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21 January 1983

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2092

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL ARMS COOPERATION WITH FRANCE WEIGHED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 29 Nov 82 pp 166, 167, 169

[Text] Do the French want to defend the FRG with nuclear weapons? Do the Germans want this protection?

Rare harmony in the Paris National Assembly: representatives from the right opposition voted jointly with socialist and communists for the first defense budget of the left--a year ago. The new left regime was not miserly with its defense spending.

The week before last, however, the harmony came to an end. Because now the government must save--and it does, as the first cabinet of the Fifth Republic, also with respect to military spending.

The 1982 defense budget had still grown by 17.6 percent, but for 1983, the growth rate was reduced to 10 percent. If pension funds are deducted only 8.4 percent remains--enough reason for the right opposition to file a (hopeless) vote of no confidence against the government.

The savings measures contain some special explosives. France's left coalition has decided--in contradiction of past policy--to reduce expenditures for conventional troops and instead to invest more in its nuclear forces. Such a priority, opposed by the left even a short time ago, was thus elevated to be official defense doctrine.

In practice this means that France would lower the nuclear threshold in case of war: since the conventional armament is not sufficient for successful defense, nuclear arms would have to be deployed sooner. The fact that economic necessity stands almost exclusively behind this progressive nuclearization of the defense concept--and not strategic reasons--caused the right, but also many experts, to oppose this change in strategy.

In the United States and in NATO the trend is exactly opposite. The Pentagon has recently described a new doctrine known as "Airland Battle," according to which highly developed conventional weapons could replace nuclear warheads in the first line of defense.

NATO supreme commander, General Rogers also sees advantages in the plan of strengthening the conventional arsenal with superior technology. New ideas of U.S. experts range from abandoning the first-strike idea of nuclear weapons, to the withdrawal of tactical nuclear arms from Europe. Only France is in the process of lowering the nuclear threshold.

The first critics spoke up immediately, like Francois de Rose, formerly French representative at NATO: "The nuclear plan allows France to defend itself only after everything in Europe is lost." In case of a confrontation with conventional weapons, France could not participate in the defense of Europe.

It is uncertain how far France would like that. Until now, the socialist head of state Francois Mitterrand has not made it clear whether he will continue with a limited frontal defense, like his predecessor Valery Giscard d'Estaing had indicated since 1976. Accordingly, France would defend its territory against the advancing enemy even outside its own borders--that is jointly with NATO--if need be, with nuclear arms.

This was expressed most plainly 3 years ago by the then defense minister Yvon Bourges in front of NATO reserve officers: "Who could in good faith justify the theory that a conflict in Europe would halt at our borders? Therefore, participation in the defense of Europe is one of the most essential missions of the French armed forces. It is directly tied to the security of the state."

In September 1981, 3 months after the left took power, Mitterrand's prime minister seemed to agree with this opinion. Before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale, he explained: "An attack on France does not begin after the enemy has entered the national sovereign territory."

In September 1982, Mauroy repeated the same sentence before the same body. But so far nothing similar has been said by his boss Mitterrand. He prefers to hide behind wise sayings such as: "One must know that a great country is ultimately left to itself in the decisive hour."

The concrete explanations of Mauroy were a signal for a new debate about European defense, in France also. At the center of the vocal considerations: a possible cooperation with the German neighbor, whose armed forces are fully integrated into NATO, while France only belongs to the political, but not to the military alliance.

Such ideas are not entirely new. In the summer of 1979, the old-Gaullist, Alexandre Sanguinetti and General of the Reserve Georges Buis stirred up excitement with the suggestion that France must seek a nuclear alliance with the FRG for technological as well as financial reasons. However, the Elysee Palace clarified: "It is obvious that these suggestions do not touch on the politics of France."

When Chancellor Helmut Schmidt then suggested to his partner Giscard d'Estaing the joint development of a battle tank for the 1990's, there was talk again of a military cooperation with the NATO member FRG. All parties in Bonn were against it, because it would only have been a political gesture on the part of Bonn--and at a high cost to Bonn. The Bundeswehr, with its Leopard II, can do without a new tank for a long time to come, while the French army will soon need a new model to replace its AMX 30.

In February of this year, Schmidt suggested to his partner Mitterrand regular discussions about security questions. An exchange of ideas of defense ministers took place for the first time at the 40th German-French Summit meeting on 22 October in Bonn.

It remained unclear what intentions Paris has. A German diplomat in Paris stated: "France strives goal-directedly for a cooperation with Bonn. But nobody knows at present how a close cooperation could look."

It is unmistakable that there is a certain readiness for change in the French military experts. The Gaullist delegate Yves Lancien, e.g., explained: "I believe that we must seriously test a strategy which also includes our neighbors in the protection of deterrence, especially the Germans." But what has until now not been discussed is whether the Germans want this type of deterrence, in which they would have no more of a voice than they have in the American one.

Socialist Jacques Huntzinger, military specialist of his party, announced a similarly one-sided offer of protection: "The problem which poses itself today and for the future is the question whether it is not in the vital long-range interest of France to guarantee a certain atomic protection beyond the national border."

And ex-general Pierre Gallois, one of the strategic avant guardists from the deGaulle era, recently even raised the question whether France should not make the neutron weapon available to other countries some day. French neutron weapons, instead of American ones, for the Germans?

Not only the intentions, but also the motives of the French remained unclear. Those in the know believe that France fears a slackening of German defense readiness and a slipping of the FRG into neutralism.

No matter how vague such a perspective is in German eyes, in French eyes it is not at all that far-fetched--and it would have detrimental consequences for France's defense system. Without the German, and thus the NATO buffer in the East, France would have to be defended at the Rhine river.

For that reason, socialist Mitterrand--as opposed to social democrat Brandt--urges the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in the FRG--in the interest of France. Admitted anti-U.S. General Gallois is already asking today: "Why don't we suggest to the United States the stationing of Pershing rockets here in France?"

At the end of the German-French summit in Bonn, Mitterrand made an effort to tone down speculations. He denied emphatically that the FRG would be cooperating in the formulation of the French nuclear strategy, would have access to nuclear technology, or even make a financial contribution to its development. "Disquieting West-German commentaries (according to the communist HUMANITE) which said otherwise were denied.

Mitterrand did offer talks to Bonn about the conservation of German security interests in case of the deployment of French nuclear arms. Bonn is very interested in such talks, regardless of whether the tactical French nuclear rockets have a 120 km range as the present Pluton, or a 350 km range as the Hades system after 1991.

The French may expect that the Germans are prepared to develop conventional weapons jointly with France for information--or even consultation--regarding the planning of these rockets. This would be especially in the interest of France because France must reduce its military spending even more in the coming years, although its armament industry, with approximately 300,000 jobs, has been highly developed.

At the very top of the Paris shopping list is a joint antitank helicopter, which is still the subject of disagreement between the partners regarding its concept.

Optimists even have not given up on the battle tank: if Paris, Optimists even have not given up on the battle tank: if Paris, due to a shortage of funds, has to put off the introduction of a new tank by a few years, it could then come close to the point in time in which the FRG wishes to introduce its Leo-II-successor.

Then sharing expenses would also be interesting for the German side.

9328

CSO: 3620/127

MUFTUOGLU TESTIFIES IN DEFENSE AT DEV-YOL TRIAL

Denies Charges

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 11 Dec 82 p 7

[Text] Questioning of Oguzhan Muftuoglu, suspect No 1 in the Ankara Dev-Yol [Revolutionary Road] case, continued yesterday. Claiming that Dev-Yol is not an organization, Muftuoglu said, "It is a political group centered around the Dev-Yol journal." During questioning in Martial Law Commandant Military Court No 1, Muftuoglu, who continued to deny the charges directed against him in the indictment, stated, "I carried false identification in order to be protected against fascists."

Muftuoglu asserted that charges in the indictment that Mehmet Ali Yilmaz was one of the persons he employed in order to obtain falsified documents are untrue. He went on:

If it is said in the indictment that a gun was obtained by Yilmaz from the Revolutionary War Units [as published], it is outside the truth and an allegation of the police. I was forced to carry falsified identification for 1 or 2 years, because persons known to be leftists were being killed by fascists. It was necessary for me to be protected from fascists more than from the police. If I had not acted in this manner, they would have killed me, too."

During the questioning, Muftuoglu said that he was ill and asked to sit down, and the judge gave him permission to be seated. Muftuoglu sat during the next section of the questioning. Muftuoglu, who said that charges in the indictment that he had formed an armed band of rebels in order to replace the constitutional system with a Marxist-Leninist system are also untrue, gave information regarding the 5,000 marks and revolver found in his home following his arrest. He said:

"There was enough money to support myself. I was going to pay the rent on the house I lived in with my own income. As for the 5,000 marks, it was part of the money belonging to the Dev-Yol journal. It is true that the revolver belongs to me. I was forced to have it to protect my life. I reject the interpretation that it was a gun of the organization."

The prosecutor and examining magistrate's statement of Muftuoglu, who denied all of the crimes charged against him in the indictment, was read. Muftuoglu asserted

that the examining magistrate's statement is correct, but refuted the security directorate statement claiming that it was obtained by use of force.

The first five pages of the statement given to the military prosecutor were read, but the other sections were signed without being read when the prosecutor said, "I shall not read it as it is late." Muftuoglu reported that he, exhausted and tired, gave the prosecutor the statement after having been subjected to torture for 80 days at the security directorate.

Statement Given Under Pressure

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 13 Dec 82 p 7

[Text] Questioning of Oguzhan Muftuoglu, who is being charged in the THKP-C Dev-Yol [Turkish People's Liberation Party Front Revolutionary Road] case with the crime of being "a central committee member of the Dev-Yol organization," will continue today. During questioning on 11 December, suspect Muftuoglu said, "Our expounding views that were against the economic policy applied by the government and that expressed our beliefs and opinions is democratic behavior." Muftuoglu, who claimed that "Dev-Yol is not an organization," said, "Dev-Yol is a political group centered around the Dev-Yol journal."

During the hearing in Ankara Martial Law Commandant Military Court No 1, Muftuoglu, stating that he accepts part of the military prosecutor statement that was read, said that during the taking of the statement, he was "in a state of physical and mental collapse." Muftuoglu claimed that "the security directorate statement was taken under torture" and asked that this statement not be read. The court committee rejected this request for the reason that "it is useful from the standpoint of evaluating similarities between the statements," and Muftuoglu's security directorate statement was read. Muftuoglu did not approve the security directorate statement.

Later in the hearing, the prosecutor directed questions toward suspect Muftuoglu. The prosecutor asked, "After Dev-Yol communiques were composed together with suspect Nasup Mitap, by whom were they printed and from where was the financial backing obtained?" Muftuoglu responded by saying:

"My answer is in the prosecutor's statement. After being written, publication was ensured by persons who looked after the publishing activities of the Dev-Yol journal and who are the owner and responsible administrators of the journal."

In response to a question of the prosecutor, Muftuoglu said that a number of persons wrote articles of a political and theoretical nature for the Dev-Yol journal.

Muftuoglu answered the prosecutor's question, "What are you goals for a Marxist party?" He said:

"In a society with classes, there are parties that represent the interests of every class. It is natural for classes to organize in the direction of their own interests. The party that is needed in our country is an organization that will engage in the struggle against imperialism, which exploits our people, and against large

capital, which cooperates with imperialism, that will cause the realization of a democratic administration of all the people, and that will act as leader toward this end."

Muftuoglu responded to another question of the prosecutor by saying:

"In countries that are administered by democracy, engaging in politics has been taken as a professional goal. It is an inescapable element of contemporary democracy for, besides politicians and statesmen, individuals, either singly or as a group, to present views and work to have an influence on the economic policy implemented by the government. The masses progress toward gradual participation in the administration of the nation. Our expounding views that were against the economic policy being applied by the government at that time and that expressed our beliefs and opinions and our calling the masses to the struggle for their economic interests and against the policy dictated by the IMF and the robberies committed by brokers are, in the manner questioned by the military prosecutor, democratic behavior. There was no aspect in our doing so that was otherwise.

The hearing was recessed until today as the hour was late. Suspect Muftuoglu will continue to answer the military prosecutor's questions today.

Questioning Completed

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 14 Dec 82 p 7

[Text] Questioning of Oguzhan Muftuoglu, suspect in the THKP-C Dev-Yol [Turkish People's Liberation Party Front Revolutionary Road] case, has been completed, and questioning of Ali Alfatli, suspect No 2 who is charged with being a member of the central committee, has begun.

In the hearing held yesterday in Ankara Martial Law Commandant Military Court No 1, suspect Muftuoglu answered questions posed by the prosecutor and the hearing judge. In response to a question of the prosecutor, suspect Muftuoglu said, "I was known and recognized as a leftist. There were plans to deal with me. Every day, my name was mentioned in newspapers, and allegations were made. I felt the need to conceal my identity. No distinction between the police and the NAP [National Action Party] was seen." Muftuoglu, who contended that the view that security for lives was ensured following 12 September is a topic that must be debated, asserted that it is not true that the Dev-Yol journal was banned by the martial law commandant. Suspect Muftuoglu, who stated that he wrote a 2 to 2½-page article evaluating the situation following 12 September, replied to a question of hearing judge Ekrem Celenk saying:

"A point I reject from the indictment is that Dev-Yol was organized in the manner of a central hierarchy. Dev-Yol is a political publishing organ, a political grouping, a political movement."

