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CONTENTS

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NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egyptian General Speculates on Possible Conflict	1
American Expectations [London SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI 17 Nov]	1
Iraqi Plans [London SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI 19 Nov]	4
Washington-Damascus Dialogue Examined [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 25 Nov]	7

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Loyalties of PFLP Leader Habash Analyzed [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 28 Nov]	8
Fatah Infrastructure in South Lebanon Described [Tel Aviv HADASHOT 29 Nov]	8

EGYPT

Opposition Parties Demand Guarantees on Electoral Lists [AL-AKHBAR 1 Oct]	8
AL-WAFD Takes Government to Task Over Oil Prices [AL-WAFD 3 Oct]	10
Review on Publication of 1989 Arab Strategic Report [AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI 1, 8 Oct]	11
Columnist Sees Israeli Planning in Temple Mount Clashes [AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 17 Oct]	20
Reporter Alleges Petrochemical Plant Faces Destruction [AL-SHA'B 16 Oct]	22

IRAQ

Christian Sects' Role in Confronting 'Conspiracy' Discussed	23
Christian Leaders React to Crisis [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH 28 Oct]	23
Christian Leader Denounces Foreign Presence in Gulf [INA 8 Oct]	24
U.S. Troops Told To Expect Long War, 'Immense' Losses [Voice of Peace 28 Oct]	24
AL-THAWRAH Holds United States Responsible for 'Massacre' [INA 10 Oct]	24

ISRAEL

Israeli, U.S. Relations Examined	25
U.S. Attitudes Changing [HA'ARETZ 30 Sep]	25
Settlements As Acid Test [DAVAR 5 Oct]	26

MOROCCO

Government Reportedly Refuses Repatriation of Prisoners [Paris LE MONDE 22 Nov]	28
Government to Sell 270 Public Sector Companies [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 23 Oct]	28
Tunis Symposium Examines EEC-Maghreb Relations [MAROC SOIR 7 Nov]	29

SAUDI ARABIA

Brazilians Ship Rockets, Ammunition to Riyadh [Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO 24 Oct]	30
---	----

SUDAN

Sources Close to Bashir Report Policy in Disarray [Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF 24 Sep]	30
--	----

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Pro-Iraqi Stance Analyzed	31
Workers Penalized [London AL-MAJALLAH 26 Sep]	31
Tribes, Parties Conflict [London AL-MAJALLAH 26 Sep]	34

SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Papers Report on Developments in Congress-I [THE TIMES OF INDIA 27 Sep]	38
Gandhi in Amethi [THE TIMES OF INDIA 15 Sep]	38
Singh Resignation Demanded [THE TIMES OF INDIA 28 Sep]	39
Paper, Press Agency Report V.P. Singh Interviews	40
TIMES Interview [THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA 30 Sep]	40
UNI Interview Reported [THE HINDU 4 Oct]	46
Paper Reports Devi Lal Resignation From Lok Sabha	47
Details of Announcement [THE TIMES OF INDIA 1 Oct]	47
Text of Letter [THE TIMES OF INDIA 1 Oct]	48
Congress' Reemergence Viewed [NAVBHARAT TIMES 6 Oct]	49
Editorial Criticizes 'Luxuriating' MPs [ANANDA VIKATAN 11 Nov]	50
Commentary Sees Challenges to Hindu Tolerance [NAVBHARAT TIMES 1 Nov]	51
UP Chief Minister's Hindi Fanaticism Condemned [DINAMANI 19 Oct]	52
Sindhis Urge Indo-Pak Unity for Lasting Subcontinental Peace [NAVBHARAT TIMES 6 Oct]	52
Karnataka: 'Establishment-Rot' Said Spreading [NAVBHARAT TIMES 2 Nov]	53
Helicopter Test Pilots To Be Trained in Bangalore [THE TIMES OF INDIA 1 Oct]	53
General Purpose Parallel Processing System Unveiled [THE HINDU 24 Oct]	54
Agriculture Ministry Predicts Record Grain Output [THE TIMES OF INDIA 2 Oct]	57

IRAN

Trade With Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece Expanding [KEYHAN 10 Oct]	58
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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egyptian General Speculates on Possible Conflict

American Expectations

91AE0128A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17 Nov 90 p 6

[Interview with Major General Husam Suwaylim, ex-director of Egyptian Defense Ministry's Strategic Studies Center, by Tharwat Shalabi; "Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim Completes His Analyses to SAWT AL-KUWAYT; United States Is Ready for War and Decision Will Be Made in Few Days; There Is no Alternative to War; Saddam Husayn's Fall Is International Must; Use of Chemical Weapons Is Possible; Baghdad Threatened With Annihilation;" date, place not given]

[Text] A total of 400 aircraft will deliver the initial blow to Iraq.

They will proceed simultaneously from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. In hours, Iraq's strategic centers, its chemical plants, and its nuclear installations will be turned into rubble.

In the second part of his interview with SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI, Staff Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim outlines a complete vision of the scenario of the initial military blow that the multinational forces will deal Iraq.

He asserts that the no war, no peace condition has ended, that the United States has prepared to wage war, and that the decision will be made in days.

In the second part of its interview with Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim, SAWT AL-KUWAYT poses to him the questions posed to the experts and raised on the political scene, all of which are questions concerning the options of war and peace.

[Shalabi] To begin, we ask: In case the Security Council fails to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and fails to adopt a unanimous international resolution to launch war under the umbrella and supervision of the United Nations, can the United States adopt the decision of war independently?

[Suwaylim] Yes, the United States can. In cooperation with its allies and with the support of the multinational forces amassed in the Gulf, it can launch war to topple Saddam Husayn's regime. But it seems that the United States is seriously trying to obtain the Security Council's approval of the war option.

Features of Coming War

[Shalabi] Should war erupt, this war will be the first of such dimensions since World War II. What form will the battles take and what will be the nature of the military operations?

[Suwaylim] A Gulf war will not be a conventional war similar to World War I or World War II. It will be a sophisticated electronic war. The main first blow in this war will destroy the Iraqi airfields and Iraqi aircraft before they take off.

We can outline our vision of the main features of the coming war in the following points:

1. Superior reconnaissance to determine the sites of weapons of destruction and of chemical plants in Iraq.
2. Deterrence: The multinational forces possess enough means of deterrence to enable them to win the war in days. They have more than 450 nuclear warheads which can be used, if necessary.
3. The multinational forces' highly sophisticated air force is capable of striking Iraq's mass-destruction weapons.
4. Should Iraq succeed in using total-destruction weapons, surface-to-air missiles developed by West Germany and capable of traveling at twice the speed of light will intercept such weapons.
5. Laser and x-ray weapons are a dangerous weapon that can be used in this war. They are targeted at a missile's body to destroy it.
6. There are extremely high preparations to confront a chemical weapon. Precautionary measures are taken in Saudi Arabia at the best levels.

United States Has Prepared

[Shalabi] We are on the threshold of winter. So where do we stand now in relationship to the war indicators?

[Suwaylim] The U.S. forces now stand ready for war. The United States has completed moving its main forces, has finished its military preparations, and has applied the final touches to the coordination plans and to the joint command. The roles have been divided between the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the other countries contributing to the [multinational] forces.

The U.S. forces have become accustomed to the desert climate, have trained, and have conducted exercises to understand the nature of the battle terrain.

The war may be sparked at any moment. Iraq may start it as a consequence of the fearful military, economic, and psychological pressure or of a miscalculation. The spark of war may be ignited when the international blockade fails to stop the flow of weapons and provisions to Iraq.

(Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim, a military expert, pauses for a few moments, examines a number of papers and maps in front of him, and then says clearly and decisively:) I find the war option to be 90 percent likely for three reasons:

First, a main objective of the international military concentration is to topple Saddam Husayn's regime

which, it has become evident, poses a threat to international and regional security.

Other reasons for toppling Saddam Husayn's regime is the fact that this regime now possesses a huge arsenal of chemical warfare weapons, including internationally banned gases, such as mustard gas and binary weapons.

The second serious reason is that, since his occupation of Kuwait, Saddam has come to control 30 percent of the Gulf states' oil production, considering that Iraq produces 128 million metric tons, Kuwait 73 million, Saudi Arabia 251 million, Iran 113 million, and the Gulf emirates 120 million. Iraq's reserves amount to 100 billion barrels and Kuwait's to 94 billion. Prior to the invasion, Kuwait exported 1.5 million barrels daily and Iraq 3.14 million. This means that since its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq has become capable of exporting 5 million barrels daily at a time when the entire world consumption amounts to 10 million barrels daily [as published].

(Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim says:) This condition is serious for the United States which relies on the Gulf for 25 percent of its oil needs. Kuwait and Iraq provide 10 percent of this amount. Would the United States agree to see such a rash ruler as Saddam Husayn control this strategic commodity and to dominate the world oil market?

What is more dangerous than all this is that if Saddam Husayn acquires the means of military and economic power, then this would mean his control of the vital Gulf region which in turn controls international navigation arteries and major oil routes.

For all these reasons, the objective of this military amassment and of all this wait in the region is to completely topple Saddam Husayn's regime and to destroy the infrastructure of his armed forces, even if he withdraws from Kuwait and swallows all his allegations and lies.

The second reason I find the military option to be more likely is this vast international military amassment which is unprecedented in the history of wars.

It is Maj. Gen. Suwaylim's belief that it is impossible for these forces to return to their countries without implementing a specific military mission of a strategic nature now that the international and regional theater has been prepared for this mission, namely toppling Saddam Husayn's fascist regime.

At this point, Major General Suwaylim notes that the multinational forces will not stay in the Gulf endlessly without a military operations plan that has a specific timetable and specific place. The continued presence of these forces in a state of alert and in an offensive position for long periods of time costs millions of dollars, not to mention that such a posture is physically and psychologically draining to the forces.

Tug-of-War

Major General Suwaylim points out two tendencies projected in the strategic outlook pertaining to the crisis and in the White House lobbies. These two tendencies are:

1. The wish of the United States to acquire permanent military facilities and strategic bases in the Gulf in order to secure the oil sources within a regional security system in which Washington plays the main role.

2. Within the security system and on behalf of the United States, Israel will undertake to defend the U.S. and western interests and to provide stability in the region.

The two tendencies are, of course, rejected at the Arab level. However, they both loom on the horizon and constitute two dangerous elements in the U.S. arrangements for the area in the wake of the invasion. This saddles the region's states with the redoubled responsibility of reshaping the Arab system in a manner that does not permit the emergence of another Saddam Husayn.

When he was Israel's defense minister eight years ago, Ariel Sharon declared that if Israel has to defend western interests in the region, then it must get a share of Arab oil revenues!

Did Saddam Husayn realize that his rash act would lead the region to this abyss?

The third reason for the war option is, in Major General Suwaylim's belief, embodied in the Iraqi threats to blow up the Kuwaiti and Saudi oil wells by way of Iraq's agents and through terrorism.

The United States and its allies cannot stand idle vis-a-vis all these threats, especially since Saddam is trying to impose a fait accompli on the world.

War Scenario

[Shalabi] So you find the war option to be 90 percent likely. What, in your opinion, is the expected scenario?

[Suwaylim] There are two possibilities in this regard: Either Iraq will initiate the war or the multinational forces will launch the first blow.

The first possibility is very small, but not excluded. The reason is that Saddam Husayn, who is aware that if the first blow is dealt him it will be fatal, may consider initiating the war in order to reduce the size of his expected losses. This will, of course, be tantamount to a grave mistake and a suicidal act. But if he resorts to dealing the initial blow, this blow will be aimed at the naval units of the multinational forces in the Gulf and against the forces deployed in Dhahran, Hafr al-Batin, and Riyadh. This blow's objective will be to inflict the heaviest losses possible on the aircraft carriers present in the Gulf waters. Saddam Husayn will use all missiles and (sliding) bombs to destroy aircraft runways and will use

chemical gases in all areas where ground forces are amassed, as well as against cities.

Iraq's chemical warfare capabilities are embodied in the following:

Three brigades of Scud missiles, each with 18 launchers and each launcher with the capability to fire six to eight missiles daily, meaning that the three brigades are capable of launching 432 missiles, each of which is capable of polluting 21,600 hectares with chemicals.

But will the multinational forces command allow Iraq to deal the initial blow, asks Major General Suwaylim? He goes on to answer the question personally:

No, of course not because these forces' defense network is so capable that it can move to promptly confront and absorb Saddam's blow and then move to deal a crushing retaliatory blow. However, there are fundamental problems that face Saddam Husayn and prevent his blow from being successful and that foil this blow in its cradle. These problems are embodied in the difficulty Saddam will encounter in determining the targets of his blow as a result of his limited reconnaissance capabilities. Saddam Husayn does not have a military intelligence apparatus capable of determining the enemy targets and of distinguishing their strong and weak points, especially since Saddam is facing a vast number of diverse forces that are spread over more than one front, more than one direction, and more than land, sea, and air site extending from Saudi Arabia to Turkey.

The second possibility is that the multinational forces will deal the initial blow. This possibility may materialize as a consequence of a mistake that Saddam Husayn may make, such as trying to penetrate the land blockade or having his agents perpetrate a terrorist operation against western interests. The western military blow may come as a result of any attempt by Saddam to invade Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, the problem of the western hostages in Iraq is tantamount to a mine that could explode in Saddam's face at any moment and to a concern that could on its own provide the justification for launching the initial blow against Saddam Husayn.

From Four Directions

[Shalabi] To this point, the image and scenario of the expected war is clear. But to this moment, it is not fully known from what direction specifically the fatal blow will be dealt to Saddam Husayn's forces.

[Suwaylim] The initial blow will be dealt to Iraq from four strategic directions:

The first is the Gulf where the naval forces and the aircraft carriers are mainly deployed.

The second is Saudi Arabia where F-16, F-15, and F-111 bombers and fighters are deployed. The third is from the U.S. base in Turkey where B-52 bombers are stationed.

The fourth is from Iran which will take part in striking Iraq in retaliation for the eight-year war. The GUARDIAN has said that the United States asked Tehran to amass its forces on the borders with Iraq in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait.

Despite Saddam's naive endeavor to neutralize Iran, one has noticed that Iran is participating in the international blockade imposed on Iraq on the basis of the Security Council resolutions.

As to the direction of the main blow, Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim has said: It will be initially directed against the strategic centers, the command headquarters, the airfields, and Iraq's sensitive installations. Whoever imagines that the military operations will begin in the direction of Kuwait to liberate it first is wrong. The main objective is to foil Iraq's main force. Iraq's subsidiary forces in Kuwait then will be isolated and will become an easy prey to any military operation.

As to the form of the military blow, asserts the Arab military expert, it will not follow the pattern of the conventional ground wars. Fighter planes and guided missiles will have the upper hand. Intelligence information and reconnaissance through artificial satellites and AWACS [Aircraft Warning and Control System] planes will play the main role in determining the targets of the blow.

In this regard, Iraq is considered to be completely naked before the extraordinary reconnaissance capabilities possessed by the western forces.

Major General Suwaylim says that the fear that Iraq will destroy the oil installations will not obstruct the progress of the military operations. Iraq and Iran did previously destroy each other's military installations which have already resumed their activities.

Major General Suwaylim finds it most likely that the qualitative superiority of the western weapons and munitions and superiority in electronic war will play a major role in swiftly deciding the war because Iraq's reliance on Soviet armament will not enable it to deal with the means of modern war.

Demolishing Baghdad

[Shalabi] What if Iraq surprises the multinational forces with an unexpected fight?

[Suwaylim] In this case, it is likely that the multinational forces will resort to the method that was employed in World War II when the U.S. air force completely leveled the German city of Dresden. This air force divided the city into square sections and squadrons of fighters [as published] leveled and annihilated the city. Baghdad may meet the same fate.

[Shalabi] In war, what kind of problems do multinational forces meet?

[Suwaylim] The most serious problems are connected with coordinating the joint forces' military operations. We are talking here of varied forces from 36 countries. Contradiction or conflict in decisions may develop. The situation requires a general central command for all the forces under the UN banner, as happened in Korea in 1951.

[Shalabi] How likely is it that the nuclear weapon will be used in the war?

[Suwaylim] There are two considerations that govern use of the nuclear weapon.

First, if Iraq possesses such a weapon, then Saddam may use it as a last resort and in an act of total suicide.

Second, if Iraq uses gas bombs and resorts to chemical warfare, the multinational forces may deal him a tactical nuclear blow and may use neutron bombs to force him to surrender.

The gist of the matter is that the images exist.

This is how Staff Maj. Gen. Husam Suwaylim concluded his interview with SAWT AL-KUWAYT.

The region is approaching a dangerous phase in which the major powers will impose completely new political equations. We are on the threshold of a new era of Arab conflicts now that the brittle alliances have fallen and that new alliances have emerged on different bases.

While I was bidding him farewell, the Arab military expert again mumbled:

We are approaching a murky period. God protect us.

Iraqi Plans

91AE0128B London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19 Nov 90 p 6

[Article by Retired Major General Husam Suwaylim: "Scenario of Coming War and Iraq's Confrontation Plan; Strong and Weak Points in Iraq's Military Structure; Experts Expect Blitzkrieg and International Community Is Preparing for Post-Saddam World; Iraq Relies on Old Military Defense Pattern, and Its Offensive Capabilities Are Limited"]

[Text] London—SAWT AL-KUWAYT continues today publishing the second part of the military study prepared by retired Major General Husam Suwaylim on the scenario of the coming Gulf war and on Iraq's preparations for the confrontation.

In the first part, we stopped at the section connected with "Iraq's vision of the course of the defense operation" and at the possibilities that Iraq may try to foil the multinational forces' offensive with suicidal counteraction. But Suwaylim finds such action unlikely for several reasons, the first of which is that preemptive action will provide the pretext for this "international" offensive and, second, because such action will be detected early

by the reconnaissance and intelligence elements of the international forces, thus providing them with the opportunity to prepare for a special confrontation in the area of exposing the Iraqi air elements that will support such action. Suwaylim adds: This is precisely what will happen in the coming war if Iraqi aircraft think of taking off from their airfields, considering that the AWACS [Aircraft Warning and Control System] planes will guide the missiles of U.S. F-15 interceptor fighters toward such Iraqi aircraft to destroy them as soon as they take off, especially with super Sparrow missiles and with surface-to-air missiles that are deployed on a large scale in the region. Consequently, the Iraqi ground forces launching such preemptive action will lack all air cover. This will make it easier to destroy these forces with (Hellfire) and (Hot) air-to-surface missiles and other missiles with which the U.S., British, and French fighter planes are equipped before these forces can engage in ground battles against the international ground forces present south of the Iraqi borders. This situation will lead to the early failure of Iraqi preemptive action. This failure will be made complete with the destruction of the Iraqi ground forces engaged in this action at the hands of the international naval forces which will first destroy the Iraqi tanks and armor with guided anti-tank missiles. Once these forces repel the Iraqi offensive, tanks, accompanied by U.S. assault helicopters equipped with anti-tank missiles and free missiles, will destroy, disperse, and pursue Iraqi tanks and armor in the desert.

Before we move from this phase, we must determine and discover if the Iraqi command plans to engage in such preemptive action and what the objectives of such action are. Saddam Husayn has noted in one of his statements that he will not permit the U.S. forces to deprive him of the initiative to deal the first blow. He means that he has learned the lesson provided by the June 1967 war when Israel launched the second [as published] air strike with which it destroyed 75 percent of the Egyptian aircraft while those aircraft were sitting in their bases and airfields. The sky then became open to Israel to do whatever it wished to do. This means that the preemptive blow which Saddam Husayn intends to launch will seek two objectives:

The first is to inflict the heaviest losses possible on the international forces' field instruments, especially their fighter planes, aircraft carriers, missile-launching ships, and surface-to-air missile batteries in the hope that such a step may temporarily delay the offensive or may eliminate it in light of the losses that will be inflicted on the international forces.

The second objective is to seize vital Saudi territory and cling to it with the purpose of using it for future bartering when negotiations are held after a cease-fire.

This is why it is expected that the Iraqi preemptive strike would be dealt to the international forces in the manner described below one or two days prior to the time at which the Iraqi side expects the offensive to take place.

A. Air raids [would be] launched against U.S. aircraft carriers and against bases and airfields where squadrons of U.S., British, and French aircraft are deployed with the purpose of inflicting the heaviest losses possible on the aircraft which are the backbone of the international forces' offensive action. These raids would be accompanied by opening preparatory fire from artillery (2,000 artillery pieces) and from surface-to-surface missiles against the positions where the international forces prepared for the offensive are amassed, especially at the sites of these forces' artillery batteries, surface-to-air missiles, and command and control centers, with the purpose of destroying or silencing these positions.

B. Under the cover of the preparatory fire, it is expected that two Iraqi armored divisions and one mechanized division will cross the Saudi borders and launch an offensive in the western part of Saudi Arabia, which is adjacent to the Jordanian borders, in order to secure the right flank of the preemptive strike and the Jordanian-Saudi borders (considering that this area is viewed in the Saudi planning as an area of secondary importance by virtue of its remoteness from the main theater of operations in Kuwait, south of Kuwait, and in the Gulf region), to get to and seize the line extending from Ramkha to Ha'il (an important Saudi town), and then to al-Shuqayq, al-Jawf, al-'Isawiyah, and then to the Jordanian borders, and to cling to this line to bargain over it in the future.

But as we have already noted, such preemptive action is doomed to failure due to numerous considerations which we have already cited. Moreover, the three armored and mechanized divisions that would carry out the action will be destroyed by the international forces' counter air and ground attacks which will disperse, pursue, and annihilate these forces in the desert. These divisions will be contained and deducted from the total Iraqi defense force which is needed to manage the Iraqi defense operation when the international forces launch their actual offensive against Iraq from various directions, and this will affect the Iraqi defense capability negatively. Moreover, a defeat inflicted on these Iraqi forces and on the air forces accompanying them in the early phases of the war will cause the collapse of morale among the Iraqi army, people, and regime. Later, this in turn will have a negative impact on the course of the Iraqi defensive operation, considering that it is expected that in the wake of the failure of his preemptive offensive, Saddam Husayn will swiftly request a cease-fire from the Security Council and will respond to the council's resolutions on withdrawal from Kuwait, on condition that Iraq is not attacked and that he keeps his throne in Baghdad. It is expected that Saddam Husayn will make this request no later than four hours after the forces he uses to launch the preemptive strike are defeated.

But it is also a foregone conclusion that the international community will not respond to Saddam Husayn's request unless he abdicates his power and agrees to the international community's other conditions, embodied

fundamentally in dissolving his military establishment, withdrawing from Kuwait, eliminating the mass-destruction weapons with which he threatens, and agreeing to other international guarantees, such as periodic inspections and other guarantees. All these are demands to which it is not easy for a person like Saddam Husayn who suffers from megalomania to respond because, to put it briefly, they mean his committing political, popular, and moral suicide. Therefore, it is expected that Saddam Husayn will decide to continue the venture or gamble with Iraq and its people to the end of the line, threatening anew to blow up the world and to destroy the oil fields and the Arab capitals with his missiles, his poison gases, and so forth. The whole world no longer pays any attention to these threats. This will be followed, of course, by the international forces' continuation of their planned offensive against Iraq.

Should the operations reach this point, then we must realize an important fact, namely that the moment the first shot is fired, especially when it becomes evident that the Iraqi forces' preemptive strike has been defeated, fire will be opened against Iraq from six fronts: Turkey, Syria, Iran, Israel, the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia, as well as from within where the Kurdish and Shi'ite elements opposed to Saddam Husayn's regime and the domestic opposition exist. All these elements, without exception, are impatiently awaiting the moment in which to settle their old and new accounts with Saddam. Therefore, the defending Iraqi forces which are spread along fronts stretching for 3,000 km will have to confront assaults launched against them by several armies from all directions, not to mention internal rebellions by the Kurds, who are estimated at 4 million people, and by the Shi'ite forces controlled by Baqir Hakim and estimated at 100,000 strong.

Initially, the defensive battles will be fought by the Iraqi divisions deployed within the first defensive belt in an attempt to hold on to this belt in the face of the international forces attacking by land or the forces landed by sea on the Kuwaiti shore, relying on dense artillery fire, on a series of man-made positions, and on the firepower of antitank missiles. With success in countering the offensive frontally and in relying on large-scale action to outflank and cordon off these Iraqi defenses, the international forces will also succeed in containing these defenses and in reaching their flanks and rear. In cooperation with the forces which will be landed by air and by sea behind the Iraqi forces, these defenses will be besieged and will collapse. The forces deployed in them will be destroyed and will surrender to the international forces or will withdraw to the second defensive belt.

At the same time the international forces are attacking the defensive belt, other international forces, in cooperation with assault fighter planes, with helicopters armed with (Hellfire) antitank missiles, and with forces landed by air, will attack the Iraqi armored and mechanized divisions forming the second line and reserves found in the second belt with the objective of promptly besieging

and destroying them in cooperation with the containment detachments which will rush swiftly to attack the Iraqi forces where they are deployed and before they can launch their counteroffensives or occupy the second belt. The Iraqi (armored and mechanized) forces found in the second line will try, in cooperation with the forces retreating from the first defensive belt, to repel the international forces' offensive and to launch a counteroffensive to regain the positions on the second defensive belt. But because of the method employed by the international forces—a method known as the air-land battle or the deep battle which relies on the concept of attacking two defensive belts simultaneously—it will be impossible for the second-line Iraqi forces to launch counterattacks or to even succeed in holding the second defensive belt. These forces will collapse and will try to withdraw to Baghdad or flee to northern Iraq.

When the operations reach the phase at which the second defensive belt falls, the Iraqi leadership will exert its efforts to gather the forces fleeing and withdrawing from the first two belts to secure, jointly with the republican guard corps which consists of two armored divisions and two mechanized infantry divisions, the regime ruling Baghdad and to repel the attacks to which Baghdad will be subjected from all directions. But the continued blockade of Baghdad and cutting off the Tigris and Euphrates water from the city will hasten the surrender of the Iraqi forces in Baghdad and the fall of the regime, whether led by Saddam Husayn, if he has survived till then, or by whoever succeeds Saddam to the leadership.

While the international forces are attacking the Iraqi defensive belts, the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, which will constitute a secondary effort to the attacking forces, will have surrendered immediately upon realizing that the road between them and Baghdad has been cut off and that they are surrounded by forces attacking by land from Saudi Arabia and forces attacking by sea and consisting of marine forces and of other forces landed north of Kuwait to block the highway between Kuwait and al-Basrah. This is in addition to the air and missile strikes which will be dealt to the Iraqi forces existing in Kuwait from land, sea, and air. This will hasten the surrender of these Iraqi forces. The Palestinian elements that have supported their invasion of Kuwait will fall easy prey to the Kuwaiti people and Kuwaiti resistance who will settle their accounts with these elements.

If we consider the other fronts defended by the Iraqi forces on the borders with Turkey, Iran, and Syria, it is expected that these forces will employ the same method of fixed defense which is based on clinging to the first defensive belt and then the second defensive belt. But these forces' realization that the Iraqi forces defending the main front in the south have been defeated will hasten the collapse of these forces in the face of the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian assaults, especially since each of these countries has regional demands in Iraq. We find that Turkey, which has nearly 20 divisions massed on its borders with Iraq, has demands in Irbil and Kirkuk provinces which are rich with oil, that Syria demands

al-Mawsil, and that Iran has demands for al-Sulaymaniyah and the Shi'ite areas in Karbala', al-Kufah, al-Najaf, and al-Basrah.

Saddam Husayn will use all the surface-to-surface missiles—both those equipped with conventional warheads and with chemical warheads—he can use at various phases of the defensive operation. He may use missiles with conventional warheads against the multinational forces and airfields where the squadrons of international fighter and bomber planes are deployed while launching the Iraqi preemptive strike. He may abstain in this phase from using chemical warheads so as not to provoke the U.S. forces to use nuclear weapons. It is also likely that Saddam will not use such chemical warheads against the Arab oil fields in this phase so that the international forces may not retaliate in the same way, thus destroying Iraq's oil fields. It is likely that Saddam Husayn will use the surface-to-surface missiles that he possesses in desperate moments of the defensive battle when his defenses totally collapse as a result of the international forces' offensive. In this case, the chemical warheads will be used with the purpose of causing total destruction in the oil fields and in the Arab Gulf capitals and cities. But this Iraqi objective will be difficult, even impossible, to accomplish because of the U.S. strategy which has established a complete system to confront the likelihood of Iraq's use of the total-destruction weapons at its disposal—a system that begins by striking the means used to launch these weapons, including fighter bombers and surface-to-surface missile launchers, on the ground and before the weapons are launched toward their targets and then by intercepting such weapons in the air with antimissile rockets, interceptor planes, kinetic energy weapons and destructive laser weapons, both of which are products of the star wars program. This is in addition to all the precautionary means with which the multinational forces have been supplied to guard against the effects of the use of these (chemical) weapons. The situation may escalate, especially if these weapons inflict heavy losses on the international forces. Consequently, nuclear strikes will be made against the remaining resistance centers surrounding Saddam Husayn, particularly his command center, with the purpose of putting a decisive end to the military operations in Iraq.

Weak Points in Iraqi Defense Structure

The weak points in the Iraqi defense structure are embodied in the following:

First, Iraq's defense relies on the fixed and rigid defense pattern embodied in defense belts consisting of man-made positions and trenches. This is an old defense pattern that dates back to World War I. This pattern has been proven a failure in modern war which relies on mobile defenses. Regardless of how fortified the Iraqi defenses are, they cannot rise to the level of the fortifications of the Bar-lev line which the Israelis built along the Suez Canal's eastern bank between 1967 and 1973. The Egyptian forces were able to penetrate and destroy

this line and to capture the Israeli forces defending it. It has become difficult to have an impenetrable fixed defense.

Second, the Iraqi forces are deployed across long front lines extending all along the Iraqi borders with six countries, namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Israel. In addition, an Israeli reaction is anticipated against Jordan on whom Saddam Husayn relies to protect Iraq's western flank. Jordan will be an easy prey to an Israeli attack aimed at seizing al-Salt Heights-Ma'an line in preparation for implementing the plan to transfer the Palestinians from the occupied territories to East Jordan. This deployment has spread the Iraqi forces thin and weakened their ability to defend and to stand fast in the face of a qualitatively superior offensive launched by the multinational forces, considering that the Iraqi forces are defending across a front line extending along more than 3,000 km. This is something that is unprecedented in history and that will make it easier for the attackers to penetrate the front line in more than one place.

