

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

KAIROS AND COURAGE

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL PETER D. MENK
SSC Fellow
United States Army**

19980512 033

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.**

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

USAWC CLASS OF 1998



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

KAIROS AND COURAGE
USING AN ETHICAL METHOD TO RESOLVE
THE ARMY RIFT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Menk

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military services or government agency.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public
release. Distribution is
unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Peter D. Menk, Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate

TITLE: Kairos and Courage Using an Ethical Method to Resolve the Army Rift

FORMAT: USAWC Strategy Research Project

DATE: 25 Jan 1998 PAGES: 26 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard must be healed. In September 1997, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Army eliminate all residual barriers - structural and cultural - to effective integration within the Total Force Army. Army staffing has not only failed to identify the means to resolve the rift, it has further aggravated it.

The author uses an ethical method to analyze the rift and to suggest means by which it can be healed. The rift is distinct from the historic tensions inherent in the system of checks and balances between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. Accusations of individual dishonesty and cultural bias are symptoms not the causes of the rift. The cause of the rift is a failure of integrity.

Using the ethical method, the author suggests that an opportune moment, *kairos*, is at hand that will permit courageous leaders to implement certain specific decision-making processes and structural changes necessary to create a truly integrated Army partnership.

Kairos and Courage

Using an Ethical Method to Resolve

The Army Rift

Peter D. Menk

"Here we are not afraid to follow the truth wherever it may lead, nor tolerate any error so long as reason is left to combat it." Thomas Jefferson ¹

The rift in the Army is distinct from the historic tension between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. The good seed of the historic tension between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard was constitutionally planted by the Founding Fathers when they premised our system of government on checks and balances. The bad seed of the rift in the Army is a failure of integrity.²

An effective standing Regular Army, while a necessity for national security in time of war, is seen as a potential threat to democracy in peacetime.³ The National Guard was

Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Menk, ARNG, is an USAWC Senior Service School Fellow at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He holds a BA (political science) from the University of Miami, Florida, a JD from the University of Virginia School of Law, and is a candidate for an MA (International Relations) from Salve Regina University. He is graduate of the Air University, Air War College (ACP), the USAWC Defense Strategy Course, C&GSC, and Judge Advocate Basic and Advanced Courses. He served as an enlisted artillery soldier in the Regular Army (1968-70), as a "traditional" Guard member in the VaARNG (1980-92), as a Title 10 AGR, ARNG Advisor at The Judge Advocate General's School, Army (1992-97) and as Executive, Domestic Operational Law, Center for Law and Military Operations, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army (1995-97).

created to be a check and balance to the perceived threat of the standing Regular Army, to continue the domestic support of the state militia systems,⁴ and to be a strategic reserve for times of national emergency at minimal expense. The political support for maintaining a large standing Army in peacetime is dependent on the check and balance provided by continued support for a strong National Guard.⁵

It must be recognized that a starting point for any realistic discussion about the present rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard is that inherent tension is necessary for an effective system of checks and balances. When the system works as it should, the Regular Army and the Army National Guard should be perpetually locked in a healthy competitive interchange of roles and responsibilities. Danger arises from those who would disrupt the balance by moving too far toward either extreme: i.e., towards assimilation,⁶ or in an effort to promote partnership and prevent assimilation, permitting the tensions to degenerate into self-destructive conduct.

The past decade brought the end of the Cold War, the downsizing of military forces, and the contradictory first significant mobilizations of Army National Guard units since the Korean War. Significant numbers of Army National Guard soldiers are now routinely and successfully deployed outside of the continental United States. Ironically, instead of

lessening the tensions, success appears to have aggravated the rift.

The senior leaders of the Regular Army and the Army National Guard have since August 1970⁷ advocated integration, but the actual practice has been the reverse; contentious competition over what integration really means developed.⁸ The contentiousness progressively worked its way down through the ranks to where it now permeates all levels of command. The contradictions between leadership statements and the failure to create and enforce rules necessary for implementation of the changes proved cancerous to integrity within the Army. Soldiers must clearly understand the meaning of the term integration. Soldiers must clearly understand the rules for implementing integration. And, soldiers also must "know what the rules are about following the rules".⁹

During 1997, the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard finally exploded into public crisis. The level of animosity escalated from private to open accusations of dishonesty and cultural bias among senior leaders.¹⁰ In September 1997, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen issued a directive in an effort to end the rancorous dispute. "Today, I ask each of you to create an environment that eliminates all residual barriers - structural and cultural - for effective integration within our Total

