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## Near East/South Asia Report

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18 January 1985

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GULF FACES SEVERE LIQUIDITY SHORTAGE AS DOLLAR PRESSURE MOUNTS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 5 Nov 84 pp 3-5

[Text]

The United Arab Emirates has taken a series of monetary measures to reverse the current "severe" liquidity shortage in the country. The UAE is not alone in having to take urgent measures: Kuwait and Bahrain have also made adjustments to take account of a strong dollar, the Gulf war and the lack of attractive local investments.

In Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, the M<sub>1</sub> money supply has remained constant for two years. Reports suggested that the same may be true of Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, which, because of the Souq al-Manakh crash, is a special case, M<sub>1</sub> fell by 21 per cent in the 12 months to last August.

The UAE last month withdrew its dollar-dirham swap facility for local banks facing currency problems. The central bank governor, Abdul Malik Hamar, said the measure would be applied only against "errant" banks and was expected to provide "appropriate liquidity" for the economy. The central bank has also stopped interest payment on foreign currency reserves lodged with it by the commercial banks.

The net foreign assets of the UAE's commercial banks rose by 5.6 per cent in the first quarter of 1984 to account for about 46 per cent of total assets. Assets were \$2.81bn at the end of 1983, a \$0.49bn increase over end-1982, the central bank's annual report says. Foreign liabilities dropped by 18.5 per cent over the first quarter 1984.

The government clearly hopes for a marked improvement, from the US currency into dirhams.

However, with the impending US presidential election and the continuing attraction of the dollar, this move, if it takes place at all, may be delayed until the position of the new administration in Washington has become clear. Until last week, there was virtually no risk or penalty attached to moving into dollars. Mr Henry Azzam, an economist with the Bahrain-based United Gulf Bank, said last week: "Gulf currencies are coming under pressure against the dollar and liquidity problems are beginning to surface." He said many of Gulf companies were facing liquidity problems, and he particularly referred to construction companies in Saudi Arabia.

He went on: "Commercial banks in Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain have started to raise gradually their lending rates beyond officially-agreed levels in order to be able to pay higher rates to depositors, reduce the differential with dollar rates and attract more deposits."

Some banking sources in the Gulf suggested that the new measures may be insufficient to overcome the shrinking local investment market, which has suffered from lower oil revenues and regional political tensions. The most attractive investments — until recently, construction and trade — have been hardest hit by the liquidity shortage. In addition, a central bank scheme to issue negotiable bonds to discourage the movement into dollars has been criticised by banks and, reportedly, withdrawn.

Bankers went on to suggest that the pressures on local currencies may force central banks to manage exchange rates more closely in what, until now, has been an almost unfettered exchange area.

## RESULTS OF OPEC MEETING

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 5 Nov 84 pp 3-5

[Article by Randa Takieddine]

[Text]

Provided that the 13 member-states of Opec take their new resolution seriously, oil prices on the spot market should start to firm in the next two weeks and move back to the \$29-a-barrel marker price. At its emergency session in Geneva last week, Opec cut its global production by just over 8.5 per cent, from 17.5mn to 16mn b/d. The 1.5mn cut was distributed as follows:

Country	Old quota	New quota	Cut b/d	Cut %
Algeria	725,000	663,000	62,000	8.55
Ecuador	200,000	183,000	17,000	8.50
Gabon	150,000	137,000	13,000	8.66
Indonesia	1,300,000	1,189,000	111,000	8.53
Iran	2,400,000	2,300,000	100,000	4.16
Iraq	1,200,000	1,200,000	—	—
Kuwait	1,050,000	900,000	150,000	14.28
Libya	1,100,000	990,000	110,000	10.00
Nigeria	1,300,000	1,300,000	—	—
Qatar	300,000	280,000	20,000	6.66
UAE	1,100,000	950,000	150,000	13.63
Venezuela	1,675,000	1,555,000	120,000	7.16
Saudi Arabia	5,000,000	4,353,000	647,000	12.94
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,500,000</b>	<b>16,000,000</b>	<b>1,500,000</b>	<b>8.57%</b>



Opec output in October was lower than the old quota of 17.5mn b/d because of the weakness of the market. Output last month was 17.2mn b/d, according to the conference chairman, Dr Subroto of Indonesia. However this newsletter understands that production was actually 16.73mn b/d broken down as follows: Algeria 650,000; Ecuador 200,000; Gabon 150,000; Indonesia 1.4mn; Iran 1.7mn; Iraq 1.3mn; Kuwait 1.03mn; Libya 1mn; Nigeria 1.45mn; Qatar 450,000; UAE 950,000; Venezuela 1.75mn; and Saudi Arabia 4.7mn.

Thus, Opec oil ministers in Geneva decided to cut quotas many of them had been unable even to reach in October. Only Qatar, Indonesia, Iraq and Nigeria (if one accepts that the output concession given in July expired at the end of September) were able to exceed their quotas; the remainder were hard pushed to make sales. However, even the new production level may cause marketing problems if world demand for Opec oil does not match up to the expectations of its members, the oil companies and the International Energy Agency in Paris. They agree that the demand for Opec oil in the northern winter months should be around 19mn b/d (17.5mn in consumption and about 1.5mn for inventories). If, however, demand fails to match this prediction, then Opec is in serious trouble and may have to make further cuts.

Opec ministers clearly do not envisage such a possibility — at least, not publically. At his press conference, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, said: "There is no disagreement that the Opec market share for November must be at least 19mn b/d. The only way to satisfy it is either from Opec or from inventories, and with the decision today, we will make sure that the price of oil will go up to the official Opec price."

Another possibility, which Opec ministers are reluctant to contemplate, is that some members may take advantage of a rising market to exceed their production quotas. This is exactly what happened in the summer when some states, eager for additional revenues, over-produced and contributed towards the fall in spot prices. Sheikh Yamani said: "From our experience in the past, whenever we have a crisis we live up to our responsibilities because we know we have two alternatives: either to reduce prices and lose revenue (a reduction in prices is a permanent loss), or to restrict output and restrain ourselves (which means only a temporary loss)." The real effect of last week's decision will be seen first by the oil companies when they feel that the flow of oil has been restricted, he said. "By the end of November, I expect the price to go back to the Opec official price. But I won't be surprised if it happens before that," said Sheikh Yamani.

Nevertheless, the Saudi oil minister's optimism is not shared by all his colleagues. In private, a number of oil ministers told this newsletter that the meeting should have tackled the pressing issue of price differentials, which has become urgent and is affecting prices. The Geneva meeting took only half-measures and set up a ministerial committee under Sheikh Yamani and including the UAE and Libyan oil ministers, to examine the issue as soon as possible.

Some Opec officials also privately urged that the question of differentials should have been tackled last week. With the official price of heavy crudes lower than the spot price, the door is open for heavy crude producers, such as Saudi Arabia, to alter the mix of export oils and effectively lower their prices. The Kingdom's new export mix (which increases the proportion of heavy crudes from 20 to 35 per cent and reduces the light component from 60 to 40 per cent) was seen by a UAE expert as effectively bringing the \$29 marker price down to about \$27.55.

The Saudi oil minister, however, gave an alternative explanation of the movement in heavy oil prices. He told his press conference: "If you follow the market, you will have noticed that the price of heavy oil has started to go up. This was probably one of the results of the Saudi decision to change the ratio. But by increasing the production of heavy oil, the price will come down. In the past, some companies had to buy from Saudi Arabia more than they needed in order to endure their heavy requirements. They found themselves with thousands of barrels of light and extra light which they did not need. However, they took it in order to get the heavy, and then put the light back on the market at any price they could get. That is why one found pressure on the price of light in the past. But now they don't do it. They satisfy their requirements with heavy and do not sell anything in the market. This is one of the reasons why the price of light is going up and will be a real support for light and extra light."

Another issue disconcerting some members was the special position accorded to Nigeria, whose oil remains at two dollars below the Opec level. This is causing particular problems to producers of light crudes comparable to Nigeria's, such as Algeria and Libya. On this issue, Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister, said: "With production reduced to 16mn b/d, you will see prices picking up so fast in the next two weeks that it will not be a major problem. I think the pressure will be on the lower priced producers, be it Nigeria or the North Sea, to increase their prices soon. In fact, if we look at the Norwegian decision, we can see that they expect this price drop to reverse itself and they have left room for themselves to adjust the price upward by reduc-

ing the discount. The discount for November is less than it was for October and they tell us that they do not expect any discount by November, only market prices."

Both Nigeria and Iraq were given special consideration at the Geneva meeting, with both countries exempted from production cuts. Explaining this position, Sheikh Yamani pointed to the crucial circumstances both find themselves in. Whether Nigeria's quota is now 1.4mn or 1.5mn b/d, it does not really matter, since there is a swing producer [Saudi Arabia] able to handle this, he said. "Nigeria has a local political problem as well as a financial one. Their contribution at this moment is to undertake not to raise production and to start raising prices, with the first step coming fairly soon," he said.

"Iraq," he said, "has a huge capacity to produce with a limited capacity to export. Its quota is allocated, not on its actual need, but on its inability to export. This is a nation still at war and it has to have financial resources. That's why we gave Iraq this special position."

Qassem Taqi al-Oreibi, the Iraqi oil minister, told this newsletter, "Our current production is 1.3mn b/d, with some 950,000 b/d going for export through the Turkish line, and the remaining 400,000 b/d for local consumption. I have asked for our production quota to be reduced from 1.3mn to about

1.2mn in solidarity with Opec and in order to be at my quota level."

Despite the generally sceptical air surrounding last week's discussions there are at least two signs encouraging the belief that Opec is taking its recent decision to heart. Firstly, according to a senior Opec official who attended the negotiations, this was the first time that Saudi Arabia, the largest producer in the organisation, gave a firm commitment and figures of its planned production level. In the past, Saudi Arabia has never accepted a production quota but let it be understood that it would act as the swing producer around the five million barrels level, leaving the organisation to allocate quotas for the remaining 12.5mn b/d.

The second sign is that all 13 member-states clearly fear the consequences of a further reduction in the oil price. This includes those producers who have exceeded their quotas in recent months. Underlying this general fear are the more specific ones, that the market may not firm up in accordance with expectations and that countries strapped for foreign exchange — and on this point all eyes are turned to Nigeria — may once again unilaterally over-produce to the detriment of all. This would clearly be disastrous: but this may be the only reason for believing that the agreement might stick.

CSO: 4400/48

## REACTION TO MEETING

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 5 Nov 84 pp 5, 6

[Text]

**Norway says no change yet:** Norway will continue to produce at current levels, despite the Opec agreement, said foreign minister Sverre Strøm last week. But he said the price cut introduced last month was not likely to last more than two months. Mr Strøm denied that Norway's Statoil had provoked the recent fall in oil prices. He said the problem was started by the British National Oil Company, which had given rebates to its customers. Norway's customers had demanded similar rebates, he said.

Nigeria's price-cut followed Norway's, but this was just an excuse, he said. They wanted to do it anyway. He said Norway could not realistically cut its production since most of its oil came from offshore fields, which were technically and economically more difficult to cut back.

**Nigeria rejects production cuts:** Nigeria ruled out any cut-back in its oil production even before the Opec meeting — a position it successfully maintained at the ministerial discussions. Oil minister Tam David-West said: "Cutting our production is completely out of the question." The minister said that since oil contributed more than 90 per cent of his country's foreign exchange earnings, it would be "suicidal" to cut output. He said he had not gone to Geneva to negotiate, but to listen. Members of Opec should practise what they preach, he declared, in an apparent reference to widespread discounting and indirect price reductions by member-states of Opec.

**Mexico will cut production:** Mexico will cut its production by 100,000 b/d immediately. The Central American country exports 1.5mn b/d, more than half its total output. The cut will cost Mexico about \$81mn in lost earnings this month.

**US says cut will help:** US government and private oil analysts said the Opec production cut would support the \$29-a-barrel marker price in the northern hemisphere, but would be severely tested when the warmer weather comes. An unidentified State Department official told *Reuters* that the agreement to cut production was "a short-term victory" and that the problem would hit them harder in the spring.

"It would be better for them to solve the fundamental problem now when the market is in their favour," he said. He did not specify what the "fundamental problem" was.

A Brookings Institution report says that political instability was likely to be the primary problem for the world oil market during the next few years. The report, written by Middle East luminaries William Quandt and Douglas Bohi, said that market incentives should help to stabilise prices and oil supply, but went on to say that the most serious threat to energy security would be a major shift in the balance of power in the Gulf region and a corresponding shift in political influence over oil production and pricing. Political factors could drastically undermine economic incentives for stability, the report declared. It gave the example of Iran's being able to dominate the Gulf. This would bring about a long-term structural change in oil-supply conditions without any physical damage to oil installations, the report warned.

**Egypt cuts output but holds prices:** Egypt says it will cut its crude oil exports by 30,000 b/d following the Opec production cut-back agreed last week. The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation said exports of around 300,000 b/d would be cut by 30,000 b/d. The cut is the maximum Egypt can afford in view of

its commitments to its customers, said Mohamed Shawkat, the deputy-director of the EGPC.

The price of export blends will be maintained through November, Mr Shawkat said. The prices, which have remained steady since last April, are: \$28 a barrel for the benchmark Suez blend, \$28 for Bahar, \$26.75 for Balayim, \$27.50 for Marine Balayim, \$26.60 for Budran and \$25.60 for Ras Gharib.

Oil experts in Cairo said any cuts in Egyptian production represented an important sacrifice, as oil revenues are the country's main source of foreign exchange after remittances from Egyptian workers abroad.

The economy minister, Mustapha Kamel said last week that an Egyptian cut-back would not have a decisive effect on production trends and quantities in the world market.

**Oman will not cut production:** Oman will stick to its 1984 oil-output target of 400,000 b/d despite the production cut-back agreed at the Opec meeting in Geneva last week. Announcing the target, oil minister Said bin Ahmed al-Shanfari, said Opec had not been in formal contact with his government nor had there been any request for a cut in Omani production. He confirmed that Oman was continuing its established

policy of following Opec prices. "There are no discounts," he declared.

Omani officials said production had averaged 414,000 b/d in the first nine months of 1984. This had risen to 410,800 b/d between July and September and had even hit 414,000 b/d during September. Thus, a small decrease in output could be made and still leave Oman on target. But, as economists and diplomats pointed out, Omani production was "a drop in the ocean compared to the big producers".

However, production has risen sharply from the 280,000 b/d level of 1980, mainly to offset falling oil prices. Production in the third quarter 1984 was 38.1mn barrels, a 2.7 per cent increase over the second-quarter output of 37.1mn barrels. Production in the third quarter 1983 was 36.9mn barrels. The most recent increase in output comes from the Safa field in northwest Oman, which started operations in February.

More than 90 per cent of Omani production goes to Asia — to Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. Demand remains high because tankers lifting Omani crude do not face the risks run by ships north of the Strait of Hormuz.

CSO: 4400/48

## GULF TANKER WAR BOOSTS INSURANCE PROFITS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 5 Nov 84 pp 9, 10

[Text]

Insurance companies have doubled premiums for oil cargoes loading at the Saudi Arabian port of Ras Tannurah as a result of recent attacks in the Gulf tanker war, according to marine insurance brokers. Insurance companies have expanded the region considered a high risk zone, which includes ports northwest of Ras Tannurah, to include the busy Saudi port. However, brokers have reduced the overall premium on cargoes by 0.05, to 0.2 per cent, in the war zone.

The new increase at Ras Tannurah came after an apparent Iranian rocket attack on the 23,796-ton Panamanian registered Gaz Fountain, on October 12th, after it had just loaded liquefied petroleum gas at Ras Tannurah. The premiums for the western Gulf ports south of Ras Tannurah remain at 0.1 per cent. Shippers to the far northern ports of Iraq or Iran, like Bandar Khomeini, must apply for a premium for each trip they venture.

Surprisingly, the 49-month gulf has lined insurance companies' pockets with money, according to the deputy chairman of Lloyds of London. "Its actually good for our business," Mr Ian Davison said. "Everyone who sends a ship into the war zone recognises the necessity of being insured even though the premiums are high. Brokers are crying all the way to the bank" he added, since "losses to insured ships were not as high as the insurance premiums generated... But premiums paid for ships sailing through the Gulf are still a bargain when balanced against the value of the petroleum at risk," he said. Mr Davison said Lloyds had suffered more losses from the 20 ships bottled up in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway at the start of the war than ships damaged by military action.

AFRICAN DROUGHT FORCES CHEAP SALE OF LIVESTOCK IN GULF

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 5 Nov 84 p 9

[Text]

East African states, threatened by drought and famine, are being forced to sell off their livestock cheaply to buy much-needed grain. Sources in the Gulf reported that sheep are being sold in Kuwait and other countries for about \$23 a head, instead of the more usual \$45 to \$60. Sheep exports from Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are depressing the livestock market in the Gulf, while threatening to decimate the breeding herds in the countries of origin. Iran is facing a similar problem of reduced herds because of heavy sales to earn hard currency to prosecute the war with Iraq.

While world attention has focused on the devastating famine in Ethiopia, other African states are also suffering from the continuing drought. Reports from Sudan said that thousands of refugees were fleeing the Western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan to the central plains nearer the Nile in the search for food. The western provinces have long suffered from desert creep, which has been aggravated in recent years by the drought. The lack of rain is also threatening to destroy the livestock which has long been the economic mainstay of the area.

Maize production in the eastern plains has declined this year to 1.3mn tonnes, from three millions in 1982. The lack of rain has caused the Nile to drop, to a volume of only 35bn cubic metres, compared to the 55.5bn required for irrigation and domestic purposes.

The United States, the UN World Food Programme and other international relief agencies are supplying emergency food and shelter.

### **Saudi Arabia will reduce grain seed imports**

Saudi Arabia has introduced new regulations to monitor the import of grain seeds which will reduce the total of imports and improve quality, reports from the Kingdom said. Saudi Arabia will need to import about 125,000 tonnes of seed before mid-November. About 98 per cent of the seed will be the US Yecoro Rojo variety.

In future, seed importers will have to declare the amount of seed required and the areas to be sown. The government will issue the requisite permit and set deadlines before which the seed deals will have to be completed. The authorities have set a deadline of December 10th for the import of this season's seed.

The government will also monitor the quality of imported seeds in an attempt to reduce crop diseases. However, western agricultural experts said crop disease was a very minor problem in the Kingdom.

A price of 2,000 riyals (\$560) a tonne has been set for the sale of seed to farmers, although supplies on credit are likely to be higher.

Saudi Arabia has been successful in achieving grain self-sufficiency, although it has been expensive. Production this harvest was about 1.3mn tonnes, of which 900,000 tonnes were exported. The government, as an incentive measure, guarantees to buy wheat from farmers at about \$1,000 a tonne. But at seven times the international price, Saudi Arabia may find that this policy is not tenable into the very

far future. Wheat output has shot up since 1981-82, when production totalled only 187,000 tonnes. The main problem now is the shortage of rodent-free storage.

### **Fertile Crescent will up wheat imports**

Wheat imports into the Middle East are expected to rise as the drought in Syria, Jordan and Iraq leaves those countries short of cereals, according to the US Wheat Association. Mr. Michael Schultz, the association's Middle East director, said that imports during the fiscal year 1985 (ie, from October 1st) could go up to 15mn tonnes compared with normal shipments of 13mn to 14mn tonnes.

Mr. Schultz said the drought would likely increase US wheat sales to Syria to 1.5mn tonnes, about double the 600,000 to 800,000 tonnes over the past year. Sales to Iraq would rise by a similar proportion, from about 2.2mn tonnes to 3.5mn tonnes, while sales to Jordan might hit 500,000 tonnes from a normal 350,000 tonnes.

Iraq has just signed its first credit for US cereals, for 125,000 tonnes of wheat flour. Mr. Schultz said sales to Egypt, the US's biggest customer in the region, would amount to about 6.2mn tonnes during 1985. Mr. Schultz estimated US sales to the region, as follows: Turkey, one million tonnes of wheat; Gulf Arab states, 700,000 tonnes; Sudan, 500,000 tonnes of wheat and flour; North Yemen, 400,000 tonnes of wheat and flour; and Cyprus, 80,000 tonnes of wheat and flour.

CSO: 4400/48

ARTICLE COMMENTS ON ARMENIAN CAUSE, WORLD POLITICS

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 5 Nov 84 p 2

[Text] Has the wheel turned again? Why not, when it is possible to do so?

Those who, only yesterday, were talking against the Armenian Cause are already saying favorable things about it and may tomorrow defend it. Is it possible to trust their words of condemnation of all acts leading to the resolution of the Armenian Cause when we don't know what they will be saying in 2 days' time?

Thus the wheel keeps turning, showing to the world and mankind its many facets while hiding others, to be revealed much later. This will surely go on so long as the positions adopted by peoples and states yesterday, today and tomorrow towards the legitimate rights of nations do not spring from the very source of justice but are generally based on the so-called political climate or on this or that disposition.

How could you, gentlemen, permit yourselves only yesterday to label as senseless and barbaric the incomparable sacrifice of the young men whose freely chosen death in Lisbon symbolized the spirit of martyrdom and rightful demands of the Armenian nation? Perhaps you did so because you were motivated by circumstances?

Perhaps you did so because in those days you did not desire to annoy Turkey, whereas today... Only the devil knows the answer. Or else, there is a change in the situation. Perhaps you have come around to realizing that the struggle of peoples for their rights cannot cease so long as justice is denied them. Perhaps you understood that the gradual merging of the energies of the dispossessed and oppressed peoples and the irresistible might of the infuriated masses, ranging from South America to the Middle East, are capable of "bringing down the suns" and of disturbing the peace of those who, in all conscience, have been tolerating the acts of injustice that take place under their very noses, often with their complicity.

It is possible that at some point your conscience awoke to the voice of justice and made you realize that, whatever the circumstances, the fight waged by the youth of a nation is stronger than despair and that victory may perhaps be delayed but it will eventually be achieved. That victory, our victory, is right there waiting for us and we shall attain it. It matters little if they call us insane and think our struggle to be mindless and ineffectual. It is



not without interest to know what is expected of us at the present time. We are supposed to rotate like that wheel, to depend on it, to conform to its rhythm by remaining quiet at times, since some people have started to accept the reality of the Armenian Genocide, while at other times we are expected to behave rashly as Turkey, that Sick Man of Europe, is held in high esteem. Perhaps many other things are also expected of us. Yesterday, it was Mitterand, today it is Reagan and tomorrow no one knows who will do a "great favor" to the Armenian people by admitting half-heartedly that the Turks have committed a Genocide of the Armenians. They are all mistaken. We have learnt the rules of the game, even though we have merely been spectators. We can now distinguish between those who direct the play and those who act. It is true that politics is amoral and it is meaningless to expect to find justice in the unjust. But not to this extent...

We accept the fact that our Cause will not be resolved in 2 days, not even in 2 years. We accept that we are dependent on world politics, much against our will. We are fully conscious of all that. But we are not passively awaiting that changes take place in this state. We are continuing our work till the end, and we are committed to continuing our struggle for our rights. We have come to understand very well Christapor's message of uninterrupted fight and our goal brooks no weakening of the tension. We and all succeeding generations, we shall be engaged in the struggle for the restoration of all the rights of the Armenian people, and if need be, we shall bring back to life, even at the price of our lives, the Greater Armenia for the whole of the Armenian nation.

12364

CSO: 4605/44

ANGLICAN CHURCH LEADER, ISTANBUL PATRIARCH CONDEMN TERRORISM

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 19 Nov 84 p 1

[Statement by Robert Rencie, Archbishop of Canterbury and of All Anglican Churches, and Turkey's Armenian Patriarch Shnork Archbishop Kaloustian: "Archbishop of Canterbury and Turkish Armenian Patriarch Release Statement: Two Spiritual Leaders Unanimously Condemn Terrorism of Every Kind"]

[Text] In this palace, which for centuries has been the center of religious leaders of England, we, Shnork Archbishop Kaloustian, Turkey's Armenian Patriarch, and Robert Rencie, Archbishop of Canterbury, have come together for a fraternal meeting and an ecumenical prayer. Thus our long-standing friendship has been renewed, and we have recalled with warmth our cordial meeting which took place in Istanbul in July 1982. On this occasion we have exchanged views and ideas with one another concerning the present condition and state of our churches. We exchanged views on numerous current issues which today threaten mankind and of which churches should remain aware.

In addition to these matters, we discussed the important issue of terrorist activities, which end in the death or wounding of targeted victims or innocent people, actions which are occurring with growing frequency and which our two churches are witnessing with great pain and sorrow.

The Bible, explaining the idea of peace, defines as "Saint" those persons who make every effort to bring peace between peoples. We therefore strongly condemn all kinds of terrorism which, for the purpose of attaining a political goal, are used without distinction and without limits or boundaries. We insistently demand of all Christians that they implement God's teachings to the letter, as he has commanded that we shall love our neighbor and forgive our enemies.

The Lambeth meeting has indeed made an important contribution to the articulation of like views on the part of the Armenian and Anglican churches, so that mankind can be assured a great peace and unanimity by following the path shown by Christ.

We ended our meeting with a prayer in the old chapel at Lambeth Palace. Both of us sincerely prayed for the unity of church and man.



May God the Almighty, His incarnate son, through the Church of Christ and all good will of this world, make this thing possible, giving thanks to the Holy Spirit which exists in the hearts of men and women.

8817

CSO: 4605/42

ARMENIAN DAILY COMMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH TURKEY

GF301854 Beirut ZARTONK in Armenian 7 Dec 84 p 2

[Editorial originally published by BAYKAR newspaper: "A Proposal for Negotiations With the Turks"]

[Excerpts] Professor Vazken Parseghian, well-known American-Armenian scientist and national worker, made a proposal recently to hold negotiations with Turkish representatives on the Armenian genocide. This proposal was published in an article on the 20 October 1984 issue of THE ARMENIAN MIRROR-SPECTATOR newspaper. In its next issue the newspaper published a letter by Dr Denise Papazian on the article.

The article and letter raise a few questions which should be discussed. Professor Parseghian bases his views on the point that during the great genocide years the Turkish people were subjected to political disturbances and that they revolted against the "incapability and treacheries of the sultans" as well as against the attempts of the Western countries and Russia to turn the Turkish Government into a tool. According to him the Turkish people have been and remain to be the victims of suppressions, deceits, and distortion of historic facts by their own government. Consequently, according to Professor Parseghian, negotiations should be held with the Turks and we must acquaint them with our history and recognize their history because he says "they also suffered and their history should be told."

He proposes that these negotiations be held in the United States between Armenian and Turkish intellectuals on a scientific level without entering into political limits. He expresses great hope that when the Turks residing in the United States face the historic facts they will accept and recognize the fact of the Armenian genocide.

Dr Papazian writes that those Armenians who have approached the Armenian genocide on an intellectual level have noticed that only a small number of Turks have participated in the massacres and that many have done their best to rescue the Armenians. Thus, he concludes by saying: "We do not have any dispute with the ordinary Turkish people who were deceived by official propaganda."

To what extent do these statements agree with the facts?

We cannot agree with Dr Papazin's insistence that the Turkish people have been the victims of their own government's lies and that only a small number of Turks participated in the massacres.

The Turkish people practically participated in the deportation of the Armenians, robbed them of their possessions, killed defenseless women, children, and the elderly, and kidnapped and enslaved girls and boys. The honesty of an intellectual requires that he see the facts as they are and does not explain everything by the "hatred" that the Armenians have against the Turks. The Armenians do not have hatred but an acute demand for justice and compensation which has turned into rage due to the negative stance adopted by Turkey and the Western world on the recognition and acceptance of the Armenian genocide.

To show the Turkish people as victims and as subjects of deceit means to ignore the facts and indulge in self-deception. The Turkish people have never been victims nor have they been deceived. On the contrary, modern Turkish people are as guilty of the genocide crime as their predecessors from 1915 to 1923. The Turkish people are well aware of the historic distortions that are being made by the Turkish Government, historians, scientists, newspapers, radio and television.

Professor Paraseghian believes that it is possible to negotiate with the Turks on the Armenian genocide and history without raising "political" questions. We do not believe in such a possibility. The Armenian genocide is politics in itself because it was a political deed of Turkey. The revision of the Armenian genocide means the study of land and possession compensation questions which are political before being anything else.

Negotiations with the Turks are not only desirable but a demand which has been delayed far too long already. We believe in the advantages of direct talks. We must talk on whatever level--on the intellectual level, or the historical, cultural, or physical education levels. But first we must analyze the facts correctly and be guided by an exact comprehension of historic evidence, or else we will fall into situations where we will unwillingly defend the interests of the "victimized" Turkish people.

