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Prospects for U.S.-Soviet Arms Reduction

90WC0039A Beijing *SHIJIE ZHISHI* in Chinese
No 1, 1 Jan 90 pp 24-25

[Article by Cao Ye (2580 0396): "Prospects of U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reduction as Seen From a Debate in the United States"]

[Text] Looking back, U.S.-Soviet and East-West arms negotiations were rather active last year, gaining momentum in the latter six months. This situation arises directly from the changed relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the Soviet side, salient features of last year were the close relations and interplay between its domestic political situation and foreign policy. Because his reform program met with great difficulties and because of the turmoil in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev found it necessary to use the fruits of arms negotiations to improve the external environment and stabilize the domestic political situation. On the U.S. side, the Bush administration had, after careful observation and deliberation, convinced itself that the trend of changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was favorable to the West. Hence, since the second half of last year, the United States has taken a more positive approach in its support for Gorbachev and made it clear that it intends to promote the "democratization process" in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through arms control negotiations. It was precisely these changes in the United States and the Soviet Union that brought about a great advance in arms negotiations.

In strategic arms reduction talks, the Soviet Union had softened its position that negotiations must be tied to negotiations on outer space weapons, expressing its willingness to reach an accord on strategic arms reduction before coming to agreement on outer space weapons. The United States also changed its insistence that the movement of land-based missiles be prohibited. This brought the two countries a step closer to the goal of reaching an accord on strategic arms reduction. At the Malta summit in early December, the U.S. and Soviet leaders again expressed their optimism about the prospects of arms talks.

While the whole world was discussing the prospects and significance of U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear arms reduction, a debate broke out within strategic issues study circles in the United States. The question at issue was whether massive cuts in strategic nuclear arms were in the interests of U.S. national security. Positive and negative answers to this question will evidently have different effects on this major negotiation between the two countries.

In the 1970's the United States and the Soviet Union concentrated on developing multiple-warhead systems. This policy was responsible for the reverse pyramid in the number of warheads, missiles, and launching pads in the strategic nuclear arsenals of these two countries. Due to the great numbers involved, the question of massive cuts will not pose too major a problem. However,

because there are comparatively fewer strategic missiles, airplanes, and submarines, how big a cut they can endure is a matter of concern.

The skeptical faction headed by Nixon and Kissinger maintained that if agreement was reached on the proposal currently under discussion (a 50-percent cut), the survivability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces would be seriously weakened, since this means it would be able to keep only 300 to 400 of its existing land-based missile launching silos and 17 strategic submarines. The United States would thus be compelled to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons (such as single-warhead missiles and small submarines). However, with a much reduced military budget, large-scale renovation of nuclear weapons is out of the question. Even with the necessary funds, the development of new weapons will take about 10 years, but, according to the terms of the agreement, the arms reduction would have to be completed in seven years. This time gap would create a big hole in U.S. defense. More important, the fact this cut will increase the threat posed by Soviet conventional arms in Europe means that whether or not the United States will sign the accord on strategic arms reduction will depend on the progress of talks on conventional arms cuts in Europe. In addition, the United States must also be on its guard against Soviet attempts to make use of internal differences in the Western camp to stir up trouble within NATO in the course of negotiations. In short, the skeptics held that it was not in the interests of the United States to rush into things.

The supporters headed by former chief U.S. arms negotiator Kampelman held that military issues after the 50-percent cut can be dealt with. For instance, more silos may be kept or built to allow mobility of land-based missiles. The question of submarines may be solved through cutting back on the number of missiles to be reduced, increasing the number of submarines and increasing the anti-submarine capability against the Soviet Union. This will not jeopardize the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces. The important thing is that, because Soviet offensive capability will also be cut by half, the threat to U.S. security will be reduced. Having weighed the pros and cons, steps should be taken to hasten the signing of the accord on strategic arms reduction because it will be in the interests of the United States to do so. They opposed combining talks on strategic nuclear arms with talks on reducing conventional weapons in Europe because this would only complicate matters.

From this debate, one can see that: First, while conditions for massive cuts in strategic nuclear arms are ripening, it is reckoned that the implications of strategic arms talks will be beyond the compare of medium-range missile talks. Negotiations and publicity are one thing, but actual implementation can be decided only after careful deliberations. Second, while problems produced by arms reduction can be resolved, the solution of these problems takes time and money and therefore can only

be a gradual process. Third, reliance on nuclear deterrence to offset the superiority of Soviet military presence on continental Europe has been the key to postwar U.S. military strategy. When the superiority of Soviet conventional arms has not been reduced to a level that the United States can feel comfortable with, no U.S. administration will find it easy to decide on a major operation that will affect its overall nuclear capability.

The stance of the Bush administration on this issue is somewhere between the two contending views, with an obvious leaning toward the side of Nixon and Kissinger. The overall policy is to actively explore possibilities and push ahead with the talks while trying to be cautious and steady rather than being overanxious for quick results. This tactic is prompted not only by military and strategic considerations but also by political calculations. The Bush administration hopes to encourage Gorbachev to go on following the line of reform through disarmament talks and economic assistance. On the other hand, the United States is unsure of the long-term strategic intentions of the Soviet Union and still has misgiving that reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may take a turn for the worse. Hence, just as it does not really want the Soviet Union to become economically strong, the Bush Administration will not rashly make major concessions that will jeopardize U.S. strategic interests in decisive arms talks. By comparison, in areas of arms talks that have lesser strategic significance, it is quite likely that breakthroughs will be made in the near future. Negotiations on chemical weapons, conventional arms in Europe and nuclear tests are the areas likely to yield fruits first. Progress can be expected next year, but one should not be too optimistic and think that an accord on strategic arms reduction can be reached within the year 1990.

In U.S.-Soviet arms control talks, one notices that in the nuclear age the United States and the Soviet Union are aware of the need to contain confrontation but are at the same time also locked in heated contention. In U.S.-Soviet relations, contention was and still is the leading factor. In the current debate in the United States, the point of departure of both sides is that on no account should the accord impair the nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union. Both sides maintained that the United States must continue modernizing its nuclear capability and must not lower its vigilance against the Soviet Union. In other words, even the accord on strategic arms reduction was signed today, it does not mean that the United States and the Soviet Union have become buddies at long last. One can see this plain fact if he or she takes a look at where the overwhelming majority of strategic nuclear weapons of the two superpowers are directed against. Understanding this debate in the United States will be of help to judging which direction the strategic arms talks will head and analyzing the current U.S.-Soviet relations.

Non-Guided Antiaircraft Weapons Defended

*HK0503053990 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 17 Feb 90 p 3*

[Article by Meng Xianhui (1322 2009 6540): "Do Not Ignore Non-Guided Antiaircraft Weapons"]

[Text] The rapid development and extensive use of electronic technology in the military sphere since World War II have made the use of guided weapons more difficult although greater importance has been attached to them. The success rate against airborne targets by guided weapons has been dropping continuously while that by non-guided weapons has been unexpectedly increasing. This can be seen more clearly when we make an analysis of some regional wars since the 1950's and relevant materials from some foreign countries.

In the Korean War, the U.S. forces lost about 1,000 military planes. Of these, 676 were shot down by anti-aircraft guns (a non-guided weapon), making 67.6 percent. In the Vietnamese war, due to the strong electronic interference and jamming by U.S. forces and the extensive use of metal foil, the hit rate for guided missiles which depend on a guidance system was greatly reduced. For example, when the SAM-2 guided missiles were used in large numbers for the first time in 1965, an average of 15 missiles were needed to shoot down a plane. In 1968, in order to shoot down a plane some 48 missiles were used. At the beginning of the 1970's, over 50 missiles had to be launched. From January to July 1966, of the 393 low-altitude planes the U.S. forces lost, 374, or 95 percent, were shot down by small-bore anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft machine guns. Of the 831 planes the U.S. forces lost in 1968 when bombing northern Vietnam, 696, or 83.8 percent, were shot down by ordinary anti-aircraft guns. The situation in the third Middle East war was even worse. The Egyptian army launched a total of 22 surface-to-air missiles in six days but none hit a plane. In the fourth war, because the Israeli Air Force had successfully applied electronic warfare technology, it destroyed Syria's guided missile base in only six minutes without any losses on its part. However, in the following battles, because it was unable to make effectively interfere with the 23-mm four-barrel self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, it suffered great losses.

The sudden attack on Libya by U.S. forces two years ago was more astonishing. Because the U.S. forces had effectively applied electronic countermeasures, the Libyan radar system was completely paralyzed. None of its planes were able to take off and its guided missiles were unable to work. The only loss suffered by the U.S. side was a military plane and it was shot down by an ordinary anti-aircraft gun. This makes us think of a recent instance of war. When the U.S. Army started to invade Panama it used its advanced F-117 "stealth" fighter to evade Panama's radar system, allowing its airborne troops to capture the airport easily. The air defense guided weapons in Panama were proved ineffective. If at

that time there had been some non-guided weapons in the airport, the result might have been different.

These facts tell us that although guided weapons have been developing rapidly, non-guided weapons still form an important force in modern air defense systems which should not be ignored. Almost all strategists in the world today believe that future wars will first of all be electronic wars in which electromagnetic interference will be unavoidable. Under such circumstances where the guided weapons are unable to escape interference, the non-guided weapons will play a greater role. For this reason, many countries are trying to enlarge the bores of their anti-aircraft guns, increase the initial velocity and firing rate of their warheads, and develop multi-barrel, high firing rate, and massed fire air defense weapons, to increase their counter-fighting efficiency under electromagnetic circumstances. Of course, non-guided weapons are by no means a miraculous cure for all diseases. We only want to remind people not to ignore the development of non-guided weapons while attaching importance to the development of guidance technology.

LIAOWANG on European Balance of Power

*HK0703065490 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION No 9, in Chinese 26 Feb 90*

["Special Dispatch from Vienna" by Liu Yunfeng (0491 0061 1496): "Symposium Probes 'New Balance' of Military in Europe"]

[Text] The general chiefs of staffs and commanders of the armed forces of the 35 member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] recently gathered in Vienna to hold a symposium on military science. Generals from countries with different social systems, in various military uniforms, and with their brief cases filled with material on military thinking and defense blueprints, strutted in and out of the brilliantly decorated ex-ballroom of the Hofburg Palace. They attracted the attention of tourists visiting the palace as well as the political and military personages in countries around the world.

At the symposium, generals who had spent their time gauging the moves of their enemies in time of war, now talked face to face in an attempt to better understand the motives and method of thinking of their opponents to make possible the establishment of a "new balance" in Europe.

The three-week long symposium was conducted in two stages. The first stage was held between 16 and 22 January, at which the joint chiefs of staffs of various participating states read their statements of principle and fundamental viewpoints on military strategic thinking and defense programs of military blocs and countries. The second stage, held between 23 and 25 January, featured detailed discussions on security models and military science. For instance, the structure and potential of armed forces, equipment and training, budget allocations, and reform concepts. The joint chiefs

of staffs vied with each other to be the first to make statements. They made a lot of noise at press conferences and then "retreated," leaving the secret discussion of relevant details to generals of lower rank and experts.

Judging from the published material, and from what this reporter has learned, some new viewpoints and those with a mixture of new and old ideas were raised at the symposium. For instance: Prevention of war should be made the highest principle of military strategy and security measures; assault-type armed forces should be changed into defensive structure; military planning should be adapted to the interests of one's country; openness of the military as the basic premise for future European security; the necessity to end the era of confrontation in Europe; the need for a coordinated defense policy in a changed Europe to build a new security balance; the elimination of ideological elements in security policy; and the recognition of men, instead of arms themselves, as the most critical element in making war.

In the first stage of the symposium the delegates from the United States and its major allies reiterated their original strategic stand which is that the NATO's "flexible response" strategy must be maintained for the foreseeable future. But they also favored cuts in defense budgets and military forces.

The U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, announced: "Deterrence is the cornerstone of our military strategy," "the United States has the obligation to insist on the flexible response strategy and the basis for this strategy is maintaining reliable deterrence."

He said: "Today, a common conclusion has been reached by the East and West, namely the era of confrontation in Europe must be ended" and the number of U.S. European-based armed forces was not "sacred and unchangeable." But he stressed that Warsaw Pact armed forces must be changed to an obvious defensive structure.

The chief of Federal German Army, Admiral Dieter Wellershoff agreed that there must be no change in NATO's "flexible response" strategy but he has also said: "It is conceivable that some changes can occur, given the nature of the factors making up the strategy. The change may first occur in the composition of armed forces. Our strategy will not stay unchanged but will depend on changes in determining relations and existing potential."

The Warsaw Pact side exhibited a loose tendency to withdraw the army and "reform" but nobody requested to pull out of the Warsaw Pact.

The chief of staff of the Soviet Army, General Moiseyev, said the fundamental content of Soviet military thinking is "resolving international problems without resorting to force, viewing peace as the greatest interest for human beings. The Soviet Union will pose no threat, will not launch any attacks on any country, and will not be a military superpower."

He also said: "The Soviet Army will conduct structural adjustment of a defensive type, will reduce the number of military regions, armies, and full-equipment divisions, with the balance between attack and defense tipped toward the latter. The divisions and regiments stationed in allied countries will be restructured. The Soviet Union will lower its conventional armed forces to a minimum level where it will be only sufficient to repel possible invasions. Defense will be the major operation pattern if the Soviet Army comes under attack."

He claimed that the Warsaw Pact may change its structure and internal system. It must change from a military-political bloc into a political-military one and Warsaw Pact member states are completely free to walk their own way and create a brand new "human and democratic society."

Apart from requesting the Soviet Union to withdraw its army, the chiefs of staff of Czechoslovakia and Hungary also stressed the necessity for the Warsaw Pact to conduct in-depth "reform" in which the first thing was to democratize decision-making organs and increase the degree of openness.

In March 1989, following the start of two parallel conferences, the Vienna Talks on Building Trust and Security Measures in Europe and the Vienna Talks on European Conventional Arms in Europe between the 23 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Western countries suggested holding an expert-level discussion on military theories. After consultation, all participating states agreed to call a conference of the military heads of 35 countries to discuss problems in military theories.

The reason the symposium could be convened at all is related to changes in the international situation. After the Second World War, the two great Eastern and Western military blocs stepped up armaments and preparations for war, especially those of the United States and the Soviet Union, which reached an extent which their economies could hardly support. In the 1970's the United States and Soviet Union began talks on arms control and called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. As East-West relations eased up gradually, talks on nuclear arms control were expanded to include talks on reducing conventional arms, which in turned initiated the talks on building trust and security measures in Europe. The latter produced the motion on exchanging and discussing military theories. The convocation of the symposium early this year was inseparable from the rapid changes in the East European situation

and the Soviet attitude. It is not difficult to perceive, judging from the condition of the symposium, that the West is exploiting the favorable situation to force the Soviet Union to make full concessions.

The symposium was not set out to end with any papers or concluding documents but people here believe that it has fulfilled the preliminary purposes of exchanging conditions and thinking, the promotion of understanding, and the strengthening of trust. It will also help push forward arms control talks.

The year 1990 will be a "year of arms reduction," everybody here said. People in arms reduction circles and press circles have recently pointed out optimistically that four to five accords of arms reduction and measures for building trust may be signed this year. But some people worry that new problems may occur if arms reduction proceeds too quickly. The British deputy chief of staff, Charles Vincent, pointed out at the symposium that too rapid arms reduction could produce new risks because if arms reduction led people to think that war was impossible, that would be a new kind of risk. If political changes in Europe are not guided by caution and not supported by trusting measures, there might also be danger. He believed that the current mission is to ensure that arms reduction will not jeopardize stability during the transitional period.

Asian Conference on Nuclear Cooperation Ends

*OW1303184590 Beijing XINHUA in English
1627 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Text] Tokyo, March 13 (XINHUA)—The first international conference for nuclear cooperation in Asia ended here today with a pledge to explore regional cooperation for development of safe uses of nuclear power.

Senior Asian atomic energy officials also decided to hold the conference annually.

Participants from China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and Japan also called for the training of safety specialists who can help insure the safety of nuclear power, conference sources said.

Participants also urged regional cooperation to promote public acceptance of nuclear power, citing growing criticism following the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in the Soviet Union in 1986.

The conference was sponsored by Japan's Atomic Energy Commission, an advisor of the Japanese prime minister.

CAMBODIA

KPNLF Says China Will Resume Arms Supplies

BK1603011790 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
16 Mar 90 p 2

[Untitled article by Thana Phuphat]

[Text] Aranyaprathet—The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) army will be able to resume its offensive against the Phnom Penh forces now that China has lifted its three-month suspension on arms supplies. KPNLF military spokesman Ok Serei Sopheak told *THE NATION* yesterday that KPNLF and its major arms supplier, China, have already settled a "misunderstanding" over KPNLF's refusal to cooperate with the Marxist Khmer Rouge in the battlefields. "China now seems to understand us and we expect arms supplies from China to resume very soon," Sopheak said. The spokesman said the KPNLF was informed by Chinese authorities a few days ago that the cut in military supplies, including artillery shells and ammunition had been lifted, and that the first shipment of fresh supplies from China is expected soon. "We (the KPNLF) were also assured by China that the misunderstanding that cost us Svay Chek has been cleared up now and that such a misunderstanding would not happen again," he said.

Svay Chek, a western Cambodian town, which had been "liberated" by KPNLF, was easily recaptured by Phnom Penh forces in late February because KPNLF soldiers ran out of ammunition due to the cut in military aid by China. KPNLF ranks second in military strength among the three Cambodian resistance forces after the Khmer Rouge which is blamed for the massacre of about two million Cambodians during its reign of terror from 1975 to 1979. The KPNLF, Khmer Rouge and National Sihanoukist Army, belong to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which seeks to overthrow the Vietnam-installed Phnom Penh regime. China supplies most of the weaponry and ammunition to the Cambodian resistance groups. The arms supplies are transported through Thai territory.