Third, the Iraqi forces suffer from a lack of mobility as a result of the small size of the mechanized and armored units in comparison with the size of the infantry units, not to mention the weak ability of the armored units to manage large-scale armored operations due to the lack of combat experience and of training on this type of armor war. There is, moreover, the poor technical standard of Iraq's obsolete Soviet-made (T-4, T-55, and T-62) tanks, the numerous technical breakdowns from which these tanks suffer, and the difficulty of maintaining them. This is in addition to the Iraqi command's inability to exercise decisive command and control over a massive mobilization of armored units capable of dealing strong counterblows in defensive operations.

Fourth, the Iraqi command has increased its reliance on surface-to-surface missiles and on the chemical munitions it possesses, without taking into account the decisive factor in the use of these weapons, namely the surprise they create. These weapons have lost the element of surprise now that the Iraqi command has made so many statements about them and has repeatedly threatened to use them. As a consequence, the international forces have taken numerous positive and negative steps to reduce the effectiveness of these weapons, not to mention that the missiles delivering these weapons are not accurate and that a long time is needed to prepare them for a strike. This exposes the missiles to detection.

Fifth, [there is] a fearful weakness and deterioration in the Iraqi forces' morale as a result of numerous factors, most significant of which is these forces' feeling that they are fighting a losing battle against forces that are superior to them in strength, size, and quality and their feeling that they have reaped no fruit from the eight-year war against Iran in the wake of the concessions made by Saddam Husayn, that no price was collected for the losses they incurred in the previous war, and that there will be no price for the coming losses. This is in addition

to the disintegrating domestic (front) that is rebelling and complaining against Saddam Husayn and his regime, whether as a result of the oppressive police measures this regime has exercised against the Iraqi people throughout the years of Saddam's rule or as a result of the economic blockade imposed on Iraq, the subsequent worsening of living conditions, the ceaseless conscription of both parents and sons, and using them as fodder for the wars launched by Saddam Husayn from time to time. As a consequence of these wars, children have been orphaned, wives widowed, and mothers bereaved of their children.

Sixth, the defending Iraqi forces in Kuwait will be subjected to fearful perils. These forces will be caught between the fire of the multinational forces attacking them by land, air, and sea and the fire of the Kuwaiti resistance and of the Kuwaiti people who thirst for the moment in which they will take revenge on the invading Iraqi forces that have exercised the most heinous forms of brutality and barbarism.

For all these reasons, it is most likely that the Iraqi defensive battle will last no more than several hours after which Saddam Husayn will ask the Security Council for a cease-fire, declaring his acceptance of all the conditions demanded by the international community, that is if Saddam and his regime's pillars are still alive by then. However, it is most likely that this will not happen, considering that the countdown has already started for the post-Saddam Husayn and post-Iraqi Ba'th Party rule.

Washington-Damascus Dialogue Examined

TA2511171A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in
Hebrew 25 Nov 90 p 2

[Article by 'Oded Zara'i]

[Text] To the same extent that President Bush wants to guarantee continued Syrian participation in the pro-western coalition in the Gulf crisis, President al-Asad wants to extract the maximum in exchange for his support. But more important than that, the summit meeting was an advanced stage in the renewal of the Washington-Damascus dialogue which should, if it continues, lead to a number of international and regional understandings.

Today it has become clear that intensive contacts between senior Syrian and American officials have been going on for the past few weeks, in addition to the visits to Damascus by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, his aide John Kelly, and various congressmen.

Apparently, the Syrians' entry into Christian parts of Lebanon in an effort to oust General Michel 'Awn, which received advanced American approval, strengthened the ties between the two countries and paved the way for the Geneva summit. Because Lebanon is such a sensitive issue, Syria attributes special importance to U.S. recognition of its trusteeship there and this was clearly expressed yesterday.

Syria attaches the same importance to its participation in any Middle East process. It should be remembered that until the Gulf crisis broke out, Syria was isolated from regional inter-Arab politics and was not involved in the political contacts revolving around an Israeli-Palestinian meeting in Cairo. The Geneva summit restored Syria to its status of a regional "power to be dealt with" that cannot be ignored.

Today Syria is the third arm of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian axis that crystallized after the Gulf crisis broke out, leading the Arab camp that opposes Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. However, Washington and Damascus agree only on their opposition to the Iraqi occupation and not on attacking Iraq's military. On the eve of the summit, a senior Syrian official made sure to clarify in the Damascus newspaper, *TISHRIN*, that Iraq represents "a national dimension and strategic depth" for Syria and that its "military strength must be directed against the Zionist enemy."

Anyone expecting "revolutionary" Syrian declarations relating to the conflict with Israel was apparently disappointed. The separate Syrian announcement released after the summit which raises the Arab-Israeli conflict to the top of the agenda restates all the traditional Syrian positions. But there is even something positive in this since, after all, Syria has for a long time refrained from mentioning UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in the context of calling for an international conference for peace in the Middle East.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Loyalties of PFLP Leader Habash Analyzed

TA2811165A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
28 Nov 90 p 3

[Text] The essence of the position of Dr. George Habash, leader and founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], is to fight against Israel while employing all means, including "a comprehensive popular revolutionary war" or a struggle in stages according to needs, in order to fight for the complete liberation of Palestine. Habash loyalties always tended toward Syria, which he termed "the heart of Arab nationalism." To this day, the main headquarters of his organization is located there, despite the fact that since the eruption of the Gulf crisis, he has openly supported Iraq, travelled to Baghdad, and declared his loyalty to Saddam Husayn. During the past weeks Habash has declared in Amman and Baghdad that the armed struggle against Israel and American imperialism must be escalated.

Fatah Infrastructure in South Lebanon Described

TA2911172A Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 29 Nov 90 p 3

[Text] The area north of the Israeli security zone in South Lebanon did not become a restored "Fatahland" overnight. Already in 1983, when Israel was taking pride

in the fact that it destroyed the PLO infrastructure in South Lebanon, Palestinian fighters were infiltrating back—mainly by sea.

They returned from Sudan, Iraq, Tunisia, and Algeria and began rebuilding their organizations which existed in South Lebanon prior to 1982. Today, their deployment is concentrated northeast of Sidon, while the refugee camps in Sidon, especially the 'Ayn al-Hilwah camp, enjoy considerable reinforcement.

As of today, 11,000 Palestinian fighters are concentrated in South Lebanon and the al-Biqa'. They are dispersed in dozens of installations, which even the PLO finds difficult to control. Fatah, however, is once again the leading organization. It has 4,500 fighters and has consolidated an autonomous area of its own in the villages east of Sidon.

The PLO, which is interested in seeing this stronghold grow and consolidate, is demanding that the Lebanese government abide by the 1969 Cairo agreement, which recognizes the legitimacy of an armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. President al-Hirawi though, claims that this agreement was nullified by the Lebanese parliament.

EGYPT

Opposition Parties Demand Guarantees on Electoral Lists

91AA0022A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Oct 90 p 4

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hafiz: "Opposition Calls For Party and Judicial Participation in Preparation of Electoral Lists"]

[Text] Elections are imminent, and with the approach of every election, the problem arises of cleaning up the electoral lists that comprise the names of voters. The opposition constantly complains about those lists, and stresses that they are filled with names of the deceased and emigres. Sometimes there are those who are prevented from the exercise of political rights, or there are names repeated in several districts. This affords an opportunity to falsify elections. The question now is, how can the electoral lists be purged, so that the complaints will end and everyone—majority and opposition—will be convinced of the honesty of the elections?

At the outset, Yas Sarraj-al-Din, the chief of the Wafd Party's parliamentary bloc, stressed the need to purge the electoral lists. He said: "Unless this is done, there will be no free or honest elections. The dead will continue to cast their votes and choose members of the Popular Assembly and the Advisory Council."

He added that the period of amending the lists must not be restricted to the months of December and January, and the first 15 days of February, as is now done. This prevents many who reach the age of 18 after this period from registering on the electoral lists and, consequently,

they are prevented from exercising their political rights, as bestowed upon them by the constitution. That results in political parties and candidates being prevented from gaining more votes. Sarraj-al-Din said that defining a period to purge the electoral lists "was as if we tell the citizens to die only during this period, so that your names can be deleted from the lists."

Yas Sarraj-al-Din calls for purging the electoral lists throughout the year, on the last week of each month. He says that this would require a change in the current law regarding the exercise of political rights. The chief of the Wafd Party's parliamentary bloc adds that to guarantee 100 percent clean electoral lists, a joint committee must be formed, composed of representatives from the political parties and from the Ministries of Interior and Justice, to supervise the process of purging those lists.

Six Months at Least

Ibrahim Shukri, head of the Labor Party and leader of the opposition, referred to the system currently being followed to register names of new voters, and said that anyone who is 18, and has an identity card, has his name automatically entered on the list. This is an imprecise system, because young girls—for example—are not required to obtain identity cards when they reach 18 and, as a consequence, their votes are not cast in elections. A law must be passed requiring everyone who is 18 to register his name on the electoral lists regardless of sex.

Shukri added that registration for the electoral lists must be open for a period of at least six months every year, in order to give the best opportunity to cleanse the lists of deceased and emigres, and to include the names of new voters.

The head of the Labor Party added that the final electoral lists must be distributed to the parties and associations, and displayed in public places, such as village and district councils, so that each citizen can learn the names of those located in his electoral district, and can object if he finds a name that should not be included for reasons of death, immigration, or the issuance of a judicial sentence against that person.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri emphasized the need for the cooperation of all governmental agencies, popular organizations, feminist associations and political parties in cleaning up the electoral lists, so that they will be 100 percent valid.

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, chief of the *al-Tajama'* Party, stresses the need to form committees from the parties and representatives from the Ministries of Interior and Justice, to supervise purging the electoral lists. He emphasized that it was necessary for the Ministry of Interior to require the data it receives from municipal records be used to register the name of every 18 year old, and to delete the dead.

Muhyi-al-Din said that the only solution to guarantee the soundness and integrity of votes is to require each voter to put his signature or mark beside his name, and record the number of his identity or family card, because that would insure proof of any occurrence of fraud. He added that a law must be passed, increasing the penalties for falsifying elections. The head of the *al-Tajama'* Party called on the village shaykhs and leaders to make a strict review of the electoral lists, because these areas are the ones in which fraud frequently occurs.

Periodic Lists

Kamal Kayrah, the secretary general of the Green Party, has called on the Ministry of Interior to request lists periodically from municipal records and from the Ministries of Health and Immigration, of the names of those who have reached 18 years of age, in order to include them on the electoral lists, and the names of the deceased and of those who have definitely immigrated from Egypt, in order to delete them from the lists. He says that this data would give the Ministry of Interior sufficient information to enable it to prepare electoral lists that would be difficult to contest.

No Substitute for the Judiciary

Muhammad al-Mulayji, secretary general of the Young Egypt Party, stressed that full judicial supervision over elections is the only guarantee of their integrity, because it would insure the disclosure of any tampering with electoral lists. He said that there must be emphasis on the identity or family card, or on any official document that establishes the voter's identity, so as to prevent anyone from assuming the identity of a deceased person, for the benefit of a specific party or candidate.

Muhammad al-Mulayji supported the party leaders' demand that a committee be formed from the political parties and Ministries of Interior and Justice to supervise cleaning up the electoral lists.

Finally, we come to the comments of the Ministry of Interior, and its views vis-a-vis the issue raised by the party leadership. Major General Ibrahim Muharram, first assistant minister of interior for administrative affairs, and supervisor of elections, stated that law no. 73 for 1956, and its implementing statute, regulates the process of exercise of political rights. It sets the month of December of each year to register the names of new voters who have attained the age of 18, and stipulates the period from 1 January to 15 February of each year to submit challenges with regard to the electoral lists. After that, opening the lists to add or subtract any name is not allowed. Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Muharram added that the process of preparing and purging the electoral lists is done in seven stages, in order to guarantee 100 percent integrity and honesty of the lists. The first of these stages is to form a committee in each precinct and police station, chaired by the secretary of municipal records, and with members that include several workers in local government units, to edit the lists of births and deaths.

In the second stage, lists are prepared with the names of citizens who have enlisted in or been discharged from the armed forces and police, and lists are prepared of citizens who have sentences against them that preclude them from exercising their political rights.

The third phase consists of deleting names of the deceased from the electoral lists; placing the phrase "armed forces" by the names of voters who have enlisted because they are forbidden to vote; deleting the phrase "armed forces" from beside the names of voters who have been discharged and have become civilians so that they may be permitted to vote; putting a mark by those who have been sentenced in order to prevent them from casting their votes; and registering new voters who have attained the age of 18.

In the fourth stage, a committee is formed to receive registration requests to insert names on the electoral lists in the event it is proved they have not been included on another district's list.

The fifth phase is when the electoral lists are displayed for citizens, beginning 1 January and up to the end of that month, in villages, shaykhs' offices, and public places, which are determined by the director of security. With this phase, the sixth stage begins, when challenges are received beginning 1 January and ending 15 February. A committee, composed of the director of security of the governorate (chairman), a judge, and a member of the Public Prosecutor's Office, renders judgment with regard to these requests. Judgment is made 10 days from the submission of the challenge.

In the final phase, the General Bureau of Elections is informed of the number of voters registered on the electoral lists before the process of addition or deletion, and the final number after the lists have been prepared.

No Stipulation in the Law

Regarding the possibility of political parties participating in supervising preparation of the electoral lists, Major General Ibrahim Muharram stated that there is no provision in the law allowing that. "Whenever such a law is passed bestowing this right, we will implement that law."

AL-WAFD Takes Government to Task Over Oil Prices

91AA0017A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 3 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Jamal Shawqi: "Government Over Oil Barrel. Gradual Increase in Gasoline Prices Behind Blazing Prices. People Enraged by Disregard for Real Reasons and Consequences"]

[Text] The government has manipulated oil prices twice in a matter of 150 days.

It raised oil prices by 40 percent the first time and 10 percent the second time.

Every time gasoline prices rise, prices of goods and services go ablaze. And each time, the government overlooks the real reasons for the price hikes just as it overlooks their dangerous consequences.

At times, the government is satisfied with announcing unacceptable justifications and, at other times, it prefers to remain silent!

But, it always overlooks or deliberately and misunderstandably forgets to grapple with the impact of such a hike.

And by drawing up an official plan to raise the price of gasoline, electric power, and all petroleum products by three times the current price in the next three years, it looks like it is dancing over an oil barrel.

A gasoline price hike sets other prices ablaze.

And government disregard for its impact strangles the companies.

What is most dangerous, however, is the government's disdain for the citizens' feelings and minds as well as their budgets.

The process of raising prices is done as if nothing has happened and as though no one is aware of it or is scorched by it!

The government imagines that passing a decision to raise prices, coupled with a statement by a minister affirming that the reason behind the hike is the government's wish to grapple with the budget deficit, would make people happy and favorably disposed toward it and to the reform plan, thus acquiescing and keeping quiet!

The government is wrong in its assumption that such a statement is persuasive to the people for they are well aware that the budget deficit is tackled, not only by raising prices, but by raising production and exports as well because the price remedy is the simplest and most dangerous cure.

The proper way to deal with the deficit is to reform the public sector, to deregulate the private sector, and to promote exports!

But why is the government being secretive about gasoline price hikes? Why does it not issue a statement citing the real reasons for the hikes and outlining their consequences and how they can be averted!

Oil, just like water, is the sinew of life, and any increase in its prices raises the prices of gasoline, electric power, solar [fuel], and all types of energy, thus automatically driving up the prices of goods and services.

If oil prices go up and prices of goods and services do not, companies and institutions, be they public or private, suffer an imbalance. Costs go up while mandatory prices maintain their level, causing companies to founder and have a budget imbalance, and, in an effort to cut their losses, they curb production by putting new

products on ice and instituting a hiring freeze or perhaps actually laying off their employees.

And, in a way, raising prices without raising salaries kills the national economy and places unreasonable pressure on limited-income groups. If salaries and wages are not raised, who would buy the goods and products?

The recent 10 percent increase the government set last week on the price of gasoline raises the price of all goods and services by varying rates of no less than 10 percent and no more than 30 percent, depending on the amount of gasoline these goods and services need, beginning with the price of plastics and ending with the prices of fruit and vegetables that are transported in cars that, of course, use gasoline, and, in between, the cost of buses, taxis, and all other means of transportation.

Some companies have been forced to raise the price of their goods and their services to counter the recent increase while others preferred to cover it under their budgets, if only for the time being.

Reports received by the prime minister, Dr. 'Atif Sidqi, confirmed that the Egyptian market has been able to absorb the new increase!

The truth is that public sector, private sector, and investment sector companies are revising their price costs in the wake of the new increase and also will revise their price figures after every increase in the price of gasoline and oil products.

But, what will happen when the government completes the plan it took upon itself before the World Bank and the IMF? The plan, which the government considers "very private" and has kept under wraps, calls for the standardization of energy and oil products' prices in Egypt with free world prices, which means raising the prices of gasoline, petroleum by-products, and electricity by three times the current level over the next three years to equal world prices during the 1994 fiscal year.

Persistence in the current government policy vis-a-vis this serious issue threatens the country with disaster. For how can the government embark on a full plan to standardize and raise gasoline and electricity prices while overlooking the consequences and impact such a raise will have on the Egyptian people and the national economy!?

The current government does not plan to compensate the people for such price hikes and is leaving it up to the companies to raise their prices in proportion to the gasoline price hikes, thus destroying the most important part of the economic chain known as the market mechanism or the relationship between the consumer and producer and prices and wages.

The question is: How can the government carry out its plans to raise the prices of gasoline, electric power, and oil products under its current policy?

The plan is extremely dangerous because, if oil prices were to be rolled back to their pre-Iraqi-invasion levels, it calls for raising oil and electric power prices in Egypt by three times the current level, a tremendous increase that, if not coupled with another plan to raise salaries and wages as part of the sweeping economic reform, is bound to set ablaze not only prices, but the national economy as a whole.

Egypt has several prices for gasoline and oil products: public sector prices, private sector prices, government prices, investment company prices, and export prices!

Egypt consumes about half its nearly 800,000 barrel-a-day oil production. The truth is that higher oil-product prices, to a certain extent, cause consumption rates to come down and the export volume to go up. But, the "insatiable" appetite of public-sector companies and government departments for gasoline and oil products and the great waste, estimated by officials and experts at 30 percent of their overall consumption, prompts us to ask the government to rationalize oil consumption, not by putting out statements, but by actually doing something about it!

The government's persistence in its policy of grappling with the general budget deficit by raising prices, foremost the prices of energy, to "adjust" budget figures leads one to wonder about the inevitable end of the policy of dancing over an oil barrel that the government is now following, silently as it imagines!

Review on Publication of 1989 Arab Strategic Report

91AA0038A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic
1, 8 Oct 90

[Article by Khalifah Adham: "The 1989 Arab Strategic Report"]

[1 Oct 90 pp 42-44]

[Text] Al-Ahram Institute's Center for Political and Strategic Studies has recently published the fifth edition of the "Arab Strategic Report." This 1989 report was prepared by an editorial team of approximately 40 researchers who were supervised by al-Sayyid Yasin, the director of the center. Mr. Yasin was assisted by three advisers: Dr. Sami Mansur, Dr. 'Ali-al-Din Hilal, and Dr. Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim. Dr. Usamah al-Ghazali served as general coordinator. The team of researchers is divided into five task forces, each of which undertook the task of drafting a report on one basic subject: the international and the regional system, the Arab system, the Arab Republic of Egypt, economic research, and military research. As usual, the report has three parts, each of which consists of four sections. These are:

The international and regional system contains four sections: the Arab homeland in international politics, regional Arab interactions, economic developments

worldwide and the challenges of the nineties, and Arab security: the Arab-Israeli military balance.

The Arab regional system contains four sections: the political structure of the Arab system, the state's elite and the management of political pluralism in the Arab homeland, the people and the Palestinian struggle, and Arab economics.

The Arab Republic of Egypt contains four sections: the political system, the national economy, foreign policy, and defense and military power.

In addition, the report which starts with an analytical introduction written by the editor-in-chief ends with an analytical table. A brief review of the contents and substance of "The 1989 Arab Strategic Report" follows.

First, the International and Regional System

The first section is devoted to a study of how conditions in the Arab region and in the Middle East are affected by the interplay between the two superpowers and also by the interplay between the major international powers (the European Community, Japan, and China). This year's report deals with this subject for the first time.

The report states that U.S.-Soviet relations got closer in 1989 as forces continued to bring these countries closer together. This year many of the obstacles which had prevented the two countries from reaching agreement on limiting short- and long-range missiles were removed, and an agreement was reached on limiting these missiles and on limiting traditional and chemical weapons as well as nuclear experiments underground. This agreement was reached when the Soviets made successive concessions and gave up positions, which in the past, they had disagreed with and rejected.

The report also indicates that 1989 was a year in which tendencies seeking to bring about change and reform in the countries of eastern Europe continued to receive support. The progress that was made in some of these eastern European countries toward political and economic liberalism induced NATO countries and Warsaw Pact countries to strengthen their relations with each other far from the watchful eye or the intervention of the leading country in each one of these camps.

The report points out that as the Soviet role shrinks, the United States is singlehandedly managing conflicts in Third World countries. Taken together, these developments affected the situation in the Middle East as the Soviets pulled back from conflicts in the region, leaving the Americans alone on the scene. In 1989 most eastern European countries, primarily the Soviet Union, got closer to Israel.

The report deals with economic relations between the two superpowers and all the Arab countries together. The United States is considered the second most important trade partner for the Arab homeland after Japan. At the same time, the Arab homeland in its entirety was the

seventh most important trade partner for the United States in 1987. In 1981 the Arab homeland was the United States' third most important trade partner. The Arab homeland, which is considered the tenth most important exporter of Arab goods to the United States, is also the sixth most important importer of U.S. goods. In 1987 the Arab homeland realized a trade surplus with the United States of \$278 million. At the same time the report makes it clear that the Soviet Union is considered a marginal trade partner for the Arab homeland in its entirety.

The report provides tables showing international trade, during the period from 1981 to 1987, between the Arab countries and the two superpowers and between the Arab countries and the other major international powers.

The role of the other major powers in the world, namely, the European community, Japan, and China, was studied for the first time in this edition of the report, which devoted pages to that subject and to the subject of relations between these countries and the Arab homeland. This is based on the premise that the political and economic role played by these powers in international relations has been growing. In addition, these countries have economic relations with the Arab countries.

The report takes note of the changes which are taking place in these countries' domestic conditions and in their relationships with the two superpowers and with Arab countries. The European Community is placing special importance on expediting implementation of the plan for a united Europe in 1992, especially in the wake of developments in eastern Europe and the movement toward a declaration of unity between the two parts of Germany. All of western Europe is considered the largest trade partner for the Arab homeland. With regard to Japan, however, that country's economic and technological influence has been growing. But although Japan's influence in technology has been growing, its political influence remains relatively weak despite its attempts to translate that economic influence into political influence. Japan is considered the Arab homeland's foremost and most important trade partner. The report refers to China's 1989 domestic challenges, and it also refers to China's sympathy and support for the Arab point of view regarding the Palestinian question.

The report affirms that the influence exercised by these three powers, namely, the European Community, Japan, and China, remains limited as far as the world's security and political questions are concerned. That influence is limited when compared to the influence exercised by the two superpowers.

In the second section, "Interactions between Arab Countries and Their Geographical Neighbors," the report examines these interactions with neighboring countries in Africa (Ethiopia, Chad, the Senegal), with neighboring countries to the north (Turkey), and with neighboring countries to the east (Iran). At the same time pages of the report are devoted to studying the interplay between

Arabs and Israelis from the standpoint of the conflict between them. The report follows the development of that conflict throughout 1989 by observing and analyzing its developments. It points out that 1989 was a year during which many initiatives for a political settlement of the Palestinian problem were continuously being set forth: local (Israeli) initiatives, regional (Egyptian) initiatives, and international (Soviet and American) initiatives. Israel's position in 1989 was characterized by the many initiatives that country set forth to reach a settlement of the Palestinian problem and to determine the future of the occupied territory and its relationship to Israel. The report also reflected the polarization which is taking place in Israel between political forces and those who are in power over the subject of direct talks with Palestinians from the occupied land but not with the PLO. At the same time, the Palestinian conduct on the whole in response to the Israeli idea, or the so-called "peace initiative by the Israeli government," was reactive. The PLO too had set forth its own initiative in the European parliament in September 1988.

With the exception of Egypt, the conduct of Israelis and Arabs reacting to each other was mostly confrontational. No examples of cooperative conduct were seen.

The report points out that all the initiatives which were made to bring about a political settlement of the Palestinian question failed in 1989 when they were faced with Israel's refusal to accept any role for the PLO. The armed Arab-Israeli conflict underwent some change, even though its general course continued to reflect the forms of armed conflict which existed previously. This conflict, then, remained generally unchanged since it was not upgraded to a regular war, whose military and political restrictions would not have precluded the parties to the conflict from carrying out broad-scale military operations.

In addressing the interplay between Arab countries and their neighboring countries in Africa, the report discusses Arab relations with Ethiopia, with Chad, and with Senegal. These countries are seen as the link between Arab countries and the countries in the central and southern parts of the African continent. Arab relations with Ethiopia are affected by two kinds of factors: one kind, manifested in the economic influence that some Arab countries have, attracts African countries to Arab countries and fosters closer relations with them. Economic influence is an inducement for closer relations. But there is also the Eritrean problem, which is a difficult problem that cannot be decided militarily. Some Arab parties have been supporting the Eritrean rebels. Furthermore, there are other factors, such as cultural and educational differences, which represent the essential incompatibility in the relationship between Arab and African countries. Other such factors include issues regarding the border with Somalia, Ethiopia's military and political support for John Garang's movement in south Sudan, the Eritrean problem, and Ethiopia's opposition to declaring the Red Sea an Arab body of water.

Another such factor manifests itself in Ethiopia's increasingly active relationship with Israel.

The report traces Arab-Iranian relations, pointing out that the deadlock still stands and that, contrary to expectations, no concrete relaxation of tensions has come about. The report attributes the lack of change in that situation to Iran itself and also to the Arab view. The report also mentions three factors behind the deadlock in Arab-Iranian relations. These are:

- Faltering talks between Iran and Iraq throughout 1989. The report mentions that Iran tried to open the question of its relations with Arab parties by dealing with each party separately. With Egypt, Iran released Egyptian prisoners. Egypt, however, thought that such matters should be handled in the context of a comprehensive settlement of the issues between Iraq and Iran.
- Continuing differences between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] countries. Foremost among those differences is the one between Iran and Saudi Arabia regarding Iranian pilgrims.
- Iran's intervention in the Lebanese question. This third factor is one that is complex and complicated and involves Iran's political use of the hostages.

According to the report, Arab-Turkish relations are a unique example of relations in which latent prospects for cooperation are just as significant as other factors in those relations which could lead to tension and even to an explosion.

The development of Turkey's strategic role in the area was affected by several factors which happened in the previous decade. While the reality of Turkey's relations with Arab countries is somewhat positive, it is not quite ideal. The report mentions several problems between Turkey and Iraq and Syria. There is the problem of the Kurdish minority on the borders which are shared by Turkey, Iraq, and Syria; and there is the problem of Iskenderun Province, which is under Turkey's control but which was originally Arab territory. Finally, there is the problem of water, a problem with grave implications. The Arab homeland is considered the most important market for Turkish exports. Iraq alone, after West Germany, is considered the second most important market in the world for Turkish exports.

The Third Section: Economic Developments Worldwide and the Challenges of the Nineties

This section is devoted to discussing economic performance indicators worldwide, the October crisis in world money markets, and economic challenges worldwide in the nineties.

With regard to economic performance indicators worldwide, the report refers to preliminary estimates made by the IMF and by competent UN organizations indicating that rates in production growth and income growth would decline worldwide in 1989. These estimates indicate that the rate of growth worldwide will decline to 3.4

percent in 1989, compared with 4.4 percent in the previous year. This decline in growth, however, will reflect a discrepancy in performance indicators between the economy of one group of nations and the economy of another group. Whereas the rate of growth in western industrial countries will decline from 4.1 percent in 1988 to 3.1 percent only in 1989 and then to 2.9 percent in 1990, the opposite is expected to happen in the developing countries, with the exception of China. According to these estimates, the rate of industrial growth in the developing countries will rise from 3.6 percent in 1988 to 4.1 percent in 1990.

The report also reviews changes in interest rates and in rates of. . . [The rest of the sentence is missing in the Arabic text.]

The report took note of institutions of the economic system worldwide, reporting on the summit meeting of the Big Seven Industrial countries and the most important issues discussed at that meeting as well as its most important results. It also reviewed the European Economic Community [EEC] summit meeting in Madrid, and it discussed its role in paving the way for Europe's economic unity which is expected to materialize by the end of 1992. The report reviewed the EEC's activities in 1989, particularly those which have to do with the EEC's position on developments in eastern Europe and German unification. The report also reviewed the business activities of the world bank and the IMF during that year as well as developments in OPEC and in the Community of 77 which celebrated the 25th anniversary of its establishment in 1989. The report placed special emphasis on the position of this community on the question of debts, which is one of the most important challenges facing its members.

Under the title, "Economic Challenges Worldwide in the Nineties," the report discussed the economic goals which must be confronted and met in the nineties by the principal parties of the economic system worldwide. The report highlights three challenges. The first one is the ability of socialism to confront its crisis of destiny and the extent to which Gorbachev will succeed in completing his reforms. The second challenge is that of the ability of industrial, capitalist countries to resolve their contradictions. The third challenge is that of the ability of Third World countries to confront the challenges of development and industrialization, to put an end to the worsening crisis of foreign debts, and to effect the success of joint economic activity undertaken by these countries to confront challenges and new changes worldwide.

According to this report, these challenges as a whole can all be attributed to the tremendous discrepancy in the distribution of production and in the level of productivity in the world.

The Fourth Section: "Arab Security: the Arab-Israeli Military Balance"

This section devotes itself to studying the changes in the military balance between the Arabs and Israel with regard to the quality and quantity of traditional weapons (the balance in land, air, and sea weapons) and of non-traditional weapons (surface-to-surface missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons). The report indicates that by and large the Arab countries continued to maintain a significant superiority in 1989 over Israel's principal land weapons systems. Although some countries had more weapons and equipment than Israel does, it is likely that there is a difference between the quality of weapons used to arm land forces in Arab countries and those used to arm land forces in Israel.

There were no major changes in quality this year to affect the military balance in the air. The air forces of the countries in the area are still receiving top priority when it comes to weapons programs for these countries. With regard to the military balance at sea, some countries are in the process of reviewing their naval forces in light of their needs and maritime interests. Naval power is becoming more important to the strategic balance of the countries of the region.

