

JPRS-UKO-90-005  
16 APRIL 1990



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# **Soviet Union**

***KOMMUNIST***  
*No 2, January 1990*

19980204 075

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## KOMMUNIST

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### Social Dynamism and the Political Party

905B0016A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 3-13

[Text] It is probably hard to find a person who does not sense or understand the extraordinary compression of current social time. We are all living in a period, in which History itself flows through each of us, carrying with it expectations and disillusionment, worry and hope. Civilization, it seems, is starting a new stage of development, where interdependence and world-wide threats—payment for the prosperity of the strong and poverty of the weak—are not only becoming a fact of consciousness, but also the pivotal idea behind realistic economic and political programs.

Our social renovation has been under way for about 5 years in all, yet our entire society, and not just it, has become involved in a process of cardinal, sometimes explosive changes. The new way of thinking is seen in the difficult, contradictory conversion from social statics to the dynamics, characteristic of most regions of the socialist world; it is growing stronger in its aspiration to reach a political consensus on the most burning problems of our day (the most acute of these is that of a nuclear-free or, better in general, an unarmed, stable world), which is a decisive factor in the strategy for survival and in the movement toward a common European home, toward "Helsinki-II."

The compression of universally significant events is greater, the clearer the people's aspiration finally to switch from slogans and declarations (including of perestroika) to constructive practical solutions in economic and political support of a transformed social order, transformed on the basis of reason, democratic freedoms and humanistic morals.

We must emphasize: *KOMMUNIST* by no means intends to act as Voltaire's Dr. Pangloss, claiming that "everything is taking a turn for the better in our finest of worlds." The forthcoming year will hardly be any less difficult than last year. We can see what we have, and what people have abroad. In breaking stagnant economic or political and bureaucratic structures, the policy of renovation has to overcome both the counter-pressure against them, as well as anarchistic intolerance and outbursts of social emotions. Neoconservative forces (old conservatives behind a new, "restructuring" screen) and the self-called "left radicals" (flying the same flags) are rushing toward the "gap" that has taken shape, the "free play" between the ruined old order of economic,

political, and cultural life and the unformed, still-weak new way of life. The screen, by the way, is used ever more rarely and more formally.

Let us immediately stipulate: it is not a question of reasonable appeals for society, the party, or the "parliament" to observe caution, and it is not a question of people who insist on implementing rapid radical reform. Each of these directions has its logic, and their clash can be of unquestionable use in reform activity. No, we are speaking of the idols (including among the CPSU) of meeting and slogan democracy, of the admirers of quasi-revolutionary phrases.

Essentially, the former are calling straight "ahead" to the former "glorious" bureaucratic-authoritarian "order;" and the latter are dreaming of "revolutionary" movement toward "good old" capitalism. Obviously, these two extremes do not exhaust the entire ideological palette or all the counter-currents in the contemporary flow of social transformations. We will leave the final judgment of which is better, and which is worse to the reader's taste. Finally, in this case, even the question of who is on the right, and who is on the left depends on from which side one looks.

Using a traditional political dictionary, let us try to define: to what should we attribute the extraordinary excitement of the December meetings in Leningrad? Clearly, at present the conservative threat is more real, but the irresponsible "democratic" adventurism which aggravates it is the more intolerable.

We are convinced: both noted tendencies lead to a dead-end in social evolution, since they inspire the strange idea of progress through regression. Not one of these directions is rooted in the deep layers of popular spiritual life or in a clear program, not to mention the fact that neither the former, nor the latter take the sum total of existing realities into account. Popular consciousness basically does not accept either the "private enterprise" freedom of capitalist profit, nor the barracks-administrative version of "heaven." It has paid too steep a price for the acquisition of tragic negative experience, to let a sudden, incredible all-round lunacy repudiate the path of radical reforms, law making, and law and order, instead preferring uncontrollable elements or dictatorship as a result of returning to civilization's pre-democratic period of development.

After making its historical choice, having started down one or another road of development, society had to follow it because of natural historical necessity. Of course, the possibility of branches in the road is allowed, but the over-all main direction is kept. Within the framework of socialism, we ourselves have to devise something more expedient than departmental bureaucracy and more democratic than "unanimous approval." For this socialism, there is the "live creativity of the people" (Lenin), such that the people themselves, automatically, will work on this difficult task.

We do not expect any kind of "Japanese miracle" whatsoever. If our own economic "miracle" is to occur, it will be basically socialist, or it will not occur at all.

However, no one forbids us from borrowing the experience of private enterprise, having in mind the reforms' orientation toward expanding the rights of enterprises and toward new forms of their functioning, toward healthy competition. On the contrary, exchange of this experience and diversity is an impetus for development.

Of course, everyone has a right to his own world view, but extremism leads least of all to improvement of the people's life. Here, group egotism, nationalistic pride, and an aspiration to elevate oneself above one's neighbor by way of unscrupulous cleverness or by fact and place of birth (although it was long ago realized that a "nation" is not a biological or geographical, but a sociocultural concept) are the natural consequences of extremism.

The fact that these attitudes have no roots in the moral foundations of the people's life does not mean that they are at all deprived of fertile soil. This soil lies in the years of mass terror, the stifling atmosphere of a regressing, stagnant society, the severity of ecological traumas, the spent, unstable economy, empty shops, etc., etc. That is, in everything which, without changing the hidden essence of ethnic character (for which the popularity and success of the course toward society's economic, political, and moral improvement is evidence), left deep scars in it and lies like a heavy burden that slows the transforming activity of the people and the party.

However, forces are also taking shape, capable of overcoming chaos and destruction, **believing that the revolution will become such, free of violent overthrows and revolts, when it stops being merely a rejection of the past and starts to create.** The social struggle between chaos and order is not a mythical, Manichean confrontation between an eternal, cosmic, abstract good and a similarly interpreted evil. Historic good and evil always have their own specific social "assessors," and are always shaped into definite political and ideological concepts.

