Department of Defense Plan for

Integrating National Guard and

Reserve Component Support for

Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

Prepared by the DoD Tiger Team January, 1998

I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries who are acquiring technology – not only missile technology – and are developing chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also on a long range basis. So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in the coming years.

1

-- Secretary of Defense William Cohen January 1997

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cover Letter

Foreword: Plan Development

Background

Methodology

Executive Summary

Chapter 1: Overview

Introduction

Purpose and Scope

Definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Planning Principles

Operational Concept

Chapter 2: The problem

Response Capabilities Today

19980423 078

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A . Report Title: Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet 21 Apr 98

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #): Department of Defense, Tiger Team

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by: DTIC-OCA, Initials:___PM ____Preparation Date: 21 Apr 98

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the above OCA Representative for resolution.

- Level of Current Preparedness
- Assessments
- Military Preparedness to Support WMD Response

Chapter 3: The Response

Integrated Response Concept

- Local
- State
- Federal
- Military Support

Response Policy

Chapter 4: Improving the Response

WMD Response Integration Program Goals

Plan for Improving Response

- Key actions required to implement this program
- Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office Functions

5-Year Integration Concept for WMD Response

Chapter 5: Response Elements

Overview

Command

Response Elements

- Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element
- Information and Planning Element
- NBC Reconnaissance Element
- NBC Patient Decontamination Element
- NBC Medical Response Element
- Triage Medical Response Element
- Trauma Medical Response Element
- Preventive Medicine Element
- Stress Management Element
- Security/Law Enforcement Element
- Mass Care Elements
- Mortuary Affairs Element
- Communications Element
- Engineering Element
- Transportation Elements
- USCG National Strike Force

Chapter 6: Training Requirements

- Training Overview
- Individual Training
- Awareness Chemical Biological Plus (ABC+) Program

- Unit Training
- Course Evaluation and Development
- Exercises
- Training Objective
- Simulation Exercises
- Regional Training Exercise
- Modeling and Simulations
- Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Sustainment Training

Annex A: Acronyms

Annex B: References

- Statutes
- Executive Orders
- National Security and Presidential Decision Directives
- DOD Directives
- DOD Manuals
- Joint Publications
- Plans
- Government Reports

Annex C: Interviews

Annex D: Studies and Analyses

Annex E: Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office

Annex F: Equipment Requirements

- Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Equipment Requirements
- Decontamination Element Equipment Requirements
- Reconnaissance Element Equipment Requirements
- Triage Medical Response Element Equipment Requirements
- Trauma Medical Response Team Equipment Requirements
- Stress Management Element Equipment Requirements
- NBC Medical Response Element Equipment Requirements
- Crisis/Stress Management Element Equipment Requirements
- Information and Planning Element Equipment Requirements
- Mortuary Affairs Elements Equipment Requirements
- Communications Element Equipment Requirements

Annex G: Legal Issues

- Planning principles
- Current legislative initiatives
- Fast Track Legislation

Annex H: Training Requirements

- Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element Training Requirements:
- Decontamination Element Training Requirements.
- Reconnaissance Element Training Requirements
- Medical Elements Training Requirements
- Other Element Training Requirements

Annex I: Tiger Team Membership

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Tiger Team – Reserve Component Integration Plan

This plan was developed at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is based on using the premise that disaster relief is primarily a state mission. Given the unique nature of a WMD attack, we anticipate requests for federal assets much earlier than during typical disasters. Accordingly, we focused on the most likely tasks that DoD would be asked to support as the Federal Response Plan is implemented in support of a WMD event. With integration of the RC as our cornerstone, our work focused on the vulnerabilities from a United States' state, territory and possession perspective.

During the mission analysis we assessed current DoD capabilities. Our analysis concluded we are insufficiently prepared to perform likely tasks which other federal agencies may request within consequence management. Additionally, there is a significant void in the response community chemical, biological and radiological assessment capability. As a result, we found it necessary to create a DoD response capability that does not exist today. These Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Elements will assist with agent identification and appropriate hazard mitigation in the affected areas of a WMD release. Operationally, these elements will be responsible for identifying the areas to evacuate and where it is safer to remain. The elements are intended to respond under the State control and, if necessary, be available for military contingencies. We recommend fielding teams in every state. We were reminded frequently during our survey process, if the responders were not in the geographic proximity, then they were likely to be too late. This plan represents a beginning, a start point, of a larger effort that requires support of senior leadership. So too must be our overall commitment to prepare for WMD attacks. Preparing for this mission requires a multi-year effort.

Finally I would like to recognize the Team that made this integration plan possible. Lt Col Jay Steinmetz from the Forces Command Domestic Plans Branch served as the Tiger Team Chief. In that capacity, he performed superbly and represents a real DoD treasure. The core group included: Mr. William McCoy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; COL Chuck Winn, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; LTC Tim Madere, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army; Maj Keith McCullough, Office of Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness; LTC Pete Aylward, Directorate of Military Support, LTC Dutch Thomas, National Guard Bureau, and MAJ Alicia Tate-Nadeau, U.S. Army Reserve Command.

Special recognition is due to Captain Todd Burton of the Army National Guard Military Support Branch, and Major Tom Welch of the U.S. Army Reserve 100th Division, whose technical contributions to the team and their agencies, truly ensured a quality final product. This Team, truly experts in their respective fields, have exceeded the standards by every measure. Their work must be regarded as "above and beyond" the call.

> (signed) Roger C. Schultz Brigadier General, USA Executive Director

Table of Contents

Foreword

Background

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici mandates the enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The Legislation provided funding to improve the capability of the federal, state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and, if necessary, respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The <u>Department of Defense</u> was given the lead in the development of the Emergency Response Assistance Program as part of a federal interagency effort. The <u>Secretary of</u> <u>Defense</u> (SECDEF) designated the <u>Secretary of the Army</u> (SECARMY) as the Executive Agent for DoD program implementation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment (ASA(ILE)) provides oversight for the Director of Military Support (DOMS) as the Staff Action Agent. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) provides policy and funding oversight for the DoD Domestic Preparedness Program.

A Senior Interagency Coordinating Group (SICG), chaired by the <u>Federal Emergency</u> <u>Management Agency</u> (FEMA), provides direction for orchestration of the overall program, ensuring that terrorism-related federal preparedness programs are coordinated nationally to enhance state and local response capabilities. ASD (SO/LIC) and DOMS represent DoD on the SICG. The SICG receives guidance from the National Security Council (NSC).

The Interagency Strategic Plan, developed in concert with our federal interagency partners represented on the SICG, was written to enhance response using a peacetime context addressing incident models such as the World Trade Center and the Tokyo Subway. While many facets of response are included in this program, its overwhelming emphasis is on training first responders in large U.S. cities. Interagency teams coordinate with local city officials including fire, law enforcement and medical responders to tailor training to meet their specific needs and requirements.

As a result of an October 3, 1997 Defense Review Board meeting, the <u>Deputy Secretary of</u> <u>Defense</u> asked the ASD (SO/LIC), <u>ASD (Reserve Affairs)</u>, and the ASA (ILE) to provide an assessment for integrating the National Guard and Reserves into ongoing Nunn-Lugar-Domenici sponsored WMD Domestic Preparedness programs. On October 19, 1997 the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) returned the initial Reserve Component (RC) plan seeking a more complete RC integration model.

On November 3, 1997 the DEPSECDEF directed that the <u>Under Secretary of Defense for</u> <u>Personnel and Readiness</u> oversee the development of a plan to integrate the Reserve Components into the DoD response to attacks using WMD. During a November 7, 1997 meeting, the Under Secretary of Defense directed the construction of a complete model for integrating the Reserve Components into a consequence management response for domestic terrorism incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The formation of a core group of experts, with support from agencies throughout the Department, was formed to complete the plan. In a November 14, 1997, memorandum, the Under Secretary of Defense placed the Under Secretary of the Army in charge of the plan development. Subsequently, the Under Secretary of the Army directed this core group "Tiger Team", to incorporate the capabilities of the RC into the plan. The Tiger Team tasking included developing the concept, model, overall direction for the program, and the funding necessary to support the RC integration. The Team's focus on the appropriate, substantive and integrated DoD support model to local, state, and federal government authorities responding to a WMD attack form the basis for this plan.

In developing this plan, the Tiger Team reviewed existing programs, applied scenario-driven analysis, and sought the opinions of other recognized experts in the Emergency Preparedness field. The Tiger Team recognized statutory restrictions and training limitations as part of their analysis and used the Interagency Strategic Plan and the Federal Response Plan (FRP) as the framework for roles and missions definition.

This plan outlines the evolutionary process to fill existing gaps in consequence management response capabilities. It focuses on improving DoD support for the response to a WMD event. In particular, response options were developed to incorporate and leverage the unique assets and capabilities of the Reserve Component into the overarching WMD strategy.

Methodology

The Tiger Team mission and charter focused on producing a comprehensive plan to incorporate work from many previous efforts and leverage all available assets. The Tiger Team recognized that any response effort must be accomplished within the statutory and regulatory provisions that govern Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). A questionnaire designed to assess current DoD capabilities was developed. This survey resulted in a response profile outlining DoD capabilities to support the Emergency Support Functions in the FRP.

More specifically, the team used Annex C to the U.S. Government Interagency CONPLAN entitled "Combating Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism (Draft-November 10, 1997)". The annex lists the tasks the Interagency Group deemed critical to successfully respond to a WMD incident. The Tiger Team grouped these tasks to correspond with the Emergency Support Functions in the FRP. Next the Team identified vital response tasks and requested the Services assess their capability to perform the tasks that DoD would likely be asked to support. The Team consolidated the Service responses to identify existing gaps in the DoD capability to respond to a WMD event. The results form a snapshot baseline of capabilities and assets.

Following the assessment of current capabilities, the Team developed a model for a prototype National Guard response concept that enhances and supports the existing and planned federal response structure. The model was tested for appropriateness by querying experts in the field representing the first responder community, primary federal agencies tasked to support state and local governments, and knowledgeable representatives from DoD organizations. These experts provided the Team with comments and recommendations. The Tiger Team also reviewed and considered numerous authoritative DoD sanctioned studies. These included the findings of the 1997 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study on Transnational Terrorism, and the Chem-Bio 2010 (Foss-Downing) Report. It is recognized that some interagency partners possess a robust capability, and may already have sufficient resources to deal with small-scale WMD events. This plan capitalizes on these existing resources and provides a basis for modeling, analysis and prototyping for further exercise. As a result, a framework for even more enhanced integration of the Total Force into the WMD program is clearly possible. The existing DoD Directives, policies, and MSCA related statutes were also considered in the development of this plan.

The Tiger Team recognized the federal response concepts identified in the May 1, 1997 Report to Congress and the SICG Strategic Plan. In addition, the Tiger Team reviewed the <u>United States Atlantic Command</u> (USACOM) and Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) response plans which included Response Task Force (RTF) and Chem-Bio Rapid Response Team concepts. Upon review, it was evident that few military elements are currently focused, trained or equipped to respond to WMD events. Hence the purpose of the project -- to increase the DoD response capabilities while developing the potential within the Reserve Component units.

While this project focuses on the RC response to a WMD attack on cities, there are other areas potentially at even greater risk. With our military today primarily CONUS based, the ability to project our Nation's military power becomes crucial to our military response options. By leveraging the Reserve Component capability, the DoD response model takes on a new and different dimension. Even further as certain RC units qualify for direct deployment, a local WMD response capability becomes all the more important.

The employment of a WMD in the United States against our power projection systems during a Major Theater War could severely degrade our ability to respond during a crisis. Both the Chem-Bio 2010 Study and the 1997 DSB Summer Study on Transnational Terrorist Threats found that no dedicated force structure exists to address potential CB use on military and civilian facilities in CONUS or in theater. At issue – projecting our Nation's military power at the appropriate time and place.

The concept for an integrated DoD consequence management model recognizes that the same or similar capabilities are required against this asymmetric threat. The response model in this plan includes force protection concepts, research & development, and resource allocations that could be applied to CONUS Major Theater of War enabling facilities. Here again, using the RC integrated response capability would support both the National Military Strategy of Force Projection by providing support to United States bases prior to and during operational deployments and also provides a response capability to WMD attacks on other U.S. targets. In addition to current tactical battlefield CB defense units, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) has documented the need for additional CB structure. As these new units are stationed, the USAR and ARNG leadership will be informed of the gaps in state and regional coverage. These new MTOE units will greatly enhance the capability to respond to WMD emergencies. Again, the existing RC unit capability is being leveraged. Since there is a relationship between the WMD skills and the unit's wartime mission, a complementary outcome clearly exists.

The methods for the first phase of this project and during the mission analysis were oriented first on the units in the current force and their capabilities to respond to WMD attacks. In the final analysis, the concept outlined here reaches far beyond just local WMD contingencies. Over time, these response elements will develop the skills necessary to be employed at US military bases or at other strategic points of U.S. interest under Title 10 U.S.C. In addition to the current force structure, this plan outlines a requirement for new structure. This proposed structure is not large by any measure but the potential impact is enormous. Further detailed in this plan, the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Element provides the core capability for the technical DoD response. Early assessment and detection of a WMD agent, determining the concentration of the release and the areas to evacuate or remain are the likely technical areas the DoD will be asked to support.

These questions form the most significant challenge facing communities and states as they respond to WMD attacks. Here again, <u>National Guard</u> and RC integration will enhance the DoD capability in response to WMD attacks.

Table of Contents

The Quadrennial Defense Review May 1997

"The purpose of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is to take a very close and thorough examination of our entire defense structure."

"The strategy devised through the QDR can be summed up in three words: shape, respond, and prepare."


(from remarks by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen)

<u>Text of the May 19 News Release</u> <u>Transcript of the May 19 News Briefing</u> by Secretary Cohen and General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff <u>Briefing Slides associated with the May 19 News Briefing</u> <u>The Report</u> to Congress <u>The Legislation</u> mandating the review

Other Pertinent Information

<u>Speeches and Comments by Senior Defense Officials</u> <u>The National Defense Panel</u> <u>Relevant News Releases</u> <u>Task Force on Defense Reform</u>

Should you have additional questions, you may convey them to the Defense Department via e-mail.