Prosecutor Celenk asked, "It is alleged that members of the group took part in killings and armed incidents. Did you write an article stating that these actions were incorrect? If you did not, why didn't you?" Suspect Muftuoglu responded:

"A series of incidents was taking place in Turkey. I certainly wrote and had published in the Dev-Yol journal articles that reported that I do not approve of these types of incidents. Sovereignty of the law is not at issue. I am talking about defense that is conducted in the manner of legal defense against fascist activities. I announced my views on this issue. There is, in the law, the case of necessity. It was clear that much larger incidents would occur. If people in Corum had responded with arms, a number of killings by fascists would have taken place. As I say, I oppose that which is outside necessary and legal defense. I also oppose the arbitrary commission of isolated incidents. If persons close to those who were murdered in a criminal manner were carried away with anger and killed as a reaction to these deaths, I do not wish to accuse them, even in order to protect myself. It is a fact that, in general, a series of incidents did take place."

In relation to contradictions among statements given at the security directorate and at the military prosecutor's office, Muftuoglu said, "I gave the deposition at the prosecutor's office in a state of collapse following 80 days of torture at the security directorate and a struggle between life and death in order to end this. I was not in a position to confirm the things that were written. A number of items were written down incorrectly in spite of my efforts." Furthermore, Muftuoglu reported that Bekir Pullu, an employee at the security directorate, said that he personally killed Behcet Dinleler.

Alfatli, suspect No 2 in the case, said at the hearing that the indictment is without support. Suspect Alfatli, who refuted the charges against him in the indictment that he "created an armed band to destroy the existing constitutional system and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist system," claimed that incidents were not related accurately in the indictment. Suspect Alfatli said that the basis and foundation for the indictment are statements made as a result of torture at the security directorate and that "here and there, items were even eliminated from statements." Alfatli claimed that the persons being charged in the case are progressive, revolutionary persons and went on:

"Following 1975, fascist forces were behind the massacres and bombings directed toward the surrender of the laboring people. These facts, which were known, were not heeded. Actions that were manifested were a succession of acts of resistance against fascists. If their goal had been announced, it would have been stated that their purpose was not to destroy the constitutional system."

Alfatli, who asserted that the indictment lacks an objectively accurate foundation and is without support, said that the reason for this is its being based on statements secured under torture.

Due to the advanced hour, the hearing was adjourned until tomorrow at which time suspect Alfatli will continue to be questioned.

11673

CSO: 3554/86

ELECTRICITY OVERCAPACITY WILL LAST FOR YEARS

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 11 Dec 82 p 11

[Report by Fred Kappetijn: "Electricity Overcapacity for at Least 10 More Years."]

[Text] About 2 years ago (3 Jan 1981) EW [ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE] wrote that the construction of the planned power plant in Dordrecht had better not proceed, due to various reasons among which was the expected decreasing demand for electricity. After much hesitation, the Cooperating Electricity Producers (SEP), Inc., decided to strike this plant, which had also been much criticized by environmentalists, from the list. Now that the coal plant will not be built in Dordrecht, it is clear once again that the decrease in electricity consumption is disrupting the plans of the government which is so fond of trying to spread the risk by dividing the fuels for power plants more fairly between coal, natural gas, oil, and possibly uranium.

The cancellation of the Dordrecht plant has also ended one of the nice plans of the former minister of economic affairs. Terlouw, who realized very well that the generating capacity of the plant to be built in Dordrecht would only increase the existing overcapacity, had hoped that his approval for the construction of the plant would delay the collapse of the boiler construction industry in the Netherlands. Probably against his better judgment, he hoped that better times would come after that.

These better times will probably never come again for boiler fabricators RSV De Schelde and Stork-KAB (VMF) unless they plunge themselves with dedication into cogeneration, the simultaneous production of electricity and heat, in cooperation with the energy-intensive industry, the government and the electricity producers.

The reason that things look very bleak for the boiler industry is that the Netherlands is certainly saddled with an enormous surplus of power plants for the next 10 to 15 years. At the moment the effective installed production capacity is almost 16,100 MW (MW is Megawatt, 1 million watts). So far this year the maximum demand for capacity is 9,400 MW. If we take into account the needed reserve capacity of 27 percent for maintenance and storage, that means that in the past year an installed capacity of 12,000 MW would have been adequate. Thus the excess capacity is 35 percent.

Decrease

Such an excess capacity costs money, of course. Even if it has the side effect that units which are old and less efficient and burn expensive fuel (natural gas and oil) will be utilized less. The SEP now has decided to set up a sort of VUT [early retirement] regulation and to retire early 15 units which are from 20 to 25 years old. That comes down to decreasing the installed capacity by a total of 1,100 MW.

The official decision on the plant in Dordrecht will probably be made in January. Only then can the new Electricity Plan 1987/88 be announced and then it will become clear how long we will be saddled with the excess in installed production capacity in the Netherlands.

EW did not want to wait for the new Electricity Plan and has itself calculated some scenarios up to 1992. In the calculation it was assumed that the newly constructed capacity agrees with what was planned in the previous Electricity Plan. The only deviation is that ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE started from the premise that the plant in Dordrecht and the Amsterdam-Hemweg (plant planned for 1989) will not be built. That means that through 1992 over 2,800 MW of capacity will be added, primarily through city heating projects and industrial generation. Determining the capacity to be retired in the coming 10 years is difficult because it depends on the policy of the SEP. If the VUT regulation initiated this year is only a one-time occurrence and the remaining existing units are simply allowed to complete their 25 years, then naturally less will be retired than if the VUT regulation were to attain a permanent character.

If the VUT regulation is just for one time, then 4,400 MW will be retired in the coming 10 years; if the VUT regulation is permanent, the total will be 7,500 MW. The adjoining table indicates how large the resulting capacity will be in 1982 in the two cases, of which the first is the more plausible according to EW. The reduction by 5 years of the life of electrical power plants will undoubtedly lead to a certain loss of capital.

Therefore we will, from this point, take the scenario with the one-time VUT regulation, that is to say that all units which have been built after 1962 will remain operative for the planned 25 years. Whether those 14,500 MW will be adequate in 1982 [as published] depends on the decrease or increase of electricity consumption in the coming 10 years. In the new Electricity Plan, the SEP will start from an [estimated] average growth in electricity consumption in the coming 10 years of 1 percent. Last year it was still [estimated at] 2.4 percent and the year before that, 3.2 percent. But even that one little percent is on the optimistic side. In the last 3 years, consumption of electricity has decreased. First, twice by $\frac{1}{2}$ percent and this year by 2 percent. Thus during the last 3 years by an average of 1 percent per year. The growth of 1 percent also seems to be very high, because the correlation of economic growth and electricity consumption is continually weaker. Earlier a ratio of one to one was not uncommon, but at the present time that ratio is more in the neighborhood of one to two because of energy saving and a shift to less energy-intensive industries. That means that, if the prediction of the SEP is to bear any relation at all with reality, our economy should grow by an average of about 2 percent per year until 1983. That is improbable.

EW has calculated how the excess capacity in electrical capacity will develop if the demand for electricity in the coming decade were to increase by respectively 2, 1, 0, -1 and -2 percent. The table shows that only with a growth of 2 percent in 1992 will the surplus capacity have been removed. In the event of a continued decrease of 2 percent, the excess capacity will increase to almost half of the demand. This explains the enormous sensitivity with respect to a few percent of more or less growth. If we look at only the production capacity, then a discussion on another 3,000 MW of capacity via nuclear power plants by the turn of the century is only interesting if the demand for electricity increases considerably and if alternative sources of energy (wind, biogas, and perhaps the sun) meanwhile do not succeed in making an important contribution. And then we're not even talking about the total surplus of the production capacity in Europe. Especially the countries which have ambitious nuclear energy programs, such as France and Belgium, will shortly have a surplus of relatively cheap capacity.

Now we have come to the price per kilowatt hour (kwh), an argument which gets more and more attention in the electricity discussion (and that is something other than the energy discussion, because the generation of electricity concerns only 20 percent of the total energy consumption). As is known, the Netherlands has a rather expensive fuel package for electric power plants, which comprises 75 percent heating oil and natural gas. In the framework of fuel diversification, the Dutch Government is striving for a more even distribution, amongst other ways by switching over to more coal. This development has its limits because most of the plants cannot be modified to use coal and because the construction of new coal plants is unjustified due to the large excess capacity. Dordrecht is proving that once again.

Foreign Countries

If the Netherlands later on should decide not to start the construction of new nuclear plants, just like the circus packs up its tents, other countries will undoubtedly be prepared to furnish moderately priced electricity to the Netherlands through the European power grid. We are already acquainted with a small sample of similar agreements, thanks to the contract of the State of the Netherlands, the SEP and the "Vereinigte Elektrizitätswerke Westfalen AG" [United Westfalen Electricity Works, Inc) (VEW) in Dortmund. The VEW pays part of its natural gas bill by making available to the SEP cheap capacity of an oil-fueled electricity plant after 1990.

For the time being, however, the Dutch electricity consumer is saddled with a high price per kilowatt hour. Now that our natural gas bubble seems to last longer than expected earlier, it is understandable that electricity consumers are screaming more loudly for cheaper natural gas for the generating of electricity. The previous government seemed to listen to them and made extra cheap natural gas available for the benefit of large industrial consumers. The fact that this extra sale of natural gas yields a few extra guilders which can be emptied into the gaping hole of the government budget probably promoted the generosity of the government.

Cogeneration

But there is something else. The big electricity consumers would be benefited by a greater application of heat-power cogeneration. This method of simultaneous production of electricity and heat, through which approximately 30 percent energy

is saved, can be of great help to the energy-gulping companies. However, they lack the financial means and knowledge to introduce the cogeneration on a large scale. The electricity producers have money (partly because Dordrecht isn't materializing) and knowledge of electricity generation. Therefore it is not so surprising that the Center for Energy Conservation in Delft proposes to offer the boiler fabricators some perspective by stimulating cogeneration.

The Center states: "If the electricity companies participate actively in cogeneration, instead of passively submitting to this process, they will be able to keep part of the work opportunity in their own circle, get part of the financial advantage and, moreover, create a better point of departure to guarantee a good electricity supply." The advantages are clear to the Center for Energy Conservation: lower energy consumption, less environmental damage, cheaper electricity and, for the boiler construction, the prospect of sales possibilities for small and average size heat-power installations. It sounds plausible, but the fact that cogeneration has been under discussion for a long time already and that little has come of it so far, makes one fear the worst.

Table 1. Calculation of the effective installed capacity of the Dutch electricity plants in 1992, expressed in MW.

| | one-time VUT regulation | permanent VUT regulation |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Production capacity in 1982 | 16,100 | 16,100 |
| Capacity to be installed through 1992 | <u>2,800</u> | <u>2,800</u> |
| | 18,900 | 18,900 |
| Capacity to be retired through 1992 | <u>4,400</u> | <u>7,500</u> |
| Capacity remaining in 1992 | 14,500 | 11,400 |

Table 2. Calculation of the excess capacity in installed electrical capacity in 1992, expressed in MW.

The first column indicates the percentage of the estimated average growth of electricity consumption in the next 10 years.

| | Installed capacity in 1992 | Maximum demand for capacity | Excess capacity | |
|-------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|------|
| 2 % percent | 14,500 | 14,500 | 0 | 0 % |
| 1 % | 14,500 | 13,200 | 1,300 | 10 % |
| 0 % | 14,500 | 12,000 | 2,600 | 22 % |
| -1 % | 14,500 | 10,800 | 3,700 | 35 % |
| -2 % | 14,500 | 9,800 | 4,800 | 49 % |

Table 3. The prediction of the necessary maximum capacity of the SEP for 1982/83.

The maximum demand for capacity will probably not be over 9,400 MW.

| Year of prediction | Estimated capacity for 1982/83 |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1975 | 16,500 MW |
| 1977 | 13,300 MW |
| 1979 | 12,000 MW |
| 1981 | 10,100 MW |

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS APPROVES MEASURES BENEFITING WORKERS

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 17 Dec 82 p 1

[Text]

BASIC social insurance benefits from the Social Insurance Fund are to be increased by 40 per cent under regulations approved by the Council of Ministers yesterday. Auxiliary benefits are also increased by 5 per cent.

The increases were approved by the Council of Ministers yesterday and the minister of Labour has been authorised to table the regulations and draft bills to the House of Representatives for ratification.

They cover the extra month's pension allowance (Christmas bonus) which is established as a statutory measure under the new regulations, when they are approved.

Among other provisions, the weekly "insurable wage" is increased and government's contribution to the fund for National Guardsmen is increased by 50 per cent.

Maternity allowance is now extended to self-employed women and the waiting period for

sickness allowance is reduced from 30 days to 18 days and for accident allowance from 30 days to three days.

The Miners' retirement age is reduced so that for every five years of work as a miner there shall be a reduction by one year from the retirement age with a maximum reduction of five years overall.

Revision is also made about the maximum amount of wage insurable under the redundancy scheme.

Another provision is for holiday fund contributions by employers to be reckoned as having been paid in favour of the employee, even if only a court decision exists about them while the actual payment is delayed.

CSO: 3500/321

SECOND FOREIGN BANK LIQUIDATES OPERATIONS

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 16 Dec 82 p 1

[Text]

THE Chartered Bank operations in Cyprus will be taken over by the Bank of Cyprus as from the beginning of the New Year.

