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ANGOLA

Chemical Arms Attack on Jamba Reported

AB0303210690 Paris AFP in English 2007 GMT
3 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Jamba, Angola, March 3 (AFP)—Angolan Government planes have dropped chemical arms on rebel UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] headquarters in this southwestern city, an AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE journalist who witnessed the attack said Saturday.

Two MiG-23 jets flying at about 8,000 meters (26,000 feet) to avoid UNITA anti-aircraft defense dropped two bombs early Thursday. One of them gave off a cloud of light grey smoke which, according to witnesses, gave people who breathed it a prickly sensation in the mouth. However there were no reports of casualties.

A crater left by the bomb, about 80 centimeters (2-1/4 feet) long, was smaller than that which would have been left by a normal bomb of the same size, the AFP correspondent said. A smell of rotting that irritated the mouth lingered at the site.

It was the first time government planes had bombed headquarters of Jonas Savimbi, head of the U.S.-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). [passage omitted]

Meanwhile a French technician captured by rebels February 21 will be released next week, reliable sources in Jamba said. Jean-Francois Grossbancher, 37, an employee of the French group Bouygues, is to be turned over to Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, who has been mediating in attempts to end the Angolan civil war, the sources said. The technician, seized during an attack on a convoy of the national oil company Sonangol, was "healthy", according to representatives of the International Human Rights Society (SIDH).

'Limited' Progress in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control*OW2702154590 Beijing XINHUA in English
1508 GMT 27 Feb 90*

[Text] Geneva, February 27 (XINHUA)—While the United States and the Soviet Union have made some headway in arms control negotiations over the past few years, the progress they have made is preliminary and limited, the Chinese foreign minister said here on Tuesday.

Foreign Minister Qian Qichen also said that the two superpowers still have a long way to go as far as disarmament is concerned and that there are numerous obstacles and difficulties on the way ahead.

Mr Qian, in his address to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, praised the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet treaty on the total destruction of their intermediate and shorter-range missiles.

But he pointed out the fact that even if the United States and the Soviet Union were to reach an agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by half, they would still possess over 90 percent of the total nuclear weapons in the world, more than enough to destroy the entire mankind several times over.

The Chinese foreign minister also noted that the U.S.-Soviet arms talks focused mainly on the aspect of quantity but evaded that of quality.

"The arms race between the two countries has not come to a genuine halt, but has turned more to the qualitative aspect," he said. For example, he said, a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and cruise missiles with better accuracy, penetration and mobility, has joined the already enormous strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers.

"The two superpowers that possess the largest arsenals bear a special responsibility for disarmament," he concluded, adding: "They should not only slash the number of their armaments, but also completely stop their qualitative arm race."

Qian Leaves Geneva for Official Visit to Iraq*OW2802204390 Beijing XINHUA in English
1545 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] Geneva, February 28 (XINHUA)—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen left here this morning for Iraq for an official visit after attending a multilateral disarmament conference.

During his three-day stay here, Qian delivered a major speech at the disarmament conference in which he explained China's principal positions on disarmament, and met director Jan Martenson of U.N. Office in Geneva and Secretary-General Kimatina of U.N. conference on disarmament.

The U.N. conference on disarmament is the only multilateral disarmament talks mechanism in the world and therefore plays an important role in world disarmament.

Qian Qichen Clarifies 'Disarmament Stand'*HK0203150390 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
1 Mar 90 p 4*

[XINHUA report: "Foreign Minister Qian Qichen Expounds China's Disarmament Stand at the Disarmament Conference"]

[Text] Geneva, 27 February—Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pointed out today that the world is not peaceful yet, nor is it tranquil; the responsibility for disarmament is heavy and the road is long, so there is no reason to sit back and relax.

Foreign Minister Qian made these remarks while comprehensively expounding the present world situation and China's stand on disarmament at a 40 nation disarmament conference.

The international situation witnessed tremendous changes in the 1980's, Foreign Minister Qian said. At a time when military relaxation has appeared and some progress has been made in the disarmament process, contention between different forces in the world, interference in some countries' internal affairs by big powers, and the sharp, complex, and prolonged tension and turbulence in some regions keep people worrying.

He said that following the development of the world situation and as a result of the strong demand and common efforts of many countries—particularly Third World countries, as well as small and medium-sized countries—international disarmament has witnessed some improvement after a prolonged deadlock and some initial results have been made in disarmament. Forced by the criticism and opposition of the people around the world, and due to U.S. and Soviet financial burdens and economic difficulties, the two superpowers felt the need to make progress in their bilateral arms control talks. Therefore they concluded a treaty on the total destruction of their medium- and shorter-range missiles. Gradual progress is also being made in their bilateral talks on reducing strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons as well as in their talks on the European conventional forces.

But this progress is initial and limited, Qian Qichen stressed. The road to disarmament is long and there are many obstacles and difficulties in the way ahead.

Citing the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms talks, Foreign Minister Qian pointed out that even if the two superpowers reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 percent, they will still possess over 90 percent of the total nuclear weapons in the world, enough weaponry to destroy all of mankind several times.

The U.S.-Soviet arms talks mainly involve the quantity of weapons but evade the quality of weapons, he further pointed out. Therefore their arms race has not really ended, but has instead shifted to the competition of quality. They use the most advanced scientific and technological achievements to develop outer space weapons. This is bound to bring their arms race from the land, the sea, and the sky to outer space, thus forming a new threat to world peace.

Many just wishes and demands of third world countries as well as small and medium-sized countries concerning disarmament have not received due attention, Foreign Minister Qian stressed. For some big powers, multilateral disarmament efforts do not seem worth mentioning. Therefore the progress of many major disarmament issues in multilateral fields does not conform with popular intention. For the last few years there have been prominent indications that attempts have been made to impose pressure on the Third World under the pretext of conventional disarmament and preventing the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.

To ensure that disarmament will proceed in a correct direction, he reiterated:

- The two superpowers, which possess the biggest arsenals, have special responsibility for disarmament and must thoroughly stop their competition of weapons quality apart from just reducing the quantity of weapons;
- They should withdraw all their troops stationed abroad and dismantle all their military bases there;
- All disarmament agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union must be made conducive to safeguarding international peace and stability and should not undermine the interests of a third country;
- All countries, big and small, strong and weak, enjoy equal rights on the question of security and have the right to participate in the discussion and settlement of security and disarmament issues;
- Bilateral and small-scale disarmament should be welcomed, but it cannot substitute for global, multilateral disarmament efforts; these two should complement and promote each other.

On China's disarmament stand, Foreign Minister Qian once again explicitly indicated that opposing the arms race and striving for disarmament are important components of China's independent and peaceful foreign policy. China has always maintained that all kinds of arms race must stop.

China has consistently advocated the total prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Qian said. To achieve this end, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the biggest nuclear arsenals, must undertake special responsibility and duty and take the lead in halting the test, manufacture, and deployment of nuclear weapons, apart from largely reducing all types of nuclear weapons deployed in their countries and abroad. Their genuine progress in

this respect will provide conditions for convening an international disarmament conference attended by all nuclear countries.

Foreign Minister Qian expressed the hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will, through negotiations, genuinely reduce their huge nuclear arsenals by at least 50 percent, and the nuclear weapons reduced should all be destroyed, with proper desposal of their nuclear heads. This reduction should not be restricted to the nuclear weapons deployed in their own countries and Europe but should also involve their nuclear weapons deployed in Asia and the Pacific region.

The disarmament conference should, under the topic of "preventing nuclear war," start negotiations at the earliest possible date to conclude an international agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. A promise by all nuclear countries not to be the first to use nuclear weapons will serve as an effective measure for preventing nuclear war, apart from being able to effectively promote the nuclear disarmament process, he suggested. He said it was time that consideration be given to another measure for preventing nuclear war; namely, all nuclear countries, first of all the United States and the Soviet Union, should withdraw all their nuclear weapons deployed abroad to their own countries.

On the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Qian announced that China is actively considering sending observers to the fourth round of meetings on a "nuclear nonproliferation treaty" to be held in August this year. For the sake of safeguarding world peace and strengthening all countries' security, China does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation, he added.

On the question of nuclear test bans, Foreign Minister Qian said that China always takes a restrained and cautious attitude toward nuclear tests, the number of which is quite limited, adding that the country will continue to have such an attitude. Our policy is that the total prohibition of nuclear tests should be realized within the framework of effective disarmament, he pointed out. The United States and the Soviet Union have conducted the most nuclear tests, so they are dutybound to halt all their nuclear tests and carry out nuclear disarmament ahead of others, so as to provide conditions for a complete nuclear test ban.

As soon as the disarmament conference forms a special committee on the prohibition of nuclear tests, China will share its efforts in the committee's work, he remarked. China's relevant department and experts are conducting technical research and considering the need to join the international exchange of earthquake data, with the aim of accumulating experience in setting up an effective international system to examine the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

On the question of starting the conventional disarmament process, Foreign Minister Qian pointed out that the countries possessing the biggest nuclear arsenals have

a special responsibility in this respect. An early conclusion between these countries and other members of the two major military blocs on the large-scale reduction of their conventional military forces will contribute to peace and security in Europe and the rest of the world. In addition, all countries should be encouraged to step up their efforts and take action in carrying forward their conventional disarmament process, on condition that their security and defense capacity remain ensured.

For several years, China has made efforts and taken concrete action in carrying out conventional disarmament, Foreign Minister Qian continued. From 1985 to 1987 China unilaterally reduced its troops by 1 million, the biggest quantitative disarmament action in the world in the 1980's. China always keeps its military expenditures at a very low level.

On the question of foreign troops and military bases, Foreign Minister Qian pointed out that China is always opposed to any country stationing its troops or building military bases in other countries, adding that now it is time to drastically cut troops, military bases, and weapons deployed on foreign soil, with the aim of thoroughly withdrawing them. China explicitly holds that all aggressive foreign troops and occupation armies must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally.

He particularly pointed out that the U.S. armed invasion of Panama not long ago was condemned by people around the world.

The naval arms race between the two superpowers involves not only nuclear and conventional weapons, but also world maritime peace and the security and stability of the world, he remarked. The specter of the bygone "gunboat policy" is still threatening some small and medium-sized countries. Therefore people cannot but concern themselves with the question of naval disarmament in the disarmament process. China maintains that the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately stop their military expansion at sea and drastically reduce their naval forces.

Referring to chemical weapons, Foreign Minister Qian said that this year and next year will be very important for the opening of negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Now the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed their readiness to drastically cut their chemical weapons. This deserves a welcome. But the key to the thorough settlement of chemical weapons is that the countries possessing the most chemical weapons must destroy all these weapons as soon as possible, still less should they manufacture or develop new chemical weapons. China has consistently advocated the total prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

China agrees to establish an effective, reasonable, and feasible system to examine the treaty on chemical weapons, Foreign Minister Qian said. Queries concerning chemical weapons should not go beyond the

purpose, target, or scope of the treaty, and precautions should be taken against any possibility of abusing the query system.

On the international transfer of weapons, he said that China always takes a cautious and responsible attitude toward the importation of weapons. Strict observance will be good for strengthening the relevant country's defense capacity, for preserving and promoting peace, security, and stability in the relevant region, and for preventing exports of weapons for the purpose of interfering in others' internal affairs. He hoped that other countries will abide by this principle in exporting their weapons.

China agrees to rationally adjust and limit the international transfer of weapons, Foreign Minister Qian pointed out, adding that exports of weapons from the United States, the Soviet Union, as well as some members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty account for over 90 percent of the world's total. If they can take practical and effective self-limitation measures, this will unquestionably produce a positive impact on world peace and security.

Foreign Minister Qian remarked that disarmament is closely linked to peace, but disarmament alone cannot ensure peace. In relations between countries nowadays, it is often the case that political, economic, cultural, and ideological methods are used to interfere in others' internal affairs and to introduce peaceful evolution to other countries. Some have even resorted to force to exert their will on others. Hegemonism and power politics still obstinately refuse to withdraw from the arena of history despite repeated defeats. The sovereignty, independence, and security of many countries, particularly small and weak countries, are still endangered. There can be no tranquility in the world if this problem remains unsolved.

In conclusion Foreign Minister Qian pointed out: To ensure universal security in the world and common development in all countries, the most important goal for the 1990's and the 21st century, there is an urgent need to abide by the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in international relations; On this basis a just, reasonable, and new international political and economic order that conforms with the fundamental interests of all countries will be created. This will provide an effective guarantee for world peace and all countries' security, and a solid foundation for disarmament.

Five Satellite Launches Planned For 1990

*HK0203022290 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English
2 Mar 90 p 1*

[Untitled article by staff reporter Li Hong]

[Text] China is set to launch a record five satellites of diversified functions this year for both domestic and international clients, according to an official from the Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Beijing.

Also included in the ministry's development programme this year are another 10 major experimental projects on aerospace technology, Jiao Yong, the ministry spokesman, told CHINA DAILY.

He said these were part of the ministry's efforts to boost its involvement in civilian production, which was expected to increase this year by six percent over 1989. Last year, more than half of the industry's output was civilian products.

"We have confidence in our ability in this hi-tech field, despite the fact China is still a developing country," Jiao said. He reaffirmed that the ministry would honour all launching contracts signed with foreign customers and was "ready to accept more similar contracts."

According to the spokesman, China would "very soon" use its modified Long March III rockets to put into orbit the AsiaSat-I, a telecommunications satellite for the Asia Satellite Telecommunications Co. Ltd. in accordance with a launching contract signed in January, 1988.

The satellite, manufactured by the Hughes airplane plant of the United States, had already been airlifted to the Xichang Space Centre in Southwest China's Sichuan Province, and was awaiting take-off, he said.

Once in orbit, AsiaSat-I would mainly relay TV programmes and would be able to cover most of Asia.

"This marks China's entry into the international space market," Jiao said.

China's successful launching of its fifth telecom-satellite at Xichang on February 4—the first of the five scheduled for this year—served as a trial shoot for the AsiaSat-I, analysts say.

The other three satellites would all be sent into orbits during the second half of this year. They included China's 12th retrievable remote-sensing satellite to be carried by a Long March II [Roman two] rocket, a solar synchronous satellite for weather forecasting borne by China's modified Long March IV rocket, and an experimental satellite to test the function of its carrier, a new rocket device.

The country would also launch two U.S.-made telecommunications satellites for an Australian satellite company, and it had just won the bid to shoot the third Arab satellite for the Arab Organization for Satellite Communication (Arabsat) at the end of 1991.

Jiao said China had so far successfully launched 26 satellites for different purposes. The aero-space industry planned to manufacture and launch dozens of new satellites during the upcoming Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), to serve telecommunications, weather forecasts, earth resources survey and other global observatory purposes.

CHINA DAILY has learned that China and Brazil have ended preliminary studies on their co-operative project

involving a global resources satellite, and are ready to start working on the prototype design.

It is believed that the project may bring enormous economic benefits to both countries, and set an example in hi-tech co-operation between two Third-World states.

Officers' Worry About Combat Capacity Decline

HK0603082890 Hong Kong MING PAO in Chinese
6 Mar 90 p 9

[Report by Li Ping (7812 1627): "High-Ranking Young Military Officers Are Very Dissatisfied With Obstructions From the Hierarchy in Military Modernization"]

[Text] A mainland miscellaneous magazine entitled XINHUA WENZAI [NEW CHINA DIGEST] not long ago published an article saying that during an interview by a group of reporters some high-ranking young military officers expressed strong indignation over obstructions from the hierarchy in military modernization. In addition they were also seriously worried about the decrease of the Chinese Armed Forces' combat effectiveness, and said that overall military modernization was irresistible.

The article entitled "General Trend" provides the names of the 20 generals interviewed by those reporters. These generals have risen to power over the last 10 years of reform and now hold the posts of group-army commanders, political commissars of provincial military districts, deputy commanders of major military regions, deputy commanders of naval vessels, or presidents of academies of military sciences.

The article does not mention the names of leaders who obstruct military reform, but boldly quotes some generals' remarks that strongly criticize and expose those leaders. Major General He Daoquan, group army commander who directed the battle on Zhenbao Island, said: "Many top-level leaders have shown their noble disinterest in modern science and technology...because the application of modern science and technology will expose their meager knowledge and ignorance."

Major General Chen Xianhua, group army commander stationed in Huizhou of Guangdong, revealed by saying that he had achieved prominent results in introducing Shenzhen Hotel's modern management to his army units, but a veteran leader severely criticized him: "What modern management? The Armed Forces must stress tradition!"

"Veteran military chiefs" who rose to power during the war years are the incarnation of tradition, and these veteran cadres' words have a permanent appealing force, even after retirement. Major General Ma Chunxing, political commissar of the Heilongjiang Provincial Military District, has never been soft-handed toward his subordinates. Once he punished a dozen or so colonels, but he has to hold in esteem some 700 retired cadres in the military district. When they telephone him at midnight, he must personally receive the call; when there is

a meeting, they must be invited to sit in the middle of the rostrum; when they go out, he must carry their handbags and open their car doors. The article points out, "Major General Ma can punish corrupt officials but cannot change the practice of seeking personal gain by abusing power or officials harboring each other!"

On the People's Liberation Army's [PLA] combat effectiveness and the introduction of science and technology to its military training, many generals have bitterly admitted that this is far behind the Western world and is even inferior to Pakistan. Major General Chen Xianhua went to Pakistan for investigation and watched their "almost destructive training." He said with a sigh that in comparison with Pakistan, the PLA's training "is like middle school students attending a sports class!" Empty politics that has overwhelmed military science and technology for many years has turned the strong points of the PLA in being brave, assiduous, and subordinate into weak points, Major General Li Guangxiang pointed out bluntly. The PLA is backward in terms of professionalism, psychology, and social quality. Where is its first-grade combat capacity?

Most of the generals who were interviewed by those reporters were under 50 and many of them have visited foreign countries. They have truly assimilated the military management experiences of advanced countries and are the most resolute reformers in the PLA. In their opinions, apart from obstinate obstructions from the hierarchy, the shortage of military funds is also an obstacle to military modernization. Therefore they suggested forming specialized production teams to operate along with civilian enterprises and to join the international operational cycle.

The article fully reveals the contradictions between the reformers and conservatives in the PLA and indicates young generals' determination to introduce military modernization. What is worth mentioning is this: The article "General Trend" had originally been scheduled for publication in May 1989 by the magazine KUNLUN [KUNLUN MOUNTAIN], a month before the outbreak of the prodemocracy movement that witnessed the peak of the 10 years of reform. Mainland literature drastically

turned to the "left" after the 4 June incident. But this article has "reappeared" this year and been published by XINHUA WENZAI, which is sold in and outside the country. This really gives us some food for thought.

No wonder PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian cried out in alarm several days ago: "Western ideology has infiltrated into the Armed Forces and affected their stability." Apparently Chi Haotian's worry was not without reason, nor were his remarks aimed at nothing. There is a possibility that the Armed Forces might turn their coat and change their course!

USSR's Accusation that West Seeks Unilateral Superiority Noted

OW0803072590 Beijing XINHUA in English 1328 GMT
7 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 7 (XINHUA)—Vienna talks on conventional weapons reduction in Europe reached a standstill in certain areas following the West's attempt to seek unilateral superiority, according to Soviet chief negotiator Oleg Grinevskiy.

Grinevskiy made the remark at Tuesday's joint session of the Supreme Soviet's committees on the international affairs, and defense and state security.