CSO: 4605/57

## EGYPTIAN MOVES FOLLOWING AMERICAN ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 82, 3-9 Nov 84 p 6

//Article: "Egyptian Political Initiative Following American Elections"//

/Text/ Political circles in Egypt consider the quick official visit Egyptian President Husni Mubarak made to Paris and Bonn as preparation for an extensive diplomatic and political initiative Cairo will undertake as soon as the American elections are over for the sake of setting the Middle East issue in motion. President Husni Mubarak discussed with President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl the European role in achieving peace and preparing for a draft communique to be issued by the European group next December.

More than one source in Paris noticed that the Egyptian president's visit to Paris had a special character and effective political dimensions that go beyond the ordinary routine; that it occurred at a time when the Middle East area and the Egyptian-French diplomatic role are going through an important stage; and that the meeting of Presidents Mitterrand and Mubarak was part of the series of consultations the Elysee Palace held last October with Arab officials and on the eve of President Mitterrand's visit to Damascus at the end of the current month, in addition to his expected meeting with the Israeli prime minister, Shimon Peres, who will make an official visit to Paris where he will meet twice with President Mitterrand. The visit is scheduled for the beginning of next December.

French diplomatic sources told AL-TADAMUN that Paris places special importance on the Egyptian diplomatic role in this area, especially since Egypt has begun to regain its strategic role in the Arab and international arena right after the restoration of diplomatic relations between Cairo and each of Moscow and Amman.

The same source went on to say that Egyptian diplomacy, in cooperation with the European group, is seeking to work out one peace plan from all the peace initiatives aimed at finding a settlement for the Middle East crisis and that the Egyptian movement in this direction is awaiting the results of the American election, according to what President Mubarak told the journalists following his meeting with French President Mitterrand when he said: "We are awaiting the results of the American elections and White House affairs being put in order to begin our necessary diplomatic initiative concerning all the issues that are of concern to the area."

12502

CSO: 4504/90

DIYA'-AL-DIN DA'UD DISCUSSES NASIRISM

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 344, 15 Oct 84 pp 21-23

[Interview with Diya'-al-Din Da'ud by Yusuf Rahal: "Nasirism Is a More Accurate Term Than the 'July Revolution'"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Before I and my colleague 'Abdallah Imam met with Mr Diya'-al-Din Da'ud, I had more than one conception of him. It was not, of course, that media image that defamed those men who lived with leader 'Abd-al-Nasir through every moment of his life. Questions began racing in my mind. What do I say to him? How and from where do I begin? Is there a limit to my questions that are growing? Will the interview be about old memories or about future contemplations. The questioning took only a few minutes after which I let the man gush forth. Although my questions were somewhat provocative, the man by nature believes that there must be a difference of opinion in order for us to agree, for each of us ultimately hopes for a restructuring of the Arab homeland. We had the following dialogue:

[Question] What do we say to those who contend that in 'Abd-al-Nasir's time there was only one opinion and one organization, be it called the Arab Socialist Union or the National Union or the Liberation Rally or any other name?

[Answer] The wrong idea that germinated about the absence of a second opinion in the presence of 'Abd-al-Nasir was born out of the view that a prerequisite of a single political organization is a single opinion. This is not true. The Socialist Union included various groups by virtue of the alliance among them. Each group had its own ideas and interests and, consequently, its varied and differing opinions. That is why the National Conference and its committees, the central committee and the Vanguard Organization committees had very important and profound discussions with several consenting and opposing views. There was not at any time [as published] and anyone who goes back to the central committee minutes and the National Conference and its committees can find clear and irrefutable confirmation of that.

[Question] But there are many problems plaguing the Nasirist movement.

[Answer] Yes, the Nasirist movement has two main problems. The first is that under al-Sadat many laws were enacted with the aim of blocking the creation of

a Nasirist organization, including the isolation imposed on the majority of the key Nasirist leaders. The second problem is that all the key Nasirist leaders are isolated politically by force of these laws and are also denied the tools of expression and contact with the people. Concerning the Nasirist bases, they do exist and are spread all over the place waiting for the organizational content that can unite them.

[Question] Only the Arab masses still keep in their hearts the image of 'Abd-al-Nasir. But it seems that the Egyptian masses, after losing the leader, have turned away from the Nasirist march and the revolution that brought them the seeds of the future.

[Answer] I distinguish between the Egyptian masses and the Arab masses in their way of acting. The Egyptian masses have their special way of expressing their position. First, reaction did not come quickly. Second, expression starts with a kind of negative resistance and upheavals wherever opportunities present themselves. That is how the masses in Egypt at the beginning of the al-Sadat era were able to hide their true inclinations when he raised the slogans of democracy, institutional rule and socialism and that he was defending the 'Abd-al-Nasir line to which he was committed, particularly since the disagreement with President Anwar al-Sadat was not yet known in detail to the public. Al-Sadat was able to portray it as only a disagreement over the rule and not over principles and the system. Things soon came to light, however, and the masses began resisting the current led by Anwar al-Sadat in the Egyptian fashion of this kind of resistance. Then the positive resistance began emerging in the Egyptian fashion, such as the 18 and 19 January 1977 uprising, and the positions of unions--the lawyers, journalists and other labor and professional unions--staying far away from the political organizations which al-Sadat tried to create to support his regime and making pointed biting jokes in criticizing and denouncing these policies. This current continued to grow, reaching its apex with the al-Sadat assassination at the hands of an Egyptian young man and the people's negative reaction and boycott of the funeral.

[Question] Was there a democratic crisis in 'Abd-al-Nasir's days?

[Answer] There was no democratic crisis. Anwar al-Sadat, as Haykal said on 14 May, wanted to talk about his differences with us concerning his contacting the Americans. He urged him to focus on democracy, and my estimation is that democracy was a bribe to the counter-forces, from the 'Abd-al-Nasir revolution, to support the al-Sadat position in that regard, considering the fact that democracy gave them the chance to defend their class interests and their attacks on the regime, namely Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and to regain the right to express these ambitions. Hence, the democracy or freedom that prevailed thereafter was not a freedom of criticism or debate of the existing policy applied by Anwar al-Sadat, but rather a freedom of attacking and slandering 'Abd-al-Nasir's person and regime. Thus, when criticism got close to Anwar al-Sadat and the people around him, he did away with all opposition newspapers and organizations. So, there was not in fact a democratic crisis. But some believe or imagine that the only form of democracy is the multi-party system, and some, driven by their self-interests, believe that freedom and democracy are their own personal freedom to write or say what they please, even if what they write is against the good of all the people, or if their ambitions clash with their interests.



[Question] It has been said that your differences with President al-Sadat were over the tripartite federation with Syria and Libya in the sense that you were against the union. How true is that?

[Answer] There are three approaches to this question:

First, the differences over the union agreement was the front, not the depth of the issue. The difference was basically directed at the method of rule. We objected to al-Sadat's autocracy which ignored all other constitutional and political organizations and institutions. It was a difference in which we insisted on a democratic rule and he insisted on autocracy.

Second, we were approaching the battle of liberation, the liberation of Arab land, and we did not want to be preoccupied with anything else or to create peripheral battles, especially since the enemies of unity, be they within or without the Arab nation, are many and would have essentially created battles and problems over unity that could have consumed our efforts and distracted us from our objective at the time, the liberation of the land.

Third, we, while undoubtedly Nasirists, are also unionists. We were seeking, based on experience, to attain unity on a basis that guaranteed its survival and stability, while al-Sadat was seeking, and he made no bones about it, only the paper, not the content or essence of unity. He was paving the way for capitulation through the creation of a wide front in which to embroil Libya and Syria. Hence, it was not an opposition to unity in and of itself, but rather to its methods and al-Sadat's goals at the time. It was a refusal to use it as a bargaining chip, based on our group's experience with Anwar al-Sadat's intentions, thoughts and tendencies.

[Question] The question that carries more than one question mark is: If al-Sadat was not an extension of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, and he was not, why did 'Abd-al-Nasir choose him? Al-Sadat, up until the first day of his regime, occupied sensitive positions.

[Answer] Definitely. Al-Sadat was the antithesis of 'Abd-al-Nasir and not an extension of him. As for why 'Abd-al-Nasir chose him, it was because ever since he met 'Abd-al-Nasir, he always pretended to take 'Abd-al-Nasir's side in all his actions, stances, relations and power struggles. He was never known to oppose any view or position. As he himself said to 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-al-Nur, when reproving him for his opposite position during our crisis with al-Sadat, he thought that 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-al-Nur's vote was in his pocket just as Anwar al-Sadat's vote was in 'Abd-al-Nasir's pocket. Hence, 'Abd-al-Nasir may have been fooled by al-Sadat as we were fooled by him when he was first elected, for we imagined that the organizations would undertake their leading role in a way that would prevent al-Sadat from monopolizing power and playing the role he did.

[Question] Al-Sadat called the May group the centers of power.

[Answer] Anyone who has authority in his position is a "center of power." However, the expression, "centers of power," was given during the field marshal

crisis to the group that exceeded its legitimate authority and usurped other authorities that did not belong to it. Hence, it was used by 'Abd-al-Nasir and then by al-Sadat in his confrontation with us. It was out of place because we were exercising our responsibilities, whether as executive or central committee members or as ministers. We exercised them democratically, for making our views known within the organizational framework and in a democratic fashion is not in excess of our legitimate right. This is what actually happened. We very much wanted the organizations to exercise their responsibilities through participation and self-expression, whereas he considered himself the only authority and any opposing view was a reprehensible crime and a defiance of the head of the family, and therefore a shame, according to him.

/Question/ What more have you learned from your long years of experience?

/Answer/ Many things, but I will concentrate on two things.

First, political struggle must not be an individual one; it must be through an organization with effective popular participation. Second, I wish that the rule be assumed by officials who have lost their freedoms and have been in jail because their time in jail sensitizes them to human dignity and freedom, in other words, experience and suffering. Such feelings can spare an official many mistakes and can correct many a practice.

/Question/ There is much talk about the creation of a new Nasirist party?

/Answer/ Some Nasirists believe that the creation of a new Nasirist party is a departure from 'Abd-al-Nasir's principles and the theory of alliances. This theory may have a place under the Nasirist system, but under non-Nasirist multi-party systems, the Nasirist must not avoid the political movement within the framework of the existing legitimacy on the pretext that Nasirism believes in the alliance of people's forces. It is imperative that all Nasirists in Egypt rally under the banner of one organization, within the boundaries of the legitimacy granted for democratic struggle, to achieve the hopes and aspirations of Nasirism and to apply its principles that serve the working masses. The Nasirist organization will necessarily include all the working groups under an alliance, and this organization is a necessity because the dominant grass-roots base is a Nasirist one. This is not conjecture. We say this because the masses of farmers who are under the protection of the agrarian reform laws are Nasirists; the laborers who under Nasirism realized their hope in the private and public sector are Nasirists; the educated for whom the revolution provided a chance for education, expression and various positions are definitely Nasirists. All those are the pillars of 'Abd-al-Nasir's revolution.

/Question/ Why don't we say the 23 July Revolution?

/Answer/ In my opinion, the expression, "Nasirism," is more accurate because the 23 July Revolution comprised phases, and the Nasirist phase was the social revolution in which 'Abd-al-Nasir took exclusive responsibility for leading the social change, drawing up and defining its principles and concepts with the help of all the cadres and forces that saw eye to eye with him and bore responsibility for such a change. Hence, the name "Nasirism" is an accurate rendition of reality.

[Question] One more question which is an expansion of another question you have already answered. Many observers considered the past 10 years an apostasy from Nasirism, as though Nasirism did not plant its roots in the ground and did not create cadres, while outside Egypt it lives on and the name of its leader is still a symbol. Nonetheless, you only think about the Nasirists here in Egypt!

[Answer] I do not imagine that Egypt should dictate to the Nasirists throughout the Arab nation their organizational form. I expect, however, that following the crystallization of the Egyptian Nasirists' organizational form, a national conference can be convened to present this idea and to get opinions about the most appropriate organizational method so that all these forces may join and meet at their various positions in view of the fact that Nasirism is a national thought and a current that transcends all boundaries and barriers.

12502

CSO: 4504/90

## OPPOSITION LEADER URGES EXPULSION OF ISRAELI ENVOY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 401, 27 Oct 84 pp 39-40

/Interview with Mumtaz Nassar, opposition leader, by Yusuf al-Qu'ayd: "The Camp David Accords Are Over Because Israel Has Betrayed Them, I Demand The Expulsion of the Israeli Ambassador from Egypt": in Cairo, date not specified/

/Text/ I met with Justice Mumtaz Nassar, leader of the Egyptian opposition, late at night in his downtown Cairo office where he practices law. It was not the first time I have gone to his office. I had gone there to attend press conferences held by Mumtaz Nassar to protest relations with the Israeli enemy. I saw him personally keep an Israeli journalist away from one conference and out of his office. I saw this scene repeated more than once. I went to the Upper Egypt city where he grew up: the city of al-Badari which stood behind him until the last elections held during the al-Sadat era. He was the only one who won in all the elections. The people of the city guarded the ballot boxes with the force of arms and no one anywhere in Egypt was able to tinker with anything. Mumtaz Nassar won. He tried to found the "National Front Party," but was unable to do so owing to his stance on the peace treaty between al-Sadat and the enemy. When the election by slate system was applied in Egypt, it became impossible for him to run as an independent, thus he boarded the Wafd's ship in the elections and currently leads its opposition in the People's Assembly.

I sat with him for a long time. He was generous in his replies to my questions, save for three questions he refused to answer.

I began with the most recent issue that forces itself on the Egyptian mind, the issue of subsidies, particularly following President Husni Mubarak's meeting with the heads of the opposition parties in Egypt.

/Question/ What is the party's position on the issue of subsidies and on President Mubarak's initiative?

/Answer/ President Mubarak in his many speeches and interviews has expressed his belief in the democratic march and will never turn away from it. We as an opposition welcome this direction and wish him more success and progress so that democracy may be deeply rooted.

[Question/ What is your position on the subsidy issue?

[Answer/ Regarding the subsidy issue, the Wafd Party's supreme body chose to have the party's economic committee study the party's position on the subject of subsidies so as to submit practical solutions on this matter.

[Question/ But the chairman of the Wafd economic committee, Dr Ahmad Abu Isma'il, is not in Egypt now.

[Answer/ He is in America attending the IMF meeting. The committee is working, however.

[Question/ People in Egypt fear the Wafd's position on the subsidy issue. They fear that there might be a prejudice towards the rich against the poor.

[Answer/ I think the Wafd's opinion concerning the subsidy issue has to be in keeping with Egypt's higher interest.

[Question/ Only Egypt's higher interest?

[Answer/ And with the hopes and aspirations of the Egyptian street. The Wafd cannot go out of this scope.

[Question/ Until the economic committee concludes its study, what is your opinion on this issue?

[Answer/ The subsidy issue is a main issue in which several basic considerations must be taken into account. The first has to do with identifying the recipients. They must be the limited-income people only and no one else. Second, it must be limited to the basic essential goods and services that have a direct effect on the life of limited-income individuals. In this framework, I think the competent committee will define the methods that can achieve these two objectives.

[Question/ Does the party's role end at just voicing its opinion? And, what guarantees it to be an effective and impressive opinion?

[Answer/ We express our opinion as we see it. What concerns us though is that the government has hitherto failed to find basic solutions to this problem, so it turned to the opposition. That is why we will not be awed by the situation.

We shall say our word in the interest of the public good.

(I asked Justice Mumtaz Nassar about the interpellations, questions and inquiries the opposition has submitted and will submit in the People's Assembly.)

[Answer/ I will submit an interpellation to the government about the excesses that occurred in the last elections. The party's supreme body has approved the interpellation in its final form. I submitted an inquiry to the government about the Israeli excesses in Taba. I imagine that Israel is up to its usual tricks. I warned the Egyptian government about Israel's tricks for wresting

away the land of others. This is a fixed policy of Israel. In the past, it wrested away Umm al-Rashrash village, a 100 percent Egyptian village and turned it into the Port of Elat.

[Question/ It is being said that you intend to submit an interpellation about the allowances for the families of 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat.

[Answer/ I will re-submit this project this year. It is actually ready.

[Question/ Why?

[Answer/ I believe that public opinion in Egypt is for the cancellation of such allowances because it is not right to have allowances for three presidents in a country which is in economic straits. These allowances are both financial and real estate.

[Question/ Will these allowances solve the economic problem?

[Answer/ If the two seafront al-Ma'murah resthouses in Alexandria and the adjoining property were to be returned to the state, they could be auctioned off for up to 1.5 Egyptian billion pounds, which is nothing to sneeze at.

[Question/ Has the Wafd formed a shadow government?

[Answer/ We have committees in the same number as the existing ministries studying current issues as well as all the various future possibilities. These committees number 20 and are known in western political life that is based on a liberal foundation as a "shadow government."

[Question/ Are you talking to Wafd breakaway elements, especially since they are trying to found their own party?

[Answer/ The Wafd is eager to unite its breakaway elements. It is trying to do that with dialogue and persuasion. Someone may get excited, but things calm down after awhile and dialogue can straighten things out.

[Question/ How do you coordinate with the other opposition parties, both in and out of the People's Assembly, especially in the wake of the recent campaign wounds?

[Answer/ Coordination with the opposition, both in and out of the assembly is something that must occur between opposition leaders, irrespective of their positions, in order to safeguard democracy and to defend people's rights and freedoms. This is a natural thing in all countries of the world.

[Question/ How do you struggle against Camp David now that you are the opposition leader?

[Answer/ First, Camp David is not too much of an issue now because the time for granting the Palestinians autonomy has expired without doing anything during this period. It has died and no longer exists. As for the peace treaty, Israel

betrayed it and has failed to honor its pledge. Israel pledged to solve its problems with its neighbors peacefully, but, despite such a pledge, it occupied south Lebanon, annexed Arab Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and hit the Iraqi nuclear reactor. International law allows Egypt to freeze all its commitments toward Israel. It is not enough to recall the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv. I say the Israeli ambassador must be expelled from Cairo and all treaties with Israel frozen. This is prescribed and decreed by international law.

/Question/ Is this your personal opinion or that of the Wafd?

/Answer/ This is actually the Wafd's opinion.

/Question/ What do you think about the Red Sea mines issue which is almost history?

/Answer/ I said in the People's Assembly, and it is a matter of record, and I say to you now: I have suspicions that point to Israel in this matter, considering it the original perpetrator.

/Question/ The Egyptian-Arab road is open now. What is your role as an opposition?

/Answer/ We have our contacts. Do not forget that we represent popular diplomacy and have contacts with all the Arab countries. However, I imagine that the freezing of relations with Israel may be an effective and basic measure that would restore Arab solidarity. We always advise the government in this direction and always agitate against Israel. I think the Husni Mubarak government is serious in its march on the road of Arab solidarity to the end and in arriving at the desired results.

12502

CSO: 4504/90

REFORMS PROPOSED FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Nov, 1, 2 Dec 84

[30 Nov 84 p 2]

[Text] A greater clarity in determining responsibility, much greater administrative precision and a decisive betterment in human relations and the social climate, an improved competition potential and a greater effectiveness brought to bear by the public enterprises in the impact they make on economic and social development.

The journal CONJONCTURE in its 89th issue published an important dossier on the public enterprises. Considering the scope of the reforms proposed, we have deemed it useful to publish the contents of this dossier.

From the beginning of the year 1984, ministerial and interdepartmental commissions, joined by the CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] of certain public enterprises, have been examining the concrete measures to be implemented, with an eye to improving management and reinforcing the competition potential of the public enterprises, all of this within the framework of the reforms in administrative style of these enterprises, as recommended by the Sixth Plan.

A program of reforms was adopted by the council of ministers, meeting on 29 March 1984 under the presidency of the head of state. This program is directed toward assuring:

- 1) An improved competition potential and a greater effectiveness of the public enterprises in the impact they make on the economic and social development of the nation;
- 2) A clearer coherence between the various areas in which the state intervenes, by means of the public enterprises, the level of its participation in the capital of these enterprises and the organization of its supervisory methods; and
- 3) A greater clarity in determining responsibility, much greater administrative precision and a decisive amelioration of human relations and the social climate.

The realization of the goals targeted above necessarily implies a judicious choice of the public enterprises that would have to come under the direct super-



vision of the state as part of the broad options of our economic and social policies and of the goals that we have set for ourselves within the scope of the Sixth Plan.

Concerning the public enterprises to come under the direct supervision of the state, it is proposed that direct state participation in the capital be not less than 34 percent, in order to allow the state to exercise its prerogatives as stockholder under normal conditions, thus giving itself the means to put its policy into operation.

Concerning the branch companies of the public enterprises, the same goals--improvement of competition potential, reinforcement of administrative precision and overall effectiveness--will be striven for and made possible by entrusting the exercise of supervision to the chief stockholder of each branch company.

For this purpose, the present legislative texts defining state control over the public enterprises, as well as certain articles of the code of business law, should be amended as soon as possible.

#### Choice of Enterprises To Come under the Direct Supervision of the State

Concerning the choice to be worked out as to which enterprises must remain under the direct control of the state and which must be confided to the control of the "parent enterprises," the departments concerned will be called upon to present to the government two lists of enterprises, the first of them to include the enterprises that must remain under the direct supervision of the state, the second those for which the supervision will be exercised by delegation and integrally by the "parent enterprises" (holding companies, development banks, commercial banks, etc.)

The departments will have to give a proper rationale for these selections and for each enterprise selected, in order to allow the proper authorities to give a ruling on them as soon as possible.

The two lists ultimately retained will form the object of a program of capital reorganization, reflecting the interest that the state places in the sector and the enterprise. This reorganization will be realized over a period of several years, notably as a function of the financial potential of the state.

#### Establishment within the Ministries of a Unit Specialized in State Supervision of the Public Enterprises

The functions of this unit:

In cooperation with the technical staffs, a specialized unit will have jurisdiction over all the enterprises placed under the direct supervision of the department and will concentrate within itself the duties normally discharged by the state as stockholder; basically, it will be called upon:

- 1) To work out the contract programs in collaboration with the enterprises and the technical staffs, and see to it that the programs are carried through.

- 2) To follow the market and evaluate the effectiveness of the actions taken by the boards of directors and the assemblies.
- 3) To follow the development of production in light of the norms previously set and, in collaboration with the board of directors and the general administration of the enterprise, to work toward identifying the most appropriate methods for each enterprise and to try to measure the development of general productivity achieved by the enterprise as well as by its various internal units.
- 4) To follow the development of costs with an eye to controlling them.
- 5) To follow the course of the state's profit-sharing.
- 6) To coordinate the decisions of the various services and departments which have a say in the life of the enterprise (wages, pay-scales, budgetary competition, tax exemptions, reorganization, etc.)
- 7) To assist the enterprises in their relationships with the various departments and organizations.
- 8) To follow the recommendations of the inspectors' and auditors' reports and establish an annual record of the measures adopted to remedy the inadequacies and gaps noted in the various inspectors' and supervisors' reports.
- 9) To bring to the attention of the government an annual report on the administration and productivity of the enterprises, particularly by way of improving the competition potential and the social climate.
- 10) To approve the annual operative and investment budget estimates of the enterprises.

Within the perspective of broadening the accountability of the board of directors on the one hand and strengthening the goal of a unified coordination of the public enterprises on the other, the role of the latter, where the budget estimates are concerned, must be to limit itself progressively to following up their development and controlling their execution, the administrators being normally under the obligation of reflecting, at meetings of the board of directors, on the policy of the state with respect to the enterprise.

#### Implementation of the Proposed Structure:

It is suggested that the government invite the departments concerned to put in place a public enterprise structure in which the work force, the job descriptions of the executive staff and the level of remuneration will have to be adapted to the size of the enterprises under supervision. This structure must be created especially in the following departments:

national economy	housing
finances	tourism
transportation and communication	equipment
agriculture	

Job descriptions of the administrative staff: This unit must be staffed by executives of high caliber and multi-disciplinary backgrounds (engineers, economics analysts, CPAs, planners, etc.), accustomed to questions of investment selection and technological problems, and by former managers of enterprises and highly-placed civil servants capable of making a really valuable contribution to the pool of ideas and the plan of action adopted by the enterprise. The examination of the dossiers must of necessity be carried out as a team operation.

The status of "charge-de-mission" would have to be conferred on the executives of this unit, in order to avoid the constraints imposed by the classical departmental organization and to enrich it with experts recruited from outside the administration, should this prove necessary.

#### The Board of Directors

The targeted objective is full accountability for the board of directors, by means of reinforcing its jurisdiction and creating the proper conditions for the exercise of this jurisdiction. To this end, the following measures are recommended:

Job description: Over and above the administrative staff members of the unit specializing in the supervision of the public enterprises, the administrators representing the state must be chosen either from among high-level civil servants or technical staff members, thus allowing them to remain always in contact with the factual data concerning the enterprises within the jurisdiction of their sector, or from among those officials in charge of other staffs, taking care at the same time to provide a good level of representation. It is imperative to avoid entrusting more than three enterprises to a given director if the latter does not exercise that function full-time.

In this connection, the departments are invited to reexamine their representation on the boards of directors. In all the important public enterprises, the prime minister's office, the ministry of the plan, the ministry of finance and the ministry of national economy must be represented.

In addition, it would be advisable for the board of directors to organize at regular intervals re-training seminars for administrators in certain disciplines (data-processing, accounting, business management and investment selection) in collaboration with the specialized organizations (the CNI [National Investment Committee], the CNEI [National Industrial Studies Center], the Bach Hamba Institute, the ISG [Higher Business Management Institute] and the IHEC [expansion unknown]).

The ministries responsible for supervising a large number of public enterprises should move rapidly in the direction of creating a corps of administrators freed from any other responsibility, and whose principal duty will be to represent the state on the boards of directors. This action would have to be started in 1984.

#### Expansion of the board of directors:

1) The chief accountants, whose status was recently reviewed, would have to attend all the meetings of the board of directors and would have consultative

vote, in order to increase their ability to handle the duties to be confided to them later.

2) Some experiments should be carried out in a large number of enterprises, to be selected in due time, whereby employee representatives would participate in the meetings of the board of directors of the enterprises placed under the direct or indirect supervision of the state.

3) Similarly, and basically in those enterprises being reorganized, an intense dialog ought to be entered into with the employees in order to develop their feelings of participation in the reform efforts.

4) In accord with the specific needs of each enterprise, the board of directors ought more and more to invite persons of mark, chosen for their competencies, and particularly university professors, so as to associate them with the talks dealing with the major options of the enterprise.

5) The directors representing the state on a single board must get together before the meetings of the board of directors, in order to be able to express the point of view, the orientations and the directives of the government.

6) They must direct the memos and reports they draft on the occasion of each council meeting to the attention of their respective minister.

7) Every director who absents himself from board meetings more than two successive times a year, or who does not show any positive participation in the activities of the board, should definitively be replaced.

8) Outside of the meetings devoted to ad hoc questions, the principal annual meetings of the board of directors must be programmed at the beginning of each year and the calendar sent out to all the representatives.

9) A precise agenda accompanied by complete and detailed dossiers must be sent directly to every administrator at least 10 days before the board meeting. Should the above-mentioned time limit fail to be respected, the director is within his rights to ask for the report of the meeting date and to inform his minister about it.

#### The Chief Executive Officer (CEO)

The choice of the CEOs should conform to objective criteria of competence (technical as well as human), integrity, motivation and commitment, and take into account any specific requirement that may affect a given enterprise.

The action of the department of supervision must be directed toward fostering the broader accountability of the directors of the enterprise for its day-to-day administration.

Except in the case of administrative inadequacy, the mandate of office of the CEO must correspond to the duration of the completed contract program, which will be treated below, with the stipulation that at the expiration of this period of time, the nomination of the CEO is to be reexamined.

His remuneration must take into account the dimension of the enterprise and the complexity of his area of intervention, as well as the productivity achieved by the enterprise, and must put an end to the anarchy presently reigning in this domain.

While awaiting the revision of the present regulations governing the remuneration of the CEOs, it is suggested that the latter be paid an amount at least equal to the salary of the highest paid executive of the enterprise, not taking into account the perquisites directly associated with his office (car and telephone).

