PEACEKEEPING TASKS IN THE METL: THE DILEMMA OF A DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping Tasks in the METL: The Dilemma of a Direct Support Artillery Battalion by MAJ Richard M. Cabrey, USA, 43 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the United States Army is finding itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of peace operations or stability operations. Additionally our National Security Strategy states that these types of operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. Although these missions are not new to the Army they do entail conducting certain tasks that are not usually trained for by the units deploying on these missions. This dilemma appears to be a result of our current training doctrine. The cornerstone manuals for Army training reflect a warfighting focus based on a pre 1990 environment. By strict doctrine, units are not permitted to place peacekeeping tasks on their METL. This monograph examines the logic of excluding peacekeeping from a unit's METL using a case study from Bosnia.

The monograph defines peacekeeping in terms of the environment and roles of the military in peace operations. Current Army training doctrine is addressed to identify the limitations that current doctrine places on units identified to conduct peacekeeping missions. The case study focuses on the direct support artillery battalions from 1st Armored Division who were part of the IFOR in Bosnia. By looking at predeployment training and the conduct of peacekeeping tasks, several shortfalls are identified which can be traced back to possible problems with current training doctrine.

Finally, the monograph concludes that the training philosophy in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 is sound but there should be allowances made for units to place peacekeeping tasks on the METL. Local Handbooks and other unit developed materials may be necessary to define tasks not covered in war planning or MTPs. Using this strategy a unit could conduct required peace training while still being prepared for combat.

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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Stability operations are becoming the predominant mission for U.S. Army forces since the end of the cold war in 1989. With the collapse of the Soviet Union as a threat to NATO and specifically the United States, army units are finding themselves performing more peacekeeping missions than any other possible mission since the completion of Desert Storm in 1990. Recent major peace operations include: Somalia, Haiti, Northern and Southern Iraq, The Sinai, Macedonian and Bosnia. The size and complexity of these deployments demonstrate a clear commitment by the United States to continue with the 1995 National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement.

The 1993 FM 100-5, *Operations*, acknowledges that operations other than war (OOTW) have, and will continue to play a significant role in our national military strategy and Army Doctrine. FM 100-5 states, "The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers continue to operate around the world in an environment that may not involve combat."[1] FM 100-5 is considered the army's cornerstone manual for principles and tenants for all operations to include OOTW.

As units are increasingly deployed to conduct the peacekeeping type missions, a dilemma arises in the area of training the force. The Army's doctrinal operations are not fully supported by its current cornerstone training manual, FM 25-100. Operationally we can expect to deploy in a non-combat role and perform tasks associated with peacekeeping that may vary greatly from war time tasks. Our primary training manual,

FM 25-100, Training the Force, states that a unit's training should focus primarily on those tasks necessary to accomplishing a wartime mission.[2] It is this dichotomy that brings to light a significant challenge in keeping our forces trained for war while ensuring success in OOTW.

Problem Background And Significance

The focus of this study is on the challenges the direct support artillery battalion faces when identified to perform a peacekeeping mission as part of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The direct support battalion's Mission essential task list (METL) is primarily based on higher headquarters' (Division Artillery) mission and external directives. This usually means a METL that is supportive of both the division artillery and the habitually supported BCT. By current doctrine these tasks should not include peacekeeping tasks. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, states that training and preparing for peace operations should not detract from the unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. Peace operations are not a new mission for our forces, and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's METL.[3] Many peace keeping tasks are directly related to normal combat tasks with the exception of the environment they are normally performed in. This is where a large gap exists with the current training doctrine. Unit's must be able to perform tasks normally associated with combat in a peacekeeping environment where self defense is the primary reason for using force. When a brigade combat team is notified for deployment in a peacekeeping role, the subordinate elements to include the combat support and combat service support units

must begin the mental transition from war fighter to peace keeper. As a combat multiplier within the brigade combat team, the direct support artillery battalion must develop a strategy to tailor their training for the upcoming operation. Because METL is our primary determinant for training, some units may neglect the emphasis required to focus soldiers on performing peacekeeping tasks in an environment where destruction of the enemy and application of overwhelming combat power is not the focus. On the other hand, a training focus geared too much towards anticipating peacekeeping missions may detract from the overall combat readiness of our forces. In either case we run the risk of sending untrained soldiers to perform critical missions. The key question this monograph seeks to answer is: Should the Mission Essential Task List for a direct support artillery battalion reflect specific tasks associated with peacekeeping operations?

Methodology

Following the introduction, the first chapter of this monograph will provide an overview of current U.S. policy and strategy with respect to peacekeeping operations. Current Joint and Army doctrine will be discussed to describe the types of missions and most importantly the environment that defines peacekeeping operations. This chapter will also show that direct support artillery battalions have and will continue to play a role in peacekeeping operations. The second chapter defines the U.S. Army's doctrine and methodology for battle focused training. The focus will be on the development of a direct support artillery battalion's METL, which will be used as a baseline to analyze the case study in the monograph.

The case study will examine the two direct support artillery battalions who were part of Task Force (TF) Eagle in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. The study will look at how the units prepared for the peacekeeping mission with respect to training. The unit's METL prior to notification and prior to deployment will provide insight into the training focus and possible shortfalls in combat readiness. The focus of the case study is to demonstrate the challenge faced by a unit trained for war and deployed for peace.

The analysis section of the monograph will asses the case study with regard to the primary research question. The criteria used for analysis: The battalion's predeployment METL accessed against current Army doctrine outlined in FM 25-100, and the ability of the battalion to adapt to the peacekeeping environment coming from a combat focus. The unit's ability to adapt will be a subjective determination based on interviews and after action reports (AARs).