The spokesman said KPNLF would continue to cooperate with the other two Cambodian resistance forces on the diplomatic front, which has been successful in retaining the CGDK's seat at the United Nations. "Although we (the three resistance forces) have common enemies—Phnom Penh regime and its backer, Vietnam—we have different military targets," he said. Sopheak said KPNLF does not want to identify itself with the Khmer Rouge, particularly at a time when a peace settlement in Cambodia and an eventual general election seem within reach.

NORTH KOREA

North Outlines Steps for Military Withdrawal

SK0703075590 *Pyongyang Domestic Service*
in Korean 0024 GMT 7 Mar 90

[NODONG SINMUN 7 March commentary: "A Practical Measure Should Be Taken To Withdraw Military Forces"]

[Text] A dangerous situation not to be found in any region in the world prevails on the Korean peninsula today. Not only are there a large number of troops directly confronting each other between the North and the South along the Military Demarcation Line, but in addition there is tension that has been aggravated. Moreover, there is a danger of war that has been increased by the provocative "Team Spirit" joint military exercises of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets. This arouses great concern among the peace-loving people of the world.

To alleviate tension on the Korean peninsula and guarantee peace there, it is imperative to decisively realize disarmament and, thus, lower the level of military deployment.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry, in a statement issued on 5 March, again clarified our principled stand on disarmament. It declared that if the United States takes measures even for partial troop pullouts—which constitute the practical start of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea—we will welcome them and, correspondingly, we are ready to take further measures necessary for military trust and disarmament between the North and the South. The Foreign Ministry again urged the United States and the South Korean authorities to stop war exercises such as the "Team Spirit-90" exercise. The ministry also urged them to respond without delay to our Republic's proposal for disarmament talks between North and South Korea and the United States.

This is not only another clear expression of the peace-loving stand of our Republic's government, but it also clearly shows once more how sincerely and patiently we have made efforts for peace in Korea.

It has become an accepted practice to solve all disputes in the international arena peacefully, through negotiations. It has become an accepted practice to abolish foreign military bases in the territory of another country, as well as to withdraw foreign forces. Such an atmosphere of disarmament and detente should be created on the Korean peninsula as well.

Our Republic, proceeding from these demands of the times, has acted alone to advance a series of disarmament proposals and peace policies in recent years. Our Republic, which is faithful to the cause of peace, not only has gone so far as to take the positive step of unilaterally reducing 100,000 soldiers of the People's Army, but it

also has put forward a proposal for disarmament talks in which North and South Korea and the United States can participate.

However, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets have rejected our reasonable and realistic disarmament proposals and peace policies at every phase and, instead, have accelerated an arms buildup and preparations for a war of northward invasion. Thus, they have not responded to our disarmament proposal as yet.

Tension has not been alleviated on the Korean peninsula, and accordingly, the danger of war has not been eliminated there as yet. This tension is caused entirely by the U.S. imperialists' occupation of South Korea and their policy of confrontation by force.

The U.S. imperialists' clamoring that we have not taken measures for building trust between the North and the South, that the threat of southward invasion has not been eliminated and the like is a cunning trick designed to deceive and mock public opinion at home and abroad and to justify their occupation of South Korea and their policy of confrontation by force. Realizing disarmament and alleviating military confrontations are the basic requirements and a precondition for preventing the danger of a recurrence of war, and for guaranteeing peace.

Regarding the plan for reducing U.S. forces stationed in South Korea that they have been talking about recently, it is not for detente nor is it related to a complete withdrawal. In fact, the U.S. imperialists have openly clamored that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea is inconceivable, and that their quality and capability will not be affected by their reduction. This tells us that their reduction plan is a sort of troop realignment show, designed to keep U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea permanently and to continuously strengthen their combat capability.

If they really want peace on the Korean peninsula, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets should not kick off such a troop realignment show, but instead they should take practical measures to reduce troop levels in South Korea and to withdraw U.S. forces and nuclear weapons. They should also suspend the "Team Spirit-90" joint military exercise and respond to our disarmament proposal.

U.S. Stages Nuclear Air Strike Exercise

*SK1003152590 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1518 GMT 10 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 10 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialist aggressors brought three Guam-based B-52 strategic bombers to the sky above South Korea to stage a nuclear bomb-dropping exercise aimed at attacking the North from 11:32 to 15:09 Friday, according to military sources.

Earlier, from 11:00 to 12:00 on March 8, they brought two overseas-based B-52 strategic bombers into the sky above the South Korean operational zone to stage a madcap bombing exercise simulating an attack on the North.

Participating in the aerial war game were pursuit planes, electronic jamming planes, patrol planes and refuelling tankers.

On March 8 and 9, they also brought into the air above South Korea formations of Japan-based F-4 fighter-bombers, A-4 and A-6 assault planes to commit a frantic exercise of making a surprise strike of the target in the inland and coastal areas of the northern half of Korea.

This shows how feverishly the U.S. imperialists are running amuck to ignite a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

Japanese Accused of Joining U.S. 'Strategy'

*SK1003050890 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0446 GMT 10 Mar 90*

["Dangerous Hotbed of Nuclear War"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 10 (KCNA)—The Japanese reactionaries are zealously joining the U.S. imperialists in the execution of their strategy of nuclear war, says NODONG SINMUN today.

The news analyst says:

At talks with the U.S. president during his visit to the United States in early March the Japanese prime minister promised him that Japan would increase its share of the cost of keeping the U.S. troops in Japan and cooperate with the United States in its world strategy. And the U.S. defence secretary while visiting Japan in February met with high-ranking authorities of Japan and discussed with them the issues of promoting the "modernization and effectiveness" of the U.S. forces in Japan and elevating the function of the base in Japan, the foremost base for the nuclear war strategy.

The news analyst further says:

With the connivance and cooperation of the Japanese authorities, the Japanese territory has turned into the U.S. imperialists' nuclear attack base for invading Asian countries and their nuclear forward base for the execution of the anti-socialist strategy.

The arrow of the U.S. nuclear forces based in Japan is aimed, first of all, at Korea. The Japanese authorities have offered their territory as a relay base, supply base and launching base for the "Team Spirit" military manoeuvres. This implies that, in case the U.S. imperialists start a nuclear war in Korea, the Japanese territory may be turned into its theatre.

The Japanese ruling circles have not only left the Japanese territory as the U.S. imperialists' nuclear attack base but also frequently staged U.S.-Japan joint military exercises to hurl the Japanese "Self-Defence Forces" into a nuclear war.

The deep involvement of Japan in the U.S. imperialists' nuclear war strategy is a very dangerous adventure which may plunge Japan into the vortex of a mushroom cloud "in case of emergency."

The Japanese reactionaries intend to gratify their militaristic desire for a comeback to Asia by partaking of the U.S. imperialists strategy of nuclear war.

Their policy of taking part in a nuclear war is a criminal one trampling down the earnest desire for peace of the Japanese people, the first victim to nuclear bombs in history. This also poses a great threat to independence and peace of the Asian countries.

The Asian people are heightening vigilance against the Japanese reactionaries' military adventurous policy of involvement in the U.S. imperialists' strategy of nuclear war.

ROK-Japanese Military Exchange Denounced

*SK1403101490 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1003 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 14 (KCNA)—The Tokyo-based KOREAN NEWS SERVICE quoted the Japanese newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN as reporting that the military academy of the Japanese ground "self-defence force" and the South Korean puppet military academy decided to exchange students from this summer.

The puppets then decided to exchange students with the Japanese militarists for the Navy and Air Force, said the newspaper.

This shows that the South Korean puppet clique is overtly tightening military ties with the Japanese militarists and opening them the way of staging a comeback to South Korea to build higher hurdles in the way of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

This treacherous act coincides with the U.S. imperialists' manoeuvres to round off the U.S.-Japan-South Korea tripartite military alliance. This adds to the grave nature of the situation.

SOUTH KOREA

Uranium Import Deal Struck With Soviet Union

Ministry Issues Announcement

*SK0503125990 Seoul YONHAP in English 1247 GMT
5 Mar 90*

[Text] Seoul, March 5 (YONHAP)—South Korea will import enriched uranium, fuel for nuclear power plants,

from the Soviet Union for 10 years until 1999, according to the Energy and Resources Ministry Monday.

A government panel Monday resolved to import the Soviet-produced nuclear fuel on a long-term basis in order to secure a stable supply of the nuclear fuel on better price conditions, ministry officials said. The enriched uranium is a finished product which contains 3.5 percent of uranium 235.

The Soviet Union has offered to the Korean government to sell its enriched uranium since the end of 1988, ministry officials said. According to conditions offered by the Soviet Union, Korea will buy enriched uranium on a long-term basis from 1990-1999 and the prices will be much lower than those Korea paid under long-term contracts with other countries last year. In addition, 30 percent of the payment will be made in Korean electronics products, according to the officials.

It is the first time for Korea to import finished nuclear fuel. So far, Korea has imported uranium ore from Australia, France and Canada and enriched it in the United States and France. It cost Korea 1,060 U.S. dollars per one kilogram of enriched uranium last year. The price of Soviet enriched uranium would be around 700 dollars—halfway between the 1,060 dollars Korea paid last year and the average price of 530 dollars in the international spot market last year, they said.

The amount of enriched uranium import from the Soviet Union will not exceed 40 tons annually considering the fact that Korea maintains import contracts with the United States until 2015 and with France until 1996. The officials said there will be no safety problems in importing the Soviet uranium.

The Korea Electric Power Corp., which will consume the nuclear fuel, will begin negotiations with a Soviet agency in charge of nuclear power export for formal contract next month. In connection with the uranium export, the Soviet Union is expected to buy electronics goods worth 6 million dollars a year from Korea.

Uranium Agreement Analyzed

*SK0603062890 Seoul YONHAP in English
0502 GMT 6 Mar 90*

[Text] Seoul, March 6 (YONHAP)—South Korea will buy enriched uranium, a top strategic material for nuclear reactors and warheads, from the Soviet Union under a 10-year contract that takes effect this year. Korea will import 40 tons of the enriched uranium a year, paying 30 percent of the cost with merchandise, according to the Energy and Resources Ministry.

Both countries have agreed to the safeguard assurance on the transportation of nuclear materials imposed by both the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency and there is no problem in terms of security, a ministry spokesman said.

This is a very different item for the two nations to trade. It is classified as a top strategic material because it can be processed for weapons use. International exchanges of nuclear fuel rely on mutual credibility and the agreement between Seoul and Moscow implies the thaw in their relations is accelerating.

The Soviet Union has been a patron for North Korean leader Kim Il-song since North Korea was given birth in the mid-1940s and was regarded as South Korea's No. 2 enemy after North Korea only a few years ago.

This agreement to trade the militarily sensitive material signals that the growing bilateral relationship, basically founded on the communist superpower's economic needs, is moving to a political level. The two nations have limited consular relations, using consular departments in their trade offices in Moscow and Seoul.

Economically, the Soviet uranium will help South Korea correct unequal contracts with its current monopolistic suppliers. All Korea's uranium concentrate comes from Australia, Canada and France. The enriched uranium, amounting to about 130 tons a year, arrives in Korea after being processed in the United States and France.

Korea was compelled to put up with unfavorable terms, such as volume and conditions for contract cancellation, because there were no alternative suppliers. The price of enriched uranium last year was 1,060 U.S. dollars per kilogram, double the price on the spot market, according to industry estimates.

The Soviet price was not disclosed, but a ministry official said it was "much lower" than the current price and the countervailing trade terms are favorable to Seoul.

The Korean Government was worried about how the U.S. Government would react since Washington has demanded a new contract for additional nuclear plant fuel. Korea's utility service contracts with America and France expire in 2015 and 1996, respectively.

The ministry said some of the Soviet uranium will be stockpiled and the rest used to meet new demand that will be created after 1995, adding that the existing uranium suppliers will not be affected by the deal. The ministry also said the agreement was the result of an oft repeated Soviet proposal.

Despite government concern over the U.S. reaction, businessmen hailed the agreement as highlighting the unfair trade practices that Seoul hopes to correct. In addition to the deal's political and economic advantages, a ministry official said bilateral cooperation in nuclear technology will be enhanced. Under the countervailing agreement, the Soviets are expected to buy 6 million dollars' worth of merchandise from Korean electronic goods makers a year, according to the ministry.

'Hasty Conclusion' on Ties

SK0703014290 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 7 Mar 90 p 6

[News analysis by staff reporter Choe Song-chin: "Soviet Uranium Deal Draws Interest"]

[Text] Monday's announcement on the planned purchase of Soviet enriched uranium is drawing keen interest for its potential economic, political and diplomatic effects. As is widely known, trade in uranium concentrate as a nuclear fuel, although an international practice itself, is subject to strict government surveillance as a strategic material.

The government's decision to expand the budding bilateral economic cooperation with the Soviets to the internationally delicate items has forced many local analysts to jump to the hasty conclusion that the two countries may soon establish full diplomatic relations. The economic and political watchers based their judgment on the fact that the deal was made in time for the scheduled Moscow visit of Kim Yong-sam, a co-leader of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party, March 19 and a bilateral business leaders' meeting March 23. The move symbolizes Seoul's desire to advance the consular-level relationship with Moscow, while urging the latter to show corresponding efforts, they said.

The international enriched uranium market is facing a glut now as shown by the fact that spot market prices are only half of the long-term contract prices.

While Korea plans to buy a Soviet item that can be supplied by someone else, Moscow will import much needed consumer products, including home electronics, in limited barter trade.

Now is the time for the Soviet Union to come up with concrete steps to further the existing economic and political ties, the observers said. So far, Korea has maintained that the country's cooperation will be helpful for successful implementation of Gorbachev's perestroika policy, while the Soviet Union demanded more advances by Korean businesses before upgrading ties.

Against this backdrop, there have recently been number of moves in this direction. The opening of direct flight routes, exchange of consular services, the Korean government's permission for investment in large projects in the East bloc country, exports of cold rolled sheets made by Pohang Iron and Steel Co., signing of a double taxation avoidance pact, and mutual investment guarantee agreements.

The government's dilemma of not angering such existing suppliers as the United States and France is seen in the rather limited intake volume of 40 tons per year, or one-fourth of the total demand to fuel nine nuclear power stations. Although there is no problem concerning direct uranium imports from the Soviet Union, response from the United States, which has exerted dominant influence over Korea's nuclear industry, is worth

nothing. Hidden behind the political-diplomatic anticipation is the pure economic impact of the deal, other analysts said.

Korea now has unequal contracts with the United States, under which Seoul is supposed to buy 70 percent of its total nuclear fuel demand from the U.S. Department of Energy. First signed in 1973, the 30-year contract, despite three revisions in 1978, 1983, 1989 and obligates Korea to notify the seller of any intent of cancellation 10 years in advance and pay heavy penalties for doing so.

Korea Electric Power Corp. [KEPCO], the state-run utility, has also made many blunders in securing nuclear fuel in the past. KEPCO spent 170 billion won on nuclear fuel last year, about 80 percent of which, or 136 billion won, went for the purchase of refined ore and reconversion and enrichment fees.

The Soviet uranium, in finished form, will also cut the delivery period from an average 15 months to less than six months, they said. The new contract in this regard will help KEPCO improve the present unfavorable terms and conditions, they said.

North-South Talks on Disarmament Urged

SK1003022290 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN
in Korean 6 Mar 90 p 6

[Editorial: "Hold Military Talks and Discuss Disarmament"]

[Text] On 2 March, in his answer at the National Assembly, Minister of National Defense Yi Sang-hun said that South Korea's defense spending has surpassed that of North Korea since 1976 and that South Korea's defense spending was 1.7 times higher than that of North Korea in 1989. The fourth underground tunnel dug inside the DMZ, 30 kilometers northeast of Yanggu, Kangwon Province, was made public on 3 March.

Prior to this, it was reported that "It is almost certain that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons." It was also reported that a U.S. Department of State official indirectly admitted that nuclear weapons are deployed in Korea.

All these facts show that what is taking place on the Korean peninsula will only lead to a heightened military buildup and further division. Moreover, these events come at a time when the Germans, who have torn down the Berlin Wall, are steadily marching forward toward reunification, which is imminent. They also come at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union have promised to reduce their forces and have assumed reconciliatory postures.

The public did not know that South Korea has spent more on defense than North Korea for the last 15 years because of the government's policy of keeping all military information secret. Our defense spending has accounted for 5 to 6 percent of our gross national

product and more than 30 percent of our government spending. We can easily see how our defense spending has continuously increased as our economy has grown. However, we were surprised that, last year, our defense spending topped no less than \$9 billion, 1.7 times as much as that of North Korea, which amounted to \$5.28 billion. South Korea's defense spending will top more than \$10 billion this year or next, and, as a result, South Korea will be seen at home and abroad as a "military power."

When it began to increase its defense spending in 1974, the government pledged that it would "achieve a North-South military balance by 1980 by building a self-defense capability." However, the government said in 1980 that it would do so by 1985, and it again postponed the target year until 1990. Currently, the government says it would achieve a balance by 1996. In his answer at the National Assembly, Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun said that South Korea's military strength is 65 percent of that of North Korea.

The allegation that South Korea's military strength is 65 percent of that of North Korea, even though South Korea spends 1.7 times as much as North Korea does, is not convincing. A country's military strength is not necessarily proportional to its military spending. Also, if this theory is applied, there is no reason for the country to increase its military spending. The Ministry of National Defense has alleged that North Korea was able to maintain and develop a powerful military force by spending less and that its military strength is superior to ours because the cumulative total of its military spending is higher than ours.

This allegation is understandable to a certain degree. However, this allegation is not sufficient to explain a difference in military spending—a difference in which South Korea's military spending is 1.7 times that of North Korea. Prime Minister Kang flatly rejected the claim of foreign military affairs institutes that South Korea's military strength surpasses that of North Korea. How does he respond to the claim of domestic scholars that "a North-South military balance has been maintained since the mid-eighties"?

All regimes up to the present, which have been criticized at home and abroad because of their dictatorial rule and suppression of human rights, have increased the military buildup under the pretext of "North Korean threats of a southward invasion." It is a fact that because they believe what these regimes have reasoned, people have not complained about big military spending. However, the international situation and political and military atmosphere on the Korean peninsula have significantly changed.