A joint statement by the two banks, confirming rumours, said that with effect from Dec 31 the business, assets and liabilities of the Chartered Bank will be acquired by the Bank of Cyprus.

This is the second case in recent months that a foreign bank has liquidated its operations in Cyprus and had its assets and liabilities taken over by a local bank. Earlier Grindlays Bank had concluded a deal with the Popular Bank.

Foreign exchange

In both cases it was stressed that the acquisition will not involve an outflow of foreign exchange from Cyprus.

Both Chartered and the Bank of Cyprus said the takeover is considered to be beneficial to the economy generally. It will give a boost and further strengthen the base and lending capacity of the Bank of Cyprus.

Chartered is considering establishing an off-shore bank in the island.

Recently a regional manager of Barclays Bank International, London, Mr C. H. Manton, who was on a short visit to Cyprus reaffirmed Barclays intention to remain in business in Cyprus.

CSO: 3500/321

INCREASE IN TRADE WITH CHINA DETAILED

West Berlin DIW WOCHENBERICHT in German 21 Oct 82 pp 526-529

[Excerpt] The success of China's export efforts can be observed in its trade with the FRG. Imports from China increased from DM 309 million in 1970 to DM 1.7 billion in 1981. In 1981 alone, an increase of almost 18 percent was achieved as compared with the previous year--far greater than the average of imports from developing countries (+3 percent, or 6.4 percent not counting the oil countries)¹. With a share of 0.5 percent of total imports, China reached 34th place; for imports from East Asia this country was in fourth place, after Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. The make-up of Germany's imports from the People's Republic in the year 1981 was not typical of those from a poor developing country, because the share of finished goods--55.8 percent--was far higher than the average of all developing countries (20 percent); food industry goods had a higher weight with 24.4 percent than those of the other developing countries (14.5 percent). Raw materials deliveries do not come to even one-fourth of the average of imports of this group of goods from all Third World countries.

The make-up of German exports to China has not changed very much. It consists of 95 percent industrial goods; the share of raw materials and semifinished goods was half that of 1970 (an exception to this is the deliveries of textiles fabrics, which greatly increased temporarily). The proportion of semifinished products was also cut in half because of the marked reduction in the export of pipe and other rolled steel. In the export of finished goods, the proportion of electrotechnical products as well as other machines and mining equipment increased strongly. The share of deliveries of plant, particularly heavy industrial plant, decreased.

These developments mirror the policy of structural changes in the People's Republic of China. Main emphasis is placed on investments in agriculture and modernization of existing enterprises, particularly in light industry, but also in the expansion of the transportation infrastructure and in that of the energy sector. On the other hand, efforts in the area of heavy industry are now exerted only if they serve to make equipment available for light industry.

Increased International Contacts

China, soon after it opened up politically and economically early in the 1970's, intensified its contacts with its major trade partners and gradually its relations with multinational and international economic and financial institutions. In 1978 a trade agreement was concluded with the European Community, and the People's Republic was admitted to the System of General Tariff Preference (APS). This led, for example, to the fact that in 1981 only one-fifth of Chinese deliveries to the FRG were in the allocated quota area and only 45 items were in the "hard core" of allocated quota goods.² Almost all tariff items in the industrial area were thus free of quantitative limitations as far as China is concerned. A good part of the People's Republic's success in exporting to the Community is considered to be due to this classification in trade relations and other privileges within the framework of EC import regulations. With these alleviations, China's handicap with regard to free access to EC markets was reduced to a large extent.

Further privileges may only be expected within the framework of multilateral agreements. Thus, for the first time the People's Republic will take part as an observer in the fall 1982 GATT Conference, and it has--seemingly also with a view to possible membership--reformed its import customs duties system. The recent introduction of export duties was apparently also in connection with this step, because the system of domestic exchange rates with the U.S. dollar introduced 1 January 1980³, which made imports more expensive and which subsidized exported goods, is being tolerated only for a temporary period under particular conditions according to IMF regulations, as well as in stricter form by GATT.

In the summer of 1980 China became a member of the IMF and the World Bank. In December 1979 China was classified as a developing country by the Committee for Development Assistance of the OECD countries. The People's Republic obtained access not only to IMF and World Bank credits⁴, but above all easier access to international financial markets. China, however, continues to be very restrained in its debt policy. For the end of 1982 the net indebtedness is stated to be only \$3.1 billion; for the current year the debt service rate can be calculated to be at most 9 percent⁵, which is unusually low by international comparison.

In 1982 China has again reorganized its foreign trade administration. The two-tier system under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Export-Import Commission has been abolished and all decision-making powers have been concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Trade.⁶ Decentralization was, however, retained, partly by more precise delimitation of the powers for independent action of enterprises, and local branches of the foreign trade companies were further strengthened.

Above all, however, international cooperation was extended in various ways (wage equalization⁷, compensation trade, mixed companies) and the contractual, tax, and industrial law framework required for this was

further built up. To gain experience in modern management, production, trade, and services, China is increasingly going over to participating in foreign enterprises. Foreign companies (70 percent of which are Hong Kong firms) invested \$3.2 billion in the People's Republic in 1981. That is not a small figure when one considers the frequent and radical upheavals which have occurred in the last decade alone in China. In relation to the gross national product, this amount corresponds to the foreign direct investment in Taiwan, and it appears that the People's Republic can at its present state of development just manage this volume. In all Chinese provinces at this time, in connection with working out the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), a multitude of small and large investment projects are being prepared. Following the not very satisfactory experiences at the investment conferences in Europe and Guangzhou, the authorities are making great efforts--partly with the assistance of foreign consulting firms and extensive feasibility studies--to work up truly mature projects and to redetermine priorities.

By the year 2000 Chinese foreign trade is to grow to \$160 billion, that is, to quadruple; up to that time, too, it is to grow in tune with the overall economy. This would mean a reduction in growth of goods trade, which in the current year can also be observed for the most important trade partners. In the future, however, the entire foreign trade is to be structured in the direction of increasing international division of labor through the various forms of cooperation at home and abroad, in export zones and special economic zones.

FOOTNOTES

1. The increase in imports from the remaining countries engaged in trade was 10 percent.
2. See the Gazette of the European Community, No L390/130, dated 31 December 1980.
3. See "People's Republic of China: Favorable Prospects for Foreign Trade," by E. Hagemann, in WOCHENBERICHT DES DIW [Weekly Reports of the Deutsche Industriewoche, German Industry Weekly], No 7, 1982, p 109 ff.
4. Up to now the People's Republic has received from the IMF, for equalizing the balance of payments, from various funds, credits for a total of \$1.4 billion; and from the World Bank (or its IDA [International Development Association]), for three larger development projects, the equivalent of \$420 million.
5. According to statements of the Chinese Finance Minister, the People's Republic of China has to come up with 3.55 billion yuan in 1982 for interest and amortization payments. Chinese exports are conservatively estimated to be 39.4 billion yuan for this year. See BEIJING RUNDSCHAU [Beijing Review], 1 July 1982.

6. The correct name is "Ministry for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries and Trade."
7. The share of wage equalization increases for imports of the FRG from China is at this time indicated as 2.5 percent; the actual value may be somewhat higher.

Breakdown of Goods Imported to Germany
from the People's Republic of China
(in percent)

| Goods Categories and Selected Goods | 1970 | 1975 | 1981 | 1982 (1st half) | Share of the respective total imports 1981 |
|--|-------|-------|---------|-----------------------|---|
| Total, in million DM | 308.6 | 553.4 | 1,728.1 | 880.1 | |
| in percent | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.5 |
| Food industry | 44.6 | 40.0 | 24.4 | 20.5 | 0.9 |
| Guts | 19.3 | 11.2 | 3.3 | 4.3 | 18.9 |
| Honey | 2.2 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 18.7 |
| Canned vegetables and fruit, fruit juices | 3.4 | 9.5 | 7.7 | 4.9 | 4.6 |
| Raw tobacco | 7.2 | 2.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| Tea | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 13.6 |
| Industry | 55.3 | 59.6 | 74.4 | 76.8 | 0.4 |
| Raw materials | 30.1 | 17.2 | 13.4 | 12.4 | 0.4 |
| Raw wool | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 3.3 |
| Hides, raw | 9.1 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 2.5 |
| Bedding feathers | 7.8 | 3.9 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 18.8 |
| Other products and metal wares | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 2.2 |
| Minerals | 4.0 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 |
| Semifinished goods | 9.8 | 9.1 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 0.1 |
| Tin, raw and alloyed | 2.1 | 3.9 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.5 |
| Raw silk, woven silk | 3.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 13.0 |
| Semifinished products | 9.1 | 13.7 | 14.9 | 15.9 | 0.6 |
| Silk fabrics, synthetic | 2.2 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| synthetic | 0 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| Wool fabrics | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Cotton fabrics | 0.2 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 3.0 |
| Hides, processed into furs | 0.9 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 3.8 |
| Other chemical semi- finished products | 2.8 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 5.8 | 0.5 |

| | | | | | |
|---|-----|------|------|------|-----|
| Finished products | 6.2 | 19.4 | 40.9 | 42.1 | 0.5 |
| Cotton clothing | 0.1 | 1.6 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 2.4 |
| Clothing of silk and chemical fibers | 0.1 | 0.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 1.0 |
| Other woven goods | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 |
| Fur goods | 1.2 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 5.0 |
| Leather goods, shoes | 0.8 | 3.6 | 7.3 | 4.5 | 2.6 |
| Wooden articles | 0.1 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| Tools, other hardware | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2.5 | 3.8 | 0.7 |
| Pharmaceutical products | 0.2 | 2.5 | 4.1 | 6.7 | 1.9 |
| Other final products | 2.2 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 7.0 | 1.9 |

Note: Returned goods and replacement deliveries are not considered, nor are deviations through rounding.

Source: Federal Statistics Office, Trade Series 7, Subseries 3

Breakdown of German Exports to the
People's Republic of China
(in percent)

| Goods Categories and Selected Goods | 1970 | 1975 | 1981 | 1982 (1st half) | Share of the respective total imports 1981 |
|--|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Total, in millions DM in percent | 611.6 100.00 | 1,291.7 100.0 | 2,286.5 100.0 | 898.3 100.0 | 0.6 |
| Food industry | 0 | 0 | 3.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Industry | 99.9 | 100.0 | 96.0 | 99.1 | 0.6 |
| Raw materials | 2.1 | 0.7 | 3.9 | 1.3 | 1.2 |
| Cellulose, synthetic fibers, and wastes | 2 | 0.7 | 3.8 | 1.0 | 7.4 |
| Semifinished goods | 19.5 | 6.2 | 3.9 | 6.4 | 0.3 |
| Semifinished iron and alloys | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 0.6 | |
| Aluminum, raw and also alloyed | 0 | 3.7 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.2 |
| Tar and tar distillates | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Nitrogen and other fertilizer | 3.4 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 3.1 |
| Other chemical semi- finished goods | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 3.1 | 0.1 |
| Semifinished products | 57.3 | 61.2 | 24.3 | 26.3 | 0.8 |
| Synthetic materials, coal tar dyes, dyes, | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|--|------|------|------|------|-----|
| and other chemical semifinished products | 16.4 | 10.6 | 19.9 | 19.0 | 1.5 |
| Steel pipe | 12.4 | 38.8 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 0.3 |
| Iron rod shapes | 5.2 | 3.9 | 0.5 | 1.6 | 0.2 |
| Plate (of iron) | 18.2 | 7.6 | 2.9 | 4.1 | 1.0 |
| Wire (of iron) | 1.6 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.5 |
| Finished Products | 21.1 | 31.8 | 63.9 | 65.1 | 0.6 |
| Other hardware | 1.8 | 0.7 | 11.3 | 7.5 | 1.9 |
| Machine tools and rolling mills | 3.8 | 7.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 0.6 |
| Pumps and air compressors | 0.7 | 3.3 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 0.7 |
| Other machines and conveying devices | 2.8 | 12.4 | 31.3 | 24.4 | 1.3 |
| Electrochemical products | 1.4 | 3.4 | 10.5 | 21.3 | 0.6 |
| Fine mechanical and optical products | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.5 |
| Photechemicals, pharmaceu- ticals, cosmetics and other chemical products | 3.6 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.1 |
| Watercraft | 3.1 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 1.6 |
| Aircraft | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| Motor vehicles | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 |
| Other finished products | 0 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.4 |

Note: Returned goods and replacement deliveries are not considered, nor are deviations through rounding.

Source: Federal Statistics Office, Trade Series 7, Subseries 3.

5586

CSO: 3620/115

ISO BLASTS RECENT BANKING DECISIONS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 17 Dec 82 p 6

[Article by Meral Tamer]

[Text] Recent decisions related to banks were the target of severe criticism at the monthly assembly meeting of the ISO [Istanbul Chamber of Industry]. Industrialists who spoke at the meeting concurred that, while the state "backs" banks with these decisions and while banks have secured broad state support, this support is being withheld from industrialists.

ISO Administrative Council Chairman Nurullah Gezgin, criticizing the banking decision for its one-sidedness and its failure to support the industrial sector, said, "While we anticipated a fall in credit interest rates, the result of these decisions will be to raise interest rates. It is difficult to understand this."

