


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wanted to grant them stewardship of the Kaaba and the honor of providing water for the pilgrims, but God commanded him to maintain the stewardship of the Kaaba in the hands of its holders. Similarly, the Israelites were granted the right of leadership and priesthood in Judaism because Moses and Aaron were of them. The Jews are not all Israelites, just as the Muslims are not all Banu Hashim. The Jews are a mixture of different nations who embraced Judaism as the Israelites embraced it. The Torah, following this concept, applies the term "the people" to the Jews, for Moses was not sent specifically to the Israelites.

The Jews, however, try to suggest this. God has said: "Go to Pharaoh; he has waxed insolent" (Koran 79:17). The Koran indicates the existence of non-Israelite believers in Judaism: "A believer from the House of Pharaoh who had kept his faith to himself said..." (Koran 40:28). The Koran also says that Pharaoh's wife was a believer, not to mention the fact that the first to believe in Moses were the magicians of Pharaoh: "The magicians fell down in prostration, saying: 'We believe in the Lord of Moses and Aaron.'" (Koran 20:70). They were not Israelites. Jewish legends say that their number was very great; some say 70,000.

The Koran distinguishes between Jews and Israelites. It praises the Israelites in many places: "O children of Israel, remember the favors I bestowed on you, and preferred you above mankind" (Koran 2:122). As for the Jews, it always mentions them in passages of blame and rebuke. For example, "You will find the Jews and idolaters most excessive in hatred of those who believe" (Koran 5:82). And, "The Jews say: 'God's hand is fettered.' Fettered be their own hands, and cursed may they be for saying what they say!" (Koran 5:64). And, "The Jews say: 'Ezra is the son of God.'" (Koran 9:30). And, "Some of the Jews distort the words out of context and say: 'We have heard and do not obey,' and 'hear without hearing,' and 'listen to us,' twisting their tongues and reviling the faith" (Koran 4:46).

Thus it becomes obvious, dear reader, that the Jews have forged themselves an image and donned garments not theirs, motivated by a sick imagination, to realize objectives for which God has revealed no authority, claiming the inheritance of a land to which they have no right. God spoke the truth when He said: "We have written in the Psalms, after the Remembrance, that those of our servants who are righteous shall inherit the earth" (Koran 21:105).

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Gulf National Conference Proceedings

Ahmad Bisharah on Union, Elections

92AE0443A *Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic*
15 May 92 p 11

[Interview with Dr. Ahmad Bisharah, Gulf National Conference General Coordinator, by 'Ali al-Mas'udi in Kuwait, date not given: "Dr. Ahmad Bisharah in Comprehensive Interview: 'Gulf National Conference Is Call for Unity, Participation; Step by UAE, Oman Encourages Rapprochement; Kuwait Under International Microscope; I Favor Inviting Observers to Parliamentary Elections in October'"]

[Text] Kuwait—Creation of the Gulf National Conference was announced last Tuesday after meetings held in Kuwait and attended by 60 public and academic figures from all the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] member states.

The conferees selected a coordination committee and a general coordinator for the conference, namely Dr. Ahmad Bisharah, a Kuwait University faculty member and Kuwait University Alumni Club member.

On the conference and its objectives, AL-KHALIJ has conducted the following interview with Dr. Bisharah, who opened it by talking about its objectives:

[Bisharah] The conference seeks to push forward the demands for political reform and general freedoms, to call for participation by citizens in building their societies, and to call for Gulf unity. It has emanated from past meetings by a number of GCC citizens, 47 of whom addressed a statement to the Gulf summit that convened in Kuwait. This statement asked the kings, heads of state, and emirs at the summit to develop efforts in the GCC member states and to endeavor to promptly unite the region. It has been agreed to continue to exert organized efforts toward this objective.

The latest meeting, which was held in Kuwait on 7 May 1992, approved basic bylaws that regulate this group and determine its objectives. As for the means, they are peaceful, open, and embodied in studies, lectures, and articles. They involve all citizens in the Gulf unity issue. In light of agreements [among the conferees] a bureau was elected to follow up on the conference issues, to expand the circle of conference participants and members, and to support the conference missions. Eleven persons from all parts of the Gulf were elected to represent the entire region. I am the number-one official.

[Mas'udi] What distinguishes the participants in this conference and what parties do they represent?

[Bisharah] The participants, nearly 60 in number, represent all the GCC member states. The majority of them are university professors, attorneys, journalists, former

ministers, former prominent government officials, merchants, and figures well-known in the region. Most of them belong to government and private institutions, their objectives are legitimate, and they don't plan to defy any individual or party.

[Mas'udi] On what issues did the conference focus, especially issues concerning Kuwait?

[Bisharah] We are speaking at a general level and from a unified Gulf perspective. What are the ordinary citizen's aspirations? They are to see the region further developed, unified, and its people moving closer to each other. These are the issues on which the conference focuses.

[Mas'udi] Did the conference come up with specific recommendations?

[Bisharah] No. This is the beginning phase. Conferences and symposiums, as well as articles, research, and studies, will come at a later phase. This is the beginning of an organized group that agrees on something. This is the first time that we see a Gulf group comprised of such a number of people agreeing on a certain thing. The next step is to implement the program and develop the ideas.

[Mas'udi] How have officials reacted to you?

[Bisharah] There has been no reaction yet, but we hope that the issue will be understood correctly and that they will not misunderstand it. We are seekers of truth by legitimate and open means. We have nothing to conceal and nothing against the existing regimes. We have demands which are really general, popular aspirations, and which are very different from what the officials say. All that we wish for is the prompt realization of these aspirations and demands.

[Mas'udi] Are you focusing on popular participation with you [the group]?

[Bisharah] Certainly, plus focusing on general freedoms, human rights, the region's unity, developing joint institutions, facilitating the movement of citizens, and whatever serves the region and helps it unite sooner or later. We will achieve this gradually, provided that the people play a role and that they are fully aware of their affairs.

[Mas'udi] Do you think that you will accomplish or reach any result?

[Bisharah] God willing. This will be done through serious participation in the conference and through the support of observers from outside the conference who express their support and voice their opinions via the press. I believe that the circle of supporters will expand, because the group doesn't aim to change a political system or to project itself as an opposition. It is a group that has clear and reasonable demands and objectives, and that doesn't wish to pose any threat to the governments.

Gulf Unity

[Mas'udi] Gulf unity will not be accomplished overnight. What is your vision of the method through which you will accomplish this objective?

[Bisharah] The Gulf unity concept will be strong, firm, and popular. Our efforts are focused on how to develop institutions and relations among the region's peoples through economy, culture, joint action, visits, and other means. All this will move the peoples closer to each other. When unity comes in any form, we hope that it will be with the free, popular will and that people will actually contribute to developing unity, not just listen and applaud. We hope that they will be a fundamental party to unity. If unity is accomplished in this manner, its foundations will be strong, but if we look for a unity based on formalities or protocol, it will be very weak and the people will play no role in it. Proximity has to be achieved in the political system, general freedoms, and ideas of the region's states. This cannot be accomplished overnight, as you have said. But it will be accomplished if we create the institutions, push for cooperation among the peoples, open the borders, abolish censorship, and eliminate the restrictions on the movement of ideas. On this basis, unity will gradually arrive.

[Mas'udi] What method will you use to contact the masses or the people?

[Bisharah] Symposiums, lectures, articles in the press, and other methods of encouragement.

Step by UAE [United Arab Emirates] and Oman

[Mas'udi] There has been an encouraging initiative by the UAE and Oman, which have abolished passports between them and which have contented themselves with identity cards. Will you espouse a similar plan and work to achieve it among the other Gulf states?

[Bisharah] All these are ideas. You are aware that it hasn't been a week since this conference was founded. But the UAE-Oman initiative that has abolished passports is a good first step to break down the borders and open them to the peoples to travel easily and to encourage rapprochement and cooperation. In their practical form, these steps build bridges among citizens with the passage of time, so that when unity comes, its foundations will already be there.

Kuwaiti Elections

[Mas'udi] Kuwait is preparing for a future transformation phase, which begins next October when the National Assembly elections will be held. How do you view this issue?

[Bisharah] Kuwait's elections are not a separate process, but part of a whole. In democratic action, an election is a step for selecting the people's representatives in the parliament. This step is preceded by creating the appropriate climate, granting liberties, a free press, freedom of

association and gathering, and participation in decision-making. These steps precede elections. We hope that next October's elections will be tantamount to an appointment with a phase of transformation in Kuwait's political system, and in the relationship between the government and the people. But this must be preceded by creating the climate so that political forces and citizens will have a part in decision-making. Regrettably, there are no indications of such development so far.

[Mas'udi] Do you think that Kuwait's parliamentary experiment is successful?

[Bisharah] It is successful, but it has its faults. However, the absence of the parliament and of general freedoms also has its problems. We have all seen them and we see them every day. This is why we shouldn't be scared by parliamentary life or apologize for it because of whatever emanates from these faults, considering that parliamentary life is capable of setting itself aright. If the parliament is incapable of reform, then the government can dissolve it and replace the [parliamentary] figures through new elections. Consequently, I believe that the excuse that parliamentary conduct obstructs democratic movement is not convincing.

[Mas'udi] Members always express their observations about the government and criticize it, even though some of them need somebody to express his observations about them. What do you think of this?

[Bisharah] Whoever has an observation should express it unhesitatingly. The government owns the newspapers and television, and can say what it wants to say. Moreover, the cabinet ministers are assembly members, not to mention those who are sympathetic to the government in the assembly. I believe that we have to understand and accept criticism and adhere to the rules of dialogue and debate. Disagreement isn't a problem, and it can often be beneficial to development. If people didn't disagree on things, life wouldn't develop. Many things have come into existence because of the presence of an opposing viewpoint. We mustn't fear this. Whoever fears debate and dialogue believes that he is wrong. A person who is willing to understand viewpoints and to select the soundest among them is a person who accepts dialogue. Only God's words cannot be debated. As for anything else, we have to accept debate on it.

Observation of Elections

[Mas'udi] You demanded previously that a committee be summoned to observe the elections in Kuwait and your demand was followed by great protest and opposition. What point has this idea reached, and what do you say about it now?

[Bisharah] It was an idea and we were motivated by the hope of contributing to the development process and to serving the country. We are aware that Kuwait is under the entire world's microscope. The world will show interest in and examine every step taken by Kuwait. It was our hope that international observers would be

invited to the elections in order to witness and judge the democratic process in Kuwait. In the short and long run, this is in Kuwait's interest at the information and political levels. But we were misunderstood, and our idea was interpreted in a way that was unrelated to its objectives. However, we hope that reason will prevail over emotion, that wisdom will predominate, and that the officials will see the matter in its true light. Supervision of elections is not a heresy. Iran, a country which doesn't accept intervention and which flies the flag of revolution in the world, opened its borders to whoever wished to observe its latest elections. In Lebanon, they have also requested international observers for their elections, which will be held shortly. I don't believe that there is any harm in the idea. What excuse do we have [not] to open the door officially for election observers, considering that they will come, even in spite of us? If we shut the doors, the consequences will be worse. Observation has been understood to mean supervision. But an observer doesn't examine and doesn't investigate what we do. He watches, following certain criteria, and records his observations only. I believe, and this is my personal conviction, that Kuwait will lose a lot if it doesn't invite international observers, because it will be under the microscope in any case. Consequently, it behooves us to open the door to them so they will not enter through the window.

[Mas'udi] So you still renew this call?

[Bisharah] Personally, I renew it and I am convinced of it. This is unrelated to the Alumni Club. It is a personal call to which I still cling and in which I believe.

Vote-Buying

[Mas'udi] Numerous issues are being raised in preparing for the elections, including the issues of vote buying, tribalism, denominationalism, familial connections, and women's political rights. You have opinions on these issues which we would like to learn.

[Bisharah] We have talked about how to develop a sound election climate. Vote-buying is a dirty process and the government has the primary responsibility for ending this phenomenon. Those who use these methods are well-known. The public prosecutor must take the first step and declare that the government has arrested one of those who use vote-buying, so that he will be a lesson for others. This applies to the issue of tribalism and denominationalism also. We cannot absolve the government of these problems. The government must declare its plans before it is too late.

[Mas'udi] In your capacity as an Alumni Club member, member of the university faculty, and former assistant secretary of Kuwait University, we would like you to share with us your opinion on an issue raised in numerous circles, namely the "veil" issue and what has been brought up in this connection at the Medical School. It was also discussed at a National Assembly session. This issue has developed more than anyone expected. What is your opinion?

[Bisharah] A person has the freedom of personal conduct and personal dress. However, there is a public interest and a public right that must be respected. Public right supersedes personal right. The administration of the university's Medical School was right in what it decided to establish good control. But some forces reacted to the decision too strongly, even though it is a purely academic decision that has no connection with politics or anything else. An understanding could have been reached with the people concerned (women students and their guardians) on the issue. But the matter has been exaggerated and embroiled in debate, and has been given a greater dimension than it deserves. If we politicize every little issue, we will end up with a serious problem. The people who supported the idea, whether knowingly or unknowingly, will regret it. We don't wish to point an accusing finger [at anyone] for the upsets that occurred recently, but it is evident that they are the work of a rancorous faction that resorts to violence to achieve its objectives.

Basic Bylaws Listed

92AE0443B *Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic*
15 May 92 p 11

[Article: "Gulf National Conference Basic Bylaws"]

[Text] The Kuwait occupation crisis has confirmed beyond a doubt the depth of the tie that binds the Gulf states, that interconnectedness is in the interest of the Gulf peoples, and the completeness of the culture and the similar social and developmental experiences that tie them together. It has also confirmed the urgent need to unite the efforts of the Gulf states and citizens, so that the Gulf can truly become a role model for a lively and developing Arab reality and a firm nucleus for an open and advanced Islamic world.

Therefore, out of faith in the single destiny of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] peoples, out of pride in the Arab Islamic identity of these peoples, and out of conviction that joint action is the path to the progress of nations, the conferees have decided to create a conference that embodies their awareness of their responsibility as individuals and as citizens toward the region's security and stability on a basis of freedom and justice, so that the conference will act as the framework through which the participants work to accomplish the following objectives:

I. Name and Headquarters

Article 1. The conference shall be known by the name of the Gulf National Conference and its headquarters shall in a city in one of the GCC member states.

II. Objectives

Article 2. The Gulf National Conference shall seek to achieve five basic objectives, which form the nucleus of its interests and the starting point for its activities, and it

shall seek to accomplish them by all open and peaceful means. These objectives are embodied in:

A. Bolstering national unity within each Gulf state and exerting efforts to ensure tolerance, dialogue, respect for the opposing opinion among society's various factions, and whatever is likely to strengthen the bonds of friendship and to bring together viewpoints;

B. Enlarge the contexts, bases, and scope of civilian institutions, through which the Gulf citizens' intrinsic initiatives are embodied, at the national and regional levels;

C. Urge the Gulf citizen to exercise true and effective citizenship on the basis of popular participation, of ensuring the citizens' basic rights and freedoms, and of opening balanced channels for all to express their various opinions, ideas, visions, and interpretations;

D. Advocate developing official and popular joint Gulf action in the various spheres;

E. Underline the Arab affiliation and Islamic extension of any joint Gulf effort.

III. Means

Article 3. The conference shall seek to accomplish its objectives in peaceful and open ways through the following means:

A. Organizing conferences, symposiums, and lectures;

B. Writing articles and expressing opinions through the published media and various other media, and by conducting and publishing research and studies;

C. Communicating with officials;

D. Cooperating with organizations and bodies related to its objectives.

IV. Organizational Aspects

Article 4. General Assembly: The General Assembly shall consist of all the conference members and shall hold its ordinary meetings at least once a year in the presence of the absolute majority of the members.

If quorum is not met, a meeting may be held an hour behind schedule in the presence of 20 percent of the members. The assembly shall adopt its resolutions by a majority of the members present, and shall have the jurisdiction to elect a Coordination Office to review reports, to sanction the annual work plan, and to adopt decisions on whatever issues are presented to it by the Coordination Office.

The General Assembly shall hold extraordinary meetings at the invitation of the Coordination Office or at the request of 20 members. The meeting shall be [deemed] correct if attended by two-thirds the conference members. If the required quorum is not met on schedule, the meeting shall be postponed for one hour and then held in

the presence of the absolute majority of the conference members. An extraordinary General Assembly shall only consider issues listed in its agenda.

Article 5. Coordinator: The General Assembly shall elect the conference coordinator for a renewable two-year term. The coordinator shall represent the conference, summon meetings, and implement the Coordination Office resolutions and recommendations.

Article 6. Coordination Office: The office shall consist of 13 members, including the coordinator, who shall be elected by the General Assembly for a renewable two-year term.

Article 7. Jurisdiction of the Coordination Office

The Coordination Office shall have the following jurisdiction:

A. Implement the General Assembly resolutions and the conference annual work program and seek to accomplish the program objectives with all means.

B. Follow up on conference affairs, membership, and finances and prepare for its activities and for the General Assembly meetings.

C. Contact and coordinate with others to accomplish conference objectives.

The Coordination Office may enlist the assistance of the conference members to accomplish its objectives and implement its program.

Article 8. Coordination Office Meetings:

The Coordination Office meetings shall be [deemed] correct if attended by the majority of its members. Its resolutions shall be passed by a majority of the votes of attending members.

Article 9. Membership:

A. Membership shall be confined to citizens of the GCC member states.

B. Those attending the founding meeting shall be considered members of this conference.

C. New members shall be admitted with the approval of the Coordination Office on the recommendation of three conference members.

D. A member shall abide by the conference's basic bylaws and its objectives and shall pay his annual dues.

E. Membership shall be dropped in each of the following cases:

1. Death;

2. Refusal to pay the annual dues for two consecutive years;

3. At the member's written request;

4. On the recommendation of the Coordination Office and by a General Assembly resolution approved by the majority of the conference members.

Article 10. Finances:

The conference finances shall consist of its members' annual dues, as determined by the General Assembly, and of unconditional grants and aid accepted by the Coordination Office. They shall be spent on activities determined by the General Assembly.

Article 11. Amendment of Basic Bylaws:

These basic bylaws may be amended by an extraordinary General Assembly. An absolute majority of the conference members shall be required for amendment.

Article 12. Dissolving the Conference:

The conference may not be dissolved except by a resolution made by an extraordinary General Assembly convened for the purpose and attended by at least three-quarters of the members. Approval of the resolution by three-quarters the attending members shall be required.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'Amman Chosen Second Headquarters for PLO

92AE0451B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
11 Jun 92 p 3

[Article: "Amman, Second Permanent Headquarters for PLO"]

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the PLO intends to open more offices in Amman, since it has decided to move the functions of these offices from Tunis to the Jordanian capital. This will make Amman the PLO's second permanent headquarters.

These offices will be used for meetings, inasmuch as the Jordanian capital is noted for allowing officials to have direct contact with people in the occupied territories. This lifts the people's morale and motivates them to increase their cohesiveness and self-sacrifices for the public good.

Evidence indicates that the PLO has begun—little by little—to withdraw from its remote headquarters in Tunis and to draw nearer, whenever circumstances permit, to the occupied territories, so that the PLO can exercise its daily and basic role vis-a-vis the people of the occupied nation. However, despite its increased Palestinian importance recently, Amman remains the second headquarters after Tunis.

ALGERIA

FAF Reportedly Cover Association for FIS

92AF0932A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
4 Jun 92 pp 1, 3

[Article initially published in the weekly VSD, by Jean-Loup Izambert and Francois Weill: "The FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] Secret Networks in France"—first four paragraphs are ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

[Text]

Fundamentalist Networks Are Being Reconstituted in France

The weekly VSD discloses that France serves as a retreat base for fundamentalist leaders.

In an investigation that will be published today, the weekly VSD discloses that many fundamentalist leaders have crossed the Mediterranean and simultaneously resurfaced in several regions of France in the last few weeks. These terrorists, several of whom are wanted in Algeria for murders and armed robberies, are trying to infiltrate emigrant circles in order to recruit troops and plan armed struggle operations in Algeria.

These activities take place under cover of an association called Algerian Brotherhood in France [FAF], as well as other associations such as the National Federation of Muslims in France, one member of which was Roger Didier Guyon, who was arrested on 12 June 1991 at Bordj Bou Naama while transporting explosives and weapons.

In addition to serving as a retreat, France is also used by the Algerian fundamentalist movement as a hub for its international contacts, and especially as a financing base for its criminal activities in Algeria.

The FIS Secret Networks in France

Since the riots that took place at the beginning of the year and the outlawing of the FIS by the Algerian Government, many FIS leaders gone underground have resurfaced these past few weeks in the Paris area and in the north and south of France. Their objective is to recruit embryos of troops for armed-struggle operations in Algeria and, in the suburbs, to organize commandos to hunt drug dealers; the police are questioning these operations.

Early in May 1992, at Cergy-Saint-Christophe, a poor town in Val-d'Oise, two bearded men came to the apartment of a fundamentalist Muslim theologian; Kherbane Kheiridine and Bounoua Boumera had just arrived in France secretly after eluding Algerian security services. A few days before, according to Algerian security services, five other FIS members—Zermane Ousat, Zerriat Said, Zeroug Abderrezak, Zouabri Ali also known as Alout, and Tchalala Abdelhakim—all wanted in Algeria for "murders and armed robberies," came to

France by the same route. These seven men are "Afghans," combatants of the most extremist FIS trend (Takfir Wal Hidjra). Arms in hand, they lead the "holy war" in Algeria, where they multiply their attacks against the police. Many of them are said to have safely reached France and now to be in the Paris area, in Marseille, Lyon, and Roubaix, where the FIS has set up what seems to constitute its rear bases.

Officially, the FIS does not exist on French soil. Yet, it has been weaving its web there for the past two years, under cover of an association called Algerian Brotherhood in France (FAF). The association president, Djaffar El Houari, a mathematics student, does not conceal its intentions; he told VSD:

"We are in charge of all the logistics for FIS meetings, because French law prohibits foreign political parties from operating on French territory."

The FAF does not stop at that. Actually, this movement is secretly trying to establish itself in the immigrant community by gaining the support of young social misfits, infiltrating associations, and extending its influence and Islamic principles inside families.

Examples of this ideological infiltration are getting ever more numerous, although evidence is hard to gather because people are afraid of retaliation. Malika agreed to meet with us. This Algerian woman lives in a suburban house south of Paris; she told us:

"It began when a cousin of my husband's came to live with us in September 1991. He managed to convince my husband that I should wear the gandura [long tunic] and the hijab (veil). After that, I was no longer allowed to go out, not even to fetch the children from school. I was forbidden to use the phone; I heard the cousin explain that FIS militants—he was one of them—had been told to go live with their relatives in France in order to convert them. Today, this cousin lives somewhere in the suburbs. He got fake papers in Belleville and travels regularly back and forth between Paris and Algiers."

The FAF proselytism is paying off. Among other things, it makes it possible to multiply the number of safe houses for FIS activists wanted in their country. It also makes it possible to recruit militants and set up logistic bases to support them and disseminate their ideas. The patient efforts of the FIS representatives in France have mostly been targeted at the young "beurs" [French citizens born of Arab immigrant parents] by exploiting the feeling of injustice that many experience, although most of them—especially women—are hostile to the FIS. The FAF and satellite organizations have opened places of prayer, of course, but also school-tutoring and Arab-teaching classes, and they have infiltrated many youth associations. In Suresnes, for instance, the "bearded brothers" have quite legally taken over a martial arts club. They are settling in the Paris area along a Nanterre-Sartrouville axis, in neighborhoods with a large immigrant population.

"They are located," a policeman noted, "in the strongholds of the National Front."

In suburban hot spots, Islamic militants apparently lead the fight against small drug dealers, under pretense of turning repentant dealers into good militants. According to a police official, this "struggle, purporting to 'clean up' the suburbs, results in the creation of strange commandos that act like sheriffs against dealers. That leads us to believe that the actual purpose of these operations might be to take over rather than eliminate drug traffic." Similarly, some fundamentalist militants in the Lyon area have become prison visitors.

"If the FIS is represented in the suburbs, it is not to manipulate the young, but to inform them and require them to be good Muslims," Moussa Kraouch, the FAF spokesman, countered around the end of December. Perhaps. But since then the FIS has been banned in Algeria, its leaders are wanted or jailed. The tone of the FAF has changed. The association is no longer content, as it used to be, with encouraging Algerians who live here to comply with Islamic precepts and vote "the right way" in their country. Now, at its meetings or through the associations it controls, the FAF is disseminating disturbing brochures. For instance, a weekly newsletter printed in France, MINHAR EL DJOUMOUA, invites Algerians, to "take responsibility for themselves: words and guns." "Faced with the silence of human rights exalters, faced with the danger lying in wait for me, I go look for a gun to free my country," an anonymous author wrote. "The victims of the junta are just the front lines."

"The FAF is trying to stir up the Algerian community," a French member of the special police forces stated. "But support for the FIS no longer expresses itself just through its unofficial representatives in France: their supporters have infiltrated other Islamic associations."

Faith and Practice, which until now had preached social peace, is now said to harbor a strong pro-FIS current. Even the ancient National Federation of Muslims in France is not safe from infiltrations. One of its French Muslim sympathizers, Roger Didier Guyon, was arrested at Bou Naama on 12 June 1991, as he was transporting explosives and weapons. But was he doing it just to support the armed struggle of the Islamic party militants? He is said to have proposed to the FIS second-in-command, Ali Ben Hadj, to constitute armed groups in France. For a long time, the very powerful Muslim Brothers, a rival organization, was an obstacle to such FIS penetration of French Islamic life. But they toned down their differences when the FIS won the first round of the Algerian legislative elections. The subsequent repression against the "bearded brothers" definitively put them on the same side.

The fundamentalist Muslim community, all trends together, is now closely following what happens in Algeria. More worrying still is the fact that the FIS is rallying the most extremist movements. On 29 March, two of its representatives, Anouar Haddam and Said

Hilali, held an indoor meeting at the Antony (Hauts-de-Seine) students residence halls. In the first row were Habib Mokni and Boulaabi. These two men are high-ranking officials of Ennahda, the underground Tunisian movement whose militants placed explosive devices in tourist complexes. Their coming to France was not just a symbol of the rapprochement between the two parties. According to an Intelligence Service report, they were also paving the way for the arrival of part of their movement's staff.

"With the FIS and Ennahda," a policeman estimated, "France may now become a retreat base for fundamentalist hardliners. We cannot rule out the possibility that they may now attempt to form a common front to impose their view on Maghreb countries."

Getting thus established requires considerable financing. Saudi Arabia, which must face fundamentalism on its own soil and learned its lesson from the FIS attitude during the Gulf war, has shut off the petrodollar flow. Iran now seems more concerned to revive its economy than to export the Islamic revolution. As for Sudan, its financial resources do not allow it to be of much help. The FIS, therefore, is on its own to find the money required for its survival.

"The key to its financing has now become 'trabendism,' i.e., the black market," a customs investigator explained.

Financing Source: the Black Market

The FIS has undertaken to organize the black market. From all corners of Europe, "ants" bring back to Algeria goods that are absolutely impossible to find over there: vehicle spare parts, household appliances, nylon stockings, etc. They are sold by local stores, which return part of the profit to the FIS. The system may seem amateurish but, organized on a large scale, it brings in considerable sums. To this should be added income from the "raclette" [scraper], a sort of forced contribution said to be levied on Algerian wholesalers living in France, Spain, or Italy, who supply the exported wares.

"Now that the Saudis and the Iranians have withdrawn, it is not just financing sources, but also the ideological leadership of the movement and the means to control it that have disappeared," a high-level official of the French intelligence service estimated. "The Americans have doubled the number of their agents working on the FIS in Paris and Berlin; they have tripled it in Madrid. Several meetings are said to have taken place in Paris between FIS leaders and the American services. Also, regular liaisons are said to have been established. The Americans believe that they can thus handle them. They are wrong; the movement is now out of control. In the short term, its militants may turn to a sort of common-law terrorism."

This concern is shared by policemen from other services. They fear that the FIS—through the FAF—may stir up protest movements in the suburbs to put pressure on the French Government. Law and order in the Paris area

would be traded for a more severe condemnation of the government in power in Algiers.

For the time being, France is turning a blind eye to FIS activism, at the risk of allowing the country to become the rear base of a movement which, under the pressure of events, is openly engaging in armed struggle in Algeria.

FIS Presence in Kasbah Discussed

92AF0861A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
7 Apr 92 p 33

[Article by 'Uthman Tazghart]

[Text] Algiers—The kasbah, 8 October 1957: A group of freedom fighters comprised of four youths lays an ambush for a colonialist military patrol. They then take refuge in the kasbah. Paratroop forces under the command of General Massou surround the quarter, manage to find the hiding place of the four freedom fighters, and, after finding it difficult to arrest them, blow up the hiding place, killing the four, whose heroism was subsequently embodied in the film "The Battle of Algiers." They are Ali Labouant, Hasiba Benbouali, Bouhamidi Mahmoud, and Omer Yasif, a child no older than 13.

The kasbah, 14 February 1992: A group of youths of the Islamic movement prepare an ambush for a group of security forces. The youths then seek refuge in the kasbah. The security forces, reinforced with paratroop groups, surround the quarter and reach the youths' hiding place. When they find it difficult to arrest them, they launch two rockets at the hiding place, blowing it up. The result is four blackened bodies, and a fifth victim hit by a stray bullet.

The locations where these two incidents occurred are separated by several small alleyways and 30 years. How are they different from each other? El-Rizqi, an elder and longtime resident of the kasbah: "The situation [now] is different. In the Battle of Algiers, people died for the kasbah. Now, they are dying in the kasbah. That is the difference."

Why the Kasbah?

The ancient kasbah's quarters cover over 60 hectares of a triangle-shaped area, whose apex contains Algiers Fort, and whose base is the seashore. The current kasbah was built on the ruins of an older kasbah built by Salim al-Tami. The Turks rebuilt the kasbah when they assumed control over Algiers around 1516. Construction works continued until 1590. Shortly before the French occupation, Ali [Khawja], the second to last bey [former Turkish title for the ruler of Algiers and Tunis], moved his residence to the kasbah, because it was more fortified than his original residence in a place called El-Djeniene. The kasbah includes 1,700 structures; 1,200 are ancient and the rest go back to the French colonialist period. Its population totals 56,000. However, due to the deteriorating condition of some dwellings, 505 buildings were evacuated, and 3,387 residents were relocated.

A renovation program was established under the supervision of the Kasbah Preservation and Renovation Administration, which was established in 1985. In December 1991, the kasbah was registered as an international, humanitarian inheritance under UNESCO's protection. This status will undoubtedly make it possible to use greater resources to preserve these ancient quarters, which have a special place in the popular Algerian memory, because the bloody fights of the Battle of Algiers occurred in them. However, 30 years after independence, Algerian paratroops are returning, this time to surround the kasbah and pursue militias composed of armed groups known as "Afghani groups."

The story begins in November 1991 when the border station in the city of Guemar (on the Algerian-Tunisian boarder) was attacked by 60 persons commanded by a person known as El-Tayyeb El-Afghani, who is known among the area's residents as a veteran who fought in Afghanistan. After the attack failed, it became clear to security forces that the arrested persons had all previously fought in Afghanistan. Based on their interrogation, the security agencies were able to uncover weapons caches and other groups of veterans who had fought in Afghanistan in other areas (e.g., Sidi Bel Abbès, Djelfa, Tiaret, etc.). The security agencies collected information that indicated that more than 2,500 Algerians had returned to Algeria after participating in the war on the side of the Afghani mujahidin, and that at least 500 of them currently belong to an organization known as the Society of Algerian Afghanis, who are distributed throughout different areas of Algeria in groups of three.

No one knows precisely when the Afghani groups began to concentrate in the kasbah. However, food and medicine uncovered by the security agencies in several hiding places makes it likely that the matter has been going on for several months. After the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid, and the cancellation of legislative elections, these groups began to organize armed operations against army groups and several state organizations (the treasury, the central post office, several police stations, etc.). Their aim in seeking refuge in the kasbah is apparently twofold. On the one hand, it is difficult for the security forces to reach them in their hiding places inside the kasbah's quarters. On the other hand, by seeking refuge in the kasbah, they apparently hope to recreate the atmosphere of the Battle of Algiers and thus reawaken the popular memory of kasbah residents and obtain their sympathy. Attempts to investigate the identities of these groups' members and the places where they concentrate are apparently running into great difficulties. Mahmoud, a waiter at the Malkouf Coffee House (in the lower kasbah): "I was born in the kasbah and have lived here all my life. However, I would be lying if I said that I knew all of its secrets. During the colonialist period, the French used every means and technique, but only rarely managed to locate the freedom fighters' hiding places. The Islamic groups are now using these hiding places. Therefore, it is difficult to reach them."

As to when these groups first appeared in the kasbah, Radwan, a patron in the same coffee house, relates: "I usually spend the evening in this coffee house with several friends. A few days before legislative elections, on a Sunday after the evening prayer, we were playing dominoes when five persons passed. They were dressed in white abas [cloak-like woolen wraps] and long overcoats, and they were carrying boxes containing empty glass bottles. They were going to the upper kasbah. One of my friends whispered that they were from the Afghani groups, and that they were using these bottles to make Molotov cocktails. That was the first time I saw the Afghanis here in the kasbah. After that, we became accustomed to seeing them, especially in a place known as [Douira Talat Zaouia], a forlorn place that passersby usually avoid."

Everyone in the kasbah is talking about the use of an RPG-7 [rocket-propelled grenade launcher] to shell a hiding place of the Afghani groups. In the lower part of [Klaybar] Street is a building that was subjected to this shelling. It has two floors containing eight rooms in which seven families live. Ramadan, who lives in one of these rooms with his wife and two children, states that the shelling occurred on the night of 13 to 14 February. However, he knows nothing about the persons targeted by the shelling or what their room contained. He states: "The building is divided into rooms. Each one is used as a separate apartment. None of the neighbors know what is in a neighboring room or what is happening in it. However, it is certain that the four persons targeted by the shelling are not residents of the kasbah. Therefore, we know nothing about their identities. However, we all know the fifth person who was killed by a bullet in the chest, El-Hadi Bouznad. He was our neighbor for years." His wife says that when her husband heard the shelling, he hurried out of his room, located directly above the four strangers' room, to ascertain what was happening and was shot fatally in the chest.

Visit Inside Reggane Camp Reported

92AF0897A Algiers *HEBDO LIBERE* in French
13-19 May 92 p 11

[Interview with unidentified "witness" by Rachid Kaci; place and date not given: "A Witness Reports"]

[Text] [Kaci] You've just returned from Reggane, and you look weary...

[Witness] I came to tell you my story, so the Algerian people will know what is happening to their sons in the "Algerian" south, or more precisely in the psychological torture centers called "Security Centers," a place France used for its nuclear tests: Reggane.