The official TASS news agency today quoted Grinevskiy as saying that in the six disarmament areas, participants of the talks basically agreed on a limited number of tanks and helicopters, and are nearing an agreement over the number of cannons and armored vehicles to remain in service.

Moreover, Grinevskiy told the session that Soviet and U.S. troops stationed in the central Europe would be cut to 195,000, which Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker agreed to last month in Ottawa.

The major problem facing weapon reduction negotiations in Central Europe involves the limitation of weapons and troops in a unified Germany under the European collective security system, that is beginning to take shape, Grinevskiy said.

JAPAN

U.S. Asian Troop Cuts Viewed

OW2302123890 Tokyo KYODO in English 0914 GMT
23 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, February 23 (KYODO)—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said here Friday that the military cuts in the Asia-Pacific region announced over the past week by U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney are "nothing to brag about" as the times demand such reductions. Gerasimov, speaking to reporters at the Japan National Press Club, also said the Pentagon chief's "extremely small-scale" force reduction proposals were primarily dictated by budget constraints and occur as part of an overall modernization of forces.

Cheney, whose visit to Japan coincides with that of the Soviet government spokesman, announced on Thursday a reduction of 12,000-13,000 U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region over the next three years.

Gerasimov compared the cuts with the Soviet Union's proposed military reductions in the region, which he said are based rather on the principle of "new thinking" in diplomacy and on the doctrine of "defense sufficiency." He pointed out President Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to slash Soviet forces in Asia by 200,000.

In addition, he said, Moscow is cutting back its Pacific Fleet by 50 vessels and reducing its military presence in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay to an insignificant level. But Cheney, reflecting his host country's concerns in a meeting with reporters earlier Friday, said that even while the number of Soviet ships in the region may be down, "The Soviet missile and air threat to Japan increases due to Soviet modernization."

Gerasimov said that any amount of modernization of Soviet forces could not possibly compensate for the massive military cuts already on the table with regard to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Soviet spokesman, disputing talk of Moscow's threatening military posture in the region, said its decision to remove all intermediate-range nuclear missiles from the Far East as part of the INF Treaty is proof of his country's peaceful intentions. Japan, he noted, would have been in easy reach of the missiles. "As can be seen by this alone, the 'threat' in Asia has decreased and the military confrontation has lessened," Gerasimov said.

Gerasimov, who is in Japan at the invitation of KYODO NEWS SERVICE, tied resolution of the two countries' territorial dispute over four Soviet-occupied islands to the future development of bilateral ties.

"If bilateral relations are developed and there is an atmosphere for further progress in that development, it will make it all the easier to talk about this problem," the spokesman said elusively.

"It's regrettable that the problem serves to be an obstacle to the future development of bilateral relations," he said.

The two sides have been engaged in a series of talks over the territorial issue since December 1988 during Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Japan.

Although no breakthroughs have been reported, the Soviets have demonstrated a new willingness to debate the issue in all its aspects, while Japan has relaxed its linkage of the issue to the expansion of economic ties.

Hopes for a breakthrough have been pinned on Shevardnadze's upcoming visit to Tokyo, originally scheduled for March. Gerasimov told Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama in a meeting Friday morning that the visit has been postponed due to Shevardnadze's heavy agenda in Moscow.

Gerasimov clarified remarks he made earlier in the week in Manila, saying the prospect of a territorial concession to Japan is the subject of internal debate within the Supreme Soviet, not the Government itself. He said that the opinions in the country range from those who say the islands should be sold to Japan to those who cringe at the very suggestion of parting with Soviet territory.

Gerasimov refuted assertions that the results of a recent Soviet opinion survey, which showed that 85 percent of respondents opposed territorial concessions to Japan, would change if they were given the relevant facts as Japan sees them. He said that if the Soviet citizenry were to read an authoritative account of the issue, the survey figures would likely show 99 percent opposed to the conceding the islands.

A Japanese member of the audience called the seizure of the islands days after Japanese troops had already thrown down their weapons and surrendered, "robbery." Gerasimov replied that such "slanders" destroy the prospects for a resolution of the problem and said the two countries should look to the future, not only to the past.

Mayors Protest Deployment of Carrier Independence

OW0103024690 Tokyo KYODO in English 1300 GMT
26 Feb 90

[Text] Yokosuka, Kanagawa Pref., February 26 (KYODO)—Yokosuka and Zushi mayors, Kazuo Yokoyama and Kiichiro Tomino, protested Monday the proposed deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier Independence to the U.S. naval base here, saying it was against the will of the local people and counter to a worldwide trend of relaxing military tensions.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who completed a five-day visit to Japan on Saturday, had announced in a Japan National Press Club speech that the nonnuclear Independence would replace the Midway in the fall of 1991, when the latter is decommissioned.

In a letter to Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama on Monday, Yokoyama said it is "regrettable" that the deployment will be made by the U.S. without prior consultation with Japan and asked, "Does the government have any plans to discuss this with the U.S. in the future?" Yokoyama insisted that the change goes against an oral understanding between former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama and Douglas MacArthur II, the U.S. ambassador to Japan 1957-1961, that the U.S. consult with Japan before any important changes in defense arrangements. The Yokosuka mayor also wondered in his missive whether the Japanese Government will ask to know if the Independence is carrying aircraft with nuclear weapons capability.

Meanwhile, Tomino protested via facsimile to Cheney that the proposed deployment was against the will of the people of Zushi, where a new housing project for the increased U.S. naval personnel is vigorously opposed. Tomino has contended that there would be no need for U.S. military housing in Zushi if the deployment of the Independence, which carries about 1,000 more crew members than the Midway, was halted. He said the deployment perpetuated the use of the Yokosuka Naval Base and is counter to the global trend of relieving military tensions between the East and West.

More U.S. Troops Costs Should Be Shouldered By Japan

OW2802092290 Tokyo KYODO in English 0650 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Tokyo, February 28 (KYODO)—Newly named Defense Agency Chief Yozo Ishikawa indicated Wednesday Japan should pay more of the cost of maintaining U.S. troops stationed in Japan.

Ishikawa told reporters after the first meeting of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's Cabinet that Japan could lose bilateral trust "if we don't respond when we know what they are expecting of us."

The U.S. has urged Japan to pay more than some 40 percent of the 6 billion dollars it costs to maintain its 50,000 American troops.

Touching on Japan's new basic defense policy plan beyond 1991, which his agency is to develop, Ishikawa only said he wishes to project a "moderate" defense policy. He did not elaborate.

Defense Chief Comments on U.S. Troop Cuts

OW0403121390 Tokyo KYODO in English 1033 GMT 4 Mar 90

[Text] Tokyo, March 4 (KYODO)—Newly-appointed Director General of the Defense Agency Yozo Ishikawa on Sunday dismissed U.S. troop cuts announced late last month as slight but said that Japan should boost its financial contribution to the forces.

Ishikawa, appointed to Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's second cabinet last Wednesday, also said keeping military spending in the range of 1 percent of Japan's gross national product (GNP) was good as a "psychological goal" in an interview with the KYODO news service released Monday. Representing a west Tokyo district which includes the U.S. Yokota Air Base, Ishikawa had been a deputy chairman for the ruling party's committee on U.S. base affairs.

The 64-year-old defense head said 10 percent reductions tabled by visiting U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney last month were "not very large." The cuts are to total 5,000-6,000 troops over the next three years.

Previous Director General Juro Matsumoto had stressed that "streamlining and efficiency" were the purpose of U.S. cuts, which would not reduce defensive strength.

Cheney also sought a greater Japanese contribution to the forces' upkeep but mentioned no specific figure. Japan now pays some 40 percent of the total 6 billion dollar cost for the troops.

Turning toward future Japan-U.S. defense links, Ishikawa said it was not simply a matter of deciding whether the role of the Bilateral Security Treaty was good or bad. The treaty should be "studied" as international conditions change, Ishikawa said. "I personally have not given any consideration to a revision (of the treaty)," he said.

Critics of the treaty have questioned its necessity in the face of a lessening threat from the Soviet Union and the shift toward democracy in the East European bloc.

The democratic wave sweeping Eastern Europe, while not without impact, would be difficult to duplicate in Asia, Ishikawa said. "In geopolitical terms and otherwise (Asia) is different," he said. The North Korean threat and the Kampuchean conflict, he said, continued to trouble the region. Ishikawa also dismissed the significance of troop reductions in Soviet Asia as a minimal part of total armaments accumulated since the 1960s. Countering the Soviet military threat is cited as the chief purpose of the Japanese Self Defense Force's military modernization plans.

Ishikawa said the pending three-to-five-year draft plan on building up the forces would "naturally" concentrate on front-line weapons systems but also pour funds into facilities for support troops. The agency's budget will top 4 trillion yen for the first time in the 1990 fiscal year, the last year of the previous five-year modernization program. The defense head said that military spending at the 1 percent of GNP level was "psychologically one goal," but rejected any strict application of the limit. "A target should be suggested but arguments that (the budget is) safe because it's below 1 percent seem pretty bare," Ishikawa said. Surrounding Asian nations had no need to fear Japan's military spending, he said. "We absolutely must not be threatening militarily...Especially in Asia," the director general stressed.

Japanese military spending reached the third-highest level in the world during the 1980s as the country boosted its naval and air arsenals.

NORTH KOREA

Reports of Nuclear Ability Called 'Sheer Lie'

SK2602042690 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0403 GMT 26 Feb 90

["Act Inconsistent With Mission of Press"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, February 26 (KCNA)—Publications of Japan and some Western countries are setting afloat the rumour that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons, alleging that it "is expanding nuclear setups capable of producing nuclear weapons."

Bringing this rumour into bolder relief, the Japanese authorities are trying to render credibility to it.

The gossip spread by the press of Japan and some Western countries is a sheer lie and fabrication.

This rumour may be beneficial to those who seek to decry the non-nuclear peace policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK Government, find a pretext to refuse the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea, and justify such nuclear attack exercises as the "Team Spirit."

The circulation of such rumour is inconsistent with the mission of the press which should be fair and just.

We put forward a proposal for the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and are making patient and sincere efforts for its realisation.

We are conducting research into the utilisation of atomic energies for peaceful purposes under the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency and promoting the construction of a nuclear power station to fully meet the growing demand for electric power.

Anyone who does not have another axe to grind would not need to be "suspicious" of these efforts of ours or "worried" over them.

The Japanese authorities and pressmen should not engage themselves in distorting our research into the peaceful use of atomic energies, but should take an affirmative attitude to our non-nuclear, peace policy in keeping with the trend of the times towards detente and confidence building.

At this most sensitive and crucial moment when more than 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed in South Korea and an extremely dangerous situation has been created in which they might be used in a nuclear war, they are turning a blind eye to this and trying to divert the attention elsewhere. This is an act rejecting virtues and helping evils.

Fair world public, true to its mission, should pay due attention to the removal of the nuclear threat of the United States to our country and withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, Japan and other parts of the Asian region.

U.S. Criticized for Arms Reduction Statements

SK2802114290 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1051 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Pyongyang, February 28 (KCNA)—The Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland in its Information No. 558 on February 28 denounced the U.S. imperialists for resorting to base moves to justify their military occupation of South Korea.

According to a report, a high-ranking official of the U.S. State Department February 22 cried at a hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives that if the North unilaterally reduced military power, the United States would take a corresponding step, telling a lie that the North has not taken a confidence building step for disarmament.

This is an intrigue to deceive public opinion at home and abroad calling for the reduction and pullout of the U.S. troops from South Korea and a preposterous sophism to justify the permanent occupation of South Korea by the U.S. forces, said the information.

It continued:

The United States has accepted none of our fair and peaceful overtures but rather challenged them with arms buildup in and around South Korea and intensified war exercises by shipping into South Korea Armed Forces of aggression including U.S. Air Force almost every day.

Nevertheless, the U.S. imperialists are talking about "confidence building step" and a "step corresponding" to "unilateral cutback," carping on us. This is just like a thief crying for a thief.

The United States should not try to lull public opinion at home and abroad calling for reduction and pullout of its forces from South Korea with far-fetched assertions but withdraw all its aggression forces from South Korea without delay and respond to our reasonable proposals for detente and peace on the Korean peninsula at an early date.

U.S. Accused of Making Japan 'Nuclear Base'

SK0103052890 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0520 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang, March 1 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN Thursday raps at the moves of the U.S. imperialists to strengthen Japan as a base for their Asia-Pacific strategy.

While visiting Japan some time ago, Cheney produced at his talks with Japanese authorities a plan to further

enhance the "qualitative capacity" and "efficiency and streamlining" of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

He cried that there is "absolutely no intention of lowering the qualitative level" of the U.S. forces in Japan and requested Japan to lift to 4.5 billion dollars from the present 2.5 billion her share to finance the U.S. troops stationed in Japan, and the Japanese authorities affirmatively responded to this request.

Commenting on this, the paper says this proves that the United States seeks to leave its troops, accelerate their modernization and strengthen aggressive military strategy under the cloak of "reduction" in the Asian region.

The news analyst continues:

Pursuing Asian-Pacific strategy and Far East strategy against socialist countries, the U.S. imperialists are stepping up the conversion of Japan, called the unsinkable carrier, into a nuclear base with emphasis on marine strategy, and intensifying war preparations there.

The U.S. forces stationed in Japan are ready to launch a military operation against the DPRK any moment such as "1,000 mile sea route defence operation," "strait blocking operation" and direct armed invasion of Korea jointly with the "self-defence forces" of Japan in accordance with plans for "emergency on the Korean peninsula" and "emergency in the Far East."

Availing themselves of the U.S. imperialists' Asian strategy, the Japanese reactionaries are working to promote their arms buildup and gratify their desire of militaristic reinvasion of Asian countries.

These war preparations of the United States and Japan are leading the situation in Northeast Asia to the extreme pitch of strain.

The U.S. imperialists' outcry over the "military superiority" of socialist countries in Asia is intended to justify their criminal moves in this region.

The United States should stop talking nonsense and withdraw its troops and nuclear weapons without delay from the Asia-Pacific region including South Korea and Japan.

Changes in U.S. Asian Naval Strength Denounced

*SK0203055690 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0511 GMT 2 Mar 90*

["Arms Buildup Disguised With 'Replacement'"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 2 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists are reportedly planning to replace the old 55,000-ton class aircraft carrier Midway based in Yokosuka, Japan, with the newer 80,000-ton class flattop Independence.

NODONG SINMUN today views the replacement as a sign of the stepped-up arms buildup by the U.S. imperialists in the Northeast Asian waters.

The news analyst says:

The U.S. authorities are scheming to increase the total combat capabilities of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region by enhancing their "efficiency" under the cloak of "reduction" of the U.S. forces in South Korea, Japan and other areas. The commitment of "independence" in this region by the United States is a major link of this move and it is aimed at promoting their sea strategy against the DPRK and other socialist countries.

It is only too clear that the U.S. imperialists' sea strategy and Far East strategy will be stepped up with the replacement of Midway with Independence superior to it.

In view of the role played by Midway, it will result in increasing tension in the Northeast Asian region and aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula in particular.

The U.S. imperialists' scheme to build up arms under the cloak of "replacement" goes against the aspiration of the people in the Asia-Pacific region for detente in the area.

Peace in the Asia-Pacific region including Northeast Asia can be guaranteed only when the war preparations of the U.S. imperialists in this region are thwarted and the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons are withdrawn.

State Department Official's Comments Criticized

*SK0303050590 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0451 GMT 3 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 3 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today denounces the schemings of the U.S. imperialists to keep South Korea under their military occupation.

Some time ago, an official of the U.S. State Department at a hearing at the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee groundlessly complained that the North failed to take "a confidence-building step" for disarmament, and blared that, if the North "reduced military forces unilaterally," the U.S. would take a "corresponding step."

Dismissing this as a nonsensical sophism reversing black and white, the news analyst says:

In recent years alone we put forward one after another the proposal for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone, the proposal for carrying out large-scale phased military cuts, the four principles for the guarantee of peace, and a peace package. Furthermore, we took active steps to unilaterally reduce the People's Army forces by 100,000 men and stop massive military exercises. Yet the United States alleged that the North has not taken "a confidence-building step," ignoring this hard fact recognized by the world. This is the height of effrontery.

Hidden in this is their sinister intention to shift the blame for the absence of confidence and detente on the Korean peninsula on to the North and thus fool public opinion at home and abroad and invent a pretext to keep the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea.

And the "troop cutback" concept peddled by them now is nothing but a trick to mislead people.

In actuality, the U.S. imperialists are not cutting back armed forces in South Korea, but are increasing them, shipping in new nuclear weapons and all other kinds of means of war.

If the United States truly wants detente and peace on the Korean peninsula, it must not provoke the North but take a step for disarmament in response to the North's reasonable proposals for it and express its willingness to build confidence by practical deed.

Foreign Ministry Issues Disarmament Statement

News Briefing Held 5 Mar

SK0503111090 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1100 GMT
5 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang, March 5 (KCNA)—The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea gave a news briefing for home and foreign reporters at the People's Palace of Culture Monday on the problem of military cuts on the Korean peninsula.

Kim Chang-kyu, director of the Information Department of the ministry, told the reporters that steps for the pullout of foreign troops have been put into practice in many parts of the world in the current trend of international reconciliation and detente, but no agreement on the relaxation of the tension has been reached on the Korean peninsula alone.

For the relaxation of the tension and guarantee of peace on the Korean peninsula, he said, it is imperative to defuse the military confrontation through disarmament.

Then he made public a statement of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea clarifying the DPRK's stand on the arms cuts on the Korean peninsula.

Answers were given to questions put by reporters.

'Statement' on U.S. Pullout

SK0503114590 Pyongyang Domestic in Korean
1100 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Pyongyang, March 5 (KCNA)—The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Monday issued a statement demanding that the United States take a practical step for troop pullout from South Korea.

The statement reads:

Regional disputes are being solved through negotiations and steps for disarmament and withdrawal of foreign

troops put into practice in the current trend of international detente and reconciliation.

On the Korean peninsula, however, no agreement for the relaxation of tension has been reached and confrontation continues.

The North and the South of Korea are standing in acute confrontation with huge armed forces along the Military Demarcation Line.

The United States keeps its troops more than 43,000 strong in South Korea and has shipped there more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons of all kinds, means of their delivery, and even neutron bombs.

The nuclear war strategy of the United States is in fact entering a stage of full-scale practice on the Korean peninsula.

Thus, a dangerous situation which cannot be found in any other part of the world constantly prevails in Korea and it gives rise to apprehensions of the world peace-loving people.

For the relaxation of the tension and guarantee of peace on the Korean peninsula, it is imperative to defuse military confrontation through military cuts.

From its consistent stand to achieve detente and peace on the Korean peninsula through military reduction, the government of our Republic advanced a series of reasonable proposals and took initiatives in recent years, including a proposal to discontinue the arms buildup and arms race and a proposal to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Notably, in July 1987, it put forward a proposal for the North and the South to cut their armed forces stage by stage down to less than 100,000 men by 1992 and, keeping pace with this, to completely withdraw the U.S. forces on a phased basis from South Korea and make mutual information and international verification for this and proposed a multinational disarmament negotiation to discuss this problem. Last year, it also urged the United States and the South Korean authorities to hold at an early date negotiations for the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone even before reaching a blanket agreement on the disarmament question in face of the ever growing danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK Government has not only put forward such disarmament proposals but also unilaterally slashed the Korean People's Army by 100,000 men by the end of 1987 in order to make a substantial breakthrough in arms reduction on the Korean peninsula and, earlier, took a positive step of mobilizing 150,000 troops in peaceful construction.

