


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SOUTH AFRICA

Air Force Head on Development of Aircraft

34000271B Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English
17 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Fred de Lange: "Development of SA Fighter Will Go On"]

[Text] South Africa [SA] would have to accommodate a programme for the development of fighter aircraft even if the Defence Budget were cut, says the Chief of the Air Force, Gen Jan van Loggerenberg.

The SAAF's [South African Air Force] current fleet of fighters had a lifespan that would take it to the beginning of the next century, but no further.

Work on the development of such a fighter has already started, but Gen Van Loggerenberg said one should not expect a fighter which would be right on the edge of technology.

"The fighter we are developing will suit our requirements and will be built taking our situation into consideration. It will not, however, be on the edge of technology such as, for instance, the Israeli Lavi project."

The Israelis were very ambitious with the Lavi project and because of that the project had to be cancelled.

"Allegations that South Africa is now planning to complete the Lavi project are ridiculous. If the Israelis could not afford it, how would we?"

The government had already made it clear that it wanted to cut state spending. This also had implications for the Defence Budget.

This would necessitate a reorganisation of activities and projects.

The assurance, however, was given that the project to manufacture South Africa's own fighter would not be halted, despite the possibility of cuts in the Defence Budget in the near future.

"One must take notice of the changing situation, but we cannot be placed in a situation where South Africa would be left without an effective air force."

Meanwhile, South Africa's existing fighters had been modernised in such a way that they still represented an adequate threat to possible enemies.

"The South African Air Force is ready and able to defend South Africa. The Mirage and the Cheetah that you now see flying have very little in common with the aircraft delivered to us originally."

He did, however, express concern over the fact that the SAAF was losing key personnel to the private sector. This not only included flying and maintenance, but also support and administrative personnel.

The reasons for air force personnel leaving varied.

A main reason was money, but pilots were especially leaving because they were concerned over what they would fly in 10 years' time. A further problem was bureaucracy and red tape.

"We cannot afford to lose these people any longer and for that reason the air force is looking into its structure, with the possibility of changing the system in such a way that air force personnel have more access to the right people with complaints of any kind."

Air Force Chief on Restructuring of Force

34000271C Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English
17 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Fred de Lange: "SADF 'Won't Be Turned Upside Down'"]

[Text] The Chief of the Air Force and chairman of the Van Loggerenberg Committee. Lt-General Jan van Loggerenberg, said yesterday no major restructuring of the defence force could be expected in the near future, but a shortening of national service could not be excluded.

The Van Loggerenberg Committee is investigating the South African Defence Force [SADF] structure and manpower requirements.

In an interview yesterday, Gen van Loggerenberg said the committee would release an interim report on its findings early next year, but the investigation was still continuing.

"We do not expect to make recommendations which would turn the defence force upside down, but at the same time one can expect some major and significant recommendations."

Changes in the security situation in South Africa over the last few months have altered the requirements of the defence force, and in this regard changes might be necessary.

Gen van Loggerenberg, however, excluded the possibility of the South African Defence Force becoming a professional army with no national service as had been advocated by some groups in South Africa.

"In the light of national budget cuts and the need to reduce the size of the civil service, there is just no way South Africa could afford a professional defence force."

"The committee is, however, open to all interested groups and individuals, with no exception, to air their views on the defence force."

These views or comments, Gen van Loggerenberg said, would be thoroughly considered by the committee before a final report was drawn up.

Spokesman: No Changes to SADF Call-up System

34000263C Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
29 Nov 89 p 3

[Untitled article by Daniel Simon]

[Text] No specific changes were envisaged with regard to the SADF's [South African Defence Force] annual military service intake programme for conscripts—including next year's batch, an SADF spokesman said yesterday.

In February next year, thousands of school-leavers and university graduates will continue to report for and complete two years of military service.

An SADF spokesman said the present call-up system would continue to function as it always had.

He could not rule out, however, the possibility of the Van Loggerenberg Commission recommending changes to the system once it handed in its findings to Defence Minister Magnus Malan in the new year.

The Van Loggerenberg Commission was appointed by Malan in April to look into SADF policy to the year 2000.

The commission's function is to evaluate the positioning and needs of the SADF with areas of investigation, including environmental factors, manpower needs and aviation. The commission is expected to hand in its findings to Malan early next year.

The spokesman said with recent developments in Namibia and the southern African region as a whole, the burden of compulsory yearly camps on thousands of Civilian Force and Commando Force members was being reduced gradually.

'Drastic' Defense Force Cuts Detailed

MB1901165790 Johannesburg *SAPA* in English
1545 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Text] Pretoria, January 19 (SAPA)—Drastic measures to prune the size of the South African Defence Force [SADF] in accordance with State President F.W. de Klerk's reform initiatives were announced at Voortrekkerhoogte on Friday [19 January] by the acting chief of the SADF, Lt-Gen Kat Liebenberg.

SAAF [South African Air Force] aircraft would be withdrawn from service and sold, SADF units would be disbanded, SADF members retrenched and far-reaching restructuring would be effected to make the SADF "smaller and more cost-effective", he told military correspondents at a briefing.

Gen Liebenberg also said major weapon and equipment projects would be cancelled, but he gave the assurance that the adjustments would "not affect the operational capability or preparedness of the Defence Force".

The rationalisation drive would see:

- The withdrawal and sale of five types of aircraft;
- The cancellation of a range of capital projects;

- The scaling down of the Army's group HQ;
- The disbandment of SADF units and SAAF squadrons;
- "Drastic curtailments" in running costs;
- The "considerable" scaling down of the naval bases at Simon's Town and Walvis Bay; and
- The disbandment of Naval Command West at Silvermine and Naval Command East in Durban.

Gen Liebenberg said the adjustments, approved by the minister of defence, Gen Magnus Malan, would enable the SADF to "make its contribution to the reduction of state expenditure in the interests of South Africa and all its people".

About 2,000 members of the Navy, both civilian and uniformed personnel of all ranks, would be retrenched or retired, the chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral Dries Putter, announced.

This would constitute 15.6 per cent of Navy personnel, national servicemen included.

It appeared the Army would need to lay off only 22 labourers at a horse breeding farm at De Aar.

The chief of the Air Force, Lieut-Gen Jan van Loggerenberg, said because the Air Force was "terribly undermanned," it would be able to absorb most members of disbanded squadrons and units.

The aircraft to be withdrawn from service would be the Canberras, the Super Frelon helicopters, the Westland Wasp helicopters, the Kudus and the Albatrosses.

The SAAF's Southern Air Command and Western Air Commands were being scaled down, he said.

Gen Liebenberg said he was not in a position to give comprehensive figures regarding the number of personnel being retrenched, or exact details on the reduction of the defence budget.

He could not discuss the budget until it had been approved by Parliament.

Military analysts said if one took into account the effect of the shortened national service period, the SADF may be left with about 30 percent to 40 percent less "boots on the grounds" than before.

At the same briefing, ARMSCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] announced its group staff complement would be cut by a further 2,100 employees—about 10 per cent—as part of its rationalisation programme this year.

This would be achieved though a combination of natural attrition, retirements on pension and lay-offs.

ARMSCOR spokesman Tielman de Waal said he feared the rationalisation process would lead to a number of bankruptcies among ARMSCOR's suppliers.

ARMSCOR said its design, manufacturing and marketing capabilities could now be used to the advantage of other sectors of industry.

Companies in the armaments industry would increasingly diversify to the commercial sector, with the emphasis on "replacing imports and creating new products for export".

Some companies in the armaments industry were already performing well in this field, while most of the others had the potential to do so.

ARMSCOR however said there was no possibility of the arms boycott against South Africa being lifted, and South Africa therefore had to continue to strive for self-sufficiency in armaments.

"The primary mission of the armaments industry therefore remains unchanged," ARMSCOR said.

ARMSCOR was encouraged by the successes being achieved in arms exports despite strong competition.

"The South African armaments industry had already built up a reputation as a reliable supplier on the world market, and repeat orders are beginning to be realised."

It was not envisaged that more ARMSCOR facilities would be closed down, but a high priority was being given to the continued improvement of productivity.

The four arms of the SADF will be pruned as follows:

The Army:

There will be "drastic" curtailments in running costs, and 11 major weapons and equipment projects have been cancelled.

Some 49 further projects will either be reduced or delayed.

Its group HQ will be scaled down, the horse breeding farm at De Aar will be closed down, and a thorough investigation into the future role and tasks of the SA Army Women's College at George will be made. It will however continue to exist as a training institution for women in the army.

The Air Force:

Five type of aircraft will be scrapped, units will be disbanded or scaled down, equipment will be withdrawn, "quite a lot of" projects cancelled, the personnel composition of the SAAF will be changed, and squadrons will be disbanded or moved.

AFB PE [Air Force base Port Elizabeth] will be disbanded. Squadron 16 (Alouette helicopters), 12 (Canberas), 25 (Dakotas), and 27 (Albatrosses) will be disbanded and their personnel transferred.

35 Squadron (Dakotas) will however continue to exercise maritime control, Gen van Loggerenberg said.

Two air commando squadrons (107 AFB Hoedspruit and 114 AFB Swartkop) will disband, and their members will be transferred.

Southern and Western Air Commands are being scaled down.

The Navy:

Admiral Putter said no ships would be withdrawn from service, but three capital projects had been cancelled.

"Two guidelines followed throughout were that the sea-going fighting ability of the Navy must not be impaired but, where possible improved, and training must enjoy a high priority to enable the navy to maintain a high level of operational readiness," he said.

The marine branch will however be disbanded and its bases at Richard's Bay, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town closed down.

The naval bases at Walvis Bay and Simon's Town will be scaled down.

Naval Commands West and East at respectively Silvermine and Durban will be disbanded, and their functions taken over by naval HQ in Pretoria or delegated to the commanding officers concerned.

All flotillas will now fall under direct control of the chief of the Navy.

Units that will be scaled down include Simon's Town naval dockyard, armaments depot and depot support group, Durban's naval dockyard, armaments depot and stores depot.

Organisational changes will be made at SAS [expansion unknown] Wingfield, the stores depot, and other units there.

About 2,000 members of the Navy will be retrenched or retired.

The SA Medical Service:

The surgeon-general of the SA medical service, Lieut-Gen Niel Knobel, said the service had reviewed certain aspects in order to become more cost effective and professional.

- No "step-outs" (formal uniforms) will be issued in future to national servicemen;
- 12, 13 and 15 Medical Supply Depots are being closed;
- Computer systems and centres are being consolidated;
- Medicines are being rationalised and standardised; and
- Sick bays and clinics are being consolidated and scaled down in accordance with the scaling down of the other arms of the SADF.

Cui Naifu Visits Tianjin-Based Tank Division

*OW0501121690 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1300 GMT 30 Dec 89*

[Untitled article by reporters Hu Nianqiu (5170 1628 4428) and Chen Hui (7115 6540)]

[Text] Tianjin, 30 December (XINHUA)—Minister Cui Naifu and other responsible comrades of the Ministry of Civil Affairs paid a New Year's visit to a certain tank division of the Beijing Military Region today.

When they arrived at the place where the troops were stationed, they were warmly welcomed by the officers and soldiers of the division.

The tank division of the Beijing Military Region, stationed at a place in Tianjin, is the first crack force of the People's Liberation Army [PLA]. It distinguished itself in action during wartime. It also made a new contribution during the period of quelling riot in Beijing. In recent years, this division paid particular attention to grass-roots construction, thus becoming an advanced unit of grass-roots construction in the Beijing Military Region. The officers and men of this division respect the local government and cherish the people. They actively support socialist economic construction. In addition, they have been launching a military-civilian cooperation drive. In a total of 92 "military-civilian cooperative projects," 33 were rated as an advanced unit of cultural and ideological progress by governments of county level or above. During their visit, Cui Naifu and other responsible comrades conveyed, on behalf of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, New Year's greetings of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council to the Army. They heard a briefing on this division and reports by heroic and model soldiers. They praised the great achievements this division had already made and expressed their hope that all the officers and men in this division would carry on the excellent tradition of the People's Army in a continuing effort to strengthen military construction and military affairs, and unity between the military and civilians, to achieve gloriously all the tasks assigned to them by the CPC Central Committee and CPC Central Military Commission. On behalf of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Cui Naifu presented silk banners and gifts to the troops. He also held a forum with grass-roots officers and men to hear suggestions about the work of the ministry.

Cui Naifu and other responsible persons also paid a visit today to local families of martyrs and military personnel.

Participating in this consolatory activity were Zhou Wenyan, deputy director of the General Political Department, and responsible comrades of the Beijing Military Region and the Tianjin Garrison District.

Export of Military Vessels To Asia Reported

*HK1601033190 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE
in Chinese 0942 GMT 15 Jan 90*

[Report by reporter Wei Lin (7279 2651): "China Is Developing An Export Market in Asia for Its Military Vessels"—ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE headline]

[Text] Beijing, 15 January (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—The China Shipping Company announced for the first time that after several years of effort, the company has opened up an Asian market for military shipping and other military supplies. Since 1987, the company has signed export contracts for a total of 18 military vessels and 13 sets of boat-related bridges.

Zhou Shou, newly appointed general manager of the company, revealed the above news today. He said that the technical performance of two guided missile escort vessels involved in a signed contract last year, is generally comparable with that of Western counterparts of the 1980's.

It was learned that China has produced a combined total of more than 6,000 military and auxiliary vessels. At present, trading in some exports for military use is being negotiated.

Xiang Shouzhi Attends Nanjing Military Meeting

*OW1601193190 Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese
26 Dec 89 p 2*

[Excerpts] A 4-day congress of the Nanjing Military Region for units and individuals advanced in grass-roots construction concluded yesterday.

The congress agreed that the military region basically accomplished the goal set by its party committee to put an end to the weakened situation in grass-roots construction within 3 years. Now, the vast number of officers have acquired a firm, clear-cut political stand and maintained a high degree of political unity with the Central Committee. They are hard working and loyal; they put the interest of national economic construction and Army buildup above everything else; and they have displayed a high degree of political consciousness. [passage omitted]

On behalf of the Military Region party committee, Political Commissar Fu Kuiqing delivered a report entitled: "Comprehensively Implement the Program for Grass-roots Construction in the Military and Carry Out Grass-roots Construction in Depth and on a Long-term Basis." [passage omitted]

At the congress, leaders of the Nanjing Military Region including Xiang Shouzhi, Fu Kuiqing, Shi Yuxiao, Zhang Ming, and Wang Tailang presented awards to the advanced units and individuals. [passage omitted]

State Rocket To Launch Third Arab Satellite

OW2101165690 Beijing XINHUA in English
1439 GMT 21 Jan 90

[Text] Amman, January 21 (XINHUA)—The Great Wall Foundation of China has won the bid to launch the third Arab satellite, Muhammad Shahin Isma'il, director-general of the Jordanian office of the Arab Organization for Satellite Communications (ARABSAT), announced.

In a statement carried by today's daily "AL RA'Y," Ismail said that the launching of the satellite is scheduled for the end of the year 1991.

Ismail made this statement upon his return from the January 13-18 meetings of ARABSAT experts and a two-day meeting of the ministerial committee of the eight-member ARABSAT organization in the Omani capital of Muscat.

Arabsat, a 400-million-dollar network which groups Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Morocco, Iraq, Syria and Jordan, began operations in 1985. It has two satellites, A-A and A-B, in orbit.

U.S. Defense Cuts, Economy Considered

HK2201084790 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
17 Jan 90 p 7

["Economic Jottings" by Sun Yi (1327 3015): "Dual Influence of Cutting Military Expenditure on the U.S. Economy"]

[Text] As the world situation is changing from tense to relaxed, a sign of reducing the defense budget has also appeared in the United States. Recently, President Bush has drawn up a plan to reduce the defense expenditure in the next fiscal year by \$13 billion. Although this is an insignificant amount as compared with the total defense budget (accounting for a little more than 2 percent), it has still aroused the interest of many economists. They optimistically hold that if military expenditure can be cut, more funds and labor will be shifted to the civilian sector of the economy, and the defense industry, with its sophisticated equipment, will also make contributions to civilian production. This will help lower the federal budgetary deficit, and will thus mitigate the pressure of demand for cash on the financial market and lower interest rates. So, a positive impact will thus be produced on the U.S. economy and its sustained and steady growth will be better ensured.

Some people use the approach of comparative economics to analyze the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in the United States and Japan, and draw the following conclusion: For every 1 percent of GNP allocated for military purposes, the economic growth rate will be lowered by about 0.5 percent. In Japan, military expenditure accounts for about 1 percent of GNP; but in the United States, the

proportion is 6 percent. The different proportions constituted by military expenditure in the two countries' GNPs mean that as long as other conditions are basically similar, Japan's economic growth rate will be 2 to 3 percentage points higher than that of the United States.

Other people use the approach of econometrics to develop a mathematical model and reach a more accurate prediction: Because a decrease in the budgetary deficit may lead to lower interest rates and vice versa, and because interest rates and exchange rates can also affect each other, if the U.S. defense budget is cut by 1 percent every year from 1989 to 1995, the federal government's budgetary deficit in 1995 will have decreased to \$63.8 billion from the present level of \$152.1 billion; and the deficit in the current account of the federal government can also be decreased from \$130 billion to \$33.6 billion.

Obviously, if the above predictions are truly scientific and prove to be accurate, then cutting defense expenditure should be regarded as a "good remedy" for solving the two major knotty problems that are eating into the U.S. economy and for freeing the U.S. economy from the present predicament of low-speed growth.

However, it must be noticed that the U.S. economy has been developed on the basis of a high degree of militarization. Under such a special condition, cutting down on military expenditure may have some positive impact on economic growth, but may also bring about certain negative effects. In other words, in the United States, the measure of cutting military expenditure will only play a very limited role in boosting the national economy as a whole.

First, the defense industry has been developed to an extremely great extent in the United States and has become a major sector of its national economy. It is estimated that at present, about one-third of the enterprises in the whole country are related directly or indirectly to the production of armaments and military equipment. The defense industry accounts for about 20 percent of the country's total industrial production. For example, production and services for military purposes account for 80 percent of the aviation and astronautics industry, 60 percent of the ship-building and nonferrous metallurgical industries, 40 percent of the electronics industry, and over 10 percent of the chemical, iron and steel, petrochemical, air transport, and shipping industries. Obviously, the shrinking of the defense industry, which constitutes a major part of the national economy, will lead directly to disorder in the cycle of social reproduction. Of course, some necessary structural adjustments may follow in the domestic economy of the United States, but the present U.S. economic structure is already in a serious state of imbalance, so any further changes in the defense industry will present great difficulties.

Second, many major industrial enterprises in the United States are engaged in defense production. Such large

companies as General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, IBM, Boeing, and Ford are the Pentagon's largest contractors. Defense production contracts bring hundreds of billions in business to these private enterprises every year. Therefore, military purchases constitute a major integral part of gross domestic demand. If the federal government reduces its military expenditure, the present insufficiency in gross social demand will be further worsened. Recently, some mass media in the United States openly pointed out that a large-scale reduction in military expenditure will deal a disastrous blow to armaments manufacturers.

The dual effects of cutting military expenditure on the domestic economy of the United States are not difficult to discover. In the long run, this will certainly be favorable to world peace and economic development, but the present special role of the defense industry in the development of the U.S. economy must not be neglected. Therefore, although the economic forecasts based on certain mathematical models show favorable prospects, no matter how accurate the calculations are, the actual results will still have to be contingent on the interaction of various political, economic, and military factors in reality, and even changes in other countries' economic policies and in the international trade and financial situation.

It must also be mentioned here that since World War II, the comparatively long periods of sustained growth in the U.S. economy have been precisely the periods of World War II, the Korean War, and the Indochinese war, in which the economy was propelled by increases in

military expenditure, which swelled to an unprecedented degree. Moreover, in the first few years after the end of each war, the U.S. economy was bogged down in a standstill without exception. Therefore, it will never be easy for the United States to cut its military expenditure by a substantial margin.

'Top-Secret' CPC Plan to Add Border Troops

HK2401105190 Hong Kong CHENG MING in Chinese No 148, 1 Feb 90 pp 6-8

[“Notes on the Northern Journey” by Lo Ping (5012 0393): “Top-Secret Documents of the CPC on Repudiating Gorbachev” First two paragraphs are CHENG MING’s introduction]

[Excerpt] Jiang Zemin criticized Gorbachev, saying that he “is basically of the ilk of Karl Kautsky of the Second International, as he has betrayed the international communist movement and the Communist Party.” Jiang said: “He just cannot shirk his responsibility for the currently deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe.” In this connection, the CPC top leadership has decided to downgrade the party’s relations with its Soviet counterpart. The Beijing Municipal CPC Committee has promptly mobilized its professional writers to start a new round of criticism against the CPSU.

It is said that the CPC has drawn up a secret plan and will begin to deploy an additional 18 divisions of troops along the Sino-Soviet border this spring. A strategic staff officers’ group has already been sent to inspect strategic points along the border. [passages omitted].

AUSTRALIA

Government May Send Troops to Bougainville

*BK1901093790 Melbourne Overseas Service in English
0800 GMT 19 Jan 90*

[Text] Australia's foreign affairs minister, Senator Gareth Evans, said Australia's Defense Forces might be used on the Papua New Guinea island of Bougainville if the security of Australians becomes a serious risk.

Radio Australia's diplomatic correspondent, Stewart Heather, reports from Port Moresby the contingency plan has been drawn up for an evacuation. Senator Evans said he has talked with the prime minister, Mr Hawke, who has agreed there will be an appropriate response if Australians are at, what he termed, a real and imminent risk.

On Bougainville today, an Australian journalist was wounded when a helicopter came under fire; 36-year-old Mr Mark Baker of the MELBOURNE SUNDAY HERALD newspaper was shot in the shoulder and evacuated to the Panguna Medical Center by military helicopter. Radio Australia correspondent on the island, Rob Reskie, said it is believed Mr Baker was not badly injured.

JAPAN

Defense Agency Plans To Introduce Air Tankers

*OW1301042890 Tokyo NHK General Television
Network in Japanese 1000 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] The Defense Agency has finalized a plan to introduce air tankers, which will help fighters radically increase their cruising range, for the first time in the next defense program beginning in fiscal 1991.

Commenting on the plan, the Defense Agency noted that since Soviet forces in the Far East are modernizing their fighters, it has become necessary to increase the capability of patrol aircraft and fighters to stand by in the sky for longer periods so that they can watch and intercept fighters from an adversary nation. However, this plan will likely come under fire because of the anticipated criticism that such a move runs counter to the principle of "defense exclusively for self-defense," and poses a threat to neighboring nations.

Firm Buys Rights to Soviet Space Technology

*OW1701183290 Tokyo KYODO in English 1424 GMT
17 Jan 90*

[Text] Tokyo, January 17 (KYODO)—A Japanese trading firm has purchased the rights to use and sell Soviet space technology database, the company said Wednesday. The Horie Group, a Tokyo trading company specializing in space industry, which bought a Soviet Mir space station last year, told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that the database was compiled by the Soviet

space control center and includes the latest information on the technology of the Soviet space shuttle "Buran." This is the first release of such information by the Soviet Union to a foreign nation, the company said. Other information in the database concerns technologies of the Soviet manned space flight program, which has established a world record of more than a year's stay in space by cosmonauts, the company said.

The Soviet space agency, Glavkosmos, the nerve center of the space research program in the Soviet Union, deals in the training of astronauts, launching of the space shuttle, and landing and retrieval control of the Mir space station. The information in the database is compiled in both Russian and English.

The Horie Group declined to disclose the price it paid for the database rights. But the company said it has already started to accept applications for information retrieval on magnetic tapes and in printed form. The price for retrieval will be the international standard charge, the firm said, without elaborating. Direct retrieval by computers will be available around May, company officials said.

The firm bought the Mir space station and the accompanying Kvant experimental science module last year. They were put on display at last year's world design exposition in Nagoya. The Mir and Kvant modules on display in Nagoya were identical to the ones launched in February 1986 and now orbiting the earth.

The database is assorted in eight different categories, and in one of these, some 100,000 files carry information on Soviet space science and industrial technologies since 1961, the officials said. This category, which also includes information on space medicine, will be updated four times a year. Another category deals with macromolecular composites, with some 8,000 files inputted since 1986. About 122,000 files cover welding on the ground and in space. The metallurgy category has some 120,000 files, they said.

The head of Glavkosmos, V. Lobachev, visited Japan and met government and company officials in October 1989 to promote the sale of space information to Japanese companies. "We would like to provide data on all fields of our space development technologies we have amassed for 40 years," Lobachev said while in Japan last year. Glavkosmos and a private Japanese television network, Tokyo Broadcasting System Inc. (TBS), agreed last year to put two TBS journalists on the Mir sometime in 1991.

Space experts say the Soviet Union has accumulated know-how on manned space flights over the last three years when the United States stopped much of its research in the field after the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986. Soviet cosmonauts spent a record 366 days continuously in space up to December 1988.

Lobachev has said his agency has established methods to prevent space sickness and found ways to increase the calcium in human bones, which is depleted by prolonged stays in zero gravity space. Japanese space experts also say the acquisition of Soviet space information especially in the field of manned space flights, will be valuable to the Japanese space development program. The National Space Development Agency (NASDA), Japan's governmental space agency, plans to join a manned space station program with the U.S., some European countries, and Canada.

Spokesman on Soviet Withdrawal From Vietnam

OW1901105590 Tokyo KYODO in English 1020 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, January 19 (KYODO)—Japan welcomes the Soviet decision to withdraw military aircraft from facilities on Vietnam's Camh Ranh Bay, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Friday. "We welcome that announcement from the viewpoint of peace and stability in the Southeast Asia region," said spokesman Taizo Watanabe in a meeting with foreign correspondents. "But we would like to see what is really going to happen, not only as to the remaining aircraft, but also other ground facilities and forces," Watanabe said.

The spokesman was referring to Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perilyev's announcement in Moscow earlier Friday that MiG-23 fighters and Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance planes at the Cam Ranh airfield were withdrawn at the end of 1989, leaving only a squadron of other aircraft. Perilyev said the move was in line with the Soviet plan to convert its Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific region "to a purely defensive structure" and thus help defuse regional political-military tension.

A senior Foreign Ministry official said while the partial withdrawal is welcomed by Japan from a political standpoint, its strategic significance is questionable. The official said the Soviet move, which has no major effect on the overall military balance, is aimed at garnering Moscow political points from Southeast Asian countries. Japan's national security interests are more directly concerned with Soviet naval power in Vladivostok, he said.

The official said the withdrawal represents a dissolution of Moscow's earlier proposal to remove its naval presence in Cam Ranh Bay if the United States does likewise in the Philippines. The two are strategically "incomparable," he said. Watanabe also noted reports that Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told a U.S. Senate delegation Friday that all Soviet forces in Asia would be withdrawn in the not-too-distant future. Defense Agency officials would not comment on Shevardnadze's remarks, but said they are now attempting to confirm the extent of the Soviet pullout from Cam Ranh Bay.

Agency officials said they noted heavy air traffic from the strategic bay in the South China Sea to the Soviet Far

East late last month. But defense officials have downplayed the significance of any possible pullout of air forces from Cam Ranh Bay, warning that the planes could be redeployed at any time because facilities there have been greatly expanded.

Any reduction in Soviet aircraft would not directly influence Japan's defense policy, according to the officials. But the withdrawal is nevertheless expected to bolster the Soviet argument for talks with Japan and the United States on mutual naval reductions in the Pacific. Japan and the U.S. have rejected the Soviet equating of reductions in naval power with cuts in ground forces, saying they need naval superiority to counter the Soviet superiority on land.

Japan, which last month boosted its defense budget for fiscal 1990 by 6.1 percent, has asserted that the Soviets have been upgrading the quality of their forces in the region. It has also suggested that the quantitative reductions in Soviet forces in the region should be viewed with an eye to the already excessive level of Soviet military power deployed here.

Muses-A Spacecraft Successfully Launched

OW2401125090 Tokyo KYODO in English 1233 GMT 24 Jan 90

[Text] Tokyo, January 24 (KYODO)—Japan launched its first moon-bound space probe on Wednesday from a southern Japanese space center. If successful the launch will make Japan the third nation to put a craft on the moon behind the United States and the Soviet Union. The launch of the Muses-A spacecraft, carrying 2 satellites, was originally scheduled for Tuesday night, but was canceled 18 seconds before liftoff due to technical difficulties.

NORTH KOREA

Military Cooperation With USSR Intensifies

902C0066 Seoul NAEWOWE TONGSIN in Korean No 661, 13 Oct 89 pp 1C-6C

[Excerpts] Seoul (NAEWOWE)—Recently, North Korea has become an international object of attention as it has created a militaristic atmosphere on the Korean peninsula with rapid development of nuclear weapons while strengthening its relationship with the Soviet Union for military cooperation.

The Soviet Government-operated Radio Moscow in its broadcast on 4 October admitted that North Korea [DPRK]/USSR joint naval maneuvers had been held covertly every year in the Eastern Sea since 1986. Earlier, the South Korean [ROK] Ministry of National Defense released a statement that the DPRK and USSR, mobilizing over 50 of the latest fighter planes and more than 40 warships, had conducted DPRK/USSR joint naval maneuvers covertly in the northern waters of the

Eastern Sea in the period of the last 10 days of September. The Moscow broadcast was a comment in response to the ROK statement, and revealed, "As a matter of fact, warships from both the USSR Pacific Fleet and the DPRK Fleet conducted joint training exercises in the final days of September." However, Radio Moscow claimed that unlike the statement from the ROK Ministry of National Defense, only 7 ocean-going warships, 20 boats of various types, and only a third of the number of last year's level of aircraft were mobilized; therefore, the ROK Ministry of National Defense had exaggerated by approximately 5 times the figures. Again, arguing that the training exercises were of a semidefensive nature, the broadcast went on to comment on the statement of the ROK Ministry of National Defense which had pointed out that the exercises constituted a threat to the situation on the Korean peninsula and the Far East region, and contended that the statement "could not but be evaluated as a foolish attempt to divert the public and its eyes and ears from the practical, dangerous, positive military acts such as 'Team-Spirit' training."

Such a report by Radio Moscow in connection with the DPRK/USSR joint training exercises represented a delayed admission of the facts, confirmed on many occasions by the informed national defense sources of the West, let alone South Korea's. What makes it worthy of attention that details of the report by the Moscow broadcast were released at a time when Gorbachev of the Soviet Union was launching positive peace offensives with unilateral reductions in its war-making capacity by carrying out perestroika and a diplomacy of new thinking is this: Despite its continuing peace offensives, the Soviet Union is not slackening the reins on its Far East war machine, and especially by strengthening its relationship with North Korea for military cooperation, it is creating the effect of adding a feeling of unease to the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula. In fact, the U.S. Department of Defense in its annual report of 27 September also pointed out the effects of military cooperation between North Korea and the Soviet Union affecting the situation on the Korean peninsula.

The annual report assessed the situation that North Korea's continued military threat to South Korea is growing and at present the overall balance of military forces still remains in favor of the North Korean side. Analyzing that in particular, despite extreme economic difficulties, North Korea would continue to strive for the improvement of firepower and mobility of the armed forces and military support, the report pointed out that the military cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea which is unmistakably increasing of late is worrisome. Earlier, in its research report the Heritage Foundation, a private U.S. research institution, pointed out that on the heels of having acquired from the Soviet Union the latest weapons such as MiG-23's and close ground support fighters, SU-25's, North Korea has, since last year, received from the Soviet Union MiG-29's which are the most advanced aircraft. As a quid pro quo,

North Korea granted the Soviet Union the right to fly across the North Korean territorial sky on its way to Vietnam, a route which, compared to the route over the Strait of Korea previously used by the Soviets, is difficult for the radar bases in South Korea or Japan to cover. Because of that, the probability is known to be high that Soviet aircraft will make use of this route for intelligence activities against the South. In particular, the close ground support fighters, the SU-25's, supplied to North Korea by the Soviet Union are so-called tank killers of a type similar to the U.S. ground attacking A-10's, and although shorter in cruising range, the Soviet aircraft are heavily armed with 30 mm cannon and rockets. As such, they are attack planes destroying ground targets at a low speed beyond the limits of regular jets. They are the latest aircraft first used in Afghanistan. The continued strengthening of the Soviet military relationship with North Korea can be interpreted as meaning that despite the declaration on disarmament by Communist Party General Secretary Gorbachev and the global trend of arms reductions such as troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, and Mongolia, the Soviet Union is reinforcing in the Far East Region alone its military hardware and troops, along with strengthening military aid to North Korea. North Korea, continuing to increase its military power on a sustained basis on the strength of such Soviet military aid, has recently hurried up its development of nuclear weapons. According to what has been revealed by the Western press and informed U.S. Government sources, in the period of the last 10 days of August, North Korea has constructed a second nuclear facility as part of its effort to develop nuclear weapons in the vicinity of Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province, where a reactor already exists, and it has been pointed out that North Korea will have the capability of making nuclear weapons in a few years. However, inasmuch as North Korea's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons is possible only with the Soviet supply of a nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel, it is too early to predict the realization of such a project.

It is a fact that through the 1980's North Korea has been putting every effort into making practical use of nuclear power, such as creating formally the Ministry of Atomic Power Industry in the State Administration Council in the autumn of 1986. It has been known that an atomic reactor loaded with 75 tons of natural metallic uranium, thermal output 30 MW [megawatts], went into trial operation in October 1987, and that with uranium mines discovered in areas such as Hamhung, Unggi, and Hae Kumgang with deposits estimated at millions of tons, a uranium dressing station is in operation in North Pyongan Province, with a daily dressing capacity of 300 kg of uranium ore. This level of facilities and resources has the capacity to manufacture 7-8 kg of nuclear materials and a 1 kg nuclear bomb. Earlier, following the conclusion of the DPRK/USSR agreement on the peaceful utilization of atomic power in September 1959, North Korea invited nuclear physicists from the Dubna Joint Institute of Nuclear Research in the Soviet Union to assist in accumulating nuclear technology. Again, in

1964, when China acquired nuclear capability, it invited North Korean specialists to become involved in academic exchanges, and every time a nuclear test was held North Korean scholars attended. At present in North Korea there are approximately 5,000 nuclear specialists and technicians in place, and for nearly 25 years since 1965 when it put into operation a 3,000 kW test reactor in Yongbyon, it has been accumulating nuclear technology independently on its own. The Western press estimates that North Korea will have the capability to make nuclear bombs by 1995 at the latest, complete with facilities such as the necessary reactor for nuclear materials and nuclear detonator test ground; and Kim Il-song has been emphasizing that the U.S. nuclear umbrella must be neutralized by acquiring the nuclear capability during his lifetime. Even as North Korea has internally been launching covert efforts to develop nuclear weapons, it has been making nuclear-free arguments in its external propaganda, and toward the end of March 1981 when the chairman of Japan Socialist Party visited Pyongyang, he suggested that the Korean peninsula be turned into a nuclear-free zone, thus taking a two-faced attitude.

In the final analysis, the behind-the-scenes objective which North Korea, riding on the coattails of the Soviet Union, is pursuing is the development, in earnest, of nuclear weapons along with military cooperation, and can be explained basically as its intent to maintain the advantage in the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula. The total troop strength of North Korea as of the end of 1988 was revealed recently in the ROK National Defense White Paper to be 870,000, a figure by far surpassing the ROK strength of 650,000. Although North Korea propagandized that its troop strength was reduced by 100,000 in December 1987, the probability is high that they either returned to their barracks or were pressed into the corps of engineers after the "Pyongyang festival" in July, and it is estimated that by the end of the year the troop strength will reach 1 million. The war-making power of North Korea which allocates more than 25 percent of its annual GNP to arms buildup comprises an Army with 26 divisions and 3,500 tanks, troop strength 650,000; a Navy with 520 vessels, total tonnage 71,000 tons, including 21 submarines and 32 high-speed missile boats as the mainstay; and an Air Force with approximately 770 operational aircraft. It has recently been known that it not only has equipped itself with chemical weapons but it also is nurturing biological warfare capability with germ research facilities in place at 6 locations.

Every time an opportunity presents itself, North Korea rants about the "racket of preparations for a northward invasion" commenting on the annual ROK-U.S. joint military training exercises ("Team Spirit") and habitually calls for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea, but when viewed in the light of the aforementioned North Korean military trend, it must be said it cannot be anything but a strategem to induce a vacuum in the strength of the South Korean side.

At the same time, it has been reported recently that North Korea is maneuvering for many-sided military cooperation, briskly launching a military diplomacy such as dispatching a military delegation headed by Choe Kwang, chief of General Staff of the People's Army, to China and communist states in Europe.

Choe Kwang visited China for 1 week from 25 through 31 August, and holding talks with National Defense Minister Qin Jiwei and General Secretary Jiang Zemin, pledged to strengthen their mutual blood alliance and continue to promote their military cooperation. [passage omitted]

Again, in October a Chinese military delegation headed by Yu Huachong, deputy secretary general of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, was invited to Pyongyang and various military meetings were held, and the Order of National Flag First Class and friendship medal were presented to him. [passage omitted]

Daily on South's Removal of Nuclear Weapons

*SK2001101490 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1000 GMT 20 Jan 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, January 20 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today comes out with a signed article entitled "South Korea is the Place Where Nuclear Weapons Must Be Removed Before Anywhere Else."

The paper says:

The withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from South Korea poses as a matter of great concern for the world, a serious international issue, because nowhere in the world are nuclear weapons of the U.S. imperialists deployed so densely and in a three-dimensional way as in South Korea.

More than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons are there in South Korea. Deployed there are all kinds and all types of nuclear weapons which the U.S. imperialists have so far developed and deployed overseas, among them the notorious neutron bomb called "third generation nuclear weapon" and "devilish weapon of the 20th century". The nuclear density there is quadruple that in the NATO sphere.

Having massively introduced nuclear weapons into South Korea, the U.S. imperialists are ceaselessly staging war games to mobilise them quickly in a nuclear war.

The "Team Spirit" joint military exercises staged by the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets as an annual event is a test nuclear war. Besides, they are staging nuclear war games including sea and aerial nuclear strike drills in South Korea almost everyday.

Noting that no place of the earth is under such menacing danger of a nuclear war as the Korean peninsula, the paper says:

If the nuclear weapons are withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean peninsula is turned into a denuclearized zone, the cloud of a nuclear war hanging over this region will be cleared away.

The U.S. imperialists are dreaming of gratifying their wild desire for world supremacy by igniting a nuclear war in Korea and plunging mankind into a nuclear holocaust by expanding it to vast areas of the world. Urged by this desire, they have deployed in South Korea nuclear weapons with their firing and flying ranges going far beyond the Korean peninsula and their delivery means. And the nuclear war exercises are oriented to expanding the war to other areas.

The preferential withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea is an indispensable requisite to the complete nuclear disarmament on the planet and denuclearization of the world.

Even if a nuclear disarmament is achieved in other areas, comprehensive and complete elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be expected, if they are not eliminated in South Korea.

The paper further says:

The U.S. imperialists fail to respond to our proposal for tripartite negotiation to discuss the problem of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free zone and answered our offer for a halt to the war games involving nuclear means with a decision to stage the "Team Spirit 90" joint manoeuvres.

The elimination of nuclear weapons in South Korea is an urgent requisite either from the national point of view or from the viewpoint of world peace.

If the U.S. imperialists persistently oppose the elimination of nuclear weapons in South Korea, they will face denunciation as a wrecker of peace.

Japan's 'Military Expansion' Policy Denounced

Running Counter to Trends

SK2201070890 *Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean*
0007 GMT 22 Jan 90

[NODONG SINMUN 22 January commentary: "Running Counter to the Trend of Disarmament and Detente"]

[Text] Running counter to the worldwide trend of disarmament and detente, Japanese reactionary forces are advancing along the road of military expansion and a policy of great military power.

Claiming that the cold war still exists in Asia and the military situation in the Far East is grave, the Japanese ruling bunch is babbling that Japan should continue to strengthen its military power.

Kaifu, the Japanese prime minister, said recently in the Diet that the Japanese Government will not change its 5-year goal for increasing its defense capability regardless of how East-West relations may develop.

During the current 5-year military expansion plan, which will be completed in 1990, Japan has sought to arm its Air Force with 300 F-15 and F-4 fighter-bombers and its Navy with 60 destroyers and 100 P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft.

It is well known that when this plan is achieved, Japan will become a great military power, second only to the United States in the capitalist world. The level of military expansion sought by the Japanese ruling bunch is to strengthen its self-defense forces in such a manner as to be able to independently carry out a local war. Toward this end, enhancing the capability to carry out a preemptive attack and to wage a lengthy war and establishing a war system has been accelerated.

Japan's military strategy is being turned into strategy of preemptive attack from that of defensive combat. Following its decision to introduce long-range AWACS and super-horizontal radars, the Japan Defense Agency recently decided to introduce aerial fuel-supply aircraft to drastically increase the flying range of its fighters. This is a clear expression of the change in strategy. The Navy is planning to introduce the (Ezit) ship, which is equipped with the most modern missiles, and to possess aircraft carriers in the near future.

The Army is being armed with new equipment to enhance its offensive and mobilization capability. It has been decided that a military intelligence headquarters composed of 2,000 personnel will be established and a staff office for electronic warfare will be formed. In addition, the intelligence and operational command system has been strengthened.

To meet such military demands, the Japanese Government allocated ¥4.16 trillion as its military budget in Fiscal Year 1990.

That Japan's annual military cost exceeded 4 trillion yen is an unprecedented matter. At a time when cutting military costs has become an overall trend, only Japan is swiftly increasing military expenditures.

ASAHI SHIMBUN pointed out that Japan is ranked as the third largest country in the world in terms of military expenditure. Why are Japanese reactionary forces running amok frantically with military expansion without paying any attention to the worldwide trend of disarmament?