[Kaci] The state had to maintain order. What would you have it do?

[Witness] I want to tell you I am neither a member nor a sympathizer of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. I am a simple citizen whose brother has been incarcerated at

Reggane since February 1992, along with other people's brothers. After the Aid promise of release, I didn't see anything happening, so I decided to go pay a visit to my brother.

[Kaci] What happened?

[Witness] I had already been to the wilaya more than a dozen times during the month of Ramadan. We were told a service had been established specifically for the purpose of keeping families informed. That was hooey. It was only through the intervention of a friend who works there that I found out my brother was alive, at Reggane. After I was directed to the officials who were supposed to issue visitor permits, I went to see them and—miracle!—I got the permit.

So I took the plane to Adrar on 21 April 1992, then the taxi to Reggane. Once there, I saw about 20 women sitting on the sand, crying. None of them had been allowed to see their sons, brothers, or husbands.

[Kaci] But as for you, you had an authorization...

[Witness] Right. So I arrived. When I handed him my visitor permit, the "djouni" immediately said: "No visit. The detainees don't want to see you." I waited anyway, and after an hour a captain arrived and told us to wait some more. This lasted four hours, about 20 km from the post. Towards 1330 hours, the officer called us to repeat what the djouni had said: "They refuse to see you, go home." An old woman began crying and begged them to tell us at least whether the people we wanted to see were alive. To which the officer replied: "We have received instructions, not information."

[Kaci] Were you able to verify any of the rumors about deaths?

[Witness] Yes and no. A Muslim sister was informed that her husband had died and that his body had been transferred to the morgue at Ain-Naadja. But she was never able to verify it. She had even been summoned by the Ministry of Defense. This was the fourth time she had traveled from Bou-Ismaïl to Reggane. Another old woman told us that two of her sons were at Ouargla and she had no news of the other four.

[Kaci] Some stalls have been set up for visitors?

[Witness] The same officer I was just speaking about told us: "See, we have even prepared stalls so you can be in the shade when you talk with them..." But the old women spent four hours in the burning sun! At the same time, the HCE [High Committee of State] says on television that all sorts of provisions have been made to assist families making the trip. Fortunately, the people of Reggane and Adrar were there... Thanks to them, we got two "J5s" full of linens, soap, sugar, scarves, kamiss [type of clothing]...

Even so, people spent the night under the stars, because the hotels in the vicinity were full. Apparently, those who offered us provisions were even beaten up.

Subsequently, the soldiers even refused to allow us to leave clothing for the detainees. When I got home, my mother asked me for news of my brother. Would you have the courage to confront a question like that from a mother? What is happening in the camps? Are people dying? We're all for Algeria, but at this rate it may turn into just the opposite: Algerians will be brought to detest their own country.

Arrest of el-Hadjar Union Council Members 'Scandalous'

92AF0909B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
25 May 92 p 1

[Editorial by Fodil Ourabah: "A Scandal!"]

[Text] The arrest of Derradji Dilmi and another member of the labor council at the El Hadjar steel-making complex is nothing short of scandalous. It is difficult to believe it happened. It is as though we had suddenly stepped back several years in time to the era of inquisition and arbitrariness, of limited speech and nightsticks, to single-party rule and Article 120. Here we are back in the days of labor repression: This case cannot be termed anything else.

No matter what tricks are used to give it a veneer of lawfulness, their arrest harks back to the old totalitarian methods, which we thought were a thing of the past. It is inspired by the same impulse as the imprisonment of so many labor activists who dared to speak out to demand the freedom to organize and to fight for their rights as workers.

Indeed, what crime have Dilmi and Lahlouh committed? Is it that they dared to challenge the survivors in certain realms of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] bureaucracy who resist all change and continue to obstruct democratic expression in the unions? Is it that they dared to demand what they believe are the legitimate rights of the workers they represent?

We, for one, are not going to swallow this business about strict enforcement of the law! The two union leaders were arrested because of the strike at El Hadjar. More serious still, they were arrested because the dispute is about to be resolved, and because the resolution in some way displeases the same political forces who did everything they could to trigger a confrontation and bring the El-Hadjar complex to a standstill! More than an act of provocation, it is a veritable plot to destabilize the country's industrial base, step-by-step.

Following the arrests in Saida and now El Hadjar, we have reason to wonder whether the forces of hegemonism may be trying to regain the upper hand. Isn't their game to make use of the justice system, forcing it to perform dirty tasks unworthy of it, with the intention of discrediting it when the major corruption cases come to trial? And, in discrediting the justice system, isn't the ultimate goal to discredit along with it the state apparatus as a whole?

Intensification of 'Terrorist' Acts Noted

92AF0910A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
25 May 92 p 3

[Article by Said Tazrout: "The Special Forces Cracking Down"]

[Text] The intensification of terrorism has resulted in a redeployment of security forces in the suburbs of the capital and surrounding wilayat. Their presence has been very visible in recent days. For several hours, helicopters flew over the Lakhdaria forest where fundamentalist terrorists were detected.

The terrorist networks had seemed resigned after losing their offensive edge, particularly in the center of the capital, following various thrusts by security forces. However, there is every indication that they have taken refuge in other wilayat in the Center to rebuild their death-dealing organization. The clash in Belcourt on 20 May, according to still unconfirmed reports, pitted intervention squads against a group of wanted terrorists who had come from the Bouira region, no doubt in search of munitions or information.

The encounter lasted several hours, taking a fairly heavy toll. Three died and several were injured. Many arrests were also made.

The Belcourt encounter coincided with another in Lakhdaria (wilayah of Bouira) in which the national gendarmerie and special forces of the ANP [People's National Army] clashed with a group actively sought by the authorities.

The large-scale crackdown by security forces in this region began Wednesday. It, too, has taken a heavy toll. There is talk of numerous deaths and injuries. Several arrests have been made. The weapons and cache of ammunition discovered were impressive.

The other wilayat in the vicinity of the capital—Blida, Tipasa, Boumerdes—have also seen an intensification of terrorist acts during this same period.

On 19 May, a police inspector was assassinated in Ouled Aich. One day later a violent exchange of gunfire broke out in the same wilayah between fundamentalists and security forces.

Last Friday, one person was killed and 40 others were arrested in Chebli (wilayah of Blida) among the group of fundamentalists opposed to the appointment of a new imam by the governmental agency that has oversight.

On Wednesday, the police station in Draria (wilayah of Tipasa) was the target of a terrorist attack on a police van which left one policeman dead and wounded a young girl.

The list of crimes by the fundamentalists is very long and there is every indication that it will grow longer still. Are these the terrorists' final desperate acts or the start of a

broad counter-offensive? We will know the answer in the next few days. But, already, the special forces are hitting hard.

Constantine University Said Shelter for Terrorists

92AF0909A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
18 May 92 p 5

[Article by T. Abada: "A Terrorists' Nest"]

[Text] Is the University of Constantine a haven for fundamentalist terrorists? The teachers, students, and workers we met while researching this article have no doubt that it is. Certain events starting in June 1991 and even earlier all point to that conclusion.

The recent terrorist acts were the work of groups operating at the university: The arsonists behind the various fires at the Ain-El-Bey campus allegedly entered the buildings at 0600 just as the watchmen were completing their shift and the cleaning women were starting theirs. According to those we spoke to, the security police discovered a cache of gas cans, rolls of electrical wire, and pliers beneath the cafeteria. The bomb that exploded on the 14th floor of the administration building killing those who planted it was the work of students thought to have been active members of the "committee for the defense of the people's choice."

One of them, it is said, was the imam of the mosque at the student housing complex "8 November 1971" ("FIRMA") and president of the complex as well, it seems. Electric circuits, probably meant for other bombs, were found in the victims' carryalls. A search of the imam's room uncovered a large quantity of electronic components.

The Zouaghi campus would have been the scene of a devastating fire had it not been for the vigilance of its watchmen. At about 0300, terrorists attacked INIATA [expansion not given] and then moved on to the Earth Sciences Institute where major damage was done to the registrar's office.

Partisan Thinking Undermining the University

The question that everyone asks is: Why, after the terrorist attacks at Ain-El-Bey did the rector's office fail to enact any security measures, except to have all workers check in?

This raises another question. The terrorist acts were preceded by warning signs, which were made known to the rector: The posting of transcripts of fiery sermons and speeches by representatives of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] in France calling for insurrection; persistent rumors of activities against the university; and a large number of young women "mouhtajibate" who reside in the Ain-El-Bey student housing complex went home the day before the various attacks.... The rector, it seems, turned a deaf ear to the worries voiced those who reported these facts to him.

There is a consensus within the university community that the university's current administration is responsible. A veritable network (part active and part dormant) in the service of the FIS and fundamentalism is firmly believed to exist and to have infiltrated the administration at various levels, its branches reaching into certain institutes, a number of scientific clubs and associations, and the larger divisions such as the photocopying department and the computer center.

Teachers, students, and workers remember how the rector's office reacted to the events of June 1991 and March 1992. In the more recent of those two cases, a very small group of students forced the university to close from 4 to 14 March 1992. When pressured by teachers to have the disruptive students (a group of 50 or so) brought before the disciplinary committee, the rector sidestepped the issue and asked the heads of the institutes to provide him with names. Those who drew up the lists did not have the courage to submit them....

Our contacts unanimously believe that there was no justification for shutting down the campuses other than the partisan thinking exhibited by the rector and his allies. Except for Ain-El-Bey, all of the campuses were functioning normally.

When the university's board of regents voted by secret ballot to request police intervention, the rector worked around their decision by hurriedly convening a meeting of the scientific council, which had never met before. Certain individuals present at that meeting were not members of the council. To everyone's surprise, the scientific council took a stand contrary to that of the board of regents and decided to close the university for 10 days. The union chapter, the CNES [expansion not given], and many teachers reacted swiftly and obtained a more open meeting at which the decision by the scientific council was severely criticized. It was decided that the university should reopen, but it was too late: The students had gone home and would not return to campus until 10 March.

Need we be reminded that the call for an insurrectional strike in June 1991 was made by Abassi Madani at the University of Constantine? Abassi was welcomed with great fanfare, while other figures—Amirat (of the MDRA [Democratic Movement for Algerian Renewal]), Belaid Abdeslam, and Boumaza—were denied access to the university.

A Tool in the Hands of Fundamentalists

The takeover of the university from within began under the previous rector, Mr. Benayache, from the time he was appointed. Various accounts reveal that Mr. Benayache had a discussion with the university's personnel director (who has since resigned) in which he recommended that positions of responsibility be given to "good Muslims." Just what are the characteristics of a "good" Muslim as opposed to a "bad" one, according to Mr. Benayache?

In trying to find out more, we were told by those we questioned that Mr. Benayache was a known fundamentalist in the east. He lived in Saudi Arabia in the 1960's where he carried on large-scale business dealings. It is said that his wealth later enabled him to play an important role in the growth of fundamentalism in Constantine and the eastern region of the country. He is even thought to be a major player in the fundamentalist network that handles recruiting for Afghanistan.

As in a relay race, when Mr. Benayache left the rector's office, he was succeeded by Mr. Thabet, the current rector, whose appointment was helped along by the fact that Mr. Mustapha Cherif had just been named minister delegate for universities. It is no coincidence that Mr. Thabet was chosen to head the University of Constantine, just as there is nothing coincidental in the choice of rectors at Blida, Annaba, Batna, and the Polytechnical School. It was part of the Hamrouche government's strategy of alliance with fundamentalism in which the institution of higher education was sacrificed for political expediency. The new rector pursued his predecessor's policy assiduously, accelerating the promotion of "good Muslims" into positions of responsibility and even extending that criterion to new hires.

Toward that end, the university's personnel department was deliberately circumvented in favor of the general resources division headed by Chettouani, an FIS activist (formerly of the FLN [National Liberation Front] who is now in prison. In June 1991, the union chapter began protesting these practices that violate the rules.

Of the 100 to 150 new hires (guards, custodians, maintenance men), electrical maintenance was predominantly FIS, we were told by those we questioned who added: "Whenever they want to disrupt the university, they always cut off the power supply." The mission of the guards and custodians, who report to a certain Khelifa (FIS) appointed by Chettouani, is to enforce "Islamic law" by targeting the couples among the student body.

There are corroborating accounts of the systematic use of resources at the Computer Science Institute in FIS election campaigns (for the communal, regional, and national legislative assemblies). It may be useful to note that the Computer Science Institute was headed by Mr. Sahnoun, FIS representative for Oum El-Bouaghi in the national assembly and currently the director of a computer science research unit. The institute's personnel director, Merrouche, also an FIS activist, is now in detention.

The photocopying department was also used to a large degree, particularly by the association "Ibn Kaldoun," to copy the proceedings of various Islamic conferences and even sermons from mosques, using a scientific journal for cover.

The entire university community remembers that the university's resources (material and financial) were used in organizing several conferences on "Islamic economics." Each of the conferences cost 25 to 30 million

centimes and was financed entirely by the university. From the Middle East and Europe, fundamentalist propagandists—Saudis, Pakistanis, etc.—flocked to the University of Constantine. It was a veritable forum and launching ground for fundamentalist ideology.

These revelations among many others indicate the degree to which the university has been made a tool of fundamentalism.

Scientific Clubs as a Trojan Horse

The University of Constantine teems with scientific clubs and associations, only a portion of which are controlled by the fundamentalists as the students have put up strong resistance to the effort to co-opt their clubs. It seems that the effort was masterminded by one Ribouh, who held a "fictitious" post within the vice rector's office for pedagogy and whose name will come up again later.

Among the associations directly utilized by the FIS, the "Ibn Khaldoun Association" and the "Malek Bennabi Association" are cited by those we interviewed.

The former was an unauthorized scientific club until 1988. Following the changes that occurred in October 1988, it received approval from the wilayah. Its founders were all former members of the National Office of Students (BNE)—Bouraoui, Chilah, Kerkar, Bouaninba—who naturally left the FLN for the FIS and are now sought by the police. Another founder was Sahnoun (mentioned earlier in this article). It was this association that organized the various conferences on "Islamic economics" with the help of the university (and probably the wilayah).

The latter, the "Malek Bennabi Association," was founded by a philosophy student, currently an FIS detainee, with help from one Abada who reportedly served two terms as FLN representative for the Constantinois.

Fundamentalist influence, particularly FIS and Hamas, extends to the "Sciences and Technologies Association," namely the "civil engineering," "architecture," "silicon" (electronics), and "El-Khawarizmi" clubs. Certain clubs that are part of the "Audio-Visual Association" are also subject to it.

Other associations are being established. "Ibtikar" is one of them.

Of course, the remaining clubs are not safe from new attempts to co-opt them. Thus far, the students have resisted. But the administration seems to be developing an actual strategy in which Ribouh, the former BNE member who joined the FIS, appears to play an important but discreet role. All accounts by the teachers and students we met in researching this article place this teacher of architecture at the heart of an operation aimed at positioning the new fundamentalist students at the

time of enrollment in the various institutes where their task is to join the scientific clubs and gradually co-opt them.

The FIS Militia

The same situation is true of the university's sports associations. Here, too, the fundamentalists have contrived numerous efforts to co-opt them.

In the process, as could be expected, women are forced out of sports. With the exception of gymnastics and track and field, that has happened in karate, tennis, etc.

The various accounts point to Chaoui Mouloud, a karate instructor who also works as a typist at the university. Constantine's FIS-controlled APC [People's Communal Assembly] made the martial arts hall at the Ben Abdelmalek Stadium available to him. According to our sources, Chaoui primarily trains the FIS' shock troops and activists assigned as bodyguards to FIS leaders.

Moreover, the administration assigned Chaoui to train the women's karate and tennis teams! The women students felt forced to abandon these sports because of the numerous obstacles created by the trainer, it seems.

The Explosion on the 14th Floor

The bomb that exploded on the 14th floor of the administrative building was intended for another target and not that particular floor, according to a consensus of opinion within the university community. It was to have been set to detonate at three in the morning and was probably meant for the computations center. But why was the 14th floor involved? Everyone agrees that the students responsible for setting the bomb chose that floor because the large number of offices occupied by FIS activists offered better security. Other questions remain unanswered, however. Was it a female who actually transported the bomb to the 14th floor? There were unconfirmed reports of a third victim.

Why did the students who broke into the administrative building tell the custodian that they were going to the 16th floor? That is the location of the office of the vice rector in charge of postgraduate activities, who is highly active in the FIS and was very visible during the June insurrection.

Our survey of the University of Constantine revealed to us how extensively this institution is exploited as a tool in an openly partisan spirit. The teachers, workers, and students remain cautious. Are the local and national authorities so naive as to let matters deteriorate to this point? Or are there other motives not readily visible to us? After all that has happened in this country, can fundamentalism still be viewed as an opinion that has a right to express itself or does it in fact resort to terrorism and acts of sabotage and vandalism, making it ineligible to exercise that right?

All these questions and others have caused a deep malaise in the university community in Constantine and

yet it possesses enormous capabilities that could permanently restore this institution.

Is the University of Constantine in danger? Without hesitation, teachers, students, and workers answer that it is. Our university, they say, is largely controlled by fundamentalists and their sympathizers in the FLN (directors of institutes, various levels of the administration and at the rector and vice-rector levels....)

We are not safe from further attacks. It is certain that dormant terrorist networks exist. They have their accomplices and enjoy the cover of scientific clubs, associations, fundamentalist student organizations, etc.

Unless they are rooted out, these networks may resume their activities at any time, at the slightest lapse in vigilance. We have not seen the end of it all.

Origin, Structure of Terrorist Groups Discussed

92AF0910C Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
20 May 92 pp 1,3

[Text] Is fundamentalist terrorism the result of the suspension of the democratic process and the banning of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], as certain national figures and the French media, in particular, have said? Are the terrorist networks composed solely of activists and sympathizers of the FIS and other fundamentalist parties? What other political or financial groups are involved either directly or indirectly in the terrorist networks? How are these networks structured? Are there links between the different groups? In which regions are they located? Who are their leaders, who gives the orders?

This past Wednesday, the special forces of the ANP [People's National Army] and the national gendarmerie clashed with a group of fundamentalists in Belcourt. That same day at nearly the same moment in time, 100 km away, another clash broke out in Lakhdaria. Mere coincidence?

According to a number of accounts from the sites, confirmed by reliable sources, the fundamentalists who opened fire in Belcourt and Lakhdaria belong to the same group. They are bodyguards to FIS political leaders.

Those in Belcourt had arrived there the previous day from the Lakhdaria mountain to accompany one or several FIS officials who are on the run. The officials were to travel to Lakhdaria for a scheduled meeting with fundamentalist political leaders and terrorists. Prior information of the meeting was received and the ANP's special forces and the National Gendarmerie were dispatched to the area at dawn on Wednesday.

Thus far, many fundamentalist elements have been brought under control. Several deaths, injuries, and arrests have been reported. Some 10 other armed elements are currently on the run. The security agencies

have been unable to lay hands on the political leaders and the commanding officers of the terrorist organization.

However, it is thought that a good number of the leaders are still in the region. Even the FIS print shop is said to be located here. The security forces are maintaining pressure in an effort to locate them.

Those who see fundamentalist terrorism as the product of the outlawing of the FIS are quite mistaken. The first terrorist group to incriminate the young "djounoud" [Arabic] was dismantled in Guemmar even before the legislative elections took place.

Six years before then, the Bouiali group already existed. But the fundamentalists have been building their terrorist organization for nearly 10 years.

In fact, Makhoulfi Said, the current commander of this terrorist organization, spent 10 years training in Italy. A native of Bechar, he is a founding member of the FIS, a former journalist at EL MASSA and later editor in chief at EL MOUNKID, the author of a notorious pamphlet on civil disobedience, and an ideologist of terrorist activism. Over a 10-year period, thanks to the Italian Red Brigades (Far Left) and Prima Linea (Far Right), he became well-versed in terrorist tactics.

The terrorist organization that now exists in Algeria was built by Makhoulfi Said and other elements (who have recently been identified) shortly after the events of October 1988.

This terrorist organization resembles its Italian counterparts in structure.

Only the high command, or central cell, knows the identities of the various groups that make up the organization. There are said to be some 15 groups scattered throughout the wilayat close to Algiers. Each group is composed of three rings. First, at the center of the group, there is the inner ring whose members are known as "flingueurs" ["gunmen"].

It has from 10 to 50 members all of whom are armed and have years of training in Afghanistan. Most of them are also linked to drug trafficking and prostitution networks.

One example is the Casbah ring, one of the most active in recent weeks and now considered entirely dismantled. The group's leader, F. Ali, who was killed a few days ago, was the husband of a prostitute and one of the largest drug dealers in Algeria's central region. His house was both a safe house for wanted terrorists and a hub of drug trafficking.

The inner ring is sustained by what is known as the support ring. It has from several tens to several hundreds of members. Its task is to give direct assistance to the inner ring, in the form of weapons, money, false papers, or by hiding weapons and "gunmen."

If Lakhdaria was chosen as a refuge for FIS masterminds, it was not merely because of the secrecy it offers. The main reason is thought to have been the very large size of the support ring in this region. Nearly 1,000 fundamentalists and "Barbefelens" [FIS sympathizers in the FLN—National Liberation Front] give direct support. This group established itself here more than a year ago and is headed by Cheikh Mabrouk and Moulai Ali, the group's ideologue who was killed, weapons in hand, during the latest operation.

Building on the family relationships of certain "gunmen" and with the help of money, they managed to forge special ties to the local FIS activists.

They succeeded in going undetected for months, passing themselves off as small farmers, itinerant vendors, or even beggars.

The goal of these bodyguards is to form a resistance movement in Mitidja and Mount Zbarbar.

Finally, there is the third ring in the structure, the ring of sympathizers. Their work is mostly psychological in nature. Through the rumors they spread, they attempt to preserve the link with the ordinary citizens.

Among the sympathizers, there are those whose job is to put up posters and distribute underground leaflets. It must be pointed out that these groups do not know each other or even the leaders of the inner circles.

The head "gunmen" receive orders from the terrorist organization's high command through clean-shaven liaisons who dress in "modern" clothes.

In fact, it was by patiently tailing the liaisons that the ANP's special forces and the National Gendarmerie managed to track down the various groups and the central cell.

In the course of our inquiry, we arrived at another conclusion. Other political forces (in particular, certain FLN activists known in corrupt circles) and other financial sources (involved in major black-market dealings) had a direct role in certain cases in which policemen or their relatives were slain.

The "gunmen" as well as the other terrorists in the groups all have now been identified by the ANP's special forces and the National Gendarmerie.

Of the 224 actively sought fundamentalists, nearly two-thirds have been neutralized. Only four or five groups have yet to be destroyed.

The most difficult part in dismantling the groups will be to break the ties between their various rings. For if one ring is put out of operation, it is still possible for the group to reconstitute itself and one of its other rings will see to it.

For that reason, the security agencies have decided to abandon the distinction between "gunmen," members of

the support ring, and members of the sympathizers' ring. All forms of involvement are treated as one and the same and all are now being targeted.

The ANP's special forces and the National Gendarmerie are thus working on different fronts at once.

RPN Reportedly Stimulates Political Activity

92AF0909C Algiers EL WATAN in French
23 May 92 p 3

[Text] In the wake of the announcement by the HCE [High Council of State] of the creation of the National Patriotic Rally [RPN], a reshaping of the political landscape is taking place as opposition parties seek out partners. While some have pledged allegiance to the National Patriotic Rally, others are banding together to create joint platforms, coalitions, or other forms of alliances.

The four parties of "the coalition of enduring national values" agreed at a meeting in Algiers Thursday morning to form a "Political Confederation" composed of the parties "that are committed to enduring national values."

The leadership of the confederation's executive body has been entrusted to the chairmen of the political parties that took part in the meeting, namely the Rassemblement Algerien Boumedieniste Islamique [Algerian Islamic Boumedienist Rally], the Rassemblement Arabo-Islamique [Arab-Islamic Rally], the Parti Algerien pour la Justice et le Progres [Algerian Party for Justice and Progress], and the Front des Generations de l'Independance [Independence Generations' Front]. This last party joined the coalition on Thursday.

The participants in the meeting also agreed to set up a technical committee that will draft the confederation's internal rules and its program of action.

In addition, they approved a final declaration stating, among other things, that "the parties of the coalition reiterate their commitment to the preservation of national values and their opposition to the Franco-Communist movement." In addition, they called for "the initiation of dialogue, respect for freedom of information, and [stated that they] refuse to accept the governmental monopoly on television."

At the same time, four other parties—the Front des Forces Populaires [Popular Forces Front], the Union National des Forces Populaires [National Union of Popular Forces], the Mouvement Social pour l'Authenticite [Social Movement for Authenticity], and the Parti Algerien de l'Homme Capital [Algerian Party of Humane Values]—joined the "National Democratic Rally" which, at the time of its creation, had 12 member parties.

The National Democratic Rally (RND) announced the four parties' move to join in a press release issued on Thursday. The Rally announced that a "policy and

proposal group had been set up" with a view to "establishing contacts with the HCE to seek ways in which the RND's sponsorship committee may work with it."

The communique added that at its regular meeting of 20 May 1992, the RND discussed "problems relating to the structure, organization, and functioning of the interparty directorate, and the drafting of its by-laws and internal rules."

It should also be noted that three political parties based in Oran—the PUP (Party of Popular Unity), the PR (Republican Party), and the PRP (Progressive Republican Party)—have banded together to form the "Union of Republicans."

The announcement was made Thursday afternoon at the Timgad Hotel in Oran following a meeting among the chairmen of the PUP and the PR and a national secretary of the PUP.

A 13-point statement was issued at the close of the meeting. Its signers stressed the need "to respect fundamental liberties, to pursue the democratic process, and to make democracy a reality in acts and deeds."

The three parties also called for "the start of a national dialogue by which all parties will participate in the search for solutions to real-life problems."

Commenting on the idea of creating a national coalition as Mr. Boudiaf has done, the parties' leaders stated that they "respect the idea but feel above all that a national dialogue should take place."

Emir on Philosophy, Influence of Clandestine FIS Group

92AF0910B Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French
28 May 92 p 5

[Article by F. Akeb: "The Most Primitive Level"]

[Text] Where to begin? For young Algerians to take up a deadly cause, something must have gone wrong not only politically, but morally as well. Clashes between security forces and armed groups are more and more frequent. On both sides, apparently, the language of choice is automatic weapons fire.

The one side, although a small minority, believes that "revolt is just" while the other side believes that when a crime occurs, the criminals must be apprehended. That, too, is just. Some have repented and abandoned their weapons under a bridge in Reghaia, but that has not diminished the scope and intensity of the confrontation. Estimated to number about 300, these young Algerians—"heroic mujahidin" to some and "dangerous criminals" to others—have opted for the path that inevitably ends in conflict. Unfortunately, more will die, because the ingredients of suicide have been present for 10 years: the continuing demagogic exploitation of an institution—religion—that was held above any suspicion and eventually called to the rescue of a nation in peril;

totalitarian thinking propagated by a use of television through which lies and the omnipotence of leaders were crudely institutionalized; the abandonment of a people by a political class that developed a taste for power and money and managed to turn licentiousness into a high social value. Those ingredients could result in nothing other than crime.

B. Mustapha is one "emir" among many. The child of divorced parents, he overcame all the obstacles to complete advanced studies, obtaining a DES [advanced degree] in physics from the University of Bab Ezzouar where he attended lectures by the famous Professor Boudjelkha. Why famous? Because, after studying in the United States, Boudjelkha returned to Algeria and went to work for the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. He is said to have recruited several activists, hence the emergence of several "physicists" with close connections to Islamic circles. He is now in a security camp in the south. Boudjelkha's former student, the pale-eyed and tan-complected B. Mustapha, is dressed in military garb and a black turban. At barely 23 years of age, he is a physics teacher, having completed secondary school at the age of 16 no doubt. Naturally, he has his political views, but he claims not to belong to any political party. He belongs, he says, to all those who fight for "the word of God and his Prophet." In reality, he is a member of an organization unknown to the public until now: "Abtal El Qods" (the Heroes of El Qods). He admits that he created this tiny group during the FIS strike in 1991. Why? He ventures a fatalistic answer: "It was God's will."

After the question is repeated with some insistence, he eventually responds, "to wage a jihad [holy war] for the glory of God." Jihad? A vague term. He tries a more precise answer: "the Koran and the sword, as the Prophet said." The sword? Against whom? He lists the targets: "the army, the police, the regime's forces of repression...." Is it possible to take on those forces and with what? The impenetrable young man replies: "with the Koran." Why do they attack barracks? "To obtain weapons." The act of killing has become a banal deed made licit by the fatwas [judgments] of a few "thinkers." He cites Ibn Taymia. As for any fear of what could happen to him in the process, he calms himself with a Koranic verse and concludes that each one of us will live out his destiny anyway. "Whatever happens to us has been decided by God." He bought his gun in Oued Rhiou. From whom? From an "unknown brother." Who gave him the "brother's" address? Another fatalistic reply: "I found his address with the help of God."

He paid 8,000 dirhams for the gun. There are two other founding members, D.E. of Oued Souf, and M.B. of Chlef. When asked what brought the three of them together to found a terrorist organization, Boudjelkha's student replies, "When there is a meeting of the hearts...." Finally, he elaborates: "They are chosen for their unshakable faith." How is the organization structured? That is a secret, he declares, then goes on to say that "each emir has four members under his command."

He is an emir, i.e., a commander. He denies any membership in a political party because, he argues, "the Islamist political parties are for dialogue and dialogue is useless. Jihad is the only way...." Thus, this emir, who answers coldly without any regret or doubt about his convictions, heads up the "heroes of El Qods" who are accused of attacking the gendarmes' station in Fouka, killing one gendarme. He was arrested in Kolea.

Which books, literature, speeches, or propaganda? What explains the power of these utterances which, repeated often enough, produce a so-called "emir" ready to carry out deeds without a hint of remorse in his gaze or voice?

He, in turn, has galvanized low-level "djounoud" [Arabic] like N.S., a mason who finds it completely natural to call this man with green eyes and mat complexion his "emir." N.S. obeys his emir's orders and recognizes his authority. "He gave me the task of raising money."

The story of the "heroes of El Qods" stops here, but it raises an enormous question: Who shapes these young 20-year-olds, telling them that they can become "heroes?" Who programs them like robots, making them capable of using a gun without thinking of the consequences?

Numerous heads of state have consulted a book by Gustave le Bon who, like Machiavelli, offered advice to kings. Counseling ambitious men on the delicate art of leading the masses and holding absolute power over them, he wrote the following: "Words and phrases are great generators of opinion and belief. They have a formidable power: More men have died by them than by cannon fire." What makes a teacher of physics, an exact science, speak a language devoid of any reference to rigor? Could it be anything other than a strategy consisting of the suggestion and repetition of ideas to the point that they become "beliefs impenetrable to reason?" By what capacity to be hypnotized do young, 20-year-old men, no doubt profoundly moved by some penetrating and striking phrases, fall into line behind self-proclaimed "emirs" who believe that they, too, have a mission to fulfill on earth? Without pausing for an instant, M.B. explains that it is his duty to fight those who are not on the side of "divine law." He believes in it, and people like him who are "dominated by a certainty have no tolerance for those who do not share it." Faith, said a famous American author of detective stories, "is like a dream in solid gold." Here, faith is a new belief distilled by new prophets in the span of a decade. They have produced a mass of individuals transfixed by highly charged statements repeated over and over again. "To be sure of hitting your target, aim for the most elementary level, the most primitive level. That advice has been put to profitable use. Hitler, had he not followed it, might have remained a house painter, one supposes." And many of the recent stars of religious ideology might never have been heard of.

Countless sermons with no logical sequence or depth of thought have moved thousands to ecstatic cries and tears and transported men to such heights that they faint—an incredible sight indeed. But what is it that these atavistic-looking leaders say to fill every seat in a stadium and cause the audience to pledge allegiance to them? "We are at times surprised by the poor quality of certain speeches that have had enormous influence over mass behavior. But it must be realized that they were meant to inspire crowds and not to be read by philosophers." It is by cultivating illusions that the great movers have entranced the multitude.

Several illusions were no doubt used by the physics teacher to convince, in turn, a mason and a laborer that they could become "heroes of El Qods." With a great willingness to believe, they address him as "my Emir." As the great leaders of the world have acknowledged, simple, well-chosen sentences carry an energy against which rationalism is powerless. Other than his physics classes, what inspired M.B. before he himself became an apostle of these ideas? What is the mechanism that causes apparently normal men to relinquish themselves to an absurd passion to the point of losing their instinct of self-preservation and aspiring to martyrdom? The most disconcerting aspect of M.B.'s attitude is his absolute certainty that he can overthrow a government and establish "divine law" with a gun and a handful of activists.

Perhaps it is precisely due to the fact that clear-sightedness allows for doubt and prevents impulsiveness. It is claimed, perhaps rightly so, that it is the "half-enlightened" who at times have deeply moved the world. Language can goad or soothe. Words have a genius, a power, a seduction. It was with words, was it not, that a frail imam built up an impressive following? "I have no respect for the law!" declared Benhadj. He has made many similarly precise and radical pronouncements to crowds of followers who were captivated by the orator's unusual language. Given the public's lack of esteem for the government, the effect of those pronouncements is all the more powerful. The following remark was made by the famous German who plunged the world into war: "From time immemorial, the force that has triggered the great political or religious upheavals in history is none other than the powerful magic of the spoken word...."

How many men have bowed low in obedience to a slogan skillfully crafted and delivered? In January 1990, when a few high school students and unemployed 20-year-olds attacked the Blida courthouse, their unfathomable act left people wondering in alarm what secret motives had guided them. That was the first act of violence; those were the first enigmas. Stunned, having had no warning of anything unusual, not even the day before the deed, the parents were left deeply shaken by what their offspring had done. What propaganda were they carrying out? Who was it that had transfixed six young men, almost all of them minors, inspiring them to martyrdom? No doubt some illusion or magic words had transformed the deed into an act of glory.

Now that attacks similar to the one at Blida, killing policemen or guardsmen, have become commonplace, people are perhaps more aware that a new belief can be forged through an incessant repetition of ideas. For a decade, hateful, primitive, but effective ideas were repeated to millions of beings, some of whom have clearly succumbed to them entirely.

Poor Planning Faulted for Demographic Problems

92AF0917B Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE
in French 21-27 May 92 pp 23-24

[Article by Nasser Mouzaoui: "More Mouths To Feed or More Capable Arms?"—first paragraph is REVOLUTION AFRICAINE introduction]

[Text] Is our high rate of demographic growth responsible for the ills of our country? Not necessarily. Our problems are primarily economic in nature and therefore require an economic solution.

