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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

King Husayn's Ties to Baghdad Examined

90AE0322A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
15 Aug 90 p 9

[Article by Pinhas 'Inbari]

[Text] The earthquake in the Middle East has sent tremors through our small eastern neighbor, Jordan, too, and King Husayn's regime has never been shakier than it is now.

King Husayn is standing by Saddam Husayn's side, and it is particularly significant to note that none other than British frigates are checking every vessel bound for the Port of al-Aqabah. We should bear in mind that Britain, who crowned the Hashemites after World War I, has remained their best friend to this day. Each time the king was unhappy with Americans he would rush to London to get Mrs. Thatcher so she would intervene on his behalf. Having lost his British support, the king's situation in Washington became even more difficult, when his standing with the White House and Congress was already not too good.

However, in contrast to the common view, it is not Saddam Husayn's threatening army that is tying King Husayn's hands, but public opinion in Jordan itself. If Saddam were to be assassinated tomorrow, the king could still not join the West. The strong opposition in Jordan would not allow him to go against the wishes of his people. Ever since the Kuwait crisis became an international crisis, demonstrations in favor of Saddam Husayn have become a daily occurrence in Jordan, and King Husayn has dealt with them by joining the demonstrators. Today he expresses the consensus of opinion in Jordan.

I watched King Husayn on Jordanian television receiving the two houses of Parliament and the cabinet members at his palace—a step that represented massive support for the King's decision to support Saddam Husayn. He smoked—against his doctors' advice—which may mean that he is under great stress, but in contrast to other recent television appearances, he actually seemed to be in a good mood. He cracked jokes and spoke with conviction and self-confidence. My personal impression is that King Husayn believes Saddam will weather the storm successfully, and that the King of Jordan will play an important role in the New Middle East of the Saddam era.

Nevertheless, King Husayn is running a fatal risk if Saddam does fall. His people may not rebel against him, as he fears they may do now, but after everything is said and done following the crisis, his relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the oil emirates will be so bad that he won't be able to rely on any aid from them for his empty coffers. 'Arafat, too, is taking a real risk, unless King Husayn has a different view of the situation, and there is no certainty that the view underscoring the idea that

Saddam has indeed sealed his fate by invading Kuwait, is actually the correct one. Husayn and 'Arafat may be estimating that Saddam Husayn will win and that their position will be strengthened in the deep changes that will affect the Middle East as a result. At the same meeting with government and parliament members, King Husayn made a 'by the way' remark that was very significant. He said that at this point there is no question of talking of Arab people, but of one Arab nation. This means that when Saddam comes out victorious from the latest crisis, as per this estimate, King Husayn will himself offer to be united with Iraq, just as Saddam's son-in-law, appointed head of the "free" government immediately after the invasion, was then appointed vice president; so will the king take the same kind of position after the unification.

On what do Husayn and 'Arafat base their forecast that Saddam will win? First of all they see unprecedented support for Saddam Husayn among the Arab people. Saddam has pushed the right buttons, and if war breaks out, the waves of support for him may topple major Arab regimes. They are both aware of the different nuances between Europe and the United States, and they estimate that in the final analysis, Europe will break the blockade cordon that the Americans are endeavoring to tighten around Iraq. When we talk of Europe, we must separate Britain from that group because it is supporting American policy wholeheartedly, and had been doing so before the present crisis, too.

When Husayn was acting to restore the Palestinian center in Amman, he also allowed Palestinian groups who supported Syria to open offices in his capital city. He has now found out that those Popular Front groups which had supported Syria without hesitation are extremely dissatisfied with President al-Asad. A delegation of Syrian supporters from Jordan went to Damascus to appeal to al-Asad to change his policy and to join Saddam Husayn instead of going with reactionary shaykhs. King Husayn is thus justified in thinking that there must be varying degrees of dissatisfaction among nationalist Ba'th circles in Syria, too, and if Saddam does win, al-Asad's regime may well collapse.

These considerations may yet turn out to be correct if the Americans do not deal Saddam Husayn a stinging blow soon—immediately to be followed by using Saudi money to promote prosperity in the Middle East and provide financial support for the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. 'Arafat and Husayn will probably not play any role in this process. Almost any other scenario may serve to prove the calculations of Husayn and 'Arafat correct.

Actually, King Husayn's pessimistic stance and his reservations about the Americans are not consequences of the latest crisis, but a lengthy process. Last year the king did not respond to an invitation to go to Washington, as a sign of displeasure with U.S. policy, and his contacts with the Saudis were mostly limited to unsuccessful requests for massive aid to pull the Jordanian economy

out of deep trouble. Husayn may be described as paranoid, but he is convinced—and has said so more than once—that the real intentions of the U.S. policy is to remove him from the throne and implement the Likud's "Jordan is Palestine" line. The Baker plan constitutes circumstantial evidence of that for Husayn, in view of the fact that the plan relegated Jordan to a peripheral place and chose Cairo as the venue of all events concerning the political process. The plan thus projected the extent of the Jordan's urgency vis-a-vis the political process.

As the Palestinians' disappointment with the political process linked to the United States and Egypt grew, so did their cooperation with Jordan, and here is where Saudi Arabia entered the picture. In order to make the Jordanian-PLO cooperation effective, it was necessary to revive the activities of the joint Jordanian-PLO Commission, but Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait) refused to finance it beyond a small stipend that did not suffice to restore it to its dominant status in the territories. Moreover, because of financial scandals at the PLO offices in Amman, Kuwait announced that it was transferring its support from the PLO directly to the territories. 'Arafat could not interpret this other than as a U.S. attempt to put pressure on him through Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Even before Kuwait transferred its support directly to the territories—for example, to the Council for Higher Education or the al-Maqasad al-Hayiria Hospital in East Jerusalem—right on the eve of the invasion, a new crisis broke out between the PLO and Kuwait when the amir's government did a careless job of estimating the tax levied on Palestinians working there for the PLO.

What interested King Husayn was that the joint commission was not the only one to which Saudi Arabia refused to remit sizable amounts of money; it also turned down his requests for real aid, while at the same time sending considerable funds to his dangerous opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood Party became a means of Saudi-American pressure against him—according to his interpretation. Jordanians also believe that the economic crisis, too, was triggered as a means of political pressure or in order to promote the Likud's plans about "Jordan is Palestine."

The king can now rub his hands with glee and malicious pleasure, while the Muslim Brotherhood, together with their creature in the territories, HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement], are turning with unprecedented viciousness against Saudi Arabia, the power that, together with the late Kuwait, has been financing them.

Added to Saudi toughness toward him, his isolation under the Baker plan, and the economic crisis facing him, has now been added the "immigration scourge." Israel has not provided any real guarantees to the effect that it will not direct new immigrants, or any other Israeli citizens, to settle in the territories as a plot to facilitate the transfer to the east thus putting an end to the Hashemite rule and solving the Palestinian problem at his expense.

The more the king's hopes for Saudi aid were disappointed and the more he internalized what that meant for Jordan's future, the stronger became his link to Saddam Husayn, until it became an unbreakable tie because of the enormous public support that Saddam enjoys in Jordan.

Egypt realized even before the present crisis that King Husayn was in a pessimistic mood and that he was convinced that he no longer had anything to lose and could only gain from close ties with Saddam Husayn. On the very eve of the crisis, the United States, with Egypt's assistance, made an effort to wrench Jordan from the Iraqi embrace: during Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid's visit to Washington, he stayed in contact by telephone with King Husayn. A U.S. promise for guarantees concerning the future of the kingdom this time convinced the king to respond positively to the invitation from Washington, but Kuwait's invasion changed the agenda.

Yesterday we heard a reverberation of what was discussed between Husayn and the Americans from Defense Minister Moshe Arens, when he declared in Nabulus that Israel was interested in the stability of Husayn's regime. As is almost always the case, Israel was a bit slow in grasping the significance of the thing. Last winter the "Jordan is Palestine" Association held a well attended conference in Jerusalem, and the guest of honor was Arens' deputy at the Foreign Ministry at the time, Bibi Netanyahu, who should have said then what Arens said yesterday. Before the latest coalition crisis, "sources close to the prime minister" leaked that Israel would be well advised to wait until the situation in Jordan became worse, because new chances would then open up for Israel.

As we see, the "chances" are taking shape, but with such "chances," who needs any dangers....

Jordanian Army Considered Dangerous Threat

*90AE0351B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
20 Aug 90 p 23*

[Article by Uzi Mahanayimi]

[Text] Movements of Jordanian army units throughout the Hashemite Kingdom are pointing to the fact that the Jordanians are preparing for the worst. There are reports of war preparations, of army entrenchment in the neighborhood of sensitive targets in the capital city of Amman and al-'Aqaba, and of movements of military units. The Jordanian air defense and air force are on high alert. This is the first serious state of alert in many years. The last thing the Jordanians want is a flare up and involvement in a war against Israel.

The Israeli announcement that the penetration of Iraqi troops into Jordan will be seen by Israel as a reason to go to war, and the possibility that in such a case IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] forces will go into Jordan, this week

increased the likelihood of Jordanian military involvement in a regional war. What is the Jordanian army like? What threat does it pose to Israel?

However strange it may sound, if fighting breaks out, the Jordanian army is one of the most dangerous to Israel, if not the most dangerous. The Jordanian army, with its 107 fighter planes, 140,000 regular and reserve troops, and another 10,000 men in the air force, is poised against Israel's soft underbelly. Jordanian airplanes are within a few minutes flight from the center of the country, closer to us than any other Arab air force. And when it is a matter of a mere few minutes warning, the thing becomes very dangerous indeed.

In spite of absolute lack of battle experience, the Jordanian pilots are viewed as the best among the Arab fighter pilots. The king, himself a pilot, personally oversees the progress of his pilots, and pays them the best salaries.

The average Jordanian pilot spends long months in foreign armies, especially in England. The Jordanian pilots also train in the company of American pilots within the framework of joint annual exercises that usually are held in Jordan.

The Jordanian air force is currently equipped with Mirage F-1 intercept planes in two squadrons, but the Jordanians have already ordered a squadron of advanced Mirage 2000. The Jordanian air defense units are made up of improved Hawk batteries, as well as Soviet SA and SA-13 anti-aircraft batteries.

The Jordanian ground forces are also small and well trained. The Jordanian artillery, which can reach populated areas in Israel, is very good. Eleven motorized artillery battalions are attached to the four Jordanian divisions—two armor and two mechanized divisions.

The Jordanian special forces, which are trained to land forces in the enemy's rear, are accompanied by an airborne artillery battalion that includes 105 mm guns mounted on Super Puma helicopters. Such a battalion, for example, if it manages to penetrate across the lines, can cause a lot of trouble to localities, military camps, and other vital sites.

Jordan's artillery is equipped with 155 mm. Copra-AD shells. This kind of shell hones in on a laser beam and can actually penetrate any tank currently operational in the area.

Enemy tanks pitted against the modern Jordanian Chief-tain tanks will run into precise shells capable of causing problems to any armored corps in the arena. The Jordanians have 275 such tanks in their armored divisions, out of the 1,115 tanks in the Jordanian army.

In recent years the Jordanians exercised several times crossing water obstacles like the Jordan river. They also acquired means and systems to improve their attack capabilities, especially for overcoming obstacles. In the wake of the training it received in the past few years, the Jordanian army is for the first time in a position to break

through IDF obstacles in the Jordan Valley and to ferry over considerable numbers of troops which would enable the Jordanians to take and hold positions in the course of an attack.

Saddam and I

Reconnaissance flights by Iraqi pilots over Jordan to the border with Israel point to the fact that crossing into Israel through Jordan may be a preferred option for the Iraqis. If and when this happens, Jordan may willy-nilly find itself at war.

King Husayn is the commander in chief of the army, and this fact has an impact especially at time of war. Upon his return from his meeting with President Bush, the king hinted that all his country's military moves were strictly defensive in nature. "Jordan will not go to war against Israel, but if Israel tries to use Jordanian territory as a springboard to other countries, Jordan will do everything it can to prevent Israeli use of its territory," Royal Palace sources reported to foreign journalists.

Jordan is preparing for war. According to foreign press reports, the Jordanians are passing intelligence information to the Iraqis, such as updated air photographs taken by the Jordanian air force. King Husayn himself provides a direct link to Iraq by frequent telephone conversations with Saddam Husayn in his bunker near Baghdad. An Iraqi liaison officer with the Jordanian general staff handles information to and from the Jordanians.

Difficulties of Iraqi 'Jordanian Option' Explored

*90AE0316A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 24 Aug 90 p 6*

[Article by Brigadier General (res.) Aharon Levran:
"Does Iraq Have a 'Jordanian Option?"]

[Text] When Saddam devoured Kuwait, wild guesses were ventured about his next moves, as though his options were unlimited. According to some, his next target would be Saudi Arabia. Others ventured that he might try to circumvent his dilemma in the Gulf by launching a war on Israel—with missiles and planes and/or by dispatching Iraqi forces to Jordan. There is no penalty for making such wild guesses, particularly if they do not materialize. A more sober assessment—particularly in the present situation—is riskier. But it is always salutary to examine all possibilities, however remote.

The probability of Iraq in its present position introducing its forces into Jordan is slim. This conclusion is based on strategic and operative considerations. Iraq, up to its neck in Kuwait, is confronted by nearly the entire world and threatened by a superpower whose actions may determine Iraq's fate. Strategically, it would be ridiculous for it to open a second front, and against a strong opponent 1,000 kilometers away. Under these circumstances, Saddam would be affording Israel "deluxe" fighting conditions.

There are those who say that in attacking Israel, Saddam would gain the backing of the Arab nations and relieve the pressure he is under. But even if he does take this unlikely step, Saddam would still be saddled with his main problem: the need to fight simultaneously on two fronts, against opponents several times stronger than his previous enemy, Iran. And since it is safe to assume that each of these opponents would be able to route him single-handedly, it would certainly facilitate matters for them to do so in tandem.

The assumption that in the event of an Iraqi war against Israel, Saudi Arabia would find it difficult to allow Americans within its borders has no basis in reality. Certainly not so long as Iraq remains in Kuwait and threatens to realize its traditional goal—hegemony in the Gulf.

The occupation of Kuwait and the danger that Iraq will gain control of the Gulf, perhaps even of the Arab world, is the main problem now preoccupying the world. So long as this is not resolved, any attempt to deflect the issue to other targets will only force Iraq to confront additional dangers, without deflecting the issue of the Gulf. It should be noted that one of the reasons that fanatical Iran lost out in the Gulf War was that it found itself fighting on two fronts: on the battlefield against Iraq and against the U.S. naval quarantine.

Despite its recent conciliatory gesture to Iran, it is doubtful Iraq can be sanguine as long as Iran, though unprepared for war, can stab it in the back, just as Iraq did to Iran when it was embroiled in revolution. This means that Saddam will need to resort to the maximum military force at his disposal. Iraq is aware that neither Jordan nor Syria would welcome Iraqi forces in their respective countries. Jordan's weakness, and the fact that it is subject to conflicting influences, militate against it letting Saddam dispatch forces.

Not to mention that King Hussein, who quite evidently fears that this would provide Israel with an excuse to destroy his country, has made his opposition unequivocally clear. In the present circumstances, Saddam must assume that Syria, his sworn enemy, would be in a position to foil and endanger any Iraqi expeditionary force in its vicinity.

Furthermore, Iraqi forces in Jordan would be liable to get involved in a senseless war and perhaps even serve as "hostages" whose relative weakness and distance from home would be exploited by the United States and other countries to roundly defeat Saddam. Whether all or only some of these moves against Iraq would occur is not as relevant as the fact that as a despot Saddam must fear their lethal consequences.

At the operational level, the deployment of Iraqi forces in Jordan is not a simple matter, even though they have been deployed there in almost all of Israel's wars. For Iraq's expeditionary land force to be effective, it must comprise two corps (eight divisions) and several fighter squadrons.

The question is whether Iraq can afford to do so now, when it has to focus on the American threat from the south and in the air. Iraq's main problem will be the division of its forces and the dilution of its ability.

Iraq has a large army, but for purposes of deployment only a part of it is relevant: the armored and mechanized units and the elite Republican guard corps (15-20 divisions). Iraq's air force is large too, but only a few fighter squadrons participated in the Gulf War. This means that consigning some of the elite regiments and squadrons necessary for a distant expeditionary force at this time, and running the risk of their defeat, would be sheer lunacy. And we haven't even broached the not-so-easy logistic problem involved in deployment such an expeditionary force.

Saddam knows his military power, including its limitations. Despite his overwhelming superiority in military hardware and professionalism, these have not proved decisive in the battlefield. Despite the absence of Iranian air defense, the Iraqi air force (as reported by the United States) was successful in only 20 percent of its missions. Land attacks were foiled in the initial stages of the war ('80-'82) when Iraq tried to conquer Khuzistan. And even in the defensive stage ('82-'88), which was the Iraqi army's forte, there were occasional breakdowns (as in Faw, Mehran and the Kurdistan mountains). True, Iraq's firepower—including chemical warfare—defeated the fanatical but non-professional Iranians who lacked materiel. But there is a world of difference between tackling Iran and getting involved in dispatching forces to Jordan.

End of Jordanian Hashemite Regime Predicted

90AE0358A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 9 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text] Tel Aviv—Developments in Jordan will "sooner or later" bring about "the end" of the Hashemite regime, a very senior source told THE JERUSALEM POST last week.

"I am not saying that Jordan will disappear as a state. But Jordan as a kingdom, as a country ruled by a king [will disappear]," he said.

In the interview, the source added that the United States had already attained the capability to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack, and suggested that the Americans were building an offensive capability.

He noted that Palestinians and Islamic groups in Jordan had attained official positions and that "the mood in the street is irreversible." The regime had partly nurtured it, he said, and it had definitely not tried to stop it.

The trend, he said, had "gained momentum," and would be very difficult to curtail. Under certain circumstances these groups could turn against King Husayn, the source said.

At the moment, however, there is no unrest directed at the king, who is liked by the army.

But should Husayn try to change his policy—close the border with Iraq, and genuinely seem to become pro-American—"he will have a serious [domestic] problem."

The source noted that in last year's demonstrations in southern Jordan against the king some soldiers had joined the demonstrators. "Next time, more soldiers may do so," he said. The Palestinians make up about half the Jordanian army, which is a problem, even though the army's commanders are "more loyal" to the king.

The source noted that King Husayn had taken many risks for Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. Last year, Husayn allowed Iraq to send missiles through 'Aqabah to the Christian forces in Lebanon, even though it meant straining his relations with Syria. When the United States queried him about his action, he lied, saying he was "not involved."

He also risked "unpleasantness" with Israel when he let Iraqi planes, painted in Jordanian colors, carry reconnaissance flights along Israel's border. "At one point it was clear [to him] that we knew about it, and didn't like it, but it was still worth his while," the source continued.

Husayn supports Iraq in the current conflict, and sends emissaries to China to try to convince its authorities that Iraq has a case.

The source predicted that Husayn would continue helping Iraq break the embargo—as long as he can do so "without having to pay a big fine. He won't fight the embargo, or the American ships, as he doesn't want to ruin his relations with the United States or Europe. But he is trying to maneuver while being on the Iraqi side of the field all the time."

Husayn has been helping Iraq because he wants its "backing," the source continued. Husayn fears Syria, forces within his own country, and "to no small extent—Israel." He is afraid that the wave of Soviet immigration will bring one million Jews to the West Bank, driving the Palestinians to the East Bank, and bringing about "the end of the kingdom."

All this does not mean that Husayn will cross the red lines Israel has set on Jordanian-Iraqi cooperation and let Baghdad sent troops into the kingdom, the source said. Israel's sensitivities are clear to Husayn "and will be seriously taken into account."

Turning to the American buildup in the Gulf, the source said he believed the United States already had the forces

necessary to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi invasion—but that it needs more troops to free Kuwait. It would need "a few weeks" to complete these preparations.

The Iraqis have some 10 divisions in Kuwait, including more than 1,000 tanks, he said. "This is quite a massive force and to get it out [of Kuwait] you need a very big force even if you have air superiority." The Americans attained air superiority "long ago," though the Iraqis are still superior on the ground.

The source said that the United States could launch "significant" air attacks on the Iraqis, easily cut off Iraq's supply routes, attain air superiority, and hit military targets in Kuwait and Iraq. However he was not sure they would attack sites where hostages might be held.

The United States may try to control key routes, airports and ports, but is not expected to enter built-up areas or invade Iraq itself.

Asked when all this might happen, the source said: "I don't believe there is an American plan with a D-Day." He said he did not believe they would exercise the military option so quick on the heels of the UN decision to impose an embargo on Iraq. Moreover, the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Helsinki is designed to coordinate additional moves—other than military, he predicted.

But hostilities could break out earlier than expected as result of a provocation, a mistake, or if the Iraqis kill hostages, he said.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis are digging in and laying mines in anticipation of an attack. They did not deploy their Air Force in Kuwait, as distances there are small, but they may have short-range Frog missiles there. Within hours the force could move to attack, he added.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Palestinian State in Exchange for Jordan, Lebanon

90AE0334A Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
21 Aug 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev]

[Text] Iraq started a process that is destined to bring dramatic changes to the Middle East and create a new order that will affect many countries in the region.

In 1916, After WWI and the victory over the Ottoman Empire, the governments of Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement regarding the distribution of areas of influence between them. The agreement stipulated that France was to receive the coastal strip from north of 'Akko to Asia Minor, and Britain was to receive Iraq and an enclave in Israel surrounding Haifa and 'Akko. The agreement also stipulated that the central

part of Israel would be under an international administration, whose nature was to be determined after the war.

Due to Britain's occupations, new facts that did not correspond to the agreement were created, and bitter disputes broke out between France and Britain. Consequently, in 1920, the San Remo Conference was convened to determine areas of influence in the Middle East. The outcome of the San Remo agreements was the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan in 1922. In 1946, Transjordan was declared an independent kingdom, and King Husayn's grandfather was declared its king.

At the end of the twentieth century, Iraq is occupying Kuwait with Jordanian and Palestinian support, the result of which is the probable establishment of a new order that will include a number of unexpected surprises.

The coalition that has formed in the Persian Gulf, which includes the Americans, and Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, is likely, if it emerges with the upper hand from the current crisis, to direct its energies toward other problems in the Middle East.

If this coalition succeeds, the first person who would be liable to pay would be King Husayn, and the cost would be his throne. Jordan is currently operating as an Iraqi agent and satellite, in contrast to the position of its neighbors and friends. It is doing so even though its economy is almost totally dependent on Saudi funds, and its political hinterland has always been Egypt. The current situation, which places Husayn together with Iraq against Syria, Egypt, and Husayn's benefactors, the Americans, is liable to produce second thoughts about the need to continue to maintain the Hashemite Kingdom in its present composition, a composition that does not answer the current needs of the Arab world.

