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12 January 1983

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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1735

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No. 5, May 1982

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USSR REPORT Military Affairs

No. 1735

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

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CSO: 1801/318

MARSHAL KULIKOV ON WARSAW PACT ANNIVERSARY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 3-11

[Article by MSU V. Kulikov, First Deputy USSR Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Nations: "The Bulwark of Peace and the Security of Peoples"; passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] Mankind is today witness to fierce attacks by imperialism against the forces of peace and socialism, the national liberation movement, Communist and worker parties. Seeking to get even for the numerous defeats of recent years, it is counting on building up its military power and on disrupting the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, between the defensive Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in a conversation with representatives of the Socialist International's Consultative Council on Disarmament, drew their attention to the dangerous consequences to the cause of world peace with which "the present policy line of the NATO blocs is fraught, particularly its principal power -- the United States." In particular, he noted that "the situation has not been so critical since the end of World War II."¹ In this situation an important role is played by the Warsaw Pact Organization, which is called upon to place reliable obstacles in the path of fanciers of military adventures and to defend the peace against their encroachments.

The victory over Hitlerite fascism demonstrated the vitality and invincibility of socialism and fostered an increase in its international image. Socialism emerged beyond the framework of a single country. Creation of a world socialist system was an important historical event. This system has become the leading revolutionary force of the present day, and its power has become the main bulwark of the cause of peace, democracy, and social advance.

Further deepening of the process of revolutionary renewal of the world and change in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of socialism evoked unchecked anger on the part of the imperialists. They began feverishly preparing for war, formulating sinister plans of attack on the USSR and the other socialist countries ('Charioteer," "Fleetwood," "Trojan," and

"Dropshot"), forming aggressive military-political blocs, openly intervening in the affairs of other countries, took the road of nuclear blackmail and unleashed a "cold war."

The signing in Washington on 4 April 1949 of a treaty establishing the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) by the Western nations, with the aim of uniting the efforts of the Western European countries into a military-political alliance to prepare for war against the socialist nations, constituted a concentrated practical expression of consolidation of the most aggressive forces of imperialism.

In these conditions the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations were forced to take effective measures for collective defense of their security and to preserve peace on the European continent and throughout the world. On 14 May 1955 the heads of government of 8 European countries signed in Warsaw a multilateral treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, which has gone down in history as the Warsaw Pact.² Establishment of a system of collective security of the socialist countries was a response measure, a forced action and vital necessity in the face of an obvious threat of attack by the bloc of imperialist nations. Speaking on the aims of the Warsaw Pact, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "We have established this alliance primarily in order to counter the threat of imperialism and the aggressive military blocs it has created, to defend the cause of socialism and peace through joint efforts."³ The history of mankind knows no other militarypolitical alliance with such noble aims and tasks.

The Warsaw Pact Organization is of a purely defensive character, for it sets as its task the rendering of arme d assistance to its members only with a threat of aggression and the necessity of self-defense. Its members, states the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee dated 15 May 1980, "do not have, have not had and will not have any other strategic doctrine than defensive...."⁴

The entire history of activities of the Warsaw Pact Organization is a tireless and persistent struggle by the brother socialist countries to prevent another world war, for detente, disarmament, for ensuring the security of peoples and the creation of favorable international conditions for building socialism and communism. In its 27 years of existence, not one of its members has initiated a military conflict or created tension in any part of the world. And this is understandable. A society which believes in its own productive resources desires peace. The Warsaw Pact wishes peoples to live and work under a peaceful sky.

The Warsaw Pact nations have authored many constructive proposals and concrete initiatives aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war, at strengthening peace, at ending dangerous competition between the two societal systems in the area of military preparations, at preserving an approximate balance of forces, but at a lower level than at the present time. Such proposals include the following: to establish a system of collective security in Europe; a nonaggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member nations; a program of universal and total disarmament; plus a number of others. The experience of history indicates that the role and significance of the Warsaw Pact Organization as a reliable guarantee of security for the nations of the socialist community and as an effective instrument of maintaining peace on our planet have been manifested to the greatest degree in periods of serious aggravation of the international situation and the development of crisis situations. The developing situation has time and again demanded that the fraternal defensive alliance take the most decisive and effective measures directed toward normalizing the situation, strengthening peace and defense of the achievements of socialism. And it has passed with honor the stern test of time.

The Warsaw Pact member nations, carrying out their international duty, in 1956 rendered comprehensive, including military assistance to fraternal Hungary in crushing a counterrevolutionary insurrection. In 1961 preparations for an imperialist act of provocation against the GDR were thwarted through the joint efforts of the allied nations. In 1968 the nations of the socialist community gave assistance to the people of Czechoslovakia in defending socialist achievements. They made a weighty contribution to peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis (1962). Their assistance helped gain the long-awaited victory of the heroic people of Vietnam in the war against the U.S. aggressors and Chinese hegemonists, and helped secure peace in Southeast Asia.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975) was an event of truly historic significance; a decisive role in convening and successfully holding this conference was played by the Warsaw Pact member nations. Its significance lies in the fact that the Final Act signed by the heads of state and government formalized the political-territorial results of World War II and acknowledged the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of nations with differing social systems as an objective necessity of the contemporary era. Waging a vigorous campaign to achieve these noble goals, the brother nations once again convincingly demonstrated that they constitute a force which in the most consistent manner is seeking to strengthen European security and world peace.

Numerous measures by the Warsaw Pact member nations involving unilateral reduction of the size of their armed forces constitute very convincing affirmation of the peace-loving nature and good will of the socialist nations. Suffice it to say that since 1955 their military forces have been reduced by 2,477,000 men.⁵ In 1960 the Soviet Union made the decision unilaterally to reduce the size of its armed forces by 1,200,000 men.⁶

At the end of the 1970's the socialist nations advanced important initiatives aimed at lessening tension, reducing the level of military confrontation, and bringing an end to the arms race in Europe. These include new proposals announced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in Berlin on 6 October 1979 following consultations with the other Warsaw Pact members. They called for a unilateral reduction of Soviet forces in Central Europe by 20,000 men, 1000 tanks and other military equipment. This decision was carried out fully and on schedule, in spite of aggravation of the international situation. The peace-loving Soviet Union, desiring to display a good example of détente in present-day conditions, has decided, as announced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his address at the 17th USSR Trade Union Congress, /"unilaterally to adopt a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. We are instituting a quantitative and qualitative freeze on such weapons already deployed in this area, and we are halting the replacement of old missiles, known under the designation SS-4 and SS-5, with newer SS-20 missiles."/ He continued: /"The Soviet Union intends this year, if there does not occur a new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce by a certain number, at its own initiative, its force of intermediate-range missiles."/7

All these decisions are viewed by the peoples of the world as vivid evidence of the love of peace and good will on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies in preserving peace.

The efficient and coordinated activities of the brother countries in the international arena are promoted by the structure of the Warsaw Pact Organization, which took time to achieve. It was developing and improving over an extended time, which was dictated by the occurrence of new international problems, by the increased volume and complexity of the problems being addressed, as well as by further deepening and broadening of multilateral cooperation among the brother countries. Of great importance were the decisions of the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) held in Budapest in 1969 and in Bucharest in 1976.

The highest-level political body of the Warsaw Pact Organization is the PCC, which contains representatives of all the member nations. At its meetings the PCC examines the most important political, defense and other issues pertaining to the sphere of interaction of the Warsaw Pact member nations in organizing joint defense. Participation by the general (first) secretaries of the central committees of the brother parties and heads of government of the member nations in the work of the PCC gives particular weight and significance to the decisions which are adopted.

The now traditional meetings in the Crimea between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the leaders of brother parties and nations constitute vivid evidence of the profound faithfulness of the socialist countries to a policy of peace and peaceful cooperation. In 1971-1973 these meetings were of a multilateral character, while since 1976 they have taken place each year as a series of bilateral meetings. Key problems of world politics are discussed at these meetings, future constructive tasks are discussed, exchange of experience in building socialism and communism takes place, and unified views are formulated in the struggle for a radical normalization of international relations and for solid peace on earth.

Meetings of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at which the main points of decisions of the PCC of the Warsaw Pact member nations are concretized, key problems are examined and common positions elaborated, constitute an important form of coordination of foreign policy actions within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization. For example, at the most recent

meeting, in Bucharest in December 1981, the ministers of foreign affairs of the allied countries exchanged information on development trends in the international situation, on the status of the Geneva and Madrid talks, and voiced approval of new Soviet peace initiatives.

Experience shows that the titanic efforts of the brother nations in the area of foreign policy, directed primarily toward ensuring peace, have not been in vain. For 30 years now the peoples of Europe have been living and working under a peaceful, although far from tranquil sky. We have succeeded in breaking the tragic cycle of world war-brief respite of peace-another world war. This is a great achievement of the peace-seeking policy of the brother Marxist-Leninist parties. The forces of aggression and militarism, however, although on the defense, have not been completely neutralized.

The aggressiveness of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism, increased particularly sharply at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's, which led to an abrupt shift in the development of world events and an appreciable aggravation and destabilization of the international situation. The current period is characterized by an intensive struggle between two directional thrusts in world politics: on the one hand there is the course of policy pursued by the brother socialist countries, aimed at curbing the arms race, at détente, preserving peace and preventing war, at guaranteeing one's peoples the chance to live and accomplish grandiose productive tasks in conditions of peace, while on the other hand there is the diametrically opposed course of policy followed by the United States, the NATO bloc and their stooges, aimed at undermining détente, at escalating the arms race, at achieving military superiority and intervening in the affairs of others.

The principal aim of U.S. imperialist circles and their closest militarypolitical allies is to disrupt the existing approximate military-strategic balance in their own favor, and on this basis to disrupt the present stability in the world, to halt the forward movement of history, to "hurl back" socialism, to regain their lost position, to delay the irreversible process of the general crisis of capitalism, to consolidate U.S. domination on a global scale, and to dictate their will on other peoples. "In these conditions," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his speech at an official ceremony in Tashkent, "the economic and defense might of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, their tenacity and self-control, as well as their consistent peace policy are clearly perceived by all peoples as the principal obstacle in the path of warmongers and the main bastion of peace on earth."⁸

A particular threat to the cause of world peace is presented by the decision, forced by U.S. leaders on a number of West European NATO bloc countries, to deploy on their soil approximately 600 new American intermediate-range nuclear missile weapons aimed at the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community. Regardless of the expatiations across the sea about this "defensive action," it is crystal clear to all sober-minded persons that the U.S. Government's propaganda thesis of the "need for additional arming" is grounded on an indomitable desire to achieve substantial superiority in nuclear arms over the USSR and to restrict nuclear war to the territory of Europe. These illusions are hopeless.

Other important component parts of the militarist program aimed at achieving U.S. military superiority over the USSR and NATO bloc superiority over the Warsaw Pact include the following: Washington's decision to develop and build qualitatively new, even more devastating weapons of mass destruction (MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, Trident nuclear submarines, B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, air-launched, sea-launched and land-based cruise missiles, etc), to go into full-scale production of neutron weapons, to improve chemical and conventional weapons, the organizational structure of troops, command and control agencies, to establish a 230,000-man police-action striking force, so-called 'Hapid deployment forces," to implement a "new nuclear strategy," which boils down to escalated preparations for nuclear war and rationalization about the acceptability and permissibility of such a war, and on adoption of a new military strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the USSR on a global and regional scale.

Further expansion of the network of U.S. bases and other military installations attests to aggressiveness. "At the present time the United States has more than 1500 military bases and installations in 32 countries. More than half a million U.S. military personnel are permanently stationed at these bases."⁹ These numbers do not satisfy Washington. New bases have been built and are under construction in Egypt, Oman, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and a number of other countries. The total number of U.S. troops, stockpiles of weapons and combat equipment at these bases are growing at a rapid pace. Just in the FRG, for example, the total number of personnel has increased by 31,000 in the last 4 years. The arsenals of the NATO countries which are members of the Eurogroup will grow in the next 1-2 years by 460 tanks, 890 other armored fighting vehicles, 360 artillery pieces, and more than 600 combat fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.

This is happening at a time when the NATO bloc force grouping is already very powerful and dangerous. According to the figures of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, NATO forces presently total approximately 5 million men, more than 80 divisions, 440 operational-tactical and tactical missile launchers, more than 17,000 tanks, 8000 combat aircraft (more than 2000 of which carry nuclear weapons), and approximately 1500 warships. More than 3 million men are under arms in Europe alone.

The arrogant ambitions of the NATO bloc are confirmed by the increasing intensity of troop training. With each passing year there is an increase in the number and scale of exercises conducted on the basis of the schedules of the bloc and the national command authorities, in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the nations of the socialist community. In 1980, for example, 140 more exercises were held than in 1975. These exercises are viewed by NATO advocates not only as an effective means of testing the readiness of their war machine to carry out their aggressive global schemes but also as an important condition for increasing its combat power. They constitute a show of force and are nothing other than a rehearsal for preparation, initiation, and conduct of war.

The unprecedented growth of military expenditures is a synthesized indicator which most fully characterizes the scale of aggressive preparations by the United States and the other NATO countries aimed at building "unsurpassed

military power." The growth rate of the U.S. military budget, for example, was 13 percent in 1978-1980, while in 1981 the U.S. military budget increased by 19 percent. In 1985 the United States plans to allocate 340 billion dollars for military purposes, and a total of 1.5 trillion dollars over the next 5 years,¹⁰ that is, almost as much as the Pentagon has spent in the last 12 years. Overall NATO military expenditures in 1981 were more than 15-fold the figure for 1949, when this bloc was formally established.

Maximum utilization of scientific-technological advances and scientific potential in the interest of qualitative improvement of death-dealing weapons and increasing the combat power of the bloc's military forces is one more trait, and far from the last trait characterizing its material preparations for war.

All these and other militarist steps are concealed by an incessant hue and cry about a "Soviet military threat," which is nothing but a smoke screen to camouflage U.S. hegemonist aspirations. The entire world knows full well that it is not the Soviet Union but rather the United States which, just in the period between 1946 and 1975, has on 215 occasions directly or indirectly resorted to the use of military forces and threatened other countries with military intervention. On 19 different occasions the question of employment of nuclear weapons has been placed on the agenda in Washington, and on four of these occasions the threat was made directly to the USSR.11

Recently the United States has chosen as target of power pressure the Polish People's Republic, the leaders of which have taken resolute measures which are fully in conformity with the aspirations of the people and which are directed toward creating conditions for the country to come out of its crisis situation. Crude interference by official Washington in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, the application of economic "sanctions," and open support of counterrevolutionary forces persuasively attest to the intentions of the U.S. Government to destroy socialist achievements in Poland, to restore the bourgeois system, to split the unity of the socialist community, and to weaken the Warsaw Pact. Faithful to their alliance with fraternal Poland, the Soviet Union and the other true friends of the Polish people have given and will continue to give them every assistance and support in their efforts to normalize the situation in Poland.

Artificially dramatizing the Polish situation and escalating tensions, Washington is patently pursuing the objective of poisoning the overall political climate to an even greater extent and worsening the atmosphere for a dialogue between the East and West.

The military-political rapprochement between the United States, China and Japan as well as attempts to form a united antisocialist front, in which the military might of the United States and the European NATO countries in the West would be combined with the manpower resources of China and the industrial capabilities of Japan in the East, are assuming an increasingly threatening character for the future of peace. Relations between Washington and Beijing, as the U.S. secretary of state has declared, will continue in the future developing on a healthy foundation, and there are even hopes of their improvement in the near future. Speaking of rapprochement between the United States and the Chinese leaders. we must frankly state that the partnership between imperialism and Beijing hegemonism constitutes a new and dangerous phenomenon in world politics for all mankind, including the American and Chinese peoples. This is confirmed by the practical actions of Beijing. Of the 30 military conflicts which have taken place in Asia since the end of World War II, China is responsible for initiating 19.

Of course the brother countries cannot ignore the military preparations and intrigues of aggressive forces, wherever these may occur. They are doing everything possible to bring an end to an arms race, to save peoples from the increased threat of nuclear war, to preserve peace on earth and to construct relations between nations and social systems on a foundation of principles of peaceful coexistence, equality and equal security for the opposing sides.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress that /"to uphold the cause of peace -- at the present time there is no more important task at the international level for our party, our people, and for all the peoples of the world"/ $.^{12}$ In the interests of accomplishing this task, the party's highest forum ratified the Peace Program for the 1980's, which embraces a broad group of issues and has gained the enthusiastic approval and full support of the peoples of the socialist countries and all people of good will throughout the world.

The appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World," which was announced on 23 June 1981 and which has evoked extensive response throughout the world, constituted a logical continuation of the Peace Program. Addressing a session of our country's highest governmental body with an endorsement of this appeal, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated: "...We must right now, today do everything possible to put an obstacle in the path of fanciers of unlimited arms and military adventures. We must do everything possible to ensure people's right to life. And there can be no uninvolved or indifferent people in this matter: it affects each and every one of us. It pertains to governments and political parties, public organizations -- and, of course, parliaments, elected by peoples and acting on their behalf."¹³

Peace-seeking proposals by the brother countries formed the basis of important resolutions adopted at the 36th UN Generally Assembly Session, including a declaration which proclaimed first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against mankind. It is highly indicative that the United States, its most zealous NATO partners and the Beijing hegemonists had the temerity openly to oppose this noble pledge, which once again confirmed the aggressive directional thrust of the policy they pursue.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's visit to the FRG on 22-25 November 1981 can with full justification be called a genuine mission of peace. The talks focused on a cardinal issue: how to avert the threat hanging over Europe in connection with plans to deploy U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the territory of a number of West European countries and how to prevent the balance of forces to tip in favor of the NATO bloc. Leonid Ilich introduced new, realistic constructive proposals aimed at reaching a mutually acceptable agreement and at removing from Europe the danger of a nuclear conflagration. All this attests to the fact that the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations are pursuing, in contrast to the militarist efforts of reactionary circles in the West and China, a balanced, calm, positive line of policy seeking to resolve international problems through negotiation and the search for mutually acceptable agreements.

The brother parties and governments of the nations of the socialist community, persistently and vigorously campaigning for peace, at the same time maintain a sober assessment of development of international events and manifest a high degree of vigilance toward the intrigues of aggressive, reactionary circles. Their policy organically combines a consistent seeking of peace and willingness to offer a suitable rebuff to any aggressor.

We should stress, however, that the measures being taken by the brother countries in the interests of further strengthening their defense capability and increasing the combat power of the allied armies are not directed toward achieving military superiority over the other side and do not go beyond the framework of necessary defense. A firm defense is needed, however, since strength, and considerable strength, is required to ensure the security of peoples, for the imperialists and their fellow travelers count primarily on force for achieving their political objectives and are responsive only to strength. Experience indicates that the military power of the nations of the socialist community constitutes a reliable guarantee of securement of conditions for building a new society and constitutes an effective instrument for preventing aggressive militarist moves by fanciers of military adventures.

As practical experience indicates, of primary significance in the successful struggle for a firm peace is the unshakable unity of the socialist countries, their military might, close solidarity, comradely mutual assistance, and coordinated, joint actions in the world arena. History teaches us that imperialist aggression becomes possible precisely when those forces which are capable of blocking its path are disunited. This must be borne in mind in the conditions of an aggravated situation.

Alongside the campaign to preserve world peace, the peoples of the brother countries have another lofty goal -- the building of socialism and communism. The efforts of the working people of the allied nations are directed toward successful implementation of the decision of the congresses of Communist and worker parties, the grandiose plans of the second year of the current fiveyear plans, toward honoring the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR in a worthy manner, toward further strengthening of the economic and defense might of the nations of the socialist community, and toward increasing the people's prosperity.

The peoples of the socialist countries and all people of good will, triumphantly celebrating the 27th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact Organization, cannot help but think back to the victorious spring of 1945. A deep, direct link exists between these two historic events, which took place in the month of May, with an interval of 10 years between them. Socialism had emerged victorious in an unequal, bloody conflict with fascism, had proven its invincibility and had become even stronger, uniting the peoples of other

 $\mathbf{11}$

countries within its amicable family. Latter-day claimants to world domination and NATO strategists should not forget the results of World War II or ignore its lessons.

The fighting alliance of brother peoples, created on principles of socialist internationalism, constitutes an insuperable barrier in the path of the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and a reliable bastion of peace. The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On the 60th Anniversary of Establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" states that, /"celebrating the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR, the Soviet people are justly proud of their achievements, of that revolutionary, historic mission which our homeland is carrying out with honor, marching in the front ranks of the fighters for peace, independence, freedom and happiness of peoples"/.14

The men of the Warsaw Pact Joint Forces totally support the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist and worker parties. Deeply cognizant of their patriotic and internationalist duty as well as the great historic mission of guarding the peaceful labor of the brother peoples and aware of the increased threat of another world war, they are working persistently to improve their professional skills, are increasing their combat readiness, and are strengthening the might of the Joint Forces.

"...The military-political defensive alliance of the socialist nations," stressed the Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, "faithfully serves the cause of peace. It has everything it needs in order reliably to defend the socialist achievements of peoples. And we shall do everything to ensure that this continues to be so in the future!"¹⁵

The historic path trod during these past 27 years by the Warsaw Pact defensive military-political alliance and its fruitful activities aimed at ensuring peace persuasively attest to the prescient, wise decisions by the Communist and worker parties and the governments of the brother nations to establish a system of collective security for their people. Experience and the development of international events have fully confirmed the vital necessity of the Warsaw Pact, the might and authority of which constitute a reliable bulwark of peace in present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 4 Feb 1982.