In the large stores, you must be among the first in line or you may not be waited on. To catch a bus, you must have strong arms or you may be without transportation to your home or place of work. Teachers must have self-control or strength of character to maintain their sanity in overcrowded classrooms. Working-age youth become discouraged as they pound the pavement in search of nonexistent jobs. The housing shortage keeps men and women from marrying. Narrow sidewalks are so crowded that it is difficult to move and even the streets quickly fill up with pedestrians, causing huge traffic jams. For nearly 10 years, the government has been sounding the alarm, warning that if Algerians do not have fewer children, they are headed for catastrophe. That, in essence, is the message conveyed through the media, public information campaigns, and even a number of films with story lines emphasizing the advantage of having no more than one or two children.

At present, about 27 million Algerians share a land area of 2,376,000 km². Are we right to think of our country as highly populated while countries 10 times smaller than ours have populations in excess of 100 million? To Mr. Bournane, general director of the Higher Institute of Administration and Planning [ISGP] at Bordj-El-Kiffan, that is to state the problem incorrectly. It could even be argued, he believes, that a high rate of demographic growth such as ours makes for a young and vigorous population. "If a country with a demographic growth rate of 3 percent a year can maintain an economic growth rate of 7 percent a year, there is no problem. But if its economy is growing at only 2 percent a year, there is a very serious and even dangerous problem," he told us. According to Mr. Bournane, curtailing the birthrate is not the solution, because those who will be looking for housing or entering the high schools and universities in

the year 2000 have already been born. To meet their future needs, we must therefore begin to prepare as of now. The only way to offset the negative consequences of soaring population growth is to improve the rate of economic growth. In his view, theories centered on aggressive policies to limit births have no chance of yielding positive results. "I do not know of a single country that has achieved spectacular results from that in the short term. A push for that type of approach is a sign of desperation."

Mr. Bournane acknowledges that Algeria is at a very critical juncture, but believes there is no reason to despair. Already, several positive signs have appeared. A few years ago, the population was growing at 3.4 percent; it has since slowed to 2.7 percent. In order to cope, the country must attain an economic growth rate of no less than 5 percent. In addition, economic growth must be evenly distributed among all Algerians and be used to build schools, hospitals, factories, etc. The principal cause of Algeria's ills is the fact that the country's economic growth of 6 percent a year for the 20 years from 1965 to 1985 was poorly managed in a way that failed to provide for difficult times. Not to mention the small number of Algerians who were able to profit handsomely by an "uneven" distribution of this fabulous economic growth, which was driven essentially by oil revenues. It was also our country's misfortune to be dependent upon foreign experts, even in key, vital areas. Algeria was wrongly advised and guided into its current impasse. "In the mid 1970's, the international experts forecast oil prices in the range of 45 to 90 dollars!" Mr. Bournane told us. The mistake was to have given credence to that forecast. At the time, the countries that bought Algerian oil were in a recession, which meant that their demand for oil would decline. "Still, the price of oil was expected to continue to climb indefinitely!!" ISGP's general director also spoke of "grossly" flawed thinking on the part of the governmental authorities of that time.

When a seller's market (in which supply lags slightly behind demand) gives way to a buyer's market (in which supply exceeds demand), a change of strategy is in order! You do not continue to seek the highest price for your product; instead, you focus on market share, and Algeria's market share is 60 billion cubic meters!" [quotation mark as published] Again according to Mr. Bournane, if Algeria had adopted an aggressive strategy aimed at market share rather than prices, it would not be its present situation. He even contends that the mistake cost Algeria some 40 billion dollars! He would conclude by reiterating his initial statement, which is that Algeria's ills must be treated with an economic remedy. Only then, perhaps, will we cease to think of a growing population in negative terms.

Indeed, every new mouth to feed also means two new arms that can provide food. But when those arms go without work, there is every reason to worry.

[Box, p 24]

The Housing Shortage

The magnitude of our population growth is visible in the housing crisis. Every year, 130,000 new marriages are registered. An equal number of new housing units should therefore be built every year. But given the existing shortage, the experts estimate that we would have to build 330,000 housing units a year for the next 10 years to improve housing conditions in Algeria. An enormous task, but there is no other solution. Social equilibrium and harmony hang in the balance.

Source: Ministry of Social Protection publication, June 1987. [end box]

Press Queries Readers on State of Nation**Student Views**

92AF0937A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
5-6 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by K. Nasri: "At Bab Ezzouar University: How To Manage"—first three paragraphs are ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

[Text] On 5 July, Algeria will celebrate the 30th anniversary of its independence. To mark this event, ALGER REPUBLICAIN is starting an inquiry among its readers, who will thus have an opportunity to express their views on the state of the nation and to offer solutions to the many problems that Algeria is facing.

While it is absolutely necessary to recall the past—its moments of glory and its failures, its progress and its retreats—to fight the cult of oblivion, the most important thing today, we believe, is to look forward, the better to build the future based on what we have learned.

To supplement the investigations, reports, and articles prepared by our editorial staff, our readers can send their contributions and testimonies to: ALGER REPUBLICAIN, "Ou va l'Algerie" (Where is Algeria Heading?), Maison de la Presse, 1, rue Bachir Attar, Place du 1er Mai, Alger.

How do you assess the first 30 years of independence? What do you think of the current situation at the university? How do you see Algeria's future? These are the questions that members of the academic community, whom we met on the Bab Ezzouar campus, attempted to answer.

Right away, most of the people we talked to stated that the country's current situation is a cause for concern. Many said that the current period is "certainly the hardest ever experienced by Algeria since 1962." Students were the most critical. Some estimated that "the country is going bankrupt"; others maintained that "Algeria is marking time and that, after 30 years, it is back to square one."

As for the workers whom we met, they were quite blunt. Stating that "the country is sick," they said that the remedy exists and that it is worth trying. They added that "Algeria has the means to overcome the multidimensional crisis it is experiencing."

Preventing Disaster

We met Mohamed and Karim on their way home, near the station; both third-year national-development students said that "during the last decade, the country has tremendously regressed in every respect and finds itself back to square one." Karim added that "currently, Algeria is threatened with stagnation."

While claiming to know nothing about politics, Samia, a student of technology, estimated that "Algeria is like a slowly sinking ship." She added: "I believe that the ship can be saved. At any rate, that is what I wish."

Concerning the historical question, Mr. A. Rachid, a union worker, mentioned two stages. The first stage, from 1965 to 1980, he said, was a period during which the country was built and the State took shape. On the subject of the university, Mr. A. Rachid said that "higher education was given special attention during this period. Large resources were made available in the hope of providing the country with skilled cadres."

The Masses and Science

Mr. A. Rachid also noted that "during this period, when the country experienced a certain amount of development, management was based far more on the mobilization of masses than on scientific, economic, and similar criteria." The second stage began in 1980, "that was the *intifadah*" he said, adding that "under Chadli, an archaic and immoral private sector emerged, which got rich at the expense of the State sector. As a result, glaring discrepancies appeared between workers who provided their efforts, and parasite wheelerdealers."

Another worker, Mr. Makhoul, a laboratory technician, also mentioned two stages. He said that "the first 15 years after independence were marked by considerable progress." At that time, he said, many measures were taken to benefit citizens. On the other hand, starting in 1980, and "especially since 1985, at the time when the State was loading entire families on trucks to send them back to their native villages, injustices began to appear." Mr. Makhoul admitted bitterly, adding that "the Algerians were thus hurt in their pride. They were divided and weakened." He did not fail to mention the university. He noted that the academic community is now divided to a huge extent by political trends. Finally, he expressed the wish that things should improve and that the university could play its true role.

Gold Rush

"We should not isolate the university from the country as a whole," Ahmed, a student of geophysics, told us, adding: "In recent years, corruption, the black market, poverty, favoritism, etc. have ravaged our country. The Chadli era brought forth fundamentalism and other society ills."

Mr. Ramdane, an administrative worker, also mentioned the post-1980 era. He said that "during the past

decade, a well-defined set of people have hoarded illicit fortunes. For these wheelerdealers, the Chadli era has been a veritable gold rush."

The eighties, he said, were also marked by the dismantling of the university. He mentioned the neglect of scientific research.

Mr. Ramdane mentioned the example of the National Office for Scientific Research (ONRS), which was "abolished in 1983 for no reason at all." He maintained that "research should be a privileged field that would be encouraged if people had a minimum of common sense." This worker deplores the decline in the university level. He said that it is certainly due to a lack of means, but "mostly to the management we had in the eighties."

Finally, the students and workers whom we interviewed all agreed that the present situation of the country is most critical. But what are the prospects? Can Algeria overcome the crisis?

What Bothers a Female Student

Mr. Rachid, the union worker, said that "as long as there is life, there is hope." Alluding to fundamentalism and regression, he said that "it's true that the danger is past, but it has not been fully eradicated yet."

He added: "We must restore the true value of work. It is imperative that democracy and transparency prevail if we are to build a modern society and, from there, a modern university."

As for Mohamed and Karim, the two national-development students, they wished that "the country should make up for lost time and that the necessary efforts be made so that Algeria could launch its development." Samia, the technology student, does not know whether the country will be able to go forward or not. She confessed: "All I know, is that we must have peace and security if we hope to live happily." She explained her position thus: "I came to the university to seek knowledge, but the unrest there has considerably disturbed me."

Trying the Thieves

For Mr. Ramdane, the problem is the following: "Those who have enriched themselves at the expense of the citizens will not hesitate to plunge the country into civil war. They will never work in the interest of Algeria." He added that "the future of Algeria belongs to future generations. Now is the time to think about the youth and about children." Concluding that the objectives to be expected are social justice and the rule of law, he said that "there is hope."

Social justice is also Makhoulouf, the laboratory technician's dream; he maintained that "all thieves must be tried." He added that "to restore the citizens' confidence, transparency must prevail." He believes that "the HCE [High State Council] headed by Mr. Boudiaf is on the right track."

For the student of geophysics, "there is no hope for Algeria if the ills of society and their corollary, fundamentalism, are not eradicated." Ahmed maintained that this is a prerequisite if the country is to get back on tracks. He concluded that we will have "to eliminate all the old responses and the old system" in order to "build a new society."

Algeria, I Love You

92AF0937B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
5-6 Jun 92 p 4

[Op-Ed contribution by Remita Chafik, Skikda: "I Love You Algeria"—first paragraph is ALGER REPUBLICAIN introduction]

[Text] ALGER REPUBLICAIN does not share some of the views expressed by our reader from Skikda, in particular her position on the HCE [High State Council] and her way of contrasting the different generations of Algerians. Nevertheless, we publish her letter in the hope that it will help "broaden the current debate on the future of Algeria, in the interest of the republic and democracy."

Whenever hope appears on the horizon, there are always people ready to darken and tarnish it.

The experience of June was not enough, nor that of December when obscurantism, populism, and demagoguery would nearly have ruined Algeria, if it had not been for the historical reaction of the true Algeria.

Yet, the lesson was quite clear: this is a fight between four poles; the first one is a project of society that is in blatant contradiction with modernity; the second, a plan to remain in power, no matter what; the third, to achieve power by any means; and, finally, the fourth, the modernistic project of the real Algeria.

The patriots are those who fight for their principles at all costs and quite openly. It so happens that this fringe is already organized in genuine parties or associations. The rest, the patriots out of opportunism or ambitiousness, are those who can be expected to swell the ranks of the future RNP [expansion not given]. And there we are, back to square one.

Algeria needs new men from the post-1962 generation, not from the pre-1962 generation who can think only of revenge, a settling of scores, a history that began before the country's independence. The youth no longer wants to be deprived again, for the umpteenth time, of its most natural right, that of eventually managing its own country, based on what it has learned at the university, not in the bush.

Beyond October, December is calling us; let's not add one more thorn on the road to modernity, the only way likely to help Algeria emerge as one of the richer nations.

There are principles to which everyone should adhere, precisely out of patriotism: establishing the State's

authority; rebuilding the country's economy; overhauling the school system; promoting and protecting culture.

Starting from that, it is not absolutely necessary to set up another rally, with State funds to boot.

There is an economic reality that we must accept with determination and courage; we need a government with a firm hand, punch, and principles to be able to face with full audacity the challenges that this century and History present to the world.

Let's put a stop to hypocrisy, to double talk. Let's us say clearly and bluntly: "We are Algerians, period." Let's drop "My revolutionary brother," "My brother in religion," the "right man in the right place," "for a better life," etc.

"Algeria, nothing but Algeria, with all its historical pride, all its social component—its Arab, Amazigh, Islamic character." Long live republican Algeria, strong like the Algeria of Masinissa, Abd-el-Kader, and Ben M'hidi.

Citizens Against Crime

92AF0937C Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
1 Jun 92 p 4

[Article signed H. M.: "Citizens Against Crime"]

[Text] After every sign of intolerance, every cry of rage, every show of force, every act of violence, every bomb, every death, most citizens would wonder with genuine anguish: where is the country heading? Distressing pictures and terrible examples of regression, made worse by a merciless crisis, further fueled pessimism. Yet, a huge number of citizens will say that the worst is over. This means that the risk of a political takeover by the fundamentalists no longer exists. A fundamentalist government would have meant the crushing of patriotic, republic, and democratic values, i.e., the negation of a fight, of a people's history and its struggles. In retrospect, we can assess the damages, waste, and obscurantist project of society that we were spared. This way of negating the values and historical gains which are a nation's framework and its base is absolute regression.

It is such regression that our people—misled, deceived, made powerless—are increasingly opposing. They nearly lost this quite ordinary right: to make each its contribution to building the country. But every cloud has a silver lining: we now know how virulent the poison might have been. Despite strong safeguards, we nearly toppled over into collective suicide, into annihilation through regression. Despite the shrieks of the temple guards who led the country into this disastrous situation, we soon became aware of the direction where the country was heading, of the dangers into which it was running. We were shouting our gut feeling: "Where is Algeria heading?"

Faithful to itself, to its calling and its traditions, ALGER REPUBLICAIN once again turns to its readers and to

the citizens concerned about the future of the Republic and of Democracy in this country, modern Algeria. For this broad debate "Where is Algeria Heading?" we are offering space in our columns. We all wish that they should be filled with their debate, food for their thoughts offered on whatever space is necessary; they have much to say.

Commentary on Society

92AF0937D Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
1 Jun 92 p 4

[Op-Ed contribution by Mr. Benaicha Affif, senior health technician in Mostaganem: "Where Is Civilian Society?"]

[Text] I am sad, deep down I am sad when I see what is going on. I wonder what crazy pathology has contaminated all Algerians, men and women, and made them sick?

Did those who rebelled against the French colonizers teach their children "the reasons for the Algerian revolution." And themselves, did they learn from their grandparents the successive struggles that took place in our motherland, and did they draw inspiration from them? It took the present stage to make us realize that we are not yet a society. Do we have a concept for a viable Algerian society project? Based on facts, we can say that most of us wish the State to aid them. As for the minority who now rise up against those who took over from the "OAS" [Secret Army Organization], those who want to revive fascism, have they not succeeded in finding some equation to prove that they are saying the truth in the face of chaos, anarchy, and the sense of what is against nature. This now prompts me to argue that those who derived their legitimacy from the people's revolution are those who bear the responsibility for our society's chaotic situation.

I would so much like our wonderful youth to understand Mr. Boudiaf's appeal concerning a "Patriotic Rally." This is not a party, as History dropouts want us to believe—these people will be the shame of our transition to the future, History shall not forget them. It was God who created the natural order of living and inert things. Let them know it.

Did these vultures have any thought for their children, tomorrow, when they themselves are gone. I would so much like to talk about man, God's creation (...).

I would like to talk about everything that concerns the mutations that our society must stride across.

Who are we, who do not have the strength to tell our brothers the truth so as to prevent self-destruction tomorrow?

Men are not wicked, but governed by their own interest... Therefore, it is not man's wickedness that we should complain about, but the ignorance of those who ruled the nation by means of the wrong laws, who always set

private interest against the general interest, until today, the soundest moral maxims have wrought no change in the mores of our nation, people, and society (...).

We can tell these hypocritical moralists, first, by the indifference with which they view the vices that destroy values and empires and, second, by the way they rage against the vices of individuals. Men are born neither good nor wicked, but capable of being good or wicked depending on whether a common interest unites or divides them.

If citizens were unable to achieve personal happiness without achieving the public good, no one would have vices but those who are mad (in the mind).

Man is shaped by his education, not just education in the ordinary sense, but all the conditions in which he lives. When a reform becomes necessary to remove the contradiction between private interest and the general interest, such a reform also requires that man transforms his conscience. We can achieve major reforms only by diminishing the people's stupid veneration for old laws or again, as was said elsewhere, by abolishing ignorance, intolerance, and obscurantism.

It is only himself that man can love in the objects of his love; it is only himself that he can like in beings of his own species.

Man can never part from himself at any instant in his life. He cannot lose sight of himself; it is always their usefulness to us, our own interest, that causes us to hate or love objects.

In his own interest, man must love his fellow men since they are necessary to his own well-being. Ethics demonstrate to him that of all beings, "the most necessary to man is man." True ethics, like true politics, strive to get closer to men in order to make them join their efforts to work for their mutual happiness.

Any code of ethics that separates our interest from that of our fellow men is wrong, insane, against nature.

To love our neighbor is to include our interest with that of our fellow men in order to work for the common good. Virtue is nothing but what is useful to men as a society. A man with no desires and no passions would no longer be a man. Perfectly detached from himself, how could he be persuaded to become attached to others? A human being indifferent to everything of his own accord, lacking any passions, and self-sufficient, would no longer be a sociable being. Virtue is nothing but the communication of what is good. Religious morals never helped make mortals more sociable.

I shall mention the example of the daily struggle of a democrat with a broad and humanist vision.

General interest, in the political sense, I am against it.

The interest of individuals in a world with well-defined rules of sociability, must yield to public interest.

But what does it mean? Isn't each individual part of the public as much as any other individual? The public interest that some attempt to personify is nothing but an abstract concept. It represents only the sum of individual interests; if it were a good thing to sacrifice the fortune of one individual to increase the fortunes of others, it would be better still to sacrifice a second one, a third one; there would be no end to it. Individual interests are the only real interests in a lifestyle based on progress, science, and tolerance, to succeed in strengthening a world where modernity [is] based on the concept of a nation that will have drawn a society project, where man will be a human being different from an animal.

M.M., a man of proven courage, you are on the right and only track for the necessary and radical transition toward the progress of civilization. Keep up the good work at ALGER REPUBLICAIN!

Disaster Prevention

92AF0937E Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
1 Jun 92 p 4

[Op-Ed contribution by Mr. Fathi Mohammed Nour, school principal in Tizi-Rached, Tizi-Ouzou wilayat: "How To Prevent Disaster"; punctuation as published]

[Text] Immediately after achieving national independence, the Algerian people, emerging from a long and bloody war, thought they would at last recover their dignity, their personality, and thus live in happiness and prosperity. Alas, it was all an illusion. In fact, a caste took over power by force, and this was the beginning of a rift that will never end (...).

...The ruling caste was selling off the country without any qualms. That was the era of the fabulous kickbacks discreetly authorized by the government, which thus enabled government officials to pad their foreign bank accounts. State property became the private property of high State officials. Theft, corruption at all levels, became common currency. The few civil servants who were honest were called counter-revolutionary.

(...) The working masses, honest citizens, were sickened, exasperated by the many injustices, by the economic failure. But what could they do? Any call for a national uprising would unavoidably have brought about civil war. Everybody knew that; everybody wanted to avoid at all costs doing anything irreparable.

The Algerians were not afraid of dying, but they did not want to make another Lebanon of their country.

The Present?

Of course, nothing has changed, the same nightmare is still going on. Life in Algeria has now become a tale of suffering. All the hopes expressed after the tragic events of October 1988 soon faded away. The country is rent; citizens, anguished. Infernal living conditions still prevail. Everybody, particularly the youth, is eager to flee

the country. Unemployment is at an all-time high, insecurity is getting worse and worse. The excessive cost of living, the scarcity of staple products on the market are exasperating the people, who no longer believe the government's reassuring political speeches. Worse still, the lack of availability of certain drugs in pharmacies and even in hospitals compounds the citizens' panic and despair (...).

That is too much! Is Algeria under a curse? The country is now tottering; any time now, it may plunge forever into an abyss.

The Future?

Without being pessimistic, I for one see a most gloomy future, unless miracle solutions are urgently found. With the government's current policy, a bloody confrontation, in other words a civil war, will become unavoidable. Let's face it: everybody is aware of, and fears the unavoidable. Let's therefore make all necessary provisions, let's rely on a flicker of patriotism to prevent a disaster (...).

For my part, considering Algeria in the midst of an economic crisis, I appeal to all Algerians, wherever they may be and whatever their social status and political may be, to agree to return to the State all the ill-gotten gains, in order to save the country. The sublime interest of the country goes before any other consideration.

Let's sweep away most current laws which are no longer relevant. Let the present Constitution be revised, amended, completed.

(...) Let's call for a "government of incorruptible men."

(...) Let's have the courage, wisdom, insight to settle once and for all the identity problem, which has lasted only too long and may be one of the main causes of the current state of crisis.

(...) Let's urgently overhaul the current destructive school system.

Let's provide bilingual teaching.

(...) Let's free the press from arbitrary censorship. Let journalists practice their profession in full freedom. Of course, the information published must be true and the facts reported real. Libel should be punishable.

Let's start an unrelenting hunt for those who squander State funds and other State property, wherever they may be (...).

Population Growth: Contributing Factors Viewed

92AF0917A Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 21-27 May 92 pp 20-22

[Article by F. Sayoud Hadi: "Population Growth Running at a High"—first two paragraphs are *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE* introduction; boldface words as published]

[Text] Since 1987, Algeria's population has grown from 23 million to 27 million. That represents an increase of 4 million people, a sizable figure, equivalent to the current population of Libya. If we maintain the same rate of growth, there will be 31.5 million Algerians in 1997—an increase of 8.5 million (equivalent to the current population of Sweden!) in the 10-year period from 1987 to 1997. That is excessive. Is the very high birthrate a boon to Algeria or a bane to the country's planning and investment programs? Opinions differ. The countries on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean are concerned. Emigration will become inevitable if we persist in our pronatalist thinking and if the economic recession continues unabated. Although they do not voice their concern outright, the loans and other types of aid they continue to grant us are indication enough.

The threat of a deepening recession raised a question in our minds: Is the high rate of demographic growth is an obstacle to Algeria's economic development? We turned to the National Office of Statistics (ONS) for an answer to that question.

Is it fair to say that demographic growth—albeit extremely high—is responsible for all the woes generated by the economic recession we are experiencing?

It is important to point out that demographic growth does not always constitute an obstacle. It becomes one when the exploitation of material resources is insufficient to sustain the growing population. That is the main tenet in the approach taken by the ONS.

It must be noted that the reproductive patterns of Algerians changed after independence. Why?

In the colonial period, the death rate equaled the birthrate, one of the consequences of the difficult conditions in which Algerians lived under colonization (deplorable health conditions, recurrent periods of scarcity, etc.)

Following independence, Algerians developed what might be termed a survival instinct in reaction to their colonial experience. As part of that reflex of self-preservation, Algerian families began to grow larger. Algerians became pronatalist and the marriage period reached its highest point, all the more so because the death rate in 1962-63, it should be noted, was 200 for every 1,000. The release of Algerians held in concentration camps, which led to a rise in the number of marriages, and the initial stages of the rural exodus made for a very high fertility rate.

The problem arose when the fertility rate reached a maximum level, posing a danger because "a rather unique 'societal process' is set in motion, giving rise to structural behaviors (in that women are recognized for their procreative role). Thought patterns will not be easy to change, particularly in view of the pronatalist message conveyed in official speeches of the 1960's and 1970's when large families were encouraged. It was part of the euphoric times of strong oil revenues. Those times created the illusion that Algeria could sustain a large population.

In fact, one cabinet minister was known to have said that **'the most effective pill is development.'** That is where the difficulties lay: After such galvanizing speeches, how could it be explained that population growth had become an obstacle to the country's development?

"No connection was drawn between the demographic question and the economic question," noted Mr. Khelladi, population director at the ONS who later added: **"The planners did not address the correlation between population and development until the demographic explosion became a reality and a tangible problem."**

But again, how can demographic growth be blamed for everything?

To some extent, it was indeed one of the causes of the economic recession, but other parameters were at work. When signs of a recession began to appear, when it was realized that social policies were costly, when social needs became qualitative instead of quantitative, it was realized that Algeria had a large population. It is true that the population was growing faster than the economy in some ways, leading the country toward social impoverishment, hence the pauperization of the latter. At that time, one of the first alarm bells sounded: the problem of housing (with its extremely high costs).

No sooner had the housing problem called out for the attention of decisionmakers, so did the demographic problem. In 1983, the cabinet approved a national program to bring population growth under control.

However, an increasingly greater natural increase (in numerical terms, obviously) was occurring, largely due to the serious effort waged in the 1980's to bring down mortality. The mortality figures fell sharply, and to a large degree, this decrease in mortality explains the demographic explosion, as the number of births did not fall as rapidly. (It is difficult indeed to change behavioral patterns overnight.) Births were decreasing, albeit slowly, thanks partly to generalized schooling for the female population and the positive impact of a certain level of knowledge acquisition on population control. Another factor was at work: delayed marriages. Algerians were marrying later in life, although not in fewer numbers.

To return to economic matters, certain problematic phenomena appeared in connection with the economic recession—among them, unemployment, which is fueled by an increasingly selective education system. (The number of young people eliminated from further studies has swollen the ranks of first-time job seekers to 200,000 at a time when not even 2,000 new jobs can be created.) And so it is that demographics can cause social impoverishment. The political will to control population growth was needed as of the 1970's when the first four-year plan was drafted. There will be 33 million Algerians in the year 2000 and the problems will be that much more difficult to overcome.

In educational matters, the number of children entering primary school is, in theory, expected to begin to decline as of 2001. As of 2005, fewer schools are to be built, which will enable us to turn our attention more fully to the quality of education.

All of these things are interrelated. The economic recession is a web of interconnected factors. Of course, demographic growth is one of the most preponderant factors of social impoverishment. As an illustration, it is less costly for our country to administer a birth spacing program than to support 800,000 pregnancies. The ONS' population director, Mr. Khelladi, states that **"there is no economic solution to a demographic problem. The response must be a demographic one."** There is an urgent need to integrate the **"demographic variable"** that consists of several parameters: birth, death, and marriage rates as well as the completed fertility rate (the number of children born to a woman during her child-bearing years). Moreover, a population policy is not merely a demographic policy. It must also address such questions as the social environment (leisure activities, day-care centers, schools, housing, etc.). It all comes down to deciding what type of society we want to live in. (We could easily run the population up to 50 million, but what sort of life would we have?)

To put matters into perspective, it can be said that developed countries will double in population in 100 years on average, whereas Algeria's population takes only 22 years to double in size.

Given its rising demographic tide, will Algeria be able to afford to keep up its spending for such social programs as education? A major problem also arises with regard to production: One-fifth of Algeria's foreign exchange earnings goes to import food that we ought to be producing ourselves.

For that matter, recourse to importation must be given to other items that are more difficult to produce as this, too, constitutes a damper on the country's economy. An illustration can be found in agricultural output per hectare, which is not what it was in 1966. In the 1960's, in fact, the output of one hectare was enough to sustain one individual. Now, for every Algerian, 0.3 hectare is farmed, which means that agricultural production has fallen to a deplorable level at a time of greatest need. The agricultural problem is thus one of the most revealing factors of the economic recession. But it is not too late. The demographic problem, like the agricultural problem must be tackled. A common effort is required if all these problems are to be solved.

First, the population as a whole must be sensitized to the problems. The common effort must address all fields and be given full priority. In addition, thought patterns must change. If they do not, we run the risk of a serious social imbalance.

One has merely to look at the average number of occupants per room, which now stands at a level bordering on indecency. That is a human problem, first of

all, and second, an economic problem. Again, Mr. Khelladi emphasizes the close interrelation between the demographic problem and the education problem. He believes that we are seeing a larger but unskilled population come into being, and the fault lies with the deplorable education system.

At the risk of repetitiousness, it must be emphasized that all things are closely interrelated. Piecemeal or short-lived responses to the problems of existence will yield nothing as they must be addressed as a whole. In Mr. Khelladi's view, **"economic recovery will not come about unless demographic growth is brought under control."** The demographic problem is real and requires that an **"aggressive"**, dynamic, and effective agency be set up to deal with it.

At a minimum, there should be a population ministry, possibly associated with the health ministry. The lack of any agency responsible for demographics in Algeria is to some extent an impediment to population control.

In more general terms, the factors contributing to the economic recession are interconnected in one way or another. Thus, the environment, the economy, education, and social "structures" all have a choke-hold on development and constitute obstacles to the economy. A wide-scale awareness campaign must be undertaken. We must again recognize the schools for the important role they have to play and make family planning instruction more widespread than ever in the education system. Coordination must therefore be ensured at all levels if the economic and demographic problems are to be solved.

The rate of population growth has fluctuated:

Table 1: Natural Increase of the Resident Population (1985-90)
(corrected data)

Year	Live Births	Deaths	Natural Increase
1985	864,000	183,000	681,000
1986	781,000	165,000	616,000
1987	800,000	161,000	639,000
1988	806,000	157,000	649,000
1989	755,000	153,000	602,000
1990	775,000	151,000	624,000

Infant mortality has fallen while general health has improved:

Table 2: Infant Mortality Rates (1985-90)
(per 1,000 inhabitants)

Year	Males	Females	Total
1985	80.00	76.57	78.30
1986	73.08	68.25	70.71
1987	66.76	61.98	64.42
1988	62.63	58.03	60.37
1989	61.89	55.40	58.10
1990	59.98	55.46	57.76

The number of marriages has continued to grow and the demand for housing along with it:

Table 3: Registered Marriages

Year	Number
1985	123,688
1986	128,802
1987	137,624
1988	139,935
1989	147,250
1990	149,345

IRAQ

Strengths, Weaknesses Assessed During Visit

92AF0888A Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French
21-27 May 92 pp 16-17

[Article by B. Faycal: "Iraqi Hands for the Iraq of Tomorrow"—first paragraph is ALGERIE ACTUALITE introduction]

[Excerpts] Iraq does not need any more tears; it needs lines of credit to save its people from poverty. That is also where solidarity begins.

The road that leads from Damascus to Baghdad is no longer the natural straight line that directly linked two peoples with the same destiny. The road now takes a long detour via Jordan, not as a consequence of the bloody and destructive victory by the "coalitions" that the United States drove into battle against Iraq but—as we bathe in the magnetic local atmosphere—as a consequence of the Arab-Islamic capitulation to Western totalitarianism and its avowed desire to vampirize this entire petroleum-rich region. [passage omitted]

It is 1500 hours on 29 April. The bus that has been provided to take the delegation to the Jordanian border is waiting; we had not been deceived. Who is paying for the trip? Mr. K. "Thanks, and also bravo": the "caravan to Baghdad" can finally get under way. Passports and visas OK; no problem. The representative of our embassy in Amman is facilitating our trip to customs, where an Iraqi bus has been waiting for us since the day before. The serious aspect of the mission is taking over again. At nightfall our bus sets out on a Jordanian road. Eighteen hours of asphalt separate us from Baghdad.

All during our nocturnal journey through the Hashimite lands we are soothed by the voice of Oum Keltoum. The driver plays for us, alternately and obstinately, *Daret el ayam* and *El atlat* (*The Ruins*). The fellow's choice is certainly no accident: he has 10 other cassettes within arm's reach. I even believe it is the Iraqis' initial message to the Algerian delegation.

Halfway to our destination we meet an unbroken column of dozens of tanker trucks moving at high speed. Our Iraqi "guide" breaks his silence. "These trucks," he says, "are our new pipeline that the United Nations has allowed for our survival. We are exchanging our oil for medicines and food products. But it is not enough."

Actually, history tells us that this opportunity "offered" to Baghdad by the United Nations is the fruit of a secret accord in which the principal condition was the dismantlement of the Iraqi research center—one of the most modern in the world, according to an American scientist of Palestinian ancestry who is a member of the UN control commission. History also tells us that when the United Nations ordered the Iraqis to destroy the center, one of the Iraqis had this response: "We built this scientific edifice. If it must now be destroyed, you will have to do it. We are a nation of builders, not destroyers." That is what happened, and the center was razed only two months ago.

Jordan is, in actual fact, Iraq's only remaining opening to the world. The kingdom is prospering in the shadow of the embargo against Iraq. In the space of several months Jordan has become an immense transit zone for merchandise of all types—a roundtable for trade between Baghdad and the rest of the world. Without really being one, the Hashimite kingdom has taken on the appearance of a fiscal paradise where foreign companies, including American firms, find they have available a complete range of fictitious and dummy corporations

domiciled in Amman. For the time being, Jordanian dynamism and well-balanced economic liberalism are taking care of the Iraqis' business interests. In any event, few Third World countries can offer as many guarantees as Jordan.

Everything in the kingdom is organized perfectly. You have a king who is respected if not appreciated; a trustworthy banking system; a stable population; a clean [preceding word in English] capital city; no robberies; no trabendo; no black market in foreign exchange; no shortages; controlled urban planning; and something that does no harm to have: a cultural life. It is a far cry from the political disorder in Algiers!

It is very early on the morning of 30 April, and we are at the gates of Iraq. We already have a first impression: the customhouse is impeccably maintained, an indication of an authoritarian state. We get our second impression when we take the freeway to Baghdad: it is a veritable carpet of asphalt—a harbinger of a people who are standing tall. It is useless to hark back to the thousand and one feats accomplished by the Iraqis in rebuilding the foundations of their country in such a short time (see the special feature on Iraq in *ALGERIE ACTUALITE*, No. 1378), except for these supplementary explanations that were given us with conviction by an engineer from the Bridges and Highways Department. "After every bombing," he said, "people would go to the site to evaluate the damage sustained by a particular building and start work on the reconstruction plan immediately. All these studies made while the bombs were falling enabled us to gain a great deal of time. At the end of the war everyone was at his work station, which had not been the case previously. We discovered that we had within ourselves a store of tremendous abilities and energy. All leaves were canceled. We worked hard 24 hours a day to restore the water, electricity, and vital means of communications.... These accomplishments quickly bore fruit, because the fussy prewar bureaucracy that was in the habit of dragging things out was gone. We finally realized that we had been depending to a very great extent on foreign companies, which, in point of fact, had put us under their control. I hope we are now definitely convinced that the Iraq of the future will be shaped by Iraqi hands."

As if to encourage the young man, my wealthy entrepreneur companion cites the case of the rebuilding of Germany and Japan despite the ravages caused by World War II. The bright-eyed engineer agrees, but adds an important detail. "Germany and Japan," he observes, "were not subjected to a worldwide embargo such as the one we are experiencing. Quite the contrary: immediately after the end of the war the entire West mobilized to participate in the reconstruction of those two countries...." Iraq is only a country of the South, and Arab to boot. That's the whole story!

