors of socioeconomic life and, on each occasion, the search for an adequate answer to the challenge hurled by the new situation. In this case, any wrong decision could lead to the collapse of the entire reform or, rather, simply put, take the situation into a new and by no means guaranteed better position.

However, there are a few more serious circumstances concerning the reform. First, it is more important in an organization based on companies not to formulate a structure but to develop an entirely clear standard of company operations. This is understood by the makers of the reform (let me refer, for instance, to the interview granted by Stoyan Ovcharov, the Bulgarian minister of the economy and planning, to the newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO of 20 March 1989); they also understand that such a standard cannot be set with any Ukase. It will (or will not) be the result of economic changes and

their conversion into the practical experience of economic managers, traditions, customs, and ethics of economic behavior.

Second, the establishment of company standards cannot be self-sufficient. Their organization takes place in a specific economic environment. Companies cannot operate fully without ordinary cash, commercial credit, an autonomous banking system, open information, truthful statistical figures, stable state economic control instruments, and a normal market for commodities, capital, and labor. Naturally, these conditions do not appear immediately. However, there must be a line of progress in that direction.

In Bulgaria, as is the case with all socialist countries, in the economic system which developed in the course of decades, state monopoly of finances and credit resources was more important than is the dogma of the infallibility of the Pope to a good Roman Catholic. To this day banking policies are almost totally subordinated to the budget; it is subordinated to the fiscal authorities. Essentially, it is a variety of fiscal policy. The lion's share of profits shown by the bank goes into the state budget.

Last year's bank reform, which led to the creation of several commercial banks, did not substantially change the situation. These are specialized banks (as was the case until last June), i.e., banks which do not have to compete among themselves for making loans. They are essentially monopoly-holding state bank branches. Furthermore, virtually all of their credit resources come from the state bank and the share of shareholders in them is extremely low. Stocks and bonds, the floating of which is allowed by the new regulation, are not rated and there is no securities market. This hinders the real movement of capital in the profitable area and, therefore, socially necessary economic management. Yet such dynamics are a natural prerequisite for the organization of the national economy on the basis of companies.

A withdrawal from the bank crediting system based on the budget has been noticed only very recently. As was pointed out in T. Zhivkov's report "On Some Basic Problems of Restructuring the Bulgarian Economy," which he submitted at the 13 July 1989 BCP Central Committee Politburo session, proposals were drafted to replace the territorial subdivisions of the Bulgarian National Bank with 60 independent shareholding banks, 26 of which will have their own branches. This should contribute to the more dynamic movement of capital and to channeling it into high-efficiency areas. Finally, steps are being contemplated to stimulate capital exports and imports with a view to internationalizing the Bulgarian economy, the purpose of which is to develop an acceptable level of competitiveness. Such suggestions are beginning to be implemented. By now some 30 independent banks have been created.

The conversion to a company-market (company in structure and market in the method of functioning) economy is developing in practice through its constant negation.

This is also related to the fact that both the central and the departmental management machineries and the economic managers themselves lack the necessary skill to manage this project under the new circumstances. Above all, however, managers, including reformist managers, are confident in their majority that this conversion could be smooth and without major problems, sectorial crises or local social tension. However, since in reality this will be impossible to avoid, there is a powerful incentive to keep under strict control each step taken in the course of the transitional period.

Furthermore, the conversion to a company-market economy is taking place under extremely adverse financial circumstances: inflation, commodity-monetary imbalance, scarcity, and an impressive foreign debt. On the one hand, this reduces company competition to naught, undermines the establishment of market relations, and encourages monopoly and autarchy; on the other, it motivates the authorities to take emergency economic measures. This, as we know all too well, is the most nutritive environment for an administrative system.

The trouble is that the economy of the socialist countries (Bulgaria is no exception to this sad rule) difficult conflicts have become intertwined, like a magic circle. The implementation of reforms which are vitally necessary and based on social consensus, clashes against the disruption of the financial system, on the one hand, and the conservatism and cumbersomeness of the national economic structure, on the other. In turn, the solution of these two problems is mutually exclusive, for a structural perestrojka puts a heavy burden on the budget. The increased indebtedness in dollars, without any real possibility of rapidly redirecting foreign trade toward the dollar area (in order to earn currency needed to repay debts and to pay the interest) hinders the solution of all three problems. Finally, all of them fall back on the final bastion of Stalinist economic ideology: the need to implement planned assignments and achieve high rates of planned growth. Everything is sacrificed to this idol: the structural reorganization, for the implementation of the plants requires steel, coal, cement, and improved efficiency of foreign economic relations, for the Soviet Union is the single supplier of basic production resources and financial recovery, and because this requires closing down unprofitable production facilities and reducing state investments. The result is that all of this slows down the reform.

The pressure applied on the pace (largely of a political-ideological and even a psychological nature) triggers the need to increase imports of energy carriers. In order to balance trade with the USSR, which is their main supplier, an escalation of "ruble" exports is necessary; since the export potential is limited, this leads to a reduction in dollar exports. Consequently, this lowers the possibility of repaying the foreign debt and paying the interest charges. According to some data, interest accounts for nearly one-third of annual earnings in convertible currency. In turn, this leads the authorities to

take emergency steps of anti-import and export-stimulating nature (a chain reaction is possible, as a result of which one emergency step leads to another).

However, there is something even more serious. Excessive orientation of the economy in any country (with the exception, perhaps, of rare cases in which a country does not have a free outlet on the world market by virtue of historical or other reasons) toward establishing foreign economic relations with any given partner becomes a type of monopoly which is of poor service to both sides.

The worst consequence of the excessive tie of the Bulgarian economy to the USSR, i.e., a tie to a market of scarcity and a market in which payments are made not with enterprise but with state money and, therefore, in an omnivorous and undemanding fashion, means losing the pressure of the consumer concerning quality, novelty, and other consumer parameters of goods in their entire variety and volume. The opposite process—the limiting of Soviet exports to the Bulgarian market, is similar (although on a much smaller scale).

The escalation of this reciprocal lack of exigency suppresses incentives to improve output, making it noncompetitive on the world market. The Bulgarian economists have reasons to fear that under the conditions of the economic reform in the USSR the extent of exigency of the Soviet partners could increase drastically. This would lead to a breakdown in a number of commodity sales and will create havoc within the Bulgarian economy. For that reason, a course toward a gradual and controlled conversion of some of the ruble exports into dollar exports would be sensible. Understandably, a similar transformation should be made in the area of imports from the USSR.