Conclusion

My study concludes that based on the guidelines prescribed in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 that the artillery battalions in 1st Armored Division as part of TF Eagle were in compliance with the strict interpretation of the battle focused philosophy found in the Army training manuals. However, the battalions did not correctly interpret the mission of performing peacekeeping operations as a key external directive to developing their training strategy prior to or after deployment to Bosnia. Incorporating this external directive into the units' mission might have reduced the initial confusion experienced by the battalions. The battalions did adapt to the peacekeeping environment, but

encountered several missions that caused confusion for the leadership. This confusion could possibly have been avoided with some type of focused peacekeeping training prior to the deployment. The soldiers performed superbly which is a credit to disciplined training prior to the deployment, but some friction occurred because the overarching mission of peacekeeping was not fully understood to all soldiers and leaders in the battalions. Furthermore, my study suggests that current Army training doctrine may need further refinement to maintain congruence with joint doctrine and the doctrinal capstone manual for the Army, FM 100-5 "Operations". The Army does not need to focus solely on peacekeeping because it will continue to be a frequent challenge, but should be allowed to incorporate a training strategy for executing these operations other than war once identified for these tasks.

CHAPTER II - PEACEKEEPING

Future of Peacekeeping

Our current National Security Strategy discusses at length the possible and intended uses of our military forces. The strategy from our senior leaders clearly identify operations other than war, to include peacekeeping operations as possibly being our most frequent challenge as a military in the future.[4] Additionally, in February 1996 the president of the United States released Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 as a means to establish a framework for how and when U.S. forces would engage in peace operations.[5] This document gives specific guidance for the use of our military forces and also addresses the fact that we will not identify units tailored only for U.N. peace operations. The capabilities of the military must still be focused on winning two major regional conflicts.[6] Below the strategic level of guidance, joint publications provide additional guidance on conducting peace operations. Joint Doctrine identified in the joint publications further refines the potential missions in the peacekeeping environment. As stated in Joint Publication 3-07.3 "*Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations*" The United States is one of a few nations capable of providing the intertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deploy peacekeeping forces around the world.[7] Deployments of our armed forces to the Sinai, Macedonia, Haiti, Somalia, Turkey, Northern and Southern Iraq and Bosnia since 1989 serve to confirm this expected use of our military forces as an instrument of power to further national strategic goals and objectives.

Joint Publication 3-07, "Military Operations Other Than War" defines peacekeeping operations as those military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties of a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.[8] FM 100-23, the Army's doctrinal manual for peace operations, defines peacekeeping as military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.[9] Although our joint and army doctrine are in agreement, within the army we are faced with a difficult task of executing missions for which we may not be fully prepared to execute. Of major concern to our forces is the actual execution of unpracticed peacekeeping tasks as well as the impact of the peacekeeping environment the tasks must be performed within.

Peacekeeping Environment

The peacekeeping environment is not easily characterized. As stated, the military forces are invited by the political powers in conflict. However, the identity of belligerents may be uncertain. US forces involved in peace operations may not encounter large, professional armies or even organized groups responding to a chain of command. Instead, they may have to deal with loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a population.[10] In many cases, the political leaders agree to a peaceful environment, but the majority of the populace may still be in a hostile mind set. The challenge to our forces is to accomplish military missions with an attitude that is

based on neutrality towards all belligerents while at the same time conduct force protection without potentially escalating hostilities among the belligerents. The close link required between our soldiers and the civilian population-at-large means the traditional elements of combat power, such as massive firepower, may not apply to peace operations. The nonviolent application of military capabilities, such as civil-military information and psychological operations (PSYOP) may be more important.[11] In order to adapt to this mentality a unit must receive training at all levels from the individual soldier to the senior leaders. This training may include some new tasks, but focuses on instilling in the soldier an appreciation for the environment that surrounds the peacekeeping mission. The necessary environmental training may include refinements to current training, expansion of basic soldier skills, or enhancement of fundamental procedures.[12] Clearly defined and understandable Rules of Engagement (ROE) assist in maintaining soldiers and units along the correct path in executing potentially sensitive operations in a sometimes hostile environment.

The environment may be more difficult to adapt to for those forces who, having just completed combat operations, find themselves involved with the mission of peacekeeping. In this scenario the application of maximum combat power in a mid to high intensity combat environment quickly changes to the application of peaceful measures to insure political peace making efforts. Operation Just Cause in Panama is an excellent example of our armed forces moving quickly from one spectrum of conflict to a lower level involving peacekeeping. The plan was to defeat the Panamanian Forces one day and rebuild the country the next.[13] The dilemma of not practicing peacekeeping tasks

prior to deployment, or as part of a unit METL is magnified in this scenario where transition to peacekeeping is expected to be quick with little time for transition physically and mentally.

Peacekeeping Tasks

The nature of missions military forces can expect to receive in a peacekeeping role are numerous. There are three operations and six tasks that may be associated with any peacekeeping effort and may be supported by ground, air, maritime, and space operations. The three operations are: peace observation, internal supervision and assistance, and monitoring the terms of the protocol. The six tasks are: supervision of free territories, supervision of cease-fires, supervision of withdrawals and disengagements, supervision of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges, supervision of demilitarization and demobilization, and maintenance of law and order.[14] There are numerous tasks associated with peacekeeping operations, many of which can be performed by a military force focused on training for winning the next war. From our national security strategy to current army doctrinal manuals there is an agreement that peacekeeping missions are not new to the military and that our overall focus must remain on training to fight and win the next major conflict or war. The NSS does conclude that U.S. forces will be trained with multiple missions in mind.[15] In keeping with the Army's cornerstone manual for conducting all operations FM 100-5 (Draft), the current FM 100-23 provides refinement on the fundamental principles of war as they apply to OOTW. An example is the definition of "security" as defined in FM 100-5 as never permit hostile factions to acquire

