



**STRATEGY  
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**THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY:  
WHAT'S WRONG IN THE ARMY**

**BY**

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What's Wrong in the Army?**

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## ABSTRACT

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The purpose of paper is to examine relations between the active Army and Army National Guard (ARNG) as members of the Total Army subsequent to the Total Force Policy. Relations between components have long been uneasy dating back to the founding of the nation and opposition to the idea of a large federal standing Army. However, relations have significantly deteriorated since the Gulf War in 1991 and release of the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997. Efforts to adapt to post-Cold War realities have ignited disputes between active Army and ARNG leaders causing one to question roles, missions, and the relevance of Total Army components.



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# THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY: WHAT'S WRONG IN THE ARMY?

## INTRODUCTION

The Army's motives and statements are suspect. The general consensus in the Guard is the Army wants to remove the Guard's historical combat mission, fearful that someone in Congress will decide the Army's own 10 divisions are too expensive and replaceable with Guard units.<sup>1</sup>

— Major General Philbin  
Executive Director, NGAUS

(Addressing the rift between the active Army and National Guard) The decisions we're forced to make are tough ones. I think, though, there has to be a realization that all of us are doing things differently than during the Cold War. That's the issue that we're trying to deal with: How do you get the right force structure to deal with that particular challenge and strategy?<sup>2</sup>

— General Reimer  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Since the early 1970's, policy has existed defining the integration of Service components for the conduct of our national defense and pursuit of political interests. Termed the Total Force Policy, this Department of Defense (DOD) initiative provides direction for respective Military Services and their components to work as an integrated team to achieve common goals.



This paper examines relations between the active component and Army National Guard (ARNG) as members of the Total Army subsequent to the Total Force Policy. To this end, we will conduct an historical review of the Total Force Policy including a general examination of the Total Army today. This provides the reader an appreciation for the foundation and current state of the Total Army. Following, is a discussion of key issues impacting on component relationships including initiatives proposing cultural change, restructuring of the Army and reshaping for a seamless Total Army. This paper concludes with observations regarding the future of the Total Force Policy as it pertains to the Total Army.

In sum, this paper addresses what's wrong in the Army between active and ARNG components and considerations for repair.

### **HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY**

In understanding problems faced by the active Army and ARNG, it is important to acknowledge the policy setting forth the foundation for success (or failure) of the Total Army. In this regard, the DOD relies on the Total Force Policy to integrate active and Reserve components in peacetime and in support of any contingency operation. DOD defines the Total Force Policy as,

"The totality of organizations, units, and manpower that comprise resources for meeting the national military strategy."<sup>3</sup>

This policy was adopted in 1973 to place greater reliance on the Reserves while maintaining a small active peacetime force. The Reserves were less expensive to maintain, and the need for their use in any major conflict was seen as a way of ensuring support among Americans.<sup>4</sup> General Creighton Abrams, who was the Army Chief of Staff at the inception of the policy, was instrumental in influencing Melvin Laird and James Schlesinger to adopt the Total Force option. Abram's Viet Nam experience compelled him to seize an opportunity to ensure the nation would never again go to war without the Reserves and supporting will of the American people. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John Vessey commented on Abrams efforts stating:

(Abrams) concluded that whatever we're going to do we ought to do it right...as a nation. Let's not build an Army off here in the corner someplace. The armed forces are an expression of the nation. If you take them out of the national context, you are likely to screw them up. That was his lesson from Viet Nam. He wasn't going to leave them in that position ever again. And part and parcel of that was that you couldn't go to war without calling up the Reserves.<sup>5</sup>

The net result was a policy integrating the active and Reserve forces for future military operations which by design meant a larger total force to match a limited budget. Restructuring of

the Reserves resulted in almost all combat forces in the ARNG, and the Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) in the Army Reserve.