Experts think it is difficult for North Korea, whose main arsenal consists of conventional weapons, to unilaterally launch an attack at a time when it is an open secret that the U.S. forces, which have operational control over the Korean forces, possess a massive amount of nuclear

weapons. Also, it is common sense that in a modern war, one does not heedlessly launch a preemptive strike against the other unless one possesses an overwhelming military strength, three to five times that of the other.

We worry that excessive military spending makes the people shoulder a heavy burden and hinders sound economic growth. What is more worrisome is the fact that a North-South arms race will further delay reunification, the earnest desire of the fellow countrymen.

What do the incessant arms race and nuclear development ultimately pursue? The world freed itself from the cold war logic long ago. An unforeseen "peace movement" has flourished in the Soviet Union, Germany, and East European countries. Even the United States has moved toward disarmament because it could not run counter to this trend. A military buildup in the modern era requires an enormous sum of money. A fighter costs almost \$200 million, and a space weapon more than 10 times that. Destroying weapons results in an irrecoverable loss for a country.

This being the case, our country must map out a policy of reducing its armaments before it is too late. This is not something South Korea can do alone. South Korea cannot unilaterally reduce its armaments unless North Korea responds to this. If the North and South Korean regimes truly want reunification and have the intention to alleviate military tension, they must hold military talks at the earliest possible date and carry out this historic task.

North Renews Call for Tripartite Arms Talks

*SK0703021690 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 7 Mar 90 p 2*

[Text] North Korea renewed Monday its decades-old call for a tripartite meeting to be attended by Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang to discuss arms reduction on the Korean Peninsula, the Naewoe Press said yesterday. The Pyongyang move came one day after Seoul disclosed a tunnel inside the Demilitarized Zone, the fourth dug by the North Koreans for use in invasion of the south.

In a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry, North Korea also called for the suspension of an annual joint Seoul-Washington military exercise, Team Spirit '90, claiming it has neither an intention nor capability to invade South Korea.

During his recent visit to Seoul, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said there will be no substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Korea unless North Korea takes substantial steps to ease tension on the peninsula.

North Asked To Use Nuclear Energy Peacefully

*SK1003090290 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
7 Mar 90 p 2*

[Editorial: "North Korea's Nuclear Development Is Dangerous"]

[Text] The eyes of the world have been focused on North Korea because of its nuclear development capability. We too, cannot help but be anxious about and be worried over the North's nuclear capability. Because of the belief that North Korea may be manufacturing nuclear bombs by using nuclear fuel left over at nuclear power plants, a meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was held in Vienna last month, advised North Korea that it should "sign the Full-Scale Safety Measure Agreement by June." This means that it was confirmed internationally that North Korea has a nuclear development capability.

It was confirmed long ago that North Korea had this capability. In his testimony to Congress, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney warned that North Korea's plan for nuclear development threatens security in East Asia. Also, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze said last February that North Korea, which has pursued nuclear development, would be able to manufacture nuclear weapons sometime in the future. The International Affairs Institute, a prestigious French institute, and JANE'S WEEKLY, a British military affairs magazine, stated that North Korea has, no doubt, pursued nuclear development for military purposes. This means that North Korea may attack South Korea using nuclear or gas weapons.

However, North Korea has denied its development of nuclear weapons, and has refused the IAEA's inspection of its nuclear facilities. North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in December 1985. Nevertheless, it has refused to sign the Safety Measure Agreement, which is necessary for an on-the-spot inspection. This refusal has come even though the treaty stipulates that the agreement must be signed. In turn, North Korea has been criticized internationally.

If it has nothing to be afraid of as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, instead of turning a deaf ear to international warnings and denunciation, North Korea must make public its facilities—facilities which have put the countries concerned on their guard and have worried them—and must fulfill its duty for peace by accepting an international inspection.

North Korea fixed a national division by provoking a war between fellow countrymen 40 years ago. Even today, while adhering to the outdated theory of carrying out an armed communist revolution, North Korea is plotting to provoke another war. This is has been proven by the presence of a fourth underground tunnel, which was discovered inside the truce line a few days ago.

It is truly horrible that North Korea, which has kept itself secluded and enclosed, may possess nuclear weapons. This may plunge the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, Asia, the Pacific, and the world in general into the horror of a nuclear war. If made ill use of—for destructive purposes in war—nuclear energy will annihilate all of mankind because of its formidable power. Nuclear energy is not like powder for a toy gun, but the greatest

horror in the history of mankind. It is intolerable for a group that is digging underground tunnels or kicking up other war maneuvers, to possess weapons manufactured using this formidable nuclear power. Because of this horrific power, countries of the world have kept watch on even each other or held each other in check even when they use nuclear energy peacefully.

As part of our effort to carry out a northern diplomacy, our government decided to import enriched uranium—fuel for nuclear power plants—from the Soviet Union this year. This was possible because our determination to peacefully use nuclear energy and our perfect safety measures are internationally recognized. Because it was confirmed that North Korea has pursued nuclear development, we hope it would not use nuclear energy in war, but only for peaceful purposes. North Korea must sign the safety agreement with the IAEA before demanding that the Korean peninsula become nuclear-free.

South Proposes 'Nuclear Hotline' to North

*SK1203140090 Seoul Television Service
in Korean 1200 GMT 12 Mar 90*

[Text] [Anchorman Pak Song-pom] The government today proposed to the North side that the North and South establish a hotline to help each other in preventing a nuclear reactor accident. The proposal was made public at the International Conference for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia.

At the First International Conference for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia held today in Tokyo, Yi Sang-hui, minister of science and technology, called on North Korea to sign an agreement on the nuclear safeguards system.

Correspondent Yi Chun-pal in Tokyo has a report:

[Begin Correspondent Yi Chun-pal recording] In his keynote speech at today's conference, Minister of Science and Technology Yi Sang-hui, calling on North Korea to sign the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement, said that South Korea, in order to play a major role since it was ranked 10th among those having nuclear power generators, was proposing the establishment of a standing community for nuclear cooperation among the nations of Asia.

Minister Yi particularly stressed the fact that the basis of our country's nuclear policy is to ensure safety domestically and the peaceful use of nuclear energy externally. He then emphasized the importance of unity between Korea and Japan in organizing a nuclear techno-belt in the Northeast Asian region. Minister Yi also proposed that, toward this end, Korea and Japan establish a nuclear hotline to prepare for various kinds of nuclear accidents.

The proposal for establishing a consultative body for nuclear cooperation put forward by Minister Yi at today's conference means that our country has transformed itself into a country that helps other Asian countries with nuclear technology, this from a state that has received nuclear technology over the past 30 years. About 300 officials in

charge of nuclear affairs and scholars from eight Asian countries, including our country and Japan, attended today's conference. [end recording]

South Korean Offer To Observe Military Exercises Accepted

Polish Officers Arrive To Observe 'Team Spirit'

*SK1303113690 Seoul YONHAP in English
1124 GMT 13 Mar 90*

[Text] Pohang South Korea, March 13 (YONHAP)—Two Polish Army officers visited Tuesday a South Korean Marine Corps unit near this southeastern port city on the first leg of their trip for observing the annual joint South Korea-U.S. military exercise, "Team Spirit."

Upon their arrival at the Marine Corps 9118th Unit, Cols. Roman Jozwick and Maciej Petrkat [names as received] were briefed by commanding officers of the unit on the progress of the ongoing military drill. The two Polish officers, who came here to observe a joint Korea-U.S. landing operation, were told by the commander of the Marine unit during the briefing that the Team Spirit exercise is aimed at beefing up readiness to jointly cope with threats posed by the North Korean communists.

The Polish officers flew to Seoul Monday and became the first military personnel from any communist-bloc country to respond to the South Korean Government's offer to observe the Team Spirit exercise.

South Korean President No Tae-u said in his New Year press conference that Seoul would invite China, North Korea and the four Armistice Supervisory Commission member countries to send their respective observation teams to this spring's Team Spirit exercise.

Poland is a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for the Armistice Agreement of the Korean war (1950-1953).

The Polish team will observe a Korea-U.S. Air Forces' emergency take-off and landing operation on an expressway and visit key Korean and American military bases and industrial complexes.

The annual military drill has officially been said to be a defense-oriented maneuver. North Korea has suspended all inter-Korean talks unilaterally, accusing the military exercise as a war game of aggressive nature.

Observation Dispels Misgivings

*SK1403011490 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES
in English 14 Mar 90 p 8*

[Editorial: "Open Access to 'Team Spirit'"]

[Text] Denial of free access to a certain place or event implies secrecy. Granting open access naturally means

there is nothing shady to be concealed. Openness, candor and honesty are the main ingredients of a free and just society.

The Republic of Korea and the United States have repeatedly made it clear that the two allies have nothing to hide from outsiders with regard to the annual Korea-U.S. joint military exercise by inviting representatives from other countries to come and observe the exercise—even North Korea and its friends who were usually regarded as Seoul's adversaries.

Regrettably, Pyongyang and Beijing have turned down the invitation on less than plausible grounds. This time, however, our sincere and positive overture received the first response from Poland, which sits on the four-member Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission charged with the function of overseeing the Korean Armistice.

The Defense Ministry said that two Polish Army officers arrived here earlier this week on an observation mission. The pair will witness a landing exercise and emergency takeoff operations and pay a visit to one of the North Korean infiltration tunnels on the central front line.

It is a significant and heartening development that Poland became the first East bloc nation to join other representatives to observe and confirm the defensive nature of the Team Spirit exercise, which will be watched by 27 foreign military attaches stationed in Seoul and those posted to Japan, India, Brazil and Switzerland.

Their presence at Team Spirit '90 will help prove to skeptics and critics that the exercise is not aggressive and does not involve "nuclear training." Seoul and Washington resolved this year to scale down Team Spirit '90 in pursuit of East-West detente and inter-Korean dialogue.

Taking no account of the defensive and limited character of the annual military exercise, North Koreans have made it a rule to suspend all talks with the South for the duration of the exercise they consider provocative without foundation.

There is no reason for Pyongyang to reject an invitation to Team Spirit, and instead make only negative propaganda capital out of it. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have agreed on mutual inspection of military maneuvers. Observation of the Team Spirit exercise by more outsiders will enable an objective assessment. It should dispel groundless misgivings about the exercise and clear the way for confidence-building between the South and the North of Korea.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces Seeking Exchanges With South Korea

SK1303001690 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 13 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] Tokyo (YONHAP)—Japan's Air Self-Defense Force is seeking personnel exchanges with the South Korean Air Force as part of its efforts to consolidate mutual military relations between the two countries

ahead of the reduction of the U.S. forces in the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

The SANKEI SHIMBUN, quoting sources at the Self-Defense Agency of Japan, reported here Monday that the Air Self-Defense Force plans to offer language training programs to members of the officers' candidate school so they can study at the Korean Air Force Academy. The Tokyo-based economic daily said that the maritime Self-Defense Force would also follow the suit of the Air Force, working out a five-year plan for personnel exchanges. The Korea Naval Academy, the daily reported, would train its cadets in the Japanese language for the exchange programs.

The paper said that the Korean Air Force had greatest interest in strengthening the cooperative relations with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force largely because the Japanese Air Force has excellent surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities. The South Korean Air Force, the daily reported, expected to learn much from the sophisticated technologies of Japan used to manufacture, maintain and repair advanced military aircraft.

The daily revealed that the Air Self-Defense Force had been reluctant to exchange personnel with the Korean Air Force for reasons of political relations and high-sensitive military secrets. But it added that Japan decided to promote the personnel exchanges with Korea to better cope with the projected closure of the U.S. Air Force bases in South Korea and the scheduled reduction of American troops in Japan, retreating from its initial reluctance to pursue exchange programs with Korea.

Discussion of U.S. Cutback, Base Relocation

SK1503071990 Seoul YONHAP in English 0701 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] Seoul, March 15 (YONHAP)—South Korea and the United States discussed security cooperation Thursday, including the reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Korea and the transfer of peacetime operational command to the Korean Armed Forces, a Foreign Ministry official said. The four-member high-level committee focused on ways to give the Korean Armed Forces a greater role, including adjustment of the operational control system, and an early conclusion of an agreement on the relocation of the U.S. military base at Yongsan in downtown Seoul to a location outside the capital, he said.

Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun and Acting Foreign Minister Yun Chong-ha represented Korea while U.S. Ambassador Donald Gregg and Gen Louis Menetrey, commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, were the American participants.

On relocation of the Yongsan base, the Defense Ministry and the U.S. side are negotiating in hope of reaching a conclusion in the first quarter of the year, the official said.

In Thursday's meeting, they recognized that considerable progress has been made concerning pending issues and agreed working-level officials of the two sides will discuss details. They confirmed the position that North Korea should take affirmative measures corresponding to the recent decision to reduce U.S. troop strength in Korea and the scope of the annual "Team Spirit" exercise, he said.

Public Hearing on Reduction of U.S. Forces

SK1503021690 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 15 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] Despite tense confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties over local issues, the National Assembly yesterday held a public hearing on the scheduled reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. The session organized by the Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs and Unification was to be followed by another public hearing on the controversial legal status of third-generation Korean residents in Japan Friday.

Opening the yesterday's session, Rep Kim Hyon-uk, who chairs the Assembly committee, said the public hearing is designed to hear view of scholars and experts on the matter, which should be helpful for the committee.

The Korean and U.S. governments have announced that about 5,000 U.S. soldiers will be withdrawn from Korea over the next three years.

All four panelists in yesterday's session said continued presence of U.S. forces in Korea is necessary in order to maintain military balance between the south and the north and peace on the peninsula. However, they admitted that the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea, even if on a step-by-step basis, is inevitable because of the global developments.

Yim Tong-won, president of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said the government is required to use the U.S. forces reduction as a bargaining chip in negotiations with north Korea, while maintaining power balance. The government should continue efforts for improving relations between the divided halves of Korea though Pyongyang is yet to show signs of discarding its hostile posture toward Seoul, Yim said.

His view was shared by other panelists, including Prof Chong Chong-uk of Seoul National University. He said the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea should be paced with improvement in relations between the south and north.

The proposed relocation of the U.S. Second Division to a rear area is undesirable. The division's deployment in the front-line area now means an automatic involvement in a conflict if the north decides to invade south again, he said. Chong also warned the U.S. forces reduction may touch off the north's military actions against the south based on misjudgment on the power balance on the peninsula.

Rep Pak Yong-kyu said the Korean and U.S. government need to reach an agreement on the proper level of Korea's payments for the cost needed for maintaining U.S. forces in Korea. Korea's payments in 1988 totaled \$2,219 million but the figure included \$1,942 million in charges for land and facilities used by the U.S. forces. Korea's share in payments for U.S. forces here is a major issue pending between the two countries.

NEW ZEALAND

Opposition Leader Wants Defense Pact With U.S.

BK1303074690 Hong Kong AFP in English
0715 GMT 13 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Wellington, March 13 (AFP)—A National Party government in New Zealand would conclude an "operative" defence arrangement with the United States, party leader Jim Bolger said Tuesday [13 March]. He said he expected to see United States warships return to New Zealand ports provided they did not carry nuclear arms.

The opposition party, around 20 percent ahead of the ruling Labour Party in opinion polls, on Friday reversed a long-held position when it endorsed the Labour government's anti-nuclear policy.

It said it would reject the United States policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard ships. Elections are due in about six months.

The change was seen as effectively ending any chance of New Zealand returning to the ANZUS defence pact which ties Australia, New Zealand and the United States. The United States has expressed regret over the decision. [passage omitted]

It became clear Tuesday that National's decision is causing deep divisions in the National Party.

Backbencher Merv Wellington said the decision was "a Munich-type approach, which like appeasement will bring its own bitter fruit." He said the caucus voted 21 to 12 for the change with six MPs (Members of Parliament) absent. Of the 12 front bench MPs, nine supported change.

In an interview with AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mr Bolger said a National Party government would seek "active security arrangements with our allies" which he named as Australia, the United States and Britain.

Mr Bolger said he could see no reason why, under a National government, ANZUS could not operate in a fashion that accommodated the New Zealand position.

"We cannot impose that on the Australians or the Americans but given the new sense of openness as demonstrated by the Baker-Moore meeting I am optimistic that, not immediately, but over time, we will move to a position where they are also open on the issue

of New Zealand, Australia and the United States once again having an operative defence and security arrangement." [passage omitted]

"The world of diplomacy and defence is not static and the shift in American policy towards the Soviet Union has been dramatic," Mr Bolger said.

"What we're asking in New Zealand is for a very small shift in their policy, and it's a shift in their policy which I think is inevitable, not because of New Zealand's decision, but because of the reality of the emerging concerns around the world," he added. He said the party's position was clearcut: New Zealand did not want nuclear arms.

"But we do want alliances with friends and allies and of course that would encompass a non-nuclear relationship, and non-nuclear ships would be welcome."

It was important for New Zealand's long-term friendship and alliance with the United States to continue and he would place a high priority on resolving the issue with the United States if National came to power, he said.

National's two defence spokesmen, Doug Mckinnon and Rob Munro, have both quit their shadow portfolios to protest the new policy. Mr. Bolger Tuesday named Doug Kidd the party's new defence spokesman. [passage omitted]

SINGAPORE

Defense Official Says U.S. Presence 'Vital'
BK1203115990 Singapore THE SUNDAY TIMES
in English 11 Mar 90 p 1

["US Presence in S-E Asia Vital: BG Lee"—THE SUNDAY TIMES headline]

[Text] A "PERSUASIVE" United States presence in South-East Asia is needed to avoid a power vacuum that others will scramble to fill, Brigadier General (Res) [Reserves] Lee Hsien Loong said yesterday [10 March].

American presence has been a major factor in the region's stability and growth and a smaller US commitment to the region may force other powers to take on its role, said Brigadier Gen Lee, who is Second Minister for Defence (Services). In military terms, these other powers were no means negligible, he said, citing India and Japan as examples.