Separation of the duties of the president of the board from those of the CEO: Concomitant with the present plurality-of-office index for these two offices, it is proposed that a test be made of the index of separativity, as applied to certain national enterprises. This proposal could present the following advantages:

- 1) A better reorganization of the role of the board of directors.
- 2) A better organization of labor; the president, with the council, devoting themselves to determining the development strategy of the enterprise, as well as to the supervision and control of management, the CEO concerning himself with the implementation of the program of action decreed by his council. In this respect, he is responsible to the council for the implementation of its policy, which can propose his dismissal to whomever it may concern.

[1 Dec 84 p 2]

#### [Text] The Contract Programs

At the present time, most of the public enterprises suffer from a lack of programs planned to extend over several years and comprised of clearly defined goals, together with the precise means to realize them. This lack is felt in the area of development and follow-up in the composition of the annual budget estimates.

In order to make up for this lack and to further rationalize the administration of the public enterprises, it would seem logical to systematize the establishment of contract programs, the main purpose of which would be to guarantee the competition potential of the enterprise and consequently its continued existence.

These contract programs, which must be integrated into the national development plans, constitute a number of middle-term work projects with precise goals of increased production and productivity, optimal utilization of production potential, cost controls, promotion of job opportunities, on-going formation of the personnel, expansion of exports, energy savings, etc.

As developed by the enterprise and subjected to discussion with its various partners, these programs necessarily imply the mobilization of all parties concerned (directors and wage-earners of the enterprise, the state and other

shareholders) and the laying of certain obligations on them (attachment and motivation of employees, capital increases by shareholders, tax exemptions by the state, granting of loans by the banks, etc.)

A periodic evaluation of productivity, possibly followed by the application of corrective measures, will allow for an appreciation of the results obtained by the various people who have worked toward obtaining them.

There is good reason, moreover, to interest employees in the achievements of the enterprise, and to envisage sanctions in case of unjustified non-realization of the goals set for the enterprise.

The implementation of these measures necessarily implies that a certain stability will be guaranteed to the directors of the enterprise who have adhered to the contents of the contract program.

A number of contract programs covering the 1984-1986 period must be developed for those enterprises in financial difficulties.

For the other public enterprises, a number of contract programs covering the 1985-1986 period will need to be established by way of experiment, with an eye toward their more widespread distribution during the period of the Seventh Plan.

#### Signing of Market Contracts

The present situation is marked by a certain heterogeneity in the drawing up and signing of market contracts by the public enterprises. In effect, the market contract procedures differ from one public enterprise to the next. Certain enterprises are equipped with an internal market commission, the composition and duties of which are determined by law: (STEG [Tunisian Gas and Electric Company], SONEDE [National Water Exploitation and Distribution Company], SNCFT [Tunisian National Railroad Company], AFI [expansion unknown], API [Industries for the Transformation of Farm Products] and SNT [National Transportation Company]); whereas others have established their own procedures themselves by means of internal regulation; but many enterprises have no regulations concerning marketing procedures.

Consequently it is proposed to make the market contract procedures uniform, through the institution of internal, departmental and supervisory market commissions, which will have jurisdiction over the workings of the markets in accordance with their relative importance.

A bill will determine in detail the procedures for the drawing up and signing of market contracts by the public enterprises.

#### Internal and External Audits

All the public enterprises must have the services of an internal audit and management control unit. At first, this unit will have to give priority to inaugurating a system of business organization, and then proceed to transform itself into a service unit for internal control, with the duty of supervising

jurisdictions and procedures and formulating proposals designed to work toward their improvement.

It also participates in the discussions relative to the budget estimates worked out by the enterprise, to assure that they are subsequently pursued and carried out, and to analyze any disparities.

For reasons of economy and effectiveness, enterprises within the same sector may have recourse to the services of the same audit and management control unit.

This unit must bring out periodic reports on internal audit and on the pursuit of the recommended reform measures, which will be discussed by the board of directors.

External Audit: At the request of the board of directors, ministries of supervision (technical and financial) or the accounts court, external audit missions of organization and management, over and above the regular auditing of the books, may be authorized. Recourse to external auditing should be obligatory whenever the enterprise reveals any unjustified divergences from the goals set in its contract program.

For the immediate future, each department must take inventory of the gaps in the organizations systems effectively set up in the enterprises within its supervisory jurisdiction (division of labor, procedure manual, analytical accountancy, etc.) and should require the enterprises to work out a program of action which will be submitted to the scrutiny of the board of directors, allowing for short- and middle-term remedies for any inadequacies noted. This program must include the means to be used in working to achieve a better organization and rationalization of management.

A deadline should be assigned to all the enterprises for the implementation of their internal organization, their bookkeeping system, the establishment of the permanent inventory system, as well as the rationalization for the handling of supplies.

### Financial Control

At the present time, the duties of the financial supervisor are defined solely in the case of the national corporations and the public enterprises of an industrial and commercial nature, within the scope of the texts governing their organization. Concerning joint management corporations, there is no text defining their functions. Nevertheless, the minutes of a meeting held in 1970 and chaired by the minister of finance, had determined the general approach of the mission of the financial supervisor as being basically one of information and of consistency control.

On the basis of the present texts (decree of 1 April 1948 and law of 26 July 1969) which provide that a financial supervisor be appointed whenever the state or a local collectivity holds--directly or indirectly--more than 10 percent of the capital, the state being supposed to exercise financial control in the case of approximately 550 enterprises. The control is insufficiently

exercised: for 350 enterprises there are only 150 financial supervisors, and of these, only eight are full-time employees.

The recommended reform consists in assigning financial supervisors to each of the enterprises under direct state supervision.

1) Appointment of full-time supervisors for the public enterprises of an industrial or commercial nature and for the national corporations undergoing reorganization: The number of enterprises concerned amounts to about 80, which means that about 20 financial supervisors will be needed.

2) Definition of their functions:

- a) Approving indirect production expenditures (receiving and mission expenses, purchase of cars).
- b) Approving the rental contracts, the acquisition and alienation of goods and any furnishings and buildings in excess of an amount to be determined later.
- c) Seeing to it that the market contract procedures are respected and that they are relevant to the contracts and pertinent riders.
- d) Verifying of the balance of finances and that of the treasury of the enterprise (regarding optimal indebtedness, recovery of credits, etc.)
- e) Verifying that the reform programs are carried out and that quarterly reports, addressed to the departments concerned, are worked up.
- f) Job description and regulations: A body of permanent financial supervisors should be created with its own code of regulations. This body would be made up of civil servants possessing broad administrative experience and in-depth expertise in the areas of accounting and financial management.

While awaiting the constitution and the authorization of this body, the present regulations governing part-time financial supervisors will continue to be applied for certain corporations of joint management status.

This body must, moreover, have the advantage of an on-going formation and re-training opportunities similar to those proposed for the administrators.

Technical Control: At the present time, there is no extant text that defines the duties of the technical supervisor. In addition, up to now his mission has been limited to a simple, passive participation in the meetings of the board of directors, and this has confined him to a liaison role, consisting of transmitting data between the enterprise and the technical staff in question.

In addition, there is good reason to note the close relationship that exists between the control mission and its corollary, that of technical assistance.

To this end, the recommended reform consists, on the one hand, of appointing a technical supervisor to the public enterprises, justifying this control, and on the other, of specifying its duties in detail, by allying the technical assistance to the control.



## Duties

Thus the supervisor would be called upon:

- 1) To participate in establishing the production norms and the methods that would allow for measuring the enterprise's normal production capacity, as well as that of its various departments.
- 2) To participate in evaluating the technical timeliness of the investment plans, drawing up the particulars of sale and aligning the technical proposals.

Its approval is required for the following operations:

- 1) Participating in working out the budget estimates, the contract programs and the plans of action for reducing and controlling production costs.
- 2) Controlling the budget estimate operation and the drawing up of the contract programs.
- 3) Controlling the existence and quality of a program for maintenance and the saving of energy.
- 4) Controlling the actualization of the fixed assets file.
- 5) Controlling inventory operations so as to present a basic evaluation of the technical depreciation of supplies.
- 6) Formulating for the attention of the general administration and the board of directors every technical proposal of such a nature as to improve the productivity of the enterprise, as well as its harmonious development.
- 7) Presenting to the department of supervision an annual report in which the results of its interventions are recorded.

Job description and regulations: A body of permanent technical supervisors should be created with its own code of regulations to be worked out before 30 June 1985. This body would be made up of public agents possessing a broad technical experience, who should in addition benefit from on-going formation and re-training programs.

### Inspections:

Given the multitude of inspection agencies supervising the public enterprises (General control of the public services within the jurisdiction of the prime minister's office, inspections by the ministry of supervision, general supervision of finances, etc.), a coordination of the different missions becomes necessary. To this effect, a calendar of the normal missions of inspection must be established each year under the aegis of the prime minister's office.

A distribution of the reports drafted as a result of each inspection mission must be sent to the departments concerned (prime minister's office, Ministry of Supervision, Ministry of the Plan and Ministry of Finance), which must publish the annual inspection and supervision transactions for the perusal of government officials.

## Budgetary Discipline Process

In order to complete the action of the inspection services and to give more effectiveness to the examination of the balance-sheets by the tribunal of accountancy, it is necessary to extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal of budgetary discipline to the administrative errors committed by the public enterprises.

This procedure will also give the occasion to those responsible for the public enterprises concerned to develop their viewpoints before the tribunal on the irregularities noted, which will confer on the decisions of the administrators the maximum of objectivity in their regard.

## Reform of the Enterprises

Within this framework, the proposal is to set up a "national commission for the reform and reorganization of the public enterprises" headquartered in the offices of the prime minister and made up of members appointed by name. This commission will be charged with examining, and if need be, adopting the reform programs before submitting them to the government, and finally, helping the enterprises to carry out the recommended measures effectively.

A list of enterprises to be given priority in reorganization should be established by the government after the proposals from the various departments concerned have been received.

In this connection there is good reason to create a sub-commission by groups of enterprises, made up of representatives from the ministerial departments concerned (supervision, plan, prime minister's office, finances and social affairs), from the central bank and from the leading bank, together with one representative from the shareholders. The proposal is to involve representatives from the labor force in working out the reorganization plan, in order to mobilize them more effectively in the achievement of the goals set by this plan.

The council of ministers, which will enact legislation on the basis of the present document, should give its consent to the members of the national reform commission.

The reform programs must necessarily take into account some delays in the approval and implementation of the measures proposed. For that reason, it is important that the study of reform measures not depend solely on the latest balancing of accounts by the enterprise, but also on the account estimates of the enterprise on the date when the reform program was implemented. In clear terms, this means that the national commission for reform must "extrapolate" from the development of the enterprise between the date its dossier came up for review and the probable date of the enforcement of its reform program.

[2 Dec 84 p 2]

[Text] The public enterprises undergo a number of external constraints in dealing with various institutions with which they come in contact (administra-

tion, port authorities, banks, etc.). In addition, the measures recommended in this document will be able to bear their full fruit only if they are accompanied by proposals that tend to eliminate certain bottlenecks.

To this effect, it is proposed to establish a higher commission of environmental impact on public enterprises, charged with finding solutions for the bottlenecks encountered by these enterprises in their relationships with the CEOs of the department of commerce, the customs office, the port authorities and the banks.

#### Social Climate, Human Relations and Participation by the Employees

Today one is led to observe that human relations within the public enterprises are generally conflictive and that the union demands do not always take business potential into account. The future of the public enterprises cannot be envisaged without providing satisfactory solutions to these problems. It is obvious that the economic development of the nation cannot be continued without involving the entire labor force. This result can be obtained within the public enterprise to the extent that certain conditions are met.

These conditions suppose first of all that management is listening to labor, and that the directors have the traits of character necessary to be touched by the human problems that present themselves. It is incumbent on them to create the climate of trust that will permit dialog to take place. They owe it to themselves to be above all suspicion in order to retain their credibility.

It is also necessary, as far as possible, to involve all wage-earners in the life of their enterprise in order that they may be correctly informed about its plans and aware of its problems. The more widespread use of staff committees and the revitalization of the enterprise committees are actions which move in this direction. The staff committee, which would assemble the chief officials of the enterprise around its CEO, will allow the executive staff to participate directly in the life of their enterprise and will involve them in its active management. The enterprise committee will handle not only working conditions and worker safety but also cultural activities and problems related to the future and survival of the enterprise, the conditions necessary for its development and the continuing availability of jobs.

The participation of the labor force in the life of the enterprise should be paralleled in a more intensive way in the sovereign executive body, namely the board of directors, on which should sit the delegates most representative of the personnel; this will allow them not only to train themselves in the practice of, and participation in, the administration of enterprises, but also, being acquainted with the real problems, to moderate the most extremist demands, the satisfying of which would lead to the bankruptcy of their work source.

The participation of the wage-earners in the life of their enterprise should not be limited to that; they must also be taught to take an interest in its economic productivity. There is a need to identify the means sufficient for allowing part of the results of the growth in labor productivity to be allocated to those who have in fact helped achieve it. Of course, there are still

theoretical difficulties in measuring productivity, its development and its distribution between capital (the investment realized) and labor (the wage-earners).

Nevertheless, it is possible to establish simple but sufficiently trustworthy indicators to measure the development of productivity. The improvement of the latter doubtlessly constitutes one of the thorniest problems, for which the solution lies in mobilizing the workers and stimulating them to take an interest in the enterprise. That could take place within the framework of special contracts, called "agreements of productivity" which, by making reference to the indicators we have just mentioned, allow every growth in labor productivity to be rewarded. The experiments already begun in certain enterprises should be improved and systematized and a consensus should emerge between the social partners, notably so that over the course of the next few years, wage improvements may be effectively proportioned to progress in production and productivity.

No reform of the public enterprise will be able to produce satisfactory results if actions are not undertaken to put an end to bad human relations, to contain wage demands within tolerable limits for society and to insure the improvement of productivity.

The state, by reason of its mission, and within the framework of its socialist options, is capable of finding original solutions and generous measures to resolve this crucial problem.

To this end, it would be most opportune in certain enterprises to test out employee participation in the reforms and the effort to improve management by inviting it to agree to the increases of capital necessary for the survival of the enterprise and the continuity of job availability.

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CSO: 4519/47

SDAR FIRST SECRETARY DISCUSSES REGIONAL, AFRICAN ISSUES

Maputo TEMPO in Portuguese 25 Nov 84 pp 29-31

[Interview with Slimane Maghrous, First secretary of the SDAR Embassy in Maputo, by Joaquim Salvador; date and place not given]

[Text] The fact that the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) has occupied a full-status position in the OAU at the 20th summit meeting recently held in Addis Ababa has led us to request an interview with Slimane Maghrous, first secretary of its embassy in Maputo (in view of the ambassador's temporary absence).

During that interview we discussed aspects which we consider pertinent to the present status of that North African country's struggle and which may shed light on the hottest issues of that situation.

Question: How do you view Morocco's attitude in abandoning the OAU during the sessions of the 20th summit meeting?

Answer: The POLISARIO Front has always given Morocco every opportunity to get out of this conflict honorably. However, Rabat has persisted in disregarding all solutions to the Western Saharan question; this has always been contrary to our position, and we even abstained from participating in previous summit meetings in order to safeguard the integrity and unity of the organization of which we are a part--the OAU.

Question: Do you mean to say that the SDAR will maintain its full-status position in the OAU, whatever the consequences?

Answer: The SDAR made its position clear when most of the member countries voted on its admission in 1982. We voluntarily abstained (I repeat) to make it possible to achieve the essential objectives of preserving the organization's unity and pursuing its ideals aimed at liberating the continent and combating racism and the apartheid regime.

Question: What is POLISARIO's position concerning South Africa? Does it consider South Africa a colonial state or an independent country with internal repressive measures against the majority of its people?

Answer: We favor a democracy which protects the interests of the majority in South Africa; that is our position. Meanwhile, let it be clearly understood that we unconditionally support the South African ANC [African National Congress] which we consider our historic ally.

#### Relations With Tripoli and Conakry

Question: Let us return to the Western Saharan question. What is your opinion about the recent alliance made by Libya and Morocco, and what consequences do you envision for the SDAR from that alliance?

Answer: Our position is very clear on that subject. We do not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries; this does not mean that we cannot express our opinions. We believe that Morocco is not sincere in this matter.

Question: How do you view Guinea-Conakry's present position inasmuch as Sekou Toure has been a staunch ally of Hassan II as he had been of Hassan's father of whom he claimed to be a personal friend? Do you think that the coup d'etat after his death changed the position of the Guinea Government with regard to the Sahara?

Answer: I think that Guinea's position at that time was dismal. After the coup d'etat, Conakry began to pay more attention to its internal problems. Moreover, Guinea had already declared (and I believe that this signifies taking a position) that it intended to take part in the 20th OAU summit meeting, despite the fact that the SDAR was going to take its place at that meeting. This is a sincere adoption of a position.

#### Major Maghreb Offensive--a Step Forward

Question: Speaking of the occupation of part of the Western Saharan territory by Morocco, what is the present military situation? And what effects are being felt from the construction of the "notorious" wall recently completed and aimed at protecting and defending strong Moroccan positions and its own southern territory? What is the general situation?

Answer: I do not believe that the construction of this second wall has enabled Morocco to resolve the military question. This is not even original on the part of Rabat: before the Moroccans, the French had built such a wall in Algeria and were defeated, and the Israelis had also tried that strategy in Egypt without success.

Therefore, in this case as well, the wall policy will not stifle our determination to bring about the total liberation of the Western Saharan

fatherland. Such a development could temporarily interrupt our armed activities, but, even so, until now we have amply shown the contrary to be true--we pass over the wall when we so desire and attack the enemy even inside his internationally established borders. A recent example is the major Maghreb offensive.

Question: When was that offensive unleashed by the POLISARIO Front?

Answer: On 13 October; and that offensive proved that the wall does not resolve the military situation for the Moroccans. Already in the past and now again, we are continuing to carry out daily operations beyond the wall and in the southern part of Morocco.

Question: What has been accomplished militarily by the major Maghreb offensive?

Answer: From 13 October to the beginning of November, we put 537 Moroccan soldiers out of combat of whom 274 were killed; and we captured 10 others, including 1 noncommissioned officer.

We destroyed 22 light military vehicles, 17 model M113 troop transport vehicles, 13 SK105 and M48 armored tanks, 3 long-range warning-signal radars, 12 120-mm mortars, 6 81-mm mortars, 1 106-mm cannon, 13 23-mm dual batteries (particularly dangerous weapons) and 24 machine guns, some 12.7 mm and some 14.5 mm. Eight enemy military bases were destroyed throughout the Saharan region, including Boucraa, located near the capital, Aaiun, an area very rich in phosphates.

From 26 to 29 October we attacked enemy garrisons behind the wall; these garrisons were under our fire for about 40 hours and had served as a defensive perimeter around Dakhla, a city second in importance to Aaiun.

Spain and Morocco--Allies

Question: Is it known that Spain recently revealed its intention to sell light and heavy armaments to the Moroccan Kingdom? What do you have to tell us about this?

Answer: It is true that Madrid has publicly declared that if Morocco expresses a desire to purchase Spanish weapons, Spain would be willing to sell them.

Question: Is this not surprising, then?

Answer: No, as a matter of fact, it is not. Moreover, joint military maneuvers are being carried out by those two countries.

Question: It is perhaps somewhat strange, since Morocco has already been making territorial demands (legitimate) on Spanish possessions in northern Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla...

Answer: These are maneuvers aimed at diverting attention from Morocco's internal divergences and the increasingly greater discontent on the part of the people. In reality, Rabat and Madrid are friends, especially after the Spanish socialists came into power.

Question: How do you account for the fact that certain socialist governments in Europe adopt more conservative positions on the international level than their predecessors, from the moment they come into power?

Answer: What you are saying is true. Before the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] came into power, its relations with the POLISARIO Front were good. After its electoral victory, everything changed with its renunciation of its previous principles. For example, before coming into power, the socialists denounced the Madrid Accords which granted Rabat and Nouakchott pseudohistoric rights to the possession of Western Sahara.

Meanwhile, since that period, they have been maintaining positions noncomitant with those accords which, in our opinion, are worthless from a diplomatic viewpoint inasmuch as one of the parties involved (Mauritania) has withdrawn from the agreements, abandoning its territorial pretensions.

Moreover, the fact that we are now members of the OAU transcends the Madrid Accords per se and signifies that Africa does not recognize those accords which, incidentally, have produced no positive results for either Morocco or Spain.

#### The Internal Card Miscarried

Question: Were there any attempts to play the now customary card of "internal parties" in conjunction with the Western Saharan question?

Answer: Of course. However, I can assure you that all attempts which Spain and Morocco made in that regard failed, leading even to its extinction and the uniting of a vast majority of its members with the POLISARIO Front; now only a few traditional structures remain which Morocco is attempting to support through a national referendum; this, as you know, they have never been able to achieve.

Question: Who are the principal suppliers of weapons to the Moroccan regime?

Answer: By descending order of importance: the United States, France, South Africa, Spain and other European countries...



Question: How many countries have recognized the SDAR up to now?

Answer: A total of 59 countries, 30 of which are in Africa, 15 in Latin America, 8 in Asia and 6 in Oceania.

On the other hand, there are certain European countries which recognize the existence of the POLISARIO Front but not that of the SDAR, such as Yugoslavia, Greece, Austria, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, the GDR and the FRG of Bremen in addition to many political parties of all leanings.

#### The Importance of Nigeria's Recognition

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize the great importance of the recent recognition of the SDAR by Nigeria, a country of great political and economic weight throughout the African continent and whose total population represents about one quarter of the entire African population.

This recognition will increase the support for the POLISARIO Front enormously and is the result of a visit made by our president, Comrade Mahomed Abdelaziz, to Lagos on 7 and 8 November at the invitation of the Nigerian military government.

8568

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## OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS WITH SWEDEN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Dec 84 p 16

[News analysis by Kurt Malarstedt: "'Painful' Relations Sweden-Israel; Many Stumbling-Blocks to Friendship"]

[Text] The murder of Folke Bernadotte--DAGENS NYHETER 18 September 1948--is still troubling the friendship between Sweden and Israel. At far right [photo not included] Folke Bernadotte in the company of the brigadier general of the British Protectorate of Palestine, N. O. Lash.

Great disappointment, almost bitterness, characterizes the Israeli attitude to relations with Sweden, which during the last few years have been cool. However, it is now possible that the relations will improve.

But on the part of Sweden, Foreign Minister Yitzak Shamir's role in the murder of Folke Bernadotte in 1948 is a negative factor which makes it difficult to have an exchange of visits at a high level with Israel.

The Swedish government's criticism of Israel concerns primarily the settlement policy on the occupied West Bank, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and what Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Pierre Schori calls the Israeli government's "inability to communicate with the Palestinians," represented by the PLO.

In conversations with DAGENS NYHETER's special correspondent in Jerusalem, officials of the Israeli government and other Israelis maintained that Israel is not being treated fairly by Sweden, that the Swedish attitude is not objective and that the criticism is unbalanced--"it is not we who practice terror, after all."

One voice characterized relations between Sweden and Israel as "very painful," but at the same time the diplomatic "working relations" between the two countries were described as good.

Furthermore: Despite over 170,000 Swedes having demanded 2 years ago in a manifesto that Sweden should break off relations with Israel after the invasion of Lebanon, Israel has many friends in Sweden. A normal cultural exchange exists.

The Israeli disappointment over Sweden's fundamental attitude on the Middle East conflict may to some extent be viewed as a manifestation of the well-known Israeli sensitivity in general to criticism from outside.

#### Palme Irritates

But as regards Sweden, the Israelis trace a large amount of the "cool stance" on the Swedish side directly to Prime Minister Olof Palme, with whom they do not consider themselves as speaking "a common language." Things were different at the time of Tage Erlander, and there are still many friends of Israel in the Social Democratic party as well.

In the background there is not only the fact that Palme in very sharp terms has criticized Israel's invasion of Lebanon, which he describes as an "outrage."

There are also the prime minister's contacts with PLO leader Yasser Arafat, above all in connection with his visit to Sweden a few years ago on the invitation of the Social Democratic party.

And from the early 1970's there is a quarrel, famous in socialist circles, between then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Olof Palme. Golda Meir had become angry and, in her own words later on, she gave "the gifted young man a lecture."

#### Controversy

Relations between Sweden and the young Israel began with a diplomatic controversy over the murder of Folke Bernadotte in 1948 during his UN commission as a mediator. Sweden did not recognize Israel until 1950.

During Erlander's period in office the relations between Sweden and Israel were quite intimate. The major turnaround can be traced to the Six-Day War in June 1967, when Israel turned into an occupying power. After that, the debate about the occupation and the rights of the Palestinians gathered momentum in Sweden earlier than in most other countries.

"It was not Sweden which changed its opinion about Israel. It is the Israelis themselves, who with their measures and actions brought about a different attitude," Undersecretary Schori says to DAGENS NYHETER.

"With its Lebanon policy, with the settlements and with its inability to communicate with the Palestinians, Israel has placed itself outside world opinion."

Former Foreign Minister Abba Eban holds, perhaps as befits a veteran diplomat, a less wounded and maybe more pragmatic opinion on the Swedish contacts with the PLO than do most other leading Israelis.

## Has Gone Too Far

"I think Sweden has gone too far as regards embracing the idea that the PLO has already changed into a rational organization (from having been a terrorist organization). You should not encourage them. If they want recognition and support from Sweden, Sweden ought to demand something from them, for example that they should strike that portion of their pact which says that Israel has no right to exist."

It is pointed out on the Swedish side that, as often as the opportunity presents itself in the contacts with the PLO, the opinion is expressed that the organization should recognize the right of the state of Israel to exist.

One factor in the relations between Sweden and Israel is also Foreign Minister Shamir's past as a member of the Lehy or Stern gang. He is said to have been one of the three men who planned the murder of Folke Bernadotte in 1948.

### 'Shamir Responsible'

"In my opinion there is no doubt that Shamir is one of those responsible for the act," says political scientist Sune Persson in Goteborg, who a few years ago earned his PhD with a thesis on the murder.

According to Persson, Shamir has clearly indicated his responsibility during several interviews, some with an Israeli, others with a U. S. journalist.

In public Prime Minister Olof Palme has stressed Shamir's role several times with words of disapproval.

This took place in a speech to the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] convention in July 1982 and in connection with at least one election campaign appearance later that year.

Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Pierre Schori confirms that Shamir's role in Bernadotte's murder is still, 36 years after the event, something one is very much aware of within the government.

"It is something we, who work with foreign policy, remember," Pierre Schori says.

"No, a visit to Sweden by Shamir is not in the picture."

### No Invitation

In plain language this means that Israel's foreign minister will not be invited to Stockholm as long as his name is Yitzak Shamir.

Pierre Schori visited Israel last spring and had what he calls "useful and good" conversations. (Upon his return, he publicly criticized Israel for conducting an "ostrich policy," which was considered undiplomatic not only in

Israel but in wide circles in Sweden. However, Israel did not react publicly to Schori's statements.)

A reciprocal visit by Schori's counterpart at the Israeli Foreign Ministry, David Kimche, has now been included in the plans for the beginning of next year.

The Israelis would like to intensify the exchange of visits at the ministerial level. The most recent Swedish ministerial visits to Israel took place in 1980, with Education Minister Jan-Erik Wikstrom and Social Minister Karin Soder. The Israeli minister of education visited Sweden in 1982.

"It is not that we have held Israel in some sort of quarantine," says Pierre Schori and maintains that the Israeli government under Shamir, who became prime minister after Menachem Begin in the fall of 1983, did not show any greater interest in more profound contacts with Sweden.

#### Improvement

On the Swedish side it is believed that the preconditions are better now than they have been in a long time for an improvement in the relations between the two countries.

Israel has expressed its desire to withdraw the troops from Lebanon, and it is not likely that any decisions about new Jewish settlements on the West bank will be made by the new Israeli government under Shimon Peres.

However, it is far from a foregone conclusion that the Israeli government, headed by a prime minister from the Labor Party, will automatically improve relations with the Social Democratic government in Sweden.

For one, the conservative Likud bloc is still part of the government of Israel, and for another, relations between the Israeli and Swedish labor parties have often been strained. For example, at the last minute the Stockholm Labor Union cancelled a planned visit by a delegation from the Israeli Labor Party to the Mayday celebrations in Stockholm in 1982.

