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Near East & South Asia

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Israelis Describe Faysal al-Husayni

93AA0081B Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 30 Apr 93
pp 6-10

[Article by S. Libowitz-Dar: "My Nice Enemy"]

[Text] "If Faysal al-Husayni were a woman, he would constantly be pregnant," says one of his Israeli acquaintances. Al-Husayni does not know how to say no to an Israeli who is interested in meeting with him; he is always meeting with anyone who is prepared to meet with him. This is not because he loves Israelis, this is a political line with him that has already documented achievements. Only five years ago, al-Husayni was considered a dangerous enemy, he was detained a few times under administrative arrest, and was recognized by Amnesty as a prisoner of conscience.

Only Israelis from the extreme left dared to meet with him then, and even on the Palestinian side, not many were happy to meet with Israelis. The PLO only then began to differentiate between Zionists and anti-Zionist Israelis, with whom it was permissible to meet, but in the territories there still were reservations about such contact. Al-Husayni, if so, essentially paved two paths: one to the center of the Israeli political map and, the other, to the elite of the Palestinian society in the territories. These two paths have now converged, when it was included in Rabin's agreement for the leadership of the Palestinian delegation for the peace talks. [sentence as published]

The first Israelis who met with al-Husayni, in the 1970's, were leftist activists. Then, he was not a central personality or important figure, and was also not leftist in his views, but his name and his lineage aroused curiosity. His grandfather, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, was head of the municipality of Jerusalem in the 1920's. His father, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, was the Palestinian hero of the 1948 war who commanded the Jerusalem front and was killed at al-Qastal.

Uri Avneri met him in the early 1970's. "For us, the Israelis, Faysal al-Husayni was interesting as the son of 'Abd-al-Qadir. His father was a legend. I fought on the Jerusalem front and 'Abd-al-Qadir was our enemy, but we had a great deal of respect for him. The day after he was killed, we brought a convoy to Jerusalem and, at the base of the Qastel, we met a Palmah group from the Harel brigade, which told us that 'Abd-al-Qadir died. This is one of my strongest memories from the war and, therefore, I was so interested in meeting his son."

The Abu-'Ali Committee

Mikhal Varshavski (Miqdo), a Jerusalem Trotskyite, recalls al-Husayni from the 1970's, but only vaguely. Al-Husayni, who was released from prison after a year of imprisonment for weapons possession, opened the Center for Arabic Studies in East Jerusalem in 1979. In

the beginning, this was a small and marginal institute. "Then, we did not have regular political contact or talks with Palestinians," says Varshavski. "There were a few personal contacts, on a very superficial level, of information seeking and becoming acquainted out of a personal interest. On this level, I met also with al-Husayni."

Yisha'yahu Toma', a Tel Aviv pacifist, succeeded in becoming the first Israeli employed at al-Husayni's institute. "My job was to photograph, as much as possible, destroyed Arab villages in Israel, for documentation and cataloguing. I found that al-Husayni was a nice person, gentle and quiet, direct and informal. He was very open with me. I am a citizen of the world, and my certificate of world citizenship was hung in the institute.

"After a year, I understood that he was very nationalistic, and to me, as a citizen of the world, it was very uncomfortable with this nationalism. I told him that I had to leave. He was sorry, but said that he understood me. Today there is no longer any tie between us."

Tzvi Alpeleg, who was the military governor in Nabulus, met al-Husayni in the early 1980's, when he wrote a book on the mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni. "In contrast to what is thought by the Israeli public, the mufti is not al-Husayni's uncle, but a distant relative of his. After his father was killed, the mufti drew him closer. I sat in his home in East Jerusalem and heard family stories from him for many hours. During the same period, his mother died in London, and the great and mighty Israel did not let him bring her body to Israel, claiming that it was a security risk.

"How the body of an old woman could endanger the State of Israel I do not understand to this day. I helped him bring the body to Jerusalem, and this is how we became close. In the military government, they were astonished that I met with him; they told me that his center is a nest of snakes, but I depict him as an easygoing, nonaggressive person. Pleasant in conduct who, personally never performed violent deeds."

Dedi Tzuqer reached al-Husayni in 1984, when he edited a report on the state of human rights in the territories. "I did not know who he was, but the people who met among us spoke about him with words of praise and said that he would yet go far. I reached his center; I remember that there was a library there with modular wooden shelves and a few workers, not something that you remain thunderstruck by. We spoke on the subject of human rights in the territories. He appeared to be an expert in that area."

In that same year, the tie between al-Husayni and the Israeli left deepened. The activity of the Israeli Committee for Solidarity with the University of Bi'r Zayt contributed to the tightening of the tie, whose climax was in the demonstration of 200 of its members in central Ramallah. The demonstration was dispersed by force and shots of tear gas by the military. The violent dispersal, the pursuit of demonstrators in the streets of

Ramallah, and the arrest of dozens of them, convinced many Palestinians that they have possible allies in Israeli society.

Faysal al-Husayni decided to go another step forward and establish a joint organization for Palestinians and Israelis. The subject that he chose was relatively easy to digest in Palestinian society: defending the rights of 'Abd-al-'Aziz Shahin, who is known as Abu-'Ali. Shahin was the most senior Fatah member in Israeli prison, and his troubles only began when he was released at the end of his sentence. He was confined to the Gaza Strip and later was exiled to Dahaniyah, a village of collaborators near Kerem Shalom. That entire time, an expulsion order from Israel hung over him.

Al-Husayni initiated the establishment of the joint Israeli-Palestinian committee for his defense, and the meetings were held in the living room of al-Husayni's home or in his office in the Center for Arabic Studies. On the Palestinian side there were, aside from al-Husayni, also lecturer and student representatives from University of Bi'r Zayt and people like Sari Nusaybah, Ziyad Abu-Zayyad, and Radwan Abu-'Ayyash. On the Israeli side were a handful of anti-Zionists, members of compass [as published] factions, as well as two leftist Zionists from among the activists of the Bi'r Zayt committee. RAQAH [New Communist List] sent representative Zoter from time to time, and took care to always have one foot outside.

"We had convoys, protests, press conferences," recalls Varshavski. "The climax of the campaign was at the highly attended demonstration at Kerem Shalom, next to the border fence, really opposite Dahaniyah." The struggle failed and, in the end, the High Court of Justice authorized Shahin's expulsion from Israel. The committee organized one further action before it disbanded up: the symbolic planting of olive trees on the ruins of Bashit village (now the 'Aseret settlement, near Ashdod), where Shahin was born, in protest of his expulsion.

A short time later, all of the activists were brought together for a joint luncheon in East Jerusalem. Al-Husayni, who thought ahead, then considered the establishment of a joint Israeli-Palestinian political movement, which would work toward a democratic solution to the conflict and would also continue to work after the Palestinian state is established. Al-Husayni thought that such a movement would create the dynamics of cooperation and unity, instead of the dynamics of distancing and separation.

Against Oppression

Reality forced cooperation under different circumstances. "Rabin, as Minister of Defense, then set the policy of oppression in action. We met then, a small handful of members of the Israeli left and a group of Palestinians with some standing in Palestinian society, and we decided to act together against the occupation. We established the Committee Against the Policy of Oppression. Al-Husayni's message, while still in the

organizational phases, was to think of togetherness. We wanted to work together, but openly and legally."

"We had many joint discussions and a lot of difficulties. Most of the difficulties were on al-Husayni's part. He understood that it is possible to exploit the Israeli law for the benefit of the Palestinians, for example, in order to demonstrate. In the territories, a ban on demonstrations was imposed, but in East Jerusalem it is possible to hold legal demonstrations, so why not exploit this. But he was afraid, lest it be interpreted in Palestinian society as recognition of the annexation of Jerusalem."

Al-Husayni decided in favor of a small step forward: It was agreed that the Israeli committee members would ask for a demonstration license from the police, and the Palestinians would only participate in the demonstration. In order to examine the reactions among the Palestinian public (within the territories and, apparently, also in the PLO), it was decided to hold the first demonstration on the border of the annexed city and the West Bank. The experiment passed in peace, and the next demonstration was already held next to Nabulus Gate. "Al-Husayni took an active part in the demonstrations," Varshavski points out. "He is not one of those leaders who sends children to demonstrate. He always stood among everyone with his sign.

"The greatest importance of this committee was concealed in al-Husayni's insistence on going after the common denominator of the Israelis and the Palestinians. He had the rare ability to take into account the needs of the other and to constantly think about an action that did not destroy that that was legitimate in each of the communities. This was the result of his deep understanding of the other side."

In demonstrations, al-Husayni took care that there be not hostility with the police, so as not to alarm the Israeli demonstrators. "Even in the wording of the proclamations, he was always concerned that the message would be around that that was common. It was difficult, because in their eyes, we are the occupiers and they are the occupied. In the beginning, we worded the proclamations together, so that no one would be surprised, but, more and more, we found ourselves able to word proclamations separately, coordinating by telephone, because each of us already understood the other's head."

The climax of the joint activity was in a demonstration marking 20 years of occupation on 5 June 1987, along the seam between West and East Jerusalem. "We wanted to mark the event in a legal manner," says Varshavski. "Al-Husayni took care that all of the participants would uphold the police conditions for the license. The police, for example, banned the flying of the Palestinian flag, and the flag, by virtue of al-Husayni, was not flown. The demonstration was so successful that, three months afterward, when we wanted to hold a similar demonstration, the police did not give us a license for fear that, this time, instead of a few hundred demonstrators, a few thousand would come."

The intifadah cut the joint action, says Varshavski, who, in recent years has directed the Center for Alternative Information, and maintains a tie to al-Husayni. "To this day, we meet frequently and advise one another. Many are amazed by the nature of the tie between me and al-Husayni. What is a radical leftist like myself doing with a person like him, who is not radical and is even conservative. The tie between us is built on a very close understanding, on a personal level, of the indispensability of the meeting between Israelis and Palestinians. Al-Husayni is a very special person. He is a complete generation ahead of his closest friends. His concept of peace is based on togetherness, not on separation. He understands that this is important and this is possible."

The years of acquaintance have not turned them into personal friends. "He is older than I. I am a product of the sixties, he is the product of the Palestinian National Movement. Aside from this, al-Husayni is a very introverted person. He has no good Israeli friends, and I also do not know who his Palestinian friends are. But, his door is always open to me. He demonstrated on my behalf when I was arrested, and once, when I tried to make an appointment with him through his secretary, he laughed and said that I can always come, without making an official appointment."

The Living Bridge

Gid'on Shapiro was also an activist in the Committee for the Defense of Abu-'Ali and the Committee Against the Policy of Oppression. "I knew al-Husayni even before that, when I was a member of the Committee for Bi'r Zayt. He was the target of plotting by the occupation authorities, and we sometimes tried to help him, too. In the same period he was on nightly house arrest. We knew that it was always possible to catch him at home at night, so we would hop over to his home in the evening and talk for hours."

"Politically, our opinions were different. I believed in the solution of two states for two peoples, and al-Husayni believed in a secular-democratic state. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories was, in my eyes, merely a transitional stage, which occupied a more important place with him when he understood how important this was to us. In the beginning of the joint action, friends from the left told me that I was naive, that he would lead us into a situation where I would be compelled to support a secular-democratic state and the elimination of the State of Israel. There were those who saw him as a shrewd and crooked man who would get his way by any means."

"Reality proved them wrong. When they organized a demonstration in front of Metzudat Kafir in Jerusalem and we spoke about the slogans that we would write on the signs, al-Husayni was the one who clarified that there would not be any slogans such as, a secular-democratic state, so as not to disturb us. He was very collegial and did not make us eat bitter herbs. Among the Palestinians,

there were always one or two who tried to drag the cart in a direction in which we were not prepared to go, but he always stopped them."

"During that period, I met with him a lot. Once, I was at his home when a policeman came and delivered him an order to lengthen the evening arrest. This was a few hours before the expiration of the validity of the earlier order, and we joked that they forgot about him, and, suddenly, a knock was heard at the door and a policeman entered with the order. I said to al-Husayni that I am ashamed and insulted by the behavior of the State of Israel, but he was very courteous, not dismayed, and also not demonstrative. He smiled politely and accepted the order."

It has already been years since Shapiro met with al-Husayni. "We were the living bridge across which he strode to additional branches of Israeli society. With him, it was a strategy, to find paths for detente with Israeli society. He started with us, and when he found other channels, he left us and went over to them. I always knew that he was not a leftist, that we were only the middle and not the goal."

"Al-Husayni, for me, is a Palestinian 'Mapainiq.' Pragmatic, flexible, ideologically inclined, does not bestow great importance on conceptual matters or principles, always knows how to get along and find an indirect way that will move him forward. He is not a Fidel Castro or Che Guevara, who leads the masses to revolts; he is a moderate and calm man with whom it is possible to talk and to conclude a matter in a reasonable fashion."

Two Compromises

In 1986, al-Husayni tried to get close to the heart of the Israeli consensus through Anatoly Sharansky, who, at that time, was released from prison in the Soviet Union and reached Israel based on the standard of a fighter of human rights. In November, he met with Sharenski in an attempt to harness him to help Akram Haniyah, editor of the newspaper AL-SHA'AB, who was expelled from Israel.

The public criticism in the wake of the meeting alarmed Sharansky, who withdrew and apologized: I did not know who Faysal al-Husayni was. Al-Husayni says that Sharansky knew well that he was counted among 'Arafat's supporters. In the same year, al-Husayni also met with officers from the National Defense College. The meetings were held at the military government in Ramallah; al-Husayni laid out his views and answered officers' questions. The matter of these meetings being held was kept secret and was revealed only in 1989, in HADASHOT.

At the same time, al-Husayni reached David Ish-Shalom, a Jerusalem leftist activist, who was recently released from prison for contact with the PLO. "I wrote a book on a demilitarized Palestinian existence, and I wanted to understand from him what the maximal Palestinian

position of compromise was," says Ish-Shalom. "Immediately, in our first meetings, I discovered that he has a clearly antimilitaristic approach, and this is not a gimmick, but a deep, strategic vision."

"Al-Husayni told me that the Palestinian state, when it is established, will not invest in weapons, but in education and industry. I liked this very much. Almost everyone around me described him as a monster; I found him to be a warm and pragmatic leader who yearns for peace. I feel a lot of esteem for him. When I went to prison, he accompanied me. He does not have a drop of haughtiness. To this day, when we meet, we embrace and kiss."

Ish-Shalom did not suffice with embraces. "Both al-Husayni and I understood that the idea that there is a partner for peace, one that is prepared for a demilitarized state, must be transferred to the Likud, which was then in power." The intermediary between the Likud and al-Husayni was Moshe 'Amirav, then a member of the Likud center, who was known for his dovish views.

'Amirav: "In the 1980's, I underwent the process of development. I understand that it no longer mattered who was right, but who was smart. I decided that the struggle must be viewed from the side of what it is possible to do, and not what is wanted. That is, the time had come to start a dialogue with the other side, because, if we do not talk, how will we know what they are thinking."

After three meetings with Sari Nusayba, 'Amirav met with al-Husayni. The two presented themselves to one another. Al-Husayni spoke of his childhood and of his father; 'Amirav described the history of his life, his immigration to Israel from Russia, being drafted into the army.

"He wanted to know why it was that I chose to be drafted into the paratroopers. He said to me: We are tired of wars, we are weary of killing you and of you killing us; we have become disappointed with the entire world. Perhaps with you, we will be able to make an agreement. He said that it is easy for him to reach an agreement with members of the right, both because we are in power and because we are the real enemy, and we have an authenticity that the left does not have, because we tell the truth."

"Immediately from the start, he proposed two compromises: They are willing to give up Jaffa and the Galilee, and they are prepared to wait many years with a Palestinian state whose capital is East Jerusalem. Perhaps I will not succeed in living in a Palestinian state, he said to me, but if I know that my son will live in this state, I am prepared to wait even 50 years for its establishment. Just promise me that it will come."

There were 10 meetings between al-Husayni and 'Amirav in the east and west parts of the city, in the summer of 1987, "with Shamir's approval and the knowledge of senior Likud ministers," says 'Amirav. In

September, the compromise was published in the Jerusalem weekly, KOL HA'IR. Al-Husayni was arrested, 'Amirav was expelled from the Likud, and the tie between the two deepened.

He said to me: "Moshe, you did a very brave thing that gave many of us hope, because, if there are people like you on the right, there is a place for hope. Now we meet once a month. We do not go out to have a good time together, because he does not do that. We converse. He uses me as a seismograph; when he has a certain idea and he wants to know how Israeli society will react to it, he converses with me."

"He has complete faith in me, and I have faith in him. He would never lie to me, and I, too, always tell him what I think, without hypocrisy. For example, on the matter of renewing the peace talks. I told him that, in his place, I would not return to the talks after Israel expelled the 400 Palestinians. There is a limit to what you can accept, I told him."

"Our conversations are held on an intellectual plane. He learns a lot from them. Our sons also got to know one another. In the Gulf War, I was the only Israeli who met with him. He is a good friend, a warm man with whom one can laugh. He can laugh about himself, as well as the Palestinians. More than once, he said to me: We are like you; when we become a state, we will be exactly like you, with all of the little corruptions and the contaminated administration."

Al-Husayni spent the next four years in ceaseless meetings with dozens of Israelis. On the question of how it happened that the barrier was breached and one who was an enemy turned into a desired guest, there is more than one explanation. "We have become moderate, and the PLO, too, has become moderate," says Tzvi Alpeleg, "so much that in the Algiers conference of 1988, the PLO recognized the State of Israel and gave us a legitimate possibility to talk with its representatives."

"The intifadah made the breakthrough for al-Husayni," says Varshavski. "We put him on the map," says Janet Avi'ad, of Peace Now. "His personality brought him to the Israelis," says Dr. Shlomo Albaz from the Hamizrah El Hashalom movement. "He does not have the face of an enemy; people love to talk with him."

Hamizrah El Hashalom members reached al-Husayni in the period of the Committee Against Oppression. "Al-Husayni is believed," says Albaz. "He is a round and pleasant man, full of faith and fragility. If only he could be the man with whom we will have to sign the peace accord."

Al-Husayni was enthusiastic about our talk of the common culture and background between Arabs and eastern Jews, says Albaz. "There is a special relationship between us. Each time that we meet, we mix the conversation with Arabic, a proverb here, a joke there, and this adds something. I have a comfortable and natural approach to him. When he is prime minister of the

Palestinian state, we will have to think of someone on our side who will be similar to him."

In Peace Now, Janet Avi'ad has created a tie to al-Husayni. "In May 1988, we invited him to a joint conference between us and the Palestinians. This was the first time that he was invited to this conference. Afterward, we collaborated on conferences and demonstrations. We took him to meetings with Israelis throughout the country. He spoke as moderately as possible, although his name was a symbol of extremism."

"He is open and warm and very fatalistic. More than once, he has said that he is not afraid of anything, because the bullet intended for him will arrive. Collaborating with us, as was my impression, was not because of a love for Israelis, but because of an understanding of common interests. He wanted to prove to us that there is someone with whom to talk."

Among Citizens Rights Movement members, al-Husayni met with Dedi Tzuger. "There were many meetings between us, most of them unpublished. The meetings were not purposeful, but were more on a political level of receiving and supplying information. I enjoyed the tie to him, because he is a silent and quiet figure, who works in minor tones, without pathos; he talks like an aristocrat, without sharpness, never hurting. Sometimes, it seems as though he has no feelings, but he told us that when soldiers beat his son, he was close to tears, and this was a very emotional position."

A Meeting With a Settler

The list of those meeting with al-Husayni has become longer. He visited Abie Natan, when he was on a hunger strike; he met with MAPAM [United Workers Party] members and with Yosi Beilin's positive feedback circle (who is not prepared to talk about this now); and with old-timers of the Labor Party, and youth party members, meetings that aroused Rabin's ire. The impression has been received that there is some sort of running amok, Rabin said in the faction's meeting.

Al-Husayni met with youths in Haifa, with family members of murdered soldier Avi Sasportas, and with Shim'on Peres in the home of Tzvi Alpeleg. He visited the wounded Amir Abramson, one of the passengers of bus line 405, which rolled down an abyss, and arranged a tour at Lohmey Hageta'ot. He became friendly with Professor Uri Me'or of Tel Aviv University. When Me'or invited him to stay at his home, al-Husayni asked that Israelis from a sector unknown to him be invited, for example, economists and Likud members like Beni Begin.

Shmu'el Goren, operations coordinator in the territories, visited him when he was detained in prison. Al-Husayni: "He said to me: I know you from the files; now I want to hear and know the person" (HADASHOT, 3 February 1989). On the initiative of the weekly KOL HA'IR, al-Husayni met with Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kolleck. In Jerusalem, he met with young Likud members from the

neighborhoods. "For 18 years, I lived in Egypt," he told them, "and the feeling never left me that I am a Palestinian from Jerusalem" (KOL HA'IR, 11 August 1989).

Al-Husayni met Menahem Frumann, the rabbi of the Teqo'a settlement, at the home of common friends in Haifa. Frumann: "I wanted to meet with him to ask him to permit members of their religion to meet with members of the Jewish religion. I gave him my message, that it is possible to achieve peace around the religious matter. With them, the religious reign in the street, and it would be easier to reach a peace agreement with them than with the political forces."

"We spoke in Hebrew. He wanted to understand the settlers, our spiritual world. I tried to explain to him who I am and what my opinions are. I think that the national state is an anachronistic term. I am in favor of a humane, multinational state. Nationalism is a childhood disease that must be overcome. The Palestinians must advance to a cultural state that is more humane and interesting than a flag and a state and such frivolities."

"He understood what I was talking about. There was a confusing moment, when he said that it could be that they are killing those who only deserve a slap on the cheek. I felt embarrassment when I saw that his regard for human life was different than mine. But, in all, the meeting was good. We talked for eight hours. There was a chemistry between us. His spiritual anatomy is similar to that of a Gush Emunim member. Both he and I are trying to solve the question of how to adapt our ancient culture to the modern world. In the end, I told him that I would answer his question yet, and he laughed."

Dov Chernovroda, a MAPAM activist from Haifa, initiated the meeting with Frumann. "The connection between us was created when I invited him to lecture at Tzavta' in 1989. Through the years, additional meetings like this were created. I also brought him to Lohamey Hagetaot. It was important to me that, just as I understand the distress of the Palestinian people, a Palestinian leader would recognize our distresses. He really related to the subject with great sensitivity. He impressed me greatly. He is modest and moderate, very authentic. Things that he said in 1989, he is repeating today, too."

The Gulf War slowed down the rate of meetings, and the peace talks in Madrid raised al-Husayni to a higher rank. "Today, he comes and goes to heads of state," says Gid'on Sapiro, "and people of my sort interest him less. Once he needed me to meet with Peres; today, I need him if I want to meet with Peres. When I was in the United States the last time, I thought to myself that if al-Husayni were with me, I could reach Clinton easily."

Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem

Faysal al-Husayni was born in 1940, in Baghdad, where his father was deported by the British for his part in the Arab Rebellion in the years 1936 to 1939. His father, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, returned to Palestine to organize the opposition to the partition plan and was killed at

the end of the battle of al-Qastal. Faysal, his son, was then eight years old. "I did not know my father, because he would move and wander, and only infrequently would come home, but I read and heard a lot about him," his said to Amnon Rubinstein in a newspaper interview (HA'ARETZ, 22 March 1968).

He lived with his family in Cairo until 1961, and then returned to Jerusalem. Al-Husayni, who studied in Egypt and Iraq, was the secretary of the Palestinian students' union. The Six-Day War caught him in a Palestinian Liberation Army course in Syria. He secretly returned to Jerusalem. "I was furious seeing my city, al-Quds, under foreign rule," he told Rubinstein.

In November 1967, he was arrested for possessing a weapon. He had received the weapon from Yasir 'Arafat, who commanded the Fatah forces in the territories, during a brief meeting that they held in Ramallah. At his trial, al-Husayni said that activity must be concentrated in political channels and to work in peaceful ways. He was sentenced to a year in prison. Since he declared that terrorism and sabotage must be abandoned, he removed the sting from the crime, the judges argued in their verdict.

When he was released from prison, he married Najat al-Husayni, his cousin; they had two children, a son and daughter. For a few years, he tried his hand at private business, worked at his uncles X-ray institute in East Jerusalem, helped work the family land at "Ayn Sin-niyah. In 1979, he established the Institute for Arabic Studies. In the 1980's, he was detained a few times under administrative detention.

Prisoners, Wanted Men as Palestinian Military

93AA0093A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Jun 93 p B2

[Article By Dani Rubinstein]

[Text] A clear, well-known picture emerges from checks conducted by the security system regarding terrorist attacks carried out by cells of wanted persons in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the most recent being the murder in Hebron of Erez Shmu'el, a soldier who was combining his military service with study in a yeshiva in a special track for religious soldiers): Almost all of the cells are operating independently, without any connection to organized commands in Israel or abroad.

These cells, including those of FATAH [Palestine Liberation Movement], Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], and the leftist fronts, receive almost no aid from abroad—no money, no arms, no explosives, not even activation instructions. Connections exist here and there with activists in neighboring countries, e.g., with people in Egypt who help wanted persons cross the border. However, these connections are usually weak. Most terrorist attacks in Israel are carried out against a local backdrop, and are initiated and organized in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Apparently this is nothing new. The phenomenon of local terrorist organizations emerged about a decade ago. Gradually the emphasis has shifted from terrorist attacks carried out abroad and across the border to domestic terrorist activity originating in the country. In the early years of Israel's rule in the territories, the situation was different.

All terrorists captured in those early years said that they were recruited in Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, or in European countries. They were trained and received weapons and money abroad. Among them were local young men of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as many who were born and grew up in concentrations of Palestinians in the Arab countries.

The clear transition to local activity has also created political changes, the first of which we are now beginning to see, e.g., the first joint activity ever undertaken by Hamas and FATAH cells and the Gaza Strip. Three weeks ago, they killed four Israeli and Arab vegetable merchants, published a joint communique regarding their action, and subsequently issued a warning to Arabs not to do business with Israelis. This is apparently an isolated incident. Nonetheless, it forms part of the general picture of the independent operation in the field of cells of wanted persons. Thus, while political tension and rivalry prevail in the territories and abroad between PLO activists and leaders on the one hand, and Muslim zealots on the other hand, the terrorist cells of rival organizations are suddenly cooperating and coordinating with each other in different activities.

To understand the significance of this, we must go back a bit and examine what has happened to the military arms of the PLO in recent years. In the past, military activity (or terrorist activity as we call it) was the primary basis of the PLO's existence. It was only by virtue of terrorist acts in Israel that the PLO, with all of its factions and institutions, gained recognition that it is the one that is acting on behalf of the Palestinian public. The notion that was current in the territories was that only one who fought and sacrificed is entitled to represent the Palestinians and speak on their behalf. Indeed, since the 1970's, whenever there was an Israeli or other attempt to hold a political dialogue with residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, those residents responded by saying: "We represent no one. Go talk with the PLO."

Although the PLO has never made a decision to cease the armed struggle, the number of terrorist acts, which its people have carried out in an organized fashion, has dropped, almost to zero, since the Lebanon war. The military units of the PLO that were evacuated from Lebanon have been dispersed in remote camps in Yemen and in the Libyan desert next to the border with Chad. A few were also sent to Sudan.

We receive information on what is happening in these camps from time to time. It seems that the situation in them is very bad. 'Arafat visits them from occasionally. On one of these visits, his helicopter crashed in southern

Libya, and he was rescued miraculously. It is difficult to know how many people are in these camps. There are apparently thousands of individuals, many with their families. Most of the time, they are idle. It has recently been very difficult for the PLO to finance the maintenance of these camps. Some weeks ago, dozens of Palestinians and their families fled from a camp in Libya to Scandinavia. According to newspapers published in Denmark, they deserted from the PLO and sought political asylum in Denmark. According to one story, which has circulated in recent days and was published prominently in the East Jerusalem newspapers, 'Arafat decided to transfer many personnel of the PLO apparatus in Tunisia to the above-mentioned camps to consolidate them and save the major costs of maintaining PLO organizations in Tunis. It has also been reported that PLO activists from Jordan will join these camps.

If the situation of the Palestinian military units in the remote camps is bad, the situation of the remaining concentrations of terrorists in Lebanon is worse. For a long time now, different groups of commands have been waging bloody struggles against each other there. Almost every week brings news of clashes and of the murder of Palestinians in the areas of Tyre and Sidon. The murder of Abu-Iyad [Salah Khalif] in Tunis by one of his bodyguards about two years ago also occurred against the backdrop of these rivalries.

In other words, the PLO's military arm, which was once the organization's symbol and glory, is now in a neglected and wretched state.

As stated above, residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are now taking their place in the leadership of the armed struggle. Initially, they acted in a spontaneous, popular format. They created the intifadah almost without employing terrorist attacks involving firearms. Subsequently, wanted terrorists formed cells that operate as if they are separate from the PLO. They are acquiring weapons stolen or captured from Israelis, and are harbored by the population to which they belong. They make their own decisions about whom to attack. For example, they refused to listen to a long repeated request by PLO activists that they stop killing persons suspected of collaboration. They are now also coordinating actions between themselves (as was the case in Gaza), without consulting the leaders.

Apparently, this is a matter of a small number of wanted persons. According to data of the security system, several hundred such persons are in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. To them must be added many of the thousands of security prisoners and detainees overflowing the prisons. Their number changes daily, given that many are arrested and then released. About 4,500 are serving long prison terms, and about 8,000 are serving short prison terms. There are also other detainees who have not been sentenced.

In honor of the Muslim sacrifice holiday, the Israeli Government released 280 prisoners, this time in coordination and through dialogue with the Palestinian delegation and the PLO. One hundred of them were scheduled to be released in another year.

Cells of wanted persons in the territories and imprisoned and released detainees are now the military arm of the Palestinians. The more independent their activity becomes, the more they strengthen the political position of the residents of the territories, which could have great significance in the future.

Israeli Prisons as 'Schools for Strugglers'

93AA0081A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew
30 Apr 93 pp 20-21

[Article by M. Sela': "Prison Is a School"]

[Text] Spokesman for Prison Services is the Sufiyan Abu-Zaida's title. When there were communications difficulties between the prison administration and the prisoners in the central prison in Gaza, "they asked for him" from Qetzi'ot, and he went.

In January 1992, jailers attacked prisoners in the Ashqelon prison. Sufiyan Abu-Zaida was the first of those beaten. "A man whose hands and feet are bound, you beat. This is how to behave?" At a time when he was bound to the seat of the car that brought him from Ashqelon to Beersheba, Abu-Zaida absorbed another kick. It has recently been decided to bring seven of the jailers to justice.

Even though three weeks have passed since he was freed from 12 years in prison, Abu-Zaida is still celebrating, going around Gaza like a groom, eating fish with friends at the beach. From his familiarity with all details of life in Gaza, it seems as though he was not missing from his home for even one day. A number of his friends in the negotiating team for the peace agreement, who are asking that he be offered a job, although it is not clear which one, have already comprehended his talents as a spokesman and representative.