The reason for this is that they are engrossed with a militaristic ambition to militarily dominate vast areas in Asia and in the Pacific by taking advantage of worldwide trend of disarmament, thus recovering its former colonial imperialist state. They also want to become a great military power which can exercise not only economic but

military influence on the international arena by possessing military strength corresponding to great economic power.

For achieving such an ambition, the Japanese ruling circle needs military expansion, not disarmament, and requires aggravation of tension as an excuse for justifying such military expansion. This is why the Japanese reactionaries are propagandizing as if Japan is faced with threat of aggression from outside.

The Japanese magazine, *MILITARY CRITIC*, pointed out that there is no reason that Japan should be afraid of aggression and attack by other countries. This is a rightful opinion.

All facts show that the strained military situation in the Far East has not been created by some else and that (?Japan) is one of the ringleaders who created such a situation.

The fact that Japan is accelerating preparations for invading Asia again with aggressive Armed Forces, one of the dominant Armed Forces in the world, is itself a major factor aggravating tensions in this area.

Not satisfied with this, Japan left its territory as a nuclear offensive base by joining the U.S. imperialists' nuclear war strategy. Thus, it is actively participating in creating a nuclear threat against the Asian countries.

The spearhead of the overseas invasion of the Japanese reactionaries is being directed toward Korea. The military provocation policy of the Japanese reactionaries who are running counter to disarmament and detente will not only threaten peace in Asia and in the world but also will bring about irreversible consequences against Japan itself.

'Reactionary Forces' Hit

SK2201053190 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0513 GMT 22 Jan 90

["NODONG SINMUN Flails Japanese Reactionaries' Policy of Military Adventure"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, January 22 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN in a commentary today lashes at the Japanese reactionary forces racing toward arms buildup and conversion of Japan into a military power against the global trend of disarmament and detente.

The news analyst says:

Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu at a recent Diet session blared that the Japanese Government "will not change the target of defence buildup according to the present five-year readjustment program of defense capabilities", independent of East-West relations. When this target is maintained, Japan would become a military power second to the United States in the capitalist world.

The level of arms buildup aimed at by the Japanese ruling quarters is to reinforce the "Self-Defence Forces" to such an extent where they could replace the U.S. military role in Asia and wage a local war for themselves.

The Japanese military strategy is turning into a forestalling attack strategy from the "Total Defence Strategy". This is proved by the fact that following its decision to introduce long-range AWACS and over-horizon radars the Japanese Defence Agency recently decided to introduce air refueling plane so as to radically increase the flight range of fighter bombers and it plans to have more aircraft carriers in a few years to come.

The Japanese Government allocated 4,160 billion yen as the military budget for the fiscal 1990. It is something unprecedented that Japan's annual military spending topped the 4,000 billion yen mark.

Why are the Japanese reactionary forces so overheated in arms buildup paying no heed to the global trend of disarmament?

Underlying this drive is their military ambition to establish a military control over the vast area of the Asia-Pacific and restore their old position of colonial empire taking advantage of the global trend of disarmament.

They want to make Japan possess "military strength commensurate with her being an economic power" and become a strong military power which will exercise its influence in the international arena not only economically but also militarily.

Facts show that Japan is also chiefly responsible for the serious military situation in the Far East.

The spearhead of the Japanese reactionaries' overseas aggression is directed to Korea, above all.

Their policy of military adventure going against disarmament and detente not only threatens peace in Asia and the rest of the world but also brings irrevocable consequences to Japan itself.

Paper Denounces Buildup

SK2001103490 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1009 GMT 20 Jan 90

[Text] Pyongyang, January 20 (KCNA)—PYONGYANG SINMUN yesterday said that the Japanese militarists accustomed to hit the jackpot with the backing of a big power have raised their heads again to threaten world peace and step up preparations for a war to invade Asian countries.

A clear proof of this is that the reactionary government of Japan decided to allot 4,160 billion yen to "defence appropriations" of the new fiscal year, or 6.1 percent higher than those of the current fiscal year, noted the paper.

In an article headlined "Japanese Reactionaries' Undisguised Move To Build Military Power," the paper says:

The Japanese Government's step to drastically increase military budget in the new fiscal year goes against the trend of the time toward peace and detente and it is an open challenge to the peace-loving people of the world who aspire after peace and security in Asia and the world.

The Japanese reactionaries declare quite often that Japan should increase military expenditure because "no trend of detente is yet visible" and "no sign of arms cut is in sight" in Asia. These utterances of the Japanese reactionaries are a fabrication and sophism to justify their moves for arms expansion.

It is entirely because of arms buildup and armed reinforcement of the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese reactionaries that the Asian situation still remains tense despite our country and other Asian countries are making all their sincere efforts to relax the situation and reduce armed forces.

The peace-loving people of Asia and the world should frustrate the foolish act of the Japanese reactionaries with heightened vigilance against their moves to head for overseas aggression with the backing of U.S. imperialism.

Roundtable Talk on South's Military Reshuffle

SK2301044090 (Clandestine) Voice of National Salvation in Korean to South Korea 0300 GMT 13 Jan 90

[Roundtable talk with an unidentified announcer, Yun Chong-won, and (?Choe Paek-su) from the program "The Hour for the South Korean Armed Forces"]

[Text] [Announcer] How are you?

[Yun Chong-won and (?Choe Paek-su)] How are you?

[Announcer] On 21 December last year, the administration unusually reshuffled the military brass, including army commanders, the vice chief of staff of the army, the superintendent of the military academy, and division commanders, on a large scale. In this hour, will you first talk about the details of the military reshuffle?

[Yun Chong-won] In the military shakeup, Sin Mal-op, vice chief of staff of the Army, and Yi Pil-sop, superintendent of the military academy, were promoted to full-star generals and appointed army commanders. In addition, the vice chief of staff of the army was replaced with Lieutenant General Yi Mun-sok, commander of the Special Warfare Command; the superintendent of the Military Academy was replaced by Lt Gen Yim In-cho; the director of Joint Staffs was replaced by Lt Gen Song Ung-sop; and the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of National Defense was replaced by Lt Gen Yong Yong-il. Also, Maj Gen Chong Chaekyong was appointed the first assistant minister of

national defense. In this way, a large-scale military reshuffle above major general-level officers was conducted.

[Announcer] Sin Mal-op and Yi Pil-sop, generals who had been appointed vice chief of staff of the Army and superintendent of the Military Academy, respectively, in the personnel shakeup last March as a result of the disturbance involving Min Pyong-ton, then superintendent of the Military Academy, were promoted to four-star generals and appointed army commanders only nine months after the previous personnel reshuffle. What do you think the background of this abrupt military shakeup is?

[Yun Chong-won] As a matter of fact, many questions arise concerning the military shakeup. In particular, when the military reshuffle is thought of in connection with complicated realities, it is not a mere regular year-end military reshuffle.

Today the No Tae-u group, faced with a grave challenge, is getting through the grim ordeals. Its policy of following the United States and Japan, a way for its survival, has been shaken by the strong spirit of our people who seek independence. Its fascist suppression aimed at remaining secure in power has been faced by the angry waves of democratization. The treacherous nature of its maneuvers for perpetuating division have been laid bare by our people's ardent patriotic aspirations for reunification.

Thus, its antinational and antihistoric maneuvers have been opposed and rejected by our masses and its scheme to tide over the difficult situation, created by the majority opposition parties through a grand coalition of conservative forces, has been challenged by the three opposition parties.

What cannot be overlooked in particular are the serious contradictions and conflicts inside the ruling forces as shown by the actions involving Kim Yong-kap, former minister of government administration, Yi Chong-chan, former floor leader of the ruling party, and Min Pyong-ton, former superintendent of the Military Academy.

In this sense, the recent military reshuffle is viewed as a far-sighted personnel shakeup designed to overcome all types of difficulties and challenges.

[Announcer] What are the meanings and characteristics of the recent military reshuffle?

[(?Choe Paek-su)] In my opinion, the recent military reshuffle is very unusual. Therefore, the reshuffle involves a series of characteristics. It is thought to be an abnormal reshuffle disguised by a regular year-end shakeup in light of the fact that Sin Mal-op and Yi Pil-sop, who had been appointed vice chief of staff of the Army and superintendent of the Military Academy, respectively, were promoted and appointed army commanders and that Yi Mun-sok and Yim In-cho, graduates of the 17th class of the Military Academy, were

appointed vice chief of staff of the Army and superintendent of the Military Academy, respectively.

The reshuffle is thought to have been abruptly conducted to attain a sinister goal.

Another characteristic of the military reshuffle is the (?establishment) of the No Tae-u military system in which pro-No Tae-u men, including graduates of the 17th class of the Military Academy, ultimately emerged as key forces.

[Announcer] In particular, Yi Mun-sok, who was particularly trusted by Division Commander No Tae-u while serving as the chief of staff of the Ninth Division during the 12 December coup d'etat, has been regarded as a leading figure of the 17th graduating class of the Military Academy. He had commanded the Special Warfare Command and was appointed the vice chief of staff of the Army at this time. Therefore, it can be said that his future is obvious to see.

[(?Choe Paek-su)] In particular, the military reshuffle with Cho Nam-pung and Ku Chang-hoe, graduates of the 18th class of the Military Academy, left as the commander of the Defense Security Command and the commander of the Capital Defense Command, respectively, shows that it is the reinforcement of the No Tae-u system in the military.

Another characteristic of the military reshuffle is the preparation of the No Tae-u group, which has entered the mid-term of its power, for remaining in power for a long time.

In fact, the No Tae-u ring began to build a ruling system like that of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and schemed for remaining in power for a long time from the initial stage of its term. As a new situation with the opposition parties as the majority political force was created as a result of the 13th general elections and the ring's wild ambition for long-term power had been obstructed, the No Tae-u ring explored a way for realigning the overall ruling system, such as the revision of the Constitution by the parliamentary-cabinet system and the formation of a new party with those hailing from the TK [Taegu-North Kyongsang Province] faction as key forces.

It is thought that the No Tae-u ring has judged that the military will remain a factor affecting its realization of the wild ambition of a long-term power if it has formed a new party by revising the Constitution by the parliamentary-cabinet system, which some opposition forces support, and by admitting those in favor of a grand coalition of conservative forces.

Under the situation whereby conservative hawkish forces were acutely confronted with conservative moderate forces, the No Tae-u ring cannot but be prudent in shaking up military brass, because it had to place its men in key military posts without trouble.

[Yun Chong-won] That is true. Rightist-hawkish forces in the government and the ruling party—those who were benefitted by the remnants of the military dictatorship—have always complained about the No Tae-u group's military shakeups.

As shown by the retirement speech of the then Chief of General Staff of the Army Pak Hui-to in June 1988, by the terrorism of O Hong-kun, by members of the Army Intelligence Command led by Yi (?Chin-paek), and by the incident involving Min Pyong-ton, superintendent of the Military Academy, No Tae-u's military reshuffles have been greatly challenged by rightist military forces, such as Kim Chin-yong. Thus, he conducted a resolute and prudent military reshuffle.

[Announcer] It can be said that the recent military reshuffle is an expression of the concept of remaining in power for a long time by firmly establishing the No Tae-u system in the military. I think that the military reshuffle will have a great effect on the political arena. What is your opinion about that?

[Yun Chong-won] Since the 13th general elections, the No Tae-u group had made desperate efforts to tide over the difficult situation with the opposition parties with the majority of political forces, until they began to accelerate preparations for forming a new party.

Approximately 40 [as heard] lawmakers of the Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] have already begun to push ahead with the merger of the opposition parties. Some independent forces have appeared to join them. Also, the preparatory committee to form a progressive mass party has worked vigorously. This situation has made it inevitable to give up the original plan to realize the wild ambition for a long-term power in coalition with a certain opposition party.

In particular, some Democratic Justice Party lawmakers have contended that coalition with the New Democratic Republican Party will make it difficult to escape from being branded as a military dictatorial party, that coalition with the RDP will be labeled as a party of the Kyongsang provinces, and that coalition with the Party for Peace and Democracy, their adversary, is beyond imagination. Under these circumstances, the No Tae-u ring has judged that forming a new party with figures not directly involved in the 12 December and the 17 May incidents and the Kwangju massacre and admitting lawmakers of the three opposition parties into it will make it possible to maintain the status of the ruling party.

It has been rumored in the political arena that the No Tae-u group has tried to use Kim Pok-tong, No Tae-u's brother-in-law, and the Songbaekhoe [an organization of retired military officers led by Kim Pok-tong] as key forces in this work.

[Announcer] Indeed, Kim Pok-tong, a graduate of the 11th class of the Military Academy, is said to be a hidden

player which the United States did not involve in the 12 December and the 17 May incidents and the Kwangju massacre.

Since the 12 December incident, he has not worked with Chon Tu-hwan. It is also said that because Yim Kum-chu, his wife, is from Kwangju, Kim Pok-tong can enjoy popularity even among Cholla provincial people.

[Choe Paek-su] Thus, the United States is said to have secretly pushed ahead with the work of forming a new party to further strengthen its domination over South Korea through Kim Pok-tong and soothe the people's resistance while paving the road for pro-U.S. elements. This is said to also conform to No Tae-u's wild ambition for long-term power.

[Announcer] In short, the recent military reshuffle is part of No Tae-u's program to remain in power.

According to a military source, the military will be led by Chief of General Staff of the Army Yi Chong-ku, Commander of the Defense Security Command Cho Nam-pung, Army Commanders Sin Mal-op and Yi Chin-sam, and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Yi Mun-sok at the last stage of No Tae-u's term. It is thought that this will greatly affect the military. What is your opinion?

[Yun Chong-won] No Tae-u's program for long-term power is, after all, a scheme to further strengthen subjugation to the United States, the fascist dictatorship, and maneuvers to perpetuate division and is a treacherous act of running counter to our people's aspirations for independence, democracy, and reunification.

Therefore, those patriotic soldiers should firmly side with the patriotic masses, who have turned out for the anti-U.S. struggle for independence and the antifascist struggle for democratization, in conformity with the demands of the times and the aspirations of the people and their parents and brothers, redirect their guns pointed at the brothers in the North to the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, and actively take part in the struggle of parents and brothers to expedite the day of independence, democracy, and reunification.

Bearing in mind that herein lies their bright future, their parents and brothers, and our nation, the men and officers of the armed forces should correctly set their goal for action.

[Announcer] The patriotic men and officers of the armed forces should make their lives shine by devoting their youth to the cause.

SOUTH KOREA

Minister Denies U.S. Planning Troop Withdrawal

SK1801134590 Seoul YONHAP in English 0915 GMT
11 Jan 90

[Text] Seoul, January 11 (YONHAP)—Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun denied Thursday that the United States has

plans to withdraw its troops from South Korea but said the Korean Government is working on ways to compensate for a possible partial pullout in the early 1990s.

Yi told reporters that U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney personally denied there are plans to reduce U.S. troop strength in Korea "for the present."

"Cheney affirmed in a recent letter that the expectations of a U.S. troop withdrawal from the Far East, where the situation is different from that of Europe, are groundless," Yi said.

Cheney's four-day visit to Seoul, slated to start Feb 14, is not for consultations on a troop withdrawal but to collect field information for a report to congress, to discuss defense burden sharing and the removal of the U.S. military base in Seoul and to discuss possible changes in the role of the U.S. Forces in Korea, Yi said. He also said the government is making preparations for possible disarmament talks on the Korean peninsula.

In his letter to Yi, Cheney reportedly said a strategic reduction of U.S. troops based overseas cannot be categorically ruled out but that such a decision would be made only after considering the global security strategy of the United States and the particular needs of the regions concerned. He also said there are still no signs in North Korea or the Soviet Union to encourage Washington to consider removing troops from the region.

Inter-Korean Disarmament, Reconciliation Urged

SK2301035690 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN
in Korean 19 Jan 90 p 2

[Editorial: "Arms Reduction Amid East-West Reconciliation"]

[Text] It appears that with the end of cold-war, the era of worldwide arms reduction has opened. Bush and Gorbachev, two top leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union—two extremes in the postwar international order—shook hands with each other for reconciliation and cooperation in the historic Malta talks last year. Since the summit talks, people hoped for global peace and arms reduction while both the United States and the Soviet Union are keenly aware of the necessity to free themselves from the burden of the arms race. Thus, the barrier of distrust between the two is now being demolished while the structure of the Soviet Union and East Europe is being reformed.

The United States and the Soviet Union were the two main axes in the international order not only during the past cold war era but also in the new era of reconciliation and cooperation. The strength and role of the United States and the Soviet Union in establishing and maintaining the military equilibrium between East and West are still invariably absolute. We may say that the substance in the military equilibrium between the East and the West is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and Warsaw Pact Organization respectively. At

the conference held recently in Vienna, military leaders from 35 member nations of NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization agreed to end the East-West military confrontation in Europe. We may define this as a concrete change making us realize that the arms race under the past cold war system has now turned into the disarmament race.

The worldwide trend of disarmament is not only seen in the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the destruction of the Berlin wall, prime ministers of both East and West Germany agreed to sign an agreement on the "contract commonwealth." Last June, East Germany made an epoch-making disarmament proposal to West Germany, stressing that "without putting an end to military race between the two Germanys, no theory on the reunification of Germany will have credibility." We may call this another aspect of change in the order of the world.

It was learned that at the military conference of member nations of NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization, the United States hinted at withdrawal of its troops from Europe. What is known at the present is that the U.S. defense authorities are working out a disarmament plan over 3 years from 1991 to 1994, during which time 250,000 troops, 3 army divisions, 5 air force wings and 62 naval ships will be reduced in a phased manner.

Such a drastic disarmament plan by the United States may be construed as a response to Gorbachev's constant peace offensive including a cut in the Soviet defense expenditure and partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe, as well as to practical reform in East Europe.

In the course of realizing disarmament, the Navy and Air Force of the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a joint military exercise in the Mediterranean Sea late last year for the first time since the end of the World War II. They announced that this exercise was designed to prevent a possible clash on the sea between the two sides. We may say that this exercise was a war exercise precisely aimed at preventing a war. The world knows that the United States and the Soviet Union are the two super powers. However, because they are keenly aware of the enormous destructive power and horror of modern military weapons, nuclear weapons in particular, they have launched disarmament regarding it as a strategy for survival of mankind.

From this viewpoint, discussion of disarmament on the Korean peninsula is not someone else's question. We may point out that official discussion of the issue of arms reduction on the Korean peninsula, which has been regarded as taboo up to now, has already begun under an indirect expression of discussing "arms limitation." If discussion begins on disarmament between the North and the South Korea and disarmament advances toward the stage of realization, this will make an epochal contribution to the overall development of the entire nation. We think that North Korea should immediately start this

work. Without this, relaxation of tension and consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula will not be easy to achieve.

LAOS

Soviet Peace Delegation on Working Visit

*BK1801125190 Vientiane KPL in English 0922 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Text] Vientiane, January 18 (KPL)—A delegation of the Soviet Committee for the Peace Protection led by its vice president Petrovitch Masline [name as received], arrived here on January 16 for a one-week long working visit at the invitation of the Lao Committee for World Peace, Solidarity, and Friendship With Nations.

During its stay here, the Soviet peace delegation will meet a Lao peace delegation and exchange views on the promotion and development of cooperation in the interest of peace and development.

The Soviet peace delegation will also meet representatives of the Lao mass organizations and give lectures on the cooperation of mass organizations in the interest of socioeconomic and cultural development in the new atmosphere of the present world.

Deputy Minister Meets USSR, SRV Military Attaches

*BK2301113090 Vientiane KPL in English 0905 GMT
23 Jan 90*

[Text] Vientiane, January 23 (KPL)—Lieutenant General Osakan Thammatheva, member of the LPRP CC [Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee], deputy minister of national defence, head of the General Political Department of the Lao People's Army [LPA] and some other officers received here on January 20 Tran Cong Ham and Timchouk [name as received], respectively Vietnamese and Soviet military attaches to the Lao PDR [People's Democratic Republic], on the occasion of the 41st founding anniversary of the LPA.

The guests wished the Lao People's Army greater success in its development and in the national defence.

On this occasion, Lieut Gen Osakan Thammatheva, on behalf of the government, army and people of the Lao PDR expressed thanks and deep gratitude for the effective help and support of the parties, governments, armies and peoples of Vietnam and the Soviet Union to the Lao PDR in the struggle for national liberation in the past and in national construction and defence at present. He also wished for further strengthening the solidarity and all-round cooperation between Laos and Vietnam and between Laos and the Soviet Union.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Defense Minister Wants Increase in Armed Forces

BK2301101290 Hong Kong AFP in English 0959 GMT
23 Jan 90

[Text] Port Moresby, January 23 (AFP)—Papua New Guinea Defence Minister Ben Sabumei said Tuesday [23 January] he wanted to increase the strength of the country's armed forces to over 5,000 by 1994. Mr Sabumei said in a statement that the government had no alternative but to increase the strength of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) after the Bougainville crisis exposed a shortage of trained soldiers.

The defence minister is to argue his case for more soldiers at a meeting of Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu's cabinet later this week. The PNGDF has been spearheading a security operation on Bougainville against secessionist landowners who have been waging a guerrilla war on the copper-rich island, closing the giant open-cut mine there since last May. More than 50 people have been killed since the crisis began in November 1988.

Three people were reported to have been killed by security forces operating in the rebel-held Kongara region Tuesday, but it was not immediately clear whether all were militants. Several clashes were reported as troops moved into the area, but there were no official details.

Mr Sabumei said he wanted the strength of the PNGDF increased by 450 soldiers to 3,800 by the end of this year—funding for which was granted by Australia last week—and to 5,200 by 1994.

"The Bougainville crisis has certainly overstretched the manpower and logistic resources of the defence force," Mr. Sabumei said. "If the crisis continues and our commitments and responsibilities along the international border and elsewhere increases, it is inevitable that more manpower will be required immediately and in the near future," he said.

The buildup would cost between three million kina (three million U.S. dollars) and four million kina (four million U.S.), he said, adding that further assistance could be sought from Australia.

PHILIPPINES

More on USSR Challenge to U.S. Military

HK1801041590 Manila PHILIPPINES NEWSDAY
in English 18 Jan 90 pp 1, 2

[Untitled article by reporter Maria Luz Baguioro]

[Text] The Soviet government yesterday challenged the United States to scale down its air and naval forces in the Philippines as a direct response to the Soviet withdrawal of most of its offensive forces from Vietnam.

Minister-Counsellor Alexandre Losyukov, deputy chief of mission of the Soviet embassy in Manila, said in a phone interview that "we hope other powers will follow our example," referring to the United States which maintains seven military installations in the Philippines alone.

"I hope that the military situation in Asia will be more secure for all after we reduce our military activities in the region," Losyukov said. But he stressed that the embassy was still awaiting Moscow's official confirmation of the reported reductions.

The Soviet embassy official denied the move is aimed to upset the regional "balance of power" and pressure the United States to make symmetrical reductions in its military presence in Asia and the Western Pacific.

In a related development, the Philippine embassy in Washington has advised the Department of Foreign Affairs that U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney will visit Manila February as part of a five-leg Asian tour.

Cheney will leave Washington for South Korea on February 14. From there, he will proceed to Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, and Japan.

In Manila, he will call on President Aquino, Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus and Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos. A meeting with a select group of Philippine legislators is tentatively scheduled.

The embassy said the bilateral discussions will focus on U.S. military facilities in the country.

Cheney's visit will also provide the Philippines with another opportunity to reiterate the proposed condonation of high-interest bearing foreign military sales credit and the U.S. government's non-compliance with most of the provisions of the bases agreement.

Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus for his part, said the Philippine government has "to study this carefully so we do not assume any of the conclusions that are popularly being made about the reported Soviet withdrawal."

Through such a close study, Manglapus added, the government will know the impact of this development on the forthcoming exploratory talks on the bases scheduled for March or April.

"We are watching these developments with great interest. We recognize the changing conditions in Europe. We are closely monitoring the movements of both superpowers in Europe and in Asia," he said.

The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE reported Tuesday that Moscow has cut its forces in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the largest naval base occupied by Soviet forces overseas. Analysts said this would thaw Soviet relations with China and the non-communist countries in the region. It will also encourage Vietnam and the Hanoi-backed Hun Sen regime to settle the Cambodian conflict.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has offered twice to withdraw Soviet troops from Vietnam if the U.S. also pulled out of the Philippines. American officials have dismissed the offer as "lopsided," for Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base are far larger than Cam Ranh Bay and play a more important role in the overall U.S. defense network than their Soviet counterpart.

"In the view of the U.S. there was no symmetry between the (forces of) the two powers because the U.S. is a sea power while the Soviet Union is a land power," Manglapus noted.

Soviet Ambassador to the Philippines Oleg Sokolov asserted recently that Americans have "a clear military preponderance here." The Soviet government, he said, supports any move to end the arms race and to dismantle all military bases from foreign soil.

Sokolov pointed out that the Soviet Pacific fleet had been reduced by 57 ships between 1984 and 1989. By the end of 1990, some 120,000 troops would have been unilaterally pulled out of the Soviet Far East, he added.

"Is it not a cherished dream of both the military and civilians to have a leaner army? And why can't others follow the same path of 'modernization' through substantial reductions?" he asked.

Losyukov echoed this, saying that under the USSR's new military doctrine of "reasonable defense sufficiency," resources once earmarked for defense requirements are now used for civilian needs.

"Our unilateral reductions are not connected with the presence of any military power in the region," he said.

The lease on the seven U.S. military facilities in the country are due to expire in September 1991. Manila and Washington both agreed to hold initial talks on the continued American use of these facilities.

The U.S. government, however, has reneged on most of the commitments it made during the 1988 review of the RP [Republic of the Philippines]-U.S. Military Bases Agreement. Manglapus last week said this fact sours prospects that the treaty would be renegotiated.

TAIWAN

Radio Commentary Views French Warship Deal

*OW1301130290 Taipei International Service
in English 0200 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Station commentary: "France Snubs Peking on Frigates"]

[Text] The French Government's decision to sell sophisticated naval frigates to the Republic of China on Taiwan does not point to improved relations between Paris and Taipei, but to deteriorating relations between

Paris and Peking. Indeed, the West's relations with Peking in general are in their worst state in at least 20 years.

The falling out between communist China and the West was brought on by the Chinese Communist regime's massacre of civilians in Tienanmen Square in Peking on 4 June. The West has condemned the massacre, and the ensuing crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Mainland China. Western governments have also been perturbed by Peking's attitude since June. The Chinese Communists insist that Tienanmen was a domestic affair of no business to foreigners. The West does not agree, especially since Peking is a signatory to most international conventions on human rights.

Thus the boldness of France in selling naval ships to Taiwan. Peking has blasted the sale, issuing its often repeated claim that Taiwan is part of Communist China, and that such sales violate Peking's sovereignty. That absurd claim carried weight with Western governments back in the days when the West felt it needed to make concessions to Communist China for the sake of offsetting the Soviet Union's influence. Now that the West's relations with the Soviet Union have undergone a major facelift, Communist China's role is no longer essential to the equation.

The downstream effects of this new balance of power are many. For starters, the West does not permit Communist China to get away with literal murder, and other gross human rights violations, anymore. In days of old, the West might have ignored Tienanmen to placate Peking.

Second, the West appears less and less willing to go along with Peking's absurd claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. Europe's relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan are growing steadily, thanks largely to burgeoning trade. On the other hand, the new political realities, and Communist China's recent digression into international isolation, have also come to bear on the West's treatment of the Taiwan issue.

As Peking's isolation deepens, due to its hardline stance on communist orthodoxy amid radical change elsewhere in the communist world, it is more and more likely that the West will open up a new era of cooperation with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Another factor is Taiwan's own progress. As Communist China returns to Maoism, Taiwan has been made important strides in putting the final touches on economic development, while moving steadily toward a democratic future. The West has praised Taipei's bullishness on becoming a member of good standing in the community of developed democracies.

The French frigate deal is thus more a symptom of the West's disdain for Communist China, rather than the disease itself. The disease is in Peking, where, despite world trends to the contrary, the Chinese Communist regime continues to retrench.

Government Building Guided-Missile Frigates

*OW1401085690 Taipei International Service
in English 0200 GMT 12 Jan 90*

[From the "News and Commentary" program]

[Text] The Navy of the Republic of China has formally begun construction work on the nation's first locally built guided missile frigate in a bid to modernize its naval force and to strengthen its fighting capabilities.

The navy has contracted with the state-run China Shipbuilding Corporation to build eight Perry-class frigates by the end of 1999 at an estimated total cost of 5.3

billion U.S. dollars. [Words indistinct] frigates about [words indistinct] to build, and the first one is expected to be completed in early 1993.

The construction of the frigates will replace the navy's oldest destroyers and it is part of the government's plan to update the naval force with the second generation of its [word indistinct] warships which include anti-aircraft [words indistinct] antisubmarine capabilities.

Defense Minister Hau Pei-tsun presided over the ceremony to formally kick off the construction of the frigate at the Kaohsiung Shipyard of the China Shipbuilding Corporation.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CSSR's Balcar on Disarmament-Related Problems

AU0901142590 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
2 Jan 90 p 6

[Interview with Ladislav Balcar, head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Vienna disarmament talks, by Peter Martinek in Vienna; date not given: "Diplomats Are Breaking the Charmed Circle"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Martinek] The known snag in the disarmament talks is the issue of helicopters, of which the two sides have dozens of types and which are fairly difficult to define. How will you be able to deal with this?

[Balcar] This really is a fairly complex issue. The main problem is that the NATO countries demand that among the helicopters targeted for reductions and for possible scrapping there should be not only all combat but also noncombat helicopters, if a combat version exists; for example, the MI-8 helicopter in the service of the Czechoslovak People's Army and, at the same time, extensively used as a transport helicopter in civil aviation. This means that this is a helicopter of which a combat version exists, and we would then also have to scrap machines which we are using, for example, as ambulance helicopters. Everyone must feel that this demand is somewhat illogical. But the Western side also complains about our demands. Specifically, our disarmament interests are at odds with the future plans of the Western arms manufacturers. Precisely those production corporations are trying to formulate the disarmament demands in such a way as not to endanger their production interests. And there are several such areas which present problems.

[Martinek] The West has now proposed a definition which sets the limit for armored tanks at 20 tonnes at the most. What does it constitute?

[Balcar] This is a proposal which enables the NATO countries to keep almost all types of light tanks. And this is precisely the direction of the technical development in their production. One, namely, switches to light materials and modern technologies. On the other hand, we would have to scrap a large number of infantry armored vehicles. At the same time, however, the new NATO's definition accommodates the wishes of the Warsaw Pact countries. Specifically, it is known that in the past NATO used to absolutely refuse to include light tanks and armored personnel carriers with heavy equipment in the category of armament which had to be reduced. Now they are doing this on the basis of a just demand of the Warsaw Pact countries, but at a considerable price.

[Martinek] It seems that we could go through category after category of weapons and always come against a problem. Let us take, for example, the combat air force.

[Balcar] Regarding aircraft, the situation is complex, too. We must realize that—to defend its economic, political,

and military centers—the USSR needs certain strategic devices located on ground. The NATO countries have them on vessels, but navies are not discussed. Thus far, these complex questions of the geostrategic position of our countries and the NATO countries still await solution. However, the scrapping of strategic air forces and missiles located on vessels will be a tough nut to crack.

[Martinek] Our public has been asking lots of questions in connection with the prospect of the departure of the 80,000-strong Soviet Army, which has been on our territory for more than 20 years now. Its withdrawal should be included in the agenda of the Vienna talks. Not so long ago, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jiri Dienstbier, spoke about this with Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.

[Balcar] I know that this question is very topical for our citizens. However, I will get more detailed instructions only when I return to Prague. Regarding the solution concerning the troops stationed outside national territories, here, as it is known, the USSR had proposed that the USSR and the United States reduce their number to 275,000 men. However, this solution sidesteps one important fact, that is, that Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain, too, have troops on the FRG territory. They number about 150-160,000 men. This numerically-strong army is not being taken into consideration.

[Martinek] So far, we have not mentioned the issues connected with the verification of the observance of the agreement which, let us hope, will be reached as soon as possible.

[Balcar] This is a chapter in itself. There will be several kinds of verification, for example, on-site inspections, which will be carried out at random, practically within an hour. The verification of the scrapping of weapons will be carried out by military attaches accredited in this or that country.

Spokesman Confirms Soviet Military Project Halted

Deforestation Raises Concern

LD1401061790 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 2000 GMT 12 Jan 90

[Text] Colonel Stanislav Pohoral, the press spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, has reacted to numerous questions from the inhabitants of Olomouc and its vicinity concerning the deforestation of the Jedova Hill in the Pohorany area for the purpose of constructing a military installation for the Central Group of Soviet troops. He was empowered to state that the prepared action had been halted as early as June last year, following an agreement with the Soviet side. At the same time, he assured the Czechoslovak public that the agreement was being observed and that the concern raised was unjustified.

Rally Urges Troop Withdrawal

*LD1501022990 Prague CTK in English
2005 GMT 14 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 14 (CTK)—More than 6,000 persons assembled at Pohorany, Olomouc District, North Moravia, today to call for the quickest possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from the district.

The rally organised by the Civic Forums from Dolany, Pohorany and Olomouc culminated in a march to the top of the Jedova Hill. The participants voiced unambiguous protest against the deployment of any foreign troops on Czechoslovak territory and support for the Czechoslovak Government's stand on this issue. The participants proposed free elections or August 21, 1990 as the date of the withdrawal.

In connection with the official announcement that on January 15, 1990 Soviet-Czechoslovak talks on the issue of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, leading representatives of the Party of Democratic Socialism published today a statement expressing their full support for the stand of the Czechoslovak Government which has proposed that the Soviet troops deployed on Czechoslovak territory since August 21, 1968 to withdraw from the country by the end of this year at the latest. [sentence as received]

The Party of Democratic Socialism also called upon the government to appeal to the Soviet Union for publishing the names of the Czechoslovak officials who asked the Soviet Union for military intervention in August 1968, according to a statement of the Soviet foreign minister made last autumn.

Party Supports Stand on Troops

*LD1401201390 Prague Domestic Service
in Slovak 1600 GMT 14 Jan 90*

[Text] The leadership of the Party of Democratic Socialism has issued a stand on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. It has expressed support for the stand of the Federal Government, which has proposed that the Soviet troops deployed on our territory since 21 August 1968 leave Czechoslovakia by the end of this year at the latest.

It has also put forward a proposal for Czechoslovakia to ask the Soviet Government to publish the names of Czechoslovak officials who asked the Soviet Union for military intervention in August 1968.

The leadership of the Party of Democratic Socialism has also spoken in favor of reducing the basic military service: for soldiers to 12 months, and for graduates who have completed military training as part of their curriculum at colleges to 6 months.

CSSR Commentary on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD1401225990 Zagreb Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 14 Jan 90*

[Commentary by Milika Sundic]

[Text] Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations begin tomorrow [15 January] in Prague on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. Does this mean that the Warsaw Pact is on the brink of disintegration? Milika Sundic comments further on this:

Negotiations between Prague and Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia represent the beginning of the end of the Soviet military presence in four countries that are members of the Warsaw Pact. This in fact is a matter related to the process that has been inevitable given the conditions of the destruction of existing regimes in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and the GDR, and the changes which have above all taken hold in the USSR through perestroika and glasnost. The latter has been decisive for everything that has happened and is happening in East Europe, and which has had a decisive impact on changing the state of relations in one of the most monolithic military alliances that the world has ever known.

The negotiations in Prague should not be difficult because, as things stand right now, the USSR will respect the wish of the Czechoslovak Government to withdraw its forces within a reasonable period. This will probably also happen when such negotiations begin with Hungary and probably also with Poland, depending on the stances which the governments in Bucharest [as heard] and Warsaw will adopt in connection with this. For the time being the only thing which is uncertain is when and whether this question will be raised by the GDR Government, which is, at the same time, the most delicate problem of the Soviet military presence in East Europe—all the more so since there is for the moment no question of any kind of withdrawal of U.S., UK, and French troops from the FRG, something which, assuming the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR at any time now, should be the basic precondition for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both parts of a still divided Europe.

True, the problems which Mikhail Gorbachev is encountering in his relations with the member countries of the already frayed Warsaw Pact are far more complex than the problems within the Western military alliance. However, this was the price paid for an erroneous policy and for, we should say, an artificial alliance between the USSR as the most significant factor in the victory over fascism and the countries on which the Stalinist system of rule was literally foisted and which, as a result of a deal between the Allies at the end of World War II, were incorporated into the Soviet zone of influence as satellites, although no significant revolutionary roots were present in these countries. This has all come to an end. The result is that the time has come to lay down absolutely fresh bases of cooperation, not only in the

ideological and political spheres, but also in the military and economic field between the Warsaw Pact member countries and Comecon members. There can no longer be any question about cooperation along the party line, because all the Communist Parties in East European countries are facing disintegration or have already disintegrated, as, for instance, in Romania.

In any case, initial statements by some East European governments made at the time of major changes that they will remain faithful to the alliance with the USSR are no longer binding on anyone, and it can be said with what amounts almost to certainty that the USSR is not counting on these promises either. In the final analysis, Mikhail Gorbachev has more pressing business to deal with because, in his own house, he is facing major changes of a kind which the USSR has not experienced in its 71-year history.

So, although no Warsaw Pact member country where Soviet units are stationed is likely to insist on the Soviet troop withdrawal happening overnight, the view we stated at the beginning is quite certain: The time is imminent when there will not be any Soviet troops in any of the socialist countries. If the West wants to help Mikhail Gorbachev, it should not take advantage of this in any way whatsoever.

Prague Soviet Troop Withdrawal Talks Open 15 Jan

LD1501142790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1400 GMT 15 Jan 90

[Text] Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Czechoslovakia opened in Cernin Palace in Prague today. The delegations are led by Evgen Vacek and Ivan Aboymov, deputy foreign ministers of the two countries.

Troop Withdrawal Talks With USSR Adjourn

LD1601165790 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1600 GMT 16 Jan 90

[Text] The first round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on a Soviet troop withdrawal from our territory has ended in Prague. Preliminary discussion took place on political, military, international legal, financial, and other aspects of this problem. Our delegation submitted a draft of the agreement on the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops, which contained specific dates and the draft for deciding the status of the troops before their withdrawal.

With regard to the fact that some issues require additional work, the two delegations agreed that the talks will be continued in the first week of February in Moscow, at the earliest. Ivan Aboimov, head of the Soviet delegation, was received today by Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier.

Report on Preparations for Disarmament Conference

LD1701174990 Prague CTK in English 1559 GMT 17 Jan 90

[Text] Prague, January 17 (CTK)—The ninth assembly of the "European nuclear disarmament" will take place in a socialist country for the first time—in Helsinki and Tallinn on July 3-7, 1990, members of the preparatory committee of the assembly Ilkka Taipale and Kari Vaclimacki stressed at a press conference here today.

The assembly will review e.g. possibilities of cooperation of the Baltic countries, problems of nationalism and the right of soldiers to reject the fulfilment of an order as well. The organizers of the assembly plan that the exchange of opinions will take place in about 50 debate centres. 30-40 Czechoslovak delegates will participate.

Ilkka Taipale and Kari Vaclimacki said that the assembly is being prepared as an action of the cities of Helsinki and Tallinn.

Answering the question of a CTK correspondent concerning the efforts of the Soviet Baltic republics to separate themselves from the Soviet Union, they stressed that they do not support extreme nationalism but would welcome Leningrad's greater openness and Tallinn's greater independence on Moscow [as received].

The "European nuclear disarmament" is a peace organization which started to work in Great Britain at the beginning of the eighties. It was joined later by peace organizations from other European countries. The first assembly was held in Brussels in 1982.

CSSR's Slimak Addresses Vienna Meeting

LD1701221490 Prague CTK in English 2034 GMT 17 Jan 90

[Text] Vienna, January 17 (CTK)—"The revival of the democratic system has opened possibilities of introducing new foreign and military policies in Czechoslovakia", Commander of the Czechoslovak People's Army General Staff Major-General Anton Slimak said here Wednesday addressing a seminar on military doctrines of the CSCE member states.

He said that Czechoslovakia proceeds from the commitments drawn from its membership in the Warsaw Treaty, but demands that these commitments should be based on equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states. He stated that the military policy is subordinated to Czechoslovakia's position in Europe both from the geographical point of view regarding also the aspect of European culture.

Czechoslovakia strives to develop friendly relations with all states, especially the neighbouring ones, in political, economic, spiritual and military spheres. Czechoslovakia considers stability of borders in Europe a guarantee of mutual confidence. It will consistently realize

the defensive character of its military doctrine with the aim to reach the level of reasonable sufficiency, he said.

Owing to reality and historical experience, Czechoslovakia is, however, still forced to adopt necessary measures for its defence.

Major-General Anton Slimak held today also bilateral talks with General Inspector of the Austrian Army General of the U.S. Army General Colin Powell, General Inspector of the West German Bundeswehr Admiral Dieter Wellershoff and Chief of Staff of the Swiss Armed Forces Army General Heinz Haesler.

First Round of Talks on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Ends

Kashlev on Talks' 'Positive' Results

*LD1701221290 Prague CTK in English
1731 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow, January 17 (CTK Correspondent)—The recent Soviet-Czechoslovak talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia took place in a constructive atmosphere and brought positive results, Soviet Foreign Ministry representative and head of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of the CSCE member states Yuriy Kashlev told journalists here Wednesday.

Czechoslovakia's demand that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia should take place out of the framework of the Vienna talks is not of prior importance, he said, adding that the talks in Vienna deal with such extensive cuts in troops number in Europe that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia can be realized out of the Vienna talks' framework.

Talks Deemed 'Constructive'

*LD1701221190 Prague CTK in English
1259 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, January 17 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky described today as the most important result of the first round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia the agreement of the two sides that the final aim of the negotiations is the complete pull-out of Soviet troops from the country.