"We Are Shocked"

TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employer Unions] Chairman Halit Narin, who describes the decision dealing with banks as an "operation to save banks," stated, "This decision was a shock to the industrialist, who anxiously awaited cheaper credit." Narin, who terms 1982 "the year of the bank and banker," said, "During the year, the state used all its resources and all the strength of the treasury for banks, and the industrialist was unable to obtain his share of this consideration. The manner in which the recent decision emerged is also a new support for bankers. Whereas the state cannot control interest rates' rising to 80 percent, the 3 to 4-point reduction made in deposit interest rates will remain within the banking community. In contrast, the working world, which has complained about difficulties for a long time, will not be able to benefit from this. It is difficult to understand why interest is not given to commercial accounts. If there is money somewhere, there must also be interest. We hope the government will reexamine the decision dealing with banks, and we await an operation that will save the economy, not various sectors."

"Mountain Gave Birth to Mouse"

Murtaza Celikel, ISO Assembly acting chairman, spoke later at the meeting and described the decision as a "mountain giving birth to a mouse." Celikel, who defined the banking decision by saying, "The state is causing the monopolization existing

within the banking front to solidify almost like a contractor does," continued, "Everyone knows that bankers' balance sheets are rigged, that they are put in order by transfers from unions. The state has heaped the burden of these sick institutions, of even floundering banks, on our puny backs. We had high expectations when Kafaoglu took office. We thought that the respected minister had a rock in his pocket. Six months later, sand came out. In 1983, the dirt swept under the rug will emerge."

Angry Speaker

Celikel's statements about banks greatly unnerved Oguz Karahan, who was in banking for 28 years and who, after serving as Yapi and Kredi Bank deputy director general, went over to industry and is currently Sabanci Holding Company general coordinator. Karahan approached the podium in a state of extreme agitation and said that, at a meeting of an organization such as the chamber of industry, banks cannot be spoken of "in a manner that can be considered calumnious and be so gravely besmirched." He asserted that banks have put industrialists on their feet for years and that they are serious institutions that have served every sector of the nation. Karahan reacted strongly to the industrialists' criticism that interest is not being paid to commercial deposits. He stated, "This is a matter of mathematics. Let us give interest to commercial deposits as well. But, then, credit costs will be even higher. Can you agree to this?"

Coffer Banking

ISO Chairman Nuh Kusculu, who took the floor after Karahan, spoke as if he had a knot in his throat. Kusculu tried to dispel the electrified atmosphere, pointing out that there is always a conflict of interest among sectors. He then threw out the question, "Despite the fact that there are banks that work very seriously, can we approve of the banking sector in its present state?" He also asked why, when banks are ensured such important support, a helping hand has not been extended to date to any institution in the industrial sector other than two organizations. Kusculu noted that commercial deposit blockage in banks totals 200 billion liras. He asked, "Why is 200 billion liras of the business world being blocked without interest, without being used?" Kusculu, who also criticized bank-union relations, said that in Germany, for example, banks are prohibited by governmental decision from owning more than 10 percent of the shares in unions, that banks have been given 5 years in which to liquidate their shares in unions, and that, following this decision, even the Dresner Bank began to sell its union shares. Kusculu concluded by stating, "We are not saying that banks should suffer losses. But, we oppose coffer banking."

Aluminum Industrialists Association Chairman Fuat Dincer spoke next and said that it is necessary for the government, which appears set on controlling deposit interest rates in a significant manner, to control credit interest rates as well.

"They Cannot Ruin Us"

Ertugrul Soysal, who took the floor later, stated, "With the recent decisions it reached, the state substantially backed the banking system, became its support."

However, this support, which is ensured at the expense of the sacrifice of those with savings accounts, was not directed toward industry. Furthermore, it appears that there will be a rise in credit interest rates. The state seeks to find a resource without creating inflation in order to support exportation and investments. For this reason, it has also introduced with its recent decisions the principle of having industrialists who seek credit pay supplemental interest of approximately 5 percent into an interest-rebate fund. In contrast, the profits of banks, which are indifferent, which have leaned on the public, and which think that 'no matter what, the state cannot cause us to go bankrupt,' have been increased in the form of 300 million liras ensured to banks by means of a reduction in deposit interest rates, an interest-rate increase from 1 percent to 1.5 percent in the state's payment to banks for deposit supplementary returns, and changes in the income tax law."

11673

CSO: 3554/91

INCREASE, IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGE NOTED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 17 Dec 82 p 4

[Text] An increase of approximately 60 percent in the minimum wage will have effects from various directions and to varying degrees on labor life and our economy.

It is not known precisely how many persons' wages in labor life the new minimum wage will change outright. However, it is expected that the new wage will influence the general level of wages.

Officials asserted that the 3,000-lira net increase will not create a huge demand on the market and, consequently, by not affecting prices, will not have a great effect from the economic standpoint.

Benefits Social Security Organization

The effects from various aspects of the approximately 60-percent increase in the minimum wage can be listed in summary:

[1.] The new minimum-wage hike will affect the wages of non-union workers. It will increase the incomes of workers employed for the minimum wage at non-union businesses and small workshops. Because there are no statistical figures for Turkey, it is not possible to say anything definite on the topic of the number of employees working in this manner. There being 2.2 million insured workers and 12 million persons in our nation participating in labor life in various manners, it is a fact that the minimum wage will affect the broad masses.

[2.] In a number of collective bargaining agreements, there are articles stating that new workers will be employed at the minimum wage and, furthermore, that equal wages will be paid at various levels. For this reason, the effect of the minimum wage will also be seen at businesses included in collective bargaining agreements.

[3.] Thousands of persons, such as counter help, doormen, and waiters, employed in the service sector for less than the minimum wage, and even if uninsured, will have the opportunity of benefiting directly from this increase as well.

[4.] By raising the wages of only low-ranking workers, those who benefit from collective bargaining agreements will have a serious argument for demands to increase

their wages, especially if the former's wages approach theirs within a short pperiod of time.

[5.] Apprentices' wages will rise. In the law, it is stated that an apprentice's salary cannot be less than 30 percent of the minimum wage.

[6.] The minimum-wage increase will raise the premiums paid by both workers and employers, which will ensure an increase in SSK [Social Security Organization Directorate General] premiums.

[7.] The 16,200-lira legal wage will directly cause a general increase in the level of wages in our nation.

[8.] The new minimum wage will affect civil servants, who receive low wages by law. Under the law, the lowest ranking civil servant's salary cannot be below the minimum wage. The salaries of civil servants whose wages are less than 16,200 liras will automatically rise to this level.

Employers Comfortable

It is not felt that the increase in the gross minimum wage $1\frac{1}{2}$ years hence from 10,000 liras to 16,200 liras will have a significant effect on the economy.

Officials reported that they do not expect the net increase in the minimum wage, which will be about 3,000 liras after tax deductions, to create a volume increase in demand that will raise prices on the market.

On another hand, following the removal of the minimum wage from calculation of seniority compensation, the minimum wage has also lost its importance from the standpoint of production costs. This is because, during the period in which seniority compensation was computed in accordance with the minimum wage, each increase in the minimum wage directly increased the compensation burden of unions. The fact that this relationship has been severed for the period lying ahead provides a great deal of comfort to employers.

Turkish Confederation of Employers Unions Chairman Halit Narin said that he "is pleased by the minimum-wage announcement." He went on, "It is important that the decision was made together by the trio of government, worker, and employer uniting around the same concept. It is also a constructive sign that this trio met within a new understanding on social and economic problems directed toward the future." Narin stated, "Because the number of employees working in organized sectors -- in agriculture and industry -- is small, there is no question of placing a huge burden on operations."

Hak-Is' View

In a written statement presented yesterday, Hak-Is Konfederasyonu [Turkish Moral Rights Workers Trade Union] Chairman General Necati Celik said, "The minimum wage established by the commission and announced by the minister of labor is extremely inadequate and far from realities and knowledgeableness."

Celik's statement reads, in summary:

"The minimum wage has been defined as the wage that will suffice to meet required needs, at a minimum level, for a worker's food, housing, clothing, health care, transportation, and entertainment at current prices. If we use this definition, it is even difficult to pay house rent alone with the minimum wage put into effect today.

"A minimum wage established today should, at the least, ensure the purchasing power of the wage set in May 1981, and the increase should be put at 85 percent at the lowest."

| Year | Gross Minimum Wage (in liras) |
|------|----------------------------------|
| 1963 | 300 |
| 1965 | 330 |
| 1969 | 513 |
| 1974 | 1,200 |
| 1976 | 1,800 |
| 1977 | 3,300 |
| 1978 | 5,400 |
| 1981 | 10,000 |
| 1982 | 16,200 |

11673
CSO: 3554/91

NEW COEFFICIENT DEBATED, ENDORSED IN ASSEMBLY

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 28 Nov 82 pp 1,9

[Text] Ankara--The Consultative Assembly endorsed the civil service pay scale coefficient as 35.

Responding to criticism leveled against the draft budget [for 1983], Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu said: "We are determined to make sure that those who lost money to the brokers will not be in a difficult situation."

Responding to criticism against the budget in the name of the government, Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu said that the 1983 budget was prepared realistically and consistent with reasonable revenue estimates and the other goals of the current economic policy.

In the draft budget for the fiscal year 1983, the government had fixed the civil service pay scale coefficient at 34. However, despite the opposition of the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Commission of the Consultative Assembly decided to raise the coefficient from 34 to 35.

The Consultative Assembly endorsed the 1983 draft budget yesterday after a floor vote. That also meant that article 26 of the draft, which fixed the civil service pay coefficient at 35, also passed the assembly.

According to the new budget, a civil servant will be paid as family assistance 720 Turkish liras [per month] for an unemployed spouse, 120 Turkish liras for each child who has not reached school age, 480 Turkish liras for each child who is going to elementary school, 720 Turkish liras for each child who is attending high school or an institution of higher learning and 120 Turkish liras for each child who is not pursuing any education above the elementary level.

Overtime pay for civil servants will not be less than 40 and more than 100 Turkish liras per hour. General administrative training and technical services employees working at the Security Directorate General headquarters or other units of this organization will have their monthly base pay raised by 3,750 Turkish liras and the monthly base pay of market and neighborhood watchmen will be raised by 1,500 Turkish liras. Members of the literary council--responsible for selecting the works that will be staged at state theaters--who are not regular theater employees will be paid 1,100 Turkish liras for each meeting they attend.

The monthly base pay of the forest conservation officials will be raised by 4,000 Turkish liras and that of the technicians will be raised by 2,350 Turkish liras. Antimalaria warfare and public health officials will have their monthly base pay raised by 2,000 Turkish liras while malaria laboratory workers will receive monthly base pay raises of 1,500 Turkish liras. The budget provides for overtime pay for the employees of all the schools and institutions of the Ministry of National Education, on condition that overtime work does not exceed 48 hours per month during the school year and 8 hours per month during the summer recess.

The monthly base pay of commissioned officers, junior officers and specialized gendarme sergeants will be raised by 4,750 Turkish liras while nonregimental employees will receive monthly base raises of 3,750 Turkish liras.

The budget also provides for supplementary payments for artists and organization, development and service funds for faculty members. Accordingly, the organization and development hardship pay scales will be as follows: Professors: between 6,600 and 22,000 Turkish liras depending on their seniority; associate professors: between 5,500 and 16,000 Turkish liras; assistant professors: between 4,400 and 13,750 Turkish liras; and teaching assistants: between 3,300 and 8,250 Turkish liras. Faculty members will also receive service pays varying between 1,200 and 5,000 Turkish liras, the actual amount being determined by seniority.

Teachers and personnel who hold additional classes in institutions of learning and training will be paid between 135 and 265 Turkish liras for each additional class they hold.

The budget also fixes conference pay. The maximum conference pay will be 500 Turkish liras.

Kafaoglu

Responding to criticism against the budget of his ministry, Minister of Finance Adnan Baser Kafaoglu spoke about the coefficient and said that the 1-point increase in the civil service pay scale coefficient, together with the increase in the supplementary pay scale coefficient, will bring on the budget an additional burden of 21 to 22 billion Turkish liras.

Kafaoglu said that within the limits of existing resources taxation has "taken a marginal form" and that this is causing certain difficulties in taxation. Emphasizing the inadequacy of Turkey's tax audit system, Kafaoglu said that France, for example, has a tax audit personnel of 35,000 compared to Turkey's 1,500.

Speaking about brokers, Kafaoglu said: "Our latest calculations on brokers show that the brokers can be divided into two classes. We estimate that some brokers can pay 100 percent of their debts. These brokers have sufficient assets to clear all their debts. But some brokers are found to have no assets at all. We want and we are determined to make sure that those who lost money to such brokers will not be in a difficult situation."

Criticism

Members of the general assembly of the Consultative Assembly also expressed their views about the budget yesterday. Erzincan member Abdalbaki Cebeci alleged that the government has remained a mere spectator on events surrounding the brokers. Central member Aydin Tug noted that the 24 January decisions were the first radical steps taken toward economic stability and that no quick solutions can be found to Turkey's economic problems whose roots lie in the past. Eskisehir member Tevfik Fikret Alpaslan said that the continuous devaluation of the Turkish currency is worrisome and recalling that the Minister of Finance said in his statement about price hikes, "You call this a price hike?" he said: "Such statements can only be material for columnists rather solutions for the nation's problems."

