


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3 December 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

***PAKISTAN***

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# Near East & South Asia

## PAKISTAN

JPRS-NEA-92-161

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3 December 1992

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## International Affairs

### U.S. Access to National Assembly Condemned

93AS0185B Lahore THE NATION in English  
21 Oct 92 p 5

[Text] Multan—The general body of High Court Bar Association, Multan which met here on Monday with Sheikh Muhammad Naeem Gorija, President Bar in the chair through a unanimous resolution condemned US-Pak agreement to install computer system in the National Assembly, Senate and four Provincial Assemblies under USAID programme and termed the act of the government contrary to national interest.

Under the agreement it would be the responsibility of USAID Department to record the proceeding of all parliamentary institutions and as a return the United States would provide economic aid to Pakistan, it added.

The general body of the Bar maintained that the government should not have allowed the United States to get access to the Parliamentary Institutions of the country when it knew that she had suspended Pakistan's military and economic aid opposing its nuclear programme and threatening it on Kashmir and East Punjab situation. It demanded for invalidation of the agreement forthwith and urged the political parties and lawyers community to play their due role in this regard.

### Brigadier Alleges Mistreatment While in U.S. Custody

93AS0180A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 19 Oct 92  
p 1

[News Story: "U.S. Offered To Release Me in Exchange for Providing Information on Pakistani Nuclear Program"]

[Text] Lahore (by correspondent)—Mr. Inamul Haq, a Pakistani brigadier who has a case against him in the United States for trying to smuggle special metal for the nuclear plant, said that the United States offered to free him provided he gave information about the Pakistani nuclear program. The United States also inquired about the nuclear collaboration among Pakistan-Iran, Pakistan-China, and Iran-China. They also asked him about how much help the BCCI [Bank of Credit and Commerce International] had provided to the Pakistani nuclear program. Brigadier Inamul Haq further said that he was warned that if he did not provide this information, he might be jailed for 15 years and fined \$750,000. "I refused this offer and declared that I had not committed any crime." The Pakistani brigadier disclosed this during his first press conference after returning from the United States of America. Inamul Haq arrived in Pakistan on October 5 and called a press conference on 17 October at his residence in Gulbarg. He said that he was accused of three crimes namely committing a fraud against the U.S. Government, providing erroneous figures and information, and endangering U.S. safety and security. On 22 September 1992, the United States dismissed the accusation against him of endangering the

U.S. security. The time he spent in the jail was considered enough punishment for other crimes he had been accused of. "I was asked to pay a \$10,000 fine, never to do business with any U.S. company or organization, never to break any U.S. laws, and to leave the United States for good. I was to be under house arrest until I left the country." Inamul Haq said that he had filed an appeal against this decision by the U.S. court. "If I am acquitted of all these, I will file for damages." He said that he was jailed for carrying out a legitimate business and he was treated this way just because he was a Pakistani national. Perhaps the U.S. Government wanted to put pressure on the Pakistani Government; however, he is not aware of what kind of pressure this was.

Brigadier Inamul Haq said that in 1980, on retirement from Pakistani military, he established a multinational incorporated export and import company. In 1986, his company made contacts to import "Merging Steel 350." This metal is commonly used in the automotive and many other industries. "I learned that according to U.S. laws, this metal cannot be exported directly. The U.S. firm, A.P. Enterprises, told me that this metal can be exported to Canada and then be sent to Pakistan. Later I was told that this firm had obtained a license to directly export it to Pakistan. It was the responsibility of this firm to get the permission to export this metal out of the United States. The U.S. firm demanded that a certificate should be sent by an official organization informing them where that metal was to be used. I obtained and sent a certificated issued by the Pakistan Council of Scientific Research. Finally I opened a credit line in the name of A.P. Enterprises. Meanwhile the license obtained in the United States expired. Later, Arshad Parvez succeeded in getting another export license and sent me a copy in 1987 and I opened the line of credit again. This metal was to be sent in July 1987, however, Arshad Parvez was arrested in Philadelphia on 10 July 1987. He was sentenced to five years in prison, however, this term was reduced to 32 months after an appeal. I was declared a partner in that crime. I was in Pakistan at that time and no action was taken against me. Arshad Parvez returned to Pakistan in March 1991. He told me that all the accusations against him proved to be false and the case against him was dismissed. He had filed a case against the U.S. Government for damages. On this information from Arshad Parvez, I left for Germany on business and was arrested in Frankfurt on 11 July 1991. I had several mango boxes with me and I was worried if someone had put heroin in them.

"I was pushed into a small room at the airport and was told that my name was registered with the Interpol [International Criminal Police Organization] in connection with the smuggling of metal for nuclear programs in Pakistan. I was kept in a jail at Frankfurt and was allowed to go out only one hour for exercise. The attitude of the jailers was very insulting. On 29 January 1992, I was sent to Philadelphia with in handcuffs on an American airplane. U.S. police officials told me that they had orders to put shackles on my legs, however, they only

handcuffed me. I was presented to a court in Philadelphia and was accused of three crimes. I pleaded not guilty to all of them. I was put in a federal prison and a case against me was started on 29 June and ended on 7 July." Brigadier Inamul Haq said in answer to some questions that his lawyer Mr. William M. Kunstler played an important role in getting him acquitted. "The Pakistani diplomats in Germany, London, and the United States helped me a lot. The U.S. courts have taken the stand that Merging Steel 305 is used in nuclear weapons only. However, Mr. Kunstler, my lawyer, proved that this metal is used in many other industries. Being jailed is not a big deal for a military officer. I had taken part in the 1965 and 1971 wars. I am very thankful to the Pakistani Government and am not upset for being jailed. As a military man, I considered it to be an honor." When Brigadier Inamul Haq was asked about his plans for the future, he proudly replied that a soldier is always a soldier.

### Security Council Membership Seen Mixed Blessing

93AS0186A Lahore THE NATION in English 4 Nov 92  
p 6

[Article by Muzaffar Ali Syed: "Our Membership of the Security Council"]

[Text] The news that Pakistan was elected to replace India as one of the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with effect from the first of January, 1993 for a two-year term, has been editorially commented upon in the local Press as "timely" and possessed of some "special meaning." The opportunity or special significance inherent in the office or attached to it in the current situation, national or international, needs to be examined in some detail before celebrating the event as a major diplomatic achievement attributable to the present regime or the structural format of the Foreign Office. It was, no doubt, rather puerile on the part of some Press persons to rush to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to hear from the horse's mouth what concrete advantages would this election provide in pressing the Kashmir issue at the United Nations. One could almost see them pulling long faces that this membership by itself is not likely to build up any automatic pressure on the world community to do its duty already overdue by more than four decades of current history.

History being not a favourite subject of study anywhere in the country, including the government departments and newspaper offices, the over-enthusiastic jubilants had to be reminded that a similar honour had been conferred on the country no less than four times earlier in the forty-five years of its history. Pakistan has been a member of the self-same agency of the U.N. in 1952-53, 1968-69, 1976-77 and again in 1983-84. That means once during Khwaja Nazimuddin's Prime Ministership, once during the last years of the Ayub era, once during the declining glory of the Bhutto interregnum and another time during the military stewardship of General

Ziaul Haq. One may conclude whatever one likes from these coincidences but it would be difficult to assume, after knowing this background that the U.N.S.C. has a direct relationship with the strength of the administration in control of the nation at any given time. If anything, the recurring coincidence seems to draw a pattern of irrelevance between the national and the international status accorded to a contemporaneous regime.

Far be it from the present scribe to underrate the highly prestigious designation of an elected member of the U.N.S.C. In a way, it may be considered more important than being a Permanent Member who is there, by virtue of having been on the winning side during the Second World War after which the United Nations was brought into being as an international outfit with the wartime allies granted a privileged position over the rest of the world. It was as if they had not won only the war but the whole world along with it. The special powers of rejecting any resolution which may remotely go against the interests, liking or sweet will anyone of these "Big Five," were granted to them by themselves in the United Nations Charter. The other forty-five nations who were prevailed upon to sign the document in the name of world peace either did not fully appreciate the implications of this "veto power" or knew they had no other choice except to agree.

The expansion of the United Nations to its present membership of 178 nations of the world has made the Security Council a kind of "international feudalist club" in which elected members come and go for a couple of years while the non-elected members with their "hereditary powers" transferable to the "successor states" remain in full control of the club affairs. There was a succession suit about who should replace the wartime China in the U.N.S.C. after the country had split in two parts, the mainland and a tiny island. The world body kept the mainland out for more than a decade and Taiwan was taken to mean the whole of China; it was like the Isle of Man standing for the entire Britain or Britain itself representing the whole Continent of Europe.

Another time, as recently as 1990, when the Soviet Union broke up into a large number of independent states, with some of them regrouping into a Commonwealth, there was no dispute about succession. There were two choices before the U.N.S.C., either to abolish the Soviet Union's seat and let its breakaway states come in again as ordinary members of the General Assembly, or to accept its major chunk—the Commonwealth of Independent States—as successor to the Soviet Union in the U.N.S.C. This, however, would have led either to the further restriction of veto or to the general abolition of this privilege altogether. So, the Russian Federation of Boris Yeltsin was chosen to function as heirs to the former Soviet Union, making the U.N.S.C. even a more exclusive club. Thus, the most powerful agency of the United Nations may be said to have acquired the status of being the most unrepresentative organisation in the world, after the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Among the "Big Five" of the U.N.S.C., the United States of America occupies the same position as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does in the G.C.C. [Gulf Cooperation Council] Of late, however, murmurs of dissatisfaction have been registered in both, among the not-so-equal partners of the combine. The 108-member Non-Aligned Movement, which met in Jakarta during the first week of September, has called for "democratising the U.N. by abolishing the veto system altogether and by giving a proportionate representation to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But even among the industrially developed nations of the world, there are proposals banded about to admit Germany, if not Japan too, as permanent member of the U.N.S.C. with the avowed aim of making it "more representative." This would expand the base of power to six or seven big powers of the world while some others like India, Brazil and Australia would also aspire to be included on the basis of their size and strength.

Most other countries, however, would like to have the U.N.S.C. restructured along with the lines of regional representation with no unelected members and equal powers for all. The regional formula is already in practice for electing the non-permanent members but the regions have been left undefined to a certain extent. The incoming members—Pakistan, Spain, Djibouti, Brazil and New Zealand—may be said to represent Asia, Europe, Africa, Latin America and South Pacific regions. That is why Pakistan was first nominated by the 41-member Asia Group in the U.N., after the withdrawals of Iran from its candidature for the same seat. But there is an overlap among the continuing members who are about to complete the first half of their two-year tenure. (Five non-permanent members are elected every year.) Of these Hungary stands for Europe, Morocco for Africa, Cape Verde for the Atlantic Islands, which is a new and small category, while Venezuela and Japan are duplicate representatives of Asia and Latin America along with Brazil and Pakistan recently elected in the same category. This is justifiable on the grounds of vast territories and a large number of countries constituting the regions to which they belong.

A further application of the same principle of regional representation distributing all the fifteen (or the projected twenty-five) seats on the basis of sovereign equality of all states, big and small would "democratise" the feudalistic character of the U.N.S.C. At least three of the five big powers are democratic in their national structure of political organisation, while the Russian Federation pays lip-service to it and China is slowly proceeding towards a similar objective. Democracy is spreading fast in East Europe and a number of countries in the Third World which were formerly ruled by one kind of totalitarianism or another. The recent entrants to the path of democracy, howsoever reservedly, are Kuwait and Bahrain, whereas some of the Latin American countries have clearly opted for a representative system of government. Among all this, it would be historically inappropriate for the U.N.S.C. to remain as privilege-ridden as it was nearly half a century back.

The U.N.S.C. has not been made a representative body so far, presumably, because it does not suit the single-most power left in the world which can easily manipulate the other Big.

Four to its own dream of world domination, the way it did to mobilise a multinational force against a single country. The Soviet Union, then extant, dutifully supported the U.S. President while China chose to play a low-profile role. Either of the two could have theoretically obstructed the devastation caused by the Operation Desert Storm by exercising their veto power in the U.N.S.C. for the purpose of finding a peaceful way out of the situation, but they did nothing of the sort.

This should be enough to confirm the absolute uselessness of a structure which can be readily paralysed anytime or manipulated into subjugation whenever required. The U.N.S.C. is now beset with the onerous task of re-establishing its credibility as a neutral force of international opinion which could effectively exercise a peace-making role in a world full of ethnic and religious strife. The efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General and of the entire General Assembly could be conveniently diverted to unfruitful channels by the lop-sided decisions formulated in the U.N.S.C., as has recently become evident during the six rounds of peace parleys on the Middle East or the ineffectual manner in which the Bosnia-Herzegovina situation has been approached.

There is, no doubt, some talk about "reinvigorating the United Nations" even in the American Press. Also, a realisation during the elections that America could not have its own way everywhere in the world. There are serious limitations to the big-power play in the General Assembly which could bring about a radical change in the structure of the U.N.S.C. by amending the U.N. Charter to bring it in line with contemporary realities. What could Pakistan contribute to this process of democratisation in the U.N. would largely depend on how it actually performs in the U.N.S.C. It is a prestigious position, but also a heavy responsibility for which both the Permanent Representative's office at New York and the Foreign Office at Islamabad seem to be inadequately equipped. These have to be strengthened with a kind of staff which could rise above the protocol-oriented level of career diplomats and incompetent lot of redundant politicians kicked abroad. None of these groups, but for very few noble exceptions, could cope with the unprecedented challenges developing at the U.N. Headquarters.

The growing demand for democratising the U.N.S.C. also implies a political as well as economic liberalisation of the entire world organisation. America desires to pass on the U.N.S.C. the highly tricky duty of controlling the nuclear proliferation in the non-Western part of the world. It will make the signing the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] a precondition for receiving any kind of aid from the United Nations, its agencies and consortia of member states. This will mean a great deal of pressure exercise on Pakistan from within the U.N.S.C., making it even more vulnerable than before. So, let us rejoice over

the event as much as we like, without being unmindful of the heavy responsibilities which the membership of U.N.S.C. involves, in the changing configuration of international awareness.

## Regional Affairs

### Relations Between Kashmiri Militant Groups Viewed

#### Hizb Leader Interviewed

93AS0181A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 29 Oct 92 p 18

[Interview with Ghulam Mohammad Safi in Islamabad; date not given]

[Text] Ghulam Mohammed Safi is the chief of Hizb-i Mujahadeen, the largest group of al-Mujaheddin in Kashmir. He worked for the government after earning a B.Sc. degree. However, he quit his position after joining the Tehrik-i Islami (TI), and received education in jihad from the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The TI appointed him a school headmaster. He also worked as a salesman in a store and later sold the TI newspaper AZAN by hawking it around the market. He was a hawker for a while and managed to sell a large number of newspapers. Later, he was appointed the secretary general of the JI of Kashmir. When the jihad campaign began, he received training in a unit battalion and became the chief of Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin. He has been taking a very active part on the diplomatic and political fronts of the jihad campaign. He invited the Muslims in various countries to join the jihad campaign and explained the real meaning of this jihad. He spellbinds people when he speaks and often people start to cry right in his meetings.

Recently, the JASARAT interviewed him at his residence in Dhamial Camp of Rawalpindi and in Islamabad.

[JASARAT] Why and when did you start the jihad?

[Safi] The jihad campaign started in 1947 and we have been preparing the people mentally since then. An Islamic campaign started in Kashmir about 30 years ago and it was part of the international Islamic movement. I provided ideological training to people from all walks of life and prepared them for the jihad. During that time, we also waited for a solution of the Kashmir issue through UN resolutions. We also tested India through the election process. However, three years ago, we came to the conclusion that India only understands the language of weapons, and we started to communicate with it using this language. In this context, we also received guidance from Afghan Mojahedin. The United Nations did not do anything for us during the last 44 years. It implemented its resolutions about Iraq within 40 days, but it never could get its resolutions about Kashmir implemented. The mujahedeen have picked up the weapons now and jihad is the only solution to our problem.

[JASARAT] How much military power does the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin has?

[Safi] Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin is the largest military organization in Jammu and Kashmir. Sixty percent of the total al-Mujaheddin belong to the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and most of them received training in Afghanistan. They fought side-by-side with them against the Russians. They are fighting the Indian troops now. We attack the Indian military installations and India is aware of Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin's importance because of our various activities. We have decided that until the last Indian soldier leaves Kashmir, we will continue jihad. Our young people are very firm in their beliefs and the only thing they know is to fight and live for Islam. They are not ready for any compromise. As the result of the training we have provided them, they will neither bow down nor sell themselves.

[JASARAT] What relations do India and Israel have about Kashmir?

[Safi] Both are old enemies of Islam. We not only have to fight Indian troops but also Israeli commandos in Kashmir. Still, India and Israel do not have the ability to defeat us. We shall, instead disappoint India and its allies in their designs and destroy their dreams of greater Israel and undivided India.

[JASARAT] There were discussions about talks between India and Pakistan over Wooleer Barrage, Siachen, and Kashmir issues. Can the Kashmir issue be resolved by talks?