Force." 11

Senior leaders from both the Regular Army and the National Guard Bureau expressed their willingness to do their part to end the dispute. There are no reasons to doubt the sincerity and the personal integrity of the senior leaders now involved, yet each has been stymied. In order to understand why, it is appropriate to examine the means by which each has attempted to do their part to end the dispute. The senior leaders directed their subordinates to identify and implement multiple substantive steps to "eliminate" structural and cultural barriers to integration. What each of these subordinate leaders did, in fact, was to turn to their staff support to identify appropriate substantive steps. The respective staffs undertook to "obey" by using the time proven method for military decision-making, "staffing". Staffing an issue leads to identifying the problem and coming up with one to three options for resolution. The staff analyzes the options and recommends a course of action in the staff brief to the senior leader. Unfortunately, staffing has not only failed to identify the means to resolve the rift, but is an aggravating factor. Staffing is a captive process defined within the existing structure and fully incorporates the culture of the Regular Army or Army National Guard. Not surprisingly, the Regular Army and the Army National Guard respective staffing

processes each came up with recommendations utterly unacceptable to the other reflecting their contradictory definitions of the term integration. One staff recommendation from the Regular Army was to solve the problem by total assimilation, the elimination of the Army National Guard.¹² The staffing process in the National Guard Bureau focused on the equal partnership interpretation and provided a more complex recommendation, but one that was unacceptable to the Regular Army.

The National Guard Bureau staff developed a proposal to give the Army and Air National Guard components representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff through elevating to four star General status, the Chief, National Guard Bureau.¹³ The National Guard Bureau argued that it should have decisive impute into decisions affecting Army National Guard operations and force structure. However, the force structure of the Army National Guard is mandated by the structural requirements of the federal mission as determined by the Regular Army at its decision-making tables. The National Guard Bureau long ago sought to mandate the right to participate in the decision-making processes.¹⁴ Now the National Guard Bureau's solution was to gain for itself the rank and positions for it to have seats at these decision-making tables.

On the other hand, the Regular Army considers the Army

National Guard units as mobilization assets to be integrated into the Regular Army, when mobilized under the same standards as any of its Regular Army subordinate units. As such, the Regular Army leadership feels it is totally inappropriate to have anyone from the National Guard Bureau, that is not a command and not a mobilization asset, sitting at the decision-making tables.

Some in the Regular Army express their point of view on the National Guard's efforts to participate in more blunt terms; one commented, "the Guard has not earned the right to be here."¹⁵ The emotional element to the debate cannot be dismissed. The increasingly contentious relationship has seriously deteriorated communications. Many people on both sides are angry. Each proposed solution is therefore viewed as a "win or lose" proposition to be contested based not on its merits but on its source.

Any substantive progress that the September directive may have made to de-escalate the rift was lost in the maneuverings before Congress that derailed the NGB four star on the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal. The only lasting ascertainable effect of the directive was to eliminate, for military personnel subject to discipline, the option of directly using the public forum for accusations of dishonesty against the leadership of the other component. The level of animosity is now at a fever pitch festering

just below the public's view.

In part, because of the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard over the Quadrennial Defense Review, Congress impaneled its own review committee, the National Defense Panel. In December 1997, the National Defense Panel Report was released and contained a bombshell:

"While the other services have continued to increase the integration of their active and reserve forces, the Army has suffered from destructive disunity among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National Guard. This rift serves neither the Army nor the country well. The Panel strongly believes the rift must be healed."¹⁶

If the Army does not promptly resolve the rift, the National Defense Panel members may urge Congress to act. There are no facts to support the proposition that Congress will succeed where the Army itself, has to date, failed. On the contrary, the reality of hard ball politics may result in a win/lose contest in which all three components of the Army could be on the losing side. The other services do not have the "rift" baggage and are clearly maneuvering to expand funding to support their own capabilities at Army expense.

This does not have to be the result. The National Defense Panel Report may have presented the Army with a unique opportune moment, *kairos*¹⁷, to initiate its own reforms.¹⁸ The threat of Congressional actions now has everyone's attention. To effect the change there must also

be courageous leadership with the vision to lead change using a method of decision-making that works. There are courageous leaders with vision in the Army. What is needed to heal the rift is method.

It is suggested that there is a method through which the rift can be resolved in time and by the Army itself. In recent years, philosophical, psychological, and sociological studies of leadership and management in business and elsewhere have constructed models for methods of acting with integrity. In order to move outside their own perceptions of protecting their "turf", and their perceived traditional roles, perhaps the Regular Army and the Army National Guard leaders should consider such a model. One such model, the model for ethical method, is analyzed here.

How does one act with integrity? Each of us would readily agree with one another that we all need to act with integrity, but it is unlikely that each of us is defining integrity the same way. The model of ethical method requires precise definition of what it means to act with integrity. Acting with integrity is a three step process: (1) *discerning* what is right and what is wrong; (2) *acting* on what you have discerned *even at personal cost*; and (3) *saying openly* that you are acting on your understanding of right and wrong.¹⁹ The first step, to ascertain what is right from what is wrong, requires using a model for ethical

method. The second and third steps require the opportune moment for leaders with courage to act.