#### **POLICY EXPANSION - IS POLICY WORKING TODAY?**

National leaders have expressed expansion of the Total Force Policy. In his report on the Bottom Up Review of 1993, Les Aspin defined the Reserves as "compensating leverage" to promote stability and security during peace operations.<sup>6</sup> In 1995, William Perry called for an integrated Total Force Policy announcing his "Increased Use Initiative" to find ways to include Reserves in the real missions of the active duty forces.<sup>7</sup> Later in 1996, Perry reiterated a need for increased reliance on the Reserves in peace operations under the Total Force Policy.<sup>8</sup>

Despite policy expansion, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) William Cohen has his concerns whether policy is working, particularly in the Army. He recently sent a policy memorandum to senior DOD leaders emphasizing increased reliance on the Reserves. In this memorandum he expressed desire to eliminate all cultural and structural barriers to effective integration of the active and Reserve components into a "seamless Total Force."<sup>9</sup> Cohen specifically stated, "I am determined to have this seamless inte-

gration that we want, a fully integrated Reserve in the Army as well as what we have in the Air Force."<sup>10</sup>

SecDef Cohen served notice the Reserves will "do more," and thus called for greater reliance on the Total Force. His stated principles aim at eliminating all barriers currently in-place. Apparently he believes the Total Force Policy is not the problem; rather service commitment (i.e., active Army and ARNG) and desire for full partnership.

Former CJCS General Shalikashvili indicated Reserve components provide the essential forces to execute our national military strategy; particularly in peace operations.<sup>11</sup> Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Fogleman considers the Total Air Force Policy a success story. In August 1997, he stated, "Our Air National Guard and Reserves are truly a force multiplier that we have made a full time partner in our day-to-day as well as contingency operations."<sup>12</sup> Current problems in the Army are more obvious when contrasted with the ease at which other services have successfully integrated Reservists with the active force.

ARNG Director Major General William Navas admits cuts in personnel, integration of active and Reserve components into the "total force" concept and the steep competition for resources, conspire to fuel tensions between active and reserve compo-

nents.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, Army Chief of Staff, General Reimer is dedicating more effort to a Total Army and has pledged to spend more time on Reserve issues and working directly with ARNG senior leaders.<sup>14</sup>

#### **THE TOTAL ARMY - CURRENT THEMES**

The Total Force Policy has been in-place since the early 1970's and met most expectations. Total Army requirements have recently been successfully met via Reserve utilization for peace operations and during the 1991 Gulf War when, "A return to use of the Reserve Components in a national emergency and was seen by many as the Total Force Policy's vindication."<sup>15</sup>

However, in view of the force drawdown and budget constraints there exists overt tension between the active Army and ARNG. Relations between components are at times dysfunctional, largely because of several themes (or assumptions):

- The active Army underestimates the political clout of the ARNG which has led to major challenges in restructuring to meet peacetime force requirements. The ARNG has exercised an excessive amount of influence in Congress to assure their primacy in the defense establishment. Lobbying efforts have at times run counter to legitimate attempts to strengthen the Total Army.<sup>16</sup>

- The active Army has failed to appreciate the intent of the Founding Fathers to maintain a limited standing Army in times of peace. Many suggest the vision of the Founding Fathers was for a militia to eliminate the need for a large standing Army. Such would ensure among other things civilian leadership and control of the military services. However, it has often been stated, the first and best reason for a strong and robust Reserve component is to provide the glue to hold society and the military together, and bring the nation to war when necessary.<sup>17</sup>

- Current Total Army command and control structure does not lend itself to a synchronized Total Army. Foremost, the Reserve component constitutes greater than 50% of the total force. This naturally makes the competition for resources difficult and more often than not contentious. Most interesting though, the Total Army chain of command is organized under common corporate leadership, but not unified under single corporate leadership. To wit, the Army Reserves are a federal force whose military chain of command directly connects the Army Chief of Staff and Chief of Army Reserves. On the other hand, the ARNG has both a state and federal role managed by a military chain of command that includes the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Director, ARNG and respective state Adjutant Generals. The ARNG reports to federal authorities

for military activities and to the state governor for domestic and civil operations. It is difficult to obtain unity of command in a Total Army when the ARNG by design maintains separate "rice bowls" (state/federal role) and levels of "corporate ownership." Furthermore, it is hard to envision an effective combat force that is not under a single command.