- 2. Signatories included Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Albania no longer took part in the activities of the Warsaw Pact Organization from 1962 on and officially announced its withdrawal from the Pact in September 1968.
- 3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 4, Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, page 68.
- 4. "Organizatsiya Varshavskogo Dogovora. Dokumenty i materialy 1955-1980 gg." [The Warsaw Pact Organization. Documents and Materials, 1955-1980], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, page 269.

- 5. Ibid., page 28.
- 6. Ibid., page 54.
- 7. PRAVDA, 17 March 1982.
- 8. PRAVDA, 25 March 1982.
- 9. "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [Source of the Threat to Peace], Voyenizdat, 1982, page 28.
- 10. Ibid., page 9.
- 11. Ibid., page 76.
- 12. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 31.

13. PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.

14. PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.

15. "Materialy XXVI...," op. cit., page 6.

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3024 CSO: 1801/318

WARTIME OPERATIONS: COMMUNICATIONS FOR TROOPS ON SEPARATE AXES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 12-19

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" and subheading "Operational Art," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col I. Taran and Maj V. Kolesnik: "The Organization of Communications in Armored and Mechanized Troops Operating on Separate Axes"]

[Text] In the offensive operations of the last war, Soviet armored and mechanized troops, particularly at operational depth, as a rule fought on separated axes. This occurred in all cases where there was no tactical liaison between adjacent combined units (formations) and the distances between their flanks exceeded the range of artillery.

Offensive action on separated axes would for the most part be caused by operational necessity and would be effected most frequently with parallel pursuit of the adversary deep in his defenses, encirclement and annihilation of hostile force groupings, as well as in the course of battles to capture built-up areas or large centers of resistance.

The conditions of difficult terrain, when it was possible to advance only along roads, also would make it necessary to operate on separated axes. Armored troops operated on separated axes during the counteroffensive and subsequent general offensive at Moscow and Stalingrad, in the Belgorod-Kharkov, Belorussian, Proskurov-Chernovtsy, East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian, and other offensive operations. Organization of communications for troop command and control in these cases constituted one of the complex problems which faced signal troops during the war years. Accomplishment of this task depended on the operational situation, the quantity and numerical strength of signal units and subunits, the proficiency of signal personnel, availability and technical capabilities of communications equipment.

In the first period of the war offensive actions were conducted on separated axes by combined units of improvised mobile forces formed for the purpose of swift offensive exploitation deep into the enemy's defenses. Operations to defeat in detail the German-fascist forces at Moscow, for example, included General P. A. Belov's front-subordination group consisting of a guards cavalry corps, two rifle divisions, a tank brigade, two independent tank

battalions and several ski battalions. A lack of highways in its zone and the highly-mobile nature of the fighting made it practically impossible to utilize wire communications for command and control of troops operating on separate axes and greatly complicated the employment of mobile means of communication. Stable radio communications took on particular importance in these conditions. Certain difficulties arose in organizing radio communications, however. fact is that in composition the group was virtually equivalent to a combinedarms army of the time, while the entire work load was on the shoulders of corps headquarters, which was little adapted for command and control of such a large mass of troops and which had far fewer radio sets than an army. The corps was unable to establish radio nets capable of ensuring reliable troop control, since it did not have the requisite means at its disposal, while including a large number of stations in a single radio net led to a substantial reduction of time available for radio traffic with each. In the search for a solution to this difficult situation, three improvised corps were formed by decision of Gen P. A. Beloy: a rifle corps and two cavalry corps. The role of corps headquarters was performed by the headquarters staffs of one of the rifle divisions, the 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry divisions. The number of combined units, and consequently radio sets in a radio net, directly subordinate to P. A. Belov was sharply reduced. This temporary measure proved quite effective. Troop control became more reliable. Although the radio operators had an extremely heavy work load, they succeeded in providing fairly stable communications.² In the course of the counteroffensive at Moscow, mobile task forces were also established in the armies (the troops of these task forces operated on separate axes), consisting of one or two tank brigades and one or two cavalry divisions. Although organization of communications in command and control of their combined units did not differ substantially from that employed in command and control of troops advancing under normal conditions, the experience was utilized to a certain degree in subsequent offensive operations.

Offensive operations conducted in the winter of 1941/42 showed that the improvised front and army mobile task forces formed in that period could not fully accomplish such an important task as developing tactical into operational offensive exploitation. By virtue of this fact, both in the counteroffensive at Moscow and in the Demyansk offensive operation Soviet forces were unable to accomplish encirclement of the large enemy force groupings or to achieve deep offensive exploitation. One of the important reasons which diminished the effectiveness of employment of such mobile task forces was deficiencies in establishment of command and control system and poor capabiliities of communications equipment.

An appropriate system of organization of command, control and communications was established in the second period of the war for successful combat employment of new armored and mechanized units, particularly for troops advancing on separated axes. During the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, for example, during operations by tank and mechanized combined units on separate axes, the combined unit commanders would follow with a command group directly behind the brigade formations on the main axis of advance. The corps command post location would be placed to the rear of the lead brigade formations. Troop control in the course of combat operations would be accomplished by means of brief commands and instructions transmitted by radio and via liaison officers. Radio communications were the principal means of providing command and control

in the course of combat operations. As a rule two nets would be established in the tank corps for communications with the brigades: one on type RSB vehicular radio sets, and the other on tank radio sets. Two nets would also be established in the mechanized corps: one net contained the radios of the mechanized brigades, and the other -- those of the tank brigades (regiments). These nets also handled command and control of subordinate brigades as well as liaison communications between them.⁴

Communications between corps and army (front) were handled by radio net, and if equipment was available, by separate radio link.

When a tank (mechanized) corps was committed into a breach in the zone of a combined-arms army, coordination radio communications would be provided by tuning an RDB set into the latter's headquarters radio net. This ensured communications both with headquarters of the large strategic formation and with headquarters of the divisions in the breakthrough sector. Mutual recognition and target designation signals would be established to ensure coordination with supporting air.

Communications between forces moving toward one another during encirclement of the enemy assumed considerable importance in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. For example, liaison radio communications between the 5th Tank Army of the Southwestern Front and the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front were handled through the liaison radio nets of the fronts by tuning into these nets headquarters radio sets of these large strategic formations and their component 1st and 26th Tank Corps and 4th Mechanized Corps. Communications between the tank corps and brigades of the 5th Tank Army as well as the combined units of the 51st Army were accomplished by mutually linking in their headquarters radio sets into the liaison radio net of the formations which were advancing toward one another.

In order to ensure liaison communications, by order of the Red Army Main Signal Directorate, a "linkup frequency" was employed for the first time in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, as well as a system of callsigns, which made it possible to determine a station's unit affiliation and to establish communications between the units and combined units completing encirclement. Subsequent radio traffic would be handled on other frequencies.

Wire communications lines were strung along the noose of encirclement in operations to encircle and destroy large enemy forces in the winter campaign of 1942/43 (Stalingrad, Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh). This provided both troop control and ccordination between the combined units which were advancing toward one another.⁵

Worthy of attention is organization of communications for command and control of the corps of the 1st Tank Army operating on separate axes in the course of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. A characteristic feature of troop control of this large strategic formation was the fact that it was accomplished with the aid of an extensive network of command and control facilities positioned through the entire depth of the tactical order of battle. As a rule three command and control facilities would be established in the army, corps and brigades: a command post (CP), a tactical headquarters or command group

(CG), and headquarters rear echelon (in today's terminology -- rear services control facility [tylovoy punkt upravleniya]), which in the course of the offensive would change position sequentially, by leapfrogging. This mode of movement proved to be the most efficient, especially during pursuit of the enemy.

Continuous command and control of army combined units in the attack position and in the course of an operation was accomplished by radio, wire and mobile means of communication.

The role of the various means of communication in providing troop control would be determined by the situation and by the character of the missions to be performed by the troops. While in the attack position wire and mobile means of communication would be of principal importance, radio would assume preeminence in the course of combat operations.

In the 1st Tank Army radio communications with the 31st and 6th Tank Corps and 3rd Mechanized Corps employed the command radio net and the "North" radio net from the task forces, and separate radio links from the large strategic formation command post.

A special front communications and reconnaissance radio net was established to support teamwork and coordination and for transmission of intelligence; this net included the sets of the command posts of the 1st Tank Army, the 31st, 6th and 29th Tank Corps, the 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 3rd Mechanized Corps, the 27th Army and headquarters of the Voronezh Front. Coordination with air was accomplished by 2 radio nets. Since air was not attached to the corps, their headquarters communicated with it via headquarters of the 1st Tank Army. Friendly troops were designated with the aid of signal flares and artillery fire (by tracer shells) in the direction of the enemy.

Wire communications were set up radially and by direction at rates of troop advance of up to 20 kilometers per day. With an increase in rate of advance, especially during pursuit, command and control would be accomplished with the aid of radio and mobile means.⁶ Difficulties in organizing wire communications would be created with abrupt, unexpected situation changes. The fact is that displacement of command and control facilities was not scheduled during the period of preparation for an operation. Displacement would be determined by decision of the commanding general in the course of the offensive. This naturally made it difficult to ready areas into which command and control facilities were to move. As a result wire lines would be run along unreconnoitered and unprepared routes, sometimes under adverse circumstances. Combined unit headquarters did not always proceed to the command post site specified in orders. In these instances the signal directorate chief needed considerable reserves of cable and pole equipment. Communications by mobile means were also extensively employed. At the army echelon, in conditions of pursuit communications would frequently be handled via a forward message center.

One observes in offensive operations in the third period of the war a further improvement of command, control and communications in mobile forces.

Principal directions for improving communications in armored and mechanized troops were determined by a number of factors, the most important of which were continuous development of the communications system and bringing it into conformity with the demands of troop control. Principal efforts were directed toward achieving stable communications capable of ensuring continuous command and control in any and all situation conditions, especially during operations on separated axes.

In view of the great depth of the operations, the planned high rates of troop advance, and difficulties in providing communications during operations on separated axes, the tank armies and corps attached particular importance to mobility of command and control facility communications centers. Principal attention was focused on radio communications. In a number of tank formations and combined units, radio sets were mounted on vehicles with good cross-country capability. A mobile radio center, for example, was established in the signal regiment of the 2nd Tank Army in the Belorussian Operation. In the 5th Guards Tank Army the army communications center radio equipment was divided among three sites, one of which provided command post radio communications, one was at the army's auxiliary command and control facility (AC²F), while the third was designated for organizing communications of the subsequent command post.⁸

Of considerable importance for ensuring stable communications in tank formations, tank and mechanized corps was the fact from 1944 their headquarters staffs began working out an arrangement of siting command and control facilities by lines and axes of advance. This made it possible to perform measures in advance pertaining to communications readying command and control facilities, to coordinate the movement of senior and subordinate headquarters, and to ensure reliable communications between command and control facilities, subordinate and higher headquarters during a location change.

During highly mobile operations by armored and mechanized troops on separate axes, just as during an offensive operation in normal conditions, particular importance was attached to thorough advance preparation and verification of readiness for combat utilization of all communications equipment, particularly radio, which was the principal means of communication during displacement of command and control facilities. During a swift troop advance in the course of pursuit, command and control facilities were in movement most of the time. During movement it was not possible to employ for radio communications efficient antennas providing long-range communications. Therefore, in order not to disrupt continuity of troop control, radio communications would be conducted during brief halts. In those cases when distances between army command and control facilities and the combined units advancing on separate axes exceeded the effective range of available radio sets, intermediate retransmitting points would be employed. During the Belorussian Operation, for example, by 30 July 1944 separation of the 3rd Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army, which was operating on the main axis of advance, amounted to 60 km. Communications with the command post were threatened. A team of radio

operators with two RSB sets and one STsR-229 was sent out under cover of darkness. They were used as retransmitting units. Thanks to this, continuity of communications between command authorities and the tank corps was main-tained.⁹

An important measure in ensuring continuity of command and control in the course of combat operations on separate axes was disposition of personnel and radio communications equipment in depth during command post resiting to a new location. Various methods were employed for echeloning in depth.

Two radio teams were available for this, for example, in the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation. One of these was kept in reserve and was in a continuous state of readiness to move out for operations at a new CP site.¹⁰ During the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation, in the 3rd Guards Tank Army the formation command post would be redeployed to the site of the AC^2F . From 10 to 12 hours before making the move, reinforcements would be sent out from the command post to the AC^2F -- RAF and RSB radio sets with crews and cable for putting in keying lines. During the time the command post was in the process of moving to a new site, the AC²F radio team, reinforced with two radio sets, would take over all radio communications on a special radio signal from the CP. The CP radio team would be redeployed to the new site fairly rapidly, since the principal keying lines would be readied in advance. As a result AC²F radio equipment would be freed up and its radio team would proceed to the new site. Redeployment of formation corps command posts was organized in like manner. When there was a considerable distance between troops and command post, the $AC^{2}F$ radio team would perform the intermediate retransmitting role.

Dependability and continuity of radio communications depended on the following: on the makeup of the $AC^{2}F$ radio team, which with slight reinforcement could assume the entire radio communications of the main command post, which was very important during redeployment of the latter; radio communications organizational layout, enabling the commander (at the $AC^{2}F$) and his chief of staff (at the CP) to maintain communications simultaneously with higher headquarters, corps commanders and chiefs of staff; on efficient radio bureau utilization both at CP and $AC^{2}F$.

Of great importance for ensuring stable and efficient command and control in conditions of troops fighting on separate axes in the operations of the third period of the Great Patriotic War was radio communications redundancy, that is, organization and securement of communications with the same station by several channels. The availability of only one channel for communications with subordinate combined units sharply diminished communications stability. Practical fighting experience in the East Prussian Operation indicated that it was essential to have at least three radio communications channels for succuessful command and control of armored and mechanized combined units operating on separated axes.

Typical of command and control of troops on separated axes was the organization of radio communications in the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation (see diagram).¹¹ A specific feature of these radio




Diagram of Radio Communications of the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation

Key:

- 1. Command
- 2. Artillery
- 3. Intelligence
- 4. Independent army artillery units
- 5. Reconnaissance parties
- 6. AC^2F
- 7. Army headquarters
- 8. Red Army General Staff
- 9. "North"
- 10. Army base
- 11. Command post

отбр. Independent tank brigade Mechanized corps MH . Guards tank corps ГВ.ТК. P/c. Radio net омцп. Independent motorcycle regiment . 1Уф. First Ukrainian Front TA. Tank army Α. Army РСБ. RSB ΡAΦ. RAF P/H. Radio link

communications lay in the fact that command and control of tank and mechanized combined units could be accomplished by radio links both from the command post and from the auxiliary command and control facility. Communications with the corps were provided from the AC²F on four and from the CP on three simultaneously operating channels, and this substantially improved stability of radio communications.

In addition, three radio nets were employed to support teamwork and coordination between combined units operating on separated axes: army headquarters (radio net 1), command (radio net 2), and intelligence (radio net 4).

Radio communications with adjacent large strategic formations (combined units) merit attention. In organizing communications in the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation, for example, it was considered most expedient, in order to obtain stable information from the army deployed on the right or the large strategic formation in the zone of which the tank army was operating, to assign the army's own operations man with an RSB set.¹²

In the course of combat operations, in order to ensure uninterrupted wire communications during displacement of command and control facilities, a tank army chief of signal troops general reserve was formed, as well as specific wire communications equipment reserves on the communications links with the corps. The lines were strung on unlikely avenues of tank movements, far from roads. Monitoring stations were set up with greater frequency and emergency repair crews formed in areas of likely line damage. As a rule each monitoring station had repair materials.¹³

Organization of communications by mobile means during troop operations on separated axes depended on the operational situation. Uninterrupted communications were achieved by establishing and using exchange points, forward message centers, and (when necessary) liaison aircraft.

Troop operations on separated axes also occurred on the Transbaikal Front during the Manchurian Operation. This was dictated by the specific features of the terrain in the theater and the combat tasks being performed by the large strategic formations.

Organization of communications for command and control of troops operating on separated axes in this theater had its specific features. It was necessary to ensure reliable communications in conditions of a rapid rate of advance to considerable depth. With a frequent redeployment of command and control facilities and a considerable distance between these facilities, the main role was assigned to mobile means of communications and radio. The principal mobile means of communications were aircraft, which carried liaison officers to the combat troops. Radio was frequently the sole means of accomplishing command and control.

In order to ensure reliable radio communications with headquarters of large strategic formations (combined units), radio communications link chiefs would be designated, with their own assigned radio equipment. If vehicle radio units fell behind, low-power radio sets would be used, with the aid of which radio communications would be provided by sky waves or via intermediate retransmitting points. Reliability of radio communications during displacement of command posts was achieved by figuring the radio equipment to be utilized for this purpose for three sites, and establishing a strong backup capability.

Let us examine organization and provision of communications for command and control of the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army of the Transbaikal Front. The troops of this large strategic formation were advancing on two axes separated from one another by a distance of 70-80 km. A rapid rate of advance and considerable separation between the large strategic formation and the front's remaining forces in the course of the operation made an imprint on the organization of command and control. In order to ensure its stability and continuity, army field headquarters and means of communication were divided among two command and control facility locations. Their displacement would be accomplished by leapfrogging, in such a manner that while one was en route the other would be providing uninterrupted troop control. Command and control facilities would be brought closer to the forward units. In all cases, when this was possible, there would be personal contact between higher-echelon and subordinate commanders and staffs. Radio was the principal means ensuring uninterrupted troop control. Liaison aircraft were also extensively utilized.

* * *

Thus the following were the principal features of organization of command and control of armored and mechanized troops operating on separated axes in the course of offensive operations: conduct of radio communications by radio links; employment of mobile communications centers; employment of intermediate retransmitting points; disposition of radio communications personnel and equipment in depth during displacement of command and control facilities; establishment of wire communications reserve and coordination radio nets for forces advancing toward one another (during encirclement of large enemy force groupings); securement of radio communications on at least 3 channels with one station; extensive employment of mobile means of communication.

As the war progressed, improvement of the system of command and control of troops operating on separated axes proceeded in the direction of expanding the network of command and control facilities (especially $AC^{2}F$), bringing them

closer to the combat troops, and development of the most expedient displacement sequence and procedure.

Combat experience of organizing communications for command and control of armored and mechanized troops operating on separated axes continues to remain valid today.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Footnote omitted.
- 2. P. A. Belov, "Za nami Moskva" [Behind Us Lies Moscow], Voyenizdat, 1963, pp 156-158.
- 3. Footnote omitted.
- 4. "Sluzhba svyazi Krasnoy Armii. Po opytu dvukh let Otechestvennoy voyny (iyun' 1941 g.-iyun' 1943 g.)" [Red Army Signal Service. Based on the Experience of Two Years of the Patriotic War (June 1941-1943)], Voyenizdat, 1943, pp 175-192.
- 5. "Istoriya razvitiya voysk svyazi" [History of Development of the Signal Troops], Voyenizdat, 1980, page 177.
- 6. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 300, List 440736, File 1, Sheet 35.
- 7. Footnote omitted.
- 8. "Istoriya...," op. cit., pp 260-261.
- 9. TsAMO, Fund 405, List 9817, File 188, Sheet 3.

10. Ibid., Fund 200, List 440741, File 3, Sheet 40.

- 11. Ibid., Fund 315, List 4461, File 148, Sheet 42.
- 12. Ibid., Fund 200, List 440741, File 3, Sheet 40.
- 13. Ibid., Fund 315, List 4461, File 149, Sheet 67.

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CSO: 1801/318

WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN WEATHER SUPPORT FOR AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 20-26

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" and subheading "Operational Art," by Engr-Col (Ret) V. Speranskiy*: "Meteorological Support for Air Combat Operations"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War weather conditions were an extremely important situation factor which determined employment of aviation. The success of air combat operations depended in large measure on the degree of reliability of weather information and anticipated weather changes as well as expeditious communication of this information to command authorities and aircrew personnel.

When the war began the Air Force had a fully established weather service organization and a perfected system of air operations meteorological support.

As of 1 January 1941 the Air Force had approximately 320 weather service subunits, including 195 in aviation units in the western frontier military districts. These subunits were staffed by 400 weather service officers (65 percent of authorized requirements). Weather observers were almost up to authorized strength. All weather stations were supplied with the requisite instrumentation and equipment. There were 200 truck-mounted field weather stations (PMS) in all districts. District air forces command authorities gave good marks to weather service performance for 1940.¹ The Air Force weather service was at this status on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR was exceptionally complicated and difficult for the Air Force weather service.

Direct weather support of air combat operations was handled by the air forces weather offices of the fronts, armies, and air divisions, as well as airfield service battalion weather stations. The air forces weather services of the Northern, Northwestern, Western, Southwestern, and Southern fronts were headed

* In 1939-1941 and in 1942-1944 Viktor Mikhaylovich Speranskiy headed the Soviet Army Air Force weather service.

by experienced officers M. N. Shevchenko, A. V. Vlasov, N. V. Azarov, P. K. Teplenko, and N. A. Chernyshev respectively.

Immediately following the attack on the USSR, all countries taking part in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany ceased clear-text radio broadcasting of weather reports. In the first months of the war weather reports also stopped coming from enemy-occupied territory as well as from certain frontier areas. Synoptic weather maps began to look truncated, and analysis of weather processes moving into the European part of the USSR, most frequently from the west, was extremely difficult, which in turn greatly complicated weather forecasting. In this respect the enemy's weather service was in a more favorable situation.

In addition to the above, our meteorologists were faced with many other difficulties as well. Frequent rebasing of aviation units, disruption of telephone and telegraph communications, as well as a shortage of weather specialists and equipment greatly complicated the job of weather service subunits. Nevertheless they transmitted weather information to the air forces weather offices of the fronts, prepared synoptic maps, and prepared weather forecasts and summaries in combat zones, with reports regularly forwarded to command authorities. All weather service subunits kept a vigilant eye out for hazardous weather, warning aircrews about such situations.