The effectiveness of today's social policy depends to a decisive extent on the successful implementation of the course toward profound, revolutionary restructuring of the system of power, toward democratizing social relations, and toward replacing existing national economic models, above all, of property relations.

This course does not take shape suddenly or immediately. A period of serious theoretical study of contemporary socialism's possibilities preceded its practical implementation. As has now become clear, the original formulations of acceleration and perestroika needed substantial corrections, both in assessing our inherited legacy, as well as in determining what must be done to get out of the crisis situation. We had to convince ourselves that all attempts to improve the building of socialism with paint and plaster are ineffective.

The resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, although not free of certain ideological stamps, were distinguished by the significantly more constructive nature of social (intra-Union and inter-ethnic) programs; a more thoughtful and realistic study preceded them. Essentially, only the January and June (1987) CPSU Central Committee plenums started the truly practical re-making of the political body and economic foundation.

The first, in terms of its consequences, went far beyond the bounds of the changes outlined in the party's cadre policy, and took the form of a complex, as yet incomplete restructuring of all the political forms, relations, and connections that had existed in society. The second was the starting point for radical reform of economic management and for a qualitative change in the economic mechanism. It is fundamentally important to thoroughly investigate the essence of the current moment, to consider the full gravity of chronic, obsolete social ailments, the acute nature of hidden contradictions. It is easy to realize that this could not be done immediately, knowing the level of our social sciences then, as well as the absence of a habit of listening to their recommendations. Most of us, experiencing profound disillusionment and alarm and observing, as we then supposed, society's gradual crawl toward a pre-crisis state, did not notice that it was already on the threshold of crisis. Perestroika was no longer able to prevent it, although it eliminated the highly probable catastrophic nature. Correspondingly, our previous callous, dogmatic ideology was unable to orient the country in the necessary manner. To this day, social consciousness en masse, in blaming perestroika for economic and other troubles, is making an ages-old logical mistake, assuming that "after this" means "because of this."

Society has stayed too long at a "standstill," and then at the start, and now it is forced to restructure itself against a background of political-economic and national and federal shocks. Nonetheless, it is taking the right road with clear goals, sincere intentions, and real opportunities to achieve them—evidence of the innate rightness of the chosen direction of development.

Can we consider the shaping of the course toward renovation definitive and perfected, not allowing for any strategic or practical tactical innovations whatsoever? An affirmative answer, it seems, would contradict the postulates, spirit and essence of scientific and analytical work, common sense, and the logic and methodology of the new sociopolitical movement, alien to stagnant dogmatic interpretations.

The ideology of creation, of social creativity, open to constructive criticism, as well as the productive dialogue that has begun between the party and all other forces for social development, do not permit us to destroy the common cause, fetter political thought, or suppress fresh ideological speech for adherents of various dogmatic systems (even of those seemingly perfected).

In addition, the development of the socialist idea should not resemble the "inappropriate" behavior of one of Shukshin's heroes. Like any Idea, it does not exist

beyond self-development, meaning beyond self-limitation. Ideological and theoretical eclecticism and political adventurism are decidedly not on the path where we will find the genuine, profound perestroika of society. Radical reforms are good, when backed by political realism. Therefore, the main political task of our day is to direct and transfer the tendencies of social movements, the creative energy of the popular masses, and the liberated potentials of social consciousness along the track of calmer and more effective, consistent social transformations.

Soon, the party will report to the people, having presented its new political platform; it is faced with outlining the trajectory of motion from the past, through the present, and into the future of socialism. We should not start to anticipate specific "articles" and "paragraphs." These ought to be preceded by a serious, open, frank intra-party discussion, capable of revealing the entire diversity of positions, and called on not only maximally to consider our positions in a unified document, but also to serve as a means for ideological consolidation of the party and to intensify its creative thinking and its awareness of responsibility.

In addition, there are principle directions which are fundamental and unquestionable. It cannot be denied that precisely the party advanced leaders from its ranks, who managed to recognize the threatening symptoms of future cataclysm in the "seismic, underground tremors" of economic life. The party also perceived the harbingers of a new spring flood in the strengthened hidden and obvious currents of social consciousness; it is in a position to guide the social creativity of the people.

From frequent and thoughtless use in the past, the concept of "political vanguard" faded in the people's consciousness and even acquired a negative shade of meaning. This also occurred because the "vanguard role" was often confused with the overseers' responsibility for marching "human columns" along the road toward universal, forced happiness, toward the forced future "abundance," as well as with the first places in line when dividing the public pie.

Like history itself, political processes are not strictly and simply defined by impersonal extra-historical forces. Real people operate in them. Objective dependencies and economic imperatives, expressed in responsible decisions, are imposed on human "passions." That is why the decisions themselves are forced to imply the aspirations and contradictory processes, as well as the state of social consciousness, hopes and prejudices of large human masses. Politics, strictly speaking, manifests in places where these come to motion. The party should find its place here, not as the administrative "core of the political system," but as the genuine intellectual and moral vanguard of society.

We are creating and re-creating a civil society, a new sociopolitical reality, in which the party must learn to live and work as its most active and rational, progressive

and humane part, as the most decisive guarantor and weightiest argument in society's favor for social justice and social protection. It has serious political and ethical grounds for this, since the most humane ideal, social justice, was developed in the history of socialist doctrines and in the practice of the socialist and workers' movements. The man of labor is the center of the humanistic social ideal, and labor itself and all its humane forms are the basis of socialism.