an unexpected advantage. FM 100-23 elaborates on this principle in terms of security dealing with force protection as a dynamic of combat power against virtually any person, element, or hostile group.[16] The need for force protection is also a determinant for the task organization of a unit destined for a peacekeeping role. In Bosnia the threat of mortars and other types of artillery led to the decision to include field artillery units in the task organization. The artillery battalions deployed with attached counter-battery radars to assist in both force protection and monitoring of no-fire agreements.[17] Because of the robust communications within artillery battalions they can also be utilized in command and control as well as liaison functions. Somalia and Haiti provide excellent examples of deploying only the field artillery command and control and fire support elements as part of the task organization to augment the command and control of the entire force. The success of peacekeeping missions does not rely on the flexible application of firepower and maneuver as with normal combat operations. In contrast, success is defined more by the absence of conflict and the achievement of the politically identified objectives. The self-propelled artillery battalions were able to significantly contribute to the peaceful environment through imposing deterrence while simply conducting movements and demonstrations of occupations to the local political leaders in Bosnia.[18] Additionally, the artillery battalion was forced to conduct operations with independent platoons due to the size of the American sector.[19] This was essential for both force protection and portraying a viable military force. Platoons conducting independent operations is not a new task for artillery battalions, however, the junior leaders within the platoons faced new missions like negotiating between and separation of belligerents with in a town or

village they operated in. These tasks placed a great deal of responsibility on junior leaders who received no real training for these missions.

In the peacekeeping operations analysis conducted by TRADOC Analysis Command, numerous division and higher commanders state that peacekeeping tasks are not essential for unit's that are disciplined and well trained on wartime missions.[20] This statement is in disagreement with a DOD Inspector General's report which found that "Army and Marine Corps leaders have begun to recognize that peace operations pose a different set of challenges than those schooled, trained, and exercised only in war fighting."[21] Many of these tasks are not usually included as part of a battalion's wartime METL. Using a strict interpretation of our training doctrine these peacekeeping tasks should not appear on a units METL, therefore, the tasks are not trained on properly or at all. With this mentality we are expecting our units to be successful in performing difficult tasks in an unfamiliar environment with little to no preparation. The environment for peacekeeping can be turbulent, and wrong perceptions in terms of necessary levels of force, level of consent, or impartiality may cause a peacekeeping mission to escalate into a peace enforcement mission thus changing the fundamental nature of the mission.[22] Due to the potentially volatile environment, on-the-job training does not appear to be the best approach to training or forces.

CHAPTER III - METL DEVELOPMENT

A recent TRADOC Analysis Center Study concludes that "Training to standard on their unit's METL is sufficient to prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW."[23] This conclusion is in agreement with FM 100-23 which states units should not include peacekeeping tasks in their METL. Therefore, by doctrine, units expected to perform peacekeeping operations are expected to possibly deploy without training necessary tasks because that unit's METL does not reflect tasks to support peacekeeping operations. The primary manual for U.S. Army training doctrine, FM 25-100, emphasizes that the focus of all training should be on being able to win the next major conflict. To ensure this wartime focus, company size units and above use METL to guide their training. The doctrinal development of a unit's METL is important to understand to see why peacekeeping tasks are not currently accepted as a valid METL task. This chapter will review METL development and the battle focused training philosophy in order to analyze the monograph's case studies.

Philosophy

FM 25-100, *Training the Force* and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, are the cornerstones for unit's to develop their training strategy. These manuals were published in 1988 and 1990 respectively. At this time the Army had a forward presence with a well defined threat that geared units to training for a mid

to shift to reflect the expected frequency with which units will conduct peacekeeping missions.

The two primary inputs to a unit's METL are war plans and external directives.[24] War plans relate to a unit's contingency missions and clearly identify those types of missions that units will be expected to execute in war.[25] External directives include any other source that may relate to a unit's wartime mission. These key inputs are both related directly to wartime missions and do not discuss peacekeeping or any OOTW as inputs to the METL. The Mission Training Plan (MTP) is one of the most significant external directives used in METL development. This document is detailed for nearly every Army unit and contains an extensive list of basic and collective tasks that units must be able to perform in order to successfully complete its wartime mission. Figure 1 shows the METL development process as described in FM 25-101.



Figure 1.[26]

The MTP for a field artillery cannon battalion that is organic to a division and usually in direct support of a maneuver brigade lists seven basic tasks and 200 collective tasks.[27] The battalion commander could never train all these tasks to standard and therefore must prioritize those that best help him meet his requirements. This prioritization is a primary reason for having a METL. The commander is responsible for determining those essential tasks that must be accomplished to support his wartime mission and his higher commander's intent. Below is a summary of the key points of METL and the METL development process described in FM 25-101.

> Battle focus is a concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Units cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible soldier, leader, and collective task. Commanders must selectively identify and train on those tasks that accomplish the unit's wartime mission. The METL serves as the focal point on which commanders plan, execute, and assess training....If a commander determines his unit cannot execute all the tasks on the unit's METL to standard, he must request an adjustment of the unit's mission. The commander determines which tasks he can train and execute.[28]

The process of METL development ensures that units remain battle focused in their training. The philosophy of battle focused training is to ensure that wartime missions can be executed successfully with peacetime training. It also allows a unit commander to focus training for leader competencies necessary to execute Army war fighting doctrine.[29]

The following list of basic tasks and possible number of collective tasks linked to the basic task are those that a direct support field artillery battalion might include in a METL based solely on the governing MTP:

- Coordinate Fire Support (15)
- Acquire Targets (36)

- Deliver Field Artillery Fires (42)
- Communicate (20)
- Move (30)
- Maintain and Resupply (60)
- Survive (54)

This list does not include any external directives that a commander may use to develop the battalion's METL, yet still shows the complexity and difficulty in determining training priorities within a battalion. Many of these tasks remain essential for peacekeeping operations. Important to note, is that all tasks have an associated set of conditions and standards to measure proficiency. Current army training doctrine identifies "train as you fight" as one of the key principles in training. This entails establishing conditions to simulate as closely and safely as possible the environment expected on the modern battlefield.