[Safi] India just wants to buy more time by staging these talks. It wants to convince the United Nations and popular opinion that it is not necessary to take these issues to the United Nations. India wants to convince them that these are minor issues, which we can take care of by sitting down together. That is why I personally believe that these Indian-Pakistani talks are a hoax set up by India. Nothing tangible will result from these talks. We should think, why should Pakistan hold talks with India over Wooleer Barrage? The al-Mujaheddin of Kashmir want to make both Jammu and Kashmir a part of Pakistan and Wooleer Barrage is just a small part of it. Why does the Pakistani Government want to discuss this with the Indian Government? India has no right over Wooleer Barrage, it belongs to us. You will remember that before we started jihad, we blew this barrage with dynamite resulting in loss of millions of to India. Even now, we can easily blow up Wooleer Barrage. They are wasting their time and energy negotiating over Wooleer Barrage and Siachen. All this belongs to you if Kashmir is liberated. You should worry about liberating Kashmir. Wooleer Barrage and Siachen will be yours as part of the package.

[JASARAT] What responsibilities are of the Islamic world in relation to your involvement against India in Kashmir?

[Safi] The Prophet said that the Islamic world is like a body. If one part of the body is injured, the whole body

will feel the pain. Therefore, the Muslim world must cooperate in fighting atrocities committed on the Muslim in any part of the world. It is the duty of the Muslims to help us by totally boycotting India. It has committed so many atrocities in Kashmir that it should be declared a terrorist nation at the international level. All Muslims should join us in the jihad.

### Reconciliation Said Possible

92AS0181B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 24 Oct 92  
p 10

Article by Syed Arif Bahar: "Reconciliation Between Jammu-Kashmir Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and Jammu-Kashmir Liberation Front"]

[Text] General Shaeab, representing the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and Shabeer Sadiqqi, representing the JKLF [Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front], both leaders of the two armed organizations of occupied Kashmir took an oath to work together against the common enemy at the strong insistence of the people on the occasion of Id-i Milad at Hazrat Bal Sri Nagar. The zeal demonstrated by the Kashmiri people at that time was worth seeing. The people expressed their feelings by raising slogans in support of this alliance. This was the expression of the desire of the Kashmiris suffering from India's atrocities and the political and militant organizations felt it, and were forced to unite in response to it. It can be called major news because Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and JKLF are not just two organizations of Kashmir, these represent two major groups of which the members will play a very important role in determining the future of Jammu and Kashmir. Perhaps, it was the result of the decision to play a decisive role that these two organizations decided to tolerate each other. Both organizations aim to oust India from Kashmir at any cost. Both organizations have accepted responsibilities for attacking Indian troops. One difference they had, which resulted in many other differences, was about the future of Kashmir. The JKLF believes that the Kashmiri people should have the right to decide on the "third option" or to have a self-government through a plebiscite. The Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin, on the other hand, wants Kashmir to join Pakistan as per the UN resolutions. These organizations had influence over two different groups in the valley of Kashmir. The JKLF was supported by the National Conference, the People's Conference Congress, and the Democratic Forum. They were afraid that joining Pakistan would be harmful to Kashmir's culture. Their preference next to joining India was to be an independent nation. This group insists on Kashmir maintaining a secular role. However, the top leadership of the JKLF did not have any relation to this group. The four very competent young men who led the JKLF are known as the "Haji group." The first letters of the first names of Hamid Sheikh, Ishfaq Majid, Javed Mir, and Yaseen Malik form the acronym Haji. These young men of Haji group suffered atrocities committed during the alliance of the National Conference and the Congress in 1987. They were associated with the Islamic

Student's League at that time and were strong supporter of a united Islamic front. Their efforts to unite all groups resulted in breaking up the hold of the Sheikh family.

Meanwhile, the source of power for the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin is the group of students who have graduated from hundred of Islamic schools. These students have spread everywhere in the Valley and even Sheikh Abdullah, and later his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah, were scared of these youth because they had ordered closed the schools that provided revolutionary education to these freedom fighters. During this period, Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin got political support from the Jamaat-i-Islami [JI] and four respected JI leaders—Ashraf Sahrai, Sayyed Salauddin, Ghulam Mohammad Safi, and Shamshul Haq—joined and strengthened the Hizb. Now these four leaders have moved from politics to militancy. Another group composed of pro-Pakistani Kashmiris also joined them. This group suffered Indian atrocities for many years. Unfortunately, this group lacked leadership. This huge group was silenced because of the deaths of their leaders Pir Ziauddin Indrabi, Mir Waiz Maulwi Yusuf Shah, and Qazi Abdulghani Shah of Baramula. Until recently, their efforts were limited to raising Pakistani flags and demonstrating against India. When the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin raised the slogan of joining Pakistan, this group got a new voice. It inclined toward Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin because it promised realization of their own dream.

Thus, there was a tug-of-war between these two organizations and it was jeopardizing the campaign for independence badly. This was a painful reality for the champions and supporters of the independence campaign that the al-Mujaheddin were fighting among themselves and the 400,000 Indian troops also. The world is well aware of the bitter experience in Palestine and Afghanistan. If we seriously review the confrontation between the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin and the JKLF, we will learn that the basic difference was not political or ideological; it was psychological. The JKLF considered itself the founder of the armed confrontation and thought the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin had "hijacked" their campaign. According to its leaders, it was the founder of the campaign because it started the blasts. It wanted the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin to be number-two after it. The Hizb leaders on the other hand insisted that they had started the freedom movement and the JKLF later had pushed them aside by accepting "lower pay." They also felt that the campaign had moved into the hands of non-Kashmiris who did not know Kashmiri culture, habits, customs, history, and language. They felt that since they had led the crusade against the Sheikh dynasty, which represented the Indian oppression for a century, they also had the right to lead the militant campaign.

During that period, the old rivalry between the JI against the National Conference and Congress Party started. Both sides had bombs and guns instead of flags and books. Some politicians raised the slogans for moderation to get the attention of Kashmiris, however, there were no effective results. The results of this call were

similar to what happens to people in Pakistan who try to become the "third power." The people in general like practical forces. At times they go so far that they cannot discriminate between the moderates and the extremists just because they are action oriented. We learned this fact when we analyze the confrontation between the militant groups in occupied Kashmir. This started with the Bis Camp of Azad Kashmir. The debate the friends in the Hizb and JKLF started here by writing articles and holding meetings spread to Sri Nagar and materialized into an armed confrontation. The JKLF leaders had a more aggressive attitude. They raised the slogan of clarifying the ideology and called every opponent a foreign agent, traitor, and many other names. Because of the rigid stand, its opponents also accelerated their slogans and activities. The results of this policy were felt openly when both organizations fought physically on 27 October 1990 in the Club Ground of Muzaffarabad. These clash was mainly between the young men from the Valley and the youth from the other regions were trying to stop the fight. At this very time, a seven-point resolution was presented at a very important meeting of Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin in Sri Nagar. This resolution was called the "Resolution To Join Pakistan." It was written in strong language. The JKLF rejected it the next day. During that period, the People's League threatened the JKLF that if it did not adopt the concept of joining Pakistan then a Lebanon-like situation might emerge in Kashmir. Mohammad Farooq Rehmani and Imanullah Khan, leaders of the People's League, started a cold war of columns and articles in the newspapers. At that time, the Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin became stronger and assassinated a former legislator named Mir Mustafa. The Hizb also accused Mir Mustafa of a long list of crimes. This legislator was closely associated with the JKLF. In response, the JKLF assassinated Dr. Mashir-ul Haq, vice chancellor of Kashmir University. Dr. Haq did not have any special official relationship with the Hizb, but was philosophically on its side.

This cold war changed into a real war when an armed confrontation broke out between the Hizb and the Front in May 1991. This led to many other confrontations numbering dozens. They also had agreements after each clash. Unfortunately, these words, which lacked sincerity, did not have any lasting effect. Early last year, the command council of the Hizb reorganized itself and combined the offices of chief commander and the chairman into a new office called supreme commander. The council appointed Sayyed Salauddin, an open-minded, mature, and educated man who was the chairman before, supreme commander. The observers called this change the beginning of a new era. Sayyed Salauddin did not only know how to work with the others, he also had close relations with the top leaders of the JKLF. Sayyed Salauddin ran elections from Lal Chowk, Sri Nagar as representative of the Muslim Joint Front. Young volunteers belonging to the JKLF, Hizb-i al-Mujaheddin, and other Muslim organizations worked as his bodyguards and polling agents. These very brave

youth later became the frontrunners of the armed confrontation. On becoming the supreme commander, Salauddin declared to unilaterally end all differences with other organizations. He declared that whatever the people of Kashmir decide about their future will be acceptable to him. That obviously meant that if the result of the polls was against his wishes, he would not oppose them. Sayyed Gailani, the TI leader, had also expressed similar wishes in the past. Amanullah Khan also responded to Sayyed Salauddin's announcement and the people of Kashmir heaved a sigh of relief hoping that the dark period of confrontation was over. This way, all those fears ended that had disillusioned the freedom fighters. The resentment of the al-Mujaheddin was pushing the people into the quicksand of disappointments. Ending that was a great deed of Salauddin.

### Internal Affairs

#### Sindhis Said Beginning To Resist Imposition of Urdu

93AS0182A Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 3, 6 Nov 92

[Article by Dr. G.M. Mekhri: "Urduism, Mohajirism and Sindh"; quotation marks, italicized words as published]

[3 Nov 92 p 10]

[Text] It has been this felt threat to Sindhi that is obviously the literary and political insurrection of Sindh. If a Sindhi does not mount guard towards the preservation of the Sindhi language and that too in his own Sindh, who else should and who else can? Neither the Sindhi nor his language had, have or care to have any designs upon any other language or culture. All that they have ever sought so far that they may be left at peace in their own terrain. The foolishness of Urduites is obvious.

The British rule gave them that sense of security. All the British officers working permanently in Sindh were obliged to pass their examination of proficiency in Sindh. Otherwise their very promotions were stopped. And some of them did uncommon service to the Sindhi language. And all because the majority of Sindhis happened to be Muslims whose ancestors had done so much literary work in Sindhi language in Arabic script. The British chose and framed Arabic script for Sindhi as already existed for centuries. So, although the British had toppled down the Muslim rule in Sindh for their imperial purposes, but just because they preserved and promoted the language and culture of the masses. The people like Mirza Qalij Baig brought into the Sindhu river, the waters of the Thames by translating the very best of English literature into the Sindhi language. And with the works of Lambrick and Sorely, the outside world came to know about the literary and cultural individuality, identity and greatness of Sindh and its language. Therefore, the Sindhis did not see any threat at all to the Sindhi language in the administrative use of the English language in Sindh, although hardly more than



three per cent of the Sindhis could understand it as was the case all over the subcontinent.

Indeed, the English language, far from being regarded as any threat, proved to be a stimulant in literary and cultural matters all over the vast land. It is only when a people feel their language or culture are threatened that insurmountable difficulties begin to appear; more specially when they feel that the threat is subtle, undermining and surreptitious. It was the feeling amongst the Indian soldiers that the cartridges of the new guns were purposefully greased with the lard of the pig and cow, to de-Islamise and de-Hinduise them that sparked off the Indian Mutiny of 1857. In matters of their language and their culture, the Sindhis began to feel that never before, in all history, their language was both openly and also surreptitiously so being engulfed as with slogans like "Urdu and Urdu alone shall be the language of Sindh." Those of us champions of Urdu, altogether and all the soon forgot the terrific resentments which we harboured when we felt that Hindi was to be the threat against Urdu. Our concern with our Urdu should have told us that the Sindhis also have the right and duty to have similar concern with Sindhis, an integrated language which is centuries older than Urdu and as is Bengali to the Bengalis. If only 14 per cent Muslim population in UP [Uttar Pradesh] clings to Urdu and if 9 per cent Muslim population of Hyderabad not only clings to Urdu, but also make it the state language and to have a big University dedicated to Urdu and if the six per cent Muslims of Mysore to this day cling to Urdu is not being undermined through the Radio and the TV, but on the other hand is being granted largest sums of money for its upkeep, the Sindhi is more than justified that in his Sindh, his Sindhi should flourish without any kind of threat. Disregard of this goes wholly against the very grain of the elements of human justice.

Indeed, looking back in modern Indian history we see the role of the language in politics and so in life in total. According to Garcen De Tassy, in his book history of Urdu, the Urdu-Hindi conflict began in 1835, when in UP of about 14 per cent Muslim population, Urdu was given the place of the thus for Persian language by the British. Then, one Naveen Chand, appealed to the British authorities that not Urdu but Hindi should be given that position. Since then the champions of Urdu and the champions of Hindi became antagonists. Again, from the pages of Hyat-e-Javed, the Urdu biography of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, by his closest friend Altaf Hus-sain Hali, we see the role of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in the matter. Sir Syed was bringing out a journal called Science Gazette both in English as well as in Urdu. In one Editorial board meeting, one of the Hindu friends of Sir Syed suggested that the Science Gazette should "also" be brought out in Hindi (the language of the 76 per cent population of UP).

According to Hali, Sir Syed just flared up at the idea and declared to the effect that this was such a move which made any prospect of Hindu-Muslim Unity impossible. One can justly wonder whether there was any question of

Hindu-Muslim unity impossible. One can justly wonder whether there was any question of Hindu-Muslim Unity at all, when all that one learned member of the Editorial board did, was to suggest not that Urdu, the language of just 14 per cent, be eliminated, but that Hindi, the language of the other 76 per cent should also be added, in a magazine intended to the wholly scientific and for the benefit of the masses. Perhaps it is such absence of farsightedness that has resulted in a phenomenon known as "Urdu Imperialism" which has done far more harm to the champions of Urdu than can be computed even with the help of the most powerful computers.

For generations upon generations to come, the whole history and lives of the unthinking champions of the Urdu Imperialism have been completely queered at the pitch. And on the other hand, English, the language of one of the most imperialistic of the people ever, is gaining and gaining friends round the world. If today a large number of Indian and Pakistani literates are having jobs in the Middle East, it is not at all because of their Hindi or their Urdu, but all because they have become good at English and far better than the harder working Japanese and Chinese and other Far Eastern people. And here is another danger awaiting our overseas job market ... that while India is helping English to continue to thrive, our cold-shouldering of English over here will very very soon get us shunted out, leaving the field justly open to the Indians as their near monopoly.

Already the 'Sindhi society in general' suffered an unremediable loss in its having been torn up in two not linguistic but economic parts. The Hindu part of it was commercial, mercantile and as much sea-faring as internally dominant economically. The Muslim part of it was and is predominantly Feudal, landlords, in the extreme as if the vast seaboard did not belong to Sindh at all; as if they were not the descendants, so to speak, of Sindbad the Sailor. When the Hindu section of the Sindhi society left, there was no Muslim part of the Sindhi society to occupy that vast commercial and mercantile vacuum. And all because the Hindu section of the Sindhi society had since long time been predominantly commercial and mercantile, when they left their dearest hearths and homes, they have made good wherever they have gone and in these matters they do not at all suffer from any sense of deprivation. And wherever they have gone, they have carried the quintessence of Sindhi culture through with them, as dearly as the dispersed Jews continued to nourish and cherish the Jewish culture all over the world these 25,000 years. Indeed, sociologically speaking that evil day will never come when Sindhi culture would be lost to Sindhi in Sindh—it may well be these emigrants in Sindh may face tragedies for generation on account of their foolishness and false arrogance. It is the Urduites who are enemies of Urdu.

To avert such a day is, to say the least, more than a Herculean job and not the work of any one or even a few. But that it could be done was demonstrated by Gokhale and his great "Servants of India Society" and "Bhandarkar Institute" at Poona, India. That Society is built

upon the one monolithic rock of the profoundest scholarship in Political Science, Economics in one and all of its branches and Sociology and anthropology in the varied forms and history and literature pertaining to history. Succeeding generations of scholars have literally sacrificed their financial futures and willingly courted 'abject poverty' exactly like monks in a sincere Buddhist monastery, in the cause of the greatness of India. "The detailed history of the Servants of India Society" and of "Bhandarkar Institute" reads as if it is unreal, unless as a dedicated religious cult's. The interdisciplinary approach to the economic, social, political and sociological problems facing India has helped this Society and this institute to serve the country to service. Sindh needs such a series of studies in depth all because some of the problems of Sindh are very peculiar to Sindh.

Without such a vigorous renaissance of Sindhi thought and culture, one wondered how long the Sindhi language and society could withstand the strain, but that renaissance and resurrection has started to the discomfiture of all Sindh's enemies. Sindhi is fast acquiring that state beside sociological, historical, linguistic and emotional and reacting violently to spurious and hypocritical pressures. The Muhajir is mad. Can a perpetual Muhajir be patriotic also.—To be concluded.

[6 Nov 92 pp 10-11]

[Text] Why, even up to 1832, Persian was the Court language nearly all over the greater part of India. But with the change over to English, so very "beautiful" a language like the Persian of Hafiz and Saadi became so "useless" for the utilitarian purposes of bread earning in even small way that "Padhan farsi...baychain taail" or "study Persian and sell oil" became the proverb in those very places where Persian had ruled supreme for many centuries. And today, in many Pakistani homes, where children had education in high class English medium schools for two generation, whole families speak English only, reserving the Urdu and other languages for communication only with the *dhobi* and *chamar* and the like.