Regarding the military balance in nontraditional weapons, surface-to-surface missiles continue to be important and to get priority in weapons programs for the countries of the region. The acquisition of long-range missiles gets most of the attention. There was no major change, however, in the chemical weapons capability of the countries involved in this Arab-Israeli military balance. Neither the number of countries with chemical weapons rose, nor did the chemical arsenal grow. The report affirms and everyone agrees that Israel continues to be the only country in the region which owns nuclear weapons.

Second, the Arab Regional System

The first section of this part discusses "The Development of a Political Framework for the Arab System" by tracing and analyzing three topics: the performance of the Arab League, the performance of regional groupings, and, finally, the Arab press as an area where nonofficials can interact within the Arab system.

The report starts out by discussing the Arab League's failure to play its part effectively. The Arab League, which is still unable to pursue efforts to stop the decline of the Arab system, has not been able "to develop the task of stopping that decline into an effort that would seriously stir up and mobilize the system's capabilities." The report lists several principal characteristics of the Arab League's performance this year:

- A continued reliance on emergency summit diplomacy instead of ordinary summit meetings.
- The emergence of a clannish spirit in interactions within the Arab League.

- A continued decline in the role of Arab radicals in the league's institutions.
- A growing gap between resolutions made by the league, on the one hand, and implementation of these resolutions on the other.
- A weak collective performance by the league's institutions as well as the weakness of ministerial committees formed by the league's general assembly.
- The continued ambiguity of the consequences of Egypt's full return to Arab League institutions.
- A continued improvement in the performance of Arabs in the area of foreign politics.

It may be said that although no progress was achieved in Syrian-Iraqi relations at the Casablanca Summit Conference which was held in May 1989, that summit did get off to a serious and successful start in its attempt to solve the problem of the civil war in Lebanon. A resolution was adopted at that summit to form the Tripartite Committee whose members were the kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco and the president of Algeria. The importance of this resolution lies not only in the fact that it is the first serious Arab resolution regarding the crisis, but also in the fact that it was adopted. Despite all the complications which characterized the session in the face of the hard-line position taken by the Arab Cooperation Council and its objection to Syria's presence in Lebanon, some of these countries were eventually dissuaded from their hard-line position, and they were persuaded to recognize Syria's interests in Lebanon and to stay in step with the general tendency at the conference. The Tripartite Committee managed to find the best ways for ending the crisis in Lebanon at the meeting which took place in al-Ta'if, albeit implementation of its recommendations to end that crisis continued to falter till the end of 1989.

The report makes it clear that, except for the question of Lebanon, the Arab League scored no similar success on other Arab questions. Its failure to succeed was mainly attributable to rapid international developments, at least some of which can be considered unfavorable to Arab interests. The report lists as examples of such developments the movement of the economic system worldwide toward blocs which are formed by the advanced countries and which are likely to push small countries to the sidelines. There is also the large number of Soviet Jews who are immigrating to Israel and the profound changes which are taking place in eastern Europe. These changes led to new relationships being formed between these countries and the countries in the region. Foremost among these new relationships is the restoration of diplomatic relations between these countries and Israel.

Regarding the Arab League's shortcomings in confronting pressing Arab problems and its foot-dragging with regard to playing a prominent role in activating the institutions of the Arab system, the report cites as evidence two cases which are of special importance. One is the league's failure to move forward on a plan advanced by some Arab countries to amend the charter of the Arab League to make it consistent with current developments. The other case involves Resolution

Number 1056 of 1988, which was issued by the league's Economic and Social Council, and Resolution 1086 of 1988, which stipulated reducing the institutional staff for functional cooperation among Arab countries by abolishing some specialized organizations and merging others together under the slogan of ending duplication and reducing expenditures. The report describes the consequences of this resolution as "a severe blow to joint Arab action."

The second subject which is discussed in this section is that of the phenomenon of Arab regional groupings. The possible consequences of the rise of such groupings on the Arab system are explored: would such groupings move the Arab countries closer to unity, or would they lead to the division of these countries? The report explores these possibilities by taking note of how these groupings are run and how they handle their relationships with each other and with the Arab League and its institutions. The report attributed the reasons for the rise of these blocs to the fact that some Arab countries are convinced that ongoing international and regional developments require collective, not national action and that this is happening at a time when the institutions of the Arab League appear to be inadequate and unable to cope and keep up with these new developments.

The report also touched upon the effectiveness of these groupings, which is still less than what is required. These groupings are institutions lacking organizational coordination and reciprocal commitments, and that creates suspicion that these groupings could scatter and divide the attention of Arab countries, and that would do more than merely undermine the Arab League.

This 1989 edition of the report takes a close look at how nonofficial Arabs interact with each other by following the Arab press, which is a nonofficial medium. The report, which devoted attention to Arabic newspapers that are sold outside a country's national boundaries, started its examination with the premise that Arab unity depends now to a large extent on the possibilities of nonofficial institutions crossing national boundaries and becoming linked to each other and merged together in a sphere which transcends that of national boundaries. This is because the Arab press is the most dangerous nonofficial institution; it is the one whose influence in shaping public opinion and the Arab mind in general is the most far-reaching. The report explains that Arab newspapers and magazines surmount national boundaries to the extent they are distributed and marketed outside the countries in which they are published. Only Lebanese, Egyptian, Gulf, and to a lesser extent, Jordanian publications have accomplished that. High transportation costs and other high costs limit the spread and distribution of Arab newspapers which are published abroad in countries to which Arabs immigrated. In addition, the strict censorship employed by some countries limits the circulation of these newspapers and prevents Arab newspapers from surmounting and crossing national boundaries.

The report makes it clear that the substance of the mission of the press represents one dimension of surmounting the regional character of the press inside and outside Arab countries. The report mentions in this regard that the expatriate Arab press is distinguished by the fact that it stays out of the propaganda battles which could break out between Arab regimes.

[8 Oct 90 pp 42-25]

[Text] In this issue we continue publishing the second part of the review of "The 1989 Arab Strategic Report." In the first part we reviewed the international and regional system, interactions between the Arabs and their neighboring countries, economic developments worldwide and the challenges of the nineties, Arab security and the Arab-Israeli military balance, and also the Arab regional system.

In the second section of the Arab part the report discusses "The Change toward Political Pluralism in the Arab Homeland." The report discusses that subject by dealing with [the following topics]: an introduction to pluralism, managing pluralism, and strategies for managing pluralism.

The report starts out by stating that political pluralism has become a common demand of the various political and ideological forces in Arab countries. Except for limited pockets made up basically of hard-line groups of people who politicized their Islam, all political forces [in the country] have recently shown their obvious enthusiasm for political pluralism, even those whose hostility to it has been known and ascribed to socialist, national, or Islamic justifications.

The report pointed out an important observation in this regard. It affirmed that although the appeal which is being made for democratic, political pluralism among the Arab peoples' political leaders and intelligentsia is being made with growing ideological power and an increasingly aggressive posture, this power is not reflected in the political reality of Arab political systems. In most cases democratic, political pluralism is limited. The report affirms that the roots of the political pluralism which is found in some Arab countries are weak and that, in most cases, this political pluralism is restricted. Several factors determine the extent to which political pluralism is open or restricted. These include the manner in which change to pluralism was brought about. The report points out that in all Arab countries, except Sudan in 1985, the shift to political pluralism was made under the control of the state. The presence or absence of restrictions on political pluralism also depends on how much pressure was applied to the state to make it shift to broader prospects of political pluralism. In some cases the shift to pluralism is voluntarily publicized by the state for one reason or another.

The state monopolizes the three methods by means of which it manages political pluralism and controls how liberal this pluralism will be. It can legitimize political forces or decline to grant them legitimacy, and it can

permit certain forces to become engaged in relatively more political activity than others, in accordance with the real requirements of the balance of power and the interests of the regime. Finally, the state's view and its judgment of how large a potential threat is posed to it by a certain political power will determine the state's viewpoint in its handling of political pluralism. The second step in the process of managing political pluralism involves the depth of pluralism. This means the extent to which parties are allowed to play their part in society and publicize their programs. In other words, it means the extent to which political parties are allowed to move beyond organizing themselves to become politically active.

Concerning strategies for managing pluralism, the report points out that the state in the Arab homeland toys with pluralism and uses a collection of policies that emphasize setting boundaries for pluralism. Arab experience in this regard indicates that these boundaries depend on many factors such as the balance of social and political forces, the goals of the ruling elite, the general mood of the public, and the view of that ruling elite and their judgment about the question of security inside the country.

The report discusses pluralism on the organizational level and points out that popular committees and strike teams have become widespread over a wide geographical area at the same time that the role played by the organizational body which is affiliated with Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, has grown, particularly in the Gaza Strip. However, the machinery for confronting Israeli occupation forces directly remains that of demonstrations and strikes. Besides civil disobedience, these are still the intifadah's [uprising] most important confrontation methods. And yet, during the second year of the intifadah, there was a limited increase in armed activity that engaged the occupation forces. The third level of pluralism, which is that of economic independence for the occupied land against Israel, assumed several forms, including the continued boycott of Israeli goods, nonpayment of taxes, and the continued effort to increase agricultural and industrial national production. The report notes that the appeal which was being made to persuade Palestinians to boycott work has lost steam, compared to what it was during the first year of the intifadah.

The report discussed Palestinian political activity in 1989 and noted the intifadah's support for PLO actions. The PLO revamped its activity and started pursuing a new approach in its actions and tactics. It announced it would accept a political settlement of the problem and it would also accept partitioning Palestine into two states as a final solution to the conflict. In fact, the PLO accepted the notion of holding elections in the occupied land as a first step to reach a final solution to the problem. The PLO also started a dialogue with the United States in an effort to induce it to take a more

balanced position in the conflict and to adopt an equitable posture on the Palestinian initiative. And yet, none of these things has produced any concrete results.

The fourth section of the report is devoted to examining the performance of Arab economies in 1989 from two standpoints: an objective monetary reading of privatization and liberal tendencies, and fiscal policies in the Arab homeland.

The report points out that 1989 represented the end of an era in which the crisis of Arab economies had worsened and "the crisis of the economic role played by the Arab state" had flared up. "The Future of the State's Economic Role," was the subject of the conflict and of the argument that the general business sector was responsible for the crisis of the Arab economies and for what will become of that sector in light of privatization tendencies and liberal changes. The report tries to analyze the effectiveness, the capability, and the fitness of the Arab state to do its economic part by considering two dilemmas. The first one is that of deciding between having the state, which owns public projects, continue its activity in the business sector, or liquidating this activity and privatizing these public projects. The second dilemma is that of balancing the burdens of the state's public spending with the shortfall, or rather the decline in public revenues. The report then tries to explore the situation in which joint Arab economic activity carried out by regional groupings can be combined with the business that will inevitably be done on a national level.

The report points out that privatization policies continued in 1989. Although there was a shift from talking about privatization to doing something about it, that shift does not suggest that the public sector's importance in business activity had become secondary. And yet, conditions do suggest that personal, objective tendencies are growing increasingly favorable to privatization and liberalism because the crisis of financing development, which is getting worse; the foreign debt burden, which is becoming more critical; the clash of economic crises; and other reasons are making "necessity" rather than "conspiracy" the reason behind privatization and liberalization policies in the contemporary economies of the Arab homeland.

The report reviews the general budgets of Arab states for 1988-1989, or for 1989, and concludes that there is a significant difference in the competency of fiscal management and in the nature of the fiscal policy which is being pursued between oil countries as a group and the countries which have budget deficits. The report also notes that this significant difference can also be found within each of the two groups of countries.

Third, the Arab Republic of Egypt

This part of the report deals with four topics in four sections: the political system, the national economy, foreign policy, and defense and military power. The first section, the Egyptian Political System, is devoted to an examination of five topics: the system of government,

political parties and political forces, interest groups, the Egyptian press, and political violence in Egypt.

Under the topic, "the System of Government," the report discusses the executive authority, the legislative authority, and the judicial authority. In its discussion of the executive authority, this edition of the report devotes itself to an examination of how this authority, which constitutes the backbone of the Egyptian system of government, interacted with aspects of the state's relationship with society in 1989. The report concentrates on decrees issued by the president and also by the ministries of industry, the interior, and finance, and it zeroes in on the method shaped by these decrees for dealing with the crisis or with production, financial, and security challenges in the context of the relationship between the state and society.

The report made general observations about the legislative authority and its role in the Egyptian political system, and it [offered suggestions] for enhancing the effectiveness of the legislative and oversight role played by the People's Assembly, page 392.

This edition of the report devotes a substantial number of pages to an analysis of both the direct and the indirect political role played by the judiciary in Egypt. Then, the report talks about the judicial authority and the political system in 1989 and calls attention to three main points, namely, the tension between the courts and the police during the year, the dispute over the legal validity of the membership of 78 representatives serving in the People's Assembly, and, finally, the dispute within the judiciary over the crisis that involves the status of these 78 members of the People's Assembly.

Under the title, "Political Parties and Political Forces," this edition of the report discusses political parties in Egypt and their political activity throughout 1989. Political forces, which previous editions of the report had called forces hidden from the government and had dealt with under the title, "Political Parties and the Partisan System," are also discussed in this section. Actually, these pages of the report offer a rich study of the assumptions underlying the political game in Egypt and the machinery that is used to give it direction. The report pursues an analytical approach that highlights all the political forces and reveals their actual level and magnitude as well as the dynamics of their relationships with each other. It dissects not only the political forces of Egyptian society, but also the machinery for working within each one of these forces. The report examines political parties from within by looking at their organization, their leadership, their development, and the level of their political rhetoric as well. The report devotes itself also to an examination of the crisis of the Egyptian left.

After criticizing its previous approach in examining interest groups, the report, which adopted a method for studying these groups based on the premise that organized interest groups are more worthy of being studied

and examined, examined the internal and external organizational changes of these groups.

Large portions of the report are devoted to an analysis of voluntary societies (the Ministry of Social Affairs) and of society's relationship with these societies. The report focused on trade union contributions, and it examined "their input" in dealing with the major crises of society, like unemployment and economic reform. The report also highlighted the role which professional associations play in political life and the effect they have on the political regime's "output," namely, its services, decrees, and actions. In this regard, the report zeroed in on associations for engineers, journalists, attorneys, business people, applied scientists, pharmacists, and physicians.

This edition of the report singled out the Egyptian press for a thorough examination. It offered a brief study of the Egyptian press that covered its historical background, its development, and the laws that governed it from the 1919-1952 period until 1989. The report lists the number of newspapers that were licensed for publication from 1981 to 1989. These amount to 160 new newspapers and magazines, including 16 partisan newspapers. The report points out that there was noticeable activity in press circles in 1989 aimed at intensifying the efforts that were being made to persuade the state that it was necessary to get rid of the laws that restrict freedom. The report also points out that there were no clashes with the press during President Mubarak's administration (!) and that President Mubarak, unlike his predecessor, had used administrative measures (!), to restrict the freedom of the press only twice: when the SAWT AL-'ARAB newspaper was confiscated and its license was revoked, and when security forces arrested three journalists in 1989 and accused them of forming a communist party.

This section of the report reviews the analysis made by Egypt's national and partisan press of a number of domestic political, economic, and social issues with which public opinion was preoccupied in 1989.

The report points out that in 1989 incidents of political violence in Egypt between the different organizations in society continued to be limited in general as far as their number was concerned and also the forms of violence that were employed in them. That was not the case, however, with regard to incidents of political violence between the organizations of society and the state. These incidents were characterized by inequality, and they were also unlimited in number and in the forms of violence that were employed. The report listed all the incidents of political violence in 1989.

Developments in the National Economy

The second section of that part of the report which is devoted to the Arab Republic of Egypt follows the development of the national economy during the 1988-1989 fiscal year. It concentrates on a few important

issues with which Egyptian economic thinking, economic decisionmakers, and public opinion have been equally preoccupied.

This section is divided into four chapters, the first one of which deals with one of the most controversial and most talked about issues of the economy: the simultaneous development of the economy, the society, and the state in Egypt. This chapter examines the question of transferring ownership of the public sector, or of parts of it, to the private sector. The report points out that vehemence and intensity characterized discussions of this subject in 1989. The report criticizes the state's position on transferring ownership or privatization, and it describes its partial commitment to a moderate policy on this matter and on dealing with the performance of the public sector as narrow and limiting. The report points out the fundamental importance of being specific in discussing these problems: that is, setting the management of public business projects free from the control of a centralized bureaucracy and turning that management into an economic one that responds to market mechanisms and market prices.

The report touches upon the most important strategic issue for economic and social development, namely, that of the nuclear choice among other choices to generate power, especially electricity, so that the country can keep up with the required expansion in the country's economic base and in the base of social operations in general.

The report discusses the year's fiscal and monetary policies, and it affirms that the 1989-1990 financial statement makes it clear that the financial crisis in society persists as a result of an increase in public spending that was much greater than the increase in general revenues. Therefore, the deficit grew and obtaining the necessary funds to finance the deficit became more difficult.

On the other hand, the report discusses the most important revenue items and zeroes in on "taxes and their various financial, economic, and social roles." The Egyptian tax system has two main characteristics. They are: the fiscal nature (or the fiscal function) of taxes predominates. Because of that, many matters which have to do with economic growth are ignored.

The report addresses the problem of inflation and points out that inflation in Egypt has gone into a spiral and that it is now feeding on itself and contributing to the deficit in the general state budget. This deficit causes the state to print new currency; that new currency generates new inflationary pressures; and that cycle goes on and continues (page 545). Inflation also increases the Egyptian economy's reliance on the dollar; it brings about an increase in demand for foreign currency; and it raises nominal interest rates.

Many pages of the report are devoted to an analysis of foreign economic relations. In this regard the report calls attention to the vulnerability and the foreign penetration

of the national economy. Egyptian exports declined in 1988-1989 from \$3.274 billion to \$2.5459 billion, a 22 percent drop from the previous year. Exports declined because Egyptian cotton and oil exports declined. At the same time Egyptian imports rose from \$9.841 billion in 1987-1988 to \$1.0789 billion [as published] in 1988-1989, a 2.4 percent increase over the previous year.

The third subsection of that part of the report which deals with the Arab Republic of Egypt discusses "The Foreign Policy of the Arab Republic of Egypt." The report traces the rise of Egyptian diplomacy in the Arab world. In 1989 Egypt completed its return to the Arab League and restored its relations with all the Arab countries and all the institutions engaged in joint Arab action. In addition, Egypt joined three Arab countries (Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen) to establish the Arab Cooperation Council. With regard to bilateral relations, the report traces relations between Egypt and Sudan, pointing out that although Egyptian-Sudanese relations started out on a tense note in 1989, they are now positive in the wake of the Salvation Revolution in Sudan. And yet, as 1989 draws to a close, clouds of tension are gathering once again because the Sudanese regime is relying on the Islamic Front and because of the reservations about the regime in Sudan which some Egyptian forces (the Wafd and the Grouping parties) have had from the outset. Throughout the year Egyptian policy showed noticeable interest in developments of the Lebanese problem. Egypt supported all the diplomatic efforts that were made to end the dispute, and it rejected the military government of Michel Aoun.

Egypt defined its position on the Arab-Israeli conflict by insisting on its adherence to the notion that the Palestinian question represents the essence of this conflict. It described the intifadah as a popular movement which no one has the power to stop or control (page 570). Egypt expressed its support for a settlement and made clear, diplomatic efforts on procedural issues to push the peace process forward. At the same time "a cold peace," or rather constant tension, characterized relations between Egypt and Israel in 1989, not to mention the dispute between the two countries regarding the Palestinian question.

Increasing activity characterized Egyptian diplomacy in Africa in 1989 due to the fact that President Mubarak was elected president of the organization by those who attended the 1989-1990 conference. Egypt played a role in liquidating the colonialism of settlers in south Africa, and it was involved in the attempts that were made to settle the dispute that erupted between Mauritania and the Senegal. In addition, Egypt showed an interest in the question of Third World debt and in that of debts owed by African countries. Egypt expressed this concern at international gatherings.

Egypt also participated in all the conferences held in 1989 by the Movement of Non-Aligned countries. Foremost among these conferences was the 9th summit at which President Mubarak was elected vice president of

the movement. Egyptian diplomacy showed noticeable interest in the problem of Third World debt as a whole, calling for dialogue between the north and the south on this problem. An initiative in that regard was declared by Egypt, India, Venezuela, and the Senegal in July 1989.

The report emphasizes the importance of conducting a daring and realistic "reevaluation" of the return on Egypt's current diplomatic activity. It affirms that the current foundation of relations between the Arabs and Egypt must be utilized to make the Arab role more effective. It affirms that the present distribution of Egypt's geographical interests, in which the three largest countries in Asia (China, India, and Japan) have marginal importance when compared with western Europe, must be reconsidered. Egypt's current relations with the countries of eastern Europe must also be evaluated in light of the new changes which took place in those countries.

In the fourth section of the report, Defense and Military Power, Egypt's defense policy and Egypt's weapons policy are examined. The report explains that in 1989 several significant changes were made in Egypt's strategic environment. Some of these changes were good for Egyptian security, but others were not. The report cites these factors which contributed to the changes. They include Egypt's improved relations with Libya and Syria; Egypt's involvement in establishing the Arab Cooperation Council; and Egypt's consummation of its relations with all the Arab countries. In addition, the continuation of the Palestinian intifadah and the fact that the ceasefire between Iraq and Iran was not broken were positive factors in favor of Egyptian security. Although these factors are not military, they do contribute in one way or another to security arrangements which serve the interests of Egyptian security.

At the same time there were other factors which, taken together and added to the economic crisis in Egypt, were unfavorable to Egyptian security. These include Israel's continued attacks on Lebanon and on the Palestinian people; fluctuating strategic conditions in Ethiopia and in south Sudan; international efforts to ban chemical and nuclear weapons from the region; and international efforts to ban the transfer of missile technology to the region. The report calls attention also to the significance of technological cooperation between Israel and the United States and between Israel and South Africa for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Such cooperation constitutes a very serious threat to Egyptian security, and attention must be called to it.

The report points out that the Egyptian armed forces are committed to a defensive posture and to achieving deterrence at all times. Egypt's military command has emphasized diversifying the sources of its weapons, especially those it buys from western countries. In addition, Egypt's military command is putting emphasis on upgrading the combat capability and effectiveness of the armed forces and on the local development of weapons in an attempt to meet the needs of the Egyptian armed

forces. Egypt declared that it owns no chemical weapons and that it is no longer developing surface-to-surface missiles. It is, therefore, looking for other means to achieve parity with Israel in this area. The report affirms that Egypt has to work with Arab and African countries too to contain Israel's cooperation with South Africa which represents a threat to Egyptian national security, to Arab national security, and to the security of the Red Sea as well.

The report points out that one of the most important characteristics of Egypt's weapons policy in 1989 is that weapons procured from the east and from the west are developed locally to prolong their usefulness and effectiveness, to increase their efficiency, and to prolong their life. In addition, the process of expanding and diversifying the national industrial military base was clearly downsized, and weapons and equipment imports also shrank partly because of domestic factors, such as the economic crisis, but also because of outside factors resulting from outside pressures applied by the superpowers who monopolize the market in the production of weapons and advanced equipment. These countries are engaged in efforts to prevent Third World countries from acquiring advanced military technology, primarily ballistic missiles technology. The report points out that Egyptian weapons manufacturers are now competing in a limited way for international bids.

Concluding Remarks

Publication of this report is in itself an advanced, investigative, critical exercise, affirming the significance of institutionalism and continuity on the one hand, and the creative linkage between thought and action, on the other. The report lists the most important events of the year: it analyzes and evaluates these events and attempts to draw conclusions from them. The report also predicts the future course of these events, and it sets forth scientific and well-considered alternatives to deal with them. Therefore, publication of this fifth edition of "The 1989 Arab Strategic Report" is seen as the institution of a pioneering effort which deserves appreciation and recognition by the Arab community of researchers who have a right to be proud of the fact that they have a library of strategic books in Arabic about actual conditions.

"The Arab Strategic Report" is a document that has another major scientific value attributable to the annual conference which is held in October of each year. More than 200 thinkers and researchers of all tendencies and from all Arab and Egyptian research institutions participate in this conference. So do researchers from state organizations, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministries of interior and of the economy, as well as the presidency and national security organizations. All these people participate in the conference for the purpose of taking note of the year's events and issues which the report did not discuss. They come to the conference to make critical and evaluative remarks about the form and substance of the report.

It may be said that most of the format changes which were made in the fifth edition of the report were made at the request of the research group which had brought up the point about these changes at the previous conference which was held to discuss the 1988 report. The changes include such matters as writing about the political forces in Egyptian society in the first section of Chapter Three in the 1989 report. In the previous report these forces were discussed under the title of "Forces Hidden from the Government." Now, the fifth edition is discussing these forces and classifying them according to their closeness to the ruling party and to their ideology (right wing or left wing).

As far as substance is concerned, the fifth edition of the 1989 Strategic Report examined subjects which the research community also wanted to discuss at the previous conference. The 1989 report examined for the first time major international powers like Japan, China, and Western Europe in the first section of Part One.

"The 1989 Arab Strategic Report" is also characterized by the fact that it did a good job of combining simple expressions and a plain style with the necessary academic jargon and expressions which appear to detract from the clarity and smoothness of any presentation and exasperate many. Thus, the report managed to maintain a commendable standard without making any compromises.

It may also be said that "The 1989 Arab Strategic Report" is still considered to be a relatively large report considering the fact that the report was expected to be abridged. It may be that the report was not abridged because new subjects were dealt with in this edition of the report.

Whatever the case may be, we can only acknowledge that "The Arab Strategic Report" is considered an important and a rich reference for Arab scholars and analysts studying all the political, economic, and social aspects of Arab conditions.

Columnist Sees Israeli Planning in Temple Mount Clashes

91AA0031A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 17 Oct 90 p 7

[Article by 'Atif al-Ghamri: "Israel Wanted A Climate of War in Jerusalem"]

[Text] As the Israelis before others will attest, the Shamir government has had an active role in the massacre of Palestinians in Jerusalem. This draws attention not only to Israeli involvement, but also to the fact that the consequences of such an action seem at first glance to be inconsistent with Israel's interests, as recently stated by Israeli officials. Hence, the countless questions about the incident and the search for the reasons behind the Israeli crimes at al-Aqsah Mosque have been a way to uncover what Israel is trying to hide.

At the beginning, the Israeli government accused the Palestinians of throwing rocks first, but Israeli eyewitnesses have come out to refute their government's allegations and reveal what really happened, which is that the chain of events began with a provocative attempt by the temple's radical Jewish "board of trustees" to lay the cornerstone for the Jewish temple, or the Temple of Solomon, in the al-Aqsah Mosque courtyard. This was a deliberate provocation because it was not the first time that this group had embarked on such an action. Moreover, this was an open provocation officially embraced through a statement broadcast on official Radio Israel to a board leader, Jerishon Solomon, which said: "The Temple of Solomon is the historic symbol for everything, and we are here in Israel to make it come true."

The Palestinians there responded to this provocation at al-Aqsah Mosque by throwing stones, whereupon Israeli troops fired shots in the direction of the Palestinians, setting off the worst clash in the 34 months of the intifadah and the most violent incident since the 1967 Israeli occupation.

Before the bloodshed in Jerusalem by Israeli bullets, the common belief in Israel was that it was in the country's interest to maintain peace and tranquility in the occupied territories and avert an eruption that would divert attention and efforts away from ending the Gulf crisis! If we were to suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is true, what drives Israel to commit a crime that, given its apparent consequences and timing, seems to be against its interests?!

Two indications can point to an answer to this question: 1. Yitzhaq Shamir's speech delivered one week before the massacre to a meeting of Jewish immigrants in which he said that some people were taking advantage of the radicalism and fanaticism Baghdad had created to cause an unholy conflagration in Jerusalem. 2. The Israeli representative's statement at the UN a few days before the massacre that Israel had many ways to deal with the gulf crisis.

This successive consonance seemed to announce the end of a policy, the lowering of the head and the voice, or Israel steering clear of the Kuwaiti occupation crisis in response to an official request by the United States in the early days of the Iraqi invasion on 2 August. Then Shamir and his representative made these statements that marked the first time Israel had tried to obfuscate events in the gulf and the first time that the Shamir government had linked events in the gulf to the Palestinian question when the official Israeli position had utterly rejected such a link.

Evidence demonstrates that this was due to a number of reasons:

There was the explanation that came out of Israel through nonofficial Israelis and quoted by Western press correspondents, to the effect that the Jerusalem massacre was aimed at, among other things, breaking the unity of the Arab position that opposes Iraqi annexation of

Kuwait, that sounded like veiled Israeli propaganda for Saddam Husayn who tried to link his departure from Kuwait with Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon.

And there was an explanation put out by European officials in Paris to the effect that the aim was to undermine the international position, that had gained unprecedented unanimity in the Security Council, which opposed Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

What disturbed Israel was not these positions per se but rather their apparent consequences that are expected to emerge following the settlement of the gulf crisis by Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

Indications of what was looming on the horizon were contained in the speech French President Mitterand gave before the UN last month in which he insisted on unconditional Iraqi withdrawal followed by efforts later to settle other Middle East problems, particularly the Palestinian people's aspirations for an independent state.

One week later, President Bush announced that Iraqi withdrawal could pave the way for other settlements.

In the same vein, British foreign minister Douglas Hurd talked about Israel's denial of Palestinian rights, putting forth a plan for negotiating a comprehensive solution that would achieve security for Israel and justice for the Palestinians.

The three Western countries' vision did not link the occupation of Kuwait to that of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but rather believed that the former would lead to the latter.

Then the Israelis engineered the massacre to make this link that they had tried to avoid and had judged to be detrimental to a solution in the gulf and to a solution in the occupied territories after that.

Aside from the aim to torpedo a comprehensive solution, an interest in prolonging the deadlock in the gulf began to surface in Israel because such a state would serve old Israeli plans to evacuate all Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, pushing them in the direction of Jordan as an alternate homeland.

Amid such a deadlock, the Israelis hope that Saddam's evacuation of Kuwait would turn Kuwait into a point of attraction for half a million Palestinians in the gulf.

This would set a precedence for an alternate homeland that the Israelis can use to justify their ambitions for expansion and annexation and to unburden themselves of part of the stateless Palestinian people.

The deadlock, according to the Israeli view, can be bolstered by driving a wedge between the two hitherto cohesive positions on the Arab and international levels.

There was also the goal of completing the settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants in Jerusalem that is taking place under the leadership of the minister of housing, Ariel Sharon. To attain that, a climate of tension, anarchy, and confusion among Jerusalem's Palestinian and Israeli residents had to be propagated to create a state of utter confusion.