Training Conditions

The key is the environment or conditions under which the task must be performed. The change in conditions will significantly affect the performance of the tasks. A logical extension of the "train as you fight" principle for unit's deploying on a peacekeeping mission is the establishment or creation of conditions relative to the peacekeeping environment. The change in environment then dictates a changed standard

for the execution of tasks in a given operation. Joint Pub 3-07.3 gives the following guidance for training units prior to deployment on a peacekeeping mission:

> To accomplish peacekeeping, individuals and units need training in various skills and techniques before deployment to change their focus from combat-warriors to soldiers who use force only in self-defense. The urgent need to deploy peacekeeping forces to establish a cease-fire often precludes a complete and lengthy training program. However, with prior planning, a training program can be developed that will assist commanders to prepare for these missions.[30]

It appears that Joint doctrine recognizes the importance of training focused on peacekeeping, and it is at this point the biggest discrepancy between Joint and Army doctrine exists.

As the National Security Strategy and FM 100-5 distance themselves from the cold war environment and outdated mentality in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101, the army must become more flexible in its training doctrine. The METL development process is an excellent vehicle to guide the focus of training, however, it currently limits a unit's ability to train properly, those tasks required for operations other than war.[31]

The next chapter looks at two artillery battalion that deployed to Bosnia as part of Task Force Eagle to assume peacekeeping operations. The battalion had a predeployment METL that supported a wartime mission. Given the limited time between notification and deployment the unit could not conduct any specific peacekeeping training. The case study will focus on the impact of the environment and numerous non-standard missions required from the battalions.

CHAPTER IV -BOSNIA CASE STUDY

In 1994, USAREUR was developing a "peace plan" for potential operations in Bosnia.[32] At this time the 1st Armored Division was identified as the potential unit to deploy for operations in Bosnia. During this early stage there was no clear indication that operations in Bosnia would be primarily a peacekeeping mission. Accordingly, in July of 1995, General Abram's, then V Corps commander, emphasized that units should maintain a wartime focus for training.[33] This guidance from the corps commander continued to reinforce current Army training doctrine for units, specifically those in 1st AD.

Predeployment Training Focus

The subordinate direct support artillery battalions of 1st AD Divarty were 2-3 FA and 4-27 FA, both 155 MM self propelled battalions with habitual relationships to brigade combat teams. In October 1995 both battalions, under the control of the division artillery were conducting annual training at the Grafenwore training area in Germany. The battalions conducted training to support their METL which included those basic tasks identified earlier for direct support battalions. The overall focus was on acquiring targets and providing indirect fires. During the middle of this training rotation numerous elements from V U.S. corps designated as the initial Task Force Eagle deployed to Grafenwore and fell in on the artillery battalions to conduct predeployment training for Bosnia. This was perhaps the first real notification that these units received concerning

the nature of the deployment to Bosnia. The battalions now knew they were part of the peacekeeping task force, but still had no idea of the expected missions they would perform.

Upon notification of the peacekeeping mission the artillery battalions had to incorporate additional assets into their force structure. These assets included Alfa battery 94th FA, a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and target acquisition batteries with Q-36 and Q-37 counterfire radars. The battalions faced a difficult task in incorporating these new subordinate headquarters into their command and control structure. This problem was compounded with the fielding of the new SINCGARS radios to the battalions in October and November. The overall training strategy of 2-3 FA and 4-27 FA continued to be battle focused. All indications were that the mission may be a peace enforcement mission which could possibly entail combat operations. With this scenario as a worst case possibility the battalion felt secure that their wartime training focus would serve them well.

There was little attention given to speculating on the expected environment in Bosnia. The units from 1st AD found they had a bigger challenge in just getting to the theater of operations. In the words of LTC Mossman, at the time the 1st AD Divarty S3, units were more concerned with trying to determine how to deploy to Bosnia, they were not yet concerned with the missions ahead of them. The time available to develop a training strategy for the deployment was almost non-existent. In general, the artillery battalions had less than six to eight weeks to prepare for deployment. The battalions focused all efforts on expanding current headquarters to include the additional target

acquisition assets. To further complicate the deployment the battalion leadership was still not sure of the expected mission.

Meeting the Environment

The battalions left Germany under the control of the Divarty and arrived in Bosnia under the control of their habitually supported brigade. Upon arrival in the new theater, the leaders were overwhelmed with operational challenges. Immediate tasks at hand included: identifying a base camp, developing a supporting fire plan for the brigades, separating belligerents, and implementing military aspects from the Dayton Peace Accord. All of these missions were important and required near simultaneous execution..

As the battalions moved to brigade directed areas the soldiers and leaders were almost shocked by the site of the war ravaged area. The peacekeeping environment was seen for the first time by many of the leaders and soldiers. LTC Mossman said, " We were not prepared for level of destruction and hate (between belligerents) that we encountered in country." The battalions immediately found command and control to be a difficult challenge. Individual batteries and platoons from the artillery battalion began deploying throughout the brigade sector to provide force protection and to enable the peacekeeping mission which was now becoming more defined. The battalions received a mission normally performed by a division artillery headquarters and found themselves operating a division level counterfire headquarters with three Q-36 radars and two Q-37 radars plus meteorological teams and an MLRS platoon attached[34]. This is an incredible

burden for an artillery battalion to handle without sufficient augmentation and training in the area of friendly battle tracking.

