


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NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

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RESULTS OF KARAMI'S ASSASSINATION ASSESSED

Beirut AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Jun 87 pp 14-15

[Text] The political community pauses in the face of the developments of the last 4 weeks to record increased political hysteria and growing alienation between the various forces in the wake of Premier Rashid Karami's assassination. If the political community truly anticipated such developments, based on the government's lack of desire to resolve the situation in the eastern sector and its continued submission to the Lebanese Forces' blackmail, this same community is pausing before three fundamental indicators highlighted by these developments that may have long-term significance and effects on the course of the Lebanese crisis. So, what are these fundamental indicators?

The Political Response

First, the successful attempts to set up an anti-government political front in Lebanon, even though the final framework had not been finalized. Perhaps the most significant fact, underscored by these developments, is that the opposition did not fall into the trap of instant reactions and random escalation in retaliation for Premier Karami's assassination. Instead it moved from the very first moment to put things in order with a view toward shifting emphasis to the establishment of a cohesive political front, while continuing to continue investigations into the assassination in order to uncover the culprits and their accomplices.

Government sources say that the establishment of a political front was no easy task in view of the cloudy political climate that prevailed at the time, the state of divisiveness among the allies that emerged as a result of last February's clashes, and the lack of trust among the national forces (between the Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party, especially between Amal and the Communist Party). Likewise, internal divisions among leaders of certain national forces and the absence of coordination in the field among forces working in overlapping positions, as well as the emergence of fundamentalist pressure on conditions in the suburbs and the south and the fragmentation of Islamic forces in Beirut, led to a state of fragmentation and disunity which is difficult to mend or use as a launching pad toward the establishment of a political front having the same objectives, the same modus operandi and a phased plan to confront the government and the Lebanese Forces.

These government sources say that Syrian officials worked with the various forces to compel them to put aside their differences, focusing from the outset on establishing a non-sectarian national front capable of undertaking political initiatives, a front which on the one hand has the kind of credibility necessary to deal with the assassination plot, and, on the other hand, can oppose attempts by the partitionists to establish a sectarian reality which would lead in effect to the disintegration of Lebanon.

These sources believe that the conciliation of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Amal Movement through meetings between Ministers Walid Junblatt and Nabih Birri has pushed forward efforts to crystallize national front objectives. Moreover, national forces' meetings in Damascus and President Hafiz al-Asad's meeting with national and Islamic leaders placed on these forces the responsibility of pursuing efforts to establish the front, which is in need of a national political program to draw up a plan of action for both the short and long term. These government forces have been able to ascertain that contacts between President Sulayman Franjiyah and moderate Christian forces underscore the success of efforts to establish the front, even though these contacts are still trying to crystallize the political program, commitment to which may be enough in the first stage before calling on the committed forces to unite their efforts into one front.

The sources believe that one of the most important decisions adopted was not to apply pressure to induce the birth of a national front, but instead to remove the obstacles so that the forces can go back to their original national affiliations after dropping the pretexts and sensitivities that have accrued throughout the past months, mixing personal factors with local and regional ones.

Powerless or Accomplice?

Second, President Amin al-Jumayyil's disposition to show flexibility in responding to national forces pressures in the Karami assassination case. Sources close to the presidential palace say that al-Jumayyil has mobilized military and judicial agencies, in addition to the state intelligence ones, to find the culprits. However, all these investigations have failed to identify anybody or to uncover any party associated with the bombing, even though they have revealed flagrant negligence in the Adma landing strip where military helicopters are serviced. These sources say that President al-Jumayyil's recourse to offering a huge financial reward is an admission of the government's failure to find the culprits and its attempts to continue the investigations using various methods that might lead to them. The sources admit that these methods do not mean much with regard to the course of the actual investigation, but they believe that the inclination of the Military Council to punish Adma military personnel for their negligence may be the only sphere in which President al-Jumayyil can achieve results since the penalty for negligence can never be as serious as actually committing the crime.

Sources close to the presidential palace say that President Amin al-Jumayyil has been put on the defensive because, with the death of Premier Karami, he, along with other leaders like him, has lost a strong arm to counter the

partitionists. These sources, however, admit that the president's way of dealing with the situation within the military establishment and in the eastern regions portrays him as being in collusion with the forces that planned the Karami assassination, or as one who stands to gain from this crime. These sources admit that al-Jumayyil fell into a trap his advisors set for him when they intimated to him that the assassination was the first step toward bringing an end to his rule, and that any confrontational move to stir up the military establishment and to effect changes in the army command would hasten this end and transform his rule into another one of the Lebanese Forces--and the weakest one in the eastern sector at that. These same sources admit that al-Jumayyil succumbed to the advice of his aides that he wait and let time pass in order to preserve the army's unity on the one hand and to study the nature of the developments on the other hand. They also admit that the appointment of an acting premier following an agreement with the expanded Islamic meeting consecrated the policy of waiting. However, al-Jumayyil was not apprised of all the developments, including the mounting pressure to proceed with the investigations, on the one hand, and the Lebanese Forces' desire to set up a partition government to replace the current one, on the other hand.

These sources concluded that President Amin al-Jumayyil chose to play it safe amidst the Karami assassination case and the pressures the Lebanese Forces are applying on him. This has led to a gradual loss of flexibility, hence the state of dilemma and impasse surrounding the president's movements.

The Battle of Partition

Third, the Lebanese Forces' return to the logic of political escalation, coupled with military threats and pressure toward the establishment of a partition government which Samir Ja'ja' refers to as a government of independence and liberation in an effort to transcend the Karami assassination and open the battle of partition by imposing a fait accompli on government and opposition alike.

Independent Maronite leaders say that the Lebanese Forces are the primary beneficiaries of the Karami assassination, and that they should have followed a different course if they wanted to insulate themselves from the actual charge of assassination. Now that they have adopted this escalatory stance, they are trying to block any possibility of arriving at an understanding over a future political formula with the other Lebanese forces. These leaders say that the Lebanese Forces committed a fatal mistake when they gloated over the assassination and tried to add insult to injury by suggesting that the assassination be brushed aside, thus rebuffing any possibility of a dialogue with them. These leaders add that such pressure can mean one of two things: a shortsightedness in placing the presidential election at the top of the priority list; or total collusion in the assassination through the adoption of partitionist steps that led to a fait accompli which these forces can utilize in the future to give everyone the option of either accepting this fait accompli or letting the forces impose their will on everyone.

In considering the logic Samir Ja'ja' employed in dealing with the assassination, these independent Maronite leaders emphasize that the forces'

pressure to brush aside the assassination is collusion itself, because it bolsters attempts to put a stop to all attempts to unify the country. !! These leaders say that this kind of logic will attempt in the future to assert the principle of "liberation" in the framework of isolating the eastern sector; the strategy is therefore to gradually violate the sanctity of the marriage contract until divorce is inevitable, blaming this situation, of course, on the national opposition. These leaders fear that this trend will be coupled with military escalation to consolidate the partition lines and compel the army to assume the position of defending the Christian regions, thus losing its official role that sets it apart from the forces, and its legitimacy as the army of Lebanon, turning into a Christian army for little Lebanon.

These are the developments that occurred in the weeks following the assassination of Premier Karami, which coincided with developments in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy in the south, in addition to domestic developments which some parties and forces tried to use to exploit certain manifestations of disintegration to intensify political hysteria, such as abductions and suspicious political movements. But do these indicators mean that the situation is headed toward military escalation or limited military flareup? Will this summer be a hot one, as some diplomats expect, or will these developments stop short of a military flareup, which some are still at a loss to determine?.

Government sources expect that communications aimed at creating a national front will proceed on their current track, and President Amin al-Jumayyil will keep the investigation of the assassination alive in his own special way through posturing. The same sources believe that the partitionist forces collaborating with Israel will try through internal political pressure and military pressure in the south during the next stage to change the facts and set up a new status that transcends the Karami assassination. These government sources believe that the timing of the military escalation must coincide with the partitionists' interest in taking advantage of this escalation. They believe that the national forces do not want this kind of escalation, because it will only lead to the intensification of the Lebanese army's alliance with the Lebanese Forces in playing the role of the victim in the eastern sector. These government circles believe that the surprises in the Lebanese crisis are not over yet and that the door of dramatic developments is still wide open, but they cannot perceive any desire to cause the military or security situation to erupt because those betting on the year 1988 do not want to throw their cards away now.

Diplomatic circles say that should President Amin al-Jumayyil sense that the deadlock is affecting him negatively, he may try to break it by taking a dramatic step toward the opposition and Damascus. However, these sources fear that al-Jumayyil might feel that his old ambition of putting a system in place during his regime has slipped away, and that the only thing he can do now is to manage the situation till the end of his term, regardless of the circumstances and consequences. Quoting people around the president, these diplomatic sources say that the hot summer ended with the month of June, and what follows will be a gradual breakdown of the state forces and the political forces' destinies. They add that the return of speaker Husayn al-

Husayni has brought back hope for a compelling parliamentary movement, but they still harbor fear that the role of parliament may be over as well because it demonstrated, in the wake of the Karami assassination, that it is a unification power in the country at a time when the partitionist forces want to assassinate anyone working for the unity of Lebanon.

With developments and indicators pointing to increased aggravation, a possibility brought up by military sources right after the Karami assassination stands out: namely, why not begin liberating the eastern sector using all available means? This possibility highlights a political leader's reply to these sources in the Islamic meeting, when he said that the battle of liberation was not yet over and that a day may come when the logic of no winner and no loser will be dropped altogether and the banner of saving the country will be raised by breaking the will of the partitionists and the agents of Israel. This day may not be far away.

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BRIEFS

FISHERY TALKS WITH PDRY--An Omani fisheries delegation is in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to discuss advances in both countries in fisheries and bilateral co-operation. Abdullah bin Ali Bakhatir, Director-General of Fisheries, heads the delegation which includes Mōhammed bin Amir al Barwani, Director of the Marine Science and Fisheries Centre, and Rashid bin Amir al-Barwani, Director of Statistics in the Fisheries Directorate-General. An exchange of statistical information about fisheries resources will form part of the co-operation being sought. [Text] [Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 13 Aug 87 p 2] /9317

SOAF DELEGATION TO PAKISTAN--Air Commodore Talib bin Miran al Raisi, the Deputy Commander of the Sultan of Oman's Air Force and Director of Operations left on Sunday for Pakistan on an official visit. He is heading the Omani delegation, whose visit follows an invitation from the Pakistan Air Force Commander. The Omani delegation will hold talks with their Pakistani counterparts and exchange ideas in the interest of the two friendly countries. They will also visit a number of Pakistani air bases. Air Commodore Raisi was seen off at the airport by the Pakistani Ambassador to the Sultanate, Mohammed Anwar Khan, and a number of officials at the SOAF. [Text] [Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 13 Aug 87 p 4] /9317

CSO: 4400/273

AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT DISCUSSES RECENT BILATERAL DEVELOPMENTS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 14 Aug 87 pp 32-33

Interview with Al-Amin 'Abd-al-Latif, Sudan's ambassador to Egypt, by A. 'A.:
"The Emergency Will Not Infringe on Freedom of Individuals or the Press!"

[Text] The Sudan has once again resumed occupying the center of Arab activities following the demonstrations which made their general appearance throughout the Sudanese capital, the widespread arrests of certain students and the participation of numerous groups in the recent events, in addition to the presence of some problems obstructing the course of Egyptian-Sudanese relations, which Dr Usamah al-Baz did not deny during his stopover in Khartoum airport on the route of his return from the African summit held recently in Addis Ababa -- although he defined them as small problems occurring in a single home.

AL-HAWADITH met Al-Amin 'Abd-al-Latif, the Sudan's ambassador to the Egyptian capital, and held this conversation with him.

[Question] The recent events in the Sudan, the demonstrations and the declaration of the emergency law both, have provoked worries among many Egyptians on the survival of the experiment of democracy in the Sudan. What is the truth of what has happened?

[Answer] I would like first of all to correct one piece of information; the emergency law has not been declared, because it basically has existed since the April 1985 uprising. However, the government has not proceeded to put it into effect, and up to now (the holding of this interview) the government has not dealt with this law, because, in accordance with the transitional constitution, it must be presented to the constituent assembly for approval, lest the government find itself in a constitutional predicament. It was in fact presented to the constituent assembly on 27 July, and the subject is still open to discussion. In addition, the government, through this law, has not been able to prevent demonstrations or marches, but in the context of the regulations there must be prior permission. As to the movements of individuals and freedom of the press, they have not been infringed at all. The measure is just related to state security, because irresponsible talk made its appearance recently on the Sudanese army in a number of Sudanese papers and it was

necessary to stop this chaos. Democracy is a responsibility and a duty, above chaos. The Sudanese ambassador added:

"There is no doubt that problems and economic straits exist, but the government is sparing no effort in dealing with them, like any developing country, and chaos or violence will not solve such problems, because it will paralyze government action. It appears that some domestic elements have found an opportunity at hand to achieve some of their objectives, as well as some people who are afraid of the Sudan's unique experiment in democracy, and it gladdens them that such an experiment should suffer a setback."

[Question] Has recourse been made specifically to controlling the dimensions of what is happening? Who is responsible for this sabotage which is taking place in the Sudan?

[Answer] There is much evidence that gives proof of the participation of elements from the previous regime and Numayri's partisans, because of the presence of slogans written on walls demanding his return, in addition to elements from the Socialist Union who benefitted and will benefit from the return of Numayri's regime.

[Question] Are they such an influential force on the Sudanese streets that they can play an important role in getting events moving on such a broad scale?

[Answer] They account for no weight on the Sudanese streets. They just exploit the economic conditions of the people who are responsible for the deterioration they are suffering from.

[Question] Can we understand from this that all opposition parties are innocent of playing a role in the events in the Sudan?

[Answer] It is difficult to state categorically that the legitimate Sudanese opposition has an interest in destroying democracy, because it also will be affected by what is going on. The opposition might be seeking power, but I do not believe that it is playing a role in the destruction of democracy.

[Question] Is there a connection between what you call activating the emergency law and what has recently been circulating on the existence of a coup attempt?

[Answer] There is no connection. Some elements that are trying to demolish democracy are the ones that hint at such a coup and talk about it. In my opinion, the Sudanese parties as well as the armed forces signed the charter to protect democracy, and the army leaders are not so naive or ambitious as to carry out any movement to deal democracy a death blow. The men on the street in the Sudan will not allow that of them, and there is a difficulty in solving the massive problems which have been the consequence of Numayri's rule.

[Question] Don't you believe that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's failure to take part in the African summit deprived the Sudan of an enormous opportunity to carry out a dialogue with Ethiopia on the problem of the southern Sudan?

[Answer] Let us say that a transitory meeting on the sidelines of the African summit conference will not solve the issue of the south. In spite of that, we tried this approach at the last conference. None of the attempts which have been made with Ethiopia have achieved results. The meeting between Mengistu and al-Mahdi was accompanied by unwarranted optimism and in addition the foreign minister headed the Sudan's delegation. If events have recently come up that would call for the attendance of al-Mahdi or the chairman of the council of the Sudanese head of state, he would have requested that. It appears, and this is my personal interpretation, that the failure to participate was a silent protest against this contradictory position which makes Ethiopia a country that hosts the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity and at the same time is striving to break up a member country of the organization and does not respond to any of the efforts exerted in the direction of good neighborliness.

[Question] What about what has been circulated about al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's meeting with personnel from Garang's group in London?

[Answer] I do not know and I do not have information about that. I believe that it is incorrect and that this news is just supposition.

[Question] It is certain that the question which poses itself now is, what is there between Ethiopia and the Sudan?

[Answer] For the Sudan's part, we hold Ethiopia in complete regard and are striving and are continuing to strive for distinctive good neighborly relations, especially in light of the presence of common borders. We do not yet know what Ethiopia wants so that we might learn the true nature of its problem with us. Some individual interpretations hold that Ethiopia wants to barter Eritrea for the problem of the southern Sudan. We will be prepared to help Ethiopia in this area, only when we know what Ethiopia is offering to solve the problem. We acknowledge that we have a problem in the southern Sudan, and we have presented our conceptions of a solution and have declared our readiness for a dialogue inside or outside the Sudan. Has Ethiopia shown such readiness?

[Question] But there are people who stress that the Sudan recently went to excess in giving aid to Eritrea, so that it could be a card for applying pressure in any dialogue with Ethiopia.

[Answer] That is not true. Since the uprising, the Sudan has categorically committed itself to the policy of good neighborliness, stopped the beamed radio service which had been broadcast in the direction of Ethiopia during Numayri's era, proscribed some aid which international bodies had sent to Eritrea if Ethiopia did not agree to that, and requested the activation of the ministerial committee on the borders which is responsible for all border problems and is seeking to solve them. When Ethiopia did not respond, al-Mahdi requested the signing of the charter of security and peace in the Horn of Africa, but the question that has been raised remains: What does Ethiopia want? In whose interest is it?

[Question] Dr Butrus Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs, in an earlier conversation expressed Egypt's readiness to mediate between the Sudan and Ethiopia. What about the Sudan's view? Is Egypt qualified for such mediation?

[Answer] Egypt, as a fraternal country, is concerned with the Sudan's security and its relations with other countries in the Nile Valley basin, and the Sudan says that Egypt can play such a role. But the question still exists: What does Ethiopia want from us? If it does not open up its mind, mediation, which could be an alternative to the failure of direct negotiations, will not be of use. This is what Ethiopia has rejected. How can one get to such mediation?

[Question] It appears that the commotion that has been stirred up on the joint defense agreement with Egypt is still in being. Has the Sudan cancelled it, as the statements of some officials assert, or does it remain, as some other Sudanese statements indicate? Where is the truth to this uproar?

[Answer] The question which must present itself is, are Egypt and the Sudan in need of a joint defense agreement? We cannot talk about an eternal relationship then talk about the "cliches" of this relationship. In my view, the Sudan's security is part of Egypt's security, regardless of any agreements. The Sudan's participation in the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973 with the Egyptian army was not because a joint defense agreement existed. Therefore I believe that the talk about the mutual defense agreement is a means for some groups to "fish in muddy waters." Egypt and the Sudan do not need a mutual defense agreement, and the charter of brotherhood includes everything. A committee has been formed which has included security and defense, self-sufficiency in food, transport and communications, culture and education, and I hope that this year Egyptian-Sudanese relations will be placed in their proper context in a way which will satisfy the aspirations of the two peoples.

[Question] Although a meeting was announced between the Egyptian Sudanese committees in July to prepare for the Egyptian prime minister's visit before October, nothing has happened yet.

[Answer] An agreement has been made on the formation of committees in the two countries which will be asked to study and discuss the whole past experience, in its negative and positive features, so that we can rule out the negative features, with the positive ones to be incorporated in the charter. Agreement has also been reached to have each country evaluate the resources which it will offer to enhance relations between the two countries in all areas. After that, a joint committee will meet in the Sudan and Egypt to produce an action program which will be presented to the meeting of the prime ministers of the two countries, which will be binding and easy to carry out, so that there will be a stock-taking and review of the reasons for failure and success at the joint committee meeting which is to be held every 6 months. I have suggested that the special committees in each country should finish in the middle of August and that the joint committees should finish in the first week of September, so that there will be room enough before the meeting of the prime ministers in the two countries.

[Question] Does this mean that relations between the two countries are being suspended until the work of these committees is finished? What about what took place earlier?

[Answer] One of the two countries' problems is that everyone wants quick results. In spite of that, there is much that was carried out earlier. An economic commercial protocol was concluded which raised the volume of trade between the two countries from \$100 million to \$200 million, and an industrial and media protocol was signed in the area of manpower and transport and communications. There is joint agricultural activity in the al-Damazin area, and there have been uninterrupted delegations. I can say honestly that the relationship between the two countries is proper and is proceeding for the first time in its proper course, since, in spite of all the slogans which were raised in past years which made it impossible for us to meet in the critical circumstances the relationship between the two countries was going through, slogans cannot be an alternative to good, effective action.

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RESISTANCE LEADER INTERVIEWED ON PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic 20 Aug 87 pp 34-35

[Interview with Resistance Leader Shafaqyar: "AL-MUJTAMA' in the Field of Battle with the Afghan Commander Shafaqyar"]

[Excerpts] Awhile ago, the magazine's correspondent met with our brother Shafaqyar, one of the prominent holy war commanders in the province of Parvan, and had the following press interview with him:

Our brother Abduljalil Shafaqyar is a young man in the Islamic movement in Afghanistan. He was a student at the Faculty of Science at Kabul University. When the Communist revolution occurred, he abandoned studies and began armed holy war. He is now commander of the Company of Balal Bin Rabah--may God be content with him--on the Victory Front in the Ghurband and Sorkh and Barsa' Districts in Parvan Province, and he belongs to the Islamic Party.