A method for ethical reflection is a necessity for anyone concerned with how ethical choices shape and reflect human character. The model for ethical method can be visualized as a spoked wheel with a hub in the center. On the hub are four sets of reality-revealing questions: (1) What; (2) Why, How, Who, When, Where; (3) Foreseeable Effects, and; (4) Viable Alternatives. The wheel model has nine spokes, each spoke reflecting an evaluational resource through which ethical consciousness can unfold: (1) Creative Imagination; (2) Reason and Analysis; (3) Principles; (4) Affectivity; (5) Individual Experience; (6) Group Experience; (7) Authority; (8) Comedy; and (9) Tragedy. (Not all nine evaluational resources apply to every circumstance.)²⁰

Using a model for systematic fact gathering and evaluation helps avoid the human tendency to drift into the flawed pattern of "consequentialism". In this view actions are right or wrong exclusively according to their intended consequences.²¹ Consequentialism occurs when each person has his/her own immediate opinion of the correctness of consequences of any act and considers anyone who disagrees as lacking integrity, or being corrupt, or stupid, or all three. Consequences are of vital importance, but must be

evaluated in a systematic process, not as the sole issue. Much of the most contentious fighting in the Army rift is the result of consequentialism thinking. Consequentialism is the source of much unethical mischief.

The model for ethical method starts with recognizing a life philosophy. The life philosophy in the model should utilize two generalized commonly accepted rules of conduct. First, that you should treat others as you would have them treat you. The second, to value persons and their milieu. These two general rules of conduct are accepted by practically everyone: by all the world's major religions, by military leaders, by idealists, and by the leading realist political theorists. These two generalized rules of conduct form the basis of international law. Fact gathering and evaluation following a model for ethical method utilizing these two general rules of conduct is a most valid way to address difficult issues in the real world.

Certain conduct by organizations or individuals alerts a person of integrity to use the model for ethical method. Conduct includes failure to do what could reasonably be done under the circumstances. The alert comes through experiencing a sense of profanation. A sense of profanation is a disturbing sense of violation and insult that is experienced in the face of certain words or actions that offend. It is reflected in the "What is wrong within Army"

or "That's outrageous!" statements now often appearing in the media.

Decisions based on a sense of profanation alone lack prudence. Good intentions triggered by a sense of profanation can lead to bad results. United States military operations in Somalia were triggered by a CNN induced sense of profanation. Failure of the overall operations in Somalia is directly traceable to the decision-makers' failure to use prudence and to gather systematically all the facts and to evaluate them properly.

To avoid such inappropriate results, those struggling with difficult decisions (on how to end the rift) in the Army might proceed with the following model for ethical method.

PHASE ONE - REALITY-REVEALING QUESTIONS.

This is difficult. What is true and what may be false perceptions are all mixed together in a series of conflicting accounts. The best path is to take the reality-revealing questions one at a time in order.

WHAT is it that we are talking about? We are talking about the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. Money, downsizing, honesty issues, and misunderstandings are symptoms, not the causes of the rift. The causes of the rift can be defined through a pattern of

discrepancies that an integral organization would not permit to continue between:

a. What each of the Army components (RA, Guard, USAR) believes it should be and do and what it actually should be and do.

b. Mismatch between what each of the Army components believes it can do and what it actually does.

c. Differences between what the Army commits itself to do and what others (Navy, Marines, USAF, Coast Guard) have done.

WHY and HOW are the ends and means questions. The life philosophy norms mandate treating others as we would have them treat us. Both the Regular Army and the Army National Guard profess that such integrity is essential. Integral behavior applies equally to both the means and ends, the how and why.

At present there is no agreement on the how or means. Senior leaders do not agree on the definition of Total Force. They must discern whether integration means assimilation or partnership. There is no implementation plan to overcome the cultural hostilities that permeate the two components. There are numerous anecdotal stories of wrong means used by individuals in one component or the other in the rift within the Army.²² Even if only a few such stories are accurate, there should be serious concern in the ranks of the senior military and action by the senior civilian leadership in the Department of Defense. Using unethical means has corrupting effects on the entire system. Unethical

behavior is like a cancer that once it spreads systematically kills the host.

The American military is responsible to a democratic society. The public and the soldier's perception that something is terribly wrong within the Army cannot be ignored. Perception often has the same effect as reality.

WHEN? *Kairos*, the opportune time to act, is now.²³ The rift has the attention of all levels within the Army.