Jordan is not in fact a national or political entity that is different from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Most of its residents are Palestinians who participate in one form or another in the Palestinian people's national struggle for liberation and independence. These Palestinians are not part of the Hashemite house and they have no interest in its continued rule in Jordan.

The force that has formed in the Persian Gulf will likely find a way to satisfy the Saudis, the Syrians, and, perhaps indirectly, the Iraqis, by solving the Palestinian problem in Jordan. Saddam Husayn and 'Arafat will not make the slightest effort to defend the Jordanian king, who is currently supporting them, and Husayn's crocodile tears will not arouse their compassion.

'Arafat, who now enjoys Iraqi backing, is likely to suddenly find himself a candidate for the presidency of a Palestinian Jordan. It seems that Israel, despite its interest in the stability of Husayn's rule, will quietly consent to such an arrangement, which would be accompanied by American political pressure.

The disappearance of the Hashemite house would not produce a serious shock, because the way would then be open to solve the Palestinian problem. Syria would consent to the arrangement in exchange for a quiet understanding of its presence in Lebanon, which would be the second state to pay the price of the success of the combined forces in the Persian Gulf.

Palestine in Exchange for Lebanon

Lebanon has not functioned as a state for many years. The Lebanese president rules only in his palace, and the Lebanese Army operates according to its commanders' interests. The state is teeming with different militias—the Palestinians, Hizballah, Amal, the South Lebanon Army, Syria, and the Israel Defense Forces. The division of Lebanon into areas of interest that would perpetuate, more or less, the current geographic lines separating Israel and Syria would be likely to satisfy the Syrians, who, in exchange, would be willing to reach an agreement on the Golan Heights that would include security arrangements with Israel.

The cost to Egypt would mainly be economic, in return for which Egypt would re-assume its leadership role in the Arab world. Only one superpower is currently active in the world. At this stage, the Soviet Union is not functioning as a superpower. It is allowing the United States to act undisturbed and unopposed. Thus, the Middle East is liable to again come up for discussions—of the kind held in connection with the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the San Remo Conference—in which the United States would determine new areas of influence.

If the Palestinian problem is solved in present-day Jordan, and the legitimate rights of Palestinians are realized, the problem of the residents of the territories and the Arabs of Israel would remain unchanged. The Palestinians living in these areas would be obliged to decide whether to remain in their places of residence or to move to the Palestinian state on the eastern side of the Jordan River. It is reasonable to assume that 'Arafat and the residents of the territories would demand the annexation of the West Bank to Palestinian Jordan, thus raising the problem of Israel's eastern border.

Concessions to Israel

To date, the state of Israel does not have clear, recognized, binding northern and eastern borders. The Camp David agreements determined the international border with Egypt, but Israel's borders with Jordan, Syria, and what remains of Lebanon remained unchanged. The international force is likely to recommend, as stated, the convening of an international conference. In that case, Israel is liable to find itself in a bitter confrontation with the United States and the Arab states over everything related to its borders.

In this confrontation, the U.S. position would be particularly important. The United States would be compelled to take into consideration Israel's position in the current crisis in the Persian Gulf. It would be obliged to pressure

the Palestinians to understand that the new order in the Middle East is also binding on them, and that the establishment of a Palestinian entity in Jordan requires them to make concessions to Israel.

Palestinians who are residents of the state of Israel would be next in line. Their position, as presented by many of their leaders, is liable to cause a deep rend. In particular, it might result in a break with the majority in Israel. The outstanding representative of this position, Knesset Member 'Abd-al-Wahab Darawishah, appeared last Friday on television across from Knesset Member Yosi Sarid, who acknowledged that he "despaired of" Darawishah's remarks.

The Arabs of Israel are liable to become caught up in the wave of nationalism currently sweeping over Palestinians inside and outside the territories. The Arabs of Israel would accordingly require corresponding treatment from the Jewish majority. The word "transfer" would no longer be an ugly word, as it is now, and the main sufferers would be the Arabs of Israel who would bring this trouble upon themselves by their own remarks.

A Change in the Status of the State

The position of the Arabs of Israel is absent from the situation appraisals generated by the different intelligence agencies. No one has deemed it correct to seriously treat their conspicuous support of Iraq. It seems that the political establishment is afflicted with a sort of paralysis regarding all that relates to the Arabs of Israel. The security system, as good as it might be, is no alternative to political thinking.

The Arabs of Israel are liable to cause a surprise when the political current that supports pan-Arabism becomes stronger, and when their demand for recognition becomes stronger, along with a demand to change the state of Israel into a bi-national state, and a willingness to apply to themselves the right of self-determination in places where they constitute a majority of the population, such as in the Galilee and in the Triangle. Therefore, this subject must be treated quickly, before it is raised for discussion at an international conference.

The preceding outlines a scenario. Any attempt to connect it with the discussions and war games now being held is purely a product of the reader's imagination.

IRAQ

Lessons From British Experience in Region

90AE0263A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Aug 90
p 2C

[Article by G. Shomron]

[Text] Four battle ships of the Royal Navy are already cruising the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Oman. The British Government announced that they are prepared to aid in tightening the blockage against Saddam

Husayn. Who knows the region better than the British? They not only ruled over it for decades, they were the last western power that fought in Iraq.

In British military history, Iraq is synonymous with "scorching defeat." In April 1916, 13,000 British and Indian soldiers surrendered to the Turkish Ottoman army in the city of Kut in Iraq. An additional 30,000 soldiers were killed or wounded in an attempt to rescue the besieged in Kut. Then, as now, oil was the reason for the outbreak of battle.

In October 1914, two months after the outbreak of World War I, a British-Indian brigade landed at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab. Its mission was to defend the oil fields of southern Iran, then Persia, because the British Navy, which ruled the waters, had developed a dependency on this oil even in those days.

A year passed. In the meantime, Ottoman Turkey entered an alliance with Germany and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The forgotten brigade in the Abadan-Basra region received orders to consolidate the defense of the oil fields against the Turkish army, which dominated the region. Reinforcements poured in from Europe and India, and the brigade swelled to a group and then a division. Within the framework of strengthening the defense, the rescue corps began to "creep" northward. Basra was easily taken. Seventy kilometers further to the north and in Qorna, too, which is at the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the Union Jack waved. And from there to 'Amara, another 100 kilometers, confronting a hungry and ill-equipped Turkish army, it was really child's play.

At British headquarters in London, someone glanced at the world map and discovered English banners in Mesopotamia. "What is this and who is this?" he asked. The "discovery" of the English presence in Iraq occurred after the British army had absorbed terrible losses in France, and become stuck at the Dardanelles front in Turkey. London needed a quick victory, something to raise morale and damage Turkey's prestige.

"Forward to Baghdad," Major General Charles Townsend was told. "Capture the city of the Arun al-Rashid." The original mission of the defense of the oil fields was pushed aside. Townsend did not like the order. He argued that his force was too small and the supply lines—500 kilometers—were too long. But Townsend was an obedient officer, and after his arguments were rejected, he began to march northward.

Townsend saw the minarets of Baghdad, but he did not reach the Halif's city. On 22 November 1915, at Qatissifun, 25 kilometers south of Baghdad, the Turks succeeded in stopping Townsend's group. The British force, which was comprised of British and Indian troops, retreated to the city of Kut, organized itself for defense, and awaited the rescue force. The rescuers became stuck in the swamps, thousands of soldiers became ill with strange diseases, and the attempts were halted after the number of losses reached 30,000 dead, wounded, and ill.

The situation of the besieged in Kut worsened. Incidentally, Kut is listed in a number of history books on the development of wireless communications: Lacking food, Townsend's troops were forced to slaughter thousands of their horses and draught animals. Many of the besieged were Indian who, for religious reasons refused to touch meat. Townsend, or more correctly, his communications officer, succeeded in establishing a wireless connection with the Hindi religious sages who granted their faithful permission to eat meat—broadcast over the site.

After 143 days of siege, on 29 April 1916, 13,000 soldiers of the group surrendered. The Turks slaughtered the wounded and marched the survivors before the jubilant Arab masses. The legend that the British were undefeatable was shattered. In Britain, members of parliament demanded a thorough investigation. The investigation was not thorough. The force was originally intended only to defend the oil fields and waterways of the Shatt-al-Arab. In order to conquer Baghdad, headquarters would have had to build a mission force at least three times as large and supply the force with equipment appropriate for fighting in the harsh field and climatic conditions of Iraq, which was not done.

Today, after 74 years, thousands of American troops are entrenching themselves in the desert on the border of Kuwait. Their stated mission is to defend the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Their supply line is very long—13,000 kilometers. Not all of their equipment is appropriate for the climate of the region, and the media in the U.S. has already reported operational difficulties of the sophisticated equipment in conditions of dust and heat. To counter Iraq's chemical weapons they are being equipped with protective suits that are more suited to the green fields of a cool Europe.

We have to hope that, in the Pentagon, they occasionally consult history books.

ISRAEL

Arens Searches for Palestinian Leadership

90AE0262A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Aug 90
p 1B

[Article by R. Padhatzor]

[Text] In contrast to Ariel Sharon's cries to immediately expel the intifadah's leadership as a wonder drug to calm the region, the Minister of Defense, as did his predecessor, is insisting on a secret system of what is termed "political discussions" with Palestinian leaders who are residents of the territories. And, like Rabin, Moshe Arens is performing nothing more than a ritual, which certainly will not have an effect on the level of violence in the territories nor on the duration of the intifadah.

Arens probably wants to sincerely advance political processes and cool down the situation in the territories, but the position that he presents to the leaders with

whom he has met attests to the fact that, like his predecessor, he refuses to recognize the processes that influence the formation of the Palestinian leadership.

Arens conducts his discussions with those identified as the political leadership of the West Bank, leaders such as Faisal Husayni and Sari Nusayba, most of whom belong to the "parlor leadership" or the "shawarma leadership," as they have been recently nicknamed. But the gap between them and what has been happening in the region is becoming deeper. Contempt among Palestinians is growing toward the white-collar leadership, "which proclaims a hunger strike in a five-star hotel." And in any case, this leadership, too, to the deep sorrow of the Minister of Defense, explicitly announces that its path is dictated by 'Arafat.

Alongside of the gradual process of the loss of legitimacy of the parlor leadership, the public is growing stronger. The clearer it becomes that the ways of Husayni and his followers are not bringing changes to Israel's obstinate policies, the greater the Shav'av force grows. The more time that passes and the longer the political processes remain stuck, the greater is the esteem for the leaders of the street, whose basis is violence.

The central problem, from the Israeli viewpoint, is that Shav'av has no clear, known core leadership, and the ability of the street leaders to multiply is awesome. With every arrest of an activist, other youth immediately take his place.

From the Shav'av leadership, no clear, standard ideology and political teachings have emanated, but no one belonging to this group is ready to compromise on the final goal—the establishment of an independent, political entity. Some of them speak of existing with the 1967 borders, others of a Palestinian state over all the territory of the Land of Israel.

The influence of the street leaders on the West Bank is still relatively small, but the continued standstill and the increased frustration among the Palestinian population will result in a situation where they will drive out the white-collar leadership and they will be recognized as the only logical alternative to the road being taken by the Israeli government.

In the words of a senior officer, who is well aware of the state of mind of the West Bank residents, that which has characterized the situation on the West Bank is recent months is that there is no intermediate leadership: there is a void between the parlor leadership and the street leadership.

To date, there has been no effort within the security system to cultivate leaders from among the conductors of Shav'av. When one of them is identified, he is put into prison, which has turned into a melting pot that forges them together for the continuation of violent activities after their release.

Next to these two leadership strata, gaining strength is the religious leadership, whose perception is completely different from that of those loyal to the different nationalist trends. Here, Islam is the only legitimate source of power, and the masses have to be returned to it. After the purification of the individual and his repentance, the revolution may begin, and at its conclusion one Islamic nation will arise. The religious leadership, therefore, rejects in principle a particular Arab nation, and hence also the differences of opinion among HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement] and the PLO.

The sober-minded ones among the religious leaders understand that an Islamic revolution can only be achieved in phases. The liberation of Palestine is the first phase, and it, according to them, will be achieved through force, since it is not possible to convince Israel to freely give up Palestine.

The religious leadership is being built on the distress of the population as long as the intifadah continues. The far-reaching social activities that the religious factors are dealing with are making it more powerful. Even the feelings of a standstill and frustration with the political process are to their advantage. Reliable professional elements estimate that one-fourth of the West Bank residents support the Islamic leadership. There is no doubt that, in the long term, this leadership is much more dangerous to Israel than the nationalist leadership.

Despite the developments and changes that have occurred on the local map of leadership on the West Bank, a general policy within the security system has not been formulated for nurturing the local leadership with whom an arrangement may be reached. Adherence to a position that claims that a wedge must be driven between the residents of the territories and the PLO not only lacks a basis for reality, but also attests to the fact that since December 1987, the security establishment has not learned a thing.

Whoever expects salvation from Arens' discussions with the residents of the territories is not reading the map correctly. Only in recognizing the dynamics of the formation of the new generation of leaders on the West Bank, together with the processes occurring there, is there a hidden chance to bring about calm in the territories and, perhaps, also a future arrangement.

General Appointed for Rear Echelon Defense

*90AE0352B Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
22 Aug 90 p 17*

[Article by Shmue'1 Tal]

[Text] The appointment of Major General Ya'aqov Lapidot as defense minister assistant in charge of the rear is a very significant signal pointing to the importance that the defense apparatus attaches to preparing the rear for an emergency situation and to its command in case of war. The signal is primarily a domestic one, and its purpose is to tell the citizens of the State of Israel

that preparing the rear is a high priority and that a high ranking officer has been put in charge of it, an officer with experience as a troop commander in time of war and with demonstrated experience in large-scale organization and administration.

The signal is also meant for the outside, and its purpose there is to reinforce the deterrent factor. Staff exercises carried out by the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] in the past have demonstrated the decisive importance of preparing the rear for emergencies and its command.

Gen. Lapidot, who until recently was head of the Academy for National Defense and was waiting for a rotation, saw himself as a candidate for one of the regional commands. The fact that he accepted to take the rear command shows that he is well aware of the importance of the job, which at present has become more of a national mission.

Gen. Lapidot will now have to study the subject as quickly as possible. He will undoubtedly be assisted by a team of experts versed in the issues of the rear, and will have to carefully select the people who will work with him. The selection will be based on their successes in this area.

Gen. Lapidot will have to study the rear defense plans and update them in keeping with the conditions in the field which will require changes. For that purpose, he will probably have to fight for allocations. The appointment was made at the initiative of the chief of staff and the defense minister, so that Gen. Lapidot is in a position to request a budget to implement the defense plan. His standing as a senior general also allows him to present his plans in the most senior forums.

Gen. Lapidot will bear a heavy responsibility. Until war breaks out he can count on everyone for help, but once there is a war he will be on his own, while the other high ranking officers are busy with their own missions. Whatever has already been prepared within HAGA [Civil Defense] to date and whatever he manages to reinforce represents what he will have at his disposal.

Arens was right to appoint an experienced general for this job. It is a pity that a crisis of this magnitude had to occur to bring about the conclusion that taking care of the rear at time of war may be an important area requiring serious attention.

Anti-Israeli, Anti-Saddam Sentiment in Hebron

*90AE0357A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 7 Sep 90 p 9*

[Article by Jon Immanuel. Hebron residents are more hostile to Israelis than many of their West Bank neighbors, but they are also opposed to Saddam Husayn. Jon Immanuel reports that this is but one of the city's idiosyncracies.]

[Text] No West Bank town has as many supporters of Hamas, the Islamic fundamentalist movement, as Hebron, but it is also a hotbed of support for the radical—and secular—Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

In no other large town will an Israeli reporter be told more often that “we do not speak with the Israeli press,” yet when Hebron residents do speak, they are more likely than residents of other towns to say that Saddam Husayn is a maniac and that the intifadah is not exactly a success.

The people of Hebron are considered conservative. There are no cinemas, alcohol is unavailable except in the neighboring Jewish settlement of Qiryat Arba' and nearly all the women dress in identical traditional Islamic dress.

They are also practical.

This week, medical and educators' associations distributed 10,000 leaflets in mosques and schools, advising Hebron residents what to do in case of chemical attack. The very distribution of these leaflets seems to be a partial indictment of Saddam Husayn, because worshippers can hardly be shown how to avoid being gassed by a dictator 1,000 kilometers away, then told to support him.

The leaflet itself is a model of the Hebronites' conflicting religious and practical way of looking at the world. Underneath a photograph of a face wrapped in a gas mask, is a quotation: “Every nation has a fate and if the time comes there is no way to accelerate or deter its arrival.” Under that is another quotation from the Koran. “Wherever you are, death will reach you even if you hide in a well-defended tower.”

If these are their sentiments, why are Hebronites taking precautions to ward off death? The questions are a kind of apology they make to themselves for the sensible precautions they are taking against the unthinkable.

Their religion is not that of the Islamic Jihad. It is not fanatical. Their lead is being followed quietly in Tulkarm, Jerusalem and Nabulus where imams of mosques and charitable organizations have asked for some of the pamphlets.

They have been distributed so far in the more than 100 mosques in the villages of the Hebron region, which has a population of 260,000. Schoolteachers are planning to give talks in schools. The pamphlets are posted on the walls of Hebron's public buildings.

Only Hebron, through its senior physicians and educators, has officially asked the United Nations to make sure that its residents get gas masks, either by providing them itself or pressuring the Israelis to provide them. If their concern for Hebron residents alone sounds vaguely selfish, considering that the threat is the same for all

West Bank residents, Dr Hafiz 'Abd-al-Nabi' says, “we are responsible only for own area. Others can do the same.”

It is an indication that the much-trumpeted intifadah-inspired sense of Palestinian solidarity which links together towns in the West Bank, and the West Bank with the Gaza Strip, has some way to go.

“We act this way because we have always been a more close-knit community than other towns,” says 'Abd-al-Nabi', who is the senior doctor in the town of 70,000.

Hebron has another reason to be ungrateful to Saddam. Before Iraqi tanks rubbed independent Kuwait off the map, the emirate was in the process of building the West Bank's largest hospital in Hebron. When completed, it would have 304 beds, 54 more than the next-largest Arab hospital, the Gulf-financed Maqasid Hospital in East Jerusalem.

Unlike Jerusalem, which has several hospitals in addition to Maqasid, Hebron has just two hospitals with a total of 120 beds, far fewer than other areas of similar size. The National Hospital, as it is to be called, will be a crucial component in Hebron's health system.

At the moment, 200,000 currently-worthless Kuwaiti dinars earmarked for the hospital (worth \$700,000 before the invasion) are frozen in Kuwaiti banks. Completion of the hospital has now been postponed and 'Abd-al-Nabi', its director, said he will be grateful if at least the maternity wing opens by early next year.

Known as the least progressive town in the West Bank, and outwardly one of the shabbiest, Hebron may also be the richest—at least Hebronites believe it is. Villas have sprouted on the outskirts of town. The grimy rows of shops have been topped recently in many places with two-stories of bright pink stone.

Apart from its well-known glass-making industry, which is in a slump at the moment, Hebron also makes many of the shoes Israelis wear. Produced from Israeli-supplied materials for Israeli companies, the shoes are stamped “Made in Israel” and sold all over the country. It also manufactures the Hebron stone which was much valued by Kuwaiti builders, until the UN embargo put an end to the trade.

The groceries in Hebron are still selling some Israeli goods, such as long-life milk, cleaning fluids, canned tomato paste and washing powder. Many of the Palestinian goods also have Hebrew labels. These products are probably being sold clandestinely in other towns because there are apparently no local substitutes for some goods, but in Hebron they are sold openly.

The “Unified Leadership” has fewer devoted followers here than in any other West Bank town. This was clear when many shop owners began dropping their shutters at 1 pm on Wednesday, the 1,000th day of the intifadah, unaware that the latest leaflet had called for them to remain open. The reason was simple. They had read last

week's Hamas leaflet which made no mention of longer shopping hours to commemorate the milestone.

The Hamas leaflet had also suggested that Palestinians take precautions against chemical attack, thereby breaking the taboo on the subject. Palestinians had chosen to ignore the threat because it would have been too obviously hypocritical to take precautions against the man they support.

Hamas went quite far in its attack on Saddam. Its links with Saudi fundamentalism and its basic abhorrence for secular Iraqi Ba'thism led it to demand the withdrawal of Iraq from "occupied Kuwait," despite its hatred of America. In this way, it went further even than the enlightened Jerusalem notables in a leaflet published three weeks ago, under pressure from Israeli friends.

One thing is clear—the Hamas stand was not meant to impress Israel. On the contrary, it is the PLO stand in support of Iraq which is dictated largely by a desire to impress Israel. Not really believing there will be war, and lacking the responsibility of power, the PLO can dance in the shadow of Saddam and shout at Israel, see how nasty we can be.

One man, who initially said he would not talk to an Israeli journalist, was not out to impress. He admitted: "The intifadah is on the defensive—mainly because Israel has imposed severe economic measures, fines and tax raids on villages." He wryly observed that this year was supposed to be the year in which Palestinians were to win over Israeli public opinion. "Instead, we now have a right-wing government and a Gulf crisis."

He dismissed the strategy of drawing Israeli support, but opposed its violent opposite. "Winning Israeli public opinion is no longer a goal of the Palestinians. The only hope is for a comprehensive solution [to the Gulf crisis and Palestinian problem], otherwise the intifadah will arise more violently than before." He said this was not meant as a threat. It was just the way he, a practical, unromantic Hebron statistician—a man who had also written a book about religion in Israel, quoting many Israeli journalists—saw the situation.

Worst Case Scenario in Gulf Said Justified

90AE0352A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
17 Aug 90 p B1

[Article by Yo'el Marqus]

[Text] I have a rather grim announcement for all those who are worried about the present crisis in Iraq: you're right, there is cause for worry.

First of all, because Iraq—with its military potential and the chemical and nuclear infrastructure capabilities it is developing—is an increasingly serious threat to Israel. Second, because Saddam Husayn has marked us as a specific target in connection with the American involvement. As we learned in 1973, it is better to take seriously

the situation we see in the field and the statements of enemy leaders, than to subordinate those to concepts and interpretations. Saddam has already demonstrated that he does what he says. Third, because we don't know whether the United States will have the courage to stage a military attack against Iraq. Whatever happens, Israel will suffer the consequences of the end of the crisis. A U.S. success will bring new alliances into the area with Arab countries which will be flooded with money and modern armament—hardly an Israeli dream come true. A U.S. failure will deal a blow to Israel.

