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ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA 1945-55

Beijing MEIGUO YANJIU [AMERICAN STUDIES] in Chinese Vol 1 No 1, Spring 87 pp 40-68

[Article by Wang Jisi [3769 4874 1835]: "U.S. China Policy a Result of Misperceptions"]

[Text] The China policy of the United States underwent radical changes in the decade between 1945 and 1955. The vacillating decision-making process of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, the inconsistencies of their policy statements, the heated debate on the China question both inside and outside Congress, the wide variety of policy proposals and intelligence analyses put forward by U.S. officials, and sensational reports on China in the media all fully pointed up the complexity and multilevel nature of U.S.-Chinese relations and provides many attractive research topics for historians and political scientists in both nations.

On the face of it, the objective of America's China policy in 1944 ran counter to those of 1945. In 1945, the United States said "it wanted to see a powerful China." In 1955, on the other hand, it sought to contain, isolate, and weaken China. Both objectives were put forward explicitly and both were undisputed within the ruling circle in the United States. The turning point was the creation of new China, which ended the American dream of setting up a powerful China in accordance with its own design and signaled the failure of the longstanding U.S. effort to control China's destiny. Henceforth, the policy aimed at weakening China remained in place for over 2 decades until the United States again recognized that a strong China was consistent with its interests.

This article reviews the China policy of the United States in the first 10 years after World War II, emphasizing the impact of U.S.-Chinese relations in this period on the future China policy. It proposes to analyze from three perspectives--the international strategic setup, conflicting interests between the United States and China, and U.S. domestic politics--the major elements in the United States that shaped its China policy, the external changes of the policy, its intrinsic continuity, and the basic ideology and values of the United States in handling its relationship with China. These elements and values have had far-reaching influence for many years and even today.

1. The U.S. Strategy in East Asia and the Soviet Factor

U.S. power in the Pacific and East Asia expanded rapidly and reached a peak in China in the first half of the 20th century. Before 1945, U.S. expansion was thwarted by Japan and checked by such powers as Britain, Russia (and, subsequently, the Soviet Union.) After the defeat of Japan in the war, however, U.S. troops were stationed all over the Pacific and found a foothold in China and Korea. To U.S. expansionists, "there is now the prospect of the entire Pacific becoming some kind of Hawaii." (Footnote 1) (Franz Schurmann: "The Logic of World Power," Penguin Press, 1974 edition, p 166) Indeed the U.S. had drawn up a plan during the Pacific War to occupy Asia and parts of the Pacific and intended to carry it out as soon as Japan was defeated. (Footnote 2) (Akira Iriye, "Was there a Cold War in East Asia?" in "The Problems and Prospects of American-East Asian Relations," edited by John Chay. Western Viewpoint Publishing House, 1977 edition, p 14) It was exactly this kind of war plan calling for the subjection of Japan to strict U.S. guardianship and the elevation of China, its wartime ally, to the position of a power under U.S. control that set the tone for America's postwar China policy.

The "Yalta Agreement" concluded in February 1945 was a grand design born of U.S.-Soviet compromise to rebuild international order. It drew up a sphere of influence for each nation in East Asia. Henceforth the Soviet Union would be content to maintain the rights and interests it obtained at Yalta. George Kennan, the U.S. diplomat, said with good reason that Soviet policy during this period was "a flexible and imaginative policy aimed at taking on the minimal obligations in return for the maximum rights in the Asian continent outside Soviet Asia." (Footnote 3) (Quoted in Harold C. Hinton: "Three and a Half Powers," Indiana University Press, 1975 edition, p 32) Franklin Roosevelt and his special envoy to China, Hurley, had banked on Soviet cooperation in setting up a coalition government in China to be headed by Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, after winning the war of resistance against Japan, both the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to avoid the outbreak of a large-scale civil conflict in China. In August 1945, just when Hurley was mediating between the Kuomintang [KMT] and the Communist Party of China [CPC], Stalin directly cabled the CPC Central Committee. The gist of his message was this: Your party should maintain domestic peace and must not continue the civil war, otherwise there is a danger that the nation would be destroyed. (Footnote 4) (Xiang Qing [0686 7230]: "Collected Works on the Relationship between the Communist International and the Chinese Revolution," Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1985 edition, p 231) This was the international background behind Mao Zedong's trip to Chongqing to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek.

As the cold war between the United States and Soviet Union intensified in Europe, the American hopes of turning China into a power became a specific strategy. Marshall's mission to China was related to the cold war. Its purpose was not so much to "help the KMT establish authority in China over the largest area possible" as to expand U.S. influence in China to offset Soviet influence. (Footnote 5) (Dean Acheson's letter to Truman. See "The China White Paper," Stanford University Press, 1967 edition, p 11) As for the extent of Soviet involvement in Chinese politics and whether it was actively

aiding the CPC, these were not primary concerns in U.S. strategic thinking. The U.S. hung on to China because of the global expansionist strategy it had adopted with the battle cry of "checking Soviet expansion." That the pro-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-CPC policy of the United States became more pronounced after civil conflict broke out in China resulted inevitably from its global strategy. As a 1948 report by the National Security Council made clear, "The basic long-term goal of the United States in China is to encourage a stable representative government at the head of an independent, united China that will be friendly to the United States and can check possible Soviet aggression in the Far East. Given the chaotic situation in China, the primary feasible goal in the short run is to prevent the CPC from overrunning China." (Footnote 6) (U.S. Department of State, "Documents on Foreign Relations of the United States," (abbreviated hereafter as the "Documents,") 1948 Vol 8, p 45)

The basic premise of the United States regarding Sino-Soviet relations during the civil war was that a "China under communist rule would ally itself closely with the Soviet Union politically, economically, and militarily." (Footnote 7) ("Documents," 1947 Vol 7 p 287). In 1948, however, Tito broke with Stalin, which gave rise to American hopes that a similar schism would occur between China and the Soviet Union. Document 48/2 of the National Security Council approved by President Truman in December 1949 proposed that the United States "exploit all differences between China and the Soviet Union and between Stalinists and other forces in China." (Footnote 8) (Quoted in "The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1950: the Question of Rapprochement and Recognition," The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1973 edition, p 5) A delegation from the CPC and the Chinese government led by Mao Zedong visited the Soviet Union for 8 long weeks starting 16 December. The U.S. State Department thought this was the most promising time to sow discord between the two communist nations. John Davis of the Policy Design Committee predicted that Soviet "blackmail" might combine with China's own economic difficulties to produce "divisions in the leadership and coup plots." (Footnote 9) ("Documents," 1950, Vol 6 pp 305-306) Clearly, it was no accident that all key policy statements by the U.S. Government at this time avoided directly attacking the CPC. But developments in China, particularly the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty in February 1950, bitterly disappointed U.S. officials who now ruled out the possibility of the appearance of a "Titoist tendency" in China.

The U.S. position on and policy toward the Chinese civil war left no room for the development of normal U.S.-Chinese relations. It should be said that U.S. actions to a large extent brought about the last thing America wanted--a close Sino-Soviet alliance. It is said that some passages in Dean Acheson's China White Paper and the address by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk in which he described China as a "Slavic Manchukuo" were designed to stir up anti-Soviet nationalist feelings among the Chinese. (Footnote 10) (Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs ed., "Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-50," Columbia University Press, 1980 edition, p 21) But this kind of derogatory talk by American officials that dismissed China as a Soviet vassal state was counterproductive. On the other hand, other plans to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, such as recognition of new China and the development of bilateral trade, were never carried out.

By early 1950, a new scenario had appeared--a Sino-Soviet alliance, the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the consolidation of the revolutionary regime in North Korea. The U.S. Government began reassessing the situation in Asia and came to the conclusion that a "monolithic communism dominated by Stalin" prevailed there. The bipolar situation in Asia prompted Truman to link his Asian policy more closely to U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Europe. NSC-68 adopted by the National Security Council in April 1950 globalized the country's cold war strategy and lumped together communist parties everywhere, labelling them a threat to the United States without making any distinction among them. As its hostility toward the new China deepened, the United States beefed up military deployments in the Western Pacific. Although the U.S. Government at one point considered not taking military actions to prevent the CPC from invading and occupying Taiwan, this policy came under review by the summer of 1950. As some U.S. scholars have pointed out, U.S. decision-makers had drawn up a new Asian blueprint even before the Korean War broke out with the intent of setting up a regional military grouping to take on the Asian communist movement. U.S. armed intervention in Korea dovetailed nicely with this new strategy. (Footnote 11) (Akira Iriye: "Contemporary History As History: American Expansion into the Pacific since 1941," in "Pacific Historical Review," May 1984, p 202) In this light, it is not difficult to explain why the United States jumped to the conclusion that the military conflict in Korea was an act of "international aggression," instead of admitting that it was an internal conflict within Korea.

After Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War, U.S. officials still failed to distinguish between Chinese and Soviet interests. They believed that it was at Soviet behest that China launched the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and that the Korean cease-fire agreement in 1953 was an indirect consequence of Stalin's death. In reality, however, the main target of U.S. containment policy in Asia had gradually shifted from the Soviet Union to China since the early 1950's as China's political status in Asia improved. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers realized that China must not be portrayed as a mature international force. If they admitted that China was independent and acted on its own, it would weaken America's own rationale for refusing to recognize the PRC. Back in 1949, Dean Acheson had put forward three conditions for U.S. recognition of China. (The new government must effectively control the territory it claimed to be under its rule, acknowledge its international obligations, and govern with the consent of the Chinese people.) (Footnote 12) (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker: "Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949-1950," Columbia University Press, 1983 edition, p 192) During the Korean War and for a long time afterwards, the three conditions were replaced by one, namely whether or not China should be regarded as independent of the Soviet Union. To justify "nonrecognition," the United States had consistently sought to manipulate public opinion and accused the leadership of new China of imposing "alien rule" on an "intimidated Chinese public by force."

Despite the heavy blow the United States suffered on the Korean battlefield and its hue and cry over the Chinese "threat" to American security, Europe remained more important than Asia in America's global strategy. During the Korean War, the focus of U.S. military buildup and war preparations was to

step up military strength on its own soil and in Europe. The United States accorded Europe a more important strategic position not only because it was economically more developed, but also because Asia lacked a regional military bloc similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]. The United States hoped that the peace treaty signed with Japan in 1951 would be the anchor of its evolving regional strategy in East Asia and planned to groom the potential economic power, Japan, to rein in China. Nevertheless, other pro-American political forces in East Asia were faltering to varying degrees in the early 1950's. The United States was deeply troubled about the unstable situation and expanding Chinese influence in the region. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization [SEATO], created in Manila in September 1954, embodied the effort by the Eisenhower Administration to organize military forces in Southeast Asia under America's wing. It was the U.S. plan to build a defense line in Southeast Asia to link up with the defense lines in the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula to form three front bases for containing China.

U.S. strategists were not content to limit themselves to the string of bilateral military agreements they had signed with countries in the Asian and Pacific area or with SEATO, which had only one member in Southeast Asia. They wanted to turn strategic points in this region into a network, a more complete anticommunist circle of containment. The forewords to the military treaties with the Philippines, South Korea, and Australia and New Zealand all mentioned the need to establish a "more comprehensive regional security system in the Pacific." To carry out this strategic plan, the United States must solve the Indochina problem.

World War II had barely ended before the United States tried to expand its influence in Indochina in the name of containing the Soviet Union. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, the United States intensified its intervention in Indochina, again with the aim of building up the region as a bulwark against advancing Chinese communism. By then the "domino theory" had been born. The establishment of the Vietnam Democratic Republic and the outbreak of the Korean War further validated the argument of some American strategists that Indochina might become a battlefield in the "communist offensive to control Asia." In 1951, John Foster Dulles warned of a communist "plot" to "win wars and create disturbances from Korea through China to Indochina, Malaysia, the Philippines and west to Tibet and the borders between Burma, India, and Pakistan." (Footnote 13) (U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 1951, Vol 24, p 484) During the Korean War, many U.S. officials considered Indochina far more critical strategically than Korea. (Footnote 14) (Russell D. Buhite: "Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-54," Oklahoma University Press, 1981 edition, p 212) Accordingly the U.S. increased aid to France continuously. In the spring of 1954, as French troops were being routed at Dienbienphu, the United States was already paying 80 percent of the costs of the war France was fighting in Vietnam.

Although Eisenhower admitted there was no "conclusive evidence that Red China was openly involved in the Indochinese conflict," (Footnote 15) (Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Mandate for Change 1953-56," Doubleday Publishing House, 1963 edition, p 340) he at one point went along with the proposal by John Foster Dulles, his secretary of state, and (Lei Fu De), chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, to send troops to Indochina (Footnote 16) (Richard J. Barnet,

"Intervention and Revolution," Palladian Publisher, 1968 edition, p 195), bomb Chinese bases and lines of communications, and even "attack offshore islands along the Chinese coast, eg., Hainandao, from land and sea." (Footnote 17) ("Mandate for Change," p 104) Dulles's "massive retaliation" strategy was exactly aimed at China. He threatened, "The dispatch of Chinese troops to Indochina may mean a war on Chinese soil." (Footnote 18) ("China: U.S. Policy since 1945" in Congressional Quarterly, 1979, p 101)

Similar to its calculations regarding the Soviet factor when it first decided to intervene more extensively in China's internal affairs, U.S. Indochinese strategy was not posited on any conclusion that the Soviet Union or China was already deeply involved in Indochinese affairs. What was more important was their assumption that the success of the Vietnamese Revolution would benefit the Soviet Union and China and signify the bankruptcy of the U.S. policy of containing China.

The United States held back from directly intervening in Indochina out of three considerations. First, some U.S. officials were concerned that the use of U.S. troops to help the French militarily might force China to send units to support Vietnam. Second, the Korean War, which was not popular with the American public, was still a fresh memory. Third, Britain advised the United States not to drag the West into another Asian war. The U.S. government itself also worried that allies and world opinion might respond unfavorably to any risky move on its part.

In view of the U.S. evaluation of the strategic importance of Indochina, the growing tendency in the American ruling clique to rely on force in foreign affairs, the unwavering faith of the Chinese leadership, America's nemesis, in revolution, and its serious concern for national security, there was every reason to conclude that but for the Korean War, the United States and China might have clashed militarily near China's southern border.

Only when the establishment of SEATO became a certainty did the United States reluctantly accept the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina. Apart from the hidden crisis in Indochina, the Eisenhower Administration considered the overall strategic situation in East Asia in the mid-1950's to be favorable to America and hoped to consolidate it by strengthening relations with allies in the region and shoring up the dominant positions of anti-Communist Asian regimes within their own countries. It was not without a measure of satisfaction that Dulles called SEATO the "Monroe Doctrine" of Asia when it was founded. (Footnote 19) (Ibid., p 104) Earlier, Robertson, assistant secretary of state for the Far East, had admitted that the U.S. objective in East Asia was to maintain "its dominant position." (Footnote 20) (Quoted in O. Edmund Clubb: "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955," in Political Science Quarterly, December 1959 No 4, p 520)

The U.S.-Soviet relationship in East Asia in the mid-1950's was in a way similar to that in the 1940's, both tacitly recognizing the other's sphere of influence. The Soviet Union was still preoccupied with subjugating Eastern Europe and, like the United States, was content to keep the status quo for the time being. In East Asia, China and the Soviet Union drew closer to each other in the 1950's, but their strategic interests remained markedly

dissimilar, as demonstrated by the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954-55. In January 1955, the Soviet Union tabled a resolution at the United Nations which called on "all parties to avoid acts of hostility in the area around Taiwan." This in effect limited China's freedom to take military action within its own jurisdiction. (Footnote 21) (John Gittings: "The World and China 1922-72," (Ai Li Mi Xiu En) Publishing House, 1974 edition, p 109) By liberating its offshore islands, China demonstrated to the world its determination to solve the Taiwan issue. Later in 1955, it also played an active role in the Bandung Conference, which was objectively a challenge to the understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States on maintaining the status quo in East Asia. These two historical facts and the subsequent ambassadorial talks between China and the United States further underlined the independence of Chinese diplomacy. From then on, the development of U.S.-Chinese relations moved even further from the orbit of U.S.-Soviet relations. After the four-power summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, the cold war between the United States and Soviet Union began to thaw, but U.S. hostility toward China remained unchanged.

As far as American perceptions of the Sino-Soviet relationship is concerned, Dulles, like Acheson, (and unlike Rusk, Robertson, (Lei Fu De) in the military, and others) privately recognized that the Chinese leadership maintained "a certain independence" from Moscow. But he believed that the most effective way to bring about a Sino-Soviet split was to "exert the greatest pressure on the Chinese people, instead of easing it." (Footnote 22) (Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis: "Strategies of Containment," Oxford University Press, 1982 edition, p 143. Robertson did not see the possibility of a Sino-Soviet split. See Sulzberger: "Four Decades of Turbulent Change in Seven Continents," Tianjin People's Publishing House, 1979 edition, p 299) This high-handed policy toward China was consistent with the position of Truman and Acheson following the outbreak of the Korean War (Footnote 23) (Harry Truman: "Memoirs," Doubleday Publishing House, 1956 edition, Vol 2, p 403) and reflected a longstanding guiding philosophy among American policy-makers.

2. The Conflict Between U.S. Policy and Chinese National Interests

If postwar American expansionism in Asia and the Pacific and U.S.-Soviet rivalry were the main driving force behind U.S. China policy, then the conflict between the United States and China was the consequence of that policy. As long as the United States refused to abandon its hegemonistic designs in East Asia, it could not possibly avoid interfering in China's internal affairs. America's deep entanglement in Chinese politics was a product of its global foreign policy. But the former also impacted the latter, prompting the ruling circle in the United States to change its China policy endlessly, thereby affecting American foreign policy as a whole.

In the first postwar years, the United States hoped that China would rise as a pro-American power and be the policeman of Asia, a role that was closely related to America's plan for internal Chinese politics. To play this role, China should become a "truly liberal democratic" state--as defined by the United States, of course. Both Hurley the mediator and Marshall the envoy declared that their goal was to promote democracy in China through the establishment of a coalition government. Before civil war finally erupted,

not a few American officials compared the KMT-CPC struggle to two-party politics within the United States itself. They believed that the two major political parties in China should check and balance each other as the two parties did in the American political system, but only with the United States acting as the arbitrator above. The United States, they argued, should put pressure on the KMT and, through it, the CPC, to create a two-party political system that would satisfy the Americans that it was headed in the direction of democratization.

U.S. leaders had little real sympathy with Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship. However, swayed by strategic considerations described above and ideological prejudice, the United States sided with Chiang against the CPC in China's civil war. Thus the expediency of preventing the CPC from seizing power buried the ideals held by some Americans about "democratization" in China. As their fantasy of "reshaping" Chinese politics in the American and European image faded, American officials tried to do the next best thing: reforming the KMT internally. When this effort proved futile, their last resort was to change horses and forced Chiang Kai-shek to step down. As for the CPC, U.S. officials never entertained any hopes of reforming its internal structure. This was because other than attacking the CPC through the KMT, the United States had no political leverage on it and was therefore unable to impose its political demands on its leadership. Moreover, as the 1940's drew to a close, the idea that the CPC consisted of mere "land reformers" and "nationalists" had fewer and fewer believers. The image of the CPC as a group of "true communists" was then well established. The United States could only hope to prevent Chinese communist forces from expanding by any means possible and encourage a "break between the so-called Titoists and Stalinists."

When its effort to prevent the CPC from seizing power nationwide ultimately failed, the U.S. State Department for a while did hope to establish some kind of normal contact with the new Chinese government, but there was no evidence to suggest that top U.S. leaders seriously considered severing ties with the KMT regime before its demise. In the debate in the United States over the recognition of the new China, few people raised this question: As long as the United States continued to regard the KMT regime as the Chinese government and deal with it, would the new China accept U.S. "diplomatic recognition?" U.S. officials seemed to imagine that once the United States, in its magnanimity, extended its hand of recognition, the CPC would rush to embrace the offer.

Led by Acheson, U.S. State Department officials were aware of the advantages of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. They hoped that through contacts with the leaders of new China, the United States would be able to keep its foothold on the mainland, gradually restore its influence, and set China against the Soviet Union. But they consistently underestimated the CPC's strength and determination to maintain its independence. In 1949, Huang Hua [7806 5478] said in Nanjing that China was willing to receive (Si Tu Lei Deng) in Beijing. This and other events and rumors in the same year gave Americans the wrong impression that the CPC and some other leaders had favors to ask of Washington from a position of weakness. They concluded, therefore, that the United States should continue to put pressure on the CPC to force it to soften its attitude toward the United States. U.S. officials reckoned also that the new China, unable to clean up the economic mess left by the old

regime, would sooner or later turn to the West for help. (Footnote 24) (Robert M. Blum: "Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia," Norton Publishing Co., 1982 edition, p 171) They theorized that with no large-scale assistance from the Soviet Union, diplomatically isolated, and subject to an economic blockade by the United States and the West, the Chinese revolutionary regime would be forced to change its domestic and foreign policies, even if it managed to survive.

The United States paid a price for this policy: its influence was all but eliminated from the Chinese mainland. From then on, what little contacts there were between U.S. officials and the CPC during the civil war came to a halt and the United States ended up with even less of an objective basis for determining the new Chinese leadership's foreign policy intent.

In the early part of the Korean War, the United States intended to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula militarily without provoking a direct confrontation with either the Soviet Union or China, a policy that was said to "remove public doubts and show resolve and strength." (Footnote 25) (Allen S. Whiting: "China Crosses the Yalu," Stanford University Press, 1960 edition, p 171) Through public statements and third countries, the Truman Administration guaranteed to China that the United States had no intention of invading it. But Chinese leaders found American guarantees untrustworthy: From the Hurley and Marshall missions to America's military blockade of the Taiwan Straits in violation of Truman's pledge in January 1950, American policy statements often contradicted one another and were no longer credible. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, the U.S. promise relayed through Britain and India that U.S. troops would halt their northern advance was sheer deception. (Footnote 26) ("Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Part II" People's Publishing House, 1984 edition, p 52) The United States succeeded in neither making China believe its promises nor cowing it into submission.

The war of nerves and trial of strength between the United States and China during the Korean War showed that U.S. policy-makers always assumed that Chinese leaders thought, reasoned, and made policies the way they did. They either dismissed the clear and unequivocal Chinese warnings as so much "bluffing" or imagined that China could be intimidated by force. American misjudgments were mainly caused by overconfidence in its own military prowess, especially its air superiority, and its fetish with the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons. Both Eisenhower and Dulles thought that it was primarily American threats to drop nuclear bombs on China that brought the Korean War to an end. (Footnote 27) (Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke: "Deterrence in American Foreign Policy," Columbia University Press, 1974 edition, p 241) Yet the result of the Korean War exactly demonstrated that when China believed its own security was seriously threatened, it was capable of and had the courage to defeat superiorly-equipped U.S. troops. Tang Tsou, a famous scholar, pointed out, "Ironically the Korean War marks the partial realization of President Roosevelt's wartime policy of turning China into a power." (Footnote 28) (Tang Tsou: "America's Failure in China 1941-1950," Chicago University Press, 1963 edition, p 589)

U.S.-Chinese antagonism in the Korean War in a sense clarified and embodied the nature of U.S.-Chinese relations at the time. During World War II, the conflict between U.S. expansionist dreams in Asia and the demands of Chinese national liberation was muted by the presence of a common enemy, Japan. In the late 1940's, this conflict manifested itself in U.S. intervention in China's internal affairs, but since the KMT regime, which claimed to represent Chinese interests, threw in its lot with the United States and since the U.S. policy of opposing the Chinese revolution was heavily ideological, the nature of this contradiction was not fully revealed. Even right before Chinese and U.S. troops met face to face in Korea, the Truman Administration was still doing its best to portray the Soviet Union, not the United States, as the greatest threat to Chinese independence after Japan and a common enemy to both China and the United States. (Footnote 29) (Robert Blum: "The United States and China in World Affairs," McGraw-Hill, 1966 edition, p 113) After the CPC seized power nationally, however, the Chinese revolutionary interests it represented clashed head-on with the U.S. strategy of containing China. As Chinese national consciousness and revolutionary spirit soared to a historic high, military buildup and expansionism in the United States also reached a peak. When the Korean War broke out, these new phenomena in the two countries as well as their conflicting interests exploded overnight into a war of nerves and a trial of strength on a large scale. This struggle between China and the United States was inevitable. What was accidental was its timing, location, and form.

The Korean War scarred U.S.-Chinese relations, but it was relatively short-lived. In contrast, the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to blockade the Taiwan Straits transformed the Taiwan issue into the most serious and long lasting political dispute in bilateral relations. Actually, for some time both before and after new China was founded, the United States had been scheming to detach Taiwan from China. (Footnote 30) (Zi Zhongjun [6327 0022 4596]: "The Test of History" in "International Studies," 1982 No 3) U.S. policy-makers bent on this course of action found an excuse and an opportunity to encroach on Taiwan in the Korean conflict.

From both the Chinese and U.S. perspectives, the Taiwan issue included two aspects: politics and territorial integrity. As far as the CPC was concerned, that Taiwan remained an outstanding issue suggested that the revolution had not been a total success. The U.S. blockade of the Taiwan Strait and its plot to create "two Chinas" constituted an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity. If the Taiwan issue was resolved, the great cause of national unification would be achieved politically and in terms of territorial integrity. One way to bring about unification was to negotiate with the KMT regime, but the idea of Taiwan territorial integrity as put forward by the United States left no room for negotiation.

To the ruling circle in the United States, Taiwan was politically important because the KMT's fortunes were linked to U.S. domestic politics in a thousand and one ways. And protecting the Taiwan authorities was a symbol of U.S. will to "oppose world communism." Moreover, Taiwan's strategic position was pivotal to maintaining the U.S. foothold in the western Pacific. When the two considerations--using Chiang Kai-shek to serve U.S. political aims and continuing to occupy Taiwan for strategic purposes--proved to be incompatible

with each other, the United States often gave priority to the latter. In the 1950's, American policy-makers believed that it would be in United States' best long-term interests and help reconcile the political and strategic considerations mentioned above to keep up the political and military pressure exerted by Taiwan on the mainland and deny that Taiwan was part of Chinese territory. While the U.S. Government never formally announced a "two Chinas" policy, in reality it had always deliberately sought to make the territorial division between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan permanent.

In 1954-55, nevertheless, the U.S. Government realized the complexity of the Taiwan issue and was unwilling to play up Taiwan's "international status." Instead it chose to take an ambiguous position on the sovereignty of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. That way it avoided driving the Chiang Kai-shek regime into a tight corner, while giving themselves some room to maneuver in the future regarding the Taiwan issue. As noted above, the U.S. strategic goal in East Asia in this period was to consolidate its foothold and maintain the status quo. Thus it wanted both Chinese leaders and the Taiwan authorities to accept the break-up of China as a fait accompli. As Eisenhower privately noted, "As for the Formosa issue, I really hope it is as simple as drawing a line and saying, 'Thus far and no further.'" (Footnote 31) (Eisenhower's letter to (Wen De Mai), 28 February 1955. Central White House Archives, Box 28, Eisenhower Library.)

The existing state of national division was unacceptable to the Chinese leadership. In September 1954, the CPC Central Committee put the mission of liberating Taiwan on the top of its agenda, reasoning that it would be a grave political error not to do so. (Footnote 32) (Wang Bingnan [3769 0014 0589]: "Nine Years of Chinese-U.S. Negotiations in Retrospect," in SHIJIE ZHISHI, 1984 No 24, p 23) Eight months after tension began in the Taiwan Straits, Zhou Enlai took the initiative at the Bandung Conference to propose to the United States that they sit down and talk. After some hesitation, Eisenhower and Dulles softened their rhetoric and agreed to negotiate with China. They sincerely hoped to reach some kind of compromise with the Chinese leaders, but on conditions unacceptable to the latter. One of the basic conditions was that China acquiesced to the U.S. "two Chinas" plan. Incidentally this was also unacceptable to the KMT authorities in Taiwan.

One of the characteristics of U.S.-Chinese relations in 1945-55 was that Chiang Kai-shek time and again exploited U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy to his own advantage. At this he often proved more politically astute than his U.S. supporters. While the KMT failed to extract a formal U.S. commitment to defend Quemoy and Mazu during the Taiwan Straits crisis, it did obtain logistical and public support from the United States for its illegal occupation of offshore islands. There were many other similar intrigues by the two sides in subsequent years, as they tried to make use of each other while fearful of being made use of itself.

From the mid-1950's onward, as the Soviet factor in U.S.-Chinese relations diminished in importance, the three-sided relationship among the CPC, KMT, and the United States reemerged as a key element and became the most intricate

aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations, one which also had the most far-reaching results. Whether consciously or otherwise, the United States consistently linked its China policy to domestic Chinese politics.

3. American Domestic Politics and its China Policy

No other issue in U.S. foreign relations after the war was so entangled in its domestic politics as the China question. As American scholars see it, "an understanding of bureaucratic politics will enable China policy analysts to answer many questions otherwise unanswerable and come up with much more comprehensive, profound, and subtle explanations." (Footnote 33) (Warren I. Cohen, "The United States and China since 1945," in "New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations," ed. by Warren I. Cohen. Columbia University Press, 1983 edition, p 140) Understanding the pluralistic nature of U.S. politics and its policy-making process indeed provides a clue to analyzing many involved phenomena in U.S.-Chinese relations.

The prelude to the "great China debate" in the United States opened in 1945. At the time there was a difference of opinion between the U.S. ambassador to China, Hurley, on the one hand, and career diplomats at the U.S. embassy and political advisers attached to the U.S. military headquarters in China, on the other. President Roosevelt supported Hurley's position, thus ending the debate on policy and goals. Although few people believed Hurley's later charges of "insubordination" and "pro-communism" among his subordinates, dissenting U.S. diplomats well versed in Chinese political affairs were all transferred out of China.

The Republican Party began criticizing the Democrats' China policy in late 1946, but it took a few months for the criticisms to gain momentum. When Congress started debating the China issue, the KMT's military position did not seem very worrisome to the United States. From March through June 1947, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were successively unveiled, both revealing the "Europe first, Asia second" preference of the U.S. Government in undertaking overseas commitments and obligations. This was criticized by Republicans who gave priority to the Asian and Pacific region.

The conclusion of the (Wen De Mai) fact-finding mission was that the KMT regime must immediately carry out reforms across the board and take measures to improve the Chinese economy. By the end of 1947, as the KMT found itself facing an increasingly grim economic and military situation, another debate on the China question took place in Congress. The Republicans demanded that major steps be taken to help Chiang Kai-shek hold the northeast. Anxious to stop the China question from boiling over in U.S. politics and getting in the way of his re-election, the Truman Administration indicated in the spring of 1948 a willingness to compromise with Congress on the "China Aid Bill."

There was a consensus within the U.S. ruling circle over the general strategy of "marshalling vast resources to contain Soviet expansion." And a China policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek and opposing the communists was part of this general strategy. There were two controversial aspects about this China policy: What priority should "China aid" be accorded and would assistance aimed at propping up the KMT government have the expected effects? The China

debate from 1947-48 did absolutely nothing to change the overall thrust of U.S. policy. Truman, Marshall, and their policy advisers firmly opposed pouring too much resources into China, while hoping to arrest the progress of the Chinese revolution to the greatest extent possible. As a result of the debate, the China issue became interwoven with U.S. domestic politics. Henceforth it became more difficult for U.S. policy-makers to adjust their policy or extricate themselves from the China question.

The "China Lobby" was an extensive and loosely-organized group consisting of staunchly anti-communist individuals and organizations. Ironically they were all critical of the Truman Administration's China policy. Otherwise there was little similarity among them. They mainly targeted Congress and the Republican Party in their operations. In 1949, when the Truman Administration indicated it might draw a line between itself and the KMT regime, which was about to go under, pro-Chiang Kai-shek anti-communist forces collaborated with Republicans intent on undermining the administration. As soon as it came out, the China White Paper was instantly denounced by the "China Lobby" as a "whitewash by the Truman Administration to cover up its responsibility for selling out free China."