Sufiyan Abu-Zaida, age 32, wearing jeans, a white shirt and sandals, was sentenced for possession of combat means, weapons training in Lebanon, and membership in the Fatah organization during his studies in Lebanon. Before he was arrested, Abu-Zaida studied psychology and sociology at a university in Beirut for a year. "This is the year that brought me to prison. There, I got to know the Fatah, there was Fatah-land; this was in 1978 to 1979."

A few weeks after his release he said, "This is a short period of time; it is difficult to judge and get a clear picture; I am still living it up and I do not think about work. I must get to know my son, who was one month old when I was arrested, and is now in sixth grade. But that chapter is behind me," said Abu-Zaida, opening his monologue.

"This is definitely a chapter of life, 12 years. Prisoners have a problem, if you are married or not. If you are married, you worry about the wife and children. If not, you see how life is passing and you mark time. One who serves a year or two—this is small change. But a continued period is difficult and worrisome.

"I was born and raised in Jabalaya. My family is from Brayir; now Kibbutz Barur-Hayil is there. The alleys in Jabalaya and the prison wings do not differ greatly from one another. How did I become a spokesman? In every prison there is a spokesman. I was in many prisons, I learned Hebrew there, and I felt that I understood the mentality of the Jews. I found a common language with the prisoners. No, this does not work against me. One who can represent the prisoners is like a foreign minister who conducts talks and contacts with hostile countries, too.

"One needs a great sense of humor in prison and a lot of strong will. Not just because, but to keep your wits and health. How do you do this? You do not give it time to eat at you, we busy ourselves. This is the most important rule, to continue to believe in yourself and in your goal. The goal is not only on a political and military plane, but it is a way of life. The third thing is that you have to study. All of the people who held up watched their health, played sports, and studied. They used the body and the mind."

"Prison is prison and there is nothing nice about it, even if it were a golden palace. But, it is a school that teaches how to stand firm. Even life beyond the prison walls is not much different. I came out three weeks ago, and I see that outside it is no easier. And on a number of planes, it is more difficult. There is no livelihood, I have no house of my own, and even in 50 more years I will not have money to build a house."

"Want it or not, it is a school. Thousands who know nothing of the problem enter it, entering a track of emotional struggle, and they learn: why we struggle, what is the occupation, what is his land, what is the PLO. All of the efforts of the Shabab [Palestinian youth] cannot prevent this. We remain together 24 hours a day, what would we talk about?"

"Many leaders have come out of this school. Despite the negative opinions about those entering, there are many who went in extremists and came out moderate, like me, for example."

"There are many friends, and all of them are remembered, everyone who remained with me in prison. But friends from before, it happens that I do not remember."

"The prison is not an isolated world, and the peace process also penetrates its walls."

"In prison, they follow and stay interested in the negotiation process more than on the outside. Because it is connected to the fate of all of the prisoners. Everyone there belongs to an organization, there are no neutrals in

prison, and each organization has its own position. Because many in prison are Fatah, the conclusion is that the majority supports the peace process."

"I felt, and I was not just any prisoner, that the delegation, the PLO, and I, personally, had doubts regarding the process. The Palestinians came down from the high tree and believe that it is possible to attain peace. True, the Madrid conditions are difficult and the Palestinians wanted to see the process from a better opening position, but, nevertheless, they believe that something will come from this. I have not come across any Fatah member who does not want the peace process at all."

"The Fatah hawks, most of them youths age 18 to 19, are no different from the soldiers who were drafted into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and immediately put their finger to the trigger. Youths think from the heart and not from the mind. Age does its own, and so does experience. I know extremists who, after a few years, speak differently. This is a process that everyone undergoes."

"It is difficult to organize political activism in Gaza, because we are not playing alone on the field; the General Security Forces (SHABAKH), the IDF, the manager, and all of the rest are there and control the rules of the game, to my regret. There are social institutions here that have recently been established and work quickly. But, outside, it is impossible to do the activity that they do inside; there, they cannot shut our mouths and minds. Outside, the process is very complicated."

"The Jews make many mistakes. I saw, even before I went in, how the authorities raised the Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement]. When there was a meeting of the national camp at the University of Gaza, the authorities arrested everyone who belonged to the national camp and left all of the rest. Today, they continue to make the same mistakes. I call up a Fatah member who supports the process, and his wife answers: He was detained for six months. Almost all 60 expelled during the intifadah, before the Hamas expulsions, were from Fatah. For example, Ayhab is an extremist? (Ayhab al-Aqshar, one of the 11 Palestinians whose expulsion order was rescinded eight months ago.) If they were to expel him, an extremist would take his place. They do not help us to be moderate."

"Israel still does not understand what has to be done. We are starting to lose faith in the process, in the delegation, in the PLO. The simple people feel that their situation is more difficult. People are being killed, there is detention, a blockade, and you talk to me about peace? This is how they think here. Like Rabin, who came to power and promised the nation that, within a few months, there would be peace, and it does not exist; therefore, they have begun to lose faith in the government. Israel is not guilty of everything; we, too, are a side in the struggle, and our way of treatment is not always right, either. We are not succeeding in controlling all of the murderous acts, internal murder or murder of people innocent of

crime; in my opinion, this hurts our struggle. Not because I love Jews, but it does not help our interests."

"Without connection to the political process and its development, and without connection to the extremists, Israel must break apart the pressure in the territories, for the sake of the Israeli interests, but also for our interests. What we call the gestures, when we talk and do not do anything, and whatever is done is propaganda. I read what they promised the Palestinian delegation; Israel must do it without connection to the process and without fear of the right in Israel and the noise that will be made."

"I see the behavior of the soldiers. They feel that there is a new policy in the territories. After the incident in Shaja'ya, in which three soldiers were killed, they took out reserves soldiers and brought, in their place, Giva'ti and Golani soldiers. They took out the adult and experienced ones and brought in 18- and 19-year-olds, who beat and hurt people's pride, and who are quick to press the trigger."

"A neighbor of mine, he has a store next to the hold [ma'ahaz] in Jabalya. Soldiers see him open his store every morning; he is known to the soldiers. No one has ever asked him where he was going and where he was coming from. One day, soldiers called to him, they took his identity card, made a degrading search of him, struck him a few times, and they worked him over for two or three hours, and afterward left him at the hold for two or three hours and threw him out. He did not throw stones and did not rub up against anyone—of what is he guilty? This happens a lot."

"It does not bother me if Israel leaves. They will not eat one another. For hundreds of years, someone has ruled us, how can they judge us? Try us. Our mentality is different, but we can rule ourselves. The incident between Fatah and Hamas was a lesson in Palestinian history. We have learned our lesson. The fact is, they are not killing one another every day, even though there are weapons. Israel has the goal of depicting the Palestinian people as though there are no possibilities for them without the occupation. We will not judge ourselves before we try ourselves."

"In the coming year, I want another child. Aside from this, I intend to devote my time to the peace process; I have no other work."

ALGERIA

'Afghan' Describes Training in Sudanese Camp

93AF0624C Algiers EL WATAN in French
22 May 93 p 32

[Unattributed article: "Arab Afghanistan Veteran: A Killer's Progress"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Aged 25, he has spent three years in mojahedin (fighter) training camps in Afghanistan. Back in Jordan less than two months ago, he told his tale before

reporting to one of the camps set up in Sudan by Golbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Eslami, to which he belongs.

Using the assumed name of Ahmad, this slim and bearded Afghanistan veteran of Palestinian origin claims to be a close associate of the Afghan fundamentalist leader Golbuddin Hekmatyar, his spiritual leader, now designated prime minister.

For Ahmad, it all began in 1990, when his brother-in-law died in Afghanistan. A house painter, he then felt "the calling toward this land of Islam," and was convinced by the writings of "martyr" Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian who commanded Arab mojahedin in Afghanistan and was killed there in November 1989.

Ahmad obtained a visa from the Pakistani Embassy in Amman, thanks to the intervention "of an Islamist Jordanian minister" whom he did not name, and left for Peshawar with nothing but a telephone number. When he arrived at the airport, he dialed the number and started a new life.

He was taken to a "guest house" for Arabs, which he then left for the training camps: "I began in Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Eslami camps, then I went to those of 'Abdol Al-Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Ettihad-e Eslami" (Islamic Federation).

He told us that Hekmatyar's camps were the largest, with 50,000 fighters. In these camps, he claimed, he rubbed shoulders with people from 60 or so different countries. In his opinion, the same Americans controlled some camps, as did the Iranians, Saudis, Iraqis, Libyans, and others. Other camps, like those where he stayed, would train foreign fighters who then left to take the jihad (holy war) to their respective countries, where they would fight to establish Islamic States, he said.

Training was "spiritual and military," because they had to learn "to kill and also to treat prisoners according to the precepts of Islam," he stated. They learned urban guerrilla and how to handle all sorts of heavy and light weapons.

Ahmad claimed to have taken part in the execution of the head of the Afghan intelligence service, a man with close ties to the communists, named Mohammad Hisham: "I was one of those who interrogated him. He was guilty, no doubt about that. He had gone to Russia twice and confessed that he had killed and tortured many Afghans. There were about 100 of us at his execution. Some were reading the bill of indictment, others were praying, the rest shot him."

Ahmad believes that an Islamic State is "about to be" established in Afghanistan. He admitted that the situation there is difficult for the mojahedin, because Pakistan has started a campaign to imprison and expel the Arabs, which deprives them of their rear base.

He mentioned the imprisonment of Mohammad Chawki Istambouli (brother of Khaled Istambouli who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat), who faces a death sentence in Egypt. "Threats from Islamic groups, who claimed that they would bomb entire neighborhoods in Pakistan, forced the Pakistani Government to release him," Ahmad said. As for him, he had to leave after becoming the representative of Hekmatyar's Islamic party in Pakistan, he told us. Today, he is about to leave for Sudan where, he said, "camps were set up with financing provided by the Saudi Oussama Ben Laden, and with the same facilities as in Afghanistan." This Saudi's name was mentioned by Egyptian authorities as one of those who finance Egyptian Islamists.

"It is mostly Egyptians who went to Sudan; they could not go home because many of them were sentenced to death," Ahmad indicated.

Militant Leader Arrested in Morocco

93AF0643A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
11 Jun 93 pp 1, 4

[Article by Mohammad Ashaabi: "Big Blow to Militant Opposition in Algeria With Arrest of One of Its Leaders in Morocco"]

[Text] On 10 June 1993, sources in Algeria confirmed that several days ago Moroccan authorities arrested Shaykh Abdelhaq Layada. He leads a militant group inside the Armed Islamic Movement [MIA], which, last year, launched guerrilla warfare against the Algerian Government. His arrest, which Rabat has neither confirmed nor denied, is considered a strong blow against the Armed Islamic Movement, most of whose leaders are imprisoned inside Algeria.

Layada, 34, is one of the main challengers to "Major General" Abdelkader Chebouti, whom his supporters call "leader of the Islamic Army." The latter has the support of the "second man" in the Islamic Front, Shaykh 'Ali Belhaj, who sent a letter from jail supporting Chebouti in a jihad against the government. Despite joining with Chebouti in the effort to establish an Islamic state in Algeria, Layada differs with the "salvationist" leaders concerning methods to attain this goal. His opponents accuse him of extremism and illiteracy.

Recently, the Algerian authorities had a very big success, when military forces killed one of the most prominent of the field leaders, Omar Eulmi, in a clash in the Khemis El Khechna area of eastern Algeria. Certain sources say that denunciations have been exchanged among competing leaders inside the Islamic movement, which led to the arrest of many group leaders or to their being killed in operations carried out by security forces.

The French news agency reported that Layada (who is called Major Abu-Adlan) lives in Baraki, considered to be the stronghold of Islamic extremism in eastern Algeria. This is located in an area known as the Peshawar Triangle, a reference to the city where, during the years

of the Afghan war, a rear base was established as a point of departure for mujahidin to fight the forces supported by Moscow.

Evidently, Layada was behind what became known as the "war of leaders," aimed at unifying the armed Islamic groups under a single leader. He reportedly asked that prominent leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front in exile be killed, including Rabeih Kebir, the Front's spokesman, and Oussama Madani, a son of Shaykh Abassi Madani, the Front's leader who is currently in jail.

On 10 June 1993, the Algerian newspaper, LA MATIN, reported that Layada had been arrested in the Oujda area of Morocco. He had infiltrated across the Moroccan-Algerian border two weeks before.

Despite Moroccan silence vis-a-vis Layada's arrest, Morocco is cooperating with Algeria in a plan to counteract the militant Islamic groups. This means increased surveillance along the joint border between the two countries, since those groups constitute a source of threats to the harmony that dominates relations between Rabat and Algiers.

The Algerian minister of interior, Mohamed Hardi, was eager to confirm recently that the operation to demarcate the border between the two countries would begin before the end of this year. He said: "Contacts are currently underway with Moroccan authorities to complete the system of markers that demarcate the border between the two countries." This means that cooperation and coordination [between the two] will concentrate on monitoring the mutual border, which the two countries are obligated to demarcate in accordance with the Good Neighbor Treaty that was formulated in 1969. This treaty was approved only two years ago within the context of the Moroccan authorities' recognizing the incorporation of Tindouf (a Polisario staging center) under Algerian sovereignty.

Since the position of the joint border was recognized in 1963, site of the first military confrontation between the two countries after skirmishes between the two sides, it has remained a source of threats and unrest because, throughout the Saharan war years, the Polisario Front used it to launch attacks against undisputed Moroccan territory. When Moroccan authorities established a security wall [berm] surrounding the disputed Saharan provinces, they were anxious to retain zones outside the wall in order to avoid military raids if they pursued Polisario forces into Algerian territory. After Moroccan-Algerian relations became harmonious, the joint border was transformed into a zone for commercial exchange and the transfer of goods and people, since it was close to the city of Mellila, which is occupied by Spain. This city is used for smuggling and free trade, as well as for the passage of tens of thousands of Algerian emigrant workers, who return to their country in the summer by way of Spain and Morocco.

One should remember that Moroccan authorities prevented an Islamic Salvation Front delegation, which was visiting Morocco last year, from making contacts with Moroccan circles and forced it to leave the country. At that time, official assurances were issued indicating that Morocco "only has relations with official quarters in Algeria." Moroccan King Hassan II recently emphasized that his country wants only independence and prosperity for Algeria and has no interest in interfering in the internal affairs of a neighboring country. Sources considered these assurances, which accompanied the appointment of a new Moroccan ambassador to Algiers, who held a preparatory meeting of the Algerian-Moroccan Joint Committee, to be an initiative to open up to Algeria, aimed at containing the complications of the previous war of words.

These sources think it likely that Morocco, which has been linked by more than one contact with Iran and with Sudan in recent times, wants to benefit from being the one to put an end to the interference of extremist Islamic movements in the North African area. One signal was Morocco's recent hosting of an Iranian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad 'Ali Besharati, which ended its visit to Morocco yesterday with a meeting with King Hassan II and senior Moroccan officials. The talks in Rabat were described as harmonious in viewpoint vis-a-vis all issues that were studied. Sources think it not unlikely that these talks dealt with Iran's tense relations with Algeria and the attempt to open it up to Morocco. In addition, it is likely that the situations with regard to developments in the Middle East crisis, Afghanistan, and the conditions of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Somalia, were also discussed.

One should recall that Morocco recently resumed diplomatic relations with Iran. It was one of those hurt by the aggravation of Iranian relations with North African countries before the restoration of harmony between Rabat and Tehran.

Large Numbers Transit Egypt To Perform Hajj

*93AF0624D Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
22 May 93 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Pilgrimage: 13,000 Algerians Transit Egypt"]

[Text] Over 13,000 Algerian pilgrims transited Egypt to go to Islam's holy places, and another 5,000 are expected by the end of this week, the Egyptian minister of communications announced.

In spite of the measures taken by local authorities to facilitate transit at the port of Nouiaa, thousands of pilgrims complained about the slowness of procedures, due to the very high number of transiting pilgrims.

The port authorities indicated that the companies and organizations in charge of organizing the pilgrim's trip did not comply with the initial schedule, which resulted in dense traffic at the port.

In addition, tens of Algerian pilgrims who chose to go by land met with huge difficulties as a result of a lack of foresight: for instance, the excessive cost of mechanical repairs on broken-down vehicles.

Illegal Immigrants in South; Census Unreported

93AF0622B Algiers LIBERTE in French 12 May 93 p 2

[Text] Southern Algeria is attracting a growing number of illegal immigrants from no fewer than 20 different countries in Africa.

Between 1 January and 30 April 1993, Surete officials of the wilayah [governorate] of Tamanrasset escorted 830 nationals of various African countries illegally present in Algeria back to the border posts at In-Guezzam and Tin-Zaouatine, located 450 and 600 km, respectively, from Tamanrasset, the capital city of the Ahaggar region.

Some 20 different nationalities were represented among them, according to the immigration department of the Surete in Tamanrasset. Most were from Mali (404), Niger (191), Nigeria (80), and Ghana (63).

The illegal immigrants were apprehended by the police as a result of questioning and identity checks in the neighborhoods of Tamanrasset following numerous armed robberies by groups armed with Kalashnikovs and automatic pistols. They have robbed people of all-terrain vehicles among other items. The security forces (the police and gendarmerie) are making a considerable effort to apprehend these groups who have yet to be identified. According to the same source, the deportees, who lacked documents authorizing them to remain on Algerian soil, had been involved in illegal activities, such as theft, drug trafficking, contraband, piracy, and the falsification of documents, seals, and money.

In addition, nearly 10 percent of the illegal immigrants were women who engaged in clandestine prostitution without medical monitoring, thereby creating a risk of venereal disease.

Escorting illegal immigrants to border posts located far from Tamanrasset poses countless problems involving logistics, food, and lodging, a police officer noted. "With our limited means, it is difficult to provide for such a large number of people over a 10-day period. Most of them are destitute," he added.

It should be noted that a large number of deportees manage to escape while being transported back to the border, and return to Tamanrasset.

Nationals from more than 43 countries currently reside in the Ahaggar region. A census of foreign residents in the wilayah of Tamanrasset was begun last October, but the results have not yet been published.

In addition, the general population and housing census ordered by the Ministry of the Interior and Local Collectivities between 1 and 16 January will determine the exact number of foreigners residing in the three southernmost wilayat (Illizi, Tamanrasset, and Adrar).

The results of the surveys will provide information about the displaced persons living in Algeria and this will allow the authorities to take them into their care, according to sources in Tamanrasset.

A wilayah commission has already chosen sites on which camps for displaced persons will be built so that aid can be made available to them.

Sites in In-Guezzam and Tin-Zaouatine were chosen so that humanitarian organizations will be able to assist the displaced persons, a large majority of whom left their countries of origin because of drought and political conflicts in the Sahel region of Africa.

IRAQ

Conflict Among Kurds in Northern Iraq Alleged

93AE0498A Paris AL-MUHARRIR in Arabic 3 May 93 p 1

[Article: "Developments in Iraq's Kurdistan: Jalal al-Talbani Received \$250 Million From Kuwait!"]

[Text] What is happening in Iraq's Kurdistan nowadays?

The flames of conflict are flaring under the burner of Kurdish parties that control the self-governing sector under American and Western patronage. Strife exists not only among conflicting parties but also within each of those parties.

As a result, partisan splintering has become the norm. After Jalal al-Talbani, the head of the Kurdish Democratic Party [as published], visited Kuwait where he received \$250 million from Mr. Jabir in support of "Kurdish orphans" as the shaykhs of Kuwait put it, Jalal's party suffered a minor splintering led by 'Abbas al-Badri, editor in chief of AL-ITTIHAD, that party's organ. After tenuous good offices and intervention by friends, 'Abbas returned to Jalal's embrace with his pockets lined with exactly 100 million Kuwaiti dinars.

In another development, Kurdish sources told AL-MUHARRIR that shipments of medicine dispatched to the northern region by the United Nations and other international organizations are seized by Jalal's group and diverted to Turkey and Iran where the medicine is sold as hundreds of Kurdish citizens die of disease. That prompted certain Kurdish notables to leave the northern region. [One such notable is] Dr. Mahmud 'Uthman who left Iraq's Kurdistan for exile. Tourist regions in Salah-al-Din, Shaqlawah, Inshki, and Sarsank have become brothels for Saudi and Kuwaiti shaykhs who have turned them into pied-a-terres where they entertain Western and Israeli women.

Infighting broke out within al-Talbani group in al-Sulaymaniyah after Jalal received Hasan al-'Alawi of Syrian intelligence and declared a federation with parties supported by the Syrian regime. Announcement of the federation was then put off to a later date in order to keep the conflict from developing into a split within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

Conflicts among Kurdish parties and citizens have verged on the explosive after the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan nominated political bureau member "Kawsart" as "prime minister of the Kurdish government" and he was installed by the West in northern Iraq. Kawsart is infamous in Kurdish circles for pillaging the Saylo Irbil treasury in the 1980s and spiriting the stolen millions into Sweden. In 1991, he caused the murder of more than 260 Kurds in the town of Shaqlawah because they objected to pillaging and plundering by said person.

Information obtained by AL-MUHARRIR from civil affairs departments in Duhuk, al-Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil indicate that 200 marriages to were consummated with Western men who claim to be Kurds and who obtained counterfeit passports that were supplied with forged identity cards and certificates of nationality.

Project Aims at Revival of Agricultural Chambers

93AE0497A Baghdad AL-'IRAQ AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 17 Apr 93 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Project To Revive Agricultural Chambers"]

[Text] The Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce is establishing a project to revive the role of the agricultural chambers that had been active in Iraq side by side with the chambers of commerce in Baghdad and in Iraq's governorates.

A study of the new tasks of the chambers regarding the private sector has been prepared by the Federation and has called for the Iraqi chambers and Federation to move for the revival of the role of the agricultural chambers and for serious thinking about involving the chambers in agricultural activity. This holds to the principle of combining several activities by establishing specialized sections to deal with these activities. This tendency to strengthen the role of the private sector in agricultural development, however, does not mean that development will be achieved only by cliques of investors: it is a process that demonstrates the joint effort of various business sectors, chiefly investment banks, consulting firms, funds, insurance companies, investment and industrial companies, and import-export companies. Each of these has a supporting and executive role in achieving comprehensive agricultural development.

In this report, the Federation summarized its position vis-a-vis the role of the agricultural chambers, transforming these chambers into indispensable agencies for coordinating activities and overseeing their needs and requirements. The goal of the call to revive them is not

only to have a bloc of interested parties, but also to have actual instruments for speeding up agricultural development by mobilizing the abilities and potentialities of the private sector in these fields.

Food Figures Announced by Trade Ministry

93AE0498C Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 21 Apr 93 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Your Rations for May"]

[Text] The Ministry of Trade has supplied distributors with citizen rations for May, 10 days ahead of schedule in order to provide rationed supplies at a time when their prices have risen on commercial markets.

The General Company for Trade in Foodstuffs and the General Company for Grain Processing have supplied agents with the rations. Each individual is entitled to:

- Nine kgs of flour at 1.025 dinars,
- 1.75 kgs of rice at 550 fils,
- 1,500 gms of sugar at 300 fils,
- 75 gms of tea at 150 fils,
- 500 gms of lard at 290 fils,
- 200 gms of detergent at 150 fils,
- 1.25 units of soap at 150 fils per unit.

Each family is also entitled to 5 shaving blades at 250 fils, and 1 kg of table salt at 250 fils.

Children's rations include 1,800 kgs of milk at 3 dinars for each infant younger than one year of age.

ISRAEL

Analysis of U.S.-Israeli Strategic Cooperation

93AA0076D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 May 93 p B1

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Cooperation, Ltd."]

[Text] The 19th meeting of the Israeli and United States teams on strategic cooperation between the two countries ended recently in the United States. This was also the first meeting since the Clinton administration took over. This time, it was Assistant Secretary of State Robert Galucci who sat opposite Defense Ministry General Director David Ivri. For some reason, the meeting took place this time outside the capital, with the teams gathering in Annapolis. Usually, little of the contents of the talks is published.

To further obscure what was happening behind the curtains, a new method was utilized, of discussions with the whole committees present, as well as a special meeting of a group of committee heads: that is, Ivri, Galucci, and their aides.

Despite the ups and downs in the relations between the two countries, everyone involved agrees on the great contribution strategic cooperation makes, especially to Israel. In Washington, there are indeed some who ask

what Israel's strategic value for the United States really is, but even those who think that the military component in this partnership has lessened do not doubt the importance of the special tie. Much has been written about the importance of the strategic partnership. And still, there remain several topics on which there are differences of opinion between Israel and the United States.

First, some background on the 19th meeting. When the Bush administration left, the promise that the United States would station additional military equipment worth 200 million dollars in Israel was left hanging. The Clinton administration has made a commitment to carry this out in 1993. Another promise, more important despite its general formulation, which Clinton gave Rabin during his visit to Washington was that the strategic partnership would deepen. There was discussion of setting up a joint committee for technology topics, and of regular meetings between the secretary of defense and the defense minister twice a year.

Israel's main complaint centers on weapons inspection. She agreed to Washington's appeals on this subject, yet has been bitterly disappointed. In January of this year, Israel signed the International Covenant for the Prevention of the Production and Storage of Chemical Weapons.

The Americans said that Israel would benefit from this, but the beginning has not been very promising.

Not one of the blocs wants Israel; they all reject her. This is true of Europe too, where the British lead the opposition to Israel. The Arabs for the most part have still not signed the covenant, and are trying as usual to create a tie between it and the question of nuclear weapons. Ivri said to the Americans that Israel is like a ball being kicked from playing field to playing field. This, of course, is a lesson for the future.

Simultaneously, Israel is having another argument with Washington. She agreed to the demand to sign the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime], yet is still not accepted as a full member in the group of signers. In addition, Israel is limited in the United States too.

According to state department directives, Israeli companies are not included in civilian calls for bids on projects having to do with space or missile launchers. The topic was brought up in the discussions in Annapolis and included an example our aeronautical industry is involved in. Although this is not resolved, Israel has joined the arrangement for United Nations management of international registry of weapons transactions. This arrangement came into force last month, and Israel intends to report for the first time on her weapons export and import transactions, hoping again that her positive approach will not be used against her.

Another major complaint Israel has is connected to the U.S. rejection of her requests to acquire various technologies that have already been sold to others. The former

secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, had already promised Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that Israel's position would be comparable to NATO's in everything connected to freeing advanced technology. President Bill Clinton spoke of expanding the technological partnership, but now it is turning out that there are areas where the promise is more like a campaign slogan.

This is too important a question to be left to bureaucrats, for it touches on the vital subject of preserving the quality gap in Israel's favor. This is a commitment that several presidents, including Clinton, have taken upon themselves, and it takes on a more acute dimension in light of the tremendous American arms sales in the region.

Following are examples of several U.S. rejections. Radar weapons control for F-16s: they refused to sell Israel vital components for certain programs that pilots have difficulty flying without. Washington refuses to sell Cray supercomputers to university research centers in Israel, although they have been sold to Saudi Arabia and East European countries. They also refuse to sell programs for upgrading the AB supercomputers and digital computers our military already has.

Another refusal has to do with up-to-date software for artillery radar used in locating enemy batteries. To this, we should add the refusal to sell various armaments, including to the navy. What is irritating is the fact that the Americans are sometimes conditioning freeing various systems on our agreement to exceedingly careful inspection of Israeli arms sales. They are insisting not only on inspection of U.S. components in Israeli equipment for export, but also on inspection of the Israeli components in these weapons systems. In the last matter, Israel has decided not to yield, and rightly so.

There are other points of disagreement, all smaller, many due to the cutbacks in the U.S. security budget. Among them is the refusal of the branches of the U.S. military to carry out Congress's promise to store a large supply of fuel (200,000 barrels) in Israel, or to share in the expenses of transporting U.S. equipment that will be stored here. The cutbacks in the U.S. budget will lead to limiting joint exercises, but not only with Israel. And again, emphasizing the things we disagree on should not lead to the mistaken conclusion that strategic cooperation has run aground. It is really the opposite, but it is important to get rid of the weeds.

Syrian Control of Lebanon Recognized

93AA0090A *Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew*
30 May 93 p B3

[Article by G. Bekhor: "They are Talking of a Complete Withdrawal From the Security Strip"]

[Text] It is in the talks that are barely mentioned by us—with the Lebanese delegation—that certain progress has been made in the latest round in Washington. The basis of that progress is the new working paper that the

Israeli delegation submitted to the Lebanese, and that aroused their excitement. It apparently indicates a change in the Israeli strategic view toward Lebanon or, in the language of one of the Lebanese analysts: "The start of the sobering up from the Israeli delusions."

The distinguishing point in the document, as it was leaked in full to the Lebanese press, is the rescindment of the symmetry that the Likud government declared between Israeli withdrawal from the security strip and the withdrawal of the Syrians from Beirut and the Lebanon Valley. The historical basis of symmetry is in the aspirations of the Israeli hegemony in Beirut, from Ari'el Sharon's school, in the political struggle against Syria with the signing of the agreement of 17 May 1983 and its cancellation, and until the wording of "the withdrawal of all foreign forces in Lebanon," from the start of the Madrid process.

On the new paper, if it is indeed exact, the Syrian withdrawal is no longer mentioned. Thus, Israel recognizes, *de facto*, the special role—both military and political—of the Syrians in Lebanon, and the fact that Syria currently pulls the strings in Lebanon. This recognition is largely the result of the failure of the Americans to force the Syrians to withdraw from the Lebanon Valley according to the al-Taif accords, and from declarations of heads of the Lebanese Government that they will not relinquish the Syrian deployment in their land, for it gives them security.

It is clear to both Israel and the Lebanese that there will be no progress in the talks with Beirut, unless the Syrians decide to make this possible. The key was, and still is, in Damascus, and, from this viewpoint, relinquishing the Syrian withdrawal constitutes a certain payment for Damascus that, perhaps will make measured Israeli progress possible without damaging the basic Syrian interests. It is clear that the Israeli demand for a peace agreement with the Beirut government, which also appears in the document, contradicts the essence of the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. In Israel, this is known, but the payment to the Syrians would, perhaps, make possible a meeting of a joint Israeli-Lebanese committee for security arrangement in southern Lebanon and a withdrawal, while leaving the peace agreement article as a theoretical matter that is on the agenda and that will be realized on the self-same day in which progress with Damascus is also achieved.

The negotiations with the Lebanese delegation, therefore, are turning more and more into negotiations with Syria, while Uri Lubrani is conducting them not with the Lebanese delegation and not with the Beirut government, but, indirectly, with Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, and the important decisions with President Hafiz al-Asad, himself. And thus, Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich asked to conduct the negotiations on

Lebanon directly with the Syrians, but they demanded that Israel continue to do this by means of the Lebanese.

The Israeli paper also clearly discusses, this time, the complete withdrawal from the security strip, and even mentions the future disarmament of the SLA [South Lebanese Army]. These are two views of the agreement that Israel has not explicitly agreed to speak of, to date. In the past, so they analyze in Lebanon, Israel thought that it had good control over the security strip, fulfilling its role in curbing terrorism, and therefore, did not find it appropriate to speed up the negotiations. The clear Israeli desire to withdraw from the security strip with a reduction in objectives is the result—in the opinion of Lebanese analysts—of the increase in Shi'ite terrorism there and the many voids that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has sacrificed in this bilateral war of attrition.

