


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No Improvement Seen in Israel-EEC Relations
*[90AE0222B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
17 Jul 90 p 14*

[Article by unnamed author]

[Text] Several days after David Levi entered the foreign ministry, Israel's ambassador to the common market in Brussels, Avi Primor, arrived in Israel, so that the minister could hear firsthand about the relations between the European community and Israel. Primor lectured, Levi listened and listened, and occasionally asked questions. The picture portrayed by Primor was grim, if not black. If Levi leafs through the assessment documents submitted by Israel's ambassadors in Western Europe during the past year, in anticipation of his meetings with the three leading foreign ministers of the European community in six days, he will learn rather quickly that Primor's report tried to soften the picture and to paint it in rosier colors. Thus, for example, in June of this year, Israel's ambassador in Spain, Professor Shlomo Ben-'Ami, wrote in an extensive document he dispatched to Jerusalem that the erosion in Israel's relations with Western Europe had reached dangerous proportions, and now includes the states closest to us—both governments and the public at large.

One month ago, when the new foreign minister took office, he made sure to clarify to all that the first objective facing him was the meeting in Washington with Secretary of State James Baker and, if possible, also a conversation with President George Bush. The United States heard this, and reacted coldly. State Department Spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler said that Levi could come to Washington whenever he liked, however no appointment had been made for him with the secretary. Two weeks ago, the Americans informed the new foreign minister of Israel that this week - on Wednesday or Thursday - Baker would be free in Paris, and that he would be very happy to meet Levi. The European community jumped at the opportunity and informed Jerusalem that it was also interested in a meeting with the new foreign minister - in Rome, immediately following the meeting with Baker.

Levi is interested in meeting Baker now in Washington. Levi is less willing to meet with the leaders of the European community, certainly not now. Last week, a notice to Washington and to Brussels, where the institutions of the European community are located, went out from Jerusalem saying that, subsequent to his heart attack and catheterization, the foreign minister's doctors forbade him to fly to Europe. The newspapers later wrote that the Levi-Baker meeting would apparently take place sometime during the first ten days of August, while Levi's meeting with the "troika", the three leading foreign ministers of the European community, was postponed to an unknown date—because, as it is known, in August the community, including its foreign ministers,

goes on vacation. It is clear who was behind this, and who is interested in this agenda for Israel's foreign policy.

Yesterday, very surprisingly, with a great deal of deviation from accepted diplomatic procedure, the "troika" informed Jerusalem that in 'exactly one week, we will be over for political discussions, for 24 hours'.

There are twelve states in the Western European community that, in recent months have been completing preparations for the unification of Europe (in 1992). Heading the community are, intermittently, three states, which are the "troika". Since the beginning of July, Italy is serving as the chairman of the "troika", whose members are also the departing chairman, Ireland, and the next chairman, Luxembourg. Next week, therefore, the Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis, the Irish foreign minister, Collins, and Luxembourg's foreign minister, Jacques Poos, will arrive in Israel. Incidentally, prior to taking office, de Michelis said that during the period that he would head the "troika", he intended to act extremely swiftly to advance the peace process.

The visit of the European delegation is not a courtesy visit. Neither is its objective to become acquainted with the new government and its new foreign minister. This is clearly a working visit. Next week, the "troika" will also meet the heads of the Arab League in Tunis. The representatives of the European community will come to Israel to hear first hand (and it is likely that they will even meet with Shamir) if Israel is still standing behind its peace initiative of May 1989.

The European community traditionally supports the existence of an international conference with the participation of the PLO and under the auspices of the United Nations to solve the conflict in the Middle East. Nonetheless, at the request of the United States, the community viewed passively from the sidelines the attempts of Israel and the United States to run the peace process of May of last year. Now Europe is coming to check for itself, independently, whether Israel indeed wants to advance its own initiative or if it has disassociated itself from it -without informing anyone- upon the establishment of the new government, and whether it is now fooling the entire world and trying to buy time. The "troika" will request specific answers to a great number of questions; should Israel avoid them it will know to give them its own meaning.

All of the guest ministers believe that the PLO must participate in all negotiations on the future of the region. They will also seek to know whether the government of Israel and David Levi continue to object ultimately to the incorporation of deportees and residents of East Jerusalem with other residents in the territories in the Palestinian delegation to the autonomy talks with Israel in Cairo. The foreign ministers will demand an explicit commitment from Israel whereby it will not establish new settlements, will not enlarge existing ones, and will

not send new immigrants to the territories. Incidentally, Western Europe refers to East Jerusalem as an occupied area.

Europe is hard on Israel. In recent years, relations between the two parties are in decline. In 1988, the European community refused to sign customs agreements with Israel, primarily regarding agriculture, until it agreed to enable the farmers of the territories to export their crops to Europe on their own. In January of this year, the community froze, in an unprecedented step, its scientific and technological relations with Israel. Western Europe objected to the suspension of talks between the United States and the PLO, and brought its position to the attention of the United States. On June 21, subsequent to the suspension, the community even decided to intensify its pressure on Israel and to tighten its relations with the PLO. The Dutch foreign minister, Hans Van den Broek, was the only one who took exception with the resolution.

On June 26, in Dublin, the capital of Ireland, the twelve heads of the European community, presidents and prime ministers, made a very comprehensive declaration on the matter of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The declaration includes eleven articles, and is regarded by the right in Israel as anti-Israeli. The declaration condemns Israel for its failure in everything related to the issue of the human rights of the civilian population in the territories. It calls upon the members of the community to appoint promptly a special representative to the territories, whose responsibility it will be to act toward the amelioration of the condition of the Palestinian population. The declaration, based upon previous resolutions of the community (Venice and Madrid), calls for the establishment of an international conference, with the participation of the PLO and the under the auspices of the United

Nations, for the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict on the basis of the principle of territories for peace. The declaration determines that Israel's settlement policy in the territories, including East Jerusalem, is an increasing obstacle to peace, and that the settlements are in contravention of international law.

The declaration welcomed the letter that the prime minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, sent to the president of the community and to all of its members, in which he announced Israel's commitment to the peace process, and expressed hope that the commitment would also be manifested by deeds. The community also expressed its support of the right of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel. Notwithstanding, it was emphasized that this right must not prejudice the rights of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

After the United States, Israel has no better friends than the countries of Western Europe. Even there, it has good friends and lesser friends. Israel has a difficult problem with the framework representing these states, while the ministers of the "troika" are coming to David Levi in the name of that structure. The meeting between departing foreign minister Moshe Arens and the ambassadors of the community to Israel, on June 6, almost exploded over exchanges of mutual charges. Israel claims that the old continent had always treated it one-sidedly due to narrow interests, although it knows that Israel is the only country in the world whose neighbors, until this day, have not come to terms with its very existence. This reached its climax in the Venice declaration (1980), and continues to come up from time to time. Prime Minister Shamir has, more than once, told guests from countries of the community that their policy of appeasement makes peace more distant instead of closer, inasmuch as it encourages anew radical elements in the Arab world.

IRAQ

Israeli Economist Assesses Results of Embargo

90AE0259A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (business supplement)
in Hebrew 14 Aug 90 pp 7, 9

[Interview by Esther Goldbersht with Professor David Levhari; date and place not given]

[Text] Iraq is capable of withstanding an economic embargo for at least six months, estimates Professor David Levhari of the Department of Economics of Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The other side of the boycott of Iraq is the termination of the flow of oil from Kuwait and Iraq and the rise in the price of oil in the world market. Should they wish to do so, the other OPEC countries can increase production, bridge the shortage of oil from Iraq and Kuwait, and bring down the price of oil. In general, the problem in the world will not be a shortage of oil, but its high price.

[Question] Will an economic embargo get Iraq out of Kuwait?

[Answer] There is no doubt that, in the long term, Iraq is dependent upon the import of food and equipment from all the countries of the world. But, in the short term, it definitely can withstand a fairly lengthy embargo. Six months, for example. They have stores of grains that are sufficient for several months, without requiring imports.

[Question] Is an economic embargo at all possible?

[Answer] Past experience proves that there are always ways to circumvent an embargo. To date, there have been several attempts at economic embargos, against South Africa and Rhodesia, for example. In both cases, particularly the embargo against Rhodesia, we saw that states can circumvent economic embargos. There are always those who are willing to circumvent them if money can be made by doing so. A third body of unaffiliated merchants is established, and they buy from the primary supplier and supply the goods to the boycotted country.

Ostensibly, Iraq is an ideal state to impose an embargo against, because it is very easy to close its entrances via the sea, from the Persian gulf. Syria and Iraq, which are states hostile to Iraq, border it on two sides, so that the only entrance to Iraq is through Jordan or Turkey. If Turkey participates in the embargo, as it declares, the only entrance to Iraq is through al-'Aqaba, Jordan.

If Jordan does not participate in the embargo, and that is the impression received at this time, then, from the economic perspective, Iraq has quite a bit of staying power to withstand it.

[Question] Who is absorbing the greatest economic blow from the oil crisis, Japan?

[Answer] Japan is the country with the greatest dependence upon Middle Eastern oil. Apart from the Middle

East, its only oil supplier is Indonesia. Thus, most of the liquid oil supplied to Japan comes from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Japan has large stocks for three to four months, without any problem. At the moment, everything is business as usual in Japan, besides the fact that Japanese consumers will have to pay higher prices. Oil from the Persian gulf has gone up to 23 dollars a barrel. Therefore, Japan will have to pay approximately 50 percent more than it did prior to the crisis.

Japan is the world's largest exporter of cars, and an oil crisis is likely to lower the demand for passenger cars, particularly large, gas-guzzling passenger cars. Such a process can, of course, harm Japanese exports. In recent years, Japan has begun manufacturing larger and fancier cars, and the oil crisis is likely to change the profitability of manufacturing cars of this type.

[Question] Is it impossible to prevent the rise in oil prices?

[Answer] Due to cheap oil prices, research to find substitutes for oil, such as the use of solar energy and coal, has almost ceased in recent years. High prices of oil during present times will accelerate the search for substitutes.

South Africa, who feared an oil embargo, built a large plant that turns coal into liquid. They are already producing gas for cars from coal. But it does not seem that at the present prices of oil, the world will require such drastic measures.

Together, Iraq and Kuwait supply over three million barrels of oil a day. The largest manufacturer in the region is, of course, Saudi Arabia, which supplies five million barrels a day. The central question is to what extent Saudi Arabia will be willing to change the rate of its pumping and supply more oil to the countries of the world. Iran has already declared that it is willing to supply a larger amount of crude oil. For Iran, this is an opportunity to replenish its sparse treasury.

The Saudis would have no problem increasing their oil production and compensating the world for the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. In the past, the Saudis have already produced nine million barrels a day, and more. Today, they are producing only five million barrels, and are capable of increasing production to nine million barrels with no problem, lowering world prices of oil to the previous level of 18 dollars per barrel.

[Question] The question is whether they want to restore the old price.

[Answer] Almost certainly not, but it is definitely possible to lower the price to the level of 21 dollars, as agreed by the OPEC council.

[Question] Is the United States indeed threatened by the loss of oil from Iraq and Kuwait?

[Answer] Oil constitutes only one quarter of the energy consumption of the United States. Electricity is produced there from coal, and the Americans have an abundance of natural gas.

The United States supplies itself with half the oil that it consumes. The rise in prices can lead to the renewed operation of all kinds of marginal wells that previously had been closed and will now be reopened.

Most of the electricity in the United States is produced by coal or by hydro-electric plants, and not by liquid gas. The United States imports some of its oil from Mexico and Venezuela. In the Western United States, it imports oil from Canada. Therefore, the harm to the United States is less than that to Japan, for example.

[Question] Where is the United State's vulnerable spot?

[Answer] Like in Japan, the car industry in the United States is likely to be hurt. A rise in oil prices will hurt the entire process of transition to bigger cars and will lead to a deepening of the recession that began even prior to the oil crisis. A deficit of seven million dollars a month in the balance of payments and a continuing deficit of 200 billion dollars a year in the government's budget are not new data. The interest that the U.S. government pays on long-term loans increased from 8.3 percent to 8.9 percent. Such an increase in interest will, of course, lead to a reduction in investments.

[Question] Can the Common Market also make do without Iraqi oil?

[Answer] In the immediate future, Europe does not have a problem, although there will be a high increase in the price of oil and its products, and Europe will have to adapt prices.

Two countries in Europe - Britain and Norway - are suppliers of oil from the North Sea and are not dependent upon oil from the Persian gulf. The other countries of Europe are dependent upon oil from the Middle East, or upon Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, and the rest of the OPEC countries.

Nigeria can increase its production by half a million barrels a day, which is approximately 50 percent of its regular production. The question is whether it will want to do so. It is likely that it will be afraid to openly go against the policy of Saddam Husayn. In any event, each of the members of a cartel like OPEC will have a tendency to supply oil under the table.

[Question] Russia will not profit from the shortage of oil?

[Answer] With the help of technology from the Americans and the Europeans, the Soviet Union will be able to increase the production of oil or natural gas to Western Europe.

At the time, the Americans objected to the Trans-Siberian oil pipe so that Western Europe would not

become dependent upon the Russians. Now, in effect, this is what will help Europe.

[Question] Is Israel likely to encounter difficulty in obtaining oil?

[Answer] I do not think that Israel has a problem of experiencing a physical shortage of oil from its suppliers—Egypt, Mexico, and chance purchases in the free market. The problem is the higher price for oil, which will particularly hurt our balance of payments. If oil imports were 700-800 million dollars annually, the price could rise by 50 percent. This would create an additional deficit of 400 million dollars annually in the balance of payments.

Industries which depend upon oil as raw material, such as the petro-chemical industry, will be hurt by the higher prices of their raw material.

ISRAEL

Israeli Arabs Increasingly Discontent

90AE0188C Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew
13 May 90 p 7

[Article by Avner Regev]

[Text] Two phenomena emerged at a seminar entitled "From War Between States to a Struggle Between Communities," held at Hebrew University in Jerusalem several days ago. One was the paucity of participants, and the second was the notable absence of representatives of the civilian and security establishment who are concerned with the intifadah and the Arabs of Israel.

I am sad to state that academia has demonstrated, especially regarding all that pertains to the intifadah, an inability to lay guidelines for the future based on an analysis of the findings of the past and the present. The guest lecture, delivered by commentator Ehud Ya'ari, was anecdotal and overshadowed the academic researchers.