Pressure from the "China Lobby" and the military and Congressional opposition made it even harder for the Truman Administration to choose a more realistic China policy before and after the establishment of the PRC. For instance, the State Department did explore, without success, the possibility of recognizing the revolutionary Chinese government. The reason was none other than the thunderous opposition from Republicans. From late 1949 to early 1950, Acheson was reluctant to reveal U.S. intentions to control Taiwan for fear of creating a "territorial recovery issue." The military, on the other hand, was not inclined toward hiding its strategic designs on Taiwan. Bradley, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Johnson, the defense secretary, and Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary of state, had voiced opposition to disengagement from Taiwan on the eve of the Korean War.

The so-called "Red Scare" in the United States, that is, a fear of "communist infiltration activities in government agencies," also had a negative effect on the Truman Administration's China policy. Hurley's accusations against diplomats stationed in China were followed by a string of cases involving so-called "communist espionage." After the successful testing of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the triumph of the Chinese revolution, the fear of communism and anti-communist propaganda in the United States intensified by the day. It was in this political atmosphere that McCarthyism began running rampant in early 1950's. Senator McCarthy, who led the "anti-communist witch-hunt," argued that the main danger facing the United States was not foreign communism, but the communist party and traitors in hiding inside the country. Although the Truman Administration was one of the targets of attack by McCarthyites, his anti-Soviet anti-communist actions worldwide and his "federal loyalty" program only served to add fuel to the flames of McCarthyism. The difference between Truman and McCarthy was that Truman urged all American people to support his anti-communist foreign policy to demonstrate their loyalty to the nation. In April 1950, Truman said, "The greatest threat comes from communism outside the nation. It is there that the core of its military and economic forces lies. The real danger is that

communism may overthrow other free nations, strengthening itself in the process, and then launches the final attack on us." (Footnote 34) (Quoted in Lewis McCarrroll Purifoy: "Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria 1947-1951," New Perspective Publishing House, 1976 edition, p 172)

A few years later, McCarthyism became a dirty word in the United States, but propaganda and actions against international communism (what some people called "foreign McCarthyism") were invariably lauded as a "holy war." Discussing the pernicious influences of McCarthyism on U.S. foreign policy, a former senior U.S. diplomat said, "The real reason why Dulles, Kennedy, and Johnson fell into the Vietnam quagmire was the widespread support for the persecution of people attacked by McCarthy for 'losing China.' They dreaded sealing their political fate by 'losing' yet another nation that did not belong to the United States in the first place." (Footnote 35) (Charles W. Yost: "History and Memory," Norton Publishing House, 1965 edition, p 230)

U.S.-Chinese confrontation on the Korean battlefield greatly magnified the importance of the China issue in U.S. domestic politics. As McCarthyites battered the Truman Administration over the question of "domestic communist subversion," so did the "Asia first" proposal by MacArthur and others in dealing with the "international communist conspiracy" disrupt Truman's policies. MacArthur attacked China as a "new dominating force in Asia. It allies itself with the Soviet Union for its own reasons, but its philosophy and methods of operation themselves constitute aggressive imperialism." (Footnote 36) (Quoted in John W. Spanier: "The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War," Norton Publishing House, 1965 edition, p 230) He strongly urged that the United States broaden the Korean conflict to the Chinese northeast and even its interior.

The quarrel between Truman and MacArthur regarding strategic principles still revolved around this question: Where did the 'communist danger' mainly come from"? Few in the U.S. diplomatic community sided with McCarthy. They believed the Soviet Union, not China, was the main threat to U.S. interests. With the MacArthur strategy in mind, Bradley said in 1951, "Red China is not a power seeking world domination. Frankly... this strategy would embroil us in the wrong war in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." (Footnote 37) (Quoted in Akira Iriye: "Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations," (Yue Fa Nuo Wei Qi) Publishing House, 1967 edition, p 289)

Although MacArthur's proposal was not adopted and the "Europe first, Asia second" bias remained in U.S. foreign relations, U.S. moves in the Taiwan Straits, while heightening U.S.-Chinese tension, provoked little discussion in diplomatic and political circles in the United States. This was certainly related to the fall from grace of Sinologists in America. Already in the McCarthy days, some of the more objective opinions on China were extensively suppressed. The heaviest blow to Sinologists occurred in 1953 after Eisenhower came into power. Driven by both his political purposes and ideology, Dulles consciously sought to accommodate the right wing of the Republican Party in Congress. As a result, all China experts in the State Department and other agencies who expressed dissatisfaction with official

China policy were purged. Even the 20 or so American journalists who had worked in China before new China was founded were all forced to lie low. No longer could the American public find objective first-hand reports on China. What they saw more of was attacks on and distortions of the new China.

With Eisenhower in the White House, anti-Chinese propoganda and actions by the U.S. Government got from bad to worse, a result of the greater ideological harmony between the major shapers of foreign policy in the government. There was no sharp difference of opinion regarding the China policy comparable to that in the Truman Administration on the eve of the Korean War. Still, a number of leading officials, including Assistant Secretary of State Robertson and Chairman (Lei Fu De) of the joint chiefs of staff, did not entirely support Eisenhower's plan to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Straits and demanded tougher measures to overthrow the new Chinese government. When the Taiwan Straits crisis came to a head in 1954-55, their views were vetoed by Eisenhower. (Footnote 38) (Tang Tsou: "The Embroilment over Quemoy," Institute of International Relations, University of Utah, 1959 edition, p 26. Foster Rhea Dulles: "American Policy toward Communist China 1949-1969," Thomas (Ke Luo Wei Er) Publishing House, 1972 edition, p 157-158) In dealing with the problem of offshore islands, both Eisenhower and Dulles dreaded that one false move might trap the United States in a new war. Eisenhower walked a fine line between militarily provoking the new China and putting pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to force him to withdraw from Quemoy and Mazu. Most members of Congress saw eye to eye with the Administration and made a distinction between U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan and guarding Xiamen and Mazu. Debates in the House of Representatives and Senate and votes on the "U.S.-Taiwan joint defense treaty" and the "emergency resolution to authorize the President to use U.S. armed forces in the Taiwan Strait" demonstrated Congressional support for the President's China policy.

Compared to the late 1940's, presidential power in foreign policy increased gradually from the Korean War onward. Throughout the 1950's (and into the 1960's), the U.S. President usually had little trouble winning Congressional backing for most major foreign policy decisions. As the China question assumed greater importance in U.S. foreign relations, it became a sensitive matter about which emotions could readily be aroused. Accordingly, major China policy issues were dealt with at the highest levels. During the cold war, the military was a potent force in the foreign policy-making process as well as in social and political life. In contrast, old China hands in the government suffered a decline in influence. These shifting fortunes marked the domestic backdrop of the formulation of the U.S. China policy in the mid-1950's and for many years to come.

4. U.S. Perceptions of China

Through long years of intercourse, China and the United States have observed each other from the perspective of their own culture and values and at their own level of social development. These observations gradually became their basic perceptions of the other party. The perceptions changed continuously over time in response to changes in the international environment and the balance of power between them, as well as changes in their own society and that of the other nation. Inevitably U.S. China policy and the nation's basic

perceptions of China interacted with and influenced each other. In studying U.S. China policy, therefore, one must analyze how China is perceived by Americans who formulate and execute policies and even by the entire U.S. society, and the characteristics of these perceptions at a particular point in time.

There was an explosion of American power during WWII and in the years immediately after, providing a solid material basis for its postwar expansion in Asia. Before 1940, the United States never dreamed of creating a "Pax Americana" in the Far East because it was not capable of doing so. By 1945, however, only the U.S. among all the powers was not seriously crippled. Indeed, its participation in the war actually boosted its power and status to a historic high. It was against this background that the U.S. began developing an "America first" mentality in its management of foreign affairs. In the postwar years, "America leads the world" was a very popular slogan. Eisenhower declared in 1953, "It is our God-given mandate to lead the free world." (Footnote 39) (Quoted in Foster Dulles: "America's Rise to World Power 1894-1954," Harper and Row, 1963 edition, p 271)

The successful push of the Chinese revolution under the CPC was a challenge to the notion of "America first." There was an unbridgeable gap between the U.S. goal of controlling and "transforming" China and its means and actual influence, but the blind faith of the United States in its own power precluded non-intervention in China's internal affairs. In the debate within the United States on the China problem, the question was not whether the United States should intervene in Chinese affairs, but how and to what extent. Had an American admitted then the inevitability of a CPC victory and suggested that it was beyond the power of the United States to "save free China," he would have been described as lacking in loyalty to and faith in the United States. It was exactly the admission in the China White Paper of America's limited ability to control events in China that gave the Republicans further ammunition with which to attack the Truman Administration. The "China Lobby" and McCarthyites increased their clout by fully exploiting Americans' sense of national omnipotence. This was their reasoning. Given the means at its disposal, the United States could have changed China's destiny. Its failure in China must be blamed on the government's incompetence or, worse, the presence of a host of "communist sympathizers" inside the government.

The ruling clique in the United States believed that America had the power to determine China's future. Therefore, it should have the corresponding will and resolve to do so. If the leaders failed to make full and "proper" use of the world's most formidable economic and military forces to capture an absolute superiority everywhere, they must be described as violating the American enterprising spirit. NSC-68, drafted in April 1950, for instance, reflected the psychological urge to use U.S. power relentlessly on a global scale. Later MacArthur's clamor for expanding the Korean War to China, Eisenhower's thinly-disguised nuclear blackmail to China, Dulles's "brinkmanship" policy, and military intimidation during the Taiwan Straits crisis were all intended to show off U.S. leaders' "fighting spirit" and their worship in their nation's prowess. What was evident here was an arrogance unique to the United States, a product of the marriage between the theory of "manifest destiny," a doctrine which called on the United States to save the

world and had long been embedded in the American consciousness, and the country's newly-acquired power.

Because of the notions of "America first" and "world leadership," U.S. officials believed they were "uniquely qualified to be China's savior." (Footnote 40) (Senator William Fulbright's speech on 7 February 1972. See U.S. Senate: "China and the United States: Today and Yesterday--Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations," 1972, p 24) At one point Americans with commercial ambition or missionary zeal took special pride in their self-appointed mission in China. In the wake of the "open door" policy, the U.S. even saw its image in China as next to perfect. Politically, U.S. officials felt that the Chinese people's anti-imperialist struggle might be directed against Japan and other Western powers but not the United States, because of the latter's "anti-colonial" and "democratic" traditions and its immense political appeal to China. While the Chinese they came in contact with were limited to a mere handful of people in the upper middle class in Chinese society, they assumed they knew China very well. Economically, many Americans sincerely believed that only affluent America could help impoverished China and that China should realize that the only way to develop itself economically was to depend on the United States. In handling relations with China, the United States followed a deep-seated idea: "In any case, they need us more than we need them."

As China's self-appointed "savior," the United States naturally did not feel obliged to understand Chinese culture and values. In their eyes, there were only two social development models; China must copy either the Soviet Union or the United States. "Communism," they believed, "is incompatible with Chinese national circumstances, popular wishes, or institutions," (Footnote 41) (Warren I. Cohen: "America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations," John Wiley and Co., 1980 edition, p 165) whereas just the opposite was true about the U.S. political system, culture, values, and Christian beliefs. John K. Fairbank wrote, "Ideals which we treasure are part of our (America's) culture, while (China's) realities are part of China. The two remain mutually exclusive." (Footnote 42) (John King Fairbank: "The United States and China," Harvard University Press, 1976 edition, p 315) Not words comprehensible or acceptable to most Americans.

Americans responsible for shaping the China policy lacked a minimal respect for China's national rights. Instead, they were invariably arrogant and "self-righteous." For instance, Truman refused to recognize that the dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea was an act of self-defense and claimed that China resisted U.S. aggression and aided Korea because it was forced or duped into serving the objectives of Soviet colonial policy in Asia, whereas "U.S. troops were fighting in Korea to ensure national security and survival." (Footnote 43) (Harry Truman's Address on 30 November 1950. See "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950" 1961, pp 724-725) Although this and other similar statements seemed very absurd to China, they represented a belief among U.S. leaders that what the U.S. did in China embodied not only American interests, but also China's long-range interests, whereas the interests of the Chinese people were totally at odds with Soviet interests. Still, it was MacArthur's big-stick policy more than Truman's attitude as China's self-proclaimed benefactor which opened the eyes of the

Chinese people to the nature of imperialism. Zhou Enlai said, "American imperialism carried out MacArthur's policy in the East." (Footnote 44) ("Selected Works of Zhou Enlai Part II," People's Publishing House, 1984 edition, p 52)

Another intellectual source of America's unrealistic China policy was Americans' sense of racial superiority. (Footnote 45) (For American scholars' views on this issue, see William Whitney Stueck, Jr.: "The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950," University of North Carolina Press, 1981 edition, p 254) MacArthur said, "A psychological feature of Orientals is that they respect and submit themselves to leadership who dare to speak and act and are firm and effective," (Footnote 46) (Spanier, p 74) in other words, U.S. high-handedness. With their racial superiority feelings, Americans could not possibly understand correctly the nature of the Chinese revolution. Accustomed as they were to regarding internal changes in Chinese society from the perspective of the Western onslaught on modern China, Americans credited Western influence with all social progress in that nation. Consequently, they were at a loss to explain why its privileges in China became the target of the Chinese revolution, other than attributing this kind of national consciousness to the communist ideology. As John K. Fairbank remarked, "A nationalist communist revolution has exceeded our power of comprehension." (Footnote 47) (See John F. Fairbank's foreword in "Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia," by James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry. Harper and Row, 1981 edition, p 12)

Both liberals and conservatives in U.S. politics refused to recognize that radical social revolution was a road China must travel to achieve modernization. Governed by the kind of historical materialism denounced by Mao Zedong, they reacted negatively by instinct to the violent revolution advocated by communist parties. In contrast, they sympathized readily with the political views of the KMT and the social system under KMT rule (particularly that in Taiwan after 1949). In American diplomatic thinking, "communism is immutable and irreversible, while right-wing military dictatorship is malleable. In the final analysis, America may depend on the recipients of its military protection. But once a nation turns communist, all hopes are lost for incremental change." (Footnote 48) (Robert J. Art: "America's Foreign Policy," in "Foreign Policy in World Politics," edit. by Roy C. Macridis. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1985 edition, pp 122-123)

The definition of communism in China might be worlds apart from that in the U.S. In a China long suffering from poverty, unrest, and national humiliation, more and more people recognized that the communist road was the only way out. In the eyes of the United States, whose sworn enemy was the Soviet Union, communism was synonymous with "Soviet expansion." In addition, American society was widely religious from top to bottom, which also lent an inflammatory quality to anti-communist propaganda that presented communism as a threat to American values.

In managing its foreign relations (eg., its relations with the Soviet Union), the CPC sometimes managed to separate ideological considerations from national interest considerations, a point beyond the grasp of U.S. policy-makers at the

time. From their point of view, national interests and ideology were consistent with each other. Observing Chinese politics through ideology-tinted glasses, they could not but misunderstand the CPC's diplomatic intents. John Service said, "Mao Zedong is basically free from ideology in dealing with foreign relations." (Footnote 49) (John S. Service: "The American Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations," University of California at Berkeley Press, 1971 edition, p 183) Nevertheless, similar opinions among China experts were never taken seriously by U.S. policy-makers. In the words of ex-Senator J. William Fulbright, after 1949 the United States "determined China to be aggressive not on the basis of its behavior but by virtue of the fact that it is a communist nation." (Footnote 50) (J. William Fulbright: "Arrogance of Power," Random House, 1966 edition, p 152)

5. Conclusion

In the first postwar decade, the new distribution of power in the world and the presence of two dominant ideologies bipolarized international politics. The cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two nations with an overwhelming superiority in power, significantly reduced maneuvering room on the diplomatic stage for relatively weak political forces. The four protagonists in the Chinese political conflict--CPC, KMT, the Soviet Union, the U.S.--essentially saw world politics as an irreconcilable struggle in which two camps with clearly-drawn lines were pitted against each other.

Looking back at these 10 years, five historical facts had a profound effect on subsequent U.S.-Chinese relations. First, the United States sided with the KMT in 1945-49, gravely damaging its interests in China and objectively helping to bring about the Sino-Soviet alliance which, in turn, deepened American hostility to the new China. During this stage, conflicting national interests between China and the United States manifested themselves as political and ideological antagonisms. Second, these antagonisms as well as the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in Asia were turned into a large-scale U.S.-Chinese war overnight by the outbreak of the Korean War. The U.S. decisions to intervene in Korea militarily and control the Taiwan Straits were essentially strategic. Third, the domestic political atmosphere in the United States poisoned China policy in both historical stages mentioned above. On the whole, however, the debate within America's ruling clique on the China issue was a result of the deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations, not the cause. Fourth, the United States globalized its containment policy in the early 1950's mainly through the formation of anti-communist alliances, foreign aid, and a reliance on military power and built a political, military, and strategic ring of encirclement around the new China. Fifth, political conflicts and military confrontations between China and the United States in the Taiwan area in the 1950's were all related to the civil conflict in China and the Korean War, but the former was not an inevitable consequence of the latter. U.S. China policy remained in a bind precisely because it was bogged down in the tricky Taiwan issue with its welter of complex elements.

After 10 years of change U.S. China policy in 1955 was essentially influenced by 5 factors: 1) The political, economic, and military power of the United States was at its peak; 2) The outline of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union was largely in place; 3) the Sino-Soviet

alliance; 4) the lingering effects of McCarthyism and the China debate in U.S. domestic politics; and 5) China has yet to achieve political and territorial unification. The absence of any economic and cultural exchange between China and the United States and the fact that America's basic perception of China had not changed were also key restricting factors. Of the five factors above, the first four gradually changed over time, which, combined with the growth of Chinese power, finally led to the thaw in U.S.-Chinese relations in the early 1970's. A serious exploration of the ups and downs in U.S.-Chinese relations over the past few decades would do much to further improve the two nations' friendly relationship and put it on a basis of mutual understanding and long-term stability.

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DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS DISCUSSED

Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING [WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese No 177, 16 Jun 87 pp 9-11

[Article by Ch'ih P'ing [6688 5493]: "Readjustment of Sino-Japanese Relations"]

[Text] Fifty Tortuous Years

The date 7 July 1987 marks the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

During these past 50 years, Sino-Japanese relations have been full of twists and turns. The Japanese invaders surrendered only after a defensive war of 8 years of great hardship. When the Chinese Communists seized power on the mainland, Japan followed the United States in a policy which would only recognize the nationalist government that had retreated to Taiwan, a fact that is responsible for 20 years of an abnormal state in Sino-Japanese relations. Although the Chinese side actively pursued a "people's diplomacy," there were political obstacles that left Sino-Japanese relations, if not in a hostile, at least in an unfriendly state during all this time. Even as late as the early 1970's, on the eve of resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the Chinese side warned of the revival of Japanese militarism.

On 29 September 1972, China and Japan announced normalization of diplomatic relations, signifying the start of a new phase in Sino-Japanese relations. Mutual trade in 1972, the year of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, amounted to around \$1.1 billion, which increased to \$2 billion in 1973. By 1977, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, mutual trade had come close to \$3.4 billion.

On 12 August 1978, China and Japan signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was another milestone in Sino-Japanese relations. Deng Xiaoping personally went to Tokyo at the end of 1978 to be present at the ceremony of exchanging the instruments of ratification, to emphasize the importance that China attributed to Sino-Japanese relations. Once the Sino-Japanese peace treaty was signed, economic relations between the two countries soared to greater heights, with mutual trade easily breaking the \$10 billion barrier.

The Hu Yaobang-Japan Relationship

Hu Yaobang, former secretary general of the CPC, visited Japan in November 1983, an event that may be said to constitute the climax in Sino-Japanese relations. In his conversation with Japan's Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone, Hu Yaobang proposed to render Sino-Japanese relations "peaceful and friendly, based on equality and mutual benefit, and of long-term stability." He furthermore decided to establish a "Committee for China-Japan Friendship in the 21st Century," which would include elderly, middle-aged and young representatives from all circles in the two countries. Hu Yaobang also invited 3,000 Japanese youths to visit China in the fall of 1984. It seemed that Hu Yaobang had established close personal relations with Nakasone, who in 1986 paid two unusual visits to China.

Reasons for the Crisis Arising in Sino-Japanese Relations

But it appears that a crisis arose during the last few months in the very promising relationship between China and Japan: First, there occurred the "Kuanghua Hostel incident," and later the incident involving Japanese news reporter Shuitsu Hemmi, who was expelled from Beijing. The "Kuanghua Hostel incident" has not yet been resolved, and for 5 months China published several commentaries that were violently critical of Japan. This year is the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, also the 15th anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. China will probably hold special memorials, drawing attention to these dates, which, as far as Sino-Japanese relations are concerned, are of great symbolic meaning. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the July 7 Incident, it is indeed fitting to explore the reasons for the crisis that seems to have recently arisen in Sino-Japanese relations.

Effect of the Kuanghua Hostel Incident

The "Kuanghua Hostel incident" is a 10-year lawsuit which has affected Sino-Japanese relations. The Kuanghua Hostel is a dormitory which had been bought years ago by the then Chinese Government to provide accommodations for Chinese students in Japan; it is located in Kyoto. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Beijing, considering the hostel Chinese state-owned property, wanted to take it over, but Taipei filed suit in Kyoto District Court, claiming ownership rights over the Kuanghua Hostel. The Kyoto District Court first refused to adjudicate the case, whereupon the Taipei Government filed an appeal with the Osaka High Court, an appeal that proved successful. Finding itself defeated in the appeal at the Osaka High Court, the Beijing Government filed a further appeal with the Japanese Supreme Court, and the final decision is now being awaited.

China Has No Further Room to Maneuver

During this time that the final decision is being awaited, China is putting pressure of Japan, criticizing that the Kuanghua Hostel incident shows that Japan is embarking on a two-China policy, one China and one Taiwan. In addition to declarations by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deng Xiaoping personally joined the fray with his criticism of the

handling of the Kuanghua Hostel incident, and it seems that China is now left with no further room to maneuver in this affair.

The Japanese explain that Japan's government organization is one of a separation of the three powers, which makes it impossible for the Japanese Government to interfere in decisions of the Ministry of Justice. This explanation is not acceptable to China. Xinhua News Agency published a long commentary in May, pointing out that the politics within one state must not be taken as a pretext for the Japanese Government to violate international law, since Japan, already as early as 1972, acknowledged that there is only one China, and that Beijing is the only legitimate government of China. The commentary also pointed out that the Japanese Constitution prescribes that foreign affairs are the responsibility of the Japanese Cabinet, so that Japan's present attempt to hide behind the argument of the separation of powers is nothing but an evasion.

In fact, China is exerting great diplomatic pressures to extricate the Kuanghua Hostel case from civil litigation. China takes the attitude adopted by Japan in the Kuanghua Hostel case as an indication of Japan's attitude toward the entire Sino-Japanese relationship. Many are surprised by the hard line taken by China. Everybody is anxiously wondering whether the Kuanghua Hostel incident is an isolated case, or whether it reflects a long-term problem in Sino-Japanese relations?

The Turning Point in Sino-Japanese Relations

The turning point in Sino-Japanese relations, the time when difficulties first arose, seems to have occurred at the beginning of this year. In 1986, Nakasone twice visited China and was courteously received, but when the Japanese Government decided, at the end of 1986, to raise defense expenditure to above 1 percent of the country's GNP, China strongly reacted and warned of a revival of Japanese militarism. Shortly thereafter, China began to attack Japan violently over the Kuanghua Hostel incident, which was followed by a string of actions, such as the expulsion of the Kyodo news reporter.

The coincidence of events has many people wonder whether Hu Yaobang's fall from power has had an effect on Sino-Japanese relations. Hu Yaobang has always been regarded as the foremost figure of the pro-Japan faction in the Chinese Communist leadership. Foreign policy has rarely been an issue in China's power struggles, and the time of Hu Yaobang's dismissal was no exception. But there may still be a reason to connect the change in Sino-Japanese relations with foreign affairs, namely the fact that Hu Yaobang's invitation that year for 3,000 Japanese youths to visit China was considered an example of Hu Yaobang acting without due circumspection.

Is it then true that Sino-Japanese relations have become strained as a consequence of Hu Yaobang's fall from power? We believe it would be inappropriate to overestimate Hu Yaobang's influence on foreign affairs. In China, foreign affairs have always been run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and policy decisions were made at the level of the Politburo; foreign affairs, we believe, are firmly controlled by Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Zhao Ziyang. Hu Yaobang's invitation to the 3,000 Japanese youths was merely

regarded as an intrusion in foreign affairs, but not as a mistake in the conduct of foreign affairs. Of course, at the time the Politburo was formulating its policy decisions, the presence of Hu Yaobang would have been an opportunity to add a few words in favor of Sino-Japanese relations, but the reasons for recent troubles in Sino-Japanese relations are certainly more deeprooted. The only important effect of Hu Yaobang's fall from power was the disappearance of an important and vigorous advocate for close Sino-Japanese friendship.

As the above analysis shows, there are much more profound reasons for the troubles that have arisen in Sino-Japanese relations. What are these reasons?

Excessively Close Relations

The real issue in the Kuanghua Hostel case is the question of the "two Chinas, one China and one Taiwan," an issue to which China is particularly sensitive. Objectively speaking, Japan's behavior in this respect was not at all below commonly expected standards. It is true that after establishing diplomatic relations with China, Japan has outwardly broken off relations with Taiwan while still maintaining connections, but this is the way adopted by almost all other countries with diplomatic relations with the PRC. Compared with the United States, Japan's behavior in this respect is actually much better.

The most important effect of the Kuanghua Hostel Incident, we believe, is that it stirred up a whole series of dissatisfactions in Sino-Japanese relations. First, there was the question of Japanese views on history. The way Japan rewrote its history textbooks provoked China's violent criticism. When he visited China in September of 1982, Japan's former prime minister, Nobusuke Kishi, promised that the textbooks would be revised to everyone's satisfaction within 2 years. China at that time accepted Zenko Suzuki's explanations and played down the textbook incident, but actually after 2, 3, and even 4 years, the textbooks had not yet been revised to everyone's satisfaction.

The way the Japanese had rewritten their textbooks reflected a dubious attitude of Japanese political circles toward the Sino-Japanese War. This attitude became even more glaringly evident in 1985 when Yasuhiro Nakasone, in his capacity as prime minister, paid his respects at the Yasukuni Shrine, a sanctuary dedicated to the Japanese soldiers who had lost their lives in Japan's wars. This action was even worse than whatever former Japanese conservative prime ministers, such as Nobusuke Kishi, Eisaku Sato, and Takeo Fukuda had done in the past. Coming under violent criticism from China, North and South Korea, Nakasone refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine last year.

Nakasone is after all a member of the hawkish faction; he has all along urged the restoration of Japan's national strength. After assuming office, he advocated building up Japan not only into an economically strong, but also politically strong country. Through many of his actions, he aroused the national spirit of the Japanese people; his activities included renewed propaganda for the emperor's position, which he made a major issue, and criticism of the present Japanese Constitution as one imposed by force on defeated Japan. Nakasone's actions have not been isolated activities; the

Japanese rightist parties have all along exercised a very strong influence in the Japanese political arena. According to material in the hands of the Japanese police authorities, there exist over 500 right wing organizations in Japan. There is also a strong rightist force in the Japanese Diet, such as the Asian Affairs Study Group and the pro-Taiwan Japan-China Relations Study Society, in which Nobusuke Kishi is a key figure.

Allowing this year's Japanese defense budget to exceed the ceiling of 1 percent of the country's GNP is a development which may be considered symbolic for the growing strength of the rightist parties. Of course, 1 percent is not a sacred figure which must not be infringed upon, but it was merely a standard fixed at will by former prime minister Takeo Miki. Even though Japan raises its defense spending to 1 percent of its GNP, it does not mean that Japan's military strength will increase steeply, and it is even less an indication that Japan will invade any other country. But since its military power will not conspicuously increase, why exceed the mentioned ceiling! By this action, the Nakasone Cabinet is definitely breaking down a psychological barrier; there will be no further upper limit for Japan's military expenditure. The reason for the said decision is indeed exactly the same as for the great effort being made in recent years to stir up national consciousness in the Japanese people.

The developments that we have presented in the above have become evident throughout a number of years already. Though China has indicated its displeasure, it has never so far seriously criticized Japan. The only possible reason for that is the great importance that China attaches to its economic relations with Japan.

The great importance that China attaches to its economic relations with Japan is due to the hope, we believe, that through this relationship China will be able to promote its modernization, and Japan on its part has also frequently expressed its support for China's modernization. Due to the geographical and cultural closeness of the two countries, China has been inclined to place great hopes on the usefulness of Japan.

Japan's actual contribution to China's modernization have regrettably been far below the magnitude the Chinese leadership had hoped for. In the transfer of technologies, Japan has always maintained a distance of 10 to 15 years and, furthermore, concentrated on consumer goods production, such as, for instance, supplying production lines for colored TVs. These technologies are really of no great help in China's modernization. Japanese investments in China are also rather limited. Up to the end of 1986, Japanese investments in China account for less than 1 percent of the total foreign investments in China, and the items of investments are concentrated in areas of construction that are of benefit to Japan, as for instance, construction at the two harbors of Qinhuangdao and Shijiu, which will mainly service Sino-Japanese trade.

The most conspicuous item in Sino-Japanese economic relations is, after all, trade. All along Japan has been China's largest trading partner, but in this area China has suffered a large trade deficit. Generally speaking, economic activities are selfish; Japan's purpose in developing trade with China is of course to earn money from China, and how China too can profit from this

relationship is a matter that China must seriously examine. The slogans of friendship and mutual benefit can be no substitute for the reality of economic benefits.

Up to the present, we cannot see that China has made good use of the economic relationship with Japan, but we hope that such political slogans as friendship and mutual benefit will stimulate Sino-Japanese relations and induce Japan to reciprocate, but the situation that has objectively arisen is: China is overemphasizing friendship in its Sino-Japanese relations, out of proportion to the many problems that actually exist in these Sino-Japanese relations. In other words, China is still unable to extricate itself from the old rut of subjectivism. There is a large discrepancy of interests, politically and economically, between China and Japan. China assumes that by merely expending more effort in diplomacy, it will bring the two countries closer together, and thereby achieve the goal of reducing this discrepancy of interests. Regrettably, this goal could never be achieved over a long period of time. In the past year, the above-mentioned discrepancy of interests finally made China recognize the realities and the need to effect a readjustment in Sino-Japanese relations.

Adjustments Are a Good Thing

According to the above analysis, the Sino-Japanese relation is outwardly an exceedingly close one, but in actual fact it is beset with many contradictions. This state of affairs cannot be maintained over a long period of time; sooner or later there has to be an adjustment in Sino-Japanese relations. The troubles that have recently arisen in Sino-Japanese relations may possibly be just the beginning of this process of readjustment.

A readjustment of this kind is, comprehensively speaking, a healthy development, very similar to the way China has readjusted its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union in the early years of the 1980's. At one time, China had overemphasized a pro-United States and anti-Soviet policy, although the strategic interests between China and the United States after all differ widely, and China is in the forefront of the confrontation with the Soviet Union. For strategic considerations, China developed too close a relationship with the United States, but there was not enough of a basis for that. Later, China used the Taiwan question as a pretext to readjust its relations with the United States and with the Soviet Union, which was an absolutely wise move. The facts have proven, that after the Taiwan question was placed on the agenda--though there were many other differences between China and the United States (such as about trade relations)--the relationship has matured greatly and has become much more rational than it had been before.

The Kuanghua Hostel incident, we believe, is just one outstanding item in a similar readjustment. If the adjustment is now accomplished, Sino-Japanese relations too will be rendered more mature and more rational. This would indeed be a good thing. However, some factors that cause anxiety still exist: First, the anti-Japanese feelings in Chinese society are much stronger than anti-American feelings. That has of course its historical reasons, but more important is it that the Japanese economic invasion begins to evoke a reaction among the younger generation in China. On 18 September 1985, when the

students commemorated the September 18 Incident, they also criticized Japanese economic aggression. The way the Japanese revised their history textbooks and Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine have aroused widespread dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. When adjusting Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese leadership are therefore easily apt to arouse strong reactions among the general population, which may turn readjustment into a serious deterioration of relations.