The survival of the fittest and the struggle for existence do not at all stop with biology. Whole civilisations, cultures and languages have disappeared when they have failed to comply with the demand of 'time', the inexorable and the pitiless. The Muhajir is set on the wrong path is being used for the advancement of alien aims and objects from inside and outside Pakistan. Even after fifty years he is a misfit—an ominous state indeed.

In the grandiose names of this and that sentiment, the language can be undermined in such a way that to protest against such undermining may be scandalised as treason to the major causes. The immigrant population has a history of this in UP Bihar CP and Deccan in India. Their language imperialism is short-lived in Sindh. Any resistance to accept Sindh in its entirety is wasteful, infructuous and hazardous effort. Unthinking resistance to change is going to be very costly for the immigrants as we can easily see today to our horror and dismay so clear in blood and tears and economic stress.

It is estimated, that, to the present rate of the progress of the Devnagri script in India, all within a period of a decade half of those who use the Arabic script will give it up in preference to the Devnagri script. This because they will find no utility of adherence to the persio-Arabic script in matters of getting bread and butter, while, by adopting the Devnagri script, they will not be in the loss!!! That simple!!! When so much for the mere change of script, how about the official imposition of a language over the other, all in the name of politics this and silly that! Urdu must answer for the sins of Pakistan's polity. Is it enough that it makes cheats thrive, soldiers trade, smuggle and terrorise: mullahs running away with their obtuse thinking, religiously dirty deeds and artifices, Urdu must answer for the defects of our education, learning and character.

Today the Sindhi as an individual and a community is asserting himself aggressively and even violently beyond any measure or manner of doubt. The Urduwallas have taken a foolish path and are now in a quandary. Sindhi literature is in total resurgence. Sindhi journalism and Sindhi reading public is increasing and advancing by leaps and bounds. Urdu press is the most prejudiced, most ignorant, ill-informed and misinformed and tendentious institutions in Sindh. They do not know even the geography of Sindh. They do not know the topography of their so-called Karachi and their Hyderabad. Urdu Press is surviving on official patronage. It has lost its status and value in the Sindhi eyes. Among Sindhis it is the most distrusted institution. It has hardly any Sindhi purchasing clientele and sale. All the buying of Urdu papers is done under government instructions and with government support.

Scientific writing in Sindhi has come into the field and is burgeoning fast—much faster than in Urdu. Sindhi scientific books are read; but science books in Urdu are not even purchased. All scientific and technical books in Urdu are a waste. It also because Sindhi is more scientific than Urdu and can express the thoughts of the soil with greater accuracy and realism. In this aspect Urdu is short of vocabulary. The present trends and vigour of scientific and technological writing in Sindhi will defeat Urdu in the long run. The Sindhis can keep both to Sindhi language and to English. The Urduwallas can't. They in their urbanised and superficial culture will have to depend on English more and in the present socio-political demographic and geographical state, the Urdu-speaking may perhaps very soon find it more profitable to accept and take to Sindhi. The land, the air, the flora and fauna and historical references about Sindh will be more easily and accurately understood and accepted in Sindh, because at present the limitations of Urdu vocabulary and literature and vision to understand the phenomena of province will work against Urdu emphasis. Perhaps under force of circumstances both demographic and geographic conditions, Urdu will have to yield to Sindhi, if Sindh is the place where Urduwallas are going to live. Urdu emphasis is wasteful and struggling, and perhaps paying heavily in the process, against natural Sindhi forces and attachments to the soil and all that is

on the land, underground or in the air. Sociology, demography, history and geography will always triumph.

The years 1969 and 1970 were significant and momentous in the socio-political literary and educational conditions in Sindh. In 1969 Professor Sayid Ghulam Mustafa Shah after this distinguished career as a teacher and principal of Sindh Muslim College (nearly 20 years), director of education, Karachi, Hyderabad, Quetta and Lahore was appointed vice-chancellor of Sindh University by the government of West Pakistan. Sayid Ghulam Mustafa Shah came to this position with the authority of his old background of literary prominence. He shook the entire socio-educational setup in Sindh to its foundations. There were thousands of his students scattered all over Sindh and Pakistan and abroad, and he commanded respect of every one all over the country. He more or less dominated the entire socio-educational and literary activity in Sindh through the University of Sindh, the Institute of Sindiology, the Sindh Adabi Board, the Shah Waliullah Academy and Sindh Adabi Sangat. With his personality and association everything was alive and resurgent. He put a new life in socio-educational organisations, and this is best reflected in his address to Sindh Primary Teachers' Association in 1969 the first very large gathering of primary teachers from all over the province—he had addressed in his capacity as vice-chancellor. We know what forces he had stirred. What a brave man! He faced all odds with his integrity and honesty of purpose. Another event took place in 1970, and that was the first genuine general elections for the Pakistan National Assembly the first ever popular general elections in which the masses of Pakistan participated—this was Bhutto's year. He was triumphant.

Sayid Ghulam Mustafa Shah and Bhutto then joined in the revitalisation of their beleaguered province and gave it personality and status. One Unit had disintegrated and the Constitution was in the making. Bhutto gave it to Pakistan in 1973. During these years from 1969 to 1976, the resurgence of socio-educational activity and the emotional association with Sindh and the literary activities of all kinds began with vigour and force. They gained momentum with every passing year. Life could not be what it was in 1948. Nature's laws began to work and the events of yester-years are before us. Should we take heed.

The modern conditions and pulls in the international field in the world will add to the success of Sindhi. For the Urduwallas farsightedness is required to get away from that they brought and inherited and are stuck with from U.P., Bihar and CP and Hyderabad Deccan. In Sindh Urdu will not and cannot be the language of the masses; it will be unnatural. With its expansion, variety and literary richness, Sindhi will meet all the requirements of the people and the masses—Urdu cannot. It is ridiculous to talk of Urdu culture. Urdu culture is a misnomer. Urdu culture is superficiality. A drawing room phenomenon. A matter of elusive sophistication. In Pakistan in the real terms, Sindh alone has a culture. No other province has its characteristic recognisable

culture, because they have no literary language of great recognition or a varied literature. Sindhi culture has a long literary and historical base both in the soil and in the masses. Punjab's self-respect and the numerical strength and majority demand it. Any sociological change will topple the Urdu appcart and destroy the Urdu house of cards. There is more craze for English among emigrants than among the Sindhis. A Sindhi can learn English without sacrificing Sindhi and the Urdu-speaking person will have to sacrifice Urdu if he goes for English. Etymologically English will strengthen Sindhi, but in the long run it will damage and disfigure Urdu.

Let no resistance to natural process be shown and the earlier the Urduwallas understand and assess the future sociologically, geographically, historically and politically, the better. The changes in the world during the last decade must open the eyes of Urduwallas and they must adjust and conform to realistic compulsive and natural processes or they will go through terrible pangs and pains and lose everything.

Today Pakistan's Urdu literature is nothing but a foolish, fanatical, hyperbolic, hackneyed, tautological, religious and journalistic writing, or a rotten house of romance, obscenity, poetry and political propaganda which is no true literature in the real sense, to give intellectual elevation and hope. Ninety percent of Urdu literature is not worth preserving, and it is a waste in literary, economic and ethical terms, which no progressive community, with any future and hope, can afford and profit by. In the context of historical, geographical, unrealistic and inhospitable language, it is dying as a language. It cannot be resuscitated. Let it die and we give it a decent burial.

Let it be borne in mind that no minority in a country or a nation can afford or be permitted to be terroristic or arrogant for long—specially when its strings and props are removed from places of power and influence in Pakistan—the army and the bureaucracy. Terrorism in and by a minority is a sure sign of its weakness, degeneration and frustration, it will remain hollow and must suffer for its cursedness.

Urduism, Muhajirism, religious fanaticism and flagrant militarism in Pakistan are responsible for the ideological and physical crumbling of Pakistan. The hollowness and falsehood of slogans and 'taranas' have rendered and reduced Pakistan to being unreal, unstable and, we are afraid, even its continued existence problematical.

Even Punjab is beginning to feel and show its resentment where Urdu is only propped up by filthy vested interests of Urdu press, the bureaucracy and the Army. They are beginning to think of Urdu as an impediment to their natural sociological development in a respectable ethical society. Once genuine and natural national urge begin asserting and false elitism in the Punjab is under attack, Urdu will be called as the source of all evil for the Punjab, and then and the sociological effervescence will grow against Urdu, Dr Iqbal had stopped writing in Urdu in later years of his life. Punjab may find it

insulting, cumbersome and soul-killing to stick to Urdu. We are the inception of these processes today and they could grow tomorrow. Today Punjab hates Muhajirism. After fifty years of tomfoolery Muhajirism is no longer accepted as patriotism to Pakistan.

There is an inexorability in the law of nature. Disappearance of some languages and resurgence of others is an accepted sociological phenomenon. With present powerful forces, processes and urges in the Punjab and its disillusionment with and alienation from Urduism and Muhajirism, Sindhi aggressiveness will grow; it cannot be stopped.

In that case Urdu will inevitably yield to to Sindhi in Sindh.

### **Sindh: Political Settlement Urged**

93AS0176B Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
7 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by S. Ahmed]

[Text] The perceptions of the army and the civil administration in respect of a lasting settlement in Sindh have a very wide gap between them. While the army wants its clean-up operation in Sindh to be followed up by effective political, economic and social solutions, the civil administration appears to be more or less in favour of the continuation of the status quo with improvements as and when possible. In any case, the political set-up is not in a hurry to act on the political front except to the extent of trying to win over as the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] members of the Sindh Assembly whose resignations have not yet been accepted. And even that is proving to be a very slow and tedious task.

On the army's part, its commanders believe they have completed the four tasks assigned to them in May: Putting down kidnapping, terrorism, dacoities and car-lifting. Contrary to the general belief, the army was not given an omnibus mandate in Sindh, but assigned these four tasks which it feels it has completed, more or less.

And if adequate and effective action is not taken by the civil administration in the political, social and economic sectors, the army fears the good work it has done in the province might go waste.

But on the economic front the government is ready to act. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif talks of the ten billion rupees given by him for economic development in Sindh, particularly to meet the basic needs of the people, including drinking water.

Chief Minister Muzaffar Shah talks of his Tamir-i-Watan Programme which he is to present to the Prime Minister soon, and is supposed to create 50,000 more jobs.

But on a real political situation, there is silence. As far as the army is concerned, it is ready to welcome fresh elections in the embattled province to settle the issue and put it on an even keel.

A provincial election as the ultimate solution to the problem means the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] coming back in a larger number in the Sindh Assembly than it did in 1990 rigged elections when it won 47 out of the 100 seats for which elections were held.

Not only would the Chief Minister abhor such an eventuality, but also the Prime Minister at a time when Ms Benazir Bhutto is escalating the confrontation with the Centre and is resorting to mass action.

Because of the peculiar turn of events in Sindh, the MQM or Mohajirs, who would not have wanted to see such PPP predominance in the Sindh Assembly and the province, would now welcome the elections to prove their hold on the two urban centres of Sindh—Karachi and Hyderabad.

The Chief Minister would not want a demonstration of the MQM's popularity through the elections, when he avoids—even by-elections and civic polls. He prefers to win over the missing eight members of the Assembly whose resignations have not been accepted to raise the total of the MQM members backing him to 18, while the resignations of 10 MQM MPAs [Member of Provincial Assembly] have been accepted.

But the fact is that political normalcy cannot return to Sindh with both the PPP and the MQM or large urban and rural areas out of the government or at war with the government in the Sindh Assembly and outside it.

Meanwhile, the Sindh political set-up has been discredited by two outrageous developments. In the first, a Special Assistant to the Chief Minister sent three of his armed men to kidnap the Divisional Engineer [DE] of the Clifton Telephone Exchange, who roughed him up and brought him before him at his home. Mr Samar Ali Shah then asked him to fix his telephone which had been out of order for four days and to transfer immediately his telephone from Nazimabad to his Clifton residence.

After he agreed readily to do both, he was sent back to the telephone exchange where the PTC [Pakistan Television Corporation] workers had gathered to protest. And when the engineer approached the police station next door, the SHO [Station House Officer] would file a case of kidnapping against only unknown kidnappers and not against a Special Assistant to the CM [Chief Minister].

As the workers of the Clifton Exchange, with its numerous VIP customers, went on strike and the issue reached Islamabad, Mr. Azam Hoti was reported to have taken a very serious view of the incident and got a proper case registered against Mr. Samar Ali Shah. He was, however, not arrested, nor did the CM sack or reprimand him.

The fear is that others whose telephones are out of order frequently may kidnap the DE or others to get their lines fixed and still stay merrily free. For all that, the DE had been at the Clifton Exchange for only one week.

In the other incident, son of the Deputy Speaker of Sindh Assembly, Atta Mohammad Marri, attacked a bearer of Silver Spoon Restaurant in PECHS along with two of his friends for not serving him a meal very late at night as the restaurant was closing. The waiter needed 16 stitches at the Jinnah Hospital. The waiter's FIR [First Information Report] against Mr Ali Marri was not registered, but Mr Marri's case against the waiter and manager of the restaurant was filed at the insistence of his mother, Parween Marri, under the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance.

When the police went to raid the home of the manager on the same night, he rushed to the Citizen-Police Liaison Committee which is located at the Governor's House, and a case was ultimately filed against Mr Ali Marri and his fellow assailants.

And that, and the anxiety of the police to talk to the father of the boy, upset the Deputy Speaker so much that he took it up too emotionally at the session of the Assembly itself while he was presiding, as if his son was a victim and not the accused. And his conduct came in for a severe drubbing from the CPLC [expansion not given] and other law-abiding elements in the city. But these are not rare happenings in Sindh where authority is everything and the underprivileged are utterly inconsequential.

There are elements in the army who feel that if there cannot be any power-sharing between the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and the PPP [Pakistan People's Army] at the Centre, or if the PPP should remain out of office at the Centre as it has a small strength there, that should not mean that the PPP should not rule Sindh or have a power-sharing arrangement here.

Of course, the army wants a cooperative relationship between the PPP and the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement] as the commitment of the PPP is to the nation as a whole as compared to the militant Jey Sindh elements.

The PPP also feels that it has to strengthen its bridgehead with the Mohajir elements, though not the MQM as such, or with the peace-loving MQM elements as more and more of them abjure violence as a political creed or the principal political tool.

But this cooperation depends on the kind of MQM or Mohajir politics that emerges following the catharsis it is going through.

Meanwhile, the desperate measures adopted by the army elements, inclusive of the Rangers, to arrest the hardcore leadership of the MQM is being disapproved by all the sane elements in Karachi, and is winning sympathy for the MQM and dis-belief in several of the highly serious charges against the MQM leadership. Arresting several of the relations of the missing MQM leaders, and torturing them to ascertain details about them, have outraged the human rights associations in Sindh. They expect a much higher level of conduct from the army.

What all this underscores is that the army cannot stay too long in Sindh without doing serious injury to its

image and its efficacy. And that makes a real political settlement all the more imperative. But, officially, that seems a taboo area which bodes ill for the unfortunate province.

### Systematic Torture Claimed Common in Sindh

93AS0187A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 8 Nov 92 p 5

[Quotation marks, italicized words as published]

[Text] Hyderabad—The act of detaining political activists and other citizens in Sindh, particularly in the interior, by the law-enforcing agencies in their camps indiscriminately, particularly after the launching of "clean-up operation" was main target of criticism made by the leaders of different political organisations and prominent human rights activists who spoke at "Stop Human Rights Violations in Sindh" conference held at a local hotel on Friday under the auspices of Sindhiani Tahrik.

Nizam Baloch, secretary-general of Awami Tahrik, contended that ongoing clean-up operation in Sindh has no cover of martial law and the army under the amended law has those powers in lieu of arresting and conducting search which are already enjoyed by police. He claimed that under this law after arresting anybody even law-enforcing agencies are bound to produce detainees in the court within 24 hours. He reminded that legally so far army involved in operation was under the writ of the court. But he regretted that these laws are not being followed by the law-enforcing agencies. He said 50 cases regarding the confinement in camps, particularly pertaining to upper Sindh are pending with Sindh High Court. The cases were filed during the last three months. He said that all these detainees are held up in the camps of 'super' law-enforcing agency. He regretted that at present the writ of superior courts is not applicable to these "camps."

Mohammad Yousuf Laghari, chairman, Sindh Democrats Group (SDG) claimed that under the law of land those arrested by law-enforcing agencies or police can only be confined either in police lock-up or sent to the jail but cannot be kept in army camps. He regretted that today the human rights in Sindh are being violated at a massive scale by the law-enforcing agencies under the cover of maintaining law and order. He appealed to the superior courts to take *suo moto* notice to protect human rights in Sindh.

He said that Pakistan is the only country where the violation of human rights have been legalised. He cited a number of examples from different laws of the land in support of his contention. He also said that Pakistan is one of those few countries of the world which yet has sign to [as published] U.N. charter on human rights.

Laghari also appealed to the human rights organisations of Pakistan to meet with the superior courts and appeal to them to take *suo moto* notice of violations of human rights in Sindh.

Dr Dodo Maheri, chairman Jeay Sindh Taraki Pasand Party, said the factual position of the human rights in Sindh can be judged from the fact that even the president and the prime minister of Pakistan of which Sindh is a part, have no mandate from the nation to rule. Moreover, he said, even ballot has been insulted by the rulers to steel power through such negative tactics.