Up until now, however, the United States and the South Korean authorities have failed to show any response to our reasonable proposals and sincere efforts for disarmament. They are taking the road of reinforcing and

streamlining the U.S. forces present in South Korea on the pretext of fictitious threat from the North, while aggravating the situation on the Korean peninsula by their annual provocative Team Spirit joint military exercises.

Facts clearly show that it is entirely because of their line of confrontation and war that the danger of war has not been removed and the unstable situation of growing tension is prevailing on the Korean peninsula.

A brisk debate over troop pullout has arisen within the United States itself, whilst the demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea is mounting rapidly among the South Korean people and the world's peaceloving people at present.

Against this background, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney visited South Korea some time ago and discussed matters of the U.S. troop pullout from South Korea.

But the United States, while talking about a partial withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea, insists that it should be a readjustment of armed forces in any case and the main combat forces and military means would be left in South Korea.

On the other hand, the United States makes incoherent remarks, claiming that a visible arms reduction would be impossible unless the North takes steps for detente and that U.S. forces must be kept in South Korea as a deterrent. All this causes many doubts about the ulterior intention of the United States in advertising a pullout.

As everyone knows, the DPRK Government has declared on many occasions that it has no intention to invade the South and it is not capable of doing that. If the United States is truly interested in peace on the Korean peninsula, it must take practical steps for troop pullout, instead of talking about readjustment of armed forces. If the United States practically takes at least a step for partial pullout, which would mark the start of the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea, we will welcome it and are ready to take more necessary measures corresponding to it for military confidence and disarmament between the North and the South.

Peace on the Korean peninsula can be achieved only when the U.S. forces are withdrawn from this region and their military bases dismantled there and arms reduction is realised between the North and the South. The DPRK Government will, as in the past and also in the future, make every possible effort to provide a practical guarantee for peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

We urge once again the United States and the South Korean authorities to stop such military exercises as Team Spirit-90 and immediately respond to negotiations for arms reduction involving the North and the South of Korea and the United States, which was already proposed by the DPRK Government. If the United States withdraw its troops from South Korea, this will not only confirm to the desire and interests of the peoples of

Korea and the United States and of the peaceloving people across the world but also create a favourable atmosphere for the realisation of North-South dialogue for peace on the Korean peninsula and its reunification and, further, contribute to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

The South Korean authorities must not entreat for the indefinite presence of the U.S. forces nor do act against the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula.

'Arms Buildup' Denounced

*SK0503110890 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1057 GMT 5 Mar 90*

[Text] Pyongyang, March 5 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists continue bringing into South Korea military equipment including warplanes based in the U.S. mainland and the Pacific for the "Team Spirit 90" manoeuvres, according to military sources.

They deployed formations of such fighter-bombers as "F-4," "F-15," "F-16" and "F-111" in the operational zones of South Korea from around 13 to around 19 on March 4.

Earlier, on the 3rd, they brought formations of Pacific-based "F/A-18" pursuit-assault planes, "A-4" assault planes and helicopters to their airforce bases in South Korea.

And the U.S. imperialists massively brought day and night into South Korea formations of "C-130" and "C-141" transport planes loaded with a large number of aggression troops and war equipment to be mobilized in the "Team Spirit 90" from the U.S. mainland and military bases in Japan, Hawaii and other places on March 3 and 4.

Their arms buildup which is becoming more hysteric before the offensive stage of the provocative "Team Spirit 90" war game fully reveals their bellicose nature.

Ministry Statement Calls Fourth Tunnel 'Fake'

*SK0603110090 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1049 GMT 6 Mar 90*

["'Fourth Tunnel' Incident Is a Fiction and Political Fraud, States Spokesman for DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, March 6 (KCNA)—A spokesman for the Ministry of People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement today regarding the wholesale smear campaign launched by the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets against the DPRK over the "fourth tunnel" incident, a new fictitious case.

Following is the gist of the statement:

On March 3 the South Korean puppets staged a drama of "counter shaft digging into the tunnel" in the presence of high-ranking officers of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces, the senior member of the U.S. forces side to the

Military Armistice Commission and others, and let the puppet minister of national defence publish a "statement" to the press and have gone off into an unheard-of provocative anti-DPRK hysterics with the mobilization of the propaganda machine under their control, even traitor No Tae-u himself joining in it.

The "fourth tunnel" over which the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets are raising such a hue and cry is a fake which has nothing to do with our Republic, like all the former "tunnels" and the "counter shaft digging into the tunnel" is nothing more nor less than a political drama entirely motivated by their insidious political end.

The DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces strongly denounces this "fourth tunnel" incident, branding it as one more anti-North smear campaign to divert elsewhere the attention of the people at home and abroad supporting our new peaceful reunification proposal and to justify their aggressive and separatist policy of confrontation and war.

Although the puppet Defence Ministry, manipulated by the U.S. imperialists, went through the motion of "verification" and "demonstration" in an effort to give authenticity to the so-called "fourth tunnel" they claim to have "discovered" this time, it failed to conceal the fact that it was a preposterous drama full of falsehood and contradictions.

Failing to indicate even the exact location of the "fourth tunnel," they said in an official report it is the "central and eastern front," whereas the puppet Defence Minister stated it is the "eastern front." Moreover, the puppet Defence Ministry announced that more than 50 home and foreign reporters watched the "counter shaft digging into tunnel" and the puppet defence minister put the number at 34, thus giving conflicting reports.

They also reported that many home and foreign reporters confirmed it on the spot. But they failed to show "their counter shaft digging into the tunnel" and the reporters covering it on the spot on the TV screen. They also failed to exhibit any of the "electric insulators," "sleepers" and "electric wires" which they said were found in the "North's tunnel."

Is there any "verification" or "proof" in this?

The puppet Defence Ministry, in a bid to present the "tunnel" as the North's, said that the letters "Choson Tongil" (Korean reunification) were painted in its wall. But it failed to show the letters. And, by alleging that the letters "Korean reunification," a phraseology not used by the people in the northern half of the country and the People's Army soldiers, were written on the wall, it proved more clearly that this is a fabrication.

If such words were written by our People's Army soldiers, they would have written "Choguk Tongil" (national reunification), instead of "Choson Tongil."

The South Korean puppets' advertisement of it as an "evidence" offers a counterevidence that the "tunnel" is not the North's.

Noteworthy is it that the puppets claimed the newly discovered "tunnel" is large enough for an hourly passage of armed forces 30,000 strong and field artillery pieces. According to their drawing, however, the "tunnel" was excavated in the mid-slope of a high mountain. A tunnel excavated on a high mid-slope of a mountain is of no use as a "tunnel for surprise Southward invasion" by blitz tactics as claimed by them, though it may be useful for defence. If we had intended to make a "surprise invasion of the South" by letting tens of thousands of troops and field guns through the "tunnel," there should be a route of mobility linked to it. How could "a surprise invasion of the South" be made through the "tunnel" dug on the mid-slope of a steep mountain? Anyone with elementary military knowledge would easily understand this.

That the "fourth tunnel" is not our "tunnel for southward invasion" was proved in a report on March 4 that a search team of the puppet ground force could not go any farther in the "fourth tunnel" because there was water 40 centimetres deep and the "tunnel" was not excavated in the 70s, but in the 80s. It is utter nonsense that a "tunnel" with standing water can be used for a "surprise invasion of the South." If it were a "tunnel" dug in the 80s by us for a stealthy "surprise invasion of the South," how could there be knee-deep water in it and how can the tunnel which was left uncared for till water has gathered knee-deep be of practical value as "a tunnel designed for a surprise invasion of the South"?

No matter how hard one may try to distort and reverse truth, it is bound to be brought to light.

If there is the "fourth tunnel" as claimed by the South Korean puppets, it must be a tunnel dug by the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the South Korean puppets themselves to invade the North like the first, second, third "tunnels."

What do we have to do with the tunnel which is claimed to have been "discovered" by a "joint detecting team" of the U.S. forces and the puppet army in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line [MDL] where the U.S. imperialist aggressors and the South Korean puppets are on strict guard, having built even a concrete wall?

According to the announcement of the South Korean puppets, they had carried out an intensive detection in the area from 1978 and made a counter shaft digging from December last year "with the mobilisation of a colossal number of people and highly efficient excavators," judging from the picture of a sleeper taken by an endoscope of a drilling machine that there was a "tunnel" dug by the North. If this is true, the sleeper caught in the endoscope might be a sleeper of a mine pit of the days of the Japanese imperialist rule or a subterranean position excavated during the last war. On what ground did they conclude that it was a sleeper of the

"fourth tunnel of the North" and started instantly the counter shaft digging with such massive mobilization of people and equipment at a time?

This tells us that the puppets faked up the "fourth tunnel" incident as a stopgap measure when their secret excavation of the tunnel for northward invasion leaked through the South Korean press.

Judging from all these facts, we can see that the South Korean puppets are playing a drama to shift the blame for the underground tunnel on to us, lacking the courage to do so with the wall on the ground, finding it impossible to conceal any more the fact that they, at the instigation of the U.S. imperialists, had built the concrete wall, a symbol of confrontation and division, on the ground and dug tunnels underground for attacking us from the middle of the '70s.

It is hardly a matter for argument that we, who have no intention to invade the South and are not prepared for that, but make consistent efforts for peace on the Korean peninsula and the peaceful reunification of Korea, could never dig "a tunnel for southward invasion." It is clear why the South Korean puppets suddenly launched a noisy anti-DPRK campaign, letting the puppet defence minister cry over "the fourth tunnel" like a thief crying "stop thief!"

As everyone knows, our new epochal proposal for peaceful reunification to pull down the concrete wall built in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line and ensure free travel and complete opening between the North and the South in order to make the 1990s a decade of national reunification has evoked active support and sympathy from the entire fellow countrymen and the world peaceloving people.

Pushed into a position of passive defensive by this reasonable peaceful reunification proposal, the South Korean puppets have carried confrontation and tensions between the North and the South into the extremes by staging the aggressive "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises in league with outside forces, only to evoke bitterer denunciation at home and abroad.

Now they find themselves in a tough spot where they can hardly gloss over the matter any more with the monosyllabic claim that there is "no" wall in face of our strong demand and the unanimous demand of the people at home and abroad that the concrete wall be torn down.

On the other hand, they sought to bridge over the crisis of the colonial military fascist rule with "political restructuring" through "the merger of three parties" according to a script of the United States only to increase the political crisis and social unrest in South Korea. And, by begging for the permanent presence of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces, contrary to the trend of the present times toward independence, they made themselves a target of protest and accusation by the South Korean people and the world people who demand the U.S. troop pullout.

Under such a situation the South Korean puppets are attempting to keep off the influence of our new proposal for peaceful reunification, justify their policy of confrontation and war, fascism and division and, furthermore, invent a pretext to keep the U.S. troops and intensify the military fascist dictatorial rule by faking up a shocking incident.

But they cannot solve any problem with such clumsy drama but will only end in precipitating their own destruction.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets themselves made public this time that they had freely done boring in the Demilitarized Zone and made a counter shaft digging there under the pretext of "detecting tunnels of the North." This is obviously a crude violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and a very grave provocative act of aggression.

Moreover, the puppets openly declared this time that they would commit such acts on a larger scale along the entire length of the Military Demarcation Line in the future. This is a declaration that they would openly dig tunnels for invading the North under the gound of the DMZ along the MDL. We cannot tolerate this and cannot but take a serious view of this, regarding this as a very grave case of provocation.

Now the provocative moves of aggression on the part of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets have entered a very adventurous stage and the consequences therefrom are assuming an unforeseeable dangerous phase.

Such being the situation, we can never remain an onlooker to the developments.

The responsibility for the obtaining situation entirely rests with the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets and, accordingly, the only way of defusing the tensions created on the MDL is for them to promptly stop the provocative anti-DPRK smear campaign groundlessly provoking the North.

The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets must frankly admit that the "fourth tunnel" made public by them this time, like all the previous "tunnels," is a tunnel for invading the North which they had themselves dug, and apologise to our nation, immediately stop tunnel digging and give assurances that they will never commit such provocative acts of aggression again.

If they continue committing the brazen smear campaign against the North, failing to accept this just demand of ours, they will be held wholly responsible for all the consequences arising from this.

The U.S. imperialists and South Korean puppets must immediately retract the anti-DPRK intrigue called "tunnel incident," stop the aggressive and criminal "Team Spirit 90" joint military exercises without delay

and unconditionally withdraw the U.S. troops and all the aggression forces including nuclear weapons from South Korea.

We will sharply watch the provocative acts of the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets with high revolutionary vigilance.

SOUTH KOREA

Military Reorganization Affects Security

902C0081A Seoul MAL in Korean Dec 89
pp 44-49

[Article by Chon Won-ha of HANGYORE Social Research Center: "Inside the Military Structural Reorganization"]

[Text] How will the current military reorganization work affect the restructuring of ROK-U.S. security relations? Why does the United States need to put the ROK Forces [ROKF] on a joint force footing? Following is a study of the intent and aims of the ROKF structural reorganization currently under way amid efforts to restructure ROK-U.S. security relations.

Outline of Reorganization Disclosed

The outline of the planned ROKF structural reorganization, disclosed by Minister of Defense Yi Sang-hun on 24 October, has drawn widespread attention at home and abroad. The plan, dubbed "18 August plan" is part of a "research to determine the direction of development of a long-term defense posture." A committee on military structural reorganization created within the Ministry of Defense had been secretly working on it since last year.

The plan disclosed by the defense minister stipulates reorganizing the present system of the three services standing side by side and putting them on a joint force footing. In other words, the authority of military administration (administrative authority) and that of military command (operational control) will remain centralized under the defense minister as they are now but, under the plan, the military command authority will be exercised by the chief of general staff of national defense, an office to be newly established, and the authority of military administration by the chief of staff of each service. Therefore, the chief of general staff of national defense will, under authority delegated by the defense minister, exercise operational control over major operational units of each service. Also, the chief of staff of each service will exercise the command authority except operational control, and this will include the authority of personnel administration, budget (distribution of resources), legal affairs, education, training, discipline and morale.

Defense Minister Yi emphasized that this type of reorganizing has become necessary to meet the requirement of joint force strategy in modern warfare. "A future war is expected to take the form of three-dimensional warfare

demanding a show of joint force strength of the three services. Therefore, we see an urgent need to restructure our system to meet the demand," he said, explaining why the reorganization has become necessary. Especially, in reference to factors that led to the adoption of the plan, he cited the U.S. case, noting that the "control-type authority held by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]" represents the operational control over overseas commands including the NATO Command, Pacific Command and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command [CFC]. He then stressed that inasmuch as the ROKF currently is in a situation that in wartime makes it subjected to CFC's operational control, the disclosed plan is intended to structurally reorganize ROKF to better suit that situation.

Let us compare the announced reorganization plan with the U.S. system and examine the true intent of Defense Minister Yi's comments. In the U.S. case, the secretary of defense exercises exclusively the authority of military administration and military command; insofar as this point is concerned, there is no difference between the present U.S. and ROK systems. Also, to ensure the conduct of joint force operations, the secretary of each military department is given only administration authority under the U.S. system, a point generally similar to the ROK plan in that it provides for a unified exercise of operational control. The difference is in the functions of the JCS. In other words, the role of the U.S. JCS is not to exercise operational control over operational units under authority delegated by the secretary of defense but to convey strategic directives of the secretary of defense to each service.

Therefore, the announced ROK plan is the same in principle with the U.S. military structure in that both attach importance to the conduct of joint force operations of the whole armed forces. The difference is that in the ROK case, the chief of general staff of national defense holds operational control of the forces, and in particular that that authority is concentrated in one person, the chief of general staff of national defense, not on a JCS composed of the chiefs of staff of the different services as in the U.S. case. (In contrast, the chairman of the U.S. JCS only presides over JCS meetings.) For this reason, while the announced plan appears in part to be a shift to a joint force setup, criticism (as published in HANGYORE SINMUN dated 25 October) that it is in fact dedicated to a system of exclusive control by the chief of the general staff to carry out national defense is not off the mark.

Dovetailing Into CFC Reorganization

However, what has been said in the above is only part of the problem inherent in the reorganization plan. The plan contains more substantive problems and those are interlocked with the current work of restructuring ROK-U.S. security relations across the board.

Supporting this reasoning is, first of all, the fact that an ROKF structural reorganization is inevitably premised

on change in the current system of ROK-U.S. combined operations and restructuring of ROK-U.S. CFC. Structurally, the present CFC is a typical joint force system, with each ROK service combined with the Army, Navy and the Air Force components of the U.S. Forces Korea [USFK] respectively and subjected to the CFC commander's operational control. Consequently, it is virtually impossible for the ROK military to independently carry out joint force operations under the present CFC system. It is precisely for this reason that military experts have been saying that the ROK-U.S. security arrangements barred the ROK from developing its own military structure.

Under these circumstances, reorganization to put ROKF on a joint force footing is directly connected with restructuring of the ROK-U.S. CFC. Needless to say, CFC experienced internal reorganizations in the past but they were not more than partial ones. Under the planned reorganization, however, the component force concept under the present CFC system (i.e., the Army component, the Navy component, the Air Force component, etc.) is bound to be abolished. In other words, ROKF will comprise a joint force under CFC and it will be subjected to the operation control of the chief of general staff of national defense.

It is widely known that CFC's structural reorganization is a pending issue currently under discussion between Korean and U.S. authorities. In this process, the 21st annual ROK-U.S. security consultations, held in Washington in July, reached agreement on upgrading the role of the CFC deputy commander and that of the deputy commander of the CFC Air Force component, currently performed by Korean general officers, and on transferring the post of the CFC chief of staff for munitions from an American general officer to a Korean.

Meanwhile, neither side has made any official disclosure as to the aims of the changes. Only data available in this connection are several proposals presented earlier by American experts on Korea relations.

For example, Professor Olsen of U.S. Naval Academy, an expert on Korean and Asian security affairs, had proposed an international plan on the subject to draw public attention. In an interview with a Korean daily in July of last year, he said that the present CFC should be replaced by a dual system and proposed a "division of operational control in which a 1st CFC, composed of ROKF and a small U.S. force, will, under the command of a Korean general officer, be devoted exclusively to defenses against North Korea, whereas a 2d CFC, comprised chiefly of U.S. forces, will under the command of an American general officer be devoted to broader Northeast Asia defenses such as a deterrence aimed toward the Soviet Union." Earlier, he had published similar plans in the August 1987 edition of THE ASIAN SURVEY.

People like Cushman, former commander of 1st ROK-U.S. Corps, took a step farther and said that the ROK-U.S. CFC should first be reorganized into a dual system and, on that

basis, USFK should be combined with the U.S. Forces Japan [USFJ] into a Northeast Asia command.

In the final analysis, all these proposals call for CFC reorganization on the premise of operational control being divided between USFK and ROKF. Especially, the point that ROKF will be devoted, virtually exclusively, to defenses against North Korea constitutes a major premise. Then, what connections are there between these CFC reorganization plans and the announced ROKF reorganization plan?