- Domestic considerations instead of strategic concepts created a Reserve force that today is being asked assume a greater role and do more. In spite of this, the ARNG feels "left out" of the decision making process (i.e., QDR) and as if they are not always part of the Army. Former President of the ARNG Association Major General Robert Ennslyn (ARNG-Ret) believes the Army desires to gain hegemony over the National Guard and has openly criticized General Reimer stating: "The Army Guard cries out for the Army to produce a senior general officer with vision to recognize the huge asset the National Guard is today and the potential that it has to be an even greater national treasure."<sup>18</sup>

Despite problems the active Army is experiencing in managing the force, other services seem to be quite successful. The Air Force routinely assigns their Reserves independent missions in active theaters such as Bosnia. In addition, Air Force Reserv-

ists are trained and evaluated to the same standards as active components at combat training centers such as Red Flag.

The Marines assign active duty officers to command Reserve regiments and air groups as well as instructors and inspectors responsible for Reserve unit readiness. The Navy provides opportunities for active officers to command Naval Reserve Ships. The Army recently entered into such an arrangement and assigned an active officer to command a Reserve Field Artillery battalion.

The crux of the problem is an intense active and Reserve component rivalry, particularly involving the ARNG. Resources are finite and any gains or pluses afforded to the Reserve components inevitably result in losses or minuses for the active component - thus the mistrust and bitterness. Ultimately the issue comes down to who will pay as the budget shrinks, roles and missions are altered and force structure decreases.

### **ROOTS OF DISTRUST IN THE TOTAL ARMY**

Strained relations between the active Army and ARNG are nothing new. The roots of the ARNG's distrust in the active Army dates back over a century to the founding of the nation and opposition to a large standing Army. Following the Civil War, Brigadier General Emory Upton sought reorganization of forces to centralize control and eliminate militia influence.<sup>19</sup> Near the end



of World War II, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, commander of US Army Ground Forces, advocated the elimination of the ARNG as an Army component.<sup>20</sup>

Over the years Congress passed a series of reform acts aimed at transforming and strengthening federal control over the National Guard. Most important was the 1933 Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 that established a distinction within the National Guard structure. Key to this, the National Guard of the United States was to be part of the Army's Reserve component at all times and administered under the Army rather than militia clause of the Constitution.<sup>21</sup>

Later in 1948, the Gray Report recommended the ARNG should not have a dual state and federal role. Instead, it should be placed under federal command and control in both peace and war. ARNG lobbying efforts ensured such recommendation was never made into law.

Contributing to the 1990's controversy between the active Army and ARNG was the publication of four documents: The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of 1993, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the QDR and the 1997 National Defense Panel Proposal. These documents identified contentious issues for debate between the active Army and ARNG. A review of

these documents offers insight to the current rift between components.

Reporting out in October 1993, the Bottom Up Review (BUR) took account the major changes in the world and dwindling defense dollars to examine force structure options to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. The BUR rejected proportional cuts to Reserve and ARNG force structure than had been programmed in the "Colin Powell" Base Force approach. Instead, the BUR emphasized an ARNG combat role that was defined in terms of retaining 37 brigades including 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades (ERB).<sup>22</sup>

The Roles and Missions Report addressed the contentious issue of retaining ARNG combat divisions. The report assumed ARNG divisions needed during the Cold War may no longer be relevant in current and future strategic environments.<sup>23</sup> A March 1996 GAO audit added additional "fuel to the Roles and Missions fire" recommending decreasing the size of the ARNG.<sup>24</sup>

The Quadrennial Defense Review released in May 1997 virtually caused the ARNG to "take a stand." The review concluded the U.S. no longer had the need for a large ARNG strategic reserve relative to the Cold War era. As a result, DOD approved a plan for reducing active Army force by 15,000 troops and the Reserve

component by 45,000 soldiers (38,000 from the ARNG). The ARNG challenged the decision on the basis they were "frozen out" of the top level decision making during the QDR process. Said retired Major General Edward Philbin, executive director of the National Guard Association of the United States, "The Army has a cultural bias against the National Guard."<sup>25</sup>

Army leaders later met to settle the disputed issues and agreed to apportion 17,000 cuts to the ARNG and 3,000 to the Army Reserve by the year 2000. The ARNG agreed to reduce end strength if the active Army adopted 11 basic principles for application to future Guard resourcing requirements.<sup>26</sup>

The QDR clearly exposed the core issue of force structure retention and which component retains the largest share as the Total Army adjusts to remain relevant for the future.<sup>27</sup> Because ARNG leadership strongly opposes the QDR findings, their challenges threaten survival of policy requiring a cohesive "Total Force" of all components.

