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Near East & South Asia

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International Affairs

U.S. Foreign Policy Foreseen Less 'Interventionist'

93AS0187E Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 5 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "U.S. Foreign Policy May Become Less Interventionist"]

[Text] Islamabad—It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the 1992 American presidential elections which George Bush lost to Bill Clinton that, in the final analysis, it was George Bush's Gulf war victory which contributed substantially to his rout at the polls. It was after the Gulf war, that Bush proclaimed the advent of the "New World Order," which remains stillborn. America's international role which was sought to be projected by Bush did not correspond to the domestic realities which saw an America in decline on the economic, social and urban fronts, and the electorate was left wondering that "if we are supposed to be so great abroad, what's wrong at home?"

It was a remarkable victory which an obscure state governor pulled off against President Bush, who was considered the "ultimate Washington insider." As one of Clinton's aides remarked "we were actually preparing Bill Clinton for the 1996 election since we thought Bush was unbeatable in 1992 and we felt that Clinton needed to have exposure and name recognition for the future." It is precisely for this reason that most of the big names in the Democratic Party refused to enter the race for the presidency given the assumption that Bush could not be beaten because he had won the Gulf war.

What is even worse regarding the Gulf war from the point of view of George Bush, is that he has lost his job while the person against whom the Gulf war was launched—Saddam Hussein—is still around! Three aspects of the Bush defeat are important from Pakistan's perspective. First, the old equation of Republicans being pro-Pakistan and Democrats being pro-India is not valid and does not hold true. In fact, the Bush administration exceeded all previous American administrations for its hostility towards Pakistan which was manifested in an arbitrary and selective application of American law to punish Pakistan for allegedly pursuing the nuclear programme while completely exonerating Israel and India in this regard.

The second aspect which is important from the point of view of Pakistan is that since the entire election campaign focused on domestic issues like the economy, the region can expect the Clinton administration to be less interventionist in its foreign policy approach, unlike the Bush administration and its predecessor, the Reagan administration, which set new records of military interventionism in the Third World ranging from Iraq, Grenada, to Lebanon and Panama apart from putting pressures on assertive countries like Pakistan, Iran, Lybia, North Korea, China and Cuba. The intensity of American pressures on Pakistan should lessen.

Third, given such serious economic problems it is highly unlikely that the U.S. will be able to replace Moscow as India's new military godfather, a role which India has avidly sought and which the Bush administration had tried to promote.

However, there will probably be two areas of concern for Pakistan under a Clinton administration. The first is a possibly harder line by the U.S. against China since Clinton had threatened during the election campaign not to renew China's Most-Favoured-Nation status (MFN) in trade if, according to the U.S., China's domestic human rights situation does not improve. It is, thus, no accident that China is seeking to build bridges with adversarial neighbours like India, and China could also conceivably succumb to American pressure not to sell the M-11 missiles to Pakistan.

The other area of concern for Pakistan under a Clinton administration could be the avowedly pro-Israeli stance of Clinton and the new vice-president, Al Gore, who was known to be one of the staunchest supporters of Israel in the American Senate. However, this may be a marginal element given the fact that the Bush administration did more to enhance Israeli interests than any other American administration in recent history. And it was during the Bush administration that the Arabs and Israelis sat together face to face for the first time since Camp David. Being pro-Israeli is now an abiding feature of the American presidency given the clout wielded by the Jewish lobby.

China apart, most of the Arab regimes who were part of the American effort in the Gulf war will be sorry to see Bush go, simply because they had developed a cosy, and sometimes, covert rapport with the Republicans in the White House for the last 12 years. Saudi Arabia, for instance, had actively funded many of the CIA covert operations during the Reagan-Bush years.

Since a number of Pakistani politicians have long been convinced that the road to Islamabad lies through Washington, it would be interesting to analyse the impact, if any, of the change in Washington on Pakistan's domestic politics. Two aspects are noteworthy in this regard. First, while Benazir Bhutto has good contacts in the middle level of the Democratic Party, particularly young activists like Peter Galbraith and Mark Siegel, a number of caveats need to be sounded in this regard. There is, for instance, the fact of interests taking precedence over personal relationships, at whatever level these may exist. It was, after all, a Democratic administration under Jimmy Carter which endorsed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's ouster in the July 1977 military coup and later acquiesced to his hanging as well, notwithstanding Carter's human rights rhetoric. Then there is the fact that two of Benazir Bhutto's best friends in the American Congress are no longer there. Congressman Stephen Solarz lost the election while Senator Alan Cranston has retired. Finally, Bhutto could have used her contacts in the Democratic Party to her political advantage had she been battling a military regime in Pakistan and not a civilian, democratic government as is the case at present.

The other aspect of the change-over from the Bush administration to Bill Clinton is the easing of pressure on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who had been dubbed "Mr. Nuke" by senior officials of the Bush administration for his

strong nationalist position on the nuclear issue. The government can relax somewhat on the nuclear issue as well since the incoming administration and its officials (there are 4,000 new senior and middle level appointments to be made at various levels of the American government by the new president), will take at least 6-12 months after its installation in January 1993 to unveil its priorities and pursue new policies.

The change in Washington provides for a breather for Pakistan from the pressures that had been emanating with varying degrees of intensity on the nuclear issue and Kashmir. Pakistan did well to stay the course and resist these pressures even at a time when many in Pakistan were convinced that with "an invincible America in a unipolar world, it would not be possible to stand up to Washington to defend the nation's interest." Bush's defeat has certainly contributed to shattering that aura of American invincibility which had emerged in the aftermath of the Gulf war and it only goes to show that after the end of the Cold war, with the growing domestic crisis in the U.S., America too is well aware of the limitations of its own power.

U.S. Pressure on Government Forecast Weaker Under Clinton

93AS0186B Lahore *THE NATION* in English
8 Nov 92 p 10

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "Prospects of Pakistan-U.S. Relations"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The defeat of President George Bush and the inauguration of Bill Clinton as President on January 20, 1993, provides a timely opportunity for Pakistani policy-makers to review the current state of Pakistan's American connection and the direction its likely to take under a Democratic President. It would be instructive to recall, with a shade of irony, what the scenario in Pakistan-American relations was precisely one year ago when Islamabad, in November 1991, was bracing itself for the visit of the then United States Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Reginald Bartholomew. On the eve of his visit, America's apologists in Pakistan, both at the official and non-official levels, had orchestrated a chorus seeking Pakistani acquiescence to American demands for a unilateral rollback on the nuclear issue. The reasons cited for bending before the architects of what was then still being proclaimed as a "New World Order" was on account of an awe of America's supposed "power and invincibility in a unipolar world" plus the perspective of those habitual addicts to American aid and who feel "Pakistan cannot survive without U.S. support."

Happily, Pakistan stuck to its stated position which is in the best national interest, ruling out any rollback and telling Washington that if it was to carry credibility with its message on the nuclear issue, then it would have to put some pressure on India first which, after all, was the first to demonstrate nuclear capability in south Asia by testing a device way back in 1974. A year later, the American perspective on the nuclear issue seems to have undergone a subtle but significant shift as far as South Asia is concerned, and it was only six months or so ago that the U.S. State

Department sent formal instructions to all American missions in the Muslim World to drop the usage of the term "New World Order," given the adverse reaction to this notion.

Before examining the thrust of Pakistan's American connection under the Clinton Administration, Pakistani policy-makers will do well to understand three fundamental realities which provide the context for this relationship under the new Administration in Washington. First, the "special relationship" that marked ties between Islamabad and Washington has been permanently terminated in the post-Cold War period and it is unlikely to return. This "special relationship" was based on what were perceived as common interests in the region (most recently, Afghanistan) which were backed by a massive infusion of American military and economic assistance on concessional terms. The world has changed in a qualitatively different manner since then and the two countries now look in different directions (Pakistan to its vicinity in the North as well as the West) and America more to the Middle East and Gulf region or, to an extent, India. In any case, given the state of the American economy, the United States is no longer in a position to prop any country with massive military and economic assistance, barring, of course, Israel, which has remained a special case of abiding American affection irrespective of the party which controls Congress or the White House.

The second fundamental reality which needs to be understood in Pakistan-American relations is that with the onset of the 1990s, the United States is not in a position to either install or remove a government in Islamabad merely through a wink from Washington. It may have been that way in the past, but the kind of clout needed for such a role is lacking for the United States in the region, and with the emergence of a nationalist consciousness among Muslim peoples, including countries like Pakistan, such a role is not only resented but also resisted. The Bush Administration, particularly the Cold Warriors still sitting in Washington, would perhaps not have been averse to a change in Pakistan so long as such a change expedited or managed to "deliver" on the nuclear issue, i.e., the rollback of the nuclear programme. They had targeted President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, nicknaming him "Mr Nuke" for his strong position on the nuclear programme. Interestingly, the Bush Administration did acquiesce in a military take-over in Thailand last year and the military-backed crackdown on the Islamist Party that won the polls in Algeria in January 1992, but in both cases there was strong popular resistance.

The third fundamental reality to the understood in Pakistan-American relations is that with the changes in the region, particularly the emergence of Islamic Central Asia, Pakistan has moved swiftly to establish new priorities and pursue new linkages that firmly establish Pakistan as a key player in what is probably the most strategic part of the Third World. There is, at one level, Pakistan's establishment of solid connections both on a bilateral and multilateral level with the countries of Central Asia, exemplified by the road project that will make Pakistan the gateway to Central Asia via Afghanistan. And the other aspect of the new regional reality is the strengthening of the relations

among Pakistan, Iran and China, three countries in the region which share common interests, geographical proximity and a political will to resist outside pressures.

From the American side, the United States is likely to be guided with fresh perspectives on the nuclear issue in South Asia which were contained in the recent 63-page, as-yet unpublished study prepared by "The Carnegie Study Group on U.S.-Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment." This authoritative Study Group included such known friends of India as Stephen Solarz and Peter Galbraith, as well as former Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley and the senior White House official under President Bush dealing with the South Asian region, Richard Haass. The Study Group met for a year for 7 meetings beginning in May 1991 and ending June 1992.

In a significant change of policy proposed by this authoritative group of experts and policy-makers on India and South Asia, the study group report said that "instead of pursuing the unattainable goal of seeking to induce India to give up its nuclear option, the United States should shift from a focus on non-proliferation in South Asia to a policy designed to maintain a nuclear restraint. Such a policy would seek to freeze the stockpile of fissile material, the development of military-related nuclear capabilities and the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan. The most effective way to pursue this perspective would be to draw India and Pakistan into worldwide agreements barring further nuclear testing and the further production of fissile materials by any state."

There are two new significant elements in this policy report. First, it accepts the principle of equating both Pakistan and India on the nuclear issue, which has been a long-standing Pakistani demand, since previously only selective and discriminatory American policies on South Asian nuclear issues were pursued, ignoring India's capability while only pressurising Pakistan. The second important new change in American thinking on the nuclear issue in South Asia, as enunciated in the Carnegie Report, is the acceptance of the principle of "mutual freeze" concurrently by both Pakistan and India. This means, in effect, that rollback by either country is ruled out, which was what Pakistan had been saying all along.

The other American perspective which is likely to guide the Clinton Administration's approach towards South Asia is an accent on stability, which means preference for the governments which already are in place in the Persian Gulf and South Asian region. This applies particularly in the case of the monarchies who are in the Persian Gulf, adjacent to Iran and Iraq, as well as the pro-American government in New Delhi headed by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, which is facing a major challenge from the Hindu chauvinist Bharatya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP has already announced that it will actively seek to topple the Rao regime. Washington is also worried that instability in Afghanistan may spread into Central Asia, fuelled by newly-resurgent Islamic nationalism, as is being witnessed in Tajikistan. The American preference for stability and the *status quo* in the regimes of the region, including Pakistan, may not be necessarily based on love for these regimes but fear of the alternative. The fact that free

elections have spawned Islamist parties with anti-Western leanings in the Muslim World in the recent past has been causing jitters in Washington. Even in secular Turkey, for instance, the most recent local polls showed the Islamists leading the rest.

In a strategic sense, Pakistan is today located in a region that has become globally more important than before both in the political and economic sense, given the fact that Pakistan stands today at a pivotal point of such regions as South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and China, of which, barring South Asia, the rest are quite important. Pakistan should, therefore, be well aware of its own options and leverage, without banking on props from the erstwhile distant God-fathers in Washington.

In any case, a more level-headed and realistic relationship between Pakistan and the United States would be expedited by the presence of the respective Ambassadors in both countries, with Pakistan Ambassador Abida Hussain probably being in a better position now perhaps to cash in on her extensive contacts in the American Congress which will have more congenial atmosphere given that two of India's best friends are no longer there. Congressman Stephen Solarz lost the election and Senator Alan Cranston has retired. And the new American Ambassador in Islamabad, John Cameron Monjo, is a seasoned diplomat and an experienced Asia hand who is aware of the cultural sensibilities of Asian Muslim countries, having been Ambassador to Malaysia and Indonesia prior to his appointment to Pakistan. During a conversation in Washington, a month before his arrival in Islamabad, Ambassador Monjo was looking forward to his new assignment and he had already picked up a few words in Urdu to underline his interest in his new country of posting.

Pakistan's dialogue with the new Administration will open sometime after January after the new team is in place when the first high-level visitor from Pakistan to Washington is probably going to be the Chief of Army Staff, General Asif Nawaz. He is scheduled to visit Washington in March 1993 on the invitation of his American counterpart, General Gordon Sullivan. General Arif Nawaz last visited Washington in January 1992 on the invitation of General Joseph Hoar, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), a good visit marked by his firm exposition of the Pakistani national interest on various issues and underlined by the Army's unflinching commitment to the civilian, democratic process in the country.

The government in Pakistan can relax somewhat since the changeover from the Bush Administration to Bill Clinton will contribute to the easing of pressure on Pakistan. The incoming Administration and its officials (there are 4,000 new senior and middle-level appointments to be made at various levels of the government by President Clinton and his senior colleagues) will take at least 6-12 months after the installation of the new Administration in January 1993 to unveil its priorities and issue new policies. For its part, Pakistan should be ready to reaffirm its bottom-line on the various issues that define the bilateral agenda, notably the nuclear question, Kashmir and Indian intransigence and obduracy on these issues, which remains the core cause of instability and tensions in South Asia.

U.S Claimed Extorting Money Over F-16s*93AS0200B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 25 Oct 92 p 6*

[Editorial: "Extortion by the Strong"]

[Text] Minister of state for parliamentary affairs, Chaudhry Assadul Rahman, told the National Assembly on Thursday that the United States had held up delivery of F-16 planes built for Pakistan, but the aircraft manufacturing company was making Pakistan pay for the care and storage of the aircraft; the company had demanded 200,000 dollars so far and Pakistan was paying it in installments because, as the minister pointed out, Pakistan did not want to be accused of delinquent payments. It should be noted that Pakistan has already paid 528 million dollars for these planes, which have not been delivered. This is one example of how big powers oppress small countries. As the saying goes, the strong bully beats up his victim but will not allow him to cry out; the United States has forcibly stopped the delivery of the planes but the manufacturing company is making Pakistan pay for storing these planes. On principle, the U.S. Government should pay these charges; but Pakistan is perforce paying the levy in order not to destroy all hope of ever receiving the planes. Pakistan should file a case against the aircraft manufacturing company demanding that it either deliver the planes to Pakistan or pay compensation to Pakistan instead of forcing Pakistan to pay the company. If these planes now are Pakistan's property, then they should be delivered to Pakistan, otherwise Pakistan should be allowed to sell to someone else its own property, which it cannot bring into the country. Pakistan should appeal to the International Court of Justice.

Bush Defeat Said Inspiring for Muslim World*93AS0186G Lahore THE NATION in English
5 Nov 92 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Mushahid Hussain: "Bush Defeat Politically Uplifting for Muslim World"]

[Text] Islamabad—In what has been the most interesting and closely contested American Presidential election since 1976, when Jimmy Carter, a Governor from a small state like Bill Clinton, ousted an incumbent Republican President, the Republicans have lost the White House after a 12-year stint.

The biggest irony is that Bush lost at the polls 18 months after winning what was touted as the biggest American military victory after World War II in the Gulf War when opinion polls were showing a whopping 91 per cent popularity rating for him. In the end, it was precisely that the Gulf War triumph that turned itself into a domestic political tragedy for Bush, when 18 months later Saddam Hussein came to haunt the Republican Administration in the aftermath of the Gulf War in what was dubbed by the American media and Bush critics as "Iraqgate." The famous bumper-sticker that surfaced early on in the campaign last year that "Saddam Hussein still has his job, do you?" Was an apt reflection of the popular feeling over a foreign policy triumph failing to substitute domestic dismay over the economy.

The 1992 American Presidential elections are notable for three aspects. First, the low-level of campaign rhetoric which would make the mud-slinging and name-calling in the Pakistani election campaign look tame and sophisticated by comparison. The endeavour of both the candidates was to seek to expose the sex lives of the other, with both Bush and Clinton accused of having had extra marital affairs, allegations that both quickly denied. In fact, by September, it was evident that the elections were slipping out of Bush's hands and no less a person than Dr Henry Kissinger told a visiting prominent Pakistani in New York that "the only way Bush can win this election is if he can find some dirt on Hillary Clinton." Bill Clinton's wife who will probably be the only First Lady in recent memory to be having a job and an income of her own as a lawyer. Such was the extent of campaign rhetoric that President Bush went to the unprecedented extent of personally telling Mikhail Gorbachev "not to take seriously what I am saying in my election speeches."

The second notable aspect of the 1992 American election campaign was the absence of any serious discussion or debate on foreign policy issues, "the first such Presidential election for 40 years," according to Charles Krauthammer, an American commentator writing for THE WASHINGTON POST, other than for the purposes of name-calling as when Ross Perot accused Bush of building up Saddam or when Bush virtually accused Bill Clinton of unpatriotism for not endorsing America's Gulf War last year. This was the first election campaign for the White House which was fought after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the absence of any reference to foreign policy issues also underlines the obsession that the United States had with the Soviet Union for the last 50 years when Communism, i.e., the Soviet Union was an election issue in one form or the other. With the Soviet Union gone, any serious discussion of foreign policy simply ceased at the level of Presidential politics.

The third notable feature of this election campaign is the focus on serious domestic issues like the economy— inflation, unemployment, crime and urban decay—issues that underlined the domestic decline of America while it seeks to promote itself as the sole superpower through sheer military might as the basis of such a status. With such a total internal focus in the election campaign, it is evident that America is going through a period of increasing doubt about both its self-image as a global power and whether it is willing, ready and able to play such a role given the very serious domestic crises which the United States faces in the last decade of what has already been a turbulent century. In fact, as historians would record, the much talked-about "American Century" lasted only for a quarter of the century, 25 years from 1945 through 1970 when weariness and fatigue set in after a brutal, unwinnable war in Vietnam.

Bush's defeat is politically uplifting for the Muslim World, particularly because in the arrogant aftermath of the Gulf War, he was seen as the architect of a so-called New World Order, which was perceived as being patently anti-Islamic

since it combined an ideological zeal to combat what was being bandied around as "Islamic fundamentalism" with pursuit of policies aimed at targeting the military might of such Muslim countries as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria or even Libya.

The latest instance was the news report last week in THE WASHINGTON POST that the Bush Administration asked Saudi Arabia to pay off Russia so as to prevent Moscow from going through a \$600 million deal for the sale of submarines to Iran. And in November 1991, Bush sent his Secretary of State James Baker to China to prevent Beijing from going through a deal on selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Ross Perot aptly referred to the Gulf War as "the only thing that the war did was to hand back the Emir of Kuwait his palace."

There will be very few tears shed for George Bush in Pakistan. From the Pakistani perspective, he was seen as one Republican "who is not a friend of Pakistan." Three "sins" of George Bush are cited by Pakistanis as indicative of this hostility towards Pakistan. First, he happened to be the only Republican President after World War II to impose a total ban on economic and military aid to Pakistan on the pretext of Pakistani violations of the American law on the nuclear issue, although other aspects of American law were never applied in the case of known nuclear powers such as India and Israel.

The second aspect was the conscious endeavour of the Bush Administration to build up India as a regional superpower and the first joint naval exercises between the Indian and the American navies were conducted in the Indian Ocean in May 1992, despite India's test-firing of the "Agni" missile which otherwise the United States was deploring in other instances as a Weapon of Mass Destruction. There were also frequent exchanges of high-level military delegations.

The third "sin" of Bush as far as Pakistanis are concerned was his role in promoting the so-called New World Order which was seen to be a negative element designed to tame the Muslim World. Even in the case of the American war in the Gulf against Saddam Hussein, it was more perceived as a David versus Goliath confrontation, with popular feeling pitched against the American war effort. The defeat of George Bush will also help shatter the aura of American invincibility that had developed after the Gulf War. The fact that the victor of the Gulf War has been defeated and sent back home by his own people is a clear pointer to the priorities that have emerged in the United States of today with grandiose notions of a global status put to rest in a decisive defeat of Bush by Clinton, since such notions can no longer be matched by domestic strength. As far as Pakistan is concerned, the Clinton Administration together with an overwhelmingly democratic-dominated Congress could be seen as providing a couple of pluses. The first plus, as perceived from Pakistan, of a Clinton Administration is that of a less-overbearing American foreign policy attitude together with a more inward-looking approach. In effect, Pakistan can expect less bullying and less arm-twisting from Washington on such issues as the nuclear question or Kashmir.

Second, Pakistan feels that given the general international climate, Islamabad would be in a better position to push the Congress and the Clinton Administration to voice its concern against human rights violations by the Indian Occupation Army in Occupied Kashmir, an issue which tops the Pakistani foreign policy agenda. Clinton, after all, was critical of Bush's apathy on Bosnia and supported American humanitarian intervention on behalf of Bosnian Muslims. There is also hope and expectation that Washington may also push India into talks with Pakistan on not just Kashmir but the nuclear issue as well. It is an interesting but little-known fact that the National Campaign Manager of Bill Clinton visited Pakistan in May 1991 for a Conference organised by the Pakistan American Public Affairs Committee, in Islamabad on "the New World Order." 35-year-old David Wilhelm was free after managing his successful campaign for Mayor of Chicago Richard Daley and he said, during a conversation then, that "I am looking for a job to manage a Presidential campaign for a Democratic candidate." He also made a speech at the Conference referring to relations between Pakistan and the United States. Eighteen months after his visit to Pakistan, David Wilhelm and the other young professionals in the Democratic Party Organisation have managed to propel Bill Clinton to the White House.

Europe, U.S. Said To Unjustly Fear Islam

93AS0191B Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 92 p 11

[Article by Jafir Wafa: "West & Resurgence of Islam"; quotation marks and boldface words as published]

[Text] Economic and political conquests by the West during the last two centuries have led to an erroneous impression in the minds of even Muslim intellectuals that today there is only one civilisation—the Western—and one superpower—the U.S.A; and that now there is 'unity of history', or 'end of history' as a U.S-born Japanese has chosen to term the present ephemeral phase of human civilisation which spans, at least, six millennia since man's advent on earth.

Admittedly, the nineteenth century was dominated by European colonialists with Britain in the forefront. Also, indisputably, the twentieth century belonged to the United States of America which has emerged as the sole surviving military power after the end of cold war and suddenly collapse of the Soviet 'empire', at a time when the latter had a larger stockpile of nuclear warheads and was as advanced, if not more, in weapons-related technology and 'star-war' preparedness.

Those who dub the entire Islamic bloc as an 'unscientific belt' and ascribe the 'decadence' of Muslim peoples in the realm of science, mainly to the biological factor (genes & environment), as propounded by Lamark in his evolution theory tend to make a rather sweeping statement. It is impossible to accept such a harsh verdict on the present day Islamic world as an unalloyed truth. Regarding the application of racial concept of inherited disposition of human society, let me quote from Arnold Toynbee, the most eminent historian-philosopher, or Ibne Khaldun of our times:

"A false analogy (emphasis added) from the phenomena that were being brought to light by physical science led our Western historians of the last generation to picture races as 'chemicals' and their miscegenation as a chemical 'reaction' which released latent energies and produced effervescence." (A Study of History)

No civilisation has ever progressed in a straight line, the Islamic civilisation being no exception. Each one, analysed so far, has displayed a shuttle-like movement—to and fro, dynamism followed by inertia, 'sword and spear' (*Sham-sheer-o-Sanaan*) in the beginning and 'dance and music' (*Taos-o-Rubaab*) at the close. Also, no civilisation Islamic one being an exception, has lasted for long since its inception. Greeks and Spartans before Christ, Sassanid and Byzantine empires after Christ were superpowers of their times but they were obliterated from the map long ago. The mighty Zoroastrian—Persian empire which, in its hey day, had been ventured to subjugate the Greco-Roman heartland and the prosperous Israelite Kingdom of Prophets David and Solomon are now 'fossilised' in the dispersed societies of Parsees and Jews, the latter trying to find a durable foothold in their habitat which was, at the start, a British brain-child and was later accomplished with American might and money.