The contacts between our businessmen and their Iraqi counterparts are made two hours after our arrival at the Hotel Al Rasheed (you are surely there, Peter Arnett and

CNN), where we are staying. The Iraqi officials, who leave nothing to chance, have taken over the planning for our stay and for the meetings among the businessmen, undoubtedly after taking the measure of the head of the Algerian trade delegation and his negligence. The quality of the welcome accorded the Algerians has everywhere been outstanding, even though the president of the Iraqi chamber of commerce officially confirmed that he was surprised to learn of the presence in Baghdad of Algerian manufacturers of such high caliber. Moreover, our hosts would learn the following day at the Ministry of Agriculture that in addition to Mr. K, the delegation they were expecting was composed of presidents of professional and social organizations, as attested by the list of delegates.

With the decks cleared for action, the major private and public businessmen were invited to open negotiations with their Algerian counterparts "within the context of the UN resolutions," or failing that, to exchange information with a view to learning more about the needs of both sides and the products they can offer.

We quickly discovered that the Iraqis had no idea of what the Algerians produced. The interest that they freely displayed—throughout the negotiations—in the production capacity of the Algerian enterprises foreshadows the future establishment of a vast potential area of trade between the two countries. In the immediate future, Iraq's primary concern is to supply itself with food and medicines. Its children—especially in the southern part of the country—continue to die from malnutrition and a lack of health care.

The shortage of new money—because of the freezing of Iraq's financial assets abroad—has forced the Baghdad regime to strip the country of a great part of its financial prerogatives. The private sector has been asked to find dollars by any means and at any exchange rate. The parallel market is flourishing; huge fortunes are being made "legally" in a matter of a few weeks, and inflation is at more than 4,000 percent! Officially, one Iraqi dinar [DI] is worth \$3.00; in practice, \$1.00 is exchanged for 14 DI's. When you realize that the average salary of an engineer is 6 00 [as published] DI's and that of a worker 300 DI's, you can calculate the extent of the social disaster that is impacting the working classes.

Nevertheless, contrary to the expectations of the Westerners—who still dream of an anti-Saddam social explosion—the Iraqis have never appeared to be so united in their solidarity. They vow incessantly that they will not forget tomorrow all those who are aiding them—even symbolically—to hold out at this crucial moment in their long history.

The Saddam enigma remains intact. A young man of 25 who is already a veteran of the Gulf war and is now demobilized—thousands of them have been—raises one corner of the veil. "As you can see," he says, "I am unemployed and am forced to travel to Jordan to sell these five cartons of cigarettes, so that I will not have to

beg. I therefore have nothing to gain by defending Saddam, but in addition to his suicidal stubbornness in the Kuwaiti affair, the Rais [Saddam] has revealed certain bitter truths to the Arab peoples. One, the dislocated Arab and Muslim peoples are no more than toys in the hands of the Westerners; two, the West will never allow an Arab country to develop and will always employ the policy of double standards, inasmuch as Israel continues arrogantly to occupy Arab lands without provoking a United Nations "desert storm"; and three, the economic and cultural backwardness of the Arab-Muslim 'Umma is very profound. There you have the real catastrophe; it is not Saddam...." This opinion—with only a few nuances—is widely held in Iraq.

It is the day before our departure, and the Iraqi manufacturers and businessmen have invited our delegation to a farewell dinner at an inn that dates back to the year 1309 [1930]. Haroun El Rasheed spent one night there. They ask us about Djamilia Bouhired. They recall November 1954 with the same emotion as in the old days, to the rhythm of the local folkloric music—and then suddenly we hear a Kabyle tune that was brought here decades ago by some unknown caravan....

Prospectuses are exchanged, options are taken, appointments are made for the very near future, and friendships are born. The Algerian trade mission leaves Baghdad with a heavy heart and a feeling of "mission accomplished"....

Pre-War Oil Levels Said Several Years Away

92AE0440A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
4 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by Riyadh Miqdadi: "Petroleum Analysts Say Iraq Unlikely To Regain Former Production Levels Before 1995-1996"]

[Text] Petroleum analysts have doubts about the veracity of Iraqi official statements that it has regained most of its pre-Gulf war oil production capacity. The analysts say that it would take a long time to repair the extensive damage suffered by Iraqi petroleum installations during the war, and that the lack of regular maintenance and the shortage of equipment and spare parts will keep Iraq from regaining its former production capacity for several years to come. Mahdi Faradi, petroleum analyst with Kleinwort, Benson Ltd. Securities in London, said that technical and technological factors prevent Iraq from resuming full oil production capacity before 1995 or 1996. Without equipment, spare parts, and technology—which Iraq can not procure because of the UN-imposed embargo on Baghdad—it will not be possible to maintain or repair the installations that were damaged in the war, or those that have been closed due to Iraq's inability to export crude oil since the invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990.

Oil analyst Robert [Shapiro] says: "Forecasts by Iraqi officials were received with incredulity in oil circles, considering the continued Kurdish control of northern

regions, which hold some of the country's richest and most productive oil fields, and the heavy damage suffered by the oil industry during the war, not to mention the technical difficulty of repairing those installations and the long time entailed."

Shapiro believes that Baghdad's overstated production forecasts have two objectives. The first falls within the large-scale information campaign waged by the Iraqi media since the end of the Gulf war to publicize the successes of rehabilitation efforts. The second objective is to prepare for the next OPEC meeting, at which Iraq is expected to seek approval for a high production quota as it gets ready to re-enter the oil market once the embargo is totally or partially lifted. He pointed out that, during the recent OPEC meeting, Iraqi Oil Minister Usamah al-Hiti sought unsuccessfully to append an addendum to the final resolution, in which the member states would pledge to reduce production in order to make room for Iraqi output once the embargo is lifted.

Mahdi Faradi says: "Even though Iraq's production capacity exceeds estimated current production by about 500,000 barrels per day [bpd] (most of it for local consumption, even though limited quantities are exported overland to Jordan), this capacity certainly continues to be way below the figures quoted by Iraqi officials." "Should the international embargo be lifted and Iraq allowed to import badly-needed equipment and spare parts, it would still take it three to four years to reach its former capacity of 3.5 million bpd," he explained.

Discussing Iraq's export potential, Faradi said that "the progress of talks between Iraq and the UN indicates that Iraq will definitely not be able to re-enter world markets this year. Its exports would be limited, even if it agreed to UN conditions and were able to return to the market in the first half of next year. Resuming crude exports will be further hindered by the limited export capacity of al-Bakr port, considered Iraq's main export outlet on the Gulf, and by the continued closure of the pipelines connecting Iraq's northern and southern oil fields with the Red Sea via Saudi Arabia, and with the Mediterranean via Turkey and Syria."

The Iraqi media had recently published a series of statements asserting that Iraqi production capacity has risen to more than 2 million barrels, and that it is now a "matter of months" before Iraq reaches its pre-war production levels. Officials in the Iraqi Ministry of Petroleum stated that oil field surveys show that the country's production capacity is 2.3 million bpd, of which 800,000 bpd are produced by the northern fields and 1.5 million bpd in the southern fields.

While the acting general manager of the Southern Petroleum Company said recently that his company alone can produce 1.5 million bpd, Minister of Petroleum Usamah al-Hiti emphasized that, if it reached agreement with the UN, his country would be able to export up to 1 million

bpd from al-Bakr port within six weeks, increasing that to 1.6 million bpd by the end of this year.

Fayiz Shahin, undersecretary of the Ministry of Petroleum, said that al-Bakr port is ready to export at a capacity of 800,000 bpd, rising to 1.6 million bpd when repairs on a fourth platform are completed by next July.

It is to be noted that Iraq is still negotiating with the UN on a plan that would allow Baghdad to sell \$1.6 billion worth of petroleum over six months, under UN supervision, provided that the proceeds are used to finance Gulf war reparations, reimburse deficit-ridden UN agencies operating in Iraq, and pay for Iraq's food and medicine imports. Baghdad has thus far rejected the plan, describing it as "undermining its sovereignty."

Zionism Said Damaging to Arab-East Europe Ties *92AE0404A Baghdad AL-IRAQ in Arabic 9 May 92 p 3*

[Commentary by 'Abd-al-Ghaffur Karim 'Ali, Political Sciences Department, Baghdad University]

[Text] In the last quarter of 1989, internal and international changes swept the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The effects of these changes have transcended the geographical boundaries of the Soviet Union and East Europe, extending to many countries of the world. Their effects on the Arab region are reflected in these countries' passive attitude toward large-scale Jewish immigration to "Israel" and their position on the 30-state aggression against Iraq, which, in one way or another, has left its marks not only on Iraq, but on the entire Arab nation.

In this article, we will attempt to respond to specific questions concerning: new factors in Arab relations with the former communist countries of East Europe following the changes which occurred in these countries after the 1989 Malta summit; the nature of U.S. and Israeli ambitions; the reasons for the growing immigration of Jews to Israel from the former Soviet Union and the East European countries; and finally the direct effects of these changes on Iraq against the backdrop of the "Arab Gulf crisis," and the linkage of that crisis to the regional and international situation after the crisis exploded and America and its allies committed an aggression against Iraq.

The Role of Zionism in the Changes Which Occurred in East Europe

In an earlier stage of the liberation-awakening movement in the Arab world, Arab bonds of cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union and the East European countries became strong. They even assumed a strategic character with respect to many Arab countries, including Iraq. The Soviet Union and East European countries became the principle supplier of weapons [to the Arab world]. Economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation grew uninterruptedly. In these relations, the East European countries provided a great deal of assistance to

strengthen Arab national security against imperialist and Zionist challenges. They also provided technical expertise for building the Arab industrial base.

A significant portion of the weapons provided by the East European countries to the Arab nation was intended to enable it to establish a legitimate defense against the Zionist threat and repeated Zionist aggressions against the Arab countries. This indicated the clear-sightedness of the former Soviet Union and the East European countries, given that the Zionist entity is an advance base for U.S.-led international imperialism, which goes beyond the Arab nation's borders. That period saw intense attacks by imperialism and Zionism against the Arab nation under the cover of numerous slogans, the most salient being "resisting the communist threat" and "stopping the spread of communism." The United States strove to establish a broad military-political alliance extending from Israel to Pakistan and embracing several Arab countries. The alliance's main mission was to eliminate Arab liberation movements on the pretext that they posed a "threat" to U.S. allies. This deepened the confrontation between the socialist camp and the imperialist countries led by the United States and the international Zionist movement, all of which was reflected in the cold war.

Shortly after WWII ended and its consequences began to take shape, Zionism began to focus on the East European countries as follows:

1. In 1957, several forces in Hungary attempted to eliminate the communist regime there. Zionist groups, including a number of prominent Communist Party and government leaders, led a new movement calling for renewal, reform, and development by benefitting from past errors. Their goal was to reach the apex of power and destroy the communist regime.

2. After Israel attacked the Arab countries on 5 June 1967 and the socialist bloc countries (except Romania) severed diplomatic relations [with Israel], the Zionists intensified their campaign against the communist program. Zionism spread a climate of protest in the East European countries, which engendered the "refusenik" phenomenon. Jewish communities throughout the world instigated the pillorying of communist regimes. Human rights violations were raised as a pretext for permitting Jewish immigration to the Arab territories occupied after the 1967 aggression in an attempt to augment the Jewish population of those territories.

3. Zionism used the efforts of all Zionist organizations in the world to bring international pressure to bear on the East European countries. After Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it shifted its attention to inflaming conditions in Poland, which knew the greatest rebellion in its political life in the Solidarity Organization, which indicated, in subsequent events, that the loyalty of the majority of Jews in the East European countries to Zionism and "Israel" is greater than their loyalty to their countries and to the socialist system. This [Zionist influence] was

confirmed by the [the East European countries'] positions on Arab issues following the events in 1989, especially [the positions of] those countries in which Jews are present in large numbers, e.g. Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary.

4. The Zionists did not form armed gangs in the East European countries. Rather, they infiltrated the leadership of ruling regimes by feigning loyalty. They remained hidden from sight until an opportunity presented itself to them to infiltrate the government. This is what happened after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which foreshadowed the collapse of communism. Zionism used dissimulation, political agitation, and deception. It promoted the slogan of antisemitism to achieve its goals in the East European countries.

5. The above-mentioned events clearly show that Zionist infiltration of important positions in the East European countries played a primary role in weakening those countries' relations with the Arab countries. Moreover, Zionism seized a favorable opportunity to exploit the accumulation of mistakes in the performance of communist governments to assail those regimes, e.g. Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1968 and 1981. Some documents disclose that Zionism had a prominent role in these events.

Zionism also collected important espionage information from Western and U.S. intelligence agencies. Those agencies had previously supplied it with some unofficial information on social and economic conditions and with precise analyses of military organizations and security agencies in the East European countries. International Zionism also exploited weaknesses in the communist experiment to make the former communist countries openly vulnerable to currents of protest and dissent, inciting popular discontent and provoking disturbances in order to carry out its aims in those countries.

Many factors caused the collapse of the socialist camp. International Zionism contributed a significant share of them. The dynamics of events made Zionism an influential element in subsequent international developments. These dynamics benefitted Israel. The restoration of Israel's relations with most of the East European countries which had severed those relations in 1967 granted Israel greater political opportunities. These developments caused the East European countries to take positions on political issues fundamental to the Arab nation which are at variance with their pre-1967 positions; e.g., their positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the legitimate rights of Palestinians, evidenced by the fact that the vast majority of the [Jewish] immigrants from East Europe and the Soviet Union were settled in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan. The positions of the East European countries also became clear regarding the "Gulf crisis," both before it erupted and after the fighting ended and the United Nations initiated a peaceful settlement pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 687, which Iraq committed itself to implement in its entirety.

The Role of Zionism in Changing the Direction of Arab Relations with the East European Countries

Iraqi diplomacy has been active in building well-developed relations with the East European countries based on mutual interests and respect, self-determination, and the free choice of social system—even in the light of the changes which have occurred in these countries. It has done so in order to cultivate their collaboration on Arab causes in general and the Palestinian cause in particular. However, Zionism has endeavored to compel the East European countries to curb their cooperation with Arab countries, especially regarding arms and the training of technical cadres. They [the East European countries] have begun to impede the freedom of action and movement of the Arab emigre community, especially Palestinians, which has weakened the morale of the Palestinian intifadah. The media in the East European countries have sided with "Israel" in waging a psychological war against the Arabs as a result of the Zionist infiltration into the main nexus of the East European media.

International Zionism has exploited the collapse of the Berlin Wall to attack the Arabs. It has claimed that the East German authorities, which built the wall to reinforce a state of enmity and alienation, were compelled by the weight of circumstances and changes brought on by perestroika to open the doors and destroy the wall. Zionism has called for the destruction of the "Berlin Walls" in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israel. It claims that destroying them has become necessary to keep pace with reality. Through rumors and leaflets, Zionist propaganda incite reactionary elements in the Arab world to destroy these barriers and walls in order to:

1. Compel the Arabs to submit, surrender, and concede their rights to the Zionist will.
2. Spread a state of impotence in the Arab nation.
3. Influence Iraq's unbending will and prevent it from developing its capabilities.
4. Defeat the morale of the Arab Palestinian people inside the occupied territories.

Thus, Zionist propaganda media in "Israel" and the East European countries attempted to fan the fire of war in the Arab Gulf to destroy Iraq's capabilities and curb its political-military role in the Arab-Zionist struggle. In this way, they hoped to generate a lack of confidence in the Arab armed forces on all confrontation fronts with "Israel"—after Iraq's removal from the confrontation sphere, and after Egypt's actual removal based on the "Camp David" agreement it signed in 1978—to permit Israel to obtain a peace settlement based on its strategic interests and those of its ally, the United States.

The East European governments' support of the American aggression preceded the events of 2 August 1990. The East European countries completely changed their

positions on Arab national causes and the Palestinian problem after they restored their relations with "Israel." We maintain that they were aware of the fact that the aggression against Iraq bore no relation to the issue of Kuwait, but was rather a confrontation between the Arab nation's liberation forces and the new designs of the United States and "Israel," after the unfolding of events in the former Soviet Union and East Europe.

Health Minister Reports on Medical Shortages

92AE0420A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
19 May 92 p 4

[Article by Tariq al-Jabburi: "Health Minister Says Health Situation Suffers From Severe Drug, Medical Supplies Shortage"]

[Text] On 18 May 1992, the National Assembly continued its sessions in its spring term, with Assembly Chairman Sa'di Mahdi Salih presiding. During this session, assembly members and Umid Midhat Mubarak, the minister of health and acting minister of labor and social affairs, reported on the visit by a joint team of members of the Committee on Islamic Awqaf [endowments] and Religious and Social Affairs, and the Committee on Health and Citizen Affairs to several health institutions. The team's meetings with various health workers were also reported.

The report included an evaluation of the health situation since the brutal attack on our country, as well as an evaluation of the reconstruction campaign, identifying its pluses and minuses, and offering certain proposals to share in developing the health situation.

Umid Midhat Mubarak, the minister of health and acting minister of labor and social affairs, who was received in open session by the National Assembly, stated: "Our health situation still suffers from a severe shortage of drugs and other medical requirements, because of the oppressive blockade imposed on our country. Assistance from humanitarian organizations only covers 10 percent of our country's total health needs. Therefore, we have relied on the available stockpile and this meager assistance."

He added that "the majority of our hospitals were destroyed or damaged as a result of the aggression. Moreover, 337 health centers were destroyed or damaged, aside from the treasonous sabotage and looting that followed the aggression. The result was the destruction of the medical system in our hospitals and medical centers, which the criminals have been unable to plunder. For these reasons, in addition to the accompanying paucity of vaccines, the unavailability of medical treatment for certain diseases, and the environmental pollution caused by the inoperative sewage system while electricity was cut off because of the bombing of power generating stations, hepatitis has increased 12 times. Furthermore, some diseases have reappeared after they had been eliminated in Iraq. For example, we have 862 cases of infantile paralysis recorded in our statistics, in

addition to other cases that have not been recorded because they were not referred to health centers by relatives of the victims. Last year, 1,260 cases of cholera were recorded, in addition to typhoid and chronic diseases whose victims, because of the blockade, have not received adequate treatment. This has led to many complications and deaths among children and the elderly."

The minister of health stressed that, despite all these difficulties, "We have been able to pool our efforts and health resources, the military manufacturing sector, and the ministries of industry and oil, to provide certain alternatives and maintain some medical equipment. Consequently, we have improved our services to the public."

Concerning pay and incentives, the minister of health said that the ministry, in light of the president's orders, is preparing a study to increase salaries for doctors and health professionals, which will be submitted in the near future. A committee has been formed to reorganize the incentives. Forums will be held with those concerned in this field.

To a question on why the law to protect against radiation has not been applied in certain provinces, the minister replied that the allowances have been restored to workers in this field and their working hours reduced.

Concerning expired medicines, the minister stressed that investigations were underway in order to hold the negligent persons accountable. The investigation's results will be submitted as soon as the evaluation is completed and the violations committed have been specified.

With regard to the shortage of laboratory materials and antibiotics, the minister of health stated that our enemies, led by the United States, Britain, and France, are still insisting on imposing their blockade on materials like these on non-scientific pretexts. This imposes an oppressive and considerable danger, since it includes even basic anesthetics for use in operations.

In conclusion, the minister answered several questions from National Assembly members. Through those assembly members, he urged citizens to cooperate with the Ministry of Health and inform it of any negative incidents that they might find in certain health institutions.

Agricultural Reports in Press

Minister Speaks on Harvest

92AE0431A Baghdad ALIF BA in Arabic
27 May 92 pp 16, 17

[Statements by Iraqi Agriculture Minister 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud al-Sabbagh]

[Text] In the country's governorates, the biggest campaign for harvesting wheat and barley has begun, for which the government has earmarked money. For the

first time, the committee overseeing the harvest campaign has relied upon the transport of more than 150 harvesters between the northern and southern provinces, distributed throughout most of the southern provinces; all needs are being supplied to them to realize the success of the harvest campaign this season.

Mr. 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud al-Sabbagh, minister of agriculture and irrigation and president of the committee overseeing the wheat and barley crop harvests in the mechanical and hand-harvesting campaign, has spoken to ALIF BA of the great crop harvest in the southern and central provinces. He confirmed the wish of President Commander Saddam Husayn that this campaign should be completed as quickly as possible to secure food and satisfy the country's needs, thereby foiling the blockade imposed upon our country. He referred to the incentives that the government had generously bestowed on all the committees throughout the country. In his statement, the minister called for the utilization of all means to make the campaign succeed on time, for the assurance of means to hasten completion of the harvest and marketing the wheat and barley crops in all provinces, by utilizing all their energy and exploiting all their efforts to bring in the crops. He added:

"The constant and ongoing blockade of our country by our enemies is part of the chain of conspiracy that requires everyone, peasants and farmers, to work with exceptional and unconventional dedication, far above the routine, to bring in the crops and market them to the special centers, and to pay the peasants and farmers in cash." He pointed out the importance of providing all the necessary requirements—trucks, harvesters, fuel, spare parts, and sacks—to the harvest and marketing campaign.

Speaking of the ministry's preparations for receiving the harvest, the minister said:

"The ministry has tried to secure most available requisites needed for the harvest, such as spare parts for the harvesters, and establishing a schedule for transporting the harvesters from one province to another, according to the degree of readiness, ripeness, and priority of the crop. This is happening for the first time in the country. The hand-harvest campaign has begun in the southern provinces for small cultivated areas, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation has urged the farmers to make exceptional efforts for the success of this season's harvest. A working program for the supreme and chief committees in the provinces has been put in place, in order to oversee and follow up the transport of harvesters between provinces, exploiting the time differences in the various provinces' harvests.

"However, there are incentives put in place by the chief committees for the success of the committees' work. They include distributing free spare parts for harvesters to their owners, and transporting harvesters from one province to another. The Public Institute for Mechanical

Industries sent two grain separators for repair, one for the northern provinces and the other for the southern provinces, with the aim of repairing the harvesters [as published]. The provincial governors have been ordered to rent means of transportation to move the harvesters and follow up the harvest campaign."

Speaking of the present agricultural season and the harvest campaign, the minister said:

"The results of the present agricultural season hint at an excellent crop because of the great efforts of the agriculture and irrigation offices in the provinces to provide necessities such as seeds, fertilizers, and suitable quantities of water, etc. This is in cooperation with all the agencies implementing the plan for the harvest, marketing, and making the decision to increase grain prices, which are compensatory prices. They increased from 700 to 2,250 Iraqi dinars for prime-quality wheat, and to 2,000 dinars for other grades, and for barley, from 500 dinars to 1,000. What is expected of the branch committees in all the provinces is to work on the grain harvest and marketing in all areas. These [grains] will feed the citizens, each according to his province. Receiving centers and the administrative, accounting, and technical foundation of these centers have been secured, and work on them is ongoing."

The minister explained, "There are special incentives for peasants and farmers who sell large quantities of their wheat and barley harvests, as well as honors for the outstanding provinces and employees in this field. There is a supply of seeds and fertilizers to peasants and farmers to meet their needs, at subsidized prices, for the next agricultural season."

He said that the cabinet had given the minister of agriculture and irrigation the leadership of the Harvest Committee, and the leadership of Marketing Committee to the minister of commerce, through the formation of chief committees for the harvest campaign in the provinces. The chief committees are headed by the minister and include the director of the Agriculture and Irrigation Branch, an official of the Local Federation of the Farmers' Cooperative Societies, and an official of the Petroleum Products Distribution Company Branch.

Mr. 'Abd-al-Sattar Sulayman, deputy minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, spoke of the means to transport harvesters from one province to another, and the measures that agricultural offices had taken in this regard:

"The harvesters are transported among the provinces to benefit from the surplus numbers of harvesters in the provinces of Ninawa and al-Ta'mim, in which the harvest season comes late, to support the situation of the central and southern provinces, in which the harvest comes early. Members of the branch committees made field visits to the provinces with the aim of seeing the obstacles on the ground and overcoming them, seeing the benefits from initiatives, and the effort to spread the initiatives. The committees earmarked 150 harvesters

from Ninawa Province to distribute in Diyala (50 harvesters), Salah-al-Din (50), al-Anbar (30), and Babil (20). Fifty harvesters were earmarked and sent to Maysan Province from al-Ta'mim.

"The committee granted incentives and privileges to the owners of the harvesters to be transported, such as the ministry's taking on the transport costs, and incentives such as free spare parts and tires, worth 1,600 dinars.

"Harvester owners were given priority in getting new harvesters in the future, if the harvesters remain in the provinces to which they are transported no less than two weeks.

"The ministry will completely guarantee transported harvesters for a period of six months to cover a appropriate period for the job. The chief committees in the relevant provinces are in charge of implementation measures, along with preparing requirements for their security, and the housing and accommodation for their crew. The provinces benefiting from the transported harvesters are in charge of providing the protection necessary for them on site until the harvesters are returned to the provinces from which they came, arranging an organized headquarters in the province to supervise the distribution of the harvesters for large, densely-cultivated areas, to guarantee high yield for the harvester activity, and encourage hand harvesting for small, scattered areas, to guarantee the best operation of the harvesters in large areas, minimizing losses in effort and productivity, and doubling the amount of oil set aside for the harvesters in the provinces, to two barrels instead of one, to guarantee ongoing harvester activity without stopping every day. The Public Institute for Mechanical Industries will distribute spare parts for Ferguson harvesters, suiting the number of reserve harvesters, and in centers near the harvesters' work areas in the provinces. Agriculture and Irrigation Branches will supply the harvester owners with a transport permit to facilitate their transport among the provinces. The permit will be authorized by the Traffic Detachments, without any need to show an identification card.

On another front, the Ministry of Commerce has prepared 176 marketing centers throughout the provinces to receive the current season's wheat and barley around the clock. These centers can handle three times more than the Ministry of Commerce's centers before the imposition of the oppressive blockade on Iraq. They are in silos and storehouses, or within or outside their areas in sites near the fields. The Ministry of Commerce guaranteed the needed laboratories, scales, and sacks to complete the process of receiving grain from the farmers on the same day and paying the price within 24 hours of the results of the lab exam on the crops (from which the price will be determined, depending on the rate of blemishes found on them). The farmer has the right to protest the examination result within 30 days of the result. A central committee for this purpose has been formed in Baghdad, to receive and deal with any protest, in addition to its regional tasks in laboratories in all the provinces'

receiving centers. The Ministry of Commerce has honored farmers for marketing the crop free of blemishes, guaranteeing an excellent financial return: farmers will receive more than the posted price of 2,250 dinars per ton for an increase of 10 percent, or 250 dinars per ton if they deliver their crop with a 3 percent rate of flaws, in addition to the positive returns for citizens through the production of fine-quality bread, due to the purity of the crop.

Iraqi-Built Mechanical Harvester

92AE0431B Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
19 May 92 p 1

[Report by Miryam 'Attiyah from al-Iskandariyah]

[Text] Mr. Fawzi 'Umran Mahdi, Director General of the General Institute for Mechanical Industries, has announced that the institute will present the first 100-percent Iraqi-made agricultural harvester to President Commander Saddam Husayn on the anniversary of the glorious July 17-30 revolution. He added, in a statement to AL-JUMHURIYAH, that Gen. Husayn Kamil Hasan, the president's advisor overseeing the Military Industrialization Committee, had directed the institute to manufacture this harvester after the manufacture of the "al-Nida'" [Appeal] tractor. He said that all the Military Industrialization Committee's plants and factories would take part in assembling the harvester once its components were distributed to them. He explained that the harvester was composed of 4,000 different parts, and that a large working group had been formed from all institutions in order to present it as a gift to the president commander during the July holidays. He confirmed that many future successes would be achieved in the field of agricultural machinery manufacture, with the aim of breaking the oppressive economic blockade imposed on Iraq and improving the variety of agricultural production. He pointed out that the supervision of General Husayn Kamil Hasan had a fundamental role in realizing these achievements. The director general of the institute said that the new agricultural harvester was considered to be a portable factory, as it can both harvest and separate the crop. He indicated that work was now ongoing to manufacture the largest possible numbers of this harvester, to cover the local market, and that then the export of surplus machines could be considered. He pointed out that the price of the harvester would be 50,000 Iraqi dinars, and that restrictions had been placed upon its distribution—only to farmers who had taken part in the mother of battles, had 10,000 dunams of land, sold his harvest directly to the state. These farmers would also be offered the support of the province's Agriculture and Irrigation Branch.

Agriculture in al-Qadisiyah Province

92AE0431C Baghdad AL-IRAQ in Arabic
23 May 92 p 2

[Report from AL-IRAQ correspondent in al-Qadisiyah]

[Text] Mr. Ahmad 'Abdallah Salih, governor of al-Qadisiyah and president of the province's Supreme Committee for Agriculturization, has confirmed that al-Qadisiyah Province is one of the provinces renowned for the cultivation of strategic crops, particularly wheat, barley, and rice. On this basis, efforts have been redoubled for the success of the harvest campaign.

In the field of wheat and barley harvest operations, there were early preparations through meetings and conferences with agricultural agencies and the Local Federation of Farmers' Societies. These meetings confirmed the necessity of harvesting all land cultivated with these two crops, which amounts to more than 600,000 dunams, after readying 260 private-sector harvesters owned by peasants and farmers.

They also confirmed the exertion of all efforts to complete hand-harvesting operations in areas where it is impossible for the harvesters to go.

To secure the basic requisites for the campaign, a number of committees have been formed for painstaking regional follow-up and authorizing the technical bases of using mechanization, fertilizing, and seeding to secure the campaign's success. This is in addition to supplying the ongoing needs for the work of combines, harvesting machinery, and necessary spare parts, as well as mobile repair shops to repair agricultural machinery and equipment.

The governor added, "For the success of the marketing that goes along with the harvest, 12 marketing centers have been opened throughout the province's cities to receive the farmer's crops and pay him immediately."

These centers were also set up to distribute sacks to the farmers.

Harvest in Karbala' Province

92AE0431D Baghdad AL-IRAQ in Arabic 23 May 92 p 2

[Report from AL-IRAQ correspondent in Karbala']

[Text] Agricultural and peasant cadres in Karbala' Province have begun the largest grain harvest ever witnessed in the province. It will be overseen by Governor of Karbala' 'Abd-al-Khaliq 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who said that 20,000 dunams of wheat and barley had been harvested by hand and mechanically. Also, eight mechanical harvesters had been readied, as well as four grain receiving centers for farmers among the silos in Karbala', Hindiyah district, and the al-Hurr area.

He added, "We expect to get great marketing momentum in these centers after President Commander Saddam Husayn's noble deed in raising the government purchase price for the wheat and barley crops."

Minister Attends Regional Agricultural Meeting

92AE0431E Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
17 May 92 p 4

[Iraqi News Agency dispatch]

[Text] Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud al-Sabbagh left Baghdad yesterday for Tehran to attend the 21st Regional Near East Conference of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], which will be held in Tehran today and continue for five days.

The conference will study a number of topics relating to agricultural resources in the region, growing population, supporting cooperation among advanced and developing countries under the framework of United Nations programs, transferring food technology to developing countries, and confirming the importance of protecting the environment and preserving natural resources.

Cattle Smuggling Rings Seized

92AE0431F Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
17 May 92 p 4

[Text] Turaybil—AL-THAWRAH has learned that the al-Qadisiyah customs police in Turaybil have arrested gangs for smuggling approximately 3,000 head of cattle.

Captain Ibrhaim Qasim 'Ali, a customs police officer, said that the cattle had been taken along the Iraqi-Jordanian border strip. He indicated that intensified campaigns had been launched to end smuggling operations, especially at a time like this, when the price of cattle has gone up in neighboring countries.

Another source in the Customs Authority announced that large quantities of mastic had been seized in trucks transporting them out of the country, in addition to spare parts for cars. A large number of citizens had been arrested in possession of gold and local and foreign currencies, with the intention of smuggling them out of the country.

Black Markets During Harvest Season

92AE0431G Baghdad AL-QADISIYAH in Arabic
17 May 92 p 2

["In View" column by 'Adil al-'Aradawi]

[Text] Harvest season these days is at its most intense. The Iraqi countryside now blooms with its men and women, who go out to their yellow fields to bring in the harvest. Wherever you go, you see the same picture: continuing harvest, gathering, and stacking operations in preparation for transporting what the earth and the arms of strong men have produced to marketing centers. The

government has designated these centers for storing the grain that will constitute a strength for our proud people, which for almost two years have suffered the oppression of the food blockade.

I know very well that huge efforts are being made to oversee the harvest campaign, on the part of the governors, farmers' societies, agriculture offices, the Ministry of Commerce, and vast numbers of farmers. They are all driven by the lofty exuberance for the abundant harvests that bless this agricultural season, and which will have an efficacious effect on securing a part of our citizens' share of food, which will be distributed by the government through the system of ration cards.

We are in the crush of this great operation, and a supervisory effort is expected of monitoring agencies, to turn over the entire harvest in accordance with crop production in the cultivated areas. The quantities that might "disappear" here and there will, of course, affect the grain stores previously planned out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation and the Ministry of Commerce. The quantities that I don't want to see "leave under someone's cloak," will be sold, in time, at black market prices, no doubt about it—as has happened before in some provinces!

I allude to this vital and sensitive subject to warn [everyone], so that matters may take their normal, set course. I am completely confident that the cases that I have alluded to are few and far between, but we must lie in wait for them and prevent them before they spread and grow. [Even] then, dealing with them will be difficult. With hopes for a bountiful harvest season to bestow its blessings on our proud citizens, Adil al-'Aradawi.

Al-Najaf Province Harvests Wheat, Barley

92AE0431H Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
12 May 92 p 4

[Article by Muhammad al-Talibi in al-Najaf]

[Text] The wheat and barley harvests began yesterday in various parts of al-Najaf Province.

Mr. Karim Hasan Rida, governor of al-Najaf, president of the Supreme Committee To Follow Up the Harvest Campaign in the province, took part in harvest campaigns in the districts of al-Kufah and Manadhirah, with the participation of hundreds of farmers who have begun to harvest the two crops by hand.

The governor and president of the supreme committee told our correspondent in the province that "a central committee has been formed, headed by me, with a membership of the director of the Agriculture and Irrigation Branch in al-Najaf, the president of the Federation of Farmers' Societies in the province, and an official [from the Authority] for Distributing Oil Products, with the aim of supervising and following up on the harvest campaign." In addition, branch committees were formed for all administrative units to supervise harvest operations in the field, all according to geographical area. The central committee has readied the necessary requisites for the campaign to succeed. Reserve equipment has

been distributed for the harvests, which will be part of the campaign, and their petroleum needs are being secured.

It is worth mentioning that al-Najaf Province stands out from other provinces, since one dunam yields two grain harvests of rice, wheat, and barley per year. The area cultivated with wheat and barley is 143,000 dunams. Dredged water was released before the harvest, with the aim of moistening the soil to make plowing the rice crop easier next season.