Secondly, in the current handling of the Kuanghua Hostel incident and the expulsion of the Kyodo news reporter, the Chinese leadership acted in a rather disconcerted way. In the Kuanghua Hostel Incident, Deng Xiaoping personally stepped into the fray with his statements, which was not at all a wise move. Because once the highest leadership had expressed an attitude, it is very difficult to effect a change. After expulsion of the Kyodo news reporter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, emphasized that this would not at all affect Sino-Japanese relations, while the Ministry of State Security published details of how the reporter in question "bought intelligence." The publication of the details of this story added fuel to fire, but also gave the impression of weakness--wanting to explain one's own actions. Actually, in most cases of expelling correspondents or spies, there is no need to reveal the details of the cases. All these actions on the part of China make it appear that China acted in these cases in a rather disconcerted way.

In Foreign Relations the Emphasis is on Actual Benefits!

Generally speaking, the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations is a rational process, but to achieve the ideal result the process must be conducted in a rational way. Just as China must not overemphasize friendship in its Sino-Japanese relations, China must also not capitalize on Japan's vulnerable points. In foreign relations, the emphasis is on actual benefits. If Japan can make good profits from the Chinese, they will of course harbor friendship for the Chinese, but what the Chinese must get back from the Japanese must also not only be abstract "goodwill" and "friendship," but must be concrete benefits. During the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, the Chinese must be clear in their minds what they hope to get from the Japanese side!. If this issue is not clearly defined, there are no bright prospects for Sino-Japanese relations.

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SINO-WESTERN EUROPE RELATIONS DISCUSSED

Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU [INTERNATIONAL STUDIES] in Chinese No 2, Apr 87
pp 56-58

[Article by Su Huimin [5685 1920 3046]: "The Review and Forecast of China's Relations With Western Europe"]

[Text] China is the cradle of the four great inventions and Europe is the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution. China and Western Europe have made great contributions to human civilization; they are now two important forces for maintaining world peace. Therefore, strengthening the friendly and cooperative relationship between China and Western Europe will strengthen the force of world peace and promote the cause of human progress.

1. The Review of History

China is on the east side and Western Europe is on the west side of the Eurasian continent. In spite of the great distance between them, both sides tried to establish contacts over 1,800 years ago. Ban Chao, an ambassador of the Eastern Han dynasty to the Western Regions, once sent Gan Ying, an envoy, to the Great Qin (the Roman Empire), leaving the earliest evidence of China's efforts to establish contacts with Europe, although the latter was blocked by the water of the Persian Gulf and failed to reach the destination. In the mid-second Century, China's silk already enjoyed a great reputation among Roman nobles. Then Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius sent envoys to China for this reason. As exchanges increased, China's four great inventions were passed on to Europe, thus accelerating the progress of European civilization. China's compass, in particular, brought about a great advance in West European nautical activities. In 1275, Italian traveler Marco Polo came to China after a long and difficult journey and won the deep trust of Kublai Khan. Later, he toured famous mountains and rivers across China and studied local conditions and customs. His book, "The Travels of Marco Polo," gave great impetus to the development of the relationship between China and Western Europe.

In modern times, China began to lag behind due to the closed-door policy practiced by Chinese feudal rulers. Taking advantage of this, big powers came in, causing Chinese people over 100 years of suffering and breaking the relations between China and Western Europe.

The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 which was a new beginning for the development of an equal and mutually beneficial relationship between China and Western Europe. But, due to some reasons that are known to everybody, our relationship met with obstructions. It was not until the early 1970's when Sino-U.S. relations became more open and after China gained its legal seat in the United Nations that various countries of Western Europe began to normalize diplomatic relations with China. China now maintains friendly and cooperative relations with all West European countries except the Vatican. In 1975 China established an official relation with the EEC and sent an ambassador to Brussels.

2. Current Situations and Problems

In the late 1970's since China adopted the policy opening to the outside, China has rapidly developed cooperation with Western Europe in political, economic, trade, and cultural fields.

Political relations: In the past few years, the political relations between China and Western Europe have developed relatively fast, and high-ranking officials have paid more visits than anytime in the past. China and Western Europe both face the threats of huge U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and the space race, many regional conflicts, and economic and environmental problems of mankind. There is no basic conflict of interests between China and Western Europe. Moreover, they share the same or similar views on a series of major issues. They both sincerely wish for peace and arms reduction; they are both determined to defend their independence and safety and are both devoted to domestic economic development and mutually-beneficial international exchanges. It is based on these common grounds that China supports the coordination and self-improvement of Western Europe and believes that increasing the strength of Western Europe is conducive to peace. By the same token, Western Europe also wants China to become stronger. This is the basis for our cooperation. It is based on this cooperative spirit that China and Britain have appropriately resolved through friendly consultation the Hong Kong issue which was left over from the past. The solution of the Hong Kong issue has set an example for finding a peaceful solution through negotiations for historical issues between countries.

Along with the development of relations in all fields, China has established a political consultation system with some West European countries to exchange, on a regular or irregular basis, views and information on major international issues or other issues of common concern.

In the past few years, West European leaders have visited China one after another, and Chinese leaders have also visited Western Europe. Contacts by these leaders have deepened understanding, promoted friendship, accelerated cooperation, and consolidated the basis for further developing the relationship between China and Western Europe.

Economic and trade relations: Western Europe, which is economically developed and technologically advanced, is one of the areas that are important for China's foreign trade and technology transfer. China has signed a series of agreements with many West European countries on economy, trade, science and

technology, civil aviation, and sea transportation. China has also signed a trade and a textile agreements with the EEC which has given China general preferential treatment since 1980, thus creating conditions for continuous and steady trade development between China and Western Europe. Since the 1980's, trade volume between the two parties has increased rapidly. In 1980 the gross import and export volume was 3.641 billion Eurodollars. In 1985, it suddenly rose to 10.446 billion, increasing by nearly 3 folds in 5 years. During the first 8 months of 1986, it showed a 20-percent increase over the corresponding period of 1985. Currently, Western Europe ranks second, next only to Japan, in China's foreign trade.

As far as technology transfer is concerned, Western Europe is relatively open. Therefore, China's technology transfer from Western Europe and the technological cooperation between the two parties have yielded fairly good results.

Cultural exchanges: According to the cultural cooperation agreement signed between the two parties, large numbers of cultural, theatrical, dancing, music, and gymnastic groups have exchanged visits every year. These cultural envoys have made contributions to deepening our understanding and improving our friendship. Currently, thousands of Chinese students are seeking advanced studies in Western Europe and their specialties cover all fields including science, technology, economy, finance, and language. There are not very many West European students studying in China, but their number is increasing every year. Whether it is diplomatic and foreign trade activities or scientific and technological cooperation and cultural exchanges, they all need China's "European experts" and Europe's "China experts." They will become the bridge of cooperation between China and Western Europe.

Our cooperation has yielded some results. However, it also has some problems.

First, while welcoming China's open-door policy, West Europe has doubts mainly about the consistency of the policy and therefore hesitates to invest in China. There is also a problem of improving investment environment on the part of China. China has repeatedly stated that the policy of opening to the outside is a long-term national policy of China, not an expedient measure, still less a leader's individual decision and that it will not be changed as a result of changes in leadership. Moreover, the policy of opening to the outside has scored universally acknowledged achievements in just a few years, the national economy has developed, and the people's living standards have improved. There is no reason for anybody to give up such a policy that benefits both the state and the people. Policies currently adopted by the Chinese government can only facilitate, not hamper, the implementation of the policy of opening to the outside. Mr Strauss, noted politician of the Federal Republic of Germany, was right when he said that nobody can stop or reverse the wheel of China's reform.

Second, both China and Western Europe are interested in expanding trade, but there is still a great gap between current trade volume and our potential and possibility. Reasons vary. As far as China is concerned, insufficient foreign exchange and lack of marketable commodities are main reasons, and some problems also exist in the management system. As far as Western Europe is

concerned, in addition to the unfavorable factor of high prices, inadequate understanding of the Chinese market and lack of a long-term plan also play a part in causing this gap.

3. Forecast on the Prospects

Judged from the international situation and scientific and technological challenge facing both China and Western Europe, it is necessary and possible for them to further expand their economic and S&T cooperation while strengthening consultation and cooperation on major international issues and issues of immediate interests to both parties. Because, there is still a gap between their economic and S&T cooperation and their good political relations, and the development of the former can in turn promote the strengthening of the latter.

What are the possibilities of expanding economic and S&T cooperation? After carefully comparing the strong points and weaknesses of both parties we will find out that conditions for cooperation do exist and that cooperation will result in mutual benefits.

China has three favorable conditions. First, China has firmly implemented the policy of opening to the outside. In the past few years, China's legislature--the NPC--has enacted a series of relevant laws to protect the legitimate interests of foreign investors, creating a favorable environment for their investment in China. This policy has won the applause of foreign economic circles. In November last year, Roger Sullivan, chairman of the National Sino-American Trade Commission, said after a visit to China as the head of a group of American entrepreneurs: "Today's China reminds people of Singapore in the 1960's. This can indeed increase people's confidence." He admitted that China's policies and measures for improving the investment environment have "substantially raised foreign investors' interest" and that on the issue of remitting profits "China's regulations are looser than other Third World countries."

Second, China enjoys a good reputation in international trade and credit markets. According to a report of FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE of the Federal Republic of Germany on 27 October 1986, the West European money market which does \$3,000 billion a year in business listed China as a debtor country with least risk. THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL wrote in November 1986 that Hong Kong's banking circle believed that China's annual payment on foreign debt amounts to only 6.6 percent of its foreign exchange income, which is the lowest in the world.

3. China is backed by a solid material basis. China has all the mines that are known to the world. Its tungsten, stibium, molybdenum, zinc, titanium, aluminum, and rare-earth deposits are the greatest in the world; its uranium, coal, iron, and oil deposits are also among the greatest in the world; and its light and industrial products, textiles, farm and sideline products are world famous for their fine quality and low prices.

Western Europe's strong points are demonstrated in funds, technology, and talented personnel.

In economic cooperation, both parties can grow by developing their strong points and avoiding their weaknesses. Western Europe can make up China's deficiencies with its funds; China can make up Western Europe's deficiencies with its raw materials and market. This is conducive to China as well as to Western Europe. The prices of products in Western Europe will decline, their profits will increase, and they will become more competitive in international markets.

In S&T cooperation, the levels of development in China and Western Europe are different and there is a big gap between their starting points, but they both face the challenge of new science and technology, which is something they have in common. To narrow the gap between China and developed countries in science and technology, China should do all it can to catch up. Even Western Europe is not free from worries. Is it not true that many West Europeans feel that they are "lagging behind the United States and Japan?" An old Chinese saying goes: "A boat sailing against the current must forge ahead or it will be driven back." This is exactly what our situation is today. Today's S&T development brings about changes as each day goes by; therefore, it is impossible for any country to be the best in all fields no matter how advanced it is. Although Western Europe has advanced technology, a variety of S&T departments, and a host of talented people, China has its originality in medical science, earthquake forecasting, and even such high technology as satellite launching. Sincere cooperation between China and Western Europe can benefit both parties.

To speed up economic and technological cooperation between China and Western Europe, China welcomes West European scientists, economists, engineers, professors, and doctors to give lectures in China during vacations or to work in China after their retirement. Mr (Gelixi), retired engineer of the Federal Republic of Germany, who was hired in 1984 as the director of the Wuhan Diesel Engine Plant in China, has gained very good experiences and won applause of all fields.

We can tell by summing up the above analysis that the range of cooperation between China and West Europe is wide and that the future is bright. But, only through mutual efforts can China and West Europe realize this prospect.

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ZHAO ZIYANG: LIU BINYAN'S POPULARITY UNDERSTANDABLE

Hong Kong KUANG CHIAO CHING [WIDE ANGLE] in Chinese No 177, 16 Jun 87 pp 34-35

[Article by Liu Xiaofen [0491 2556 5358]: "Zhao Ziyang Discusses Liu Binyan and 'Furongzhen' ('Fairylnd')"]

[Text] He Jingzhi [6320 2417 0037], deputy director of the CPC Central Committee Propaganda Department, recently discussed the issue of Liu Binyan [0491 6333 7159], vice president of the China Writers Association, surprising many people abroad. He said that "The inspiration for some of the reportage written by Liu Binyan was probably good. Liu Binyan is still a writer, and still holds the post of vice president of the China Writers Association. We still have hopes for him, and expect him to work hard, correct his mistakes, and be unanimously reelected at the next Writers Association election. If he really raises his consciousness, corrects his mistakes, and wants to rejoin the party, we will still welcome him." This evaluation of Liu Binyan by He Jingzhi was obviously not a private opinion. In which case, what was its motivation?

Liu Binyan's Works Enable the People To Express Their Anger

I went to Beijing in the last 10 days of May 1987 to seek an answer to this issue. It turned out that Zhao Ziyang had discussed the issue of Liu Binyan while on a recent work inspection tour of Liaoning Province. It was said that a cadre in Liaoning had included remarks on the issue of Liu Binyan in a work report to Zhao Ziyang. He said that several works written by Liu Binyan that exposed certain issues in Liaoning were sheer calumny and slander, and had caused a lot of work problems for some units in Liaoning. Hearing this, Zhao Ziyang expressed his own opinion, saying that "Some of Liu Binyan's works do not tally with the facts, but it cannot be said that all of the things he has written are rumors! I think that some of his criticism is factual." He indicated that certain of Liu Binyan's works will still be able to be published and sold. He said that "Of the three people who were recently expelled from the party, Liu Binyan had the greatest influence. His works have been very well received by their readers. Why is this?" Zhao Ziyang posed this incisive question. Since no one answered it, he went on himself to say that "This is because there are unhealthy tendencies in our party which, moreover, are still quite serious in some places. The people are angry, and reading Liu Binyan's exposes enables them to express their anger. Thus, Liu Binyan being expelled from the party indeed does not mean that we ourselves

have no faults and make no mistakes." He went on to warn that "It should be seen that we still have faults, and will have to make up our minds to strive to improve our work."

This discussion by Zhao Ziyang was not covered in the Chinese press. There were some discrepancies in the details and terms used in the editions that were given to me by several friends, but the general spirit was consistent. Thus, the motivation for He Jingzhi's evaluation of Liu Binyan was clarified.

There Are Differing Views on Yao Xueyin's Article

It was said that Zhao Ziyang posed the following question in this discussion in Liaoning: "What good articles do you think have been published in the newspapers recently?" Only one person answered, saying that Yao Xueyin's [1202 7185 0995] article was pretty good. This article was a rewrite of a speech that Yao Xueyin had given at a national CPPCC session. In that speech, he had criticized Zhang Xianliang [1728 6343 0081] without mentioning his name for writing "pornography," criticized by name the preposterous Sichuan opera "Pan Jinlian" ("Bound-Feet Pan"), and severely censured the chaotic condition of literature and art circles in the past several years. An authoritative person allegedly enjoyed Yao Xueyin's speech very much, urged him to revise it, and then authorized its publication in the newspapers. Zhao Ziyang did not give his opinion of Yao Xueyin's article, saying only that "There are differing views on this article."

Zhao Ziyang Thinks That It Is Entirely Possible for the Film "Fairyland" To Be Shown Abroad

In addition to mentioning Liu Binyan in that discussion in Liaoning, Zhao Ziyang also discussed the film "Fairyland" on another occasion. On the eve of 1 May, International Labor Day, a mass rally was held in Beijing to give awards to model workers. As a recipient of the "May First Labor Medal," Xie Jin [6200 2516], director of "Fairyland", attended the rally. Zhao Ziyang met Xie Jin and talked with him about the film. Xie Jin said that "Fairyland" would be shown in China, but had not been approved for showing abroad. He asked, "If it can be shown in China, why can it not be shown abroad?" Zhao Ziyang immediately asked which unit had made this decision, and clearly indicated that it was unreasonable not to allow "Fairyland" to be shown abroad. In the midst of the usual disturbances preceding the screening of "Fairyland," someone had criticized the film for overexposing the seamy side of the "great cultural revolution." On this point, Zhao Ziyang said that "We all personally experienced the 'great cultural revolution.' I think that 'Fairyland' underexposed rather than overexposed it."

When Zhao Ziyang was only the premier, he was mainly concerned about economic construction and reform issues, while his views on literature and art were rarely heard. But now that he is the acting general secretary of the party, the situation has changed. Ideology is a major responsibility of the party which the general secretary has to pay special attention to. It is said that Zhao Ziyang has held many discussions on this issue recently. The two abovementioned ones that I recorded and narrated seem to indicate his views on literature and art, and his attitude on handling literary and artistic issues.

Zhao Ziyang's views and attitudes naturally affect the literary and artistic atmosphere in China. In order to illustrate this atmosphere, I will now introduce several interesting stories that I heard in Beijing.

Deng Liqun Invites Wang Meng for a Talk

On a certain day in April 1987, Deng Liqun [6772 0500 5028], director of the CPC Central Committee Propaganda Department, suddenly invited Wang Meng [3769 5536], Minister of Culture, editor-in-chief of RENMIN WENXUE (PEOPLES LITERATURE), and vice president of the China Writers Association, for a talk. In the various political movements in China in the past, the Ministry of Culture was always the place where trouble began. Since the recent fight to combat bourgeois liberalization was launched, the rumor that Wang Meng and Gao Zhanxiang [7559 0594 4382] would be removed from office could be heard from time to time. Despite what Wang Meng had said on public occasions, it was believed that he still felt uneasy. When he heard that Deng Liqun wanted to talk to him, he was allegedly rather nervous. Not knowing what issues this talk might involve, he quickly prepared a file of material on certain sensitive issues that have arisen since he was appointed Minister of Culture. Who would have thought that the large briefcase of material that Wang Meng took to the talk was to be totally useless. Deng Liqun indeed did not raise any issues for Wang Meng to explain, but instead gave full approval to the work of the Ministry of Culture.

Wang Meng Did Not Expect That Deng Liqun Would Make This Kind of an Evaluation

The main spirit of Deng Liqun's remarks on that occasion can be summed up in one sentence: "The Ministry of Culture is made up of an outstanding group of people, and is expected to do outstanding work." Not even Wang Meng himself had expected this kind of an evaluation.

Deng Liqun Declares That the Issue of Liu Zaifu Is an Academic and Ideological One

When discussing the controversy over Liu Zaifu's [0491 0375 1788] theory of literature and art, Deng Liqun recently declared that "The issue of Liu Zaifu is an academic and ideological one." This young literary and art theorist was severely criticized in HONG QI more than a year ago. Since the fight to combat bourgeois liberalization was launched, he also handed in a letter of resignation over an incident of "censorship" in WENXUE PINGLUN [LITERARY CRITICISM] magazine. Nor did he attend the recent session of the national CPPCC. People abroad were watching to see if he would become a key target of this fight. Deng Liqun's declaration has relieved people's misgivings on this issue.

The appearance of these kinds of stories has enabled the tense atmosphere that had appeared for a time in literary and art circles to be gradually restored to a harmonious one.

Zhao Ziyang's Speeches Win Deng Xiaoping's Approval, and Using the Fight to Combat Bourgeois Liberalization as a Pretext To Revive "Leftist Movements" Will Surely Be Rebuffed

The CPC has declared that the fight to combat bourgeois liberalization will go on for a long time and have to continue to be developed in depth. However, in major speeches given in the middle of May 1987 that were approved by Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang indicated that developing the fight in depth will indeed not imply carrying on a movement, making everyone undergo ordeals, or creating a tense atmosphere.

Of course, there are still those in China who need to carry on movements. I heard in Beijing that some people are using all kinds of methods to carry out political activities, saying that all of the academic, theoretical, and literary and art work that has been accomplished since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee has been seriously infused with bourgeois liberalization, and indicating their desire to "set things right" again by criticizing a number of people by name. Creating this kind of tension can only affect the stability and unity of China, making it impossible to continue to carry out the policies of reform, opening to the outside world, and invigoration of the economy.

Deng Xiaoping has clearly indicated the need for "everything to proceed according to plan." Zhao Ziyang has repeatedly and firmly pointed out that "leftist" movements must absolutely not be used to fight bourgeois liberalization. This accords with the will of the people and the general trend of events. Recent conditions in China indicate that trying to use the fight to combat bourgeois liberalization as a pretext to revive "leftist movements" will certainly not succeed.

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SHIFT IN POLITICAL WIND FAVORS RIGHT

Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 7, Jul 87 pp 27-31

[Article by Lu Jingshi [7120 0079 1102]: "Ascendancy of the Left Comes to a Quick End"]

[Text] Just a little over 100 days after Hu Yaobang lost power and was dethroned from the general secretaryship on 16 January, the political wind has suddenly changed direction again. With his "keen insight," Master Deng, the ruler of Zhongnanhai, "discovered that the main problem remains leftist obstruction" and has ordered the helmsman to steer "all the way to the right." Since May Day, authoritative figures in China have first revised then completely silenced their "antiliberalization" rhetoric, so strident a while ago. Taking advantage of student demonstrations late last year, some people fed Master Deng with false intelligence, thus adding fuel to the flames. "Leftist forces," already amassed and waiting in the wings, sprang into action in full strength with the pretext of "ridding the emperor of evil ministers" and forced Master Deng to "change horses." Yet 4 months later today, "self-criticism" has unexpectedly set in and the "antiliberalization" campaign is firmly grounded. Could there possibly have been a miracle? What are the internal factors and external pressures? What has tipped the scales? All this is worth pondering over.

Arriving at Beijing on the eve of May Day, this writer first discovered that all his friends had more or less the same expression as late last year: everybody still looked concerned and worried. Five weeks later, when he was about to bid farewell to the capital and head south for Hong Kong, he noticed that many well-informed people there looked very happy. To get to the bottom of this strange phenomenon, he returned his plane ticket, postponed his departure, and stayed in Beijing to investigate. Finally, after working through various channels, he ferreted out the underlying reasons for the change of heart within the CPC's top echelons and pieced together the major trend today. This trip has not been in vain after all. Here facts are presented for the reference and study of compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon.

Examination As A Mere Matter of Form

Hu Yaobang was ousted from power in mid-January, but he was not the only person in Beijing who did not have a happy Spring Festival (29 January).

Leading figures in the "CYL faction" all looked worried as they waited for criticism or were being criticized. In addition, a large number of intellectuals branded as having engaged in "bourgeois liberalization" had a premonition of impending disaster.

Then came word from Zhongnanhai that Little Hu (Qili) [5170 0796 4539] had "criticized himself" while "shedding bitter tears" and, protected by Yang Shangkun [2799 1424 2492], cleared the hurdles of the "five heroes" and the "Central Discipline Inspection Commission." Qiao Shi [0829 4258], too, underwent "self-criticism" of a sort. Because Master Deng has always had a high opinion of him, he managed to get away without much severe criticism. The last one to go in for half-hearted "examination" was Wan Li [8001 6849]. He, pigheaded in a way typical of Henan natives, was at first reluctant to do any "self-criticism." However, his "speech to the soft science conference" touched upon Liu Binyan [0491 6333 7159], the most untouchable figure of all. This event made it difficult even for Deng Xiaoping to shield him, although the former has usually protected and held him in high esteem. In the end, Wan Li had no choice but to do a round of examination "in a perfunctory way." He was subsequently cleared. Other members of the "CYL faction" and individuals closely related to it each did their own thing, some fighting back, some expressing sincere contrition. There were numerous such cases.

People in the know say that one of the "die-hards" in Hu Yaobang's "cabinet" was Zhu Houze [2612 0624 3419], who had been transferred from Guizhou to Beijing to take charge of propaganda. He refused to knuckle under Little Deng (Liquan) [6772 0500 5028] or to criticize himself. Instead he publicly declared, "Let history judge the rights and wrongs, deeds and misdeeds of the case." Also unyielding was Ruan Chongwu [7086 1504 2976], who had been transferred from Shanghai to Beijing to be minister of public security. He clung to his enlightened ideas on the issue of "student troubles" and refused to order their crackdown. Although he was denounced for his "humanism" and "weakness and incompetence," he actually did a big favor for the Chinese Communists: Had the Beijing and Shanghai police started shooting indiscriminately and killed a couple of college students with their modern weapons, the result would probably have been disastrous. A friend with close ties to the police said that there is a group of cadres even within the public security machinery who admire Ruan Chongwu's independent thinking and indifference to his own personal bureaucratic fortunes.

Two Elder Statesmen Face Off: One Vote Against One Vote

Less than 3 months after Wan Li examined himself over the "soft science conference," Zhao Ziyang told cadres from Liaoning Province, "While Liu Binyan's works contain inaccuracies, they are not totally inconsistent with the facts. Some of his articles are correct and have been instrumental in exposing unhealthy trends and criticizing bureaucratism." He even said, "Not all Liu Binyan's works are unprintable. Some can be printed... And if he admits his errors, he should be welcome to rejoin the party." (Apparently taking a cue from the acting general secretary, Deng Liquan and He Jingzhi [6320 2417 0037] have successively expressed a similar opinion to Chinese and foreign reporters.) Wan Li openly told the national soft science work conference, "The first kind of loyalty is certainly necessary; however, the

second kind of loyalty is also needed in the course of reform." This statement was not without "backing," nor was it just a "personal opinion." Only the presence of powerful "leftist" forces at the time forced Master Deng to take the painful decision to leave Wan Li twisting in the wind.

Rumors have it that when the higher echelons of the CPC discussed the succession issue affecting political and government positions at the center back in March, Deng Xiaoping recommended Wan Li to be the next premier, only to be vetoed by the boss behind the "left wing," the economic authority who loves listening to storytelling and ballad singing in Suzhou dialect. This "lover of storytelling" went all out to push the candidacy of Deng Liqun as the next party general secretary, a bid firmly opposed by Deng Xiaoping. Hence the so-called "one-vote-to-one-vote" impasse.

From early December last year to early March this year, the generals of the "left" in Beijing buckled on their armor, mounted their horses, and charged into battle against the "right" (a minority of whose members were certainly the people involved in "liberalization"). They encircled and persuaded them to surrender and finally annihilated them. Since March, however, these unpopular daring generals have shown their true colors: they could neither come up with anything constructive nor produce substantive critical achievements. Because the masses resisted them in every way, the "antiliberalization" campaign has ground to a halt. Overexposed and gradually losing favor with people at the highest levels, it found itself in a beleaguered state both internally and externally.

The series of major happenings on the political stage in just 10 weeks from mid-March to late May offer us a clear view of the internal and external factors behind the changing scene today.

How the "Left Wing" Angers Old Deng

To begin with, a so-called "contribution-soliciting work conference involving two magazines (HONGQI and WENYI LILUN YU PIPING) and a newspaper (GUANGMING RIBAO)" was held in Zhuozhou County, Hebei Province, under the detailed state-management of Lin Mohan [2651 7817 3211] (vice chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles and an adviser to the Ministry of Culture), a literary and artistic theoretician of the left, and He Jingzhi, deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department, and with Little Deng acting as commander-in-chief. The conference took place amid much fanfare and was attended by leftist writers, theoreticians, editors, and even professors and scholars from provinces and municipalities around the country. For a while Zhuozhou County took on a militant air. Reportedly Wang Renzhi [3769 1804 0037], the newly appointed director of the Central Propaganda Department, joined his boss in a free-wheeling chorus of the "five struggles in the realm of ideology since 1979" to illustrate the serious proliferation of "bourgeois liberalization."

At a meeting of the new Central Propaganda Department earlier, Little Deng had talked of "four big struggles" and enumerated the instances in which Hu Yaobang ordered that the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign be halted, leading to its demise in 24 days. He also bitterly denounced the corrupting

effect of Hu Qili's speech on creative freedom to the fourth writers' congress, which the latter attended on behalf of the CPC. Now he, Lin Mohan, He Jingzhi, Wang Renzhi, and Meng Weizai [1322 0251 0762], the newly appointed director of the Literature and Art Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department, raised the pitch of the rhetoric even higher. Not only did they turn the four struggles into five struggles, but they also condemned as a "major event in which bourgeois liberalization elements ganged up against party magazine HONGQI" the spate of articles and reports refuting Chen Yong [7115 8673] and supporting Liu Zaifu [0491 0375 1788] that appeared after HONGQI published last April an article in which Chen Yong criticized Liu Zaifu's "Literature as Subject" and "Theory of Composite Character."

Even more atrocious was that under a centralized command Little Deng and his bunch of comrades-in-arms clamored in unison for a new round of "rectification" and made the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee their target of attack. Letting success go to their heads, these people arrogantly demanded that "ideological liberation" and "renewal of ideas" be refuted and even maliciously tried to destroy the notion that "practice is the only criterion of truth," which was put forward by the "theoretical and practical meeting" in the past. In an address to the national conference on political and ideological work in trade unions held in Tianjin in April, Little Deng again demanded even more loudly a "new round of rectification" to "eliminate the wrongs resulting from the previous round of rectification."

By then Deng Liqun had angered Deng Xiaoping as well as Zhao Ziyang. It has been reported that Zhao Ziyang ordered the tapes of the Zhuozhou conference and of Deng Liqun's speech in Tianjin sent to him for investigation and made a report to Deng Xiaoping, whereupon the top leader flew into a rage and rebuked Wang Renzhi for "talking sheer nonsense." He asked, "What wrong could there be after the Third Plenary Session?" It was against this backdrop that Zhao Ziyang summoned Wang Renzhi for a lecture and announced openly, "There is something very dubious about Xu Weicheng [1776 1919 6134]. He cannot be allowed to continue exercising propaganda power in Beijing." During the student movement, university students had Xu Weicheng in mind when they angrily denounced BEIJING RIBAO as a "Goebbels-run" paper which "fabricates rumors."

As acting general secretary, Zhao Ziyang had earlier realized that he could no longer let these "leftist kings" do as they pleased. Thus even before he reprimanded the left-leaning Central Propaganda Department, he launched an "all-around and timely self-defensive counterattack." Little Deng had directed Wang Renzhi to convene a national conference for propaganda chiefs. In preparing for the conference, Deng Liqun and Wang Renzhi deliberately decided not to let the acting general secretary know. But they also felt that leaving Zhao Ziyang totally in the dark would be unjustified, so they informed him by telephone in the morning on the closing day of the conference; there was no "sincerity at all on their part to invite him." Zhao Ziyang, however, was ready: He immediately rushed to the conference to address the entire gathering and proceeded to correct the erroneous leftist views held by Little Deng and his ilk.

Voters Support Liu, Wang, and Fang

General elections were held in all districts in Beijing in April to choose grassroots people's representatives. "To do a good job in the ideological work of Beijing University students," Haidian ward had to postpone balloting for a month. Needless to say, this election was a "public opinion poll" reflecting the genuine wishes of the people. Election returns showed that the voters preferred the several intellectuals who bore the brunt of the attack and were punished in the "antiliberalization campaign." Naturally, the proportion of cadres from central organs who avoided voting and voluntarily abstained also testified to the public apathy to this kind of election which had the appearance but not the spirit of democracy.

Liu Binyan's and Wang Ruoshui's [3769 5387 3055] electoral district was Xiaozhuang office in Chaoyang ward in Beijing. It included the offices of RENMIN RIBAO and ZHONGGUO RIBAO and the graduate school of Beijing Mechanical Institute as well as employees of the No 1 National Cotton Plant and a number of state-owned stores. According to friends who work for ZHONGGUO RIBAO, 55 people at the newspaper office had nominated Wang Ruoshui as a candidate. (Under election regulations, one can become a grassroots candidate if he is nominated by 10 voters.) A person was put in charge of investigating Wang Ruoshui's advanced deeds and an experienced translator was also sent to visit him at his home. When they got wind of this, the authorities above stepped in and rejected Wang Ruoshui's candidacy, the reason being that "he has deviated from Marxism in theory and questioned the four cardinal principles in politics." At the same time, the decision by the office of the RENMIN RIBAO and the graduate students of Beijing Mechanical Institute to nominate Liu Binyan as a candidate had also been overruled by the units above in charge of elections. Two reasons were cited, namely that "Liu Binyan opposes party leadership and the four cardinal principles and that he is now administratively affiliated with China Writers Association, so that he does not belong to the electoral district of RENMIN RIBAO anymore." In the end, Liu Binyan was disqualified as a candidate. Beijing might disregard constitutional provisions and trample upon voters' democratic rights, but 680 voters in the Xiaozhuang area voted for Wang Ruoshui and 540 for Liu Binyan.