However, such learning is no easy matter. The existence of historical and moral **grounds** does not automatically guarantee the present-day actual **right**. "On the path to obtaining a real, democratic right to popular representation," M.S. Gorbachev considered it necessary to emphasize at the 25 December 1989 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "the party should overcome intra-party barriers of political passivity, pseudo-revolutionary activism, relapses of political and bureaucratic lack of culture, separatist attitudes, and conservatism. It must realize that the party, like society, still stands only at the sources of renovation and carries the burden of many administrative-command flaws, yet has managed to preserve the basic, generally significant socialist values." We must also not forget that the party, in all its years of history, has accumulated and gathered the largest socially active part of the population into itself.

We often hear that the party should "purge" its ranks and free itself of "ballast." It is not just this naval instrument jargon, over-burdened by associations with the unpleasant memory of Stalinist purges, that evokes doubts. Using what formal procedure can we separate the "wheat" from the "chaff," or ballast from lifting force? By listening to a self-accounting at a party meeting, or by survey? What if we "wash" a child with water! After all, for some, the most important thing in perestroika is initiative and spiritual freedoms, for others, regulation and order, and for a third, "sturgeon with horseradish."

The party really needs a cleansing. However, it should be a self-cleansing, a natural filtration. There is no better filter here, than the equality of initial, starting conditions in any socially useful activity, for a communist or a non-party member.

Today, not only the current owners of party cards are invited into the ranks of the vanguard under equal conditions, but also all healthy social forces (regardless of beliefs, social membership, or personal preferences for specific ways to achieve social ideals), sharing the directives and slogans of renovation and ready to work actively to implement them. The party does not at all monopolize and, moreover, does not usurp the role of the vanguard, but sees prospects for cooperation in it.

Therefore, we must separate, theoretically and practically demarcate the concepts of "political vanguard" and "political power," and detach them from that which we call "the leading role of the party." This is not a tricky,

verbal balancing act, performed for the purpose of "dispersing the vigilance" of possible opponents of the party's political policy, but a real political and practical "topic of the day."

Three interrelated institutions of political life are just now being created anew, with great difficulty; society is faced with serious work, if they are to acquire clear ideological and practical outlines. It is understandable, however, that a social vanguard, even one that gathers society's intellectual and spiritual-moral potential into itself, is locked into a "pure" sphere of thought moralization, if it is not supported by the guiding will of political power, the power, above all, of soviet and state-government organizations.

Only these can proclaim law, create real conditions, provide guarantees for the practical participation of every citizen in political and social processes, and halt the actions of destructive, extremist forces.

Furthermore, political will, having seized the levers of state apparatuses, may have unpredictable consequences, if not limited by the authority of a political party which relies on the people's support: A party, which is not isolated from power (the opposite would be politically absurd—by whom and why would such a party be needed?), but which actively influences the country's politics by way of its representatives to soviets and to administrative institutions. This thesis has been proclaimed before. However, it had exclusively ideological, not real political meaning, under conditions in which the party had merged with the state in practice. Party-state authoritarian bureaucratic diktat did not at all imply the real (not declared) popular approval of the party's work, meaning that it also did not entail a need for thoughtful, responsible work to select its delegates to the bodies of political power and state management. The candidate's personal probity and practical, moral and professional qualities were often sacrificed to loyalty, or worse still, to personal friendships and other aspects, making up the essence of a conformist personality.

Today, many are noting with alarm (some with approval) that the process of acquisition by soviet bodies of a new quality of legislative, executive, and management power is occurring against the background of a decline in party authority, and is accompanied by a definite alienation and self-alienation from active political influence on its course on the part of elected party bodies. It is also not passing by without leaving a trace for the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Observing the proceedings of its second session, everyone had an opportunity to see how, along with reasonable and well-grounded legislative activity, the effects of "running on idle" appeared, as well as unnecessary discussions and even unwarranted blocking of reasonable proposals, which the deputies themselves in fact also noted. All this is not really so terrible. Such "blocking" can be entirely justified, but it is bad that this occurred with a mysterious silence on the part of many

deputies from the CPSU. Of course, some deputies from the party spoke very actively and usefully, but these were more individual people, the communist Petrov, Sidorov, etc., than representatives of the party parliamentary group. Were they shy? Were they being modest? Meanwhile, it is the deputy's task and a natural, normal condition for civilized parliamentary proceedings to know how to represent one's "electorate," one's voters.

Of course, we could try to explain such "restraint" as a desire not to harm democratic processes of discussion by interfering in the solution of questions relating to the competence of the Supreme Soviet and the government. However, does normal development really mean spontaneous, and does "relating to the competence" really assume freedom from critical party political analysis?

The point lies elsewhere. We must all, both rank-and-file party members, as well as its leadership, master the new standards for political work. It will not come by itself: it must be purposefully cultivated within oneself, using the tools of glasnost, freedom of speech, and party principled-mindedness. In particular, the party should keep in mind, in selecting its delegates to elected soviet bodies, not only loyalty to party principles, but also the ability to stand up for them under conditions of competing opinions.

Everyone, for instance, can see the fruits of work by the Supreme Soviet commissions: Their problems and arguments are well-known. We can observe debates in the Council of Ministers on television screens. Yet, by what do the CPSU Central Committee commissions live? This is far less known to us. Judging by reports in the central press and the IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS [Proceedings of the CPSU Central Committee], complete indifference reigns in them. Is this so? Meanwhile, it is precisely here that the mechanism of glasnost should operate to the greatest extent.

We understand: The work of the CPSU Central Committee and of the Supreme Soviet commissions is defined by different tasks and occurs under different conditions. None of the Central Committee commission members are released from their basic, very stressful jobs. However, perhaps that is precisely why their labors and concerns are in need of even greater openness and broader public review?

If not through glasnost and open, frank discussion, then how can the party still deserve the people's trust today? In a period, in which the party is experiencing serious difficulties, not one of its members has the right to carelessly delegate his own anxiety, to shift responsibility for its future fate to even one, even the most authoritative instance. The task directly relates to democratizing the party itself, to reviving the Leninist standards of party life under the new sociopolitical conditions.