Great Britain that used to make and unmake smaller nations in the previous century is now a mere England with sagging economy, rising unemployment, declining political prestige and the 'royal' pound sterling plummeting to an all-time low in recent months. What will happen to the artificial state of Israel, surrounded as it is by hostile Arabs, when its other benefactor, the U.S.A., also collapses economically like the U.S.S.R. did without betraying any symptoms of its unexpected extinction, is anybody's guess. The U.S.A. is facing a faltering economy with a national debt of four trillion dollars, shrinking job opportunities, disease-stricken population with a large segment suffering from, or prone to suffer from, deadly AIDS and other drug and sex-related ailments, complete breakdown of morality and so on.

It might, in this context, set discerning minds thinking that historians have mentioned among other things, two main causes for the decay of Greek civilisation—the entry of malarial epidemic in Hellenic homeland and depopulation caused by social evils like large-scale recourse to abortion and infanticide.

Scientific know-how and technology can be bought from where ever it is available provided one can pay the price asked for. The oil-rich Arabs and Iran are in a position to purchase anything they want and they are doing so. The former are enjoying an extremely high standard of living today, their desert oases having been turned into most modern cities of the world during the last two decades. Turkey is sufficiently advanced technologically and is manufacturing even the sophisticated weapons of war, including F-16s. It is followed by Egypt. Iraq was trying to catch up and had to be destroyed.

Pakistan has the unique distinction, in the Islamic world, to have acquired nuclear capability. In South Asia, it is the

only country which has joined the 'ranks of middle income nations', according to a World Bank director. One thing is at least not controversial. The Pakistani currency is the strongest among those of SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] countries. Indonesia and Malaysia in the Far East are well on their way to scientific and economic progress. The long-lost countries of Islamic Central Asia have miraculously returned to the fold of the Millat and so are the countries of the Balkan peninsula (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania) where the Osmanali (Ottoman) Turks ruled for four centuries, which may also join the Islamic belt, its much-lamented backwardness notwithstanding.

The West never considered Soviet communism a real threat to its so-called civilisation. A resurgent Islam has always been perceived as a lurking peril. Toynbee, an acknowledged historian and not a politician, wrote before the demise of U.S.S.R.:

"World-wide triumph of communism over capitalism would not mean the triumph of an alien culture, since communism, unlike Islam, is itself derived from a Western source being a reaction from and a criticism of the Western capitalism that it combats."

Now that Soviet communism is dead, the West will concentrate all its energies on restricting the resurgence of Islam. But the West, it is quite conceivable might collapse the way U.S.S.R. did. History tells us that there have always been two or more competing civilisations ('superpowers' in modern parlance) to maintain military and political 'balance' in the world and when one goes, the others follow suit, yielding place to either a new or a resurgent civilisation that emerges unsuspectingly almost from nowhere. The Sassanid and the Byzantine empires had fallen ignominiously before the 'primitive' Muslim Arabs in half a dozen years despite the latter's technological backwardness, lack of fighting experience and want of resources.

Government Said Ready To Send Forces to Bosnia
93AS0161A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 9 Nov 92 p 1

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Hajj: "Pakistani Minister to AL-HAYAH: 'We Are Ready To Send Forces To Defend Bosnia's Muslims'"]

[Text] Jiddah—Pakistan's minister of state for foreign affairs, Mohammad Siddiq Khan Kanjo, announced that his country is ready to send armed forces to defend the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina if asked to do so. Meanwhile, Saudi diplomacy is making intensive efforts to ensure the success of the emergency meeting of foreign ministers of the Islamic countries scheduled to be held in Jiddah on 1-2 December. In a statement to AL-HAYAH before leaving Jiddah yesterday, Kanjo said that he had discussed with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal how to provide a mechanism to energize the resolutions to be taken by the upcoming emergency meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization so that they will be effective and operative in rescuing the Muslims of Bosnia. The Pakistani minister asked the United Nations to apply equity and lift the arms embargo on the

Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to allow its people to obtain military equipment to defend their existence in the face of Serbian aggression.

He said that the call to form Islamic forces to defend Muslims there was a good idea and that Pakistan supported it. He disapproved of how the international community is acting like a spectator while a nation is being exterminated. "Where," he asked, "are the human rights laws that the civilized world proclaims?"

He urged the Islamic states to bear their responsibility to aid the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "who are being assailed by Serbs, winter cold, and international conspiracies." He said that the peoples of the Islamic community expect the foreign ministers of the Islamic countries to produce practical recommendations, not simply formulas of sorrow and disapproval.

Dr. Hamid al-Ghabid, the general secretary of the Islamic Conference Organization, informed AL-HAYAH two days ago (Saturday), that Saudi contacts are continuing both with the member nations of the organization and with a number of European countries to explain the seriousness of the tragic conditions to which Bosnian Muslims are exposed and the effect of this on relations between the countries of the Islamic world and the European family.

He said that King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz is engaged in personal diplomatic contacts to stress the need to solve the problem in a way that guarantees the rights of the Muslim people in Bosnia and that stops the daily suffering and killing to which they are being subjected.

Al-Ghabid asked the Security Council to impose strict sanctions to deter Serbian aggression. He said that the two chairmen of the international conference on peace in the former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, would be invited to attend the emergency conference in Jiddah.

AL-HAYAH has learned that there is an Islamic proposal to solve the problem of insuring international emergency forces. Under it, charitable Islamic countries would commit themselves to funding such forces and to equipping them quickly to defend Bosnia's Muslims. This proposal will receive the support of some of the Islamic countries when it is presented to the scheduled meeting.

Al-Ghabid left Jiddah to begin a tour that will last until the 18th of this month and will include the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Albania. The tour will conclude with a visit to Croatia. He will discuss with these countries ways of strengthening their relations with the Islamic Conference Organization.

Regional Affairs

Hizb-I-Mujahadeen Commander Interviewed on Plans

93AS0201A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 23 Oct 92
pp 25, 27, 49

[Interview with Hizb-I-Mujahadeen commander Shamsul Haq by Sayed Arif Bahar in Azad Kashmir; date not given:

"Only Those Who Are Working for Indian Interests Are Spreading Rumors of the Division of Kashmir"]

[Text] At first glance, one would not believe that the slender young man with the innocent smile is the same individual who is used to crossing forests and mountains, deserts and market places, houses and basements, always seeking his target, his enemy; or that, before he crossed the Line of Control into Azad Kashmir [Free Kashmir] one and a half months ago, he was one of the guerrilla commanders who keep the enemy's nerves on edge. Shamsul Haq is a symbol and representative of that generation of Kashmiris who, finding all doors closed to them, decided to launch an armed struggle against India and who are now writing their own history of courage and martyrdom in the valley of Kashmir. Shamsul Haq was born in 1951 in the village of Sanwarkali Pura in Bazgam district; his father was a farmer. In 1971, Shamsul Haq first became acquainted with the concept of a revolutionary and dynamic Islam through the first book, *Purdah*, of the prominent modern thinker, Sayed Abulala Maududi. He joined Jamaat-i-Islami in 1972 and began to study and teach at Islam Model School. He then was made chief of Berouah Tahsil. He ran on the Jamaat-i-Islami and Muslim Mutahedda tickets in the 1983 and 1987 elections. At the start of the jihad for freedom, he gravitated towards militancy and was made chief of Hizb-i-Mujahadeen of occupied Kashmir. A few weeks ago, Shamsul Haq arrived in Azad Kashmir. Following is the text of a conversation with him:

[Bahar] What made you give up politics for fighting?

[Haq] For a long time, a political and turbulent struggle was carried on against India in the states of Jammu and Kashmir but this long struggle resulted only in India refusing to solve the Kashmir problem in accordance with internationally approved resolutions. Furthermore, India has used every political trick possible, from Article 370 of the Indian Constitution to offers of constitutional and then of financial concessions, in order to continue to deprive the people of their birthright. The army was sent into Kashmir under the pretext that it was under attack; the army built barracks and has stayed on for the last 45 years. The state has become a colony. Yesterday's temporary annexation has become today's inseparable part. The oral and written promises and agreements of the past are now declared to have become outworn. The demand for referendum is called a wish to restore past history. Under the changing conditions, Kashmiris are now being taught to accept slavery mentally and psychologically. These conditions made our political struggle meaningless and a waste of time; hence, the people started to experiment with various forms of protest. Kashmiris are not traditionally a militant people. Our militancy started with throwing rocks at the police and the military and [being] beaten with sticks and [text illegible]. The second stage was making and exploding gasoline bombs. The third stage was using locally obtained gunpowder to set off explosives in government installations and buildings. The fourth stage started with the regular use of guns. We did not take up guns immediately but our thought and approach moved upwards as we tried various experiments. God opened up ways and means for us to obtain weapons. I was

involved in all these stages from the early part of my life. As a child, I shouted slogans, waved black flags in demonstrations, burned the Indian flag and waved Pakistan's flag. In 1988, I became directly acquainted with Kalashnikovs and not only welcomed this acquaintance but with singleness of purpose and self-assurance became a direct participant in the war of jihad. After obtaining official permission from the organization, I joined a military order. In 1988, work was in progress under the name of the Liberation Front but ideologically, I could not agree with it. A meeting was held in Srinagar with the Liberation Front leaders in the valley. Representing the Liberation Front were Ashfaq Majidwani Shaheed [martyr], Yasin Malik, Javed Mir, Shaukat Bakhshi, and Hanif Haidari; the supporters of the Islamic movement were represented by Ghulam Rasool Dar, Abdul Wahid Shaikh, Hasan Dar, and myself. After four hours of discussion, we reached the conclusion that the Liberation Front could not be reformed. Among them, Ishfaq Majid was the only one who believed in a purely Islamic method of work. Finally, Yasin Malik said that they believed in Islam but international support should not be jeopardized by giving the present movement the coloration of a jihad for freedom. We then decided to form a separate organization. The early leaders of the Liberation Front including Mohammed Maqbul Alai and Abdullah Bangru left the Front in Azad Kashmir for the same reasons. In the beginning, Ishfaq Majid and Yasin Malik also withdrew from the Front but later rejoined it under outside pressure. A military organization by the name of Al Badr was formed under the leadership of Maqbul Alai, which envisaged freedom for Islam. Disappointed with the Front leadership, we laid the foundation there of Hizb-i-Mujahadeen; freedom leader, Sayed Ali Shah Gilani, approved of the name. I then wrote a letter to Maqbul Alai in Free Kashmir and asked him to end Al Badr and start work under the name of Hizb-i-Mujahadeen. We wanted to include in the name two historical jihad movements, which had as their goal the establishment of an Islamic system. One was Sayed Ahmad Shaheed's Tehrik-al-Mujahadeen and the second Engineer Golboddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami. We thus invoked historical precedents from our predecessors and our contemporaries. As a result of the patronage by Tehrik-i-Islami [Islamic movement], [Hizb-i-Mujahadeen] formed the organizational basis for the entire state. As soon as Hizb-i-Mujahadeen was formed, hundreds of thousands of young people volunteered for training. We had a certain standard in mind; therefore only a particular number were sent to Afghanistan for training.

[Bahar] Why did the people have such confidence in Hizb-i-Mujahadeen?

[Haq] The primary reason was its connection with Tehrik-i-Islami. Second, the leaders of the Hizb were the prominent figures [text illegible] of the Tehrik-i-Jihad such as Mohammad Maqbul Alai, Ejaz Dar Shaheed [martyr], Ashraf Dar Shaheed, and Abdulla Bangru Shaheed. These individuals were men of high morals and outstanding deeds; that is why in only one year, Hizb-i-Mujahadeen became the state's largest and most effective organization so much so that it became the centre of hope for those who loved Islam

and those in India who loved freedom; it also became the target for Indian spies and agents of the Indian forces.

[Bahar] Your organization introduced in the fighting in Kashmir the hit-and-run military tactics whereas earlier the do-or-die method was followed. What was the reason for the change in tactics to hit and run?

[Haq] Our main goal was to scatter the Indian administration and make the movement an all embracing political one; to send units of the Indian troops in all directions and to put additional pressure on their treasury; to send Indian troops out of cities and towns by keeping them preoccupied in small and large skirmishes in villages, forests and mountain passes; in this way, it would become untenable for India to maintain supplies for such a large number of troops, to keep their morale high and to surround the Mujahadeen in any given area and attack them. The tactics of hit-and-run are practised in situations where a small number of young men with limited numbers, weapons, experience, expertise, and facilities face an organized and strong force. In such situations, only the tactics of hit-and-run can succeed. Kashmiri Mujahadeen have used this method to harass Indian troops and to inflict financial and human loss on them through unexpected and continuous attacks. India's economy is being burdened and the attention of the whole world is being drawn towards Jammu and Kashmir. At the same time, the numbers, experience, and expertise of the Mujahadeen are increasing.

[Bahar] Last year, Hizbul Mujahadeen went through a change of organization; what is the background on that?

[Haq] The change in the organizational framework of the Hizb was carried out as a result of the decision of the supreme council to organize the Mujahadeen in a military fashion; to have them follow strictly the rules and regulations of a regular volunteer army and thus ensure the training, discipline and readiness of the Mujahadeen at all times. Sayed Salahuddin was the chief supervisor of the organizational framework, Shamsul Haq the leader, and Ahsan Dar, the commander in chief. Later, Sayed Salahuddin was made the supreme commander. The changes can thus be called militarization.

[Bahar] In spite of the proved importance of abduction, your organization has shunned it even though you could have used it as a means to obtain the freedom of several of your mujahadeen who had special talents.

[Haq] Hizb-i-Mujahadeen is an ideological organization, which advocates a morally right revolution. It is our belief that a righteous revolution can be brought about only through moral means and by moral individuals and we thus adhere strictly to the use of such weapons to inflict harm on the enemy and to benefit the organization, which is [not] against the spirit of Islamic law and does not trample the spirit of humanitarianism. In fighting against Indian terrorism, we should not contravene the principles and limits of humanitarianism. Abduction is an unIslamic and inhuman act. We would like to obtain the release of our young men but not at the price of other people's freedom. We do not want to besmirch our sacred movement by shedding innocent blood or imprisoning innocent people.

When India realized that the international community disapproved of this kind of action [kidnapping] by the mujahadeen and that international sympathy was turning into dislike, India encouraged abductions in every way within the state. That was why Sayed Ali Gilani sent a message to mujahadeen from jail asking them to refrain from abductions and, soon after being released from jail, Gilani declared in his meetings with the leaders of mujahadeen organizations and in conferences that abduction was terrorism and against [the principles] of the freedom movement; that it did not conform to Islamic rules and should be ended. His words received favorable reaction among the mujahadeen and Al Amir mujahadeen and Hizballah released all their hostages and other organizations also put an end to the practice, which had earlier spread like an epidemic. Hizb-i-Mujahadeen was the only organization, which from the very beginning, abstained from this reprehensible action. It is a characteristic of the Kashmir jihad that it is not undisciplined.

[Bahar] How much truth is there in reports that Israeli advisers are helping Indian troops in the valley?

[Haq] We knew from the very beginning that India would use every underhanded weapon to destroy Kashmir's jihad movement; that if India could not bring the situation under control on its own, it would obtain help and cooperation from imperialist exploiters and Islam hating forces of the world. What else can be expected of Islam haters such as the United States and Israel than that they would allow India to benefit from their experience in international terrorism? Tourists were banned from Kashmir in order to prevent any Israelis from getting in. We informed [the people?] through the press to keep a watchful eye on the activities of foreigners in order to prevent any acts against the movement. Last year, we learned of the presence of Israeli commandos in the Dal Gate area of Srinagar; but before we could carry out a planned arrest, the irresponsible actions of a few Islam-loving mujahadeen prevented us from taking care of the Mossad agents. At present, Mossad agents are training Indian commandos in several training locations in India; various counterinsurgency weapons are being used. Mossad agents wanted to send Indian commandos over the state's borders into Pakistan where they would have targeted Pakistani installations and nuclear plants.

[Bahar] The arrest of the political leaders of the valley created a vacuum; they have now been released after two years. You consider the vacuum filled?

[Haq] It is necessary to continue the political struggle while the military struggle is in progress; they complement each other. When the military struggle reached its climax in 1990-91, the need was felt to conduct a political struggle. By the grace of God, our political leaders were released and their release enhanced the military struggle. After their release, Sayed Ali Shah Gilani and his friends have continued activities such as demonstrations. By demonstrating their support for freedom peacefully, the people show to the world that not just a few thousand gun-carrying individuals but the entire nation wants liberty. Political leaders have

rejected any kind of negotiations within the limits of domestic autonomy, a loose federation or staying within the Indian constitution.

[Bahar] Why are there clashes among mujahadeen organizations?

[Haq] There are no wide ideological differences among mujahadeen organizations nor are there any class, race or linguistic differences except for one organization. Disagreements arise among youths over minor matters and clashes result. This is the work of Indian spy organizations, which brainwash young men in prison and inculcate organizational dissension among them and through them [the spy organizations?], former national conference and Congress traitors try to protect themselves by seeking refuge in various organizations. They spread distrust among organizations but the mujahadeen have chosen the approach of understanding and tolerance so much so that Hizb-i-Mujahadeen and the Liberation Front have concluded an agreement.

[Bahar] What is the condition of the Indian Army?

[Haq] (laughing) The Indian Army is in a sorry state. It is under constant attack. When Indian troops accelerate their movement, the mujahadeen intensify their attacks. Eight or ten Indian soldiers are killed daily and up to now thousands of Indian soldiers have been killed.

[Bahar] World major landholders [sic] talk of the Dixon plan, etc. Would you accept such a plan?

[Haq] Only those who are working for Indian interests spread talk of the division of Kashmir. We have undertaken to liberate the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control; no matter what sacrifices we may be called upon to make, we will not accept enemy control over a single inch of our land. These are international weapons intended to distract the mujahadeen and we pay no attention to them. We will take back from India all those areas of the Islamic nation, which it has usurped since 1947. In the same way that Afghanistan brought freedom to the Baltic and Central Asian states, the victory of the Kashmiris will bring freedom to the Harijans, Assamese, and Sikhs.

Internal Affairs

President Khan Said Likely To Obtain Another Term

93AS0187H Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 6 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by Khaled Ahmed: "The Politics of Re-Election and Dissolution"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has finally made it clear that he would like to be re-elected president for another term. Deputy speaker of the National Assembly has also let it be known that the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] would like to support the candidacy of the president at the end of next year. There have however been some IJI grumblings about the false nature of a parliamentary system in which the indirectly elected president is actually more powerful than the directly elected parliament.

The president was chosen by the electoral college comprising both houses of the parliament and the provincial assemblies on 12 December 1988. He was sworn into office on 13 December 1988. Therefore, his incumbency lapses on 13th December 1993 (next year) after the completion of the term of five years under constitution. Article 41 (4) of the Constitution says that the president has to be elected on any date within two months before the expiry of the earlier term, or within one month after the expiry of the said term. That means that the president can be elected by the IJI any time from October to January 1993-94.

Article 44 (1) of the Constitution lays down that the president 'enters upon office' only after being endorsed by the electoral college and the subsequent swearing-in. The period spent as president under Article 49, which allows chairman of the Senate to act as president, is not considered a fulfillment of Article 44 (1) mandating his 'entry upon office'.

The opposition in Pakistan seems to be convinced that there are contradictions between the IJI leadership and the president, and one part of this opposition wants the president to use his discretion of 'dissolution' to dismiss the IJI government. The contradictions are perceived as an integral part of the Constitution, in Article 46 clause (a), (b) and (c), which bind the prime minister to inform the president of 'all decisions' of the Cabinet, to furnish all information demanded by the president, and to entertain for discussion all issues referred to the Cabinet by the president.

This perception grew out of the PPP's [Pakistan People's Party] brief tenure in office from 1988 onwards when the mandated communication between the government and the president caused friction and ultimate rupture. It should be noted that these provisions also created problems between the government of Mr Junejo and General Zia. Article 46 under the 8th Amendment had struck down the earlier vague provision in the Constitution asking the prime minister to keep the president informed.

The 8th Amendment has retained, in Article 48 clause (1), the obligation of the president to act in accordance with the advice of the cabinet, but clause (2) of the same Article says: 'Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the president shall act in his discretion in respect of any matter in respect of which he is empowered by the Constitution to do so (and the validity of anything done by the president in his discretion shall not be called in question on any ground whatsoever)'.

This provision had caused the most friction between the PPP government and the president as he would not sign papers sent by the cabinet for his signatures as the titular head of the executive. The 8th Amendment has thus not only awarded 'factual' executive power to the president through the power of veto, but has also enabled the president to block bills passed by the National Assembly. If the president refuses to sign a bill even after reaffirmation, a joint session of the parliament would be required to endorse the bill to overcome his veto. Earlier, the Constitution had made it mandatory on the president to sign after reaffirmation by the National Assembly.

The other 8th Amendment power that undermines the power of the parliament and the prime minister is the 'discretion' given to the president under Article 58 (2) to dissolve the National Assembly. This power is total and unchallengeable, as proved by a reference to the Supreme Court which found (after General Zia's death) that the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1988 was invalid because the general had omitted to nominate a caretaker prime minister, but not because the 'discretion' itself was invalid under the parliamentary spirit of the Constitution. (Had the general been alive the court might have interpreted the word 'cabinet' used in the constitution as a caretaker government without a prime minister.) It should be noted that the Court did rebuke the attorney-general (and author of the 8th Amendment) for the slipshod manner in which the amendment had been inserted in the Constitution.

That the situation created by the 8th Amendment is unprecedented is proved by the Indian Constitution which, while designating the president as titular chief executive, had by an amendment of Article 74 (3) made it mandatory for the president to abide by the advice of the cabinet or Council of Ministers or face impeachment. The only veto the Indian president enjoys is the 'pocket veto' arising out of the provision that the president will sign a bill reaffirmed by Lok Sabha 'as soon as possible' and not within 30 days as stipulated in the Constitution of Pakistan.

The president virtually rules the executive side of the state on the strength of the above constitutional provisions. He can hamstring the government by 'sitting on the files', he can veto a bill because he can be overruled only by a joint parliamentary session. He can order the government to show him any paper he wants to see, he can dismiss the National Assembly on his own, and he can call a national referendum on his own without the advice of the prime minister. The diffuse provision of 'discretion' can ultimately be applied on any situation as the president pleases. His control of the Federal Shariat Court whose judges he can retire at his pleasure gives him considerable power on the side of the judiciary as well.

After the chastening experience of the dismissal of the PPP government in 1990 and the more frightening prospect of 'references' after the dissolution (Mr Jatoi can oblige again), the IJI government has settled down to being subordinated to the will of the president. It is well known in Pakistan that the references against the PPP government have lost all moral conviction after what has come to light about the functioning of the IJI government. But more accountability lies totally within the discretion of the president who has been keeping close tabs on the working of the government under relevant clauses of the amended Constitution.

That the president can be elected easily under the IJI government is quite apparent. The prime minister may have a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly and the Senate under the IJI banner, but his ability to gather votes against the president at the time of re-election is eroded by a number of factors. The IJI is splintered in three factions: the Jamaat, the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement], and the PML [Pakistan Muslim League]. Within the PML, the Junejo group is actively canvassing for leadership, with Mr

Junejo brandishing enough National Assembly votes (in his view) to convince the president that he can replace the prime minister. Three provincial assemblies are ruled by people who are 'cooperating' with IJI but are not loyal IJI followers like the members of the Punjab assembly. It would be difficult if not impossible for IJI to put up a candidate against president Ghulam Ishaque Khan and muster the needed support for him in the electoral college.

The president has announced his unequivocal support for the IJI government repeatedly, yet keeps hobnobbing with the opposition leaders and IJI dissidents to keep his leverage on both the government and the opposition effective. Just as the IJI is divided, the opposition is also divided over whether they should target the president or the prime minister. In this scenario, it is almost certain that the president would succeed in winning his next term in office. The IJI would thereafter lose all opportunity to change him, while he will retain the 'discretion' of dismissing the IJI government after being re-elected. His term after December 1993 will extend to December 1998, fully three years more than the incumbency of the IJI which ends in 1995. After 1998, the president will become ineligible for re-election, but not before he has ruled over the next government for three years. IJI's dream of being re-elected in the 1995 elections will therefore hinge on his incumbency.

But why not the so-called 'balance of power' of the 8th Amendment led to good government in Pakistan? Here comes the leverage the IJI has over president Ghulam Ishaque Khan. The president has rejected the one alternative government (PPP-PDA) and can dissolve again only at the risk of bringing back the angry leaders he has already cashiered. This leverage could have totally paralysed the powers granted to the president under the various provisions of the 8th Amendment, but for the fact that the IJI is splintered. It is feared that even the group that sticks to Mian Nawaz Sharif in opposition to the Junejo group within the PML would abandon the prime minister were he to decide on a show of force with the president. This is a formula for bad and irresponsible government in which ministers can remain loyal only through blandishment and members of the parliament kept within the IJI fold through 'facilitation' of their various unending demands on the executive.