[Question] How are problems and conflicts that exist among people in general in the liberated areas resolved? Are Islamic penalties applied?

[Answer] It is very natural that legal and penal conflicts should arise among people, but they are not numerous. All cases and conflicts are resolved in accordance with the provisions of lofty Islamic law. The Mujahidin try to reduce and eliminate disputes and conflicts among people through publicity and the call to religion and by persuading people to live on the basis of Islamic values and to adhere to the principle of forgiveness and tolerance, especially in these difficult circumstances Afghanistan is going through. In cases where it is not possible to resolve conflicts through an appeal to religion and attempt at reconciliation, we hand the cases over to the Islamic court of the Mujahidin, whose judges are religious scholars, and the court's verdicts are applied by the security committee. As far as the Islamic penalties go, so far the punishment for adultery, "stoning," has been applied in eight cases and the penalty of killing and blood retribution in five.

[Question] We would like you to give us information on the quality of the Mujahidin's administrative organizations in the liberated areas.

[Answer] The command of the front is primarily responsible for military and administrative affairs in the region. There are seven-party committees at the

front to facilitate the administration of matters, and these are the military committee, the financial committee, the judiciary committee, the cultural committee, the intelligence committee, the planning and organization committee and the health committee. Each of these committees administers and organizes matters in its area of competence. There is a security department at the front which performs the function of the police, and every young person reaching 18 years of age serves for a period of a month in this department.

[Question] We have heard that there are some schools at your front. Would you be so generous as to give a glimpse of these schools and their activities?

[Answer] From the premise that holy war in Afghanistan began on the basis of our fighting people's Islamic awareness and not as a reaction, it is therefore very necessary for us to educate young people and children and furnish them with genuine Islamic culture. Proceeding from this premise, we established the schools in the areas belonging to the Mujahidin. These schools, in spite of the scarcity of resources and means, continue to carry out their mission. The most important achievements of the schools here include teaching children to read and write, because after the liberation of the region and eradication of the government schools we faced the problem of illiteracy among children. It is worth mentioning that we use mosques as a site for the schools.

[Question] Have the propaganda the Russians and the puppet regime have made on the national reconciliation and the appeal to the Mujahidin to take part in the government had an effect on the holy war and the Mujahidin?

[Answer] The declaration of national reconciliation has had no effect on the holy war in the Russians' favor. The Mujahidin knew that this propaganda was just a political ruse to strike at the holy war. Therefore they rejected it unanimously.

The declaration of the reconciliation and the cease fire are clear proof of the Communist defeat in Afghanistan, because we have seen the submission of the Russians and the puppet regime before the troops of Islam. The Russian media, having called the Mujahidin evil persons and thieves, started to call the Mujahidin "angry brothers" after the declaration of the so-called reconciliation and ask the Mujahidin to participate in the government. This is an official Russian recognition of the Mujahidin and an admission by the enemy of the legitimacy of the cause of the Afghan holy war. There is no doubt that the declaration of the so-called reconciliation and the call for a cease fire led to the strengthening of the Mujahidin's morale and an increase in their assurance of final victory, which is the establishment of the nation of Islam in Afghanistan.

[Question] It is said that the Russians and the Americans have agreed on a political solution to the issue of Afghanistan and the formation of a government in Kabul under the leadership of the overthrown king Zaher Shah or another figure like him. What will be your position in the event this agreement is carried out?

[Answer] The talk about agreement between the Russians and the Americans on a political resolution to the Afghanistan issue is not a new thing. Worldwide

apostasy is in agreement on striking at the Islamic holy war in Afghanistan by every possible means, but we consider that the Russian and American conspiracies against the holy war under the cloak of a political solution cannot be achieved, God willing. Self-determination is a pure right of our fighting people, we will be content only with Islam and a genuine Islamic government, and no material power on the face of the earth will be able to compel our fighting people to non-Islamic solutions. Holy war will continue, with God's permission, until the total liberation of our country and the establishment of the nation of Islam in it. The people who have refused to accept infamy in their religion will not accept Zaher Shah and his likes, and these agents have no influence on the stage of the holy war. Zaher Shah is wanted by the Mujahidin for trial for his many crimes against our Afghan people.

'1887

CSO: 4604/32

'BLITZ' EDITOR STANDS BY REPORT ON CIA PLOT

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 31 Jul 87 p 9

[Text]

BOMBAY, July 30: The weekly "Blitz" today stood by its report that the CIA was involved in a plot to oust the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi.

Reacting to the denials of the U.S. administration that charges against the late CIA chief, Mr William Casey, were "baseless and unfounded", Mr R. K. Karanjia, editor-in-chief, of "Blitz", today affirmed "unequivocally the authenticity of its August 1 front page story and the accompanying letter from Mr Casey to the president of Heritage Foundation, Mr Edwin Feulner".

The denials consisted of "a tissue of lies", Mr Karanjia said.

He pointed out that only in November last charges against Mr Casey with regard to the Iran-Contra scandal were similarly dismissed. "Today, the testimony of his fellow conspirators has placed him at the centre of that scandal. We have no doubt that the document we have reproduced is only one of the many that will emerge in due course from any investigation of Mr Casey's covert activities.

"We recall our earlier story, subsequently confirmed within the U.S., on the report prepared by Prof. Robert Hardgrave for the U.S. state department on India in the event of Mrs Gandhi's death", Mr Karanjia adds.

He also drew attention to the government of India's white paper on the Punjab agitation of July 10, 1984, which stated that Dr Chauhan of the Khalistan movement had maintained contacts with organisations such as the Heritage Foundation. "This makes a mockery of denials on the role of the Heritage Foundation vis-a-vis India," he concluded.

/9317

CSO: 4600/1896

WRITER SCORES HANDLING OF PRC BORDER ISSUE

Madras THE HINDU in English 22 Jul 87 p 7

[Text]

NEW DELHI July 21

There seems to be a gap between the top-level professional defence thinking and the Government of India with regard to the handling of the situation on the Sino-Indian border. The Government is now applying pressure on the army to consider a withdrawal from its forward defensive positions on the border to facilitate the re-starting of border talks with China. The Chinese have been upset by the Indian defensive build-up in the Tawang sector and have alleged that Indian forward positions lie on their side of the Line of Actual Control which, according to them, defines the border. The Indian position is that the positions are within its interpretation of the McMahon Line. According to well-informed sources, in addition to the visit by the External Affairs Minister Mr. N. D. Tiwari to Beijing, the Prime Minister sent a personal emissary to the Chinese capital in a bid to defuse the situation and to tell the Chinese that it was time that the border talks were raised to a political level.

Casual approach: The whole development brings out once again the casual and inadequately thought out handling of sensitive affairs by the Rajiv Gandhi Government. First, an enormous hue and cry was raised over the Chinese occupation of Sumdorong Chu valley. Then, various references were made to the 'Sino-Pak-U.S.' axis. Following the Sumdorong Chu episode, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs authorised the Indian army to take up forward positions to prevent any Chinese adventurism in this sector. Moving with speed, the army took up positions on the Hathung La ridge which comes down from the Bhutanese border to the north-south flowing Namgyang Chu, and subsequently on a ridge on the east bank of the river overlooking Sumdorong Chu. The Chinese viewed this as an unacceptable incursion and have since made this an issue.

The main point is that the Indian army movements have had the full sanction of the political authorities and now, sensing a Chinese hard line, they are seeking a way out. It is obviously going to resent a problem since the action of

first authorising and then reversing a military course is going to have its impact on the morale of troops. For this the political authorities must be held accountable for not having thought the policy fully through before ordering the army to take up its present positions.

Too far back: The Indian army's current positions are based on the Indian interpretation of the McMahon Line in the sector as well as the fact that its basic mission is, according to a Cabinet decision taken by Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1981, the defence of Tawang which was captured by the Chinese within three days of the beginning of the border war in 1962. According to the army, the only alternative position would be 25 km south of the border from where no viable defence of Tawang could be possible.

In this light, the army has informed the political authorities that in the event of any unilateral pullback, the defence of Tawang to the traditional 'last man and last round' could not be guaranteed and the defence line would have to shift to Bomdi La. The decision to defend Tawang in the full military sense taken by Indira Gandhi in 1981 followed the recommendations of a high-power, though now defunct, China Study Group comprising high Government and intelligence officials. Following this plan, the Intelligence Bureau established the temporary post at the Sumdorong Chu valley in 1984 and 1985. In 1986, the Chinese reached there before them and have since occupied the valley.

Currently, the Indian army has taken up a strong defensive position which stretches from the Hatung La ridge to Tulung La in the Kameng sub-division of Arunachal Pradesh. Confronting the Indian positions, the Chinese are in strength on the Thag La ridge and across the Sumdorong Chu.

Most 'live' sector: There is little doubt that the sector is the most 'live' in the current unresolved problem on the ground between India and China. The Chinese have repeatedly warned against the adverse consequences of the Indian deployment on the Chinese side of the Line

of Actual Control. On the other hand, India has maintained that the territory up to the Thag La ridge falls on its side of the McMahon Line. The problem stems from the fact that India recognises the McMahon Line as the border whereas the Chinese do not recognise it and maintain that the border is defined only by a Line of Actual Control which broadly approximates the McMahon Line. The incursions and counter-incursions in question are really of the order of a couple of kilometres and not more. However, while China (according to Government of India sources) has not furnished the detailed coordinates of the Line of Actual Control to India, it insists that Indian forces have crossed it.

The Chinese intrusion in the Wangdung sector touched a raw nerve in India and the result was a crash effort to ensure that it was defensible. Moving with remarkable speed considering the Indian decision-making set-up, a viable defensive posture was created within six months. This obviously made a real impact on the Chinese who had for their own reasons drawn down their forces on the border. Subsequently, two group armies were rushed to Tibet and today 14 Chinese divisions face roughly seven Indian divisions across the entire Sino-Indian border.

Not an easy option: Given the need to restart serious talks on the border issue, some Government of India officials, notably in the Prime Minister's Secretariat and the Ministry of External Affairs, have tried to push for a pull-back from the border. Unfortunately, this is not considered an easy option in the military sense. Situated on the Tibet plateau, Chinese forces are everywhere one to three hours away from their motorable highways from the border. The situation on the Indian side is much worse and more

complex. In areas of Arunachal Pradesh, especially Subansiri and Siang sub-divisions, not even mule-tracks are available 125 km up to the border. The Indian positions all across the border including the Tawang area are maintained by air. Road-heads are days if not weeks away. Therefore, accepting a call for a pull-back to fixed distances behind the border is not an easy on-the-ground option to exercise since it will not appear to be equitable.

However, it is important to break the log-jam and restart the border talks. One view is that the Chinese insistence that there has been an Indian incursion in the Tawang sector can be responded to partially by a mutual pull-back to the main defence lines by Indian and Chinese troops at two positions in Lungrong La and one at Sulu La in the Wangdung sector where they face each other in an 'eyeball to eyeball' situation. Positions separating the Indian and Chinese forces to the west of this, that is, the Hathung La ridge and Thag La ridge are divided by the Namka Chu and so no possibility of accidental confrontation can arise here. After this, talks on the vexed issue of where exactly the Line of Actual Control or the McMahon Line lies can begin with greater urgency than was shown earlier.

This would be an advisable course for the Chinese to take as well since any pressure on India to withdraw its forces in an area that is associated with national humiliation in 1962 could result in a hardened political stance and defeat the very purpose which the Chinese want apparently to serve--the resolution of the border issue. A perception in the political arena of governmental weakness on the border issue would only serve to delegitimise any settlement arrived at and give a fresh handle to chauvinistic forces.

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CSO: 4600/1890

CPI-M GENERAL SECRETARY WRITES ON INDO-PRC RELATIONS

Madras THE HINDU in English 23 Jul 87 p 8

[Text] In this article contributed at the invitation of THE HINDU, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, General Secretary of the CPI(M), puts his recent discussions with Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, in perspective and presents his understanding of how to go about resolving the Sino-Indian border question and improving bilateral relations--without repeating the mistakes of the past. He argues that there is no sensible alternative to "give and take," which means a trade off or balance of concessions in different sectors and makes "a plea for fresh thinking, a determination to see the talks through to a settlement."

LED a three-member delegation to China in 1983 for the normalisation of relations between the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Communist Party of China. We had long discussions with a delegation of the Chinese Party headed by General Secretary Comrade Hu Yao Bang as well as with Comrade Deng Xiaoping. The relation between the two parties which had remained cut for 16 years were reestablished.

Again this year, a two member delegation headed by me which had gone to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on invitation from the Workers' Party in that country had a stop-over in Beijing on our way back. Although we spent only three days in Beijing, we had discussions with a Central Committee delegation as well as with Comrade Deng.

On both occasions, the media in India and abroad showed keen interest in our visit. It was assumed that we had exchanged views with the Chinese leadership on how to settle the difficult problem of the border between India and China. Questions were therefore showered on me after coming back to India: what was the essence of our discussions with the Chinese, whether the problem is anywhere near solution and, if so, on what terms, etc.

I want to make it clear that, being the representatives of the same Communist movement in the two countries—all the more so,

parties which differed from each other on a number of issues—our exchange in Beijing on the two occasions (1983 and 1987) covered a large number of issues—bilateral as well as international. India-China relations were only one of these issues and was related to other issues.

We had been very close to each other till 1959-60. My first visit to China, in fact, was in 1956 as the leader of our party's fraternal delegation attending the Eighth Congress of the Chinese party. Our relations became strained since then, though they supported us for three years from 1964 till they were broken in 1967. We therefore had to exchange views on all these questions, the border between the two countries being only one of them. The Beijing discussions (in 1983 and 1987) therefore covered a much wider field than has been assumed by the media and other friends.

Furthermore, our party being in the Opposition in our country, we were not expected to—we did not—talk to the Chinese leaders as the spokesmen of our country. That job has to be discharged by the Government and its representative in Beijing. We have been trying, and shall continue to try, to convince the people and the Government of our country that the problem of the border between the two countries has to be resolved through mutual discussions and that, for such discussions to succeed, both sides have to adopt a give and take attitude; neither India nor China can afford the

luxury of trying to settle the differences through force of arms.

It was for taking this stand, in the worst days of India-China tension—the days of 1959-62 when the adventurist moves made by our Government ended in national humiliation—that we, the then "left" group in the undivided Communist Party of India, were denounced as "Chinese agents". Two years later when the CPI got split into two and we of the "left" formed ourselves into the Communist Party of India (Marxist), our political adversaries and the media called us "the pro-China Communists."

Almost every political party in the country (including the ruling Congress Party) has, since then, accepted at least in theory what we had advanced earlier. Nobody calls today for a war with China to enforce our claim on the border. It is therefore to be hoped that our detractors would no more call us "unpatriotic" and "Chinese agents."

It is full two decades since the Government of India started thinking of turning over a new leaf in India-China relations. Indira Gandhi's initial 11 years of Prime Ministership, the Janata Government that followed it, the second Indira Government and now the Rajiv Government—all have been trying to bring the relations between the two countries back to normal. The latest examples of these efforts are the overnight halt of Defence Minister, K. C. Pant and External Affairs Minister of State Eduardo Faleiro, on their way back from Korea, and the subsequent visit of External Affairs Minister N. D. Tiwari.

We who had to pay a heavy price for taking the stand that we did in 1959-62 have reasons for satisfaction at this change in the Government stand. The question, however, remains: have the Government of India, and those Opposition parties which had taken the same stand as the Government in 1959-62, learnt any lesson from the experience of what happened in those days? Do they concede now that our humiliating experience of 1962 was not due only to the Chinese intransigence, that India too contributed its share? Are they prepared at least now to adopt a give and take attitude, the very suggestion of which was considered an act of treachery in 1959-62?

Let me make it clear that I am not a defender of the position adopted by the Chinese either on the bilateral relations with India or internationally. It is clear now, as stated publicly by them, that, having adopted a by and large correct stand on the international and national situation at the 1956 (Eighth) Party Congress (at which incidentally I was present), their leadership deviated from that correct position with disastrous consequences. Our party is of the view that this had its impact on India-China relations as well.

It however goes to the credit of the Chinese that they have self-critically examined what happened in their party, in their country and in their relations with the outside world for over two decades. The measures that they adopted following this self-critical examination have improved China's relations with several countries. The 1983 invitation to our party to send a three-man delegation to visit China, following which party-to-party relations were reestablished, was part of the process of rectification. At the governmental level too, there have of late been improvements for which initiatives have been taken as much by the Chinese leaders as by the Indian leaders beginning with Indira Gandhi. If this is to be consolidated and carried forward, the Government and other leaders should, in my opinion, undertake a serious and self-critical examination of all that happened.

Such an examination of the past would inevitably raise the question whether it was correct on the part of our leaders to have adopted the line that the borders drawn by the British rulers are so "sacred and inviolable" as would merit a costly war to enforce it, or whether it would have been prudent to consider the border *de novo* and settle it through negotiations. The rigidity shown by the Government, most of the Opposition parties and almost the entire international press regarding the sanctity of the British-fixed border, their denunciation of anybody who failed to fall in line was, in my view, the root of the tragedy that overtook the country. Is this reality seen by our leaders at least now, after a quarter century since then?

Let us recall that, two-and-a-half years before the disastrous adventure of 1962, the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had visited India with a view to settling the border problem; he made proposals which appeared to impartial people to be reasonable. However, in spite of the utmost flexibility shown by the Chinese Prime Minister, his efforts to come to an agreement were rebuffed by the Indian side. Then followed a series of skirmishes on the border, all of which cannot be blamed on the Chinese side. The anti-Chinese hysteria worked up in those days not only by the Government but by the entire Opposition minus the "leftist" group in the then undivided Communist Party had a great deal to do in bringing about the tragic situation.

Fresh thinking

I am referring to the happenings of those days not because I am interested in raking up the past, but because it is of topical interest today. For, if those concerned with the negotiations today insist on what their predecessors had demanded in 1959-62, the results would not be different. Mine is thus a plea for fresh thinking, a determination to see the talks through to a settlement.

Several rounds of talks have taken place at the official level between the two countries since the talks were resumed after a long break. These, however, did not yield any result because on our side there was no willingness to adopt a give and take attitude. The talks reached a stalemate because the Indian side insisted on a sector by sector agreement while the other side proposed an overall settlement.

It passes one's understanding why so much "sanctity" should be attached to a sector by sector agreement; why a concession cannot be made in one sector in return for a concession from the other side in another. This, after all, is the meaning of an overall settlement or package deal. Is this a repetition of the rigidity which broke the Nehru-Zhou Enlai talks? If so, the border will continue to remain a hotbed of tension.

It is for the political leadership of the nation—the ruling party and the Government—to decide whether it is good for them as a party, good for the country, to have the border tension continue. So far as my party is concerned, we have always been of the view that the nation stands to lose if the Government adopts an inflexible attitude, and we said so even in the days of the worst anti-China hysteria.

The Chinese leaders have stated publicly that they are prepared to have a package deal which keeps the national susceptibili-

ties of the peoples of both the countries in mind. This makes it obvious that each will have to accommodate itself to the other so that they can come to an agreement. It becomes obvious again that the Indian side will have to give up the dogmatic stand that it has so far been taking, exhibiting the political courage to abandon the resolution adopted by Parliament in 1962.

The question will no doubt arise: If India takes a flexible attitude, would China respond? My answer is twofold: First, they have gone on record that they stand for such a settlement on the basis of give and take; they repeated it in the exchange of views that our delegation had in 1983 and 1987. Secondly, their perception of the world situation today is basically different from what it was in the latter half of the 1950s and for nearly two decades since then. They have succeeded in mending their fences with the majority of socialist and non-aligned countries and are on the way of improving relations with the rest. There is no reason why they should be interested in maintaining the tension on their border with India. They do not lose, but would gain a lot if the state-to-state relations between the countries, together with other non-aligned countries, can strengthen the common struggle for world peace and for liberation of the developing world from the octopus grip of the U.S.-led world imperialism.

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CSO: 4600/1892

GANDHI REMARKS TO PRESS ON RETURN FROM COLOMBO

Madras THE HINDU in English 31 Jul 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 30.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, today expressed confidence that the Sri Lankan President, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, would be able to carry his colleagues with him and implement the peace accord successfully.

"I am confident that he will carry it through," Mr. Gandhi told newsmen on his return from Colombo on the conclusion of his two-day State visit to Sri Lanka.

Two kinds of problems: Answering a specific question on reports that Mr. Jayewardene was not able to carry his own Prime Minister and people with him, Mr. Gandhi quipped "Well, some Prime Ministers have problems with Presidents and some Presidents have problems with Prime Ministers". He was apparently making an oblique reference to the differences he had with the former President, Mr. Zail Singh).

Mr. Gandhi took the opportunity to congratulate Mr. Jayewardene for the "tremendous courage and statesmanship he has shown", in bringing about the accord.