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# LEBANON

## PERMANENT TRADE EXHIBIT IN SOVIET UNION PROPOSED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 21 Aug 84 p 7

[Text] The vice chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut, Mr Gabriel Badaru, traveled to Moscow yesterday to participate in meetings of the Arab-Soviet Chamber to be held between 21 and 25 August. Chamber sources say that Mr Badaru will speak for Lebanon in these meetings and will give a presentation of economic relations between Lebanon and the Soviet Union, particularly in light of the decline in the amount of trade during recent events. Trade had been increasing in the early and mid 1970s. He will propose that a permanent Lebanese exhibit be set up in Moscow to acquaint Soviet businessmen and citizens with Lebanese products. This exhibit might be part of a permanent general and specialized Arab exhibit. In addition, he will request the participation of the Soviet Union in the reconstruction of Lebanon and a strengthening of the Soviet position in support of Lebanese sovereignty and the development of its economy. He will raise the possibility of amending the trade agreement concluded between the two countries in a way that will benefit the Lebanese economy. The sources stated that trade between Lebanon and the Soviet Union is the period between 1974 and 1980 was as follows:

Year	Imports	Exports	Trade Deficit/ Surplus
1974	108	31	-67
1975	64	26	-38
1976	29	17	-12
1977	56	13	-43
1978	27	14	-53
1979	78	11	-67
1980	59	18	-41

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## LEBANON

### UNITY, LIBERATION DEPEND ON SECURITY PLAN

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 405, 24 Nov 84 pp 26-27

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Security of Beirut Prerequisite to Liberation of South Lebanon"]

[Text] If the Lebanese people do not agree on strong security measures for Beirut, on opening the road to south Lebanon and on rallying around the legitimate government, all of Lebanon will pay a high price, and that will not serve the interests of the country's unity and independence.

Political and non-political analysts have not agreed on anything in Lebanon as much as they have agreed on their portrayal of the relationship between what has been happening in south Lebanon and what has been happening in Beirut and all along the area between Beirut and south Lebanon. Analysts are portraying that relationship as one of cause and effect, where incidents generate changes in accordance with developments.

There are many signs that confirm this close link between what has happened and is happening in Lebanon--from Beirut, to Tripoli, to al-Biqa' and Mount Lebanon--and the prevailing situation in south Lebanon. Almost all these signs are well-known, and there may not be enough space here to list all of them. However, there is one sign of this relationship whose implication this time is international. This is what took place during the talks that were conducted by British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe when he visited Lebanon. The British foreign secretary held these talks with the president, al-Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, with Prime Minister Rashid Karami and with a few Lebanese officials.

Although it is well-known that the purpose of the chief British diplomat's visit to Lebanon--a visit that was part of a tour that took him to Syria and Israel--was to look into preparations for the military talks between Lebanon and Israel and to try to overcome and settle the obstacles and problems that had been delaying those talks, the British foreign secretary did bring up at those talks the subject of negotiating an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. He also brought up the subjects of prevailing security and political conditions in Beirut and putting an end to the breakdown of control in those areas. The British foreign secretary brought up these matters as though they were one and

the same subject. Therefore, in the official statements he made after the talks, the British foreign secretary stressed, "We believe that Beirut must be restored to its former status. It must become the economic focal point in the area so that capital can be encouraged."

An image of the international interest in the status of the Lebanese capital and how it may be helped to regain its vitality and its security so it can resume its role in the world of finance, business and culture appeared quite clearly in matters that had already been investigated with more than one American, Soviet and European envoy and official. It were as though an international decision had been made to let Beirut shake off the dust and effects of war and resume its role.

Throughout the past months when all the international and regional efforts and attempts were being made to figure out a way by which the Israelis could withdraw from south Lebanon and from the rest of Lebanon's territory, prevailing conditions in the capital, Beirut, were the Achilles' heel of Lebanon's official position. The Israelis often took advantage of those conditions for their own security and political purposes. Thus the belief that became prevalent on various official, leadership and popular levels was that it has become absolutely impossible for the situation in Beirut to continue. Political and security solutions will have to be reached to bring law and order back to the capital and to enable the state to control the security situation in a manner that would eliminate the authority of armed individuals and put an end to this condition of broken down controls and lack of discipline.

The need for those solutions was becoming more and more urgent as the countdown to the start of negotiations with Israel on its withdrawal from Lebanon came closer to zero. [The following] are among the foremost conditions for these important and grave overdue solutions:

First, the security situation in Beirut had to be corrected to enable the state to establish its legitimate authority over the capital.

Second, a security plan that would open the coastal highway from al-Madfun Bridge in the north to al-Awli Bridge in the south was to be implemented, and the state's security controls all along this highway were to be tightened. Unless these security controls are tightened it will not be possible--in fact, it will be altogether impossible--for units of the Lebanese army to move to south Lebanon if an agreement over an Israeli withdrawal is reached. Nor will it be possible to work with the Lebanese army and the UN's emergency forces to implement security arrangements in the south.

It seemed that these two conditions were essential. In fact, it seemed they were one Arab condition required to thwart all factors threatening an outbreak of sectarian and religious conflicts in the western sector of the capital where the majority of the people are Muslims.

That Arab attitude is one that sympathizes with the fears expressed by Muslim residents of Beirut who fear a change in the sectarian identity of Beirut if the situation in their city remains unchanged. These are fears that more than one party on the scene has tried to exploit to stir up feelings and prejudices and to contrive confrontational situations between Islamic sects, particularly



Sunnis and Shi'a. During the past months the close cooperation between Mufti al-Shaykh Hasan Khalid and the vice president of the Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council, al-Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, and many other leaders on both sides succeeded in containing many of these contrived incidents whose purpose was to destabilize the situation for Muslims in West Beirut.

As the military talks in al-Naqurah between Lebanon and Israel began, the army's case was reopened and an effort was begun to come up with fundamental measures that would reorganize army brigades nationwide. This would eliminate the sectarian and religious nature that had characterized some army brigades in East Beirut, West Beirut and some mountain regions. It was the need to start organizing a new army brigade that would be ready to go to south Lebanon when an agreement on security arrangements was reached that prompted the opening of this case.

Many questions are being asked today in Lebanese circles about the relationship between the collapse of security in Beirut and Mount Lebanon and stepping up efforts to implement a security plan for Beirut and for the road to the south. Observers are also wondering about the relationship between the suspension of the military talks between Lebanon and Israel in al-Naqurah and what Israel intends to do in Beirut and elsewhere.

Given such questions, it appears that the gravest [prospect] now is that existing security and political situations will make the process of correcting the situation in Beirut and turning over the responsibility of security in that city to the state an extremely difficult one. Some official agencies even fear that it may be impossible.

A high-level Lebanese official thinks that resolution of the matter requires further intervention from Syria. Experts and observers, however, believe that according to currently prevalent facts, it will not be easy to reach a political settlement on the security situation in Beirut by mutual consent for the following reasons:

First, there is a crisis of confidence between the president and what he represents in Lebanon and in politics and a principal group of ministers represented by the two ministers Nabih Barri, the leader of the Amal Movement, and Walid Junblatt, the leader of the Socialist Progressive Party. Relations between the president and these two ministers are always tense. Mr Barri and Mr Junblatt are the leaders of the two most powerful armed organizations controlling West Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

Second, opposition ministers, especially Barri and Junblatt, have set a condition that political reforms be realized so that new Lebanese formulas for managing the political game in Lebanon can be devised. This has to be done before beginning the task of looking into giving up arms and turning the responsibility over to the state to let it play its required role.

Third, maintaining the status quo in Beirut is almost desirable since doing that can be used to apply pressure to the state to keep it from going beyond what is allowed in its negotiations with Israel on security arrangements. Thus, the question of the 17 May Agreement will not be repeated. Maintaining the status

quo in Beirut is also a factor that would put pressure on the state, particularly the regime of President Amin al-Jumayyil, to make it more willing to comply with demands that are being made for reform. It is the ultimate objective of these demands to have the rights of sects and the extent to which they can participate in government reconsidered.

These facts that are prevalent on the scene are making each team hold on to its military and political positions. No team is willing to give up these positions or any part of them easily. It is this that is making the situation extremely sensitive and critical. It is [this unwillingness to compromise that will] make one of two possibilities the outcome of the situation in Lebanon in general and the situation in Beirut in particular.

Either the prevailing facts will remain unchanged, and in their light a new political map will be drawn for the country; or one has to expect these facts to be changed. Such a change will have to alter the balance of powers, and it will have to alter positions too.

Diplomatic circles in the Lebanese capital who are watching al-Naqurah talks and are looking beyond the significance and implications of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon think that the entire area is on the verge of an era of preparations for major decisions that will have an impact on international and regional directions in 1985.

People who are close to President Amin al-Jumayyil admit that these expectations are correct. Even Prime Minister Rashid Karami says that it is in the interests of everyone without exception to be alert to these overdue solutions and to try to anticipate them by issuing political and security resolutions and measures that would shore up the situation in Lebanon and keep Beirut safe from security setbacks that could change the picture of the existing equation.

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PHALANGE OFFICIAL HOPES ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 405, 24 Nov 84 pp 28-29

[Interview with George Sa'adah, deputy chairman of the Phalangist Party, by Antoine 'Abd-al-Masih: "George Sa'adah Tells AL-MUSTAQBAL, 'Because Politics Does not Change Geography, a Good Relationship with Syria Is One of the Constant Principles of the Phalangist Party'"; in Beirut; date of interview not specified]

[Text] The war to maintain positions has come to an end, and preference is being given to dialogue and political solutions.

The Phalangist Party hopes that Israel will withdraw unconditionally and without direct or indirect negotiations.

However, hope is one thing and reality another.

All the Lebanese resist occupation; the Resistance may not be partitioned.

Ever since the agreement of 17 May 1983 was rescinded, attention has been focused on Lebanon's Phalangist Party, the principal partner in the "Lebanese establishment." People want to find out about the political course of the party after a Lebanese-Syrian understanding was prescribed by rapid and successive developments.

The death of al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, the chairman and founder of the party, focused even more attention on the party. This is because al-Shaykh Pierre had guaranteed moderation in the party in the face of political radicals and militant party members, especially after his son, Amin, was elected president of Lebanon.

Today, the Phalangist Party's support for the Lebanese government is unequivocal. This support was evident first in the election of a new commander for the Lebanese forces. Second, it was evident in the party's support for Mr Husayn al-Husayni during the election campaign for the Chamber of Deputies. The party's Political Bureau did not even hesitate to oust two party members from the party--the two representatives Edmond Rizq and Louis Abu Sharaf--when they declined to vote for al-Husayni.

How and why did all this happen overnight? What are the implications of the

Phalangist Party's new position, particularly with regard to the dialogue and the understanding with Syria?

AL-MUSTAQBAL took this heading/question to Dr George Sa'adah, deputy chairman of the Phalangist Party, who is known for being knowledgeable about all aspects of the Lebanese problem. Dr Sa'adah is also known as one of the architects of the party's relations with Damascus in previous periods. AL-MUSTAQBAL asked Dr George Sa'adah about the new directions of the Phalangist Party and the extent to which these new directions reflect the situation in Lebanon.

[Question] Something is going on in the Phalangist Party. That was manifested in the elections of the leaders of the Lebanese forces and in the election of the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. What is really going on in your party?

[Answer] When one considers that the sources of such statements are numerous, and when one considers how credible these sources are or how hostile they are to the Phalangist Party, one concludes that what has been said and what may be said about this subject remains speculative; it falls in the realm of the imaginable and the desirable. In our opinion, however, what has happened and is happening and what may subsequently happen may be limited to three points.

1. Preparing the party, its cadres and its institutions would enable it to confront new and anticipated changes that will come about locally and regionally. The war in Lebanon, the war to maintain positions, has stopped; we want it to come to an end. The conflict is taking on a new course. We are among those who say that dialogue and political solutions are preferable.

2. There was an actual transfer of power in the party from one man to another after the death of the party's founder, al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. "The institution" was to succeed "the historic man." This is an extremely sensitive matter. Parties that had similar experiences in the past did not succeed in those experiences. But in the Phalangist Party, we think that the process was completed successfully, even though there were some differences in points of view over some issues. But that is normal in a democratic party that has numerous staff members and responsibilities. The formulation of a decision in such a party is a process that has its own logic and its own momentum. It is a process that can include numerous opinions and produce them as one opinion even as it fully preserves the principles of a civilized democracy in what it says and what it does.

3. Effecting discipline in the ranks is desirable after the long years of the war and the breakdowns that accompanied that war. Following a disciplinary course for the party means going back to the basics. I firmly believe that there isn't a single party in the world that could have withstood what the Phalangist Party was subjected to by its enemies inside the country and abroad. Nevertheless, the Phalangist organization has been functioning regularly, and its national role has been growing day by day. In order for the Phalangist Party to play its part fully, some internal arrangements will have to be made in the light of actual and anticipated developments, and the notion of modernizing the party will have to be put into action so that the party can remain a place of refuge for the Lebanese.

One can glean from all this that we regard as normal what some people consider a significant event in the Phalangists' progress, such as the election of a new commander for the Lebanese forces or the election of a speaker for the Chamber of Deputies and what accompanied those two events and their outcomes. To us, on the one hand, such matters may not be variously interpreted; they may not be traded or controlled by others. On the other hand, what the Phalangist Party is doing today--those matters that the question referred to and other matters as well--provides evidence of the party's vigor. The party's actions today are a testimonial to Pierre al-Jumayyil who left behind a legacy of an organized institution that has principles and methods of thought and action. The institution al-Jumayyil left behind is not a random gathering of people that would cease to exist with the death of one man or the end of an era.

[Question] The May 17 Agreement was rescinded as a result of military and political pressure. What does the Phalangist Party think is the best way under the current situation for liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation?

[Answer] It would be difficult to have total Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon unless such withdrawal were part of a comprehensive and an integrated plan for the departure of all foreign troops from Lebanese territory, regardless of the nature of Syria's military presence in Lebanon. There may be partial withdrawals from south Lebanon, from al-Biqa', from north Lebanon or from the mountains. But a total withdrawal can only come about in an integrated plan. This is because there has been a series of [national groups who have had a] military presence in Lebanon--Iranians and Palestinians--and all those people are being asked to leave Lebanon. Syria can play a major role if it wishes to help in this regard. We hope that Israel will withdraw unconditionally, without direct or indirect negotiations and without military arrangements or political agreements. But hope is one thing and the reality of relations between countries another. Therefore, Lebanon and Syria have to investigate the possibility of having the United Nations, the United States of America or any third party serve as mediator. To enable Lebanon to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli troops, political and diplomatic action will have to be taken. To do this Lebanon has to call on its friends in the world. The question of south Lebanon--in fact, the question of all Lebanon--has become an international question. The pressure that could be applied to Israel in this regard could yield positive results. Strengthening the Lebanese state or the legitimate authority in Lebanon is a basic requirement for the success of Lebanon's international action and its success in resisting the occupation itself.

[Question] Resisting foreign occupation is a legitimate right that does not have to be recognized or confirmed. What is your view of Lebanon's national resistance in south Lebanon and in the western al-Biqa'?

[Answer] Every act that resists the occupation is appreciated. Ours is a party that knows the meaning of resistance. We spent 48 years resisting occupation. It is natural for us to sense any resistance against any foreigner. On the one hand, resistance would be more effective if it is comprehensive; on the other hand, it would be more effective if it stems from good relations and an understanding between Lebanese parties. Therefore, the resistance may not be partitioned, nor may there be multiple resistance organizations in Lebanon. I

look forward to the day when as Lebanese citizens we will recognize one resistance organization against all foreigners just as we recognize one legitimate government for all the Lebanese people.

[Question] Lebanon has sought the assistance of multi-national, regional and international forces to solve its problem. What regional or international power is the Phalangist Party counting on at the present time?

[Answer] It would be normal for a helpless people to seek the assistance of friends who would help them solve their problems, particularly since this problem has regional and international causes and implications. This does not mean that we are turning over our destiny to outside forces who will take our place in finding solutions for us and determining our destiny. We are counting above all else on ourselves and on our own power. At the same time we welcome any regional or international initiative that would contribute to a resolution of the Lebanese crisis. We do not consider any of these initiatives an alternative to having one Lebanese will that will put an end to the tragedy. The Phalangist Party's determination to preserve its own power manifests, on the one hand, the party's reliance on itself and, on the other hand, the party's reliance on free Lebanese capabilities that have not been mortgaged to others. This is what we have been working for, and there are three matters that we have in mind.

A. We are not counting on any one regional or international power because there isn't any such regional or international power that can singlehandedly save Lebanon.

B. We do rely on those interests that one or another country has in common with Lebanon's interests. International relations are based on interests that may or may not be common.

C. Syria's interests would be served in more than one respect if tranquillity and stability were restored to Lebanon.

[Question] It is known that during certain periods you personally initiated a dialogue with Syria and brought about an understanding with it. It is known that you have personal friendships with a number of Syrian officials. At the present time many people are waiting for the dialogue between you and Damascus to be resumed. When will you visit Syria?

[Answer] In recent years I was a member of the Phalangist team that negotiated with Syria. This may be a factor that could help in the effort to revive these negotiations, especially since we in the Phalangist Party never intended to arouse Syria's or any other country's hostility. Instead, we have always tried to strengthen relations between Lebanon and all Arab countries, especially Syria. This is because we understand that Lebanon is a peaceful, independent and neutral country that does not get involved in Arab conflicts. The Phalangist Party's proposal was firm and unequivocal in affirming the need to establish good relations with Syria. We still subscribe to that opinion, particularly at this stage. A good relationship with Syria is a constant in the party's policy despite the fact that that policy has been shaken during the years of the war. But policy cannot change geography; it has to make adjustments to geography in the context of independence, freedom and mutual respect. But regarding a visit

to Syria, that depends on favorable developments. This is something that leaders will decide on at the proper time. We are extending our hands to everybody to bring about what is good for Lebanon and for its supreme interests.

[Question] What exactly does Syria want from the Phalangist Party, and what does the Phalangist Party want from Syria?

[Answer] Syria alone knows what it wants from the Phalangist Party. It is Syria that must be asked that question. As far as what the Phalangist Party wants from Syria, that is clear. We want Syria to help Lebanon overcome its problems and liberate its land. We want Syria to view Lebanon as a source of security for its borders and its regime. Syria should not cast doubts about the Lebanese state and about us, the Phalangist Party. I will say even more than that. The Phalangist Party wants Syria's conduct toward Lebanon to follow what Syrian newspapers--AL-THAWRAH, AL-BA'TH and TISHRIN--have been calling for. For the foreseeable future, we want the case on Lebanon's security and politics closed; we want a strong state to be built; and we want a strong army and a united people. For the long term, or if you will, for strategy, the Phalangist Party wants Syria to recognize once and for all not only the independence of Lebanon but also the foundations and the reasons upon which the Lebanese homeland has been built since it was established. It may be up to us to make Syria believe in these foundations and reasons which are more useful and more feasible for fraternal and neighborly relations between the two countries.

[Question] In the past 9 years Saudi Arabia played the role of rescuer in Lebanon. At the present time Lebanese-Saudi relations are cool. Do you believe that the incident of the Saudi consulate in Beirut is the only reason for these cool relations?

[Answer] The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can play a positive role in the Lebanese question. It has offered assistance in that context many times. Our view of Saudi Arabia has always been one of a special friend. We were distressed by what happened to the Saudi Consulate in Beirut, and we asked that those who were responsible be punished. Saudi Arabia is not to be rewarded for its role in Lebanon by having its consulate in West Beirut burned. I hope that Saudi Arabia will look beyond that incident and will return to play its conciliatory role among the various parties on the Lebanese scene.

We are reminded of what Saudi officials used to say about Lebanon. They said that Lebanon was an Arab necessity: if it did not exist, it would have to be created. They said that Lebanon did not belong to the Lebanese people only; it belonged to all the Arabs and to the world as well.

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LEBANON

MINISTER ASSIGNS FIRST PRIORITY TO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 405, 24 Nov 84 pp 65-66

[Interview with Joseph al-Hashim, minister of health and communications by 'Imad Judiyah: "Minister Joseph al-Hashim Tells AL-MUSTAQBAL, 'Occupied Lebanese Territories Will Get Priority in Development'"; in Beirut; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Despite the difficulties the state has in carrying out its duties in the occupied areas, Minister Joseph al-Hashim explains that a major effort is being made to ensure that services are provided to those areas.

The minister says that telephone and telex lines are now functioning after repairs have been completed.

Political, spiritual and popular activists in the occupied areas of Lebanon submitted a memorandum 2 weeks ago to the government of Lebanon. The memorandum contained demands that had to do with medical services as well as telephone, mail and telex services. The memorandum urged officials to meet those demands and to regard them as the simplest components of steadfastness.

To be mentioned in this regard is the fact that half the government and private hospitals in the occupied areas were completely destroyed during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The other half that were not destroyed are currently operating with modest capabilities; they have a large shortage in personnel, in necessary medical equipment and in medicines. These hospitals are now unable to treat the scores of wounded who go there daily as a result of random Israeli shake downs in villages, cities, public roads and crowded parks. So much for the health scene. In telecommunications services Israel's occupation forces cut telephone and telex systems in all the occupied cities more than 5 months ago, and they barred mail carriers from delivering mail between these cities and the capital. All this was done to isolate the people of south Lebanon, the western al-Biqa' and Rashiya from Beirut and to isolate the remaining areas of Lebanon from the outside world.

To find out more about the nature of these problems that occupied Lebanese areas are suffering from and to find out about the efforts that official state agencies are making to ensure what is required for steadfastness in the occupied



areas, AL-MUSTAQBAL met with the minister of health and communications, Joseph al-Hashim, and it learned from him about everything that pertains to these matters.

[Question] Health conditions in the occupied areas of Lebanon are very poor. Government hospitals operating there lack the necessary medical equipment and drugs. In addition, they have a big shortage in personnel; they don't have enough physicians, nurses, maintenance workers and administrative officers. The hospitals are thus unable to provide adequate health services to residents who are suffering under the Israeli occupation. What is the Ministry of Health doing about this matter?

[Answer] Everyone knows that before the incidents of 1975 the government health sector in Lebanon, like other government sectors in the country, had many problems. Government hospitals which used to be widespread in the capital, Beirut, and in the rest of the governorates were not enough to meet the medical needs of citizens. The incidents that occurred intensified the urgent need for more of these hospitals. But during the 10 years of the incidents some government hospitals were destroyed completely. New government hospitals were built, but these did not meet the needs of citizens because their number was small, and the condition of the government health sector remained unchanged until today. Actually, we are now interested in the process of developing that sector. But this requires that a comprehensive and an integrated health policy be devised. If such a policy were to be devised, we would not be able to implement it until security conditions in the country are stabilized once and for all. Therefore, I've issued instructions to authorized agencies in the ministry to prepare a comprehensive study on the current status of the health sector in Lebanon so we can utilize the capabilities that are available to us to provide government health services in the near future to all the citizens of Lebanon without exception.

As far as the occupied areas are concerned, we are very much interested in health conditions there. Our greatest efforts are being directed to those areas. The Ministry of Health is coordinating its efforts with the Council on South Lebanon and with the Ministry of State for the Affairs of South Lebanon to provide all the funds, personnel, medical equipment and drugs that government hospitals there need. In addition, we also offer aid and assistance to private hospitals that are located there.

[Question] Will new government hospitals be built to meet the medical needs of the population in Lebanon's occupied areas?

[Answer] The ministry is undoubtedly looking into the possibilities of building new government hospitals in south Lebanon, in the western al-Biq'a' and in Rashiya. But we are concentrating our efforts now on supporting existing hospitals in those areas. These hospitals are operating with modest capabilities. The help we are giving them enables them to carry out their humane role in the best way they can, and it makes their work easier. We help them by providing them with all the medical requirements they need so that the health needs of citizens in those areas can be secured.

[Question] Management staff of government hospitals in the occupied areas of

Lebanon are annoyed with the policy of tightening expenses that is being pursued by the government. Management staff at these hospitals are complaining about the fact that the financial assistance they receive is very little.

[Answer] That is true. I sent a letter about that to the Ministry of Finance, and I asked the ministry to pay government hospitals in the occupied areas all the money they need. The last memorandum I wrote in this regard was one I submitted to the Ministry of Finance regarding the hospital at Tyre.

However, supplying the necessary funds that government hospitals there need is not restricted to the Ministry of Health. In fact, the Council on South Lebanon and the Ministry of State for the Affairs of South Lebanon are also concerned with supplying those funds that these hospitals need.

[Question] The occupied areas of Lebanon are also suffering from a major shortage in telecommunications services because the occupation forces cut all telephone and telex lines to keep the outside world from receiving news about the uprising of these areas' residents.

[Answer] (The minister interrupted.) According to information that is available to me, the areas of Lebanon that are occupied are no longer suffering from this problem. Workers and officials of our ministry who work in south Lebanon, in the western al-Biq'a and in Rashiya informed us that almost everything has gone back to normal after repairs were made on all telephone and telex systems.

On my part I have been following closely and with much interest everything that the occupied areas have been suffering from in the area of telecommunications services. We now have new telephone and telex systems, and these will be installed in south Lebanon soon to meet the needs of the steadfast people there. Our national duty calls upon us to provide all the health, telephone and mail services that are needed in the occupied areas. We will not neglect this matter at all.

As I said before, our interest in these matters in the occupied areas complements our interest in the remaining remote areas of the country.

[Question] Let us shift our attention from the concerns of the ministries of health and postal and telephone services to the country's other concerns. It is known that you were appointed minister to succeed the late minister, al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, the president of the Phalangist Party. It is also known that the country is about to collect on some overdue matters in the near future. Chief among those is the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. How do you view that significant happening which is overdue and is about to happen in light of the fact that military negotiations between Lebanon and Israel are beginning in al-Naqurah?

[Answer] There is no doubt that our attention today--the government's and ours--is focused on the problem of liberating the occupied areas from Israel's military presence. Contrary to everything that is being said and rumored, I can say that south Lebanon will remain united despite all the plans that are being made for it. There will be no change in the demographic makeup of south Lebanon, as some people dream there will be. When I speak about south Lebanon I am also

talking about al-Kharub Province. The state is determined to use all its resources, in total cooperation and coordination with the UN's Emergency Forces, to establish its legal authority over all the areas of south Lebanon, including the coastal highway. The state is determined to do that to preclude any civil strife that Israel may be planning for the areas of south Lebanon.

[Question] In addition to this matter that is overdue, there is an important domestic claim that has become due. It has to do with constitutional reform. The Lebanese people who have been suffering from a murderous war for the past 10 years are now hoping that national accord will be achieved and a strong modern state will be built. From your political position and your position in the ministry, how do you view that significant overdue matter?

[Answer] Before I answer this important question, I would like to make one thing clear first. I would say that each party had a hand in the destruction. Now, instead of wasting our time on superficial issues, we all have to work together to achieve national accord.

It is out of our patriotism and our concern and affection for Lebanon that we are extending our hands again today sincerely and affectionately to all Lebanese groups, so that an understanding may be reached on the basis of the national accord that is being hoped for.

We are committed to everything that was mentioned in the ministry's statement. In other words, we will not become a stumbling block to the achievement and implementation of reforms and articles mentioned in that statement. Today, however, we must focus our efforts on ending the Israeli occupation and putting an end to unstable security conditions in the country. After that we are to look quite objectively into the reforms that have to be realized inside the country. I would like to remind people here of exactly what was mentioned in the ministry's statement. "We need not remind ourselves that achieving all the foregoing will depend on ending the state of war and refraining from all kinds of combat and armed actions."

On our part, we are committed to everything that was mentioned in the ministry's statement. It is up to those committees that were formed at ministers' retreats to take the time to carry out what is being required of them in the area of constitutional reforms and in other areas as well.

[Question] Finally, what is your assessment of the Syrian role in Lebanon and of the existing relationship between the two countries?

[Answer] The relationship between Lebanon and Syria is a historical one that goes back hundreds of years. Lebanon and Syria are one and the same country. Their national interests are the same, and they have common objectives. Everything that Syria is doing in Lebanon today and all the active parts it is playing in that country serve the supreme national interests of the two fraternal countries.

On our part we are absolutely willing to develop that relationship nationally and politically because we think that Syria has a distinguished and an important role to play in Lebanon.