Only the lecture of Dr. 'Aziz Haydar was exceptional. It dealt with the effects of the intifadah on the Arabs of Israel. For the first time, there was an airing of statements and lines of thinking attributed to the Arab leadership in Israel, most of whom have refrained until now from airing such statements and lines of thinking before a broad public. Standing in the background of this lecture is a media report that the son of Knesset Member Nafa', a Druze member of RAKAH [New Communist List], is refusing to serve in the Army. This phenomenon, which is spreading among the Druze, is worthy of extensive treatment, because it testifies to a change in the mood among this community that would surprise many when it becomes publicly known.

Dr. Haydar, who is a researcher at the Truman Institute at Hebrew University, has decisively determined that the Arabs of Israel have been working for equal rights in

different areas with the goal of ultimately attaining recognition for themselves as a national minority. This recognition will bring in its wake a demand for a change in the status of the state of Israel from the state of the Jewish people to a bi-national state, in which two nationalities co-exist with fully equal rights. In his lecture, Dr. Haydar stated that the currently recognized leadership of the Arabs of Israel, has demonstrated—as expressed in recent months, mainly in negotiations over the composition of a Labor-led government—a stunning weakness and lack of leadership ability, and it has consequently lost a considerable amount of the credibility that it had among the broad public in Israel. The Islamic movement, according to the lecturer's analysis, has also lost heavily, because it has ignored, intentionally it would seem, its main goals.

The weakness of this Arab leadership, which includes the leaders of RAKAH as well as Knesset Members Mi'ari and Darawishah, is liable to result in activity that will produce a demand for the separation of the Arabs of Israel from the state. No longer would the Arabs of Israel demand recognition as a national minority. Rather, they would demand a two-state, two-people solution, under which the right of self-determination would also apply to the Arabs of Israel. The weakness of the Arab leadership in Israel is liable to result in the growth of a new generation of leaders among Israel's Arabs, who would recognize their inability to exercise influence within the ordinary democratic system and would seek alternatives. One result of such a development is liable to be indifference as expressed in non-participation in the next Knesset elections. If the Arabs of Israel conclude that they cannot have influence in the Knesset and in other systems of government, and if the political right continues to delegitimize Arab members of Knesset, the state of Israel can expect great tension between Jews and Arabs, next to which the intifadah would seem like nothing.

The Israeli establishment is ignoring these processes and is liable to find itself surprised again. In an article published recently in the AL-'ARABI newspaper, published in the Galilee, it is determined that, due to processes that the state is undergoing, disregard of the Arabs of Israel and their needs, and immigration from the Soviet Union, the Arabs of Israel must prepare themselves for the possibility of separating from the state. This process will occur in the framework of a transfer or by means of the breaking away of parts of the state that are densely populated with Arabs and their subordination to another entity. The increasing appearance of articles of this type is liable to lead to a process that will be difficult to stop.

The new intellectual elite of the Arabs of Israel has recently been at pains to stress that they do not recognize the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and the realization of the dream of the world Zionist movement. In this way, they are attempting to explain the contradiction between the duty of loyalty to the state on the one hand, and their support of the intifadah and opposition

to immigration on the other. They identify more with the Palestinian liberation movement, of which they feel a part. The growing trend toward extremism on the Jewish scene is leading to a parallel trend towards extremism on the Arab scene, and we are quickly rolling toward a deep abyss in Jewish-Arab relations in the state.

The seizure of land in the Negev, which involved the uprooting of olive trees and the destruction of buildings in Lajiyah several days ago, is another slap in the face of the Arabs of Israel. They are quickly losing hope for a gradual change in Israel's government, a change that they believed would come as a result of the increase in the Arab population and the demographic change. Immigration is the central factor in the shattering of this dream and the plotting by Israel's Arabs of methods of struggle for the future.

The desire for a change in leadership, and a feeling of disappointment on the part of the Arab public in Israel, especially among intellectuals, are liable to accelerate these processes, including the demand for separation from the state and the application of the right to self-determination for the Arabs of Israel. When reality slaps the face of a good many, it will be too late to establish another commission of inquiry.

Continuity Required From New Government

90AE0190C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
17 Jun 90 p 1B

[Article by Dan Margalit]

[Text] Like partners in a deep crisis, the Israelis are not settling the serious disagreement with the Americans, but are arguing with them. They are keeping score, haggling over trivial matters, and do not understand that all of their successes in producing irritation of this type are leading only to the breaching and undermining of the alliance.

However, from the narrow perspective of the new government, it had a good day the day before yesterday. After James Baker spoke to Israel as to an escort girl, so that it would telephone the client in the White House, the Committee of Presidents of Jewish Organizations in America denounced the expression of the American secretary of state. How pathetic: The government in Jerusalem prides itself because one of its indubitable tools is mustered temporarily.

It is also pathetic to hear Yosy Ben-Aharon, the director general of Yitzhaq Shamir's office contradict himself on the Israel Defense Forces radio station saying: No, there is no terrible rupture in relations with the United States, and yes, the Labor Alignment caused it. According to him, the Labor Alignment wanted to respond affirmatively to Baker's questions regarding the Cairo meeting and should therefore be blamed for the deterioration in relations with the United States.

What did the government really think? That Roni Milo' would announce that Baker's questions were irrelevant and that the United States would nod its head and fold? That Ari'el Sharon would say, on QOL YISRA'EL [the Voice of Israel] radio, that it is necessary to stop exacerbating American-Soviet annoyance regarding the settlement of immigrants in the territories, and the problem would solve itself? Or that Beny Begin would raise a proposal on the Knesset's daily agenda to discuss why Washington is not hastening to sever its contacts with the PLO, and thereby bring salvation to the Middle East? Is Begin not aware that, despite Yasir 'Arafat's refusal to disassociate himself from terrorism, Washington is interested in continuing the dialogue with the PLO?

Jerusalem will gain nothing by satisfying its momentary need to prove that Baker is inclining toward the Arabs and that George Bush is flirting on the telephone with Husni Mubarak. Such a policy will only speed up the deterioration in relations with Washington. This is especially true, as wisdom and the debate score tend to favor the Americans, because a joint political project was conducted by the two countries over a nine month period, and now, Israeli sends a note to Washington saying that David Levy is willing to start from square one.

This technique is unheard of in modern Western diplomacy, and proves that the new government in Jerusalem wishes primarily to gain time and to deceive the world, including its citizens who are interested in peace.

Commitments were already given, and an ironclad political rule states that new governments cannot cancel previous commitments. On the basis of this determination, Menahem Begin adopted Security Council Resolution 242, according to which it is appropriate for Shamir to continue with the Camp David agreement.

There is no basis for asking the Americans to reshuffle the cards and return to square one, which would of course be ruinous for peace.

Nor can it be claimed as an excuse that what was agreed in 1989 reflects only the will of the Labor Alignment, which has left the coalition in the meantime. Concessions were made with the knowledge of the national unity government in Jerusalem, and no diplomat in the world would accept as an excuse that decisions made by the government, on the inspiration of the Labor Alignment, can be cancelled in one fell swoop on account of the resignation of the Labor Alignment ministers.

If Shamir wishes to introduce an essential change to the government's policy, he has no recourse but to withdraw from the peace initiative. However, if he seeks to continue the initiative, he must take into account that the march to the threshold of discussions in Cairo was carried out with his knowledge, and that he is also bound to the old concession of secondary parts of the Israeli peace initiative.

It is reasonable to assume that the United States will not concede its position at present. It is also not desirable that it change its position, save for several stylistic improvements. Israel faces a final, difficult reckoning with Palestinian terror. It must be interested in coordinating with Washington in advance, and in reformulating their common interest. However, at this stage of the political freeze, Israel has a supreme interest in advancing the peace initiative. As it turns out, Baker is serving this interest better than Shamir.

Value of Bellicose Military Statements Questioned

90AE0201C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Jun 90 p 7

[Article by Hana Zemer]

[Text] Maybe I am wrong, maybe I am suspicious of things that really are kosher. Maybe all the warlike announcements that swirled around us in one day last week were simply an accidental congruence. Even so, it is a very characteristic congruence. It sounds to me like an alibi chorus.

What am I talking about? On Tuesday—and they have since repeated them—the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Justice all came out with announcements of a political-defense nature, in part, a reaction to Arab announcements, in part, unprovoked. Taken together they all gave the impression of preparing the ground for a possible conflagration.

The words of Defense Minister Arens seem to me, in this connection, to be particularly clear as their alibi. "There is a fear that Saddam Husayn will act against us, even without Israeli provocation," the Minister said, adding a characterization of the Iraqi ruler as having a history of aggression, a characterization that is correct in and of itself.

Moshe Arens did not stop at that. He said also that "at times it seems to me that Saddam Husayn's announcements are moderate because he conditions an attack on Israel on Israeli aggression against Arab states. But we know there are officials in the government of Saddam Husayn who claim that the very existence of Israel is an aggressive act."

That is to say, they are telling us that Iraq is likely to attack us even without any provocation. The fact that they say it means they are saying it to the whole Arab world, as well. That Arab world, which is nervous any way because of the makeup of this government, could see that as preparing public opinion for military action. When on the same day pronouncements are added about the gravity of the situation that justifies concern, the probability increases that it will happen.

The announcement by the Foreign Ministry was also strange. The new Foreign Minister is certainly not guilty of it and did not dictate it from his sick bed. It sought to arouse an association within us of the Khartoum formula

by pointing out the negative direction of the Baghdad summit "...which said 'No' to peace with Egypt, 'No' to recognition of Israel and 'No' to dialogue with Israel." What is the purpose of Israel bandying about the Arab 'No's' when you can't hear those who speak for us giving an Israeli 'Yes'?

The national unity government spoke with two voices, and we thought that was bad. The new government speaks in a chorus, and that is much worse. As we said, maybe these things came together in a chorus accidentally. Even so, it would be nice if the ministers would talk a little less and think a little more about how their words are likely to be interpreted. Maybe now, if the government has an iota of sense to pay back the U.S. president for his good deed in suspending the dialogue with the PLO, it will come up with something constructive in the relationship with the Palestinians, at least to encourage its own theses. Even those who don't believe in this government, even those who disparage its composition and course, have to want and wish that it will do the right things, since mistakes are sometimes irreversible.

Agriculture Minister Eytan Profiled

90AE0199C HADASHOT in Hebrew 9 Jun 90 pp 11,13

[Profile by Ronel Fisher]

[Text] Moshe Arens was already standing at the podium, waiting to swear allegiance to the Knesset, when he all of a sudden detected a slight commotion. Rafa'el Eytan, who several moments previously had taken his place on the chair of the minister of agriculture, rose, crossed the plenary hall, and approached Arye Der'i. You forgot your things on my desk, he told him dryly, handing him the collection of papers and returning to his place. The Knesset exploded with laughter. Arens momentarily lost his train of thought. Afterward, he looked at Eytan for a long moment, astonished. Some time afterwards, Eytan again departed from protocol: in the group picture with the president, he was the only one who insisted on showing up without a jacket and tie. These curious deviations have, for some time, turned into the myth called Raful, and they are also accompanying the new stage in his career, from the coalitional contacts into the office of the minister of agriculture. A few days with the new minister persuaded me, once and for all, that the man does it all naturally, even if he is not unaware of its effect in the media.

For seven years, since he served as the chief of staff of the Lebanon war, Rafa'el Eytan, 62, has been waiting for this implementational portfolio. The prime minister, who offered him the job of deputy minister of defense with enlarged authority during the formation of the coalition, retracted his offer after he understood that with Eytan, one does not play with promises. Eytan stipulated that his consent would be conditional upon Shamir retaining the portfolio of defense. Neither Sharon nor Arens, he said, would send orders down to him from above. But

Raful does not fight over positions. From his perspective, even the ministry of religious affairs would be welcomed wholeheartedly, as long as they went for a change in the election system within three months of the day of convening of the government. If Shamir fakes it, Eytan announced, he would have no problem making it all explode. He will not take any nonsense. Thus, he found himself in the office of the minister of agriculture, carrying on his shoulders, the portfolio of morality for the 'they-are-tired-of-this government' [group]. Perhaps for that reason he was so quick to clean his desk of all of Der'i's personal belongings.

On Sunday, two weeks ago, he came into his office in the government compound in Tel Aviv to drink a toast with the secretaries. Eytan politely moved the upholstered chair that was left there by the previous minister, Katz-'Oz, and blocked it with a plant. Put a regular chair here, Kokhba, said Raful to one of the girls, a regular chair, so one can sit down.

The first days in the ministry he devoted to the purification of the system. The last seven appointments that were made in the office were swept away together with the director general, Yehezqi'el Zaka'i, a political appointment by the moshav movement. I will have only professionals sitting with me, he said, sending MK Yeho'ash Tzidon to hunt ex-generals, people with whom Eytan can speak. A rumor immediately spread that the ministry of agriculture was about to turn into an improvised military base, and that an order would go out to the farmers to start collecting used packaging in the field.

Indeed, already during the first meeting of the senior staff led by Eytan upon assuming office, there was a strong smell of an operational general headquarters. Hezi Shelakh, a director of companies and an ex-paratrooper, reported with the title of special consultant. Tzvi Agassi, a lieutenant colonel in the reserves, was appointed, organizational officer of the special steering committee for the examination of the structure of the ministry of agriculture. Gidon Bikel, an ex-paratrooper, presently a flower exporter and close to Eytan, became a special consultant. At the same meeting, after an exchange of greetings among the comrades at arms, Arye Zayif, deputy director general for foreign commerce, made an undisciplined remark that made Eytan jump. Bikel's presence here, said Zayif, raises serious fears of a conflict of interests. Bikel is a private agriculturist, and he may exploit the hot information that comes out of here in order to further his own business. Tzidon, who sought to respond, was elbowed by the minister. Eytan likes to deal with things like that on his own. "I want everyone here to know that Bikel is a good friend, a friend for years, and I rely on him to do everything as a volunteer in order to improve agriculture. Should Bikel mess up and undermine me, that is my problem, and I know how to throw people out of an airplane without a parachute. Is that clear?"

The quiet that ensued could not camouflage the permit that the minister granted his friend to export mushrooms

independently. A hurried act, likely to remind one of Katz-'Oz's chickens. Eytan: What are you talking about, favors? Anyone that comes to me with an offer for private marketing, I will consider it seriously, and if we find it worthwhile, we will approve it. Bikel, Shelakh, and all of the other people who will sit here are superb professionals. The fact that they are also ex-paratroopers proves that the best go to the paratroopers. Nothing more."

Eytan called his four assistants and personal advisors, all members of Tzomet, to a formative conversation in order to prevent misunderstandings. He gave them an educational hour on the values of friendship. Should there be internal wars here, he briefly clarified, I am kicking all of you out of here. In order to prevent misunderstandings.