Asked by a Pakistani Correspondent whether the presence of the Indian peace keeping troops in Sri Lanka—the Indian troops have landed in Jaffna—would not be similar to the stationing of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Mr. Gandhi said "Not at all". He said the (military) assistance was sought by Mr. Jayewardene.

"We are prepared to withdraw the troops the day he says he does not want them there", Mr. Gandhi said.

Mr. Gandhi said he was asked by the Sri Lankan President yesterday to provide some military assistance. "It involved not only some Indian forces but also transporting Sri Lankan

forces from the Northern parts of Sri Lanka to other parts. We have given all assistance needed", he said.

Asked about reports of attempts being made by some forces to sabotage the accord, Mr. Gandhi said there were so many forces which would like to see violence continue in Sri Lanka so that there involvement would also continue.

Mr. Gandhi hoped that with the implementation of the accord, violence would come to an end in the island country.

No detention of Prabhakaran: Asked whether Mr. V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE chief had been kept under detention in New Delhi, Mr. Gandhi said there was no reason at all for his detention and asserted that it should not happen.

He said the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was facing certain special problems and he had discussed them with Mr. Jayewardene. "We will work out how they can be removed", he said.

The Prime Minister said the agreement had recognised the existence of various ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Their problems could not be solved by violence.

Answering a question on the presence of outside forces in the Indian Ocean, Mr. Gandhi said those forces were present there because of the continued violence. "We hope this agreement will bring an end to the violence and to the presence of those forces", he said.

Wordy duel: A Pakistani correspondent today misquoted Mr. Gandhi's statements on Pakistan's nuclear programme and then had a running argument with him.

"You have said that India has an answer if Pakistan produces a nuclear bomb." But be-

fore he completed the question, Mr. Gandhi interrupted him to say, "I have not said that".

"What I have said is that India is greatly concerned over Pakistan's nuclear programme. The proof that Pakistan is producing a nuclear bomb has also been forthcoming," Mr. Gandhi said.

The correspondent persisted: "You have said India does not care about what Pakistan is doing."

Mr. Gandhi: "I have said this because we are not afraid of what Pakistan is doing and can face it any time.

Q: Will this type of talk not create an adverse reaction in Pakistan?

Mr. Gandhi: "You stop your nuclear programme and we will stop talking about it".

Joint Commission will be revived: Speaking to newsmen at the Colombo airport before leaving for Delhi, Mr. Gandhi said the Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission would be revived and its first meeting would be held in New Delhi at the earlier convenience of the two Governments. He said he had also extended an invitation to Mr. Jayewardene to visit India.

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CSO: 4600/1897

JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER DETAILS PLANNED AID

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 11 Aug 87 p 7

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug. 10.—Japan has told India that it will give a loan of Rs 593 crores to India this year for execution of nine selected projects.

This was disclosed at a meeting here today by the visiting Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Tadashi Kuranari and the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Natwar Singh.

Japanese aid will be given to the Srisaillam hydro-electric plant, the Purulia pumped-storage hydro-electric plant and the Anpara Thermal Power Project, Assam Gas Power and Transmission Line Construction Project, Tamil Nadu Small-scale Industries Development, Malanjkhanda Copper Expansion, Telecommunication Network Expansion, revamping of the Gorakhpur fertilizer plant of Fertilizer Corporation of India and for additional inplant generation facility for the Cochin division of FACT.

During the three-hour discussions Mr Natwar Singh reiterated that India wanted to resolve the border issue with China through political dialogue.

Mr Singh told Mr Tadashi Kuranari, that China had reciprocated

India's sentiments on developing friendly relations and spoke of the enormous possibilities for "deepening and widening bilateral cooperation" between India and China. For his part, Mr Kuranari referred to his own country's efforts to improve relations with China.

The two Ministers exchanged views on Indo-China, with Mr Natwar Singh referring to his recent visits to Vietnam and ASEAN countries and the indication he received from Vietnam of its readiness to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by 1990.

Mr Kuranari referred to Japan's policy of promoting dialogue with South Asian countries and the steps it had taken in this direction.

Mr Natwar Singh took the opportunity to apprise the Japanese Foreign Minister of the developments across the border, the acquisition of U.S. arms by Pakistan, the clandestine build-up of its nuclear capability and the adverse implications of the continued supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan on the security environment in the region.

Mr Natwar Singh later hosted a dinner in honour of the visiting Japanese Foreign Minister.

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CSO: 4600/1908

GROWING ASSERTIVENESS OF FOREIGN, SECURITY POLICY SURVEYED

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE in German 6 Jun 87 pp 3-15

[Article by Hubert Wulf: "India's Foreign and Security Policy Between Nonviolence and the Atom Bomb;" first and second paragraphs contain source supplied bio-bibliographical information; third to eighth paragraph source supplied abstract; numbers in parenthesis refer to footnotes]

[Text] Herbert Wulf: Dr of Political Science; Member of the Scientific Staff at the Institut fuer Friedensforschung and Sicherheitspolitik [Institute for Research on Peace and Security Policy] of the University of Hamburg.

Selected publications: "The Import of Arms as Technology Transfer," Munich-London 1979; (Co-author) "With Armament Against Unemployment?" Reinbek 1982; (Co-author) "Security Policy, Armament and Disarmament," Frankfurt 1982; (Ed) "Rearmament and Underdevelopment," Reinbek 1983; (Co-author) "Alternative Production Instead of Armament," Cologne 1987; several articles on India in professional journals.

Abstract

Today's Indian foreign and security policy leans toward power politics. Judged by Gandhi's ideals, it is the exact opposite of absence of force. The Indian government strives toward military strength and superiority in the South Asian region; it keeps its nuclear option open but stresses again and again that nuclear weapons would only become part of India's military strategy if forced by Pakistan's nuclear development. Pakistan's mirror image of this argument suggests the beginning of a (largely covert) nuclear arms race.

Since India gained independence 40 years ago, the character of its global and regional foreign policy has been shaped essentially by four constants:

1. To keep at a distance from the major powers which--except for brief periods of rapprochement--has led to rather strained relations with the United States while relations with the Soviet Union have been friendly.
2. Neighboring countries are not regarded as equal partners; India demands a special status. The different Indian governments wanted to be more than *primus inter pares*.

3. The doctrine of nonalignment, supplemented by independent economic development, are intended to pave the way for a third road between capitalism and socialism.

4. These three policy guidelines are responsible for India's regional predominance which its neighbors do not view uncritically.

I. How Peaceful is India's Foreign Policy?

India's foreign and security policy is far removed from the principles of nonviolence of the great Mahatma Gandhi to whom India's elite likes to refer to this date. (1) Furthermore, Gandhi himself still experienced how the principles of nonviolence were disregarded in the fierce confrontations between Hindus and Moslems during the 1947 process of decolonization and the partition of the subcontinent into two nations. On the other hand--as a first reference to the other extreme in the title of this article--foreign and security policy is not officially shaped by nuclear weapons. Contrary to NATO, the Warsaw Pact and China, the nuclear threat is not reflected in strategic concepts. On the contrary, it is emphatically excluded; however, with the proviso that this exclusion would apply only for as long as Pakistan has no nuclear weapons at its disposal.

The Indian subcontinent is as strife-ridden region today as it has been for the past 4 decades. The internal social, economic, ethnic and religious conflicts in particular have frequently given rise to violence. In the classic European model of the last century, attempts are being made to divert attention from internal social problems with campaigns against "external enemies," accompanied by a militant stance toward neighboring countries. Most recently, early in 1987, this took the form of mutual accusations by India and Pakistan, accompanied by troop concentrations at their common border. As the many wars with Pakistan (1949, 1965, 1971) and with China (1962) illustrate, India's foreign political relations have by no means followed a purely peaceful path.

Absence of force meant more to Mahatma Gandhi than just nonviolence. It meant that the strong should renounce the use of force as a matter of principle and that refraining from the use of force against man and nature was a vital principle. Gandhi perceived the absence of force--"Satyagrah," the "adherence to truth"--as a philosophical concept with practical applications for everyday life. Force was to be overcome by voluntary sufferance of force. Measured by these criteria, India's security policy, which relies in the South Asian region on military strength and superiority, euphemistically called "preeminence" by India's elite, is the very opposite of Gandhi's ideals.

Whereas Gandhi wanted to forego the use of weapons in principle, Indian Minister of Defense Narsimha Rao commented in 1986: "It is our goal...to strengthen our defense forces to a point where there can be no doubt of our ability to defend ourselves. Our forces must be strong enough to prevent or frustrate any attempt to endanger our nation's independence." (2) This attitude is hardly unusual since it corresponds to the security policy concepts espoused globally by almost all governments. India's foreign and security policy is no exception; it is based on power politics and not on the revered principles of freedom from force proclaimed in India with much pathos and without regard to political realities.

The director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, K. Subrahmanyam, an advocate of a nuclear option for India, tried to resolve the contradiction between the nuclear threat and Gandhi's denial of force by relating a fable: A cobra, under the influence of a wise man, had converted to the principle of denial of force. It was then taunted by some juveniles who quickly discovered that the cobra was harmless. The cobra turned to the wise man and asked for advice. "I recommended abstinence from force to you," replied the wise man, "but did I ever tell you not to hiss or raise your head?" The cobra acted on this advice and has been left in peace ever since. Subrahmanyam concluded: "It may come as a surprise, but Gandhi practiced nonviolence from a position of strength." (3) Citing Gandhi as a key witness for nuclear policies is an approach shared by few in India despite frequent all-too-liberal interpretations of Gandhi's ideas.

India's foreign policy since independence has been shaped primarily by four constants:

1. To keep at a distance from the major powers although this goal has not been followed consistently.
2. Neighboring countries are not regarded as equal partners: India demands a special status.
3. The doctrine of nonalignment. India is trying to find an alternative road between capitalism and socialism not only with regard to economics but foreign policy as well.
4. These three policy guidelines confer on India a position of regional predominance.

II. India, South Asia's Dominant Regional Power

India is known as the land of contrasts. It is not a developed industrial power but ranks 12th worldwide in industrial production; however, in view of its considerable technical and scientific achievements, it can not be regarded as a typical developing country. In the perception of people in developed countries, India is almost synonymous with hunger and misery, mass unemployment and underdevelopment. India is regarded as the largest democracy in the world; yet, many of India's 500,000 villages have virtually no contact with the world beyond the confines of the village. India's Armed Forces rank fourth in the world and it is on the verge of becoming a nuclear power; it is a country which defies categorization and is in a class by itself. India is South Asia's central state and dominates militarily, economically, and by virtue of its population.

India's foreign policy, since it was delineated by Nehru after independence, has followed a global as well as a regional approach. It had been Nehru's objective to keep the two great power blocs and their leading powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, away from the Indian subcontinent. India was thus able to assert its dominant position without opposition. At that time its foreign policy, in contrast to today, was not primarily based on military power. Nehru's attitude toward the military, as revealed by his pre-1948 comments, was characterized by disinterest. He had already expressed the view

in the thirties that security would not be a significant problem for India when it became independent. Nehru believed that India would become a major power in due time and would only need to make minimal national security investments. (4) After 1948, when independence was gained, India's foreign policy, despite the Kashmir conflict, favored a pronouncedly low military profile which was also reflected by a low military budget. There were even plans to reduce India's army to 100,000 men. Nehru's attitude changed radically in 1954 after Pakistan received military aid from the United States and after the 1962 war with China in which India suffered a humiliating defeat.

Mahatma Gandhi saw the primary mission of the army not on the battlefield but as a force for the country's development. In 1946, when attainment of independence seemed assured, Gandhi wrote: "We can now look upon the military as being ours and need not hesitate to accept any constructive activity which we are able to obtain from our soldiers. Until now they have only been used to shoot at us indiscriminately. Now they must till the soil, dig wells, clean latrines and perform any constructive work they are capable of and thereby transform the people's hatred for them into love." (5) This assignment of tasks to the military reflects Gandhi's liberal-pacifist attitude which was based on the assumption that it would be relatively easy to overcome the class structure in an independent India.

Gandhi thereby expressed a technocratic optimism with regard to the military which was based on the assumption that a colonial army could be transformed into an army of workers for development. This intended allocation of roles evoked protests by the officer corps. (6) British plans at that time had envisaged that the army of an independent India would maintain troops in Burma, Malaysia, Siam (today's Thailand), and possibly also in Iraq and Persia (today's Iran) to provide internal security and defend against attacks by smaller powers. (7)

India's foreign policy elite is influenced to this date by the special role foreign countries have granted India. Indian leadership could expect to inherit a Pax-Britannica role as a result of decolonization in which the Persian Gulf would play a subordinate role to be codetermined by India. Since the seventies, however, the Gulf region has become a center of global political interests while the region of South Asia has lost importance. (8)

The 1971 victory over Pakistan has given India's regional preeminence a vigorous boost. India unquestionably emerged from the war as the militarily superior nation. India's regional foreign policy has clearly been conducted since then by reliance on power provided by the military and on power politics. Pakistan's claim to parity with India was rebuffed for the time being. The United States, which to the chagrin of the Indian government supported Pakistan's claim, could not impede India's "natural preeminence." Since then the Indian elite believes that Indian superiority guarantees stability and peace in the region. Military parity between India and Pakistan as favored by the United States in 1971 and again in the eighties is viewed by India as threatening and destabilizing.

The Pakistani government, as expected, arrived at the opposite conclusion. "It is not surprising," argues Joachim Betz, "that in view of the events preceding partition the Pakistani elite--contrary to the small states of Sikkim, Bhutan

and Nepal (which concluded corresponding agreements with India)--was disinclined to accept a status of inferiority and permanent dependency on the good will of the stronger partner." (9) Indian attempts to make India's dominant position in the region irreversible increased the neighboring countries' suspicion of India's predominance, and the events listed below caused neighboring countries to view India's dominance with apprehension: The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1971; the 1974 explosion of a nuclear device "for peaceful purposes;" the 1975 integration of Sikkim (designated by Indian critics with the German word "Anschluss" ["political union" but referring to Germany's annexation of Austria]; (10) the 1975 intervention in Bangladesh after the assassination of President Mujibur Rahman and also the increasing tensions with Pakistan after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.

In the meantime the Janata's government (which succeeded the first Indira Gandhi government in March 1977) shift in foreign policy improved relations with neighboring countries and resulted in initial attempts toward regional cooperation. "However, this policy was never popular with India's self-assured elite and Indira Gandhi, upon her return to power, was able to benefit by denouncing this 'soft' policy as a 'sell-out of Indian interests.' Upon returning to power she systematically reversed the trend and relations between India and her neighbors again deteriorated rapidly." (11)

Modest beginnings for a change of the 4-decades-old political map of South Asia were made for the first time in the eighties. The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation--suggested by Bangladesh and requested to be invoked by the region's smaller states of Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives--was also agreed to by India and Pakistan and formally established. (12) However, this regional association is nothing like the European Community or the ASEAN states which are readily cited as examples and as prototypes. The enmity and conflicts between India and Pakistan, India and Nepal, and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are too deep-rooted to permit smooth and rapid integration.

III. Relations With Major Powers

1. The United States of America

India was never considered to be of major importance to the United States. American interest in India was sporadic, it often derivative and consistently related to the rivalry with the Soviet Union. (13) Relations can be depicted as correct rather than friendly and were at times severely strained. American policy has fluctuated between neglect and deleterious meddling. (14)

Power politics, principally the containment of the Soviet Union and communism, was point of departure and catalyst for American involvement in South Asia during the cold war. America's rigid, bipolar view of the world, which did not fit the goals and ambitions of many of the new nations in former colonies, led in the mid-fifties to the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact (later Central Treaty Organization or CENTO) and of SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) of which Pakistan became a member.

India's foreign policy position differed greatly from that of Pakistan. Nehru sharply criticized the military alliances, not merely because of Pakistan's membership, but also because they were diametrically opposed to India's

efforts to maintain its nonaligned status and to keep the major powers out of South Asia. Nehru's anticolonial and anti-imperialist views did not prevent India's first ambassador to the United States, Asaf Ali, from soliciting aid in Washington for a strong India to make it a "bastion for the world against the great northern neighbor." (15)

India not was of great strategic importance to the United States and India's policy in the United Nations was at times at odds with American interests. Secretary of State Dulles viewed these policies as obstructionist and he characterized India's efforts to remain unaligned as immoral. The two states had few common interests. For a time India was looked at in the West as an alternative model to China, its great northern neighbor. But this comparison became less frequent in the literature and in political discussions as it became apparent that India's predicted accomplishments in rapid development failed to materialize while in China industrialization, elimination of hunger and control of population growth proceeded at precipitate speed.

India criticized the United States primarily because the latter carried the East-West conflict into Asia and because arming of its Pakistani rival precipitated an arms race. (16) The United States treated Pakistan as if it were India's equal--a policy which contradicted India's claim to "natural" preeminence.

This first phase of Indian-American relations ended in 1962 when India asked the United States for aid against China. India's cry for help--which was also addressed to Great Britain, other Western powers and the Soviet Union--educed an immediate response from both major powers. The Indian government accepted previously disdained military assistance with American weapons. However, this period of rapprochement already came to an end after the Indian-Pakistani war of 1965. The United States remained neutral in this conflict and enforced an arms and spare parts embargo on both warring parties which, however, affected Pakistan more than India.

The United States was clearly on Pakistan's side in the 1971 Indian-Pakistani war, which led to the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. The United States moved its fleet into the Gulf of Bengal to make it clear to India and--as eloquently explained by Henry Kissinger--to the Soviet Union that an expansion of hostilities to West Pakistan would trigger countermeasures from the United States. (17) The normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which occurred in the Nixon-Kissinger era at the same time, caused India great concern. Pakistan, on the other hand, was an important channel for the United States for establishing political relations with China. This political development of global significance greatly influenced India's decision to conclude a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union at a time when India saw itself in a difficult situation. This treaty was interpreted in the United States, in other Western countries, by some of the nonaligned states and by India's [internal] opposition as a violation of India's nonaligned status.

Bilateral relations with the United States improved during Jimmy Carter's presidency and the brief rule of the Janata coalition (1977-1979). The Carter administration accepted India's leadership role in South Asia. This assessment was facilitated by India's foreign policy, which--as Desai, the head of government, emphasized by way of criticizing Indira Gandhi's policy--aimed at

"true nonalignment" and attempted to loosen the close ties to the Soviet Union. President Carter insisted on a somewhat more restrictive policy with regard to the export of arms with corresponding consequences for Pakistan. His willingness to limit naval power in the Indian Ocean also conformed to Indian interests. (18)

At the same time Carter followed a strict policy regarding nuclear nonproliferation. This affected India's nuclear program, part of which was not under the control of the International Atomic Agency. The continued supply of enriched uranium and heavy water from the United States was at times in doubt because the Indian government failed to comply with Carter's demand for international controls. American-Pakistani relations also reached a low point primarily because of the nuclear problem.

Nuclear deliveries were not the only cause for irritation. The strategic significance of the Gulf region increased already during the Carter administration after the Shah's deposal in Iran. American foreign policy, with the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine, made a 180 degree turn. Naval activities in the region increased drastically to protect the oil supply. By 1979, at the latest, relations between the United States and India had again reverted to the former level of detachment. The different responses of the two countries to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan caused further deterioration of the foreign political climate. The United States government was interested in a joint response from India and Pakistan. For Pakistan the Afghanistan conflict was an opportunity to improve its relations with the United States; for India the rivalry with Pakistan carried more weight. India was apparently not in a position to affect Soviet behavior. The United States offer of military assistance to Pakistan (to counteract the Soviet presence in Afghanistan) precipitated states of anxiety in India which were not alleviated by the fact that India, too, was offered American arms for the first time since the sixties.

The change in the respective administrations (Indira Gandhi 1980 and Donald Reagan 1981) sealed the state of detached relations for the time being. Reagan's perception of the world--reliance on military strength; a primarily unilateral approach toward providing security for the United States; deferment of a North-South dialogue; and interpreting changes in the world mostly as evidence of Soviet expansionism--also influenced Indian-American relations.

The priorities in Asia were clear to the Reagan administration: countries whose detachment from the Soviet Union was unequivocal were supported. Allies like Pakistan, in line with American policy, should not be confronted--as in Carter's time--with human rights violations or their nuclear policies. At least verbally in line with cold war concepts, Pakistan was henceforth regarded as a state in the vanguard. Since that time the United States has given Pakistan generous military assistance and has supplied the most advanced fighter aircraft (F 16) even though Pakistan's ambitions with regard to nuclear bombs had become increasingly obvious. The American offer, repeated in 1982, to supply arms to India as well has not helped overcome India's fears. Thus the foreign relations of the two countries remain marked to a considerable extent by India's rivalry with Pakistan and by American rivalry with the Soviet Union. For 4 decades, except for brief periods of rapprochement, it has been a dialogue between the deaf and dumb.