WHERE? The center of gravity of the decision-making process in the Army is the "seat at the table".²⁴ Prerequisite to gaining a true partnership seat at the table are matters of both position and rank. The Army National Guard has long perceived that it has no effective seat at any meaningful integrated decision-making table. The Army National Guard is fully aware of the seats the Air National Guard occupies within the Air Force.²⁵ There is a sharp contrast between how the Regular Army and the Army National Guard contemptuously fight with one another and how the Air Force and the Air Guard cooperate in an integrated partnership based system.²⁶

Recent efforts to elevate the rank structure in the National Guard Bureau to General with a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff table were vigorously contested and defeated. The alternative adopted may do nothing to end the rift, and may even aggravate it further. The alternative

is the creation of a National Guard Major General Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard matters. One widespread perception is that the Major General Advisor will have a similar experience to that of lower ranking Guard Advisors. Advisors without rank or position must rely on personality and receptivity.²⁷ Experience shows that Army National Guard Advisors spend considerable time attempting to overcome obstacles to gain access to information and to the real decision making process. Advisors have to spend considerable effort avoiding being used to legitimize decisions that they really had no say in making. Experience is that advisors can play a valuable liaison role, but are not the means to gain full participation in decision-making processes.

WHO? Guard efforts to penetrate the Regular Army's center of gravity have been through a Federal agency, the National Guard Bureau. National Guard Bureau was created on February 12, 1908. Its mission is to serve as "the channel of communications between the departments concerned and the several states"²⁸ The National Guard Bureau is not in command of the Army National Guard, but "formulates and administer programs to ensure development and maintenance of Army and Air National Guard units".²⁹ Yet, in dealing with the Regular Army the National Guard Bureau has, by default, been compelled to make command like decisions.³⁰ Over the years

National Guard Bureau has developed its own culture which is in competition and conflict with Regular Army culture, and sometimes is a source of tension with the "traditional" fifty-four National Guard state commands. Some traditional National Guard members have accused the National Guard Bureau of being too conscious of protecting its own "turf". The system is structured so that National Guard Bureau is too frequently placed in a "no win" situation.

System analysis suggests that the National Guard structures mismatch with the structures of the active Army. The fifty-four Area Commands under Adjutant Generals have no comparable active Army structure. The structure of the Guard combat forces tops out at the Division level that is well below the "player" level in the Army policy decision-making game. This lack of commonality in organizational structure makes it very difficult for the Regular Army and the Army National Guard to effectively communicate. All the structures need not match, but at least one major structure must in order to ensure communication. When no structures match between agencies, the people working in those agencies do not recognize the "standing" of the others to participate and frequently don't even speak the same language.³¹

Another factor contributing to the structural differences is that the Regular Army reorganized under the Goldwater Nichols Act. In the Regular Army the formulation

and administration agencies are distinct and apart from the war fighting Unified Commands. The National Guard structure has not been substantially reorganized since 1908. This mismatch between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard structures compounds the cultural animosities.

FORESEEABLE EFFECTS. The rift between the Regular Army and the Guard is self-destructive. The rift adversely affects the ability of the Army to conduct its missions.

The Regular Army is becoming disconnected from the civilian world, its ultimate customers. The rift would not be tolerated in any civilian corporation.

Morale, retention, and recruitment will increasingly be adversely affected. Congressional support will lessen, making it more difficult to balance resources. As the Army's ability to perform missions becomes more suspect the other services will take over more and more of the historic Army missions.

VIABLE ALTERNATIVES? To do nothing in a crisis is not a viable alternative. Doing nothing constitutes a failure of leadership.

One alternative suggested is for the Army to "muddle through". The Army keeps its present structures and continues efforts to implement integration through calling for the Regular Army and Guard (and Army Reserve) to "try harder" to join ranks with one another. Emphasis is placed

on implementing programs that make Regular Army commanders directly responsible for training Army National Guard soldiers. This proposal reflects the assimilation interpretation of Total Force. This puts the best face on the rift by emphasizing that the Army is already effectively addressing the issues. Discussing the issues contributing to the rift is to be considered as "not helpful".

Another viable alternative is to immediately restructure at least part of the National Guard by creating a National Guard Homeland Defense Command. This is not a new concept.³² This is the partnership interpretation of Total Force. The restructuring would be initiated in anticipation of a broader reorganization as suggested by the National Defense Panel.³³

PHASE TWO - EVALUATIONAL PROCESS.

CREATIVE IMAGINATION. Creative imagination is necessary to break out of the restrictions of the current state of things and see other possibilities. That is to move beyond what *is* and consider what *can* and *should* be. There are six factors in creative imagination: enthusiasm, receptivity, work, malleability, kairos (right moment), and at-home-ness (absence of alienation).

The Army has yet to escape the management disaster self-inflicted by inappropriate use of zero defect

management techniques that permeate the Army staffing process. Zero defect management is reactive and is intolerant of failure or mistakes. Imaginative ideas inherently contain a risk of failure. The staffing process within the Army is perhaps appropriate for zero casualty decision-making in Bosnia. But, the Army staffing process has proven itself incapable of healing the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard.³⁴

Another approach has to be used. Robert W. Galvin, Chairman, Executive Committee, Motorola, used an innovative method³⁵ to break the hold of zero defect thinking by the senior executives of Motorola. He called a series of meetings of all the senior executives to discuss future operations of Motorola. Admission to the meetings was to hand Galvin, who stood at the door, a list of one hundred ideas. The executives were instructed that feasibility was not to be considered. The executives were "ordered" to do the list themselves. Galvin personally collected each list; no list and Galvin refused to admit the executive. Galvin took the time to carefully review each list. The pattern was that the first set of ideas was less than imaginative. As the list continued the ideas grew pretty wild, but around the seventy plus mark most of the executives started to be constructively creative. Several executives enthusiastically pushed their newly found solutions to specific problems. The

meetings were used to discuss and refine several of the ideas. As a direct result, Motorola is enjoying great success globally using ideas that had their genesis in those meetings.