Brigadier Gen Lee, who is also the Minister for Trade and Industry, was speaking at the graduation ceremony of 86 officers as the Pasir Laba Safti Camp. The officers comprised 74 graduates from the Medical Officers Cadet Course (MOCC) and a batch of 12 scholars and award recipients.

Touching on the history of Southeast Asia, Brigadier Gen Lee highlighted two lessons about the realities of the geo-politics of the region:

—The region has always been a focus of competition among powers. They included both regional powers,

like the Sri Vijaya, Majapahit empires and the Malacca Sultanates, as well as extra-regional ones, like the Portuguese, Dutch and the British;

— The advantage of Singapore's geographic position can be lost easily. Continued success depends on the island keeping up a high standard of performance, maintaining its physical security, and plugging into the regional and global economies.

Brigadier Gen Lee warned that some things have changed today but others have not: "While the impulse of the colonial powers to rule and civilize remote parts of the world may have disappeared, competition for economic and political influence has not." He said the rivalry between the superpowers was not the main threat to the stability of the region. The US presence has, in fact, been a positive influence.

"Without a persuasive US presence, there will be a power vacuum, which other powers would scramble to fill." Brigadier Gen Lee said that India, for example, had a powerful blue-water navy, with nuclear submarines and two aircraft carriers.

Japan too was steadily modernising its forces. "As an economic superpower, it has an understandable interest in the state of this region," Brigadier Gen Lee said. Its defence budget of 1 percent of its GDP, in absolute terms, was the third largest military budget in the world. Noting that Japan presently enjoyed protection from the US nuclear umbrella and depended on the US to maintain a regional balance, he added: "A smaller US commitment may force Japan to take on this role itself. This will be a different environment to get used to."

He said that through all the uncertainty of rapidly changing scenarios, Singapore's vital interests "must be kept steadfastly in view". He listed three concerns:

- TO HAVE a stable Southeast Asia, free from conflict and strife;
- TO PREVENT external elements from causing instability within Singapore;
- TO STRIVE constantly for economic progress and growth.

He pointed to the constructive role the Singapore Armed Forces [SAF] could play in these concerns. "Its very existence, its known professionalism and credibility discourages external threats to Singapore and thus contributes to regional stability. "The SAF makes prosperity possible by being an effective deterrent to any political aggressor."

"A central fact of the history of this region is that the key to influence and power lies in the control of the maritime trade routes in the Straits of Malacca and the South China sea.

The Sri Vijaya empire, and the Malacca Sultanates, were maritime-based powers. It was also the case when Europeans came to establish themselves in the region, he said. "After Sir Stamford Raffles founded modern Singapore

in 1819 for the British East India Company, Singapore quickly eclipsed Malacca as the centre for regional entrepot trade," he noted.

"Initially, Singapore's success has depended on its developing the advantages of this position. "Now, in an age of jetliners and satellite communications, our location at the southern tip of the Malaysian peninsula is no longer so unique. Satellites can be anywhere and so can international airports."

But he stressed that Singapore's economic vitality still depends on its free and unimpeded access to sea and air lanes of communications with the rest of the world.

VIETNAM

U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy Viewed

*BK1403152190 Hanoi Domestic Service
in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 10 Mar 90*

[NHAN DAN 10 March article by Le Ba Thuyen: "The Bush Administration and Its Asia-Pacific Strategy"]

[Text] In his trip to Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines last February, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney talked about the readjustment of U.S. defense policy and about U.S. troop cutbacks in Asia and the Pacific. What does this mean? Just as former Defense Secretary Weinberger of the Reagan administration advocated earlier, the current Asia-Pacific strategy pursued by the Bush administration still relies on some important props. The first is a huge, 300,000-strong force of which part is stationed on the U.S. mainland and the remainder deployed under a massive network of 350 U.S. military bases in the Pacific strategic arc, mainly in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. This Pacific strategic arc is linked with another arc in the Indian Ocean by the very important base on the Diego Garcia archipelago. The U.S. Pacific fleet with hundreds of warships and thousands of aircraft is now under intensive modernization.

This time, in planning to readjust the overall U.S. strategy of cutbacks in troops and military spending to overcome domestic economic and financial difficulties, the Pentagon advocates cutting between 10,000-12,000 soldiers, mainly technical and logistical personnel, from the total 120,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the next three years. This is a small troop cutback, considering the total number of U.S. troops stationed in the region. This cutback may help the United States save some \$10 billion per year in military spending. However, to compensate for the cutback in numerical strength as revealed by Cheney, the Pentagon has devised a renovation and modernization plan to enable U.S. forces to fulfill their duties. This would maintain or even strengthen the combat potential of U.S. troops in the region.

The second prop is the U.S.-Japanese alliance. In his trip to Tokyo last year, President Bush declared that this alliance is a bipartite alliance of regional and global

significance. It consists of 50,000 U.S. troops stationed in some 100 military bases in Japan and 350 soldiers of the Japanese Defense Force. The Japanese Defense Force is, in fact, a modern-equipped regular army tied to Washington's war chariot under the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. The United States wants to turn the Japanese archipelago into an unsinkable aircraft carrier to serve U.S. global strategy. In its attempt to readjust its defense strategy this time, Washington is executing a two-tier policy. On the one hand, it strives to draw Tokyo more tightly to a military alliance with the United States by pressuring Japan into responding to the policy of responsibility-sharing and into increasing its financial and manpower contributions to the U.S. plan. On the other hand, it seeks to restrain Tokyo's strengths both militarily and economically. U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney openly said that Japan should maintain its military potential at its present level. Public opinion is very concerned about Cheney's first-ever attempt to link the pace of resolving U.S.-Japanese trade with the U.S. defense policy toward Japan. He threatened that differences in trade between the two countries, if not averted, would spill over into other areas.

The third prop being strengthened by the United States is the Northeast Asian military alliance or the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul (South Korea) axis which, made up of 49,000 U.S. troops stationed in over 50 military bases and 600,000 U.S.-equipped South Korean troops, is regarded as an ideal overland springboard in Northeast Asia and designed to serve Washington's two-pincer strategy against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to control the East Asian and North Pacific regions. The Pentagon's plan in this readjustment, which calls for merging three U.S. air bases in South Korea into one and withdrawing thousands of U.S. military personnel, does not affect in any way the combat potential of the two countries as already pledged by Cheney. The U.S. defense secretary's statement that U.S. troops will remain on the South Korean peninsula as long as the peoples and governments of South Korea and the United States want them to do so has revealed Washington's attempt to prolong the presence of U.S. troops on this burning peninsula.

In the Pacific strategic arc, the two huge military bases—Clark and Subic—in the Philippines occupy a very important position. Not only are they used to oversee the Southeast Asian region and control various sea lanes in the Eastern Pacific, but they are also regarded as a strategic springboard for a 300,000-strong U.S. rapid deployment force—RDF—to quickly move from the United States to Okinawa through Clark and Subic bases into the Indian Ocean and the Middle East to oppose liberation and national independence movements.

In his recent trip, Cheney advocated cutting only 2,000 of the 17,000 U.S. troops stationed in the Philippines over the next three years. Washington is trying to bargain and pressure Manila in a bid to maintain the two strategic bases after 1991. Meanwhile, various alternative plans have been made to cope with the situation, if

necessary. These include discussions on the use of Singapore-owned bases and building a new base on Palau Island in the Pacific Ocean.

The U.S. Asia-Pacific defense strategy adjustment program is being carried out at a time when Washington is facing many problems and contradictions resulting from the towering U.S. economic and financial difficulties; a continuing U.S.-Japanese economic conflict; an ROK demand for command of the joint U.S.-ROK forces; the different ways the United States, Japan, and Australia interpret danger in the Asia-Pacific region; the deterioration of U.S.-New Zealand relations; the collapse of the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] military pact; and the support public opinion in Southeast Asia and the southwestern part of the Pacific region has given the antinuclear movement. Nonetheless, various U.S. strategy adjustment policies and measures as well as the

redefinition of long-term U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region that Defense Secretary Cheney talked about indicate that the fundamental objectives of this strategy remain unchanged. This means that efforts continue to be made to keep the Asia-Pacific region in the U.S. orbit in order to use it as a weapon against socialist countries, national independence movements, and other movements for patriotism and progress in the region.

With the Pentagon's advocating maintenance of the same outer defense force in this region, combining the nuclear deterrent policy with the forward defense strategy, and feverishly implementing the competitive strategy, everyone has more clearly realized that Washington's aggressive, belligerent Asia-Pacific strategy is posing a danger to the peace, security, independence, and sovereignty of countries in the region.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

CSCE Envoys on Prospects of Conference

*AU1403091390 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 9 Mar 90 p 4*

[Report on interview with Klaus-Dieter Ernst and Guenther Buehring, GDR delegation heads to the Vienna negotiations, by Bo Adam; place and date not given: "We Will Continue in Vienna for Some Time"]

[Text] A few days ago in Vienna, the fifth round of the negotiations on troop reductions and conventional disarmament in Europe, as well as of the parallel negotiations on security and confidence-building measures on our continent, was concluded. BERLINER ZEITUNG had the opportunity to talk to the GDR's two chief negotiators, Ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst and Ambassador Guenther Buehring, on the state and the prospects of the negotiations in view of the leap-frogging political developments in Europe.

[Adam] How much progress has been achieved in Vienna in the meantime?

[Ernst] I will concentrate on the negotiations on conventional disarmament, in which the 23 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are participating. During the fifth round, standpoints have been brought closer to each other concerning quite a number of problems, for instance concerning the definitions of helicopters, tanks, and planes, without which an agreement would not be possible.

However, essential progress was not achieved in Vienna but in Ottawa. There, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the reduction of their armed forces that are stationed in Europe. Accordingly, the United States and the Soviet Union may have only 195,000 men each stationed in Europe. This would be a quite considerable reduction, in particular on the part of the USSR. For the USSR this means more than halving its forces. In addition, there is the stipulation that the Americans may keep only 30,000 men in the "rest" of Europe. This is a very important question, which was cleared up here in advance and which will be part of an agreement.

Nevertheless, many things remain open. But one may be cautiously optimistic.

Seminar on Doctrines Was a Complete Success

[Buehring] The main event of the conference on security and confidence-building measures, in which all 35 CSCE states participate, was undoubtedly the seminar on military doctrines, which took place recently. There had been some resistance against this seminar—in particular from the Western side.

However, the seminar was a complete success. In which sense? In the sense that the highest-ranking military officials from East and West agreed at least basically that it is not enough to reduce troops and armaments, but

that this must be accompanied by a change in the military way of thinking, that is, in the concepts, the deployment plans, and the equipment programs. In the end, they agreed that this seminar should not be a one-time event.

[Adam] While you have been negotiating in Vienna, the political changes in Europe have achieved breathtaking speed. Let us take just the topic of troop reductions and troop withdrawal. Is this not a problem for the negotiations?

[Ernst] Certainly, it is a problem. Of course, at the beginning of the negotiations in March last year we had certain ideas, which no longer correspond with today's political situation. However, I also have to say: The measures that have now been taken unilaterally by the Warsaw Pact states in the field of disarmament, but also the predictable withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the CSSR—all this is certainly still within the framework that we had originally planned. In detail: Last May, for instance, we proposed that only 570,000 men should be stationed on both sides of Central Europe. The aforementioned reductions would be within this framework, and, under certain circumstances, we would reach the figure 570,000. Thus, we are able to keep pace. Basically, the problem only is that the Western side is not willing to carry out bigger reductions and wants to keep almost 1 million men.

Let us take another example—the upper thresholds for military equipment. On the side of the Warsaw Pact, also in reality, we have not reached the intended number of 20,000 tanks by a long way. And concerning combat planes, the reductions are not going as far as originally intended. Thus, there is still quite a lot to do. But one thing is of course a fact: The basic principle of the negotiations, which we had intended to establish, that is, to establish equal collective upper thresholds for the two alliances—this is now slowly starting to topple because the alliances are simply no longer what they were a year ago. This applies, in particular, to the Warsaw Pact; but, of course, changes are also taking place within NATO. One can certainly imagine a situation—not within the next three or four months, but in the longer term—in which we might establish equal collective upper thresholds between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, but with the Warsaw Pact no longer being willing to reach them but remaining below them.

[Adam] Let us go back to the troop strengths. If we proceed from the current state of affairs, the armed forces of a united Germany would amount to about 600,000 men. Such a military power in Europe is hardly compatible with the goals of the Vienna negotiations.

[Ernst] In terms of figures, the number would even be a bit higher. But one thing is clear: However the process of drawing closer together and unification of the two German states takes place, it is neither in the interest of the Germans nor in the interest of the Germans' political

surroundings that an army with 600,000 men is established or maintained. Basically, it should be a fundamental condition that in an overall Germany—whatever it may look like—there must also be some developments in the military area, namely toward a drastic reduction. Twice Germany was armed to the teeth and this was to the detriment of the people in Europe. Upper thresholds must be set for Germany so that this Germany cannot be a danger to anyone. The ideal thing would certainly be a complete demilitarization down to some sort of police troop. However, the ideal thing usually cannot be implemented in politics. But we must be clear about the fact that the size of a future German Army—regardless of what it will look like and what its structure will be—should be between zero and 600,000 and should be closer to zero than to the 600,000, in my view.

Fears About Too Quick a Unification

[Adam] At present, there is a great controversy over the alliance membership of the two states in the process of drawing closer together and unification. The topic will certainly be a focal issue of the "two-plus-four" talks. However, the question also directly affects the Vienna negotiations.

[Buehring] This is, indeed, an extraordinarily complicated matter. I will try to simplify it as far as possible: In the technical negotiations themselves, the question of the drawing together and unification of the two German states is not an issue, either at the meeting of the 23 states or at that of the 35 states. There one expects to continue to see the GDR for some time to come. At the same time, in personal talks one can clearly feel and hear the fear that all this could take place much too quickly and without any control. When a chancellor comes back from Moscow like a drunken rabbit and states: Well, now we will quickly hold these GDR elections, and then in December we will hold all-German elections—this causes some shock to the experts' minds.

The basic idea, the framework that was mapped out in Ottawa for the incorporation of the German issue in the CSCE process is good. In simple terms, the basic idea is as follows: The four and the two meet first to discuss how the questions concerning the future status and membership in an alliance can be settled. Subsequently, a summit of the 35 CSCE states will be held to deal with these issues. As I already stated, the basic idea is good. However, nobody has precise ideas concerning the timetable and the practical implementation. I think it is illusionary to work out a specific timetable according to which there should first be two or three "two-plus-four" meetings. At these meetings, a decision will be adopted that Germany will either belong to NATO or become neutral. Four weeks later, the result will be presented to the CSCE summit, and the statesmen will listen attentively and state afterward: How nice. Thus, the German question has been settled for us. Well, things will certainly not work out this way.

Some people have now seriously thought about how this process can be shaped in a reasonable way. The GDR Foreign Ministry has presented a memorandum that might be helpful. There are also neutral states, such as Austria, for example, that are trying to find a way in which the 35 CSCE states in Vienna can make a useful contribution. They have suggested that, on the sidelines of the Vienna talks, experts should think about the agenda of a possible summit of the 35 CSCE states. The question of the agenda is probably open again because the summit's central issue has changed. So far, everything was clear—the agreement of the 23 states on conventional disarmament was to be adopted. Now the question is whether the German question should be the summit's central issue. This naturally depends on how much progress is achieved by the "two plus four."

[Ernst] I would like to add that all those who are participating in the 23 states' talks are also thinking about a timetable. Most of them believe that if a disarmament agreement is completed this year it should also be adopted the way it is, irrespective of the situation on the German issue. However, if everything becomes irrational, if all reasonable arguments are ultimately discarded, it may happen that the chances for the conclusion of a disarmament agreement this year will diminish. Such an agreement would be based on the existence of the alliances and that of the GDR. Whoever wants to change this will have to draft a completely new agreement.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

USSR Vehicles, Soldiers Continue Withdrawal

*LD0503160590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1500 GMT 5 Mar 90*

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from CSSR territory continues according to schedule. The first stage is to be completed by the end of this May.

Besides the railway border crossing the Soviet Union in Cierna nad and Tisou and Matovce, which is being crossed by trainloads of caterpillar truck equipment, the first convoy of vehicles crossed the border in Vysne Nemecke. About 200 soldiers and officers, 80 military vehicles, and 20 trailers from Soviet garrisons in the North Moravian region reached the territory between local and Soviet customs without any problem. After passing through customs and passport checks on both sides, the equipment crossed to Soviet territory, where it will continue under its own steam.

Soviet Troop and Tank Withdrawals Scheduled

Troops To Vacate South Bohemia

*LD0903210190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1200 GMT 9 Mar 90*

[Summary] According to the schedule of Soviet troops' withdrawal from Czechoslovakia, a section of the garrison from Boletice in the South Bohemian Region was

due to leave by the end of this week. Our correspondent (Jiri Jisa) says that altogether 60 conscripts and 11 officials plus their equipment are due to depart from Boletice for the Soviet Union on Sunday, 11 March. The remaining part of this communications unit, amounting to 35 conscripts and 10 officials, are to remain in Boletice for the time being and the date of their departure, which could be as early as this year, will be determined by their commanding officer from the Soviet garrison in Bohdanec near Pardubice. I also found out from Lieutenant Colonel [Stefan Macar], chief of the military district office in Boletice, that as of a month ago a group of specialists was working in this locality. The group discussed the ecological situation both in the Soviet garrison and its surroundings. They found no defects of a serious nature. The military facilities and two housing blocks will serve the Czechoslovak army after the Soviet troops' departure.

Tanks Withdrawing From Krnov

*LD1003152490 Prague CTK in English 1353 GMT
10 Mar 90*

[Text] Prague, March 10 (CTK)—The first Soviet tanks started to withdraw from the North Moravian town of Krnov early today. The first train with 30 Soviet tanks will set off for the Soviet Union this evening to be followed by the second one after midnight.

Another ten trains with Soviet military equipment will be dispatched in the following days. The last transport is to leave the town on March 26.

There will be a total of 197 vacant flats in Krnov after the withdrawal of Soviet forces and their families.