Increase in Rice Harvest Discussed

92AE0431I Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
12 May 92 p 4

[Text] Today, Tuesday, the Technical Institute in al-Shatrah is organizing a science lecture on practical agricultural research.

The lecture will present practical solutions to help break the economic blockade. There will be a discussion of the possibility of manufacturing an alternative fodder for chickens that would [not] dip into strategic crops, of manufacturing "bitmus" [phonetic] from papyrus plants, and of increasing the soybean yield in the southern region, in addition to discussing the use of a kind of fungus to increase per-dunam rice yield by 71 percent.

Grain, Sugar Industries Discussed

92AE0431J Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
12 May 92 p 4

[Article by AL-THAWRAH correspondent]

[Text] The Food Industries Conference has continued into its third day, with AL-THAWRAH taking part in the symposium on the grain industry, which was held yesterday and chaired by Minister of Commerce Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Salih.

In the meantime, another hall hosted a symposium on the sugar industry, in which reasons for the closure of sugar industry plants as a result of the blockade conditions were reviewed. AL-THAWRAH toured the special exhibition set up at the conference, and visited a number of wings whose exhibits reflected the degree of the Iraqis' determination to challenge the blockade, and the creation of numerous methods of providing alternatives to what used to be imported, thus giving [us] pride.

The wings of participating Arab companies saw a bonanza of visitors, interested persons, and citizens, who obtained some commodities during the direct sale activities.

Call for Great Effort in Harvesting

92AE0431K Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
12 May 92 p 4

[Article by AL-THAWRAH correspondent]

[Text] The General Federation of Farmers' Cooperatives has called for intensified efforts for the success of the manual harvesting campaign for small agricultural areas this season.

In an appeal directed at the peasant masses, the federation also called for their greatest efforts and energies to complete the campaign, to maintain production and attention in marketing the produce, to rely on all possible means to make the grains available, and to make the most of President Commander Saddam Husayn's noble deed of raising of the purchase prices for wheat and barley to foil the evil blockade imposed on our steadfast country.

Increase in Rice Production Studied

92AE0431L Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
24 May 92 p 4

[Article by AL-THAWRAH correspondent]

[Text] With the slogan, "We want our rice production to break the economic blockade imposed on our struggling country," the General Commission for Agricultural Services, in cooperation with the Agricultural and Irrigation Branch in al-Najaf Province, is holding a special fair specifically for rice next Wednesday in the Technical Institute Hall in al-Kufah.

The fair will include the opening of an exhibition on the rice crop and honor a number of farmers, researchers, and technicians distinguished for the cultivation and production of rice. A number of organizations will participate in the festival, including the General Federation of Farmers' Societies, the General Authority for Agricultural Research, Baghdad University's College of Agriculture, the General Corporation for Grain Industrialization, and the Agriculture and Irrigation Branches of the al-Najaf, al-Qadisiyah, al-Muthanna, Wasit, Dhi Qar, and Diyala provinces.

In cooperation with the province's Agriculture and Irrigation Branch, the commission is also holding a scientific symposium on the rice crop and means of increasing its production and improving its variety next Tuesday, in the province's Teachers Syndicate Hall.

Statistics on Cattle Disease in al-Qadisiyah

92AE0431M Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
24 May 92 p 4

[Article by As'ad al-Hilali in al-Qadisiyah]

[Text] The Veterinary and Animal Resource Department in al-Qadisiyah Province has, in the first part of this year, examined and treated more than a half million animals. The examination has included 125,312 head of cattle with worm viruses in the lungs, stomach, intestines, and liver; blood parasites; digestive inflammations; and other ailments.

Dr. Hasan 'Abbudi Hasan, director of the department in the province, revealed this to AL-THAWRAH, and went on to say that "veterinary offices had vaccinated 105,000 cows, water buffaloes, and sheep against cattle cholera, aphthous fever, symptomatic anthrax, splenic fever, sheep pox, and hemorrhhea sepsis. Other working teams have vaccinated 317,778 chickens for viruses affecting domestic fowl, including chicken pox, Newcastle, and [cambura, phonetic], and vaccinated 1,200 heads of various livestock with manufactured vaccines."

He confirmed that the monitoring and inspection committees had seized and destroyed more than 1,100 kg of meat unfit for human consumption on their inspection rounds in butcher shops, restaurants, and places of business. Fifteen premises were closed down for violating health regulations.

He pointed out that the department had supplied 183 tons of yellow corn to public chicken fields and had distributed 232 tons of bran to outstanding cattle, sheep, and water buffalo breeders.

Nationwide Centers for Wheat, Barley Delivery

92AE0431N Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
11 May 92 p 4

[Article by Subhi Jasim]

[Text] The Ministry of Commerce has prepared 176 marketing centers in all Iraq's provinces to receive the current season wheat and barley harvest round the clock.

Minister of Commerce and President of the Supreme Grains Marketing Committee Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Salih disclosed this to AL-THAWRAH. He said, "These centers are three times bigger than the ministry's receiving centers before the imposition of the blockade on Iraq. [The harvests] will be distributed throughout granaries and silos, or inside [empty] spaces, or outside them in sites near the fields."

He added, "The ministry has secured the necessary laboratories, scales, and sacks to to receive grain from farmers on the same day, with appraisal and payment within 24 hours of the laboratory results of the crops to determine their prices, in light of any blemishes found on

them. Farmers have the right to protest the examination results within 30 days of the date of the posting of the results. A central committee in Baghdad will be formed to receive and deal with any protest, in addition to its missions in the field and in the laboratories in all the provincial receiving centers.

The minister called on the farmers to sell the harvest free of blemishes, in order to guarantee a good financial return; farmers will receive more than the posted price of 2,250 dinars per ton, up to 10 percent more, for an increase of 250 dinars per ton, if they deliver a harvest with blemishes of no more than 3 percent. In addition, there are benefits for the citizens, through [better] bread production resulting from the purity of the harvest.

Wasit Province Agricultural Report

92AE0431O Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
7 May 92 p 4

[Article by Qasim Mahdi]

[Text] After a break of more than 10 years, 2,500 peasant families have begun to exploit the 450,000 dunams in the Tigris Project in Wasit Province, after the damage sustained in the war imposed on our country by the Iranian enemy, and which affected irrigation and filtering networks.

This was disclosed to AL-THAWRAH by Engineer 'Ali Husayn Hajim, director of Wasit's Agriculture and Irrigation Branch, who confirmed that, "As a result of our country's present circumstances, with the unjust blockade against our people, the possibility of restoring life to this project is under study.

"A plan to cultivate 100,000 dunams with wheat and barley and 30,000 dunams with oil-bearing crops (cotton, sunflowers, and various vegetables) had been prepared.

"Regarding the completion of the fourth phase, which was abandoned by foreign companies who did not finish it, it was implemented by us last July. The Tigris pier was extended after the Kilometer 41 barrage, and included work to heighten and widen the dams in the project, raising [sediment deposits, as published] and railings at a cost of 400,000 Iraqi dinars. A group of irrigation systems to circulate water via a barrage at Kilometer 51 to draw off 12 cubic meters per second was also completed.

Two new barrages to circulate water in [areas] 13 and 14 were also completed, along with improvements to raise their drainage capacity from 2 cubic meters per second to 6 cubic meters per second, as the water is conveyed to the last point of the border of Maysan Province.

Eng. 'Ali Husayn Hajim mentioned that as a result, the overflow was used to irrigate expanses of about 15,000 dunams outside the project's borders, in the al-Hayy district.

KUWAIT

Country Facing Balance-of-Payment Problems

92AE0433B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 7 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by Raflah Kharyati: "Kuwait's Options for Facing Budget Deficit—Taxes, Privatization, or Devaluing Dinar"]

[Text] Kuwait faces a number of difficult choices to confront an increasing budget deficit and declining income, due to the small quantity of oil being extracted from the wells that Iraq set ablaze during the recent war. Current oil production stands at about 1 million barrels per day.

Economic analysts who follow developments in Kuwait say that the government may turn to imposing taxes, privatizing public companies, reducing public spending, or devaluing the national currency to cover the deficit and balance income with expenditures. They add that the government may be forced to resort to all these options if production declines or if oil prices drop for any reason, as has happened in the past.

According to estimates by Kuwaiti economists, after the war, Kuwait owed domestic and foreign markets \$40 billion, distributed as follows:

- \$20 billion in obligations to buy the debts of Kuwaiti banks and companies, only one-fifth (\$4 billion) of this sum being recoverable over a 20-year period;
- \$7 billion in the form of treasury bonds and debentures that the government has obtained from the domestic market;
- \$5.5 billion obtained from international markets, lending of the sum having been arranged by the American J.P. Morgan Bank last December; and
- 7 billion in export credits from Japan and other Western countries.

These high debts are balanced by a contraction of realized foreign investments, which now range between \$25 billion and \$30 billion, as a former official of the Kuwait Investment Office stated to the British newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES last week.

Kuwaiti Finance Minister Nasir 'Abdallah al-Rudan announced last week before the National Assembly (the provisional parliament) that "Kuwait is bearing heavy burdens under the current circumstances." He explained that Kuwait's 1991-1992 budget deficit amounted to over 5 billion Kuwaiti dinars. Expenditures stood at 6 billion dinars, including one-time expenditures for defense and reconstruction, while revenues were limited to 800 million dinars. (One dinar equals \$2.91.)

After the liberation, the Kuwaiti Government bestowed 115 million dinars as a royal gift to Kuwaitis. It wrote off 1.049 billion dinars in Credit Bank real-estate loans, remitted 12 million dinars in social loans to certain citizens, cancelled 700 million dinars in payments due to

the General Housing Authority, and wrote off 388 million dinars in consumer loans. The government paid 547 million dinars in salaries to Kuwaitis during the occupation. It cancelled 45 million dinars in payments due to Ministry of Electricity, Water, and State Property. A pay raise to Kuwaiti citizens has cost approximately 400 million dinars. The government has also undertaken to pay 32 million dinars in salaries for Kuwaitis in the private sector. Cancellation of customs duties has cost 100 million dinars. Finally, social security payments are estimated to cost 18 million dinars.

In a letter sent to the National Assembly's Finance and Economy Committee, the Kuwaiti finance minister predicted that the deficit in the coming budget (1992-1993) would reach approximately 2 billion dinars and that the government might be forced to turn to borrowing once again.

The National Assembly's Finance and Economy Committee, which has an advisory capacity, mentioned in a recently-published report based on information from the finance minister that "the reserve for coming generations (foreign investments) is not an unlimited resource; the greatest part of it, in fact, has been consumed, and it is destined to dry up completely if one relies on it and withdraws from it in coming years at the current rate."

Analysts added that the financial crisis could be seen in the statement of the Kuwaiti finance minister before the National Assembly, in which he proposed paying the sum of 5,000 dinars to every Kuwaiti family. "My government," he said, "would like to implement any proposal that would improve the citizens' living standard, but the proposal under consideration cannot be practically implemented, due to current circumstances."

Analysts wondered whether the government would opt for imposing income taxes, particularly on foreigners working in Kuwait, in an initial phase. Kuwaiti economists have noted that "the idea was proposed long before the Iraqi invasion, particularly when oil prices collapsed in the early eighties and after the crisis of the al-Manakh market (the stock exchange). The idea was revived after liberation, when the idea of restructuring the population composition was studied."

These economists say that financial estimates have shown that about \$400 million a year could be provided from direct taxes that could be imposed on the work contracts of the over 1 million foreigners estimated to work in the country. Twice this amount could be obtained from indirect taxes on staples and luxury goods that these foreigners consume during their stay in the country. This means that approximately \$1.2 billion could be assured from these taxes alone.

The economists added that taxes could be imposed on Kuwaiti citizens who invest their wealth abroad, with a major part of the tax to be remitted if the money is invested at home. Independent sources place the wealth of Kuwaitis abroad at approximately \$25 billion, at the lowest estimate.

The analysts say that most Kuwaiti savings were transferred abroad after the war and that all of them are now in the major international currencies. If the value of the dinar drops, it will guarantee a balance between real income from oil exports, which is valued in dollars, and imports, which are imported in the American currency. Analysts point out that all the Gulf currencies are valued at their real value, except the Kuwaiti dinar, which costs the government large sums of money to maintain at its announced price.

The third option that has begun to be discussed since liberation involves selling government-owned companies to the national or Gulf private sector, or in some cases, to foreign investors. This would ensure at least several billion dollars and would help cover the greater part of public debts.

Kuwaiti economists say that the British experience should be a model to be imitated in Kuwait.

Companies proposed for privatization include Kuwait Airways, the telephone department of the Communications Ministry, Kuwait Petroleum Company, and a number of investment companies that bring in a reasonable return.

It should be noted that, recently, some Kuwaiti investors had repeatedly purchased some of the assets sold by the Kuwait Investment Office overseas.

Kuwaitis acquainted with the official point of view say that implementation of the major options has been postponed until after elections for the new National Assembly (parliament) scheduled for this October, especially since some prominent political figures favor reviewing the financial policies that have been applied since independence.

Investment Losses Said To Spur Policy Changes

92AE0433A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8 Jun 92 p 10

[Article: "60 Million British Pounds Lost in Sale of Midland Shares, Kuwait Investment Office Resignations Confirm Abandonment of Risk Policy"]

[Text] Xavier de la Rosa, the Spanish businessman who planned and managed the investment program for the Kuwait Investment Office in Spain, with an estimated expenditure of \$2 billion, recently tendered his resignation from his post as deputy chairman of the board of directors of Grupo (Toras), the Spanish holding company belonging to the Kuwait Investment Office.

The resignation strengthens the prevailing belief in London's financial quarter, where the Kuwait Investment Office is headquartered, that the office is undergoing a storm of change relating to its policies and the individuals who direct it. Mr. Fahd Muhammad al-Sabah left his post as head of the Kuwaiti office about two months ago and was replaced by Mr. 'Ali Rashid al-Badr, former chairman of the board of the Kuwait and Middle East Bank. This was considered evidence that the Kuwait

Investment Office had abandoned the bold investment style for which it had become famous in the mid-eighties.

While there were repeated rumors implying that Rosa's resignation was related to the Kuwaitis' desire to end their investments in Spain in order to concentrate on the process of rebuilding Kuwait, the British newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES said yesterday that reliable sources had stated that Rosa's resignation was related to his aversion to working with the new officials of the investment office, whom he considers bureaucrats.

It should be mentioned that Mr. Khalid al-Sabah, the deputy general director of the London office, is the only high official who has remained in his post from the old group, though he is currently reviewing his plans.

One can observe that the new conservative style, which indicators show that the Kuwait Investment Office now will follow, was confirmed in the sale that took place about six weeks ago, when the office disposed of the major portion of its 10.5 percent share in British Midland Bank at a moment of intense competition for control of Midland between the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Company and Lloyds Bank.

The Kuwaiti office sold about 60 million of its shares in Midland at a price of 355 pence a share—the current price of a share is 446 pence. A former official of the office told the aforementioned British newspaper that "The office's sale of its Midland shares at a time when the battle for control was beginning to intensify was regrettable. The Kuwait Investment Office's income from the transaction would have risen by between 50 and 60 million British pounds if the office had postponed the transaction by several weeks." The same former official stated that such an operation would have been virtually impossible under the old system.

Rumors in the London financial quarter are that the new management of the Kuwait Investment Office wants to transform the office into something like a savings fund, rather than leaving it to operate as an investment office that participates in high-risk operations, notwithstanding the profit that can accrue to the office if these operations succeed.

Rumor also has it that the recent change in the office's orientation resulted from a struggle between the ruling al-Sabah family, which still controls the London investment office, and businessmen as a class, who are trying to increase their influence. Word has spread that the many resignations recently offered by senior officials of the Kuwaiti office have led to "a retreat of the spirit of successful adventurous investment that characterized the office in past years, so that it had become one of the strongest investment offices in the London financial quarter, despite its reputation for secrecy and concealment of its operations."

It should be mentioned that the Kuwait Investment Office, whose investments once were valued at over 100

billion pounds (including a large share in British Petroleum and a share in Midland Bank), was founded in the mid-sixties with the purpose of controlling fluctuations in the oil market and guaranteeing the state a steady income. In 1976, Shaykh Jabir al-Sabah, the emir of Kuwait and also finance minister at the time, established a private reserve fund of 1.5 billion pounds, which he attached to the investment office.

This sum, however, quickly reached 45 billion pounds by the late eighties. The individuals considered responsible for this success were Shaykh Fahd al-Sabah, chairman of the board of directors; and Mr. Fu'ad Ja'far, under whose administration the deal to purchase the share of British Petroleum was concluded.

LIBYA

Al-Muqaryif Discusses Contacts, Organization's Image

92AF0855A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
23 Apr 92 pp 1,4

[Article by 'Ali al-Ruzz]

[Text] Dallas—'Ali al-Ruzz. The secretary general of the Libyan National Salvation Front [LNSF], Dr. Muhammad Yusuf al-Muqaryif, said that the front's leadership "is now in constant contact with Libyan officials, military leaders, and tribal chiefs." He revealed in an exclusive interview with AL-HAYAH yesterday that his call to "those who are still alive" among the ruling Libyan "Revolutionary Command Council" and personalities of the previous monarchical era to cooperate with the opposition "does not come out of a vacuum, but is the result of unannounced contacts with personalities in the country, who asked us, directly or through mediators, to send out this call." He said that the front had received "a clear signal of agreement from a member of the Libyan 'Revolutionary Command Council'."

On the difference between the current crisis and other crises to which the Libyan regime has been subjected, al-Muqaryif told AL-HAYAH that "past crises have been either domestic or foreign, but this is the only crisis which combines both dimensions, and the first crisis with such long duration or direct impact on all aspects of life and regime institutions." He added, "We can be sure that the regime's institutions and elements of the regime have begun to collapse because of the psychological circumstances to which they are subjected."

Protest and Witnesses

He was asked whether there was any evidence of that, and he replied, "Great indications of complaint and stirrings of protest have been observed at the level of Qadhdhaf al-Dam, for example, one of the men upon whom al-Qadhdhafi depends. Restlessness has been observed within the al-Qadhdhifah tribe itself, specifically in the family of the late Hasan Ishkal (killed in 1985). One of the restless elements is Col. Barani Ishkal, commander of the Gharyan

Military District, who more than once has made public his rejection of what is going on."

He explained that "al-Qadhdhifah shaykhs met with those of other tribes and apologized to them for the abuse of power by some members of the tribe. We were informed of that by our brothers in the tribes that took part in the meetings, and they conveyed a picture of the psychological state that is bringing down the structure of the regime and its agencies. In addition, we have information on the number of requests for [political] asylum being submitted to Arab and Western embassies and diplomats by elements more radical, sloganeering, and revolutionary than al-Qadhdhafi."

On the identity of these elements, al-Muqaryif said, "Ask those who have connections in the foreign ministries, for they are more qualified to answer and can better assess the consequences." He pointed to "intensive contacts with tribal shaykhs, former and current officers and commanders in the Libyan army, and all the forces of change abroad, on agreeing on a formula of for toppling the regime and steering the country away from any kind of chaos. We have definite information that the LNSF conference's call for this purpose is now being circulated among political and tribal officials.

"Present circumstances are promising for the Libyan issue, and we know that the Libyan people are enduring the siege today and paying the price, but they are sure that the days will bring a change that will take the specter of dictatorship away from them."

Arab Relations

About developments of Arab relations with the LNSF, al-Muqaryif said, "Relations are good, and they have seen great improvement in certain aspects. I have received official invitations to visit a number of Arab states, which I will do after the conference, God willing."

He was asked about the basic concept which the front's conference meeting in Dallas will try to bring forth, and he answered: "[The basic concept is] putting the LNSF in a state of maximum readiness to deal with the expected rapid changes, which will inevitably bring about the overthrow of Qadhdhafi's regime. We are studying the crisis and monitoring it carefully, and we are preparing alternate plans for all contingencies, including dealing with the transitional phase to keep the country away from any chaos or confusion, and to help in setting up a constitution that expresses the hopes and free choice of the Libyan people."

Domestic Criticism

Al-Muqaryif dealt with the criticism directed against the Libyan opposition for not concentrating on the homefront, saying: "The opposition cannot but concentrate on the homefront, because it is not struggling to establish a Libyan state in exile. Rather, its goal is the homefront, and its purpose is to liberate it and enhance it. However, the criticisms that you mentioned have had some basis at two stages. The first was the Bab al-'Aziziyah operation

in 1984, and the savagery of the regime in dealing with the various sections of the Libyan people; and the increasing severity of repression and exemplary punishment following the assassination of al-Warfalli in 1988, in addition to the regime's constant propaganda that its intelligence forces had penetrated the Libyan opposition; and its barring the people from travelling freely.

"The second was after the declaration of the 'open-door' policy [infatih] in March 1988. Some of them were convinced of the so-called change, and preferred a truce to opposition. In addition, al-Qadhdhafi retreated from some of his destructive policies in some Arab states, something which exposed some opposition figures with the help of Arab security agencies."

Relations With United States

On relations with the United States and other Western states, he said: "Each state has its own concerns, and so does the opposition. Each state has its positions, and so does the opposition, and these concerns and positions are sometimes far apart from one another and sometimes approach one another. We see those who devote all their time, effort, and money to talking about these relations during times of closeness, but we do not hear a word from them during times of distance. On this issue we are frank: We cooperate with every sincere effort, near or far, that helps to achieve truth and justice and to lift the nightmare from the chests of the Libyan people. We do not retreat from our positions or abandon our independence under the harshest of circumstances, and if we have done that at certain times, perhaps things were different then. But we are committed to the goals that we have set in the charters and which we have sanctified in practice."

"Fundamentalism" of LNSF

On the "fundamentalism" of the LNSF, which some media talk about, al-Muqaryif said: "I always found it odd how descriptions are tossed out right and left without any basis. The LNSF has its starting points, its culture, its programs, and its political statements, and in all those there is none of the political fundamentalism that they talk about. We brought up in our current conference the civilizational project [al-mashru' al-hadari], which includes all our views of Libya's future. It is a plan in which almost all of the front's sections participated, and it did not include any fundamentalism, even though it will be our general program and our starting point for an agreement with all opposition groups, for our relations with Arab and African states, and for our foreign and international relations."

He added: "There are religious groups in the Libyan arena, and they have their own plans. The LNSF itself has sometimes seen members withdraw and join Islamic groups. But let me draw attention to the fact that the idea of the 'Islamic bogey' was created by Muammar Qadhdhafi himself, so that he could say to neighboring and

other states, 'Either me or fundamentalism.' The fundamentalist movement in Libya is mostly Salafi, concentrating on religious legal aspects, and it does not occupy itself with politics. In fact, the al-Tabligh wa al-Da'wah [Announcement and Call] group, for example, forbids turning to political activity. When al-Qadhdhafi became aware of the growth of this phenomenon, he picked a fight with it, even though it did not threaten him, and gave it a political stamp so as to give the impression that the alternative to him was fundamentalism."

On another subject, the front's conference is continuing its work in Dallas for the sixth day. Yesterday, it formed a committee to prepare and amend working papers. It will conclude today with final resolutions, and elections for leadership positions and the councils.

Opposition Members Discuss Prospects for Change

92AF0838A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
29 Apr 92 pp 20-25

[Article by 'Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi: "Crisis Over the Airplane Opens Internal Situation in Libya to Debate"]

[Text] Cairo—An "intelligence-gathering" war against Libya has been raging in the media ever since the onset of the crisis between that country and the West. This "intelligence-gathering" war, if one may use such a term to describe it, manifested itself in a set of plans which dealt with the future of the regime in Libya. These plans were discussed by the various media agencies.

Ahmad Qadhdhaf-al-Dam said: "In Libya, the regime is in the people's hands, and everyone has weapons. Who, then, would be overthrowing whom?"

A number of political observers and journalists who returned recently from Libya are affirming that Col. al-Qadhdhafi's position inside the country has been considerably bolstered by the recent crisis. They are saying that the Libyan people's sense of the Western and American pressure which is being applied to them has created a reaction that runs counter to that which the West had been hoping for. To them, this has become a matter that touches upon their dignity. It is giving them the reasons and the justifications to continue holding on to their present leadership.

Commenting on recurrent news of change in Libya, Libyan officials told AL-MAJALLAH, "People do not understand the nature of the regime in Libya, where we employ a populist system in which people make their own decisions. Neither Mu'ammar nor anyone else can tell Libyans what they have to do. Libyans can make those decisions in the People's Committees and congresses." Libyans affirm that the West's miscalculations about the possibility of changing the regime are due to the fact that the nature of their regime is misunderstood. They also affirm that Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi is the leader of a revolution and not the ruler of Libya.

Some of the most important plans which were set forth since the inception of the crisis contain traces of information. AL-MAJALLAH reviews them in the following report and interviews a number of Libyan activists in the opposition who represent its various tendencies. The names of some of these people were mentioned in connection with these plans.

The branches and factions of the Libyan opposition—those that are known as well as those that are not—have been surfacing since the onset of the crisis between Libya and the West. During the past three years at least, i.e., during those years when a noticeable measure of openness existed between Libya and the outside world, particularly the United States and West Europe, these factions were not heard from at all. It was during that period that Egypt played the role of introducing “the new” Libya to the world. Egypt played that role in the wake of the major rapprochement which took place between the two countries. At that time, President Mubarak used all the clout he had to persuade the United States and the countries of West Europe, with whom he has strong relations, that the Libyan regime had changed and that the new openness policy it was pursuing was a positive one. Banking on his position in the Gulf war, President Mubarak affirmed that the United States had to counter all these positive indicators in Libya with positive indicators of its own. It may be said that, at that time, these efforts were not made in vain. High-level meetings between Libyans and Americans and between Libyans and Britons were held in Cairo and in some European capitals. At that time the information that was leaked about those meetings left the impression that everything was going according to plan, so that Libya's relations with the West could be “normalized.”

At that time, the voice of the opposition faded from the scene. The opposition was no longer able to operate out of Cairo, which it had used as its base of operations for 14 years, after relations between Cairo and Tripoli were improved, after the ouster of Sudan's Numayri and Chad's Habre, and after Libya's relations with the West started to improve.

Members of the Libyan opposition who subscribe to different tendencies emerged once again last November, after indictments were issued in the investigation which had been carried out into the explosion of the American and French planes. They resurfaced after memoranda regarding the suspects' arrest and extradition were filed, and their re-emergence coincided with conflicting news about proposed plans for change. The Libyan regime became the subject of discussion and inquiry by media agencies and by various intelligence agencies. The changes, which were being discussed in those plans, started with having Col. al-Qadhdhafi add to the regime's cast of characters some elements who would be acceptable to the people, and they went so far as to include plans for bringing about a complete change of the regime by means of a military coup or an American-Western military strike against Libya.

The process of outlining these plans started during the third week of last November. According to newspaper reports at that time, the plan on the table then involved U. S. troops arriving in Libya by sea and by air to liquidate those who symbolize the regime and perhaps start a civil war. Putting this plan on the table coincided with news about a meeting which was held in a suburb of the U.S. capital between Dr. Muhammad al-Maqrif, the secretary general of the [Libyan National] Salvation Front; Shaykh 'Abdallah Abu-Sinn, who describes himself as the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya; and Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Shaybani, leader of another faction of the Muslim Brotherhood. The CIA's North Africa officer and other officials attended the meeting, whose purpose was to unite those opposition parties who were at the meeting and bring about an agreement between them. Differences between these parties, which had surfaced in a meeting held several weeks earlier, had made it clear, according to one American official, that the only way to go was “to have an agreement and to work together.”

A Failed Coup

Before too long, press sources announced last December that a group of low- and mid-level officers in the Libyan army had attempted to overthrow the regime in Libya in November, the previous month. However, a few hours before it was to have been carried out, at dawn on November 30, the coup was foiled. Those who were involved in that attempted coup had planned to seize control of the revolution's command headquarters in al-'Aziziyah, which is located in the heart of the capital. They had also planned to seize control of the Staff Command Office, the Tripoli airport, and the radio station. It was further reported at the time that the coup was being led by an army officer and a senior civilian officer in the Interior Ministry. Those sources, upon whom this news was based, affirmed that secret contacts had been made between the U.S. administration and some senior military leaders in Libya, who were described by those sources as leaders of the Libyan revolution who had participated in all stages of the present regime and whose reputation inside the country and abroad was sound.

Ahmad Qadhdhaf-al-Damm, general coordinator of Libyan-Egyptian relations, wasted no time in issuing a denial. He denied that any attempted coup had taken place in Libya, and he said, “The system of government in Libya is controlled by the people, and everyone in Libya has weapons. Who then would be overthrowing whom? Any attempted coup, therefore, is impossible.”

As the stress of the crisis between Libya and the West was heightened, Libyan sources affirmed last January that Col. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi had been advised recently by Arab leaders to establish political pluralism in the country, liberalize the country's economy, and dissolve the People's Committees. The same sources added that one Arab capital had offered to host Col. al-Qadhdhafi and members of his family if he were to

agree to give up power so that the country can be spared the dangers of a possible confrontation with Western capitals. It has been reported that Col. al-Qadhdhafi put this question to the Arab leader who had made him that offer: "Are you making that offer of your own accord, or did Washington suggest that you make that offer?" The Arab leader's reply was that he would guarantee Col. al-Qadhdhafi's safety.

It is obvious, of course, that the country and the Arab leader who are being referred to here are Egypt and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. And yet, more than one Egyptian and Libyan source have denied that this ever happened. In this regard, a high-level Libyan source told AL-MAJALLAH: "The primary purpose of such news is to wage a psychological war against the Libyan people. The fact that this incident is basically contrived and totally devoid of truth confirms that. That one Arab leader would advise another to leave power makes no sense. Had that happened, however, Mu'ammarr would not have accepted such advice. On the other hand—and this is more important—Mu'ammarr holds no position in Libya. He does not govern Libya, since Libya has no governor. In Libya, the people act through their people's congresses, the only mechanism in our view for a popular democracy, and they govern themselves. The people are also the only tools of government." The same source, who played a major role in bringing about Libya's rapprochement with Egypt, added, "Regarding the subject of unity with Egypt, we declared from the outset that we were serious about this. Col. al-Qadhdhafi made that declaration unequivocally and unconditionally. That proposal was made long before the recent crisis. That is why such a dream and such a national goal cannot be linked to a passing crisis."

As the contest continues between the expected plans, almost all of which originated in London and Washington, news about the arrival of Col. al-Qadhdhafi's family and Ahmad Qadhdhaf-al-Damm's family (the latter is unmarried) to Cairo is published. It was reported that good progress was being made on preparations for completing renovations to the mansion which housed Sudanese president Ja'far Numayri, and it was said that the mansion had been purchased and was being prepared as a residence for Libya's Col. al-Qadhdhafi. A Libyan official, who categorically denied this information to AL-MAJALLAH, described it as "nothing more than unethical rumors. Anyone spreading such rumors, whose purpose is to wage war against us in the media, does not know what kind of men we are."

According to the news at the time, al-Qadhdhafi pursued measures on two parallel tracks. The first one involved deporting elements of the regime who were involved in acts of violence and in assassinating members of the opposition inside the country and abroad. The second track involved contacting a number of Libyan politicians in the course of setting the stage for a collective and cohesive alternative to al-Qadhdhafi to lead the country after his departure. According to these reports, al-Qadhdhafi's departure is set for next September.

This plan goes on to project how Col. al-Qadhdhafi will leave office, and it describes his departure as follows:

A superficial union between Egypt and Libya would be proclaimed, and Col. al-Qadhdhafi, having "achieved one of his most important goals," would then leave his position. A new leadership group would then take over. That group would include Abu-Bakr Yunis, Muhammad Nijm, Mukhtar al-Qarawi, 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Huni, 'Izz-al-Din al-Ghadamis, Mansur al-Kikhya, and Ahmad Qadhdhaf-al-Damm.

Col. al-Qadhdhafi contacted three members of the Revolutionary Command Council. He also contacted others who had served in the government but had either retired from politics or switched to the opposition. Al-Qadhdhafi contacted the people who are members of the Revolutionary Command Council, namely, 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Huni, Mukhtar al-Qarawi, and Muhammad Nijm. He also contacted 'Izz-al-Din al-Ghadamis, a former ambassador, to persuade them to serve in the government once again. There were conflicting reports about why these people were contacted: Were they contacted to persuade them to return as an alternative to al-Qadhdhafi, or were they contacted so they can work once again under his command? It is here that the final plan unfolds: Working through the People's Committees, Col. al-Qadhdhafi would sift through the people in the regime, and he would get rid of those who members of the People's Committees believe were involved in acts of violence inside the country and abroad. The People's Committees may resolve to dissolve the Revolutionary Committees, or they may carry out radical changes on their structure, their method of operations, and their political functions. At the same time, they may also invite a few "national" figures to return to Libya and to exercise their political role.

This was evident in Bob Woodward's book, "The Veil," which dealt with the CIA's secret wars between 1987 [as published] and 1981. In that book, many pages are devoted to the numerous and various attempts that were made to change the regime in Libya. Eventually, using intelligence and Pentagon documents on the situation in Libya, Woodward concludes that all these attempts had ended in failure. He described American policy, which had manifested itself in trade restrictions that were imposed on Libya, as an ineffective policy. The Libyan source who listened with an open mind to the charges that were conveyed by AL-MAJALLAH, said, "Our theory of government is not understood, and no one wants to believe it. We see ourselves as having gone beyond all these theories that govern the world today. No one can overthrow the regime in Libya because it is the people who govern, and the people cannot be overthrown."

Al-Ghadamis Tells AL-MAJALLAH, "I Am Willing To Work With the Libyan Government"

'Izz-al-Din al-Ghadamis was the last person to be released by the First of September Revolution from a political detention center. He was employed by Libya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he served as the country's ambassador to Vienna till 1980. When he left the

regime at that time, he also switched to the opposition. Al-Ghadamis was at home when AL-MAJALLAH conducted the following telephone interview with him:

[AL-MAJALLAH] Were you a member of the independent opposition when you left the government, or did you join an opposition organization then?

[al-Ghadamis] You can say that, despite the relations I have with some opposition fronts, I continued to be a member of the independent opposition.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What exactly did you oppose when you left Libya? Were you opposed to Col. al-Qadhdhafi himself, or to those who are around him?

[al-Ghadamis] I opposed those persons who were at the forefront of power and whose actions were incompetent.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Were you contacted recently by the Libyan regime, and did that regime attempt to persuade you to return to Libya or to coordinate your activities with theirs?

[al-Ghadamis] Contacts have been going on for many years. At first, attempts were made to dissuade me from making public my departure as a member of the opposition. Then, attempts were made to persuade me to return to Libya.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What about recent contacts, specifically those which were made during the period which followed the crisis over the two [downed] planes? Were you contacted by parties in the regime who wanted to persuade you to return to the country?