In this regard, it is a question not of the unthinking imitation of historical experience, but of its creative interpretation and equally creative utilization as applied to a situation which has cardinally changed. There are

common principles for us, for socialists, especially important at crucial moments of historical development, of the ideological and organizational building of a political party. The main ones are: democracy and conscious discipline, political activeness and socialist conviction, emancipation and independence of sociopolitical thinking, and an ability for critical self-analysis.

These are also the foundation of strong social policy, which can in no case exist without **strong political power**. Here, we must explain ourselves:

Recent (and not only recent) literature has exposed the myth of the Stalinist "strong policy and iron will," and has cited sufficient examples of the grossest military, economic, and political failures—the direct consequences of Stalinist leadership. Here, it is appropriate to note that only an extremely irresolute government operates on the darkest strata of society and speculates on the basest social instincts. Although an almighty state was created, with citizens helpless against it, a leviathan state is an obvious sign of weak policy.

The maelstroms of imperialist and civil wars, forced military communism, and devastation lifted a great deal of "social scum," formed in the "bottom layers," to the surface of political life. Exterminating the still-weak **socialist** spirit in the people, having replaced it with primitive dogmas, not only reconciling themselves to social flaws, but also provoking them in every way, the Stalinists in society's leadership made repressive power not merely possible, but also most likely and real.

There was a kind of stern **historical truth** in the revolutionary violence: The world of ages-old exploitation was destroyed. However, there was also a cruel and terrible reverse side to this truth. It lies in those innocently destroyed, in executions "by percentiles," in the costs of the activity of the Extraordinary Commission and the revolutionary tribunals, "unrestricted by law." The Stalinist repressions lack even a shadow of historical justification. Everyone knows their vile truth: the hunger for power and the fear of losing it, a dread of imagined and, even more so, of real enemies, and fear of one's own people.

The idea of socialism, of course, could not have assumed a test of durability, such as Stalinism. However, it endured. The **higher truth** of thousand-year old values, of common human experience lived on in the people: certainty in the possibility of a just social order, one that is humane, absolutely kind, mandatorily conscientious.

Of course, we are now reaping the fruits of Stalinist (and its latest hidden successors') "strong" policy. They lie in the presumption of guilt, beaten into millions of heads by arrests and falsified ideology; in mutual suspicion (we even suspect socialism of inescapable Stalinism); in demands for democratic dictatorships or authoritarian leaderships; in the degradation of nature (a consequence of departmental ambitions); in social relations which fetter personal initiative and suppress the individual; in the senselessness of many resolutions, and the constant

shortages of the most necessary things; and in moral and spiritual losses. They exist in the physical and spiritual impoverishment, whose consequences we are overcoming with such difficulty, and which is not reduced to the "**insecurity of existence**" (Engels). It is an impoverishment that reflects the growing gap between the contemporary person's needs and the means that he has at his disposal to meet them; the separation of labor from political, cultural, and other spheres of a person's activity, the loss of control by the working people not only over the means of labor, but also over the act of labor itself, its purpose and rhythm; and the devaluation of free time and its orientation toward passive entertainments (in the worst case, toward alcoholic or narcotic intoxication). Yet, any spiritual impoverishment is an **absolute impoverishment**.

A strong social policy is one which is able to break the core of Stalinism (authoritarian bureaucratic diktat), stop the flow of negative events, and open a broad path for positive tendencies.

A strong social policy is that which does not rely on violence as the only way to solve social conflicts; it entrusts strength to the **ethic of nonviolence**. Believing violence it evil, such a policy resorts to it only in extreme, exceptional cases, in which the failure to use force is the greater evil. However, it does not hesitate once a display of force really becomes objectively necessary to protect the rights, dignity and, the more so, lives of citizens.

"The ideal strong policy," an idea constantly present in M.S. Gorbachev's speeches, "is not toughening and confrontation, but harmony and solidarity. Right now, these are among the main tasks of the day. From the summit of the sociohistorical path, which society has reached, there is a direct, although difficult road: the way to humane socialism, and movement based on consolidating all available and possible potential progressive forces. Based on civil peace, not on civil war..."

The motive force of this movement is not slogans, and not even parliamentary debates (although both the one and the other are needed), but real, diverse interests and a power, capable of bringing them into harmony. A power, supported by a political party which ideologically and organizationally forms the vanguard of social development. Its leading role lies in this; this is where its guiding efforts should be applied.

Thus, the central political problem of future socioeconomic development is: the **question of power**. In the coming year, precisely this will determine practical social movement. The basic political task is to ensure that the demarcation of power functions does not lead to the dispersion and breaking up of power. We should not rule out such a danger, considering that the process of reconstruction will occur at all levels of the social pyramid, that soviets at all levels will be involved in it, and consequently, the entire social building will start to "shake."

Moreover, this social operation is vitally important for the social organism. We must bring political and economic reforms into conformity, mainly by eliminating, at last, the threat of political instability on economic grounds. If we measure the effect of our political and legal reforms "by that achieved" and take the sum total of starting conditions into account, the rates of reform ought to be considered entirely satisfactory. However, the depth of attendant, hidden contradictions leaves no room for passivity.

Only one democratic method can prevent the erosion of power: the influence of a united, authoritative political party. Perhaps, it is best to abandon personal "multi-party" ambitions for a while and, instead of "languor of the spirit," to work on the problem, to do productive, transforming work to democratize even one party, for a start? Not confusing, incidentally, a soviet federation with a party federation, all forces supporting the creation of the former, and excluding the latter as contradictory to this task.