Here is an example of how the air forces command authorities of the Southwestern Front assessed the performance of the weather service. "The weather service has been performing quite satisfactorily from the beginning of the war; as a rule forecasts prove to be correct, and weather alerts are reported promptly and expeditiously. Military Engr 3rd Rank P. K. Teplenko is putting a lot of effort, concern and energy into organization of the front's air forces weather service." The air forces weather services of the Northwestern, Western, Bryansk, Southern, and Karelian fronts also received good performance ratings.^{1a}

In the central part of the country meteorological support of air combat operations was assigned to the Air Force Main Aviation Weather Center (GAMS) and the Central Weather Institute of the USSR Hydrometeorological Service. GAMS provided command authorities and Air Force headquarters with all requisite weather information, and also handled the weather briefing needs for combat sorties flown by the 6th Air Defense Fighter Corps within a 200 kilometer radius of Moscow, and forwarded daily forecasts to the air forces weather offices of the fronts and to long-range bomber combined units. It also played an important support role in the movement of aviation units and groups of aircraft from rear-area districts to the fronts, as well as during concentration of aircraft in the main sectors where air action was being conducted against the enemy.

Every 6 hours the Central Weather Institute broadcast weather reports for preparing weather maps and provided briefings on synoptic processes. These broadcasts were received by all Air Force weather service subunits. In addition, the institute provided the Air Force weather service with long-range weather forecasts for each month by combat sector, as well as providing scientific workups and methods manuals. At the same time a number of measures would be

carried out for the purpose of improving the performance of the Air Force weather service. A large number of officer-meteorologists and junior weather specialists were sent to the front to form new weather service subunits; the requisite weather service equipment, radio gear and consumables were also sent. The training curriculum was shortened for military meteorologists with a higher and secondary technical education, and early graduations of training classes were performed; the total number of specialists in training was also increased. Approximately 100 weather forecasters on reserve status were assigned to Air Force units. In the summer of 1941 the military faculty at the Moscow Hydrometeorological Institute (MHMI) was redesignated the Soviet Army Higher Military Hydrometeorological Institute (HMHMI). In 1942 a 3-month training curriculum was introduced for training into weather service officers NCO meteorologists who had completed Air Force special services school. By 1 November 1942 more than 2500 male weather observers and code specialist-radio operators had been replaced by women who had received training at junior aviation specialist schools.² The overwhelming majority of these subsequently performed their jobs well.

In July 1941 the country's civilian hydrometeorological service was merged with the military weather service. The Air Force Headquarters Weather Service Directorate, GAMS and the Air Force's headquarters weather services of the rear-area military districts were transferred into the system of the Soviet Army Main Directorate of Hydrometeorological Service (GUGMS). Famed polar explorer Hero of the Soviet Union Ye. K. Fedorov was placed in charge of it.

The weather service subunits of aviation combined units and units rapidly collected data on weather at airfields as well as from aircrews, synthesized this data and reported to the command authorities the weather situation and expected weather changes. A special ll-man weather office was formed during the period of the battle of Moscow and functioned on a regular basis. It was headed by Engr-Maj I. V. Kravchenko. Situated adjacent to the command post of the commanding general of the Soviet Army Air Force outside Moscow, it provided him and his command group with weather situation data and weather forecasts in the combat zones. The weather forecast reported personally to Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin on the eve of the historic military review on 7 November 1941 also proved absolutely correct.

The book "The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945" states the following about the performance of the weather service: "Successful Air Force combat operations would have been impossible without comprehensive support first and foremost by the workers on the home front, the men of the aviation engineer service, the aviation rear services, the Air Force navigation and weather services."³

Radio weather centers (RMTs) were established in November 1941 on the basis of weather offices and front air forces liaison agencies, collection of weather information from the weather service subunits of the air forces of the fronts and ground forces was organized, regular broadcast of weather information began to provided, and the time required for weather data to be transmitted by wire communications was reduced. By 1 January 1942 such radio weather centers were operating on all fronts. There were many negative aspects to the fact that there was no supervisory meteorological agency at Soviet Army Air Force headquarters. Therefore in February 1942 a meteorological department was established in order to achieve greater efficiency in directing the weather service and increasing responsibility for meteorological support of air combat operations. This writer was placed in charge of it and the Air Force weather service. Energetic, welltrained officers with considerable work experience were assigned to this department: P. A. Borisovets, M. K. Arkhiptsev, P. F. Kostryukov, I. S. Nikolayev, S. A. Tyurev, and A. M. Yakovlev. Somewhat later, in May 1942, GAMS and the weather offices at the Air Force headquarters of the rear-area districts were detached together with their personnel from the GUGMS system and transferred over to the Air Force. Supervision of flight operations meteorological support at the front and in the rear was assigned to the meteorological department at Soviet Army Air Force headquarters.

Aviation weather offices (AMB) became operations entities under the weather service chiefs of air armies and air divisions, and subsequently aviation corps as well, while meteorological support for aviation units continued to be provided by aviation weather stations (AMS) of independent air regiments and airfield service battalions (BAO), which were run by the weather service chiefs of the air basing areas (RAB). This structure was maintained up to the end of the war.

In March 1942 long-range aviation (ADD) obtained its own independent weather service. Engr-Maj A. S. Potapov was named head of this service. Air defense fighter aviation weather service also became independent. It was headed by Engr-Maj A. N. Tikhomirov. By the end of 1942 tactical air combat operations were being provided support by more than 70 weather offices and 300 weather stations of airfield service battalions and independent air regiments. These weather subunits were at 90-94 percent authorized strength.⁴

"Instructions for the Chief of an Airfield Service Battalion Aviation Weather Station Pertaining to Meteorological Support of Air Regiment Combat Operations," approved by the chief of staff of the Soviet Army Air Force, were prepared and issued in 1942 on the basis of the synthesized experience of the meteorological department.

In 1942 weather support was organized and successfully provided on the air route Basra-Teheran-Kirovabad for aircraft transporting supplies to the Soviet Union during the war years on lend-lease from our allies which had been delivered to the Iranian port of Abadan. Air Force meteorological subunits of the rear-area districts also took part in providing meteorological support for aircraft ferry runs from the United States along the Trans-Siberian air route.

Thus in the first period of the war the Air Force weather service, in spite of the difficult situation and the fact of a number of deficiencies, was able to provide support of air combat operations and amassed experience in organizing practical operations.

IN THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR the weather service continued to become strengthened, the forms of meteorological support of air combat operations were

improved, new meteorological subunits were formed, and specialist personnel were becoming available in growing numbers. On every front the air army headquarters aviation weather office (AMB) was the principal operational-forecasting agency. All weather information was concentrated here. It was disseminated by schedule via radio weather centers. Radio weather reports were received and three synoptic and 6-8 regional weather maps would be prepared; weather forecasts in the combat zones would be prepared on the basis of Central Institute and Air Force GAMS briefings, as well as aerial weather reconnaissance and local observations. These forecasts were basic information sources. They would be reported to command authorities and communicated to the front headquarters hydrometeorological department and all air army meteorological subunits. The latter made changes only if new weather data were available. This procedure continued until the end of the war. The weather offices of the air armies were staffed with well trained specialists. In order to provide weather data to air army commanders and their command groups, there began the procedure of assigning specialists from the weather offices to auxiliary command and control facilities (VPU). There were always meteorologists on duty during combat sorties at the command posts of aviation corps, divisions, and regiments.

Airborne weather reconnaissance underwent more extensive development. Aircrews flying combat missions would conduct it on an incidental basis. In addition, all air armies specifically assigned aircraft, and subsequently flights, with the most highly trained aircrews, which on weather office request would fly out in the required direction and report observed weather by radio. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, for example, in a period of 45 days the 2nd Bomber Corps alone flew 45 weather reconnaissance flights. Engr-Capt Ye. K. Bugrov, weather service chief of the 287th Fighter Division, and engineer-meteorologist L. A. Voytashevskaya flew with aircrews almost daily on weather reconnaissance. Meteorologists were on duty at aviation combined unit and unit command posts. For example, on duty at the command post of the commander of the 8th Air Army, Gen T. T. Khryukin, was weather office chief Engr-Maj I. G. Yermolayev, who provided him and his command group with all requisite weather data.

Often combat operations would be conducted in very bad weather, and meteorologists had literally to "catch" local weather improvements. On 5 January 1943, for example, during the Velikiye Luki Operation, the weather was very bad, but the weather office forecast a brief weather improvement by 1300-1400 hours: cloud bases would rise to 200 meters, with increased visibility. Command authorities took this into consideration. Ground-attack aircraft successfully assisted ground troops in repelling enemy attacks.

Weather information received by radio from partisans, although sporadic, nevertheless was quite valuable. On 2 July 1943, for example, on the basis of incomplete synoptic maps one could hardly expect favorable weather that night between Moscow and Kiev. A report received from partisans that weather observed in the Korosten - Gomel area was scattered clouds enabled the ADD command to make a more correct weather evaluation and to conduct a successful bombing strike on the designated target.⁷ We should note the organizational changes which took place in ADD. In June 1943 a branch of the Central Weather Institute was established at its headquarters; its synoptic map makers, together with weather office specialists, performed all forecasting and briefing activities.

Thus meteorological support of air combat operations was substantially improved in the second period of the war.

IN THE THIRD PERIOD OF THE WAR, with an increase in the scale of offensive operations, in which massive air support was employed, there was a substantial increase in the tasks and role of the Air Force weather service. In the Belorussian strategic operation, for example, air combat operations were supported by more than 200 meteorological subunits of air armies and air combined units of the Supreme High Command Reserve, involving approximately 2000 specialists, including 480 officers.⁸ This demanded precision teamwork and a great deal of coordination. Therefore the air army weather service chiefs, upon receiving appropriate instructions, would conduct the requisite preparation in the preparatory period prior to an operation and would determine the work sequence and procedure for meteorological subunits for all phases of the operation. Various methods of expanding collection of weather data were employed: additional weather reconnaissance flights were scheduled; weather observers with radio sets were assigned to forward navigation ground support service posts, information would be received from aviation representatives in the combined-arms (tank) armies, and weather information would be exchanged with the subunits of adjacent air armies and fleet air forces in coastal areas. Weather teams from AMS and BAO would be sent out to airfields captured from the enemy together with forward teams, in order to obtain weather information for the purpose of providing meteorological support of the units rebased to these fields. A weather team was assigned to the VPU of the air army commander. In organizing teamwork and coordination, especially with meteorological subunits of Supreme High Command Reserve aviation corps and divisions, orientation courses were held for weather service leader personnel, at which the procedure of mutual exchange of weather information would be established and other matters pertaining to meteorological support would be resolved. Corresponding instructions would be appended to an air army order. On the basis of the Central Weather Institute's bong-range forecast, Air Force GAMS briefings, and its own observations, the weather office would prepare a weather forecast for the first day and the next 2-3 days of an operation. On the eve of the operation the meteorologists would communicate this forecast to the air army commander and his staff and forward it to the hydrometeorological department at front headquarters and to all meteorological subunits of aviation combined units and units.

At subsequent stages of an operation, one of the principal tasks of the weather service was that of obtaining weather data from airborne weather reconnaissance and other specified weather information sources, as well as rapid communication of this data to leader personnel and aircrews. Weather support of air combat operations in the Iasi-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, East Prussian, Berlin and other offensive operations was accomplished in this manner. More than 5500 weather reconnaissance missions were flown in 1944-1945, while the total number of weather reports from special and incidental reconnaissance in tactical aviation exceeded 60,000 for the entire war.⁹ In longrange aviation, where no night bomber mission was flown without a weather determination, during the entire war a total of 2738 separate weather reconnaissance missions were flown, or 1.4 percent of the total number of combat sorties.¹⁰

The accuracy of forecasts played an important role. Here is an example. Commencement of the assault on Koenigsberg was postponed from 5 to 6 April 1945 by order of Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hg SHC), due to adverse weather. Hg SHC representative Chief Mar Avn A. A. Novikov, who was supervising and coordinating the combat operations of several air armies, recalled: "...As soon as the meteorologists gave a favorable weather forecast for 7 April, I ordered almost all the bombers retargeted to the principal centers of resistance immediately forward of our battle groups. The fog had scarcely lifted when our ground-attack aircraft appeared over the enemy's positions. Fighters of the 11th Fighter Corps flew several low-level strikes on airfields in Gross-Dirschkeim and Gross-Hubnicken, which were subsequently completely sealed off from the air. The bombers of the 1st and 3rd Air armies and 5th Guards Bomber Corps went into action from 1000 hours on.... I ordered the combined units of the 18th Air Army into the air -- all four corps.... Soviet airstrikes reached maximum force on 8 April."11

Many such positive examples of precision work by the weather service could be cited. We should emphasize that the command authorities and aircrews were well aware of all the difficulties connected with forecasting weather.

We should say a few words about the work done by the most numerous component of the Air Force weather service -- the BAO AMS, the total number of which reached 350 on the fronts by war's end. While small in size (7 persons), in addition to a substantial work volume they performed another very important task -- communication of all weather data to aircrews. Not one combat sortie was flown without a detailed weather briefing for unit commanders and flight crews. Meteorologists not only were on duty at command posts and personally flew on weather reconnaissance missions, but also held meteorology classes for flight personnel.

In 1944, under the supervision of Engr-Maj I. V. Kravchenko and with the direct assistance of the Air Force GAMS (Maj Gen Air Force Engineer Service V. I. Al'tovskiy, commanding), U.S. bomber "shuttle" operations, flying missions against military-economic targets in Germany and its satellites, were successfully run from airfields in the Poltava area.

As of 1 May 1945 the weather service at the fronts totaled approximately 400 top-qualification specialists together with weather forecasters called up from the reserves, or 86 percent of staff requirements, which made it possible substantially to improve meteorological support for air combat operations.^{11a} Officers from the Air Force Weather Service Directorate regularly visited the air army combined units and units to assist the meteorological subunits. Utilizing the experience obtained on the Soviet-German front, the Air Force weather service successfully provided support of air combat operations in the Far East as well, in the war against militarist Japan.

A total of 3,124,000 tactical and long-range aviation sorties were flown during the Great Patriotic War,¹² As well as a large number of group and individual flights.

Thus the principal trend in the activities of the Air Force weather service in the course of the Great Patriotic War was comprehensive execution and continuous improvement of measures directed toward efficient meteorological support for air combat operations, such as the following: extensive training of specialists, improvement in the organizational structure of the weather service and staffing of new meteorological subunits, organization of radio weather centers and regular radio broadcasting of weather information, extensive utilization of airborne weather reconnaissance and participation by meteorologists on such flights, assignment of weather specialists to command posts of air combined units and units, acquisition of supplementary weather information sources, coordination with the Soviet Army hydrometeorological service, as well as regular briefings at the Central Weather Institute and Air Force GAMS. All these measures made it possible to provide efficient and high-quality support for air combat operations throughout the entire war.

Thus weather specialists made a substantial contribution to the cause of victory over the enemy. The command authorities greatly appreciated their labor. During the years of the Great Patriotic War more than 2000 officers and junior specialists of the Air Force weather service were awarded Soviet decorations and medals for excellent performance in meteorological support for air combat operations.¹³

Today the Air Force weather service, thanks to tireless concern on the part of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government, has highly qualified and experienced specialist cadres and is equipped with modern technical means, radar systems, and automated weather information collection and distribution systems. All this makes it possible to accomplish on a scientifically valid and high level the tasks of meteorological support for flight operations, innovatively utilizing the experience amassed during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

- TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 35, List 23054, File 3, sheets 10, 15, 38, 43, 48, 56, 64, 67, 71, 80, 89, 132, 152, 155.
- 1a. Ibid., Fund 35, List 23056, File 10, sheets 11, 12.
- 2. Ibid., List 34179, File 3, Sheet 209.
- "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Voyenizdat, 1968, page 87.

- 4. TsAMO, Fund 35, List 23056, File 10, sheets 4, 297, 299; List 23057, File 1, sheets 89, 128, 131; List 23058, File 6, Vol 1, sheets 1, 9, 32, 281.
- 5, 6. Footnote omitted.
- 7. TsAMO, Fund 35, List 34179, File 2, sheets 122, 178.
- 8. Ibid., List 23061, File 2, sheets 10, 18, 86.

9. Ibid., Fund 35, List 34179, File 3, Sheet 235.

10. Ibid., File 2, sheets 139, 230, 233, 235.

11. "9 maya 1945 goda" [9 May 1945], Moscow, Nauka, 1970, pp 286, 288, 290.

11a. TsAMO, Fund 35, List 34179, File 2, Sheet 198.

12. "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye...," op. cit., page 438.

13. TsAMO, Fund 35, List 34179, File 3, Sheet 246.

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CSO: 1801/318

WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN AIR DEFENSE FOR NAVAL FLEETS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 27-33

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" and subheading "Operational Art," by Chief of Naval Air Defense Rear Adm S. Teglev: "Covering Fleets From Air Attacks"; passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] In the prewar years manuals and regulations devoted considerable attention to fleet air defense. It was viewed as a most important type of combat support of warship operations at sea as well as defense of naval bases.

Fleet air defense was provided by fighter aviation, ground personnel and equipment (antiaircraft artillery units, antiaircraft machinegun subunits, antiaircraft searchlight units, aircraft-warning service (VNOS) units and subunits), as well as shipboard antiaircraft artillery.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War air defense of the Northern, Red-Banner Baltic and Black Sea fleets included fighter regiments (442 aircraft), antiaircraft artillery regiments and battalions (738 guns), 6 antiaircraft machinegun battalions, 15 antiaircraft searchlight battalions and independent companies, and 6 independent aircraft-warning service battalions and companies.¹

The antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machineguns available in the fleets at the beginning of the war provided protection only to naval bases. Important installations away from bases (base maneuver areas, airfields, supply depots, etc) remained unprotected against air attack.

Antiaircraft artillery was developing at an inadequate pace. Warships were poorly armed with antiaircraft artillery, and the quality of the guns left much to be desired. The experience of the first weeks of the war revealed the need to strengthen antiaircraft artillery, to mount larger-caliber artillery and automatic guns on warships, and to increase their number.

Fleet antiaircraft artillery units were armed primarily with 76.2 mm guns. Very small numbers of new 37 mm automatic antiaircraft guns began to be delivered. Fighter aviation was a most important component of the Navy's air defense forces. Fighter aviation was manned by well-trained pilots and ground crews, who had thoroughly studied their equipment, had mastered air combat tactics, and possessed excellent fighting and moral-political qualities. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons reequipping of naval aviation with new types of aircraft was proceeding with considerable delay.² As of the spring of 1941 87.5 percent of naval aircraft were of obsolete types, including fighters.

Air defense fighter aviation, equipped with aircraft of obsolete types (I-16, I-15 bis, I-153), which were performance-inferior to the adversary's aircraft, were unable adequately to protect warships at sea from air attack. Due to the aircraft's limited combat radius, weak armament and poor airborne endurance, they were unable to provide ships with reliable protection even at a comparatively short distance from the coast. This substantially limited utilization of fleet forces in areas within range of hostile aircraft.³

The navy's air defense directorate was headed throughout the war by Lt Gen Arty V. D. Sergeyev (effective 24 January 1943 deputy chief of naval air forces for air defense -- chief of naval air defense). In 1941 Maj Gen Arty A.F. Pimenov (Northern Fleet air defense chief from August 1942) was chief of the air defense directorate of the Northern Fleet. In June 1941 air defense in the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet was directed by Gen Shore Service G. S. Zashikhin (on 29 July air defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was reorganized into the directorate of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet air defense chief, which functioned up to the end of the war). The Black Sea Fleet contained the Crimean Air Defense Sector, reorganized on 31 July 1942 into an air defense directorate. It was headed by Maj Gen Arty I. S. Zhilin. The fleet air defense chief was subordinate to the commander of air forces of the corresponding fleet.

As we see, there was no uniform organizational structure of air defense in the fleets. It depended on the composition of each fleet's air defense forces, their assigned tasks, and the specific features of the theater. Organization of air defense improved as the war progressed.

Fleet air defense personnel and equipment were concentrated at naval bases.⁴ All units and subunits providing air defense of the facilities and forces of a given naval base comprised an air defense sector. It included permanentlyassigned air defense ground personnel and equipment plus attached fighter aviation, which was operationally subordinate to the air defense sector chief. The air defense artillery of warships in base was in the same subordination structure.

Fascist Germany's military command authorities, utilizing the territory of Finland, Romania, and Norway, deployed considerable air forces in advance, with the objective of destroying our fleet. As of 22 June 1941 they had concentrated approximately 2167 aircraft in coastal sectors (498 in the northern, 869 in the western, and 800 in the southern).⁵

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War our fleets had a developed air defense system which was at a high degree of combat readiness. In spite of

the fact that many naval bases were subjected to enemy air attacks during the very first hours of the war, we did not lose a single warship or aircraft to the enemy's first strike. Nor did the Hitlerites succeed in achieving another objective -- to prevent warships from putting to sea by planting magnetic influence mines by air in the vicinity of our bases. Fighter aviation, shipboard and shore antiaircraft artillery, aircraft-warning system units and subunits, and antiaircraft searchlight units and subunits at Sevastopol', Kronshtadt and other naval bases met the enemy fully armed and successfully repulsed the first strikes.

The fleets' air defense experienced considerable difficulties /in the first period of the war./ These were caused by the enemy's air superiority as well as by the fact that naval aviation in general and fighter aviation in particular was employed for the most part to support ground troops. In spite of this fact, the fleets essentially successfully accomplished the air defense mission.