It has been noted that just as the temple's board of trustees engineered the deliberate provocation at al-Aqsah Mosque, the situation in Jerusalem a year ago was being deliberately pushed to the breaking point.

All these reasons came together to render a major outbreak in Jerusalem an Israeli political interest amid whose thick fog—with poor or no visibility—numerous goals can be achieved, including the destruction of al-Aqsah Mosque itself. It appears that none of this has had a chance to come about yet, perhaps because Israel is now under scrutiny and even those who usually had an interest in overlooking its dubious behavior are not ready to do the same, for the time being at least.

Reporter Alleges Petrochemical Plant Faces Destruction

91AA0052A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Sha'ban 'Abd-al-Rahman: "Petrochemicals Complex Threatened With Complete Destruction"]

[Text] AL-SHA'B warned of the danger of the giant petrochemical project years ago and of the destruction that might befall it due to serious technical errors. AL-SHA'B said the project was no more than an iron framework nicely assembled and painted to dazzle visitors, nothing else. We revealed annual losses of the project amounting to 100 million pounds. At that time, silence bridled the tongues of oil sector officials, deafness stopped their ears, and pride drove them to sin. They continued to beat the drums of specious propaganda for the project, alleging that it represented a great historic move that the oil geniuses had achieved for Egypt. The case slept for a time. But God's eye did not sleep, and the disaster of this project was uncovered by Japanese gentlemen.

While the conscience of the oil sector was sleeping, the conscience of the Japanese company that implemented one of the most important projects of the complex was awake. In an important technical report presented to officials, the company warned that a terrifying explosion awaited the complex and threatened to destroy it because of many deadly errors.

The report was prepared by the Japanese Mitsui Company, which implemented the main vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) production unit for plastic manufacturing.

The report's author, Yamashita, the operations director of the Japanese company, said bluntly: "I am very surprised at the method you followed in operating the

unit during the last six months. You were lucky that no accidental explosion occurred as a result of the method of operation."

In his report to the Egyptian Petrochemicals Company last July, the Japanese expert cited the example of what happened six years ago in Bulgaria, when a petrochemicals complex exploded and was completely destroyed, killing 17 workers.

As another example, he cited an explosion at a petrochemical factory in East Germany that claimed two victims.

Effects of Improper Operation

The Japanese report said that improper operation in the Egyptian petrochemicals complex is leading to the loss of three tons of catalyst (a very expensive substance) used in the unit, with a value of \$100,000.

The report indicated a time deficiency in the unit, considered the most important part of the complex, leading to the escape of catalyst. It also indicated that cooling pipes were not cleaned, leading to their becoming blocked. This required the operation of the unit to be stopped for no less than three months, during which the catalyst was lost.

This is a summary of the frightening report. The Japanese company that designed and implemented the unit presented the report out of concern for its reputation and in response to the Secretariat of Labor, which obliges the company to make everything public, especially the danger that threatens Egypt. One would suppose that this concern on the part of the Japanese company—a foreign company—would be met by similar interest by officials in the oil sector in remedying the dangers and calling to account those responsible for the defects. In fact, the report went in one ear and out the other, as if the disaster knocking at the gates would never strike our country. We have examined the secret behind the indifference of the honorable officials and have obtained information confirmed from within the petrochemicals complex itself implying that the administration itself represents another disaster. That is the secret of the trouble. The president of the company does not devote himself to the company, because he at the same time heads al-'Amiriyah Petroleum Refining Company. He comes to the petrochemicals complex only a few days a week and has left management of the complex to the general director of financial affairs and the general director of production. Both are under a cloud, having been censured by the Higher Disciplinary Court for wasting public funds. Is it any wonder how the petrochemicals complex, the oil minister's giant project, is being operated, when they are directing it?

A Million Pounds Up in Smoke

Groups of petrochemicals company employees specializing in various fields were sent to Europe, America, and Japan to train in various operation and maintenance

activities. These missions cost more than 1 million pounds, but did not achieve the intended aim. The company was therefore forced to employ foreign workers—Swiss, Japanese, and Italian—when the project began to operate. Their salaries for one year amounted to 15 million pounds.

Worker training was then entrusted to an Italian company that connived with those sent in not training and in making up bogus transportation invoices to obtain transportation and travel allowances higher than those to which they were entitled. The matter was turned over to the public prosecutor's office, and a committee was formed to investigate the violations. It reported: "The extent of laxity, negligence, and waste of public funds by company officials has become evident. The company was therefore forced to bear additional and unnecessary financial burdens."

The committee added: "Company officials sought to evade the organization's rules by paying higher travel allowances by the following means: 1) The persons approving invoices connived with the foreign contractor in issuing fake invoices for hotel reservations; and 2) Company officials connived with the supervisor of the complex in approving a fake itinerary in order to disperse higher travel allowances."

The report commented: "The committee cannot find suitable words to express its indignation at the intentional deception and deliberate laxity in wasting company funds with the knowledge of all organizations of the company."

The committee concluded its report: "In view of the above, the committee finds no excuse or unintentional error. Rather, it affirms that in this matter as in others there was deception and intentional laxity with public funds. The company management was fully confident that there was no surveillance of public funds."

What more can be said about this management? What can one expect after all this negligence and sabotage?

The result is that information coming to us from inside the complex confirms that conditions are deteriorating day by day. Although the complex was overhauled last December, it stopped operating dozens of times because of improper operation, forcing a full overhaul on 5 July 1990, i.e., six months after the first overhaul. Normal practice is to do an overhaul every year, not every six months!

Besides this, production is badly planned and out of step with the needs of the market. The complex has stopped producing polyvinyl chloride (PVC), the powder or pellets that are considered the principal material in plastics manufacture. Customers have therefore been forced to import the material from abroad. At the same time, officials continued to push the project. AL-AKHBAR quoted them as saying that the complex would save millions of dollars for Egypt by producing this material—which is what never happened!

The enormous errors within the complex also include negligence with production requisites. Large quantities of hydrochloric acid were thrown down the drains after being neutralized with large quantities of caustic soda—4,600 tons at a price of 1,000 pounds a ton. In other words, amounts of these important materials worth about 5 million pounds were thrown down the drain, according to the official report issued by the production sector. Furthermore, the damage extended to the sewers, since the soda and acid caused drainage shafts to collapse and affected the quality of waste water discharged into the Nubariyah canal. Much of the fish life was destroyed as a result, and the productivity of agricultural land was affected. Destruction, in other words, on every side! Praise be to God, who takes vengeance, the Almighty! The acid could have been used profitably, as shown in the Japanese experts' report.

Despite all these disasters, instead of seeing rapid movement to remedy them, we were surprised to learn in the 13 May 1990 issue of AL-AKHBAR that 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, the oil minister, is discussing a plan to implement new expansions in the petrochemicals complex. The planned capacity of the PVC project is to reach 120,000 tons a year—at a time when the project is currently operating at 60 percent of capacity. Instead of producing 80,000 tons, it is producing only 48,000, and is realizing losses amounting to 100 million pounds a year. What a drain on our resources! What sabotage of our economy is taking place!

Conditions at this petrochemicals complex have reached this state and this degree of danger. We warn the officials not to be indifferent this time, if only in response to the Japanese gentleman's report, and to save Egypt from a terrifying, dangerous explosion—even if it comes to shutting the complex down finally, instead of continuing to operate it in this way. Thus lives will be saved, and our economy will be spared losses every penny of which is needed by the poor people of Egypt.

IRAQ

Christian Sects' Role in Confronting 'Conspiracy' Discussed

Christian Leaders React to Crisis

JN02N1331A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
28 Oct 90 p 5

[Text] 'Abdallah Fasil, minister of awqaf and religious affairs, yesterday met with heads of Christian sects in Iraq.

During the meeting, the minister conveyed the greetings of leader President Saddam Husayn to the Christian sects in Iraq for their honorable role in confronting the imperialist-Zionist-U.S. conspiracy against Iraq.

The heads of the Christian sects reiterated their denunciation of the presence of the U.S.-Zionist-Atlantic forces in the region.

They appealed to all international and humanitarian organizations, institutions, and establishments to work to secure the withdrawal of the invading forces from the holy lands and to lift the economic embargo imposed by the United States and its allies on Iraq.

During the meeting, means of intensifying the role of the Christian sects in confronting the imperialist-Zionist conspiracy against Iraq and its great people were discussed.

Christian Leader Denounces Foreign Presence in Gulf

*JN0810124A Baghdad INA in Arabic 1035 GMT
8 Oct 90*

[Text] Baghdad, 8 Oct (INA)—Bishop Avac Asadorian [name as received], head of the Armenian Orthodox sect in Iraq, has denounced the presence of the American-Zionist-Atlantic forces in the Arab lands in Najd and Hejaz [Saudi Arabia]. He adds that this matter hurts all Arabs and Muslims. In a statement to INA, the Armenian Orthodox bishop condemned the economic embargo imposed by the forces of despotism and aggression on the Iraqi people and the attempts by the forces of evil and aggression to strike at Iraq's civilization, progress, and prosperity.

Bishop Asadorian said that this inhuman act is aimed at depriving the Iraqi children of milk and depriving the Iraqi people of food and medicine. And the Iraqis are the people who illuminated the road of civilization and progress to mankind at a time when Europe was living in total darkness. He added that the imperialist, American, Zionist, and Atlantic countries are making threats and mobilizing fleets and means of destructive war in the holy Islamic places and the Arabian Gulf without any legitimate excuse. This contradicts with human rationalization and human rights; it is a violation of all laws and social principles, the bishop said.

The Armenian Orthodox bishop in Iraq appealed to world countries and forces of goodness to do their utmost to work only for peace and to put pressure on America and its allies to withdraw their forces, fleets, and means of war from the Arabian Gulf and to resort to the voice of truth in order to achieve peace and security in this region.

U.S. Troops Told To Expect Long War, 'Immense' Losses

*JN2901249A Baghdad Voice of Peace in English to
Saudi Arabia 1230 GMT 28 Oct 90*

[Text] To the American soldiers. Good day. Listen to the voice of truth. Your commanders tried to say to you that if a war should happen, it is going to be a short conflict, a flashing aerial attack of strategic targets inside Iraq and everything ends quickly, and then you go back home as

safe and neat and clean as you came. This is nonsense. It is a big lie. They just want to raise your morale. They are buying your silence and the silence of your fathers, mothers, your wives, and sons, and children.

No my friends. The aerial attack will end nothing. It will occupy no lands. Not even if Bush's jets flew and escaped our strong air defenses. Such a strike could never occupy a land because there has to be participation of land troops and forces, and there lies the defeat of Bush forces.

Iraq, as you know well, has over one million experienced fighters, thousands of advanced and modern tanks, rockets and missiles of all kinds and species, beside other kinds of full destruction weaponry. Iraq also has over eight million Arab and Muslim volunteers that will make the war ever so long that the American losses will be as immense as hell. And eventually, you are the losers, believe me.

We are saying this because we want peace for us and for you. We want life for us and for you. War will not be useful except for a few greedy businessmen in the States and a bunch of corrupt petrol shaykhs and princes in the Arabian Peninsula. Raise your voices asking for peace against the war, and thanks for listening. This came to you from the Voice of Peace in Baghdad.

AL-THAWRAH Holds United States Responsible for 'Massacre'

*JN1010095390 Baghdad INA in Arabic
0740 GMT 10 Oct 90*

[Text] Baghdad, 10 Oct (INA)—The newspaper AL-THAWRAH has stressed that the massacre perpetrated by the Zionists against the sons of the Palestinian people reveals anew the falsity of America's claims of respecting international law and human rights, and its exposed political hypocrisy.

In its editorial today, the paper held America historically responsible for what has happened and is happening to the Palestinian people at the hands of the Zionist usurpers. It says: Under all circumstances, America has always been concerned to affirm its continuous bias toward the Zionist entity, and its commitment to this entity's security and strategic supremacy over the Arabs. Moreover, it has continued to provide it with all forms of political, military, and economic support, and to protect it politically at all international forums at a time when it adopts a constant course of hostility toward the Arab nation.

AL-THAWRAH adds: The new U.S. stand indisputably proves that the United States, which was behind the issuance of all the hasty and unjust UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq, adopts double standards in its dealing with international issues and the UN Charter. Before this stand, the United States rejected leader President Saddam Husayn's historical 12 August initiative, and wasted a real opportunity to put the Palestine

question on the course of a lasting and comprehensive peace, in addition to the other issues in the region, in accordance with common standards and principles to be prepared by the UN Security Council.

The paper questions the credibility of the United States' claims and promises concerning the Palestine question, especially since it used the veto at the UN Security Council last May to foil a resolution to dispatch three observers to the occupied Arab territories to submit a report on Israel's repressive measures.

The paper ridicules the attempt to insinuate that the new Zionist crime against the Palestinians was perpetrated by extremists. It says: This talk is null and void of truth because the Zionist entity, from top to bottom, is based on fanaticism, terrorism, aggression, and extremism.

AL-THAWRAH denounces the crime perpetrated by the traitorous Arab regimes that gave an Arab cover for the invading U.S. and foreign forces to occupy the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula, and to desecrate the sanctities of the Arabs and Muslims. It says that these regimes are also responsible for what has happened to our people in holy Jerusalem. The Zionist enemy perpetrated its crime because the U.S. and foreign military concentrations and fleets that have come to the region, and their preparations to carry out aggression against Iraq secured the appropriate political atmosphere to commit this crime and to distract attention from it as quickly as possible.

AL-THAWRAH points out that the Zionists are mistaken and will be deluded if they believe that this massacre would enable them to quell the intifadah and abort the mammoth Palestinian awakening that constituted a sincere pan-Arab response to the call for the great battle that Iraq made on 2 August. It adds: They are completely deluded and mistaken, because the massacre exposes in part the Zionist occupation's impotence to regain its control over the occupied Arab territories, and its failure to end the intifadah or affect its momentum and continuation.

AL-THAWRAH adds: The stone heroes are determined to confront the occupation and tangibly prove that all the Zionist massacres, repression, and terrorism will not succeed in quelling the intifadah or the spirit of defiance and resistance that are now implanted inside our people and brothers in the occupied territories.

Concluding, the paper says: The massacre has clearly proved that all the aggressors and evildoers are determined to continue with their tyranny, injustice, evil intentions, and criminal acts. Therefore, this gives additional responsibilities to the faithful gathering regarding the mobilization of all the sincere Arab and Islamic forces—leaderships, regimes, and masses—to support the intifadah and enable it to continue and stand fast for the sake of liberating Jerusalem and the sanctities and the principles of right, justice, freedom, and peace; and of deterring all the invaders and tyrants.

ISRAEL

Israeli, U.S. Relations Examined

U.S. Attitudes Changing

91AE0087A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
30 Sep 90 p 1B

[Article by Dan Margalit]

[Text] Israel is bringing upon itself heavy, unnecessary suspicions with its sanctimonious anger over the U.S. demand to obtain a commitment that American money will not be used to channel new immigrants and veteran residents to settlements in the territories. What is all the rage about? This matter is no more than an American request of the government in Jerusalem to honor its promise.

Housing Minister Ari'el Sharon would be the first to sign such a commitment, not for deposit with Washington, but for deposit in a safe in Moscow. The Arabs are accusing the Soviet Union of encouraging the immigration of Jews to Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and Yitzhaq Shamir's government promised the Kremlin that the immigrants would remain west of the green line. Mikha'el Gorbachev boasted to Yitzhaq Moda'i and Yuval Ne'eman that he relied on their government's word of honor in dismissing Arab leaders' arguments against continuing the immigration of Russian Jews to Israel. The Americans, who are more skeptical, sought to nail down the commitment in writing.

A government that intends to keep its word need not fear signing a commitment. Only someone who plans to break his promise would respond in such a neurotic fashion to such a reasonable request.

This demand has always angered Jerusalem. However, the Jewish state needs the \$8 billion to absorb its brothers from Russia, and after several rounds of verbosity on the part of Foreign Minister David Levi, the Government of Israel will sign the commitment as requested of it, making a cosmetic, linguistic addition to it. What will be agreed regarding the first \$400 million will be a precedent, and there is nothing bad in that.

The problem is that Jerusalem's nervousness stems not only from these guarantees, but from the totality of relations now developing between it and Washington. There are growing signs that the American administration is developing new diplomatic patterns in the Middle East. The balance that is now being upset amid special, understood circumstances, will not return to its previous status after the Persian Gulf crisis. Leaders of the U.S. Jewish community complained exactly about that to Pentagon leadership the day before yesterday in the United States.

George Bush spoke by telephone with all of the leaders in the region, except Yitzhaq Shamir. Although the exclusion of Shamir is accepted with understanding for the

time being, experts in the Foreign Ministry fear that the American President is in any case refraining from such dialogues with the Israeli Prime Minister. James Baker set a precedent in his unilateral visit to Syria by skipping over Israel, which is also justified against the background of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. However, the first time is never the last time. A substantive change, not limited to the current crisis, in the American outlook has become evident in three areas:

- In a similar manner the aid program has undergone a substantial change. Since the days of Anwar Sadat, the administration has used Israel's special status in Congress as a locomotive to pull behind it the train of financial aid for Egypt. Egyptian diplomacy did not oppose aid to Israel as long as it did not damage the flow of dollars to Cairo. Last week, Finance Minister Moda'i found himself in an inferior position. Israel, he told the Americans, would not oppose erasure of Egypt's debt if that entailed a similar step with respect to Israel. As in the ballad of Ariq Lavi', an era in the history of the Israeli locomotive has come to an end.
- Strategic cooperation regarding everything connected to Israeli security interests has declined. When the Chief of General Staff, Dan Shomron, denied reports that the United States is withholding from Israel intelligence information from U.S. spy satellites orbiting over Iraq, he was referring to only one section in the delicate sector of relations. There is a qualitative delay and a reduction in the flow of satellite information. In particular, there is a clear American reluctance to examine joint possibilities. Leaving discussion of such possibilities solely to a time of combat might result in a fateful delay.
- The demand being heard in the Pentagon to reassess the balance and the significance of the qualitative advantage traditionally promised to Israel is finding expression in IDF [Israel Defense Forces] psychology as well. Indeed, on the eve of the [Jewish] new year, Shomron asked Washington to maintain the qualitative advantage in combat means, and to supply dollars that could be spent in Israel to ensure the qualitative edge through independent Israeli production. However, he further determined that IDF soldiers would make more efficient use of the same types of arms provided [by the United States] to both the Arabs and Israel. From the standpoint of mood, Shomron's emphasis contains an unconscious reconciliation with the process in which Israel's qualitative advantage is being eroded with respect to the U.S. arms supplied to it.

The deterioration of Israel's situation is not appreciable as long as the world focuses on Saddam Husayn. It would seem that Bush will ultimately use his military power, or that this power will pose enough of a deterrent to subdue the Iraqi leader in Kuwait. The American president's time is not unlimited. In *NEW DIPLOMACY*, Abba Eban wrote that the Americans want victory, not defeat. However, they prefer defeat to an impasse. They are impatient. Accordingly, a decision regarding the Persian

Gulf is near. If military action against Iraq succeeds, Jerusalem's political confrontation with Washington will be inevitable.

Negotiations on a political settlement, which would begin immediately after the crisis ends, would find Israel in an inferior position. However, such a position would be preferable to an impasse.

Settlements As Acid Test

91AE0087B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Oct 90 p 11

[Article by Hami Shalev]

[Text] It is difficult not to wonder about the Americans' sense of timing. For more than 20 years the American taxpayer has been financing the whims of every Israeli government to settle in one or another part of the expanded land of Israel. U.S. administrations, some more and some less, have been making this possible generously, adding protests of various degrees of strength, but to no real effect. Now they are aroused when there is virtually a national [Israeli] consensus against new settlements in the territories. The government is not building new settlements, and the coalition partners on the right understand that the time is not right for that. We have immigrants, we have NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] masks, we have Der'i, and we do not have money. Under these circumstances, who is of a mind to promote settlements?

The U.S. administration's arousal regarding settlements is nothing but the psychological predisposition of President Bush and Secretary of State Baker towards beating on something Israeli, after they learned, like Reagan and Schultz before them, that when Yitzhaq Shamir does not want to move, he does not move. A year of "nu, fine [an interjection spelled in Hebrew to parody Shamir's accent]," with or without the Labor Alignment, was about to end without any achievements, or worse than that, with the final, shameful storage of the questions to which Baker, in a moment of light-headedness, affixed his name.

Many plans have accumulated in the State Department that deal with actions the United States would take the moment it became clear, as expected, that Yitzhaq Shamir is not inclining toward any compromises regarding the composition of a Palestinian delegation for a dialogue in Cairo. The Gulf crisis has diverted attention from Israel and the Palestinians, and it has changed the order of priorities in Washington. However, Baker's anger and Bush's frustration remained unchanged. They are venting these feelings through cheap manipulations, such as the Likud's Petah-Tiqva branch of the foolish Israeli ministers, and through expending breath regarding the settlements issue.

On the eve of the holiday, David Levy brought good news to the nation to the effect that he succeeded in reaching an agreement with Baker regarding Israeli

promises that will be given in exchange for loan guarantees totaling \$400 million. It is not certain that Yitzhaq Shamir will be enamored of the need to precisely report on the government's plans to build a new day care center in Elqana [in the West Bank]. In any case, he will grit his teeth and remain silent. The guarantees are perceived in Jerusalem as the key to obtaining billions of dollars in loans from American banks. These loans are essential to preventing a true catastrophe regarding the absorption of immigration. In an interview that he gave to DAVAR on the eve of the holiday, Shamir was asked about the fact that immigrants were not being directed to the territories. In an incidental remark, he blurted out: "They don't need to go there." The geniuses among Israeli officials will certainly be energetically engaged in composing reports that will not anger the Americans unnecessarily. The truth is that the U.S. administration does not need frankness from Jerusalem. The same satellites that are photographing Saddam Husayn's forces are also passing over Judaea and Samaria. Whenever a finger moves there, some official from the U.S. Embassy on Yarkon Street mysteriously appears to take a polite interest in our actions, which became known to him completely, completely by chance. The Americans will file our reports in the safe, only to pull them out one day to settle accounts with a government that again refuses to talk with Arabs for any reason.

In their conversation last week, Baker told Levi that the White House actually wants to receive commitments from Israel that are even more constraining than those that he is seeking. Informed sources in Jerusalem confirm his remarks, thereby freeing Baker from the suspicion that he learned from his predecessor, Henry Kissinger, to blame the president for all bad things. Bush, it is said, was convinced by King Husayn that Shamir indeed intends to settle millions in the territories, expel the Palestinians, and transform his kingdom into Palestine. Baker again recalled the incident of the misunderstanding between Bush and Shamir regarding settlements during the Prime Minister's visit in Washington last year. Someone should tell the secretary that this matter has already been sufficiently beaten. Shamir is not to be blamed because Bush understood his remark "it will be fine" regarding settlements as a commitment to suspend them, inasmuch as the Prime Minister had already set forth matters precisely.

A third reason for the American preoccupation with settlements is the Arab states' anti-immigration campaign, which has actually ceased as a result of the Gulf crisis, without anyone taking the trouble to inform the people of Israel to that effect.

The settlements issue has therefore become the acid test of the suspicious administration's relation with Israel, a test that ascertains the seriousness of Jerusalem's intentions. Washington is also seeking to signal to the Arabs that it is taking the initiative and taking action, even when its thoughts are on the Gulf, and is able to impose on the Israeli Government, policies that *prima facie* contradict its very foundation lines. However, the

administration has also been careful not to pull the rope too much. A month before Congressional elections, when Israel's stock is on the rise, Washington needs cooperation, even through a hidden act and an open omission on the part of the Shamir government. The result is that the guarantees will be obtained after the required dose of abuse.

The Israeli Government is urging the United States and other countries not to agree to Saddam's demand to create a linkage between settlement of the Gulf crisis and the political process between Israel and the Arabs. After achieving its goal, the government is creating the linkage itself. Shamir and his partners are making no effort to conceal their satisfaction with the remark that "the conflict does not have to be treated until Iraq is treated." In Washington, our declaration has therefore been recorded as stemming from a desire that, after the settlement of the Gulf Crisis, the time will come to treat us as well.

The president's speech to the U.N. General Assembly gives one to understand that just that is intended, and Jerusalem knows this. The Foreign Ministry is encouraged by American statements regarding the need to move in a "2-track" channel that aspires to a settlement with the Arab states running parallel to progress in solving the Palestinian problem. In the time remaining until the removal of Saddam, the ministry is attempting to make the administration recognize that a willingness on the part of the Arab states to make peace with Israel can also positively affect the Palestinians. Regarding this opportunity, we tend to forget that no Arab state will budge without an Israeli acceptance of the principle of "land in exchange for peace." We also disregard the fact that calling for progress in several sectors in a parallel manner is the guiding principle of the proposed international conference on the Middle East.

In November 1987, Shamir "agreed" to the participation of the Soviet Union in the political process. However, he also added to that agreement a list of limiting conditions regarding the exile. At that time in the distant past, those conditions seemed completely imaginary: the opening of the gates to Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union, the cessation of the hostile Soviet policy toward Israel, and the establishment of diplomatic relations. In Jerusalem, some said this week, with only rhetorical skepticism, that Shamir would now be the one to seek Moscow's participation, because it has been satisfied with less humiliating promises regarding the territories. Moreover, officials here remembered this week that the Russians in fact show greater understanding than the Americans regarding the importance of strategic depth, inasmuch as they invented the system. It is therefore possible to predict Israeli flexibility regarding joint action by the superpowers, especially if Syria sees encouraging signs. There is nothing to discuss regarding an international conference with the five permanent [Security Council] members. In Jerusalem, animosity towards Mitterrand's old age puts to shame even the youths of the Kremlin.

It is difficult to precisely predict how Israel will inevitably be brought under control following the Gulf crisis, and it is striking that the government has also yet to form an opinion on the matter. The ability to create a Palestinian partner seems almost impossible. Administration officials also acknowledge that the PLO has removed itself from the political action sphere of the United States and Egypt for the foreseeable future. In the same breath, officials state that they adhere to their assertion that the Palestinians cannot be budged without the PLO. It is also difficult to predict the results of the United States' effort to create a post-Saddam coalition with a Cairo-Riyad-Damascus axis, or a Cairo-Amman-Baghdad axis minus Saddam. In addition, the equation will be affected by the presence of American soldiers, which will be prolonged endlessly according to remarks made recently by an American official to his Israeli counterpart. In general, when artillery thunders, forecasts are spoiled. An American folding, for example, would bring a new, explosive world upon us.

What is clear is that the United States will attempt to preserve its coalition by any means, including demonstrating its ability "to exert influence" over Jerusalem. Also, the United States will certainly not be quick to abandon its role of world leader inside and outside the United Nations.

What has not and will not change are the basic parameters of U.S. policy on a solution to the conflict: territories in exchange for peace, political rights for the Palestinians, and opposition to settlements. The administration's behavior regarding the irrelevant matter of the settlements is a warning sign that does not augur well for when a serious topic is on the agenda.

MOROCCO

Government Reportedly Refuses Repatriation of Prisoners

91P40055A Paris *LE MONDE* in French 22 Nov 90 p 8

[Report by Georges Marion]

[Text] Tindouf—This is not a prison camp since those who live here may come and go; their liberty is limited only by the expanse of the desert that surrounds them. Yet it is not a place of freedom since the inhabitants of this camp, although theoretically free, find it impossible to leave. A camp? It's rather a center that the Saharans of the Polisario Front [FP], who built it, have named the Abraham-Serfaty Center, without worrying too much about the ambiguity of this homage to one of the oldest political prisoners of the Moroccan king.

The Abraham-Serfaty Center, an open area encompassing about 40 neat mud houses, does indeed shelter Moroccan prisoners of war. Situated in the open desert, in "free territory," i.e. in that part of Western Sahara outside of Moroccan control, the camp was specially designed to receive the 200 prisoners of the royal armed

forces that the FP, in its concern to show goodwill, freed in May 1989. Now, 18 months later, 199 prisoners still remain; the 200th recently died. Without any explanation, Morocco refuses to repatriate its own men—unimportant men who have seen both gains and losses in this war which has been going on for 15 years.

The youngest prisoner is 26 years old and was captured "only" a few years ago. The oldest, taken from the rear of the Moroccan forces, is 84 years old and has spent the last 14 years in confinement. Many of the prisoners are 60 years old or older. Career soldiers in the Moroccan Army who often served first in the French Army, they were captured more than 10 years ago when they fell into ambushes that the Saharans, mobile fighters accustomed to the desert, were clever enough to set.

Thus it was for this chief warrant officer who is 64 years old and had been a warrant officer in the French Army fighting in both Indochina and Algeria. Father of six, prisoner since 1979, he has had no news of his family since then. "I left them in Agadir, but where are they today?" he asks. Another one, a dentist from Meknes, was luckier. The Red Cross sent him a few letters from his four children. "I was captured in 1976, two weeks after being called up. I don't know why we're not free."

At the Abraham-Serfaty Center, life is nothing but a long wait punctuated by a few occasional duties such as bringing water from the well, hoeing the garden, cooking. Daily meals here are austere; they consist of lentils, white beans and rice enlivened rarely by sardines in oil and occasionally by vegetables in season. On the day of our visit, the prisoners picked out live chickens whose fate was immediately sealed. "They get meat at the beginning of each month," the FP member in charge assured us. Privately, the prisoners swore to us that they hadn't seen any meat in eight months and that our visit was the sole explanation for this manna. "They themselves have nothing, so for us..." one of them added.

All of them await that freedom that they are told has been secured but never materializes. They are all scared and unwilling or unable to explain why their country refuses to repatriate them. "We are career soldiers and not politicians," they say with uneasy smiles. Thus they wait, their hearts undoubtedly even more ravaged knowing that they owe the protraction of their pain to their own people.

Government to Sell 270 Public Sector Companies

91AA0075A London *AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT* in Arabic 23 Oct 90 p 4

[Dispatch from Rabat: "Morocco to Privatize 270 Public Enterprises. Economists Predict Smaller Investment Role for the State"]

[Text] The Council of ministers approved last 16 October a measure to transfer the ownership of 270 public sector enterprises to the private sector, putting Morocco on the doorstep of the biggest economic deal in

its modern history—a privatization operation to begin next year and continue through 31 December 1995. The scope of the endeavor and the type of enterprise involved are expected to have considerable impact on Moroccan economic development in the medium-term with regard to the concentration of capital and the growth of the private sector as the state's investment role diminishes. Furthermore, a larger presence of foreign capital in the local economy would spur the stock exchange to an expanded role.