ROK Seeks Own Joint Force Operations

An answer to this question can be found more easily in a preview of how ROK-U.S. combined operations under the present CFC will possibly change after CFC reorganization. The "Team Spirit" exercise, a typical case of ROK-U.S. combined operations, shows that U.S. and ROK forces conduct joint force operations under the operational control of the CFC commander. It is a widely known fact that the operational doctrine used here is an "air-ground war doctrine" attaching importance to simultaneous frontal and rear attacks through air, ground and sea joint operations.

A comparison of the ROK and U.S. roles in this operation indicates that offensive functions in the "offensive-type defense" are in the main assigned to U.S. units, leaving ROK units to perform mainly defensive functions plus an auxiliary offensive role. For example, offensive operations against the rear of the enemy are carried out by various types of U.S. fighter planes led by F-16's and F-4E's of the U.S. Air Force in Korea as well as carrier-based aircraft.

This type of operational division, however, is bound to change if ROKF are to be devoted to defense against North Korea on a virtually exclusive basis and USFK to a "broader role." The "offensive-type defense" concept as reflected in the air-ground war doctrine seeks to "deter" war by threatening retaliation. This means that offensive is the most important function in "detering" war, which is achieved through air-ground-sea joint operations.

This precisely is the reason why the ROKF's shift onto a joint force footing is needed in the first place. In order for ROKF to perform the deterrent function against North Korea on its own, it has to independently fulfill the operational doctrine the United States and Korea heretofore have experimented with in their combined operations. And doing so is something impossible unless ROKF are put on a joint force footing. Lending credence to this reasoning, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun emphasized that the plan for the chief of general staff of national defense reflects consideration over the controversy involving withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea and the future return of operational control to ROKF. Under the present system of the three services standing side by side, he continued, it is impossible for Korea to carry out operations all by itself if USFK pulls out and the operational control is returned to ROKF.

The above-listed points confirm that the announced reorganization plan is not just a matter of ROKF but involves overall restructuring of ROK-U.S. security relations. Therefore, for an understanding of the real aims of the reorganization plan, there is a need to examine the intentions and aspirations involved in the current review of ROK-U.S. security relations.

First of all, it is noteworthy that the question of ROKF performing a deterrent function on its own is being considered in conjunction with that of a partial withdrawal of USFK. Discussion on the issue of pulling out part of U.S. Forces from Korea began among some members of the Congress in the latter days of the Reagan administration; presently, the Nunn-Warner amendment, seen as a "graduated" plan, has passed both the Senate and the House, requiring the administration to conduct a review of the USFK strength and functions. Based on it, the administration is taking a new look at USFK's future.

Nowadays prospects for a partial pullout of USFK beginning in the mid- 1990's are accepted by people as something inevitable. As is known to every one, the reason for the U.S. push for a partial withdrawal of USFK is a result of pressures for a cut in its defense budget. Both the U.S. Congress and the administration are demanding allies such as Japan and Korea to expand their shares of defense and at the same time pushing reductions in the U.S. forces stationed overseas. The work for a partial withdrawal of USFK is an extension of that effort.

It is inevitable that the gap resulting from a USFK reduction in force will eventually be filled by ROKF. Also, the U.S. side actually expects that ROKF will have a deterrence of its own against North Korea in the mid-1990's. USFK Commander Menetrey made that point clear sometime ago. Also, the Department of Defense [DOD] in its "report on the combined forces strength 1989" submitted to the Congress stated that in 1996 "the ROK ground forces will have sharply increased strength and be able to block or repel North Korean attacks. Even if North Korea acquires up-to-date aircraft from the Soviet Union, it will be unable to offset the buildup of the ROK Air Force."

Truth About USFK Withdrawal Argument

In order for ROKF to replace USFK and be a deterrence independently against North Korea, it needs a buildup of war potential that surpasses the USFK cut. Assessments in the above-mentioned DOD report are also based on a prospective buildup like that, with special emphasis on "modernization of tanks and artilleries" and "modernization of Air Force equipment and effective increases in the related air fighting power." Acquisition of as many as 120 fighter planes and planned production of next-generation fighter plane (the so-called FSX plan) are typical examples of these efforts.

Also noteworthy is the question why the United States is attempting to reorganize CFC. As was pointed out

already, one of the reasons, needless to say, is to shift to a new system under which ROKF can perform joint force operations independently, in preparation for a partial USFK cut. Adding to it, however, is the realistic need of the U.S. military itself.

Back to Professor Olsen, his article entitled "Korean politics and U.S. Policies" explains some aspects of this situation. In the article, he refers to USFK's links to U.S. global strategy—i.e., strategy of horizontal diffusion of war (strategy of simultaneous multiple retaliations symbolizing multilateral threats) which was adopted under the Reagan administration—and says that under this strategy, USFK is required to conduct combined operations with the U.S. Pacific Command more effectively. This requirement, he notes, is one of the major reasons why the U.S. military finds CFC reorganization necessary. The reasoning is that if USFK should continue to fulfill a deterrent function against North Korea by forming a combined force with ROKF in each service area, it impedes joint force operations between USFK and the Pacific Command.

This means that readjustment of the USFK functions is demanded. USFK has heretofore relied on the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty for justification of its presence. In actuality, too, its primary function has been a deterrence against North Korea. Now, if ROKF develops its deterrence against North Korea sooner or later as referred to in the above-mentioned DOD report, where should one then look for a rationale of the USFK presence? An answer to this question can be found in recent remarks by U.S. administration and military officials regarding a review of USFK functions. A typical example is the Congressional testimony by USFK Commander Menetrey in May of last year. It is not difficult to imagine that the current review of the USFK strength and functions by the administration also contains the same information.

All these factors listed above lead to the conclusion that the planned ROKF structural reorganization is a product of an overall revamping of ROK-U.S. security relations. And it contains problems of an extremely complex nature, politically and economically as well as militarily.

It can be said first of all that this reorganization plan is indicative of the positive will of the ROK side for accommodating the global strategic demand of the United States. In other words, it manifests a positive response to the U.S. stance to actively use its military bases in Korea in the pursuit of its strategy against the USSR in Asia and the Pacific region. In view of the uncertainty about the future of the U.S. bases in the Philippines, the United States is currently studying a variety of options, including a policy of dispersing functions currently being performed by the bases in the Philippines. Korea is one of the relocation sites being considered under this policy. Among other things, one should pay attention to plans to deploy the F-15E new-type fighter-bombers. According to explanations, this fighter is for supplementing the tactical nuclear

attack capability for the aircraft carrier Midway, which has become obsolete and will soon be retired. When the plans are implemented, U.S.-USSR confrontation will be added to the present North-South Korea confrontation and the military tension on the Korean peninsula will undoubtedly take on a more complex aspect. It is too obvious that this trend will cloud prospects for a disarmament on the Korean peninsula, which has lately become the subject of a cautious debate.

Prelude to a New Arms Race

Next, with regard to the so-called deterrent function said to be performed by ROKF independently against North Korea, there is a need to take another look at what it means. As was pointed out in the above, the means of "deterrence" is based on the "offensive-type defense" concept. Therefore, it has been the consistent policy of the U.S. and Korean Governments that a buildup of offensive strength and pursuance of offensive military strategy is the most effective means of deterrence.

Strategy of deterrence has historically come through changes in the course of logical development. In the 1970's, it meant "crushing the enemy in the initial fighting" along the truce line in the event of war; under this so-called frontline defense strategy, emphasis was on preparedness along the truce line and on a buildup to that effect. Entering the 1980's, this strategy evolved into the "air-ground war doctrine," signifying that for a deterrence against war, first-strike threats against the rear of the enemy should now be added to preparedness along the truce line.

This offensive-oriented escalation proved to be a major factor fanning an excessive arms race between North and South Korea, with the North-South tension aggravating progressively. In the fact that the North Korean deployment of troops to forward bases, beginning in the mid-1980's, was in part a response to the air-ground war doctrine, one can see the harmful aspect inherent in the strategy of deterrence.

The announced structural reorganization directly leads to ROKF independently fulfilling the air-ground war doctrine. This means pushing Korea's military buildup into a new phase. The FSX plan vividly shows how serious the situation is. Does Korea need as many as 120 highly sophisticated planes that are not for air defense but for bombing purposes?

Economically, too, this clearly is a waste. The U.S. demand itself may also be seen as pressing Korea to make such economic wastes. It was announced that in 1989 alone, RF-4C reconnaissance planes, F-4E fighter planes, Sparrow and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles would be imported from the United States, ostensibly for ROKF modernization. They alone cost \$300 million. If the United States and Korea reach a compromise on the FSX plane, Korea will be required to make the first payment of approximately \$3 billion to the United States. Involved in the current work of restructuring ROK-U.S. security relations is this sort of U.S. commercialism.

On the other hand, some may quibble that the planned reorganization will free ROKF from U.S. military control more than ever and thus bring an improvement in a situation that has been criticized as infringement on our national independence. The improvement, however, will be a limited one, because, even if CFC is restructured into a dual setup, an American general officer will continue to occupy the post of the commander in chief of the entire ROK-U.S. CFC, exercising operational control over 1st and 2d CFC. Furthermore, with the operational control of ROKF being concentrated on one person, the chief of general staff of national defense, there is the possibility of the control of ROKF by the U.S. military becoming even more direct. The reason is that in view of the fact that the chief of general staff of national defense is appointed via consultations with USFK, the U.S. military might see it as making control of ROKF easier if the ROKF operational control is concentrated in one person, the chief of general staff of a national staff, rather than divided among the three separate services. This would be preferable if the CFC is to be restructured into a dual setup anyhow. (Needless to say, this is almost entirely a conjecture. Possibly, there will be a variety of checking devices.)

Fourth 'Invasion' Tunnel Discovered in DMZ

Defense Minister's Statement

*SK0303103090 Seoul Television Service
in Korean 0909 GMT 3 Mar 90*

[Press statement by Minister of National Defense Yi Sang-hun at the Defense Ministry conference room—live]

[Text] I am the minister of national defense. Today, I would like to tell the people that a new tunnel for southward invasion has been found on the eastern front.

This fourth tunnel was found south of the Military Demarcation Line, inside the Demilitarized Zone, on the eastern front. The Army has dug tunnels to find North Korean tunnels. Today, this tunnel was found as 34 domestic and foreign reporters were watching. We are examining the size of this tunnel. Roughly speaking, this tunnel is around two meters high and two meters wide, which is as large as the second and third underground tunnels. We found this tunnel 145 meters below the surface.

On signing the 4 July joint declaration in 1972, North Korea began to dig southbound tunnels. We think that it has dug around 20 tunnels along the DMZ.

As you well know, the first tunnel was found in Korangpo in 1974; the second tunnel, north of Chorwon in 1975; and the third tunnel was found south of Panmunjom in 1978. Ever since, the military has made patient efforts to find more tunnels for southward invasion. As a result, we were able to find an underground tunnel for the first time in the mountainous area in the east.

North Korea has dug approximately 20 tunnels for southward invasion across the front. These tunnels were dug in

order to secretly send large numbers of troops to the rear areas of our side and simultaneously turn the front and rear into battlefields, thus carrying out a blitzkrieg strategy.

As you know, the world's situation today shows that, as a result of new detente between the East and West, we are opening the 21st century of reconciliation and cooperation. In step with this situation, the government has positively carried out the northern policy and has made various efforts to find ways for prosperity and reunification with North Korea, a member of the Korean community. Despite these changes of the era and our sincere proposals, North Korea has dug tunnels for southward invasion across the truce line. As a grave violation of the Armistice Agreement and an obvious act of aggression, this can never be forgiven.

Therefore, I urge North Korea to immediately stop such provocative acts of aggression, give up its goal of communizing the entire Korean peninsula as it has stipulated in its Workers Party rules, disclose the location of all tunnels that it has so far dug, and voluntarily seal the tunnels. Also, North Korea must stop assuming a posture for a surprise attack against our side by redeploying to the rear areas the troops and equipment which North Korea has deployed north of Seoul, our capital, in a concentrated manner. North Korea must also abolish chemical weapons, which it possesses to mass murder its fellow countrymen in an inhumane manner, and it must immediately stop developing nuclear weapons. Also, with regard to our side's tank barriers in some open areas, North Korea has said that a concrete wall like the Berlin Wall exists inside the DMZ. In this regard, North Korea must immediately stop its absurd and deceptive campaign to have this barrier removed.

Moreover, the North Korean side unilaterally suspended the North-South dialogue by using the "Team Spirit" exercise as an excuse and calls for an unconditional withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the ROK. I would like to make it clear again that the Governments of the ROK and the United States will closely discuss the issue of the scale of the "Team Spirit" exercise, along with the issue of reducing U.S. troops in the ROK depending upon the tangible change on the part of the North Korean side. Furthermore, since it is impossible to practically ensure the security on the Korean peninsula and peace and the alleviation of tensions in the northeast region unless the reckless military adventurism of North Korea is effectively checked, all the surrounding countries concerned ought to make joint efforts.

As our people are well aware, we are now making utmost efforts for the alleviation of tension between the North and the South, under the situation in which communist countries are making changes, pushing ahead with the northern policy, the arms control policy between North and South Korea, and the reduction of the U.S. troops in the ROK. Nevertheless, North Korea is still perpetrating preparations and provocations for a war of southward invasion. I cannot help but be perplexed by this.

However, we ought to put into practice our government's northern policy steadily with a firm and united security

consciousness between the civilian and military sectors to achieve our security and reunification. In support of this cause, our Armed Forces will apply themselves to the mission of national defense entrusted to them with perfect combat readiness.

Finally, the reason why we could not announce the location of a fourth tunnel immediately after detecting it was that if it had been confirmed to be a natural cave instead of a tunnel for southward invasion, after a hasty announcement of an uncertain fact, we would have given North Korea a good object for a counterpropaganda offensive. If a hasty announcement had been made when it turned out to be a tunnel, the North Korean side would have been able to take countermeasures, as it did in the case of the first, second, and third tunnels. These countermeasures by the North endangered the lives of many soldiers, civilian engineers, and U.S. technological assistance personnel who were engaged in detecting tunnels in the DMZ, and it even provided the possibility of an armed clash. We, therefore, had to announce this after we had done enough to ascertain the fact. I hope the people will understand this situation.

There was some misunderstanding recently that we interfered in an undesirable way in the operations of a certain news organization. I can assure you that that step was taken through mutual consultation and understanding between the relevant authorities carrying out the fundamental mission of protecting military secrets and the news organization. I am grateful to the news organizations for their cooperation in withholding reports for the sake of protecting national interests, and I look forward to the people's assistance and cooperation.

I also want to express my sincere gratitude to the ROK and U.S. Army officers and men and civilian engineers who worked hard day and night in the open air for the detection of the tunnel.

Seoul Plans 'Strong Protests'

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[Text] Seoul, March 3 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Government announced Saturday that a joint Korea-U.S. team has confirmed the existence of another North Korea-dug "infiltration tunnel" in the Demilitarized Zone of the mid-eastern front line of the country.

The announcement, which was simultaneously made by the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, said a counter-shaft dug by the joint survey team successfully penetrated the tunnel at 4:15 p.m. Saturday (local time) while a group of 34 local and foreign journalists watched the process through a closed circuit TV relay.

The counter-shaft pierced through the tunnel in a layer of granite at the depth of 145 meters under ground at a point 1,080 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) northeast of Yanggu-gun county, Kangwon

Province. The 4-km wide DMZ is halved by the MDL and the tunnel crosses into the southern buffer zone.

Defense officials said the newly-uncovered tunnel is two meters wide and two meters high and its cavity is so sizable as to let about 30,000 troops carrying pieces of field artillery pass through per hour.

While delivering a statement at a press conference, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun claimed that Pyongyang's construction of tunnels is aimed at securing infiltration routes through which it can move its troops deployed near the DMZ to the rear of South Korean Army's front line bases quickly at the time of eventuality.

Yi accused Pyongyang's construction of infiltration tunnels as "a violation of Armistice Agreement" and as "an intollerable act of aggression." He also called on the North to stop "provocative acts of aggression" and help pursue reduction of tension in the Korean peninsula.

The tunnel is the fourth of its kind the South Korean Army has uncovered in the 155-mile-long DMZ since North Korean leader Kim Il-song ordered the construction of the underground passageways across the MDL in 1971, according to a report released by the Public Information Ministry Saturday.

The first one was found in November 1974 in the western DMZ while the second or the largest of the three previously found was spotted north of Chonwon, northeast of Seoul in March 1975. The third tunnel was found in 1978 near the truce village of Panmunjom in the western DMZ, just 45 km north of Seoul.

Defense ministry officials said the Korean and U.S. military engineers have conducted intensive surveys on 17 segments of the southern buffer zone to detect similar tunnels ever since the third one was located. They believe there are still more than 20 tunnels being dug by the communist North Korea.

The existence of the fourth tunnel was first perceived at the end of last December when a counter-shaft dug by the joint survey team hit pieces of ties inside a granite layer, the officials said.

The Seoul government and the U.S.-led U.N. Command, the southern-side signatory of the Armistice Agreement, will file "strong" protests against the North Korean Government through the Military Armistice Commission, officials said.

Tunnel Worked on 'Recently'

*SK0403000590 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES
in English 4 Mar 90 p 3*

[Text] The discovery of another North Korean-built tunnel, the fourth to be found under the DMZ since 1974, consternated the South Koreans and bewildered the world over the weekend.

The shock is greater than at previous times because the fourth invasion passage was uncovered when the international community is paying keen attention on the Korean peninsula with the expectation of a scene of thaw amid the worldwide receding of ideological confrontations.

The North Korean Communists bored the latest passageway roughly 1 kilometer southwards from the Military Demarcation Line that stretches through the center of the 155-mile-long Demilitarized Zone dividing the South and North Korea.

The big question is when the North Koreans built the tunnel. Items abandoned inside the tunnel by the builders indicated that work was being done until quite recently. Only two months ago, Kim Il-song claimed brazenly that the biggest obstacle to the reunification of the divided nation was the concrete wall built by South Korean along the DMZ, which simply is an anti-tank barrier.

Military strategists commented that they could not but help feeling goose bumps imagining the North Korean troops sneaking southwards through this and other yet undiscovered tunnels across the border in a surprise action hitting South Korean forces in the back.

It is crystal clear that Kim Il-song and his cohorts are still clinging obstinately to their decades-old "dream" to communize the southern half of the peninsula.

According to South Korean military intelligence officers, Gen. O Chin-u, former chairman of the North Korean joint chiefs of staff, put the northern forces into the clandestine tunneling operation along the entire DMZ under the direction of Kim Il-song in September 1971.

While Seoul and Pyongyang delegates were holding "dialogue" in the two capitals after issuing a joint communique on peaceful reunification, Gen. O and Kim Chung-in, then leader of Pyongyang's anti-South Korean operations headquarters, worked out a blitzkrieg strategy against the South including the utilization of invasion tunnels.

Camouflaged as ordinary fortification construction, North Korean forces started to bore the underground passageways across the DMZ in May 1972.

Gen. O directed the People's Army corps to dig two tunnels each, while deploying more than 65 percent of the entire ground forces forward close to the Demilitarized Zone.

The intelligence officers said on condition of anonymity they confirmed that North Korea imported from Sweden 16 sophisticated tunnel excavators valued at South Korean equivalent of 3.9 billion won to 12 billion won apiece from 1975 through 1978.

The four tunnels were dug at locations on the historical invasion routes from the North to the South. The fourth

tunnel, in particular, lies below a strategic point on the northeastern section of the DMZ.