Robert Galvin's approach offers another alternative. If the premise of this paper is accurate, that the rift may prove catastrophic for the Army, using such a process by the most senior leadership to encourage creative thinking does not seem inappropriate. The two generalized alternatives examined in this paper should be just the beginning of the creative thinking process.

AFFECTIVITY. Affectivity is grounded in the foundational ethical experience of the value of persons as persons. Affectivity is useful to balance the appeal of expert knowledge. Affectivity aids in giving due weight to expert knowledge but helps lessen the sense of infallibility of the expert. It is art/science. The dilemmas confronting the soldiers caused by the rift cannot be ignored or explained away by experts who simply dismiss the factual validity of the soldier's perceptions. The growing disconnect between the Army and civil society cannot be explained away by convoluted explanations.

REASON AND ANALYSIS. Reason is working intelligence that faces the objections to one's position. Reason faces the facts. President John Adams once said, "Facts are

stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence."³⁶ The facts are particularly stubborn things in the rift in the Army. Whatever may be the wishes of those that desire otherwise, the fact of the rift cannot be altered. The facts must be hunted down, gathered, and evaluated. This is a difficult task and one that cannot be done without offense to someone. Assuming for argument sake that the two alternatives are the only two, where does reason take us in deciding which one to follow? Does the Army muddle through as it has been since 1970 or does the Army immediately implement a major command, the Homeland Defense Command? The answer requires work.

There is no substitute for homework and preparation. It requires realistic common sense analysis of the issues and proposed viable alternatives. One must be reasonable. Being reasonable means being open to reality and ideas, balance and thoroughness. Reviewing a little history might help one be reasonable in the present crisis.

The Japanese surprise attack on December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor should not have caught the United States by surprise. After action reviews disclosed that there were ample intelligence warnings closely predicting the actual attack. The Admiral in command at Pearl Harbor was later relieved because of his failure to be prepared. Recently the

family of the Admiral questioned the fairness of how the Admiral's military career ended. "He did not know" they argued. The intelligence was scattered piecemeal in numerous agencies. The Army did not tell the Navy what they knew. What are seldom mentioned by those engaged in that debate are that many people died unnecessarily. Regardless of whose fault it might be, the United States suffered serious damage. One fact is indisputable: many leaders knew that intelligence was fragmented and uncoordinated. They did nothing to fix the structural deficiencies. The system failed to create in a timely manner the appropriate structures to address the threat.

Keeping Pearl Harbor in mind, consider the following: We know, possess actual knowledge of, certain facts. A number of terrorist states and organizations view the United States as their enemy. Some of these people have weapons of mass destruction (WMD), certainly chemical and biological and some perhaps nuclear. Electronic terrorism is a growing threat. There are increasing threats of attack against the citizens and infrastructure of the United States. The threat is real and some attacks have already happened. One terrorist group came very close to knocking down one of the World Trade skyscrapers in New York City with a truck bomb.

Within the United States, there are groups and individuals who think the furtherance of their beliefs

justifies terrorism. On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City was blown apart by a fertilizer based truck bomb killing 168 people.

As bad as these bombings are, terrorists now know how even more "successful" at causing terror was a poison gas attack in a Tokyo subway station.

In addition, large urban areas within the United States are subject to natural disasters and the public has come to expect prompt military response. Domestic response is a hodgepodge of multiple agencies. FEMA provides some coordination. But the military at present is only organized to be reactive in response.

Every after action report of every multi-component Army response to civil unrest, natural disaster, and terrorist attacks, contain evidence of repeated failures of cooperation and coordination. The rift within the Army is reflected in the way the Army responds to threats to the homeland.³⁷

It is a fact that there is no unified coordinated military structure in the United States to respond to these threats. The National Defense Panel Report recommends creating a new geographic Unified Command, America Command, having a subordinate Homeland Defense Command.³⁸ A very real question is whether it prudent to tarry longer in correcting such an obvious "oversight". Should leaders consider

immediately going beyond studying the National Defense Panel Report recommendation?

AUTHORITY. Authority is quite different from leadership. Authority is the "conferred power to perform a service". Leadership is the process through which leaders use authority to "create meaning".³⁹ Authority is given to managers because of their position as managers. Managers have limits of what they can do. Management has failed to end the rift in the Army.