[al-Ghadamis] The contacts have been ongoing, and they are still ongoing. They became more frequent after the subject of the two airplanes.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Can you tell us what these recent contacts were about?

[al-Ghadamis] These contacts specifically were attempts to find out how and by what means Libya can get out of the present crisis.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What was your answer when that question was put to you?

[al-Ghadamis] The incident with the two airplanes emphasized the fact that nationalist forces in Libya bore the responsibility for what might happen to the country. The response, therefore, was positive, and there was a feeling that we had to do our part to save the country and spare it the dangers of what was being planned for it.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How was that to be done, specifically from your point of view?

[al-Ghadamis] It seems to me that the group of people who hurt the country, mistreated citizens, destroyed the country's reputation, and ruined its economy must now step aside and go away. Our country has lost its credibility locally and with the outside world because this

group has been at the forefront of our country for many years. Therefore, what is required to restore this credibility, is that this group step aside and leave positions of power.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you think that Libya's problem with the West and with the United States will come to an end if this were to happen?

[al-Ghadamis] It seems to me that putting an end to the presence of this group in positions of power will cause national figures to come back to the country. I am not saying that these people would be coming back to rectify matters, but the fact that they will be coming back to assume their role in the country will undoubtedly restore Libya's credibility as a country that respects international law and plays the political game by the rules that have become known. Many people whose aim is to hurt Libya or deny it the opportunity to play its national and Arab political role would thus be shut out and denied the opportunity to use the excuse that Libya was being accused of practicing international terrorism.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you willing to work with Col. al-Qadhdhafi once again?

[al-Ghadamis] I am willing to cooperate to protect my country from what is being planned for it. I believe that what is being planned for Libya will cause total damage to the Arab homeland and to the future of pan-Arab action in the region.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do I take this to mean that your conditions for returning to Libya and becoming involved in political activity include that al-Qadhdhafi give up the Third Theory [of the Green Book], for instance, as well as the system of People's Committees, the al-Jamahiriyah system, and other such matters?

[al-Ghadamis] Outright rejection in advance of any idea, no matter how splendid or trivial it might be, is something that no one can do. However, forcing a person to accept a certain point of view is unacceptable.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Your name was mentioned in a collection of Western reports, along with the names of a group of people who would run the government in Libya during a transition period. What do you know about such plans, and how true are they?

[al-Ghadamis] I don't know anything about such plans, but I do know that the name of one man in particular has been mentioned. This man is an honest Libyan citizen, who, from the very outset, rejected actions in Libya that were undemocratic. That is all I know. I am a citizen who has been active in politics in my country since the sixties. I've worked with the masses, and I do not see myself working outside the mainstream in Libya and in the Arab world. I am not seeking any position of any kind.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is Abu-Bakr Yunis the name of that man, or does that man have another name?

[al-Ghadamis] The names I heard are those of Abu-Bakr Yunis, al-Kharrubi, al-Khuwayldi, and 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Huni.

[AL-MAJALLAH] When you mentioned these names, to whom were you referring specifically?

[al-Ghadamis] With all due respect to those whose names are mentioned, I find that certain qualities must be available to affirm Libya's credibility. These qualities must be available so that others can believe Libya when it asserts that it is no longer engaged in terrorism and that it will not become engaged in it in the future.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do any of these people whose names you mentioned have these qualities?

[al-Ghadamis] It seems to me that only one person of those whose names I mentioned has these qualities. I am certain that all those whose names I mentioned rejected terrorist practices. I believe that 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Huni is the man who would be most suitable for the coming stage.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is your assessment, so far, of Libya's position on turning over the two suspects?

[al-Ghadamis] To us, as Libyans and Arabs, turning over our citizens to any foreign country is unacceptable. As a Libyan citizen, I, too, would refuse to turn over the two Libyan citizens, because doing so, first of all, would violate the provisions of international law. Second, it would make our country fair game to anyone who wanted to violate its laws. These are matters which none of us can accept, regardless of the differences we may have with any regime in the Arab homeland.

[AL-MAJALLAH] One Libyan opposition organization announced that it was engaged in high-level coordination with the United States. That organization announced further that, if asked, it would cooperate with the United States in any strike that country may launch against Libya. To be specific, I am talking about the [Libyan National] Salvation Front, which is led by Col Haftar. What is your assessment of such a position?

[al-Ghadamis] Every organization has its own point of view. It has its own means and its own practices. As a Libyan citizen, I am quite confident that most Libyans do not support such a view. To us, any violation of our country and of its safety and sovereignty would be totally unacceptable.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Al-Qadhdhafi proposed that members of the opposition come to Libya and make their case to the People's Committees or to the People's Congresses. Do you think this is possible?

[al-Ghadamis] Present circumstances would not permit that. **[passage omitted]

Al-Huni: "Revolution Committees Must Be Dissolved and Tried"

'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Huni, is a former member of the Revolutionary Command Council, head of intelligence, and former foreign minister. He left the regime in 1975 and settled in Cairo. He met recently with Col. al-Qadhdhafi and had met previously with him in 1988 in Algiers. He is one of the names mentioned within the framework of the recent plans. AL-MAJALLAH met with him in his office in Cairo. He told AL-MAJALLAH the following:

[Al-Huni] I believe that the regime itself is now the prisoner of certain elements who are rejected internally before being rejected externally and internationally. There are elements who have harmed Libya in an unprecedented way throughout the world. There are calls for the trial of certain elements internally, not internationally. Some internal figures have contacted the regime itself and made a number of proposals in a memorandum meant primarily to spare Libya a foreign strike or act of aggression, which we can do without, and also meant to give Mu'ammar [al-Qadhdhafi] and the regime a chance, if there is an intention to introduce change or reform. There was a pressing opportunity. At the beginning, there was some response to some of the proposals we submitted. They [the Libyan regime] held a series of contacts with us and we discussed the issue at length, to the extent that some papers in the Arab world thought that change was imminent. The news was leaked by the Libyan regime as a feeler to gauge the mood at home before assessing attitudes abroad. After a while the issue was, to our surprise, completely dropped and there were no more contacts.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Why?

[Al-Huni] It was said that Mu'ammar himself said that he could not personally decide the matter and that it should be submitted to a General People's Congress, but it was not raised at all during the latest General People's Congress. So, clearly the proposals appear to have been frozen, despite the other choices available to them. The latest information we have is that Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi himself will present these topics to the General People's Congress and seek its opinion. If the opinion is taken for agreement there, then the contact will be become official, as will the negotiations. However, thus far no topics are being advanced. This means that this idea is being discarded. This has become evident, particularly because it has recently been announced by Mu'ammar himself that he refuses to have anything external imposed upon himself, by either countries or by Libyan citizens. These topics will surely persuade the People's Congress, so that the aforementioned topics will emerge solely as a Libyan matter.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you expect this matter to be raised at the People's Congress meeting, which will begin after Ramadan?

[Al-Huni] We hope so. I believe that the opportunity to emerge from this difficulty presently exists.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Who are the national forces that signed the memorandum?

[Al-Huni] Most of the national forces presented this memorandum, with the exception of certain organizations.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Such as?

[Al-Huni] All those working abroad who do not belong to organizations adopted this memorandum, with the exception of the NFSL, as well as the Grouping, which is still considering it. There are perhaps several other organizations that have agreed to the memorandum, such as the National Organization, which has partially agreed to it, and the NFSL, which has not yet had a chance to review the memo for acceptance or rejection.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Specifically, on what do you agree and on what do you disagree with Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi?

[Al-Huni] I agree with Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi that the Libyan citizens accused of blowing up the airliner should not be handed over and brought to trial before a foreign court. I disagree with him on one thing, namely on the revolutionary committees, or the elements who have committed crimes against the Libyan people. They should face trial in Libyan courts as soon as possible.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Apart from the recent incident, what about the general situation?

[Al-Huni] Libya had good relations with all the world's states. As a small state, we should be eager to establish good ties with all states around the world. This would, above all, be in the Libyan people's interest. What have we gained from the boycott imposed on us by the United States? All it means is that we will have to purchase items at many times their original price. All this drains the Libyan people's resources.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Can't you find one point of agreement with al-Qadhafi?

[Al-Huni] He advanced the idea of Arab unity, even at the working level. However, we are still dreaming of Arab unity and power. This state of affairs by rationality and in due course.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you prepared to cooperate with Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi again?

[Al-Huni] In Libya's interest, why not?

[AL-MAJALLAH] Under what conditions?

[Al-Huni] Of course, under specific conditions and with a program on which we agree and to which we all commit ourselves.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What are the features of that program, and what would be the goal after that program?

[Al-Huni] The program we have proposed and sent to Mu'ammār consists of nine points. The first and basic point is the confirmation of Mu'ammār's seriousness about introducing change. It calls for the exposure of everyone who participated in or whose name was linked to terrorist operations at home or abroad. The second point calls for an extensive, comprehensive, and unlimited interrogation of the persons who stand accused. The third point calls for full cooperation with investigative authorities at home and abroad with the aim of identifying those who committed terrorist crimes. The fourth and, as far as we are concerned, most important point is upholding the rule of law. Without the rule of law, the security and freedom of the public will remain in danger. The fifth point is building bridges of trust inside Libya. That calls for the dissolution of all the press organs. The sixth point is the immediate declaration of a general national charter which would abolish all laws and decisions contrary to the International Declaration of Human Rights. The seventh point is a general declaration of goodwill. These are the main points that we proposed in a memorandum that did reach and was handed to Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you believe that a military strike against Libya could solve the problem?

[Al-Huni] On the contrary, I believe that any military strike or internal action of anarchy would be dangerous, because it could lead to Libyan division. Any military strike would affect only the Libyan public. The price would be paid by ordinary Libyan citizens. There is no justification for any foreign power to strike Libya.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you expect a military strike?

[Al-Huni] I believe it unlikely in the near future.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Have you been consulted or has your opinion been sought regarding the question of launching a strike or the attitude that should be taken toward Libya in the next phase?

[Al-Huni] I have no connection with any foreign party, establishment, or state. That is a fact. I do not believe that any Libyan organization would be consulted about a strike against Libya. I don't think that there are any Libyan organizations that can take a position on a strike directed at Libya—regardless of whether or not these organizations say that they agree with each other. These organizations would not have had any prior knowledge of a strike. They are being used as pawns and do not actually have a role, in my estimation, whether by America or other persons with whom we aren't necessarily acquainted.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you think that the opposition abroad has leaders or links inside Libya?

[Al-Huni] Certainly, because Libya has a small population, just over 4 million. So of course, we have contacts on the inside.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Have you been contacted by the current Libyan regime or offered participation in the regime in one way or another?

[Al-Huni] They contacted me and I contacted them. The initiative was by both sides. My main aim is to get Libya out of this predicament, regardless of whether someone else or I play the important part in that. That is the main objective.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Has any formula for cooperation been put forward?

[Al-Huni] The idea you mentioned has to start from the ground up.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are there any candidates inside the current Libyan regime or outside Libya who are able to play a significant role in the coming period?

[Al-Huni] Many candidates. Moreover, I believe that contact has been made with a large number of Libyans abroad.

[AL-MAJALLAH] You have, among other things, called for a transitional period in which Abu-Bakr Yunis would play a major role. What are the justifications for such a proposal, and what is your concept of such a transitional period?

[Al-Huni] I suggested Abu-Bakr Yunis because there may be some reservations regarding me personally, on account of the many years that I have lived abroad. Some people see that as being out of touch with Libya. I suggested Abu-Bakr because he is part of the regime and is known for his honesty, having no knowledge about matters of terrorism and having played no part in that. Furthermore, Abu-Bakr is also acceptable to the armed forces and acceptable at the Arab level. The important and essential point is that Abu-Bakr does not inspire fear and bears no grudge against anyone. He does not want to wreak vengeance on anyone. That is important at present. I believe that if spiteful people were to achieve power Libya would suffer tragedies. I believe that Abu-Bakr bears no grudges and has no personal scores to settle. He is also a man for democratic dialogue and is acceptable to all.

Some people asked me why I did not suggest 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, who is a statesman who has exercised power, but 'Abd-al-Salam may not be acceptable to some elements inside and outside Libya. That is why the most suitable person at the present time is Abu-Bakr Yunis. He can help the colonel at this stage.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In your view, what role could al-Qadhafi play in the next phase? Is there a part he could play to get himself out of this dilemma?

[Al-Huni] I believe that there is a lot he can do. The most important thing he can do is dissolve the revolutionary committees as a first step, draw up a program, and set a timetable that would confirm that the country was on its way to change.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Are you prepared to start a dialogue with the regime on possible political and economic changes for the next phase, and could such dialogue take place in Libya?

[Al-Huni] Inside Libya? No, that would be impossible as long as certain elements are there around him. Outside Libya, however, I am ready at any time.

[AL-MAJALLAH] How do you assess the position of the Salvation Front and Colonel Haftar, who announced in Washington that he had a unit that was being trained and that he was ready to cooperate?

[Al-Huni] I personally wish that he were not involved in such a thing. This is because if Libyan elements were used by a foreign power and planted inside Libya, the situation would become very bad and there would be division in Libya. I wish he would reconsider. I actually believe it unlikely that the Americans would need a Libyan force. They have massive capabilities. I believe this whole thing is a media stunt.

Al-Bakush Tells AL-MAJALLAH, "Any Military Action Against Libya Would Be Stupid"

[AL-MAJALLAH] When you consider unfolding events, do you think that this problem will end with the Libyan regime agreeing to turn over the two suspects, or will it maintain its position?

[al-Bakush] Several points can be touched upon in answering this question. The first one is this: The makeup and the conduct of the Libyan regime over the past 22 years lead me to affirm that the regime will not turn over the two suspects in the Lockerbie incident, nor will it turn over the other suspects from Libyan intelligence who have been implicated in the accident of the French airplane.

The second point: The evidence that the Libyan regime will not turn over the suspects in these terrorist cases is the confusion that is evident in Libya's statements and conduct. This deliberate confusion brings to mind Libya's political conduct on the international scene, and that leads me to state with absolute certainty that al-Qadhafi will not turn over the suspects to anyone.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Libya is still asserting that it was not involved in the accident. Do you have information that would confirm or deny Libyans' or Libya's involvement in this matter?

[al-Bakush] It is the conduct of the Libyan regime over the past 22 years which leads me to believe that Libya bears responsibility for these accidents. The Libyan regime was involved in terrorist operations in the Philippines, in northern Ireland, and in many countries in

South America and in Europe. Libya had some relationship in the past with almost any terrorist group whose name one could mention. And yet, right now, the world is accusing Libya, but it is not convicting it.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you agree with Libya's position and its refusal to turn over the two suspects, or do you believe that it would be better to turn them over?

[al-Bakush] I personally believe that the suspects must be put on trial, and they must be turned over.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Should they be turned over to those international investigators who are asking for them?

[al-Bakush] Yes, yes.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Don't you believe that turning them over would somehow diminish Libyan sovereignty?

[al-Bakush] No. Traditional sovereignty as we've known it since the early years of this century is no longer that which is recognized by the new world order. There are two issues here: the sovereignty issue and that of human rights and justice.

I am not calling for a strike against the people of Libya by the United States, but this crisis, which was contrived and is being exacerbated by the Libyan regime, is a crisis that the Libyan regime itself concocted. It must bear the responsibility for this crisis and for its consequences. Lining up with the Libyan regime on this matter under the pretext of standing beside the Libyan people is not the issue here.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you believe that the aim of the hardline position taken by the West vis-a-vis the Libyan position is to get Libya to turn over the suspects? Is fighting terrorism the aim of that position, and beyond that, is the West aiming for an attempt to overthrow or replace the regime?

[al-Bakush] It is difficult for me to know what other people have in mind, but it appears to us, based on our understanding of events, that people are fully convinced that the Libyan regime was responsible for the accident of the two airplanes: the Lockerbie accident and that of the French airplane which crashed in Niger. Given the premise of responsibility for the victims' lives and the activities of those victims' families in Britain and in the United States in particular, we find that British and American authorities are under pressure to pursue this matter. It seems that American and British authorities have evidence that leads them to believe that the charge is a serious one. That is why they feel that they must continue pressing for this demand. I do not know, however, if they intend to deal with the Libyan regime or if they intend to overthrow it.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Were you asked by anyone for your thoughts and ideas on the feasibility of a military strike at this stage? Did anyone ask for your opinion on what measures can be taken in this regard?

[al-Bakush] No one seeks my opinions except fellow Libyans. I am, however, against any military action that would be undertaken against Libya, because while Libyans would die and Libyan homes would be destroyed in any such military action, the one who is responsible for this terrorist activity would not be harmed. Any military strike against Libya will serve the Libyan regime. The West tried that in 1986. Repeating such a military action, which I strongly oppose, would be stupid and counterproductive. None of the hoped-for results from military action materialized.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Moderation has prevailed in Libyan politics over the past two years. What is your assessment of that moderation?

[al-Bakush] I hear about the Libyan moderation of recent years, but when I look for it, I do not find it.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What, then, is the change that you expect?

[al-Bakush] I believe that if change is to come about, it will come about from within Libya itself.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did the Libyan regime contact you previously in an attempt to persuade you to come back to Libya?

[al-Bakush] No.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Col. Haftar, who has a military group, announced in Washington that he will harness all his resources and put them to work for any military action that would be undertaken against Libya.

[al-Bakush] There is a group of former Libyan military officers who were prisoners in Chad. Thousands of Libyans were taken prisoner in Chad after Libya's defeat in that country. Some of them managed to get out of Chad and are living in Europe and in America. Those people are affiliated with the [Libyan] National Salvation Front which is actually the leading organization of the Libyan opposition. The salvation front is the most effective Libyan opposition group; it is the one that is most capable of standing up to the Libyan regime.

MAURITANIA

Health Minister Discusses Funding for Projects

92AF0845A Nouakchott AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Mohamed Ould Abdelhay: "Director of Health and Population Project: 'Project Is Step Toward Controlling Health, Human Realities'"]

[Text] Due to the special situation characterized by countrywide climatic and economic difficulties during the eighties, and in deference to the general framework of government policy priorities (the support and payment program), the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs has chosen to make the greatest possible effort in the

context of certain important health sector priorities and to set a policy aimed at effective social activity to stop the stubborn deterioration of living conditions.

Social Affairs Development Plan

The ministry's health plan forms part of the continued development of this sector and of the efforts already made.

In the health area, the economic and fiscal reform program has called for seeking financial participation by citizens. The funding agencies are assuming partial responsibility for investment and private sector development costs.

Some of the set goals in the equipment reoperationalization area have been realized; however, goals such as spreading health care and supplying basic medicines have not been realized. The reason lies in the limited means and operating capacities available to a central system as well as an inadequate drug supply and distribution system.

The support and payment program for 1989-1991 aimed at continuing these goals, some of which have been achieved. The government is pursuing the goal of health for all Mauritians, as demonstrated by the regular increase in the budget of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The new Health Ministry regulation and Decentralization Decree 64089 issued on 17 May 1989 constitute a great leap forward.

The ministry has prescribed major choices and designed strategies to continue previous activities. The health and population project represents the backbone of health options and strategies during the coming years.

Realizing the nationwide importance of this project, we contacted Mr. Abdallah Ould Mohamed Lahbib, director of the Health and population project.

Speaking about the project, he said that health and population policies will depend on this project during the coming years. He said that the connection of population to the Health Ministry might be regarded as dubious. To explain the connection, [he said] that the project first began as a health project. Because the government asked the funders to fund a project for human resources, the funders asked that this project be joined to an agency that had begun to deal with them. Thus, the project began as a project for health and population.

Beginning

The project began in 1988 with the establishment of the unit charged with its preparation. Preparation of the project began on the basis of studies falling in the framework of the support and payment plan, which includes various aspects in the fields of health and population.

The health aspect of the project is based on three main points. First, the project aims at buttressing and strengthening the reforms undertaken as part of the decentralization instituted by the decree of 17 May mandating the establishment of regional offices for health and social work. Implementation of this policy means monitoring human, financial, and physical resources. An administrative order has been issued in this context to define this policy and the resources needed for its implementation.

This policy calls for restructuring the Health Ministry. Under this restructuring, the ministry will become a unit for planning, monitoring, and supervising. This requires the provision of certain human resources.

The second point of the project calls for supporting national health programs that must be operated at the central level, such as the education for health program, the nutrition program, the motherhood and family health program, and the basic medicines supply program, to make them available to all social classes. It also calls for supporting the department responsible for health information, so that it can perform its work as fully as possible.

The third point is the legal framework. Among other things, this means creating the necessary legal framework for citizen participation in operating health bureaus. Experiments have been made in this field. Some residents' health committees have been formed to operate certain health units. The health units consist of 500 health units located in Mauritanian villages. Health centers at the rural community level consist of 120 centers. Health centers at the department level consist of 53 centers. The health and population program supports these approaches.

Second Half

The project's second half, involving population, means two essential points: incorporating women into development activities, and supporting the Department of Human Resources created in 1991 in the Planning Ministry.

The first document by the unit charged with preparing and drafting the project was submitted in December 1989. The document was distributed by funders in 1990, and that phase was followed in September 1991 by negotiations for funding.

These negotiations led to acceptance of the project by funders. An agreement with the World Bank, the principal funder, was signed on 2 March 1992.

An agreement with the African Bank, the second funder, was signed on 25 February 1992. The director of the health and population project said that "After preparing the project, we found that the customary international organizations that support the health sector as well as bilateral governmental cooperation agencies were ready to participate in funding the project."

Funding contributions are as follows:

- The World Bank: \$7.15 million over six years;
- The African Bank for Development: \$12.4 million;
- The United Nations Fund for Population Activities: \$3 million;
- The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): \$2.4 million;
- The French Government Cooperation Agency: \$3 million; and
- The German Government Cooperation Agency: \$2.3 million.

We will examine the components of this project in greater detail in subsequent installments.

Status of Press Sector Reported

92AF0845B Nouakchott AL-SHA'B in Arabic 19 Apr 92 pp 5, 17

[Article by Mohamed El-Hafez Ould Mohamed: "Press Freedom a Reality That Newspapers Embody, Law Protects"]

[Text] The constitution guarantees all citizens universal and individual freedoms in a way that gives each citizen confidence that his freedoms will remain protected; for these freedoms are guaranteed by the constitution, which specifies that freedom can be restricted only by law. Thus the constitution eradicates despotism, injustice, and oppression, and lays firm foundations for a state of law where all enjoy justice and equity.

Weighty Responsibility

Although the tenth section of the constitution mentions many freedoms specifically, our concern here is freedom of opinion and thought and freedom of expression.

For it was only two weeks after the constitution was ratified that the legal provisions related to freedom of the press were promulgated—on 25 July 1991—to codify the exercise of press freedom and grant each citizen the right to information.

The preamble to this legal text focused on the citizen's right to be informed of the truth on matters that concern him, or concern his country, or relate to international issues, and his right to enjoy freedom of expression. Without this, the media cannot play their role in economic and social development, enriching culture, and developing thought.

The preamble of this text stresses the great responsibility devolving on all parties concerned with this noble task.

It specifies that "these parties, including public authorities, journalists, and beneficiaries of the information process—all components of society—must assume the duty to obey certain basic principles based on tolerance, respect for others, fairness, honesty, adherence to the ideals of freedom and social justice, defense of human rights, and the pursuit of peace among peoples."

The preamble affirms the following principles:

- Respect for the principles of Islam and for national cultural values;
- The dedication of all to the general interest;
- Creating conditions that guarantee the independence of journalists and protect their professional honor;
- Giving priority to correctness of facts and honesty of expression;
- Full respect for the private life of citizens;
- Commitment specifically to avoiding unsound means and methods, such as forgery, blackmail, and exaggeration, to obtain information, documents, or pictures;
- Preserving professional secrecy;
- Rejection by journalists of the pursuit of sensationalism;
- Vigilance by all who benefit from this vital institution to preserve the desired level; and
- Guaranteeing pluralism, with no person or group allowed to monopolize control of any information sector, because that could imperil the right to information.

Twenty-Eight Newspapers Available to Readers

The 83 sections of the press law codify the spirit of this preamble and the obligatory principles it includes.

The wait was not long, for independent newspapers appeared in ever increasing numbers only a few days after the promulgation of this text. Pluralism appeared in its most visible form, and freedom of expression was exercised to the utmost limit.

The number of periodicals that appeared because of the promulgation of the press law reached 28. Today they embody freedom of the press in the country under the democratic system whose dawn we are experiencing.

Free Newspapers Respect the Law

According to information provided to us by Mr. Ahmed Ould El-Moustafa, the director of information, the newspapers currently being published are:

1) MIR'AT AL-MUJTAMA', 2) AL-ZAMAN, 3) AL-KHIYAR, 4) AL-TANMIYAH, 5) AL-SABIL, 6) AL-QAFILAH, 7) SHANQIT, 8) DA'IRAT AL-DAW', 9) AL-BAWWABAH, 10) AL-BASA'IR, 11) AL-BUSHRA, 12) AL-BADIL, 13) AL-DIYA', 14) AL-ISLAH, 15) AL-SHABAKAH, 16) AL-SHUMU', and 17) SAWT AL-WAHDAH.

Newspapers in French: 1) MAURITANIE DEMAIN, 2) LE TEMPS, 3) LA TORTUE, 4) L'EVAIL, 5) LEBJAWI, 6) LE SPORTIF, 7) AL-BAYANE, 8) MAURITANIE NOUVELLE, 9) EVOLUTION, 10) REGARDS, and 11) EL-MOUSTAGBAL.

They range from weeklies and biweeklies to monthlies. They appeared regularly during the presidential election campaign and after the campaigns. Each newspaper has a press run of about 2,000 copies, and their distribution ratio is between 25 and 45 percent.

These newspapers have respected the law. Confiscation has been ordered in only one case to date, that of MAWRITANIYA AL-GHAD, which returned to publishing after conforming to the law. Not a single case is now before the courts, and no newspaper has been punished to date.

Government Aids Free Newspapers

Mr. Ahmed Ould El-Moustafa, the director of information, thinks the government is making great efforts to aid these newspapers. Last October it lowered the cost of printing at the national press by 26 percent, and an additional 8-percent reduction was subsequently added, bringing the total to 34 percent, in addition to lowering the cost of credits to cover newspaper debts falling due.

All measures have been taken to solve the problem of distributing the free press. Ten distribution points have been granted, as well as a headquarters for the newspapers' general association. Furthermore, we are giving them all the administrative facilities to guarantee that they carry out their mission as fully as possible.

Where Is the Specialized Press?

In his capacity as a journalist, rather than as director of information, colleague Ahmed Ould El-Moustafa thinks that the kinds of free press have not yet become regularized and that its selection and treatment lack news and investigations. We see nothing in it but political ideas. No specialized journalism has appeared in it, such as children's and women's journalism, although we have reached the stage for this sort of journalism, with young people forming 60 percent of the population, and women over 50 percent; yet there still is only a general press. We believe that the political side of things cannot fill all these newspapers by itself. However, we realize that the press gets its funding only from advertisements and circulation. The former are few in number, and the latter is difficult due to the inability of the circulation market to absorb large numbers. So we know that one can find an excuse for the press.

Harmony Inspires Satisfaction

Although the independent press still suffers from some technical problems, one cause for satisfaction is how it has harmonized with the press law. It thus has confirmed that our people are worthy of democracy and mature enough to establish a state of law where all express their views freely and responsibly.

In this regard, we have tried to survey the views of a number of publishers and editors of independent newspapers that speak for political parties.

Thus, the French-language newspaper MAURITANIE NOUVELLE believes that the independent press needs the help of the public authorities to crystallize freedom of the press.

An official of MAURITANIE NOUVELLE introduces his newspaper and then reviews the conditions of the independent press. (See the accompanying box.)

We Utilize Freedom for Change and Reform

Editor in Chief Ahmed Ould Mih of the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, which speaks for the Democratic Social Republican Party, is proud of the qualitative and quantitative level the press has reached in this short period of time. Colleague Ahmed Ould Mih has given us many of his views on freedom of expression. (See the accompanying box.)

Hope Realized

Trying to make our survey of views comprehensive, we contacted four independent newspapers in addition to AL-JUMHURIYAH. Some of the responses arrived late, despite our urging from a desire to give the reader a comprehensive idea of the views of those who supervise the newspapers concerning the extent to which the press law has been applied.

In any event, our people today enjoy freedom of expression protected by the law through provisions to which the constitutional institutions adhere and whose implementation they protect. This is something to which our people and its vital forces have long aspired.

[Box, p 17]

"Our weekly, which was founded on 22 December 1991, has just published its 14th number. The newspaper was born after passage of the (limited) press freedom law. Since that time, it has tried to provide its readers with objective political, social, and economic news by means of analyses and reportage of events. Our weekly has a press run of between 2,000 and 2,500 copies each week. We employ the efforts of 11 persons: eight journalists, an editorial and design secretary, and two computer specialists. This staff enables us to rise to the challenge and overcome the difficulties every week, for the task is arduous.

"We have spared no effort to win the gamble. We have obtained quality fixtures, furnished buildings, a computer for storage, a computer for design, a printer, and a photocopier, in addition to documents. We always want to stay up to date."

"But we have not gone very far with our individual effort. We therefore need the help of the public authorities, by lightening the limit on press freedom."

"Furthermore, they should allow us [access] to information considered 'state secret.' The independent newspapers also should be given a printing press that will enable the newspapers published to be designed and printed. Without these measures, the free press will be only a mirage. The crisis it is now experiencing is the greatest indication of this."

MAWRITANIYA AL-JADIDAH [MAURITANIE
NOUVELLE

[Box, p 17]

"As a newspaper editor, I am very happy that the door of press freedom has been opened. Although the newspaper is committed to the line of the party whose opinion it expresses, I have never felt that there are any censor's scissors, whether of a party or of an official in management. I think this is the case for all the newspapers that have appeared from the onset of the democratic process to the present."

"I, like any Mauritanian, can be proud of the qualitative and quantitative level the press has reached in this short period of time. It is a level that the press has not reached in countries that have known democracy before us and that possess many times more human and material resources than we."

"Freedom of speech in a developing, backward country such as ours is no easy matter; yet that is what in fact has been realized. It augurs well for the success of the democratic process; for the freedom of the fourth estate, the press, forms the first guard of this process and its main guide."

"Freedom of expression has not been limited to the press. Every individual in our people expresses his opinion however and wherever he will, frankly, and without offense or harassment. The people have said everything they want to say and have now raised all the subjects that used to be forbidden. This has happened in the newspapers, information media, gatherings, festivals, and other occasions of expression."

"All I hope is that this will all take place within the ethical and religious framework of our society and that we utilize it for change and reform to reach what is better."

Editor in Chief, AL-JUMHURIYAH

MOROCCO

'Islamic Group' Becomes Political Party

92AF0781A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 May 92 p 1

[Article by Talhah Jibril]

[Text] Rabat, Talhah Jibril. Members of the Islamic Group in Morocco submitted an official application to establish a political party named the National Renewal Party. 'Abd-al-Ilah ibn Kiran, the anticipated leader of the new party, told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that he does not yet know what position the authorities will take towards this request, but he expressed optimism about the chances of getting an official license. He indicated that his group is not making any contact with other political powers in order to coordinate with them.

It might be mentioned that Ibn Kiran and a number of his companions had been detained during the eighties. After they were released, they continued to carry on their activities in the name of the "Islamic Group," which later turned into the "Group for Reform and Renewal."

It should also be noted that another group, led by 'Abd-al-Salam Yasin, the "Group for Justice and Right," is in its turn trying to obtain legitimacy.

Aherdane Comments on Elections, Opposition

92AF0854A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 May 92 p 6

[Interview with Mahjoubi Aherdane, leader of the Moroccan National Popular Movement, by Hatim Bitioui in Rabat; date not given]

[Text] Mahjoubi Aherdane, secretary general of the Moroccan National Popular Movement, called upon political parties to turn over a new leaf of Moroccan political life and act as if Morocco has just won its independence.

Aherdane, in an interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, said he would welcome the postponement of the elections, which would benefit his movement organizationally, but he pointed out that he never advocated the postponement. He said that he considers the elections to be a secondary issue and that only the spirit in which they will be held will be of significance.

Aherdane criticized the property declaration act recently passed by the parliament, and asserted that people who profited in the past should be held accountable.

Aherdane discussed his relations with Dr. Abdelkarim el Khatib, secretary general of the Constitutional Popular Movement; his position on allowing fundamentalists to found political parties; and other Moroccan developments.

The text of the interview follows:

[Bitioui] Do you believe that the elections will be held as scheduled?

[Aherdane] I don't know. Our movement would benefit if the elections were postponed because, as you know, we returned to work only last June, but not with a presence in the political arena. Our structure is not yet complete. The strugglers and the grassroots are still coming into the movement.

[Bitioui] Do I understand by this that you would rather the elections were postponed?

[Aherdane] We would welcome a postponement, because that would give us more time to organize; but I have never advocated that. We are ready for them at any time public interests dictate.

It is to be noted that when inaugurating the municipal debate, the sovereign said that the new elections bill

would have to be passed into law before 4 May if the elections were to be held on time.

There is something else that escaped everybody's attention. The king said "if you want the elections to be held as scheduled." Elections are not paramount. The important thing is where we want to go and what we want Morocco to become. It is important that Moroccans know what they want. Do they only want elections, fair or rigged, and no changes in the status quo? Or do they want to rebuild Morocco on a sensible foundation?

Enough talk and wasting time. Let us turn over a new leaf and conduct ourselves as if we have just won independence. We should differentiate between good and bad; re-examine social, economic, and cultural programs; and embark on a new strategy to rebuild Morocco. Therefore, elections are of secondary importance to me. I am interested only in the spirit in which they will be held.

I wonder why Morocco suffers so much. By examining the past, we find that political organizations did not offer guarantees to secure the future. We must all be practical, undergo self-criticism, and admit to the calamities that we committed.

For instance, the property declaration law was passed in parliament yesterday, but how about accountability for past malfeasance, and people who lived by profiteering and not by the sweat of their brow? Yes, we must hold accountable those who were at the bottom and rose to the top. It is regrettable that those very persons would stand up today to decry the state of the country. I keep asking: Where do we want to go? The way is clear and the differences between right and wrong are obvious.

[Bitioui] Since you founded the National Popular Movement, you have been speaking more like the opposition than a loyalist, but yet you were recently received by the Moroccan sovereign as a member of the majority. Where do you stand exactly—with the majority or with the opposition?

[Aherdane] I don't fathom this differentiation between majority and opposition. We at the Popular National Movement hold to special concepts that are totally different from the thinking of other political organizations. We only want what is good for the country. In other words, I am neither with the majority nor with the opposition. I belong neither to the "artificial" majority nor to the boundary-stepping opposition. To put it very succinctly, I am for diligence and sensibility, wherever they are to be found. Consequently, I do not consider the present majority a majority, because it did not earn it. It consists of people who merely went to sleep and woke up at their targeted destination, so they seized the opportunity. Will we keep on repeating the mistakes of the past?