The Czechoslovak delegation set the end of 1990 as the definitive deadline for the withdrawal while a substantial part of the troops, more than one half, should be withdrawn before the June elections. The spokesman said the Soviet delegation had not commented on the proposed timetable, stating that it must consult it first.

Dobrovsky characterized the atmosphere of the talks as constructive and voiced the hope that the two sides will find mutually acceptable solutions. He said the Soviet side readily grants necessary information about the troops and confirmed that the withdrawal of Soviet

troops will be one of the subjects discussed by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel during his visit to the Soviet Union, scheduled for the beginning of next month.

Czechoslovak experts have stressed that the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia will not harm the course of the Vienna discussions. On the contrary, it will make their course easier and quicker. This standpoint is in harmony with the stand of the USA, Lubos Dobrovsky underlined.

The draft agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops also solves the problems of property rights and other questions connected with it. Questions related with the statute of Soviet troops during the time of the withdrawal should be adjusted by special legal forms which could have the form of a letter exchange between the premiers or of a diplomatic note.

As regards European security the Czechoslovak delegation has stressed several times that Czechoslovakia will fulfil its obligations towards the Warsaw Treaty and share in the Vienna discussions, Dobrovsky stressed.

"We consider the withdrawal of Soviet troops the key question in mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union", Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky stressed, adding that the withdrawal would make it possible to purge bilateral relations of the past, improve them significantly and build them on a new basis.

The discussions were open, several misunderstandings occurred but were quite easily overcome. Some Czechoslovak standpoints and its preparedness seemed surprising for the Soviet delegation, Lubos Dobrovsky said. The Czechoslovak delegation understands the complexity of these problems from the side of the Soviet Union, as well as the complexity of a technical solution. Czechoslovakia is convinced that on the basis of a political solution a solution to technical problems will be easily reached, Dobrovsky underlined.

The Soviet delegation seemed not to understand quite correctly at the beginning the depth of changes which took place in Czechoslovakia. After the exchange of opinions the Soviet delegation seems to understand better all the changes in Czechoslovakia, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said and expressed the belief that this reality will be positively reflected in the second round of the discussions.

The Soviet delegation has not commented on the timetable of the withdrawal proposed by Czechoslovakia. It has only stressed the necessity to consult the possibility of the adoption of this proposal. "I drew a speculative conclusion from this—that the Soviet delegation had a narrower mandate for the talks than we had", Lubos Dobrovsky said.

The Soviet side has been ready to grant the necessary information about the state of troops, Dobrovsky said

and confirmed that the visit of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel to the Soviet Union will certainly be very closely connected with the questions of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Viewed

*AU2201114090 Prague MLADA FRONTA
in Czech 16 Jan 90 p 5*

[Commentary by Milan Vodicka: "Temporariness Draws to an End"]

[Text] Yesterday talks began in Prague on just how long temporary is. Although the topic is more appropriate for philosophers, it was diplomats who sat around the table, and moreover, matters of an absolutely non-philosophical nature—tanks, artillery, and men in uniforms—were the focus of their interest. At the end of the talks, a date should be set for the withdrawal of the last Soviet soldier from the republic's territory. A date which will bring to an end the temporariness that has become somewhat long and drawn out.

We know very well when it all started, since 21 August 1968 was a traumatic time in our most recent history. The act which inaugurated this temporariness has, step by step, been called intrusion, invasion, occupation, intervention, and then international assistance; a few weeks ago, the word invasion began to be used again. While this enumeration has no pretensions of being exhaustive, the main thing is that matters are once more being called by their correct names. Now we are in agreement with those who came "internationally" to us in their tanks that this was an assault and an act of aggression. All five participants in this event, who violated the most fundamental principles of international law and treaties, including the Warsaw Pact treaty and the UN Charter, have recanted and apologized for it.

This was not a formal act: in view of the fact that an apology also came from Moscow, there is no further reason for Soviet soldiers to remain on our soil.

The treaty concluded under pressure (and which is, therefore, invalid) in autumn 1968, on whose basis Soviet units have remained "temporarily" in our country for 22 years, will be rescinded in the foreseeable future. Primarily, this will mean a definitive end to the Brezhnev doctrine of Eastern Europe's limited sovereignty. Another plus will be the much desired exodus of military khaki from the middle of the continent. For us there will be a late moral and actual satisfaction and, finally, the partial return of matters to their original state.

Only the question of when the withdrawal of Soviet units will take place remains. Only one thing is certain: the tanks will not depart as quickly as they arrived. We are suggesting the end of this year as the latest date. In light of the fact that all the former ideological and strongly colored arguments about the threat to our Western borders have long been part of history, all circumstances

are in favor of a speedy solution—except one. This is the impact of the withdrawal on the Soviet domestic scene. The returning columns of tanks, for some generals a sad symptom of the collapse of a former superpower empire, could cause a draught in some of the most senior circles at home.

Therefore, in connection with the current Prague talks, it will be necessary to talk not only about speed but also about moderation. A surgical incision is inappropriate and Prague is also not striving for this. However, the end result remains clear: a complete withdrawal, after which Czechoslovakia will become a truly independent state. There can be no talk about independence until this 22 year "temporariness" comes to an end and until the troops, whom no one invited, withdraw.

Deputy Proposes Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD2301210590 Prague Domestic Service
in Slovak 1655 GMT 23 Jan 90*

[Speech by Deputy Michal Kocab at the Federal Assembly session—live]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] I am speaking for the first time in the parliament and on a very sensitive subject. The problem that I want to deal with has not been opened here yet, thus I am taking up this task myself because in my opinion this is an urgent matter. Allow me, first of all, to briefly but emphatically express my support for proposals put forward by the president. I think that arguments by which the president supported his proposals are quite extensive and correspond to the view of a majority of our population. The change of the republic's name, the change of the state emblem, and the change of name of our army is welcomed as confirmation of a successful transition of our society from a totalitarian system to democracy by a greater part of the nation. There is, however, one more important fact that prevents the feeling that our changes are definite and irreversible. Allow me to voice at this forum, in the spirit of the Gorbachev's concept of international relations—as the principle of state sovereignty, noninterference in the affairs of other states—my view on the most urgent problem of our state: the question of the presence of Soviet troops on our territory and its legal basis.

The fact that in the past we have not been able to deal properly with this question has cost our nation much pain and suffering. The presence of Soviet troops on our territory is based on a treaty between the CSSR and the USSR on conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the CSSR territory from 16 October, 1968, and ratified by the National Assembly's resolution from 18 October, 1968. [passage omitted on treaty, which Kocab calls a clear violation of principles of international law, above all the UN charter] The treaty was concluded at the time when troops of five armies of the Warsaw Pact were present on our territory, thus, under obvious military pressure. The National Assembly agreed with the ratification of this treaty and proceeded from the

unequal conclusions of Moscow talks in the period 23-26 August and 3-4 October, 1968, and said in its resolution at the 27th National Assembly on 18 October, 1968, that—and I quote—it is at this time the only possible way out for the gradual withdrawal of troops of the five states of the Warsaw Pact from the CSSR territory. [passage omitted]

The treaty is an obvious violation of the state sovereignty and other principles of international law, and thus I propose that it is declared null by the Federal Assembly, that is invalid from the very beginning. Such a declaration is a necessary prerequisite for an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. Recognizing the fact that the troops cannot leave as fast as they came, I propose that the Federal Assembly sets, in a sequel to the trust expressed to the CSSR Government in December for its talks with the Soviet side, the deadline for the definite withdrawal of Soviet troops to the end of 1990 with the point that a considerable part of troops and their equipment will be withdrawn by 15 May, 1990, and to turn, at the same time, to the USSR Supreme Soviet for support for these justified demands.

Esteemed Federal Assembly, allow me to read out the drafts of both resolutions:

The first resolution: The Federal Assembly of the CSSR declares the treaty between the governments of the CSSR and the USSR of 16 October, 1968, on conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the CSSR territory ratified by the National Assembly on 18 October, 1968, invalid from the very beginning.

And the draft of the second resolution, including a message to the USSR Supreme Soviet, I quote: The intervention by troops of the Soviet Union and the other four countries of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 meant the violation of the basic principle of the international law. Because of the invalid character of the treaty on conditions of the temporary presence of Soviet troops on CSSR territory of 16 October, 1968, since its very beginning, the CSSR Federal Assembly considers it necessary for the troops of the Soviet Union, which for more than 21 years have remained on our state territory without a legal reason, to be withdrawn expeditiously. The Federal Assembly of the CSSR expressed the full support for the CSSR Government in the talks with the Soviet side and stresses the necessity to start the withdrawal of Soviet troops immediately so that by 15 May, 1990, a considerable part of the troops and their armament are withdrawn and the withdrawal completed by the end of 1990 at the latest. In connection with this, the Federal Assembly of the CSSR stresses the wish of the Czechoslovak people to fulfill the idea of identity, independence, and state sovereignty and turns to the USSR Supreme Soviet, in the interest of friendly relations not burdened by the mistakes of the past, to support these justified demands of Czechoslovak people.

Esteemed Federal Assembly, it would be, no doubt, a great underestimation of you, deputies of the Federal

Assembly and citizens of the whole country, if I were to defend both of my proposals also from my position as a human being. There is possibly no such a unity on other questions concerning the most basic matters of both our nations as regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet military forces. Thank you for your attention.

Demonstrators Demand Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD2401111490 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 0500 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] A mass demonstration demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia was held in Vysoke Myto yesterday. At least one-fourth of the citizens of this town of 12,000 inhabitants took part in it. The citizens handed the following demand to the commander in chief of Soviet troops there: withdrawal of troops by the time of the free election; immediate liquidation of the fuel storage, the evacuation of the building used by the command by the end of January and the return of the building of the former music school, which is now a museum of the Soviet Army's military glory.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GDR, U.S. Officials Discuss Trust, Disarmament

*LD0901151790 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1331 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Mutual trust, the elimination of hostile prejudices, and stability are important elements of securing peace. This has been affirmed by the chairman of the National Defense Committee of the GDR People's Chamber, Dr Wolfgang Herger, and Ronald K. Machtley, member of the Armed Forces Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, today at a talk in Berlin.

Wolfgang Herger briefed his guest on the achievement of the GDR's unilateral disarmament initiatives and explained the security model 2000, introduced by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism, with which the GDR People's Chamber will also deal. The proposal is designed to further expand the treaty-based community between the GDR and the FRG in the military sphere. He described total demilitarization as a vision for Europe and both German states.

Machtley described the dialogue as a good opportunity to gain a picture on the spot of the GDR's rapidly advancing developments. He is interested in how other countries can be convinced that a united Germany does not represent a threat to them.

In this connection Herger expressed the view that two German states have existed over a lengthy period but are getting increasingly close within the framework of the European process. "A German Europe cannot be the aim," it would represent a retrograde step in history.

Machtley also had questions on the possibilities for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from GDR territory and the upcoming elections.

First 'German-German Military Summit' Held 17 Jan

LD1701100290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0848 GMT 17 Jan 90

[Excerpt] Vienna (ADN)—Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz, deputy GDR defense minister and chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army, and Federal Army Inspector General Admiral Dieter Wellershoff met in Vienna today for the first German-German military summit. The meeting took place on the sidelines of the seminar on military doctrine that began yesterday and that has brought together high-ranking military officials of the CSCE states. [passage omitted]

HUNGARY

NATO Plane Overflies Hungary for First Time

LD0601163890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1509 GMT 6 Jan 89

[Text] Budapest, January 6 (TANJUG)—A Canadian Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft today overflew almost the entire Hungarian territory in the first ever such flight.

The Defence Ministry in Budapest issued permission for the flight to proceed along the requested course (Budapest-Miskolc-Debrecen-Kecskemet-Keszthely-Zalaegerszeg-Dombóvár-Budapest), although important military facilities lie along the route.

The aircraft was not equipped with surveillance equipment, and the principal objective of the flight was strengthening mutual confidence. The Hercules, which landed at Budapest's Ferihegy Airport on Thursday, is the first NATO plane ever in a Warsaw Pact country.

Today's flight is the first step in the realization of the "open skies project," under which surveillance aircraft from each bloc will be able to overfly the other bloc's territory. Negotiations on the issue will start on February 12 in Ottawa, and should be continued late in April in Budapest.

Soviet Air Force Still in Debrecen

LD0801233590 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Jan 90

[Text] One of the controversial questions of the Hungarian-Soviet military relationship is the affair of the Soviet planes flying around the town of Debrecen. Karoly Toth reports on today's developments.

[Toth] [loud noise of aircraft flying in the background] The withdrawal of the Air Force regiment from Debrecen has meant the reduction of armaments and not

the fulfillment of the population's demand, namely, ending the military and Soviet character of the airport. This was stated by representatives of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. They continue to demand that the National Assembly's October decision be executed.

The Soviet side has questioned the previous data and surveys on noise level and damages and it now wishes to carry out further private measurements. However, in the end it was only Hungarian experts who did the measuring. They not infrequently registered noise levels of about 110 decibels. Since the Soviet planes took off and landed in an unusual manner, the flights were stopped.

The parties sat down to negotiate in the early evening hours, but there is as yet no information about these talks. The affair, by the way, has spread beyond the borders of Eastern Europe with the help of the television crew of the Japanese ASAHI TV channel. A large number of the people in Tokyo are demanding, in a similar way, the closure of an American military airport.

Nemeth Says Ryzhkov Agrees on Troop Withdrawal

LD1301120290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1130 GMT 13 Jan 90

[Text] Hungary and the Soviet Union believe that there is no need, from any standpoint, for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Thus, they have agreed that the units in question will be withdrawn as soon as possible. Miklos Nemeth gave the news to two Japanese papers after his talks in Sofia with Nikolay Ryzhkov.

Speaking about CEMA, he said that transforming the organization will take a long time. At the same time, he indicated that Hungary wishes to create a separate group within CEMA with Czechoslovakia and Poland, which are at the same level of development.

Military Leaders Meet Counterparts in Vienna

Bilateral Military Relations Discussed

LD1601230590 Budapest MTI in English 2208 GMT 16 Jan 90

[Text] Vienna, January 16 (MTI)—The participants in the CSCE seminar on military doctrines grasp the opportunity to hold bilateral consultations as well.

On Tuesday, Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief-of-staff of the Hungarian People's Army, and Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief-of-staff of the Soviet Army, discussed some topical issues of bilateral military relations.

The Hungarian military leaders held bilateral talks with the representatives of some states belonging to the other military bloc and of some neutral countries.

Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, commander-in-chief of the Hungarian People's Army, and Laszlo

Borsits exchanged views with General Colin Powell, president of the United Committee of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the United States.

On Tuesday, the commander-in-chief and the chief-of-staff of the Hungarian People's Army were received by General Otmar Tauschitz, chief inspector of the Austrian Armed Forces.

Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits met his Swiss counterpart Heinz Haesler, too.

The talks were characterized by an open atmosphere. The Western partners inquired about the efforts of the Hungarian People's Army to realize its defensive orientation. The sides discussed the possibilities of developing bilateral military contacts.

Borsits Meets More Counterparts

*LD1701222190 Budapest MTI in English 2025 GMT
17 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, January 17 (MTI)—On Wednesday, Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief-of-staff of the Hungarian People's Army, who is heading a military delegation to the CSCE seminar on military doctrines in Vienna, held talks with Army General Maurice Schmitt, French chief-of-staff, Admiral Dieter Wellershoff, chief inspector of Bundeswehr, and Vice-Admiral Jan Klenberg, Finnish chief-of-staff.

'Anxiety' Over USSR Military Project on Border

*LD1601203290 Budapest MTI in English 1925 GMT
16 Jan 90*

[Text] Budapest, January 16 (MTI)—On Monday, "Panorama", a political magazine of the Hungarian television, broadcast shots about an alleged military project built in Soviet Subcarpathia and interviews with some locals who expressed anxiety over the construction. Since the project is being built near the Hungarian border, an MTI correspondent asked Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, whether the ministry had formally inquired about the project.

Since the Ministry of Defence was informed about the project by the population some weeks ago, it asked the competent officials of the Soviet Army for further information. According to the answer, which arrived some days ago, a radio locator station is being built in the vicinity of Mukachevo. The electromagnetic field intensity generated by the project will remain well below the internationally accepted limit both in the vicinity of the project and along the border. The station is located and its aerial directed in a way that they do not endanger the population and the environment either around the project or in Hungary. The station is not equipped, and will never be equipped, by any nuclear reactor, Colonel Gyorgy Keleti said.

Official Views Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Wants Withdrawal in 1990

*LD1801174790 Budapest MTI in English 1542 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, January 18 (MTI)—In his contribution to the plenary session of the conventional arms reduction talks of the 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries in Vienna on Thursday, Ferenc Somogyi, under-secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that the analyses available about Europe's present and future political and military position had become largely outdated, and the arms control plans based on last year's assessment of the altered conditions also need to be reconsidered.

In the view of Hungary, Mr Somogyi said, ensuring a balance of power between the two groups of countries remains a major element of the future agreement. At the same time, he pointed out that Hungary continued to attach great importance to a comprehensive reduction of troops, but at the present stage it considers it possible and necessary for the talks to focus on the forces stationed abroad as the most destabilizing element of the problem. He said these forces should be limited so as to forbid any country to station forces above a given limit outside its frontiers in Europe. According to Hungary, this figure should be far below the 275-thousand mark proposed at the talks.

Speaking about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the under-secretary of state said Hungary was convinced—on the basis of analyses into political and military conditions in Europe and the country's security considerations—that the Hungarian Armed Forces are able to guarantee the country's security. At the same time, the Hungarian Armed Forces are also capable of adequate contribution to ensuring the security of the Warsaw Treaty as a whole.

Accordingly, Hungary sees neither political nor military and arms control reasons which would justify the presence of foreign troops in Hungary. The Hungarian Government, backed by parliament and the broad public, is consistently striving for the complete pullout of the Soviet troops to take place as early as this year, but not later than next year. The bilateral expert talks on the subject are aimed at drawing up a schedule for the departure of Soviet troops remaining after the troop withdrawals announced so far.

Says 50-60,000 Troops Remain

*AU1801142390 Paris AFP in English 1412 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] Vienna, January 18 (AFP)—The Hungarian Government on Thursday called for all Soviet troops to be pulled out of Hungary this year, or at the latest during 1991.

Secretary of State at the Foreign Affairs Ministry Ferenc Somogyi said the demand was made as part of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations here in a bid to end a stalemate over Soviet troops stationed abroad.

The Kremlin began pulling out troops from Hungary last year, but Mr Somogyi said between 50,000 and 60,000 were still stationed there.

Under Budapest's call, a withdrawal calendar has to be worked out "as soon as possible". A CFE meeting to draw up the calendar would take place in "the coming days", he told journalists.

The presence of Soviet troops in Hungary "is no longer justified for either political or military reasons," according to Budapest.

Mr Somogyi's statement came after a similar call by Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak government has presented Moscow with a proposed timetable for a staged withdrawal of Soviet forces, currently numbering 80,000, which have been based in that country since the 1968 invasion. [passage omitted]

Poland's Solidarity leader Lech Walesa said Thursday that Soviet troops should leave the country by the end of the year. The Soviet Union has an estimated 40,000 troops stationed in Poland.

Interviewed on Upcoming Talks

*LD1801214690 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 18 Jan 90*

[Interview with State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ferenc Somogyi by unidentified reporter on 18 January; place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ferenc Somogyi arrived home from Vienna a few hours ago. In his speech at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces, if I am correct, he dealt with the issue of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. Can you briefly summarize the essence of this speech?

[Somogyi] [Passage omitted] Within the framework of the speech, I informed the participants in the session of a fact which is already known in Hungary—that in the coming days, expert-level Soviet-Hungarian talks will open, the aim of which, according to our intention, is to work out a timetable on the basis of which the Soviet troops can be completely withdrawn this year, or at the latest, during the course of next year.

[Reporter] We know that talks are under way, have been under way in Czechoslovakia recently, about the withdrawal of the Soviet Troops stationed there. Is there a difference between Hungary and Czechoslovakia's strategic position?

[Somogyi] I would definitely mention as a difference that Czechoslovakia has a direct border with a NATO country, while Hungary does not, so from this point of view, our situation is simpler.

[Reporter] Can I interpret this to mean that the Soviet troops can be withdrawn more quickly from Hungary than from Czechoslovakia?

[Somogyi] I think that it does not necessarily follow from this that the Soviet troops will be withdrawn earlier or later from Hungary than from Czechoslovakia, for innumerable other circumstances must be taken into consideration in this complicated situation. changed date in source line from Oct to Jan

USSR 'Formally' Asked To Remove Troops

*LD1801131290 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1300 GMT 18 Jan 90*

[Text] The Hungarian Government has formally called on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Hungary, if possible this year, but by the end of next year at the latest.

As Deputy Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi said at the news conference he held at the Vienna armed forces reduction talks, Hungary will be ready to begin expert discussions within days to formulate a concrete schedule for a complete troop withdrawal as soon as possible.

At the experts' exchange of views, agreement could be reached on the shortest term necessary for withdrawal, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister said in Vienna.

General Outlines Military Doctrine

*LD1901223290 Budapest MTI in English 2059 GMT
19 Jan 90*

[Text] Vienna, January 19 (MTI)—In the long term, Hungary advocates a bloc-free Europe but, for the time being, it plans to fulfil its tasks of national defence within the Warsaw Treaty since the two historically established military blocs are still stabilizing factors on the continent, Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief-of-staff of the Hungarian People's Army, stressed at the CSCE seminary on military doctrines in Vienna on Friday [19 January].

Mr Borsits outlined the main principles of Hungary's military doctrine, and programme aimed at international peace, security and cooperation. Mr Borsits said Hungary was urging genuine reforms within the Warsaw Treaty, first of all the democratization and modernization of its internal relations and the mechanism of decision-making.

The Hungarian chief-of-staff laid emphasis on Hungary's efforts to contribute to confidence- and security-building in Europe, and referred to the Hungarian proposal for establishing 50-km wide zones of security along its borders with Austria and Yugoslavia.

MTI on Departure of Soviet Air Force Unit

LD1901174790 Budapest MTI in English 1527 GMT
19 Jan 90

[Text] Budapest, January 19 (MTI)—As the first step of Soviet troop reductions from Hungary this year, the military airborne unit in Debrecen is to be withdrawn: The aerodrome there will no longer be used for any kind of military purpose by the end of the year, Colonel-General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group temporarily stationed in Hungary, confirmed at a meeting with Debrecen council leaders.

Ferenc Debreczeni, acting chairman of the local council, told journalists on Friday that the Soviet military commander had expressed his concern about people's tension over the airport at Debrecen. The colonel-general said he hoped the Soviet units and the local population would part in friendship, and the acting chairman of Debrecen city council seconded this.

Mr Debreczeni told the news conference that the military airport would be converted to suit civilian purposes. As had been proposed by the local population.

Reorganization of Army Command Detailed

LD1901142490 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today the military leadership's views on the Army's transformation were outlined at a press conference at the Ministry of Defense. Peter Trebits reports:

[Trebits] [Passage omitted] By the end of March 1990, the Hungarian Army Command will be set up in its final form. The command will deal with exclusively professional and military matters, with a new Defense Ministry. In the course of the reorganization, the Defense Ministry's staff has decreased by about 600. The average age of the ministry's employees is currently 46 years. Major General Csaba Bicskei, department head at the ministry, described this as a generational change.

The hall where the news conference is held at the Defense Ministry was filled, however, for another reason. Interest is attracted, following the promise by the ministry that the writing of the paper REFORM, which had been dubbed as a sensation, would be dealt with at the press conference.

Those who have the paper could read that a woman resident of Szentendre found secret military documents in a local garbage can. As the newspaper headline reports, the affair which amounts to treason is being investigated by a military committee.

One of the files classified as secret refers to the activity of the Chief of Staff [Toerza] of the Warsaw Pact within the allied armies. There are also documents about the domestic air defense and internal cadre affairs.

The article written by Peter Toeke, editor-in-chief of REFORM, also outlines the meeting in the course of which, even before their publication, Mr Toeke presented the relatively recent—as it has become clear—documents to Ferenc Karpati. As he writes, the minister reacted to this instinctively with a spicy, really Hungarian, oath.

Since then it has become clear that the files were stolen deliberately. There is a suspect but so far there has been no confession.

'Radical' Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Urged

AU2201112690 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
19 Jan 90 p 1

[Burkhard Bischof report: "Moscow Offers Radical Troop Reductions: Reduction of Troops Deployed to One Fourth?"]

[Excerpts] Vienna—The conference of all European chiefs of staff in Vienna has gotten the negotiations on force reductions in Europe moving in a dramatic way. Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, suggested new upper ceilings for the troops that a country is allowed to deploy on foreign territory; these upper ceilings must be far below the 275,000 men that are currently being discussed in Vienna. According to sources from among the delegates, the Soviet Union even suggested to the United States reducing the troops deployed in the allied European states to 150,000 men each. Thus the Soviet troops deployed in East Europe would be reduced to one fourth of their current number. State Secretary Somogyi also announced that expert talks would be held soon on the total withdrawal, by 1990 at the latest, of the Soviet soldiers deployed in Hungary. [passage omitted]

The fact that the negotiations in Vienna's Hofburg on the troops deployed are progressing was also confirmed by the move of Hungarian State Secretary Somogyi, who demanded that the ceilings of deployment troops "should be much lower than 250,000 men." This was the first time at the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe that an alliance member had submitted such a proposal as an individual state. However, Somogyi hinted that Budapest had informed its allies about this initiative in advance.

He said that in view of the positive developments in Europe, Hungary had arrived at the conclusion that its forces were able to defend the country themselves. Therefore, the Hungarian Government planned to achieve, in bilateral negotiations with Moscow, the total withdrawal of the 50,000 to 60,000 Soviet soldiers that are deployed in the country before the end of this year but not later than in 1991, said Somogyi. He added that talks between experts from the two countries would begin soon and should consider a "technically necessary minimum period of time" for the withdrawal and the "international implications" of such a step.

POLAND

Military Service To Be Reduced 'This Year'

*LD1001232690 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 2200 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Already this year—rather than next, as previously planned—military service will be reduced to 18 months. This was reported by General Antoni Jasinski, deputy national defense minister, at a session of the Sejm National Defense Commission which examined the portion of the government budget bill for this year concerning the Ministry of National Defense.

Polish Senate Discusses Defense Spending**Jasinski Addresses Senate**

*LD1201234590 Warsaw Domestic Service
in Polish 1515 GMT 12 Jan 90*

[Speech by Vice Minister of Defense General Antoni Jasinski at Polish Senate session in Warsaw—live]

[Text] Madam Speaker, may it please the House. First, I would like to thank you for allowing me to speak. May I also be permitted to raise several more general issues in my statement.

Our defense doctrine, which was debated in December by the National Defense Committee, sees the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic, which are of a national nature, as a fundamental component of the state's defense system. The phenomenon of detente in international relations has made it possible to make changes to enable the nature of our doctrine to be strictly defensive. It assumes the organizational development of our state's defensive capacity on the basis of necessary sufficiency, I emphasize, necessary sufficiency. This very principle lies at the root of the changes that are being made in our Armed Forces and these changes are fashioned according to the defensive essence of the doctrine. Consequently, deep changes are under way in the Polish Army, which are resulting in a fundamentally altered organizational model and training and educational system. Obviously these changes are also reflected in the National Defense Ministry's 1990 budget.

For a number of years now expenditure on national defense has been showing a downward trend; in 1989 we noted its lowest level during the postwar period, namely a reduction of 16 percent compared with 1988. During 1987-89, this spending was reduced by a total of 25 percent. The Defense Ministry's draft budget for 1990 has been set at the level fulfilled in 1989. But in practice it will be lower by about 5 percent, since, among other things, it does not provide for tax breaks for defense industry enterprises. The country's defense effort can be ascertained by the share of defense spending in distributed national income and is evident in the following indicators: 3.4 percent in 1987, 3.6 percent in 1988, and approximately 3 percent in 1989.

You can get some idea of our defense effort in comparison with other countries based on the data provided by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and by NATO. Thus, in terms of the amount of military spending per head, among the European states, the United States and Canada, Poland comes 29th, with \$40 per head among the population, Hungary is 25th with \$78, Czechoslovakia is 20th with \$188, the FRG is 5th with \$634, France is 4th with \$695, and Switzerland is 8th with \$493.

Among the restructuring measures taken in 1989, we should mention the reduction of the Army by a further 33,000 servicemen, the disbanding of 68 military units, and the reorganization of 147 others, the decommissioning of 400 tanks, 700 artillery pieces and mortars, 600 armored personnel carriers and 80 aircraft, as well as the handing over of 30 facilities to the public. This year it is intended to disband 57 units, reorganize about 70, decommission 450 tanks, 200 artillery pieces and mortars, 100 armored personnel carriers, and to reduce manpower by 10,000 servicemen.

By the end of 1990, manpower will be at the level of 300,000 soldiers, that is, 0.8 percent of the population. With regard to the number of soldiers, the Polish Army is in 15th place among the countries mentioned earlier with 80 soldiers per 10,000 citizens. The FRG takes 14th place with 83 soldiers [per 10,000 citizens], Hungary takes 12th place with 94 soldiers. The total expenditure related to the functioning of the military forces is still within the budget of the Ministry of National Defense, including funds allocated for the purchase of cooperative apartments, which was mentioned by Minister [name indistinct]. I would like to point out that the Ministry of National Defense is not secretive. We have made all data available to the deputies from the Sejm Defense Commission and also to Senator Madej. We are open and prepared to make available to senators and deputies everything that is of interest to them.

The deputies from the Sejm Defense Commission have acquainted themselves in detail at the Ministry of National Defense's central institutions—that is, at the General Staff, the quartermaster's headquarters, at the technical services headquarters, and the finance department—with the areas of military life concerning these institutions and funds indispensable for their functioning. The budget of the Ministry of National Defense does not cover the so-called expenditure for the implementation of tasks in the national economy. This expenditure is included in the central offices' budget and local administration budgets. The means for this purpose for 1990 have been set at Z292.3 billion, including Z169 billion to be allocated for investment projects. It is envisioned that out of this sum will come the expenditure to continue the construction of the interconnected telecommunications system of the CEMA states, the construction of roads, water reservoirs, and the purchase of life-saving equipment for civil defense. Thus, they are investment projects that benefit the country as well.

Expenditures for the payment of military pensions and annuities also remain outside the Ministry of National Defense budget, which has also been mentioned before. It will come to about Z600 billion and will be covered by the central budget. Including this amount in the Ministry of National Defense budget would mean increasing it by about 4 percent. According to the law on soldier's pay, the wages of professional soldiers are being increased at a rate not lower than the average wages of industrial workers. The average pay of professional soldiers in 1989, inclusive of all benefits, bonuses, and the equivalent of free food, which also is, in principle, a norm sanctioned by the law, came to Z308,000 and was about 30 percent higher than the average pay of industrial workers. The 30 percent higher pay of professional soldiers is justified, among other things, by the service involving shift work, which, as a rule, is longer than the nominal working week of other employees by about 40 hours a month, by the fact that it is impossible to choose the place of service or to undertake extra work to earn additional money, by frequent changes of the place of service—an officer changes his place of service at least 5 times—and by the fact that officers hold almost exclusively commanding and managerial posts. This requires high general and professional qualifications. A total of 43 percent of the staff are educated to the degree level, 32 percent have vocational secondary education, and 25 percent have basic vocational education.

[Word indistinct] to the aforementioned conditions of military service, the pay of professional soldiers in all armies is above the average remuneration within the economy, from 40 to 70 percent. The resources anticipated within the draft budget law for the pay of soldiers (?amount to) Z2.615 billion and encompass, apart from pay, the payment of various benefits and dues, among others family allowances for members of soldiers' families; funeral allowances, which are paid to employees by Social Security Agency centers; lump sums for service transfers; and wages paid for a period of 1 year after dismissal from professional military service. [Words indistinct] payments, resources anticipated in the draft budget will ensure that the proportions between the wages of cadres and the remuneration of industrial workers is maintained.

Esteemed Senate, the budget of the Ministry of National Defense, according to the government's submission, is a modest budget. We have named it a budget of survival. There will not be sufficient resources to meet all needs, as we might wish it, but we do wish to focus particular attention on the living conditions of cadres, soldiers on basic military service, and (?Army employees). This is expressed in the structure of the draft budget. I would like to state at the same time, however, that even a budget shaped in this way will ensure the preservation of the basic fabric of the Armed Forces and their combat readiness.

In conclusion, I would like to inform the esteemed chamber that the processes of restructuring are accompanied by a program for the humanization of Army life,

which, to put it as concisely as possible, aims to bring more of home into the army barracks. The Polish Army is a national and civic army, inheriting the many-centuries-old progressive Polish military tradition. It serves the nation with everything that is most valuable, and in every place where a need for this exists. Today, our Armed Forces, fulfilling their defensive role, are honestly supporting the coalition government of Premier Mazowiecki. There can, therefore, be no issues hidden from the highest representation of the nation, the Senate, and the Sejm of the Polish Republic. We are open and ready to give all explanations. We will consider your visiting our headquarters and units as an honor, ladies and gentlemen senators, and I cordially invite you to do so.

Defense Budget Discussed

AU1701103290 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
11 Jan 90 p 7

[Stanislaw Reperowicz report: "How Much Can and Should Be Spent on the Army?"]

[Text] The Sejm National Defense Commission's meeting on the topic of that part of the 1990 draft budget dealing with the Ministry of National Defense lasted over 8 hours.

General Antoni Jasinski presented the main principles of the draft, which has been approved by the National Defense Committee. The primary tasks of our Armed Forces stem from Polish military doctrine, which reflects national interests. National interests are also the reason behind the profound transformations of the Army, which are known generally as "restructuring" and are aimed at considerably reducing the size of the Army. Not so long ago, the Army had 450,000 men. This year, it is intended to bring this number down to 300,000. This number may be even less if the international situation permits.

"The Defense Ministry budget," said General Jasinski, "has been steadily decreasing since 1986. It has fallen by 25 percent since 1986. In 1990 we want the same size military budget as in 1989. Under hyperinflationary conditions, this is a very low figure. Thus, the 1990 military budget should be regarded as a survival budget. Any lower figure would be dangerous. The living conditions of professional soldiers is a cause for concern. Particularly serious are the conditions in distant garrisons, where wives do not work and the entire family has to live off one salary. Army scientific institutes are in a crisis situation. Outlay on building and refurbishing work has been heavily cut.

"In this situation, when we know that there is not enough money for everything, the Defense Ministry leadership has suggested that the funds be concentrated on the most valuable objectives, in other words maintaining professional soldiers and those undergoing compulsory military service. However, not even here will requirements

be completely satisfied. This is understandable, in view of the fact that the entire country is bearing the costs of emerging from the crisis.

"Outlay on new equipment will be second in importance, and outlay on training and on maintaining equipment will be third."

This classification of priorities caused a heated debate. Some Commission members insisted that more money be spent on modern equipment. However, this argument was defeated by the existence of soaring prices.

Before the start of the meeting, members of the commission had visited central Defense Ministry institutions, such as the General Staff, Main Educational Administration, Quartermaster's Office, and Finance Department, where they had held talks with officers in order to establish where further economizing measures could be taken. The conclusions they then presented at the meeting will certainly make the work of many staffs and commands more efficient. That was also the tone of speeches by representatives of the above institutions, who had been invited to the commission meeting, though not all of them agreed with everything. Some commission members pointed out the disproportionately low spending on culture in the army. In light of the present campaign to make Army life more humane, this spending ought to be much higher.

In the end, the commission adopted a resolution to ask the Budget Commission to accept the size of the Defense Ministry budget approved by the government. At the same time, commission members expressed concern that, with present prices being what they are, the sum of money allocated for the purchase of equipment and for personal expenses may not satisfy the country's defense requirements. Therefore, the commission placed the minister of national defense under an obligation to present, by 1 June, a new classification of spending priorities, taking the remarks and conclusions of the commission members into account.

Walesa Demands Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD1801223490 Warsaw PAP in English 2135 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Text] Gdansk, January 18—Jaroslaw Kurski, Lech Walesa's press spokesman, handed over to PAP a communique concerning the Solidarnosc leader's meeting with Soviet Ambassador to Poland Vladimir Brovikov held here today.

The communique reads in part as follows:

The Solidarnosc chairman criticized the to-date relations between Poland and the Soviet Union and said that since September 17, 1939 they had been based on political domination of one side. He expressed the conviction that in the era of far-going reforms which were taking place in

the two countries it was necessary to build these relations in a new way. In Lech Walesa's opinion necessary are the following conditions:

Explanation of the background of the Soviet aggression against Poland in September 1939;

Showing by the Soviet authorities places of burial of Polish officers murdered in April 1940 (which have not been found yet);

Explanation of the trial of the 16 leaders of underground Poland;

Compensation for sufferings of Polish citizens who lived in the borderland of the 2nd Polish Republic;

Guarantees of free cultural and tourist exchange, and in particular, the lifting of any restrictions concerning visits of families in the two countries;

The withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationing in Poland till the end of 1990.

Polish Official Addresses Military Talks

*AU2201125490 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 18 Jan 90 p 2*

[Speech by General of Arms Jozef Uzycki, chief of the Polish General Staff and vice minister of national defense, at the military seminar in Vienna on 17 January]

[Text] The Polish delegation is taking part in this seminar with genuine pleasure because there is a clear need to take a fresh look at the doctrine applied by our Armed Forces in the new international situation. This need is also brought on by the fact that President Wojciech Jaruzelski's peaceful idea of reducing armaments and increasing confidence in central Europe, announced three years ago, called for the kind of transformation of military doctrines that would make them mutually recognized as defensive.

We have come to Vienna with the intention of presenting the national defense doctrine and the activities that have been undertaken in accordance with this doctrine.

Together with the other delegations, we wish to attain the seminar's established objectives.

As experts who know the strength of modern weapons, we can imagine what the effect of their mass use in today's Europe would be. The conviction that our continent would not survive another war is becoming universal. I think that also makes our talks important. This conviction makes us mindful of the need to alleviate the development of events in each one of the spheres we are discussing.

International relations have improved considerably in recent years and have become more democratic. Realism is beginning to dominate, especially in the political sphere, and mutual confidence is growing.

However, these positive trends are not accompanied by any radical changes in the military situation, which, in our opinion, can still not be considered safe because there are still many grounds for mistrust.

Both alliances still have too many different kinds of dangerous weapons. Research on making these weapons even more accurate and destructive continues.

A considerable proportion of forces possess considerable striking and maneuvering capability, which would enable hostilities to be transferred onto the territory of another country in the first few days of war. I have in mind the air forces, rocket forces, airborne forces, marines, and rapid deployment forces.

Some of the strategic concepts of deploying forces and accumulated combat resources that are still in effect contain a disturbing amount of aggression.

I think it is our common duty to alter this situation. We should achieve a sufficient rapprochement of views in order to eliminate more quickly all the barriers to an increase in confidence and cooperation between every state, no matter what its political views are or which alliance it belongs to.

We believe that a creative debate and a constructive exchange of views will permit a fuller understanding of the political-military principles and intentions of every country taking part in our meeting.

The Polish Republic's defense doctrine stems from our *raison d'etat*. It takes into account Poland's moral and economic potential, as well as its geopolitical and geo-strategic location. It avails itself of the centuries-old complex history of Polish statehood. It also takes into account the principles of the coalitional military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states.

According to our doctrine, the state's supreme aim is to safeguard the vital interests of the Polish people—its security, right to live in peace, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Our doctrine highlights the close connection between national security on the one hand and international security, especially European security, on the other.

The consolidation of peace and the prevention of war are considered to be the basic components of our security. Our doctrine calls for the resolution of international conflicts and crisis situations by peaceful means.

Poland considers the UN Charter and a respect for the CSCE Final Act to be an important component of international security.

Our doctrine considers the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic to be a basic component of the state's defense system. Their primary task is to safeguard the independence, security, and sovereignty of the Polish people.

The Armed Forces are organized according to the principle of minimum defense sufficiency, and their structure and numerical strength are such that they are able to repel any aggression either on their own or as part of the coalition system of defense.

This results in armed forces that possess a nonoffensive structure and are of a suitable size. While maintaining the old priority toward those units designed to conduct defense operations against attacks by airborne forces, aircraft, and armored land forces, we intend to keep these units supplied mainly with resources that are typical of defense operations.

We consider the principles of the defensive doctrine to be the cornerstone of the policy concerning Poland's national security, the guiding principle of our intentions, and an expression of our honest intentions vis-a-vis the other countries of Europe.

We realize that the credibility of any declaration must be proved in practice. We know that it is details that always raise the greatest doubts. After all, one can formulate a defense doctrine, but still harbor opposite intentions in one's strategy, tactics, and armed forces' organization. That is why, in order to ensure a conformity between words and deeds and to confirm our honesty, we are planning and fulfilling many organizational, structural, and educational undertakings.

I will present them in general terms.

Doctrinal principles are the reason behind the structure and strictly defensive nature of our Armed Forces. They are also expressed in the way in which commands, staffs, and forces are trained. The supreme objective is to prepare the forces to defend their own territory and its waters and airspace.

We consider defense to be a basic type of combat operation. It is a primary subject in the training of all levels of command, from top to bottom. We assign a key role in defense to those units that combat attacks by airborne forces, aircraft, and armored forces on land.

On the other hand, we consider attacks to be an essential part of combat. A surprise counterattack is the highest form of modern defense.

Our exercises are devoid of any signs of aggression, and do not go beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact member states.

The training curriculum and combat regulations also illustrate the defensive nature of training.

The training of commands, staffs, and forces involves a shaping of a defense orientation. Soldiers have to be convinced that armed struggle is only to be undertaken in reply to an aggression that threatens national security.

For many years, Poland's military spending and weapons production have been at a moderate scale, sufficient to ensure the state's security and defense.

When deciding on the size of the military budget, we consider not just defense needs, but also social requirements and economic capabilities.