The 1997 National Defense Panel (NDP) was chartered by Congress as a fact finding tool to determine the force of the future. Some suggest the role of the NDP was to gather the facts overlooked by DOD in previous reviews (i.e., Roles and Missions, QDR). In this regard, the NDP proposes to end the rift between

the active Army and ARNG, and envisions change whereby the Guard assumes a "homeland defense" role. This proposal focuses for the most part on change to Guard combat units. Such change include: ARNG CS and CSS units aligning with active division and brigades, ERB's reporting to active divisions, ARNG battalions training under the auspices of the active component, and reduction in armor units in reshaping as a more lighter and agile force.<sup>28</sup>

The NDP proposal received criticism from active component leadership as unrealistic (i.e., two MTW doctrine wrong), too narrowly focused and lacking the true picture from the field.<sup>29</sup> Support for the NDP proposal came primarily from ARNG leadership. Some on this side of the fence suggest the results of the NDP reaffirm the spirit of the Total Force Policy and the ARNG role in American society.<sup>30</sup>

#### **DISCUSSION - SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?**

Some degree of competition and selfish interest is good; however, no military or human purpose is served by the rivalries and distrust that currently exist between the active Army and ARNG. Post-war and peacetime environments have never been easy for the Army; however, the current struggle between components for personnel strength, roles and missions, and portions of the limited defense budget cries out for resolution.

The Reserve Officers Association (ROA) has articulated an intent to repair the damage between the active Army and ARNG and thus improve the effectiveness of the Total Force Policy.<sup>31</sup> There is no evidence to suggest anyone in the DOD or Army disagrees with the ROA. However, in assessing the strained relations between the active Army and ARNG, General Reimer has consistently advocated realization that change has followed the end of the Cold War. Clearly he desires what is best for the Total Army and has stated such in specific terms.<sup>32</sup>

So what is the solution to create conditions for a relevant and synchronized Total Army? Foremost, we need to recognize and put into place the Total Army basic tenets recently put forth by General Reimer. All components need to "sign up" to such tenets and place into action. We should also consider change. Such change should define a Total Army relevant to the future. To this end, the following paragraphs address a variety of options for consideration. This includes changing the culture, restructuring the Total Army, and reshaping for a seamless Total Army.

#### **CHANGE THE CULTURE**

A key element and first step to any effort to enhance the effectiveness of the Total Army is to change the culture of the team members. This is a tough task at best, highly unlikely but

worthy of discussion. This implies "influencing the beliefs, values and wishes of each component with respect to the organization, capabilities and expertise of the other."<sup>33</sup> The current lack of trust and cooperation between the active Army and ARNG is an impediment that must be eliminated if there is any hope for an effective Total Army. If we accept the premise the U.S. is moving toward a \$200-billion defense budget in the 21st century, and the Army will continue to reduce in size, then we must change the way we think.

The following "culture related" initiatives, a combination of proposals suggested by John Tillson and thoughts by the author of this paper, could improve cooperation among the active Army and ARNG. Some of these initiatives are being implemented in the ERB's, but taken as a whole challenge the breaking of current cultural barriers

- Increase active component officers assigned in an advisory capacity to ARNG units. Title X law compels the Army to support such an effort; however, we need to do more. This includes possibly eliminating assigning active duty officers to Reserve Officers Training Corps duty and instead assign these officers for duty with the Reserves. We must expand the opportunities for members of one component to serve with the other. Assigning an

active duty Army officer to command ARNG battalions should be further magnified. Such assignment opportunities should be further expanded for Reserve component units slated for early deployment to support contingency operations. Why not assign an active duty Army colonel to command an ERB?