Balcar Comments on Vienna Armed Forces Talks

*LD1603103490 Prague CTK in English 2024 GMT
15 Mar 90*

[Text] Vienna, March 15 (CTK)—The sixth round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, attended by 23 member states of the two military groupings, opened here today.

Head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the talks Ladislav Balcar told CTK he supposed that stands could come closer in the sphere of the air force. Time has also come for the removal of the last obstacles hampering determination of the definitions of tanks, armoured vehicles and helicopters, he pointed out.

"The break has enabled us to study NATO proposals of February 22 concerning information, verification and a control system on the basis of unappealable inspections. They are constructive proposals creating a good basis for talks to come", the Czechoslovak official stated.

He went on to say that political circles and the public in Czechoslovakia have been satisfied with the fact that in the course of the previous round of the talks a solution was found to such an important issue as cuts in numbers

of Soviet and U.S. troops deployed in Europe outside Czechoslovakia. He pointed out that fruition of the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is in harmony with this agreement.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NVA Strength Reportedly Down to 90,000 Men

*AU0703163490 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
7 Mar 90 p 4*

[Ruediger Moniac report: "Fewer Soldiers and New Strategy"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—While the controversy over the future tasks and size of the German armed forces is becoming increasingly intensive behind the scenes of Bonn politics and the Bundeswehr leadership, one can notice a decreasing combat readiness among the land, sea, and air forces of the National People's Army (NVA) of the GDR prior to the 18 March elections. According to information received by DIE WELT, the NVA's strength, which amounted to 175,000 men in mid-1989, has now decreased to 90,000. According to estimates by Western military experts, even this number will be further reduced to 60,000, if more and more young men opt for the alternative national service.

Despite all efforts by the NVA leadership in the course of a military reform to ensure that the Army is only committed to the state, although it used to be committed to the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there is reliable information that there is increasing insecurity among the military concerning the principles according to which they ought to do their duties, while the training of soldiers has stopped almost everywhere. The higher ranks have been made completely insecure because "those above" have failed to provide credible guidelines and the state has failed to provide such guidelines for the new understanding that has to be created.

Nevertheless, one can notice trends to more and more adapt the NVA to the Bundeswehr's requirements. It was stated that the GDR's military system ought to become "as compatible as possible" with the Bundeswehr because in this way the military are probably hoping that they will not be discharged in case of German unification. [passage omitted on recent discussion of military questions within FRG parties]

Defense Ministry Spokesman on SS-23 Destruction

*AU0903113690 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 8 Mar 90 p 3*

[Interview with Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Uwe Hempel by Rene Heilig in East Berlin; date not given: "No Secret Surrounding the Missiles of the National People's Army"]

[Text] [Heilig] Colonel Hempel, there are reports that the National People's Army [NVA] has SS-23 type missiles....

[Hempel] Yes, that is correct.

[Heilig] How many of these missiles are there?

[Hempel] There are 24 missiles, four launch-pads, four cargo trucks, and corresponding technical equipment for maintenance.

[Heilig] Missiles have warheads. What kind of warheads do the NVA's SS-23 have?

[Hempel] They have only nonnuclear warheads.

[Heilig] This kind of missile is mentioned in the INF Treaty. The Soviet Union has stated that its missiles of this type have been completely destroyed....

[Hempel] There is no doubt that this is correct. The Soviet Union is fulfilling the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the liquidation of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the INF Treaty. Our missiles are not the subject of this agreement.

[Heilig] Thus, one cannot speak of the GDR's violating the treaty. What is being done with the NVA's SS-23 missiles?

[Hempel] They are also being destroyed. Premier Modrow ordered this on 14 December. On 1 February their destruction started.

[Heilig] Where?

[Hempel] In Demen near Schwerin. This is where these weapons are deployed. So far two launch-pads have been destroyed publicly. SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG reported on this, for instance, and I assume that is where U.S. State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler has gotten the information, which was published on Tuesday [6 March]. This is probably also where the reports in the U.S. press come from.

[Heilig] What is being done with the entire missile complexes?

[Hempel] They will be destroyed by November 1990.

Office To Convert Military Resources Planned

LD1203114490 Hamburg DPA in German 1143 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The GDR Government is expected to set up an Office for Disarmament and Conversion before the end of this week. This was announced by Walter Romberg, the Social Democratic Party minister without portfolio, to journalists in Bonn on Monday. By conversion is meant the diversion of military financial resources to other areas.

During his four weeks in his ministerial office, Romberg has dealt, above all, with security and defense issues. He

said that the National People's Army is in a process of constant reduction. Conversion in the industrial and social areas is one of the main problems. Many officers will have to be trained for new occupations. A united Germany and Europe are increasingly faced with the same task.

HUNGARY

Preparations for Troop Withdrawal Talks

Parties To Send Observers to Moscow

LD0703135590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1300 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] The Hungarian Government has proposed that the country's 12 big parties appoint three representatives who will take part as observers in the new round of Soviet-Hungarian troop withdrawal discussions in Moscow. In accordance with the agreement concluded the day before yesterday [at the National Summit on 5 March], the representatives of the 12 groupings were briefed by Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about the discussions conducted so far in the matter of the armed forces' withdrawal. As he said, Hungary would like these forces to leave our country by the end of June next year, whereas the Soviet side wants another two months. Nevertheless, the Hungarian side's position is that the troop withdrawal should take place within the shortest possible time, but in such a way that in the meantime bilateral relations suffer no harm.

Miklos Nemeth, head of government, made an unexpected appearance at the consultation in Parliament House, and he invited the 12 to attend a coordinating consultation at 1530 this afternoon [1430 GMT] to clear up the argument about counting votes in the elections.

Opposition Observers Named

LD0803144590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] In the parliament, agreement has been reached about who are to be the three opposition experts who will travel to Moscow with the government delegation to negotiate the conditions for the troop withdrawals. Erno Kardos reports.

[Kardos] It has been decided which three party representatives will accompany the Hungarian Government as observers to the talks to be held in Moscow on the withdrawal of Soviet troops. After a long debate in the morning, it was decided that Erno Raffay of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Lajos Kosa representing FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], and Gabor Demszky of the Alliance of Free Democrats will travel to the Soviet capital.

A debate evolved about the choice of persons and parties. The smallholders said that their opinion about

the Soviet withdrawal is so opposed to that of the government that they do not wish either to vote or to participate in the talks. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party did not have a candidate. The electoral coalition insisted that their representative should travel to Moscow, too, but they withdrew before the vote as it was obvious they did not have a chance. The 12-party meeting was attended by only nine parties.

Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary for foreign affairs, said at the meeting that the government will only sign the agreement with the Soviets if they manage to keep to June of next year for the withdrawal. In the opposite event, there will be no signing of an agreement. That will become the task of the new government.

The opposition said that they wish to participate not only at the talks, but also at the signing of the documents. However, they said they retain the right, upon forming a new government, to begin negotiations again, in the hope of a possible more favorable agreement.

Logistics of Withdrawal Surveyed

*LD0703191890 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[Excerpt] At the 12-party meeting on Monday [5 March], those not in the government announced that they wished to participate in the talks on Soviet troop withdrawals. [Prime Minister] Miklos Nemeth did not see any obstacle to this, and at today's briefing, after the Hungarian Government had informed the parties of the present situation, they appointed three observers. Peter Szorenyi reports.

[Szorenyi] At today's briefing, it was mentioned that the withdrawal of Soviet troops is to take place by rail; this is why it will take around 16 months. First they will withdraw the offensive-type divisions from our homeland. This means that by next February 90 percent of Soviet soldiers will have left Hungary.

The representatives of the parties present naturally urged earlier troop withdrawals. Their opinion was that perhaps not only railways should be used for transportation.

General Jozsef Biro then said that this kind of solution is at the request of the Soviets. As he said, we must take account of the other side's interests, too, for a withdrawal which has the effect of a defeat will only give support to the conservative forces in the Soviet Union.

However, the presence of foreign troops here makes Hungarians uneasy, declared a well-known party leader. As he said, in a possible rollback in the Soviet Union, these soldiers will obey the authorities.

Speaking about financial questions, State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi said that according to their own calculations, the Soviets will leave installations and other materials here to the value of 45 billion forints. We are not obliged to purchase these; rather, we will have to make contracts regarding them which are advantageous

for us. They cannot, by the way, accept the aforementioned 45 billion forints, even as a basis for negotiations. What is certain, however, is that the complete cost of the withdrawal will be met by the Soviets. [passage omitted]

Statistics on Withdrawal Reported

*LD0703210790 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[Excerpts] There were two subjects today at the meeting between 12 parties and the government. In the morning they heard a report on the Soviet troop withdrawals.

[Unidentified reporter] [passage omitted] The most interesting information was about the numbers in our country, and the technical force present. In 60 garrisons, in 6,000 installations, there are 49,700 soldiers serving. One-third of them are professionals. Apart from them, 50,000 civil employees and family members are living here today. Among other things, 27,146 combat vehicles, 860 tanks, 600 self-propelled artillery, and 18,000 public road vehicles are in the inventory. Some 560,000 tonnes of material are also awaiting transportation. And, for example, if no agreement were to be reached on the question of fuel, then 100,000 tonnes of fuel alone would have to be transported out. Altogether, this means 2,029 trains. It would be physically impossible to move it out within a year, for only rail is possible. The Yugoslavs and the Romanians will not allow it on the Danube; the cost of aerial shipping is prohibitive and of minimal capacity. As for public roads, they would be ruined. Moreover, one single motorized rifle regiment makes up a convoy 30 km long—no mistake, 30 km. [passage omitted]

Complete Pullout Seen by End of Jun '91

*LD0703224990 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Now we turn to Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati, who spoke to [reporter] Gyorgy Bernard in The Hague about the troop withdrawals:

[Begin recording] [Bernard] At your press conference in The Hague, you said a change had occurred in the matter of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Last week, transportation difficulties impeded the withdrawal, but now you say that you are optimistic that in the coming days the final agreement on troop withdrawals will be signed. On what do you base your optimism?

[Karpati] Before we traveled here, we reviewed this problem of transportation in a very detailed way with the Soviet military leaders. It is a question of 264 trains—well, one train has around 40-45 cars, so it is quite significant. According to their calculations, they could not fulfill the Hungarian Government proposal to complete withdrawal by the end of June [1991]. The result of this joint review was that we managed to solve it, so we got rid of this obstacle. So, on this basis, I think that I have the right to be optimistic.

[Bernard] So, you can confirm a date by which the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary will take place?

[Karpati] The Hungarian Government's proposal was that this should be completely and definitively concluded by the end of June next year. The Soviet side asked that it be the end of August. So, it was a question of a difference of two months. On the basis of this, according to our proposal it will be completely concluded by the end of June. [end recording]

Karpati Holds Talks; Interviewed in Netherlands

Queried on Expectations

LD0803001190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 7 Mar 90

[Text] [Announcer] In The Hague, our reporter [Gyorgy Bernard] asked Ferenc Karpati what concrete results he expects from his present visit to the Netherlands:

[Begin recording] [Bernard] Mr Minister, this is the first visit by a Hungarian defense minister to a NATO country. Even if it is such a small one as the Netherlands it is still a NATO country. What agreement can there be between a similarly militarily small country, Hungary, and a small NATO power? And, what is more, just before the Hungarian elections.

[Karpati] Last year, when the Netherlands defense minister was in Hungary, we discovered that our interests, perceptions, and endeavors regarding security were the same in a great many things. This understanding has continued here. First of all, there is no kind of problem between us which causes us to look with hostility at each other. On this basis the Dutch were very open; they gave us thorough and detailed briefings in many matters, and showed great willingness for our two countries to cooperate in any way possible, in the military sphere, too.

[Bernard] Pardon me, but how can two countries which belong to opposing, different military organizations cooperate?

[Karpati] By not threatening each other, not seeing each other as enemies. For this reason, what they showed us, and we were very interested in this...[changes thought]. They very helpfully offered that either our experts should come here, or their experts should come to us, and they would explain in great detail, for example the whole question of the organization of land-based troops, which Hungary is now transforming. And for us, this could be very important. [end recording]

Remarks on Eliminating Close-Range Weapons

LD0803092890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0900 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] In Hungary weapons that would be suitable for an attack against neighboring countries will be eliminated. This was said by the Hungarian defense minister in

Holland, where he held talks with his hosts. Ferenc Karpati once again advocated the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact's political nature, and said that it should not be able to make decisions that are obligatory or disadvantageous for any member country. The minister emphasized that the allies support the Budapest leadership's endeavors in this direction.

Military Ties To Be Strengthened

LD0803111590 Budapest MTI in English 0955 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] The Hague, March 8 (MTI)—Hungarian Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati and his Dutch opposite number, Relus Ter Beek, have agreed to strengthen military relations between the two countries.

Under the agreement Ter Beek announced at an international news conference in The Hague on Wednesday [7 March] evening, Hungary will accredit its Brussels military attache to The Hague, and the Netherlands its Warsaw military attache to Budapest.

A Dutch Air Force delegation is due to visit Budapest in late May, and expert consultations will be held, either in Budapest or The Hague, about organizational forms of military training.

Speaking to journalists, the two defence ministers spoke in appreciative terms about the openness and friendly atmosphere which had characterized the talks and the delegation's programme.

Answering a question, Karpati said that Hungary's neighbours had also adopted a new approach to both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

For example, in Romania, he was extensively informed about the difficult position the Romanian Army was in.

Asked by MTI's correspondent whether the Hungarian example of cutting Armed Forces by 35 per cent was likely to be followed by its neighbours, Karpati said that Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland also planned considerable reductions.

Reflecting on a remark, Karpati pointed out that national security had always been considered a top priority during arms reduction talks.

"We presume that European detente will be a lasting process yielding concrete results, or else the concepts so far would have to be re-examined," Ferenc Karpati said.

The military delegation left The Hague for Budapest on Thursday morning.

Dutch Defense Minister: Visit 'Successful'

LD0803143990 Budapest MTI in English 1235 GMT 8 Mar 90

[Text] The Hague, March 8 (MTI)—In an interview with MTI's correspondent, Dutch Defence Minister Relus

Ter Beek described the visit to the Netherlands by the Hungarian military delegation Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati headed as "highly successful and useful".

Ter Beek stressed discussions had been held in an open, friendly atmosphere. Different alliance commitments do not hamper useful cooperation, he added, citing the recent agreement on the mutual accreditation of military attaches.

The Dutch defence minister stressed that the open exchange of information about military forces served to strengthen reciprocal security and confidence.

Asked about the effects the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and the imminent Vienna arms reduction accord are likely to produce on the future of the Dutch Armed Forces, Ter Beek said that these forces would also be reduced.

The extent of reduction is currently being negotiated by the NATO countries.

For a start, there will probably be 150-180 fewer tanks, a drop of 10 to 15 per cent.

The Netherlands will firmly speak out for the first Vienna accord on conventional armed forces reduction to be signed this autumn by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, to be followed by further talks along this line.

Ter Beek said that a few weeks ago, he had notified the Dutch parliament of plans to reduce the number of active Dutch forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany after the first Vienna accord.

This is, of course, a political issue relating to the German reunification process, in the light of which everybody should reconsider their military policy, he added.

The minister said he would be working out his concepts about a new Dutch defence policy, including reductions and a comprehensive restructuring of the Armed Forces.

A white paper will be put out on the subject, Ter Beek told MTT's correspondent.

Formal Agreement on Troop Withdrawal to be Signed

'Soviet Sources' on Initial Troop Withdrawal

*AU0803215690 Paris AFP in English 2056 GMT
8 Mar 90*

[Text] Budapest, March 8 (AFP)—The Soviet Union will begin pulling out its troops from Hungary on Monday [12 March] after an agreement on a total withdrawal by mid-1991 was reached, Soviet sources said here Thursday.

Hungarian Defence Minister Ferenc Karpati said in The Hague on Wednesday that Hungary and the Soviet Union had resolved the remaining problems standing in

the way of the troop withdrawal and a formal agreement is expected to be signed in Moscow on Saturday.

53,000 Soviet troops are stationed in the country, according to the minister.

Soviet sources said here that a first motorized infantry battalion will leave the town of Hajmasker, 150 kilometers (90 miles) west of here, by train on Monday at 1000 GMT. Informed Hungarian sources confirmed the report. A ceremony has been scheduled and journalists were invited, according to the sources.

The total number of soldiers and family members to return to the Soviet Union add up to 100,000 people. More than 27,000 vehicles and armoured carriers, 100,000 metric tons of petrol and 730,000 tons of ammunition will also to be taken back.

Soviet sources said all troops and equipment would return to the Soviet Union by the end of August next year. Hungarian officials have insisted that the dateline be brought forward by two months.

10,000 Soviet troops left Hungary last year.

Moscow started pulling out its 80,000 troops from Czechoslovakia late last month.

Delegation Leaves for Moscow Talks

*LD0903113290 Budapest MTI in English 1021 GMT
9 Mar 90*

[Text] Budapest, March 9 (MTI)—A Hungarian delegation headed by Ferenc Somogyi, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff, left for Moscow on Friday to attend the third plenary session of the Hungarian-Soviet expert talks on the pull-out of Soviet troops from Hungary.

The delegation was joined by three observers—Gabor Demszky, Lajos Kosa and Erno Raffay—representing those parties which have put up national lists for the parliamentary elections.

Preparations for Troop Withdrawals Under Way

Defense Ministry Spokesman Interviewed

*LD1103193390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 11 Mar 90*

[Report on interview with Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, Ministry of Defense spokesman, by Budapest radio editor Erno Kardos; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] We have known since yesterday that the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary will leave the country entirely by the end of June next year. Our editor, Erno Kardos, asks Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, Ministry of Defense spokesman, exactly how this will take place.

[Kardos] Has the technical plan for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army been prepared?

[Keleti] It has, of course, been prepared. When the two foreign ministers signed the agreement in Moscow on 10 March, it contained a plan that states the pace and schedule according to which Soviet troops will leave Hungary by the end of June next year.

To begin, the first Soviet military trains will leave from the Hajmasker [near Veszprem, southwest of Budapest] Railway station. These trains will carry one of the battalions of the Veszprem mechanized rifle regiment to the Soviet Union with some 30 armored transport combat vehicles and 300 soldiers.