In yet another openly unconstitutional move in grassroots elections, Beijing's East 48 Electoral District in Dongcheng ward denied the candidacy of Liu Xinwu [0491 1800 2976], former editor-in-chief of RENMIN WENXUE. Liu Xinwu lost his job and was criticized for publishing Ma Jian's [7456 1696] novella, "Show Your Tongue Coating or Nothingness." Whatever the rights and wrongs of the case, his right to stand as a candidate should not have been infringed upon. In the end, Liu Xinwu remained "a person who has made mistakes" and could not stand for election.

Surprisingly, a so-called "voters' victory" and, by extension, "a loss of nerve on the part of senior officials," did occur in Yanyuan electoral district (Beijing University) in Haidian ward. (In order to "educate university students," all elections were postponed 1 month and 3 days in Bidongcheng, Xichang, and Chaoyang electoral districts in Haidian ward.) On 27 May, Li Shuxian [2621 3219 8300], Fang Lizhi's [2455 0536 0037] wife, was elected grassroots people's representative. Ideologically open-minded, Li

Shuxian is an associate professor at the Physics Department of Beijing University. She and Fang Lizhi are a couple of like-minded intellectuals. Most Beijing University voters would have voted for Fang Lizhi if they could. Reports suggest that Professor Li Shuxian captured 8,000 of the more than 9,000 votes at Beijing University, which gives us a good idea of which way the people were leaning.

Blunders Abound at Zhuozhou Conference

Well-informed sources say that after the Zhuozhou conference "leftist kings" like Deng Liqun, Lin Mohan, and Wang Renzhi had planned to organize a "mass criticism group" covering politics, economics, philosophy, history, literature, art, and education. Numerous articles were to be written to criticize "liberalization" on topics determined by China's theoretical authority. Manuscripts were to be solicited in two ways: They might be prepared separately or by a group of writers organized as a writing corps at a hotel.

Deng Liqun differed sharply from Zhao Ziyang in his evaluation of the movie "Furong Township." While the latter praised the movie and recommended it for participation in foreign film festivals, Little Deng roundly condemned it for "vilifying the image of party cadres and discrediting the CPC." In the wake of this argument, a "10-men film criticism group" was set up at a hotel whose major assignment was to criticize first "Furong Township" and, second, "Black Cannon." To mobilize initiative, everybody was given a subsidy of 15 yuan, in addition to good food. They were paid as much as 90 to 150 yuan per 1,000 characters in contribution fee. (Note: the top rate on the mainland today is 20 yuan per 1,000 characters.) Unfortunately, although a bunch of "brave men" did respond to the handsome rewards, their caliber was very poor and few forceful, well-reasoned articles were produced. Not long ago, the writing corps put together by Deng Liqun, Lin Mohan, Wang Renzhi, and He Jingzhi penned a total of 400 articles critical of "liberalization." These works, purchased at a high price, were reviewed again and again by Chen Yong, Yao Xueyin [1202 7185 0995] and Zang Kejia [5258 0344 1367], but not a single piece was deemed worthy of selection.

According to an editor who was present at the Zhuozhou conference, all sorts of "leftist" scholars made numerous ludicrous mistakes at the meeting, betraying a lack of common knowledge. A professor of Chinese from Hunan, for instance, actually said, "The Literature and Art Publishing House in Hunan recently put out a title 'Mrs Thatcher and Her Lover.' It is filthy and disgusting. Wouldn't the publication of this kind of book affect Sino-British relations?" This guy mistook Lady Chatterly for Mrs Thatcher, the current British prime minister, and was even worried about Sino-British friendship. How absurd!

Reports say that when Zhao Ziyang was informed that Little Deng and others privately raised contribution fees and rented a hotel to give preferential treatment to the "mass criticism group" they organized, the acting general secretary and premier directed that the expenses incurred not be reimbursed.

By then the two groups were clearly pitted against each other, swords drawn and sabres rattling. In news and publishing, Director Du Daozheng [2629 1418 2973], acting on orders from his superiors, repeatedly criticized magazines like Shanghai's SHIJIE JINGJI DAobao and Beijing's DUSHU. Zhao Ziyang, on the other hand, thinks highly of SHIJIE JINGJI DAobao. A young man who works at Zhongnanhai said that the premier has proposed that officials in charge of structural reform and economic work read the magazine regularly and sometimes even personally selects articles in the publication and has them reprinted for the consumption of relevant department heads in the State Council. Director Du Daozheng originally wanted to order the suspension and reorganization of SHIJIE JINGJI DAobao but refrained from acting too rashly for fear of clashing with the acting general secretary.

Internal Dissensions Within the Left Over Power Distribution

In March and April, internal strife broke out within the left over power redistribution. It has now been confirmed that Bo Yibo [5631 0001 3134] had a shouting match with Wang Zhen [3769 7201] over the distribution of seats at the 13th National Party Congress [NPC]. The "two heroes" brought their case all the way to Deng Xiaoping. Noting what was happening, Deng Xiaoping announced that he would be chairman of the "13th NPC nomination committee" himself and made Bo Yibo vice chairman to act as a buffer.

Actually Wang Zhen's anger is understandable. Not long ago this veteran general has been removed as principal of the central party school in favor of Gao Yang [7559 2254], who is younger and better-educated. His removal reportedly had the personal approval of Master Deng. The aim was to improve educational quality at the school and correct the "left" tendency and ossification in educational policy. During his tenure as school principal, the elderly general had committed many "leftist" mistakes. Two are public knowledge. On one occasion, he openly rebuked Ba Jin [1572 6855] in the school hall, criticizing him as an "old hand in opposing communism" and for "devoting himself to denouncing the CPC and Lu Xun [7627 6598]." Second, he turned the graduate course of the senior party school into a "controlled study course" for senior cadres. For instance, once he joined the course, Pan Weimin [3382 4850 3046], who had just been dismissed as director of the propaganda department of the Shanghai Municipal CPC Committee, discovered that his personal freedom and all legitimate rights were gone. This is because Wang Zhen stipulated that all participants in the course must secure permission before they made any contacts with the outside world or left the school to visit relatives and friends. In effect the course became a controlled or concentration camp. It is thus clear that Principal Wang Zhen, who years ago led the 359th Brigade in opening up Nanni Bay, acts very much like a war lord.

Meanwhile, Deng Liqun's left and arrogant ways and his determination to thwart Zhao Ziyang's policies of reform and opening to the outside world had not only annoyed the premier but also infuriated Yang Shangkun, Deng Xiaoping's assistant on the Central Military Commission. Yang Shangkun is said to have argued that Deng Liqun, with his vaulting ambition and factionalism, was a "hidden worry for the party." A self-designated "firm believer in Marxism-Leninism," Little Deng had little respect for Yang Shangkun. The ignoble

role of his hatchet man, Xu Weicheng, in the Cultural Revolution only served to anger the permanent vice chairman and secretary general of the Central Military Commission even further. (Yang Shangkun's wife, Li Bazhao [2621 0130 6856] was persecuted and attacked several times by red guards from the literary and artistic circles during the Cultural Revolution.) Yang Shangkun once reprimanded Deng Liqun for his rigidity at a meeting of the secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Deng Liqun's subsequent failure to be admitted to the "central five-men group" is obviously related to the strong resistance by Zhao Ziyang and Yang Shangkun.

Zhao Ziyang Given Carte Blanche

A clear turning-point occurred on 30 April. Meeting with Alfonso Guerra, sub-secretary general of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, Deng Xiaoping pointed out bluntly, "It is not easy to correct decades-old 'leftist' ideology. Our main mission is to oppose the 'left.'" Master Deng added, "We have obstruction from both the 'right' and 'left.' On balance, however, the greater danger comes from the 'left.'"

This new tune has been a shot in the arms for Zhao Ziyang, burdened as he is with dual party and government responsibilities. Arrogant and reckless, the left wing had been directing its fire at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, which laid down the key policies of reform and opening to the outside world. This prompted Deng Xiaoping to give Zhao Ziyang carte blanche to fight back vigorously against the onslaught of the left. Zhao Ziyang's three major speeches on 11, 13, and 23 May were the opening salvo of a new "all-out war against the left."

Several months ago, when Zhao Ziyang was setting limits to the "antiliberalization" campaign in Document No 4 of the CPC Central Committee in order to rein in the surging movement, Hu Qiaomu [5170 2890 2606], Deng Liqun, and the like were chanting a battle song warning that "opposition to bourgeois liberalization must not degenerate into superficiality." They created disturbances everywhere, from the central to the local levels, and condemned Zhao Ziyang as a "fire-fighting chief" through and through. If the "fire-fighting chief" was only equipped with a bucket of water then, now he has a high-pressure water hose.

Master Deng Angrily Reprimands Little Deng

Both the Zhuozhou conference, carefully orchestrated by Deng Liqun, and his belligerent speech at the national conference on ideological and political work in trade unions have become examples of what not to do to avoid self-exposure. Xu Weicheng was rebuked by the acting general secretary for privately convening in the capital's outskirts a mobilization meeting on "opposing bourgeois liberalization in the countryside" (to oppose Document No 4). Wang Renzhi was summoned and lectured by Deng Xiaoping for his wild talk about a "new round of rectification." In short, the left wing, which was riding high just a few months ago, has met a disaster worse than falling into disfavor because it overplayed its hand.

Among the "five major heroes," Deng Liqun is a die-hard who stubbornly clings to the "leftist" direction. Reports say that Master Deng summoned him for a face-to-face discussion in early June in which Deng Xiaoping chastised him for a string of mistakes involving personnel and the party line, particularly his appointment to important posts of members of the "rebel group" like Wang, Xu, and Ma (said to be the ringleader of the "three hardliners in the NPC" during the Cultural Revolution and currently liaison man in the All-China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles and various associations for Deng Liqun). Unconvinced, Deng Liqun asked about his assignment after the 13th NPC, only to be snubbed by Deng Xiaoping, who said, "After the 13th NPC, both you and I will retire, right?" Little Deng protested that he is not old enough to retire. Master Deng burst into laughter and said, "True, you are slightly younger than I, but your thinking has aged more than mine." Piqued, Little Deng entered Beijing Hospital on 9 June.

As for the several other leading figures who brought about Hu Yaobang's downfall, Bo Yibo was the first to go along with Zhao Ziyang, admitting that "reform had been ignored" in theoretical propaganda and declaring loudly that "political reports to the 13th NPC must be on reform and nothing else." Wang Zhen was forced to apologize to Old Ba (Jin), saying that his original intention was to "criticize Bakunin." He never managed to recover from this setback: apart from meeting with Japanese a couple of times on orders from above, he has made few appearances. Hu Qiaomu has also begun singing a different tune in time. For instance, when Zhao Ziyang reproved him to his face for failing to include a single topic on reform or the open policy in the hundred topics he drew up for the "left-wing" writing corps, this "chameleon" had the nerve to flatly deny the whole thing. All this is evidence enough that the left is doomed.

Amazing Change in Deng Xiaoping's Ideology

On 25 May, when Hu Qili had been instructed by Zhao Ziyang to preside over meetings of the secretariat of the CPC Central Committee while the premier is out of the country and when Wan Li had also decided to stand in for the premier for a limited time, Hu Qili circulated in Zhongnanhai a series of speeches based on Deng Xiaoping's ideas that Zhao Ziyang had delivered at recent meetings of the secretariat. This long circular consisted of four parts: 1) reasons for making these speeches; 2) political issues; 3) the superiority and appeal of socialism; and 4) the issue of uniting the majority and establishing a theoretical corps.

This circular offers the public a glimpse of the extent to which Deng Xiaoping's ideology has changed. As far as his understanding of the "left" and right is concerned, he underwent an about-face before and after the Spring Festival. First, Master Deng has instructed that reports to the 13th NPC "focus on just one theme--reform--and nothing else." Theoretical and propaganda work must fall in line accordingly. Proceeding from this instruction, Zhao Ziyang has criticized the notion of "opposing liberalization" in the economic field and the fallacy that the "four cardinal principles are the key link, while reform and the open policy are details." He has also reprimanded "leftist" theoreticians for peddling outdated stuff indiscriminately. He encourages "bold theoretical exploration" and makes it

clear that "there are two missions for people on all fronts, upholding the four cardinal principles and reform." Quoting Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang said, "There is a criterion in practicing socialism, namely the extent to which productive forces have been developed." Elaborating this, he criticized the tendency to "discuss socialist principles in an abstract manner divorced from productive forces" and explained the truth that "poverty is not socialism." Yang Shangkun went further and revealed a secret about the late "great leader," Mao Zedong. He said, "Chairman Mao Zedong took relations of production very seriously throughout, but he never paid any attention to productive forces."

Finally, Hu Qili conveyed in the circular Zhao Ziyang's demand that in compliance with the "new line," old and new workers unite to form a brand-new theoretical corps. It is hopeless to depend on outdated theoreticians to expand their ranks." Support for conservative theoreticians like Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, Lin Mohan, Chen Yong, Sun Guohua [1327 0248 5478], Qin Liufang [4440 2692 2455], and their ilk is over. The days when people fell under the spell of "leftist" ideology are gone for good.

Last May was the 45th anniversary of the "talks at the Yanan forum on literature and art." Using this occasion, leftist writers and artists, including Yao Xueyin and Zang Kejia as well as people from the "Yanan school" and "Shandong art" school, gathered together under the direction and aegis of Deng Liqun for a flurry of activities, from academic discussions to creative workshops, from drama to song and dance. The events were costly to stage but were coolly received. Outdated performances like "The Press Gang" (skit, the average age of the performers was close to 70, which must be unique) and "12 Sickles" (Shaanxi opera, musical) will clearly bore the public and prove unpopular. The left may as well throw in its towel and quit.

12581

CSO: 4005/856

REPORTS ON PRESS REFORM, RECTIFICATION

Press Rectification

Beijing ZHONGGUO BAKAN BAO in Chinese 17 Jun 87 p 1

[By reporter Wang Liandi [3769 6647 1717]: "Successful Conclusion of Nationwide Appraisal of Youth Newspapers and Periodicals for Good News, Good Articles, and Good Activities; Upgrading Newspapers and Periodicals in Line With Press Rectification"]

[Text] Activities carried out in order to improve the quality of youth newspapers and periodicals, stimulate activism among writers and editors, and to actively correlate efforts with the "Nationwide Appraisal of Youth Newspapers and Periodicals as to Good News, Good Articles, and Good Activities," activities in line with the ongoing Central Committee's press rectification, were successfully concluded on 9 June. These activities had been participated in by 49 newspapers and periodicals belonging to 45 publishing establishments, and rewards were presented for 143 items of good news and good articles and for 5 good activities. The reward ceremony took place in the Yunnan Hall of the Great Hall of the People that afternoon.

The present activities were sponsored by the following 6 units: the Press Bureau of the CPC Propaganda Department, the Publications Bureau of the CPC Propaganda Department, the Central Propaganda Bureau of the Youth League, the All-China Journalists Association, the Chinese Publishers Association, and the Federation of Chinese Journalism Societies. Several specialists, scholars, and veterans of journalism had been invited to serve as members of the appraisal committee. The appraisal was carried out in two steps, a preliminary appraisal and final appraisal, lending mass character as well as authenticity to the procedure. It was the first time since the founding of the PRC for this kind of activity to take place. In his speech at the reward ceremony, Lu Yun [4151 0061], special advisor to the State Publications Bureau, pointed out: "At this time when we are engaged in a rectification of the press and in reinforcing our press and public media front, an activity as the present one gains additional significance. It will have a certain beneficial effect nationwide on improving the quality of youth newspapers and periodicals." Tang Fei [0781 7235], member of the party committee at the All-China Journalists Association and a secretary of its secretariat, gave the following evaluation of the present activities: "It ensured quality and

direction. All items that won rewards displayed specially high qualities as to themes, material used, and ideas expressed; they were written in vivid style and showed certain literary merit, this then made them so very appealing." He said: "The present activities were a contribution to our efforts to build up a reserve for our journalistic work force."

Yuan Liang [5913 0081], vice director of the Publication Bureau of the CPC Propaganda Department, presided over the reward ceremony. The list of reward recipients was announced by Wang Furu [3769 4395 1172], director of the Press Bureau of the CPC Propaganda Department. The following gave speeches at the meeting: Lu Yun, Tang Fei, Li Yuanchao [2621 3293 3390], members Liao Haisuo [1675 3189 2747] and Sun Changwen [1327 2490 2429] of the appraisal committee, and Xiao Dongsheng [5135 2639 0581] and Li Zhiping [2621 2535 1627] as representatives of the reward winning units. The following were also present at the reward ceremony: Hu Jiwei [5170 4921 0251], Wang Ziyue [3769 1311 6851], Wang Yekang [3769 2814 1660], and Liu Binjie [2692 3453 2638].

Ideological Awareness Demanded

Beijing ZHONGGUO BAKAN BAO in Chinese 1 Jul 87 p 1

[By reporter Deng Kemou [6772 0344 6180]: "Liu Zheng [0491 2973], Deputy Secretary, Hunan Provincial CPC Committee, Declared: Distributors Must Pay Serious Attention to Thought Rectification and Political Direction"]

[Text] "Newspaper and periodical distributing departments must give serious attention to ideological rectification and to the political direction, making social benefits the supreme criterion." This was the viewpoint that Liu Zheng, deputy secretary of the Hunan Provincial CPC Committee, expressed at a recent meeting.

Last year, Hunan Province published and distributed 620 million newspapers, over 57 million periodicals, and 170 million books. Much effort was expended by the distributing departments in these enterprises. Liu Zheng said, a problem that exists in the area of distribution is that party newspapers and periodicals, as well as high quality newspapers, periodicals, and books, do not achieve wide distribution, while certain publications which are beset with many problems, and which are seriously erroneous, are widely distributed. One reason for this state of affairs is that some distributing departments merely attend to trifles to the neglect of essentials, and pay attention to economic rather than social benefits. He demanded that distributing departments also study Central Committee documents, undertake rectification, and effect improvements, and that distribution must not only strive for excellence in quantitative, but more so in qualitative performance.

Liu Zheng demanded that in all localities throughout the province further reforms take place in the organization of distribution, and that distribution operations be invigorated. At the same time, control of individual retailers of newspapers, periodicals, and books, should be intensified, and a stop be put to the sale of illegal publications.

Interesting Local Newspapers

Beijing ZHONGGUO BAKAN BAO in Chinese 1 Jul 87 p 1

[By reporter Yao Mei [1202 4168]: "Conference of Leading Cadres from 57 Prefectural and Municipal Newspapers Reviewed Experiences and Lessons: How to Make Prefectural and Municipal Newspapers Interesting and Attractive"]

[Text] On 16 June, the third nationwide conference of prefectural and municipal newspapers for the exchange of experiences was held in Xiangfan, Hubei Province. Leading cadres of 57 prefectural and municipal newspapers from 25 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly controlled by the Central Government attended the conference.

Prefectural and municipal newspapers greatly proliferated since the 3d Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee. Presently, there are over 260 prefectural and municipal newspapers throughout the country, which take up more than 70 percent of all party committee organs above county rank. They have brought forth new ideas, to varying degrees, be it in the content of manuscripts submitted, the form of reporting, the way of writing articles, or the layout of the papers, thus contributing everywhere to the buildup of the spiritual and material civilization. Examples are: emphasis on exemplary cases in the reports of the ZHANGJIAKOU DAILY, attention to urban tourist attractions in the CHENGDE DAILY, emphasis on building up the work force in the BAODING MUNICIPAL DAILY, elimination of outdated customs and conventions by the YULIN DAILY, reporting on a reform conference in the XINGTAI DAILY, emphasis on news appearing in the first column of the first page in the XINGANG DAILY, increased service orientation of the YANBEI DAILY, trial of undertaking own distribution by the LUOYANG DAILY, discussion on updating concepts launched by the SHAOXING DAILY, organizing the collection of news on poor villages by the XIAOGAN DAILY, and multiple functions developed by the XIANGFAN DAILY. All these experiences were given serious attention, and were highly welcomed, by all who attended the conference. However, operation of some prefectural and municipal newspapers still face certain problems, which are mainly: An unjustifiable length of news items. Most prefectural and municipal newspapers are of four quarto pages, so that articles should be short and concise, but some papers print long articles on conferences, reproducing whole texts of speeches, and news reports of several thousand words. Newsworthy items are submerged in outworn phrases and conventionalities, and there is an undesirable lack of new ideas. The events that some news items or articles deal with may be current, but are of little benefit to the readers. Coverage is narrow, such as reporting at excessive length on news from higher authorities, and reporting too little on basic level news; too much reporting in a current-account style on news of production and bringing little news of importance or value. The format of some newspapers, furthermore, lacks vividness and attractiveness.

The present conference provided an opportunity to discuss the above-mentioned problems. The conference decided to start an effective appraisal of the news media and to develop energetically lateral ties between prefectural and municipal newspapers.

Press Rectification in Shanxi Province

Beijing ZHONGGUO BAOKAN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 87 p 1

[Text] Shanxi Provincial CPC Committee attached great importance to press rectification. In the past half year the committee concentrated on setting up experimental points of rectification, conducted training classes for leading press and publication cadres, reviewed and checked up on the main newspapers and periodicals published during the last 2 years, and set up a press rectification office for Shanxi Province.

In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of newspapers and periodicals in Shanxi Province. There are currently 78 newspapers and 158 periodicals throughout the province. These newspapers and periodicals have played an active role in promoting spiritual and material civilization. However, they are still faced with the problem of excessive numbers, not altogether rational distribution and structure, and conducting propaganda in a way that cannot yet be considered satisfactory. On 20 May, the Shanxi Provincial CPC Committee put forward suggestions for the rectification of newspapers and periodicals. Before doing so, the committee engaged in the work of setting up experimental points.

In the work of setting up experimental points, a start was made in mid-January at the Shanxi Provincial Youth Newspaper and Periodical Publishing House. The SHANXI QINGNIAN [SHANXI YOUTH], published by the said publishing house, had published some politically erroneous articles, in violation of press discipline, of low literary quality, and containing quite inappropriate formulations. During the rectification, the company's entire staff underwent studies which raised their ideological perception; they corrected the guiding policy of their publications, and effected an initial adjustment of the leadership group in their publishing house, while also reforming the editorial department of the SHANXI QINGNIAN. During the rectification of errors, they conducted a very strict criticism and extended patient assistance and education, focusing on drawing clear lines of demarcation between right and wrong. They achieved a deepening of understanding, without checking whether each individual surmounted his difficulties. After rectification, the provincial party committee endorsed and circulated the rectification experience of the SHANXI QINGNIAN throughout the province, as an effective means of encouragement and showing it off as a successful experiment. Subsequently, the editorial committee of the SHANXI DAILY also made arrangements for the rectification of the newspaper. Under the sponsorship of its editorial committee, the said publishing house will conduct five study courses in an effort to achieve a situation in which the leading comrades of all sectors, especially those selecting and editing materials will have, in rotation, the opportunity to engage in political studies. The Shanxi Provincial Public Health Department, Finance and Trade Consultation and Research Center, and the newspaper publishing establishment of Taiyuan Steelworks will also, within 5 months, arrange for rectification of their specialized periodicals and internal newspapers.

Currently, the various newspaper and periodical enterprises are in the process of carrying out a most intensive rectification of their operations.

Press Control Commissions Proposed

Beijing ZHONGGUO BAKAN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 87 p 1

[By reporter Zhang Fenzhi [1728 5358 0037]: "Leading Cadres of the ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN [CHINA YOUTH] and 10 Other Publishing Houses Proposed Establishment of Commissions for the Registration, Examination, and Assessment of Newspapers and Periodicals"]

[Text] "The establishment of commissions for the registration, examination, and assessment of newspapers and periodicals in all provinces, municipalities directly controlled by the Central Government, autonomous regions, and by the departments and commissions of the Central Committee, would be an important means of ensuring that the rectification of newspapers and periodicals will not be handled in a perfunctory way or that registration be obtained by 'going in the backdoor'." This proposal was put forward at a joint conference on June 25 held at Jilin by leading cadres from 11 publishing houses throughout the country.

This conference on newspaper and periodical publishing was sponsored by the Jilin magazine YANJIANG YU KOUCAI [SPEECH AND ELOQUENCE]. Invited to attend the conference were leading cadres from 11 newspaper and periodical publishing houses, namely from ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN [CHINESE YOUTH], XIN TIYU [NEW SPORTS], QINGNIAN YIDAI [YOUTHFUL GENERATION], DUZHE WENZHAI [READERS' DIGEST], QINGNIAN WENZHAI [YOUTHS' LITERARY DIGEST], SHIJIE BOLAN [LITERARY WORLD REVIEW], LIAONING QINGNIAN [LIAONING YOUTH], FUJIAN QINGNIAN [FUJIAN YOUTH], JIANKANG ZHI YOU [HEALTH FRIEND], and ZHONGGUO BAKAN BAO [CHINESE NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL NEWSPAPER]. As its central theme, the conference discussed how best to conduct an effective rectification of newspapers and periodicals, how to further improve the quality of newspapers and periodicals, and how to achieve a state in which newspapers and periodicals would truly benefit society and be of benefit for the people.

When discussing the rectification of newspapers and periodicals, the leading cadres from all the 11 publishing houses generally acknowledged that China's newspaper and periodical publishing has its flourishing aspects, but that it is actually now in a chaotic state, just as expressed by Comrade Du Daozheng [2629 1418 2973], director of the State Information and Publication Bureau, when he said: "It would be disastrous to continue in this chaotic way." It is therefore necessary to take action in line with the "six criteria" laid down by the Information and Publication Bureau and to effect most thorough investigations, check out before finding acceptable, and to strictly institute rectifications. All participants were, furthermore, agreed that rectification of newspapers and periodicals is an extremely serious affair; its results will affect millions of people, as it will also affect the future of China's newspaper and periodical industry. It is therefore necessary on the one hand to implement the ideological line of the party truly effectively, and on the principle of seeking truth from facts, as it is on the other hand necessary to prevent that action is simply taken in arbitrary uniformity. It must also not be tolerated that the matter is handled like an internal "family affair," or by "going in the backdoor." What is required is, on the one hand, the

rectification of all those low-grade and vulgar newspapers and periodicals, but also action against those "fake large empty bubbles," in order to arrive at a state in which newspapers and periodicals truly become best spiritual nourishment and good teachers and benefactors of their readers. To ensure the sound progress of the present newspaper and periodical rectification, all comrades attending the conference suggested that in addition to strengthening the organizational leadership of the CPC Central Committee's Propaganda Department and of the State Information and Publication Bureau, all provinces, municipalities directly controlled by the Central Government, autonomous regions, and all departments and commissions of the Central Government, as a general measure, set up commissions for the registration, examination, and assessment of newspapers and periodicals, to be specifically charged with the rectification and registration of newspapers and periodicals in their territory or under jurisdiction of organizations concerned, so as to ensure that rectification will not be conducted in a perfunctory manner.

Action Against Illegal Publications

Beijing ZHONGGUO BAKAN BAO in Chinese 11 Jul 87 p 1

[By reporter Li Li [2621 5461]: "All Localities and Sectors to Cooperate Energetically and Take Unified Action in a Resolute Crackdown on Illegal Publications"]

[Text] This reporter has learned at the exhibition of illegal publications held by the Information and Publication Bureau and on other occasions that the following phenomena are characteristic for the flood of illegal publications that have recently appeared: Illegal activities are getting more abhorrent and more secretive in their methods, and illegal publications cover everything from violence and murder to filth and sex. Illegal activities are frequently acting in collusion with small groups of people working in the publication, printing, and distribution departments and furthermore benefit from the permissiveness and support of certain persons in leadership positions.

Investigations of individually-operated book and newspaper stalls carried out in Beijing, Wuhan, and in other places have revealed a conspicuous increase in filthy and pornographic books and periodicals. The illegal publication "Xiexianlu Piaopiao" [Fluttering About in the Land of Evil Spirits], published under the fake publisher's name of "Eastern Art Group Publishing House," is a book filled with violence and murder as its main themes, interspersed with pornographic descriptions, a book so filthy as has never before been seen since the founding of the PRC, a book of an extremely poisonous character. In the Qiaokou district of Wuhan in a little over 3 months, 310 illegal publications were seized and 154 units apprehended for faking and forging publications. The book "Bu Ceng Shiluo de Rizhi" [Time Not Yet Lost], which appeared on Beijing's individually-operated book and newspaper stalls, had on its title page Qiong Yao [8825 3852], as author, but contained, merely dished up in a new form, a novel by a famous woman author. It had been published by the Yunnan National Publishing House, though the Yunnan National Publishing House had never published novels by Qiong Yao before.

Illegal publishing is often connected with economic crimes and criminal wrongdoing. Manager An Zhenming [1344 6297 2494] of the Antai Trading Co. in Nanchang, Yunnan Province, illegally printed martial novels, seeking to make a profit of 1.2 million yuan. They used their illegally obtained profits to bribe the leadership in editorial, printing, and distributing units. In Beijing, Zhang Xiaosheng [1728 2400 3932] and Liu Yijing [0491 0001 7234], though lacking capital, printing paper, and a publishing license, were successful in getting 150,000 copies of "Jiangwu Fengyun" [River Mist with Storm Clouds] illegally printed, relying also on bribery. After receiving his "fee for favors rendered" from the couple, the director of a certain printing plant in a county on the outskirts of Beijing eagerly got busy serving them, making it possible for them to build themselves up from nothing, with a huge profit of 140,000 yuan. Some places report that illegal publishing is entangled with unhealthy tendencies within certain party and government organs. In the process of ferreting out these activities, it will frequently happen that someone will come forward and intercede for the culprits.

At present, some cities have already started their crackdown on illegal publishing, and in the course of such actions the "underground network" of these activities has been discovered. It is linked up with many cities and their activities are carried out surreptitiously. To bring about a radical solution of the problem of illegal publishing and distributing, it is necessary that all provinces, municipalities, and all other sectors take unified action, exercise comprehensive control, and thoroughly smash the network in question.

9808

CSO: 4005/877

HUNAN GOVERNOR REPORTS ON TIES WITH GUANGDONG

HK240317 Changsha Hunan Provincial Service in Mandarin 0000 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Excerpt] The 6-day 26th meeting of the 6th Hunan Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee concluded in Changsha yesterday. Chairman Jiao Linyi presided at the concluding session.

Governor Xiong Qingquan made a report on his visit to Guangdong for discussions on economic and technological cooperation between the two provinces. He said: From 10 to 17 July, a provincial economic and technological cooperation delegation visited Guangdong. The leaders of the two provinces discussed policies regarding mutual assistance and profit and studied a number of new ideas on cooperation. We also obtained new enlightenment from Guangdong's valuable experiences in reform, opening up, and invigoration.

After introducing in detail the main experiences of Guangdong in this respect, he pointed out that we must further emancipate our minds and strengthen our consciousness of commodity economy. We must create an excellent environment for developing commodity economy at all levels in the province. We must learn from Guangdong in light of our own realities, and form Hunan characteristics by taking full advantage of our strong points. We must develop lateral economic ties through more channels, in more forms and at more levels. We should base our efforts on the province itself and on the domestic and international markets in vigorously developing outward-oriented economy. We must do a thoroughly good job in pushing Hunan's economic development to a new level.

The committee members highly evaluated Governor Xiong Qingquan's report.

/6091

CSO: 4006/849

FACTORS RELATED TO IMPROVING EXPORT PRODUCTION CAPABILITY

[Editorial Report] Beijing GUOJI MAOYI WENTI in Chinese No 3, 1987 publishes on pp 48-51 an article by Ren Xianzhong [0117 6343 2973] entitled "On Issues Related to the Building and Improvement of the Export Production System." The article examines seven factors that are related to the establishment and improvement of China's export production system.

1. Interaction between the national economic production system and the export production system. Author emphasizes the need to strengthen the hinterland's material bases from which export producers can draw, the need to closely integrate the development of the domestic economy with the development of export production, and the need to coordinate the economic development of China's three major geographical regions--the export-oriented eastern region, the mid-region rich in natural resources, and the developing western region--so that they can mutually benefit each other.

2. Technical transformation of existing export commodity production bases and the establishment of new ones. The obsolete nature of much of the equipment in China's industrial enterprises is hampering the nation's ability to manufacture goods that are competitive on the world market and that can earn more foreign exchange. To solve this problem, sophisticated technology needs to be introduced to upgrade production facilities.