Military officers assessed that North Korea will be able to send lightly-armed infantry brigades through the tunnels to the rear of the South Korean forces undetected.

Kang Says Arms Talks Could Start 'Any Time'

SK0303000990 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
3 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun testified yesterday that the government is ready to start arms reduction talks with North Korea at any time if premier talks between the two Koreas make progress.

"If the arms reduction talks are opened, a joint panel to assess military powers of both sides will be able to be installed," said the prime minister. He was answering a question of an opposition lawmaker Yi Chan-ku during the parliamentary interpellation of the administration on security and unification affairs.

However, Kang expressed a negative response to a possibility that South and North Korea will reduce their troops by 50 percent in the near future. "The confidence-building between the two sides should come first," said Kang.

He made it clear that there were no consultations between Korea and the United States about the possibility of transferring U.S. military bases in the Philippines to South Korea.

Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun said about 20 infiltration tunnels are suspected to have been dug by North Korea along the 155-mile demilitarized zone (DMZ).

"Judging from testimony by North Korean defectors and other intelligence sources, at least 20 tunnels are believed to have been dug for invasion purpose," Minister Yi said. However, only three of them have been found thus far, he said.

Yi said the government has agreed in principle to relocate U.S. bases in Yongsan. He then denied that the 8th U.S. Army bases in Yongsan will move to a suburb of Taejon City.

"Detailed negotiations are underway. But, the two sides have yet to decide where to relocate the U.S. bases in Yongsan," Minister Yi said. He said that a total of \$25.9 billion is required for South Korea to secure the defense capability to fill the vacuum to be left by the withdrawal of US troops.

Foreign Minister Choe Ho-chung observed that the day will come in the near future when the Soviet Union and China will not exercise "veto powers" against South Korea entering the United Nations.

Five lawmakers took the floor during the interpellation. Opposition Party for Peace and Democracy lawmakers called upon the government to make concessions to

North Korea in the sports talks aimed at fielding a joint Korean team to the Asian Games in Beijing this September as well as in other inter-Korean talks.

Ruling party lawmakers, for their part, focused their questions on the prospects of establishing full diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union following the opening of consular departments in Seoul and Moscow last week.

Rep. Pak Chung-su of the Democratic Liberal Party questioned if Kim Yong-sam, co-representative of the new ruling party will deliver a message to North Korean diplomats stationed in Moscow for improving inter-Korean relations when he visits the Soviet Union in March. He also inquired into government measures to improve relations with mainland China by taking advantage of the upcoming Asiad in the Chinese capital.

Rep. Yi Chan-ku of the PPD suggested that the government propose forming a joint panel with North Korea to assess the military powers of the two Koreas in a bid to clear away mutual distrust.

"Does the government have a willingness to suggest to North Korea that both sides reduce troops by 50 percent within the next two or three years?" the former professor at an institute affiliated with the National Unification Board questioned.

He asserted the necessity for signing a "peace agreement" between South Korea and the Soviet Union "as the Soviets hope to."

MONGOLIA

Talks on Final USSR Troop Withdrawal Held

Document To Be Signed 2 March

OW0103114190 Ulaanbaatar International Service
in English 0910 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Mongolian-Soviet talks on complete withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the Mongolian territory have begun in Ulaanbaatar. Chief negotiator from Mongolia is First Deputy Defense Minister of Mongolia Lieutenant General Jadambaa, and from the Soviet side is deputy head of General Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces, Colonel General Kleymenov.

On March 2 the sides will sign the document of the talks.

Batmonh Receives Soviet Negotiator

OW0403135990 Ulaanbaatar International Service
in English 0910 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Mongolian party leader and president, Batmonh, has received Colonel General Kleymenov, head of the Soviet delegation to Mongolian-Soviet talks on complete pullout of Soviet troops from Mongolia. Mr Batmonh expressed satisfaction over the successful completion of the talks and described the forthcoming complete Soviet

withdrawal as graphic demonstration of the resolve of Mongolian and Soviet Governments to consolidate an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust in the region in the spirit of new political thinking. He highly spoke of Mongol-Soviet cooperation in the sphere of defense and voiced his confidence that this cooperation will further develop and strengthen.

Troop Pullout To Finish in 1992

*OW0403130590 Ulaanbaatar International
Service in English 1200 GMT 3 Mar 90*

[Text] A protocol on complete pullout of Soviet troops from Mongolia was signed in Ulaanbaatar. According to it, Soviet troop withdrawal will start in 1991 and end in 1992.

The sides have signed another protocol on [words indistinct] passing over to the Mongolian side of a cantonment and [word indistinct] of the pulled-out Soviet contingents.

Speaking at a press conference, chief negotiator of Mongolia at the talks, First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Jadambaa, said that the agreement does not envisage any more presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia and noted there will be no more need to invite Soviet military instructors after the complete Soviet troops' withdrawal.

NEW ZEALAND

Opposition Party Firm on Nuclear Policy

*BK2202061490 Hong Kong AFP in English
0535 GMT 22 Feb 90*

[Text] Wellington, February 22 (AFP)—New Zealand's opposition leader Jim Bolger signalled Thursday [22 February] that his National Party would not change its nuclear policy despite calls by MPs [members of Parliament] for an immediate review.

National, which holds a strong lead over the ruling Labour Party in the polls and is confident of gaining power in the October general election, has a declared policy of allowing foreign warships into the country's ports without knowing whether or not they carry nuclear weapons.

It also wants to lead New Zealand back into the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] alliance with Australia and the U.S., a casualty of Labour's decision to ban warships which did not give assurances that they were not nuclear armed.

But there are fears now among National's 40 members of Parliament that the policy will lose votes. Two have said there should be an immediate rethink and at least one other is expected to join them.

Mr Bolger, however, told a press conference Thursday he had no plans to alter the policy and swing it towards Labour.

"Policy has been worked out with care to express the National Party's twin objectives—to say no to nuclear weapons in New Zealand but to say yes to New Zealand having an effective role in wider defence alliances and cooperative arrangements," he said. "The objectives won't change."

Foreign Minister To Meet With James Baker

Palmer Firm on Nuclear Policies

*BK0103013490 Hong Kong AFP in English
0040 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Text] Wellington, March 1 (AFP)—New Zealand stands by its anti-nuclear policies despite conciliatory moves by the United States in their five-year-old row over the issue, Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer said Thursday [1 March].

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said Wednesday he was prepared to resume high level political contacts that were suspended after Wellington denied nuclear-capable U.S. warships port access.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Mike Moore, who is passing through Washington on his way home from a trade mission to Iran and Turkey, is to meet Mr Baker on Friday.

"We can look forward with confidence to the relationship improving," Mr Palmer told Radio New Zealand. "But that doesn't mean that there's been any change in New Zealand's attitude to our nuclear policy. There has been no change of that sort and there will be none." "Our nuclear policy is non-negotiable, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't have civilised diplomatic dialogue between the two countries."

Although there has been speculation that Mr Moore might have acted as an intermediary in negotiations over U.S. hostages in Lebanon, Mr Palmer said he "wouldn't put much emphasis on that at all." "I think it (the renewal of contacts) has been done because it simply isn't sensible for two countries with so much in common to not have political dialogue at the highest level."

Mr Moore also insisted that the U.S. move had little to do with his talks with Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on the American hostages. "The Iranians are not a go-between for us and neither are we a go-between for the Iranians," he told New Zealand reporters by phone from Washington.

Washington became embroiled in a bitter dispute with Wellington in 1985 after Mr Palmer's predecessor David Lange refused to allow U.S. warships into New Zealand ports unless they declared they were nuclear-free. U.S. policy is to neither confirm nor deny the nuclear capability of its warships.

The United States responded in 1986 by cutting off all high-level political and security contacts with New Zealand and effectively freezing it out of the ANZUS ALLIANCE linking the two countries and Australia since 1952.

(But Mr Baker told the U.S. Senate Budget Committee on Wednesday: "I don't think that it makes very good sense to continue a ban on high-level contacts on matters other than military or intelligence.")

(He said that New Zealand had supported U.S. positions, notably on drift-net fishing and anti-drug trafficking.

(The secretary of state added, however, that discussions on security issues and U.S. military obligations toward New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty remain suspended.)

Mr Lange told Radio New Zealand he believed Mr Baker's decision vindicated the New Zealand stand. He added: "There's no doubt at all that my not being prime minister has helped considerably."

Palmer Welcomes Relaxing of Ban

*BK0103072090 Melbourne Overseas Service
in English 0500 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Text] The New Zealand prime minister, Mr Palmer, has welcomed the decision by the United States to relax a ban on top-level ties with Wellington. The American secretary of state, Mr Baker, says he will meet the New Zealand external relations and trade minister, Mr Moore, in Washington later today ending a four-year freeze on direct contacts following Wellington's ban on nuclear warships.

The ban was introduced by the former prime minister, Mr David Lange, after Labor came to power in 1984.

Mr Palmer says high-level contacts will resume on all issues except military and intelligence. But he stressed Wellington would not change its nuclear policy.

PHILIPPINES

Army Chief Stresses Need for Armored Carriers

*HK2402091290 Manila Manila Broadcasting
Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 24 Feb 90*

[Text] The Philippine Army today demanded the immediate purchase and delivery of 150 British-made Simba armored personnel carriers [apc]. The purchase is being questioned by the Congress. Army Chief Major General Manuel Cacanando said that other competitors to the Simba, including Cadillac which manufactures V-150 apc's, are also being considered and that these firms have reduced their prices to meet the Simba price.

Cacanando explained that except for eight Simbas to be manufactured in Great Britain, other units to be purchased by the Army will be made in the Philippines. The Simba manufacturer has offered to set up a joint venture with its Philippine counterpart in an agreement similar to that concluded between the Augusta and the Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation for the production and maintenance of F-211 trainer jets.

Cacanando admitted that he has approved the purchase of Simba following extensive field tests. He said that some modifications were introduced to the original design of the apc based on the results of the field tests. One modification is the installation of a V-shaped bottom for the Simba. Most apc's, including the V-150 currently used by the Army, have flat bottoms which are easily destroyed once they hit landmines.

Cacanando declined to reveal the price of the Simba but stressed that the terms are favorable to the Philippine Government. He also emphasized that the Army needs new apc's to enhance the mobility and firing power of its combat units in the campaign against the New People's Army and Muslim secessionist groups.

SINGAPORE

Army Generals on Defense Policies, Cooperation

*BK0203103790 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES
in English 2 Mar 90 p 1*

[Text] A trimmer army with the same firepower—that's how the SAF [Singapore Armed Forces] is tackling the problem of declining birth rates. This was revealed by Brig-Gen (Res) [Brigadier General, Reserves] Lee Hsien Loong and Lt-Gen [Lieutenant General] Winston Choo in separate interviews with an international military publication.

Among the changes: smaller but more flexible combat units supplied with equipment to produce the same firepower, though manned by fewer soldiers.

Brig-Gen Lee, who is minister for Trade and Industry and Second Minister for Defence (Services) and Lt-Gen Winston Choo, chief of the General Staff of the Singapore Armed Forces, touched on a wide range of topics in their interviews with the magazine, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. These ranged from the island's defence policies to defence co-operation between ASEAN states. The West German publication, which has an international circulation, ran the interviews in a special issue in February.

One of the main points covered in the interviews was a trimmer and leaner SAF which could be expected in the near future. The declining birth rate in Singapore and the resultant drop in the number of males for national service has given impetus to the SAF's plans to review its manpower use.

Included in the upcoming changes are a trimming and re-structuring of the combat units. Trials have already been carried out in the SAF on how companies and battalions could be altered while maintaining total firepower and combat effectiveness. "The results have been very encouraging," said Lt-Gen Choo. But the number of active units in the SAF will remain the same, though they will be smaller.

To free more men for combat roles, the SAF has also engaged private companies to handle some of its activities. For example, catering has been partially handed over to civilian catering firms.

Automation is also one of the means being used by the SAF to maximise its use of manpower. For instance, through automation, the locally-developed FH-88 155mm howitzer that has been introduced into the SAF only needs eight gunners, compared to the 16 with the older models of 155mm howitzers.

The possibility of upgrading or replacing the F5E/Fs, the acquisition of maritime patrol aircraft, and the testing of tanks for possible purchase in the future were mentioned in the interviews.

It was revealed that the SAF was testing new armoured vehicles with a view to replacing the AMX-13s currently used by Singapore.

Commenting on ASEAN defence relations, Lt-Gen Choo said: "There should be greater defence co-operation between ASEAN states at a pace comfortable to everyone."

Asked if Singapore was willing to help other states in the region to repel aggression, Brig-Gen Lee said that Singapore was always willing to assist others in achieving an effective resolution through peaceful means. "Aggression only engenders further aggression and may not bring about any resolution," he said.

Brig-Gen Lee also gave a rundown on the basics of Singapore's defence policy which he said was founded on two principles—deterrence and diplomacy. Deterrence was attained through high operational readiness of its armed forces while diplomacy aimed at promoting good defence relations between other countries and Singapore.

About Singapore's defence industry, Brig-Gen Lee said it formed an important part of Singapore's total defence capability. "They are economically viable, and contribute to Singapore's deterrence," he said.

In the early years, Mindef [Ministry of Defense] absorbed 70 percent of the industries' output. This has dropped to the present level of 40 percent.

On the future growth of the defence industry, Brig-Gen Lee said the defence industries will have to look beyond the SAF. They would have to hold their own against well-established international companies by improving their capabilities and products, he added. "We cannot afford to subsidise them from public funds," he said.

THAILAND

Army Wants 40 Billion Baht To Modernize

BK2402090790 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
24 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] The army needs about Bt [baht] 40 billion to finance its modernization programme, which is aimed at

increasing the offensive capability of its combat force, deputy army chief Gen [General] Suchinda Khraprayun said yesterday.

However, Gen Suchinda said the new strategy did not mean that Thailand would be aggressive towards other countries.

"It only means we will attack first anyone who is preparing to attack us," the deputy army commander-in-chief said.

Speaking to students at Chulalongkon University yesterday on the development of the armed forces and national security, he said the army wants Bt40 billion to buy more advanced technology weapons though he did not specify what weapons he had in mind.

On political issues, the general said he would not enter national politics after his retirement from military service which he said he still enjoys.

Gen Suchinda, 56, said he was too proud of his military career to enter politics, which he considered full of people with vested interests. Entering politics would mean having to humbly beg support from many people including former subordinates, he said.

The general is considered heir apparent to Army Command-in-Chief Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut who promised to resign this year, two years before his compulsory retirement.

Suchinda added that the military had to support the government to create the necessary stability to build confidence among foreign investors considering doing business in Thailand.

"Foreign businesses are not keen on investing in countries that frequently change their governments," the army officer said.

While saying he was not interested in politics for himself, Suchinda said many MPs [members of parliament] and ministers had little education and urged that an education standard be set for parliamentarians.

VIETNAM

NHAN DAN Analyzes U.S. Defense Strategies

BK2502140790 Hanoi *Domestic Service*
in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 23 Feb 90

[NHAN DAN article: "Washington's Adjustment of Military Strategies"]

[Text] The Bush administration is feverishly promoting the long-term national defense program that Defense Secretary Dick Cheney presented on 29 January 1990 as well as the draft defense budget for fiscal year 1990-91 currently being considered by the U.S. Congress.

With regard to the long-term defense program, the Pentagon said that in the next five years it will deactivate

five out of 28 regular and reserve army divisions, suspend the operation of 14 out of 157 strategic B-52 bombers, stop the production of F-15 jet fighters, reduce the number of heavy tonnage warships from four to two, close down or limit the operations of 54 military bases in and outside the country, and effect a 10 percent reduction in military personnel up to the year 1995—the U.S. Defense Department now has three million military and civilian employees. The objective of these moves is to reduce defense spending by 180 billion dollars in the next five years. In fact, the moves are only part of Washington's adjustment of military strategies to achieve old objectives in a new situation marked by many important changes. Even though this adjustment of military strategies does not serve offensive purposes, it poses a potentially dangerous threat to the peace and security of world nations.

First of all, the extremely costly arms race will make it impossible for the United States to find enough money to modernize its equipment, technology, and economic structures. As a result, the economy of this country will be pushed back and overtaken in a number of important fields by its rivals—Japan and Western Europe. This is a serious challenge with which the United States must try to cope. Second, the nuclear arms race has reached the saturation point. The use of nuclear weapons is regarded as inconceivable. Now that the nuclear war strategy is deadlocked, what kinds of strategies and weapons should be used in order to realize Washington's strategic objectives? Third, one must mention the strong pressure of public opinion in the United States and the rest of world urging Washington to respond to the Soviet Union's constructive proposals for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

Washington's dilemma is how to cut military spending in order to have more investment capital for improving economic development structures and reduce the budget and trade deficits at the same time, and how to ease public demands for the United States to carry out disarmament while maintaining and strengthening its military strength to implement the deterrent strategy and the strategy of peace based on strength. In the mid-1980's, the Reagan administration tried to work out a new politico-military strategy to meet these requirements. This new doctrine was dubbed competitive strategy. Immediately after he entered the White House, President Bush quickly announced official recognition of the competitive strategy. He was pleased because this strategy was consistent with U.S. policy and capable of overcoming the difficulties and contradictions. He called it a delicious apple pie. The competitive strategy provides guiding principles for current U.S. military efforts and prepares the way for future war, and as a short-term objective, for the period covering the first decade of the 21st century.

In implementing its competitive strategy, Washington will never give up the nuclear weapons modernization plan but will maintain it to consolidate and strengthen its deterrent position as well as to improve both

conventional and nuclear weapons, while continuing to modernize the three nuclear strategic weapons. The U.S. also advocates building a nonnuclear strength with a long-lasting deterrent power that can defeat all kinds of nonnuclear war. The competitive strategy doctrine is aimed at preparing for and carrying out a nonnuclear war using sophisticated industrial technology to exploit conventional weapons, which are different from nuclear weapons. With the application of new nuclear physics innovations, these lethal weapons can attain unbelievable results in terms of speed, distance, and destructive power—as has been described by founders of this modern strategy. These kinds of weapons are suitable for future battlefields which will be fought not only on land, in the seas, and in the air, but also in space. The Pentagon strategists advocate using smash weapons [vux khis tinh khoon] to realize the competitive strategy. These include lasers, cluster beams, and the B-2 Stealth strategic bombers. B-52 bombers equipped with new generation missiles are also considered facilities of the smash weapons era.

With the competitive strategy doctrine, the Washington administration nurtures hopes of gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union by relying on favorable conditions in the scientific-technological field, especially its sophisticated industrial technology. Implementing the competitive strategy doctrine, the United States, first, intends to combine this doctrine with the nuclear deterrent strategy in order to realize its policy of peace based on strength. Second, the competitive strategy doctrine is aimed at preparing for future wars which must rely on sophisticated technology—wars that the United States hopes to win. Third, this doctrine may be applied to low-intensity conflicts which may occur if the interests of the United States and the West are threatened. Fourth, the competitive strategy also serves Washington's SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] programs by accelerating the study and installation of non-nuclear weapons in space. U.S. military analyst (Jack Firecus) said: With the competitive strategy, the United States can reduce its military force while effectively maintaining its power.