/In the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet/ air defense forces repulsed enemy air attacks at Liyepaya, Hanko, Kronshtadt and other bases, and also protected our lines of communication. Defense of our main base, Tallinn, during the defensive fighting in the Baltic was handled by two squadrons of the 71st Fighter Regiment and a squadron of the 13th Fighter Regiment, plus antiaircraft artillery. In connection with the enemy's advance eastward, fighter aviation began to be used with increasing frequency for operations on the land front.⁶

Command and control of fighter aviation within the air defense system was handled by the commander of the 10th Composite Aviation Brigade, the command post of which was collocated with the command post of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet's air defense chief, who was simultaneously responsible for the air defense of Tallinn.

When the war began the Hanko Naval Base was provided air cover by a patrolling 3-ship formation of fighters, and subsequently by a 2-ship formation. This placed considerable stress on the pilots, who had to fly 8-9 missions per day. Effective 10 July the base was provided air cover primarily from an alert-on-ground status.

On the first day of the war the naval base's pilots downed an enemy aircraft which was attempting to bomb Hanko. From 3 July on the initiative in the air in the Hanko area went over to our air warriors, who destroyed 44 enemy aircraft during defense of the base, while not losing a single plane. A particularly fine job in aerial combat was done by Capt A. K. Antonenko, who downed 11 fascist aircraft in two months, primarily bombers; Capt P. A. Brin'ko, who had 15 downed aircraft to his credit, including 2 ME-110 fighters which he rammed. Both were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for their courage and heroism.

During the period of combat operations Kronshtadt was defended by the air defense sector's three antiaircraft artillery regiments, three independent antiaircraft artillery battalions, aircraft-warning service units and subunits, other air defense means, as well as the 61st Fighter Brigade, the command post of which was collocated with the command post of the air defense sector commander. Fighters were guided to the enemy from the command posts of the fighter regiment and antiaircraft regiment commanders, but the latter performed guidance only when authorized from the Kronshtadt Air Defense Sector command post.

Kronshtadt's air defense forces worked in close coordination with Leningrad's air defense forces. They operated a common hostile aircraft warning system, exchanged air situation information, and joint air actions were organized.⁷

On the first two days of the war the fascists flew four strikes on Kronshtadt. They were repulsed by base antiaircraft artillery, which downed three enemy aircraft, and by fighters patrolling over Kronshtadt.

The enemy subsequently mounted regular airstrikes in force against the ships of the Baltic Fleet. The heaviest attacks were flown against Kronshtadt on 21-23 September 1941 (approximately 400 bomber sorties with fighter escort), but the enemy failed to inflict significant damage on the warships, while losing 24 aircraft.⁸

In April 1942 the Hitlerite air forces mounted air operation "Eisstoss" ("Ice Strike"), with the objective of destroying warships of the Baltic Fleet.

Aggressive actions by the Leningrad Air Defense Army and the air defense assets of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet, as well as the air forces of the Leningrad Front completely thwarted this operation.⁹

In addition to protecting naval bases against air attack, fleet air defense successfully defended important water routes. Suffice it to say that during the war years more than 2.75 million tons of various cargo and more than 2 million persons were transported along Baltic basin lines of communication.¹⁰ Approximately 741,500 tons of cargo and 253,000 persons, for example, were transported on Lake Ladoga just during the 1942 navigation season. In addition to the manpower and equipment of the National Air Defense Forces, a special naval air forces aviation group was formed on 16 September 1941, which also included fighter subunits of the 8th, 15th, and 54th armies, to protect lines of communication.¹¹

Protection of lines of communication was provided by fighters for the most part on airborne patrol as well as on-ground alert status. A combination of these two modes ensured successful protective coverage. In 1941-1942 Red-Banner Baltic Fleet air forces flew more than 8,000 sorties to protect lines of communication and fought 200 air engagements, which involved the participation of up to 750 Soviet aircraft.¹² The 13th Fighter Regiment particularly distinguished itself in battle. On 19 January 1942 it was redesignated the 4th Guards Fighter Regiment. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to its top pilots, party members Lt Col V. F. Golubev, Maj G. D. Tsokolayev, and Capts M. Ya. Vasil'yev, P. P. Kozhanov, A. I. Kuznetsov, and A. Yu. Baysultanov. /Black Sea Fleet air defense/ was assigned the following missions when the war began: to prevent air attacks on naval bases, ports and other facilities, destroying enemy aircraft and forcing them to abort their combat mission; to protect against air attack warships at sea and in base, when leaving and returning to base.¹³

In 1941-1942 German-fascist air efforts were directed toward mounting strikes on Sevastopol. In June 1942 alone, for example, enemy bombers flew more than 17,100 sorties against installations and troops in Sevastopol.¹⁴ The period of defense of Sevastopol is characterized by numerous air battles, in which as many as 50 or more fighters on both sides would be involved. Our pilots attacked the enemy boldly and resolutely, and when their ammunition would run out, they would ram the enemy.

The enemy also repeatedly attacked Novorossiysk. These attacks were successfully repulsed when there was good organization of teamwork and cooperation between fighter aviation and ground air defense assets. On 28 April 1942, for example, more than 20 Ju-88 aircraft, flying in three groups, attempted to attack the base. 22 Soviet fighters, guided by radio from the air defense command post, met them on the near approaches to the city, penetrated their formation, broke it up and proceeded to shoot down individual aircraft. Failing to reach the targets, the Hitlerites dumped their bomb loads and proceeded to withdraw. Nine enemy aircraft were downed and five disabled in that air battle. No Soviet fighters were lost.

There were instances, however, when prompt air defense measures were not taken and enemy aircraft succeeded in delivering fairly heavy strikes. On 2 July 1942, for example, enemy aircraft succeeded in attacking essentially with impunity, sinking and damaging several warships and vessels at Novorossiysk.¹⁵

On the basis of amassed experience, on 6 December 1942 the People's Commissariat of the Navy issued a directive which demanded correction of deficiencies in air defense, particularly in the employment of fighter aviation. It prescribed that ground radio guidance teams should be formed in each fighter regiment, and that air defense commanders be taught to utilize the data provided by all instrumentation available at air defense command posts and helping vector fighters to the target.¹⁶

In addition to air defense of naval bases, the Black Sea Fleet, just as other fleets, devoted considerable attention to protection of convoys at sea. a highly effective measure was the assignment of cruisers and destroyers to escort convoys; operating in coordination with fighter aviation, these would successfully repulse enemy attacks. The tankers "Sergo" and "Peredovik," for example, which in March 1942 were steaming from Poti to Sevastopol, were escorted by the cruiser "Krasnyy Kavkaz" and the destroyer "Nezamozhnik." Fighters provided air cover to the convoy. During the passage enemy bombers and torpedo planes attacked the convoy 13 times, releasing 43 bombs and 2 torpedoes. All attacks were without result, however.¹⁷

An important mission /in the Northern Fleet/, in addition to air defense of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, other ports and naval bases, was protection of external

and domestic lines of communication. Characteristic here was close coordination between fleet air defense, National Air Defense Forces, the air forces and air defense of the Karelian Front.

A principal role in protecting convoys against air attack was assigned to fighter aviation. Following the instructions of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, in May, June and September 1942 the air forces of the Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk air defense regions took part in Northern Fleet convoy escort operations. The 95th Fighter Regiment, consisting of 20 fighters, was transferred over to the fleet to perform these missions; these fighters could rendezvous with convoys at a distance of 200 miles from shore. All these measures ensured air cover for convoys in our zone of responsibility.¹⁸

Thus in the difficult conditions of the first period of the war, a period of particularly intensive fascist air activities, the air defense of the fleets protected naval bases and lines of communication. Fleet air defense forces destroyed 2689 aircraft (of that total, fighters downed 1451, shore-based medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery downed 854, shore-based small-caliber antiaircraft artillery downed 36, shore-based antiaircraft machineguns downed 40, and shipboard antiaircraft artillery destroyed 248 aircraft).¹⁹

At the same time, however, in 1941-1942 shortcomings were also revealed in air defense. The principal deficiencies consisted essentially in the following: command and control of forces was being handled in a scattered manner and by various authorities; poor organization of coordination between fighters, antiaircraft artillery, and air observation assets; deficient mastery of methods of group air combat; excessive emphasis on airborne patrol. These deficiencies were analyzed by command authorities and personnel and taken into consideration in subsequent combat operations.

/In the second and third periods of the war,/ enemy air forces were utilized with diminished intensity. At the same time fleet air defense grew quantitatively and improved qualitatively. Air defense units and warships received new antiaircraft weapons and equipment. New air defense units were formed, the organizational structure of air defense was improved, as were the modes and methods of combat employment of assets. Our air forces wrested and firmly held air superiority.

In the fleets old types of aircraft were being replaced with new ones (YaK-1, LAGG-3, LA-5). Air defense fighters were more effectively repulsing torpedo plane and bomber attacks and were providing air cover to convoys, ports and naval bases.

The modes of combat employment of aircraft also changed. In the first period of the war fighters for the most part employed the "airborne alert" method during daylight hours, while when detection radars became operational in 1943-1944 this method was supplanted by the "on-ground alert" method. In 1943-1945 effectiveness of fighter utilization increased considerably over the first period of the war. It became the principal means of combating hostile aircraft. Substantial quantitative and qualitative changes also took place in ground air defense assets. As of 22 June 1944 fleet air defense totaled 593 mediumcaliber antiaircraft guns, 533 small-caliber antiaircraft guns, 289 antiaircraft machineguns, 315 searchlights, 29 fire control radars, and 28 aircraft location radars.²⁰

The fire capabilities of air defense forces increased sharply. They began to be equipped with Model 1939 85 mm semiautomatic antiaircraft guns with new antiaircraft gun data computers (PUAZO-3), and equipping of medium-caliber antiaircraft batteries with gun control radars improved. In fleet air defense aircraft-warning system units, in the third period of the war the number of air target detection radars had increased 10-fold over the first period. All this substantially increased the effectiveness of employment of air defense assets.

A most important factor in increasing the effectiveness of air defense forces was improved proficiency of personnel, who skillfully utilized weapons and equipment and were improving tactics. Within tactics we should mention massing antiaircraft fire, elimination of delivery of barrage fire, and heavy shelling of maneuvering targets. The overwhelming majority of successful firing at air targets by antiaircraft artillery involved antiaircraft gun data computers.

Searchlight units played an important role in the fleet air defense system in repelling night air attacks in the second and third period of the war. In 1941-1942 antiaircraft searchlights illuminated aircraft only in conditions where targets were observed by the searchlight operators themselves, while in the second period of the war, when artillery radars (SON-2) became operational in air defense units, and RAP-150 radar-directed searchlights in 1944-1945, capabilities to put light on hostile aircraft increased sharply. Antiaircraft searchlight troops made a definite contribution to the cause of combating hostile aircraft. Over the course of the war approximately 3300 aircraft attacked fleet targets during hours of darkness, with searchlights placed on as many as 1200 of these. Antiaircraft searchlight units helped down 132 aircraft. Of this total, fighters destroyed 69 (Black Sea Fleet -- 47; Baltic Fleet -- 20; Northern Fleet -- 2), while antiaircraft artillery downed 55 (Black Sea Fleet -- 10; Baltic Fleet -- 39; Northern Fleet -- 6).²¹

Alongside quantitative and qualitative growth of air defense weapons and equipment and improvement in tactics, there also took place changes in organization of air defense. These were directed toward obtaining better forms of organizational structure and direction of air defense and were dictated by the requirements of the developing situation, as well as consideration of acquired combat operations experience. In particular, the air defense sectors were reorganized into air defense base areas. At the beginning of 1943 the fleet air defense chiefs also became deputy air force commanders for air defense, which helped improve coordination of the actions of all air defense forces and facilities. In the summer of 1944 there began the reorganization of air defense base areas into air defense divisions, brigades, and independent regiments. In the third period of the war maritime air defense regions were established, headed by commanders of air defense combined units (corps, divisions, or brigades); they were subordinate to naval base commanders and, in a special respect, to the fleet air defense chiefs.²² Thus by the end of the

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Great Patriotic War the organizational forms of air defense of the fleets had become improved.

A worthy contribution to the evolution of fleet air defense was made, in addition to those named above, by fleet air defense chiefs Maj Gens Avn A. M. Mironov, N. T. Petrukhin, A. Z. Dushin, Col B. L. Petrov, as well as other officers and general officers. They synthesized and disseminated advanced know-how, searched for new modes of employment of assets, and made suggestions on improving air defense organization.

/Thus air defense forces played an important role in protecting the fleets against air attack./ They performed this task in close coordination with the National Air Defense Forces.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that fleet air defense is an important factor which exerts considerable inlfuence on the success of combat operations of warships and units.

FOOTNOTES

- Ts VMA [Central Naval Archives], Fund 15, File 39253, sheets 6-8; Fund 71, File 1422, sheet 2-4, 38, 44; Fund 97, File 33345, sheets 49, 74, 82; Fund 10, File 39631, sheets 1-3.
- 2. A. S. Yakovlev, "50 let sovetskogo samoletostroyeniya" [Fifty Years of Soviet Aircraft Engineering], Moscow, Nauka, 1968, pp 26-29.
- 3. S. G. Gorshkov, 'Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva" [Sea Power of the State], Voyenizdat, 1979, page 199.
- 4. TsVMA, Fund 15, File 39253, sheets 11-16.
- 5. Ibid., Sheet 27.
- 6. Ibid., Fund 9, File 8580, Sheet 32.
- 7. Ibid., File 7877, Sheet 381.
- Ibid., Fund 15, File 39253, Sheet 30; Fund 97, File 33345, Sheet 14; Fund 9, File 39975, sheets 63-67.
- 9. For more detail on operation "Eisstoss," see article by N. Mil'chenko in this issue.
- 10. TsVMA, Fund 9, File 33041, Sheet 58.
- 11. Ibid., Fund 46, File 808, Sheet 111.
- 12. Ibid., File 25806, Sheet 25.
- 13. Ibid., Fund 138, File 11073, Sheet 3.

- 14. Ibid., File 9615, Sheet 154.
- 15. Ibid., Fund 10, File 24252, Sheet 8.
- 16. Ibid., Fund 12, List 1149, File 18, Sheet 2.
- 17. Ibid., Fund 10, File 17714, Sheet 125.
- "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II], Vol 5, Voyenizdat, 1975, pp 258-276; TsVMA, Fund 15, File 39253, Sheet 31.
- 19. TsVMA, Fund 15, File 39253, sheets 195-200; Fund 97, File 3345, Sheet 28; Fund 138, File 11073, Sheet 39; Fund 71, File 1422, sheets 116-122.
- 20. Ibid., sheets 17-18; Fund 97, File 33345, sheets 49, 78; Fund 71, File 15592, sheets 16-18; Fund 11, File 35691, sheets 86, 91.
- 21. Ibid., Fund 15, File 39253, sheets 159-169; Fund 97, File 33345, sheets 75, 76; Fund 138, File 11073, Sheet 46.
- 22. Ibid., Fund 15, File 39253, sheets 20-25; Fund 97, File 33345, sheets 49, 74, 82.

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3024 CSO: 1801/318

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: RIFLE REGIMENT IN LARGE CITY COMBAT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 34-39


[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War" and subheading "Tactics," by Capt P. Vakula: "Rifle Regiment Combat in a Large City (25 Apr-1 May 1945)"]

[Text] It was the final days of the war. Soviet forces were storming the fascist capital. The 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Maj Gen N. D. Kozin, commanding) of the 12th Guards Rifle Corps of the 3rd Assault Army on 25 April 1945 was advancing in the Gesundbrunnen area (northern part of Berlin) toward the center of the capital of the Reich. Operating on its right flank was the 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment (Lt Col S. P. Zubov, commanding). By noon its 1st Rifle Battalion (Capt A. Ye. Totkaylo, commanding) had captured a park on Schiefelbeinerstrasse and had reached the street intersection at the south-western corner of the park. The 2nd Rifle Battalion (Capt I. T. Obushenko, commanding) was advancing along Dehnenstrasse (see diagram).

The 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment had been assigned the mission to continue advancing in a southwesterly direction and by evening to capture an important rail junction -- Gesundbrunnen Station. It was given as attachments the 1st Battalion of the 124th Guards Artillery Regiment, a battery of 76 mm self-propelled guns of the 1729th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, two guns from the 57th Independent Guards Tank-Destroyer Battalion, and a platoon of combat engineers from the 61st Independent Guards Combat Engineer Battalion. Advancing on the right was the 164th Rifle Regiment of the 33rd Rifle Division, and on the 1eft -- the 151st Guards Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division.¹

The enemy was offering stiff resistance. The basis of the defense consisted of well fortified strongpoints and centers of resistance working in coordination with one another.

Various artificial obstacles were being maximally utilized. Troop strength in these defensive positions varied. It ran to a company, sometimes to a battalion, depending on a position's tactical significance. The bulk of the weapons were positioned in the windows of the ground floor or semibasement.



Fighting by the 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment in Berlin, 25 April-1 May 1945

Key:

- 1. Legend
- 2. Position of opposing sides
- 3. By noon on 25 April
- 4. By 1500 hours on 25 April
- 5. By evening of 25 April
- 6. 26 April-1 May
- 7. Gesundbrunnen
- 8. Bornholmerstrasse

(Key to diagram on preceding page, cont'd)

- 9. Schiefelbeinerstrasse
- 10. Gesundbrunnen Station
- 11. Koppenhagenerstrasse
- North
 Schwaedterstrasse

14. Norwegerstrasse

cn. Rifle regiment

cd. Rifle division

FB. Guards

15. Demminerstrasse

Machineguns were also set up on the first and second floor balconies, in doorways and entranceways, as well as in specially breached holes in the walls. The majority of a center of resistance's weapons were placed in key buildings from which flank fire could be delivered, and intersections were barricaded.

The building entrances and interior rooms were heavily booby-trapped.

The regimental commander decided that, continuing the advance, the 1st Rifle Battalion would attack the railway junction from the east, while subunits of the 2nd Rifle Battalion would bypass it on the south.² Lt Col S. P. Zubov realized thereby that the subunits would be fighting an adversary positioned in masonry buildings and railway station structures. He realized that they could be captured only by outflanking in small groups, making use of holes breached in walls, the courtyards and basements of neighboring buildings.

Six assault teams (each consisting of a reinforced rifle platoon) and two assault detachments (each consisting of a reinforced rifle company), trained to operate independently, were formed in the subunits for combat in a built-up area. These teams included artillery pieces, self-propelled guns, as well as several combat engineers, whose job would be demolish thick-walled masonry structures, barricades, and to clear minefields.

Command and control of the subunits was handled from the regimental commander's observation post, located 220 meters from the dispositions of the 1st Rifle Battalion. Communications were by field telephone and radio, but were chiefly handled by regimental liaison officers and personal contact between the regimental commander and the commanders of the subunits.

Overcoming enemy resistance to the west and southwest of the park on Schiefelbeinerstrasse, by 1500 hours on 25 April the 1st Rifle Battalion reached the intersection of Norwegerstrasse. Here the Hitlerites' principal strongpoints were the station building and the depot building. The battalion commander, estimating the situation, decided to take them sequentially: first the depot building and then the station building, first reconnoitering avenues of approach to the strongpoints, moving up weapons and replenishing ammunition. Lieutenant Colonel Zubov approved the decision.

Preparations for the assault were completed within an hour. At 1600 hours, on Captain Tokaylo's command, artillery in indirect fire positions as well as direct-fire guns opened fire on the station building and depot building. Under the cover of this fire, subunits of the 1st Rifle Battalion approached to a distance of approximately 100 meters from the depot building and then made entry with a swift dash. The Hitlerites offered stubborn resistance. Our fighting men, however, operating in small teams, took the building floor by floor, room by room.

Fighting inside the building was the most difficult and dangerous. The enemy was lying in wait at every step. It was necessary to take every room with a fight. Frequently things came to hand-to-hand combat. Instant response, initiative, resoluteness, persistence, and sharpness of wit were demanded of the NCOs and enlisted men. Moving up the stairwell to the upper floors, the men threw smoke grenades, swept the landings with submachinegun fire, and swiftly took the stairwell. Upon reaching the following floor, the assault troops would immediately burst into the rooms, first pitching in hand grenades.

The depot building was completely cleared of fascists by 1800 hours. Losing no time, the battalion commander ordered 5 minutes of artillery shelling brought to bear on the station building, while the machinegun company opened fire on the enemy's firing ports. Under cover of fire, the men of the battalion fought their way into the station building and captured it by 1900 hours.³

Many men distinguished themselves in the fighting. Komsomol member Pvt I. N. Luchenok of the 3rd Rifle Company, for example, while fighting to take buildings adjacent to the station, discovered on the sixth floor of one of these buildings an enemy observation post from which they were adjusting artillery fire. This soldier made his way across the roofs of buildings and through attics to the room containing the enemy OP, boldly engaged and killed the Hitlerites occupying it.