3. Developing lateral ties between enterprises and strengthening vertical macroeconomic control. Invigorating export-oriented enterprises is important in increasing China's foreign exchange earning ability. The old system that separated production from management and where MOFERT singlehandedly ran foreign trade operations is no longer appropriate for developing the economy and expanding foreign trade. Reforms that would grant greater autonomy and exploit all available economic levers to stimulate production initiative must be carried out.

4. Export commodity circulation. Production and the work involved in the circulation of commodities such as packaging, transportation, storage, and marketing must complement each other.

5. Establishing an information network. Because of the need to collect, sort, and make full use of data reflecting changes in the international market that will affect export production, an export-oriented economic information network is indispensable for developing an export production system.

6. Intellectual development and personnel training. Scientific and technological advances and intellectual development are seen as having a strategic role in improving the quality of exports. China needs to develop readily absorbable scientific knowledge and technology so that its application can expand and improve production. It also needs to invest adequate resources in personnel such as training them in foreign management techniques and foreign languages.

7. Distribution of profits among the State, collectives and individuals. Policies governing the distribution of after-tax profits should be designed to counter the current phenomenon whereby certain commodities earn more on the domestic market than on the international market due to China's irrational, dual-track pricing system.

CSO: 40060865

GUANGDONG ATTRACTS LARGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT

HK040603 Beijing JINGJI RIBAO in Chinese 24 Jul 87 p 1

[Report: "Foreign Funds Utilized by Guangdong During the Past 8 Years Accounts for Nearly 70 Percent of the National Total"]

[Text] Today, people in Guangdong can gladly see: A new outwardly oriented economic structure has appeared in the three special economic zones of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou which has attracted the world's attention; the two coastal cities of Guangzhou and Zhanjiang, and Hainan Island, have rapidly developed and have made remarkable achievements; in the rich and beautiful Zhujiang delta area, a funds market oriented to overseas areas plus the economic mechanisms for a commodity market have been basically formed; and foreign investment has extended from special economic zones and coastal areas to mountainous and rural areas. The entire province of Guangdong has become a forefront base for our country's utilization of foreign funds and introduction of advanced technology. During the past 8 years since the party central leadership and the State Council decided to adopt special policies and flexible measures in Guangdong Province's foreign economic activities in July 1979, various Guangdong economic sectors have made direct use of more than \$4.6 billion in foreign funds from more than 20 countries and regions, accounting for some 70 percent of the total amount of foreign funds used in the whole country.

In 1986, Guangdong made a major breakthrough in the use of foreign funds. The provincial authorities seriously investigated the conditions of enterprises which had foreign capital, helped solve their problems, and created a favorable "small climate" for investment. In particular, after the State Council promulgated the "Regulations for Encouraging Foreign Investment," they formulated a series of measures to implement the regulations in light of Guangdong's conditions. More preferential treatment in the aspects of taxation, tariff, land use fees, and the remittance of profits have been given to foreign investors who run high technology enterprises and enterprises that export their products to earn foreign exchange, and those who invest in energy and transportation projects. This has advanced the province's work of attracting and using foreign funds to a more healthy and mature stage. Among the new investment projects started last year, 84 percent were productive projects, and many of them use technology and equipment that reaches early 1980's world advanced level. The proportion of products

for export has also grown markedly. In 1986, Guangdong's export volume reached \$4.2 billion, exceeding that of Shanghai and ranking first in the whole country for the first time. The province's export volume accounted for one-seventh of the national total. In particular, more than half the products from Shenzhen Special Economic Zone were exported to international markets. At the same time, Guangdong has also introduced advanced management experience from foreign countries and opened new channels for exporting products to overseas markets. At present, Guangdong has established more than 100 trading companies and business institutions in the United States, Japan, France, and Australia, as well as in the Hong Kong and Macao region. The number of these organizations increased by 55 percent during the Sixth 5-Year Plan.

This year, the investment atmosphere in Guangdong has been getting better, and has attracted more and more foreign investors to run enterprises and plants. They generally agree that investment in Guangdong not only enjoys many advantages, but also has great potential for development. Many foreign investors have invested in labor-intensive projects and shifted their production from other Asian countries and regions to Guangdong, including some of the mountainous and rural areas in Guangdong. Some of them have planned to move their plants from other countries to Guangdong. With the improvement of the "small climate" for investment, enterprises which involve foreign capital have lowered their operating costs and increased their earnings. This has helped increase the amount of foreign funds actually used in Guangdong. Between January and May this year, Guangdong actually used a total of \$366 million in foreign funds, an increase of 31.6 percent over the same period last year. This good tendency continued in June and July.

How will Guangdong further consolidate and develop the achievements in making use of foreign funds? Provincial Vice Governor Yu Fei and Provincial Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commission responsible person Lin Jun said that Guangdong will speed up the pace of reform and opening up and continue to improve the investment environment, and will fully improve the results in the use of foreign funds.

/6091
CSO: 4006/849

BRIEFS

HENAN FOREIGN TRADE INCREASES--By mid-July this year, Henan Province's income from foreign-trade export reached \$425.57 million, thus fulfilling the state plan for foreign exchange earnings more than 5 months ahead of schedule, an increase of 65 percent as compared with the same period last year. [Summary] [Zhengzhou Henan Provincial Service in Mandarin 1130 GMT 30 Jul 87 HK] /6091

SHENZHEN EXPORT TRADE--During the first half of this year, Shenzhen city's export trade volume totaled more than 440 million yuan, an increase of 73.4 percent as compared with the same period last year. [Summary] [Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 29 Jul 87 HK] /6091

HAINAN PROMOTES EXPORT--During the first half of this year, Hainan region's foreign exchange earnings from exports totaled more than \$29 million, an increase of 133 percent as compared with the same period last year. During the spring trade fair this year, Hainan's departments of foreign economic relations and trade and affiliated import and export companies actively promoted the sales of agricultural and sideline products as well as light industrial and textile products, with an export volume totaling more than \$15 million, thus achieving a 20-fold [as heard] increase as compared with the same period last year. [Summary] [Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Service in Mandarin 0900 GMT 1 Aug 87 HK] /6091

CSO: 4006/849

ZHEJIANG'S EXPERIENCE IN ESTABLISHING DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

Hangzhou ZHEJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 17 May 87 p 1, 3

[Interview with Zhong Borong [6988 0130 2837], Director of the Zhejiang Rural Policy Research Office; interviewer, date, and place of interview not given]

[Text] Editor's Note: Establishing funds to develop agriculture and mobilizing all social forces behind agricultural construction is something new in rural reform in Zhejiang, and it is worth summarizing, disseminating, perfecting, and improving. To this end, a ZHEJIAN RIBAO reporter has interviewed Zhong Borong, Director of the Zhejiang Rural Policy Research Office and invited him to discuss his view on certain issues of principal importance in the establishment of agricultural development funds.

Question: What is the practical significance of establishing agricultural development funds?

Answer: If we are to guarantee stable agricultural development and steady growth in grain production, we must increase inputs and augment reserves. This is already commonly recognized. However, there are also some comrades who always look to higher levels when inputs are mentioned, thinking only of increases in state inputs. Of course the state must increase inputs as much as possible, but there is always a limit. Moreover, state inputs are used primarily for opening up and harnessing major rivers. In enhancing agricultural inputs, we cannot rely only on the state: we must rely on all social forces and exploit the enthusiasm of the state, the collectives, and the peasants. In particular, we must take care to explore potential in local areas and among peasants. Agricultural problems should arouse interest and concern throughout society, because agriculture is the foundation for development in all other trades and enterprises. All of society has the responsibility and obligation to support agriculture. Our suggestion to develop funding at the county, township, and village level expresses the need to mobilize and organize all social areas and forces to raise funds from many areas and increase agricultural inputs.

At present, this has already been done in many places, with good results. For example, this year the city of Jiaxing may collect 30 million yuan in funds through the establishment of county, township, and village agricultural development funds. This is a fairly sizable figure. We hope that every

locality will adopt a positive attitude and conscientiously focus on and embrace this effort to establish funding for agricultural development.

Question: What is the difference between undertaking agricultural development funding and our effort in the past few years to "subsidize agriculture with industry?"

Answer: The system of funding for agricultural development is both the continuation and the perfection and development of the policy of subsidizing agriculture with industry.

In recent years the policy of subsidizing agriculture with industry has been put into effect everywhere and been very effective in promoting steady growth in agricultural production. However, funding channels have been relatively narrow, primarily limited to township enterprises. In addition, the sources of funds have not been very stable, and the upward direction of investment has emphasized the price of subsidization.

There are more channels and a broader scope is possible in collecting funds to develop agriculture. Agricultural development funds can be established not only in the villages, but also at the county level. In addition to collecting funds from township enterprises, these funding channels also include agricultural subsidy funds, contracting fees, and profits retained by collectives turned over by peasants engaged in secondary and tertiary industry; a portion of construction fees; part of the money paid in lieu of voluntary labor; and increased collection of retention funds by township finance departments.

Agricultural development funds combine "agricultural subsidies" with "agricultural construction," and place the emphasis on the latter. This has made the direction of investment more rational and raised the policy of using industry to subsidize agriculture to a new level.

Question: The government of Zhejiang has stipulated that township enterprises raise their wage standard for calculating taxes and inject the increased portion into agricultural development funds. Some cadres are worried that this will affect local financial receipts and increase the burden on enterprises. What should we think about this?

Answer: Township enterprises are the major channel for collecting agricultural development funds. The provincial government's provision may effectively guarantee a source for these funds. Generally speaking, this is welcomed everywhere, and in fact some counties already implemented such a plan before the provincial government acted. Now most places have begun to carry out this provision. This is because the leaders in these areas have already clearly recognized that without a firm agricultural foundation, and without coordinated industrial and agricultural development, things will not be easy. Today, in order to make some effort at agricultural construction and to secure this agricultural foundation, we can provide a reliable material guarantee that various local enterprises will prosper and township enterprises will grow. We hope that enterprises in each locale and department will, as they ought, plan for the long term and enthusiastically support the establishment of funds

for agricultural development. Of course, financial circumstances differ from place to place, and enterprise capacity to bear encumbrances may be great or small. As we implement this program we can proceed from actual conditions, do what we are capable of doing, and control the situation flexibly. Where conditions are good we can draw somewhat more money, and where conditions are poor we can draw somewhat less. Enterprises that are losing money can, with approval, avoid payment.

Question: How can we differentiate the collection of agricultural development funds from unjustified financial levies

Answer: The two cannot be confused. I believe that to distinguish reasonable burdens from unjustified financial levies, we must look to see whether the amount taken is reasonable, there is a limit on the amount received, and it is used appropriately. Agricultural development funds collected in the countryside are primarily composed of farm subsidies from township enterprises, funds accumulated and retained by the collective, investment of labor, contract fees handed over to higher authorities, and farm subsidy funds from farmers working in industry or engaged in trade. The profit retention system, the labor accumulation system, the policy of subsidizing agriculture through industry, and the policy of supporting farming with sidelines all were reaffirmed over and over again in the CPC Central Committee Document No. 1. The system of handing over contract fees to the higher authorities has been upheld in many places for a long time. In other places, because it has not been enforced well for the past few years, the current enforcement is seen as an additional burden. This is truly the wrong way to look at it. All agricultural development funds are used only for agriculture and for the peasants' own enterprises. We should justly and boldly launch propaganda and education among the peasant masses and carry out this effort with enthusiasm.

Question: What issues should we be concerned about in the management and use of funds for agricultural development?

Answer: This is a very important question. I believe there are three points that much deserve our attention.

1) We must strengthen the management system. Counties, townships, and villages all must establish committees to manage agricultural development funds and be responsible for fund collection, management, and use. Counties must collect what counties use, townships must collect what townships use, and villages must collect what villages use. Management must be enhanced, there must be special bank accounts for storage, and special funds must be earmarked for specified uses only. There must be a plan for fund usage and a system for project examination and approval. Also, the circumstances in which funds are used must be inspected and the results made public.

2) We must have a firm grasp of the direction in which funds are applied. These funds should be used to aid the development of the rural commodity economy, and must particularly promote steady growth in grain and hog production. Their usage should also help improve the material and technical conditions of production, enhance socialized agricultural services, and

promote and appropriate scale of agricultural operations. The first focus of applications should be to improve the conditions of production, including building water conservancy facilities on farmland, transforming low-yield land, purchasing and replacing agricultural machinery and equipment, and so forth. The second focus of applications should be to subsidize agricultural service organizations for tractor-plowing, irrigation and drainage, crop protection, and breeding improved varieties. The third focus should be to open up agricultural resources and construct commodity bases, including processing, shipping, and other basic facilities. The fourth focus should be to subsidize commodity grain and hogs, and support key grain-and hog-producing households, family farms, and cooperative farms. The fifth focus should be to supply funds needed to match special funds set aside by the higher authorities to invest in building basic agricultural facilities. For all three levels of funds--the county, the township, and the village--there should be some division of labor and some particular focus of investment.

3) According to differences in the source of funds and the direction of investment, we can adopt various methods of repayable use and nonrepayable aid. We can also launch financial activities between cooperative economic organizations and improve the benefits of fund applications.

12510/12951
CSO: 4006/757

BRIEFS

JIANGXI PIG PRODUCTION--In the first half of 1987, there were 13,510,700 pigs in Jiangxi Province, an increase of 405,200, or 3.1 percent, over the same period in 1986; 4,934,000 pigs were slaughtered, an increase of 441,100, or 9.8 percent, over the same period in 1986. Pork output was 311,000,000 kilograms, an increase of 3 percent over the same period in 1986. On average, each rural household raised 3.41 head of pigs. [Excerpts] [Nanchang JIANGXI RIBAO in Chinese 21 Jul 87 p 1]

JIANGXI CREDIT COOPERATIVE LOANS--In the first half of 1987, credit cooperatives in Jiangxi Province granted 1.099 billion yuan in loans to develop farm production, an increase of 363 million yuan, or 49.3 percent, over the same period in 1986. In addition, the province granted 29,790,000 yuan in loans for forestry and fruit orchard development. [Excerpt] [Nanchang JIANGXI RIBAO in Chinese 23 Jul 87 p 1]

JIANGSU GRAIN STORAGE--As of 20 July, Jiangsu Province had put 2,545,000,000 kilograms of summer grain in storage. [Excerpt] [Nanjing XINHUA RIBAO in Chinese 24 Jul 87 p 1]

HEILONGJIANG SOYBEAN EXPORTS--As of the end of June, Heilongjiang Province had exported 942,000 tons of soybeans. This year exports to the Soviet Union account for half of all soybeans exported. [Excerpt] [Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 19 Jul 87 p 1]

ZHEJIANG FERTILIZER OUTPUT--From January to June, Zhejiang Province produced 1,860,000 tons of chemical fertilizer. Output of nitrogenous fertilizer and phosphate fertilizer increased 16 percent and 35 percent respectively over the same period in 1986. [Excerpt] [Hangzhou ZHEJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 29 Jun 87 p 1]

HEILONGJIANG AFFORESTATION--According to June statistics, Heilongjiang Province has afforested 4,124,700 mu, accounting for 117.8 percent of the annual plan. [Excerpt] [Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 9 Jul 87 p 2]

ANHUI WHEAT STORAGE--As of 5 July, Anhui Province had put 1,089,700 tons of wheat in storage, of this amount 968,500 tons was contracted, accounting for 76.4 percent of the annual plan, and an increase of 183,000 tons over the same period in 1986. [Excerpt] [Hefei ANHUI RIBAO in Chinese 11 Jul 87 p 1]

HUNAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY--The gross value of industrial output of the tobacco industry in Hunan Province in the first half of 1987 was 721,260,000 yuan, profits after tax were 565,840,000 yuan, an increase of 144,650,000 yuan over 1986. [Excerpts] [Changsha HUNAN RIBAO in Chinese 15 Jul 87 p 1]

YUNNAN AERIAL SOWING--As of the end of June, Yunnan Province had afforested 1,906,000 mu by aerial seeding, exceeding the annual plan by 5.9 percent. [Excerpt] [Kunming YUNNAN RIBAO in Chinese 13 Jul 87 p 1]

HEBEI RECALLS FARM LOANS--As of 20 May, agricultural banks and credit cooperatives in Hebei Province had recalled 36,630,000 yuan of farm loans issued prior to implementation of the rural household responsibility system. [Excerpt] [Shijiazhuang HEBEI RIBAO in Chinese 22 Jul 87 p 2]

HEILONGJIANG RURAL SAVINGS--As of the end of June, rural deposits in Heilongjiang Province totalled 3.21 billion yuan, an increase of 41 percent over the same period in 1986. [Excerpt] [Harbin HEILONGJIANG RIBAO in Chinese 16 Jul 87 p 2]

SICHUAN PIG PRODUCTION--From January to June, in Sichuan Province the number of pigs slaughtered, pork output, the number of pigs in stock, and the number of sows increased 1.8 percent, 1.4 percent, 2.4 percent, and 4.3 percent respectively over the same period in 1986. [Excerpt] [Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 25 Jul 87 p 1]

SICHUAN SILK EXPORTS--As of the end of June, Sichuan Province earned more than \$60 million in foreign exchange from silk exports, fulfilling 65.1 percent of the annual plan, and was a 63.1 percent increase over the same period in 1986. [Excerpt] [Chengdu SICHUAN RIBAO in Chinese 25 Jul 87 p 1]

CSO: 4006/869

SONG MUWEN DISCUSSES CRACKDOWN ON ILLEGAL PUBLISHING ACTIVITIES

HK311031 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 30, 27 Jul 87
pp 13-14

[Article by reporter Yin Jindi (3009 6855 1229): "Song Muwen, Deputy Head of the State Media and Publications Office, on Striking Severe Blows at Illegal Publication Activities"]

[Text] Reporter: In a "Circular on Striking Severe Blows at Illegal Publication Activities," the State Council called for nationwide action to crack down on illegal publication activities. Would you please talk about its significance? What is meant by illegal publications? What is their background?

Song Muwen: Well, I shall first answer what is meant by illegal publications. All newspapers, periodicals, books, tapes, and video tapes for public sale which are not printed or produced by the publication units or individuals approved by the state come under the category of illegal publications.

The publication and production of newspapers, periodicals, books, tapes, and video tapes for public sale and the sale of these illegal publications by units or individuals other than the publication units approved by the state come under the category of illegal publication activities.

Why is it necessary to crack down on them today? The State Council circular has made it very clear. At present, the illegal publication activities are rampant. By forging or usurping the names of legitimate publication units some unscrupulous people have illegally printed or produced large quantities of harmful publications, such as books, periodicals, tapes, and video tapes, and flooded the market with them. Decadent in content, most of these publications spread homicide, pornography, and superstition. They are extremely harmful to the physical and mental health of the people, particularly the young, and seriously affect the building of socialist spiritual civilization. We must take firm measures to put an end to this state of affairs.

According to preliminary investigation, indiscriminate compilation and publication of books and periodicals, as well as reproduction of video tapes, have been serious matters since 1984. Their contents range from reckless concoction of vulgar "inside stories" and "unofficial histories"

to indiscriminate compilation of "selected cases" of fights, homicide, rape, and so on. Now they are moving toward the publication of obscene books, periodicals, tapes, and video tapes. These people have changed their activities from covert publication of "white cover books" omitting the names of publication units, serial numbers, and fixed prices at the beginning, to flagrant usurpation or use of the names of official state publication units and the forging of book and periodical serial numbers. They have also developed their methods of activities into group actions and networks. They gang up with one another on matters of printing, reproduction, and sales, shift the site of printing from cities to rural townships and towns, and engage in secret distribution and sales activities. These illegal publications and audio-visual products are dirty in content, vulgar in style, inferior in printing and reproduction quality, and high in price. They are extremely harmful to the readers, especially the youth and adolescents. They have become a public scourge.

Recently Beijing municipality cracked a case of illegally reproduced magnetic tapes at Shoudu Airport. Some of the tapes are obscene. They were sent to Beijing by an illegal unit after being reproduced in Xiamen for sale at underground sales points. There were a total of 114 cases, containing over 38,000 tapes of more than 270 different kinds.

Recently, farsighted people and parents again raised the call "Save the Children!" In their letters to the State Media and Publications Office, two middle school teachers cited the harm done by bad books to middle school students, saying that, because of reading pornographic works, a Form Two girl student left home several times and loafed about the streets.

In his letter, a teacher from Sanmenxia City party school said that, while conducting social investigation in the rural areas, he found out that the obscene books had harmed youths and adolescents, especially middle school students. After reading such books, a girl, who was formerly a "three-good pupil," was so fascinated by them that she took to evil ways and was eventually detained by the public security bureau according to the law. After reading the obscene books, a young man, who was formerly a shock worker at a professional team and had given a good account of himself, turned into a criminal and was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment for raping a young girl.

According to a province's statistics, in 1985, about 40 percent of the province's young detainees were found guilty of sex crimes. According to investigations, most of the young delinquents had some contact with blue, obscene books and periodicals. Calling the "obscene books" "abettors," the parents of some middle school students worriedly said that "soul strangling is genuine strangling." They urgently asked: "Save the children. We hope that measures will be taken to provide against possible trouble."

The party and state leaders attach great importance to this. Recently, they issued numerous instructions, calling for cracking down on illegal publication activities. It was under such circumstances that the State Council's circular on striking severe blows at illegal publication activities was issued.

Reporter: Why are the illegal publication activities so rampant? What should be the main target of our attack?

Song Muwen: Judging from the present conditions, the principal aim of those people engaging in illegal publication activities is to make money. So long as there are great profits to be made, some people are not afraid of taking risks and being punished. For this reason, the main target in cracking down on illegal publication activities is those units or individuals printing, reproducing, and selling large quantities of illegal publications and making exorbitant profits. In cracking down on illegal publication activities, we should be firm and prudent. All localities should proceed from their own practical conditions, seek truth from facts, and deal with each case on its merits in order to achieve the aim of cracking down on a small handful of seriously unscrupulous people and educating the great majority. It is necessary to call on the whole society to expose the pernicious influence of illegal publications on youths and adolescents and the unlawful behavior of the unscrupulous people of putting profit-making first and entrapping youths and adolescents. We must create a situation characterized by the saying, "When a rat runs across the streets, everybody cries, 'Kill it!'"

Cracking down on illegal publication activities is a specific act of building spiritual civilization. It is also a specific act of developing the socialist legal system.

The fact that the illegal publication activities are so rampant also shows that the development of our legal system in the past left something to be desired and that our management work was weak, thus providing unscrupulous people with an opportunity. Therefore, the current crackdown on illegal publication activities is by no means an expedient. We should see from a strategic point of view its far-reaching significance of driving out evil and upholding justice. We should also sum up policies, laws, and regulations from specific cases, experiences, and lessons so that we can have some laws or regulations to go by in our future publication management. In this way, the unscrupulous people will not have an opportunity that they can exploit to their advantage. We are now studying the formulation of "China's Publication Law."

Reporter: Youths and adolescents are the future pillar of the state. Enabling them to grow up soundly is a major factor having a strong bearing on the future of our state. Naturally, the current crackdown on illegal publication activities is supported by the leaders of party and government departments and the people of the whole country. I have a few specific questions on which I want to seek your views. For example, what attitude should we take toward novels by Chin Yung and Liang Yu-sheng depicting the chivalry and prowess of ancient swordsmen, "The Ugly Chinese" by overseas Chinese writer Po Yang, and "Lady Chatterley's Lover" by British writer D. H. Lawrence? Do they come under the crackdown?

Song Muwen: This is a very important question which needs a serious explanation.

Cracking down on illegal publication activities has a strict meaning and scope. It refers to illegal publication activities conducted by unscrupulous people and has nothing to do with publication activities conducted by legitimate publication units approved by the state. Naturally, even legitimate publication units find it difficult to avoid making mistakes in their work. If they publish some books or periodicals that should not have been published, this is a question of summing up experiences and lessons and does not come under the category of the "crackdown." In fact, all publication units approve and support cracking down on illegal publication activities because these activities represent serious interference to and destruction of state publication work and cause serious damage to legitimate publication units (quite a few unscrupulous people are forging or usurping their names). That is why I said before that the crackdown on illegal publication activities has a far-reaching significance of driving out evil and upholding justice.

As for how to publish the works of some overseas writers, this is a question to be studied by the publication departments. It does not come under the category of cracking down on illegal publication activities. Chin Yung and Liang Yu-sheng are noted Hong Kong writers. Their new style of novels depicting the chivalry and prowess of ancient swordsmen has an extensive influence and is well received by the readers on the mainland. It is beyond reproach to appropriately publish their works. The problem is that they have been published on the mainland in too large quantities in recent years, which makes it necessary to make some adjustments. We do not say that we shall not publish them. We shall still publish them in a planned way in the future. What merits our attention is that, knowing that Chin Yung's and Liang Yu-sheng's books sell like hot cakes, some unscrupulous people have dished up something under the names of Chin Yung and Liang Yu-sheng to deceive the readers. By cracking down on these illegal publication activities and, in particular, resolutely investigating and banning illegal publications published under the names of noted writers we actually want to protect the writers' reputations.

With regard to Po Yang's work "The Ugly Chinese," there has been much talk in society. In our view, Po Yang is an upright and influential writer. In the future, we shall continue to publish his works which are academically valuable, and recommend them to readers on the mainland. There is no question of banning or refusing to publish his works. Some time ago, the China Friendship Publishing House republished his "Mirror of History Written in the Vernacular" (10 volumes) and "A Genealogical Tree of Chinese Emperors, Kings, Queens, Princes, and Princesses."

Concerning "The Ugly Chinese," some friends say that the writer has the defect of being biased out of his desire to turn iron into steel overnight. Some people expose the deep-rooted bad habits of Chinese people in the hope that all Chinese will have high aspirations and accomplish something. This is understandable. However, if they do not have the concept of historical development and they talk about the traditional culture of the Chinese nation as if it has no redeeming features, it is liable to weaken the national self-confidence of youths and adolescents who have no ability

to distinguish right from wrong. In spite of this, we still arrange for the publication of "The Ugly Chinese." However, failing to keep one another informed, a dozen or so publishing companies simultaneously published this book in very large quantities. For this reason, proper adjustments should be made.

It is quite natural that people should have different views on a writer's book. We hope that Po Yang will become our friend and cooperate with us in contributing to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

"Lady Chatterley's Lover" is the work of noted British writer D. H. Lawrence. Lawrence is an influential writer and "Lady Chatterley's Lover" is one of his important works. The antireligious and antiprivilege ideas and descriptions in the book should be affirmed. But the book's sex descriptions are unsuitable for youths and adolescents under the present Chinese conditions. It is not impermissible to adopt appropriate methods to introduce this book to Chinese readers. The problem is that some publishing companies have rushed forward to publish the book. Six or seven publishing companies in Hunan and other localities have vied with one another to publish and distribute the book in large quantities, developing this into another "upsurge." For this reason, it is necessary to appropriately adjust its publication method and distribution quantity.

As in the past, we shall continue to publish Lawrence's works. Some time ago, the People's Publishing House published another of his works, "Sons and Lovers," as a volume of the "Twentieth Century Foreign Literary Collection." In the future, we shall continue to implement the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools of thought contend." We shall adopt appropriate methods to introduce to Chinese readers in a planned way all influential works and schools of thought in the world so as to further broaden our vision and to learn and use for reference the outstanding cultures of all countries in the world.

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CSO: 4005/916

WOMEN'S FEDERATION OFFICIAL APPEALS FOR END TO DISCRIMINATION

HK040743 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 31 Jul 87 p 4

[Report by Chi Yuhua (3069 7183 5363) and Chen Jin (7115 2516): "Zhang Guoying, Vice President of All-China Women's Federation, Calls for Eliminating Discrimination Against Women"]

[Text] The phenomenon of some units refusing to accept females in the course of assigning college graduates has once again become serious this year. In view of this, Zhang Guoying, vice president and first secretary of the Secretariat of the All-China Women's Federation, called on relevant departments and units to resolve this problem with a positive attitude.

Zhang Guoying pointed out that after the General Office of the CPC Central Committee issued Document No 38 in 1985, there was some improvement in discrimination against women. However, since the beginning of July this year, some of this year's female college graduates and cadres in charge of assignment of college graduates have come to the All-China Women's Federation and ZHONGGUO FUNU BAO to report that the problem of discrimination against women has become serious this year.

The Beijing Municipal Higher Education Bureau and the State Education Commission have confirmed this trend. According to incomplete statistics, by 25 July, more than 100 female graduates of Beijing University had been refused acceptance and had to be reassigned; some 12 female graduates of the China University of Political Science and Law had yet to be assigned; the refused female graduates from journalism and other departments of the China People's University accounted for 80 percent of the university's total graduates refused; and 3 female graduates of the Central Finance and Banking Institute, whose graduates have always fallen short of demand, were refused acceptance this year.

Some relevant figures of the State Education Commission confirmed that the indication of this problem appeared as early as March this year when a conference on assignment of college graduates was held. Since the beginning of July this year, not only universities and colleges in Beijing but also those in Shanghai and other areas have reported successively that some units would rather accept male college graduates with poorer academic results than female college graduates with better academic results. The

problem of central organs refusing acceptance of female graduates was also very striking this year. Some people attribute the problem partly to the reduced targets for the number of cadres assigned to units that really need cadres and to the relatively small demand for college graduates.

Some of the reasons given by units that need college graduates for refusing to accept females are: Female graduates are usually incompetent in practical work despite their high scores; it is inconvenient for women to go on business trips; and once women get married and have a child, their work will be influenced for several years.

Zhang Guoying quoted responsible persons of some universities and colleges who are in charge of assignment of graduates as saying that units that need college graduates were particularly strict with females this year. In the past, units that needed college graduates hoped only for male graduates instead of female ones. But this year, 80 percent of units that need college graduates have turned the hope into a strong action and one or two units even set such additional demands as the employed female graduates must have families in Beijing, must be good in every respect, and must have a good image.

In view of this phenomenon, Zhang Guoying pointed out: The strict demands on female college graduates have undoubtedly given rise to discrimination against women. The students may have shortcomings of one kind or another, but these shortcomings are not exclusive to females. She said that double social pressures on women show up in assignment of female college graduates. On the one hand, men hope that female college graduates will become "virtuous wives and good mothers"; on the other, men demand that female graduates play a more perfect social role than male ones. This is unfair.

Zhang Guoying worried about chain reactions that might be caused by these problems in enrollment of college students. Some people in charge of assignment of college graduates said explicitly that if this relationship between supply and demand continues, they will have to suggest that college authorities reduce the proportion of female freshmen. If this occurred, it would further deprive women of the right to become talented people and would make sexual discrimination more serious.

Zhang Guoying said: There is no sign that this problem would automatically be eased and this social prejudice would not only affect the upgrading of Chinese women's social status, but would also be disadvantageous to the benign circle of society. She said: There are not too many, but too few, well-educated people in our country. To upgrade our nation's cultural quality, we must remove all factors disadvantageous to women becoming talented people. It is unimaginable that we can properly build socialism if we discriminate against a large number of female intellectuals.

She called on units that employ college graduates to overcome their prejudice against female graduates and to employ them on equal demands on males. Personnel departments at higher levels must set demands on units employing college graduates at lower levels and must supervise their work in this respect.

She also called on all female students to study and work hard, to do their best to upgrade their own quality, and to improve their actual working ability, to meet the demands raised by reform on women.

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CSO: 4005/916

INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE FOR STRATEGIC MISSILE FORCE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Jul 87 p 1

[Article by Chen Dechun [7115 1795 2504] and Guo Qingsheng [6753 1987 3932]: "China Strategic Missile Force Has Fairly Broad Scope for First Time; Set of Rather Complete Operational Bases and Facilities Established, Weapon Types Constantly Upgraded, Already Has Ability To Launch Under Complex Conditions"]

[Text] China's Strategic Missile Force has already achieved results which command attention. Through 21 years of unceasing labor, it has established a set of rather complete operational bases and facilities, is equipped with different types of medium-, long-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and has the ability to launch under complex weather conditions, thus becoming a strategic military force which the Party and people can rely on. In preventing nuclear war, preserving world peace, and protecting the security of the fatherland, this young service is now playing an increasingly important role.

China formally formed the Strategic Missile Force in 1966. In the next 20 years, this modern new service went from small to large and from weak to strong, unceasingly making progress along the path of modernization: from a few regiments at its inception, the force has developed into a combined arms service branch with a more reasonable organizational structure and fairly broad scope; it has formed into a force with a complete range of specialties and a scientific cadre body of broad scope and technical expertise.