On the surface everything seems to be happening without us: the United States avoids us like the plague, but we are deeply involved both as one of America's real friends, and as a military and political target. The tension that is developing may ignite the whole area, and there is a danger that we will be dragged into the midst of it even against our will. Anything may happen or not happen, but the odds for war are higher than they were one month ago. And those who were cautious then should be prepared for the worst now and should, perhaps, distribute gas masks too.

There is cause to worry because we are groping in the dark; in fact, we don't really know anything either about America's intentions or about the plans and intentions of the Iraqi ruler. The unknown factors are so numerous that estimates change sometimes three times on the same day. For example: the assumption that Iraqi missiles are not provided with chemical warheads is based on the fact that such a missile was never fired. But how do we know that such missiles don't exist anyway and are reserved for Israel, as Saddam has clearly stated? And are we so certain that in the case of an aircraft attack carrying chemical bombs, none of the airplanes will be able to penetrate Israel's air space?

There is nothing more idiotic than our leaders' statement that Saddam "knows very well" (note the "very well") that he would be ill advised to pick on Israel. What is it he knows so very well? That we will bomb his country? But the consideration that will guide him to go to war with us will not be a military, but a political consideration, and will also have to do with his personal survival. He may take a step against us in order to expand the support he has already won in terms of Arab public opinion to drive a wedge among their leadership, and to isolate the United States.

A "step" does not necessarily mean raining missiles on Israel; it can also be some initiative in Jordan. From this viewpoint, we did play into Iraq's hands to a certain extent when our leaders announced their "red lines." These lines give Iraq the option of playing with us without actually opening war. For example, there was a rumor this week that Jordan and Iraq were about to declare their unification. Would we start a war if this report came true? And would we start a war if Iraq deployed only two companies in Jordan? Or would we engage in war if they only mobilized massive forces at the Jordanian border?

We have reason to worry, as we said, because there are so many unknowns. For example, where does the Palestinians' enthusiasm for Saddam lead? To a Palestinian takeover in Jordan and the overthrow of the king? Will the intifadah resume full force and will it give the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] an excuse to abandon the approach of reasonable, safety-level forces and descend upon the Palestinians with crushing force as the present government would like to?

A specially problematic unknown is Saddam Husayn's brain. There is no intelligence service that can guess how this brain will function under pressure: will he seek a compromise to extricate himself from a tight spot? Will he do something desperate, like an unprovoked attack on U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia? Will he pull out of Kuwait and go into Jordan "at the king's invitation?"

Saddam Husayn's actions depend primarily on the United States. And here we come to the biggest unknown of all: what will the U.S. administration do? One school of thought said that the blockade and the siege and the international pressure will bring Saddam down from the inside. And there is a school of thought—Kissinger, for example—which thinks that if the United States does not deal Iraq a crushing blow very soon, it will lose the momentum and Saddam will be left with Kuwait and the victor's glory.

Experience has shown that western societies have trouble functioning in protracted conflicts. Unity becomes eroded in time, as well as the determination and lasting power at home. A careful examination of recent polls in the United States shows that Bush has support, provided there are no victims and hostages, and provided the price of oil doesn't go up. This is a very thin layer of ice. Only this week we saw how CNN blew up the news of the "first American victim" in Saudi Arabia, killed in a traffic accident. Time will not work for the United States, who is waiting for the walls of Jericho to tumble down by themselves. But time may work for Saddam. He has already had the time to deploy ten elite divisions in Kuwait; those divisions are well entrenched and will make any military land operation difficult.

Hesitation and waiting will weaken the blockade and will give Saddam many options, including attacking us. Military speed and determination—the United States can bring Saddam down to his knees with an air operation that will destroy his entire military infrastructure—can not only eliminate a dangerous and unrestrained ruler, but will lower the threat potential in the entire area, including Israel. As they say, all the options are still open. But in the final analysis, until we know what this tiger called George Bush is made of, we have good reason to worry.

Arms Sales, Strategic Interests Examined

90AE0357B Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST
in English 7 Sep 90 p 5

[The massive U.S. arms sales to its Arab allies are examined by Dore Gold, who raises the question of whether Israel will be as important to the United States after the Gulf crisis is resolved. (Dr Gold is the Director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Project, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies—Tel Aviv University)]

[Text] One of the immediate byproducts of the current Iraq crisis has been a renewed acceleration of American arms sales to the Middle East on a scale that could well be of concern for Israeli security in the 1990's.

Last February, when the administration notified Congress in the annual "Javits List" of its planned arms sales to Saudi Arabia for 1990, mention was made only of possible transfers of light armored vehicles, MLRS artillery support units, Awacs upgrading and a variety of ammunition packages; however no major aircraft sales were proposed at the time though it was recognized that the Saudis aging F-5 fighter fleet would have to be replaced eventually.

However, since the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait, reports have proliferated of new American arms transfers to regional U.S. allies. First, during one of the rounds of negotiations held by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in Saudi Arabian mid-August, there were indications that the United States was prepared for the first time to sell the Saudis its ground-attack version of the F-15, known as the F-15 E. Cheney did not deny these reports. In a press conference held in Kennebunkport on 22 August, he stated "the report that we're going to provide the F-15 E's immediately simply is invalid; *that's the kind of thing we'd work in the longer-term package*" (emphasis added).

Second, the Bush administration decided immediately to break the cap on Saudi Arabia's present-day force of 62 older F-15 air superiority fighters maintained by Congress during the 1980's, by selling 24 F-15 C/D at present and promising an additional 24 aircraft for next year; the new sales would bring the Saudi F-15 air superiority fleet to 110 aircraft by the end of 1991. Later F-15 E sales will enlarge the size of the Saudi F-15 fleet even further. Some 50 shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft launchers were also intended for the Saudis according to administration briefings in Congress. In the past, Congress had attempted to block Stinger sales to the Persian Gulf since 1985.

These massive increases in U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia might have made some sense according to the logic of U.S. arms transfer policies during much of the Cold War period. For the last two decades, in particular, American security assistance to the Middle East was based on a rough division of responsibilities between the United States, on the one hand, and its regional allies, on the other.

While Washington extended its security umbrella to counter the direct Soviet military threat to the area, American local partners armed with U.S. equipment were mainly held responsible for coping with threats emanating from the Middle East itself. The 1980 Carter Doctrine, for example, specifically called for the injection of American military power in the Middle East in cases involving "any attempt by any *outside force* (emphasis added) to gain control of the Persian Gulf region."

President Reagan, in his 1987 National Security Strategy Report, continued this definition of America's primary defense responsibilities as well when he stated "for military contingencies not involving the Soviet Union, however, the United States looks primarily to the nations involved to provide for their own defense." Arms sales, were intended among other things, to enhance the capabilities of local states to cope with regional threats that were not specifically covered by American defense policy.

But with the large-scale U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia against the local Iraqi threat, much of this underlying logic in Middle Eastern arms transfers has been discredited. Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf simply are not in a position to defend themselves adequately against the magnitude of the military threat posed by heavily-populated Arab states to their north like Iraq. The crisis essentially proved that even in regional threat scenarios, deployed American military power may be as much a necessity as it was during the heyday of the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

The current round of arms to Arabia is apparently being executed quickly before a new U.S. security strategy for the Middle East has been fully thought through. What are some of the basic issues that any new strategy will have to resolve? There is certainly the basic question of how the United States and its local Arab allies will divide their responsibilities in containing anti-status quo states like Iraq.

Given the time it takes to deploy forces located in the United States, it makes more sense that the U.S. role in a future scenario entail the utilization of rapidly deployable airpower, while local Arab armies employ heavier ground forces that are already in the Middle East theater. But given the proposed expansion of the Saudi F-15 fleet this does not appear to be the type of thinking found in the Defense Department at this time.

For Israel there is the basic question of how the United States will balance its renewed security ties to Riyadh and Cairo with some sort of revitalized security ties with Jerusalem. Improved U.S. ties with the Arab states have sometimes been interpreted in Israel as automatically necessitating a worsening of U.S.-Israeli relations.

In this context, it is important to recall that during the Reagan years, the United States did not regard its relationships with Israel and the Arab states as an

either-or proposition. This point was most clearly articulated by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage in 1987 when he stated: "it has to be understood that our relationships in the Middle East are not zero-sum games." In his non-zero sum Middle East, "the United States can have congenial, indeed growing and warm relationships with both Israelis and the moderate Arabs."

This still seems to be the basic wisdom motivating U.S. defense relationships with the Middle East under the Bush administration as well. This would explain the reports in early September of large American arms transfers to Israel, including Patriot anti-air/missile batteries, that were estimated by the NEW YORK TIMES to be valued at up to \$1 billion. Even if these reports were somewhat preliminary and some of their details questionable, they indicated a basic American willingness still to fortify Israel along with other U.S. moderate Arab allies.

What is unclear at present is whether these transfers to Israel are seen by the Defense Department just as compensation for arms sales to the Arabs, or as an acknowledgement, that despite its low profile role, Israel will be as critical in the post-crisis containment of Iraq as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. In the past, American policymakers acknowledged Israel's stabilizing role in the Middle East region in deterring initiatives by expansionist radical states.

In order to achieve a non-zero sum Middle East centered on American leadership, the United States, moderate Arabs and Israel will have to exercise certain restraints. Israel will not be able to express its displeasure with every major American arms sales to the American Arab allies: Jerusalem, in fact, has been showing greater selectivity in the last year over arms sales to Saudi Arabia, remaining silent about large weapons transfers to Saudi ground forces, in particular.

The United States, on its part, must not be tempted to cause a new round of the Middle Eastern arms race by introducing new weapons systems in the region like the F-15 E. The projection of American power anyway has been proven to be, far and away, more of a guarantor for the security of the Persian Gulf than all the arms sales in the past to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

On the Arab side, moderate Arab states during the 1980's came to accept U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation as a fact of life. Their remaining sensitivities in this regard ought to take into account that their security can be improved, as well, by the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

In fact, common interests have existed in the past between Israel and Saudi Arabia that were recognized by both parties and quietly discussed. Tacit agreements have been brokered by the United States in cases where their security interests have conflicted. New tacit arrangements between the two may be explored by the

United States in order to make a strategically stable Middle East a realistically achievable goal however the current crisis is resolved.

SAUDI ARABIA

Avibras Rockets Sold to Saudi Arabia

10,000 Rockets Sold

91SM0006A Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 20 Sep 90 p 12

[Article by Roberto Godoy]

[Text] Two days ago in Riyadh, Avibras Aerospace Industry, Inc., of Sao Jose dos Campos, closed a sale of 10,000 rockets to Saudi Arabia. The sale involves the three types of rockets used by the Astros II multiple launcher, a weapons system already being used by the Saudi ground forces.

Negotiations resulting in the \$60 million (Cr\$5.31 billion) [cruzados] contract were handled personally by Avibras president Joao Verdi de Carvalho Leite, and signed by Minister of Defense Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, brother of King Fahd. The terms of the order call for prompt delivery.

The federal government has known about the transaction from the beginning. Actually, Verdi de Carvalho has been discussing a sale estimated to be worth \$480 million for 18 months now. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the sale finalized this week was part of that larger potential transaction.

The Saudi forces are still considering purchasing additional Astros II batteries. The purchase of 318 tanks, mainly EE-T1 Osorio main battle tanks from Specialized Engineers, Inc., (Engesa), was halted by the Riyadh government.

Engineer Verdi de Carvalho left Riyadh on Tuesday night and is now in Europe, specifically London and Paris, where he will formalize the financial details of the transaction. All the rockets involved in the sale are in stock at Avibras' high-security industrial facility at the Santa Branca dam in Jacarei.

The company does not normally keep this large an inventory, but was forced to warehouse a lot originally intended for Iraq—now a sworn enemy of Saudi Arabia—after Baghdad officials failed to pay outstanding bills of \$40 million (Cr\$3.08 billion), although insisting that it wanted to take delivery of new supplies for the Astros II.

Special procedures will be required to ship the Brazilian rockets that were sold to Riyadh. The weapons weigh about 1,800 tons, enough to fill two ships or 20 big Boeing 747 cargo planes. According to Army experts associated with the development of the Astros project, none of the components have been adversely affected by

the fact that the SS-30, SS-40 and SS-60 delivery systems have been kept in Avibras factory warehouses for the past 18 months.

The weapon was designed to be "mothballed," i.e., stored indefinitely, with only simple maintenance done on the warheads and the solid fuel. The same experts said that all the units would be checked over before shipment.

Default

The company refused yesterday to comment on the export of weapons to Saudi Arabia, which was confirmed in the evening by Prince Sultan's spokesman, Colonel Hisham Haum. The news had been circulating unofficially since early morning in Washington, where the Pentagon announced it "knew of" the report.

Avibras Aerospace is operating under a "concordata," and is administering a debt of \$200 million that is mainly the result of Iraq's default and the lag in exchange rates accumulated during the past five years. The organization, which once had 5,500 on its payroll, now employs no more than 550.

The Astros II system is Joao Verdi's brainchild, one that yielded Brazil approximately \$1 billion in exports between 1983 and 1987. The Iraqi Army is its primary user; it used the equipment extensively during the war with Iran, and also in the invasion of Kuwait, although only on secondary positions targeted on the second day of the attack.

Saddam Husayn's forces have 160 launch trailers, and the Ministry of the Military Industry is building its own rockets, copies of the Brazilian models, in order to rearm the batteries. These are composed, basically, of six vehicles—four firing and two reloading units and, sometimes, an electronic command center. A system with this configuration costs \$10 million.

Each trailer (built by Tectran, an Avibras subsidiary) is capable of launching 32 SS-30 rockets (having a 20 kg warhead and a 32 km range), 16 of the SS-40's (35 kg of explosives, 45 km radius), and four SS-60's (which carry 150 kg in the warhead, but can carry multiple subcaliber ammunition; they have a range of 70 km).

The warheads are of three types: armor-piercing, anti-personnel, and incendiary. Between 1983 and 1985, Saudi Arabia bought six batteries (36 vehicles) equipped with sophisticated electronic support resources, including advanced land-based navigators.

Future Sale Negotiated

91SM0006B Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 21 Sep 90 p 8

[Article by Roberto Godoy]

[Text] The contract covering the export to Saudi Arabia of 10,000 new surface-to-surface rockets from Avibras

Aerospace Industry, Inc., of Sao Jose dos Campos, exceeded the company's initial expectations. The firm had hoped to make a \$60 million sale, but closed a deal on Tuesday for \$70 million, which is about Cr\$5.6 billion [cruzados]. Yesterday the company began to ready the materiel, which has been stored at its maximum-security factory in the Santa Branca reserve in the municipality of Jacarei.

The shipment of the supplies for the Astros II launcher, sold to the Saudi forces seven years ago, will require mobilizing two ships or scheduling 20 flights by Boeing 747 jumbo cargo planes. The rockets weigh a total of 1,800 tons.

The SS-30, SS-40, and SS-60 delivery systems, with their armor-piercing, antipersonnel, and incendiary warheads, became available because the Iraqi Government has not paid its international suppliers since 1987. The rockets, which can strike targets located from nine to 70 km away and carry 25 to 150 kg of explosive charge, were supposed to have been sent to Baghdad two years ago.

However, in the face of Iraqi's failure to pay \$40 million in outstanding debt, Avibras decided to cancel delivery of the new orders. The step was taken when two containers had already arrived at the warehouses of the agent, Eudmarco, in the port of Santos, and were awaiting transfer to an Iraqi ship. The Federal Police had to intervene to ensure the release of the equipment.

Yesterday, at the headquarters of Avibras Aerospace, company directors saw the sale—personally negotiated in Riyadh by group president and engineer Joao Verdi de Carvalho Leite—as a significant factor in the recovery of the company, which has been operating under bankruptcy protection since January and managing a debt of \$200 million. An international trade specialist associated with Avibras believes that the remaining package of \$410 million, which has been under discussion for 18 months, may be finalized before the end of the year. It involves Astros II system launch vehicles and command and control cars, besides a shipment of delivery systems with new attack warheads.

AFGHANISTAN

Commentary Views U.S. Policy Changes Toward Afghan Problem

90AS0441A Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 11 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "America's Farewell to Arms"]

[Text] The United States has finally decided to end the last battle of the cold war, which characterised superpower relations for the greater part of the period after the end of World War II. From all available evidence, it seems that the Americans are finally taking Afghanistan off the superpower agenda in a realisation that they can, as a senior Western diplomatic source in Islamabad put it, "back a losing formula just so long."

Three separate but related developments are pointers to what is undoubtedly the most significant shift in America's attitude towards the Afghan resistance and change in Afghan policy since the U.S. became seriously involved 11 years ago. First, in a U-turn of policy on Cambodia, the United States has renounced the resistance it had backed for long, retracted on its position on seating of the Cambodia delegation and virtually accepted the regime in Phnom Penh. This will be done, according to Secretary of State James Baker, through "talks with Vietnam (which had established this regime) and establishing contacts with the Phnom Penh regime." The Cambodia model is quite relevant for Afghanistan since both were seen as Soviet interventions either directly in the case of Afghanistan or indirectly in the case of Cambodia via Vietnam. Although ostensibly the purpose of the U.S. shift on Cambodia is to take the conflict, in Baker's words, "from the theatre of war to the ballot box," an important underpinning of U.S. policy which has relevance for Afghanistan as well is that the Americans are freeing themselves from the "extra baggage" of such resistance leaders as Pol Pot in Cambodia and Gulbadin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan.

Second, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee has recommended that covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1990 be slashed by one-third. This essentially means that from last year's figure of U.S. aid of \$300 million, the figure promised this year will be cut by \$100 million, i.e., the total coming to \$200 million. Last year, apart from the \$300 million in covert aid which the Americans gave to the Afghan mujahideen, an additional amount of \$400 million was given by Saudi Arabia. This is the first such cut in covert American assistance to the mujahideen since May 1979, when the CIA launched its covert action programme in Afghanistan in support of the mujahideen and in co-operation with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.

Third, the U.S. television network, ABC, in a despatch from Moscow on July 24, had announced an impending agreement among the superpowers on Afghanistan

which, according to ABC-TV, would include a simultaneous suspension of arms supplies to both mujahideen and the Kabul regime, a ceasefire and a reduced role for Dr. Najibullah who would retain the presidency, as steps towards elections under United Nations supervision. The agreement was supposed to be announced during a meeting of Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker in Irkutsk, Siberia, on August 1. Although this news report was promptly denied by Baker himself the next day, but the speculation still persists that an agreement between Moscow and Washington on Afghanistan is in the offing.

From the American perspective it makes sense to get on with the other business with Moscow leaving Afghanistan behind as a remnant of the cold war. The chief objective, which the Americans had set before themselves in Afghanistan, namely, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, has long been accomplished. And as the American themselves feel, "Our patience and money won't last indefinitely if all that we see is an Afghan civil war." However, the most important factor in any calculation would be the need for new thinking to adapt to new realities and the changing times. If one set of policies were needed on Afghanistan when the Russians were there, a new set of policies would be required now that they are out of Afghanistan and in any case the situation itself has been overtaken by events. Even the nature of the Afghan conflict has been transformed from a proxy war among superpowers to a festering ideological and sectarian conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The American reversal on Afghanistan follows the change in policy on the same issue on the part of Iran and China, two other close allies of Pakistan, which has already taken place since last year.

Where does all this leave Pakistan's Afghan policy? Pakistan itself has agreed to the phased repatriation of Afghan refugees under United Nations auspices, thereby delinking the humanitarian aspects from the political questions in the Afghan conflict. This Pakistani endorsement of the U.N. repatriation plan, which follows the earlier American support to this project, in a reversal of its last year's policy, has come despite stiff opposition from the Afghan mujahideen leaders based in Pakistan, most of whom have denounced it as a "betrayal and a sell-out." Although Pakistan knows that this repatriation plan accords de facto recognition to the Kabul regime, since it will operate with its logistical assistance, Pakistan is left with no option other than to back it up, since it knows that even the international humanitarian assistance for Afghan refugee is drying up.

While only 100,000 Afghan refugees were said to have returned to their homeland in 1989, U.N. officials are more optimistic this time around. They have set a projected figure of return of 250,000 refugees in the next 90 days and they are already claiming that some 1,200, on an average have been daily returning home on their own. This formal repatriation plan enables each returning refugees to receive an allowance of \$150 per person and dry ration of 300 kg of wheat per family.

Instead of indulging in a futile and in fact inane debate on "who lost Afghanistan," Pakistan's political leadership, both in the government and the opposition, should look inwards at their pursuit of a bankrupt policy rather than blaming others for "betrayal." The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government, which inherited this policy and which faithfully pursued it as well, can only be accused of not reversing this policy or even initiating a new one. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan's Afghan policy has been overtaken by events both in our vicinity and in the broader international domain. Ever since the Russians withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan was marked by a lack of agility and imagination and Islamabad seemed to be fighting the same war and pursuing the same policy which it had done when the Russians were occupying Afghanistan. Finally, new realities have dawned on Afghanistan in the form of new policies and a new ground situation with Pakistan left "carrying the baby" on its own.

Mujahidin Claim Downing of Two Regime Helicopters

90AS0441G Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 14 Aug 90 p 5

[Text] ISLAMABAD (PPI)—Mujahideen attacked communist regime outposts of Puli Khumry, a district of Baghlan province, destroying one post, killing six regime servicemen and capturing a military supply vehicle which was loaded with ammunition, reports MIDIA [MEDIA INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF ISLAMIC AFGHANISTAN].

In retaliatory bombing by the Kabul regime bombers, two farmers were killed in Hokchanar area of the said province and some crops fields were also burnt.

One-hundred and seventy-five regime militiamen defected to the mujahideen in Medicin area of Baghlan province.

Meanwhile, mujahideen shot down two Kabul helicopters, killed 28 soldiers and militiamen, injured 29 other, destroyed four posts along with one tank, one military vehicle and an ammunition depot, when they launched an operation on Ghazni security post.

Three soldiers were also defected to the mujahideen along with their weapons.

In retaliation, Kabul jet fighters bombed residential areas of the said province, as a result, three women and children were martyred, twelve houses were destroyed and twelve stack of reaped corns were burnt. Six mujahids were also killed and 14 others injured during the operation.

In another attack on the 20th division of Puli Khumry district, Talawbarfak sub-district and Kayan's militiamen of Baghlan province, as a result, 240 of Kayan's militiamen defected to the mujahideen along with their weapons. One-hundred and eighty other joined with the

mujahideen of commander Baz Mohammad along with their arms from the 20th division in Talahowbarfak subdistrict.