## LEBANON

### BRIEFS

BEIRUT AIRPORT TRAFFIC--The number of passengers arriving and departing through Beirut Airport between the time it reopened last 9 July and 12 August (33 days) totaled 73,130 passengers, broken down as follows: 41,291 arrived and 31,839 departed. It is worth noting that the number of those arriving exceeded the number of those departing by about 10,000, which reflects that there was movement in both directions and that there is a significant return of people to Beirut directly in the wake of the implementation of the security plan. The number of flights undertaken by Middle East Airline during this period was 891, or an average of 27 takeoffs and landings daily. The operations of the company have been limited to 10 planes that have been able to service most of the routes to and from Lebanon, down from an original 23 planes in its fleet. The rest of the planes are either in maintenance or leased. The flights have included the principal points in Europe, West Africa, the Arab States and New York. Meanwhile, it has been learned that there is a move afoot by Middle East Airlines to amend the agreements it has with other airlines and known as joint funds which limit the percentage of profits in light of the current situation. General Customs Authority sources say that customs revenues taken in at the airport are increasing, something which signifies the improvement in air traffic. The General Customs Authority has been preparing a study for the improvement of airport customs since the forced closure that lasted about 5 months. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 16 Aug 84 p 7] 12608

JULY BEIRUT PORT TRAFFIC--During the month of July, Beirut port registered the arrival of 90 ships that unloaded or loaded 163,030 tons of goods and 9,577 head of sheep. The goods unloaded totaled 156,378 tons, including 80,532 tons of various kinds of fuels brought by 13 ships. The most important was fuel oil (mazut)--40,178 tons, gasoline--30,403 tons, and liquified petroleum gas--4,065 tons. The amount of wheat unloaded was 33,028 tons, followed by 12,987 tons of cereals, 8,253 tons of paper and cardboard, 8,103 tons of iron and iron byproducts, and 3,250 tons of glass and glass products. Total transit traffic was 3,142 tons of goods, including 1 ton through the free trade zone. There were 327 passengers carried by six ships, including

120 who arrived and 207 who departed. Twenty ships unloaded 224 containers that held 2,553 tons of goods: 41 containers were unloaded in the container yard for direct delivery, 18 containers were unloaded into the warehouses, 138 containers were removed full into the country, and 6 containers left through transit. There were 226 empty containers and 71 containers with 556 tons of goods that were loaded onto ships. It is worth noting that the port actually resumed operations on 9 July. Before that date, only three ships entered the port in July. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 23 Aug 84 p 9] 12608

THERMAL ELECTRICITY GENERATING UNIT--The General Investment Authority has agreed--and Minister of Hydroelectric Resources Nabih Birri has confirmed the agreement--to grant the contract for the heat generating unit for the second complex in al-Zuq plant No 2 to the French company Alsthom. This agreement came after a decision by the managing board of the Lebanon Electric Organization to select the French company because it presented the best offer and price. The value of the deal is 396 million Lebanese pounds. The Italian company that was contracted for the first complex with its three units presented a high-priced bid, then it offered a discount of 40 million Lebanese pounds. After comparison it became clear that: 1) When considering the construction cost of the equipment per megawatt and multiplying this by the total capacity of the complex--which is 145 megawatts for the Italian bid and 170 megawatts for the French bid--the cost of the latter remains cheaper by 1 million Lebanese pounds and 2) There is a 3 percent fuel oil savings in the French unit, which represents 75-80 million pounds over the expected service life of the unit. The agreement between the Lebanon Electric Organization and the Alsthom Co will be signed at the beginning of next month. Meanwhile, the organization expects to link the first thermal unit in al-Zuq plant No 2 to the grid on 27 August when it will conduct commercial experiments on it. The capacity of this complex is 145 megawatts. If the experiments are successful and the plant remains unharmed, then rationing will be eliminated altogether at the end of this month. However, the National Authority for the Litani River is to undertake renovations soon that will last for 10 days, and this will force the organization to supply the Biqa' region which, in turn, could force the organization to prolong the current rationing schedule, which is 4 hours every 2 days. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 23 Aug 84 p 9] 12608

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## ARTICLE EXAMINES IRAN'S INFLUENCE ON AFGHAN RESISTANCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Oct 84 p 7

[Text] The Hazarajat, a central party of the Shi'ite population of Afghanistan (15 to 20 percent of the total population) has remained uninvolved in the war since the central government was driven out in 1979. Until 1982 it was administered by a council, the Shura, which brought together the clergy and some notables led by Sayyad Beheshti in charge of political affairs and Sayyad Jaglan responsible for military matters. This council had established quite a centralized little government equipped with a burdensome and often corrupt bureaucracy.

Supposedly descendants of the Prophet, the Sayyad caste, whose influence has always been very substantial in the Hazarajat, very quickly seized power. The group maneuvered cleverly to get rid of its rivals: in 1980, it drew on the support of the radical and pro-Khomeyni elements to push to the fringe the arbab, landed proprietors who are often more liberal than the clergy; in 1982, they reversed their alliances: the Shura attempted to eliminate the Khomeyni elements by renewing an alliance with the arbab. The drama took another turn when it became known that the intermediaries between the Shura and the outside world were former Maoists.

Nevertheless, in 1982 the Khomeyniites militarily opposed the Shura whose authoritarian ways had upset the peasant population. After 2 years of various fluctuations, 1984 saw the conquest of two-thirds of the Hazarajat by the Khomeyni group; all that remained was Nawur, Jaglan's fief, and the eastern border of the Hazarajat, dominated by the small but dynamic Harakat-e Islami.

The supremacy of the Khomeyniites, whose troops are young and educated, resulted in a real revolution. Disciplined and honest, but sectarian and dogmatic, the Khomeyniites inaugurated a "cultural revolution" after their own fashion: schools and libraries were opened in the bazaars, and highly politicized meetings, in which both France and the United States as well as the USSR were condemned, were held every week. Admittedly, the great mass of the peasant population remained indifferent to ideology, but the Khomeyniites easily make recruits among the tens of thousands of young Hazaras who have gone to work in Iran. The great question is whether they will succeed in finding a permanent niche for themselves in a population which has remained very traditionalist.

## Shock Mullahs

In the Ghujur bazaar, near Jaghori, the Nasr party has opened a library in which there is a shelf of children's books (with more stories and fables than propaganda) and a women's department, which says a great deal about the evolution of people's mentalities. In remote villages lost in the mountains, one often meets young shock mullahs, recently trained in Iran, whose intellectual level contrasts sharply with the narrow conservatism of their elders. One also sees Afghans who have spent several years among the Guardians of the Revolution in Iran who have returned as the cadres of the movement. Hundreds of young Hazaras are fighting right now on the Iraqi front, and it is not unusual to see an appeal pasted up on the village mosques to commemorate the death of a "martyr" who has fallen on that distant front.

The Hazarajat has always walked in lockstep with Iran; the same inns which display the portrait of Khomeyni today, exhibited that of the shah 10 years ago. The Shi'ite clergy was trained in Qom or in Kerbala in Iraq; since the war between Iran and Iraq, it is trained exclusively in Qom. It is well known that this clergy is much more hierarchically structured than its Sunni equivalent; its esprit de corps is very strong. Afghanistan's Shiite mullahs keep in close contact with their Iranian teachers, and a good number of political divisions within the Hazara community can be explained by the rivalries between the different Iranian and even Iraqi--by followers acting as intermediaries--mojtahed (teachers competent to carry on the practice of interpretation).

But even within the Khomeyni movement there are evident dissensions which seem to reflect the struggles between different tendencies in Iran. The most powerful and most recent organization is the Sepah-e pasdarans, modeled on the Guardians of the Revolution whose name it has adopted; as a matter of fact, it is incorporated into the Iranian organization. Arms and training are provided by Iran and its activities are directly supervised by the staff of the Iranian pasdarans. Outside the Hazarajat, on the Iranian border, the equivalent small Shiite groups are called Hezbollah, like the group of Qari the one-armed in Herat. Another Hazara organization that is much older is the Nasr, made up principally of former student activists from the time of King Zaher. While the Nasr acknowledges Khomeynism, it claims to be strictly Afghan and refuses to be integrated with the pasdarans. Tensions have appeared between the Sepah and the Nasr, and the latter seems to be preparing to make overtures to more moderate groups and to Pakistan.

Opposition to the Khomeyni group is very heterogeneous: it includes the remnants of the Shura, the traditional notables and a party that also hails the Islamic revolution, the Harakat-e Islami, whose star is rising (not to be confused with the similarly named Sunni group, the Harakat-e Enqelab e Islami). Led by the most prestigious living Afghan Shiite religious chief, Sheik Assef Mohseni, a former disciple of Ayatollah Khuy, the Harakat-e Islami is the only Shiite party which is not exclusively Hazara (its leader is a Pachtun). It gathers

recruits as readily among the urban minority Shi'ites as in the periphery of the Hazarajat, where it is well entrenched. For 2 years it has been the only Shi'ite party to really fight the Soviets. It collaborates closely with the Jam'iat whose structure and recruitment are similar to the Sunni group.

#### No Confrontation With the USSR

Is there a coherent Iranian policy towards Afghanistan, and what are the risks of confrontation between the most pro-Iranian elements and the Soviets? Iran's involvement with the Afghan resistance is increasing: arms may now be transported through Iranian territory and Shi'ite groups receive deliveries of light weapons directly. Furthermore, a hardening of Iran's attitude is evident towards the USSR whose press for the last year and a half has been virulently denouncing Iranian "meddling" on the Afghan border; the Imam Khomeyni is openly criticized by the Kabul press.

Nevertheless, the Afghan question remains a secondary one for the Iranians, by comparison with the conflict with Iraq, and there is no question of getting involved in even an indirect confrontation with the Soviet Union. What interests Iran above all is the control of Shi'ite minorities outside the country. Everything goes on as if the leaders of the Islamic revolution think that this revolution is mainly the affair of the Shi'ites who are the principal objects of their propaganda. This Iranianization of the Shi'ite minority includes a "revolution" that is not only ideological: among the Hazara activists it is fashionable to adopt Iranian accent and dress (fatigue dress and a beard of few days growth).

In the short term, this desire to favor the internal revolution at the expense of the struggle against the invaders places the Khomeyniites against the majority of the resistance parties, both Shi'ites and Sunnis. Thus for the moment, Iranian influence only helps to muddy the waters.

But in the long term, things are not so clear. Whatever the ambiguities of the Khomeyni movement may be, it has two assets in relation to the former leadership of the Shura: it offers an ideology and it has cadres at its disposal. The dynamism of the movement is an obstacle to Soviet strategy which banks on the weariness of the population and its lack of interest in politics. Soviet concern can be seen in the virulence of their recent attacks against pro-Khomeyni groups, even if the short term they benefit from the paralysis of the Hazarajat. If the expansion of the radical movements becomes established and if Iran manages to retain control over them, it will have to make a choice: either a sort of autonomous Shi'ite republic will be created in the Hazarajat and will establish a modus vivendi with the Kabul regime, or Iran will find itself increasingly involved in the Afghan conflict, which will alter the relationship of forces in favor of the resistance (and in favour of the Shi'ites within the resistance).



In any case, it is inevitable that sooner or later, Iran will enter the game, if only by geopolitical necessity, and therefore independently of ideological questions, even if this change is conditioned by the end of the conflict with Iraq and by modifications in the leading spheres. Pakistan moreover, which feels very isolated, is not at all inimical to Iran's return to the scene, which would thus break the increasingly strained confrontation between itself and the USSR, supported by India. The paradox therefore is that at the time when Pakistan, the main supporter of the resistance, is openly pondering a political settlement, another protagonist, even more dangerous to the Soviets, is appearing on the horizon. The risk is that the resistance may have lost impetus before Iran decides to support it more openly.

9824

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## PAPER NOTES PROBLEMS OF ASSASSINATION PROBE

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 11 Nov 84 p 5

[Text]

**M**r Anand Ram has begun investigations into the assassination of Indira Gandhi. The special team of high-ranking detectives and intelligence experts that he heads will prepare the brief for the Commission of Enquiry that the government has announced, to be headed by a judge of the Supreme Court. The judge is yet to be named, and so are the terms of reference of the commission. But 11 days after Mrs Gandhi was killed, there has been very little to show that the authorities have taken the necessary action to collect basic evidence and prevent people from disappearing so that once it begins its work, the enquiry commission does not flounder or run into blind alleys.

It is miraculous that an assassin lives to tell his tale. Sub-inspector Beant Singh was shot dead by the ITBP jawans inside the Safdarjang Road-Akbar Road complex within minutes of shooting Mrs Gandhi. The same guards also shot Satwant, but a team of doctors working in a strict security cordon have patched him up, removed a kidney and brought him back to the world of the living.

Anand Ram has his work cut out for him. The basic enquiry is whether Beant Singh and Satwant Singh were religious fanatics acting on their own who killed Mrs Gandhi without any links with third parties, or was there a bigger conspiracy. If there was a wider conspiracy, how many men were involved? Was this conspiracy born after the Army action in Amritsar in June or was it hatched long before that? Does it have links with emigre Indian extremists organisations abroad? Are they traceable to any other country, openly hostile or friendly at the surface, in the neighbourhood or across the globe?

The second phase is the collapse of intelligence. The final is the collapse of the security systems surrounding the late Prime Minister.

It will be all too easy to believe that Satwant and Beant were fanatics who killed her in religious fervour, avenging Golden Temple or Bhindranwale in a personal action without contact with anyone else.

More difficult to prove but also more probable, is the theory that the assassination is the end product of a successful conspiracy that had far more instruments of execution than the pair Satwant-Beant. If the two had failed, or just could not make it together that day for hundreds of reasons, the conspirators would have an alternate strategy; another pair, perhaps. The two have proved how easy it is to penetrate and lie or buy your way into the closest security ring that exists in this country.

Mrs Gandhi had faced, and survived, many plots against her life in the past. The exposures have been accidental, or providential. Occasionally, in unpublicised cases, it is the warning of intelligence agencies which prevented a tragedy — remember those stories of guards whose guns go off accidentally, or policemen who are summarily transferred without much explanation.

Satwant Singh's interrogation is yet to begin in earnest, but preliminary information suggests many more mysteries. It is now certain that both he and Beant had been under the influence of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale for some time, perhaps long before June. Beant, in fact, with his relatives in the Diplomatic Corps has also been in touch with pro-Khalistan elements in the UK, and perhaps in Pakistan, information suggests. How did they both manage to be near the PM on the same day, and how could they persuade senior officers to arrange their postings and duty changes? How many of them were really there — just these two or another, as the first reports had said, and had then mysteriously not pressed the point?

And how were these two really shot? The story of the two being shot in the ITBP guard house as they struggled to seize the arms of their captors, is getting fishier by the passing day. Were they meant to be liquidated after they had done their job? What is the level of infiltration? Intelligence is a many-sided ogre, with thousands of avenues of information, a dozen collection and processing points. But intelligence is useful only if correlated. Was this done properly, or is intelligence too suborned? Mrs Gandhi

was warned of such an eventuality, sources say. She had refused to remove the Sikhs from the guards. She was expected to make such a decision, secular that she was. But why was subterfuge of other preventive action not taken?

The entire intelligence structure is now in the throes of a great earthquake. Mr R N Kao, security advisor to Mrs Indira Gandhi, has resigned. The heads of IB have rolled. Subhash Tandan, chief of Delhi Police, has no job for the moment. The entire security unit has been disbanded, and black-clad commandos of the armed forces are keeping a watch on Mr Rajiv Gandhi's security.

This is, obviously, a temporary arrangement. A system will have to emerge from the ashes of the old. How good will it be if it once again depends on the agencies that failed Mrs Indira Gandhi, is a question Anand Ram and the Commission of Enquiry will have to ponder over even as they start investigating what went wrong last time.

#### The Security Structure

Over the years, the top security men sitting in South Block and occasionally in unmarked buildings and barracks have put the wisdom of their experience in a document that is popularly called the Blue Book. There are Blue Book regulations for the President of India, and for the Prime Minister. Considering the different nature of these two jobs, and the personalities of the individuals holding the two posts, the Blue Book is modified and updated. The President as head of state goes to ceremonial functions, the Republic Day, the technical area at Palam airport to receive VIPs. He seldom goes to a mass meeting, or makes a public speech. His security has a visible ceremonial component — all those brilliantly attired Cavalry officers and men and Guards of the Rashtrapati Bhavan. And the invisible security.

The Prime Minister has the visible guards at the house, but for the most part, her security too is of the invisible variety, the men in plain-clothes and those who check an area that she is to visit for undesirable men and objectionable objects. Anyone who has ever prepared for the Prime Minister's visit to inaugurate a project or take the salute at a passing out parade knows the squads of people who descend on the scene perhaps a week in advance, inspect the site, prepare dossiers on the persons who will be in the room or hand-shaking distance of the Prime Minister, inspect the dais or wooden structures for hidden time bombs, the electric wiring for sparks of fire hazard risk and advise certain windows to be sealed, certain doors to be closed, and a certain distance kept between the Prime Minister and the first row of people whether they are sitting or standing. This distance is supposed to be the distance at which a thrown knife or stone cannot harm the Prime Minister, and a bullet can lose its killing edge. The Blue Book says all this is to be done thoroughly in concert with all available intelligence from the local intelligence unit, the higher intelligence group and the warnings issues from the agencies in Central Secretariat and R K Puram, so to say.

#### The Blue Book

For the Prime Minister's residence, the Parliament House office and the South Block office, the Blue Book lays down specific guidelines. As it does for other places that Mrs Gandhi may go to and stay for any length of time — perhaps the retreat at Simla or a bungalow in the valley of Kashmir or Rashtrapati Nilayam in Hyderabad and the Governor's house in any other State.

The closest to the Prime Minister at Safdarjang Road is her personal bodyguard, the PSO. He is a person of supreme reflexes, indomitable courage and sense of duty, and a loyalty that will not make him think twice or flinch from putting his own body in between the Prime Minister and an oncoming bullet, or knife. It is a posting that makes unheard of demands on men and their nerves. But it has its own rewards — in duty performed with religious fervour, in the power of being close to the front of all power in the country, and perhaps in the small capacity to disburse patronisation to relatives and friends by getting them jobs and licences through the other staff officers who live and work around the Prime Minister. It, of course, is also a very thankless job, with odd hours and hard work, and the propensity to provoke the anger of Mrs Gandhi if one becomes too obvious or crude, and of rubbing other VIPs the wrong way. The bodyguard is the person who trusts no one, just no one who may come close to the Prime Minister. It could be a senior civil servant, or a junior minister. Not that they are dangerous. But because history says that there have been cases of ministers and officials assassinating their leader. And bodyguards are taught not to ignore history.

The second security cordon at the house consists of armed guards from the DAP and police. All are taught the use of weapons which were once 303 Enfield Rifles and are now carbines which have a magazine capacity of 32 rounds, but carry about 22 so as not to jam the mechanism. The entire magazine can be emptied in a few seconds, with bullets leaving the gun with a muzzle velocity of 200 pounds per square inch and an effective range of 60 yards. Beant Singh fired his six revolver bullets, and Satwant Singh had emptied his carbine magazine at Mrs Gandhi at point blank range. The effect was disastrous.

The third security cordon was earlier once again of the Armed Delhi Police. Two factors changed this. One was the attack during Mr Moraji Desai's time on the Prime Minister's house by a mob. The crowd, protesting police action in the Kanjhawla village reached up to Mr Desai's doors, and no one could stop them. The main gates were almost torn from their hinges.

The other incidents were attempts by some people to drive their vehicles crashing through the gates. With the threats she was receiving, the cordon was changed to one manned by commandos of the Indo Tibetan Border Police, also armed with automatic weapons. The ITBP, like the BSF, is a border patrol unit trained to guard and kill at high altitudes. It is a moot question

how the jawans used on long-term duty, responded to the cures and weaknesses and tensions of the big city.

#### Delhi police

In Delhi, the Delhi police and its units man the security rings at the Prime Minister's house, and for that matter, at the residence and offices of other Central Ministers, judges of the Supreme Court and sundry other VIPs thought fit and deserving of receiving the protection of these men. The men of the Delhi Police, the Delhi Armed Police and the local intelligence, are all good men and true, but from the Police Commission and the Khosla enquiry that investigated them when they revolted in the late sixties, the police force must be the most easy to suborn and to be made to commit perjury. In other words, with the exception of the truly honest, this is a cadre that is corrupt and that has in all too many recorded cases shown a certain lack of honesty and courage when it is most required.

Just now, the police has 10 battalions of DAP, the numbers raised in the last five to seven years to take care of the increasing agitations at the Boat Club and the like, the frequent VIP duty of lining roads and keeping crowds away from the dais, and increasing use in industrial areas where their lathi has been used to settle wage disputes and end strikes as often as it is used to protect the property of the factory. This was supposed to free the police station, or thana police, for the more vital task of crime fighting and preserving law and order in the city's inhabited areas.

Not to be posted to the Traffic Police or the thana is a punishment in itself. To be removed from them and posted to the DAP comes as close to capital punishment as possible! Life in the DAP is hellish, with just about no rewards. It is the first posting of a young recruit who walks out of an urban village in Dhaka Dhampur, or Munirka, or Kanjhawla in Alipur, and goes through the training period at the Police Training School which was at Mehrauli and is now further towards the Gurgaon border. The training itself has a basic course in law and crime detection, and in rifle and small-arms shooting. Also, in unarmed combat nowadays. The main weapon they ultimately use is not the gun so much as the lathi, or the stick.

There is precious little motivation for these young men, apart from the security of the job. Of all the men in the Delhi Police, they are the most vulnerable to outside influences and corruption if ever it comes their way. The thana constable is the one they envy. The traffic constable is their idol.

If they had disbanded and castrated the intelligence and investigative agencies of the Government for their participation in the excesses of the emergency, the Janata Government and then Mr Charan Singh's short-lived ministry did not realise that intelligence was not just a question of plain clothesmen trailing suspects of RAW agents interrogating a political, but activist intelligence gathering, its pro-ig and correlation and finally, its use was, an integrated exercise involving India's internal and external security, both, as also its political stability.

Mrs Gandhi, when she came back to power in 1980, could not entirely undo what the Janata had done. Nor could she really restore the apparatus of the emergency years. An effort was made to recondition and refurbish the combined intelligence apparatus for internal and external security, and to develop specific agencies and equip them with the latest 'software' and hardware for their specific tasks.

Among these agencies were the intelligence organisations of the three defence services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—and the three paramilitary organisations of the Border Security Force, the Coast Guard and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. All three are effectively armed forces with lesser weapons and limited police powers. Like the three wings of the defence services, all these groups have their 'G' or 'Q' or 'I' intelligence and counter-intelligence officers with comprehensive headquarter structures. So do organisations like the Central Reserve Police and the Central Industrial Force for the limited purpose of field intelligence in their areas of postings.

#### Other agencies

The Research and Analysis Wing—sometimes infamous, sometimes fearsome, but always super-secret—was another organisation, together with operatives of the office of Special Operations. The field coordinator for many of the agencies reporting to the Home Ministry is the Director-General of Security under whom function the SSB, the SSF, the Special Frontier Force with its deadly commandos trained to handle every situation in every terrain, from tropical jungles to the asphalt jungles of a metropolis, and the ARC, the Aviation Research Centre.

The father-figures of Indian intelligence have been policemen like B N Mullik and R N Kao and Shankaran Nair. Mullick, who worked under Nehru, really set up the infrastructure for the intelligence set-up, but the fiasco of the China war forced its rapid modernisation. The Bangladesh war showed the success of external

**POLITICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE**  
**(Chaired by PRIME MINISTER)**



intelligence structures as well as the armed services, but the internal security aspect remained largely untested till 1975. The next two years proved that the system could keep track of political activity rather too well, and if it had not got mixed up with extraneous elements, the set-up would have escaped close scrutiny by the Janata regime in 1977.

In her new term in office, Mrs Gandhi asked Kao to revitalise the intelligence and security systems as her advisor. As he took up his task, he had before him a report submitted to the Prime Minister a few months earlier on the health of the intelligence units. The report had categorically said that intelligence activities often had overlapping management or non-

existent coordination. The report highlighted the poor evaluation of the intelligence gathered, the overlapping of various intelligence-gathering activities, the lack of a mechanism to eliminate duplication; the absence of coordinated long-range programmes, major gaps in areas of coverage, and critically, absence of unrestricted channels of internal communication and the inordinate delay for intelligence reports to reach their destination or the person who is to order some action based on it.

Mr Kao set about his job methodically and thoroughly. He resigned last week, owning moral responsibility for the intelligence lapse. He had not met with the success he had hoped for, in improving the system.

## Incomplete Dossiers of Beant Singh and Satwant Singh

**S**atwant will survive to tell the tale — or so is everybody hoping. According to sources at Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, he is fully in command of his senses and perfectly coherent. In fact, he is so coherent that he may well be in a position to avoid disclosing anything worthwhile!

The man is very particular about knowing the latest on his health front; he has shown all the right signs towards a willingness to live.

His recovery has been quite remarkable. One specialist was certain that if it was not for his strong constitution, he could have succumbed any minute to what continues to be a "sick" condition.

Sources said that Satwant is astonishingly alive to things around him, and is able to recognise a new doctor or whoever came to his heavily guarded ward. Only the doctors who are attending on him are allowed to go in, and it is almost impossible for even the hospital staff, howsoever senior they may be, to reach him.

Till 5 November, Satwant was very critical. But almost surprisingly, he has since begun responding to the straight-forward treatment being administered on him.

There is some 'Guruji' Satwant keeps talking about. But till now, he hasn't given anybody a chance to identify who he is. "He appears to be a very organised fellow, who will like to live even when it may not mean much" said someone closely observing him over the last few days.

A top hospital source debunked the rumour that Satwant is already off his rocker: the man has not lost his mental balance. He even tries to laugh, and according to one source, his stock response is the weak, but remarkably apparent, smile. He initially was on a heavy dose of sedatives, but for the last three days, his dependence on them has been reduced somewhat.

The main source of worry right through was his kidney especially after he developed some post-operation complications. But the bullet injury, in the abdominal region, has healed suffi-

ciently for him to be put on a solid diet. His damaged liver, which was restituted a couple of days ago, has been functioning satisfactorily. Although initially he needed blood transfusions to keep going, he no longer needs any such aid.

It is only to be seen, however, whether Satwant can stand up to the grill of what's in store for him at the interrogating chair. While his overall condition has stabilised enough to raise visions of survival, it is said that hospital authorities are less than sure about releasing him for interrogation right-away. In fact, on Thursday, they had resisted attempts by crack sleuths working on Satwant to take him away for their work with him.

Satwant was recruited in Delhi Police in 1982. He was posted in 2nd Battalion DAP, but to everybody's surprise, managed to be in Prime Minister's security in a short time.

Satwant, who hails from Gurdaspur, the most notorious area infested with extremists, was recruited in Delhi Police from Bareilly in U.P.

A few days before the assassination, Satwant had visited Gurdaspur district and his village at Dera Baba Nanak, and left his family there. Immediately after his return, he was re-posted in the PM's security in contravention of the rules laid in the Blue Book of Prime Minister's security.

Satwant, 21 years old, was posted in "peripheral security" of the PM's House.

On 31 October, he was posted at the wicket gate between 1, Safdarjung Road and 1 Akbar Road and had Beant Singh standing guard on the other sides.

It is said that of late, Satwant had been coming to office in private taxis, and did not have meals in the mess for a very long time. It is reported that along with his other accomplice, Beant, he had taken a vow at Gurdwara Rakab Ganj under a granthi to avenge the army action at the Golden Temple by assassination Mrs Gandhi. The granthi was stated to have fled India 10 days before the event.

Police had hauled up one Giani Charan Singh of Ashok Vihar. But after interrogating him thoroughly for a number of days has reportedly concluded that he was not the granthi they were seeking. Satwant is a recruit of the 1982 controversial large-scale recruitments made from Punjab when Mr P S Bhinder was the Police Commissioner of Delhi. His recruitment had been okayed by three DCPs. Two of these three DCPs were arrested along with Mr Bhinder in the Sunder dacoit murder case. Mr Bhinder says all this is a coincidence and that he is not involved.

Another coincidence is that Satwant was sent to man one of the most sensitive posts from 2nd Battalion DAP, by one of the same group of officers.

Satwant is reported to have said that a serving senior army officer with the rank of Major-General based in Chandigarh, was behind the planning of the whole operation. The Defence Ministry said there are no Major-Generals in Chandigarh. At one stage, Satwant had said that a clean shaven accomplice had joined him and Beant Singh in the shooting.

Satwant is reported to have said that President Zail Singh and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi were also on the hit-list for assassination.

According to one report, Satwant had gone to Bhopal in connection with his higher secondary examination. There he stayed in Hanumanganj police station and availed of better accommodation by saying that he was from PM's security guard. He had given the address in his own handwriting.

Gurdaspur police is reported to have rounded up six family members of Satwant for interrogation — Satwant's father Tarlok Singh, three brothers Gurnam Singh, Wariaj Singh alias Ram Singh and Balwinder Singh and two of his teenage sisters.

Some Bhindranwale literature found amongst Satwant's belongings suggests possible links with the Bhindranwale group.