The sheer scope of the Moroccan privatization program raises doubt on whether there will be sufficient liquidity to effect the transactions under current economic conditions of depressed private sector facility for self-financing, low level of savings, and a marginal economic role for the stock market.

The Moroccan private sector's current funding difficulties are expected to persist for three years because a billion dirhams will be transferred from the companies to the state treasury. This means that private sector investment will shrink and that any allocation of private sector funds to purchase shares in public enterprises to be privatized can be only at the expense of investment.

Informed inner circles believe that the role of the banking sector in financing [privatization] will be limited since the state believes that its policy of restricted credit should continue for a few more years.

Privatization, which can be accomplished only at the expense of investment financing in the various sectors, appears less likely at a time when the Moroccan private sector is anxious to have restrictions lifted on bank loans in order to finance its investment projects.

In view of domestic financing limitations, it seems that the government will seek to involve foreign capital. It took a step in that direction last November by revoking the Moroccanization Act which restricted foreign ownership of companies in Morocco. The Moroccan government embarked last month on publicizing the privatization program in Britain where the Moroccan-British Friendship Society sponsored a seminar on privatization and investment in Morocco. Some 3,000 businessmen in Britain attended.

The government is also attempting to create new dynamics in the stock exchange in order to propel savings towards investment in chattels thereby developing the exchange into a major conduit for the privatization of public sector enterprises. A draft law for stock exchange reform stipulates a number of measures to encourage trading in stocks and bonds and to promote savings and investments in chattels. The measures include the creation of a futures market, investment institutions, and mutual investment funds which would aid the privatization effort by collecting savings funds and investing them in financial papers.

It is of interest that of all enterprises marked for privatization, only eight are listed on the Casablanca

exchange. This raises questions on how far the exchange can be developed as a conduit for the sale of public enterprises. Officials, exchange executives, and private sector [sources] differ on the optimum ratio of exchange participation. Their estimates vary from 10 percent to 30 percent. Private sector financial troubles, the then low level of savings, restrictions on bank loans, and weak stock exchange dynamics all suggest that large private investors and foreign capital will be the primary beneficiaries of privatization. This, should it be true, would be antithetic to an officially announced objective of privatization—thwarting monopolies.

Tunis Symposium Examines EEC-Maghreb Relations

*91P40047A Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French
7 Nov 90 p 11*

[Excerpt] About 40 people from the Maghreb and Europe attempted to define the prospects for relations between the Maghreb countries and the EEC during a symposium organized in Tunis on 4 and 5 November on the occasion of the third anniversary of the accession of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to power in Tunisia

The participants, who finished their work Monday evening, emphasized the debt and development problems faced by the countries south of the Mediterranean.

Mr. Bettino Craxi, former prime minister of Italy and current special adviser to the secretary general of the United Nations on development problems, favored a reduction of bilateral debt along the lines of 90 percent for poor countries, 60 to 80 percent for countries with intermediate revenue levels, and 30 to 60 percent for those with average revenues. He also recommended lowering the interest rates associated with these debts and reorienting the debt of the Maghreb countries owed to businesses and multilateral organizations.

Finally, Mr. Craxi proposed the creation of a bank for the development of the Mediterranean countries, modeled after the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development intended for East Europe.

In this respect, the participants stressed that it was necessary for the EEC to establish special cooperation with the Maghreb countries and proposed the promotion of investments and the resolution of the unemployment problem in the Maghreb countries.

The symposium also considered the question of residence conditions for immigrants from the Maghreb living in EEC countries, calling for maintaining the rights of the citizens of the Maghreb living in Europe, revising the regulations to this effect, guaranteeing the economic, political, social, and cultural rights of immigrants and organizing future immigration.

In a speech before the participants at the opening of the symposium, President Ben Ali had recommended the formulation of a charter guaranteeing the rights of the Maghreb community.

Many participants are convinced of the necessity of creating a Maghreb-EEC structure for immigration matters that would take charge of enforcing such a charter and would serve as a framework for consultation and cooperation. [passage omitted]

SAUDI ARABIA

Brazilians Ship Rockets, Ammunition to Riyadh

91SM0066Z São Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO
in Portuguese 24 Oct 90 p 9

[Article by Roberto Godoy: "Avibras Ships Arms to Riyadh"]

[Text] Campinas—The first partial shipment of an order sold by Avibras, of Sao Jose dos Campos, to the government of Saudi Arabia and consisting of ammunition, propellant, and 10,000 rockets of the three types used by the Astros-II multiple launcher was scheduled for embarkation early this morning at Viracopos International Airport in Campinas. The shipment of approximately 250 tons of armament was transported early yesterday morning in a convoy of 17 transport trucks and 14 support vehicles—including a mobile office—from the Avibras factory in Jacarei, in the Paraíba River Valley. Another shipment is expected today, but whether it will complete the export of the order—which totals 1,800 tons—is not known.

Contract

The shipment is in fulfillment of the contract—valued at \$69 million (approximately 6.9 billion cruzeiros)—that was concluded in early September by Avibras president Joao Verdi de Carvalho Neto and Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, brother of King Fahd. The company maintained complete secrecy concerning the transaction, which was revealed exclusively by O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO on 20 September.

This initial shipment—which may include a replacement SS-30 launcher—had been stored since 0600 hours yesterday in the Infraero [Brazilian Airport Support Enterprise] warehouses at Viracopos. In two hours early this morning, it was transferred to cargo planes chartered from a number of international airlines. The planes then took off for Riyadh, still in the early morning. The total shipment is expected to require at least 16 flights. Avibras refused to comment on the shipment, which was confirmed by the Infraero superintendent at Viracopos, Mozart Mascarenhas Alemao.

The shipment that is beginning to be sent to Saudi Arabia is part of a shipment that was originally destined for Iraq but was canceled when Baghdad authorities failed to pay past-due bills amounting to \$40 million.

The sale currently represents financial relief for Avibras, which has entered into an agreement with its creditors to manage a debt of \$200 million. Of the contract's total value of \$69 million, the company will receive within the next few days a down payment of at least \$11 million. This equals the total of the labor debts of the company, which at one time had as many as 5,500 employees and today has barely 10 percent of that number. Avibras is currently negotiating a new contract worth \$410 million.

Astros-II

The principal user of the Astros-II system is the Iraqi Army, which used the equipment extensively during the war against Iran—and also in the invasion of Kuwait—although only in secondary positions that were hit on the second day of the attack. The forces of Saddam Husayn have 160 mobile launchers, and the Ministry of the Military Industries is constructing its own rockets—copies of the Brazilian models—to resupply with ammunition the batteries that consist basically of six vehicles: four firing units, two reloading units, and possibly an electronic control center. A complex of this type costs \$10 million.

Each mobile launcher can launch 32 SS-30 rockets (ogive of 20 kilograms, range of 32 kilometers), 16 SS-40 rockets (payload of 35 kilograms, range of 45 kilometers), and four SS-60 rockets (150 kilograms in the warhead, with the potential for carrying multiple subcaliber ammunition, and a range of 70 kilometers. The ogives are of three types: antitank, antipersonnel, and incendiary. Saudi Arabia purchased, in 1983 and 1985, six batteries (36 vehicles) equipped with sophisticated electronic support resources, including advanced land navigation equipment.

SUDAN

Sources Close to Bashir Report Policy in Disarray

91AA0033A Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
24 Sep 90 p 30

[Article by Tariq Hasan: "Sudan on Doorstep of Explosion"] txt

[Text] Suffering severe isolation because of its pro-Iraqi position in the Gulf crisis, the al-Bashir government has tightened its repressive grip on the country.

Sources close to the Sudanese Government report that official policy is in acute disarray because of interplay between the government's Gulf policy and difficult national political, economic, and social conditions that the al-Bashir government's policies have rendered more complicated. This may soon cause an explosion of conditions in the Sudan on many levels.

These sources revealed that the Sudanese Government and its allied Islamic Front [NIF] had recently conducted

a series of contacts with Arab, foreign, and local opposition parties in order to contain the effects of the isolation settling around the government.

The al-Bashir government's latest attempt came two weeks ago, when Lieutenant General al-Bashir summoned to his office in Khartoum Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the cousin of former Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, who is now under arrest in Khartoum. Al-Bashir asked Ahmad al-Mahdi to intercede with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Ummah Party, so that they would agree to cooperate with the government. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi refused, saying that he would not cooperate with a collapsing government.

After the attempt failed, al-Bashir's government claimed that Ahmad al-Mahdi had come to it to announce his support for the government's Gulf policy. However, a few days ago Ahmad al-Mahdi sent a telegram of support for Egyptian policy and for President Husni Mubarak.

On the other hand, al-Bashir had promised the American administration that the Sudanese position on the crisis could be changed. He did this in contacts between the two countries in recent weeks. In return, the American administration was to settle the Sudan's debts with the IMF, guarantee oil supplies, and pay compensation to Sudanese returning from the Gulf after the attack on Kuwait.

In preparation for this, Lt. Gen. al-Bashir met in his office with Kuwait's ambassador to Khartoum, 'Abdallah al-Sari'. Al-Bashir told him that Sudan stood on the side of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and promised to announce this officially.

At the same time, a delegation from the government-allied NIF traveled to Saudi Arabia through the mediation of one of the major Gulf financiers who have granted Sudan financial aid. During the visit, NIF head al-Turabi told Saudi officials that Sudan stood with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The delegation returned to Khartoum, where the Gulf financier accompanied the Saudi finance minister to the radio and television building. A televised conference took place during which Sudan's finance minister announced his government's support for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Meanwhile, an Iraqi emissary hurriedly arrived in Khartoum and put heavy pressure on al-Bashir's government. The latter announced its retreat, and the Iraqi emissary announced that his country would bear all Sudan's burdens, particularly those related to armaments. NIF leader al-Turabi announced that his position agreed with al-Bashir's and told someone close to him that Sudan would remain on Iraq's side.

At present, al-Bashir's government is worried about attempts at a coup. Last week it tightened security measures in the capital and launched a new campaign of arrests. By the end of the week, 41 persons had been arrested, and 92 officers had been discharged from the military. This continues a policy begun at the time of the

30 June 1989 coup, when the government expelled large numbers of military and civil servants and replaced them with NIF members. About 500 officers, not counting noncommissioned soldiers, have now been discharged from the Sudanese Army. This April, the government executed 28 officers without trial on a charge of [plotting] a coup. Three hundred and fifty persons have been discharged from the ranks of the police and 150 from the ranks of prison officers, in addition to 25 ambassadors, 60 diplomats, 40 counselors from the Public Prosecutor's Office, and 118 judges (the most recent of them were 60 who were discharged last week on the charge of organizing meetings to discuss current conditions in the Sudan).

As for the economic crisis, at the end of the current fiscal year foreign indebtedness amounted to \$13.6 billion. It is growing yearly by an average of \$1 billion, even without recourse to new loans.

In regard to the domestic balance, the al-Bashir government has continued the policy of selling government-owned companies to rich members of the NIF. Defense expenditures rose from 3.6 billion Sudanese pounds to 4.3 billion pounds, not reckoning arms purchases made using the country's exports of livestock and oilseeds. Famine conditions have worsened. About 140,000 refugees have come to the outskirts of the capital, Khartoum, from Kordofan and the central Sudan.

While support for publicly owned companies and organizations has dropped by 203 million pounds, there have been great increases in the repressive agencies, including the People's Defense Forces and the People's Committees.

As regards the south, the al-Bashir government insists on continuing the policy of war and of importing weapons from Iraq, even while the government's southern garrisons are falling, one by one, into the hands of the rebellion. Some units of the Sudanese army that have gone there have fled.

Fighting is now going on in the Yei area, near the southern capital of Juba, at a time when the autumn [rainy season] is a factor aiding the rebellion.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Pro-Iraqi Stance Analyzed

Workers Penalized

91AE0030A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
26 Sep 90 pp 28-31

[Article from Jeddah by Wahib Muhammad Ghurab: "The Government of Yemen Supported Iraq's Aggression, Forgot Interests of Its Citizens; Saudi Arabia Implemented Development Projects in Yemen Worth Over \$4 Billion"]

[Text] No Arab citizen can work in any other Arab country unless he has a sponsor, and no Arab country allows the citizens of another country to work on its territory without obtaining a work permit. Yemeni citizens in Saudi Arabia, however, are the exception: they do not need to have a sponsor to practice any profession, and they can work in the kingdom without obtaining a work visa. Yemeni citizens in Saudi Arabia are free to travel and to work without a visa. A Saudi businessman was fined and questioned for holding on to the passport of a Yemeni citizen he employed in spite of the fact that it is customary for employers to hold on to the passports of their employees who then use their residence permits in lieu of their passports to establish their identity when they travel in the country.

When the royal decree regarding the treatment of foreigners residing in Saudi Arabia was issued, Yemeni citizens were exempted from the decree. Among the articles of the law is one stating that "a foreigner may not invest his own funds or join another person as his partner in any activity which is not permitted by the Foreign Capital Investment Act or by any other act or regulation. Anyone who makes it possible for a foreigner to invest funds or become engaged in any activity which foreigners are prohibited from becoming engaged in, by allowing said foreigner the use of his name or the use of his commercial license or registration, shall be considered to be condoning noncompliance with this law." It is well known in Saudi Arabian trade circles, particularly in the areas of trading food stuffs and offering services, such as automobile repair, for example, that exempting Yemenis from this law gave them the freedom to become engaged in trade and employment.

Saudi Arabia found itself compelled to reconsider these privileges when 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president of Yemen, supported Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and Iraq's threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the troops it amassed on its borders. Although Saudi Arabia took no measure that would affect Yemeni citizens, the behavior of the state-owned Yemeni media was not neighborly. Consequently, Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Interior issued a statement "canceling the privileges which had been granted to some Arab communities residing in Saudi Arabia." The decision to cancel those privileges was a strong blow to Yemen's leadership; it was a blow that Yemen's leaders might not have counted on. But when it became clear to those leaders that Yemeni citizens were unhappy with their government's position supporting the aggression, and they realized that their position was the principal reason for canceling the privileges, which Yemeni citizens in Saudi Arabia had enjoyed, Yemen's Council of Ministers met in an emergency session and issued a statement after the meeting. An official source in the Ministry of Interior described that statement made by Yemen's Council of Ministers as "having missed the point, in interpreting the statement issued by Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Interior, by asserting Yemen's right to take steps aimed at preserving the rights and property of Yemeni citizens." The statement issued by Saudi Arabia's Ministry

of Interior made it clear that "the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, had granted members of the Yemeni community special privileges which citizens of no other Arab country had received. The Saudi government had done this to show its appreciation for the fraternal ties between the two countries and two peoples and to affirm the kingdom's concern that its ties of friendship with its good neighbor become deeper and stronger. Yemeni citizens could have continued to enjoy these privileges had the government of Yemen been mindful of the kingdom's kind initiative and upheld the underlying assumptions of the bilateral relations between the two countries."

Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Interior affirmed in its statement that cancellation of the privileges "did not mean that the rights and property of Yemeni citizens would be infringed upon or that the material gains they had made during the period when they enjoyed the benefits of these privileges would be arrogated."

Dissatisfaction and Understanding

Yemeni nationals residing in Saudi Arabia showed their understanding for the decision made by the Saudi Ministry of Interior, which, according to an officer of the League of Yemeni Nationals, "Saudi Arabia found itself compelled to make after the Yemeni government took unfriendly positions toward it." The Yemeni national then added, "This decision had a profound effect on the Yemeni government, and its consequences for the Yemeni government will certainly be grave."

The leader of a large Yemeni tribe made it clear that "The Yemeni people will not remain calm and silent about the government's practices which are causing the people to forfeit their interests. I think that the privileges we used to have in Saudi Arabia are among the most important of these interests."

The Yemeni government's position on Iraq's invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait received no popular support in either part of the country. Tribal leaders in North Yemen sent cables to King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques, denouncing the position of Yemen's president. "We condemn the aggression of Iraq's Saddam, and we also condemn the Yemeni authority led by the opportunist 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and his aides. We condemn this intrusive leadership which lacks understanding and which, unabashed in front of the brave citizens of Yemen, continues to support the criminal of Iraq." The tribal leaders also indicated their willingness to defend the sacred territory of Saudi Arabia and to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Saudi people.

The position taken by 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president of Yemen, received no support in South Yemen, especially among key figures there whose silence, sources close to some of them affirm, is due to "their rejection of the shameful position taken on Iraq's aggression against Kuwait." These sources made it clear that the silence of

South Yemen's leaders "will not last long. What is keeping them from expressing their opinions at the present time is their desire to give the president of Yemen an opportunity to rectify his position and withdraw his unjust support for the aggressors." A senior Arab diplomatic source, who is recognized in Jordan and "has access to inside information," made it clear that "Yemen's position supporting Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could have destructive effects on Yemen if war breaks out and Sanaa decides to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out military activities against Saudi Arabia in the hope of finding a solution to its border disputes with the Kingdom by using force. The Saudis then will have to respond with force, and their military options will include destructive air strikes and missile strikes against all Yemeni establishments that are located within range of Saudi airplanes and weapons."

A South Yemeni official said in a telephone conversation, "Although we might understand the background behind unresolved political issues between Yemen and other Arab countries, we do not approve of them. But it was their position on Iraq's occupation of Kuwait that took us completely by surprise, particularly since Sanaa had been making frequent claims about its association with Kuwait and its close relationship to it."

The involvement of Yemen's president in Saddam's conspiracy was confirmed after unrefuted news reports indicated the presence of squadrons of Iraqi fighters in the city of al-Hudaydah near the southern borders of Saudi Arabia. According to the chief of a large Yemeni tribe, "When one learns that Saudi Arabia had supplied Yemen with modern, F-5 military aircraft to protect its security and sovereignty, this position by the Yemeni government makes it clear that it knows nothing about loyalty and being true to one's roots."

Saudi Arabia's interest in Yemen's education sector, for example, is documented by a large number of achievements. Saudi Arabia established and furnished 85 schools and institutes throughout Yemen. These include elementary, preparatory, and secondary schools as well as teachers' institutes. A social services office was established, and many Yemeni students were awarded scholarships in all Saudi universities without exception. In addition, Yemeni students were also awarded scholarships in a number of Arab, Islamic, European, and American universities. Saudi and non-Saudi teachers were also provided to Yemen at Saudi expense.

In addition, textbooks for all the stages of education were printed by Saudi Arabia. Once the process of education in Yemen reached an advanced stage, Saudi Arabia set up a modern press to print textbooks in Yemen.

An institute for the blind was established in cooperation with the Regional Office in the Middle East for the Affairs of the Blind.

Saudi Arabia's interest in education in Yemen was so great that it spent over 1.337 million Yemeni riyals on education. This figure does not represent everything that

Saudi Arabia spent and did for every element of the educational process. Nor was Saudi Arabia's interest in education in Yemen limited to its sponsorship of educational activities in Yemen. Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of education reached beyond Yemen: it admitted into its schools over 100,000 male and female students in all the stages of education.

Saudi Hospitals for Yemen

Saudi assistance for Yemen was extended to the health sector which received as much comprehensive care as the education sector did. Health projects were established and furnished in cities and villages and in the highlands and plains. Saudi Arabia then undertook the management and operation of these facilities, and it underwrote the costs of both.

According to 1987 statistics, Saudi Arabia established 14 health centers throughout Yemen and furnished them with everything they needed. Hospital construction activities were also proceeding at the same pace. Al-Salam [Peace] Hospital was built in Sa'dah. As a result of its integration and its ability to accommodate and treat patients after undergoing multiple expansions, the hospital became a model of the latest, most modern and most advanced hospital.

At its own expense Saudi Arabia contracted hospital management and operations to an international firm that specializes in hospital management and operations. Project costs, including construction and operations, amounted to 500 million Saudi riyals (\$120 million). Approximately 2 million patients have received treatment in the hospital since it was established.

In addition, Saudi Arabia built other hospitals in Yemen. It built al-Bayda' Hospital and Hajjah Hospital, whose cost exceeded 37 million Saudi riyals (\$10 million). Saudi Arabia spent more than 1.814 billion Saudi riyals on health sectors in Yemen.

In the roads and communications sector Saudi Arabia undertook the construction of many roads, including the highway between al-Hudaydah and the Saudi borders, the Zahar-Radi'-al-Bayda' Highway, and the Sa'dah-South Zahran Highway. The cost of building these roads exceeded 918 million riyals.

In the communications area a plan for a microwave link was carried out to increase [the number of] telephone communication channels. This network provides 150 telephone exchanges.

In the agriculture and water sector several important projects were carried out, like drilling wells and providing them with special pumps.

This project, whose cost amounted to 48 million Saudi riyals, bore fruit at a time when drought prevailed over the plains of Yemen. It was followed in 1983 by the implementation of the second stage of drilling wells, with

50 new wells being drilled. It is expected that work on 15 other wells will be completed some time next year.

Building Mosques

In the religious affairs sector mosques, judicial institutes, and buildings for religious courts and the offices associated with them were built.

The Saudi government, acting through the Saudi office in Yemen, implemented a meteorological project in the aviation sector. A task force of Saudi technicians carried out this project. More than 42 Saudi technicians had been appointed to work on this large project, but the number of those technicians soon dwindled to seven only after Yemenis completed their training in this field. International experts from the International Meteorological Organization were provided to the project for four years in accordance with the agreement between Saudi Arabia and the International Meteorological Organization. Steps for implementing this project started with construction of seven main buildings, Sanaa International Airport, and the airports in Ta'izz and al-Hudaydah. Total cost for the meteorological project exceeded 334 million riyals, all of which was paid in full by Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia paid the construction costs for Sanaa Airport, which is considered a vital project. The cost of that airport amounted to more than 125 million riyals.

Saudi Arabia later shored up a program for civil aviation experts so they can carry out their program in Yemen. It strengthened the capabilities of the General Authority for Yemeni Aviation, and it improved communications and shored up general maintenance capabilities. Costs for strengthening this program exceeded 22 million riyals.

Afterwards, Saudi Arabia demonstrated its interest in establishing the Yemeni Aviation Company. It signed a final agreement with the Yemeni government in 1977, and the company was accordingly established: the Yemenis held a 51-percent interest in the firm, and the Saudis held a 49-percent interest. The Saudi government undertook to support the start-up and development of the company, offering it at the outset to support its activities two DC-6 aircraft and half a million riyals.

The company took off, and its capital rose from 130 million riyals in 1977 to 260 million riyals in 1980. The firm managed to realize high profits. In its second year of operations the firm's profits exceeded 54 million riyals. A 10-story building to house its general administrative offices was built, and the company expanded thanks to Saudi Arabia's support. The firm continued to realize high profits and to add new routes. It managed to win a medal of merit, second class, for the services it had offered. It received the medal from the president of Yemen after its airplanes were flying to 28 destinations.

In another context Saudi Arabia continued its support for another important sector: the media sector. The capabilities of Saudi broadcasting were placed at the

disposal of Yemenis until their broadcasting needs were completed and furnished. The Saba' Public Corporation for the Press and News was furnished with a full-fledged printing press, and Saudi Arabia gave Yemen a (mobile) television station and a vehicle for color transmission.

In the area of electricity the Saudi office carried out a number of projects. The total amount spent on this sector exceeded 400 million riyals. Many other areas were also included in Saudi Arabia's support. It suffices to say that the total spent on the various sectors, on the reconstruction plan, and on annual support exceeded 18 billion riyals (more than \$4 billion).

Tribes, Parties Conflict

91AE0030B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
26 Sep 90 pp 30-31

[Article by Yahya Sa'id al-Ahdal: "The Anxious State of Yemeni Conscience; Yemen: Partisan, Tribal Conflict and Appeal to Yemen's Conscience"]

[Text] As a citizen of Yemen I plead in defense of an examination of Yemen's history and Yemen's conscience. I plead in defense of that great historical record, which is full of heroism and models of male steadfastness. As I stand here, I feel embarrassed for Yemen's ideals of manhood and for the men and people of Yemen.

I am talking here about Yemen's anger and its determination to remain an Arab country with an Arab history. Yemen is determined to remain a Muslim country, committed to Islamic values and to Muslims.

Let me say here for the record that Yemen's chaste progeny and seed reject the practices of the opportunist, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. Yemen's chaste progeny and seed reject Salih's malicious practices and problems, and they reject the practices of his lackeys and key figures. They reject the secret machinations which indicate scorn for the contemporary Yemeni intellect and [a predisposition to] trade the conscience of Yemen and get the better of Yemen's character, history, and men.

Let me protest here: my voice is not hoarse. Let me protest as I draw my sword and wrap an authentic Yemeni dagger around my body, a dagger that knows no treachery, no shamelessness, and no cowardice.

Let me stand tall like the cliffs of Sanaa as I declare repeatedly with its great poet, al-Barduni, that Yemen is being courted and wooed by those who will infect it with tuberculosis and scabies. The tuberculosis infection will come from that group of people for whom funds were transferred into well-known secret bank accounts, and the scabies will come from President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's political approach. Sanaa, however, declines to accept such advances.

Let us name names and key figures; let us open files and put events in their logical and objective context so that our people in Yemen, who know the truth or parts of it,

can have the whole picture in front of them. Let us do this to bring about the historic awakening of our people so that matters inside the country can be straightened out after the confusion of a frail, ailing, and ignorant alliance.

Let us protect Yemen and the people of Yemen from the tragedy into which they are being led by 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih with his compound ignorance of the truth about the forces that are interacting in Yemen and his misunderstanding of the parties that can control the player and the game. Let us protect Yemen and the people of Yemen, using a political perspective which would get Yemen out of a crisis the likes of which it has not encountered for a long time. This would prevent the breakup of Yemen and keep the flames of conflict which are getting started from growing.

'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's regime is dying, but we have to be ready and vigilant. Burying this regime should cost us no more than the cost with which this regime has saddled our national conscience. The burden placed on Yemen by this regime has jolted Yemen's psyche.

'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and his own team, which is trained in everything except engaging in proper political activity and understanding its underlying principles, believe in everything except Yemen and the history and men of Yemen. They are engaged in foolish practices which are exposing Yemen to the prospects of a compound crisis. Such a crisis has difficult, internal as well as external implications and considerations.

The black python which is wrapping itself now around Yemen's neck must be struck before it kills Yemen and exposes it to a vehement conflict and an endless crisis.

When a leader who lacks leadership skills insists on managing a crisis, he is, first of all, exposing himself to defeat. But he is also exposing us, the people of Yemen, by making us liable for the costs of his emotional problems, his ignorance, and his personal feelings of rancor. Through no fault of our own we are paying for 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's crooked behavior. We are paying for his attempts to outsmart himself and triumph over Yemen's right to a free and honorable life.

Let us review together what 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih got us into.

'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, our unqualified associate, rose to power through a series of geographical and historical coincidences. But his rise to power should not be construed as an indication of past accomplishments, a manifestation of skills and competence, or evidence of legitimate support. His rise to power was merely accidental and coincidental. It happened under questionable circumstances that 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih himself knows best.

Once in power 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih started playing the part of a character in a poorly directed play. He made the most of the bilateral incompatibility between Nasirism

and the Ba'th, and he turned the Islamic-Marxist conflict to good use, donning a special costume for each situation: a Muslim one in the morning, a Marxist one in the afternoon, and so on and so forth.

Among political parties 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih defends a political party to keep it from being devoured by a tribe, and among tribesmen he defends tribal ties against the threats which political parties pose to tribal concepts and tribal ways and modes of conduct.

When he is with the Hashid Tribe, he kneels in front of its chief, fanning the flames of the conflict between that tribal chief and his relative and making the most of bilateral incompatibilities. He tried secretly to embrace Shaykh Naji 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shafi, chief of the Bakil Tribe, to establish a balance with Shaykh 'Abdallah Ibn-al-Ahmar, chief of the Hashid Tribe. But as a result of a series of practices he lost favor with everybody, and that led to a situation which made a severe internal conflict in the country imminent. 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih was advised that unity would enable him to get out of the corner in which he had placed himself, but he tried his hand at a tug of war under circumstances in which the ways of getting in and getting out were well known.

Although he may have learned a few tactical skills in partisan-tribal conflict, copying this experience, with its horrifying implications on the future of stability in Yemen, and applying it everywhere to regional conflicts outside the borders of Yemen indicate a short-sighted and an erroneous approach to the situation in the country.

The players in this game are bigger than 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and more capable of managing the conflict. Having had centuries of organized political activity, their skills are greater than his. This is the tragedy of the president who was used to test Yemen's history, the values of its men, and the conscience of its citizens.

Let us judge matters in their national-Arab-Muslim context. That is, let us use authentic Yemeni standards to judge these matters. Let us see how President 'Ali Salih will fare under these concepts in light of the tasks which have to be done in Yemen at this stage and the extent to which these tasks express the wishes of national forces in the country.

'Ali 'Abdallah Salih allied himself with an Arab ruler who is a professional conspirator and whose record of treacherous behavior and betrayal is well documented in the Arab mind. He allied himself with the man who sent Israel a letter of apology. (See Henry Kissinger's memoirs.) He allied himself with the man who persuaded 'Abd-al-Nasir to fight the 1967 war and surrender the West Bank. He allied himself with the man who declined to participate in the 1973 war when he discovered that he would be fighting in a war which the Arabs were not likely to win.

'Ali 'Abdallah Salih allied himself with the man who used Israeli bayonets to slaughter the Palestinian Resistance in the streets. Yemen and its Arab conscience are not honored by such an alliance, and being on the same side with such a man is no credit to Yemen's Muslim disposition. Men are judged by the way they live their lives and the positions they take, and not by the positions they claim to take.

With his Fascist, bloody record, what has President Saddam Husayn given Iraq and its citizens besides slaughter, murder, and homelessness? What has he done for the Arab cause besides paying it lip service? What has he done besides falsifying facts and exposing the conscience of Iraq to compounded guilt problems? Siding with a foolish dictator who exposes a whole nation to danger, not just Iraq, is no credit to Yemen; nor is it a credit to Yemen's conscience or its Arab and Islamic view. It would have been more appropriate for President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to express our keen awareness of the specific nature of the people of Iraq. He should have acted in a manner that was consistent with the people of Yemen and with their character, their history, and their living conscience and refused to support the tyrant.

Let us consider the other side of the problem. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait is a major loss for Yemen. By all standards and measures, it is an economic, moral, and a religious loss.

No people benefited from Kuwait's support, which came in the form of projects, assistance, and continuing support, as much as the people of Yemen did. We have to stand with Kuwait, which stood by our side, now that Kuwait is facing its own crisis and predicament. After all, Yemen and the people of Yemen are genuine Arabs who do not forget those who were kind to them. They are genuine Arabs who fulfill their obligations.