According to another report mujahideen of Jandullah headquarters attacked Koati Sutara and Qalai Now posts of Paghman district, west of Kabul, killing ten regime servicemen and destroying one P.K-machinegun.

Five soldiers and militiamen were killed and one soldier was arrested along with two Kalashnikov rifles, when mujahideen ambushed in Bitot area of the said district.

Mujahideen also attacked security belt posts of Khurd Kabul district of Kabul province, early last week. As a result, six posts were destroyed two tanks were set ablaze and a number of militiamen and soldiers were killed or injured. Eight mujahids were martyred and ten others also injured, the report added.

A Kabul communist regime's supply caravan which was going from Hairatan post to Kabul, faced with the attack of the mujahideen in Tashqurghan valley of Samangan province, capturing three supply vehicles loaded with food stuff and inflicting a massive human and material losses to the caravan.

Mujahideen also destroyed one vehicle and one transformer, when they attack Mahiper dam in Sorobi district of Kabul province.

Mujahideen in their 24 hour long operation on Jerqdoq village post of Derzab district of Jouzjan province, killed three soldiers, injured five others, a mujahideen source reported. Three Kalashnikov rifles were also captured along with a huge quantity of food stuff. One mujahid was injured in the operation, the source added.

According to another report, mujahideen targeted Qandahar division with heavy machine guns, killing ten Kabul regime officer, 22 soldiers, and destroyed two tanks and one military vehicle.

Rabbani Meets With Russian Delegation To Discuss POW Problem

90AS0441F Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 14 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] The five-member Russian delegation, currently on a visit to Pakistan called on Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jamiat Islami Afghanistan [JIA] and ministry of reconstruction in IIGA [Islamic Interim Government of Pakistan], at JIA offices in Peshawar on Monday morning. The delegation consisted of three mothers and one father of the Russian soldiers missing in Afghanistan. It was headed by Andronov, a journalist and member of the Russian federation's parliament, PPI reported.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mrs. Emilia Zukova presented the message of the families whose sons were missing in Afghanistan. She pleaded for mujahideen's cooperation in providing information about the POWs

and arranging meetings with them. Andronov apologized for asking mercy from mujahideen while the Soviet Union was still helping the Kabul regime to continue killing the innocent people of Afghanistan. He also noted that while the Eastern Europeans had achieved self-determination, the Afghans nation were still denied their inalienable right. "We have committed too many crimes. It is not easy to forget," he added.

Andronov further said that he represented Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian federation and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. Yeltsin was in favour of ending the war in Afghanistan, he said.

Thus, he wanted to stop supply of arms and ammunition from the Russian republic to the Kabul regime, he added.

In reply, Prof. Rabbani sympathised with the families of the missing soldiers and said "we can understand your feelings because we have also lost thousands of our youth." He noted however, that the POWs' problem could only be solved as part of a comprehensive solution of the Afghanistan issue. "We appreciate Yeltsin's position but continuation of the war is a crime. He must exert pressure, the families of the missing soldiers must exert pressure and the Russian people must exert pressure to stop the Soviet Union's interference and aggression in Afghanistan. A comprehensive solution will bring peace of mind and tranquility to all the fathers and mothers, be them Russian or Afghans," he added.

In the meeting of Prof. Rabbani with the delegation, which lasted about an hour, Dr. Najibullah Lafraie, minister of information in IIGA and head of JIA's political office, and Eng. Ayub, deputy minister of reconstruction and head JIA's military committee, were also present.

Hekmatyar Said Ready To Free One Russian POW for 100 Afghans

*90AS0441E Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 13 Aug 90 p 1*

[Text] A five-member Russian delegation, currently on a visit to Peshawar, led by Aiona Andronov called on the chief of Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan [HIA], Engineer Gulbadin Hekmatyar, at the HIA secretariat in Peshawar on Saturday night, reports Afghan News Agency.

Other members of the delegation included three mothers of the prisoners of war Emilia Zukova, Anna Popova, Mariya Dubina and father of one Russian POW Alexy Amelin.

Andronov delivered to Engineer Hekmatyar a message of the Russian president, Yeltsin, the contents of which could not be known.

Engineer Qutbuddin, head of the political committee of HIA, and doctor Ghairat Baheer, director, international relations, were also present on the occasion. Both the sides exchanged views over the release of POWs.

Engineer Gulbadin Hekmatyar as a gesture to the goodwill message of Yeltsin and his personal pressure over the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to stop arms supply to Kabul, proposed the release of one Russian POW for the exchange of 100 Afghans made prisoner either by the Russian army or the puppet Kabul regime. He said he would provide the names of the Russian POWs as well as the Afghans imprisoned during the past 10 years. In reply to the message of Yeltsin, Hekmatyar said it would be for Yeltsin to further take up the matter of POWs exchange both at the level of his country as well as the Kabul regime. He viewed that it would have been more plausible to decide the issue once for all vis-a-vis the Afghan problem.

He stressed upon the Soviet Union to stop the supply of arms to the despicable Kabul regime and let the Afghans decide about their own future. He said even today hundreds of Afghans were killed each day by lethal weapons supplied to the Kabul regime by the Soviet Union.

Talking to women members of the delegation, Hekmatyar said the Afghans who were captured by the Russian and Kabul army too had mothers, sisters and wives, who were waiting for them and extremely worried about their fate. These mothers, he added, had been inquiring from him about the fate of their sons for which he had no reply. The mothers of Russian POWs advocated that their sons were not guilty of the crimes they were arrested for but it was the regime of Kabul and that system which had resulted in such a situation in Afghanistan. They expressed similar sympathies for the Afghan mothers and wished that their sons too should be released.

Engineer Gulbadin Hekmatyar in response to the request of two Russian POWs mothers promised that he would arrange their meeting with their sons at the Pak-Afghan border. The delegation thanked Hekmatyar for his humane attitude and assurances in this regard.

Later, Aiona Andronov told ANA [Afghan News Agency] that he had come to Pakistan to convey Gulbadin Hekmatyar the message of Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russian Federation and President of Russia for the exchange of POWs and the stoppage of Soviet military supplies to Kabul at the soonest possible time. He disclosed that Yeltsin was playing his part best to stop the arms supply to Kabul and considered it immoral to kill Afghan people with Soviet weapons. He said Yeltsin had the intention to stop military supplies to Kabul. He pleaded for the release of one or two Russian POWs as a sign of goodwill gesture which (in his view) would accelerate the resolution of the Afghan problem.

Replying to a question about his meeting with Dr. Najib who is currently in Moscow, Andronov said he did not meet Najib recently but in his previous meetings he had asked Najib to help in the release of Soviet POWs. He complained that Najib had promised him of help but he did not help much. He conceded that he had business

like relations with Dr. Najib over the exchange of POWs and they exchanged some POWs in the past. "But now I am openly and publicly calling to stop Russian supplies to Kabul so you can imagine my relations with Dr. Najib", he replied the questioner.

Replying to a question about the proposal of Engineer Hekmatyar for the release of 100 Afghan mujahideen in exchange of one Russian POW, he said it was a great problem as Hekmatyar told him that several thousand Afghan mujahideen were in the prisons of Kabul regime. He added that this would not resolve the problem and he, on his part, would make all out efforts to persuade the concerned parties in securing the release of all the POWs. He repeated the words of Gulbadin Hekmatyar by saying that the exchange of Soviet POWs which was a part and parcel of the Afghan issue had to be resolved after which the POWs issue would automatically be solved. Aiona Andronov who is a member of the Russian Parliament and vice chairman of the Russian Parliament's Committee for International Relations pledged that he would stop the arms supply to Kabul and solve the POWs problem. He went on to say that he as a representative of Yeltsin would leave no stone unturned to solve the Afghan problem and if things went in the right direction it would be for Hekmatyar and Yeltsin to decide what to do next.

Refugees: Repatriation Problems Discussed

Pakistan Government Help Urged

90AS0442A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 1 Aug 90 p 12

[Text] Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, chief minister of Balochistan, has said that the Afghan refugees' stay in Pakistan has created problems for the people of Pakistan and their repatriation would help in solving these problems and should therefore be welcomed. He has stated that these refugees came in difficult times and it was incumbent upon Pakistan to help them, but hospitality cannot spread over decades.

It is difficult to disagree with Nawab Bugti. Refugees have always been a problem for the host country. In Lebanon, after the influx of Palestinian refugees, the state lost its peace and today stands as a fragmented society divided into Sunni, Shia and Christian communities, all armed and hostile towards one another. In India, the province of Assam witnessed bloodshed when after the emergence of Bangladesh the Assamese population faced the influx of refugees. The situation in Sindh is also the result of unchecked migration of refugees from other countries and provinces. It is a happy development that the Afghan refugees have started going back. But the sad reality is that certain vested interests are creating hurdles in their peaceful return. Though the federal government is in favour of their return, there are indications that it is not in a position to implement its policy on the refugees. It is advisable that the power elite in Islamabad sit together and make decisions in this regard.

The issue for Pakistan is not the conquest of Afghanistan but the security of its provinces against the danger of civil war.

Refugees Said Leaving Despite Leaders' Opposition

90AS0442B Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 1 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by Amanullah]

[Text] Spinboldak (Afghanistan)—A total of 72 families of the Afghan refugees on Tuesday deposited their pass-books in the National Bank, Chaman and Pishin under the repatriation policy.

Rahimuddin Badanzai of Roghani camp and Saadullah Barakzai of Makokach camp in Chaman sector, while talking to this correspondent said they were happy to return to their homeland and were going to the areas under the control of Afghan mujahideen. Badanzai and Barakzai are affiliated to Mujaddadi and Hekmatyar group respectively. When asked why they were going back to Afghanistan while their leaders had rejected repatriation plan, they replied "our leaders do not know that under which condition we are living here. They are only interested in holding big gatherings when they visit refugee camps."

Commenting on the distribution of some pamphlets by some Afghan mujahideen in different camps that mujahideen would not allow refugees to go back to Afghanistan under repatriation policy, both Badanzai and Barakzai said "we are also mujahids and have participated in Jihad, therefore no one can create obstacles in our way."

Badanzai deposited pass books on behalf of 27 families while Barakzai for 21.

Haji Ahmad Khan Achakzai, son of late Haji Maghas, Haji Karim Khan Alizai and Haji Ghulam Haider Khan Achakzai, influential personalities of Achakzai tribe in Kandahar, while talking to this correspondent at Spinboldak, 12 kilometres inside Afghanistan, strongly opposed repatriation and said it meant to surrender before Dr. Najibullah regime and to forget sacrifices of thousands of Afghans for Islamic system and national integration of Afghanistan. "Removal of Khalaqi regime is the aim of our struggle," they said adding that refugees were not taken in confidence on the repatriation policy and that it was injustice to refugees by ignoring them while preparing repatriation policy.

They said that convening a Loya Jirga could alone solve the Afghan issue because throughout Afghan history whenever there was any crisis or dispute among Afghans it was resolved through Loya Jirga. They were of the view that majority of Afghans supported former king Zahir Shah.

They were critical of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's policy and alleged that by supporting Gen. Tanai, he (Hekmatyar) had compromised on the sacrifices of Afghan martyrs.

They denied that Afghan mujahideen were creating obstacles for those refugees returning under repatriation policy. However, they agreed that refugees were returning to their homeland. They said it was seasonal returning and refugees would come back to camps.

Haji Ghulam Farooq Barakzai, a close relative of late Haji Abdul Latif, said that they were not against repatriation policy but amounts being given to refugees was not enough. He said that thousands of Afghan families had already gone without any assistance. He also emphasised for convening Loya Jirga to resolve the Afghan issue.

However, most of the Afghan refugees affiliated with any Afghan mujahideen party were in favour of repatriation and were depositing pass books in Chaman and Pishin banks. Five Afghan refugees families crossed the border on Tuesday.

Mujahidin Leaders Criticize Repatriation Plan

90AS0442C Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 4 Aug 90 p 2

[Text] According to a MIDIA [Media Information Department of Islamic Afghanistan] correspondent in Konar province, a gathering of local mujahideen severely criticised the untimely repatriation programme of Afghan refugees. The meeting which took place in Chauki district of Konar province on 31 July, was attended by a big number of mujahideen. A number of prominent commanders spoke on the occasion. It was the first meeting of its kind ever held in the district.

The local council of mujahideen in Chauk district in a resolution announced that "at a time when the mujahideen continue to fight against the communist regime in Kabul, an Islamic government has not been established and the Russians continue to back the Marxist regime in our country, the merciless killings of our people go on unabated, and hundreds of villages and townships remain heavily mined, the repatriation programme of the Afghan refugees is nothing but a cruel joke with the 12-year long jihad and the martyrdom of over one and a half million Afghans."

The council of mujahideen declared that it was imperative on the mujahideen and the refugees to beware of the evil designs of their enemies and not to be sold out for a sum Rs 3000 [rupees] and a ration of 300 Kgs. The resolution called upon the mujahideen to continue their struggle till the ouster of the puppet regime and establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan. The council consists of the representatives of the six component parties of the Afghan interim government, local notables and mujahideen commanders.

Commentary Sees Law and Order Problems Emerging

90AS0442D Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 4 Aug 90 p 12

[Text] The Soviet Union and the United States have at last announced that they are close to an understanding over the Afghan conflict. Though the media had already speculated that the two superpowers had entered an accord on the issue, U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, denied it and later, on the first day of his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, at the Siberian city of Irkutsk, the latter also denied it. Now both Baker and Shevardnadze have declared that after their discussion on the issue they are close to an understanding over the Afghan settlement.

The announcement is significant because it marks the formal end of the cold war in which the two superpowers have been caught for over three decades. With the superpowers out of the arena, both Cambodia and Afghanistan are supposed to cease as arenas of regional conflict. In Cambodia, it is China that is still supporting Pol Pot, whereas in the case of Afghanistan it is Pakistan which is believed to maintain its support for mujahideen. Both Pol Pot and Mujahideen have a bad press in the West. China may go along with its support for Pol Pot unhurt, because the refugees have not concentrated on its soil. The contradiction between the Pakistan government, which is in favour of the repatriation of Afghan refugees and the mujahideen, who are opposing it, may lead to a law and order situation in the two affected provinces. If the U.S. sincerely wants the resolution of the conflict, it must convince the Pakistani power elite to change its Afghan policy.

Refugees Said Unwilling

90AS0442E Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 5 Aug 90 p 3

[Text] The U.N. repatriation programme was unpleasant news for the Afghan refugees, living in the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] tentage camps. It was received with a chill reaction. MIDIA's [Media Information Department of Islamic Afghanistan] reporter from Torkham border area of Afghanistan, writes that on the first day of the programme, only one family-comprising of parents and one child handed over their ration card for the U.N. one-time cash and wheat, and returned to Afghanistan. Apart from the said family, it claimed from 28 July until now, no family of the Afghan refugees crossed the Torkham border entrance. But the U.N. adhoc officials have registered names of those seasonal returnees who crossed the border in the passed week, possessing no ration cards.

Some foreign journalists and reporters who came to the fixed points to see the repatriation, desperately lumbered toward Peshawar and Islamabad. A Japanese delegation also headed back to Peshawar after a desperate watch at Torkham, on 30 July, MIDAI claimed.

An official of the register of the returnees, Feda Mohammad, told MIDIA's reporter that it seemed that none of the Afghan refugees were willing to repatriate under the present programme: Those who were registered, had no ration cards at all.

Parallel with the inception of the U.N. programme, MIDIA reporter added that the communist regime had resorted to savage bombardment of Samar Khel, Ktarghi, Sarshahi and Surkhrood areas of the besieged city of Jalalabad.

New Pakistan Government Stops Return

*90AS0442F Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 10 Aug 90 p 1*

[Article by Khalid Sultan]

[Text] Islamabad—Repatriation of Afghan refugees has been stopped mainly due to the change of government in the country informed sources told THE FRONTIER POST on Thursday.

It was revealed that the refugees were being repatriated due to anti-Afghan Refugees policy of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government and now they would stay until the situation inside Afghanistan became normal. The refugees were reluctant to go to Afghanistan unless a government acceptable to all Afghan people was established in Afghanistan and that country became a mine-free area, the source disclosed.

On the other hand, the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] sources said that 1,231 Afghan families had left Pakistan till 5 August and they had been provided with assistance of Rs 3,300 [rupees] plus 300 kilograms of wheat.

Some reports reaching here said that distribution of aid among refugees in various camps inside Pakistan had been stopped, which were contradicted by the UNHCR officials in Islamabad.

An insider of the UNHCR said "we have been approached by a number of Afghan refugees, who requested us to offer some assistance." The return of refugees to Afghanistan was totally voluntary the UNHCR official said.

When asked if the initial assistance provided to the repatriating Afghans was insufficient, he admitted the fact and said "we have noticed renewal of economic activities and it is hoped that at a later stage the refugees will be able to cultivate their land and will also be provided with some other ways and means by the U.N.

Returning Families Threatened

*90AS0442G Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 11 Aug 90 p 12*

[Article by Haji Mujtaba. Words in italics as published.]

[Text] Miranshah—A dangerous development in North Waziristan was observed when a group of Afghan muja-

hideen took out a procession on Friday from Manbae-Uloom Madrassa, by Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani and demanded punishment for the repatriating families of the refugees under Islamic law.

The group held a congregation at the graveyard near Match-Factory and in their speeches Maulavi Jalaluddin, Maulavi Azizuddin, Maulavi Rasool, Maulavi Abdul Rahim, Maulavi Noor Mohammad and Epi Dawar said any refugee family which accepted ration and money from the authorities supervising repatriation on voluntary basis, would be treated as agent of Dr. Najib's government and punished accordingly.

The punishment they elaborated, would be under the Islamic law and there would be no discrimination on group basis in this regard. None would perform the *nimaz-i-janaza* of such people, they said.

Haqqani Group Accused of Resisting

*90AS0442H Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 13 Aug 90 p 3*

[Text] Asghar Wazir Ahmadzai, central president, All Tribal Students Union, has alleged that Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani group of Afghan mujahideen in the North Waziristan agency, creating problems in the return of Afghan refugees to their homeland and warned the political authorities that if this group was not stopped from doing so, the tribals would take action against it.

In a press statement on Sunday, issued from the Engineering University, Peshawar, he said that the political authorities of SWA [expansion unknown] had given free hand to the Afghan leaders in the agency area. He alleged that Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and other leaders of Mujahideen were involved in minting money in the name of refugees. He added that the local political administration was fully involved in this practice.

He said that the tribals had always welcomed their Muslim brethren from Afghanistan, during war in Afghanistan. But, he said that now while peace had been restored in that war torn country, there was no specific reason for the stay of Afghans in SWA. He warned the government that if the political authorities did not stop the groups of Afghan Mujahideen from their opposition to the return of refugees, the tribals would take action on their part against the groups of Mujahideen.

Mujahid Commander Terms Repatriation 'Conspiracy'

*90AS0442I Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 13 Aug 90 p 4*

[Text] Islamabad (PPI)—Mohammad Qasim, security commander of ministry of the AIG [Afghan Interim Government] in Torkham region, interviewed recently by MIDIA [Media Information Department of Islamic

Afghanistan], said, "the people of Afghanistan had migrated to Pakistan because of the USSR imposed communist regime there." Therefore, the repatriation of the Afghan Muhajireen was impossible at the moment, where still the communist regime existed. They would not go back till there was an Islamic government, he added.

He said, on the day it was announced that Afghan refugees should return to their homeland, the next day a supervisory delegation of the U.N. had reached Torkham and photographed those who used to go and come every day on the route. They did not have household articles he said and added the aim was to show to the world that it was a kind of humanity. But, he said, it was rather against the human interests.

"Although the U.N. had set up depots and a bank in Landi Kotal and Torkham regions to help the repatriates, the refugees have termed all that as a conspiracy against the Afghan jihad. Those who have gone are busy now in their agricultural activities in the mujahideen's controlled regions and will come back to Pakistan after they have collected their crops," he concluded.

Commentary Critizes Stoppage by Pakistan

90AS0442J Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 13 Aug 90 p 12

[Text] The repatriation of Afghan refugees that started on 28 July has reportedly been stopped and the reason cited for it is the change of government in Islamabad. The report, quoting informed sources, blamed the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government for collaboration with the United Nations to make arrangements for the repatriation of the refugees against their will. Now the Afghan refugees, it is said, can stay back until the situation in Afghanistan is normalised.

So far there is no official denial of the report, which means the U.N. and the PPP government were in agreement on the issues but the establishment opposed it. The U.N. plan was based on voluntary repatriation and the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] has claimed that till 5 August, 1,231 Afghan families had left Pakistan for their homeland. The stoppage of repatriation will have significant repercussions on the politics of Pakistan. The superpowers have already reached an understanding on the Afghan settlement. World opinion is unanimous in favour of a political solution to the conflict. Therefore, the argument that the refugees will not be repatriated until the situation in Afghanistan normalises has no logical or political support. If by normalisation is meant the victory of the mujahideen, then that seems like a distant dream as they have not yet succeeded in capturing a single significant Afghan town. Meanwhile they are busy in infighting. Pakistan's decision will go against the world consensus which may prove economically devastating and politically self-destructive. By stopping the repatriation, Pakistan is losing its rationale for providing refuge to the Afghans; it has been telling the world that it provided

shelter to about three-million refugees on humanitarian basis and has no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. One hopes that Pakistan will not only stop the refugees from going back, but also not allow the mujahideen, who are in its control to do so. Otherwise it will be considered that Pakistan is unwilling to go with the rest of the world, which will certainly isolate it politically, even if it continues to get aid from some quarters.

INDIA

BJP's Changing Attitude Towards Government Viewed

90AS0454A New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi
5 Sep 90 p 10

[Commentary by Harishankar Vyas: "The Changing Stance of BJP"]

[Text] The BJP's [Bharatiya Janata Party] attitude is changing! Lal Karishan Advani forced the prime minister to change the agenda of the all-parties meeting and to have Rajiv Gandhi attend the meeting. At the end of the meeting, when V.P. Singh tried to conclude that the meeting had unanimously agreed to reserve 27 percent of the seats for the backward classes, Mr. Advani said it was wrong and had the statement canceled. Today, during the last hours of the Lok Sabha meeting, he took the government to task for making Hindu festivals government holidays and for not declaring ULFA [United Liberation Front of Assam] a terrorist group. After giving a bitter warning to the government about its minority status in the Loksabha, the BJP leadership's attitude toward the government is changing.

The government wanted to have an all-parties meeting even after the Congress party had rejected the proposal of a five to 10 percent reservation quota. The Congress party had requested in-depth discussions on this issue when it had rejected the proposal on Sunday. The BJP also took this stance on Monday. Lal Karishan Advani met with the prime minister at 1:00 PM on Monday and asked him why he was calling a meeting to discuss the reservation of jobs on an economic status and told him that the BJP was going to boycott the meeting. Advani suggested that the whole proposal should be discussed and since the Congress party is a large one and has a valid reason for boycotting this meeting, the agenda should be comprehensive.