Exporting on the harshly competitive Western market is exceptionally difficult. However, it sets a standard for production quality as a result of which the production process becomes modern and efficient. Foreign trade conditions are a sort of educator for the producers from the socialist countries who are attending the school of market reform. An extremely light curriculum and a nonexigent teacher make zealous and patient learning unnecessary and boring and incentives to engage in daily work and research is dulled. Conversely, if the grades are not high and if one must compete for them with one's fellow students, powerful labor and creative motivations develop.

Following is a typical example: When, at the time of the "Red Guard attack" on alcohol, we significantly reduced our wine purchases from Bulgaria, Bulgarian wine producers had to find their way to the Western markets and, to this effect, ensure the strict observance of all technological requirements. As a result, they were not only able to consolidate their position on the markets of a number of Western European countries (which provides such greatly needed foreign currency) but also to master the necessary production standard. This is being reflected also on the quality of output on the domestic market.

An orientation toward Western European markets of many lines of clothing led to their improved quality standards, as is clear today to any shopper in Bulgarian stores.

The situation prevailing in machine building and, particularly, electronics, is entirely different. The artificial acceleration in the development of such sectors, in many cases lacking the necessary technical-economic and social prerequisites, led to the fact that an exigent market is rejecting their output. In terms of the dollar zone their export potential is practically equal to zero. Meanwhile, an undemanding market is absorbing this output. Furthermore, in frequent cases such omnivorosness is backed by political and ideological motivations. As a result, the level of electronics is falling increasingly behind contemporary requirements. Yet in the past few years alone several billion leva's worth of Western loans were made essentially for the machine building and electronics industry. How are such billions to be repaid?

Such trends which are adverse to the economy and, above all, to the competitiveness of Bulgarian goods, are supported by the existing foreign exchange mechanism. The existing rates of exchange and coefficients create an interest on the part of the producer to engage in ruble-oriented rather than dollar exports.

I believe that, therefore, it would be no exaggeration to conclude that the economic reform must be accompanied by and based not only on restructuring the economy (in the sense of closing down unnecessary, obsolete, and unprofitable production facilities and stimulating the highly efficient ones) but also the restructuring of foreign economic relations and their orientation.

Approaches to solving some such problems may be seen in T. Zhivkov's report "On Some Fundamental Problems of the Restructuring of the Bulgarian Economy." Thus, taking the electronics industry out of the impasse of noncompetitiveness is projected on the basis of cooperation not only with socialist but also with capitalist countries. A gradual conversion is anticipated leading to the convertibility of the leva and, on this basis, tying domestic prices and exchange rates to prices on the world markets. It is considered that without a convertible leva it would be impossible to take the creative companies out of their greenhouse conditions of state paternalism, in the course of which the state is "the only stockholder" of many companies, equalizing high with low-efficiency producers and thus undermining the very incentives for true enterprise.

Finally, there is the problem of inflation. In the course of discussing it with Bulgarian economists, one becomes increasingly convinced that despite the entire dissimilarity in the external manifestations of the problems of the economies of our countries they are practically the same and, furthermore, they mature and appear on a synchronized basis. Hidden inflation had been accumulating in Bulgaria for decades and at this point its open (price) component has emerged on the surface. Scarcity

and postponed demand are growing. The annual retail trade amounts to some 18 billion leva whereas the population has accumulated in savings accounts more than 19 billion, i.e., a sum exceeding the volume of trade (for the sake of comparison, in the USSR the amount of savings accounts is three-quarters that of retail trade, although we must take into consideration that in Bulgarian savings the percentage of postponed demand is lesser while that of "normal" accumulations is higher compared to the Soviet people). Furthermore, according to some assessments, between 4 and 5 billion are kept in cash in "money boxes," and another billion in foreign currency. This would total 25 billion leva whereas the annual national income of the country is 30 billion and the state budget income is 24 billion leva. One can easily see that such savings would suffice for the entire Bulgarian population to live carefree for a whole year, without work.

What is the mechanism for the expanded reproduction of inflation? The main inflationary wave stems from the market in means of production, the investment area. It is primarily a credit inflation. All funds deposited in a bank account turn into a credit resource. For that reason, credit is virtually unlimited.

It is believed that in terms of the sources, the volume of investments can be divided approximately equally among budget financing, enterprise funds, and bank loans. However, bank crediting is, essentially, a concealed form of budget financing, for most loans are not repaid. The indebtedness of enterprises to the bank in terms of capital investments alone and increased (due to the extremely low interest rates) loans for working capital has reached, according to competent economists, approximately 19 billion leva, including 7-8 billion of uncollectable loans. Credit investments are an even greater inflationary factor than budget investments, for they are being directly taken from the population and the producers, and each available leva immediately becomes a loan resource and, therefore, an investment and, therefore, an inflationary resource. The bank does not distinguish among sources in lending funds. To a great extent this is the same as the familiar old postponed demand.

For many decades the enterprises learned to behave toward their own funds as though they were someone else's. Aware of the fact that such funds will be confiscated unless they have been already spent before the end of the year, the enterprises have become accustomed to spend them freely.

Also important is the authority which makes investment decisions. As a rule, the higher the level of such decisions the more political and the less economic are their grounds. Correspondingly, the less efficient and more burdening to the budget become not only construction but also the functioning of the various projects. Thus, we know that most enterprises built on the basis of special governmental decrees, are losing.

The cumbersome structure of the national economy, reproducing production facilities for the sake of production, has become the most important inflationary factor. The wages of those employed in such enterprises generate a strong pressure on the consumer market. Furthermore, in the majority of cases, these enterprises are subsidized. Frequently their capacities are used extremely inefficiently (as is the case, for example, of the heavy-machinery building plant in Radomir). In other words, here budget outlays have been increased, returns have been reduced, and the difference is covered by the money printing press.