The rifle squad of the 3rd Rifle Company under the command of Jr Sgt V. M. Matyukhin also did a fine job. At the railway bridge northeast of the station building, our infantry's advance was blocked by fire from a machinegun position on the second floor of a building. A courageous sergeant stealthily approached it with his squad and knocked out the machinegun and its crew with an antitank grenade. Continuing to advance, our men penetrated the basement of a building adjacent to the bridge and captured 8 Hitlerites. The men of the rifle platoon under the command of Komsomol member Jr Lt B. M. Chentsov inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy. In the course of the fighting to capture the station they destroyed 2 armored vehicles and 4 trucks, and also captured approximately 20 Hitlerites.4

The regiment's 2nd Rifle Battalion was also successfully advancing. Attacking simultaneously with Captain Totkaylo's subunits, it fought its way to the railroad tracks. At 1130 hours its rifle companies, following 5 minutes of artillery shelling, attacked enemy troops defending the railroad tracks on Sonnenburgenstrasse. At this point the tracks ran through a cut. The slopes of the cut were very steep (5-6 meters high). The assault mounted by our infantrymen was swift and determined. The battalion succeeded in fighting its way into buildings on Koppenhagenerstrasse and consolidating its position. All the artillery, however, was still on the other side of the railway cut, since it could not be crossed without the aid of the combat engineers. They were only able to move 2 45 mm guns along with the infantry, literally carrying them

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by hand. This fact did not stop battalion commander Captain Obushenko. He decided to continue carrying out his assigned mission with indirect-fire artillery support. By 2000 hours his men had cleared Hitlerites from the building on Sonnenburgenstrasse and had reached the public garden between Gleimstrasse and Gaudistrasse. An attempt to move across this square to the rail line was unsuccessful, since it was being heavily raked with fire from adjacent buildings. Having lost 10 men killed and wounded here, the battalion commander pulled his men back into the buildings east of the square and set up a perimeter defense. Many men distinguished themselves in this battle. In the course of the day the men of the platoon under the command of Komsomol member Jr Lt V. Ya. Potapov, for example, captured several large buildings, killing more than 15 Hitlerites. Pfc T. Ye. Narykin from the regiment's combat engineer platoon, assigned to an assault team, cleared mines from Gleimstrasse under a hail of hostile fire and enabled our riflemen to advance unimpeded.⁵

At approximately 2100 hours a Ferdinand assault gun appeared from the west on Gleimstrasse. Fascist soldiers began running along the street under its protective fire. The battalion commander communicated to the regimental commander the precise coordinates of the Ferdinand. Heavy weapons opened fire on it. The enemy self-propelled gun was forced to withdraw. At 2200 hours on 25 April the fascists suddenly proceeded to deliver heavy fire on the battalion position from machineguns, mortars and faustpatronen from the neighboring buildings. This was followed by an attempted counterattack on the battalion by the Hitlerites from the direction of Gaudistrasse. Our men met their onslaught with dense fire. The fascists, losing 30 men killed, withdrew.⁶

Repelling the counterattack, the battalion commander decided to make use of the hours of darkness and continue the advance. After midnight, at his command the men began silently advancing toward buildings on Gleimstrasse. On the north side of the square the rifle companies deployed into an extended line and forced their way into the entryways of the buildings.

Capturing the block north of the square, the battalion crossed the railroad tracks in a single dash and, taking advantage of the darkness and the enemy's confusion, began moving forward. Just before dawn it reached Swinemuende-strasse, burst into the adjacent buildings, and set up a perimeter defense.⁷

Receiving a report on the combat actions of the 2nd Rifle Battalion, the regimental commander ordered Captain Totkaylo to attack the enemy and link up with Obushenko's subunits. This could not be accomplished, however. The Hitlerites offered strong resistance to the companies of the 1st Battalion. Losing 30 men killed and wounded, the battalion was forced once again to take up a defensive position in the station buildings and the depot building.⁸

Fearing counterattacks, Lieutenant Colonel Zubov ordered the commanders of the subunits to take measures to consolidate their positions. The precaution poved to be premature. At approximately 1200 hours on 26 April, as much as a battalion of Hitlerites was concentrated in the vicinity of a bridge on Bornholmerstrasse (north of the station), while up to a company was concentrated at the rail line end of Demminerstrasse (south of the station). Then both enemy subunits simultaneously launched a counterattack. The northern force succeeded in dislodging our men from the station building and advancing to the depot. The southern force also launched a counterattack. But the fascists were unsuccessful. Our battalions met them with organized fire. The Hitlerites began to scatter along the tracks, and then proceeded to retreat toward buildings on Norwegerstrasse and Schwaedterstrasse and to consolidate in these buildings. This enabled them to control the avenues of approach from our rear to the dispositions of the 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment. Lt Col S. P. Zubov did not have sufficient forces at his disposal to push back the Hitlerites who had severed the regiment's supply routes. Nor did the division commander have sufficient forces available. In these conditions the regimental commander decided to continue fighting, in order to divert to himself the maximum amount of enemy forces, until the adjacent units could break out of the enemy's noose of encirclement. The Hitlerites, sustaining substantial casualties and losses of equipment, were unable to crush the regiment's resistance.9

Our men, encircled by the enemy, fought aggressively and courageously for approximately 5 days and nights, inflicting considerable casualties and losses on the enemy. Deserving of high praise are the actions of the foot reconnaissance platoon under the command of Lt I. A. Sotnikov. During the night of 27 April the recon scouts mounted a bold raid into the enemy's dispositions. Taking concealment behind buildings and other structures and utilizing underground municipal utility lines to move unobserved, the scouts, led by Lieutenant Sotnikov, made their way past the enemy's security posts, right up to the gun position of a Hitlerite artillery battery. All day its guns had been shelling our positions. The scouts silently took out the sentries. Then came the command: "Advance!" The assault was bold and determined. The element of surprise ensured success. In a brief, swift skirmish the recon scouts destroyed 4 guns, killed 12 and captured more than 20 fascist officers and enlisted men.

Other soldiers also fought intrepidly, displaying excellent military skill. Sgt V. F. Videborenko, for example, loader on a 76 mm regimental gun, took the place of his disabled gun commander, entered into an artillery duel with an enemy assault gun, and set it on fire with an accurately-placed round. He also knocked out an enemy tank which was attempting to shell the 1st Rifle Battalion dispositions.10

The subunits of the 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment steadfastly held their positions until 1 May 1945, when the fascist soldiers, seeing the hopelessness of continuing the fight, began surrendering.

The 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment accomplished its assigned mission in the fighting for the Gesundbrunnen rail junction in Berlin. Performing with success in this area, it inflicted substantial casualties and losses on the enemy. The enemy lost more than 300 killed and wounded, and more than 120 were captured. Our men captured large quantities of weapons and combat equipment.¹¹

The actions fought by the regiment demonstrated that offensive operations in a large urban built-up area are characterized by a number of specific features.

These include first and foremost extensive enemy employment of upper stories and attic spaces. Small forces and weapons positioned on the lower floors and in basements offered strong opposition to the attacking forces.

Infantry small-arms fire is very important in street fighting. Experience indicated that to achieve success in an offensive action it is essential to maintain the windows and doors of all stories under fire by rifle squads. This prevents the enemy from using them to deliver fire and helps eliminate the multitiered nature of defending-force fire.

The regiment's offensive actions in this built-up area were successful because of correct utilization of the assault teams, which consisted of small independent units capable of taking out individual strongpoints and centers of resistance. The assault teams advanced along the streets, provided cover by buildings and protruding parts of buildings. They endeavored to avoid frontal assaults on the adversary. Making use of courtyards, holes breached in walls, and basements, they would move to the flank and rear of a strongpoint and attack it from several directions.

The regiment's performance once again confirmed that when fighting in large urban built-up areas rifle units frequently must advance without close contact with adjacent units. As a result the adversary is able to mount flank attacks and cut off those subunits which have advanced furthest forward. In these conditions the ability of these latter to set up a perimeter defense and to hold steadfastly to captured positions (objectives) is of considerable importance.

The performance of subunit command personnel merits praise. The decision by the commander of the 1st Battalion to assault the principal strongpoints (the depot and the station building) in sequence was correct. This made it possible to concentrate maximum efforts on capturing the objective. Capture of the depot made it impossible for the enemy to defend the station building.

The courage, heroism and high degree of military skill displayed by the regiment's officers and men in the battle of Berlin were worthily honored by the homeland. Many of them were awarded government decorations.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 452, List 212916, File 13, Sheet 142; File 6, Sheet 182.
- In the period described the regiment contained 2 rifle battalions (Ibid., Fund 1165, List 1, File 61, sheets 156-168).
- 3. Ibid., Fund 1165, List 1, File 61, sheets 120-135.
- 4. Ibid., Fund 1165, List 2, File 59, sheets 214, 314, 370, 399, 292, 149; File 60, Sheet 461.

- 5. Ibid., sheets 75, 214, 314, 370, 399, 292, 149; File 60, Sheet 141.
- 6. Ibid., List 1, File 60 sheets 158-160.
- 7. Ibid., Fund 1165, List 1, File 61, sheets 128-133.
- 8. Ibid.
- 9. Ibid., Sheet 158.
- 10. Ibid., Fund 1165, List 2, File 59, sheets 292, 399.
- 11. Ibid., List 1, File 61, sheets 130-140.
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3024 CSO: 1801/318

WARTIME OPERATIONS: AIR DEFENSE IN THE LENINGRAD AREA

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 40-47

[Article, published under the heading "Little Known Operations," by Lt Gen Arty N. Mil'chenko, chief of staff of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District: "Failure of Operation 'Eisstoss'* [Ice Strike)"]

[Text] It was the spring of 1942. At that time I commanded an antiaircraft battery in the 169th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, which was covering the southwestern approaches to Leningrad. Enemy air activity, which had diminished for a certain time, was once again being stepped up. Everything began in March with intensified reconnaissance. Single Junkers, flying at high altitude, almost continuously circled above the city on the Neva, which was sealed off by land. Frequently enemy fighters would also appear. Judging from regimental headquarters briefings, the Hitlerites were endeavoring to destroy our antiaircraft defense system and to find the most favorable axes for running bombing attacks.

Yes, the enemy was clearly up to something. It later became known that it was Operation "Eisstoss" ("Ice Strike" in translation). Preparations for this operation were being made by the high command of Hitler's air forces (OKL), meticulously and in great secret. The Hitlerites had not abandoned their hopes of capturing Leningrad, and then "wiping it off the face of the earth." The Red-Banner Baltic Fleet and a powerful air defense system, however, constituted one of the obstacles in the path of executing this sinister scheme. In Berlin they certainly were well aware of the fleet's importance in defending the city on the Neva. Together with the troops of the front, it represented a formidable force. Operation "Eisstoss" called for destroying the warships of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet which were frozen in the ice on the Neva.

* Voyenizdat is about to release a volume of memoirs by Lt Gen Arty N. P. Mil'chenko entitled "Zalpy nad Nevoy" [Salvos Over the Neva]. In it the author relates the air defense of Leningrad during the Great Patriotic War. The following is an excerpt from this book. On orders from Reichsmarshal Goering, the command authorities of the 1st Air Force began preparations for the contemplated operation. The outlines of the warships of the Baltic fleet were reproduced at full scale on a frozen lake. Warship mock-ups were repeatedly bombed by bomber squadrons and attacked by fighters, which simultaneously rehearsed providing cover for targets over the "battle" area. Headquarters of the 1st Air Force spent almost the entire month of February drilling its pilots, after which a presumptuous report was sent to Berlin, guaranteeing the successful outcome of the forthcoming operation.

Other details of preparations for and execution of "Eisstoss" have now become known. West German historian Gerhard Huemmelchen writes in the journal MARINE RUNDSCHAU that on 26 February 1942 headquarters of the 1st Air Force (Colonel General Aviation Keller, commanding) instructed the 1st Air Corps (General Aviation Foerster, commanding) to conduct, just prior to breakup of the ice in the Gulf of Finland, a massive raid by ground-attack aircraft, under fighter cover, in order to destroy the main combatant forces of the Russian fleet in that area. The author further stresses that fascist Germany's top leaders were keenly interested in the successful outcome of this operation: "On 22 March 1942 headquarters of the 1st Air Force once again drew the attention of the 1st Air Corps to destruction of the Russian fleet's main forces prior to breakup of the ice in the Gulf of Finland, making reference to Goering's instructions, which stated that Hitler was expecting the warships to be destroyed."1

Of course at that time the defenders of the city on the Neva did not know about these secret orders from Hitler. The secrets residing in the fascist safes were revealed much later. But numerous enemy reconnaissance flights in March gave reason to assume that he was contemplating large air attacks.

We, the subunit commanders, the immediate combat organizers, were ordered to intensify our vigilance and work even more persistently to improve the fighting proficiency of our men. Antiaircraft crews practiced daily. They were practicing in order to ensure that not one of the innumerable component skills of antiaircraft fire would let them down in battle, in order not to waste shells in that difficult time of blockade. This is why there was constant activity in the gun position. Platoon commanders Lts A. M. Babushkin and A. Ya. Smorodinskiy, the gun commanders and section commanders devoted particular attention to training of the instrument operators, range takers, gunners, fuze setters, and loaders. They worked painstakingly to get the crews working smoothly.

We commanders worked equally hard to improve our skills in antiaircraft fire control and practiced the various types of fire delivery, especially at dive bombers and ground-attack aircraft. Each and every person felt a strong sense of responsibility, which reached a maximum degree on the first days of April. The Leningrad air defense command ordered antiaircraft batteries and fighter squadrons to maintain continuous combat readiness. The timeliness of this measure was confirmed by practical experience. On 4 April Keller, executing an order received from the OKL, sent out more than 100 bombers, under fighter cover, to destroy the fleet's warships. The first force of enemy fighters was detected 115 km from the city at 1805 hours by the "Redut" site, located at Volkovo cemetery. A total of 9 group targets took part in the raid. Simultaneously with the air attack, the enemy commenced an intensive long-range artillery bombardment of antiaircraft gun positions and fighter airstrips.

What measures were taken by the command authorities of the Leningrad Air Defense Corps Region from the moment the first report about the enemy air attack was received?² The situation prevailing at the command post at that time was described in detail by the political section chief, Col I. I. Geller. He recalls: The duty officer reported that communications were operating normally and that everybody was receiving information on the enemy. Three blips were slowly proceeding northward. More and more targets were appearing on the situation board. Within a few minutes enemy aircraft were over Gatchina.

The commanding officer, Gen G. S. Zashikhin, looked at his watch and ordered: "Deploy balloons!" the general's voice rang out above the light buzz of noise at the command post from instructions going out and reports coming in over the telephones.

The duty officer looked at the commanding officer, surprised. Deploy the balloons during daylight? That was something new.

"Don't lose any time, get them up!" Zashikhin repeated the order.

It became noisy in the command post artillery room. The liaison officers all began talking at once, feverishly pencilling notes on paper. The telephone and radio operators were transmitting commands in a subdued voice, endeavoring to act with maximum precision and efficiency. Series of numbers reporting the courses of fascist aircraft were coming in through the speakers from the main aircraft-warning service post, impassively and continuously.

A report came from the aviators that four pairs of fighters had scrambled. The commander of the 7th Air Defense Fighter Corps, Col Ye. Ye. Yerlykin, climbed up onto a tower specially constructed on the roof of his headquarters so that he could personally observe the air situation as it developed.

Three additional targets coming from the same directions appeared on the situation board. General Zashikhin kept a careful eye on them. Lights flashed on, signaling that the antiaircraft artillery had commenced firing. The batteries of the southern regiments barked into action simultaneously.

An alarming report was received at the command post: "Forward batteries under bombing attack." The battle with the Hitlerite aircraft was becoming hotter with each passing minute....

This is how events were proceeding at the command post of the corps air defense region. How were things going at our battery? The alert sounded when the men were resting after a routine practice session. Almost simultaneously there was a shell burst, followed by a second, not far from our gun position. Obviously the enemy had begun ranging. Indeed, a minute or two later the fascists commenced delivering rapid fire into the area of the battery's position, which was in the Commercial Port. I ordered the men to remain in the shelters and to be ready to man their guns. A thought flashed through my mind: well dug emplacements for the guns and instruments, as well as fulldepth communication trenches make a battery practically invulnerable.

Soon observers Sabirov and Dolganov reported: "Air!" A large force of enemy aircraft was headed toward the battery from the southwest. The men took their stations at the instruments and guns. Thirty agonizing seconds passed. The data were calculated swiftly. Finally I ordered the guns to commence firing. Almost simultaneously the adjacent batteries also began firing. We could clearly see the closely-grouped shell bursts in the middle of the group of enemy aircraft. The enemy immediately proceeded to scatter, employing evasive maneuvers. At this point our fighters arrived on the scene and swiftly attacked.

The tempo of the battle picked up. Some of the fascist bombers made their way through the antiaircraft shell bursts and were attempting to attack the ships. Our battery's fire was impeding the enemy and disrupting his plans. Then to bombers, separating from the group, headed swiftly toward our gun position. The lead bomber went into a dive....

"Get the aircraft!" came the lightning command.

The enemy was rapidly approaching. It seemed that a little delay and hot metal would be pelting our gun position. But the antiaircraft crewmen responded swiftly. The guns were firing with such intensity that the ammunition handlers were unable to keep up. One of the observers hastened to assist them. The rate of fire did not diminish.

Evidently the pilots of the first enemy bomber lost their nerve, and they released their bomb a second too soon. A deafening explosion boomed out somewhere close by. We were showered with shell fragments, bricks, and dirt. Enemy artillery was continuing to deliver rapid fire. The Hitlerites poured at least 150 rounds into the Commercial Port area. Things were hot and heavy in the fire position. Some of the men were taking wounds, but nobody left his station except for Red Armyman Panichkin, who had received a serious concussion. A shell fragment struck Lt A. Ya. Smorodinskiy in the head, right on the five-pointed crimson star on his cap.

Shell bursts disrupted telephone communications, and it was necessary to change over to radio communications with battalion headquarters, but they were unreliable.

The battle continued. A second enemy aircraft was met with accurate fire. A particularly fine job was done by the gun crew of NCO Ivan Stepanovich Khalepa. Red Armyman Dergachev scored a direct hit on the target with his skillful laying. The rear of the fuselage was knocked off the fascist aircraft. The enemy aircraft, in flames, fell to earth near the battery. Archival documents, particularly the entries made in the historic service record document of the 2nd Air Defense Corps, impassively relate how the subunit's battle ended and its results: "Massive antiaircraft fire forced the enemy aircraft to maneuver evasively and drop their bombs randomly. A group of enemy aircraft, for example, under heavy antiaircraft fire, on the approaches to the Commercial Port was compelled to drop its bomb load into the Gulf of Finland and withdraw to the southwest, in the direction of Strelna...."

We do not mean to give the reader the impression that only our battery or only our regiment took part in this battle. No, the overwhelming majority of antiaircraft units and subunits of the Leningrad Air Defense Corps Region took part in battles against the foe. All antiaircraft gunners fought selflessly. The battery of the 351st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment under the command of Sr Lt A. A. Kaplar also engaged a fascist bomber. The gun crew of NCO Bespalov shot down an enemy aircraft with accurate fire. A fine job was done by Jr Lt Ye. S. Yurasov (now a colonel general of artillery and first deputy commander in chief of Air Defense Forces), platoon commander in the 23rd Battery of the 115th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, distinguished himself in battle. He performed with coolness and confidence, issuing commands with precision. Under his supervision, his antiaircraft gunners downed an enemy aircraft. Red Armyman Popov, loader in the second small-caliber antiaircraft artillery regiment, although wounded, manned his station until the action ended. This crew also downed an enemy bomber. Many such examples could be Communists and Komsomol members fought particularly bravely, incited. spiring their comrades by personal example.

The pilots of the 7th Air Defense Fighter Corps fought boldly against superior enemy forces over the Gulf of Finland. Air warriors Appolonin, Belikov, and Oskalenko, led by squadron commander Captain Matsiyevich, each downed a fascist bomber.

The final battle entry in the historical record of the 2nd Air Defense Corps reads meager and laconic: "Twenty-two Soviet fighters were scrambled to repulse the attack, engaging outside the zone of antiaircraft artillery fire, for the most part over the Gulf of Finland and the southwestern approaches to the city. In these aerial engagements fighters downed 6 and disabled 1 enemy aircraft, losing 1 fighter. Antiaircraft artillery fire downed 19 and disabled 9 enemy aircraft. The Germans lost a total of 25 downed and 10 disabled aircraft during this raid."³

But the main result was not even the quantitative figures on destroyed aircraft. The main thing was that less than half of the 100 enemy aircraft reached the moored warships. They dropped 230 high-explosive bombs, 70 of which hit close to the ships, while the remainder impacted in empty areas and on the ice on the Gulf of Finland.

Following the all clear, we took stock of the fire position damage. The wounded were given medical treatment. Personnel filled in the bomb craters and removed bricks and dirt. All the men were in animated conversation. The antiaircraft gun crews were in an enthusiastic mood. This is natural, for success always generates enthusiasm. The regimental commander called. I reported to Lt Col P. D. Gordiyenko that battery personnel had performed heroically in the battle. But we were almost out of ammunition.

"Our people have a great deal of courage," Petr Davydovich said in praise. "Write out recommendations for government decorations for those who particularly distinguished themselves...."

Then there was silence on the other end of the line for some reason. A few seconds later I once again heard Lieutenant Colonel Gordiyenko's voice: "Comrade Mil'chenko, can you hear me? Sound the alert...."

These few brief words are sufficient for antiaircraft gunners. I immediately repeated the command. The antiaircraft crews ran to their guns and instruments. It was not a drill. A few hours later, during the night of 5 April, the Hitlerites flew another raid on the fleet's warships. Our posts reported 18 enemy bombers. Soon we commenced barrage fire: the enemy once again was approaching from the southwest toward the regiment's dispositions.

Only eight enemy aircraft penetrated our curtain of fire. Fascist pilots dropped parachute flares over the city. They illuminated squares, avenues, and warship mooring locations with a deathly pale blue light. The enemy was hoping to perform precision bombing. But even this device, which the enemy was employing for the first time, failed to produce the desired results. Within seconds the parachute flares were destroyed by the gunners of 2nd Medium-Caliber Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. The enemy bombers scattered their deadly cargo into the Gulf of Finland and the southern districts of the city.