But the chaos unleashed by the 'arrangement' under the 8th Amendment has made both the IJI government and the president unpopular. This has revived the opposition which can now easily muster mass support. The dilemma for the opposition is the matter of lawful transition: only the president can bring it about because his own impeachment is impossible under the circumstances. The opposition is therefore split among those who favour the ouster of the president, even through extra-constitutional means, and those who would appeal to the president. Meanwhile, the president is exercising ambiguity in his dealings with the various leaders because this establishes de facto presidential supremacy under a constitution overtly aspiring to a parliamentary form of government.

President Khan's Remarks on Sharif Government Viewed

93AS0199A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
8 Nov 92 p 10

[Editorial: "Government's Performance—President's Clarifications and Caution"]

[Text] President Ghulam Ishaq Khan told the newsmen in an informal conversation while attending a wedding feast that the achievements of the present government were being reviewed by the National Assembly and that it is the best form for such a review. He said, "Nawaz Sharif is carrying out his duties as the prime minister very well and a misquote about his inefficiency was attributed to me and published in the news. I did not come here to make decisions about the government's efficiency." President Khan made some comments in a ceremony in Lahore two days earlier. The way it was reported by the government news agency was startling. The government agency had to explain the report itself, and the president also complained that the newspaper had not understood what he meant. Our politicians have the habit of not being careful when talking to newsmen and expressing feelings about national issues whimsically. When they learn about the reaction, they know they were careless, but complain that the newspapers did not quote them accurately. In the past, only the opposition members or members of the ruling party who did not have important government positions used to make such mistakes. However, now even cabinet members and other officials have begun to become careless. We just cannot expect the president of our nation to make such mistakes since because of his experience, knowledge of rules and laws, and fame, every person believes that whatever he says is the result of his experience and careful thinking. The position he occupies also demands that he talk straight do not make comments with double meanings.

The fact is that the presidents preceding Ghulam Ishaq Khan neither had to explain anything nor were they ever questioned. The late Ziaul Haq was all-powerful and was in his own words the absolute ruler. In Junejo's cabinet and the National Assembly, there were people who called themselves the president's own man. However, even their own newsmen did not give the impression that the president was ready to criticize the government or was not satisfied with the accomplishments of the assemblies. That is why when he took the 29 May action, it was unexpected to everyone. Opposed to it, every politician and member of the National Assembly who visits the president, thinks that it is a must to tell the press that the president is not satisfied with the accomplishments of the assemblies and the government. They also imply that the president forecast political unrest. We believe that the president is a careful and prudent person and his past service record supports the belief that he weighs his words before speaking. However, it is the duty of the president to clean up the impression that the people who meet him have created about him. Why does not he demand from the people he meets that whatever he says is confidential and they should not repeat it later. The statements issued by Mr. Jatoi, Khar, Taraq Chowdhury, Maulana Samiul Haq, and now Maulana Kausar Niazi create an

atmosphere of suspicions and doubts. Even when the president gives some hints, these are viewed according to the impression of these people.

The president has already dismissed one assembly and a government, and the opposition of that time had created a similar atmosphere as now. The newsmen are forced to ask him questions. If the president thinks that they are asking unnecessary questions about the Parliament and the government, there are reasons for that. Instead of blaming the newspapers, the president and other government leaders should be cautious. They should never say anything that need to be clarified later, and should also require the callers never to spread negative connotations. Then he will not have to say that he did not mean this or that. He is perfectly correct in saying that the National Assembly is reviewing the work of the government and that it is the best forum for this purpose. The work of our government is in front of the people and the president is the part of the present government. Therefore, he is also responsible for its negative or positive achievements. It is the people who have the right to decree about the government's performance in a parliamentary democracy. They can easily decide in the general elections as they did in 1990. If the performance of the present government is substandard, the people will give their decision during the 1995 elections. No one should be worried about it until then.

President Khan's Motivation in Attacking Sharif Examined

93AS0191C Karachi DAWN in English 8 Nov 92 p 8

[Article by Shaheen Sehbai: "How To End the Political Confusion"]

[Text] Islamabad, Nov 7: The conflicting signals emanating from the repeated off-the-cuff remarks by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan about the health of the Nawaz Sharif Government have further confounded the political scene, specially at a time when all the players on the political chess board are desperately manoeuvring to set up a position of relative advantage over the others, in the troika or outside it.

The President, as is evident from the time that he has got to prepare for the next presidential election, feels that the dawn of 1993 would herald the countdown for the end of his long and eventful career, unless he moved fast to secure another term.

The Prime Minister also knows that the next year would provide him the best chance so far to acquire real powers and he would never bargain for another term for Mr Ishaq Khan unless the man on the hill agreed to loosen his grip on the lifeline of the elected Parliament—his powers under the Eighth Amendment.

The person who matters outside the power troika, Opposition Leader Benazir Bhutto, believes that time for her to extract the best bargain was approaching fast, as both the president and the Prime Minister would be in need for her votes—the former for his election, the latter for amending or excluding the Eighth Amendment.

But matters are not as simple as stated. The President wants that Mr Nawaz Sharif should go. At least this is what he tells his very private and trust-worthy confidants. But he does not want to take the blame for his dismissal as he argues: "I can not dissolve the National Assembly every second year on similar charges."

This argument has some weight because the charges that he levelled against the Benazir Government have yet to be proved and the Court verdict on the dissolution of the 1988 assembly indirectly hints that the decision was not 100 percent justified. The corruption charges read out in the President's address in 1990 still remain unproved. All the references against Benazir and her men have back-fired. "It is the President's trial and not ours," Benazir's lawyers proudly claim.

So the President does not want to involve himself in any direct action against the Nawaz Sharif Government though he does not mince words privately in criticising the Prime Minister. Although yet unconfirmed, there have been reports that Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan has written many more letters to this Prime Minister than he had done during the Benazir Bhutto period.

This is one big constraint why Mr Ishaq Khan does not want to be seen publicly criticising the PM [Prime Minister] and if some reports tend to convey that message, he moves quickly to correct it.

But the President knows, according to his close quarters, that a second term under Mr Nawaz Sharif would be at such a high political cost that he better not go for a bargain. Mr Sharif is a businessman and a known bargainer. So to under-estimate his potential to extract a good deal would not be prudent.

His options are thus limited, in a way. The President can only turn to the present Opposition to seek their support for his re-election but that requires a gigantic task of rebuilding bridges, establishing a rapport, developing an understanding and finally creating a feeling of mutual trust and a confidence. This is a long shot as far as Benazir Bhutto and Ghulam Ishaq Khan are concerned.

Yet the President has to try this option and the signals that are emanating from the Presidency show that he is, through his trusted people like Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Maulana Kausar Niazi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Mian Zahid Sarfraz and PPP [Pakistan People's Party] MNA [Member of National Assembly] Choudhry Altaf Hussain. All these gentlemen repeatedly visit the Presidency and later throw out feelers that tend to bring the two sides closer. And they are succeeding as well, to a degree. Benazir has stopped directly attacking President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and he has consciously declared in so many words that he had nothing against Benazir, or the Opposition parties in general—a posture of distancing himself from the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] so that some semblance of neutrality could be established once again.

Benazir's options are many and she seems to be enjoying her new-found political importance. The so-called President's men are pressing her to join a larger political alliance that

would be led by the "jokers," as the PPP camp derisively calls them. They are pestering her to quit the Balochistan coalition so that the Taj Jamali government falls and heralds the fall of the other dominoes.

She knows, and believes, that the fall of the Nawaz Sharif government was no longer a big deal for her. Neither was this a big task. She asks her advisers and friends repeatedly: "What after Mr Nawaz Sharif goes?" This is the key question for her because she knows about times when somebody else reaped the harvest of someone else's hard toil and sweat. She does not want to be a tool in anybody else's game plan. If she was to remove the Nawaz Sharif Government, she must get the benefit period.

These are the clear lines she must have drawn for her negotiations with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. But these are very difficult lines to cross because President Ishaq Khan has, rightly or wrongly, acquired the image of the prosecutor, the judge and the jury in the references against her. Any step backward would mean that his first action was mala fide. Forward he cannot proceed as things have already reached the deadlock stage.

A deal could come on the basic points of releasing Mr Asif Ali Zardari, withdrawal of references, a share for PPP in the next government (whether interim or national) and, most importantly, a firm promise that Mir Murtuza Bhutto would not be brought back to Pakistan. Repeal of the Eighth Amendment could be a bargaining chip.

The President could, in return ask for a safe and ensured re-election for another term, a guarantee that neither he would be impeached before his re-election nor the Eighth Amendment would be repealed.

What could Mr Nawaz Sharif do to block such a deal and what is he doing? Apparently what he is not doing at the moment is the main stumbling block. He is not yet ready to "advise" the president to withdraw the references—an advice which is a basic constitutional requirement for the President to act. And Mr Asif Ali Zardari is not being released because the "deal" is not yet through and some way has to be found to delay the decisions in the courts so that his release could form a substantial part of the deal. If he is released earlier, it would give Benazir a chance to replace one of her key conditions with something extra.

Mr Nawaz Sharif also knows that it would be almost impossible for President Ghulam Ishaq Khan to remove him "constitutionally." The President can ask him to seek a fresh vote of confidence under Article 91 (5) provided he is "satisfied" that the PM [Prime Minister] has lost the confidence of the majority in the House. To give this impressions, "all the President's men" have, to the best of their ability, activate themselves but as yet no such impression has gained ground.

Mr Mohammed Khan Junejo, the perpetual prime minister that he thinks he is, is not yet prepared to openly defy Mr Nawaz Sharif. His son, Asad Junejo, continues to enjoy being adviser to the PM by virtue of being MKJ's son. The rumblings in the media that Junejo's Group is ready to sign a requisition paper for the NA [National Assembly] have yet

to prove anything beyond media's wishful thinking. Mr Jatoi, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Khar and company have to mobilise themselves to a degree that they accept what Benazir has to tell them, and not vice versa.

On her part Benazir is only buying time by going through the motions of preparing to launch a mass movement or a sit-in before the Parliament. She knows that these moves are not actually needed, once the right kind of deal was struck with the right people.

Whatever all these moves by all these men may mean, it is clear that these are "backdoor manoeuvres" and are a negation of the kind of democracy everyone so vociferously pleads publicly.

The simple way, as one political observer put it, would be for the President to declare that he would not contest for another term, that he was prepared to withdraw all cases against Benazir Bhutto, that he would not dissolve the National Assembly, that corruption has caused a major dent in the credibility of the IJI government and so the majority party should elect a new leader of the House.

"He should then see to it that these tasks are accomplished and probably through this process he would restore his credibility to a degree that he may again be asked by all the parties to serve another term in office," the observer said.

President Will Address Parliament for New Year

*93AS0177D Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Nov 92 p 12*

[Text] Islamabad, Nov. 8: President Ghulam Ishaq Khan will address the joint session of the Parliament on Dec. 22 to mark the onset of the new parliamentary year.

This was agreed at the meeting of the National Assembly Business Advisory Committee [NABAC] held in the Parliament House Sunday morning. The committee finalised recommendations on the schedule of six sessions during the new parliamentary year.

In the last session of the National Assembly, the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], Jamaate Islami and other parliamentary groups along with some backbenchers of the ruling party including Brig. (Retd.) Asghar had pressed the point that the government should give the working schedule of the National Assembly for the whole year in advance. The Speaker, Gohar Ayub Khan, had also made observations several times in the House urging the government to come out with the business schedule for the entire year in advance.

Several members including those from the PML [Pakistan Muslim League] had made the point that the MNAs [Member of National Assembly] worked for three-and-a-half hours daily in the five-day week. Thereupon the Speaker had observed that the House should meet for the period above mandatory days.

According to the schedule drawn up at the meeting, the first session starts from Dec. 22 and will last until Jan. 1993 for 24 days. The second session which will last 18 days, will last from Feb. 4 to Feb. 21. The third session will be spread over

22 days from April 2 to May 13. The fourth session begins on June 6 and will end on June 28, lasting for 23 days. The fifth session will be of 26 days span from August 1 to August 26. The sixth session will continue for 25 days from Sept. 23 to Oct. 17. In all, during the third parliamentary year, the National Assembly [National Assembly] will meet for 138 days—eight days over and above the mandatory 130 days.

The Advisory Committee reached the consensus that the fixed schedule of the business and sessions would go a long way in improving qualitative working of the National Assembly. There was consensus that this would help all sides to regulate their work in the Constituencies and elsewhere in an organised manner.

It was decided that the business Advisory Committee will meet three days before the commencement of each session and finalise the business of the House like the legislative business and adjournment motions to be included in the order of the days. According to the press release issued by the National Assembly Secretariat, the decision of the committee will be binding on the parties in the House. According to a decision taken in the meeting, the days of the sessions will be notified in the Gazette Notification of Pakistan.

The Advisory Committee decided that exact timings would be fixed for adjournment motions and call attention notices in each day's sitting and also for the legislation work. The committee was informed that as many as 72 Bills were pending in the House.

The meeting decided that discussions on reports submitted for statutory organisations will also become a regular feature of the Assembly's work along with fixed scheduled discussion on the important topics.

Chaired by Speaker Gohar Ayub Khan, the meeting was attended by Deputy Speaker Haji Mohammad Nawaz Khokhar, PM's [Prime Minister] special assistant Ch Nisar Ali, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Ch Amir Hussain, Mian Yasin Wattoo, Ajmal Khattak, Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Liaquat Baloch and Secretary General NA Secretariat Khan Ahmed Goraya.

Last year the Parliamentary year began on Dec. 19. The session was marked by shouts of "Baba, Baba, Go Away" by the opposition led by Ms. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the opposition. The PDA has yet to decide about its strategy for the new year.

Prime Minister Criticized for Unwarranted Fear of Press

93AS0187G Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 6 Nov 92 p 10

[Editorial: "Three Cheers for Munazira"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Addressing the journalism department of Karachi University on Wednesday, Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif has asked the Pakistani press to imagine themselves travelling on a highway, where undue spending might involve them in 'accidents'. The journalist in Pakistan will

have to strain his imagination to accept the highway metaphor of a prime minister who has commissioned a highway and is about to start a controversial 'bullit' train in the country. ('Bullit train' would have been a better simile because of the word 'bullit' in it). Looking back at what has been happening to the press in Pakistan and what has happened to it in recent times, during Mian Shaib's favoured Jam Sadiq era, the extended metaphor most suited to the profession of journalism is that of a dilapidated castle under siege from tough governments and their unscrupulous henchmen. If you ask Zamir Niazi, the meticulous historian of the country's stricken press, he will take you to an ill-smelling dungeon where the fair maiden is in cruel rasping chains. If you take the dark castle as the word describing the state of journalism in Pakistan, then Mian Sahib's other metaphor of 'freezing' political coverage for two years also becomes relevant: the dungeon is so cold that the chained pen tends to 'freeze' so that no truth can reach an electorate waiting for the next elections in 1995, with baited breath.

That there is another warning concealed in the prime minister's latest message to the press there is no doubt. The journalist has to travel the highway built by Mian Sahib's information sleuths, according to 'rules' laid down by them on the basis of PR handouts spawned by them in the name of the various IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] ministers. If he ignores these rules and decides to go too fast with his news, he will meet 'accidents'. The truth of the matter is that there have been 'accidents' recently that have mystified Laleka no end. The hapless editor of a Lahore daily, about whom the government had been complaining, has been visited by 'dacoits'. One journalist who, even by normal ethical yardstick was travelling too fast, has been the 'quest' of a Lahore police station, while an innocent news editor has escaped mugging by 'mysterious' hoods by the skin of his teeth. There are sound anti-libel laws in the country to scare an unscrupulous hack, but the IJI government has gone to court most ill-advisedly on grounds of sedition, which simply wouldn't stand. Democracy has to work in the limelight of free-flowing information about the way it functions. When politicians take their business underground, as they are doing these days, newspapers are compelled to smell out the truth from the various 'conspiracies' being hatched in the corridors of power. For instance, why doesn't Mian Sahib announce that he is going to re-elect the president? If he has made this commitment to the president, why is the president hobnobbing with Mian Sahib's rivals and muddying the waters of open government in Islamabad? There are so many 'candidates' for the PM's [Prime Minister] job, who think the president has given them the green signal that newspapers are hard put to remove the element of speculation from their pages. Mian Sahib's own jitters vis-a-vis the press encourage the impression that he is cracking under pressure. From Indira Gandhi to Richard Nixon, the incumbency jitters have given way to wrath till one side or the other gave way. The prime minister should appreciate the fact that the national press is against martial law and against the dissolution of the assemblies; but it has to give space to politicians who talk of martial law and dissolution to retain a balance of coverage. After all, that is what happened when

the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] was ruling in Islamabad; as far as one can remember, Mian Sahib didn't mind it then.

Prime Minister's Attitude Towards Press Condemned
93AS0205B Karachi DAWN in English 9 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Nisar Osmani: "The Press, Politics and Prime Minister"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Lahore, Nov. 8: Once again, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has chosen to offer a package of advice to the Press, suggesting that political reporting be stopped for the next two years and the print media should concentrate on economic development.

The Press-Government relations have been one of his favourite subjects and during his two years in office, the Premier has spoken on about half a dozen occasions to express his views on this sensitive issue. Most of his remarks have not been very kind and in cases, not even charitable. Among other things, he claimed he had a whole list of working journalists who, according to him, were in the pay of various political parties—a list which he did not release despite the demands made by newsmen and their representative bodies. On another occasion he said time had come to do something to ensure that the Press behaved and that he felt like asking his party workers to get up and convey his message directly and convincingly to the newsmen.

The Prime Minister has every right to speak about the role of the Press—an underdog in the national history along with its twin, democracy. But as they say, the wearer alone knows where the shoe pinches, the journalists have their own story to tell.

First, the journalists would be justified in asking the Prime Minister to let charity begin at home. Let the practice be introduced in the electronic media which the Government totally controls. Let there be no hard-hitting speeches and statements by the Prime Minister himself and his colleagues and let there be no one-way traffic on the TV and radio networks.

And then let the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] papers and the premier news agency, APP (which also continue to be under Government control) discontinue publishing and crediting material which falls under the category of political news. This would set a healthy trend, indeed. The independent papers (if at all they could claim to be so) give coverage to both the sides in the political game—the Government and the Opposition—in order to be fair to everybody and to attract larger readership which even today is pitifully low along with the rate of literacy. Unlike the NPT Papers, therefore, their coverage of political activities is not one-sided.

One thing more. Even today, there is very little political news in our papers. What generally falls in that category is the unending series of political statements and counter-statements. According to a conservative estimate, more than half the space in our news columns is consumed by the platitudinous statements which are repeated every now and

then. And who issues these statements? The Cabinet colleagues of the Prime Minister, the leaders, the provincial Ministers and, of course, the honourable Chief Minister of the Punjab.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself who has been spending very hectic Fridays for quite a few weeks (instead of holidaying as some people believe he has already launched his electoral campaign), also makes pointed references to the activities of his political opponents.

The Opposition leaders, of course, do not want to lag behind others in this mad race. But then since the doors of the electronic media are closed to them, the print media is the only mode of conveying their ideas which is both their right and duty.

And another thing. Once political reporting is stopped the next logical step will be the suspension of political activity. Which party or leader would like to address a public meeting or take out a procession if they are not covered by the papers? And what would happen to those genuine Press statements which must come to the notice of the public, particularly when Parliament is not in session? And will parliamentary proceedings also come under the purview of the 'no political news' formula?

But one would certainly agree with those who are opposed to the menace of blackmailing by some black sheep in the Press or the unhealthy practice of publishing concocted or baseless stories.

It would be pertinent to suggest that instead of a parrot-like repetition of the so-called development activities, the radio and TV networks could offer an objective and critical appraisal of economic programmes which can provide some guidance to the Government.

Criticising and exposing the policies and performance of the Government is always allowed, rather encouraged, by a democratic society because that way alone can an alternate leadership be organised. The Opposition, in a democratic set-up, is known as the government in the making and has a shadow cabinet. In a society, where political reporting in newspapers is not allowed and only the government development programmes are published, how else can they project their views?

A society which does not permit the publication of political news is basically and authoritarian one. This has been the case in Pakistan. No Government should, therefore, make such an appeal to the Press.

And what does the Press normally report except what it observes in the assemblies, the streets and other public forums? The Press, which has been described as the ears and eyes of a society only mirrors the happenings in the country. The Prime Minister would, therefore, be well advised to appeal to the legislators who have been creating scenes in the assemblies to observe parliamentary decorum.

And last but not least. The working journalists would be justified in reminding him that part from the APNS [All Pakistan Newspapers Society] and the CPNE [Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors], the bodies of the newspaper

proprietors and editors, there are elected unions of working journalists and newspaper workers which must be taken into confidence on Press-Government relations.

Bhutto Spearheading Anti-Nawaz Agitations

93AS0177E Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
9 Nov 92 p 12

[Article by Javed Syed]

[Text] LAHORE, Nov 8: The confirmation of "The Muslim's" earlier stories came Saturday evening when PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Co-Chairperson Benazir Bhutto formally directed her MNAs [Member of National Assembly], MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly] and other leaders to be ready for "Long March" to Islamabad in the last week of November in a bid to finally dislodge the Nawaz government. Benazir Bhutto has reportedly asked her district leaders in clear terms that their future party tickets depended on their performance in the ongoing anti-government agitation.

During her Saturday meeting with these party leaders, she made every MNA, MPA and ticket holder responsible for arrangement of at least 70 buses to carry the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] workers and like minded people from every nook and corner of Punjab to join the much talked about "Long March. These party leaders have also been entrusted with the responsibility of arranging maximum dry food for three days for the participants of the long march. The PDA workers have also been advised to keep blankets, dry food and other necessary luggage with them during the historic opposition long march.

Benazir Bhutto was of the view that if the local PPP leaders succeeded in bringing about 5 lakh people to the long march the present government would not survive by any way.

Benazir Bhutto reportedly told the meeting that although PDA was not carrying out street agitation in Sindh due to the army operation going on there, even then thousands of people from Sindh would join the long march. She said on the day of long march all highways of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP [North West Frontier Province] would lead to federal capital.

She said if government tried to create obstacles on the highways leading to Islamabad the entire highways of the country would be blocked for many days bringing all sort of transportation to a standstill.

Meanwhile, the two prominent NDA [National Democratic Alliance] leaders, former caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar are learnt to have assured Benazir Bhutto to join the PDA long march. The political circles were of the view that if PDA succeeded in making lakhs of people to sit-in in Islamabad to force their demand for the dissolution of Assemblies then there would be no option with the President but to take Constitutional action.

Government Said Abusing Judicial Process

93AS0205D Karachi *DAWN* in English 9 Nov 92 p 8

[Article: "Government Abusing Judicial Process To Victimise Opponents: PDA Charge"]

[Text] Islamabad, Nov 8: The People's Democratic Alliance (PDA) on Sunday accused the government of "using the judicial process for the victimisation of its political opponents" and called upon the international Human Rights organisations to take cognizance of this issue.

"The spate of political victimisation by involving political leaders and workers in false cases is continuing through sheer abuse of the process of law, immense pressure and blatant encroachment on the judiciary," PDA's central information secretary Senator Iqbal Haider told a hurriedly called Press conference in the Assembly cafeteria.

He cited a number of examples to prove that the Government was abusing its power and even defying the superior courts by refusing to release the Opposition workers whose release had been ordered by the superior courts. Whenever an order was passed by a higher court to release a political prisoner, he was arrested on some other charge.

"We strongly condemn this strategy for using the judicial process for the victimisation of political workers," he said and called upon the national and international human rights organisations to "protest and check this abuse of power."

Senator Iqbal Haider recalled the "blatant attempts" made by the Government to pressurise the judiciary and said the Special Court judge who acquitted Asif Ali Zardari in cases of alleged firing on MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] camps in Karachi, was asked on telephone to stop conducting the trial of the cases of PPP [Pakistan People's Party] workers and leaders. Similarly, he said, the Public Prosecutor, Amir Hussain Shah, was immediately removed.

Similarly verbal orders, Senator Iqbal claimed, were issued when another Special Court judge had recorded evidence in the case against Khwaja Mohammad, MPA [Member of Provincial Assembly], charged with possessing illegal arms. He said the prosecution witnesses had refused to confirm the charge, on which the honourable judge had made a verbal observation. The moment he made this verbal observation, the case was transferred to another court," he said.

Senator Iqbal Haider also referred to the Ghulam Hussain Unar case and said while the main accused Unar was released on bail some 18 months ago, the co-accused Asif Ali Zardari was refused bail in the same case.

He said Asif Ali Zardari was entitled to bail as there was a specific provision in the law that any accused who was in jail for more than two years without the conclusion of trial, could be released on bail. He said Mr Asif Zardari was arrested on October 1990 and more than two years have passed since then and therefore he was entitled for a "statutory bail" which was being denied.