In Lebanon, it is also estimated that, paradoxically, the Hizballah movement, in the guerrilla warfare that it is conducting against IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon, is what has forced Israel to word the more moderate Israeli document; at the same time, if the document is accepted, Hizballah will be the big loser.

The Israeli paper includes many enticements for the Lebanese Government, and it appears that it, indeed, will be shortly prepared to appoint a military committee that will discuss the withdrawal and security arrangements in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, there is still no talk of the readiness for a peace agreement, on which, for no reason, the Syrians will impose a veto, until there is progress on the Golan question.

The document, which was presented in English, includes 12 clauses, and, immediately following its presentation, senior Lebanese officials came out to consult with the Syrians. And these are the clauses:

1. Recognition of Israel in Resolution 425, which refers to the withdrawal of Israel from all of southern Lebanon, and recognition of Lebanon's international borders.
2. Israel's readiness to sign a peace agreement, in a political-security framework, while responding to Lebanon's demand for withdrawal.
3. Establishment of a Lebanese-Israeli military committee that will determine the nonuse of weapons and their nonpossession by any group within Lebanon, aside from the forces of its regular army.
4. Israel and the countries giving protection to the Government of Lebanon will offer aid in dismantling the weapons of all armed sides found in the region—those subject to other sides (Syria and Iran) or Palestinian organizations.
5. The guaranteed dismantling of SLA in the security strip, if the previous steps are carried out.

6. The Israeli withdrawal will be in the framework of a timetable that will be determined following the execution of the previous steps and the guarantee of cessation of terrorism against Israel from the Lebanese border.

7. Israel's readiness to release Lebanese detainees in Israeli prisons in return for the return of six Israeli soldiers in Lebanese territory.

8. The exchange of intelligence information between the two countries to ensure the security aspect.

9. Israel is prepared to discuss a rapid withdrawal (of SLA) from the Janin region as a first step of good will.

10. There will be a discussion of trade and tourism agreements.

11. American economic aid will be guaranteed to Lebanon to get its economy on its feet.

12. Israel again determines that it has no desires or interests in Lebanese waters or territories.

After consultation with Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, who is responsible for Lebanon, and with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar', the Lebanese consolidated a response to Israel document, which will be presented with the renewal of talks in Washington: They bless the acceptance of the principle that Israel must withdraw from the entire region of Lebanon, but do not agree that Israel should intervene in the internal security in Lebanon. The Israeli readiness to withdraw, their response states, indeed "opens the door" for the establishment of a military committee that will discuss this. And regarding a peace agreement with Israel, this will be discussed, in the opinion of the Lebanese, only after completion of the withdrawal from Lebanon and in the wider context of the conclusion of the struggle with all of the rest of the Arab parties.

Rabin-Peres Tensions Reportedly Resurface

93AA0092E Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 4 Jun 93 pp 18-19

[Article by Orli Azulay-Katz: "Rabin-Peres: Is It Heating Up Again?"]

[Text] "I know that in the party there is a conspiracy against me, and I know exactly from whence it comes," said Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a meeting of the "Our Ministers" forum. The ministers sought some point in the air upon which to fix their gazes, and were silent. No one got up. It was four months ago, when the demand was again raised for the appointment of a defense minister and removing the job from the prime minister's hands.

This week, when the political campfire between Rabin and Peres was lit again, Nisim Zvili, the secretary-general of Labor, reconstructed that tense meeting: "I did not want my silence to be interpreted as an admission of guilt," he related, "I got up and said to Rabin:

"This is all prattle, foolishness. No one is organizing against you." Zvili added that to the best of his recollection, this was the first and only time that Rabin made such an assertion.

The fire was ignited again this week by two political events. Once, when Peres led the opposition to the amendment to the law that broadens the authority of a prime minister who is elected directly, and once when the Labor faction attacked the prime minister aggressively for the manner in which he had handled the coalition crisis. Both the prime minister and the foreign minister are making noteworthy media efforts in order to put it out, but emotions are leading them to other areas.

In their public meetings, in the "Our Ministers" forum, and at faction meetings, they take care to shake hands, and to nod their heads in greeting. Shim'on Peres is careful not to express his opinions at meetings of that kind, if they are contrary to those of the prime minister. Therefore, mostly he stays silent. Yitzhak Rabin, for his part, makes a noticeable effort to keep to the minimum the amount of criticism that he voices of Peres, and when he does that nevertheless, he is careful not to mention Peres' name. Whoever understands, understands.

Behind the back, the story is completely different. "Nu...has that one already established his Middle East bank?", Rabin loves to ask sarcastically, every time that someone mentions Peres' vision, or his plans for a solution to the problems of the region.

Peres does not take it lying down. "I do not understand that man," he was heard saying this week, referring to Rabin. "When I went to a rabbi to establish a government, that was groveling, a general sale. But when he goes to rabbis, that is all right, that is substantive negotiations.... May he be healthy."

At the end of last week, Rabin surprised the members of the Meretz council. He revealed to them that he had contacted Peres and told him about Aloni's demand to receive the foreign affairs portfolio. "I told him that this is the situation," Rabin said, "and I did not detect in him any spirit of volunteering." Peres read about this in the newspaper, and told the members of his bureau: "What does he want again? I did not receive from him any concrete proposal. What exactly did he expect? That I should volunteer for what? That I should jump and request the defense portfolio? That it will be said that I am exploiting opportunities?"

Yitzhak Rabin could perhaps note with satisfaction that he had succeeded in solving the coalition crisis, "without stinking stratagems," and without "promises under the table," had he not been hit, even before he had the chance to savor the achievement, by stinging criticism at home. Members of the faction openly challenged the way he had acted in that crisis.

"In this government, there are no ministers, only a prime minister," Peres said this week in a private conversation. "Even in Ben-Gurion's time there was no such situation."

Many ministers are complaining that Rabin does not engender a feeling of "together," that he speaks with each minister only on specific matters, the affairs of the ministry for which he is responsible. With 'Uzi Bar'am he talks about tourism, with Liba'i he speaks, when necessary, about legal affairs. The ministers do not have a clue as to what is really going on. At the time of the coalition crisis, they lived off of the press, and on the subject of the peace process, whoever has contacts in the American Embassy or in the State Department tries to extract details from there. "It is not that Rabin is seeking glory for himself, and does not want to share it," explained 'Uzi Bar'am this week, "It is simply the nature of the man. That is the way he is."

Yitzhak Rabin indeed does not involve his ministers, and he also sees no need for that. He does not believe in anyone and does not rely on anyone. To this day, no one in the government has decided whether the last coalition crisis continued for so long because it was handled clumsily or if, perhaps, this was Rabin's conception: to wear everyone down, to let the process ripen, and then to whip out the trivial solution, which could have been offered right at the beginning of the crisis.

Experienced politicians who sit in the government assert that if, indeed, the method of attrition was his "concept," it was more harmful than helpful. It led to "a foul odor," they say, and to wounds within the government. Ministers who were not brought into it felt left out, cut off, and bitter, and more than that: they began to fight each other over every crumb of control, because they felt that they were being tricked.

"Rabin's image with the public was hurt severely," explains party Secretary-General Nisim Zvili, "Rabin appeared always as a leader and military leader, and suddenly he is involved in divvying up a quarter of a portfolio to Shula and an eighth of a portfolio to Shitrit. He made a terrible mistake when he handled it himself, and did not send ministers or Knesset members to do this work for him. Rabin asserts that he did not suffer with the public, and only the party hacks on Hayarkon Street are talking that way. He wanted to insult us. All right. I long ago stopped getting upset over what he says."

In the Labor faction, they do not recall such an attack on the prime minister. In the party, they assert that this was an outburst that was long suppressed. The members of the party, like the members of the government, have had a bellyfull of the centralistic manner of handling affairs. They "exploded" at the faction meeting.

The leaders of the attack were Knesset members Daliya Itzik and Nissim Zvili. And what was said at the meeting was only the tip of the iceberg. In the conversations at the coffee shop afterwards, the attackers argued that

Rabin was not displaying leadership, that he was not marking a target and leading to it. He does not initiate moves, does not decide matters, and only lets things happen, they said. His slogan is compartmentalization and murkiness. There is no one person near him who knows everything. Each one knows only a portion of the puzzle. Rabin refuses to share the full picture with anyone.

Rabin's confidants rejected the criticisms with disgust, and said loudly: Peres is scheming again. They pointed to the two events—Peres' opposition to the amendment to the law for direct elections and the outburst at the faction meeting, and argued: "It is all Peres' work."

Zvili responded: "Rabin's people are trying to remove subjects from the agenda, and the easiest thing for them to do is to shout that there is factionalism, and that everything is coming from Peres. I, for several months already I have not spoken with Peres about internal party affairs. That is prattle. Daliya Itzik also speaks only for herself, and is going crazy over the fact that every time that she has something to say, they say that Peres sent her. I know these methods of Rabin's people. Instead of confronting the problem, they shout Peres is a schemer, Peres is organizing. That is not serious."

Zvili relates that it was precisely Rabin's people who had approached him and requested that the Central Committee be convened, in order to discuss the coalition crisis. But he decided to prevent the discussion, so that there would be no criticism of Rabin while he is making efforts to mend the coalition. "I did not order surveys, but I know how to read the surveys that are published in the newspapers," Zvili explains. "There is an erosion in Rabin's stature. We all saw that the surveys show that Bibi is overtaking Rabin in the present situation. That lights up red lights with me. I hope that the government will now get on the high road."

Rabin's people have a different explanation, they talk about a plot: every Friday morning, they assert, Peres convenes his team of advisers and his image and publicity people. According to them, at these meetings is decided the strategy whose aim is to undermine Rabin's status in the party, in order to cause him to lose his strength and, mainly, his nerves.

Peres' people reject this completely. "It is clear to us that with every failure of Rabin, they will accuse Peres," says one of the foreign minister's confidants, "Rabin's problem is that he made a lot of promises, but he is not successful in getting this government to take off. He feels that there is a feeling of disappointment in the public, and is trying to find the guilty persons in the Foreign Ministry."

One of the persons closest to Rabin said about that: "Whoever talks about an erosion in the status of the prime minister is the one who is causing the erosion. Whoever sees Rabin's appearances and his meeting with the public knows that there is no erosion in his status, to

the contrary. If Nisim Zvili does not want there to be an erosion in Rabin's status, he would not speak as he does in the faction."

With a scornful tone, Rabin's confidants add that all of them can just "jump"—after all, Rabin won strongly in the primaries, he is the head of the party, he is the prime minister, and any attempt to hurt him is actually doomed to fail.

The old rivalry between Peres and Rabin is, therefore, gaining momentum. Aside from the ancient hatred between the two, there is also a substantive disagreement between them as the peace process proceeds. Peres looks at the events from a long-term perspective. He marks the target that has to be attained, and only afterwards seeks to examine how to get there. Rabin works according to an opposite method: first of all, he examines the small details, builds on the everyday events, expects progress in the delegations' talks, and only afterwards indicates the final goal. Several times in the past, Rabin declared that he opposed discussing the final goal now, because that will cause the talks to blow up. Peres sees things exactly oppositely.

He is dreaming, argue Rabin and his people, and they pronounce the word "vision" with a scornful tone. Peres and his confidants reply: if the peace process is stuck, it is because Rabin is the man of small details, they say, a man who gives immediate solutions, but cannot see the picture.

Around this axis, Rabin-Peres, spin all the other ministers, most of them in the dark. They have no clue, they say, where Rabin is leading, and whether he is leading at all or running in place. For fear that "something big" is happening behind the curtains, they are still silent. They are waiting to see whether Rabin really has some card, a winning card, that he is holding very close to his chest, a card that could one morning bring about a diplomatic breakthrough. In that case, they hope, it will turn out that their silence was worthwhile.

But if days and weeks pass, and things seem to be stuck as they appear today, they intend to settle accounts with Rabin—and how. More than once, ministers in Labor were heard mentioning that in a little while the government will have been in existence for a year, and it does not have even one achievement to brag about.

Impact of al-Majali Selection on Islamic Movement *93AA0094A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew* *31 May 93 p B2*

[Article "From the Heart of the Bedouin Consensus" by Gai B'khor; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text] The appointment of 'abd al-Salam al-Majali as temporary prime minister of Jordan is meant to establish a bond with the Palestinian organizations and curb the growth of the Islamic parties with the parliamentary elections coming up.

'Abd al-Salam al-Majali, the soft-spoken doctor who heads the Jordanian delegation to the peace talks and who was appointed temporary prime minister of Jordan last weekend, has not been a conspicuous figure in Jordanian politics. Born in 1925 of Bedouin origin, he studied medicine in England, where he also met his wife. Later he returned to Jordan and laid the foundation of the Jordanian medical corps. In the 1970's he left the army and entered politics, first as minister of health and then in the marginal role of minister of state for the prime minister's affairs, then as minister of education, and later as president of the University of Jordan. In 1989 he served as adviser to King Husayn, and after that as head of the Jordanian delegation to the peace talks.

But many in Jordan understand that this relatively marginal figure in Jordanian politics is right now precisely the right person to be prime minister of the transitional government until time for the Jordanian general elections at the end of October or early November this year. The king made 'Abd al-Salam al-Majali prime minister not because he is well-known to the public or because of his charisma, but because of a maneuvering ability that will enable him to create a Palestinian-Bedouin party bloc to curb the expected rise of Islamic factors in the next parliamentary elections. The worry is that something may happen to prevent the continuation of the peace process with Israel—which is seen as vitally important for both the royal house and the PLO top leadership.

Al-Majali, from a family that has been always identified with the Hashemite family, is a figure from the center of consensus among the Bedouin, who are the nucleus of loyalty to the king. His brother, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Majali, is the leader of the 'Al-'Ahd [the Promise] party, the party closest to the king today, which outspokenly supports the peace process with Israel. Therefore, he is listened to in the Bedouin camp.

In addition, 'Abd al-Salam al-Majali has forged good ties to the Palestinian leaders from the territories—by whose side he carried on negotiations with Israel in Washington—as well as with the top PLO leaders. With him, it will be easy for them to talk things over and reach an understanding. His excellent connections in the Persian Gulf and in Washington can also help.

King Husayn will be asking his new prime minister to do something that would never have crossed his mind just two years ago: to create an ad hoc coalition with the Palestinian organizations, so that the Jordanian nationalist parties will go with them to the elections and defeat the factors that view Islam as more important than all other things—or at least to lessen the percentage of support for the "Muslim Brethren" and similar groups.

In the last elections, which were held in November 1989, all these parties were forbidden to stand in the elections, except for the Islamic Brethren movement, which has enjoyed special status ever since the 1950's (when political parties were forbidden to be active in Jordan because

of a leftist overthrow attempt). The "brethren" were better organized as compared with the other competitors, who were running in the elections as individuals, according to the exemption they received. The Islamic bloc won 40 percent of the 80 seats in the Jordanian parliament: Delegates from the Muslim Brethren won 22 seats, and another 10 were won by independents with an Islamic background. Five of the Muslim Brethren entered the Jordanian Government, and succeeded in legislating conservative laws such as separation of the sexes in the schools.

In order to curb the growth of Islamic power in the coming elections, the king has moved forward his legislation of the new law regulating parties, which on the face of it will bestow the possibility of running democratic multiparty elections again (each party needs permission from the minister of the interior to run, and that is not easy to get), but which actually is meant to split the Islamic vote among several parties. King Husayn's assumption that several Islamic parties would immediately begin to quarrel among themselves has been proved correct, and the intention to establish a bloc of Islamic parties under the name "Islamic Action Party" has not succeeded so far. At the same time, the king's supporters are trying to create a united nationalist bloc that will include most of the parties in the center. This is what al-Majali will be working on. Right now, though, this experiment is not going very well, either.

The Palestinian voice will be much stronger in the next elections because since the last elections about 400,000 Jordanian citizens have returned to Jordan from the Persian Gulf. This is one more reason the king needs al-Majali's connections.

The popular and democratic fronts will run in the elections under other names, supposedly as Jordanian parties, and contacts are being made right now between the king's men and the PLO, so that the most central movement in the Palestinian camp will also be able to compete in the elections, using candidates who are Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin. This way, the PLO will win a power base in the Jordanian parliament, something they have always wanted, and the nationalist factors, whether Jordanian or Palestinian, will strengthen their power in parliament relative to the Islamic factors. And it makes no difference that the popular and democratic fronts oppose continuation of the peace process; the fact that they are anti-Islamic is more important to King Husayn at this time than how much they criticize the peace.

This is certainly a real concession on Husayn's part; he is ready to allow the PLO organizations into his parliament 23 years after he expelled them from their military-political power bases in the kingdom. But the twofold Islamic threat, against both the king and 'Arafat, is pushing them to put the old-new differences aside and

come closer to each other, to stand together against the Islamic Jihad, against the Muslim Brethren, against Hamas.

The voting power that parties like the "Muslim Brethren," "The Jordanian Islamic Party," or the "Islamic Jihad" (which appears as a Palestinian party) will really have is still not clear. There are several parameters that collide with one other.

At first glance, statistics are against the supporters of the king. Except in the city of Irbid, Islamic candidates have won in all local elections that have taken place since 1989. The picture is similar in elections at the universities and trade unions. Among the students, some of the Islamic lists even won a 90-percent majority. Since the Jordanian elections, there have been elections in Algeria and Kuwait that also reflected the power of the Islamic movements and their unwillingness to compromise with the nationalist regimes. Iran has increased its involvement in the countries of the region—including Jordan, which uncovered a new pro-Iranian terror group just two weeks ago. Two delegates from the Islamic Brethren who have seats in the present parliament were charged and convicted of membership in the group, and of subversion.

But the Jordanian people are beginning to show dissatisfaction with the way the Islamic delegates in parliament and the local council heads from Islamic circles have been doing their jobs. It is illegal in Jordan to publish public opinion polls, but in a "comprehensive" and secret survey carried out by the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, and leaked to the daily paper JORDAN TIMES, it was found that only 19 percent said they would vote for Islam. The central-national stream would get 54 percent of the vote; the other streams, 27 percent. It may be that many of the people questioned were afraid to say openly that they were going to vote for the opposition Islamic movements; in any case, the survey's findings caused great satisfaction in the royal palace.

The name of the game now is to curb the Islamic vote, and this, more than furthering the peace process, is the primary mandate the new prime minister has received. It is reasonable, therefore, to imagine that he will finish his term after the elections are over.

The curbing will be done peacefully, in accordance with the "spirit of democracy and liberalism," which King Husayn declared in effect before he left for medical treatment in the United States, and which—like the outgoing prime minister—past prime ministers, Zaid bin-Shakher or Mudar Badran, who were known for their harshness, did not succeed in living up to. Al-Majali's Bedouin origin and his good family background are likely to help curb the sweep of Islam among the nucleus of Bedouin tribes. This is why a Palestinian prime minister, like Tahir al-Masri, for example, would not fill all the expectations for the game Hashemite kings like to

play so well: switching prime ministers according to political circumstances and according to the demands of the hour.

Social, Ideological Implications of the Green Line

93AA0076A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
21 May 93 p B2

[Commentary by Gadi Algazi: "The Way to the Iron Wall Is Through the Closure"; first two paragraphs are HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text] The closure is influencing not only the lives of the Palestinians in the territories, but also our social consciousness. Among other things, it returns us to the purist conception of Zionism, the one interested in creating a national body free of Palestinians, and even ready to give up territory to do it.

The closure goes on and on, and silence surrounds it. Behind the thick curtain it erects, it allows brutal violations of basic human rights. Red lines are erased—and the public silence continues. And this silence, the collective shrug of the shoulders, itself requires an explanation. For the only pressures inside Israel for even a partial easing of the closure are supported with economic arguments, that is to say not the needs of the Palestinians as human beings, but the need of the economy for Palestinians as manpower. From this, we see that the lack of public debate itself is a tangible political fact, and the closure perhaps makes it possible to throw light on some characteristics of Israeli social and political consciousness.

Many of us do not argue at all about the closure because it is ours. What we are doing—from the very fact that we are the ones doing it—is all right. Expulsions are bad: but our expulsion, an expulsion carried out by the good, the righteous, the excellent tribe, is all right. And it is exactly the same when it comes to the closure: a closure that the enlightened government carries out—that we, enlightened people, support—is an enlightened closure.

This approach dissolves away basic moral principles and replaces them with the principle of tribal membership. There is, of course, a debate about the definition of these tribal limits: whether they include all the Jews—and then what Jews do is from its very nature something completely different—or only a small group of Jews; and then what we—not the Likud, but the good Israel—do with the culturally Arabic Jews is by definition something completely different. This is an exclusive tribe: "We are all right, completely all right," in the words of Hanokh Levin in "The Queen of the Bathtub," in the old days of Labor rule, so very far away and yet so near.

This means that if anyone is still debating, it is mainly about the effects of the closure on Israeli social consciousness. The most important claim is that the closure is returning public consciousness to the Green Line and can further the process of establishing it anew. And in truth, if the Green Line is established again, if Israel does

withdraw from the territories over the next few years, perhaps, looking back, people will be able to point to the closure as part of this process. But none of us knows whether that is what will happen. None of us can even pretend to know how things will go. The politician in power does of course pretend to know what the future will bring and turns to us in its name; but for those of us who are not in power—and do not have to tell ourselves and others the lies of those in power—it is better to consider the varied results this may bring. The closure could just as well—like the expulsion—serve as a precedent for more of the kind of brutal measures that occupying regimes tend to take, in a situation where there is no effective protest. Is there a red line? Is there a boundary? The answer of those who make the decisions about the closure and the expulsion: There is no boundary. Period.

There is no real reason to assume that raising the great fence around the occupied territories will be the first step in the process of saying goodbye to them. In the debate over what the closure may mean for reestablishing the Green Line, it is more important to remember that the Green Line has always existed, at least in the consciousness of the security forces. Although the official ideology was busy blotting it out, the members of the security forces, the arms of the state responsible for the use of force, well knew that beyond it lay a separate law, and flexible rules, and things that are permissible that were not before. The closure has only strengthened the Green Line as the point beyond which (as Ada Oshpitz has written) another land begins—not a separate sovereign land, but a distinctly different colonial realm, a place where rules and orders change.

Reestablishing the Green Line does have significance for our social consciousness, because it strengthens the impression that this is a war, that our forces will be functioning from now on in a real enemy land, and in a war like any other war. And right away, there is the return of TV reports of our correspondent accompanying the troops in Gaza, pictures in the papers, and the kind of interviews they used to have, with unshaven commanders who tell us “how it is there,” and themselves sharpen the distinction between “there” and “here.” The closure gives us a colonial “there” and “here” of another kind, very clearly distinct: we can have but feel we do not have, and we can hold on to colonies without dirtying our fingers with day-to-day contact with the natives. Here the closure can also be another model for future relations, the beginning of a Bantustan.

If so, the closure violates no social taboo, because the taboo of the Green Line was only on the surface anyway, while the true taboo—of control of the occupied territories—still stands. The state has preserved its ability to penetrate any point in the territories. Someone who thinks he sees the Green Line rising anew is not distinguishing between a border and a fence. A political border is meant to separate sovereign groups of people; a fence surrounds those who are ruled, but in no way limits the ruler; it is completely penetrable, from one direction.

If a process has begun of marking the Green Line anew as the border, it is the intifadah that began it; it put an end to the colonial idyll, to the visit to the shuk [open market], to getting things repaired cheap, to the affordable occupation, to the settler's quality of life. We should pay attention to the waves of popular rage that have been stirred up since then, the outstanding expression of which has been one recurrent line: “How is it that they wander around here freely while I do not dare to go there?”—a sentence that expresses longing for the right of free penetration, the right to violate the sovereign boundaries of others' bodies. The closure is the answer to these longings, because now they, the dirty ones, can no longer “wander around freely here,” but we—or our messengers, the neighbor or the son or the excited TV correspondent—can wander around freely as though we were at home, overturn cabinets and barge into rooms, and view the shocked and embarrassed family in the middle of the night.

The closure is accompanied, then, by a bursting of boundaries, by the deepest possible penetration of our security forces into the kitchens and bedrooms of the residents of the territories; it is enough to mention the degrading of the residents of the Strip by the soldiers of the Golani. The great fence surrounding the occupied territories weakens all the restrictions still left on the use of violence within their boundaries, and allows the military man to burst all the shaky boundaries that make people's lives and bodies private.

The closure not only influences the lives of the Palestinians in the territories; it is also one of the forces that are reshaping the body of the tribe-nation. It is possible to exchange points of view now and see the closure from outside, as armor covering the national body and shaping it. Why do so many people feel comfortable inside this old/new armor?

In the public discussion in Israel over the national body and its borders, it is possible to distinguish two main approaches, one usually represented more by the Likud, the other by Labor, though it seems that there are representatives of these views in both political blocs, and when you come to the settlers, things become even more vague. One version of Zionism tends to be constantly melting away the borders of the national body: It is busy with constant expansion, in the hope that this giant body will be able to overcome the obstacles it is having trouble digesting; the Palestinians, that is, and perhaps also other minorities. This is a “swallow-it-all” version of nationalism; this is a body caught in a mania for swallowing up territories. The Lebanon war was a good example of the digestive problems this spreading body is liable to run into. Under ideal conditions, this body would want to throw up the residents of the territories; but actually it is forced to swallow larger and larger quantities of people.

This assimilating and spreading body needs constant reinforcing to help it swallow, and this is where aliya [expansion not given] has a central role. It is important to realize that aliya is seen in this version as a function of

the national body: it is not meant to solve the problems of the Jewish people in the world—like the Zionism in books or festive speeches—but to supply the expanding body with manpower. This is why it is so important to assimilate the masses of immigrants quickly and then to shunt them from place to place.

The other version of the national body is a little more realistic. Even though it would like to see its body grow and grow, it sees great difficulties in assimilating great chunks of Palestinians into its frame. The obsession of this version is the purification of the national body, making it uniform, consolidated, and fortified, well separated from the Oriental body, from the Levantine, from “melting into the heart of the East.” This version of the national body is permeated with deep revulsion for the Arabs. Even if there is no contradiction in principle between the two versions, those who support this one are ready to give up territories under certain conditions, in order to guard the purity of the body.

And here too, recreating the old external border is tightly connected to the internal social structures. The longing for “Little Israel” is not always the longing for a more democratic Israel, free of occupation. Some of those who support withdrawal long for a small, orderly state with an organized and well-fortified body; the longing for the little settlement, free of Indians. They are, in part, the longings for that good old time when there were clear cultural hierarchies, before Likud and the Orientals came along—and of course, when the Labor party was clearly dominant.

And again we should mention that until 1965, a certain number of the residents of Israel were under military rule, with a system of licenses limiting their freedom of movement, and under close supervision by the security forces. Military rule is also part of the picture of the orderly state, where everyone knows their place; thus it is, at least, in the collective fantasy. Under certain conditions, a return to a pleasant little state like this could be called by the code name of “withdrawal from the territories.” It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that this nostalgic fantasy of the clean and well-separated social body is completely modern: It fits in well with the main goal of the Western societies, to spit out the weak and helpless and get the hobos, drug addicts, and homeless off the streets of the cities, away from the eyes of the passersby, in order to present a model society, one where what is marginal is hidden from the eye.

The closure is accepted with a sigh of relief or with silent agreement, but not because it signals the beginning of a true border between sovereign human groups. It finds an echo in people's spirits because it signals a passage from the “swallow-everything” conception of the national body to one emphasizing purity, because it activates anew a long tradition of fences, bulldozers, fears, and longings. The reality of the closure forces us to stop making do with a debate over where our borders are going to be, and to think instead about the character of the border lines we want to have. Will we really be able

to break the yoke of these two conceptions—the “swallow it all” and the “purification”?

A quick look backwards is not very encouraging. The history of Zionism is filled with boundaries; not only maps and territorial aspirations, but also the powerful recurring images of walls and fortresses. Beginning with the wall protecting Europe from Asia, which we all should have been part of, according to Herzl's vision; from the “stockade and tower” of the Labor movement, and the “iron wall” of the Revisionists, right up to the writings of Ben-Gurion, who in his diary described the new immigrant housing projects in the border areas as creating a “human wall” on which the pressure on it would consolidate and solidify. And we can also go on to describe the transition from command post to fortress, from fence to security zone, and as part of all this, the creation of the society of the “state under siege.”

This is why the debate is not only about juggling territories and drawing maps, but about the social and human content of the borders that will arise, about the form the boundary will take. And this outward boundary will play a central role in forming the society. The struggle over withdrawal from the occupied territories is a political struggle, and therefore brings together strange allies; support for the closure separates these allies in that it emphasizes the fact that some of them support withdrawal because they want to build a strong body armor for the nation. But the debate over the nature of the border that is to arise cannot be put off any longer if we do not want to help build an iron wall and be forced to live under its shadow.

Nuclear Disarmament Said Second to Peace Talks

*93AA0076B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
21 May 93 p B2*

[Summary of study done by Dr. Ari'el Loite and Emily Landau, by Aluf Ben; “Waiting for Declarations From Israel”; first two paragraphs are HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text] The Arab world's reaction to Israel's nuclearization has not been uniform, but whether its importance has been downplayed—or been related to with the greatest seriousness—it has not been considered the main problem in the dispute with Israel. This is the main conclusion of a new study based on materials published in the Arab countries.

Israel's nuclear capacity is seen as a serious problem by the Arabs, but it is not the most important aspect of the dispute with her; its place is secondary compared to the problems of the territories and the Palestinians. This is the main conclusion of the new study, “Israel's Nuclear Image in Arab eyes,” carried out by Dr. Ari'el Loite and Emily Landau of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. The study's findings, which will be appearing shortly in book form, were presented this week at the Center's conference, which was dedicated to the topic of nuclear weapons dissemination in the Near East.

The study, which lasted four years, is based entirely on materials that have appeared publicly in Arab countries. Loite and Landau scanned thousands of publications that have appeared in the Arab media since December 1960, the time the nuclear reactor project at Dimona was revealed. They also met with Arab academics who are studying the dispute.

These Arab publications evince no doubt that Israel has nuclear weapons. A few limited circles already believed after the Six-Day War that the bomb was in Israel's arsenal, but the opinion that Israel had crossed the nuclear threshold became set in Arab awareness only after the Yom Kippur War. It has been considered an accomplished fact ever since.

The Arabs explain Israel's entrance into the military nuclear realm in three ways, no single one of which is dominant, according to the study:

- **The great power context:** Israel has been directing its nuclear activity toward the great powers to extort aid, force a cease-fire in the war, avert Soviet interference in the region, ensure strategic cooperation with the United States, and avoid dependency on the great powers.
- **The regional context:** Israel has been working to deter the Arabs from a war of annihilation against her, freeze the conflict, and improve her position in the Near East—through territorial expansion, suppression of the Palestinians, perfecting qualitative superiority, and keeping the Arabs from achieving nuclear capacity.
- **The internal context:** the Arab publications identify a certain phenomenon: Israel's approach to the atom has changed depending on how secure its population has felt at different times throughout the history of the state. Israel's "muted responses" when it comes to her nuclear weaponry, saying things like "We will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East," have tended to be less muted in times when the public has felt less secure.