Chapter 1: Overview

Introduction

The United States is beginning to realize that terrorists may attack individuals, institutions, and facilities with weapons of considerable destructive power. Under Secretary of State Bartholomew, during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 1993, delivered an almost prophetic warning when he said,

"We are especially concerned about the spread of biological and toxin weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. ...To date we have no evidence that any known terrorist organization has the capability to employ such weapons... However, we cannot dismiss the possibilities... It may be only a matter of time before terrorists do acquire and use these weapons."

While not employing true weapons of mass destruction, the 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City portend the tremendous response necessary if a WMD is used in the US. Few communities, including military installations and facilities, have the full array of response assets and expertise required to adequately deal with the effects of radiological, biological, or chemical weapons or the necessary depth to sustain these response operations. They must rely on the concerted effort of local, state, and federal government agencies, cooperating with private organizations, to meet the technological, medical, and engineering demands posed by such attacks. The DoD anticipates requests from civilian agencies responding to WMD attacks and plans to augment the local response capability with expertise, manpower, and equipment. Conversely, the DoD may also require mutual community and state support to respond to attacks on military installations, bases, or ports necessary to deploy and sustain military forces employed overseas.

Purpose and Scope

The DEPSECDEF directed the development of this plan which includes the concepts, model, direction, and funding required to deliver an appropriate, substantive, integrated military support to local, state, and federal government authorities responding to the use of WMD. This plan provides a comprehensive and cohesive program consistent with national policy and DoD Directives. It integrates and advances many ongoing efforts throughout the Department and specifically addresses issues identified in a number of studies and reports. The plan supports evolving interagency plans including the FRP and the evolving Interagency Plan for WMD Response. It specifically identifies the actions required to leverage the capabilities of United States military forces. These capabilities are vital to fill the gaps in civil response assets currently prepared to respond throughout the United States. Many cities, states, and other federal agencies simply do not have the focus, the equipment, or the trained personnel needed in such a demanding environment. This plan addresses the DoD role within that context and the emergency management tasks that may require a DoD response.

This plan develops capabilities for operational response to nuclear, biological, and chemical threats within the confines of the United States, its territories, and possessions. These capabilities can and should be used outside the United States when required to support validated Commander-in-Chief requirements.

Definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1

For the purpose of this strategic plan, WMD include any weapon or device that are intended, or have the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation or radioactivity.

The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The threat to the US posed by WMD is characterized by several factors. Recent events illustrate a real threat of domestic terrorism. Today terrorists have an improved ability to collect information, raise money, and disseminate rhetoric. Advanced information technology available through the Internet allows extremists to communicate widely and efficiently. Additionally, publicly available databases serve as repositories for technical information relating to weapons production.

Another important factor is that WMD, together with the materials and technology used to make them, are increasingly available. Many of these materials are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes. Moreover, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union increased concerns about the protection, control, and accountability of WMD, related materials and technologies, and the potential unemployment and proliferation of thousands of scientists skilled in this field. Transnational threats arising from the collapse of the eastern bloc, including the development of Chem-Bio capabilities by terrorist organizations, have increased the potential for attacks within our borders. A final factor is the relative ease of manufacture and delivery of WMD. Facilities required to produce radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are small and hard to detect, compared with those associated with nuclear weapons.

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act contains several findings which define the requirement for an enhanced domestic response capability. Among these findings are:

"... the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history."

"There is a significant and growing threat of attack of weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not military targets in the usual sense."

"... the threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing."

"The United States lacks adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical terrorism."

Planning Principles

The plan underscores the principle that domestic disaster relief is fundamentally a State mission falling with the State's broad authority/responsibility for public safety and welfare within its borders. Consequence management of a WMD incident is a category of disaster relief over which the State usually will have primary responsibility. Federal assistance in WMD consequence management situations generally will be in support of the State's disaster relief efforts, to include efforts in response to a WMD incident. Recognizing these basic principles, the plan focuses on filling the void in the State's initial assessment capability and the United States' ability to rapidly facilitate required assistance in excess of the State's capability to respond.

Two organizing principles were considered in developing this plan:

To structure the force based on the State disaster relief mission

To structure the force based on the Federal national defense/MSCA mission

The team chose the Federal mission as the organizing principle. Under this organizing principle, the immediate response elements act as the tip of the Federal MSCA spear. Although immediate WMD response would be in a State status, under the control of the Governor, the unit's force structure would also support homeland defense, MSCA missions, and provide a secondary warfighting capability.

This organizing principle is consistent with the use of Federal military funds and other resources in support of this plan, and the extension of Federal military personnel benefits to National Guard personnel assigned to units engaged in these operations. This choice also avoids the legal and policy difficulties inherent in Federally funding and organizing a National Guard unit solely to conduct a State mission and is consistent with the general organizing principle of the National Guard for other missions.

Operational Concept

The operational concepts outlined in this plan are based on the principles noted above. The Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Elements, in their immediate response capacity, will assist in confirming the nature of a WMD attack. In most instances, the response elements will remain under State control. Under a worst-case scenario, Federal resources may also be requested very early in a WMD incident. We must anticipate these cases in planning for a coordinated local, state and federal response.

Table of Contents

Chapter 2: The Problem

Response Capabilities Today

Terrorist attacks using Sarin gas (a nerve agent) in the Tokyo subway affected more than 5,000 people. Concern for similar or larger events using chemical, biological, or radiological weapons have spurred legislation and programs to prepare local firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and other first responders. Despite these commendable efforts, significant shortfalls remain in trained and equipped response capability throughout the United States. The relatively small-area bombing in Oklahoma City required 11 of today's 27 national Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. Even these highly skilled teams are not prepared to operate in or around chemical, biological, or radiological hazards. The sheer size of WMD events may demand the support of many other properly trained and equipped personnel. First response organizations, state support agencies, and other federal agencies require major efforts to develop adequate capabilities. Until this occurs the DoD will continue to be tasked to support the WMD response. Even military units prepared to fight in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment are not fully focused, trained, or equipped to support response to victims of attacks in the United States. Furthermore, our own ability to project combat power may be severely degraded by asymmetric attacks on sea and air ports of embarkation. Military units must also be prepared to respond to attacks on our facilities and installations.

Level of Current Preparedness

Local, state, and federal governments are applying tremendous resources in many ongoing efforts to improve their WMD response capabilities. All responder agencies of local, state, and the federal governments must prioritize resources to address deficiencies in their plans for responding to a domestic WMD event. Military units identified to perform functions in and around the hazard areas will require additional personal protective gear, special training, and periodic exercises to ensure their safety and ability for timely and effective responses. This plan highlights those areas and provides sound solutions to meet those needs.

Assessments

Results of the assessments conducted by the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG) were highlighted in a report to the President in February 1997. These same shortfalls were identified in the SICG Strategic Plan produced in August 1997. The critical areas of concern which are highlighted below:

- Tailored and timely Federal Response to augment state and local responders.
- · Specialized equipment and coordinated training.
- · Capability to deal with a large number of victims.
- Adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals: available and stockpiled.
- · Baseline information of capability at federal, state and local levels.
- Better planning interface among federal, state and local authorities.

• Prioritization of transportation infrastructure for rapid movement of time-sensitive response resources.

• Timely and accurate emergency information.

· Electronic information management and communications capability.

· Manage stringent Public Safety measures.

· Finalize FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.

In addition to the CDRG assessment, DoD has identified four additional areas not addressed in the existing NLD Domestic Preparedness Program highlighted below:

 \cdot Current NLD program targets 120 cities - 11 states and 4 territories are not included in this program.

· Federal assets are not well dispersed geographically.

 \cdot Military personnel require additional equipment and training to reach an adequate response capability.

 \cdot The RC has some statutory limitations that impede response decisions.

Military Preparedness to Support WMD Response

While many military units possess basic skills and capabilities that can be applied to WMD response requirements, few have been specifically focused on the precise tasks or equipped with the appropriate assets to immediately respond to such an event. During the development of this plan, Services were asked to identify units that might perform the response tasks identified in the interagency WMD response plan and to indicate if those units were adequately organized, trained, and equipped to perform these specific tasks. This survey dramatically displayed existing gaps in procedures, training, and equipment necessary for appropriate response.

For many of the WMD response tasks, focusing units on the missions they may be asked to perform and developing their awareness of the Incident Command System (ICS) is all that may be necessary. For others, specific tasks will require training. In a WMD scenario, selected members will be tasked to deploy to the Hot Zone and operate for extended periods of time, quite different from our wartime practices. Even more demanding, the tasks requiring total decontamination must be anticipated. These are very different practices when compared to our military doctrine today. Here again, the value of training to the same standards, using common terminology and exercising with first responders, we have the opportunity to prepare for this most demanding mission. In general terms today, the Department is not prepared for the WMD response. This plan addresses the areas requiring DoD attention and isolates in some detail the response options the Department may be asked to perform. In the end, the solution to the WMD response mission requires a partnership – military and civilian.

Table of Contents

Chapter 3: The Response

Integrated Response Concept

Local

Local response to an emergency situation uses the Incident Command System (ICS) to ensure that all responders and their support assets are coordinated for an effective and efficient response. The Incident Commander is normally the senior responder of the organization with the preponderance of responsibility for the event (e.g., fire chief, police chief, or emergency medical). If local assets are not sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they request state (or regional) assets through the State Office of Emergency Services.

State

The state's substantial resources, including the National Guard in state status, are coordinated through the state's response plan(s) and are normally coordinated by the state's Office of Emergency Services. If state assets are not sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they request federal assets through the FEMA Regional Operations Center.

Federal

The Presidential Decision Directive 39 entitled "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism" recognizes that there must be a rapid and decisive capability to protect U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to victims. The goals during the immediate response phase of an incident are to terminate the terrorist attack so that terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, and to minimize loss of life and damage and to provide emergency assistance to the affected area. In responding to a terrorist incident, Federal departments and agencies rapidly deploy the needed Federal capabilities to the scene, including specialized elements for dealing with specific types of incidents resulting from the threat or actual use of WMD. To coordinate the Federal response, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and FEMA have been assigned lead agency responsibility for crisis and consequence management, respectively, in response to a domestic terrorist threat or incident.

The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management response to acts of domestic terrorism, which includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response.

Crisis management activities include active measures for prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident response. Activities include command of the operational response as the on-scene manager for an incident in coordination with other Federal agencies and State and local authorities. The FBI provides guidance on the crisis management response in the FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan (classified) and the FBI Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan (classified).

FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management, which entails both preparedness for and dealing with the consequences of a terrorist incident. Although the affected State and local governments have primary jurisdiction for emergencies, a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction could create havoc beyond their capability to respond. If this were to happen, FEMA would coordinate consequence management activities including measures to alleviate damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by the incident; to protect public health and safety; to restore essential government services; and to provide emergency assistance. FEMA would implement the Federal Response Plan, cooperating with State and local emergency response agencies. Final authority to make decisions onscene regarding the consequences of the incident (rescue and treatment of casualties, protective actions for the affected community) rests with the local Incident Commander.

The federal government, including the DoD, responds to emergency requests from the states through the FRP. After the President declares a major disaster or emergency, the resources of the federal government needed to support the state response are managed by the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). When the State Coordinating Officer makes specific requests for assistance, he or she certifies that the state does not have the capability to meet the requirements. The FCO assigns the request to one of the 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) represented within the Emergency Response Team. If the lead agency of any ESF is not able to meet the requirements, it may ask the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to provide the necessary response. The DCO coordinates all federal military assistance provided during the consequence management response.

Military Support

The DoD supports local, state, and federal government agencies in planning for and responding to domestic emergencies. Local units may respond under the immediate response doctrine when necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Many units execute memorandums of understanding for mutual support of emergency services with local jurisdictions or municipalities. National Guard units may also respond under state control when directed by appropriate state authorities. Upon the declaration of an emergency or major disaster by the President, the Secretary of Defense or his Executive Agent directs a supported CINC to provide federal military support to the FCO through a DCO and Defense Coordinating Element (DCE). For most domestic emergency responses requiring DoD assets, the DCO controls all DoD response elements. Because of the potentially large number of DoD requirements, the supported CINC may activate a Response Task Force to command and control all federal military personnel responding for consequence management (with the exception the Joint Special Operations Task Force). The RTF deploys to support the federal crisis and consequence management operations in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) during domestic operations. A Chem-Bio Rapid Response Team (CBRRT) under the RTF has been established to provide technical expertise and assessment support to the local officials. A network of Reserve Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) from all Services in each state and federal region supports the DCO and provides the military interface to coordinate response requirements and activities with each state and federal region.

At the local, state, and federal levels, a task force oriented structure and process responds to the emergency requirements. The missing elements in most structures are the task-oriented, trained and equipped task force elements that actually perform the required response functions. The local civil Incident Commander directs these response elements. Task-organized elements that can be plugged into the task forces at the local, state, or federal level must be formed.

Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces possess expertise, trained manpower, and equipment that can support response to chemical, biological, radiological attacks at DoD installations and in civilian communities. As the Department of Defense supports all Emergency Support Functions identified in the FRP, we must be prepared to perform those functions which other agencies are not capable of supporting or simply do not have adequate resources to meet the demand. Specific response functions have been identified that may require substantial military augmentation for execution. Units capable of performing these functions must be focused, task organized, adequately trained, and properly equipped to work in and around nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards.

Today's task organized response assets in the DoD are very limited. Expert and capable response organizations like Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, the Army's Technical Escort Unit, and the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force have been involved in the development of response plans and procedures. The RTF staffs have also been instrumental in organizing and employing military assets to support requests for assistance.