The water commissioner, Tzemakh Ishay, a political appointment of Minister Moshe Nissim, still does not understand the mindset of the new minister. Arye Nehamkin, Avraham Katz-'Oz, and their predecessors totally relied upon him with anything related to Israel's water programs, and he was given full freedom of action. Now, with the hard talk about the condition of the water administration and the severe crisis in reserves, there are those in the ministry of agriculture who say that it would be very worthwhile for the commissioner to have good answers for the new minister. Hence, one afternoon last week, Ishai went into the minister's office with his staff of senior assistants and began a comprehensive lecture on our situation, aided by a slide projector. But the projector, which worked just fine in the finance committee, created trouble now. The commissioner requested a long stick in order to indicate important statistics. Eytan, who did not like the idea from the onset, told him that here there were only sprouts, and asked to receive information on desalination of the water. Ishai answered that the subject had not been finally formulated. The commissioner continued his lecture, and Eytan began to drum on the table. Ishai suggested a break. Eytan said: No break, when I fall asleep, take your people and go. Afterward, he went to a convention of hydro engineers at the Yamit Hotel, and fell asleep again in the arms of the commissioner.

[Question] Minister Eytan, is this a mid-life crisis?

[Answer] "God forbid. Simply, they talk about water, water, and I dry out from the words. I want answers, not lectures."

The following day, the minister sent down an order to the gardener of the ministry of agriculture to close the sprinkler switch at least until the winter. The opinions presented to him on a requisite cut in water for agriculture infuriated him. "If there is a water crisis in the country", he says, "then first we cut and save on landscaping. When I was a boy, there were no parks and fountains, and I grew up just fine without them. So, for two years Israel will be a little less beautiful. Nothing will happen. Soon the Russians will be coming, and they

won't have anything to brush their teeth with. We must become accustomed to living frugally. Agriculture, on the other hand, must be cut only at the end, when there is no alternative. Unless someone is willing to start eating grass tomorrow morning."

Speaking of the gardener of the ministry of agriculture, when he met a moshav member, a childhood friend, he was told that the fellows were saying that Raful would create a mess in the ministry of agriculture. What could a farmer from Tel Adashim move in such a big system? With him, everything will go through the prism of an olive grove forty dunams large. Yanush Ben-Gal, now the chairman of the board of the national desalination program (Tahal), grabbed him for a brief, eye to eye conversation in the racket of the symposium at the Yamit Hotel. Ben-Gal: "Congratulations on the position. So what's doing?" Raful: "There are places and people that need to be cleaned like one cleans a weapon. You know, hard with the rod. Otherwise, nothing will help." Ben-Gal suggested that they meet for a working discussion, to be scheduled on the spot. Raful said that this drives his secretaries crazy, now that everything goes through the office. Ben-Gal was badly hurt.

Last Wednesday, Eytan came to the Knesset for the first time as a minister, in order to answer parliamentary questions and motions for the agenda. The chairman of the Knesset, Dov Shilansky, who reviewed the minister's attire with serious deliberation, tired him with warm blessings. Whoever expected that he would now put on his safari suit, or the one that remained from the days that he represented the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] while traveling abroad, was mistaken. Blue work pants, a blue farmer's shirt, and tall, black work shoes. May I begin, asked Raful impatiently, and read off the page a laconic answer to a parliamentary question by MK Ze'ev Feldman (Agudat Yisra'el) regarding the marketing of pork. Ya'ir Levi of SHAS [Torah observing Sephardim] called to him: what is the distance between Mizra' and Tel Adashim? The minister was silent. Even when the calls multiplied, he remained impervious. "I am not a big meat eater, but when there is pork, I do not run away. I have a promise from the Likud that I will be given freedom of vote on religious matters. Beyond this, I cannot do anything."

When he returned to his seat at the cabinet table, MK Sara Doron approached him and began a conversation. Sit, sit, Eytan said to her, offering the chair of Minister Moshe Nissim. I am forbidden to, Doron explained to him, it is not acceptable. Raful was annoyed. These ceremonies simply destroy him. On the floor where the offices of the parliamentary factions are, his assistants cleaned off the shelves in the room that, until then, had served them in the opposition. The room, next door to the room of Mapam, the CRM [Citizen's Rights Movement] and the Alignment, did not become loathsome during those years, unlike Moledet or Tehiya. "Somehow", says the spokesman of the CRM faction, Moshe

Horowitz, "they always succeeded in leaving the impression of a sane right. Perhaps the time really has come to dissolve that."

MK Husayn Faris of Mapam, considered a close friend of Eytan, explains that it is all because of his straightforwardness. Because Raful says even difficult things to one's face. "I really love the man. You sit and talk with him, and you know that he is not fooling you. After his expression in Nir Eliahu regarding collective punishment of the residents of Kalkilya, I was quite shocked. I said to him, Raful, how can you say things like that? He said to me, it was no slip of the tongue. That is really the most humane punishment that I think should be inflicted for the burning of farmers' fields. I know that Raful does not hate Arabs. He has his opinions on political issues, but that is not hate. Now, as minister of agriculture, I say that if there will be water for the Jews, there will be water for the Arabs, as well, and if there will not be any for the Jews, the Arabs won't have any, either. That is Raful."

Yitzhaq Golan, a friend, a radio man for Qol Yisra'el, invited him for a first interview in his program "Examining Eye". Something totally passe. Eytan accepted. To friends, one does not ever say no. Eytan arrived at the radio studios, and suddenly became hungry during the time that remained before the start of the broadcast. The cafeteria was closed, and he does not frequent coffee shops. In short, we went down to the technicians' kitchen for a hot drink. Eytan opened the refrigerator, took out a dry slice of bread, spread a little mayonnaise, and cracked the sandwich with his teeth, as if it were a cracker. The technicians rolled on the floor. The minister of agriculture did not understand. What is this, someone's private stuff, he asked innocently, opening a can of sardines. He suggested that Golan get a hold of Baker's telephone number, the one that everybody is now dialing. The minister of agriculture wants to tell him that he did well by terminating the dialogue with the PLO, and it was just a shame that he had ever started it. Ultimately, a tiring interview was held, with Eytan nasalizing with difficulty until the finish line.

As is well known, Eytan has turned making do with less into his standard. Incidentally, this includes drinking beer out of old yogurt containers. Upon his appointment, he notified Nehama, his assistant, to arrange a more modest hotel than the Hilton, where he stays on the days that he does not return to his home in the north. Nehama explained that while it was true that it was a five star hotel, the government only pays for three stars. It is not the money, said Eytan, it is the luxury. I want a bed, Nehama, just a bed. She moved him to the Carlton, so that he would be happy. While this story can perhaps be understood, the idea that a minister in Israel does not need a driver or a car phone is a totally different matter. Eytan parks his own car, a 1989 Passat, in front of his office, subsequent to continuous maneuvers that block the road for long moments. When we drove within the city, at least twice he created traffic jams that lead to cursing, shouting, things that a minister in Israel does

not customarily hear from the rear seat of the Volvo. For example, a taxi driver of the nervous breed exited his car on Hayarkon St. in Tel Aviv and threatened to attack the minister, who was, at the time, struggling with a parking spot that was smaller than he was. When he detected Eytan, he retreated. "God, he is lucky that he is Raful. If he were Yossi Sarid, oh, what I would have done to him now because of that traffic jam."

But bully drivers are a relatively minor problem. The question is what one does about accumulative exhaustion on the Kastal slope.

[Question] Have you fallen asleep at the wheel?

[Answer] "Ah, it is not so terrible. Since my release from the IDF until today, I have done 350 thousand kilometers, and nothing has happened. Besides, nobody ever asked me if I was tired or not when I took charge of an airplane. But I will take a driver. There will not be any alternative. The wife, the kids, and the assistants are all putting strong pressure on me. But someone in Tel Aviv, only for local travel. I go home by myself."

On Friday, in his carpentry workshop in Tel Adashim, a wooden horse rocked. He sells them for fifty NIS apiece, but not for export. He does such things only when time allows. His friends suggested that he remove the labels "Raful Oil" from the bottles that he had produced up until now in his press, that he put it in his wife's name, or something like that. Eytan refuses. Not oil or shoes. They told him that Sharon had also done so, and not to be difficult. Eytan insists. From his point of view, the business can wait for better days. Now he is occupied with public issues, and if the work on the farm was taken from him, that is worth being sorry about, but he will not do any monkey business.

[Question] The straightforwardness, the simplicity. Even if it is genuine, it is not a bad gimmick.

[Answer] "That is superficial, for crying out loud. That is who I am, there is nothing to do. But I am also a lot more than that. Whoever does not live in a moshav, cannot understand."

[Question] But is Raful prior to politics the same Raful as afterward? [Answer] "The same Raful."

[Question] During your first days as minister of agriculture, you happened to say something that angered a lot of people: the collective punishment in Qalqilyah. In Davar Aher, it was written that the residents of Ris'on Letziyon object to your proposal.

[Answer] "There is a lot of confusion. The fact that they murdered Arabs in Ris'on Letziyon does not turn Ris'on Letziyon and the Jews there into my enemies. My enemies are the Arabs, all of the Arabs. Qalqilyah, too. If the situation were vice-versa, and the Arabs were ruling the land of Israel, they would give us punishments. In the meantime, it is the contrary."

[Question] They say that Darawishah and Faris are your friends.

[Answer] "Darawishah, no. He is a man of the PLO, he declares that, and the PLO is my enemy. Faris, yes. He is a friend."

[Question] Then he is a special breed of a drugged cockroach, an Arab who is not an enemy.

[Answer] "I do not have any problem with the cockroaches, and do with that whatever you want. But that sentence was taken out of its context. The drugged cockroaches in a bottle were a sentence that I said as chief of staff, actually about the Jews, in the context of the freedom that the United States gives us. It was a completely different sentence about the Arabs."

[Question] How is it that you are no less right-wing than Ge'ula Cohen, for example, yet are considered much more realistic and moderate than she is? [Answer] "Because if I have a proposal for absorbing immigration and Yosi Sarid has one, we meet and raise the issue together. And because you will never hear me say a word like transfer. Why? Because this is not serious, and from the perspective of Utopia, I want a transfer just like Sarid wants one."

[Question] May one assume that the curve of moshav farmers committing suicide will decrease under you?

[Answer] "I am not at all sure that all of these cases were on the same background. A few days ago, friends came to me and said that there is a moshav farmer that is always saying that he will commit suicide if he is not taken care of. I said, bring him to me. You saw a drunk, and his wife was also not so terrific, and the story was that their water had been disconnected."

[Question] As a moshav farmer, not as minister of agriculture, would you go for the moshav arrangement?

[Answer] "No. The only arrangement here is that there is no arrangement. The banks will not get their money, either, and the economy will never recover. I still do not know how, but we are going to do something about this, too. Just recently, a friend of mine committed suicide, a moshav farmer, a veteran paratrooper. I know that the moshav arrangement screwed a lot of farmers. But I cannot unsheath solutions. It is important to me that agriculture become profitable again, like it once was, that people will want to do this without the threatening shadow of losses and the severe casualties."

[Question] The Histadrut will not allow you to do what you want. Even now, with Tzidon pulling to the direction of controlled free export, there is an absence of quiet in the system.

[Answer] "The Histadrut has the weight of a ton around its neck, the Histadrut cannot do a thing. First, let it solve the problems that it created itself; afterwards, I, too, will hear what it has to say."

Agriculture Minister Eytan May Influence Intifadah

90AE0191A DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Jun 90 p 8

[Article by On Levi]

[Text] The new minister of agriculture can have a lot of impact on what is happening in the territories. With poorly considered decisions, he is likely to cause an escalation of the uprising.

A few of my friends, who watched the television coverage of Rafa'el Eytan's entry into office with me, were captivated: He is the best of the lot, he doesn't put on a show, is real, modest (he gave up the official car, the driver, and the car phone). They particularly liked his 'sabra' mannerisms: he arrived at the president's residence for a photograph of the new government dressed in a short-sleeved shirt without a tie. I was almost tempted to be overcome with a wave of affection for the former chief of staff of the Lebanon war and the father of the image of the cockroach in a bottle.

The morning after his appointment to the position of minister of agriculture, Rafa'el Eytan reminded whoever tended to forget, exactly what he considers of importance. "The residents of the town of Qalqiliyah must be collectively punished, and 50 thousand NIS demanded of them for every sprinkler belonging to Kibbutz Nir Eliahu that is destroyed by a resident of Qalqiliyah," suggested the minister.

Prior to the convening of the Likud government, many attempted to examine, with fear and suspicion, what the impact of: Minister Ari'el Sharon and members of the Knesset Rehav'am Ze'evi, Ge'ula Cohen, Elyakim Ha'etzni, Bibi Netanyahu, and Michael Eytan, was likely to have on an extreme right-wing government established with their support and needy throughout its candidacy of their approval. The name of Rafa'el Eytan is absent from this list. According to what is known about him, he tends to listen to the directives of the system and he will do his job with consideration.

It will be interesting to examine how he will exercise the authority of his office in the territories. It is within his power as minister of agriculture to have a good deal of impact on what is happening there. By poorly considered, intemperate decisions, he is likely to cause an escalation of the uprising.

As is known, agriculture in Israel is planned. This means that the ministry of agriculture outlines planning policy that determines frameworks for the various types of crops, as well as growth and marketing quotas. In the territories there is no planning, primarily because until 1967 there was no agricultural planning there at all. The residents grew whatever they grew, according to their own choices. Since 1967, the ministry of agriculture has been trying to coordinate agriculture in the territories with the planning policy of the ministry of agriculture in Israel. The representative of the ministry of agriculture

in the civil administration executes the agricultural planning in the territories, but agriculture there has remained, for the most part, unplanned. The crops recommended by the ministry of agriculture are crops that are not competitive with Israeli agriculture, primarily crops that do not require investments in infrastructure and water.

For years, the ministry of agriculture tried to prevent the marketing of the produce of the residents of the territories abroad. The civil administration and the coordinator of activities in the territories differed with the ministry's position, but were not capable of determining policy. The attempts made in the past to prevent the residents of the territories from exporting their produce drew, more than once, sanctions on the part of the states of the European Common Market. The relations of the residents of the territories with elements in the Market states and the position of the European states led Israel to allow direct export of citrus from the territories abroad. Nonetheless, until now, Israel has succeeded in preventing direct contacts between the residents of the territories and various elements regarding direct marketing of vegetables from the West Bank abroad. There is no doubt that any hardening of the ministry of agriculture's position, or decision to hurt agriculture in the territories would cause direct damage to Israel, already subject to pressures and suffering from difficulties in the European Common Market.