After the Yom Kippur War, Israeli leaders made statements that were interpreted within the Arab countries as an attempt to calm the public with the help of the final and absolute deterrent. The Arabs point to a similar attempt to raise the Israeli public's sense of security after the intifadah began.

The Arabs identify in Israel a "muted" nuclear policy, undeclared and mainly meant as a deterrent. In the 1980's, after the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor, they spoke in the Arab countries of the stubborn Israeli decision to make sure it remains the only nuclear state in the Near East, and deprive the Arabs of nuclear capacity. This policy is dubbed the "Begin Doctrine" or the "Sharon Doctrine."

The Arab publications agree that Israel could very well use its atomic weapons in the event that its survival was threatened. It is hard to define a threat to survival, but the Arabs talk about bursting the boundaries of the

Green Line into Israel, and causing serious civilian casualties. A more extreme minority estimates that Israel would use nuclear weapons in other circumstances as well—for example, as the answer to a chemical or biological attack, or even as a nuclear preventive strike. According to the Arab evaluation, the Israelis will try to destroy population centers and strategic sites in Arab countries.

The reaction of the Arab countries to what seems to them like a nuclear power developing outside their borders has changed over the years. In the 1960's, after the revelation that the reactor was being built in Dimona, the Arabs tended to put pressure on Israel through the great powers and to threaten a preventive war to stop the Israeli program. The Egyptians even prepared to attack and destroy Dimona to halt the project, assuming that Israel would be crossing "the critical threshold" of production of fissionable matter for atomic weapons in 1967-68. The Egyptians determined the "threshold point" through simple mathematic calculations of plutonium production.

After the defeat in the Six-Day War, the nuclear problem dropped from the headlines in the Arab world, either because conventional weapons had become more important or because of the feeling that the Arabs had already missed the boat. The Yom Kippur War brought the subject back into Arab public awareness, estimating that the shock Israel had absorbed would lead it to rely more on its nuclear option and wear down the "muteness." Mordekhai Vanunu's revelations near the end of 1986 were interpreted within the Arab states as an Israeli plot to humiliate the Arabs, who did not have nuclear capability. Saddam Husayn's threats in April 1990 that he had the capacity to burn up half of Israel, and the uncovering of the Iraqi program after the Gulf War, reawakened discussion of the danger of nuclearization of the Near East and the relation between the demilitarization of Iran, Iraq, and Israel.

Loite and Landau identified two approaches in the Arab publications as to what the best Arab response to the Israeli atom should be. One school of thought tried to downplay the importance of the matter, claiming that the atomic demon is not so terrible. They gave many arguments to prove this: The Near East is small, whoever uses nuclear arms will harm himself as well; the Vietnam War proved that there is a world order and there are rules for behavior, and Israel will not use nuclear weapons for fear of a harsh response by the great powers; the Arabs have no intention of threatening Israel's survival, and therefore have no need to fear a nuclear response; the existence of an Arab deterrent capability, even if it is weaker, will still lessen Israel's nuclear motivation.

The second school of thought took the opposite approach, according to which Israeli nuclear activities should be looked upon with the greatest seriousness. The spokesmen for this approach argued that Israel is using its bomb to humiliate and dominate the Arabs and to get

American aid. In the most recent period, they have been complaining that Israel is dragging other countries in the area after her, and saying that Israel should be treated the same way as Iran and Iraq. According to Loite, the second school of thought has also created a relationship between the peace process and nuclear deterrence, on two levels: The Arabs have no choice but to resign themselves to Israel's existence, because they cannot conquer her: Israel, on her side, can afford to give up the territories, because she has the ultimate deterrent in her hands.

In his lecture this week, Loite described the approach of the Arab leaders to their nuclear neighbor as "balanced and rational." Presidents Gamal Abdel Nassar, Anwar al-Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, Hafiz al-Asad, and King Husayn tried to define the "rules of the nuclear game" in the Near East: as long as Israel stays with the muted "option" (that is, does not openly announce that it has nuclear weapons), which is meant for possible use only if her survival is threatened, it is possible to live with that, in the hope that as the peace process progresses, Israel will agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons at some time in the future. Rulers who had territorial claims against Israel tended to put them first. Egypt, on the other hand, which has already taken care of its territorial question, emphasizes denuclearization.

Unofficial Arab factors took a different approach from that of their rulers, especially in the last few years, and expressed their displeasure with the West, which is working to keep unconventional capacity away from the Arabs and Iran and closing their eyes when it comes to Israel.

According to the study, it is clear to the Arabs that in an age of Israeli nuclear monopoly in the Near East, they have no military way to threaten Israel's survival. The evaluation became set after the Yom Kippur War. The dream of a war of extermination against Israel, which they had talked about before 1967, makes no sense when Israel is the only one with the bomb. The Arabs have concluded that there are four possible lines of action:

- Limited military steps against Israel, as in the Yom Kippur war, which was al-Sadat's and al-Assad's conception.
- A struggle with Israel "beneath the nuclear threshold" through an uprising in the territories—Palestinian thinkers were already saying this in the early 1970's, long years before the intifadah began.
- Development of comparable nuclear capacity on the Arab side.
- There is no escape from a diplomatic initiative for a solution to the conflict. This is the Egyptian approach, which explains that in addition to its nuclear power, Israel also has conventional strength and American support.

The Arabs greatly doubt that their developing nuclear weapons would neutralize Israel's superiority. Most of

them feel that a situation where only some Arab countries have nuclear capability is not to be preferred.

Summing up, Loite said that the Arabs express two lines of thought: resignation to the fact of Israel's existence and pressing for a diplomatic process, alongside a feeling that it will be hard to reach this unless there is also a solution to the problems of nuclearization of the region and demilitarization of Israel. The Arabs tend, therefore, to look for declarations from Israel on the question of the general dismantling of nuclear weapons in the Near East, as part of the framework of future settlements.

Implications of the Jerusalem Covenant Signing

93AA0076C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 May 93 p B2

[Article by Arye Dayan: "Parchment Under Glass"; first two paragraphs are HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text] The unveiling of the Jerusalem Covenant, signed day before yesterday by 1,300 representatives of Jewish congregations from all over the world, was another of the ceremonies surrounding the covenant that the present regime is being forced to carry out.

In one of the Knesset reception halls, almost hidden, and with only a few people present, a minor ceremony was held yesterday at noon. Knesset Speaker Shevah Weiss, removed a cloth and unveiled a glass-topped wooden display case. Everyone who passes through the hall from now on will be able to see, under the glass, a parchment scroll: "The Jerusalem Covenant." A year ago, when the text of the covenant was first published, several members of the opposition poked plenty of fun at it. Today they are in power and are forced, because of the rule of continuity of government decisions, to lend it respect. They are trying to do this as modestly as possible.

This ceremony in the Knesset was held in honor of Jerusalem Day, which is being celebrated today. Only two other public figures, besides Professor Weiss, were invited to take part. One was Mordekhai Gur, deputy defense minister. General Gur (Ret.) was commander of the parachute brigade that fought in Jerusalem in the Six-Day War. The second was former Knesset member Rabbi Abraham Verdiger. The Jerusalem covenant, which will be on display in the Knesset hall from now on, was his initiative.

In June 1990, after the formation of Yitzhak Shamir's narrowly based government ended the protracted coalition crisis, the Likud and Agudas Yisrael searched for jobs to give each of the Knesset members from the ultra-Orthodox party. Just before the government was formed, only one problem was still unsolved: which job to give Knesset member Verdiger. The solution was found in the creation of a new government ministry, the ministry for Jerusalem affairs. Verdiger was appointed deputy minister for Jerusalem affairs.

Except for the deputy minister's office and the office of the general director he appointed, there was not a thing in this ministry. It stayed in existence as long as the Shamir government was in power. In June 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin formed the new government, the ministry for Jerusalem affairs ceased to exist. The Jerusalem Covenant is the one legacy that ministry left behind. This evening, in an official ceremony on Ammunition Hill, it will be signed by the senior IDF [Israel Defense Forces] commanders of the Six-Day War. A copy will also be kept at the commemoration site. The decision to do this was made by the ministerial committee for ceremonies in the days of the former government.

Verdiger's main task in the two years he served in the government was to plan the events for "Jerusalem Year," which is now coming to an end. The writing of the covenant was integrated into these events. The ministry was abolished at the beginning of this year and responsibility for the ceremonies it organized was handed over to the prime minister's Information Center.

The year of celebration, which began on the 25th anniversary of the city's capture in the Six-Day War, is finishing with a series of showy events. The central one is the convention in the capital, of 1,300 leaders of Jewish congregations from around the world. This convention, which took place two evenings ago, is also a legacy from Verdiger. It was planned in his ministry, and authorized by the former government's ministerial committee for ceremonies. Everyone who came to the convention was asked, according to the program Verdiger had prepared, to sign the covenant. No one in the government dared to suggest canceling the signing.

Verdiger's original idea was well-suited to the declaratory pathos that characterized the Likud governments. Verdiger wanted to write a festive scroll that "would help to bring together the hearts of all the Jews in the world over the matter of Jerusalem." He wanted to have it signed by all the leaders of the Israeli Government, and by representatives of all the Jewish communities around the world. The government leaders in Israel signed it a year ago; the representatives of world Jewry signed it this week. Many of the signers, then and now, felt uncomfortable with several of the formulations included in the covenant.

Verdiger left the formulation of the scroll in the hands of Judge Menahem Elon, vice president of the high court of justice. The text Elon came up with a year ago is very pompous, and strewn with religious and nationalistic phraseology. "Today," it says, "is Jerusalem Day, the 28th of Iyar, 5772, 1992 years since the destruction of the Second Temple, 44 years since the founding of the State of Israel, 25 years since the defensive war by the Israel Defense Forces, which is known as the Six-Day War, when the walls of the city were breached and the Temple Mount and Jerusalem were liberated, 12 years since the members of the Knesset of Israel met and declared: Undivided and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel (...). The chiefs of the people and leaders of the

congregations have gathered in Zion to make a covenant with Jerusalem, like the covenant that the heads of the people and every Jew made when Israel returned from Babylon to our land (...) Jerusalem, may peace and tranquility fill her. May Jerusalem and all those who love her have peace. May there be peace for your troops, tranquility in your palaces, and from her good tidings of peace have gone out and will again go out to all the world. And may they beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning forks. May no nation lift up sword against nation and may they learn war no more. And as our sages, may they rest in peace, said: 'Blessed Be The Lord, He will not comfort Jerusalem except by granting her peace.'"

The only person in the past who publicly expressed discomfort over these formulations was Teddy Kollek. The mayor of Jerusalem did not love the idea of a government ministry being created for the affairs of his city, and he saw the covenant the ministry was initiating as "a superfluous declaration." What especially irritated him was the reference to the "Jerusalem Law," which had been presented to the Knesset by Ge'ula Cohen and passed against his will, as well as the lack of any reference to David Ben-Gurion. He also complained that the covenant was written entirely in Biblical Hebrew, "not modern." In the end, after the intervention of President Hayim Herzog, he was pacified and signed. He later explained that he had agreed to sign after a change had been made in the text. In the first version, Kollek explained, the IDF had not been mentioned. They said yesterday in Kollek's office that the covenant, like the ministry that initiated it, is part of history.

Just one little passage in the covenant mentions, indirectly, the fact that non-Jews also have a tie to Jerusalem. "And thus the Knesset of Israel has legislated," it says, "that the holy places of the members of all faiths are to be guarded against desecration, and against any attempt to limit access to them." This passage gives the Rabin government another good reason not to emphasize the ceremony of the signing of the covenant. In these days, when the closure keeps the residents of the territories from coming to their holy places in Jerusalem, it would not be too bright to emphasize it.

Reported Plan To Withdraw Jews From Hebron

93AA0088A HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 May 93 p B3

[Article by Nadav Shraga'i: "Why Is a Large Police Station Necessary in a Quiet Town?"]

[Text] The only place in Judaea and Samaria where Jews live among the Arab population is Hebron. There is a historical reason for that—the riots of 1929, in which the Jews of Hebron were massacred and deported. There is also a religious reason—the Cave of Machpela. The Jews of Hebron Committee is convinced that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has prepared a contingency plan for the withdrawal of Jews from the city when autonomy goes into effect in the territories. This information, while not

confirmed by the IDF, reached the heads of the committee from staff officers at the Judaea and Samaria division. They reported it to the settlers, and even knew to tell that the plan was prepared by the Planning Branch, only recently headed by 'Amram Mitzna, and that it does not refer only to the Jewish settlement in Hebron, but also to a few more very small settlements, whose residents do not exceed 25 people.

The Camp David Accords determined, as is known, that the IDF will withdraw from centers of Arab population in the territories and concentrate on defined military areas. Hebron is, without a doubt, a dense center of Arab population, but Jews also live there. If we adhere to the text of Camp David, then the IDF outside of Hebron will not be able to defend Jews that remain in the city. It is, therefore, logical that [the IDF] would prepare a contingency plan for the withdrawal of the Jews of Hebron during autonomy.

There is also a large police station in Hebron—not yet Palestinian police, but Israeli police. There are approximately 50 patrolmen and investigative policemen and approximately 50 more policemen in charge of the jail facility on the site. The overwhelming majority of them are Jews. The Arab policemen resigned from their positions with the commencement of the intifadah. According to the logic of the Camp David Accords, which refer to the establishment of a strong Palestinian police, this station should be removed from the city. The IDF knows that. Minister Shahal knows that and the Qiryat Arba Council is also aware of it. The red lights were lit there when the information about the contingency plan crossed with the general knowledge with regard to the Camp David Accords. The Israel Police requested that the Qiryat Arba Council rent it a structure in the industrial section of town, in order to establish a large police station there. How large, people from Qiryat Arba wanted to know. Dozens of people, the police told them. Qiryat Arba is not a center of crime, at least not criminal crime [as published], and it manages nicely with the existing station, which was established two years ago. To date, this station is manned by only a few policemen. Hence, the town leaders turned to friends in the Civil Administration and learned that behind the intent of establishing a large police station in Qiryat Arba hides a plan to gradually decrease the number of policemen in the Israeli station within Hebron, until it is closed down.

In the interim, the end of the story: The Qiryat Arba Council said no to the Israel Police. Avraham Struck, the chairman of the Jews of Hebron Committee, says that the Jewish residents of the area are not willing to be partners to the folding of the Israeli flag in Hebron. Struck, also fears that dozens of policemen in Qiryat Arba may, one day, close the town and limit the movement of Jews in its vicinity.

When the Likud was in power, Elyakim Ha'etzni constituted a red flag for Yitzhaq Shamir. The prime minister at the time tried very hard not to meet with him. Ha'etzni did not believe that Shamir was capable of

stopping the process leading to a Palestinian state, and Shamir viewed Ha'etzni as a false prophet of destruction. During the last meeting between the two, Shamir rose from his seat in fury. Red with anger, he yelled at one of his escorts: get that man out of here. Eventually, it was Ha'etzni who started the process in Tehiya and Moledet that led to the resignation of these parties from the Shamir government.

Now, it turns out, there has been a rapprochement between the two, at least with regard to their perspectives. The former prime minister and Ha'etzni, who currently heads the headquarters for the frustration of the autonomy plan, which seeks to create a nonviolent civil revolt against the government even now, at this time, have both recently expressed themselves in a surprisingly similar manner.

At the weekly meeting of the secretariat of the headquarters, Ha'etzni distributed to his colleagues a paper that was intended, among other things, to strengthen the spirit and determination of the members, but mainly to get rid of what is currently perceived in rightest circles as their greatest enemy—the indifference and complacency among the people in light of the “collapse of the rule of Israel and the entrance of the terrorist PLO state into the heart of Israel”. “Nahum Goldman,” it was written there, “the person who the president of the World Jewish Congress, said that in 1942, he received a message from the Warsaw Ghetto: ‘we are being destroyed. Please, do something unusual, an act of alarm. At least hold a sit down strike on the steps of the Capitol in Washington!’ I did not do so, Goldman confessed regretfully, because, at the time, such an act appeared to us to be too unusual, too extreme, inappropriate....”

Afterwards, the paper quoted the words of Ze'ev Jabotinsky: “Even desperation, even strong and burning despair—that is a reaction, too. Worse than that is what I see among masses of Jews in Eastern Europe: equanimity, fatalism, surrendering to fate...people are now acting as if their fate has been sealed. I have not seen anything like this in history. Even regarding the Romans I have not read of such a surrender to fate. What is this similar to? It is as if they sat these people down in a cart, they added 12 million educated and experienced people to a cart, and they pushed the cart over a cliff. How are these people conducting themselves? One sobs, one smokes a cigarette, others read newspapers, one sings and, in vain, go find one person who will rise and take the reigns into his hands and get that cart out of there. That is the attitude, as if some great Job put all of our brains to sleep with chloroform. I am now coming to make an attempt, the last attempt. I call upon you: put an end to this situation! Try to stop the cart! Try to jump out, try to place some obstacle in its way, do not go like sheep to the slaughter.”

In an article that he published in YEDI'OT AHA-RONOT, Yitzhaq Shamir took an almost identical position: “The normal heart of a sane person refuses to believe...people refuse to believe that their government

is knowingly striving, with enthusiasm, devoutness and persistence to return to those borders, to the same death trap...and when the call is heard in Israel: we shall revolt, we shall rise, we shall object, we shall prevent the tragedy from happening, many hesitate to take in the call and obey it, for they still do not believe that such a thing will happen in our country...one cannot avoid the terrible thought that even there and then, during those terrible days, which we commemorated several weeks ago, Jews did not believe...time is running out...."

Yitzhaq Shamir hinted, and Elyakim Ha'etzni spoke loudly: both address the public with an identical message: the indifference in light of the imminent tragedies is similar to the indifference of the Jews in the world during the Holocaust. We must rise up. Shamir, in the interim, is a retiree who is writing his memoirs. Ha'etzni and his headquarters, currently the most serious organization in the rightest camp among the nonparliamentary movements, are already taking action and planning the opposition. In an article that he published in the last issue of NEQUDAH, Ha'etzni wrote that: "The Government of Israel, which will be forced to jail thousands of its citizens, will lose its legitimacy among the people and, insofar as we are a democratic regime, it will also lose the foundation of its power." "Ansar for the Jews," writes Na'etzni, "will bring about the end of a perverted and sick government in a necessary process, but the entrance to the Jewish Ansar will not be by the ways of Ishma'el. It will be based upon nonrecognition and delegitimization of the government."

Rabbi David Yosef, the rabbi of the Har Nof neighborhood in Jerusalem and the son of Rabbi 'Ovadia Yosef, called upon the "bullies of the right to go to Uganda. At a gathering of Shas, which took place at the Cinerama in Tel Aviv right before the festival of Shavu'ot, young Yosef "protested vigorously against the bullies, who do not know what 'do and listen' means, and shame and desecrate the honor of the Torah."

The oldest brother, Rabbi Ya'aqov Yosef, formerly a member of the Knesset on behalf of Shas [Sephardi Torah Guardians], is keeping silent, in the meantime. Ya'aqov Yosef is a member of the limited secretariat of Emunim, the continuation of Gush Emunim, headed by Rabbi Benny Alon from Beit El. In recent weeks, Benny Alon has become the punching bag of several of the leaders of Shas and of its publication, "Yom Leyom." The Emunim movement that he heads is the one who initiated the lengthy sit-down strike near the home of Rabbi 'Ovadia Yosef. As will be recalled, it ended with a fistfight and several painful bruises, actually the initiative of Shas.

Ya'aqov Yosef, an admired Torah authority in the Bucharian and Beit Yisra'el quarters in Jerusalem, refused to answer any questions this week. He would not even answer the question of whether it has his guidance and advice that led Emunim to decide upon the sit-down strike next to his father's house. Notwithstanding, he confirmed that he is still a member of the Emunim secretariat. "Not active," as he defines himself. But the

silence of the oldest son will not continue much longer. Soon, some of the members of Shas who oppose the continued partnership with Rabin and Meretz, will distribute a videocassette containing initiated references by Rabbi Ya'aqov Yosef to current events. Ya'aqov Yosef does not hide his differences of opinion with his father there.

He also examines the question of the territories according to the laws pertaining to the saving of lives. Contrary to his father, who maintains that these laws demand the concession of territories, the son believes that the concession of territories is prohibited exactly due to these laws regarding the saving of human lives. Hence, one must maintain allegiance to the land of Israel. Yosef will express his confidence, that, sooner or later, the world will recognize this. The crisis between Meretz and Shas will perhaps be solved by then, but the Yosef family will remain divided in the ideological confrontation between Emunim and Shas.

'One-Sided' Peace Process Said To Lack Support

93AA0079A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 20 May 93 p 3

[Article by Dr. Ron Briman, a member of the circle of professors and lecturers for political and economic health: "Support, Half Support"]

[Text] The experience of the peace process with Egypt shows that the State of Israel can arrive at and implement an expensive and fraught-with-risk peace agreement only when a decisive majority of the people and in the Knesset support the government. This necessary condition does not exist today: the people are divided, with it clear that for at least half of them that the present process can, perhaps, bring a peace agreement, but not real peace, while the government is spurred on by the radical left and non-Zionist elements.

At this time, when a supreme effort is being made to accommodate the enemy and to build trust among the Arabs by showering them with a tremendous stream of absurd gestures of good will, it could have been expected that no less strenuous an effort would be made to create a crystallized national front that would include all of the Zionist forces in the people.

The purpose of the State of Israel is to serve as a solution for the Jewish people, that is, to allow the return of the people of Israel to Eretz Israel. Therefore, we should expect of the Government of Israel that it engage first and foremost in the solution of the Jewish problem and not in the solution of the Palestinian problem. Instead of that, we witness the focusing of the negotiations on one-way concessions for the benefit of the Arabs, on handling of human rights only on the condition that the human is an Arab (the transfer of Jews does not outrage the fighters for human rights, because the Jew, as it is known, was not created in the image [of God]), on investments in the "territories" only on the condition

that they are intended to improve the conditions of the Arabs, on the realization of the Arabs' right of return instead of fostering immigration and absorption of Jews who were exiled from their country and wish to return there, and on and on.

The accelerated diplomatic process that is occurring today is not a process that leads to a real peace, but a process that creates a Palestinian state in western Eretz Israel. This one-sided process is conducted with great skill by the Palestinian gesture extractor, the American steamroller, the drawing away of the State of Israel from its purpose, and the blind rush to peace now at any price, whose significance is not peace in our time but lamentation for generations. If the parties of the Left are really and truly interested in peace, they must act in order to create the vital conditions for constructing peace:

- Broad support among the people and in the Knesset, that is, a government based on truth and on the unity of all of the Zionist forces.
- Internal confidence-building measures, which are even more necessary than the chain of good-will gestures directed externally. Including: a return to the original values of Zionism, a change in priorities so that the security of the individual and of the state will be more important than peace, provision of credible information to the public about the dangers stemming from the diplomatic process, conduct of the negotiations with the Arabs in a manner that will inspire confidence instead of amazement.
- Understanding that the people in Israel want peace, even if it is divided into two camps of more or less equal size, and refraining from disqualifying an entire camp on the false argument that it is not interested in peace. The camps are distinguished from each other by the manner in which they analyze the present reality and by the conclusions that they draw from it on the way to arrive at peace, but not by the very desire for peace.

Levi Camp View of Likud Congress Reported

93AA0079D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 21 May 93 pp 3, 20

[Article by Bina Barzel: "The Levi Camp's Rearguard Action"]

[Text] At night, after the sharp confrontation with Bibi on the stage at the Likud congress, Maxim Levi departed immediately. "I was hurt and angry. I went straight home with the driver. I wanted to sleep. My wife Carmella; my daughter, who is in the army; her boyfriend; and the youngest daughter were awaiting me. They heard what happened and worried.

"I spoke with David, and he said to me: 'With all of your opinions (about the possibility of working with Bibi, B.B.), I told you that was what would happen. You did not understand me. You did not accept my opinions. I

went independently, and now I see that what I had said was true, that I was correct that no one wants [a reconciliation].'"

"My wife said to me, go rest. I undressed and went to bed, but it was hard to fall asleep. This negation of mine. I said to myself: a man such as myself, what was done to him at the congress, maybe they do not want me in the movement. Maybe I am not suitable for them, they want another man in my place, someone who will say, 'Amen, amen, amen' after everything that they say. I have a terrible feeling. This is my movement. Is it a movement in which it is necessary to take a microphone only to praise, to glorify, and to exalt? Can it be possible? Is it not a movement where it is possible to enter and to debate within it?"

The day after the gloomy night at the Likud congress, when all of the media were still recycling the insolent language, the accusations, and the angry voices that emerged from it, Maxim Levi, the mayor of Lod, sat in his office in the new and beautiful municipality building, drank tea with fresh and strongly scented mint, and awaited the decisions of his elder brother regarding the camp's coming moves.

Despite his being one of the strongest supporters of the idea of seceding, which arose in the Levi camp after the disgraceful events in the election of the groups of seven, he rejects this idea today: "David, who feared doing this then, would do it now? When we came to him with the demand to secede on account of the organizing against us in the election of the groups of seven, he said to us: 'If your mother were not pretty, would you exchange her?'" Maxim Levi himself, as of Wednesday afternoon, does not intend to bolt the Likud, and also not to leave his work as a member of the supreme steering team of the municipal elections. Those close to Bibi smile and say that he also does not have many options: if he boycotts the new leadership, he is liable to lose the position of chief of the Local Government Center—a powerful position, and now the most senior position in the establishment held by someone in the opposition. The events at the congress again united the two Levi brothers, who had ceased speaking to each other after Maxim went to Bibi.

Maxim Levi: "After the big argument that I had with David, we also maintained tight family ties. We would jump over for visits on Shabbats and holidays. It is correct that we had differences for several months. Now, I will soon try to meet with him and to talk. I will ask what he thinks. What he wants. You ask what I will propose? I, what do I have to propose to him? I continue and think that without David Levi, the Likud is not a real Likud. He upholds the social banner."

It may very well be that had Netanyahu been willing to hand over the control of the Likud Central Committee to Maxim Levi, he would have thus delivered a mortal and decisive blow to the Levi camp. In that way he would have widened the wedge between the two brothers, and

neutralized the possibility for elements in the camp to ride again on the assertion of discrimination against the Eastern Jews.

But Bibi's confidants viewed Maxim Levi's candidacy for the position of chairman of the Central Committee as a sophisticated strategem, which was conceived in the brain of Aharon Abu-Hatzera—or even dictated by the elder brother—and was intended to strengthen the tradition of the camps within the Likud.

I Sacrificed the Family

It was hard for Bibi to drop the suspicion that in case the Levi camp decided to become a fighting opposition in the Central Committee, Maxim's control in that body would also ensure the control of the Levi camp in it. In the estimation of Netanyahu's advisers, sooner or later Maxim had to return to Levy, and, therefore, in their estimation, Bibi could not entrust such a position to him.

Many of Bibi's confidants are certain that David Levi plans to make life hard for Bibi, as he did for Shamir. So Bibi went to a confrontation with Maxim Levi in the contest for the position of chairman—which broadened into a confrontation with David Levi and his people—and in that way gave a shot of unity to the Levi camp.

[YEDI'OT] There are those who assert that the submission of your candidacy and your dramatic withdrawal were a planned strategem, that was cooked up from the beginning in order to blow up the congress. They assert that the thing was planned by Abu-Hatzera, in coordination and communication with David Levi, who expected Bibi's failure.

[Maxim] Plain stupidity. What kind of a strategem? Whoever wanted to blow it up could have done that at the opening of the congress, as David Levi did not want to participate in this congress. There was no organizing by the people. I was approached from all of the camps to submit my candidacy for chairman of the Central Committee. I weighed it well, and I decided. Those who approached me asserted that it was very important that I be in this position, so that there would be a certain channel to the Levi camp and a chance for the unification of the Likud.

At first, I told them, 'Leave me alone about chairman of the Central Committee. My positions as chairman of the Local Government Center and mayor of Lod are enough for me.' I decided by myself. I did not consult with Abu-Hatzera or with Robi (Rivlin). I even had an argument with Robi the night before. And Abu-Hatzera was even angry about the decision, because I had not consulted with him.

[YEDI'OT] But they worked for you.

[Maxim] You are making a bad mistake. I took it upon myself to conduct the campaign. I sat in a small room and called the branches and the sectors. When I saw that I had truly broad support, a situation was suddenly

created in which Limor (Livnat) fell from the list of candidates, because Bibi asked for that, and I see that 'Uzi (Landau) falls, and the chairman's advisers are going to support 'Amor. And I hear serious things on the radio, that the chairman says that he wants 'Amor to be the representative of the Easterners, so that they will not say...

Were there democracy, they would have let people compete—and whoever takes it, takes it. It cannot be that the chairman takes a strong position in the contest. I view this act as if the chairman of the movement determines for whom to vote. Does that mean that he does not want us in the system? And this after the loyalty that I displayed following the primaries.

I sacrificed the family. 'Civil War,' that was the headline in YEDI'OT AHARONOT. I tried with all my strength to heal the rifts. How can I come to the members of the congress, when the chairman of the movement says not to vote for Maxim Levi. That he represents a camp. If I am a representative of a camp, so who is Sha'ul 'Amor—not a member of a camp? And so, towards the end, when I sat by myself in a room a quarter of an hour before I entered the hall, I decided that in this situation I will go up and withdraw my candidacy.

[YEDI'OT] Why did you not first go and discuss it privately with Bibi?

[Maxim] Look, I want to tell you. I am at congresses from the age of 17. There is a congress to the point, which takes into account all of the persons in the leadership and pays attention in advance to the subject of the institutions, the debates, the subjects, the reservations—and says, let us build the system together. In this congress, the chairman did not do that. I, Maxim Levi, no one asked me to come to any committee at the congress. Nothing. Also not to committees that deal with social issues.

My late father used to say, he who eats the entire cake by himself, chokes. I think that he (Bibi; Maxim Levi never calls Netanyahu by his name, B.B.) choked yesterday. I think that the dizziness of victory brought about the situation. You were elected chairman. You submitted a constitution, which placed in your hands all of the authority and emptied the Central Committee of all content. He skipped the preparatory committee, called out the names of the members of the Presidium, without consultation, determined by himself who was the chairman of the Presidium, who were the assistants.

[YEDI'OT] Levi's men accuse you of having gone to Bibi, after your brother's defeat in the primaries, without consulting with him. And, according to them, when it became clear to you that the payoff for your brother's head did not make a prince of you, you tried to return home this week.

[Maxim] When I had differences of opinion with David, I told him, 'We have to unite in the Likud, and we must find common ground in order to work.' David said that

he did not want to be a partner with the man until he receives an apology. I thought that we should mobilize for the municipal battle, and I strongly opposed the demand not to enter into negotiations for cooperation.

And then a very deep split developed between me and David. We did not speak to each other. The split was also within my family. Also in the street. Also in the media. I sacrificed everything for the movement. After I did what I did, I thought that the day would come and we would come together united to the congress, together with all of the forces and the persons who create the movement. But I did not see the understanding for that.

[YEDI'OT] During the congress, you proposed to Bibi that he meet with your brother, that they sit and clarify what has to be clarified between themselves, and that they would return to work together. Why didn't you succeed?