The increased volume of unfinished construction has a particularly great influence on inflation. Legally, it should not exceed 60 to 70 percent of the annual volume of capital investments (in Bulgaria's case today this amounts to 6-7 billion leva). Actually, today its volume has reached 13 billion, i.e., almost double the rate. Instead of 6,000 to 8,000 projects, some 33,000 are being simultaneously built. Of the 6-7 billion above-norm share, approximately 3-4 billion are in construction and installation projects. One-half of that is wages. It is wages that are the heaviest burden of the unsupported demand on the consumer market. The fate of the remaining billions, included in the above-norm unfinished construction is similar. One way or another, money is being paid to machine builders, metallurgical and chemical workers, who create means of production which become frozen in such unfinished projects. Unsecured demand is growing.

These are pressing and difficult problems. Both scientists and the government understand this. But is there a positive program for solving them? We discussed the matter with Ivan Angelov, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. Professor Angelov is a theoretician and a practical economic worker. He is an expert in Eastern and Western political economy and economic policy (he has worked for 12 years in international economic organizations).

He believes that inflationary trends can be surmounted through an array of interrelated steps concentrated in a single direction. Schematically, they are as follows: first, stabilizing investments, halting most new construction projects, lowering unfinished construction to its normal level, which would ease the pressure of demand. Second, development of agriculture and processing, essentially not through new capital investments but by increasing efficiency as a result of the development of leasing, contracting, and cost accounting and eliminating sectorial disproportions and gigantomania. This will increase offer on the consumer market and, furthermore, will make it possible to increase the export potential in areas in which Bulgaria is competitive and will provide the necessary income in foreign exchange, without which the conversion to exceptional measures and the collapse of the reform would become quite likely. Third, the slowed down turnover of cash, above all deposits in savings accounts, and their freezing by applying a high interest rate on long-term deposits, will help to ease the pressure

of demand. This will also be the purpose of the purchasing by the population of labor stocks and bonds and the creation, this year, of shareholding social insurance funds and health insurance funds. Naturally, this is not their main but their auxiliary function. Nonetheless, it should be taken into consideration.

Encouraging private accumulation and private investments is the most important channel for easing the pressure of consumer demand. Furthermore, this is a powerful incentive for displaying enterprise and a way of converting private initiative from speculative into productive in a constructive area. For example, it is contemplated to free from taxes the invested share of income of private farmers, including lessees. They have also been allowed to make use of their foreign currency to purchase minor mechanization facilities abroad. Naturally, one could object as follows: Reducing the scarcity on the consumer market will increase scarcity on the market of means of production. The entire point, however, is for this step to be taken not on an isolated basis but within the context of a sharp reduction in state investments. This will help to release means of production which could be freely sold on the market.

Inflation noticeably encourages inefficiency and high outlays in the functioning of social consumption funds, for which reason their rationalization, decentralization, and elimination of equal utilization and very close ties to the state budget are important on the anti-inflationary level.

Naturally, the course of the reform itself, which will include the organization of companies, commercial credit, bank pluralism, the creation of exchanges, *perestrojka* in the price-setting mechanism, conversion to state economic regulation, the purposes of which are much broader than simply the struggle against inflation but which, if systematically and skillfully implemented, would have a "general strengthening" impact on the financial system, would help the country to come out of its inflation-generating situation.

Thus, the interest rate policy of the state bank, costly credit as a means of halting investments, particularly low-efficiency ones, could be a much more effective anti-inflationary step than any administrative freezing of capital investments, for the latter, as the action of the central authority, relies on insufficient information concerning the specific economic situation and limits the autonomy of producers. The extensive development of commercial credit will enable economic organizations not to consider credit a variety of state budget financing and would separate it from the state treasury. Removing the pension fund from the state budget is the first step toward the appearance within the economy of a powerful and relatively independent investor and, above all, an investor which is not so closely linked to the printing press, which is having a most painful impact on the country's financial condition.

Individual factors are closely interwoven with general factors in an economic reform. One cannot eliminate inflation without affecting relations of ownership and ways of governmental interference in the economy; in turn, however, they cannot be optimized without a strong currency and healthy monetary turnover. Political economy becomes economic policy and vice versa. A concept, however progressive, realistic, and considered it may be, will not be converted into the desired changes without institutional, motivational, cultural, and material foundations. However, it is precisely the ideology of reform, as it conquers public opinion, and as it is accepted by the authorities, that becomes the motive force leading to the necessary changes.

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### CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

#### Russian Orthodoxy in the Context of History

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[Review by A. Popov, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the book "*Russkoye Pravoslaviye: Vekhi Istorii*" [Russian Orthodoxy: Historical Landmarks]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 719 pp]

[Text] Currently new concepts are being developed in the social sciences concerning religion and the church and the previous simplistic formulations and popular stereotypes are being discarded. Debates have been started in periodicals on existing and "customary" evaluations of the social status of religion. A wide discussion is gathering strength on the place of religion and church in history, social life, and the system of spiritual values, and their role in the development of the national self-awareness of nations and in the safeguard of universal human values.

Can it be said that the lack of knowledge in this area and the readers' hunger for good quality publications on religious topics have been eliminated? Historians, philosophers, and specialists in other areas still owe the public a great deal of work on such subjects. It is in this context that we should consider the publication of the book under review.

Let us emphasize, above all, that this is a solid, a fundamental work which makes a notable contribution to the development not only of domestic religion but of historical science as well. A rich and comprehensive historiographic material is put in scientific circulation, on the basis of which the one-thousand year period, from the establishment and development of the institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church to its present condition, is traced.

The authors of this book, headed by doctor of historical sciences A.I. Klibanov, include major specialists in history and philosophy. These researchers justifiably consider their work in a certain sense as a starting point which opens a cycle of meaningful publications on this complex topic.

The importance of this monograph is largely the result of the fact that it is a fruitful although, it is true, not always consistent effort to leave behind simplistic vulgar sociology in interpreting the historical practices of religious and church institutions and blanket negativism in assessing the role of Russian orthodoxy in history, based on strictly formulated black and white concepts of its absolute "reactionary nature." Nonetheless, in my view, in restoring historical truth about the position held by the Orthodox Church in the past, the authors do not fall into the other extreme which has now become somewhat popular in our periodical publications: a certain apology of orthodoxy and idealizing the traditions of religious-church culture.