Although for many Lenin is no icon now (which is as it should be), we should nonetheless listen to the opinion of one who, say what you will, understood the meaning of the ethnic question and of party building. It seems, this is just now really beginning to reach us (and not all of us). So, in defining his attitude toward party federalism, he deemed it necessary to emphasize that he objects to it not because of any tactical considerations. "...Our principle attitude toward the federation. We are **against it in principle**. We support democratic centralism" (V.I. Lenin, "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 48, p 329).

Democratic centralism is the most important characteristic of a progressive political regime, including the objective orientation of a state's activity, the essence of actual legal standards, the work of law enforcement agencies, the methods and procedures for forming representative institutions (election Law and voting), the nature of interrelations between legislative and executive power, and between the chambers of the representative body and the central and local bodies of power and management. This also includes the activity of political parties and mass organizations of working people. It is precisely glasnost, a democratic environment, and the regime of political power, not at all the multi-party system in itself, which cement or weaken interethnic ties: the main forces of attraction and repulsion lie in them.

The fact that our former, masked federalism cannot stand up to criticism by life is, apparently, not clear to everyone. The problem now is how to transform it with the fewest possible losses in the shortest possible time, since a rapid and painless advancement of a new state system has not yet happened. It must occur, such that the freedom of some ethnic groups does not turn into the suppression of others. The Armenian-Azerbaijan confrontation (armed, with human victims), a conflict with "sticks and stones," as well as other known local (for the time being!) shifts toward nationalism and discrimination, show how little we have insured against this.

There is also trouble with the fact that, for subjective reasons, the unitary state did not use even the limited possibilities that existed under centralism. Authoritarian bureaucratic paternalism on the ethnic issue was guided more by ideological phantoms, more by the desirable and "proper," than by the real, not noticing and often scorning political, economic, sociocultural, ethnic, demographic, linguistic and psychological realities. As a result, an inert, rigid system of interethnic relations took shape with a seemingly "indestructible unity of nations," but with by no means illusory economic and political state-wide ties. Assuming that it can be dismantled into parts, for instance, on the way to democratizing separate, isolated ethnic and economic regions, means falling into another illusion.

At recent meetings in Lithuania, it was suggested that all persons involved (i.e., the entire Union) carefully consider what centrifugal tendencies may lead to, if not balanced by an aspiration toward the common good of a Union of peoples. We can say many eloquent words about freedom and the aspiration to freedom, but can we be free by ourselves? Why do we aggravate the overall situation in the country with separatist moods (although understandable, explainable)? If conservative forces prevail as a consequence of this, it is easy to understand what this will mean for all of us, what kind of boomerang private "freedom" may become for the authors of this idea. It is unlikely, but, of course, it could turn out differently. However, "the stake is bigger than life" only in the movies: political games are a sign of irresponsibility. Is it worthwhile, in trying to straighten the path of one's own people, to complicate a Union-wide and, with it, even a Europe-wide movement?

M.S. Gorbachev's December and January speeches—the theoretical article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," reports to the CPSU Central Committee Plenums, and speeches at the Congress of People's Deputies and in the Lithuanian SSR—reveal the Central Committee's and the party leader's new approach to problems in party life. It is a question of reviewing all our viewpoints on the party's place and role in society. The second stage of political reform—reinforcing the sovereignty of the soviets and demarcating the functions of party and state bodies—in practice entails a restructuring of all party and political activity.

There is probably no need to repeat the passages which speak of the radical change in the functions and methods of work of the CPSU. Everyone remembers them. Let us only emphasize that the party does not intend to yield positions already gained, that "we will remain in all spheres of society's life," and we will stand up for our policy, consulting with the people, "wherever communists work."

The fact that the party acquiring a new ideological, organizational, and political quality faces it with previously unfamiliar or forgotten problems. First and foremost among them is the **social base**. Before, it was removed from the agenda by authoritarian pressure. Now, the stone that the builders rejected has become the main cornerstone.



Under the new conditions, the party should not only know its own social base—whose interests and which social groups it reflects in deed and in words—but should also actively shape it. It should learn a new unity with the workers' movement, supporting everything healthy and progressive in it; it must win the sympathies of rural laborers, realizing how much powerful moral potential, still unreleased, the peasant who feeds the country keeps within himself; it must involve intellectuals—workers in science and culture and the technical and administrative intelligentsia—into social formation, for they are the brains behind all renovation.

The party should not teach, but learn and mature together with the people, grow wiser and, by its own example, teach others the ability to grow wiser. We should derive intellectual and moral strength from popular and ethnic diversity, and political hope—from unity. In that case, we can be sure that the newly created, but very thin, fine layer of political civilization will be the soil on which the fruits of human social relations, both within the party, as well as beyond it, will grow.

The world in which we live is such that merely ascertaining contemporary processes is not enough to eliminate current threats and prevent future ones. This requires re-interpretations, searches for alternatives, and an active policy. A policy, where basic decisions would be made democratically, be they in the field of economics, engineering, ecology, or culture; in society, in the political party, in an enterprise, or a work place.

There are full grounds for assuming that society's tomorrow will be even less reminiscent of today's, than today's seems like yesterday's. We envision a stable, nonviolent world, a world without exploitation, with highly developed productive forces, not deforming the environment, with intensive, waste-free technologies, civilized social relations, citizens in solidarity, and the highly moral individual. In short, we envision the future of socialism as this. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### **Diplomacy and Science: Union in the Name of the Future**

905B0016B Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 14-22

[Article by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, USSR minister of foreign affairs, based on a report given at a conference of the USSR MID Scientific Council]

[Text] A reporter for a popular journal asked to be shown the "kitchen of diplomacy." His request was granted: the guest was led through almost all floors of the tall building on Smolensk Square, taken around with the leaders and experts of leading subdivisions of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID], and shown the "mechanics" of preparing draft foreign policy decisions... The guest

carefully wrote notes and changed dictaphone cassettes, but by the end of the visit he seemed noticeably disillusioned.