Based on the principle that China has developed nuclear weapons solely for defense, and to adapt to the operational requirements of a future nuclear counterattack, the missile force in recent years, while strengthening training and raising the overall technical level of its officers and soldiers, has incorporated the characteristics of weather and terrain found in its operational areas and conducted complex training in extreme cold, high temperatures, high winds, rainstorms, on high plateaus, and in hilly and mountainous areas, thus gaining experience in organizing operations in harsh natural conditions. It has also used various types of exercises where personnel assume multiple tasks, operating personnel are reduced, and operations are conducted at night, allowing the force to achieve year-round launch capability.

Following constant improvements in weapon types, our Strategic Missile Force has also strengthened its arguments for operational use as approached using operational [or campaign (zhanyi 2069 1763)] and tactical doctrine, and

stepped up research in topics such as improving weapon system capabilities and developing operational command systems, successively achieving more than 500 results. These results have been promoted and put into use, have effectively improved the Strategic Missile Force's survivability under nuclear conditions, and have improved its quick reaction and mobile capabilities.

CSO: 40050918

BRIEFS

2D ARTILLERY RESERVE TECHNICAL TRAINING--A certain Second Artillery Corps [China Strategic Missile Force] "reserve technician augmentee [jishubing yubu 2111 2611 0365 7315 5943] dadui" was established at a certain location in late June. Following the spirit of Central Military Commission directives, this dadui was formed to improve the liaison between units and sites where soldiers are stationed in reserve, and to strengthen Second Artillery units' war preparedness concept of reserve organization, thus putting the building of Second Artillery reserve strength in line with the strategic shift in the guiding ideology of national defense building. Fifty percent of these reserve organization soldiers are operators of special equipment, the majority of the remainder also being technical support specialists. After receiving an order to assemble from the people's armed forces departments, they immediately congregated to carry out transshipment and formation training, also braving the rain to complete their exercise mission of advancing to the train station and making a rail delivery. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 24 Jul 87 p 1]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGNER--He Xianjue [6320 0341 6030], age 47, is an engineer with a certain strategic missile unit. He joined the army after graduating from Xibei Engineering University in 1964 and was the operator who made the final adjustments on China's first hydrogen bomb test. He has participated in nuclear aerial detonation testing and the design, production, and acceptance of vital parts for nuclear missile warheads, and has toiled for 10 years to automate China's first nuclear weapons depot. [Excerpts] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Jul 87 p 1]

OPERATIONAL THEORY FOR HIGH-LEVEL CADRES--A course in operations [zhanyi 2069 1763] for high-level cadres in the Jinan MR concluded on 10 July. More than 30 papers on operational theory were presented, producing important theoretical results and greatly advancing and perfecting the system of operational theory. This research changed the past model of studying theory after theory and emphasized hands-on work. Participants observed terrain in combat zones, analyzed military geography and social conditions of future operations, and studied and discussed recent changes in foreign military doctrine along with the PLA's traditional theory of campaign [zhanyi] operations. They also had broad exchanges about the basic doctrine of theater operations, principles of combat operations, operations and tactics, inter-service coordination, organization of command, and problems in political work and logistics support. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Jul 87 p 1]

NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT REPAIR CENTER--China's first maintenance center for satellite navigation receivers was established at the end of May in Qingdao, and has begun to contract for the repair of satellite navigation receivers

from domestic and foreign naval vessels and ocean-going transport ships. It has already contracted to repair more than 40 pieces of equipment. Last year, with considerable aid and support from a related scientific research institute, the Navy trained engineering and technical personnel, and established the center in a relatively short time. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Jul 87 p 1]

HIGH ALTITUDE TIBETAN OUTPOST--A border defense company in the Xizang MD is stationed at Chaguola [2686 2654 2139], altitude 5,300 meters. Six new barracks of more than 1,000 square meters each have been constructed. Adjacent to the 120 sq/m pig sty are two 300 sq/m shower houses. [Excerpts] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Jul 87 p 1]

JOINT EXERCISES IN SHENYANG MR--A ground-air joint operations training area established by a certain group army of the Shenyang MR and a certain army of the Shenyang MR Air Force has already developed from training only air and artillery to complex problems of combined arms. This area was set up at the beginning of 1986. At first it conducted joint exercises between AAA and aviation troops, and after initial successes, expanded into joint exercises involving aviation, tanks, and motorized divisions. Scenarios included: a tank division on an assault fights enemy aviation; a motorized division in hold fast defense is attacked by enemy air fire and requests air support from higher levels; the Air Force supports a tank assault; the Air Force supports defensive combat and stages an air raid against enemy targets. More emphasis has been placed on effective camouflage, disguising effective strength and intent, and forming an air defense fire net. [Excerpts] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 Jul 87 p 1]

PROGRAMMED TELEPHONE EXCHANGE--Fuzhou report: The PLA's first communications equipment with advanced standards of the 1980's--a 4,000-line programmed telephone exchange which combines long distance and intra-city calling--was formally put into use on 17 July at the Nanjing MR's 3d Central Communications Station. [Text] [Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Jul 87 p 1]

CSO: 40050918

SHANGHAI PARTY SECRETARY ON STUDYING SOCIALISM

Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 17 Jun 87 p 3

[Text] According to a SHIJIE JINGJI DAobao [WORLD ECONOMIC HERALD] dispatch datelined 15 June 1987, Rui Xingwen [5360 2622 2429], Shanghai Municipal CPC Committee secretary, and Ceng Qinghong [2582 1987 4767], Shanghai Municipal CPC Committee deputy secretary, invited certain Shanghai theorists and responsible people from propaganda organs and educational and scientific research institutions to a forum on 12 June 1987 to plan how to use the basic Marxist standpoint and method to intensify theoretical studies on developing socialism and carrying out reforms and the policy of opening to the outside world.

Rui Xingwen pointed out at the forum that in order to "build socialism with distinct Chinese characteristics" as proposed by Comrade Deng Xiaoping, it will be necessary to enrich and develop basic Marxist theory on building socialism. This is not merely an academic issue, but will have an even more important bearing on the major issues of whether China's reforms and policy of opening to the outside world can be carried out successfully, and whether the fight to uphold the four basic principles and combat bourgeois liberalization can thoroughly permeate the entire course of the four modernizations.

Rui Xingwen also pointed out at the forum that the theory of scientific socialism that was founded by Marx is indisputably correct, and is also China's fundamental theoretical basis for building socialism with distinct Chinese characteristics. However, Marx conceived of socialism as being established first in a developed capitalist society, whereas China entered the state of building socialism directly from a semicolonial and semifeudal form of society in which the level of the productive forces was very low. How to build socialism in a society that has very undeveloped productive forces is an issue in Marx's theory of scientific socialism that has yet to be studied. Should building socialism in a poor and backward country be carried out in a different way from practicing socialism in a developed capitalist society? This is both a major basic theoretical issue, and also one that China urgently needs to answer in order to carry out its reforms and its policy of opening to the outside world.

Rui Xingwen further pointed out that there has long been quite a lot of arbitrary interpretation of the theory of scientific socialism that was founded by Marx, and that a lot of things that are essentially nonsocialist have been attached to it.

For instance, it seems that the more direct the planning and distribution of the means of production and the means of subsistence, the better. In fact, this is not necessarily a thing that is essentially socialist. The influence of the past "leftist" ideas, and the regarding of rural industry and sideline occupations as remnants of capitalism that must be eliminated, have further distorted the theory of socialism beyond recognition.

Rui Xingwen went on to say that although theoretical studies are generally divided into the two major categories of basic and applied research, studying basic theory in order to scientifically clarify the fundamental characteristics of China's present stage of building socialism has become the more pressing task. Since the characteristics of China's present stage of building socialism have not been clarified, it has been impossible to justly and forcefully popularize many methods of work that practice has proved are favorable to social development, and certain good things have been suppressed even before they could be brought up.

Rui Xingwen indicated four major topics in the area of basic theory that he hoped would be studied by theoretical circles in Shanghai:

1. The Issue of Using the Level of the Productive Forces as the Criterion To Judge Socialism

Rui Xingwen said that in the past, China used the relationship between ownership and distribution as the sole criterion to judge socialism. This caused the specific misunderstanding that the more "public" the ownership, the closer to the society is communism. Using the level of the productive forces as the criterion to judge socialism can enable us to more soberly understand the Marxist theory of social development stages and avoid putting undue emphasis on the counteraction of production relations while overlooking the productive forces, which are the most dynamic factor in the social development of mankind. According to the Marxist standpoint on the history of social development, the productive forces are more developed in socialist societies than in capitalist ones. Studying the use of the level of the productive forces as the criterion to judge socialism will be a major basic theoretical issue in carrying out our reforms and policy of opening to the outside world. Clearing up this issue will help us to get rid of whatever rigidifies the understanding of and imposes restrictions on socialism.

2. On the Issue of the Initial Stage of Socialism

Rui Xingwen went on to say that the Marxist interpretation of socialism as the initial stage of communism is different from our interpretation of China's socialism as the initial stage of socialism. China began to build socialism under undeveloped conditions that Marx did not anticipate. Building socialism in the period from then until the level of the social productive forces develops to that of a medium-sized developed country, has been and will be very different from Marx's expectation of beginning to build socialism in a developed capitalist society. How can the initial stage of socialism be distinguishable? What are its characteristics and tasks? How should socialism be built in this stage? These issues have yet to be explained theoretically.

3. On a Theoretical Model for a Planned Commodity Economy

Rui Xingwen said that it will be necessary to draw up a broad outline of this model. The facts have proved that if general socialized production is not carried out in a planned and proportionate way, the productive forces will suffer. But violating the law of value will also similarly be detrimental to developing the productive forces. How can the relationship between a planned economy and the law of value be integrated? How can both state guidance and enterprise invigoration be realized? How can a planned commodity economy operate when China's markets are so extensive? All these issues will have to be illustrated by a general model in order to make our reform orientation clearer.

4. The Issue of Building Socialism Under Open Conditions

After the failure of the Paris Commune, Marx thought that if the socialist revolution was to be victorious, it would have to succeed in several developed capitalist countries at the same time. In developing Marxism, Lenin thought that the vulnerable stage when capitalism was developing into imperialism could be taken advantage of to establish socialism in one country first and, thus, he successfully carried out the October Revolution. The Soviet Union has long been building socialism under basically closed conditions, whereas China is now building it under open ones. This is also a recent issue in the development of socialist theory and practice.

Rui Xingwen concluded that studying and clarifying these issues will help us to better understand Comrade Deng Xiaoping's idea of "building socialism with distinct Chinese characteristics."

12267/12828
CSO: 4005/822

NEED FOR INTENSIFIED MARXIST EDUCATION DECLARED

Zhengzhou HENAN RIBAO in Chinese 12 Jun 87 p 2

[Article By Zhu [1 character illegible] [2612]: "Reforms Necessitate Intensification of Marxist Education"]

[Text] Intensifying the study and propagation of Marxist theory is a traditional strategem of our party. The study of Marxism and the use of Marxist theory to integrate the philosophy and action of the entire party are particularly important at present, as we implement the policy of opening to the outside along with comprehensive reforms to produce a Chinese style of socialism. By joining our hearts and strength we can realize the common objective of our struggle.

Marxism is the scientific world-view of the working class, it is the people's scientific methodology for understanding and transforming the world. Marxism is the theoretical foundation for our party's line, principles, and policies. Furthermore, Marxism is the correct and fundamental guiding philosophy for implementing these lines, principles, and policies, and cannot be departed from for an instant. If a country like ours, with 1 billion inhabitants and a ruling party of 40 million members, lacked such a unified guiding philosophy, a common ground and shared point of view, then each, perhaps, would go his own way. Trapped in a morass of shifting sands, it is unlikely our undertakings would be successful.

The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee promulgated the policy of opening to the outside, comprehensive reforms, and principles of livelihood. Due to these our country's government, economy, and philosophy have undergone profound transformations in every domain, and many new situations and problems have arisen. To properly clarify these situations and solve these problems we must study Marxism, and achieve a firm grasp of its position, viewpoint, and methods. Moreover, as the policy of opening to the outside and other reforms are implemented, we cannot avoid bringing the people into contact with decadent, backward elements of feudalism and capitalism. The best method for managing this problem is the intensive study of Marxism; the development of keen powers of discrimination and vigorous struggle will alone prevent certain preposterous bourgeois doctrines from coming into fashion and being revered as authoritative. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping has pointed out many times, under the new conditions party members and cadres must lead the way in the intensive study of Marxism. "Only thus will we be able to refine

our use of its fundamental principles and methods, and actively explore its ability to solve new, basic problems in government, economy, society, and culture. Thus not only will our objectives and Marxist theory itself be advanced; but certain comrades, particularly some newly promoted young and middle aged comrades, will be preserved from losing their way in the ever more complicated struggle." Based on the historical experience of our party, the present needs of the socialist modernization process, and in particular the lessons of the recent period of rampant bourgeois liberalism, we should thoroughly understand the profound implications of this passage.

In this manner the importance of studying Marxism can be established and enhanced. Aside from reading the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Zedong, intensified study and propagation of Marxism must, at present, also particularly emphasize various important works of Comrade Deng Xiaoping. Comrade Deng Xiaoping has written many brilliant expositions on such subjects as the practical establishment of Chinese-style socialism, upholding the four principles, and combatting bourgeois liberalization, as well as economic and governmental reforms, the open door policy and the establishment of dual socialist cultures, and the concept of "one country, two systems." These writings of Comrade Xiaoping comprise a summary of the practical experiences of our party and a crystallization of collective wisdom. They are a model for the integration of universal truths of the Marxism with the realities of China, and constitute a major development in the practical application of Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. These ideas and theories of Comrade Xiaoping are the most straight-forward, realistic, and viable Marxism we know at present. Hereafter, if we make unremitting efforts to intensify study and propagation in this regard, the integration of philosophical knowledge throughout the party will unify the two foundations of the party line. Socialist production capacity will be developed, and the correct course for building a Chinese-style socialism will be established.

In strengthening the study and propagation of Marxist theory, it is still fundamental to unify theory with practice. The universal truths of Marxism must be closely conjoined with the practical realities of China, and Marxism's basic principles and methods must be used creatively to solve the problems which confront us. Marxism is not a dogma, but a science which is ceaselessly developed and enriched in accordance with historical and scientific progress. If Marxism is made into a dogma, its living strength is lost, along with its guiding function. Why do some comrades view enterprise contract leasing as the "establishment of private ownership", the plant manager responsibility system as "abolishing party leadership", rural household output-related contracts as "destroying the foundation of collective economy," and the development of a planned commodity economy as a capitalist phenomenon? Such views demonstrate that these comrades lack a deep understanding of Marxist theory; but more importantly, that they take Marxism to be a unchanging, corpse-like dogma, and use ossified concepts to judge real life. This hinders the enactment of our reforms, as well as the development of Marxism. Proclaiming that Marxism is an "outdated theory" is a grave error, but regarding

Marxism as an unchanging, rigid dogma is just as mistaken. Practicability is the sole criterion of truth, and is our cardinal method for discerning and expanding truth. Only by combining theory and practice will we grasp the essence of Marxism's spirit, only then will our work become principled, unified, foresighted, and creative. Only then will our open door policy and program of reforms make steady progress.

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REVAMPING IDEAS, SUCCESS OF REFORM DISCUSSED

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 22 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Chen Zhenhong [7115 6966 1347]: "Reform is Impossible Without Changing Public Thinking"]

[Text] The revamping of ideas has become a popular conversation topic in the past few years. During this period, some people have actually discarded fine traditions as outdated stuff and went astray in the process. On the other hand, there are people who frown whenever the revamping of ideas is mentioned. They regard obsolete and fossilized ideas as a treasure and act as though one lets one's ancestors down whenever one modifies traditional ideas. It is worthwhile to consider whether there is a need to revamp our thinking and how.

According to Marxist teaching, "at any time consciousness can only be the consciousness of existence. And human existence is the way people actually spend their lives." How then have people really been spending their lives in recent years? As modernization and reform advance, traditional institutions and the old way of life have been disrupted. But since new institutions and a new way of life have not taken shape, society is in a transitional stage in which the new "coexists" with and is replacing the old. Reform has unleashed an explosion of potential productive forces, spurred rapid social economic development, and effected a drastic change in people's way of life. Logically, ideas should change radically as a result. However, the stability of ideas has rendered people panicky in the face of social change, not knowing what to do, which has prevented reform from going further. We need only look back at the course of reform over the past 8 years to see that reform has to fight its way every step of the way, overcoming obstruction posed by obsolete and fossilized ideas and concepts.

Reform began with the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. Had there been no great debate in the ideological arena concerning the criterion for truth, had we not established practice as the only yardstick for judging truth, we would have continued to do things in accordance with the "established principles" of the Cultural Revolution, "take class struggle as the key link," struggle against "capitalist roaders," and limit bourgeois rights." Ideas would still have continued to be confined within the "whatevers" and any reform would have been out of the question.

When the countryside was launching all kinds of responsibility systems, some people cried out in alarm, "We toiled for 3 decades and now they are going back to the pre-liberation days overnight." In their thinking, "large

communes" amount to socialism while the family output-related contracting system is capitalism. "Being poor together" is socialism, while letting some people become rich ahead of others is capitalism. If we do not rid ourselves of this kind of outdated fossilized thinking, the responsibility system cannot be implemented or even put forward.

After the commodity economy began thriving everywhere, some people insisted on regarding it as incompatible with a planned economy and, proceeding from the notion that "all merchants are dishonest," put up hurdle after hurdle in its path and tried to outlaw it. The commodity economy was legitimized only after the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee declared in its decision on economic structural reform that the socialist economy is a "planned commodity economy," thus opening up a brave new world for the development of a socialist commodity economy.

Facts have proved time and again that "tradition is a vast conservative force in the entire ideological arena." (Engels) The difficulty and long-term nature of reform derives not only from its own complexity, but also from obstruction and resistance by old traditional ideas. These old ideas grew out of the small producer's mentality of absolute egalitarianism, the Confucian notion of "great universal harmony," and the partial, even erroneous, understanding of socialism that has always existed. A self-sufficient natural economy has bred an isolated, rigid psychology. The kind of modernization people aspire to is a "monarchy" where people treat each other courteously and where everybody is like everybody else. If this kind of modernization materializes, people will take to it readily. But since reform necessarily undermines the natural economy at its very foundation, it ruins the beautiful image people carry in their minds. Thus while everybody is for reform in an abstract sense and pray for its early realization, reform runs into stiff resistance whenever a specific problem crops up. This is because people see reform differently and expect different things from it. Thus every step forward on the road to reform must be achieved at a heavy price.

The resistance to reform from all quarters can be summed up as the negative effects of the impact of changes in the social structure on the traditional psychology. Changes in the ownership system run counter to the traditional idea that the greater the extent of public ownership, the better. Thus they are negatively perceived as "unsocialist." Changes in the distribution system run counter to egalitarianism and are thus regarded as "unprogressive." Changes in the cadre system run counter to the traditional adulation of the seniority principle and respect for elders and are perceived as "unrevolutionary." Changes in the consumption system run counter to the tradition of taking pride in poverty, so they are considered "unethical." Social change erodes and reshapes the public psychology constantly. Positive perceptions of reform translate into new ideas that can serve as a driving force behind reform, while negative perceptions translate into resistance. It is impossible, therefore, to try to further reform without revamping our ideas. If ideas are not overhauled, reform will not last even when it is introduced. Even today, at a time when reform has been crowned with achievements that are the focus of world attention, some people still dismiss reform as an utter failure and argue that reform has disrupted the economy. Enterprises that go in for contracting and leasing are said to be "practicing

private ownership." To carry out a director responsibility system is to "abolish party leadership." To develop a commodity economy is to engage in capitalism." So on and so forth.

There has been interference from the right as well as obstruction from the "left" in the course of reform. On the surface, the "left" and right are diametrically opposed to each other. In essence, though, the two extremes share some similarity. Both refuse to recognize that the line, policies, and principles of the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee have furthered Marxism and made a new contribution to scientific socialism. Instead, they equate reform with "engaging in capitalism." The difference is that while the "left," believes reform will lead to capitalism and must be avoided at all costs, argues for an end to reform, the right thinks that reform makes up for the weaknesses in capitalism and that there should be "complete Westernization." Both misinterpret socialism and put it inside a rigid mold. Anything that does not fit neatly into this rigid mold is considered capitalist. As a result, whatever is favorable to the release of productive forces is regarded as capitalist stuff, and whatever hampers the release of productive forces is dismissed as socialist stuff. Whether you reject the four cardinal principles because of your opposition to reform or whether you reject reform because you oppose the four cardinal principles, the result is inevitably the same: you end up rejecting socialism with Chinese characteristics. Consequently, the only way we can eliminate obstruction from the left and right, implement correctly the line, policies, and principles of the 3d Plenary Session across the board, and promote the cause of reform is to free ourselves from the bondage of outdated ideas and fossilized thinking and publicize in depth the socialist nature, achievements, and theoretical development of reform.

In the final analysis, ideological change will be determined by tangible social change. It is through changes in the real world following changes in the production and distribution systems that people develop new demands and new interests. New interests, in turn, give rise to new ideas. Old ideas, too, are related to certain interests and are more than a question of the relative independence of consciousness. To unshackle ourselves from the fetters of old ideas and fossilized concepts, therefore, depends ultimately on changes in living conditions in the real world, not theoretical deduction. This requires us to uphold and protect reform. As reform gains depth and reform achievements multiply, people will reap more and more tangible benefits. At that time those who have been taking a wait-and-see attitude and those who have opposed it will gradually understand it and join the ranks of reformers. In the process of reform, they will also discard old ideas and develop new ones. At the same time, reform fuels the growth of productive forces and brings out in full splendor the superiority of socialism. As the appeal of socialism increases, bourgeois liberalization will gradually lose its audience. In short, to oppose both the right and "left" and bring about the enrichment and development of scientific socialism, all we need to do is to take China's conditions as our starting point and build socialism with Chinese characteristics.

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CORRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF 'DOUBLE HUNDRED' PRINCIPLE URGED

Changchun JILIN RIBAO in Chinese 22 Jun 87 p 3

[Article by Liu Jingtian [0491 2529 3944]: "Do Not Interpret the 'Double Hundred' Principle as Bourgeois Liberalization"]

[Text] The principle of "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" and bourgeois liberalization are essentially two totally different things to begin with. However, there were people in the past who insisted on lumping them together. Today, in the midst of opposition to bourgeois liberalization, a handful of comrades are also confused about this issue. We need to study and understand anew the nature of the "double hundred" principle.

The "double hundred" principle is a socialist principle, formulated and carried out by the party subject to the interests of the proletariat. It was put forward by the CPC Central Committee in 1956 based on China's specific conditions at the time. It was founded on the recognition that all manner of contradictions still exist in socialism and proposed in response to the urgent demands of a rapidly developing national economy and culture and the needs of building a socialist revolution. This principle, therefore, is one which aims at promoting artistic development and scientific progress and expediting China's socialist cultural flowering. Comrade Deng Xiaoping emphasized then that it was within the framework of socialism that the party proposed to let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend in art and culture. According to the principle, there should be democratic discussion in academic matters and free competition in art in order to develop correct and advanced things and rectify erroneous and backward things through criticism and self-criticism and overcome the sham, the bad, and the ugly with the true, the good, and the beautiful. If we deviate from this basic point, we would be moving away from socialism. If we use the principle to attack socialism and propagate capitalism, we would go against its purpose.

"Relaxation" must take place within constitutional limits. Comrade Mao Zedong once referred to the "double hundred" principle as one of "relaxation." "Relaxation" calls for independent thinking and freedom in literary and artistic work and scientific research. It calls for the freedom to debate, create, and criticize and the freedom to express and hold on to one's opinions. But there are limits to and restrictions on any kind of freedom.

In proposing the principle, Comrade Mao Zedong noted, "Let people express without interference all kinds of schools of thought, correct and otherwise, within the framework of the PRC's constitution." He also laid down the criteria for determining the right and wrong of words and deeds, namely the wishes of the vast majority of people in the nation and the traditional declared positions shared by China's political parties, of which the most important are the socialist road and party leadership. In other words, "relaxation" should take place among the people and within the confines of the constitution and the laws. It does not mean deviating from any principle and saying, propagating, or expressing whatever one pleases. Our party is for "relaxation," but it will absolutely disallow the legal existence of speech or works opposing the four cardinal principles. "Relaxation" is not an end in itself. The end is to use "relaxation" to encourage the simultaneous development of different points of view in scholarship and the simultaneous development of different styles in literature to promote scientific progress and cultural flourishing.

The blossoming of a hundred flowers and the contending of a hundred schools of thought must be guided by Marxism. This is determined by the nature of the state. In China, only science and culture that contribute to socialism should be developed. In implementing the "double hundred" principle, all parties which blossom and contend, whatever their positions and opinions, should aim to develop and further the socialist scientific and cultural enterprise first and foremost. As a hundred schools of thought contend, an array of opinions would emerge, some correct, some misguided, some Marxist, some non-Marxist, even anti-Marxist. To ensure that "contending" does not drift aimlessly and degenerate into empty talk and rash acts unregulated by any criteria and that the forum for contending does not deteriorate into a hotbed for the propaganda of erroneous or reactionary opinions, we must have a yardstick for telling right from wrong. Since Marxism is the truth, this yardstick must be Marxism.

The "Resolution of the CPC Central Committee Concerning the Guiding Principles for the Building of a Socialist Spiritual Civilization" gives the political term "bourgeois liberalization" a specific definition. At present a struggle is being waged throughout the nation to uphold the four cardinal principles and oppose bourgeois liberalization. The CPC Central Committee has defined the limits, emphasis, policies, and methods of this struggle. People these days certainly will not allow the misinterpretation of the "double hundred" principle as liberalization. On the other hand, we must also prevent the opposition to liberalization from affecting the "double hundred" principle. What we must pay attention to is the correct understanding and handling of the relationship between opposing bourgeois liberalization and implementing the "double hundred" principle. To some people, since we stress the "double hundred" principle, we can forget about the four cardinal principles. Others believe that since we stress the four cardinal principles, we need not worry about the "double hundred" principle. This tendency to consider the four cardinal principles and the "double hundred" principle mutually exclusive is metaphysical. In fact the two are opposites that unite with and are supplemented by each other. The four cardinal principles are what the nation is founded upon and have been written into the constitution. The "double hundred" principle, in turn, rests on the four cardinal principles. The anti-bourgeois liberalization struggle we are engaged in today is intended to

uphold the four cardinal principles so as to provide the implementation of the "double hundred principle" with a clear political direction, a solid political basis, and an ideal environment. In no way is this to be regarded as "tightening." Nor should it be allowed to interfere with the thorough implementation of the "double hundred" principle.

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CSO: 4005/860

JILIN: GAO DI'S SPEECH ON PARTY RECTIFICATION

SK240150 Changchun JILIN RIBAO in Chinese 4 Jul 87 pp 1, 2

[Speech by Gao Di, secretary of the provincial party committee, delivered at the provincial meeting on summarizing party rectification on 3 July 1987]

[Text] The current meeting being held by the provincial party committee is designed to relay and implement the guidelines of the national meeting on summarizing party rectification, studying and discussing Comrade Zhao Ziyang's speech and Comrade Bo Yibo's report delivered at the national meeting on summarizing party rectification, appraising party rectification achievements and problems in line with the provincial reality and by seeking truth from facts, summarizing experiences and lessons, and studying how to strengthen regular party building during the new period. In discussion, the meeting's participants unanimously maintained that the current national meeting on summarizing party rectification was very important and that the speeches of Comrade Zhao Ziyang and Bo Yibo were very profound and enabled us to further understand the great significance of intensifying the building of the ruling party and define the guiding ideology and basic tasks and demands on strengthening party building during the new period. The meeting's participants pledged to successfully implement the guidelines of the meeting and continue to push forward provincial party building.

Now I would like to address some opinions on how to strengthen regular party building based on carrying out party rectification.

The Great Significance of Strengthening Party Building During the New Period

At present, our country is in a new historical and great transitional period. The fundamental task in this period is to mobilize the entire party and all the people to make concerted efforts to build socialism with Chinese characteristics and to build China into a modern socialist country with a high degree of democracy and civilization under the guidance of the party line followed since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th party Central Committee. To fulfill this historic mission, we must uphold the four cardinal principles, placing stress on upholding party leadership. The CPC is a firm core of leadership in building the socialist modernization drive. Without the communist Party, there would be no new China. Similarly, without the leadership of the Communist Party, there would be no success in socialism. The leading position of the party is decided by the nature of the party, and

has been formed through the revolutionary struggle over the past 50 years. To uphold and strengthen party leadership, we must strengthen party building, improve the expertise of party members, and enhance the party's fighting capacity.

We must clearly notice that changes in the position of our party has given a new test for our party and sets still higher demands on party building. Our party has undergone a tremendous change from heroically fighting against the White terror by shedding blood to become the ruling party of the entire country. This change cannot but affect the ideology of some party-member cadres within our party. When joining the party during the past White terror period, party members were ready to bear hardships and sacrifice themselves without any attempt to seek personal gain. In addition, they withstood the hardship of a ruthless environment and the test of life and death. Therefore, when joining the party, one must have a high degree of consciousness and the spirit of self-sacrifice. Without such a consciousness and spirit, one would soon be eliminated by history, even though he joined the party organizationally. After the founding of the PRC, our party became the ruling party, and fundamental changes were witnessed in the objective environment. Instead of joining the party at the risk of their lives, many party members are provided the opportunities to embark on leading posts at all levels and to grasp some power thanks to the position of the ruling party. Lenin had said "There is a great attraction, Join the ruling party." Under such a situation, it is inevitable that some persons with impure motives also join the ranks of the party. If they refuse to set strict demands on themselves and conscientiously remold their world outlook, such party members will seek ease and comfort, fame, position, benefit and money, and indulge in bureaucracy along with the change of their environment and position. During and after the "Cultural Revolution," we recruited a great number of new party members. However, some of them did not foster a communist conviction due to our failure to conduct strict investigations before recruiting them into the party and educating them after giving them party membership and due to their inadequate understanding of the party's basic knowledge. Some of them even became just as Lenin once described, "persons who only enjoy benefits from a ruling party and are unwilling to work selflessly for communism." If such persons are in power, they will engage in abusing their power to seek personal gain and will even violate laws and discipline. Some veteran cadres, although they may have succeeded in breaking with the "barriers of hardships as well as life and death," have failed to break with the "barriers of power and selfish desires." After the change of the party's status, problems of one kind or another will occur. At the Eighth National Party Congress, which was held as early as 1956, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "The status of the ruling party will easily taint some of our comrades with the bureaucratic habits. As far as party organizations and party members are concerned, the danger of departing from reality and the masses has not decreased, but increased over the past." Concerning these problems, we must understand them sober-mindedly, adopt effective measures, and realistically strengthen the party's self-cultivation.

To strengthen party building, it is necessary to adopt the method of concentrating efforts on consolidation and solving major inner party problems, and to unceasingly install new vitality into the party organs during the major historical period. During the 3 and 1/2 years of party rectification, the entire party has progressed in ideology, workstyle, discipline, and organizations. The situation of serious impurity in the party's ideology, workstyle, and organizations and lax discipline has already improved. We have accumulated important experiences in correctly handling inner party contradictions and have laid a fairly good foundation for regular party building. Just as Comrade Zhao Ziyang said that despite interference and shortcomings, our achievements are the most important aspect of our work. This absolutely conforms with our province's actual conditions. We must fully affirm this point. However, we should also note that we still have many problems and shortcomings in this party rectification. The development of our work in this field is imbalanced. Some units have failed to comprehensively fulfill the four basic party rectification tasks and some even did perfunctory work. Even some units that did a fairly good job in party rectification still have many leftover problems in party style and other fields. In the work of registering party members and adopting organizational measures in particular, problems of slack discipline still exist to a varying degree. The completion of party rectification through concentrated efforts does not mean an end to party building. Instead, it means a starting point of regular building party. It is impossible to solve all problems by only conducting one party rectification. Party building is a process of long-term historical development, as well as a regular task. As far as a party member is concerned, he is never too old to learn or transform himself. This is also true of the entire party. The party must build itself as long as it exists. This party rectification has solved some problems. However, some unresolved or partly resolved problems still exist. Furthermore, even when we solve all old problems, new ones will arise. Therefore, it is impossible for us to accomplish the entire task at one stroke. The numerous party building tasks must be fulfilled with our regular work.