2. The Soviet Union

Since the beginning of the sixties the USSR was everything to India that the United States was not: a true ally against China and Pakistan. The Soviet Union, despite its superpower status, took India seriously as a partner. The Indian government could and can count on aid from the Soviet Union, even with regard to arms.

The intense Indian-Soviet relations date back to the mid-fifties. An accommodation before that time was hardly possible primarily because Stalin regarded India as an appendage to capitalism and the Indian elite as reactionaries under Anglo-American influence. (19) When general attitudes toward the Third World and its stand concerning nonalignment changed under Khrushchev, India became the cornerstone of Soviet Asian and "Southern" policy. Nehru's unequivocal advocacy of worldwide diplomatic recognition for China (by concluding bilateral Sino-Indian treaties and at the 1955 Bandung Conference of Nonaligned Nations), which was in stark contrast to American foreign policy, made India's foreign policy appear credible to Soviet leaders.

Nehru believed that the Soviet Union provided an opportunity to shake off remaining dependencies from colonial times and to pursue an independent third road between capitalism and socialism. Soviet diplomatic advances in South Asia and the Near East were augmented by favorable conditions for trade and by spectacular aid for development projects which were of great importance to India's industrialization policy. The Soviet Union, contrary to Western countries, agreed to trade on a rupee basis and was willing to deliver a steel mill. Diversification of trade relations was seen by Nehru as a necessary complement to a policy of nonalignment.

Indian foreign policy was severely criticized in the West, particularly when Nehru sharply condemned the Franco-British Suez Canal intervention in 1956 but remained silent when, in the same year, the Soviets marched into Hungary. (20) India, as well as Egypt, was very important to Soviet foreign policy during this phase of the East-West confrontation. Ideological considerations concerning the social development of politically independent countries--which had been the reason for Stalin's negative attitude--were irrelevant to Khrushchev in the actual conduct of foreign policy.

The Soviet Union did not support China in the Sino-Indian border conflict that developed in 1959 but remained neutral. However, the agreed delivery to India of Soviet MIG 21 fighters was delayed so that they could not be committed in the war between China and India. (21) The Indian opposition criticized the government at that time for its pro-Soviet policy while Nehru pointed apologetically toward the difficult political situation then facing the Soviet Union (Cuban crisis).

Indian-Soviet relations improved again after a short period of disenchantment and especially after the break in Sino-Soviet relations. Close cooperation in the armament sector, which still exists today, began at that time. India remains the only country outside the Soviet camp which is licensed to produce Soviet weapons (fighter aircraft, guided missiles, warships, tanks). (22) The generous grant of licenses for the production of weapons as well as extensive Soviet developmental aid undoubtedly had been motivated by the Western help received after the Sino-Indian war. (23)

The escalation of Indian armament promoted by both East and West caused Pakistan to reevaluate its military position. The anticipation of ultimate Indian military superiority induced Pakistan's government to find a military solution to the still unsolved Kashmir problem. The Soviet Union remained officially neutral in the war that was fought in 1965 and sent identical proposals for an armistice to both sides. After the war the Soviet Union assumed the role of a mediator which led to a modest improvement in relations with Pakistan but was viewed with distrust in India. (24)

In the 1971 conflict over East Pakistan, however, the Soviet Union was clearly on India's side. By siding with the dominant party, the Soviet Union preserved, in contrast to the Near East conflict, its influence in the region.

Although Indian-Soviet relations were friendly throughout and secured by the 1971 Treaty for Peace and Friendship, they did not remain entirely free of friction. To the disappointment of Soviet leaders, the Indian government refused to sign the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India also failed to accept the role the Soviet Union had in mind for it as the lead nation in the creation of an Asian collective security system that Brezhnev had proposed in 1969. The Indian government's response to this proposal was decidedly cool and it ignored Soviet pressure. When the Soviet Union's most important partner withheld its support, the plan was no longer viable.

The increased Soviet (and American) naval presence in the Indian Ocean, on the other hand, ran counter to India's interest in the creation of an "Indian Ocean Peace Zone." (25) Without mentioning the Soviet Union by name, the Ministry of Defence, in its annual report on the political status of India's security, regularly criticized "superpower rivalry" and their efforts to secure "military bases" in the Indian Ocean. (26) Even the unequivocally benevolent attitude of the Soviet Union toward Indira Gandhi during the period of "crisis" (1975-1977), when the head of the government suspended the constitution, led to a deterioration of Indian-Soviet relations. In supporting Gandhi Brezhnev had characterized the elements which assumed power in 1977 as "reactionaries." (27) This induced them, of course, to distance themselves from the Soviet Union upon assuming power.

Indira Gandhi revised this policy again in her second administration, and after her assassination her son, Rajiv Gandhi, basically continued her foreign policy. Later in the seventies, India attempted to diversify its suppliers in the armament area. Production of weapons is not based solely on Soviet licenses; West Europe also provides development and production know-how. This policy has not been detrimental in any way to the long-cultivated Indian-Soviet relations.

3. The People's Republic of China

India and China, the two most populous countries, are frequently regarded as natural rivals. Because of their different social concepts and unsolved border problems--which led to war in 1962--the two neighbors have remained cool toward one another. Mutual irritations were reinforced and rekindled by China's close relations to Pakistan and by India's policy of friendship with the Soviet Union.

Some unsolved, if insignificant, border problems relating to hardly accessible regions in the Himalayas between China and British India existed already in colonial times. However, the "cordon sanitaire" consisting of Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim assured that for large border areas there would be no military confrontations. (28) While the Indian government recognized China's new rulers very quickly in 1949, its attitude toward Tibet harks back to British colonial times. It protested the Chinese invasion of Tibet and rejected Chinese claims of sovereignty. India continued the colonial policy of maintaining buffer states between the two countries by concluding treaties with Nepal, Bhutan, and--before its incorporation into the Indian Union--with Sikkim. These smaller adjoining countries are obligated by treaty to inform and consult India with regard to security matters.

Sino-Indian relations improved significantly in the mid-fifties as the two countries made efforts to establish close relations, using the slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" ("Indian-Chinese Brotherhood"). Anticolonialism was the common denominator. China's rapid initial economic successes were noted and admired. The principles of nonintervention, respect for territorial borders and the peaceful resolution of conflicts were agreed upon by concluding the Treaty of "Panch Sheela" in 1954. (29) By agreeing to mutual coexistence both countries became international powers.

Their differences, however, had a more lasting impact: India was a member of the nonalignment movement while China remained on the outside and pursued its own Afro-Asian objectives. Because of the emerging break with the Soviet Union, China viewed Soviet military and development aid to India with apprehension. Finally, in 1962, war broke out over border disputes which amounted to no more than postcolonial "untidiness." (30) While India adhered to historically ill-defined colonial borders (in the east the McMahon Line, drawn in 1914 but never accepted by China; in the north, the even more ill-defined borders created by unilateral claims or occasional annexations) China advanced its own--in part even older--historical arguments for the border line it desired.

India had tried to create facts by pursuing a policy of pinpricks. Efforts to find a peaceful solution failed when the Chinese Army of Liberation repelled weak and badly equipped Indian forces and established the status quo of the border as being that border which was actually controlled. (31) The war triggered a governmental crisis in India, which was militarily completely unprepared for it, and eventually led to a revised Indian security policy which clearly emphasized military strength.

Thanks to efforts by both sides, today's relations have become somewhat more normal. However, all disputes remain unresolved. The hope of continuing along the lines of the optimistic phase in the fifties has so far been dashed primarily by unbending attitudes toward the border problem; by the close Sino-Pakistani and Indian-Soviet relations which, because of the arms build-up directed against the other side, have always affected the Indian subcontinent; and by periodic Indian apprehension about a Sino-Pakistani-American axis.

IV. The Unresolved Conflict With Pakistan

The starting point of the conflict, and by now the cause of three wars between India and Pakistan, is the partition of Britain's colonial Indian empire into two nations. Indian-Pakistani rivalry and hostility have been forged by this colonial heritage. Religious and ideological differences, which led to the partition of the subcontinent, were the major reason for continued instability which time and again heated up the regional arms race.

Leaders of the Moslems, unified under the Moslem League, demanded the subcontinent's partition for the first time in 1940. They were afraid of being dominated by the Hindu majority in an India that was free of British colonial rule and reeled by formulating a so-called two-nation concept which would divide the Indian subcontinent according to religious (and consequently also linguistic and cultural) criteria. Reluctantly and against the will of the Hindu leadership, which was consolidated in the Congress, the British government agreed to the partition into two independent states. The congressional leadership, on the other hand, championed a unified, secular Indian state. (32) The inevitable partition of the subcontinent was accompanied by the movement of enormous masses of refugees and country-wide massacres.

The princedoms, indirectly controlled by England, constituted a problem. When Great Britain withdrew from India, it was left to the princes to decide into which of the two newly created nations they wanted to be integrated. In most of the 560 then existing princedoms the process of integration proceeded smoothly. (33)

The repercussions of this arrangement, however, can be felt to this day in the former princedom of Kashmir because both India (for strategic reasons) as well as Pakistan (because of a Moslem majority which is ruled by a Hindu prince) lay claim to Kashmir. First Pakistan then also India--which advocated a plebiscite--tried to absorb Kashmir by military means. (34) The combatants agreed to an armistice with the help of the United Nations; India received the larger share of Kashmir while Pakistan since that time has owned a smaller part.

The following comments of a UN diplomat make it clear how unwilling the Hindu elite has been to accept the independent state of Pakistan: "I attempted to appeal to his (Nehru's, H. W.) inspired leadership and indicated that India was in a position to signify its willingness to make a conciliatory gesture toward Pakistan. Pandit Nehru responded vehemently. In a fit of bitterness he jumped on a chair and screamed: 'You don't seem to understand our position and our rights. We grant everyone freedom of conscience. Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. Pakistan should never have been created and it would never have happened if the British had not stood behind Jinnah's crazy idea.'" (35)

In 1965 combat was waged a second time because of Kashmir. On the one hand, Pakistan believed itself strong enough to seek a military solution because of Chinese support, especially since internal unrest in Kashmir had weakened India's position; on the other hand, it felt threatened by India's continued buildup of arms. The war ended in a draw and had to be suspended after a few weeks because both the United States and Great Britain stopped the resupply of

ammunition, spare parts and weapons with an effective embargo. An armistice was again negotiated with the help of the United Nations. The Soviet Union invited both governments to Tashkent to conclude a nonaggression pact. Both sides were willing to withdraw to the old armistice line but the basic disagreement concerning the status of Kashmir remained.

Criticism from East Pakistan's elite of West Pakistan's domination could actually be heard since the day of partition. After the overwhelming election victory of the Awami League in 1970, separatist tendencies increased. Pakistan's central government committed troops. A civil war followed and millions of refugees crossed the border into India. The Indian government came to the aid of East Pakistan toward the end of 1971 which triggered the third Indian-Pakistani war that ended with Pakistan's capitulation and the creation of Bangladesh.

Kashmir's status hardly changed as a result of this war. Although fighting also took place in Kashmir, the Indian government did not expand the war to West Pakistan, presumably because it expected that the People's Republic of China and the United States would initiate countermeasures. The Soviet Union, as it had done in the second Indian-Pakistani war, again mediated. An agreement (the Simla Agreement) was signed in 1972 which gave India minimal territorial gains. However, Pakistan was not willing to agree to a general settlement of all remaining problems while it was in a weakened position as a result of the lost war. All subsequent attempts at rapprochement in the seventies and eighties failed to bring about tangible results.

The beginning of 1987 illuminated the fact that the conflict remains virulent. For respective domestic political reasons, and engaging in mutual accusations, both governments reinforced their military forces at the border to be in a position to respond to potential aggression. Separatist tendencies in either country are always being manipulated by the other side to further its own interests.

V. India's Armament and Nuclear Policy

1. Armament Policy

The abandonment of Gandhi's policy of nonviolence and the unequivocal reliance on the military as a power factor in its foreign and security policies is clearly reflected in India's military budget, import of weapons and domestic arms production. The military budget increased only insignificantly during the first decade of independence and until the end of the fifties. Less than 2 percent of the GNP, but nevertheless about 25 percent of the central government's total expenditures, were appropriated for the Armed Forces and their weapons. (36) The increase in the Army's manpower, from 280,000 in 1947 to roughly 350,000 6 years later, corresponded to the modest rise in military expenditures. The Armed Forces had primarily weapons from British World War II stocks weapons at their disposal.

From about 1958 on military events (India's occupation of Goa in 1961, but primarily the wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965) triggered a frenzied rise in military expenditures. Its share of the GNP had doubled by the mid-sixties and constituted a severe strain on the crisis-weakened economy. The authorized strength of the Armed Forces was increased to 825,000. The import and domestic production of arms rose considerably.

Another boost of military expenditures was justified by the renewed Indian-Pakistani conflict over Bangladesh in 1971. The real growth rate of India's military budget since the mid-fifties clearly exceeded the simultaneously rising trend of military expenditures worldwide. India today spends almost \$7 billion for its Armed Forces and their weapons, three times as much as Pakistan (roughly one-third of FRG's expenditures). The share of the GNP has stabilized at about 3 percent and personnel strength exceeds 1.2 million soldiers. This, as well as the quantity of arms, gives India a wide superiority over Pakistan. Armament efforts are, however, more burdensome for Pakistan than for India. This quantitative superiority is being justified by the openly admitted goal of supremacy and also by reference to Pakistan's access to the most advanced American arms technology.


Chart: Military Indicators (1986)

	by comparison		
	India	Pakistan	FRG
No of soldiers (in 1,000)	1,260	480	495
Mil. expenditures (millions of US \$)	6,956	2,067	22,487
Mil. expenditures per capita (US \$)	9.00	22.50	368
Share of GNP	3 %	6 %	3 %

The beginnings of India's armament industry go back to colonial times. The Indian government has continuously expanded its armament industry, which has been structured exclusively in the public (that is to say state-controlled) sector. About 280,000 employees work for roughly 40 armament firms. (37) All types of large, modern weapon systems (fighter planes, tanks, submarines, frigates, fast patrol boats, guided missiles, etc.) are being produced, and partially also developed, in India today.

India is nevertheless one of the largest importers of weapons. India's ambition to become independent in the development and production of all weapons has not been realized as yet despite enormous investments. Delays in important projects have triggered complaints by the Armed Forces. Since the end of the seventies, the Indian government has relied more extensively on production licenses obtained from France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. The emphasis on Soviet weapons as well as on India's own developments is thereby diminished.

Nuclear Energy Installations in India



Source: Ministry for Atomic Energy; Annual Report 1982/83, New Delhi

2. Nuclear Policy

Both India and Pakistan have expended considerable resources on nuclear development. (38) According to pronouncements by both governments, nuclear technology is to be used only for peaceful purposes. Neither country has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They also claim that they are keeping the nuclear option primarily open to protect themselves against their neighbor who (with similar arguments to those used in the East-West conflict) is suspected of aggressive intent and who can not be trusted. Both governments are prepared to make sacrifices to this end. Z. A. Bhutto, the former Pakistani prime minister and driving force behind the nuclear program, once said: "If India produces the bomb, we will also have our own bomb, even if we have to eat leaves and grass and go hungry." (39) An Indian member of Parliament, S. Swamy, expressed in mirror image a similar sentiment: "If we need the bomb, we should also procure it, even if it means running around without trousers." (40)

The detonation of a nuclear device in India in 1974 did not come as a surprise to the experts since the Indian nuclear program--both with regard to research as well as energy production--is very broad and has already been in place for 3 decades (See map). (41) Indian scientists and engineers built the explosive device with plutonium; Canada provided the plutonium producing reactor and the United States the heavy water to drive the reactor. The Indian nuclear program develops and builds reactors--and these are not subject to any international control--under its own program and also produces reactors utilizing foreign know-how and technology.

There is little doubt that India could build a deployable nuclear force in a relatively short time for a variety of reasons:

In the first place, Indian nuclear scientists have proven with the detonation of a nuclear device that the basic required technology is at their disposal.

In the second place, India's nuclear program is looked at with distrust because in some reactors, in which weapon-grade enriched plutonium is a by-product, the International Atomic Energy Agency lacks authority to exercise controls. Even the termination of cooperation between Canada and India or the difficulties in importing heavy water have not induced the Indian officials responsible for the program to submit to international controls. (42)

In the third place, India's Armed Forces have military aircraft at their disposal which can be used as nuclear carriers as well as an extensive space program with missiles which can also be used for military purposes.

In the fourth place, despite the fact that no official position includes nuclear weapons as a military resource and that strategic concepts do not provide for nuclear weapons, the nuclear option is kept in reserve. This is done with a view to China and Pakistan as well as for reasons of power politics. K. Subrahmanyam, director of the government's Defence Studies and Analysis Institute, a persistent advocate of an Indian nuclear option remarked: "The United States totally ignored and humiliated China for 20 years until Nixon discovered that 800 million Chinese armed with nuclear weapons can not be ignored. They could be ignored before they acquired their nuclear weapons. Today India counts for little in the calculations of the United

States and is only an object in U.S. foreign policy. Only if India acquires a nuclear arsenal will it have several options." (43)

There are many reason for keeping options open. Critics point out correctly that the large powers have not fulfilled their obligations concerning disarmament which the preamble to the Nonproliferation Treaty imposes. The question is being asked why nuclear weapons are more secure in the hands of the large powers than in the hands of Indian Armed Forces. Racist attitudes on the part of nuclear powers are severely criticized and characterized as hypocritical: "One of the most frequently proclaimed means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the creation of so-called atomic weapons-free zones (AWFZ) which, however, are only recommended for the brown and black segments of the human race and in reality constitute only the reintroduction of the white man's protectorate over the rest of the world." (44) This policy, according to Subrahmanyam, is reminiscent of the time of the East India Company when Indian princes were advised to reduce their forces and to place the country's security into the hands of the British. (45)

Chances for the creation of an atomic weapons-free zone in South Asia, as repeatedly proposed by Pakistan's government, or of a "Zone of Peace" in the Indian Ocean, discussed for decades, are extremely slim. The Indian government has rejected proposals for a nuclear-free zone with the explanation that South Asia could not proceed in isolation and that, especially in view of China, India must insist on a nuclear option vis-a-vis the large powers. The nuclear arms race that has been going on in South Asia for years appears to proceed ever more openly and will--unless India and Pakistan come to an agreement after all--further increase mutual distrust and lead to new tensions.

FOOTNOTES

1. A detailed bibliography on India's foreign policy has been compiled by the Indian journal SEMINAR (1986) No 324, pp 47-50.
2. Interview in: INTERNATIONALE WEHRREVUE, 1986, No 4 p 431.
3. K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Dilemma," in K. Subrahmanyam (Ed) "Nuclear Myths and Realities," New Delhi 1981, p VII f.
4. See K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru's Concept of Defence," in THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES JOURNAL, Vol V (1972) No 10, pp 196-211.
5. Cited in St. P. Cohen, "The Indian Army. Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation," Berkely-Los Angeles-London 1971, p 103. In a similar vein already in 1921 when he explained: "The soldiers will not then be hirelings, but they will form the national militia for defensive and protective purposes alone....And they will certainly never be sent to cut down inoffensive Turks or Arabs in the West or equally inoffensive Chinese or Burmese in the East." In "Young India of 27 October 1921," reprinted in: M. K. Gandhi, "Non-Violence in Peace and War," Vol I, Ahmedabad 1942.
6. St. Cohen, "The Indian Army," op. cit. p 104.

7. Lorne J. Kavic, "India's Quest for Internal Security," Los Angeles 1967, pp 237-240, mentions details of British plans.
8. Sh. Chubin, "The Place of India in US Foreign Policy," in: T. George, R. Litwak and Sh. Chubin, "India and the Great Powers," Aldershot 1984, pp 147-234; here p 153.
9. J. Betz, "Krisenherd Suedasiens: Der indisch-pakistanische Konflikt" [South Asia's Trouble Spot: The Indian-Pakistani Conflict], in: R. Hamann (Ed), "Die 'Sueddimension' des Ost-West Konfliktes" [The 'Southern Dimension' of the East-West Conflict], Baden-Baden 1986, pp 173-197, here p 178.
10. For example: Bh. Wariavwalla, "Domestic Compulsions," in: SEMINAR (1986) No 324, pp 14-17.
11. D. Braun, "Der Indische Ozean: Konfliktregion oder 'Zone des Friedens'" [The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or 'Zone of Peace'], Baden-Baden 1982, p 138 ff.
12. R. K. Srivastava, R. Kothari, "SAARC," in: SEMINAR (1986) No 324, pp 22-26.
13. Henry Kissinger's Memoirs illustrate very clearly that preoccupation with this rivalry also played an important role in Washington's foreign policy decisions with regard to the 1971 Indian-Pakistani war. See H. A. Kissinger, "Memoiren 1968-1973," Munich 1979, Chapter XXI, especially p 958 ff.
14. Sh. Chubin, op. cit., p 156
15. "Foreign Relations of the United States" (1947) No. 3, cited in: G. S. Bhargava, "Super Power Involvement," in: SEMINAR (1986) No 324, pp 38-43, here p 41.
16. H. Wulf, "India: The Unfulfilled Quest for Self-Sufficiency," in: Th. Ohlson and M. Brzoska (Eds) "Arms Production in the Third World;" London-Philadelphia 1986, pp 125-145.
17. H. Kissinger, op. cit., p 966 ff.
18. SH. Chubin, op. cit. p 161.
19. A. Stein, "India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era," Chicago 1969.
20. R. Litwak, "The Soviet Union in India's Security Perspective," in: T. George, R. Litwak and Sh. Chubin op. cit. pp 69-145, here p 77 f. However, in the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict Nehru sided with Tito, a diplomatic initiative which promptly led to a short-lived deterioration of Indian-Soviet relations.
21. For the beginnings of Indian-Soviet armament cooperation see: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "The Arms Trade with the Third World," Stockholm 1971, p 468 ff.