In accordance with our defense doctrine, military spending has fallen considerably in real terms. This is illustrated by figures provided by the Ministry of National Defense, showing that military spending has fallen by 20 percent over the past 3 years.

The reduced social outlay on national defense is also illustrated by a fall in military equipment purchases and in a reduction in the numerical status of the Armed Forces.

A reduction in military orders has already curtailed the already modest manufacture of military equipment in Poland. In selected spheres, wherever this is technologically possible, enterprises that have been manufacturing military equipment are now being converted to civilian production.

Openness in the sphere of military activity is a very fundamental part of the process of building confidence between our people. Guided by the provisions of the documents concluded in Helsinki and Stockholm and by unilateral Polish decisions to restructure the Armed Forces, we are undertaking many activities, of which I will mention just a few.

Concerning the doctrine of openness and unification, we have already presented our defense intentions.

We have published detailed information about structural changes to our Armed Forces, including the names of units, their location, basic equipment, and expenditures. This is contained in the publication "The Polish Army—Facts and Figures," which is also available to you.

Via the mass media, we are informing the public about the Ministry of National Defense's decisions on restructuring our Armed Forces. We have been inviting diplomats and foreign journalists accredited in Poland to visit units that were in the process of being reduced, so as to enable them to observe this process.

We are also presenting possible variants concerning the conversion to civilian production of enterprises that have been involved in special military production so far.

Via the media and specialized publications, we are informing society about state defense expenditure, taking into account the structure of the Defense Ministry budget.

We are fully implementing the provisions of the Stockholm concluding document concerning the openness of military activity, having invited foreign military observers to watch Polish military exercises such as "Opal 87" and "Orion 89."

In addition, we are expanding our political-military contacts with NATO, neutral, and nonaligned countries. Our officers are taking part more and more frequently in

joint conferences, seminars, and symposiums devoted to military policy and to increasing confidence and mutual security.

I beg to inform you that, taking present circumstances into account, we have modified our national defense doctrine, which the National Defense Committee has examined and provisionally approved.

We intend to publish our defense doctrine in the form of an open and high-ranking document, which will be equally binding on the state authorities, Armed Forces, and citizens of our country.

I conclude my speech, confident that our meeting may already be considered historic.

I believe that a visible practical confirmation of the defense intentions of the military doctrines of every CSCE participating country would be the greatest success of this seminar.

ROMANIA

Romanian Chief of Staff Speaks at Vienna Meeting

AU1901201490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1901 GMT 19 Jan 90

[ROMPRES headline: "Romanian Address to the Seminar on Military Doctrines Vienna"]

[Text] Bucharest, 19 January (ROMPRES)—Speaking during the seminar on military doctrines taking place in Vienna Colonel General Vasile Ionel, first deputy minister of national defence, chief of general staff, showed that Romania's military doctrine had a strictly defensive character. It sets from the principle according to which homeland's defence has a profoundly popular character.

In case of an aggression, not only the Army but all people will fight arm in hand to defend the country. The Romanian Army will never take part in military actions in the territory of other states, will never endanger the freedom and independence of other peoples.

Romania's military doctrine fully accords with every state's right to self-defence in case of an armed attack—right acknowledged by the UN Charter. Through its objective principles and orientations, Romania's military doctrine ensures the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, conditions for the peaceful work of our people not to be endangered, fully harmonizing with the policy of international peace, detente and security, of friendship and cooperation among peoples in Europe and throughout the world.

YUGOSLAVIA

Chief of Staff Discusses Military's Role

AU0501131390 Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 7 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Report on interview with Lieutenant General Blagoje Adzic, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, by NARODNA ARMIJA; date and place not given: "Numerically Smaller and Technically More Modern Armed Forces"]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General Blagoje Adzic, who assumed the duties of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces at the beginning of October this year, responded to a request by NARODNA ARMIJA and answered some questions.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] How do you assess the military-political position of Yugoslavia in the light of the latest processes in the world and in Europe, and especially in the Balkans? Does a certain thaw in international relations, especially in Europe, essentially change the strategy of those forces whose aim is to destroy Tito's Yugoslavia?

[Adzic] The present military political situation in the world is more favorable in comparison with the situation a few years ago. I am only pointing out two processes that characterize it: the first is negotiations and agreement between the big powers, and the second, significant changes in socialist countries. The result of the first process is a relaxation of tension, partial disarmament, a certain calming down of the hotbeds of crises, and in general a more favorable climate in overall relations. In this sense one may speak about a certain thaw, which certainly has reduced the danger of clashes on a world scale. The second process is developing when it looks that the present practice of real socialism is being abandoned, but the "outlines" of new socialism are not visible or clearly defined. If these processes of a further improvement of relations continue, one will be able to say that the world will move further away from war.

Contradictory Events in the World

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Your conditional wording leaves room for at least one "but...."

[Adzic] Precisely, because if international relations, and especially the military political situation in the world, are analyzed in more detail, one can notice that the global strategic goals of the superpowers have not essentially changed. This means that none of them is prepared to renounce its goals, especially not in favor of the other. The reduction of the Armed Forces and their armaments is virtually only symbolic, and in essence it represents a reduction of old-generation armaments, while on the other side the armed forces are being developed and equipped with much more modern weapons, in which way they are actually being strengthened. The changes in the socialist countries are occurring at an unexpected

speed and it is not quite certain in which direction they run, so that twists and turns are possible. The countries of the so-called "free world" will certainly make no effort to support a reform of socialism or rather to save socialism. On the contrary, as the only proper way out of the crisis they recommend a return to capitalism, and the demands for a change of borders in some parts of Europe are also more and more clamorous. The consequence of this could be developments that cannot easily be foreseen.

The center of these events is chiefly Europe. More precisely, all these events are occurring around us and they directly affect the security of Yugoslavia. These processes are happening, or will happen, also in the Balkans, which makes the situation even more unclear and even uncertain.

As the matters stand at present, Yugoslavia is not threatened by any direct danger from abroad. However, if one bears in mind that twists and turns are possible, which would lead to further aggravation of relations, it is too early to conclude merely on the basis of first positive processes that outside danger to the security of Yugoslavia is a thing of the past.

As regards the forces whose aim is to destroy Yugoslavia, I think that it can be said that their strategic aim remains unchanged. Of course, the methods and manners of activities do change. Encouraged by the "defeat of socialism," these forces now appear on the scene more openly and propagate the destruction of socialism, division of Yugoslavia, and restoration of capitalism. These forces are, above all, present within the country, but they are supported to the maximum by those who think alike abroad.

Social Reform Is Increasing the Strength of Defense

[NARODNA ARMIJA] What is the influence of social reforms on the concept of all-people's defense and social self-protection, and particularly on the Armed Forces, and to what extent could the process of pluralization—which some people consider an introduction to a multi-party system—affect the place and the role of the Yugoslav People's Army?

[Adzic] All that we do in reforming our society is directed toward making it politically, economically, and legally more efficient, so that each of its parts may responsibly and fully carry out its tasks in conformity with the Constitution and the law. This applies equally to the Armed Forces and to the defense system in general. The reform should lead to economic integration, make possible the rule of law and a law-governed state, reduce state intervention in the economy, make possible an opening toward developed industrial countries, speed up scientific and technical progress, and reduce our financial and technological dependence on foreign countries. This, in its briefest form, is the road to create the conditions for a better and richer life.

The social reform can thus have only a positive influence on the development of our defense and protection system, and within it, on the improvement of the combat readiness of our Armed Forces, their modernization, and a more efficient performance of tasks.

As regards pluralization of society, I see no negative connotation. It is simply a matter of different views and interests that exist in every society. Of course, the most important thing is in which way they are harmonized; if the proper ways are not found, they may reach political proportions and may turn into a political struggle of political parties opposed to each other. I am convinced that party pluralism does not suit the SFRY, its social nature, and its further development, and that our society will succeed in finding the most suitable way for harmonizing different interests on a socialist, democratic, and general Yugoslav platform.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Some people call the Army conservative, others demand its depolitization and want it to be confined to barracks, yet others dispute the right of the military and party leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army to express the views of the Army personnel on social problems, and others again claim the Army as their own. How do you comment on this?

[Adzic] The Yugoslav People's Army and the Armed Forces in general are a part of Yugoslav society, and it is unthinkable to consider them anything else. As a part of this society, they bear all its general marks, particularly those that arise from their functions and tasks. In thinking about this deep permeation of society and defense, they, therefore, cannot imagine what our Armed Forces would be like and how they would perform their functions in society if they were to be depoliticized, as some would wish, which means a separation from society's basic problems. A people's army cannot be separated from the social mainstream. If that were to happen, it would cease to be "people's" in the proper sense of the world.

I see the fact that some people dispute our right to express opinions on social problems as an expression of their impotence to oppose our stands convincingly, as well as an expression of their fear of the fact that our stands and precepts in favor of a unified socialist Yugoslavia and an efficient social reform meet with the support of the majority of citizens.

Speaking about claiming the Army as one's own, I would say only this: We have been and remain the Yugoslav People's Army, the Army of all our peoples and nationalities in an equal degree, and this is only where we properly belong. We have always been in the front ranks of the struggle for true social values: for democracy and freedom, for humanism and human happiness, and for comprehensive progress. Finally, this is the best reply to those who accuse us of conservatism.

Regular Financing of Numerically Smaller and Technically More Modern Army

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Can you, as a political man, at this time conceive the Yugoslav People's Army without the League of Communists of Yugoslavia?

[Adzic] To answer quite briefly: No. Our Army was created in the fire of war and revolution, under the leadership of Tito and the party, and from that time the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is an inseparable part of its essence and strength. The basic task of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia organization in the Army now is building and strengthening the ideopolitical unity and the moral force of the Yugoslav People's Army, and its general Yugoslav and people's nature.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Beginning with 1978, the funds actually allocated for financing the Yugoslav People's Army have been constantly reduced in comparison with the funds envisioned and approved by the SFRY Assembly, so that this year they amount to as little as 3.57 percent instead of 4.90 percent as agreed to originally and 4.60 percent as amended later, and lately one mentions more and more frequently the daily liquidity shortage of the Army that was unthinkable until recently. What does this mean for combat training and education of the Army personnel, for the modernization of the Armed Forces, and for the standard of living of the Yugoslav People's Army personnel?

[Adzic] The situation is as you have stated, which means it is very unfavorable and it serves as a warning that the new SFRY Constitution must solve the financing of the Yugoslav People's Army over a long term, so that a continuous, planned, and realistic performance of its tasks may be ensured. The Army must know what funds it will possess before it defines its short-term and long-term tasks. The experience in providing the funds for the Yugoslav People's Army has not been good so far. The uncertainty in providing the funds has a negative effect on all its activities, and especially its modernization and equipment.

Because the planned influx of funds from the federal budget has not been realized, the Yugoslav People's Army is paying huge interest on loans because it cannot meet its daily financial commitments. This aspect of the funds outflow is not being compensated for, and the planned funds are thus reduced. Therefore, the entire problem of Yugoslav People's Army financing must be resolved more precisely by the new constitution, so that the Yugoslav People's Army will be assured of a secure material basis for its development. Our views on this are known to the public.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Our country has recently reduced the peacetime and the wartime Army by as much as 12 percent. Nobody in Europe has yet done this. At the 21st session of the Committee of the League of Communists organization in the Yugoslav People's Army, General Kadijevic announced further steps in this

field. What else are our possibilities and social needs, and up to what limit may the Army be reduced?

[Adzic] The size of the Armed Forces depends primarily on the probability of aggression, the estimated strength of the potential aggressor, and naturally on the level of modernity of one's own armed forces and their ability to resist such aggression. Looking at this problem, we assess that a further reduction of the Armed Forces is possible. The basic premise is that we build numerically smaller, but modernly equipped and trained, armed forces that will be able to carry out all their tasks and to respond to their constitutional purpose. For the armed forces of this size, our military industry produces the major part of modern armaments and military equipment, and the pace of deliveries will primarily depend on the volume of budget funds.

Whatever we are doing in reducing our armed forces, we are doing out of our own conviction and because of social needs. This is the best confirmation of the peaceful nature of our policy and of our respect for the freedom and independence of other states, especially our neighbors, and it is a proof of how principled our stand is regarding the nonexistence of territorial pretensions by the SFRY toward other states. We hope that our neighbors will respond with similar measures, and the neighboring countries, members of the Warsaw Pact, have already announced a reduction of their armed forces by up to 10 percent.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] How do you imagine our Armed Forces, and the Yugoslav People's Army within them, in the year 2000?

[Adzic] Numerically smaller but technically more modern. Their development in the coming period will be characterized by their harmonization with the realistic requirements of the utilization plans and the material possibilities of the country; by economizing in all spheres of consumption; by improving the system of leadership and command, and so forth. I think that we will succeed in building such armed forces as correspond to the basic premises of society in the field of defense.

To Radically Change the Approach to the Scientific World

[NARODNA ARMIJA] We have more and more officers who are doctors and masters of military and other sciences, and officers with the highest military education. How is this valuable potential used in modernizing the leadership and commanding, and in scientific research work for defense purposes?

[Adzic] This is a sphere of the life and work of the Armed Forces in which we must radically change the thinking and the behavior of people. Our scientific research cadres are still relatively few in numbers, especially in the field of military skills. It is difficult to assess precisely how rationally the scientific research cadres we possess are utilized, but certainly not rationally enough. We endeavor to gather a sufficient number of researchers on some key tasks, and

we are successful in this respect. We see a solution in increasing the numbers and the quality of scientific research cadres, in concentrating them on key development programs and practical problems of our Armed Forces, and in a greater inclusion of the scientific potential of society, especially as regards the problems of all people's defense and social self-protection.

Of course, this question cannot be regarded as isolated from other significant aspects of scientific work, such as plans, financing, organization, coordination, publishing activities, and training of cadres. In brief, scientific research work must be carried out in a planned way, and on the basis of long-term plans and programs, and clearly defined aims and a strategy of scientific work. Of course, the coordination of work and the motivation of cadres must be increased.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] How do the very fast and radical changes in engineering and technology influence military skills, the leading and commanding, and the system of education and training, and what is being done in the armed forces so as to keep pace with the scientific and technical revolution?

[Adzic] It is well known that the changes in armaments and generally in military technology change the ways and the factors of conducting armed combat, increase the combat capability of the armed forces, and change the manner of communication in a military organization. The changes are of many kinds and are numerous. It is not simple to follow them; both a material and a scientific foundation is necessary. We are paying special attention to this in the Armed Forces. In keeping with our abilities, we try to apply everything that is new and that we assess as suitable to our defense system. We have institutes with well-developed scientific research, whose results are known to our public.

Speaking about scientific research, from 10 to 15 percent of the military budgets in the world are allocated for it. These activities have become decisive for the development of the armed forces. In some countries they are treated even as a new service of the armed forces. [passage omitted]

There Was No Alternative to the Emergency Measures in Kosovo

[NARODNA ARMIJA] You used to be the commander of the Pristina Corps, and as deputy chief of the General Staff, you visited many Kosovo garrisons this year. We would like to know how you assess the effects of the emergency measures introduced in the province 8 months ago, how the Yugoslav People's Army units have carried out the tasks they received from the SFRY Presidency, and how the military collectives cooperate with the sociopolitical system protagonists in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo?

[Adzic] By the end of 1988 and in the March events this year, the Kosovo crisis of many years escalated rapidly and threatened to grow into an open armed conflict on a

large scale. This was helped by the indoctrination of the ethnic Albanian population through many years, the insufficient or almost nonexistent political work by Communists and political leaders in Kosovo, and, of course, lack of unity in Yugoslavia at large. Extremist Albanian separatists and nationalists assessed that this was a favorable moment for implementing their goals, and of course, in any case, it happened. Thus the introduction of emergency measures proclaimed by the SFRY Presidium had no alternative. These measures have yielded results that were foreseen when they were introduced. The escalation of lawlessness has been stopped, the separatist forces have been defeated in a direct clash, and they have abandoned the strategy of an open confrontation with the forces of public peace and order. In the meanwhile, they passed on to a strategy of long-term attrition.

The Yugoslav People's Army units, which were brought to the highest level of combat readiness by the decision of the SFRY Presidency, have not been directly involved in eliminating the emergency situation. They have carried out their task by their presence in this region, and they have acted by deterring all the forces with anti-Yugoslav inclinations in Kosovo and in the country in general, of course including the forces that may try to aid the separatists in any way from the outside. On the other hand, the presence of the Yugoslav People's Army units has had an effect in strengthening the confidence in the state and its subjects by the Yugoslav-oriented citizens of Kosovo. The Yugoslav People's Army units have carried out all these tasks impeccably and, what is of particular importance, they have not for a moment allowed themselves to be provoked and possibly compromised in the eyes of the people. On the contrary, they have succeeded in organizing good cooperation with the people in all the places they stay.

The chief result of the emergency measures introduced in Kosovo is to ensure conditions for planned and organized activities of all the subjects in realizing the Yugoslav program for the resolving of the Kosovo crisis. Unfortunately, this program has been imperfectly realized for the time being.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Are you personally an optimist when you think about the possible development of events in Kosovo?

[Adzic] The situation in Kosovo is still difficult and complex. The enemy has not capitulated, but has only changed the manner and the method of his activities. This is also confirmed by the latest events for which the beginning of the Titova Mitrovica trial has served. The complexity of the Kosovo problem is also indicated by the fact that the conditions for solving it have also not changed in the Yugoslav context in general, and one should bear in mind that some outside forces are also interested, seeing that they could break Yugoslavia's unity most easily through Kosovo.

Nevertheless, I am an optimist. The Kosovo problem can be solved, and precisely when proper Yugoslav moves are made, real conditions for its final solution will be created.

To Judge Tito's Work in a Historically Responsible Way and With Rational Arguments

[NARODNA ARMIJA] We are witnessing numerous attacks on the person and work of Josip Broz Tito. Of course, Tito's military work is also not exempted from these attacks, and its actual size, originality, and possibility of application in our conditions and in world conditions are questioned.

[Adzic] Josip Broz Tito and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia that he headed for over 4 decades always had political adversaries who tried in various ways to remove them from the social and political scene. This, after all, is the fate of every historic personality and every revolutionary movement.

One should speak with historical responsibility and with rational arguments about the main points of Tito's work. Tito himself knew that more distance in time was needed for a final judgment about him. [passage omitted]

It is clear that Tito is not being attacked and disputed because of himself. It is a matter of continuous re-examination of the essence of Tito's work in the National Liberation Struggle and the revolution, of the AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] foundations of the SFRY, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia role in our society, the socialist social system, the concept of the all-people's defense, and the role of the Yugoslav People's Army. One tries to proclaim our entire revolutionary road a failure and an unsuccessful experiment. The purpose of all this is to destroy socialism, and the political and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, making use of the current crisis. [passage omitted]

Caring for the People and Protecting the Environment

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Gen Kadrijevic and some other officers from the top leadership of the Army have been pointing out in the past few months the importance of ecology even from the point of the view of the defense of the country, and the responsibility of the Army—as part of society—for the protection of the environment. The Yugoslav People's Army units more and more frequently join in ecological drives by young people, and—toward the end of the year—a conference will be held on this subject under the auspices of the General Staff. Convinced that this means comprehending the essence of one of the vital problems from the point of view of strengthening the defense capabilities of society, and not a kind of trendiness and of pandering to the youths, may we ask you to indicate the size of this problem?

[Adzic] The protection of the environment is an important social function. The Yugoslav People's Army understands its importance and pays a great deal of attention to it by taking specific measures. Our barracks and other military facilities are nicely tended, with flowers planted. Very often they are the nicest areas in the cities in which the garrisons are located. The Yugoslav People's Army units have planted tens of thousands of hectares of forests, regulated many streams, and so forth. Of course,

we are not completely satisfied with the results achieved, because we are restricted by the funds available, and, like all factors in society, by the lack of synchronization of the actions by all the factors in the state. We must do much better and much more in this field, both in society and in the Armed Forces. [passage omitted]

[NARODNA ARMIJA] What is your ethnic affiliation and what do you think of those who have declared to be Yugoslavs, or will do so at the next census in the spring of 1991?

[Adzic] The institution of free expression of citizens regarding their affiliation to a nation or nationality has

long been a part of the SFRY, a multinational community of equal peoples and nationalities. Using this right, I have declared myself a Serb from the beginning, like my ancestors. As regards the second part of the question: The process of forming a Yugoslav consciousness and a Yugoslav patriotism was begun in our area a long time ago, and our people declaring to be Yugoslav arises from that. Some people specifically declare themselves Yugoslavs, which is certainly good. People should be enabled to declare themselves freely, because this is the basic characteristic of modern, law-governed, and sovereign states. This is the Yugoslavia that we want. [passage omitted]

BOLIVIA**Bolivian Military Relations With Cuba Unchanged***90ET0062D La Paz HOY in Spanish 11 Dec 89 p 4*

[Excerpt] (ANF)—The recent visit paid to the Republic of Cuba by more than 50 of our military and civilian personnel failed to achieve the launching of a new era in the relationship of the military institutions, since "this subject is still under study."

This fact was announced by the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the nation, General Jorge Moreira Rojas, who said that the military high command is assessing the potential for establishing a new era in the relations between the Armed Forces of the two nations in the future.

During an interview granted by the president of the Republic to the students at the School of Higher National Studies and the War College of the Bolivian Air Force, some military officers suggested to him that a new relationship involving the exchange of visits with this country be launched, in order to exchange military study experiences.

In connection with this suggestion, the commander in chief of the military establishment said that "this would be a hasty move, because such desires need rigorous analysis on the basis of Bolivia's military interests."

Gen Moreira Rojas said that in a democratic regime, the Armed Forces play a productive role through the projects carried out by the various specialized units that contribute to the development of the country's regions. [passage omitted]

Minister on Air Navigation Radar Deployment*PY1701143090 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Text] Aeronautics Minister Luis Gonzales Quintanilla has said that the government will deploy radar installations in eastern Bolivia to support civil air navigation and occasionally to support the antidrug fight.

The minister said that consultations and negotiations were held with European governments, especially with the Italian Government, which promised to install two powerful air navigation radar units.

Quintanilla reiterated that Bolivia does not need military radar to support the antidrug fight, and less still those supplied by the (U.S.) Government.

Gonzales stressed that the Bolivian Air Force can control the Bolivian airspace and that it can guarantee our sovereignty.

Aeronautics Military Under Secretary Installed*PY1701125290 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 0000 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Text] Brigadier General Franz Moscoso Ruiz was installed this afternoon as new Aeronautics Military Under Secretary, replacing Brigadier General Erwin Greminger Duran.

Aeronautics Minister Luis Gonzales Quintanilla presided over the ceremony, which was held at the Aeronautics Ministry. During an impromptu speech, the Aeronautics Minister stressed the qualities of General Moscoso Ruiz, and asked him to work at the service of the Aeronautics Ministry and of the nation.

The minister also stressed the importance of aeronautics, not only in times of war but also in times of peace by uniting the regions of the country with the urban centers and by guarding Bolivian sovereignty and air space.

Referring to the outgoing under secretary, the minister said that Gen. Greminger is known for his serious and responsible work. He called upon Gen. Moscoso Ruiz for his cooperation in his new post.

Gen. Moscoso Ruiz thanked the government for the confidence placed in him and promised to work responsibly.

Militarization of Northern Regions Debated**Armed Forces Propose Military Zone***PY2201165990 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 22 Jan 90*

[Text] According to a Government House source, President Jaime Paz Zamora will thoroughly analyze a proposal made by Armed Forces Commander General Jorge Moreira to declare the northern Bolivian territories a military zone.

Gen Moreira has recently proposed to militarize the northern Bolivian territories to defend and preserve Bolivian natural resources from constant despoliation by foreigners.

The media has been reporting charges made by the inhabitants of Beni and Pando Departments, north of La Paz, who say that nonrenewable resources like gold and wood are [words indistinct] being despoiled, and that no effective measures are being adopted to stop this illegal action.

Gen Moreira said that the Armed Forces' proposal stems from the need to safeguard Bolivian natural resources in face of foreign penetration of northern national territories. He said the final decision will be made by the president of Bolivia in his capacity as captain general of the national Armed Forces.

Government House sources reported that the Armed Forces commander's proposal has been sent to the

National Security Council to be studied, and a final report will be drawn up to allow the chief of state to make a final decision.

Iturralde Against Militarization

*PY2301155790 La Paz La Red Panamericana
in Spanish 1130 GMT 23 Jan 90*

[Text] Foreign Minister Carlos Iturralde last night said that the northern border regions should be settled with civilians rather than be militarized. Iturralde said the proposal made by Armed Forces Commander General Jorge Moreira to militarize the northern regions to protect Bolivian natural resources must be thoroughly analyzed because the deployment of military units implies the analysis of several internal factors.

The foreign minister said the national government is committed to national development and that the role of the Armed Forces is very important. The military contribution to national development is clearly outlined by Decree No. 22407, recently proclaimed by the government, Iturralde said.

[Begin Iturralde recording] If the Armed Forces could help by creating cooperatives and building schools and hospitals, thus guaranteeing the security of the people, then why not? This is an important subject which I have discussed thoroughly with the defense minister. It is (?mentioned) in Decree No. 22407, which defines the Armed Forces' role. [end recording]

Ormachea Denies Militarization

*PY2401022890 La Paz Television Boliviana Network
in Spanish 0030 GMT 24 Jan 90*

[Text] Defense Minister Hector Ormachea denied today that he announced the militarization of Beni and Pando Departments. He said:

[Begin Ormachea recording] The press report is wrong. I would like to say that militarization is one of many possibilities, and the most remote without any doubt. A thorough and lengthy study must first be done before a decision can be made in this regard. The study is necessary to learn if the conditions warrant militarization; therefore, I would like to deny the press report. No such concrete proposal has been made to the executive branch. It was only wrong information from the press. I would like to reiterate that this is only one of the numerous possibilities in the country to put many things in order. [end recording]

BRAZIL

President-Elect Appoints Navy, Army, Aeronautics Ministers

*PY1701201690 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo
Television in Portuguese 2001 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Text] President-elect Fernando Collor de Mello has appointed Admiral Mario Cesar Flores as minister of the

Navy; General Carlos Tinoco as minister of the Army; and Brigadier Socrates Da Costa Monteiro as minister of aeronautics.

Interview With Future Military Ministers

*PY2301130090 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 18 Jan 90 p A-6*

["First" joint interview with Army Minister-designate Carlos Tinoco Ribeiro Gomes, Navy Minister-designate Mario Cesar Flores, and Aeronautics Minister-designate Socrates da Costa Monteiro by unidentified reporter; date and place not given]

[Text] [FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Has President Fernando Collor already given you some specific tasks?

[Flores] Nothing specific. In our case, things are much simpler. We are going to lead institutions with a natural stability and continuity so there is no need for specific tasks, unless some requirement eventually arises. You must understand that for the Armed Forces, very stable and continuous institutions, specific tasks are not as important as they would be, for example, in the economic area.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Are you in favor of abolishing the EMFA [Armed Forces General Staff]?

[Ribeiro Gomes] This seems to be a less important matter because the EMFA will continue to do the same work and play the same role. This organization will continue to perform the same work despite losing its ministerial status.

[Flores] I want to say in this respect that ministerial status was accorded the EMFA chief some 3 decades after the creation of the EMFA, and it continues to do the same work.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] What do you think about abolishing the SNI [National Service for Intelligence]?

[Flores] I would prefer to be excused from commenting on this matter, not only for professional reasons—I have always been involved with the Navy—but also because I am not entitled to give my opinion on this matter. As in any government, I think there should be some sort of system to keep the president continuously informed. Whether it should be the SNI or some other organization, it is just a matter of adaptation. But frankly, I am not in a position to elaborate further on this matter.

[Ribeiro Gomes] The SNI issue is not under our jurisdiction. It depends directly on the Presidency.

[Da Costa Monteiro] I think the SNI issue should be analyzed not emotionally but technically, to determine its specific mission or what types of missions need to be modified. I am sure that the government will know how to handle the security issue.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Are the difficulties to which you gentlemen referred when you introduced yourselves related to labor strikes? When strikes occur, who should negotiate on behalf of the government?

[Flores] Is the question who should negotiate? It should definitely not be the military. The difficulties that I referred to, to which I wanted to refer—excuse me if I did not describe them clearly—had to do with implementing a program for equipping, for maintaining naval preparedness in face of the serious economic problem we are experiencing. I did not mean to refer to anything else.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] In the next government, will the professionalization of the Armed Forces be emphasized, or will they continue to play a political role?

[Da Costa Monteiro] Speaking for the Air Force, I can say that the intention is to work in the professional area, to continue to work in the professional area. The observation of political issues only indicates interest...the Air Force plans to be totally and absolutely dedicated to the professional area.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] What are your plans, gentlemen, in the area of equipment? Will the Aeronautics Ministry continue the AMX project?

[Da Costa Monteiro] As far as the Air Force is concerned, the AMX program is more than a project to build a plane; more than an intention to have a plane. Our objective is to participate and to help in the technical development of the Brazilian industrial and aeronautic establishment. We are presently building planes that are taken to the United States, planes that, although small and medium-sized, fly in Europe. We intend to keep pace with the global development of aviation. It is therefore necessary to introduce technology and to train engineers, workers, and technicians; it is necessary to update equipment, and this is our objective. If possible, we intend to continue working in that direction. We hope that it will be possible to find solutions by evaluating the priority of these programs so the Brazilian economy can grow and our country can develop. We believe it will be possible to find solutions to the problem.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Collor said during the electoral campaign that he would not tolerate disorder. Does this mean the Army will be deployed in the streets?

[Ribeiro Gomes] The Constitution allows and establishes rules for strikes. Abuses of the right to strike cannot be allowed. The problem initially belongs to the states. As a public order problem, strikes are a specific problem for the states.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] The Constitution granted Congress greater power, and it practically prepares the budget. Do you gentlemen intend to work with Congress?

[Flores] I believe that a solid understanding between the Armed Forces and the Congress is indispensable. This is

essential to maintain political support for our military preparedness. I have the impression that this is a widespread view in the Armed Forces. We will not refuse to explain the reasons for proposing any budget allocation. We will try to convince the nation's representatives of the requirements for preparedness and, consequently, of the financial needs they will entail. This understanding is necessary. In fact, it already exists; it is nothing new. We will continue to promote that understanding on the Navy's part; to the extent that I can make decisions, we will seek an increasingly clear and deep understanding.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] How was the invitation for your appointments as ministers handled?

[Flores] I received a notice to report at a certain time, and as a good military man I was there right on time. The president then told me of his intention to invite me to take the post. It was his decision and the invitation was accepted, of course. I received a notification to appear here this morning; I didn't know at what time.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Further on this point: Were you escorted by someone? Former Navy Minister Maximiliano da Fonseca, for instance?

[Flores] I didn't know the name of the person who escorted me to see the president; he met me downstairs. It was not a high-level official who took me to the meeting, as far as I know.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Had you already met the president?

[Flores] I had already met him, but under different circumstances.

[Ribeiro Gomes] There was some intermediation in the Army's case... The call to appear for this meeting with the president was made through the current minister.

[Da Costa Monteiro] I received a call this morning from Aeronautics Minister Moreira Lima, who said that I had to report here this afternoon. When I got here I received the president's invitation with much pride and satisfaction.

[Flores] Just for your information: I was told to report by Admiral Saboia, who is my chief. I am an officer on active duty and he was the one who notified me.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Do you gentlemen plan to make any changes in the structure of your ministries? In the military school curriculums, for instance?

[Flores] The curricula of the Navy Joint Staff are professional. As far as I have seen in my time in service, they were always professional curricula. The problem to which you referred, the problem of political involvement, is a national cultural problem rather than a military problem.

[Da Costa Monteiro] Regarding the Air Force, professionalization is a reality, something that we are working

on today. The Aeronautics Ministry is working hard to maintain its professional activities in an up-to-date fashion, modernized through appropriate training. We also need to meet civil aviation demands, as we have been doing for more than 15 years, by installing radar units, analyzing problems, and overseeing operations. Professionalization is a work program with a long history.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Do you gentlemen plan to make any changes in the Brazilian nuclear program?

[Flores] I would imagine that you are addressing that question to me. The Navy is considered responsible for that process, but it actually only cooperates with the Brazilian nuclear program; it does not manage it. Contrary to what has been said many times, the Navy is cooperating to ensure a technological capability so that some day, if it is so decided by political leaders, we can build a nuclear submarine. This is what the Navy does. The Brazilian nuclear program is not a military program.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] President Collor will dismantle the SNI. Will you follow suit by dismantling the intelligence services at the ministries?

[Da Costa Monteiro] As far as the Air Force is concerned, the CISA [Air Force Intelligence and Security Center] has already been dismantled. We now have an intelligence secretariat that is part of military planning. This secretariat is subordinate to the chief of the Joint Staff as a component of the Aeronautics Joint Staff, as in the joint staff of any armed forces in the world. That answers your question from the Air Force's point of view.

[Ribeiro Gomes] For the Army, in my view the Army Intelligence Center is indispensable for providing the minister and the Army in general with information needed for decisionmaking.

[Flores] I would say that the Navy's situation is similar to the situation described by General Ribeiro Gomes. The Navy Intelligence Service is more...is less well-known and more maligned. However, it is necessary as a source of information for the decisionmaking process and as such it should continue to exist. Its objectives and goals will be adjusted with the nation's evolution. And this is exactly what is happening.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] What is your opinion on the possible creation of a defense ministry?

[Flores] The idea of creating a defense ministry should not be categorically rejected. As I have already said, I believe that if a defense ministry is ever created, it should be the result of an evolution in which things have been prepared for that goal. It is not advantageous from a... It is not necessary from an operational viewpoint. Operations between the three branches have gone smoothly and are going smoothly without a ministry. There is no economic pressure either. A defense ministry will not produce a substantial savings and, consequently,

there is no urgent need to create one. If the issue is ever raised again, I think we should consider it as part of the evolutionary process. The president, however, has not talked to me about this possibility.

[Ribeiro Gomes] I fully agree with Adm. Flores. The Armed Forces are now operating without a defense ministry. This does not mean that the idea has been rejected; its implementation will call for study and analysis, so it may actually improve the operations of the Armed Forces.

[Da Costa Monteiro] I want to express my total agreement with Commander Flores, and I would like to say that a defense ministry is part of the administrative structure of a state. At this time, however—despite the fact that many countries do have defense ministries—I do not see an urgent need to create one in Brazil. Even though a defense ministry might be advantageous from some viewpoints, it would be questionable from others. I therefore conclude that an analysis of the possible advantages of a defense ministry would be rather theoretical. Now, if the creation of the ministry is considered a political decision, the Armed Forces will have nothing to say about it. If the decision is made within the framework of the current situation, by those who should make this political decision...

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Can Embraer [Brazilian Aeronautics Company] be sold to the private sector?

[Da Costa Monteiro] It can. Each privatization process allows several alternatives and choices. Considering Embraer's importance to the Air Force, the country, and the development of sophisticated technology, we believe that if it is sold, appropriate precautions should be taken. I would like to say that the Aeronautics Ministry—through the Aeronautical Technology Institute—has for the past 40 years produced highly skilled engineers. The institute, which charges no fees, has produced highly skilled engineers for society because we understood this was the path that would lead to the development of our own aeronautical capability, with Brazilian technology. This goal has already been accomplished through Embraer. Consequently, we are always very cautious and very careful with anything having to do with an aeronautical industry like Embraer, which is very dear to us.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] What are the plans for promoting integration with Argentina? Why don't we withdraw our forces from our southern border?

[Ribeiro Gomes] I would say the fact that we have more troops in the southern area is independent of the integration process with Argentina. These troops were not deployed recently; they have been there for years. In our project to restructure the Army, we are trying to improve the deployment of our forces as a function of our efforts to promote integration, which is a target toward which we are working.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] The country is undergoing several reforms. Are any military reforms being considered?

[Flores] I would like to hear suggestions on the kind of reforms we could make. I frankly believe that our military system is appropriate and that, like everything else, it could be improved. Our system is being gradually improved. As for compulsory military service, it is a political—not a military—issue, because it is provided for in the Constitution. The Armed Forces cannot reject a constitutional provision; they should comply with it.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Until recently, the Armed Forces have been more concerned with internal matters than with external wars. What is your current approach to the issue?

[Ribeiro Gomes] The Armed Forces have until recently been more concerned about internal security for reasons with which you are familiar. As for external security conditions, we fortunately have no problems. Despite the fact that Brazil shares borders with many countries, we have no border problems. There is tranquillity in this area. The economic situation is affecting not only the Armed Forces but the entire nation.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Mr Army Minister, have you ruled out the possibility of an intervention by the Army in case of disturbances of public order?

[Ribeiro Gomes] No, we have not. I have only said that any such disturbance—when it begins—is a public order problem and that, consequently, state governments should take care of it. It is obvious that all situations should be observed. If the situation deteriorates to the point where the government feels the Armed Forces should intervene, they will obviously comply with the order.

[Flores] Article 142 of the Constitution outlines the objectives of the Armed Forces. It states that, at the request of one of the three branches of government, the Armed Forces can intervene to guarantee law and order. There are constitutional mechanisms that guarantee this procedure. Any intervention by the Armed Forces will, therefore, be the responsibility of one of the three branches of government.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Has the U.S. invasion of Panama produced any change in military strategy?

[Ribeiro Gomes] That issue does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces. It is a civilian issue.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Have the military budgets been adequate? Do you think they should be increased?

[Flores] I can assure you that the budgets for the Navy have been very low, especially the budget for this year, which is drastically low. I can also assure you, however, we understand that under the current circumstances, our budgets cannot be any larger. We have to live with this situation.

[Ribeiro Gomes] Right. The Army is in the same situation. We have to manage with the budget that is allocated to us. We are, however, making efforts to receive more funds.

[Da Costa Monteiro] As for the Air Force, I can say that this year our budget was reduced by 250,000,000 new cruzados, the largest reduction among military ministry budgets. This situation has deeply affected our ongoing projects. We understand, however, that all of us are members of a large team that must make an all-out effort to work with the budget we have received. This is how we will work.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Should implementation of the Calha Norte project continue?

[Ribeiro Gomes] The Calha Norte project is nothing but an extension of the occupation of the border areas beginning in Rio Grande do Sul and then going on to the western border. Now we are in the northern border area. The government has decided to implement this program to populate areas that need people. The Armed Forces have been the instruments for the program.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Is Brazilian democracy an irreversible process?

[Flores] The question of whether democracy is reversible is a problem to be tackled by society, not by the Armed Forces. Military men and civilians are all for making democracy irreversible. From a political viewpoint, however, it is an issue to be dealt with by society.

[Ribeiro Gomes] I agree. It is obvious that democracy...should not be merely discussed; it should be practiced. We hope things will be like this.

[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO] Do you think that the size of the military ministries should be reduced? The Army apparently has 400,000 troops...

[Ribeiro Gomes] Who says that? It is important to clarify that the Army is authorized to have approximately 280,000 troops, but we have around 200,000. Actually, the Army has already been reduced, more than you can imagine.

[Flores] The Navy has some 65,000 troops.

[Da Costa Monteiro] I would like to give an example to show the extent of the reduction of the Armed Forces. All Brazilian Army troops can be seated in Maracana Stadium, while the Navy and the Air Force troops can be placed on each side of the field. This is the size of the Brazilian Armed Forces. They can all be placed inside Maracana Stadium.

NICARAGUA

U.S. 82d Airborne Troops Dropped Into Honduras

PA2301184890 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish
1819 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Text] According to available information, part of a battalion from the U.S. 82d Airborne Division parachuted out of four C-141 aircraft today into Honduran territory. A

few minutes later, five other C-141's dropped more 82d Airborne Division troops, thus completing a full battalion of the 82d Airborne Division paratroopers who were dropped somewhere in Honduras today.

We are establishing contact with Honduran radio stations—which up to this time have evaded the topic. This prevents us from giving any more precise information on this situation.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PRC 'Likely' Site for Arabsat Satellite Launch*LD1801133790 Kuwait KUNA in English 1142 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Text] Paris, January 18 (KUNA)—The Arab authority for satellite communication, Arabsat, will likely choose China to launch its third satellite into space, industrial sources said here Thursday.

The sources told the Kuwait News Agency that the Chinese offer for launching the missile is "economically wise" for the Arab group, saying it would cost the third of what the European consortium, Arianespace, would charge.

Arianespace, the sources said, normally charges about 100 million dollars for launching a rocket carrying commercial satellites and placing them in space.

The third Arab orbiter, Arabsat-3, was manufactured by the French space group, Aerospatiale, and is now waiting for the launching decision.

An Arab eight member ministerial committee concluded meetings in Oman yesterday after discussing, among a host of issues, the tenders given by China and the European consortium for launching the satellite.

The two other Arab satellites, also manufactured by Aerospatiale were launched in the mid 1980's by Arianespace and a U.S. space site.

EGYPT

Soviet Envoy on Mideast, Relations With Israel*NC1501162690 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1515 GMT
15 Jan 90*

[Text] Cairo, 15 January (MENA)—Assistant Foreign Minister Ambassador 'Aziz Sayf-al-Nasr received Soviet Ambassador in Cairo Gennadiy Zhuravlev today. They discussed the Soviet stand on the Middle East issue, peace efforts in the region, and the results of Israeli Science and Technology Minister 'Ezer Weizman's recent visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

During the meeting, the Soviet ambassador emphasized that the Soviet stand on the Middle East issue is well known and has not changed: This stand is represented in the need to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

He said that the Soviet Union has urged the Israeli leadership to change its current stand to a more realistic one with regard to the Palestinian issue so as to keep pace with the changes the world is now experiencing.

Asked about the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, the Soviet ambassador said that the Soviet

Union is prepared to normalize relations between the two countries as soon as tangible steps are taken toward achieving peace in the Middle East. He indicated that his country supports any step toward finding a settlement to this issue.