- Change the career pattern for active duty officers and make duty with the Reserves career enhancing. The Army adjusted its officer career path to accept the realities of "joint duty." This was done to accommodate Goldwater-Nichols. Why not do the same for the Total Army and much like the Marine Corps, select active duty officers for Reserve assignments similar much as we select battalion commanders.

- Conduct integrated active and Reserve component training utilizing the National Training Center (NTC), Battle Command Training Program, etc. Division rotations to the NTC should routinely include an ERB rather than by exception.

- Implement common personnel management systems. This includes promotion and school boards, Officer Candidate Schools and the Non-commissioned Officer Educational System. With this approach the Army should take the lead in the joint world and aggressively integrate our Reserve component officers into joint duty assignments.

These initiatives aim at changing a mind-set and argue for a renewed effort for harmony and unity between components. As such, the ARNG has taken major steps in reorganizing its combat divisions to fill shortfalls in CS and CSS requirements. Supporting this effort and offering a step in the right direction is the ARNG/Active Component integrated division concept. This approach will result in an integrated active and ARNG combat division structure and present the opportunity for incorporating many of the initiatives addressed in the above paragraphs.

#### **RESTRUCTURE THE TOTAL ARMY**

The Army has restructured itself in major proportions since the end of the Cold War, and further change is on the horizon. However, some significant change toward more effective and synchronized operations among all components can be attained through consideration of three different restructuring plans. These plans, developed by retired Army officers, take advantage of component strengths and reflect the realities of a peacetime force in a constrained budget environment.

#### **Beveridge Plan**

One approach proposed by the Commanding General of the Delaware National Guard's 261st Signal Brigade, Brigadier General Reid Beveridge, is based on three assumptions. First, the re-



sults of the QDR ("active Army absorb minimal personnel cuts while the ARNG is slashed") would not receive the support of Congress. Second, based on an Institute for Defense Analyses report, it will take 94 days, not 360 days to train an ARNG combat division for deployment. Third, in his book, *Breaking the Phalanx*, Douglas Macgregor is correct in recommending the Army convert its 10 combat divisions to mobile brigade-sized units.<sup>34</sup>

Beveridge's plan provides an active force of 300,000 soldiers and about 400,000 in the ARNG. His approach saves money at the expense of the active Army. Beveridge contends this allows for the U.S. to retain superpower status and still meet the requirements of the current national military strategy during an era of a declining defense budget.

His plan is also predicated on the belief air power will "stop" most invasions and Macgregor's vision of a more deployable and mobile fighting force (brigade vice division) able to task organize and respond much like the Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept. This plan provides for a leaner force and reflects relevancy in recasting the Army for the future.

#### **Heller Plan**

A second approach proposed by Colonel (Retired) Heller restructures the Total Army into two components - a Federal Army

consisting of the active Army and U.S. Army Reserve, and a militia, the state ARNG."<sup>35</sup> Heller's two-component "Total Army Force Generation Model" is generally organized as follows:

- The active component of the Federal Army focuses on forward presence, contingency operations and Continental United States (CONUS) based support. The Reserve component operating under the same federal laws and standards (peace and war) provides support units and individual augmentees for the forward presence, contingency operations and CONUS support base missions. The active component saves manpower spaces by turning over much of the CONUS base infrastructure mission.

- Resolution of the dual state and federal role for ARNG combat units is eliminated by assigning the mission of reinforcement and reconstitution. ARNG maneuver forces would be provided a six to 12 month window of opportunity for post mobilization training. Reconstitution would initially be an ARNG responsibility until such time as the Selective Service System would mobilize. This would more realistically reflect post mobilization training and expectations in support of the Federal Force in time of a major deployment.

Heller's proposal clearly defines roles and missions and provides for a Total Army of delineated responsibilities. The role

of ARNG combat units in a state militia role is eliminated; however, combat capabilities of the ARNG are matched to an acceptable deployment schedule. It appears any increase in active component force structure is produced by transferring support missions to the Federal Reserve who would assume a greater role as a federal (and thus state) source to the likely dissatisfaction of the ARNG.