We should note that the building of the party during the new period is being carried out amid the situation of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration and of developing a planned commodity economy. This new situation has also brought many new problems for our party building. Comrade Zhao Ziyang recently pointed out: "The objective conditions have changed. We have not only changed the closed economy into an open economy, but have also carried out or will carry out many reforms. All these are the new environment and new conditions we must consider in our work and they regulate us to raise our party building work to a new and higher level."

Being the second revolution in China, reform is of far-reaching significance. We are presently confronted with many new problems as we must not only adhere to the four cardinal principles, but also persist in the principle of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration. The purpose of reform is to develop the socialist commodity economy. Some weak-willed persons will become decadent through the development of the commodity economy and the exchange of commodities. Opening the country to the outside world is a wise and

unshakable policy decision, as well as an important component of reform since it helps bring in advanced foreign sciences, technologies, and management experiences. Meanwhile, when we make contacts with capitalist countries, their corrosive ideas and ways of life have been brought in. Thus, some party members and cadres have been affected. We must maintain sharp vigilance against these negative factors. All dust must be swept away in a timely manner and all corrosive ideas must be eliminated. The struggle against corrosive ideas must penetrate into the entire course of the four modernizations and the practices of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration. Adhering to the four cardinal principles; persisting in reform, opening up, and economic invigoration; and strengthening party building are tasks of long-term importance. The party assumes heavier tasks and sets higher requirements on party members during the new historical age. Thus, we must place importance on building the party.

Major Tasks for Party Building

Comrade Zhao Ziyang pointed out at the national conference to summarize experiences in party rectification: "The tasks for party building are arduous. Many tasks can be listed. However, to put it in a nutshell, the task of party building is to ensure the implementation of the line adopted at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee." This is an important task of party building in the foreseeable future, as well as an important guiding ideology for party building in the new historic period.

The key ensuring implementation of the line adopted at the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th party Central Committee is to educate the vast number of party members to correctly and comprehensively understand the line and to ceaselessly upgrade their awareness to implement it. The line adopted at the Third Plenary Session is to build socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as to realize the building of our country's socialist modernization. The line has two basic points. One is to adhere to the four cardinal principles. This is the foundation for building our country, the prerequisite for realizing the four modernizations, and the fundamental guarantee for conducting reform, opening the country to the outside world, and invigorating the economy. The other is to conduct reform, open the country to the outside world, and invigorate the economy. This is the general principle and policy of the socialist modernization, a new content of the line adopted at the Third Plenary Session, and the new contribution to the Marxist theory. These two basic points are inseparable. We must not stress only adherence to the four cardinal principles to the neglect of reform, nor can we stress only reform to the neglect of adherence to the four cardinal principles. Either of the two basic points cannot be considered more important than the other. Adherence to the four cardinal principles cannot be regarded as a guiding principle, just as reform, opening up, and economic invigoration cannot be regarded as methods. All such thoughts are misunderstanding the line adopted at the Third Plenary Session. The relationship between the two basic points of the line is an interdependent dialectical relationship. It is certain that reform and opening up will slide down the evil way of bourgeois liberalization if we do not adhere to the four cardinal principles. If we do not persist in reform,

opening up, and economic invigoration, the superiority of socialism will not be brought not fully play, and we will not be able to forcefully educate the people to firmly believe socialism or to adhere to the four cardinal principles. The socialist line with salient Chinese characteristics certainly includes these two cornerstones which are interrelated and interdependent. We should not approach the four cardinal principles with an ossified idea; neither should we approach the general principle of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration with the viewpoint of bourgeois liberalization. The four cardinal principles and the general principle of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration are the foundation for formulating policies and are untied with the line, principles, and policies pursued since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee and with the practice of building socialism with salient Chinese characteristics. In the 8 years since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, based on the dialectical unity integration between these cornerstones, our country has undergone an extraordinary process, made an solid step in building socialism with Chinese characteristics, and scored a great achievement which attracted the world's attention.

Implementing the line since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee precisely means building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Regarding this, we must first have a correct understanding of socialism. In his recent talk with the premier of Czechoslovakia, Comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "In developing socialism, we must have developed productive forces. Poverty is not a sign of socialism. We should persist in socialism. However, to further build a socialism that is superior to capitalism, we must first extricate ourselves from socialism that is characterized by poverty. Although it is said that we are engaging in socialism, in fact, we are unqualified to do it. Not until the middle of the 21st century, when our country reaches the level of the middle-class developed country, can we say that we have truly engaged in socialism and can we say with assurance that socialism is superior to capitalism. Now we are moving towards this path." Comrade Zhao Ziyang has expounded on Comrade Deng Xiaoping's remark on many occasions. He maintained that Comrade Deng Xiaoping's speech has new significance to the reunderstanding of socialism and can straighten out the people's ideas. Over the past several years, we have paid no attention to productive forces in understanding socialism; and the insufficient attention to the development of productive forces has frequently made us explain the so-called socialist principles in an abstract manner by deviating from the social productive forces. At the same time, this is why "leftist" things can exist. If we only stress "socialist public ownership" and the principle of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work" and neglect the development of social productive forces, it seems that socialism does not have the sign of productive forces, but has only a public ownership and a principle of each according to his work, which will add a burden to socialism. Consequently, the people's understanding of socialism will be confused, the development of productive forces will be hampered, and the superiority of socialist system will be prevented from exploitation.

The most important task of socialism is to develop productive forces and to create a labor productivity still higher than that created by capitalism. The development of productive forces is the most important criterion for us to understand and assess socialism. We are now at the initial stage of socialism, our level of productive forces is rather low, and the people's standard of living is not high. Therefore, we must concentrate our efforts on developing productive forces on the basis of upholding the four cardinal principles. Without the development of productive forces, the socialist system will be unable to hold its ground, will be unable to exploit its superiority, and will have no attraction. At the same time, if we refuse to develop productive forces, we will be unable to thoroughly solve the problems with regard to bourgeois liberalization.

In developing productive forces, we must adhere to reform. Reform is the self-perfection and development of the socialist system, as well as the only way to emancipate and develop productive forces. In assessing failure or success in reform, we should see primarily whether it is conducive to promoting the development of productive forces and the socialist modernization drive. Practice is the sole criterion for judging the truth. Thanks to carrying out the principle of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration, china has ensured a sustained, steady, and coordinated economic development; its social wealth and economic strength have increased by a large margin; and the people's material and cultural life has notably been improved over the past 8 years. After carrying out the system of contracted responsibility on a household basis with payment linked to output, our province has made a breakthrough in agricultural development, particularly grain production. For 5 successive years the industrial front has realized steady increases in its output value, profits and taxes, and revenues. Comparing the first 5 months of this year to the same period of last year, the province's total industrial output value increased 12.3 percent, income from sales increased 25.7 percent, profits and taxes realized by the industrial front increased 24.6 percent, and revenue increased 15.6 percent. This good situation fundamentally resulted from persisting in reform and carrying out various forms of contracted management responsibility systems. Practices proved that quick increases in production have been gained through contracts, the economy has enlivened through carrying out the open policy, and reform has given a powerful impetus to the development of productive forces.

In order to implement the line adopted at the Third Plenary Session and to persist in the principle of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration, we must persist in the struggle between two fronts; eliminate the "leftist" and rightist obstacle; get rid of force of habit; and smash outdated, stagnated, and ossified ideas. Comrade Xiaoping repeatedly stressed recently while receiving foreign guests that over the past few years, we have had both "leftist" and rightist obstacles; however, "left" is the most dangerous. It is not easy to correct "leftist" ideas which have been fostered for several decades. Thus, we should focus on opposing "left." A kind of "leftist" force of habit has taken shape in society. It is difficult to get rid of such a deep-rooted habit. These statements are of profound significance and completely accord with our national and provincial situations. In order to

deepen reform, we must continue to eliminate "leftist" influence. At the same time, we should act in accordance with the principles and policies of the central authorities to deepen the struggle against bourgeois liberalization and to permanently persist in the education on setting positive examples in order to ensure that reform, opening up, and economic invigoration will deeply develop along with the orientation of socialism.

Party organizations should work hard to ensure the fulfillment of political tasks and the implementation of the line of the party. In the new historical period, we should work in accordance with the two basic points of the line adopted at the Third Plenary Session to strengthen the self-construction of the party. Only by so doing can we achieve party building.

Striving to Upgrade Party members' Quality and To Enhance the Party's Combat Effectiveness

We should rely on the party organizations at all levels and party members to realize the leadership of the party. Thus, we should upgrade party members' quality and enhance the party's combat effectiveness in order to strengthen the party's leadership.

Here, I would like to especially stress the issue on strengthening the party's ideological and theoretical construction. The Marxist basic principle is the basis for formulating our line, principles, and policies as well as a guide for our action. Only when we grasp the basic tenets of Marxism can we accurately understand and implement the party's line, principles, and policies. There are no ready-made patterns or plans for building socialism with Chinese characteristics. So, we must work under the guidance of the basic Marxist principle to study and solve the new problems cropping up in the course of our country's socialist modernization and to explore new ways that are suitable to us. Most of our party members, including leading cadres who just took on leading posts, do not fully understand Marxist theory. Even some veteran comrades have not made full theoretical preparations for building socialism and carrying out reform. Studying Marxist theory is the fundamental task for party building as well as a task of urgent importance.

Theory stems from and guides practice. Reform is now being carried out relatively quickly, but the theory lags behind. Thus far, we cannot use Marxist theory to explain the new things and new problems emerging in reform, and therefore theory cannot guide practice in a timely and effective manner. At present, some comrades are not determined to carry out reform and hold different views on some major issues. The basic reason for this is the failure to distinguish right from wrong on the question of theory. Without a thoroughly understanding theory, there would be no steadfastness in reform. It is very important for us to correctly implement the line pursued since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee; uphold the four cardinal principles; persist in the policy of reform, opening up, and economic invigoration; and strengthen the study and propagation of Marxist theory.

In studying theories, we must conscientiously read some of Marx' works, particularly the works on dialectical materialism and historical materialism, in order to comprehend the essence of these works; master the stand, viewpoint, and method of Marxism; and analyze, study, and solve practical problems with the stand, viewpoint, and method of Marxism. At present, we should mainly study well the books "On Upholding the four Cardinal Principles and Opposing Bourgeois Liberalization," and "On Building Socialism With Chinese Characteristics." These two books are the models in which the party Central Committee and comrade Deng Xiaoping creatively apply the fundamental tenets of Marxism to solve the problems emerging in our country's modernization drive. These two books are a sign of the development of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought in China's new period, as well as an ideological and theoretical weapon for guiding us to carry out various reforms, launch the campaign of opposing bourgeois liberalization, and build socialism with Chinese characteristics. Studying these two books well is not only the demand of the current situation, but also a very important theoretical construction. Comrade Deng Xiaoping's speech on the "reform of the party and state leadership system" has not been reissued. We should organize cadres, leading cadres in particular, to conscientiously study this important speech in order to make good ideological preparations for the convocation of the 13th National CPC Congress.

To deepen reform, we should depend on theory; and to enhance the consciousness of party members, we should also depend on theory. Some party members have no consciousness, and others engage in various kinds of evil practices, basically because they fail to foster a proletarian and communist world outlook, do not understand or do not truly understand the truth that only by emancipating the whole people can they emancipate themselves, and lack the idea of wholeheartedly serving the people. If they refuse to solve problems in ideology and theory and fail to understand what the Communist Party does and why one should serve as a communist member or a cadre, they will be unable to solve other problems.

To strengthen the building of ideology and theory, leaders at all levels should attach importance to and take the lead in studying theories. The study courses sponsored by the theoretical study center of organs at or above the country level should be upheld and improved in order to promote and guide the study among the vast numbers of party members and cadres and form a strong climate of studying Marxist theory among party members.

In studying theory, we should give consideration to the reality, particularly the ideological reality of party members and cadres. This requires party organizations to have strict and perfect organizational activities. In judging whether or not the organizational activities are perfect, we should mainly see whether or not party members can conduct criticism and self-criticism in a conscientious manner. Integrating theory with practice, maintaining close ties with the masses, and conducting criticism and self-criticism are the party's three major work styles. We should actually strengthen party building in these three fields.

Through the efforts made over the past few years, particularly through party rectification over the past 3 and 1/2 years, our province has made great achievements in improving party style. The main trend of party style is good, and notable improvement has been made in certain fields. However, many problems exist and some are even very serious. The tasks for improving party style are very heavy, and there are many problems that need to be solved. Comrade Weizhi's speech has mentioned this. I would like to stress the issue concerning opposing bureaucracy. The State Council has set an example for us by seriously handling the Da Hinggan Ling forest fire accident. This has embodied the decision of the party and government on dealing blows to bureaucracy. Therefore, we must resolutely and constantly wage the struggle against bureaucracy in line with the arrangements of the central authorities.

Bureaucracy is incompatible with the party's purpose and the duty of the people's governments. The higher the person's leading post, the more harm his bureaucracy will cause. So, we must set higher and stricter demands on party-member leading cadres. Leading cadres should set strict demands on themselves and should regularly check and their bureaucracy and correct it in a timely manner. Whoever creates serious losses must be called to account and strictly handled. We never are allowed to be softhearted in handling such cases. We must enable the people to know that being communist "officials" is not an easy job, that officials who are unwilling to handle affairs cannot exist, and that "peaceful" officials cannot exist continuously. From now on, we should select and promote cadres according to their political achievements, which include political integrity and ability. Just as Comrade Bo Yibo said, unable cadres with political integrity accomplish nothing and that able cadres without political integrity do evil deeds. Cadres without political integrity or ability do not have political achievements.

We must effectively supervise party members; particularly, leading cadres in the course of opposing bureaucracy and correcting unhealthy practices. Discipline inspection departments at all levels, being responsible organs for supervising inner-party activities, should substantially enforce their own duty and should pay particular attention to strengthening the supervision over the work of party committees at the same level. Party committees at all levels, particularly principal leading comrades, should consciously accept disciplinary supervision by the Discipline Inspection Commissions and should vigorously support the commissions' work. At the same time People's Congresses should bring into play their functions for exercising supervision according to law, the CPPCC should play its functions for exercising democratic supervision, and the people should bring into play their supervisory functions. Party committees should play an exemplary role in supervision. They should persist in democratic centralism, strengthen collective leadership, and conscientiously make criticisms and self-criticisms among leading members. All party members, particularly all leading cadres, should always act under the supervision of the party and the people. Leading cadres should consciously eliminate and prevent bureaucracy, resist and correct various unhealthy practices, and play an exemplary role in improving party style.

Improving the Leadership of the Party and Persisting in the Principle That the Party Should Take Charge of Party Affairs

Since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Comrade Xiaoping has repeatedly stressed the principle of separating the party from government functions and the principle that the party should take charge of party affairs. The national conference to summarize party rectification work reaffirmed the principle that the party should take charge of party affairs. Reaffirming it is extremely essential. Although this question has been stressed repeatedly over the past few years, it is not handled well. The tendencies of not separating the party from government functions, of the party acting in place of the governments, and of the party being irresponsible for party affairs generally exist. These tendencies directly affect party building and prevent the governments and their work departments from bringing their functions and initiative into play. Solving this problem is an important part of political restructuring as well as a fundamental measure for improving and strengthening the leadership of the party.

In order to separate party work from government work and let the party manage party work, we must first understand that "the party must lead everything." In our country, the Communist Party is a ruling party. Therefore, we should, without question, uphold and strengthen party leadership. but, it must be clearly defined that party leadership should be exercised primarily in the fields of politics, ideology, and organization; and the party should not monopolize all matters of all organizations, including the political power organizations. If we regard party leadership as the leadership in specific vocational work, and if party committees and their principal comrades immerse themselves in specific economic and administrative work, it will be impossible to strengthen party building and to raise the level of party leadership. As a result, party leadership will be weakened, rather than being promoted.

The party should manage the party's work. What should it manage? Comrade Bo Yibo pointed out: "In principle, the party should concentrate its energy on managing well the formulation and implementation of the party line, principles, and policies (including the major policy decisions concerning economic and social development); managing well the party's ideological and political work and the work in the party's ideological field; managing well the work on the party's organizational cadres and the propaganda work; and managing well the work of exploiting the vanguard and exemplary role of party members." These "four managing wells" are the concrete task of the party in managing its work, the criterion for judging the success or failure in the work of party organizations at all levels, as well as the yardstick to assess the achievements scored by leading cadres of party committees in their official career. From now on, we should conduct the party work, and supervise and examine the work of party organizations at all levels in line with these "four managing wells."

By conducting party work in line with these "four managing wells," we never mean that the party does not manage the economic work. After the party's work emphasis was shifted, economic construction has become the central task of

our party, and it is an urgent demand to strengthen and improve the party's leadership over economic work. In leading the economic work, the party should mainly grasp the guiding ideology for economic work, grasp the principles and policies on economic work, and ensure and supervise the fulfillment of the tasks for economic work through the party's organizational, ideological, and political work and through the vanguard and exemplary role of party members. By so doing, we will truly strengthen, rather than weaken, party leadership over economic work.

Party committees should be good at exploiting the organizational role. Local governments at all levels are the executive organs of the local state political power organs and local state administrative organs at all levels. In line with the stipulations of the Constitution, all levels of local government should manage economic, educational, scientific, cultural, physical and sports, urban construction, and various other administrative work within their own administrative divisions. All levels of party committees should positively and enthusiastically support local governments to dependently exercise their functions and powers and give full play to their functional role. At the same time, attention should be paid to handling well the relations among party committees, people's congresses, and CPPCC committees. People's congresses are the state power organs, and CPPCC committees are united front organizations. Party committees at all levels should energetically support people's congresses to independently exercise their powers in accordance with the Constitution and the law and should support CPPCC committees to launch the political consultation and democratic supervision activities in line with the party's historical mission for the new period, so that people's congresses and CPPCC committees can display still greater role in building the socialist modernization and in developing state political life.

Drawing no distinction between party and government work and the party taking over the government work are very complicated problems which were formed by history. These problems should be gradually soled along with the constant deepening of the political structural reform. We should pay attention to solving these problems, but should not do with undue haste. Those problems whose nature has already been defined should be solved conscientiously. As for those problems whose nature has not yet been defined and which must be solved, investigations, studies, and experimental work should be conducted to gain experience in order to create conditions for solving these problems.

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CSO: 4005/908

HEILONGJIANG STUDY PROGRAM DISCUSSES STAGES OF SOCIALISM

OW301349 Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin 2310 GMT 29 Jul 87

[From "Study Program": "Program by the Heilongjiang Provincial Broadcasting Station entitled 'How To Understand China's Present Society'"]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we are living in a socialist society. There is probably no question about it. However, different views exist regarding China's present stage of socialist development. In addition, our misjudgments on this question have cost us dearly. We should have a precise understanding of this important question which is vital to the overall situation.

The resolution of the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee explicitly pointed out that China is still in the initial stage of socialism at present. During this stage, we should develop commodity production and encourage some people to get rich first for the sake of achieving common prosperity. It is very important to correctly understand China's present stage of socialism, for it is the fundamental point of departure for observing, analyzing, and dealing with all important questions in China, as well as an objective basis for formulating principles and policies. Departing from this point is bound to lead us to unrealistic thinking.

Our party has learned a bitter lesson in this regard. After the basic completion of the three great transformations in 1956, due to repeated misjudgments regarding the stage of socialist development we were in, we considered it too easy to materialize communism and committed the mistake of making a rash transition to communism. During the 10 years of internal disorder, some people pushed for "transition through poverty," encouraged "large in size and collective in nature," negated the principle of to each according to his work, and cut off capitalist appendages. As a result, the national economy was pushed to the brink of collapse. The lack of scientific understanding of China's stage of socialist development is the main reason why this leftist guiding ideology of seeking hasty results lasted for 20 years without being corrected.

The 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee brought order out of chaos and restored the ideological line of seeking truth from facts. We then sobered up and reached the correct judgment that China is in the early stage of socialism at present. Under the guidance of this correct guiding thought, we are regaining prosperity in all our endeavors.

Looking out of the theoretical window, we notice that our neighboring country, the Soviet Union, has also experienced some bewilderment. During the 1930's, Stalin declared that the Soviet Union had completed the building of socialism, and the task then was making the transition to communism. After taking office, Khrushchev completely repudiated Stalin, which was wrong, of course. However, on the question of the transition to communism, he still remained within Stalin's confines. In 1961 he declared that the Soviet Union would have basically achieved communism by 1980, which has proved to be unrealistic. His "goulash"-type communism has become the laughing stock of history. Brezhnev criticized Khrushchev for committing subjective mistakes, saying that the Soviet Union had established well-developed socialism. In place of Khrushchev's idea of "progressing toward communism," he advanced the idea of "progressing toward well-developed socialism," which marked a significant shift in understanding. Andropov's understanding of this question was another step forward. Considering that Brezhnev's judgment was not in conformity with reality either, he revised the theory of "progressing toward socialism" to the theory of a "starting point," saying that the Soviet Union was at the starting point of well-developed socialism. After Gorbachev took power, he reexamined the historical lessons and acquired an understanding closer to reality. He holds that the Soviet Union is in the developing stage of socialism.

History is evolving in an intensified manner. The lessons we and our neighboring country have learned show that we cannot afford to neglect the long-term nature of socialist development, and that we should not leap over historical stages of development in our eagerness to make the transition to communism.

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HEILONGJIANG LEADERS ATTEND ARMY DAY FORUM 28 JULY

SK290648 Harbin Heilongjiang Provincial Service in Mandarin 2100 GMT 28 Jul 87

[Text] On the afternoon of 28 July, responsible comrades of the provincial and Harbin City party, government, and army organs held a forum at the Harbin Youyi Palace to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA.

The meeting hall on the third floor of Youyi Palace was filled with a harmonious and cordial atmosphere. Leading comrades of the army and the locality were full of joy and their cheerful laughter reverberated in the hall.

The forum was presided over by Li Gensheng, secretary of the Harbin City party committee. Liu Jingsong, commander of the Shenyang Military Region, gave a speech at the forum. He said: Not long ago, in the Da Hinggan Ling fire-fighting struggle, more than 1,400 army officers and soldiers gave up their holidays, and approximately 1,800 comrades, who had decided to be transferred to civilian jobs, persisted in going to the fire forefront. What power has inspired us? There is but one reason--because we come from the people. When the people need us, we cannot retreat.

He Taoquan, commander of a certain combined army, Ma Chunwa, political commissar of the provincial military district, and (Tan Qitang), president of a certain air force academy, gave speeches in which they thanked the provincial party and government organs and the masses of people for their support.

Sun Weiben, secretary of the provincial party committee, said: This year's army day will be different from those of previous years. In the land of Heilongjiang, the sentiments between the army and the people have become much closer. I hope that all soldiers will find this unusual festival happier than ever.

Liu Zenhua, political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region; Shao Zhao and Dong Yisheng, responsible persons of locally stationed PLA units; Hou Jie, Chen Yunlin, Huang Feng, Zhang Xiangling, Wang Fei, and Yang Zirong, leading comrades of the province; and Qi Guiyuan, director of the propaganda department of the provincial party committee, attended the forum.

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CSO: 4005/908

CRACKDOWN ON ILLEGAL PUBLICATIONS

Xi'an Confiscates 10 Million

HK240950 Xi'an Shaanxi Provincial Service in Mandarin 2330 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Since the beginning of this year, Xi'an city has ferreted out more than 10 million copies of 800 kinds of illegal publications and confiscated and fined the people concerned some 120,000 yuan for their income from the sale of illegal publications.

This year, the Xi'an City Party Committee Standing Committee has held three meetings to discuss the problem of cracking down on illegal publications. All districts and counties have established special organs to censor publications. They have adopted such methods as integrating check-ups with supervision by the masses and integrating regular check-ups with spot check-ups. As a result, the city has ferreted out more than 40 underground printing houses that especially printed illegal publications, reregistered all collective-run and individual-run newspaper and magazine newstands, outlawed some operators without licenses, and straightened out some publishing units that did not have accurate office addresses and published extra editions, supplements, and books without authorization.

'Incomplete' Shaanxi Statistics

HK221128 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 21 Jul 87 p 1

[Dispatch by reporter Meng Xian [1322 6007 1344]: "Shaanxi Severely Suppresses Illegal Publishing Activities"]

[Excerpts] Since 1985, Shaanxi Province has taken various measures to deal continuous blows on illegal publishing activities to check and ban these activities. According to incomplete statistics, in the past 2 years, this province has confiscated more than 15 million volumes of books, and has imposed fines totaling more than 200,000 yuan.

Small Number in Qinghai

HK280020 Xining Qinghai Provincial Service in Mandarin 0430 GMT 26 Jul 87

[Excerpts] Recently, the provincial administration for the control of publications under the provincial people's government, as well as Xining city's departments of public security, culture, industry and commerce, and radio and television have jointly taken actions to conduct comprehensive inspections of Xining area's cultural and book markets. As a result, they have discovered and seized over 400 types of illegal publications, totaling more than 1,000 copies, as well as nearly 100 illegally produced magnetic tapes. In addition, they have inspected a number of state-operated, collectively managed, and individually-operated printing houses, thus hitting hard at activities of promoting illegal publications.

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CSO: 4005/903

OPPOSING BUREAUCRATISM PROMPTED BY DAXINGANLING FIRE

Gansu Governor Reports

HK250423 Lanzhou Gansu Provincial Service in Mandarin 2200 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Excerpts] The second plenary meeting this year of the provincial government, convened on 24 July, proposed that opposing bureaucratism must start with the provincial government and the provincial organs and with the leading cadres. The government and the departments at all levels must take rapid action to check on and expose problems of bureaucratism in work.

Vice Governor Liu Shu chaired the meeting. Present were responsible comrades of the province including Li Ziqi, Liu Bing, Jia Zhijie, Lu Ming, Zhang Wule, and (Yan Haiwang), and responsible comrades of all prefectures and cities and the provincial departments.

In a speech, Governor Jia Zhijie reported on the provincial government party group's inspection of problems of bureaucratism. He said: The State Council decision on dealing with the Daxinganling forest fire constitutes profound education for the leading cadres at all levels. During study and discussion, the party group of the provincial government has felt that the problem of bureaucratism similarly exists in the government departments at all levels in Gansu. Some of the problems are very serious and have caused major losses and grave consequences.

Since last year, there have been many fires, major traffic accidents, and accidents in small coalmines, causing serious losses to life and property. Direct economic losses caused by fires alone amount to 7.87 million yuan. In addition, serious damage done to water conservancy facilities has weakened agricultural production. Problems of indiscriminate lumbering, smuggling of cultural relics, land disputes in remote and pasture areas, and speculation in chemical fertilizer have also exposed serious bureaucratism in some places and units. The whole province from top to bottom must attach sufficient importance to these problems. We must seriously solve these problems in the course of the current struggle against bureaucratism, to promote a fundamental turn for the better in party style and social mood.

Jia Zhijie said: At present the government and departments at all levels must seriously take stock of and expose problems of bureaucratism in their work and get a good grasp of handling various accidents for which people have to be held responsible. We must set up responsibility systems and put them on a sound basis, and strengthen administrative supervision and democratic supervision by the masses. We must strictly control expenditures.

Provincial Party Committee Secretary Li Ziqi said in a speech: Eliminating bureaucratism is a major goal of carrying out political structural reform. We must grasp opposition to bureaucratism as a regular task. In investigating and dealing with bureaucratism, we must practice division of responsibilities and grasp the work to the end. We cannot just talk about it, thereby using bureaucratism to oppose bureaucratism. We must deal severely with people who deliberately conceal bureaucratism and erect obstacles to and interfere with the work of investigating and punishing it.

In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the cadres at all levels will brace their spirits, work actively, and do a good job of the tasks assigned them by the party and people.

Xinjiang Regional Government

HK250517 Urumqi Xinjiang Regional Service in Mandarin 1200 GMT 24 Jul 87

[Excerpts] The regional government held its 20th plenary meeting today. The meeting called on the people's governments at all levels to oppose bureaucratism and improve the work style of the organs.

The main purpose of the meeting was to check on the major accidents that have occurred in the region since 1985 and the way in which they were handled.

The meeting held that many major accidents were inseparable from the bureaucratism among the leadership. It is extremely essential to launch the struggle against bureaucratism.

Regional Government Chairman Tomur Dawamat spoke at the conclusion of the meeting. He said: In opposing bureaucratism we cannot just stop at the level of investigating the causes of accidents and summing up the experiences and lessons. We must punish the persons mainly responsible, according to the seriousness of the case.

After analyzing various expressions of bureaucratism, Tomur Dawamat said that at present the government and the work departments at all levels must carry out thorough education in opposing bureaucratism. It is necessary to grasp the educational material on the Daxinganling forest fire, further enhance understanding of opposing bureaucratism, and improve government work.

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CSO: 4005/903

SHAANXI CPC COMMITTEE URGES DIALOGUES BETWEEN LEADERS, MASSES

HK230406 Xian Shaanxi Provincial Service in Mandarin 2330 GMT 21 Jun 87

[Text] On 16 June, the Shaanxi Provincial CPC Committee issued a circular on approving the transmission of its Propaganda Department's proposal for extensively opening dialogues between leaders and the masses on all fronts throughout the province.

The circular demands that party committees at all levels fully understand the great importance of opening such dialogues, conscientiously organize and meticulously guide such dialogues, emphasize practical results, enable all fronts to extensively open such dialogues, and gradually turn the opening of such dialogues into a regular and systematic practice for the purpose of promoting the building of our socialist material and spiritual civilizations.

The proposal made by the provincial party committee Propaganda Department for extensively opening dialogues between leaders and the masses on all fronts throughout the province primarily contains four points:

First, leading cadres at all levels must regard opening dialogues between themselves and the masses as an important task, conscientiously promote the opening of such dialogues in a planned and guided way, and turn the opening of such dialogues into a regular and systematic practice. Leading party and government organs at all levels and their subordinate departments' leading cadres must first take the lead in devoting time and energy to going deep among the masses of all trades and professions including offices, factories, mines, rural areas, schools, and shops, and hold direct dialogues with the masses in a planned and well-prepared way. Leaders of all enterprises, and undertakings, and leaders of all colleges and universities must also make concrete arrangements for the opening of such dialogues. Cadres on the ideological and theoretical front, and cadres of cultural departments, must use their professional skills and knowledge to open all avenues for the opening of such dialogues. Mass organizations at all levels must give full play to their roles of being a bridge and a link, center on the opening of such dialogues, and successfully promote their own work.

Second, regarding the contents of such dialogues, we must act in accordance with the principle of proceeding from actual conditions, discuss and resolve matters of interest to the masses in accordance with the concrete conditions of different trades, professions, and targets; and extensively heed the opinions of the masses of all social strata. Overall, the masses are currently most concerned with only two points, namely, upholding the four cardinal principles and opposing bourgeois liberalization, and upholding the policy on reform, opening up, and reinvigoration, while promoting in-depth development of the "double increase and double economy" campaign. These points mean that the basic contents of our dialogues with the masses should center on the two basic points and really urgent problems on all our fronts. They also mean that we should clearly explain to the masses the reasons for upholding the four cardinal principles and the policy on reform, opening up, and reinvigoration; the ways to uphold the four cardinal principles and the policy on reform, opening up, and reinvigoration; and the real relations between the two.

Third, the ways to conduct such dialogues must be flexible, varied, and be really effective. In opening dialogues between leaders and the masses over the past 2 years, we have summed up and created some effective forms and methods. All areas and units should selectively apply such forms and methods in light of their own specific conditions.

The following are some of the effective forms and methods: a) During a dialogic meeting, leaders can directly answer questions raised by the masses; b) During a meeting to hold earnest talks, leaders and the masses can jointly study and discuss matters of interest to both sides; c) During meeting or forums of party delegates, NPC deputies, CPPCC committee members, or members of democratic parties, party and government work can be appraised through discussions; d) Meeting of representatives of workers and staff members mean that workers can directly participate in enterprise management; e) Heart-to-heart talks; f) Visits to the parents of young workers; g) Fixed dates for leaders to receive the masses; h) Some people's special problems can be solved by opening a dialogue between the relevant people and leaders; i) Through private talks, leaders can explain policies to the relevant masses, and can also assist the relevant masses in resolving their ideological and cognitive issues and solving their real problems; j) Through television dialogues, the number of targets of the education can be increased.