Unquestionably attractive and sometimes even heroic passages and periods can be found in the history of Russian orthodoxy, which today are mentioned by the church itself unwillingly. Therefore, in order to have an honest and unprejudiced scientific study we should neither exaggerate nor ignore various aspects of church activities which either suppress or absolutize the actual and quite contradictory significance of religious-church orthodox tradition in the development of statehood in Rus and its influence in the various areas of the people's life.

Let us point out that despite a substantial number of monographs, not all problems of Russian orthodoxy have been studied to an equal degree. The authors have concentrated their efforts primarily on describing precisely the evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church (and not Russian orthodoxy as a whole) as a particular type of social structure and the place of this institution in the political, governmental, economic, and legal system in Rus and, subsequently, in Russia. The authors do not especially analyze the internal nature and conceptual meaning of the orthodox-dogmatic faith or the specific forms of orthodox religiousness of the Russian people and of its various strata and groups at different periods of domestic history; nor do they study the proselytizing ways of instilling orthodox ideology among the masses or else the characteristics of the ethical and esthetic means used in church culture.

We believe that a detailed consideration of this range of problems would be just as interesting and important. Unquestionably, this is an essential task of our science for the immediate future. The study of the internal content of orthodoxy in its historical development is relevant not only for its own sake. It enables us to see why the church which, throughout all stages in the history of the Russian state was a totally class-oriented institution, was able, nonetheless, to perform its special role in the spiritual life of the people, appealing to what

is "human in man," and struggling through the forces of its best and honest preachers and pastors to promote the development and enrichment of the national self-awareness.

Let us note one unquestionable merit of the book. It does not deal exclusively with church-orthodox history. The authors have taken a much broader view. They have paid significant attention to the nature and content of popular heresies and anticlerical actions, the spreading of sectarian religious movements of social protest, the historical destinies of the "direct descendants," as they describe themselves of the initial forms of Russian Christianity—the old believers—and the exceptionally curious and to this day insufficiently studied phenomenon of the renovative split within the Orthodox Church in the post-October period. This approach has been fully justified, for all such phenomena are directly related to the history of Russian orthodoxy and one cannot acquire a sufficiently profound knowledge of it without taking side trips outside the realm of religious orthodoxy.

As a whole, the monograph leads to the conclusion that the Russian Orthodox Church has always been an organization entirely "of this world," socially rooted, with totally earthly concerns and a hierarchical institution with its own power pyramid, its "upper" and "lower" strata and specific corporate interests, participating actively in social affairs with a different success to itself and usefulness to society at different historical stages. As the authors justifiably point out, the church was not some kind of "monolith." Within it, it was quite strongly stratified. The clergy played a complex and disparate role in the life of the state, performing a variety of social, political, and cultural-moral functions. The authors rightly provide a differentiated assessment of the real contribution which the church has made in the life of society. With the help of substantial specific data they describe both the positive and the obstructing impact which the church has had on the country's social progress.

It would be unnecessary to retell here the main content of the book. However, it is obviously worth mentioning, with the authors, some turning points in the history of the Orthodox Church and of the entire land of Russia. Many events of both periods and the role which the Orthodox Church played in them were, until very recently, carefully bypassed along with the contributions of orthodoxy in the eyes of the people's mind.

The monograph describes the substantiated and dialectically supported role of the adoption of precisely orthodox Christianity in terms of the historical destinies of Kiev Rus, proving the justification of this step taken by Prince Vladimir. The efforts which have taken place to counter Christianity with a reformed pagan cult failed. The demands of historical progress could be best satisfied by the type of Christian religion such as orthodoxy, which appeared under the conditions of the latter antiquity and was consistent with the stage of development

which Rus had entered (see p 15). Furthermore, subsequently, during the times of feudal divisions, the church was able to contribute to the progressive process of "gathering together" the Russian lands.

In our view, the monograph defines precisely and in a balanced way the new historical circumstances in which the Orthodox Church found itself during the period of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, when, like the prince, it became a vassal of the khans but was exempt by the Horde from paying fees. In this case the "Russian hierarchies were given the opportunity to defend their interests in the Horde despite the power of the princes, which made them active participants in the political struggle waged in Rus in the 14th-15th centuries" (pp 68-69). The Moscow princes made effective use of the high authority enjoyed by the church and its special position in the deployment of political forces in solving their own problems which, as a whole, at that time coincided with the national interests. By this token, the church made its unquestionable contribution to the common cause of liberation. It nurtured in its ranks an entire galaxy of true patriots and spiritual guardians who uplifted the nationwide movement. Actually, even then relations between the administrations of the prince and the church were far from idyllic. Such a conflicting situation remained in subsequent period in Russian history. Nonetheless, both dominant social forces needed the other, which led to the alliance between them (see pp 109-110).

The Patriarchy, which was instituted 400 years ago, was an important landmark in the governmental and church history of Russian society, the consequences of which would be difficult to overestimate. Here as well the merits of the authors in the objective study of this phenomenon are substantial.

The correlation between the monarchy and the Patriarchy and cooperation and struggle between spiritual and worldly powers is a most interesting dramatic problem, the "solution" to which crowds subsequent Russian history. Behind the disputes which, one may have thought, were of a purely theological nature, there were obvious ideological, political, and economic interests and ambitions of these two sides which were both allies and rivals. In the final account, and this complex process is described in detail in the book, autocracy prevailed. The church reforms instituted by Peter the Great and many other Russian tsars led to the definitive subordination of the church to monarchic absolutism. The elimination of the Patriarchy by Peter the Great and the establishment of a synod were of crucial significance to the Orthodox Church. It lost its independence and became directly integrated in the governmental autocratic machine. In our view, the monograph successfully brings to light the true tragedy of the state church, which became an organic part of the official powers. Such an alliance between the "horse and the horseman," despite all external conveniences and benefits to the rulers of orthodoxy triggered, in the final account, extremely negative consequences to the church itself as a religious

apologetic institution. In its new role, the Orthodox Church increasingly developed into a bureaucratized department of absolutism.