New Missions

Individual soldiers and sections executed normal war time tasks throughout the peacekeeping mission. That is, they moved, occupied to provide fires, conducted maintenance, and enhanced survivability all in support of the mission. The leaders, however, experienced a new set of challenges. The artillery battalions found clearance of fires in a peacekeeping environment to be more complex than in normal combat and training environments. Because there was no clearly defined FLOT or FEBA the standard fire support coordination measures were not sufficient to control indirect fires.



Task Force Eagle's Sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The task force had troops from the US 1st Armored Division from Germany and 10 other nations.

Figure 2[35]

Figure 2 provides an example of the separation measures and the size of the terrain units were required to operate in. Of special concern to fire supporters is the clearance of fires along a boundary like the Zone of Separation. Because of the shape of this control measure , the clearance of fires with maneuver units and precise battle tracking was of extreme importance to the artillery battalions to avoid fratricide.[36]

Units had to develop new methods of tracking individual sectors to determine if friendly or enemy factions were in the sector that initiated hostile firing and if there was any potential for fratricidal fires. This required the artillery battalion to develop this task in country. The battalions developed and executed tactics techniques and procedures to execute the mission well, but it is yet another task that had to be learned in the theater. Battalion commanders and their staffs were faced with the tasks of "election support" and "mine investigations" to name a few. These tasks required interaction with Non-governmental organizations (NGO) that most leaders were unfamiliar with. In another nontraditional mission, the artillery battalion was tasked by the BCT to conduct weapons site inspections of the former warring factions. The challenge with this mission is identification of weapons and ammunition not familiar to the inspectors. In this case the unit acknowledged that diverse knowledge of world wide weapons systems was necessary to accomplish the mission.[37] These missions were mostly successful through leader initiative.

Overall, the units found the environment for peacekeeping was not what they expected, they did not know what to expect. They did learn quickly that all sides respected power. The deployment of individual platoons and batteries in "presence

missions" not only provided force protection for soldiers on the ground, but demonstrated the power of the U.S. military to the belligerents in terms they clearly understood. Artillery batteries demonstrated capabilities by showing how quickly a Q-36 fire finding radar could detect an incoming round, send the data to a fire direction center for processing, and transmit that data to an MLRS launcher or howitzer for a return fire mission. The battalions did not conduct any live fire missions of this type, the demonstrations proved to be enough deterrence for the former warring factions. These demonstrations provided an additional means of deterrence that both enhanced force protection and legitimized the U.S. military forces in the eyes of the former warring factions.

Shortfalls

As the peacekeeping mission continued to unfold, it was apparent that the soldiers of the two battalions were well trained in their individual and small unit collective tasks. Successful execution of the collective tasks of moving and occupying and individual tasks focused on small arms and survivability validated the war time focus of home station training. Perhaps the biggest shortfall occurred at the battalion level. Although the staff became proficient in the planning process for the various missions, they suffered initially in the areas of Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), command and control and in the conduct of the non standard missions. IPB was a problem form the start of the mission. Units were not afforded the opportunity to conduct advanced recons, nor were they given sufficient training on the culture and environment to prepare them

mentally for the devastation of the country. The command and control issue was a factor of the limited time available to the battalions to incorporate new units into their organizations and fielding of a new radio system in the battalions. Additionally the battalions were not deployed as a task organized force. Again, the discipline of the soldiers and flexibility and competence of the leaders allowed for successful execution of the overall peacekeeping mission.

In review, this monograph looked at peacekeeping operations from a strategic level, looking at the current National Security Strategy down to the tactical level as outlined in FM 100-23. Special emphasis was given to defining the impact of the peacekeeping environment on performance of normal combat focused tasks. The monograph also explored the development of battalion METL to determine battle focused training priorities.

CHAPTER V -ANALYSIS

The analysis in this chapter will focus on two areas. The first is the logic for excluding peacekeeping specific tasks from a unit's METL. Next, is an assessment of the battalion case study to help provide an answer to the primary research question: Should the Mission Essential Task List for a direct support artillery battalion reflect specific tasks associated with peacekeeping operations? The criteria used for analysis in this chapter is twofold. First, the battalions predeployment METL process is assessed against doctrinal guidance in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. The second is a subjective evaluation of whether the battalion's METL either enabled or detracted from the unit's ability to perform their peacekeeping tasks upon arrival in Bosnia.

Logic of Excluding Peacekeeping Tasks

The battalion commander must review the unit's mission and METL when tasked to perform a new mission. The new task is an external directive and logic says that a change in mission may precipitate a change in METL and the training focus. A unit assigned a peacekeeping mission should then be able to review the METL and delete or add tasks that support this new mission. The restrictions around peacekeeping tasks on a METL in accordance with current training doctrine appears to be questionable. In *Operations Other Than War*, a U.S. Army TRADOC Technical Report, Dr. Mayer writes, "Training to standard on their unit's mission essential task list sufficient to

prepare soldiers for duty in OOTW."[38] Dr. Mayer makes this conclusion based on an examination of four OOTW activities to include peacekeeping. He asserts that the flexibility and adaptability of the American soldier are sufficient to allow him to perform his tasks in any environment to include OOTW. His bottom line is that tasks performed in peacekeeping are the same as those performed in combat. Dr. Mayer suggests that guard duty is the same for both combat and peacekeeping.[39] This statement is misleading because it fails to acknowledge the difference in the environments. In identifying that each task has a specific condition and standard that must be applied, there is a major difference in the

conditions for performing a task in combat and OOTW. Additionally, the METL is derived from the mission given to the battalion.