"I had expected something outwardly ultra-modern..."

Alas, the reporter could really have seen new equipment at the kitchen of the private residence on Aleksey Tolstoy Street, where the USSR MID holds diplomatic receptions and dinners. As far as the "diplomatic kitchen" proper is concerned, although equipped with the most modern electronics and information science devices, the main production tool here is the same as it was in Gorchakov and Chicherin's time—human intellect. There is only one criterion for its contemporary nature: its adequacy for the laws of development in the country and the world, for the higher goals, ideals and aspirations of the people, of society and of the state in their organic linkage to common human interests. Not only, by the way, adequacy, but also an ability to outstrip phenomena, tendencies and events, to predict them and develop correct decisions for the purpose of maximally weakening any possible negative consequences and for the same maximum growth in positive consequences.

It is hardly necessary to prove how hard it is to conform to and follow this criterion. Even if it was originally built into the trade and advanced as the chief virtue and dignity of a professional, the inertia of placidity most often overcomes the restlessness of thought and spirit. A well-developed set of professional views, methods and habits also operate, with which it is difficult and even pointless to part. We should not part with it, when everything is tightly squeezed beforehand into a Procrustean bed of dogma, when deviation from it promises headaches and continuous troubles, when in the decision-making process you are just the bearer of necessary material, and higher will is in no way and by no one disputable.

What is there to hide: This is how it was.

We began with democratizing the process of drafting and making decisions, having set the goal of maximally augmenting the fruitful intellectual layer of diplomacy. We tried to expand the circle of employees, whose capabilities and qualities as political thinkers were not called for until now, and put into practice the collective discussion of problems and various forms of intellectual "field testing" of the ideas and solutions that arose. All this gave results to the highest degree. Nonetheless, the main question remained unanswered: How can we make the new political thinking the basic working tool for the entire diplomatic service, for each of its employees?

The concept of the new thinking, declared at the higher political level, should manifest its creative strength precisely in practical politics. However, without really new, scientifically substantiated ideas, objectively true in terms of their nature and content, it can remain only a collection of eloquently formulated principles.

The idea, expressed by M.S. Gorbachev at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, of including science in the arsenal of world politics became the main direction for our efforts to set up planned, systematic contacts with the country's scientific centers.

I personally see the goal of a union between diplomacy and science in the utmost concentration of intellectual forces on the peak of perestroika tensions.

Science, or rather, pseudoscience has labored meticulously as the maidservant of politics. The results are plain to see.

It is clear that we do not just need a service for rapid scientific assistance to foreign policy, for a rapid intellectual reaction to the problems that arise to face it. It would be more correct to raise the question of merging and intermingling them.

Today, the interests of science and diplomacy are so closely intertwined that is even somewhat awkward to try to vindicate the thesis of the need for their union. Nonetheless, let me give several examples.

The peaceful use of outer space is the broadest field for research in a number of scientific disciplines. In this regard, however, space, as mankind's common property, is a sphere for the active involvement of foreign policy. Ever more states are becoming involved in its study and mastery, and problems of political, legal, and other regulation of their interaction are appearing. Therefore, diplomacy enters into the matter long before the blast-off commands at space vehicle launching sites. For instance, we had on concluding the Treaty on Cooperation in Research and Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes with the U.S. Now, 18 promising fields are being determined, on which the scientists of our countries are working hand-in-hand.

Scientists have been thinking a great deal and for a long time about thermonuclear fusion, the basis of power engineering for the future. If not for the 1985 summit meeting in Geneva, the matter would hardly have successfully advanced to a draft design and the beginning of its implementation.

In the span of a single generation, mankind has been faced with the threat of ecological catastrophe. Even the efforts of a group of the most developed states cannot deflect it. The internationalization of nature preservation measures, implemented according to a unified global program, is necessary. Politics and diplomacy, not limited by the development of the concept of ecological security, are laying the path to cooperation among scientists of different states for the sake of saving mankind.

Coming into contact with a tremendous range of ideas and innovations, foreign policy, as a minimum, should be able to distinguish present-day from future. To do this, it should not only clearly perceive the contemporary state of the world, but also understand the direction of

human thought. Without such a level of scientific information, it will be unable skillfully to fulfill its responsibilities.

Crisis conditions in the world economy and ecology, alternative sources of energy, world demographic overloads, and genetic engineering—all these and many others are now the subject of talks, found in constant foreign political circulation.

Therefore, the first level of interconnections between diplomacy and science is educational. It is not a question, of course, of eliminating illiteracy. We need scientifically substantiated concepts about the nature and rates of changes in the living conditions of man and mankind, above all in the material sphere.

Another very difficult problem arises here.

Due to a number of reasons, in the past we were forced to introduce an heightened regime of secrecy in our country. As a result, we have closed sciences in a closed society. The channels for dissemination of knowledge and ideas have been cut off and the social atmosphere is intellectually impoverished.

The past is abandoning us slowly. Today, it is sometimes extremely difficult to obtain exhaustive information.

The associates of our embassies know that it is possible to "store" 200 pages of text on one "chip." They know about the speed of modern computers. However, not having pertinent "domestic" data, they cannot integrate this knowledge into their political and economic analyses.

We have fallen thoroughly behind in our concepts. The point is no longer just that we are lazy or incurious, but that we continue to operate according to obsolete categories.

Diplomacy poorly understands the modern language of science, not to mention that it is not armed with adequate knowledge about contemporary technological realities.

Information science, genetics, and material sciences still remain exotic fields for us, in which we sometimes cannot distinguish fantasy from reality.

Perhaps I am laying it on thick, but in principle such a picture is not far from the true state of affairs, and it cannot help but evoke alarm. I repeat, it is impossible to have modern politics without modern concepts of what comprises the basis for the existence of society, for its future.