[Kardos] Does this mean that the Hajmasker barracks will be evacuated entirely?

[Keleti] Part of them, yes, because this entire withdrawal, properly speaking, constitutes a gradual withdrawal. Obviously, technically it cannot be accomplished in one day, because the objective is not to disturb either commercial or passenger railway traffic, but it should be completed within the shortest possible time.

[Kardos] Can we say, therefore, that there will be no Hungarian railway delays caused by the withdrawal of the Soviets, and that if there are delays they will be due to other reasons?

[Keleti] That is probably so because the Soviet troop withdrawal will be coordinated within the capacity of the railways.

[Kardos] Soviet soldiers lived in Hajmasker. Will the housing be handed over to the locals? And if the barracks are evacuated, what will move into their place?

[Keleti] I cannot tell you now who or what equipment will be moved into the barracks and the housing there. The appropriate government commission will be formed and will decide who will take over the various Soviet military premises after the withdrawal. Naturally, this will have certain material aspects, too. It is also necessary to take into account the damage to Hungarian property during their stay here—what it was, whose renovation was neglected, and the condition of the premises they built. After this, there will be a rendering of accounts which will be ready by summer of next year.

Withdrawal of Troops Begins

*LD1103210690 Budapest MTI in English 1835 GMT
11 Mar 90*

[Text] Budapest, March 11 (MTI)—The pullout of Soviet troops is to begin on Monday, starting with a battalion of the Soviet Southern Army Group's Veszprem (W Hungary) Mechanised Artillery Troop.

The nearby railway station of the village of Hajmasker will be the site where the division's armoured transport vehicles, also involving 300 soldiers, will start returning to the Soviet Union. This information was given to MTI's correspondent by Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman of the Ministry of Defence.

Concerning news in circulation about the arrival of other Soviet troops to Hungary until the end of June, 1991, Col Keleti had the following to say: Soviet privates who have completed their service in Hungary are to be discharged by the end of May, and will return to their country.

They are to be replaced by some 10,000 new Soviet soldiers by mid-June, but their number is much less than those being discharged. These soldiers will be joining military units which will be pulled out only after June, 1990.

The newly arriving soldiers will be manning the important combat and technical equipment, and whose service is indispensable for the planned performance of the pullout. Therefore it is not the case of an increase of staff but the required change of personnel, the colonel emphasized.

Details Announced

*LD1203115190 Budapest MTI in English 1000 GMT
12 Mar 90*

[Text] Budapest, March 12, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Under the agreement Foreign Ministers Gyula Horn of Hungary and Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union signed in Moscow on Saturday, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary starts today, March 12, and is likely to last until June 30, 1991.

At the moment, 49,700 Soviet troops are stationed in Hungary: if the members of their families are also taken into consideration, the number swells to somewhere near 100,000.

The equipment over here includes 27,146 combat vehicles, 860 tanks, 600 self-propelled guns and 1,500 APCs [armored personnel carriers].

Material provisions are estimated at 560,000 tonnes, with 230,000 tonnes of ammunition and 100,000 tonnes of fuel.

Hungary would like to buy all the fuel, and is prepared to pay about 1 billion forints for it.

An estimated 100 billion forints' worth of assets will return to Hungarian ownership after the Soviet troops pull-out is completed.

The Soviets are claiming 40 billion forints in reimbursement for building work they carried out, but Hungary is insisting on a zero balance: There is, they argue, all the outstanding rent to consider for buildings Soviet troops used but did not actually build in the first place, and the free medicine and hospital treatment they have received over the past few decades, which alone worked out to about 500 or 600 million forints a year.

Fifteen thousand or so flats Soviet troops and their families vacate will also be returned to Hungarian councils, but most of them are in need of a top-to-bottom renovation.

Text of Agreement on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*AU1303091390 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG
in Hungarian 11 Mar 90 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Agreement on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Temporarily Stationed on the Territory of the Hungarian Republic"]

[Text] Guided by their efforts to develop the friendly and good neighborly relations between the Hungarian Republic and the USSR and consistently adhering to the basic principles of international law stipulated in the UN Statute and in the CSCE Final Document, including adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non interference in internal affairs, the Government of the Hungarian Republic and the Government of the USSR (the two sides) regard the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary as an organic part of their joint efforts to strengthen European and international confidence and security, and have agreed on the following:

Article 1. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic will commence on 12 March 1990 and will be completed by 30 June 1991.

To be withdrawn are the entire personnel of the Soviet troops, including the Soviet civilian employees and their weapons, combat equipment, and materiel.

The appendix of this agreement contains the schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, and this appendix is an integral part of this agreement.

Article 2. The Government of the Hungarian Republic will contribute to guaranteeing the conditions necessary for implementing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary's territory.

Article 3. Transportation of Soviet troops and the elimination of various materials and waste remaining in Hungary will be carried out while taking into consideration the interests of the civilian population and observing the regulations for environmental protection.

Article 4. The training and combat activity of the Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Hungarian Republic—including flights—will be limited.

Article 5. The two sides will nominate their representatives to guarantee the implementation of this agreement, to supervise the orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, and to register, evaluate, hand over, or sell the various installations and materials by coordinated methods.

Article 6. Until the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, the legal status of the Soviet troops, and the property law, financial, and other issues concerning the temporary deployment of Soviet troops in Hungary will be determined by the agreement on the legal status of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of the Hungarian

People's Republic signed between the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Government of the USSR on 27 May 1957, as well as by the stipulations of other valid Hungarian-Soviet agreements.

Article 7. The property, financial, and other economic issues concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops that are not included in the valid agreements will be regulated by separate agreements. The two sides will take immediate steps to deal with the aforementioned questions by the time of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Article 8. The two sides will settle disputed issues in respect of the interpretation and application of this agreement, as well as the implementation of the withdrawal in accordance with the planned schedule, within 30 days of the date of submitting the same, in the framework of the joint Hungarian-Soviet commission established on the basis of Article No. 17 of the agreement on the legal status of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, signed between the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the USSR Government on 27 May 1957.

If the joint commission is unable to decide on any submitted question, the dispute must be settled through diplomatic channels.

Article 9. The stipulations of this agreement do not apply to the obligations deriving from the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, including those deriving from the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955.

Article 10. This agreement shall enter into force on the day it is signed.

Drawn up in Moscow, on 10 March 1990, in two original copies, each in the Hungarian and Russian languages, both texts being authentic.

[Appendix referred to in Article 1 above is not published]

Chief of Staff Discusses Soviet Troop Pullout

*LD1203221590 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 12 Mar 90*

[Report on interview with Army Chief of Staff Laszlo Borsits by correspondent Gyula Horvath on 12 March, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] The agreement on the definitive and full withdrawal of Soviet troops was signed on 10 March. It presumably will figure in our grandchildren's—and if everything goes well, our children's—history books. [passage omitted] The interview conducted by Gyula Horvath, who saw the first departing train, indicates that there will be a relief of staff, but it is not exactly a situation in which the Soviet soldiers who are departing will be replaced.

[Begin recording] [Horvath] [passage omitted] Today, the first day, 315 people and 40 infantry armored combat vehicles, together with trucks, which is a force exactly equivalent to that of a motorized rifle battalion, are leaving the country from Hajmasker and Herend. According to Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, the troop withdrawal will become more vigorous.

[Borsits] In the month that remains, another 20 military trains, troop transport trains, and in April, 30 military trains, will leave the country's territory. After this, there will be a mobilization of between 90 and 100 military trains every month for the transport of troops; they will be supplemented by trains for passenger transport and the freight trains necessary for transporting home the quantity of some 15,000 containers that are allocated for the Soviet military families. Therefore, for continuity's sake, beginning today, and with greater intensity after mid-April, 18 military trains will be in motion daily in the country's territory, and they will be transporting the Soviet troops.

Some of these will be loaded at the stations, some of them will run on railways in various areas of the country, and some of them will reload at the Zahony reloading area.

[Horvath] We would like an explanation about something else. It has come to light that there will be a change of staff.

[Borsits] What should be understood by a change of staff is that upon the completion of service in the Soviet Army, the time of service for some of the staff will expire before the withdrawal. Most of these are soldiers who drive important combat vehicles, who handle important equipment. Therefore, to prevent them from having to do service beyond their period, this staff will be taken home, and another staff will arrive to handle the most important equipment, so that the former can continue to be taken home. It is only a matter of the relief of staff.

[Horvath] So if they were not to come, there would be no one to take home the combat...

[Borsits, interrupting] That is exactly so. It is indispensable that there should be such a relief of staff. [end recording]

Horn on Soviet Withdrawal, NATO

AU1403113390 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
14 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn by Peter Martos; place and date not given: "Hungary Must Never Again Be Dependent"]

[Text] [Martos] Mr Minister, last weekend, you and your Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze signed the agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Hungary. At the final stage of the negotiations, the question was discussed as to when the withdrawal should be concluded. Did Hungary consider 30 June 1991 an

appropriate date because on that day the last Soviet soldier will have left the CSSR?

[Horn] No. Originally, we wanted the withdrawal to be concluded by the end of this year. That would have been possible for the troops, because only 50,000 Red Army men are deployed in Hungary, whereas 75,000 are based in the CSSR. However, two and a half times as many arms are stored in Hungary. We will need 2,029 sets of railroad cars [garnituren]—not cars, but sets of cars!—to transport them all to the border where they will be reloaded.

The Red Army suggested the end of August 1991 as a deadline. The Soviet political leadership backed us in this respect: The withdrawal must be concluded on 30 June 1991.

[Martos] There have been numerous contradictory reports about the intentions that the Hungarian Government is pursuing between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. You have been quoted as saying that Hungary should get closer to NATO. What does your concept envisage?

[Horn] Following World War I, Hungary was severely punished. Just think of the Treaty of Trianon which even President Mitterrand recognized as unfair. Following World War II, the Treaty of Paris confirmed Trianon.

In addition, beginning in the second half of the forties, an absolutely strange model was imposed on Hungary—Stalinism. Thereby the country was forced to pursue a course the consequences of which are still straining us now, four decades later.

In the future, Hungary must never again depend on a single superpower. Our security must be based on multilateral support. I am convinced that all of Europe will be democratically restructured. However, this will put an end to the division of Europe into two blocs.

I believe that a collective defense and security system will help bring about convergence of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In such a defense system, Hungary must also have its place.

[Martos] Could that be in the framework of NATO?

[Horn] Drawing closer to NATO, which was not initiated this year but started as early as in 1987, is an important stage on the path that I outlined earlier. Why should Hungary not become a member of a political organization of NATO—the North Atlantic Assembly, for instance?

I do not rule out neutrality either. In this respect, there is a prerequisite, however. We must have a multilateral security guarantee, as I said earlier. Never has a superpower sided with Hungary in the past—just think of World War II or even 1956.

[Martos] Does that mean that Hungary would leave the Warsaw Pact and become a NATO member only if the security situation in Europe changed?

[Horn] The solution is not to demonstratively leave the Warsaw Pact. That would be bound to cause unnecessarily large tensions with the Soviet Union. I am confident that the Warsaw Pact will advance on the road of change in its member countries. It may then eventually become unnecessary. For the moment, the conditions are not very stable.

[Martos] There are indications that following Ceausescu's fall, not nearly as much has changed in Romania as people originally expected. Does that have a destabilizing effect also on Hungary?

[Horn] In December 1989, I was euphoric, as almost all people were. I really thought that a totally new phase would begin, not only in Romania but also in Romanian-Hungarian relations. Unfortunately, I have been disappointed in many respects. If the process of democratic transition fails in Romania, nationalism will increase. I see increasingly alarming indications in this respect every day. That means that the rights of minorities, including the Hungarian minority, are in jeopardy.

When we agreed with the Romanians on 18 points on 29 December, there was complete harmony. Meanwhile, only a single point has been implemented. My impatience is growing in view of the fact that we are confronted with obstacles everywhere.

[Martos] Calling the Treaties of Trianon and Paris into question is probably not possible. What could Hungary do now for the minority in Transylvania?

[Horn] Calling the territorial integrity and sovereignty of present-day Romania into question would not help us achieve a result. On the contrary—we would only create mistrust.

Two things must be done: First, we will address the open questions virtually every day. Second, the policy of the Romanian leadership and even more of the emerging

parties could be much better influenced by civilized Europe. They must see that with their nationalism, they cannot have a place in the European family of nations, because democracy and nationalism are mutually exclusive.

[Martos] On 25 March, democratic elections will be held in Hungary. You are a candidate of the governing Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], which originates from the Communist Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. At the party congress in October, you were among the radical reformers; however, you agreed to a compromise recently. Now the MSZP is reproached time and again for not delimiting itself sufficiently from the dogmatic MSZMP which has re-emerged.

[Horn] With my present experience and knowledge, I would certainly have behaved differently at the party congress in October. It was a mistake that we did not act with the necessary resolve. Compromises were concluded which have proved to be harmful—both politically and in terms of personnel. The point is not delimitation from the old party, but forming a party leadership.

It is another matter that the opposition deliberately blurs the differences between the MSZP on the one hand, and the former and the present MSZMP, on the other. In doing so, they ignore the fact that it was the present leadership of the MSZP which initiated the changes leading to the elections on 25 March and 8 April.

I believe in the MSZP. In Hungary, we need to have a modern leftist party, like in West Europe and in Austria. Without socialism Vranitzky-style, or Gonzalez-, Craxi-, or Mitterrand-style, there can be no political interaction.

[Martos] But such a party does not exist in Hungary.

[Horn] I think the MSZP has embarked on the way to that goal. However, it will not get there straightaway; it has to carry many old burdens.

BRAZIL**Weapons to Protect Cuban President Castro in Brazil Cause Incident****Cubans Forced To Send Back 10 Tons of Weapons**

*PY1303174890 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1618 GMT
13 Mar 90*

[Text] Rio de Janeiro, 13 March (EFE)— The Cuban delegation that arrived last weekend in Brasilia to attend the 15 March inauguration of Brazilian President-elect Fernando Collor de Mello brought with them 10 tons of weapons that their security guards intended to use for the visit of Cuban President Fidel Castro.

According to a report published today by the newspaper JORNAL DO BRASIL, the plane load of weapons, which even included missiles, was sent back.

JORNAL DO BRASIL reports that the arrival of the Cuban delegation's weapons almost provoked a diplomatic incident between Brazil and Cuba, but the matter was settled after nine hours of talks at the Brasilia international airport.

The plane, a Soviet-made Ilyushin, arrived at 2220 (0020 GMT 11 March) with 15 crew members and 83 passengers who carried diplomatic passports. Also on board the plane were 10 tons of weapons, including an anti-aircraft gun, submachine guns, grenades, and missiles.

The Planalto Military Command was called in to inspect the weapons while federal officials demanded the submission of documents concerning the weapons. The plane finally returned to Cuba on 11 March with the weapons, despite protests by the Cubans.

It has also been reported that after Collor de Mello's inauguration, Fidel Castro will have a busy schedule in Sao Paulo.

JORNAL DO BRASIL reports that the Cuban president wants to visit a health center, a school, an institution charged with promoting human rights, a housing development, and the Latin American Memorial.

The newspaper adds that Castro may also meet with Brazilian businessmen interested in investing in Cuba.

In Brasilia, center and right-wing congressmen are planning to hand the Cuban president a communique urging him to call "free, direct elections in Cuba as soon as possible." They will also suggest to the Cuban leader that the election be followed by "an indispensable general, unrestricted amnesty" for all those who are being deprived of their freedom for political reasons.

Collor de Mello's inauguration will be attended by 25 other chiefs of state, including all the presidents from South America, with the exception of Ecuadoran President Rodrigo Borja.

Government Confirms Incident

*PY1303212890 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1908 GMT
13 Mar 90*

[Text] Brasilia, 13 March (EFE)—Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, secretary general of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, today confirmed that authorities had refused entry to a cargo of "nonportable" weapons intended to protect Cuban leader Fidel Castro during his visit to Brazil on 15 March to attend Fernando Collor's inauguration.

JORNAL DO BRASIL reported today that a Cuban plane, a Soviet-made Ilyushin, arrived in Brasilia on 10 March carrying 10 tons of weapons, including an anti-aircraft gun and missiles.

Brazilian authorities first requested certificates for the weapons, but after nine hours of talks, the plane had to return to Cuba with them despite strong protests by Cuban officials on the plane.

Flecha de Lima said that sending an advance mission to prepare for a president's visit was normal business, but added that the arms had been rejected.

"What was not portable did not need to be unloaded," Flecha de Lima said. The Foreign Ministry official today held a news conference to talk about Brazilian foreign policy during President Jose Sarney's administration.

The Brazilian Foreign Ministry yesterday confirmed that Castro will attend Fernando Collor's inauguration, 30 years after his last visit, when the new capital was under construction.

Flecha de Lima, whose position is equivalent to that of a deputy foreign minister, minimized the importance of the incident, pointing out that it was only a case of "excessive care by the security personnel" in charge of the Cuban president's protection.

Asked about the prospects of Cuba's reintegration into the Latin American community, Flecha de Lima said that the island "is increasingly looking toward Latin America" and that relations will improve, particularly following recent developments "in the Soviet Union's organization."

It has been reported that Fidel Castro will tour Brazil after Fernando Collor's inauguration, even though Castro's official agenda has not been confirmed.

Brazilian newspapers have said that the Cuban president will visit Manaus, capital of Amazonas State, and Sao Paulo, site of the Latin American Memorial, which was inaugurated last year.

Sao Paulo Governor Orestes Quercia—who visited Havana two years ago—had reportedly invited Fidel Castro to attend the inauguration of the memorial. The cultural center was designed by Oscar Niemeyer, the architect of Brasilia.

MEXICO

USSR Envoy on Defense of Cuba, Gorbachev Visit

*PA0903144190 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0110 GMT
9 Mar 90*

[Text] Mexico City, 8 March (EFE)—Rostislav Sergeev, USSR Ambassador to Mexico, stated today that the Soviet Union will not allow foreign intervention in Cuba. The ambassador made these statements after a meeting at the Government Secretariat in Mexico City.