Iraq's occupation of Kuwait is unjust; it is an aggression and a violation. Yemeni morals are such that Yemenis can neither condone injustice nor assist those who carry out unjust deeds.

Loyalty is one of the characteristics of the people of Yemen, and condemnation of the invasion and the Iraqi president's siege would have been consistent with their morals and their conscience. We think that 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih should have been persuaded by the cables which the people of Yemen were sending continuously to affirm their support for the Kingdom and for the people of Kuwait. We think he should have known his place and he should have represented the conscience of his people.

But having become involved in this collusion and finding it difficult to extricate himself from it, the opportunist insisted on conspiring against us, the people of Yemen. He assumed positions which not only do not represent our principles and vital interests but which also expose our internal unity to danger. He assumed positions which intensified the sharp differences between an authority, which forced us to accept a superior position for the military and a conspiratorial

mentality, and the people who want to act according to their awareness of their own history and conscience. The Yemeni people want to act on the basis of their sense of affiliation with a nation known most importantly for its loyalty and its opposition to injustice, a nation whose greatest attributes include its willingness to restrain the unjust and fight against the treacherous.

If we were to consider President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's attitude toward the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we would find his conduct toward our largest fraternal country amazing: we would find it extremely ignorant and characterized by treachery and betrayal. When we experienced hardships, the kingdom stood by our side. When we as a nation experienced earth-shaking events, neither Saddam Husayn nor the ruler of Jordan thought about us, but the kingdom did think about us. It stood by our side promptly, and it consoled us, supported us, and softened the blow of the disaster that befell us.

When the late al-Zubayri, may God have mercy on his soul, said that Yemen's conscience was suffering from the unholy triangle of ignorance, poverty, and disease, the kingdom understood what he said. With a protective historic sense dictated by its Arab morals and disposition, it opened schools in Yemen and provided teachers to fight ignorance. The kingdom and its citizens opened their doors and their hearts to the Yemeni people who came to the kingdom to study, to acquire numerous skills, and to make money. With Saudi Arabia's efforts, with its funds, and under its sponsorship the people of Yemen were fighting ignorance and poverty.

With regard to disease, I will not remind the president how much money the kingdom and Kuwait have been spending on health care in Yemen. Nor will I remind him how much the kingdom has offered to finance projects and establishments and to offer assistance. The kingdom's actions, which showed feelings like those that an older brother would have, indicated the self-respect that Arabs have and the earnest concern that Muslims have for each other.

It would have been more appropriate for us to return the favor. We should have acted the way the people of Yemen would have acted, and our Arab qualities of loyalty, gratitude, and friendship would have protected us, relieved our conscience, and spared us the feelings of guilt which 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has been trying to make us bear with the psychological barriers he is creating between us and a fraternal, neighboring country that has been taking care of us as though we were its own people. This neighboring country has been as generous with us as it has been with its own citizens.

That is how an adventurer and an adolescent is leading us today into a dangerous situation in which the organic relationship we have with a capable neighbor will be at risk. This is a neighbor to whom we owe a debt that weighs heavily on our national conscience.

The presumptive president should have known that citizens of the kingdom are genuine Arabs whose destiny

and character traits we share. When an Arab extends his hand to shake another person's hand, he does so with a sense of confidence and generosity, but that Arab will cut off your hand with his sword if you infringe upon his dignity and honor. This is a lesson that the opportunist should have learned before placing on us, the people of Yemen, difficult moral burdens that our minds and our sense of manhood have to contend with. He should have learned this lesson before putting us in a position in which we appear to be ungrateful people who deny acts of kindness shown to us by others. The opportunist should have fairly expressed Yemeni thinking and the feelings of justice that the people of Yemen have. He should have balanced the relationship between geography and history before getting us involved in a contrived battle which is too big for him to fight and too difficult for him to understand and to manage.

Let me declare here as a citizen of Yemen that the conscience of Yemen is in a state of anxiety and the history of Yemen stands at a crossroads. Let me declare

that our president led us into a tragedy and that he will make us pay the price for his adventure, his ignorance, and his problems. We must all stand together, united as one. We must say no to 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's oneupmanship; we must say no to his ignorance and arrogance; and we must say no to his miscalculations and confused considerations.

We must say yes to the liberation of Yemen. It is the more capable and the more skillful player who is pulling the strings. In this case that player is the Yemeni people. The Yemeni people have been put upon and their values have been falsified. The Yemeni people are being exposed to adventures which their own, objective circumstances cannot accommodate. Let me make a final appeal to the conscience of Yemen and to the values of Yemeni men: we have to master the rites of burial and the rites of a funeral procession before the burdens and costs of these rites become too much for us. Let God determine my reward.

INDIA

Papers Report on Developments in Congress-I*91AS0159A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 27 Sep 90 p 1*

[Article by Subhash Kirpekar: "No Constructive Backing: Congress"]

[Text] New Delhi, September 26—The Congress has, for all practical purposes, withdrawn its constructive support to the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh. It is, however, willing to extend this support to a "more responsive" government.

At the same time, it is not at all inclined to be part of a coalition government in the event of its support becoming necessary to help the formation of a new government with fresh political alignments. While such Congress support might facilitate a new formation at the Centre minus the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party], it is being speculated in political circles that the BJP might choose to withdraw support to the V.P. Singh government on the issue of the construction of the Ram mandir in Ayodhya in October.

By any reckoning, the political air is full of uncertainty, what with some ambitious ruling National Front [NF] leaders visualising themselves as an alternative and running down other contenders.

A section of the Congress, notably hawks like Mr Kamal Nath, MP [Member of Parliament], would like to move a motion of no-confidence against the V.P. Singh government in the special session due to begin on October 1. But there is another view in the party, more dominant, that the party should not rush in to hasten the collapse of this government.

Mr Kamal Nath said: "Mr V.P. Singh has doggedly tried to fulfill his commitment of being a disaster for the nation. We concede he has succeeded, to borrow his phrase, in toto. He should now be dislodged, lock, stock and barrel."

Meanwhile, the Congress has taken the position that it would be difficult for it to take any position on the bill to amend the constitution for extending Central rule in Punjab unless the contents of the bill were made known to it by the government.

Talking to mediapersons, Mr V.N. Gadgil and Mr M.J. Akbar, party spokesmen, recalled that the Prime Minister had stated that elections would be held in Punjab. They wondered if a reference to the assembly polls in six months would be made in the bill. Since the National Front government had a non-policy on Punjab, they said, the major opposition party had every right to know what precisely were the contents of the bill. "This government is capable of doing anything," they remarked.

Mr Akbar also raised the question regarding the Prime Minister's yatra to Punjab. "We remember an outpouring of very bad poetry at that time when he expressed his willingness to take every risk," he observed.

Posing the question as to why Mr V.P. Singh had pulled up the U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] chief minister, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav, as was revealed by the BJP president, Mr L.K. Advani, Mr Akbar wanted the nature of the differences between the chief minister and the Prime Minister to be made known.

"But will these questions be answered by silence? There was silence on the excise refund scandal. There was silence on the Bofors gun controversy. There is silence on the questions on Punjab," Mr Akbar stated.

Mr Gadgil assailed Mr Singh's sudden announcement on the Mandal commission report as "the most mean and callous decision for petty political ends." Although Mr Advani had disclosed that Mr Singh had taken the decision to counteract Mr Devi Lal's rally, he said, the BJP was still not willing to withdraw support to the minority National Front government. The BJP, he said, was speaking in different voices.

While Mr Madan Lal Khurana called for a Delhi bandh today, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee stated that his party would continue to support the Central government.

Gandhi in Amethi*91AS0159B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 15 Sep 90 p 7*

[Article by Sharat Pradhan]

[Text] Lucknow, September 14—The categorical assertions of the former Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, on several national issues during his two-day visit to Amethi parliamentary constituency recently have marked his emergence as a politically mature and confident leader.

The Congress president, who had so far remained non-committal and vague on many vital issues since the formation of the National Front [NF] government in November last, did not hesitate to put across his own and thereby the Congress', clear-cut views on several problems faced by the country.

His sharp differences at many public and party workers' meetings at different places in Amethi are being considered as the beginning of his campaign against the failures and follies of the V.P. Singh government. These draw greater significance in view of his repeated assertions that a mid-term poll could not be ruled out.

Mr Gandhi endeared himself to the masses wherever he went throughout the sprawling constituency, not merely because of the absence of the erstwhile black cat ring around him but also because he successfully projected himself as one who meant business.

He also succeeded in making a severe dent in the Amethi unit of the Janata Dal, where the lone block pramukh of the ruling party, Mr Ram Harak Singh, crossed over to the Congress. There are 17 block pramukhs in the constituency and 16 were already with the Congress. Mr Singh announced his quitting the Janata Dal to join the Congress together with his bandwagon of 46 gram pradhans and four sarpanches at a function organised by the Amethi Bar Association. Only three pradhans in the entire constituency continue to owe allegiance to the Janata Dal now.

Thanks to the efforts of Mr Gandhi's legal advisor, Mr S.C. Maheshwari, who is an eminent senior advocate of the Supreme Court, lawyers in all segments of the constituency have also been organised to carry the Rajiv Gandhi banner.

Mr Gandhi succeeded in driving home his point that the present Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, had sown the seeds of division of the nation on caste lines. Interestingly, the message was received well even in some backward dominated areas where the people seemed to agree that only the poor among the backward classes must be entitled to the benefits of reservation.

Clear stand: While most Congress leaders seemed to, so far, waver in their attitude towards the government's announcement to implement the Mandal commission's recommendations, Mr Gandhi took the lead in formally coming out with the party's clear cut stand on the issue. He reiterated that the implementation of the Mandal report in toto would result in confining the benefits of reservation to the families of the privileged ministers, IAS [Indian Administrative Service] officers, doctors, and engineers.

By highlighting the fact that the Constitution had provided for reservation to backward classes and not castes, Mr Gandhi was able to impress upon the people that the much talked-about egalitarian society could be created only if caste barriers were removed.

The Congress president explained both the merits and demerits of the Mandal report, whereby he also sounded convincing that the Congress regime had gone deep into the report whereas the Janata Dal government had worked in haste, mainly for "petty political considerations."

Apart from lashing out at the Janata Dal leaders over the current nation-wide turmoil on the Mandal issue, Mr Gandhi did not hesitate to admit his follies as Prime Minister. Referring to the Ram Janambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue, he pointed out that mistakes could be committed by anyone, but stressed that it was important to ensure that they were not repeated.

When his attention was drawn to a recent statement by the former Union home minister, Mr Buta Singh, asking for handing over the disputed shrine in Ayodhya to the Hindus, Mr Gandhi said, "Well, that must be his personal opinion." He asserted that he was willing to extend

full support to the Mulayam Singh Yadav government in its stand on the Ayodhya issue as he felt that the matter should be resolved only through the judicial process.

The former Prime Minister, who often in the past appeared uncomfortable with questions relating to the Bofors scandal, seemed confident now that the new regime had not only failed to establish a case against him, but that it would not be able to do so in future either. Laughing off a question raised by a newsman, he remarked that now the National Front government was in such doldrums that one could not be sure "whether the Bofors investigations will be made public or whether the government will fall before that."

Excise duty: Mr Gandhi highlighted the large-scale irregularities by the present government in the refund of excise duty. While the irregularities were first brought to light about two months ago, no one has raised the issue at the national level so far. He made it a point to emphasise that the excise duty scandal was a far bigger case of financial bungling than Bofors. "While the Bofors case allegedly involved a sum of Rs64 [rupees] crore, the excise refund scandal is of the order of Rs1,000 crore," Mr Gandhi said. When the Union finance minister had himself admitted refunding as much as Rs350 crore to industrialists in this manner, it was obvious who the present government was trying to benefit, he added. Interestingly, he also demanded a high-level probe by a parliamentary committee into the case as had been done in the Bofors scandal.

The Congress president made no bones about admitting that the party had suffered a serious debacle in the last general elections because of certain inherent weaknesses, which, he said, he was trying to remove. He therefore called for strengthening the party organisations right from the roots.

With Mr Gandhi having sounded the bugle in Amethi, it remains to be seen whether his party colleagues and state leaders also follow suit and rise to the occasion to keep up the tempo of his offensive against the V.P. Singh government.

Singh Resignation Demanded

91AS0159C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 28 Sep 90 pp 1, 19

[Text] New Delhi, September 27—In a strongly worded attack demanding the immediate resignation of the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, the Congress party said today that he was under seige and terrified of moving anywhere in the country because his own chief ministers like Mr Chimanbhai Patel of Gujarat could not assure him protection from the incensed people of India.

Recalling his resignation letter of July 14, Mr M.J. Akbar, party spokesman, said that Mr Singh's own logic for wanting to quit office at that time was that he had lost the trust of the people, of members of the National Front

[NF] and of the supporting parties like the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the CPM [Marxist Communist Party].

Quoting from that letter sent to Mr S.R. Bommai, party president, Mr Akbar stated: "The rationale of my being in office was the trust of the people, of the members of the National Front and the supporting parties. The developments during the last two days have shown that I have lost this trust." Therefore, Mr Akbar stressed, "Mr Singh has no right to stay on in office for even a minute because he had now lost the trust of all the three components mentioned in his own letter."

Both the main supporting parties, the BJP and the CPM, had demanded what was the statement signed by ten of them, including two Central ministers, Mrs Maneka Gandhi and Mr Dhangar, and a Telugu Desam party MP [Member of Parliament], Mr Vijay Reddy, in addition to the recently elected NF parliamentary party secretary, Mr Hamohan Bhawan, and a senior MP, Mr Yashwant Sinha.

Mr Akbar also drew attention to the statements of senior Janata Dal leaders like Mr Chandra Shekhar and chief ministers like Mr Biju Patnaik of Orissa and Mr Chimanbhai Patel of Gujarat, not to speak of the stand of the BJP chief ministers of Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh.

All this is evidence that he has lost the trust of National Front members, Mr Akbar stated. Most important, Mr Singh had lost the trust of the people of India. "We charge that the Prime Minister has completely lost the trust of the people of India. The people of India are telling him in anger and anguish that they have had enough of his misrule. Mothers are saying that a democratic government cannot be allowed to live on police brutality. Little children are being chased by the police. A six-year-old was killed today. Which six-year-old is guilty in the eyes of this government," Mr Akbar asked.

"The capital is under seige. The Prime Minister is under seige. The Gujarat chief minister has announced cancellation of the Prime Minister's tour of Gujarat on October 6 and 7. Mr V.P. Singh could not go to Haryana (Rohta) for similar reasons. He cannot move in India. He is terrified. His own chief ministers cannot assure him protection from the people. If this chaos has to be curtailed, then Mr V.P. Singh must go and go right away," Mr Akbar said.

The senior party spokesman, Mr V.N. Gadgil, said that the insincerity of Mr Singh's appeal was evident from the fact that it had no effect on the situation. In fact, the situation has worsened. Describing his TV tears as sanctimonious humbug, Mr Gadgil said it was a shame that even after 14 children had committed self-immolation, the Prime Minister had not budged an inch. He appealed to the students, while expressing profound sympathy for those who have suffered, not to resort to self-immolation in protest against the repressive measures adopted by this government.

They also told mediapersons that government could not absolve itself of its obstinacy by trying to make spurious allegations against the Congress party. What Mr Sharad Yadav and Mr Ram Vilas Paswan had launched in conjunction with the home ministry was a very pathetic disinformation campaign. "Instead of seeking to survive by telling lies, the government must open its eyes and ears to the sound of the caste war it has unleashed," Mr Akbar stated.

Parrying a question on whether the Congress party would bring a non-confidence motion against the government in the special session of Parliament, they said that the demand of the ten National Front members should first be dealt with by the Prime Minister. No political party discussed its strategy in public, Mr Gadgil remarked. "A week is a long time in politics," quipped Mr Akbar, suggesting that the question could become irrelevant by Monday.

Meanwhile, Professor K.K. Tewary, former central minister, in a statement assailed the Prime Minister for his reference in his telecast to the spate of self-immolations in relation to his own sons who are both NRIs [nonresident Indians], courtesy their doting father. "It is an extraordinary situation where a person with only 17 percent popular vote in parliament is holding the country to ransom with the help of self-proclaimed nationalist and patriotic parties whose track record has either been a fascist concept of nationhood based on communal and caste sectarianism or their well-known extra-territorial loyalties," he said.

Urging the President of India to dismiss the government, Prof Tewary said that if a minority Prime Minister aided and abetted by opportunistic and fringe political elements imperilled the unity of the country for his personal political ambitions, he was liable to be dismissed and charged with subversion. He appealed to all patriotic and nationalist forces to save India from being torn apart.

Paper, Press Agency Report V.P. Singh Interviews

TIMES Interview

91AS0155A Bombay THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA in English 30 Sep 90 pp 23, 24

[Interview with Vishwanath Pratap Singh by Dileep Padgaonkar; first two paragraphs are THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA introduction; time and place of interview explained in introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] No adversity will prevent Vishwanath Pratap Singh from using his spell in office to reorder Indian politics and society along radically different lines: neither the rumblings within his own party, nor the growing impatience within the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the CPM [Marxist Communist Party]—the two parties supporting this government from the outside—nor the aggressiveness of the Congress, nor the disillusionment of those intellectuals who had hailed him barely a year

ago as a messiah, nor even the wrath and despair of the young who have taken to the streets to protest against his decision on Mandal. Armed with the conviction that he is destined to fulfill a historical mission, he is determined to go about the task by deploying his uncommon political instincts and his formidable tactical skills against his real and potential adversaries. This lonely, intensely introspective Prime Minister, whose personal integrity is above all reproach even in the eyes of his bitterest critics, is an altogether bizarre figure: one who conveys the impression that he is at one and the same time driven by fate yet haunted by events and forces he is unable to control. There is something pathological about his sense of commitment to what he believes is his mission; alongside, however, he also exudes an equally powerful sense of detachment.

The presence of both the yogi and the commissar in Vishwanath Pratap Singh makes it difficult to understand the working of his mind. He manages at all times to be elusive, enigmatic, self-abnegating, doughty, confident, and touchy to the extreme. This much became all too obvious in the course of a 90-minute conversation with the Prime Minister held aboard the special IAF [Indian Air Force] aircraft bringing him back to Delhi last Sunday after a two-day visit to the south. The week that has passed since the conversation took place has been his most trying period in office. What he has to say helps to better understand his conduct during the crisis: resolute to the point of being obstinate, he is determined to single-handedly take on all adverse forces regardless of the cost to himself or to the nation.

[Padgaonkar] Your decision to implement the Mandal commission report has polarised opinion in the country as nothing else has since Independence. Some hail you as a messiah of the backward classes; some others do not hesitate to compare you with Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Those constituencies which were with you at the time of your election have now become alienated from you. Do you agree with this overall assessment?

[Singh] No. We have not lost our large support. Only we have advised our supporters to be restrained so that conflict does not flare up. As a matter of caution we have advised them very strongly not to come out in the open when the government itself is taking steps. There is support for Mandal in the south; the support in the north is no less.

[Padgaonkar] How then do you explain the violent reaction to your decision in the north?

[Singh] The media has been giving a one-sided verdict. If the press does not believe in something it is perfectly free to say so. I have never criticised the press so far and I never will. I believe in freedom of the press not by announcing it, but by practising it. Today, too, I practise it.

But the press should present the other side. The fact that we have gone about this (implementation of the Mandal report) in a cautious way has not been reported by the

media. Neither has the fact that the Congress has got into the act: the NSUI [expansion unknown], for example, or the Congress MLAs [Members of Legislative Assembly] in Bihar doing it openly. An issue becomes socially volatile when there is only one sort of projection by the media. We would not have had this expression of passion if there had been a more balanced projection. Anyway, basically the reaction is confined to Delhi and Haryana.

[Padgaonkar] Apart from the press some political parties have also been very critical.

[Singh] Basically it is the NSUI and the Congress in Bihar.

[Padgaonkar] But the BJP and the CPM have also been critical, at least as regards the manner in which you announced the decision.

[Singh] Well, Mandal is an old issue. It has been debated. We have been giving notice for the past three years that we were going to implement it in the first year that we came to power. We said so in our manifesto, in the President's speech, in my assurance to the house, at every party meeting, at the meeting of our parliamentary party. Everyone has been so vociferous about the implementation. So there has been no lack of notice. There was no surprise about it.

[Padgaonkar] In retrospect do you feel that the ground could have been better prepared?

[Singh] We have been preparing the ground for years and years. The fact that it (the decision on the Mandal report) has such wide support shows that the ground was prepared. Why don't you look at the national picture? The southern states, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, the whole of the north-east: is there no support? There is no problem in Gujarat. In Orissa, too, there is no problem now. There is major support in U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] and Bihar. The problem is confined only to Delhi and Haryana.

[Padgaonkar] Why do you think the intelligentsia has not been able to appreciate your move? It has by and large gone along with reservation for the SCs [Scheduled Castes] and STs [Scheduled Tribes].

[Singh] I don't think they have gone along with it. They have not accepted it in their hearts. But assuming that they have, it is for them to introspect on how and why they have changed. They raised no objection when reservations for the educationally and socially backward classes were made in many states—in some cases several decades ago. But very serious objections are raised by opinion makers when I try and implement the same policy. Is that intellectual honesty? If they were honest they ought to have said all along that what the states have been practising was wrong. But they never did. Now they turn against the Centre even when it has taken so many precautions. We have said that one should go ahead with the implementation only on the basis of what is accepted by a state. In fact at the Centre we want to do something

far less than what the states have done. So why is the intelligentsia so violently against us?

[Padgaonkar] Is it because of the feeling that the so-called backward classes already have a very big stake in the political structure as well as in the economic structure in the countryside?

[Singh] Since when have they come up in a big way? It is only after the National Front came to power that you hear this complaint that backward classes have acquired all this clout. This is the one chance they have got to come up. And they are being robbed of it.

[Padgaonkar] But surely there must be sound reasons why the previous government did not implement the report even partially?

[Singh] They did not want these groups to come up politically. It is as simple as that.

[Padgaonkar] Is there any reason why you have not commented on the students taking to the streets in Delhi and elsewhere in such a big way?

[Singh] What to do? Everybody is inciting them. It is not their fault.

[Padgaonkar] You think they are being incited.

[Singh] Yes.

[Padgaonkar] But don't you feel it will be a good move to at least talk to them?

[Singh] It is not a question of talking to them. Do you know the full case of the first boy who tried to burn himself? I should not like to say anything more on the subject at this stage.

[Padgaonkar] With your decision on Mandal you appear to have changed the very parameters of Indian politics. We don't know yet what this change will mean. But you have forced every political party to redefine itself. Would you go along with this view?

[Singh] We have very clearly spoken about transformation through equity. We have said again and again that we will bring equity as the central theme of national politics. This was one of our objectives. Somehow we were not taken seriously.

In recent years the state of the nation has been reduced to statistics, to growth data. But statistics do not reveal relationships between various productive forces and between the various sections of society. Nor do they show how growth rates get distributed. Given the heterogeneous nature of our political, economic and social structure we can avoid the question of equity only to the peril of our national unity. If the question is avoided, sooner or later, the issue of equity is going to hit us so hard that we shall not know how to react.

Therefore our agenda is to look at the issue. The agenda does not relate necessarily to the treasury of the government where you are naturally confined by the available resources. Take the national integration council or the interstate councils. These can provide yardsticks to political equity in various spheres: equity between communities, between regions, between the Centre and the states. Our commitment is to federalism, to panchayat decentralisation, to electoral reforms, to autonomy for TV and radio, to the right to information, to the modification of the Official Secrets Act.

As for social equity, take the steps the government has taken as regards the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, land reforms (place in the Ninth Schedule), right to work, the Mandal commission. We have also taken steps regarding the minorities. We want greater involvement of youth through the national youth councils, the elimination of illiteracy, involvement of farmers (Sharad Joshi is working on this), the creation of a women's council. We want 30 percent reservation for women in panchayats.

[Padgaonkar] By 'involvement' of these sections, I presume you mean not dole, but a place for them in the power structure.

[Singh] Yes, I do not promise heaven. I do not promise a palace. My concept is as follows: Even if it is a hut it must be your home. Your house may be small but you are entitled to share it. A family is not sustained by its wealth. A family is family because of love and justice. And we are able to impart this sense of family (to the oppressed). This is a process of giving a place to them (in the power structure). None of this will get reflected in budgets or data. What the National Front government is attempting to do is something much more powerful.

[Padgaonkar] What you are attempting to do, in substance, is to radically change attitudes and values. But the attendant risks are surely great.

[Singh] Certainly the risks are great. We are ready to take them. The steps we have taken to bring about greater equity on the political and economic fronts are powerful measures and certainly they will provoke powerful responses. We can't give doles or provide government jobs to all, our resources do not allow for this. But within the available resources we shall plant the seedling. For the first time since Independence, employment has become the hub of our planning.

[Padgaonkar] What will the right to work involve?

[Singh] Within the resources available, it will mean some sort of an employment guarantee. We can't attempt to give doles or guarantee a government job. But we have to provide work to anyone who wants it.

[Padgaonkar] Will these employment guarantee schemes also be considered on the basis of reservations?

[Singh] No. They will benefit mainly the poor.

[Padgaonkar] Do you expect any turmoil on this score?

[Singh] Not for the right to work. But there will be some turmoil on labour participation in management and also on the policy on farmers. There will be lobbies against them.

[Padgaonkar] Are you not running grave political risks by attempting to overhaul attitudes and values on your narrow electoral base?

[Singh] No one has achieved anything without risks. We have come up through struggle. As I see it, I have to carry out the struggle in government. If I had to choose between the struggle and the government it would not take me a split second to choose struggle. Because if you give up the struggle and stay in your chair, it will become an electric chair where you face a certain, collective death. And that will be your end. If you stick to your struggle, chair or no chair, you also live forever. See what happened to the Congress: it became a mere government. It no longer remained a movement. It remained in power. But then it died.

[Padgaonkar] When were you convinced that the spirit of the movement had evaporated in the Congress?

[Singh] I think the watershed came with the emergency. The Congress became status quoist.

[Padgaonkar] And yet you continued to be in the party for many, many years afterwards.

[Singh] Yes. (Pause). The psychology was the resolution of power, not change. When we try to get into the trap of trying to retain power at all costs not only will the government be shot dead, but our political life itself will be shot dead.

[Padgaonkar] Prime Minister, I fear that the very powerful forces you are unleashing will make it very difficult for you to function.

[Singh] They will, as they did when I was in the finance ministry. I am very clear about this. There are forces operating within and outside the government. Still, I have got quite a bit of support within the government and also in the National Front.

[Padgaonkar] On the communal issue you had once said not long before you were elected Prime Minister that you would not allow anyone to harm the emotional fabric of the country. On Ayodhya we seem to be heading towards a confrontation. What price are you willing to pay on this issue?

[Singh] No price is too big to pay to preserve the emotional integrity of the country. But nationalism and patriotism are requisites of emotional unity. We have, however, to reckon with the fact that politics has become transactional. The argument runs like this: I will give you this or that benefit provided you give me your vote. To my mind, the question is not what anyone can give to the other but what we all can give to the country. Consider

this: if polarisation starts taking place on religious lines, won't we give a first-class agreement to the secessionists in Punjab and Kashmir? Will we not also ignite the fires of secessionisms in the north-east where Christians are in a sizeable number? Secularism is the rock foundation of our unity and integrity. There is no other.

We have so many faiths and beliefs. It is not for nothing that Gandhiji and other leaders of the nation held that secularism and democracy were partners. We have to seriously debate this issue, to put it in proper focus. I mean, if someone commits a mistake in an election, he can correct it in five years. But if emotional integrity is shattered, it will take five generations to repair it.

[Padgaonkar] On the issue of secularism everyone, save a couple of parties, would agree with you.

[Singh] I do not wish to think in terms of parties on this issue. The integrity of the country is not a monopoly of the parties; it is a matter of concern to every common citizen. Parties cannot appropriate the country. Take all the parties and all their members, including the bogus ones. They do not add up to even one-tenth of the population. Are the other 90 percent dumb? Should they not have rights? No one should shift an inch on the issue of secularism.

[Padgaonkar] All the same the parties are privileged channels of political communication.

[Singh] That is what we should try to change. We should try to build on what Jayaprakashji (Jayaprakash Narayan) championed: Lokshakti (people's power). Apart from paksh (party) and vipaksh (opposition party) there is the janpaksh (party of the people). The democratic process has to be extended to the daily experience of people, to places where people participate in managing themselves. Therefore, our emphasis on decentralisation.

[Padgaonkar] Why are you taking on so many things with far-reaching implications? I am sure you have given some thought to the perils and dangers.

[Singh] I am very clear about the dangers. I have consciously taken the decision to risk those dangers. One is the matter of your credibility with the people after you have made a commitment to them. We have gone about this very systematically. Our manifesto is the basic document of this government. The bureaucracy knows it; every minister knows it. We have put all our manifesto items on a monitoring grid. We know where each item stands at a given point in time. Various steps and even sub-steps are clearly laid down to attain a particular goal. Alongside the monitoring, we also process each item to move ahead: to prepare the bills, to turn them into enactments. When we swing forward some bill, it looks as if it is a sudden act. It is not. Several months have gone into its preparation: consultations, interaction, legal formulations, and so on. We want legislation to get out fast so we can spend the rest of the time implementing it.

I have developed this technique which is also part of my nature. The process consists of first setting goals, then deadlines, followed by a great deal of interaction. We do all the necessary preparation, going into each step minutely. After doing all this you can push quite a bit in a short time.

The peculiar thing is what I do is being suspected. They say it is on account of a mid-term poll. We want to reverse this: you do not do something for the people when polls are round the corner but when the polls are far, far away. Memories of what we do might not remain by the time the poll comes. But if we are sincere we must do something for the people even without keeping polls in mind.

[Padgaonkar] Are you planning a strategic shift on the economic front as well?

[Singh] We have to give a push in that direction. Because if the cake is not there, what will you distribute? Equity is meaningless without growth.

[Padgaonkar] How do you expect to give the push?

[Singh] In this matter you have to take cognisance of Indian reality as well as the world situation. Our largest asset is our manpower. On the other hand, the world economy is fast integrating. We can't remain aloof from it. It represents the challenge of modernisation and competition.

Our biggest challenge is how to marry the two: manpower with an integrated world economy. We will not get any set answers. We will have to evolve our own answers taking into account Indian reality. We have sought to do this since Independence. Nehruji's concept of the mixed economy and of self-reliance did give us industrial growth. But it also created a high-cost economy. We have to get out of it. At the same time, how do you give more and more employment? How do you ensure that purchasing power does go to the people? How do you make sure that investments conform to the needs of the larger masses? How can items of mass consumption be produced along with items which enable us to compete abroad?