The Opposition Senator also recalled the manner in which one of the courts had reserved the judgement on a bail application filed by Asif Ali Zardari. He said it was a well established practice that in detention cases involving the

liberty of citizens, judgements were not reserved. "This is miscarriage of justice—judgement is being deferred to deny liberty," he said.

Referring to another criminal case against Mr Zardari for possessing illegal arms, the Opposition Senator said the main accused, the driver of Zardari, was acquitted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan but bail was being denied to him. He said the arms being carried by the driver of Zardari were licenced arms but delay had occurred in the payment of renewal fee of the arms. "This is nothing but mockery of justice by the state," he observed.

Senator Iqbal Haider also referred to the case of former Senator Masroor Ahsan who was falsely implicated by the Government in 20 cases and who had been absolved in all these criminal cases by the courts. He said that the Government of Sindh had presented a list of over 20 criminal cases filed against Masroor Ahsan since 1978 to the date of his arrest in January 1991. He said the High Court had ordered his release because most of these cases had become infructuous or were not pursued in the past. But the day the High Court ordered his release, the government instituted four new cases against him "in blatant disrespect and disregard for the judiciary." He said the High Court acquitted Masroor even in these four cases but the government did not release him and instead detained him for 30 days under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (MPO). "I condemn the efforts of the Government to attempt to encroach on the independence of the judiciary—it's sheer disrespect of the superior courts and an attempt to frustrate the High Court order to release Masroor," he added.

The PDA Information Secretary said the case of Sadiq Imrani, Adviser to the former Sindh Chief Minister, Qaim Ali Shah, was no different from others. Imrani, he said, was arrested along with five other people on Sept. 30, 1990 while he was campaigning for his election. He said these people were kept in jail on treason charges although the federal government had not given its consent to treason cases against them at the time. He said it was only after one year that the consent was given by the Federal Government, and their trial had not been started yet while these people were rotting in jail.

Another "classical" case, he said, was of Ghulam Abbass Chandio, a councillor of Nawabshah, who was arrested for his alleged involvement in the Singapore hijacking case in March 1991. He said though the Federal Cabinet had announced on 26.3.91 that the investigation of the case would be completed within 10 days, even after the passage of 19 months, his trial had not even begun.

Senator Iqbal Haider said the special courts were specifically constituted by the Government to hold speedy trials. He said these courts were supposed to dispose of cases within one to three months "but the state counsels are deliberately causing delays even in these courts."

He called upon the human rights organisations to take serious notice of this issue which concerned hundreds of political workers and leaders implicated in false and fabricated charges.

Citizens Said 'Fed-Up' With Political Corruption

93AS0186F Lahore THE NATION in English
9 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Inayatullah: "Sabotaging the Parliamentary System"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Imagine Tehmina's "feudal lord," Khar, at the helm of affairs in this blessed land of ours! Think of his chequered career, riddled as it is with bizarre episodes and unsavoury adventures. Recognise his over-weening ambition and thank God that he neither enjoys credibility nor power.

Another aspirant for high office is Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, our hubble-bubble master of the art of negative politics, the untiring ever-ready forgerer of alliances, an also-ran of the office of the President, and twice defeated at the polls during the last two years. Coming from the same district as Khar he shares with him the honour of belonging to a nondescript, almost non-existent party. He heads the latest gang called NDA [National Democratic Alliance]. One of his illustrious colleagues is none other than our former "interim Prime Minister," Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who loves to bask in reflected glory. He held offices earlier as Bhutto's Chief Minister of Sindh and later as a handyman of the Establishment. Finding that the PM's [Prime Minister] office was out of his reach, he has left IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] and has taken to hobnobbing with the Nawabzada and wooing the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. His national following is nominal.

Another illustrious NDA fellow-traveller is the maverick Maulana Kausar Niazi of the Jama'at-i-Islami, Convention Muslim League and PPP fame who has the distinction of representing none other than himself. Other comrades from Karachi, Hafeez Pirzada, Meraj Mohammad Khan and Fatehyab too are known wanderers of the wilderness of politics.

Put together, what is the credibility and what are the credentials of this motley coterie of assorted characters? They indeed are disgruntled, dejected and out-of-work politicians contriving somehow to get into the mainstream and hopefully grab power.

There also are the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal leaders, educated and well-meaning, but unfortunately bereft of power or influence. They joyfully ride on the shoulders of the PPP which of course is a major national political party. But why does the PPP which has a large following in all the four provinces and which certainly can and should stand on its own, stoop to associate with hapless political orphans and echo their whimsical demand for a national government.

The very idea of a national government is absurd in a situation where a duly elected government already exists. The country is not facing any emergency. The alliance in power has a comfortable majority in the National Assembly. Why is the PPP asking for something so unrealistic and outlandish?

The answer to this question is that the Leader of the Opposition has failed to reconcile herself with the hard reality of having lost the 1990 election and is hell-bent to destroy the IJI government. If this is a correct reading of the

PPP's mind, one is constrained to find that most ineptly, right in the beginning, the party committed a blunder by formally accepting the electoral results. Not only did it agree to contest the provincial elections after having lost in the allegedly 'rigged' national polls, its elected MNAs [Member of National Assembly] and MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly] went ahead and formally accepted the Assemblies by taking the constitutional oath thereby according due recognition to the IJI government. For two years it has actively (and sometimes vociferously) participated in the National Assembly proceedings. How can it turn around and question the legitimacy of the Nawaz Sharif administration? You can't eat the cake and have it too!

Considering that for various reasons, the PPP's consuming passion is to get rid of the alliance in power, how can it achieve its objective? Assuming that the PPP is wedded to democracy as evidenced by Benazir's expressed desire to strengthen it all over the world by forming an association of all the democratic countries, as also the recent conference of the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] opposition leaders at Karachi, the obvious route expected to be followed by it has to be in line with the constitutional provisions and parliamentary procedure. There is the well-known device of the no-confidence vote. With its meagre numbers in the House this option is not available to it. Another way is to convince the President that the government has totally failed to operate in accordance with the Constitution and therefore, should be sent home by dissolving the Assembly under Article 58 (of the 8th Amendment). The chances for the President obliging the PPP in this respect are rather slim, the party having thoroughly annoyed him by sparing no opportunity to malign him. There is also the consideration that the Nawaz Sharif government has not done badly enough to deserve this treatment. And after the Supreme Court observations in cases pertaining to earlier dismissals under the said article, the President will now be reluctant to use his discretionary powers in this behalf unless he is totally sure that the situation calls for the drastic action in question. It also looks awkward for the PPP to insist on the use of the 8th Amendment which it has been roundly condemning all along.

The third option—unthinkable for a political party which firmly believes in democracy (in Pakistan, though, everything goes) is somehow to lure the Army to use the hatchet and behead the government of the day. Although some PPP leaders have been openly articulating their desire for such a recourse and the party has been, as a matter of current policy, throwing feelers to the Army to "work together" with it and generally has been commending its performance, there is little possibility of any tangible action in the desired direction. And it so happens that the present COAS [Chief of Army Staff] is keen not to get the Army entangled in party politics.

Having despaired of the futility of following the constitutional route and finding the Army unwilling to act, the desperate and obsessed leader of the PPP, confident of considerable popular backing and its proven capability to mobilise masses, has finally decided to launch people's

movement against the government. Despite the impressive achievements of the IJI, there is enough of mishaps and mismanagement, scandals, rising unemployment, soaring prices and an unsatisfactory law and order situation to whip up public agitation against the government. And in this operation, why not use the professional agitators like Nasrullah and company?

An objective assessment of all the relevant factors and forces—the political strength of the IJI in the Centre and the provinces, especially in Punjab; the government's overall record of success and failure, the attitude of the President and the armed forces, the credentials of the Opposition, including the PPP's own record of failure when in power in 1988-90, the credibility of the aforementioned discredited bunch of politicians—all this leads one to the view that the possibility of the mass agitation, the long march and the sit-ins, securing the desired results for the PPP is quite thin.

Apart from the justification for resorting to such unconstitutional action which the people generally may not find called for and convincing there is the important question of the enormous damage it will cause to the political process. After decades of military rule Pakistan has fortunately recommenced its journey on the democratic path. No sensible and patriotic Pakistani would like the democratic process to be interrupted, halted and reversed. The PPP's consuming passion for power and its attempts at rabble rousing may succeed in causing social and economic disruption and to some extent, destabilising the government. It could also perpetrate incalculable harm to the parliamentary system itself. The eventuality of the Army willy-nilly, taking over to save the situation also can't be ruled out. How will that help the PPP, or for that matter the country? One shudders to think of another martial law and the consequences following from it!

One good thing emerging from the new alliance activity on the part of PDP [Pakistan Democratic Party] and NDA is the release of 'manifestoes'. This certainly is a healthy development. While the manifestoes hardly provide the grounds for toppling a government presently in command of the national affairs, these do provide considered views of the Opposition about alternative policies and programmes. If Nawaz Sharif is wise enough, he should lose no time in welcoming these ideas and proposals and hasten to set up committees and commissions to consider them, preferably in consultation with leaders of the Opposition. It is time he and Benazir sit down and join their heads in building up a consensus on all major matters and issues of national concern. The external situation and our social and economic conditions demand an end to mindless confrontation which has bedevilled our politics for so long. In this connection it is for the Prime Minister to take the initiative and seek to secure the Opposition's cooperation by going out of the way to address sincerely and adequately all the PPP's genuine grievances. He has enough political strength in the Assemblies and outside to undertake this much-needed exercise for the sake of democracy and the country which he appears so keen to serve, without any fear of loss of authority and prestige.

The people of Pakistan are fed up with their politicians' shenanigans and stupidities and are no longer willing to be exploited for the sake of the latter's selfish, shoddy and shabby wheelings and dealings.

Benazir would be well-advised to respond promptly to Nawaz Sharif's initiatives and not place too many hurdles by way of unreasonable pre-conditions. She must place the national interests above personal and party considerations.

She will also be rendering a great service to the country by following the time-honoured democratic practice followed in all mature democracies of putting up with an elected government and patiently waiting for the next opportunity at the polling booths. In the meantime, she can vigorously work for electoral reform so that the next elections hopefully are, manifestly, free and fair. And she should also strengthen her party, democratising its leadership at various levels and mounting a viable strategy to win back power at the next round. As Prime Minister, unfortunately, she threw away a great opportunity perhaps because of lack of experience. Let it not be said that she also failed to act in a responsible manner as a great leader of the national Opposition.

PDA Said Ready To Quit Balochistan Government

*93AS0187D Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 28 Oct 92 p 4*

[Article by Munir Ahmad: "PDA Likely To Quit Balochistan Government Next Month"]

[Text] Lahore—PPP [Pakistan People's Party] co-chairperson Benazir Bhutto is said to have agreed to quit along with her party members the seats of parliament during the agitation movement, which PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] has launched throughout the country to ensure removal of IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government.

Informed sources told THE FRONTIER POST that Benazir Bhutto held a lengthy meeting with NDA [National Democratic Alliance] leaders Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada at a hotel in Islamabad on Monday to discuss the latest situation prevailing in the country.

Malik Hakmeen Khan, central coordinator of PDA, had arranged this meeting. Earlier, Malik Hakmeen, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Aftab Sherpao rushed to the chamber of Benazir Bhutto at National Assembly where they informed her that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi wanted to have an important meeting with her.

Benazir Bhutto, after having a meeting with Malik Hakmeen and Aftab Sherpao, agreed to have a luncheon meeting with NDA's central leaders at a hotel in Islamabad.

The source said that Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and his son Ghulam Murtaza Jatoi, who had been expelled from the federal cabinet by Mian Nawaz Sharif, discussed the latest situation relating to the agitation movement.

Those who were present at the luncheon meeting included Benazir Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Malik Hakmeen Khan, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Sardar Farooq Leghari and Aftab Sherpao.

NDA's central leaders assured Bhutto that Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was ready to extend cooperation to PDA to ensure removal of the IJI government.

Apparently, none of the political parties is supporting PDA in its efforts to remove IJI government. None of the political parties has so far joined hands with PDA in the agitation movement.

But, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi has convinced Bhutto that PDA should seek the support of other alliances of the opposition to continue agitation in an effective manner.

The leadership of NDA is expected to join the agitation soon as NDA would approve this proposal at its convention which would be held at Lahore on November 1 and 2.

It is learnt that Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, who are considered to be loyalists of Z.A Bhutto, held three meetings with Bhutto at Islamabad on Monday within three hours.

They held important negotiations with Bhutto to convince her that PPP should quit Balochistan government.

It is learnt that PDA is considering to quit Balochistan government in November 1992. If legislators belonging to NDA and IDF [expansion not given] agreed to quit parliament, then PDA would also do the same. But, this would be done at the right time.

The sources said that PDA, NDA and IDF would coordinate with each other during the agitation movement. The possibility of launching an agitation on the pattern of PNA movement of 1977 cannot be ruled out.

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi will reach Lahore on October 27 to inform Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan about his talks with Bhutto. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada and Ghulam Mustafa Khar would also hold a meeting with the Nawabzada on Tuesday.

Bhutto is said to have suggested to Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi that Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan should use the platform of APC [All Parties Conference] instead of NDA. This issue would come under discussion when party heads of NDA meet in Lahore on October 30.

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan is reluctant to resume political activities from the platform of APC according to the wishes of Bhutto. The Nawabzada thinks that NDA would convene APCs in future in its capacity as an opposition alliance, while, Bhutto thinks that he should convene APC in the capacity of PDP [Pakistan Democratic Party] chief.

The source said that Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan is of the view that until PPP quits Balochistan government, the opposition would not be in a position to launch agitation in an effective manner. He is demanding of Bhutto to withdraw her MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly] from Balochistan government.

However, Bhutto says JUI [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan] and JUP [Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan] should accept her as opposition leader and should sit on the seats in the parliament

reserved for the opposition, as both the religious parties are not in favour of woman's rule.

PDA, NDA Alliance Seen Capable of Gaining Power
93AS01871 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
(Supplement) in English 6 Nov 92 pp 1

[Article by Aziz Siddiqui: "The Other Options"]

[Text] What are the people to make of the election-like fever now sweeping the political scene? Mian Nawaz Sharif virtually started it by this time taking the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] threat of a long march seriously, and seizing the onset of floods as an opportunity to try and build dams round the bastion of his own power, Punjab. PDA then gradually turned up the heat, and the rest of the opposition groupings also got into the act.

Government's jitters apparently worsened as it primed its own heavy artillery to deliver blow for blow. The National Assembly—and the TV Khabarnama—recently spent days savaging Al-Zulfikar for its alleged terrorist activities in order only to rubbish the People's Party by association. The government has also sought to bring the non-official media more in line by selective arm-twisting. And it now looks that the more it will be hit in sensitive parts, the more desperate its onslaught will grow.

The opposition has just heightened the end-of-tenure make-believe and taken its process of willing an election into being by separately issuing what is made to look very much like election manifestoes. PDA has come out with a 24-point pledge to the nation and the newly formed National Democratic Alliance [NDA] with a 26-point programme, the first specially gunning for areas of the government's greatest vulnerability in the public eye. It looks rather unlikely that all this mutual fury now set on an escalator ride will soon be spent without, at least, driving the state apparatus into more irredeemable follies and without further weakening its ability to govern.

The competition for the adrenalin, if not the mind and heart, of the people may however end up doing some good to the people themselves. PDA's Islamabad Declaration, incomplete and even bland in many ways, raises some relevant issues, at least one by omission. It omits to say anything about Islamisation, which has been given such a bad name by the self-serving sallyes in that direction by Zia and the present inheritors of his mantle. This may be a devise to keep the options open, especially considering that the pledge to abolish all special courts omits mention of the Shariah courts. But even that in the circumstances is a step forward, especially since some of the other commitments confirm the alliance to a different course from Zia's and Sharif's. It promises to abolish the system of separate electorates for the minorities, to dismantle all forms of discrimination against women, and to establish a legal framework for strict equality of rights between religions, sexes, etc.

Another notable aspect is the commitment to transparency in the running of national affairs. Mandatory annual declaration of assets by public office-holders and commissions to inquire into charges of misappropriation of public funds

and private deposits, to review privatisation and to take suo moto notice of allegations of corruption (the last one comprising the chief justice, the leader of the opposition and the government head) are specific undertakings not only in respect of the past but also the future. This twins up with the pledge to conduct all official inquiries in the open, to promptly publish their findings and to strictly honour the freedom of the press. If this last is meant to suitably include the electronic media as well beyond the promise of election—time appearance to candidates, as it should, that will be a notable change from all of the past.

The PDA has also bound itself to separating the judiciary from the executive within a year, scrapping the special courts, overhauling the judicial system generally, allowing prisoners whose trial has gone on for more than six months to be released on bail, abolishing the Frontier Crimes Regulation and other special laws in tribal areas, and integrating the federally administered tribal areas with the rest of the country and extending adult franchise there. None of these may be platitudinous bids merely to cater to popular sentiment and add to the numbers in the long march, but they do look in need of being fleshed out to impress as well-considered seriously-meant commitments.

Electoral changes promised—substantial increases in national and provincial assembly seats to be exclusively filled through proportional representation, adult franchise in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas], reduction of electoral expenses, and a more widely credible election commission—are all gestures in the right direction. So is reiteration of such objectives as greater autonomy to provinces and then decentralisation towards elected local bodies, as the third tier of government.

In the social and economic spheres the promise of shift from grandiose projects like the trans-Indus motorway and the bullet train to farm-to-market connections, works programme carried through community-based organisations in such areas as irrigation, water supply, soil conservation and land reclamation and oriented also towards job creation, doubling of the allocation to education, making education more relevant to the needs and switching to the mother tongue for the children, establishing a network of student village doctors, emphasis on industrialisation in less developed areas and tackling the problems of sectarianism and drug addiction touch on some of the issues of popular concern. But again they also allow Mr. Sartaj Aziz the opportunity to contend that his Social Action Programme is even more radical.

The NDA programme generally follows the same drift, promising maximum autonomy to the provinces barring six subjects and devolution of power and financial resources to local government institutions, integration of FATA, provision for proportional representation, reform of the judicial system through repeal of 12th and other amendments to eliminate room for political influence, enforcement of fundamental rights, accountability of public representatives as well as government functionaries, equality and non-discrimination for women and minorities, redress of parochial and sectarian prejudices of all categories, measures

from equitable distribution of wealth, participatory economic development, greater progress of rural and other backward areas, and elimination of corruption and fiddling with people's money, and emphasis on national and regional languages, NDA also commits itself to ratifying all ILO [International Labor Office] conventions. And it makes a point of promising strengthening of the federal parliamentary system, including the appropriate repeal of the 8th Amendment, and promotion of democratic culture.

The problem with all such broad enunciations is their ability to convey conviction even when they touch on genuine, prevailing concerns. Parties out of power and feverishly competing with the ruling order for popular support do often make the right kind of noises. Passage from round denunciations to presentation of an alternative platform is admittedly a step forward, but acquiring credibility for a practical commitment to that alternative remains a big leap still to be made. Much the same tenor of commitments was variously made in the past. Why was it not possible to implement them? If it was lack of political will in some cases, absence of institutional support in some others, deficiency of resources in yet others, how is that to be made up for now? The fact that most of the components of the two alliances had not had a chance in the past, and those that had, like the PPP [Pakistan People's Party], were hobbled by an extraordinary hostile political opposition and extremely uncooperative state apparatus, makes a point. But it still does not prove their superior acumen or greater motivation in the present circumstances to fulfil what the others or some of themselves couldn't start doing when they could.

However, the point about these programmes is that they at least commit the alliances in a few of the essentials to an alternative course from the present—one away from pandering to fundamentalism, one more oriented towards the priority concerns of the people, and one more in line with the democratic spirit. It is not too uncertain a base to build upon.

PDA of course has a far greater mass following than NDA and the more it warms up to the present campaign the greater should be the compulsion for it to fill in the details of its offering. That will enhance its own faith in it, and therefore its commitment to it. Thus what has been devised, in Ms Bhutto's own view, as a means to rally greater popular support in the present campaign can become a basis for a genuine and practical alternative programme for the country.

There is need for such an effort. The people need to see if they have any honest options from the present drift towards greater intolerance and greater murderous schisms within the society. The PDA and NDA programmes, fragmentary and incomplete as they are, do, if seriously built upon, offer hope of some balance being restored in the society. They constitute a fairly competitive bid for popular support.

PPP Political Moves Seen Destabilizing Nation

93AS0200C Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 3 Nov 92 p 5

[Editorial: "Politics of Creating Instability"]

[Text] In order to quench their desire for vengeance and bring down the present government, the [Pakistan] People's Party [PPP] and its supporting parties have been using

negative strategies such as boycotts and agitation, but have failed to attract public support. Now they have entered the arena to play their last game. The PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] has issued an "Islamabad announcement" demanding indirectly that the president dissolve the assembly and hold elections, and set up an interim government and a new election commission. The announcement includes several other matters but the real emphasis is on dissolving the assemblies. Meantime, an important leader of the PDA and former interim prime minister, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, said that time was growing short and that the situation would deteriorate further for which the president would be responsible. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan is being asked to dissolve the assemblies and dismiss the prime minister. The question is, if the president should decide to take such measures, he would have to invoke the eighth amendment to the constitution under which he dismissed the corrupt People's Party; this is the same amendment to which the People's Party and other parties are strongly opposed. They have been constantly demanding the abrogation of the eighth amendment because they believe that it gives too much power to the president. Ever since the president invoked the eighth amendment to dismiss the PPP government, the People's Party has been campaigning with great fervor for the abrogation of the amendment; this has been the focal point of the party's politics. Now, the president is being asked to use his powers under this amendment to dissolve the assemblies. This shows that the PPP and the parties supporting it have no fixed principles. Anything that is used against them is bad and if this same thing is used as a weapon against their opponents, it is regarded as good. In this connection, an important leader of the PPP, Yahya Bakhtiar, said in a recent interview that the eighth amendment was the root of evil because it gave too many powers to the president and that the PPP was not wise in changing its position. He said that in the beginning, the PPP took the field with the slogan, remove the president; now, it had changed its slogan to save the president but remove the prime minister; this clearly showed that the policy of PPP and PDA was not based on principle; rather, they followed a policy of dissension to which serious PPP circles were opposed.

The fact is that the PPP never adopted a positive policy. In the past, as soon as PPP chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed office, he suspended basic rights. Then he started to harass his political opponents and have them assassinated. Baluchistan's assembly was dissolved; the FSF [Federal Security Force] was used to remove opposition leaders from the assembly; linguistic agitation was started in Sindh and workers were fired on in Landhi. When PPP came into power a second time and Benazir Bhutto assumed office, history was more or less repeated. The very next day, the Baluchistan assembly was dissolved but was later restored by the High Court. A confrontation was started with the elected government of Punjab, which did not belong to the PPP, and this caused great harm to the country. A campaign of harassment was started against opposing politicians and the wealth of the nation was ruthlessly plundered, all of which caused the president to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities.

After losing power, the PPP refrained from taking the president's action to court saying instead that it would fight its case in the people's court. But when the people delivered their judgment against them in the elections, the PPP did not follow democratic principles and accept the verdict with a good grace; instead, it alleged fraud and refused to accept the verdict of the people's court. Since then, the PPP has been licking its wounds and it has started a policy of vengeance. It has only one aim now: to remove Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This is not a policy based on principle but a desire for personal vengeance in pursuit of which assemblies were boycotted, disturbances created, demonstrations held, and a path of destruction followed. Threats of resignations from the assemblies were made but they did not have the courage to carry out their threat. Now they have entered the arena with the intention of using the power of the people against the government but at the very first step, their hopes have been deflated because the people have not supported them. It has become plain to the public that the policy of the PDA is not in the interests of the people but based on personal interests and vengeance and aimed at attaining power at any price. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was right when he said that the day of politics by empty slogans was past. Intelligent people know well the difference between sloganeering and action and they will foil all attempts to create instability in the country.

PPP Call For Proportional Representation Criticized
93AS0205C Karachi DAWN in English 9 Nov 92 p 11

[Article by Mohammad Waseem: "Why Proportional Representation?"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The proportional representation has again surfaced on the political stage of Pakistan. The PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] has demanded a change in the electoral system so as to make it more representative in terms of seats/votes ratio. Apparently, the PDA's dismal performance in the 1990 elections in terms of representation on the assembly floor, despite its votes which equalled the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] votes at about 37 per cent, prompted it to go for this demand.

The situation has changed diametrically from the 1980s. President Zia publicly showed his preference for proportional representation in order to bring the PPP's [Pakistan People's Party] prospective representation on the floor in any future elections down to its expected vote at 40 per cent or less. Conversely, Jamaat-i-Islami lent its support to this proposal and declared it to be in the spirit of Islam largely to transfer its wasted vote in many constituencies into membership of assemblies. The real purpose was not to make the overall system more representative but to undermine the position of the PPP as an electoral giant and promote the electoral prospects of certain smaller parties.