In order to combine the competitive strategy with the nuclear deterrent strategy, the Bush administration planned to spend a substantial portion of the 1990-91 federal budget on modernizing the three strategic weapons, providing the star wars program with an additional sum of \$900 million, continuing to build the B-2 Stealth strategic bombers at a cost of \$500 million each, and accelerating research to perfect smash weapons. The competitive strategy manifests the U.S. imperialists' bellicose, aggressive attitude. It is a dangerous tool of Washington aimed at opposing the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, threatening independent and developing countries, and maintaining Washington's military control over U.S. allies. The adjustment of U.S. strategies has prompted nations to continue heightening vigilance. Peace and international security can be achieved only through resolute and tireless struggles by nations for various goals of the era.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

New Proposal Offered at Disarmament Talks*LD2202225190 Budapest MTI in English 2125 GMT
22 Feb 90*

[Text] Vienna, February 22 (MTI)—The agreement to be concluded on the reduction and limitation of conventional forces in Europe should be based on the obligations of the particular countries rather than those of the two military blocs. This is the essence of the Hungarian proposal put forward by Ambassador David Meiszter to the plenary session of the Vienna talks on disarmament of 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states.

The head of the Hungarian delegation pointed out that the security system established after the second world war and based on mutual deterrent had become obsolete and ineffective by now.

Referring to the reunification of Germany, the Hungarian diplomat pointed out that the dramatic changes taking place in Europe make it indispensable to establish a security system based on cooperation between the States. It is very important that the agreement to be concluded in Vienna should be adjustable to the changing world, including the possibility of dissolving the military blocs.

Mr Meiszter said the agreement can only attain this aim if it breaks once and for all with the approach based on military blocs, and focusses on the national rights and obligations.

The new requirements call for major modifications in the former conceptions. These modifications, however, should not prevent the agreement from being signed this year and implemented quickly. For this reason, the Hungarian delegation makes again an independent initiative. According to the Hungarian position, the size of national armed forces should be made the decisive element of the agreement. The ideas that the agreement would contain only the aggregate upper limit of the armed forces of the states belonging to the same alliance system should be modified. Since the proposal is not opposing the former conception, it does not disturb the talks. On the contrary, it makes an essential contribution to the agreement reflecting the new conditions emerging in Europe.

Hungarian Official Assesses 'Open Skies' Talks*LD2802102690 Budapest MTI in English 0855 GMT
28 Feb 90*

[Text] Ottawa, February 28 (MTI)—The 'Open Skies' agreement is due to be signed by the foreign ministers of NATO and WT [Warsaw Treaty] member states in Budapest in May.

The first phase of the conference dealing with the contract drew to an end in Ottawa on Tuesday [27 February]. An agreement was reached in Ottawa to stage the second phase of the conference in Budapest between April 23 and May 12.

Tibor Toth, deputy head of department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and leader of the Hungarian delegation, had the following comment to make to MTI's correspondent:

The agreement would allow countries of the two military alliances to make mutual surveillance flights, with no weapons on board, over each other's territory. While there is agreement in principle, positions still differ on some major practical points, especially on the Soviet side.

The Soviet Union requests that the planes doing the monitoring flights over the particular country should belong to that country, but with a foreign crew on board. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would impose more restrictions on flights over its territory than other countries, and would also want monitoring to extend to the foreign bases of the participating countries, including U.S. bases in Asia. This request has been turned down by Washington.

Another open question concerns the type and performance of the instruments used for monitoring, and whether the data obtained should be generally available, (as requested by the Soviet Union).

In view of the complexity of the questions involved, the progress reached during the course of the short three weeks should not be undervalued, stresses Mr Toth, who considers Western press opinion which overrates the difficulties met during the conference pessimistic without a cause.

The Hungarian standpoint is that the meetings between the two alliance systems should help eliminate division, in other words, should reach an agreement not between blocs but 23 countries. "It is to be hoped that Hungary will also be able to play a part in other projects connected with the contract. A permanent consultative committee which is likely to be set up could be based in Budapest," said the leader of the Hungarian delegation.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Federal Assembly Briefed on Soviet Withdrawal*LD2802120190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0836 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Remarks by Deputy Michal Kocab at the Federal Assembly in Prague—live relay]

[Text] Esteemed Federal Assembly, in connection with the report on the state and development of the federation delivered by the prime minister yesterday, I would like to brief you about the conclusions of the 26 February

joint meeting of the foreign, defense and security, and constitutional and legal committees of the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of the Nations.

In accordance with the conclusions of the 23 January joint meeting of the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of the Nations the above committees discussed two proposals concerning the departure of Soviet troops from our territory. The committees gave their unequivocal support to a draft resolution asking the CSSR Federal Assembly to declare the treaty concluded between the governments of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union of 16 October 1968 on the conditions governing the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, approved by the CSSR National Assembly on 18 October 1968, as void from the very beginning.

On the basis of this stand the committees proposed that the Federal Assembly should adopt the text of the following resolution:

The Federal Assembly of the CSSR states that

1. The treaty on the temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia is void from the very beginning;
2. Also void is the agreement of the CSSR National Assembly expressed in the relevant resolution 18 October 1968.

At the last meeting of both Chambers I also delivered a proposal regarding the date for the complete withdrawal of Soviet military units by the end of 1990 at the latest. The deputies of the above committees are fully conscious of the enormous and justified interest of the Czechoslovak public in the departure of Soviet troops from our territory and the fundamental importance of the given question. In this they proceed from the prerequisite that the Czechoslovak public must be informed about all aspects of the resolution of this problem.

The conclusion adopted at the talks in Moscow embodied in the treaty of 26 February this year—two days ago—do not depart in their basic intentions from the intentions of the two proposals submitted by myself. The basic difference concerns the date of the final departure of Soviet troops from our territory. The treaty signed embodies several stages for the departure of Soviet troops.

During the first stage, by the end of May this year, 35 percent of Soviet troops and 50 percent of the most dangerous combat equipment, including all launching equipment and the entire special ammunition, are to leave Czechoslovak territory. We all surely know what we should imagine under this term special ammunition: nuclear warheads.

Secondly, during the second stage, by the end of this year, about another 25 percent of troops and a further portion of combat equipment is to be withdrawn. This means that 60 percent of troops should be outside the territory of our republic by the end of the year.

During the third stage, by 30 June 1991 the withdrawal of the remaining Soviet troops, their family members, and the remaining combat equipment should be definitely completed.

We were informed that these dates had been proposed following a consultation with the president of the republic and the federal prime minister, with the knowledge that the Soviet side has found itself in an extraordinarily complicated situation and that for a number of technical, social, and political reasons it was not capable of ensuring the complete withdrawal of troops earlier. The circumstances of the talks have, however, indicated that in the future development the situation may change in a positive sense. Both sides at the same time are considering all prerequisites of such decisions in light of common interest in order that differences in the attitude to the issue under discussion do not lead to a possible destabilization of mutual relations or a possible destabilization arising from the departure of Soviet troops unsecured by the necessary internal prerequisites in the Soviet Union itself.

The departure of Soviet troops must be ensured in a manner which corresponds to the principles of humanism and democracy and should not be accompanied by any manifestations of hatred, in the spirit of our efforts for mutual understanding among nations. We must realize that the Soviet people, too, found themselves in a position in which they could not express their real political will and that a peaceful resolution of all questions which are connected with the departure of Soviet troops has only been made possible by the leadership of the Soviet state adopting a policy of respecting the rights of individual states and nations.

In order to systematically monitor the problem connected with the resolution of the whole complex of issues concerning the departure of Soviet troops from our territory, it is proposed to the Presidium of the Federal Assembly that a mixed commission be set up composed of deputies of the above committees—that is, the foreign, defense and security, and constitution and legal committees of the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of the Nations, and deputies of other committees having a direct interest in the matter and relevant specialists. This commission should supervise the implementation of the obligations arising from the relevant treaty, initiate the resolution of other issues, including property, historical, and humanitarian matters and should establish cooperation with the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The above committees understand the establishment of the mixed commission for monitoring the implementation of the treaty on the withdrawal of Soviet troops in a broader context. Taking part in the intervention in August 1968, as well as the Soviet Union, there were some other Warsaw Pact states. This fact must be considered within the totality of legal, political, and other aspects. In this sense the relevant mixed commission should prepare their own proposals which would

lead to a truly definitive and complex resolution of all problems connected with the intervention in August 1968. The deputies of the above committees express their firm belief that it is necessary to create conditions for the restoration of mutual confidence and friendship and to build on this basis new relations among all European states and nations.

So much for the report on the meeting of the foreign, defense and security, and constitutional and legal communities of the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of Nations.

In conclusion, I would like to speak both for myself and in behalf of hundreds and thousands of citizens whose signatures in support of the speedy departure of Soviet troops I am receiving daily.

I respect the efforts of the Czechoslovak Government in its talks with the Soviet side. I understand that under the current situation better results could probably not have been achieved. Despite the fact that I regard the process of renewal of democracy in Czechoslovakia as irreversible I am concerned, especially in view of the increasing tension in the Soviet Union, that the talks on the Soviet withdrawal do not become fossilized at the level of the simple conclusion of this treaty, embodying the upper limits for the departure of Soviet troops.

At the same time it would not be in variance with the content of this treaty, in line with the wishes of the whole of our nation which is standing at the threshold of a new development stage, if the departure of Soviet troops was speeded up substantially through the joint increased effort of both parties to the treaty in the interest of the development of democracy and the economy. Thank you for your attention.

'Text' of Joint Soviet Troop Withdrawal Accord

*AU0103153290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
28 Feb 90 p 14*

[CTK report: "Text of the Agreement on Troop Withdrawal"]

[Text] Moscow—On 26 February, an agreement was signed between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The document, which was signed by Jiri Dienstbier and Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign ministers of the two countries, contains the following:

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

—taking into consideration the statement issued by the Czechoslovak Government on 3 December 1989, and the statement issued by the Soviet Government on 4 December 1989, including their legal aspects,

—motivated by an attempt to develop traditional friendship and cooperation between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics while thoroughly adhering to the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs,

—confirming their firm resolve to comprehensively assist in the strengthening of peace, stability, and security in Europe and throughout the world,

—and expressing their desire to adhere to the undertakings resulting from the Warsaw Pact Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 14 May 1955,

—have agreed to the following:

Article 1

1. The complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will take place in stages; the first stage will be completed by 31 May 1990, the second stage by 31 December 1990, and the third stage by 30 June 1991.

2. During the first stage, the withdrawal of a substantial part of the Soviet troops will be completed in harmony with the jointly drafted timetable.

Article 2

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will provide the Soviet side with the necessary cooperation during the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Article 3

During the period prior to the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the principles in existence when this agreement was reached—including property, financial, and other issues—with regard to appropriate changes in conditions for the mutual settling of accounts and mutual payments, will apply to these troops.

Article 4

The sides will appoint commissioners for matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops who will resolve practical issues resulting from the implementation of the appropriate stipulations of this agreement.

Article 5

Property and financial issues occurring in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be considered by the commissioners for matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and will be resolved by agreements between the appropriate ministries of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 6

Property and financial issues associated with Soviet troops in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, not revised prior to the period of their complete withdrawal, will be dealt with by a special agreement between the sides, by an agreement

that will be reached no later than two years from the date that this agreement becomes valid.

Article 7

This agreement is valid from the date it is signed.

Timetable for Troop Withdrawal 'Strictly Maintained'

Official Says Troop Withdrawal on Course

*LD0203204890 Prague Television Service
in Czech 1830 GMT 2 Mar 90*

[Text] The Czechoslovak border has already been crossed by two trainloads of military equipment in the framework of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and other trainloads are currently being prepared. Colonel General Grinkevich, chief of staff [as heard] of the Soviet Ground Forces, said the timetable for the units' withdrawal is being strictly maintained.

Some 60-65 percent of the Soviet troops and equipment is to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia this year, and the remainder next year.

Machinery To Be Removed

*LD0303230390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1730 GMT 3 Mar 90*

[Summary] Since 24 February five trainloads of Soviet troop heavy technological goods have left Frenstat railway station. Another two trains are to leave by tomorrow. Trucks are now arriving from the surrounding areas and a convoy of heavy military machinery will leave tomorrow in the direction of Roznov, across the Beskydy hills, through the Tatras to the border.

Foreign Adviser Reviews Troop Withdrawal Talks

*LD0403113390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0830 GMT 4 Mar 90*

[Commentary by Dr Jaroslav Sedivy, adviser to the foreign minister]

[Text] It has not even been three months since we began to forge a new foreign policy; yet looking back, the progress we have made now seems almost incredible, particularly in comparison with the years when our society was moving forward at the speed of mud. Three months ago we said that if we were to build a foreign policy of our own based primarily on the need of our state, that state had to be a fully sovereign one. That, then, was the genesis of our first foreign policy task: To negotiate the total withdrawal of the Soviet Union's troops for our territory.

Today, with the first phase, the negotiation phase, already under our belts with the recent signing of the agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, it all seems simple but the truth is quite the reverse. The negotiations were neither straight forward nor simple, and this is illustrated by the two sides' initial positions.

At first the Soviet Union was totally unprepared to address the issue of the troops' departure. It only wanted to talk about their presence in Czechoslovakia in terms of a new legal basis on Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] and linking their withdrawal to the Vienna talks. For the sake of interest, under this Vienna process the Soviets originally contemplated withdrawing 5,500 troops by 1990, once again invoking the danger of German revanchism, Warsaw Pact interests, and so on.

However, we insisted that the troops' entry was unlawful, that the agreement concluded subsequent to their entry was negotiated under duress and thus invalid, that it was a bilateral issue, and that we were prepared to talk not about the troop presence in our country, but about securing their earliest possible withdrawal; we declared this to be an issue of absolutely pivotal importance for further Czechoslovak-Soviet relations.

I do not intend to describe the talks in detail; they were tough, but correct. I do not think that Soviet politicians have often found themselves meeting for talks with an allied state that had such a clear and thoroughly planned position with the intention of sticking to that position.

This experience offers four important conclusions:

First, this is perhaps the first time in modern history that a major power is withdrawing its troops from the territory of a second state on terms negotiated and agreed beforehand. In other cases, the major power has simply announced its own say-so and timeframe for pulling out. This shows that both sides are genuinely interested in insuring that future relations have a clean start.

Second, the talks took place on our terms, and this, too, is something that tends to be the exception in talks between a major power and a smaller state, so this is not a troop withdrawal hinging on the outcome of the Vienna CFE talks, but a total pullout in the shortest possible timeframe, negotiated as a bilateral issue, an act enshrined in the form of an agreement providing for the settlement in law of property issues.

Thirdly, it transpires that not only did our talks not undermine the Soviet position in Vienna, as the Soviet politicians had feared; they contributed to even more favorable progress in Vienna. Before the talks began, the United States announced that its own troop cuts in Europe, to go down to not only to 275,000, but to as few as 200,000 troops, was subsequently cut even further, to 195,000, by President Bush.

Fourth and last, I would like to emphasize something that seems to be very important for the future of our relations with the Soviet Union and for our foreign policy in general. Sitting around the negotiating table were two equal delegations, defending their positions down to the last point, but what clinched this first step forward, this first minor victory, was natural justice. The principles and methods of these talks are and will continue to be a source of inspiration for the further development of our relations with the Soviet Union.

A marvelous followup to what we might call the first round of this great endeavor to put our relations with the Soviet Union on a new footing was made by the two leaders, President Havel and Mikhail Gorbachev. When the talks between the delegations ran up against a brick wall on the issue of the final date for the Soviet troop withdrawal, Mikhail Gorbachev sent a personal message to our president setting out the reasons why the Soviet side was requesting a certain degree of understanding on our side, and only then were we able to reach a date acceptable to both sides. The president's visit to Moscow then set the seal on what had become clear during the political and expert talks on the troop withdrawal, which is that if our future relations are to have any sense of direction at all, they must be relations between two partners with genuinely equal rights, without any interference in each other's internal affairs. This is what the brief statement adopted in Moscow says, in a pedestrian sort of way.

Thus for the first time in 22 years, Mikhail Gorbachev stated on behalf of his country in the final communique something which we here in Czechoslovakia have been awaiting for a long time: The Soviet side expressed regret at what it did in August 1968.

Troop Withdrawal Proceeding 'Exactly' as Planned

*AU0503123290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
3 Mar 90 p 1*

[CTK report: "The Troops Are Withdrawing According to Plan"]

[Text] Prague—By seven o'clock on the morning of 2 March, seven trains carrying Soviet military equipment and soldiers left Czechoslovakia; two trains were already on their way and, during the day, four trains were loaded with combat equipment and another train was loaded with military materials. This corresponds exactly to the fixed timetable. It means that 118 tanks, 44 combat vehicles, 38 trucks, and 564 people have crossed the border. The Soviet side is paying for the railroad transfer. The largest amount of combat equipment possible should be removed from our territory by the end of 1990. The Soviet Army has undertaken to substantially reduce the intensity of military exercises. This reduction is associated with the removal of equipment. Should the Central Group of Soviet Forces want to use its equipment or conduct exercises with munitions, it will seek the agreement of the local national committee.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Details of Arms Exports Discussed

*AU1702161990 East Berlin HORIZONT in German
No 2/1990 p 32*

[Interview with Erhard Wiechert, former director general of Imes Import Export GmbH, by unidentified HORIZONT reporter; place and date not given: "A Hot Potato"]

[Text] [HORIZONT] How was the Imes GmbH established?

[Wiechert] Imes was founded as a limited liability company in 1982 by former State Secretary Schalck-Golodkowski and registered at the commercial register of the city area court Berlin-Center after a shareholders' resolution. Thus the enterprise was given the right to carry out business operations and transactions with other countries.

[HORIZONT] Did you have to shape the Imes GmbH in a certain way?

[Wiechert] From the very beginning, Imes was founded to earn foreign currency through exporting arms, ammunition, and military technology that was discarded by the armed organs, or that came from the GDR's "special production." We had the necessary licenses for all transactions, which were granted by the Commercial Coordination Office (KoKo), or which were binding to a certain degree through the so-called supply readiness plan of former Council of Ministers Chairman Stoph.

[HORIZONT] Can you give us any information about the kind of weapons and military goods that were exported by Imes?

[Wiechert] It was mainly technology that was cast out by the GDR armed organs, for example aircraft that were fit for the scrap heap, and outdated armored vehicles; we also provided repair services, sold maintenance industry know-how, spare parts for various military equipment, rifles, and ammunition. I would like to add that we also sold things that were actually not at all intended for active use by armed organs, but that were rather collectors' items, such as old guns or carbines, which were provided from the People's Police stocks.

[HORIZONT] Were there enough customers for these old weapons?

[Wiechert] Well, the demand for them was not exaggerated but with the adequate public relations work we found enough customers.

[HORIZONT] Which countries did you have commercial contacts with?

[Wiechert] For example, with Egypt, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Uganda, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Argentina, Botswana, Peru, Iran, Cuba, Poland, Hungary, and also with the PLO. Moreover, we also supplied weapons, which were only of a certain value to collectors, to Belgium and Austria, namely the Pistol 08 and the Carbine K 98. In addition, we also imported things, for example, from Sweden, when a supplier of gunpowder from the CSSR failed to supply us.

[HORIZONT] Which countries did you conclude new agreements with in 1989?

[Wiechert] In 1989 we agreed, among other things, to deliver ammunition to Hungary for convertible foreign currency; we concluded agreements with Jordan on the supply of rifles, with Uganda on the export of radio technology, and with Botswana on the export of rifles. We also supplied training services to Iran for the maintenance of aircraft. The same applies to aircraft repairs for Egypt, or the supply of technological know-how to Argentina. Most agreements contained secrecy regulations.