Figure 3

A generic wartime mission for an artillery battalion might read: "4-5 FA deploys, provides fires in direct support of 1st BDE attack in zone to destroy enemy forces; on order continues the attack or establishes a defense."[40] In developing the METL for his battalion the commander would use this mission statement, external directives and

applicable mission training plans to identify the essential tasks for the METL. Some of these tasks may be applicable to OOTW. However, these tasks are focused on destruction of an enemy force and are designed to be executed in a combat environment. An example METL for a generic artillery battalion given a wartime mission appears in figure 3. When a unit is identified for a peacekeeping mission the METL may be adjusted. Planning for a contingency mission of this type definitely falls in the category of using external directives to identify essential tasks. An adjustment to the METL will allow units to adjust the training conditions necessary to perform in operations other than war. The environment for peacekeeping does not require the application of force necessary in combat. A unit that receives a mission statement that reflects OOTW will be required to perform tasks considered non-standard. An example is the task of "Conduct Weapon Site Inspection." The commander must then define the task and its associated conditions and standards to ensure successful execution. This process is also in accordance with METL development. An example of this process with the same generic battalion is shown at figure 4. Local Handbooks and other unit developed materials may be necessary to define tasks not covered in war planning or MTPs. Using this strategy a unit could conduct required peace training while still being prepared for combat.

4-5 FA Battalion METL	
1. Transition to Mission (War Plan/Contingency)	6. Communicate MTP
2. Deploy (War Plan/Contingency)	7. Move MTP
3. Coordinate Fire Support MTP	8. Maintain/Resupply MTP
4. Monitor ZOS (Local Hand book)	9. Survive MTP
5. Deliver Fires MTP	10. Conduct Weapon Site Inspections (Local Hand book)

Figure 4

The METL serves to focus the collective task training for the battalion. A battalion that receives notification for peacekeeping operations anywhere should change both the battalion mission and METL to reflect requirements of the current mission. This would allow the commander to adjust the battalions training prior to deployment. This is the same philosophy for units assigned the mission of deploying to support a major regional contingency. In the case of the units from 1st AD, there was insufficient time to conduct peacekeeping training prior to deploying all units. The division attempted to cycle units through the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) for OOTW training, but ran out of time.[41] In this case, a METL that reflected peacekeeping tasks would still provide focus for in-country training. 1st AD chose not to change their METL upon arrival in Bosnia and continued to encounter minor problems that a METL adjustment might have helped avoid.

As the units from 1st AD arrived in country there was still no clear idea from the leadership on the mission at hand. The units from 1st AD, to include the artillery

battalions, continued to operate as if in a peace enforcement role. Once task organization was complete and details of the military actions required from the Dayton Peace Accord were disseminated, the staffs encountered another challenge. They had not trained an orders process that included peacekeeping tasks. They found that NGOs and PVOs played a major role in the operations and the staffs were unsure of how to incorporate them into the orders process.[42] This is a problem that battalion staffs could solve with predeployment training and a Staff METL that reflects incorporating NGOs/PVOs into the orders process.

Assessment of METL Development

The case study of 2-3 FA and 4-27 FA showed that the battalions followed a strict interpretation of METL development and guidance for METL found in FM 25-100. The battalions did not adequately consider the contingency plans for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The battalion and higher leaders believed that the existing METL would suffice for operations that might entail peace enforcement or combat. The field artillery battalions' wartime METL proved to be sufficient but did not allow for a smooth transition once peacekeeping became the overarching mission. Of special interest is 1st AD experience in Macedonia during Operation Able Sentry. From May to Dec 1995 TF 3-12 Infantry conducted peacekeeping operations as part of the U.N. mission in Macedonia. Prior to TF 3-12 deploying in April 1995, the division commander certified the units METL which reflected several peacekeeping tasks[43]. TF 3-12 performed the peacekeeping mission successfully and redeployed back to Germany in December 1995.

It appears inconsistent that the division did not direct a revised METL for the units deploying to Bosnia

Examples of specific fire support tasks that are normally part of a wartime METL applicable in peace operations with modifications are: Close support fires, extensive use of laser designation for precision guided munitions, and "Accountability of fires."[44] The first two tasks are common to most artillery units, however, in a peace keeping environment they may take a more prominent position in the delivery of fires. Both tasks focus on force protection and reduction of collateral damage. The importance of these types of tasks would be highlighted in a published ROE. All personnel in the fire support chain must be prepared to execute these tasks in a peacekeeping environment like Bosnia. The "accountability of fires" is a method of proving that U.S. forces were not responsible for collateral damage. According to LTC Mossman, this task required exact knowledge of all five elements for accurate predicted fires. Again, this is not a new requirement for fire supporters, but methods of tracking and verifying fire missions other than standard means were needed in order to present data to former warring faction members. The reports generated from the "accountability of fires" were used to prevent former warring factions from discrediting the U.S. forces when questions of collateral damage arose.[45] These tasks demonstrate a unique training requirement that begs for an interpretation of FM 25-100 in terms of the spirit of the law and not the letter of the law.

This case study clearly demonstrates the need for versatile units and leaders. The requirement to perform a peacekeeping mission on eight weeks notice strengthens the case that units require some training for numerous contingencies. This is especially true,

as stated earlier, now that our strategic level leaders acknowledge that peace operations will be our most frequent challenge.

General Joulwan, the commander and chief of USEUCOM, issued a mission statement for EUCOM in which he clearly identifies the necessity for preparing units for all contingencies.