There are four essential elements of leadership: "(1) a relationship based on influence, (2) leaders and followers develop that relationship, (3) they intend real changes, and (4) they have mutual purposes."⁴⁰ Regular Army senior leadership acting alone contrary to these four elements of leadership cannot hope to lead the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard must be included at appropriate decision-making tables such as the Homeland Defense Command. Once this is done then a truly Total Force senior leadership can effectively lead rather than manage. To do this requires clearly understood decisions. General (retired) John R. Galvin recently wrote, "The decision has to come from the top and be unambiguous. This has not happened. Then, the follow-up has to hammer this home".⁴¹

PRINCIPLES. Ethical principles all stem from equality. People should be treated fairly and equally "The American

people rightly look to their military leaders not only to be skilled in the technical aspects of the profession of arms, but to be men of integrity".⁴² Individual values are essential for building trust that must exist for a military service to operate at its peak efficiency. "The four individual values that all soldiers (leaders and led) are expected to possess are courage, candor, competence, and commitment".⁴³

The principle of "giving back" to those who serve, taking care of the soldiers, should be the guiding principle for leaders at all levels within the Army. It is their job to take care of the soldiers. The one thing that soldiers expect of a leader, more than anything else, is that the leader knows his/her job. The job of military leader requires the leader to know, as does the soldier, the difference between right and wrong. Leaders fail who do not treat all soldiers regardless of component with candor, competence, and commitment. The rift in the Army could not exist if all military leaders gave back to all the soldiers what those soldiers desire and deserve from all their leaders.

INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EXPERIENCE. There is a working rule "if anything has been held by a large number of persons for a long period, it most likely is not completely valueless."⁴⁴ Checks and balance within the Army between the

Regular Army and the Army National Guard has value. The rift does not, is self-destructive, and must be ended. If blame for the rift is to be assessed, let it not be assessed after a domestic terrorist Pearl Harbor.

COMEDY AND TRAGEDY. It is indeed an ironic incongruity that some in the Regular Army and the Army National Guard each seem determined to continue the rift even at the risk self-destruction.

CONCLUSION. Using the model for ethical method provides a guide for terminating the Army rift. Continuing the "muddling through" to assimilation alternative is plainly wrong. What is right is to act on what has been discerned to be right. Integrity requires saying openly that you are acting on your understanding of right and wrong. In this use of the model for ethical method the right answer is to implement a true partnership by immediately creating a four star National Guard Commander in Chief, U.S. Armed Forces Homeland Defense. Such a position and organization would address the threats and substantially remove the "discrepancies" listed under the WHAT criteria of the reality-revealing questions:

a. The National Guard would have a seat at the Regional Commanders' table (a most important decision making table) and in keeping with the Guard's historic combat missions and joint structure with the Air National Guard.

b. The National Guard would have an organizational structure and a rank structure that coincides with the active Army organizational structure and rank structure.

c. The mission of Homeland Defense requires a national command structure. The Homeland Defense Command should be a joint command. The National Guard is already a joint command comprised of Air National Guard and Army National Guard resources. Other Army components and Services should be integrated into the Homeland Defense Command.⁴⁵

d. The National Guard has a successful track record with multi-state commanders (most ARNG Divisions are multi-state). The National Guard has already made significant progress coordinating domestic assistance through interstate compacts.⁴⁶

e. This can be done promptly and should receive strong civilian support. It has a strong probability of success and is reasonably proportional to the problems it addresses.

The difficulties in healing the rift between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard may be solved by using a model of ethical method as described above. To do this requires courage and kairos. It requires leaders who as Thomas Jefferson said are "not afraid to follow the truth wherever it may lead, nor tolerate any error so long as reason is left to combat it."⁴⁷

¹ Letter to Mr. Roscoe 1820, inscribed on the Portico at the University of Virginia

² The word "integrity" means something different to each person that uses it. Here the focus is on responsibility for the healing of the rift. Sun Tzu said "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if the orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders are clear and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers." Sun Tzu, James Clavell, Editor, *The Art of War*, Delacorte Press, New York, 1983, p.4. Army means all three components of the Army, the Regular Army ("active" no longer seems applicable now that the reserves are "active"), the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

³ See George Washington, *Washington's "Sentiments On A Peace Establishment"* (From *Washington's Barrack Book*), 1783, "Alto' a large standing Army in time of Peace hath ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a Country, yet a few Troops, under certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably necessary" (p. 376).

⁴ The Regular Army defines Total Army readiness by "first to fight" external threats to the United States. The National Guard's additional mission of "first to serve" the civilian population in times of natural disaster, civil unrest, and now terrorist threat from inside as well as abroad is not perceived to be by the Regular Army leadership an equivalent "readiness" issue. See John G. Roos, "View From the Top, Army

Chief of Staff Assesses Strained Relationship Between The Service's Active Component and National Guard", *Armed Forces Journal* (October, 1997, p.24.