On the desk of the minister of agriculture lay many requests for the imposition of more severe limitations on the crops of the residents of the territories. For example, the settlers requested that the ministry terminate their Arab neighbors' grape crops. The request was turned down by the previous minister of agriculture.

The new minister, Rafa'el Eytan, has the ability to decree various edicts that will make life very difficult for the Arab population of the territories, already under pressure. In the present situation, and with the sensitivity that already exists, every poorly considered decision is likely to be a match in a field of thorns. This will serve the leaders of the uprising well, since for a long time they have not succeeded in getting the masses out on the streets. A blow to the agricultural public in the territories will be a blow to the majority of the population of the territories, and will blow new wind into the uprising. The ministry of agriculture has the ability to influence crops, quotas, marketing, and marketing infrastructure. By means of administrative decisions, shrouded in a cloak of "planning", the minister can, if he desires, cause a ton of trouble to the residents of the territories.

Opposition Criticized for Abetting Government

90AE0201D Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Jun 90 p 7

[Article by 'Olaq Netzer]

[Text] "The dogs bark and the caravan moves on"—that saying is used frequently to describe the relationship between the ruler who goes along his way and the

opposition. The comparison does not fit our reality. The dogs really do bark and the caravan does move on, but our dogs are like Eskimo dogs. They bark, but are harnessed to the sled of the state and pull it faithfully along the frozen slope on the path set by the administration. When we draw this comparison in our imagination between barking dogs and a moving team, we have to describe the dogs as being harnessed to the administration's wagon and pulling the caravan.

The intent of this is not only aimed toward the opposition which has no quarrel with the administration over what path to take or who will hold the reins. The simile also fits those who really do not want us to continue to move endlessly throughout the territories. The conclusion that they, too, are Eskimo dogs is based on a comparison between what the opposition needs to do and can do when it intends to influence policy and its chances for taking over the government, and what steps the opposition forces here really do take against the policy of annexation.

The democratic opposition struggle could be conducted in many ways, apart from "barking" and trying to bring down the government in the Knesset. The struggle could be carried out using the law that stands above the administration. It could directly influence the government to change its policy by presenting it with initiatives and making practical demands, and could influence the government indirectly by directly influencing public opinion in ways that increase opposition prospects in the next elections. It could make use of these means, as the right has done so successfully, but the opposition has not done any of those things.

On the legal plane, the single initiative that had any connection to the struggle for the government and the soul of the nation was the law against inciting racial hatred. The conclusion that the left is pulling the sled of the radical right is evident from the fact that the law is not applied. Israel is the only a modern country in which a racist can stand in the center of the capital city with police protection, wave a hangman's noose and shout "death" to a minority, or identify in public with someone who slaughtered seven members of that minority. All of that is done with the concurrence of the left, which is not taking legal action. The opposition has not even proposed to make the "Kakh" organization illegal in the territories, even though the latter is under military rule which can forbid any organization it wants and despite the loud "barking" against what the "Kakh" people are doing there.

In the area of direct pressure on the regime, a true opposition presents demands, makes requests and tries to make suggestions that the government would be hard put to refuse. For example, recently there has been a serious problem of penetrations aimed at arson and sabotage of agricultural equipment all along the Green Line. The declared position of the opposition is that the Green Line must stand, since on the other side is that "territory heavily populated with Arabs." Nevertheless,

no proposal has been made to close the Green Line. No such demand was made after the slaughter in Ris'on Letziyon, even though that would prevent the phenomenon of the "slave market." The Palestinian workers would get permits like foreign workers to come directly to work for the employer who requested them. Even though the principle of the separation of the territories exists in all the programs of the opposition, the latter continues to pull the wagon even when there is a chance that direct political pressure would influence the government, and certainly would influence public opinion.

The solidarity of the opposition with the policy of annexation is particularly salient in its avoidance of a struggle for the soul of the nation. It looks as if the opposition believes that it would be better if retreat from the territories would come through external pressure, but in the meantime it would be worthwhile for the nation to get used to loving the "complete Land of Israel." Look at the incident of the members of Kibbutz 'Ayil, who drew media sympathy. The opposition exploited the incident to raise the idea that penetrations must be prevented, as they are prevented along the border with Lebanon. Nobody in the opposition publicly claimed that the policy of annexation, which erased the border, is to blame for the many penetrations along the Green Line. Had that been done, it would have greatly benefitted the security situation in 'Ayil or Ta'anakh without hurting anyone apart from the devotees of the "complete Land of Israel," who are firm in their determination to erase the Green Line from the public consciousness.

The people of the extreme right have exploited every incident of the intifadah to establish facts in the public consciousness that prove there is no difference between the State of Israel and the State of Annexation. They have done that by demanding and receiving from the security apparatus the same life, freedom and rights in the area of military rule that they have in the State of Israel. No Zionist-left body has raised the simple proposal that they not be allowed to walk around freely in the land of the intifadah without coordinating it with the army. Such a proposal, were it to be accepted, would solve almost all the security problems of the settlers who are subject to attacks on the roads, thereby preventing many victims. The security bodies would be happy to supervise Israeli civilian traffic on the roads. But from a political point of view, that would hurt the interests of the fighters for annexation, for whom Shekhem and Hebron are like Tel Aviv and Haifa, and who demand for themselves the same rights. I cannot imagine any reason why Ratz, for example, or Mapam has not raised this proposal, except for the desire not to "bite" the settlers, God forbid.

IDF Plans New Types of Exercises

90AE0191B Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR 18 Jun 90 p 7

[Article by Avi Benyahu]

[Text] Far from the eye of the public and from the eyes of the media, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] is seriously preparing for the next war, should it be forced into it.

Alongside the continuing engagement with the "intifadah", the tasks of regular defense along the borders and, in addition, to coping with budgetary difficulties having repercussions for every aspect of the IDF, General Headquarters continues to train its senior commands in new models as well as to install new and original patterns of thought.

Over the past two years, General Headquarters has designed clear models of maneuvers in a new format. This refers to maneuvers that take place at a senior level of the regional and general commands, in scenarios close to the reality of the next war, as anticipated in a draft of the characteristics of the future battlefield. The chief of staff is also among those who take part in the maneuvers.

Contrary to the maneuvers at all levels familiar to us from the past, this time the "battle maneuvers" are hidden from the eyes of the body being trained. The headquarters of the exercise itself does not know where things will lead on the second or third day of the "war", like the decisions of the chief of staff and the OCs of the commands, which are unexpected and given only in "real time". These exercises, which are becoming assimilated into the IDF, are characterized by an "open playground", i.e. everything is open and everything is possible.

The State of Israel is surrounded by confrontational states, and considering the characteristics of the future battlefield (high firing power, the ability to strike the rear, a versatile and mobile means of warfare), General Headquarters estimates that in a real war of unbeknownst dimensions it will be very difficult to forecast the following day. Therefore, senior commanders must be trained in real-time decision making. In this, they are tested. This characteristic of the exercises, primarily directed by the Department of Military Training, headed by Major General Doron Rubin, forces the senior command to work with a measure of physical and conceptual effort similar to that required from them during a war. They must make sure to maintain reporting and battle procedures and to refer to all of the operational and logistic bodies under their responsibility.

These "maneuvers of the senior commands", directed by Major General Bar-Kohba, together with the Department of Military Training, define to the senior command exactly what they need to deal with and, primarily, what they do not need to deal with. This method is becoming entrenched in the army corps, and exercises in the new format are already taking place in the divisions, the brigades, and even at the level of the battalions.

The exercises emphasize the critical role of the battalion commander during a war. The battalion commander is, in effect, the most senior person to have eye contact with his forces, and is with them at the line of fire, transmitting the battle scenario to the rear. In contrast, the

brigade commander is generally somewhat further to the rear and does not always see the field and what is happening there. The exercises emphasize the degree of responsibility and specialization required of each person fulfilling a function in the commands.

Senior officers at General Headquarters, including the chief of staff, define the program for senior maneuvers as a "real revolution". Incidentally, the political level, which must follow the movements of the IDF in a war on a daily basis, and which must be represented in an exercise of this sort, does not usually take part. The experience of the Lebanon war shows that a government that does not know how to read a map and military moves, and is unfamiliar with military terms and concepts, will have difficulty following a pretentious minister of defense who leads an army to a war that is a lost cause. [He would also be dragging] an entire government through frustration and anguish. Therefore, a way must be found, through the minister of defense, to incorporate the members of the ministerial committee of defense into some of the maneuvers that will be determined in the present government.

Parallel to the establishment of the senior command maneuvers, the IDF is attempting to adopt the air force's "debriefing culture". There is no point in maneuvers of this kind if lessons are not drawn from them and actions are not taken toward their implementation. In a summary of this type, an attempt is made to consolidate the problems arising during the maneuver (an unclear order, a misunderstood destination, firing toward our own forces, the problem of a night movement, a logistic rear echelon, lack of intelligence, etc.) in an attempt to find solutions for them.

During the debriefing, every event in the maneuver is presented against a backdrop of the orders that were issued, operations journals, recordings of the communications network, and telephone calls that were recorded during the exercise. While this method of investigation puts the senior commanders under pressure, inasmuch as they cannot deny the erroneous moves that they executed, lessons can be better learned through its use. At the end of every maneuver, after reviewing lessons on various levels and, following the summary of headquarters and the chief of staff, the Department of Military Training produces a thick booklet outlining the lessons.

Precisely who reads it? This is not clear, but there is no doubt that the competition for "eye time" of the senior military commander is fierce. Only if the issue of maneuvers and their lessons become properly assimilated into the IDF will the commanders be required to address the lessons.

In light of its experience in the Lebanon war, the IDF now makes sure, following large maneuvers at the senior levels, to execute summaries at two levels: Were "battlefield" moves in the maneuver executed in accordance with the principles of war (devotion to the task, combat

spirit, surprise, initiative, originality, etc.), and did the forces adhere to the combat theory as summarized by General Headquarters?

The chief of the Department of Military Training, Major General Doron Rubin, puts special emphasis on what is termed "devotion to the task in light of the goal". This value is of great importance in war, as well as in activities of regular defense, including the intifadah. The intention is that the commander and the soldier must always remember the goal and the objective put before them and aspire to achieve them. Thus, for example, the IDF is now attempting to explain that if a division received a task in the Lebanon war to arrive at the Beirut-Damascus highway, there would be no point in a lengthy delay to conduct a battle with the Syrians in 'Ayn Zalahah.

Incidentally, all of the maneuvers at the senior level at General Headquarters and at the regional commands rely on real scenarios, as they are anticipated in the annual intelligence assessment. In the interim, until the war that everyone hopes will be avoided, the people of the Department of Military Training are passing through the various commands, holding seminars on battles and war doctrines, in addition, to staff work in the senior commands and at the command level. The subject of "command and control" is a central focus of the exercise, referring to the large and varied dimension of military forces in the same "playground", whether in a maneuver or in a war.

Parallel to the criticism of the press on the subject and perhaps even prior to it, the IDF has identified the deterioration that has taken place in terms of the value of reporting in the military. The issue had already come up at the very start of the intifadah, when commanders and soldiers filtered parts of reports, delayed them, and sometimes even prevented them totally [from appearing].

Thus, it became evident from polls taken by professional elements in the IDF that both soldiers and junior commanders testify to a conflict between two values: "truthful reporting" and "comradeship among warriors". In other words, if I tattle on a friend who beat an Arab in an alley, I will report truthfully as is requested of me, but I will transgress the comradeship of warriors that where I received my education.

The senior commanders of the army must consider this phenomenon. The exercises at the senior levels and the stage of debriefing and summaries of those exercises rely primarily upon those reports. If this is now deteriorating (as agreed upon by many commanders), the situation is likely to become exacerbated and leave its impression on the next war.

An additional realm being given much consideration in these maneuvers is that of "night warfare". This is a military lesson of the utmost importance from the Lebanon war. Since that war, the IDF has made great progress in this field, however the process is slow and

complex. Commanders are required to enter a secret and dark world, and become accustomed to optical and other new equipment, etc.... Combat by night has tremendous power. If the IDF specializes in it, this will constitute an advantage in the future battlefield.

If the IDF succeeds in assimilating this model of maneuvers at the various levels and, primarily, in drawing true lessons from them and acting toward their implementation (the report of the State Comptroller was not flattering on this subject), it will attain great expertise enabling it to incorporate modern means of warfare and withstand the next war, should it be forced upon us.

Columnists Question Syria's Intentions in Region

Gilbo'a Examines Preconditions

90AE0194A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
20 Jul 90 p 5b

[Article by 'Amos Gilbo'a]

[Text] Towards the end of the 19th century, a terrifying Turkish wrestler arrived in a small mountain village in northwest Syria, called Kardaha. In a thunderous voice, he invited those who were gathered around to fight with him. They all were afraid. And then one came forward, tall and big-framed, who grabbed the Turk and threw him to the ground.

"Wahash" (wild man), the villagers called out in admiration, and from that moment, this nickname stuck to Suleyman, the new hero of Kardaha, and became his surname. This was the grandfather of Hafiz al-Asad, the president of Syria. His father, Aley Suleyman, also was strong, solid, powerful, and protected the poor and the weak, until the elders of the village gathered and said to him: "You are not a "wahash," you are an asad (lion)." And that became the new surname of Hafiz, born in 1930. And, as were his grandfather and his father, he was tall and well-built.

I remembered these stories when I saw him this week during his visit in Egypt. He is still tall, of course, but bowed down, thin, almost bedridden. Only 60 years of age (in another three months), but his speech is halting and his appearance is pitiful, like that of an old man. Where is he and where is al-Asad of the Yom Kippur War, of the Syrian invasion of Lebanon, whom Henry Kissinger praised so much?

Where is he and where is Mubarak, the 62-year-old Egyptian president, who next to him looks like his son or his younger brother? Tanned, vigorous, sure of himself, moving like a boxer. Where is he and where is the Iraqi Saddam Husayn, 53 years old, vigorous, aggressive, rapacious, ready to eat for breakfast the entire al-Asad family and the families of the rich sheykhs of the Arab oil states of the Persian Gulf, and, of course, the entire Israeli general staff, and, at its head, the commander of the air force?

This is today the trio of the important rulers in the Arab world. It is joined by a fourth ruler, whose territory along with its population is the most important—King Husayn, 55 years old, who, like al-Asad, has suddenly been taken by old age accompanied by a deep depression.