The fleet's warships took no damage. They stood motionless, locked in the ice, along the Neva embankments. And they were almost indiscernible.

The rest of the night represented a brief lull in the action. After getting a little rest, I went out with the platoon commander and gun crews to check the combat readiness of the equipment, ammunition and personnel. Work was continuing on cleaning up the fire position, repairing equipment, hauling in and stockpiling ammunition. I ordered immediate preparations for a thorough critique of the combat performance of each crew member and section. This was followed by a detailed critique in the platoons and battery as a whole, with all personnel and individually with the commanders. I am convinced that such after-action critiques are very necessary. They are a most important means of indoctrinating personnel and improving their combat skills.

Party-political work was vigorously conducted in our battery, just as in the regiment's other subunits, work directed toward instilling excellent moral-fighting qualities in the men. It was closely coordinated with the tasks being performed by personnel. It was conducted in the most diversified forms: lectures, reports, and discussions. Preference was given to work with in-dividuals. Battery political officer V. G. Yevsyukov was the heart and soul of party-political work. He skillfully placed his party-Komsomol activists and assigned concrete tasks. And the majority of the men in our subunit were Communists and Komsomol members. They were exemplary in all things and led all personnel.

Subsequent events connected with the struggle to preserve the fleet's warships developed rather swiftly. On the following days the command authorities of the Leningrad Air Defense Army specified measures which were to hinder enemy air attacks.

The pilots of the 7th Air Defense Fighter Corps were assigned the mission to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the airfields occupied by the squadrons of the 1st Air Force. Soon information was received that a large number of enemy aircraft had massed at Krasnogvardeysk airfield.

On 15 April 11 fighters of the 26th Fighter Regiment, led by the commanding officer, Lt Col B. N. Romanov, mounted a surprise strafing attack on the enemy airfield. Met with a hail of enemy antiaircraft fire, our pilots hit the fascist aircraft standing on the ground. The following figures testify very eloquently to the results of this strike: 10 aircraft were destroyed and 10 damaged. In addition, one fighter was shot down as it attempted to take off, while another was downed in air combat by pilot Georgiy Zhidov.

It took Keller and his staff almost 10 days to make their tattered bomber squadrons operational again. The Hitlerites were unable to mount another attack on the fleet's ships until 24 April. They sent more than 70 bombers to Leningrad under fighter escort. At 1350 hours approximately half of the Ju-88 and Ju-87 bombers were in the zone of fire of our 169th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment. They were proceeding along the route Strelna-Ugolnaya Gavan [CoalPort]-Port-Leningrad.

Once again guns barked into action over the Neva. Our batteries, joined with other units, delivered intensive fire and broke up the enemy's formations. He then began dropping bombs on our fire positions and hitting them with long-range guns. One round hit our dugout shelter, but fortunately it was unoccupied; everybody was at his station. The sole casualty was Red Armyman Belozerov, who was wounded. Other batteries sustained casualties and damaged combat equipment.

The regiment remained on alert for 5 hours and 14 minutes and gave the enemy plenty in return. Our batteries expended 683 shells and downed 11 enemy aircraft.⁴ The men of other units also distinguished themselves. Z. N. Minustin, political officer in the 11th Battery of the 2nd Medium-Caliber Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, in the middle of the battle took over command of a platoon in place of its disabled commander. Placing accurate fire, his men shot down a Junkers, which plunged into the Neva. The day's total for the Leningrad Air Defense Army was 20 downed and 14 disabled bombers. But the main thing was that once again the enemy failed to accomplish his principal aim.

On 25 April the Hitlerites sent more than 60 bombers under fighter escort against the city and the ships of the fleet. At 1153 hours a group of enemy aircraft, flying at an altitude of 6000 meters, was proceeding along their favorite route: Strelna-Port-Vasilyevskiy Island. The regiment's batteries opened fire. Our neighbors, the gunners of the 2nd Battery, worked hard that day. Several bombers tried to hit the battleship "Marat" and the subunit's gun position at the same time. The batteries drove the enemy off, and he was unable to precision-bomb. But we also took losses from the heavy hostile artillery fire: a gun and a rangefinder were knocked out, and Red Armyman Selivanov was killed. Instrument section commander Frangulov, who had run to the assistance of an observer who had been buried in dirt, was gravely wounded and died soon thereafter. Red Armyman Golovan' was seriously wounded.

The antiaircraft gunners avenged the deaths of their comrades in arms. The gun crew led by Sergeant Anyutin downed an enemy bomber with an accurately-fired round. Our regiment's 5th Battery destroyed enemy ammunition stores and an enemy gun position which was shelling our fire positions. The fighter pilots did an excellent job. On that day our air defense people destroyed 15 enemy aircraft on the approaches to the city and directly above the warship moorings.

During these days the ice on the Neva broke up to a considerable degree, which made it possible to move the warships. The cruiser "Kirov" was moved to the Red Fleet embankment, and the cruiser "Maksim Gorkiy" took position by one of the industrial plants. The destroyers were dispersed, with some positioned in the Lesser and Greater Nevka. Camouflage and deception measures were taken: the training ship "Svir'" was placed at the "Kirov's" mooring location, the foremast was taken down on the "Oka," and the ships were camouflage-painted. All this made it difficult for the fascist pilots to choose bombing targets and nullified their aerial photography efforts.

German-fascist aircraft flew two final raids on 27 and 30 April, still hoping to destroy the fleet's warships. Approximately 60 bombers and 15 fighters took part in the first raid. Up to 20 aircraft were operating in the regiment's zone, proceeding in small groups along a route Krasnoye Selo-Uritsk-Port, with a turn southward. Once again the enemy's heavy artillery swung into action.

Savage fighting erupted in our battery's zone of fire. The enemy realized that until he suppressed the subunit's fire he would be unable to precisionbomb our warships. A pair of Ju-87 dive bombers separated from the enemy's cover force and headed swiftly toward our gun position. At the same time enemy artillery intensified its bombardment of the Commercial Port.

"Two Ju-87s headed for the battery," observer Vasiliy Churikov reported to the section leader.

"Number 3 and 4, fire on the lead aircraft!" I commanded the crews of sergeants Kudryavtsev and Del'tsov.

Shells were fired at the rapidly approaching aircraft. On the fourth round the bomber was knocked out by a direct hit. Aircraft fragments fell in the battery area, as the battery continued delivering intensive fire at the bombers.

Here are the results of the day of fighting: the regiment downed 2 aircraft, while a total of 10 enemy aircraft were destroyed. But enemy dive bombers dropped 19 high-explosive bombs onto the warship mooring locations.

Finally, the last raid, on 30 April, was a miserable failure for the Hitlerites. Only three bombers of the 20-odd aircraft reached the southwestern outskirts of the city. Pressured by antiaircraft fire, they released several high-explosive bombs into the Gulf of Finland. One bomber was destroyed.

A total of more than 400 enemy sorties to Leningrad were recorded in April. On 6 occasions the city and warships were subjected to aerial bombardment, including one night raid. Air-raid alarms sounded 9 times in April, with a total duration of more than 11 hours. The Germans dropped a total of 611 high-explosive bombs, 219 of which fell into the Gulf of Finland and onto empty ground. The enemy lost more than 70 aircraft, and an additional 27 were disabled.⁵

Thinking back to these battles, I must say that we had amazing people. Essentially during the entire month of April our fire positions were under continuous artillery and bomb attack, and yet our antiaircraft gun crews fought so tenaciously that one is still amazed that they could stand up under the stress. But they did stand up, and they won.

The overall results of the April battles are gratifying, for on the whole the results of Operation "Eisstoss" proved insignificant. And yet the fascist radio reported that all the warships of the Baltic Fleet had been destroyed. In actual fact there had been one direct hit on the battleship "Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya," the cruiser "Kirov" received damage on the starboard side from 9 high-explosive bomb bursts, and just 2 destroyers received some small holes. This damage was soon repaired by the ships' crews. The Red-Banner Baltic Fleet continued to give artillery and air assistance to the ground forces, to defend naval bases and facilities from the sea, ground and air, and continued fighting to push back the blockade line.

I shall once again cite West German historian Huemmelchen. Unquestionably he is not averse to exaggerating the exploits of the Luftwaffe (this is evident from his article) and to minimizing our achievements. But there is an element of truth in the statements made by this author. Huemmelchen is simply forced to acknowledge that "the mission to destroy the main forces of the Baltic Fleet which was assigned to the 1st Air Force, in spite of numerous raids during April 1942, was not fully accomplished as a consequence of the extremely aggressive air defense of the Russians."⁶

Thus ended Operation "Eisstoss" (after 4 April it had a new code name --"Goetz von Berlichingen"). It was a failure. And considerable credit for this goes to men of the Leningrad Air Defense Army. Their skill and courage saved warships from destruction, reduced our casualties within the city proper, and helped preserve fleet forces for subsequent joint operations with ground forces.

FOOTNOTES

1.	MARINE RUNDSCHAU, August 1955, page 227.					
2.	On 5 April 1942 the Leningrad Air Defense Corps Region was redesignated the Leningrad Air Defense Army by decision of the State Defense Committee.					
3.	TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], Fund 742, List 595874, File 1, Sheet 58.					
4.	Ibid., Fund 13829, List 20024, File 1, Sheet 33.					
5.	Ibid., Fund 285, List 530694, File 1, Sheet 29.					
6.	MARINE RUNDSCHAU, August 1959, page 231.					
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WARTIME OPERATIONS: ALLIED COOPERATIVE EFFORTS AGAINST GERMANY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 48-54

[First part of two-part article, published under the heading "World War II," by Candidate of Military Sciences Lt Gen Tank Trps S. Radziyevskiy: "Military Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts by Countries of the Anti-Hitler Coalition"]

[Text] Emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition and unification of the efforts of the countries in that coalition constitute a complex and multifaceted sociohistorical phenomenon, dictated by the specific features and character of World War II, war aims, the spatial scope, distribution of internal class forces in the individual countries, and by the international situation. V. I. Lenin regarded as possible "military agreements with one of the imperialist coalitions against another in those cases where such an agreement, without doing detriment to the foundations of Soviet rule, could strengthen its position and neutralize pressure brought to bear by any imperialist power...."

The anti-Hitler coalition constituted an alliance of many countries and peoples with differing social systems, which united efforts to defeat the aggressive bloc of fascist states. Its principal and decisive force was the Soviet Union, which through its consistent and firm policy sought to achieve a relative unity of actions on the part of the nations of the coalition, strengthening of the alliance of peace-loving peoples, and an enhanced role by these peoples in the struggle against fascism.

Within the camp of imperialist nations joining the anti-Hitler coalition, the war did not eliminate the antagonisms which are inherent in the capitalist system. "...The class conflicts which tear peoples asunder," wrote V. I. Lenin, "continue to exist and will be manifested in time of war, in war, and the manner of war."² Herein one finds the deep-lying reason why the powerful material and manpower resources of the cpitalist countries, particularly of Great Britain and the United States, were utilized in the war considerably less effectively and why their contribution to the cause of victory was more limited than that of the USSR.

The need for coordination of the military efforts of the USSR and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was dictated by the real and present course of

events. The fascist regime, expressing the interests of the most reactionary detachment of international imperialism, set for itself the aim not only of destroying the socialist state but also of achieving world domination. The war was initiated by Hitlerite Germany and fought with enormous, advanceprepared armed forces, an important role in the establishment of which was played by a lack of political principles and conciliationism based on anticommunism, as well as capital from Great Britain, France, the United States, and other capitalist countries invested in the economy of the Third Reich.

But the politicians of the West badly miscalculated. Fascism dealt its first blow against those who had nourished it and had directed it against the Soviet Union. Within just a few months a number of capitalist countries in Europe had been brought to their knees. The aggressor proceeded to embark upon a campaign of aerial and undersea terror against England. Some of the other European countries, contrary to the will of their peoples, were transformed by fascism into its satellites.

In the prewar period the Communist Party and Soviet Government, by means of their consistent foreign policy, thwarted attempts by imperialist reaction to create a united anti-Soviet front. They firmly and persistently struggled to achieve collective security and unification of the efforts of progressive forces in the struggle against the aggressor. This helped millions of people in different countries to become increasingly more cognizant of the need for close unity to repulse fascism.

The Marxist-Leninist ideas of defense of the socialist homeland constituted the theoretical foundation of the forms and modes of coalition direction of military operations against fascist Germany, militarist Japan and their allies. Upon its entry into the war, the Soviet Union conducted a campaign to achieve extensive military-political cooperation with all countries, and to have all forces fighting fascism join the anti-Hitler coalition. The just, liberation character of the Great Patriotic War was a decisive factor in uniting peoples. I. V. Stalin stated in a radio address on 3 July 1941: "In this great war we shall have faithful allies in the peoples of Europe and America.... Our war for the freedom of our homeland will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence and for democratic freedoms. This will be a united front of peoples...."³

By war's end there were more than 50 countries in the anti-Hitler coalition, including the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, France, and China. The conclusion of Marxism-Leninism that in spite of differences in societal system nations and peoples can fruitfully cooperate in accomplishing historically pressing tasks and achieve important results in the interests of preserving peace and progress had been graphically affirmed. In this article we shall briefly examine the experience of cooperation by nations in World War II, which in our view is relevant to present-day conditions.

Hitlerite Germany's treacherous attack on the Soviet Union rocked the entire world, radically altered the military-political situation, and strengthened the just, liberation character of the war on the part of the peoples which were resisting fascism. There took place a further unification of all progressive forces capable of fighting Nazism.

On 22 June 1941 British Prime Minister W. Churchill declared that Great Britain would be on the side of the Soviet Union and would give it every possible assistance. A day later a like declaration was made by U.S. President F. Roosevelt. At the end of June an exchange of military missions took place between the USSR and Great Britain. A British economic mission also arrived in Moscow. The first official document marking the beginning of establishment of an anti-Hitler coalition was signed on 12 July -- an agreement between the governments of the USSR and Great Britain to act in common cause in the war against Germany.⁴ On 2 August the U.S. Government announced a resolution "to offer all feasible economic assistance, for the purpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression."⁵

On 14 August W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt signed a declaration which was given the name "Atlantic Charter." The USSR, proceeding from the fact that it contained a number of democratic principles promoting strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition and mobilization of peoples for the struggle against fascism, acceded to the Charter. In a special declaration on 24 September, the Soviet Government substantially broadened the program of the anti-Hitler coalition, stressing that its principal and determining aim was the absolute defeat of the aggressors at the earliest possible date, and the only sure way to achieve this aim was unification of all the manpower and resources of the nations of the antifascist alliance.

Expansion and consolidation of the forming anti-Hitler coalition was fostered by the fact that the Communist Party and Soviet Government advocated the principles of respect for the sovereignty of peoples, their self-determination and equality under the law, their territorial integrity, and their right to choose for themselves a societal system and form of government. All this became the foundation of the coalition and inspired peoples to struggle against the aggressors.

As a result, the anti-Hitler coalition was also joined by the governments of countries whose territory was occupied by the Hitlerites. The USSR signed a number of agreements: on 18 July 1941 with the Czechoslovak Government in exile, and on 30 July with the Polish Government in exile. On 27 September 1941 the Soviet Union was the first to recognize the Free France National Committee, ⁶ and on 5 and 7 August 1941 it reestablished diplomatic relations with Norway and Belgium.⁷

The anti-Hitler coalition was expanding: more and more countries were joining. On 1 January 1942 representatives of 26 countries, including the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain, convened in Washington to sign the United Nations Declaration, which contained the pledge to utilize all resources for the struggle against the aggressors, to cooperate in the war effort and not to sign a separate peace with fascist Germany.

The Communist parties of the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and other countries came forth with a slogan calling for unity of action with the

Soviet Union. The Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Romania, France, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia called upon the peoples of the world to step up the antifascist struggle, to increase assistance to the Soviet people, who were carrying the brunt of the war effort against the fascist hordes. Support for the Soviet Union's struggle on the part of Communist and worker parties as well as working people in various countries of the world was of a consistent, sincere and effective character. This meant that not the governments in exile of the German-occupied nations but rather mass antifascist, national liberation organizations were leading the struggle and moving forward: the Poland National Democratic Front, the France National Front, the United Popular Liberation Front in Albania, the National Liberation Front in Greece, the Independence Front in Belgium, and the Patriotic Front in Bulgaria.


The nations which were members of the anti-Hitler coalition employed various forms of struggle to achieve victory over fascism: military operations by regular armed forces on the battle front, a resistance movement, partisan operations behind fascist lines, economic and ideological forms of struggle against the occupation forces, etc.

Of course military operations at the front were the principal and decisive form of struggle. The Soviet Government and Supreme High Command devoted primary attention toward an all-out increase in their effectiveness, scope and purposefulness. Political and military treaties were signed with the aim of strengthening cooperation. These included an Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany, signed in London on 26 May 1942. The Soviet-American agreement of 11 June 1942 on principles of mutual assistance in the war effort against the aggressor was an important step forward; this agreement regulated economic and financial issues connected with rendering mutual assistance. This constituted the concluding stage in building a powerful coalition of nations and peoples fighting fascism.

At the same time, pursuing selfish calculations, for an extended period of time the U.S. and British governments avoided active efforts by their armed forces in the main theater of war. A second front in Europe was not opened until 1944, that is, when the fate of the war had essentially already been determined.

Joint actions by the Soviet Union and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition demanded a search for and formulation of appropriate forms and methods of coordination of military-political efforts (see diagram). A major role was played by personal correspondence between the heads of government of the USSR, United States, and Great Britain. The exchange of correspondence was handled by diplomatic channels and applied to a broad range of issues of a political, economic, and military-strategic character.⁸

The most important form of coordination of efforts of the three powers was inter-Allied conferences of heads of government, at which fundamental political and military matters were settled, matters connected not only with prosecution of the war effort but also the postwar arrangement of the world. The Teheran (November-December 1943), Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945) conferences were held during the war years. Bilateral



Forms of Military Cooperation and Coordination of Efforts by the Nations of the Anti-Hitler Coalition in Europe

Key:

- Countries of the anti-Hitler coalition: USSR, United States, Britain, France
- 2. Personal correspondence between heads of government
- Bilateral meetings of heads of government with participation of military officials
- 4. Bilateral meetings of chiefs of general staffs
- 5. Through military missions
- Conferences between nations under the direction of heads of government, with the participation of representatives of military command and control agencies
- 7. Multilateral meetings of chiefs of general staffs
- Coordination by means of correspondence between military command and control agencies on military-technical matters
- 9. By means of economic missions

10. Moscow

- 11. U.S. military mission
- 12. British military mission
- 13. French military mission
- 14. Washington
- 15. London
- 16. Soviet military missions
- 17. U.S. economic mission
- 18. British economic mission
- 19. French economic mission
- 20. Soviet economic missions

meetings of heads of government, bilateral and multilateral meetings of chiefs of general staffs or their authorized representatives became an effective form of cooperation.

Many issues pertaining to coordination of mutual efforts were settled by means of military and economic missions of the nations of the anti-Hitler coalition to the USSR, as well as Soviet military and economic missions in Washington and London.

Coordination of the plans of the Soviet Armed Forces with the Anglo-American forces was handled in the form of mutual briefings on the objectives and tasks of military operations during a specific period. Essentially they pertained to strategic problems, and only toward the end of the war in Europe did they take on some features of an operational nature. In particular, it was necessary to delineate boundaries for air operations and to establish points of meeting with Allied forces. Certain other items pertaining to the limits of authority of fronts and armies were also discussed.

The main problem of coordination of military efforts between the USSR and Western nations in the anti-Hitler coalition was that of opening a second front in Europe at the earliest possible date. The U.S. and British governments, pursuing their own political aims of mutual exhaustion of the USSR in Germany, in order then to impose advantageous peace conditions, made every effort to delay settlement of this cardinal issue. But when it became clear that the Soviet Armed Forces could accomplish the total defeat of the enemy alone, they were forced in June 1944 to open a second front in Europe. The Soviet Army, on instructions by its Supreme High Command and carrying out its duty as an ally, conducted a number of large-scale operations (in Belorussia, at Leningrad, in Karelia) in order to create favorable conditions for execution of the first operation by the Allied forces after crossing the English Channel.

* * *

As the Soviet Army proceeded to carry out its historic liberation mission, coordination of efforts with a number of countries in Southeastern and Central Europe began to take on forms of governmental agreements. History's first coalition of nations of a new, progressive type began to form. It was distinguished by a unity of political goals, by a high degree of coordination of the military-strategic efforts of its members, and by more efficient, deeper and more diversified collaboration among forces.

Initially military collaboration was carried out with Polish and Czechoslovak combined units and units which were formed on Soviet soil, as well as with the Yugoslavian People's Liberation Army, which was fighting against the fascist occupation forces in its own country. Contacts were established and consolidated with participants in the resistance movement, with partisan units of the Armija Ludowa in Poland, the People's Liberation Insurgent Army in Bulgaria, and with partisan detachments in Czechoslovakia. As combat operations advanced beyond Soviet borders, troops of Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and other countries joined the coalition. Thus a fighting alliance of a new type was born and was gaining strength, a coalition grounded on mutual trust and on principles of proletarian solidarity and internationalism. Taken into consideration in its organization were features proceeding from the conditions of the military situation, the national features characteristic of the various countries, and their geographic position.

Strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition and its capabilities in the armed struggle was fostered by enormous assistance by the Soviet Union in establishing and equipping allied military units. In particular, 19 infantry, 5 artillery and 5 aviation divisions were formed, armed and trained in the USSR, as well as 6 infantry,^{8a} 8 tank and motorized rifle, 12 artillery and mortar, and 5 combat engineer brigades, plus dozens of various units and subunits, totaling 555,000 men.^{8b} Many Soviet military specialists, at the request of the national command authorities, served in these elements in the capacity of advisers and instructors, or held command and staff positions in the units and combined units.