I am very clear that many of our bureaucratic regulations are counter-productive. We have to dismantle them. I'm also very clear that we cannot build the country wholly on the resources of the government's treasury. So, while we optimise government spending, we will also have to consider how to trap resources outside the government.

All this becomes an area of intense political debate. There is such a thing called the politics of economics. I intend to interact with the friendly parties, with the Left and the BJP, to evolve a consensus. To that extent the process will take time, it might also appear to be slow. But the gains will be solid. And they will provide powerful arguments to take the next steps.

[Padgaonkar] Do you anticipate any resistance within your own party?

[Singh] In a debate of this nature there are bound to be differences of opinion. We should not fight shy of them. Within the party I will allow the fullest debate. Only those who are politically insecure fight shy of debate or dissent or of the democratic process itself. We should realise that democracy is a contentious affair. If you are shy of contention, you are shy of democracy.

That is the new culture we are developing, slowly but surely. I have been derided for this, ridiculed, called names. You see, I know the other culture where a single word of dissent was supposed to be heresy. There was an apparent solidity and unity in the party. But this could not keep the country united. The country has paid heavily for this.

The only way to keep the country united is to create a truly federal ethos, a democratic ethos of dialogue and interaction. It will take time to lend legitimacy to this process. Tolerance of dissent has for decades been regarded as a weakness in politics, as something not legitimate. I have the courage of my conviction to go through all the ridicule. One day I will be able to say, and so will you, that this is a better political ethos.

[Padgaonkar] This ethos is not altogether new; it did prevail in Paditji's time.

[Singh] The country was no weaker for it. You suppress a democratic process now, you have to pay the price some time later. All I can say to such people is: forgive them, lord, for they do not know what they do.

They (the Congress) got stuck in a system of governance which I shall call a system of departments. It turned itself into a government department. That was the trouble. They thought that if you run a department well, you are in fact running India.

[Padgaonkar] How do you appear to be so relaxed on this question of dissent when the two friendly parties are critical of you and when some of your senior colleagues in your own party rarely miss an occasion to snipe at you?

[Singh] If they criticise me politically can there be a greater challenge to prove yourself?

[Padgaonkar] When you say this you almost seem to be taking an artist's delight.

[Singh] Yes. That is why I'm an artist. You can face this only when you don't care for your own peace. Once that worry comes in all is finished. I can say: alright if the government goes it can always come back; you have not lost. Certainly we will not lose. If you are likely to become a non-person once you are out of government then you should begin to worry, not otherwise.

[Padgaonkar] Is it because you were planning to bring about far-reaching changes that you once went on record to say that you would be a disaster as a Prime Minister?

[Singh] (Long pause) That time when I had in mind was that there are better, more talented, more experienced people in the party. It would be better if they were there and given the job. If the best is not made available to the country, it would be a disaster.

I knew, though, that if I join the government I would not be able to continue without the confidence of the party. I was also aware of the limitations of government officers. While I very much love to work among them I've never been deluded into thinking that they do everything.

[Padgaonkar] How have you developed this sense of detachment? I'm told you meditate a great deal.

[Singh] Even a tinge of an artist gives a lot of sense of detachment. The political world, indeed the entire external world, is hierarchical, however you might define it and wherever you are. You measure it all the time: how many are below you, how many are above you.

But in the field of creation there is no hierarchy. And there is your liberation from the political order and every other order. You're not measuring either yourself or anyone else. You are just being yourself. No politics can take away that from me.

[Padgaonkar] No Prime Minister of the country has quite attempted to bring such an 'artistic' or 'creative' dimension in politics as you seem to be attempting.

[Singh] I've not cultivated this. I've grown that way. It's very difficult to analyse it. But let me say this: behind the facade of all great things, of things that are supposed to be big, you find something very human.

[Padgaonkar] I wonder what thoughts ran through your mind when you were sworn in as Prime Minister.

[Singh] My thoughts were: after all, this is only our office. This is not something you would show off. Office is an education. It depends on what you wish to do with it. How do you fulfil the trust of the people? They had put up a very hot fight against the Congress party, against the whole structure. On my part I know I could fulfil this trust if I defined everything in terms of human relations. My religion is human relations: it starts and ends there.

[Padgaonkar] In this context how do you propose to strike a balance between equity and merit?

[Singh] The two are not incongruous. Let's look at it this way: to bring up a child, is it the mother or the nurse who has got great merit? A mother is a mother not because she is knowledgeable but because she cares. An administration is an administration not because it is knowledgeable but because it should care.

Today's biggest criticism against the bureaucracy is not that it is not learned or meritorious. It is something else. This bureaucratic machinery has both a head and a

heart. But all the time they seem to be testing only the head. People who undergo suffering expect them to test the heart as well.

But tell me: where is it said that only top intellectuals should come in the administration? They certainly are needed very much. But maybe they can do better in the universities. They can be better teachers, perhaps also better writers. Are we not depriving our country of good literature by failing to provide talents with an atmosphere to write and create? Why do we want to mould all of them into officers? Is it because only officers and politicians enjoy the image of being in charge of everything? Is it not worth the while that this talent should be put to more creative work?

[Padgaonkar] I sense in you a certain amount of disillusionment with the intellectuals.

[Singh] No. All I'm saying is that they can do more creative things than pushing files and taking orders from a minister. Every officer is dissatisfied. I keep a watch on these things. Why does this happen? Because society does not give the opportunity to creative talents. You don't respect your scientists, your writers. The only way a person can display a medal of achievement is by becoming a politician or an officer.

[Padgaonkar] Do you then have a hierarchy of merit?

[Singh] No. Each one is needed. After all, society is a mosaic. You need everyone.

[Padgaonkar] I suspect, Prime Minister, that with your ambition to de-bureaucratise society you are again on to something quite far-fetched.

[Singh] I don't know (laughs). No, it is not like that. I've yet to concretise my ideas. But whatever we are trying to do will have an impact only if we don't bureaucratise the exercise. I'll remain unintelligible to many people for quite some time.

[Padgaonkar] You mean to intellectuals? Don't you think this entire Mandal business would have gone down better had it been better explained? You know, lots of people are saying today that we, who have never thought in terms of caste, are suddenly made to do so.

[Singh] This is not so. Ask these people whether they are marrying into other castes. They don't accept other castes in their own house and they demand that the caste system should be abolished. One generation passes it on to the next and they say: the government should abolish the system. They argue that the Mandal commission has come to remind them of caste. If a son or a daughter marries elsewhere, they turn him or her out of the house. Had they not accepted such a thing in their own house, I would have understood.

[Padgaonkar] The suspicion is widespread that with Mandal the question of equity is related not to the need of an individual but to his caste origin.

[Singh] We are not looking at it as a permanent feature. It is an interim feature meant to dramatically counter discrimination. It gives a shock to society. When you breathe, you are not conscious of the air. Similarly, you are not conscious of caste if you are not actually living it like a Scheduled Caste person.

I will say only this: clothe and house everybody, then reservations can go. Make everyone not exactly equal but fairly equal. Then there will be no need for reservations.

[Padgoankar] That is a tall order.

[Singh] Yes. But here lies the difference between what has been happening so far and what we are trying to do. When I was a standard 10 student my biggest satisfaction was to have taught a child the alphabet.

UNI Interview Reported

91AS0155B Madras *THE HINDU* in English
4 Oct 90 p 11

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, Oct 3—The Prime Minister, Mr. V.P. Singh, said today that the Mandal Commission recommendations had to be implemented without delay to check the rapidly growing resentment in backward areas and rising anti-urbanism.

He said expectations had been aroused in the backward classes and to go back on that "would be difficult and possibly cause more violence."

In an interview to UNI [UNITED NEWS OF INDIA], the Prime Minister justified his stand on the job reservations by saying that this was essential "to contain growing alienation."

Power centres: Mr. Singh said: "In our country, dangerous pressures have begun to develop." In the South, reservation had enabled the non-forward castes, who constituted 80 to 90 percent of society, to gain a decisive say in the State Government. But they had been unable to get into the Central Government. "This dichotomy, control over your own State, but no stake in the Centre, was giving rise to a growing demand for autonomy."

In the North economic power centres had emerged in rural areas following the green revolution, but their conversion into political power was being blocked. When asked why he should not apply economic criteria for reservations, he said: "This would close with one hand the door that we had opened with the other. Even to achieve the minimum standard set within the reserved categories is not easy."

"In 43 years, the proportion of class I posts filled by the SC/ST [Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes] is only 10 to 11 percent, and other backward classes 4.5 percent. Even with reservation the backward sections will experience the same problems as that of the SC/STs. Even children of those coming from urban schools will initially make it

into the reserved categories. Take them out and reservation will remain an empty gesture. We have, however, provided for a review after 10 years."

On creating employment opportunities on a merit-cum-economic weakness basis, he said: "We are seriously working out the details of the employment policy but it will take some time. The problem was not born with the Mandal Commission reservations. For years now employment has been growing far more slowly than the labour force, and no one has been thinking about it, much less doing anything. The disenchantment of the educated unemployed has actually become a threat to the unity of the country, as in Kashmir. So I can assure you that we're in dead earnest."

"As for not taking these steps first, governments do not always work in a textbook fashion. Accepting the Mandal report gave a shock to the social system and set us all thinking. That includes most of us in the government. A problem that we had tolerated, or were giving a lower priority to, suddenly became a matter of the utmost urgency.

Right to work: "In essence what I want the student community to know is that ever since Independence, they have been patronised by successive administrations. They have been told to concentrate on their studies so that they can prepare themselves to do well in life. But after they leave the university, this concern for their welfare has suddenly disappeared, and they have been left to the cruel mercies of the job market.

"The National Front Government is determined to end this hypocrisy. The plans we are now drawing up are intended to involve students in nation building activities of the highest priority from the day they enter secondary schools and colleges. But in exchange, the government will take on itself the responsibility of finding them gainful employment after they complete their studies. That is what we mean by the right to work. It is not a dole. Nor is it simply the right to draw a government salary. No one with any self-respect can stand that for any length of time.

"What I want the young people to have is a place in society that values them. We do not have too many resources. And implementing such an ambitious programme requires a huge gearing up of the government machinery. So it will take a little time. That is why I asked the other day for patience and for justice. We need to work together to achieve this goal."

In reply to another question as to how he would meet the aspirations of the 30,000 or 35,000 persons who would not get government jobs because of the reservations, he said: "Broadly speaking the new plan involves devising a system for drawing up a merit list of people leaving schools, polytechnics, and colleges, and offering them three options—scholarships for further studies, loans for self-employment and dealership, agencies and franchises that the Central Government and the 225 centrally owned public undertakings award every year.

"Our aim is to award these franchises, on the basis of merit, to the people who do not come from affluent families. By doing this we will also eliminate a great deal of corruption and nepotism in our society."

'Divisive' issue: Answering another question as to why he had taken up such a divisive issue like job reservation at this point of time, Mr. Singh said over the last 40 years, entry into the elite of the country—its permanent power structure, became blocked for the vast majority of the people, particularly from rural areas. Even the smaller towns were getting increasingly left out.

Mr. Singh said that the best schools and universities were located in large cities and these admitted students who had scored high marks in the tenth and Plus Two examinations and so these also became the preserves of the students of elite schools. Students from rural areas could not compete with those coming from the towns. "Over the time this monopoly has been reinforced by government policies. The total central subsidy for higher education of about Rs. [rupees] 3,500 crores did not cover the capital cost of building new colleges and institutes or adding to the existing ones. Those who are not part of these are increasingly shut out. In any society where recruitment to the elite became closed destroyed itself," he said.

Mr. Singh said the job reservation would assure half of the country's population, if they worked hard, of a share in the State of India. "They will not just have decisions made for them, but will play a part in making these decisions themselves," he added.

When asked why should not there be reservations for the forward caste students in the rural areas he said: "That was why I had proposed an additional 5 to 10 per cent. We are now finalising an employment programme of which a large part will be geared to finding people jobs or income earning opportunities on the basis of economic weakness-cum-merit.

"But it must be remembered that the backwards and deprived sectors of our society suffer from a disadvantage. Few in the present generation have a tradition of learning in their families. Children of educated parents start the schooling process with a huge advantage over those from families where the parents have not gone to college or had an equivalent education. On these grounds alone the socially and educationally backwards deserve some preference.

The Mandal Commission 'defined' backwardness in terms of castes, whereas he spoke sometimes of an elite and sometimes of castes. When asked was this not confusing, he said: "A better word than 'defined' would be 'identified.' "The urban elite too can be identified, very broadly, in terms of the castes from which it is drawn. But the Mandal Commission did not use castes as the sole determinant of backwardness. That is why the same caste is backward in one State and forward in another. The Commission carried out sample surveys in two villages and one urban block in each district. To

judge backwardness it set up a total of 11 criteria, of which four were social, three educational, and four economic. The economic criteria were for instance, whether the number of families of a caste/class living in kutchra houses was 25 percent below the state average, or the average value of assets of the families in the group was 25 percent below the State average."—UNI

Paper Reports Devi Lal Resignation From Lok Sabha

Details of Announcement

91AS0158A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 1 Oct 90 pp 1, 11

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 30—The former deputy prime minister, Mr Devi Lal, also one of the chief architects of the Janata Dal, today took the party by surprise when he resigned his Lok Sabha seat.

In a dramatic move, the Haryana patriarch handed over the resignation letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. V.P. Singh, while the National Front [NF] parliamentary party meeting was in progress this morning at the Parliament House annexe.

A two-page letter, accompanied by the resignation note to the Lok Sabha speaker, was actually addressed to the Janata Dal president, Mr. S.R. Bommai, with the request that it be forwarded to the speaker for "acceptance with immediate effect."

Since Mr Bommai is away in Bangalore, Mr Devi Lal chose to give the letter to the Prime Minister, to be handed over to the party president.

Though the prime minister did not touch upon this issue during the five-hour-long meeting, Mr Singh is learnt to have spoken to Mr Devi Lal on the telephone in the evening, when he requested the former deputy prime minister not to press his resignation.

Earlier, at an impromptu press conference, Mr Devi Lal declared that he was resigning not because he was opposed to the Mandal commission recommendations but because of the style and manner in which the report was accepted by the government and the subsequent mishandling of the whole issue. He said he was firm on his decision to quit his Lok Sabha seat, adding emphatically, that there was no question of taking back his resignation letter as he had already made up his mind. At the same time, he clarified that he would continue to remain in the party. "The party was created with great difficulty, so there is no question of breaking it," he said.

The resignation drama, which was set in motion this morning, created a flutter in political circles and was being viewed as the beginning of yet another crisis for the National Front minority government. Many were unaware of what was to follow when Mr Devi Lal arrived

for the National Front parliamentary party meeting at 9.30 a.m., about half an hour after the meeting had begun.

Immediately, Mr Devi Lal walked over to the dais where the Prime Minister was seated and quietly handed over the resignation letter to him. He then left the hall, heading straight for his Willingdon Crescent residence, where he was closeted with the veteran Janata Dal leader, Mr Chandra Shekhar, for quite some time.

In between, he took time to talk to press reporters, where he indicated that he favoured a change in the party leadership, though he did not specifically name Mr. V.P. Singh in this context. He said there was widespread resentment within the party over the hasty manner in which the Mandal commission report was being implemented.

He pointed out that he was resigning as he did not want to be a party to the "mishandling of the situation" by the government and also in recognition of the sentiments of the people. Expressing anguish and concern at the large-scale violence triggered by the government's decision, including a spate of self-immolation cases, the Haryana patriarch pointed out that now members of scheduled castes and backward classes were also resorting to this extreme measure.

Mr Devi Lal was, however, confident that despite the current happenings, the party would not break, saying that his resignation from the parliamentary seat was actually intended to strengthen the party. The Janata Dal-led government, he asserted, would remain in power, irrespective of who led the party while admitting that there was a mood for a change in the party leadership.

UNI & PTI adds:

Expressing deep distress over the self-immolation by young boys and girls, Mr Devi Lal said: "I expected the Prime Minister to rise above petty personal prejudices and to give a healing touch by opening a dialogue with the agitating students and try to remove their misconceptions." He also regretted that while Mr. V.P. Singh had invited the students for a discussion, he stuck to his stand not to dilute the recommendations of the Mandal commission.

He clarified that he had submitted his letter of resignation to the Prime Minister, since the party president, Mr. S.R. Bommai was not in the capital.

Mr. V.P. Singh also spoke to Mr Bommai in Bangalore, requesting him not to forward Mr Devi Lal's letter of resignation to the Lok Sabha speaker, Mr Rabi Ray.

Mr Devi Lal also appealed to the students and kisans to lift the economic blockade of Delhi since this step would only hit the common man in the capital.

He also urged the students not to damage public property since it belonged to the nation and not to the government.

In Hyderabad, the National Front chairman, Mr N.T. Rama Rao, today described the resignation of Mr Devi Lal as an "unfortunate and totally unexpected incident."

He said: "Devi Lal commands respect and honour from everyone of us. He has an important role to play in fulfilling the promises of National Front."

On the performance of the National Front government, particularly in the wake of widespread anti-reservation agitations, Mr Rama Rao said "Everything is being done according to the manifesto. For any social reform, resistance and opposition is inevitable."

The Uttar Pradesh Janata Dal vice-president, Mr Syed Ali Asharif, described as "unfortunate" the resignation of Mr Devi Lal.

Mr Asharif said it was not the opportune moment for resignation as the party and the country were facing crisis and challenges from different quarters.

Text of Letter

91AS0158B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 1 Oct 90 p 11

[Text] New Delhi, September 30 (UNI)—Following is the text of Mr Devi Lal's letter to Mr S.R. Bommai:

"I am writing this letter with deep distress and heartfelt anguish over the way our young boys and girls, even in their early teens, are sacrificing their dear lives by self-immolation, consuming poison, or otherwise. These young hopes of the future have taken to this extreme step by one hurried and unplanned decision of our government of implementing the recommendations of the Mandal commission report. I am led to believe that no proper discussion was held either in the cabinet or the party or with the supporting parties of our minority government before the announcement. The undue haste and abandoning the process of consensus approach of deciding such a momentous issue is the very root cause of the whole problem today. This has even led the press to impute motives to the sincerity of the government in implementing the recommendations of the Mandal commission report, and even the so-called friends of the government in the press reacted critically to the decision."

"Let me make it clear at the very outset that I am not, repeat not, opposed to the upliftment of our unfortunate brothers and sisters belonging to the backward communities. I, in fact, started my political career with a protest against the treatment meted out to one of the members of the backward community. I continued the struggle for their welfare throughout my life along with the leaders like Shri Karpoori Thakur of the depressed classes and backward communities."

"I, as a member of the drafting committee of the Janata Dal ejection manifesto fully understand the implications of including the demand in the manifesto. I am not therefore opposed to the idea of the Mandal commission recommendations but am opposed to the style, timing, and manner of announcing the acceptance of the recommendations and the mis-handling of the whole issue."

"The announcement of the acceptance of the recommendations on August 7 was an abortive attempt to scuttle the chances of the success of August 9 rally at Boat Club. Some of the members of the government seems to have thought, and accordingly misadvised the Prime Minister, that the announcement with one stroke will take a major chunk of my sympathisers and friends away from me and the rally shall collapse, little knowing that the announcement will also immediately divide the whole society into two factions—the pro-Mandalites and the anti-Mandalites, thus preparing a ground for the civil war in every village, every town, every mohalla, and every street. The fire was further fanned by two cabinet ministers by their open call to their sympathisers to come on the streets and fight their opponents. It is unheard of in the history of our country, nay of any country, that cabinet ministers have instigated a section of the people to take to streets to silence those expressing their grievances."

"No government can afford to divide its own people just to carry its views across. All my efforts to request the Prime Minister to dissuade one of his cabinet colleagues from going to Jaipur and addressing the meeting there proved to be naught. The visit further deteriorated conditions there and the minister had to face the public wrath."

"I expected the Prime Minister to rise above the petty personal prejudices and to give a healing touch by opening a dialogue with the agitating students and try to remove their misconceptions. However, his broadcast to the nation on September 26, fell far short of the expectations of the young students. He on the one hand stuck to his early stand of not diluting the recommendations and even talked of the resignation, and on the other invited an "open mind."

This duplicity, coupled with insensitivity of the government to the problem of the children have further estranged them, and in spite of the best efforts of the various people at various levels, no proper channel for the dialogue with the agitating students has been opened, thus creating an impasse.

The young lives are being lost, the property worth millions is being destroyed, the law and order situation has collapsed, the credibility of the government to govern has been shattered, and it has failed even to provide drinking water to 80 lakh population in the capital. All this because a decision was taken at a wrong moment and without taking the consensus of all concerned."

"I am a loyal and disciplined worker of the party and have contributed my little bit in the formation of the party and also of the government. I have been keeping my silence all these days because of the party discipline and also that any move on my part may not be misunderstood and mis-interpreted."

But the time comes when the inner voice of your conscience compels you to rise above your party affiliations and your personal whims and prejudices. The time, I feel, is now. Though it is very sad for me to part company especially from the friends in the government which has come into being by my efforts still I cannot support the government which is so insensitive to the cries of the dying children and is leading the country to Balkanisation and the society to fragmentation. I have, therefore, decided to relinquish my membership of the Lok Sabha. I am enclosing my resignation with the request that the same may be forwarded to the speaker for acceptance with immediate effect."

Congress' Reemergence Viewed

91AS0130B Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
6 Oct 90 p 6

[Commentary by Suryakant Bali: "Congress Has Risen in the Horizon"]

[Text] Who has not benefited from the blunders committed by the Rashtariya Morcha government during its 10-month rule? When the BJP [Bhartiya Janata Party] had endorsed this government in December 1989, it was clear that it wanted to push this minority government toward a fall in order to win the elections itself. 30 October seems to be the time it was waiting for. The main goal of the MKP [Marxist Communist Party] and other left wing parties is to keep the Congress party out of the government. Neither the Janata Dal nor the MKP had the capability to help or hurt each other, in the elections at that time or now, as they do not share the sphere of influence. The Congress party hoped that this government would self-destruct because of its internal strife and pave the way for Congress' return to power.

In other words, Congress and the BJP were the two priests waiting in the wings for this government's post-death ceremony feasts. The MKP was not in this priests' group. Now the question is who will benefit from the sins and good deeds of the V.P. Singh government? Congress or the BJP?

This government does not seem to have done any good deed. Had there been any solid results from the Bofors investigation and had it been proven that Rajiv Gandhi was the broker in this deal, then the Janata Dal, the BJP, and the MKP would all have benefited. Their coalition based on this issues would have been considered appropriate. However, this did not happen and the Bofors affair either fell through or slipped down the government's priority list or was pushed to the bottom. The Congress party will have a strong weapon to attack the Janata Dal and the BJP if the next elections are held

before the [Bofors] drama is brought to a logical ending. Mr. V.P. Singh, who has already lost his face because the mask of moral politics has been ripped off him, will be the main target of this development. He had used the Bofors incident as a catapult to put him in the government.

The V.P. Singh government had tried to bring about a revolution by reserving 27 percent of the jobs for the mid-level castes. Had this revolution succeeded, it would have been a feather in V.P. Singh's cap, much like Mrs. Indira Gandhi's "eradicate poverty." However, this revolution was brought about with deceit and it became the hangman's noose instead of a feather in his cap. This noose is being discussed by everyone and it is the government that is heaving a sigh of relief at the Supreme Court's decision to suspend implementation of this decision. Let us analyze this. Mr. V.P. Singh wanted to be portrayed as the messiah of the poor by reserving 27 percent of the employment and other opportunities for them. He was never portrayed like that before. Had he taken this step after planning and discussing this plan with the other parties, then perhaps he would have succeeded in this effort. However, then he had to make the BJP, the MKP, and Congress an equal partner in the glory. Mr. Singh did not want to do that. He wanted to devour the whole bowl of sweetmeats himself! This leader of a minority government suffering from factionalism tried to defeat all the factions of his own party, supportive groups, and the opposition—including the Congress party—with this one arrow. His efforts to betray them all were discovered too soon. When the people caught the leader who had sought votes in the name of honesty stealing goats belonging to other people, they were outraged. The result was the emergence of a middle class revolution in north and south India.

There are some other facts. There are not enough people in the mid-level castes to make them 52 percent of the population as the government tried to tell the people. The 1931 census, on which this figure is based, is not only 60 years old but was also used in a way to skew the figures. Also, the majority of the backward castes live in the south, where V.P. Singh doesn't have much influence because they have their own platform and messiahs. In the northern states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana, they already have their own leaders. For example, why should the low castes in Uttar Pradesh give up the leadership of Mulayam Singh for V.P. Singh? Will Mulayam Singh transfer his assets to the empty bank account of Mr. V.P. Singh? Why should the Congress and the BJP transfer the support of low castes to Mr. V.P. Singh?

So, whose castle will be built now? Will it be the Congress or the BJP? Had there been no miracles or antitheses, the pro-government BJP and the opposition Congress party would have reaped the benefits and losses as expected. However, the record of disorder and confusion has been broken during these last 10 months (since Mrs. Gandhi's first government), therefore, the results can have far-reaching effect. The BJP had strongly

criticized the government for the anarchic situation resulting from its handling of Punjab, Kashmir, inflation, and the reservation campaign, but it had also announced its intention to support the government. The people did not mind this support for the government as they wanted this government to stay. Now that the people do not like this support anymore, the BJP has also started to participate in condemning the government.

There is little possibility of the Janata Dal and the BJP working together during the next elections. The situation is clear in the regions where these parties have equal influence (Himachal, Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujrat, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh). Both parties will win together or lose together when they work together. The Congress party will definitely win if these two parties run for elections separately. The present atmosphere is negative for both parties. India's middle class and the voters that it influences are opposed to V.P. Singh and they are also angry at the BJP because of its role in making V.P. Singh the prime minister. Therefore, it would be a miracle if the results are positive for the BJP and the Janata Dal and not for the Congress party. The BJP is hoping that the Ayodhya situation will pull a miracle for it. We shall see how it comes out.

There are some certain facts about the Congress. Its leader has all but cleared the stigma of the Bofors incident. He did not try to make a government using desperate strategies, even though he headed the largest party in the nation. He did not try to hasten the fall of the already-crumbling government. This helped his party win more credibility. The Janata Dal members in the government are breaking each other's skulls, while the Congress had maintained its unity both during its government and now while sitting in the opposition ranks. The Janata Dal tends to insult its own prime minister, while the Congress party's devotion to its leader is still unshaken. The people have begun to understand the unity-prone character of the Congress party much better after observing the Janata Dal policies, which are trying to divide the country. Rajiv has to take care of two things for his return. There are strong Congress party leaders in every region. He has to demonstrate his ability to lead them all. The second thing is to make sure that his party does not look anti-Hindu even when keeping the important secular role of the party in the Ayodhya conflict. He must work on it. These two tasks are not easy, but then these should not be very difficult for a party like the Congress.

Editorial Criticizes 'Luxuriating' MPs

91P40044A Madras ANANDA VIKATAN in Tamil
11 Nov 90 p 14

[Editorial: "Luxuriating MPs [Members of Parliament]"]

[Text] As the toppling of V.P. Singh's government at the center became imminent, people thought that mid-term

elections might follow. The majority of the MPs [Members of Parliament], however, did not want midterm elections! That is, they had no desire of coming face to face with the public!

In an effort to gather followers, Devi Lal said quite openly and unabashedly "Those not opting for elections come and join me!"

These politicians have come to power after "investing," i.e. spending a lot! They worry thus: "We haven't even broken even...if elections were to be held at this time, will we get tickets again? Even if we did get the tickets, will the people vote again for us?"

Today, the people's representatives wield extraordinary powers and thrive in an autonomous capacity! Their goal has become the "lakhs" that can be made. None of them has lost his mind to the extent of staking his position!

In addition, elections seem like an acid test of sorts to these "luxuriating" MPs!

The mendicant common man, whom they slight all the time, takes the form of the discus wielding Narayana [God] as soon as he holds a vote in his hand!

We must take heart though! This fear, in the hearts of the politicians of the power of the people, is the sign that democracy will win in the end!

Commentary Sees Challenges to Hindu Tolerance

91P40049A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
1 Nov 90 p 6

[Commentary by Rameshwar Misra 'Pankaj': "New Food for Thought"]

[Text] The majority of the Janata Dal and the National Coalition Front's supporters were very pleased that V.P. Singh had prevented a Congress-BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] union by implementing Mandal's recommendations, that the BJP will no longer be able to have the support of the whole Hindu community in the matter of Ram Janmabhoomi [Building a temple in the birthplace of Ram, the Hindu God].

Just the opposite has occurred. If the nation has ever surged forward together on any one issue since 1977, it is on the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. If the ornamental cornices of the Marxists could be overlooked for a moment, their Hindu "masses" were as enthusiastic about the issue of the Ram temple as any other Indian. Substantial numbers of Muslims from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Gujarat have thronged to support the Ram-rath yatra [Chariot-procession in support of Ram temple construction] program. In Bihar, even leaders who support the Mandal Commission share the view of other Hindus on the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. The Ram temple campaign has broken all previously existing barriers between the forward and the backward, the Harijans and the higher castes, Hindus and Muslims. Has the typical Indian muslim ever been

automatically against Lord Ram? Mr. Lalkrishna Advani has said correctly about the Ram-rath yatra that the national procession has brought about greater Hindu-Muslim unity and will contribute to further harmony in the society. Then, are the Indian intellectuals really scheming hypocrites, who were threatening that there will be widespread violence in the nation, new possibilities of partition, and unbridgeable rifts between communities, etc.? In truth, we need to give up twisted thinking and calling others conspirators. It is better to keep quiet if we don't know about someone and rather make an attempt to know that person.

It is a fact that except for the Congress-BJP-RSS [Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh]-VHP [Vishwa Hindu Parishad: World Hindu Council], the chiefs and intellectual leaders of the other parties were really very concerned and frustrated. They feared that with this campaign the Hindu-Muslim tensions would reach their nadir. This was not apparent only in the case of the leaders of the Congress and the BJP. Congress knew very well that there was widespread community support for this campaign and that it would continue. Its strategy was to keep the truly supportive community behind it at the grass roots level but to let the BJP put on the defensive at the media level.