Begum Ruqia Khanam Soomro, president, PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Sindh (Women Wing) and Maula Bukhsh Chandio, secretary Records and Events, Sindh PPP also spoke on the occasion and said that human rights of the people of Sindh are being violated blatantly.

Later on addressing the conference as chief guest Rasool Bux Paleejo, president Awami Tahreek (AT) said that every piece of the land of Sindh has been turned into "abattoir" of democratic, legal, constitutional and human rights of Sindhi people.

Talking about torture in Pakistan, Mr Paleejo said that not only the police, law-enforcing agencies and other such agencies are resorting to torture on the masses but even so-called democratic governments had also been involved in systematic torture against their political opponents. He said that now when operation clean-up was in full swing in Sindh, people are being tortured openly and a large number of the torture victims have lost their lives. He said that the agencies are even violating the verdicts and orders of superior courts of the country during the operation.

Paleejo said that though Pakistan has signed many international declarations regarding the safeguard of human rights including "Human Rights Declaration" and on convention against torture, but agencies in the country are resorting to various third degree methods on the citizens.

He said that in Pakistan, especially the Sindhi women are much deprived of their rights. Pakistani law gives free hand to a man to kill a woman in the name of "karo kari" or 'ghairat', he said. He said that the basic human right, i.e., right to live has become almost meaningless as Sindhi women are even deprived of their choice in selecting life partners, he added.

Addressing the seminar, Mumtaz Nizamani, the president of Sindhiani Tahreek (ST) said that Sindh has always remained a victim of human rights violations.

The old mother of the two real brothers who were killed in Tando Bahawal incident, kept on crying during the two sessions of the conference. When she was told that the murderers of her son have been sentenced to death and life imprisonment, she cried, "Give me back my two sons, who used to work on brick kiln. I have no more relative in this world."

**Power Struggle Seen Threat to National Security**  
*93AS0180B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 26 Oct 92*  
p 11

[Article by Nusrat Mirza: "Power Struggle: Dangerous to Pakistan's Well-Being"]

[Text] The political confrontation has become so acute that it is endangering our national security. This conflict had already crossed the ideological boundaries and all kind of methods are being used now. The moral boundaries were never considered as boundaries. Later, the stand of protection of Pakistani ideology was adopted for political reasons. It is believed that Pakistani ideology was considered inadequate for keeping it united, and the idea of four separate communities was touted, and this helped develop the idea of Muhajir (refugees) being a separate community. Then the principle of "moving things around" was levied to help the communal feelings. It required continuing communal tension. The goal was to save the nation by having them fight with each other. This is a negative school of thought, which would fail in the end. This doctrine brings destruction with it as it did in the Soviet Union. This affair has bloodied thousands of people. For example, when the proposal for Sindh Desh was brought up, its negative effects were felt everywhere. At that time, it was thought it necessary to check this plan. Thus, Muhajirs, Punjabis, and Pathans got united, and later the Muhajir got the opportunity to unite as a group. Later, conflicts between Muhajirs and Pathans, Muhajirs and Sindhis, and Muhajirs and Punjabis were encouraged. Iltaf Hussein, leader of the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement], told me at the time when the Muhajir-Pathan conflict was at its apex, that he was being preached to about unity among Muhajirs, Punjabis, and Pathans, and also was being told to improve relations with the Sindhis. At the same time, the government impeded these efforts for unity. He said that he had tried to start talks with Gul Zarin, leader of a Pathan organization who was in Karachi jail at that time. But was not given permission to do so and Gul Zarin was sent to another jail. At one time Iltaf Hussein insisted that Muhajirs should meet with G.M. Syed and investigate the possibility of cooperating with the Sindhis. He was excited about meeting with G.M. Syed and discussed the possibility with his veteran associates. Most of them approved the idea and said that meeting with G.M. Syed would not hurt him.

The date for the meeting was set for 22 June 1988. Many young Muhajirs and Sindhis were injured or killed and when we arrived in Hyderabad, it was in chaos. The strangest thing was that several news correspondents surrounded the mayor and Ishtiaq Ahmed who were members of the delegation and asked them why were they going to meet with G.M. Syed. Seeing the situation in Hyderabad, Iltaf Hussein postponed the meeting. It is believed that the policymakers did not want these opposing leaders to meet even though this meeting would have removed the disagreements between the two. Syed could not overcome Hussein and Hussein could not have changed Syed. All Iltaf Hussein wanted was to decrease the tension. The second riots occurred on 30 September 1988 when 200 people were killed in Hyderabad. The obvious purpose for these riots was to postpone the elections and to increase the conflict between the groups. This could be true as the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] chief briefed the cabinet that the elections

must be held because apparently India was trying to have these elections postponed for some reason. A doctor, who was the leader of the bloody team and who was responsible for the massacre in Hyderabad, has not been punished to this date. He is practicing politics from behind the jail. We feel that some power is protecting that doctor from being punished and that power could not be foreign. I believe that the riots that occurred in Karachi since 1986 were efforts to protect Pakistan's oneness by following the policy of keeping the conflicts alive. This is not an appropriate philosophy or method. You can, if you wish, ask anyone. We can use the ideology on which Pakistan is based once in a while, however, presenting this ideology in a negative light just to keep things going will result in pushing Pakistan gradually towards destruction. My worry has doubled since Pakistan's intelligence agencies have been clashing with each other. I wrote in one of my English articles that these agencies should stop quarreling with each other. I thought that the appointment of Brigadier Imtiaz as the chief of Intelligence Bureau [IB] was a good solution to this problem and thought that the ISI and IB would be doing a better job protecting the nation. However, the situation is deteriorating instead of improving. There have been some developments that have totally shaken up our security system. This game has become very dangerous and should stop now. For example: 1) The Shah Bunder case; 2) Tandu Bahawal case; 3) Jinnah Pur scandal; and 4) The problem of the list of 72 people.

I have discussed the Shah Bunder and Tandu Bahawal cases in my 22 June and 1 July articles in the NAWA-I-WAQT. It is imperative that the Jinnah Pur scandal is also discussed here. Involving the whole Muhajir population in the Jinnah Pur rumor would mean that they would all become opposed to the military or would be aware that the military is running the operation in Sindh and is involved in some hanky-panky. However, two aspects did not stay in the naive minds of these people. First, Iltaf Hussein will never call his state Jinnah Pur because he and Jinnah do not "follow the same route." Second, the Muhajirs are not opposed to the military since they believe that it is helping realize their dreams—keeping Pakistan alive and making Pakistan a great country in the world. In this context, Mrs. Benazir, who in spite of my continued efforts has not succeeded in taking a firm stand about the Muhajirs, has been following the wind. I meant that the purpose of the Jinnah Pur rumor is very different. The people who understand politics as "a science of changing things" know that human nature is always kept in mind when playing politics. For example, if you want Benazir to do something for you, you should spread a rumor that she would like to hear. She would play into it and help launch a person's career whether it helps her or not.

Chaudhary Nisar's statement in support of Iltaf Hussein on one side and interview of Al-Zulfiqar chief Murtaza Bhutto on the other side, these are all tricks to increase pressure on Benazir as well as keeping the military generals under control. Third, the supreme commander position of the president is being touted repeatedly on

television. Another dubious trick, which I do not think is the last one, is the publication of the list of people sought by the military. This list includes some names of people who are each other's enemies or opponents. This list definitely would not be the same as the military actually wants. Most of these names perhaps were taken from the list the military had prepared. Some names must have been added. For example, Pir Pagara, Makhdum, son of Jatoi and other names in order to make all the opposing groups go against the military. This is a very dangerous trick.

### Government Seen Facing Severe Challenges

93AS0180C Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 28 Oct 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Arrival of a Storm"]

[Text] According to political pundits, it is difficult to say at this time whether the government is going to face a major storm soon. We can, however, definitely say that the government is facing dangers from within and abroad. The general atmosphere is chaotic. The situation in Sindh could not be controlled even after six months of military presence and Operation Cleanup. Thus, the federal and the state governments had to depend on the army for a longer period. This decision proved the inefficiency of our government even though it does not admit it openly. Mr. Muzaffar Hussein Shah, Sindh's chief minister, said that situation in Sindh was not suitable for holding municipal and general elections. A while back, when riots were occurring in various cities in the state, terrorism was rampant, and curfew was imposed all the time, they succeeded in holding general and municipal elections. These elections were satisfactorily held and in a friendly environment. Perhaps, the situation is worse than before and the government does not want to endanger people by holding elections. The present government is to be blamed for the deteriorating situation in Sindh to this point. Even though Nawaz Sharif and Muzaffar Shah claim that the situation is under control, there is the danger that the situation in Sindh will become more serious, and a major uprising might devastate the present government as well as the democratic system in our country. It is unfortunate that the people who are hungry for power have not learned any lesson despite all the untoward experiences our country has gone through in the past. The nation has to suffer the results of our rulers' incompetence: The political and law-and-order situation in the whole country is at crisis level, but the situation in Sindh is very explosive. During late Jam Sadiq Ali's rule, there were just the incidents of robberies, kidnapping, and terrorism. He failed to control these in spite of his efforts and ability. He assured the people when he was elected that he was going to control the situation within three months. However, it did not happen and he was criticized for it. Still, we have to admit that the late leader stopped armed fights among various groups in Sindh. He did not have to impose curfew. Were the patriotic and pro-Pakistan political parties more effective at that time, they would have achieved a lot to develop unity and harmony.



However, these parties were rendered ineffective. The late Jam-i Sadiq Ali's successor, Muzaffar Hussein Shah, has been gradually deteriorating the situation even though he has the full support of the army. It is possible that he received wrong advice from some people and he was wrong in understanding the people's minds, however, he is the one who should accept the blame for the present situation. If the government does not review some of its wrong decisions and steps, then Sindh will be facing a major catastrophe soon. The kindling coals of hatred and prejudice that have been buried for so long is raging now and could ignite any time.

### Political Alliances Seen Opportunistic

93AS0185D Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
28 Oct 92 p 6

[Editorial: "Politics of Alliances"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The politics of alliances has been the order of the day in the country ever since the decline of the Muslim League in early fifties and the phenomenal electoral victory of the Jugutu Front in the then East Pakistan. Ironically, while the party which had led the Pakistan Movement was gradually turned into a play thing of whosoever seized power, losing the charisma it once had in mass politics, no other political party in the country was able to emerge as a viable alternative until early seventies. Forging alliances was, thus, deemed by politicians as a 'short-cut' to success, and a great variety of the so-called 'united fronts' were put together from time to time to outmanoeuvre the party in power. This particular strategy has had considerable success as a weapon to achieve 'limited goals' or 'short-term gains', more so in the context of agitational politics. Nonetheless, it also has suffered veritable debacles, particularly in the face of uneasy compromises failing to outgrow contradictions inherent in such alliances. The Opposition, which is presently, like it has always been, a motley crowd of divergent interests and objectives, is once again engaged in a marathon exercise to create a 'grand political alliance'. The job has hitherto turned out to be a tall order,

since the 'mushroom growth' of parties and groups seeking a share in the booty are prone to making such conflicting demands that it requires either the patience of a Buddhist monk, or the craftiness of a Machiavellian negotiator to strike a deal. However, even if the feuding factions were to override their mutual distrust and settle for a bargain, the expedient relationship that will form the basis of common action will not be strong enough to pull the alliance through a major crisis.

So long as the basis of unity among the Opposition parties is negative, and the only common factor amongst them is the desire to dislodge the party in power, they may be able to join hands for a while in the hope of sharing the spoils of victory, but in case of a long drawn out political battle the odds are against the survival of such an alliance. Ms Bhutto has at long last declared war against Nawaz Sharif government, albeit her promised mass movement has yet to take shape, and there are indications that she may proceed by fits and starts waiting for the final offensive till such times she is sure of her locus standi in quarters that have traditionally been called upon to act as the final arbiters in situations of political crisis. Her fellow travellers are perhaps more apprehensive of her stealing the show alone than the prospects of Mian Nawaz Sharif overriding the 'storm' that they are threatening to raise against him. The 'grand Opposition alliance', therefore, may actually be a far cry from what it looks like in the wake of prolonged parleys among the Opposition parties. If Ms Bhutto has learnt any lessons from the historical experience of DAC [Direct Action Committee], PNA [Pakistan National Alliance] or MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] she should be relying more on raising issues that relate to a common man's problems of 'bread and butter', rather than associating herself with manipulative politics for which her potential partners in agitation are well known. If she is not seeking an 'extra-constitutional intervention' to settle old scores with Nawaz Sharif government, she can take her time to go to the people and mobilise support for her party. The politicians who wish to operate within the parameters of the democratic system should be willing and capable of waiting for their turn to secure the popular mandate.



## Articles Criticize Religious Identification Card Approval

### Ahmadis Targeted

93AS0183A Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 23 Oct 92 p 1

[Article by Jalees I. Hazir: "Free To Go to Your Temples, Your Mosques"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Lahore, October 21—The demonstration outside the Punjab Assembly, staged against the government's decision to add a column for religion on the National ID card, was not mammoth by any standards. However, the diversity of people gathered there to register the first mark of protest against the decision was striking. Christians from kacchi abadis, lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, Ahmadis, students, a Parsi writer, women workers, minorities' leaders, Muslims and non-Muslims met in an unusual mix to renounce State-sponsored intolerance. Why were the Muslim participants protesting against a decision which can only be seen as an advantage for them in an Islamic republic?

The speakers insisted that the additional column was a threat, not only to the minorities but also to the Muslim majority, as it strengthened a small and intolerant religious orthodoxy against a large majority of Pakistani citizens. From the size of the demonstration, it seems that these implications of the decision are not widely understood. The leaders of Pakistan Peoples Party [PPP], which has the largest vote bank in the country, have criticised the decision but apparently decided to stay out of the demonstration. Without the involvement of larger political parties, can the protest succeed? In what sense is the majority of Muslims threatened by the religious column?

It is important to understand the process in order to understand the repercussions of its culmination. One must see how similar decisions and laws implemented with the avowed intention of propagating Islam and securing it against infidels are being practised. Can they ensure the protection guarantee to minorities under Islam? Have they served their purpose or have they become tools for achieving other less noble purposes? Who are the victims and who stand to gain from them?

The amendment declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims might have been passed by a popularly elected parliament under Z.A. Bhutto for solving 'a long-standing problem once and for all', but it proved to be the opening of a Pandora's box. A precedent had been set for the State's interference in matters of belief. The amendment itself did not have the potential of being abused to victimise the community thrown out of the pale of Islam. The ground, however, was set for such a development.

During Zia's regime, which had neither legitimacy nor popular support, from 1980 to 1986, five amendments were made in the Penal Code, awarding punishment for blasphemy or insulting the sentiments of Muslims. Four of these amendments were passed under martial law, and

all five of them served the purpose of keeping the support of the fundamentalists for the military dictator intact.

The addition of Section 298-A to the PPC [Pakistan Penal Code] through an ordinance in 1980 by CMLA [Chief Martial Law Administrator] Gen. Zia, made the use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages, including 'any of the righteous caliphs or companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) [Peace Be Upon Him]', an offence. This was seen as the reinforcement of law against the Ahmadiya community and the Shiites and designed to deal with the following of the fourth caliph who do not accept the earlier caliphs as having been legitimately chosen.

Section 295-B was added in 1982 and it awards life imprisonment for defiling, etc., of Holy Quran. Two more sections were added to the PPC in 1984; Section 298-B regarding the misuse of epithets, titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages, and Section 298-C for punishing any person of Qadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith. Besides other things, these sections prohibit Ahmadis to call their place of worship a masjid, or to recite azan as used by Muslims. Section 295-C, added in 1986, awarded death penalty or life imprisonment for the use of derogatory remarks, etc., about the Holy Prophet (PBUH). In its judgment given in October 1990, the Federal Shariat Court declared that the offence was punishable only by death which could be awarded for contempt of any other prophet also.

Before these amendments were introduced, allegations of blasphemy were hardly ever made. With their introduction, such allegations became frequent. The manner in which these amendments have been phrased allows them to be abused for ends which are quite different from their avowed purpose. For instance Section 295-C reads: Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) shall be punished with death. A closer study of cases registered under these sections strongly indicates that the law was invariably used as a prop for personal motives and settling scores that do not fall under their ambit.

Chand Barkat, a bangle-seller in a mangal bazaar of Karachi, was charged for blasphemy. Another bangle-seller from the same bazaar, Mohammad Arif accused him of using derogatory remarks against the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Barkat claims that the case had been registered against him due to business rivalry and that Arif had earlier on asked him to shift his stall elsewhere as it affected his business. No eye-witnesses said they had heard him say anything against the Holy Prophet (PBUH).

A Christian school-teacher from Faisalabad, Naimat Ahmer, was slain to death by a student, Farooq Ahmad, earlier this year. Farooq claimed to have killed him on learning about his blasphemous utterances through an

anonymous poster that was pasted and circulated some-time ago. Before his death, Naimat had approached the bishop of Faisalabad for help. He felt that the putting up of posters in his school was the conspiracy of some teachers to get rid of him in order to create a vacancy for one Allah Ditta, who was then teaching at a school in Jhang. The Headmaster of the school confirmed that after Naimat's murder, he did receive an application from a school teacher in Jhang. Significantly, the murderer, Farooq Ahmad, is related to this school teacher from Jhang.