King Hassan II knows his country well. The main concern, then, is to hand responsibility over to honest, clean hands that would serve the interests of the people. The king would be assured then, and so would the

people. As I said, we indulge in a lot of rhetoric, but will we stick to our platforms when we assume responsibility and govern?

I have always advocated a serious and sensible approach, in or out of the government. I am likewise opposed to frivolity, in or out of the government.

[Bitioui] There was coordination, then, between your party and opposition parties?

[Aherdane] I prefer the term "outside the government" rather than the term "opposition." There is coordination among those parties, but we did not coordinate with them.

[Bitioui] And in the future?

[Aherdane] As God wishes.

[Bitioui] You demanded, on May Day, the release of unionist Mohamed Noubir al-Amaoui. I would like to know your view on this issue.

[Aherdane] To start with, injustice terrifies me, especially since I myself have been wronged and, but for the grace of God, could have ended up in jail if the truth had not come out. This is why I denounce injustice. Al-Amaoui's remarks about the government are no cause for his imprisonment, because the current government deserves to be disparaged. It is true that it includes important persons for whom I have respect. At its core, however, the government is not up to snuff. Likewise, we should not forget that the opposition is not above reproach either. It joined the government and has been a partner to the acts the government committed.

I have called for al-Amaoui's release and for the release of the youths arrested after the 10 December 1990 incidents. I should mention that I do not know al-Amaoui personally, and I have never met him.

[Bitioui] Are you sympathetic to al-Amaoui because both of you have been afflicted with the EL PAIS [the Spanish newspaper which published interviews with both men] curse? It is common knowledge that your problems resulted from interviews with that newspaper!

[Aherdane] Indeed, there is a curse. There is a spiritual bond between us; and our problems stemmed from EL PAIS newspaper. This is why I have an interest in al-Amaoui's case and have kept up on it as much as possible.

[Bitioui] Dr. el Khatib, secretary general of the Constitutional Popular Movement, has announced his return to politics. Both of you are outside the mother popular movement. Would you consider an alliance, especially in view of your good relations?

[Aherdane] Dr. el Khatib is one of the wonderful figures of this country. He has an honorable past and he lives a simple life. He earns his living by the sweat of his brow,

as a physician. Our friendship is strong and solid, and I would be honored to put my hand in his.

You mentioned communicating with him, but what sort of communications would you have between two brothers and friends who have struggled and endured together in the past? He has tried me and I have tried him.

[Bitiou] I mentioned the mother popular movement—but where is it? Rather, what is its name and who watches over it?

[Aherdane] I'll tell you what we have done for the mother popular movement. We shot a long-range missile called the National Popular Movement. To those who insist on the popular movement name, I say it is a tarnished name.

[Bitiou] Are you optimistic about the work of the Arbitration Committee?

[Aherdane] The issues we discussed in this committee boil down to this: The sovereign should know that we want power to the government and power to the people. The future would be guaranteed by devotion between government and people, not by whether the elections are free.

[Bitiou] How do you envision post-election Morocco?

[Aherdane] I have no concepts of an old Morocco and a new Morocco. My concept is of Morocco and Moroccans. Does having sons mean something new? If you ask me whether I stand with the old or with the new, I would tell you that there is a link between the old and the new. Tomorrow's new can only be rooted in yesterday's experience. One thing that I cannot abide is this insistent demand for the new. This is not like changing a shirt or a shoe.

Young people must be trained in certain matters, so they will not be excluded from the arena. Youths must be given the means they need to play their role without making the same mistakes we did. We were youthful once ourselves, so young people have never left the arena.

Generally speaking, the new Morocco should be based on the old Morocco. The old Morocco, since the time of independence, has made mistakes that should be avoided [in the future]. There were political organizations that committed grievous mistakes by advocating a single-party system and rallying behind the "Morocco for us, but not for others" slogan.

[Bitiou] You say that the new Morocco must be rooted in the old, but you also said that in order to advance, Moroccans must forget the past and conduct themselves as if they have just won independence?

[Aherdane] I meant analyzing our past. By utilizing the experiences of the past, we can progress towards a prosperous future. Analysis is necessary to sort out the

experiences of the past. We must analyze well and make decisions based on our findings. Let those who harvest the seeds they planted rejoice in the fruits of their labor.

[Bitiou] How do you envision the future of the National [Popular] Movement in light of post-election Moroccan politics?

[Aherdane] I see a prosperous National Popular Movement. Why would it be prosperous? Because it is of no importance to us whether we are a majority or a minority in the next parliament. We also are attractive to youths and the grassroots because our movement is rooted in reasonable concepts.

Let me tell you something. We are totally different from those who are interested in achieving a majority in order to serve their private interests. Our concern is for the empowerment of the government and of the people.

[Bitiou] You wrote in an editorial in your party's newspaper that there is a national consensus that the current government is bankrupt and that Morocco is taking off in another direction towards democracy—a direction given impetus by the Moroccan sovereign when he formed the Arbitration Committee to review the elections law. You also said that the trend lacked only a strong government. How do you envision such a government? Would it be a national coalition or a government by technocrats who would oversee the elections?

[Aherdane] The truth is, I have no specific format in mind. The important thing is to select the individuals and re-examine certain "artificial" political organizations. Anything artificial will always remain artificial and will get nowhere without falsification and without assistance from someone or another.

It is essential that government is committed to the concept of mutual trust, as I mentioned earlier.

[Bitiou] If you were called to join the government, what conditions would you demand?

[Aherdane] Our only condition is that the issues be sensible and articulated. I say that King Hassan II can depend on us, in or out of the government. Our only interest is the prosperity of our country.

On the occasion of May Day, I called for replacing the present government. I tell you now that I have many friends in that government, but I generally articulate the wishes of the people, so I am putting my personal observations and feelings aside.

The current government is, in fact, a lame government that hastens to involve King Hassan II whenever it encounters problems. This is what the people say. What, then, does the government do?

[Bitiou] Ali Yata, secretary general of the opposition Party for Progress and Socialism [PPS], said in an interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that political

party leaders have aged and must be replaced. Have you thought of retiring? Is it true that you remain involved in political action only to spite your opponents who removed you from the mother popular movement?

[Aherdane] Please help me get my supporters to accept my retirement from politics. This has nothing to do with one individual or another. Each of us must do his job to the very end and this is why I practice politics—not as a vocation but as a duty. If Mr. Ali Yata wants to hand the torch over to someone else, that is his business.

I asked my supporters at the National Popular Movement's constituent assembly to name the person they want elected secretary general. I did not tell them that I sought the job. There is a spiritual bond between me and them based on friendship, amity, and love of country. Retirement does not concern me, because that is an employment concept and I am nobody's employee. I do my duty by my supporters and wish for someone who would carry the torch and assume the responsibility. We in the National Popular Movement have not been able to get rid of several of the problems that we had in the past seven years. We are now about to organize ourselves. I say with all objectivity that we would like, after the elections, to form a strong organizational conference [administrative structure] that would make it possible for me as secretary general, should God prolong my life, to perform my duties to the very end.

As for the mother popular movement from which I was removed, I say that it wasn't Laensar (the current minister of posts and telecommunications) who removed me. The issue has to do with more than two, or five, or eight individuals. You know who is behind all of this and there is no point in belaboring the issue.

[Bitiou] Frankly, I don't know who removed you!

[Aherdane] In fact, they did not remove me. The power, represented by the strugglers, remained with me. The National Popular Movement is only an extension of the popular movement. We added the word National because we expanded, but those who wish to wear the old garment may continue to do so. People don new clothes on feast days, and we are now feasting.

[Bitiou] How do you view Islamic movements in Morocco? Are you for giving them the right to form parties?

[Aherdane] I am a Muslim, so why should I consider another to be more of a Muslim than I am? I recall that when the late Mohamed V went into exile, people used to say that he was exiled because of Islam. When Mohamed V returned to his homeland, Moroccans considered it a victory for Islam. I cannot, therefore, accept that an individual be considered more of a Muslim than another. I have every respect for religious people, but I support the call for a liberal Islam, an Islam of freedom. Bad character is not the result of not wearing a veil or a jalabiyah [traditional men's robe]. Islam is in the heart in action, and in the struggle.

I would like to point something out. There has to be some sort of dialogue with them. I am opposed to turning Morocco into another Algeria and I believe that Muslims dislike sedition and do not condone riots. We don't have to lose several lives to disturbances before we can say that we are Muslims.

I also believe the fundamentalists have several avenues to enter the political field as part of existing organizations, until they establish themselves within these organizations and influence them to bolster our customs and traditions, and in order to serve the motherland.

I therefore reiterate that the best avenue to political action is to join political organizations. I say that the ranks of our party include fundamentalist strugglers, and that I am in constant dialogue with them. We debate until one side wins over the other, and we consequently work very hard to politically implement their ideas.

Trials of Opposition Newspapers Criticized

92AF0854B Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI
in Arabic 13 May 92 p 1

[Editorial: "The Timing of the Trials of Democratic Newspapers"]

[Text] Today, in Casablanca, begins the trial of our newspaper, AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI, in the persons of its director, brother Mohammed al-[Barini]; and our colleague staff writer, Abdelkadir al-[Haymer]. Meanwhile, our colleague ANOUAL is on trial in Rabat.

This trial is conspicuous by its timing. It is intended to take place at this crucial time in the nation's history, when two wills and two concepts have polarized. On one hand, there is national will, which calls for reforming political conditions, resolving the social crisis, and creating a climate conducive to an economic revival. It espouses an enlightened approach that defers to dialogue, democracy, and informed participation. On the opposite side stands the will of conservatism and the status quo. It rejects all changes and insists on perpetuating the conditions, mentalities, methods, and relations that prevailed over past decades as if no change or transformation has ever taken place in today's world and today's Morocco.

At this stage, when a bold and visionary option is proposed in order to put the country on the right track, the opponents of democratic progress are launching a barrage of confiscations and successive trials to constrict opposing views, be they political or unionist, all at once.

Immediately following the trial, conviction, and arrest of brother [Noubir] al-Amaoui, secretary general of the [Democratic Labor] Confederation [CDT] and member of its political bureau, the trial began of our colleague ANOUAL. An appeal by AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI to lift a prison sentence imposed by a court of first instance at the request of the public prosecutor will be

heard today. AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI will stand a second trial a few days later, on 18 May.

The orchestrators of this series of trials, which will no doubt engulf other patriotic papers, cannot explain them away by claiming that they are in response to slander or disrespect for the law. Rather, the correct explanation is that the opponents of democratic reform, the enemies of social dialogue, and those annoyed at the press for investigating the news, are quick to resort to all methods they believe would abort all reform attempts and prevent Morocco from embarking on true democracy rooted in a wider social base, in free choice, and in honest elections.

What is the purpose behind the trials of the patriotic press and behind suffocating freedom of expression when it is the [only] hope Moroccans have for saving the country from the vortex of fraud, mock institutions, and dialogues that are either contrived or non-existent? Since the opponents of democracy have put the future of the country at stake, they force the following question: Will the trial and sentencing of those with opposing views solve the problem? Will they eradicate corruption? Will they replenish shortfalls in housing, education, health, and justice?

Those who incite those trials and verdicts against opposing viewpoints are proving once again that they lack the ability to see the facts for what they are and to properly differentiate between [their] hostility for certain individuals and organizations and between endangering the ultimate welfare of the motherland.

We understand why we have to stand trials today, and tomorrow, and we will react on the basis of our realization that the trials only show that the opponents of democratic reforms are running scared and are flailing about in a vain attempt to stop the march of progress and development in our country.

Yazghi on Press Trials, Role of Journalists

92AF0880A Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI
in Arabic 23 May 92 p 3

[Interview with Mohamed Yazghi, USFP deputy in parliament and general secretary of the Moroccan Journalism Union, by Younes Mjahid; place and date not given: "Press Repression an Attempt to Keep Situation as It Has Been"—first paragraph is AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI introduction]

[Text] Mohamed Yazghi, the deputy first secretary of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and general secretary of the Moroccan National Journalism Union, talks to us about the political dimensions of press trials, the importance of the struggle in the information field, and the role of journalists and their union in setting the course of this struggle. He also talks to us in this interview about the power of public opinion in building democracy and the role of the opponents of change in stopping the continuous progress of the Moroccan people in determining their destiny.

Oppression Initiated Whenever Signs of Change Appear

[Mjahid] In the last few weeks we have seen a series of political trials, including a succession of trials against the press. How do you explain this sequence of events politically?

[Yazghi] As regards the present government, we were not surprised by its having initiated a series of political trials. Morocco is approaching a number of due dates this year. These relate to changing the constitution, guaranteeing honest elections, improving the political climate, and a number of ongoing social problems. As a matter of course, we were not surprised that the government initiated these trials under these circumstances. The government in fact wants to keep things the way they have been. It knows that freedom of the press and freedom of expression are a fundamental condition for democratizing society. Resorting to Section 55 of the press law of course is a brazen act. The section really relates to protecting persons, so that their private moral affairs revealed in court are not published generally. As for the trial of Noubir Amaoui, it is a trial of a member of the USFP political bureau and general secretary of the Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT); so it is a political trial. Everyone is treating it as a political trial. The mobilization this trial has witnessed and the broad solidarity that has arisen among national political parties, trade union organizations, and international trade union and political organizations show that the trial is political and that one therefore cannot resort to Section 55.

[Mjahid] These trials have coincided with talks about the election laws and constitutional reforms. This may be a general observation applicable to other periods in the history of Moroccan political life: whenever there were talks and discussion, there were trials and pressures at the same time.

[Yazghi] That is correct. The opponents of democracy stir whenever signs of change appear on the horizon. They want to abort any development to guarantee normal progress directed toward the future. The due dates that the Moroccan people are approaching, whether involving the constitution, guarantees of fair elections, or laws to guarantee this fairness, and for a national organization to monitor the honesty of elections—all these things have spurred the opponents of democracy into action; hence their rigid position rejecting all dialogue with the trade union organizations. Hence, also, the violent interventions against high school and university students in past weeks and months, the trials and prosecutions of the national press, and the harassment of the May 1 organization. This is all a plot to abort any continuous process to democratize the country's institutions and move the country out of its present condition into the 21st century.

Problem of Judicial Independence

[Mjahid] The conflict is clearly political. How can the judiciary be mobilized in this conflict, and how can the provisions of the law be used to exert pressure on the political level?

[Yazghi] This raises the problem of judicial independence. The national democratic political parties therefore have been raising this question continually. We have stressed the issue of judicial independence in official memoranda and statements. The executive system is dragging the judiciary into an area that is not its area. The confrontation should be political, pitting argument against argument and proposal against counterproposal, but the government is using the policy of the impotent, turning to the means of repression. Naturally, it is mobilizing the judiciary in the political conflict. The judiciary really should stay out of political controversies.

Unfortunately, the conduct of these trials has exposed the blatant intervention of the executive system.

[Mjahid] There is another side to the conflict: the subject of the media. Certainly there is a government monopoly of the public information media and harassment of the democratic press. How do you view this subject in light of the scheduled national debate on the media?

[Yazghi] This is the contradiction. On the one hand, the government announces that is preparing to hold a national debate on the media. Naturally, the Moroccan National Journalism Union had proposals. It wrote to the Ministry of Information about the subject and distributed the text of the correspondence to all journalists in the country to crystallize the basic terms of the debate. Yet, at the same time the government, or some parties in it, are move toward confronting the press. They are interpreting the law narrowly, in a way that gives no consideration to the stage through which Morocco is passing and the need to expand press freedom and harmonize with what is happening around us in the world. The media are moving more and more toward broader freedom and stronger guarantees to enable citizens to obtain the information needed to create public opinion. Without the formation of public opinion, there is no democracy.

A basic rule of democracy is that there should be public opinion supplied with all the facts and before which all views are presented. The government wants one view: that is what it does on radio and television, which it monopolizes to propagandize for its policy and "achievements," while closing the door to any other view. It does not want the national press to perform its role of enlightening public opinion and expanding its horizons, so that it becomes the fundamental element in making the scheduled debates bring the results required by the new circumstances of Morocco, Arab North Africa, and the world.

[Mjahid] Do you think that the current law accords with aspirations for media development?

[Yazghi] When the press law was launched in 1958, it was an advanced law, but in 1973 the government introduced retreats under the tragic circumstances Morocco was then experiencing. Naturally, the USFP has presented parliament with suggestions for revising these changes. Even more, it has put forward a complete proposal on public freedoms, taking into account the development in the area of freedoms at the international level, particularly in view of Morocco's ratification of international charters on 3 August 1979. These charters still have not been incorporated into a Moroccan legal text. Although there are some positive aspects in the law, it must be reviewed. As the government has confronted reporters with repression, so has it confronted development of the law by shelving the proposal on public freedoms that the USFP delegation in parliament submitted a number of years ago. The proposal has not been scheduled for debate despite the extension of the term of the current parliament.

Development of Moroccan National Journalism Union

[Mjahid] The Moroccan National Journalism Union is a basic tool in the struggle to democratize the information sector. The union is now expanding because a significant number of journalists are joining it or through establishing more branches. As general secretary of the union, how do you see its role in the ongoing struggle over the media and in defending journalists' rights and freedom of expression?

[Yazghi] The union certainly has witnessed expansion, especially with the establishment of branches in various regions of Morocco. We now have completed most of the branches; only the eastern Morocco branch remains, and its general meeting is about to be organized. Also, a women's committee has been established within the union, and it has raised women's journalism problems. All this has made journalists participate, on the one hand, in issues of freedoms because the issue of press freedom will become broader as people who work in the journalism field participate. On the other hand, they have been led to participate in defending their interests and improving their conditions. All this expansion and the many new memberships will lead to strengthening this cadre in the struggle for freedom of expression. It will give a legal framework to professional relations within media organizations. It will give impetus to reforming the laws dealing with the journalistic profession, laws that are now the subject of our discussion.

[Mjahid] How do you view the development of the structures of the Moroccan National Journalism Union?

[Yazghi] The union made a decision I consider positive when it proposed this new structuring with the founding of its branches. This will affect the structure of the union, which will enter a new stage, not in its way of operating, or in its organization, or in how it chooses its officials. The step following the organization of the branches will be one in which journalists themselves will have to decide the form and shape of the reforms that have to be

made to the basic law, the way of operating, the means of operating, and the new relations that should exist between journalists and union officials at the branch and national level.

[Mjahid] Let us return to the subject of press freedom. One sees that there has been a sad history of newspaper and magazine seizures and trials of newspapers and journalists. As we know, the newspaper AL-MUHARRIR is still banned. Do you not think the struggle focuses strongly on freedom of the press and the information media?

[Yazghi] The USFP press has suffered more systematic repression than any other. The newspapers AL-TAHRIR and AL-MUHARRIR have been stopped from publishing. Despite our demands that they be allowed to resume publication, we have not been allowed to resume publishing them. Now the newspaper of the USFP is being subjected to an unjust trial, an attempt to strangle it and prevent it from enlightening public opinion, because everyone knows that this press has credibility. Moroccan readers and citizens [word illegible] its work; they deem what it says to be in their interest, and that it [word illegible] to their problems. That is why there is much suppression of this [press] by opponents of democracy. They do not want Morocco to come of age. They do not want the Moroccan people to [word illegible] consciously in steering [word illegible] and participate in solving their problems and building their future.

Daily Criticizes Press Trial Postponement

92AF0880C Casablanca AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI in Arabic 23 May 92 p 1

[Editorial: "From Insistence on Trial to Indefinite Postponement"]

[Text] Lawyers, journalists, jurists, and interested persons following the trials of the newspapers AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI and ANOUAL have been surprised by the strange and abnormal way in which these trials have been halted and postponed indefinitely.

The case was being tried before the appeals court in Casablanca. A defense challenge had already been rejected. It had argued that, since the defense was entitled to adherence to the conditions of a fair trial, the body looking into the case on appeal should not be adversary and arbiter at the same time. Suddenly the session was halted at the request of the public prosecutor; when the committee of judges returned to the chamber, the public prosecutor in a very terse, enigmatic speech asked that the trial be postponed indefinitely. The court granted the request without hearing the opinion of the defense, without discussion, and without explanation.

Before the lower court in Rabat, where our fellow newspaper ANOUAL was prosecuted, the same scene was repeated, with the public prosecutor taking the

initiative and asking that the trial be postponed indefinitely. The decision came immediately; the opinion of the defense was not heard, and no explanation was given.

Yesterday, on Friday morning, the same theatrical scene repeats itself, with the prosecutor introducing the same request that his colleagues in Casablanca and Rabat had introduced: that the trial be postponed indefinitely. The response comes immediately. The court yields with amazing speed, even while the defense was asking for the floor to express an opinion.

In three cases within a few days of each other, in the same manner evoking surprise, if not annoyance, apprehension, and anxiety about the future of justice in Morocco, we see a prosecuting body that was enthusiastically prosecuting and stubbornly refusing well-founded challenges to invalidate—we see this body with one accord and with no difference from court to court or city to city seeking an indefinite postponement. What is more significant and serious is that the prosecutor's motion is approved immediately, at the expense of even hearing the defense, without even token discussion, and without the slightest explanation.

One might argue that the logic of the law allows the party bringing a case to withdraw its case at any stage, as long as the verdict has not been pronounced, or request a postponement if something unexpected or new occurs.

However, the present instance involves no abandonment of the case, and no significant new development in the facts seems to have occurred. Rather, we are faced with a request for postponement with no clear, exact time frame, a request approved in a manner that causes surprise and wonder and sets the imagination free to go off in every direction.

When the imagination freely takes as its point of departure what happened in the Casablanca and Rabat courts in this case, the puzzle that strongly, plainly, and actually emerges is whether the court in both places acted spontaneously from conviction and with the independence the constitution defines and encourages, or whether the independence without which the judiciary cannot be a constitutional power alongside the legislature and executive is still a wish held in abeyance in reality as lived and seen.

What causes this kind of genuine wonder is our observation that the prosecution of the nationalist press has taken place at the suggestion of the government apparatus. It was the government that asked the Casablanca judiciary to prosecute AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI. Two letters from the minister of justice bear witness. It was the government that threatened to use Section 55 against the nationalist press if it did not stop reporting the Amaoui trial. The government insisted on initiating these trials despite everyone's conviction that initiating them was a political mistake—behavior infringing on freedom of the press and at odds with the desire for political and democratic reform.

Thus, initiating the trials and insisting on them was an obvious mistake. If some people have finally perceived that it is no part of wisdom or sound political judgment to continue with them, we still believe that remedying the matter should not have taken place in a way that damages the reputation of the judiciary and violates its independence, a way that makes it appear to everyone as if the first and last word in the country belonged to the executive and to it alone.

Remedying and correcting the mistake requires respecting legal rules and constitutional principles. It is not right to correct a mistake by another mistake. Furthermore, if the sudden halting of the trials for an indefinite time is aimed at stopping the escalation and the increasing government-fabricated tension, the correct decision is to take this logic to its conclusion. This will be achieved by taking all the political and practical measures that lead to clearing the public, social, and political atmosphere and bring about the necessary alleviation. Some of these urgent measures are ending the imprisonment of Amaoui, releasing political and trade union prisoners, restoring dismissed trade unionists to their work, and entering into an earnest and serious social dialogue with the trade union central organizations.

Clearing the air and guaranteeing conditions for an independent judiciary have become pressing issues, if the administration really is going to improve conditions and open new prospects for the development of the country in the context of democracy and respect for a state of rights and laws.

New Fishing Agreement With European Community

*92AF0781B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 May 92 p 9*

[Text] Rabat, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau. The vice chairman of the European committee [not further specified] and envoy for fishing, Manuel Maran, arrives today in Morocco. This visit comes within the framework of discussing the last of the controversial issues in the Moroccan-European talks on renewing the fishing agreement.

Moroccan news sources indicated that the new fishing agreement is expected to be initialled tomorrow (Monday) between Morocco and the European Community. It is now ready from the technical aspect, which relates to the number of ships permitted to fish, fishing sites, forbidden zones, and the means of monitoring. Agreement was also reached on issues of technical cooperation and various technical dimensions.

The same sources state that the question of monetary compensation, which has not been finally settled, and the duration of the new agreement, which could be less than four years, will be the subject of the European envoy's talks with Moroccan officials.

It should be mentioned that the talks, which were resumed last April 24 and lasted until the beginning of this month, had May 15 as the deadline for finalizing and reaching a new agreement. Within this framework, the [old] agreement was extended for the second time for 15 days, to end this May 15.

The delay in renewing the fishing agreement resulted from the crisis which arose when the European parliament voted against the fourth monetary protocol between Morocco and the European Community.

It should be mentioned that Morocco insisted on including the fishing agreement within the scope of a newly proposed European-Moroccan partnership, for which the first round of exploratory talks ended last Tuesday.

Observers expect, therefore, that the new fishing agreement will include means for amending it so that it will conform to the new partnership agreement that will replace the cooperation agreement that has been in effect since 1976, and the 1988 protocol adjusting it.

SUDAN

Serious Differences Threaten Abuja Talks

*92AF0863B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
28 May 92 p 4*

[Report by Imam Muhammad Imam]

[Text] London—In a surprise development, a sharp disagreement has broken out between the delegations to the peace talks now being held in Abuja, the new Nigerian capital, regarding Nigeria's chairmanship of the conference. The Sudanese Government's delegation is demanding that chairmanship of the sessions of the conference be limited to the three parties [the Sudanese Government and the Torit and al-Nasir wings of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army—SPLA]], so that the matter remains a purely Sudanese matter, with Nigeria having only an observer role.

At the same time, the delegation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (the Torit wing) is calling on Nigeria to be responsible for chairing the conference in every stage of peace negotiations in Abuja. The al-Nasir wing [of the SPLA] has not opposed an active Nigerian presence in the Abuja negotiations. Nor does it insist on Nigeria's chairmanship of the conference, viewing this matter as a marginal issue on which the three parties can easily agree.

Speaking by telephone from Abuja, Dr. Abd-al-Wahab al-Afandi told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that a series of side meetings were held yesterday to reach an agreement regarding the chairmanship of the conference, so that the conferees would then be free to discuss the main issues on the conference agenda.

He added that the Sudanese Government has rejected the principle of discussing partition, but has expressed its willingness to negotiate on various issues, which the conferees have resolved to discuss.

'Ali al-Hajj Muhammad, a member of the Sudanese Government's delegation, denied his delegation's willingness to discuss self-determination, because it implies partition, which the government rejects categorically. When journalists asked him whether disagreement over this issue might lead to the collapse of negotiations, al-Hajj said: "Yes."

Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, whose country is sponsoring the peace talks between the Sudanese Government and the two wings of the SPLA (the Torit group and the al-Nasir group), met yesterday in Abuja with the heads of the three delegations. Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah, the chairman of the government's delegation in the Abuja negotiations, delivered to President Babangida a handwritten letter from Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation and the prime minister of Sudan. In that letter, Lt. Gen. al-Bashir expresses appreciation for the Nigerian president's efforts to hold these talks and the constructive suggestions which he has put forth to make them successful.

During the meeting, President Babangida declared that his country opposes any attempt to damage Sudan's unity, and that he is keen on the Abuja negotiations achieving tangible progress, ending the war in southern Sudan, and establishing the pillars of unity and peace throughout Sudan. Col. Khalifah apprised the Nigerian president of the commitment of the government and people in Sudan to peace, and of his government's desire that he continue his mediation, even after his tenure as chairman of the Organization of African Unity is over.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Nigerian president expressed the hope that the Abuja negotiations would be crowned with success in order to preserve the unity of Sudan and its people.

Yesterday's session was devoted to a discussion of procedural issues before entering into substantive issues.

The Nigerian foreign minister presided over the session, which lasted from 1300 until 1430. At 1700, the conferees reconvened under the chairmanship of the Nigerian foreign minister. At 1730, the Nigerian minister and his aides emerged from the meeting, which indicated that the three parties had reached an agreement on the issue of the chairmanship of the meetings, whereby the chairmanship is to rotate among them.

Doubts were raised as to whether the discussions would continue during the opening session when the three Sudanese parties demonstrated inflexibility and traded accusations.

Richard Mawla, the spokesman for the main platoon of the SPLA, which is headed by John Garang, stated: "As long as the Sudanese Government is unwilling to discuss a secular constitution or self-determination, I believe that this will be the end."

The al-Nasir group, which split off from the SPLA, stated that it will not moderate its demands regarding self-determination. In reference to the government's proposal for a federal system under which non-Muslims in the south would be exempt from Islamic law, 'Ali al-Hajj Muhammad stated: "No party or Sudanese Government in the north would dare repeal Islamic law."

He added: "The separation of the South would lead to a full breakup, which might lead to a chain reaction in other African countries, especially those whose borders were delineated during colonialist rule."

Foreign diplomats stated that they do not see any appreciable hope of reaching an agreement in Abuja. However, negotiations are likely to continue for several days, if only out of respect for Nigeria, the OAU's current chairman.

Sudanese President Lt. Gen. 'Umar al-Bashir rejected the Garang movement's offer of a cease-fire before a peace agreement is reached. He described this offer as aiming to stop the advance of government forces on Torit and Kapoeta, Garang's command headquarters. Al-Bashir stated in press statements yesterday that his government "rejected the rebel's cease-fire offer, because a cease-fire would freeze the situation and would be difficult to monitor, and because Garang does not keep his word."

He emphasized that the Sudanese Government desires the success of the negotiations now being held with the two wings of Garang's movement, and "it has no desire to decide the matter militarily, but rather wishes to reach a peaceful solution while adhering to its policy axioms, which are a federation, the rule of Islamic law in the north, and the nationalism of the armed forces and the political system."

Lt. Gen. al-Bashir announced that government armed forces had entered and were combing the city of Tali south of Yirol in the province of Bahr al-Ghazal. He added that large numbers of the al-Mandari tribe had surrendered themselves with all of their weapons to government forces.

He also said that large numbers of the residents of Bor al-Pibor in the province of the Upper Nile had joined the armed forces [of the government], and that large batches of the rebel movement in the al-Nuba mountains were surrendering daily.

Al-Bashir emphasized that aid transport operations were suspended after the Garang movement threatened to blow up planes carrying aid. He expressed hope for a solution to the problems, which ensued from that.

Islamic Shari'ah Subsumes Human Rights
92AF0764B Khartoum AL-SUDAN AL-HADITH
in Arabic 9 Apr 92 p 5

[Interview with secretary general of Sudanese Human Rights Organization Ahmad al-Nasri by Ayman Sayyid; place and date not given]

[Text] Since Sudan announced the application of Islamic shari'ah [religious law], indeed, since the first moment that the trend toward fundamentalism emerged and God's law became the law of the land, Sudan has been the target of the Western, atheist, and hireling media. The liars have used the question of human rights as a pretext to attack Sudan. They spread their lies and falsehoods in a desperate attempt to harm Islam and Sudan, but they failed, their plans misfired, and their lies have been refuted by substantiated facts and evidence.

In the following interview with Ahmad al-Nasri, secretary general of the Sudanese Human Rights Organization, we review the human rights situation in Sudan, the country that has adopted shari'ah as its path and way of life, and we discuss the nature of the organization's role, its direct relations with the public, and its attitude toward all these falsehoods and lies.

'Ali al-Nasri [as published] said, "The application of shari'ah means adherence to all its principles and rules, as they came down in the sunnah and the book. The Holy Koran proclaimed human rights more than 14 centuries before the United Nations. Man is God's most honorable creature, in that He said: 'We have honored the sons of Adam; provided them with transport on land and sea; given them for sustenance things good and pure; and conferred on them special favors above a great part of Our Creation.' [Koran 17:70]

"Indeed, man is more honorable than the angels, as the Almighty said: 'We said to the angels "Bow down to Adam".' [Koran 2:34] This bowing is for the greatness of man in Islam. God has honored man. This honoring is inviolable, just as are his human rights. Islam bans discrimination between peoples, for the Almighty said: 'O mankind, revere your Lord, who created you from a single soul.' [Koran 4:2] The Lord did not differentiate between male and female believers. The Almighty said: 'O mankind, We created you from a single (pair) of male and female, and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other. Verily the most honored among you in the sight of God is he who is most righteous among you.' [Koran 49:14] Islam has also granted the freedom of thought and expression of opinion. Indeed, He ordered man to think, for He said: 'Behold! In the creation of heavens and earth and the alteration of day and night there are indeed signs for men of understanding.' [Koran 3:190]

"God gave an example in the story of Moses and the pharaoh, and how Moses was more truthful than the pharaoh and how God helped him to win against the pharaoh. Islam has called for consultation and for expression of

opinion, in that God said: 'Conduct their affairs by mutual consultation.' [Koran 42:38] God also said: 'Take counsel with them in the affair.' [Koran 3:159]

"According to the hadith, the great martyr Hamzah stood up to an unjust imam who scolded him, rebuked him, and then killed him.

Islam equalizes between man and woman. The Almighty said: 'Revere your Lord, who created you from a single soul.' [Koran 4:2] It is said in the hadith: 'You all come from Adam and Adam comes from earth.' As for the differences between man and woman, they are qualitative but do not involve human rights. Islam has granted the right of marriage, divorce, and guardianship, and has prohibited slander and lies, which is incorporated in the Sudanese criminal code."

Al-Nasri said that "When the French Revolution broke out in the 18th century it proclaimed equality, freedom, and fraternity. Islam has been ahead of the French Revolution since the Koran. The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim. The Almighty said: 'Remember with gratitude God's favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His grace ye became brethren.' [Koran 3:103] With regard to freedom, it would suffice to mention our Lord 'Umar Bin-al-Khattab's saying to 'Amr Bin-al-'As when his son hit an Egyptian: 'How can you enslave people when they were born free?'. And the Almighty said: 'God has struck a similitude: a servant possessed by his master, having no power; and the other, a man on whom We have bestowed goodly favours from Ourselves.' [Koran 16:75]

"Islam allows personal property. Indeed, God has put all that is in the universe in the service of man. He said: 'It is He who hath produced you from the earth and settled you therein.' [Koran 11:61]

"This is the Islam that we adopt as course for the protection of human rights. As for the organizations that defend those rights, there is the Arab Human Rights Organization in Cairo and Amnesty International, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. They both defend human rights. It has become apparent that the international organization is often biased, particularly in its stand toward the Gulf war, and interferes in the Third World countries, often under false pretexts.

[Sayyid] Sudan has become increasingly the target of lies relating to human rights aimed at harming it. Certain quarters are still generating and disseminating lies through similar organizations abroad. What is your comment on this and how does the organization carry out its work in protection of human rights?