The task of increasing the science-intensiveness of foreign policy cannot be solved through our own forces.

Therefore, we are asking scientists to help us organize scientific guidance for employees in the foreign policy service, to find a possibility for informal interaction with diplomats, to consider the possible forms for this, and to

propose systematic approaches to this work. These could be joint conferences of the Academy of Sciences Presidium, scientific councils of institutes, and ministry collegiums, joint discussions and talks on key problems and immediate issues, "situation rooms," simple meetings over a good pot of tea without a previously announced agenda, or participation of our employees in science "brain-storming sessions."

The second level for our cooperation with it is traditional: the development of positions and definition of attitudes on practical issues on the international agenda.

The USSR Academy of Sciences, academic institutes, and a number of departmental scientific centers are full-fledged participants in drafting foreign political decisions. However, to this day there are broad areas where we act separately.

Consider a problem, such as including our country in the world economic system. Foreign policy requires maximally complete knowledge of all parameters related to solving this strategic problem for our state.

We are already holding a specific talk on conditions for our participation in international financial and economic organizations and institutions. We are often led blindly, for to this day we have no well-considered plan of action or concept for our participation in the international division of labor, as well as no clear ideas about the degree of our readiness for one or another form of integration into the world economic system.

Here, another problem of ours, backwardness, makes itself known. As a rule, work is being done according to yesterday's guidelines and, in only the best case, for today's needs. There are no surpluses for the future and no exploratory work is being done that outstrips present-day positions.

I see no need to prove how dangerous this is. Work "behind the wheel," without estimating actions for the course ahead may lead to substantive errors.

Science is called on to equip politics with a prediction. Everyone works on forecasting here, both on the "home," as well as on the official and professional level. It suffices to leaf through our periodicals, to be convinced: we seem entirely suitable in terms of the number of prophets and political "fortune-tellers" per capita. Incidentally, we have always had enough "hopeful old fogies." Today, however, under conditions of a sharp politicization of society, in which the supreme monologue has been replaced with a strained, sometimes fierce polyphony of sociopolitical dialogue, well-weighted scientific forecasts which orient social thinking are noticeably insufficient.

There is not enough of that which all advanced countries mean by the concept of "strategy charts," which are developed before or simultaneously with making important decisions. This deplorable lack of scientific foresight makes itself known not only in diplomatic practice.

The third main direction of our cooperation with science is the development of the theoretical basis for foreign policy.

The Soviet Union has formulated and advanced several fundamental positions:

On world unity and interdependence;

On the priority of common human values;

On freedom of choice;

On balance of interests.

These need theoretical support, scientific substantiation, and intensified historical and political development.

The goal of the new political thinking is a nuclear-free, nonviolent, demilitarized world.

Science would be of great help to politics, if it would propose a scientific model for organization of the world and for methods of ensuring security in it.

The rapid accumulation of questions, each of which is equivalent to the classical "To be or not to be?" is occurring in the world and in our country. It must be admitted, history has not faced mankind with questions like these since the time of the October Revolution and World War II.

Do we have answers to them? Unfortunately, no. Yet, while we do not have them, others are trying to formulate them.

A typical example is an article by the young American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?"

Published in a journal with a relatively small circulation, it caused a proper stir and ignited sharp discussion in the broad scientific and political circles of the West. Regardless of the title question, which is more of a tribute to the requirements of scientific objectivity, than to the author's doubts, he quite definite concludes of the "victory of the West, of Western ideology," which, in his opinion, "is appearing in the full absence of any viable, stable alternate to Western liberalism." "Obviously, we are," writes Fukuyama, "witnesses not simply to the end of the 'cold war' or completion of the final stage of post-war history... It is a question of the last boundary of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form for managing human society..."

For me, this article is an example of the attempt to arm Western political thinking with new fundamental theoretical arguments, reinforcing its practical actions. The attempts are not without success: the article's positions were put into active practical circulation by many state leaders in the West.

The shortage of counter-arguments, free of the patina of the self-seeking "struggle of ideas," but full of serious

scientific study of tendencies and processes that appear in the world and full of practical conclusions from said study, practical recommendations for foreign policy, shows clearly against such a background.

Materials for such an analysis, and unusually complex and sharp material, is more than sufficient and is growing with stunning alacrity. The year of 1989 gave us an especially large flood of it. I am referring to events in Central and Eastern Europe. Again and again, they are raising the most difficult questions for us, the answers to which must be given within the strictest time limit. Once again, we are faced, in all its magnitude, with the problem of raising the level of science-intensiveness of diplomatic "production," of increasing the policy-shaping and forming role of science.

How are we solving it? What do we need to work on? In what directions should we focus our leading scientific forces?

A brief review of that which we have managed to do, not a report, but information for consideration:

It can be claimed that, on the whole, we have formed an organizational structure for interaction with scientific institutions. The USSR MID Scientific Coordination Center has been created. Scientific advisory councils, in which prominent scientific workers are involved, are operating in most departments and directorates. The practical scientific conference noticeably encouraged contacts with large-scale science. In 2 years, over 60 meetings among workers in diplomacy and in science have been held within the walls of the USSR MID. Most of all, our positions on one or another talks were discussed at such meetings.

Another form of cooperation concerns research on problems which interest us. These studies, about 200 in all, are either sent to us directly from the institutes or, as has begun to be practiced recently, are implemented according to economic contract principles.

Now, scientists are participating with us in the most important talks. New areas for interaction between science and diplomacy have opened up, such as joint participation of their representatives in international symposia and conferences on topical foreign policy subjects.