In the course of liberation of the nations of Southeastern and Central Europe by the Soviet Army, at the request of the governments of these countries, the Soviet Union gave them friendly and unselfish material assistance. The quantities of arms furnished to these nations are indicated in the following table.

Tab	le*
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Arms	Countries				
	Bulgaria	Poland	Romania	Czechoslovakia	Yugoslavia
Rifles and carbines	18,800	302,994	12,175	36,459	155,328
Submachineguns	10,615	106,531	5,248	15,726	38,345
Light and medium					
machineguns	2,040	18,799	1,556	4,023	15,511
Antitank rifles	300	6,768	397	1,427	3,797
Mortars	310	4,806	402	837	4,599
Artillery pieces	516	3,898	184	603	1,273

* See: "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, page 574

/The basic principles of coordination of efforts and the nature of collaboration between the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the Hitlerite-occupied European countries were spelled out in the agreement between the government of the USSR and the Polish Government in exile of 30 July 1941 on the principle of forming an army under the command of Gen W. Anders on Soviet soil/ [in boldface]. It stated: "The government of the USSR expresses its consent to establishment of a Polish army on the territory of the USSR, under command authorities designated by the Polish Government with the agreement of the Soviet Government. The Polish army on the territory of the USSR shall function operationally under the direction of the USSR Supreme Command, which shall include a representative of the Polish army."⁹ As of February 1942 the Polish Army totaled 73,415 men and contained 6 infantry divisions and a tank brigade. Motivated by anti-Sovietism, however, Polish emigré circles and the army's command authorities refused to wage a joint struggle against fascist Germany, and in 1942 the troops of this army were evacuated to Iran.

In May 1943, at the initiative of the Alliance of Polish Patriots¹⁰ (APP), establishment of the Kosciuszko 1st Infantry Division began. At the request of the APP, 150 Soviet officers were assigned to the division to fill middle-level command slots.

In the summer of 1943 the influx of Polish volunteers increased. On 10 August the State Defense Committee responded to a request by APP and adopted the decision to establish the Polish lst Corps in the USSR, initially containing two and subsequently three infantry divisions, an artillery brigade and a tank brigade, an aviation regiment, plus other units. Forming of the Polish 1st Army Corps was completed by March 1944.

Pursuant to a 17 March 1944 directive of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, deployment of the Polish 1st Army, based on the corps, commenced in the Kharkov Military District. Gen Z. Berling was named its commander, and Gen A. Zawadski was designated military council member.¹¹ The army's military council was subordinated politically to the APP and operationally to Headquarters, Supreme High Command.

The Polish 1st Army took part in the Belorussian strategic operation. After crossing the Western Bug, its troops set foot on Polish soil.

On 21 July 1944 the Krajowa Rada Narodowa [National People's Council] (KRN) issued a decree announcing formation of the Polish National Liberation Committee (PNLC) -- the first worker-peasant government in the history of the Polish people. That same day the KRN issued a decree announcing that it was assuming supreme authority over the Polish 1st Army and its unification with the Armija Ludowa into a unified Wojsko Polskie [Polish Army] (WP). It stressed, however, that the combined units of the WP would continue to be operationally subordinate to the Soviet command authorities.

The 2nd Army of the WP (4 infantry divisions and artillery units), under the command of Gen K. Swierczewski, was formed on Polish soil in the fall of 1944, as well as a composite aviation corps (in the Mirgorod-Volchansk area). Soon command and control of the Soviet 6th Air Army was handed over to the WP Air Force.

Matters pertaining to military-political cooperation between the Soviet and Polish governments were handled through a Soviet delegation assigned to the PNLC. In particular, it was charged with monitoring execution of the 12 July 1944 agreement, which specified that any part of Polish territory was to be handed over to the Polish administration upon cessation of military operations in that area. In the combat zone an authorized representative of the PNLC provided liaison between the Soviet military command authorities and local authorities. In January 1945 KRN made the decision to transform the PNLC into a Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic. In connection with this, the Soviet delegation in Poland was disbanded, and a USSR military mission was formed. Subsequently large strategic formations of the WP were incorporated as elements of the Soviet fronts. Liaison between the Polish and Soviet headquarters was handled within the overall system of front communications; verbal communications and correspondence between the command authorities and staffs of the formations and combined units of the WP on the one hand and our headquarters on the other were conducted in Russian in conformity with the requirements of Soviet regulations and standard operating procedures. (To be continued)

FOOTNOTES

- 1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 36, page 323.
- 2. Ibid., Vol:26, page 41.
- 3. PRAVDA, 4 July 1941.
- "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the Patriotic War Period], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1946, pp 130-132.
- 5. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya" [Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. Concise History], Voyenizdat, 1970, page 148.
- "Osvoboditel'naya missiya Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, page 38.
- 7. "Vneshnyaya politika...," op. cit., page 145.

 See "Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SSha i prem'yer-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [Correspondence Between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, U.S. Presidents and British Prime Ministers During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Vols I, II, Moscow, Politizdat, 1957.

- 8a. Including a Polish cavalry brigade and Czechoslovak airborne brigade -- Ed.
- 8b. IZVESTIYA, 8 May 1968.
- 9. "Vneshnyaya politika...," op. cit., page 138.
- 10. A mass antifascist organization of Polish emigrés in the USSR, which totaled 100,000 persons in June 1943.
- 11. "50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR" [Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces], Voyenizdat, 1968, page 540.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION MOSKALENKO

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 63-67

[Article by Twice HSU and Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Army Gen D. Lelyushenko: "Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko (On His 80th Birthday)"]

[Text] The Communist Party and Soviet Government, in the process of strengthening the defense capability of the socialist homeland, have produced a large number of prominent Soviet commanders and military leaders. A worthy place among this group is held by Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko.

I would say that Kirill Semenovich's biography is uniquely beautiful and remarkable. He was born on 11 May 1902 in the village of Grishino, today Donetskaya Oblast, and began his military service as an 18-year-old Komsomol member. He fought with the 6th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army against the White Guardists and the followers of Makhno in the Ukraine and the Crimea, and against counterrevolutionary bands on the Don and in the Northern Caucasus. In 1922 he graduated from the unified red commanders school in Kharkov and was reassigned to his division. In 1927-1928 he studied in a command personnel advanced training curriculum in Pushkino and in 1939 completed studies in the higher command personnel advanced training faculty at the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy. By mid-1941 Kirill Semenovich had advanced sequentially through Red Army ranks from private to major general. A probationary member from 1923 and a full member of the Leninist party from 1926, he also obtained excellent party conditioning.

The field generalship talent of K. S. Moskalenko was revealed most fully and vividly in the years of the Great Patriotic War, which he entered as a comprehensively trained general officer, possessing considerable theoretical preparation and a wealth of practical experience. Kirill Semenovich served at the front from the first to the last day of the war, displaying outstanding ability in organizing and directing combat operations, firmness of character, and personal courage. Under his guidance the men of the 1st Motorized Antitank Brigade of the High Command Reserve disabled and destroyed more than 200 enemy tanks in the frontier battle alone. In the third month of the war he was placed in command of a rifle corps, subsequently a cavalry corps and a horse cavalry-mechanized group. At the end of 1941 Kirill Semenovich was named deputy commander of the 6th Army, and beginning in March 1942 sequentially commanded the 38th, 1st Tank, 1st Guards and 40th armies; he once again commanded the 38th Army from October 1943 to war's end. The large strategic formations under his command took active part in major defensive and offensive operations in the southwestern sector, as a rule operating on the main axes.

I took part together with Kirill Semenovich in the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, the crossing of the Dnieper, liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia. I had frequent contact with him and got to know him particularly well during preparation for and execution of the Lvov-Sandomierz and Prague operations. In all the ordeals of the war, no matter how difficult the conditions of combat became at times, he impressed me with his purposefulness and vigor in carrying out assigned tasks, his staunchness, fearlessness and steadfastness, and his striving for maximally aggressive actions both in defense and offense. At the very beginning of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, for example, the 1st Tank Army, which was under the command of K. S. Moskalenko, for 12 days straight attacked the enemy almost continuously and delayed his advance. By Kalach-na-Donu he halted the headlong rush on Stalingrad by the 6th Army of General Paulus and gained almost a month's time to organize for defense at depth and for moving up reserves. Later the 1st Guards Army under Kirill Semenovich's command mounted a number of attacks on the enemy, together with other forces, northwest of Stalingrad, forcing the adversary to lessen his pressure on the city. On 12 September 1942 Army Gen G. K. Zhukov, representative of Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC), reported the importance of these attacks to Hq SHC. 1

I was also impressed by Kirill Semenovich's constant striving to find innovative solutions, new modes and techniques of combat. I shall cite several examples.

K. S. Moskalenko was faced with responsible tasks as commander of the 40th Army in the 1943 battles in the Voronezh area and further south. In the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Operation (13-27 January 1943) the army's forces were operating in the most important sector of the Voronezh Front and were to commence an offensive by breaking through a strong defense which the enemy had been fortifying for a period of half a year. Preparations for the combat operation were executed skillfully and with great thoroughness. The army carried out a decisive massing of men and equipment in the breakthrough sector and skillfully executed measures pertaining to operational concealment, camouflage, and deception, which made it possible to achieve total offensive surprise. Artillery preparation proved highly effective. The front command authorities highly praised the performance by the army's artillery. A report to Hq SHC stated: "Two hours of artillery bombardment of the enemy totally destroyed his ability to resist. Our attacking infantry broke through the enemy's defense standing tall, practically without casualties."3

In spite of extreme cold, snowdrifts and roadless terrain, the offensive advanced swiftly. It took the 40th Army and Gen P. S. Rybalko's 3rd Tank Army only a week to break through the defense, to encircle and split up the enemy force, plus an additional week to destroy it. A total of 86,000 enemy officers and enlisted personnel were taken prisoner.

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K. S. Moskalenko was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st Class, and promoted to the rank of lieutenant general for his skilled direction of his forces in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Operation.

K. S. Moskalenko's participation in the Battle of Kursk, the Battle of the Dnieper, and the liberation of Kiev are vivid pages in his career. Following the victory at Kursk the 40th Army, fighting as an element of the Voronezh Front, once again, just as that winter, advanced as the main spearhead of the offensive, in the direction of Kiev. Its actions were swift and successful. On 19 September 1943 the front military council dispatched a telegram to Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin: "For skilled leadership in battle, for courage, for devotion to the homeland.... For capture of a number of cities in the Ukraine and victories over the enemy, as well as for crossing a number of rivers: the Boromlya, Psel, Grun, Khorol, Sula, and Uday -- we request that the rank of colonel general be awarded to the commander of the 40th army, Lt Gen Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko. He covered more than 350 kilometers during the offensive operation, with capture of the towns of Trostyanets, Boromlya, Gadyach, Lubny, Piryatin, and Lokhvitsa."⁴ The petition of the front military council was approved that same day. Kirill Semenovich was one of the first army commanders to be promoted to the rank of colonel general.

Engaging in offensive exploitation, in the latter third of September the army's troops reached the Dnieper south of Kiev, effected a hasty river-crossing operation, and seized a bridgehead in the vicinity of Bukrino. K. S. Moskalenko was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for successful execution of combat missions.

The adversary, attempting at all costs to stabilize the front and to hold the capital of the Ukraine, swiftly concentrated large forces south of Kiev. The fighting took on a stubborn, protracted character, and in addition the terrain did not favor successful employment of tanks. In these conditions Hq SHC gave instructions to mount the main attack to liberate Kiev from the northern, Lyutezhskiy bridgehead. A large-scale redeployment of troops was carried out. The main role in the new operation was assigned to the 38th Army. K. S. Moskalenko was named its commander.

Kirill Semenovich's generalship ability was particularly vividly manifested in this operation. In order to ensure breaching the enemy's strong defense, he concentrated 88 percent of the army's guns and mortars in a 6-kilometer breakthrough sector. This resulted in a higher density of artillery than all the preceding offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War -- an average of 380 guns and mortars per kilometer of frontage, not including truck-mounted multiple-tube rocket launchers.⁵

The 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps were committed to battle to complete penetration of the enemy's tactical zone of defense and to exploit the successful advance of the troops of the 38th Army. Smashing fierce enemy resistance, the Soviet forces advanced swiftly, and liberated Kiev on 6 November. This was a great victory, and an important role in this victory was played by the troops of the 38th Army. A Supreme Commander order dated 6 November 1943 noted that "the troops of Colonel General Moskalenko and Lieutenant General Chernyakhovskiy, the tankers of Lieutenant General Rybalko, the pilots of Lieutenant General Aviation Krasovskiy, and the artillerymen of Major General Artillery Korol'kov distinguished themselves in the fighting to liberate the city of Kiev."⁶

During the liberation of Kiev and thereafter, the Czechoslovak lst Independent Brigade, and subsequently the Czechoslovak lst Army Corps based on the brigade, performed successfully as an element of the 38th Army. In the course of the joint struggle against the fascist invaders, truly fraternal relations were established between the Soviet and Czechoslovak fighting men. Following the Carpathian-Dukla Operation, when the Czechoslovak 1st Corps was removed from the 38th Army, its commander, Gen L. Svoboda, sent the following message to K. S. Moskalenko: "As we take leave of the troops of the army under your command, on my own behalf and on that of the officers and men of the Czechoslovak lst Army Corps, I should like to express to you personally, to the military council, as well as to the army's general officers, officers and men, our sincere gratitude for that fraternal Slavic assistance and support which you constantly gave us during our common combat activities.

"We are proud of the fact that we were given the great honor to fight side by side with the valiant troops of the 38th Army on the border of our homeland, and we shall never forget that it is only due to the heroism and self-sacrifice of the troops under your leadership that we succeeded in fighting our way onto the soil of the Czechoslovak Republic...."⁷

The troops of the 38th Army had traveled approximately 2000 kilometers along the roads of the war, liberating from the fascist invaders more than 10,000 inhabited localities, including a number of large cities, and victoriously ended their combat operations in Prague. They fought with bravery and skill against the hated foe and by their combat exploits added brilliant pages to the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War. Thousands of enlisted men, noncommisioned officers and officers were awarded decorations and medals, and more than 360 were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Successful combat operations by the troops under the command of K. S. Moskalenko were mentioned on 18 occasions in Supreme Commander orders.

A. M. Vasilevskiy, describing the commanding general of the 38th Army, wrote in his memoirs: "The practical know-how, knowledge, resoluteness and persistence which are characteristic of Kirill Semenovich as a rule led to successful accomplishment of the missions assigned to his troops. His generalship talent was most fully manifested while he was commanding the 38th Army, which victoriously fought for liberation of the Ukraine, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This is why the subsequent career of this commanding general is not mere happenstance...."⁸

After the war K. S. Moskalenko was in command of an army. In 1948 he was named commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, and in 1953 commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District. From 1960 through 1962, serving as commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces and USSR deputy minister of defense, he devoted much effort and energy to the development of this new branch of service. In 1962 the party and government appointed him to the post of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense and deputy USSR minister of

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defense, in which post he has been working productively up to the present time. K. S. Moskalenko was elected member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1956. He has served as a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet at all postwar convocations.

For his considerable services to the Soviet State and its Armed Forces, in 1955 Kirill Semenovich was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, and in 1969 he was awarded the title Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. In 1978 he was awarded the Order of Lenin and a second Gold Star Medal for skilled leadership of his troops, for courage and heroism displayed in the struggle against the German-fascist invaders during the years of the Great Patriotic War, for his large contribution toward training and increasing the combat readiness of troops in the postwar period, and in connection with the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. Kirill Semenovich has been awarded the Order of Lenin 6 times, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Red Banner 5 times, has twice been awarded the Order of Suvorov, lst Class, has twice been awarded the Order of Kutuzov, lst Class, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, lst Class, and the Order for Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd Class, a great many medals, foreign decorations, as well as a presentation weapon.

MSU K. S. Moskalenko skillfully combines his considerable party, governmental and civic activities with scientific research work. His articles, synthesizing the experience of the last war, practical organizational development of the Armed Forces, and on military-patriotic indoctrination are frequently published in periodicals. His experience in leading troops in the Great Patriotic War is reflected in his 2-volume "Na Yugo-Zapadnom napravlenii" [In the Southwestern Sector], several editions of which have been published.

Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko is celebrating his birthday full of health and energy. We wish him good health and future successes in his diversified activities directed toward strengthening the defense might of the Soviet Union.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], Fund 220, List 226, File 19, sheets 258-262.
- 2. Footnote omitted.
- 3. Ibid., Fund 203, List 68578, File 5, Sheet 7.
- 4. Ibid., List 2777, File 98, Sheet 49.
- 5. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 7, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp 256-257.
- 6. "Prikazy Verkhovnogo Glavnokomanduyushchego v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Orders of the Supreme Commander in the Period of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Voyenizdat, 1975, page 67.

- 7. TsAMO, Fund 393, List 9003, File 10, Sheet 26.
- 8. A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [Lifelong Cause], Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, page 379.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN PARTY-POLITICAL WORK IN MILITIA UNITS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 72-75

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Lt Col (Ret) A. Limberger: "From the Experience of Organizing Party-Political Work in Units and Combined Units of the People's Militia"]

[Text] The narodnoye opolcheniye [home guard or people's militia] is one of the most mass forms of voluntary participation by the civilian population in the armed struggle against the enemies of the homeland. On the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Leningrad party organization was initiator of establishment of home guard units. In view of massive requests by civilians not subject to conscription to be accepted to active military service, and in view of the difficult situation at the front, on 27 June 1941 the Leningrad city party committee petitioned the Soviet Army High Command to permit the formation of seven volunteer divisions. The request was approved, and on 30 June there began in Leningrad the forming of units and combined units which were designated home guard units.¹

The party Central Committee extended the Leningrad initiative to other cities. On 4 July 1941 the State Defense Committee ordered that 200,000 persons in Moscow and 70,000 in Moscow Oblast be enrolled in home guard combined units.²

Following Leningrad and Moscow, a home guard began to be formed in many other cities, oblasts and republics. In the summer and fall of 1941 approximately 60 divisions, 200 independent regiments, and a large number of subunits were formed of volunteers. They totaled approximately 2 million men. Nationwide more than 4 million persons announced the desire to join the home guard.³

The home guard was a vivid expression of Soviet patriotism, one of the forms of struggle against the German-fascist invaders, and constituted a powerful support to the Soviet Army with reserve manpower.

Its combined units, units, and subunits belonged for the most part to two combat arms: infantry and cavalry. They were formed according to the wartime authorized strengths of rifle and cavalry divisions. The city party organizations directed their establishment. They were greatly assisted by the command authorities, headquarters staffs and political agencies of the military districts, which selected command, political and engineer-technical personnel and furnished combat equipment, weapons, and ammunition. As a rule military agencies formed special units and subunits for the home guard divisions. For example, by decision of the military council of the Moscow Military District, signal battalions as well as combat engineer and artillery regiments were formed for the Moscow home guard combined units. Pursuant to instructions by the commanding general of the southwestern sector, MSU S. M. Budennyy, 15,000 rifles and a large quantity of other weapons were allocated to the Kiev home guard.⁴

Their combat and political training differed in many respects from the training received by regular troops. For example, almost all units were formed for defense of their rayons and cities, using the workers and employees of enterprises, plants, and factories, without taking them away from their jobs. At first home guard members performed 2 jobs: civilian -- working at their regular jobs, and military -- serving as soldiers. This dual character also determined the nature of combat and political training. At the initial stage training was held after work and included weapon and tactical training for the individual soldier, study of military regulations, field manuals, the military oath, plus other items. The guard members would usually report for training by subunits 2-4 hours after their workshift. The following stage included combat and political training with time off one's regular job. Subunits, units and combined units were quartered in barracks, with personnel issued full military gear and weapons. During this period main emphasis was placed on small subunit tactics and drill, developing a smoothly operating unit, on organization, command and control, and strengthening of military discipline. Special subunits and units from the military districts would be assigned to them.

Party-political work in the units was conducted in conformity with this. We should note first of all that political agencies of combined units and formations and the party-political edifice of units and subunits were established in all home guard units, just as in the regular military. One peculiarity was that all political personnel were selected and approved by the party oblast and rayon committees. For example, the chief of the political department of the Leningrad People's Militia Army was party city committee official I. A. Verkhoglaz,⁵ while the entire department consisted almost entirely of persons enrolled in Lenin courses under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). The Leningrad rayon party committees dispatched for the first eight home guard divisions a total of 31 Communists for the position of regimental commissar and 477 to serve as political officer.⁶

The Moscow party organization assigned approximately 800 of its members as commissars and political workers in home guard divisions and regiments.⁷

The majority of political agencies of these combined units were staffed by professors and instructors from the social sciences departments of Moscow higher educational institutions.

In Kiev rayon party committee secretaries became home guard battalion commissars, while propaganda department instructors became company political officers.

Local party officials were quite familiar with the forms and methods of party work in peacetime conditions, but they possessed poor knowledge of partypolitical work in the military, particularly in time of war.

One of the primery concerns of the political agencies of home guard combined units and units was establishment of strong party and Komsomol organizations in the battalions and companies. The platoons and squads contained party and Komsomol groups. In the 4th People's Militia Division formed in Moscow's Kuybyshevskiy Rayon, for example, in mid-August 1941 there were 1050 Communists and 900 Komsomol members.⁸ They comprised 32.5 percent of total personnel. This represented a considerable force.