Certain DoD laboratories can also be called upon to respond with specialized equipment and capabilities. One such laboratory is the AMC Treaty Laboratory that was established to verify compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is an ISO 9001 registered quality system that was pre-deployed to support the FBI during the Olympics in Atlanta. The US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) is capable of deploying an Aeromedical Isolation Team consisting of physicians, nurses, medical assistants and laboratory technicians. These team members are specially trained to provide care for and transport of patients with diseases caused by either biological warfare agents or infectious diseases requiring high containment. Also, Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) maintains a rapidly deployable mobile environmental monitoring and technical assessment system. This Mobile Analytical Response System (MARS) provides a state-of-the-art analytical assessment of chemical or biological hazards at incident sites. The Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), through their Biological Defense Research Program (BDRP), has designed reagents, assays and procedures for agents classically identified as biological threat, as well as non-classical threat agents in environmental and clinical specimens. This program has developed rapid, hand-held screening assays that can be deployed globally. Though highly capable in their areas of expertise, these teams are extraordinarily limited in their response capacity and could be easily consumed by a WMD event.

The Office of Naval Research Science & Technology Reserve Program (S&T Reserve Program, or Program 38) has a small cadre dedicated to chemical, biological, and radiological defense (CBRD). These include medical service corps officers, hospital corpsmen, and officers of assorted line designators. Program 38's lead CBRD unit--NR NRL Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Detachment 106 (NR NRL CBRD106)--drills at the headquarters of CBDCOM in the spaces of the Naval Research Laboratory's Detachment to CBDCOM. Program 38 members comprise the Navy's intellectual capital of military personnel in CBRD, and can help the National Team to deal with problems of an unexpected nature; (e.g., one might imagine generically engineered microbes being used against us in which case we can provide Ph.D. microbiologists with connections into academia and industry who could help deal with this problem.) The main contribution of Program 38 officers is probably in providing a reach back resource that responders can tap into to better assess the situation at hand, and formulate the best action to take.

Overall, the group consensus was that the local preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness applies to the NBC arena, some basic military skill levels exist. The group recognized that there are other programs that have specific statutory authority to provide support including the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program and the Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Program. Leveraging the resources provided by these programs as well as the National Disaster Medical System will improve the linkage between expert assistance and the first responders. However, much needed attention must be applied to resourcing, planning, and training for the unique nature of NBC terrorist incidents.

Response Policy

The Stafford Act (P.L. 93-288) establishes the authority and process for "all hazards" response to natural and man-made disasters in the United States. It is implemented through Executive Order 12656 and the FRP.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 established the policy for crisis and consequence management of terrorist incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

DoD has assigned the CINCs planning, coordinating, and execution authorities for responding to "all hazards" disasters in the United States and its territories. Response to the consequences of WMD should use the same process as response to other natural and man-made disasters, as specified in the "all-hazard" concepts of the Stafford Act and the FRP and laid out in DoD Directive 3025.1. CINCs have developed plans to support this response as the DoD planning agents for their respective areas. They, in turn, have designated regional planning agents to interface with the other federal agencies and the states. A network of EPLO's from all Services has been established and trained to represent the federal military in each state and in each of the ten federal regions.

DoD support of a federal response to a domestic terrorism incident will be personally managed by the Secretary of Defense, with the assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of the Army. The DoD crisis management response will be provided through the national interagency terrorism response system. DoD response forces will be employed either under the operational control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force or a Response Task Force assigned to the appropriate Unified Combatant Commander.

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandates training and development of capability to respond to WMD attacks in the United States. Response to WMD attacks or accidents must be consistent with the concepts, response model, and responsibilities for other domestic emergencies. We may often be in the situation that we do not know who or what caused the event to which we are responding. Section 1414, Title XIV of the Defense Appropriation, mandates that the SECDEF "shall develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of DoD who are capable of aiding Federal, state, and local officials in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction containing chemical, biological, or related materials." The DoD has formed the RTF and the CBRRT to meet this requirement. The elements described in this plan further support this requirement.

DoD has developed two consequence management RTFs under the command of U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The headquarters elements of these RTFs are assigned to First and Fifth U.S. Army for responses east and west of the Mississippi River respectively. Forces of the RTF will be tailored and assigned based on the situation. Central to these forces will be technical and specialized units capable of supporting a response to a chemical, biological or radiological incident. One concept being studied is the chemical and biological quick response cell.

Responsibilities for oversight and execution of Title XIV, Subtitle A, Domestic Preparedness, are spread among several organizations. ASD(SO/LIC) has responsibility for policy and resource oversight. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs) provides resource oversight for equipment procurement. Additionally, in accordance with Section 1413, Title XIV, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) to serve as the Executive Agent for the coordination of DoD training assistance to Federal, state, and local officials to better assist them in responding to threats involving chemical and biological weapons or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of biological and chemical weapons and related materials and technologies. As the Executive Agent, the Secretary is responsible for developing the planning guidance, plans, implementation, and procedures for the Domestic Preparedness Program. The SECARMY subsequently named the ASA(ILE) as the focal point for all matters in which the Army has executive agency, and the DOMS as the DoD Staff Action Agent. In a separate directive, the SECARMY directed the Commander, Army Materiel Command (AMC) to appoint a DoD Program Director. AMC subsequently directed Commander, CBDCOM to appoint a DoD Program Director with the primary responsibility to implement the basic elements of Title XIV. Also under Title XIV, for nuclear and radiological preparedness, the Secretary of Energy has specific responsibilities. The Secretary of Energy is responsible to test and improve the responses of Federal, State and local agencies involving nuclear and radiological weapons or related materials. Here again, agency responsibility must be communicated clearly and the value of PDD 39 becomes even more evident.

Co-Chaired by FEMA, the Senior Interagency Coordination Group (SICG) on Terrorism was established to facilitate the interagency coordination of policy issues and program activities in support of Federal initiatives to assist Federal, state, and local first responders in responding to WMD incidents. The SICG is composed of senior members from DoD, FEMA, the FBI, the Public Health Service (PHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DoE), the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of Transportation (DoT), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), General Services Administration (GSA), and the National Communications System (NCS).

Table of Contents

Chapter 4: Improving the Response

WMD Response Integration Program Goals

The Interagency Strategic Plan laid out an ambitious list of objectives that are part of the overall goal to improve the nation's WMD response capability. A program to coordinate and integrate DoD's capabilities to support local, state, and federal consequence management response to WMD events must be established. This program supports the Military Support to Civil Authorities policies of the Department and the plans of the supported CINCs charged to execute that response. It must coordinate and orchestrate many on-going efforts throughout the DoD to meet requirements for response to WMD attacks at our installations and facilities and within civilian communities. The program should:

1. Establish a fully operational DoD preparedness and response capability to deal with potential effects of domestic terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.

2. Leverage Reserve Component preparedness and response capabilities to deal with these threats.

3. Enhance local, state, and other federal agency access to military capabilities and expertise.

Plan for Improving Response

Key actions required to implement this program

1. Establish a Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office to implement this plan. Assign program management responsibility and transfer functions to the program office. A program office of at least14 people will be established with contractor support to ensure the integration of research & development, procurement, training, and doctrine development for response to WMD. The program director should report to the Secretary of the Army, as the DoD Executive Agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities, through the DoD Director of Military Support and hold quarterly program reviews on project status.

2. Review DoD Directives 3025.1, 3025.15, 3025.12, 3020.26, 5160.54 and others that may require updating as the RC integration effort matures. Assist in the coordination of policy as applied to the many DoD organizations that may become involved in a WMD response.

3. Coordinate the development of legislation that facilitates Reserve Component activation for WMD response.

4. Modify Defense Planning Guidance and the Unified Command Plan to reflect WMD response requirements.

5. Coordinate the development of an OPLAN to respond to terrorist on U. S. installations, facilities, ports, and the states and communities.

Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office Functions

1. Identify and task military response elements. The Departments will identify specific units

to provide the response elements, so the program office can coordinate the training and equipment necessary for each. Each Service will task these units to be prepared to perform the response element mission.

2. Develop and publish individual position descriptions and doctrine for integrated employment of the teams.

3. Integrate WMD training for DCOs, EPLOs, RTFs, and military response elements. Leverage existing responder training programs as the core and develop required specialized training. The program office will coordinate training and exercises to ensure the identified response elements, EPLOs, DCOs, and RTFs receive training identified in the plan. The DoD Emergency Preparedness Course and other regional training programs provide a solid foundation for individual responsibilities of the command and liaison elements. Interagency exercises conducted at the state or regional levels will be used to validate concepts of employment and response integration with local, state, and federal response assets. This training will leverage existing federal training for WMD response (currently led by CBDCOM). Response elements will interface with local and state exercises and federal interagency response exercises. The program office will ensure crossflow of lessons learned and coordinate improvement recommendations between similar response elements.

4. Purchase equipment for the military response elements. In year one, equipment will be purchased for the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Elements, the reconnaissance and decontamination elements, some of the medical personnel and the laptop computers for the Emergency Preparedness Liaison officers (EPLOs).

5. Identify DoD WMD response assets and capabilities. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) will include DoD's WMD response assets and capabilities in the DoD Resources Data Base and coordinate with FEMA to include appropriate information in the Rapid Response Information System. The program office will coordinate this effort with the Joint Staff and Unified Commands.

6. Facilitate training exercises for the military response elements under the CINC's RTF. Coordinate these exercises with local, state, and federal agencies.

7. Identify and coordinate the WMD related interests with the Advanced Concepts and Research & Development initiatives. The program office will identify equipment that requires prototyping, simulation, or testing. There are currently a number of Chemical Defense Equipment (CDE) initiatives of significant value to the WMD response effort. ASA(RDA) initiatives are of particular interest and require attention by the program office. The ASD(SO/LIC) Technical Support Working Group will be a key office to facilitate development of this equipment. The OSD Office for Counterproliferation will be an additional resource for testing advanced concepts and newly developed equipment.

8. Establish and maintain linkages with the processes of the CJCS Readiness System to include:

- The Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)
- Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Teams
- Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
- Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)

9. Coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, FEMA, and other federal agencies in development of the Presidential Report on Preparations for a National Response to Medical Emergencies Arising From the Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and leverage the results of the report to ensure that the Reserve Components are trained and ready to provide this support. 10. Work with the National Guard Bureau to develop a plan to reprogram current resources to fully resource RAID Elements if additional full time spaces are not authorized.

11. Evaluate geographic dispersion of Reserve Component assets for support within the U.S.

12. Develop or revise procedures and doctrine to address:

- Capability to deal with a large number of contaminated victims.
- Use of chemical units to perform patient decontamination
- Response element tactics, techniques, and procedures
- Response to attacks on U. S. facilities and installations.
- Additional doctrinal shortfalls

13. Ensure medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are rapidly available to military response elements for use in U.S. WMD incidents.

14. Ensure that designated response elements have readily accessible Personal Protective Equipment for rapid deployment to respond within the United States.

15. Develop and publish individual position descriptions and doctrine for integrated employment of the teams.

16. Coordinate the new response capabilities into the ongoing interagency exercise program in order to validate concepts of employment and response integration with local, state, and federal response assets.

17. Ensure communication of lessons learned and coordinate improvement recommendations between similar response elements.

18. Establish at least a partial Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element in each State and Territory.

19. Integrate Civilian Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) operations into existing Chemical Training programs.

20. Develop FY00-03 POM requirements.

21. Develop a program to train leaders on HAZMAT, ICS, the FRP and how all of the local, state, and federal agencies interrelate to support the operations.

22. Leverage the existing NLD training programs to provide training to DoD responders.

23. Provide Reserve Component medical personnel with additional specialized training in the management of nuclear, chemical, and biological agent casualties.

24. Develop a rapid systematic notification process to notify military medical personnel when an incident occurs.

25. Upgrade JANUS, Spectrum, or other simulations for use in WMD exercises and execute a proof of concept for using SPECTRUM and JANUS to conduct WMD response exercises.

26. Fund participation by response elements including DCOs, EPLOs, and the RTF staffs in the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici city visits and training.

27. Integrate WMD response elements and assets into the DoD Resources Database.

28. Define requirements for additional number and types of military response elements.

29. Document the authorization document for the RAID Elements and the requirements for any new force structure.

30. Coordinate the development of training material for the NBC Defense Teams.

31. Coordinate the DoD WMD training efforts using distance learning techniques.


5-Year Integration Concept for WMD Response

The program office will develop a schedule of milestones to ensure that the elements identified in this plan are tasked, trained, and equipped in a smooth and efficient manner.

The first year of the program will start with the RAID, reconnaissance, and decontamination elements. Training for medical personnel will also begin the first year. Follow on work will expand training to the other elements, analyze equipment requirements, and orchestrate integration of the response concepts and models.

The chart below shows a phased approach that begins to develop domestic response in FY 99 and certifies coverage by FY 02. The most critical elements to develop, task, train, and equip are the RAID Elements. This will ensure a minimal assessment and requirement definition capability in each state and territory. Additionally, the Reconnaissance and Decontamination Elements, which leverage the capabilities of Army Chemical Companies and Air Force Patient Decontamination Teams, will be trained and equipped over a two-year period. Medical Elements will begin their individual training and development of concepts for fielding and equipment

Program Completion Rate



purchases in the second and subsequent years. The other less technical elements may not require as much training to be fully prepared for a WMD response. By phasing in the element tasking, training, and equipping over time, less stress will be placed on doctrine development, training delivery, and procurement activities. Lessons learned from evolving military and civil assets will allow for review and improvement of element procedures and structures in the latter years.

The program office will develop and integrate operational plans and doctrine for the domestic WMD response elements, working closely with the supported CINCs. The program office will prepare specific procedures for each response element and evolve those procedures as the response elements mature. These procedures will be based on established and evolving interagency plans and procedures. Integrated exercises and training will ensure elements can operate together as military units and with corresponding civilian responders.

Table of Contents


Chapter 5: Response Elements

Overview

The Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) and other elements have been identified to support local, state, and federal agencies responding to a WMD. The basis for developing these elements is the four elements of the Incident Command System (Information and Planning, Operations, Logistics, and Finance) and the 12 Emergency Support Functions of the Federal Response Plan. Elements are designed to "plug into" existing task force structures required by the incident commander, the Governor, or the CINC responding in support of the FRP. A potential model response is portrayed in the figure below.

Command

Military command elements are established by the Adjutant General for the National Guard responding as state resources and by the CINC for the area (s) affected for federal military assets. In most cases, the pre-designated DCO coordinates for any federal military assets. A RTF may be deployed to provide command and control during a major federal response. The CINC's RTF is responsible for the command and control of all responding military elements, less the Joint Special Operations Task Force. It is comprised of command, staff, and technical experts required to support the WMD consequence management response.