Regarding the recent increase in the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, the Soviet ambassador said that this happened after the recent decisions were made. These decisions stipulate that any Soviet citizen has the right to immigrate to any place. He affirmed that the Soviet state has no plan for Jewish immigration to Israel.

The Soviet ambassador also emphasized that Ethiopian-Soviet relations are good and friendly and that the Soviet Union will continue to extend aid to Ethiopia.

He said that it is important that efforts be made to settle the Eritrean issue. He added that there can be no military solution to the issue of the Horn of Africa, stressing the need for solving all problems peacefully.

INDIA

Army Chief Calls for 'Careful Military Planning'*BK1401161990 Delhi Domestic Service in English
1530 GMT 14 Jan 90*

[Text] The chief of the Army staff, General V. N. Sharma, has called for careful military planning, keeping in view the capabilities being developed in neighboring countries. He said despite the resources crunch, no laxity can be shown to the country's military preparedness. All necessary investments have to be made, whether in equipment or in the field, alongside developmental needs.

In an interview with our special correspondent, the Army chief ruled out any change in the overall role of the Indian Army despite changes in the geopolitical situation in the subcontinent.

Commenting on the recently concluded "Exercise Zarb-i-Momin" by Pakistan, the general said though every country has full rights to keep its army in readiness, the concepts involved in the exercise have to be carefully examined. When asked to compare "Zarb-i-Momin" with the Indian Army's "Operation Brass Tacks," he said the Indian exercise was not aimed at any neighbor. The Army chief agreed that the forces have been overstretched in recent years because of increasing assignments.

IRAN

Pakistan Navy Commander Visits Iran**Holds Talks With Shamkani***LD1801134790 Tehran IRNA in English 1223 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Text] Tehran, January 18 (IRNA)—Visiting Pakistani Navy Commander General Yastur-ul-Hagh Malek met

his Iranian counterpart Rear Admiral 'Ali Shamkhani here Thursday morning and discussed issues of mutual interest.

During the meeting, Shamkhani briefed Malek on Iran's naval policy and its self-sufficiency in educational fields. He also stressed the might of the Iranian naval fleets extended throughout the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea waters to the mouth of the Indian Ocean. On the Persian Gulf security, he said it will be secured only when the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran is guaranteed. He also called for further expansion of bilateral relations.

Malek arrived here Wednesday to hold talks on upgrading of Iran-Pakistan cooperation in marine and shipping areas. Calling for non-presence of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, the Pakistani guest urged the need for collaboration among Muslim countries to confront big power threats.

After the meeting, Admiral Shamkhani told IRNA that Malek's visit to Iran aimed at developing ties between the two neighbouring countries and to follow up previous bilateral negotiations held earlier in Pakistan. The existence of extensive economic, political and military cooperation between Tehran and Islamabad was also underlined by Shamkhani who expressed the hope that the two countries' cooperation would result in the establishment of a consolidated peace in the region.

During the visit, Shamkhani added, General Malek will also be informed of the latest developments regarding the U.N. resolution 598 on peace between Iran and Iraq's blocking the peace process.

Meets With IRGC Naval Commander

*LD2001112890 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian
1030 GMT 20 Jan 90*

[Text] The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps [IRGC] Navy commander, in a meeting today with the Pakistani Navy commander, stressed the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Persian Gulf. According to a Central News Unit report, the Pakistani Navy commander also stressed the need for more cooperation, particularly in training, and called for closer ties between the IRGC naval forces and the Pakistani Navy.

Meets Joint Staff Chief Shahbazi

*LD2101165690 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian
1030 GMT 21 Jan 90*

[Text] General Yasurul Haq Malik, Pakistani chief of Navy staff, met Brigadier General Shahbazi, the joint staff chief of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Army, this morning. According to the Central News Unit, in the meeting Brigadier General Shahbazi referred to the two countries' actual and potential talents and expressed the hope that Iran and Pakistan would be able to make good progress without reliance on the superpowers.

The Army's Joint Staff chief noted the good trend of cooperation between the two countries' naval forces in educational and training matters and added: It is expected that the two countries' naval knowledge will make further progress with the exchange of information. Pakistan's chief of Navy Staff, for his part, stressed that Iran had emerged from the imposed war with pride and that it had gained valuable experience. He referred to two countries' cultural, economic, and political common points and described them as a cause for a sense of ever-increasing closeness between the two nations. He conveyed his country's readiness to provide the spare parts needed by the Islamic Republic of Iran's naval force.

ISRAEL

Israeli Reaction to Proposed U.S. Aid Cut

Peres Says 'No Justification'

*TA1701181090 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
1705 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Untitled report by Menahem Friedman]

[Text] Finance Minister Shim'on Peres says Senator Dole's call for cuts in aid to Israel should be taken seriously, and yes, indeed we are worried. As for the threat itself, Minister Peres says: The \$3 billion in U.S. aid should be divided in two: the economic aid to the tune of \$1.2 billion, earmarked for repayment of debt plus interest to the United States, and the \$1.8 billion in defense aid.

[Begin Peres recording] Congress decided economic aid to Israel never should fall below the annual sum of money Israel must repay to the United States. In fact, we use that money to repay all our debts to the United States.

As for security assistance, evidently this year the U.S. inflation rate will reach close to 5 percent. This means an erosion of 5 percent in purchasing power. In addition to this, weapon prices have rocketed. It is not a static situation. It is not as though the Soviet Union has begun to disarm, because whatever the USSR may do in the Middle East, Iraq takes pain to reverse. It has procured and is manufacturing more sophisticated and expensive weapons, which are more frightening and worrying as a result. From the point of view of Israel's efforts, too—and by that I refer to the 22 percent or so of Israel's annual budget slated for security—compared with the efforts exerted in Europe, there is no justification to single us out instead of balancing it somewhat with the Europeans, who are having an easier time now from the strategic point of view. [end recording]

The U.S. Government, says Peres, has pledged not to affect Israel's defensive capability. A strong IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is one of the necessary conditions for the peace process.

Iraqi Threat Considered

TA1701182690 *Jerusalem Television Service in Arabic*
1730 GMT 17 Jan 90

["Excerpt" of address by Shim'on Peres, vice prime minister and finance minister, at the Jerusalem Economic and Social Club on 17 January—recorded in Hebrew with Arabic subtitles]

[Text] I was surprised by the remarks of Senator Dole, who should not necessarily be regarded an enemy of Israel. Let me say a few words regarding the aid: We receive \$3 billion in U.S. aid per annum. Part of it is economic aid, another part is defense assistance. We get \$1.2 billion in economic aid, and \$1.8 billion in defense assistance. The entire sum of \$1.2 billion actually stays in the United States, as it is used to repay debts and interest. We have a historic \$10.5 billion debt to the United States. We accrued that debt from the wars, but also as a result of peace. For example, we are still paying for the relocation of the airfields, which were moved from the Sinai to the Negev.

I cannot ignore the fact there is at least one Arab country building up a highly threatening military force—a country which in fact started out with a large military force, even though it never won a war. That country is Iraq. Iraq has established approximately 50 divisions [not further specified], which is a huge force, even in European terms. It also built a very large air force. It now produces long-range missiles with nonconventional warheads to obtain hegemony in the Arab world and to threaten several countries in the region. In the end, perhaps nothing will come of it, but Israel cannot afford, even for a moment, to ignore this threat. This is one of the reasons why I, as finance minister, did not suggest slashing the defense budget this year. I had this threat in mind, and I still see it very clearly.

Shomron Notes Soviets in Syria

TA1701174190 *Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew*
1700 GMT 17 Jan 90

[Text] Lieutenant General Dan Shomron, chief of staff, says a strong Israel is in the United States' interest. He consequently hopes Washington will not slash defense and economic aid to Israel. The intention to cut back aid is connected to the new phase in superpower relations, but in the Middle East, nothing has changed.

In this context, the chief of staff reported Soviet advisers still are in Syria, and even if the Soviets are seeking ways to reduce their expenditure, there's been no noticeable departure of Soviet advisers from Syria. The supply of Soviet weapons to Syria continues, with no visible reduction. The chief of staff was speaking today at the end of a cadet exercise in the Negev.

Cutbacks 'Harm' Strategic Plans

TA1801100090 *Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew*
0600 GMT 18 Jan 90

[Text] Sources in the defense establishment have said the proposed cutbacks in aid to Israel suggested by Senator Dole would seriously harm Israeli purchases in the United States and the two countries' joint strategic plans, and lead to the dismissal of hundreds of employees from Israeli defense industries.

The sources pointed out the Soviet Union is continuing to supply arms to Iraq, Syria, and Libya. They expect Moscow to step up arms sales in the near future to inject money into its dwindling coffers.

SAUDI ARABIA**Prince Urges Arab Cooperation in Defense Industry**

PM1801115490 *London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT*
in Arabic 17 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Hasin al-Bunyan report: "Prince Sultan Tells AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Saudi Arms Deals To Be Announced at the Right Time"]

[Excerpt] Riyadh, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—Prince Sultan Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz—Saudi second deputy prime minister, defense and aviation minister, and inspector general—has called for efforts to be pooled to establish comprehensive cooperation among the Arab states to set up broadly-based military industrialization projects.

Asked about the intention to endorse the compulsory military service system for Saudi youths, Prince Sultan said: Military conscription applies in the countries whose peoples avoid joining armed forces sectors. But in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we do not believe it is necessary, because our sons are part of the Armed Forces and we can see their interest in joining the Armed Forces sectors. The door still is open for them to train in our Armed Forces."

Asked whether the allocation of a major proportion of the new Saudi budget to the Armed Forces and security indicates a desire to conclude new arms deals, Prince Sultan told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: We announce deals only at the right time and when they take place. But the aid in the budget reflects the leadership's and the government's feelings toward Armed Forces officials. Undoubtedly the preservation of our country's security and stability is a necessary demand, though I stress the country's security comes from God, due to its commitment and adherence to the Islamic faith, praise to Almighty God.

After attending a major air display by Saudi fighter aircraft yesterday and the graduation of a new group of Saudi officers, pilots, and technicians—including two

Bahraini pilots—Prince Sultan said: That support in the state budget for the Saudi Armed Forces is nothing but support for our country and our generous people for opening the door for our young university and secondary education graduates to join the Armed Forces sectors, because we realize their eagerness to serve their country in various fields.

Prince Sultan described the "economic parity" program being implemented by Saudi Arabia as a fruit of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz's directives that much of the funds paid for the arms deals be recovered in hard currency, by investing a major part of them in industrialization and transfers of advanced technology to Saudi Arabia—a positive and constructive step which will serve Saudi Arabia.

Answering another question from AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT about Saudi Arabia's position on the "conditions of moderation" in the region, Prince Sultan said: We always look at these conditions with optimism and see them from that angle. [passage omitted]

SUDAN

Claims of Downed Government Bombers Disputed

SPLA: 2 Bombers Shot Down

EA1901145790 (Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Text] Forces of the "Bright Star" campaign shot down an enemy Antonov bomber over Kajo Kaji [Western

Equatoria] 10 days ago. The wreckage of the plane was found 2 days ago about 40 miles from Kajo Kaji. The plane was shot down by a (Zu)-37 anti-aircraft gun.

Again yesterday, Thursday, 18 January 1990, another enemy Antonov bomber was shot down by "Bright Star" campaign forces advancing to Juba from Yei area. The enemy had used high-altitude Antonov [word indistinct] 22 bombers over the last month, but now the SPLA has acquired the capability to bring down high-altitude bombers using both anti-aircraft cannon and heat-seeking missiles.

Government Denies Claim

EA2001153490 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 2145 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Text] The General Command of the People's Armed Forces today issued the following statement:

The outlaws' radio said today that their forces had shot down a Sudanese military Antonov aircraft, type CU-22, north of Kajo Kaji 10 days ago. It also said that on 12 January they shot down another aircraft in the area near Juba.

The General Command wishes to confirm that all its aircraft are present and that it has lost no aircraft. This claim has no basis in truth. What was broadcast by the outlaws' radio was intended to boost the morale of its routed forces. That is the end of the statement.

Col Gen Kochemasov Interviewed on Missile, Artillery Troops Day*90UM0207A VILNYUS SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 19 Nov 89 p 1*

[Interview with Col Gen S. G. Kochemasov, the Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, conducted by an unnamed TASS correspondent, under the rubric "19 November—Missile and Artillery Troops Day": "The Missile Shield of the Homeland."]

[Text] 19 November is Missile and Artillery Troops Day. The Soviet people honor missile launch crews, artillerymen, and the inventors of formidable combat weapons. In connection with this holiday, a TASS correspondent asked Colonel General S. G. Kochemasov, the Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Main Staff, to answer some questions.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Grigoryevich, I would like (you) to remind our readers about the history of the vocational holiday for Soviet artillerymen and missileers and about those heroic pages which they have added to the combat annals of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Kochemasov] I will begin with the fact that this holiday was established in commemoration of the Soviet artillerymen's special combat services during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Namely, in October 1942, the salvos of 15 thousand guns, mortars, and rocket launchers announced the beginning of the Red Army's counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

During the years of the war, Soviet artillery destroyed more than 70 thousand enemy tanks, 167 thousand guns and mortars, and tens of thousands of his soldiers. During this time, Soviet industry produced 482 thousand guns of all calibres and 352 thousand mortars. More than 2,100 artillery regiments and brigades were awarded decorations, approximately 1,200 received honorary name designations, and more than 500 received the title of guard units. 1.6 million artillerymen were awarded combat decorations and medals and 1,885 of them became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Of course, one can also cite other impressive statistics, but, in my opinion, the significance of the artillerymen's contribution to the achievement of our common victory is obvious without them.

During the postwar years, in response to the growing military threat from the aggressive forces of imperialism to unleash nuclear missile warfare, the Communist Party, the Soviet government, and our whole nation secured through incredible efforts the development of nuclear missile weapons in our country. And since 1964, (by USSR Supreme Soviet decree dated 17 November) our holiday began to be observed as the Missile and Artillery Troops Day.

[Correspondent] It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this event for our country and for the

fortunes of the whole world. Therefore, please, go into more detail on the fact of the development of our nuclear missile shield.

[Kochemasov] They say, do not discard the lyrics of the song. Moreover, we, having learned through bitter experience, must not rewrite nor retouch our history. And our history attests that during the summer of 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, Truman, with insidious intent, informed Stalin: the United States had developed the atomic bomb. Stalin, when the occasion required, knew perfectly well how to control himself. Not until that same evening (and this is also a historical fact), did he contact Kurchatov by telephone, hurrying the scientist to finish the development of the atomic bomb.

Regarding that historical period we can ask ourselves the question: was everything done correctly at that time? And we can honestly answer: on the whole—yes. There was no alternative to the development of the nuclear missile shield. But we would not be completely honest, if we did not address the fact that during the postwar period, good use was not made of all the opportunities to limit the scale and the acuteness of confrontation and to prevent the spectre of an "iron curtain", which subsequently cost us a pretty penny. The deviation from Leninist norms, the aftereffects of which we are still overcoming, also played a part in this. As a matter of fact, this is why we need perestroika.

[Correspondent] Be that as it may, Stanislav Grigoryevich, it is symbolic that our country was the initiator of a radical reduction in nuclear missiles. Along these lines, an opinion exists among a certain portion of the Soviet people that many military men, primarily missileers of course, opposed the peaceable initiative of the highest Soviet leaders. What can you say regarding this?

[Kochemasov] In common terms this is called a discourse to the extent of one's own expertise. But if one is speaking seriously, one must note that hundreds and thousands of people, primarily our military experts, worked on the preparation of the Soviet-American INF Treaty. No one can or does know better than military experts, how to eliminate the most complex weapons of our age. Furthermore, we even had to train hundreds of missileers for this purpose. And in order to put an end to this once and for all, I will add that among our soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers, it is unlikely that people, who doubt the correctness of the Party's and government's decisions, could be found. Although by everyday standards, many of them have experienced the type of problems, which do not fall within the usual bounds of military service.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Grigoryevich, please dwell at greater length on this circumstance.

[Kochemasov] It is no secret that in the not too distant past during such large reductions in the strength of the Armed Forces, people sometimes seemed to recede into the background. The military bureaucracy did not trouble itself an awful lot about them, especially in the

provinces. Today, we are solving the problems of discharging officers with particular care, bearing in mind that consideration and concern for the people, who are performing the honorable duty of defending the homeland, was and still is a main factor determining the morale of the Army.

Seizing the opportunity, I would like to address the representatives of the local Party and Soviet bodies, who,—and I would very much like to believe this,—will provide an appropriate welcome to our missileers in the cities and villages, at the factories and plants, at educational institutions, at transportation facilities, at the kolkhozes and sovkhoses, in short, in every aspect of the national economy. I really think that these people, who have devoted so much strength and energy to the homeland, are worthy of every consideration and encouragement from the local Party and Soviet bodies.

[Correspondent] What is the state of the modern Missile and Artillery Forces? Have not our unilateral and rather large scale reductions affected their combat readiness?

[Kochemasov] First of all, I must state that our artillery has made a qualitative leap during its period of development. In connection with the development of battle-field missiles and operational-tactical missiles, a new combat arm has appeared—the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Ground Forces. Cannon artillery has not lost its great importance in accomplishing offensive and defensive objectives. Today, high-powered gun artillery, howitzer artillery, tank-destroyer artillery, and rocket artillery are actively used in all field training exercises.

Modern missile systems and their automated guidance and control systems ensure the highest degree of readiness for delivering a retaliatory strike.

I do not say this at all for the purpose of once again rattling the sabre. In my opinion, the whole world is convinced that none of the Soviet people, including the military, desire war, but are fighting for peace. The revolutionary character of our new thought lies in the fact that it is directed toward a denuclearized future. However, defense is the main priority of the state. Safeguarding the life and peaceful labor of the Soviet people is a matter of supreme responsibility. And so, proceeding from present-day realities, we cannot under any circumstances allow military superiority over ourselves.

Therefore, special responsibility lies with the strategic missile launch crews. This responsibility is conditioned by the combat role of this branch of service and the special nature of the missions entrusted to it. Our soldiers' basis for serving is the performance of combat alert duty in peacetime. The entire system of personnel training and education is subordinated to the unconditional and efficient execution of this special responsibility.

[Correspondent] As a rule, it is natural that they should celebrate their vocational holiday with significant achievements in combat and political training.

[Kochemasov] And such is the case. You know, in the long run, the mood of the missileers is mainly determined by their sacred duty to the homeland and to their nation.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that the realities of the modern world do not give us grounds for complacency. And this means that we cannot, we do not have the right to lower our constant vigilance and combat readiness. For today, this is the most effective way of preventing war. For the present, the implementation of the principles of our new political thought is just beginning to develop other measures for preventing war.

Review of Progress, Problems in Arms Control Agreements

90WC0026A Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 23, Dec 89 (signed to press 9 Nov 89) pp 36-39

[Article by Vladimir Belyshev: "USSR-United States: From Dialogue to Cooperation"]

[Text] The White House meeting of CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze with President G. Bush of the United States and Shevardnadze's talks in Wyoming with Secretary of State J. Baker raised the Soviet-American dialogue to a qualitatively new level.

The 8 months following Bush's arrival in the White House were a period of mutual adaptation for the Soviet leadership and the new American administration. There was a natural process of the definition of political priorities, the consideration and choice of options, and the expression of opinions on the possible and the attainable. Contacts between Moscow and Washington, including contacts at the highest level, were maintained throughout this period.

In the letter E.A. Shevardnadze delivered to the President of the United States from M.S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader proposed the discussion of issues on the Soviet-American agenda, expressed new ideas, and listed the new circumstances allowing for a mutually acceptable approach to negotiations and agreements on several major issues.

The meetings on American territory proved that the U.S. leadership also intends to take vigorous action to achieve practical results and expand the base of Soviet-American cooperation in various fields. "We have moved from confrontation to dialogue, and now to cooperation—to joint action for the purpose of solving common problems relating to a broad range of current issues," J. Baker said.

The new positions of the two sides, their intentions, and their policy aims put the issue of another Soviet-American summit meeting on the agenda as an effective means of securing breakthroughs in the main areas of USSR-U.S. relations. A meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush was tentatively scheduled for late spring or early summer in 1990. This agreement reflects the belief of the two sides in the possibility of concluding major agreements and making considerable progress in general and in the relations between our two countries in particular. Furthermore, this applies primarily to the sphere of disarmament and security.

At the meeting in Wyoming the sides reached several agreements in principle on a group of issues. "Each of these achievements is important in itself," G. Bush announced, "but they are particularly important as signs of the new prevailing approach in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union today. Serious differences still exist, but the willingness to eliminate these differences in a constructive and frank manner is something new and welcome to us and the rest of the world."

We can agree completely with the American President. The stable and normal development of Soviet-American relations, the attempt to settle all differences by political means, and the constructive approach are all in the interest of our people and in the interest of the world civilization as a whole.

In which areas have the USSR and United States already reached agreements, and in which spheres have the views of the sides converged and paved the way for the conclusion of negotiations? Where do differences of opinion still exist, and in what do they consist?

Strategic offensive arms. Several of the obstacles which had been impeding the conclusion of an agreement in this area have now been eliminated. One of them—the demand for a ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's)—was withdrawn by the American side. It is true that the U.S. administration made this conditional upon a positive congressional response to requests for funds for American mobile ICBM programs. Immediately after E.A. Shevardnadze's meeting with J. Baker, however, the Senate voted on 29 September to allocate 1.1 billion dollars for MX missiles on railroad platforms and 100 million dollars for the development of another mobile system, the Midgetman. In Wyoming the two sides agreed that statements referring to the effective verification of limits on mobile ICBM's would have to be worded more clearly.

The USSR put forth a new proposal which helped to solve the problem of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's). The differences of opinion here essentially consisted in different approaches to the rules of counting the number of ALCM's on heavy bombers. The American side had previously wanted heavy bombers of any type to represent 10 ALCM's on the average. This approach, however, put the sides on an unequal footing:

One type of Soviet bomber, for example, is equipped with only 6 missiles, but it would still represent 10 in the total calculations. On the other hand, some American bombers are equipped with 20 or more ALCM's, but they would also represent only 10 missiles each. For this reason, at the talks in Geneva the Soviet side previously wanted the calculations for each heavy bomber of a specific type to be based on the maximum number of missiles it could carry. Now, however, the USSR has proposed a new procedure for counting missiles—the actual number on each plane. It appears that both sides should be satisfied with this method.

The Soviet side also proposed new approaches to solve the complex problem of the long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's). It announced the possibility of discussing these missiles separately, not at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, but in the broader context of naval arms reduction and limitation. As for the talks on nuclear and space weapons, in view of the United States' tendency to avoid decisions on this matter by citing difficulties in the verification of SLCM's, the USSR suggested that the sides concentrate on the problem of this verification and then use the results of these studies to settle the issue of limiting the number of SLCM's, and to do this on the basis of mutual commitments, outside the framework of the treaty on strategic offensive arms.

In Wyoming the American delegation announced its willingness to study the new Soviet ideas on the sea-launched cruise missiles but also underscored its doubts about the possibility of the effective verification of SLCM's. Besides this, it repeated its earlier views on the serious problems that would supposedly arise during any discussions of naval arms limitation. Nevertheless, the possibility of taking the problem of SLCM limitation outside the framework of the talks on nuclear and space weapons will probably facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms (SOA).

Space weapons. The Soviet proposal on ballistic missile defense and space was the most unexpected and even surprising development for certain groups in the United States. It paved the way for the conclusion and implementation of an SOA treaty without reaching an agreement on space weapons. This means that the USSR is willing to sign and ratify an SOA treaty even if an agreement has not been reached on ballistic missile defense by the time the treaty has been drafted. This untied the main knot impeding the talks.

This calls for the immediate clarification that the USSR's feelings about the U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative," envisaging the establishment of a broad-scale ABM system with space involvement, are still negative, and that the USSR still insists that the sides continue observing the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. Obviously, the right to withdraw from an SOA treaty if one side does not observe the ABM Treaty

should be reserved. Besides this, a common understanding of prohibited and permitted activity—i.e., an understanding of what can be done in space—should be reached at the talks on nuclear and space weapons. The Soviet Union now believes that research and related tests can be conducted in space, but this does not apply to ABM systems and components and their space-based prototypes. This is a serious shift in our position, which will allow the United States to conduct certain experiments in space within the framework of the bilateral agreement but will not allow it to put prototypes of weapons or their elements in low orbits.

In this way, the USSR, which has opposed linkages in disarmament talks, has now extended this approach to the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons by proposing the "divorce" of the talks on strategic offensive arms and on space weapons. This new proposal is a new and fresh approach which will facilitate the process of agreement on strategic offensive arms. The objective connection between strategic offensive arms and ballistic missile defense, however, must not be ignored. This is the reason for the conditions set by the Soviet Union for the drafting of a separate treaty on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms.

It must be said that some people in the United States and even in our country initially regarded the new approach proposed in Wyoming to the talks on nuclear and space weapons as a retreat by the USSR in matters of fundamental importance, but this opinion soon underwent radical changes. This can be traced in the American press. "The SDI is dead," the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS concluded in an analysis of the "Star Wars" program, which reached a dead end as a result of the talks in Wyoming. "Shevardnadze eliminated the last reason for the continued existence of the SDI." The Soviet Union, according to the newspaper, had deprived the United States of the chance to use the SDI as an argument in the talks: If the United States stops working on this program, it will receive nothing in exchange; if it continues the work, it will take the risk of losing an agreement on strategic offensive arms. "We were already witnessing the slow death of the SDI," the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS asserted, "and the Soviets' clever move was the last nail in its coffin."

Can we expect a summit meeting to be marked by the signing of an agreement on strategic offensive arms? In his response to this question, E.A. Shevardnadze displayed cautious optimism and said that the main unsolved problems impeding the drafting of an agreement would probably be settled by the time of the meeting. And here is what President G. Bush of the United States said: "I cannot say that I am absolutely certain this will happen, but I agree that there is a good chance it will happen."

Stability, openness, and verification. In Wyoming the Soviet side had a positive response to President Bush's June initiative regarding verification and stability, envisaging the exchange of information on agreed categories

of weapons and the joint perfection of methods of verifying strategic offensive arms. The leaders of the foreign policy agencies in the USSR and the United States signed an agreement aimed at the development of these measures and stipulating the principles of their implementation. Besides this, the sides expressed their common wish to secure the maximum confidence of the two sides with regard to the observance of a future treaty on strategic offensive arms. Here I would like to focus attention on an extremely important fact. The agreement on "trial" measures of verification and stability will be implemented before the SOA treaty has been drafted. The Soviet side agreed to this because it understood the American side's position: If verification measures are perfected through joint effort prior to the signing of the treaty, it will be easier for the U.S. administration to secure the congressional ratification of the document because it will refute the "traditional" complaints of the opponents of disarmament about defects and difficulties in verifying the observance of the treaty.

The agreement signed in Wyoming on advance information about large-scale exercises by strategic forces will also be important from the standpoint of the further reinforcement of strategic stability.

The USSR minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state agreed in principle with the "open skies" proposal, which was set forth by President Bush in May and which envisages mutual flights by unarmed planes over the territory of the USSR and United States and their Warsaw Pact and NATO allies. The USSR expressed its willingness to discuss ways of implementing this idea at an international conference with all interested parties, proceeding from the understanding that the "open skies" agreement might strengthen trust between the countries party to the agreement and reduce the danger of war. In a speech in the United Nations, E.A. Shevardnadze announced that our country was willing to go even further and to extend the openness to land, the seas and oceans, and even space.

Nuclear tests. The Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively, are to be prepared for ratification. The two sides made a serious attempt to reach a compromise and were able to agree on some complex verification issues, thereby making the enactment of these two important documents possible. The sides agreed on the use of Soviet and American verification methods, including on-site inspections of one another's nuclear test ranges.

Chemical weapons. In this sphere a memorandum on a bilateral experiment in data exchange and verification was signed to promote the quicker drafting, signing, and ratification of a multilateral international convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. The USSR and the United States will exchange the most exhaustive data on their military chemical potential in two stages. During the first stage there will be an exchange of visits to

several facilities for the production and storage of chemical weapons and to civilian chemical enterprises. During the second stage the accuracy of data will be verified by on-site inspections, and not only at notified facilities, but also with the aid of inspections on request. It is indicative that the inspections will begin before the drafting of the comprehensive convention has been completed.

In a speech in the United Nations, G. Bush announced the United States' willingness to begin destroying chemical weapons along with the USSR and to eliminate more than 80 percent of chemical stockpiles if the USSR reduces its arsenal by the same amount. On behalf of our country, E.A. Shevardnadze expressed the willingness to join the United States in going further and, without waiting for the conclusion of the multilateral convention, to stop producing chemical weapons and to radically reduce or completely eliminate chemical means of warfare on a bilateral basis. Unfortunately, in a meeting with reporters, President G. Bush refused to eliminate the entire American arsenal before the future convention goes into force, saying: "No, absolutely not. We need a certain degree of prudence."

Conventional arms. E.A. Shevardnadze discussed the possibility of eliminating the obstacles to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the substantial reduction of troops and conventional arms in Europe with President G. Bush and Secretary of State J. Baker. The recent exchange of serious compromises between the USSR and the United States in this sphere cannot be ignored. In response to the American President's constructive proposals at the NATO anniversary session in Brussels, calling for the reduction of airborne systems, the Soviet Union agreed in Wyoming to include all of the aircraft of frontal (or tactical) aviation in the Vienna talks, rather than just the attack planes as in the past.

Besides this, the USSR proposed that the Vienna talks also cover the exchange of information on the number, structure, and location of troops and arms throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, thorough and comprehensive verification, including on-site inspections, and stabilizing measures to put any significant troop transfer or concentration under control.

Our country asked the United States and other NATO countries to hold a conference of the heads of state of European countries, the United States, and Canada in the second half of 1990 for the signing of an agreement on conventional armed forces.

All of this points up the broad range of disarmament issues discussed and settled in Wyoming. Of course, it would be wrong to overestimate the results: **There are still significant differences of opinion in some areas, but in the continued presence of the necessary mutual effort and the shared commitment to frank dialogue for the purpose of finding practical and concrete solutions, the sides can accelerate and develop the progress that has been made in Soviet-American relations in recent years.** The following

thesis from the joint statement the foreign minister and secretary of state issued in Wyoming is extremely important from this standpoint: "The two sides agree that their common goal consists in building a more stable, constructive, and lasting relationship—the kind of relationship in which openness and interaction will gradually take the place of suspicion and rivalry."

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Malta Summit as End to 'Cold War'

Produced Something New

18120033A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 50, 17-24 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Simonov, Valletta: "A Meeting in A Storm"]

[Text] I could have got three interviews from the US President.

To do that I only had to get aboard the cruiser *Belknap*, where he was, but by swimming there. The White House press secretary ran no risk at all when he dropped this journalistic sweet to the 2,000 correspondents, who had swarmed over Malta. Two-metre-high waves swept the Marsaxhlokk Bay and wind velocity reached 100 km per hour.

Man proposes, but God disposes. The storm re-shuffled the programme of meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush off the shores of Malta. It made security services shudder. Bush's launch made four approaches to the *Belknap*, bringing back nostalgic memories to the US President about the days when he was a Navy pilot, providing grounds to the Voice of America to assume ironically that Moscow and Washington were madly seeking the culprit who thought up the idea of meeting on water instead of land.

I think that if the culprit is found, he should be rewarded.

Gorbachev and Bush, a Russian and an American, a Communist and a capitalist, were viewed by TV cameras as sons of one civilization, equally vulnerable and equally united by nature and other common human values that expect from us careful mercy and reasonable caution.

The meeting in the storm became a wonderful metaphor of the new political thinking.

It reigned supreme also at the talks between the two presidents. As if the energy of the elements was transferred to the two of them. Their first meeting lasted five hours all told, and observed a very broad range of themes—from processes of renewal in eastern Europe to problems of disarmament and the situation in Central America. That was how the pace was set for the "presidents' floating weekend". Later on the leaders described

it as "very productive", "with a broad exchange of opinions", "open" and "extremely meaningful".

It looks like the invisible participant in their talks—perestroika—was sitting together with Bush and Gorbachev. The US President convincingly expressed his hope for the success of the reforms in the USSR. His resolution belies those Western analysts who before Malta professed the theory that Bush "has exchanged skepticism in relation to Gorbachev's intention to pessimism about his chances".

No, the US President was not at all burdened by a vision of doomsday for the Soviet leader. The meeting in the storm was more meaningful than had been expected, showing Bush's solidarity with perestroika. Bush blessed the efforts of US business to find a profitable niche in the USSR for themselves and for reforms of Gorbachev. After Malta, our country has hopes of becoming an observer in the Western commercial organization GATT—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Judging by everything, the Americans are prepared to abolish the Jackson-Vanik amendment which imposes punitive customs taxes on Soviet exports to the USA. It will be annulled by June 1990, when Bush and Gorbachev will meet officially in Washington.

By the way, a person who thinks like you do, is especially good in a storm. In Malta, it looks as if both presidents were united by a feeling that the wave of change in the world—also stormy and unexpected—leaves their plans and ideas behind. The swiftly changing landscape of international politics demands from the two powers and their leaders a new level of responsibility and a new quality of mutual understanding.

Malta's meaning is precisely in the progress towards this.

As for the US side, this was expressed in its going beyond Platonic declarations of love for perestroika to deeds, which can assist the Soviet people, if in the future. Specialists say years are needed for the economy to produce dividends from disarmament. Therefore, it is good that Gorbachev and Bush hurried to bring their positions nearer. There are few doubts after Malta that the basis of the treaty on strategic arms will be agreed upon by the Washington summit. And there are few obstacles for the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the limitation of nuclear tests.

Lastly Malta produced something new. Gorbachev left with an interesting idea of Bush—a global ban on chemical weapons. And Bush took away Gorbachev's persistent proposal to start reducing the Navy.

Malta took only two days on the calendar. But perhaps they will be seen as a Rubicon between the "cold war" and the era of prolonged peace.

Reminiscent of Reykjavik

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12-18 Dec 89 pp 5-9

[Article by Alexander Pumpyansky: "Recognition on Rough Seas"]

[Text] One proceeds from the old to comprehend the new. To pronounce judgement, the chronicler, much like the judge, looks to precedent. "Malta rhymes with Yalta." The world media highlighted that the moment the planned shipboard summit plan was first announced. They also warned: "President Bush, beware of another Reykjavik in the Mediterranean." Of rhymes and reefs later. But why not recall one more historical parallel, that of Tilsit in 1807.

Napoleon met the Russian tsar Alexander I on a raft in the middle of the Niemen River. They entered the gaily coloured tent adversaries, and emerged allies. What are we fighting for? Such was the opening issue that followed a succession of bloody battles. Prof. Manfred described one as follows: "The battle at Preussisch-Eylau left no victors, but only dead bodies, wounded and deadly tired men who had escaped by a fluke. The Russians were estimated to have lost 30,000 killed and wounded, the French 20,000."

"The battle left no victors." How surprisingly up-to-date that sounds! It is consonant, or "rhymes," if you please, with another remark that is part and parcel of today's political parlance since the first Gorbachev-Reagan Geneva summit in 1986, to the effect that a nuclear war leaves no victors.

Inconceivable

The summit was to have taken place aboard naval ships. The day before we went aboard the Slava. By we, I mean Academician Georgi Arbatov, Valentin Falin, Izvestia political analyst Stanislav Kondrashov and myself. Stanislav and I definitely needed background material as according to the rules of an on-the-spot report one must have a plethora of sundry details like freshly burnished railings glistening in the Mediterranean sun or the copper plaque inscribed with the name of President Bush that had been affixed to the door of the captain's cabin. In a hoarse voice accustomed more to issuing commands than to discussing philosophical issues, Victor Lesnoi, the husky youthful captain, furnished explanations. He said this cruiser had been launched in 1983, was the last word in Soviet naval engineering, and had 64 cruise missiles with a range of between 550 and 650 kilometres that could carry nuclear or conventional warheads and now had only conventional weapons on board. "When asked what warheads are on the tips, we say they are conventional warheads. After all, the Americans say the same and grin. Nobody believes them, just as nobody believes us," the captain remarked. The guns fire 6,000 shots a minute or 100 a second.

The captain then noted the special security measures introduced aboard the *Slava* and the *Belknap* in view of the designated mission. He said that scores of frogmen would take care of the ships under the water and that even a company of Marines equipped with Stinger missiles would stand by as the Americans were worried about the Libyans.

Fortunately, there were no terrorist attacks. With my exclusively civilian mind I sought to comprehend the armed might with which I was faced and got nowhere. I tried to imagine flesh-and-blood men in battle, when all these missiles, each of which could wipe out a whole city, would be fired, when decisions would need be taken with the speed of 100 shots a second. At this point I recalled for some reason the command the Russian Admiral Ushakov who covered himself with glory in these waters at the turn of last century once issued to the effect that shrapnel be fired at the distance of a mere pistol shot away. I simply couldn't imagine how one could cope with this inconceivable fire power, how it could be used rationally. In my mind this brand-new cruiser, the pride of the Soviet Navy, manifestly surpassed every conceivable notion of human potential.

"Now the 24 dollar question," Academician Arbatov intervened. "How much does it all cost?"

"We don't know," the captain replied.

He is not the only one who doesn't know. That is due not only to the professional love the military entertain for secrecy. Indeed, if one bothers to compare the absolutely arbitrary scale of prices in the Soviet economy with the money-no-object principle used in such matters, evidently nobody would really know how much the cruiser costs. The only thing clear is that it must be an astronomical sum. I remember a naval officer friend who, incidentally, spent years renting lodgings for himself and his family noting once that a big naval vessel cost as much as a city for a population of 100,000. And there you have one more paradox inherent in this inconceivable power. That is that the ship launched, God forbid, to fire not a single shot, meant a city for 100,000 had not been built.

One could, of course, indulge in such reflections on the eve of the summit. However, when the morning of December 2 dawned, it was seen that Dame Nature had intervened. The gale that had raged throughout the night put the shipboard rendezvous out of question. The entire incredible destructive force of the navies of the world's two superpowers was but a plaything in the hands of the elements. I think that remarkable. Luckily enough the Maxim Gorky passenger liner had prudently anchored off Malta as a floating hotel to house the Soviet delegation. It now served as venue for the first meeting.

"Mr President, do you plan to reduce troops in the world?" reporters yelled at the five-minute press conference.

"We shall be discussing a wide range of issues," President Bush was manifestly adhering to his famous principle of prudent evasiveness.

"Mr General Secretary, are you going to cut down on the Warsaw Treaty?"

"The first thing we must do is to destroy such ships on which we can't even meet." The concerted laughter this raised showed that the press appreciated more than the gag itself.

The split atom, the split world

"A nuclear war leaves no victors..."

Thousands of words in diplomatic communiques are penned to be forgotten the very next day. However, the phrase just mentioned has become the formula for our awareness, the point of departure for the movement in East-West relations that we observe with hope and apprehension.

The next landmark was Reykjavik in October 1986.

"We stood on the verge of major historic decisions... I told the President we were letting a historic chance slip by. Never before had our stands been so close..."

This was at Gorbachev's concluding press conference. He could barely restrain his anger. In the room, there was almost a physical sensation of unrealized hope. Agreement on radical nuclear disarmament had fallen through, it seemed, at the very last moment. The firebird was so close. But, alas...

Much at Malta was reminiscent of Reykjavik. The same sensational announcement, the romantic halo, the lack of a formal agenda. But mostly, an open finale. So would not there occur what had almost taken place at Reykjavik?

There was a mystic horror in the warnings served President Bush to beware of Gorbachev's "surprises." No wonder, as in Reykjavik he had dazzled the emotional Reagan with the vision of a nuclear-free pipedream. Bush parried, saying the only surprise for all who expected surprises at Malta would be the absence of surprises.

All these years the heritage of Reykjavik has been a debatable issue in the West. What did Reykjavik afford? What didn't it furnish? Could it have produced something different? And what was it that it could not have offered in principle? Today, three years distant from those dramatic days—and as one thinks, hundreds of light years away—we may look calmly at what we were then and at the path traversed since.

On the eve of Reykjavik, the situation was as follows.

The world was sick. In that respect West and East agreed. However, they were at different ends of the pole as concerned the diagnosis and accordingly the remedies proposed.

The Soviet view was that in the upshot of the runaway arms race the weaponry itself threatened the world most. Hence, nuclear disarmament offered the strategic outcome. Thus was formulated a programme for a nuclear-free world by the year 2000.

The Western credo proceeded from a totally different standpoint. The matter was not one of the overkill, but of incompatible ideologies. As long as the communist doctrine proceeded from recognition of confrontation between the two systems, of antagonism between "capitalism" and "socialism," as long as it recognized "revolutionary" coercion and violence, disarmament was totally out of the question. Consequently, nuclear disarmament was a dangerous illusion, however tempting one or another option may have appeared. Security stemmed from nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weaponry guaranteed peace.

At Reykjavik, the two stances superimposed and naturally could not dovetail. However, stating them clearly was amazingly fruitful. After decades of mutual repulsion, the search had started for mutually acceptable, probing for other ways aside from the beaten track.

This search climaxed in a modest, but realistic compromise—the IBM treaty. In my view, this document, signed in Washington in December 1987, brings home a few things even to die-hard advocates of concrete mentality, even to those who—to paraphrase the two Soviet satirical authors Ilf and Petrov—believe not so much in the materialization of spirits as in the allocation of elephants. I personally believe as valuable the intellectual, ethical and political revelations made since about the times and ourselves.

The nuclear furnace of the cold war definitely presents the greatest obvious menace. But can it be put out, and the cold war continued? The split atom and the split world reveal an unbreakable connection.

We realized that the split world implied two laws and two ethics, a battlefield with an untranslatable play of words in place of dialogue and the infinitely resurgent principle of "ends justifying the means."