The new agenda was formed because of the BJP leader's firm attitude. P. Upendar was deputed to talk with Rajiv Gandhi. Later, it was decided that the whole issue of reservations should be discussed. During the five hour meeting on Monday the only BJP member to speak was Atal Bihari Bajepai. Lal Karishan Advani remained silent. However, he objected when the prime minister announced that the majority of the people present were in favor of having 27 percent of the seats reserved for the backward classes. He said that no such opinion was

expressed. The leaders of other parties also objected after Advani made this statement. The government could not talk about any unanimous decision as a series of objections ensued.

The truth is that the Congress and the BJP agree on the reservations issue. Both agree on a 50 percent limit to reservations based on economic status. The BJP demand for having Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress party in the all-parties meeting was very inconvenient for the government. The government was hoping to limit the discussion to five to ten percent reservation based on economic status and pass the resolution by acclaim. The BJP and the Congress joined their forces to make this efforts unsuccessful.

On Tuesday, the day after this meeting, Lal Karishan Advani shocked the government by his stand on two issues. The first was Madan Lal Khurana's proposal to make Ramnavmi, Janamash tami, and Shivratri national holidays. Khurana argued that Rama, Karishna, and Shiva are Hindu prophets, therefore, their birthdays should be national holidays. Advani got up after Khurana's proposal and said that he had the text of the answer given on this issue in 1983 by the then home minister Venkataraman. In this answer, it was said that the government had already decided on the policy to have 16 national holidays. These include three national days, 11 religious holidays, and the remaining two are reserved for regional holidays. He continued, "It is a good idea to have a policy. At this time when the whole world is reducing holidays, this limit on our holidays is just right. It appears that the government is changing this policy, so let us add the Hindu religious birthdays to this list! We do not need a national event or a historical place (Advani was hinting about V.P. Singh's announcement about making the prophet Mohammad's birthday a national holiday during his speech on 15 August at the Red Fort). The government can let the people know through a news release." Lal Karishan Advani had ridiculed the government very strongly. The Congress party members listened to it with zeal, and the Janata Dal members remained quiet.

Lal Karishan Advani also criticized the government over the terrorist group ULFA. He asked why didn't the central government declare this group illegal. The BJP leaders were as vocal as the Congress party in criticizing the government for not curbing terrorism. The Congress, the BJP, and the MCP [Marxist Communist Party] jointly declared the government unsuccessful.

It is interesting that after the government acted on the recommendations made by the central commission, the Congress, the BJP, and the MCP have started to agree on every issue. The BJP is not only upset with the government for its decision based on the recommendations of the central commission, but it is angry at it over V.P. Singh's statement about the reservations issue. According to informed sources, the BJP leadership has reached a decision about V.P. Singh's methods. Lal Karishan hinted about this decision when he warned the

government about its minority status in the Lok Sabha. Mr. Advani was very angry that day. He was never before seen so angry from the press box. All of the statements issued by the BJP leaders in various cities over the Ram Janambhumi issue show that the BJP is reconsidering its stand.

Commentary Views, Supports National Security Council

90AS0454B New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi
1 Sep 90 p 6

[Article by Jawahar Kaul: "The National Security Council's Role"]

[Text] According to some people, the National Security Council will be a parallel and a super cabinet. They are concerned that the limitations imposed upon the cabinet and the formation of this group will reduce the authority of the cabinet. The cabinet's work will be interfered into and its decision-making power will be reduced. Some people object to inclusion of non-government personnel in the Security Council as this might jeopardize the secrecy required in defense issues. However, both of these fears have arisen because the critics do not understand the need for and the rules governing national security. Defense is a very complex issue for a country like India because not only is our border very long, but also there are pressures because we are a democratic nation. In a despotic government such pressures can be avoided for a long time as the citizens in such a government do not have the opportunity to contact or be influenced by outside people. The government does not have to explain its military spendings to the people even when a military build-up occurs at the cost of developmental work in the country. The smaller nations have limited resources and they are forced to use some bigger nation as a "defense umbrella."

There are four important ingredients to defense. The most important of these is a strong army. Because of the increased use of modern technology, a war means a clash of the latest weapons. The army is still an important branch, however, the air force and the navy are playing much more important roles now. New weapons are introduced into the three branches almost daily and they have to work together now. Actually, no branch has a monopoly on one specific kind of weapon anymore. For example, satellite weapons are used by all three branches. The navy is considering the concept of land and water and is active on land, water, and air.

The second ingredient of defense is acquisition of war technology. A country has two options to obtain this. One way is to buy it from other countries, the other is to develop it at home. The dangers of buying weapons from other countries are common knowledge. Only nations that belong to one or the other power bloc and help serve their interests can depend on getting weapons this way. Pakistan is an example of such an arrangement. In the beginning, because of its being under the influence of the

United States, it paid the price of getting weapon technology by losing its own identity and democratic values. It is expected that the countries surrounding such a nation become the center of superpower clashes. Such countries usually are controlled by despotic rulers. The latest example of this is Iraq.

It is important to have advanced technology available in order to develop weapon technology at home. There are many aspects to scientific research. Some of this research can be greatly beneficial for daily use as well as for defense. We can decide what kind of technology to use in defense after looking at our own country's industrial development. For example, the United States could not have been able to either expand its weapon technology or bear the expenses for so long, if it did not have a powerful industry sector. The Soviet Union, on the contrary was only partially successful in its industrial and economic development efforts. It was successful in developing weapon technology because of its specific government system, however, it could not afford the expenses for long.

The third ingredient is timely control of any danger to the nation's safety and security. It is not enough just to be aware of the military activities of a neighboring nation that has aspirations to harm us. It is also important that we study all the activities in the countries around us and analyze what affect a specific activity in any country might have on our defense in the future. It is important to understand that security is important not only to our borders, but also to our political and national interests as well as trade routes. The superpowers have built powerful navies that have the far-reaching effect of protecting their sea trade and blocking other nations trade routes when the need arises. The present embargo of Iraq is a good example of this strategy.

This is possible only if we consistently observe international politics and keep abreast of other countries' economic and social developments. It is crucial that we do not consider our borders the sphere of our defense activities. Instead, we must plan for all possible dangers that might make problems for us in the future.

The last ingredient is our own internal social and political situation. A nation can be proactively aware of its own defense only when its citizens have a strong desire to protect their interests and being. Because of our democratic system of government, we can neither suppress the freedom of expression nor can we protect our people from the influence of developments all over the world. Present day diplomacy is not limited to what is done through the embassies; many other innocent-looking strategies are also used. These are used to weaken the people's resolutions, to develop social problems among them, and to make sure that they are not able to face an outside danger as a united country.

It is obvious that a country has to utilize talents in every sphere to meet these demands of national security. It is true that the central cabinet can consider all these aspects

and make the required decisions. However, the central cabinet has a lengthy agenda for running the government, and it does not have enough time left to give its full attention to security issues. It is important to collect all data related to military, politics, government, and law, and then have it analyzed by experts in each area. The government personnel have limited knowledge in these areas. It is imperative that we use experts in industrial and international political areas as advisers. Let us use the smuggling on our borders as an example. The agencies responsible for stopping smuggling and the border patrol forces work actively to stop it. However, they do not necessarily have the expertise on terrorism and the foreign agents connected with terrorism that are related to smuggling activities.

Some organizations devote their activities for future developments. For example, we have not formed any policy related to the Himalayas mostly because we did not take care of the events occurring in and around the Himalayas in a timely manner. We accepted Chinese rule over Tibet because of the political situation at that time, however, we did not think about its long-term effects. The Chinese aggression in the Northeast, Pakistani intrusion in Laddakh in Kashmir, and the resent fear of Nepal's leaning toward China have all resulted from the lack of a policy. Pakistan and some Islamic countries' efforts to form an alliance in the name of Islam is also the result of a chain of incidents that took place over a long time.

The Central Government finally accepted this fact that India cannot defend itself if it does not get involve in the events happening around the world when it announced the establishment of the National Security Council. It has also been accepted that other nations might be behind some of the events occurring in our country as some nation in the world do not like the progress India has made because of its size and capabilities. We were not capable of developing our armed forces on our own after independence. We had to depend on other countries for weapons and strategy during the cold war between the superpowers. However, we are at a point where we can gradually be self-reliant in military and industrial areas and ready to increase the sphere of our influence.

It is not true that the involvement of non-government experts will cause leaks in defense intelligence. The National Security Council is neither a military organization nor an intelligence agency. It is a special advisory committee which will consider various issue and advise the government according to the situation. Any secrets connected with a specific military action or weapon technology will not come under its sphere. There already are many organizations that study defense. One of these is the Delhi Institution which studies and researches defense issues. The only difference is that the National Security Council will gather information on all aspects and help develop a comprehensive policy.

Deterioration, Low Standard of Education in Tamil Nadu Examined

Editorial on 'Deplorable' State, Role of English

90AS0416A Madras *DINAMANI* in Tamil
27 Aug 90 p 6

[Editorial: "The Quality of Education"]

[Text] Several panelists at a seminar held in Madras two days ago expressed concern over the worsening standard of university-level education in Tamil Nadu. Their concern also centered on the fact that year after year fewer and fewer students from Tamil Nadu are selected into the all India services such as the IAS [Indian Administrative Service] and the IPS [Indian Police Service].

This concern which has been growing over two decades is wholly justified.

Two suggestions are being made, namely, (1) restructuring the university syllabus to serve the needs of today's scientific and technological advancements and (2) changing today's system of grading students. Both are laudable suggestions. The University Grants Commission should examine them closely and take appropriate action.

Educational experts point out that today's educational setup and the favorable treatment the central and state governments provide to certain segments of society give room to the evaluation of average students on par with bright students. No one will oppose measures to improve the lot of mediocre students. But we should not let that cause frustration among the superior students. A sense of despair that "we will not be dealt what we deserve despite our hard work and our skills" has been gaining ground among the superior students of Tamil Nadu. This hopelessness and frustration are the two main reasons why Tamil Nadu students are obtaining low ranks in selections for the all India services.

Generally, the best from among the students do not show much interest in such all India services such as IAS and IPS. Among the many reasons for this lack of interest are: insufficient remuneration, the political interferences the selectees are subject to, the system of reservation of jobs (to help the less advanced communities), the more attractive salaries superior students can obtain in the private sector and the enormous potential they have for getting good jobs in foreign countries including the United States.

It was said that a new national education policy would be announced and implemented by the National Front Government as soon as it took office. This new policy may be expected to take into account the declining standard of university-level education and find ways and means to implement the code of "the best jobs for the most skilled."

Proficiency in languages has hit the bottom over the years. We have been hearing the cry "down with

English" and yet another "down with Hindi." Proficiency in English has come down to regrettable levels in Tamil Nadu.

It is an irrefutable fact that, as it stands now, proficiency in English and the quality of education are interrelated. Also, regional languages including the ancient Tamil should be allowed to flourish. Toward this objective, steps must be taken in an unbiased and realistic manner in all areas of endeavor, educational and administrative. It may take several years for these measures to bear fruit and for the emergence of one Indian language as the national link language.

In the interim, English must continue to play its role in the educational system in Tamil Nadu. Only then can Tamil Nadu recover its former preeminent place in the field of education.

Tamil Nadu's chief minister, Karunanithi, said at a function in Madras last Saturday that Jawaharlal Nehru's pledge to continue English as an administrative language as long as the people of non-Hindi speaking states so desire should be incorporated in the nation's Constitution. The general secretary of AIADMK [All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam], Jayalalitha, has noted that the resolution which the chief ministers of some north Indian states passed recently vowing to "banish English" is more dangerous than separatist tendencies. The people of Tamil Nadu concur with both statements.

With the help of the Government of India, the Tamil Nadu government should take prompt and suitable measures to raise its standard of education at the university level and restore the people of Tamil Nadu to their lofty past in the field of education.

Nonaccredited Teachers' Training Condemned

90AS0416B Madras *DINAMANI* in Tamil
27 Aug 90 p 4

[News essay by Pon Dhanasekaran: "'Bogus' Teachers' Training Colleges"]

[Text] Despite an insistence that the quality of education be raised and the standard of teacher training be enhanced, one sees a swarm of new nonaccredited teachers' training schools in Tamil Nadu. These schools are commercializing education with the sole aim of profiteering from students—men and women. These privately owned schools operate under the cover of minority-run educational institutions.

There is keen competition among students to join teachers' training schools. Taking advantage of this, teachers' training schools are popping up all over Tamil Nadu without accreditation from the government. Unmindful of the consequences of their actions, students join these schools with the false hope that they can somehow complete teacher-training and get into the job market.

These teachers' training schools do not have even minimum facilities to train teachers. Some schools may just have their sign boards hanging, but there will be no other sign of any teacher-training on the premises. Such schools abound in South and North Arcot Districts, though you see them all over Tamil Nadu.

Commercializing Education

Money is the sole consideration for the admission of students in these schools—not their qualifications. Some schools commit daylight robbery in admitting students towards the close of the academic year, monetary gain being the only motive.

One may wonder why students join these nonaccredited teachers' training schools with so much faith in them. The truth lies in the capacity of the schools' administrators to convince the students and their parents and then fleece them. Although the Directorate of Public Education is ready to accredit new institutions that conform to government regulations, many schools do not seem to care. When students are ready to place their trust in the sign boards and stand in line to pay money, why would these administrators bother with the quality of education or the standard of the training?

The Real Snag

It is only when the examinations approach that these students begin to realize their predicament. Even at that stage, the school administration makes the students believe it will move the courts to have them write their exams. This will provide an additional excuse to continue the pillage.

The administrators of these unaccredited teachers' training schools approach the courts seeking a ruling to let the students sit for their exams taking into consideration the latter's predicament. And the courts invariably rule, permitting the students to take their exams on compassionate grounds. The administrators approach the courts again, this time demanding that the exam results be published. The courts will order the publication of the results after obtaining an undertaking from the administrators that "they will not continue to run the schools without getting accreditation." Do the administrators abandon their commercialization of education at least at this stage? No. The following year, they will list the school at another location in the name of their wives or other relatives and continue their trade with no hesitation whatsoever.

Sometimes, when seeking court orders to permit their students to take their exams, the school administrators do not provide details about their students. They do not, because they do not have even a few students in the school at that point. As soon as they get the court order, they will use it to recruit students telling them, "you can participate in the current exam; it's an opportunity you wouldn't want to miss," thus making money even at this stage.

Seeking the Courts

In 1988, 106 nonaccredited teachers' training schools obtained court orders to have their students write exams. In 1989, 71 schools resorted to the same tactic. This year (1990) again, 37 unaccredited schools have obtained rulings from the Madras High Court in favor of their students. It must also be noted that the high court has rebuffed more than 50 of these schools this year.

Although most of the nonaccredited teachers' training schools are run by members of minority communities, it cannot be denied that minority communities also run schools with government accreditation; and, they run them quite well.

Decreasing Job Opportunities

Up to 1984, teacher-training was introduced in the curriculum of 540 High Schools in Tamil Nadu as part of vocational education. Some 4,000 middle school teachers are trained every year in Tamil Nadu. Ninety seven schools geared to the training of middle school teachers turn out some 4,000 of such teachers every year in Tamil Nadu. High Schools turn out some 13,000 teachers annually. Today some 30,000 newly trained teachers are unemployed. Adding to this the number of teachers who will be graduating this year, the unemployed teachers' list may go well over 45,000. The annual need for middle school teachers is only 4,000.

Government Warning

As a result, even last year, high schools stopped admitting women students to their first year teacher-training classes. There is no further admission of women teacher trainees in Plus Two classes. But because of the keen interest students are showing in teacher training, there is a likelihood of more nonaccredited schools popping up. Despite governmental warnings from time to time, students do seek admission into these nonaccredited schools.

The director of public instruction in Tamil Nadu has cautioned the public through the media that students of accredited teacher training schools alone will be allowed to graduate and that students joining nonaccredited schools will do so at their risk and will not be allowed to graduate.

Teacher training schools are in existence for the specific purpose of training personnel to teach children of impressionable age. Teachers without enough or proper training should not be allowed to teach the helpless, mentally un-awakened children, yet in their formative years. Teachers may have passed their training exams, true. But that alone is not enough.

The Director of Public Instruction has also pointed out a ruling of the High Court that it is indispensable that a teacher be trained for a specific period of time in a

proper teacher-training school with required facilities before he or she is allowed to pursue a proper teaching career.

Declining Standard of Education

The quality of teachers trained in nonaccredited schools is doubtful. Under the old SSLC [expansion unknown] (11th grade) examination system, only those who scored 50 percent marks could qualify for teacher training. Now, those who pass Plus Two (a revised precollegiate discipline equivalent to 12th Grade) can qualify for teacher-training without a minimum requirement of marks. One needs to secure only 35 percent of the marks to pass Plus Two and they can automatically qualify for teacher-training.

Students are admitted into government schools solely on the basis of their grades. One who has scored 60 or 70 percent of the marks often finds it difficult to get admission into government-run teachers' training schools because of the lack of seats. But someone with just a Plus Two qualification is able to bribe and get admitted in a private nonaccredited teachers' training school. Besides, according to regulations, government teacher-training schools can admit only 40 students per class. But many private nonaccredited schools disregard this rule and admit any number of students—money being the only criterion. A school in South Arcot District admitted more than 100 students. Certainly, a trainee cannot get the best training in such an overcrowded school.

This belief is further strengthened by the low percentage of students graduating from these nonaccredited teacher-training schools. Only 30 percent of the students come out successful in their exams. How can one expect these students with insufficient training to excel as teachers?

Firm Action Needed

It is hard to imagine the future of the poor grade of students molded by these teachers—themselves products of teacher-training schools of dubious standards. Merely cautioning the public against these substandard schools will not produce the desired results. More than anything else, the government should take action against administrators of schools who fleece the public, thereby putting an end to the improprieties committed by these institutions.

In an attempt to stem the proliferation of these nonaccredited teachers' training schools, a recommendation was made to the Government to raise the minimum qualification based on marks for admission into these schools. No definite decisions have yet been taken.

Meanwhile, the Government has recently directed the creation of a Teacher Education Research and Training Program in order to raise the standard of teacher-training. The Government hopes that this program will help create a community of highly skilled teachers and

also attract students keenly interested in teacher-training and accord them the best training possible.

Unless and until the Government takes firm action to stop the operation of nonaccredited teacher-training schools, any hope of raising the quality of education in Tamil Nadu will be nothing more than a dream.

IRAN

Agricultural Production Steadily Declining

90AS0464N London KEYHAN in Persian 13 Sep 90 p 4

[Text] While to respond to the public's need for food during 1357 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] the Commerce Ministry and other responsible organizations imported only 730,000 tons of wheat from abroad, the level of imports for this critical staple during the past year surpassed five million tons. Thus, it is evident that the Islamic regime of Tehran has rapidly ascended the path of dependence on foreign economic and agricultural sources at a rapid pace. Iranian agricultural experts are of the opinion that, in case the present trend continues—especially the expansion of urbanization, the population explosion, the continuous devastation of villages and destruction of agriculture—the Islamic Republic will be forced to spend a large part of the foreign exchange earnings from the sale of petroleum on the purchase and import of various foodstuff such as grains, cereals, sugar, vegetable oil seeds, and other agricultural and dairy products.

The economic bankruptcy of the country, in general, and the devastation of agriculture and animal husbandry, in particular, have reached such a dimension that debates have even begun in the Islamic Consultative Majles and many of the deputies of this Majles have been criticizing the regime and its wrong policies. Some time ago 'Ali Akbar Taha'i, the deputy from Ramsar and Tonekabon in the Islamic Consultative Majles, presented these statistics which indicate that Iran's wheat imports in 1357 did not go beyond 730,000 tons and addressing the other deputies said: "These imports during 1366 [21 March 1987-20 March 1988] reached 4,880,000 tons." He also added: "Corn imports during 1357 mounted to nearly 380,000 tons which, compared to the year 1366, there has been an increase of 986,000 tons."

Destruction of Forests and Pastures in Northern Regions

The deputy from Ramsar, in another part of his remarks, pointed out the deplorable state of forests in the northern part of the country and said: "The Neopan line of Chuka manufacturing plant has been idle for the past several months due to shortages of wood." Addressing the leadership of the Islamic regime, he said: "You presented the statistics that 1.5 million hectares of natural resources in the north have been destroyed and over one million hectares of pastures are being devastated."

In continuation of his speech, this deputy stated that the harvest of vegetable oil seeds in Mazandaran is still below the level of the previous regime. While expressing his regrets concerning this situation, he added: "Compared to the past, the situation of cotton has deteriorated." He then referred to the statistics put out by the International Agricultural Organization (FAO) and announced that, based on these statistics, the Islamic Republic's achievements concerning the production of barley and wheat has been even lower than the standard for developing countries.

The Tehran daily KEYHAN recently published a report and noted that indicators for the production of foodstuff in Iran point to a rapidly declining trend in the production of critical foodstuff. It was stated that the level of decline has been in absolute terms as well as in relation to the rapid population growth. Statistical evaluations show that, while the national rice production during 1366 was about 1.8 million tons, the level of production in 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989] had actually declined and the production level dropped to 1.4 million tons. A comparison of these figures indicates a 21 percent decline in production. It has been stated in the statistical report concerning the agricultural production that production of potatoes, which had amounted to 2.3 million tons during 1366, was drastically reduced to 1.4 million tons in the following year. This shows a 39 percent decline in production. Apparently, the production of onion did not fare any better and from 920,000 tons in 1366 it dropped to less than 610,000 tons in 1367. This newspaper's correspondent, in a part of his analytical article concerning the agricultural ills and failure of the regime's policies, in this regard writes: "Wheat, as an indicator in the list of critical foodstuff, also suffered the same fate. Statistics show that production of this staple, estimated to have reached 7.6 million tons in 1366, did not surpass 7.2 million tons in 1367."

Continuous Decline in Food Production

Experience and analysis of Iran's agricultural production statistics for the years 1366 and 1367 indicate that the production level of other foodstuff—such as cereals, beat, and sugar cane—also dropped in the period of these two years.

While the production of cereals, beat, and sugar cane during 1366 reached 340,000 tons, 4.4 million tons, and 1.5 million tons respectively, these levels in 1367 dropped to less than 230,000 tons, 3.7 million tons, and 1.1 million tons.