22. H. Wulf, op. cit.
23. Even the harsh internal policies of the Nehru administration against India's communists, which--as a type of prohibition to exercise a profession--denied communists employment in public service, failed to irritate Soviet leaders. R. Litwak, op. cit. p 83.
24. The two warring parties eventually came to an agreement in Soviet Tashkent to accept the status quo ante.
25. See D. Braun, op. cit., pp 177-191.
26. E.g.: Government of India, Ministry of Defence, "Annual Report 1983-84," p 1.
27. Cited in: R. Litwak, op. cit., p 100.
28. For the border problems and the war between India and China see the by now classic and informative work by: N. Maxwell, "India's China War," Harmondsworth 1972.
29. The treaty eliminated, at least temporarily, the divergent views regarding Tibet. India accepted the status quo.
30. T. George, "Sino-Indian Relations," in: T. George, R. Litwak and Sh. Chubin, op. cit., pp 1-67, here p 3.
31. The image created in 1962 for the world's public of an innocent and defenseless India which unjustly lost border areas through Chinese aggression was thoroughly revised by the work of N. Maxwell; N. Maxwell, op. cit.
32. G. W. Choudhury, "Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966," London 1968. For earlier disagreements as seen from the Hindu side, see: J. Nehru, "An Autobiography," Bombay-New Delhi-Calcutta-Madras 1962; or: J. Nehru, "The Discovery of India, Bombay 1967; see also: J. Betz op. cit.
33. However, in some states--as for instance in Junagadh and Hyderabad, under Moslem rule but with Hindu majorities and located within India--the Indian government employed military force to assure an integration into the Indian state.
34. India later refused to agree to a plebiscite.
35. J. Korbél, cited in: Z. Khalilzad, "The Security of Southwest Asia," Aldershot 1984, p 113 f. [Citation retranslated from the German]
36. I refer to my own earlier works and the references cited therein. See H. Wulf, "Militarization and the Formation of an Autonomous Armament Production," in: "Internationales Asienforum," Vol 6 (1975) No 3, pp 272-301.

37. Detailed information is in the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence (see footnote 26). See also H. Wulf, *op. cit.* The number of employees therefore compares to that of the armament industry in the FRG.
38. In 1983 roughly 32,000 employees--including almost 20,000 scientists, engineers and technicians--were working under the direction of the Indian Atomic Energy Department. See, Department of Atomic Energy, "Annual Report 1982-83," New Delhi, p 7.
39. Cited in: P. S. Jayaramu, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Non-Proliferation Treaty and South Asia," in: K. Subrahmanyam (Ed), *op. cit.* p. 81 [retranslated from the German].
40. Cited in: Z. Khalilzad, *op. cit.*, p 127.
41. Hundreds of studies have been published on India's nuclear development especially since the nuclear explosion. See the official version in Department of Atomic Energy, "Annual Report," New Delhi" (annually); R. Tomar, "The Indian Nuclear Power Program: Mythos and Mirages," in: ASIAN SURVEY, Vol XX (1980) No 5, pp 517-531; K. Subrahmanyam (Ed), *op. cit.*; concerning the proliferation problem see: SIPRI Yearbooks; G. Jain, "India," in: J. Goldblat/SIPRI (Ed), "Non-Proliferation," London-Philadelphia 1985, pp 89-123 and P. Clausen, "Nonproliferation Illusions: Tarapur in Retrospect," in: ORBIS, Vol 27 (1983) No 3.
42. In an extensive and detailed assessment of the Indian program, G. Milbollin comes to the conclusion that either heavy water is being imported outside of control channels (which could only be from China) or it is illegally diverted from internationally controlled domestic reactors. G. Milbollin, "Dateline New Delhi: India's Nuclear Cover-up," in: FOREIGN POLICY (1986) No 64, pp 161-175.
43. K. Subrahmanyam, *op. cit.*, p VII.
44. K. Subrahmanyam, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: A Third World Perspective on Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation," excerpts reprinted in "Militaerpolitik, Dokumentation," Pamphlet No 37, p 97 f.; Bhutto used similar arguments for Pakistan and coined the concept of the "Islamic Bomb;" see P. K. S. Namboodiri, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture," in: K. Subrahmanyam, *op. cit.*, pp 139-194.
45. Cited in: P. S. Jayaramu, *op. cit.*, p 73.

12628

CSO: 4620/37

GANDHI DEFENDERS REVIVE CONGRESS SOCIALIST FORUM

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 23 Jul 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 22.—At a crucial moment when the Congress(I) is going through a crisis, a group of senior leaders today revived the Congress Socialist Forum "with the same commitment with which Mr Gulzarilal Nanda and the late Keshodeo Malaviya had launched the movement—once again to be in the vanguard of revitalizing the Congress and building the nation".

In the forefront of reviving the forum, which had been disbanded by Indira Gandhi, were Mr Vithal N. Gadgil, former Information and Broadcasting Minister (who had in Mrs Gandhi's days been a prominent member of another party front called "Thursday club"), Mr K. R. Ganesh, Mr K. N. Singh, Mr G. L. Dogra, Mr N. C. Paroskar, Mr K. H. Ranganath and Mr H. M. Mehta, all M.P.s. Mr C. C. Bhattacharyya, Mr Girish Mishra and Mr Janardhan Dwivedi, joint secretary of the AICC(I).

The forum was re-launched at a Press conference held at the residence of Mr Gadgil and the sponsors made an appeal "to all Socialist Congressmen to organize a nationwide campaign to revita-

lize the Congress ideology and strengthen the organization without any fear or favour".

Mr Gadgil and Mr Ganesh, who were the main spokesmen at the Press conference, parried a question whether the sponsors had secured the permission of the party leader, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, to launch a Socialist group in the Congress(I) since Mr Gandhi and the Congress(I) manifesto had already declared Socialism to be the party's goal.

Neither did they reply categorically why they had chosen this crucial moment when there was turmoil in the party to form a sub-group. From the tenor of questions and answers, however, it was more than clear that the forum was intended to counter the challenge posed by Mr V. P. Singh, former Finance Minister, and his followers in the Centre and the States after he had been turned out of the party.

Both Mr Gadgil and Mr Ganesh declared at one stage: "Corruption is not the real issue before the country today. The real issue is the crisis of capitalism and crisis

of politics in the country. One cannot ignore the fact that there is a crisis in the Congress(I), and indeed in all the political parties today".

"Our external enemies have come to believe that the removal of the present Prime Minister would create conditions in which they would be able to suck India into their strategic designs and draw her away from the path of anti-imperialism, non-alignment, friendship with the Soviet Union and Socialist countries. The internal forces are concentrating their attack on the Prime Minister because he is committed to Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of India and its role in the world.

"We are once again witnessing the revival of the demand for sacking the Prime Minister and for fresh national elections coupled with threats to initiate fake legal actions and mass agitation to annul the verdict of the people. We are also witnessing the re-enactment of the 1974-75 scenario whose consequences could only be anarchy and chaos and eventually the destruction of the democratic system.

/9318

CSO: 4600/1902

REPORT ON GANDHI SPEECH TO CONGRESS-I MP'S

CALCUTTA THE STATESMAN in English 28 Jul 87 pp 1, 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 27.—Mr Rajiv Gandhi said here today he was "positive" that certain foreign Powers harboured "designs" against India and that they were doing everything to harm this country. Addressing the eve-of-the session meeting of the Congress (I) Parliamentary Party, Mr Gandhi charged that both China and India had denied that there was any "tension" on the Sino-Indian border, "but, in spite of this, rumours are being floated and propaganda is being made as if we are going to come to blows".

Briefing the Press on the meeting, the AICC (I) general secretary, Mr Nawal Kishore Sharma, quoted the Prime Minister to say that "these things and happenings around indicate positively and clearly that there is a design against us, and that there is a linkage of what was happening in this country and what was happening around the world".

Without naming them, he averred that these "designs" were being hatched by "outside Powers" and that he had no doubt about it. Mr Gandhi said earlier also such conspiracies had been hatched against India, "but we have been able to fight these out because we have inherent strength." It was only when there was weakness in the country that these evil designs could succeed.

Mr Gandhi said "it is a challenge to us and we would see to it that these challenges are met adequately. We are not to succumb to pressures from abroad or from within. We have to be vigilant, careful and disciplined".

Earlier, Mr Gandhi had said that Pakistan was continuing with its nuclear weapon programme. This was dangerous not only for the se-

curity of the region but for world security.

"There is not a programme built on their own indigenous technology or knowhow, but by pilferages and stealing. The pilferages have taken place from western countries who talk of nuclear non-proliferation. They asked everyone to sign a non-proliferation treaty. Nevertheless, we have heard of stealing or pilfering from the USA of a special type of steel which is used for making nuclear weapons. But what has the USA done? They have a law that says that unless the Senate or Congress is assured about non-proliferation, no arms aid would be given. But what we see happening (in Pakistan) is something else. So also in spite of China's and our denial about tension on our border, rumours are being floated and propaganda made in this regard."

'ONE-POINT PROGRAMME'

Mr Gandhi said "fighting against poverty is our one-point programme". It had to be fought at all levels, "not only in India but outside because unless the total world conditions are changed, we cannot succeed in ameliorating poverty". He said: "We have seen how difficult it is to make the developed and affluent countries to concede even a little that would help the developing countries and the poor. The richer nations always exploited the poorer countries by making them sell cheap what they want and by selling to them dearer what the poorer countries want".

Mr Gandhi said there had been a recent upsurge of communal incidents and the virus seemed to be spreading. Congressmen would have to fight it out.

Generally speaking whenever a communal incident took place, "we tried to find leaders of the

particular community affected and send them out to the area to help. But this has not helped solve the problem. For future, we have to find credible persons from other communities who can go and work. Besides, we have to create an atmosphere of peace and oneness. It is Congressmen who have to undertake this task and then other political parties would come into it".

He admitted that "some mistakes have been committed in the past and we have to rectify them". He said politics and religion had to be delinked. "We wanted to have a debate on this in the last session but could not take it up, so in this session we should have the debate".

The Prime Minister expressed his anxiety about drought. India has had the worst drought in the past 100 years in several parts of the country. He referred specifically to the difficult situation in Gujarat and Rajasthan where the monsoon failed in the past three or four years. He said maximum efforts would have to be made to provide electricity and water to the farmers.

On the food front, there was no cause for worry because the stocks were sufficient, though the distribution system would have to be strengthened.

He laid stress on the eradication of corruption in the distribution system and stressed that the needs of the poorer sections of society must receive priority. He wanted foodgrains to be distributed through the system to tribal areas at subsidized prices. To implement this, the Centre and the States would have to cooperate. The Centre and the States would also have to cooperate to intensify anti-drought measures.

/9317

CSO: 4600/1894

REPORT ON GANDHI 2 AUG SPEECH IN MADRAS

Madras THE HINDU in English 3 Aug 87 p 9

[Text]

MADRAS, Aug. 2.

The Indo-Sri Lanka agreement not only renders justice to the minority communities on the Island but also removes the opportunity for hostile forces to destabilise the region, the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, said addressing a public meeting on the Marina here today.

Pointing out that tension and violence in Sri Lanka was also causing a problem in the region, Mr. Gandhi explained that forces which did not stand for nonalignment, forces which were not in India's interest were showing their presence in Sri Lanka. "This hostility has opened up for others to fish in troubled waters and cause problems in this part of the world. The greatest threat to security in our region is if countries drift towards power blocs. Our security and strength lies in nonalignment. Certain outside presences in Sri Lanka were destabilising this commitment to nonalignment. This agreement not only brings to an end the hostilities but also brings peace, gives justice to minority communities in Sri Lanka and also removes opportunity for hostile forces to destabilise the region. It strengthens the security and nonalignment in our region.

Apart from the agreement which took care of the Tamils' interest in Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister said he and Mr. Jayewardene, Sri Lankan President, had an exchange of letters. In these letters "we have seen the security problem in our region. We will see that such hostile forces are not allowed to come into our region."

"This exchange of letters ensures that forces prejudicial to India's interest will not be present on the Sri Lankan soil. It also ensures that Sri Lankan ports including Trincomalee will not be given for military use if it is prejudicial to India's interest. It will also ensure that any broadcasting facility that is set up in Sri Lanka will not be used for military or intelligence purposes. With this agreement and the exchange of letters, President Jayewardene has shown his commitment to Gandhiji's ideals of non-violence, truth and his commitment to nonalignment," Mr. Gandhi said.

"This is the time to end violence; this is not the time for recrimination or reprisal; it is time to bring peace to rebuild and to develop a new friendship and bond between the various communities in Sri Lanka. This is the time for restoring confidence and faith for promoting amity and goodwill for the rebuilding".

New era of peace: The agreement, the Prime Minister said, ended a period of pain and sorrow, anguish and suffering and ushered in a new era of peace. "In this turning point in Sri Lanka's history", Mr. Gandhi said, "we must mourn the dead; our hearts should go out to the widows and orphans, mothers who have lost their sons and daughters who have lost their fathers; but this memory cannot be honoured with further bloodshed. Their memory will be honoured if Tamils continue to live in Sri Lanka with peace, with honour, with dignity and this is what we have made possible with this agreement", he said.

In the agreement, Mr. Gandhi saw "the greatness of our civilisation; the tolerance, the compassion of our civilisation". Many other civilisations did not survive because they were unable to adapt to new things or coexist; with differences of language, region or religion, they were not able to adapt. "Our strength is in our flexibility, adaptability and resilience and this comes from self-confidence". "This self-confidence had allowed us to go beyond, to pick the best, yet remain ourselves", he said.

Indo-Sri Lankan links: This agreement, Mr. Gandhi maintained, drew upon the deep values of "our shared traditions and history with Sri Lanka; our relationships go back to thousands of years."

"Today we have realised Subramania Bharati's dream.... to Sri Lanka we shall build a bridge, raise Sethu to make a road; we have built that bridge of friendship".

While peace had already been restored, Mr. Gandhi said, "we must be realistic and each one of us must do whatever there is in our ability to see that we do nothing which could disturb this peace which has come". Although

peace had been fully restored it had come neither quickly nor easily. While there might be difficulties and problems in completing the agreement and whenever there had been such violence and such high tempers one could not expect that it could be switched off just at the turn of the switch. "We must approach these problems the way we have approached this peace—discuss, sit across the table and bring about solutions and I know that solutions are possible".

Mr. Gandhi said there would be many forces which would want to see that this agreement did not work out. All those forces whose presence would have to be removed would not like to see the agreement coming through. "And all those who feel they can benefit from violence and the killings will not want this agreement to come through. It is for us—Sri Lanka and India—which must see this agreement through with patience and perseverance.

The Prime Minister contended that the democratic method was the only method for getting real, workable and long-term solutions and it was there "we must seek for answers". The agreement, he said, had been possible because many people had been involved from the tentative steps in June 1983 when President Jayewardene first asked Indira Gandhi for help.

Pat for T. Nadu people: Mr. Gandhi paid a special tribute to the people of Tamil Nadu. The people of the State, he said, had demonstrated tremendous courage and humanity during these very difficult years. "You have suffered great anguish while relatives and friends have been killed, but you have persevered, you have shown tremendous strength."

The Prime Minister also praised the tremendous restraint of the people of Tamil Nadu who, he said, had kept their heads level even in the face of serious provocations and incitement to violence. "You have kept the greater perspective in view. You have not been swayed at all by false rhetoric," he said.

Mr. Gandhi said the agreement was a major landmark in the four decades of India's freedom. "I am told no such agreement has been signed by any country in the world at least in this century. It is an agreement without any precedence in history. It is an agreement which does not have a parallel in the world. It is an agreement which vindicates the principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful coexistence and nonalignment.

Praise for MGR: Paying a high tribute to the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran for his involvement in hammering out a solution to the Sri Lankan Tamil's problem, the Prime Minister said that but for his help the agree-

ment would not have been possible. "Without his sagacity, without his profound humanism, without his rock-like support, especially during the most difficult and complicated negotiations, without the deep understanding that he has shown, we could not have achieved this agreement. Without his statesmanship in raising above all narrowness and selfishness and looking towards the greater interests of the country, the agreement would not have been possible. It is his patriotism and his support which made the agreement possible" he said.

Referring to Mr. Ramachandran's proposed visit to the United States for a medical check-up, Mr. Gandhi said "We wish him all the best and a very speedy recovery. And I hope he goes with his mind in peace that the Tamils in Sri Lanka can now live in peace, equality and harmony. I wish him a speedy return so that he can devote many more years in the work of the people of Tamil Nadu and in furthering the glory of India."

Mr. Gandhi's English speech was translated into Tamil by the Union Minister of State for Internal Security, Mr. P. Chidambaram.

Rajiv 'hero of peace': Earlier, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran said Mr. Gandhi had come to Madras as a "hero of peace after signing the historic agreement. The Tamils in Sri Lanka had been undergoing untold sufferings for many years and the agreement had come as a culmination of the efforts initiated by Indira Gandhi to remedy the situation. "Indira Gandhi's dream has been fulfilled by his son" he said and appealed to the people to wholeheartedly support the accord.

It was to ensure that the people in the Jaffna peninsula lived without any fear that the Prime Minister had sent a contingent of the Indian Army to Sri Lanka as a peace-keeping force. "The militants should have confidence in the efforts of the Prime Minister and extend him all support; they should respect the agreement and act according to it" he said.

The TNCC (I) president, Mr. M. Palaniyandi, welcomed the Prime Minister.

Mementos presented: The Chief Minister presented a golden shawl to the Prime Minister. He also gave mementos to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and his wife Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, who was seated on the dais. Garlands were presented to the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister by Tamil Nadu Ministers and representatives of the TNCC (I) and the AIADMK.

Among those who garlanded were Mr. A. Amirthalingam, TULF General Secretary, Mr. Sivaji Ganesan, Mrs. Vyjayanthimala Bali, Mr. Tindivanam Ramamurthi Mr. Jaya Mohan, MPs, Mrs. D. Yasodha, MLA and the acting Chief Minister of Pondicherry Mr. Kannan.

/9317

CSO: 4600/1901

RSS GOVERNING BODY MEETS, PASSES RESOLUTIONS

New Delhi PATRIOT In English 26 Jul 87 p 5

[Text]

The Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) has defended the role of the PAC in the Meerut riots and condemned the recent killing of bus passengers by terrorists at Lalru and Fatehabad, in two separate resolutions passed by its highest body, the Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal ABKM, reports IPA.

The ABKM passed the resolutions at its two-day (July 17-18) meeting at Hardwar. Mr H V Seshadri, new Sarkaryawah (general secretary) of the RSS, released the resolutions to the press.

The resolution on Meerut says, "it is shocking to note that impediments were placed in the search of houses of rioters and their arrests. More unfortunate is the thoughtless role of certain politicians and responsible papers who, without caring to make independent, impartial enquiry, were carried away by the insinuations of mischief-mongers against the PAC as in the case of Maliana (Meerut). They poured severe indictments on its head, which however, have proved baseless. It is on record that the rioters could be subdued and their arms seized only after the PAC swung into action in Meerut district.

It may be recalled that almost a week after communal riots broke out in Meerut on 18 June, the PAC went on a rampage in Maliana and nearby villages on the outskirts of Meerut on 23 June. On 28 June a list of 111 killed had been given to the administration by residents of Maliana. The administration later claimed that only 16 had been killed and that the rest had been found

alive. This was contested by residents of Maliana and a resident, Aizaz Ali Siddiqui, had prepared a list of 67 dead after detailed enquiry in the area. The number game is still on.

In its resolution on Punjab, the ABKM has expressed "deep resentment and sorrow over the inhuman and gruesome killing of 78 innocent bus passengers at Lalru and Fatehabad.