> USEUCOM is a unified combatant command whose mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with the coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support of NATO; to promote regional stability; and advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.[46]

This mission statement is in agreement with the National Security Strategy, FM 100-5, and joint publications discussing peacekeeping operations. The statement reflects an acknowledgment that training and preparing for operations other than war is important for the armed forces of the United States. The specified task is "a ready force to conduct the full spectrum of operations". This statement was made after the IFOR mission to Bosnia, and reflects a new attitude in training focus for the forces in USEUCOM, to include 1st AD.

One of the major arguments that our senior leaders use to discourage peacekeeping as part of METL is that units will lose their warfighting edge. In the case of the artillery battalions, they did not change their METL but became fully engaged in peacekeeping. The leaders established wartime training strategies for the battalions in conjunction with the peacekeeping mission. Units continued to conduct live fire exercises at the platoon and battery level on designated ranges. The battalion staffs also refined their orders process and became very efficient in the decision making process,

paying close attention to NGO, joint and coalition involvement. With this continued warfighting training the unit maintained a high level of proficiency on their basic wartime METL tasks upon redeployment back to Germany in December of 96.[47] The case study shows that units can do both combat and peace operations simultaneously. The battalions executed the primary mission of peacekeeping, and through initiative and versatility were able to maintain a warfighting edge.

Another logic argument used to prevent peacekeeping from appearing on the METL is that of resources. In reality their are limited funds available to conduct all desired training. However, FM 25-100 states that "The availability of resources does not affect METL development"[48] This fundamental of METL development allows for the addition of peacekeeping tasks if the commander believes it is essential for his/her unit. For units with multiple contingency operations, or if a unit is expected to perform peacekeeping in an identified operational contingency the commander may foresee the need to incorporate peacekeeping tasks into the unit training plan to avoid the possible confusion experienced by units conducting combat operations and then transitioning to peace operations as in Operation Just Cause.

CHAPTER VI -CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of the Army is to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of America.[49] Additionally, the Army is a decisive instrument of power for strategic objectives. Although peacekeeping is not the primary mission of the Army, it is a mission that we must be train for and be prepared to successfully execute. The peace operations that involve Army units are designed to promote regional stability and deter possible conflict. The president acknowledges that peace operations will be our most frequent challenge in the future as evidenced by the increasing frequency since the end of the cold war. Clearly, peace operations to include peacekeeping require a unique training strategy to overcome the non-standard tasks and environment that are indicative of peace operations. The purpose of the study was to determine if peacekeeping tasks should be reflected on a direct support artillery battalion's METL.

This study only looked at units deployed as part of a peacekeeping force. The proficiency in peacekeeping of the deployed units provides insight to developing training strategies for future operations. The case study of the artillery battalions focused on units that were deployed as a whole organization. A major factor that this monograph did not address was the proficiency of units that send only part of their organization on a peacekeeping mission. The stay behind elements may suffer greatly in terms of ability to train for wartime missions. Lack of personnel and equipment required for deploying units can severely decrease abilities of stay behind units. This is an area that would

require further research on the overall impact on combat readiness based on task organization for peacekeeping missions.

Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the peacekeeping environment provide a different set of conditions for conducting normal warfighting tasks. This environment must be recognized and implemented in defining conditions for soldiers to operate within. This is usually done through ROE but may require further refinement of MTP collective and individual tasks. Secondly, The basic METL for a direct support artillery battalion does not adequately reflect tasks that must be executed in a peacekeeping environment. The use of artillery units in a maneuver role, execution of non-standard missions, and incorporating NGOs/PVOs in the orders process are but a few examples of possible shortfalls. Thirdly, Units are capable of maintaining proficiency in warfighting while conducting peacekeeping operations. This capability rests heavily on the initiative and versatility of the leaders and soldiers. If this proficiency in operations can occur during a major deployment then it should be possible to devote some efforts to peacekeeping during home station training. Limited resources and task organization all have an impact on training, but a clearly defined strategy helps focus efforts within a unit.

This study does not support or suggest that peacekeeping tasks should be reflected on every artillery battalion METL. Nor does it recommend that specific units be identified as sole peacekeeping units. It does suggest that peacekeeping entails numerous tasks that should be trained for prior to deployment if possible. There is a risk associated with sending untrained soldiers and leaders on missions that impact greatly on strategic objectives including stability in any given theater. The USEUCOM commander,

identified as a warfighting CINC, recognizes this requirement. By limiting peacekeeping tasks from the METL, a unit's ability to transition from war to operations other than war is also degraded.

The Danish army is involved in numerous peace operations as part of NATO and the UN. The Danish army requires all task forces assigned for a peacekeeping mission to complete a four week training program prior to deployment. Table 1 provides a list of the training by stages[50]. This is in addition to leader training and basic training where individuals are exposed to some of the demands required in peacekeeping operations.[51]

Basic Training - One Week	Stand-By Force Training - One Week	Pre-mission Training-Two Weeks
U.N. Information Briefing	Observation Post Training	Organize/manning OPs
Control Post Training	Standing Patrol Training	Operation of OP Stands
Standing Patrol Training	Control Post Training	Check Point Duties
Basic Weapon Training	Riot Control/Cordon Training	Contingencies for ZOS breach
Basic Map Training	Escort Training	Matters for armistice negotiations
Communications Training	Escort/Safeguard Civilian groups	History/Culture/General Conditions
	Obstacle and fortification training	IPB on local units
	Land Mine Warfare	Basic Language training
	Stand-By Map Training	
	Stand-By Communications Training	

Table 1

This approach allows units to place emphasis on warfighting with an eye directed at peacekeeping. All members of the armed forces undergo basic training. Stand-by

training is for personnel designated to the Danish U.N. Stand-by force. Pre-Mission is for any unit immediately deploying to a peace operation and is focused on country and mission specific tasks.