Uluslu's Words

Speaking for the government in response to criticism against the budget, Prime Minister Bulend Uluslu gave detailed information about the budget and said: "The basic goal of our policies is to make our economy more investment-oriented and more productive." Stating that the 1983 budget was prepared realistically and consistent with reasonable revenue estimates and the other goals of the current economic policy, Uluslu noted that one of the most important problems of the economy is unemployment. Stating that the five-year development plan being prepared strongly focuses on the employment issue, Uluslu said that this plan will be submitted to the Consultative Assembly together with the 1984 budget and program.

After Uluslu's speech on the whole of the budget, Budget Planning Commission Chairman Tandogan Tokgoz took the rostrum. In a comparison of the 1983 and 1982 budgets, Tokgoz said that the investments envisaged by the current budget are less than those of 1982.

After discussions over the whole of the budget were completed, the draft was submitted to a floor vote in which members voted openly after their names were read. During the vote, 125 members accepted the draft and 31 members abstained.

In a brief speech after the budget was approved, Deputy Assembly President Vefik Kitapcigil, who presided over the session, thanked the assembly members for their work. Stating that the discussions were held in a very mature atmosphere, Kitapcigil said, referring to members Muzafer Ender and Mehmet Pamak: "There were two unfortunate incidents during this period. But we do not think that our colleagues acted maliciously."

Upon these words, Mehmet Pamak nervously got up and left the room closing the door very loudly behind him. Pamak's act drew a lot of criticism from the other members. Stating that there are no other issues on the agenda, Kitapcigil adjourned the meeting to 8 December.

BRIEFS

NEW JUSTICE, PRESIDENCY APPOINTMENTS--THE new Director General of the Ministry of Justice is Mr. Nicos Symeonides. Born in Famagusta, he studied law at Middle Temple of London and economics at Southampton. He also attended postgraduate studies in Toronto where he obtained his MA in economics. Since 1963 he had been serving with the Planning Bureau. Mr Linos Shakallis is the new director of the Ministry of the Presidency. He was born in Limassol and joined the public service in 1953. He studied sociology in the USA. [Text] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 17 Dec 82 p 3]

CSO: 3500/322

PETRA KELLY ON GREENS' FUTURE, COALITION WITH SPD

Amsterdam DE TIJD in Dutch 19 Nov 82 pp 62-66

[Report of interview with Petra Kelly by Ton Crijnen]

[Excerpts] Petra Kelly, for years the symbol of the West German environmental party "the Greens," has been out since the end of last week as chairman--"I have almost worked myself to death, now it is time for a little rest"--but remains active in the party. She is even earmarked for chairman of the party delegation in a new Bundestag. A coalition with the Social Democrats? No, but cooperation: "If the SPD want to govern they must first accept our demands."

Before the conference she still thought that they might leave her as chairman until after the March Bundestag elections--"it looks better to me cosmetically not to change standard-bearers now"--but the 650 delegates of the West German environmental party "the Greens," meeting last week-end at Hagen, decided otherwise. Petra Kelly, 34, could leave.

Not that she is sorry about it. "I nearly worked myself to death, and during the last 4 weeks I have twice had serious trouble with my heart. Now it is time for a little rest." And: "I think it is fine that the Greens do not get to cling to their seat, and are automatically discharged after 2 years. Democracy in top form. That holds for parliament and the city council, so why not for our own party executive."

But after a little questioning it turns out that there is another side to the coin. "I will not deny that as far as I myself am concerned, with some male delegates a bit of fear of a competent woman may have played a part."

???

"When I was elected chairman everybody thought that was very left and very chic. After all, no woman was at the top of any other party in the Federal Republic. But when it turned out that I handled it quite nicely and that I knew how to build up good contacts with the media, some comrades' enthusiasm decreased somewhat. They obviously couldn't swallow the fact that a woman was in the limelight. So you see, even our club is not entirely free of male chauvinism."

Petra Kelly, all that time the very symbol of the Green Party and still very active, wants to put herself up as a candidate for the Bundestag. ("That has always been my ultimate goal.") Many favor her as the new leader of the party delegation, assuming that in case of accelerated elections the Greens get the 5 percent of the votes required at the minimum to get into the national parliament.

"I have no faith in all those opinion polls. First they gave us too many percentage points on purpose, to scare people away from voting for us. Now they are doing precisely the opposite. But the voters know better." (In the last polls the Greens stand at a good 6 percent.)

She sits across from me, short and slight. A pale woman with medium-length gray-blond hair and practically no make-up. Friendly, helpful, and without any poses. She speaks monotonously and rapidly; the words flow over you like a tidal wave.

"We are ready to work together with any party that meets our demands. It is logical that we look first of all to the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]. Many of us, including me, regard ourselves as stepchildren of that party. They find strong correspondences in the field of social policy and détente policy. But there are also great differences, especially as concerns the environment.

"Yes, I know that Willy Brandt is now talking big about ecological concerns and that he wants to integrate the women's movement and the peace movement into the SPD, but that is pure election tactics. For the same reasons he is reaching out to us full of deadly cordiality. I am not falling for that. The Social Democrats are first going to have to show by deeds that their intentions are honest.

"Anyway, I absolutely cannot see a coalition with the SPD, though possibly support to a Social Democratic minority cabinet. In that case the SPD must first publicly declare that it is against the stationing of new atomic weapons and rejects the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Social Democrats should also be ready to recognize that preservation of the environment takes absolute priority over any economic consideration.

"Do I believe that our demands will be accepted? Look, without the support of the Greens Messrs Vogel, Brandt, Wehner, and Schmidt might as well forget about getting into power, for an electoral majority for the SPD seems to me to be out of the question. They can, of course, make common cause with the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union], but that is not very probable. A Genscher does not come in for consideration at all, of course. It is therefore in the SPD's interest for us and not the 'liberal' FDP [Free Democratic Party] to get into the Bundestag."

All that does not alter the fact that Kelly's "open letter" to SPD Chairman Brandt was strongly denounced in Hagen. Radicals like the East German émigré ideologist Rudolf Bahro saw in it an unacceptable approach to the SPD. Kelly: "I am not ready to jump, but ruling out any form of cooperation is going too far for me."

The second appointment, too, begins half an hour late. She comes on the run, out of breath. "I am exhausted, my head is whirling." Tells about a meeting with representatives of the West German employers' association the evening before.

"Frightful. Those people do not want to understand anything. They questioned me the whole time about the fact that there are also communists among our members. It was the only thing they were interested in." She sighs.

[Question] I am not an employer, but I, too, am left with the question: Who is really "Green"? Gertrud Schilling, who during a visit to Libya discovered "definite points of agreement" with Mr Qadhafi? A Marxist-Leninist like Thomas Ebermann, leader of the parliamentary delegation of the Green-Alternatives in Hamburg? Raphael Keppel, who highjacked a Lufthansa plane 3 years ago with a toy pistol in his hand and now operates as secretary of the Green delegation in the Hessian Landtag? Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, who in Baden-Württemberg regularly makes "common cause" with the CDU? Or perhaps delegation head Martin Mombauer from Lower Saxony, proponent of cooperation with the SPD? Who?

Kelly: I admit outright that our movement includes all sorts and conditions of men. You meet communists there, as well as people with a conservative-Christian background. But I do not find that so interesting; what is important is that they have all gone through a learning process, and have all come together. Young and old, Christian Democrat and Marxist.

Precisely this multiformity is our strength. The unique thing about the Green Party is the fact that people with differing political and social backgrounds find each other in the fight for essential values: life, survival.... that sort of thing.

[Question] Sounds nice, but in practice it is different. Look at Bremen. There, members of the state parliament representing the Green List almost literally cut each other's throat, and in Stuttgart Helgo Braun refuses to give up his seat in the Landtag in spite of the fact that he proclaims antiecological ideas.

[Answer] Contrary to what the media suggest, the Green Party and the Green List have no connection whatever with each other. As for Braun, that is the childhood diseases of a new movement.

(After a brief hesitation) I do not know, of course, whether our historic experiment of being a party and at the same time remaining a "movement" will succeed. If the Greens take the path of reformism, if we become a sort of green SPD, or if we lose ourselves in ideological sham battles, it will certainly go wrong.

[Question] Does the danger not lie rather in the fact that in the long run the voters can see that the Greens talk much but do little?

[Answer] I deny that. Thanks to our motley composition, we are an efficient party. Let us take one example. In Bielefeld, a city of 170,000 inhabitants, the Green mayor and aldermen have gotten so far that from now on no asbestos may be used in public buildings. In the same way you can sum up a whole series of concrete results.

No End in Itself

The reason our, the Greens', activity is so realistic is that we combine extra-parliamentary campaigns with parliamentary work.

[Question] Seems difficult to me.

[Answer] We are an antiparty party. For us parliament is not an end in itself but only a component of our strategy.

[Question] And that is...?

[Answer] To bring the decision-making process back to where it belongs: the grass roots.

[Question] Then why participate in elections to regional parliaments and the Bundestag?

[Answer] In parliament I can make things clear, appeal to the media better, and see to it that the citizen again gets a grip on political happenings. But it is not a spot where social changes take place. They occur on the street, on the job, and in the homes for women. The battle is won or lost there, not in parliament. Even if you have a hundred seats.

[Question] The Greens want to carry on "total" opposition in parliament. But parliamentary democracy means reaching compromises, entering into coalitions with other parties.

[Answer] A parliamentary democracy must be able to stand an ecological, anti-military party's operating that enters into no coalitions and carries on pure opposition.

(But all this appears to be pure rhetoric, for according to Petra Kelly the FRG has no true democracy.)

[Kelly] Now is it democratic that the SPD and the CDU have depicted us from the very beginning as "enemies of the constitution" and have tried by illegal means to destroy us? A democracy that excludes pluralism is no true democracy. Indeed, I find a system in which practically only men have any say suspect in any case.

[Question] As suspect as a party that only wants to follow the conflict model in the Bundestag is to others.

[Answer] If we should get into the Bundestag next year, and I have no doubt that will happen, it will be found that we are quite willing to take parliamentary responsibility upon ourselves within the framework of parliamentary democracy.

[Question] Including governing responsibility?

[Answer] (Fiercely) If in an evil day the Greens should send ministers to Bonn, I would immediately get out. As a democratic grass-roots movement we must not let the establishment take us over. We must keep our distance from a political culture that is marked by a hierarchic, patriarchal structure.

[Question] Good. No participation in a government. But what, then? How will Petra Kelly give shape to the political responsibility she assumes?

[Answer] We regard ourselves as representatives of groups that up to now have had no voice in parliament: guest workers [i.e., temporary laborers recruited abroad], the socially weak, women, children, and even... plants, animals.

[Question] It is this sort of nature mystique that led such a progressive man as the Netherlands writer and student of Germany Louis Ferron not long ago to the conclusion that "a new Hitler is more likely to come from the Green corner than from CDU and CSU circles."

[Answer] (Sharply) That is complete nonsense. Pure demagoguery. If you are talking about the danger of a revival of fascism you must look for it in people like Strauss, a cynic and antidemocrat who makes out as communists. What I am talking about has nothing to do with neo-Nazism or *Blut und Boden*. I only want to say that we are working toward a social-emancipation socialism that deals with problems that the established parties ignore.

This "third way" between capitalism and communism finds its right to exist on the street, in the Third World movement, feminism, the peace movement, environmental groups, squatters, you name it. The Green Party stands or falls with the force of this extraparliamentary activity.

All Alike

Petra Kelly wrestles with a contrary contact lens, then says: "As long as a man like Kohl thinks he must dispose of the problems of the environment, in his government declaration of policy, by saying and writing seven rules, the country needs a Green Party."

[Question] You may wonder, of course, whether the Greens are not partly the cause of the new rightist cabinet. The electoral defeat of the SPD and the FDP that led to the change of government in Bonn was partly a result of the fact that the Greens were able to attract some progressive voters to themselves.

[Answer] We can hardly be blamed for that. We are not the cause but the result of the political malaise. The SPD in particular--I am not even going to talk about Genscher's liberals--is missing decisive opportunities. In that way the party repels large groups of voters. If the SPD really differed qualitatively from the CDU, it would not be looking so miserable now.

[Question] CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD--all alike?

[Answer] Yes. With the exception of détente. In all other principal areas--defense, energy policy, attitude toward the Third World, health care, emancipation policy--hardly any differences from each other.

Peace Movement

The Greens, and first of all Petra Kelly, play an important part in the West German peace movement (3 to 4 million sympathisers). In a fierce power struggle with the East-Germany-oriented DKP [German Communist Party] the Greens succeeded in keeping the work for peace "open." Kelly: "As soon as the peace movement attaches itself to one military bloc, it is done for."

[Question] And so?

[Answer] And so we demonstrated not only during Reagan's stay in the Federal Republic [of Germany], but also on the occasion of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn. And so we maintain contacts both with the IKV [Interchurch Peace Council] and with the independent East German peace movement *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen* (Swords Into Ploughshares). We are against all nuclear weapons.

[Question] Nevertheless, there is a good deal to indicate that if Geneva should fail, the new rockets will be stationed on West German territory. The new minister of defense, Manfred Wörner (CDU), left little doubt about that in Washington last week. If that should happen, what would the Greens do, what would the peace movement do then?

[Answer] Then there will be (peaceful) demonstrations. We are thinking in that connection about occupying rocket installations under construction, about a blockade of the Ministry of Defense, about general strikes.