The texts of these two resolutions make it abundantly clear that the religious identities of victims weights heavily with the RSS. Those killed by the PAC in Meerut were Muslims and those killed by the terrorists were Hindus. The way the new Sarkaryawah elaborated upon the resolutions at his press conference in New Delhi on 22 July, also confirmed that the resolution on Meerut was communally motivated. Speaking on Meerut he categorically declared, "the PAC must be given a chance to explain before it is condemned".

Mr Seshadri could not explain why the RSS wanted the PAC to be given a chance to explain before being condemned and why it condemned terrorists without giving them a chance to explain? Faced by this insistent query Mr Seshadri resorted to a long lecture on the tendency to defame and demoralise law-enforcing agencies, which is giving the country a bad name abroad. In his reply he had hit upon the one crucial difference between the massacres at Lalru and Fatehabad and the massacres at Maliana and Hashimpura in Meerut. That difference is that the former killings were by terrorists who are worse than plain

criminals because they kill indiscriminately and with the intention to provoke riots between two communities, or at least alienate them from each other. The massacres at Maliana and Hashimpura were carried out by a force that is entrusted with the enforcement of the law of the land.

Article 21 of the Constitution stipulates that no citizen of India will be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law.

The PAC, like other such forces, is expected to enforce this guarantee in two ways, by not violating it itself and making sure that nobody violates it.

However, the PAC selected members of one particular community and killed them. It is not just a violation of the law of the land, it is a breach of trust. In this sense perhaps the PAC's crime is much worse than that of the terrorists.

It is strange that the RSS did not into this aspect of the matter. Instead Mr Seshadri first maintained that no massacre had taken place in Maliana, because reports of 200 people killed have been proved to be wrong. He was asked if the killing of 20 or 18 would not be massacre and if the PAC had the right to kill even a single citizen. Instead of making a straight reply Mr Seshadri insisted that numbers have their own significance. Interestingly, even the Meerut administration has not denied the fact of PAC killing even though it has been trying to reduce not denied magnitude of the crime by its attempts to prove that only 16 were killed instead of the 86 reported by the papers.

/9317

CSO: 4600/1893

ARUN NEHRU, OTHERS FAST TO CALL ATTENTION TO TROUBLES

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 10 Aug 87 p 1

[Text]

Former Internal Security Minister Arun Nehru and several MPs including Arif Mohammed Khan, Satyapal Malik, Vidya Charan Shukla, Ram Dhan, Manvinder Singh, Raj Kumar Rai and Ram Pujan Patel sat on a 12-hour long fast from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. at the Raj Ghat on Sunday to focus attention on the drought situation, corruption in high places and the threat from disharmony. They were joined by a large number of supporters, including Congressmen and women.

Former Defence Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh joined the assemblage for a shortwhile early in the morning before leaving for Ganganagar.

Speaking on the occasion Mr V P Singh said the people were disillusioned with the present Government at the Centre and they wanted a change.

Mr Singh said "the credibility of the Government has been eroded completely and if mid-term polls are held today, the ruling party is sure to be reduced to a minority".

On the Punjab problem, Mr Singh said the most important thing was to understand the Sikh psyche and not suspect the community as a whole. It was essential to establish a rapport with all shades of Sikh opinion to hammer out a viable and acceptable political solution, he added.

Referring to the alleged economic of-

fences and transfer of money outside India, the former Finance Minister said it was not merely a question of violating the law of the land but was a crime against the nation, because every Indian had to pay the cost of resources transferred abroad.

On the communal situation in the country, he said "we have to create new political and social ethos for a lasting solution".

While Mr V P Singh left Raj Ghat in the morning itself, Arun Nehru, Arif Mohammed Khan, Satyapal Malik and V C Shukla sat under a well-laid out shamiana through the hot afternoon. The supporters also sat around their leaders. The members of the leaders' family, especially the womenfolk, were also present. In the background played the solemn number "Raghupati raghav raja ram".

The leaders were reluctant to talk to the press. "We can't talk now. Let us break our fast first", Arun Nehru said.

Mr V C Shukla wondered why the high command was not expelling the four Congress MPs who were sitting with them. "They are openly supporting us but no action is being taken against them. The high command has developed cold feet in their case", he said.

Mr Shukla was referring to the presence of Mr Ram Dhan, Mr Manvinder Singh, Mr Raj Kumar Rai and Mr Ram Pujan Patel in the protest fast.

/9317

CSO: 4600/1907

AGENCY REPORTS GANDHI INTERVIEW WITH 'BLITZ'

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 13 Aug 87 p 4

[Text]

Bombay, Aug. 12 (PTI): The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, has said that corruption needed to be fought courageously and tenaciously, "but let us have some perspective, some sense of proportion."

In an interview with the editor of *Blitz* weekly, Mr R.K. Karanjia, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the country's independence, Mr Gandhi said, "One does not fight corruption by destroying the whole political system. Who benefits from this kind of skuldruggery? Surely not the poor."

Turning to specific instances he said the Opposition stand on the Bofors inquiry amounted to saying that the inquiry should be handed over to the Opposition parties.

"In fact, the Opposition stand throughout has been that the one-fourth represented by themselves is more legitimated than the three-fourths of Parliament which constitutes the Congress," he observed.

Mr Gandhi said the ruling party tried to accommodate the Opposition on every point they raised in regard to the composition of the parliamentary inquiry committee into the Bofors deal, both in terms of composition of the committee and its terms of reference.

"But the fact is that they still don't seem to be interested. They want the inquiry to cover all deals from the 1980s. I really

bility seriously, he added.

"What shall we say of those who do not respect the verdict of the people and are ready to resort to extraconstitutional action, wanting to dislodge governments before they run their allotted time?" he asked.

On destabilisation, Mr Gandhi said, "We have to realise that a psychological war is being waged against India, against its institutions, its political leadership, its fundamental values.

"We have to see that the people do not lose their self-confidence, their pride and their will to build a strong and prosperous India," he said.

The whole approach to legal processes needed a radical change. The law should not favour a "big" person but be an ally of the poor and the wronged. "This is a matter of revolutionising the ethos," he said.

On the question of catching up with more developed nations, Mr Gandhi said it was through education that the country could ensure that the people do not miss out the technological revolution sweeping across continents.

"That is one of the basic objectives of the new education policy," he averred, adding that "another is to make sure that they are aware of, and appreciate, our cultural heritage."

don't see why they chose the eighties and not the seventies or the sixties. This new development can only diversify and diffuse the probe," he said.

As far as he was concerned, Mr Gandhi said, "I have nothing to hide, nothing to fear, and have done nothing to be ashamed of, personally or nationally."

He said the government genuinely felt that it was imperative to get to the root of the Bofors deal and find out what exactly happened, so that if something had gone wrong, it could be corrected.

"We want to take action and punish the people involved no matter who they are. The Opposition, on the other hand, seemed to be interested in political capital rather than in getting to the root of the problem. That's unfortunate and counter-productive about this whole exercise," he said.

'No harm in reviewing Constitution'

Mr Gandhi said there was no harm in reviewing how the Constitution had worked over the last 36 years.

The intention was to see what should be done to strengthen the basic values that underlie the Constitution, Mr Gandhi said. The issue was not that constitutions were vulnerable, but that those who should be protecting them do not take their responsi-

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CSO: 4600/1910

HARYANA CABINET EXPANDED, PORTFOLIOS CHANGED

Madras THE HINDU in English 12 Aug 87 p 1

[Text]

CHANDIGARH, Aug. 11.

The nine-member Devi Lal Ministry in Haryana was expanded today with the inclusion of four Cabinet Ministers and three Ministers of State, raising the strength of the Council of Ministers to 16.

The Governor, Mr. S. M. H. Burney, administered the oath of office and secrecy to the seven at an impressive swearing-in ceremony in the Raj Bhavan here.

This is the second expansion of the Ministry since Mr. Devi Lal assumed office on June 20.

The four new Cabinet Ministers are: Mr. Ram Bilas (BJP), Mr. Hukam Singh, Mr. Om Parkash Bhardwaj and Mr. Lakshmi Narain (all Lok Dal).

The Ministers of State are: Mr. Azmat Khan, Mr. Subhash Katyal and Dr. Raghbir Singh—all belonging to the Lok Dal.

With this, the number of Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Minister goes up to 11 and the Ministers of State to five. The BJP now has two Ministers, both of the Cabinet rank.

Portfolio change: The Chief Minister shed the Agriculture portfolio and handed it over to the Social Welfare and Welfare of Schedule Cast-

es and Backward Classes Minister, Mr. Kirpa Ram.

Mr. Devi Lal shed some other portfolios also but kept to himself 31 others including General Administration, Home (CID), Planning and Administration of Justice.

Mr. Dharam Vir, Minister of State, was divested of the independent charge of Tourism which the Chief Minister himself took over. Mr. Dharam Vir has been given the independent charge of Local Government.

'Biggest fraud': The Union Minister for Environment, Mr. Bhajan Lal, today termed as the "biggest fraud" the Haryana Government's decision to write off loans amounting to Rs. 227.51 crores advanced by the cooperative and commercial banks to the small farmers and weaker sections of the society.

Addressing a press conference in Delhi, Mr. Bhajan Lal said the State Government's decision benefited only a fraction of the population and was far short of the promises made by Mr. Devi Lal to the electorate. —PTI, UNI

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CSO: 4600/1917

REPORT ON NAMBOODIRIPAD ARTICLE IN CPI-M ORGAN

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 29 Jul 87 p 1

[Text]

CPI-M general secretary E M S Namboodiripad has asked President R Venkataraman to "suggest a mechanism" for dealing with the allegations of corruption against Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and his government.

This suggestion comes after the CPI-M strongly opposed any move on the part of former President Zail Singh to either dismiss the Rajiv government or allow prosecution of the Prime Minister in the light of these corruption charges, indicating that the Marxists have probably done some re-thinking on the Constitutional role of the President.

In an article titled **How will the President act?**, appearing in the CPI-M's central organ *People's Democracy*, Mr Namboodiripad has said that a "serious crisis" has gripped the ruling party in the wake of the kick-back scandals and the challenge of Mr Mufti Mohd Sayeed and Mr V P Singh to the Prime Minister on policy issues.

As a result of this challenge, several Congress leaders have been arbitrarily expelled by Mr Gandhi from the party. Minister of State for Defence Arun Singh has resigned from his post and Mr Amitabh Bachchan has resigned from the Lok Sabha. According to Mr Namboodiripad, all these things hap-

pening on the same day, are indicative "of a serious political-organisational crisis in the Congress party".

Given this background, President Venkataraman had a special role to play since he cannot afford to "close his eyes to these realities". "The reference is to the role of the President at a time when the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers are under such a cloud as Rajiv Gandhi and his cabinet are today".

The CPI-M leader has asked whether Mr Venkataraman, under the circumstances, would "function as President in such a way as to fulfil the hopes of those who nominated him (the hope that he would act as their rubber stamp), and yet protect his image as a man of integrity?"

While such a question appears to be aimed at goading Mr Venkataraman to take action against the Rajiv government by suggesting that his integrity would be at stake if he did not, Mr Namboodiripad immediately adds that he does not want him to "arrogate to himself the right to dismiss the Prime Minister or to order his prosecution".

"But can he remain a helpless witness to the disgraceful developments which have sent Amitabh Bachchan packing from the Lok Sabha? It is for

him to suggest a mechanism for dealing with the allegations of corruption which have become the most burning political issue in the country today".

Thus, it would appear that while not endorsing any drastic step by the President such as dismissal of the Government or prosecution of the Prime Minister, Mr Namboodiripad nevertheless wants him to take some action against the Government. Significantly, he does not spell out what this action would be but leaves the matter entirely with Mr Venkataraman.

Mr Namboodiripad has then quoted a letter that Opposition Presidential candidate V K Krishna Iyer had written to the voters, stating that the President "cannot sit with folded hands even without vital information when the national scenario is showing serious shocks of corruption charges at the highest levels".

To this the Marxist leader has added: "This (the issue raised by Mr Krishna Iyer) assumes importance today when those who still claim to be Congressmen accuse Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of direct involvement in corruption. Can President Venkataraman close his eyes to these realities?"

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CSO: 4600/1895

CPI-M DEMANDS RAJIV RESIGN, FRESH ELECTIONS

Madras THE HINDU in English 13 Aug 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug. 12.

The CPI(M), in a strongly-worded resolution, has denounced the Government of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi for "its harmful economic policies, opportunism with regard to problems of national unity and its dubious role in the corruption involving the Defence deals." The resolution also demanded the resignation of Mr. Gandhi and fresh elections to the Lok Sabha.

The text of the resolution was released here by the party's General Secretary, Mr. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, at the end of the CPI(M) central committee meeting here between August 7 and 10. According to this resolution the central committee, "came to the conclusion that the Rajiv Government is leading the country to ruin, disunity and disorder, with accelerated speed. Everything which it touches leads to increased misery, disruption of national unity, enabling the forces of destabilisation to attack the country with greater vigour."

The Central Government was warned that the "distress" following the "unprecedented" drought could not be "combated by the administration single-handedly," but required "the combined efforts of all political parties and mass organisations."

The CPI(M) concluded that the Rajiv Gandhi Government has "become a Government of national disintegration, incompetence, and utter callousness to democratic and parliamentary norms." Illustrative of this was the "dismissal of the Barnala Government when it was taking a secular stand against the bigotry of the High Priest of the Akal Takht" which "was not only an attack on the election principle but a criminal misdeed against the fight for national unity."

Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala's dismissal meant "the disorganisation of the political forces in Punjab which on a secular basis were coming

together to fight and isolate the Khalistani terrorists," especially as Mr. Barnala's stand against the Akal Takht had drawn the line between the secular and religious forces, enabling the former to forge ahead. But "Mr. Rajiv Gandhi had stabbed the struggle in the back to win an electoral advantage" in Haryana.

Incompetence: The recent incidents of communal violence reflected the "thorough incompetence of the Government" and its "callousness to the ever-rising communal challenge."

The Government has a dismal record in the struggle against divisive forces in the country. "The record of the Rajiv Government in these four months in relation to these divisive forces is once again a record of failure, conciliation and compromise." The Assam accord was delivering blow after blow to the minorities and tribals, but the Central Government "stands paralysed before this organised force of disruption." Only in relation to the GNLFF agitation was the Government trying "belatedly" to settle the issue in consultation with the West Bengal Government, "on the basis of the terms suggested by the latter for the democratic solution of the problem."

In a reference to the arms and submarines deals, the CPI(M) noted that "for months now, the Rajiv Government is not only under a cloud in the eyes of the people, it is in the dock, unable to answer a single allegation." No previous Government, whatever its crime, had caused "such suspicion in the minds of the people that Government personnel are betraying the defence of the country and accumulating filthy lucre."

The overwhelming majority of the Congress(I) in the Lok Sabha "is no longer the reflection of the earlier mandate given to Rajiv Gandhi," the

CPI(M) maintained. Hence it demanded the resignation of this Government and fresh elections.

Broadest understanding: The fight to oust the present regime required "the broadest understanding and unity of all oppositional, secular parties, and the unity between these and the left and democratic forces."

In a clear reference to the dissidence in the Congress(I), the CPI(M) observed that "already the effect of oppositional unity is being felt inside the Congress(I) ranks as it is enabling more and more people, though at present in small numbers, to voice their protest against Governmental corruption and take up issues of national unity." Such dissidence, the party said, "objectively helps the forces of national unity and, therefore, has to be welcomed."

The CPI(M) went on to "call upon all Congressmen who are opposed to corruption and other facets of the Rajiv regime to take a bold stand and join the popular forces to demand a new government for the people."

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CSO: 4600/1909

CONGRESS-I LEADERSHIP MEETS, ISSUES STATEMENT

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 23 Jul 87 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 22.

THE Congress central leadership today pledged to revitalise the organisation so as to thwart the "personal ambitions" of some dissidents.

The Congress working committee, which met for over two hours today, ratified the expulsions of Mr Arun Nehru, Mr V. P. Singh, Mr Arif Mohammed Khan and Mr V. C. Shukla. It endorsed the action of the Congress president, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, unanimously.

The committee said the step should have been taken earlier. The subsequent action of the expelled members, who joined hands with the opposition, was indicative of their design to destabilise the country.

When pressmen asked whether Mr Kamalapati Tripathi, who had expressed his regret over the expulsions, was present at the meeting, the AICC general secretary, Mr Nawal Kishore Sharma, replied in the positive and said the Tripathi was of the opinion that there was no need to discuss the activities of the expelled members, since "we stand by the leader."

The meeting was attended by Mr Arjun Singh, Mrs M. Chandrashekhar, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, Mr Darbara Singh, Mr Vir Bahadur Singh, Mr J. B. Patnaik, Mr Ramanand Yadav, Mr Uma Shanker Dixit, Mr Sitaram Kesri,

Mr Bhagwat Jha Azad, Mrs Najma Heptullah, Mr G. K. Moopanar and Mr R. L. Bhatia.

Mr Rajiv Gandhi, who chaired the meeting, stressed the need to revitalise the party at the grassroot-level.

Mr Gandhi told the working committee that elections should be held in January next, as per schedule. The modalities may be discussed but there should not be any further delay in holding the party elections, which were a part of the revitalisation programme, he said.

The U.P. chief minister, Mr Vir Bahadur Singh, told the committee that talk of a large number of MLAs deserting the party was totally incorrect. The state government was quite safe since it enjoyed the support of almost all the 267 Congress MLAs.

Mr Sharma was asked whether the statement of Mr K. K. Tewari at the press conference yesterday, in which he had accused Mr Zail Singh of sedition, was discussed by the committee. Mr Sharma said it was not brought up.

LEFT-OF-CENTRE POLICIES: In an obvious measure to meet the growing challenges, the committee opted for left-of-centre socio-economic policies.

The details of this new strategy have not yet been spelt out. The committee expressed concern over the drought conditions in the country, and demanded that the government take im-

mediate steps to meet the situation.

Mr Sharma and Mr Moopanar told pressmen that the members demanded that the economic policies spelt out in the election manifesto of the party be implemented effectively.

It is also significant that Mr V. N. Gadgil, former minister of information and broadcasting, announced the revival of the Congress socialist forum. He told pressmen that the forum would hold a convention in Delhi in the last week of August.

He also released a statement which was signed by Mr Sharma, Mr K. R. Ganesh, Mr K. N. Singh, Mr G. C. Bhattacharya, Mr G. S. Dogra, Mr N. C. Prashar, Mr H. M. Mehta, Dr Girish Mishra and others. The statement stressed the need to revive the Congress socialist forum with the same commitment with which Mr Gulzari Lal Nanda and Mr K. D. Malaviya had launched the movement.

Although it did not mention him by name, the statement was critical of Mr V. P. Singh and the policies he had pursued as finance minister.

The statement was also critical of the economic policies pursued by the government. Mr Gadgil said the statement was "our analysis of the political situation. You may draw your own conclusions." He said there was a need to revive the tradition of debate in the party.

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CSO: 4600/1891

GANDHI TELLS OF DRIVE AGAINST ECONOMIC OFFENDERS

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 21 Jul 87 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 20 (UNI).

THE Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, said here today that the drive against economic offenders would not be slowed down at any cost.

Inaugurating a three-day workshop of economic editors, Mr Gandhi said his government had caught and punished more economic offenders than any other.

Opposing the writing off of loans by state governments as in the case of Haryana, he said "If loans were remitted on a blanket basis, the rural credit system would collapse and co-operative banks will have to close down."

On the state of the country's economy, he said "Our economy has many strengths and some weaknesses and it should be our endeavour to re-inforce the productive forces to achieve our objective of building a strong and self-reliant nation."

On the battle against poverty, he said 48 per cent of the population was below the poverty line at the beginning of the sixth plan, and the figure came down to 37 per cent at the beginning of the seventh plan. It would be just 25 per cent by the beginning of the eighth plan.

He expressed concern at the balance of payment position, and said it was however within manageable limits for India. On criticism that returns on the huge investments in the public sector were meagre, he said "I do not think we can look at the public sector with a capitalist's view."

It had gone to the backward areas and invested where the private sector did not. The sick units in the public sector were those taken over from the private sector, he said.

But to make the public sector more efficient, a first step should be to give its managers a proper environment for efficient result-oriented management. They must have the autonomy and flexibility they need to manage efficiently, Mr Gandhi said.

Mr Gandhi said the government was trying to move away from the system of detailed departmental scrutiny and control over the public sector to a different system which would give the managers greater power, while making them accountable for their performance.

Asked about the present stagnation in the capital market, Mr Gandhi said the market had been sluggish for the past few months only. It had been buoyant for about two years and the "current lows were not lower than the lows touched during the buoyant period."

Till now the stock exchanges were being run to suit the convenience of certain groups, but the issue of government bonds for huge sums had taken a big chunk of money that would have otherwise gone through the stock exchanges, he said.