Iraq and Jordan today constitute a clear axis in the Arab world. Egypt and Syria are beginning to be another axis, whose foundations were laid by al-Asad during his present visit. Al-Asad did not come with song to Egypt, and with little treasure. A wave of troubles drove him to renew diplomatic relations with Egypt about half a year ago. [Other factors prompted him] to set foot on its soil these days: a severe economic situation, the Lebanese mire, threatening Iraqi hostility, a change in the world order and the crumbling of the Soviet Union and its satellites, his long-time defense-strategic support, the loss of the hope for "strategic balance" versus Israel (that is, Syria must fight alone against Israel), troubling isolation within the Arab world, and serious water problems with Turkey.

Al-Asad came to Egypt with a large flock of companions. Not generals, as before the Yom Kippur War, but ministers of economics, housing, education, industry and the like. What was on the agenda at the meeting with Mubarak were three groups of subjects: the so called the "diplomatic process" (or the "peace process"), relations within the Arab world, and direct relations between Syria and Egypt. It is important to spend some time on the first group.

A reading of the headlines of some of the newspapers could make one think that al-Asad's Syria has become a pursuer of peace, that he has adopted the model of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement and the way in which it was achieved, and that peace contacts have already begun, or are about to begin, between Israel and Syria, and that we will shortly be able to visit the great Umiyyah mosque in Damascus. This is little more than direct Egyptian disinformation.

Mubarak is interested in placing himself at the center of the Arab world, as the main manipulator of the diplomatic process and of the inter-Arab system. He wants to appear as the person who makes the Arab world more moderate, who can "bend" the extreme al-Asad, promote reconciliation in the Arab world, and prevent wars in the Middle East. It is important, of course, for Mubarak's ego, but it is important for him mainly vis a vis the West. Only in that way can he get the West to continue to give him money, so that he can feed the million mouths born in Egypt every seven to eight months.

And it is also important to him before this November, when the Arab summit conference will be held in Egypt. This summit will be a kind of historical landmark, that will finally blot out the decade of the Arab boycott of Egypt and will make it clear to the Arab world that

Egypt's political doctrine—political struggle against Israel to clip its wings—is the ruling one.

And what did al-Asad say in Egypt? Although his appearance is that of a goner, his determination, his intelligence and cleverness, are still there. He said something like this: I join the peace efforts of my friend Mubarak, despite my own theory, according to the Syrian conception and the Syrian conditions, in which there has not been any change.

And the conception and the conditions are as follows:

- A complete Israeli withdrawal from all of the Golan Heights and Israeli agreement in advance, even before talks begin. On that, and only on that, he is "on the same wavelength" as Egypt. Israel returned to Sinai up to the last grain of sand of Taba—Israel will return the Golan Heights up to the last bit of soil at the mouth of the Jordan River.
- Israel will withdraw from Southern Lebanon. In other words, if someone in Israel is toying with the illusion that it is possible to make a deal with Syria in which Damascus will give up the Golan Heights and, in exchange, Israel will recognize Syrian control in Lebanon—he can forget it.
- All of this will be achieved through an international conference under U.N. auspices, which will solve "in one blow" the problem of the Golan Heights and of the Palestinians.
- Egypt paid with a peace treaty and diplomatic relations with Israel in exchange for the Sinai. Syria is willing to pay only with "the cessation of the state of hostilities with Israel." And this is not merely a semantic matter. This is a weltanschauung.

Such a statement, of course, also should not be taken lightly, because it is of no little practical importance. First of all, al-Asad is in that way saying that he, too, is involved, that the Golan Heights are also up for discussion, and that it is not solely Arafat's and a Palestinian problem nor solely an issue for Baker.

Second, al-Asad is signalling the U.S.A. and Western Europe: It's possible to do business with me on the basis of my conditions. Then, let's move forward, start talking with me, pressure Israel to agree to my conditions, and meanwhile give me economic and financial aid.

Does this open some new diplomatic horizon for Israel, some kind of chance? The answer is negative, to my sorrow. Even if Israel were to turn to al-Asad and say to him: Let's sit and talk on your terms, even though our position is "without preconditions;" al-Asad would reply: "Thank you, let's meet in an international conference after you announce that you are withdrawing from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon. There, at the conference, we will clarify the technical details of how you are going to do it."

And then there is the Syrian chance and the danger for Israel of some kind of rapprochement and reconciliation between Syria and Iraq. But that's already another kettle of fish.

Zak Reviews Golan Issue

90AE0194B Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
20 Jul 90 p 3c

[Article by Moshe Zak]

[Text] "We know that the Israeli government is conducting secret talks with Syria"—Egyptian President Mubarak commented about a year ago, surprising his Israeli interlocutor. This week, Mubarak also surprised Hafiz al-Asad when he declared in his presence that Syria was ready to join in the diplomatic process.

That same week, the Iraqi ruler declared (in an interview with the WALL STREET JOURNAL) that the Arabs had erred in 1967, and that "they had missed the opportunity for a convenient settlement with Israel by rejecting its proposal to take most of the West Bank and Gaza, in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel." The Iraqi ruler spoke of the Arab loss of an opportunity in 1967, and the Syrian ruler did not contradict the words of the Egyptian president about his willingness for a settlement with Israel, and this after having concentrated a large army on the border with Israel a few days earlier. Mubarak can now bask in the glory in his achievement of turning Syria toward a diplomatic path. Indeed, after al-Asad's return to Damascus, the official newspaper TISHRIN wrote that the Syrian-Egyptian agreement reached in Alexandria was important both for war and for peace. But the Egyptians prefer to hear the "ending" only, the Syrian willingness for peace.

Mubarak did not specify al-Asad's terms, but a reporter of Radio Monte Carlo specified Syria's preconditions. Nevertheless, the value of the declaration at Alexandria should not be dismissed, as talk about the diplomatic option can contribute to calm in the region, and even influence the Palestinians in Judaea and Samaria. The announcement in Alexandria was preceded by an announcement of al-Asad's second-in-command that the next war would be hard not only for Israel, but for Syria as well. It may be that this announcement signals the beginning of a process in Damascus, but it would be better to allow it to ripen without initiating declarations from Jerusalem, which would spark immediate denials.

In fact, al-Asad never ruled out a discussion about getting the Golan Heights. When Major General Yariv conducted the talks at Kilometer 101 with General Gamassi, al-Asad was jealous of Egypt. Yariv had proposed a significant withdrawal, and said to Kissinger: Send me General Yariv, so that he makes a similar proposal to me, as well. Kissinger tried to convince Israel with this story not to be hasty in finishing up at Kilometer 101, without leaving items for Geneva.

About three years afterwards, al-Asad asked King Husayn to mediate between himself and Israel, in order to obtain agreement for deployment of the Syrian army in Lebanon, with an understanding not to come near the Israeli border. This agreement could have become the foundation of a broader agreement after the Peace in the Galilee War. But Israel did not take advantage of the opportunity, because it did not want to appear as if it were seeking to divide Lebanon between itself and Syria. Then, Israel had something to offer al-Asad: control in Lebanon in exchange for Israeli control of the Golan. But Israel lost its bargaining chip when Syria increased its control in Lebanon.

Now al-Asad is demanding the Golan as a precondition for any settlement in the framework of the international conference, and he did not wait until his visit with Mubarak. Cyrus Vance, Jimmy Carter, and even Senator Arlen Specter, who visited him, heard this proposal from him. Senator Specter, the Jew, was so impressed by what al-Asad said, that he came to Jerusalem to report about it to Shamir, and this week, when al-Asad repeated his proposal, he went to President Bush in order to spur him to support Israeli-Syrian negotiations, in the framework of an international conference, without waiting for an official Syrian proposal.

Two weeks ago, President Bush sent a message to Shamir that the U.S.A. had examined and determined there was no chance now for negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, as Israel had proposed in its initiative. Mubarak's announcement of Syrian willingness to be a partner in the diplomatic process somewhat embarrassed the officials in Washington, who hastened to belittle the value of the Syrian demarche.

Syria has never ruled out a settlement with Israel on the basis of the return of the Golan. It carefully used the term settlement and did not speak of peace. This time, Mubarak says that al-Asad is also ready for peace. If al-Asad indeed transmits such a message to us through Mubarak, it will stem from two motives:

A) The Arabs's belief that time is on their side has been shaken. They know that Israel is getting stronger, therefore they are seeking a settlement now on their terms, before Israel is strengthened by the waves of immigration. Mubarak took al-Asad to the Sinai, in order to arouse his jealousy of Egypt's territorial achievements through the diplomatic route, and that worked without too much talk.

B) Syria's belief that the U.S.S.R. will aid it in achieving strategic balance with Israel has been shaken. Although the Soviets now have 19,000 tanks too many, they need cash, and Syria has no means of paying, and it sought another weapon, not tanks.

Syria does not want to be isolated in the Arab world, and it cannot accept Iraqi hegemony in the Arab world. Al-Asad knows that during the Gulf War, Saddam Husayn sought ways for a secret dialogue with Israel, for helping him in the American arena, but strongly refused

an Israeli proposal for the operation of the oil pipeline to Haifa, in order not to appear in the eyes of the Arabs as a collaborator with Israel. Therefore, al-Asad can empower Mubarak to lobby to get the Golan for him, without "being dirtied" by negotiations with Israel. He needs the Egyptian crutch, and for its sake he agreed to Mubarak's announcement.

Sadat came to Jerusalem after prior secret talks, and after he and Begin had foiled Carter's initiative (in an agreement with Gromyko) for convening the Geneva Conference, while al-Asad was still talking about the formula of the international conference. The first test of the Syrian ruler will be the permission he gives Egypt to transmit his proposals formally to Israel, for until now he has also ruled out indirect negotiations. For the time being, he has authorized Egypt to talk only with the Americans. Therefore, Israel is not required to determine its position on a proposal that has not reached it.

Harif Views Regional Role

*90AE0194C Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
18 Jul 90 p 10*

[Article by Yosef Harif]

[Text] The declaration of the Syrian President, Hafiz al-Asad, that he is ready to join "the peace efforts" of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, sounds, as it were, like good news. But it appears from an initial examination of his list of conditions that the Syrian ruler wants Egypt's achievements, as he was able to see them with his own eyes during the tour that his host gave him of the expanses of the Sinai, without having to take the route that Egypt took—direct negotiations with Israel.

It is important for Mubarak to show to the Western world that he has succeeded in steering even a man such as al-Asad, and in harnessing him to the peace efforts, and it is important for al-Asad to appear as a peace-seeker (suddenly, he has already "accepted" 242 and 338, on account of which he had been the only one to boycott the Geneva Conference at the time), in order to extricate himself from isolation and to enjoy the West's, and mainly the U.S.A.'s, courtship.

Mubarak tried to persuade al-Asad that according to the Camp David Accords, Israel must withdraw from all the territories within the framework of a peace agreement, exactly as was the case in the Sinai. And thus it was written in the preamble: "This framework, according to what is appropriate, is intended to be the basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and every one of its other neighbors willing to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis."

Israel, as is known, argues that no comparison should be made between Sinai and any other territory, and that is the intention of the words "according to what is appropriate"—in other words, what can be appropriate for the Sinai region, is not necessarily appropriate for the region of the Golan Heights and Judaea and Samaria. But

Mubarak adds, in order to encourage al-Asad and to persuade him, that it is worth it to him to take the peace route, because only in that manner will he be given back the Golan Heights.

As far as it is known, an understanding was reached in the past between Israel and the U.S.A. according to which the Golan Heights are not to be regarded as any other conquered territory. However, it is worth remembering that in a discussion between the previous U.S. president, Ronald Reagan, and King Husayn, he told Husayn that as to the final status of the territories, the U.S.A. maintains that the reference to withdrawal in Security Council Resolution 242 also applies to the Golan Heights. And if with Reagan this was the case—all the more so with George Bush.

It is almost certain that al-Asad's declaration, whether devoid of all intention of sincerely achieving peace with Israel, will continue to roll on, and that there will be someone who will ascribe peaceful intentions to the president of Syria.

If al-Asad wanted to take Egypt's route by similarly recognizing that only through direct negotiations with Israel will he succeed in obtaining what he wants, then he would not have raised as a condition the convening of an international conference—a "peace conference" to be held under U.N. auspices, and convened by the U.N. Secretary-General where all permanent members of the Security Council together with all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO, would participate on an equal basis.

The presentation of preconditions, including the demand that Israel express beforehand its readiness to withdraw from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon—proves that there is nothing new in al-Asad's tidings, aside from additional proof that Damascus has not given up the idea of a "greater Syria," of which an important stage is, of course, the taking over of all of Lebanon. Thus it is demanded of Israel "for the sake of peace" and as a condition for peace that it withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon.

It is not only a matter for estimates, for al-Asad himself said yesterday in Alexandria that Syria was ready to join in the peace process "but we maintain our positions." No one says that Syria must give up in advance one of its positions, but why must Israel give up in advance its positions as a condition for peace negotiations?

An attempt was made on the part of Washington to draw Syria closer to the peace process before the end of the Reagan administration. Former Secretary of State George Schultz met on his own initiative for that purpose with the Syrian foreign minister. Washington was ready to come towards Damascus and as a gesture cancelled a series of limitations that it had imposed on Syria following the revelations about Syria's direct involvement in terror. But Syria would not be moved. The Syrian foreign minister summed up his meetings

with his American counterpart and said that the positions of the U.S.A. and Syria were far apart on the subject of the peace process and the international conference and its authority, and that the U.S.A. continued to accept Israel's positions on this subject. An "international conference" according to al-Asad means that it will have the authority to dictate the "just settlement", in his words.

Washington did not accept that. The efficient way to establish peace, it explained to Damascus, was by means of direct negotiations.

Al-Asad repeated the old trick this week. He knows well that Israel will not agree to an international conference, but al-Asad did not speak during his visit to Alexandria to Israel, as a response to the "invitation" of the Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir. He spoke to the European Community, always enthusiastic about the idea of an international conference, and also to the U.S.A. Apparently, it seems to al-Asad that the positions that were previously rejected by the Reagan administration will perhaps not seem so severe to the Bush administration. It's worth trying. Why should he not try to give himself a "moderate image"? There's nothing new in Damascus.

Bedouin Trackers Guard Southern Border

*90AE0189A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
18 May 90 p 17*

[Article by Amir Rozenblat]

[Excerpt] The bedouin soldiers of the desert reconnaissance unit drive their jeeps very artfully and skillfully. They know every valley and hill. The concept of "impassable terrain" is foreign to them. In the course of continuous pursuits on the southern borders with Egypt or Jordan, it is difficult to catch them studying a map. They know the area well and do not need aids such as maps and compasses, as befits true masters of their environment.