Today the opinion is frequently voiced in literature to the effect that the Russian Orthodox Church, with its "progressive social impulses," which played a positive role in the 10th to the 16th centuries, and which subsequently began to fall behind social needs, became, in the course of time, an obstruction to social progress and turned, particularly in the spiritual area, into a force of obscurantism. We believe that although there are reasons leading to this conclusion, it should be adopted with a great deal of stipulations. Otherwise, once again we would obtain a rather simplistic system. The church—as the content of this monograph proves quite convincingly—never developed in Russian history in a strictly single direction (exclusively "at the top" or "at the bottom"). Even after the 16th century the church had its own "bright stripes," and its merits. The fact that the church fell behind the requirements of the development of bourgeois social relations and hindered the historical progress of the country, particularly in the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, is obvious. Nonetheless, we cannot totally deny certain positive aspects of the activities of a number of church institutions, bearing in mind that the widespread structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, as we mentioned, was socially quite heterogeneous and complex.

The materials in the book make it possible to assess this contradictory situation existing in the church's social activities. The conservative and, sometimes openly reactionary line pursued by the church leadership, particularly at the turn of the 20th century, is a historical reality. However, we need more than such a monochromatic description. The monograph properly points out that the objective significance of the influence of the church on social awareness (in this case its patriotic activities during different periods in the country's history) has been by no means identical. For example, whereas in 1812 "protecting the faith" helped to win the victory in the liberation struggle, during the Crimean War, which was an unjust war on both sides, this slogan contributed to the enhancement of chauvinistic moods. Conversely, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which brought about the liberation of "co-religionist Bulgaria" from the Ottoman yoke, the church provided an active ideological inspiration in the just struggle, under that same slogan of "protecting the faith." Adding to this the fact that "the church participated in the organization of medical services, helping the disabled and the refugees, and so on, the need for a considered and objective view on the role of the church under extreme circumstances in the life of the people in the 19th century becomes clear" (p 330) and, let us add, at the beginning of the 20th century as well (the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars). Correspondingly, from the same viewpoint the authors of the monograph consider the contradictory results, which cannot be brought under the same denominator, of the

participation of church institutions and church leaders in solving other social problems in the country (the needs of public education, etc.).

Nonetheless, the overall conservative and protective trend of church actions during the period of the three Russian revolutions, the rejection of the October Revolution by the church, the anti-Soviet actions of the church hierarchy, and the participation of many priests in the White movement remain incontrovertible facts and these too are pages in the history of the country and the Russian Orthodox Church. Here again, however, and let us repeat it, today we must take a fresh look (an approach already earmarked in the book) at the motivations, both subjective and objective, of such views and see the entire complexity and disparate significance of the attitude of the masses of the clergy (and not only the church leadership) toward revolutionary changes. Nonetheless, the contemporary researcher must also consider the question of whether at that time the policy of the Soviet system in the area of implementation of the democratic ideas of the October Revolution of the separation of the church from the state and the freedom of conscience, was sufficiently weighed and consistent. What role did the numerous antireligious and antichurch excesses, particularly in certain localities, play in these processes?

A movement toward renovation already began to develop within the church by the end of the 19th century. Even after the October Revolution it was a noteworthy phenomenon in religious and social life. The renovators, who were followed by many rank-and-file believers, called for cooperation with the Soviet system and tried to organize a dialogue with it.

In general, the section of the book which deals with the post-October stage in the evolution of the Orthodox Church is of understandable interest. In November 1917, after 200 years, the institution of the Patriarchy was revived (at the same time as the October coup d'état). The church entered a new period in its existence, both in terms of organizational quality and other social circumstances. Did at that time conditions develop, thanks to this fact, for a different alternative—nonconfrontational relations with the people's regime? This question as well should be thoroughly studied.

The post-October period in the history of Russian orthodoxy and the entire panoramic view of the development of relations between the church and the Soviet system and the changes in its functions and status as a result of its separation from the state in the socialist society have unfortunately not been sufficiently discussed in the monograph. In any case, it is clear that at a certain period in our history—we are referring to the time of the cult of personality—such relations developed much more tragically than the relevant section in the book indicates. On this level the period of "stagnation" was also far from normal.



The Stalinist repressions affected many thousands of clergymen and millions of believers. Distortions of the Marxist principles of the policy in the area of religion caused tremendous harm to the consolidation among all citizens of the socialist state regardless of their conceptual views or the need to provide positive solutions to social problems. All of these most severe deformations affected both the Russian Orthodox Church as well as the other faiths in the country. Unquestionably, these difficult questions, which are only briefly mentioned in the book, await their researchers, who would analyze them profoundly and truthfully, without concealing anything. We should draw lessons from the experience in the development of this area of social relations in order to avoid a repetition of errors today and tomorrow.

The choice in favor of acknowledging socialist reality, the active participation in present processes of renovation and cleansing of our life and the patriotic, peace-making, and compassionate practices of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the other religions in the country cannot fail to create a feeling of respect. The church has been separated from the state but not from society. Russian orthodoxy is a major social and spiritual-moral force which is making its contribution to civil affairs. It is regrettable, naturally, that the monograph does not provide greater details of such contemporary aspects in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church. The authors do not consider problems which could be but remain unsolved so far in the relationship between church and state, and the state and the church. Above all, this applies to the new law on religious associations and the freedom of conscience, the draft of which will soon be discussed by the USSR Supreme Soviet.... However, we should not ask of the authors to do more than is possible.

Naturally, not everything in this book is uncontroversial and of equal value. However, a detailed analysis of some gaps, simplifications, and inaccuracies found in the work is not the purpose of this review. Let the specialists argue about it. What matters is something else: to realize that Soviet studies of problems of religion are dynamically developing and are sufficiently open and daringly speak of things about which, only yesterday, it was customary to keep silent; such studies set themselves major and significant problems which they try to solve on a serious scientific basis. This is the only sensible and long-term way of understanding complex sociohistorical phenomena, such as religious institutions.

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#### According to Yesterday's Canons

905B00080 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 89 (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 123-126

[Text] The substantially increased stream of letters to the editors of KOMMUNIST assessing currently published books on social science subjects confirms one alarming phenomenon. Increasingly they point out the serious

lagging of a significant percentage of sociopolitical publications coming out of the central and local publishing houses behind the level of information and competence of the readers, which have increased in recent years, and behind the discussions which are currently taking place in society.

Unquestionably, many interesting works may be found in bookstores, analyzing, in the spirit of the new thinking and historical truth, topical aspects of perestroika and our country's recent past. Alas, however, books which avoid the discussion of problems, written in accordance with the standards of yesterday, are still frequently published.