Response Elements

Most military elements called to respond to a WMD attack will perform operations supporting the incident commander, state authorities, or federal agencies requiring their help. These elements include:

Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element

The point of the military response spear is the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element. This element is comprised of highly trained experts in a cross-discipline of functional areas that can deploy and assess the situation, advise the local, state and federal response elements, define requirements, and expedite employment of state and federal military support.

<u>Mission</u>: Provide early assessment, initial detection, and technical advice to the incident commander during an incident involving weapons of mass destruction. Facilitate identification of DoD asset requirements.



 $\underline{C^2 Cell}$: Provides overall command and control of the assessment team and conducts hazard modeling.

Recon Cell: Provides early detection, initial sample collection, and NBC reconnaissance.

Medical Support Cell: Provides an initial DoD medical assessment.

<u>Security Cell</u>: Provides initial assessment of security requirements and manages force protection/assessment element security.

<u>Logistics Cell:</u> Determines initial resource requirements and provides supply and maintenance support for the assessment element.

<u>Air Liaison Cell:</u> Coordinates for transportation and/or air movement of assessment element.

<u>Communications Cell</u>: Provides internal communications within the assessment element, coordinates for communications connectivity with civilian responders, and maintains a reach back capability for additional technical expertise.

Units Employed: The RAID Elements assigned to each state/territory represent the first military responders. Regardless of the full-time and traditional member mix, the reconnaissance team will likely be the primary area that technical assistance will be requested. Given the goal of four-hour on-scene, the demands of the RAID Elements will be significant. While not ideal in terms of fully developed response capability, teams from surrounding states or even use of the regional assets may well be necessary if the disaster escalates quickly.

Employment: The RAID Element is organized as an element under the peacetime control of the Adjutant General. Given its rapid response and assessment mission, the RAID Element is designed to assist incident commanders with the initial detection and the nature of the emergency. There is also a wartime RAID Element mission: to provide force protection support within the state during mobilization. As with the other elements of the response module, these elements can also be used as part of a federal (Title 10) response to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) requirements.

The RAIDs have the capability to rapidly deploy to an incident site and provide initial support to the Incident Commander. The element has the capability to conduct reconnaissance, provide medical advice and assistance, perform detection, assessment, and

hazard prediction, and can provide technical advice concerning WMD incidents and agents. Equipping the RAIDs requires both military standard and commercial-off-the-shelf components. The equipment list can be found in Annex F.

Information and Planning Element

<u>Mission</u>: Collect, process and disseminate information about WMD emergency to facilitate the overall response activities. The scope of this functional element is to coordinate the overall information activities. Provide an initial assessment of disaster impacts including the identification of boundaries of the affected area and distribution, type and severity of damages, including the status of critical facilities. The information and planning activities are grouped among the following functions:

- Information Processing function to collect and process essential elements of information from the State, and other sources, disseminate it for operations, and provide input for reports, briefings, displays and plans;
- Reports function to consolidate information into reports and other materials to describe and document overall response activities and to keep follow-on support personnel informed of the status of the response operations;
- Displays function to maintain displays of pertinent information and facilitate briefings using maps, charts and status boards other means, such as computer bulletin boards or electronic mail, as available;
- Consolidate information to support the action planning process initiated by ICS.

<u>Units Employed</u>: Air Force Information Management staffs and Army Information Operations staffs.

Employment: When activated, this functional element will provide information processing support to military response activities. Information may be obtained from a variety of sources to include but not limited to ICS representatives. This functional element will proactively seek information that is a viable to develop an accurate picture of the emergency condition. The collection and processing of critical information is forwarded to the operational element in order to create an overall perspective of the situation. The release of information directly to the public or media remains a Public Affairs function. These elements deploy to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident Commander.

NBC Reconnaissance Element

Mission: Provide NBC Reconnaissance Support to the local Incident Commander.

NBC reconnaissance operations include <u>search</u>, <u>survey</u>, <u>surveillance</u>, and <u>sampling</u> missions.

<u>Search</u>: Reconnaissance undertaken to obtain significant information about the NBC condition of routes, areas, and zones. This information confirms or denies the presence of NBC hazards with detection and identification equipment. Visual observation or the collection of samples in the specified location or region can also provide this information.

<u>Surveys</u>: Missions conducted to collect detailed information of NBC contamination hazards. The survey determines the type of contamination, the degree (extent/intensity), and the boundaries. Surveillance: The systematic observation of an area to provide early warning.

Sampling: Provides physical evidence of NBC attacks and technical intelligence concerning NBC weapons systems.

<u>Units Employed:</u> Each National Guard and USAR Chemical Company will train a platoon-sized element to perform reconnaissance operations. (The Separate Brigade Chemical Platoons will also train to provide recon support.)

Employment: These elements should be prepared to deploy to an incident site after an incident to assist the incident commander to:

- Confirm or deny contaminated areas.
- Confirm the area is clear of contamination.

Units will operate primarily using standard MTOE and TDA equipment. Additional equipment requirements are attached (Annex F.)

NBC Patient Decontamination Element

<u>Mission</u>: Provide patient decontamination support to the local Incident Commander. Prepare to:

- Perform casualty decontamination near the incident site, prior to evacuation, or;
- Establish decontamination/detection stations at community hospitals.

Decontamination of non-ambulatory casualties is normally performed prior to evacuation. However, in a terrorist incident, many ambulatory casualties will self evacuate, arriving at the hospital still contaminated. Hospitals must have the capability to detect contamination, and decontaminate when necessary.

Casualty decontamination is done by trained non-medical personnel under the supervision of the medical personnel in accordance with procedures outlined in FM 8-10-7.

<u>Units Employed:</u> Each National Guard and USAR Chemical Company, and each Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Medical Patient Decontamination Team will train platoon-sized elements to perform patient decontamination. (Separate Brigade Chemical Platoons will also train to provide decon support.) This training will be conducted during a weekend drill by the unit squad and platoon level leadership. A train-the-trainer program will be established and a program of instruction will be developed.

Employment: Each decontamination team will consist of twenty non-medical personnel and is capable of decontaminating 12 casualties per hour.

Three teams are required per decontamination site to run 24-hour operations (4 hours on and 8 hours off shifts).

This team requires three to five medical personnel from either the supported hospital/EMS or a medical unit to supervise the process and perform triage and immediate treatment of casualties. Equipment requirements are defined in Annex F.

NBC Medical Response Element

* The Medical Response Elements require further study and analysis. Noted below are the initial concepts for tasking and element employment. The ongoing medical studies must be considered before the DoD response plan is finalized. With many initiatives in various stages of fielding, a more detailed medical response element missions and tasks will be developed further during the first year of the program. The medical response plan requires coordination with our partners, in both the private and public sector.

<u>Mission</u>: Provide medical advice to incident commander and local authorities on protection of first responders and health care personnel in an NBC environment. Provide advice on casualty decontamination procedures, first aid and initial medical treatment. Provide medical threat information and characterize the health risks to civilian and military populations. Provide initial medical advice to include signs, symptoms, and first aid.

<u>Units Employed:</u> NBC Medical elements consist of 6 medical personnel and is capable of providing medical advice to include signs, symptoms, and first aid of NBC agents. Teams consist of: 1 Preventative Medicine Officer, 1 Preventive Medicine NCO, 1 Acute Care Physician, 1 Nurse, 1 Preventive Medicine Science Officer, 1 Practical Nurse, 1 NBC NCO, 1 Nuclear Medical Science Officer, 1 Nuclear Medical Officer, 1 Nuclear Medicine Specialist/Health Physics Specialist.

Employment: After the initial assessment National Guard/Reserve Component NBC medical elements will provide periodic updates to the incident commander and local authorities on protection of first responders and health care personnel in an NBC environment. Elements may elect to use telemedicine reach back capabilities to provide medical advice to local hospitals on appropriate management of care issues. These elements deploy to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident Commander.

Triage Medical Response Element

<u>Mission</u>: Provide triage support to the Incident Commander including the sorting and assignment of treatment priorities to various categories of wounded, and providing immediate emergency care.

<u>Units Employed</u>: Each National Guard, USAR, AFRES, USNR triage team will be trained to perform triage using the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) system and deploy to an incident site within 72 hours to assist the Incident Commander with a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI).

Employment: Each triage team will consist of 26 personnel and is capable of treating 100 patients per hour.

Trauma Medical Response Element

Mission: Provide expertise in triage, resuscitation, and damage control medicine near the incident site or at a definitive care location. Specific tasks are:

- Perform damage control surgery for up to four patients.
- Augment community hospital systems overwhelmed by NBC casualties.
- Augment hospital/Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMST) after 24 hours to conduct sustainment operations.
- Provide support to local hospitals or MMST triage and immediate treatment of casualties.
- Provides Analgesia and anesthesia for patients under their care.

Units Employed: Each National Guard, USAR, and USNR, AFRES trauma team will be trained in the treatment of chemical, biological and radiological casualties and associated effects from blasts and crush injuries. Teams consist of: 2 General Surgeons, 1 Anesthesiologist, 1 Emergency Medical Physician/Orthopedic Surgeon, 1 Critical Care Nurse, 1 ER Nurse

Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident Commander.

Preventive Medicine Element

<u>Mission</u>: Provides initial disease and environmental health threat assessments during early or continuing assistance stages of a disaster. Specific tasks are:

- Provide medical threat information and characterize the health risks to civilian and military populations.
- Prepare preventive medicine estimates; conduct rapid hazard sampling, monitoring and analysis.
- Sampling including endemic and epidemic disease indicators.
- Provide initial disease and environmental health threat assessments prior to or in the initial stages of a disaster.

<u>Units Employed:</u> Each National Guard, USAR, and Naval Reserve preventive medicine team will be trained in initial disease and environmental health threat assessments. Teams may require information from the Center for Disease Control and other agencies with endemic disease and environmental effect information to prepare their database for the area. Teams consist of: 1 Preventative Medicine Officer, 1 Industrial Hygienist/Health Physicist, 1 Environmental Science/Engineering, 1 Community Health Nurse, 1 Entomologist, 1 Biologist, 1 Preventive Medicine NCO. This team should attend the HHS/FEMA public health aspects of natural disasters and civil emergencies.

Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the Incident Commander. Personnel are alerted using pagers and deploy to incident site.

Stress Management Element

Mission: Provides initial stress management for military and civilian responder and incident survivors.

<u>Units Employed</u>: This element is highly trained in stress management and neuropsychiatry. It is capable of providing limited neuropsychiatric triage and stabilization of clinical cases in order to reduce the disabling effects associated with post traumatic stress disorder.

Personnel: Each NBC element will consist of 6 medical personnel and is capable of providing medical advice to include signs, symptoms, and first aid of NBC agents. Teams consist of: 1 Psychiatrist, 1 Clinical Psychologist, 1 Social Work Officer, 1 Psychiatric Nurse, 2 Mental Health NCOs, 1 Chaplain, 1 Occupational Therapy Officer, 1 Occupational Therapy NCO and require training victim assistance, psychological trauma, post traumatic stress disorder, mental health risks associated with relief workers (burn out syndrome) critical events management course.

Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site between 18 and 48 hours after an incident to assist the Incident Commander.

Security/Law Enforcement Element

Mission: The National Guard provides support for the Incident Commander IAW state and local emergency response plans to assist in maintaining order, ensuring public safety and providing assistance to the law enforcement officials. Specific tasks and capabilities include:

<u>Access Control</u>: The potential for mass panic following a WMD incident will overwhelm the ability of hospitals to function effectively without additional personnel to control access to the facilities. National Guard troops could be called upon to augment law enforcement and hospital security personnel to maintain efficient access control in the hospitals. Because arriving victims may be contaminated, the personnel assigned this function require both awareness level knowledge and training in performing security operations in personal protective equipment (PPE). The units assigned this responsibility need ready access to PPE which allows for rapid mobilization from a local armory to an incident site.

<u>Site Security</u>: Once the limits of the contaminated area are established, a cordon will need to be established to prevent people from entering the area. Because this mission will be performed outside the hot zone and National Guard units regularly perform this type of mission in other disaster situations, no additional training beyond basic awareness will be required.

<u>Civil Disturbances</u>: The potential for lawlessness and disorder will exist following any WMD incident. Units designated with on-street civil disturbance missions need to have awareness level training on WMD incidents.

<u>Quarantine</u>: The National Guard could be called on to assist in the implementation of a quarantine if public health officials determine that a biological attack using a communicable disease agent occurs.

<u>Evacuation</u>: National Guard units will be required to assist in any evacuation ordered by the local officials. Military Police and other types of units may be called upon to assist in managing the flow of traffic during an evacuation. Because this mission will be performed outside the hot zone and National Guard units regularly perform this type of mission in other disaster situations, no additional training beyond basic awareness will be required.

Mass Care Elements

<u>Mission</u>: Provide support to the incident commander in providing shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, and bulk distribution of emergency relief supplies. Specific tasks and capabilities include:

<u>Shelter:</u> The provision of emergency shelter for disaster victims includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in existing structures; creation of temporary facilities such as tent cities, or the temporary construction of shelters; and use of similar facilities outside the disaster-affected area, should evacuation be necessary. Military installations and facilities such as the armories and reserve centers can be used. The military can also be tasked to provide tentage, cots, etc. in the event of an incident.

<u>Feeding:</u> The provision for feeding disaster victims and emergency workers through a combination of fixed sites, mobile feeding units, and bulk food distribution. Such operations will be based on sound nutritional standards and will include provisions for meeting dietary requirements of disaster victims with special dietary needs. Mobile kitchens and MRE's may be requested from the military to support mass feeding operations.

<u>Emergency First Aid</u>: Emergency first aid services will be provided to disaster victims and workers at mass care facilities and at designated sites within the disaster area. This emergency first aid service will be supplemental to emergency health and medical services established to meet the needs of disaster victims.