[Al-Nasri] There is a complaint box. Contact is maintained with the political authorities in order to look into the complaint and to find out the reasons for arrest. Statements are then taken, and if a crime was committed, then the defendant is arraigned. He has the right to defend himself. But if the arrest is for illegal political

reasons, then the organization will defend him and will demand that he either be set free or be brought to trial. Among the organization's duties is to visit prisons and ensure that detainees are being reasonably well treated, so that human dignity is not violated. The courts are fair and everybody is equal before the law. There are no special immunities. Any official responsible for causing harm to any citizen can be sued. If a citizen is attacked without legal justification, then he has the right to file a complaint, which will be dealt with by the judiciary. Many complaints are filed against the government. The judiciary looks at them and the attorney general represents them.

[Sayyid] Where do human rights stand in relation to the new criminal procedures law?

[Al-Nasri] The new 1991 procedural law provides that any citizen detained for more than 72 hours is either brought before a court or released. If this is not done, then the detention period can be extended only by a judiciary order and under judiciary control. The Islamic shari'ah principles provide that a citizen should not behave in a manner harmful to society nor should the society harm a citizen. An equilibrium should be maintained between the individual's rights and those of society. Society should not hurt a citizen except when society's interest is concerned. Public freedoms and rights are not absolute. The rights of others must be taken into consideration. For example, the right to freedom of expression is subject to such freedom not being harmful or slanderous to others, just as it is a man's right to carry arms to defend himself, but not to commit aggression against others. Freedom should be such that it causes no harm to others.

The criminal law is a definition of personal freedom and criminal behavior, as well as other laws regulating freedom, such as the customs law. The individual's freedom ends where the freedom of others (the community) begins.

With regard to the Sudanese Human Rights Organization's attitude toward Western allegations concerning violation of human rights, this has been clear. The organization condemned Britain's arrest of Sudanese student Muhammad Mahjub Harun. It also condemned the rebel movement [in the south] for using children to carry arms, the Western blockade of Iraq, and the burial of Iraqi soldiers alive during the Gulf war. It also condemned President Bush's statement when he called on the UN to declare that Zionism is not a racist movement. The organization's answer was that Israel is racist and violates human rights, which is evident in many instances.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Shaykh Zayid Officially Decrees 1992 Budget

92AE0382A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
30 Apr 92 p 10

[Article by Shafiq al-Asadi]

[Text] Abu Dhabi—Yesterday the Government of the United Arab Emirates [UAE] began operating officially

under the 1992 budget, after Shaykh Zayid Bin-Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the UAE, issued a decree authorizing it. This is the first time that this has happened at this time of year. Ever since the early eighties, it has been authorized in the last month of the year.

Improvement in Oil Price

Government sources confirmed that the improvement in the oil price and the UAE's rising revenues had enabled the new government, headed by Shaykh Maktum Bin-Rashid Al Maktum, vice president of the UAE and ruler of Dubayy, to complete the budget last March.

They said that the government will have broad freedom of movement in implementing its plans and programs, especially in the area of economic, investment, and social projects; and in meeting its obligations early in the year. Locally, these include the government leases and purchases sector; internationally, they include the UAE's share in the budgets of regional, Arab, and international agencies, establishments, and organizations.

It was officially announced that the 1992 budget is 17.3769 billion Emirian dirhams, an increase of about 1 billion dirhams over the 1991 budget. Meanwhile, budget revenues for this year are 15.9149 billion dirhams, making a deficit of 1.462 billion dirhams.

Largest Share From Abu Dhabi

An official source revealed that Abu Dhabi will assume the largest share of the revenues of this year's budget, that being more than 75 percent of the budget. Meanwhile, the Emirate of Dubayy, the second emirate in oil production, will assume about 10 percent, making the total share of the two emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubayy about 13.598 billion dirhams.

He said: "The rest of the budget revenues will be covered by the ministries' own income, which is estimated at about 2.3169 billion dirhams."

The source confirmed that this year's budget is very important to social issues. For the first time, an amount of 80 million dirhams was authorized in the 1992 budget for the marriage fund for young citizens, in addition to 533 million dirhams for social aid.

The first section of the budget takes up about a third of its revenue and expenditures, having been allotted 5.578 billion dirhams for salaries for 50,000 government employees.

Likewise, expenditures of the second section of the budget reach 3.019 billion dirhams, and this includes social aid and some services offered by the ministries.

The source mentioned that the investment projects in the government budget take up almost 1.310 billion dirhams, of which 984.5 million dirhams are for completing ongoing projects, and about 325.5 million

dirhams are for new projects. It covers projects pertaining to electricity, water, public works, housing, fisheries, communications, agriculture, health, labor, social affairs, Islamic affairs and awqaf [religious endowments], and sports.

Also included in the budget is 1.552 billion dirhams authorized for separate budgets for the Emirates University, the higher technical colleges, the Administrative Development Institute, and the Public Information Authority, in addition to citizens' retirement pensions and benefits and allocations for the marriage fund.

Text of Investment Treaty With France

92AE0401C *Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 May 92 p 3*

[Unsigned article: "Text of Investment Promotion, Protection Treaty Between (United Arab) Emirates, France; Amicable Settlement of All Disputes Between Two Sides' Investors; Investments Include Movable Property, Stocks, Bonds, Industrial Property"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi, AL-BAYAN Bureau—His Highness Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, head of state, recently issued Federal Decree No. 35 of 1992 Concerning the Reciprocal Treaty for Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Government of the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and the Government of the French Republic, which was signed during his highness's recent trip to France. Signing for the UAE was His Excellency Rashid 'Abdallah, foreign minister, and for the French Republic, Roland Dumas, France's foreign minister.

The treaty includes a definition of the term "investment" to cover movable and other property, stocks, shares of issue, bonds, copyrights, industrial property rights, and privileges granted by law.

The treaty also contains articles pertaining to encouraging and exchanging investments between the two countries, all special commitments, transfers, investment guarantees, and resolution of all disputes that may arise between investors.

Following are the detailed provisions of the treaty and the protocol clarifying certain of the articles.

Article 1—Definitions

For the purposes of this treaty:

- The term "investment" shall mean all types of assets, rights, and interests of whatever kind, in particular, but not exclusively:
 - Movable and immovable property, as well as any material property rights such as mortgages, privileges, franchises, warranties, and similar rights;

- Stocks, shares of issue, and other types of participation, even if minority or indirectly, in companies established in the territory of a country of the two contracting parties;

- Bonds, credits, and rights to any payment of economic value;

- Copyrights, industrial property rights, "such as patents, licenses, trademarks, models, and industrial patterns," technical methods, trade names, and repute;

- Privileges granted by law or by contract, including exploitation rights related to seeking, farming, extracting and exploiting natural resources, including resources located in maritime regions of both contracting parties.

It being understood that such investments shall be those that were made, or shall be made, prior to or after this treaty goes into effect, pursuant to legislation in effect in the territories and maritime areas of the contracting state where the investment is located.

Any change in the property's form of investment shall not affect its nature as investment, provided that such change does not conflict with legislation in effect in the territories or maritime areas of the contracting party where the investment is located.

- The term "investor" shall mean any national or company belonging to one of the contracting parties, or a government of either of the contracting parties.
- The term "national" shall mean any natural person bearing the nationality of either of the contracting parties.
- The term "company" shall mean any corporate entity established on the territory of either contracting party pursuant to legislation of that party, whose management headquarters is in the party's territory or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of either of the contracting parties, or by corporate entities whose management headquarters is in the territory of either of the contracting parties, which were established pursuant to legislation of that party.
- The term "income" shall mean any sums resulting from investment during a specific time period, such as profits, fees, stock profits, capital gains, and interest.

Investment income, and in the event of reinvestment, reinvestment income, shall enjoy the same protection as investments.

- The term "related activities" shall mean all activities pertaining to managing, maintaining, enjoying, and liquidating investments, in particular, organization, supervision, operation, maintenance, and the right to dispose of corporate entities, branches, agencies, offices, plants or other facilities for conducting business, and the acquisition, use, protection, and the right to dispose of property of whatever type, including intellectual and industrial property rights,

as well as to borrow funds, to purchase and issue shares, and to purchase foreign currencies for importation in accordance with national systems and norms.

- The provisions of this treaty shall apply to the territories of both contracting parties, as well as to the maritime areas of each contracting party, which shall hereinafter be referred to as the economic zone, and the continental shelf beyond territorial waters, where under international law each exercises sovereign rights and judicial authority for the purpose of seeking, exploiting, and preserving natural resources.

Article 2—Encouraging Investment

Each contracting party shall permit and encourage investments established by the other party's investors in its territory or maritime areas belonging to it, equally in accordance with its legislation and pursuant to the provisions of this treaty.

Article 3—Just and Equitable Treatment

Each contracting party undertakes to grant investments established by investors of the other contracting party in its territories and maritime areas belonging to it just and equitable treatment in accordance with the principles of international law and to set aside any unjust or discriminatory measure that might impede, whether legally or in practice, the management, maintenance, enjoyment, or liquidation of such investments.

Article 4—National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Provisions

Within its territory and maritime areas, each contracting party shall apply to investors of the other party, insofar as their investments and related activities are concerned, treatment that is no less favored than that granted to its investors, or the treatment granted to most favored nation investors, if the latter is more favorable. In this regard, nationals permitted to work in the territory or maritime areas belonging to either of the contracting parties shall enjoy the material facilities related to the practice of their professional activities.

However, such treatment shall not include privileges granted by one of the contracting parties to third nation investors by virtue of that nation's share or participation in a free zone, customs union in a common market, or any regional economic institution of any form whatsoever.

Article 5—Special Commitments

Investments that were subject to a special commitment by one of the contracting parties vis-a-vis investors of the other contracting party, regardless of the provisions of this treaty, shall be governed by the provisions of such commitment, if the provisions of such special commitment are more favorable than the provisions of this treaty.

Article 6—Expropriation, Nationalization, and Ownership Termination Measures

- Investments undertaken by investors of one of the contracting parties shall enjoy complete protection and safety within the territories and maritime areas of the other contracting party.
- Neither of the contracting parties shall take any expropriation, nationalization, or other measures of any kind whatsoever, that would directly or indirectly cause investors of the other contracting party to lose ownership of investments belonging to them in the territory and maritime areas of the first contracting party, except in the case of the public interest, provided that such measures be carried out pursuant to its legislation, that they be nondiscriminatory, and not conflict with any special commitment.

—All measures taken causing loss of ownership must be met by swift and adequate compensation calculated on the basis of the true value of the investment concerned. The amount of such compensation shall be determined by the natural economic circumstance prevailing prior to any threat to terminate ownership.

—The value and modalities of payment of such compensation shall be determined at a date not later than the date of loss of ownership. Such compensation shall be effective and acted upon, and shall be paid to the investor concerned without delay. It shall be freely transferable, and until the date of payment, it shall yield interest calculated at an interest rate agreed upon by the two contracting parties.

Investors of one of the contracting parties whose investments were subjected to loss resulting from war, or any armed conflict or rebellion, emergency, mutiny, or any other situation having the same effect occurring in the territory or maritime areas of the other contracting party, shall enjoy treatment by the other contracting party no less favorable than that granted to its investors or a most favored nation.

Article 7—Transfers

Each contracting party shall guarantee investors of the other contracting party whose investments are located in the territories and maritime areas belonging to it the freedom to transfer:

- Interest, share profits, profits, and other current returns,
- Fees resulting from incorporeal rights specified in Article 1.1.D or 1.1.E
- Repayment of loans contracted for in a regular manner,
- The value of total or partial sale or liquidation of the investment, including returns on invested capital,
- Compensation for the loss of property or loss set forth in Article 6.2 and 6.3 above.

Nationals of either of the contracting parties who are permitted to work in the territory or maritime areas

belonging to the other contracting party as a result of an agreed investment shall also be permitted to transfer an appropriate amount of their returns to their original country.

The transfers referred to in the foregoing paragraphs shall be made without delay at the official exchange rate prevailing on the day of transfer.

Article 8—Investment Guarantees

In the event either of the contracting parties has regulations providing for the guarantee of foreign investment, such guarantee may be granted following a study of each individual case to investments made by that party's investors in the territory and maritime areas belonging to the other contracting party.

Investments made after this treaty comes in force by nationals or companies of either of the contracting parties in territory and maritime areas belonging to the other contracting party may receive the guarantee referred to in the previous paragraph only if approved in advance by the other party.

Article 9—Settling Investment Disputes

- Any investment-related dispute arising between one of the contracting parties and an investor of the other disputing party shall be resolved amicably by the parties concerned.
- Should settlement of such dispute fail to be made within a period of six months from the date it is instituted by either party, it shall be referred at either party's request to arbitration of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], provided for in accordance with the Convention for Resolving Investment Disputes Between the State and Nationals of Other States signed in Washington on 18 March 1965.
- In the event the provisions of the treaty referred to in the foregoing paragraph are unable to be applied, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration. To this end, a special arbitration tribunal shall be formed as follows:
 - Each of the disputing parties shall appoint one arbitrator. These two arbitrators shall by mutual agreement select a third-country national to be appointed chief of the tribunal by both parties. All arbitrators must be appointed within two months of the date either contracting party notifies the other contracting party of his desire to refer the dispute to arbitration.
 - If the time period specified in Paragraph 2 is not adhered to, and in the event no other applicable agreement exists, either contracting party shall invite the president of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris to make the necessary appointments.
 - The tribunal shall render its decisions by majority vote. Such decisions shall be final and legally binding on both parties.

The tribunal shall make its own rules, and it shall interpret the judgement at the request of either party. Provided the tribunal has made no other decision because of special circumstances, the costs of arbitration, including arbitrators' fees, shall be divided equally between the two parties.

Article 10—Creditor Succession

If, as a result of a guarantee given pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of this treaty concerning an investment effected in the territory and maritime areas of the other contracting party, either of the contracting parties has paid sums of money to one of its nationals or companies, the first contracting party shall have all rights of succession regarding the special rights and treatment of such national or such company.

The aforementioned payments shall not affect the rights of the guarantee's beneficiary to make recourse to ICSID or to pursue claims raised before ICSID until such claim has ended.

Article 11—Consultations

Each contracting party shall be able to propose consultations to the other contracting party concerning any matter regarding this treaty, its interpretation, or its application. The other contracting party shall take all measures necessary in an expeditious manner to make such consultations possible.

Article 12—Settling Disputes Between the Contracting Parties

- Disputes related to the interpretation or application of this treaty shall be settled through diplomatic channels, wherever possible.
- Should such dispute fail to be settled within six months of the date it is filed by a contracting party, it may be referred to an arbitration tribunal at the request of either contracting party.
- Such tribunal shall be composed as follows in each individual case:
 - Each of the contracting parties shall appoint an arbitrator. These two arbitrators shall by mutual agreement select a third arbitrator, who must be a third-country national, and who shall be appointed chairman of the tribunal by the contracting parties. All arbitrators must be appointed within two months of the date either contracting party notifies the other contracting party of his desire to refer the dispute to arbitration.
 - If the time period specified in Paragraph 12.2 above is not adhered to, and in the event no other applicable agreement exists, either contracting party shall invite the secretary general of the United Nations to make the necessary appointments. Should the secretary general be a national of one of the contracting parties, or for any other reason be unable to undertake this task, the assistant secretary general immediately

below him in seniority, who is not a national of either of the contracting party, shall make the necessary appointments.

- The arbitration tribunal shall render its decisions by majority vote. Such decisions shall be final and legally binding on both parties.

The arbitration tribunal shall make its own rules, and it shall interpret the judgement at the request of either contracting party. Provided the tribunal has made no other decision because of special circumstances, the costs of arbitration, including arbitrators' fees, shall be divided equally between the two contracting parties.

Article 13—Treaty Effectiveness, Term of Effect, and Termination

Each party shall notify the other party of the completion of constitutional measures required to effectuate this treaty which shall begin one month after receipt of the last notification.

This treaty shall be effective for an initial term of 10 years, after which it shall remain in effect so long as neither of the contracting parties gives the other party through diplomatic channels one-year written notification to terminate it.

Upon termination of the effectiveness of this treaty, investments that were made while it was in effect shall continue to enjoy the protection of its provisions for an additional period of 20 years.

Double Taxation Treaty Signed With India

*92AE0401A Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic
30 Apr 92 p 5*

[Unsigned article: "Treaty To Avoid Double Taxation Signed With India; Hamdan Bin Rashid: 'We Shall Open New Horizons for Bilateral Cooperation in Investment Areas'"]

[Text] Emirates News Agency, New Delhi—His Highness Shaykh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktum, minister of finance and industry, and Dr. Manmohan Singh, Indian minister of finance, yesterday morning signed a treaty to avoid double taxation of income and capital between the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and the Republic of India.

Treaty ceremonies were attended on behalf of the UAE by Dr. Muhammad Khurbash, director of the Investment Department at the Ministry of Finance and Industry, Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Musalli, UAE ambassador to India, Ramish War, minister of state for financial affairs, and a number of officials from both countries.

The treaty seeks to avoid double taxation of income and capital in both the UAE and the Republic of India.

Dr. Muhammad Khurbash stated that this treaty covers all aspects of investment and provides comprehensive coverage of anticipated tax transactions between the

UAE and India, in both directions. It is considered the second double taxation treaty between the two countries.

Dr. Khurbash indicated that another treaty between the two countries that provides for avoiding double taxation on income and the capital of civil aviation institutions was initialed last February.

Under the provisions of this treaty, government investments shall be exempted from taxes. All government institutions in both countries are covered.

Dr. Khurbash added that the private sector tax burden will be eliminated or reduced, depending on the type of investment. He said that this treaty will have the effect of creating an ideal tax incentive for investors of both countries by reducing their tax burden.

His Highness Shaykh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktum, minister of finance and industry, delivered remarks on this occasion, stressing the importance of signing the treaty as an embodiment of the good relations between the two countries. He said that the present visit to India by His Highness Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, UAE president, demonstrates his country's desire to realize and enhance cooperation between the two.

His highness described this treaty as a blessed step that is welcomed by businessmen in the UAE as an indication of continued progress in the investment climate in India. He said that because it offers several advantages, the treaty will open new horizons for bilateral cooperation in investment and various other related areas.

His highness praised the profound good relations between the UAE and India. Great progress has been witnessed over the years as a result of notable advances in cooperation in all fields of common interest and mutual benefit to both countries.

Shaykh Hamdan stressed that the UAE and India have a definite continuing interest in cooperating in several fields to meet developmental challenges "out of our faith that such cooperation can be developed on the basis of common interests and mutual benefit."

Hamdan said that UAE businessmen are monitoring the helpful investment climate in India with great interest. They welcome the Indian government's adoption of structural reforms in all fields of economic activity, and in particular, the removal of investment constraints and the writing of a new foreign investment law.

The UAE minister added that establishment of an investment promotion and development council will encourage individual initiatives and help attract foreign investment.

In his remarks on this occasion, the Indian finance minister welcomed the visit to India of His Highness Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the UAE.

He said that this visit helps strengthen the bonds of friendship between India and the UAE, which were founded on distant centuries of firm underpinnings of mutual cooperation and common understanding in today's world and which increase our mutual interdependence.

The Indian minister stressed that cooperation between the two countries was of mutual benefit in facing the new challenges looming on the horizon.

He expressed his pleasure at the positive results accomplished during the discussion he held with His Highness Shaykh Hamdan bin Rashid al-Maktum, minister of finance and industry, and at the further strengthening of ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries that they will engender.

The Indian minister indicated that this treaty will not only provide greater confidence in tax legislation, but also provide a set of tax benefits to both countries. It offers a more attractive atmosphere for investment and commerce for businessmen in the UAE and India.

The Indian minister appealed to UAE businessmen to make the utmost benefit of the new liberalizing climate for foreign investment in India. He said that continuing contacts between economic interests in both countries will make an effective contribution to enhancing the influx of trade, investment, and finance.

The Indian minister also made a statement to the Emirates News Agency in which he pointed out that the treaty provides for imposing taxes [as published] on any venture between the two countries only in the event it pertains to a recognized institution. Temporary commercial deals not involving two long-established institutions will not be covered by the exemption provided for by the treaty.

He indicated that the treaty provides for a full exemption of profits on shipping from the country of origin and seeks to reduce tax rates on investment inputs to encourage the inflow of capital, technology, and technical services between the two countries due to the mutual interests this serves.

He added that the treaty also provides for preferential treatment for students, teachers, artists, and sportsmen. It will go into effect once legal ratification procedures have been completed in both countries.

Dubayy Airport Plans for Year 2000 Detailed *92AE0401B Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 7 May 92 p 3*

[Unsigned article: "\$3.5 Billion To Be Spent by Dubayy Government To Improve Air Transport Sector; Dubayy Airport Expansion To Absorb 10 Million Passengers in Year 2000; Emirates Airlines Continues Growth While Maintaining Its Perpetual Distinction"]

[Text] As Dubayy's oil reserves, estimated to have a remaining life span of 15 to 20 years, near exhaustion,

the emirate's need to diversify its sources of income becomes more pressing. In the last 12 months, the veil has been lifted off a project to build an oil refinery and a petrochemical plant for producing "methyl quadrethyl ether" at Jabal 'Ali; the Dubayy Port Authority has announced the modernization and expansion of installations and handling equipment, and capital has flowed in from both private and public sectors to improve the tourism infrastructure in the emirate.

In its latest issue, the magazine MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST indicated that the air transport sector still has the lion's share of these investments. It appears that decisionmakers are convinced of the important and vital role of this sector in promoting Dubayy as a regional trade and services center. They have allocated an estimated \$3.5 billion to be spent through the end of the decade. Planned expansions at Dubayy International Airport will account for about \$1.5 billion of this amount, while \$2 billion has been set aside for Emirates Airlines to purchase 14 long-range aircraft from America's Boeing Corporation.

Dubayy International Airport is considered the busiest in the Gulf region, serving more than 55 international airlines. There were fears in the mid-80's that operation of long-range aircraft by international companies would lead to a drop in transit and stopover traffic through the airport, however they proved to be unfounded. The total number of passengers using the airport rose 50 percent annually between 1983 and 1990, and last year 5 million departing, incoming, or transiting passengers were recorded. Muhy-al-Din Bin-Hindi, director general of the Civil Aviation Bureau [CAB], says that such growth is due to the open skies policy followed by the government and Dubayy's prominence as a regional center for trade and services in the area, in addition to the establishment of the Emirate Airlines company.

Gulf War

Like airports in all other parts of the world, Dubayy Airport was affected by the Gulf crisis at the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, which coincided with a deepening of the world recession. Until October 1991, monthly passenger traffic through the airport was lower than the corresponding rate for that month in 1990. February 1991 witnessed the lowest rate; passenger traffic dropped of 63 percent compared to February 1990. Growth of 11.5 percent in traffic in the last quarter of last year confirms that recovery is under way, however, total traffic for 1991, when 4.4 million passengers were recorded, was 12 percent lower than in 1990.

Optimism for Future

The CAB appears optimistic regarding the future. Bin-Hindi expects the airport to handle 8,000,000 passengers by the beginning of 1994. The opening of the cargo village last summer, at a cost of about \$70 million,

brought about an increase in cargo traffic rates, which had fluctuated around 140,000 tons annually for the previous two years. At the beginning of last April, the CAB opened a special building at the airport to serve Emirates Airlines passengers.

Expansion Plan

The Dubayy government appears about to approve the plan to expand the airport. Bin-Hindi says, "We have to move quickly, if we want to realize traffic projections for the year 2000. Any installations that have to be built will take from six to seven years to complete." The main obstacle blocking adoption of the plan is site determination. Bin-Hindi indicates there are two options. The first is to build the expansions next to existing buildings. The second is to build them on land on the other side of the tarmac.

First Phase

During the first phase of the expansion plan, which America's Bechtel Corporation has finished preparing, the airport's absorptive capacity will be raised to 10 million passengers annually. Once the plan is adopted, the same company will prepare detailed designs and tender documents and supervise the construction. The project will be put out in several bidding competitions.

Growth at the airport is keeping pace with that of Emirates Airlines, owned by the Dubayy government. Since beginning its first flights to Karachi, Delhi, and Bombay in October 1985, Emirates Airlines has added 22 new destinations to its regularly scheduled network, with a resultant increase in the number of passengers on its flights. In 1991, a year that all airlines would like to ignore when doing their calculations, Emirates Airlines carried 1.2 million passengers, a 26 percent increase, and cargo figures rose 25 percent to 37,615 tons.

Fastest-Growing Airlines

Emirates Airlines is considered the fastest-growing airline company in the world. Starting from zero only seven years ago, it has registered a higher annual percentage increase in capacity than any other airlines operating. In terms of its size, Emirates Airlines is considered a small company, even when compared to such regional carriers as Saudia Airlines, which operates 69 aircraft, Gulf Air, which owns 27 aircraft, and Royal Jordanian Airlines, which has a fleet of only 17 planes.

Emirates Airlines continues to concentrate on the level of service it provides. It has gained an excellent reputation as the best Gulf company, managed with utmost efficiency. Dubayy's commercial progress since the end of the Iraq-Iran War has helped Emirates Airlines tremendously, but it has also extended flights along lines that other carriers to the region failed to serve. Tim Clark, director of operations and planning at Emirates Airlines, says, "In the late eighties, we had to make it clear to British Airways that we were not seeking to snatch away part of its market share. During the first

year we operated our service on the London-Dubayy line, we added 66,000 seats to the average 100,000 annual seats at that time. The Frankfurt-Dubayy line was similar. We opened a market that Lufthansa itself had not paid attention to, which is Dubayy as a tourist destination. In the first five months of 1988, we were able to attract more than 10,000 Germans planning vacations."

Clark feels that Emirates Airlines management has played a role in realizing this growth. He says, "We face no constraints. On the contrary, we have a cooperative chairman and highly efficient personnel. This means that decisions can be made without delay." In addition, Emirates Airlines operates its small fleet more efficiently than its counterparts. The daily rate aloft for an Airbus aircraft is eight hours, while Emirates aircraft fly an average 13.5 hours daily.

Maurice Flanagan, occasional group manager, is intent on emphasizing that the Emirates Airlines' objective is to grow from a small- to a medium-sized company by the year 2000. To accomplish this, the company is adding lines and purchasing new aircraft. In addition to the Abu Dhabi-London line inaugurated this past January, the company will fly to five new destinations this year—Paris, Rome, Zurich, Djakarta, and Taipei. According to Clark, "The five new lines are part of our strategy to locate in places where our competitors' presence is shrinking. This way they give us the chance to score new points."

In the long run, aviation accords signed with other European countries will prove beneficial.

Fleet Expansion

The Emirates Airlines fleet is undergoing expansion in order to provide new services and meet the anticipated growth requirements of passenger and goods traffic on existing lines, estimated at between 5 and 8 percent this year. This expansion will also allow it to dispose of its old Boeing 727 aircraft. Six Airbuses will enter service by August 1993: five A-310's and one A-300. Meanwhile, delivery of Boeing 777 airliners, operating with Trent (Rolls Royce) engines, will begin in 1996 and continue through the year 2000.

The signature of the letter of intent with Boeing for purchase of the 14 airliners, worth \$2 billion, crowned three years of planning for the coming generation of aircraft at Emirates Airlines. The magnitude of the deal reflects the company's great ambitions. Good fortune, as well as deliberate selection, played a role in Emirates' ultimate choice. According to Clark, "We were lucky because we entered the market at a time when the aircraft industry was in a recession, and the three major world producers were vying with one another to present us with competitive offers." McDonnell Douglas offered its MD-11; Airbus proposed the A-330 and A-340, but Boeing won the deal with its new 777 because it fit the

requirements of our expansion program at Emirates Airways, especially its internal design options and freight capacity."

Additional Services

Emirates Airlines is also modernizing and upgrading its operational Airbus airliners. It was the first airlines

company in the world to introduce video service for tourist and business class passengers and the first carrier operating in the Middle East to offer it at all. The service will be available on all Emirates airliners by the end of this summer. Clark says that these additional services highlight Emirates Airlines distinctiveness: "We are determined to be the best forever."

BANGLADESH

Dhaka Takes Position on Bosnian Troubles

92AS1145A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 May 92 p 1

[Text] Bangladesh has decided to close down its mission in Belgrade and called for complete withdrawal of all Yugoslav troops from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a newly independent state in Europe, reports UNB.

A spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said this in Dhaka on Thursday and expressed Dhaka's serious concern over the continued military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina causing senseless bloodshed and loss of lives and property.

Bangladesh has already recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia, the three breakaway republics of the civil war-torn Federation of Yugoslavia formed in 1945 following the second world war.

The Foreign Office spokesman said Bangladesh fully supports the combined efforts of the EC, OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference] and the U.N. Security Council to bring about a negotiated political solution to the conflict in the troubled region.

The government of Bangladesh also calls for immediate cessation of the use of force and end to the killing of innocent civilians, he maintained.

The spokesman further added "Bangladesh firmly believes that there should be no interference or outside intervention in the internal affairs of the newly independent state".

"And there should be no attempt to change the ethnic composition of the country by force and her neighbour should fully respect the territorial integrity and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina", the spokesman asserted.

It may be recalled here that the Ministerial meeting of the Coordination Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) held recently in Bali, expressed deep concern over the tragic situation in the independent republic in the Balkan peninsula.

It also called for showing full respect to the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Zia Meets With Iranian Foreign Minister

92AS1143A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 18 May 92 p 1

[Text] The visiting Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, said that his country would support Bangladesh in sorting out the Rohingya refugee problems with Myanmar, reports BSS.

The assurance came when the Iranian Foreign Minister called on Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia at her office. Dr. Velayati said he was going to visit the camps for the Rohingya refugees.

During the meeting the Prime Minister said a new horizon had been ushered in the relationship between Iran and Bangladesh with the establishment of democratic government in the country. She said, we are committed to foster development in the country and want to expand relationship with friendly countries particularly the Muslim states.

Begum Zia said her Government had liberalised the industrial policy to attract investment providing equal opportunities for foreign and local investors.

She said joint collaborations with private and public sectors in Iran would be welcomed in Bangladesh. She said there were a large number of doctors, engineers and other technical personnel in Bangladesh who could help Iran in its post-war reconstruction and development activities.

Begum Khaleda Zia thanked Iran for its help in the reconstruction work of Bangladesh after last year's cyclone. She also urged Iran for exerting its influence on Myanmar so that under the present Bangladesh-Myanmar agreement the Rohingya refugees could go back with honour and dignity to their homeland.

1992 Production of Jute Termed 'Uncertain'

Weather, Financial Difficulties

92AS1144A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 10 May 92 pp 1, 8

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Production of jute in the coming year (1992-93) has become uncertain due to decline in acreage following drought and lower price in the local and international market.

According to the Directorate of Jute, the cultivation of white jute has been largely affected due to drought. The season for sowing white jute in the jute growing districts of the country ended in April last. Farmers, who expected early rain for growing jute are not interested in growing it further due to poor response of the buyers. Bangladesh Jute Corporation (BJC), Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC), Bangladesh Jute Mills Association (BJMA), Bangladesh Jute Association (BJA) and Bangladesh Jute Exporters Association (BJEA) have reported poor export of jute till April this year. International buyers are interested in buying quality jute at Minimum Export Price (MEP). Exceptions are India and Pakistan who are major consumers of the item.

Sources said that the sowing of Tossa variety of jute will not be affected as the season ends in mid June. The

acreage of jute shrank to 11 lakh acres last year (1990-91). In the current year acreage declined further to 10 lakh acres. Jute production in 1990-91 was only 55 lakh bales as against 51 lakh this year (1991-92). Production is likely to come down to around 45 lakh bales next year.

The existing stock of jute and jute goods are yet to be disposed of by the concerned jute mills and the traders. The buyers of jute and jute products in EEC countries have taken a hard bargaining stance for buying jute in view of synthetic products being available at much cheaper rate. India is, however, in a better position in this regard as most of its products are consumed internally. India, in the meanwhile, has solidified its position as an exporter of jute in the international market. China is following India as an exporter of mixed jute.

Jute traders in the private sector find it difficult to export jute to their traditional buyers in Europe, Middle East and African countries due to lack of bank financing. The number of jute exporters in the private sector has come down from 250 to only 50 due to discontinuation of CC (Cash Credit) limit to most of them by commercial banks recently. The jute growers in Mymensingh, Kishoreganj, Netrokona, Jamalpur, Dhaka, Pabna, Comilla, Faridpur Noakhali and Jessore are gradually shifting to other cash crops due to poor return on investment. The Government has already suspended all subsidies to the jute sector following World Bank's prescription in this regard.

Sources said that the government should fix the minimum price of jute at growers level. They believe that this will project their interest against machination of the fariah and middlemen. Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC) has set production target of only two lakh tons of jute this year against 3 to 15 lakh tons during the last few years. Source said many jute merchants who sold jute to BJMC or BJC last year could not realise their money from them.

Meanwhile, decline in the price of jute in the international market has prompted a group of businessmen and private sector jute mills to market substantial amount of jute to India. India has offered to buy jute at reasonable prices following devaluation of the Indian rupee.

The 17th session of International Jute Organisation (IJO) held in Dhaka took no definite measure to raise marketing of jute and jute products from the current decline.

Largest Mill Suspends Operations

92AS1144B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 21 May 92 pp 1, 10

[Text] Production in Adamjee Jute Mills, the biggest jute mills of the country has been suspended since Monday last. The Adamjee Jute Mills, the biggest in Asia has been running with losses since the independence of the country. The total loss of the mills from 1972 to 1992 stood at Taka 5000 crore.

No financial institution of the country neither in the public sector nor in the private sector is willing to provide the mills with running capital. The jute mills is about to face closure due to lack of running capital.

An official of the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation on condition of anonymity told the Bangladesh Observer on Wednesday that the biggest jute mills of the country would face complete closure if provisions were not made to transfer the present workers to some other jute mills and accountable to production.

The corporation official blamed the present administration for crippling the jute mills and said that the inefficient management had eroded into the vitals of the mills and made it into a perennial loosing concern.

The jute mills during its nationalisation in 1972 had an outstanding loss of Taka two crore 90 lakh. The present strength of workers in Adamjee Jute Mills is 31,373 of which 21,849 are permanent and the rest are either casual or temporary. The number of officials and administrative staff in the mills now stands at 2900.

The mills has to spend Taka eighty lakh to meet the salary bill of the workers and Taka two crore on the employees every week. The mills have now three thousand looms in addition to 200 broad looms.

The production cost of hessian in Adamjee Jute Mills is 59,915 as against 40 thousand Taka in other jute mills.

Similarly the production cost of sacking in Adamjee Jute Mills is also higher. As compared to other jute mills in the country, the total loss of the mills would stand Taka 550 crore at the end of the current financial year. The total loss as estimated by the Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation can be described in different sectors as 17 crore in energy (power), eight crore in gas, 18 crore in jute purchase, bank interest 130 crore and salaries of the workers and employees Taka six crore.

A serious tension has been prevailing in the mills following the decision of the government to suspend production.

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