Fourth, we should strengthen organizational leadership to ensure the good quality and results of such dialogues. Prior to conducting such dialogues, it is imperative to finish all necessary preparations. Such dialogues should be conducted in a democratic atmosphere and on the basis of equality. Statements made during such dialogues should be based on facts. We must be practical and realistic in treating achievements and shortcomings in our work. We must not just stress our achievements nor must we avoid mentioning our shortcomings. We must absolutely not describe our shortcomings as our achievements. What is more important is that leading cadres must set good examples in every field, and promote the style of actions matching words. Leading

cadres must not say one thing during a dialogue with the masses and do another in reality. In conducting dialogues, leading cadres with strong party spirit, moral integrity, and with deeds that are consistent with their words will show greater persuasive power and will also achieve better results.

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CSO: 4005/903

SHAANXI CALLS FOR STUDY OF NATIONAL PARTY RECTIFICATION MEETING

HK200217 Xian Shaanxi Provincial Service in Mandarin 2330 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] The general office of the provincial party committee recently issued a circular calling on party organizations at all levels and the whole body of party members to seriously study and implement the spirit of the national conference on summing up party rectification work.

The circular pointed out: This conference was an important meeting held before the 13th Party Congress. The important speeches and reports of leading central comrades including Zhao Ziyang and Bo Yibo evaluated the achievements and problems in nationwide party rectification in a truth-seeking way, profoundly summed up experiences and lessons, and explicitly put forward the guiding idea and fundamental tasks of regular party building in the future. Seriously studying and implementing the speeches of the leading central comrades is of great and far-reaching significance for unifying the understanding of the whole party and strengthening party building. The circular demanded that the party organizations at all levels and the party members focus on discussing and resolving the following three issues:

1. Apply the spirit of the national conference on summing up party rectification to unify understanding of party rectification and analyze party rectification work in the various areas, systems, and units, and make an appropriate and truth-seeking evaluation of it. It is necessary to sum up experiences and lessons and continue to do a good job in party building.
2. Have a clear idea on the guiding idea and fundamental tasks of party building in the new period, which is, to ensure the implementation of the line since the 3d Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee and its two basic viewpoints of adhering to the four cardinal principles and persevering in reform, opening up, and invigoration.
3. Make a success of the transition from concentrated party rectification to regular party building. Starting by analyzing the current state of party building following party rectification, in light of Comrade Bo Yibo's report, we should have a clear idea on the problems in ideology, work style, and organizational discipline in the party in the different areas, systems, and units, and propose measures for dealing with them. Responsibilities should be firmed up for this purpose. We must guard against and eliminate the slack idea that everything is fine the moment that party rectification is concluded, and get a good grasp of dealing with leftover problems.

ISSUE OF UNIFICATION, INDEPENDENCE DISCUSSED

Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 209, Jun 87 pp 58-61

[Article by Nan Min [0589 3046]: "Taiwan's Unification-Independence Controversy and the Struggle for Self-Determination"]

[Excerpts] Should Taiwan finally become part of Mainland China or become independent? This question has been repeatedly argued about during the last few decades.

In the past, the argument over unification or independence was conducted very much in secret because both sides of the argument were politically taboo. An example is the "argument over native soil literature" of past years, when the unification party emphasized anti-imperialist and anticapitalist characteristics, while the independence party emphasized the special sense of identifying with one's own native soil. The argument, however, surfaced from its secrecy after the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP], organized by the "tangwai" made "self-determination by the local population" their slogan.

The DPP is an extension and evolution of the former tangwai, and it cannot be denied that it is to some extent linked with the Taiwan independence movement. In the many factions within the Taiwan independence movement of earlier years, the faction in which members of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church dominated had indeed already earlier advocated self-determination for Taiwan. In the party program of the DPP there are the following references to self-determination:

We oppose the use of armed force by any state to subjugate states or political entities separated from other states and still under international dispute.

The future of Taiwan shall be determined by the entire population of Taiwan in freedom and self-determination, and in a comprehensive and impartial manner, with equality for all. No government or coalition of states shall have the right to determine the political affiliation of Taiwan.

In view of the hostile confrontation between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and while their political, social, and economic systems differ widely, efforts should primarily be directed toward improving the livelihood of the populations on both sides of the Strait, and nothing should be done to aggravate the tension in this confrontation. Each side of the Taiwan Strait

shall resolve its problems by decision of the entire local population, expressing their free will in self-determination. We oppose any resolution of such problems based on negotiations between the nationalist and communist sides that would violate the principle of people's self-determination.

Since the establishment of the DPP at the end of last year, and adoption in its party program of the principle of self-determination by the local population, there has been a subtle change, a move toward the "realities of the situation," in the essential meaning of self-determination, but this was only an "intrinsic change." In its outward formulation, this term "self-determination," which has been inherited from earlier days, cannot possibly be rid, as long as it is not changed, of some vestiges of "independence" in its implied meaning. "Self-determination by the local people" is, therefore, something that is vehemently castigated by both the nationalist as well as the communist side. Especially on the communist side, its leaders have repeatedly and openly criticized the concept of "self-determination." There are reasons to believe that America's lack of support for self-determination has been brought about by indirect pressure from Communist China. The Chinese Communists have all along been afraid that a "four-party coalition" could come into being which would separate Taiwan from the mainland. The "four-party coalition" refers to a unison of interests in Taiwan among the United States, the younger generation of KMT members, the DPP, and Japan. Deng Xiaoping declared at least twice that unless Taiwan unites with China, it would be swallowed up by Japan, a statement obviously made to counteract the formation of a "four-party coalition."

For a little over half a year, following the gradual relaxation and breakup of the political taboo, "self-determination" and the unification-independence issue have risen to the surface. Within this year, there have been four important "close-quarter engagements" fought on these questions on the island of Taiwan.

On 15 January, Chao Shao-k'ang [6392 1421 1660] and Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing [6200 7022 1694] started the argument over "unification" and "self-determination" in a debate entitled "Taiwan's Future in Relation to China." On the whole, we may consider this debate as soliloquies without interaction. Chao Shao-k'ang's argument was more or less that of a spokesman for the government position, expressing the belief that self-determination was not only not feasible and unnecessary, but also very dangerous, as apt to result in great harm for the people of Taiwan. Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing's argument was on the whole a repetition and expansion of the position expressed on the subject of self-determination in the DPP party program.

On 20 February, the first public dialog on self-determination took place between KMT and DPP as a result of a general interpellation in the Legislative Yuan. First, DPP senator Yu Ch'ing [1429 3237] inquired about self-determination; after reading the section on self-determination in the DPP party program, he stated: "The KMT criticizes self-determination as divisive, and that self-determination is equivalent to Taiwan independence. May I ask the legal experts of the KMT to explain the meaning of self-determination?" Executive Yuan President Yu Kuo-hua's reply to this was: "What is the true purpose of advocating self-determination for the people of Taiwan? Is it not

independence? Taiwan is a province of the Republic of China. It is stipulated in the constitution that the territory of the Republic is indivisible. If Taiwan would separate itself and become independent, it would not only be a violation of the constitution, but could invite an immediate attack from the Chinese Communists and thereby inflict limitless calamity on us..." Yu Ch'ing followed up by pointing out that self-determination is one of the people's rights derived from human rights and national autonomy. According to the origin and meaning of the right of self-determination, it may be divided into four categories: 1) Due to differences of ethical concepts, majority decisions may infringe on minority interests; self-determination has, therefore, the meaning of "joint decision-making." 2) It provides legal basis for colonies to break away from the rule of colonizing governments. This is the "national self-determination" of President Wilson's times. 3) Refugees should have the right to return to their home countries, as in the case of the Palestinians from Israel, the Jews of Russia, and others. 4) A separate political entity should have the right to oppose reunification by one-sided armed force. The self-determination referred to by the DPP is of the fourth category.

Yu Ch'ing, furthermore, expressed that Taiwan has been under Communist Chinese threat for a long time, and that the only way to internationalize the Taiwan question is to implement the right of self-determination. He even went so far as to say: "In the last 10 years, experts on international law have established general consensus on the right of self-determination. According to the views on self-determination held by Western countries, if armed force is used to implement self-determination, it must be on the principle of commensurate proportions between the applied method and the goal. Current international law permits a third country to interfere with armed force in order to assert the right of self-determination. In other words, a third country may act in support of implementing the right of self-determination, based on the principle of human rights, in order to achieve the aim of self-help."

Minister of Justice Shih Ch'i-yang [2457 6386 2254] replied to Yu Ch'ing's interpellation, that according to Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of China, Taiwan is part of the territory of the Republic of China, which absolutely rules out applying the "principle of self-determination."

Next, there followed an interpellation by another DPP senator, Chu Kao-cheng [2612 7559 2973], on the issue of self-determination. He first recited the last section of the preamble to the West German Basic Law: "The entire German people are called upon to achieve, in free self-determination, the unity of the German nation and state." He pointed out that there was here the same concept as in the case of self-determination for the people of Taiwan. He, furthermore, said: "The whole period, from the 28 February Incident to raising the issue of self-determination for the people of Taiwan, portrays the total breakdown of KMT rule over Taiwan." He also said: "The KMT propounds the unification of China under the rule of the Three People's Principles," but "I can tell Premier Yu that according to my knowledge people on the mainland have a very bad impression of the KMT, so who would want us to come and liberate our mainland compatriots? Isn't such talk really like blowing your own trumpet?" and he went on and on in this vein.

Yu Kuo-hua replied to Chu Kao-cheng's interpellation at considerable length, the main points of his reply being: "The government cannot tolerate any proposal that would encourage cutting off Taiwan from China. As to the formulation "self-determination by the people," this is in our opinion a preposterous proposal to alienate the people of Taiwan from the state and from its historical and cultural traditions; under no condition can it be implemented for the territory of Taiwan in the present situation." "The right of self-determination must not be used to split up a state; this is a principle of international law that is generally recognized by every country and international organization of the world. Self-determination for the people of Taiwan is fundamentally wrong by the rules of international law." "The proposal for self-determination will not only impede our international and diplomatic progress, but on the contrary aggravate the tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and any talk to that effect is extremely dangerous and irresponsible."

During the period from March to April, this debate will possibly be expanded into a debate identifying with cultural affairs.

The proponents of unification and of independence have had many a contest of strength in secret during the past few years. The fight between the Taiwan-ideology and the China-ideology, between the Taiwan-solution and the China-solution, usually flared up suddenly and after a short fight disappeared again from the scene for some time.

On 11 March, the second issue of the MINCHINPAO published an article by Hsieh Li-fa [6200 6849 3127], a Taiwan painter living abroad, entitled "The Historical Blind Spot of Taiwan Intellectuals Viewed Under the Aspect of the 28 February Incident." The article argues that every misfortune suffered by Taiwan resulted from Taiwan's dependence on China. "One truly owns only what has been gained by reliance on one's own strength. No one must be in a state of dependence. A Taiwan that is dependent on no one is of course an independent Taiwan. Only an independent Taiwan is master of its own fate." Apart from his conclusion, which is the need for Taiwan's independence, the whole article interprets past history completely from a Taiwan viewpoint. Consequently, he decries pro-China anti-Japanese patriots and leaders of popular movements, such as Chiang Wei-shui [5592 3262 3055] of former years, and such phenomena as the exultation over Taiwan's return to China after the War of Resistance Against Japan, or the study of literary Chinese. On the whole, this article is frequently reprinted in Taiwan independence movement publications abroad, but hardly ever seen on the island. It presents a rather queer viewpoint of history.

Publication of the said article, and the fact that it negates the value of Taiwan's anti-Japanese democratic movement, immediately aroused the indignation of veterans from the time of the Japanese occupation, so that, for instance, 10 men, including Chen Ch'i-ch'ang [7115 0366 2490], chief secretary in the former Taiwan People's Party, protested to Chiang P'eng-chien [3068 7720 1017] and published a rebuttal. The protest appeared in the ninth issue of the MINCHINPAO of 30 April. The editorial department of the paper printed its own reply in the same number, supporting the viewpoint expressed by Hsieh

Li-fa. The CH'IEN FANG, a publication of the unification party, moreover, printed a further rebuttal, and we can foresee that this debate will possibly grow in intensity.

As the forces on both sides of the unification-independence controversy grow more fascist, a group of young intellectuals at the Taiwan University has shown a feeling of exasperation over this matter in recent years. Their organ is the magazine NANFANG [THE SOUTH], and their main viewpoints are:

1. Being inspired by the modern "New Left," much of their attention is focused on the development and integration of socialism and the democratic rule of law.
2. They believe that through following the tenets of historical dialectics, a dialectic "popular society" can be created, and Taiwan be directed toward greater socialism and democracy.
3. They believe that the Chinese people show little initiative because since antiquity China was ruled by autocratic dynasties, while a democratic system on the other hand must be set in motion by the people. Only a society in which the people hold power needs not fear a shift in political power. In the struggle between the proponents of unification and those of independence, it is always assumed that settlement of the question of uppermost sovereign rights settles everything; this is nothing but mental indolence and ignorance.
4. There is another level of thinking as regards socialism: No system that lacks democratic checks and examinations will prove superior. History in essence is a constant democratic confrontation in a "ruler--ruled" relationship.

The four above-stated "engagements" are the unification-independence debates concerned with arguments over self-determination for the people, as they were launched in various steps following the establishment of the DPP. The fact that deserves special attention is that these four confrontations had been rather broad in scope; they had actual political, cultural, historical, and philosophical aspects. They took the form of debates in the national assembly and of articles in periodicals and newspapers. Their increasing frequency, furthermore, demonstrates that they are really concerned with an issue that has indeed been raised onto the political stage.

The unification-independence controversy is an old one, and one that cannot be resolved.

9808

CSO: 4005/875

ALTERNATE POLITICAL ALLIANCES FORMING IN LEGISLATIVE YUAN

Hong Kong CHIUSHIH NIENTAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese No 208, May 87 pp 72-74

[Article by T'ang I [3282 3015], under the rubric "Taiwan Topics": "Some Special Developments in the Political Situation on Taiwan"]

[Excerpts] Recently, supplementary Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members in the Legislative Yuan have been cooperating in droves and preparing to organize various kinds of mutual friendship groups. The KMT, particularly senior members of the Legislative Yuan, have misgivings and are looking askance at this move. Although supplementary legislative members have focused on them time and again, these organizations have not involved real political action. But according to senior members, a combination that cuts across party groupings and is entirely composed of "supplementary members" will reveal a hint of independence and defiance toward "senior" legislative members, and this will indeed be difficult for people to endure. In addition, they are worried that this trend may affect future action in discussions of official business in the Legislative Yuan.

Some of these mutual friendship groups initiated by supplementary legislative members are classified by alumni and some are classified by simultaneous participation in some social organization...they are a numerous. Right now the following organizations are actively being planned or have been completed: 1) The "One in Three Club" of Yu Ch'ing [1429 3237] (DPP) and Wu Tzu [0702 2737] (KMT), which welcomes legislative members who must be reelected once every 3 years; 2) The alumni of Chungshing University have already begun to get together once a month, and the alumni of National Taiwan University are now organizing; 3) The "Friendship Association for Young Members of Chambers of Commerce and the National Assembly" founded by K'ang Ning-hsiang [1660 1337 4382] (DPP) and Lin Lien-hui [2651 5114 6540], which breaks the bounds not only of party membership, but also of Legislative Yuan membership, to absorb members of the Control Yuan and the National Assembly; 4) The entire body of Taipei's KMT legislative members has already selected a day to invite all DPP legislative members to a feast.

However, the most spectacular such organization is the "Taiwan Regional Friendship Association for Supplementary Legislative Members" organized by Lu Hsueh-i [0712 1331 0308] of the KMT. It has already signed 80 percent of the supplementary KMT legislative members and it plans to gather together 85

percent of all supplementary legislative members and then make a proposal to party headquarters. It is this organization that has created the greatest pressure and poses the greatest threat to the senior legislative members.

Actually, senior legislative members' concerns are not without reason. Customarily, after each legislative election and before the new members assume their offices, the KMT holds a several-day "New Legislative Members Training Camp"--a party political action discussion meeting--at Yangming Shan Revolutionary Practice Research Institute. At the conference held at the end of January 1987, supplementary legislative members voiced many shocking political opinions, such as that "The president and vice president of the Legislative Yuan should allow supplementary members to handle affairs," and that "A supplementary legislative member should hold the post of secretary-general in the Legislative Yuan party headquarters, and senior committee members should occupy a less important position behind the scenes." They brazenly demanded that senior legislative members share power. The supplementary members' original point was that if they could not get the senior members to let go so that they could facilitate and undertake greater reforms, later elections would be even less advantageous to KMT legislative members. However, these demands were very distasteful to the ears of the senior members of the Legislative Yuan, who control the real power in all major legislative factions.

Right now the real power in the Legislative Yuan is held by two of the existing factions: KMT members call them "sentimental groups." One of these is known as the "Forum Faction," and is composed of three groups: the "Huang," "Fu," and "Ch'ing" ("Huang" refers to graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy, "Fu" refers to fierce and tough members of the secret "Revival Society" that was active during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and "Ch'ing" refers to members of the San-min Chu-i Youth League). Ni Wen-ya [0242 2429 0068], current president of the Legislative Yuan; Chao Tzu-ch'i [6392 5261 7871], current secretary-general of the KMT Central Policy Association; and Chou Mu-wen [0719 1970 2429], now secretary-general of the Legislative Yuan party headquarters, all belong to this faction. Because the "Forum Faction" is now the largest faction in the Legislative Yuan and has ample power to control the overall situation there, the KMT central authorities both respect it and have misgivings about it.

Another faction is the "C-C Faction," which is now the second largest in the Legislative Yuan. This year it has become well known because of the close relationship between Ch'en Li-fu [7115 4539 1133] and Ch'en Kuo-fu [7115 2654 1133]. Right now Liang Su-jung [2733 5126 2051] and Wu Yen-huan [0702 1693 3883] form the backbone of this faction.

Seeing the long-term monopoly that the power of these two factions had created within the Legislative Yuan, in 1981 legislative member Hsiao Jui-cheng [5618 3843 1794], who has since died, initiated an organization called the "Mutual Aid Association." He was dissuaded from this course, however, by Jiang Yen-shih [5592 1750 1102], who was then secretary-general of the Central Party Headquarters, and Liang Hsiao-huang [2733 1321 3552], who was chairman of the Work Organization Association. In the end, nothing was settled. Recently, after feeling the pressure of political questions from DPP legislative members

and experiencing rapid changes in the political climate and environment, many legislative members stirred up another mass fervor to organize mutual friendship groups. Their purpose was nothing more than the hope that they could concentrate political power between themselves and expand and develop their levels of influence.

On 10 April, at one of the meetings of KMT legislative members, Chao Tzu-ch'i, one of the high-ranking officials in the Forum Faction, said that he does not oppose private links between individuals of the party in power and the DPP, but that they cannot form organizations that cut across party lines. This is the position the senior legislative members took the first time it was made public that the supplementary members had been struggling to organize a mutual friendship group for the last month. Because Chao Tzu-ch'i is also secretary-general of the KMT's Central Policy Association, this statement might just as well be seen to reflect, to some degree, the view of KMT authorities.

For the last few days, Taiwanese newspapers have covered this issue extensively. To sum up, supplementary legislative members are optimistic about the success of the new groups. Senior members, on the other hand, are unwilling to see others establish another faction on the grounds that they are worried it will exacerbate the adversary relationship between the supplementary and senior legislative members (nobody has yet dared to admit calmly that they are worried that their interests or powers will be diminished.) The problem is that the point of departure for these new organizations is precisely the wish to resolve some of the antagonistic circumstances. It's just that this antagonism exists not between supplementary and senior legislative members, but between the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party. The sponsors feel that after the various disturbances that have taken place in the Legislative Yuan in the last few months, we have already moved toward bipolarization, and this is bad for harmonious discussions of official business. Therefore, to resolve this bipolar antagonism, it is essential that we establish vital mutual friendship groups outside the institutionalized channels of consultation between political parties and other organizations. From the perspective of practical politics, this argument is reasonable and should be accepted. But in addition to this, legislators elected by overseas Chinese have long had mutual friendship groups, and there is also one for the National Assembly (which makes no distinction on the basis of party membership). Since these organizations were not barred at the outset, why should legislators for the Taiwan region alone be treated this way? Moreover, just as some magazines have pointed out, since the factions formed by senior legislative members are just sentimental groups, the organizations that the supplementary legislative members wish to set up are just mutual friendship groups. "If the older members can be "sentimental," but the supplementary members cannot be "mutual friends," then I'm afraid it is difficult to justify."

A commentary offered by TZULI WANPAO [THE INDEPENDENT EVENING NEWS] was very tactful: We hope the parties concerned can give it more consideration, because there should be a change in the objective situation. CHUNGKUO SHIHPAO [THE CHINA TIMES], on the other hand, was relatively straightforward: It would be better to concede that this move is natural than to oppose it. In the end, if these suggestions verify that there is no way to bring about any

change, then we will really see that, "viewed from above, there are still a great many people who are utterly oblivious to social change."

In addition, this affair has revealed a message: although the highest authorities in Taiwan early on made major strides to expedite the determination and actions behind reform, today, when faced with a new, challenging situation, many high-ranking Kuomintang officials and bureaucrats behind national policies still vacillate and hesitate between an attitude of "obstruction" and one of "accommodation." But circumstances show that Taiwan has no other course to follow than to accept new ideas, new realities, and clever innovations.

That the supplementary legislative members have set up mutual friendship groups that cut across party lines is symbolic of the internal situation in the Legislative Yuan, this most important parliamentary organization. The past adversary relationship between the Kuomintang and the opposition party has gradually changed to become an adversary relationship between the new supplementary legislative members and the old, degenerate senior legislative members.

Outside of observing the series of lifted restrictions and reforms, this conscious or unconscious transformation in our native land is perhaps the one development that should be of most concern to people interested in the political situation in Taiwan.

Postscript: In the last several days before the publication deadline we learned through the newspapers that Ma Shu-li [7456 2885 4409], secretary-general of the KMT's Central Party Headquarters, and Chao Tzu-ch'i, secretary-general of the party's Central Policy Association, formally announced on 16 April that they would firmly prohibit the organization of mutual friendship groups and require the disbanding of the "Taiwan Regional Friendship Association for Supplementary Legislative Members." Afterward, over 30 KMT signatories withdrew from the association. From this piece of discouraging news we can predict that other friendship groups that are in the process of forming are destined to face an early death one after another.

There is one difficulty after another to face in carrying out reform and lifting restrictions in Taiwan. There are always some unseen obstructions holding us back. But the view that the Legislative Yuan "feels it should change" is already widespread. Although this time direct pressure exerted by KMT party headquarters caused the friendship associations to be aborted in the embryo stage, the spring breezes will bring them to life again. I am convinced that after a short time has passed a new plan will appear.

12510
CSO:4005/734

PAPER URGES CROSS STRAIT VISIT

OW030827 Taipei CHUNG KUO SHIH PAO in Chinese 20 Apr 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Squarely Facing the Issue of Ordinary People's Mutual Visits Between the Two Sides of the Straits"]

[Text] When President Chiang Ching-kuo proposed a series of major political reforms last year by noting that "the world situation is changing, the local situation is changing, and the trend is changing" and that "we should adapt ourselves to suit the circumstance we are in," his proposals immediately won support from all circles in the country. As a result, all kinds of taboos and sensitive questions that nobody dared to talk about openly in the past surfaced from the dark and changed from a matter of exploration into a matter of confrontation. Amid the rapidly changing trend, let us calmly and prudently discuss the issue of mutual visits between the people on both sides of the straits.

In a recent interpellation legislators Hung Chao-nan, Chao Shao-kang, Li Sheng-feng, and others urged the government to abandon the unnecessary mentality of "fear of communism." Moreover, Legislator Chao Shao-kang also suggested that the government, on the basis of humanitarianism and its anticommunist stand, help separated families on both sides of the straits achieve reunion. Premier Yu Kuo-hua answered by saying: The government has no intention of pursuing a policy of separation, but since the communists are crafty and deceitful, it is imperative for the government to adopt, at this stage, precautionary measures of banning correspondence with and travel to visit relatives on the mainland. As well, in his reply to an interpellation at a meeting of the Legislative Yuan's Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Minister Chu also explained the government policy of "no contacts, no talks, no compromise" with the CPC along with the principle of "no concession and no evasion." Because in recent years the Chinese Communists have been trying to isolate the Republic of China [ROC] internationally, the government has taken measures to cope with the situation by changing some policies while upholding some others. What has not been changed is our fundamental national policy. What has changed is the ROC's nongovernmental participation in international organizations, meetings, and activities in line with local conditions.

As Premier Yu Kuo-hua, Foreign Minister Chu Fu-sung, and other government officials have declared, our fundamental anticommunist policy will never be changed. This is something that everyone must agree to and affirm. However,

their statements can be understood as suggesting that a flexible principle has been adopted, on the premise of opposing communism, to cope with the current situation. This so-called flexible principle can be explained this way: As far as the government is concerned, it absolutely adheres to the policy of "no contacts, no talks, no compromise;" as far as civilians are concerned, there is no harm in adhering to the principle of "no concessions and no evasion." In fact, the ROC's nongovernmental contacts with mainland personnel in sports arenas, at meeting tables, at social gatherings, and at other places of nongovernmental activities have been quite universal and are becoming increasingly more frequent. Even the Executive Yuan has directed its overseas diplomatic personnel to follow the principle of no concession and no evasion and actively participate in activities organized by neutral overseas organizations, when both ROC and Chinese Communist personnel are invited to attend those activities. This shows that the government has substantially changed its consistently stern attitude in order to adjust itself to the changing situation. Such a change in the face of reality has won the appreciation of the people.

Nevertheless, it seems that this flexible principle only applies to activities and contacts outside the country. No change in principle has occurred within the country. Of course, this decision has been taken to guard against the united front tactics of the Chinese Communists, to guard against their infiltration, and to assure national security. But in the past our martial law and laws and regulations for banning the formation of political parties were also aimed at guarding against united front tactics and infiltration and at safeguarding national security. These laws and regulations are being changed to cope with the changing situation. Therefore, if proper regulations are carefully worked out, preventive measures for illegal activities of infringements on the law are taken, and the people are well-informed, we believe that non-governmental exchanges across the Taiwan Strait can be open to a certain extent. Such exchanges can not only alleviate the pressure from dissatisfaction among our countrymen but will also enhance our nation's international image. Now when the tide for change is rising in our nation is the best time for sober, rational, and careful thinking in order to achieve a breakthrough on this issue.

We think that matters to be examined in dealing with the issue of Taiwan-Mainland China contacts should include the following:

The first deals with the import of commodities from Mainland China. For a long time, we have called commodities from Mainland China "bandit goods" and have banned their entrance into Taiwan. Only the Taiwan Supply Bureau is exclusively authorized to procure certain kinds of traditional Chinese medicinal materials. However, longing for the past is only human nature. Many mainland products either do not exist in Taiwan or are of superior quality to local products. The more they are prohibited, the more some people long to get them. Thus, these "bandit goods" have found their way into Taiwan either via entrepot trade or by smuggling. The situation of entrepot trade is frequently very absurd. Although the origin of some products is hard to trace, they are still subjected to sample checks. If occasionally some

commodities are found to have been labelled of Mainland China origin, these labels are regarded as ironclad evidence, and the "bandit goods" are confiscated. If, however, no such evidence is found with some commodities, even though they are identical to the confiscated "bandit goods," they are allowed to enter Taiwan. Thus, the same type of commodity meets a different fate. As for smuggling of "bandit goods," despite custom's continuous efforts to seize and confiscate them and to punish people involved, there is still a steady flow of "bandit goods" into Taiwan. On Taiwan's market, there is an ample supply of various kinds of "bandit goods" that one can name. All this has only hurt the government's credibility and the consumers' pocketbooks as well. But at the same time, it gives some criminal elements an opportunity to engage in producing imitation goods, which hurts our public interest. The fact is that commerce and politics can be dealt with separately by different principles. It is a fact known to everyone that our products are being imported to Mainland China via entrepot trade. Therefore, we think the ban on some specific Mainland China commodities that do not exist in Taiwan but are particularly desired by the people, could be partially lifted. The Economic Construction Commission's recent decision to lift the ban on the import of Chinese angelica and the fruit of Chinese wolfberry is a harbinger in this regard. Of course, it is far from sufficient. The move should be extended to include many more items, thereby turning what appears to be abnormal into something that is normal.

The second item concerns the import of books from Mainland China. The people of Mainland China are our compatriots. Our understanding of this fact is conducive to China's reunification. Therefore, we think that Taiwan's younger generation should be allowed to have the opportunity to appreciate books of mainland origin such as literary works of the 1920's and 1930's published before the Chinese Communists took over China. Reference material and books for academic research published in Mainland China under the rule of the Chinese Communists are also of reference value to Taiwan's academic research circles. Therefore, we think that the government should establish a system to examine and give approval to the selective import of publications from Mainland China that are neither politically tainted nor propaganda oriented. This will prevent the flooding of indiscriminate reprints of Mainland China-published books on street book stalls.

The third issue deals with the mutual visits between people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This issue is divided into two parts. One deals with people in Taiwan visiting Mainland China, and the other deals with mainlanders coming to Taiwan. In recent years, because of the open policy adopted by the Chinese communists which welcomes "Taiwan compatriots," some people in Taiwan, either because they have relatives in Mainland China, or because they yearn to see Mainland China, have sought various ways and channels to visit the mainland from foreign lands; and our government agencies in charge of such matters have never been able to keep them from doing this.

It is estimated at least 10,000 people have done this. Even the records of our security agencies show that the number has reached 4,000. However, the number of our overseas compatriots who have visited Mainland China is even

greater. Our government announced long ago that those overseas compatriots who have visited Mainland China, are still welcome to visit Taiwan, if they have not done or said anything wrong. therefore, we think that the people of Taiwan should be allowed to visit Mainland China for a limited period of time, if their purpose is really to visit relatives or pay respects at their ancestors' tombs, and if their visit does not involve any security risks and have been approved beforehand. First, this will show that our government respects national ethics; and second, it will enable our people to realize the hardships experienced by our compatriots on the mainland under the rule of communist tyranny and take the opportunity to tell the people in Mainland China of the freedom, democracy, and prosperity enjoyed by the people in Taiwan, our base for national rejuvenation. For those who have failed to return home within the allowed time limit, their residence in Taiwan will be canceled. Those who engage in illegal activities after returning to Taiwan will be punished in accordance with the law. Any correspondence with mainlanders, as long as it is not done by direct postal service, and as long as it deals with only family matters and friendship, should not be banned. The current regulation banning Hong Kong as the first stop for any trip abroad is very unreasonable and should be abolished. If we can advise the people to make Hong Kong their site for reunion with relatives from Mainland China without going to the mainland to see their relatives themselves, it would be a feasible way beneficial to the people.

Concerning the question of mainlanders coming to Taiwan, the current government regulation stipulates that with the exception of those 75 years of age or older; those who have resided outside Mainland China for over 5 years and have parents, spouse, or children in Taiwan; or those with special reasons; no mainlanders shall be allowed to come to Taiwan. In view of Taiwan's limited space and dense population as well as the fear of an exodus of mainlanders into Taiwan lured by Taiwan's freedom and prosperity, this regulation is of course necessary. But we think that those who only come for a short stay either for attending an international conference or for participating in an international competition, should be allowed to enter Taiwan if no security problem is found with them after investigation. This will extend our sphere of activity and will also let the mainlanders see with their own eyes the prosperity enjoyed by the people of Taiwan in a free and democratic society. If after seeing Taiwan, some of these people were to opt to apply for permanent residence here; and if this fact were to make the Chinese Communists, feeling a loss of face, refuse to allow any more people to come to Taiwan, we will have done something toward advancing our "antiunited front work" cause.

The above is only intended as a primer for examining a sensitive issue. We hope that our government will give more comprehensive consideration to the question, solicit more opinion, consult more people, and achieve a breakthrough in promoting mutual visits between the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This will definitely have a positive impact on the future of our nation.

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