Rather than propagating Islam which attaches great importance to a fair treatment of non-Muslims in an Islamic state, these amendments provided patronage to their victimisation. If the political segregation of non-Muslims was brought about by General Zia's introduction of separate electorate, then these amendments to the PPC makes it even more difficult to integrate them socially.

Cases brought up against followers of other faiths for blasphemy against Islam, even when they are not proved, tend to create tension between the community and the Muslim majority. The arrest of two Christian brothers in Sargodha on charges of blasphemy divided their neighbourhood on religious lines. The tension and resentment caused by a mere allegation was unheard of before. Similar situations were created due to cases against Ahmadis.

Another factor that comes across from a study of these cases is the involvement of fanatic religious elements. On many occasions, cases were registered by, or on the insistence of, the local maulvi. It is not difficult to understand how the laws dealing with a person's belief and faith can go to the advantage of this class that claims to be the sole interpreter of religion and also the sole authority on how it should be practised. And this is where danger lies for the Muslim majority, who do not enjoy such claims.

When an average Muslim hears about cases registered against Christians and Ahmadis for blasphemy, he invariably identifies with the Muslim complainant even before the allegations of blasphemy are proved in a court. It is difficult for him to understand how these laws can be used against Muslims. The case of Professor Itrat Hussain should help understand this aspect. While teaching at a college in Rahimyar Khan, he was asked to describe the form of government in the Holy Prophet's (PBUH) time. His description was twisted and he was accused of describing it as dictatorial. And this was sufficient ground to try him for blasphemy. A case was registered against him and he was arrested. There is no reason to believe that other such cases will not come up against people who consider themselves to be believing Muslims in the future.

The recent decision of the government is a step in the same direction. By conceding to the demands of a small minority of orthodox elements, it will further strengthen their position to decide for the majority, which includes

Muslims and non-Muslims, how they are to practice their religion and what they should believe in. The majority, however, is largely unaware of the repercussions of the decision, and unless larger political parties like the PPP, which represents a large percentage of Muslims and is also opposed to the recent decision, take up this issue and educate the majority about its impact, the direction is unlikely to change.

### Christians Fear Persecution

93AS0183B Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 24 Oct 92 p 10

[Editorial: "People Driven Against the Wall"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Federal law minister Chaudhry Abdul Ghafoor says his government has decided to put a committee on the issue of 'religious cards'. His companions at a wedding party in Lahore have all sworn that the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] decision to put religion on the ID cards was correct. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who set the ball rolling by conceding the clerical demand for the new cards much before the matter was taken up by the government, says the decision is correct under the constitution since it is within the ambit of governmental law-making. Other IJI stalwarts have told the offended minorities and human rights-conscious citizens to go to the court to sort out the problem. The Christians in Lahore are going on hunger strike today because they think they have been abandoned by Mian Nawaz Sharif who promised not long ago at a conference in Lahore that he would remove their grievances emanating from separate electorates and some judicial decisions affecting their family law. Fearing discrimination and persecution, the minorities have already staged a procession in Lahore and likened the ID card change to a 'religious cleansing' violative of the pledge of equity of treatment given in the constitution and the commitment of the Founder of the Nation to the minorities in Pakistan.

Most probably the committee Ch. Ghafoor has referred to is going to ignore the minorities' protest and take refuge behind President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's assertion that the 'religious card' would serve to strengthen and consolidate the law on separate electorates barring non-Muslims to vote together with Muslims. It is quite obvious that the IJI politicians do not wish to look at the other aspect of the problem: that the state and society are becoming highly discriminatory against the minorities and that the new cards would strengthen this behaviour rather than the law on separate electorates. Admissions to educational institutions can be cancelled if the bureaucrat wants to apply the principle of 'separation' against all accepted norms of affirmative action. Jobs can be put outside the reach of the non-Muslims by ignoring merit simply because the ID card says the holder is not a Muslim. Since the universal principle of allowing the minorities to contest on the basis of merit in addition to the reserved seats has been rejected in practice in Pakistan, the non-Muslims run the risk of being disenfranchised altogether in Pakistan. The law on

separate electorates which General Zia applied to gain acceptance among the clergy who supported him has already partially disenfranchised them. The judiciary has given verdicts that are clearly a break from the past of treating the non-Muslims at par with Muslim citizens. Given this environment of medieval recidivism, the minorities cannot hope to get justice if they approach the courts to give them justice on the issue of the ID cards. According to estimates in the absence of new census figures, almost 10 per cent of the total population now are minorities. The IJI is pushing this large proportion into the social limbo that produce 'traitors' and 'outlaws' in Pakistan for the establishment to mop up through witch-hunts. Since Islamisation first started, the Christians have been trying to leave Pakistan to avoid being persecuted socially and officially. But most of them are forced to live in a hostile environment because mass emigration is no longer possible. Legislations and court decisions are gradually pushing them and other minorities against the wall. Large Muslim populations are already alienated from the state because of the divisive national politics; the non-Muslims who have served the country with proven loyalty are now being forced to join the ranks of the alienated. Pakistan was never intended to consolidate its identity through the elimination of non-Muslims, but the last couple of decades have proved that the state is trying to achieve its 'Land of the Pure' status by peeling off large sections of the population from the national mainstream. IJI's prostration to the fundamentalist clergy as part of the policy to defeat and exterminate the opposition will only lead to the escalation of extremist demands. There is growing support in Pakistan to the view that the state should be declared 'Sunni' on the model of Iran and the 'non-Sunnis' should be dis-enfranchised like the minorities. The ID cards policy flies in the face of the idea of the modern state and attempts to undermine the benign face of the religion of Islam that past generations had grown to love as the faith of the tolerant. The 'purity' sought to be achieved by our opportunist politicians will undermine the very foundations of the state envisaged by the Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal.

### Move Towards Fascism

93AS0183C Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 28 Oct 92 p 10

[Article by Zabnab: "Signpost of a Fascist State"]

[Text] Are they just ignorant or party to some heinous plan? What are they up to? Do they know where they are taking this country? Causes for which the modern civilization is known, all that the humanity has struggled against is being given legal sanction in this country.

Differentiation among people on any basis is one thing which the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) [Peace Be Upon Him] prohibited most vehemently. His message, undoubtedly, is that of equality and justice. No one in the right mind could ever agree that a society based on discrimination could be called Islamic.

Why did they think it essential to have a religion column in our National Identity Cards? Will this bring Pakistan closer to the ideal of an Islamic state? Will this help the law and order situation in Sindh and reduce the economic deprivations of the people of the province? These and some other questions have been haunting me over the last few days.

It is time for everyone to pause and ponder about what is being done to us in the name of Islam. The protectors of our faith—who believe in proselytising not only the non-Muslims but also those Muslims who do not agree to their creed—seem to be hell-bent on making intolerance and discrimination as the only basis of social order.

The more one considers the ramifications of these measures, the more one worries. How would they know that such and such a person is a Muslim or a person is declaring his actual religion? What measures will they adopt to find out the truth? Soon, it occurred to me, there would be another amendment in the constitution, saying that no non-Muslim can have a name similar to that of a Muslim and all those who have in the past committed this sin should change their names immediately.

Then I saw in the offing another presidential ordinance, making it obligatory on all citizens to get their religion certified from the local police station and also from the *muhalla maulvi*. Oh, and, of course, the *maulvi* would have to be the right one: The Sunni? The Wahabi? The Shia?

There is a mosque in my neighbourhood, which has a warning on its front, saying that no other than a Sunni can offer his prayers there. What will happen if a person belonging to a sect different from that of the person responsible for certifying one's religion or issuing new religion column ID cards?

The thought of the hassle of getting a new ID card with my religion imprinted on it and feeling proud about it gave me the shock of my life; I could see long queues outside the ID card office and people being fleeced by different kinds of intermediaries. Police stations, humming with innocent people to get their credentials cleared from those responsible for law and order in the land of the pure. As a matter of fact, an ID card is essentially an administrative requirement, not a religious one.

The police and other institutions of the state in a mass society need to tabulate information about its citizens and identify them for administrative and other needs to organise a society. It entitles a citizen to certain facilities over non-citizens, like getting jobs and other benefits provided to citizens of modern welfare states, irrespective of his or her religion. They don't need to know about the religion of a person.

What arrangements have to be made to issue ID cards to the entire population of more than 100 million people? The movers of the amendments, one is sure, didn't consider what is involved in such a provision. They are

blinded by a bigoted view of religion. They have closed their minds to any rational thinking. There are others who have nothing in mind, but to weaken their political opponents irrespective of the consequences of their decisions.

All that this religion column can do is to strengthen the process of institutionalising intolerance and discrimination in society which, ironically, is already rampant. The system of separate electorate introduced by General Ziaul Haq is already there to deprive a large number of Pakistani citizens, on the one hand, of the right to choose a candidate from their own constituency and, on the other, the right to contest from a constituency like any other person. They are not promoted to sensitive decision-making positions, because their loyalties are considered to be generally suspect.

This rise in the wave of discriminatory legislation is no signal to good days ahead. Watch out, Mr. Prime Minister, they too can become intolerant in private property and free economy. The example of Hitler's national socialism based on discrimination of one people against the other still haunts the modern civilization. Your allies may well assure you that it is not possible. But once on the streets, they won't be in control of things.

#### Appeasing Religious Zealots

93AS0183D Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 9 Nov 92 p 10

[Editorial: "Practical Side of 'Religion Card'"]

[Text] Federal minister of interior, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain has stated that the government is not prepared to reconsider its decision to include a religion column in national identity cards (NICs). Officials of the registration department, who would be responsible for the implementation of this decision, tell us that the replacement of NICs would roughly require Rs [Rupees] 200 million and would take 20 years given the present technology and manpower at their command. If the department were to be fully computerised, which would take an additional Rs 80 million, this mammoth exercise of issuing new NICs to the country's population may take five years. Some officials are extremely skeptical of the department's ability to successfully complete the process. Reportedly, during the last 18 years, only 75 million, of a population of 120 million, have registered themselves to obtain ID cards. According to rough estimates, the department has so far only been able to issue 50 million NICs throughout the country. Due to lack of computerisation, 25 per cent of the record of those registered with the department has been lost. Officials state that at least four million fake ID cards are floating around the country.

If the government were to rationally and carefully take account of the logistical difficulties, the expense and the political ramifications of its decision regarding NICs, there is little doubt that it would find its salvation lies in backtracking while it can. The decision has been made to appease a small extremist religious lobby. History tells us

that such appeasement does not serve to strengthen tottering regimes. The concessions that Mr Z.A. Bhutto made to religious zealots only whetted their appetite for more. It is a tribute to General Zia's unscrupulous guile that even though he used the religious lobby to legitimise his usurpation of power, he kept them at bay when it was politically expedient to do so. The decision to add the religion column to the ID cards was first taken by the Islamic Ideology Council in 1984, but the general kept matters pending to avoid the political backlash. The IJI government desperate to use the Islamic card against Benazir Bhutto's populism, has taken a decision, which not only goes against the national interest and belies the promises made by our founders, it will also increase their political difficulties. If this preposterous demand is conceded, the religious fanatics battle against democracy and rationality will gain renewed vigour. Their offensive for banning interest is only one such demand. Proclaiming adherents of certain smaller sects as *kafirs* is another in an unending list. On the other hand, the minorities of this country will be shamefully alienated. Pakistan will be denounced as a polity of fanatics in international circles and foreign investment and trade that we are so desperately seeking will be negatively affected. Against all these adverse ramifications, the government's argument that the religion column is necessary for the efficient administration of separate electorates is, indeed, ludicrous. If there are four million fake ID cards already floating around, and new cards are made for the whole population, God knows how many millions will be sham.

#### Will Divide Citizens

93AS0183E Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 3 Nov 92 p 5

[Text] Lahore—All the founder members of the National Democratic Alliance including Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Mairaj Mohammed Khan and a large number of other political leaders have condemned the government's decision to include a religion column in the national identity card.

At the dinner hosted by THE FRONTIER POST on Sunday the leaders expressed their concern in this regard.

Almost all the political figures present on the occasion maintained that the inclusion of a religion column leads to deplorable consequences not only for the minorities but for majority as well.

They were of the view that on the one hand it would add to the problems of the minorities and on the other, it would pave the way for the inclusion of columns like sect and caste, etc. They termed it a conspiracy to divide the country on religious lines.

The politicians who expressed their resentment included Maulana Kausar Naizi, Ghulam Mustafa Khan, Salman Taseer, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Agha Murtaza Pooya, Rana Ikram Rabbani, Manzoor Gichki, Haider Farooq Maududi, K.M. Azhar and Noor Mohammed Achakzai.

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi said the decision negated the teachings of Quaid-e-Azam as he had always advocated equal rights for minorities. Nawabzada Nasrullah was of the view that this decision would compel the minorities to demand a separate province. Mairaj Mohammad Khan maintained that it would increase discrimination against minorities and they would not be able to find a job anywhere.

Maulana Kausar Niazi said that this decision was being taken under the pressure of a certain mullah group. However, he added that it was totally against the Islamic history of protecting minorities' rights.

Abdul Hafeez Pirzada said it was against the provision of the constitution according to which discrimination at all levels was restricted. Rana Ikram Rabbani said the government had made the decision without calculating its after effects, which would definitely be dangerous for the solidarity of the country.

Agha Murtaza Pooya said it was the brain child of some fundamentalists, who were out to destroy the country in the name of religion.

#### Will Inflate Sectarianism

93AS0183F Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 8 Nov 92 p 10

[Editorial: "Sectarianism Stays"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Noises coming from Islamabad said some time ago that a law against sectarian parties was on the anvil. Interior minister, Ch Shujaat has cleared the air by saying no such law was on the anvil because the anvil was busy hammering out another law making 'religion card' a certainty not open to references in the court of law. Sect politics is here to stay and the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] feels it can handle it better than it can handle banning parties liable to go underground with massive popular support that the IJI itself is counting on to keep the opposition at bay.

Under the circumstances, a wise decision. Here is IJI pandering to the clergy of all stripes by hanging non-Muslims under 'insult' laws and ordering new ID cards; how can it divert the deafening frog-chorus of fundamentalism from the non-Muslims upon its own precarious position? In any case, the TNFJ [Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria] is not at all times toeing the line with IJI; and the clerical consensus on the various laws that the IJI has on the anvil is bound to keep the Sipah-e-Sahaba on the leash. Going into the 'desiderata' of the Shia-Sunni conflict in the history of our religion is a scary task. Maulana Jhangvi always asked to be taken to the Supreme Court because he knew that the 'Islamic' judiciary would become hamstrung in short order over clear verdicts from the famous elders of the three Sunni schools (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith) that Pakistani religious community is divided into. The state of sectarian deadlock suits the IJI. The presence of Iran in the West will keep forcing it to articulate a non-sectarian

stance while 'incidents' on the political margin that the press is supposed to play down can go on taking place.

#### Withdrawal Demanded

93AS0183G Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 8 Nov 92 p 4

[Text] Lahore (PR)—Fr. Vernon Buysier SJ, president, Fr. James Channan OP, vice-president, Conference of Major Superiors of Pakistan (men), and Sr. Arsene Anthony SCJM [expansion not given], president, Conference of Major Superiors of Pakistan (women) in a telegram to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, have expressed their grave shock and anxiety over the recent announcement by Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, minister for religious affairs that a religion column would be included in the national identity cards. They have requested the president to withdraw this decision.

The presidents of the conferences have said that Christians, the community which forms the largest minority group in Pakistan, have reacted very strongly against this one-sided decision. This is being expressed through press conferences, statements, hunger strikes, processions and demonstrations in various parts of the country. They anticipated that the implementation of this decision will cause a sense of deprivation and insecurity in them and they will be discriminated again on the basis of religion. They would be treated as second-class citizens. Moreover, it is a denial of their equal and basic human rights.

They said that Christians have always been patriotic citizens of the country and they are playing a vital role for the welfare and prosperity of the country particularly in education and medical and civil services.

The conference of Major Superiors, Pakistan is an association which represents all Catholic religious priests, brothers, nuns and sisters in Pakistan. This conference works jointly for the matters, concerns, and coordination of activities the Catholic religious are doing for the service and uplift of the country.

#### Sindh Assembly Opposed

93AS0183H Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 4 Nov 92 p 10

[Text] The Sindh Assembly has passed a resolution asking the federal government to rescind its decision to add a column, identifying religion in the national identity card. Both treasury and opposition benches voted together on the resolution tabled in deference to the apprehension of the non-Muslim members of the house that the new 'religion card' would make certain the discrimination against them. It is unusual in Pakistani politics for a province to oppose a measure that the federal government consider consensual. One such resolution was passed by the Sindh Assembly against the construction of Kalabagh Dam under the Junejo government.

The federal government will overlook the resolution, because it is constitutionally not binding, but there is a

moral force behind it that must give pause to any democratic regime. The people of Sindh think that the new ID card would lead to the persecution of the non-Muslims already suffering under the cruel yoke of the 'insult' law. There has been a groundswell of protest against the 'religion' card in Pakistan, because it militates against the founding principles of the state as articulated by the Quaid. Human rights organisations and enlightened circles have circulated similar resolutions, warning the government of the social and international consequences of discrimination through the ID card. No one will go to the court against the new regulation, because the judiciary is already hamstrung by a particular brand of ideological interpretation. One can only pray that, since the new cards will take a long time to prepare, the present government will pass and the regulation will be thrown in the wastepaper basket once the government is not on the scene. The non-Muslims of Pakistan are on trial as never before in the country's history. And Sindh, despite its various other disorders, has realised it.