[Maxim] On the first day of the congress I sat with the chairman for half an hour. I explained to him that it was necessary to make unity and to find common ground between all the members of the leadership. David does not represent himself alone, he represents 37,000 persons who chose him. It is impossible to say to the people: you are not playing.

I said that I want to try in any event to bring [them] closer. Let us see what to do, how we create the possibility not to lock up the congress with David on the outside. I proposed that they meet, and he (Bibi) would say that he recognizes David's strength, and how important David is to the movement, and that if someone from the movement was insulted, he is sorry about that. And that there is an understanding to arrive at a composition of the institutions according to all of the forces.

I said to him, 'Make a decision on your own, without bad advisers. We have to arrive at a composition of the camps according to all of the forces.' And then he said, 'I cannot do it today, maybe tomorrow'—and left. The next morning I waited. But he did not return to the subject.

Who Speaks in the Name of David Levi

Everyone advised David Levi to come to the congress, but he stayed outside, surely with a heavy heart at the sight of the reports on the congress in the media. In the course of it, his confidants engaged in efforts to bring about an agreement between David Levi and Netanyahu. Robi Rivlin, for example, who was convinced that Levi would not arrive at the congress, tried anyway to arrive at a formula for an apology, which would answer Levi's demand for exoneration in the affair of "the senior person surrounded by criminals." Rivlin regarded an apology as the sole key for a reconciliation.

While Bibi was already sitting on the stage and preparing to bring up the constitution for a vote, Rivlin was conducting with him there in whispers, before the eyes of thousands of delegates, the urgent negotiations in an

attempt to arrive at an agreement before the voting, so that David Levi could arrive in the hall. But then Bibi asked him: "They tell me that David Levi is pressing to get the chairmanship of the Secretariat. Is that your direction? They also told me that you are not authorized to speak in Levi's name."

Robi went down from the stage, and from one of the corners of the sports palace spoke by cellular telephone with David Levi, trying to get him to agree to a formula that Benni Begin had devised. At the other end the attitude was chilly. "First clarify whether the formula is also acceptable to Bibi," said Levi, and he refused to come. "Bibi says that Maxim demands to be chairman of the Secretariat," Rivlin said into the device: "It has to be concluded now. After the voting it will be too late." But Levi stood firm in his refusal.

The next day, his friend David 'Amar, the head of the Neshet council, said: "In the formula that Benni proposed to us there was an expression of regret, but David Levi simply wants an apology. David said, 'I do not need to say what he needs to say. He (Bibi) knows exactly.'"

The frenzied activity of the heads of the Levi camp during the congress exposed the tensions that exist within the Levi camp, tensions that rose due to the defeat in the primaries and afterwards due to David Levi's absence from the congress. Levi's supporters are even now paying for his failure.

Rivlin, for example, is fighting in Jerusalem over the candidacy for the Likud for mayor against Ehud Ulmert, who is supported by Netanyahu's and Benni Begin's people. Maxim Levi, as was stated, is liable to lose the position of head of the Local Government Center without Bibi's support, and Ya'akov Bardugo, in such an event, is also not safe in his position as director-general of the Local Government Center. Abu-Hatzera has become a one-man force and has lost the ability to manoeuvre within the movement bodies.

There is no love lost, to put it mildly, between Rivlin and Maxim Levi, and Abu-Hatzera is not especially loved by either of them. Abu-Hatzera's situation is worse, because of the rejection of his lawsuit for the recognition of the 200 delegates that he brought with him to the previous Central Committee. Without his delegates, Levi actually has not much use for him, besides the pleasure of the lengthy conversations that they hold.

On the other hand, Abu-Hatzera is accused by senior persons within the Levi camp that his entire aim was to bring about Levi's withdrawal and the establishing of a new party, through which he would realize his yearning to be an MK [member of Knesset] again.

The tension between Levi's men turned at one point in the congress into a quarrel between Robi Rivlin and Maxim Levi. "I said that no everyone can conduct negotiations that are intended to heal the rift between David and Bibi," said Maxim. "Either one takes the job, or I take [it]. I do not want everyone to begin to cook

something up." He does not shower praise on Abu-Hatzera, either. "I will not tell you what I think about him," he said.

When Maxim Levi walked out and slammed the door behind him and threw in Bibi's face his "dictatorship speech," Bibi's men scanned the rows in which still sat thousands of delegates. Only a few tens in each block in the stadium accompanied Maxim with cries of rage. The rest, surely including many Levi supporters, were quiet. And on these Bibi bases his hope of liquidating the phenomenon of camps in his movement.

[YEDI'OT] What will be the camp's next steps? Does your brother indeed intend to convene all the members of the Central Committee who are in the Levi camp, to demonstrate strength at the same time, and to report on the expected moves?

[Maxim] In my opinion, there are two paths: either they really want the camp, which is called David Levi's camp—and David is the leader of the camp; or David Levi, and also other forces, must weigh what they are doing.

[YEDI'OT] Weigh what?

[Maxim] I do not know, but if a very large group of persons is shunned, the Likud cannot be an alternative for governing. Leadership of one man without a movement cannot be an alternative.

[YEDI'OT] Will you continue to attempt a rapprochement between David and Bibi?

[Maxim] I do not know if this is the time. I do not know what David wants. We have not yet sat down to talk it over. My desire is that everyone will unite. I will not interfere with any move. I am not the kind of person who burns a clubhouse or brings about rifts. If I were that kind of person, I would not have gone to the Metzuda [Likud headquarters] immediately after the primaries. At the congress I saw that every camp wants a meeting between David and the chairman. It may be that David erred in not coming.

[YEDI'OT] You are acquainted with both of them. In your opinion, even if they succeed in getting them to meet, could they cooperate?

[Maxim] That is reminiscent of the story with Rabin and Peres. In politics everything is fluid. After an apology by Bibi, they would sit together. Staff the institutions. David does not want people to be abandoned. They should be in the institutions. What is wrong with that?

[YEDI'OT] Bibi coopted persons who are identified with the Levi camp, for example in the Secretariat that he proposed.

[Maxim] Five persons out of 61, is that proportional?

[YEDI'OT] Tzahi Hanegbi says that you demanded a quota according to camps, that this contradicts Netanyahu's concept against the continuation of the camps.

[Maxim] The group has a great right to demand representation. Is that invalid? You cannot coopt persons however you want, and negate democratic elections.

[YEDI'OT] What do you think about Bibi?

[Maxim] I do not want to say, because it is delicate. I never operate on emotions. I pass on that question.

KUWAIT

National Assembly Friction With Regime Grows

93AE0506A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 25, 26 May 93

[Article by 'Abd-al-Wahhab Badrakan: "Battle to Protect Public Funds Will Determine Fate of Parliamentary Experiment"]

[25 May 93 p 6]

[Text] There is an enormous disparity between the election gatherings last October and the gatherings this May, which are trying to evaluate the National Assembly's progress and its work over the last seven months. The Assembly speaker, Ahmad al-Sa'dun, rejects the evaluation of the elected deputies' accomplishments so far. He will do that in good time and on television. He is, no doubt, waiting for the Assembly to reach a decision, even if only one, on the thorny issues that it is considering. These include the issue of debts, for example, or foreign investments, or even the issue of the housing law.

The "dashing of hope" that many are announcing with regard to parliament might be—to some degree—justified, except that it contains some injustice and exaggeration. The frustration that dominates popular circles can be attributed to the fact that the hopes that were placed on the National Assembly were considerable. In fact, the candidates themselves shared in inflating those hopes. The projects, promises, and commitments have all faded away. Verbal exaggerations in parliamentary sessions do not compensate for the effectiveness of the Assembly and its members, which they did not have originally. The mentality that led the voters to the ballot boxes made the National Assembly an executive power in advance, which is contradictory to the reality of the institutions that form the government.

The candidates' and voters' enthusiasm was expressed by a strong desire for political reform, by a strong wish to stop the waste of public money, by the overwhelming desire not to repeat the experience of losing democracy, and for the fervent hope that all aspects of the disaster, represented by the invasion and occupation, would be clarified. All of that was legitimate. However, the view from above is not like the view from underneath. The

"machinery" of government is still the same; it is difficult to change overnight. When the "machinery" of legislative oversight receives successive blows—from dissolving the previous parliament in 1986 to the "National Assembly" shock in the spring of 1990, to the political-emotional upheaval that the invasion caused, to the nature of rule that dominated the period following liberation—then its current performance should be considered reasonable to a considerable degree. In view of all these influencing factors, everyone is anxious not to repeat the mistake of a government showdown, for fear of bearing responsibility for damaging the new democratic experiment.

Moreover, if the Assembly had to do anything after the dissolution of the previous National Assembly, it was incumbent upon it to determine the constitutionality of the 517 laws decreed during its absence. Some of them were affirmed, others rejected. The regulations in some laws were canceled, including all that pertained to the work of the "National Assembly," with the exception of one decree during this assembly because it was an amiri decree. Ahmad al-Sa'dun still calls that assembly "meek." He believes that the parliamentary committees have been working hard. He says the masses do not know the value of that work, because they want speedy results, reflected immediately in their daily lives.

The Kuwaiti National Assembly is immersed these days in the Indebtedness Committee. A law was enacted concerning this in 1986, dealing with the problem of the al-Manakh market. It was amended after the liberation, to include indebtedness incurred as a result of the invasion. The state's total debts are nearly two billion Kuwaiti dinars, confined to 1,200 debtors. The total is nearly six billion dinars among 9,546 debtors. Therefore, the Assembly has gone into the essence of the matter in order to eliminate the legislative heritage of the previous period. The matter is embarrassing for bigger reasons. First, because the debts were public funds and it is the Assembly's job to protect public money; second, because the debts were converted by the government into an instrument of political action; third, because of the nature of the indebted persons, whose interests are interwoven with the government on the one hand, and members of the National Assembly on the other; and fourth, because the solution is pressing and necessary. However, the economic recession may take its place in the forefront of problems.

The Assembly speaker says that they are looking for a solution marked by the greatest degree of justice, along with efforts to reconsider the institutions and their structures that have resulted in the accumulation of these debts. He says that the two parties—the government and the Assembly—have recently come up with joint ideas that might enable them to reach a final solution. The chairman of the parliamentary Finance Committee, Dr. Isma'il al-Shatti, for his part, stresses that the committee has finished a final report, which will facilitate formulation of a law that will include the elements of the solution. He indicated that the law that the government

submitted "was ambiguous and does nothing but buy the debts. As for how these debts will be recovered, that question is not answered in the government's bill."

Al-Shatti says that the government's policy "has been to play with us. Our response was that we would reveal the debtors' names. They consider this step a catastrophe. As for the man-in-the-street, he sees that as a gain. The recent meeting with representatives of the government was aimed at ending the political game. The hope was that we could achieve that." He says that 88 percent of the debtors comprise only 8 percent of the debts. Only 1,000 people are responsible for nearly 5.4 billion dinars. There are 500 companies out of the original thousands, in addition to 500 individual debtors. Al-Shatti asks: "Are the 500 companies all incapable of paying their debts? Therefore, let us see the explanation and justification for this inability, so that we can look at their circumstances. This same situation should be applied to the 500 individuals." The Chamber of Commerce and Industry suggested 25 percent for repayment, but the parliamentary Finance Committee is inclined toward different percentages for repayment, taking into consideration the circumstances of the small and large debtors, each individually. This matter is still up for further debate.

Al-Sa'dun says that the present relationship between government and Assembly remains "a cooperative relationship, not confrontational." He points out that "in the past, the government tried to depict the assembly in a negative manner but, now, it appears to want cooperation." As evidence, he cites the government's cooperation with the fact-finding committees vis-a-vis the invasion, the investments, and even concerning armament deals. In this regard, al-Shatti adds that the Finance Committee has generated doubts and reservations with its look at expenditures and has concluded that there were violations, some of which occurred since 1988 in the Yugoslavian tank deal or the French artillery deal, "which was said to be a beauty." Some other violations occurred after liberation, since a budget of 3.5 billion dinars over 12 years was earmarked to strengthen defense. Half of this has been disbursed so far, and all expenditures were not in the desired direction. Al-Shatti stresses: "Our clear need is to change certain leaders who have become filthy rich. The government has responded indirectly through resignations of certain officers."

Perhaps, the accumulation of work on the Finance Committee can be explained by the fact that half the legislative inheritance fell upon its shoulders. It had the urgent task of attaining rapid results to stop the squandering of public funds. "We set up camp to enact a law to protect public money," says al-Shatti, alluding to the heavy workload required of the committee. However, this work "is unnoticed by the public, because it is quiet work that does not seek out attention. The people want us to exercise executive authority and, perhaps, the government wants us to do something that we can be blamed for. This is not our job, constitutionally. Finally, the people do not blame the government, because they

did not choose it, but they blame us because they elected us. However, the important thing is the results."

Deputy Dr. 'Adnan 'Abd-al-Samad agrees that the citizens are correct in their belief that the Assembly has been immersed in examining old questions and has spent a long time on the debt and investment issues without, so far, achieving results. However, it is close. The man-in-the-street "is burdening us with jobs that are not ours. If there are people involved, their trials should not be put on our shoulders. We are a legislative body. Everything we do, we leave to the judiciary. We pursue our work. If there are those who it is proved were remiss with regard to the invasion, and the [lack of] warning, then the Assembly will condemn them, politically. But, it cannot take the place of other authorities that must deal with the proof of involvement." 'Abd-al-Samad believes that the Assembly is currently doing the work it should, in order to establish its main role as the overseer of the executive branch. He expects that the present initial session of the Assembly will end with important accomplishments, despite everything. The most important is to resolve the debt issue, in addition to two other extremely important bills, which have been affirmed: a law to protect public funds, and the law for housing protection and allocation, which is important to a great many Kuwaitis.

[26 May 93 p 6]

[Text] Despite the fact that the Kuwaiti National Assembly does not lack grounds for defending its accomplishments so far, political circles generally believe that it has lost the opportunity to enjoy the effectiveness the voters want it to have. Some blame this ineffectiveness on the political composition of the Assembly, since the Islamists are in control and, in the view of some, they are inclined to bargain and make deals with the government. This is done in exchange for formal religious gains, to which the religious community has not given priority, given the country's course since the occupation.

Despite the multiplicity of their trends, the Islamists do not deny that they form the principal movement in the Assembly. However, they do—fervently—deny the accusation of compliance or partiality toward the government vis-a-vis the basic, fundamental issues proposed in the Assembly. One deputy from the Muslim Brotherhood movement says that the political "trashings" that have occurred between the Islamic deputies and the government are sufficient to refute the "accusations hurled by those who complain about the influence that we enjoy in the Assembly." This deputy stressed that the Islamists and their friends form a permanent bloc of about 20 members (out of a total of 50), enabling them in differing circumstances to build mutual agreements and alliances that keep them constantly in the majority in the Assembly. "However, we don't play the game of monopolizing democracy. It is not true that we take up the Assembly's time with religious debates. When we were blamed for raising the issue of veiling women in the mosques, the discussion took no more than half an hour. With respect to the bill for an organization to instruct the

acceptable and deny the objectionable (the Salafis endorsed it), it was not proposed for debate."

In any case, the liberals and the Islamists are struggling in the "star system" of parliamentary work, in a quiet game—seldom developing into disputes—that is difficult to deal with. The (former?) pan-Arabists who were the stars of the 1985 Assembly, do not deny that they are a minority, but their presence is a necessary element of balance. They compensate for the eclipse of their movement by effective and dynamic participation, favorable at times toward the Islamists, if a proposal of theirs is appropriate, but most times toward the liberals. There is a group of independents who try to maintain their identity and pass on their ideas through various movements. In the different orientations, there are those who do not complain when described as being not suited—in a practical sense—for parliament despite being elected in free balloting.

A seminar was held in the salon of former deputy Sami al-Munayyis, entitled "The National Assembly, What Is It and What Must It Do?" In this discussion, Deputy Dr. 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Mid'ij defended the idea that the period when the Assembly was suspended left "a serious epidemic in governmental administration, which blamed all problems on the National Assembly." He said: "The absence of constitutional activity during the past few years was tragic. We now have broken-down institutions, incapable of performing their daily duties. Moreover, money has been drained away, and we are in an unenviable economic situation. These mistaken practices have left feelings of disquiet and instability among the Kuwaiti citizenry and have destroyed international goodwill, which prevailed after the liberation. The citizen is at a loss concerning himself and his nation. A great deal is asked of the Assembly. There are those who try to hold the Assembly responsible for the deteriorating situation."

Deputy Mashari al-'Usaymi raised questions like, "Is democracy in Kuwait permanent or transitory? What made the government return to constitutional activity and restore the National Assembly?" He posed the hypothesis that "the reason for the return of democracy was foreign. If those foreign eyes that are watching Kuwait close, a day will come when democracy will be buried." Al-'Usaymi was harshly critical of the concept that the national economy was synonymous with the concept of "a government of public expenditure, since those who are called economic activists are living in the highest style in the county." Words like these are like candidates' speeches, but they are more concentrated. It is clear from the deputies' complaints that they are suffering from:

1. Difficulty in getting political reform underway, in light of traditions that cannot endure oversight;
2. The general popular concept of parliamentary work and the nature of the representative's job. As examples, people have written to the assembly to complain about

phenomena, such as: People hang their washing on balconies along the expressway; drivers' recklessness is increasing; many are building cement risers in front of their houses; there is a lack of public gardens and parks.

Writers and commentators cite various reasons to explain the malaise on the political scene. One of them talked about "political oversight." Another complained about "the blend between party interests and the nation's interests." A third emphasized the need for "the oversight of public opinion," so long as the assembly is "restricted." While a fourth analyzed the status of the six ministers who are members of the National Assembly. He does not hold them "responsible for not achieving radical changes in the general policies of the state. Moreover, it is not fair for us to hold them responsible for the spread of frustration and disquiet. The fact of the matter is they are 'ministers at a miserable time,' since the condition of the country has reached a degree of disorder resulting from policies that have continued for more than 30 years. No one can do anything different in this general circumstance. Therefore, there is nothing for the six ministers to do except reform their ministries' affairs, without their being connected with the big plan, or a part of a comprehensive 'corrective movement.' The six ministers' success will be their personal reward; they will be unable to establish principles that those who follow them can pursue."

These ministers are from among the Assembly members. This upsets and embarrasses their fellow deputies, because the manner in which the cabinet was formed has left "an erroneous" impression that it is "the Assembly's government," according to the statement of one of the liberal deputies, who believes that this situation might complicate the process of "accountability." He would draw a different political map for the assembly, since he thinks the liberals are the broadest movement and that they form a majority with regard to the fundamental issues. The Islamists number no more than ten. They are unable to establish permanent, firm alliances, no matter what their influence. This deputy thinks that some popular frustration can be explained by the fact that the deputies have raised expectations to a point higher than their capabilities. The evidence for that is that they were forced—time after time—to reduce the mission of the invasion fact-finding committee. They made concessions in their demands concerning formation of the cabinet. They caused a big outcry over the foreign investments and, then, suspended their report concerning that matter while it was at its hottest point. They will also be forced to settle for less than they wanted vis-a-vis the debt issue, or else they will be held responsible for the recession. They strongly raised the question of embezzlements and violations in armament deals, but it is feared that they will be unable to go far in this regard and, thereby, they will cause public hopes to be dashed.

One deputy's general analysis is that no deputy opposes the "democratic pulpit," but he points to "defects" that have occurred in the concept of governmental work, which is no longer subject to traditional ways, but whose

shape has not yet crystallized. He believes that the existence of minister-deputies does not mean that they, or at least most of them, can withdraw and return to the assembly's ranks. This deputy fears the state of "unstability" that predominates in the Assembly. He expects the situation to change in the Assembly's second session, or else a "disaster" will occur which, in his view, "will end single-handed decisionmaking, because the country has suffered greatly from that." He believes that the current situation in the Assembly is the result of its fragmentation and not the different political movements' pursuit of specific agendas. The government has benefited from that as much as the Islamists, who want to mold the assembly in their image. However, everyone knows that "this situation cannot continue and must be corrected."

Government Aims at Regaining Refining Capacity

93AE0505A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
21 May 93 p 13

[Report from Kuwait by Randah Takiy-al-Din: At 410,000 BPD: Kuwait Plans to Regain Refining Capacity in 1994"]

[Text] Kuwait aims at regaining the refining capacity it had prior to the Iraqi invasion. Badr al-Haj, head of the project to rehabilitate Kuwaiti refineries, leads a working group from Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) that is handling the project with the help of the U.S. consulting firm Foster Wells, says that "the Port al-Ahmadi refinery will regain full refining capacity by January of 1994."

Ya'cub al-Tarrach, Operations Planning Supervisor at Port al-Ahmadi, told AL-HAYAH that "before the Iraqi invasion, al-Ahmadi refinery was refining only about 410,000 bpd [barrels per day]—170,000 bpd at unit no. 1, 120,000 bpd at unit no. 3, and 100,000 at unit no. 5. [figures as published] Another unit that handled heavy fuels from the neutral zone had a capacity of about 21,000 bdp.

Kuwaiti refineries, according to Badr al-Haj, are [now] operating at 50 to 60 percent of original capacity as a result of the damage sustained by the three Kuwaiti refineries (al-Ahmadi, Port 'Abdallah, and al-Sha'biyyah) during the Iraqi invasion.

Al-Haj expects the rehabilitation of al-Sha'biyyah to be completed in September 1993 and that it will be fully operational in October 1993. That refinery is now completely shut down as a result of heavy damage inflicted by the Iraqi invasion. It will be producing about 130,000 bpd in October.

The Port 'Abdallah refinery produces 230,000 bpd and will maintain that capacity when it is fully rehabilitated in January of 1994, especially after the repair of some of the pumping stations and pipes destroyed during the invasion.

Al-Haj said that refinery rehabilitation is to be completed in three stages. The primary stage was the first when the objective was to supply the domestic market and local gas stations, which used to be supplied with foreign imports. The second stage involves rehabilitating the refineries to restore them to their former capacities. That required studies and engineering consultations and was handled by Foster Wells. The third stage is targeted for early 1994 when Kuwait regains former refining capacity.

Al-Tarraah explained to AL-HAYAH that the Port al-Ahmadi refinery has special units to treat and process petroleum-associated gases. In order to protect the environment, associated gases are not flared in the field but sent to those units at Port al-Ahmadi for treatment and the extraction of butane and propane. The units can handle the gases associated with more than 2 million barrels of crude per day. He added: "Should KNPC produce crude at 2.5 or 3 million bpd, we will have the capacity to treat and process their associated gases transported in pipelines that connect Port al-Ahmadi with Kuwaiti fields in the north, the center, the west, the east, and the south."

AL-HAYAH witnessed rehabilitation work on the southern quay of Port al-Ahmadi, which was completely destroyed during the Iraqi invasion. That is the quay used to load Kuwaiti oil tankers.

Al-Haj added that the financial cost of rehabilitating the three refineries is still being calculated.

LEBANON

Hizballah Deputy Funaysh on Resistance, South

93AA0096A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
21 May 93 p 21

[Interview with Deputy Muhammad Funaysh by Halah al-Husayni in Beirut; date not given: "Deputy Muhammad Funaysh to AL-HAWADITH: Developing South Is National Must Because South Is Symbol of Lebanon's Unity"]

[Text] Deputy Muhammad Funaysh sees that resistance is the essential option to preserve right, and he believes that political action must complement the resistance's role so it will highlight our cause in the international circles. Funaysh has said that the Chamber of Deputies is performing its role in the best manner and that there is an attempt on the government's part to avoid the parliamentary assembly's control. He has also expressed the fear that the Chamber of Deputies will become a political pawn because of the loans policy. Funaysh has criticized the government for its performance in the various fields.

The above was stated in the following interview which AL-HAWADITH has conducted with Deputy Funaysh:

[al-Husayni] With the approaching completion of the bilateral negotiations, how do you view these negotiations, and will they, in your opinion, produce any positive results?

[Funaysh] We have, in fact, defined our position on this issue clearly. We believe that within the balance of power prevailing currently, the objective of these negotiations is to eliminate the Palestinian issue, to confirm legitimacy of the Zionist entity in Palestine, and to ensure this entity's future by making it a part of the social and cultural fabric of the region's states.

These negotiations aren't in our interest and we have no hope that they will produce beneficial results for the Palestinian people's rights in Palestine nor for the future of the occupied territories in Lebanon, in the Golan, or in other Arab countries. This vision emanates from a principled position because we consider Palestine an occupied and usurped territory. Nobody is entitled to impose a fait accompli at the expense of those who are in the right and it isn't permissible in any way to abandon or relinquish a single inch of the occupied territories under pressure and force. Moreover, the U.S. role in these negotiations isn't a neutral role or the role of a middleman. The U.S. role is fully biased in favor of the Zionist entity. The proof to this is the declared strategic partnership. The constant U.S. declaration of the need to maintain the Zionist entity's qualitative superiority over all the Arab countries confirms this bias. This is in addition to the numerous U.S. positions, especially those connected with Resolution 799, which calls for the immediate repatriation of Palestinian deportees, that confirm that the United States has been acting and performing in the interest of diminishing this resolution and making its contents hollow.

[al-Husayni] Meaning that national resistance is the only option, in your opinion?

[Funaysh] Resistance is the essential option to preserve right. It is the only path that permits us to protect our land from the enemy's schemes, from its expansionist plans, and from the Judaization of land and people. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't take advantage of political action to wrest our rights. In this case, political action should complement the resistance, on the condition that this action doesn't compromise our principles and doesn't lead to squandering our rights. If we talk about resistance as a sole, essential, and beneficial option, it doesn't mean that we should abandon political action and efforts to bring attention to our cause and our rights in all international circles. However, there is a difference between political action, which is compatible with the resistance option and adheres to constants, principles, and rights, and political action, whose sole concern is to acknowledge the fait accompli and to entrench the occupation. We make a distinction between these two forms of political action. Within the prevailing political circumstances, resistance is the sole essential option to preserve our rights. If we don't resort to this option, I don't think that our wager on international

laws, UN resolutions, and the world community will be enough on its own to enable us to wrench our right from the occupying enemy.

[al-Husayni] It has been reported that the government seeks to have the Chamber of Deputies grant it special powers. What is your opinion?

[Funaysh] We in the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc have defined our position clearly on the issue of special powers. We consider that there is a separation of powers in our democratic system. Therefore, the executive authority may not perform the parliamentary assembly's tasks, and the parliamentary assembly may not perform the executive authority's tasks. There is a separation of powers on the basis of cooperation. Constitutionally, the Constitution states explicitly that no law may be promulgated unless passed by the Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, there are clear and explicit constitutional articles that assert that no authority may legislate laws independently of the Chamber of Deputies. This task is confined to the Chamber of Deputies as the authority with the power. Legislation of laws by another authority will lead to the seizure of powers by one authority and will lead to stripping away the assembly's power in favor of the executive authority. Moreover, we see no practical justification or need for requesting special powers. As long as the Chamber of Deputies, especially this chamber, is performing its duties actively, vigorously, and in the best manner, there is no justification for requesting these powers on the pretext that the government needs to have laws drafted and issued promptly. Inversely, we find that the government has withdrawn numerous bills and that it hasn't re-submitted them to the Chamber of Deputies. Numerous bills are being studied by the government, but they haven't been submitted in the form of draft laws. There has been no delay on the Chamber of Deputies' part in making its decision on and passing any bill submitted to it by the government within the grace periods set by the Constitution. There is, in my opinion, another problem, namely that powers cannot be delegated. The Chamber of Deputies is the people's representative and the people have selected their representatives to perform this duty. Therefore, we may not delegate the deputy's or the Chamber of Deputies' duty to others, exactly as the deputy's role may not be performed by somebody else because people have chosen their deputy to represent them. The chamber may not delegate its duties to the executive authority.

[al-Husayni] What is your assessment of the government's role in the various fields, especially the economic field, at present?

[Funaysh] It seems that there is, in my estimate, an attempt on the executive authority's part to avoid the Chamber of Deputies' control, especially since this chamber has proven its presence in the sessions it has convened by exercising its role as a watchdog and as an auditor. We fear that the goal is to avoid the parliamentary assembly's watch and, consequently, avoid being tasked by it, especially in the loans policy area. The government is

fully aware that there are numerous voices and a parliamentary majority that doesn't approve of the loans policy at all. The Chamber of Deputies is really afraid that a political mortgage will emanate from the loans policy. From our reading of the conditions and circumstances and our understanding of our economic circumstances, we will not be able to meet the requirements and repay the burdens of these loans.

[al-Husayni] How is the approach of the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc different from the approach of the other parliamentary blocs?

[Funaysh] In the Chamber of Deputies, we perform our role in an objective, logical, constitutional, and also constructive debate. We will always make efforts to unite with the other parliamentary blocs so we can take a united position and can avoid ill consequences based on cooperation for our people's interest and not the basis of creating obstacles and barriers in the way of the government's performance.

[al-Husayni] It has been reported that the government has drawn up a plan for economic revival. What do you say to this?

[Funaysh] We don't believe that there is such a plan to date. We believe that there are broad lines for spending in all areas but that there is no determination and arrangement of priorities or a clear definition by the government of the details of this spending and this plan.

There are features of a plan, and figures are projected for spending in the various sections. We cannot say that there is a plan to date. Moreover, the large volume of loans projected by the government means that this government has a political vision for the coming phase. In my opinion, the basis of this vision is that the coming phase will be a phase of peace with the enemy. Consequently, we will be able to shoulder the burdens of the loan policy. But this vision is based on probability and it lacks accuracy. What happens if no peace is concluded with the enemy? The region may experience some sort of instability. Wouldn't such a situation subsequently reflect on our economic situation and wouldn't it make us unable to repay these loans?

[al-Husayni] In your capacity as a deputy from the south, what is the action in which you will engage with your other colleagues to develop the area?

[Funaysh] It is well known that the south has suffered historically from deprivation and that it has the special distinction of being the object of ceaseless Zionist attacks. The area lacks a lot in terms of services and infrastructure, including water, power, and telephone networks. There are problems in all these areas, and these problems are worsening daily because of the Israeli attacks. Add to this the problem of the inhabitants who live in villages on the frontline with the occupation forces. These villages require a plan from the government. Bolstering the steadfastness of these villages' inhabitants must be one of the priorities of government

action. Such a thing doesn't exist in the government's performance to date. The reparations system adopted by the Council for the South hasn't been modified yet. This area lacks numerous services, and we are surprised that the previous governments, as well as the current government, haven't taken the initiative to utilize the al-Litani water, especially since numerous villages in the south experience a shortage of irrigation and drinking water. We haven't seen a plan to promote agriculture in the south or to encourage farmers to invest. There are numerous gaps, and I find that it is necessary to focus on the industrial sector, on electronic industries, on drugs, and on other industries. The south requires a great deal of attention and development, considering that it is the symbol of the country's unity and of lasting stability. We cannot envision lasting stability in Lebanon as long as Israel's occupation of the south continues.