Satwant is also reported to have named a Delhi Police officer who has also served in Punjab Police and who had visited us soon after the army action in the Golden Temple.

Inspector Yogendra Mani is reported to have sent a detailed report about Satwant's activities to the SP for VVIP security before the assassination of the Prime Minister. But sources in security say that no action was taken on that report.

The visit of some of Satwant's friends in cars at the PM's house at odd hours are also being investigated by the police. The places where he used to have his lunch and dinner are also being ascertained.

On Friday, police seized a letter addressed to Satwant Singh at the hospital. The contents of the letter have not been declared.

**B**eant Singh is dead. Information about him, therefore, had to come from the statements by the police officers, and the people who had been associated with him. Satwant Singh, his accomplice in the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi, and who is still alive, will, however, be the main such source.

Beant Singh was born in village Malowa near Chandigarh. He had a reputation for being a late-comer and for absenting from work without prior intimation, or 11th hour information. He had been warned a number of times for this, but he had remained incorrigible.

One of Beant's brothers is an advocate in Punjab. Another a legal adviser in a company in Delhi. His brother in Ropar was formerly a magistrate, according to reports.

Recruited in Delhi Police in 1975, Beant had been in Prime Minister's security staff for eight years before his transfer in 1982. But he had managed to come back to PM's security staff again through alleged powerful connexions.

Beant had accompanied late Mrs Gandhi on one of her trips as the Prime Minister to the Scandinavian countries. At London, he had met his cousin Harinder Singh, a Foreign Service officer posted at Oslo, Sweden who later defected and proclaimed that he would work for "Khalistan". It is understood that using Harinder as a link, he has also met self-proclaimed "Khalistan president" Jagjit Singh Chauhan. Earlier considered a staunch loyalist of Mrs Gandhi, he is suspected to have changed his loyalties at this meeting.

According to reports, his wife has stated during interrogation that after "Operation Bluestar" Beant has said that "something has to be done now". Since then he had often been returning home at very late hours. There are reports that Beant used to visit a gurdwara regularly, and along with Satwant Singh and a clean-shaven Sikh is said to have taken a vow at the Bangla Sahib gurdwara to kill Mrs Gandhi.

According to Satwant Singh, Beant had taken hand-grenades to the PM's House on 13 October. A driver belonging to Beant's village and attached to a senior officer in Haryana Chief Minister's office, was arrested by Punjab Police when it was disclosed that he was related to Beant, and was on very friendly terms. Beant is reported to have arranged the marriage of this driver's daughter, and even met him recently.

The driver has told intelligence men that Beant was known to him, and as he was placed in a "better position", he had asked him (Beant) find a good match for his daughter.

A police party that raided Beant's house after the assassination recovered 20 dollars from the premises together with photographs of the militant Sikh leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Some recorded cassettes with inflammatory speeches against Mrs Gandhi's government and a particular community were also reportedly recovered.

It is stated that Beant, after "Operation Bluestar" had started openly expressing his displeasure over the army action, and had said that "Mrs Gandhi would have to face the consequences of her action".

On the fateful day, Beant was on afternoon duty, but a day before he had persuaded sub-inspector Ram Kishan to exchange duty with him, allegedly on medical grounds.

## WRITER ANALYZES PROBLEMS OF INTELLIGENCE

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 13 Nov 84 p 6

[Article by Dipak Rudra]

[Text] Mrs Gandhi's tragic death at the hands of her own personal body-guard must raise immediate and urgent questions not only about the adequacy of the security cover around the highest in the land, but also about the state of our intelligence system as a whole. As expected, the new Prime Minister has promptly ordered an inquiry by a Supreme Court judge; the Lieutenant-Governor of Delhi has been replaced and many heads in the topmost echelons of the Delhi police and the Intelligence Bureau have rolled.

Let us not beguile ourselves into thinking, as Mrs Gandhi is supposed to have been advised even in July last after the Army action in the Golden Temple, that India has a relatively small, ill-equipped intelligence organization with inadequate human and material resources at its command. Far from it. Whatever may have been the form and strength of the intelligence agencies we inherited in 1947 and made do with until the Chinese debacle of 1962, today we have one of the most elaborate and comprehensive intelligence networks in the Third World. It covers nearly every aspect of political, economic, social and cultural activity in the country, and perhaps even abroad.

#### Agencies

Broadly speaking, apart from the State-level CIDs, enforcement, intelligence and detective branches, four distinct civilian agencies operate at the national level. They are the Intelligence Bureau raised in 1920, the Central Bureau of Investigation started in 1963, the Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat formed in 1968, and the Revenue Intelligence branch of the Finance Ministry initiated in the early seventies. A Joint Intelligence Committee oversees the first three of these agencies--we will not discuss the fourth in this article--and is responsible for coordinating both domestic and foreign intelligence. At the same time, an apex committee headed by the Security Adviser to the Prime Minister is expected to make sure that there is no duplication or overlapping of functions, that resources are optimized and evenly spread out and the results obtained properly sifted, classified and made available when required.



Manpower varies from agency to agency, with RAW reportedly having the maximum, around 20,000 and CBI the least, nearly 4,000. Since none of the agencies comes under direct parliamentary control, no figures are readily available about budgetary allocations. However, RAW alone is believed to have an annual budget of Rs 400 crores per annum--not an insubstantial amount considering the Plan allocations of even medium-sized States!

In point of fact, RAW is, by common consent, the most prestigious of all the agencies; and a RAW posting is the ultimate aspiration of any ambitious police officer up for the take. And once ensconced there, few deign to return to the more mundane tasks of policing the motherland. An Orissa officer of the 1946 batch has been away from his home State for the last 25 years. A former President's grandson, assigned to the Union Territories, has never served in India since 1963. True, there are also recruits with records of proven competence in the domestic agencies, but by and large, RAW has always been the happy hunting ground of political influence and favouritism. Well-connected officers discredited in their natural habitat--district and city administrations--have all too often been spirited away to a comfortable refuge in West Europe or North America, or fitted into pivotal assignments in South Asia, while their worthier colleagues languish in inconsequential backwaters like Fiji or Outer Mongolia.

The upshot, inevitably, has been that compared to its inputs and institutional clout, RAW, after the euphoria of the post-1965 war period and the Bangladesh liberation struggle, has rarely been very productive, in terms of either vital information or pre-emptive action. The Samba spy case is an instance in point, as is the failure to detect and identify, until recently, sources of Pakistani and Chinese arms purchases. The assassination of Mujibur Rahman and General Zia in Bangladesh, and Mhatre murder in the U.K. and the outrages against Tamils in Sri Lanka, all left our blue-eyed boys of the secret service singularly flat-footed.

Which brings one back to the question of control and critical analysis. A few months ago, a sub-committee of the U.S. Congress flayed American intelligence agencies for their obvious lack of public contact in Iran, and their consequent inability to gauge the depth of feeling against the Shah's regime. One wonders whether our RAW men could not be accused of a similar complacency where and when it matters.

Next to RAW, our largest intelligence set-up, with a staff strength of over 13,000, is admittedly the IB. It is also, as mentioned earlier, the oldest, with established classical traditions of counter-espionage, infiltration, "bird-watching," and the like. Besides, in the ITBP and SSB, it had until now the only paramilitary commando outfits in the police. (The Special Frontier Force raised by the Prime Minister's Security Adviser is a recent addition). Known as the eyes and ears of the Union Home Ministry, the IB has for long shouldered the responsibility of internal security. But because of its low profile and unobtrusive ways its exact areas of interest have seemed rather diffuse, and its tally of victories and losses remained little publicized.

## Tenacious

All the same, the IB and its subsidiaries have been reasonably active in observing and reporting on developments along our international borders, insurgency in the north-east, and communal stirrings in other parts of the country. The Larkins case, revealing the CIA connexion of two retired officers of the armed forces is an example of the hard-nosed, tenacious work the IB is capable of. On the other hand, it can with equal aplomb commit the most incredible gaffes, e.g. the misreporting about Jayaprakash Narayan's death in Bombay during the Janata Government.

The IB's main problem is that it has no mechanism to ensure that its reports are acted upon speedily, or at all. Yet it has to take the rap time and again for the tardy responses and ineptitude of policymakers, as well as of the local police administration. There is no way of knowing, for instance, whether periodic IB field despatches about the arms build-up inside the Golden Temple were sent, and if so, if they were taken at all seriously, by those who matter in the Ministry. Before the 1977 elections, a series of IB reports from Rae Bareilly supposedly suggested that Mrs Gandhi should visit the constituency and explain publicly the exigencies and excesses of the Emergency. It would appear that none of these were brought to her notice.

As things stand, the IB is primarily used, by whoever happens to be in power, to keep track of the political opposition, to feed it with disinformation and spread confusion in its ranks--that is, when it is not used for forecasting election results, baiting foreigners, journalists and bureaucrats, and such other sterile capers. As one senior IB official ruefully comments, "All I need do to get a Padma Shri is to tail Mrs X and Mr Y (naming two prominent Opposition leaders) for a year."

The CBI, too, is fast degenerating into an instrument of political harassment and vendetta. Originally conceived and structured as a highly specialized and sophisticated investigative agency, it has two separate cadres to deal with general and economic offences. Since it notionally enjoys a fair measure of flexibility in selecting its targets of action, it can, if it chooses, prove invaluable to State governments in detecting and curbing a wide array of individual and social criminal behaviour. The CBI has a reputation for thoroughness and single-mindedness which has stuck to it, unimpaired by the motivated labours it frequently has to undertake. The prospect of a CBI inquiry still strikes terror in trade and industry circles, and induces, if not rectitude, at least frantic efforts at straightening out papers. One recalls the suicide two years ago of the chief executive of a private firm in Bombay, and another suffering a heart attack, after successive CBI raids on their offices. A Calcutta businessman paced the corridors of Udyog Bhavan for six months in 1975 fearing a probe into a suspected misdirection of imported raw material.

## Corruption

For much the same reason, the CBI lends itself easily to charges of corruption and witch-hunting, of bounding the innocent and letting the real sharks off the hook. In 1975, an IAS officer was suspended and proceeded against for the unexplained presence in his flat of some electronic equipment and whisky of foreign origin. Later, in 1977, someone else got away with several kilos of gold, on the strength of a princely father-in-law turned M.P.

The CBI's track record is even worse in respect of general offences. The Bobby case in Patna, the Atwal murder in Amritsar, and numerous other unsolved mysteries crown CBI files, and here too political considerations, rather than the interests of justice, usually determine the outcome of months and years of intensive toil and investigation.

It is time, therefore, that a thorough-going, high-level inquiry is instituted into the working of our intelligence agencies, to determine how best they can be made to serve the country's needs of internal and external safety. Lack of coordination and mismanagement (adversely noted by the Santhanam Committee set up by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1962), absence of accountability to Parliament (present in the U.K. and USA), and progressive politicization are among the more obvious malaises that affect and minimize their effectiveness, and deserve immediate correction. Methods of recruitment and training certainly bear improvement and change--an open-ended system of induction, from walks of life other than the police, could be considered. Pooling of resources and information between the three major agencies--theoretically done even now, but inoperative because of strong institutional rivalries--and the State governments' apparati of intelligence would help maximize returns on investments and personnel.

The use of modern equipment including computerized data storage and retrieval systems, seems imperative, and new techniques of investigation must replace old and outmoded ones--the Naxalite movement and Punjab offer enough illustrations of the inefficacy of traditional methods like infiltration and subversion from within.

In fine, we can afford and support a forward-looking, fast-acting and expensive intelligence cover only if it can really preserve and protect the fruits of our hard-earned freedom and national integrity, not surrender them lightly to fanatics, traitors and worse.

CSO: 5650/0044

## COMMISSION APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE GANDHI ASSASSINATION

## Few Precedents

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 13 Nov 84 pp 1, 9

[Text] New Delhi, November 12--Mr Justice M.P. Thakkar, a sitting member of the supreme court bench, has been appointed to head the commission to inquire into the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi by two members of her security guard.

The terms of reference of the commission have not yet been announced, but it is understood that the inquiry will cover all the ramifications of a possible conspiracy to murder the Prime Minister, including its foreign connections.

Another important aspect to be probed is expected to be the security set-up at the Prime Minister's residence when the murder took place and the lapses committed by various individuals.

Nothing definitely is known what happened at the Prime Minister's residence on the fateful morning of October 31 when two members of the PM's security force were reported to have gunned down Mrs Gandhi. No official version of the incident has so far been given out although it was promised at one stage by the home ministry.

It was reported that one of the assassins, Beant Singh, was shot dead by the commando guard after the incident. The other assassin, Satwant Singh, was seriously injured and hospitalised. There were reports of a third assassin, but it was not confirmed.

The Union cabinet, under Mr Rajiv Gandhi, decided last week to institute a judicial inquiry into the murder and set up a special machinery to do the investigation. The investigation machinery is in the process of being set up.

There have not been many inquiries of this kind in the world and therefore the commission will not have many precedents to go by. One famous inquiry was instituted by the U.S. government into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the Warren commission was appointed.

Mr Justice Thakkar told reporters today that in conducting the inquiry he would have to fall back on his experience as a judge and his "vision of the world as a man." He said the tragedy was a great setback to Indian democracy and the entire nation would grieve this unprecedented event.

He said he would do his best to get to the truth. It was a tremendous responsibility "and I pray to God to give me the strength and wisdom. I accept the appointment with a great sense of urgency and humility and I will perform my duty honestly, conscientiously and to the best of my ability."

The home ministry, meanwhile, has been going about to constitute the special investigation machinery. Mr S. Anand Ram, director-general of CISF has been appointed to head the team. He is one of the seniourmost police officers. He has been given the power to choose the members of the team but it is understood that the bulk of them will come from the CBI.

The team will be assisted by different intelligence and law-enforcing agencies like the crime branch of the Delhi police, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing. It will assist the inquiry commission by providing it with raw material. The team has already started work.

The commission will have to go through a mass of records and other evidence and familiarise itself with the material relating to the inquiry. It will also have to examine a large number of witnesses.

UNI adds: Home ministry sources said on Monday that there would be "no duplication" in the work of the commission and the special investigation team led by Mr Anand Ram. There would, however, be "some linkages," between the commission and the investigating machinery. Some of the material collected by Mr Anand Ram could be utilised by the commission, the sources said.

The decision to appoint a commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1956, to inquire into the murder of Mrs Gandhi was taken by the Union cabinet early this month.

Chandigarh (PTI): Sleuths investigating the assassination of Mrs Gandhi were believed to have identified some persons in Chandigarh and Punjab as associates of sub-inspector Beant Singh, one of the two assassins of the former Prime Minister.

Official sources who declined to give details about these persons, however, said on Monday that those identified were besides the three brothers and friends of the killed sub-inspector, who were earlier taken into custody for interrogation from Chandigarh and Maloya village near here.

A senior Chandigarh police official told PTI on Monday that the local police was not connected with the investigation of the case being done by a high level team headed by Mr S. Anand Ram, special commissioner of police.

Sources said that some relatives of Mrs Bimal Kaur Khalsa, wife of the slain sub-inspector, were also being interrogated.

The sources said that the circumstances of Mrs Bimal Kaur becoming an Amritdhari Sikh were also being investigated since it was unusual for Sikh women to suffix "Khalsa" to their names.

Investigations reveal that Beant Singh had not given any hint of his plans to assassinate Mrs Gandhi to any of his relatives.

The family members, sources said, were not aware of Beant Singh having taken any vow at the Akal Takht in Amritsar to shoot down the Prime Minister as reported in a section of the press on Monday.

Chandigarh police sources said that none of the brothers of the slain sub-inspector had a criminal record.

#### Terms of Reference

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 21 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 20--The M.P. Thakkar Commission has been asked to inquire whether there was any conspiracy behind the assassination of Indira Gandhi, reports UNI. A Government notification today, setting out the five-point terms of reference, directs the panel to submit its report within six months.

Besides going into the events leading to the assassination, the commission will look into any lapse or dereliction of duty in the security of the late Prime Minister as well as in providing medical attention to her.

It will examine whether the crime could have been averted on October 21 and whether any person or persons or agencies were responsible for conceiving, preparing and planning the assassination. The commission will also go into all the ramifications.

The commission, set up under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, might, if it deems fit, submit interim reports. According to the notification, the Government feels that it is necessary to appoint a commission for the purpose of inquiring into "a definite matter of public importance--the assassination of Indira Gandhi."

Mr Justice Thakkar, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court, will have his headquarters in Delhi. The commission has been given powers to summon witnesses and records and to prosecute people for its own contempt.

The following are the terms of reference: (a) the sequence of events leading to, and all the facts relating to, the assassination of the late Prime Minister; (b) whether the crime could have been averted and whether there were any lapses or dereliction of duty in this regard on the part of any of the individuals on security duty at the time of the crime and other

individuals responsible for the security of the late Prime Minister; (c) deficiencies, if any, in the security system and arrangements as prescribed or as operated in practice which might have facilitated the commission of the crime; (d) deficiencies, if any, in the procedures and measures as prescribed, or as operated in practice in attending to, and providing medical attention to the late Prime Minister after the commission of crime, and whether there was any lapse or dereliction of duty in this regard on the part of individuals responsible for providing such medical attention; and (e) whether any person or persons or agencies were responsible for conceiving, preparing and planning the assassination and whether there was any conspiracy in this behalf and, if so, all its ramifications.

The commission may also recommend corrective remedies and measures that need to be taken for the future with respect to the matters specified in Clause (D).

The commission shall submit its report to the Central Government as soon as possible but not later than six months. The commission may, if it deems fit, make interim reports to the Central Government before the said date on any of the above matters.

CSO: 5650/0043

POST-ASSASSINATION CONDITIONS IN PUNJAB REPORTED

'Undercurrent of Anger'

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Nov 84 pp 1, 15

[Article by L.K. Sharma]

[Text] The relief over Punjab escaping an immediate backlash to the post-assassination riots elsewhere fades as one stays on in Amritsar.

Beneath the foreboding calm runs the undercurrent of resentment and anger against the Centre, not inarticulate and often hysterical. The air is thick with suspicion and bitterness. There is fear lurking in the eyes and despair underlining the words. When will the pall of uncertainty be lifted? everyone wants to know. A sense of insecurity has gripped all regardless of sect and creed.

"It is all very dark and I am depressed," says an Amritsar industrialist (Sikh) who keeps getting telephone calls from his anxious relations in cities outside Punjab. "One wants to help but what can one do," he bemoans.

"There is petrol and there is a lighted candle. One does not know when the two could come together," says a prominent citizen (Hindu) of Jalandhar. "All have failed us, the Congress and the opposition." A leading businessman (Hindu) is convinced that Punjab cannot be ruled by politicians. "It should be ruled as Pakistan is being ruled."

More than five months have lapsed since the army operation but on approaching the periphery of the Golden Temple, the first thing one notices is an elderly Sikh woman feeling with her fingers the smoky walls of the Gury Nanak Niwas. She does it with an intensity that is frightening.

A senior Sikh lawyer, an avowed socialist, says "they could have damaged any other gurdwara but why did they do it to the Golden Temple." And he is agnostic.



Operation Blue Star: The feeling of grievous hurt caused by the operation Blue Star had hardly subsided when the post-assassination riots came. The common Sikh does not speak the language of separatism but there are any number of Sikhs in intellectual professions who throw dark hints about separatism gaining ground rapidly.

There is some indication of a new awareness among the Sikhs of the common stakes in the unity and integrity of the country and of the things having gone too far. They have started reassessing the role of those elements who appear to be seeking not conciliation but confrontation.

One does hear the voice of sanity and sees the face of moderation but only occasionally. The trend of self-introspection is feeble and it is too early to say whether it can make a dent into the competitive militancy of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and Akali leaders.

A professional Sikh in Amritsar feels that they (Akalis) would not be able to "give a garam slogan." The people are not for it (hard-line).

The enthusiasm of the Punjabi for growth and development is intense and the state has already suffered economically during the past three years. May be, the basic good sense of the common man will bring pressure on Sikh and Hindu politicians.

Has there been any change in the Akali Dal's approach? Since the leaders are under detention, there is no clue to this. The third-ranking and fourth-ranking leaders who are conducting the affairs of the SGPC and the Akali Dal give no reason to feel relieved.

The detained Akali leaders will consider the mood of their constituents. Is the average Sikh fed up with violence and interruption in his economic activity? Even the farmer who was told by the Akali leaders that he had nothing to lose has been hit because there are no trucks available for sending his potatoes from the Hoshiarpur district to the distant markets. The Sikh industrialist is unable to sell his goods and has to suspend production.

The urban Sikhs have relations all over the country. The Jat Sikhs in villages have their relations working as truck and taxi drivers who were hit most by the disturbances.

Voices are being raised even against the Sikh high priests. Polite memoranda are being addressed asking them to keep out of politics. The Sikhs in other states are being privately advised to delink themselves from the Punjab politics.

"I had told my Sikh friends in Bombay when they were sending money to Bhindranwale that they would not be able to face two lean and thin Shiv Sainiks," says a Sikh leader.

A former Congress leader (Sikh) interested in art and literature tells his coreligionists: "You were Badshah. You used to walk with your head upright, you dominated all spheres of activity. Tusan hi apna beda gharak keeta hai."

He is critical of the calibre and role of the high priests. "But you can't quote me, otherwise I will be declared a tankhaiya."

Complex Problem: The problem is quite complex. The Sikh community is rudderless and leaderless. Its priests are under pressure and the Akali leaders in jail are vulnerable to public anger for their refusal to lay down their lives at the time of the crackdown by the army. Sacrifice and martyrdom is Sikh tradition.

The moderates among the Akalis in the recent past did not assert themselves even to save their own face and one does not know how they will behave now.

The rift in the SGPC and the Akali Dal has to be assessed with great care. Some political shadow boxing has always preceded the SGPC presidential elections for which Mr G.S. Tohra, the current chief now under detention, is in the fray. In the past, except when they were in power, the Akalis managed to keep their differences and dissidence under control.

The Akali dissidence cannot help the government. It is the trade union-management conflict situation in which the multiplicity of trade unions leads to the closure of the factory. The government will have to ensure that Akali factions as well as the opposition groups are a party to a national consensus on Punjab, if such a thing is feasible.

The Akali leaders may be in an embarrassing situation for not having fought against the military might, but they are the ones with whom any business has to be done. The Akali Dal is the political instrument of Jat Sikhs who are in the forefront of the power struggle in the state.

A carnage has been averted but feelings have hardened and bitterness increased, says a political worker. In the current atmosphere, the initial collapse of the law and order machinery in Delhi is generally seen in Punjab not as a failure but a devilish design.

"After this, the talk of healing touch has lost all meaning, says a Sikh university teacher. The widespread resentment calls for a prompt response from the new government which, all have convinced themselves, would not come before the Lok Sabha elections. The credibility of the political leaders and the Union government is abysmally low.

The magnitude of the crisis is such that the sooner the new Prime Minister takes an initiative in this regard the better. This is the general view. The Centre must explore the possibility now even without waiting till the elections. If the opposition parties do not cooperate, or if the Akalis prove difficult, let the people of Punjab know the facts. They are being fed on rumours.

The Issue: The issue must be redefined and an immediate effort made by the Centre to restore its credibility. Because of rounds and rounds of futile talks earlier, the impression has gained ground that it is the Centre which does not want to do anything. "Bibi ne kuch nahin keeta" is the comment one hears from those who have little sympathy with Akali militancy and perhaps do not even know what the Akalis are fighting for.

The government has to deal with terrorists, the Akali leaders and Sikh masses. Why should there be the feeling among the masses that for electoral considerations, the government would not do anything for some time. The government may fail in its fresh attempt. The Sikh masses have to be convinced only of the sincerity of the negotiating effort. It is the right psychological moment for trying.

The earlier approach to crisis management which was marked by drift may have succeeded in some cases. An understanding of the Jat Sikh psychology will make it appear unsuitable for dealing with Punjab.

Playing for Time: The Jat Sikh who forms the backbone of the Akali Dal is a man of action. He goes straight to the point and has no time for theorising. He can take a firm "no" to his demand as the answer. He understands the language of firmness. One thing that he cannot stand is prevarication. Unfortunately, the general impression in Punjab is that the Centre just kept playing for time. If some demands are not negotiable it has to be said forcefully, but if others are acceptable why delay action on flimsy excuses. Let the Akalis come up with fresh demands but the government should clear itself in the public eye.

In the Indian ethos, often, doing the right thing turns out to be the best strategy and cunningness misfires.

The fact that Punjab was not on fire by November 3 or 4 has a lesson that is often forgotten. More than a grand design in the South Block in New Delhi, what the country needs in an hour of crisis is 400 and odd dedicated and efficient district collectors.

The district collectors need officers in the state capitals who do not await clearance for the shoot-at-sight orders from higher-ups and do not pass the buck on to the district officer asking him to deal with the situation "firmly but tactfully."

It is difficult to attribute the earlier total administrative collapse in Punjab to the absence of a political settlement between the government and the Akalis. The administration cannot do its best in an atmosphere of political turmoil but surely it does not have to abdicate its primary responsibilities. How could the truck loads of arms arrive from Pakistan?

The revamped administration in Punjab has fortunately not mixed up its two functions of assisting the Centre in possible political negotiations and of maintaining law and order to the best of its capability.

Results: The capability itself has been enhanced as a result of careful planning and implementation and has started showing results. Some of the cases of violence by terrorists are being solved, the demoralised police force is being re-trained and given new weaponry and mobility and an efficient communications systems all to match the resources that scattered band of terrorists command.

The response time has been reduced considerably and an incident is reported to all concerned within 15 to 20 minutes. The other day when undertrial extremists were snatched away by fellow terrorists, two top police officers were on the scene in no time and all agencies were mobilised to plug the escape routes. Anti-smuggling operation is also now a joint action.

Pat for Governor: Constant monitoring at the highest level in Chandigarh does not mean that a district officer has to wait his instruction all the time. It only means that when he takes a decision, assistance is available to him if necessary. Those working with the new governor, Mr K.T. Satara-wala, say his approach is very straightforward and effective. "There are things about which the governor knows he can do nothing. But if the prisoners escape from a bus, he wants more prison vans to be deployed immediately," according to one senior civil servant. There is accountability at all levels and local initiative is given full play.

The administrative morale has been restored to some extent after a careful screening and weeding out of undesirable elements in government service. The attempt has been to avoid a general witch-hunt. The army, while showing its presence has been conducting anti-terrorist operation along with the police. Searches are done on specific information and after taking the village leaders into confidence.

However, combating terrorism is not just matching weapons with weapons and mobility with mobility. The large body of student activists who were rendered useless by the host of colleges that suddenly cropped up in Punjab more than a decade ago were attracted to Naxalism. The fact that later they went over to the Bhindranwale camp showed that they had no ideological commitment and were looking for adventure and were driven by frustration.

Decisions on vocationalisation of education must be taken by the state governor at emergency meeting called to review law and order. The issue is too urgent to be left to the education department.

A string of agro-industrial units is what Punjab needs as much as the police wireless sets that are being acquired. The breeding ground for terrorists has to be reclaimed.

## Looming Economic Crisis

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 23 Nov 84 p 9

[Text] Patiala, November 22--The uncertain conditions prevailing for the last two years have pushed Punjab, one of the most prosperous states, to the brink of an economic crisis. This is the finding of a survey conducted by the Punjab, Haryana, Delhi chamber of commerce and industry to assess the health of the industry.

In this uncertain scenario, there has been considerable talk about might of capital from the state to other parts of the country, large number of steel rerolling mills from Mandi Gobindgarh (Patiala district) are stated to have been attracted to Gujarat because in Punjab these were reportedly operating at less than 40 percent of the installed capacity. Haryana has been receiving numerous inquiries, especially during the last 12 months or so, regarding allotment of land at important industrial centres like Panipat, Kundi and Faridabad.

These unfortunate happenings have demoralised the business community and crippled the economy of the state. In several cases, small-scale units and traders have become sick. The survey says that the situation in that state calls for a crisis management.

Both industry and trade, the survey says, have been affected alike by uncertainty. Industry and trade are interdependent sectors and the effects on the other. Businessmen stopped visiting Punjab and supply of goods and raw material from outside the state was discontinued. This resulted in acute shortage of essential raw material and inputs. In fact, the state got totally cut off from the rest of the country.

On several occasions, banks were closed down for days together, clearing houses were also closed and cheques piled up in thousands. In the absence of clearing of cheques, the wholesalers and manufacturers stopped extending credit to the business community in the state which resulted in an unprecedented cash shortage in trade and industry. It was reported that the banks had a shortfall of 35 to 40 percent in their business and bank transactions.