<u>Bulk Distribution of Emergency Relief Items</u>: Sites will be established within the affected area for distribution of emergency relief items. The bulk distribution of these relief items will be determined by the requirement to meet urgent needs of disaster victims for essential items. Military units can be tasked to man these operations.

Mortuary Affairs Element

<u>Mission</u>: Provide mortuary support to include identification, processing, storage, and disposition of remains following a mass casualty WMD incident. Specific tasks and capabilities include: assist in providing victim identification and mortuary services, temporary morgue facilities; victim identification utilizing latent fingerprint, forensic dental, and/or forensic pathology/anthropology methods; and processing, preparation, and disposition of remains.

Communications Element

<u>Mission</u>: This function is to assure the provision of telecommunications support to the response forces following a WMD emergency. This functional element coordinates actions to assure the provision of required telecommunications support. This functional element will coordinate the establishment of required temporary telecommunications. Support includes Government-furnished telecommunications, commercially leased communications, and telecommunications.

<u>Units Employed</u>: Tactical Army, Navy, and Air Force communications units may provide communications elements to link key command and control and deployed assets. Each NBC command element will consist of an information specialist.

Employment: These elements deploy to an incident site between 8-72 hours after an incident to assist the incident commander. Personnel are alerted using pagers and deploy to incident site. This functional element serves as a basis for planning and use of military telecommunications assets and resources in a WMD emergency.

Engineering Element

<u>Mission</u>: Public Works and Engineering support includes technical advice and evaluations, engineering services, construction management and inspection, emergency contracting, emergency repair of wastewater and solid waste failities, and real estate support for the stated purposes. The United States Army Corps of Engineers is the lead for this Emergency Support Function.

Specific tasks include:

Emergency clearance of debris for reconnaissance of the damage areas and passage of emergency personnel and equipment for lifesaving, life protecting, health and safety purposes during the initial response phase,

Temporary construction of emergency access routes which include damaged streets, roads, bridges, ports, waterways, airfields, and any other facilities necessary for passage of rescue personnel,

Emergency restoration of critical public services and facilities including supply of adequate amounts of potable water, temporary restoration of water supply systems, and the provision of water for fire fighting,

Emergency demolition or stabilization of damaged structures and facilities designated by State or local government as immediate hazards to the public health and safety, or as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of life saving operations (undertake temporary protective measures to abate immediate hazards to the public for health and safety reasons until demolition is accomplished),

Technical assistance and damage assessment, including structural inspection of structures.

<u>Units Employed:</u> ARNG & USAR Engineer units and ANG/AFRES Civil Engineering units could be tasked.

Transportation Elements

Mission: Provide support for the incident commander (through the SCO or FCO/DCO) IAW state and local emergency response plans and the Federal Response Plan to satisfy the requirements of Federal agencies, State and local governmental entities, and voluntary organizations requiring transportation capacity (service, equipment, facilities, and systems) to perform their assigned WMD response missions.

Units Employed:

Air (Fixed): The Air Force (including ANG and AFRES) will be tasked to transport both civil and military response assets and elements to the site of an incident. Pilots and aircrews require awareness training.

Air assets may be tasked under the National Disaster Medical System to provide transport of patients (post-decontamination) to medical facilities around the nation. Pilots and aircrews require only an awareness level of training.

Air (Rotary): Military rotary wing assets will be critical to the operations of the other military response elements and in support of the local Incident Commander. Potential missions include:

Transport of the RAID: In order to meet a four-hour response window, many of the RAID's will be stationed at or near air units. Rapid activation of pilots and crews will be necessary. The RAID air liaison cell needs to coordinate with the supporting aviation element to ensure that adequate cargo capacity is available. The pilots and crews will require an awareness level of training.

Air Ambulance: The potential for mass casualties in a WMD incident will quickly overwhelm the hospital capacity in a local community. The use of aeromedical ambulance companies to transport patients to more distant treatment facilities can help to alleviate this problem. This transport capability is post decontamination and outside the hot zone. (Helicopters should not be used within a chemically contaminated area because their rotors tend to spread agents/contamination.) Pilots and crews will therefore only require an awareness level of training.

Survey/Reconnaissance: Helicopters may be used to conduct an aerial reconnaissance of a radiologically contaminated area to determine the spread/level of contamination. Pilots need to receive training in the conduct of this type of operation.

Ground: Military vehicles such as military busses, HMMWV's, trucks, etc. can be operated in support of ESF#1 if not otherwise required to carry out the unit's emergency mission. Potential assets include transportation units that can be activated to provide additional transportation support. Only an awareness level of training will be required for those vehicles operating outside the hot zone. The assigned drivers of vehicles operating within the hot zone (such as ambulances) will require training on vehicle operations while wearing protective clothing.

USCG National Strike Force

The Coast Guard's National Strike Force's capabilities and responsibilities are available for responding beyond port areas. The Strike Teams are regularly deployed throughout the US on behalf of both USCG and EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs). Further, the Strike Teams are key tactical response units for the EPA to call upon when responding under the Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Function #10. The potential exists that the Coast Guard OSCs could very well be the first Federal presence in a WMD scenario. Coast Guard OSCs have a pre-established response organization in coastal areas (including rivers and Great Lakes) with state and local responders as well as fire and police. USCG OSCs have experience coordinating support services (NOAA Scientific Support Coordinators, CDC, etc.) and other government agencies with response capabilities into a cohesive unified command.

Table of Contents

Chapter 6: Training Requirements

Training Overview

Training and exercises are the two key components of the overall training program. Achieving a level of enhanced readiness is directly linked to both. The challenge is to utilize the limited resources available during the development phases through a rigorous training and exercise program. Training must be conducted to ensure an efficient and effective response. Exercises offer an opportunity to practice response operations and to validate training preparations. Ultimately the real test will be when the first unit responds to an event -- turning victims into patients, rather than collecting casualties for body bags.

This challenge is complicated by the fact that this effort is evolutionary. Instruction must focus on the unique aspects of a domestic WMD response. On the surface, responding to civilian casualties in a downtown metropolitan area would seem to have similar tasks that a soldier would perform when responding to a fellow member on the battlefield. The key difference is in the emergency operational environment. One is a wartime theater and the other is just as chaotic, just as lethal but CONUS based. Of course there is a correlation to the individual tasks and the circumstances surrounding the event, the response and the associated functions the unit will perform when it arrives on scene. Yet, the specific conditions may vary greatly given the unique nature of a WMD attack in a CONUS setting. Performance based objectives will define the overall training needed for these teams to effectively respond.

Identification of the Performance Based Training Objectives for the first responder community has been an ongoing CBDCOM effort. This program should reap the benefits of that hard work by leveraging the already developed CBDCOM compendium of courses and program of instruction and then tailoring them to meet the training requirements of the state response teams. Orchestrating that effort will have to be accomplished by the program office. Concept development and rigorously exercising the response elements will help refine doctrine development. To meet the challenges of such an incident, an integrated training approach must be applied for both civilian and military personnel. Training for and response to a WMD incident is an interwoven process that must be viewed and analyzed as a total system.

In addition to leveraging CBDCOM's programs of instruction, a "Center for Excellence" should be established as the accrediting body to oversee WMD training to ensure a complete crosswalk between both civilian and military training. One solution would leverage the seven Institutional Training Division's TRADOC approved chemical training battalions and medical training brigades to support the Center for Excellence. Another solution could include expanding the current training base through the use of mobile training teams to satisfy training requirements. The program office needs to determine the cost reduction potential realized through innovative training technologies such as distance learning and interactive CD-ROM. Utilizing these capabilities could dramatically reduce the costs associated with training large numbers of military response elements. TRADOC schools and courses should integrate the Incident Command System, Civilian HAZMAT procedures and the Federal Response Plan into lesson plans and programs of instruction.

In addition, simulation exercises will provide city leaders, first responders and other federal partners a cost-effective method of testing current response procedures. In conjunction with training objectives, exercises can be tailored to individual city or state needs, allowing them to improve their process to meet specific training requirements.

1

Individual Training

In particular, first responder training is viewed as the single most critical area for enhancing the nation's capability to respond to domestic terrorism. This training addresses the competence of skills needed to execute WMD response missions. There does exist a training gap between battlefield skills and the unique response skills required for civil WMD missions. In addition to providing individual training for the teams outlined in this plan, awareness training to the entire Reserve Component community will enhance our nation's overall response capability. Awareness training linked to ongoing unit training delivered using distance learning technology or via interactive CDROM capability provides low cost solutions with a high impact yield. Course material developed by CBDCOM for training first responders under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program is a readily available training source.

Awareness Chemical Biological Plus (ABC+) Program

Early detection, identification and notification of the emergency management system is essential to saving lives and mitigating the effects of a WMD event. Situational awareness, recognizing symptoms and effects, knowing what to do and who to call, is the theme of the ABC+ training program. During the first year of this integration program, a small cadre at each installation, reserve center and armory will receive the ABC+ training. ABC+ is based on the NBC awareness course currently being taught in the NLD City Training Program. In addition to the awareness training, key leaders and individuals will receive training in WMD emergency procedures. These procedures will also reinforce the proper techniques, protocols, and references that are essential to first responders. The intent is to answer questions that might be asked and provide an awareness of particular items to be alert to as the events develop during a WMD event. An ABC+ checklist will be provided that will guide the person through a series of questions that provide a profile of a potential WMD attack. ABC+ training will be provided on an interactive CD-ROM. At a minimum, full time National Guard and Reserve Component staff members need to complete the ABC+ training.

Unit Training

Preparing for a WMD response requires a focus on new and different tasks for some units. While many of these tasks are complementary to the unit's mission, some tasks have a new focus. Unit training builds on the individual skill proficiency to achieve unit domestic readiness. Rigorous training exercises are most appropriate for units with a WMD mission. These exercises require an understanding of the critical infrastructure nodes and emergency response protocols within the state and local communities to allow response units to refine "battle drill" techniques. The focus of unit training should provide immediate feedback to participants, which reinforces individual skills training. Also, measuring the effectiveness of completed training will identify areas that require further improvement. Unit NBC Defense Team's provide a WMD response capability as well. These teams are trained today for their military NBC mission and a basic orientation on the unique WMD tasks will be necessary. Annually, these defense teams exercise for their wartime mission, which is their primary orientation. With a minimum investment, a special training module could be developed that would provide a WMD track for the NBC Defense Teams. The Program will coordinate this initiative with the appropriate proponent school.

Course Evaluation and Development

The timely evaluation of training courses and materials is critical to ensuring that course content is properly focused. In this way emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to WMD responses will be made available to units.

Exercises

Exercises allow the teams, elements and units to practice for the WMD mission. A critical step in this process is learning the roles and responsibilities that individuals will assume should an actual incident occur. Exercises provide the opportunity to practice and develop skills as well as foster teamwork among responders and between agencies. Exercises ensure that a crisis is not the first opportunity for interagency coordination among responders. Lessons learned and opportunities to improve should be documented and shared with our interagency partners.

Exercises complement and enhance training activities. Since the Regional Training Brigades have the mission to conduct exercises using simulation, WMD scenarios can be developed for this capability.

Training Objective

The overarching training objective is to employ joint, interagency, and intergovernmental efforts to mitigate the effects of a WMD incident. The specific training objective may be broad or narrow in scope. A broad application of this training objective is focused on training interagency leaders and staffs in response management. A narrow application focuses on a specific sub-system not normally exercised by local emergency services such as planning decontamination of urban infrastructure assisting survivors, preventing additional casualties from chemical or radioactive agent drift, or restoration of public order.

Simulation Exercises

WMD Simulation Training Exercises (WMD SIMEX) will be conducted after initial training has been completed. The WMD SIMEX is a modified SPECTRUM or JANUS driven training event focusing on key leaders and response agencies. A CD-ROM and/or Internet based interactive computer-assisted training program with learner controls, practical exercises, and comprehensive assessments will be developed to support this program. The concept behind a WMD SIMEX is similar to the military's use of simulation training prior to field training exercises in order to maximize scarce operational dollars.

This methodology parallels the Army Battle Command Training Program. A read-ahead package made available provides selected materials appropriate to the training audience. Seminars bring interagency teams together to learn the process of reducing risk and mitigating the effects of a WMD attack. The exercise concludes with an Incident Command Post Exercise which brings interagency teams together in their actual operations centers to deal with issues, including fog and friction, generated by the separation in time and space from an event. The CBDCOM sponsored training provides a model for developing future training simulations.

Regional Training Exercise

This event brings all regional responders to a training incident and evaluates the entire response. The exercise is a joint, city, state, and federal effort. The leadership of these organizations should have completed a WMD SIMEX prior to a regional training exercise in order to maximize the benefit of the training event. Lessons learned will generate improvements in response.

A read-ahead package provides selected materials appropriate to the training audience. Civic leaders choose tasks they wish to exercise. Training scenarios will pull together the interagency team in a focused training exercise that allows them to operate together to reduce and mitigate the effects of a WMD. Through realistic execution the teams will test emergency response plans and coordination of responsibilities which will serve as the basis for formulating and testing alternatives to developing capabilities. Finally, an after action review process emphasizes lessons learned from and a take home packet provides direction for future interagency training events.

Modeling and Simulations

Many elaborate simulation models and simulation tools have been developed for Major Theater Warfare scenarios using current Active and Reserve Component data. These models can be adapted to scenarios which impact the civilian populace at large. Data generated from these models can produce hazard effects, which would be useful identifying "hot zones", evacuation areas and safe areas. Custom reports generated from these databases could instantaneously identify units within the geographic proximity of an event by zip code. This will be helpful for identifying gaps in the existing capability. More important, it will facilitate decisions about fielding force structure that could be used to fill current force structure gaps.

Two agencies that provided invaluable help to the Tiger Team include the Concepts Analysis Agency and Defense Special Weapons Agency. Each organization has extensive experience in developing modeling and simulations for the Department of Defense. Furthermore, each organization has the technical expertise to assist the future efforts of the program office in many ways including doctrine and training development. Areas of interest for the program office include: determine WMD impact, number of casualties in a contaminated area, downwind hazard, areas to avoid and evacuate, neutralization procedures, analyze and determine tasks and their priority, and estimate response force size and composition.