Hizballah Congress Proceedings Scrutinized

93AA0096C Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
24 May 93 pp 16-18

[Article: "Hizballah's Latest Congress: 'Ansar' Versus 'Party'"]

[Text] Hizballah's latest congress had a main objective, namely to reaffirm that putting the house's internal affairs in order, as was begun after the assassination of 'Abbas al-Musawi, continues generally and fundamentally from top to bottom, as is evidenced by the fact that Sayyid Nasrallah's term has been renewed, despite the numerous doubts the party's shaykhs have about his abilities. The shaykhs expressed these doubts openly as soon as Nasrallah assumed his position.

The second point highlighted by the party's congress is reaffirmation of the separation process within the party, called conventionally the Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli [process]. It is called this because al-Tufayli has decided that he will not hold any official position in the party in the coming phase, preferring to be represented in it as a force which exists within the party but which has some sort of independence and which, simultaneously, has numerous options with which to confront the "legitimate leadership" when necessary and when matters between the two sides reach a bottleneck. One of the most important options available to Shaykh al-Tufayli is the option of establishing a movement parallel to Hizballah's and consisting basically of a considerable segment of Hizballah's cadres. It is believed that if established, this tendency will be called Ansarallah [followers of God].

It seems impossible that Shaykh al-Tufayli will accept in the coming phase a step, such as the one that was taken against him, without retaliating against the party's "legitimate leadership." What is meant by this step is during the implementation of the security plan there was an emphasis on combing the area where al-Tufayli's cadres and supporters were while other quarters where the "legitimate leadership" existed were treated with different political and security criteria. The step made it

clear that the leadership had lifted the political cover of al-Tufayli group, even though this group continues to be an indivisible part of Hizballah.

The third point produced by the congress is inclined to confirm that no change has occurred in Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah's position in the party; according to the consensus of well-informed sources, he is still capable of dealing with the party as scattered groups from his position as spiritual leader. The fact is that Fadlallah, with a private plan which sets him apart, prefers to continue to see the party as separate groups that are easy to contain rather than see it as a united bloc with which he is compelled to deal collectively.

What has happened in the party congress?

This question is answered by the following report:

Hizballah has held its congress confidentially, as usual, somewhere in Lebanon. The congress proceedings lasted an unknown period of time. No official information has been disclosed, except for a brief statement announcing that the party has renewed the term of its secretary general, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, adding that the congress has been concluded.

Moreover, the real results of the congress continue to be the subject of estimates and opinions. On the other hand, the market of "leaked reports" attributed to "informed sources" has flourished. We should keep in mind that the majority of these reports are fabricated, well-considered, and contradictory and that they are passed to fill the atmosphere of those who are interested in the issue, including political circles and lobbies and security agencies, with trial balloons to test the reaction of the interested and to determine their political and security interests regarding Hizballah.

Openness and Confidentiality

In this regard, there is an opinion that has aroused the interest of numerous political observers. This opinion sees that Hizballah's eagerness to engulf its congress' proceedings with such a thick layer of confidentiality and security unmasks one of the most significant results produced by the congress. This result indicates that the party hasn't been able to cover any ground in its trip to adapt itself to an open political life or to make a "move" to coexist with the light, i.e., abandon the practices and policies of the confidential party which has lived with the "complex of being targeted." But numerous Hizballah cadres argue that the option of moving from the "shadow" to the "open" isn't based on a decision by the party alone. If this were the case, Hizballah would have moved forward with longer strides with its policy to open up to the political life—a policy which it launched through its participation in the parliamentary elections. But the accomplishment of this "move" is tied, to an equal degree, to whether the "imperialists" have actually, not deceptively, decided to abandon the policy of waiting for the ripe "objective moment" to strike the Islamic condition in Lebanon and in the entire region.

These Hizballah cadres also note that the party's organization of an "Islamic resistance" against Israel also dictates that numerous Hizballah agencies stay, as an organization and as a movement, not just in the shadow but also underground.

Part of the Facts

These are some results of Hizballah's congress, as circulated and debated openly and according to some confidential information, which is doubtful information. But what is the true nature of the decisions and resolutions actually adopted by the conference? Furthermore, where was the congress convened, how long did it last, and what is the true mechanism governing the congress activities and the course of the party's legislative, executive, and logistical, i.e., field, decision-making?

A source, which is tied to Hizballah by a firm relationship and that has been active as a partisan within the party, has corrected to AL-SHIRA' numerous fallacies circulated by the media regarding several issues connected with the outcome of the latest congress and the particulars of its work and mechanism.

The source has said that, contrary to rumors, Hizballah's congress was held in Beirut and lasted just one day. The entire congress was confined to putting in order the organizational affairs of the party's various top, middle-level, and lower-level structures.

We have had an interview with the said source, and here are its most important contents:

[AL-SHIRA'] What is the top authority which organized the congress and gave its outcome legitimacy?

[Source] It is noticed from media reports that they confuse the party's councils and their tasks noticeably. Moreover, they don't call these councils by their true names, using at times names that absolutely are not present in the party.

For example, there is no such thing as a consultative bureau in the party. What exists is the Decisionmaking Council, the Executive Council, and so forth.

As for your question, the congress' top authority is the General Assembly which consists of clergymen, party deputies, and notables who have their influence in the broad circles of Hizballah's "community."

[AL-SHIRA'] What is the General Assembly's task?

[Source] First, it makes arrangements for the party congresses and, second, it elects the Decisionmaking Council.

Decisionmaking Council Members

[AL-SHIRA'] Who are the Decisionmaking Council members elected by the General Assembly in the latest congress?

[Source] The Decisionmaking Council members are: Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Shaykh Na'im Qasim, al-Hajj 'Abdallah Qusayr, Shaykh Muhammad Yazbak, Deputy Muhammad Ra'd, and al-Hajj Muhsin Hashim.

[AL-SHIRA'] And who did the General Assembly elect as party secretary general and as deputy secretary general?

[Source] Here emerges a fallacy that needs to be clarified. Upon electing the Decisionmaking Council, the General Assembly dissolves itself promptly. Immediately, the Decisionmaking Council, with its new members, convenes to elect a secretary general and a deputy secretary general. This council then appoints a new General Assembly, which becomes anew the party's highest authority.

[AL-SHIRA'] How is the General Assembly appointed?

[Source] Appointment is made by presenting a candidate's name for a vote in the Decisionmaking Council. A candidate has to win a majority of the votes, not unanimous vote. If the majority of the Decisionmaking Council members support a certain individual when the party secretary general is opposed to him, then this doesn't abolish appointment of the said individual to the General Assembly, i.e., nobody has a veto right in this regard.

The Decisionmaking Council also appoints the party's Executive Council. This council's members are selected from within the General Assembly and they continue to hold their position in the assembly after they become Executive Council members.

The Executive Council is comprised of the officers in charge of the district councils, from which emanate the sector councils. In other words, the Executive Council is an authority to which the party's entire action mechanism on the ground is tied. In turn, the Executive Council is tied to the Decisionmaking Council directly.

Tufayli Faced With Two Possibilities

[AL-SHIRA'] We notice that Shaykh al-Tufayli's name isn't on the Decisionmaking Council?

[Source] To start, there is a common error, namely that al-Tufayli was a member of the former decisionmaking councils. This is wrong. Prior to convocation of the latest congress, al-Tufayli was a member of the Executive Council, not of the Decisionmaking Council. He was also, necessarily, a member of the former General Assembly.

What has happened is that al-Tufayli hasn't come out of the Decisionmaking Council because he wasn't in it in the first place. Moreover, al-Tufayli has decided to stay out of the Executive Council.

[AL-SHIRA'] Why?

[Source] There has been a lot of clamor over this question. But I believe that there are two reasons or two possibilities behind al-Tufayli's current stance:

The first reason is, according to circulated reports, that al-Tufayli plans to form a group, a movement, or some organizational structure that doesn't rise to the level of a party at present. The name chosen for this framework is Ansarallah. This plan is not yet confirmed, but it is mentioned in the "circulated reports market" inside and outside Hizballah.

The second possibility is, according to reports circulated at a very small scale within the party, that Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli may be compensated by being nominated by the party to the position of deputy chairman of the Supreme Shiite Islamic Council.

Iran's Candidate

[AL-SHIRA'] We notice that the party congress has reelected al-Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. Does this reelection have distinguished indications?

[Source] Yes, it has significant, but not distinguished, indications. The most important of these indications is derived from the fact that when elected party secretary general for the first time, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah was confronted with numerous challenges reflecting his rejection by the majority of the party shaykhs. The observations of those rejecting him focused on the new secretary general's young age and the brevity of his political experience, considering that Nasrallah was in his mid-thirties. More importantly, those shaykhs belittled Sayyid Nasrallah's learning and jurisprudence.

At the time, Nasrallah tried as hard as he could to absorb the opposition of his adversaries among the shaykhs. But when he couldn't do it, he went to Iran to complain about what was confronting him. He returned from there with an explicit directive ordering everybody to obey him, and so it was.

[AL-SHIRA'] Why has Iran supported Nasrallah?

[Source] At the time, the phase dictated bringing a moderate leader into the party's General Secretariat to succeed al-Musawi, who was also considered an adherent of the moderate line. To counter Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli and the ambitions of Na'im Qasim, who was supposed to succeed al-Musawi but who didn't because of his radicalism—Iran selected Sayyid Nasrallah who was known to and trusted by Iran. Nasrallah's history is distinguished by the fact that he wasn't greatly involved in the party's internal conflicts because of his greater interest in the resistance issue around which all the party wings, with their various tendencies, rallied.

To return to the question of the significance of Nasrallah's reelection, this act gives the impression, as concluded from the above, that the Iranian influence continues to exist decisively in the party. Nasrallah's continued presence in his position is an immediate proof of this decisive influence.

[AL-SHIRA'] This doesn't mean that the reports saying that Hizballah is inclined to "Lebanize its political experiment" are untrue.

[Source] This tendency exists, but it isn't crystallized in the form of specific forces within the party. It can be said that the endeavor to make Hizballah, as an experiment and as options, interact within the sphere of the unique and special characteristics of Lebanon's demography is something that cannot be accomplished with a mere decision adopted by a congress or by any other assembly. Rather, it is a general course of interaction within the party on the one hand and between the party and its experiment with the real situation in Lebanon on the other hand. However, it can be said promptly here that Iran's connection with the party is an organic connection that doesn't allow Hizballah to gain its special Lebanese character in the foreseeable future, at least.

[AL-SHIRA'] Is there anything new regarding the outcome produced by the party's executive, district, and sector councils, i.e., by the party's entire organizational infrastructure?

[Source] The fact is that the party had adopted fundamental resolutions on restructuring its organizational infrastructure which is connected with the resistance and with the south. The party has paid an exorbitant price for Israel's successful infiltration of the party ranks recently, and this price has motivated the party to embrace the option of establishing a rear command for the south.

The phrase "rear command" means that the declared names that perform the tasks of logistical command in the south are not the real names that truly perform these tasks.

The congress has been careful to display its strictness on the issue of observing the special security condition under which Hizballah lives at more than one level.

Hizballah Deputy Shaykh Khudr Tulays Interviewed

93AA0096B London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
4 Jun 93 pp 23-24

[Interview with Hizballah Deputy Khudr Tulays in Beirut by Halah al-Husayni; date not given: "Deputy Shaykh Khudr Tulays to AL-HAWADITH: Government Has Frozen Economic Deterioration But Hasn't Dealt With Crux of Crisis"]

[Text] Beirut—Deputy Khudr Tulays, a member of the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc, has expressed the opinion that the government has failed to date to resolve

the priorities of Lebanon's economic problems. He has noted that the issue of aid and grants is largely connected to the outcome of the Arab-Israeli negotiations and that talk about any aid before this issue [is resolved] is futile. Tulays has also warned against allowing these negotiations to usher in a new 17 May. He stressed the importance of abolishing political sectarianism and announced the formation of working committees in this regard. The above has been stated in the following interview with AL-HAWADITH:

[al-Husayni] Now that a short period has passed on your work in the Chamber of Deputies, what is your evaluation of this chamber's performance and work?

[Tulays] Now that nearly eight months have passed on our work in the Chamber of Deputies, we can say that this chamber has begun to open its way, which was blocked previously. I believe that the chamber has assumed its natural role of watchdog over the work of the government and of all state institutions. Naturally, the Chamber of Deputies needs more time to assume its full legislative role and its role as watchdog and auditor. It is noticed that through the legislation it has presented and by passing the bills that are presented to it, the chamber has been able to gain prominence and to turn into a very important institution issuing legislation and watching over and tasking the government. This, briefly, is what can be said after the passage of this short period. In principle, we consider that, when the government requested special powers from the Chamber of Deputies, the request meant confiscating the role and action of this parliamentary assembly. The request would have been appropriate if this assembly were suspended and if the deputies couldn't perform their duties, considering that the government has, of course, to carry on with its work. If this were the case, the government could say: The parliamentary assembly is suspended, so give me part of its role. But when the assembly is present, when it assumes its natural role, and when its members are present in such a way that we can call a large number of them the parliamentary assembly "porters," then we see no justification for such a request, regardless of the legal aspect of the special powers issue.

[al-Husayni] It is a known fact that the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc hasn't given this government its vote of confidence. What is your current evaluation of this government's role at the various levels?

[Tulays] It is true that the government has been able to stop the decline in the country's economic situation and to freeze the dollar exchange rate at a certain ceiling. But I cannot say that the government itself is the party that has stopped the decline and has frozen the dollar exchange rate. Rather, it is the prime minister's moral halo that has been able to accomplish this. Beyond this, the government hasn't been able to score any success in this regard, as indicated by the conditions under which the country lives.

Inflation persists. Certain mafias continue to control the country, and it is the government's role to control these mafias. There is, moreover, an extremely difficult economic recession that is felt by every citizen and that has left the citizen without any liquidity. These are indications of a difficult economic recession. From some figures, facts, and manifestations on the ground, it becomes more certain day after day that the government has failed to provide the citizen with minimal services and has failed to resolve priorities of the country's economic problems. I don't mean to say that the government is required to have solved the entire economic problem in these few months. However, the problem has its priorities, which the government has failed to figure out to date.

[al-Husayni] Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri has made a number of tours. How do you view these tours and will they, in your opinion, produce results?

[Tulays] In fact, some political issues, whose objectives the prime minister seeks to accomplish through some of these tours, are confused with economic issues pertaining to aid, grants, and other questions. To date, we have heard nothing but promises which, I fear, will remain within the sphere of promises because everybody in Lebanon is aware that the issue of aid and grants and of solving the country's economic problems is tied, very regrettably, to the outcome of the negotiations with the Israelis. In order not to drown the citizen in promises, hope, and dreams, we have to be realistic with him, and we have to speak realistically. It is true that the prime minister is making efforts to get aid and grants. But I don't see much hope of getting this aid and these grants.

As for political issues, from the statements that we have heard and read and that were made by the prime minister and by some officials of the countries that he has visited, it doesn't seem that there is a quick solution to the existing problems.

[al-Husayni] The government has drawn up a plan for economic revival. You have opposed this plan. Do you still cling to your opposition?

[Tulays] We are for having the government conduct a long-range economic study or draft a short-term plan. But no such plan has been presented to date to either the cabinet or the Chamber of Deputies in order that we may assess it. Before it presents a comprehensive plan, the government has to offer a temporary plan to solve the urgent problems at this time.

[al-Husayni] In your capacity as member of the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc, to what degree do you cooperate with the government and, subsequently, with the other blocs in the Chamber of Deputies.

[Tulays] Even though we held a certain position toward the government when it was formed, we have stated that we are fully prepared to cooperate with it and with the

prime minister to solve problems existing in the Lebanese provinces and, to be specific, primarily and fundamentally in the areas we represent. But because the government hasn't been able to solve any problems, we have felt, and we continue to feel, that (certain positions were taken in advance vis-a-vis the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc as a result of its stances toward the government). We haven't felt that the government is dealing seriously with the districts that we represent. Consequently, we exert efforts with the prime minister and with the government as a whole to overcome the problem or the dilemma which the government is experiencing. I am hopeful that we will achieve acceptable results.

[al-Husayni] Let us turn to the issue of the south, to the bilateral negotiations specifically. Will they, in your opinion, produce results, keeping in mind that you are opposed to them?

[Tulays] In addition to our principled position on the negotiations issue, we have our own assessment or vision of the course of the negotiations at the Lebanese level and at the other levels. We are certain that Israel will not implement all the resolutions issued by the United Nations or by the Security Council. We have the 17 May experience in this regard. It is evident that through its weight and influence, Israel seeks to impose more than another 17 May accord. From the observed performance of the government and of the entire Lebanese regime, it doesn't seem to us that this regime will be able to diminish the harm that will be done if it concludes a new accord with Israel. Rather, I want to say that it doesn't seem that the Lebanese regime will be able to wriggle out of an accord that amounts to more than the 17 May accord. As for Resolution 425, what I see is that all the regime figures know that it is just a slogan. Resolution 425 will not be implemented. Israel will not implement it. It is being used as a slogan with which to silence the [world] public opinion and to give the Lebanese public the impression that the Lebanese negotiator is strong and that he is defending the Lebanese people's rights. What is offered on the negotiations table now is more serious than the 17 May accord. It is into this that we are afraid the Lebanese regime will fall.

[al-Husayni] But how, in your opinion, can the the south and al-Biqa' al-Gharbi be liberated, especially since these areas are subjected to daily Israeli attacks?

[Tulays] It is our opinion that the south and al-Biqa' al-Gharbi can only be liberated with resistance action, with government support for the resistance, and with the citizens standing fast with the resistance. If it is said at this time that it is difficult for military force or the resistance to liberate the south, then we say that there is an experience which occurred here in Lebanon and through which the resistance, in all its forms and colors, was able to liberate a large part of Lebanon's territories.

[al-Husayni] Southern citizens are complaining that no reparations are being paid to them. In your opinion,

what role does the Council for the South play, especially since the Chamber of Deputies has established a certain tendency in this regard?

[Tulays] To begin, I wish to stress that there can be no resistance without a tax. All must be ready to pay the tax at any level. The government must prepare to pay the tax and the Lebanese people must also prepare to pay until the land is liberated. We, as deputies in the Loyalty-to-the-Resistance Bloc, are always prepared to support any bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies to aid the occupied territories and to bolster the steadfastness of our kinsmen there who are subjected to constant Israeli aggression. What is more, we, along with our colleagues in the Chamber of Deputies, constantly demand that greater attention and care be given to the issue of the south and of the citizens there. Regarding the Council for the South, I believe that it is tied to the government. So the government should provide supervision and should act in harmony with this council. As we know, the Council for the South is experiencing numerous financial problems. The government has to help the council so it can perform its role.

[al-Husayni] How do you view the abolition of political sectarianism and do you think that this abolition will be accomplished under the current circumstances?

[Tulays] We are among those who demand strongly the abolition of political sectarianism on the basis of dialogue among Lebanon's sects because this sectarianism shouldn't be abolished on the basis of division among the Lebanese. There has to be a dialogue that leads to an understanding so all the Lebanese will be in accord with the plan to abolish political sectarianism. We, as Hizballah, have begun dialogue with the Christians, meaning with Bkirki, i.e., with Patriarch Sufayr, and with the various parties. We have been drafting a bill for the purpose. It will be completed soon, God willing, to be presented [to the parliament]. A dialogue committee has been formed by Hizballah and another dialogue committee by the patriarchate so they will embark on serious dialogue between us. We believe that this dialogue constitutes a background, and it should be a solid background, for abolishing political sectarianism. These two committees have been formed to embark on official action, with the provision that the dialogue start soon. I see nothing to prevent the abolition of political sectarianism, even among those who demand another administration. What I mean is that there isn't a single citizen in the country who says he is opposed to abolishing political sectarianism. There are parties who say that they are for the postponement of the abolition of political sectarianism, and they believe that it is incumbent upon other countries to begin preparing the bases for facilitating the abolition of political sectarianism. There could be disagreement over the bases, i.e., their type, their details, and their duration. This could be a subject of disagreement. But I see no disagreement over the principle of abolishing political sectarianism.

[al-Husayni] In al-Ta'if, the principle of balanced development of the provinces was established. But it seems that this principle isn't being implemented. What is your opinion?

[Tulays] Very regrettably, a certain mentality continues to control certain junctures of the government, and this mentality has nothing to do with balanced development, but rather with the opposite. This mentality continues to control numerous government junctures. To date, we haven't noticed that anybody has begun implementing the principle that was established in al-Ta'if. We play the role of those who exert pressure in the direction of applying the principle of balanced development. Often, we succeed. At times, we don't. It is our hope that if these pressures by the Chamber of Deputies persist then, I believe, we will create in the future a situation in which this mentality will change. But if it doesn't develop and doesn't change, then I believe that a loud, rather resounding, scream will issue from the people, and we hope that we will not reach this point.

LIBYA

Khashoggi Denies Involvement With Libyan Pilgrimage

*PM0806105093 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
5 Jun 93 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "Khashoggi Denies Israeli Reports"]

[Text] London, AL-HAYAH—We have received the following denial from [Saudi businessman] Adnan Khashoggi: "The Israeli radio alleged in a fabricated report that I participated with Israeli parties in a mediation to collect information about an Israeli prisoner and in [arranging] the visit of 200 Libyan pilgrims to holy Jerusalem. I herewith emphasize that what that hostile radio alleged is nothing but mere fabrication and falsehood and absolutely untrue. Everyone is aware of the malicious aims that this radio station wants to achieve from dragging my name into such matters, which it has persisted in fabricating."

AI Seeks al-Qadhdhafi's Support for Human Rights

*LD2306192793 Tripoli JANA in Arabic
1640 GMT 23 Jun 93*

[Text] Tripoli 23 Jun (JANA)—Amnesty International's [AI] Secretary General Pierre Sane has appealed to the brother leader of the revolution to intervene personally to support human rights in Africa. He also pointed out the brother leader's important role in urging the OAU to adopt a public stand for an end to the violation of human rights in Africa. The organization's secretary general asserted in a written message to the brother leader that his great faith in the leader stems from the latter's humanitarian and noble stand on capital punishment

and his call to abolish it throughout the world, as well as his continuous support for human rights.

Sane added that he is making the appeal on the eve of the OAU summit conference in the hope that an African initiative, under the patronage of the brother leader, will lead to the protection of human rights and put an end to their violations.

Al-Qadhdhafi Cancels Natan Meeting Due to 'Sore Throat'

*TA3006052093 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English
0400 GMT 30 Jun 93*

[Text] Peace activist Abie Natan has returned to Tunis from Libya without meeting with Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. Natan said his meeting with the Libyan leader was canceled because he was told that al-Qadhdhafi had a sore throat and was unable to talk.

MOROCCO

Protesters Said Violently Suppressed

*93AF0611A Algiers LIBERTE in French
12 May 92 p 14*

[Text] The local authorities in the city of Zaouyet Cheikh (200 km southeast of Rabat) recently carried out a massive crackdown.

Violent clashes erupted Thursday between thousands of demonstrators and the police during a protest march that had drawn nearly 6,000 participants to the city's main streets. Major property damage was reported. The march was held in protest of the decisions by a court ordering the demolition of several houses that it found to be in violation of building codes. The newspaper EL-ITTIHAD AL-ICHTIRAKI (which represents the opposition party Socialist Union of Popular Forces) confirmed the news and reported that the security forces had begun a large-scale campaign of arrests and prosecutions. This state of affairs cannot continue, said Moumene Diouri, a Moroccan opposition figure, speaking for the Moroccan opposition as a whole. He recently stated that the situation in Morocco has deteriorated to the point that a military coup d'etat cannot be ruled out. Moumene Diouri, who believes in the possibility of an overthrow by the people of the current Moroccan regime, is attempting to convince the major powers of the world to grant their backing and give credibility to the desire for change that he says is deeply felt. Although he is counting on American support for the establishment of democracy in Morocco, some observers wonder if Moumene Diouri actually has entry into American democratic circles, much less the White House.

According to Moumene Diouri, the American administration, purportedly ready to give a favorable reception to a demand that the king of Morocco be tried for crimes against humanity, is placing its bets on a post-Hassan II era. It should be pointed out that if there were to be

American support for the Moroccan Democratic Bloc (BDM), it would no doubt be motivated by the blatant deterioration in human rights and by drug trafficking. Every year, Amnesty International writes a scathing report on the disregard for basic human rights in Morocco.

Meeting With Amnesty International Initiated

93AF0637B Rabat L'OPINION in French
23 May 93 pp 1, 3

[Communique from the Consultative Council on Human Rights: "Meeting Between CCDH and Amnesty International"]

[Text] *The Consultative Council on Human Rights [CCDH] published the following communique on Thursday:*

The Consultative Council on Human Rights proposed to His Majesty King Hassan II—may God glorify him—during its sixth meeting that contacts be established with Amnesty International by holding meetings with that organization in an atmosphere of transparency, openness, objectivity, and honesty on behalf of human rights. His Majesty—may God preserve him—gave his assent to that proposal. The council therefore addressed an invitation to the organization in question expressing its desire to receive a mission from that organization during the first half of May this year. But the organization decided to publish a report on 14 April 1993 in which it attacked the human rights situation in Morocco while expressing its willingness to publish any response on the subject if such a response reached it before 31 March 1993, even though it knew that the report, which totals 39 pages in English, did not reach our council until 29 March.

The secretary-general of the council tried to persuade the organization to delay publication until working meetings could be held or to move up the date of the visit and then, after verification, to make the decision it deemed appropriate. Despite that, the organization persisted in its refusal to move up the date of the visit or to delay publication.

The delegation from the council explained to the organization's representatives at a private meeting held during the work of the Arab Congress on Human Rights (in Cairo from 10 to 12 April 1993), just as it also explained in Geneva (19 to 30 April 1993), that the report was in fact a campaign being conducted against Morocco by a group wanting to harm the country's reputation for purposes other than the defense of human rights. Such a report shows the organization's bias, something contrary to the principles of independence and neutrality, which ought to be observed by an organization interested in human rights around the world.

At its seventh meeting, the council unanimously expressed its indignation at that method and, as a sign of good will and good faith, decided to confirm the invitation despite everything.

The contacts with the delegation from the organization will therefore begin on Friday 29 Dhu'l-Qa'da 1413 (21 May 1993) under the chairmanship of Herve Berger, deputy secretary-general, for the purpose of examining all points relative to human rights, attempting to find a platform for cooperation far removed from double talk and a selective spirit, and convincing that institution of the civilized rules of dialogue so that it can be persuaded to abstain from hostile campaigns and show objectivity and honesty in order that dialogue may continue on behalf of human rights.

The council will inform national and international public opinion of the results of that meeting.

UAA Congress Address: Focus on Unity

93AF0637A Rabat L'OPINION in French
22 May 93 pp 1, 3

[Article: "Attorneys Are Responsible for the Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens"]

[Excerpt] The work of the 18th Congress of the Union of Arab Attorneys (UAA), which is being held under the patronage of His Majesty King Hassan II, began in Casablanca on Thursday with the theme "Restoration of Arab Solidarity and Strengthening of Democracy and Human Rights in Order To Meet the Dangers Threatening the Arab Nation."

The ceremony marking the opening of that congress, which will continue until next Sunday, included the important royal message addressed to the congress. The message was read by attorney Abdelhadi Boutaleb, an adviser to His Majesty the King.

Speaking on that same occasion, the president and chairman of the congress, Ibrahim Semlali, recalled the role played by Casablanca not only in the struggle for the kingdom's independence but also at the Arab and African levels.

He also emphasized the profound meaning of the theme chosen for this congress, recalling in that connection the suffering of the Palestinian people as the victims of Zionist repression and of the Iraqi and Libyan peoples as a result of the embargo.

At the same time, he reaffirmed the UAA's support for the Palestinian people's intifadah in the occupied Arab territories.

Discussing the issue of human rights, Semlali condemned the inhumane exactions perpetrated against Muslims in that region.

Concerning the situation in the Arab world, he paid tribute to His Majesty King Hassan II for the latter's courageous and wise stands on behalf of the reuniting of Arab ranks.

Last, he expressed his profound gratitude to the sovereign for the interest shown in the congress.

For his part, Farouq Abouaissa, secretary general of the UAA, emphasized that Morocco, the land of Arab meetings, had also hosted the UAA's 12th congress, which was held in Rabat in 1980, adding that the participants in the current meeting would be looking into ways of strengthening Arab solidarity and making practical recommendations for achieving that objective.

He also pointed out that the congress is being held at a time when the world is undergoing far-reaching changes marked by the emergence of economic and political groupings in some regions and the development of democratic choice and political pluralism.

After reviewing the situation in the Arab world, Farouq Abouaissa emphasized the efforts made by His Majesty King Hassan II to bring about the reuniting of Arab ranks. He also called for the lifting of the embargo imposed on the Iraqi and Libyan peoples and for an end to the horrors being inflicted on the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he reiterated his support for the struggle by the Palestinian people.

The secretary-general of the UAA touched on the issues of democracy and human rights in the Arab world and discussed the situation of the legal profession and the outlook for its development. In that connection, he announced the establishment by the UAA of an institute in Tunis for the training of lawyers. He also called for the harmonization of legislation and the unification of legal concepts.

The opening session included speeches by the presidents of the UAA Standing Committee, the African Union of Attorneys, and the International Association of Attorneys' Unions. They, too, emphasized the vanguard role played by Morocco under the enlightened leadership of His Majesty King Hassan II in strengthening Arab ranks and bringing about the triumph of just causes, among them that of the Palestinian people.

It should be pointed out that the work of the congress will be carried out by the following committees: Arab issues, Palestine, basic freedoms and human rights, independence and justice, the Arab economy, Arab women, and comparative Arab law and the unification of legislation. [Passage omitted]

Logistic Problems Slowing Export Potential

93AF0611B Rabat L'OPINION in French
21 May 93 pp 1, 8

[Article by Naima Ennazi: "Supply Lags Behind Demand, Slowing Entry into Other Markets"]

[Text] On 13 and 14 May, the produce industry gathered to discuss the problems and difficulties of their sector. The sector is a vital one, employing more than 600,000 people, directly and indirectly, and generating more than 2 billion dirhams in foreign exchange.

Morocco currently exports 165,426 metric tons per year of tomatoes, 65,000 metric tons of potatoes, and 17,000 metric tons of fruits and vegetables, mostly green beans and strawberries. (See Tables 1 and 2.) Exports of melons rose to 3,500 metric tons in 1992-93, a remarkable level as melons were considered a miscellaneous export in 1991-92.

Table 1. The 1992-93 Tomato Crop

Type	Hectares	Exports (metric tons)	Yield (tonnage/hectare)
open grown	3,067	46,926	15.3
covered	2,356	118,500	50.5

Table 2. Fruits and Vegetables, 1992-93

Commodity	Hectares Planted	Tonnage Exported
Potatoes	12,000	65,000
Fruits and vegetables	3,360	17,000

Despite such results, Morocco has not seen any real improvement in relation to its tomato exports 20 years ago: In 1972-73, Morocco exported 163,341 metric tons, the same tonnage it is exporting today. In other words, despite all this time, despite all the farming techniques that have been developed and the large sums invested to improve out agricultural sector, Morocco is losing rather than gaining ground.

But what has brought about this state of affairs? We have found that all the sector's difficulties are caused by changes in EC regulations (the totality of Morocco's exports of tomatoes, potatoes, and fruits and vegetables are sold to Europe) as well as by changes in the export calendar and changes in the trade circuit.