Another problem the business had to face, according to the survey, was the shortage of labour. The uncertainty of the situation had its effect on the labourers, most of whom come from the states of U.P., Bihar, Rajasthan and Orissa. Due to insecurity, the labourers fled from Punjab to their home states. The shortage of labour was felt not only by industry and trade but also in the agricultural sector. The worst-affected industries include the woolen hosiery industry which had export orders worth more than Rs 60 crores and the cotton textile industry which is labour-intensive. Light engineering industry was also affected on this account.

Ultimately, in the absence of raw material, labour and marketing outlets, industrial units were forced to cut down production. In other words, there was on the one hand, a breakdown of the marketing channels and on the other, a significant cut down in production.

Exports from the state have been equally affected. The existing export orders are not being fulfilled because of the fall in production. Moreover, future export orders are not coming in because of the fear of the importers that export commitments may not be fulfilled. The sports goods industry is amongst the worst sufferers in this regard. Reduced production and frequent closure of industry and trade channels also created unemployment for the daily wage earners.

The survey points out that over the past few years, the state witnessed recurring power shortages and on several occasions the industry was totally closed down for want of power. This affected development of both industry and agriculture. Coal too, has always been in short supply.

Referring to the effects of the recent happenings in Punjab, the survey says that the worst sufferer in the state has been the important town of Amritsar. This town had a flourishing hotel industry, catering mostly middle class traders and visitors from various places. This industry has been the hardest hit. The city has three three-star hotels, having an occupancy rate of 70 percent before the Akali Dal launched its agitation. It has now come down to about 15 percent. With the sharp fall in the number of visitors, the smaller hotels are indeed facing considerable hardships, and a number of them have already downed their shutters.

In the context of the prevailing situation, the chamber took up certain issues with the Reserve Bank and the state government for improving the health of the industry. The result is that some steps have been taken by the authorities in the right direction.

The chamber, however, feels there are definite visible signs of recovery of the state's economy. Some of the agencies concerned have taken some welcome steps to boost the morale of the trade, industry and agricultural sectors. Raw material like steel and pig iron have started moving but not adequately. At the instance of the chamber, the Punjab financial corporation has decided to postpone the recovery of instalments until February 1985. The recovery of the interest amount has also been postponed in deserving cases and the rate of interest has been reduced by 1 percent.

CSO: 4600/1185

## RAJIV SPEAKS AT DELHI MEMORIAL MEETING

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Nov 84 p 1

[Excerpt] New Delhi, November 19--The Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, said here today that the assassination of his mother and former prime minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, was part of a deep-rooted international conspiracy to destabilise and disintegrate the country.

Addressing a well-attended public meeting organised by the Delhi administration in memory of the late prime minister at the Boat Club, Mr Gandhi said the wide ramifications of the murder were clear from press reports. The aim of the conspiracy was not to kill an individual but to divide the nation.

The public meeting was part of the day-long observance of Mrs Gandhi's birth anniversary. It was also the first public meeting to be addressed by the Prime Minister since he assumed office. Mr Gandhi had also participated in a series of homage functions in the morning, starting with a floral tribute to Mrs Gandhi at her samadhi in Shantivana, the opening of an exhibition depicting her life and work and opening of a permanent children's recreation complex--Appu Ghar--at Pragati Maidan.

In a voice charged with emotion, Mr Gandhi said: "We have to avenge her murder not by displaying anger, passion or hatred but by building a strong and united India, which was the dream of Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Mrs Gandhi."

India had demonstrated to the world that the foundation of the country was very strong and could withstand the pressure and other evil designs of the external divisive forces which wanted to weaken the nation, Mr Gandhi asserted. "An assassin's bullet cannot destroy this country," which had come to be regarded as one of the few nations left in the world where true democracy existed.

## Call for Peace

He said that some forces were trying to help the secessionists. "We shall have to identify and completely destroy such forces." This would be possible if the people helped strengthen unity by maintaining peace and communal harmony. By displaying anger or passion "we might play into the hands of the very forces that we want to destroy."

Mr Gandhi called upon the people to realise the need of the hour and follow the path shown by Pandit Nehru and Mrs Gandhi to help strengthen the foundation on which the edifice of the greatest democracy in the world stands.

The Prime Minister also emphasised the need for enforcing discipline in politics and administration to expeditiously implement the policies and programmes aimed at ameliorating the lot of the poor. "We have had little time to do so since the elections have been announced," he added.

However, during this short period his government had started acting in this direction and would work earnestly to achieve the broad national goals. To illustrate his point, he cited the announcement of subsidies for the weaker community which, he said, would go a long way to reduce their misery.

Mr Gandhi began his speech by mentioning that this was the first occasion when the nation was observing Mrs Gandhi's birth anniversary. He said she had acquired such a stature that she would "remain with us even when she is physically not with us." Similarly, 35 years back Mahatma Gandhi had fallen to an assassin's bullets. "Both of them have become martyrs and will continue to inspire and lead us in these difficult times," he said.

#### Indira's Spirit

"Indiraji's spirit and strength will remain with us. It will continue to strengthen and electrify us to march forward and build a strong united India. When an individual like Mrs Gandhi reaches a certain stature the person ceases to be all that important and what is really important is her ideas, programmes, ideology and policies and what kind of challenges she faced and how," Mr Gandhi said.

Referring to the progress made by the country during the last 37 years, he said: "We can proudly claim that we are a truly independent nation. Our leaders have strengthened the country so ably that today we are in a position to meet the challenges thrown in our path."

Earlier, the President, Mr Zail Singh, and Mr Rajiv Gandhi led the nation in paying tributes to Mrs Indira Gandhi at her samadhi at Shantivana.

CSO: 4600/1185



## RETIRED GENERAL NOTES THREAT FROM PAKISTAN

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 20 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, November 17, (PTI)--Pakistan would continue to be India's main security problem in the next decade because of its uncompromising attitude on the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India and its "passionate desire" to avenge the humiliating defeat suffered by its armed forces in 1971, according to Lt-Gen (retd) Z.C. Bakshi.

Delivering the sixth Bhai Parmanand memorial lecture on "Challenges to national security in the next decade" here today, Lt-Gen Bakshi said Pakistan's political identification as the torch-bearer of the Islamic world, its strong political and military links with China, its affinity with extra regional powers unfriendly to India and the covert help being given to terrorists and anti-national elements in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir were all constant threats to India's security and stability."

He also spoke of Pakistan's nuclear capability and said it appeared fairly certain that within a period of three to four years Pakistan would be able to produce nuclear bombs.

With the acquisition of nuclear capability Pakistan would pose a credible nuclear threat, which would lend a new dimension to India's national security, he added.

'Front-Line State'

Lt-Gen Bakshi said Pakistan had never hesitated in the past to be the first to use military force to resolve its territorial dispute with India.

"Indeed, use of force to gain an initial advantage appears to be a dominant factor of Pakistan's doctrine. It is, therefore, vital that we should take immediate measures to acquire nuclear capability which can act as a deterrent against a nuclear attack," he said.

He said as a result of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan had become a front-line state in American perceptions. The U.S. also relied on Pakistan's assistance in ensuring stability in the vital Gulf region

where a serious situation had arisen due to the Iraq-Iran war and armed struggle going on in Lebanon.

According to Lt-Gen Bakshi, Pakistan had become militarily stronger than it had ever been since its inception following military and economic aid flowing from the U.S.A.

CSO: 4600/1185

MUSAVI: U.S. EMBASSY OCCUPATION STABILIZED REVOLUTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] On the eve of the sixth anniversary of the seizure of the spies nest by Muslim students and followers of the imam's thoughts, Eng Mir Hosein Musavi, the prime minister, yesterday afternoon visited the different parts of this spy center. He talked with the Muslim students about different measures taken for the restoration of the collected documents. In this visit, the prime minister first met with a few of the Muslim students and talked about different methods for restoring the shredded documents and the powdered microfiche obtained from the spies nest.

Then two of the Muslim students reported on the different phases of restoration of the shredded documents and powdered microfiche and the steps taken to identify those who were collaborating with the spy station of the CIA in Iran on the basis of the restored documents. These efforts are undertaken by the Muslim students in order to compile the history and methods of the spies nest seizure and the events that occurred during this anti-oppression movement. They requested that our nation's responsible authorities, officials and the mass media describe, explain and propagandize these published documents in a positive way, and through the proper use of these documents take measures to present and introduce them to society.

One of the Muslim students noted that the documents obtained from the spy nest pertained to the U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense and the CIA spy station in Iran and said: "Up to now, more than 2,000 sheets of these documents, which were shredded and powdered during the occupancy of the spies nest by CIA agents, have been restored. A selfless group of the Islamic revolution and Muslim students helped in this task."

He added: "Through the restoration of these documents from the spies nest, many individuals who were collaborating with the CIA organization in Iran have been identified, and the responsible authorities have taken steps to pursue and capture these individuals."

He also said: "So far, 41 volumes containing 1,739 documents from the spies nest have been published, and of this number, 262 documents are related to CIA activities in Iran."

In emphasizing the students' efforts to restore the rest of the available documents, he said: "In the near future, nearly seven volumes of books about the meetings of Russian and American officials, U.S. and Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence activities and Soviet economic affairs, as well as documents regarding political asylum for citizens of Eastern bloc nations, will be published."

At the conclusion of the Muslim students' report, Prime Minister Eng Musavi issued some guidelines about the use of advanced scientific methods for the restoration of the documents obtained from the spies nest, increased student power for continuing research on these documents and the dispatch of volumes of published documents obtained from the spies nest to embassies of the Islamic Republic of Iran abroad. He emphasized that the mass media are able to play the best role in presenting these documents to society.

At the conclusion of this meeting, the prime minister visited the documents room, the restoration room for shredded documents, the telex room, the room for restoration of the powdered microfiche and the secret conference room of the spies nest, and at each stop one of the students answered questions. The prime minister, Engr Musavi, at the conclusion of this visit, talked with reporters of the Central News Unit about the values and importance of the seizure of the spy nest and especially about its political dimensions and stated: "I think the most complete statement in this regard is that of the nation's imam, which called the occupation of the spies nest the beginning of the second revolution.

"In fact, today, when we stop and review the past few years of this event, we realize its effects on internal and foreign policy, which cleared the way for the eradication of U.S. influence in Iran. It seems that without the occupation of the spies nest, we would not have been able to stabilize our Islamic revolution and push forward. When we visit this complicated complex and see these very complicated systems, we realize the extent of their intended plots and the difficult task of the brothers in this regard; besides, we were unable in such a short spell to explain the important role of the occupation of the spies nest."

Then the prime minister talked about using the spies-nest documents to condemn America in international organizations especially the World Court in The Hague, and said: "Definitely these documents, which the fraternal students have used their unwavering efforts to restore, could have various applications. I think the most important thing is to show the activities of a superpower to the Third World. We are able to reveal through these documents obvious and unconcealed facts of how a superpower that has gained power through its materialistic strength and malicious thought has used the most complex methods to exercise its policy on an oppressed nation of the Third World.

"That is why all devout and interested groups must analyze and study these documents from their political point of view. The analysis of these documents and the book that these brothers are gradually publishing has a wide role in the political future of our nation. In these documents we find the facts that reveal aspects of our multifaceted economic affairs, how the previous regime was dependent on the United States and the kinks and twists of U.S. policy

inside the country in regard to various cultural, social, political and economic division. Among these documents are small parts that could be useful but have not yet been carefully studied and which, in my opinion, could be used at the World Court, especially in regard to the arms purchases."

Engr Musavi then talked about the presentation of guidelines and use of the latest scientific methods to uncover the secrets of these documents and restore them and added: "Although these brothers have taken the lead in this area, I had the impression that their work is to paste the shredded pages together and publish them as documents, except for the very tiny powdered microfiche which shows that there are documents about 1 millimeter or smaller on them. These brothers with their new innovations have separated this microfiche and have used it in their apparatus. Each of these tiny pieces of microfiche seems to contain one or two 3-square-centimeter documents. These brothers intend to connect them together in the second phase of their operation and necessary steps have been taken in this regard. We have seen that some of these documents reveal the names of some organizations. Definitely this work is a gigantic step toward discovering the method of U.S. spying in our country, especially when we realize that the most sensitive documents of the U.S. spies nest seems to be on this microfiche."

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CSO: 4640/145

# TRAVEL TO BE CLEARED THROUGH MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC GUIDANCE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 24 Nov 84 p 18

[Text] Mashhad--The Ministry of Islamic Guidance will supply the private sector with building materials and the necessary funds to provide lodging and other guest facilities in the deprived areas of the country. Furthermore, every week 2,000 applicants will be given permission to travel to Syria for the purpose of making pilgrimage to the holy shrines. In addition to this number, nearly 500 people make regular trips to Syria either by land or air every week.

The deputy minister of excursions and pilgrimage affairs of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, who came to Mashhad to visit and investigate the problems of the Khorasan's Islamic Guidance offices, in addition to the above statement said in an interview with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY (IRNA): "Excursions and sightseeing are encouraged in Islam. On the one hand, in the Koran they are treated as a matter of basic belief, enhancing one's foresight and life experiences. Therefore, in order to introduce the Islamic revolution to the people of the world, the general public of the world is invited to visit Islamic Iran so that the falsehood and mendacity of the mass media and the sinister plots of world arrogance can be rendered useless." He also stated: "Excursion tours through Asia and Africa are given priority since the revolutionary potential of the people of these two continents far exceeds that of the American or European peoples."

He then cited the high cost of travel and the attendant airline and flight problems for trips to Asian and African countries as the major difficulties facing the excursions and pilgrimage affairs department of the Ministry of the Islamic Guidance and said: "Any visit to Iran by people from other lands should be guided. On the other hand, the expansion of world travel calls for the creation of necessary accommodations and guest facilities, the preparation and bolstering of existing hotels along highways and throughout the towns and cities of the country. The Ministry of Islamic Guidance, to encourage the private sector to set up the necessary facilities in certain areas where lack of such accommodations is felt most, will through the cooperation of the banks take proper measures to provide the necessary credits and to procure building materials for appropriate applicants."

The deputy minister of excursions and pilgrimage affairs of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance then referred to the construction problems facing that ministry

and said: "Since the reception and building facilities of this ministry were used unlawfully by the previous regime as a result of improper education, for certain reasons the general public used to attack these facilities with animosity. After the victory of the Islamic revolution, since some of the organs and institutions of the Islamic revolution were faced with a shortage of building facilities, they occupied these buildings, so that up to 70 such units are presently at the disposal of the Islamic revolution organs. Although the Islamic Revolution Guardian Corps pays us rent and this rent solves some of the financial problems of this ministry, the issue of the shortage of reception facilities nevertheless persists. However, we hope to resolve these problems through the formation of a three-member delegation that will propose some solutions in the future."

In conclusion, he emphasized that the formation of any travel caravan must be under the supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and said: "If some of the people who surreptitiously used to organize travel caravans continue to carry on their unlawful and illegal business, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance will deal with these violators with the utmost severity and will turn them over to the proper judicial authorities so that they are brought to justice."

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CSO: 4640/162

## OFFICIALS WARN AGAINST MISTREATMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Nov 84 p 3

[Text] Karaj KEYHAN correspondent--Under the imamate of Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Ali Sharifi, the Friday imam of Karaj and with the participation of many of our Muslim compatriots in that city, the religious-political, enemy-defeating Friday prayers were held in that city. Hojjat ol-Eslam Malekzadeh, in charge of the Islamic Republic Party of Karaj, was the speaker at the pre-Friday prayer sermons and talked about the significance and ramifications of the Islamic revolution. Thereafter, the Friday imam of Karaj, Hojjat ol-Eslam Sharifi, talked about piety and the character of pious men in detail. In part of his speech he referred to the prophet Ali's (peace be upon him) statements, and said: A pious man is he who listens well and follows good advice properly. He will invite people to do honest and pious deeds and warns them to keep away from vice, obscene acts and behavior, calumny and malicious accusations.

As for speedy investigations and fair treatment of the general public, he warned the officials in charge and said: The responsible authorities in public offices should keep away from peevishness and hot temperedness. They should try to do as the imam of the nation has indicated: behave well toward the people since the people are the guardians of this revolution. He then referred to the martyrdom of Ali (peace be upon him), the commander of the troops, Mahdi Zeyn ol-Din, and his brother and the martyrdom of the Sunni cleric, Mulla Reza Rashidi. Furthermore, he congratulated the attainment of the status of martyrdom by Mulla Reza Rashidi and others on the intercession of the Iman of the Age and his lawful deputy Khomeyni, and duly expressed his condolences at their demise.

In his second speech, the Friday imam of Karaj made reference to the lives of the Prophet Mohammad (may God send upon him greetings and peace) and Imam Hassan Mojtaba (peace be upon him) and their far-reaching and extensive methodical knowledge and stated: Today, in a sensitive moment of history, we have chosen only one path and that is the magnificent words of the Prophet Mohammad (may God bless him) whose last words in his last days on this earth were: I trust you with two precious and rare attributes, one is the Holy Book, the Koran, and the other is the household and the Holy Family of God. As long as all Muslims resort to the teachings of these sources they will never be misguided. He went on to say: The only person who can save Islam from the clutches of the aggressors and the rule of the great powers is Imam Khomeyni.



In conclusion, the Friday imam of Karaj made some statements about the Mobilization Week of the oppressed, the formation of the seminar of the Relief Committee of the imam in Karaj and the bombardment of the Lebanese Shiite's regions by Israel. (Karaj--KEYHAN correspondent)

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CSO: 4640/162

# EMIGRE PAPER ANALYZES ROLE OF ARMY, FEAR OF CLERICAL REGIME

London KEYHAN in Persian 6 Dec 84 p 1

[London] KEYHAN weekly in Persian; founder and publisher Dr Mesbahzadeh]

[Text] Yashasin Azarbaijan (praise to Azarbaijan) is a phrase that forms on the lips of Iranian patriots on 12 December of every year, meaning the day Azarbaijan was liberated. In this phrase, whether spoken in Azari or Farsi, there is a world of secrets and hidden meanings.

Praise to Azarbaijan means thanks to God that he preserved and will preserve our sacred land during the most difficult times and the blackest days of our history.

Praise to Azarbaijan means worship of a group of the great Iranian nation which from the first days of our sacred land's history, from the days of the Medes, were, are, and will be the fiercest and bravest guards of Iran's independence and greatness; meaning praise to a people who have never lowered their heads to tyranny.

Praise to Azarbaijan means long live freedom, which is the dearest, loftiest, and most glorious of human values; freedom which is as important for the continuance of human life and development as clean air.

Praise to Azarbaijan means death to colonialism and imperialism which were and are the continuers of the ancient system of slavery; colonialism and imperialism which we deem the enemies of national independence and freedom in whatever shape or form they appear.

Many contemporary historians recall 12 December as a miracle. The liberation of Azarbaijan and the stabilization of Iran's territorial integrity at the end of World War II was truly an exceptional occurrence. It was the only case in which Stalin's forces left territory they had occupied during the war.

How did this miracle, an exception to an historical rule, come about? The first factor in our victory was that the Iranian nation was able to resist the enemy unitedly, mobilizing all its institutions. The monarchical institution showed that the shameful experiences of Golestan and Torkmanchai would not be repeated when the shah uttered the famous sentence "I would cut off my hand but not sign a document of Azarbaijan's separation." The clerical

institution unitedly issued a fatva stating that defense of the homeland was the highest duty, and thus showed that religion and patriotism not only are not contradictory values but can be indispensable to one another, contrary to what occurred during the Russian-Persian wars and what we observe of today's ruling clerics.

The Majlis, with such figures as Dr Mohammad Mossadeq, taking its turn in this crusade to liberate Azarbaijan, supported the government--an institution in the hands of Ahmad Qavvam, an experienced, patriotic statesman.

Other institutions, such as the press and the parties, (with the exception of the Tudeh Party which followed Soviet policy), also aided the united front of the monarchy, clergy, Majlis, and government in the attempt to liberate Azarbaijan. This front was complete with the support of society's traditional institutions, such as the tribes, the merchants and the guilds. In practice this front incorporated the entire Iranian nation, from the Arax River to Chabahar and from Sarakhs to Khorramshahr.

Defense of Iran's territorial integrity in those momentous days was not a goal or program limited purely to one institution, group, or class. Stalin saw himself facing the united resistance of the entire Iranian nation. In Iran, unlike the Baltic countries or the occupied territories of Poland, Romania and Germany, he was not facing a nationalist bourgeoisie which could easily be isolated, and thus cut off from other social forces, be crushed. In Iran, particularly in Azarbaijan itself, the poorest and most deprived of the suffering masses took up position against Stalin's puppet government. It was the Azarbaijani masses which shattered the framework of foreign tyranny and smoothed the way for the army's entry into Tabriz.

Logic dictates that each nation should at least learn from its own history and apply its learning in its life course. The liberation of Azarbaijan showed that Iran, even in those days of weakness and bewilderment, was able to gather a great force to resist an enemy's intrigues by mobilizing all its institutions, both traditional and modern. In 1946 it was not sufficient for the enemy, as an example, to defeat our army so that it would have no further obstacles on its path. Supposing the army eliminated, other institutions existed that could form cores of resistance. If the army were defeated, the monarchy would have resisted; if the monarchy were defeated, the clergy would have resisted; if the clergy were defeated, the tribes would have resisted; if the tribes were defeated, the merchants and guilds would have resisted; if the merchants and guilds were defeated, the Majlis and government and press, parties, universities...would have resisted. To put it otherwise, there were numerous strongholds to defend Iran's independence and territorial integrity. If one stronghold fell, another stronghold could stand on its own to resist by itself.

But in 1979 all these strongholds had been destroyed because not one of our institutions could stand on its own to fight independently. It was sufficient to bring down the monarchy to bring down the whole show.

Today Ayatollah Khomeyni has also created a situation in which no institution exists that can stand on its own. He has even practically annihilated the

clergy as an institution. Today Iran is more naked and helpless than at any other time, and were it not for the miraculous self-sacrifice of its children, God only knows what its fate would have been.

The most important lesson of 12 December is that gathering all the forces of a society into one super-institution--meaning transforming other institutions into empty vessels--means nothing other than disarmament of the entire society. For this reason, the Iran of the future--which, God willing, will be built in a context of freedom and welfare--must take shape on the principle of unity in diversity.

The principle of unity in diversity does not mean only that all the institutions, from the government and the Majlis to the parties, bazaar, press, universities, workers union, judiciary, etc, must be independent and self-reliant. The principle also means the recognition of diverse Iranian ethnic elements. The existence of numerous languages and dialects within our ancestral homeland is not only not a weakpoint but can be a strongpoint. For example, the Azari language and culture was born and bred in Iran, and it is natural that Iran should be the center and capital of this language and culture. In Iran we must form a society in which all the cultural talents of our nation's ethnic groups serve equally in the independence and greatness of Iran and the welfare and pride of its masses.

If we put idiotic chauvanism aside, we will see that Iran's cultural diversity can and must be the guarantor of our homeland's independence and territorial integrity. The experience in Azarbaijan showed that dividing Iran by spreading discord among its ethnic groups is not possible. Iraq's cowardly assault on Iran again confirmed this truth because Arabic-speaking Iranians in Khuzestan were the first people to take up arms to stand and fight the bloodthirsty enemy. Numerous attempts to create separatist movements among Iranian Kurds and Baluchis also met defeat, and today Kordistan and Baluchistan are among the most important centers of national resistance against the Ayatollah's anti-nationalist regime.

The Ayatollah's anti-nationalist regime naturally fears 12 December and is using all its might to prevent holding popular ceremonies celebrating this great day in Iranian history. This fear has several causes:

Firstly, from the first day of the proclamation of a "theocratic" republic, Azarbaijan over and over again has shown its opposition to a government of believers. There is no place for the Ayatollah's republic in Azarbaijan today.

Secondly, 12 December is also Army Day, and the republic has been and is the blood enemy of the Iranian army. The slaughter of officers and NCO's, the furloughing of soldiers, the plunder of arsenals, the closing of military industries, stopping purchase of needed weapons, and a concentrated program of insulting the army and its soldiers were at the head of the Ayatollah's priorities. Iraq's attack caused a temporary side-tracking of these priorities, but the republic's enmity to the army has not disappeared, and will not disappear.

Thirdly, remembrance of 12 December will in any case set the people to making comparisons. Thirty eight years ago, Iran, with almost empty hands, stood up

against the greatest military power of that day and took back Azarbaijan. Today, after 4 years of war, the Ayatollah has still not been able to take back all of Iran's occupied territory from the despicable Ba'thist enemy.

During the liberation of Azarbaijan the army's slogan was this: There is death but there is no return!

Today Iranian patriots must write this same slogan on their banner and be transmuted in their love of Iran as they battle on two fronts--against the foreign enemy on the one hand and against the cruel and tyrannous republic on the other.

They must write the phrase yashasin Azarbaijan (praise to Azarbaijan) on their banner and be transmuted in their love of Iran as they battle on two fronts--against the foreign aggressor on the one hand and against the cruel and tyrannical republic on the other.

The phrase yashasin Azarbaijan must be a representative of our reconsecration to the ideals of freedom, independence, and unity of our homeland.

Praise to Azarbaijan, meaning long life and victory to the heroic Iranian army.

Praise to Azarbaijan, meaning we will not surrender to cruelty and tyranny.

Praise to Azarbaijan, meaning long live Iran and the proud Iranian nation.

The Editorial Board

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CSO: 4640/172

## MANUFACTURE OF ENGINES WITH CHINESE HELP PLANNED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Dec 84 p 6

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec. 4: Pakistan Engineering Company (PECO). A public sector organisation, has undertaken a programme to manufacture a complete range of engines from 6.5 HP to 25 HP in collaboration with the Chinese which will give a great fillip to the mechanisation of the farm sector in the country.

Informed sources said that PECO machine tools are being modernised by addition of sophisticated attachments and revision of designs to make them competitive. These machines would make a positive contribution to modernise the country's light engineering industry, the sources added.

PECO has also plans to introduce high volume production technology in its works to replace the existing batch production technology which was to cater to the limited domestic market. Programme is also in hand to introduce sophisticated techniques in the foundry to make casting of latest technology at economical costs. All these measures will result in the increased production of diesel engines, pumps, motors and bicycles.

To achieve economies of scale, PECO is now encouraging sub-contracting, orders are being placed on sub-contractors for various components.

PECO has introduced a 12 HP high speed diesel engine with multi-purpose applications. The engine could also be used as a prime mover with wheat threshers. It would be economical for the farmers as it would avoid unnecessary wear and tear of the high cost tractors which are being used to run the threshers. It could also be used as a prime mover with other agricultural

implements in addition to pumps and small tractors etc.

The company is currently in the process of developing various products which could use this engine as a prime mover. In this regard, fork-lift, dumper and mini-combined harvester are worth mentioning. The engine is being made available to the farmers at a 'reasonable' price, exclusive technical franchise for the engine has been obtained from China national agricultural machinery, import and export corporation. PECO plans to delete 75 per cent of its parts within three years. Plans are afoot to produce 10,000 engines annually on single shift basis.

PECO has initiated manufacture of 220 KV towers which were hitherto being imported. It has already won two international tenders for the supply of 220 KV towers of WAPDA in world-wide competition and obtained orders worth over Rs. 90 million. The company has been meeting the major requirement of WAPDA of 11 KV and 132 KV transmission towers.

A reaper has been developed by its research and development cell. The machine has shown satisfactory results both on rice and wheat crops.

Efforts are being made to increase the production of bicycles to 150,000 during the 1984-85. Emphasis is now being laid on the reduction of cost through modernization of existing facilities and resorting to sub-contracting.

## PETROLEUM MINISTER TALKS ABOUT OIL POTENTIAL

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 Business Supplement pp I, IV

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec 13: Dr M. Asad Khan, Minister Incharge for Petroleum and Natural Resources has said that total oil and gas demand in the year 2,000 will reach around 300 million barrels of oil equivalent, assuming an annual GDP growth rate of 6.5 per cent during this plan period and six per cent subsequently.

He was inaugurating the one-day seminar on "Oil Exploration in Pakistan", organised here by the Petroleum Institute of Pakistan today.

For meeting this enormous demand, Dr Asad Khan informed the seminar "we have done a scientific study for making sound assessment of the oil and gas potential that we might have and what efforts are needed to explore it."

The present discovered recoverable reserves of oil were only 200 million barrels, while that of gas were about 10 times of that.