### **Hartley Proposal**

A third approach to restructuring has been proposed by Brigadier General (Retired) James Hartley, who served with the ARNG and Army Reserve until his retirement in 1988. His argument supports the contention of the 1948 Gray Report whereby the ARNG should not have a dual state and federal role. Instead, it should be placed under federal command and control in both peace and war.

Hartley's plan eliminates the state role of the ARNG based on the same problems identified in the Gray Report: "difficulty coordinating with over 50 governors, the arms length relationship between the two Reserve components that results in a lack of integrated training, cross utilization of training sites and equipment exchange."<sup>36</sup>

Hartley suggests the need for a single Federal Reserve for national defense rather than for domestic needs. He further contends state defense forces are currently active in over 30 states and thus could be equipped and trained to support any governor's domestic needs. However, some would question the Constitutional soundness of Hartley's ideas and our founding fathers desire for a militia based force.

#### **RESHAPE FOR A SEAMLESS "ONE ARMY"**

Reshaping for a seamless "One Army" should consider greater reliance on the Reserves during a period when the threat affords the acceptance of increased risk. In short, this translates to a greater investment in the Reserves at the expense of the active component. Such allows for the retention of force structure at the least possible cost.

To accomplish this requires greater trust and confidence in the Reserves that must be supported by investment. This implies among other things, more money for training to a single set of standards in order to enhance Reserve readiness and capabilities.

A "One Army Policy" implies change and redesign which foremost must support the National Military Strategy and also be acceptable to all components based on logic and void of politics and personal desires. This may require an outside agency to

evaluate, assess and make recommendations. Decisions on force mix, roles and missions are tough enough; however, some investment in "battle lab" type experiments oriented on solving the rivalry and rifts within the Total Army may be warranted.

Unfortunately reshaping the Army as a seamless "One Army" is a zero sum game. A "One Army Policy" initiative only works if all components sacrifice for "the good of the whole." Unfortunately, not everyone can agree on what constitutes the "good of the whole." The ARNG would likely accept any proposal that allows for retention of their force structure. On the other hand, the active force would find it difficult to accept greater reliance in a component which to date has not demonstrated equal abilities to deploy and support contingency operations.

### **CONCLUSION**

We need the ARNG - General Abrams was right. The ARNG is our connection to the people of America and our heritage as a nation. The men and women who proudly serve the ARNG are patriots who represent the public and receive little for their 48 days service each year. With 3,222 armories in 2,700 communities across the country, the ARNG is providing local visibility and presence as military experience has declined since the draft ended and the Total Force Policy went into effect.<sup>37</sup>

However, it seems the ARNG created self-imposed conditions adding to the current competition between components with failure of the combat brigades to deploy in the 1991 Gulf War and the ensuing "awakening" to face the issue of relevancy. ARNG contention its units cost 25 to 33 percent the cost of similar active component units misses the mark. The issue is how the Total Army remains relevant for the future regardless the cost. Thus the ARNG must accept responsibility as a member of the team and work within the Total Army - not the active Army become better integrated with the ARNG.

Indicators suggest some efforts are being made to improve relations. General Reimer now hosts quarterly meetings with state adjutants general to discuss concerns. Also, MG Navas meets weekly with the vice chief of staff of the Army to discuss ARNG issues.

Conversely, the ARNG appears to pursue it's own interests by attending DOD budget and strategy sessions (outside the Total Army team?). The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the director of the ARNG recently participated in a Defense Resource Board meeting and Defense Program Review Board. Mission requirements and budget priorities are usually established at such sessions and ultimately determine the future shape of the military.

One may legitimately ask does the ARNG represent the Total Army in such sessions?