When used properly, simulations and models can create the environment and stress needed for effective response options. Proper use ensures quality training that can compensate for fiscal constraints that limit live exercises. In addition, simulations and modeling efforts will provide leaders at all levels effective training alternatives.

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Sustainment Training

The Senior Interagency Coordination Group Sustainment Training Process Action Team has recommended four Courses of Action for providing training to first responders following the initial 120 cities:

1. Maintain the Domestic Preparedness Training Teams for the cities beyond the current mandate.

2. Use or expand the existing training infrastructure to include NBC models.

3. Enable the cities to train themselves.

4. Empower the states to execute sustainment training by providing them a menu of approved Domestic Preparedness training courses.

Their plan provides multiple options depending on funding availability. Integration of Reserve Component personnel into each of the courses of action could leverage the unique capabilities and geographic dispersion to provide a cost-effective training opportunity.

Annex A: Acronyms

ACTD Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration

AFNSEP Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Office

AFRES Air Force Reserve

AMC Army Materiel Command

ANG Air National Guard

ARNG Army National Guard

ASA Assistant Secretary of the Army

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense

BDRP Biological Defense Research Program

C² Command and Control

CAM Chemical Agent Monitor

CB Chemical Biological

CB2010 Assessment of Chemical & Biological Agents on Joint Operations in 2010

1

CBDCOM Chemical Biological Defense Command

CBIRF Chemical Biological Initial Response Force

CBRRT Chemical & Biological Rapid Response Team

CDC Centers for Disease Control

CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group

CINC Commander in Chief

Commo Communications

CONPLAN Contingency plan

CONUS Continental United States

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DCO Defense Coordinating Officer

Decon Decontamination

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DoDRDB Department of Defense Resources Database

DoE Department of Energy

DoJ Department of Justice

DOMS Director of Military Support

DoT Department of Transportation

DPP Domestic preparedness Program

DSB Defense Science Board

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer

ER Emergency Room

ERDEC Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center

ESF Emergency Support Function

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FORSCOM Forces Command

FRP Federal Response Plan

GSA General Services Administration

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HQDA Headquarters Department of the Army

IAW In Accordance With

ICS Incident Command System

ILE Installations, Logistics & Environment

I-TRAP Interagency Terrorism Response Awareness Program

LFA Lead Federal Agency

MARS Mobile Analytical Response System

MMST Metropolitan Medical Strike Team

MRE Meal, Ready to Eat

MRMC Medical Research and Materiel Command

MSCA Military Support to Civilian Authorities

MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment

MTW Major Theater War

NBC Nuclear Biological Chemical

NC&B Nuclear, Chemical & Biological

NCO Non Commissioned Officer

NCS National Communications System

NDP National Defense panel

NG National Guard

NGA National Governors' Association

NGB National Guard Bureau

NICI National Interagency Counterdrug Institute

NLD Nunn-Lugar Domenici

NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute

NRC National Response Center

OCAR Office, Chief of the Army Reserve

OCONUS Outside of the Continental United States

P.L. Public Law

PAT Process Action Team

PC Personal Computer

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PHS Public Health Service

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RA Reserve Affairs

RAID Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection

RC Reserve Component

Recon Reconnaissance

RTF Response Task Force

SCO State Coordinating Officer

SECARMY Secretary of the Army

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SICG Senior Interagency Coordination Group

STARC State Area Command

TAG The Adjutant General

TDA Table of Distribution of Allowances

TEU Technical Escort Unit

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USAMRICD United States Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease

USAR United States Army Reserve

USCG United States Coast Guard

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

USMCRC United States Marine Corps Reserve Component

USNR United States Naval Reserve

VA Department of Veterans Affairs

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Annex B: References

Statutes

Title 42 Sections 5121-5204c Stafford Act

Title 14 Sections 1402 - 1455 1997 Defense Authorization Act Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

Title 32 Section 502, 3500 Mobilization Statutes (Army and Air National Guard)

Title 14 Section 712 Coast Guard

Title 10 Sections 12301-12304 Reserve Components

Title 50 Appendix 2251-2303 Civil Defense Act

Title 18 Section 1385 Posse Comitatus Act

Title 10 Sections 331-335 Insurrection Act

Title 31 Section 1535 Economy Act

Title 42 Sections 9601-9675 CERCLA (Superfund)

Executive Orders

E.O. 12656 (53 FR 47491) Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 Nov 88

E.O. 12472 (49 FR 13471) Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, 3 Apr 84

E.O. 12148 (44 FR 43239) Federal Emergency Management, 20 Jul 79

E.O. 13010 Critical Infrastructure Protection, 15 Jul 96

National Security and Presidential Decision Directives

NSD 66 Civil Defense, 16 Mar 92

PDD 39 U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (Unclassified extract), 21 Jun 95

DOD Directives

DOD Directive 3020.26 Continuity of Operations Policies and Planning, 26 May 95

DOD Directive 3020.36 Assignment of National Security

Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities to DoD Components, 2 Nov 88

DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 15 Jan 93

DOD Directive 3025.12 Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), 4 Feb 94

DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance for Civil Authorities (MACA), 18 Feb 97

DOD Directive 3150.5 DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, 24 Mar 87

DOD Directive 3150.8 DOD Response to Radiological Incidents, 13 Jun 96

DOD Directive 4000.19 Interservice and Intergovernmental Support 9 Aug 95

DOD Directive 5030.41 Implementation of National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 1 Jun 77

DOD Directive 5160.54 DOD Key Asset Protection Program (KAPP), 26 Jun 89

DOD Directive 5525.5 DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 15 Jan 86

DOD Manuals

DOD 3025.1-M Manual for Civil Emergencies, Jun 94

DOD 5100.52-M Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), Sep 90

Joint Publications

Joint Publication 5.0 Joint Operations

Plans

A National Security Strategy for A New Century prepared by the White House, May 1997.

National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 97.

Strategic Plan for Developing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Domestic Terrorism Preparedness and Response Capability prepared by the Interagency Working Group on Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, 29 August 97.

Annex C to U.S Government Interagency CONPLAN: "Combating Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism," Draft - 10 November 97.

Government Reports

Defense Reform Initiative Report, William S. Cohen, November 97.

GAO Report (GAO/NSIAD-97-129) Proposals to Expand Call-up Authorities Should Include Numerical Limitations.

GAO Report (GAO/NSIA-97-254) Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies Effort to Implement National Policy and Strategy.

FEMA, Focus Group Report: NBC Terrorism Response Focus Group For Local Government, 29 October 97.

Table of Contents

3

Annex C: Interviews

1. Henry J. Siegelson, MD, Division of Emergency Medicine, Emory University, Tucker, Georgia.

2. Theodore J. Jarboe, Deputy Chief, Department of Fire and Rescue, Montgomery Country, Maryland.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Carl Curling, SC.D., NBC Defense Staff Officer, Office of the Army Surgeon General.

4. Mr. Robert Weiderhouse, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

5. Mr. Robert Elliot, Department of Veterans Affairs. Also conducted a conference call with the Training and Development Section, Office of Emergency Medical Preparedness, Department of Veterans Affairs: Colonel Connie Boatwright (USAR, Registered Nurse) and Major David Teeter (Ph.D. Pharmacy - Indiana National Guard).

6. Commander Mike Anderson, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Public Health Service.

Annex D: Studies and Analyses

- 1. <u>Department of Defense Report to Congress: Domestic Preparedness Program in the</u> Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (1 May 1997).
- 2. An Assessment of Federal Consequence Management Capabilities for Response to Nuclear, Biological or Chemical (NBC) Terrorism A Report to the President in coordination with the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (February 1997).
- 3. Chem-Bio 2010: Assessment of the impact of Chem/Bio Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010 (Joint Staff September 1997).
- 4. The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response for the United States Congress and Federal Emergency Management Agency (January 1997).
- 5. Defense Science Board: DoD Responses to Transnational Threats (August 1997).
- 6. <u>Proliferation: Threat and Response</u>. Office of the Secretary of Defense (November 1997).
- 7. <u>Report of the National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense "National Security for</u> the 21st Century (December 1997).
- 8. NBC Terrorism Response Focus Group for Local Government Report (October 1996).
- 9. National Governor's Association Workshop with Interagency Partners (FEMA, DoD, EPA, FBI, DHHS and DVA) (September 1996).

Twenty six states participated in assessing capabilities to respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) terrorism. These 26 states were chosen because their large urban areas and other factors could make them potential targets for a terrorist incident.

10. FEMA - September 1996

During September 1996, FEMA met with representatives from Boston, MA; Denver, CO; Los Angeles, CA; and Philadelphia, PA. They focused on the capabilities and needs of local government to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD. Input and feedback from this sampling of U.S. metropolitan areas was intended to provide an indication of the spectrum of nationwide preparedness at the local level. Participants primarily represented emergency response and public health organizations from the respective state and local governments. Policy and subject matter experts included Federal officials from FEMA, the FBI, DHHS, and DoD.

Overall, the group consensus was that the local preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness applies to the NBC arena, some base level exists. However, a great deal of progress remains to be made on resource, planning, and training fronts regarding the unique nature of NBC terrorist incidents.

11. FEMA/FBI Report to Congress (January 1997).

FEMA and FBI submitted a Joint Report to Congress in January 1997. It addressed both crisis management/prevention and consequence management/response activities. This report focused on capabilities and interagency roles and responsibilities to respond to an incident involving WMD. In the assessment summary, the impact of a WMD incident and significant response requirement were recognized.

A NBC terrorist incident may occur as a local event with potentially profound national implications. In responding to a NBC incident, first responders must be able to provide critical resources within minutes to mitigate the effects of the incident. Since the ability of the local government to deal with the immediate effects of an incident is essential to the success of any NBC response, enhancing and maintaining the local capability with trained and adequately equipped responders is a key component of a viable national terrorism response capability.

12. DoD Focus Group Meetings (February 1997).

DoD, with the support of other Federal agencies, conducted a series of focus group meetings with first responders during February 1997. The findings and

recommendations of the groups formed the basis of a comprehensive set of training performance objectives. Based upon the focus group's review, a training course development program was begun to modify existing training courses, and develop programs of instruction and instructional material.

13. DoD/DoE Report to Congress (April 1996).

DoD and DoE, in consultation with FEMA, submitted a report to Congress in 1996 on current plans, resources, and capabilities to respond to a nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorist attack. The report covered consequence management plans and capabilities. Key points made were, first, there is a fundamental shift from the local or regional level of Federal involvement and decision-making authority to Washington, DC and the SECDEF's personal involvement during a WMD domestic terrorist incident. Second, there are some highly trained personnel available and excellent capabilities in many consequence management organizations to respond to a domestic NBC disaster. Finally, first responders need training, equipment, and supplies, yet there are limited quantities of DoD combat supplies available for NBC contingencies.

Annex E: Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office

A DoD program integration office will be established to manage all facets of the program.

Activities will include contracting, budget and quality assurance actions; evaluating current capabilities of WMD response elements; integrating WMD training activities; coordinating the development of WMD consequence management doctrine and modifications; coordinating the development and production of doctrinal publications; and coordinating development of scenarios and integrating all WMD exercise activities between local, state and federal response elements.

A critical function is establishing and maintaining linkages with the processes of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness System to include: the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Teams; Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). Initial tasks following establishment during the second quarter, FY98 will include coordinating the development of a comprehensive program with the Joint Staff, CINC's, Services and the DoD interfaces with the Interagency Domestic Preparedness Program. The office will be staffed with 8 Active Guard/Reserve military personnel; six GS civilians; and five contractors. Specific positions and duties include:

An O6 Program Director with joint experience and a minimum of three years in domestic support operations to exercise general program management and oversight.

An O5 Deputy Director with at least one year experience in domestic support operations.

An O5 Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment.) to coordinate staff actions and interface with the DoD Executive Agent.

A GS09 Administrative Assistant/Office Manager.

An O4 Program Management Acquisition Officer and O3 or GS12 Assistant to execute contracting, budget and quality assurance actions.

An O4 Program Management Training Officer assisted by an O3 or GS 12, and an E7 to integrate WMD training activities; coordinate development of training publications; and evaluate current capabilities of WMD response elements.

An O4 Program Management Doctrine Officer assisted by an O3 or GS12 to coordinate the development or modification of WMD doctrine based on training activities, exercises and subject matter-expert input.

An O4 Program Management Exercises Officer assisted by an O3 or GS12 and a SFC to produce exercise scenarios, coordinate major exercise play between local, state and federal response elements, and integrate all exercise events.

Five Contractors to provide support for information management, publications, exercise development, training development and scheduling, and administration.

Equipment requirements include:

• 20 Computers with 12 docking stations for 12 laptops connected to a local access network with internet access.

1

- 12 Laptop Computers.
- One Scanner.

- One CD-ROM Writer.
 One Lumina projector.
 One VHS Recorder.
 One Digital Camera.
 One Copier.
 One FAX machine.
 Multi-line phone system with speakers.
 One Television with CNN capability.
 Statistical and modeling software packages.
 Video telephonic hook-up.