(Her expression grows gloomy.) But I do not know whether anything like that can be done in the short term. Most of our people are not used to that sort of alternative actions. And yet it must happen if the peace movement is not to run aground.

Anyway, that movement embraces much more than just opposing intermediate-range weapons and trying to break open the military blocs. It also interprets the opposition of "ordinary" citizens to the "experts," and leads the revolt of realistic dreamers against defeatist speculators. Nuclear weapons, atomic power plants, health factories, socioeconomic growth policy--they are all on a par.

Reality

At the door she says: "It is often thrown up to us, the Greens, that with the idea of a decentralized, grass-roots democratic, powerless, ecological society we are remote from reality. But there was a time when the same was said against those who advocated the abolition of slavery, those who fought for woman's suffrage, and those who advocated workers' participation in business decisions, and all those things have become realities."

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SPECULATION ON SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN LANDTAG ELECTION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Dec 82 p 10

[Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "An Almost Forgotten Landtag Election-- New Candidates, New Worries and Hopes, Old Subjects in Schleswig-Holstein"]

[Text] Over the Bundestag election campaign (which is not allowed to exist as yet because the Federal president has not yet dissolved the Bundestag) one easily forgets that there is a quite normal Landtag election campaign in Schleswig-Holstein. In peaceful times the election was scheduled for 13 March 1983. This will remain to be the date even if there is to be a new Bundestag election 1 week earlier. Any attempt to hold it sooner, the political representation of the Danish minority (the South Schleswig Voters Union, SSW) has threatened, would be contested in court. In the last three Landtag elections the SSW got 1.4 percent of the vote and one seat each. It is not subject to the 5-percent clause, but this is not the case in the Bundestag election (and the SSW therefore does not compete in it). In Land elections coinciding with Federal elections the SSW fears for its existence, if only because of the expected greater number of voters, which would raise the number of votes needed for a seat.

Proximity of Dates

In this respect the interests of the CDU and SSW coincide, for in the recent past the CDU, governing in Kiel, has clearly always done worse in Bundestag elections than in Landtag elections. This was due in part to greater voters' participation in Bundestag elections. It is difficult to say whether this is due to a lesser interest in Landtag elections or to the fact that SPD supporters too feel they have been well governed under the CDU-led Land governments which have been in charge since 1950. In Schleswig-Holstein, even more so than elsewhere, "the voter's" moods are inscrutable. In the last Landtag election on 29 April 1979 (a time when the CDU was devoting itself with abandon to the dispute about who should be candidate for chancellor), the CDU under Minister-president Stoltenberg with 48.3 percent of the vote obtained a bare absolute majority of Landtag seats (37 of the then 73), while the SPD obtained 41.7 percent and the FDP 5.7 percent. In the Bundestag election on 5 October 1980, with its candidate for chancellor Strauss, who was regarded with curiosity but also frowned on in the north, the CDU attained only 38.9 percent of the vote in the Land, while the SPD's share was 46.7 percent. In the municipal elections in early 1982 the usual regional superiority of the CDU was restored.

Even with two separate dates the Schleswig-Holstein election will not be able to escape the influence exercised by the results of the 6 March Bundestag election. A possibility is election fatigue as well as an extreme effort by an SPD which may have suffered only a bare defeat in Bonn, the confirmation of a possible CDU victory as well as the usual counterreaction (though a counter-reaction never before demanded of the regional voters within such a brief period). But the initial position of the CDU has also changed in other respects. Gerhard Stoltenberg, continuing as CDU Land chairman, went to Bonn in early October to become Federal finance minister. In the Land in which he has ruled for 11½ years, he will conduct a kind of dual election campaign--for the confirmation of the Kohl government in Bonn and of the government of his successor, Barschel, in Kiel. Barschel, elected on the basis of the CDU's absolute majority in the Landtag, is only 38 years old, which is not necessarily an advantage. He previously served as finance minister and minister of the interior for 4 years, but Land ministers never get to be well known. Stoltenberg, though not exactly a man of the people, in the years he was in power earned the sometimes reluctant recognition one can gain from the people of Schleswig-Holstein--the kind of people who, though inclined to be dissatisfied and fond of looking for something new, have a sense of persistence, of fidelity to the existing order and also of just reward.

The SPD too is in a position which is disparate in many ways. While chancellor in Bonn, the north German Schmidt probably also in Landtag elections drove some voters into the camp of an SPD which did not like him but hid that fact before any elections. Vogel is only a candidate for chancellor and therefore will not achieve as much (also because he has assumed a south German image). But even sentimental memories of Schmidt will be able to accomplish something. The SPD candidate for minister-president because of developments in Bonn has managed easily to do without one particular shortcoming. At first, understandably, Engholm did not want to exchange the post of Federal minister of education for a seat on the opposition bench in the Landtag in Kiel. That was all right with the party, because it wanted a Federal minister's post. Now this is no longer possible, and Engholm is in a position to give assurance that the Land is so important to him that he will come in any case. This has caused difficulties in the SPD, but these are a matter of indifference to the electorate. The present leader of the SPD deputies in the Landtag, Matthiesen, who twice tried in vain to displace Stoltenberg, has put up with the outsider Engholm as candidate for minister-president--in the expectation that he himself, one way or another, will remain the leader of the party in the Landtag. Now Matthiesen, who for reasons of health will miss part of the election campaign, will be pushed aside by Engholm unless Engholm became minister-president. A return to his "bourgeois" profession (adult education), if in fact possible, would be a painful comedown for Matthiesen.

Despite threatening opinion polls, the FDP, which has pledged itself to the SPD for a fourth time (conditionally, but this can be fixed if it comes down to it), does not look all that bad in Schleswig-Holstein. The Land party has stuck to its left-liberal course, disapproving definitely of the change in coalition in Bonn (in contrast with Hamburg, for example). The advocates of that Bonn course dare speak only of "keeping the coalition question open," but they constitute a respectable minority. Land Chairman Ronneburger, who is not a Landtag candidate, so far has been something of a right counterweight to the

leftwing Land party. (At the FDP Federal party congress in Berlin, Ronneburger as a "left" candidate opposing Genscher, achieved consonance with his friends in the Land.) The somewhat isolated existence of Schleswig-Holstein may result in the Land FDP doing well with its coalition stance differing from the one in Bonn. Moreover Schleswig-Holstein, which at best in appearance but not in reality is an agriculturally oriented Land, precisely because of the process of change contained therein has developed a stratum of enhanced workers which provides for a leftwing FDP an anchor which, though modest, promises a sufficient share of the electorate.

Thus the CDU has to deal with the two opponents in Schleswig-Holstein--the SPD and the FDP. In addition there is the SSW in the north. Its deputy, by the name of Meyer, would have liked to bring down Stoltenberg in 1979. He is a "socioliberal," but he is also tied to the interest of his minority. Barschel conceded quite a lot to Meyer here. Land subsidies to Danish schools were raised from the rate customary for private schools in the Land--85 percent--to 90 percent. Meyer, who already at the election of Barschel abstained from voting, has some very nice things to say about the minister-president.

Varying Greens

And finally there are the Greens. As everywhere, they represent a checkered crowd. In Schleswig-Holstein there is an inveterate troop which achieved the first parliamentary successes in the 1978 municipal elections--the Schleswig-Holstein Green List (GLSH), from which hails "ecofarmer" Baldur Springmann, who has become well known not only because of his scurrilous getup but because of his personality. And then there is the Land association of the Federal "The Greens" party, in which former supporters of the Communist League, specifically its "Z Group," play a role. In a series of separate conferences and joint negotiations, of agreements and differences, bordering on the ridiculous, one now appears to have agreed on forming a joint list of candidates.

As for the program, agreement is limited to rejecting nuclear energy and opposition to armament, even at the expense of a certain one-sidedness as far as Western preliminary actions are concerned. But there is wide disagreement, for example, on the question of the "monopoly of force" of the state and conclusions to be drawn therefrom as regards the limits of the right of the individual to employ what traditionally is called "force." The top candidate of the joint list is the teacher Boje Maassen of Foehr, an intelligent and moderate man of experience. It remains to be seen to what extent the voters will regard the brittle alliance as an electable entity.

But what are the political aims? Under the present conditions of lack of money, it is Land policy rather to administer laboriously in an attempt to offset tenacious interests, and all that is proceeding in the shadow of Federal politics. Big political gestures are difficult. If they are attempted, the opposition immediately describes them as theatrical. Barschel has submitted a program to cope with the recession--because of the comparatively high unemployment, despite the indebtedness of the Land and, to that extent, as the SPD points out, contrary to the policies of his predecessor, Stoltenberg.

Then there are the older subjects--Brokdorf, for instance. Engholm wants the nuclear power plant to be completed, but then not to be put in operation--a strange way of handling the money the power consumer will have to come up with one day.

There are old differences in school policy, where the SPD however is now retreating to the clever position that it must be left up to the "will of the parents" as to whether or not there will be a comprehensive school--without any mention being made of how many parents as related to how many children of school age constitute the "will of the parents." Then there is the old subject of extremists in public service, in behalf of whom the SPD and FDP persistently demand "liberalization," whereas the Land government points out that anti-constitutional activities are only inquired into when it is intended to employ someone and that, therefore, the "regular inquiry" being held in disrepute does not exist.

Presumably all these subjects will be able to affect the voters less than the Bonn atmosphere clouding the Elbe northward or a look at the people, the top candidates and their background--Stoltenberg back of Barschel, and Schmidt or perhaps Vogel back of Engholm. It is possible that Hessian conditions--the CDU against (almost) everyone else)--will prevail, in Schleswig-Holstein with an advantage for the ruling CDU.

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MOVEMENT TO MAKE COMMUNITIES 'NUCLEAR ARMS FREE'

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 4 Dec 82 pp 130-131

[Report by W.G.J. Bavelaar: "Nuclear Arms Free -- Disarming Folklore"]

[Text] The Netherlands is no longer a leading country in the nuclear arms question. Peace movements elsewhere in Europe are also starting to speak up. In our country almost 150 communities have declared themselves nuclear arms free. For the time being these are merely symbolic decisions.

During the debate on the government declaration, a thick mist of ambiguities was formed around the question of the placing of cruise missiles. Is the government indeed painstakingly continuing to work on the execution of the so-called NATO dual decision of December 1979 or not? Or is it abiding its time while awaiting Minister De Ruyter's Defense Note which is to appear in the middle of 1983? It is not clear either exactly what is to be understood by the vague concept "preparation for the placing of cruise missiles."

Three years have already passed since the placing decision, and three Van Agt cabinets have also passed. The chamber, or at least the opposition for the time being, appeared to desire clarification on the consequences of postponing or not postponing the debate on that rather sensitive question. According to former minister Hans van Mierlo of defense, NATO inspectors are going to come to our country already in January in order to look for suitable locations for the placing of the missiles. Exploratory discussions would then be held with representatives of provinces and municipalities. Then the question is whether that is considered to be "active" preparation, at which stage the Chamber should be asked for an opinion.

Government Leader Lubbers appeared to be manipulating new definitions during the chamber debate. He discovered the term "operational measures," a moment during the proceedings at which the Chamber will have the opportunity to exchange thoughts with the ministers in question. A complicated word game, which appears to be aimed at delaying crucial confrontations with the chamber still a little longer. After all, the new cabinet can't do everything at once. It is very busy filling in "income pictures," freezings, etc.; matters which now enjoy the highest priority. With respect to the cruise missiles, the Chamber will become involved again only when it comes to contracts and changes in destination plans. But those will come up

for discussion only at the end of 1983. And then in 1986, if the Geneva arms negotiations have not yielded the desired result, the cruise missiles would have to be in position in the Netherlands. For those arms discussions in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union continue to furnish the Lubbers cabinet with the needed legitimacy to postpone crucial decisions. Therefore the Netherlands said "no" to the Swedish-Mexican proposal to immediately freeze existing nuclear arms arsenals. That would be disadvantageous for the negotiations in Geneva. The Chamber was able to follow Lubbers' reasoning in that and thus, so it seems now, it will only be able to discuss the matter again when it is time to speak with municipal administrations on the actual setting up of launching installations.

About 150 municipalities have declared themselves "nuclear arms free" so far. Which means that council decisions, often initiated by peace movements, will not cooperate in the building of installations. The actions appear to be primarily symbolic; after all, the modest municipal autonomy has little power to go against the decisions of "higher" authorities who, using the term "indications," brand all that well-intentioned local deliberation in council- and town halls as disarming folklore. In some municipalities where council majorities calling themselves progressive could be recruited it was even decided to place signs with the inscription "Nuclear Arms Free Community." It started in North Holland with the municipalities Wormer and Oostzaan, later followed by Zaanstad, Amsterdam and last week also Rotterdam. In The Hague, voices are also heard to post the municipal territory as nuclear arms free. The mayor of Weststellingwerf in Friesland is even trying to have the entire province of Friesland declared nuclear arms free.

Prior to the commemoration of the massive 21 November 1981 peace march in Amsterdam, the city council of the capital debated the more profound meaning of the placing of signs at the city limits. Mayor Polk advised in vain -- "this is practicing world politics at the Madurodam [miniature] level." -- against the placing of the very promising but not very significant signs. After all, the inscription doesn't give the least assurance that Amsterdam is indeed free of the despised war implements, simply because a municipal administration does not know whether there actually are, or will be, nuclear arms within its municipal territory. Transports also escape the observation of a municipal administration.

PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] councilman Bob van Schijndel in Amsterdam once again explains the philosophy behind the sign motion which he supports: "That placing of signs is an outgrowth of a symbolic action showing that municipalities prefer not to have nuclear arms. It can be seen as an expression of the desire for peace by the majority of a municipality. We really don't have the illusion that we are keeping nuclear arms out of the city with such a sign." However, naive drivers who read such an announcement at the city limits still get the impression that such a place doesn't have nuclear arms in its territory. Van Schijndel assents to that. It is not an announcement of an actual situation but rather the indication of a desire, so he says. "The same is true for an inscription such as 'European Community.' That European unity hasn't arrived by a long ways. And the same is also true for a text such as 'Welcome to Amsterdam,' for example."

"The municipal administration has no knowledge of shipments which pass through the harbor or through Schiphol. The government simply doesn't tell about them. In brief, the action is purely symbolic, just a small component of peace politics."

Meanwhile the provincial administration of North Holland has also been looking into the signs question. The signs are not allowed to be put along provincial roads, supposedly out of traffic-technical considerations. In the coming period various official platforms will seriously look into this matter. Nationally this local initiative threatens to draw attention away from the main issues. During the parliamentary bickering about timely or untimely information of the Chamber on "passive," "active," or "operational" preparations for the placing of cruise missiles, reports appeared in the international press about new threats by the Kremlin on enlarging the nuclear arms arsenal if the United States indeed were to place 100 new MX missiles (each with 10 nuclear warheads) in the desert of Wyoming. This is actually a matter of intercontinentally launched nuclear weapon systems through which, according to Pravda, the Americans would want to achieve nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

Similar problems which keep turning up go far beyond the sign-question of North Holland townships. And apparently there is no concern about TASS publications in which there are reports of fierce attacks on a peace movement leading a wretched existence in the city of Moscow. The Soviet peace movement is having a hard time of it, and is being depicted as a club of "renegades and criminals," supported by Western secret services. The climate has not become less somber with the new party leader, Andropov.

In the European context, the nuclear arms question appears to give many a European state serious governmental headaches. The Netherlands still has managed to postpone the final decision with the new cabinet; NATO member Norway already has had considerable trouble in that respect.

With a majority of one vote, the Storting (Norwegian parliament) decided, after considerable deliberation, to make 3 million kroner (about 1.1 million guilders) available after all as a contribution for 1983 to NATO for the preparation and stationing of the Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Europe. Norway itself will not have to place anything, but it is obliged to contribute financially.

The oppositional Labor Party pleaded in vain last week to wait for the decision of the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. Formerly that party, then the government party, aligned itself behind NATO's dual decision. The Danish conservative right-of-center minority government is also having problems. Denmark also has to come up with money for NATO's "infrastructural fund" with which the preparation costs are financed. The Danish social-democratic party pleaded in 1979 for carrying out the NATO decision made at that time. But the Danish peace movement has been very active since that time. The survival of the Danish government is at stake.

In Comiso, the southeastern point of Sicily, a missile basis is to be constructed where the 112 cruise missiles assigned to Italy will be placed. At the beginning of next month the Italian peace movement is also going to campaign, through a large-scale march from Rome to Comiso. "An opportunity to give a massive appearance to pacifism."

Last weekend the peace movement in the United Kingdom, consisting of 250,000 alarmed Britons, announced it would initiate acts of civil disobedience. In an organized manner they are going to resist the British plan to station 96 missiles.

Thus there is no lack of action. "Hollanditis" has spread to the other European NATO states. The Netherlands no longer leads, but it continues to be undaunted in thinking up new plans of action. Supported by the commemoration campaigns of "1 year 21 November," the 15 peace movements announced they would hold large-scale demonstrations and actions again next year. Even the chairman of Pax Christi, Bishop Ernst van Breda, made mention of a continuation: "He who really wants detente must himself be prepared to take steps which inspire confidence and to be creative with unilateral steps by the opponent. In that manner a process must come about which changes the arms race into a process of disarmament," said the bishop.

8700

CSO: 3614/29

MOROCCO EXPECTED TO INCREASE PRESSURE AGAINST CEUTA

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 11 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by J de Dios Mellado]

[Text] DIARIO 16 has learned that Morocco will officially demand from the Gonzalez regime the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla. This demand and possible actions against these two cities, which were expected to take place in Spring 1983, are being moved up.

King Hassan of Morocco's government has already worked out a strategy to "force" its demand for the return of Ceuta and Melilla. These plans, which had been expected to be carried out next spring, are being moved up to the end of January, at the time that Spain demands sovereignty over Gibraltar.

The plans worked out by the Moroccan Government involve long-range diplomatic actions including pressure at the UN and in other high international organizations. DIARIO 16 has learned that Morocco would not reject other means for exerting greater pressure if these steps do not accomplish their objectives.

Morocco takes the position that Ceuta and Melilla are colonies and thus their decolonization must take place. To this end it will propose a plan which will include the departure in several stages of all Spaniards.

Moreover, Morocco would not accept a referendum or shared sovereignty with Spain. King Hassan's only doubt is as to how far he can go in exerting pressure before the Felipe Gonzalez government takes some sort of counter-measures.

All Moroccan political parties, including the socialist and the communist, support Rabat's policy of demanding restoration. Both the Istiqlal and the Moroccan Nationalist Democratic Party are exerting pressure at the present time on Rabat to demand the return of the two Spanish cities.

Force

However, there has at no time been any thought of resorting to any such action as the movement of civilian or military personnel so as to come to an agreement regarding sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla.

In spite of this Morocco is continuing its policy of "Moroccanizing" the area to the point that, in spite of the most recent measures of the previous government to control the settling or presence of undocumented Moroccans in the two cities, it is certain that their number will continue to increase.

At present, in Ceuta and Melilla there may easily be about 25,000 Moroccans as compared to no more than 100,000 Spaniards. This infiltration of subjects of Rabat, known in political and military circles as "the march of the tortoise," causes serious concern in military circles in these two cities which have had a long military history and through which most of the high ranking Spanish Armed Forces officers have passed.

Test

The foreign policy of the new socialist government, although directed primarily toward Europe during this first stage, does not neglect the southern flank. It is for this reason that Felipe Gonzalez first trip abroad will be to Morocco.

Socialist sources consulted by DIARIO 16 informed this newspaper that on the subject of Ceuta and Melilla there is nothing to negotiate and they will maintain a firm stand against any possible demands by Morocco.

Don Juan Carlos, King of Spain, personally has been taking this position with regard to the claims of the Moroccan monarch. This has always been the stand of the armed forces.

In Ceuta and Melilla, accustomed to the repeated demands from Rabat, they attach no importance to the increased pressure on the part of King Hassan's government nor are they fearful of a closing of the borders, another one of the possible steps which the Moroccan politicians are again coming up with.

9204

CSO: 3548/56

OBSERVER COMPARES PALME'S PRESENT RELIANCE WITH VPK TO 1970'S

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Dec 82 p 6

[Excerpts] On Friday Parliament put a stop to one of the most dramatic "terms" since the war. It began with the new Palme government's shocking devaluation and ended with the debate about the Value Added Tax (VAT). But the VAT settlement between the Social Democrats and the Left Party Communists (VPK) is not such an absolutely historic event as it is said to be.

Olof Palme's underhanded deal with Lars Werner with respect to the VAT issue is not the absolutely historic event it may seem to be at first glance. During the 1971-73 period, Palme's first government was more dependent upon VPK than it is today. And even then, VPK threatened to topple the Social Democratic government over the VAT issue.

The Social Democrats hold 166 parliamentary seats in 1982, the nonsocialist parties together 163 seats.

In 1983 VPK only has to abstain from voting for Palme to win the parliamentary votes; during the 1971-73 period, VPK had to vote for Social Democratic proposals or the nonsocialists would win.

Defense spending proposals, to no one's surprise, created the same kind of socialistic confrontation. In 1972 the Social Democrats had the great advantage of relaxed tension in Europe and wanted to block any increases in defense spending for tactical internal party reasons, among other things.

Traditionally, defense allocations have been determined on the basis of block limits. In 1972 the Social Democrats wanted a spending limit of 32,350 million kronor, the center parties raised the bid to 33,600 and the Conservatives raised it to 34,525 million kronor. For the first and only time, the Social Democrats by a chamber vote forced the adoption of its spending limit with support from the Left Party Communists. In principle, that was something new.

The 1973 election was followed by a 3-year lottery government and then 6 years of nonsocialist governments of varying colors and strengths.

In 1982 Sweden is back to a parliamentary situation where VPK represents the weight in a one-chamber Parliament.

In order for VPK to engage in blackmail politics against Palme, it must be prepared to vote with the nonsocialist parties on issues like the VAT.

It is doubtful that there will be many situations of that kind before the 1985 election. The fracas in Parliament was thus created because the Palme government in an unorthodox manner combined tax and spending proposals and because these proposals were characterized as sacred election promises.

However, the political situation will change as we are about to enter a new political year.

The result of the shocking devaluation was that the 3-year tax resolve went up in smoke and, by killing the nonsocialist savings proposals, Palme destroyed all bridges to the nonsocialist opposition.

The block concept has become more defined than ever. It is difficult to see how the cooperative climate can be restored before the 1985 election. Ullsten has said "no more settlements with Palme" and Falldin wants revenge before the 1985 election.

As a member of the opposition, Palme repeatedly stressed the need for a strong government that could govern the nation with power and authority.

The underhanded deal between Palme and Werner has clearly shown that the Social Democratic government is not quite as strong as it has led itself and the people to believe.

The likely result of the VAT debate is that Palme lost prestige on the agreement with VPK, while VPK hardly gained as many votes as it might appear from the first political excitement.

The political situation will be changed by still another factor. After 6 years of nonsocialist governments, the nonsocialist opposition is stronger and better able to fight than when it was always in sterile and frustrating opposition.

Nonsocialist party leaders and their closest coworkers have gained both useful experience and self-confidence and can press Palme harder than before.

In the name of block politics, which even Palme helped to promote, the Social Democrats will be forced to remain more sensitive to what VPK likes and thinks. The Left Party Communists really thought it was nice to be in the political limelight and is certainly thinking about trying to repeat the performance as soon as possible. But VPK should proceed cautiously considering the mood among workers.

EREL LOOKS AHEAD TO POST-MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 3 Dec 82 pp 8,11

["Telex" column by Teoman Erel: "They Do Not Want to Leave Before They Finish the Job"]

[Text] When President Kenan Evren announced that general elections will be held in October 1983, some members of the Consultative Assembly were deeply grieved.

They said: "How can we enact all the laws stipulated by the Constitution in such a short period of time?"

"What happens if you do not enact these laws?"

"That would be very bad. Since the assembly to be elected will be dominated by the political parties, the fundamental laws they will formulate would be based on political considerations."

"So what must be done?"

"If only there was some more time..."

Our friend Abbas Gokce, a member of the Constitutional Commission [of the Consultative Assembly], was very kind to bring out into the open these complaints that have been going on in the anterooms. In a statement he signed, he sincerely pointed to a problem that could arise:

"...the enactment of the political parties law before the electoral laws can be construed to have an adverse effect on the work of the Consultative Assembly. Because, as soon as the political parties law goes into effect, parties will begin to organize and Consultative Assembly members who are expected to take part in these parties may be expected to show major irregularities in their work. As a result, it may be difficult to find the necessary majority for the enactment of a good [electoral] law."

Gokce offered the following remedy for this serious problem:

"The political parties and electoral laws must be put into effect concurrently --even if that will mean postponing the elections to the spring of 1984--and the political parties law must never be allowed to go into effect before the electoral law."

We obviously respect every viewpoint that is put forth with sincerity. Naturally, we also reserve the right not to agree with that viewpoint and to criticize it. We do not agree with Honorable Gokce's views.

We think that the pretext Gokce gives for postponing the elections till the spring of 1984 rests on an unnecessary mistrust toward some members of the Consultative Assembly.

We do not believe that if the political parties law is enacted first assembly members who will enter politics will neglect their primary function of lawmaking.

Why would a person who will enter politics be so clumsy particularly when he has risen as high as the Consultative Assembly to serve his country?

That is to say, those individuals would take part and work in political parties without causing irregularities in their lawmaking functions.

A politician who hopes to become a parliamentarian must be able to show this skill all the time if he is elected to the assembly. Most of the laws in force today were prepared by parliamentarians who were members of political parties in the days when political parties were operating.

Consequently, it is not right to postpone the elections to the spring of 1984 on grounds that some members of the Consultative Assembly will neglect their work in the assembly if they are captivated by politics.

If this unwelcome possibility comes true, it will give rise to the impression that the Consultative Assembly has acted improperly on this issue, which means that the term of office of the assembly must be cut short rather than prolonged.

Let us also add that the administration that has finalized the transition schedule has thought about the possibility that the Consultative Assembly cannot complete the required work on time and has developed appropriate countermeasures.

The work to complement a major part of the laws required by the Constitution by a government decree with the power of law--on the basis of an authorization law to be enacted--has reached its final stage.

If the honorable assembly members do not think they have enough time and they do not trust themselves, they will have to transfer their authority to the government, and the issue is solved.

They have done this in the past on some very important issues; for example, they gave authority to the government on the issue of reorganizing the government simply on the basis of persuasive explanations given by the Honorable [former deputy prime minister] Turgut Ozal.