⁵ Ibid., George Washington, *Washington's "Sentiments On a Peace Establishment"* (*Washington's "Barracks Book"*), 1783. "Before I close my remarks on the establishment of our National Militia, which is to be the future guardian of those rights & that independence,..." (p.391).

⁶ Assimilation includes the Army National Guard being consolidated into the United States Army Reserve, the United States Army Reserve being consolidated into the Army National Guard.

⁷ In August 1970, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed consideration of a policy of Total Force. Since Total Force has sometimes been referred to by various terms such as "seamless", "America's Army", "integration".

⁸ The Regular Army and the National Guard have distinctly differing views as to what is meant by cooperation and integration. The Regular Army focuses on the absorption of the reserve as an integral, but subordinate element in its plans to meet external threats. The Army National Guard focuses on an equal partnership with the National Guard having the lead on domestic threats.

⁹ Stephen L. Carter, *Integrity*, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1996, p.13.

¹⁰ See comments by John Roos, Editor, *Armed Forces Journal*, November 1997, p.6, "More than a year ago (October 1996), AFJI first reported on the latest rift between the Army's active-duty leaders and those who look after the interests of the Army National Guard. We've covered this estrangement in every issue since then."

¹¹ Memorandum dated September 4, 1997, Secretary of Defense

¹² This proposal is a repeat of a proposal made by General McNair during World War II, see Robert F. Ensslin, "The Army's Civil War, The National Guard Cries Out For an Army Leader With the Vision to Recognize a National Treasure," *Armed forces Journal* (September 1997), p.67.

¹³ Proposal submitted by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Chairman Senate Appropriations Committee, to 1998 Defense Authorization Bill

¹⁴ 10 U.S.C. Section 3033 (a). provides that "Each policy or regulation affecting the following subjects shall be prepared by a committee of officers of the appropriate division or divisions within the Army General Staff and an equal number of officers of the Army National Guard of the United States: (1) The organization or distribution of the Army National Guard of the United States; (2) The organization, distribution, or training of the Army National Guard." Prepared has not been interpreted to mean decided.

¹⁵ This phrase has often been repeated. The author was greeted with this statement his first day as ARNG Advisor at The Judge Advocate General's School by the then Commandant.

¹⁶ Report of the National Defense Panel December 1997, "Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century", p.54.

¹⁷ kairos means the opportune time as in the right moment, the right time to do something.

¹⁸ In an interview with BG Harvey M. Haakenson, Deputy Adjutant General, North Dakota National Guard, observed, "that with the continued downsizing the real financial crisis may still be forthcoming. The opportune time may not yet have arrived, and unfortunately we may need to reach the survival level before everyone's attention is genuinely given."

¹⁹ Ibid., Stephen L. Carter, *Integrity*, p. 7.

²⁰ Daniel C. Maguire and A. Nicholas Fagnoli, *On Moral Grounds, The Art/Science of Ethics*, The Crossroads Publishing Company, New York, 1996,

p.41.

²¹ Ibid., p.65.

²² The anecdotal stories are multitudinous. The continued questioning of the motives for post mobilization training for the three National Guard Round Out Brigades of three active Army divisions during the Gulf War are illustrative. See, Major General (ARNG-Ret.) Robert F. Ensslin, "The Army's Civil War, The National Guard Cries Out For an Army Leader With the Vision to Recognize a National Treasure," *Armed Forces Journal* (September 1997), p.67.

²³ Dr. Mark Foley, Chief, Personnel Actions Office, Guard & Reserve Affairs, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army, stated, "If this is truly *kairos*, not a logical evolution - a *chronos*, then the steps should be bold - seize the moment, which may not return for decades."

²⁴ Ibid., Haakenson, "There is a difference between being invited to sit at the table and being a participant."

²⁵ Interview with Major General Keith D. Bjerke, Adjutant General North Dakota National Guard, discussed the First Air Force, that has an Air National Guard Commander illustrative of the integrated culture in the Air Force.

²⁶ In an interview with Major General (retired) Keith E. Nelson, former The Judge Advocate General, Air Force, he stated the Air Force developed an integrated partnership through a model for shared learning and because "each component is dependent on missions performed by the other components within the Air Force."

²⁷ In an interview with Major General Robert E. Schulte, ARNG, Deputy commanding General, Fifth Army, he stated that the effectiveness of such an advisor would be "dependent on knowledge, personality, and whether he can be there when the right meetings were going on."

²⁸ United States Code Title 10 Section 3015.

²⁹ See, Ronald S. Hunter, Gary L. Smith, and Debra M. Gordan, Editors, *National Guard Almanac*, Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., Falls Church, VA, 1996, p.99.

³⁰ Major General Robert E. Schulte in the interview stated, "The National Guard needs to resolve National Guard command and control."

³¹ Compare the Army structure with the Air Force. The First Air Force is lead by an Air National Guard Commander and has the same structure as other major commands within the Air Force.