Reports from Tehran indicate that the agricultural policies of the regime's officials have not been effective in any of the desired areas and, thus, they resulted in the government's adding fuel to the fire of high prices—in addition to previous shortages of meat, rice, wheat, and other essential staples—by taking away the controls on the supply of foodstuff with the excuse that some importers pay for their imports with foreign exchange currency obtained at high prices. Presently, there has

been a five to seven rial increase in the price of bread. The framework for the supply of meat and poultry is still limited and lamb meat in the free market is being sold at 350 toman per kilogram.

A while ago Farajollah Afrazideh, the deputy from Noshahr in the Islamic Consultative Majles, harshly attacked the agricultural policies of the regime and said: "We have imported the highest amount of wheat from abroad during the year 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990]. If the agricultural land in Khuzestan had been developed, not only could we reach self-sufficiency, but we could also export wheat." This deputy added: "Due to falling production, the price of potatoes reached 60 tomans per kilo during the past year. This year, with increased production, farmers can not gain more than five tomans per kilo—while they have to purchase the seed at 60 tomans per kilo—the consequences of which will again appear during the next year."

In a part of his remarks, Farajollah Afrazideh harshly criticized the policies of the Agricultural Ministry and said: "Thousands of hectares of prime rice growing land in Mazandaran have been sold to the vacation seekers from other parts of the country and turned into villas." He added: "If the present situation is allowed to continue, God knows what will become of the situation in regard to rice in Iran."

PAKISTAN

Election Issues Analyzed, 'Credible' Poll Urged

90AS0444E Lahore THE NATION in English
19 Aug 90 p 6

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "Pointers to a Bumpy Political Path"]

[Text] Most analysts of Pakistan's politics have viewed political developments in the last couple of decades as being uncertain, unstable and unpredictable. There is, for instance, the increasingly shortened political span of Pakistani Prime Ministers. Mr. Zulfikar Alai Bhutto spent 66 months in office, Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo 28 months and Ms. Benazir Bhutto 20 months. This uncertainty is best exemplified by the four different people who have been performing the official flag-hoisting ceremony on Independence Day on August 14 in the last four years. Mr. Junejo did it on August 14, 1987, General Zia took over on August 14, 1988, Ms. Benazir Bhutto performed the honours on August 14, 1989 and this time around, it was the turn of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

A couple of weeks after August 6, the dust is settling on the political situation with the political forces taking stock of the evolving scenario and gearing up for what promises to be a rerun of the previously hard-fought electoral campaign. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] has now recovered from the initial shock of the August 6 action and it is trying to forge a strategy which is still

apparently confused but is basing itself on three planks. First, a sort of "we did no wrong" assertion of the 20 months tenure, delinking the President, the Army and America from any point of attack while singling out Military Intelligence as the cause of its ouster from office. However, Benazir's desire to equate her ouster with that of Junejo's, treating both as undermining civilian rule, is somewhat strange now given that she had applauded General Zia's dissolution decision of May 28, 1988 since he had also announced elections within 90 days.

For the moment, the bigger problem is now with those parties that constituted the COP [Combined Opposition Parties]. Those who have been left out of the caretaker government are miffed, since they feel they have been deprived of their "rightful share." It is clear that the key components of the Federal Caretaker Government are those who do not have strong party affiliations, particularly with the Muslim League. Despite some initial sparring and other complaints, a broad-based anti-PPP alliance will be garnered together well in time for the polls so that the electoral contest sees the PPP in a direct face-off with the one alliance candidate, similar to the strategy pursued by V. P. Singh against the Congress in the last Indian elections.

In his statement, after the August 6 action, General Aslam Beg has made two important, and interesting observations which provide some insight into the military's thinking on political issues. He has said during his August 14 meeting with newsmen that the real purpose of the Army's seeking power in Sindh under Article 245 of the Constitution was not to have a crackdown in that troubled province but "we were actually trying to make the previous government start the process of dialogue under the cover of this demand." Now that, according to the army Chief, dialogue had begun in Sindh, under the auspices of the caretaker government, the Army, in his words, "would be withdrawn within a few weeks." The other interesting aspect of General Beg's comments pertained to the future, when he hinted that the Army was not interested in blocking PPP's return to power. He said: "The Armed Forces are neither opposed to nor afraid of any political party or personality. Therefore, whoever gets a majority in the next elections and comes into power will be welcomed." He, however, added "we will never compromise on principles," a codeword for political forces to abide by the "rules of the game" in Pakistan's power structure in which the Army remains a key political player.

In the rerun to the elections on October 24, the Federal Caretaker Government will have to face three crucial tests, which alone can provide the basis for a clean, fair and free and peaceful election, which is its primary responsibility.

First, sustaining a genuinely democratic political environment leading up to the polls. In this regard, a crucial responsibility rests on Syeda Abida Hussain, an

acknowledged political heavyweight and an accomplished grassroots politician. As "manager" of the official electronic and print media, she would be well-advised to continue the one positive legacy of the PPP Government, i.e., free Press which is a guarantee for political openness. Indeed, this Press freedom was also central to the success of the COP campaign against the corruption of the previous government. In the PPP government, much of the responsibility for the creation of a free political ambience can be credited to Aitzaz Ahsan, who was Pakistan's foremost civil libertarian lawyer before becoming Interior Minister. He initiated the crucial passport reform which abolished the requirement for endorsements, an unnecessary irritant which hindered the freedom of movement of Pakistanis. Together with this, no arrests were made on political grounds, and Aitzaz Ahsan also contributed to the removal of names of politicians from the once-dreaded Exit Control List as well as in the release of political prisoners. These are vital ingredients of any democratic society and these should be preserved and promoted by the caretaker government as well.

The other aspect which will be a test for the caretaker government is the situation in Sindh, which was the catalyst for the fall of Benazir Bhutto. Success in this area would require defusing the ethnic tension, a political dialogue among the political forces there and a violence-free poll.

The third test would be an agreement on a Prime Ministerial candidate representing the anti-PPP alliance, prior to the holding of elections. Notwithstanding, the "Prime Ministerial looks" being exuded by several political figures, from the anti-PPP coalition there would be four serious candidates for the top slot, namely, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mohammad Khan Junejo, Nawaz Sharif and Akbar Bugti. With rare exceptions, Prime Ministers in Pakistan have been chosen for their being amenable to the Establishment, their ability to forge a political consensus around various factions of the political forces or to redress imbalances in the power structure, which give rise to a sense of deprivation among those sections and regions of Pakistan that are not represented in it. The important thing in the present situation, which should be a plus for the holding of elections on schedule, is the confidence on either side of the political divide that they can win. This confidence should contribute to generating the right political mood for elections which are both free and open with no politician being debarred. Only a credible poll with all political forces and politicians participating can help in moving the democratic political process forward.

Political Accountability, Related Questions Examined

Editorial Says 'Voter Knows Better'

90AS0436A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
11 Aug 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Whom Are They Kidding?"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] If the very mention of the word 'accountability' by the caretaker prime minister has led to a frenzied uproar

from various quarters, that is understandable. However, the issue has been treated primarily with reference to our earlier experiences in this regard when the supposed process of cleaning the political stable has in fact been employed to both justify delay in holding of elections and to disqualify 'undesirable elements' of the time from contesting polls. The apprehensions in this connection are as valid today, if not more, as they were in all similar situations in the past, especially when a team of partisan and, by and large discredited individuals, is supposed to reside over the supposedly impartial process of accountability. But the basic question which nobody seems willing to raise is regarding why it is that the corrupt doings of the political managers of any era—democratic or dictatorial—become an issue only after the departure from the scene of the relevant set of rulers. Equally intriguingly, while a lot of noise would routinely be made by each successive crusader who has inflicted himself on the nation in the name of restoring political morality, how is that not a single plunderer of national wealth has to date been taken to task? The present exercise is not likely to produce any different results in this crucial area. And for good reason.

Taking a look back at the political phase which ended last Monday, it is apparent that the otherwise blood-thirsty antagonists on both sides of the divide continued to exercise utmost discretion in even the most acrimonious of exchanges throughout the period. The hapless nation would, of course, thanks to the free press, get a periodic exposure to how its elected representatives as a body were committing most serious breaches of public trust. But none from within the power club ever exposed a colleague on the substance of corrupt practices. Is it that none of them could afford to do so without running the risk of getting exposed himself or herself? What about the normal law of the land? Does it have no provision to make a corrupt individual pay for his sins? Or, it is that the normal process of accountability, as had perhaps unwittingly been set in motion by certain cases lodged for serious instances of misappropriation, has effectively been forestalled by the recent disruption of the political process? This tomfoolery won't do. The politicians seem in for a surprise once again. The voter knows better.

Bureaucratic Approach

90AS0436B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
25 Aug 90 pp 1, 6

[Article by Mir Jamil-Ur-Rahman: "Accountability—Bureaucratic Style"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] All is set to propel the process of accountability into motion as was indeed promised by the caretaker prime minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. The government has dug up an old law, which was never put into operation, to debar the dishonest politicians from politics.

In fact, there are two Presidential Orders (No 16 & 17 of 1977) which will govern the process of accountability:

- 1) The Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for Membership) Order, and
- 2) The Holders of Representative Offices (Punishment for Misconduct) Order.

They were notified in the GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN on 25 November 1977. On that date General Ziaul Haq was the Chief Martial Law Administrator and Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, who signed the Orders, was still the president.

Interestingly, these two orders were photocopies of the two earlier Acts which were enacted in late 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. They were

- 1) The Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for the Membership) Act, 1976, and 2) The Holders of Representative Offices (Prevention of Misconduct) Act, 1976. These Acts had their antecedents in EBDO (Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Ordinance, 1959) promulgated by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. EBDO's application had forced a large number of politicians to withdraw from politics. The EBDO itself was the offspring of PRODA (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act, 1949) made by Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister. The main sufferers under PRODA were politicians who had incurred the displeasure of the central government. They included heavy weights like Mohammad Ayub Khuro and Qazi Fazlullah (Sindh), Hamidul Haq Chaudhry (East Bengal) and Khan of Mamdot and Mian Mumtaz Daultana (Punjab).

Z.A. Bhutto had excluded the president and the prime minister from the purview of his law. He had also provided the option to the accused to retire from public life voluntarily instead of contesting the charges. Gen Zia's law added the president and the prime minister against whom action could also be taken and removed the option of voluntary retirement. Mr Bhutto did not get the chance to bring his law into operation. He was ousted in July 1977, Gen Zia for some reason or the other also abandoned the idea of disqualifying politicians from politics.

Now President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has assumed the command of the task force which will clean the politics of Pakistan of unclean politicians. The president intends to succeed where democratic leader Liaquat Ali Khan and military leader Field Marshal Ayub Khan had failed. The president would like to demonstrate that bureaucratic approach in cleaning the politics is more efficient, more honest, more potent, more effectual and more practical than that of a political or military leader.

The rejuvenated law empowers the president to constitute special courts to enquire into and decide cases relating to the misconduct of a person who is holding or

has held the office of president, governor, prime minister, federal minister, minister of state, attorney-general, chief minister, provincial minister, parliamentary secretary, advocate-general, MNA [member of National Assembly], senator of MPA [member of Provincial Assembly]. This law is applicable for the period from 20 December, 1970 to the present. Only the president—in provinces the governors—could refer cases to the special courts. The bureaucrats who may have abetted the politicians in their acts of misconduct are totally protected from the jurisdiction of the special courts.

What is misconduct? The Presidential Order gives the description quite exhaustively. Misconduct includes bribery, corruption, jobbery, favouritism, nepotism, wilful maladministration, wilful misapplication or diversion of public money, and any other abuse of whatsoever kind of power or position, and any attempt at, or abetment of, such misconduct. The description is expanded further in the second Order which states that a holder of representative office is said to commit misconduct if he accepts illegal gratification. Its all-sweeping clause 2(f) leaves no escape for the accused. It is misconduct if the holder of representative office or any member of his family or any other person on his behalf is in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known source of income and for which he cannot reasonably account for. If his explanation is unsatisfactory then the Special Court shall resume [as received] him guilty of misconduct and his conviction shall not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely on such presumption.

Most of the charges like 'wilful maladministration' and 'nepotism' are all-embracing and full of vagueness. The Special Court had been vested with such vast powers and rules of evidence have been framed in such a manner that an accused could be convicted on the flimsiest of evidence. It is quite certain that nobody accused of such charges would emerge unscathed from the Special Court. If the same yardstick is applied to our bureaucracy, nearly all of it would be convicted of misconduct.

It is only the electorate which has got the legitimate right to judge the politicians. It is the best judge of its leaders. It is not justifiable to operate special laws for the conduct of politicians. It has not worked before and would not work now. If a politician is corrupt, he should either be charged in a normal court of law or in the court of people. He should neither be discriminated against nor favoured. The accountability process if discriminatory and quasi judicial would neither be accepted by the electorate nor would it help in the eradication of corruption. When PRODA was repealed in October 1954, the then Governor-General had proclaimed, "I do take note of the fact that public opinion in the country has strongly denounced PRODA, and particularly its discriminatory character."

Politicians are making fools of themselves. In their urge to equal old scores they are disgracing each other. They

must not allow the bureaucrats to judge the credentials of each other's political opponents. Take them to the courts under normal law or refer to the electorate and ask for its judgment.

If every new government were to resort to this method of eliminating its opponents, in a few years there would hardly be a politician left qualified to hold public office.

Process Said Suspicious

90AS0436C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM in English*
24 Aug 90 pp 1, 5

[Article by Shireen M. Mazari: "The Dilemma of Accountability"]

[Text] Not wanting to rely on public accountability through the process of elections and the judgement of the masses, the caretaker government has set into motion the procedure of accountability "by the elite, of the elite and for the elite" through the special courts.

The cry for accountability has always accompanied fall of governments in this country and has become inextricably linked with political victimisation. The net result has been that the corrupt have always managed to get away.

That the previous regime had been beset with charges of corruption cannot be denied, nor can the fact that a number of the charges could probably be validated. Yet, the partisan nature of the present regime, especially the Ziaist taint (as witnessed on 17th August) has already clouded the process of accountability amidst charges of victimisation.

Yet, the nation has been informed by various caretaker representatives that no one has anything to fear and there will be no victimisation. The caretaker prime minister has declared that accountability is part of the democratic process.

Well, if one is to accept that his form of accountability is part of the democracy for which we yearn then as a first step let there be accountability of the caretaker government itself to allay the suspicions and misgivings of the nation. After all, the suspicions that hang over the heads of some of the caretakers would be removed. And it is only then that at least some of the problems of the caretakers' image can be balanced. Even if a number of them are seen as Ziaists and politically partisan, at least they can claim to be materially incorruptible. The validation of the PPP corruption within this framework would certainly gain more credibility than if accountability is restricted to ousted PPP politicians only.

Otherwise a host of allegations and assertions will continue to come to light at the PPP counter the charges of corruption with counter-charges. To enable the caretakers to assert their proclaimed integrity, it would surely be fitting to face the special courts first.

In fact one caretaker minister, Chaudhry Shujaat, categorically stated that he would not fear appearing before any tribunal as, contrary to public perception, he had not had any loans written off. Surely, he should be given the opportunity to put this doubt to rest once and for all by being the subject of a special court investigation. Since we have been told that the special courts will function with speed and efficiency, it would surely be possible to clear the present caretakers from all charges of corruption and still have time to look into the misdeeds of the PPP—especially since the caretakers do not see this process as interfering with the election schedule.

Along with Chaudhry Shujaat, wouldn't Mian Zahid Sarfaraz like to clear his name once and for all regarding the messy business of the reconditioned cars—an issue that continues to rear its ugly head in debates on corruption?

Then of course, there is the nasty business of the McDonnell Douglas bribery case that has been documented in the book published some years ago entitled "The Prosecutors" which deals with a number of similar "white collar crimes" investigated by U.S. government prosecutors. The name of Rafi Raza keeps cropping up along with that of Ashiq Bhutto in this case.

It is indeed commendable to know that the caretaker of the media has never had to defend her spouse, unlike the unfortunate Benazir Bhutto whose spouse is causing her a political nightmare. Yet it must be pointed out in all fairness that the caretaker information minister has never occupied a similar position of power either and in any event her spouse, being a politician who has held public office would be held responsible for his own political misdeeds were there to be any.

While the special courts are at it, they could of course look at various plot allocations, especially in the Blue Area in Islamabad since the time of the Zia dictatorship. It would be interesting to know who all were allotted the lucrative plaza plots. Incidentally, it would also be interesting to find out how streets 15A and 14A were created in Sector F-7/2 since they are not a part of the original sector plan—and this is very apparent.

As for the provincial caretakers, some newspapers have already carried damaging information regarding the ADBP [Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan] loans of the Sindh chief minister and these plus the issue of plot allocations should surely be cleared up?

Also, there has always prevailed a very disturbing rumour that one of the leading political cum business families of Karachi were involved in the supply of oil to Israel (because of their close U.S. links), through Kuwait, during the 73 Arab-Israel War. Since one member of this family holds the highest office in Sindh at the moment, this story is worth investigating.

Apart from the large-scale corruption that has, and continues to pervade our polity, the psyche of our leaders is perhaps best reflected by the petty-minded corruption

revealed in the story doing the rounds in Islamabad since then. According to this story when the then Saudi interior minister, Prince Naif bin Abdul Aziz visited Pakistan in 1983, he gave a whole set of watches to be handed out to the staff of the Interior Ministry. It is alleged that the then interior minister in fact never passed on these gifts!

Another equally, if not more important issue is that of intangible corruption reflected in policies taken against the national interest or in the abdication of duties.

If there is to be accountability of the previous regime, other than through elections, then surely the tribunals must examine why the foreign minister allowed his ministry to abdicate to others its function of conducting the nation's foreign policy. In recent Press briefing, he admitted that the Foreign Office had little control over Pakistan's Afghan policy. Policy decisions made in keeping with IMF interests and U.S. interests must also be scrutinised. The manner of accountability is imperative as the national interest is so often pushed aside in the face of other sub-national, institutional and/or foreign interests. No institution or individual should be beyond such accountability.

Of course, the whole issue of accountability opens up a gamut of possibilities after the suppression of the Zia period, the disappointment and disillusionment of the Benazir period and the frustration and anger felt at the retarding of the democratic process at present.

One of the great sins of the previous regime was the trend it has set whereby losers come to power by circumventing normal democratic processes. It began with losing electoral candidates becoming advisers along with unelected bureaucrats and it has developed into the leaders of minority parties, again with unelected bureaucrats and losing electoral candidates, taking over the government through extra parliamentary procedure. How long the elite will continue to fool the Nation and make a mockery of the concept of democracy is anybody's guess—but definitely as long as they are able to, it is within this framework that we must evaluate our expectation of elections at all let alone fair and free elections.

Editorial Cautions Prime Ministership 'Hopefuls'

90AS0444D Lahore THE NATION in English
19 Aug 90 p 6

[Article: "Run-Up' to the Top Slot"]

[Text] Mian Nawaz Sharif has made it known that he is in the run for Prime Ministership. Notwithstanding his low profile since August 6, Mian Sahib's declaration of intent does not come as a surprise. If the balance of forces during the 19-month rule of the Bhutto government is any guide, no one would dispute that he has been the number one challenger to the political authority of the former Prime Minister. And though he was not formally designated as the leader of the opposition, since

he had chosen to concentrate on consolidating his power-base in the Punjab, he was, undoubtedly, the real power behind the opposition. Given his impressive credentials as the most authoritative and durable Chief Minister of the largest province and as the man who put the IJI [Islamic Democratic Alliance] together and ran it, he would be an obvious choice to lead the anti-PPP [Pakistan People's Party] forces in the forthcoming elections. Nevertheless, his chances of success will be determined, besides other variables, by the ability of the camp he hopes to lead, to offer a viable alternative to the electorate. And before he presents himself as a candidate, he ought to ensure that rival bidders for the job from within the camp accept his claim and go along with him.

Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo, for instance, is not only the President of the Muslim League whose authority as the party chief has recently been acknowledged by Mian Nawaz Sharif, but also an ex-Prime Minister who could claim a prior right for the top slot. Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi may have been installed as the leader of the Combined Opposition in the erstwhile National Assembly for no other reason except political expediency, but given his long-standing ambition, he should also be counted as a serious candidate. There may be quite a few other hopefuls also, such as the legal heir of late Ziaul Haq, who notwithstanding their locus standi, can spoil the broth. Mian Sahib has told a British journalist that if the performance of the IJI in 20 byelections was any indicator, his chances are good. He does not only seem to have taken for granted his unanimous candidature, but also overlooked the not too encouraging state of unity in his party ranks. And he has yet to decide on what plank he is going to contest the polls. If the Muslim League or the IJI remain bogged down in internal squabbles and all the 'hopefuls' for the office of the Prime Minister continue to run their own campaigns, the chances of Mian Nawaz Sharif's success are quite clear.

'Grand Alliance of Nationalists' Fails in Sindh Campaigns

91AS0001G Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English
13 Sep 90 pp 34-35

[Article by Momin Bullo: "No Grand Alliance of Nationalists"]

[Text] Almost all federalists, confederalists, 'separatists,' nationalists, communists and democrats have started their electoral campaign in Sindh. But everyone is using his own party platform for canvassing. All efforts for a grand alliance of nationalists have reportedly failed and politicians like Messrs Mumtaz Bhutto, Rasul Bux Palejo, Jam Saqi and Arbab Khuhawar (all SNA [Sindh National Alliance] dissidents) are now reportedly planning to evolve a code of conduct for the election campaign.

Mr. Palejo is busy in projecting himself as a true sympathiser of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and the

Benazir cause. It is reliably learnt that the PPP's Central Committee has decided to support Mr. Palejo for a National Assembly seat from Thatta and seek his assistance in defeating the big waderas in Larkana and Sukkur, both areas which have a considerable proportion of Palejo workers.

In the meantime, Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto and Mr. G.M. Syed in frequent statements and speeches have urged the Sindhi masses to vote cautiously and not to fall into what they call the so-called 'muzloomiat' (victim-complex) trap of Benazir Bhutto. They say if this time the Sindhi people again made the mistake of voting PPP, it would be the end of their Sindhi identity.

On the other hand, a leader of the Sindh Saguar Party (a group of progressive mullahs) has called on all nationalists to boycott the elections because in its opinion there is no surety and sanctity of elected assemblies in the Constitution of Pakistan.

According to the well-placed sources, following the mutual understanding between the PPP and the PNP [Pakistan National Party], the central leadership of the latter has decided to quit the SNA. This was said to be one of the PPP preconditions for the alliance. A meeting between Mr. Hussain Bux Narejo, secretary-general of the Awami Tehrik (his own group), with Mr. Hafeez Pirzada of the PNP did not produce any result except assurances from both sides to help elect honest candidates.