On food and fertiliser subsidy, Mr Gandhi said, "I do not think we are ready to abolish subsidy. A large section of the people need subsidised food and fertilisers".

Mr Gandhi said though subsidy should be only for the poor, it was administratively inconvenient to effect this. If a group is targetted to be eligible for subsidised food, others would try to get into that bracket, and this led to corruption.

On sick mills, he said the government would not throw good money after bad. "The problem is aggravated because many of our industries, especially sick industries, do not try to rejuvenate themselves. They should fight back to keep themselves fit, if not, they should be allowed to die."

- FAIRFAX PROBE

The Prime Minister, has said any change in the terms of reference or the scope of the Thakkar-Natarajan commission, probing the utilisation of the Fairfax Group Inc. "at this stage" is bound to delay submission of its report.

Replying to a letter from the CPM leader, Mr Somnath Chatterjee, and others, Mr Gandhi said if the submission of the report by the commission was delayed, it would be tantamount to defeating the very purpose of appointing the commission, to set all controversies at rest "within the minimum possible time."

Reiterating the government's "commitment" to take the "severest possible action" under the law in respect of any violation of the FERA Act and other economic offences, Mr Gandhi said issues like transfer of money out of the country or illegal deposits in foreign banks required to be looked into on a continuing basis.

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CSO: 4600/1888

GOVERNMENT REPORT CLAIMS INFLATION UNDER CONTROL

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 21 Jul 87 p 6

[Text]

New Delhi, July 20 (PTI): Inflation in the country is by and large under control and trade deficit in the current year has been reduced, but the balance of payments continues to be difficult, according to a background paper on the nation's economic scene circulated at the economic editors' conference here.

Inflation in 1986-87 was up and stood at 5.3 per cent in terms of the wholesale price index (WPI), but in terms of the consumer price index, it touched 7.5 per cent in March 1987, which was lower than 8.9 per cent recorded in the same period last year. Inflation in terms of the WPI in 1985-86 was 3.8 per cent.

The price rise in the early part of 1986-87 was mainly due to pressure on prices of commodities like fruits and vegetables, oilseeds and edible oils and fibre whose availability was affected by deficient monsoon and restricted imports.

The paper said that the balance of payments, which had improved considerably in the latter years of the Sixth Plan, came under pressure in 1985-86.

Export growth

Corrective measures taken by the government to increase exports and reduce imports, coupled with a sharp fall in international prices of crude oil contributed to an increase of 20.4 per cent in export in rupee terms in 1986-87.

Import expansion was contained at 9.2 per cent and as a result the trade deficit during 1986-87 showed a decline by Rs 438 crores.

The foreign exchange reserves during 1986-87 increased only marginally by Rs 261 crores from Rs 7,384 crores in March 1986 to Rs 7,645 crores in March 1987.

Some of the measures taken included incentives to exporters and encouragement of indigenous production of key bulk import items like sugar, edible oils and fertilisers.

The price situation, the paper said, was kept under surveillance and remedial measures taken.

The thrust of government's anti-inflationary policy continued to be on effective supply and demand management, including strengthening the public distribution system for essential commodities, supply of food-grains to weaker sections under special schemes, regulated release and import of sugar and edible oils to meet the domestic demand, enforcement of fiscal discipline.

Price rise checked

The paper claimed that the various anti-inflationary measures taken by the government had contained the rise in prices.

In 1986-87, the paper said, the growth rate for the gross national product (GNP) was expected to be equal to the Seventh Plan

target of five per cent, despite a poor monsoon. Industrial production exhibited an increase of seven per cent over the corresponding period of 1985-86.

Despite three successive weak monsoons, the food situation remains comfortable—grain production recovered to 150.5 million tonnes in 1985-86 and is anticipated to touch 151 million tonnes in 1986-87.

There is an indication of buoyancy in the industrial investment climate. Consents given by the controller of capital issues for raising capital increased sharply from Rs 2,003 crores in 1984-85 to Rs 3,695 crores in 1985-86 to Rs 5,843 crores in 1986-87.

Sanctions by all financial institutions also went up from Rs 5,647 crores in 1984-85 to Rs 6,614 crores in 1985-86.

In the first six months of 1986-87, this went up by 22 per cent. Total disbursement also went up from Rs 3,502 crores in 1984-85 to Rs 4,920 crores in 1985-86 and further by 16 per cent during the first half of 1986-87.

The Centre's revenues from major taxes, which increased by over 22 per cent in 1985-86, are expected to increase by about 15 per cent in 1986-87. Of particular interest is the buoyancy in direct tax collections which increased by about 20 per cent in 1985-86 and further by about 12 per cent in 1986-87.

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CSO: 4600/1889

GOVERNMENT REPORTS RISE IN EXPORTS DURING 1986-87

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 30 Jul 87 p 9

[Text]

India's exports in 1986-87 touched Rs 12,550.06 crore, registering a 20 per cent increase over the previous year, reports PTI.

The exports in 1985-86 was to the tune of Rs 10,420.37 crore.

According to an official release, the increase in exports has to be viewed against the background of sluggish growth of about 3 per cent in the world trade in 1986 and a general decline in the world commodity prices.

In the plantation sector, coffee exports have increased by Rs 71 crore to reach a level of Rs 306 crore during 1986-87. Coffee prices had been firm till late 1986 but started declining since then. The tea exports have declined from Rs 612 crore in 1985-86 to Rs 550 crore in 1986-87. A shortfall in the production of tea by 41 m kg due to adverse weather, affected the quantity exported; world prices had also been depressed till October, 1986.

The agricultural sector as a whole made a significant contribution to exports. The exports during 1986-87 were Rs 1521 crore showing an increase of Rs 264 crore over the previous year. Spices as a group has done well, though export earnings from cardamom have declined. The Government's decision on long term policy for export of cotton has borne fruit. The exports of raw

cotton increased from Rs 66 crore in 1985-86 to Rs 182 crore in 1986-87. Tobacco exports also went up from Rs 147 crore in 1985-86 to Rs 174 crore in 1986-87.

During 1986-87, the exports of marine products reached a level of Rs 477 crore as compared to Rs 389 crore in 1985-86. The trade is responding to the policy initiatives for upgradation of quality and regarding deep sea fishing.

The leather sector has shown commendable performance largely as result of the policy initiatives taken in 1985-86. The exports of this sector as a whole increased from Rs 521 crore in 1985-86 to Rs 787 crore in 1986-87.

The textile sector, particularly readymade garments, has performed well. The exports of cotton garments, covered by DGCI&S data, amounted to Rs 1038 crore during 1986-87. However, the exports of readymade garments including silk and woollen garments are placed at Rs 1510 crore by Apparel Export Promotion Council. The export of jute goods have declined marginally from Rs 270 crore in 1985-86 to Rs 265 crore in 1986-87.

The exports of handicrafts (other than hand knotted carpets) have also shown a good increase from Rs 123 crore in 1985-86 to Rs 145 crore in 1986-87.

Gems and jewellery sector has shown growth in exports at Rs 2059 crore during 1986-87 as compared to Rs 1498 crore in 1985-86. This was largely due to an increase in export of cut and polished diamonds in which India is now the largest exporter.

The exports of machinery, transport, equipment and metal manufactures (excluding iron and steel) as also chemicals and related products indicate retrieval of the ground lost in 1985-86.

The exports of ores and minerals were static, being Rs 680 crore compared to Rs 686 crore in 1985-86. The exports of iron ore, the most important mineral, however, showed an increase in quantity from 27 million tonnes in 1985-86 to 28 million tonnes in 1986-87. The fall in value terms was due to fall in international prices.

During the year 1986-87, imports increased to Rs 20063 crore from Rs 18371 crore in 1985-86 thus registering an increase of 9.2 per cent in rupee terms, equivalent to 4.6 per cent in terms of dollars.

Among the bulk imports, oil imports during 1986-87 fell by Rs 2265 crore, fertiliser imports by Rs 380 crore, sugar by Rs 227 crores, non-ferrous metals by Rs 52 crore, cereals and cereal preparation by Rs 41 crore and pulp and waste paper by Rs 27 crore.

Among the bulk items, import of iron and steel increased by Rs 235 crore and metalliferous ores and metal scrap by Rs 83 crore.

There was an increase of Rs 394 crore in the imports of pearls, precious and semi-precious stones. This has to be viewed against a very significant increase in exports of cut and polished diamonds which increased by 46 per cent to Rs 960 crore in 1986-87; the value added achieved was Rs 520 crore against a value addition of Rs 299 crore in the previous year.

Machinery imports increased by Rs 1792 crore to Rs 5261 in 1986-87. Among individual categories machine tools increased by Rs 51 crore, non-electrical machinery by Rs 1188 crore, electrical machinery by Rs 316 crore and transport equipment by Rs 236 crore during 1986-87.

the residual category of imports consisting of relatively small and diverse items constitute about 30 per cent of the import bill. This category increased by Rs 2192 crore in 1986-87. Amongst the relatively important products under this category which recorded a raise are: organic and inorganic chemicals increased by Rs 166 crore, artificial resins, plastic material etc, by Rs 145 crore, professional and scientific controlling instruments etc by Rs 117 crore.

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CSO: 4600/1900

SELF-RELIANCE IN OIL TO DECLINE BY HALF BY 1995

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Jul 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 19 (UNI).

CONTRARY to the claims of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the country's self-reliance in oil will decline to 60 per cent by the end of the current plan and to 50 per cent by 1995.

The degree of self-reliance in oil has already gone down from 70 per cent at the beginning of the current plan, to 66 per cent in 1986-87, according to official estimates.

The consumption of petroleum products has been growing at the rate of about seven per cent a year in the current plan. This growth rate is considered essential to sustain the five per cent economic growth rate envisaged in the plan.

The seven per cent growth rate means the country requires three million tonnes more of petroleum products every year. To meet this demand, the increase in domestic crude production should be at least three million tonnes a year.

However, domestic crude production has been stagnating at 30 million tonnes a year since 1985. Indigenous crude production is estimated to touch only 32 million tonnes annually by the end of the current plan, against the target of about 35 million tonnes.

It is estimated that the annual demand for petroleum products will reach 55 million tonnes by the end of the current plan, compared to the estimated consumption of 46 million tonnes in the current financial year.

The current stagnation in crude production is caused by the slippages in all major activities, including surveys, oil exploration and production, during the sixth plan and the first two years of

the current plan.

The import of crude oil and petroleum products by the end of current plan is estimated at 26 million tonnes. Imports are projected to rise to 40 million tonnes by 1994-95 and to 50 million tonnes by the end of the century.

These imports of 40 million tonnes at today's prices would amount to Rs 8,000 crores in foreign exchange before the turn of the century. However, the actual drain on foreign exchange at the then expected price of 40 to 50 US dollars a barrel would be a staggering Rs 16,000 crores, according to official estimates.

Thus, unless sources of oil are discovered and exploited quickly, the country's dependence on imported oil will rise to alarming levels.

Meanwhile, contrary to the repeated claims of new oil strikes, the performance of the ONGC during the sixth plan was considerably below target, according to the report of the Committee On Public Undertakings (COPU).

"There have been slippages in all the major activities like surveys, exploratory drilling and production of oil and gas," says the report.

The total expenditure of the ONGC on surveys and exploration activities during the sixth plan, was only Rs 1,312 crores as against the plan allocation of Rs 1,413 crores, leaving a sum of Rs 161 crores utilised. This is ironic, as on the one hand the ONGC has been complaining of shortage of funds, while on the other it has not been able to utilise even the allocated resources.

The country's known reserves of crude oil might be depleted completely by the turn of the century. The country's balance recoverable reserves of crude oil was only a little over 500

million tonnes. The balance recoverable reserves of natural gas is 490 billion cubic metres.

For each tonne of recoverable reserves of oil, 60 tonnes of geological reserves are required to be established by exploratory drilling. Since the demand for petroleum products is going up at an average rate of three million tonnes, the country needs to establish 180 million tonnes of geological reserves of oil every year.

However, less than 25 per cent of the country's theoretical oil and gas potential has been counted as proven, after exploratory drilling in the last 25 years by the ONGC.

The commission has not yet prepared a time-bound programme for exploration of all the 26 sedimentary basins identified by the Geological Survey of India as early as 1920.

Asked whether the ONGC had formulated any strategy for exploratory surveys and drilling, the ONGC chairman admitted that they have still to carry out about 75 per cent of the work.

The committee was surprised to hear from the ONGC chairman that systematic survey of all the sedimentary basins would not be completed even within the next 20 years.

In its latest report, the committee has passed strictures against the ONGC for its failure to prepare a corporate plan and submit it to the government for approval. The committee took serious note of the matter, more so, as the ONGC chairman had promised the committee in 1985 that the ONGC's corporate plan would be prepared within six months.

The committee has asked the petroleum ministry to direct the ONGC to finalise and submit its corporate plan for approval without further delay.

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CSO: 4600/1887

GROWTH IN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR REPORTED BELOW TARGET

Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN in English 2 Aug 87 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Aug. 1.—The rate of growth in the industrial sector has declined to about 7.5 per cent in 1986-87 compared to 8.7 per cent in 1985-86. It is far below the desired growth of 10 per cent necessary to achieve the 5 per cent growth target in GNP in the Seventh Plan, says the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Expressing concern at this slow rate of industrial growth, a FICCI study on "state of industry" reveals that growth rate of gross profits in 100 selected private companies have also declined from 23.1 per cent in 1985-86 to a mere 15.5 per cent in 1986-87. The performance was worse in respect of both pre-tax and post-tax profits.

According to the study, the unsatisfactory performance in the industrial sector has been due to slow growth in domestic demand, excessive expansion in capacity, disproportionate increase in production costs, infrastructural bottlenecks and illegal imports.

The generation of domestic demand has lagged behind the expansion in industrial production, resulting in huge inventory build-up in industries such as fertilizers, commercial vehicles, agriculture, tractors, etc.

The demand of medium and heavy duty range of commercial vehicles has failed to pick up momentum. The two leading manufacturers—TELCO and Ashok

Leyland—have decided to trim their output for want of adequate demand.

Industry, in general, has suffered on account of high cost of production because of the rise in prices of raw materials and other inputs such as machinery, wages etc.

For higher industrial growth, the study suggests provision of consumer credit by banks for purchase of durable consumer goods, reduction in excise duties of commodities whose demand is relatively elastic as also of products having high share of excise in final prices and expansion of exports specially where there is over capacity.

FICCI study calls upon the industry to utilize resources more productively, achieve better utilization of capacity, reduce inventories, adopt R and D. The Government, on its part, should reduce the cost of borrowing of funds from banks and financial institutions, fix administered prices on the basis of certain efficiency norms, develop infrastructure ahead of demand, involve the private sector in the generation of power, effect better coordination between Coal India and Railways to facilitate the movement of coal and encourage energy conservation and utilization of non-conventional energy sources on a large scale, it says.

/9317

CSO: 4600/1898

BRIEFS

ACCORD WITH INDONESIA--Jakarta, Aug 10--Indonesia and India have signed an agreement to prevent double taxation and fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, an Indian Embassy release said here on Sunday. The agreement signed by the Indian Ambassador to Indonesia, Mr Vinod C. Khanna and an Indonesian Foreign Ministry official, Mr Rusli Noor, envisages tax exemption in income from shipping and air transport in the country of the source. There will be concessional taxation on dividends, interest and royalties in the country of the source to enable accelerated flow of capital, technology and technically trained personnel between the two countries.-- Antara [Text] [Madras THE HINDU in English 11 Aug 87 p 9] /9317

CLOTH FOR USSR--New Delhi, August 11 (UNI)--The National Textile Corporation has clinched a massive buy-back deal with the Soviet Union for the export of 100 million metres of cloth for 200 looms each worth Rs three lakhs. According to the chairman-cum-managing director of NTC, Mr Ajit Singh, this is the first direct deal with the Soviet Union without commission agents. But it does not mean, Mr Singh clarified, that commission agents have been eliminated. It is a normal business practice to have agents in deals with the Soviet Union. The direct negotiation will result in a substantial saving to NTC. Mr Singh told newsmen that the average realisation per metre of cloth export to the Soviet Union would be better than that of in the domestic market, including the cost of inventory for at least six months, which NTC had to per force incur. Beginning 1988, the cloth will be exported to the Soviet Union in five years at the rate of 20 million metres per year. The average price realisation will be Rs ten per metre. NTC will also supply two million metres of cloth by the year-end, a deal for another three million metres by this year-end is under negotiation. Mr Singh said the prices settled for the two million metres of cloth is the same as settled by the Soviets for about 50 million metres of similar varieties with private Indian parties. The Soviet Union had booked orders for import of about 80 million metres of cloth from India, entirely from private parties. NTC had been left out. To offset the imbalance, NTC entered into negotiations with the Soviets at the highest level. The tripartite agreement was signed recently among NTC, Techmashexports, suppliers of looms and exportijon, central textile import organisation of the Soviet Union. [Text] [Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Aug 87 p 11] /9317

DEFENSE INSTITUTE CHIEF--New Delhi, July 31 (PTI)--The renowned international affairs and security expert, Mr K. Subrahmanyam, today retired as director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) here. The deputy director, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, succeeds Mr Subrahmanyam, who was director for a span of 15 years with a gap of four years in between. Mr Subrahmanyam, an IAS Officer of the 1951 cadre, has been nominated Jawaharlal Nehru visiting professor to Cambridge University, a post he will soon take up. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 1 Aug 87 p 5] /9317

ADMIRAL IN USSR--New Delhi, July 26 (UNI)--Admiral R.H. Tahiliani, chief of naval staff left here today on a nine-day official visit to the Soviet Union. During his visit Admiral Tahiliani will meet senior military officials of the Soviet Union and discuss matters of professional interest, an official release said. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 27 Jul 87 p 5] /9317

CPI LEADER SUSPENDED--Communist Party of India (CPI) leader M. Kalyanasundaram has been suspended from the party for one year along with his 16 supporters in the State, reports PTI. The decision was taken at the just concluded meeting in the Capital of the national council of the party. Mr Kalyanasundaram recently formed a parallel committee and started a parallel party journal. Mr Kalyanasundaram has also been removed from the membership of the party's national council and central executive committee. The national council authorised the party's central secretariat to remove Mr Kalyanasundaram from the party if he failed to dissolve the parallel body and close the journal within one month. The State committee has been authorised to remove Mr Kalyanasundaram's associates from the party if they failed to disassociate themselves from the parallel committee within one month. During the last national council meeting in April, Mr D. Pandian, another party leader from Tamilnadu, was removed from the council. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Aug 87 p 1] /9317

TRADE WITH IRAN--Government admitted in the Rajya Sabha on Tuesday that the counter-trade deal with Iran was "in dumps," reports PTI. Commerce Minister N.D. Tiwari told Mrs Renuka Chowdhary, in a written reply that such a situation arose due to divergence in the interpretation of the agreement reached during the fourth session of the Indo-Iran joint commission held in New Delhi in February 1987 by which the Iranian side agreed to effect imports from India of items of a value equivalent to 50 percent of the oil contracted during the period of the oil contract. He, however, said the development was not expected to have any adverse effect on India's trade and foreign exchange position. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 29 Jul 87 p 5] /9317

NEW PRC ENVOY--New Delhi, July 31--Mr Tu Guowai, the new Chinese Ambassador in India, this morning presented his credentials to the President, Mr R. Venkataraman. After the ceremony, Mr Tu visited Raj Ghat to offer his homage to Mahatma Gandhi. [Text] [Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 1 Aug 87 p 1] /9317

CSO: 4600/1916

VELAYATI SPEAKS ON GULF WAR, OTHER ISSUES

46200049 Vienna PROFIL in German 6 Jul 87 pp 43-44

[Interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati by Michael Siegert; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mr Velayati, will you fire on the 13 Kuwaiti tankers which will soon be reflagged by the United States and will be making their way through the Persian Gulf under the protection of U.S. warships ?

[Answer] In the name of God the merciful and benevolent, we will act in such a way as our national and regional interests require it. For its part, Iran has no intention of attacking any ships whatever or to create unrest in the region.

[Question] But there is talk in your country of reprisal attacks and of "bitter lessons" for the United States.

[Answer] If our tankers, harbors and oil installations are attacked, then we will defend ourselves; we will retaliate. But that does not mean that we will attack first.

[Question] What do you have against Kuwait ?

[Answer] We warned the Kuwaitis several times that our patience with them has come to an end. They are financing the Iraqi government; Iraqi aircraft fly over Kuwaiti air space prior to attacking Iranian ships. A large portion of Iraq's weapons is being offloaded in Kuwaiti ports. Peace and security around Kuwait is possible only if that country remains impartial.

[Question] What would you do if it does not ?

[Answer] The Kuwaitis are extremely vulnerable and for another thing they are our immediate neighbors. You know, if we were to decide to respond to their hostile acts, then that would be very easy for us. We do not have to attack the Kuwaiti tankers; we can make life difficult for them in a number of other ways.