Such was the gist of the Reykjavik tragedy, the philosophical unpreparedness to believe that the proposal offered was in earnest, that the traditional rival and adversary sincerely wished to become partner in tackling paramount world issues.

We can understand the Reykjavik sceptics' line of reasoning. At the time they had to take words for granted. No publicity, no propaganda could dissuade them. However, the proof was forthcoming. The proof was afforded by the tempestuous, contradictory, dramatic process of reform in the U.S.S.R. The proof can be itemized. First glasnost. Logically, first came the word, the basis, the guarantee of the irreversibility of the process. Second was perestroika, as the incarnation of the word in democratic institutions. Third was the new thinking, one that is serious, unafflicted by dogma, prejudice, sclerosis and

narrow egoism, a mentality which has served to generate the amazing, yet natural conclusion that even in this nuclear day and age the human race has not been able to come up with anything better than common sense, honesty and universal values.

Common human values—that offered the key. That is the universal touchstone for any position, any idea, any offer, of one's own or of others. What took place, though, was more than that, there came a change in the very relationship between one's own and that of others. One's own was no longer synonymous with the absolute truth, with the absolute good, that had necessarily to be championed and defended at all price, even the price of truth and good. What comprised the other's was no longer the name for evil. Compromise became logical and desirable. Concessions no longer implied betrayal. On the contrary, they could often spell a gain.

Indeed, when we stopped seeing human rights as the fabrication of a villainously-minded West, to whom did we offer a concession? Did the West rob us of something that for decades it had wanted to take away from us? No, it was we who obtained human rights. It was our citizen who acquired those own rights of his, which had been so rudely denied him by his own authoritarian power. Or, when, say, the KGB disbanded its Fifth Directorate, which in secret made Soviet people anti-Soviet, did it offer a concession to Western colleagues?

Intrigued and excited, the world watched the on-going reform in the U.S.S.R. until, at last, it realized that the changes there were serious and for good. On the other hand, it was for us here in the U.S.S.R. to note that when our reform became reality, the world too changed! The two halves of the divided world had turned to face one another.

Of walls and lamentations

The latest developments in Eastern Europe have swept away every doubt as to the character and trend of change. The process of reform rapidly transcended Soviet boundaries, overrunning country after country with the irrepressible and unpredictable surge of a spring flood. The Berlin Wall collapsed in the face of its universal unacceptance. Not only drops wear away stone. Even human eyes destroy walls. There similarly collapsed another stage setting masking a crime perpetrated 21 years ago, the murder of the Prague Spring. Still earlier, developments in Poland and Hungary burst out of the Procrustean bed of those old political stereotypes that had proved powerless to extricate these countries from the crisis. In this part of the world history and politics have regained national and social multiplicity.

But, I hear you say, does not all that imply the demise of socialism?

What an odd, humiliating fad ever to identify socialism with the most unpopular forms of power and the most unpopular figures in power! For decades that was termed socialism. But perhaps it is time for us to ask what

entitled regimes that trampled human dignity underfoot to arrogate that "title"! Isn't that defamation of the very idea?

Not socialism is collapsing. Collapsing are the Potemkin villages and the walls of the camp that called itself socialist.

But can't we see that the socialist idea is already losing credibility? We can indeed, not as before, when we did not notice that. But it is losing credibility for quite a different reason. How can the idea not lose credibility after the decades during which Stalin's GULAG crucified it, after it was put up against the Berlin Wall, after all those assurances that only tanks could shore it up? How could it not lose credibility after having been personified by those walking mummies of self-appointed leaders, those political long-life record holders, those unsettling suns who blotted the horizon for 28 and 35 years? Could all that bolster the socialist idea? One need but wonder it's still being alive after all that. Unquestionably, admirable is the heroic attempt to raise it on high again, to infuse it with the life-giving juice of renovation. Morality and political common sense suggest we should not lament the demise of serf socialism, but help all those seeking to make socialism democratic and humane.

'Help Gorbachev!'

At the outset the Western media served up two words with a question mark. Answers varied. Some said that to help the U.S.S.R. would strengthen an arch-enemy. Others, on the contrary, claimed that to help the U.S.S.R. would serve to transform a former enemy into a normal partner in the human community. This last answer has come to dominate in the minds both of the masses and of responsible Western politicians.

However, does not this demean our national and social pride? One feels urged to posture and exclaim that we do not need help, that we can get by ourselves. Incidentally, prior to the Armenian earthquake that was the reply even during natural calamities.

It is true that nobody can resolve our problems for us. There is no question about that. On the other hand, to reject compassion and help is simply inhuman.

One more legacy inherited from the decades of the war of nerves consists of those odd complexes of superiority which, when tested, prove to be inferiority complexes, suspicion manias. The worse things are, the more they manifest themselves. Quoted both appropriately and not are maxims born of other circumstances. "If the enemy praises you, stop to think where you went wrong." Or the same, but from the other end, when we are urged to regard "vociferous cries of rage" as "shouts of approval." True, the Russian poet Nekrasov imparted a different meaning, invoking this to characterize not politician, but satirist and servant of the angry Muse. So what? The basic thing was that the world was divided into "us" and "they," the "they" being our enemies from whom we could expect nothing good. However, in this

day and age of interdependence, of global problems and the nuclear menace, can we proceed from such postulates when shaping policies?

In reality it is wonderful that in spite of an enduring anti-communist confrontation—with the same "us" and "they" principle only in its mirror reflection—the "Help Gorbachev!" slogan has emerged and gained ground in the West. Gorbachev indeed needs help. We as a country indeed need help. We need help that would be specific, speedy, help that our Soviet consumer could sense in the shops. For that matter, when discussing help for the East, the enlightened West is by no means altruistic. Sensible egoism suggests that thereby the West may help itself.

Help is needed, whether from West to East, or from North to South. In effect, the entire world needs help. Needed is the reciprocal help and solidarity of all sensible and rational forces.

Actually, the "Help Gorbachev!" slogan is simply a token of trust, that we can trust one another.

Does Malta rhyme with Yalta?

But now seen was a new source for suspicion. Would not Malta become a second Yalta?

Besides the rhyme, there is really but one other connection. On their way to the Crimean conference at Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill stopped on Malta to synchronize approaches before meeting Uncle Joe. But perhaps there is another connection, Roosevelt's suggestion that the Crimean talks be off the record.

The time was February 1945. The end of the war was in sight, and the allies sought to look further ahead. They debated the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender and solemnly proclaimed their intentions of "wiping off the face of the earth the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions."

But what about the problem of Germany as such?

Roosevelt thought Germany's division into five, even seven states a good idea.

Churchill elaborated plans to separate Prussia from Germany.

As victors and saviours of peace, at Yalta the Big Three laid the foundations for the postwar world. Of course it is far from perfect. The war had influenced notions of security and the means of achieving it, with force, naturally, taking priority. After so many years of ruthless slaughter it was hard to count on the victory of pure idealism.

It is the irony, or perhaps, the supreme fairness, of fate that during the war the allies did not spend breath to clarify ideological attitudes. Nobody spoke about the "red menace" or the "corrupt bourgeois democracy" save, of course, Goebbels and his propaganda machine. Generated was the wonderful term of the "united

nations," one we have yet to fill with true content, at least towards the end of this present, twentieth century. There was no question then that freedom and peace are the supreme values.

Then came peace. Division and confrontation returned. An offspring of the time, Yalta possessed features of both war and peace.

Yet the blueprint of the world we have today was drafted at Yalta. The all-European Helsinki conference reaffirmed the inviolability of Europe's frontiers.

Today Europe is on the move. Were not the two great powers planning once again to decide Europe's lot behind Europe's back as at Yalta? The Malta rhyme was not that innocuous.

Aboard the Maxim Gorky

We seem to be far from Marsaxlokk Bay. Is that really so though? At first we found ourselves home and then roaming around Europe. Yet, let us get back to the Maxim Gorky on the day it afforded refuge in inclement weather to the two world leaders and enabled them to put their heads together and see what they could do with respect to another sort of inclement weather. There are already facetious remarks that the liner had long had a premonition of its starring role. Indeed, when last year it had hit an iceberg in northern latitudes, that had been by no means fortuitous as it had merely rehearsed how to break through the ice of the cold war.

Meanwhile though, the elements were having a very watery field day. The two delegations met. Then Gorbachev and Bush had a face-to-face talk. They breakfasted and parted to meet aboard the Slava in the afternoon. However, again the raging winds and seas kept the President on board in an absurd situation. Some described this American venture as childish. Others recalled a warning issued in the New Testament, when Malta's most celebrated visitor, the Apostle Paul, shipwrecked on his way to Rome, had gone ashore there. Still others totted up the remaining hours. December 3 offered but half a day while prolongation was out of the question, as NATO allies awaited Bush in Brussels, while Gorbachev was to see his Warsaw Treaty allies in Moscow the following day. In short, time seemed to be slipping away with catastrophic swiftness.

Then came the new day, the President and his team again boarded the Maxim Gorky, shoving aside all protocol considerations of parity. First to turn up as before was Baker. I heard Gorbachev jokingly welcome him with the words: "Still alive?" "Very much so, and even completely dry," the U.S. Secretary of State cheerfully returned. Were the parties involved really so cheerful? Or was this noblesse oblige? The answers came at the news conference.

The first sensation was the announcement that this would be a joint news conference. That had never happened before. It could only signify new agreement.

The time for conjecturing what symbols meant had gone. Now one had to assess the hard facts. We were interested in those hard facts, in the decisions taken.

The next summit has been slated for the latter half of June 1990. When this takes place in Washington, the Treaty on a 50 per cent cut in strategic systems should be basically ready.

The U.S. President put forward what Gorbachev termed new interesting proposals on chemical weaponry. From what I overheard, I have understood this as a three-stage reduction, first by 90 per cent and next up to 2 per cent of the present arsenals of the two countries. When that is done, they will undertake to agree with other countries in possession of chemical weapons to have such weapons completely abolished. Hence we may expect 1990 to bring a convention as well on the abolition of the bulk of chemical arms.

In Vienna things seem to show that an agreement on the reduction of troops and conventional arms in Europe is well in sight.

The year 1990 may well become the Year of Disarmament!

The President stressed that he would facilitate the promotion of bilateral relations in every conceivable way. That also relates to the removal of obstacles in trade. I understand this as facilitating the withdrawal of the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment (incidentally, even before Congress rescinds it, the President may suspend its operation for a whole year) and also observer status for the U.S.S.R. in GATT. Though I do not think that of themselves these moves will serve to boost Soviet-American commerce, which is currently merely creeping along—that unfortunately cannot occur due to the U.S.S.R.'s present economic situation and its domestic market—removal of these political hurdles will nevertheless be useful.

In his reflections on the changes in Eastern Europe, which he wholeheartedly welcomes, the President impressed that the U.S.A. will not try to prod developments or exploit them to the U.S.S.R.'s disadvantage. It will not "dance on the wall."

The two leaders said that their countries did not believe themselves entitled to interfere into the affairs of any third parties or decide matters for any third parties. Consequently, all fears that the superpowers may plot for a redivision of Europe are overblown.

As we listened to what the two leaders said, there was awareness of the intonation, of the manner of speech. This was a totally different, uncourtly intonation, that of a well-intentioned respect by two men who understand one another and know that they have much on which to cooperate, without any jokers up the sleeve.

The agitation we—not the sea—felt, abated. I realized that even if the gale had caused still less time to be devoted to the summit, it would have still retained its

cardinal underlying significance. This is not a matter of detail. It is the introduction of a truly businesslike constructive atmosphere in the relations between the two countries, not just between the two leaders.

When on St. Helena, Napoleon was asked what he thought the happiest moment in his life, he said it was at Tilsit. His elder brother had implored him to conclude "peace at all price." According to the historians, Alexander's younger brother insistently advised the Russian tsar to do likewise.

The paradox is that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were allies in a shooting war and adversaries in the cold war for four weary successive decades. "Peace at all price" was vital. That generated the summits in Geneva and Reykjavik. Today our hopes, feelings and emotions of the time may seem naive. We have grown wiser and have a better understanding of the world in which we live. For that matter, the world itself has changed. Fear of nuclear disaster has abated. The cold war is over. I think President Bush had called for the rendezvous on Malta to say that to Gorbachev in person, face to face. And also to say that he was prepared "to help him."

What came about on Malta was recognition, the mutual recognition by the two great powers of each other, not as the existing reality on this planet, not as opponents who could make things equally hot for one another, but indeed as partners in one common cause.

McNamara Interview on U.S. Military Budget, Arms Control

90WC0023A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 1, 3 Jan 90 p 9

[Article by Edgar Cheporov, APN correspondent (New York): "Robert McNamara: 'A Supermarket Instead of a Super-Fighter Plane'"]

[Text] "For 40 years," says John O'Brien, chairman of the board of directors of the Grumman company, "the Soviet Union presented us with an extremely reliable enemy. These days are almost over...." Grumman, one of the most famous Pentagon contractors in the United States, produces fighter planes and other military equipment. The firm is still working on military contracts, but its financial status is shaky and its income has begun to decrease. The prospects for new large deals with the military establishment are inconsequential—the Pentagon is reducing military expenditures. For this reason, Grumman took an extraordinary step a few days ago: Bulldozers leveled several of its plants and a runway. A hotel, office buildings, and a shopping center will take their place. The cost of the project—over a billion dollars—proves that the firm's intentions are serious.

The American press has recently had much to say about companies like Grumman and about the first signs of the reorientation of the military business. This tendency is still just barely apparent and has not revealed its exact

dimensions yet, but it is quite indicative of the political climate in the United States today.

It is an absolutely unique situation. The Washington administration has never discussed cuts in military spending in recent decades. The Pentagon planned to request 311 billion dollars for the coming fiscal year. The White House decided that 295 billion would be enough. The administration also announced that expenditures on defense would continue to decline and would drop to 180 billion dollars by the middle of the 1990's.

Therefore, the reordering of priorities in defense spending and the planning of new approaches to this spending have begun in the United States. Of course, there is also no shortage of warnings against hasty cuts. Admiral William Crowe, who was just recently the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is certain that the "instability in Eastern Europe and the USSR" precludes such decisive moves by the United States. These warnings, however, do not reflect the prevailing mood. The first of what has been predicted as a long series of hearings on defense spending cuts were conducted in the U.S. Senate Budget Committee. One of the speakers, Robert McNamara, the former secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, spoke of the need to cut Pentagon expenditures in half during the next decade.

"Why do you feel," I asked McNamara, "that there are valid grounds for this kind of serious move?"

"Because I believe that agreements on strategic nuclear arms and on conventional arms will be signed by the end of 1990. The discussion of this issue, according to Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, will be one purpose of their summit meetings. They are certain to be followed by new agreements and further cuts. I also believe that in the next few months the Soviet Union and the United States, the East and West, will be discussing the proposal that our nations should not intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts. If this should be the case, then neither will need to have the strength required today for the Pacific zone and other parts of the world. In addition, of course, the level of naval forces and the prospects for their reduction should also be discussed at the upcoming summit meeting. I feel that the military potential of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, especially the military forces of the USSR and United States, could be far below the level being debated today at the talks on strategic nuclear and conventional arms."

"Will cuts in military appropriations hurt U.S. national security?"

"No, they will not. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe now pose less of a threat. The reduction of Pentagon expenditures will aid in achieving global stability, reinforcing our own security, and making resources available for the reconstruction of American industry."

"Is the administration prepared to accept your 'ceiling' on defense spending?"

"It seems to me that it is not ready to do this yet. It is being held back by the unfinished talks on nuclear and conventional arms and by the fact that the dialogue on these issues has not even entered a new phase yet. I understand this, but I suggest that it look ahead—beyond the agreements being considered today. It is already time to think about a new international policy which will not, I repeat, allow anyone to intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts. These conflicts should be resolved with the help of the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Organization of American States. Under these conditions—and they are attainable—the 50-percent reduction of U.S. military expenditures I have proposed will be justified."

"But what about the military-industrial complex? What role is it playing in current events?"

"The military-industrial complex is naturally against defense budget cuts, but I think that its members will ultimately realize the need for the current changes. This is a reality they will have to accept. Newspapers are already reporting that General Dynamics, one of the largest military firms and a firm more dependent on Pentagon contracts than others, has been discussing the need to reduce its income from the military establishment. Refusing to accept this is like beating your head against a stone wall."

"Would it be fair to say that the Soviet perestroika created the necessary conditions for the current discussion of defense spending cuts in the United States?"

"Yes, absolutely. Your perestroika is aimed at improving the state of domestic affairs in the USSR so that you can produce more goods for your own use and enter the world market. To this end, you have to move resources from the military to the civilian sphere, but to do this without weakening your defense, you must reduce the danger of political confrontation and the risk of a potential conflict with the West. I am certain that these are the goals M. Gorbachev is pursuing, and by doing this he is also giving the West, and the United States in particular, a historic opportunity to reduce the defense budget."

Soviet Arms Control Agreement Needed To Help Economy

90WC0027A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 1, 6-12 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "There Is No Alternative to Disarmament"]

[Text] Now the last page of the political calendar of the 1980's has been turned. These were years filled with events of great importance to certain states and to all mankind, but there is no question that one of the greatest achievements of the last decade was the beginning of the process of genuine disarmament. The leaders of the United States and Soviet Union signed an agreement on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The USSR has already destroyed 1,498 such missiles and 555 launchers in line with this agreement. In addition, 47 Soviet missile operating bases have been eliminated.

Nevertheless, in spite of the cuts in the military spending of the greatest world powers, huge stockpiles of weapons, conventional and nuclear, still exist on earth. New and improved missile systems and other weapons are being developed, and space battle systems are being tested. According to the calculations of Academician A. Sakharov, however, it would take only 4 percent of the thermonuclear weapons accumulated by the USSR and the United States to kill 30 percent of their population. This is precisely why the conclusion of an agreement on the mutual reduction of intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, which should be signed this summer at the next summit meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and United States, is of such special importance to the future of the American and Soviet people and all mankind.

The reduction of weapons, especially such expensive types as nuclear arms, is now particularly important for our country. After all, it is no secret that the military budget of the USSR, which, according to Defense Ministry information, will amount to 70,975,800,000 rubles just in 1990, is a heavy burden on the economy and is complicating the use of important resources for public needs. Each intercontinental missile produced today represents hundreds of unbuilt homes, schools, and hospitals. It is obvious that disarmament cannot be unilateral under the present conditions of the existence of two politico-military blocs, but the intelligent reduction of military expenditures, the conclusion of international agreements on the elimination of strategic arms, and the resolution of regional conflicts by peaceful means will provide opportunities for the more efficient use of available resources for the good of the Soviet people.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Wellershoff Views Progress of Military Seminar

AU1901170390 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
19 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Admiral Dieter Wellershoff, inspector general of the FRG Bundeswehr, by DIE PRESSE editor Burkhard Bischof in Vienna; date not given]

[Text] [DIE PRESSE] Admiral, you said here in Vienna that a reduction in conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and the changes of its forces in the direction of recognizable defensive structures would be a proper basis for military stability in Europe. Judging by what you have heard at the seminar on military doctrines in Vienna, do you think the Warsaw Pact is moving in that direction?

[Wellershoff] The picture is really differentiated. The movement is largely in the right direction; however, there are some cases of relapse as a result of "old thinking," which we have clearly addressed. However, what I heard at this seminar and in the bilateral talks I held has made me quite hopeful on the whole.

In the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, in the Soviet Union, there are obviously serious efforts to adjust the military-technical aspect of the military doctrine to the changed conditions. I admit that I am somewhat impatient in this respect, because we have heard statements to this effect for quite some time now. Nonetheless, what I have heard here apparently is heading in the right direction.

However, doctrines are only one side of the coin, structures and potentials are the other. In this respect, a lot of questions remain open. By the way, the state of developments in the individual Warsaw Pact states also differs considerably. I believe therefore that in the case of interaction between the Warsaw Pact states, the forces of those who really work for defensive structures of their armed forces will prevail. There are some very encouraging announcements in this respect.

[DIE PRESSE] A point that NATO has criticized time and again is the principle of the Warsaw Pact of dealing a crippling blow to a possible enemy on his own territory. Did you notice any change of position on this point?

[Wellershoff] This was expressed in different ways. We will have to analyze the statements in detail. I only want to point out that I also encouraged a general chief of staff in bilateral talks to state publicly what he told me in private talks. In his statement, he spoke about repulsing an attacker. That requires interpretation. He gave me an interpretation in private talks. I encouraged him to state this publicly as well. So some countries have something to catch up on.

[DIE PRESSE] You also said that, in the foreseeable future, there will be no alternative to NATO's strategy of

flexible response or its strategy of "defense from forward-based positions" [Vorneverteidigung]. What does this mean in the foreseeable future?

[Wellershoff] Generally speaking, the strategy of flexible response will never be changed because it will remain a sensible strategy. However, looking at the elements of this strategy very closely, we can conceive of changes in the implementation of this principle. Such changes will primarily manifest themselves in the composition of the armed forces. Our strategy will not remain static forever; it depends on the prevailing conditions and the real existing capabilities which have not substantially changed. Therefore, we will essentially have to keep to the present structure until any possible arms control accords become effective.

As for defense from forward-based positions [Vorneverteidigung], it has often been wrongly translated from English as forward defense [Vorwaertsverteidigung]. I have stated clearly in Vienna that our goal is the status quo ante and not somewhere in the future.

[DIE PRESSE] What do you think are the criteria of a defense-oriented European security landscape?

[Wellershoff] To begin with, these criteria do not primarily lie in the military area. It is not the weapons that make wars, it is the people in their state organizations. No gun has ever started a war. The spread of democratic pluralism, human rights, and an efficient economic system increasingly in the eastern part of our continent, would be a larger contribution to ensuring peace than we could ever make in purely military terms. To my knowledge, there is no example of two democratically governed, free states ever having waged war against each other.

The criteria in the military area can, of course, be clearly seen in the figures on forces. We have reason to hope that we will achieve agreement in this respect in the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe before the end of this year. That would be a huge step forward. However, we must also say that an agreement is one thing, but its implementation will take several years.

Building confidence and creating security is a matter of the second Vienna conference. Here we have to create mutual openness which shows that the preparation of an attack becomes impossible. The point is the macro-structure of the armed forces, the capabilities. It is good that professional military experts are discussing these problems.

To cite an example: At the seminar here in Vienna, the Bulgarian representative boasted that his country's forces have not carried out any exercises in 8 years. If a general chief of staff does not carry out any exercises, he does not fulfill his mission, because it is our mission to make available to our state combat-ready forces. So I understand the other side if it holds exercises.

[DIE PRESSE] Regarding the Bundeswehr itself: People have said recently that it must be trimmed for demographic reasons. In the case of successful conventional disarmament negotiations in Vienna, additional reductions will have to be implemented in the future. What consequences will that have for the structures and the operational planning of the Bundeswehr?

[Wellershoff] In our planning for the Bundeswehr, we have proceeded on the assumption that the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe will be concluded successfully. Under such conditions, we can afford to reduce our Bundeswehr, and we will, of course, have to introduce new structures. That applies in particular to the Army, and there are a number of reasons to do so. They include demographic developments as well as defense budget problems. This will be done by means of a system of phased active service with a reduced number of brigades.

The Air Force and the Navy will have to feel the cuts, too, because there is not enough money. On this assumption, we thus have a new political basis for the Bundeswehr's future. If this assumption materializes, the extension of basic military service in the Federal Republic will probably not be carried out.

UK, French, GDR Chiefs of Staff on Seminar

*AU1901144990 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
19 Jan 90 p 2*

[Untitled report by B.B.]

[Text] Vienna—At the CSCE Seminar on military doctrines in Vienna's Hofburg on 18 January, British Deputy Chief of General Staff Richard Vincent said that the disarmament process could create new risks. This would be the case when and if disarmament led to the assumption that it would be possible to wage war again. He said that the process of political change in Europe could also create dangers, unless it was carefully controlled and bolstered by confidence-building measures. In view of these two sources of danger, General Vincent considers it a task for all to carry out troop reductions in a way that does not jeopardize stability in the transition period.

This thesis was also represented by French Army Chief of General Staff Maurice Schmitt at a news conference. In view of centrifugal tendencies within the Warsaw Pact, he does not see the necessity of the West reconsidering the bases of its own alliance system: "If my neighbor is divorced, it does not mean that I have to be too," says General Schmitt.

The statement made by GDR Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz on the evening of 17 January gave the participants in the seminar a lot of food for discussion. In contrast to his East European colleagues, he voiced extremely harsh criticism of NATO's military strategy, and accused the Western alliance of intending to expand its offensive options.

Graetz said that in addition, there were political forces in West Europe who were calling the existence of the GDR as a state and its borders into question. The address of the GDR chief of general staff was assessed above all by NATO representatives as a "relapse" and as an example of "old thinking."

AUSTRIA

U.S., USSR Generals Make Press Statements

*AU1801112990 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
18 Jan 90 p 2*

[Untitled report by B.B., K.R.O.]

[Excerpt] Vienna—In view of the changes in Europe's political landscape, General Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, intends to urge Washington to help bring about an initial agreement in the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces as soon as possible. He said this at a news conference in Vienna's Hofburg on 17 January. He said he had the impression that the top military officials from the other NATO states also wanted the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe to be accelerated.

Powell says that at the meetings with East European general chiefs of staff, he has gained the impression that a reassessment of the respective national security situation and defense requirements is under way in these countries. However, he says, there are no indications that individual countries intended to leave the Eastern alliance.

The U.S. chairman of the joint staff did not voice any criticism of the planned cuts in U.S. military spending. He said that they were simply necessary because of U.S. budget problems and changes in the global situation.

Soviet General Nikolay Chervov on 17 January reiterated Moiseyev's statement that it was Moscow's goal to transform the Warsaw Pact from a military-political bloc into a political-military alliance. He said that concrete plans included changes in the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee which has been the most important body in the past and is made up of the Communist Party chiefs. He said that it was necessary to consider creating a new leadership body, because the communists were deprived of power in a number of East European countries.

East European military officials have said unofficially that changes in the Political Consultative Committee alone are not enough. They want to see changes in the entire command structure which has so far been essentially dominated by Soviet military officials. [passage omitted]

CYPRUS

Kurds Warn Against Turkish Chemical Warfare

NC2401001690 Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English
23 Jan 90 p 13

[Untitled report by George Penintaex]

[Text] The Kurdish movement fighting for liberation in Kurdistan, in eastern Turkey, has served notice that it would retaliate in kind were the Turkish Army to carry out its threat to use chemical weapons against the Kurdish population in an attempt to suppress their struggle.

This was revealed at a press conference on Friday [19 January] by Hoca Omer and Akif Hasan, representatives of the international office of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK), currently in Cyprus. The ERNK was established by the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which started a guerrilla war in eastern Turkey on August 15, 1984.

Middle-aged Omer, who was jailed for six years in Turkish prisons, spoke through an interpreter. He regretted the fact that the absence of a Kurdish-speaking translator obliged him to speak in Turkish.

The Kurdish population in Turkey has been forbidden by the Turkish Government from using their own language.

He said the Turkish Army had already used chemical weapons on a small scale in clashes with Kurdish guerrillas when all other efforts to defeat them failed.

The first instance was in February 1988 at Bagok village, when the Turks resorted to chemical weapons killing 20 Kurdish fighters. In the second instance, in spring 1988, another 10 fighters were killed when the Army sprayed the area with chemicals.

Omer said the "Turkish colonial regime" had forcibly evacuated many villages in the area of Van, Mardin and Hakkari, with view to using chemical weapons against the Kurdish guerrillas fighting in this territory.

He quoted one Turkish Army general, as saying that "it would be good if we carried out a genocide against the Kurds just as Iraq did."

He said Turkey was in a position to carry out extensive massacres against the Kurdish population and it was within its character as a "fascist regime to do so at any moment."

"In the event that the Turkish fascist regime proceeds with the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, we want world public opinion to know that we will answer such massacres with the very language that the Turkish regime recognizes," Omer warned.

The Kurdish representative called on progressive mankind to express solidarity with the just cause of the Kurdish people.

He urged the international community to condemn "the barbaric and inhuman oppression against our people by the Turkish state and imperialism."

He said all oppressive actions against the people of Kurdistan were directed against the whole of mankind.

In practice the white-haired Omer said that during 1990 the Kurds would extend their struggle from mountainous villages to towns. "We march directly towards a liberated, independent and democratic Kurdistan," he added.

He said Turkey had taken the Kurdish question to the NATO. As a result, he added, "other imperialist states like West Germany and France have been mobilised."

He claimed that the Kurdish workers living in those countries had been under pressure and blackmail because of their support for the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan.

Omer referred to the arrest of 17 Kurds in West Germany two years ago and their trial which started last September in Dusseldorf. "The trial does not seek to dispense justice... but to try the ERNK and the Kurdish people."

Asked if the Kurdish movement would attack Turkish targets outside Turkey, Hasan replied in English that the Kurdish movement would continue to confine its struggle within the territory of Kurdistan, which was under Turkish occupation. "Our only battlefield is Kurdistan," he said.

He added: "We reject such action. We don't want action just to draw the attention of world public opinion towards our movement."

He declined to reveal from where the PKK was supplied weapons.

He said: "We believe that the most effective weapons are the power of man and the justice of our cause."

Hasan said one of the PKK arms suppliers was the Turkish Army. He explained that many rifles in the possession of the Kurdish guerrillas were taken from Turkish soldiers following the PKK attacks.

He said the guerrillas had in their possession light weapons, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles.

Omer took again the floor to say that during 1989 the PKK fighters were involved in attacks against Turkish military, economic and other interests throughout Kurdistan killing hundreds of Turkish officers, members of the "special units" and "village guards." He was unable to give exact figures of either Turkish or Kurdish casualties.

In one case, he said, Kurdish guerrillas seized the town of Silopi in the district of Bachesaray in the province of Van and held it for eight hours.

He said the Kurdish guerrillas could form a brigade and could move in formations of up to 300 men.

He said that through its action the PKK had become an "administration" in the provinces of Siirt, Mardin and Hakkari, in the larger territory known as Botan. The areas of Kars, Agri and Van in the Serhat territory were in the stage of becoming a second Botan. "Today, the Kurdish fighters are waging a guerrilla war throughout Kurdistan," Omer added.

He said three Turkish unit commanders were replaced after failing to suppress the Kurdish activities in these areas and in reprisal Turkish soldiers had slaughtered peasants while 22 Kurdish civilians, including women and children were murdered at Iliyaka village, because they refused to take arms against the Kurdish guerrillas.

Omer said about 500 people had died in Turkish prisons, Turks and Kurds. Another 100 Kurdish fighters were executed in prison while hundreds of others had been paralysed after being tortured, a practice common in Turkish prisons for decades. "It is an offence to be a Kurd," he said.

[Item is accompanied by a photograph with the following caption: "The general secretary of the Kurdish Workers' Party Abdullah Ocalan, who leads the Kurdish liberation struggle in Kurdistan. He stated that 1990 would be the year of the Kurdish intifadah. Above, he poses for a photograph in front of the emblem of the Kurdish military academy 'Mashum Korkmaz' in al-Biq'a' valley in Lebanon."]

DENMARK

East Bloc Events Revive Security Debate

Would Alter Defense Plan

90EN0152A Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 19 Dec 89 p 1, 3

[Article by Susanne Hegelund and Michael Ulveman: "Radical Liberal Party Wants to Change Defense Compromise"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] In light of the international detente, the defense compromise may have to be revised by 1990, thinks the defense spokesman of the Radical Liberal Party [RV]. Otherwise, the compromise is in effect until 1992. Connie Hedegaard repudiates this.

It may become necessary by 1990 to look at the defense compromise for revision, says RV's Jorgen Estrup on the basis of the international development.

The 3-year compromise was agreed upon by the government, the Social Democratic Party [S] and the Christian People's Party [KrF] and was to be in effect until 1992.

"There is considerable likelihood that events will occur so strongly internationally that we may have to reconsider the entire background for the defense compromise," says Jorgen Estrup.

He states that the underlying factors for this are that Denmark must cut its defense budget in light of an agreement on disarmament in the conventional area. The defense budget today is 14 billion kroner.

He admits that all the compromise parties must be in agreement in order to change the compromise. "But if the development continues as it has within the last half a year, we will very quickly find out that time has also run out for the defense compromise. After all, the compromise means that a lot of things are locked in, both in the Army and the Navy, and that is what I am afraid we have to deal with in 1990," he states.

Connie Hedegaard Conservative Party [KF] is willing to look at a long term reduction but does not want to change the defense compromise.

"It is imperative that we do not start to adjust the compromise until we have an international agreement on the table and before it is altered," she says.

Jorge Estrup rejects her way of thinking and points out that in only 14 days the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party have moved considerably in the direction of the Radical Liberal Party. He refers to, among other things, that Connie Hedegaard and Peder Sonderby of the Liberal Party [V] have made "very sensible" remarks about the agreement on conventional disarmament that is expected at the end of 1990.

Tomorrow, the results of the work of the Defense Commission for this year will be presented. A report on the drastic changes in Danish defense is being prepared for presentation.

A new version of the 1,500-page thick report was sent around last evening for study among the commission's 23 members before they meet for the last time on Wednesday morning under the leadership of the chairman, Defense Department Division Chief Michael Christiansen.

Armed Forces Under Fire

Danish defense will change drastically during the nineties, says the Defense Commission.

Drastic changes will be announced in Danish defense when the Defense Commission's work is presented tomorrow morning.

Since the fall of 1988, nine politicians and 14 other members of the Defense Commission under the leadership of Defense Department Division Chief Michael

Christiansen have been working on a report on Danish defense through the nineties.

The report is expected to recommend great changes in the Danish defense during the nineties.

- In the first phase, which will be launched this fall, the efficiency of the top defense leadership will be improved. According to the newspaper POLITIKEN, the defense staff will be reduced from 580 to 410 people and the Danish Defense Construction Service will also be greatly reduced. The Air Force will also be looked at more closely.
- The second phase will be launched as of the end of next year. This involves discussions of a Danish follow up of the international disarmament negotiations, as well as discussions on the development of defense when the current defense compromise expires at the end of 1991.
- The last phase will consist of discussions on the development of defense until the year 2000.

The Radical Liberal Party demanded to have the Defense Commission abolished when the party entered the government in 1988. The party is also—for the first time since 1973—a partner to the defense compromise that was agreed upon last year.

The latest version of the report was sent around to the politicians last evening before the commission holds its final meeting tomorrow morning.

After the meeting, a summary of approximately 50 pages of the 1,500-page long report will be published.

The politicians are not eager to comment on the direct content of the report before its final publication, but Connie Hedegaard of the Conservative Party warns people, in general, not to wait for cutbacks in the defense here and now.

Hans Haekkerup of the Social Democratic Party [S] thinks that a supplementary agreement will be made to the current defense compromise in order to be able to follow up with the international disarmament. "There is definitely nothing formulated about that in the agreement but we have done that in previous agreements," he says.

Much Obsolescent Material

90EN0152B Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 20 Dec 89 p 12

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Defense Cutback"]

[Text] The Army's peacetime forces have been cut by half since 1965.

There has been a cutback of defense in Denmark in the last 25 years. Personnel has been reduced by almost 1,000 persons per year on the average, and at the same time, one defense savings scheme after another has denied the Defense Department the requested money for the purchase of new materiel and maintenance of the old materiel.

Those who work for the Defense Department are tensely waiting these days for the deliberations from the commission that for more than a year has been scrutinizing the future tasks and future prospects of the Defense Department.

Information about new cuts in defense stems from a note leaked from the otherwise amazingly "water tight" Defense Commission.

The existence of the note, which is described as a "synopsis, stamped in confidence," is confirmed by Defense Department Division Chief Michael Christiansen who immediately underscores that it is taken out of context and that the note's content does not necessarily correspond to the commission's deliberations.

None of the information that the "synopsis" contains seems to include immediate reduction of the Armed Forces.

Since 1965, the peacetime Army forces have been cut by half, from 32,200 to 16,750 men and the wartime forces have been reduced from 78,000 to 72,000 men. The number of new draftees has fallen drastically. Thus, the average age of the mobilization forces has risen greatly. In case of war, people close to 40 can be drafted.

Steps are being taken to solve this problem with the defense scheme that was approved in March of this year. This scheme increases the number of men drafted annually by approximately 2,000 and in the course of several years it will ensure a reasonable "revitalization" of the wartime forces.

Certain materiel procurement plans are also in effect. The Army will receive 110 used leopard tanks from West Germany, and the rebuilding of the wartime supply of ammunition has begun.

The 30 Swedish-made Draken aircraft are on their last legs and one of the hot issues in connection with the work of the Defense Commission is whether they will be entirely or only partially replaced.

In the Navy, the only two frigates have, for example, been mothballed and are expected to be scrapped by the end of 1991. The number of ships will be further reduced if the plans are realized for the 16 new Standard Flex 300 ships that are to replace the 22 older ones. Instead, the new ships will be able to perform more tasks and will be able to last far into the next century.

Denmark's Disarmament

Defense Dimensions	1965	1988
Peacetime Armed Forces	47,900	29,132
Army		
Brigades	6	5
Peacetime forces	32,200	16,750
Conscripts	23,100	7,675

Denmark's Disarmament (Continued)		
Defense Dimensions	1965	1988
Navy		
Combat units	44	33
Peacetime forces	8,050	5,340
Conscripts	4,600	870
Air Force		
Fighter planes	128	84
Peacetime forces	9,650	6,882
Conscripts	3,800	870

Defense Panel Cautious

90EN0152C Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 20 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Ole Dall and Michael Ulveman: "Reduced Nuclear Threat"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The Defense Commission says that the European countries must take care not to endanger the security interests of the Soviet Union. The report views the situation in the Soviet Union as "unstable."

NATO and the Warsaw Pact will be less dependent upon nuclear arms in the future.

This is what the Defense Commission foresees in a draft of the final report.

The evaluation is based on the best conceivable development in the relations between East and West, presupposing that in the near future, an agreement will be reached between the Soviet Union and the United States about cutting the strategic nuclear arsenal by half.

"There are good prospects for considerably greater reduction in the number of short-range nuclear arms in Europe," the commission writes in the draft and adds:

"It will, in general, strengthen the possibilities for reducing the dependency on nuclear arms in the defense planning, including early use and first use of nuclear arms."

In general, the commission is uncertain about the rapid changes in the Eastern Bloc. That is why they postulate two possible scenarios, i.e., "the best possible" and "the worst possible."

As the worst case, the commission fears that a setback for Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union would have serious consequences for the entire development in the Eastern Bloc.

"The Soviet Union—with a depressed economy, ethnic unrest, and sporadic strikes is viewed as unstable.

"Moreover, the reform process has created expectations and if these expectations are not realized within a

reasonable period, it could become a reason for a political setback," writes the commission.

Reform Limits

It is noted that the Soviet Union has disassociated itself from the Brezhnev doctrine of military intervention in the Warsaw Pact countries.

But the commission says that there are, however, limits to how far the Eastern European countries can go in their reforms. It is stated in the report: "There must be a limit for how far the development can go, especially if on the Soviet side it is felt that the security interests of the Soviet Union are being affected."

The commission, however, sees it as very unlikely that the development can, in the worst case, lead to a renewed, large-scale armament in the Eastern Bloc. The Eastern European countries cannot afford it.

On the other hand, the commission fears that it can lead to a political dissolution of the Eastern Bloc resulting in regional conflicts which will put a quick halt to disarmament in Europe.

The crucial preconditions for the reforms to have a positive ending is that the countries in Eastern Europe at all times consider the security interests of the Soviet Union, writes the commission.

The negotiations about the reduction of conventional arms in Europe will have an impact on NATO's entire strategy, says the commission. The NATO strategy is in fact based on the conditions of the strength of conventional weapons. The commission points out that it is impossible to foresee what will happen when the first disarmament agreement is in place.

The Defense Commission is, therefore, of the opinion that there is a greater need for a "dynamic perspective in NATO's concept."

The North Without Nuclear Arms

The discussion of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is also addressed in the report.

It is concluded, that a nuclear-free zone will "hardly have an impact on the proportioning of Denmark's defense."

"From Denmark's standpoint, the value of a Nordic nuclear-free zone will, if anything, be judged from its possible political effects as a confidence building East-West arrangement," states the report.

And the commission does not think that a zone in the North is a real policy.

"With the importance that is placed on the solidarity of the Alliance, the judgment is that under the current conditions, it will not be possible to find support within

NATO for a Nordic nuclear-free zone arrangement," writes the Defense Commission.

Budget Cuts Premature

90EN0152D Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 20 Dec 89 p 12

[Editorial: "Future of Defense"]

[Text] Although the international climate has improved markedly in recent years, there is still quite a distance to be covered before the West with peace of mind can begin to look critically at defense budgets with the objective of drastically adjusting toward a cut. And if this applies anywhere, it must be in Denmark. Evil tongues will be able to assert that we have for a long time been taking an advance on the future. During the last 20 years, we have been in a period of disarmament based on a comfortable thesis to the effect that we, as a small country, should lead the way—to show the others a good example. Obviously, also to convince the world around us about our peaceful intents.

On such a basis, it is, of course, possible to argue that Denmark should now lead the way by one more step—in a situation where the others have begun to follow our example. But before we go too far, the parties that sponsored the latest defense compromise must remember two facts. The reality is that during the most recent years, Denmark has reduced the defense appropriations—without any observation of whether there was an international background for it. Normally, only domestic issues have been the deciding factors in the size of the defense budget. That is, of course, fair and correct in a democratic society that solutions are reached through compromise. But at one time or another, balance must be brought into the argumentation and this is not the time for new one-sided initiatives from Denmark.

This is why it is good that the prime minister and the defense spokesmen for the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party have unambiguously stated that the current defense compromise that is in effect for 2 more years will remain in effect. The spokesman of the Radical Liberal Party does, however, feel new changes are in the air. Jorgen Estrup sees disarmament possibilities already next year. If Denmark is to maintain its credibility, we must cooperate with our allies if we want an optimal utilization of our security interests.