In addition, the failure of the open-grown crop to meet the requirements of European demand and the availability of varieties that fall short of European demand have combined with logistic problems to cause a heavy decline in produce exports in recent years. Competition from Spain has also been very harmful and the April-May crop is no longer exported as a result of the changed export calendar.

The Need To Develop Other Markets and Match Supply and Demand

Reports issued by three committees meeting on 13 May at the gathering of the produce industry stress the need to diversify our markets.

It is a fact that 75 percent of Morocco's output has gone to the French market, while other markets accounted for 7 percent or less.

This means that Morocco has a host of other market possibilities to explore and they will be snatched up by such competitors as Spain and the Canary Islands if Morocco does not move quickly and effectively. It is certain that diversification will have the beneficial effect of reducing the dependency of Moroccan producers on the French market. This will eventually bring greater balance to Morocco's exports and, along with it, greater security for Morocco's producers.

In addition, Morocco can increase its exports to Germany to 30,000 metric tons of tomatoes and 20,000

metric tons of potatoes, starting next year, provided that several requirements are met. Producers must be able to supply the small-sized tomatoes and the medium-sized potatoes preferred by the German market and consideration must be given to packaging preferences.

The British market imports 120,000 metric tons between November and March, but only 5,000 of that amount (4 percent) come from Morocco. The British market is still a difficult one to approach. Morocco's goal is to sell 15,000 metric tons of the variety and size acceptable to the British market.

Similarly, a goal of 6,000 metric tons of tomatoes has been set for the Swiss market, which currently buys 4,000 metric tons from Morocco. Switzerland imports a total of 33,000 metric tons of tomatoes a year. The lack of time constraints on the Swiss market makes it an attractive one. It is open from November to June; a 0.30 dirham/kilogram tax is applied as of 1 April.

However, the Swiss market for potatoes is practically closed except for a short period of time each year. Morocco is able to export only 500 metric tons during that period.

For the Benelux market, a goal of 10,000 metric tons has been set, with emphasis placed on quality. (See Table 3.)

Table 3. Tomato Imports by Leading European Countries (in metric tons)

Country	Total, All Origins	From Morocco	
		Current	93/94 Target
Germany	160,000	15,000	30,000
United Kingdom	120,000	5,000	20,000
Switzerland	33,000	4,000	6,000
Benelux	85,000	10,000	18,000

Morocco also has the possibility of exporting to Italy, Spain, and Canada. But in exporting to Canada, the problem of logistics has yet to be solved and the long period of time it takes to ship products to Canada affects product quality. The goal is to export 1,000 metric tons in the short term, and 5,000 to 10,000 in the intermediate term.

The main problem that produce exporters experience, the reports conclude, is the transportation problem. In

place of the current reliance on very costly road transportation, it is preferable to use maritime transportation, which would entail setting up regular lines and once- or twice-weekly linkups with potential clients. But first, product size, quality, color, residue level, and taste must be brought into line with the requirements of the importing countries.

These various measures will enable Morocco to limit the harmful effects of EC regulations on Moroccan producers and stand up to unfair competition.

SUDAN

Instability Blamed on Misunderstanding

93AF0631B London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
28 May 93 pp 28, 29

[Article by Nash'at al-Taghlabi: "Between the Catastrophe of Famine and the Foreign Relations Crisis: The Sudan Lives in a State of Tension and Blames 'Misunderstanding'"]

[Text] Husayn Abu-Salih, Khartoum's foreign minister, described press reports of human rights violations in the Sudan as mere unfounded lies whose real objective is to interfere in the affairs of the Sudan. The minister added that most of that campaign is part of Sudan's crisis with the West as a whole. The reason behind it is that those who have belatedly started to deal with Sudanese affairs are hostile to Islam and are targeting us with their attacks because we have implemented Islamic "Shari'ah" law even though the tenets instituted are merely an initial step. Our challengers claim that our objective by taking that step is to incite the masses against certain non-Muslim groups in the south and likewise against foreign visitors to our country. This compelled us to carry an olive branch with one hand and a gun with the other.

This statement attributed to the foreign minister is an unexpected beginning from a responsible foreign minister. The statement defames certain countries, especially the United States, on the pretext that they are hostile to the Sudan and pressure it to grant their demands, while it wishes to carry out only what serves the interests of the people and is advocated by its leaders!

The minister then touched on the campaign [attacks] against Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the Islamic Front. He said that the accusations are meant to serve certain interests and said: "They speak of Hasan al-Turabi as if he alone were the Sudanese government, even though the Sudan has enough problems to attract the attention of the sincere and of those who are motivated by nothing but the ultimate interests of the country."

It is noted that recent statements by Sudanese officials target not only the West but some Arab countries as well. It is as if the latter are the ones that undermine relations among the Arabs and urge them to fight each other, even though most Arab officials are tirelessly and incessantly working for Arab unity of action and for solidarity among all countries of the Arab region.

When we speak of solidarity, we can't help but place Egypt in the lead. The Arab Republic of Egypt has no objective but to close Arab ranks and safeguard them against all conspiracies directed at them. President Muhammad Husni Mubarak's recent tour of the Gulf was an important indication of Egypt's solidarity with its Arab brethren and its interest in Arab unity and of its national objectives targeted by all the actions they take.

Perhaps one of the most obvious causes of misunderstandings that serve no purpose but to sow the seeds of dissension among the sons of a single nation—a most obvious such reason is the arrest 10 years ago (i.e. in 1983) of Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ummah Party, on charges that he objected to the implementation of Shari'ah and for saying that they shouldn't cut a thief's hand if he steals because he is hungry.

Even though Sadiq al-Mahdi was arrested at the time of the Nimayri regime, he remains under pressure because he leads a cohesive party whose objective is Sudanese unity first, then Sudanese union with any Arab country that has the same objective. [This is true] even though certain of his statements have been misunderstood.

Sadiq al-Mahdi repeatedly warned against tense relations between certain civilians and certain members of the military, created by contradictory statements by one side or the other. He called for national unity where there would be no opportunity to make mistakes that could cost the country dearly, especially in the presence of new generations of educated youths who seem more determined and more political than their brothers that preceded them. He warned in particular against conflicts between members of the military and civilians as represented by their unions. [Such conflicts] merely undermine the national structure and threaten its destruction unless preempted by the sincere before it is too late. The National Union still requires diligent effort in order to bolster its solidarity from within and its cooperation with the national elements in order to strengthen democracy and stabilize it. Also needed is a more-balanced foreign policy and a bulwark around the judiciary that would safeguard it from all forms of interference. Decisive action must be taken to overcome the succession of crises in the country—especially the famine that affects a few million of the citizenry and that has prompted the United Nations to describe it as a catastrophe in the near-term and that has all the elements of a catastrophe; and especially the economic and political instability that continues to bolster the demand for convertible currencies, which causes the Sudanese pound to decline in value. Then there is the exodus of a large number of Sudanese who have settled in other regions. This threatens the overall economy, especially now that the number of such expatriates is between 750,000 and about 2 million citizens.

To make matters worse, official efforts to deal with the catastrophe have caused a crisis that apparently exceeds \$15 billion which [the Sudan] remains unable to pay back. In fact, [the country's] current economic policy leads to serious dissension both in the government and in the economic field where objections to that policy, which are driven by the unions, are mounting. This has led to the emergence of forceful voices that call for abrogating the debt no matter what the consequences, and for imposing a three-year moratorium on repayment. Such serious trends, however, have been a subject

of discussion and debate for some time, leading to sharp conflicts between economists and officials responsible for the economy.

It is noteworthy at this point that the wavering style enforced so far, perpetuates delays. The miscalculations made, have all enforced the expectations of Garang, leader of the Liberation Party, who emphasizes that there is no difference between the current military rule and the Nimayri regime. The conflict between the Union Syndicate and Garang, who rejects military leadership, is making matters more complicated, even though the governing is sometimes the result of compromise rather than longevity.

Garang advanced a new proposal to overcome the crisis by forming a coalition government composed of three alliances:

1. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, 2. Young officers, and 3. Unions.

The proposal is based on an old theory advanced in 1969 that calls for a coalition of young officers, professionals, and progressive groupings. This would mean that an alliance between the powerful and the less powerful would lead to one-man rule. No one paid any attention to Garang's proposal because authority was a Nimayri monopoly, prompting his [Garang's] statement that there was no difference between the current military regime and the military rule under Nimayri!

Developments have proved that most leaders of the Sudanese People's Liberation Party reject traditional centers of power and insist on "progressive" leaders. This creates a dilemma in formulating a new well-defined policy and consequently means that its forces have changed a great deal over a period of a few months. It is no longer considered by northerners as the savior of last resort and has also lost control of the south and of traditional parties. Only the military-supported grouping remains. Meanwhile, a strong movement has emerged in the equatorial region that opposes domination by al-Dinka, the strongest tribe in the South, in order to maintain the South in three divisions between this tribe, Anyanya, which controls the Upper Nile and which was invited to lay down all arms!

The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement emerged against such disturbances as if hesitant to choose between two strategies, the worst being to rely on the return of dictatorship to the North, and especially to Khartoum, in order to remove all opposition or rejectionist trends. The Sudanese Liberation Movement believes that it could safeguard the political line and eradicate all opposition to the Liberation Movement or to its political thrust—which is to establish a revolutionary Islamic democracy—even if this could be realized only in the long term, while pursuing a pragmatic policy for coalescing with the union federation so they could effect fundamental changes in the fiber of pluralistic democracy that the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement could control, along with others.

At any rate, fighting in the South has resumed on a wide scale after a short reprise. On the other hand, the government and the unions issued a manifesto to be considered a national dialogue on the South. That option seems risky, however, because it removes the issue from the Sudanese people and impinges upon a country with standing in the region—the United States which pursues a global strategy.

Hence the utmost significance of President Mubarak's recent visits, especially to the Gulf states. The Egyptian president is not in the habit of visiting any country except for the purpose of serving the interests of the two countries or of some neighboring or distant Arab region. Western countries have come to view Mubarak's visits with great interest because, in most cases, they have objectives that, if realized would have local, regional, or international impact.

As to relations between Egypt and the Sudan, the conflict over local conditions in the Hala'ib triangle on the Egyptian-Sudanese border was about to assume a dangerous dimension. The Egyptian president, however, defused the situation when he responded to official Sudanese statements by declaring that Egypt would never take up arms against the brotherly Sudan and would not use the infiltration of terrorism from Iran as a pretext for such an operation.

A few days earlier, the Sudanese foreign minister said in a statement he made in Hala'ib: "This triangle may belong to Egypt and may belong to the Sudan. At any rate, these are provocative matters and we neither wish to call things by their names or to resort to force! I came to Egypt a while ago and told the media in Cairo that the Hala'ib crisis is merely the symptom of the sickness!" (see last issue). That was an odd description. How can the sickness fester for as long as the Hala'ib crisis has remained with nobody but the Egyptian side offering to treat the patient, that is, assuming that there is indeed a patient? Why has no Arab summoned a specialist to treat that which is in need of treatment?

The thing that escapes certain politicians when they discuss the problems of their countries is that what is sometimes called a misunderstanding is frequently the smoke that denotes a smoldering fire. It is common knowledge that the African continent is headed for splintering, that the threat of war exists in Angola, and that conflict is at its highest in Zaire, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Should these conflicts explode, they would create a tempest that would destroy many of the accomplishments that took several years to achieve.

Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad said in a recent statement: "The Israelis have been pressing for peace since 1948, but what kind of peace do they have in mind? There can be no peace when territories are occupied that should be returned to their owners as a pledge for peace or as a gesture of goodwill." That, in fact, is what we consider calling things by their names. Saying that we should extend our hands to each other in a handshake

that would be a down payment for amity—that is nothing but a wish that may or may not come true. The Arabs still lack assurances because of Israel's imperialistic designs for settling in Palestine and because Israeli negotiators are committed to dragging their feet—a situation that exists, albeit to a limited degree, and does not bode well for a conclusion.

Those who say that dissenting leaders are closer to an understanding than others can't see the sun at high noon. Dissenting leaders in Somalia still cling to non-existing hopes. The difficulty of coordinating between the French and the Americans, also in Somalia, is threatening the lives of thousands as negotiators continue sitting at the round table!

The Sudanese foreign minister alluded indirectly to the possibility of resorting to force in Hala'ib when he stated: "And yet, we do not wish to use force. But let me once again call things by their names. What happened in October of 1992 is Egyptian occupation of Hala'ib and a persistent one, disregarding that we can give Egypt more than Hala'ib, but with our consent!"

Would Egypt accept the Sudanese minister's donation? Such a statement unfortunately indicates nothing but shortsightedness, especially in view of the fact that minister Husayn abu-Salih met with his Egyptian counterpart, 'Amr Musa, in Cairo while attending Arab League council meetings, in an attempt at containing conflicts and crises between the two countries and at "closing the gap" between Cairo and Khartoum.

Foreign Affairs Minister Interviewed

93AF0598A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
21 May 93 pp 30-31

[Sudanese Foreign Minister Husayn Abu-Salih interviewed by Usamah 'Ajaj in Cairo; date not given: "No One Can Push Around the Government of Sudan, Not America or Anyone Else!"]

[Text] Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr. Husayn Abu-Salih, who visited Cairo to take part in Arab League council meetings, met with Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa, in an effort to contain the conflicts and crises between the two countries, to "bridge the gap" between Cairo and Khartoum, and to clear the air. Upon his return to Sudan, Khartoum began to talk about an alleged Egyptian-supported coup plot aimed at the government of al-Bashir.

Before the recent Sudanese accusations, AL-HAWADITH discussed all the outstanding issues with Abu-Salih. He charged that it was Egypt that had undermined the Hala'ib negotiations with its military presence there, warned Washington not to try to intervene in Sudan, and denied that his country was a transit area or source for terror or instability in the region.

The text of the interview follows.

[Usamah 'Ajaj] You said in a statement recently that Egyptian-Sudanese relations are not as they should be; why not? What is the reason?

[DR. Husayn Abu-Salih] What is certain is that since Egypt is an Islamic, African, and Arab neighbor, no one, either in Egypt or in Sudan, is happy when relations are this bad. That is why it has always been our policy to insist on building up our Arab relations. We want to clear the air with the Arabs and create a suitable foundation for Arab solidarity. That is why we supported the initiative of King Hasan II. I recently visited Morocco, carrying a letter to the Moroccan leader from Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir praising these efforts and that initiative, as they are the refuge and hope of the Arab nation because of the delicate circumstances it is facing. When we speak of Arab solidarity, Egypt comes first. Thus we seek to rebuild these relations. What is going on now is due to a misunderstanding or erroneous information which may have been blown out of proportion, which has necessitated sitting down and talking—even if it does not furnish the proper method—instead of resorting to total violence. All this is to ensure the eradication of the causes of the dispute and to rule out any form of provocation. I have wished for that since my first day in the ministry. I held two meetings with the Arab ambassadors in Khartoum. I visited Morocco. I attended Arab League meetings in Cairo—it was an opportunity to meet with Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa. There was something that gave those discussions the spirit of responsibility, as if there were a desire to continue the peaceful dialogue, in an effort to restore relations to the level everyone wants.

['Ajaj] You mentioned misunderstanding and erroneous information—would that apply to Lieutenant General al-Bashir's references to "struggle to the last drop of Sudanese blood to liberate Hala'ib"?

[Abu-Salih] There are well-known methods for solving disputes, such as mediation, negotiation, and dialogue. You may have a triangle, which may be Egypt's or Sudan's, but if there is a dispute over it, no one should go running to other parties to insert their forces into the disputed land—especially since a technical committee of experts and specialists is consulting and negotiating the issue. This entry came in October 1992—prior to that there was no Egyptian presence in the region. We do not want to call things by their names, but that does not make us blind to facts and realities. Therefore we ask that things be as they were: that these forces be withdrawn. Otherwise we will resort to force. It has nothing to do with territory, or its area, or what is found there. The important thing is dealing with the dispute; I came to Egypt some time back, and told the media people that the Hala'ib problem is the "symptom of an illness." Relations are tense, and we need to discuss the causes of the tension. Lieutenant General al-Bashir says so, and we have not forgotten that he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which are responsible for safeguarding every inch of Sudanese territory. Even so, we do not

want this, nor does our brother 'Amr, nor are Sudan or its people happy that things have come to this pass.

['Ajaj] Don't you think that Sudan's quest to broaden the scope of the dispute beyond its bilateral context with Egypt into a pan-Arab context was a departure from previous procedures?

[Abu-Salih] If I had wanted to stir up the dispute at the pan-Arab level, I would have brought it up in the meeting of the Arab foreign ministers. As to the memorandum sent to the Security Council, they mention previous memoranda the Council has had since 1958. I am speaking as a representative of the Sudanese Government. We think this issue is easily solvable, if intentions are good, and if a true, sound climate suitable to that is forthcoming.

['Ajaj] Easily solvable by what means?

[Abu-Salih] We must eliminate what led to the tension and incited the problems, and go to the negotiating table. I discussed procedures with my brother 'Amr Musa.

['Ajaj] Who prevented the joint Egyptian-Sudanese committee on the Hala'ib crisis from reaching a solution?

[Abu-Salih] This occupation prevented it. There was a committee meeting in Khartoum, and in Cairo to meet for the second time. It seems there are those who had expected that there would be no results. We were surprised by this move in the triangle, and so I am calling things by their names. What happened in October 1992 was occupation and its formalization. We want things to go back to the way they were; we can give more than Hala'ib, but with our approval and Sudanese consent. We must choose the method.

['Ajaj] You said that Hala'ib is the symptom of an illness; don't you think the basic illness originates from the sheltering of terrorists and the presence of their camps in Khartoum? There are Egyptian documents proving this.

[Abu-Salih] It is up to our accusers to prove that. This is something that can be proved. We are speaking of a dialogue, and that means we must discuss the matter. They should look through Khartoum, inch by inch, to see for themselves whether there are any support centers for terrorism. The things that were mentioned would seem like a myth—the relationship with Iran and the business about Sudan being a transit area for terrorists. They should investigate everything. [Our case] will be proved, and there is no need to base things on anything but the facts and on reality. We are convinced that when there is seriousness, credibility, and a means of convincing any person, it is absolutely impossible for Sudan to shake Egypt's security, and that Sudan cannot make terrorism its method as in the south. I agreed with Brother 'Amr that we should put an end to these accusations and suspicions and make a careful study so that everything may return to normal between Egypt and Sudan.

['Ajaj] But the accusations no longer come from just Egypt, but from the Americans too. They have said there are six terrorist camps.

[Abu-Salih] That is a lie and a slander. They are liars and criminals working against Sudan but they will not be able to harm it. We accept this vicious attack from America and the West, but we cannot accept it from our Arab brothers. All that is said seems to consider Sudan a superpower. We undertook a dialogue with them, but saw that it was futile.

['Ajaj] Who started the dialogue?

[Abu-Salih] We did.

['Ajaj] Through formal channels, or was it Hasan al-Turabi that opened the way?

[Abu-Salih] These are provocative things. Hasan al-Turabi is an Islamic thinker who lives in Sudan, and he is part of this government, but what provokes us is when some people talk about al-Turabi as if he were the Sudanese Government. The Salvation Revolution is proceeding in Sudan, supported by millions; they are not represented by the grouping that tours around Egypt. No one can push around this government, not America, or the West. It represents the Sudanese people and its hopes and aspirations. If that were not the case, the Sudanese people would not have been patient throughout this period, fighting in the South, putting up with all this plotting, sabotage, and the media siege.

['Ajaj] But does this negate the presence and penetration of the National Front into all the positions and places of importance in Sudan?

[Abu-Salih] What's wrong with that? There are many representatives of other parties and movements participating in and supporting this regime; I am the best example of that.

['Ajaj] But doesn't the party have reservations about your participation in the government, and has actually isolated you?

[Abu-Salih] Who said I don't represent the party? I was behind the uprising that overthrew al-Nimayri. The parties' masses—both the Unionist and National—support the Salvation Revolution. I am bigger than the Unionist Party; I led the uprising, and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was asked about it.

['Ajaj] But the government was unhappy with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's criticisms, and arrested him.

[Abu-Salih] Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has spoken dozens of times, on all occasions, and no one stops him.

['Ajaj] But he was interrogated, and he was released only after pressure.

[Abu-Salih] Security was asked about that. Any person who has done something that calls for interrogation, is interrogated, and if he has committed a crime, he is imprisoned.

[Ajaj] But there has been talk of human rights violations.

[Abu-Salih] Lies. The Americans are trying to exploit human rights with the aim of interfering in Sudanese affairs. There is no other reason—that's it, no less, no more.

[Ajaj] But there are expectations [that they will create] security zones.

[Abu-Salih] We reject that. They cannot. They should try to intervene in Sudan—let them see what a real jihad is.

[Ajaj] Do you think your problem is just with America?

[Abu-Salih] Our problem is with the whole West. They are against Islam. This whole attack is because we have enacted Islamic law. It is a first step.

[Ajaj] Could the Khartoum-Tehran axis be one cause of Sudan's problems?

[Abu-Salih] We have ordinary relations with Iran, as with any other country, such as Italy, for example. I do not know the mystery behind the exaggeration of this subject, and this talk of alliance and axis and dependency. We oppose dependency and hegemony. We do not want to be controlled by a superpower. We are not dependents or followers of anyone. We do not export terrorism—I wish Sudan were properly understood.

[Ajaj] But Sudan's isolation is increasing, most recently with the failure of al-Bashir's talks in Libya.

[Abu-Salih] Who said they failed? They agreed to hold a joint meeting and to set up a committee for integration between the two countries, headed by Major 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud and Minister Muhammad Salih.

[Ajaj] Do you think there's any chance the Abuja talks will succeed?

[Abu-Salih] We have done everything that was asked of us. We tried to ease the suffering of our citizens in the South. We made a cease-fire to persuade the mutineers to attend the Abuja meeting. We are carrying a gun and an olive branch, and now we have put down the gun until the negotiations end. If they end well, thank God. Otherwise things will go differently. It is clear that there are some who do not want the talks to succeed, and will talk about their failure even before they begin, for some need of their own: to prepare for intervention in southern Sudan. If anyone tries that, they will see the result.

[Ajaj] Are there any ways out of the economic predicament Sudan is now experiencing?

[Abu-Salih] We are not in a predicament. We have been proceeding with an economic program for three years,

called the Economic Salvation Program, and this program has, according to foreign sources, boosted the national product 21 percent, 15 percent this year alone. It achieved self-sufficiency in wheat and a surplus of corn. Unfortunately it is not moving along on its own power, because there are no other backers, and because of political pressures. In spite of that it is still moving along.

Businessman Discusses Industry's Problems

*93AF0631A London AL-KHARTUM in Arabic
21 Apr 93 p 5*

[Interview with businessman Fath-al-Rahman al-Bashir by 'Awad Abu-Talib, in Cairo, date not given: "Industry in Sudan Faces Difficult Problems"]

[Text] Numerous are the windows to the boughs of the Sudanese economy, which is simple in its composition but complex in its treatment. One window is through agriculture, another through investment, banking, and finance, and yet another through savings, the law of supply and demand, employment policies, and wage standards.

But the most important window into its development or decline is the intertwining of farm production with industry. There is an adage that no one knows Mecca better than its inhabitants. Likewise, well-known businessman Fath-al-Rahman al-Bashir is a master among those involved with the economy, knowledgeable in its fundamentals, aware of its ills, and capable of pinpointing the area of pain and making a diagnosis with no hesitation. He even takes you one step further by prescribing the treatment and participating in giving it the medicine it needs.

AL-KHARTUM seized the opportunity of his presence in Cairo in order to embark with him on a prolonged tour of economic concerns. He was generous in his answers and explicit.

We began the interview by defining the problems that face Sudanese industry in general and the textile industry in particular. He said:

Industry in the Sudan, as in other developing nations, faces numerous and serious problems, the most important of which involve energy and its derivatives. Electricity is the leading problem, since it is the primary engine for production and today represents a fundamental impediment to better quality and increased production.

We lack petroleum and its various derivatives, such as gasoline, benzene, and kerosene. He added that the dearth of foreign exchange impedes importing the means of production from abroad.

He said that a serious problem facing industry is the lack of skilled and semi-skilled workers, especially because of the accelerated exodus to the Gulf states, resulting in low industrial productivity rates.

Industry in the Sudan would have collapsed totally because of the multiplicity of problems that plague it every now and again, except for its strong base that began to emerge in the early seventies. Thanks to this very real base, [industry] is much stronger than many realize.

[Abu-Talib] Has industry been very successful since then?

[al-Bashir] Some Sudanese industries should have been successful, especially the cooking oil industry, since the Sudan is an exporter of one of its means of production—grains such as beans and sesame seed. The same goes for the textile industry and its raw material—cotton for which the Sudan has been renowned since the days of bilateral rule. The 5-million-faddan al-Jazirah Project, which produces cotton of superior quality, is world-famous. It is common knowledge that the world competes for Sudanese cotton because of its quality. As long as cotton remains the textile industry's primary raw material, it should be strikingly successful in the future, despite the obstacles it faces.

Sudanese businessmen are qualified to deal with industry at all times, even under the darkest of conditions, considering that the Sudanese industry has had to endure severe obstacles over the past ten years.

[Abu-Talib] Specifically, what problems does the textile industry face?

[al-Bashir] The textile industry is currently facing complex and arduous problems. Chief among them is raw material quality. For the past two years cotton has been afflicted with a disease caused by inappropriate pest control procedures, such as spraying insecticides at the wrong time and for too long, causing severe damage to cotton and imposing a heavy burden on the textile industry. This has resulted in a decline in production and in extremely low quality. We hope that a suitable and effective treatment is found for this crop disease, because the high demand for Sudanese cotton is propelled by its reputation.

Another reason for the decline in output by the textile industry is the decree ordering a reduction in the acreage planted with cotton. Selecting quality cotton has become extremely difficult because there is so little of it in the marketplace.

[Abu-Talib] Is industry still far from realizing the slogan "we wear only what we manufacture"?

[al-Bashir] Let me tell you that this industry consumes large quantities of spare parts and chemicals that require huge amounts of foreign currency, which the Sudan lacks. That impacts industrial activity and causes a decline in production, even though the Sudan is a large

consumer of textiles. It uses about 200 million yards annually, or 60 percent of the total volume of production. But production, as a result of the aforementioned problems, has declined to 25 percent; thus, the "we wear only what we manufacture" slogan could not be realized. Those problems must first be solved before it can.

He added that textile industry problems could be overcome with a little effort since the Sudan remains among the world's most qualified countries for that industry, despite cotton's current high prices and despite the cotton blight which can be dealt with in the near future.

You should not forget that this industry is shared by both the public and private sectors and that the high degree of coordination between the two sectors is unmatched in other fields and, especially, that this industry is Sudanese, except for the Korean company, which has Sudanese shareholders.

[Abu-Talib] We notice that foreign investment in the Sudan is weak at a time when Sudanese investors are beginning to immigrate. Why is that, do you think?

[al-Bashir] Foreign investment in the Sudan is weak and very limited. The main reason is the infrastructure—energy, transportation, communications, warehousing—which is of the essence for all investment operations.

The lack of infrastructure has created a noticeable weakness in foreign investment in the Sudan even though the new investment law offers incentives for investing in the Sudan. But the impediments I mentioned constitute a formidable barrier to investment. Some Sudanese have recently founded industrial and commercial enterprises abroad. This trend is now becoming apparent in neighboring countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, as well as in certain European countries. This trend in no way does any harm to the Sudanese economy. Rather, it helps directly to provide the Sudan with foreign exchange.

I would not describe the egress of investors as immigration because their number is limited and because of the aforementioned obstacles to investment.

[Abu-Talib] The Sudan is going through complex economic conditions and economic semi-isolation. How can the economy grow under such conditions?

[al-Bashir] Economic cooperation is one of the most outstanding features of international relations in the new world. This cooperation model is almost an international commitment and may be described as the overall operation of economic activity based on importing the means of production, available technology, loans, and grants. This, of course, requires complete cooperation among all nations.

I would like to say that international economic, social, and political cooperation at its best does not mean the imposition of inappropriate conditions for the beneficiaries of such cooperation.

[Abu-Talib] How about the impact of Sudan's isolation?

[al-Bashir] The Sudan has friends and it has enemies, and I believe that the enemies have the louder voice, which has direct, and considerable, impact on all aspects of Sudanese economic activity. This is quite evident in the fact that the marketing problems encountered by traditional Sudanese exports were rooted in unstated policies and decisions by antagonistic countries.

He noted that the Sudan is currently reviewing and reevaluating its foreign relations, which should have good and positive consequences for the Sudanese economic issue.

[Abu-Talib] What is the solution for the economic crisis in the Sudan?

[al-Bashir] I can't deny the existence of numerous economic problems, but I don't know that the term "crisis" describes the current status of the Sudanese economy. I believe, however, that the way out of the current economic recession in the Sudan is through more planning and re-planning and through more plans to install capable managements by selecting people with qualifications and expertise. Such people are plentiful both within the Sudan and abroad.

I should not fail to mention that international cooperation is involved in this issue by helping, offering, complementing, and sizing-up the whole issue, but it does not provide the basis for economic process. This is a function to be carried out by nationals themselves with understanding and knowledge of what is involved in the problems.

The agencies concerned with economic activity in the ministries of finance, planning, agriculture, irrigation, and energy must undertake studies to determine the fastest and most secure way to deal with economic stagnation in the Sudan.

[Abu-Talib] The issue of privatizing the public sector looks thorny and large and is currently being debated by economists and by those interested in liberalizing the economy. How do you view this policy?

[al-Bashir] The decision to liberalize the economy is an excellent one and is something sought by private sectors in all countries of the world, including the United States. But the privatization of the Sudanese economy is slightly marred by inflation and the high dollar exchange rate vis-a-vis the local currency. Those, in my view, are temporary in nature, can be studied and dealt with, and require the government and the private sector to engage each other in more consultations, discussions, and studies. Great gains from the liberalization policy will ultimately accrue to the state, provided solutions are found for related problems such as inflation, high exchange rates, and wages. I believe that we must differentiate between a liberalized economy and a black market economy, in the sense of control and manipulation of commodity prices. The liberalization process in no way means that prices should rise every twenty-four

hours. Rather, it means that prices are not to be set by some authority that does not take into consideration the true cost of manufactured and imported goods. Balance, reason, and fairness must prevail under a policy of liberalization. I believe that soaring prices and the high cost of living are attributable to a minority of merchants. In any case, the solution to this issue (high prices) is in raising production (dealing with production problems is at the forefront) in order to provide an adequate supply of goods and induce competition. Accomplishing the liberalization of the law of supply and demand should bring prices down to their true levels.

[Abu-Talib] Would there be a clear imbalance in linking liberalization with wages? How can such an imbalance be corrected?

[al-Bashir] The cost of living issue is complex. That is why a national council of employers, employees, and the state was formed to make a bi-annual assessment of the cost of living.

This is not to say that current salaries and wages meet the ordinary cost of living. The solution, as I previously mentioned, is in raising production and resolving economic problems in order to allow the marketplace to correct itself through the process of supply and demand.