[Question] Do you expect the two superpowers to join hands ? The Soviet Union has also offered to support Kuwait.

[Answer] We will never hesitate to defend our rights, if we are attacked.

[Question] Which country do you fear more: the United States or the Soviet Union ?

[Answer] We fear God alone--and no one else.

[Question] Doesn't an escalation of the war in the Gulf increase the risk of intervention by the superpowers and of their dividing up the zone among themselves--as the Soviets and the British did to Persia during the Second World War ?

[Answer] The Persian Gulf is a very sensitive region. If something uncontrollable happens in the area, there will be a ripple effect and everyone will suffer.

[Question] Do you view the situation in about the same way as the late lamented [Leonid] Brezhnev who once called the Persian Gulf a "powder keg" ? Prior to the First World War people used to refer to the Balkans in this way because its conflicts might unleash a global war.

[Answer] No region in history was ever as explosive as this one. At stake are the oil, the economic well-being and the life of the world.

[Question] What are the chances for an armistice ? Would you be satisfied, if the Iraqi military were to topple President Saddam Hussein and if they were to offer to negotiate with you ?

[Answer] All we want is for the Iraqi people to choose its own government and its own fate. The condition we make is that the regime disappear, i.e. Saddam Hussein and his clique who are responsible for this war. In addition, we ask to be compensated for our losses.

[Question] The Gulf war has now lasted longer than the Second World War. Is there nothing else that can be done besides shooting ?

[Answer] There is only one way and that is the ouster of the Iraqi regime. If the weapons shipments to Iraq were to end, the regime would be gone by tomorrow. France is giving Mirage aircraft to Iraq; the Soviet Union is supplying Iraq with MIGs; the United States is providing military information gathered by its spy satellites. Kuwait is supplying money; Egypt and Jordan are supplying soldiers, experts and weapons. Anyone who remains neutral in this war supports the war crimes of this regime by his silence.

[Question] Austria has supplied Iraq with field pieces and an ammunition plant. Has that adversely affected your view of this country ?

[Answer] Officially, we have not been informed of these things by your government.

[Question] Have you purchased Austrian field pieces by direct or indirect means ? We have reason to believe that you did purchase between 40 and 100 VOEST GHN-45 guns.

[Answer] That is not true.

[Question] Did you not say that you captured some Austrian field pieces from Iraq ?

[Answer] I did not say we captured Austrian guns from Iraq. We did capture different kinds of weapons from various countries.

[Question] You bought weapons from the United States. Doesn't it bother you that these monies were used by the Reagan administration to finance the Contras, in other words against Nicaragua, a Third World nation fighting for its independence just as you are ?

[Answer] If we had known that the Americans would use the money for this purpose, then we would not have made these purchases.

[Question] Are those Iranians who dealt with North and McFarlane now being punished ?

[Answer] Certainly not--because these people were essentially just exercising our right to weapons which belong to us and which the Americans were holding back from us.

[Question] Have you extended an invitation to President Waldheim to visit Iran ?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] When will the visit take place ?

[Answer] We have not yet set a firm date.

[Question] Would you care to comment on the attacks against Waldheim ?

[Answer] We view them as pressure being applied by the Zionists. We consider this an insult to the Austrian people. The population elected him president in the kind of democratic process that is customary in your country. Those who voted for him are not children but responsible grown men and women. They are same people as those of yesterday and tomorrow. A small minority cannot be permitted to apply pressure on this country--the more so, since it does not have a good reputation with regard to being humane.

[Question] Do you think the charges leveled against Waldheim are wrong ?

[Answer] The Zionists exert an unjustifiably strong influence on many governments and nations. They create an artificial climate; they force their plans on others; they prepare a soup which others then have to eat. We believe it would be wrong under these circumstances to take part in this. It would

mean falling into their trap. After all, this is the very same Waldheim who held the post of UN Secretary General for 10 years without anyone being able to accuse him of any wrongdoing.

[Question] What do you think we should do ?

[Answer] We have a proverb which says that the family members know best what is happening inside the family and not those on the outside. Mr Waldheim is a citizen of this country. He is an Austrian and you all know what Mr Waldheim was like before; what Mr Waldheim did or did not do. And you elected him. All of a sudden, the Zionists appear and put a question mark over him although they were unable to offer the slightest shred of evidence thus far. Let me give you a piece of advice. The Austrian people should protect its national identity and honor and reject any interference and attack by outsiders. There may be differences of opinion between your political parties; but those you can work out among yourselves after you have repulsed the blackmail and the outside pressure.

[Question] Mr Velayati, Amnesty International accuses Iran of having executed at least 115 persons last year, including six men and two women by stoning.

[Answer] We will not permit other nations to exert political pressure on Iran in the guise of human rights. It is a lie that people in Iran were stoned--at least not during the past year. We will safeguard the legal system of Islam which we consider to be the best. Why is it that some Europeans insist on foisting their values on other people ?

[Question] We did away with the death penalty 40 years ago. Up to that time we, too, could have been accused that such an antiquated procedure was part of our legal system.

[Answer] We believe that this is an eternal law: anyone who kills another person premeditatedly and in full awareness of what he is doing must himself be put to death. Only those who are afraid of being executed will themselves refrain from committing murder.

[Question] But is it also grounds for execution to hold different political views ?

[Answer] In the Islamic Republic it has never happened that an individual was executed solely for holding different political views.

[Question] We were quoting Amnesty International

[Answer] Amnesty International is nothing but a tool of the British government.

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COLUMNIST SUPPORTS INDEPENDENT STAND IN U.S.-IRAN DISPUTE

46560108a Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 11 Aug 87 p 2

[Column by Nazir Naji : "Why Are We Being Pressured?"]

[Text] Had Pakistan not refused to allow the U.S. Navy to use the Karachi port;

Had Pakistan given half as much assistance to the anti-Khomeyni groups in Baluchistan as it had given to Afghan Muhajirs;

Had Pakistan blamed Iran for the attacks on anti-Iranian persons living in Karachi;

Had Pakistan blamed Iran for all the bombs that were blasted in Karachi, transformed these incidents into permanently strained relations with Iran, and facilitated the U.S. activities in the Gulf, we would never had any problem procuring that special steel and our atomic program. I agree with Prime Minister Junejo that all these accusations about our atomic program are just to pressure us.

Common sense dictates that the United States should not demand Pakistan's help in its activities against Iran. Pakistan government just cannot afford to oppose Iran for several reasons.

The largest portion of Pakistan's border is shared with two countries. We are fighting a war with one and have a long-lasting enmity with the other. We are bearing this because we have support from a neighbor and an important regional power (China).

The third longest portion of border is shared with Iran. China does not only support Iran's struggle, but also helps it. Iran is fighting both superpowers in order to keep its own independence. Pakistan's attack against Iran will not only force it into a war, but also will make it lose a warm friend. Result: Pakistan will be surrounded by enemies from all sides!

A Part of Pakistan's population subscribes to Fiqa Jafaria [religious belief] and even a larger portion simply supports fair justice. An attack on Iran will destroy Pakistan's national unity.

Do not the Americans know about these facts? Why are they forcing Pakistan to do something impossible?

..ad the United States not killed Sadat after having him sign a pact at Camp David.

Had the United States not destroyed the Shah of Iran by misleading him?

Had it not given false hopes to Lech Walesa and sabotaged the Polish labor movement.

Had not President Carter shot himself in the foot by taking military action in Iran to free the hostages and had not the United States destroyed Marcos and his beautiful wife, then I would have been surprised at such a strange request by the United States. You know why the United States made this impossible demand and still did not learn anything?

Only yesterday, the United States gave a flag and a captain to each of the Kuwaiti tankers and pushed them toward the Gulf. Then it threatened Iran, "Careful, if you did anything we will punish you." One of these tankers hit a mine. It was learned later that this mine was laid only an hour earlier. Only then did the Americans remember that they had forgotten to bring "mine sweepers" along. It would have taken 2 weeks to get one from the United States and requesting its European allies would have meant listening to West Germany repeat, "our constitution does not allow it." Italy would also have expressed its regrets. France and England are involved in the Gulf. However, they have their own interests; they want their presence felt in this area again. In other words, the United States cannot count on their help in case of a military action against Iran. According to a report by Richard Murphy, Saudi Arabia has given permission to the United States to use its AWACs. Other countries in the Gulf have also assured their cooperation to the United States. The United States wants to get another resolution passed in the Security Council of the United Nations. This resolution will "force" the country which refuses to accept the earlier resolution to end war by bringing in the United Nations task force. Pakistan and Turkey have no alternative but to refuse to help in these "activities." Pakistan has demonstrated its independence and foresight in this affair so far. We just cannot afford any new war. Pakistan has faced enough hardships just for helping in the Afghan mujahiddin. There is more to come.

7997

DEPENDENCE ON USSR FOR SECURITY RIDICULED

46560109b Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 17 Aug 87 p 4

[Editorial: "The USSR -- Enemy or Friend?"]

[Text] General Tikka Khan, secretary general of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), addressing a meeting sponsored by the MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) said that the United States will not help Pakistan when we are in trouble. He said that the USSR has never refused help to a friendly country and would be willing to help us if we extend a friendly hand. Gen Tikka Khan holds a very important position in a political party and the leader of that party, Miss Benazir Bhutto, has talked several times about the Soviet designs and the causes of strife in its various areas. After witnessing the armed aggression into Pakistan, only a person without common sense would think about the friendliness of the Soviets toward any Muslim country. People who used to talk about the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan are silenced by the Soviet admission of their mistake of sending army into Afghanistan. The truth is that be it the Soviet Union or the United States of America, they are both enemies of Muslims. The whole U.S. diatribe about democracy and slogans about freedoms become quiet whenever Israel or the "Jewish lobby" rises against any Muslim country. Israel seems to be United States' representative, but sometimes it appears that the United States is at the beck and call of Israel. The United States wants to rule the Middle East through Israel. The same is true for the USSR. We all know that the USSR is controlling a large area populated by Muslims in the Central Asia. It also has a major ideological difference with Islam. As for its helping friends, a good example would be the USSR role in the Egypt-Israel war. The USSR deserted its close friend Egypt just because its being an Islamic country. Therefore, Tikka Khan should reexamine his hypothesis that the USSR helps its friends. In our opinion neither of the two superpowers is a friend of Muslims. At the same time, no Muslim country is interested in their friendship. We should not have any illusion about our friendship with the United States or the Soviet Union. Tikka Khan may have been referring to India when he made this speech in the MRD meeting. As for India, both the United States and the Soviet Union are its friends. It is, after all, a non-Muslim country!

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BENAZIR'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH PRAISED

46560108a Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 9 Aug 87 p 4

[Editorial: "Benazir's Realistic Attitude"]

[Text] Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), said the other day that she does not want the people to fight in the streets as such a development would definitely invite another martial law regime. She added that she wanted to be very careful. On return from abroad Miss Benazir Bhutto had several political experiences that have made her very realistic. Her fears of another martial law if she brought a popular movement to the street are based on historical facts. Experienced politicians who support starting movements at any cost should take a leaf out of the book of this young and novice politician. Those politicians are not careful even after several bad experiences. If these people give up the idea of "democracy by demonstrations" and demand "democracy by elections" then they will get the political system they have been asking for. Until such a government system is not established, our country cannot progress. Quaid-e Azam [Jinnah] wanted this country to run on democratic principles, we must make his wish come true. We must also remember that democracy will come only with democratic means. We cannot succeed in bringing in democracy without self-control, proper procedures, and peaceful efforts. Disorderly conduct and violence will only pave way for another martial law. We know that from our history, therefore, politicians should practice patience and be very prudent. They should also educate the people about it and not encourage them to participate in violent demonstrations. They can get these people to support them in the next general elections and remove the present government legally. Any other method cannot be democratic.

7997

BIZENJO SEES END OF MILITARY SUPREMACY ESSENTIAL FOR DEMOCRACY

Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu 4 Aug 87 pp 14-17

[Interview with Ghaush Bakhsh Bizenjo, PNP leader, by Asif Bhalli; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] In your opinion which are the most important problems in Pakistan? As the leader of the Pakistan National Party (PNP) what solutions do you offer for these problems?

[Answer] It appears that our country has become "mother of problems." Whether we look at our internal affairs or external, our country seems to be facing a crisis in every area. Our internal problems are mainly economical in nature. There is unemployment, inflation, and lack of progress in the industrial area. Small farmers are facing grave problems. Then there is the problem of various ethnic groups in Pakistan. They complain about unfair treatment. The basic structure proposed for Pakistan in the 1940 resolution has not yet been implemented even 40 years after our independence. The rights of various minorities were sacrificed for forming a federal government. Provinces are unhappy with each other as the result of some policies followed by the federal government. People who supported a central government one time are now in favor of a confederation type of government. Separatist elements have become very powerful in the smaller provinces. Slogans for a confederation are being raised now because of the repeated emergence of martial law regimes. A movement to separate Sind under the leadership of Jiye Sind group has already taken momentum. They are talking about "independent Baluchistan" and the problem of Paktoonistan has emerged all over again. People have lost hope of ever having a democratic government because of the continued rules by various martial law regimes. Our countrymen cannot even think about the possibility of a real democratic government being established in Pakistan. They do not believe that there will be a regime in which the provinces will have equal rights in a federation. Will basic rights be ever available to people? Will there be economic justice? When will the monopoly of landlords and other capitalists over the politics be removed? Will the country ever get rid of the steel grip that the civil and military bureaucracy has over us? Because of this situation, smaller provinces have begun to look outside of Pakistan for help now and the safety of Pakistan has become a question mark. What about the peace and welfare of people? Robberies, thefts, smuggling, drug dealing, regional and communal riots are common occurrences. The nation has divided

into hundreds of groups because of the non-party elections. There seem to be an ocean full of problems in which our country is drowning. The truth is that we do not see any action by the government. The present government is helpless even when it tries to solve the problems that it has created. These problems have choked the government. Our country is not being ruled by the government of Mr Junejo and General Zia, but by the problems. The genie of problems that General Zia has been nurturing for the last 10 years is coming out of the bottle now. This genie will not only devour General Zia, but also the civilian government that he has created. What worries me is that this genie can also be dangerous to our national safety and welfare. The armed forces have not also made the legal, administrative, and legislative systems ineffective to gain power, but also have rendered itself useless by involving in politics. When the agencies that are necessary for a country's safety are weakened, the safety of the country is threatened. None of these agencies have enough power now to save the country. This is what is happening within our country. Now, let us look outside. I would like to refer to a statement made by General Zia in this context. He had said that Pakistan is the only country in this region that could protect the U.S. interests. So, we have made protection of American interests our duty. General Zia made this statement representing a country which is surrounded by four countries that are challenging the United States. In a situation like this when you declare yourself a supporter of one superpower, you are openly asking the other powers to oppose you. If you work against the USSR and India in order to protect the U.S. interests, you are deliberately making the two countries angry. What are these interests that General Zia has taken the responsibility to protect? There are so many U.S. interests that I cannot discuss all of them here. The United States wants to control the oil and other resources in the Arab countries. It wants the Iranian revolution to fail, Israel to become the most powerful country in the Middle East, end of India's status as a nonaligned country, and supply weapons to Afghanistan to fight the USSR. These are the U.S. interests that General Zia has taken the responsibility to protect. You cannot expect favorable results if you work against other countries just to protect some American interests. The United States is conspiring to make Pakistan attack Iran. Both Pakistan and Iran will be destroyed if such accident even happens. The United States will benefit by giving Iran to another ruler of Reza Shah Pahalvi mold who would work for the U.S. interests. Pakistan will be destroyed if it attacks Iran just to make the U.S. wish come true.

[Question] Some of our politicians have begun to subscribe to the idea that a democratic system cannot bring about any changes in this country. Keeping in mind the present political situation, are you also disappointed with the democratic system and thinking about other ways?

[Answer] We are still trying to make sure that there is no large-scale confrontation between the armed forces and the people. It appears that all my efforts are unsuccessful. No one is listening to me. The government just does not want to pay any attention to this issue. The youth will not listen to my preaching in the present situation. When the people lose faith in the democratic system, they go out and look for new ways. Our rulers are forcing the people to ignore the traditional politics and head toward a violent solution. I want to assure you that I will never follow undemocratic or

unconstitutional methods. However, I feel helpless in front of the people who want to bring about changes with these methods.

[Question] If you decide to hold talks with the present government, instead of opposing or confronting it, will you succeed?

[Answer] If we promise the military rulers that their services will be used, we can find a way to negotiate with the present government. However, we must eliminate all influence of the armed forces on the present government if we want to establish a real democratic form of government. The Junejo government will have no role if we choose the latter. General Zia can always replace Junejo with anyone who wants to serve the armed forces. Anyone who wants to eject the armed forces from politics has no room in the so-called civilian government. The people picked by the military officers carry out the services and duties assigned them. They cannot develop an understanding with political parties without the permission of their military bosses. I can openly declare that even today General Zia has all the powers. Better still, his position, chief of army staff, has all the rights and powers. If it were not true General Zia would have relinquished his title after 90 percent of our countrymen came out to vote for his referendum. You have asked me for developing some understanding and cooperation with our civilian government. First this government has to prove to us that it is a civilian government. How can we negotiate with a civilian government which considers leadership of a military general essential for its safety?

[Question] Some people believe that participation of the MRD in the February 85 elections would have opened the doors for a democratic government. The present government, which you refer to as a puppet government, would not be so helpless. You would have been able to establish a real democratic government with support of the people.

[Answer] Had the MRD taken part in the elections and won the majority status, the resulting parliament would not have been any different than the present one. Individuals elected would have been more faithful to the generals than to their political parties!

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CSO: 4656/107

COUNTRY SEEN HEADING TOWARD CIVIL WAR

46460109a Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 17 Aug 87 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen (Retd) Mohammad Azam Khan: "40 Years of Negligence"]

[Excerpts] The third martial law regime, despite its consistency in some areas, has forced the country to face some insoluble and very difficult problems. It is almost impossible to get rid of these problems. Even the 1983 restoration of democracy movement and the 1985 general elections could not get us out of this deep rut. Instead, we sinking even lower!

The 1977 martial law tried to make this great nation lose faith in everything. It distributed the country into innumerable religious, political, racial, and geographical groups. This is the only government that used Islam to break up the Muslims as a group. It brought the religious discussions from the peaceful environments of mosques and schools into the streets. The atmosphere is so full of hatred and disagreement that a true Muslim and a patriot trembles thinking of the results of such an atmosphere. The practice of throwing dust in the eyes of the public in the name of Allah is still being carried on. Our rulers, who had already forgotten the fear of God, are now declaring themselves above such a fear. These leaders established the government to make the dreams of quaid-e Azam and Ilama Iqbal come true, but once they get into the government they try to make the chair of power their ancestral property. The corruption is so prevalent that you cannot even bury the dead without bribing someone. There is no department in the government system that could be called clean. There are, of course, some good people but they are persecuted by the others. Life, liberty, and property of the people are not safe anywhere. The government encourages regional and racial difference. It adopts all kind of methods to spread prejudice among the citizens!

Against this dangerous background, our rulers do not want to see further than their chairs of power!

The struggle to get rid of this curse has reached a catastrophic point. In the light of our experience, we can see the danger of another martial law regime taking shape. Some adventurer might decide to play with the future of the country in his hunger for absolute power. It is a fact that politicians have always paved the way for these adventurers. These politicians gave up at

times when they had chances to establish democratic government just because of fear of their rivals or some false promises made by those adventurers.

The people are well aware of this tendency of our politicians. Even though they know the psychology of the present rulers, they are hesitant in taking some decisive steps. The government is taking advantage of this hesitancy. The politicians are not ready to trust each other even though they know this is a very crucial time. The truth is the people and the politicians have not come closer to each other than they were in 1977.

It is imperative that the real cause of regional and minority unrest be eliminated using some revolutionary approach. The present decayed administrative system should be replaced with a new government system that can implement effective political, economical, and social programs. The habit of taking foreign loan after loan with their compounding interests should be stopped. The nation is already so heavily under debt that there is no room for any more borrowing.

The loans procured in the past were used for the welfare of dictators and their families and friends. This group's hunger for money has increased so much that it has transformed the country into a heroin market overnight!

I am warning the politicians that if they took any more time in getting united then they will lose this war for good. The future historians will suspect their patriotism. The people will be forced to rise and their sword will reap the ripe fields of necks without any discrimination.

The country is standing at the brink of a civil war and foreign arms and ammunitions are being distributed freely. Thousands of insurgents are busy within the country. One person is using our armed forces for his personal gains and has spread a wide network of conspiracies to become a Mogul-e Azam (the great Mogul emperor). The country is being threatened by various dangers from within and abroad. The politicians should be aware of the fatal results if they continue to procrastinate.

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