According to a prediction by a Hyderabad-based Sindhi eveninger, if Mr. Asif Zardari is arrested in the middle of his election campaign, Mr. Qadir Magsi will be picked as a candidate to face Mr. Jatoi in the Moro constituency. The newspaper further said that Mr. Magsi would be supported by both sides: PPP and Jeay Sindh.

The Hurs' spiritual leader, the Pir Sahib of Pagara, has reportedly decided to contest the election from the ancestral seat of former Prime Minister Mr. M.K. Junejo in Sanghar district. Mr. Junejo will stand from Khaipur constituency where he will face a tough time.

Political Establishment Said Abusing Espionage

90AS0444B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
29 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Saquib Yusuf: "I Spy..."]

[Text] At previous critical junctures in the nation's history, 1988, 1977, 1971, 1965, 1958, despite the traumatic and disastrous nature of the events occurring then, there were few accusations, rumours or even thoughts of espionage or treasonous activity going on within the upper echelons of what is known euphemistically in our country as political leadership. The sort of treason taking place then was either inspired by the only institution that has flourished in the last forty years, or directed against it. Either way, hardly a second thought was given to the involvement of activists from the cloak and dagger, neither world of espionage. There was too, none of this

obsession then with artificial fertilizers so we could justifiably be proud of our fully home-grown, tended by nature, traitors.

Today, in the era of DAP [expansion unknown], urea, pesticides and sundees, it only takes a rise in the price of onions to render a generation of ministers, in all probability brought up on powdered milk, open to accusations of being in cahoots with RAW [Research and Analysis Wing]. RAW, now being the second word that Pakistani babies add to their vocabulary after amma. One begins to wonder whether the children playing "I spy with my little eye, have not been put up to it by RAW agents, and whether the pet hound who has taken to howling eerie tunes at weird hours is not passing on some encrypted message to his handler in the bushes outside. Are my household secrets safe anymore?

What are the factors to which one could attribute the recent phenomenal success of concerned Indian agencies in having infiltrated the ranks of our politicians? Could it be the video boom that has resulted in a plethora of mind-boggling, third rate spy movies direct from the speedy studios of Bombay, flooding the local market? Or could it be the increasing popularity of authors such as Robert Ludlum, John Le Carre and Graham Greene amongst the intellectuals of the political arena who are usually the first ones to point the accusing finger and take up the cry of 'Spy'? Or perhaps, the present preponderance of spies is just a natural consequence of having as many agencies playing the espionage game as would confuse an average Prime Minister, with each agency duty bound to do its share of tapping and bugging and consequently of having to unearth the occasional traitor to justify its expenses and its existence.

After all the stories, smirking at, attempting to ridicule the ex-prime minister's supposed ignorance of events until the very last minute before her dismissal, it was a little hard to swallow that part of the current and vicious smear campaign that aired, on prime PTV [Pakistan Television] time, the news report from Bombay's THE DAILY newspaper. How could Ms Bhutto, unaware even in the early evening of August the 6th, of the fate that was to overtake her within house and minutes, have attempted to encourage or invite Messrs Singhs and Gujral to do the necessary at the end of July as reported by THE DAILY? Equally difficult to understand was the restraint exercised in the matter, many thousands of miles away, by Mr. Eric Margolis, a household name within his four walls in Ottawa. One could understand why local hacks might have held back on such juicy items as had apparently fallen into Mr. Margolis's lap, while Ms Bhutto's government was allowed to hold the reins. But why an obscure journalist writing for his obscure paper in the relatively obscure Ottawa should have sat on this news for so long, has yet to be explained to us by those making hay with seeded stories now being planted upon them. Could it be that Mr. Margolis is a Pakistani planted mole within RAW now betraying one time fellow agents? Or is he a double agent now returning triumphant? Or has he turned and by maligning our

ex-prime minister, is carrying out RAW's work, undermining great offices and institutions and eroding national confidence? Only the Trust papers can clear this great mystery?

Similarly, the recent unveiled hints suggesting that Ms Sanam Bhutto had some ulterior motives, once again presumably related to espionage, for her visit to India which took place between January 7 to 13 this year, are banal to say the least. That the Pakistan High Commission there did not know about the visit is neither here nor there. It only reflects on their usual level of competence, and quite astonishingly on the junior Ms Bhutto's praiseworthy, low profile style that did not involved the use of either the High Commission's vehicles or its fawning diplomats, normally eager, willing and waiting to do just that and not much else.

If the ex-prime minister is an Indian collaborator, agent or spy, then RAW had better carry out a soul searching exercise designed to investigate the reasons why their Mata Hari, having managed to infiltrate herself into one of our top offices and to stay there for twenty months, could not succeed in her mission. They would be well-advised to review and overhaul the training and support methods that forced her to be in direct contact with their Prime Minister, and that allowed journalists in Ottawa and Bombay, and journalists in Pakistan, hardly renowned for their investigative reporting, to be in full possession of the most minute details of the case.

Accountability, given its checkered history in this country, probably holds no fears or anxieties for the Bhutto ladies. Is espionage or treason any different a kettle of fish? The ex-prime minister is probably not taking this to heart either. After all, she is in exalted company and the precedents and portents for rehabilitation on this count are just as bright as those of used car salesmen under the head of accountability. The comforting list of agents past and heroes present, includes Jeay Sindh as an organisational whole, yesterday's focus of opposition wrath, the national correspondent in Kabul and New Delhi, Mr. Wali Khan together with assorted members of his party, and the Karachi miracle worker Jam Sadiq Ali, once confirmed to use as a spy in the Philby mould.

As eager participants in the hottest new game in town, in their own list of traitors and spies, the Bhuttos themselves have recently included, a fair proportion of the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement], not just its leaders but its rank and file also, as agents carrying state secrets, which were presumably on sale in Pucca Qila and Azizabad, across the border to their Indian relations. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, too, in those fleeting moments when he was with them, was a patriot, but apparently swapped national allegiances with the same ease as his party affiliations. And we all know what they think Shatrugan Sinha was up to on his frequent visits to the late Gen. Zia-ul-Haq.

Today, when any public figure is accused of being corrupt, a thief, or a scoundrel, given the background of those who are raising these accusations and the tangled web of lies, fabrication and falsification of evidence, the ulterior motives, the undermining of the integrity of the police and the courts, people have taken to disregarding and disbelieving all such claims. With everyone who matters now playing I-Spy with the same gay abandon, it is inevitable that the public will soon turn a blind eye to the spies in our midst, with obvious harmful consequences. But them, as long as the interests of the establishment are served, who cares?

Commentaries Offer Perspectives on Government Change

'All the President's Men'

90AS0437A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
19 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Tahir A. Abbas]

[Text] It was a welcome sign to break the National and provincial assemblies on 6 August 1990. Quite a lot of people thought that it was necessary as the confrontation between the two rival groups was at its peak and it had become difficult to run the affairs of the National and provincial assemblies smoothly.

The president of the country, during his address to the nation discussed at length the corruption and other misdeeds of the Bhutto government. The president very rightly blamed both the rival groups for the present state of affairs the country is facing.

All was well till the press conference was held and speeches were made but what was to follow had given some air to the thoughts that there was a well planned conspiracy in the offing.

Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi took the oath as the new caretaker prime minister of the country. It is to the knowledge of everyone that Mr Jatoi took an active part in the so-called 'Horse Trading' and was quite instrumental, with the top IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] brass, to buy the loyalties of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] members and transferring them to Murree. One of the reasons for dismissing the PPP government was its alleged involvement in 'Horse Trading.' But quite strangely, instead of bringing a neutral government the leader of the opposition, one of the parties involved in the 'Horse Trading' was brought into power thus punishing one and rewarding the other. What about the induction of Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Jam Sadiq Ali? What about the trips to Changa Manga? Is it 'Horse Trading'?

The president also blamed the PPP for the vast corruption which was done during its tenure. But what about the Punjab government, which was also accused of the same level of corruption if not less? Why was the 1985

provincial assembly of the Punjab not punished, when it was dissolved on the instructions of Zia-ul-Haq on charges of corruption?

The president has also blamed the outgoing government for favouritism and nepotism. But what about the appointment of all the chief ministers, governors and ministers. Don't they belong to only one electoral alliance or dissidents of the PPP? Can anyone ensure fair and impartial elections in the presence of such a biased setup?

Why was the PPP government not allowed to have Abdul Khaliq Khan as the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] governor in 1989? Bugti's son-in-law and the president's son-in-law were also inducted in the provincial cabinets. Is it favouritism?

Two of the provincial governments were asked to resign while the PPP governments in two provinces were dismissed after blaming them for corruption. The Frontier government was dismissed on the pretext that it was very vulnerable. Which government was more vulnerable, Balochistan's or Frontier's.

The PPP government was also blamed for ethnic violence in Sindh. What about the role of COP [Combined Opposition Parties], which only used to visit Sindh to increase tension and confrontation between Muhajirs and Sindhis? Is that the way a responsible opposition acts?

The PPP government was also criticised for using the electronic media and NPT [National Press Trust] newspapers for defaming the opposition leaders. Is there a change in the policy now?

The president says that we cannot play with the destiny of 100 million people of this country. How come then we have to bear with an unelected person who has become the prime minister through the back door? The best course would have been to select such neutral persons whose loyalties were not inclined towards only one rival group.

In his first press conference, the Honourable Mr Jatoi has vowed that his is a democratic government and enjoyed support of the masses. Are democratic governments elected (Sorry, selected) this way?

This whole scenario leads us to the conclusion that when the COP couldn't topple the previous government through democratic means, they resorted to back-door policies through an Invisible Hand.

The same old corrupt and defeated faces are being inducted in the cabinets. In the present circumstances, it would have been best to appoint neutral cabinets for holding the elections on time and accelerating the accountability process. By accountability we don't mean the accountability of PPP only!

Manipulating Election Results

90AS0437B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
19 Aug 90 p 4

[Text] The establishment at Rawalpindi-Islamabad appears to be in a fix. And the powers that be have nobody but themselves to blame. The precipitate action of Assemblies' dissolution may or may not be found to be justified in strict constitutional terms if the matter is taken to court. But it is already clear that the pinch of unavoidable political dynamics has started making itself felt to the current managers of power. Apart from the device of accountability, whose actual operation still remains far from clear, it is obvious that a number of deviationary tactics are being aired and tested to achieve the unstated but manifest objective of achieving the 'desirable' results in the forthcoming elections. After floating the idea of adoption of the proportional representation system for the promised elections in October, the latest ploy is the doing away of the first-past-the-post principle as applicable in this country. As is usual with such dubious exercises, the reported 'proposal' has been dressed by in apparently altruistic logic. Since the prevalent system of elected victories permits a person to return to a legislature on the basis even of less than a majority vote, and that, of course undermines the democratic credentials of the returning candidate, the practice must be stopped. In the case of any of the contesting candidates' failure to poll at least 51 percent of the vote, one or more repeated rounds of polling should be conducted so as to throw up a victor with a majority mandate.

The problem with the idea is that it is too transparently ill-motivated to convince anyone in the present circumstances. There is nothing sacrosanct about the system which we have so far followed in Pakistan. Indeed, there is a lot of merit in the case for a switch-over to the majority-vote pattern which is being practised in a number of democracies. But what militates against the idea of a change at this stage is the timing of the reported move. In a country where changes as basic as those in the constitutional document have been made in the past for no nobler intent than to suit purely personal expediences, the people are bound to view with scepticism any tampering with the established structure of the political system at the present stage. The Establishment's protestations of neutrality notwithstanding, the new scheme has obviously been contrived to allow the splintered political forces aligned with the powers that be, a chance to have a consolidated showing at the hustings. This may well be perceived as a clever way of ensuring the defeat of 'unwanted' individuals, but, as our chequered political history will bear out, coalitions based on nothing more basic than shared antipathy is a sure recipe for instability.

Speculation About Next Prime Minister

90AS0437C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
20 Aug 90 pp 1, 6

[Article by Mir Jamil-Ur-Rehman: "Who Will Be the PM After Elections"]

[Text] Elections are barely 2 months away. Political activity is gaining momentum. Another few days and

election campaign would take off in earnest. The PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] leadership are now engaged in charting out their respective election strategies.

As far as leadership is concerned the PPP has got a clear edge over its opponents, particularly the IJI. The voter who would vote for the PPP is certain that if the PPP won, Benazir Bhutto would be the prime minister. Who would be the prime minister if IJI were to win? Nobody—least the voter—is sure of the answer.

It has emerged that the main object of the opponents of the PPP is to forge a grand alliance to keep Benazir Bhutto from becoming the prime minister again. This is a legitimate object, morally and politically admissible in a democratic dispensation. Almost every political party has reasons to complain against the attitude of the PPP government. PPP's companions in adversity and its partners in prosperity have all abandoned it one after the other. Its political isolation was complete and pathetic when the PPP government was dismissed on 6 August. Not a single prominent voice was raised against the action of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.

The IJI and COP [Combined Opposition Parties] are moving towards a grand alliance to fight the PPP as a single force. In the present circumstances the alliance has got every chance to materialise. But such an alliance will be greatly handicapped in the elections if it failed to nominate its leader as the only prospective candidate for the office of the prime minister. In the absence of this decision the proposed alliance will be prone to split even before the elections.

The erstwhile opposition is burdened with too many leaders. Pakistan Muslim League (PML), major component of the IJI, is headed by Mohammad Khan Junejo who does not see eye to eye with the strongman of his party, Mian Nawaz Sharif. Mr Junejo in his capacity as the president of the largest party after the PPP and having been prime minister once, would naturally aspire to be the prime minister again. He has recently gained the support of an influential political segment by appointing Ejazul Haq, the budding politician son of his chief tormentor, as the chief organiser of Muslim League. The appointment has once again proved the existence of a serious rift between Junejo and Mian Nawaz Sharif. While Mian Nawaz Sharif would not go beyond offering the post of vice president, Junejo upped the offer considerably, enticing Ejazul Haq away from Mian Nawaz Sharif. The post of vice-president were insignificant because there was already 19 vice-presidents. The importance of Ziaul Haq factor was also demonstrated by the presence of Junejo at Zia's grave on 17 August. Last year he did not feel it worth his while to remember Zia on his death anniversary.

The IJI is headed by Mian Nawaz Sharif who more than once has declared his candidacy for the office of prime

minister. He also presides over the PML in Punjab, the most active and effective wing of the PML anywhere in Pakistan. As chief minister of Punjab he took a lot of pounding from the PPP government in Islamabad but seldom lost his nerve. He can rightly claim the largest contribution in the ouster of Benazir. He is no doubt a serious contender for premiership.

Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, caretaker prime minister, was the leader of the opposition in the dissolved National Assembly. He was elected to this post unanimously by all the opposition parties represented in the National Assembly. Although his own National People's Party did not have any MNA [Member of National Assembly] excepting himself, he was preferred to lead the opposition for he enjoyed the confidence of all the political leaders sitting in the opposition. Mr Jatoi, on his part, has not let them down. In the few days he has been prime minister, he has admirably succeeded in dissipating the atmosphere of confrontation politics which had become the hallmark of the short-lived government of Ms Bhutto. He has amply demonstrated that he believes in politics of consensus. He has called on politicians who have been his adversaries and been meeting even those who have been very close to the previous government.

The grand alliance which is in the offing stands to benefit greatly by nominating its parliamentary leader before the commencement of election battle. In the absence of such a declaration the alliance would tend to disintegrate even before elections. Somebody must have the veto power to settle disputes on the selection of candidates and other related problems which are bound to crop up sooner than expected.

The PPP is not faced with any leadership crisis. Benazir Bhutto continues to be its unchallenged leader and only she could lead it to victory. No other party could offer a leader of her charisma. In spite of being accused of ineptness, nepotism and corruption, she would still attract bigger crowds than any other political leader. She will be facing the most difficult test of her life. This time the voter will also judge her by her performance of last 20 months. The whole government machinery will be working against her and her party. Her close aides, including her husband, will soon formally be facing the charges of corruption and irregularities. She will be required to make herculean efforts to save the PPP from disintegration. She has courage and lots of it. She can still stage a comeback in spite of the heavy odds stacked against her.

Ms Benazir Bhutto would do well to appoint a committee of her competent loyalists, not sycophants, to probe the reasons of alienation of her government and party in such a short time. The truth will help her to contest the elections on a surer wicket. It would not hurt her cause if she could stop accusing the army for her downfall. Such utterances would neither win her votes nor endear her to the establishment. She may rest assured that the army is neither afraid of her nor of any

other politician. She can enter the election arena sure in her mind that the army would not block the transfer of power to the winner, however that may be. And lastly, it will help her cause if she would stop defending the universally known corrupts. The intelligence of people is hurt when she insists that Asif Zardari has suffered financially by marrying her.

Commentary: Define, Limit Intelligence Agencies' Roles

*90AS0444A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
18 Aug 90 p 4*

[Article: "Role of Intelligence Agencies"]

[Text] Soon after the dissolution of the National Assembly on August 6th, former Prime Minister [PM] Benazir Bhutto publicly expressed the opinion that the force behind her constitutional ouster was the Military Intelligence. Whatever the truth or otherwise of this statement, or the wisdom of the ex-P.M. in giving it voice, the role and the efficiency of Pakistan's intelligence agencies have been the subject of some controversy. While the proper role of these agencies should be to compile and process intelligence to the government or the services, depending on whom they serve, they have been employed for the manifestly undemocratic purpose of surveilling political opponents. Intense inter-agency rivalry has also meant that energy which should be utilised investigating matters of national security, is being dissipated in self-defeating wrangles. But in reality the rivalry is a reflection of the greater tussle between various power centres in Islamabad. Rather than having defined spheres of activity within which they operate, successive personalities in Islamabad have attempted to tailor a favoured agency for the purpose of strengthening their hold on power.

In a situation where intelligence agencies are often working at cross-purposes, the ultimate loser not surprisingly is the national interest. It was due to the inefficiency of these agencies that the uprising in Kashmir came as a complete surprise to everyone including the elected government. Inefficiency or the politicisation of an agency led to the complete miscalculation of the Battle of Jalalabad, and the more recent Tanai coup. And to date our intelligence has come up with no answers as to who was behind the air-crash which killed General Zia and other army top brass two years ago. The Indian Intelligence Agency RAW, on the other hand, is known to be effectively and efficiently spreading the tentacles of its influence. The existence of its network in Sindh and the success of its efforts at internal destabilisation in Pakistan, are acknowledged. Streamlining our agencies, clearly defining and limiting their roles may not suit the personalities which come and go in Islamabad, but is a task essential for our national security.

Editorial Calls for 'Disciplined' Investment Promotion

90AS0418D Karachi *BUSINESS RECORDER*
in English 25 Aug 90 p 2

Editorial: "Economic Priorities"]

[Text] The emphasis on freeing the economic activity in the country from regulatory controls, as laid by the Federal Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz in his recent address at a meeting of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce & Industry, cannot but be welcomed. As if to further prove himself as an ardent supporter of a market-oriented economy, Sartaj Aziz reportedly voiced his preference for declaring the whole country as a tax-free and duty-free zone for new industrial investment for a period of four to five years thereby enabling entrepreneurs to establish industries of their choice at any location in Pakistan. In the same context, he reportedly committed himself to the task of launching effective steps to remove glaring instances of regulatory controls if any on industrial investment within the limited tenure of the caretaker Government.

Other vital issues which were reportedly touched upon by Sartaj Aziz in his speech included the distortions in the fiscal structure and reforms in the financial sector. He referred to what he termed as the "glaring anomalies" in taxation on services and at the same time expressed his determination to move ahead with measures to reform the financial sector. In this connection he cited the present Government's initiative in the reconstitution of the boards of directors of the nationalised commercial banks in which, bankers of long professional standing have been nominated as directors.

Sartaj Aziz has rightly identified his priorities which call for clarity in steps to grapple with problems which have the potential to further deteriorate to serious proportions if left unattended to. The spheres understandably relate to promotion of industrial investment, initiating a process of improvement in budget deficits and ridding the nationalised sector of banks and DFIs [expansion unknown] of political and bureaucratic controls.

Reverting to the emphasis to free the economy specially industrial investment, from regulatory hurdles, it may be pointed out that the existing Industrial Policy has considerably liberalised the industrial sanctioning procedures and barring projects with total cost exceeding Rs. 1,000 million [rupees] and which belong to specified list, all other projects are allowed to go ahead with investment and implementation without prior sanction from official authorities. Foreign investment also stands liberalised with waiver of earlier restrictions on foreign equity investment up to 49 percent. However, the scope for further liberalisation does exist in that certain industries which are still retained in the specified list, can be thrown open for investment without prior official approval in addition to other liberalising measures.

It appears that the role of financing agencies and banks as catalysts of investment finance should be considered as effective enough for a disciplined promotion of industrial investment. An efficient selection of industrial projects by the DFIs and banks in the light of their professional scrutiny of the viability of a project from different angles, would serve to preclude official controls on sanctioning of industries. It is common knowledge that almost all medium to large-size industrial projects are submitted to sponsors to DFIs and banks for loans in foreign and local currencies. Even the projects proposed to be based on direct loans from abroad are also referred to DFIs and banks for providing repayment guarantees.

Thus, removal of official control over sanctions and entrusting the DFIs and banks with the task of supporting only viable projects would not only free the investment activity from regulatory pinpricks but at the same time, it would unshackle banks and DFIs from the grip of bureaucracy and politicians. This step would serve the cherished objective of reforming the financial sector by allowing the professional expertise to wield a free hand in the promotion of investment activity.

The idea that the entire country should be declared as tax-free and duty-free for new industrial projects for a period of five years, as expressed by Sartaj Aziz, would unreservedly be lauded by the private sector. The incentive of tax-holiday along with exemption of import duty on plant and machinery in tax-holiday area, has long been in use in Pakistan as a major tool to encourage industrial investment. Even the present Industrial Policy allows two types of tax-holidays: one is area-wide for the less-developed regions and the other is based on the concept of promoting key industries. The policy for industrialization in rural areas has further extended and reinforced the incentive of tax-holiday and duty-free import of machinery. These incentives have lately provoked debates in favour and against their efficacy in accelerating the pace of industrialization. The loss of revenue to Government is one aspect which the opponents of tax-holiday had been putting forward vigorously. This is also one of the issues directly related to the need of fiscal reforms. It continues to be a debatable issue calling for an indepth analysis as to whether at all does an all-embracing incentive like tax-holiday deserve a place in a market-oriented economic system?

Article on 'Signposts of Economic Collapse'

90AS0418C Karachi *DAWN* in English 26 Aug 90 p 7

[Article by Shahid Kardar: "Signposts of Economic Collapse"; first paragraph is *DAWN* commentary]

[Text] The government will have little choice but to curtail imports, not selectively but through sweeping across-the-board reductions. This reduced access to imports will affect utilisation of production capacities, particularly in industries heavily dependent upon imported raw materials and components.... Currency

depreciation, as a solution for boosting export earnings and raising additional dollars, will also not work.