### Sindh Press Opposed

93AS0183I Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 9 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by Sikandar Brohi]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Most of the Sindhi newspapers lauded the Sindh Assembly's unanimous resolution rejecting Islamabad's decision to include a religion column in national identity cards, terming it a historical one. The Karachi-based daily JAAGO in its issue of November 5 editorially wrote: by passing a resolution to reject the inclusion of a religion column in the national identity card. Sindh Assembly has upheld the dignity of human values and ideals. This move on the part of Sindh Assembly has elevated the honour of Sindh not only in Pakistan but in the world community also. The paper opined that through the said move, Sindh has once again proved that it does not believe in hatreds on the basis of religion, caste or creed.

The daily KAWISH of Hyderabad in its issue of November 5 editorially wrote: Sindh Assembly had done nothing commendable during the past two years and public circles had not only been expressing concern over this state of affairs but also started questioning the necessity of such an institution which had no positive role to play. Under these circumstances the assembly move to reject the inclusion of religion column in ID card, has created a ray of hope in the minds of Sindh people. [passage omitted]

### Intellectuals Opposed

93AS0183J Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*  
in English 2 Nov 92 p 12

[Article by Beena Sarwar]

[Excerpt] The government's decision to include a column for religion in the national identity card shocked

the nation when it was announced on October 13. Not because it was unexpected, but because it happened so fast.

Those who hadn't heard the news that day, woke up to headlines about it in morning newspapers on October 14. "I can't believe this is happening," said a friend, who is normally completely apolitical. She told me about another friend, who had sat stunned, staring at the headlines with tears trickling down her cheeks.

Raising the topic with an uncle, a former journalist who is extremely religious, almost brought on an apopleptic fit. "This is not Islam," he sputtered, clutching his tasbeeh. "They're ruining this country in the name of religion."

Dr Eqbal Ahmed, an expert on the Middle East and a student of Islam, challenges those demanding a religion column to show him "where it is in the Quran." Speaking at a recent seminar on the issue in Lahore, he thundered, "Why are they trying to divide us? Sects will be next." This has been made amply clear by the demand to declare Shias as kafirs, or non-Muslim.

What has brought us to this pass? Dr Ahmed was among the three speakers at the seminar who addressed this issue. The meeting itself was an indication of how far things have gone: it was organised by the newly formed Movement for Justice and Social Tolerance (JUST), initiated by those who form the most privileged—hence normally most complacent—sector of society.

The "liberal intelligentsia" (see F.P., Oct 31), are finally waking up to the fact that they can't ignore the situation any longer; it's too close to home. While their efforts may be met with scepticism by those already in the battleground, there is no denying that if they are truly sincere, their resources, influence and education could be valuable assets to the fight against obscurantism.

JUST got off to a shaky start last month when they attempted to show their support for Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali. The minister for commerce had graciously accepted an invitation to meet them, but quite ungraciously (and not surprisingly) turned it down at the last moment when the tightened reins of Islamabad pulled him up short.

But the recent, well organised seminar made up for this, with well informed speakers like Hamid Khan, President of the Lahore High Court Bar Association and historian K.K. Aziz besides Dr Ahmed.

Mr Khan, in his bold talk about the legislative history of Pakistan, pointed out that the ID card decision was not at all surprising. "We've been moving towards this for some time now. [passage omitted]

### To Exacerbate Divisions

93AS0183K Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
21 Oct 92 p 9

[Article by Abbas Rashid: "Dividing Ourselves"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Yet another blow has been struck for divisiveness and discrimination with the decision to add a column for religion in Pakistan's National Identity Card (NIC). The decision has been widely regarded as paving the way for accentuating the process of discrimination that already exists in Pakistan, against the citizens who belong to non-Muslim minorities—in a cultural ethos increasingly pervaded by prejudice, narrow-mindedness and exclusivism. Not since the separation of our Eastern wing and the formation of Bangladesh has divisiveness been such a prominent leitmotif in our body-politic. Among other things, we stand divided on the basis of sect, *biradri*, ethnicity and language.

Whatever useful purpose might have been served by adding a column for religion in the NIC in a particular set of circumstances, it is entirely clear that in the present situation, given the manner in which the minorities have been marginalised and even persecuted, especially over the recent years, adding such a column can only lead to increased victimisation of the country's non-Muslim citizens and add considerably to their insecurity. It is not for nothing that the Bishop of Lahore, the Rev. Dr Alexander Malik, felt constrained to refer to it as a policy of apartheid, not on the basis of colour but on the grounds of religion. Given this kind of a strong reaction from the minorities, that should not have been at all difficult to anticipate, one would have assumed that the government would put forward a half way decent justification in defence of such a major, and highly questionable decision. However, the most weighty reason so far has to do with facilitating the system of separate electorates for which the voters lists are prepared on the basis of the NICs. Now, for one thing there has been no recent chorus of complaints from any side that the NIC format was in any way inadequate for the smooth functioning of the separate electorate system. If anything, the minorities have from time to time raised their voice in favour of doing away with the system of separate electorates, as it keeps them from participating properly in the country's mainstream politics to their own as well as the nation's detriment.

The timing and manner of the decision is also illustrative. At a time when floods have wreaked havoc across much of the country and hundreds of people have been killed while property and crops worth billions of rupees have been destroyed, our politically ambitious religious parties such as the Jama'at-e-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam were apparently seized with the urgency of modifying the NIC format to include a column on religion. How this was going to help alleviate the misery and loss suffered by millions of Muslims (and, presumably, some non-Muslims) was never made clear. In any case, they threatened to demonstrate before the National Assembly if this and other similar demands were not accepted. Of course, this says something for their priorities. It also says a lot about the government which a day before the proposed demonstration conceded the demand. It is a measure also of the low esteem in which the government holds minorities that when the Minister for Religious Affairs, Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi, was

asked if he had consulted the different communities on a matter of such immediate import to them before taking the decision, he said there was no need to ask the opinion of minority leaders because Pakistan was formed on the basis of religion, Islam. How well has the Maulana served the cause of Islam, a religion, more than anything else, of universalism, tolerance and humanism by projecting it as being so completely indifferent to the concerns of minorities? He has, however, rather cogently stated the concept of the dictatorship of the majority. And where does this leave us as a nation-state where all citizens are supposedly equal under the Constitution? True, given the rank inequity that has characterised the system ever since Pakistan's inception, this has largely remained in the realm of the abstract. But does that mean that instead of working towards the ideal, however, painfully slow the progress, we start moving in the opposite direction through such policies and administrative actions?

As reported in the Press, the decision has been taken in the light of recommendations of the provincial governments, Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). Whether the provincial governments made such recommendations on their own initiative or were induced to do so by the Ministry of Religious Affairs headed by Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi is anybody's guess. The assertion, however, that the Council of Islamic Ideology had anything to do with it has been squarely challenged by the well-known lawyer and expert on the process of 'Islamisation' of laws, Mr Afzal Haider, who contends that no such recommendation has been made in the recent past and that, in any case, a Ministry was not entitled to refer such a matter of the CII. While the Maulana, then, has sought to create the impression that the decision, though taken outside the Assembly, was based on a relatively broad consensus, it in fact reeks of the worst kind of politically-motivated closed-door manoeuvring quite bereft of any consideration of service to Islam or public welfare. While it undoubtedly undermines the status of non-Muslim minorities, it also does very little for the moral standing of the Muslims majority.

However, there is reason to believe that a majority of this country's Muslim population has no interest in turning its minorities into second-class citizens. Otherwise, the National Assembly could well have been the forum for such a decision. But since the Zia years, particularly, divide and rule seems to have been a pronounced feature of state policy. Fomenting divisions within the polity becomes something of an imperative in the context of governance under an undemocratic dispensation. That is bad enough. However, when supposedly democratic governments appear bent upon pursuing policies of divisiveness to ensure their continuance in power, the crisis becomes that much more acute.

One may add, parenthetically, that such policies are not limited to the area of religio-politics alone. Consider, for



instance, the case of the MQM [Mohajir Qaumi Movement]: Gen Zia's government is credited with strengthening the MQM as a counter-weight to the PPP [Pakistan People's party] in Sindh. In the process Sindh's rural-urban divide was considerably reinforced. Subsequently, when the MQM was perceived as having gotten out of hand, the MQM (Haqiqi) was encouraged to come forward to outflank the former. Now another sarkari' faction has apparently given its blessing to the MQM (Amn Pasand). In the manoeuvring to keep the Sindh government propped up, a number of other Mohajir organisations have also been encouraged to stake their claim, but, meanwhile, virtually nothing has been done to facilitate the bridging of the urban-rural divide in Sindh. Only further divisions have been created.

To conclude, what happens when a politico-religious group such as the Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP) demands that the sect should also figure on the NIC? After all, it does refer to the Shias as *kafirs* and certainly sees in them a greater threat than all the religious minorities of Pakistan put together. It is highly unlikely that it will for long put up with ID cards that put Sunnis and Shias in the same category: Muslim. Having initially encouraged the ASSP, the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Ittehad] now finds the sectarian organisation inconvenient. Having cracked down on its militant workers, it now seeks to outflank it by strengthening the Anjuman Sipah-e-Mustapha (ASM), an organisation of Bareilvi Sunnis. Whatever the merit of such moves as tactics, these are completely bankrupt as a strategy for national solidarity. It is time for the government to take a cool long look at the increasingly divided polity over which it presides and review its decision before going further down the slippery slope.

### Waste of Money

93AS0183L Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
23 Oct 92 p 9

[Article by Masud Ahmad: "What New Identity Cards Imply"; quotation marks, italicized words as published]

[Excerpt] What is all this brouhaha about the government's very apt and timely decision to add a column of religion in the identity card? Aren't we proud to own our faith—Islam? So, I am sure, would be the Hindus living in Pakistan or Christians and Buddhists or Sikhs, at least in their hearts, although it may be injudicious for them to declare it openly. All that our Religious Minister Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi (and this is only half of his name), impelled by our zealous Ulema, has decided—and the Federal Government has promptly bowed down to his decision—is that our faith should be entered on our identity cards. Instead of sharp criticism from our intellectuals, the government ought to have been lauded for the urgency with which it has taken up this issue. Yes, we are facing horrendous problems. Huge parts of our countryside have been washed away, houses, people's belongings, crops, the very land. How many lives were lost, human, animal, we still do not have the exact figure. What efforts, what resources are needed to restore a

semblance of normalcy? The Prime Minister is hopping from one deluged spot to another, nonstop. He announces, wherever he lands from his helicopter, that he cannot rest in peace seeing what has happened to our land. Praise be to our Ulema. They can rise above these worldly worries. Stamping a person's religion on his identity card has a priority of its own regardless of any circumstances.

Good thing they had Maulana Niazi holding the portfolio of Religious Affairs who was ready to go along with them. What if someone less zealous had taken over his office? Remember he had threatened to resign if the government went to appeal against the Federal Shariat Court's [FSC] decree that interest was "repugnant to the injunctions of Islam." The government did go to appeal against the FSC's ruling in June. Maulana Abdus Sattar is still sitting in the ministerial chair, his 'turra', stiffly starched, still standing a foot-and-a-half high. What could have urged him not to resign could be a realisation that as a Minister he could be of more service to Islam—send people for Haj gratis, for one thing—than as an ordinary citizen. And now his great achievement of adding a person's religion on his or her identity card, earning for Pakistan the distinction for being the first country in the world to think of this novelty.

Printing new cards for our burgeoning nation will cost Rs [Rupees] 500 million. This money could go on flood relief work, you can say. After all, the nation has survived for so many years on old identity cards. But this would be nitpicking. We can spend Rs 150 million on face-lifting of a Governor's House and nearly a million rupees for a VVIP plane, what is Rs 500 million to provide a new identity to the entire nation! Imagine the elation it would provide, carrying an authenticated testimonial in your pocket that you are a Muslim! What about the other communities? Well, they do not matter really. The meeting chaired by Maulana Niazi which took the final decision did not care to invite any member of the minority communities to partake in the discussions—if there were any. It was a gathering of some Ulema and senior bureaucrats which took the hasty decision and the Federal Government blindly okayed it.

Any flaw in the idea?

A small point, but it could create complications: How would the authority issuing new national identity cards know that a man named Ghulam Ahmad or Nooruddin or Bashir Ahmad or Rashid Ahmad or Nizar Ali or Asif Ali is indeed a Muslim before stamping it on his card?

The Religious Minister, himself a maulana, and his posse of ulema could not have given a thought to this problem. It is not their forte to think of possible ramifications of anything they do with pious intentions. The bureaucrats are not much different. but if you ask them this question they would, as is their custom, blurt out an "easy" solution. Just have it endorsed by your area's SHO [Station House Officer]. Imagine the consequences?

Forget what were the views of the Founder of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, on this subject.



His thoughts are just to be flashed on the TV screen as a form of ritual, not to be taken seriously. Picture in your mind the scene of a 100 million people, men, women and children, surging to obtain the blessings of their area SHO about their religious beliefs, some travelling 20 miles or more to reach the place, camping around *thanas* to wait for their turn, for the *thanedar sahib* to spare time for them—of course for a small “fee.” It would surely provide another occasion for the Prime Minister to flutter all over the country in his helicopter landing unannounced to be vociferously greeted by huge assemblages, and announcing to them that he will not rest till every Pakistani—every Muslim actually, as others don’t matter—gets a certificate that he is a Muslim. Of course, there has to be a follow-up by brother Shahbaz Sharif and other Muslim League (which founded Pakistan and is to lead it to its glorious destiny) stalwarts to ensure that the process of affirming a person’s Islamic identity by the police officials is carried out fairly without any hanky-panky.

And precisely what will be the function of the new entry on the card? You don’t have to prove that you are a Muslim to get your son admitted to a primary school, to get a cinema ticket or purchase *dal* and *atta* from the utility stores or enter your barber’s saloon for a haircut or order a diamond-studded necklace from one of the classy jeweller’s shops which are more numerous in

Islamabad and Rawalpindi now than the barber’s saloons (flourishing on smuggled gold and diamonds) or to get into a bus to travel to Theri Sansi or Sambrial. Maybe, it would be needed if you are donating blood or a kidney to a Muslim patient. Maybe, in course of time, you may have to show your identity card to enter a mosque to offer your *namaz* to avoid the sort of incident that occurred in Peshawar recently. A Qadiani actually dared to enter a mosque and said his prayers. He was arrested, but only because he was an eminent lawyer and could be recognised. If he were an ordinary unknown person, he would have easily escaped. In fact, he could have repeatedly gone into the mosque and prayed with impunity. Our pious government would have to think about such an eventuality and make it a requirement to carry your card when going to a mosque.

I only hope Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi does not come out with a ruling tomorrow that the identity card of the deceased would be needed to allow a dead body to be buried in a Muslim graveyard. That would be taking the joke a bit too far. Tomorrow they may ordain that the identity card will be buried along with the body, at least in case of Muslims, for ready reference for Munkar and Nakeer. Whether they will give any credence to a certificate issued by the Ministry of Interior of Pakistan of the year 1992 is another question. [passage omitted]

**Government Policy on GATT Criticized**

93AS0185F Lahore THE NATION in English 31 Oct 92  
p 6

[Article by Anjum Ibrahim: "GATT Round Stalled Again"]

[Text] Individual countries, over the years, have amassed a whole range of import controls ostensibly for the purpose of protecting their domestic industries but, in reality, have achieved only inefficiency. And if a domestic industry constitutes a powerful pressure group then the government becomes adamant about not changing its existing protectionist policies since few governments can resist voters pressure. Yet GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) as an international forum, is designed to exert pressure on those states which are reluctant to abandon protectionism for achieving, what they claim, higher levels of world trade whose benefits are likely to filter down to the poorest nations of the world. But one cannot deny the fact that lower import controls of a particular commodity may benefit country A more than country B. However, higher world trade due to fewer import controls, so argues GATT, can and does lead to higher output in countries, with higher employment levels, and the ability to take a recession ridden economy towards prosperity.

The current scenario of the stalled GATT talks is pretty much what has been stated. The big players in the controversy are the United States on the one hand and the European Community on the other. And within the Community there are those countries which have aligned themselves with the U.S. stance, like Britain, and then there is France with a powerful farm lobby and an election due within four months. The issue is simple: America wants the EEC [European Economic Community] to lower its farm subsidies because they provide unfair competition to American producers in the international market place. And the U.S. President, facing elections on November 3, wants the issue resolved before that date as he feels it can be used as part of his election campaign. To achieve a prompt resolution of the controversy Mr Bush has threatened the recalcitrant French with import controls against their cheese and wine exports to the U.S. But the French are adamant. And right now have adopted delaying tactics. Pierre Beregovoy, the French Prime Minister, recently stated that the issue is not likely to be resolved till after the U.S. general elections. Perhaps, ideally, he will be able to postpone it till after the elections in France and, then too, adopt a watered down solution of the American demands.