Following are two responses by readers to recently published books not claiming, naturally, the status of regular book review. Rather, they are reactions on the part of consumers of books concerning their quality which is inconsistent with the requirements of our time.

**A. Kalmanson, docent, Department of Scientific Communism, All-Union Correspondence Engineering-Construction Institute, Moscow: History**

In our present atmosphere of universal interest in works on history and the familiar difficulties in teaching this subject in secondary schools and VUZs, any book about our past is the subject of closer attention. Naturally, we could not ignore a school aid for teachers entitled "Izucheniye Istorii v Vecherney Sredney Obshcheobrazovatelnoy Shkole. 10-12 Klassy" [Study of History in Evening Secondary General Education Schools, 10th-12th Grades] (Prosveshcheniye, Moscow, 1988, 336 pp, signed to press at the very end of last year), which appeared in the bookstores at the beginning of 1989. For the time being, we have very few general works which describe our post-October history on a systematic basis.

What new facts are provided in this book for specialists and nonspecialists interested in the problems of the past? What are its conceptual approaches to the complex and difficult periods of development of Soviet society?

As we read this school aid we find out, to our amazement, that its authors have followed overall and as a whole the Stalinist version of domestic and world history of most recent times. This is most clearly manifested in the interpretation of development of the USSR after 1924. Here the only logic prevailing is that of the "Short Course." It is true that J.V. Stalin himself is not mentioned either positively or critically, with the exception of the period of the Great Patriotic War (neutrally) and the 20th CPSU Congress (negatively). Actually, in the preceding sections as well he is kept behind the screen of events: not a word is being said about Lenin's "Letter to the Congress," which provided characteristics of the leading party personalities, or the plan for autonomization, which is criticized anonymously, without any mention of its author (see pp 140-141, 143).

In describing the period which they call the stage of the "struggle for the implementation of the Leninist plan for

building socialism in the USSR (1926-1937)," the authors use, in general, exclusively rosy hues. If anything darkened life during those years (the 1920s above all), in the opinion of the authors, it was caused only by the actions of right-wing and "left-wing" opposition members who, for instance, "brought forth the idea of 'super-industrialization,' i.e., a maximally high pace of development of industrialization, the financing of which they intended to procure at the expense of the peasantry" (p 148). Actually, this idea was anti-Leninist. However, did Stalin himself not take up the same concept and did he not become its promoter in the practice of the socialist changes in our country? Not at all, the authors claim. Conversely, the building of the new society at that time was taking place fully in accordance with the Leninist plan which was fully implemented (see pp 144, 158). Strangely enough, the authors appear unfamiliar with the new and objective assessments of that period, assessments which have already been firmly accepted in our social sciences. Let us merely recall the description which was heard almost 1 year prior to the publication of the book from the rostrum of the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "... We were unable to implement quite fully the Leninist principles of the new social system. This was greatly hindered by the cult of personality, the command-administrative management system which developed in the 1930s, and bureaucratic, dogmatic, and arbitrary distortions and arbitrary behavior...."

The line of the authors' approach has led to the fact that the entire tragic and complex period of our history after the "great change" of 1929 is presented in the work in a frankly positive style. In the dozens of pages describing the 1930s, not a word is mentioned of the cult of personality, the terroristic management methods, mass repressions and illegalities, the severe consequences of the coercive Stalinist collectivization, and the cost and victims of the inhuman methods applied in promoting industrial progress. Meanwhile, a great deal is being persistently said about the "high conscientiousness of the working people" "manifested in a deep understanding and support" of the decisions and steps taken by the party and the government (p 193) and the successful "development of Soviet democracy," thanks to the upsurge of which "the former kulaks had their electoral rights restored" (p 158), etc. What is the explanation for such an obvious one-sidedness in the description of the events of that time? Are the authors nurturing the hope that the educators for whom this aid was written and the students, who are today quite well-informed about Stalinism, would react without irony to such "antiquarian truths?"

Unfortunately, in the subsequent parts of the school aid as well, the authors have been unable to abandon all such ancient dogmas and false stereotypes. With enviable stubbornness, for example, they have developed the Stalinist thesis of the "suddenness" of the attack launched by Hitlerite Germany as being the actually only reason for the "temporary failures" of the Soviet forces

during the initial period of the Patriotic War. Not a single mention is made of the tremendous harm caused to the country's defense capability by the total repressions and purges in the Red Army and in the corps of military-technical specialists.

Our contemporary times "fare" no better in the book. Again they are assessed on the basis of those "eternally yesterday's" positions. Here is a typical view considered "current" under the present conditions of the disruption of the consumer market in our country: "Under contemporary conditions, the teacher will emphasize, there is a conversion from the 'phase of saturation' with consumer demands to a 'phase of substitution,' in which demand for their quality increases sharply" (p 291).

Let us stop abusing the patience of the reader: innumerable similar examples may be found in the book.

Nonetheless, in conclusion, I would like to ask the authors and publishers: How could such a methodical aid appear in the fourth year of perestroika? To what lessons of truth does it orient today's school and what feelings could it trigger among teachers, other than protest and puzzlement?

Could it be that the editors and managers of Izdatelstvo Prosveshcheniye were mesmerized by the reputation of high personalities? For in the title of the book, which was printed in a large edition, we clearly read: "Recommended by the Main Training-Method Administration for General Secondary Education, USSR State Committee for Public Education."

**S. Dichkovskiy, candidate of historical sciences, Tula: Social Problems**

Not so long ago Izdatelstvo Mysl published the book "*Sotsialnaya Politika KPSS na Sovremennom Etape*" [CPSU Social Policy at the Present Stage] (1988, 303 pp), aimed at propagandists and higher party school students. Its authors, teachers at the Moscow Higher Party School, unquestionably set themselves a complex task: to take a new look from the positions of the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress and subsequent party fora, at the entire set of problems related to the development of social processes at the contemporary stage and their reflection in the social policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

Is this work consistent with the set task? Let me immediately say that the authors have been unable, in my opinion, to abandon declarativeness and a superficial approach in the interpretation of topics and entirely to abandon the dogmatic postulates and stereotypes which had developed in the past in the assessment of many socioeconomic processes in Soviet society.