Captain 'Ataf, the commander of the unit, paratroop wings decorating his chest, explains that the bedouins are not required by law to serve in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], especially not in a unit of this type, which is based on volunteers alone. He is enthusiastic about the field craft of his soldiers and points to their combat infantry brigade training. According to him, the loyalty of his men to the state of Israel is without limit. The intifadah in the territories is nevertheless not a subject for open discussion, but the soldiers say that the Palestinians are rebelling against the state, and accordingly, it is necessary to treat them as an enemy would be treated. [passage omitted]

They return to the Egyptian border. In the briefing tent located at the unit's departure base in the south of the country, Cap 'Ataf relates that the unit was established about four years ago, with the goal of preventing infiltrations by smugglers and terrorists from the territory of Egypt to Israel and vice versa, after the return of the

Sinai. 'Ataf, 27, has a face tanned by the desert sun, and the penetrating eyes of a hawk. He speaks in the authoritative tone of a commander who knows what he is facing. Recently, he emphasizes, there has been an increase in the activity of smugglers from the territories of both Egypt and Jordan, and his unit has assumed the responsibility for locating their tracks, preventing infiltration attempts, and neutralizing fatahist elements who attempt to penetrate into Israel.

The border area is extensive, extending from Rafiah in the north to Eilat in the western border sector, and from Eilat in the south to the Dead Sea in the north in the eastern border sector. "We track infiltrators, mainly in the vital passages that serve as movement routes through which they must pass, or in places known to us in advance. Our operations include setting up ambushes and observation posts, and surveillance at critical points."

Cap 'Ataf has served as the unit's commander for about one year and 3 months. According to him, in this period, 90 percent of the attempts to infiltrate Israel, or exit from Israel into Egypt and Jordan, were thwarted. Most of these cases involved smugglers. However, there have also been penetration attempts carried out by terrorists who made their way from Egypt and Jordan, equipped with many combat means, with the objective of carrying out attacks in Israel. His men discovered their tracks and prevented them from carrying out their plan.

He does not elaborate on these cases. He is willing to speak about operational methods only in general terms, lest they become exposed to potential infiltrators. "Being a special unit, whose soldiers know the conditions of the desert well, we are sensitive to every detail. For example, a desert rock that is moved from its place, or a bush that is brushed against, will immediately arouse our attention. Someone carrying five kg of pistachios is less pressured than someone carrying five kg of TNT, and this is reflected in the prints that he leaves in the field. For us, these and other details are the end of a thread that are likely to lead to the capture of a smuggler or a terrorist." [passage omitted]

What brings a young bedouin to enlist in the Army, and to volunteer for a select unit? 'Ataf does not want to speak on behalf of others. It is easier for him to speak about himself. "After I finished high school in my place of residence in the north of the country, two possibilities stood before me: To continue studying or to join the Army. I decided to enlist. As a citizen of this state, I felt that I was obliged to fulfill my obligation before demanding my rights. In my opinion, whoever lives in the state of Israel, who exists and studies in it, is obliged first of all to fulfill his obligations."

'Ataf relates that he is from a family whose sons all served in the IDF. His father and uncle are currently serving in the IDF, and they encouraged him to enlist. Initially, he volunteered for the paratroops and was in the command track. "I felt no discrimination as a

bedouin, and they gave me equal opportunities to prove my ability in the Army. With time, I expressed my willingness to transfer to a unit composed entirely of bedouins, because I knew that I could contribute much more in such a unit. Young bedouins currently finishing high school have the same enthusiasm that I had. I am personally familiar with many of them, and I know that they usually prefer to enlist in the Army. I encourage them to also enlist in IDF other units. [passage omitted]

[box]

Egyptians and the Jordanians Are Not Making an Effort to Prevent Infiltrations

The border of peace with Egypt is about 300 km long. Soldiers of the Bedouin Reconnaissance Unit block the penetration of infiltrators not only from the Egyptian border, but also from the Jordanian sector. Daily existence is not easy, because the soldiers must stay in the field for long hours. The desert way of life has created a special lifestyle around the campfire among the desert trackers, charged with carrying out diverse missions and exhausting chases.

From time to time, they capture smugglers seeking to penetrate into Israel, who have in their possession spare parts for cars, medical equipment, clothes, tobacco, and cheeses. Goods smuggled into Egypt include all types of drugs, pistachios, nuts, electrical appliances, and stolen cars. Some of the smuggling trips are carried out in jeeps and on camels. Sometimes a penetration from Egypt involves crossing into Israel by camel, then linking up with jeeps, or camels inside Israel's territory.

Penetrations involving hostile terrorist activity are also not lacking. In the first months of the intifadah, Cap 'Ataf states, there was an increase in infiltration attempts by terrorists. "However," he emphasizes, "subsequently, a sharp decline was recorded, because they understood very quickly that as long as we are here, they have no chance."

The unit commander estimates, according to data in the field, that both the Egyptians and the Jordanians are not making any special efforts to prevent penetrations by infiltrators from their territories into Israel. It is precisely on the "seam" between the Gaza Strip and Egypt that there exists stronger control and vigilance on the part of Egyptian soldiers.

Bedouin soldiers of the unit treat each penetration attempt as if it were carried out for the purpose of staging an attack. Many of their activities are classified. From the cases that have been publicized, particularly memorable is the capture of a cell that infiltrated into the south to carry out a terrorist attack. The cell was apprehended with its weapons and equipment before it managed to carry out its scheme.

Service on the quiet border of peace is divided between situations of tedium and high-speed chases. Accordingly, the desert trackers need to carry out their menial tasks

while maintaining maximum alertness. Other elements are required to clarify whether the uninvited guests from Egypt are cheese smugglers or terrorists.

Comptroller Report Criticizes Police

*90AE0190A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
27 May 90 p 2B*

[Article by Re'uven Shapira']

[Text] The chapter dealing with "handling suspicion that police personnel have committed a criminal offense" in Report No. 40 of the state comptroller will apparently be pursuing the police for years to come and will be quoted on many occasions. The new Inspector General of the Police, Ya'aqov Terner, will need to work hard with the senior command staff of the police to change the impression made by the report, which is one of the most critical in the history of the police.

This report focusses on a most sensitive and problematic area. "...The police are not countering impaired integrity forcefully enough," writes the comptroller among other things. "The policy of the police regarding offenses committed by its personnel, which is expressed by the encouragement of officers, especially senior officers suspected of the commission of offenses, to resign without a disciplinary hearing, not only thwarts the execution of judicial proceedings against them, it also does not achieve the objective of deterring and educating all police personnel...The control mechanisms developed by the police do not in any case ensure the integrity of internal investigations and do not preclude the possibility of harmful interference in such investigations."

These summary sentences from the latest report of the state comptroller, who examined police methods for treating police personnel, including senior officers, suspected of committing criminal offenses, undermines the credibility of police leaders of the last decade. The state comptroller dealt a bruising blow to the persistent claim by the police that it thoroughly and impartially investigates suspicions of criminal conduct on the part of police personnel and officers and executes investigations and judgement regarding such conduct.

The police command has worked in recent years to prove that the police is strict with police personnel suspected of crimes, and that it acts impartially. The state comptroller's report is a slap in the face of the command.

The comptroller does not in fact mention the names of those responsible for the difficult reality that she discloses. However, the outgoing Inspector General, David Krause, and his predecessor, Arye Ivtzan, cannot derive satisfaction from the report.

In private conversations, senior police officers argue that the report is too harsh on the police and causes unjustified damage to their image and intensive activity to purge corrupt policemen and officers. Nevertheless, the

prevailing understanding is that it is impossible to suspect the state comptroller of misunderstanding matters or having extraneous considerations when she writes critically of the police. Therefore, no police officer has dared to publicly state that the comptroller is incorrect or that she exaggerates in the report or regarding its findings.

It Was Not in the Public Interest

Several years ago, an investigation by the comptroller uncovered many deficiencies in internal investigation procedures in the police. The current report focuses mainly on the non-execution of the judicial process with regard to police officers, including the most senior, who are suspected of crimes. The comptroller cites examples, most of which are from five and six years ago, but were actually examined by the comptroller during May-November 1989.

Among other things, the comptroller strongly criticizes the circumstances of the resignation from the police (without specifying names in the report) of two former commanders, Barukh Levi, who was the Civil Guard commander (forced to resign from the police three years ago) and Rahamim Heder, the commander of the northern district of the police (forced to resign about six years ago). Both were the subject of criminal investigations into suspicions that they had committed offenses. The comptroller determines that, in both cases, an investigation was not carried out as required, and that the police command permitted them to resign without being tried.

Commander Levi was suspected of submitting falsified reports on personal expenses and expenses of the unit that he commanded, and of behaving inappropriately by exploiting his senior position for personal purposes. Despite the decision of the attorney's office to try him, and the fact that more than four months remained until his retirement date, he was not tried.

Commander Heder was suspected of twice leaking classified material to a journalist and of irregular behavior in promoting matters pertaining to a private business deal in which he was a partner. According to the comptroller, "material pertaining to the investigation was kept in the safe of the inspector general and was not transferred to the investigation of the commander of the internal investigation unit...Nor was the material transferred to the attorney's office, and justice was not carried out regarding the officer." It emerges from the investigation file that the investigation was conducted according to the directives of the inspector general and the head of the investigations branch, both of whom determined the topics of the investigation, the method of conducting the investigation, and even the questions to be posed to the officer. This investigation did not produce any findings. Only after the investigation was completed, did the police, on the order of the attorney's office, uncover prima facie evidence of criminal offenses.

The police, in response to the comptroller, stated that it was not in the public interest to try the officer in view of the brevity of his service, his rank, his age, and the fact that his discharge from the force did not entitle him to financial compensation.

The police further stated that, before the district attorney, made a decision, they informed the state attorney and the district attorney of their intention to allow the officer to resign without a disciplinary hearing. This position was also acceptable to the district attorney, who indicated that he saw no need to insist on a disciplinary procedure, because the objective was obviously achieved, in that a senior police officer who did not tell the truth when being investigated, and who damaged the force's discipline, would no longer be counted among the ranks of the police.

Regarding this, the report states: "In the comptroller's opinion, the public interest is served by trying an officer suspected of impaired integrity. This position is all the more valid in view of the senior rank and position of the officer." The comptroller further wrote in her preface to the examples relating to the two above-mentioned commanders: "The comptroller's investigation brought to light cases in which the interference of the police command resulted in irregular (lenient) treatment of cases of suspected impaired integrity. Such interference was expressed in the issuance of orders to conduct an investigation in a non-routine manner, and in the concealment of material without transferring it to the attorney's office, while encouraging suspected officers to resign from the force. Usually, decisive proof that clearly indicates the existence of an irregularity in the handling of a case is not to be found in the investigation files, nor is it expected to be found in them. Rather, it is expected that an attempt will be made to conceal such interference."

Contrary to the Order of the Attorney's Office

In the continuation of the report, the comptroller responds to the claims of the police. According to the police, the comptroller is doing everything in her power to prevent policeman with the slightest stain from serving. They add that this objective has been fully achieved through the dismissal or voluntary resignation of such personnel, in lieu of subjecting them to disciplinary hearings. The goal of a police hearing, argue the police, is, among other things, to examine whether a police officer is fit to continue serving in the police.

In this connection, the comptroller finds that officers suspected of crimes resigned from the police in the course of being investigated, or even after the attorney's office recommended subjecting them to a disciplinary hearing. In several cases, the police even encouraged such officers to resign by promising to refrain from subjecting them to a disciplinary hearing if they resigned.

"This policy of the police," writes the comptroller, "does not serve the goal of maintaining integrity among its

personnel. The encouragement of police personnel suspected of committing disciplinary and criminal offenses to resign from the force, and to thereby thwart the execution of disciplinary procedures against them, severely damages the deterrent effect of disciplinary procedures. It also damages the ability of the police to scrupulously maintain integrity and judge police personnel who deviate from obligatory and appropriate rules of behavior....In view of the role of the police in enforcing the law and the special status that this role requires, the police must be excessively scrupulous about judging their own personnel who are suspected of impaired integrity."

The comptroller indicates that the cases that she examined were not selected so as to constitute a representative sample, but are only examples. A large portion of the examples are cited from cases that were brought up by police officer and chief superintendent Bila Weinstock, who was the chief of the internal investigations unit and is currently the chief of the investigations unit in the southern district. She complained to the comptroller about two years ago of the whitewashing of investigations against senior police officers and inappropriate handling by the police command of suspicions that these officers engaged in criminal conduct. Weinstock also specified to the comptroller claims related to her non-promotion in the police.

One of the examples contained in the report describes an investigation that was conducted in March-July 1984 as a result of suspicion that an officer with the rank of chief superintendent received sexual favors from a policewoman in exchange for the continuation of her service in her unit. The same officer is also suspected of aiding a friend of that policewoman to obtain the transfer of her husband from one prison to another.

It is also suspected that he received the key to an apartment from two citizens, who were seeking to obtain business permits at the time, in exchange for help in obtaining those permits. At the end of the investigation, the internal investigations department recommended that the officer be tried on criminal charges of accepting a bribe and abusing the power of his office. The officer expressed a willingness to resign immediately, with pension, if the case against him were closed without charges.

In October of the same year, the case was transferred to the attorney's office, which requested that the police carry out supplementary investigations. These investigations were put off for an extended period. The attorney's office expressed dissatisfaction with the protracted handling of the investigation and determined that, because of the long time period that had elapsed since the events, it was necessary to subject the officer to a disciplinary hearing. The attorney's office also stipulated that it would close the case if the police made a commitment to indeed subject the officer to a disciplinary hearing without delay. It emerged that, contrary to the directive of the attorney's office, and despite the explicit commitment made by the police, the retirement and pension of

the officer in question were approved, and he was not subjected to a disciplinary hearing.

The comptroller determines unequivocally: The comptroller's investigation exposed deficiencies in the manner in which the police handle officers suspected of committing criminal or disciplinary offenses. Not all suspicions raised against police personnel were examined. Some of them did not even come to the attention of the internal investigations unit, even though the unit is intended for this purpose. In some cases, the police withheld material and did not transmit findings of investigations to the attorney's office, as is required.

"It emerges that investigation procedures were prolonged beyond what is reasonable. Protracted handling not only caused a delay in the sentencing of police personnel who were investigated, it also thwarted, in many cases, the possibility of executing a judgement on a police officer, including the possibility of trying him on criminal or disciplinary charges. Non-exhaustive investigations were conducted that did not look into all of the suspicions that were raised and did not use all means at the disposal of the investigators." In the opinion of the comptroller, the police must use their authority to delay the resignation of officers under investigation, so that these officers can be subjected to disciplinary hearings.