The Soviet diplomat reaffirmed that his country will defend Cuba's right to independence because it is a

country that wants peace and security and that holds excellent, good, and normal relations with the USSR.

Sergeev insisted that not only has Cuba received many things from the Soviet Union, but that the Soviet Union has also received many things from Cuba. He added that the exchange between both countries is important.

Concerning the European situation, the diplomat rejected the possibility of a return to the cold war and pointed out as an example of their good intentions the Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia to propitiate detente.

Sergeev reaffirmed the possibility of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev officially visiting Mexico this year and added that for this to occur, the necessary contacts between both governments would be required.

INDIA

Policy Reconsideration Possible 'If Pakistan Goes Nuclear'

*BK0803161290 Delhi Domestic Service
in English 1530 GMT 8 Mar 90*

[Text] The minister of state for defense, Dr Raja Ramanna, today said that India might reconsider its nuclear policy if Pakistan goes nuclear. Speaking to newsmen at Visakhapatnam after inaugurating the 56-crore rupee north dry dock complex, Dr Ramanna stressed the need for acquisition of modern technology and skills for the modernization of the Navy.

On the subject of tensions and relations with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, he expressed the hope that an all-party meeting would provide some solution to it.

IRAN

Velayati Leaves for Geneva Disarmament Conference

*NC1403065090 Tehran Domestic Service
in Persian 0430 GMT 14 Mar 90*

[Text] Foreign Minister Mr Velayati left Tehran for Geneva this morning heading a delegation to participate in the disarmament conference. The Central News Unit reports that the conferees will discuss signing an agreement on chemical weapons, on nuclear arms testing, and on preventing an arms race in space.

KUWAIT

Defense Chief Denies Long-Range Missiles Bought

*LD0903093390 Kuwait KUNA in English 0706 GMT
9 Mar 90*

[Text] Kuwait, March 9 (KUNA)—Minister of Defense Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad Friday denied that Kuwait had purchased long-range missiles and stressed that it maintains good relations with the region's countries.

In an interview with daily AL WATAN, published today, Shaykh Nawaf said the region's future is safe as long as security and stability have prevailed following the cease-fire in the Gulf war. He expressed hope that both countries would reach a comprehensive peace agreement to start a new stage of cooperation on the basis of one religion and good neighborliness.

Shaykh Nawaf expressed satisfaction over military cooperation among the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] states, noting that the 4th peninsula Shield maneuvers, which are currently taking place in Kuwait, form an advanced stage of such cooperation.

Shaykh Nawaf and chief of staff of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces as well as chiefs of staff of GCC member states are scheduled to attend activities of the maneuvers next Sunday, the paper said.

LIBYA

U.S. Alleges Chemical Weapons Being Produced**Official Denies Al-Rabitah Claims**

*LD0703154990 Tripoli JANA in English
1426 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[Text] Tripoli, al-Rabie [March] 7 (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)—An official source at the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation has disclaimed today what has been broadcast by the U.S. TV network ABC alleging that Libya has produced quantities of chemical weapons in al-Rabitah medicine factory.

Replying to a question raised by JANA, the above source has said that such allegations aired at present by some media circles aim at creating a state of suspicion vis-a-vis [word indistinct] reconciliation and harmony prevailing in the Arab unionist atmosphere where excellent and forward steps have been taken at all levels—economically, politically, and in the sphere of development among the Arab Maghreb Union countries in particular and among members of the Arab nation in general.

The above source has maintained that the U.S. Administration as it seems has not benefited from the mistakes made by the former U.S. president in alleging a series of allegations against Great al-Jamahiriya such allegations have been shown to be baseless before the world public opinion [sentence as received]. We have thought that the Bush administration will benefit in a sensible manner from these mistakes that have inflicted great damage upon the U.S. people itself. Apart from discrediting the U.S. worldwide, especially when Reagan committed an aggressive crime by bombing the two cities of Tripoli and Benghazi causing the U.S. a moral catastrophe.

The above source has concluded by expressing his sorrow over the sham comments that have been repeatedly aired by Western and U.S. media organs in particular against Great al-Jamahiriya and the Libyan Arab people taking into account that we in Great al-Jamahiriya have called for a balanced and open dialogue with the new U.S. Administration.

Envoy to UN Denies Production

*JN0703203990 Paris Radio Monte Carlo
in Arabic 2000 GMT 7 Mar 90*

[From "Panorama" program]

[Text] Ambassador 'Ali al-Turayki, head of the Libyan delegation to the United Nations, has told our radio that Libya does not produce chemical weapons. He declared

his government's readiness to sign an international agreement to ban the manufacture and use of chemical weapons in the Middle East, and to carry out international verification to ensure that there are neither chemical nor nuclear weapons.

'Authoritative Source' Comments

*LD0803142290 Tripoli Domestic Service
in Arabic 1330 GMT 8 Mar 90*

[Text] An authoritative source at the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation has made the following statement:

The U.S. Administration has started once again to reiterate false allegations and accusations against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. These accusations were preceded by a distasteful media campaign, which was followed by a statement made by the White House official spokesman yesterday in which he claimed chemical weapons are being manufactured at the pharmaceutical and medical equipment factory of al-Rabitah.

The U.S. spokesman was not content with only reiterating these allegations, for which we supplied answers, and about which the world noted the falsity, but the statement hinted at the possibility of embarking on any action against the Great Jamahiriya, including military action.

While the People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation condemns and denies the statement of the U.S. official spokesman, it stressed once again the already announced full commitment of the Jamahiriya to all international charters and efforts aimed at forbidding the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and other destructive weapons. The Jamahiriya stresses its readiness to cooperate with any international and constructive effort in this connection. It calls on the international community, its countries and organizations, to denounce and stand up to this hostile and serious policy still being pursued by the U.S. Administration, and which does not only represent a threat against Libya, but also against all developing countries that strive to be committed to their freedom and reject capitulation to foreign hegemony and domination.

Further on Al-Rabitah Chemical Weapons Production

Plant 'Not Equipped' for CBW Output

*PM1203112690 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 9 Mar 90 pp 1, 2*

[Allan George report: "Architect Who Built Al-Rabitah Plant Tells AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Libyan Plant Not Equipped To Produce Chemical Weapons"]

[Excerpt] London (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT)—Architect Ihsan Barbuti, the man who was in charge of the construction and equipment of the Libyan plant of al-Rabitah, has stated that the U.S. intelligence report claiming that the plant has begun producing chemical weapons is untrue. He described the claim as sheer nonsense.

Architect Barbuti, who was born in Iraq and grew up in London, said: Although I have not visited the plant since 1988, I am 200 percent—not just 100 percent—sure that these reports are not true.

He added: As far as I know, the construction of the plant has not been completed yet. I know, for example, that there is still no available means of supplying it with the water necessary for its operation. Even assuming that the plant has been completed, there are no engineers capable of operating it. [passage omitted]

Italians Cited on Plant

*LD1303110990 Tripoli JANA in English
1436 GMT 12 Mar 90*

[Text] Rome, al-Rabie [March] 12 (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)—On the U.S. anti-Great al-Jamahiriya campaign JANA's correspondent in Rome conducted several press contacts with some trades union leaders, politicians and officials in Italy to listen to their viewpoints and reaction to the new campaign against Libyan Arab people.

Mr Fabaristo, in charge of the foreign affairs in the continuing struggle movement in Italy has said that the U.S. threats constitute a provocation. The U.S., he has added should at first prove that the al-Rabitah manufacture is one that doesn't produce medicines. He continues that Libya is not the first country in this respect. Whatever is permissible, other countries should [words indistinct] to Libya. Therefore, the Zionists who produce nuclear bombs should be exposed. So is South Africa [as received]. Additionally, it is necessary to expose Italy which produces chemical weapons. The U.S. and the USSR also produce chemical weapons.

Mr Babariuto adds that these things are part and parcel of the rights Libya is entitled to. As regards the political aspect, it is incumbent at the international level to find a formula and a solution to ban the use and production of chemical weapons worldwide. Should there be one country to use such weapons in self-defence.

The Americans have no justification to launch this anti-Libya campaign because they are the first to have used such a weapon. They can make other countries get rid of such weapons. They should make an example to eliminate such weapons they have at their disposal. Therefore, any other country has a right to produce such weapons for self-defence. I am he adds, very positive that al-Rabitah manufacture doesn't produce chemical weapons. This is so because of strategic and military reasons preventing their production.

Additionally, it is not possible to conduct an inspection on this manufacture. Such an inspection should be conducted on all and in every country.

He has proposed the formation of an international committee under the auspices of the United Nations to prohibit the production of chemical weapons. This committee should go to the U.S. and the Soviet Union and other countries for inspection. Should there be an international programme that is accepted widely, there exists no justification for anybody to disapprove such an inspection.

Arab Committee Condemns U.S.

*LD1203175790 Tripoli JANA in English 0820 GMT
12 Mar 90*

[Text] Tripoli, al-Rabie [March] 12 (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)—The Libyan Arab Committee for Cooperation and Peace has condemned the American hostile statements and threats against the Libyan Arab people and its civilisational achievements realised thanks to the great al-Fatih Revolution.

In a statement yesterday, the committee said that the American statements showed the hostile intentions against Jamahiriya, its people and leader of the revolution.

It added that the American statements were aimed at dealing a blow to Arab cooperation, Arab unity and covering up for the immigration of Soviet Jews to occupied Palestine carried out by the Zionist enemy and the American administration and the new inventions by America to manufacture weapons of mass destruction to annihilate mankind.

The Libyan Arab Committee for Cooperation and Peace urged all peace and security lovers in the world including individuals, organisations, institutions and states to confront these hostile threats and statements against Great Jamahiriya.

Spokesman Denies Chemical Weapons Production

*AU1003151190 Rome ANSA in English 0847 GMT
10 Mar 90*

[Text] Rome (ANSA)—A spokesman for the Libyan Embassy in Rome denied on Friday allegations that his country has resumed the production of chemical weapons at a plant in Rabta.

Asked about the charge levelled against the chemical plant, the spokesman cited Tripoli Foreign Ministry sources and said he was "amazed by what had been said and reported in some newspapers in the United States and then picked up by the Western media as regards the presumed Libyan production of chemical arms.

"We respond with a categorical denial, we are amazed at the statements made by the U.S. Administration in this area and we urge them to open a frank, balanced, and open dialogue, without creating positions on false news," said the spokesman.

The Embassy official added: "This is an excellent and positive time in relations among Arab states, especially among the Maghreb countries."

SYRIA

TISHRIN Condemns U.S. Arms Sales to Israel

*JN1503103490 Damascus SANA in Arabic
0818 GMT 15 Mar 90*

[Text] Damascus, 15 March (SANA)—The newspaper TISHRIN warned here today of the dangers of the U.S. decision to provide Israel with a modern radar and early-warning system, which confirms the U.S. position concerning continued Israeli military superiority over the Arabs to impose its conditions on them.

The newspaper said in a commentary today that giving U.S. weapons to the Zionist aggressors so that they can stockpile them to serve their aggressive expansionist objectives cannot serve the peace process or realize any true progress in seeking to find a peaceful settlement in the region.

The newspaper adds: Whoever seeks to establish peace does not place the most modern military weapons in bloodthirsty hands. This does not benefit the constructive role which a superpower like the United States should play to establish peace in this part of the world.

TISHRIN affirmed that Israel owns weapons for destruction and killing greater than its actual size, and that stockpiling these weapons imposes impossible conditions on the Arabs.

The newspaper pointed out that the U.S. relationship with world countries is based on a trilateral, rather than bilateral, policy. In other words, when the U.S. Administration thinks of strengthening its policies with this or that side, it inevitably thinks of the extent of the positive or negative effects on the U.S.-Israeli relationship. If they are positive, then it proceeds to set them up; if negative, then it avoids them.

TISHRIN concludes its commentary saying that the announcement on providing Israel with the most modern radar and early-warning systems will not be the last. In fact, it accompanies the U.S. role to step up Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel.

This dictates that the Arabs should rise to the responsible level of comprehending President Hafiz al-Asad's sounding of the alarm and his call for realizing unity and solidarity, since they are the most important weapons owned by the Arab nation in confronting its enemies.

USSR Assesses North Korean Readiness To Sign IAEA Agreement

*90WP0051A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 4 Mar 90 p 3*

[Article by G. Petrov, TASS analyst for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "Work Is Being Completed on an Agreement with the IAEA To Rid the Korean Peninsula of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The "creeping" of nuclear weapons is one of the problems that increasingly concerns the public both in the East and in the West. While the USSR and the United States are advancing step by step along the path of reducing their nuclear arsenals, some countries, above all Israel, the South African Republic, and Pakistan, are very close to creating their own nuclear potential.

Recently there has been concern expressed in the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Australia that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, too, is allegedly capable of creating its own nuclear weapons, possessing a small atomic reactor supplied by the Soviet Union for scientific research work back in the 1950s. They remind us that Pyongyang, unlike Seoul, up to now has not concluded an agreement with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] with respect to verification, although it is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The North Korean side admits that resolving the issue of concluding an agreement with the IAEA on safeguards has been drawn out, inasmuch as it promised to sign it within 18 months back in 1985. It explains this by the fact that its experts do not yet understand the complex organizational and technical problems associated with

signing the document. At the same time, the DPRK rejects urging on by the IAEA secretariat, considering it insulting for a sovereign nation. In addition, Pyongyang insists that Washington pledge not to use against the DPRK American nuclear weapons located on the Korean Peninsula. The Americans do not recognize a direct link between the presence of its weapons in this region and the DPRK's conclusion of an agreement with the IAEA.

In June 1986, the DPRK government confirmed its pledge not to test, produce, introduce, or station nuclear weapons on the territory of the DPRK. And last November, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed holding trilateral talks involving the United States and South Korea on the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the south of the Korean Peninsula and also talks between North and South Korea to adopt a declaration on turning the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. This initiative was welcomed in many countries and supported by the Soviet Union. However, Washington and Seoul responded negatively to the DPRK's proposal.

The question of the DPRK's agreement with the IAEA was raised at a press conference by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze on 10 February devoted to the results of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker's visit to Moscow. The Soviet minister stated at that time that the "Korean leaders are very close to completing work on an agreement with the IAEA with respect to verification and to placing their reactor under control of the IAEA. I think this is a very important circumstance," he noted.

But the other side, too, must contribute to turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

CANADA

OTTAWA CITIZEN on Technology of 'Open Skies' Proposal

52200014A Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN
in English 26 Jan 90 p A8

[Text] The broad consensus on the desirability of an "open skies" agreement indicates the extent to which East-West relations have improved recently. Just 12 months ago, the idea that NATO would be allowed to fly unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over Warsaw Pact territory upon short notice—and vice versa—was unthinkable.

At the same time, however, the disputes shaping up over the details of the agreement indicate that mutual trust is still at a premium.

When the two sides present their bargaining positions in Ottawa next month, for example, there will be an argument over the type of sensor technology allowed on the reconnaissance planes.

The West insists each side should be allowed to equip its planes with active sensors (radar) and passive sensors (cameras and infra-red technology that make it possible to collect data at night). Not surprisingly, we claim a technological advantage in both areas and are reluctant to share the sensors and the information collected with the other side.

Thus it is equally unsurprising that the Soviets are worried about NATO using its technical advantage to glean more information from its flights than Warsaw Pact missions will be able to obtain. They are proposing the establishment of a common pool of aircraft equipped with mutually agreed upon sensors. The Soviets also want the information collected to be shared.

Such obstacles can be overcome if the 23 countries involved in the negotiation have the political will to make it work. Both sides, however, must avoid an "open skies" regime where the aircraft are equipped with "mickey mouse" cameras that don't improve upon the information now available from spy satellites. This would undermine the credibility of the exercise, only marginally increase the confidence one side has in the other and limit the usefulness of the "open skies" agreement for arms control verification purposes.

Flying at short notice over each other's territory will increase confidence. But aircraft equipped with sophisticated sensors will make the exercise even more worthwhile. The flights could be used to verify unilateral troop reductions. And after the signing of an agreement to reduce the conventional forces in Europe later this year, the planes could be used to monitor military exercises and the demobilization of troops.

Political will is the essential ingredient to transform the "open skies" concept into reality. The Ottawa conference is proof that some of this political will exists. The

real measure of the "new relationship" between East and West, however, depends on whether the two sides can settle on something other than the lowest common denominator when it comes to the technical details.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Experts Debate Merits of Naval Arms Control

90EN0335A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Feb 90 pp 46-47

[Article by Volker Hogrebe: "For and Against Naval Arms Control—Experts Discuss the Question at the German Naval Institute"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] With the contention that "no arms control at all is better than bad arms control," Hans Ruehle justifies the reluctance of the West to enter into a naval arms control agreement at this time. In most cases, arms control leads to a balance of forces. As a naval alliance, however, NATO, as compared to the Warsaw Pact, is dependent on the superiority of its naval forces. At the invitation of the German Naval Institute, Ruehle—formerly chief of the planning staff in the Ministry of Defense in Bonn and currently responsible to NATO for coordinating Tornado activities as the NAMMA [NATO Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Development and Production Management Agency] director in Munich—recently crossed swords at the Parliamentary Society in Bonn with Egon Bahr, the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] disarmament expert and director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policies at the University of Hamburg.

The CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] arms control negotiations in Vienna, which are expected to be completed in the second half of this year, are concerned with parity in conventional ground and air forces in Europe. Naval forces are expressly excluded. The fact that a state of balance does not yet equate to stability was not an issue being debated by the two adversaries in Bonn. Guarded hopes are therefore linked to a second phase of CFE, which in Bahr's opinion must begin immediately upon completion of the first phase. On the other hand, the outcome of "Vienna 2" should not simply be a further reduction—by a margin of 25 percent, for example, as is currently being discussed. The outcome must be stability. Military stability without inclusion of the nuclear component—the subject of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] negotiations in Geneva—and without consideration of naval forces is inconceivable, however. If for no other reason than to make it impossible for the Soviets to compensate for the reduction of ground forces and aircraft required by the completion of "Vienna 1" by beefing up their naval forces in the ocean-bordering seas, arms controls of naval forces, as well—at least in the Baltic Sea area—are necessary.