It is my view that the Sudanese private sector, with suitable encouragement, is capable of carrying out its function.

[Abu-Talib] What, in your opinion, are the reasons for the decline and shrinkage of the Sudanese-Egyptian trade protocol?

[al-Bashir] The Egyptian-Sudanese protocol started high, with economic cooperation between the two countries. Then it began to decline, gradually year after year, until recent years when the volume of trade between the two countries shrank. If we add past and current dollar costs we arrive at the sad reality that commercial cooperation between the two countries has declined.

There are many factors behind this decline. Politicians, by virtue of their responsibilities, agree on what is in the best interests of the two countries; but the bureaucrats, with their endless red tape and countless formalities impede the course of the Egyptian-Sudanese trade protocol.

He concluded by saying that the trade protocol between Egypt and the Sudan could realize considerable economic and social gains for the two countries and could become a special international model for economic and trade relations, provided good intentions prevail and red tape, which is largely responsible for depleting the Egyptian-Sudanese protocol, is abandoned.

He expressed hope that the next trade protocol would be intelligible and devoid of the usual shortcomings. He said that both Egypt and the Sudan must recognize their prerogatives and their obligations each to the other.

TUNISIA

UGET Leader Arrested on Drug Charges

93AF0659B Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 May 93 p 1359

[Text] Mr. Naoufal Ziadi, general secretary of the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET), was arrested on 18 May so that he could be brought before the correctional court in Mahdia. In April, Mr. Ziadi was convicted of "drug use and distribution" and sentenced to two years and six months imprisonment, but was allowed to remain free. His arrest on 18 May came after his lawyer's motion to set aside the court ruling was denied. The UGET describes the drug charges as "notoriously fabricated" and urges the authorities "to put an end to such dangerous machinations." The UGET is demanding the "release" of its general secretary and "a halt to the legal proceedings underway" against its deputy general secretary, Mr. Asset al-Yahiaoui. As general secretary of the UGET, which has a long history of disagreement between opposing groups within its executive bureau, Mr. Ziadi had made statements to the press in support of a series of partial strikes observed by students at several universities in late February, and had expressed his opposition to government proposed reforms of academic programs and graduation requirements.

Agricultural Projects With Argentina Outlined

93AF0681C Tunis LE TEMPS in French 22 May 93 p 2

[Text] Diversifying Tunisia's economic relations with other countries has become a constant concern of the government. Diversification is sought in all areas, but especially those areas that are most important to our economy and our daily lives, such as agriculture.

Destined to remain the basic, leading sector of the economy as long as the targets of self-sufficiency in food have not been reached, Tunisian agriculture is in search of new partners in addition to those it has dealt with up to now. In that search, divisions of the ministry of agriculture have been working to build relations with Latin America. Their efforts have focussed on the two giants of the South American continent: Argentina and Brazil.

With Argentina, a leader in grain cultivation and agriculture, those efforts have already moved beyond the initial contact phase and into high gear.

The cooperation agreement signed by Tunisia and Argentina in October 1991 and visits last year by Tunisian and Argentine experts have resulted in plans for five cooperation projects. They cover the following areas:

- reduction of grain losses both during and after harvest;
- technology transfer for the production of seeds for fodder plants and pasture land;

- the experimental introduction of the cultivation of soy beans and wheat in rotation;
- a study of possible improvements in the production of beef from pasture-grazed cattle in humid and sub-humid regions; and
- the development of methods for improving the production system used by farmers in grain-growing regions.

Two of Five Projects

To move the projects into implementation, a delegation of Argentine experts representing the National Institution of Agricultural Technology recently traveled to Tunisia.

As a result of the delegation's contacts with Tunisia's Ministry of Agriculture, including Minister Mouldi Zouari, and Tunisian experts and researchers, action plans for at least two of the five cooperation projects have been developed.

The two projects are the technology transfer for the production of seeds for fodder plants and pasture land and the experimental introduction of the cultivation of soy beans and wheat in rotation.

The action plan for the first of these two, which will be carried out between 1993 and 1996, calls for various steps:

1. Starting next July, high-quality plant matter will be made available. 2. Two Tunisian technicians will be trained in planting, tending, and evaluating crops, and in the technology used to grow, harvest, package, and store seeds. The training program will run from November 1993 to February 1994. 3. Varieties of fodder- and pasture-land plants will be selected for the purpose of cultivating fodder and improving grazing lands in humid, subhumid, and arid areas.

4. The propagation phase is scheduled for the 1995-96 growing season. 5. Making the benefits of the project available to Tunisian farmers will be the final step, to be carried out during the 1996-97 growing season. It will result in the development of permanent prairies.

The second project, the experimental cultivation of soy beans and wheat in rotation, will determine whether soy beans can be successfully farmed in Tunisia. The project is to be implemented in five phases:

1. A simulated model will be used to monitor the cultivation of soy beans in Tunisia's climatic conditions.
2. Laboratory tests and experiments will be conducted to study the response of the soy bean plant to Tunisia's climatic conditions.
3. Varieties of rhizobium appropriate to Tunisian soil conditions will be applied.
4. Cultivation trials will be conducted in demonstration fields.

5. Techniques of cultivating soy beans will be conducted and production systems will be evaluated in order to determine the feasibility of widespread cultivation of soy beans by Tunisian farmers.

Tunisia and Argentina have also agreed that as early as next month, a delegation of Argentine experts will introduce Tunisian technicians to methods of evaluating and reducing grain losses during and after harvest.

Concerning the plan to study ways of improving the system of producing beef from pasture-grazed cattle, it was decided that Tunisia will reformulate the project, specifying the expertise to be provided by Argentina.

Problems Affecting Textile Industry Described

93AF0659C Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 May 93 p 1360

[Text] The textile sector—which provides more than 210,000 jobs and brings in a surplus of more than 200 million dollars in foreign currencies—is in difficulty. Economic liberalization and the opening up of the Tunisian market have not been profitable to the manufacturing industries, and textiles—despite being considered Tunisia's leading industry—is no exception. The main indicators of the sector's difficulty are: a zero growth rate in 1992, a drop in the business volume of all companies operating in the sector, and a slackening of investment in textiles for the second year in a row.

Mr. Ahmed Sallami, president of the Federation of Textile Employers (Fenatex), attributes the slump to a flood of foreign products illegally brought into the local market. At a press conference held on the eve of the Eighth International Textile and Clothing Fair (19-23 May), Mr. Sallami told reporters that for several months now, the textile industries have been working through Fenatex to remind the government at every opportunity of the structural and cyclical difficulties confronting the sector and of the urgent need to adopt measures to remedy the situation.

In order to make themselves better heard, textile manufacturers seized the opportunity offered by labor negotiations in May to draw attention to their problems and to delay the signing of collective bargaining agreements. So far, Fenatex has deliberately refused to grant wage increases as other federations have done, making any increases contingent upon having its principal demands met. It is a tug-of-war between the government, which is anxious to complete the economic liberalization process, and the textile manufacturers, who are concerned by delays in the implementation of measures meant to accompany that process. Overshadowed by all of this are the difficulties of a sector that is going through a deep transformation.

To place this transformation in perspective, the enormous socio-economic importance of the textile sector must be borne in mind: It provides 50 percent of manufacturing jobs and leads all other sectors of the

Tunisian economy as an exporter of goods, accounting for 35 percent of export revenues. As a point of reference, textile exports in 1992 totaled 1.4 billion dollars in value, exceeding the combined value of petroleum, phosphate, and olive oil exports. Despite such results, the textile sector is fragile and vulnerable to the point that Fenatex has described the situation as "serious." That assessment, in any case, is unanimously shared.

Officials and manufacturers agree, in fact, that the problems confronting the sector could—if they persist—seriously affect the future of this branch of the economy. Its problems are both structural and cyclical. At the structural level, the sector suffers from insufficient integration, a shortage of managerial personnel, and dilapidated equipment. For instance, nearly 80 percent of the sector's weaving equipment consists of shuttle looms; in Europe, this type of loom represents only 8 percent of weaving equipment. With regard to size, 85 percent of Tunisia's 1,800 textile companies employ fewer than 100 persons.

The foreign threat is to be taken into consideration. The sector faces what could be major upheavals. Europe's single market and its standards, competition from eastern Europe and the dismantling of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA), as well as the inclusion of numerous competitor countries, threaten to undermine the advantages provided by the MFA, which protected the Tunisian textile industry. At the local level, the sector has suffered greatly from irregularities cited by the executive office of Fenatex, such as the massive importation of quality fabrics from Egypt, Turkey and southeast Asian countries (Taiwan, South Korea...), imported through the Libyan connection and sold in Tunisia at ridiculously low prices.

Other sources of unfair competition have been the introduction of nearly 20,000 metric tons of secondhand clothing into the market (whereas only 12,000 are officially allowed) and an increase in the volume of textile items brought into the country by emigrant workers and travelers. According to Fenatex, the combined effect of these various factors has been a drop of 35 to 50 percent in the business volume of textile companies, a zero rate of growth in 1992, and excess inventory in factories, resulting in situations of insolvency. Also according to Fenatex, several companies have been forced to file for authorization to make lay-offs so that they can reduce worker numbers and hours of work.

Yet there is no lack of proposed solutions to restructure the sector: The government and manufacturers are still wavering between two options. The first is to improve the sector's vertical integration. This can be achieved only if the spinning, weaving, and finishing subsectors can attract investors. However, such projects require very large amounts of investment and their profitability is in question. Meanwhile, the government has launched a series of measures toward greater vertical integration. Among them, the enactment of incentives for cotton production and the creation of a textile engineering

program at the engineering school in Monastir and at the Higher Institute of Textiles in Ksar Helal (where the largest textile companies are concentrated) in response to the need to expand technical and high-level managerial staffs. The manufacturers take the view that liberalization of the textile industry must be preceded by the enactment of accompanying measures and safety measures aimed at ensuring a successful liberation [as printed] and at avoiding the unfortunate experiences of some countries which have seen their industries disintegrate (Senegal) or undergo enormous job losses.

In concrete terms, these measures are, first, to set a reference price for imported yarn, fabrics, and made-up articles so as to eliminate the dumping effect and the impact of sales of discontinued product lines; and second, to obtain funds for conversion and modernization from local and international sources. In support of investment, the manufacturers are proposing lower interest rates charged by banks on investment funds, the elimination of customs duties on imported capital equipment, and a total tax exemption for export revenues. Other support measures being proposed are the promotion of research and development in textiles, flexibility in employment, and the revision of the labor code to legalize night-time hours for women workers (as the majority of textile workers are women).

The second option involves abandoning vertical integration in favor of finishing, fashion, design, up-market garment making and research. The advantages of this option are that supplies could be purchased from suppliers able to under cut prices, and that large investments in yarn spinning and weaving would not have to be made. At the same time, the Tunisian textile industry would remain dependent on the suppliers of its raw materials.

New Consumer Protection Law Operative

*93AF0681B Tunis LE TEMPS in French
19 May 93 p 2*

[Text] The new consumer protection law will enter into force on 1 June. This long-awaited law, promulgated on 7 December 1992, establishes a clear legal basis for the defense of consumer interests. "The new law is more preventive in nature than the one it replaces. The lawmakers also sought to give greater weight to judicial mechanisms of enforcement, meaning verification of compliance and punishment of those fail to comply," said Mr. Hafedh Ben Salah, a law professor, speaking at a national conference on the consumer protection law, which took place yesterday in Tunis under the auspices of the Ministry of the National Economy. The new law addresses product conformity to standards, fairness in marketing transactions, and violations. "The law lacks precision with regard to product conformity to standards because Tunisian standards do not cover all products," Mr. Hafedh Ben Salah assured the audience.

In fact, many consumer products do not match the standards of production.

Liability of the Merchant

The consumer protection law requires that a product put up for sale conform to Tunisian standards or internationally recognized standards. The consumer protection law holds merchants responsible for any harm that may result from the use of a product, whether imported or locally manufactured.

The law also prohibits the fraudulent marketing and sales of products not fit for consumption, including false advertising.

The new law requires that a National Consumer Protection Council be formed. Its task is to make recommendations concerning consumer information and guidance, guarantees of product conformity to standards, and the improvement of quality. A ministerial order will establish the council's make-up and operating methods.

Monitoring To Increase

If a defective product is sold, the supplier must replace or repair the product or reimburse the client, depending upon the client's wishes.

The new law subjects merchants to monitoring by a battery of inspectors, including the economic monitoring services, municipal agents, and public health inspectors. Inspection agents may seize suspect products, if they deem it advisable.

Violators are subject to three types of punishment. They may be fined, imprisoned, or ordered to close their business temporarily. The maximum fine is 20,000 dinars and prison sentences may vary from 16 days to two years.

Mr. Habib Guerfal, president of the organization that defends consumer interests, has consistently argued that, "The consumer has a right to truthful advertising, to know the content of the product he is buying."

New Law Review Issue Published

*93AF0681A Tunis LE TEMPS in French
18 May 93 p 2*

[Text] The 1991 issue [as published] of the "Tunisian Law Review" has just been published by the Center for Studies, Research, and Publications, under the oversight of the State Secretariat for Scientific Research and Technology.

This issue, like its predecessors, is rich and varied in content.

The French-language portion contains a large number of doctrinal contributions covering the most diverse fields of law. Professor S. Belaid attempts to develop a theory of how legal systems change, using the Arab legal systems as a reference.

Regulations governing foreign investment in Algeria are studied by Mr. Zouaimia, and similar regulations in

Tunisia are examined by Professor F. Horchani. J. Ladjili offers an analysis of Tunisian public opinion on the Mediterranean.

In the area of social law, Prof. H. Kotrane presents a study of labor law, the requirements of companies, and employment policy, while Prof. E. Bouslah looks into the problem of restructuring and streamlining the way in which the social security system is managed.

Prof. Charfeddine studies the status of private property in areas slated for land development. Other articles of note include a study by Mr. S. Rezgui on the tax liabilities of government officials and a study by Prof. Knani on Article 100 of the code of commerce. Mrs. Bouraoui looks into the question of expert assessments in criminal cases in relation to modern criminal policy.

Mr. A. Ahmadi examines the question of failure to remain at the scene of a traffic accident. Last, Mr. A. Rebai studies regulations governing commitments to sell space in buildings under construction.

In the Arab-language portion, the Jordanian professor, G. El Joundi publishes a study of the functions of the rule of equity in international law.

Prof. S. Ben Halim looks into the difficulties relating to the failure by an appellant to produce an exemplified copy of the original divorce decree in filing for an appeal. Last, Mr. M. M. Ezzine studies the invalidity of procedural acts.

In addition to the studies mentioned above, the Arabic-language portion contains a much richer section devoted to case law, while the French-language portion contains news, notes, and reports.

This issue constitutes a valuable reference document for researchers as well as for practitioners and students of the law.

Maghreb Labor Unions Call For Opposition Islamists
*93AF0659A Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 May 93 p 1359*

[Text] On 22 May, the United Maghreb Labor Unions of the Arab Maghreb (USTMA) called for an "effort to combat religious extremism." It urged that democracy be strengthened in the countries of the Maghreb in order to counter fundamentalist militancy. In a press release, the USTMA stated its conviction that "religious extremism, which has given rise to terrorism," is "a serious danger to democracy in the countries of the Maghreb and a direct threat to the unity process" in the Maghreb. It underscored the need to confront this "danger by mobilizing public opinion in favor of strengthening democracy and establishing societies that ensure dignity and social justice." The USTMA, which is based in Tunis, is made up of labor organizations from the five member countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). The UMA was urged to act more "effectively and quickly" in laying the foundations of a "Maghreb entity that gives importance to respect for democratic freedoms and human rights, beginning with labor freedoms."

BANGLADESH

Paper on Quick Restoration of Friendly Ties to Burma

*BK1306104193 Dhaka DAINIK ITTEFAQ in Bengali
29 May 93 p 2*

[Editorial: "Rohingya Refugees"]

[Text] The home minister of Burma, Lieutenant General Mya Thinn, visited Bangladesh and held high-level talks on the Rohingya refugees issue. After the meetings, he expressed optimism that the problem will be resolved soon.

At present, the total number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is about 265,000. Despite repatriation efforts over the past year, only about 25,000 have been sent back so far. The Bangladesh Government has sent the Burmese authorities a list of 227,741 refugees, who are to be repatriated, but Rangoon has agreed to take back only 98,865. Many people believe the Burmese have adopted a go-slow policy.

The refugees want to be repatriated under the supervision of the UN, which is also opposed to their forcible repatriation. To prevent any coercion, the Bangladesh Government and the UN have signed a memorandum of understanding. However, the Burmese Government is still silent over the issue of involving the UN in the repatriation process.

The Burmese home minister has said that Burma and Bangladesh are not only brothers but twins. It is true that apart from the Rohingya issue there is no dispute between the two countries. After the refugee problem is resolved, there would be no hurdles along the path of development of good neighborly ties. It may be recalled that these countries were under repressive British rule at the same time. In the past, many Bangladeshis visited Burma for their livelihood. The famous classic Bengali novel entitled "Pother Dabi" [Demand of Pavements] depicts characters in the streets of Burma dreaming of achieving freedom. Many Bangladeshis are also married to Burmese. The history of the early part of the present century is replete with examples of close ties between the two countries. Bangladesh and Burma are bound by close historical and traditional ties. Hence, the Rohingya refugee issue should not be allowed to mar these ties.

Unfortunately, despite similar history and tradition, bilateral ties have not been as cordial as it could have been. Perhaps, the Ne Win government's secessionist policy is primarily responsible for this. Whatever the reason, we hope there will be efforts to foster closer ties between the government and the people of the two countries. It appears that the only hurdle on this path is the Rohingya refugees issue. We hope the Burmese authority will remove the current tension between the two brotherly countries by speedily taking back the refugees under UN supervision. It is expected that peace and cooperation between the two twin brothers would then be restored.

IRAN

Raja'i-Khorasani on Iraq's Role in Gulf Security

*93LA0065H Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
2 May 93 p 2*

[Text] In an interview with AL-KHALIJ newspaper, an Iranian Majles representative emphasized the readiness of Iran to cooperate with its western neighboring countries regarding the maintenance of security in the Persian Gulf. He expressed the opinion that in any final security decisionmaking, Iraq's presence should be considered.

Raja'i-Khorasani, member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of Majles while making the above statement also said: We are ready to cooperate with the region's states regarding the maintenance of collective security in the Persian Gulf; however, we believe that the final step depends on the return of Iraq to its normal condition, which will be contingent on the decision of the Iraqi people with regard to its political future.

He went on to say: Iraq is an important country in the region and without that country it would be impossible to reach permanent security and all the states of the Persian Gulf are well aware of the fact.

Regional security, which was proposed at the end of the Persian Gulf War never translated into the key to resolve the differences between Iran and the Arab countries.

Tehran is particularly opposed to any participation by Egypt and Syria regarding the prevalence of security in the Persian Gulf region.

Report on State of Health Care in Esfahan Province

*93LA0065G Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
8 May 93 p 5*

[Text] Throughout the province of Esfahan there are 1,681 general and specialized physicians and 206 dentists engaged in the care and treatment of the patients of the province.

Similarly, there are 304 pharmacies (drugstores), 42 hospitals, 39 medical laboratories, 25 radiology labs, 17 public and private nonprofit infirmaries (wards), and four clinics with limited surgical capabilities, which are active for the treatment of patients in need of help.

Dr. Banak, deputy director for the Regional Health Care Organization of the province, in a conversation with IRNA's correspondent declared the number of hospital beds of the province at 7,110.

While expressing his satisfaction with the health care and treatment condition of the city of Esfahan, he said: Our

major difficulty is the shortage of specialized physicians and other treatment possibilities for the deprived regions of the province.

While stating that in the current year about 10 billion rials [Rls] of credit was allocated for the treatment services of insured individuals, he said: If we do not have any increase in the tariff, we will not be facing any budget deficit in the area of treatment services.

The deputy director for the Regional Health Care Organization of the province of Esfahan pointed out that the cause of nonpayment of debts of treatment centers when due in 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] as the unforeseen increase in the price of drugs and tariffs, which was not reflected in the allocated budget.

He went on to say: Last year the budget for treatment services of the Esfahan Province was Rls5 billion, but with the increase in the price of drugs and tariffs, which began in 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992] and nearly doubled by the end of 1371, we faced a deficit of Rls4.5 billion; this matter caused some delay in the payment of the debts of which a portion has been duly paid.

He further mentioned the creation of an ophthalmology department each in Shahreza, Khomeyni-shahr and Ard-estan, and the erection of six emergency stations throughout the city of Esfahan; construction of similar emergency stations in Vazvan, Qoroqchi, and Murche-khort on the Esfahan-Tehran highway and construction of an information center for patients in Esfahan as some of the measures taken by the aforementioned organization during last year.

Billions Spent Annually on Subsidies in Kerman

*93LA0065F Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
4 May 93 p 5*

[Text] In the province of Kerman more than 500 billion rials [Rls] are paid as subsidies for basic goods annually.

Marashi, governor general of Kerman Province in a gathering of the inhabitants of Golbaf district while making the above statement also said: From the aforementioned figure an amount of Rls450 billion is spent on fuels, Rls40 billion is employed in the production of bread, and the remainder is consumed by other essential goods.

He further added: Per capita subsidy in the province of Kerman stands at Rls250,000, which is about 13 times more than the per capita development budget of the province.

With reference to the depravity of certain districts of the province in the development process, the governor general of Kerman stated: If this amount of subsidy is not given out, it will be used on development projects of the province as well.

While visiting Golbaf in the district of Shahdad and other neighboring rural areas, the governor general

pointed out that in the current year Rls600 million were allocated to continue construction work on the road between Kerman and Golbaf and also an amount of 200 million rials of credit was appropriated for paving the road between Sirjan and Jowshan in the district of Shahdad.

Khark Petrochemical Production Figures Released

*93LA0065E Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
8 May 93 p 3*

[Text] In 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] Khark Petrochemical Company succeeded in producing 415,000 tons of sulphuric products, benzene, propane, and butane. This figure shows a 19-percent increase over 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992] figures and an 83-percent increase over that of 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] figures.

According to the report of the Public Relations Office of Khark's Petrochemical Company, during last year the company produced about 163,000 tons of sulphur by-products, around 117,000 tons of regular benzene, close to 75,000 tons of propane, and nearly 59,000 tons of butane.

Last year, Khark Petrochemical Company exported 105,000 tons of sulphur by-products and 43,000 tons of propane. Similarly, while maintaining proper production output, in 1371 the company carried out essential repairs on various dependent units and at the same time, in order to improve productivity, the active compressors of the company were equipped with computerized monitors as well.

Khark Petrochemical Company is located on the coral island of Khark and in the area of petrochemical industry is in charge of the retrieval of sulphur, liquid gas, butane, and propane from the rich gasses of the continental shelf's oil zone.

Over 91 Million Kg Goods Exported From Kerman

*93LA0065D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
5 May 93 p 5*

[Text] During last year more than 91 million kg of goods with a total value of 26.9 billion rials were exported from Kerman.

The director general of the Center of Standards and Industrial Research of Kerman in an interview with the IRNA's correspondent while making the above statement, also said: The highest export figure of 87.3 million kg belongs to pistachio products.

He further enumerated the export goods including such items as pistachios, dry figs, rosewater, sweet marjoram, and dates and stated: The aforementioned goods were exported to Germany, France, Canada, Australia, Japan, and some Persian Gulf countries as well.

Funds Allocated To Complete Dam, Tunnel in Kordestan

*93LA0065C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
8 May 93 p 5*

[Text] A 10-billion-rials [RIs] credit plus 2 million dollars of foreign exchange funds have been allocated to continue construction work on the dam and tunnel of Gavoshan in the province of Kordestan in the current year. This project will provide the irrigation water for the two provinces of Kerman and Kordestan.

According to IRNA, this matter was announced by the executive director of the said project during a visit by Engineer Mir Salim, adviser to the president and other responsible western regional water authorities of the country.

The executive director further added: For the execution of the Gavoshan tunnel, which is going to be 18.6 km long and will have a capacity for 26 cubic meters of water per second, two excavating machines equipped with laser-beam capability were purchased for \$25 million from Germany. After the preparation of the plant's workshop, the excavation work on the tunnel with a diameter of 5 meters will start.

The aforementioned person also stated: After the completion of the Gavoshan dam and tunnel and its supplementary channels, more than 40,000 hectares of dry farming land in the provinces of Kordestan and Kermanshah will be transformed to irrigation system. At the same time, in the long run the needs of the inhabitants of both provinces for potable water will be duly met.

Aqa Jani, executive director of the State Western Regional Water Affairs in a report said: The western region of the country, which includes the provinces of Kermanshah, Kordestan, Ilam, Lorestan, and Hamadan, with about 500 mm of rainfall per year on a national basis, comprise third place for availability of water resources. And so far the usage of water in this region has been far below the percentage of the rate of rainfall.

Aqa Jani further stated: The State Western Regional Water Affairs in the Second Five-year Plan intends to execute the construction of 18 reservoir dams on 14 rivers in order to utilize and control the surface waters in the provinces of Kordestan, Ilam, and Kermanshah.

Furthermore he added: This year with the allocation of RIs140 billion of credit, the operational work on 10 reservoir dams and some other water procurement projects in the aforementioned provinces have started.

Later, adviser to the president, Mir Salim, participated in a meeting with Sahraian, governor general of Kermanshah, representatives of the province at the Assembly of the Experts, and the Islamic Council and studied the issues and other relevant problems of the plans and projects under operation in the western region of the country.

In addition Salim stated: Extensive work on the utilization of surface and subterranean waters of the country started, which has been given priority to continue in the Second Five-year Plan.

Flood Damage to Agriculture in Khuzestan Detailed

*93LA0065A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
4 May 93 p 3*

[Text] In the agricultural year of 1371-72 [1992-1993] more than 65,000 hectares [ha] of agricultural land of the province of Khuzestan was completely flooded.

Dr. Kalantari, minister of agriculture, in a conversation with correspondents in Ahwaz further stated: The damages incurred by those farmers whose lands were covered by insurance will be duly compensated by the insurance company and the remaining damages will be likewise compensated for by use of the Damage Fund through the Interior Ministry.

While pointing out that during last year 1 million tons of wheat was produced in the province of Khuzestan, Kalantari said: With regard to all the damages incurred by farmers in the current year, it is still expected that wheat production will match that of last year's.

Dr. Kalantari went on to add: Three years ago the median wheat production in the province of Khuzestan was below 2 tons, but right now the median production of irrigated wheat of the province is above 4 tons.

The minister of agriculture further stated: At present, Khuzestan stands behind the provinces of Khorasan, Fars, Azarbaijan, and Mazandaran in wheat production.

While underlining the necessity of attention for preventing floods, the minister of agriculture said: The best way to combat the floods in such provinces as Khuzestan, which has gentle grade arable land, is to widen the river beds.

Referring to his visit to the Water and Earth Project of the province of Khuzestan, Dr. Kalantari stated: Thirty active water and earth workshops throughout this province are busy leveling and dredging the designated areas and we hope that by the end of the Second [Five-Year] Plan all of the related engineering work will be done.

The minister of agriculture, while mentioning his visit to the date-palm groves of Abadan and Khorramshahr and their reforestation, also said: Right now more than 80 percent of the date-palm groves need to be replanted and it will take at least another six to seven more years for them to become economically and technically viable.

He went on to say: in 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] a 700-billion-rial subsidy has been allocated to the farmers to combat the shortage of fertilizers and pesticide sprays and, as a result of these subsidized payments, the price of fertilizer and pesticides is bound to increase between seven- to ten-fold.

Report on the State of Damages and Other Pertinent Losses Resulting From the Flood in the Khuzestan Province

Chief of staff of the State Unexpected Events Bureau announced that 55,000 ha of agricultural land of Khuzestan Province were flooded recently.

Sunday afternoon, Engineer Zargar told correspondents that the recent flood has caused damages to about 4,000 dwelling houses in the rural areas of Shadegan, Shush, and Ahvaz. He further added: In the townships of Masjed-e Soleyman, Shush, Shushtar, Dezful, Ahvaz, and Shadegan, 53 villages were completely flooded, while another 118 villages are surrounded by flood waters as well.

Zargar, deputy for Coordination of Development Affairs to the Minister of Interior and chief of staff of the Unexpected Events Bureau said: From about 10,000 families living in the affected rural areas, 3,500 individuals were placed in tents close to their original villages.

With regard to the flood damages in Khuzestan he stated that so far three persons lost their lives, and 10 people were injured. At the same time, about 3,500 heads of livestock perished.

Zargar pointed out that the Staff of the Unexpected Events will assign 1 billion rials [Rls] for emergency operations in the province of Khuzestan.

Regarding the frequent flooding in this province he said that four projects have been proposed to safeguard the security of Ahvaz for which Rls50-billion credit is necessary.

Zargar enumerated the aforementioned four projects: Construction of coastal roads alongside the banks of the Karun river; completion of the present flood embankments; reconstruction and improvement of the dredging and sewage plants. [sentence as published]

He further stated that the Staff of the Unexpected Events does not have the capacity to deal with these projects on its own.

In conclusion, Zargar stated that the damages caused by the recent floods in the province of Khuzestan outweigh those of other provinces of Esfahan, Lorestan, Yazd, and Kohkiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad.

IRGC Personnel To Move to Law Enforcement Forces

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[Text] Happenings Service: Transfer of law enforcement personnel in the various regions of the country will take place simultaneously with the interdepartmental transfers of the same force.

According to our correspondent, Brigadier General Pasdar Mohammad Asghari, deputy director of personnel of Law Enforcement Forces yesterday [Tuesday], in an interview with domestic correspondents while making the above statement also said: Interdepartmental transfers of the law enforcement personnel during current year will reach one-third of its equivalent for last year.

He further added: One of the important activities of this force is the issue of the interdepartmental transfer of the law enforcement personnel in which a group of deprived regions will replace others. In 1371 [21 Mar 1992 - 20 Mar 1993] 85 percent of the qualified individuals were duly transferred.

The deputy director of personnel of Law Enforcement Forces mentioned that the transfer of natives is dependent on the approval of the related units and the requirements of the local department in question. He also said: Last year after the merger, the first phase of transfers were effected in which about 13,000 individuals from the law enforcement forces were transferred.

While referring to the grading and classification systems of the individuals between various centers of the force, he said: One year of service by officials in the less desirable geographical locations will count as two years of service in the favorable regions.

Brig. Gen. Mohammad Asghari, while mentioning the attraction of young and efficient individuals to the forces as one of the future programs of his office, also said: The office of the Deputy Director of Personnel of Law Enforcement Forces is considering a nationwide examination and acceptance of the same in the officers' colleges, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the forces.

He further announced: Until now about 95 percent of the guardians of the former Komitehs received their ranking designations and the remaining individuals will receive their promotions in the future as well.

In this regard he added: Hierarchy and assignment of ranks are mandatory in this force and those disregarding the rules will be dealt with accordingly.

In conclusion, the deputy director of the Law Enforcement Forces stated: For future reinforcement of the law enforcement forces in the current year 2,500 individuals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] will be transferred to this force.