The results of the 1990 elections hit the PPP hard. Even if provision is made for alleged rigging in the polls, the disproportionality of the electoral system based on the first-past-the-post system was considered a serious matter. The PDA circles have been trying to keep this demand on the agenda for some time, although their lack of enthusiasm in this regard points to indecision and confusion in their

ranks. Obviously, there is still the possibility that the party gains in future elections by keeping the present system intact.

No party in England has won 50 per cent or more votes during the last half century while all elections, with one exception, returned stable majorities on the floor of the parliament. Similarly, the Congress party in India won all the elections upto 1971 but it never commanded a simple majority of votes in any of these elections. The question arises as to how does the PPP plan to win elections under the proposed formula of proportional representation, given its consistent electoral base at 40 per cent and with no concerted programme of expanding its constituency. Or does it simply want to increase its proportion of seats in the assemblies and then seek to form a coalition? Is this demand only a reaction to the adverse results of the 1990 elections or is there a more serious and long-term change envisaged by the PDA leadership?

Of course, it is true that in the single-member district system operative in Pakistan as well as in England, India and many other countries, a large minority remains unrepresented in the parliament. In this so-called plurality method, the element of disproportionality of election results is relatively more visible than in our systems, granting the fact that there is some vote-seat share deviation present in every general election. While this situation has promoted a demand for change, electoral systems tend to continue as they are and only rarely change as per these demands. The same holds true for Pakistan.

The PDA has demanded partial proportional representation in addition to the existing majoritarian system. Already the members of the upper house of the parliament, the Senate, are elected on the basis of proportional representation. Also, women's seats in the previous assemblies were filled on the same basis. In other words, the present electoral system of Pakistan incorporates selected elements from both the plurality and proportional representation systems. However, the fact remains that it is the National Assembly, elected on the majority principle, rather than the Senate, which plays the pivotal role in the government formation in this country.

Proportional representation has many variations such as single transferable vote, party list system or various methods ranging from D'hondt method based on the highest average between votes and seats to the largest remainder method as well as the two ballot majority-plurality system introduced in France in 1958. Historically, these systems and methods were developed in order to meet the conflicting demands of ethnic minorities in countries like Germany, Denmark, Belgium and Finland. Conversely, they have contributed to fractionalisation of politics in these countries in the form of persistent multipartism.

What some of these countries gained in terms of representation, they lost in terms of political stability and continuity. Especially, Italy is an example of chronic instability. Making and un-making of successive coalition government and their internal reshufflement presents a challenge in the form of a constant pressure on the public to be vigilant as well as

patient. This system demands a consistently active and participant role from citizenry. A typical Third World country such as Pakistan which suffers from the absence of an organised and mobilised citizenry would in all probability be stuck in the morass of coalition-building under this system.

In England and other Commonwealth countries, any change in the direction of proportional representation has been less than welcome by an uncomprehending public. Here the first-past-the-post system is understood to be a road to unequivocal decisions. Under this system, the party in government must take the credit or blame for its performance as the case may be. There are no coalition partners to function as an alibi for the government's failures. This system generally leads to consensual politics if allowed to function without interruption. Extreme right or extreme left parties are unlikely to dictate terms to their senior coalition partners.

What the PDA seems to have ignored is the lack of a constituency out in the society which would serve as a support base for the demand for proportional representation. Need for a strong and stable government is felt all around in Pakistan. Any change in the prevalent electoral system at this stage entails the danger of starting a new controversy in addition to multiple points of conflict already dividing the society. In the massively illiterate society of Pakistan, the present system is far simpler and better understood than any variety of proportional representation. Various studies show that a coalition government, which is a typical feature of the latter, is twice likely to collapse in the midst of parliament than a party government typical of the former.

The PDA leadership must realise that an electoral system *per se* is relatively unimportant in determining the democratic functioning of a government. While in opposition, it must not raise those issues which are not likely to appeal to any significant number of voters nor indeed serve its own interests in the long run. Even more important than the way democratic governments are elected is their performance in upholding the rule of law, freedom of speech and other fundamental rights including the right to fair and free elections. Whatever the electoral system, it is the interaction between its operative clauses and the established political tradition in general which defines its efficacy. What is required at present is perhaps the change more in what the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] government does, especially vis-a-vis the parliamentary opposition, than in the electoral system which brought this party alliance into government.

Army Praised on Handling Tando-Bahawal Massacre
93AS0176A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
5 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Musarrat Babar; italicized words and quotation marks as published]

[Text] Early this week, a Field Court Martial awarded death sentence to an Army Major and life imprisonment to 13 other ranks who were involved in the cold-blooded murder of nine innocent villagers in village Tando Bahawal near

Hyderabad in June last. These nine innocent peasants had been picked up by Major Arshad, leading a dozen of his men, at the behest of one Ghulam Muhiyuddin Pathan with whom they were involved in a land dispute. Pathan, who later died in police custody during investigation, was said to be related to Major Arshad through marriage.

The gory incident took place in the night between June 5 and 6, just a few days after the Operation Clean-Up was launched in Sindh, involving the Army, to flush out dacoits and restore law and order in the province. It was, indeed, the first major operation of the Army soon after the crack-down on dacoits and terrorists. The local Army command was led to believe that those killed were terrorists with Indian connections, and had died in an encounter with the law-enforcing agencies.

Not only that, lethal weapons, including grenades, Klashnikovs and even anti-tank missiles, supposedly of Indian origin, were 'recovered' from their possession to prove their Indian connection. The initial news story released by the official news agency APP from Hyderabad, termed these villagers as dacoits. The story was however 'killed' within hours, and a fresh news story was issued, clarifying that the persons slain were terrorists and not mere dacoits. The official version of the incident was dutifully broadcast by state radio and television and owned by the Army, the provincial Chief Minister and the Prime Minister.

Muted questions were, however, asked by the people and the press as to whether the poor villagers were really terrorists, or they had been murdered in cold blood as a result of family and property dispute behind the mask of Operation Clean-Up. It was asked, for instance, that among the murdered peasants was a young boy of 16 studying in class nine and an old man of 60—how could they be dubbed terrorists? When the press began to ask embarrassing questions, the Prime Minister initially snubbed pressmen for "sabotaging the Army's Operation Clean-Up in Sindh," but later agreed that the government would try to find out the truth, and that "justice will be done to everyone in Sindh."

The Army, however, was the first to realise that a probe was called for, and that the institution's credibility could become seriously suspect by persistent questioning by the press and the public. Its enquiry revealed some foul play. In a quick and decisive move to contain [as published] damage, the Army publicly accepted the responsibility, relieved three senior officers, including the GOC [General Officer Commanding] Hyderabad, of their command, hauled up the Major and his men, and set up a formal court of enquiry, before proceeding with the court martial of the culprits. The rest of the story is all too recent and fairly well known.

The Tando Bahawal case will have three major fallouts for the government. First, the Army, having convincingly established the principle of accountability in its own ranks by awarding death to a senior officer, would henceforth stand on a higher moral ground *vis-a-vis* the civilian government and politicians. Add this moral authority to its existing gun-power, and the Army will stand much taller than even before. That would further tilt the balance in favour of the

Army in the so-called power troika. As the President and the Prime Minister continue to dither on the arrest of 72 'big fish' in Sindh, the list of which has been prepared by the Army, the personal and political stature of both of them would diminish, and the moral and political authority of the civilian government would be further eroded.

The Army Chief, General Asif Nawaz, has already said in Karachi the other day that the Army had established the principle of accountability and it was now for others to do accountability in their ranks as well. If the on-going Operation Clean-Up in Sindh is perceived as intended merely to defend the government of Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah and promote the narrow political ends of Islamabad, the Army would become more assertive and outspoken.

As a corollary, the on-going references against the Leader of the Opposition and other PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] leaders in the name of accountability, would also appear more of a farce. Ironically, a military court has awarded death to one of its own officers without interference from the top at a time when the civilian government is seen as manipulating the judiciary. Barely a week ago, the Special Prosecutor entrusted with various government cases against PPP in Sindh was sacked, and all cases against the PPP leaders in the court of the judge who acquitted Asif Zardari have been withdrawn and transferred to another court. The contrast will only dramatise the irrelevance of the on-going references to the process of accountability.

The second fall-out of the incident will be for some state institutions, particularly the intelligence agencies whose reports and 'findings' it may no longer be advisable to be taken for granted. From the way the local Army command in Hyderabad presented the Tando Bahawal incident to the Prime Minister, then on a visit to Sindh, it would appear that it was an institutional rather than individual failure. "Do organized institutions also mislead deliberately?" That will be the question asked. Strident voices could also be raised for a thorough probe in the Shah Bandar and other such incidents.

The third important fall-out of the Tando-Bahawal case will be on government-press relations. The national press, rightly claiming credit for the cover blow-up, will become more suspicious of the government and assert more decisively and forcefully its 'right to know'. The Prime Minister has often been complaining against the 'negative' attitude of the press and for publishing stories "without quoting any authoritative source." He has been talking of making laws to make it mandatory for the press to give definitive source for its stories and prohibit publication of speculative reports. He can now no longer seriously complain about these scores. When the press first exposed the Tando Bahawal killings, it did so without "quoting any definitive source." As for the "negative" attitude of the press in blowing up the case out of proportion to 'sabotage the Operation Clean-Up', that criticism has already been proved wrong. The Prime Minister will be increasingly on the defence before an assertive press.

Death Sentence of Christian for Blasphemy Condemned
93AS0187F Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 5 Nov 92 p 10

[Editorial: "A Sentence Dangerous for Pakistan"]

[Text] A district additional judge in Sargodha has sentenced a Christian citizen to death on the basis of the 'Gustakhe-Rasul' law. If this sentence is carried out, it will be akin to the witchhunts of medieval times. It will further fan the fanaticism that is threatening the very fabric of Pakistani society, a fanaticism so great that zealots, frothing at the mouth, consider violence against members of other sects a holy act and people cheer when a Muslim stabs a Christian on the allegation that he heard him insult the Prophet (PBUH) [Peace Be Upon Him]. It is this type of fanatic, who is most vocal on the issue of differentiation of minorities through the national ID cards. So far such fanatics constitute only a small minority. As the state panders to them through discriminatory legislation and procedures, it in effect increases their destructive fervour and their strength.

Last year, the Federal Shariat Court declared the law relating to blasphemy in the Pakistan Penal Code as repugnant to Islam, ruled out the option of life imprisonment and prescribed only death for anyone found guilty of defaming the name of Islam or the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The fact is that the blasphemy laws, as they exist, are so framed that the offence of derogation of the Holy Prophet's (PBUH) status

has not been specifically defined, leaving enormous discretion in the hands of the prosecuting parties and the magistrates. There have been a number of cases, where individuals have been charged with blasphemy on the basis of oral testimony which is clearly suspect.

The shameful harassment of Akhtar Hameed Khan, an internationally renowned social worker, on the basis of this law is evidence of the ease with which it can be abused. The law, as it is, presently worded can be exploited to harass and persecute members of minority communities, smaller sects, in fact anyone, by providing false oral testimony. That Muslim societies must protect the honour of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) at all cost goes without saying. But laws, when they are framed, must be seen to serve the objective needs of justice for all citizens. Laws which become open to abuse because they are loosely worded can only be called unjust. A state that aids and abets injustice to its minority citizens through bad laws must lose its standing in the comity of nations. Other countries will be scared to do business with a state, in which religious fanaticism and violence is the order of the day. The fate of Muslim citizens in neighbouring countries will be threatened by such actions. The German foreign minister was right when he said that Pakistan should learn from the German experience. Societies that persecute their citizens on the basis of religion sow the seeds of their own destruction.

New Deal With EC in Textiles Initiated*93AS0177C Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Nov 92 p 9*

[Text] Despite the threat of a breakdown in world trade talks the European Community claims that a new textile agreement with Pakistan will give Islamabad its long awaited guaranteed access to the EC textiles market.

Pakistan and the EC have just started talks on a new two year deal which will come into force from next January.

It has been a good for years for Pakistani textiles in Europe, exports of the EC are booming and traders say the creation of a single European market could boost their EC's sales. EC officials have warned Pakistan that with the recession cutting into demand and their domestic textile industry on the protectionist war path, the exports boom has to end. The new agreement with Pakistan will be restricted, Brussels says.

Pakistani traders like Rasheed Sethi, Chairman of the Karachi-based government exporters association are not happy, such restrictions he told would also hurt EC consumers.

Rasheed Sethi said, we would like them to give us a liberal entry into the EC countries of the products we specialise and these products are for the benefit of the consumers of the EC countries. Price-wise and quality-wise they are very much satisfied and demanding more. Further proof is that the more and more EC countries are opening their offices in Pakistan now.

The head of the Pakistani negotiating team, Naseem Qureshi used another argument stressing that a more generous textile deal would help revitalise the cotton industry destroyed by recent floods.

Naseem Qureshi said, Pakistan has been hit by the international pricing trend in cotton and yarn. On the other hand the recent floods have wiped out about four million bales of cotton and this is a great setback as far as export earnings are concerned.

But despite the pleas the EC is not expected to change its hardline's stands. Mr. Sethi said the EC should not be afraid of Pakistani exports.

We are not offering any competition to any EC countries. We are supplementing the supplies. So I do not know why they are afraid of Pakistan's exports to EC countries.

Trade Mission Said Frustrated by Russian Posturing*93AS0185J Lahore THE NATION in English
6 Nov 92 p 11*

[Article by M.A. Shami and Wahab Kazmi: "Pak Trade Mission Returns With Empty Hands From Moscow"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Karachi—An eighty-three-man trade mission of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) has returned from Moscow empty handed.

The delegation, which left for Tashkent and visited Samarkand and Bukhara *en route* to Moscow. The delegation went

to Moscow without the permission of the Russian authorities, left here in the third week of October under the leadership of FPCCI President Mian Habibullah.

First it was denied to put up its stall of goods it had taken along with it but later the Moscow authorities allowed them to come to Moscow but it failed to attract the Russian businessmen. Hardly anyone came to see us, complained a participant.

The delegation had become unmanageable because of its size in the first place and the members of the delegation continued to fight with each other on petty matters. It is ironic that Tabani Group which arranged the visit and sponsored it in certain respect has been blamed for the failure of the mission.

For one thing the visit to these states was untimely and has failed to achieve any purpose. Moscow had already turned down the request of the FPCCI and informed the PFCCI Chief through a fax message not to come to Moscow. The delegation head however, manipulated and through the government was able to get permission to visit Moscow for three days. But during this period neither any government official or a private businessman contacted the delegation. The Chief of the Moscow Chambers of Commerce and Industry, however, met the delegation for half an hour but the deliberations remained inconclusive. The Moscow businessmen actually cold shouldered the Pakistan delegation, some members of the delegation have said. Of the recently freed Central Asian Republics, Russia is the only state which has hard currency and could do business with Pakistan but our businessmen wanted the opportunity as most of them concentrated on visiting churches in Moscow and appreciated flyovers and tubes.

Even Pakistan's Ambassador in Moscow was surprised at the attitude of some businessmen who instead of harnessing all avenues, which the new states and Moscow offer, wasted their time and energy on such futile exercises. Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif has laid emphasis on promoting and selling Pakistani products in these lands of opportunity but this delegation failed in its objectives and instead has been instrumental in earning bad name for the country.

For instance, instead of pressing economic points of PFCCI rubbed in the question of common faith in the Central Asian Republics which the CIS heads did not appreciate.

Bakhtiar Amotov is reported to have clearly stated that religion and business are separate and should be pursued separately because we are open for trade relations with every country irrespective of its faith, what we are interested in is what goods and services a certain country can offer us. Question of faith becomes secondary, he said.

In fact the whole exercise seems to be trying to frustrate the efforts of the present government in increasing exports proved a futile exercise, because such attitude as displayed by this delegation at a time which was not opportune was doomed to be a failure. In fact the CIS states have fully developed infrastructure, they have large number of aircraft, and resources which if harnessed properly can usher in

an era of prosperity quicker than expected. Uzbekistan for instance produces 1.5 million bales of cotton which is equal to Pakistan's production, has irrigation network and is rich in fruit orchards. It is blessed with mines which have to be exploited for its hidden wealth.

Uzbekistan can buy from Pakistan sugar, rice, garments in return for cement which it has in plenty. The CIS states in fact offer lucrative markets for Pakistan products like leather goods, handicrafts, sports goods of quality, surgical goods, leather, chemicals and even pharmaceuticals. In fact this delegation could at best be termed a joy ride and a picnic as the businessmen are said to have enjoyed themselves.

It may be stated that the CIS states possess political culture, economic resources and to a great extent are self-sufficient in physical infrastructure like roads, highways, aircraft but they are deficient in expertise to mobilise these resources. They need managerial skills, and do not have proper market place. They have no banks and have no hard currency, i.e., dollars.

Pakistan can take the message and offer all these expertise in banking, accountancy, managerial accountants, advisers and dense way to earn dollars which it badly needs.

With literacy rate as high as 77 per cent in these states it is pertinent for Pakistan to exploit this vast market with tact and instead of exporting low quality garments, poorly finished sports goods and handicrafts and low quality goods, which these states have been importing from Turkey and Iran provide these sources. It is hightime we realise that the opportunity that is knocking at our door will remain dormant and some other country, which is more forward looking will grab it.

At a time when we badly need markets and hard currency this God sent chance must be taken and grabbed before it is too late.

The delegation which went to Moscow came empty handed though each member paid Rs [Rupees] 48,000 for the trip. Is this the way to increase our exports? It seems someone is trying to frustrate the efforts of the Prime Minister and trying to foil the country's economy at the behest of some hidden hand.

Inflation Said Nearing Double-Digits

93AS0191D Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 92 p 9

[Article by Sultan Ahmed: "The Deep Bite of Inflation"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The fear is real that inflation in the current financial year will again be in double-digit. In that case, it will be the third year running for the people to feel the deep bite of double-digit inflation—beginning with 12.7 per cent in 1990-91.

The average inflation was 7.34 per cent in the 1980s, as officially claimed, though the average price rise in the tumultuous 1970s was 12.33 per cent following the disruptive rise in oil prices.

Every year we are assured that inflation the next year would be in single digit, but as that financial year ends, the painful squeeze of double-digit inflation becomes a reality.

What governments do not care to admit is that even when inflation is below the dreaded double-digit, it represents a rise in prices over the cumulative inflation of the last 22 years—after the 1960s when the average price rise was claimed to be 3.83 per cent only. That makes even a five per cent inflation in Pakistan now painful, unlike in the West where the inflation has been kept low as a matter of deliberate policy. And that is one of the secrets of Japan's economic success and social harmony.

The people, of course, do not go by price indexes. Officials outside the Finance Ministry scoff at the official price indices. When the government recently said that it wanted to hold the price of 'atta' at Rs [Rupees] 4 per kilo, for the poor that meant a rise by 15 times over the 1960 price. In reality the 'atta' is selling at Rs 5 to Rs 6 per kilo except at the Utility Stores where it is sold at Rs 4.25.

In the West, the political leaders have come to the firm conclusion that non-inflationary development was essential for the success of the economy. The reason for that is that inflation not only hurts the poor and the fixed income groups, particularly when their incomes are not indexed to inflation, but also hamstring the government in many ways. It has to spend far more out of a limited budget whether it buys stationery for its offices or luxury cars for the ministers or tanks and aircrafts for the defence forces. Then, it has to increase the salary of its employees year after year. If Rs 6 billion was spent on that count last year, it was Rs 4 billion a year before. The people had to be taxed more for that purpose. Prices go up as a result, and neutralise the impact of the rise in salaries.

Governments in Pakistan have been reluctant to try radical remedies to tame inflation for fear of displeasing the people, particularly when the ruling elites are not ready to make any sacrifice in their own style of living. As long as fighting it out does not become a major plank on the official platform, inflation will remain caught in its own web, and keep on trimming the development outlays in favour of the expanding current expenditure.

Speaking in the National Assembly last week, Industries Minister Sheikh Rashid said that prices of four essential eatables had registered a sharp rise during the last two years. Prices of onion had risen by 140 per cent since June, 1991, of sugar by 14 per cent, 'atta' by 7.13 per cent and vegetable ghee by 11 per cent. Prices of gram had risen by 44 per cent and Moong pulse by 29.35 per cent since June 1991.

All he could say to explain such a price hike was that their prices are not controlled by the government but determined by the forces of demand and supply. To some extent, the price rise reflected seasonal trends, and an increase in support prices to the farmers was another factor. Rise in the cost of production raised ghee prices. He said nothing which had not been said before or which the people did not know.

Rise in prices each year follows the fixation of higher support prices for agricultural products, which now cover

the entire gamut of output. Usually the rise is between 10 to 15 per cent, though at times it could be lower as in the case of sugar cane this year because of the larger crop expected in the wake of the rains. Then comes the increase in the rates of the utilities like water, power, gas etc, along with a rise in POL [Petroleum Oil and Lubricants] prices which makes transportation more costly.

The heavy indirect taxation which is usually passed on to the consumers at the rate of two to three times the actual tax rise pushes prices further. Devaluation, along with the rise in duties on the ad valorem basis makes all imports and manufactures which use imported items far more costly. And the trend in Pakistan is towards a high rate of profit (certainly compared to India) whether the seller be a push-cart vendor or a big businessman.

While the supply of goods, particularly edibles, is not increasing on the scale needed, and at prices acceptable to the lower income groups, demand has been going up on a large scale. When that demand is not met because of high prices of some manufactures following heavy taxes on them, smuggling becomes rampant, as in the case of a vast range of electronics and electrical goods.

The affluent sections in our society are fond of conspicuous consumption. The fleet of large cars they sport, led by the Pajero, their swanky homes, and very large wedding dinners are only a few manifestations of the display of wealth. The ministers are unhelpful when it comes to reducing the conspicuous consumption. While the Prime Minister appointed an Economy Committee to reduce the size of government and shrink needless administrative expenditure, he then expanded the cabinet unduly. The report of the committee has hence been pigeonholed. He is now stated to have set up another high-level committee for economic analysis and policy formulation, following the danger signals given by intelligence agencies in respect of the political fallout of the sustained inflation.

There should have been some urgent and effective cleansing of the Augean stables following the devastation caused by the floods and the new burdens on the national exchequer. That has not come to pass. The Sensitive Price Index showed a rise of 9.45 per cent on October one on an annual basis compared to 11.24 per cent in the same period last year. But let it not be forgotten that this too represents a rise over the cumulative inflation of the past years and hence doubly hurting.

There is inflation in India, too, following the deregulation of the economy. The annual rate of inflation there on October 3 was 9.3 per cent, and that is shaking an even otherwise unsteady government. India has been forced to shelve a report of a panel of the National Development Council on austerity as that is not regarded politically popular. But India has been able to build a foreign exchange reserve of six billion dollars from a very low reserve—Pakistan's reserve is now one billion dollars.

Our rulers are fond of saying that the people of Pakistan are better than those in India. That brings small satisfaction to the masses who are poor, undernourished and unemployed.

The element of ostentation on the part of the rulers, law-makers and senior officials in India is far less than is visible in Pakistan and is hence less provocative.

Inflation indisputably fuels corruption on a vast scale, and crimes ultimately, as in Sindh. The army talks of finding an economic solution, too, to the Sindh problem. But no real attempt is being made.

The government comes up with Utility Stores and Friday Bazars which have led to other bazars like Tuesday Bazars as well. But they are more useful to the rich with official or personal cars, than to the poor unless they live close by. Undoubtedly they have their uses, but they cannot meet the needs of the whole country and replace the market system as a whole.

The solution to the problem lies in cutting down all wasteful official expenditure and eliminating corruption. The corrupt consumes a great deal since the money easily earned can be easily spent. A determined policy of discouraging ostentation is called for. Rulers have to live a simple life instead of driving around the cities in long motorcades of a dozen of cars or escort vehicles.

Austerity and simplicity should become a norm for everybody, so that more could be saved and invested; and that more could be produced at lower prices. Taxation, too, should become rational instead of remaining rapacious in some sectors. What is needed is a sustained war against inflation. Otherwise we will have the double affliction of inflation and devaluation making each other worse.

Government Borrowing Said of 'Frightening' Proportions

93AS0191E Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 92 p 11

[Article by Shahid Kardar: "Postponing Day of Reckoning"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] It is a frightening thought that the Government of Pakistan is currently borrowing at the rate of Rs [Rupees] 500 million per day (a staggering Rs 60,000 every second) to maintain its operations. Not surprisingly, therefore, its bank borrowings during the first three months of this fiscal year, 1992-93, have already exceeded the figure for the entire year.

The pressure on the already strained budget is also mounting as the costs of damages caused by floods are totalled up. On the one hand are the costs of restoring infrastructure and the loss of crops and on the other hand is the fear of the shortfalls of the government's tax and other revenues with a slow-down in industrial and economic activity as a result of a squeeze in the purchasing capacity of the population. No wonder the Finance Minister is already acknowledging that the deficit for 1992-93 will be Rs 21 billion higher.

It is, however, no consolation that the deficit has widened because of the floods, the slump in domestic investment and production and the recession in international markets and that a drastic recasting of the original budget will be required. It is also another matter that there were not enough resources, to begin with, to finance the budget. What

is worrying is the continuing lack of recognition by the government of its failure to adjust its stance to restore fiscal integrity.