Annex F: Equipment Requirements

Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Equipment Requirements

	-	-	•	-	
Cat	Nomenclature	NSN	Quantity	Cost	Total FY 99
С	10 Bank PAPR Battery Charger	COTS	1	597	597
С	1-C United Charger (Radio Charger)	COTS	1	517	517
С	Cellular Phone	COTS	9	200	1,800
С	Cellular Phone/Fax (STU III)	COTS	2	7,500	15,000
С	Commo/Computer Maintenance Contracts	COTS	1	2,000	2,000
С	INMARSAT	COTS	1	12,000	12,000
С	Lap Top Computer	COTS	9	3,000	27,000
С	Lap Top Computer Printer	COTS	9	300	2,700
С	"Pagers, Skytel w/Message Screen"	COTS	24	100	2,400
С	Saber Radios (Secure)	COTS	15	3,000	45,000
С	"Water Test kit, M272"	6665-01-134-0885	1	178	178
D	Air Inflatable Tents	COTS	1	7,140	7,140
D	Collapsible Pool	COTS	1	200	200
D	High Test Hypochlorite (50 lbs)	COTS	2	81	162
D	M-295 Individual Decon Kit	6850-01-357-8456	24	27	656
D	Plastic lined Drums	COTS	5	201	1,005
D	Portable Shower Kits	COTS	1	768	768
D	Roll Sheet 6mm (Box)	COTS	1	26	26
D	Sodium Carbonate (10 kg)	COTS	2	214	428
D	Sodium Hydroxide (10 Kg)	COTS	2	182	364
D	Sodium Hypochlorite (15 lb Bucket)	6810-00-598-7316	2	58	116
D	Spill Containment pillows	COTS	6	174	1,044
D	Waste Water Containment Device	COTS	1	2,584	2,584
D	Water Bladder, Decon Shower Waste Collection	COTS	1	1,762	1,762

М	"Convulsant Antidote, Nerve Agent (CANA)"	6505-01-274-0951	22	10	222
М	Cover, Chem Protective Patient Wrap	8415-01-311-7711	2	75	150
М	Cyanide Antidote Kit	COTS	22	15	330
Μ	Med Equip Set - Chem Agent Decon Kit	6545-01-176-4612	1	4,791	4,791
Μ	Med Equip Set - Chem Agent Treatment Kit	6545-01-141-9469	1	12,736	12,736
Μ	Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (Mark 1) - 3 Autoinjectors	6505-01-174-9919	22	12	257
М	Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (Mark 1) - Trainer		2	12	23
Μ	Nerve Agent pretreatment - PB Tablets	6505-01-178-7903	44	18	775
Р	Apron, Toxicological Agent protective	8415-00-281-7815	6	57	341
Р	Best "N" Dex Nitrile Gloves (25 Pr/Box)	COTS	2	15	29
Р	Boots, Toxicological Agent protective	8430-00-820-6300	44	100	4,402
Р	Cotton Blankets	COTS	12	24	288
Р	Cotton Clothing, Coveralls	COTS	40	50	1,980
Р	Cotton Drawers	COTS	44	2	88
Р	Cotton Socks	COTS	44	2 ·	88
Р	Cotton Towels	COTS	44	3	132
Р	Cotton T-Shirts	COTS	44	3	132
Р	Coveralls, Toxicological Agent protective	8415-00-099-6970	6	791	4,746
Р	Drawers, Underwear, CP	8415-01-363-8689	66	91	6,013
Р	Filter Canister, C2	4240-00-165-5026	66	9	574
Р	Gloves, Toxicological Agent protective	8415-00-753-6553	40	12	484
Р	HAZMAX 16"" Kneeboots"	COTS	6	43	260
Р	Hood, Toxicological Agent protective	8415-00-261-6690	6		0
Р	ILC Dover Cool Vest	COTS	4	189	756

Р	Interspiro SCBA	COTS	6	3,000	18,000
P	Level A Encapsulated Suits with Boots/Gloves (Kappler or equal)	COTS	12	685	8,220
Р	M30 Modified Hoods		44		0
Р	Mask M40	4240-01-143-2017	22	290	6,380
Р	Replacement Ice Pack for cool Vest	COTS	12	75	900
Р	Safety Glasses	COTS	22	3	74
Р	SCBA Spare Cylinders	COTS	6	1,400	8,400
Р	TOPPS Nomex IIIA Coveralls	COTS	8	83	664
Р	TYVEK-F Decon Suits	COTS	66	81	5,346
Р	"Undershirt, Underwear, CP"	8415-01-363-8693	66	99	6,501
R	44-6 Side Window GM Probe (Beta/Gamma)	COTS	1	145	145
R	44-9 Pancake G-M Detector (Alpha)	COTS	1	175	175
R	4-Gas Portable Monitor	COTS	1	1,700	1,700
R	Battery, CAM US	6665-99-760-9742	4	18	71
R	BIOS 600 Air Sampling Air Pumps/ DAAMS Tubes	COTS	1	3,675	3,675
R	CAMSIM	6910-01-275-4833	1	5,100	5,100
R	"Chemical Detector, M90"		2	16,500	33,000
R	"Detector Kit, Chemical, M18A2"	6665-01-903-4767	1	294	294
R	"Detector Kit, M256A1"	6665-01-133-4964	4	40	160
R	Dosimeter Charger	COTS	1	95	95
R	Draeger Quantimeter	COTS	1	2,200	2,200
R	Draeger Multiwarn II	COTS	2	2,800	5,600
R	Draeger Kit	COTS	1	853	853
R	Extra Draeger Tubes	COTS	1	368	368
R	Hand Held Reader for Immunoassay Tickets	COTS	1		0
R	ICAD Mini Chemical Agent Detector	COTS	1	2,798	2,798
R	Immunoassay Tickets	COTS	400	3	1,000

R	Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) W/alarm & tips	665-01-199-4153	3	5,500	16,500
R	Ludlum Digital Scaler Ratemeter 2241-2	COTS	1	725	725
R	M256 Training Kits	6665-01-112-1644	2	100	199
R	M8 Detection Paper	6665-00-050-8529	52	1	41
R	M9 Detection Paper	6665-01-226-5589	13	4	56
R	Monitox Phosgene Detector	COTS	4	200	800
R	Photoionization Detector	COTS	1	1,325	1,325
R	Pocket Radiac (AN/UDR-13)		16	627	10,032
R	"RADIAC Monitoring System, Alpha (AN/PDR-77)"	6665-01-347-6100	2	4,800	9,600
R	"RADIAC Monitoring System, Beta- Gamma (AN/VDR-2)"	6665-01-222-1425	2	2,026	4,052
R	Sample Collection Equipment Kits (Trelborg or equal)	COTS	1	500	500
R	Sample Transfer Container/ Small Black Infectious Substance Container	COTS	4	150	600
R	SAW MiniCAD	COTS	2	5,495	10,990
R	Sensidyne Detector Tubes	COTS		650	0
R	"Soil Sampler, M34"	6665-00-776-8817	1		0
R	Spray Simulant for Tng CAM		1	550	550
R	TEU Sampling Kit		4	300	1,200
X	Digital Camera	COTS	1	500	500
X	EMS Book	COTS	16	10	160
Х	HAZMAT Gear bag	COTS	24	40	960
Х	Med Mgt of Bio Casualty Book	COTS	24	2	50
X	Med Mgt of Chemical Casualty Book	COTS	24	2	50
X	Nicad batteries (Extra)	COTS	4	109	437
X	REAC/TS Trans. Of Radiological materials - Q&A About Incident Response	COTS	1	0	0
X	SCBA Maintenance Contract	COTS	1		0

4

.

X Video Camera

COTS

1	800	800
	<u>Total:</u>	336,888
54 Teams	Total:	18,191,953

Decontamination Element Equipment Requirements

Cat	Nomenclature	NSN	Quantity	Cost	Total FY 99
D	Air Inflatable Tents	COTS	3	7,140.00	21,420
D	Collapsible Pool	COTS	1	200.00	200
D	High Test Hypochlorite (50 lbs)	COTS	2	81.16	162
D	M-295 Individual Decon Kit	6850-01-357-8456	0	27.35	0
D	Plastic lined Drums	COTS	20	200.95	4,019
D	Portable Shower Kits	COTS	5	768.00	3,840
D	Roll Sheet 6mm (Box)	COTS	10	26.00	260
D	Sodium Carbonate (10 kg)	COTS	2	214.03	428
D	Sodium Hydroxide (10 Kg)	COTS	2	182.03	364
D	Sodium Hypochlorite (15 lb Bucket)	6810-00-598-7316	2	58.12	116
D	Spill Containment pillows	COTS	6	174.00	1,044
D	Waste Water Containment Device	COTS	1.	2,584.00	2,584
D	Water Bladder, Decon Shower Waste Collection	COTS	1	1,762.00	1,762
М	Convulsant Antidote, Nerve Agent (CANA)	6505-01-274-0951	20	10.08	202
М	Cyanide Antidote kit	COTS	20	15.00	300
Μ	Med Equip Set - Chem Agent Decon Kit	6545-01-176-4612	1	4,790.77	4,791
Μ	Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (Mark 1) - 3 Autoinjectors	6505-01-174-9919	20	11.66	233
М	Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (Mark 1) - Trainer		2	11.66	23

М	Nerve Agent pretreatment - PB Tablets	6505-01-178-7903	40	17.61	704
Р	Apron, Toxicological Agent protective	8415-00-281-7815	20	56.90	1,138
Р	Best "N" Dex Nitrile Gloves (25 Pr/Box)	COTS	2	14.50	29
Р	Boots, Toxicological Agent Protective	8430-00-820-6300	40	100.05	4,002
Р	Cotton Blankets	COTS	60	24.00	1,440
Р	Cotton Clothing, Coveralls	COTS	40	49.50	1,980
Р	Cotton Drawers	COTS	40	2.00	80
Р	Cotton Socks (Size 10)	COTS	40	2.00	80
Р	Cotton Towels	COTS	60	3.00	180
Р	Cotton T-Shirts	COTS	60	3.00	180
Р	Drawers, Underwear, CP"	8415-01-363-8689	60	91.10	5,466
Р	Filter Elements, M13A2"	4240-00-165-5026	60	18.83	1,130
Р	Gloves, Toxicological Agent protective"	8415-00-753-6553	60	12.10	726
Р	Level B Chemical Suits with boots/Gloves	COTS	20	126.00	2,520
Р	TYVEK-F Decon Suits	COTS	60	81.00	4,860
Р	Undershirt, Underwear, CP"	8415-01-363-8693	60	98.50	5,910
R	44-6 Side Window GM Probe (Beta/Gamma)	COTS	1	145.00	145
R	44-9 Pancake G-M Detector (Alpha)	COTS	1	175.00	175
R	Battery, CAM US	6665-99-760-9742	4	17.81	71
R	CAMSIM	6910-01-275-4833	1	5,100.00	5,100
R	Chemical Detector, M90		2	16,500.00	33,000
R	Detector Kit, M256A1	6665-01-133-4964	4	39.93	160
R	ICAD Mini Chemical Agent Detector	COTS	1	2,798.00	2,798
R	Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) W/alarm & tips	665-01-199-4153	3	5,500.00	16,500

R	M256 Training Kits	6665-01-112-1644	2	99.55	199
R	M8 Detection Paper	6665-00-050-8529	52	0.78	41
R	M9 Detection Paper	6665-01-226-5589	13	4.27	56
R	Pocket Radiac (AN/UDR-13)		5	627.00	3,135
R	"RADIAC Monitoring System, Alpha (AN/PDR-77)"	6665-01-347-6100	1	4,800.00	4,800
R	"RADIAC Monitoring System, Beta-Gamma (AN/VDR-2)"	6665-01-222-1425	1	2,026.00	2,026
R	SAW MiniCAD	COTS	2	5,495.00	10,990
R	Spray Simulant for Tng CAM		1	550.00	550
Х	HAZMAT Gear bag	COTS	20	39.99	800
			Per Team	<u>152,719</u>	
			Total:	127 Teams	19,395,275

Reconnaissance Element Equipment Requirements

Cat	Nomenclature	NSN	Quantity	Cost	Total FY 99
С	Water Test kit, M272	6665-01-134-0885	1	178.00	178
D	Collapsible Pool	COTS	1	200.00	200
D	M-295 Individual Decon Kit	6850-01-357-8456	20	27.35	547
Μ	Convulsant Antidote, Nerve Agent (CANA)	6505-01-274-0951	20	10.08	202
Μ	Cyanide Antidote kit	COTS	20	15.00	300
Μ	Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (Mark 1) - 3 Autoinjectors	6505-01-174-9919	20	11.66	233
Μ	Nerve Agent Antidote Kit (Mark 1) - Trainer		2	11.66	23
Μ	Nerve Agent pretreatment - PB Tablets	6505-01-178-7903	40	17.61	704
Р	Best "N" Dex Nitrile Gloves (25 Pr/Box)	COTS	2	14.50	29

Р	Cotton Clothing, Coveralls	COTS	60	49.50	2,970
P	Cotton Drawers	COTS	60	2.00	120
Р	Cotton Socks (Size 10)	COTS	60	2.00	120
P	Cotton Towels	COTS	60	3.00	180
Ρ	Cotton T-Shirts	COTS	60	3.00	180
Р	Drawers, Underwear, CP	8415-01-363-8689	60	91.10	5,466
Р	Filter Elements, M13A2	4240-00-165-5026	60	18.83	1,130
Р	ILC Dover Cool Vest	COTS	4	189.00	756
Р	Interspiro SCBA	COTS	6	3,000.00	18,000
Р	Level A Encapsulated Suits with Boots/Gloves (Kappler or equal)	COTS	12	685.00	8,220
Р	Replacement Ice Pack for cool Vest	COTS	12	75.00	900
Р	SCBA Spare Cylinders	COTS	6	1,400.00	8,400
Р	TYVEK-F Decon Suits	COTS	60	81.00	4,860
Р	Undershirt, Underwear, CP	8415-01-363-8693	60	98.50	5,910
R	44-6 Side Window GM Probe (Beta/Gamma)	COTS	2	145.00	290
R	44-9 Pancake G-M Detector (Alpha)	COTS	2	175.00	350
R	4-Gas Portable Monitor	COTS	1	1,700.00	1,700
R	Battery, CAM US	6665-99-760-9742	4	17.81	71
R	BIOS 600 Air Sampling Air Pumps/ DAAMS Tubes	COTS	1	3,675.00	3,675
R	CAMSIM	6910-01-275-4833	1	5,100.00	5,100
R	Chemical Detector, M90		2	16,500.00	33,000
R	Deluxe Pump Kit for Draeger kit	COTS	1	374.50	375
R	Detector Kit, Chemical, M18A2	6665-01-903-4767	1	294.00	294
R	Detector Kit, M256A1	6665-01-133-4964	4	39.93	160
R	Draeger Kit	COTS	1	852.75	853
R	Extra Draeger Tubes	COTS	2	367.55	735
R	Hand Held Reader for Immunoassay Tickets	COTS	1		0