³² Ibid., George Washington, *Washington's "Sentiments On a Peace Establishment"*, see "I come next in the order I have prescribed myself, to treat of the Arrangements necessary for placing the Militia of the Continent on a respectable footing for the defence of the Empire and in speaking of this Bulwark of our Liberties and independence..." p. 387.

³³ Report of the National Defense Panel December 1997, "Transforming Defense National Security in the 21st Century", p.73.

³⁴ Interview with Major General (ND State Active Duty for Red River Flood Relief) Murray G. Sagsveen, and formerly ARNG Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate General, Army (1993-96). General Sagsveen stated, "Unfortunately, the process now used tends to attribute problems to personality disputes requiring neither examination of the causes nor substantive steps to find solutions. It is one step forward two step back process."

³⁵ Osborn, Alex, *Your Creative Power*, Motorola University Press, Schaumburg, Illinois, 1991. Robert W. Galvin, Chairman, Executive Committee, Motorola, personally abridged the original Osborn book "as a service to my associates".

³⁶ John Adams in defense of British soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials of December 1770.

³⁷ see Peter D. Menk, Editor, *Domestic Operational Law Handbook*, (Center for Law and Military Operations, Office of The Judge Advocate General, US Army, unpublished) 1997, and in particular AARs Los Angles Riots and Hurricane Andrew.

³⁸ Ibid., *National Defense Panel Report*, p.72.

³⁹ Wilfred H. Draft and Charles J. Palus, *Making Common Sense, Leadership as Meaning-making in a Community of Practice*, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro NC, 1994, p.6.

⁴⁰ Joseph C. Rost, *Leadership For The Twenty-First Century*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1993, p.127.

⁴¹ Used in this paper by permission of GEN (retired) John R. Galvin, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University.

⁴² General Joseph Lawton Collins as quoted in FM 22-100, *Military Leadership* (Washington GPO, July 1990), p.22.

⁴³ FM 22-100, *Military Leadership* (Washington GPO, July 1990), p.23.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Maguire, *On Moral Grounds The Art/Science of Ethics*, p. 126.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Major General Bjerke, stated that redundancies may exist among the several major commands now located within the continental United States, Southern Command, First Army, Fifth Army, and NORAD.

"Consolidation is a necessity. Such consolidation could be done through a joint Homeland Defense Command that could stretch from Point Barrow, Alaska to the Panama Canal."

⁴⁶ The Homeland Defense Command will enhance time is of the essence coordination via interstate compacts by providing "one stop" resources. This proposal totally preserves the authority of our State Governors and reaffirms the protections afforded by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. s1385).

⁴⁷ Ibid., Thomas Jefferson.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carter, Stephen L., Integrity, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1996.

Cohen, William S., "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components", Office of The Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. September 11, 1997, by Press Release No. 472-97.

Draft, Wilfred H., and Palus, Charles J., Making Common Sense, Leadership as Meaning-Making in a Community of Practice, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro NC, 1994.

Ensslin, Robert F., "The Army's Civil War, The National Guard Cries Out For an Army Leader With the Vision to Recognize a National Treasure", Armed Forces Journal International (September 1997).

FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington GPO, July 1990).

Hunter, Ronald S., Smith, Gary L., and Gordan, Debra M., Editors, National Guard Almanac, Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., Falls Church, VA, 1996.

Maguire, Daniel C. and Fagnoli, A. Nicholas, On Moral Grounds, The Art/Science of Ethics, The Crossroads Publishing Company, New York, 1996.

Menk, Peter D., Editor, Domestic Operational Law Handbook, Center for Law & Military Operations, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army, unpublished, 1997.

Osborn, Alex, Your Creative Power, Motorola University Press, Schaumburg, IL, 1991.

Roos, John G., "View From the Top, Army Chief of Staff Assesses Strained Relationship Between The Service's Active Component and National Guard", Armed Forces Journal International (October, 1997).

Rost, Joseph C., Leadership For The Twenty-First Century, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1993.

Tzu, Sun, and Clavell, James, Editor, The Art of War, Delacorte Press, NY, 1983.

Washington, George, Washington's "Sentiments On a Peace Establishment" (From Washington's Barrack Book), 1983.

Sources

The author interviewed and discussed the subject matter of this article with the following individuals and is most appreciative that each has agreed to the notes and quotes attributed to each of them respectively:

Major General Keith D. Bjerke, The Adjutant General of North Dakota.

Dr. Mark Foley, Personnel Manager, Guard & Reserve Affairs, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Army.

General (retired) John R. Galvin, now Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Brigadier General Harvey M. Haakenson, Deputy Adjutant General North Dakota National Guard.

Major General (retired) Keith E. Nelson, former The Judge Advocate General, Air Force.

Major General Murray G. Sagsveen, (North Dakota State for Red River Flood Relief Operations), and formerly ARNG Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate General, Army.

Major General Robert E. Schulte, Deputy Commanding General, Fifth Army.