The comptroller's investigation further disclosed that, between January 1987 and August 1989, dozens of intelligence items concerning suspicions of the commission of criminal offenses by police personnel were not transferred to the internal investigations unit. Some of the items withheld, without there being a comprehensive, exhaustive investigation.

The comptroller: "Because of the sensitivity of the topic, it is necessary to develop additional control and supervisory staff, possibly outside the police, who would closely accompany internal police investigations to ensure a fundamental, in-depth investigation into every suspicion, and who would prevent any possibility of harmful influence and the diversion of an investigation, especially when it concerns senior officers....The failure to execute judgement regarding several members of the police suspected of criminal or disciplinary offenses not only harms the morale of the police, it also loosens the moral basis for rendering justice in other cases, which has a far-reaching effect on the behavior of all police personnel, the image of the police, and the public's trust in the police. The strict preservation of the integrity of the senior officers' cadre is vital to assuring the high moral level of the entire police force."

According to police personnel, about 400 investigations are opened each year by the internal investigations unit into police and officers suspected of crimes. There are cases in which an investigation is not carried out because the material that arouses suspicion is received from anonymous sources and is not detailed enough to provide a basis for opening an investigation, according to assertions by professional investigators. It is emphasized

in the police that, some time ago, the police and the minister of police recommended to the attorney's office and the Ministry of Justice that the 15 investigators of the internal investigations department be transferred to the police. They also recommended that investigations into police personnel suspected of crimes be conducted within the purview of the attorney's office. However, the latter is unwilling to accept such an arrangement.

Regarding the resignation of officers instead of facing a disciplinary hearing, it is maintained in the police that compelling an officer suspected of wrongdoing—who usually has seniority and a glorious record in the police—to resign in shame, i.e. dismissing the officer from the police, is a most serious punishment. [The reason for this is that] trying the officer could end in an acquittal for technical and other reasons, and the tarnished officer could continue to serve on the force, inasmuch as after an acquittal in a trial, it would be impossible to dismiss him.

This argument, and others, was made to the comptroller's team when it wrote the report. The comptroller nonetheless reached the conclusions that she reached, and the police have no choice but to treat the findings of the comptroller's investigation with the appropriate seriousness.

Professor Says War Option Unaffordable

*90AE0190B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
29 May 90 p 6B*

[Article by Avner Yaniv, Professor of Political Science at Haifa University]

[Text] Israel's security policy is currently at a crossroads. The crux of the problem is a combination of an overload and a decline in marginal (to borrow an economic term) security. Although Israel has never been stronger in absolute terms, in relative terms, matters are becoming more complex.

As a result of the escalation of the Arab world's conflict with Israel and Iran, the Arab world has moved quickly since the 1970s to exploit its raw economic, organizational, and technological potential with a much greater degree of success than in the past. The formulae underlying our security concept, which produced excellent results in the past, do not assure success in the future.

Dangers are rapidly developing on the ladder of threats. At the bottom of the ladder is the intifadah. At the top is the research and development, production, and launching of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by the confrontation states, such as Syria and Iraq. In the middle of the ladder is the conventional battlefield. These dangers will be difficult to neutralize or even blunt with the solutions of yesterday, and it should be assumed that it will also not at all be easy to limit their damage by means of the solutions of tomorrow.

The way out of the imbroglio lies somewhere between two courses of action: An increase in the load on the security system as it is, or increased reliance on innovative force multipliers.

The first alternative, increasing the load on the security system as it is, was exhausted at the end of the 1970s, from both a functional and a budgetary standpoint. The security system is now in a period of ongoing cuts following the enormous reinforcement after the Yom Kippur War, an astronomical increase in the cost of combat means, the substantial growth in Arab military strength, and the expenditure of about \$4 billion on the Lebanon War and more than \$2 billion on the Lavi' (not to speak of the many billions of dollars erased from the national capital, though not directly from the defense budget, by "correct economics" and the collapse of the bank shares).

Taking into account the fundamental economic position of the state and the great economic effort required as a result of the massive immigration wave from the Soviet Union, there is no chance whatsoever that this process will stop or become reversed. There is what there is, and no more. It is worthwhile for us to pray that there will not be another war, not just because of its terrible price in blood, but also because Israel's economy would find it difficult to cover its cost.

The second alternative, increased reliance on non-conventional force multipliers, is very problematic strategically and politically, and does not offer an inexpensive force multiplier.

Chemical and biological weapons, which cause horrible damage, are difficult to use, as their damage can migrate easily and quickly from the enemy's territory into our own territory. Nuclear weapons cannot be used against the main confrontation state at present, Syria, or at least against southern Syria, where the main battlefield of a future war would surely be. Launching a bomb like that of Hiroshima over Damascus would be like launching a bomb over the eastern Galilee region, and a tactical nuclear weapon fired in the Golan theater would be liable to endanger our forces almost as much it would endanger the Arab side.

A possible scenario (albeit not a very likely one at present) of such a situation: Syria starts a war and attempts to prevent the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] from achieving rapid superiority. In the first five days of the fighting, the Syrians have no partners, but as the fighting becomes protracted, there is increased political and psychological pressure on other elements in the Arab world to "come off the fence" and contribute to the war effort. In soliciting the aid of Iraq, and even Egypt and Jordan, the Syrians argue that failure to rush to Syria's aid would place the blame for a failure to achieve victory on Saddam, Mubarak, and Husayn. These leaders thus find it difficult to completely refrain from certain moves that do not necessarily oblige them to fight actively, such

as moving substantial forces within their sovereign territories, so that the IDF is forced to divert its own forces from the Golan and south Lebanon to other sectors. This reduces Israel's ability to gain superiority in battles against the Syrians, and it increases the chances of Israel becoming exhausted without being subdued in the battle field itself.

In order to prevent a collapse of this sort, a paramount need emerges to hit the foreign expeditionary forces, especially the Iraqis, before they reach the main theater of combat.

The possible size of these forces is unknown, but it is nearly certain that Iraq cannot divert a force larger than four divisions for the war effort against Israel, because the diversion of a force larger would harm Iraq's deterrent ability vis-a-vis Iran, and might entice Iran into renewing the war that ended in July 1988. Also, it can be assumed that Damascus (whose army does not exceed 10 divisions) and Amman (which has only four divisions) would not be willing to endanger themselves by hosting a large number of Iraqi divisions that might be turned against their capitals. However, this is no great consolation for Israel, because an Iraqi force of only four divisions could tip the balance decisively in a war with Israel in which the IDF becomes exhausted after several days of intense fighting with the Syrians.

If there is an efficient, cheap, and accurate way to destroy an Iraqi force of two to four armored divisions heading through Syria or Jordan toward Israel's border, it probably lies in the difference between defeat and victory. In a hard-pressed situation in which the IDF is having difficulty achieving superiority and is being rapidly pounded in the Golan and in Lebanon, it is liable to be difficult to find the regular air power that could eliminate an armored expeditionary force deep inside the territory of the states of the eastern front. When matters reach this point, it is probable that a tactical nuclear weapon, if we possess such a weapon at that time, carried by aircraft or by intermediate-range ballistic missiles, could supply an arresting blow against expeditionary forces beginning to make their way from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt (via the Sinai or the territory of another confrontation state).

However complex the problem of expeditionary forces may be, it pales in comparison to the risks looming on the horizon, e.g., the possibility of an Iraqi attempt to stage a surprise attack with missiles carrying chemical or conventional warheads to disrupt mobilization procedures at the start of a conventional war. Israel has indeed warned that it would respond to such an act with means several-fold more serious. However, it would be a grave error to assume that such a warning guarantees against such an attack. The Ba'th regime in Iraq has made many serious appraisal errors (e.g., the decision to start a war against Iran in 1980) and could err similarly in relation to Israel. Such a view of the Iraqi threat resulted in the destruction of the Osirak reactor in June 1981. Although that action has deferred Iraq's admission into the nuclear

club for close to a decade, it did not deter Baghdad from continuing its efforts in this direction, and even perhaps gave it greater incentive to continue them. The difficult truth is that Israel is unable to carry out a similar operation in the 1990s without the greatest danger of failure and/or an Iraqi retaliatory action.

If this assumption is correct, Israel is subject to a new strategic context that is dangerous beyond precedent. As soon as the Iraqis acquire any nuclear capability, and they are apparently not far from doing so, a primitive threat based on an Arab first-strike capability will develop. Such a situation is essentially unstable because it encourages attempts to cover inferiority by means of a surprise attack. There are only two reasonable responses to this threat: Deterrence by means of a perfected unconventional capability along with grave but indistinct threats of massive retaliation that would cause "insufferable damage"; or a defense based on protective means and shelters, and an ability to thwart and intercept based on a significant technical advantage, primarily anti-missile missiles. Regarding deterrence, almost everything that can be done has already been done. Despite Israel's denials and its calls from time to time to make the Middle East free of nuclear weapons, the entire Arab world assumes that Israel has had a perfected nuclear weapon and suitable launching means since the mid-1970s (and perhaps even before that). Most of the Arab governments do not have many doubts as to the boldness and stubbornness of the Jewish state, and different governments in Israel have found different ways to clarify to the leaders of the Arab world that Israel will not be the first to introduce unconventional weapons to the region, but that if it is compelled to respond, the response would be disproportionately destructive. Such a response would cause anger in Washington, create pressure on the Soviets to grant more solid protection to Syria, and above all, would legitimize the development of an unconventional weapon by Iraq.

In the area of defense, by contrast, matters are more complicated. After about three decades of a completely offensive doctrine, which assumed that Israel would strive to initiate wars and in all cases conduct most of the fighting on the enemy's territory, our protection and shelter situation, especially against unconventional weapons, is far from satisfactory. It seems that, after the second half of the 1980s, especially after Iraq's massive use of ground-to-ground missiles and the end of the war in the gulf, the Israeli defense system identified a "window" of Israeli vulnerability, and it entered into a race against time to develop a ballistic ability to destroy enemy missiles in flight. Until the completion of research and development of these new means, especially the Arrow and Patriot missiles, Israel will be compelled to rely on the deterrent effect of threats of punishment. The ballistic weapons in Iraq's possession are still not sufficiently perfected to pose an existential danger in the short term. Until Iraq perfects the means at its disposal, there is a reasonable chance that Israel will

have suitable responses to Iraq's ballistic threat. However, the new phase in the arms race heralds astronomical costs and growing dependence on the United States, not only regarding financing, but also in the area of using these means.

In the long term, sometime around the beginning of the 21st century, it is possible to expect a situation comparable to strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1950s: A second-strike capability in the hands of both sides, and therefore, a balance of "insane" fear, whose source of stability lies in the real possibility of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD). However, in contrast to East-West relations, a MAD strategy in the Middle East, rather than holding out hopes of a new security formula, would quite certainly pose additional difficulties. If the Arabs move toward developing unconventional weapons as an alternative to conventional weapons, and the Arab armies gradually reduce the size of their forces, one could feel justifiably optimistic that a such a stable balance of fear, indeed, significantly reduces the chances of war. But this is the unrealistic desire of a benevolent heart. An Arab effort (mainly in Iraq at present) to develop modern combat means does not aim at mutual deterrence, but at an advantage based on a combination of decisive quantitative superiority and qualitative parity. If we reach a situation in which both Israel and the Arabs have a second-strike capability, nuclear weapons will go out of use, the center of gravity of the contest will shift back to the conventional battle field, and, under the frightening protection of a nuclear stalemate, the Arabs will be able to exploit their decisive quantitative advantage.

In other words, there is no basis for the hope of "[declare the] bomb now" adherents, who believe that a future, declared nuclear strategy would be a stable, sure, and cheap miracle solution. In the future strategic era, Israel will not be able to base its security on a combination of a small conventional army and modern unconventional combat means. Rather, it will need the most expensive combination conceivable: A large conventional army equipped with the best combat means in combination with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

In the potential situation of a nuclear stalemate coupled with a deepening asymmetry in the conventional balance, even a hyperbolic defense formula such as this is nothing more than the very minimum to ensure survival. It is also probable it would be insufficient without a defense agreement with the United States that would define any attack against Israel as an attack against the United States. However, as long as the conflict between Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians is not settled, a comprehensive defense agreement with the United States is unlikely, and it is doubtful whether Israel, given its current internal situation, would be capable of the flexibility required to make such an agreement possible.

Thus, as in almost every other area, wisdom collides with the strange, perverse logic of Israeli politics in the strategic realm. It is worthwhile for us to quickly make every effort to reach an agreement, on the model of the

peace agreement with Egypt, that would create the maximal separation of forces, reduce the chance of wars of attrition and surprise attacks, reduce the incentives of the Arabs to go to war, and remove the main stumbling block to a defense agreement with the United States. Such an agreement could also provide for a sufficient presence of American forces, on the pattern of the multi-national forces in Sinai, to establish an American trip wire, against which any attack (e.g., by an Arab

military force) would oblige the United States to intervene. It is even possible to assume that the distance between the American position and Israel's minimal acceptable position, regarding the components of such an arrangement, is not as great as one might gather from the degree of tension between Shamir and Bush and Baker. However, judging by the previous years, it may be fairly assumed that we will continue to behave as if none of these possibilities existed.

INDIA

Leader Alleges Activities of Tamil Insurgents 'Uncontrolled'

90AS0344A New Delhi DINMAN TIMES in Hindi
5-11 Aug 90 p 12

[Interview with Jnan Krishnamurthy, Tamilnadu BJP leader: "Police Force Indifferent to LTTE's Activities"; date and place not given]

[Text] [DINMAN TIMES] The prime minister has declared that he and the Tamilnadu chief minister, Kalinger Karunanidhi, have no difference of opinion over the Tamil terrorists. However, news reports from Tamilnadu and outside indicate that Mr. Karunanidhi has no interest in controlling them. What is your opinion?

[Krishnamurthy] It is possible that the prime minister issued this statement keeping in mind the resolution of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka. He wants equal rights and opportunities for the Tamils in Sri Lanka. They should be treated fairly and should get all this peacefully and by cooperative efforts. We all have the same goal. A major question is about the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's [LTTE] activities in Tamilnadu. The Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] considers the state government's attitude toward LTTE inappropriate. I think that the prime minister does not agree with Karunanidhi's policy toward LTTE. The central government has learned, through its intelligence agencies, about the sphere of activities that LTTE is involved in. I believe that the central government must have advised the state government.

[DINMAN TIMES] What is your own view of all this?

[Krishnamurthy] I consider it my duty to mention that the people do not think that the central government has discharged its duties properly. It has not even understood the seriousness of the Tamilnadu situation. The people believe that the central government is supportive of the DMK [Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam—Dravidian Progressive Foundation] government because of the crucial role the DMK plays in the Rashtariya Morcha government.