To prove this, let us turn to the text. For example, in the chapter "Regulating Social Relations Is a Task of Communist Party Policy," we read the following: "On the basis of the implementation of the Leninist cooperative

plan a new socialist class in terms of its social nature arose from a petty-commodity private farming: the cooperated (kolkhoz) peasantry, which began to base its labor on public ownership, collective work, and advanced equipment" (p 167). I fail to understand the basis for such a categorical claim, with no stipulations and explanations, about Stalin's successful implementation of the Leninist cooperative plan. Instead of a profound study of documents and the discussions of this matter, as well as debates with opponents and consideration of new conclusions and assessments found in the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress, the January 1987 and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the latest publications by historians, the authors essentially hold onto the old interpretation of collectivization in the USSR as a "classical model" of the socialist reorganization of agriculture.

Furthermore, today's social problems in agricultural work, the rapprochement between town and country, and upgrading the efficiency of the agroindustrial complex are considered in the book more from the viewpoint of the notorious concept of the "further advancement of socialism" rather than the position of perestroyka. Although the concepts of "perestroyka," "renovation of socialism," "qualitatively new condition of society," "democratization," "glasnost," etc., have been introduced in the text in some places, the study, unfortunately, largely follows the style of the old declarative "propaganda of success," alienated from the facts of life and real difficulties. Following are some examples:

"Capitalism has nothing with which to counter the real gains of socialism, such as the right to work, the right to housing and recreation, free medical services, and education" (p 135);

"The real gains of socialism must include... improving the indicators of physical development, reduced mortality rate, and increased life-span," characteristic "of all nations and nationalities in the country" (pp 120-121);

By the end of the 1970s and turn of the 1980s, according to the authors, no deformations of social policy were noted but merely "cases of indifferent, bureaucratic, and formal and, as a whole, unfair attitude toward the satisfaction of the legitimate rights and needs of the individual, displayed by individual (?) officials" (p 140).

Unfortunately, in this book, which claims to describe the social policy of the CPSU at the stage of perestroyka, the old approaches predominate in assessing the forms of socialist ownership and ways of changing the nature and conditions of labor of the Soviet people.

Strange though it may seem, many chapters in the book leave the impression that the authors appear to be living in the past, isolated from the fresh winds of perestroyka and are totally unable to surmount the old scholastic approaches.

Today, when Soviet society is seeking ways of surmounting the "nobody's" nature of socialist property,

and of creating a variety of optimal ways of its functioning, the authors have focused on the quite speculative matter of the "ways of the further rapprochement and, in the future, blending" of national with kolkhoz-cooperative property (see pp 172 and following), claiming that today's nature of production relations in socialist society already "eliminates the alienation" allegedly typical of capitalism only (see pp 76-77).

At a time when our theory and practice are seeking ways of halting the process of "decountrification" of the countryside, it is as though the authors fail to notice this and follow a different route. In their view, "a dominant trend prevails in the country: It is not a process of 'countrification' of industrial workers and sovkhoz workers but, conversely, a rising of the kolkhoz peasantry to the contemporary highest... level of the working class" which, in their view, is reflected in the "progressive trend" of the increased number of sovkhoz workers, which "will continue to develop in the future" (pp 177, 179).

While the science of economics is struggling with the problem of how to upgrade the efficiency of socialist distribution according to labor, the authors persist with their statement that everything is working splendidly and that under socialism the working people "are obtaining their share of product in accordance with the amount of time worked (!). In other words, everyone receives according to his labor" (p 149), for labor in this society already has a "direct social nature" (p 83).

The monograph fails particularly badly in comparing systems. Thus, in an effort to persuade the reader that, unlike socialism, by its very nature capitalism cannot show any concern for the worker on the job, and to create decent working and living conditions for him, the authors quote as their main argument Marx on the capitalist economic system of the mid-19th century, which leads to the "systematic plunder of all the conditions needed for the worker's life at work: space, air, and light, as well as all means which protect the worker from conditions in the production process which are threatening to life or harmful to the health" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 23, p 437). Unlike the situation under capitalism, the authors go on to say, socialism has radically changed the socioeconomic nature of the very concept of "labor conditions." One could quite firmly claim that no other economic system has ascribed such great importance to improving the working conditions of the industrial worker" (p 91). In confirmation of their "theoretical investigations," they cite the following proofs:

"... For example, the labor of the Soviet worker is characterized by its greater meaningfulness compared with that of the American worker" (p 95);

"The capitalist tries to restrict the social needs of the working people to their minimum.... The underconsumption by the masses is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of any exploiting social system, particularly capitalism" (p 73).

What could one say on the subject of such "statements?" One thing only: As we know, the 27th CPSU Congress condemned the "quotation-mongering," and dogmatic attitude toward the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, assigning to ideological cadres the task of mastering their legacy in full and of mastering the creative Marxist-Leninist dialectical method for the objective study of the historical processes of our time. For the time being, in my opinion the authors of the monograph are quite distant in many parts of their work from the realism and objectiveness in scientific analysis, dictated by life. Only such features can lead to a true increase of our knowledge of the socialist society.

Naturally, I have mentioned only some of the most obnoxious concepts without setting myself the task of analyzing in detail the entire book which contains a great deal of accurate and useful things and interesting parts. We are concerned, however, by the fact that dogmatism, which is being eliminated with such great difficulty in scientific research, continues to exist in the teaching of the social sciences and in publications to be used by propagandists and students of higher party schools. Is this not the root of inertial thinking, poor theoretical preparedness, and incompetence shown by a certain segment of party and Komsomol workers and economic managers? Quotation-mongering in theory leads to dangerous losses in economics, the social area, and party activities. Unfortunately, we must note that most political books have still not spoken loudly the language of our revolutionary time, as this monograph proves.

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### Short Book Reviews

905B0008P Moscow *KOMMUNIST in Russian No 14, Sep 89* (signed to press 14 Sep 89) pp 126-128

[Text] "*Kratkiy Slovar po Sotsiologii*" [Short Sociological Dictionary]. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 479 pp. Reviewed by I. Dmitriyev, doctor of philosophical sciences.