Also disturbing and in no way assisting to bring about a Total Army team is the attitude of some in Congress. Members of the House and Senate conference committee recently drafted "tough" language for the pending defense authorization bill which appears to further "stir the pot" between Army components.<sup>38</sup>

There is also a positive spin suggesting Total Army teamwork on the horizon. A recent Army initiative to establish two new divisions whose design will feature divisional headquarters companies from the active component, and three separate ARNG ERB's has been approved by the Secretary of the Army.<sup>39</sup> Major General Navas strongly supports this plan stating, "The ARNG leadership is enthusiastic of this significant step that furthers the integration of the active and National Guard combat structure."<sup>40</sup>

Clearly, suggestions the ARNG and Army Reserve afford a cheap way to maintain national security are somewhat founded if the world were of a predictable nature. Without doubt the ARNG is a key component of our national heritage and national defense. However, only the active Army is trained and prepared to respond rapidly to threatened national interests. Instead of internal

fighting, "the ARNG, Army Reserves and regular Army should work in unison to push lawmakers for a bigger piece of the budget."<sup>41</sup>

Bottom line, we need to approach this situation much as a new head football coach approaches his job. Redesign the offense and defense to match the opponents. Create a new image and instill team first. Get rid of malcontents and treat everyone equal.

Suggest we consider reshaping the Total Army with a "One Army Policy" establishing common values, culture and views absent rivalries. Policy must be void of individual component "rice bowls" and should create conditions for unity of command. Enough is enough - both the nation and Army need a Total Army that is truly one team working together to achieve what is best for the entire organization.

WORD COUNT: 6000





## ENDNOTES

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<sup>15</sup> George E. Heller, TOTAL FORCE: Federal Reserves and State National Guards," Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, (December 7, 1994): 3.

<sup>16</sup> Charles E. Heller, "21st Century Force: A Federal Army and a Militia," ROA National Security Report, (May 1996): 23.

<sup>17</sup> William E. Barron, "Reserve Component Roles and Missions," The Officer - Reserve Officer Association National Security Report, (Sep 97): 25.

<sup>18</sup> Robert F. Ennslyn, "The Army's Civil War," Armed Forces Journal, (Sep 97): 66.

<sup>19</sup> Ennslyn, 66.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 67. McNair stated in a secret memorandum to George Marshall, "Our Constitution, in its preamble, gives to provide for the common defense as one of the six purposes of the Federal Government. It is the most vital of the six. It is not only improper, but dangerous, to share this great responsibility with the States."

<sup>21</sup> Samuel J. Newland, "Following Our Tradition: The National Guard and the American Way of War," Unpub Manuscript: 80.

<sup>22</sup> Jeffery A. Jacobs, "Guard Talks Big But Can it Deliver?," The Army Times, (3 Nov 1997): 54. The ERB concept elevated doubts about the readiness of the ARNG to go to war within 90 days. The General Accounting Office (GAO) determined in 1995 the highest priority ARNG combat units, in all likelihood, could not be ready to go to war with 90 day's post-mobilization training - even with monumental active component support.

<sup>23</sup> John P. White, Directions for Defense--Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, (Brassey's Edition 1995): 70. Report states, Reserve component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill

force shortfalls in higher priority areas. For example, the Army has eight National Guard combat divisions with approximately 110,000 personnel spaces what were required for possible war with the former Soviet Union, but are not needed for the current national security strategy...The SecDef should verify this shortfall and direct the Army to restructure its combat division to provide the additional support forces needed.

<sup>24</sup> Newland, 73. This GAO audit states: "The Guard's eight combat divisions and three separate combat units are not required...although the Guard has come down in size, our analysis shows the combat forces may still be too large for projected war requirements.

<sup>25</sup> Weible, 26.

<sup>26</sup> No Author, "Off-Site Agreement Collapses Over Misunderstanding Between the Army and Army Guard," National Guard, (Nov 97): 12. Sara Lister stated, "The 11 principles submitted by the ARNG during the off-site were, aside from those requiring specific resourcing, agreed to in principle. Determination of their future use must be based on a realistic assessment of the ability of the Total Army to assimilate and resource them.

<sup>27</sup> John G. Roos, "View From The Top," Armed Forces Journal, (October 1997): 24. Army leaders conceded coordination with the ARNG during the QDR could have been better. General Reimer noted, "Over time, but particularly during the past six months, we've done the negotiations on the QDR and tried to keep the Army balanced, issues have come between us. We've taken different approaches to these issues and a rift has developed...I am the Chief of Staff of the Total Army and I want to bring all components together and leverage the great strength and capabilities that each component has."