R	ICAD Mini Chemical Agent Detector	COTS	2	2,798.00	5,596
R	Immunoassay Tickets	COTS	400	2.50	1,000
R	Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) W/alarm & tips	665-01-199-4153	3	5,500.00	16,500
R	Ludlum Digital Scaler Ratemeter 2241-2	COTS	1	725.00	725
R	M256 Training Kits	6665-01-112-1644	4	99.55	398
R	M8 Detection Paper	6665-00-050-8529	40	0.78	31
R	M9 Detection Paper	6665-01-226-5589	20	4.27	85
R	Monitox Phosgene Detector	COTS	4	200.00	800
R	Photoionization Detector	COTS	1	1,325.00	1,325
R	Pocket Radiac (AN/UDR-13)		20	627.00	12,540
R	"RADIAC Monitoring System, Alpha (AN/PDR-77)"	6665-01-347-6100	2	4,800.00	9,600
R	"RADIAC Monitoring System, Beta- Gamma (AN/VDR-2)"	6665-01-222-1425	2	2,026.00	4,052
R	Sample Collection Equipment Kits (Trelborg or equal)	COTS	1	500.00	500
R	Sample Transfer Container/ Small Black Infectious Substance Container	COTS	4	450.00	1,800
R	SAW MiniCAD	COTS	2	5,495.00	10,990
R	Sensidyne Detector Tubes	COTS	0	650.00	0
R	Soil Sampler, M34	6665-00-776-8817	1		0
R	Spray Simulant for Tng CAM		1	550.00	550
R	TEU Sampling Kit		4	300.00	1,200
Х	EMS Book	COTS	16	10.00	160
X	HAZMAT Gear bag	COTS	20	39.99	800
X	REAC/TS Trans. Of Radiological materials - Q&A About Incident Response	COTS	1	0.00	0
Х	SCBA Maintenance Contract	COTS	1		0
				Total:	<u>174,883</u>

Triage Medical Response Element Equipment Requirements

Description Trelborg Level B Suit **Trelborg Training Suit** Rebreather Masks Advantage 1000 Filters Tyvek Saranex 23-P Suit Disposable Surgical Mask **Disposable Gloves** Triage Kit Blankets Laptop Computer w/Modem Printer Field Medical Tag CAM M8 Paper M9 Paper Traffic Cones Marking Pens Flashlights I-V Fluids /Basic Dressings Communications equipment Muti-passenger vans

Trauma Medical Response Team Equipment Requirements

Description Trelborg Level B Suit Trelborg Training Suit Rebreather Masks Advantage 1000 Filters Tyvek Saranex23-P Suit M8 Paper M9 Paper

Stress Management Element Equipment Requirements

Trelborg Level B Suit Kappler Training Suit Trelborg Training Suit Rebreather Masks Advantage 1000 Filters Tyvek Saranex23-P Suit M8 Paper M9 Paper Neuropsych patient treatment bag Medical aid bag with basic physical and neurological exam inst. ID Vests

NBC Medical Response Element Equipment Requirements

Trelborg Level B Suit Kappler Training Suit Trelborg Training Suit Rebreather Masks Advantage 1000 Filters Tyvek Saranex23-P Suit **Disposable Surgical Mask Disposable Gloves** Sample Collection Kits (water, entomology, industrial hygiene, occupational health) Radiac meters CAM M8 Paper M9 Paper M272 Chemical agent water testing kit Medical specimen collection and transport kits Commo equipment Muti-pax vans ID Vests

Crisis/Stress Management Element Equipment Requirements

Ruggedized computer w/printer, FAX, and PC MCIA LAN Communication Equipment Hand held radios Multi-pax vans Expand-o Van (Cmd Ctr) Expand-o Van (Commo Ctr) Fields Tables Traffic Cones Barrier Material Bull Horn Engineer Tape Light Sets 30k Generators Porta-Johns Refrigeration Trailer

Information and Planning Element Equipment Requirements

Copiers FAX machines Printers Calculators Clocks displaying local and Zulu time Laptop or notebook-type personal computers Computer work stations with file servers Fax boards on file servers Laser printers **Optical** scanners **Display** projector Surge protectors Backup power sources Portable televisions with built-in Video Cassette Recorder (VCR) Portable, battery-powered AM/FM radios Flashlights with extra batteries Wall charts/display boards Maps/overlays Supply of preformatted computer diskettes, ribbons and VCR tapes

Mortuary Affairs Elements Equipment Requirements

Personal Protective Equipment Body Bags Refrigerated trucks: A mass fatality situation may require additional refrigeration capacity to store remains until final disposition. Military units with this capability need to be identified and included in the DoD Resources Database. Operators need both awareness training and training in operating the equipment in a contaminated environment.

Communications Element Equipment Requirements

Mobile or transportable telecommunications equipment Multichannel radio systems Base station and hand held portables Mobile or transportable microwave systems Mobile or transportable switchboards and station equipment Aircraft suitable as platforms for airborne radio repeaters Trained installation and operations personnel available for deployment to the field Naval ship(s) as appropriate to act as relay platforms.

Annex G: Legal Issues

Planning principles

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the team selected the Federal mission as the principle to guide the organization of the response elements. Under this organizing principle, the immediate response elements act as the tip of the Federal MSCA spear. It is anticipated the initial WMD response would be in a State status, under the control of the Governor. Since the unit's outlined in this plan remain DoD assets, the unit's force structure would also be available to support the homeland defense and MSCA missions, and provide a secondary warfighting capability.

Current legislative initiatives

Status of full time personnel: The team analyzed a number of options regarding the status of full time personnel. These included: state active duty (SAD), full time National Guard duty for special work (Title 32), full time Active Guard and Reserve duty (AGR)(Title 32) and active duty for special work (Title 10). The team recommends full time Active Guard and Reserve duty (AGR)(Title 32), for National Guard personnel. This status best enables the personnel to perform required missions within the envisioned command and control structure and with federal military personnel benefits. This status provides a career track for soldiers who will be highly skilled and in high demand. A change to current statutes covering Title 32 is necessary since the WMD mission is operational in nature. The specific language has been included in the fast-track legislative package being staffed separate from this plan.

Stafford Act Amendments: The team also recommends amending provisions of the Stafford Disaster Assistance Act that concern Federal and State disaster preparedness programs and disaster response, to include WMD incidents within the definition of a disaster under the act and to authorize the use of the National Guard (as defined in section (101)(3) of Title 32) or the reserve components (as named in Section 10101 of Title 10) "to take such actions that may be necessary to provide an immediate response to a disaster involving a weapon of mass destruction" (as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Act, as it would be amended). The act would also be amended to also require that DoD be reimbursed for any expenses incurred by the department for disaster preparedness programs conducted by the National Guard or the reserve Components from funds "appropriated for the purposes of the Act" and to authorize the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Director of FEMA, to direct the National Guard and Reserve Components to conduct training exercises, preposition equipment and other items, and to take such other actions that may be necessary to provide an immediate response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction (as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Act, as it would be amended). The Department of Defense would be reimbursed with funds made available for the purposes of disaster relief. These changes facilitate use of the reserve component in WMD response under the Stafford Act.

Fast Track Legislation

As mentioned previously in this document, WMD response activity will be quite different. In fact, federal resources may be required much earlier than during a typical disaster response. Given this potential, access to federal resources takes on a new and perhaps even demanding dimension. With quick access in mind, now is the time to work the accessibility issues, not after an event has occurred. Both have unique features but it appears that at a minimum, the amendment to 10 USC 12301(b) deserves favorable consideration. The 10 USC 12304 amendment addresses access but extends the current PSRC authority to WMD related incidents. The nature of just these amendments is an example of the issues requiring attention. More work remains necessary. Perhaps, in the end, a new status covering operational missions will be most appropriate for the type duty outlined in this plan. The two categories for consideration are listed below:

1. Extension of Involuntary Call-up Authority to 30 Days: Amendment to 10 USC 12301(b). That section currently authorizes the Secretary of a military department to order, without the consent of the persons affected, any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of the Secretary to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. This amendment would increase a period of active duty from 15 to 30 days a year. This authority would enable the military departments to initially respond more effectively to a domestic incident involving a weapon of mass destruction and to make members of the ready reserve more readily available to participate in other operational missions.

2. Enhanced access to the Reserve Components: Amendment to 10 USC 12304(b) concerning the authority of the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense to order members of the Selective Reserve to active duty not in time of war or during a national emergency declared by Congress and amendments to the Stafford Act to authorize and facilitate DoD preparation for and response in WMD consequence management situations. Currently, Section 12304(b) prohibits such an order to active duty "to provide assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe." The amendment inserts a very limited exception to section 12304(b) that would allow a unit or member to be ordered to active duty to provide assistance in responding to an emergency involving a "weapon of mass destruction."

Table of Contents

2

Annex H: Training Requirements

Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Element Training Requirements:

Advanced Life Support Response to Hazardous Materials Incidents	FEMA NFA
Advanced Radiation Incident Operations	FEMA EMI
Applied Health Physics	DOE
Basic Life Support & Hazardous Materials Response	FEMA NFA
CB First Responder Awareness Training	CBDCOM
CB Warfare Countermeasures Course	USACMLS
CB Warfare Proliferation Course	CIA
Chemical Accident & Incident Response and Assistance	USADAC
Chemical Awareness	USADAC
Chemical Hazard Prediction	FEMA/CSEPP
Consequences of Terrorism Integrated Emergency Management	FEMA EMI
Emergency Response to a Criminal/Terrorist Incident	FEMA EMI
Field Management of CB Casualties	RIID/MRICD
Fundamentals Course for Radiological Monitors	FEMA EMI
Fundamentals Course for Radiological Response Teams	FEMA EMI
Hazardous Materials Incident Response Operations	(HAZWOPER) EPA
Health Physics for the Industrial Hygienist	DOE
Health Physics in Radiation Accidents	DOE REAC/TS
Introduction to Radiation Safety	DOE
Medical Management of CB Casualties	MRIID/MRICD
Medical Effects of Nuclear Weapons	AFFRI/USUHS
Nuclear Hazards Training Course	DNWS
Operational Radiation Safety	USACMLS
Radioactive Material Basics for Emergency Responders	DOE
Senior Officers Nuclear Accident Course	DNWS
Service Response Force Commander/On Scene Coordinator Course	USADAC
Toxic Chemical Training for Medical Support Personnel	CBDCOM
Personal Protective Equipment Course	FEMA/CSEPP
Response Phase Decontamination for	CSEPP FEMA/CSEPP
Air Monitoring for Hazardous Materials	EPA
Incident Command System/Emergency Operations Center Interface	FEMA EMI
Emergency Response to a Hazardous Materials Incident	EPA

Decontamination Element Training Requirements

Leader Training	TBD
Element Training (1 IDT Weekend)	Unit Leaders

Reconnaissance Element Training Requirements

Hazardous Materials Incident Response Operations Element Training (1 IDT Weekend)

Medical Elements Training Requirements

Medical Management of CB Casualties Other Medical Courses from RAID list as appropriate.

Other Element Training Requirements

B First Responder Awareness Training Other Courses from RAID list as appropriate

Table of Contents

(HAZWOPER) EPA Unit Leaders

MRIID/MRICD

CBDCOM

Annex I: Tiger Team Membership

TIGER TEAM CORE

BG Roger C. Schultz	Executive Director
Lt Col Jay Steinmetz	FORSCOM
COL Chuck Winn	OASD/RA
LTC Tim Madere	ASA (ILE)
LTC Dutch Thomas	NGB
MAJ Alicia Tate-Nadeau	USARC
MAJ Keith McCullough	AFNSEP
Mr. Bill McCoy	OASD/SOLIC

OPERATIONAL PLANNING SUPPORT

	FORCOM
LTC Charlie Todd	FORSCOM
LTC Ontiveros	CBDCOM
LTC Don Harrington	CBDCOM
SFC Holden	CBDCOM
MAJ Sopher	DOMS BF751
LTC Pete Aylward	DOMS BF751
CDR Alfred Byrne	USACOM J3
Maj Don Bauza	HQ USMC RA
CW4 Joseph Treat	HQ MARFORES
LTC Phil Migliori	USACOM J5
COL Pat Nilo	DAMO-FDB
COL Bill Lixey	USA Chem School
COL Bob Hart	ASA (M&RA)
CAPT Miller	ASN (RA) 4E789
CAPT Ralph Malone	N095
CDR Thomas Blakeney	N953
CDR John Murphy	N953
LTC Willis Lee	J33 WHEM
COL Stu Crane	J3 RC Advisor
Col Phil Steptoe	SAF/MIR 9C938
Col Ron Manning	SAF/MIR 9C938
LtCol Dave Pitman	SAF/MIR 9C938
Maj Mike Landry	AFRES (AF/REO)
COL Spencer	ATSD (CP/CBD)
Mr Matta	ATSD (CP/CBD)
Mr. Davis	COMNAVRESFOR
LT Mike Edgerton	USCG HQ (MOR)
CDR Jane Hartley	USCGR(WTR-1)
MAJ Elizabeth Wilson	OCAR
CPT Todd Burton	NGB-ARO-OM

Lt Col Bill Baisden LTC Scott Wells Mr. Jim Smyser COL Rich Beauchemin MAJ Larry Shaw LTC Bill Stranko Maj F.P. Gresham Mr. Bob Barret LTC Mark Cremin LTC Terry Jones LTC Guy Shields MAJ Tim Oujiri Dr. Maurice Mizrahi Ms Sally Morse COL Lou Kronenberger COL Bruce Westcott COL Bo Mayhew CAPT Dave Grupe CAPT Gerry Fleming Col Chuck Anderson **COL Steve Cook** COL Bob Fitton LTC Tim Ringhold **CAPT** Pat Casey LTC Dave Green Mr. Hemenway Mr. James Gerding LTC Carl Curling

ANG/XO FEMA LNO **OSD** General Counsel OSD (HA) OTSG SAGC USMC CBIRF CAA DAJA-IO OASD (RA) HODA PAO OCLL OSD PA&E ODUSD/C OCLL OCAR-ODD NGB OASD/RA USCGR OASD/RA (RT&M) HQ USMC RA Army PA&E (RA) DAMO-ODS (DOMS) MG Davidson's M.A. J5(CP/WMD JWCA) J8 OASD(C3I) **DSWA** OTSG