Slowly, but surely, we are heading towards a structural collapse—political, social and economic. The monster in the shape of the military-bureaucratic establishment which was till recently gnawing away at the vitals of the national edifice now threatens to devour us. The old order is resisting the demand of the people for economic and political opportunity and access to the gains from development.

At the political level, the establishment is not prepared to tolerate a politician with a wider constituency to which he or she can appeal. A politician who can derive strength from forces other than those controlled by the establishment is a dangerous entity and is unacceptable. He or she may not exercise this option, but the mere fact that they may have such an option invests them with a potential to strike an independent posture and, thereby, at some stage, question the hegemony of the establishment. In view of Benazir Bhutto's wider constituency and, consequently for capacity and ability to exercise independence, the establishment is hell-bent on brokering a deal with all anti-PPP [Pakistan People's Party] forces, so that there is a one-to-one contest against the PPP in each constituency. It has not sent Benazir back to Karachi to allow her to come back to Islamabad just 90 days later.

It will, however, take more than just money and threats of accountability and other forms of reprisals to ensure that the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] fields just one candidate in each constituency against the PPP. What is clear, however, is that all these attempts will not bring any stability and sanity to the political system. The undemocratic forces will not allow such foundations to be laid; they are loath even to entertain the possibility of a truly democratic system striking root and eventually challenging their prerogatives and privileges.

With the establishment consuming increasingly large chunks of mobilised resources, it is in its interest to maintain a highly centralised system of revenue generation and its distribution, in sharp contrast to the national aspirations for a more decentralised framework and the demand for greater political and financial autonomy for the provinces as the sine qua non for a more stable and lasting basis for national unity and integration.

To this writer, however, the impending economic collapse is of more immediate interest. Not only has the thawing of the cold war and the waning of American strategic interests in Afghanistan resulted in a decline, in the real terms, of aid flows from the USA, there are other economic factors that threaten a rather bleak future for the Pakistan economy. The oil price has risen by 6 dollar(s) per barrel (representing an additional annual bill of 450 million dollars on petroleum and its products) as a consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. This, at a time when 80,000 Pakistanis are returning from Kuwait—with others soon to follow from other parts of

the Middle East (the political repercussions of backing anachronisms like monarchies by sending soldiers to protect them).

The consequent drastic fall in remittances (already declining) and the high debt-servicing obligations of approximately 1.2 billion dollars per annum—given the meagre foreign exchange reserves of USD 500 million—will make it extremely difficult for the economy to bear the higher bill of imported oil. As it is, the import bill exceeds export earnings by roughly 2 billion dollars. Then there are the debt repayment of 1.2 billion dollars. Against the net requirement of 3.2 billion dollars, the government has foreign exchange reserves of 500 million dollars and remittances worth 1.6 billion dollars provided by expatriate Pakistanis. If, given this depressing state of affairs, the oil bill increases and there is large-scale return migration of Pakistanis from the Middle East and the consequent drying up of this source of additional dollars, from where will we get dollars to repay our debt?

Currency depreciation, as a solution for boosting export earnings and raising additional dollars, will not work. A devalued rupee will push up the costs of imports, thereby not only inducing inflation in the economy but also affecting the price competitiveness of our exports. The additional burden of higher priced imported oil and the happenings in the Middle East will, therefore, surely break the back of the proverbial camel.

The government will in the end have little choice but to curtail imports, not selectively but through sweeping across-the-board reductions. This reduced access to imports will affect utilisation of production capacities, particularly in industries heavily dependent upon imported raw materials and components. This state of affairs will have undesirable consequences for production, incomes, investment and employment, setting into motion a vicious circle of low investment levels, lower growth rates, higher unemployment, rising poverty, etc.

The establishment is, however, simply not prepared to consider proposals for curtailing defence- and administration-related expenditure. We can easily develop their argument. It will run something like this. National security is our top-most priority. We may be poor but we have to defend our territorial integrity, whatever the cost. No resources will be spared to ensure our defence preparedness. In any case, in per capita terms, or per square kilometre of hostile border our defence expenditure is among the lowest. Government can change but national aspirations cannot—of course, national interests and aspirations as defined by them. We have to maintain our military capability and keep adding to the stockpile of arms. This is the only real deterrent to India's hegemonic designs.

The outlays on defence and administration are over Rs 100 [rupees] billion per annum—made up of direct budgeted expenditure on the armed forces, expenditure on paramilitary forces and defence-related activities

reflected under other budgetary heads, and expenditure financed under the 4.02-billion-dollar aid programme. It is in the interest of these elite groups to insist on measuring patriotism in terms of money being spent on defence and along the lines of the hare-brained schemes being peddled under the label of "strategic depth."

Military imports and the servicing of military debt to the tune of 15 percent of foreign exchange earnings from exports are acting as a haemorrhage on the supply of scarce foreign exchange in the face of surging trade deficits. In the scenario discussed above defence imports can only be maintained by taking more loans. But will anyone be willing to give us the money?

Today, donors are refusing to pledge large amounts; they are far from offering succour to the beleaguered government. Lower pledges are reducing the government's manoeuvrability. Aid levels continue to decline. The decline started some time back. Now even the World Bank is choking off existing and future lines of credit, cutting them down from 700 million to 300 million dollars. Eastern Europe is only providing a convenient alibi.

The other option, higher commercial borrowings, are, however, a non-starter. To begin with, international banks will not be forthcoming with funds in this highly uncertain economic environment. Even if they are, they will charge higher interest rates, creating more problems of debt management.

It will take a super-optimist to believe that these are not the signposts of an economic disaster.

Political Use of Bank Loans Denounced, Bank Protection Urged

90AS0444G Karachi DAWN in English 25 Aug 90 p 8

[Article by Sultan Ahmed: "Saving the Sinking Banks"]

[Text] The sad state of public sector banks, and to a lesser extent of the development finance institutions (DFIs) has been of grave concern to successive regimes in Pakistan. But each regime has left them in a worse state than it found them, resulting in an ever-increasing banking crisis which has upset the World Bank and the IMF as well.

Each regime has tried to come up with its package of cures or reforms to check the misuse or abuse of bank deposits. It had come across and put the banks on the right track, but the package of reforms announced were either not implemented or very partially done.

As a result, the depositors in these five banks as well as the government, which has invested a great deal of money to keep their liquidity going, have been heavy losers. Contrary to the commitments made prior to Islamisation of banks, depositors are getting very poor returns on their deposits, and if the PLS [expansion unknown] profits are adjusted for inflation most of them

are losers. The government got a ridiculously low return of Rs6 [rupees] million from the five banks in the last financial year, and the bleak picture will not get any better this year as anticipation of profits is just as nominal.

Use of bank loans as political tools by successive regimes, large bad loans given through executive misdemeanour and robbing of banks, some times in collusion with the bank staff, have brought the banks to state of bankruptcy more or less.

If nationalisation made the banks a cesspool of corruption and increasing inefficiency, Islamisation of the banks has absolved the bank chiefs of the need to give depositors agreed returns. So while the depositors receive a return far below the real inflation rate, they agonise over the real value of their deposits getting depreciated constantly. It is only the severe checks placed on advances by foreign banks which have prevented more of the deposits being diverted to them to get better returns.

In such a dismal context successive regimes assume that if bank Presidents are reshuffled, and along with them members of the Board of Directors, and a couple of senior officials of the Ministry of Finance join the banks at the top, the rot could be checked, and the banks set on the right course initially. But such frequent playing around with the men at the top of the banks has not produced positive results.

The caretaker government, too, has done the same initially. It has reshuffled the bank Presidents, after dropping a controversial one, and appointed new boards of directors, along with a few promoted as directors. It is proposed to appoint a non-official director on the board of each bank, but can just one non-official amidst five bank officials and a nominee of the Ministry of Finance check the sad slide of the banks? Anyway, the non-official presence which the 1973 Bank Nationalisation Ordinance provided for is welcome. Despite that provision non-officials have hardly ever been appointed on public sector bank boards.

The allegations, which the past and present Ministers have come up with in respect of gross misuse of bank funds, are grave. Former Water and Power Minister Farooq Leghari has said the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government had proof that over Rs 100 billion of bank funds were misused by the government previous to the 1988 elections. He said Mr Nawaz Sharif had taken Rs2.45 billion from banks without proper collateral and M. Shujaat Hussain had taken Rs1.3 billion in the same manner.

While the figure of Rs100 billion bank funds misused seem to be an exaggeration, the statement of caretaker Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz that the government may suffer a loss of Rs1 billion because of improper collateral may seem an understatement.

But the statement of caretaker Commerce Minister Elahi Bux Soomro has even lower figures. He says that about Rs700 million had been written off by the banks. But it appears the State Bank of Pakistan has been asked by the government to conduct a study of the overall bank loans, collateral security provided, write-offs etc. How long will that study take? Even if the study is thorough the public may never get to know all the facts, although as depositors and clients of banks they are entitled to know such basic facts.

What is even more disturbing is the contention of Mr Sartaj Aziz that during the last 20 months 4,000 persons were recruited by the banks in violation of rules and in disregard of merit. He has called for legal cover to prevent such massive injection of additional staff when the banks are already over-stuffed top to bottom and yet banking efficiency is at its bottom.

The World Bank and the IMF, which have been watching the banking scene agitatedly want effective privatisation of banks. Mr Luis de Azcrate, chief of the World Bank in Pakistan, who left recently complained bitterly that the financial sector reform was not keeping pace with the Structural Adjustment Programme of the IMF. He said the economic growth which the Structural Adjustment envisaged could not come through without banking reform, recapitalisation of the banks and the necessary autonomy for the banks.

Dr Mahbubul Haq as Finance Minister came up with his banking reforms in 1985; but nothing much came out of that as he ceased to be Finance Minister shortly after that.

He came up with the same kind of reform proposals when he became Finance Minister again in 1988, but was out of the Cabinet again soon—following the general elections.

The PPP Government too came up with several suggestions but could not do much besides reshuffling the top personnel and adding far more staff to the banks. Now the caretaker Finance Minister talks of giving top-most priority to banking reforms and implementing the banking reforms of 1988. He is right in saying the fundamental reforms needed could not be implemented within the short time available to the caretakers, but a start would be made to clean up the banking sector so that the process could continue.

Dr Mahbubul Haq as Minister for Planning had said in 1986 that the bad debts of the banks given to the private sector were about Rs30 billion and to the public sector about Rs40 billion. Evidently the situation has become far worse demanding large recapitalisation of banks of the kind urged by the IMF.

The banks are plagued by four kinds of maladies.

(1) Large loans given since 1974 on a political basis and without adequate collateral.

(2) Loans given by senior bank executives on a dishonest basis. Some of the executives have left Pakistan and joined foreign banks abroad. Such bad loans have been given by bank executives not only in Pakistan but also abroad. As a result of massive frauds in the UBL [United Bank Ltd.?] and Muslim Commercial Bank in Britain Rs78.7 million had to be written off a few years ago. And now a large fraud had been detected in Habib Bank in Britain.

(3) Large non-performing loans to public sector enterprises which have been running on losses. They have been pulling down the banks, too, along with them.

(4) Increasing bank robberies, like the latest in Fish Harbour depriving Habib Bank of Rs eight lakh.

It is notable in contrast that foreign banks which are doing well in Pakistan have hardly any problems of embezzling funds by their staff or bank robberies. They are not afflicted by heavy bad loans to the public sector.

Apart from the comprehensive measures proposed in 1988, what the banks need now is efficient and prompt internal audit of their operations along with effective audit by external auditors. The Pakistan Banking Council, too, has to become very vigilant, instead of remaining more or less a superfluous body despite the senior bank executive who man it. The State Bank of Pakistan's audit of the banks has to become more effective and less nominal. Clearly all the auditors have failed conspicuously.

The dominance of the bank unions has to be checked and the present practice of bank officers, including seniors, virtually taking their orders from the union leaders ought to go now. Bank managers should not remain as helpless as they are now. The middle rank bank officers should not be paid very poorly compared to the union members and the senior executives.

In the area of large investment loans given by banks and DFIs, they must be used only for the purpose for which they were given, and not diverted to the private companies of the borrowers or to build palatial mansions or acquire luxury limousines.

The requisite collateral must be furnished where it is short or non-existent. Effective steps must be taken to ensure borrow honour the agreed equity-loan ratio, and really use their own money as committed.

In case of large loans advanced on the basis of land, evaluation of land should be done at the actual market value, and not exaggerated wildly as has, reportedly, been done in many cases of political loans.

Effective solutions must be found to reduce public sector loans, including thorough rapid privatisation and disposal of irreclaimable enterprises.

But all such cleaning of the banking sector has to begin with the caretaker Ministers who had taken large loans with no or inadequate collateral repaying the loans or providing the requisite collateral. If they will not, the

public will not take the banking reforms seriously. For that matter, even the bank staff may scoff at such moves and regard them farcical.

Of course, investment and commercial loans have to be given. Otherwise banks will not be able to pay returns to their depositors. But the bank loans should not be used for political purposes brazenly embezzled by the bank executives or squandered by the lower bank staff. The banks need all-round protection now after the gross misuse they have been put to.

Commentary Questions AJK Prime Minister's Views, Action

90AS0432B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
22 Aug 90 p 4

[Text] Azad Kashmir premier, Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, has really sprung a surprise, if not produced an absolute shocker. In his effort to set up Kashmir National Bank [KNB], he has outdone Mr Nawaz Sharif as Chief of Punjab who set up the Bank of Punjab [BOP] in defiance of the Centre. While Mr Sharif did not ask all Pakistani banks in the province to shut shop and go home, Mr Rathore has directed all Pakistani banks to close down and go off.

Evidently, the Azad Kashmir prime minister does not know the elementary banking principles and practices, while he is quick to announce setting up the Kashmir National Bank, with the accent on the "National," which the BOP does not claim to be. At a time when Pakistan is forced to permit increasing number of foreign bank branches on a reciprocal basis, as Pakistani banks function abroad, how can Mr Rathore expect Pakistan banks to pull their shutters down in Azad Kashmir and rush home? Will his KNB function only in Kashmir and not in the rest of Pakistan? If it will function all over Pakistan, will not Pakistani banks be enabled to function in AJK [Azad Jammu and Kashmir]?

If the KNB will open branches in Britain and elsewhere where Kashmiris are working, will not banks from those countries want to function in AJK? So what makes him think that his KNB will have absolute monopoly in AJK? In a period of increasing international competition and expiry of monopolies, how does Mr Rathore hope to make a success of his little banking monopoly?

Striking, indeed, is the manner in which the AJK Premier, who is a PPP [Pakistan People's Party] leader, is acting, utterly contrary to the PPP government's stance in respect of the Punjab Bank. Has this somersault come about now because of the PPP's exit from office in Pakistan?

In a stance more befitting a leader out for a UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence), he talks of the exploitation of AJK by Pakistan for the last 40 years, giving ample fuel to India's propaganda guns. He talks of the foreign exchange brought by AJK citizens to Pakistan, but it is also a fact that through devaluation of the

rupee, Azad Kashmiris are getting 120 percent more in rupees on their earnings than they did before devaluation. And if Azad Kashmir does not want to have anything much to do with Pakistan economically, how is the current president of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry a nominee of AJK, and there are Kashmir business houses all over Pakistan? The AJK Chief may claim Rs350 [rupees] million or more subsidy, but on the basis of merits of his case, he is now behaving more like Don Quixote than the premier of Azad Kashmir, which faces grave new challenges because of the tragic happenings in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

Economic Commentary Criticizes Feudalism, Rural Elite

90AS0444C Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
18 Aug 90 p 4

[Article by Anjum Ibrahim: "Social Justice Versus the Rural Elite"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The rich landlords of Pakistan have increasingly come under criticism over the last 43 years of the country's independence; but nothing has been done to make a dent in their power base—both political and economic.

That land is concentrated in the hands of a few cannot be denied. According to Pakistan Agriculture by Akhtar Mahmood and Forest Walters: 'There are 4.07 million farms in Pakistan cultivating 19.06 million hectares of land. About 74 percent of the total farms are characterised as small farms (below 5 hectares), but own only 34 percent of the total farm area. Medium farms (5 to 10 hectares) own 25 percent of the total farm area and constitute about 17 percent of total number of farms. Large farms (10 hectares or above) are only 9 percent of the total farms but occupy 41 percent of total farm area.' A rich landlord can point to the fact that agricultural surplus is wholly produced by the large and medium sized farms and hence if the government is to realise its export targets, due to the inordinate reliance placed on earning foreign exchange by the government on agricultural surplus, it must retain the status quo as regards the existing ownership of land. While no one can deny this fact yet it is essential to determine the reasons why.

Pakistan's agricultural output rose basically for five reasons. Firstly was the introduction of high yield seed varieties. Secondly due to increased usage of fertilizers. Thirdly was the increase in irrigation. Fourthly was the use of sophisticated machinery, largely imported, and for which cheap credit facilities were available from the government-owned financial sector. And finally the availability of subsidies on the one hand and cheap infrastructural facilities on the other. While these factors did increase Pakistan's agricultural surplus yet it was confined to the rich and the middle income farmers. This fact, by itself, proves conclusively that there was a correlation between the availability of these incentives

on the one hand and the economic and political clout of the farmer on the other. The oft-quoted case when, during Junejo's Premiership, zero interest loans meant specifically for the subsistence level farmers were hijacked by the rich proves the case that despite government's awareness of the deteriorating income inequality in the farm sector reforms almost always backfired. We have only to look at the failure of land reforms in 1959, 1972 and 1977. In the words of Mahmood and Walters: 'The implementation of all the three reforms fell far below the public expectations'. An unsatisfactory feature of these land reforms was that less than half of the excess land acquired from the big landowners was redistributed to target groups. Also, the best productive lands were surrendered and transferred within families preserved family control of large holdings. Thus the element of social justice is completely lacking as regards the 72 percent population of the country living in rural areas.

During the 1980s all efforts at land reform were abandoned. This is as much true of the dictatorial era of General Zia as it is of the democratic government of Ms Bhutto. The stress was and is on promotion of rural industrialisation so that people in rural areas could at least secure jobs. Ignored was the fact that rich landlords were displacing labour, and consequently increasing unemployment, through introduction of capital intensive farms methods. Also ignored was the fact that these same people contributed little to the increase in domestic savings of the country, a necessary prerequisite for increasing investment through lower reliance on foreign aid; and that their consumption patterns were largely geared towards procuring luxuries. And also ignored is the fact that even though the agricultural sector does pay taxes as a whole yet via subsidies they make substantial profits. Thus the present government has no intention of upsetting the applecart through the introduction of land reforms. The obvious conclusion that they could not institute reforms even if they wanted to go a long way in explaining the political power wielded by this class in our national and provincial assemblies.

Land concentration is the highest in Sindh followed by Balochistan, Punjab and NWFP [North-West Frontier Province]. Such has been the legacy since 1947. In other words no government has made a sufficient effort to transform the system into a more egalitarian one. And while growth rates are frequently quoted to show the financial success of a government in power the fate of the rural majority is neglected. Of course claims are periodically made that clean drinking water will be provided to all, as will electricity, health facilities and education; but these are implied to reflect a government's commitment to the poor (largely in the rural areas) as opposed to giving them social justice which is possible only through effective and meaningful land reforms.

The large land owning families of Pakistan also affect the urban middle and upper classes. This is possible because of the scarcity of water in the summer months—water which is used for both irrigation purposes and for electricity generation. By diverting water for irrigation

purposes, a necessity if we are to realise our export targets for the year, there is less available for power which leads to load-shedding which in turn leads to lower revenue of industrialists for whom power is a basic input. And with lower industrial output the economy grows at a slower rate than would have been possible otherwise. The fault here is really not the rich agriculturists but that of the government who succumbs to their pressure and still refuses to allocate more funds to WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority] for investment purposes and has still been unable to resolve the controversy surrounding Kalabagh Dam which could partially resolve the issue of scarce water in the country. Thus the rich landlords are responsible for (a) low savings in the country; (b) social injustice; and (c) loadshedding to some extent.

The question is has the total agricultural output in the country made Pakistan self-sufficient in food items at least? After all during the time of independence Pakistan had a surplus. The answer is 'no'. In fiscal year 1989-90 (July-March) Pakistan imported grains, pulses and flour valued at 8.8 billion rupees, and edible oil worth 6.1 billion rupees which was close to 14 percent of our total imports. Exports of agricultural products, inclusive of raw cotton, rice etc was 17.5 percent of total export in 1989-90 thus giving approximate exports of 0.85 billion rupees from our agricultural surplus and imports of one billion rupees to feed the population by keeping prices down possible through government legislation. The conclusion is that despite subsidies, despite controlling the prices of food crops, despite having support prices that are designed to ensure the income returns to the farmer and despite large land holdings Pakistan has lost the self-sufficiency in food that it enjoyed at the time of partition. This is particularly unfortunate considering that, as a nation, we have already compromised the principle of social justice in our rural areas.

One possible solution would be of course to institute land reforms keeping the element of social justice in mind. Land should not be appropriated by government decree but be bought at its market value by the government (possible through issuing bonds which should act as legal tender) prior to selling it to the poor farmer. The bonds will, in all probability, be used for setting up industries—and the government should attach the condition that the investment be used in rural areas. Incentives should be so provided. And the poor farmer through credit allocation, possible through education, should be given higher incentives as his yield increases. Eventually he should be liable to pay back the value of the land that the government allocates to him. This way the initial investment of the government will be zero and it will be redistributing resources of the rural sector within that sector. Unfortunately though this does not seem to be the policy trend of Ms Bhutto's government and as aforementioned she is pushing for rural industrialisation as a means of resolving the unemployment problems emanating from the rural sector—industrialisation which is expected to be engineered by existing businessmen and not by the rural elite. The

former are hesitant to move out of, or around, major cities, their markets, and the latter have shown little inclination to set up industries and have preferred to spend their wealth on gaining political votes or for procuring luxuries. Consequently this policy is doomed to failure; more so because rural areas do not have either the social or the physical infrastructure so necessary for the successful running of a production plant.

One should not make the mistake of under estimating the power of the rural elite in Pakistan with their

access to unlimited loans from the state-controlled financial sector and their ability to get these loans written off largely due to the political power enjoyed by them. Unless the government can break the basis of their political and consequently economic power the status quo will be maintained. It is pertinent to note that even during military dictatorships in Pakistan the feudals continued to enjoy the same privileges. Without a leadership dedicated to evolving social justice it seems unlikely that the situation will change.