And it should be called to mind that nuclear disarmament does not necessarily call for a large scale conventional disarmament immediately. The Vienna negotiations are about reducing the imbalance that currently prevails. The Warsaw Pact countries that currently are undergoing such great changes, still hold a considerable predominance in the area of conventional weapons and forces. It should not be forgotten either that the nuclear disarmament of the two superpowers change the security policy picture of Europe. In the future, Europe will have a greater independent responsibility for its own security

and that will not be implemented through one-sided Western steps on the part of the path that already is on the defensive.

The work of the Defense Commission will be a good basis for debate of Denmark's defense efforts in the nineties. But there is no reason politically—in a difficult negotiation phase—to make it more difficult for the West to defend Western security interests.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FRG's Army Chief on Structure, Doctrine for 1990's

90EN0165A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Dec 89 pp 31-38

[Interview with Lt Gen Henning von Ondarza, Army chief of staff, date and place not given: "Trend toward Smaller, Highly Modern Forces"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] The interview with the Army chief of staff also demonstrated that the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] talks in Vienna could have an impact on specific aspects of the German Army. In addition, it pointed up the many different problems the Army will have to face in the years ahead. It addressed itself to personnel and materiel issues; to new structures, to air mobility and military training, and to the increasingly important question of environmental protection.

[WEHRTECHNIK] One of the basic features of Army Structure 2000 is staffing and rapid mobilization. The first mobilization troop exercises have now been concluded. Have they provided any new information?

[Ondarza] The "staffing and rapid mobilization" principle definitely is one of the basic features of the new Army structure. The distributive principle, i.e. equal assignment of regular Army members and reservists to two units charged with similar missions—one of them cadre-strength and the other made up of regular Army personnel—represents a new approach for us. Our aim is to see to it that the degree of operational readiness of the two battalions will be the same.

A number of innovations are being tested in this respect. That is why operational tests will be conducted by 10 battalions of all three corps over the next three years. We will be testing different procedures for dividing units up into permanent battalions and mobilization battalions, and the impact of these procedures on their combat effectiveness. We hope to learn how mobilization can best lead to a reactive posture. In addition, we hope to design the most effective procedures for material storage in order to achieve material operational readiness.

We are presently in the midst of evaluating the recently completed first five mobilization troop exercises. Although it is too early to say anything definite about

them, my initial impression gained from visits with the experimental brigades indicates that we are moving in the right direction.

Materiel appears to be the least of our problems. All the major equipment we had had in storage was operational in almost no time. Let me give you an example: One of the armored battalions completed a 180 km road march with all its tracked vehicles without any breakdowns immediately following mobilization.

As far as reactive capability is concerned, we will be able to achieve time lapses enabling us to attain prompt defense readiness, particularly against the background of incipient security policy developments. In the future, we will have to have more advance warning of course. But on the other hand, the Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack will also decline.

One important planning goal is to improve the survivability of our units and to enhance the attractiveness of military service for the members of the regular Army. This is one reason why the experimental battalions already have a larger number of commanders. A number of shortcomings of Army Structure 4, especially in the administrative sector, have been corrected. I have received reports of very positive results of these measures, not only on the basis of experiences during the mobilization exercises but above all in day-to-day army life.

The new quality of the use to which reservists are being put is particularly impressive. In the future, up to 40 percent of the most sophisticated weapon systems will be operated by reservists. Our main goal is to provide training and advanced training to the reservists and, above all, to create such a high degree of personal commitment to their permanent units that they will be ready to participate in exercises and training courses on their own accord. Our goal is to have 80 percent of all reservists participate in military exercises, and not just 60 percent as is the case nowadays. In the course of the initial mobilization exercises we were able to improve on these numbers only in some areas. The fact is that we could not really expect more than that. Some of the participating battalions had to be restructured; others had to change over to combat effectiveness upgraded gear, or even to new major items of equipment. It has therefore not been possible to make significant headway in establishing a pool of reservists who meet these requirements. But I am confident that we will make some real progress in this regard over the next two or three years.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Army Structure 2000 contains references to firepower and barrier capability, i.e. defense capability. What steps have been taken to meet these requirements?

[Ondarza] Let me first address the question of defense capability. Both the Bundeswehr and the German Army as such have always been used for defensive purposes and will also be used in this capacity in the future. This

is our mission as laid down in the Basic Law. It is not the type of weapons or the armed forces structures which pose a threat, but human beings and their intentions. Concepts such as "defense capability" or "non-offensive capability" thus are part of the political vocabulary. Equipment and structure play a subordinate role in this regard.

As far as barrier capability is particularly concerned, however, some technological gains have been made which favor the defender. The same applies to firepower.

New, intelligent, and, above all, remotely deliverable mine systems will make it increasingly possible to supplement the tactical components of fire and movement with the barrier component. Our plans and developments in this field have been collected in a project designated "Barrier System 2000." This is one of the points on which the equipment and development plans of the Army are focused.

Organizationally, this emphasis is highlighted by the fact that we are adding engineer units to some of the brigades under the new structure, thus enhancing their barrier capability. Concretely speaking, we are thinking in terms of one engineer battalion. In terms of increased firepower, the new structure will add some barrels to the forward area. In this field, too, we will be strengthening the capability of the brigades which are the principal units engaged in combined arms combat operations. The number of self-propelled howitzers will be increased from the present 18 to 24.

But firepower will not be qualitatively upgraded until reconnaissance and location systems as well as new munitions are introduced. Longer range and improved point accurate terminal effect will enable the Army to extend its effect horizon in the aggressor's depth, thus making it possible simultaneously to attack both the attacking forces in the forward areas and the follow-on forces in their wake. Let me give you some examples, e.g. homing munitions for 155-mm guns; TGW's [tactical guided weapons] for the MRL [multiple rocket launcher] system and combat drones.

[WEHRTECHNIK] One much-debated topic which has also been addressed in Army Structure 2000 and which is unlikely to go away even if the Vienna talks succeed is the question of air mobility of major formations. Is this still realizable from a budget point of view?

[Ondarza] Before I get to the question of air mobility, let me say a few words about the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] negotiations in Vienna. In this connection, let me emphasize that I expressly welcome the trend in East-West relations toward military balance with equal limits and lower levels. Our age demands disarmament. The new structure of the Army is therefore designed in such a way that it takes account of the possible outcome of CFE I and leaves an opening for additional developments in the aftermath of CFE II.

But it is quite apparent that neither side has any intention of returning to pre-technological levels. The trend is clearly toward numerically smaller armed forces outfitted with highly sophisticated equipment.

The three operational elements are forces, area, and time. If forces are reduced and the area remains the same, the time factor will perforce become increasingly important. The way to resolve this problem is first of all to upgrade reconnaissance capabilities and verification procedures in order to provide the defender with more time to prepare, and also to increase the mobility of one's own forces. To achieve this, the third dimension must be utilized, since it offers the greatest advantages for development in this field. It would be wrong not to adopt this policy.

If there is not enough money available to allow for optimal utilization of already existing possibilities, ways must at least be found to put to use what we already have. This is what we are doing with the new structure. We are combining our existing airborne units and our air transport capability and adding antitank helicopters to form airmobile major formations. I would then like to develop these formations onward to enable them to conduct combat operations on their own, i.e. by adding on engineer and artillery components for example. These components have to be planned and then developed industrially. The budget issue will have to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis later.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The outcome of CFE next year could conceivably have an impact on the structure of the Army. The expectation is that there will be a reduction in the capability for area-covering defense. How could this problem be dealt with—while still maintaining the forward defense posture?

[Ondarza] I have already said that the new structure of the Army has some flexibility built into it with regard to possible agreements in Vienna. It is obvious, however, that we will need a new plan if we are required to defend the same area with fewer forces—a possibility we may have to face following the successful conclusion of CFE II.

We will then be left with the necessity of keeping a potential aggressor from penetrating FRG territory in depth. The Army's mission to be prepared to make a significant contribution to forward defense will thus remain the same.

German forces will no more be able to do this job singlehandedly in the future than they can at present. It can only be done in close conjunction with our allies. As before, a potential aggressor must know that an attack on our country would be viewed as an attack on all the members of the alliance. Under these circumstances, the question of exactly how the strategic forward defense concept is dealt with operationally, once forces on both sides have been reduced and parity has been achieved, is not to be faced by the German Army alone. In the final analysis, this issue needs to be evaluated jointly at the

different command levels of the alliance and to be agreed upon in an operational plan.

However, I can already tell you what the basic parameters are. I said earlier that if we have fewer forces operating in an unchanged area, these forces will have to be more mobile. The Warsaw Pact forces will no longer be able to carry out an attack over the entire width, but only along a handful of axes. Nonetheless, a potential aggressor does enjoy the advantage of choosing the time and the focus of his attack. Because of this, mobile reaction capability needs to be enhanced by providing accurate, long-range reconnaissance so as to eliminate the surprise element as much as possible. The defender must be able to concentrate (or in other words shift) his forces as quickly as possible to those points where the attacker chooses to make his main effort. Armored combat units will continue to be the heart and soul of the Army. They alone possess the striking power to prevent breakthroughs and recapture lost terrain. Using the already mentioned barrier capability, less threatened areas are capable of interdicting enemy movements for limited periods of time.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Given the shortage of funds, procurement priorities have also be established. Which procurements will be made under any circumstances? Will it be possible to have as many PAH-2 antitank helicopters as the plans call for?

[Ondarza] Let me respond to the last part of your question first. My assumption is that the PAH-2's will be built and the numbers will be those proposed by Army Plan 91. But that will only happen if the cost overruns remain within tolerable limits. Industry will have to see to that. The PAH-2's are a major component of our future capability to establish and shift the main effort of our antitank forces. They will contribute substantially to the combat effectiveness of the Army airmobile component.

I have already said what priorities should be established in view of the increasingly tighter budget situation. As far as I am concerned, our primary objective should be to upgrade reconnaissance, command resources, electronic warfare, indirect fire, barrier capability, air mobility, and the armored forces which constitute the most important element of the Army.

But over and above our current and projected purchasing programs, I think it is even more important to make sure that funds are available for development projects which permit us to keep our options open for procurement of modern equipment in the above-mentioned areas beyond the mid-nineties. I therefore expressly welcome the fact that we have managed to focus on these projects in the 1990 budget.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The decision to extend basic military service to 18 months has been postponed until 1992. Does that mean that the new plans for military training have also fallen by the wayside for the time being, or will they be implemented in a modified form?

[Ondarza] It would surely have been a simple way out to leave the W 15 training program in place once the government reached the decision to postpone the extension of basic military service. But if we had done that, a number of improvements the new training scheme would have introduced would also have fallen by the wayside. There is a continuing need for a longer period of basic training which provides our fighting men with solid infantry skills as well as aptitudes in other fields such as anti-aircraft, NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] defense, etc.

I have therefore decided to retain the basic outlines of the new training scheme and adjust it to the basic training cycle which is shorter than originally planned, even if the length of time in which the draftees are available to us as fully trained servicemen has been reduced. This decision has also enabled us to retain most of the organizational procedures necessary for the transformation of the training program. On my visits to the troops I have often been told that the otherwise unused three-month periods which have to be added to the program in many units are of great value for providing training and advance training to permanent personnel.

[WEHRTECHNIK] There were also plans to improve upon the training of noncommissioned officers. How far along are these plans?

[Ondarza] We have reached a decision on the noncommissioned officer training program. It is in progress and is oriented toward the staff sergeant grade. What I am looking for is masters with professional experience and personal maturity rather than apprentices as we have seen in the past. This is the only way in which we can provide the kind of training and leadership which our draftees and reservists have a right to expect—wherever it is needed: in the individual units, platoons, down to the squad level.

The reduction in the noncommissioned officer training program from 15 months to 12 months is in place. The big advantage it offers is that even a draftee undergoing basic military service can become a noncommissioned officer and can exercise a command function during the final three months of service. We hope to assign the best of the conscripts to this particular training program.

At the moment, we are looking into new-type training and advanced training programs to help turn these noncommissioned officers into staff sergeants in the reserve. More than heretofore, these training programs will be designed to make use of the draftees' civilian skills in conjunction with their military grades and responsibilities.

Starting in 1990, we will set up these new noncommissioned officer schools—one for each corps. They are to serve as training and advanced training centers for the entire noncommissioned officer corps. The focus will be on training methods, sport activities and, above all, on modern leadership concepts. I have issued express orders

to select none but the best-qualified officers and noncommissioned officers as instructors. This is being done at this time.

In addition to high-quality commanders and instructors, the improved noncommissioned officer training program will serve to make the noncommissioned officer career more attractive. As we compete for human resources with industry and business, that career must be enhanced by a demanding professional training program adaptable to civilian use. In this regard, we are planning to introduce improvements particularly for those long-term noncommissioned officers who were previously disadvantaged. The defense minister is lending his support to this aspect of the program. I am confident that Parliament will give its approval, too.

[WEHRTECHNIK] As regards volunteer enlistment, the Army has to compete with other branches of service. What is the Army's position with respect to bonuses as compared to the other branches of service? And what about the Army's incentive program?

[Ondarza] It is true that the Army is competing with the other branches of service in its volunteer enlistment program. This is one of the reasons why I want to improve Army training and service conditions and increase the number of commanders at the company level in order thereby to enhance the attractiveness of Army service. I believe the improvements the Bundeswehr has made in the bonus area as part of its incentive program are adequate. I particularly welcome the increase in field duty pay which benefits the members of the Army most of all. Additional improvements are being reviewed at this time. For that matter, the Army incentive program is an integral part of the overall Bundeswehr incentive program.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The whole world is talking about protecting the environment. It is an important task in peacetime. What is the Army doing to protect the environment?

[Ondarza] I might point out first of all that I put General Steinseifer, the chief of staff section V of the Army command staff, in charge of environmental protection and have provided him with a staff of full-time and part-time experts. But environmental protection is not first and foremost the job of institutions, experts, and staff sections, but a challenge confronting us in everyday Army life. In this regard the Army is doing an excellent job in many respects. I take it that it is a well-known fact by now that our training areas have become oases of rare plants and animals.

We are spending a great deal of money on improving the infrastructure so as to make the Army's technical equipment more compatible with the environment. But I should also point out that while we give due consideration to the need for protecting the environment, we continue to attach the appropriate importance to maintaining the Army's operational readiness.

In my view, the Army's new training plans make the training program more efficient and contribute substantially to lessening the impact of military activities on the population and the environment. To be sure, we will not be able to do without the participation of units up to brigade strength in selected areas of major exercises in the future. But any reduction in the number of tracked vehicles taking part in an exercise will definitely be an improvement. The problem I continue to worry about in this connection is whether our training areas provide enough space for major exercises. I am therefore holding intensive talks with the chiefs of staff of friendly armies to look for additional locations for exercises in foreign countries.

Let me give you an example from the world of technology to demonstrate that the Army really cares about protecting the environment. There is a lot of public debate again about whether diesel engines are or are not harmful to the environment. We had thought initially that we would be able to reduce pollution by switching to diesel engines as much as possible. Accordingly, we refitted more than 1,200 of our M-113 personnel carriers with diesel engines. In order to set an example for the future, we have gone one step further. We have just purchased 10 trucks with experimental carbon filters. In addition, we are conducting a test which will equip the Army's more than 10,500 armored vehicles with carbon filters developed by industry.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Aside from the obvious wish for peace, what are your wishes for 1990?

[Ondarza] For myself and for the German Army I have five wishes for the coming year in all:

- Productive progress in Vienna which takes us further along the road to greater security in peace and freedom, at least in Europe.
- For my own branch of service, a changeover to the new structure marked by calmness and prudence.
- That my able officers and noncommissioned officers will continue to succeed in recruiting qualified young personnel.
- That we make further progress in our work with and for our reservists. The joint achievements of our reservists and regular Army members is indispensable for carrying out the mission with which we have been charged by Parliament, our sovereign.
- For all the soldiers and civilians of the Army and their families, a healthy, personally successful, and blessed year 1990.

Smaller, More Concentrated Fleet Foreseen

90EN0173A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Dec 89 pp 22-26

[Interview with Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann, naval chief of staff, conducted by Erhard Heckmann and

Capt Dr Juergen Rhades (ret), date and place not given: "Fewer Funds for Investments—a Shrinking Fleet"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] What are the effects of the arms control negotiations on the Federal Navy? Have the operations of the Warsaw Pact naval forces changed? How can readiness in personnel and materiel be maintained? Why is the training ship Deutschland being decommissioned? What is going on with RAM [close-in antiaircraft system] and ANS [supersonic antisurface missile]? These questions were answered by the chief of staff of the Navy, Vice Admiral Hans-Joachim Mann, in the following interview with chief editor Erhard Heckmann and Capt Dr Juergen Rhades (ret).

[WEHRTECHNIK] Admiral, this conversation is intended to be a retrospective of the year 1989 and a preview of the near future. What would you describe as the outstanding event of the year that is ending?

[Mann] If your question did not refer to the Navy but to political events, one could give a rather long answer, even in the form of a list.

However, the outstanding naval event of 1989 is closely connected with the political changes in Eastern Europe, which can almost be called dramatic:

Our men on the frigate Niedersachsen, the destroyer Rommel, and the supply ship Coburg, which made a visit to the Soviet Navy in Leningrad in October of this year, were thoroughly aware of the historical event of which they were a part.

Force commanders, ship captains, and crews without exception deserve great praise and our full recognition for the manner in which they mastered their by no means simple task of being "messengers in blue."

[WEHRTECHNIK] A reduction of the threat as perceived by the population, more and more wishful thinking regarding disarmament in the conventional area, affects the surrounding field as well. How do you, as Navy chief of staff, evaluate these effects on your service branch? Are better or more public relations helpful?

[Mann] Of course, as a soldier one could wish for a somewhat more pronounced as well as more obvious security mentality and security need in our country. Above all, I would also wish for more widespread insight that everything that, happily, is taking place over there in Eastern Europe in such a gratifying manner, as we see it, was only possible because the free West has stood firm and ready to defend its values for the last 40 years.

On the other hand, it must also be understood, of course, in these times of major changes in Eastern Europe and of well-founded hopes for more security in all of Europe, that the readiness to take risks is chancy and simultaneously eliminates the willingness sufficiently to take into account the concerns which we continue to have

over the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. It is not the "capabilities" but the "intentions" which enjoy a boom in such times.

I doubt that in this situation even more public relations work by the Federal Armed Forces could produce more security consciousness and a greater need for security in our society.

Our motto in the Navy for a long time has been: rationalization, belt-tightening in all areas, observing the threat development even more closely, and on the whole directing our own defense efforts toward the absolutely required minimum necessary for carrying out the task.

[WEHRTECHNIK] If it should come to concrete CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] agreements in Vienna, how should the results be interpreted for the Navy?

[Mann] Naval forces are not involved in the CFE. Accordingly, any agreements would have no effect on the Navy.

The fact is, however, that for years the scarce commodity called money has been affecting the Naval branch of the armed services particularly severely. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the modest increase in new naval resources in the coming years is accompanied, so to speak, by a particularly large number of units which have to be retired due to their age.

A development has, therefore, already begun which I have to describe—even taking into account that the Warsaw Pact is and will be retiring some older units—as a rather unilateral reduction in the German fleet. The rate of new construction in the Warsaw Pact, in particular the USSR, is considerably higher than in our country, and we must be very careful that we are not outdistanced in quality as well.

You see, I am now talking quite concretely—because that is my duty—about "capabilities." I can envision a conversation partner who now suddenly changes the subject and would like to speak with me about legitimate hopes for further disarmament steps, etc. That is the dilemma in which we military people find ourselves at the moment. And, unfortunately, we must also conclude that our duty-bound reference to "capabilities" is often misinterpreted as a lack of readiness to achieve detente and disarmament—an accusation which lacks all foundation and hits us particularly hard.

[WEHRTECHNIK] In view of the armament limitations over the last two years, has there been any determination of a change in activities by the Soviet fleet in the Baltic Sea?

[Mann] That is precisely our problem, that we are still not rid of our concerns regarding the capabilities of the other side. The Warsaw Pact's shipbuilding program, especially in the Soviet Navy, continues, in particular in the area of submarines, which are critical to us in the alliance. And that is why at the moment the only improvement I am able to record is that they, too, have recently gotten rid of the older units in the Baltic. At the same time, however, an increase in

quality in the newer units has taken place, and the fact is that the numerical superiority continues. Perhaps it would be fair to say that it is not that easy to make a spontaneous intervention in running shipbuilding programs; they run over such a long period of time. Possibly something more could still be done in future times, or such assumptions are at least justified by the swift political developments.

We have already been able to identify changes in the training activities. The Soviet Navy is apparently changing over to holding its exercises only "on its doorstep."

In so doing, the training, much more intensively than before, involves drills as well as the use of naval means under multiple threats.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Maintaining operational readiness with narrowing framework conditions for both personnel and materiel ought to become increasingly difficult and bring about a concentration to the significant tasks. What possibilities of solution do you envision here? Does fulfillment of the combat duties take priority? Is a reduction in the floating and/or supporting area contemplated? Where are there still rationalization opportunities?

[Mann] The overall rationalization of the Navy is taking place according to a series of criteria. "Concentration" is still a key word here, of course; concentration in logistics and training actually leads to more economic operation, as a rule. In some areas we are already taking the first steps toward this, and other, more complex areas are still being thoroughly studied right now with a view to this objective.

During the inevitable reduction of the fleet's combat and support units necessitated by the resources, still other factors are relevant—aimed at the yardstick of "task fulfillment."

It must principally be taken into consideration that naval operations—above and below water—by nature are subject to entirely different conditions than operations on land and that they are exposed to completely different constraints, but that they also must have and use completely different opportunities if they are to be successful in the sense of fulfilling their mission. Second, in our cutback process we naturally also include the increasingly longer warning times and certain compensation possibilities made possible through newer and better technological solutions, at least for the principal tasks of our various naval means.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The subject of overloaded duty time, so effective in the media, has an impact on the Navy as well (mainly for the floating units). Have measures been initiated by now and, if so, where?

[Mann] The new overall concept includes three steps, which are intimately connected with one another:

—The first step is to reduce the overloading of duty time by tightening up and combining tasks wherever possible.

—The second step is the release from service through planned leisure time. This step is the nucleus of the new regulation. The political as well as the military leadership have left no doubt that leisure time has absolute priority. Under the new regulations the soldier, for the first time, can claim compensatory time for overtime.

—The third step is financial compensation. Only where the two previous steps—depending on the task—do not apply, will individual financial compensation be given.

In my opinion, a couple of points need to be improved in the law, for example the amount of the compensation rates when leisure time cannot be provided, or lowering the start of compensation from the seventh month at present to the fourth month of service in the future.

Altogether, however, one can say that the new service regulation is greeted by the Navy and accepted by the troops. It is now important to practice duty tactics, that is, to give the troops time to implement the new regulation in the various fields according to the situation.

[WEHRTECHNIK] For well-known reasons, increased use of reservists is gaining more and more importance, which is surely also connected with problems. Are there consequences to be expected from this with respect to organizational changes or innovations? What happened to the idea of a "training center for floating units"?

[Mann] The shrinking fleet due to the diminishing investment funds and—commensurate with it—a smaller Navy, too, also reduces our need for reservists, of course.

In our technically demanding combat units, which because they have been cut back in size without exception have to be operational, that is to say immediately available, the peacetime force is even today identical to that under the threat of war because of the high maintenance and training costs. Therefore, we would essentially be able to replace losses in the event of crisis and war with the normally exceptionally well-trained technicians and operators from our schools. What we need in addition here in the way of reservists we can and will—above all for reasons of motivation in our reservists—call up for individual training with "their" active units. We can no longer afford, and we no longer need, a "naval reservist training center" because of this development.

Since, as I said, even in the future there will no longer be any additional modern combat units in partial or full cadre strength for the above-mentioned reasons—and we wouldn't have any money for additional procurement of such means anyway—and since not a single unit is foreseen to reinforce the German Navy, only partial areas of our floating supply remain "capable of growth" in the actual sense: medical units for service at sea and units in the naval security area. But even the latter will obviously have to be adapted to the size and structure of a smaller Navy.

For the reasons listed, I therefore do not assume that the use of reservists will become a problem for the Navy.

[WEHRTECHNIK] How will the decommissioning of the training ship Deutschland affect the training of naval officers?

[Mann] We expect that the new form of training will have a positive effect. Giving up the training ship was not an easy decision, but it was the right one in balancing all the possibilities that remained. We had to take into account that there were no funds to build a training ship that would have corresponded with the conditions of the fleet. We then had to study a second alternative, a so-called "inexpensive training ship," which would only have offered the opportunity of training in the nautical field in the broadest sense, allowed a glance at the operating facilities, and otherwise would have been a floating lecture hall. The third alternative remained training with active units of the fleet. In comparison with the second and third opportunities we very quickly came to the conclusion that the advantages of fleet training were far greater compared to training with the inexpensive training ship.

In the fleet unit the future Navy officer will be given an intensive introduction to the normal work day of the fleet, he will get to know his future place of work, and—what is very important—he will stay with "his home," so to speak, during the period of study with this fleet unit. We will therefore demand that officers in training will repeatedly be brought back to their units on certain occasions.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The news recently circulated through the media that the city of Wilhelmshaven and the "Deutschland Naval Museum" supporting organization would like to have the ship in Wilhelmshaven as a museum ship. A parallel can be seen in the former imperial battle cruiser Goeben, which after its tour of duty in the Turkish Navy was also offered to our Navy, but for reasons of cost we could not at that time accept. What does the Navy command staff think of the chances for the Deutschland as a museum ship in Wilhelmshaven? Has such a wish already been presented to you?

[Mann] I would be extremely pleased if it came to that, because the training ship "Deutschland" has a good tradition; it is a ship which has its fixed place in the history of the West German Navy, and I really couldn't think of a better future for the ship than to be used in this form in Wilhelmshaven. The Navy and the Federal Ministry of Defense cannot support this financially, of course. There are no funds for that. But we support the idea of this project without reservations, and I can only hope that a sufficient number of sponsors can be found in order to realize this project.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The modernization or fundamental renewal of the fleet has begun. Two additional type-122 frigates and type-343 mine warfare boats are being added, three new type-423 boats are in service, four type 123-frigates and minehunters of type 332 are being built. MPA-90 [Maritime Patrol Aircraft] have been added.

Even so there are problems. NATO Frigate 90 is only being built with five countries, which will probably lead to cost increases. NH-90 [Nato Helicopter] is a very important matter. Are alternatives being considered?

[Mann] Naturally. I have always represented the opinion that we can and should only remain in this NATO project if our demands for a submarine hunter can be realized in a more cost-effective form than with a national solution. A foundation or starting point for such a solution would in that case be Frigate 123.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Your predecessors in office had repeatedly mentioned that the necessary savings in personnel and costs would be achieved through the decommissioning of ships/boats or their transfer to reserve status. The Amphibious Group was repeatedly mentioned as an example. Are there any new thoughts in this direction for the 1990's or are there even concrete ideas?

[Mann] With the boats you mentioned from the amphibious group and some units of the minelaying and mine-sweeping flotilla, we do in fact still have some units that are "simple" to maintain and operate in our possession, which would basically also be suitable for cadre-type operation.

We have studied this, under the aspect of "operating costs to be paid for the remainder of the duty period" and have come very quickly to the realization that such cadre-type operation would result in an unjustifiable cost/utilization relationship. Cadre operation of floating units is—as we in the Navy indeed know from experience—not cheap, and would therefore only be justifiable for a significantly longer remainder of the useful life of the platforms than the units in question still have.

[WEHRTECHNIK] In the investigation report by the Federal Audit Office we found two admonitions for the Navy: One is aimed at the Federal Office for Defense Technology and Procurement, and the other questions the procurement of the 123-type frigates.

[Mann] As for the Federal Audit Office's investigation report regarding Frigate 123, I assume that we were able to eliminate the misgivings raised in it, for otherwise the project would not have received parliamentary approval. For this ship in particular the cost-utilization ratio is balanced in a special way.

[WEHRTECHNIK] The RAM close-in antiaircraft system, long delayed, is primarily effective against missiles with radar homing heads. Is there any thought of expanding it, at least for the frigates, by a gun system?

[Mann] The U.S. Navy is presently working on a study to increase the combat effectiveness of the RAM with the goal of "infrared all-the-way." If the technical feasibility should be determined in this study, and if the upgrading of combat effectiveness could be held to a reasonable cost framework, the German Navy should commit itself to this increase in combat effectiveness at a not too

distant point in time. We have no money for interim ASMD [Air-to-Surface Missile Development] solutions.

[WEHRTECHNIK] Another "problem child" is the ANS supersonic antisurface missile. Its chances of survival are apparently good as a bilateral program. For how long?

[Mann] There are problems with the financing of ANS. The armament division is now studying possible solutions. One thing is certain: Toward the end of the 1990's the Navy must begin to enter a new generation of antiship missiles, primarily for the fast attack craft, whose principal duty is surface combat.

[WEHRTECHNIK] In order to tighten the organization in the area of training and support (as a result of new structural considerations), for the purpose of distinct savings in personnel (up to 4,000 positions by 1995) and in materiel equipment (not a 1:1 replacement for ships and boats), the Navy is forced to rethink its organization, as for example the Army with its Army Structure 2000. In concrete terms, in the administrative area (schools) and in the support area, will elements be dissolved or combined into so-called "system schools" in order to take this into account? If so, could you mention today some of the starting points/considerations?

[Mann] Studies have long been under way in the Navy regarding the question of how the "land service enterprises," meaning the support field and the Naval Office field might be adapted to a shrinking fleet in the most economic way. As for the training field, it must simply be taken into account that considerable investments have been undertaken in the various schools until just recently, both in the infrastructure and in the supply of equipment. It would be impossible to justify—as well as impossible to pay for—carrying out a decentralization by force in this field. But, as I said, even if we had the money it would not be justifiable simply to write off investments made in recent times as some sort of "sunk cost." We will thus have to live with the present dislocation of the schools for some time to come. For the time being our deliberations are focused on making the training even more economical than hitherto by means of decommissioning measures and changes in the content of the training.

FRG, GDR Chiefs of Staff To Meet 17 Jan

LD1501120490 Hamburg DPA in German 1042 GMT
15 Jan 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Admiral Dieter Wellershoff, inspector general of the Federal Armed Forces, will meet in Vienna on 17 January, with Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz, chief of the main staff of the GDR National People's Army. Further bilateral talks, to be held on the sidelines of the first seminar on military doctrines of the 35 CSCE states, which begins in Vienna on 16 January, are planned with military leaders of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, it was reported in Bonn today. It is the objective of the talks to

develop contacts with the armed forces of those countries. The meeting was requested by the GDR.

Chiefs of Staff Hold Interview

*AU1701195890 Mainz ZDF Television Network
in German 1700 GMT 17 Jan 90*

[Interview with Dieter Wellershoff, chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, and Manfred Graetz, chief of staff of the GDR National People's Army, by unidentified ZDF reporter in Vienna on 17 January—recorded]

[Text] At the international seminar on military theory in Vienna, Wellershoff, chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, and Graetz, chief of staff of the GDR National People's Army, met for the first time. They described their hour-long talk as open, honest, and businesslike. They granted the following interview to ZDF.

[Reporter] Do you consider it possible that the friend-enemy relationship will turn into a real friend-friend relationship in the near future?

[Wellershoff] Well, this depends on social development. In any case, it is no enemy-enemy relationship. It is important for me to stress this. I took the opportunity of explaining to General Graetz what we advocate. I think we all should make efforts to make it clear what we advocate, what our task is, what we defend, and not constantly think about who the evil enemy is or what we are against.

[Reporter] Do you share this view?

[Graetz] I fully share this view. There is no reason whatsoever at this time to fight against each other or to accuse each other of having hostile images. Our goal is to talk with each other, in the same way everyone else does.

Wellershoff Comments on Warsaw Pact Transition

*LD1801142490 Hamburg DPA in German 1331 GMT
18 Jan 90*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The countries of the Warsaw Pact now intend to change from a military to a political alliance. Dieter Wellershoff, the inspector general of the Bundeswehr, indicated this today in Bonn after his return from meeting high-ranking military officials from East and West. Mikhail Moiseyev, the Soviet chief of general staff, indicated this new development to him, without going into details, Wellershoff explained. The Soviet Union has not yet found any solution. But it is clear that all members want to remain in the Warsaw Pact.

According to Wellershoff, it is apparent that the Eastern armed forces are "in a great hurry" to develop intensive military-political relations with the Federal Army. But there must be "a political procedure" for these contacts. They must be embedded at a political level. Wellershoff

referred to the fact that there are already closer relations with Soviet military officials.

The commander in chief of the Soviet Navy will visit the Federal Republic in mid-February. Soviet naval vessels are also expected. But there are no visit arrangements as yet with the GDR. Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg only recently made it clear this must await a democratically legitimized government in East Berlin.

In the seminar on security and defense concepts in the framework of the Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, there was also a first meeting with Lieutenant General Monafred Graetz, chief of the main staff of the National People's Army. Here Wellershoff offered, for example, to send Graetz material on the internal leadership of the Federal Army.

Graetz informed him, Wellershoff said, that the National People's Army would be converted from an Army of the party to an Army of the state. He stressed that confidence among the soldiers provides positive chances for the disarmament measures. Referring to the internal situation of the Federal Army, Wellershoff stressed that conscripts must be given a better motivation—what to fight for rather than what to fight against.

1990 Seen As Decisive Year for Arms Control

*AU1501111190 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jan 90 p 5*

[Untitled article by Jan Reifenberg]

[Text] Brussels, 10 January—The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Vienna talks on arms reduction are increasingly subjected to political pressure of time. Their results essentially depend on Gorbachev's fate. However, even if the leadership in the Kremlin were to change, the economic and demographic constraints that exist in all participating states would necessitate a reduction of troops and weapons. The profound changes in Eastern Europe lead to a basic reexamination of the strategic thinking that has held both NATO and the Warsaw Pact under the dominance of the nuclear weapons as the main basis of deterrence for more than 40 years.

The United States and the Soviet Union are increasingly moving away from concepts which, ultimately, would have resulted in their mutual destruction. Politicians in East and West have to adjust to that, also the military men. Otherwise they will be overtaken by the consequences of the popular movements between the Elbe River and the Urals. "New thinking," for which NATO has been striving since its latest summit conferences, and the politization of originally purely military organizations are necessary if the alliances are to maintain their credibility in the eyes of the public. Otherwise the costly luxury of excessive armament threatens to deprive all parties involved of the ability to tackle the real problems, in particular those in the south of the world. However,

nothing is more difficult than changing bogged down structures and disentangling oneself from a dense network of concepts of the enemy, national ambition, and ingrained distrust.

These are the actual questions the negotiators and their political leaders are facing. They cannot be solved without constant political stimuli, even though a dense network of mutual understanding has already formed and "confidence-building" is producing the first positive results. When on 12 January the 23 representatives of NATO and Warsaw Pact resume the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] for an equal balance between the Atlantic and the Urals, they will have to double their efforts if the goal that is desired by both sides, namely the completion of a first agreement by the end of this year and its signing at a meeting of the 35 heads of government of the CSCE states, is to be achieved.

The draft agreements are available. However, so far only one definition of weapons has been agreed: artillery. The same could become possible for combat tanks and armored vehicles. On the question of depots, an agreement in the spirit of the proposal, presented by the Bonn delegation before the end of the last round is conceivable. There remains the difficult question of defining combat planes and combat helicopters and, finally, of the desired reduction of troops. As regards most items the United States and the Soviet Union have shown flexibility, while France and Great Britain are applying brakes, because they are worried about the future of their national nuclear weapons and their role in the German question. Paris and London give a warning about overestimating the events in Eastern Europe. They are pursuing a conservative policy. They want the United States to maintain its military strength in Western Europe, and are in favor of a strict balance, pointing out that the Soviet Union remains a threat to Western Europe even if the rest of the Warsaw Pact dissolves both militarily and politically. This is based on the will to keep a grip on the German question and on the fear that this will not be possible in the long run without the permanent presence of the two superpowers.

Washington thinks along different lines: Not only the influential democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Nunn, but also planners in the Pentagon believe that the United States could reduce its troops stationed in Western Europe by far more than the 275,000 men which President Bush proposed as the upper threshold for both superpowers. If Moscow continues its troop reductions in Eastern Europe at the current speed and if, in particular, the Soviet units in the GDR are drastically reduced, the Americans could withdraw 55,000 instead of 30,000 soldiers from Western Europe within the framework of the CFE agreement. A U.S. Defense Department study speaks of a reduction to a level of 150,000 men in Western Europe under favorable political conditions, which, however, is considered as the "political minimum" for the foreseeable future. Such questions could be discussed both at an early CSCE

summit and at the bilateral talks between Washington and Moscow. Foreign Minister Genscher, who sees his views confirmed by the development in Vienna so far, urges the speedy transition from the first to the second stage of the CFE negotiations.

Yet, what does the Warsaw Pact still represent today? Hungary, the CSSR, and Poland are pressing for fundamental changes. The USSR knows that, in the case of conflict, it can no longer rely on the allied armies between the Elbe and the Bug. Will the USSR go as far as to transform the alliance, which it dominates, into structures with a purely defensive character and completely withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe? Vienna will throw light on this question. The "seminar" of doctrines in the coming week, which is held in the context of parallel talks on extending confidence-building measures, may provide important information on the current degree of rethinking in West and East, and it may become a test case for the effects of the changes in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Here, too, the parties involved will struggle to formulate definitions once the spectacle of the appearances of the chiefs of staff from West and East is over, and here too it remains to be seen to what extent distrust has been reduced. There can be no doubt that the implementation of mutual inspections, which were agreed in Stockholm in 1986, has shown that openness is worthwhile and creates trust.

The START talks on a 5-percent reduction of long-range strategic arms which, following another meeting between Foreign Ministers Baker and Shevardnadze in Geneva in February, will enter their 14th round, are to result in a treaty that is ready to be signed by the end of June, when Bush and Gorbachev will meet in Washington for the second time. However, this would mean that within less than half a year the controversial questions of sea-based cruise missiles, of reserve arsenals of long-range, land-based missiles that are not deployed, of the incorporation of long-range bombers, and other topics have to be solved. The American Senate demands watertight verifications for ratifying the START agreement, as well as for the CFE agreement.

However, both sides are beginning to move away from maximum demands; for example, the Soviet negotiators in Geneva have signalled that they might agree to regular information on sea-launched cruise missiles, whereas Washington has hinted that in Vienna it might be willing to renounce permanent inspections of armaments, which are rejected mainly by France, England, and Italy. The Americans might also make concessions in the sphere of tactical fighter bombers.

Thus, the year 1990 is becoming a decisive year for the relationship of arms control and politics. If pluralist regimes emerge from really free elections in Hungary, the GDR, the CSSR, Romania, and Bulgaria, the current patterns of thought and the current strategies will no longer be sufficient. The basic terms security and stability must be redefined. The "Magenot" thinking of both sides is melting in the heat of reform. However, the

geopolitical facts remain unchanged. Those who ignore them harm reforms in Eastern Europe. Including this in the European future and in the relations between the two superpowers is the real task of the talks, if they are not to resemble the flowing of the last sands of the time of outdated thinking.

Major General Klaus Naumann on Military Doctrines

AU1901191490 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 19 Jan 90 p 2

[Untitled interview with Major General Klaus Naumann by Norbert Mayer in Vienna; date not given]

[Text] Vienna—Major General Klaus Naumann belongs to the think tank within the FRG Bundeswehr. DER STANDARD editor Norbert Mayer conducted the following interview with him during the Vienna military summit:

[DER STANDARD] The seminar in Vienna deals with the traditional doctrines at a time that is characterized by political dynamism. Is this not an anachronism?

[Naumann] This is certainly no anachronism because this is the first meeting between military officials from East and West, aimed at the presentation of the military doctrines and at promoting confidence by making possible openness and not hiding anything. Of course, we are all aware of the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. This naturally means that during such a period a doctrine cannot be stipulated for all times. First of all, we must examine here whether all states that must contribute to security in Europe have doctrines that really are exclusively designed to ensure the defense of their people and whether their armed forces have structures that correspond to this.

[DER STANDARD] How do you assess the changes in the East bloc in this respect?

[Naumann] The non-Soviet states of the Warsaw Pact are quite obviously undergoing a deep process of rethinking. Poland, the CSSR, and the GDR briefed the seminar on their national military doctrines which are also undergoing certain developments. Nearly all speeches suggested a defensive nature of the doctrines.

[DER STANDARD] You received first-hand information from the GDR. A historic meeting, the first meeting between the two German chiefs of staff, has taken place.

[Naumann] We had a very good talk with the GDR chief of staff, Lieutenant General Graetz. It served primarily the purpose of briefing the other side on the further development of the armed forces of both sides on German soil. It was also designed to explore possibilities of establishing contacts, primarily in the technical sphere.

[DER STANDARD] The West is currently propagating defensive structures. However, Defense Minister Stoltenberg speaks of security on the basis of plans. In

concrete terms, he wants to set the troop strength of the Bundeswehr at 420,000 men.

[Naumann] I do not think that there is a link between defensive structures and troop strength. Like all German states and Austria as well, the FRG has always been oriented toward the continent. With our 12 divisions—the German Bundeswehr currently has a peacetime strength of 340,000 men—we have long exceeded the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

[DER STANDARD] Among the General Staff, there has recently been talk about strengthening the firepower within the concept Army Structure 2000. Is this not in contradiction with defensive structures?

[Naumann] The fire element is part of the operation. Every operation consists of the elements of fire and movement. The farther you proceed on the path toward disarmament, the more important it is to leave the space factor unchanged where you have fewer forces, so that you have the possibility to quickly shift focal points, particularly by using firepower. We will have to accept gaps. To compensate for them, one needs a higher level of operative mobility of the reserves and firepower with a longer range.