[HORIZONT] What profits did you make with the arms deals?

[Wiechert] Between 1982 and 1989, Imes made profits to the tune of \$318.9 million. The foreign currency that we gained was passed on. Some of it was returned to us for refinancing loans.

[HORIZONT] Did Imes only deal in weapons and military goods, or was it also offered agent services?

[Wiechert] Imes also dealt in goods of a nonmilitary nature. For example, for the foreign trade enterprise Transport Machinery, we sold W-50 trucks. If I remember right, we exported approximately 18,000 trucks either directly or acted as agents for such transactions with Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Uganda. We did not act as agents in arms deals, but carried out such transactions on our own behalf and on our own account. For example, we repaired 50 T-55 tanks for Iran in the GDR. This was in the spring of 1989. These were tanks that Iran captured from the Iraqi Armed Forces. I do not know where exactly these tanks came from, but I believe that they were not originally supplied by the GDR.

[HORIZONT] Rumor has it that Imes has ignored and even infringed upon obligations our country has toward the Warsaw Pact and that it also supplied NATO countries.

[Wiechert] I can categorically declare that Imes did not supply any weapons or ammunition to NATO countries. The only thing that we ever did in this connection was exporting GDR-made rifles to Great Britain in 1986-87. We supplied no more than 10 pieces that were intended as samples and for display. It is internationally customary to present weapons in this way to interested parties so that, on the basis of a sample, they can decide whether they want to buy or not. Great Britain would most probably not have bought them; however, it would have been conceivable that, for example, former British colonies, such as Nigeria or the United Arab Emirates, are interested in acquiring such weapons via a British arms dealer.

[HORIZONT] Did you receive orders directly from the leadership, people like Honecker, Mielke, and Mittag?

[Wiechert] Our company received orders certainly from the sphere of KoKo, but I have information that many of these orders were based on instructions or orders of the people that you mentioned.

[HORIZONT] Did Imes GmbH also cooperate with the Armed Forces?

[Wiechert] Yes, we sometimes did. This was simply the result of the necessary technological coordination. We did this with experts of the armed organs, and this was necessary to guarantee safe transport from the production enterprises to our warehouses, and from there to the dispatch department. This had to be coordinated, for example, with the Interior Ministry in line with the applicable regulations.

[HORIZONT] What relations did you have with the former State Security Ministry?

[Wiechert] Our relations with the former Ministry for State Security were on a purely business level. This includes, for example, the fact that our warehouses—such as the one at Kavelstorf—were run and protected by this ministry.

[HORIZONT] Did you also provide services that had "nothing to do with ordinary business transactions" for the former Ministry for State Security or foreign trade enterprises that were engaged in its intelligence operations.

[Wiechert] I can certainly deny this. We were not involved in any intelligence tasks of the Ministry for State Security, and never executed any such tasks.

[HORIZONT] Should not one suspect that this ministry carried out arms deals on its own account?

[Wiechert] I cannot exclude this.

[HORIZONT] How do you today assess the activities of your enterprise?

[Wiechert] From a moral point of view, dealing in arms and ammunition is problematic, because mankind wants peace and disarmament.

I have tried, and I can say that on behalf of the entire collective of Imes (30 people), to always make sure in our work that the weapons and the ammunition that we exported did not reach people that it should not reach. I can confirm that products with which we dealt never went to Israel, South Africa, Chile or organizations such as the IRA. In addition, our supply lists included neither chemical weapons nor other means of mass destruction.

Hoffmann Outlines Army Concept After Unity

*AU0203173590 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 24-25 Feb 90 p 3*

[Interview with Defense Minister Theodor Hoffmann by Rainer Funke; place and date not given: "In the Future, a Federal Army of 300,000 Men?"]

[Text] [Funke] The Defense Ministry has prepared a concept entitled "The Future of the Armed Forces in the Process of the Two German States' Growing Together." Why such a concept?

[Hoffmann] Unification has become a task of practical politics. The development that is taking shape here shows that the German process could go faster than the

European process. However, without being embedded in European security structures, and without guarantees that peace will not be threatened by a unified German state, it would only have a slim historical chance.

[Funke] What are the objectives of the ministry's concept?

[Hoffmann] In the course of their economic and political growing together, both German states would have to remain members of their alliances. The military disengagement of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Central Europe would take place step by step in the framework of pan-European disarmament negotiations.

If both German states and their armed forces meet their political obligations in their alliances, they will also remain politically predictable for Europe when federative institutions are created. For this period, the further presence of Soviet and U.S. troop contingents on the territories of both German states would also lead to favorable framework conditions of stability and security, even if at a certain time they are only of a symbolic nature.

We are striving for solutions that can be fitted into future European security structures. The military issue must be a bridge leading to this goal.

[Funke] But do we still need armed forces on the road to such a security system?

[Hoffmann] We have no doubt about that. Different "changes in temperature" in foreign policy relations between states, crises within and outside of Europe remain potentially possible.

[Funke] What could German-German armed forces be like?

[Hoffmann] A German federal state could have a federal army that would be composed of citizens from all regions and would not exceed the total number of about 300,000 men in peacetime. Less than 200,000 would not allow us to fulfill the training tasks; more than 300,000 would not dispel the concerns of our direct neighbors, despite political statements.

Because the mission, potential, peace, and wartime size of the European states' national forces will most probably be justified and approved within the scope of the institutionalized CSCE process, preparations for setting up a German federal army could be the substance of the work by the respective organs of the two German states on the road to a federation.

Schnur on Abolition of Short-Range Missiles

*AU2602124390 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
26 Feb 90 p 4*

["DW"-signed report: "Schnur: Also Abolish Short-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Berlin—GDR Democratic Awakening Chairman Wolfgang Schnur is advocating a "zero option for short-range weapons as well in Europe." In an interview with DIE WELT, the GDR politician said on 25 February: "The

historic meeting of Chancellor Helmut Kohl with U.S. President George Bush is a good occasion for introducing the abolition of short-range weapons in Europe. In the same way as Kohl brought about the zero option for intermediate-range missiles, he could now give impetus to this important disarmament step, even though he will certainly have to overcome resistance in NATO. Of course, Moscow would also have to move in the same direction. Because, unfortunately, the Soviet Union has modernized these weapons until most recently."

Schnur considers the short-range weapons "obsolete." After all, the "enemy image of the past decades is gone." Schnur added: "Who can tell me today at whom the short-range weapons are to be fired? At our friends in Poland perhaps? Or at the people in the CSSR? The peaceful revolution in East Europe has made these weapons meaningless. Therefore, I am sure that Mr Kohl will meet with open ears on the part of the U.S. President if he makes such a disarmament proposal."

HUNGARY

Talks on Soviet Withdrawal Continue

*LD2802123690 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] The talks continue this afternoon, and, for the moment, every indication is that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from our homeland this year, or at the latest next year. Here is Elemer Csak:

[Begin Csak recording] The further round of experts' talks is continuing on the same level. The Hungarian delegation is led by State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi, and the Soviet delegation by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov. The intention is to finally clarify the technical details, perhaps today, but as Bela B. Kupper, head of department at the Foreign Ministry, told NEPSZABADSAG, it is not impossible that negotiations at the highest level will also be necessary for the agreement to be signed.

So the announced date of 10 March is the desired, or probable, schedule, and it depends on the way the experts' negotiations go whether the final agreement's text can be formulated by then.

One more piece of information linked to this subject. According to the briefing by Chief of Staff Laszlo Borsits, the Soviet formations will regroup over three nights in Transdanubia, in connection with the withdrawal of troops. So the vehicle movements in the coming days do not mean a military exercise. [end recording]

USSR Troop Pullout Might Finish by 1991

*LD2802113390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0900 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary could be completed by the end of the year, but the operation will definitely be concluded next year. This

was said by (Bela V. Kupper), head of department at the Foreign Ministry, in NEPSZABADSAG. He added that the text of the agreement relating to the withdrawal of troops and the schedule for this would probably be prepared by mid-March. At the same time, it is conceivable that an exchange of opinions at the highest level would also be needed for this, the head of department at the Foreign Ministry said.

General Comments on Arms Deal With Romania

*LD2802155990 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] The Hungarian defense minister has discussed with his Romanian counterpart in Bucharest the delivery of military technology devices. Here at home I asked Major General (Károly Janza), the specialist ministry's economics department head, about the background of the Hungarian-Romanian arms deal:

[Begin recording] [Reporter] The Hungarian leadership earlier had reproached the Bucharest leadership for supposedly buying carrier missiles [hordozo raketak] from abroad and for entering into various nuclear arms deals; at least, this was the hearsay. Now, however, we are delivering military equipment to Romania. Is there not a contradiction here?

[Janza] I do not see a contradiction in this. Meeting the Romanian Army's needs is an internal Romanian affair.

[Reporter] Assuming that political considerations might perhaps lie behind the Hungarian-Romanian arms deal, I consider it conceivable that, for example, according to the Hungarian Defense Ministry, a takeover of power is not precluded in Romania, and in this case it is good if the Romanian Army has various weapons, the telecommunications means with which it can uncover, let us say, the signs of a possible attempt to take power.

[Janza] I do not know of political considerations.

[Reporter] And do economic considerations play a role?

[Janza] Of course there are economic considerations because, just as in the world and in Europe, here in Hungary, too, the military technology capacities are not tied down. [end recording]

Details Still To Be Worked Out for Troop Withdrawal Pact

No Date Set for Signing Pact

*LD0103155890 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Untitled report by Correspondent Elemer Csak]

[Text] In Budapest, no agreement has been reached on the date for signing the Soviet troop withdrawal agreement. As Foreign Affairs State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi has informed Hungarian Radio, at the moment there is a debate on technical details, namely at what pace it will

be possible to transport the technical equipment back to the Soviet Union via Chop. It can be taken as certain that there will be a further consultation of experts, but the state secretary does not preclude a meeting at the highest level by representatives of the two countries before the agreement is signed. The Soviet delegation that took part in the current discussions is traveling home at this moment.

Further on Troop Withdrawal

*LD0103183390 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Text] [Announcer] In the past days, the news has spread that the protocol relating to the definitive withdrawal of Soviet troops would be signed on 10 March. The second round of experts' talks concluded today, and it seems that the date was premature. The Hungarian negotiating group's leader, Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi, has given a telephone interview to Elemer Csak, for this, the "Evening Chronicle" program.

[Begin recording] [Csak] Let us start at the end. Was an agreement reached about the date when the agreement on the troop withdrawal would be signed?

[Somogyi] The date of signing the agreement did not feature directly on the agenda now. Here, our task was basically to summarize the work up to this point, and to make the preparations for the signing of the agreement and the planned schedule.

[Csak] So then, according to this, the date of 10 March is not valid?

[Somogyi] The fact that we did not manage to agree in all questions now does not in itself automatically exclude that the signing would take place on the 10th.

[Csak] Of what nature are the differences of views? What does the debate concern?

[Somogyi] We are debating many things. The differences of views basically derive from the fact that we evaluate differently the technical possibilities, and also about what the limit is when we can still talk about orderly circumstances, because withdrawal as soon as possible is a fundamental Hungarian demand and endeavor.

[Csak] Do the technical difficulties relate to the capacity for passage at Chop, or rather the placing of the Soviet troops at home?

[Somogyi] They now relate almost exclusively to the capacity for passage at Chop.

[Csak] It was mentioned, or at least it appeared in the press, that perhaps the problems will be clarified at a meeting at the highest level.

[Somogyi] There can be various ways and means of clarifying the still remaining problems. I do not exclude that this question would also be discussed at a level higher than the delegation leader, for I feel it is in the

interests of both sides that an agreement be reached as soon as possible, but a correct, acceptable agreement.

[Csak] Did you decide when the experts will next meet?

[Somogyi] We did not agree on a time, but we said that after the interpretation and study of the present situation, we would make contact when we have something to say to each other. [end recording]

Szuos on Army's Future, Soviet Withdrawal

*LD0303052990 Budapest MTI in English 2317 GMT
2 Mar 90*

[Text] Budapest, March 2 (MTI)—On Friday at Bocskai Barracks in Debrecen, a celebration was held to mark the 45th anniversary of the 6th Hungarian Infantry Division and the Democratic Hungarian Home Defence.

Matyas Szuos, interim president of the Republic, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, and Defence Ministry and Army leaders laid a wreath on the barracks' memorial wall.

Following, a festive staff meeting was held at Kossuth Barracks in Debrecen, with Matyas Szuos delivering a speech.

Szuos said, "Hungary's liberation from under the yoke of the party state permits us to face the past without the guise of hushing up and deliberate falsifications. Our people was compelled to put up for decades with the label of the 'last hanger-on' and the sense of collective sin imposed on the whole of society.

"We are now witnessing a time of peace, rapprochement between the peoples and military blocs, strengthening confidence and shrinking troops and armaments. As a

result, it also becomes unnecessary for foreign troops, namely Soviet military units, to be stationed in our country. Their final withdrawal is only a matter of time now.

"Such being the condition, the Hungarian Army faces the particularly huge responsibility of defending the country against any possible provocation or attack from the outside, and finding its place independent of parties and answering the interests of the entire country in the new democratic state order," Szuos said.

Horn 'Expected' To Sign Troop Withdrawal Pact

*LD0303104790 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0700 GMT 3 Mar 90*

[Text] The Hungarian foreign minister is to go to Moscow in a week's time, and it is expected that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed on the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

Gyula Horn, in reply to a question by NEPSZABAD-SAG, did not qualify the consultation of experts in Budapest on 1 March as unsuccessful. However, he indicated that they did not come to an agreement over a very significant question. According to the Hungarian stance, every Soviet soldier should return home by the middle of next year at the latest. However, Moscow does not want this, saying that there are not enough rail cars for the transportation of the troops and military equipment and that transshipment at border stations is slow.

Despite this, the Hungarian foreign minister believes that an agreement will be successfully reached, and the intergovernmental agreement on the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary can be concluded.

CUBA

Soviets React to U.S. Statements on MiG's

*FL2802031090 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 0025 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] The Soviet Union today ratified Cuba's right to get MiG-29 fighter planes and expressed its surprise over irritated statements made by the U.S. State Department on the delivery. Yan Burlayay, deputy chief of the Latin American Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, read a statement during a news conference today which characterizes as naive the argument that Cuba is a threat to the United States or any other country in the area.

The Soviet Union understands Cuba's wish to replace the obsolete MiG-23 planes for MiG-29's and this is determined by the abnormal state of Cuban-U.S. relations, said Burlayay.

According to the Soviet assessment expressed in the statement, the situation can be settled by creating confidence-building measures and holding a dialogue to normalize bilateral relations. Burlayay also said the delivery of the planes is in line with bilateral cooperation commitments and do not constitute any type of build-up of the Cuban potential but the replacement of this type of weapons.

U.S. 'Militarism' in Central America, Caribbean

FL0303033090

[Editorial Report] Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish at 0130 GMT on 3 March carries its 28-minute "International View" program entitled "Imperialistic Militarism in Central America and the Caribbean." Program host Valentin Rodriguez introduces his three guests: Maria del Rosario Roiz, representative of the Committee of Popular Organizations of Honduras; Lic

Reynaldo Rivera, national coordinator of the Secretariat of the Democratic Revolutionary Party of Panama; and Edgardo Rivera, coordinator of the Caribbean Project of Education for Peace of Puerto Rico.

The three guests give a historical background of the presence of U.S. military bases in their respective territories and explain how they have contributed to the continued U.S. "hegemonic dominance" in the area.

Valentin Rodriguez notes there are indications that the United States has approximately 2,500 military bases in 114 countries of the world. He adds that almost 100 of them are located in the Central American and Caribbean area.

Panama's Reynaldo Rivera sums up the main point of the program when he says: "The agreement the United States attempts to reach, and has already launched at a certain degree, regarding the geopolitical-military situation in Europe is different from what it intends to do in Central America and the Caribbean. Americans can negotiate any type of detente in Europe but what they have shown with the invasion of Panama and what they have been doing in Central America in general; such as the case of Honduras, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, but even more so with what it did in Panama on 20 December, to establish in an irrefutable way its military dominance—which will bring geopolitical dominance in the region—shows that they can negotiate in Europe, but in Central America, specifically Panama and Central America, they are not willing to negotiate." He adds: "Imperialism can negotiate detente in Europe but it is showing other international forces that it is not willing to give up its predominance and strategic and military dominance in sensitive areas such as Central America."

Rodriguez agrees with this view and adds that: "Peace among superpowers has been negotiated but, as I said at the beginning, peace in Central America is being threatened."

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ACC Armies Agree on 'Joint Military Maneuvers'*JN2602080890 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0720 GMT
26 Feb 90*

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 26 Feb (WAKH)—News sources said here today that the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC] leaders have agreed to carry out periodic joint military maneuvers of the ACC armies. These maneuvers will be carried out twice a year, each time in one of the ACC countries according to the nature and strategic, geographic, and technical character of the maneuvers.

AL-ITTIHAD cited ACC sources as saying that a core military unit formed from the armies of the four countries will also carry out a joint exercise in order to create a unified military pattern for some of the military corps, and that military leaders have been tasked with arranging a date and place for these exercises.

The paper added that there has also been an agreement not to buy the ACC armies' supplies of ammunitions, weaponry, and military hardware from foreign countries, and to give preference to the products of the ACC war factories in Egypt and Iraq, in addition to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

IRAN

Tehran, Moscow To Cooperate in Defense*LD2702160590 Tehran IRNA in English 1535 GMT
27 Feb 90*

[Text] Tehran, February 27 (IRNA)—Iran and the Soviet Union have agreed to cooperate in defence area as per a political document inked between the two during the visit of President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani to Moscow last June, Iran's ambassador to Moscow has said.

Naser Heirani-Nobari in an interview printed in the daily RESALAT today said some progress has been made in the agreement and that the main objective of the Islamic Republic is transfer of the technology for manufacturing defensive arms.

Nobari reiterated that Iran seeks a widescale cooperation with the Soviet Union. No delay has taken place concerning the practical progress of the agreement, rather the progress has been speeded up and one of the signs is resumption of natural gas exports to the Soviet Union as of April, he noted.

On Soviet mediation concerning U.N. Resolution 598, Nobari said talks are underway in this regard, and Moscow is making preparations for the tripartite (USSR, Iran and Iraq) session.

"According to my last contacts with the Soviet officials, they would state their proposals for the session in the near future," he added.

As war has two sides, peace too should have two sides, and that peace cannot be achieved unilaterally, he said, adding Iran is seeking an honourable peace which considers interests of both the Iranian and Iraqi peoples. "We have so far taken serious measures in this regard and the world including the Iraqi side has been witness to our goodwill."

Nobari regretting that Baghdad's Ba'athist rulers seem to be insisting on their expansionist plans, warned them against repeating their wrong experiment.

They (Iraqi rulers) cannot achieve anything as long as they stick to their aggressive stands, and their intentions will not come true by the approach they have so far adopted towards the peace talks, he made it clear.

The Iraqi rulers mistakenly imagine or hope to get some concessions at the negotiation table, but their efforts in this respect would only result in the continuation of the no war no peace situation and instability of the region, said the Iranian ambassador.