Securing the Atlantic Sea Lanes

The freedom of the oceans and the mobility of naval forces quickly lead all attempts to achieve naval regionalization into a dead-end street, however. The United States 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea can easily operate strategically in the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic, as well. Similarly mobile are the Soviet ships of the Pacific and North Sea Fleets—and it is not likely that they will become the subject of Central European naval arms controls. For the industrial nations which depend on unrestricted utilization of the seas, and which are linked together in the Western Alliance, these ships could threaten their existence in case of a conflict. The timely military reinforcement of Western Europe with troops and equipment from the United States that would be necessary during a crisis—10 divisions within 10 days—stands or falls on the security of the Atlantic sea lanes. Since an attacker at sea always has the option of deciding when and where he will take the initiative, superior naval forces are necessary for the protection of transports carrying reinforcements as well as civilian and military supplies. A renunciation of naval superiority is out of the question because of the geographic asymmetry of the two alliances: on the one hand the Warsaw Pact—continentally self-contained with relatively short distances—and, on the other, NATO as a naval alliance with the Atlantic Ocean lying between the main naval power United States and her European partners.

Egon Bahr, as the proponent of naval arms control, feels that it is conceivable that negotiations with the Soviet Union will lead to an agreement which will take the geographic asymmetry and its necessary impact on the naval force relationship into consideration. What he has in mind is an "honest equalization"—"not with respect to km but with respect to the time that it takes me to span distances." With that, the Wartime Host Nation Support would take on a completely new significance: Heavy weapons of United States reinforcement units stored here to compensate for the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union behind the Urals, "for everything on this side of the Urals will be included." Bahr is convinced that "the Soviets cannot fail to see that we have a legitimate, fundamental interest in maintaining sea links with America ... under no circumstances would I agree to naval arms control in which there has to be a balance of forces."

For Hans Rühle it is more than doubtful whether a naval arms control negotiating position in keeping with Western interests can even be sustained: "What I am afraid of is that, under the pressure of public opinion, and despite divergent initial positions which may be very reasonable, we will be forced in the end to give in bit by bit, since to all appearances the other side is making such fantastic proposals and we keep insisting on an imbalance." The desire for superiority in individual sectors is not necessarily incompatible with arms control, "but only in those cases where one is convinced of one's ability to negotiate and persevere in achieving imbalances." In recent years, however, public pressure in Western countries has had the effect "that, once arms control has gone public, all security-political and strategic considerations have been swept away, and in the

end one settles for what appears to be the normal and the right thing to do, namely a situation of balance."

Arms Control for Naval Forces?

Regardless of this, Egon Bahr considers the implementation of naval arms controls as having already taken place anyway—the subject is at least no longer taboo. If not in Vienna, naval forces will, without a doubt, be discussed in Geneva: "When strategic arms reductions are talked about, topics will simply not be limited just to land-based resources; they will include sea-based resources as well." According to Bahr, the subject does raise complicated questions of verification, to be sure, "but I cannot imagine that a START treaty can be approved without agreement on cruise missiles. I cannot conceive of an agreement which does not include sea-based strategic missiles—those carried by submarines, in other words. If this should be the case, however, one will most assuredly have to agree on control measures for these." In the CFE negotiations, as well, carrier aircraft of the United States 6th Fleet will have to be considered, since the Soviet Union has the potential to counter these. In similar fashion, the Tornado aircraft of the German Navy will probably also enter into the negotiations in Vienna. To be sure, through the preferential treatment accorded Western naval aircraft by virtue of the noncrediting of comparable quotas of Eastern systems, the freedom of movement of naval forces so tenaciously defended by NATO is not affected. The ships themselves are not affected anyway—for good reason, in Hans Rühle's opinion: "The fewer United States troops are available in Europe, the greater the need for reinforcements." The security of these reinforcement transports across the Atlantic requires powerful, mobile naval forces: "This automatically rules out—the smaller the conventional military potentials in East and West become in Vienna—any limitation of naval mobility."

Defense Ministry Considers EFA Withdrawal

'Open Options' Justified

90EN0311A Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German
1 Feb 90 p 3

[Article on a conversation with Parliamentary Under Secretary Will Wimmer by Hans Joerg Sottorf: "On the Subject of the EFA, Bonn Is Keeping All of Its Options Open"; first paragraph is HANDELSBLATT introduction]

[Text] Bonn, 31 January—On the question of whether the controversial EFA [European Fighter Aircraft] will be procured, the Federal Defense Ministry obviously wants to keep all of its options open. The costs of withdrawing from the project are presently being calculated. In a discussion with HANDELSBLATT, Willy Wimmer, the parliamentary undersecretary from Hardthoehe, said: "In view of our close attention to the development phase, we know the status of the project at any time and whether the framework of the basic agreement is being adhered to."

The undersecretary foresees that prior to a possible production decision "those subjects that were considered in making the decision on development will be discussed politically." Wimmer adds: "In view of the tax money to be spent, we will certainly have to carry on a very attentive discussion that will include everything pertinent." The politician from the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] is thereby convinced that there will be armed forces and air forces in Europe even after the signing of the disarmament agreements that are now being sought.

In Wimmer's view, this careful examination must also include the situation in the labor market. The parliamentary undersecretary sees this necessity, however, under a particular aspect: "I see the effects in the labor market in the sense of long-term national economic development in the FRG." That is, the FRG ought not to be eliminated as an "efficient and compatible industrial partner and world competitor" in central sectors of the air and space industry.

Wimmer understands that it is "of great importance" for the German and European industries to demonstrate a "performance capability of their own" in aircraft building. This is especially valid for the building of turbines and the development of radar. In this respect, the development phase of the EFA is important for industrial policy.

With the background of the discussions about the EFA and the demands of the FDP [Free Democratic Party] for a further reduction of the Bundeswehr, Wimmer says, however: "I believe that in the economic area, as well as in other social areas of our country, we are going to have to get used to the idea that we need a new perspective for the future. Europe is becoming more political. We see that an economic capacity, cultural strength, and social balance are providing for a prospect for peace in Europe. Military matters are moving into the background. In this connection, I believe that the defense policy of the past was an outstanding investment for the future." Wimmer spoke out optimistically on the capability of the German industry to gear itself to the fact that one day fewer arms will be needed. The undersecretary said: "We are one of the most dynamic and successful industrial nations of the world. If it is at all possible to make useful investments in new areas, then it is we who can do it." Wimmer spoke out in favor of initially using the means that become available in the event of successful disarmament negotiations for the establishment of the necessary facilities to monitor disarmament.

In connection with the discussion on the procurement program of the Bundeswehr, however, the parliamentary undersecretary pointed out that for all the armaments that are produced in the FRG or in joint production in Europe "about 60 percent flow back to their own treasury in the form of taxes and fees." In the case of armaments that are procured outside of Europe, the return flow of invested money is only about 10 percent. Wimmer: "So we must

always make a national economic calculation. Consequently, an arms project that is produced within the FRG or Europe costs the taxpayer considerably less than the sums that are identified in the federal budget."

Wimmer also expressed himself on the demands of the FDP that the strength of the Bundeswehr be reduced to 350,000 men. The undersecretary called this number an "arbitrary thought." The size of armed forces is always based on objectives, and thus could theoretically be under 350,000 men in the indefinite future. If one looks at the current sizes of the armed forces, that is, 500,000 men in the Bundeswehr and 170,000 men in the National People's Army of the GDR, then today one must come to the conclusion that "670,000 German soldiers are too many for Europe and for Germany."

Tornado Possible Alternative

90EN0311B Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
5 Feb 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Tornado Instead of EFA"]

[Text] The Defense Ministry in Bonn and the FDP [Free Democratic Party] are seeking a compromise in the coalition's quarrel about the DM100 billion project. The idea is that an "air-defense" version of the multipurpose combat aircraft Tornado, that heretofore has been procured only by Great Britain, should be ordered instead of the costly weapon system. As early as this week, the Free Democrats plan to talk about this in a coalition dialogue with Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg. This change in the way of thinking has been brought about by the new security situation: Because of the diminishing threat from the East and the pending unification of the two German states, a high-performance aircraft such as the EFA [European Fighter Aircraft] may no longer be necessary. The Tornado version (current unit price: DM56 million) may be adequate for securing German air space. Beyond that, the billions that have already been spent on development of the EFA are not being wasted: The British have insisted from the beginning that the new engines, radar, and electronics of the EFA must be adaptable for the modernization of their Tornado fighter, planned for the mid-1990's. Bonn could also save substantial sums in the maintenance and operation of the multipurpose aircraft, because the air force could rely on the well-tuned logistics of its bomber-version of the Tornado that was not introduced until 1982.

Press Review on Chemical Weapons Withdrawal

AU0803145390 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0605 GMT 8 Mar 90

[From the press review]

[Text] The press today discusses the announced withdrawal of all chemical weapons from the Federal Republic.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg in Bonn on 7 March

announced with satisfaction the withdrawal of all U.S. chemical weapons from the Federal Republic before the end of this year. The government considers this a success and hopes for recognition. Ever since Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and former President Ronald Reagan in 1986 agreed on the withdrawal, the East-West relationship has developed so unexpectedly well that chemical weapons are no longer necessary for deterring the Soviets in Europe. Nonetheless, the happiness at this withdrawal is not unmixed. On the same day when Stoltenberg made his gratifying statement, reports from Washington said that the production of chemical weapons has been resumed at the factory in the Libyan town of Al-Rabitah, which was presumably set up with the help of German firms. It is difficult to find out whether this report is true; however, there is surely not only one such chemical factory in the world.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG has this to say: Supervising an agreement requires considerable openness. The dismantling of production facilities and the clearing of stores must be verified. However, it must also be possible to carry out inspections on suspicion, not only by government representatives but also by independent expert commissions. To that extent, the withdrawal of U.S. chemical weapons from the Federal Republic is not yet exemplary. The United States expects us to fully trust their assurance that there are only chemical weapons in the Clausen depot. Washington can expect its German alliance partners to have such confidence. However, for the Soviets the phrase will hold true that former President Reagan liked to cite in Russian—confidence is good, control is better.

The Essen daily WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE comments as follows: In the final analysis, this disarmament step, too, is the result of the new relationship between the superpowers. It may be another impetus in efforts to totally abolish all chemical weapons. However, there is no reason for all the world to be happy now, because what is stored in the Federal Republic is just a small part of the superpowers' stores. The superpowers' efforts for abolishing these weapons, which can be easily produced at low cost, have been undercut for some time by Third World countries, which consider poison gas the poor man's atomic weapon.

GENERAL-ANZEIGER, published in Bonn, writes: The U.S. gesture is a triple signal. It underlines the present quality of German-U.S. relations, which is very high and is of special importance for the Federal Republic at this time. It is a clear contribution toward easing the two-plus-four talks on the security aspects in connection with the unification of Germany. In addition, it illustrates Washington's new, constructive line regarding the efforts to achieve a global ban on chemical weapons.

Bonn Informed of Libyan Chemical Arms Production

*LD0903202190 Hamburg DPA German 1307 GMT
9 Mar 90*

[Excerpt] Bonn/Freiburg (DPA)—The Federal Government has been informed since at least the beginning of the year on a possible commencement of production of

mustard gas in the chemical factory in Rabta, Libya which was constructed with German participation. This was confirmed by Foreign Office Spokesman Hanns Schumacher on 9 March at a federal news conference in Bonn. According to the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), 30 tons of mustard gas have been produced there, Schumacher said.

He contradicted U.S. press reports, according to which there has been considerable differences between Bonn and Washington because of the commencement of production. Bonn informed the United States immediately on the German information. [passage omitted]

USSR Troop Withdrawal From Hungary Welcomed

*LD1203142390 Hamburg DPA in German 1349 GMT
12 Mar 90*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government welcomes the Soviet-Hungarian agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary by 30 June 1991. Deputy government spokesman Norbert Schaefer told newsmen in Bonn today that this agreement reflects the radical changes in relations between the two states, and shows the "new quality" of Moscow's relations with the states in central and southeast Europe.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl today met for a one-hour talk with four U.S. Senators who are members of the observer group for East-West arms control negotiations. According to Schaefer, the chancellor underlined that the German unification process must be harmonized with the security requirements.

Libyan Plant Produces Chemical Weapons

*AU1203155990 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
12 Mar 90 p 12*

[Text] The poison gas factory in al-Rabitah, Libya, which was built with FRG aid, has allegedly been producing complete chemical weapons with the main chemical agent named "lost" since the end of last year. "Under difficult provisional conditions," the Federal Intelligence Service reported to the FRG Government, the Libyans have meanwhile produced more than 30 tonnes of "lost." There is a frequent lack of spare parts and there are also problems with "exclusively Libyan and Thai personnel." Two "production lines" were built in the "Pharma 150" complex: one for "lost" (daily output: up to one tonne), and a second one for even more dangerous nerve gases such as sarin. Obviously, these nerve gases are to be produced only when the Libyans are more sure of their handling the poisons.

The metal processing facility of the al-Rabitah technology center, the reports say, is "excellently suited for the processing of larger parts, such as those that are needed for bombs and missile warheads." In the future, the production of missile parts might also be possible in al-Rabitah. The production of chemical bombs, for its

part, is possible now. Each one contains 36 plastic bottles with one liter of "lost" in each. So far, up to 100 bombs have been completed.

The Federal Intelligence Service thinks that it may cancel its alert only because of one issue: There is no information that German firms are participating "in the production and in the new start at Al-Rabitah."

Negotiations on Tactical Nuclear Weapons Urged
LD1503155790 Hamburg DPA in German 1454 GMT
15 Mar 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] has spoken in favor of negotiations soon with the Soviet Union on reductions in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Stoltenberg told the German Strategy forum in Bonn today that the West could maintain its security with a considerably smaller number of nuclear weapons if Moscow is prepared to make a drastic reduction. The Soviet Union still has massive superiority in this area. The objective could not, however, be a denuclearized Europe. "We need a minimum capacity of nuclear weapons in the interests of stability."

Stoltenberg made clear Bonn's interest that all the Western allies should continue to station their troops, even if in smaller numbers, in the Federal Republic following a successful conclusion to the Vienna disarmament negotiations. He reckoned that the amount of the U.S. Armed Forces would decline from 250,000 to fewer than 200,000 soldiers. "Total withdrawal would be a completely wrong signal."

The "consequences in a 'yes' to mutual controlled disarmament" should be drawn from the changes in Europe. Public opinion should be clear however "that we continue to need NATO and a secure defense capability." There will be more modern armed forces, although smaller in their extent. The "overlapping security structures" will play a large role in the Europe of tomorrow.

ICELAND

Foreign Minister Presses for Disarmament at Sea
PM1403145390 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 11 Mar 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson by Elisabeth Crona from Stockholm; date not given]

[Text] "The Soviet nuclear-armed submarines—floating Chernobyls—are the greatest and most dangerous environmental issue facing the Nordic countries."

The man from Isafjordur sat in the vault of the Gramunken restaurant in Stockholm's Old Town and spoke about his most important task. Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson, Iceland's foreign minister, had come direct from the Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in Turku.

In Turku the talks dealt with South Africa, the Middle East, and the EEC—and with disarmament at sea to a much lesser extent. The communiqués did not contain a word about an issue dear to the Icelandic foreign minister's heart:

"If last year goes down in history as the year of the great democratic revolution, this year will without a doubt be the great year of disarmament," he said.

"It is only in one area—covering two-thirds of our globe—that there are no negotiations going on at all—the area of disarmament at sea."

Politics in Iceland almost always has a link with fishing and the sea. Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson, who is both foreign minister and foreign trade minister, can therefore introduce himself as "minister for Iceland's vital interests."

His call for nuclear-free seas involves security policy, the environment, and the economy.

It was two years ago that Iceland began to press proposals for disarmament at sea in NATO:

"They are more complicated than existing agreements. And the United States and Britain have been inflexible. They have said a big 'no' to all notions of negotiating with the Warsaw Pact about the seas. The main argument is that the communications between the United States and Europe are NATO's lifeline. And the West's naval forces are stronger. So why negotiate? First we received no support at all. Not even Norway's representative said very much. But changes are on the way. We know that the Pentagon is looking at our proposals.

"This is also a major environmental issue. The Soviet submarine accident off Norway worried the Icelanders greatly.

"We were staring an ecological catastrophe in the face."

Nor was it long before Japanese buyers began to ask questions about possible radioactivity in Icelandic fishing waters:

"Even the mere suspicion of an accident can have serious consequences for our economy and national existence. And Moscow has not provided any answers in connection with this life-and-death environmental issue."

Nor does the Icelandic foreign minister, who is also Social Democratic Party chairman, consider that Iceland's Nordic brother peoples realize the importance of the issue. They should concentrate more on the seas than on the idea of a nuclear-free zone, he said.

"People here are much more taken up with the old—and in my view outdated—idea of the Nordic area as a nuclear-free zone. In the past this idea was a protest against the lack of results in the field of disarmament. It could be seen as the proposal of smaller nations for confidence-building measures, even though there was not much logic or direct knowledge behind it. But

developments in disarmament have provided good evidence that this method, to which I have always been opposed, was wrong from the start."

Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson is on a trip through eastern Scandinavia: from Turku to Stockholm and then on to Lund and Copenhagen. He has asked for a lengthy talk in Denmark with Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. He is unable to understand the Danish Government's call, repeated most recently in Reykjavik and Turku, that the rest of the Nordic area should jump on the EEC bandwagon and apply for membership:

"They say that the rest of us should change our approach to negotiations with and our policy toward the EEC. They tell us that the EEC countries are changing their minds and will soon be ready to welcome us into their circle.

"But no leading EEC politicians have given us any signals of a change in policy. On the contrary. That is why there is no approach other than that chosen by the European Free Trade Association countries. And it is we, under Swedish leadership, who are speeding up negotiations while the EEC is behind in its preparations."

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