<sup>28</sup> Jack Weible, "Panel Wants Feud to End Between Army, Guard," The Army Times, (15 Dec 1997): 4.

<sup>29</sup> No Author, "Expand Guard's Duties - It Can't do its Main Job," USA Today, (15 December 1997): 22. The active duty argument suggests, "Granted, the nation's governors and the ARNG itself would love to protect the Guard's bloated ranks by assigning it more peacetime duties. But the proposal from the NDP, char-

tered by Congress to critique Pentagon planning, ignores a basic fact - the Guard isn't even performing its number one job of providing the Army with combat-ready back-up troops in the event of a war."

<sup>30</sup> No Author, "Guard Ready to Serve," USA Today, (15 December 1997): 22. The argument on the ARNG side goes, "The Guard delivers the best peacetime defense for the American tax dollar. A typical guardsman is paid, trained and equipped for less than one-fifth the cost of an active-duty soldier. Greater reliance on the Guard would allow the cash-strapped Pentagon to invest in 21st century technology. It would enable Congress in time of relative peace, to shift resources to the domestic agenda."

<sup>31</sup> Barron, 26. ROA states, "We recommend the SecDef develop comprehensive plans to eliminate artificial barriers between the regular and Reserve components....The objective is a seamless, integrated and cohesive military that includes a better balance between regular Reserve component values, views and forces that is true today which achieves greater mutual respect and harmony among the service."

<sup>32</sup> Roos, 24. General Reimer states, "In my mind the issue is not that the Army is giving any one component less resources than their fair share. The issue is that the Army is not getting as many resources as it should to do the job we've been asked to...The bottom line is I'm going to make every effort to reach out and incorporate all the components to make the Total Army as ready as we can, because that is what the nation needs."

<sup>33</sup> John C.F. Tillson, "Improving the Management of Reserve Forces," Joint Force Quarterly, (Summer 1997): 40.

<sup>34</sup> Reid K. Beveridge, "Breaking the Mold," Armed Forces Journal International, (October 1997): 50. Beveridge suggests the Total Army can accomplish its mission with fewer personnel and greater unity of effort by reorganizing as follows: (1) Retain three active Army light divisions: one in Germany, Korea and the U.S., (2) Reorganize the Army into 20 of the combined arms brigades proposed by Douglas Macgregor, a total of about 100,000 soldiers, (3) Retain Army Reserve CS and CSS units at no fewer than 200,000 soldiers, (4) Retain eight ARNG combat divisions (four heavy, three medium and one light), and (5) Organize two

additional ARNG combat divisions composed of active Army and ARNG staff, and leadership.

<sup>35</sup> Heller, 26. According to Heller, "This structure returns the roles and missions of each component to its Constitutional authority. Thus reflecting the strengths of each component, the U.S. military tradition and the realities of a constrained budget." In his plan, Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees and individual Reservists replace active duty soldiers in numerous CONUS assignments. Specific support missions transfer from the active to Army Reserve saving more than 47,400 active spaces worth almost \$1.2 billion. Also, in his plan, active Army divisions would receive roundout Reserve units along the lines of the USMC model.

<sup>36</sup> Charles E. Heller, "The State Militia," ROA National Security Report, The Officer, (May 1996): 33

<sup>37</sup> Graham, 2.

<sup>38</sup> MG Richard Alexander, "Presidents Message - A Cautious But Positive Progress Report," National Guard, (November 1997): 4. Congressional language includes, "The Secretary of Defense must ensure the Army does not treat the ARNG in a cavalier manner, ignoring valid requirements and intentionally under resourcing the ARNG."

<sup>39</sup> Tranette Ledford, "Two Integrated Divisions to be Established," The Army Times, (15 December 1997): 3.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>41</sup> Eric Bailey, National Guard Struggles with Shortages, Cuts," Los Angeles Times, (November 24, 1997): B-1.



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