In those divisions, regiments and battalions the personnel of which continued in their regular jobs, combat and political training classes, as well as party-political measures were conducted 3 times a week after work. On Sundays the home guard members would go out to the field for tactical exercises.

Primarily collective forms of party-political work were conducted in almost all home guard units: political instruction classes and political briefings at the battalion and company level; party and Komsomol meetings (frequently open) in the regiments and battalions; political personnel conferences in the divisions and regiments; various seminars and training conferences (party organizers, Komsomol organizers, propagandists, wall newspaper editors, etc) in the division political departments.

Political workers, just as all home guard personnel, were civilians, workers and employees. Many of them were employed in shock-work and front brigades producing combat equipment, weapons, ammunition and other items for the needs of the battle front.

In those home guard divisions, regiments and battalions which shifted to fulltime personnel activities, the subunits engaged in combat training from morning to evening, preparing to be sent to the front. Subsequently they became regular units.

In each oblast and city party-political work in home guard units was conducted on the basis of local schedules. In Stalingrad, for example, pursuant to the "Instructions on Party-Political Work in Combined Units, Units and Subunits of the Stalingrad People's Militia Corps,"⁹ formulated by the party oblast committee. Commanders, political workers and party organizations devoted principal attention to indoctrinating home guardsmen in a spirit of love for the homeland, total devotion to their people, the cause of the party, the Soviet Government, initiative, strong tenacity and fearlessness in battle; they sought to ensure that each and every man possessed solid knowledge of Red Army regulations, was an accurate marksman, possessed excellent mastery of hand-to-hand combat techniques, was capable of making correct decisions in a rapidly changing situation, and was ready at all times to carry out any party and government order.

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In addition, all commanders and political workers, party full members and probationary members, as well as Komsomol members were to conduct explanatory work among the civilian population, to combat the spread of false rumors, organizing the worker masses to work to achieve high labor productivity, to fulfill and overfulfill production plans, for harvesting crops rapidly and without loss, ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the grain delivery plan and successful accomplishment of other agricultural work, and to organize among individual personnel, subunits and units socialist competition for excellent performance in labor, combat and political training.

Lectures and reports were presented, and discussions held on the following topics for Stalingrad home guardsmen: "History of the Russian Home Guard," "The Heroic Defense of Tsaritsyn in 1918-1920," "Combat Operations of Armed Detachments of the Tsaritsyn Proletariat in Defense of that City," "Iron Discipline and Organization -- Decisive Condition for Victory," "On the Situation at the Fronts," "On the International Situation," plus others.¹⁰ The oblast publishing house, on instructions from the Stalingrad Oblast party committee, put out for home guardsmen a library consisting of 16 pamphlets. They included the following titles: "Master the Hand Grenade," "How to Combat Enemy Tanks," and "Terrain Orientation." Commanders and political workers used them extensively in conducting classes and discussions.

In Nikolayev, by decision of the Zavodskoy Rayon committee bureau of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), at least 6 hours a week were allocated to political instruction classes with home guardsmen on the following topics: "The Historic Significance of the Home Guard," "Lenin -- Leader and Organizer of the Red Army and Navy," "Defense of the Homeland -- Sacred Duty of Each and Every Citizen of the USSR," "Patriotism and Heroism of Red Army and Navy Personnel," "Fascism -- the Bitterest Enemy of Peoples," etc.11

In the Sevastopol People's Militia Division, political work was conducted according to the following schedule, on the recommendation of the Crimean Oblast party committee: 20-30 minute political briefings would be held prior to the commencement of training classes; newspaper readings and discussions would be held during breaks; news sheets were issued in each company, dealing with the tasks of home guardsman combat training, and containing results of socialist competition among personnel for the best combat training; assistance by excellent personnel for lagging personnel was organized.¹²

Predominant in the Orenburg People's Militia Division were such forms of partypolitical work as general meetings of Communists and meetings of home guardsmen by regiments, at the division and city levels; company political officer seminars in the division political department, and sometimes by regiments.¹³ One of the most important means of ideological-political indoctrination of the masses was the press, which played an important role in the ideological and political indoctrination of home guardsmen.

Combat and political training of home guard subunits and units was given extensive coverage in local and central newspapers. Some combined units and formations had their own newspapers. The Leningrad People's Militia Army, for example, published a daily newspaper, NA ZASHCHITU LENINGRADA, while the Ivanovo Division published the newspaper VOORUZHENNYY NAROD. From the very outset the Great Patriotic War took on a truly popular character. Home guard units, formed under the direction of the Communist Party, were a vivid expression of the supreme patriotism of the Soviet people. Practical experience once again confirmed Lenin's statement that "that people in which the majority of workers and peasants have learned, have felt and have seen that they are defending their own Soviet rule -- rule by the working people, that they are defending that cause victory of which will guarantee to them and their children the opportunity to make use of all cultural benefits and all things created by man's labor, will never be defeated."¹⁴

Mass heroism in the struggle against the German-fascist invaders was a characteristic feature of all the fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces. Home guardsmen displayed examples of mass heroism on the battlefield. Recognition by the homeland and the Supreme High Command of the enormous combat merits of the home guard divisions was expressed in the fact that many of them were designated regular Soviet Army combined units, and that several were awarded the guards appellation, given honorary names, and awarded Soviet decorations. For example, the following were designated as regular combined units: 16 Moscow, 10 Leningrad, an Odessa (421st), a Donetsk (383rd), a Voroshilovgrad (395th), a Murmansk ("Polar"), and a Yaroslavl (234th) rifle divisions; 8 cavalry divisions (2 from Krasnodar Kray, 1 each from Rostov and Stalingrad oblasts, the Kalmyk, Bashkir, Kabardino-Balkar, and Chechen-Ingush ASSR). Nine divisions subsequently received the guards appellation (former 4th, 18th, 21st people's militia divisions and 3rd Communist Division; 12th and 13th Kuban Volunteer CossackCavalry divisions, 15th and 16th Don and 112th Bashkir Cavalry divisions).

All former home guard divisions, having become a regular army unit, fought right to the end of the war, were awarded Soviet decorations and received honorary designations in honor of the cities in the liberation of which they took part.

One of the important factors which ensured successful combat operations by the home guard units was well-organized party-political work, in the conduct of which the specific features of these volunteer units and combined units were taken into consideration.

Thanks to a large party-Komsomol element, it was possible to establish an extensive network of primary party and Komsomol organizations, which became a reliable support of commanders and political workers in organizing and conducting measures aimed at maintaining high morale in home guardsmen and in mobilizing them for a selfless struggle against the enemy and successful accomplishment of that mission.

FOOTNOTES

- "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 5, Book 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, pp 180-181.
- 2. Ibid., page 182.

- 3. Ibid., page 183.
- 4. A. D. Kolesnik, "Narodnoye opolcheniye gorodov-geroyev" [Home Guard of City-Heroes], Moscow, Nauka, 1974, page 216.
- 5. "Opolchentsy. Rasskazyvayut uchastniki oborony Leningrada" [Home Guardsmen. Accounts by Participants in the Defense of Leningrad], Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1975, page 16.
- 6. S. Belyayev, and P. Kuznetsov, "Narodnoye opolcheniye Leningrada" [Leningrad's Home Guard], Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1959, page 42.
- N. M. Aleshchenko et al, "Moskovskoye opolcheniye" [Moscow Home Guard], Voyenizdat, 1969, page 33.
- 8. K. Bukov, "Vse my byli soldatami" [All of Us Were Soldiers], Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1972, page 46.
- 9. Volgograd Oblast Party Archives, Fund 113, List 2, Unit of Storage 26, sheets 1-3.
- 10. I. Loginov, "Opolchentsy v boyakh za rodnoy gorod" [Home Guardsmen Fighting for Their Home Town], Volgograd, 1963, page 15.
- 11. Nikolayev Oblast Party Archives of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Fund 7, List 1, File 361, Sheet 40.
- 12. Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Fund 17, List 8, Unit of Storage 62, Sheet 4.
- 13. Party Archives of Orenburg Oblast, Fund 267, List 13, Unit of Storage 20, sheets 1-24; sheets 25-90; Unit of Storage 21, Sheet 13.

14. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 38, page 315.

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REVIEW OF THE BOOK 'FROM WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE'

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 76-79

[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by S. Dmitriyev: "Who Is Threatening Whom?"]

[Text] As we know, the détente in relations between nations adhering to different sociopolitical systems, achieved in the 1970's primarily due to efforts by the Soviet Union, substantially lowered the temperature of the "cold war." Beginning in 1979, however, and particularly following the change of administration in the White House in January 1981, an abrupt shift took place in the policy of the United States and a number of other NATO bloc nations. The hysteria whipped up in the United States over a mythical "Soviet brigade" in Cuba and the U.S. hostages in Teheran steadily grew. And during the final months of the election campaign both presidential candidates propagated the lie about a "Soviet military threat." The aggressive-reactionary U.S. elite, convinced that international détente, which had exerted such a beneficent influence on practically all continents, was undermining its claims to world domination, decided to return the world to "cold war."

Precisely this goal, according to the White House plan, was to be fostered by a pamphlet published by the Pentagon at the end of September last year entitled "Soviet Military Power," the purpose of which was to justify the Reagan-proclaimed so-called "comprehensive strategic program," to justify the need for the lost military superiority, and to overcome serious conflicts which had arisen in NATO.

Naturally escalation of Washington's big lie could not be left without response. A worthy rebuke to the falsifiers was published in the 18 October 1981 edition of the newspaper PRAVDA. A wealth of factual material, which exposes the aggressive schemes of U.S. imperialism, is contained in the 1981 supplement to the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA -- "The Arms Race: Danger, Burden, Alternative."

A convincing reply to the question "Who is to blame for the long-standing arms race?" is offered by a book entitled "From Whence the Threat to Peace," published by Voyenizdat.¹ It was prepared by competent Soviet agencies and fully exposes the authors of the pamphlet "Soviet Military Power," who

attempt to frighten the public, particularly in the countries of the West, with the military potential of the USSR and to convince these countries of the need further to increase the military power of the United States and NATO.

The book contains four sections. The first section, entitled "Objective Appraisals?", shows how unobjective and prejudiced are the assessments of the military potential of the USSR, its foreign policy and military strategy, and notes the tendentiousness in selection of figures on the USSR Armed Forces made by the authors of the American pamphlet. It demonstrates with convincing facts who is actually throwing a "challenge" to whom, who began and for more than 3 decades is continuing the arms race at an ever increasing pace, particularly in the area of mass destruction weapons.

It is correctly stated in this book that it is precisely the United States which throughout all the postwar years has been the initiator in developing new weapons -- be they nuclear weapons, intercontinental strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, or MIRVed missiles. The USSR has merely been compelled to take response measures. This is indicated by the following figures on development of strategic weapons systems (page 7):

	United States	USSR
Atomic bomb Intercontinental strategic bomber	Mid-1940's Middle of 1950's	End of 1940's End of 1950's
Nuclear missile-armed nuclear-powered submarine Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers	Middle of 1950's Beginning of 1960's	End of 1950's None
Intercontinental ballistic missile with MIRV warhead Neutron munitions	End of 1960's End of 1970's- beginning of 1980's	Middle of 1970's None

It is evident who is the instigator in the buildup of fleet nuclear power, for example, from figures cited in the book (see table).

Year	USA USA		USSR	
	SSBN/Launchers	Nuclear Warheads	SSBN/Launchers	Nuclear Warheads
L960	3/48	48	None	None
967	41/656	1552	2/32	32
L970	41/656	2048	20/316	316
L975	41/656	4536	55/724	724
L981	40/648	5280	62/950	2000

One searches in vain in the U.S. pamphlet for even a mention of the U.S. Minuteman and Trident strategic missiles, "Ohio"-class missile-carrying submarines, or aircraft carriers cruising around Europe and carrying on board hundreds of nuclear weapon carrying aircraft. Here is another example. The Pentagon-published opus states that the aircraft-carrying ships "Kiev" and "Minsk" and the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser "Kirov" have been added to the Soviet fleet, and conclude that the threat to the United States and its NATO allies has increased in connection with this. But let us turn to the figures cited by our authors. The U.S. Navy has not two but 20 carriers, not one but 9 nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock is completing construction on a fourth nuclear carrier. Its cost is 4 billion dollars. But it seems that even this is not enough. The Moloch of militarism in the United States is inexorably and swiftly escalating the arms race. When the book "From Whence the Threat to Peace" was coming off the presses it was learned that the Pentagon has ordered two more nuclear carriers for its naval forces. Just who is threatening whom?

In the West, and particularly in this U.S. pamphlet, Soviet military expenditures are deliberately exaggerated, and there is no mention of the fact that in recent years they have remained virtually unchanged. As regards U.S. military expenditures, they are growing year by year, and in the last 20 years (1960-1980), for example, "national defense" expenditures have tripled. An even sharper increase is planned for the 1980's. Just in the period 1981-1985 expenditures for military preparations will increase by a factor of more than 2.2 and will reach an annual figure of 303.9 billion dollars by the end of this period. "National defense" expenditures for fiscal year 1986 are projected at 342.7 billion dollars (pp 48-49).

The Pentagon ascribes to the Soviet Union a striving toward "global spread of Soviet military power," but it is at the same time forced to admit that Soviet military personnel are stationed on the territory of only a few allied countries in Eastern Europe as well as the neighboring countries of Mongolia and Afghanistan, and strictly on a treaty basis. And yet military units and combined units of the U.S. armed forces are stationed in dozens of countries throughout the world. The United States maintains more than 1500 military installations and bases on the territory of 32 countries (page 28). They are particularly numerous close to the borders of the USSR (page 11).

The second section -- "The U.S. War Machine" -- contains figures on the U.S. armed forces and shows their threatening development. The book points out that there are 2112 nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the combat units of U.S. strategic offensive forces, including 1053 ICBM launchers, 411 bombers, and 648 ballistic missile launchers on 40 nuclear-powered submarines. These assets can put into the air in a single launch approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads ranging from 50 kilotons to 10 megatons each. Counting heavy bombers in reserve and mothballed, the United States has for its strategic offensive forces 2338 means of delivering nuclear weapons, including 2273 intercontinental-range platforms, as well as 65 medium bombers specially designated for operations on the European continent.

Land-based strategic missile forces total 550 Minuteman III, 450 Minuteman II, and 53 Titan II launchers. U.S. ICBMs are capable of firing in a single launch 2153 nuclear warheads ranging in yield from 170 kilotons to 10 megatons. U.S. military and political leaders view these forces as means of delivering a preemptive nuclear strike. Sea-based strategic missile forces include 40 nuclear submarines armed with Trident I (216 launchers), Poseidon C3 (304 launchers) and Polaris A3 (128 launchers) missiles, carrying more than 50 percent of all strategic nuclear warheads. More than half of the missile-armed nuclear submarines are on combat patrol at all times, in areas from which nuclear strikes can be launched from various directions at targets located deep in the Soviet heartland.

Strategic bomber units contain 346 B-52 heavy bombers and 65 FB-111A medium bombers. The strategic bomber force is deployed in the continental United States, as well as on the island of Guam in the Pacific.

One must also bear in mind that the Soviet Union not only faces the United States but other Western nuclear powers as well, and the threat from China's nuclear forces is currently even more serious for the USSR than for the United States.

The third section -- "Correlation of Military Forces Between East and West" -compares on the basis of persuasive factual data the strategic nuclear forces and intermediate-range nuclear weapons of the opposing sides and compares the general-purpose military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as their naval forces. The book points out that by the mid-1970's an approximate balance of strategic nuclear arms of the two powers was established: one side had 2500 means of delivery, while the other side had 2300. U.S. development of qualitatively new systems, however, will disrupt this parity. The authors of "From Whence the Threat to Peace" also analyze in detail the correlation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, about which U.S. propaganda is spreading so many lies. For quite a few years now the number of USSR and NATO intermediate-range nuclear weapons has remained approximately equal -about 1000 on each side. If an additional 572 new U.S. nuclear missiles are deployed in Europe, the West will obtain a more than 50 percent superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations in number of intermediate-range delivery vehicles, while in total number of nuclear warheads the NATO advantage will be even greater. The equality of nuclear arms between the opposing sides in Europe will be greatly disrupted in favor of NATO. In addition, this disrupts the balance of USSR and U.S. strategic forces, since the new U.S. missiles constitute a strategic weapon as regards the Soviet Union.

As we know, the Soviet Union offers its own program in contrast to these plans, which are aimed at preparing for a military catastrophe precisely in Europe; the Soviet program is a program of radical reductions and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons on European soil, both intermediate-range and tactical. This program, presented by L. I. Brezhnev during his visit to Bonn, is also a genuine program for a stable peace in Europe. In addresses at the 17th Trade Union Congress and at an official ceremony in Tashkent, L. I. Brezhnev advanced new USSR peace initiatives: announcing a unilateral moratorium on deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR and reduction by a certain number of medium-range missiles if there does not occur another escalation of international tension.

The authors analyze statements by NATO leaders about an alleged substantial Soviet superiority in Europe in conventional arms. This too is not true, as is even acknowledged in the West. According to figures of London's Institute for Strategic Studies ("Correlation of Military Forces in 1981-1982"), total military forces are as follows (thousand men): NATO -- 4933; Warsaw Pact --4788. Ground forces numerical strength in Europe is as follows (thousand men): NATO -- 2123, Warsaw Pact -- 1669.

The exchange of figures at the Vienna talks (as of 1 January 1980) also confirms the fact of an approximate equality in ground forces and air forces numerical strengths of the opposing sides in Central Europe (NATO -- 991,000 men, Warsaw Pact -- 979,000).

The fourth section of the book -- "Two Directions in World Politics" -presents facts which attest to the attitude of the governments of the USSR and the United States toward signed treaties and negotiations in the area of arms limitation and reduction. The authors stress that the USSR and the other socialist countries are resolute opponents of dividing the world into opposing military blocs. They enumerate many facts which clearly show who is for peace and who is ready for war. They present figures from America's Brookings Institution, according to which between 1946 and 1975 the United States on 215 occasions directly or indirectly resorted to use of military force or threatened other countries with military intervention, while on 19 occasions the United States considered the employment of nuclear weapons, and in four of these instances the threat was aimed directly at the USSR.

The book "From Whence the Threat to Peace" convincingly exposes the authors of the Pentagon pamphlet, who have sought to substantiate the decrepit thesis of a "Soviet military threat" and, under cover of this thesis, to continue with the next round of the arms race and to smash the wave of antiwar attitudes in the NATO countries.

Attempts by the enemies of détente and peace to prove the unprovable are in vain. The arms limitation and disarmament talks, particularly the SALT talks, were terminated not through the fault of the USSR. Washington clearly is presently giving priority to stepping up military preparations and is urging its allies to do likewise. As was stressed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, receiving representatives of the Socialist International's Consultative Council on Disarmament, it is insane to forge one's policy figuring on nuclear war and on victory in such a war; this represents irresponsible, adventuristic playing with the fate of mankind.²

FOOTNOTES

1. "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," Voyenizdat, 1982, 80 pages.

2. PRAVDA, 4 Feb 1982.

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INFORMATION ON RECIPIENTS OF THE 'ORDER OF VICTORY'

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 5, May 82 (signed to press 23 Apr 82) pp 85-86

[Unattributed article: "You Ask, We Answer"]

[Excerpt] Readers V. T. Stolyarov (Zaporozh'ye), M. K. Moskalenko (Moscow), M. A. Kolosovskiy (Izobilnyy, Stavropolskiy Kray), A. S. Pasechnik (Yedintsy, Moldavian SSR) and others ask when the Order of Victory was awarded to Soviet and foreign military leaders.

Ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarding the Order of Victory to Soviet military leaders occurred in the following sequence.

On 10 April 1944 the Order of Victory was awarded to Supreme Commander MSU G. K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff MSU A. M. Vasilevskiy.

On 28 July 1944 the Order of Victory was awarded to Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces MSU I. V. Stalin.

On 30 March 1945 the Order of Victory was awarded to Commander of the First Ukrainian Front MSU I. S. Konev, Commander of the Second Belorussian Front MSU K. K. Rokossovskiy, and to Commander of the First Belorussian Front MSU G. K. Zhukov (second award).

On 26 April 1945 the Order of Victory was awarded to Commander of the Second Ukrainian Front MSU R. Ya. Malinovskiy and commander of the Third Ukrainian Front MSU F. I. Tolbukhin.

On 31 May 1945 the Order of Victory was awarded to the Commander of the Leningrad Front MSU L. A. Govorov.

On 4 June 1945 the Order of Victory was awarded to Chief of the General Staff Army Gen A. I. Antonov and representative of Headquarters, Supreme High Command MSU S. K. Timoshenko.

On 26 June 1945 the Order of Wictory was awarded to Supreme commander MSU I.V. Stalin (second award).

On 8 September 1945 the Order of Victory was awarded to Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East MSU A. Vasilevskiy (second award) and Commander of the First Far Eastern Front MSU K.A. Meretskov.

On 20 February 1978 the Order of Victory was awarded to Chairman of the USSR Defense Council MSU L. I. Brezhnev.

The Order of Victory has also been awarded to five military leaders of foreign countries in the anti-Hitler coalition:

on 5 June 1945 -- Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in the European Theater General Dwight David Eisenhower, and Commander of Allied Forces of the 21st Army Group in Europe Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery;

on 6 July 1945 -- former king of Romania Michael I;

on 9 August 1945 -- Supreme Commander of the Polish Army Marshal of Poland Michal Rola-Zymierski;

on 9 September 1945 -- Commander in Chief of the Yugoslavian People's Liberation Army Marshal of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito.

Thus the Order of Victory has been awarded to 17 persons, three of whom have been awarded it twice. There have been a total of 20 awards of this decoration.

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