A certain amount of anxiety, concern and foot-dragging can be expected in times of transition from unusual to normal times. A pessimistic air of this kind hangs over the Consultative Assembly these days. But let us emphasize that we do not subscribe to the view that some assembly members are dragging their feet

for reasons of "not being able to guarantee the future status" or "getting too comfortable in their seats."

They have nothing to worry about if they are concerned that those who will take over their lawmaking functions will not act as patriotically and seriously as they have.

With all its gratefulness for these assembly members, this fatherland has nurtured in its bosom sons as valuable and serious as themselves.

9588

CSO: 3554/81

MAYORAL ELECTIONS SEEN AS START OF POLITICKING

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 3 Dec 82 pp 2,11

["Angle" column by Mumtaz Soysal: "Transition Order"]

[Text] The passage from unusual to ordinary times is difficult.

One of the difficulties arises from explaining the need to change the guard to people who have taken office under unusual conditions.

In Turkey, people who have come to power during unusual times are usually found in local governments. Elected mayors have almost everywhere been replaced by appointed officials. Some of these officials are impatient to return to their old jobs, which they performed efficiently before they were appointed to their present offices. But other officials, more numerous than the former group, are not so impatient to leave office since they have found an occupation in their retirement years and they feel that that occupation is compatible with their nature.

Consequently, during transition periods in Turkey, a dual difficulty is encountered particularly with respect to municipalities: On the one hand there are individuals who have never gotten accustomed to their jobs and on the other there are those who have gotten too accustomed to their office.

The dual uneasiness that this situation raises lasts until long after the general elections. That is because, in Turkey, there is the general habit of tackling the issue of local governments after the general elections. Our way of building democracy is a top to bottom process.

But is it correct?

Is it not possible to find a more logical approach which will relieve this dual uneasiness, which will make the transition easier and which will be more in step with the true meaning of democracy?

Is there not a way which will both make the job of those wanting the transition easier and make the transition look more credible, more realistic and, in particular, more in step with the Western view of democracy in the eyes of outsiders?

Is it not possible--if it is so desired--to hold mayoral elections around the beginning of next spring with municipal council elections postponed, perhaps, to a little later?

Do not rush to say: "The election system has not yet been determined; the political parties law has not yet been enacted."

There is no need to develop a special election system for mayoral positions. The traditional system in Turkey--which is also the healthiest--is the plurality-based election in which voters within the municipal boundaries participate. The candidate with the largest number of votes becomes mayor. It is as simple as that.

The setting up of full party organizations and full-steam partisanism is not necessary--particularly at this stage--to elect mayors to office. Everyone knows that a mayor's job rests more on personality than on partisanism. In every town and city everyone more or less knows who the mayoral candidates can be and their names are household words: Engineer so and so, doctor so and so, retired so and so... If you like you can include the person already in office among the possible candidates. If he wants to remain mayor he can also stand for election.

Will there not be any partisanism? Even though organizations have not yet been set up, will there not be rumors that so and so is supported by so and so? Will not the election of mayors pave the way for some political movement?

Naturally, all these will happen.

But is it too bad that all these will happen while the control and oversight measures of the emergency period are still in effect without leading to bloody tensions and divisions? Is it too bad that such a process may turn out to be a small-scale tryout on the way to a new democracy? Since by that time the necessary laws will have been enacted, is it not better to have something like this to allow parties to organize at the local level and to build their political cadres slowly starting from cities and towns?

This approach is very healthy and reassuring not only from a perspective of making the transition easier, but also from a standpoint of building a real democracy from the bottom up. The local dynamism of a changing Turkey can be the source of a new democracy just as it has been the source of the country's productivity, creativity and prosperity.

9588

CSO: 3554/81

MILITARY

SWEDEN

OFFICIAL REPORT: AT LEAST THREE SUBS INTRUDED IN HARSFJARDEN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Dec 82 pp 1, 5

/Text/ DAGENS NYHETER has learned that at least three--possibly four--foreign submarines simultaneously violated Swedish territorial waters in connection with the submarine chase in Harsfjarden. While the previously established submarine was inside the fjard, there were at least two or three submarines outside that area.

The Defense Ministry is now trying to establish the movements of these submarines while the search was in progress, most intensively in Harsfjarden.

For that matter, some investigations are continuing in the waters outside Harsfjarden.

The submarines outside the fjard moved a great deal more than the one inside. To the extent possible, the Defense Ministry wants to establish the other submarines' maneuvers in order to determine how many there were among other things. If they were fast-moving vessels, there may only have been two submarines outside Harsfjarden.

If they were slow-moving submarines, it is likely there were more than three. It has been established that there were foreign submarines within quite a large area, outside Sandhamn among other places. A couple of slow-moving submarines would be incapable of operating within such a large area, according to the Defense Ministry.

At least one of the submarines outside Harsfjarden engaged in diversionary maneuvers in order to confuse the Swedish Defense Ministry. What was believed to be an escape attempt at the end of the long chase may have been the result of such a diversionary maneuver.

8952

CSO: 3650/75

NAVAL CAPTAIN COMMENTS ON SUBMARINES' ROLE IN BALTIC

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Dec 82 p 3

/Article by Anders Ohman/

/Text/ The Soviet Union is very much interested in Sweden having sufficient sub-chase equipment to prevent foreign submarines from using Swedish territorial waters.

That is the opinion of Naval Captain and Commanding Submarine Officer Nils Bruzelius. He believes that Soviet submarines have knowingly provoked the Swedish Navy--in order to get the Swedish government to reinforce its sub-chase equipment. That would better protect the Baltic coast against NATO submarines.

"It is vitally important to the defense of the Soviet Union that Sweden, a neutral nation, be able to prevent other nations' submarines from using Swedish ocean territory. For that reason, Soviet submarines are penetrating and allowing themselves to be detected in Swedish territorial waters, knowingly provoking so as to get the Swedish government to reinforce the nation's sub-chase equipment."

This is Naval Captain Nils Bruzelius' theory after several years' experience with the Submarine Branch as commanding officer on a "Nacken" series submarine, among other things. His analysis is printed in full in the latest issue of MARIN-NYTT, which is published by the Navy.

Based on his experience as commanding submarine officer, Nils Bruzelius says it is almost impossible to detect a submarine--if it does not want to be.

He feels that espionage may be one reason foreign submarines enter the Swedish archipelagos. But why take the risk of using a submarine when it is simpler to buy a sailboat and sail unhindered into our archipelagos? Reconnaissance is being pursued more systematically from specially equipped surface vessels or planes outside Swedish territory.

Landing "Pure Fantasy"

Nils Bruzelius dismisses all theories about the landing of troops or the placement of acoustic "lights" on the ocean floor as "pure fantasy."

"What really surprises me as commanding submarine officer is that submarines are detected at all. Furthermore, it is often unqualified reconnaissance sources that do the detecting," he writes and refers to the fact that it is people on land or in boats who, for the most part, see the submarine masts.

"The only explanation I can give is simply that submarines are detected because they want to be."

Continuing with his analysis, Nils Bruzelius maintains that an invasion is considered to be the most serious threat to Sweden. Sweden's defense is designed to counter a large invasion.

The Soviet Union is not particularly interested in invading Sweden. The conceivable war would be a defensive war in Central Europe. Warsaw-Pact forces are also training for that. The Baltic would play an important role as a transportation link in this kind of a situation. Ocean transports from Leningrad and Riga to harbors in Poland and East Germany would be very important. Planes and railroads would not be able to handle it all.

This transportation link has a rather large capacity, but it must be protected. It is threatened by attacks from NATO planes, surface vessels and NATO submarines.

NATO has 30 submarines designated for the Baltic, 24 West German and six Danish. The threat from these 30 submarines could be mastered if the Soviet Baltic navy had a chance to detect, chase and combat submarines throughout the entire Baltic.

"But that they do not have. They cannot chase NATO submarines within neutral Swedish ocean territory. Furthermore, the Swedish navy and air force are altogether too strong," says Nils Bruzelius.

Six-Lane Submarine Highway

Soviet sub-chasers, helicopters etc., would certainly be rendered harmless in a short time within Swedish territory since their presence would be an act of war. Chaser-subs might be a possible solution--but the Soviet Union lacks submarines superior to the West German type 206 submarines.

"As for the Soviet Union, Swedish and Finnish territorial waters must be viewed as a six-lane submarine highway where NATO submarines can move unhindered from Oresund to Leningrad. Sweden cannot chase them away, nor can Finland, but Sweden can effectively protect NATO submarines from Soviet sub-chasers.

"If Sweden had sufficient sub-chase equipment, it would be able to stop NATO submarines along a line from Skane to Bornholm to Rugen. The NATO submarine threat in the Baltic would thus be averted."

Nils Bruzelius stresses that weak Swedish sub-chase efforts "leave the door open at the straits of Bornholm," making it impossible to protect vital ocean transports along the Baltic coast.

Even the west coast is of interest to NATO submarines.

According to Nils Bruzelius, French nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles may take up position along the west coast to safely reach targets with their missiles. By the end of the eighties they will no longer need to remain there; French submarines will then be armed with type M 4 missiles equipped with MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle) warheads, which can be accurately targeted over long distances.

8952

CSO: 3650/75

MILITARY GETTING NEW AUTOMATIC CARBINE AND SIDEARM

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Dec 82 p 5

/Article by Anders Ohman/

/Text/ A new automatic carbine, Ak 5 FNC 82--a finely calibrated high velocity weapon manufactured in Belgium--will most likely become the new weapon for Swedish soldiers. Tests have shown that it is better, less expensive and lighter than the well-tested Ak 4.

Over a 10-year period, this weapon could save the Swedish military 100 million kronor.

Those who have tested the Ak 5 met with Defense Ministry personnel on 15 September and decided to recommend that Army Chief Nils Skold purchase the FNC 82. This disclosure will be made in the next issue of VARNPLIKTSNYTT.

The new automatic carbine was tested by an armored rifle platoon at Revenged artillery range last fall. Each soldier fired 1,000 shots with this finely calibrated 5.56 millimeter weapon. The advantage of this caliber is that the ammunition is both light and inexpensive and that it recoils less upon firing.

High-velocity weapons have been subject to criticism, during the Vietnam war, for instance. When the projectile hit the human body and skin it began to rotate and caused very serious injuries. The shells in the new Swedish automatic carbine have been made more stable by greater rifling and a heavier nose.

The army's requirement has been that Ak 5 fire 1,000 shots without any interruption of fire. After some problems in the beginning, the weapon has become more reliable.



Replaces Mauser Rifle

The new automatic carbine will replace the k-pistol and the Mauser rifle, while artillery soldiers will continue to use the Ak 4. Highly mobile forces, like combat and armored units, will get the new Ak 5 and their discarded Ak 4s will replace the Army Service Corps' Mauser rifles.

The advantages of the Ak 5 are that it is lighter and less expensive, that it has a longer firing range with greater penetration and a magazine that holds 30 shells--10 more than the Ak 4.

Its durability, which is the weak point, is now being tested, not only on the artillery range but also in the laboratory, by the Defense Ministry's Equipment Division in Solna. Some 20,000 shots have been fired without any problems.

"The FNC 82 is the result of an extensive search for among all the automatic carbines in the world," writes VARNPLITSNYTT.

The cost of the FNC is 2,000 kronor each--one thousand kronor less than the Ak 4. The ammunition costs 1.25 kronor each--compared to 2 kronor each for the Ak 4.

The Belgian factory is supposed to have modified this weapon according to the wishes of the Swedish army. The first 5,000 carbines will be manufactured in Belgium and the rest on license by the FFV factory in Ekilstua. The manufacture of these weapons is supposed to employ 240 persons, but there will be no new jobs since the manufacture of Ak 4s will be terminated simultaneously. According to plans, the first Ak 5s can be delivered in 1985.

"Zero-Seven" Has Served Purpose

One of the old faithfuls, as far as defense weapons are concerned, is about to disappear, namely a black pistol dating back to 1907--referred to as the m/07 pistol in weapon language--or "zero-seven" for short.

The "zero-seven" will be phased out between 1983 and 1988 and replaced by a somewhat better and more modern sidearm. There has even been talk about doing away with it altogether. The "zero-seven" is not being used by the armed forces. For decades, dentists, doctors, orderlies and others have carried the black, well-oiled pistol in their cases. From time to time it has been fired on the shooting range.

But the pistol will now be replaced. A sidearm is needed for self-defense.

"First-aid personnel must be able to defend itself in some manner if it is assailed," said army lieutenant colonel Evert Dahlen.

The "zero-seven" has a 9 millimeter caliber, but needs special ammunition. The new pistol can use the 9 millimeter ammunition used in the Swedish k-pistol.

Three pistols and a revolver are now being tested by the Defense Ministry's Equipment Division. One of them will replace the "zero-seven."

The pistols are P 7, made by Heckler and Koch, West Germany; P 225, manufactured by SIG, Switzerland and 92 SB, made by Beretta, Italy. The revolver is named Ruger Security Six and is styled in the United States.

Revolvers are being used by the army, if only by certain air force personnel. According to Lieutenant Colonel Bo Westerlund, the revolver is easy to fire, simple, dependable and relatively inexpensive. The disadvantage is that the magazine holds only a few cartridges, about six.



"Pistols have larger magazines--up to 15 to 18 cartridges. That makes the pistol heavier and necessitates the use of two hands."

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CSO: 3650/75

END