The deficit is now threatening to touch 10 per cent of the GDP [Gross Domestic Product] (against the budget estimate of 5 per cent of GDP) and the outstanding gross debt (both domestic and foreign) is almost 90 per cent of the national income.

This massive debt is, as one U.S. Senator is reported to have said about the American debt, "eating away unnoticed, like the work of termites, the foundations of the country's economy ... destroying resources for investment." Can the government, in view of the scenario described above, reduce the deficit? Can it service its domestic and foreign debt? These are moot questions because a fascinating feature of Pakistan's money market today, (contrary to what logic and economic theory would expect) is that the government of Pakistan (a supposedly risk-free borrower) is borrowing rupees (that it can theoretically print if it were to run out of funds) from the domestic market at 13 per cent to 15 per cent, as against one or two multinationals that are borrowing at 10 per cent to 11 per cent. This state of affairs indicates the lack of confidence of the market in the government's ability or will to repay its debt.

While the size of the deficit is causing a great deal of concern everywhere, the damage it can do is rather difficult to document. The obvious concern is that the government is borrowing to cover this deficit. Other things remaining the same, one would expect that more government borrowing will increase interest rates, choke off productive private investment (with the government reducing the access of the private sector to credit), thereby slowing down economic growth. But then other things rarely remain the same and government expenditure itself creates a demand for private sector goods and services. It would, therefore, be difficult to find a link between the deficit, movements in the interest rate, investment and growth.

The link between deficit and interest rates is the key to this controversy and past evidence is not a good guide to the future. A rather unique characteristic of Pakistan's money market is the stickiness of the interest rate. It is difficult to discern any movements in the interest rate, whatever the rate of inflation.

Moreover, the way a deficit comes about also affects the interest rate. Investment demand can respond differently to different taxes and different kinds of government expenditure can produce different results for both savings and investment. The result may not be as simple as that claimed by some that the drain on national savings from the record budgetary deficits is the single most important cause of low investment and productivity growth. Thus, the relationship between the deficit and the interest rate tends to get lost.

Even though the costs and benefits of deficits are not known with certainty, some judgment has to be reached on how much is too much. Some 'rules of thumb' can be employed

for arriving at this judgment. When we look at the performance of the government, under the norms available to gauge the seriousness of the budgetary problems, we realise the severity of its dilemma.

The government's borrowing enables today's taxpayers to postpone the full cost of government spending. This raises a potential conflict between today's taxpayers and those who will become taxpayers in the future, a conflict in which the latter are not fully represented when decisions are made. If the government is spending to increase the productive capacity of the economy or even for goods assets that will be consumed over many years, shifting the cost to future taxpayers whose income will have increased as a consequence will be justified. The golden rule is that the government's current revenues should finance its current consumption while capital expenditures may be financed over the useful economic lives of the assets.

Large and persistent deficits can seriously limit the government's freedom to meet other fiscal goals. If it runs large deficits in the boom years, its ability to respond to temporary recessions is reduced, as is borne out even by the experience of the United States.

Past efforts to contain the deficit have focused mainly on increasing revenues while spending has out-paced economic growth. Other efforts to respond to the concern over the deficits through fiscal responsibility are seen mainly in the decline in government investment. The deficits have been rising over the last 2-3 years and government investment has fallen relative to output.

Serious fiscal reform has been prevented by the polarisation and splintering of political power and widespread use of the government expenditure for party patronage. Whereas different governments (including the present one) have failed to carry out fiscal reforms under favourable economic conditions, the Nawaz Sharif government now finds itself having to establish fiscal credibility when conditions are much less favourable.

Government Claim on Economy Disputed

93AS0199B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 6 Nov p 5

[Article by Professor Iltaf Ahmed Siazana: "Pakistani Economy: What Are the Facts?"]

[Text] According to the latest issue of the National Bank of Pakistan's, MONTHLY ECONOMIC LETTER, our gross domestic product (GDP) increased 5.59 percent during 1990-91. This increased by 6.38 percent in 1991-92 and is expected to increase by 6.19 during the 1992-92 fiscal year. The GDP at the present rupee value in 1990-91 was 910.10 billion rupees and increased to 1,054.80 billion rupees in 1991-92. It is expected that this amount will increase to 1,209.90 billion rupees in 1992-93. As for the performance in the private sector, in agriculture the rate of growth was 5.06 percent in 1990-91, which increased to 6.40 percent in 1991-92. This rate of growth will go down to 4.98 percent in 1992-93. In manufacturing, the rate of annual growth was 6.32 percent in 1990-91 and increased to 7.70 in 1991-92. This is expected to increase further to 8.54 percent in 1992-93. In the mining and quarrying department, the rate

of growth was 10.80 percent in 1990-91 and shrank to 4.38 in 1991-92. This rate is expected to increase to 8 percent during the 1992-93 fiscal year.

The rate of annual growth in the construction department was 5.70 in 1990-91 and was slightly up to 5.93 in 1991-92. This growth rate is expected to go up to 7.20 in 1992-93. The annual increase in wholesale and retail trade was 5.55 percent in 1990-91 and increased to 7.57 percent in 1991-92. It is estimated to go down to 6.10 percent during the present or 1992-93 fiscal year.

As for agricultural production, the situation of the major crops was as follows. Wheat production for the year 1990-91 was 14.56 million tons. This production increased to 14.58 million tons during the 1991-92. The wheat production is expected to rise to 15.20 million tons in 1992-93. Rice production was 3.26 million tons in 1990-91, and went down to 3.18 million tons in 1991-92. They expect rice production to up to 3.48 million in 1992-93. Sugarcane production was 35.99 million tons in 1990-91 and went down to 34.21 million in 1991-92. The projection is for 39.70 million tons in 1992-93. Cotton production was 9.64 million bales in 1990-91. It went up to 12.70 million bales in 1991-92. It is expected to go down to 12.60 million bales in 1992-93.

As for industrial production, the situation about selected industrial productions is as follows. Cotton yarn production was 1,041.25 million kg in 1990-91 and went up to 1,135 million kg in 1991-92. Its production is expected to rise to 1,294 kg in 1992-93. Cotton cloth production was 295 million square meters in 1990-91 and went up to 305 million square meters in 1991-92. It is expected to go up to 320 square meters in 1992-93. Sugar production in 1990-91 was 1.956 million tons in 1990-91 and went up to 2.18 million tons in 1991-92, and is expected to rise to 2.375 million tons in 1992-93.

The production of hydrogenated vegetable oil was 656,000 tons in 1990-91 and increased to 680,000 tons in 1991-92, and is expected to further increase to 710,000 tons in 1992-93. Fertilizer (N) production was 1.12 million tons in 1990-91 and decreased to 1.11 million tons in 1991-92. It is expected to increase to 1.30 million tons in 1992-93. Cement production was 7.75 tons in 1990-91 and increased to 8.03 million tons in 1991-92. It is expected to increase to 8.44 million tons in 1992-93.

As for the trade balance our exports (F.O.B. [free on board]) during 1990-91 was worth \$5.902 billion. During the same period our imports (FOB) cost us \$8.385 billion. During this year we suffered a deficit of \$2.483 billion. During 1991-92, we exported items worth \$6.719 billion and imported goods worth \$9.268 billion. Thus, the loss during this year was \$2.549 billion. During the 1992-93 year, our exports are expected to be of worth \$7.727 billion and imports worth \$9.731 billion with a projected loss of \$2.004 billion. Our major exports have been the following. We earned \$346 million from exporting rice in 1990-91 and earned \$404.41 million in 1991-92. The projection is for earning \$475 million in 1992-93. As for raw cotton, we earned \$412 billion in 1990-91 and \$501.55 million in 1991-92. We

expected to earn \$549 million in 1992-93. During 1990-91, \$1.183 billion were earned from export of cotton yarn. This figure went down to \$1.106 billion in 1991-92.

The projection for earning from cotton yarn export is for \$1.3 billion in 1992-93. The income from exporting cotton cloth in 1990-91 was \$676 million. It went up to \$794 million in 1991-92. The projection for 1992-93 is for it to increase to \$918 million. Readymade garments and hosiery industry earned \$831 million in 1990-91 and \$1.005 billion in 1991-92. We expect this industry to earn \$1.14 billion in 1992-93. Carpets and rugs worth \$222 million were exported in 1990-91 and worth \$210 million in 1991-92. The projection for sales in 1992-93 is \$237 million. Leather goods exports brought in \$276 million in 1990-91 and \$237.9 million in 1991-92. We expect to earn \$241 million in 1992-93. As for major imports, petroleum and petroleum products cost \$1.731 billion in 1990-91 and \$1.36 billion in 1991-92. In 1992-93, the cost for this item is estimated at \$1.54 billion. Import of wheat cost \$91 million in 1990-91 and \$341.8 million in 1991-92. We expect to spend \$382 million in 1992-93. In 1990-91, \$402 million were required to import vegetable oil. This sum went up to \$403.4 million in 1992-93, and is expected to increase to \$476 million in 1992-93. Tea cost us \$166 million in 1990-91 and \$172 million in 1991-92. The estimate for 1992-93 is \$179 million. Import of chemical fertilizers cost the nation \$264 million in 1990-91 and \$256.8 million in 1991-92. The expected expenses for 1992-93 is \$353 million.

Import of capital goods cost \$2.5 billion in 1990-91 and \$3.450 billion in 1991-92. During the current year of 1992-93, these imports will cost us \$3.55 billion.

The above given figures tell us a lot. For example, our annual GDP growth is much less and is of smaller proportion. The annual growth rate in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and construction is not very promising. There is a lot of room for increase in the production of wheat, rice, sugarcane, and cotton. The industrial production in our nation is very meager. The trade balance is against us. This most painful fact is that we are importing wheat when we call ourselves an agricultural nation. Last year, we spent the huge sum of \$341.8 million to import wheat and will spend additional \$382 million during the present year. This really is an embarrassing situation for us.

Per Capita Income Said in Range of Middle-Level Countries

93AS0191F Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 92 p 11

[Article by Shahid Javed Burki: "Current Per Capita Income: \$400 or \$2000?"; boldface words as published]

[Text] A meaningful journey must begin not only with a clear understanding of where and when it is to end but also from where it is to start. I am concerned here with the shape of the Pakistani economy by the turn of this century. For this series of articles the journey ends in 2000 AD. If that is the destination it is worthwhile to identify the point from where it began. As I will show below this is not an easy question to answer.

I am writing this series in the strong belief that Pakistan has arrived at an important crossroads in its economic journey. It could move along two very different paths: it could as easily take the high or the low road. The high road will place Pakistan squarely among the middle income nations of the world; the low road will push it back once again among the ranks of the desperately poor. But what is the precise location of the crossroads—from where precisely is Pakistan starting its journey? Exactly how large is the Pakistani economy, what is the per capita income of its population, what is the sectoral composition of its economy? All these are important questions. They must be answered before we can say much about the future direction of the economy.

In the article published last month ("The Current Situation and Future Prospects," DAWN, October 6, 1992) I promised to address the issue of the real size of the Pakistani economy and the real income per head of the country's population. I raised the question of the real size of the Pakistani economy this summer in a speech I gave at a seminar sponsored by the daily MUSLIM and in a TV lecture. In both I suggested that the Pakistani economy is much larger in size and its people much richer than indicated by official statistics. This information was treated as interesting news by some commentators while some others expressed scepticism about the numbers I had used.

What do official statistics say about the size of the Pakistani economy and the income per head of the country's population? The *Economic Survey* for the year 1991-92 issued by the Ministry of Finance estimated Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP) at Rs [Rupees] 1202 billion at market prices in the year 1990-91. The gross national product (GNP) was estimated at Rs 1225 billion. The twenty-three billion rupees difference between GNP and GDP represents the net income the citizens of Pakistan obtain from outside the country. Pakistan's population on January 1, 1991 was of the order of 113 million; dividing the GNP by the number of people in the country gives the figure for per capita income—Rs 10,841 for 1990-91. (The *Economic Survey* commits a mistake by using the estimate for the size of the population on January 1, 1992 to obtain the figure for GNP per capita for 1990-91).

How does Pakistan's income per head of the population compare with that of other developing countries? The World Bank in *World Development Report 1992* presents an estimate of 380 dollars for Pakistan's per capita income in 1990, putting it among the world's poorest 43 countries. According to the same document, Bangladesh's GNP per capita income was \$210, that of India \$350 and that of China \$370. Since the World Bank uses income per head of \$630 to differentiate between poor and middle income countries, Pakistan, along with Bangladesh, India and China, is classified as a poor country.

In 1991, Pakistan's rate of exchange with respect to the United States' dollar averaged at Rs 22.42; at that exchange rate, the World Bank's estimate for per capita income translates into Rs 8,590 which is not too different from that presented in the *Economic Survey*.

If both the Government of Pakistan and the World Bank agree on the estimate of the size of Pakistan's economy and income per head of the population, why did I use a figure of close to \$2000 for Pakistan's income per head in my speeches this summer? Why was I suggesting an estimate some five times as large as the one used conventionally? Was my purpose to twist national income accounts in order to justify the claim I have been making for some time that it is legitimate for Pakistan to regard itself as a middle income country and for economic decision makers in the country to be guided by that notion? These are very legitimate questions but my readers will probably be surprised when I say that the much larger estimate of income per head of the population also comes from the World Bank. In fact it is presented in the same document that carries the more conventional figure of \$380.

Pakistan is not the only country with such enormous differences in the estimates of per capita income. Table 30 of the World Bank report cited above estimates Bangladesh's income per capita at \$1050 that of India at \$1150, of Pakistan at \$1770 and of China at \$1950. These estimates were made for the year 1990; updating them to 1991 brings the estimate for Pakistan close to \$2000. One important conclusion already emerges from the conventional and not-so-conventional (or reconstructed) estimates I have provided for this set of four Asian countries using the World Bank as the source. It will be noticed that for Bangladesh, China and Pakistan the "correction" between conventional and reconstructed estimates is much higher than that for India. The largest correction is for Bangladesh in which the reconstructed figure is more than nine times greater than the conventional estimate.

A comparison between these two sets of estimates for per capita incomes for these Asian countries leads to another legitimate question: Why does the World Bank carry two dramatically different figures for developing countries' per capita income in the same document? There is a very good reason for the World Bank to use two very different methodologies in making these estimates. The conventional estimates are the product of a methodology the World Bank identifies as "the Atlas method," so called because the World Bank publishes every year a widely used Atlas that provides estimates for national income, income per head of the population, size of the population etc for its member countries.

The reconstructed numbers for per capita national income come from a project launched several years ago by the United Nations working together with a number of other international organisations including the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. The project goes under the title of the U.N. International Comparison Programme (ICP) and is being carried out in several phases. Comprehensive results from Phase V of the programme were made available in December 1991 for 57 countries and were used in *The World Development Report 1992*.

The Atlas method converts a country's national income at an exchange rate roughly comparable to the one used for

official transactions. In order to remove the effect of fluctuations that are not of structural nature, the Atlas method uses a three-year average exchange rate. If the exchange rate is depreciating rapidly, it eventually begins to show up in the dollar estimate for national income. In the spring of 1982, Pakistan decided to delink its currency from the United States dollar and set it afloat on the basis of a basket of currencies that reflected the destination of its exports weighted by their value. At that time the rate of exchange between the United States dollar and the Pakistani rupee was 9.9; now, some eleven years later, Pakistan exchanges 25 of its rupees for one U.S. dollar. This represents a sharp devaluation in the value of the rupee since it was floated. The depreciation in the rupee's value is equivalent to 9 per cent a year in the eleven year period between the spring of 1982 and the winter of 1992-93.

This depreciation of the rupee would not have been significant for Pakistan's national income account when expressed in dollars had the difference between the rates of inflation in the United States and Pakistan matched the rate of rupee devaluation. But that was not the case: the rupee depreciated much faster than the difference in the rate of inflation with the result that a measure of per capita income that converted the Pakistani currency at the official rate of exchange into dollars represented a serious downward bias. For instance *World Development Report 1984* put Pakistan's per capita income in 1982 at \$380 at that year's prices while the *World Development Report 1992* estimated it for 1990 at \$380 in 1990 prices.

In the eight-year period between 1982 and 1990, the purchasing power of the dollar had declined by 59.4 per cent. In other words, in the prices of 1982, Pakistan's per capita income in 1990 was only \$238, or \$142 less than the estimate reported for 1982. Could Pakistan's per capita income have declined so sharply over 1982-1990 when world Bank Development Report 1992 tells us that the country's per capita income increased at the rate of more than 3 per cent a year during this time. While running forward at a fairly fast pace, Pakistan seems to have gone backward. Even those who find it difficult to accept that Pakistan's economy has performed reasonably well in the last ten to 12 years will find the suggestion of the economy taking a great leap backward not to be entirely credible.

This Alice in Wonderland kind of situation persuaded a number of international organisations, including the World Bank, to begin to use two methodologies for estimating national incomes. The higher estimate for Pakistan and other countries better represents the actual situation than the conventional way for calculating per capita income in dollar terms. It certainly removes the paradox of a decline in the level of per capita income when it was actually growing.

Exchange rate is not the only reason for the significant difference in the estimates of per capita income provided by the Atlas and ICP methodologies for countries such as Pakistan. Official estimates of national income do not include a number of economic activities; these amount to a significant size for Pakistan. What is even more significant for Pakistan is the undisputed fact that the size of the "unaccounted" or underground economy has been growing at

a rate much faster than the increase of the "counted" economy. This divergence has three important operational implications for Pakistan.

First, when Pakistan's per capita income is calculated according to the ICP method and compared with that of other countries it can no longer be classified as a poor nation. It should be recalled that the ICP method calculates Pakistan's income for 1990 at \$1750, \$700 more than that of Bangladesh and India. The ICP dividing line between poor and middle countries is about \$1200, well below the estimate for Pakistan's per capita income. In other words Pakistan is better placed in the group of middle income countries while India and Bangladesh remain in the category of poor nations. This analysis simply confirms what should be apparent to most economic observers.

The character of the Pakistani economy—its structure, composition and destination of external trade, urbanisation, incidence of absolute poverty, availability of skills etc—resembles that of a middle income country rather than that of a poor nation. The strategic significance of this finding is that Pakistan has to consolidate its position as a middle income country rather than plan to emerge out of economic backwardness.

The resources of the public sector should be committed toward skill improvement (in particular that of the female work force), development of a technological base, removing bottlenecks in infrastructure, provision of urban services, and increasing the sophistication of the products traded in the international markets.

If the ICP estimate of Pakistan's income is nearer the truth, then the structure of the economy is considerably different from the one suggested by conventional statistics. The country's manufacturing base is much larger than that suggested by conventional national accounts; within the manufacturing sector, small scale industries have a much more prominent place than indicated by official data; commerce plays a much larger role in the nation's economy; real estate and construction are definitely much larger sectors of the economy than suggested by official statistics. Conversely, the contribution of agriculture is much smaller as is that of public expenditure. All this suggests that the dynamic that is moving the economy forward is very different from that indicated by official statistics. In policy making the modern sectors need greater attention not only to help them to play their role in advancing the economy but in also instituting a greater sense of public purpose in their functioning.

Politics is the mirror image of economics and its dynamics have already begun to reflect the presence of the forces official statistical information generally hides. The remarkable ascendancy of urban politics and urban politicians that the country has seen in the last decade in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh can be understood only in terms of the rapid transformation of the economy. This restructuring of the economy is difficult to comprehend by simply focusing on official economic numbers.

Third, a large GDP also means that some of the important macroeconomic ratios that guide the policy makers do not accurately portray the real picture. For instance, the public

sector spends an even smaller proportion of the country's gross domestic product on health and education than suggested by official statistics, the amount the government invests in creating physical infrastructure when calculated as a proportion of the GDP is also much smaller, the revenue collected by the government as a proportion of the GDP is also significantly less. Correct and rational accounting of national income should put these ratios under an even sharper spotlight for the purpose of making the right policy decisions.

In conclusion, therefore, I would like to argue that Pakistan is starting its journey toward the year 2000 from a point which is different from that indicated by conventional data for gross domestic product and per capita income. There is great merit in recognising this point clearly at this stage.

Economy Said Registering Strong Growth

*93AS0191G Karachi DAWN in English
8 Nov 92 pp I, IV*

[Article: "The State of Pakistan Economy"]

[Text] Preliminary estimates for fiscal 1992 indicate that Pakistan's economy continues to register strong growth, with GDP [Gross Domestic Product] projected to grow by about 6 percent. This reflects high growth in the agricultural sector and continued strong performance in the external sector, with exports estimated to increase by about 12 percent.

Pakistan's balance of payments, however, remains under pressure, particularly given the very high import growth experienced in the current year, coupled with a sharp fall in workers' remittances. As a result the current account deficit is expected to be considerably above the fiscal 1991 level of 4.6 percent.

The government has continued to experience difficulties in achieving its fiscal reform objectives. This reflects longstanding problems in resource mobilisation, including slower than expected progress in broadening the tax base and improving tax administration. The government's macroeconomic programme for fiscal 1992 aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit by 4 percentage points of GDP to achieve the original target of 4.8 percent of GDP. To achieve this ambitious target, the government undertook a number of steps to improve resource mobilisation and curtail expenditures. Preliminary estimates indicate that the target will not be achieved, and the government expects the fiscal deficit for fiscal 1992 to be around 6.5 percent of GDP.

Despite continued difficulties in strengthening macroeconomic management, the government has made considerable progress in opening the economy and beginning to improve the environment for private sector activity. Important reforms in industrial deregulation, lifting foreign exchange controls, and eliminating investment sanctioning, which were implemented during fiscal 1991, have helped to develop a more hospitable framework for the private sector. Progress has also been made in reducing non-tariff barriers to imports and the maximum tariff, although Pakistan's trade regime remains heavily protective.

The government has also continued its reform of the financial sector, introducing an auction system for government securities and taking steps to improve competition in the sector by approving several new private financial institutions and privatising the nationalised commercial banks, two of which have been sold. These reforms are important elements for promoting a stronger private sector, improving overall resource mobilisation and allocation, and helping to pave the way for the needed increase in the savings rate.

Considerable progress has also been made in the government's privatisation programme. Of the 103 industrial units put up for sale, 34 have been, or are about to be, transferred to the private sector, and another 16 units are in the process of being transferred. The government is also committed to privatising telecommunications and is initiating work on a privatisation strategy and an appropriate regulatory framework. The government is also pursuing initiative to increase private sector participation in the energy sector.

Although Pakistan's current account deficit is expected to decline, it will require substantial external financial support, especially of its very low reserve position is to be strengthened. External financing requirements are projected to average about \$3 billion in the next few years. Funds from official sources are expected to meet about 80 percent of the financing requirement. Pakistan's debt/GDP and debt service ratios stood at 48 percent and 23 percent, respectively in 1991 and are expected to decline moderately as the government's adjustment programme continues.

Principal Development Issues

Pakistan's high population growth rate and poor record in social development undermine the pace of development and contribute negatively to improving income distribution. Estimates indicate that 29 percent of Pakistan's households fall below the poverty line, with poverty more prevalent in rural areas and small towns than in the large cities. The past decade has seen an increase in average incomes and some success in allocating more resources to the social sectors. Nevertheless, Pakistan's literacy rate of 26 percent ranks among the lowest in the world, and few countries record a poorer literacy rate for rural females than Pakistan's 6 percent. Infant mortality and life expectancy indicators are similarly poor. Health coverage is limited, heavily focused on urban areas and hospital-based curative care.

Inadequate public social services and limited access to productive assets are the main causes of poverty in Pakistan. The government's planning targets for social services have not been matched by detailed programming and adequate budgets. Aside from insufficient budget, major constraints include a shortage of primary school teachers and paramedical staff, especially females, and inadequate local involvement, especially in the development of rural water and sanitation services. Because of rapid population growth, landlessness is increasing, and the average size of farms operated by the poor is declining.

Other structural weaknesses inhibiting Pakistan's prospects for sustained growth include low savings and investment rates, of about 13 percent and 17 percent of GNP, respectively. The share of public investment has also remained

low. Direct and indirect price controls, subsidy programmes, and regulatory policies continue to affect resource allocation, even after a major policy shift in 1991 towards deregulating industrial activity. Despite some progress towards trade liberalisation, the trade regime continues to have a significant anti-export bias. Moreover, the concentration of exports in rice and cotton, where price prospects are uncertain, and in cotton textiles subject to protectionist pressures from industrialised countries, and declining worker remittances, leaves Pakistan's balance of payments fragile and vulnerable to external shocks.

Physical infrastructure bottlenecks also constitute important obstacles to economic growth. Public investment has been low at 6-7 percent of GDP, reflecting inadequate revenue generation and the need for strengthening overall macro-balances. Continued high levels of spending on defence—which in recent years exceeded development expenditures—have further constrained efforts to expand public sector development spending. Public sector management constraints and project implementation bottlenecks have also slowed public investment efforts. As a consequence, large public investments in electric power upgrading, highways, and railway modernisation are needed. Moreover, an aging irrigation system requires investments in drainage and salinity control, as well as replacement and repair of irrigation networks.