A dictionary of sociology, which was so eagerly awaited by professional sociologists and a wide circle of readers, was published recently. The expectation of the readers was largely caused by the current critical situation in the social area, the solution to which should be sought not only by politicians and economists but, possibly and not least, by sociologists. As to the specialists, they are naturally interested for sociology, like the other sciences, to be equipped with its solid and expanded conceptual apparatus.

This dictionary, which contains more than 400 articles, is distinguished by a sufficiently broad scope: general problems of sociology; its sectors; methods and organization of sociological research; trends, concepts, and scientific schools in sociology. It includes references to the Soviet Sociological Association and sociological scientific centers and journals in the USSR. Another merit of the dictionary is the aspiration of its compilers and authors, not limiting themselves to theory, to depict the reality of social life. To a large extent, they have succeeded.

The group of authors (58 specialists) has not limited itself only to the explanation of specific terms. As a rule, the entries consider broader sociological categories, giving us an idea of the extent to which problems have been developed and the history of one scientific trend or another. In the sections dealing with the basic branches of sociology we find sufficiently extensive data on leading Soviet and Western researchers. The reader could obtain information on quite rarely used concepts in our sociological publications, such as "social interaction," "social conflict," "crowd," "social ecology," "manipulation," and others.

As a whole, this dictionary can be described as a worthwhile work and as having many and unquestionable scientific merits. The intensified approach to the scientific works of Western scientists is of great importance in the development of Marxist-Leninist sociology. This is essential also because Soviet sociologists frequently come across the problem of applicability of the conceptual apparatus and concepts of their Western colleagues to our reality.

It is exceptionally important under the conditions of perestroika to earmark the long-term tasks in the development of sociology and its individual areas. In this connection, the entry on sociology itself and its subject is successfully treated. It considers the ways of development of this science in its interaction with other "traditional" social sciences (psychology, history, geography, law, etc.), as well as with logic, semiotics, linguistics, and mathematics. It is precisely interdisciplinary interaction that leads to the appearance of new "border" disciplines (economic sociology, social ecology, and others). With the expansion and intensification of the social experiments taking place in the country, unquestionably the functions of sociology itself will undergo a change. The possible implementation of these functions is largely related to the way the science of sociology itself and the professional training of sociologists are organized. Nor does the dictionary ignore such problems (see pp 338-339).

Unfortunately, not all articles in the dictionary are of equal quality. Along with quite informative entries ("Russian Sociological Thinking," "Social Conflict," "Sociology of Public Opinion," and many others) there also are less informative ones.

In this connection we would like to point out a topic such as the sociology of labor. This important sectorial discipline is represented with a single and very short entry in which the main trend of the study (unfortunately, described, in our view, not entirely accurately or fully) is noted as "analysis of the influence of the nature, conditions, and forms of social organization of labor on labor and the growth of its productivity" (p 372). As a result of the vagueness of this formulation, the reader would seek in vain to find in the dictionary an entry on "Social Organization of Labor," finding only the rather unclear term of "social organization." As a result, many questions concerning the subjects of labor, its targets, and so on, remain unanswered. Yet, considering the lack of good quality scientific publications, we have in our country a major group of specialists, deprived of methodological tools, working in the area of labor sociology. They could hardly find useful monographs which were published in the 1960s and 1970s, when it was proclaimed (frequently also with the help of "data" of applied research!) that under socialism there had been a total elimination of alienation and in which research was focused, as we know, on a far-fetched remote problem of allegedly initiated growth of socialist into communist labor and its conversion into the "most important vital need."

During the period of perestroika, what is being offered instead of such scholastic postulates? Where do we see the impact of the economic reform and developing market relations on labor relations? The dictionary provides no answers to such questions. The authors have chosen the easier way of simple enumeration of research areas: satisfaction with labor, humanizing of labor, and labor incentive. Obviously, all this is accurate but can we be satisfied with merely such an abstract formulation of the question today?

Despite an overall positive rating of the entries on sectorial sociologies, frequently as we read this dictionary we sense a feeling of dissatisfaction. It is caused by the fact that a number of problems of theory and practice, as presented in the dictionary, do not include a sufficiently realistic assessment of the current situation in the social area in our society, to put it mildly.

Sociology, as a very universal science, greatly intersects with other areas of social knowledge, such as the science of economics, philosophy, scientific socialism, psychology, and political studies. Naturally, it would be impossible to demarcate the individual areas strictly, in the same way that we cannot formulate a comprehensive formula which would accurately and simply delineate the subject of one science or another. However, the authors do not always systematically follow the necessary "related" interpretation of many concepts and terms which reflect the specifics of precisely the science of sociology. Hence we have a surplus of general sociological terms, which could be found in dictionaries dealing with other social disciplines ("the state," "demographic policy," "population health," "ideology," "capitalism," "communism," "science," "production

forces," "social political system," "production method," etc.). The efforts of the authors to provide a sociological interpretation of such terms are by no means always fruitful which, unquestionably, impoverishes the work.

The abridged dictionary genre limits the number or concepts to be considered. Nonetheless, the dictionary should have included primarily sociological terms such as "choice," "behavior," "charisma," "social contract," "social entropy," "prohibition," and others. To the specialized sociologist the dictionary could have been of greater value had it, in addition to theoretical and information articles, contained statistical data which illustrate the state of affairs in the social area of Soviet society (possibly in comparison with other countries).

Considering the development of sociological training in our country and the further development of the means, ways, and methods of sociological research, the time has come to undertake preparations (already under way) for and publication of the first Soviet encyclopedic dictionary of sociology. We believe that this abridged dictionary, which quite adequately reflects the achievements and problems of our sociology, could be a good foundation for such future work.

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### Chronicle

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[Text] A meeting was held between the editors and the personnel of the Leninskiy CPSU Raykom in Moscow. A wide range of problems related to the activities of party organizations at the present stage were considered. Particular attention was paid to problems related to the democratization of internal party life, upgrading the vanguard role of the CPSU, and strengthening its ties with the working people. The enhancement of the work of party committees and individual party members and their active and efficient involvement in perestroika processes taking place in labor collectives were a topic of interested discussion. The need was noted for the efficient and full summation of suggestions by party members, submitted in the course of reports and elections, and their extensive discussion by the mass information media.

Problems related to the participation of the party press in perestroika were discussed at a KOMMUNIST-sponsored meeting with students of journalism at the Patrice Lumumba Friendship of the Peoples University.

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