The dilemma of parties like the Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena is different. As parties of the present, the status of their long-cherished ideologies and traditional intellectual outlook is pathetic. They thrive in a strange intellectual realm, where they see Hinduism through the demagoguery of their leaders, and while equipped with a half-baked English education but drawn emotionally to Sanskrit, some of these leaders even espouse a cause of universal Hinduism. However, the situation of the RSS and the BJP is different.

With all its limitations, the RSS still is the basic representative of current Indian thinking. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the BJP both are institutions spawned by the RSS. Thus, when it chose Ramjanma[bhoomi] temple as an issue, it was backed by a great deal of thought, 50 years of experience with the Indian psyche, a hand on the pulse of the Indian masses, and also sufficient knowledge of Indian Muslims. It is true that the RSS has slowly grown into a mature organization. In the past, it was totally unfamiliar with the Muslims. There are glimpses of this unfamiliarity in many of the statements of Dr. Hedgewar and in the analyses of Golwalker. Since the active involvement of the Jana Sangh and the BJP in politics, however, many of the RSS statesmen have been somewhat successful in understanding the mind of the Indian Muslims. They have also understood that there is a deep ideological distancing between the Indian Muslims and the majority of the Muslim leadership.

It is due to his own farsightedness that in contemporary India, Lalkrishna Advani is considered the biggest national leader. He has not allowed the spread of hatred against Muslims nor has he used any unnecessary scare

tactics. At the same time, he has also avoided betraying the people's trust on the Ram temple issue. A party with not even a small group of stalwarts with any philosophy, no significant knowledge of historical events, no clear-cut economic or industrial plan, and no knowledge of or stand on various units that make up the Indian society, has accomplished in Ayodhya a feat which even parties which have traditionally possessed distinguished groups of intellectual statesmen as members could not dream of doing. If the apprehensions of those intellectuals were proven unfounded, there is no need to ridicule them for that. After all, they are also representing an aspect of Indian thinking. Their limits are the limits of current Indian thinking.

It has not been possible thus far for a traditional Hindu to completely identify with non-Hindu thought. We [Hindus] can recognize Muslims, Christians, etc., as distinct communities, but we can never consider them to be an absolutely separate and adverse society. There is no basis for that in any interpretation of Hindu thought. Also, on the other hand, the current leaders and forerunners of the Muslims and the Christians whose religions were not born here, will not be prepared to consider themselves as one of the integrating components of the complex Indian society such as the Shaivites, Vaishnavites, Lingayats, Ramasnehis, Kabirpanthis, Raidasis, Dahpanthis, Pranamis, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and Satnamis, etc. However, Indian traditional teaching has never acknowledged a division based on internal and external origins. It is obvious, then, that many problems will arise. What solution will Hindu thought provide? These are significant questions and important challenges. The Hindu intellectuals will have to fight them head-on and find acceptable solutions.

UP Chief Minister's Hindi Fanaticism Condemned

91P40044B Madras DINAMANI in Tamil
19 Oct 90 p 4

[Editorial: "Nayanar Burns Yadav"]

[Text] The entire nation knows about UP [Uttar Pradesh] Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav's language fanaticism. He insisted that Hindi would be the language of his state and forbade the use of English. He proclaimed that he would conduct correspondence with the Center and the other states only in Hindi. He was reminded that such a fanatical approach would be detrimental to the cause of national integration. It was also pointed out that in adherence to the promise made by former premier Jawaharlal Nehru, English should continue as the bridging language of the country.

These words seem to have fallen on deaf ears. Recently, Yadav wrote a letter in Hindi to Mr. E.K. Nayanar, chief minister of Kerala. He did not even care to attach an English translation to it.

Naturally angered by this, Nayanar returned Yadav's Hindi letter to him and pointed out strongly that he did

not understand what was written in it. "Please give up writing to me in Hindi alone," the Kerala chief minister advised the UP Chief Minister.

Nayanar has strongly proclaimed: "Let's conduct correspondence with other states in English. If we are adamant about conducting correspondence only in Hindi, there will be deterioration of relations between the states and national integration will be threatened." Nayanar has also taught the lesson that a state cannot force its favourite language on another state. We can only wait and see if Yadav heeds Nayanar's counsel or stays adamant.

Sindhis Urge Indo-Pak Unity for Lasting Subcontinental Peace

91AS0130A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
6 Oct 90 p 6

[World-Sindhi-Conference: "The Ever-Loudening Call for Indo-Pak Unity"]

[Text] Bombay, 5 Oct (NP)—There is only one way to establish peace in the Indian subcontinent and that is by establishing a "union" with Pakistan.

This opinion was expressed by Sindhis from various parts of the country attending the World Sindhi Conference. The same desire was expressed in a resolution passed in the conference. This resolution asked for the establishment of a union that could end tension between the two countries, save the money being spent on defense, remove the fear of a nuclear war, and increase dealings between the two countries and have better relations.

The speakers emphasized that such a union would benefit the Sindhis most as they would be united with their motherland again. They are serving India as its true sons; however, they cannot forget the land of their birth. The establishment of an Indo-Pakistani Union would help the Sindhis to visit Sindh and still remain Indian citizens.

Religion Not the Issue

The chief guest at the Conference, Maharashtra's finance minister, Ramrai Aadik, said that religion cannot be a criterion for dividing a nation and it should never be.

If the people are given a blood test, we cannot tell a Hindu from a Muslim. Still, they fight each other over religion. Pakistan would never have been established if religion had not been made an issue.

He praised the conference for proposing the establishment of a union which he said would help bring peace to the world and bring heaven right to the earth.

Vilasrao Deshmukh, minister of education, said that they all must work to implement this new idea.

He also announced that the state Academy of Sindhi Literature and Art had decided to organize a Sindhi festival in February. The state government was planning to offer Sindhi language as an approved subject in schools and colleges next year.

Sindhi scholars and artists will receive awards during the conference.

The Origin of Establishing a Union

Mr. Balram Madhok, president of Bharatiya Jansangh, was specially invited to Bombay to address this conference. In his usual style, he directly addressed the issue and said that the reunification of India depended on one factor and that is there should be no further division of Pakistan. He added that the present situation in Pakistan was pushing it toward further division. He stressed that our government must help in order to keep Pakistan alive.

He encouraged having similar conferences all over the world and said that efforts must be made to make the seed sown in this conference bear fruit and we must get international support for it.

The conference was chaired by Kundandas Dorda, chairman of the World Sindhi Congress. He talked about the present problems of the Sindhis and stressed the need for such conferences.

The conference organizer, Kahahialal Gidwani, expressed the patriotism of Sindhis in these words, "We are Indian first and Sindhis second." He asked the education minister to help get the Sindhi language an appropriate place in education.

The "Indo-Pakistan Union" proposal was presented by Harpal Punjabi, the general secretary of the World Sindhi Congress. It was seconded by another official, Harish Dube. Both urged the governments of both countries to take initiative in this direction.

Barham Kumari Usha also welcomed the effort for peace between India and Pakistan in the conference.

The proceedings of the conference were in Hindi in the beginning and later in Sindhi. The conference hall frequently roared with the slogans of "long live Mother India" and "long live Jujhelal."

Karnataka: 'Establishment-Rot' Said Spreading
91P40048A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
2 Nov 90 p 6

[Editorial: "Ramakrishna Hegde Again!"]

[Text] Ramakrishna Hegde's problems are worsening. The Dayal Commission's report has attached another short chapter against him and his son, Bharat Hegde, to an already infamous saga. Like its predecessor, the Kuldip Singh Commission, the Dayal Commission has not been able to catch Mr. Hegde red-handed, but has

arrived at the same conclusion that the former chief minister was unethical in misusing his clout to protect members of his family.

It was a commonplace thing. We are saying commonplace because following crooked ways to get admitted to engineering and medical colleges and to give bundles of currency-notes as donations has become a routine now. According to probability-theory, a definite proportion of the people conducting this business must be from the families of people in power. It has taken our investigative system five years to get to the bottom of this routine, commonplace matter! It was in 1985 that Rs. [rupees] 250,000 was accepted for admitting someone to the MD [medical doctor] program. We have some inferences now at the end of 1990, after the dismantling of three different commissions. This shows how far 'establishment-rot' has spread into the core of our political system.

For politicians who regale in throwing mud at each other, the matter stops with questioning Mr. Hegde's own moral values, since he has publicly propagated a value-based political system. The real problem and its cause, however, go much deeper. The matter of admittance to MD program in a medical college is not like obtaining a quota or a license. How then, were Sudha Satyanandan's parents convinced of coughing up Rs. 250,000 towards this? It is appropriate at this time to remember the self-immolating anti-reservationists. There was also the latent fear in this case that in medical and engineering studies, the backward people might win the cake. When there is such pressing need for higher education in the country, why should it be made so hard to obtain, making the backdoor entry process flourish so well? Needless to say that corruption, especially political corruption, becomes rampant when there is scarcity. Those who shout out against corruption, but don't do anything about this scarcity, are surely not serious about resolving the issue.

There is yet another lesson to be learnt from the Kuldip-Dayal series of investigations, that when you are yourself not in the clear, be restrained about what you say. Ramakrishna Hegde spoke out rather in excess about his own political straightforwardness. Perhaps that is why people are also angrier than usual at him.

Helicopter Test Pilots To Be Trained in Bangalore
91AS0157A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 1 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Yogendra Bali]

[Text] Bangalore, Sept. 30—India's first advance light helicopter (ALH) test pilots will be trained at the test pilots' school here run by the Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) of the Indian Air Force [IAF] commanded by the IAF test pilot, air vice marshal Ajit Singh Lamba. The ALH is expected to be test flown early next year.

The ALH is one of the two ambitious military aircraft development projects of the country. The other one is the light combat aircraft (LCA), which is expected to come off the assembly lines in 1995.

Since the responsibility for ensuring the success of any aeronautical venture in India, through foolproof testing and evaluation, is shared by the IAF base here with the policy-making and other agencies from the design to mock-up and model to actual proto-type flight-tested aircraft and weapons system, it has earned the title of the flight test station of the nation.

The most seasoned test pilots and aviation experts like the group captain Ravish Malhotra, who was the alternate space pilot for wing commander Rakesh Sharma, who eventually made the space flight, in a Soviet spacecraft, are on the faculty of the ASTE.

The test pilot's school (TPS) is a prestigious institution of the IAF and recognised as peer of such establishments in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. It is the only test pilots school of its kind in Asia. Commanded by group captain P.K. Yadav, the institution has already turned out a distinguished community of well-trained test pilots, test flight engineers, and test flight instrumentation engineers. It has now decided to train test pilots and flight test engineers for the army and the navy also.

Prior to the establishment of this school, IAF pilots had to undergo training at Epner in France, Empire test pilots school in the U.K. or at two such schools in the U.S. The cost of training a test pilot abroad was about Rs [rupees] 1.30 crores equivalent of foreign exchange. While the cost of training here has been reduced to about Rs 80 lakhs, the greatest saving is in terms of foreign exchange. Now, in a week's training course, which includes visits to various aeronautical institutions within the country, the trainees have to visit institutions in the U.K. and France for only two weeks.

A high-powered group of the Empire test pilot's school which visited this institution was so impressed by the syllabus and quality of training that it expressed the desire if one or two of their trainees could also receive training here.

A group of visiting defence correspondents were provided the opportunity to watch the test pilots on aircraft as varied as Kiran, MiGs, Avros, AN 32s, MiG 17s and Jaguars.

The air vice-marshal Lamba explained that ASTE was the only flight testing organisation in the country that catered to the needs of the three services—defence research and development, the directorate general of civil aviation and academic institutions involved in aeronautical studies.

He said flight evaluation was required in three main areas of aeronautical activity. These include research projects, development trials and user evaluation trials.

There has been a rapid build up of aircraft development projects, including new aircraft design, improvements and modifications to aircraft and weapons systems to increase performance, and even import substitutions.

Aircraft like MiG 29 or IL-76 have been evaluated here. A complex third generation navigation and attack system has been developed indigenously for the Jaguar by INA's [Indian National Army's] integration organisation and ASTE.

General Purpose Parallel Processing System Unveiled

91AS0199 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
24 Oct 90 p 18

[Article by N. Gopal Raj, Thiruvananthapuram Staff Reporter recently in Pune and Bangalore]

[Text] The Centre for the Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) in Pune has whisked the wraps off its Param series of parallel processing supercomputers (or high-performance computers as it would prefer to call them). The series is expected to become India's first full-fledged general purpose parallel processing system.

The 64-node machine C-DAC exhibited at its recent Technology Transfer Meet at Pune would deliver 100 Mflops (million floating point operations per second—an indicator of computing speed). The objective is to have a 256-node machine delivering 1 Gflops (one gigaflop is equivalent to 1,000 Mflops) ready when its Mission 1 comes to an end next year. The Cray X-MP delivers about 200 Mflops.

In doing so, C-DAC will have mastered a strategic technology and provided a tool which promises a new era of computational science and engineering according to Dr Vijay P. Bhatkar, its Executive Director. During Mission 2, C-DAC would seek to boost the computing power of Param to 20 Gflops in four years.

Crux of Parallel Processing

A traditional single processor system executes a programme one instruction at a time. Faster processors speed up programme execution. Another route to rapid computing is to use more than one processor and to divide the programme among them. This is what parallel processing is all about and is used to an extent by conventional supercomputers like the Cray.

In computer terminology, the Param is called a multiple-instruction multiple-data (MIMD) message passing machine. It sees a programme as a number of concurrent processes running on a network of processors and communicating with each other. The Param uses the British company INMOS's T-800 transputer chip. The transputer, a natural choice for a parallel processing system, handles hardware tasks. It is a fast processor, with a floating point unit and four high speed communication links built into the chip.

Apart from the transputer chip, each computing node has between 4 and 16 MBytes of memory. The communication links are routed to a switching network. The interconnection between nodes can be software reconfigured to any topology, depending on programme requirements.

Variety of Host Systems

The Param, a back-end processing system, would take a variety of front-end host systems, including the IBM PC family, DEC MicroVAX II, Sun workstations, ECIL's Medha, and other popular VME or Multibus II machines with Unix/Xenix environments. It is partitionable (hence accessible to multiple users) and is accessible on a standard Ethernet network.

The Param will have a unique mass storage subsystem (MSS). In many applications disc access is needed frequently. Present systems are by far too slow and would constitute a major bottleneck. The MSS would allow high capacity discs to be added in parallel as and when required. Software would hide the physical structure of the file system while presenting a single large virtual disc to the user. A single file could be distributed over several discs to increase data transfer performance. Concurrent access to the MSS is also possible.

Welding the host system and Param into a powerful computing platform would be the advanced parallel programming environment (Apex). C-DAC documents describe Apex as a software environment which provides a seamless and easy-to-use interface for developing and executing parallel C and Fortran programmes for MIMD message passing machines. It is, reportedly, the largest systems software development effort ever in the country, requiring 100 man-years of work. Developed from scratch, Apex would include an operating system kernel comprising several libraries, some of which would reside in the host system and the others in Param.

Apex would have compilers for parallel C and Fortran. It would provide two off-line tools for algorithm prototyping and load balancing. In addition, it will have a powerful debugging tool and graphics capabilities.

Faster Hardware

With Apex, the Param can use faster hardware while the user would continue to see the same programming interface. Apex itself is expected to be improved in course of time, says Dr Paulraj who heads C-DAC's Bangalore unit.

In addition, C-DAC has established a substantial applications software group, claimed to be one of the largest for parallel processing systems. The trouble with parallel computers, particularly the message passing variety, is that existing programmes suited for single processor systems must be extensively modified. This has to be done manually. In fact, to get the full computational power of a large number of parallel processing nodes, the entire programme has often to be reworked from scratch,

starting from basic algorithms. Users with a considerable programme base may therefore hesitate to switch to a parallel processing machine unless there are application programmes already available.

C-DAC has signed a MOU (memorandum of understanding) with the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre [VSSC], Thiruvananthapuram, which has over 300 programmers and some 2,000 programmes of its own. Using a 9-transputer board on a PC, VSSC was able to achieve real time simulation of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle's trajectory from lift-off to satellite injection, an exercise which would have taken hours on their existing Cyber mainframe. C-DAC has also signed a MOU with the Space Applications Centre to develop application programmes for remote sensing.

Aerospace Applications

C-DAC has a team working on computational fluid dynamics (CFD) which finds applications in aerospace for simulation studies of airflows over airframes and other structures. Finite element methods used for structural analysis is another field of interest. Others where C-DAC is involved in developing application software include image processing oil reservoir modelling, signal processing, circuit simulation and computational chemistry.

C-DAC has already got ready more than 20 application programmes, says Dr Bhatkar. Some of this software was displayed at the Technology Meet. Among these was Code which simulates a parallel processing environment on a PC to learn Occam programming. More than 50 copies of Code have already been sold abroad. Crux (a toolset for parallel Fortran and C programme development on unix machines), image PRO (an image processing programme with many uses), a programme for analysing remote sensing satellite data, and an interactive signal processing package were among the programmes shown.

The likely customers for Param will be the Space Department's various wings whose computing needs have outgrown the mainframe systems and whose chances of getting a Cray or another conventional supercomputer are slim. But C-DAC hopes that universities, engineering colleges, and research institutions will form the bulk of the demand for its systems.

C-DAC is not the first group to develop a parallel processing computer in India. The National Aeronautics Laboratory developed their Flosolver back in 1985 and C-DOT, Bharat Electronics, the Indian Institute of Science, and, recently, the Defence Research and Development Organisation, are others which have developed their own parallel processing systems.

Tremendous Effort

C-DAC's mandate is to bring performance parallel processing systems in commercial production, says Dr Bhatkar. This called for tremendous effort. Not only had the

complete hardware to be designed and built but a rich programming environment created and a whole range of application software made available on the system. Altogether Param would have taken about 300 man years to develop. Dr Bhatkar estimates C-DAC had to develop the domestic market and address the international market as well.

But C-DAC advertisement blitz and its Technology Transfer Meet—which together seem to have created the impression that Param is ready—have left a great many in the parallel processing community and in the computer industry puzzled.

Actually, Param has some way to go before becoming the full-fledged parallel processing system it is notched up to being. After C-DAC got powerful design tools by the middle of 1989, about a dozen top class hardware designers sat down to design the Param in about six months, Dr Ashok Joshi—director of C-DAC's Pune Unit—told the Technology Transfer Meet. What exists at the moment is a sleek, extremely compact 64-node machine which can easily fit under a table. It is rugged enough to be transported by bus, and can be unpacked and running in less than an hour.

On the other hand, a private manufacturer in the country is reportedly putting on the market a 125-node transputer system using imported components, imported systems software and the host file system. Param does not offer too much more at present. Its crucial mass storage subsystem is not yet complete. Even more important, Apex is only half ready. Param is currently interfaced only to PCs, and its interfaces to other machines and Ethernet need more work. Integration of all these is expected to take place some time next year. Even after that, field tests by actual users of the entire system would be needed to iron out bugs before full scale commercial production begins.

Disturbing Trend

What is disturbing is C-DAC's announcement of a time schedule for technology transfer even though not a single Param machine has yet been delivered to an actual user. User experience of C-DAC's parallel processing hardware is restricted to transputer cards fitted to PCs. Transputer cards have been available from private manufacturers for the last two years. While C-DAC has already done considerable ground work in applications, its major goal of bringing one or two to operational use has not yet been achieved, say sources. But it wants to sign the technology transfer agreement this month, begin pilot production in December, and have the first sales by January 1991.

In the two years since its inception C-DAC has created a basket of technology including PC accelerator boards application specific sub-systems (over 16 board level products), more than 16 parallel processing tools, utilities and packages, several of which were international firsts, as well as the 64-node Param itself, points out Dr Bhatkar. It is true that the spectrum of products

announced are under various stages of development, but all these will be complete before July 1991 as per schedule. Apex would be released in December this year. Several tools and utilities developed by C-DAC were already available. Most importantly, its applications development programme was one of the most substantive efforts in parallel processing software anywhere in the world, maintains Dr Bhatkar.

The developmental efforts by private manufacturers, while being praiseworthy, could not be compared with C-DAC's efforts in terms of continuum of technology, the spectrum of hardware, software and application products, and advanced research in architectures and algorithms, he says. Four industries had already come forward to take the C-DAC knowhow.

Param had superior design features to comparable machines such as Meiko, Parsys and Parsytec on the European market, maintains Dr Bhatkar. Several users, including Pune University professors and the VSSC, had run their programmes on the 64-node prototype with C-DAC at Pune for quite some time, he adds.

C-DAC's critics have faulted continued use of the transputer as the microprocessor of choice for the Param. Intel's i860 microprocessor, released over a year ago, delivers a peak of over 80 Mflops and a sustained throughput of 15 Mflops and more. The T-800 transputers used in Param now give slightly over 0.5 Mflops sustained. Once i860 based workstations become available, users would be able to almost match the 64-node Param's performance without the hassle of parallelising their existing programmes. Intel's next generation chip with three million transistors is to be released next year and would be twice as fast as the i860. Indian parallel processing groups such as NAL and C-DOT are already considering using the i860 to power their systems.

Computer Consortium

Further, Intel has already brought together a consortium of hardware and software companies in a bid to evolve a shared memory parallel processing architecture around its powerful microprocessors. Such a system would run a multiprocessor version of Unix. The basic architecture could be ready next year. With Intel's clout, it could well become a de facto industry standard and pose a serious threat to Param even within the country.

The 30 MHz version of the transputer currently provided a peak of 4.25 Mflops, counters Dr Bhatkar. A network of a thousand of such transputers could accomplish awesome computing power for the ensemble. The fact is that such an ensemble can give reasonable sustained power in a wide range of applications, not only in scientific engineering but also in real time database and artificial intelligence applications, he says.

C-DAC was wedded only to state-of-the-art parallel computing, and not to any specific chip or VLSI manufacturer, asserts Dr Bhatkar. "We have been looking closely at i860 from the day it was announced. A

development project code named GM 20 based on the i860 had already been launched, and a test bed would be ready by July 1991. This would then be scaled up to a 20 Gflops machine in Mission 2," he says.

The i860 was also being integrated into the existing Param architecture. By using the i860 as a vector node attachment, serving a coprocessor to four T-800s, it would be possible to get high performance systems exceeding several gigaflops, adds Dr Bhatkar.

Advanced Router Chip

An advanced router chip to substantially speed up communication was being designed. Successful development of the router chip would make C-DAC one of just three organisations in the world to have done so, he avers.

Further, INMOS had invited C-DAC to participate in the development of their next generation H-1 transputer and C-104 router chips, he says. C-DAC intended to switch to the H-1 transputer, which would be about six times faster than the T-800, when it became available some time next year, he adds.

Ultimately C-DAC may not be judged solely by the technology it develops. Many wonder aloud whether the returns are commensurate with the money spent. C-DAC's funding—about Rs [rupees] 30 crores by next year—has been several orders of magnitude higher than what other parallel processing groups have received. By C-DAC's own estimates, the 300 man-years of effort required for Param was worth about Rs 8 crores. That still left a fair amount to be explained.

Budget Outlay

C-DAC had been allocated Rs 37.5 crores for its First Mission, says Dr Bhatkar. This included building two full-fledged prototypes of the target machines: 1 Gflop peak computing power, 1 Gbyte of memory and 20 Gbytes of secondary storage. The Rs 7.5 crores allotted for land and building was immediately surrendered after it was decided that C-DAC should not have its own complex in the First Mission. The actual expenditure was expected to be about of the order of Rs 5 crores by July 1991. Out of this, Rs 8 crores would have been spent on salaries, travel and operational overheads. About Rs 2.3 crores would have been spent by way of capital expenditure on preparation of offices and workshops, according to Dr Bhatkar.

In addition, Rs 3 crores had been set apart for funding external R&D and development contracts. All major parallel processing R&D projects currently under way in the country were being supported by C-DAC, he observes. In addition, C-DAC had launched application development projects with several institutions, and given development contracts to Indian computer and software companies. C-DAC had kept Rs 8 crores for components to build parallel processing platforms and

two target machines. Another Rs 8 crores had been spent on equipment and software to establish state-of-the-art design environments.

C-DAC expected to recover about Rs 6.7 crores through transfer of parallel processing technology, says Dr Bhatkar. For the first time in the country, a Government-founded research institution was planning to recoup the investment on it by commercialising its technology, he points out. C-DAC had also suggested that the entire investment in Mission 1 and proposed investment of Mission 2 be paid back through technology transfer royalties and taxes and duties collected from commercialisation of its knowhow, Dr Bhatkar adds.

Agriculture Ministry Predicts Record Grain Output

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in English 2 Oct 90 p 14

[Text] New Delhi, October 1—With an anticipated record kharif grain harvest of nearly 101.75 million tonnes, the country seems poised to exceed the current year's production target of 176.5 million tonnes.

The Union agriculture ministry feels that the total foodgrain output in 1990-91 might touch or even cross an all-time high mark of 178 million tonnes.

The optimism is based on the expectation of the ensuing rabi season being good thanks to the excellent monsoon this year, resulting in normal or excess rainfall in 31 or the total 35 meteorological sub-divisions in the country. About 81 percent of the districts received normal or excess precipitation this season, against 71 percent last year.

The rains in the second half of the season have not only benefited the standing kharif crops but have ensured adequate moisture in the soil to facilitate extensive rabi sowing.

The working target for the rabi grain production has, therefore, been fixed at 85 million tonnes, against the actual target of producing between 75 and 76 million tonnes. This has been done after consulting the states during the national conference on the rabi campaign held here this week.

If the optimism about the 1990-91 output held true, it would mean a production growth of around four percent. This would be significantly higher than the growth of less than one percent achieved in 1989-90 over the previous year notwithstanding a good monsoon. When asked to explain the reasons for this, the agriculture secretary, Mr S.K. Misra, said about three million tonnes of potential production was lost in 1989-90 due to climatic reasons. The actual foodgrain output during the year was estimated at 170.48 million tonnes, only marginally higher than the 1988-89 harvest of 170.25 million tonnes, he said.

Giving crop-wise details for 1989-90, Mr Misra said the output of wheat and gram had suffered a set-back, especially in U.P. [Uttar Pradesh], Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The estimated output of various crops was wheat 50.15 million tonnes; gram 4.26 million tonnes; rice 73.2 million tonnes; coarse grains 34.4 million tonnes; and total pulses 12.73 million tonnes. The figures for the previous year were wheat 53.99 million tonnes; gram 5.06 million tonnes; rice 70.67 million tonnes; coarse grains 31.89 million tonnes and total pulses 13.7 million tonnes.

The agriculture secretary said the output of most crops, barring oilseeds, would be higher this year than in the previous two years.

The shortfall in oilseeds would be chiefly due to lower production of groundnut in the Saurashtra region where sowing could not be done on part of the area for want of moisture. Monsoons had started late in this region which accounts for nearly one fourth of the total groundnut production.

The output of other oilseed crops, including soyabean, sunflower, castor, etc., is expected to be good.

The three successive good monsoons have helped increase fertiliser consumption at a faster pace. This year again the growth rate is expected to be over 10 percent. However, the availability was generally satisfactory, he maintained.

The rabi production target of 75 to 76 million tonnes for the ensuing season is significantly higher than the last year's actual rabi output of 69.69 million tonnes.

IRAN

Trade With Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece Expanding

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[Text] The minister of foreign trade of Yugoslavia, the deputy minister of industrial affairs of Turkey, the deputy foreign minister of Greece, and the new ambassador of Lebanon in Tehran met and spoke separately yesterday with Dr. Habibi, the first vice president.

According to a report by the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, Horvat, the minister of foreign trade of Yugoslavia, met and spoke with Dr. Habibi, the first vice president, yesterday afternoon.

In this meeting, the foreign trade minister of Yugoslavia pointed out the positive political relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yugoslavia and said: We hope our economic relations will also reach a desirable level.

Emphasizing the peaceful position of the Islamic Republic in solving the Persian Gulf crisis, he pointed out the actions of Iran and Yugoslavia towards a peaceful solution in the nonaligned movement and said:

We believe the recent events will result in the expansion of international cooperation and raising the level of relations between Iran and Yugoslavia in the south-south conference.

The Yugoslavian foreign trade minister also announced the inclination of his country to expand joint cooperation in various areas, including production and distribution of energy, cars, petroleum, and tourism, and said: The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the cooperative partners of Yugoslavia and, in the future, will be one of the major partners of Yugoslavia in the nonaligned movement.

Then Dr. Habibi, first vice president, spoke and, referring to the change in the economic structure in Yugoslavia, expressed hopes that the negotiations between the officials of the two countries will reach positive results.

The first vice president pointed out the clear position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in condemning any sort of aggression and threatening of the security of international borders and said: The resolutions of the United Nations and the Security Council must be implemented precisely, and no change in international borders is acceptable.

In conclusion, Dr. Habibi emphasized that in order to expand economic relations between the two sides, the bureaucracy and meddlesome regulations of the two countries must be eliminated. He also expressed hope that by employing the joint existing resources in the two countries, Iran and Yugoslavia will be able to reach favorable results in economic areas.

Meeting of Deputy Minister for Industrial Affairs of Turkey With Dr. Habibi

Cemil Cicek, the deputy minister for industrial affairs of Turkey, met and spoke yesterday morning with Dr. Habibi, the first vice president.

The deputy minister for industrial affairs of Turkey termed the negotiations with the Iranian delegation in Turkey successful and expressed hope that relations between the two countries will enjoy increased expansion and development.

In connection with the Persian Gulf crisis, the deputy minister for industrial affairs of Turkey pointed out that Turkey has suffered greatly in this regard. He announced the inclination of his country to settle the existing discord in the Persian Gulf through peaceful means.

Then Dr. Habibi, the first vice president, expressed his satisfaction with the positive trend of the eight negotiations of the joint committee of both countries and emphasized the pursuit and implementation of its ratification.

Visit of Deputy Foreign Minister of Greece With Dr. Habibi

Panayulis Akunomo, the deputy foreign minister of Greece, met and spoke yesterday afternoon with Dr. Habibi, the first vice president.

In this meeting, the deputy foreign minister of Greece referred to the old relations between Greece and the Islamic Republic of Iran and said: I carry a message of friendship and declare the readiness of my government to cooperate with Iran in all areas.

Announcing the visit of the Greek foreign minister to Iran, he expressed happiness about his negotiations with

the officials of our country and said: As a country that enjoys a solid and good position in the European Economic Common Market, we have always presented and supported the views of the Islamic Republic in that assembly.

Dr. Habibi also said in this meeting: We wish to preserve these relations during the reconstruction and renovation of our country and expand them in cultural and economic areas. According to this report, Nur al-Din, the new ambassador of Lebanon to the Islamic Republic of Iran, also met and spoke with Dr. Habibi, the first vice president, yesterday morning.

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