[DINMAN TIMES] In which area are the terrorists concentrated?

[Krishnamurthy] LTTE terrorists are spread along the coastal regions of Tamilnadu. They are not only roaming armed in these areas, but are also terrorizing the people there. Being the opposition, the DMK had a very close relationship with LTTE during the M.G. Ramachandran government. A DMK legislator, Gopal Sawami, had even visited Sri Lanka quietly and met Mr. Prabhakaran and stayed in his camp. Another leader, Nedumaran, is also very close to the DMK and had visited Sri Lanka. Some DKM leaders are now talking in public meetings about openly endorsing the LTTE. One example of this

changing attitude is Mr. Karunanidhi's absence in the welcome reception for the last regiment of the peace keeping army returning from Sri Lanka. He refused to attend the ceremony since that army had killed 5,000 people of his caste or the Tamils. It is common knowledge that the Indian peace keeping force was active against the LTTE and not against the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

[DINMAN TIMES] What else did Mr. Karunanidhi do?

[Krishnamurthy] Anyone can guess where the chief minister stands after seeing him criticize the Indian army and showing open sympathy toward the LTTE. The state government has been lenient toward the LTTE and its activities. Mr. Karunanidhi had even denied the existence of the LTTE in Tamilnadu, just when the police had arrested 12 terrorists in Vichi district.

[DINMAN TIMES] Are there any other examples of DMK's protection of the LTTE? Is Mr. Karunanidhi also a separatist?

[Krishnamurthy] There is no doubt that during the lifetime of the late Anna Durray, the DMK had demanded a separate Dravidasthan. This demand was dropped later. I am not saying that the DMK is demanding an independent Tamilnadu, however, there are persons in the DMK that desire an independent Tamilnadu. Such people are within the DMK as well as outside of it. A "self-determination conference" was held in Madras about three or four months ago. Several speakers in that conference had openly advocated self-determination. A television news anchor participating in that conference had said that the fire that had started in the Azerbaijan region of the Soviet Union will burn the Ashoka Chakra soon. He meant that the movement of separation that had started in Azerbaijan would spread into India soon. Another speaker said that the tri-color flag would be used as a loin cloth. Another meeting was held in Tinjore only two months ago. This was called the "Tamil National Self-Determination Declaration Conference." The organizers of this conference had invited the Akali leader, Samaranjit Singh Mann. It was a coincidence that Mr. Mann was arrested two days before the conference. According to a statement issued by the BJP, the LTTE is giving military training to the youth in small groups of 10 and 12 in remote areas of Tamilnadu. All these support the fact that the separatist elements are active in Tamilnadu and the state government is not taking any action against them.

[DINMAN TIMES] You had said in your speech that the police are ignoring LTTE activities. Were such incidents brought to light?

[Krishnamurthy] I want to say that the police are indifferent toward the LTTE. However, it is because of political pressure. The police do not take any action when they learn that an influential DMK group is sympathetic toward the LTTE. They are afraid of being punished for doing something. The other reason is that the state police has very old rifles while the LTTE has

modern weapons. The police are afraid to fight them with their old weapons. I think that weapons—including AK-47 rifles, bombs, and parts—are being manufactured secretly in the state. A renowned DMK leader was arrested recently by the police. He was accused of making weapons and parts in his factory. I believe that these weapons are not being made for the LTTE terrorists because they already have a stockpile of weapons. These weapons made in Tamilnadu will be used to train the youth who are followers of the separatists. The police have still not learned why these weapons are being made.

PAKISTAN

Kashmir Said Essential to Pakistan's Survival

90AS0324A Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu
21 Jul 90 pp 32-34

[Article by A.K. Khan: "The Geographical Significance of Kashmir"]

[Text] We had the opportunity to read several articles on the Kashmir issue recently, however, none of them discussed Kashmir's geographical significance. Let us look at the importance of Kashmir from both the Indian and Pakistani perspectives.

Kashmir is in the north of Pakistan. Our borders meet China in the north, Afghanistan and Iran in the west, and India in the east. Kashmir, which has been a disputed issue between India and Pakistan for the last 42 years, is a beautiful land of high mountain ranges. These mountains include the Himalayas, the Korakoram, and the Pir Panjal. These mountains are covered with snow year-round and the masses of compacted snow known as glaciers move downward. These glaciers melt when they go down below the snow line and help make rivers. Some of these rivers go toward India and some toward Pakistan. Pakistan, which has a hot dry climate, depends on these rivers for agriculture, electricity generation, and industry. It rains here only during the monsoon months of July and August. These rains are too much for those months and there is no specific time for rains for the rest of the year. The monsoon rains are only 10 percent of our water supply. The total rains meet only 25 percent of our water needs. The British had started the canal system in the desert and semi-desert areas for agricultural production. We use these canals for irrigation. This unique canal system depends on these rivers. The vast plains of Punjab and Sindh, which are known to be one of the most fertile in Asia, also were made by these rivers. Our land's fertility, agriculture, electricity, and industry depend on these rivers that originate in Kashmir which is occupied by India.

By stopping the water in these rivers, India wants to stop our self-reliance and to hurt our defense system. It has, however, accepted the full rights of Pakistan on all rivers except the Beas, the Satluj, and the Ravi rivers according to the Sindh-Tas agreement in the United Nations. We did not understand the logic behind this agreement. Why

should India have the title to our waters? The weak government of Pakistan signed this agreement to avoid a war and also to save the other rivers' water. The Hindu mentality, however, did not abide by this agreement and started usurping the other waters also. It built the Siala dam in 1985 and then the Wooler dam on the Jhelum in its efforts to hurt Pakistan twice. Where is the United Nations and its agreement now? The United Nations could not help the Kashmiris to get their rights for 42 years. If Pakistan and the Kashmiris have to depend on the United Nations, they will not get any justice for another thousand years.

The question is: Why is India doing all this? Why is it breaking the UN agreement? Stopping water to Pakistan will reduce its self-reliance, but what danger is there to its defense?

India, which has control over five of our rivers, is already the owner of water from three of these rivers and has illegally controlled the other two. Our agriculture and electricity production would stop if India dams water from October to June. Our industrial production will stop when there is no electricity. We start load shedding usually in November and continue it for about six months. It affects our agricultural and industrial production. Cities plunge into darkness and life becomes a drag. Pakistan may have to shed load for 10 months if India stops the water in the Chenab and the Jhelum. This would put an end to our self-dependence and aggravate our problems many times.

It rains so hard during the monsoon months of July and August that our rivers are flooded and some villages are submerged under water. These five rivers could bring further havoc to Pakistan if India lets the dams on these rivers do. The whole eastern side of the Sindh to the border of India will look like an ocean. It will create an impossible situation for our defense department if India chooses to do that during a war. Nothing in the path of the flow of the river will stay. This would prove the most lethal weapon against us. India will win the war because these rivers run parallel to India's borders with the sea. Look at the Hindu mentality and planning and what it is doing to destroy us! India, whose greatest enemy in this region is Pakistan, would have accepted the Zia government's plan if it desired peace. Instead, it just kept planning to destroy Pakistan. It knows well that the next war will not be won by weapons alone and these rivers will play a key role in it. India's plans cannot be implemented if the Kashmir issue is resolved. This would not only strengthen Pakistan's defense, but also make it secure.

The government of Pakistan should consider these facts when deciding its stand on the Kashmir issue.

India will not be able to use the waters of these rivers if the Kashmir issue is resolved, and this will make us stronger defensively.

Pakistan's water and electricity shortage will be solved if we get Kashmir, and Pakistan will become safe.

Kashmiris will get their rights, Pakistan will become strong, and India's power will be reduced.

It will be very harmful if a war is forced on us as per India's threats. Both countries will be dilapidated economically. Debts will increase and we will suffer all the devastations that come with a war. I would like to mention that there can be some benefits to a war if it is fought with a goal. India took over Kashmir in the [19]48 war and broke up Pakistan into two countries in 1971. India will hurt us again if we continue the policy of just defending ourselves. India fights for some goals and we just try to defend ourselves. We must win the war if we want to survive in this region. Otherwise, it will be difficult even to live here. We could takeover Kashmir in a war. The situation in India's Punjab can also help us.

We can destroy India's plans to destroy our defense and security by winning Kashmir. This would be possible only by careful and thorough planning and helping the Kashmiris in every way. Only then can we push India out of Kashmir.

Sooner or later, there will be a war between India and Pakistan. India is escalating its preparations for a war and its only target is Pakistan. It wants to become a superpower by destroying Pakistan. It has decided not to fight China and is trying to improve its relations with it. There is no other neighbor that can afford to offend India. India is daydreaming about ruling its neighbors. Any proud nation would prefer to die rather than face such humiliation. Perhaps the superpowers also do not want Pakistan to become strong, as many Islamic countries have high hopes for Pakistan. China would be in great danger if India becomes a superpower in this area. It is hoped that China will help Pakistan.

Why should India solve the Kashmir issue when it is extensively planning to destroy Pakistan? Pakistan is the answer to Kashmir's stability and India cannot accept that. It will fight a war with Pakistan to make sure Kashmir does not become independent. It is a deplorable situation that India is threatening to attack us at a time when the whole world is aware of the havocs of war and always tries to solve all conflicts by diplomatic negotiations to avoid war; the superpowers are destroying their dangerous weapons, Europe is uniting, and many changes have happened on the world map without any war. It is doing this just to assert its authority. However, only prosperous countries can dream of becoming superpowers, and we do not see any signs of prosperity in this region. It does not matter how mighty an army one builds. The danger from within the country is many times worse than from without. The people want prosperity and if it is taken away from them for a long time, they will rise against their government. You have seen this happen in the Soviet Union.

In our opinion, both countries should think about the welfare of this region and India should agree not to attack Pakistan.

Cabinet Said Involved in Corruption

90AS0292A Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu
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[Column "Islamabad Diary" by A. H. Shehbaz: "Prove Your Ministers Are Not Corrupt"]

[Text] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told the newsmen on 16 June that the press was abusing the freedom given it by the government. She said that the freedom that she had given the press was being used to attack the government with a vengeance. The prime minister added that the newspapers published false and baseless accusations of government corruption by the opposition without first investigating them. The prime minister said that her and her family's character were being attacked. She further said that all these accusations were baseless and false. The prime minister went on to say that no one had dared to raise a voice against corruption during the previous government.

The opposition also has similar complaints. It talks about the character assassination being carried out by the electronic media under government control, the National Press Trust newspapers, and the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] publications. They are being targeted for revenge. It is true that freedom of the press was reinstated when the democratic government was established. However, the present government has nothing to do with it. The press enjoyed freedom even during the interim government, before Benazir was elected, and the work to end the Press and Publications Ordinance of 1923 had started during Junejo's time. This notorious law that was a relic of Ayub Khan's martial law regime had ended before Benazir took over. The PPP greatly benefited from the free press during the November 1988 election campaign.

However, freedom in general and freedom of the press in particular are not a birth right. It should be used within the framework of social and moral requirements. You can call freedom anything if it breaks these rules. You can call it character assassination or an act of revenge. We wonder what is causing all this. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did not say anything about it. The biggest cause of all this is the continuing feud between the federal government and two state governments. This feud is getting worse every day, and the electronic media and newspapers play a major role in it. Such a situation is natural when facts are ignored and misleading news are published. The friction is bound to increase when the opponents respond to such accusations. Both sides lack tolerance and both think it a political defeat if they do not respond.

One has the right to say ones say and also listen to others in a democracy. One-way communication is possible only in a dictatorship. It would not be wrong to say that democracy means tolerance. You have to properly respond to anything that you are opposed to. It is not appropriate to use lies or to slander your opponent. Face the facts or the results will not favor you. No one will

throw mud at you if you do not throw mud at anyone following the adage "all is fair in politic." You will be ridiculed if you ridicule someone. The time has gone when you could suppress your opponents voice. Pakistan cannot be immune to the progress that the news media has made all over the world. No matter how hard you try, you cannot hide the facts; they will come out.

The Benazir government started attacking its political opponents through its electronic media since it came to power. The people who are targeted in this campaign do not have access to the electronic media and the only way they can respond is using the newspapers. Newspapers that are sympathetic to them publish their side of the story; government controlled newspapers do not. This is against the freedom of the press rule. The accusation that the freedom of the press is being used to take revenge against the government simply is not true. Why are editors and special correspondents of independent newspapers advised by the government to play down or play up specific news items? When the opposition newspapers use the same approach, they are accused of retaliation. One must accept all these news items on their merit if we want to promote freedom of the press. Unfortunately, freedom of the press in Pakistan is judged by the favorability of the news item. The policies of newspapers and the political sympathies and affiliations of the journalists also play an important role in this drama. Some reporters knowingly or unknowingly forget their objectivity and become instrumental in publishing misleading news reports and hiding facts.

As for Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's declaration that all accusations levied against her by the opposition are lies, she should remember that these accusations cannot be lies just because she said so. Either these accusations should be challenged in a court of law and proved wrong or facts should be brought in the open to show that these accusations are lies. It is not appropriate to accuse the newspapers of everything. When the opposition accuses the government of something and the newspapers

request the government for information, they should be given facts to help them learn what is true and what is false. Simply calling these accusations lies will not prove them to be false. The opposition distributed copies of government documents in support of some accusations in its 24 May convention in Rawalpindi. These documents give support to the accusation of corruption against the government.

The prime minister should present us with facts if she believe that these accusations were false. She should prove that the copies that the opposition distributed were fake. If these documents were not fake, then she should explain the facts to prove that those accusations were false. However, the government has not done anything and is targeting the opposition assembly members for vengeful activities and accusing the newspapers of abusing freedom of the press.

I had an opportunity to review some documents belonging to the Zarai Taraqqiati Bank of Pakistan. These documents listed the 248 people hired to work in the bank between 1 January 1990 and 30 April 1990. According to this list, 123 people worked in higher positions and the other 125 in lower positions. From among the total list, 151 people were appointed because of recommendations from members of the prime minister's secretariat, advisors, and department secretaries. Senators from the National Assembly and state assemblies had appointed 30 people, PPP officials recommended the appointment of two people, and another nine people were employed as per the desire of the chairman of Zarai Bank. Only 15 people were hired on their own merit and all of them had to have special skills or training. The question arises: Were these vacancies filled keeping in view the regional and state quotas after advertising the positions and reviewing applications? What would you call this system if rules were not followed and all the jobs were passed out on the basis of personal recommendations? Isn't it corruption in which the prime minister's secretariat is also involved?