Presently, he said, Pakistan needs 120 million barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) of commercial energy every year, nearly 3/4th of which comes from oil and gas (that is, approximately 90 million BOE).

To achieve 100 per cent self-sufficiency in oil and gas by the year 2,000, Dr Asad declared, "we will need to drill 940 exploratory and 1,755 development wells. However, for 70 per cent self-sufficiency by that year we will require 675 exploratory and 1,225 development wells.

### Development wells

If the target were to be reduced to 35 per cent self-sufficiency, 310 exploratory and 600 development wells would be needed, the Minister explained with the help of

charts and slides.

The corresponding level of investment needed for this type of efforts to achieve self-sufficiency by the year 2,000, the country would require, in 1984, a sum of 14 million dollars for 100 per cent, 10 million dollars for 70 per cent and four million dollars for 35 per cent self-efficiency.

He pointed out that the order of magnitude of the investment was not extraordinarily high, and added, it was equally important, however, that the investment was made on the basis of proper geological assessments and through sound planning.

The Minister said the Government was working hard to further maximise its exploratory efforts so that dependence on imports could be reduced from the existing 78 per cent.

### Drilling

He said drilling activity in the public sector which reached the ebb of 39 meters per month in September 1983, was now at the level of 4,000 meters per month.

The private sector had also been equally contributing to the effort. As a result, within a period of one year the oil production nearly doubled, now averaging 25,000 barrels per day, the Minister said.

Earlier, in his address of welcome Mr Khan Tariq Hamid, Chairman Petroleum Institute of Pakistan, gave a brief history of the PIP, its aim and objectives and its role in promoting oil exploration, marketing, etc.

He said Pakistan imports 90 per cent of its petroleum requirements and spends 1.5 billion US dollars annually on the import of crude

and petroleum products.

Almost 60 per cent of "our export earnings are consumed by the oil import bill creating a severe impact on our balance of payment position", he pointed out.

He said the solution to our energy problems needed both short-term and long-term planning. In short-term, the need was to develop an awareness of energy constraints and efficient utilisation of available sources of energy while in long-term the solution lay in more concerted efforts and intensive programme of exploration, both on-shore and off-shore.

Referring to recent explorations, PIP chairman said oil was found in Leghari in December 1983, Dhurnal in April 1984, Tando Alam in May 1984, Tajidi in May 1984 and Nandpur in August this year.

### **Nandpur find**

He attached special importance to Nandpur find because it was not the first discovery in the oil and gas field in Punjab and this enhanced the possibility of discoveries in the adjoining areas. He also disclosed that steps had been taken to develop dormant fields at Golhar, Uch and Jandran.

Mr Hamid said PIP believes that this is the right time for hydrocarbon experts, both from the public and private sector to get together for an objective appraisal of the situation and to develop strategies for intensifying exploration activities towards a solution to Pakistan's energy problems.

In all four papers were read at the seminar which was spread over two sessions.

In her paper on "Petroleum and Pakistan Off-shore" Mrs Viqarun Nisa Quadri Manager Technical Services Department, OGDC discussed various aspects of off-shore drilling in Pakistan.

She said Pakistan could not afford to undertake petroleum prospecting, be it on land or the high seas, and that to date, country's off-shore "cannot boast of spectacular statements similar to 'Black Gold from Bombay High' or, 'Hydrocarbons and South China Sea'."

In their joint paper on "Satellite Imagery and its use in petroleum exploration in Pakistan", Messrs M. Sajjid Abid and N.K. Siddiqui pointed out that a study of the satellite imagery of Pakistan has revealed a few regional lineaments and large topographic highs. The presence of these lineaments has been examined to provide further clues to support geological exploration for petroleum.

Messrs Farhan Sadiq and Mausuf Ahmad also presented jointly a paper on "Computer simulation models for predicting petroleum reservoir behavior: a case history" discussing steps involved in using a computer simulation model such as formulation of reservoir grid preparation and integration of various input data.

Another joint paper was presented by Messrs Sayeed Ahmed and D.G. Ashton on "The Khaskheli Oilfield".



PRODUCTION MINISTER TALKS ABOUT EXPORT OF FERTILIZER

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 in English Business Supplement p I

[Text]

MULTAN, Dec 13: The Federal Production Minister Lt-Gen Saeed Qadir, has said that 300,000 tons of the fertiliser costing about 60 million dollars, has been exported during the last financial year. He added that contracts have already been signed with China, Iran, India and some other country for export of the fertiliser. The export of this product is in progress. About 150,000 tons of fertilisers is lying in ready stock with Pak-Arab Fertilisers Factory at Multan for export he also added.

Replying to a question, he said that the stocks of fertilisers (urea) lying in the open in the Pak-Arab Fertiliser factory, Multan, are being properly looked after and the product is quite safe from wastage.

Talking about the progress of service of the National Logistic Cell (NLC), the minister said that the cell has earned Rs. 90 million during the last financial year.

Replying to another question, he said that the home delivery of goods booked by NLC has proved a success in the country.

CSO: 4600/159

STUDY SAID TO REVEAL EXTENT OF BLACK MONEY IN ECONOMY

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec 13: Black money to the tune of about Rs. 50 billion has been injected into the national economy over the last five years creating serious socio-economic imbalances.

According to an official study, which is being analysed by financial experts, Rs. 10 billion black money is injected into the economy every year on the average.

The multiple inflationary effect of the black money had reduced the purchasing power of the common man to only 15 per cent of 1979. In this regard an independent study was also made and the authorities were asked to take remedial measures.

The indepths study on the induction of black money into the market has created identification problems for income distribution and hampered smooth flow of resources to the lower income groups. In addition, the unchecked flow of black money in foreign trade has resulted in a precarious balance of payments position even more vulnerable and led to a 40 per cent fall in the exchange value of the rupee.

The study has further revealed that every year about five to seven billion rupees are transferred illegally to foreign countries.

CSO: 4600/159

# BALUCHISTAN TO HAVE 11 SEATS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Dec 84 p 8

[Text]

QUETTA Dec. 2: The number of national assembly seats for Baluchistan has been raised from seven to eleven in the forthcoming general elections, reliable sources said here today. However, the strength of Baluchistan Assembly seats which was 40 would remain unchanged.

These sources added that soon constitutional amendments will be announced regarding changes in the constituencies. These changes have been made after hearing the objections raised by people.

According to new delimitations of constituencies of National Assembly from Baluchistan the following constituencies will be formed:

(1) District Quetta (2) District Chagi and Kharan, (3) District Pishin (4) District Loralai (5) District Zhob (6) District Naseerabad (7) Kohlu and Dera Bugti Agencies (8) Sibi and Kachi districts (9) Kalat and Khuzdar districts (10) Turbat and Panjgur districts and (11) Gwadar and Lasbela districts.

Previously delimitation of National Assembly seats for Baluchistan was:

NA-194, QUETTA-I which include Quetta district and Zhob district.

NA-195, Quetta II including Pishin district.

NA-196, Quetta-III Loralai and Zhob districts.

NA-197, Sibi I including Kohlu Agency and Naseerabad

district.

NA-198 Sibi II including Sibi district and Kachi district

NA-199, Kalat including Kalat, Khuzdar and Kharan districts

NA-200 Kalat-cum-Mekran, including Turbat, Gwadar and Panjgur districts of Mekran Division and Lasbela district of Kalat Division.

By raising the number of National Assembly seats an all time confusion has been resolved. Previously Mekran Division and district Lasbela of Kalat Division formed a single constituency for the National Assembly but the new demarcation would make Gwadar, district of Mekran Division, and Lasbela, district of Kalat division, a single constituency. While district Turbat and Panjgur of Mekran Division would make yet another constituency.

Similary district Naseerabad would comprise a single constituency contrary to the previous set-up that Kohlu Agency and district Naseerabad formed a single constituency. But recently the status of Kohlu Agency and Dera Bugti Agency was raised to full fledged district. Now these two agencies would form a new constituency for the National Assembly. Previously Quetta district and Chagi district formed a single constituency but now Quetta district would have an independent constituency while Chagi and Kharan districts would form another constituency.

CSO: 4600/157

# BOOK REVIEW DISCUSSES PROBLEMS OF BALUCHISTAN

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 Magazine p V

[Book Review by Makhdoom Ali Khan]

[Text]

**'BALUCHISTAN MASLAKIYA HAI'** (What's Baluchistan issue?) by Mujahid Barelvi, published by Qaumi Adab, Quetta, 1984, Pp. 128, price 25.

Every federation, due to its very nature, must resolve the problem of power distribution between the Centre and the provinces. Its early settlement and the delineation of the limits of provincial autonomy help ease the process of national integration.

The failure of our rulers, over the years, to work out a formula for the allocation of these powers and for the entrenchment of the basic minimum rights of the people has been the cause of much discontent.

The strategic location of Baluchistan, its geographical and cultural contiguity with Iran and Afghanistan — countries which have undergone revolutionary changes in recent years — and the vastness of its territory combined with the sparsity of its population which isolates its inhabitants from the impact of movements within the rest of the country have gone a long way to exacerbate the grievances of its people. The national problems take on an intensely regional colour here.

In his quest to chart the potentially turbulent political waters of Baluchistan and to diagnose what afflicts its people, Mujahid Barelvi interviewed a number of its most important leaders as well as a rep-

resentative of the new leadership emerging from Punjab. Collected together and interspersed with the author's comments these interviews constitute the book.

A few of these are now years old and what is more important the leaders interviewed have long since abandoned the views expressed therein. Ataullah Mengal is a case in point.

In his 1978 conversations with the American journalist Selig S. Harrison he gloomily contemplated retirement from politics to avoid choosing between the betrayal of his honour and a course of reckless adventure which would negate his life work.

## Metamorphosis

Talking to Mujahid, before his departure for London, he remained emphatic that amends can be made by a normalisation of the situation and reposition of confidence in the people. Since then he has undergone a political metamorphosis.

His exhortations addressed to the people of the province from his London exile travel well beyond the pale of conciliatory politics and his earlier expressed preferences. The inclusion of his interview, in the book, containing assertions to which he no longer subscribes, is of little value in improving our comprehension of current Baluch politics.

The general agreement which emerges from the interviews of Mir Chaus Bux Bizenjo, Ahmed Nawaz Bugti, Aslam Gichki, Saleh Khan Mandukhel and Ayub Baluch is

that much can be righted by the re-introduction of democracy in our political practices, by organising free and fair elections which alone can quell mistrust and by providing guarantees of fundamental socio-economic and political rights to the people of every province.

The book goes a long way to establish that the problem of Baluchistan is essentially a problem created by the communication gap and that what its people and leaders desire is no different from what is being sought by the nation as a whole.

But one eventually comes away from it with the feeling that a little bit of re-working, for each interview, would have improved the thrust and direction of the questions saving the reader from the monotony of going through the same queries over and over again.

Yet this little book is of great importance for the valuable insights it provides into the thought processes of the front ranking Baluch leadership thereby improving our perception of their position.

One may not relish their blunt portrayal of some of the facts and disagree with their projections of the future but it is vital to listen with a great deal of care and understanding to what they have to say.

Mr. Bizenjo, the accomplished politician that he is, succinctly sums it up, "If today you fail to listen to our remonstrations then those who come after us in Baluchistan may refuse to listen to anyone at all."

CSO: 4600/158

## DEFENSE MINISTER LAUDS ZIA'S EFFORTS ON ISLAMIZATION

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 21

[Text]

HYDERABAD, Dec 13: Defence Minister Mir Ali Ahmed Khan Talpur said here on Thursday that the policies adopted by President Zia-ul-Haq had been a challenge not only to the champions of secularism and so-called nationalists but also to the whole world.

Speaking at the Niaz Stadium public meeting which was addressed by President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, he declared that despite all opposition the religion of Almighty Allah would prevail and Sunnat-i-Rasool would rule in the country.

He said that the process initiated for Islamisation of laws would not stop since the reigns of the country were in the hands of those who were "Khuddam" (humble servants) and not dictators.

He said that throughout his life he had never supported those who humiliated the people and subjected them to excesses.

"I opposed the martial laws of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Bhutto. I am also not in the favour of present martial law, but what has been done by President Zia-ul-Haq has been a difficult mission which he is taking towards accomplishment", Mir Ali Ahmed said.

He said that those who were trying to create division and hatred among the people merely to achieve their ulterior motives would never succeed as the present government stood for unity of the people on the basis of the philosophy propounded by Prophet Mohammed.

He said that seven and a half years of President Zia-ul-Haq and his colleagues were before the people. The vote they would cast in

the referendum would not be for President Zia but for themselves.

"We will not leave the people in mid-stream and would go only when we have fulfilled our responsibilities to the full satisfaction of over 85 million Pakistanis", he announced.

He declared that Sind would emerge on the top in the forthcoming referendum in the same way it supported creation of Pakistan.

He declared that the Islam-loving people of Sind would turn up in a large numbers on December 19 and vote for the rule of Islam and stability of Pakistan.

Earlier, the Hyderabad Mayor and provincial Education and Information Minister, Syed Ahad Yusuf and Chairman District Council, Hyderabad, Pir Khalid Saeed Jan Sarhandi, delivered welcome speeches expressing whole-hearted support on their and on behalf of the people of Hyderabad.

Pir Sarhandi, paid tributes to

President Zia-ul-Haq for his programme of Islamisation and said that this would lead to having the dreams of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Dr. Alama Mohammed Iqbal materialised — a dream which remained unfulfilled so far.

Chairman, District Council, Dadu, Syed Ghulam Shah Jilani, who is also Sajjadah Nasheen of Dargah Neng Shafir in Dadu district, also addressed the gathering and said that eyes of the people of Sind were focussed on President Zia-ul-Haq for his efforts towards the establishment of a real Islamic State in Pakistan.

# ZIA ADDRESSES PUBLIC GATHERING IN SIND

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 21

[Text]

HYDERABAD, Dec. 13: President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq on Thursday said he was pleased to note that migrants from India to Sind after the creation of Pakistan had adjusted themselves fully to the cultural heritage of the province and had adopted a Sindhi way of life. He said it was a matter of great satisfaction that there was no feeling about new or old Sindhis among the populace.

Addressing a huge gathering here at the Niaz Stadium, he said that future progress and prosperity of Pakistan lay in the total elimination of sectional feelings as Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluchi and Pathan, and rising of the entire nation as one.

He pointed out that the actual reasons behind the secession of Bangladesh were mutual suspicion, distrust and lack of unity, and not foreign aggression.

The President said that it was a matter of great satisfaction, however, that Bangladesh was in the hands of Muslims and that they were making efforts similar to Pakistan Government for the cause of Islam.

He declared amidst thunderous applause and clappings that no one could harm Pakistan in case we remained united and abhorred parochialism and petty mindedness.

Pakistan, he said, was a young State and it badly needed proper nourishment and care in almost all spheres. He sought people's active, devoted and dedicated cooperation towards the upbringing of the child — Pakistan — and elevation of its image in the comity of nations and the Muslim world.

President Zia-ul-Haq said that

Pakistan was gifted with immense fortunes. With the blessings of the Almighty God, the country had become self-sufficient in a variety of crops and recently there had been discoveries of uranium and petrol.

He paid glowing tributes to the people of Sind for the tremendous contributions they had made for the cause of Islam.

He said that Sind had rightly been described as the 'Gateway of Islam'. It was in fact the heart of the whole of Pakistan.

He said that Sind had also the honour and privilege of taking a lead in passing a resolution in favour of the creation of Pakistan.

The President said that this region was also rich in spiritual heritage. He referred in this connection to Qalander Lal Shahbaz and Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, among other "Auliya" produced by this region.

He was sure that the people of Sind would follow their traditions and vote overwhelmingly in favour of Islamisation at the ensuing referendum.

He stressed the need for maintaining peaceful atmosphere and said that no one else except outside elements benefited from lawlessness.

The President said that law and order situation in Sind and other provinces was satisfactory.

He said that law and order situation in Sind had improved satisfactorily as a result of effective measures adopted by Governor Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan.

The President urged the people not to pay heed to rumours and check the rumour mongers.

He said while there was chaos and confusion in various regions around Pakistan, there was complete peace and tranquillity in this country. It was because of the bles-

sings and mercies the Almighty God had bestowed on Pakistan.

The President said that after accepting the responsibility of the country, his endeavour had always been to make Pakistan a truly and exemplary Islamic welfare State through reformation of society.

He said that it was with this end in view that his government had decided to hold referendum on December 19 to lay infrastructure of the future people's elected government.

The gathering endorsed President's proposal that the people's elected house be named as Majlis-i-Shoora and the provincial assemblies as Provincial Councils.

The President said that he had proposed this as the name carried with it a substantial measure of blessing.

The President said that Islamic system of government envisaged participation of masses at all levels.

He said he had always been eager to hold elections and transfer power to the genuine and elected representatives.

He said his government had taken upon itself the responsibility of Islamisation as nothing concrete and positive had been done during the last 30 years in this regard.

He outlined the measures his government had taken for the achievement of the objective including the introduction of Ushr, Zakat, interest-free banking system and Nizam-i-Salat, and expressed confidence that his government with the active support of the people will continue the process. It was a religious obligation which his government will discharge to the complete and total satisfaction of the peoples aspirations, he added.

He refuted the allegation that his government was not an elected one. He said that his government was constitutional in all respects and was authorised by the Supreme Court to hold elections and suitably amend the 1973 Constitution.

The President dispelled the apprehensions about making any change in the 1973 Constitution.

He said that what he wanted to do was to "Islamise the Constitution" so that it could truly reflect

the Islamic values.

"Our manifesto is contained in the Holy Quran and the Constitution of Pakistan should contain the spirit of the holy book," the President said.

He said the preamble of the Constitution would be incorporated in the body, and articles repugnant to Islam and Sunnah would be removed.

He further said that his four-point manifesto comprised "authority of human being" and "Hubb-i-Rasool".

The President's address was repeatedly greeted by full-throated slogans of "Mard-i-Momin Zindabad", "Long Live Mujahid-i-Islam" and "Pakistan Ka Matlib Kiya, La Ilaha Illallah".

The gathering raised their hands when the President asked them whether they endorsed his government's policies including the continuation of the process of Islamisation.

Earlier the crowd gave a standing ovation to the President as he accompanied by Defence Minister Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur and Federal Industries Minister Ilahi Bux Soomro and Governor Sind Lt. Gen Jahan Dad Khan, arrived at the stadium.

The multi-coloured shamiana was decorated with banners reading "Islam Zindabad", "Live Long Mard-i-Momin General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq".

School band, consisting of young students struck welcome tunes, balloons and pigeons were released in the air.

### **'Dama Dam Referendum'**

The spirited speeches made on the occasion were frequently punctuated by slogans.

A new slogan raised at the meeting was "Dama Dam Referendum". The slogan greatly delighted the President who said that the forthcoming referendum would be a 'Dama Dam' in reality.

Mayor Ahad Yusuf presented traditional Sindhi ajrak, cap and ralli to the President and garlanded him. Deputy Mayor Bashir Ahmed Chandio presented vote of thanks.



WOMEN'S BODY ISSUES MEMORANDUM ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 20

[Text]

KARACHI, Dec 13: Women's Action forum has addressed a representation to President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq for his consideration, in view of the referendum of Dec 19.

The memorandum contains a declaration of the rights of women in an Islamic society and has been signed by the founder-president of APWA, Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan, and the president of Pakistan Women Lawyers Association, Begum Rashida Patel.

Following are the points made in the representation:

- Education and training for women shall be on a scale and dimension equal to that for men, without any discrimination on the basis of sex.

- Women shall continue to have access to all institutions of higher training and education as presently available, especially to all the universities in Pakistan. Separate universities for women (though not supported) will not in any way affect their right of women to study at any other university.

- Women shall have rights equal to those of men to enter each and every procession and area of work or gainful employment.

- The right to vote and stand for elected office available to women under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, will not in any way be changed.

- The fundamental rights of women under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, among them equality before law, non-discrimination on the basis of sex, etc., shall not in any way be amended.

- The Family Law Courts Act, 1964, and the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, will not be abrogated.

- The right of maintenance of divorced women, which is a Quranic injunction, shall be legally recognised.

- The right of 'khula' by women on the same basis as 'talaq' by the male should be legally recognised, being an Islamic right presently denied to women.

- No law shall be proposed or adopted which discriminates against women and clauses in laws which discriminate against women shall be reviewed in the light of the Quran and Sunnah.

- Enlightened women, on the recommendation of women's organisations, shall be appointed to the Council of Islamic ideology and policy-making bodies.

- Action-oriented programme and policies for the uplift, advancement and development of women all over Pakistan should be undertaken on an accelerated basis

- Effective steps should be taken to ensure free movement and security of women in all parts of Pakistan.

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# VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 4

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec 13: Terming the violation of human rights as synonymous with the murder of the innate capabilities of people which get nourishment only in an atmosphere of freedom of thought and conscience, Prof. Waris Mir of the Punjab University has challenged those who hold the contrary view to prove that the Islamic concept of human rights is in conflict with the Human Rights Charter of the United Nations.

Addressing a meeting in connection with the Human Rights Day here, he said such elements were out to prove that the citizens of Islamic states could not demand those rights from their rulers which were available in secular, democratic societies and which now formed part of the UN Charter.

These elements "are determined to confront any natural manifestation of the process of evolution and limit Islam to their narrow interpretation of our religion", Prof Waris Mir said.

He lashed out at the elements describing democracy as a satanic system of western politics and secularism as faithlessness. While doing so they never pondered as to why the Indian Muslims had been demanding true secularism, if the latter was just another name for faithlessness, Prof. Mir asked.

The real intention of the people trying to find contradictions between the UN Human Rights Charter and the Islamic concept of human rights was to pave the way for the acceptance of the Hudood Ordinance, Law of Evidence, the draft Law of Qisas and Diyat and the recommendations of the Ansari Commission on the status of women, Prof. Mir observed. He asked: "By doing so, are the official intellectuals not proving counter-productive for the policies of the present regime at an international level?"

"Do they want to prove that the human rights accepted by the UN were in conflict with the process of Islamisation in Pakistan?"

Prof Mir said the problems of government and the people of the contemporary world were very similar today, and restricting the practicability of the Human Rights Charter in the Western countries alone and not applying it to the Muslim countries was not Islamic thinking.

He said it was a matter of great satisfaction that the official intellectuals did not see the clauses relating to free and fair elections, or he feared such elements would have suggested the government should dissociate itself from the UN Human Rights Charter, to which it was a signatory.

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# OFFICIAL VISITS REFUGEE CAMP, LAUDS HUMANITARIAN ROLE

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Dec 84 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Dec. 7: Gen. John W. Vassey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA today lauded Pakistan's efforts for its massive relief programme for the Afghan refugees as well as the courage with which the refugees are facing the hardships and their kinsmen are keeping the resistance alive inside Afghanistan.

He was addressing a gathering of Afghan refugees at the refugees tentage village at Nasir Bagh which he visited this morning.

Gen. Vassey said American political leaders including Vice President George Bush have visited the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and carried back to the American people their fight to regain their freedom.

The people of the United States, Gen. Vassey said, understood what faith in God implied as every coin in the US bore the inscription 'In God we trust'. He was certain that the refugees would return to their country in honour and dignity.

Gen. Vassey assured the refugees that the government and people of the US would continue to support the relief operations of Pakistan as well as international agencies to mitigate their suffering as much as possible.

Earlier in the morning when Gen. Vassey arrived here he was received by the Air Officer Commanding Northern Air Command, Air Vice Marshal Shabbir Hussain Syed and other senior civil and military officers.

Immediately afterwards the commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Rustam Shah Mohammad made a presentation to familiarise Gen. Vassey with salient features of the 400 million dollar a year refugee relief programme to which Pakistan was contributing to the extent of 80 per cent. He said out of the three million refugees who had taken shelter in Pakistan nearly two million were living in

200 tentage villages in the NWFP.

Besides providing food and other means of sustenance, the refugees were being extended educational, health and other facilities.

Visibly impressed by the scale of humanitarian assistance, Gen. Vassey remarked that those engaged in providing relief were performing a 'monumental task' he said the entire free world was grateful to Pakistan for what it was doing for the Afghan refugees.

Later, Gen. Vassey drove to the historic Khyber Rifles Mess where he was received by the Inspector General of Frontier Corps, Maj. Gen. Arif Bangash.

Earlier on arrival in Pakistan Gen. Vassey was given a warm reception.

He was received at the Islamabad Airport by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen. Rahimuddin Khan and senior officers of the three services. The US Ambassador to Pakistan Deane R. Hinton and other officers of the US embassy were also present at the airport.

Later in the day Gen. Vassey visited the Joint Staff Headquarters. He was received by Gen. Rahimuddin Khan, who introduced his Principal Staff Officers to his distinguished guest. A smart army contingent presented him guard of honour. He reviewed the honour guard.

Gen. Vassey, who was accompanied by Ambassador Hinton, then settled down for his meeting with Gen. Rahimuddin. They discussed matters of common interest.

Later Gen. Vassey attended a lunch held in his honour by Gen. Rahimuddin Khan. The lunch was attended by the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif, Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Tariq Kamal Khan, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief

Marshal Muhammad Anwar  
Shamim, Secretary General  
Defence, Major Gen. (Retd)  
M. Rahim Khan, Defence Secretary  
Mr. Aftab Ahmed Khan, Foreign  
Secretary Mr. Niaz A. Naik and  
other senior officers of the three  
services.

In the afternoon Gen. Vassey  
called on the Foreign Minister  
Sahabzada Yaqub Khan at the  
Foreign Office.

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## BRIEFS

PAMPHLETS PROSCRIBED--SAHIWAL--The provincial government has proscribed five pamphlets and posters under the Press and Publication Ordinance. These include 'Roshan Sitarey', 'Islam aur Intikhabat' 'Peoples Party key rannamaon ko helak karne ka mansooba', 'General Ziaul Haq Islam par manazara kar lain' and 'Tehrik-i-Jadeed (Rabwah).' [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Dec 84 p 8]

PUBLICATIONS PROSCRIBED--LAHORE, Nov. 30--The Punjab Government has proscribed the following publications as these contain objectionable material within the meaning of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance 1963. Letter captioned 'Khutba Sadarat Sheikh Rafique Ahmed' addressed to the editor, Nawa-e-Waqt, Karachi, by Sh. Rafiq Ahmed, President PPP (defunct). Issues for the months of May, June and July 1984 of monthly 'Ansarullah', Rabwah, published by Ch. Mohammed Ibrahim. Booklet entitled 'awaz' issued by the Democratic Students Federation, Punjab. Copies of the above publications have also been forfeited to government. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Dec 84 p8]

AGREEMENT ON BALUCHISTAN DEVELOPMENT--QUETTA, Dec. 3--Pakistan and the European Economic Community (EEC) will sign an agreement at Islamabad shortly for the implementation of Baluchistan Integrated Area Development (BIAD) programme. Disclosing this the Director General BIAD said the EEC had committed 5.8 million U.S. dollars financial assistance for implementation of BIAD's programme in Pishin and Kachhi districts of the province during the fiscal year 1984-85. It is in addition to 3.8 million dollars assistance from the EEC for the procurement of rigs, vehicles and pipes for 36 rural water supply schemes for implementation in the district of Loralai, Kalat, Nasirabad and Gwadar under the first phase of the rural water supply programme already under execution. Meanwhile, the EEC mission now on a visit to Pakistan has held a meeting with the Director General BIAD here to review the pace of progress of BIAD's programmes with EEC assistance. The mission has expressed its satisfaction over the BIAD programme in the province. [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 4 Dec 84 p 6]

ELECTIONS LIKELY IN MARCH--ISLAMABAD, Dec 13--General elections to the National Assembly and provincial assemblies are likely to be held in the first week of March, it is reliably learnt here, according to PPI. An announcement to this effect is expected to be made soon after the referendum. This will provide enough time for electioneering by the contesting candidates before the polls. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 1]

NWFP BANS LEADERS' ENTRY--LAHORE, Dec 13--The NWFP government has banned the entry of Malik Mohamad Qasim, convener of the MRD, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri and Rao Abdur Rashid in the province. Kasuri has been banned for 90 days while the others have been banned for 30 days. The orders of the NWFP Home Department was served on these leaders here on Thursday by officials of the Punjab Home Department. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 2]

PPP MEN ARRESTED--LAHORE, Dec 13--Local police have arrested Syed Salmat Shah and Mr. Sarwar Butt, leaders of the (defunct) Pakistan People's Party. Both have been lodged at the Lahore Fort. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Dec 84 p 2]

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