The British Prime Minister John Major is adopting a pro-U.S. stance, something which the other members of the EEC are used to by now. His purpose, or so he claims, is to promote world farm trade which, if the GATT agreement is reached, will increase the volume of world trade by over 100 billion dollars out of which Britain's share will be substantial. Besides Mr Major's contention is that in the current recessionary phase being faced by world economies any promotion of trade would boost

output and lead to prosperity. But Britain has always been against farm subsidy policy of the EEC known as CAP (Common Agricultural Policy). CAP is designed to subsidise farm output. In France where land holdings are small, because of the inheritance laws, there is great need for subsidisation as economies of scale are impossible to achieve. In Britain the situation is entirely different where land holdings are large. But Britain has been powerless to stop subsidy payments to its farmers after the EEC had adopted CAP. Yet another negative angle of CAP is that subsidy payments by the state have to be paid for by the general public. And this is the reason why EEC consumers pay higher prices for their farm produce. The surplus farm output is then dumped on to third world countries whose farmers, equally subsidised, i.e., as much as their governments can afford, talk against dumping by the West. Cap, therefore, does not serve anyone's interests but that of a few farmers in the Community who have small land holdings.

Britain has harnessed Germany's help in convincing France to reach a GATT agreement. But it is extremely doubtful if Germany would put pressure on France to succumb other than merely exhorting it to do so. Hence it is probably safe to say that GATT deadlock would continue unless of course Mr Bush decides to tone down U.S. demands in the interest of reaching a compromise prior to general elections.

Even those countries of the world with a decided anti-American foreign policy cannot but help support the U.S. in its recent thrust to get the EEC to lower its farm subsidies. But it is important to remember that whereas America can get the EEC talking at least, the rest of the world, even if it had joined hands, would have been unable to do. And the reason is that the U.S. has economic clout based on it being a major trading partner of EEC member states. That it uses this clout for promoting its own trade is understandable, though, perhaps, not very altruistic. And it has become patently obvious that where economic considerations of individual states are concerned there is little chance that a decision contrary to its perception of its own economic interests will be entertained. The recent example of the German Bundesbank's decision not to lower its interest rates further despite the fact that it caused a European currency crisis bears ample proof of this fact. And, indeed, the current GATT deadlock can be ascribed to nothing more than the preservation of the political interests of the ruling party in France.

Within the GATT talks Pakistan presents rather insignificant entity with little economic clout and with interests making it lean towards the U.S. stance. Our government too, like others, heavily subsidise the domestic agricultural sector. And the fact that this sector constitutes the pivot on which the entire economy runs makes the success of the GATT talks vital to our interests. That subsidisation of this sector has further increased this year due to the recent floods cannot be denied. Now interest free loans have been added to other subsidies that this sector has traditionally enjoyed. In Pakistan the

agricultural sector has, perhaps, the most political clout amongst all other pressure groups and hence no decision deemed to be against the interest of its sub-sector, represented by the rich absentee landlords, is entertained in the National or Provincial Assemblies of the country. Ideally, of course, the government must not only withdraw all subsidies to this sector, while utilising the money so saved for social sector development, but also effect a structural shift which will make our annual growth in output dependant on raw materials other than those emanating from our farms. But such is an impossibility as no such policy decision would be allowed to become effective.

The government of Pakistan, succumbing to pressure from its international aid donors, has already committed to lower subsidies and to end all existing import controls in a phased manner over a four year period. With GATT still deadlocked and the rich nations refusing to follow policy recommendations detrimental to their interests such a stance on the part of the Pakistani government seems hasty, at best. This is especially so since our trade deficit is rising. Surely our government ought to have stalled for time—something which they do as regards other aid conditionalities.

#### **Foreign Remittances Said Declining**

93AS0185C Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
24 Oct 92 p 6

[Article by Anjum Ibrahim: "Remittances—An Important Source of Foreign Exchange"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] As a general rule remittance income is associated with Third World countries. The failure or rather inability of a typical developing nation's government to provide jobs for its ever growing population, or social services, or for that matter high wages leave those in the lower middle classes and those with technical skills to look for jobs elsewhere. While this sector of the population does technically constitute emigration yet they rarely categorise themselves as such since their families, more often than not, remain back, and are dependant for meeting their living expenses on income that is remitted to them. They are also associated with high consumption patterns as the remitted income is initially used to provide basic amenities to the family unit like housing, electronic gadgets, etc.

The government of the home country, as opposed to that of the resident country, has realised that remitted income is in the form of a most coveted and scarce commodity, i.e., foreign exchange. It can be used to meet the import bill, pay off past debts and incur more loans from the international financial community. This explains the involvement in helping their populace to procure jobs abroad by the Third World governments. And an attempt is made to harness the higher consumption patterns associated with remitted income to promoting investment in the country through allocating favourable terms and conditions in the industrial policy.

And of course to try to make policy changes which are perceived by those remitting income as detrimental to their interests and by implicit logic to those of the state, if remitted income is not being used for investment. This explains why, in Pakistan, we have a Minister for Overseas Pakistani labour.

As we are all aware remittance income is very important in terms of the national economy. In the Finance and Development December 1991 issue Sadek Wahab outlines Pakistan's case: "The number of Pakistani workers jumped from roughly 500,000 in 1975 to 1.25 million in 1979. With this massive movement of labour came a movement of capital in the form of remittances to their home countries. These became the major source of foreign currency and, therefore, an important element in the balance of payments of many labour exporting countries. Such flows...continued to grow dramatically up to the mid-1980's in most cases, particularly relative to the flows of exports of goods and services from the home countries of migrant workers... There was a general downward trend in the period 1985-89, but in many countries in the region the volume of remittances remained high relative to exports of goods and services. In 1989, this ratio was: 37 per cent for Pakistan... As a percentage of GDP [Gross Domestic Product], remittances remained at roughly the same level in Pakistan for 1988 and 1989 (5.6 and 5.9 per cent respectively)." Of course the reason for the decline in the mid-1980's is considered to be recession in the Middle East and the falling oil prices but Wahab states that in Egypt remittances continued to rise during this period. And in his view this is due to the fact that Egypt attracted the four different kinds of remittances.

Thus remittances are of four kinds. First, there are potential remittances defined as all savings once the migrant's expenses in his host country have been met. This of course consists of the maximum amount that can be remitted by the migrant. The other extreme of this is termed fixed remittances, i.e., the minimum amount a migrant remits to satisfy his family's basic needs. The rest is saved in the host country or any other country other than the home country. The two other forms are between these two extremes. Discretionary remittances that are over and above fixed remittances and saved remittances which represent a savings in a country outside the home country. What exactly determines the latter two is the incentives/monetary and investment markets in the home country and it is, therefore, very essential, to monitor these markets if a home country is to successfully tap these sources of remittances.

In this context it is extremely pertinent to determine whether our government is allocating the necessary reforms/measures to attract the two median types of remittances. The first point is that the rupee value is constantly falling vis-a-vis other major currencies of the world. And secondly, the real interest rates continue to be negative. Thus any emigrant worker investing in the capital market in rupees will lose as the financial market will not ensure a positive rate of return given the

inflation rate and the 10 per cent tax recently imposed on profits accruing on all deposits. The government can very well argue that since foreign exchange accounts are now allowed the emigrant can invest right here in foreign currency, and get a loan for business purposes in rupees based on his foreign exchange account. This is indeed true but it is not an incentive that is not available in the Middle East or in the West. Besides a lot of our emigrants are not really into starting a business. What is required, and is in fact being promoted by the government, is to form a sort of consortium of emigrants to commence business operations in Pakistan. This too might not prove successful as the majority of our emigrants prefer to save instead of taking a risk with their hard-earned savings which a business venture necessarily implies.

Pakistan also has an official and unofficial source for remitting income. The latter gives higher rates for foreign currencies. And there has been no effort on the part of the government to bring the unofficial source into the legal gambit. So a lot of foreign currency remitted is lost to the government. Some of it may come back into the foreign currency accounts allowed by the government of Mr Nawaz Sharif, but it is doubtful if all of it would. And the reason is that residents of Pakistan are also beginning to understand the financial loss that can accrue from saving domestically. Thus the difference between the real domestic interest rate and the real foreign interest rate may prove to be the major deterrent to the promotion of savings in Pakistan.

Wahab argues 'When a parallel market exists and the government wishes to increase the flow of recorded remittances, it could devalue its exchange rate. A devaluation will reduce the differential between the parallel and official rates and will make it attractive for workers to remit through official channels.' But the present government seems reluctant to do so. In fact, our new Industry Minister recently boasted that for the first time ever the Pak rupee was higher valued than the Indian rupee—an argument not conducive to a devaluation.

And now in the aftermath of the Gulf war our remittance income has further declined to the failure of the government to procure jobs abroad. One cannot imagine that our workers' efficiency has declined just that our foreign policy during the war has back-fired on us as far as supporting the balance of payment position is concerned through workers' remittances. Lower aid seems to be another factor that Pakistan has to contend with in the aftermath of the war. And even though experts have risen, whether due to the industrial policies of Nawaz

Sharif or not, yet the decline in remittances is more than enough to offset any gains made through an increase in the exports of goods. Hence changes are urgently required in the economic and foreign policy areas of activity of the present government.

#### **Government Statement on Budget Deficit Said Incorrect**

93AS0185A Lahore THE NATION in English 25 Oct 92  
p 8

[Editorial: "Budget Deficit"]

[Text] Federal Finance Minister, Mr Sartaj Aziz has stated that the budgetary deficit in the current fiscal year is expected to rise by 800 million dollars or approximately 20 billion rupees, i.e., over and above 89 billion rupees that was estimated on May 14 this year when the budget was announced in the National Assembly. He ascribes this to the devastation wrought by the recent floods. But there seem to be some discrepancies in this new estimate of the expected deficit. First of all the extent of the devastation caused by the floods is given as at least two billion dollars and not 800 million dollars. And secondly, the government intends to distribute compensation to the victims, which was not a part of the devastation estimates, hence the expenditure may well be higher than two billion dollars. Of course, the government is diverting resources earmarked for the Special Development Programme [SPD] for flood relief which may account for the much lower estimate of the deficit than is warranted by the extent of the damage caused by the floods; yet, the Finance Minister seems to have overlooked the fact that at least 50 per cent of the revenue that he had originally envisaged in his budget speech can no longer be realised because of the unwillingness of certain categories of people to pay the new or higher taxes.

Yet another aspect of the burgeoning deficit was revealed on May 14 when it was said that the budgetary gap for fiscal year 1992-93 would be 15.5 per cent. In the preceding year it was claimed that the gap would be 7.2 per cent—a target that the government failed to achieve irrespective of the fact that there were no natural calamities that year. In such a situation it seems difficult to believe that 800 million dollars will be the extent of the deficit this year. The real deficit may well be three times as much. And with it, the consequent inflation would rise, forcing the government to over-spend by the greater need to subsidise essential commodities on the one hand and the black-marketeers would increase their profits on the other.

### Commentary Demands Protection for Women in Custody

93AS0185E Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
30 Oct 92 p 9

[Article by Masud Ahmad: "Protection for Women in Custody"]

[Excerpt] One field for the Press to indulge in sensationalism is going to be closed forever. There will be no rapes in police or CIA [Crime Investigation Agency] lockups in future which used to provide grounds for the Press to go berserk. Remember the storm that was raised over the dishonouring of Aasiya Ayub in the Banni Police Station in Rawalpindi or the treatment given to Rahila Tiwana and Shala Raza by the CIA in Karachi run by Samiullah Marwat, a cousin of the (still) illustrious Irfanullah Marwat? These will be stories of the past. The government has decided to deny the police the facilities to enact those abominable dramas in future. In its meeting last week the Federal Cabinet resolved to amend Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code to ensure that women will not be allowed to be remanded to police custody except for offences of murder or dacoity or if there are special circumstances which will be clearly stated in writing. Otherwise, women will now ordinarily be kept in judicial lockup. This is a good news and it elucidates our government's sensitivity to a hateful crime which has been torturing the souls of our conscious public for a long time.

One cannot say that our society was all clean earlier, but it is an incontrovertible fact that the degradation that we descended to during Gen Zia's unholy period had no parallel before. And his legacy continues. Never before Zia's rule did you hear of women being paraded naked in the streets in our rural society and no storm erupting as a consequence. Yet it went on, one incident after another with culprits going scot-free. Then the cult of gang-rapes and the ghouls committing the horrid crime invariably escaping punishment. Rapes and gang-rapes in police stations were a natural sequel and who could debar them? Police were the pet hounds of people in power. Gang-rape of poor women in the Raiwind police station was taken up by the Press and the Chief Minister of Punjab (Mian Nawaz Sharif at that time) ordered an immediate inquiry, the report to be submitted to him, he said as is his wont, within 10 days. Those 10 days have yet to elapse. Then the gang-rape of poor labouring women in the Mandi Bahauddin police station and the gang-rape in ... it has been going on and on. The new law, when enacted, will provide some security to some women in custody. Why women accused of murder or dacoity cannot be kept in judicial lockup escapes commonplace logic. Is a woman accused of murder or dacoity—it can be a totally false accusation—likely to catch hold of the sentry strolling along her cage in the judicial lockup, drag him inside somehow, dig her teeth in his neck and suck his blood? What will prevent her repeating the same act if thrown into police lockup? But then you cannot reason with the ruling class.

Again, it will perhaps not be a very clever thing to ask our pious rulers whether keeping women under detention away from the policemen's reach is the only way to save

those unfortunate women from being raped? Why can't they induce the police force not to indulge in raping women under their charge? They could begin by deputing Religious Minister Maulana Mohammad Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi (full name this time) to go from police station to police station and give regular sermons to staff that raping, even ordinary 'Zina' is a mortal sin in Islam punishable by stoning to death—yes even for policemen. That will surely put the fear of God in their hearts. Even after Maulana Niazi's sermonising if a policeman is caught transgressing they could make an example of the first policeman caught in the act, even if he is the pet tiger of a man in the Cabinet, an example by trying him in a genuine court of law and trying to get for him an exemplary punishment, yet, under the Hudood Act if our penal code is soft on policemen rapists, to send a message to the farce as a whole.

In fact if our Law Minister, Ch Abdul Ghafoor, had even a nodding acquaintanceship with the law of the land he would have stood up to say in the Cabinet meeting that there was no need to enact a fresh law to save women in custody from the beastly lust of policemen. There are enough laws in our statute books against any crime. You can make 10 more laws to save women from police brutality, it will serve no purpose if you have no will or power to apply those laws. Why waste your time and energy on a futile exercise! Better concentrate on making the country self-reliant, marching briskly to the 21st century, becoming a donor country before the next eclipse of the moon and accelerate the process of privatisation including seasonal flooding and not leave everything to public sector WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority]

Oh. Yes. They can add one small clause to the law or rules, if there are any, governing the conduct of the police. The rule should say that no bearer or cook or gardener working with a Deputy Inspector-General of Police or even an Inspector-General will be free to abduct any poor man's daughter he likes and if there is any resistance, have the father or brother of the girl arrested on false charges. If Law Minister Ch Ghafoor cannot make out what I am talking about he should ask his Secretary to read out the editorial in *THE NATION* of October 1 and specially listen to anguished remarks of Justice Khalilur Rehman Randey who rescued a poor family from a dire fate. [passage omitted]

### Amputations Ordered by Special Court

93AS0186D Lahore *THE NATION* in English  
12 Nov 92 p 1

[Text] Lahore—Mr Justice (Retd) Gulbaz Khan of Special Court for Speedy Trials has ordered the amputation of the right hands and left legs of three culprits from Sargodha. They are Muhammad Ashraf, Khalid Javed and Zafar Ali.

The three culprits from south of Sargodha were charged with looting Rs [Rupees] 40,000 from one Zahid Mehmood and seriously injuring him.

### Society Seen Becoming Increasingly Violent

93AS0185G Lahore THE NATION in English 2 Nov 92  
p 7

[Article by Mubarak Ali: "Violence in Society"; italicized words as published]

[Text] Violence has become endemic in our society. The last few years have seen an alarming rate of increase in the number of instances of domestic, political, feudal, gender and several other forms of violence. Gang-rape and violence for vendetta against political opponents are almost daily occurrences. The state's protective institutions, such as the police and the judicial system, appear to have become ineffective against organised violence and armed dacoities, rape and murder. As a matter of fact, these institutions are often themselves implicated in cases of violence.

Violence has a host of social, psychological, institutional, historical, economic and other causes which are intricately related to one another. It is difficult to reduce the phenomenon to a single cause. Nevertheless, some of its psychological and sociological causes can be highlighted very briefly.

Like other social products, violence also begins at home, in the family. Domestic violence is one of the most prevalent forms of violence in society. It is also the one most easily accepted and condoned. According to one report, it occurs in over 50 per cent of homes in Western countries and between 80 and 99 per cent homes in Third World or underdeveloped countries. It is the world's number one problem, yet no international summit such as the one on the environment has ever been held on domestic violence. In the United States, October has been declared to be anti-domestic violence month. Other countries of the world could unite in this endeavour and condemn this most pernicious form of violence.