Pakistan is likely to face increasing unemployment in the future if the foundation for sustained economic growth and employment opportunities is not strengthened. With Pakistan's high past population growth rate, labour force growth is expected to continue to exceed 3 percent a year for at least 20 years, even if fertility rates were to fall rapidly. The need to more rapidly expand employment opportunities is further complicated by changes in the Middle East, which is unlikely to continue to absorb the number of Pakistani workers it did through the early 1980s.

Macroeconomic Adjustment and Structural Reform

Although substantial progress has been made in the context of the original 1988-91 reform programme, the pace of reform has at times been slower than expected, reflecting in part the impact of political changes during 1990 and the Gulf crisis. There have also been slippages in some areas, especially in respect to fiscal reform.

Pakistan's adjustment and stabilisation programme for fiscal 1992-94 emphasises strengthening public finance, financial sector reform, and trade and exchange liberalisation and incorporates expanded efforts in economic deregulation and privatisation. It aims at annual real GDP growth of 6.3 percent. Investment levels are programmed to increase from slightly above 18 percent of GDP in fiscal 1991 to 20 percent in fiscal 1994. Inflation is projected to remain above 8 percent in fiscal 1992, but decline to 6 percent in fiscal 1993. On the external side, the current account deficit target remains at 2.5 percent of GNP (following the rise to 4.6 percent in fiscal 1991). Consistent with these objectives, the overall fiscal deficit was targeted to decline to 4.8 percent of GDP in fiscal 1992 and to remain at that level in the subsequent two years. The programme for

fiscal 1992 is being supported by a third annual arrangement under the IMF's Structural Adjustment Facility.

Recent Macroeconomic Developments

GDP growth remained strong during the first three years of the adjustment programme (fiscal 1989-91), reaching 6.5 percent in fiscal 1991, but inflation proved difficult to control, accelerating in fiscal 1989, falling to 6 percent in fiscal 1990 and rising to about 13 percent in fiscal 1991. This reflected the monetary expansion that financed the fiscal deficit of fiscal 1990 and the added impact of higher energy prices stemming from the Gulf crisis. Efforts to strengthen the budget have also been disappointing, with the deficit falling to 6.7 percent of GDP in fiscal 1990, but increasing sharply to 8.8 percent to GDP in fiscal 1991, well above the 5.5 percent target for that period.

In the external sector, the current account deficit deteriorated to 4.6 percent of GNP in fiscal 1989, reflecting a worsening of Pakistan's terms of trade; it remained at this level in fiscal 1990 and fiscal 1991, well above the target of 3.9 percent of GNP. Exports, particularly cotton manufactures have continued to perform well, growing by over 19 percent in fiscal 1991. This performance was offset by a substantial rise in imports, including an additional \$530 million on account of higher import costs for crude oil and petroleum products during the Gulf crisis. The current account deficit was financed by drawing down already low reserves to less than four weeks of imports.

Foreign Investment Said To Top \$500 Million

93AS0186E Lahore THE NATION in English
9 Nov 92 p 9

[Text] Islamabad (APP)—Federal Minister for Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis Mohammad Ejazul Haq has said the revolutionary economic measures taken by the Prime Minister had started yielding results by attracting foreign investment of \$500 million.

Inaugurating the ninth International Industrial Exhibition organised by Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry here on Sunday, he said, more foreign investment of \$1 billion was expected in the wake of improved investment climate in the country.

President, Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Shahid Rashid Butt presented an address of welcome.

The economic growth rate during 1991-92 was 6.4 per cent as compared to 4.7 per cent during 1990-91. Likewise exports increased by 12.6 per cent against decline in the imports level. Import of machinery went up by 60 per cent during the period.

The foreign exchange reserves, the Minister said, recorded an improvement from \$583 million to \$797.1 million. There was an increase of 20 per cent in repatriation of capital to Pakistan by the overseas Pakistanis, he added.

The present government, Ejazul Haq said, believed that the private sector was responsible for running industries, business and setting up production units. However, the Government would provide all possible and practical cooperation in this regard.

Federal Labour Minister said, the industrialists and trading community had made valuable contribution to the economic uplift of the country. Weak and sluggish economy, always created poverty, political frustration and several other problems, he said.

Country's economy must be strengthened to achieve political stability and improve the country's image abroad. Had the nationalisation not hampered the industrial process in the past, the country now would have been in the ranks of industrially developed countries of the world he pointed out.

Nationalisation of the industrial units had caused irreparable set back to the economy and the same effects were still visible on the country's economic state, the Minister observed.

He categorically stated that nobody could reserve the process of privatisation and denationalisation, like Islamisation process in the country.

The Minister also went round the different stalls set up at the exhibition and took interests in the locally produced products put on display.

Earlier, the President, Islamabad, Chamber of Commerce and Industry Shahid Rashid Butt said that the industrialists and traders community strongly believed that the present Government under the sagacious leadership of Mohammad Nawaz Sharif would change the economic scenario of the country through its dynamic economic policies.

Munawar Mughal, Vice-President of the Islamabad Chamber of Commerce underlined the need of enforcement of Rent Control Act in Islamabad as early as possible.

Privatization Said Assisting Export Growth

93AS01851 Lahore *THE NATION* in English
9 Nov 92 p 11

[Text] Islamabad (APP)—The policies of privatisation and deregulation of trade enhanced exports by 39.4 per cent during 1991-92, reaching a record level of \$6.9 billion.

The exports stood at \$4.9 billion when present government assumed office in November 1990. The main thrust of the government during the two years had been on achieving self-reliance through generating revenues by enhanced foreign exchange earnings.

"Without adding to the crushing burden of debts payable by generations after generations, we deem it absolutely essential to develop the capacity to pay for our ever-increasing import requirements from own resources instead of looking for charity and assistance from other," Federal Commerce Minister Malik Naeem said.

He said this calls for adoption and pursuits of dynamic policies of export promotion. In our circumstances, export led growth was not something merely desirable but it was absolutely critical.

"The government has been trying to recapture the lost momentum and help exporting sector to regain the competitive edge by providing highly congenial policy environment and promotional support at the operational level.

For realisation of these objectives, the export policies given in 1991-92 and 1992-93 focused on a six-point strategy.

Boosting exports to the maximum possible extent through various incentives and institutional support.

Devising an export oriented liberal import regime.

Deregulating trade and commerce to facilitate the business community to flourish in an atmosphere of increased freedom.

Simplifying procedures for removing administrative bottlenecks.

Enhancing participation of private sector in trade and commerce and.

Playing an important role in global trade negotiations and making effective efforts for regional economic integration.

The key elements of these policies were elimination of duties and surcharge on the import of machinery for major industries like textile, leather, sports goods, surgical instruments and cutlery and extension of income tax exemption on exports for manufactured goods. Moreover the widening the scope of export processing unit scheme (EPU) which meant duty free import of machinery spares and raw material by export oriented industries, exporting more than 50 per cent of their production. For engineering industry the percentage is 25. Similarly export finance scheme has been streamlined to provide concessionary credit to the exporters.

The Minister referring to trade imbalance gap said "the increase in the import bill was due to substantial increase in the import of capital machinery which at \$2,299 million is 59 per cent more as compared to corresponding period last year.

During the last two years, Pakistan played an important role in the Uruguay round of trade negotiations under GATT with the neighbouring countries like Iran, Turkey and Central Asian states.

Pakistan has played an active role in getting the General System of Preferences (GSP) scheme of European Community extended for another 10 years and is endeavouring to have the similar 10 years tenure from the United States.

Redefining of the role of Trading Corporation of Pakistan as an export house and appointment of chairman of Export Promotion Bureau from private sector to ensure better performance were other steps taken by the government.

The government has also taken a number of steps to liberalise and deregulate the import regime and simplify the import procedure mainly aimed at promotion of exports and removal of administrative bottlenecks.

Similarly the tariff has also been rationalised with a view to remove fiscal anomalies and distortions and make Pakistan's tariffs export oriented and production efficient.

China Said Ready To Sell 40 F-7P Fighter Jets *93AS0200A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 23 Oct 92 p 1*

[Text] Islamabad, (APP/PPI): Chaudhry Assadul Rahman, minister of state for parliamentary affair, informed the National Assembly today that Pakistan signed an agreement to purchase 40 F-7P planes from China. Replying on behalf of the minister of defense to a question by Liaqat Baluch (Jammat-I-Islami) during question time [in the Assembly], Assadul Rahman said that after the suspension of the delivery of F-16 planes by the United States, Pakistan had been trying to find other sources for obtaining fighter planes including China and Russia; Pakistan had so far paid 528 million dollars in installments and owed an additional 878 million dollars; because of the suspension of the sale of military weapons to foreign countries by the United States as a result of the Pressler Amendment, it was not possible to determine a date for the delivery of F-16 planes; no demurrage charges were levied but General Dynamics, the maker of the planes, told Pakistan that it would have to pay 200,000 dollars for storage and care charges. The minister of state said that Pakistan was paying the installments regularly and on the 6th of the current month paid a fresh installment of 85 million dollars because Pakistan did not want to be delinquent in payment. The minister also said that Pakistan reserved the right to take legal action against the company for failure to deliver the planes. In answer to a related question by Babu Ghulam Hussain, PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], the minister said that POF [Pakistan Ordnance Factory] was constructing all types of small weapons, tanks, antitank ammunition, some types of aircraft and anti-aircraft ammunition; since 1985, 3 and one-half billion rupees' worth of weapons had been exported.

Arms Purchases From Russians Said Facing Obstacles

*93AS0186H Lahore THE NATION in English
2 Nov 92 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Ahmed Rashid: "Pakistan's Arms Purchases From Russia Face Problems"; italicized words as published]

[Excerpt] Moscow—The power struggle between the military hardliners and President Boris Yeltsin, has intensified in recent weeks with the ban on the Opposition National Salvation Front. The chronic political instability in Moscow will seriously affect foreign policy and arms sales, as more Asian countries arrive in Moscow looking for cheap high tech weapons.

Pakistan and Malaysia are just two countries looking at the possible purchase of the SU-27 fighter bomber, which have already been sold to China. Last month's visit by Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, Akram Zaki concluded the first high-level negotiations between Pakistan and Russia—talks that set out a multiple level of principles that are to guide relations between the two countries in the future. The visit also paved the way for a senior Pakistani military delegation, drawn from all three services that visited Moscow to appraise the possibility of arms purchases. It was the first such visit for nearly four decades.

Pakistan is interested in buying attack and transport helicopters, aircraft and submarines as well as artillery and various types of ammunition. However, the keenness of the Russian military to sell arms to Pakistan will, as happened with sales to India and Iran, face considerable problems from President Yeltsin's office. India, Moscow traditional ally, which itself now faces massive problems because of the lack of spare parts for its inventory of Russian-made weapons, is bound to put significant pressure on Moscow through the President's office to oppose any weapons sales of Pakistan.

Moreover, the U.S., which has banned all arms sales to Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons programme is likely to do the same, under the excuse that Moscow would be fuelling the arms race in the Sub-Continent and that the eventual restoration of aid to Pakistan could deprive U.S. arms manufacturers of the lucrative Pakistani arms market. Washington is already nervous at the prospects of its long-standing arms customers in Asia, now looking at Moscow for cheaper weapons. Such is the case of Malaysia, which could end several decades of dependence on British and U.S. arms if it decides to buy the SU-27. Non-controversial countries like Malaysia are not expected to face the kind of political problems from the Americans that Pakistan can expect in buying Russian weapons.

The Pakistani military also faces many problems if it buys Russian weapons. Revamping its own military infrastructure and assuring the future supply of spare parts, which are becoming increasingly difficult to find in the chaos that is now Russia, are just two of such problems.

At the formal level, Russia would like to see an improvement of relations with Pakistan. "We do enjoy thoroughly good relations with India but now that does not stop us from developing similar type of relations with Pakistan," said Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kunadze. "It is not wise to take sides in the India-Pakistan disputes and it would complicate things far more for a third power to be involved. Both countries must improve and develop their own relations and end the mistrust on both sides," he added.

At policy level, Russia is no longer bound to side with India on every issue and Russian support for the five-nation nuclear conference for South Asia and less tepid support for India's stance on Kashmir are indicative of this. However, the Russian Foreign Office, the Oriental Institute and the foreign policy journals, in fact all the key decision-making organisations are full of old India hands, who still view the Sub-Continent through the Indian point of view rather than through independent eyes. Pakistan also faces the residue of its decade-long Afghan policy for backing Gulbadin Hikmatyar in Afghanistan and even though that may have changed in Islamabad, in Russian eyes, Hikmatyar was built up with Pakistani help and is now helping destabilise not only Afghanistan but also Tajikistan. Moreover, the liberals in Moscow backing the President are also heavily influenced by Washington's continuing poor relations with Pakistan.

The CIS military's keenness to sell arms to Pakistan do not carry any significant political dimensions. The military-industrial complex is after quick profits, commissions and

ensuring that its production lines keep running. Russian Generals are willing to sell weapons to anyone who pays hard cash up front.

Parts of Moscow's strategy in dealing with the southern belt of Muslim Asia is to ensure that countries like Iran and Pakistan do not gravitate solely to Central Asia but develop equally close ties with Moscow—which still sees itself as the big brother in Central Asia. Officials and academics stress that Russia's relations with the Muslim world were set back by a decade because of the invasion of Afghanistan, but now Russia does not want to see an exclusive Islamic bloc being formed between Central Asia and Muslim countries to the south.

It was significant that the attendance of Iranian and Pakistani leaders at the Ashkabad Summit of Central Asian leaders was reviewed very negatively in the Moscow Press,

whereas Turkey's attempts to woo Central leaders such as the forthcoming summit in Ankara never receive such a negative Press. The bottom line for Moscow appears to be that Pakistan, when viewed in the context of such major players and potential investors in Asia like China, Japan and India are small fry. Russia needs investment and business and Pakistan's inability to offer much will determine the continuing low level of importance that Moscow will give Pakistan in the future.

With the volatile situation in Central Asia, Russia also had a much greater degree of commonality of interests with China, than ever before. Containing Islamic fundamentalism, maintaining the present *status quo* of the increasingly fragile borders in Central Asia and Xinjiang and ensuring security are just some of these mutual concerns. [Passage omitted]

Alarming Rise in Birthrate Worries Senate
93AS0177A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Nov 92 p 5

[Text] ISLAMABAD, November 8: The Senate Sunday resumed discussion on the population growth in the country on a motion moved by Khawaja Mohammad Aslam.

Eight members spoke in favour and against the motion. Those who took part in the discussion included: Dr. Muhammad Rehan Syed Faseih Iqbal Akhundzada Behrawar Saeed, Muzammal Shah, Prof. Khurshid Ahmed, Syed Iqbal Haider and Abdullah Shah.

Dr. Mohammad Rehan taking the floor expressed serious concern over the population growth and described it as a root cause for the increasing crime and prevailing restlessness in the country.

He said due to defective policy the population rate in the country has increased to 13 crore from the three crore in the former West Pakistan in 1947.

Defending criticism on the use of artificial means of birth control he said this system has been practiced in a number of Muslim states like Bangladesh, Malaysia, Egypt and Iran.

He said the population planning be made effective to check rapid growth.

Syed Faseih Iqbal favouring the motion said the fruits of economic planning were being nibbled away by the growth of population and it was the main reason that people were being deprived of even basic amenities of life.

He said the government should give this matter top priority and vigorous motivation campaign should be launched at the district level with the involvement of teachers political leaders and national government organisations.

PUBLIC AWARENESS: Akhundzada Behrawar Saeed emphasised that masses should be kept aware about the factors causing population growth and its possible consequences.

He said if the population growth was allowed to continue unchecked it might lead to natural calamities. He said the actual causes of the increasing population should be ascertained to find out the solution otherwise it would be a waste of time and money.

Muzammal Shah said the issue was being complicated with the passage of time. If the population continued increasing with the present ratio and day would come that no body would have a place to construct a house for living.

RATIONAL APPROACH: Prof. Khurshid Ahmed responding to the points expressed by the members discussed various issues concerning the population growth. He said instead of being emotional various aspects of this serious issue needed to be discussed thoroughly. Blindly implementing western policies would lead us to a catastrophe.

Prof. Khurshid Ahmed said the density of population was subject to economic development technology and economic

opportunities adding that Malthus theory has now been proved to be wrong otherwise this world would have been packed up by now.

Prof. Khurshid Ahmed said that population planning was introduced during Ayub Government but the figures showed that population rate has increased instead of declining. He said the amount spent for controlling the population could have yielded positive results had these resources spent on the welfare of the population.

Senator Iqbal Haider taking part in the discussion said that manpower should co-relate with the existing resources of a country to keep balance. He said Japan has lowest ratio of population growth while Germany became the superpower because of minus population.

He also said that council of Islamic Ideology has not prohibited family planning. Therefore he said attention should be paid to control the population.

ISLAMIC CONCEPT: Hafiz Hussain Ahmed opposing the motion said it is an Islamic country where guidance should be sought from our religion. Referring to population control he said China which attained freedom along with Pakistan has made rapid progress despite large population.

The Senate Sunday began its 40th session. Chairman Wasim Sajjad presided.

ARTS AND ORGANS BILL: A Bill moved by Syed Iqbal Haider to make provision relating to the use of arts and organs of bodies of the deceased persons for therapeutic and other purposes (the transplantation and use of human organ Bill) was sent to the standing committee.

Another Bill moved by Dr. Muhammad Rehan to amend the National Institute of Health Ordinance was also referred to the Senate standing committee.

REGULARISATION: A Bill moved by Dr. Muhammad Rehan to provide for the regularisation of the appointments of medical officers and engineers appointed on adhoc basis in Pakistan Railways and withdrawn by the mover following the assurance by the minister for environment and urban affairs Anwar Saifullah Khan. He said that a similar Bill was under consideration of the government and will be introduced in the National Assembly or Senate very soon.

The disposal of the Federal Government out lived quarters Bill sought to be moved by Prof. Khurshid Ahmad as reported by the standing committee was deferred to be taken upon the next private members day on the request of the mover.

The Senate then continued discussion on the motion under rule 194 moved by Khawaja Muhammad Asif to discuss rapid population growth in the country. Dr. Muhammad Rehan Senator Faseih Iqbal Akhundzada Beharwar Saeed Muzammal Shah, Syed Iqbal Haider, Hafiz Hussain Ahmad Prof. Khurshid Ahmed and Syed Abdullah Shah expressed their views on the subject.

The House also started discussion on the motion moved by Tariq Chaudhri pertaining to agricultural policy of the government.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY: Initiating the discussion Senator Abdul Rahim Mandokhel criticised the agricultural policy of the government and which he said was not a national policy but limited to the promotion of agriculture to a particular area or province.

He observed that government policies on agriculture, industries communication, commerce and education were not integrated. It also did not encompass the whole country, he said.

DETRIMENTAL IMPORTS: Senator Mandokhel said that Balochistan province produces high quality of apple and onion but the government allows imports from Iran of these products which were detrimental to the interest of local growers.

He called for measures to stop wastages of lakhs of cusec water of the provinces. He also demanded expanding the farm to market roads, provision of electricity and reopening of railway track.

Editorial Says Zardari Used as Pawn in Politics
93AS0177B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English
9 Nov 92 p 6

[Italicized words and quotation marks as published]

[Text] ONLY FOOLS would argue against the principle of equality of all citizens before law. But it would take bigger ones to fail to see that elected members of the National Assembly, or even provincial assemblies, have certain privileges endowed by law. Mr. Asif Ali Zardari is under detention, ostensibly because he is the accused in what looks like an interminable chain of criminal cases in a number of special courts. Several of these have been discharged by these *special* courts, acquitting the accused Mr. Zardari. It is hardly any use counting how many bail applications moved on behalf of the accused have been rejected or are awaiting decision (or possible rejection). Lately, a court expressed inability to hear a plea for bail because the honourable judge said he was suffering from 'ulcer.' Fortunately ulcer is a minor malady and we are sure his honour will soon be able to hear the bail petition. What is most important is that upon the court's decision depends the freedom of an honourable citizen and member of the National Assembly.

Mr. Zardari is becoming perhaps the most acquitted accused in the history of this country. He is involved in so many cases pending before so many special courts. He has also been acquitted in each case which has finally been disposed of so far by the special court concerned. Mr. Zardari is an elected member of the country's sovereign law-making body. He is a man of high social and political status with very high family connections—hardly the sort of non-entity who cannot be trusted to be in a position to fulfil and honour conditions on which he may be bailed out. He has already spent nearly two years in detention. Of course, the final word is with the honourable courts. But the public cannot be expected to be deadwood unable to react in its own honest and human way to a situation which has few parallels, if any.

The question agitating millions of minds is whether Mr. Zardari is really not being used by the government as a bargaining counter in the larger game of politics. The government might like to give a thought to the general feeling that at least in respect of cases discharged by the courts already, Mr. Zardari has been innocent and the punishment endured by him so far has been incompatible with the principles of poetic justice.

Scholar Said Arrested Without Warrant or Cause
93AS0187B Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 21 Oct 92 pp 10-11

[Article by Inayatullah: "Dr. Khan and His Work"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The well-known scholar and pioneer of several social work programmes, Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, was arrested at 1 am on the night of 1st October by a person, calling himself an army captain and accompanied by a dozen policemen, without producing a warrant.

Dr. Khan was not informed of the reason for his arrest and was taken to the police station. The police surrounded the whole plaza in which the apartment of this 78-year-old servant of the poor was located. This was an unnecessary show of force, as Dr. Khan was confined to bed with serious heart ailment and was physically incapable of absconding, even if he wanted to do so against his conviction. This is the second time that Dr. Khan has been illegally arrested within the span of one year.

Dr. Khan is being tormented due to the machinations and on the instigation of a certain Afzal Mubeen, a former subordinate of Dr. Khan, earlier removed from his job on charges of corruption. The charges against him involved some remarks he is alleged to have made in an interview and reproduced by the weekly TAKBEER. He was accused of insulting the Prophet (PBUH) [Peace Be Upon Him], a charge Dr. Khan categorically denies.

When this charge did not lead to incarceration of Dr. Khan, Afzal Mubeen dug up a nursery rhyme written by Dr. Khan and published by Oxford University Press. It was interpreted to be insulting to the Prophet (PBUH) and Hazrat Ali (RA)—an insinuation which Dr. Khan contends was far from his mind. Afzal Mubeen secured *fatwas* of *kufr* against Dr. Khan and the courts were approached to try him for blasphemy. Dr. Khan's explanation convinced many of the *fatwa* issuing persons that no blasphemy was intended and the *fatwas* were withdrawn.

The allegations against Dr. Khan have been adequately discussed by the media, particularly the NEWSLINE and THE HERALD in their issues of April, 1992. Here, an attempt will be made to provide a short introduction to the man and his work to raise public awareness of the wrongs being done to this great man.

Born in Meerut, Dr. Khan was one of the few Muslims who got into the Indian Civil Service in 30s and then did something unbelievable. He resigned from that highly coveted service to opt for a life of piety and service to humanity, though even during his career as a civil servant he had

devoted all his energies to serving the poor masses of Bengal, where he was posted. A Bengali peasant had as good a chance of meeting this unusual district officer as a big landlord or rich trader.

After discarding the glory and power that ICS officers enjoyed, he chose to become a locksmith—an ordinary locksmith and went through an arduous apprenticeship to learn his new profession. But he soon discovered that as a locksmith, he could not earn enough to satisfy his “addiction” for knowledge and books. So he gave up the job of locksmith and went to join that unique institution in Delhi—Jamia-e-Millia where distinguished scholars of India worked as teachers on a pay of only Rs [Rupees] 50 per month. After Partition, he moved to his beloved East Bengal and became the principal of a local college at Comilla with a nominal pay a considerable part of which went to support the poor students. At this stage, Dr. Khan was made the director of Village AID in view of his considerable interest in improving the lot of the rural poor. He refused to accept any salary though after considerable hesitation, he accepted a token salary of Re. 1 to accommodate the demand of the federal bureaucracy, which could entrust him with the job of directorship only if he was shown to be a government servant in their documents.

After some time in mid-50s came the offer to head the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, which was to be located at Dacca with a salary of Rs. 3000, Dr. Khan accepted the offer subject to two conditions. A rural development academy, he insisted, should be located at Comilla in rural environment, not in urban Dacca, and that he should accept the pay of Rs. 1500 which, he said, was enough to meet his and his family's needs. The government, after some hesitation, met the two conditions.

Dr. Khan confronted a major crisis at the very start of the academy. The Federal Board of Governors of the Academy suspended its budget, arguing that by starting an experimental area in the surroundings of Comilla, Dr. Khan had deviated from the mandate of the Academy to train officials for rural development. Dr. Khan successfully resolved the crisis by convincing the then military rulers that direct knowledge of rural conditions and experimentation with new approaches was necessary to promote rural development.