Genscher Interviewed on Germany, Europe

AU2201060090 Vienna Television Service in German 1000 GMT 21 Jan 90

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by ORF editor Horst F. Mayer, Gerfried Sperl, chief editor of DER STANDARD, and Fritz Csoklich, chief editor of KLEINE ZEITUNG, in Bonn on 21 January—live, monitored in progress]

[Text] [Sperl]... Mr Minister, EC Vice President Martin Bangemann has connected the problem of the GDR's membership in the EC with the problem of Austria's membership in the EC, by stressing that Austria's neutrality is a problem regarding the political union. Should the GDR not have to leave the Warsaw Pact, before becoming an EC member? It cannot be that neutrality is a big obstacle, but membership in the Warsaw Pact is not.

[Genscher] I think that citing the GDR's membership in the Warsaw Pact already underlines what I just said. The point is the European perspective, and whether and when it will be observed is another question. As for Austria, I have always believed that Austria must decide itself whether it can join the European Community with all rights and duties. It is not the EC which has to decide that Austria can or cannot become a member. Austria must know whether it can become a member of the EC as it is and as it plans to become.

In this connection, I think that both the problem of Austria's neutrality and the problem of other ties will change and will become less significant as East and West are getting increasingly closer. I think that many people who discuss the possibility of Austria's membership in

the EC or the GDR's relationship with the EC think statically. They assume that nothing changes. In reality, we must realize that it is a difference of whether two alliance systems confront each other in Europe highly armed, or whether there is a development where an increasing number of countries become democratic, where cooperative security structures are discussed, and where the CSCE process is continued. In such a Europe, the problem of Austria's status is of smaller importance. So, if I were an Austrian, I would not be concerned about the remarks that have been made in this respect. Development in Europe is heading in the direction of growing together, not in the direction of separation.

[Csoklich] But, Mr Minister, is it not understandable that Austria is disappointed?

[Genscher] Hopefully, not at the Federal Republic.

[Csoklich] Well, generally with the reaction from Western countries for which Austria currently is obviously not at all playing a role. Austria decided to become a member and filed an application for membership last year. Now nobody is talking about Austria, and we have been told for many years that our neutrality represents a problem. Mr Bangemann has reiterated this opinion. Suddenly a Warsaw Pact country is preferred to us, and it looks as if Austria's application would be shelved even more than before.

[Genscher] That is certainly not correct. We, the Federal Republic, are of course in favor of integration within the EC, because that makes the EC so attractive. However, I never left any doubt about the fact that EC is the abbreviation for European Community, not West European Community. That means that this European Community must be open to all European states that are democracies, have market economy systems, and endorse the goals of the European Community. That holds true for Austria, and it was also stated in Austria's application for membership. That means that the road to the EC is open for Austria.

As for the GDR, it is indeed a special case. One must not underrate and ignore the fact that the two German states have a special bilateral relationship. We are one German nation, and it is our goal to live in one state again. That the other part of Germany has a special position in this respect, is a foregone conclusion. However, you rightly pointed out that the GDR is a member of the Warsaw Pact, and it is hard to conceive of a Warsaw Pact state being also a member of the European Community which is on the road to European union. I think that in the discussion on the GDR and its relationship with the EC, we are addressing a very crucial problem of European policy. It becomes clear here that German unity is the centerpiece of European unity, and that the German question is also the centerpiece of European security. That means that in our attempt to bring the two German

states increasingly together we must also settle the European security problems. Therefore, we consider the CSCE process as playing a crucial role for the future of Europe.

The role of the alliances will also basically change. The alliances will increasingly be of political importance, and they will increasingly be of importance for disarmament policy. Without the alliances, disarmament is hardly conceivable. Imagine, if everyone were to negotiate with everyone on disarmament, I am afraid everyone would step up armament against everyone. That means that the alliances play a decisive role for disarmament. The only thing that connects Europe on the whole, the only thing that all European countries share is the Helsinki Final Act. All countries have endorsed it, and it is a basis of cooperation in Europe, something that unites Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Therefore, on a German-French initiative in Dublin yesterday [20 January], we specifically advocated holding a summit meeting in the framework of the CSCE in 1990. That does not mean that we have advanced the summit meeting scheduled for 1992, but it is an additional meeting. We did not discuss the place. I think it is important to agree on the meeting itself and on the tasks of such a meeting, and then it will surely be possible for sensible people to agree on the place of the meeting.

[Mayer] I would like to ask a question about neutrality, and then we should really discuss the GDR. Regarding the CSCE meeting that you addressed, the neutral states—the importance of which you described as decreasing when the European countries are getting closer together—the neutral countries...

[Genscher, interrupting] I did not say that the importance of the neutral countries will be decreasing. On the contrary, the neutral and nonaligned countries will play an increasingly important role in this CSCE process. A CSCE meeting means that the 35 signatory states will take part. That is important because at this CSCE meeting, we will have to agree on their tasks.

Its tasks include signing the first agreement on conventional disarmament. That can be achieved in 1990. That is what East and West want. That means that we will sign Vienna one, as I would like to call this conference. I think that it is necessary that Vienna one is followed by Vienna two. That means that following the conclusion of this agreement, we will not interrupt disarmament. While this first disarmament agreement is being implemented, we will resume negotiations on a second agreement so that we achieve further, far-reaching reductions, and so that not only the U.S. and Soviet troops are reduced, but also the other countries' forces. If and when the walls across Europe fall, the walls of missiles, bombs, and grenades must also be dismantled, so that they cannot hinder the process of rapprochement. That means that disarmament must keep abreast of political developments.

Then we will have to agree on negotiations on cooperative security structures, meaning that not only disarmament must be implemented, but cooperative security structures must also be created, which means building more confidence. Then a negotiation mandate must be given on the future architecture of Europe, an architecture in which the member states of the two alliances will have a place, as well as the neutral and nonaligned states, and the Germans.

I repeat: The German question and German unity is the centerpiece of European integration. Therefore, we, the Germans, also bear special responsibility. To be able to achieve unification ourselves we must be the driving force of the European unification process.

We should also be strong enough to create European institutions. Why should we not create a human rights institution to which everybody in Europe could turn—not comparable to the Council of Europe which can only be approached by members—but every European citizen. Whether the Council of Europe would then be expanded to include all of Europe is another question and would be a possibility. Why should we not create a European environment agency? Why should we not create a European crisis center and a verification center to verify disarmament measures? Why should we not create a certain regularity regarding foreign ministers' meetings? All these are possibilities to create additional stability.

We must be aware of one thing. We are currently experiencing dramatic revolutionary developments in the central and East European countries and in the Soviet Union itself. If we want these developments to take place in stability—and this must be in our elementary interest—it is also necessary for us to create a sort of stability partnership between East and West, for which the CSCE framework is the only suitable and necessary instrument. It is necessary because the Soviet Union and the East European countries must know that in periods of weakness in these dramatic developments, the West will not only not exploit the situation but, on the contrary, do everything in its power so that such developments can take place in a stabilized environment.

[Sperl] Mr Minister, the German-German question and the development of the two Germanys remains the central issue regarding also European balance. Francois Mauriac once said that I love Germany so much that I would like to have two of them. On the other hand, there is the understandable movement in both German states in the direction of reunification. There are also historical apprehensions. Mr Minister, is reunification possible without reunification? In other words, what structures are possible—people talk about confederation and similar things—to prevent such historical apprehensions and, as the scientist Weizsaecker said in an interview recently, to prevent the emergence of anti-German coalitions?

[Genscher] The most important thing is that our neighbors see that by unifying the Germans, we do not intend to claim a dominating role in Europe. To quote Thomas Mann, we do not want a German Europe, but we want a European Germany. Therefore, it is our sincere goal to solve our national question in a European context and in the scope of European developments. Therefore, I am passionately in favor of embedding the solution to the German question in the CSCE process. We, the FRG, have made our decision. We are a member of the European Community, and we will remain a member. The rapprochement of the Central and East European states to the European Community is also helpful for our ties with the GDR. It is important that the German way cannot be intended, understood or misinterpreted as a lone action, but pursued in the European context. The more disarmament accords are concluded between East and West, and the more the CSCE process is strengthened, the more the concerns of our neighbors will decrease. After all, we do not live in a world of sovereign states. The FRG has already ceded a high degree of its sovereignty to the European Community. By the way, not only the FRG. Alfred Grosser has rightly pointed out that France and Britain have also done so. Not everyone is totally aware of this. However, as a result of our membership in the EC, we have transferred part of our sovereignty.

But in doing so, we have lost nothing. In reality, we have won. Austria will also realize that, once it is a member of the EC. One gains by membership in this Community. A new culture of coexistence between the peoples has been created. There is no longer the rivalry of the past, nor do countries think in categories of power politics as they did in the past. What is developing here is really transition to a policy that is marked by responsibility. That was urgently necessary too. We are still dealing with minor differences in Europe, whereas in reality, we must guarantee the survival of mankind.

The truth is that this Europe is the most highly developed continent, apart from North America. Europe is still very busy with itself, even though it is called upon to give answers to the global questions, such as protecting the natural basis of life, solving the international debt problem, helping the Third World. Finally, we must also lastingly ensure peace, because in the nuclear age, there will be no postwar period following another war, nor will there be a chance to reconstruct countries, a chance that our generation had following the most terrible of all wars. I think it is gratifying and encouraging to see at the beginning of this year 1990, that in the same century in which the most terrible wars of the history of mankind took place, in the same century in which the most terrible crimes against humanity took place, we have a chance now in the last decade to develop a really happy future for Europe. Why is this possible? It has become possible owing to a prudent policy in the past decades. The CSCE process forms part of this policy, as does Germany's treaty policy, as does the policy of a man such as Gorbachev.

I said that eventually he must be taken seriously back on 1 February 1987. I was harshly criticized at that time, and some people even voiced suspicion. You mentioned President von Weizsaecker's statement about the trademark, Genscherism. At that time, it was meant differently. Meanwhile, Genscherism has become a sort of mass movement. That is a good and positive thing. We must really take advantage of the opportunities that lie in the freedom movements.

[Mayer] Mr Minister, it is already 1123, and we have prepared quite a long list of questions. Could you perhaps formulate your answers a bit more concisely?

[Csoklich] I would like to address the other side of the coin. Obviously, a new national awareness and partly even an aggressive nationalism are emerging in East Europe, some of them in our immediate vicinity, in Yugoslavia. Now my question: Is there not the danger that a new nationalism could develop in West Europe? In concrete terms, possibly also a new German nationalism? Do you see such a danger, and what could be done to prevent it, do you think? Another practical question: If a German-German confederation comes about, will there be a new capital, or perhaps the new old capital?

[Genscher] I agree that there is an interdependence of freedom movements. However, there will be no interdependence of nationalist tendencies. That is the result of the process of integration in the EC, the result of the new culture of coexistence. Therefore, there is no danger of German nationalism. Such nationalism would at best have a chance if the impression were created that Europe should be unified, but the Germans should not be unified. However, sensibly enough, no one wants that, and therefore, I rule out the danger of German nationalism.

I also think that the CSCE process provides the framework for keeping developments under control that are taking place in countries where the national identity was not expressed for a long time. In fact, these reactions are a result of the past.

As for the relationship between the two German states, I have always said that the imagination of history must not be straitjacketed, and that the people's strength and their will to achieve freedom have invalidated many blueprints that were designed for the future. Rapprochement and finally unification will be achieved, and we want that to happen in a European context, in the CSCE framework.

Then we will also have to decide in Germany where the capital should be. I have always considered Berlin the city where the Germans' heart beats, and for which the hearts of the Germans beat. I can hardly imagine that the majority of our people see that differently.

[Csoklich] Mr Minister, do you share Helmut Schmidt's opinion that the Soviets should be allowed to continue to keep Soviet troops on the territory of the GDR or the former GDR, to satisfy their security needs?

[Genscher] Helmut Schmidt has addressed a crucial problem of future developments, by rightly pointing out the Soviet Union's security interests. I think that the German-Soviet relationship which we view as being of central importance not only for us but for Europe, must also be seen under the aspect of security policy. The unification of Europe and the unification of Germany must not lead to a change in the balance of forces. That way of thinking belongs to the past. Nor must there be an increase in security for one side, and a loss of security for the other. I think it is absolutely necessary that we fully observe the security interests of the Soviet Union and our other neighbors in the East. We will then also have to discuss the question with the Soviet Union as to how its security interests should be observed. In this respect, what Helmut Schmidt said is one of the existing possibilities.

[Sperl] I have another question on the nationalities issue. It is not only the classical problem of nationalities and possible conflicts among nationalities. It is a modern development problem—nationalities in state agglomerations, the problem of the Turks, for instance; generally, the problem of the refugees, the multicultural society. That will also become a decisive problem with the growing openness. You talked about an environment agency, a human rights agency. Would it not be possible for a multicultural agency to deal with such problems, and also religious and social problems?

[Genscher] I think that the problems related to minorities must be given highest priority in this unification process. We will only be able to create this Europe if it is a Europe based on tolerance—tolerance towards national minorities, cultural minorities, and religious minorities. I think that those countries which have different nationalities would be well advised to give the idea of federalization more attention.

Generally, I think that the federalization of Europe—or call it confederalization, as Mitterrand is doing—is a future chance because it takes the wish of the various nationalities for preserving their cultural identity into account more than is being done by the classical and strict nation-state form as existed in the first half of the 20th century. I think that the idea of federalization is growing within the European Community. It is easier for us than it is for others to talk about this, because our people have a very long federalist experience, and we have gained excellent experiences with the federalist structure of our state now.

[Mayer] But is it not daily practice and a daily experience in very many European countries that xenophobia has increased so much that what you just said and what we also wish to achieve, probably cannot be more than a pious wish?

[Genscher] I think that it is important to make the people familiar with the cultural achievements of other nations. That is important to the respect for other nationalities and other cultures. You cannot instigate

people against each other who respect each other. History has shown that xenophobia, hatred of foreigners, and hostility in general have always been started by people disparaging the cultural achievements of others. Therefore, I think it is an important task also of our schools to strengthen the respect for other cultures and the achievements of other peoples. All peoples have made great contributions to the great European history and our common culture.

[Mayer] Mr Minister, I have a question about the FRG's relationship with the CSSR. The new president, Vaclav Havel, and Cardinal Tomasek have touched a taboo which has considerably strained the relations between Germans and Czechs. Havel said that one must consider a gesture regarding the expulsion of the Germans from the CSSR in 1945. What is your comment?

[Genscher] I believe that this is a significant contribution to the peoples' coexistence in Europe. I am grateful that during my first meeting with my new CSSR counterpart, Dienstbier, we agreed that a commission of historians should be set up to deal with all aspects of our common history and our relationship. Only if we solve our problems jointly—without squaring accounts—will it be possible to overcome the difficulties that you mentioned.

I said about the Warsaw Pact that its great significance and its moral quality lie in the fact that it has broken through the vicious circle of wrong and new wrong. We want to have good relations with all our neighbors. I think that if we Germans see our own happiness in the fact that the other peoples and our neighbor countries see the existence of the Germans as an advantage for themselves, this is the best guarantee of a happy future for the Germans.

[Csoklich] Another question on the German-German relationship. How about the emigration of the Germans from the GDR? I understand that it is continuing in incredibly large numbers. I have heard—and I do not know whether you can confirm this—that some 10,000, 12,000, and even 15,000 people leave the country every week. In the long run, this is an entirely impossible process that nobody can tolerate. How can it be stopped?

[Genscher] I think that the GDR Government bears special responsibility in this respect. There was a decrease in the number of resettlers. It never stopped totally. It also had to do with the fact that the Modrow government had won confidence, among other things, by the announcements he made in the talks with the federal chancellor. The dissolution of the State Security Service was an encouraging element for the people in the GDR. As soon as the GDR government started creating something similar, profound distrust set in. The discussion on the election law, which is still going on, and the fact that the new groups really do not have equal opportunities also play a part. The newspapers are in the hands of the former parties. There are no new independent newspapers or newspapers that are available to the new parties. They do not have the same access to the media as the

Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]. That leads, of course, to a loss of confidence. The people have no prospects. They are even concerned that the situation might deteriorate. That means that the GDR Government bears special responsibility; it must open up new prospects in a credible way. That is the immaterial side, if you like.

The material side is this: The sooner the GDR decides to introduce a market economy, the faster the material conditions can be improved. We can do a lot in the area of telecommunications. We do so by helping them develop their infrastructure, by cooperation in many areas, in connection with founding private enterprise. However, the chains that hinder private initiative and the people's creativeness must be abolished. We cannot abolish them from here. Our readiness exists, industry and business are also very ready to make private investments. However, the conditions for such investments and for their taking effect must be created soonest in the GDR.

Also, it will be very important to enter into negotiations very soon on a monetary union with the GDR, so that the people do not have the impression that they are working for paper money. Meanwhile, our German mark has become a strong second currency in the GDR; for many people it is the first currency. It will be important to overcome the discrepancy between the two currencies. That includes, of course, also an increase in economic efficiency. In this respect, the GDR leadership bears substantial responsibility.

[Sperl] So you do not think that the economic program goes far enough. Vaclav Klaus in the CSSR is going much farther than Christa Luft.

[Genscher] The program is not going far enough, as was said very emphatically by my colleague Haussmann, who has offered really very generous loans to finance the establishment of small firms. These are deeds, not mere words. But the offer must be used. We have really no interest in seeing the people leave, not only because that creates problems in our country but above all because it is the qualified people who leave the country. They are urgently needed to build the country. There is a saying in the GDR: What is the difference between 40 years of the Federal Republic and 40 years of the GDR? The answer: 40 years. That means that the GDR has a lot to catch up on. The people are as creative, intelligent, diligent, industrious as the people here in the FRG. They have had to bear the heavier burden of German history. They want to start now and really advance the GDR together with us. We are ready to practice solidarity on a large scale. However, all this can only become effective if basic changes are carried out over there. The earlier, the better—following 6 May anyway, but that is still a long way away.

[Csoklich] You said that more than 15,000 Germans leave the GDR every week.

[Genscher] The tendency has been increasing. There have been days when more than 2,500 left.

[Mayer] Apart from the visit to Dublin, your last visit was to Romania.

[Genscher] My last visit was to Bulgaria.

[Mayer] Yes, you were in Bulgaria, but you were also in Romania.

[Genscher] Yes.

[Mayer] I wanted to discuss the German minority in Romania. The policy pursued there in recent years was resettling the people, and everybody wanted to go to the FRG. What is the situation of the German minority in Romania, in view of the political development the direction of which nobody can clearly recognize?

[Genscher] Currently, the majority of the Germans in Transylvania and Banat want to come to the FRG. We are ready to do a lot to improve the living conditions in Romania. There are problems in connection with legislation, and the preservation of the people's cultural identity. We are working on a program for developing the school and university system for the German minority, as well as a program for the improvement of the infrastructure. We are also ready to create conditions for private initiatives in Transylvania and Banat to be able to create qualified jobs in this way. However, nobody can seriously answer the question now whether this is enough. We must not forget one thing: Strictly speaking, there are no families in Transylvania and Banat that do not have family in the FRG, so that the families are separated anyway. Because it is hardly conceivable that those who live here will go back, there is a strong tendency that a large number of those who are still in Romania will also come to the FRG.

[Sperl] How do you assess the situation in Romania? Almost all the other countries—the CSSR, Hungary, and the GDR—also have problems; they have democratic traditions, and they have different conditions. Romania is in an almost anarchic situation. Decisions are made which are canceled the next day. You held talks there. What is your opinion? Are there reliable institutions?

[Genscher] To begin with, it is really wrong to talk about a bloc. That has always been wrong, because the history of the individual countries is different. In Romania, the democratic forces—which do exist—do not have the possibilities for free development. They still need support, promotion, and advice from outside. The terrible consequences of decades of dictatorship, this bad dictatorship of Ceausescu, have manifested themselves in a special way.

That also explains the instability of the situation; and some decisions which may seem incomprehensible to the outside world can be explained in the special circumstances there. That means that new structures must be developed which will give a new democracy in Romania stability. That will be a very, very difficult road for

Romania. I do not only mean that in a material sense, but also regarding the building of really stable democratic structures.

[Csoklich] Understandably, the German question is a centerpiece of European reunification, if I may say so.

[Genscher] It is the centerpiece.

[Csoklich] It has such difficult aspects that it is also understandable that much intellectual power is being used to reflect on the form in which it can be achieved. My question is: Is there not the danger that one might fail to see what the future in the Danube region will be? Considering the fact that a small country such as Slovenia will possibly declare its independence before long, and that there are many small- and medium-sized countries in this region, which at one time fell prey to the German or Russian hegemony, I would like to ask whether new structures of increased cooperation between these countries would be possible, or do you not consider this a problem of special urgency now?

[Genscher] Yes, that is a problem of high priority, because we do not want to relapse into the Europe of the year 1913, involving many national egotisms and regional conflicts. Therefore, I stressed the significance of the CSCE process in the beginning—you found it a bit too long. The CSCE process is our only link between East and West. Strengthening and deepening it will also allow us to create the structures that must give Europe stability in these processes where such developments can be expressed. In creating these structures, the two alliances will have an increasingly political function. They will also change their mutual relationship; they will no longer have a relationship based on confrontation; they will have a cooperative relationship, and they will eventually be absorbed by these European structures. However, they cannot be ended without replacement, as some people believe. That would increase the instability. That means the creation of all-European structures, for which the alliances will be used, which in the event of a favorable development will be absorbed by these structures in the medium or long run. For all this, the CSCE process is the appropriate way. It answers the questions in south and southeast Europe, it also answers the German question.

[Csoklich] Are not regionalizations necessary? Portugal and Austria, Denmark and Italy are not the same thing. They are equivalent, but they have totally different problems.

[Genscher] The regions will gain in importance within the overall CSCE process. Then differences which play a role now will no longer play a role. I think that the meeting of the foreign ministers of Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Italy were a model example in this respect, and here we also have all the types of countries that there are—a NATO state, a Warsaw Pact country, a neutral country Austria-style, and Yugoslavia as a non-aligned member. They all discovered and stated what they have in common—that they form one region where

they want to cooperate and where they want to achieve stability. However, that too is the expression of a new European federalism. We talked about the federalization of Europe earlier.

[Sperl] A minor additional question: Should such institutions as the working community, Alps - Adriatic Sea, which have been quite successful recently, and of which some federal laender and republics are members, also be assigned a higher value?

[Genscher] I think that such a development is bound to come. It is a good development, unless it takes place at the expense of existing communities such as the European Community. I am a committed proponent of integration in the European Community, because I think that the EC finds its strength in it, and it is an anchor of stability. However, that does not prevent anyone from having such regional organizations and cooperation. Italy is among the most committed countries in the European Community. Nonetheless, they have made their regional responsibility clear by this meeting in Budapest.

[Mayer] Mr Minister, we should devote the last 15 minutes of this press hour to a topic that we have only broached, the question as to how things will continue in Gorbachev's Soviet Union, and how the reform policy can be continued. The Soviet Union has given up the forefront—to speak in military terms—I mean the buffer zone from the Baltic Sea to southeast Europe. What will happen to Gorbachev's reform policy?

[Genscher] I would not say that it has given up the forefront. I believe that the new Soviet leadership has realized that its own interests, the Soviet interests, are safeguarded better if its neighbor countries have internal structures allowing the governments to rely on the confidence of their peoples, instead of on the bayonets of the Red Army. By the way, this is the right insight, and it shows how basically new the thinking of Gorbachev is, and Shevardnadze. Gorbachev is increasingly the architect of Soviet foreign policy, as all his publications and statements have shown. In this respect, Gorbachev has really let his words be followed by deeds.

He has to do a lot of things simultaneously. He not only accepted the democratization movements in the Warsaw Pact; in reality, he even triggered them. They did not come of their own in hardly any country, but Gorbachev encouraged the people to use their freedom. At the same time, he must push the economic reform in the Soviet Union, and he must also cope with something that has been pent up since the times of Stalinism, in the war, and in the postwar era, including during the Brezhnev era—that is the wish of the nationalities in the Soviet Union, to be allowed to develop their own identity, their cultural and religious identity. It is what we describe as the nationalities problem. It can only be resolved by a more intense federalization of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must carry out what its name says—Union of

Socialist Soviet Republics. In reality, it has been governed as a central state for decades. Now the nationalities demand their rights. That is an internal affair that the Soviet Union can only settle itself.

We can do three things to facilitate the process. First, we can help where there are bottlenecks in the economy, including in the supply. The FRG is determined to do so, because we do not want the reform process to be harmed or lose confidence owing to symptoms of economic shortage.

[Csoklich] Will you supply foodstuffs?

[Genscher] If the Soviet Union wants us to supply foodstuffs, we are ready to do so, and the EC is ready to do so too. Our efforts which are aimed at allowing the Soviet Union to take part as an equal member, including as a borrower, also head in this direction, even though some members have not yet realized that. We must not exclude the Soviet Union from this process of East-West aid; on the contrary. That is one thing.

The other thing is this: By pursuing a resolute disarmament policy—not a hesitant policy but a policy that shows resolve and pushes things—we must reduce the burdens of armament which absorbs a large part of the Soviet Union's gross national product. Third, we must do what I said about the stability partnership and the strengthening of the CSCE process, so that the Soviet Union can be sure that not even the biggest convulsions and the most revolutionary developments in the Soviet Union will lead to a shift of forces in Europe at its expense. That would be a real danger to the reform policy. However, resolving the nationalities problems is something that the Soviet Union must do itself.

[Csoklich] It is strange that Gorbachev is very popular in the West. In the Federal Republic, he was given an almost enthusiastic welcome, whereas he is not popular in the Soviet Union itself, but has been attacked time and again even by important people, and has been accused of having failed to carry out essential reforms.

[Genscher] It is difficult in such a development to get everyone's approval. Some people are concerned about their privileges; they are the natural opponents of reform policy, and then there are the forces of inertia that he has to overcome. Others think that his reforms are not going far enough. In our democratic societies, some people also say that things must develop faster. These people are also important because they influence public opinion. However, he who bears responsibility must make sure that developments remain under control. That is a difficult road.

In addition, there is no real democratic tradition in the Soviet Union. That means that building democratic structures is much more difficult than in the countries you mentioned, the CSSR, Poland, the GDR, and other countries. Moreover, they have no experience with the market economy. In this respect, we, the Western countries—no matter whether we are neutral, EC members,

or NATO countries—can do a lot by providing know-how, by inviting experts to visit our countries to see the functioning of our open societies and our market economy systems.

[Sperl] Mr Minister, reportedly Gorbachev has said in a certain situation that in the event perestroika fails, the marshals will take over. Judging by your statements, he is more firmly in power than people believe. Do you think that this leadership is more stable than the West believes? Are there enough people who support this leadership, and are the opponents of perestroika just a large minority?

[Genscher] It is not only the opponents but the circumstances against which the man must fight. I am not among those who keep speculating on whether he will be successful or not. I think it would be better to ask ourselves whether it is in our interest that he is successful. If that is the case, we should do everything in our power to help him succeed. I mentioned the three areas where we could help.

The crucial question is whether the development which has been initiated in Central and East Europe and in the Soviet Union is irreversible or not. I am convinced that it is irreversible.

[Csoklich] Despite Azerbaijan?

[Genscher] It is irreversible despite these developments. It will not be possible to turn back these freedom developments. Therefore, the crucial problem is to create stable framework conditions—something that you cannot stress often enough—so that these revolutionary developments can take place in such stable framework conditions, and no convulsions result from them which would create substantial problems for all of Europe.

[Mayer] So you do not think that the simplest thing could happen, and Gorbachev would say some day that he must react now, because otherwise, he would be deprived of power, and then he would have to resort to means that his predecessors would also have taken. Do you not think that this will happen?

[Genscher] No, he will certainly not go back and resort to repression or restrict the rights of freedom. We must not confuse this with the attempt to pacify a situation where we can hardly speak of civil war, where almost more than a civil war is taking place. No, I think that the man has identified himself so much with the policy of perestroika, restructuring, more rights of freedom for the individual. He did not do so—as many people in the West believe—out of opportunism, or to build a better military machine, or to play the role of superpower. He left that behind him long ago. He has realized that his country, the peoples of the Soviet Union, only have a chance to cope with the future tasks if they can develop their own individuality. That is the basic idea of perestroika expressed in the way that he considers appropriate. That is also the reason why he paved the way to democratization for his allies.

[Sperl] He will probably also have to do so regarding the problem of the Baltic Republics, unless he pursues the other way.

[Genscher] I think that his appearance there was very impressive, when he faced the discussions for 3 days and called upon the people not to go too far with their wish—which he did not reject or condemn—for more independence within the Soviet Union, because he is concerned that this could result in more (?demands) regarding his policy. It was an appeal to common sense. He tried to show that there are limits. That shows that he is using the power of his personality to keep these dramatic revolutionary processes in a stable framework. We should help him in this respect. The stability partnership that I mentioned must not only be effective between East and West, or between all European states. Basically, it is also necessary for the development of those states where different nationalities live. The Soviet Union is the biggest of them.

[Csoklich] The Baltic Republics were the victims of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. They were occupied. It is understandable that they now say that they have had enough of it.

[Mayer] Let me ask the last question of this press hour about the German problem once again. Do you consider it possible and feasible in the foreseeable future that a peace treaty will definitely conclude this troubled period of postwar history?

[Genscher] I would not talk about a German problem but about a German chance that is now developing in Europe. I see this German chance materialize; it is German unity in an all-European context, in the CSCE process. What is generally understood by a peace treaty is something from the times of the nation-states. That belongs to the past. A European peace order is the place where we determine the future of all peoples.

[Mayer] Mr Genscher, dear colleagues, dear viewers, thank you very much.

NORWAY

Admiral Warns Against Naval Force Reductions
90EN0138A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
4 Dec 89 p 7

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Skepticism Concerning Naval Force Reduction"]

[Text] "We should be extremely careful about entering into negotiations on naval force reductions," warned Rolf E. Pedersen, Naval Chief of Staff.

Pedersen is very skeptical about the repeated Soviet campaigns to bring naval forces into the general arms reduction talks. The Soviets have even hinted that results at the negotiating table in Vienna will depend on western concessions at sea.

Supremacy

"We must remember that this is a question of a continental power, the Soviet Union, with its internally-protected supply lines versus the NATO alliance which is totally dependent on the sea. This means that we must be able to establish naval supremacy along our vital ocean transport routes. Therefore, at the very least NATO should have a defense that is capable of securing transatlantic navigation channels and adjacent coastal areas. This capability should be almost entirely separate from the level of tension in Europe because other conflicts may arise that are impossible to foresee at this time. Therefore, we should have an overall defense that is capable of dealing with the kind of insecurity that will always exist. But of course it may be possible to reduce individual elements if we are talking about mutual reductions. However, I would like to point out that from a historical perspective naval reduction has never been very successful nor has it guaranteed a more peaceful world."

Expansion Continues

Rear Adm Pedersen said that even after Gorbachev came to power developments in the Soviet Union indicate that Moscow is aiming at achieving naval supremacy in adjacent areas, which means the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea in our part of the world.

"In spite of glasnost and perestroika, Gorbachev's policy has had no impact on the Soviet naval pattern," said Pedersen.

"The Soviet Navy's expansion program simply continues as before and Gorbachev does not seem to have canceled any of the construction programs for the Soviet naval forces. These are the realities we professional military people must take into account. At this time we see that the Soviet Union is getting rid of many old ships that have hardly any combat value while at the same time its fleets are being supplied with effective new vessels as far as both size and weaponry are concerned."

More Aircraft Carriers

"If there is a move toward a reduction of the American involvement in Europe as a result of detente, ocean transport routes will also be considerably more important than they are today. The indications that the British are now considering a reorientation of their defense effort in the direction of a maritime strategy should probably be seen in light of their fear of lying within the area where the Soviet North Fleet has the capacity to cut off transoceanic communications. The same also applies to us."

Pedersen pointed out that within a few years the Soviet Union will have more aircraft carriers. It is expected that the carrier *Tbilisi* will be transferred from the Black Sea to the North Fleet next year. Another new aircraft carrier, the *Riga*, is already under construction and the Soviets recently released the name of a third aircraft carrier.

New Situation

The presence of a fullscale aircraft carrier in the northern area creates a new situation for Norway, but Pedersen declined to comment on whether Norway—in cooperation with its allies—should implement concrete measures to meet this situation.

"I will put it this way. We certainly should not reduce our military forces. In addition, we should maintain the training pattern we and our allies have had in adjacent waters for it is quite clear that with a Soviet aircraft carrier in the north that can operate in an advanced position in the Norwegian Sea, there will be a real confrontation zone in our immediate vicinity," Pedersen said.

SWEDEN

Domestic Arms Industry Seen Vulnerable

90EN0126B Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 25 Nov 89 p 8

[Untitled article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] "The Swedish Armed Forces must first decide what kind of defense materiel they need for the 1990's. Once the OB [commander in chief of the Armed Forces] has told us that, we in the industry will be able to take care of structuring ourselves."

That is what DAGENS NYHETER was told by the head of FFV [National Defense Industries] Ordnance, Borje Olsson.

"The OB seems to have underestimated our ability to figure out our own problems. But first he must decide what he wants," says Borje Olsson, who would like to see more plain speaking in the debate.

"If the Armed Forces get less money, several firms will have to close their doors and let their employees go. This should be plainly stated instead of talking vaguely about 'restructurings,'" says the FFV chief.

OB Warning

In the current debate over the economic crisis in the Armed Forces, OB Bengt Gustafsson has warned of a sharply reduced defense industry. The OB wants a restructuring, mergers, and a creative new approach in response to a continuing decline in defense appropriations. The defense industry employs about 35,000 people, about 26,000 of whom work on defense materiel.

Crucial Decision

The FFV's management does not feel that the debate about a crisis in the defense industry has affected the firm so far. Along with Nobel Industries, the state-owned FFV is among the firms that are expected to survive even if economic levels in defense drop further. There is a good backlog of orders. There is plenty of time between now and 1990 to analyze the situation.

The next defense decision—in 1991—will be crucial to the industry's prospects. The structural issue has been settled. Bofors manufactures guns and missiles, while the FFV sticks to flat trajectory weapons and small arms ammunition. The manufacture of ammunition and lighter weapons will be necessary as long as Sweden has military forces.

FFV Ordnance manufactured 1.7 billion kronor worth of defense materiel in 1988 and exported 62 percent of that. Exports would increase sharply if there were no restrictions on Swedish arms exports. But without orders from the Swedish Armed Forces, the FFV would not survive. It is a matter of credibility.

"We would find it hard to sell materiel that had not been approved by the Swedish Armed Forces," says Leif Nimander, head of the Marketing Department.

An ideal situation for the FFV would be for half of its production to remain in Sweden, with the other half being sold for export. A total ban on arms exports would mean an entirely new business situation.

The FFV sees other threats in the future. The defense industry is growing smaller worldwide. Honeywell in the United States and Philips in Holland have stopped manufacturing military products. Competition is growing keener in a time of disarmament and detente.

Cooperation

What is lacking is development projects for the 1990's. Developing new weapons costs a lot of money. The FFV's AT-4 light antitank weapon cost about 75 million kronor to develop in the early 1980's.

Developing a similar antitank weapon today would cost 10 times that much. To reduce development costs, the defense industry must cooperate across international borders. The FFV's management is eagerly awaiting the government's war materiel report, which will recommend rules governing such cooperation.

East Bloc Developments Alter Threat Picture

90EN0126C Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 3 Dec 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense With an Unclear Threat Picture"]

[Text] The previous commission on defense wrote in its report on security policy that any important changes within the Warsaw Pact did not seem very likely in the foreseeable future.

That was 4 years ago. One ventures to guess that the current commission on defense will choose different wording in its security policy report, which is expected during the last half of January.

A great many things have happened in the Soviet Union and its neighboring East European countries since 1985.

So far the changes have been mainly political, but it is hard to see how they could fail to have military repercussions as well.

This applies especially to the swift emancipation of Poland, Hungary, the GDR, and, just recently, Czechoslovakia. Even if those countries do not pull out of the Warsaw Pact, it is hardly likely that they could be advanced among the Soviet Union's allies if there were an offensive war. And at the same time, on the Soviet side, there is an obvious effort to cut back on the USSR's expensive commitments in Central Europe.

A thaw has also occurred in relations between the two superpowers. One should not draw any conclusions in advance concerning the summit meeting in Malta or the ongoing disarmament talks in Vienna. The shared interest in reducing tension between the two military alliances in Europe that has been manifested so far is, however, a good sign.

But the situation is more complicated than that. Developments in the Soviet Union in recent years have been difficult to predict, and a good prognosis for the 1990's is not possible. But the signs we have seen so far indicate clearly that the Soviet determination to play a role as a leading nuclear power still exists. If so, it may mean that interest has shifted from Central Europe to our own immediate vicinity. Murmansk is the most important base for Soviet nuclear-armed submarines, which play a crucial role in the balance of terror.

It cannot be an easy task for the commission on defense to describe the threat picture which, at least in theory, should form the basis for its upcoming proposals. Instead, the commission's main task will be to emphasize Sweden's will to keep contributing even in the future to stability in the Nordic region, which presumably is going to find itself in an increasingly exposed position from the military strategic point of view. That view is shared by our nearest neighbors, Norway and Finland, both of which are busily beefing up their defense capability.

Defense policy decisions have long-term effects. From the damage done by the defense decisions of 1968 and 1972, we should have learned not to let changes in the rest of the world influence our defense appropriation levels too quickly. The serious shortcomings existing in the Swedish Armed Forces, especially in the Army, can be explained to a large extent by the "hibernation" that followed the budget reductions back then.

Just to remedy the shortcomings in its Armed Forces, Sweden is compelled to get out of step with those countries now reducing their defense spending. Unlike the others, we have kept our defense spending at a constant level in real terms for the past 20 years. During that same period, room has been made for improved conscript benefits and better real salaries for defense employees.

Most of that has been done at the expense of materiel procurement and maintenance. In 1968, materiel represented 38 percent of defense spending, and it now stands at around 22 or 23 percent. But at least that was the result of conscious decisions. Even worse is the situation resulting from inadequate maintenance, meaning that the materiel we have procured is unusable or not available in the depots. At a defense conference sponsored by the Liberal Party [FP] on Thursday, Major General Helge Gard of the Defense Materiel Administration estimated that filling those previously concealed gaps in the Army's depots would cost a dizzying sum of between 10 billion and 13 billion kronor.

No wonder a credibility gap has arisen between defense politicians and the military. FP Member of Parliament Hans Lindblad's declared distrust of the OB [Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces] institution is due largely to the fact that the existence of those shortcomings has long been denied in military quarters. Even the criticism from Carl Johan Aberg, chairman of the commission on defense, concerning poor efficiency is directed at the OB, although it has to do mainly with the latter's request for an annual appropriation increase of 3 percent in real terms.

The Armed Forces are not going to get that much. But the government, which in fact has committed itself to going ahead with development of the JAS aircraft, ought not to be entirely out of sympathy with the idea of an appropriation increase. Otherwise, both the Army and the Navy will be forced into such extensive cutbacks that they will have no reasonable chance of carrying out their missions. And after a cutback like that, there would scarcely be room for at least 5 months of compulsory military service, which the minister of defense has made a key element of Social Democratic ideology.

Agency To Assume JAS Crash Costs

90EN0126D Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 1 Dec 89 p 6

[Text] (TT)—The FMV [Defense Materiel Administration], which is the state's representative on the JAS aircraft project, has received the government's permission to sign an agreement with the JAS Industrial Group to pay 1 billion kronor, that being the cost of the crash by the first JAS-39 Gripen test plane, according to an announcement by the Ministry of Defense.

The sum of 1 billion kronor will be taken from the reserves allocated as part of the project's budget.

Series-produced aircraft of the JAS type will cost about 100 million kronor each. The total cost of developing the aircraft is estimated at 20 billion kronor, including 13 billion for the firms making up the JAS Industrial Group.

TURKEY

Staff Chief Leaves for CSCE Seminar in Vienna

TA1701185390 Ankara TRT Television Network
in Turkish 1800 GMT 17 Jan 90

[Text] General Necip Torumtay, chief of the General Staff, left for Vienna today to attend the seminar on military doctrine to be held within the framework of the CSCE. In a statement at Istanbul's Ataturk Airport before his departure, Torumtay said that during the seminar, which will be attended by 35 CSCE members states, countries will present their military doctrines or similar concepts without relating to their security or defense policies. Pointing out that the first part of the seminar will be attended by the chiefs of staff of almost all the countries, Torumtay noted that he, too, will explain Turkey's military doctrine during the meeting.

Accord With FRG for Construction of 2 Frigates

TA1901132790 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish
1100 GMT 19 Jan 90

[Text] An agreement with the FRG was signed in Ankara today for the joint construction of two frigates. The agreement was signed by Lieutenant General Dogan Celikay, Defense Ministry undersecretary, and the representative of the FRG firm.

The frigates, one of which will be built at the Golcuk dockyards and the other in Hamburg, will join the Navy in 5 years. Loans from the United States, the Netherlands, Britain, and Switzerland will be used in financing the project.

General Staff Chief Returns From Vienna Talks

TA2101072590 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish
2100 GMT 20 Jan 90

[Text] Chief of the General Staff General Necip Torumtay has returned from Vienna where he attended a seminar on military doctrines organized within the framework of the talks on security and security-increasing measures in Europe. In a statement at Istanbul Ataturk Airport, Gen Torumtay said that in the speeches he delivered at the seminar, he stressed Turkey's geostrategic value and its role within NATO. He said he also discussed Turkey's defense doctrine, and pointed out that, once mutual political (?intentions) are reflected in the military organization, security and stability will be strengthened in Europe.

Gen Torumtay expressed the belief that the seminar, in which the chiefs of general staff of 35 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participated, will make positive contributions to the talks on security and security-increasing measures in Europe.

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