The METL development process as outlined in FM 25-100 and 101 provide an excellent framework for developing and executing a training strategy. The manuals are however, not in line with the Army's current capstone doctrine in FM 100-5. The training manuals should reflect the need to incorporate training for operations other than war, or "stability and support operations" as they are called in the new draft FM 100-5 (1998). The threat of the Cold War era is changed and this change should reflect in what we expect our missions to entail as an army. The section in FM 100-23 that states units should not place peacekeeping tasks on the METL should also be changed to allow for a METL adjustment.

The idea of placing peacekeeping tasks on a unit's METL is not a mandate that all units need to comply with. The commander still has the final determination on the unit's training strategy. The suggestion is made that a commander be allowed to adjust the METL if the unit is identified or is expected to deploy on a peacekeeping mission. This would also ensure a smoother transition for units conducting combat operations and immediately moving down the spectrum of conflict to peace operations.

ENDNOTES

[1] U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 13-0.

[2] U.S. Army, Field Manual 25-100, *Training The Force*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), 2-1. This is paraphrased from the discussion on METL development and the concept of training those tasks that are deemed by the commander to be mission essential to the unit's wartime mission.

[3] U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 86.

[4] William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy For A New Century." (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997), 12.

[5] Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25), [Memorandum on-line] (U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1996, accessed 12 November 1997); available from http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/z302.html ; Internet.

[6] PDD 25

[7] Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Peacekeeping Operations,* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), I-2.

[8] Ibid. III-12.

[9] FM 100-23. 112.

[10] Ibid., v.

[11] Ibid., v.

[12] John P. Abizaid & John R. Wood "Preparing for Peacekeeping: Military Training and the Peacekeeping Environment." Special Warfare. (April 1994), 15.

[13] Thomas E Swain. "FA and LIC." Field Artillery, (April 1991): 7.

[14] Joint Pub 3-07.3, I-4

[15] NSS, 12.

[16] FM 100-23, 16.

[17] Hollis, Patrecia S. "Peace Enforcing: Never Let Them See You Sweat." Interview with Col Gregory Fontenot. Field Artillery, (Jan-Feb 1997) 8.

[18] "Field Artillery Journal" Jan-Feb 97, 10. This was taken from an interview of COL Fontenot, 1st Bde 1st Armored Division commander, in Field Artillery Journal. COL Fontenot was one of the brigade commanders of TF Eagle.

[19] Ibid., 10.

[20] Hugo E. Mayer, "Operations Other Than War". Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Analysis Center, February 1995A-1 to A-2.

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[22] FM 100-23, 13.

[23] Mayer, "Operations Other Than War", TRADOC Analysis. 7-1.

[24] FM 25-100, 2-1.

[25] Ibid. 2-1.

[26] Flynn, Michael. This figure appears in MAJ Flynn's Monograph,13. It is an expounded version of the figure in FM 25-101, 2-2.

[27] ARTEP 6-115 MTP. *Mission Training Plan for Field Artillery Cannon Battalion.* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 2-2 to 2-25.

[28] FM 25-101. *Battle Focused Training*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 1-10, 2-2. This was taken from a monograph on peacekeeping operation and mech infantry battalions. "*Battle Focused Training for Peacekeeping Operations: A METL Adjustment For Infantry Battalions*" written by MAJ Flynn, Michael J. Dec. 96.

[29] FM 25-101, 1-10.

[30] Joint Publication 3-07.3. VI-1.

[31] Barnham, Brian D. in "Cordon and Search: An Operations Other Than War Task For Infantry Battalions", MMAS, Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995, 15.

[32] Interview conducted with LTC Mossman on 14 Oct 1997 at Fort Riley Kansas. LTC Mossman was the Divarty S3 for the 1st AD during the initial deployment and throughout the IFOR deploying to Bosnia in Dec 95 -Dec 96. A Series of questions included METL for the artillery battalions prior to deployment, training strategies for peacekeeping, shortfalls and lessons learned. Additionally the warfighting capability of the battalions was given a subjective evaluation by LTC Mossman upon their redeployment to Germany. The majority of this chapter is taken from the authors interview notes.

[33] Interview with LTC Mossman, Author's notes.

[34] Corpac, Peter, S. "Peace Enforcement Operations." Field Artillery, (July-August 1996) 35. At the time, LTC Corpac was the TF 2-3 FA commander. Part of the 1st AD Divarty.

[35] Field Artillery, Jan-Feb 97, 6.

[36] Interview with LTC Mossman, Author's notes.

[37] B/H CAAT 5 Initial Impressions Report, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS. May 1997.

[38] Mayer, "Operations Other Than War", TRADOC Analysis 7-1

[39] Ibid., 4-2.

[40] Flynn, Michael, MMAS Monograph, "Battle Focused Training For Peacekeeping Operations" (Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1996) 33.

[41] Interview with LTC Mossman. Authors notes.

[42] Interview with LTC Mossman. Authors notes.

[43] Flynn, 30-31.

[44] Kellar, Charles S. "The Roles And Functions Of Fire Support In Peace Operations", MMAS Monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS. Dec 94. 34.

[45] Interview with LTC Mossman. Author's notes.

[46] Copy of USEUCOM vision and strategy slides accessed 28 Oct 1997 on the Internet @ WWW.useucom .mil/documents/sep/sep04. Produced November 1996. POC for this document is: HQ USEUCOM ECJ5-Strategy DSN 430-5458 Comm +49 711 680 5458

[47] Interview with LTC Mossman. Author's notes.

[48] FM 25-100. 2-4.

[49] FM 100-5, iv

[50] Dennis J. Quinn, "Military Perspectives" Peace Support Organization and Training: A Danish Perspective by LTG Kjeld G. H. Hillingso, National Defence University, (Washington, D.C.: 1994). 66-69.

[51] Ibid,. 66-69.

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