First of all Nobari believes, the situation would be most harmful for the Iraqi people and soil. "We should wait and see Iraqi rulers realize the fact that when they could not defeat the Iranian people by imposing an eight-year-long war, they cannot do so through non-peaceful methods," he added.

Turning to Soviet Azerbaijan, Nobari said even though the Soviet officials have been told that it is an internal issue, "we do not like to see Muslims killed near our borders."

"We would like to see the issue resolved through right reason and peaceful means, and that's why we do not consider use of force a principle solution," he said.

IRGC To Share 'Military Experiences'*LD2702151290 Tehran IRNA in English 1420 GMT
27 Feb 90*

[Text] Tehran, February 27 (IRNA)—The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) is ready to share with Islamic armies and movements across the globe the military experiences it has acquired during almost 8 years of the Iraqi-imposed war.

Addressing a press conference, IRGC Deputy Commander Rahim Safavi said that IRGC equipped with modern technology enjoyed "a high degree of combat readiness coupled with valuable military experiences."

IRGC personnel, in addition to carrying out a total of 106 large-scale military operations during the imposed war, have proved their alertness by foiling in time conspiracies of the internal and external enemies against the Islamic republic, he said.

IRGC air, ground and naval forces are all equipped with modern military technology especially missile systems, Safavi noted.

In order to procure its needed skilled manpower, IRGC has made large investments in a military academy named after Imam Hoseyn (PBUH) [peace be upon him], the 3rd imam of Prophet Mohammad's (PBUH) household, he said.

Coming Thursday is the birthday anniversary of the martyr of Karbala' Imam Hoseyn (PBUH) an event celebrated in Islamic Iran as "IRGC Day."

\$10 Billion Slated for Military Modernization

*LD0103183790 Tehran IRNA in English 1728 GMT
1 Mar 90*

[Text] Tehran, March 1 (IRNA)—Iran intends to spend \$10 billion on arms purchase and modernization of its Armed Forces in the upcoming 5-year development plan, the minister of defence and Armed Forces logistics said Thursday.

Speaking at a ceremony marking the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps day, Akbar Torkan said that in modernizing the Armed Forces, emphasis would be place on training and organization.

The birth anniversary of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet, is celebrated in Islamic Iran as Roz-e Pasdor (Guards Day). The Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics is a merger of the ministries of Defence and the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC).

ISRAEL

Firm Developing Rocket Engine for Satellites

*TA0103144790 Jerusalem Domestic Service
in Hebrew 1400 GMT 1 Mar 90*

[Text] Israel Aircraft Industries is developing a rocket engine to launch 2,100-kg satellites. Our correspondent reports the engine is used in the interim phase to raise the satellite from a low orbit of 200 km above the earth to 36,000 km. The engine will be used to launch communications satellites to a permanent orbit in space. Neither the cost of developing the engine nor the duration of the project has been disclosed.

PAKISTAN

Official Says No Change in Nuclear Policy

*BK2802104790 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
28 Feb 90 p 8*

[Text] Islamabad, February 27—Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC], today categorically stated that neither Pakistan has changed its nuclear policy nor bargained on this issue.

In an interview tonight telecast by Pakistan Television Munir Ahmed Khan said that Pakistan's stand was based

on principles. He said Pakistan would be ready to accept IAEA [International Atomic Energy Authority] safeguards on plants supplied by foreign countries but not on locally produced installations unless India abides by these safeguards.

Acquiring of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was our right, he added.

To another question the PAEC Chairman said that France has regretted to supply the reprocessing plant for which Pakistan has claimed compensation of loss it suffered.

French President Mitterrand has agreed to pay the compensation which would be determined through mutual negotiations, he said adding that an agreement to this effect would be signed soon.

Differentiating the role of the reprocessing plant and the nuclear power plant, Munir Ahmed Khan said that the reprocessing plant purifies the fuel used in the nuclear power plant so that the remaining uranium could be utilised again. While the nuclear power plant simply produces electricity, he added.

Munir Ahmed Khan said the apprehensions of United States and India were completely baseless on the proposed French nuclear plant. He said Pakistan was acquiring it for only peaceful purposes. He said "we need electricity. We need it immediately and urgently."

The Chairman of PAEC said the proposed plant would be subject to international inspection and hence any apprehension otherwise were baseless.

While replying to a question whether Pakistan can rely on France after the previous experience regarding the unilateral abrogation of supply of a nuclear reprocessing plant, he said the situation now was different.

He said President Mitterrand has expressed full confidence that Pakistan's nuclear programme was peaceful and secondly that the reprocessing plant was sensitive one.

Replying to another question about the indigenisation of nuclear power plants he said in the process of establishment of the plant in Pakistan we will gain experience and eventually in due course of time Pakistan would be able to develop these type of plants.

Referring to the nuclear fuel for this plant Munir Ahmed said initially it would be provided by the French suppliers which would be sufficient for several years. Fabrication of nuclear fuel in Pakistan for this plant at this stage will not be feasible both economically and technically, he added.

He said our uranium enrichment facilities were still in the initial stage and enrichment costs were also very high. Moreover, he said we can not afford to run any risk for the safety of the plant.—APP [Associated Press of Pakistan]

Radar Station Construction Halted

90WC0045A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
31 Jan 90 p 1

Article by RATAU [Ukrainian News Agency] Correspondent Ya. Yadlovskiy: "[The Deputies] Carried Out the Will of the Voters"]

[Text] The Transcarpathian Oblast Council decided to halt construction of a radar station in Mukachev Rayon at its 26 January extraordinary session. The deputies appealed to the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviets to ratify their decision.

All oblast residents could participate in the session's work—there was a direct television transmission and telephone lines were in operation with the conference hall where representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, Ukrainian SSR AN [Academy of Sciences], USSR people's deputies, and leaders of informal associations were also present.

The people of the Transcarpathian Region—one of the most densely populated oblasts of the Ukraine—have become alarmed by construction of the radar station. Electromagnetic radiation and consumption of a large quantity of water during future operation of the site cause special concern, especially right now when there is already insufficient water in Mukachev and several neighboring villages.

The Transcarpathian Region is a resort area and people arrive here from every part of the nation to get well. Here alone are over 300 of the Ukraine's 500 mineral springs. Where is the guarantee that this water reservoir facility will not impact the condition of the "underground pharmacy" that is also fed by the high underground water table?

In accordance with the public's demand, the Transcarpathian Oblispolkom formed an extra-departmental commission last year whose conclusions were published in the local press. However, passions did not subside even after assurance of the facility's ecological cleanliness. All the more so since the commission was not able to provide answers to many questions since they are within the jurisdiction of the military department. The Mukachev Gorsovet proposed a temporary halt of construction on the radar station to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Mukachev Party Raykom Plenum and the Rayon Council Session advocated a total cessation of work.

In the opinion of the deputies, the requirement to convene an extraordinary session of the Oblast Council on this subject was dictated by the high degree of social tension attained whose primary cause became the atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the site that had reigned until recently. The lack of reliable information gave rise to rumors, conjecture, supposition, and afterward to a wave of rallies, meetings, and picketing whose participants demanded a halt to the facility's construction, its

reorientation to social needs, and transformation of the Transcarpathian Region into an ecologically closed zone and an all-union health resort. These same appeals were also heard at a rally near the building where the session took place. The content of hundreds of telegrams, letters, petitions, resolutions, and phone calls received by the session also had only one meaning. The deputies could not go against the will of the voters.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Interviews Italy's Admiral Porto

90WC0047A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Fleet Admiral Mario Porto, chief of the Italian General Staff, by Captain 1st Rank V. Kuzar: "We Are Open for Any Kind of Contact"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA regularly offers space on its pages to leading political figures and military leaders of Western countries. The goal is to provide our readers with the opportunity to have a better understanding about the military-political views and moods of our opponents. Today Fleet Admiral Mario Porto, chief of the Italian Armed Forces General Staff, answers the questions of Captain 1st Rank V. Kuzar.

[Kuzar] At the end of last year, M.S. Gorbachev made an official visit to your country. I was a witness to the cordial atmosphere with which the Italians met the Soviet leader. But how did the Italian Armed Forces regard the visit?

[Porto] The Italian Armed Forces are deeply integrated into the social context and national policy and completely share that satisfaction with which President Gorbachev's visit to Italy was perceived. It is linked with the positive influence that the visit may have on the two countries' relations, on appropriate military political alliances, and to strengthen international stability.

Furthermore, we perceived with satisfaction and exclusive interest the remarks in which M. Gorbachev—the direct initiator of the process of democratization in Eastern Europe and the initiator of the development of the new Soviet Military thinking that provided the properly inspirational political and military perspectives. The perspectives that are opening to Europe are not only trends toward detente and security but also close cooperation in the construction of a structure of prolonged peace.

The goal of European security—stability supported on the lowest possible levels of arms—was always the basis of the Italian Republic's military policy that is guided by the constitutional principle that strengthen the refusal of the use of force as a means for resolving international contradictions.

[Kuzar] During the visit, they talked about the need to accelerate the pace of talks on nuclear, chemical, and

conventional weapons within the framework of universal security. Can you set forth Italy's position on this issue?

[Porto] The goal of arms control talks is to avoid the possibility of a surprise attack and to reduce and, in the future, eliminate the risk of armed conflict between countries.

While preserving our allegiance to the constitutional principles mentioned above, we regard any initiative directed at the development and progress of talks on nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons positively and with enthusiasm.

As for chemical and biological weapons, Italy has officially stated that it does not have such weapons. Furthermore, in 1925 Italy signed the protocol that was ratified in 1928 that bans the use of chemical and bacteriological agents in combat operations. Italy has also adhered to the Convention that she ratified in 1975 which bans the improvement, production, and storage of biological and toxic weapons and advocates the destruction of existing stores.

Finally, as for conventional weapons. Italy assumes an active position at all rounds of talks until they lead to a positive result in the shortest time periods.

[Kuzar] In spite of the efforts made, regional conflicts and a high level of military confrontation are being maintained in the Mediterranean Sea. How do you regard the Soviet proposal to transform the Mediterranean Sea into a zone of peace and stability?

[Porto] With that same feeling of duty with which we are striving for stability and peace in Europe, we have always advocated reduction and elimination of the causes that underlie crisis situations and existing tensions in various areas of the Mediterranean Sea. Italy has played an active intermediary stabilizing role whose purpose was reduction of the level of tension and conflict resolution in this complicated environment and in various conflict situations that have appeared up to the present time. The Italian Armed Forces also participated in these missions that are important for peace.

Our country is deeply interested in the development of peaceful relations and cooperation among all the countries of this basin. At the present time, there is still not a total unity of views with regard to realistic and effective ways to transform the Mediterranean Sea into a region of reliable stability and peace. But it inspires us that there is a recognition of the need to attain this important goal.

[Kuzar] The times persistently dictate the need for basing military structures on defensive principles. This was also discussed during Soviet-Italian talks. What is being done in this sphere in the Italian Armed Forces?

[Porto] In accordance with constitutional provisions, the Armed Forces of the Italian Republic have always had a clearly expressed defensive structure. We will maintain it and strengthen it even in the future. We are convinced that precise presentation and the capability for thorough inspection of this characteristic of military capabilities is an important element of stability and mutual trust. Therefore, we have always participated in searches and later in implementing adequate measures for notifying and insuring the openness of operations and the accomplishment of inspections and verification. We are open for any contact and discussion on our modern military doctrine.

[Kuzar] The parties have announced the need to develop contacts between the Armed Forces of the USSR and Italy on a long term basis. What can we anticipate here in the near future?

[Porto] The Italian General Staff intends to develop serious and intensive ties between the militaries of both countries and is studying a number of specific proposals at the present time. We assume that the proposals could be thoroughly discussed during Soviet Minister of Defense General of the Army Yazov's possible visit to Italy.

Furthermore, I intend to invite the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR General of the Army Moiseyev to conduct an official visit with the Italian Armed Forces.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Experts Debate Merits of Naval Arms Control

90EN0335A Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German
Feb 90 pp 46-47

[Article by Volker Högbe: "For and Against Naval Arms Control—Experts Discuss the Question at the German Naval Institute"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction]

[Text] With the contention that "no arms control at all is better than bad arms control," Hans Ruehle justifies the reluctance of the West to enter into a naval arms control agreement at this time. In most cases, arms control leads to a balance of forces. As a naval alliance, however, NATO, as compared to the Warsaw Pact, is dependent on the superiority of its naval forces. At the invitation of the German Naval Institute, Ruehle—formerly chief of the planning staff in the Ministry of Defense in Bonn and currently responsible to NATO for coordinating Tornado activities as the NAMMA [NATO Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Development and Production Management Agency] director in Munich—recently crossed swords at the Parliamentary Society in Bonn with Egon Bahr, the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] disarmament expert and director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policies at the University of Hamburg.

The CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] arms control negotiations in Vienna, which are expected to be completed in the second half of this year, are concerned with parity in conventional ground and air forces in Europe. Naval forces are expressly excluded. The fact that a state of balance does not yet equate to stability was not an issue being debated by the two adversaries in Bonn. Guarded hopes are therefore linked to a second phase of CFE, which in Bahr's opinion must begin immediately upon completion of the first phase. On the other hand, the outcome of "Vienna 2" should not simply be a further reduction—by a margin of 25 percent, for example, as is currently being discussed. The outcome must be stability. Military stability without inclusion of the nuclear component—the subject of the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] negotiations in Geneva—and without consideration of naval forces is inconceivable, however. If for no other reason than to make it impossible for the Soviets to compensate for the reduction of ground forces and aircraft required by the completion of "Vienna 1" by beefing up their naval forces in the ocean-bordering seas, arms controls of naval forces, as well—at least in the Baltic Sea area—are necessary.

Securing the Atlantic Sea Lanes

The freedom of the oceans and the mobility of naval forces quickly lead all attempts to achieve naval regionalization into a dead-end street, however. The United States 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea can easily operate strategically in the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic, as well. Similarly mobile are the Soviet ships of the Pacific and North Sea Fleets—and it is not likely that they will become the subject of

Central European naval arms controls. For the industrial nations which depend on unrestricted utilization of the seas, and which are linked together in the Western Alliance, these ships could threaten their existence in case of a conflict. The timely military reinforcement of Western Europe with troops and equipment from the United States that would be necessary during a crisis—10 divisions within 10 days—stands or falls on the security of the Atlantic sea lanes. Since an attacker at sea always has the option of deciding when and where he will take the initiative, superior naval forces are necessary for the protection of transports carrying reinforcements as well as civilian and military supplies. A renunciation of naval superiority is out of the question because of the geographic asymmetry of the two alliances: on the one hand the Warsaw Pact—continentally self-contained with relatively short distances—and, on the other, NATO as a naval alliance with the Atlantic Ocean lying between the main naval power United States and her European partners.

Egon Bahr, as the proponent of naval arms control, feels that it is conceivable that negotiations with the Soviet Union will lead to an agreement which will take the geographic asymmetry and its necessary impact on the naval force relationship into consideration. What he has in mind is an "honest equalization"—"not with respect to km but with respect to the time that it takes me to span distances." With that, the Wartime Host Nation Support would take on a completely new significance: Heavy weapons of United States reinforcement units stored here to compensate for the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union behind the Urals, "for everything on this side of the Urals will be included." Bahr is convinced that "the Soviets cannot fail to see that we have a legitimate, fundamental interest in maintaining sea links with America ... under no circumstances would I agree to naval arms control in which there has to be a balance of forces."

For Hans Ruehle it is more than doubtful whether a naval arms control negotiating position in keeping with Western interests can even be sustained: "What I am afraid of is that, under the pressure of public opinion, and despite divergent initial positions which may be very reasonable, we will be forced in the end to give in bit by bit, since to all appearances the other side is making such fantastic proposals and we keep insisting on an imbalance." The desire for superiority in individual sectors is not necessarily incompatible with arms control, "but only in those cases where one is convinced of one's ability to negotiate and persevere in achieving imbalances." In recent years, however, public pressure in Western countries has had the effect "that, once arms control has gone public, all security-political and strategic considerations have been swept away, and in the end one settles for what appears to be the normal and the right thing to do, namely a situation of balance."

Arms Control for Naval Forces?

Regardless of this, Egon Bahr considers the implementation of naval arms controls as having already taken place anyway—the subject is at least no longer taboo. If

not in Vienna, naval forces will, without a doubt, be discussed in Geneva: "When strategic arms reductions are talked about, topics will simply not be limited just to land-based resources; they will include sea-based resources as well." According to Bahr, the subject does raise complicated questions of verification, to be sure, "but I cannot imagine that a START treaty can be approved without agreement on cruise missiles. I cannot conceive of an agreement which does not include sea-based strategic missiles—those carried by submarines, in other words. If this should be the case, however, one will most assuredly have to agree on control measures for these." In the CFE negotiations, as well, carrier aircraft of the United States 6th Fleet will have to be considered, since the Soviet Union has the potential to counter these. In similar fashion, the Tornado aircraft of the German Navy will probably also enter into the negotiations in Vienna. To be sure, through the preferential treatment accorded Western naval aircraft by virtue of the non-crediting of comparable quotas of Eastern systems, the freedom of movement of naval forces so tenaciously defended by NATO is not affected. The ships themselves are not affected anyway—for good reason, in Hans Ruehle's opinion: "The fewer United States troops are available in Europe, the greater the need for reinforcements." The security of these reinforcement transports across the Atlantic requires powerful, mobile naval forces: "This automatically rules out—the smaller the conventional military potentials in East and West become in Vienna—any limitation of naval mobility."

FINLAND

Finland Seeking Replacement Fighters for Air Force

Western, Soviet Fighters Considered

*LD0103102890 Helsinki Domestic Service
in Finnish 1900 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] The Defense Ministry has sent to three Western aircraft manufacturers requests for tenders for new fighter aircraft to be bought for the Air Force. Tenders have been

asked for the American F-16 fighter, the French Mirage, and the Swedish JAS 39 aircraft. An order from the Soviet Union is also considered possible, although no tender is now being asked for the MiG-29 fighter. The replacement of the Air Force's fighter aircraft is calculated to cost about 10,000 million Finnish marks.

Planes To Be Purchased From USSR

*LD0203234490 Helsinki Domestic Service
in Finnish 1400 GMT 2 Mar 90*

[Text] According to Major General Pertti Jokinen, commander in chief of the Air Force, one-third of the Air Force's interceptor fighter planes will be ordered from the Soviet Union. An open tender will be held on the remaining 40 between three Western countries. The requests for tender were handed yesterday to the embassies of the countries concerned in Finland. After a study lasting more than a year the requests for tender were made for the U.S. F-16 plane, the French Mirage 2000, and the Swedish Saab 39 Gripen interceptor fighter aircraft. The request for tender at the first stage concerns 20 fighter aircraft and five training planes for the Satakunta wing. The Soviet aircraft, which are considered almost certain purchases, will be studied during the spring.

Commander in chief of the Air Force, Major General Pertti Jokinen:

[Begin Jokinen recording] The Air Force has proposed that we should continue this present system under which we have two squadrons from the West and one from the East. As we have in the Karelian wing a maintenance system ready, based on Soviet equipment, it will be easy and simple to bring into it an Eastern flying unit even in the next generation.

[Reporter] In other words, it seems that it is almost certain at the present time that the Air Force will have 20 MiG-29 aircraft at the turn of the millennium?

[Jokinen] Or, let us say that there will be some kind of Soviet aircraft. It has not been finally decided yet what they will offer us. [end recording]