Central to the relation of violence is the relation of inequality. In the family, the women and children's inequality vis-a-vis the husband makes them the frequent victims of male violence. There is no institutional framework to prevent this form of violence, since in feudal family relations, this is regarded as the male's prerogative and a symbol of his manliness and domination. Patriarchal family relations provide a prop to feudal relations of domination. The male considers the women and children as his private property, which he feels free to treat anyway he likes. Their humanity is diminished because of this treatment as objects. The male child takes his revenge later on by doing the same to his own family and the female child adjusts to violence as her fate.

The penal and judicial systems treat this form of violence as a private 'family' matter. They are reluctant to intervene, leaving the women and children at the mercy of a frustrated male. The patriarchal culture as a whole tacitly supports this violence, as it is essential to maintain feudal power and control by means of the strict control of women and children.

However, those who are beaten at home take the culture of violence outside the home and commit acts of violence against others. Thus, a gradual brutalisation of society begins which has seeds in family relationships and grows

and spreads outwards in society. In society, the inequality of social classes, regions, sects and groups enables those who are in power to suppress weaker groups by means of violence. The state, which reflects and protects the interests of the powerful, allows its violent institutions such as the army and police to be used in the service of powerful groups. It fires upon workers for being on strike, it kills innocent people on suspicion of terrorism, it enacts laws which officially sanction violence against women, for example, the Hudood and Zina Ordinances, stoning for adultery, cutting off hands for stealing, public hangings and the like. Thus as the society is brutalised, the state itself becomes brutalised, since it is an instrument of the ruling groups in society.

When the state becomes terrorist and brutal, its institutions, such as the police and courts, also become brutal. Police rounds up poor people on suspicion of some crime and without any judicial process beats them into false confessions and then punishes them. Judges give increasingly brutal sentences and punishment to those who cannot bribe their way out of prisons. Ruling groups manage to commit violence and stay out of courts and prisons because of their domination over public institutions. The ordinary people pay for the crimes of the powerful.

With the state and society both becoming brutalised, a general acceptance of violence as a way of life sets in. People begin to take violence as normal and are no longer shocked or appalled by headlines of gruesome murders, rapes and dacoities except when these happen to powerful landlords and ruling classes. Then the state may react. Otherwise, the state remains silent when the victim is an unknown person.

When violence becomes rampant, generally accepted as a way of life, people, by and large, become desensitised to it. A general dehumanisation occurs and the value of human life diminishes. As this basic value diminishes, so do all other related values. A general breakdown of values results in an indifference towards the manifestations of violence. The breakdown of the value system is concomitant with institutional breakdown, since institutions were originally created by society to protect the weak against the powerful and to ensure a measure of justice. Since these institutions are no longer responsible to elected representatives, who, in turn, are no longer responsible to the people, state institutions have become unable to perform the function of protection. They have become instruments in the hands of powerful classes just as the state itself is an instrument.

The absence of security and feelings of protection and safety in the home, the street, the *thana*, the court or anywhere has led to general feelings of depression, apathy, indifference and a lack of respect for life. It has led to a general sense of fear, of impermanence, of transience. No one knows when his life or possessions may be destroyed violently. This sense of impermanence, insecurity has created a negative climate for investment and economic growth. Foreign, as well as local, potential investors are afraid of investing in a country where nothing is protected. This increases the flight of capital to safer lands and further augments poverty. This poverty, in turn, becomes another prop to violence, since a

frustrated, unemployed, poor father unable to feed and clothe his children is more likely to commit violence upon the family than one who is able to perform his functions. Violence is thus related to poverty and underdevelopment.

The only way to overcome this problem appears to be to create genuinely representative institutions which are responsible to the people. The state's institutions should be accountable to the people's elected representatives. This will keep a check on the functioning of these institutions, whose job is to protect the citizens, male and female, against violence. The pernicious effects of violence should be discussed in educational institutions to make people aware of its destructive, dehumanising and diminishing effects. To remove brutality from our psyche, it must be removed from those institutions which form our psyche such as the family and the school. Due to prevailing inequalities in the society, public institutions should be geared toward the protection of those who are either physically or economically weaker and subordinate. Only a representative system can take the powerful into account for brutalisation. Therefore, unless we have a proper democracy, we will be incapable of removing violence from our midst, because the state apparatus will be used not for the good of many but for the good of a few against the multitude.

#### Factors Behind Increasing Violence in Society Examined

93AS0185H Lahore *THE NATION* (Supplement)  
in English 4 Nov 92 pp 29-31

[Extract From Paper by K.K. Aziz: "Historical and Social Roots of Violence in Pakistan"; italicized words as published]

[Text] An inquiry into causes of this fanaticism will have to take notice of the following factors:

##### ONE. General ignorance about religion.

Even the educated classes have no knowledge of the Arabic language and cannot read the Quran with understanding. The overwhelming majority of them doesn't even read the interlinear translation; they merely recite or read aloud the text every morning as an act of devotion, not of comprehension. Their faith is sincere but truly blind. There is a great deal of difference between being told what God has said and reading God's own word oneself even if one's Arabic is not of a very high standard. The way the subject of Islamiyat is defined and taught in the schools and colleges is no help. Thus the educated class derives its knowledge of Islam from commentaries, glosses, collection of *fatwas* and such other secondary literature in exactly the same way as the illiterate villager takes on trust the belief and practice of his faith from the *mullah* of the local mosque who knows no Arabic. This ignorance, which is on a massive scale, does not allow the Muslims to acquaint themselves with the real message of tolerance contained in the Quran.

##### TWO. National trait of intolerance.

It appears as if it is easy to be intolerant and self-righteous in matters of religion anywhere: look at the

Roman Catholic-Protestant warfare in Northern Ireland, the Christian-Muslim clash in Nigeria and the Lebanon, the resurgence of Hindu feeling in India, etc. But in a society like ours, where tolerance and compromise and forbearance are rare attitudes of mind, religious feelings, often uninformed and extrinsically excited, are bound to add an inflammatory element...

##### THREE. The role of political parties.

Since their birth in the subcontinent and in an increasing measure since 1947, all political parties, the secular claims of some of them notwithstanding, have been using religion to achieve their ends and, as was inevitable, fanning the flame of fanaticism...

##### FOUR. Religious groups and parties teach self-righteousness.

Even if we overlook for a moment the sectarian rifts, we find a diverse and variform collection of groups and parties which, professing the advance and greatness of Islam as their sole aim, teach their followers and the general citizenry the virtues of a literal, uncompromising and inflexible approach in everything to do with religion. Self-righteousness is identified with devotion of one's beliefs, and religiosity with religion. Toleration is suspect as a weakening of the fibre of faith. A kindly look at other religions is interpreted as next door to apostasy. Sympathy for those who are not within a specified pale is branded as heresy.

This claim to infallibility is due to several circumstances:

A society which admires strong and self-centred personalities; and educational system which teaches by rote rather than understanding and expects blind obedience rather than critical scrutiny; a priesthood which, in spite of being out of place in Islam, dictates religious opinions, defines and prescribes and enforces ritual, presides over religious practices and occasions, and in matters of controversy or conflict of interpretations has no objection to fighting among itself and using indelicate phrases to describe its rivals; and an inability to argue one's case and defend one's cause without losing one's temper.

##### FIVE. The government encourages it in the "national interest."

Governments, which are composed of political parties and religious groups, find it easier to win elections and run the country through appeals to religious feelings than through economic planning, social welfare, political skill and rational debate. Once this has become a tradition, religious ideas and opinions and convictions are shaped into orthodox and dogmatism. The society, at the same time a creator and a victim of the combined assault of political intolerance and religious fanaticism, is now ready to accept as the true writ an ideology devised and dictated by the Establishment. Political need is imposed as the law of necessity. Ideology is prescribed as the first prerequisite of national integrity. This ideology is not even vaguely defined, but it is eloquently defended, extravagantly praised, and rigidly enforced.

##### SIX. Religion-politics nexus.



The general statement that "in Islam religion and politics are inseparable" is made *ad nauseam* by politicians, Ulema and publicists. But they never substitute in this sentence the word "politics" with "economics" or "manners" or "public morals" or "work ethics" or "business morality" or "social equality." Those who mouth this platitude or offer it as the argument to end all arguments do not explain how an Islamic state or system sanctions feudalism and concentration of wealth and political oppression and rigged elections and so on. They are blind to the fact that by making the statement "in Islam, religion and politics are inseparable" and applying it to the existing political system they are tarring Islam with the brush of their own brand of politics and of their personal inadequacies, and in consequence giving a bad name to a noble religion in the eyes of not only the "heathen" West but also the true Muslims everywhere.

Another implication of this assertion falsifies history. By declaring that the only force behind the creation of Pakistan was Islam they expose themselves to two criticisms. First, the claim ignores the economic and political and geographical factors and pressures which gave life to the Pakistan Movement, and thus falsifies history. Had the Muslims of India been on a par with the Hindus in matters of education and economy, or had they been treated as equals by the non-Muslims, or had they been scattered all over the subcontinent without a province or region in which they formed a majority, there would have been no demand for Pakistan and no country of that name. Secondly, the statement flies in the face of the events of 1971, when approximately half the Muslims of Pakistan left Pakistan because they were convinced that there was no place for them in the country.

This ideological stance has led to the campaign of Islamisation, the debate on the meaning and scope of *shariat*, and the tremor of misgiving and fear which is now running up the spine of the minorities and the liberal Muslims.

#### SEVEN. The legacy of General Ziaul Haq.

By encouraging all these tendencies and lending them the invincible strength of martial law, General Ziaul Haq, who himself had come to power by violating the country's Constitution, opened the floodgates of violence in politics as well as in society. Gun-running armed the unruly elements of the population, which included the religious parties, the student organisations and the riff-raff of the land. Drug trade made some Generals and politicians rich and a few million citizens addicts. The half-educated religious leader was officially confirmed in his pedantry and formalism and prudery; he was encouraged to issue *ex cathedra* utterances on literalism, unbending dogma and hard, irrational interpretations; he was allowed to sell his cant and bigotry as true Islam; he was permitted to set up an inquisition which tested and passed the Muslims by his own standards of sanctimony, hypocrisy and pharisaism; and he was licensed to pontificate on the true nature and contours of an Islamic state.

The alliance of a Chief Martial Law Administrator, who believed that he was a special gift of God to the nation,

and his authorised agents who had made Islam into an easy and lucrative livelihood was as irresistible as it was noxious. Hand in hand with this religious rigour ordered by an oracle in military uniform went relentless social harassment and a torrent of fiery edicts on how the citizens should order their lives. As expected, this *Weltanschauung* gave birth to a *Weltschmerz*, an agony of mind and an anguish of heart, which, denied all ways and means of deliverance, found release in raging sectarianism, unbridled dacoity, student hooliganism, common looting and general barbarism.

Violence became the norm.

#### Sectarianism

On relative moral grounds—if morality can ever be relative—it could perhaps be argued that sectarianism is a shade worse than fanaticism because the citadel to be defended is a sect not a religion. But this reasoning is perverse and won't do. The sectarian asserts that his sect follows the true religion, while all others believe in *kafir* or are outside the pale of Islam or at best are slaves of distortions of the original message. Fanaticism knows no such casuistry, and is nothing but ill-directed zeal irrespective of what inspires this irrational loyalty: from Communism through Socialism to Fascism. The Left and the Right in politics have been as devastating in their conduct and consequences as the sects in religion. It would be imprudent to applaud it in one sphere and condemn it in another.

Sectarianism has a long pedigree in Indian Islam, a genealogical tree of distinguished names. Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, popularly revered as a *mujaddad* of Islam, was not only anti-Hindu (religious fanaticism) but also anti-Shia (religious sectarianism) and anti-Iran and Turan (racial prejudice). Aurungzeb Alamgir was a strict Hanafi, and the *Fatawa-i-Alamgiri* prepared on his orders by a team of Ulema enshrines a code which if fully implemented would make a country a Hanafi State unacceptable not only to the Shias but also to the same degree to the Malikis, the Hanbalis and the Shafis. Shah Waliullah and Shah Abdul Aziz upheld and propagated in their school in Delhi the Hanafi sect of the Sunnis. So did Sayyid Ahmad Barelawi in the short-lived *khilafat* be established on the north-west frontier. So did the *Faraizi* movement and its later offshoots in Bengal.

As if this Shia-Sunni rift were not enough to keep the Ulema busy in firing their broadsides at their enemies in Islam, the Sunnis themselves broke up into a half dozen sects, with each sect having a teaching school of its own and a board of vociferous and intemperate *Ulema* and a few journals of propaganda, and the Deobandis even a political party of their own, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind. The Shias had had their splinter groups since much longer, and produced sects like the Alavis, the Druzes, the Ismailis and a few others, which have fought against each other without compunction.

The four legal schools of Sunni Islam may or may not be sects in the technical sense, but each of them has its own theology, collection of beliefs, legal code, interpretation of *nass* (Quranic text containing a clear injunction or



proscription), and preference for one or the other collection of *hadith*. It is difficult to avoid the label of sect for them. In the application of the Quranic teachings and the *sunna* to a Muslim's belief and the daily practice of this belief, they differ almost as much from one another as the Sunnis as a whole do from the Shias.

The history of the Muslim world is not lacking in examples of Shia-Sunni State rivalry and even open hostilities. To take only three major examples: the clash between the Shia Fatimid Khilafat in Egypt and the Sunni Arabs and Turks, the Mughal-Safavi conflict, and the Ottoman-Safavi quarrels.

Modern Indian history is replete with sectarian strife and bloodshed. Shia-Sunni riots have occurred at various places with depressing frequency, at times giving an opportunity to mischief-seeking groups to jump into the fray, as the Ahrars and the Khaksars did in the United Provinces in the 1930s and early 1940s. The Ahrars were also responsible for the anti-Ahmadiyya movement of the 1930s, when the Ahmadis were still a sect of Islam.

The United Provinces led the rest of India in producing, proliferating and giving virility to sectarianism. Deoband and Bareilly were the principal centres of fissiparous trends. Soon the disease spread to other provinces, and there was a general free-for-all among the Ahl-i-Hadith, the Ahl-i-Quran and a number of other more minor groups. Their intellectual(?) leadership argued in unrestrained language in their respective journals and newspapers, their religious spokesmen thundered at each other from the *mimbars* (pulpits) of their separate mosques, and the smaller fry fought it out in the streets and bazars and lanes.

With the creation of Pakistan religious factionalism was given a fillip by four developments:

ONE. As the Hindu enemy was no longer present to attract their hatred and gall and animus, the religious-minded Muslims and their leaders were content to fight among themselves. In Muslim history the faithful have always been more united when pitched against a foe or existing as a minority than when living without an outsider among them.

TWO. The migration of a large number of Ulema and *maulawis* from India, especially from the United Provinces, breathed a new spirit into the schismatic rivalry. Bred and schooled in sectarian seminaries and making a good living from delivering polemics and issue *fatwas*, they were quick to turn their new home into an arena of religious discord.

THREE. The emphasis placed by certain quarters on Pakistan's being a child of Islam brought these *maulawis* into the political mainstream, and since it was Islam which was being debated they claimed and received a priority hearing.

FOUR. Pakistan has had a succession of governments which were indifferent to the country's weal, too much in

love with power, incompetent in administration, and too weak to stand up to the *mullah*.

The natural result of this favourable environment was that sectarianism flourished, denominational differences and divergences gained undue importance, recusancy and dissent became intolerable, excommunication or the threat of it grew to be a menace, law and order deteriorated, and violence grew apace. Hot gossipers soon took to witch-hunting. People had not to wait long for an explosion.

The first major encounter between the *mullah* and the State took place in 1953 when several religious parties, headed by the Ahrars and the Jama'at-i-Islami, staged a violent and bloody agitation against the Ahmadis who were still recognised as Muslims by the country. It was the first clash of wills, and the government at least resisted fanaticism with some determination. The Army was called in and martial law was declared in Lahore. A few political heads rolled and the wave of sectarianism receded—for the time being.

Since then there have been many religious fights and many deaths in all provinces. Khairpur, Jhang and the Northern Areas have been the chief centres of this violence. But familiarity breeds complacency. Now martial law is not declared where and when it is really required. A few newspapers write editorials bemoaning the outbreaks. The rulers issue statements calling upon the Muslims to be united. The standard drill is repeated each time. The country goes through the usual motions. Muslims kill each other in the name of Islam, the enthusiastic talk of one *ummah* notwithstanding. The riots continue. Sectarian murder has been routinised.

#### Politics and Violence

It is not an original thought and yet an apposite observation that the traffic of a country faithfully portrays its politics. I think the road traffic of Lahore draws a vivid picture of our politics: heavy, congested, uncontrolled, uncontrollable, dangerous to life and limb.

The average driver resembles more than anybody else the average politician. Look at the points they have in common. The driver is careless of the pedestrians; the politician ignores his voters. The driver is inexperienced; the politician is new to public life. The driver is proud of his vehicle since it is the first in the family; the politician puts on airs because the new status sits ill on him. The driver is more often than not without a licence or with one procured through connection or bribe; the politician lost his credentials in a rigged election. Still the driver expects the police to be respectful to him simply because he is a car owner; the politicians demand unheard of privileges because he is the member of an Assembly. The driver is rash and wants to get to where he is going in the shortest possible time; the politician is in a hurry because he may not get another chance to represent a section of the electorate. Both misbehave in public, both break the rules, both are serious hazards to the self-respect and life of the citizen, and both escape punishment. Both are agents of violence.