Once this challenge was successfully met, Dr. Khan's work became known both nationally and internationally. After a visit to Comilla, Ayub Khan came back highly impressed and assured all support for Dr. Khan's work. Soon honours and awards started flooding the Khan, including Magsaysay Award from Philippines and Sitara-e-Imtiaz from the Pakistan government. Numerous articles in international professional journals analysed and praised the Comilla experiment. Many national and international scholars and development experts got convinced that innovative approach to rural development evolved by Dr. Khan with his creative mind and hard work was a significant breakthrough. The rural poor of Comilla district, whose economic conditions and cultural outlook was undergoing visible change for the better, were all out to cooperate and prove the soundness of Dr. Khan's approach.

The tragedy of East Pakistan forced Dr. Khan to undergo his second migration. He decided to settle in Karachi. Soon the Director of Pakistan Academy for Rural Development in Peshawar, Shoaib Sultan Khan, offered him to become an adviser to the academy and experiment there the approach developed in Comilla. The result was the Daudzai project initiated on Dr. Khan's advice.

In a short time, the project became known nationally and internationally. The international aid donors started swarming the academy, eager to provide needed help to the new project. But its success hurt the provincial bureaucracy and the local feudals, ultimately forcing Dr. Khan to abandon his project.

The Michigan State University of U.S.A.—which had already conferred on Akhtar Hameed Khan an honorary degree of Ph.D, found a chance to invite him to the university to become a visiting professor. Dr. Khan taught at the university for about four years, where his classes were always crowded.

This western university of a supposedly materialist country was more keen to learn from this sufi, a courageous non-conformist suffused with idealism and wisdom earned through long years of service to his people than the pretentious rulers and bureaucrats of Dr. Khan's own country.

When an ageing Dr. Khan returned to Karachi from U.S.A., his decision to spend the years of his life in reflective retirement was overridden by his urge to serve the suffering slum-dwellers of Karachi. The well-known Orangi Project was born. Dr. Khan creatively applied to urban slums the approach he had developed in villages of Comilla. From his ageing body sprang the gushes of energy of a young man to improve the sickening conditions of slum-dwellers, giving them a new hope.

An additional bright side of the working of the project was that the women of Orangi got a new self-confidence, a new social awareness and a new status in a male-dominated society. When ethnic hatred shattered the peace of the other slums in Karachi, the multi-ethnic Orangi could still maintain a degree of tranquillity. In short time, Orangi project became known all over the world. The lessons learned in urban Orangi, combined with insights from rural Comilla, started shaping a new experiment—Aga Khan Rural Support Programme—in the Northern Areas of Pakistan.

Dr. Khan's fame and success in making Orangi slum-dwellers self-reliant and immune to exploitation disturbed some local bureaucrats—contractors, and bigoted defenders of the faith. Their malice was further fanned, as noted above, by Afzal Mubeen. Threatened material interests, ignorance of the values of religion and wounded pride coalesced and invoke some oppressive laws of Pakistan to punish Dr. Khan in the garb of protecting religion.

A man, who has left an indelible mark on history and who would inspire future generations of Pakistan for his service to the poor, is being hounded for last several years by a single ill-motivated individual. He is being forced to go from one court to the other, from one province to the other,

applying for bails before arrest and finally ending up in police confinement without lawful authority.

Is there anyone with authority who can ensure peace of mind to ailing and ageing Dr. Khan and deploy the police for apprehending the true criminals in this case?

Social Degeneration Seen in Balochistan

93AS0187C Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 20 Oct 92 p 10

[Editorial: "Tribal Degeneration in Balochistan"; italicized words as published]

[Text] The demands made by the abductors of the Chinese experts in Balochistan have revealed that they resorted to kidnapping in order to settle an ongoing blood feud with their opponent clan within the Achakzai tribe in Gulistan sub-division. The captors have not asked for ransom, but the arrest of the alleged murderers of a prominent leader of Ghaibzai clan, release of their arrested clan members, compensation and restoration of property destroyed or occupied by their opponent clan, Hamidzai. They have named the chief of Pakhtoonkhwa Mili Awami Party (PKMAP), Mehmood Khan Achakzai, provincial minister of agriculture Hamid Khan Achakzai and a 'risaldar' of Musa Jan Levies for having killed Haji Khan Ghaibzai along with his two sons. Although the government has involved the chief of Ghaibzais and has approached the governor of Qandhar to mediate in the release of the hostages, it would be difficult to accommodate all the demands of kidnapers. The fragile and hard-pressed provincial government of Jamali is not in a position to exert sufficient pressure on one of its allies, the PKMAP, to get at least two demands of the culprits, pertaining to their property, accepted. But even that may not help unless the authorities adopt strict measures against the abductors with the help of the Afghan government.

The clan conflict between Ghaibzais and Hamidzais has become intense after the latter were forcibly evicted by the former from Gulistan city, following a chain of assassinations on both sides in the last two years. The vendetta between them has so far resulted in more than 70 casualties. The internecine conflict between them, however, reflects further disintegration of the tribal society on a general scale in Balochistan. Instead of assimilating into a broader social affinity of nationality by outliving their tribal exclusivity, most of the Baloch and Pushtoon tribes are degenerating into clans and sub-clans. Now, various sub-tribes and clans of the Bugtis, the Marris, the Raisanis, the Magsis, the Zehris and others among the Baloch; the Achakzais, the Kakars, Baizais and other major tribes among the Pushtoons are at loggerheads with one another. Since the transition towards social evolution had been hampered by many factors, the dissolution of tribal form of social organisation would reinforce anarchy instead of cohesion. Infiltration of various Afghan mujahideen groups and the rise of ethnic conflict between Baloch and Pushtoons have played havoc with a normal ethnological process. Moreover, arms and drugs have become so widespread that every sub-tribe can assert itself vis-a-vis its rival within the tribe. What else

could have been more instrumental than this ethnic degeneration to serve the designs of certain agencies to erode not only the solidarity between the Baloch and the Pushtoons, but also the social base of each nationalist leader in his respective tribe? Can the provincial government allow the *jirga*, backed by the ministerial commission formed earlier to secure the release of the Chinese, on the one hand, and mediate reconciliation among the Achakzais on the other?

Intolerance Within Society Said Increasing

93AS0191A Lahore THE NATION in English
6 Nov 92 p 7

[Article by Abbas Rashid: "Institutionalised Intolerance and the Concerned Citizen"; quotation marks and italicized words as published]

[Text] A recent seminar organised by JUST (The Movement for Justice and Social Tolerance) on the theme of growing intolerance in our society seemed a rather timely affair coming as it did soon after the government's decision to include a column for religion in the National Identity Card and yet another round of harassment of the widely respected and aged social worker Akhtar Hameed Khan. The speakers panel included Mr Hamid Khan, President, Lahore High Court Bar Association [LHCBA], Mr K. K. Aziz, the well-known historian and Dr Eqbal Ahmad, an outstanding political analyst and educationist.

Clearly one of the reasons for the growing intolerance in our midst is the undermining particularly of those institutions that uphold the norms of civilised behaviour which societies adhere to. How this has taken place with respect to the crucial institution of the judiciary was well brought out by Hamid Khan in the course of his presentation. The Federal Shariat Court [FSC] created by Gen Ziaul Haq as a part of his drive for, ostensibly, Islamising Pakistan has become a kind of parallel judiciary. Hamid Khan mentioned the FSC ruling in 1981 to the effect that there was nothing Islamic about *Rajam*, the punishment of death by stoning, and its subsequent reversal. The ruling, contrary to the government's position, had resulted, promptly, in a Presidential Order empowering the FSC to review its own judgments. The court was also reconstituted and the FSC reviewed its earlier decision in 1982. At another level the LHCBA President brought up the issue of the intellectual dishonesty of those who should be in the business of setting standards of fairness. He accused Justice Tanzeelur Rehman of the FSC of plagiarism, alleging that the judge had copied nearly half of the book on Muslim Personal Laws authored by an Indian, in the course of writing his own book. The FSC rulings on the law of pre-emption and land reforms are not likely to help the cause of equity, though in the interest of not rocking the boat there has only been limited implementation of these. But, as Hamid Khan pointed out, it is the ruling on Riba that the government sees as a major problem. Initially fiscal laws and other related matters were specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court albeit for a limited period of ten years. This period having expired in 1990 the FSC gave a ruling holding 'riba' (interpreted as interest) to be un-Islamic—putting the government in a difficult spot and encouraging stalwarts from

within the ruling party to suddenly rediscover the merits of not letting the *mullas* define Islam for us. It is instructive that these same gentlemen have had very little to say about the Haddood Ordinances, for instance, under which women and minorities have suffered, particularly. Such a selective and often self-serving response to steps that are discriminatory and repressive, in whatever idiom these may be couched, is one of the key reasons for the rise of politico-religious forces in our midst. Even more than that it is the propensity of the liberal power elite to use Islam for their own ends, whenever the opportunity arises, that has made religion such a freely employed weapon in the political arena.

Prof K. K. Aziz made some very interesting points regarding our inability as a people to organise ourselves either into a civilised, 'rooted' society or a well run modern state. Pakistan, he contends, as indeed some others have done, got off to a dubious start. Almost simultaneously with Partition and its extreme suffering and privation for the many came the stampede after evacuee property and the 'grab' culture took hold. In this context he made a perceptive comment. In my time, he said, those who were dishonest were socially boycotted but how, he asked, can you boycott the dishonest when they are your elite? Certainly that would take a lot more doing. And as we see today it is clearly not happening. Another point he made that applies more particularly again to the elite was the absence of a well worked out concept of what kind of a state Pakistan was going to be, let alone how they were going to go about making it an actuality. Pakistan, he observed, got independence on the cheap and the time for the gestation of the ideas of Pakistan was far too short. This is of course something to think about but one can also make too much of it. Most anti-colonial movements were just that. Most had not worked out the nuts and bolts of the nation-state they were seeking to develop after independence. In a sense what they got were state-nations rather than nation-states with relatively well-developed instruments of state power such as the military and civil bureaucracy, but an underdeveloped nation in the sense that the people who made it up did not often share the attributes of a community knit together by ties of culture, history and language, or even of trade and commerce within the territory that defined the new state. What was needed then, after independence, was not so much to build up the state but the nation. Instead the very fact of a new state having been wrested from the hold of the colonial power was taken as self-evident proof of the existence of a vibrant and unified nation that could be treated as a given, i.e., taken for granted. A bad mistake that, as we learn to our cost in 1971. But did we? As Prof Aziz rightly pointed out even the fall of East Pakistan failed to shake up the rest of us in the Western wing. He put it down to the fatalism that informs our character as a people. Perhaps its just that the people of the two wings never became a community in any real sense. Certainly the short-sighted elite that ruled often in undemocratic ways, for the greater part of the period of united Pakistan never felt the need to strengthen the people-to-people ties. And so when India intervened in 1971 the Bengalis were not inclined to resist. The Indian intervention also provided our rulers with the opportunity to focus on

this aspect exclusively, conveniently ignoring the contemptuous and shameful manner in which we had ignored the cultural, political and economic claims of the majority from 1947 to 1971.

Dr Eqbal Ahmad in his lucid and closely argued presentation related the rise of intolerance in our society to the manner in which Islam had been opportunistically employed in the service of politics and the breaking down of civilisational and societal links. Intolerance at some level he said exists in every society but it becomes a matter of grave concern when it crosses the boundaries of civil society and becomes institutionalised in state power. In a formal sense this 'crossing' had not occurred till 1974 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government declared the Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority. Ziaul Haq, of course, took full advantage of the opening so provided by exploiting Islam to the fullest in legitimising his regime and the pursuit of undiluted power at the expense of civil society. From a tolerant and humanist religion, Eqbal Ahmad said, Islam had been reduced by Zia and his legatees to a narrow penal code with hardly a trace of *Taqva* or *Tassavuf*. It has all been reduced to *Tazeer*. Illustrating his point he spoke of the ordeal of Akhtar Hameed Khan who had become, despite his decades of service to the cause of the poor and dispossessed of his country, the victim of a deliberate campaign of harassment by an individual using the blasphemy laws for his own personal ends. These laws, in any case, he said, did not derive from the Islamic tradition but were amendments to the colonial penal code. In the absence of a modernist Muslim response, the vacuum was being filled by those whose view of Islam was myopic and who consistently used it to divide and exclude. On the other hand an amoral individualism had replaced whatever collective vision we may have started with. Manifestations of a splintered society were everywhere, with a widening gulf for instance between the Westernised and the non-Westernised, the elite and the non-elite, the leaders and the led. At the heart of this process of delinking lay the crisis in education. For when an education system breaks down, he pointed out, you stop producing educated people who have links with the country's politics, culture and society. For us it is a point well worth considering as an increasing number of those who can send their children abroad for education are doing so at a much earlier stage than was the case ten to fifteen years ago. This was in any case indicative, Eqbal Ahmad said, of how completely our own system of education had broken down. It was certainly bad enough, he said, for someone like him, rather fond of being on the move, to stay put in Pakistan and try and set up an educational institution. That is indeed a welcome undertaking and it is fitting that a man of his calibre and experience should do so. Meanwhile, we have any number of colleges and universities where increasingly less is taught and the ranks of those singularly ill-equipped to deal with the modern world, swells. But perhaps the 'vanguard' position is occupied by the Islamic University in Islamabad. To call such universities medieval, Dr Eqbal said, in what the audience initially took to be an attempt at humour, was an insult to medieval universities. The syllabi of universities like Al-Azhar, he pointed out, that many centuries ago, was much more broad-based and enlightened

than what we have today for instance at the Islamic University in the closing years of the 20th century. Certainly it helps to understand the kind of society we have ended up with. But where does one go from here? Dr Eqbal's advice was to organise to register one's protest as well as in a more positive sense to effect change. Mr Hamid Khan welcomed the development whereby those who had stayed aloof as society was in the process of falling apart, even though they took the most from it, were now showing an interest in finding ways to resolve the crisis.

The JUST resolution unanimously passed by the large and involved audience at the end of the session demanded the withdrawal of the religion column in the National ID Card, condemned the misuse of blasphemy laws against citizens such as Akhtar Hameed Khan and noted that institutions such as the Federal Shariat Court had been used to undermine the role of the legislature and disproportionately strengthen the hands of the Executive.

Postscript: Maybe there is some hope after all. A few days ago there were reports in the Press that all charges against Akhtar Hameed Khan are to be dropped on the instructions of the Prime Minister. But it should not stop at this. The laws that were used against him have been used against many others, often poor people who are virtually defenceless. Such unjust laws must go. JUST and other similar groups in Islamabad and Karachi that took up the cause of Akhtar Hameed Khan should keep the pressure on.

College Degrees Reportedly Sold on Open Market *93AS01861 Karachi DAWN in English 27 Oct 92 pp 7-8*

[Article by Adnan Ahmed Mufti: "The Angry Young Man"]

[Text] The youth are the symbol of strength and stability, both of our country and society. They have to play an important role in bringing about a change in the society. It is their responsibility to work collectively to bring a worthwhile change in the social set-up.

Youth have always played a major role in social and political movements. There is a splendid and terrific chapter of struggle by our youth, particularly by students, in our history. For example the student movement at the Aligarh University for the establishment of Pakistan. Even after the establishment of Pakistan, the youth have played a major role in the struggle for democracy and against dictatorship.

But even after writing such golden chapters of our history, today a student faces disappointment, strain, frustration and political victimisation everywhere around him. The question is, why are such circumstances created where various forces seem determined to push the students against the wall.

A nation's future is in the hands of the youth and only that nation makes progress whose citizens are educated. Unfortunately, our educational standard is extremely low and is sadly fast declining.

The foremost reason behind this declining standard of education is massive cheating. This is the biggest crisis faced by today's devoted students. We seem to be very worried over the increasing trend of cheating but, nobody among us

has ever tried to solve this problem. Even after 45 years of creation of Pakistan, we are unable and helpless to uproot this venom.

Through unfair means candidates not even knowing the entire syllabus pass the examination with "flying colours"—distracting the devoted ones. They have all the means, methods and innovative ways at their disposal, and are not hampered by any one in authority in their unfair designs.

The business of fake documents and artificial degrees was always running smoothly, but now it has turned into an industry. Forged documents industry is producing a remarkable output these days. According to a reputable English daily, forged degrees of Masters of Arts (M.A.) can be obtained from the Urdu Bazaar at a cost of Rs [Rupees] 80 to Rs 100.

The students are disillusioned and disappointed and they see no hope in the future.

Gone are the days, when the educational centres were considered sacred. That was a time when the student union was meant for productive purposes instead of destructive.

When we talk of education, we see bullet politics all around us. Another problem today by the youth relates to the violent conditions at our educational institutions. Today colleges have been changed into armouries. A student union's concept is entirely changed and now the objective ahead of every student union is to suppress the opposing union by hook or by crook. This is an alarming situation as weapons are so easily used in educational centres.

The selfish politicians are responsible for dividing the student community, for their own vested interests. It is, indeed, a great setback that in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, sometimes the students are sacrificed for the prestige of Islam and sometimes for the prosperity of democracy.

Today every problem regarding education creates a minor or major crisis. Even the attitude of a teacher with the students has changed. The status of teachers has been at stake because of the changing attitude of some of the teachers.

Admitted that today's student is not as obedient and cultured as he used to be say, 20 years back. A teacher does not get the respect he deserves, but that does not condone his attitude towards the students.

Some years ago, one could walk into an affectionate teacher's house at anytime of the day or night to have one's difficulty solved and if it was meal time, the teacher's spouse would gladly invite you to eat. But today while there is over-crowding in the educational institutions, the teachers take marginal interest in the students because they are running their own private tuition establishments to which the students are invited. Pick up any newspaper and you will come across a large list of tutors and tutorial classes which offer their services to teach from class 1 to Masters level. Unfortunately, today some teachers have started marketing teaching instead of imparting it.

This is a problem for a sincere student as the system of private tuitions diminishes the self-confidence of the pupil and destroys the curiosity, the inherent knowledge and learning.

The second issue relates to the illegal activities of some members of this profession. I am an eye witness to a case where the principal of a known college was offered an amount of money as "donation" for the college (normally amounting to between Rs 10,000 to Rs 50,000) and afterwards this donation was credited in the principal's personal account. As a reciprocal gesture, the principal granted admission to B and C grade holders in his reputed institution.

Then, there were some cases last year regarding teacher's personal involvement in cheating. Sometimes high amounts of money were received and sometimes "the man in command" pressurised them. Cases have been reported where evidently the seals had been tampered with. This can only be done with the connivance of educational authorities, i.e., teachers and principals.

One can imagine how much discouragement and unfairness our youth face the government itself is not preventing such illegal practices.

Another issue which attracts our attention relates to the present standard of education—which is extremely low. One of the reasons behind this is that we are short of good institutions. By reasonable and respectable institutions, I mean that educational colleges, polytechnic and universities should be rated according to their academic standard. It is our backwardness that in our country very few centres of education are reputed and have some standard. College shortage and the quota system has badly affected our students.

In our present set-up there are very few institutions whose degree's marketability hasn't declined yet and they are accepted by foreign universities too. No doubt, we lack remarkable education centres mainly because of the violence in our colleges and universities. This crises has really broken the backbone of both, the education system and the student.

The problems faced by the youth are so complicated that they cannot be solved soon. But if we all resolve to face and solve the problem we would soon succeed.

The student of today is facing an identity crisis as merit is no more the key. There is no one to teach our youngsters the right way of life—neither parents nor teachers, neither society nor media. But they are full of vitality and anticipation. They are to be motivated and this can only be done by trying to understand their problems. Khalil Jibraan said: "Pity the nation that raises not its voice and whose sages are dumb with years."

Feudal Mentality Said Prevalent in Urban Areas *93AS0186J Karachi DAWN in English 27 Oct 92 p 15*

[Article by Iqbal Jafar: "Feudal-Agrarian Culture"; quotation marks and italicized words as published]

[Text] It is an accepted tenet of conventional wisdom that most of our political and social ills have been caused and sustained by feudal mentality that exercises a political

stranglehold on our society through individuals, representing about a thousand families of landowners, who are supposed to be the repositories of that mentality.

This socio-political perception is too simplistic and personalised inasmuch as it is focused merely on the tip of a far larger and deeper social iceberg. The so-called 'feudal mentality' may have its more prominent practitioners—prominent not because of their mentality but for other reasons—but it is a far more pervasive phenomenon than we are prepared to admit.

First, the feudal mentality is only one aspect of a culture that could be called feudal-agrarian culture. That culture consists of two distinguishable but inseparable elements: the feudal and the agrarian. In the process of social evolution, the feudal values, that are not entirely agrarian, and the agrarian process, that is not entirely feudal, have merged to produce a single culture—the feudal-agrarian culture.

To illustrate, the hierarchical-authoritarian social order, associated with the feudal system, is not a product of agrarian compulsions but of the state structure based on the concept of kingdom. Similarly, fatalistic view of life, associated with the agrarian societies, is not a product of the feudal system, but grows out of the feeling of helplessness before the forces of nature. But both elements—hierarchical-authoritarian social order and fatalism—despite their separate and independent origins, do characterise the same culture.

Second, the feudal values are not a part of the mindset of only those who have a dominant position in society. Those who accept these values without question are as much the prisoners of the system as those who enforce them without question. A peasant is as much a believer in feudal values as the landowner, for both are part of the same system.

Third, we have to recognise the fact that social values and modes of behaviour that have evolved over a period of many centuries, involving hundreds of generations, cannot become inoperative within three or four generations by change of locals or of profession. One cannot be sure, for example, that all traces of the feudal culture have been erased from the social order of even the leading industrial societies of Europe. No wonder that the feudal mentality is alive and well in our urban centres, too, disclaimers notwithstanding.

This is evident from the way some of the big business houses and government offices operate, and the way the hierarchical social order is accorded recognition in such ways as VIP lounges at airports and graded chairs for important and unimportant invitees at social gatherings. In the social interaction of even the fourth and fifth generation urbanites lineage, a matter of major consideration in a feudal society, is of as much consequence as in remote villages.

If all that is not enough, consider the urban tribes and clans, for tribe and clan-like identification, concealed under more literate denominations, are of as much significance in urban centres as in rural areas. A glance at any list of housing societies or welfare organisations would confirm this. Also, the concept of 'good family' is as relevant in cities as in

villages. In an otherwise competitive urban society, a bright and brilliant son of a barber would be beaten at the post by an upper-class dimwit as surely in Karachi as, say, in Tando Bago.

It seems, therefore, that the vast majority of the urban population remains captive of the feudal-agrarian culture even after third or fourth generation of urban living, and true urbanites may not constitute more than five per cent of the population. There is good reason to conclude, therefore, that the feudal agrarian culture is our *national* culture.

Having come thus far, we may ask the question: what kind of mindset does the feudal-agrarian culture create? Well, it creates a mindset that has seven major elements: instinctive acceptance of hierarchical-authoritarian social order; perception of society as divided into tribes, clans, and similar other racial or sub-racial classes; tendency to confer social privileges and honours on the basis of lineage; compulsive desire for the ownership of land, and feeling of insecurity without it; fatalistic view of life; and innate, though unconscious, reluctance to measure time in hours and minutes rather than morning, evening, noon and night; and a disposition to short time-span of planning activity.

Of the seven elements, the first six are operative in too obvious a manner to need elaboration. The last (short time-span of planning activity) is, perhaps, an unfamiliar concept, and needs some explanation. It is something like this: in an agrarian society the most natural time-span for planning activity is a period of three months—the time-span of a season—where all energies are geared to a season-related activity. This is a most meaningful time-span for a farmer.

For an industrialist, on the other hand, a meaningful time-span could be anything from five years to a decade or more. An economist talking about the patterns of international trade 10 years hence would, for example, be heard with rapt attention by an audience of businessmen, while an agronomist talking about crop patterns ten years hence, would be heard with least interest and much amusement by most of the farmers.

It stands to reason that, living in an all-pervasive feudal-agrarian culture, our thought process, as a nation, is that of a farmer to whom the period of three months sounds so natural and convenient (curiously enough, the Constitution of Pakistan refers to the period of three months or 90 days at 14 different places in relation to 12 different situations). Consequently, any time-span that is longer than three or four months reduces our interest in the same proportion as the proportion in which it exceeds that period.

That, perhaps, is one reason why we, as a nation, have never felt concerned about such consequences of an action as could materialise after one or two years, not to speak of a decade or two. This is as good an explanation of our collective shortsightedness as any.

Thus, we in Pakistan, as others living in similar societies elsewhere, are placed in a situation where we are trying to jump the queue by trying to create a democratic-egalitarian social order in a feudal-agrarian culture *before* having created an industrial society.

Some societies have had the chance of being led by 'freaks' who managed to make good their escape, as if in a time machine, from the cultural confinement that begins at the moment of birth. We have had no such freaks, for we, if you please, are normal, healthy, pragmatic people, at peace with our environment.