Thanks to this, an whole series of big, promising ideas that have found practical application for shaping the position of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting of participants in the Europe-wide meeting on questions, such as shaping a Europe-wide legal and economic space, or arranging contacts between the Soviet Union and the Council of Europe, have joined the arsenal of Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

Since 1988, a directorate on matters of international scientific and technical cooperation has been operating in the ministry. We are cooperating with the USSR Academy of Sciences on creating the "Universal Laboratory" Department in Moscow, which has declared its goal to be

the conduct of scientific research, open to all countries, and the utilization of scientific achievements for peaceful purposes. The MID is taking part in organizing the Baykal International Center for Ecological Research. The inclusion of Soviet scientific organizations in projects of the West European "Eureka" program for technological cooperation has become a area for our common activity.

All this has not gone unnoticed beyond the country. A document prepared by Johns Hopkins University in the U.S. noted: "Thanks to the changing political atmosphere in the USSR, Soviet scientists and diplomats as never before are displaying a readiness for frank discussions on the problems of contemporary international relations. As opposed to the practice of past decades, the political powers are inviting specialists from the Academy of Sciences to participate in debates on problems related to official Soviet policy, and are asking them to suggest new political alternatives. In striving to stimulate creative thinking, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working specially in order to familiarize its associates with a broad range of diverse thinking, both from foreign, as well as from internal sources."

I repeat: I least of all would wish this review to sound like a parade report, made according to patterns of the recent past. Critical self-assessment does not lend itself to placidity. The main and unpleasant conclusion from this is that, despite noticeable shifts in a number of directions, contacts with science are all still weak.

One of the important flaws is the alienation of scientists from the drafting of conceptual foreign policy documents.

Other embassies only record the arrival of our scientists in the countries they visit, not using them to strengthen ties with local scientists.

As before, the views of diplomats are aimed at academic and departmental centers, and in no way at VUZs or VUZ science. As a rule, a "chosen circle" participates in international scientific exchange. One and the same names and faces... We simply must expand this circle and introduce new people, young scientists to contacts.

For our other foreign partners, especially in a number of rapidly progressing, developing countries, agreements with us in the sphere of scientific cooperation has priority significance, even compared to trade relations. Hence, the exceptional importance of bilateral scientific ties. For the time being, they are intermittent and interrupted.

We are not sufficiently active in using the scientific potential of Union republics.

Self-criticism opens the door to criticism. Our dissatisfaction with the state of affairs is not confined to the walls of the MID. It is not a question of the obvious incompetence of some of our scientific partners, their deplorable lack of experience in analytical and forecasting work, the noticeable increase in the sensational

nature of the resolutions being made, or aspirations toward artificial trouble-making.

Everything with this is more or less clear. Far more serious is the obvious lack of ability to surmount international processes in all their dialectically multi-faceted and contradictory nature, or the inadequacy of conceptual approaches in obviously absolutist attempts to pass off speculative constructions, far, far removed from reality, as the last word in truth. As before, we lack a multi-variant system, a multi-dimensional forecast for events that may arise and for tendencies and evaluations based on a broad and universal, comprehensive analysis of the situation.

Yet another important flaw that prevents science from being actively included in the policy-shaping process is the obvious lack of specialists who have profoundly mastered the problems that interest us. This relates, in particular, to area studies, the study of the world's large and small states, the changes in which no longer in any way correspond to traditional concepts about them and their place, role and importance in international affairs. We keenly feel the shortage of specialists, who work intensely on the theory of international relations, on studying the laws and specific nature of processes developing in this sphere in our time.

Politics and diplomacy lack profound studies on ethnography, religion, and the ethnic psychology of other countries and peoples. Even in a seemingly leading sector such as military-political, there is a very limited circle of scientists and, naturally, they cannot satisfy the entire diversity of practical needs without damaging quality.

Possibly, we ourselves are to blame for this: We poorly know our potential partners or do not know them at all, we do not encourage the training of young specialists, and we do not delegate talented diplomatic youth to science. Obviously, our departmental higher school has also contributed greatly to the appearance of this shortage. In any case, we are forced to verify that today the demand significantly exceeds supply.

Our infamous departmental nature continues to weigh heavily on us. Too often, considerations of corporate competition take first priority, to the obvious detriment of mutually advantageous cooperation. Whereas scientists are ever more actively becoming involved in participation in diplomatic practice, the reverse process—participation by diplomats and representatives of ministries and departments in scientific measures—is noticeably complicated. Sometimes, one cannot even successfully obtain the necessary documents on the results of one or another conference or symposium.

The attempts of our Scientific Coordination Center and several other MID subdivisions to somehow be included in joint scientific projects or even ordinary international meetings of scientists on problems which interest us in a

number of cases encountered jealous suspicion on the part of their organizers, as though we intend to take away someone's "bread."

Obviously, the reasons lie not only in relapses of the command-order system, and not only in that in the past the suggestions and conclusions of scientists most often were neglected, as was done on the questions of Afghanistan and military cooperation with a number of developing countries. No, a great deal here is especially subjective. After all, for some people it is far simpler and more peaceful to perform "service" functions, than to become involved in a battle of by no means local significance.

The problem cannot be helped by appeals for principle-mindedness and fellowship. Science needs the status of independence. Only in this regard, having broken from the paths of departmentalism and having realized the advantages of cooperating with diplomats, will it be able to hold its own position. Schools, whose competition and conflict of opinions and approaches will only enrich both science, as well as practice, will appear again.

I am certain that decentralization of foreign policy research will lead to the assertion of genuine multi-variant systems in solving problems, proceeding from scientific and civil conviction, not from an order or departmental interests.

As before, the full and broad utilization of the scientific potential of one or another department is obstructed by secrecy, and efforts are often aimed not at objectively evaluating phenomena and drafting of proposals, but at substantiating the decisions that were made and defending narrow departmental interests. Therefore, we must think of how to ensure the development of independent, objective evaluations, to create an extra-departmental center for scientific expert analysis.

Finally, on "paying for the music." Promising ideas are the most expensive, most valuable "commodity," and we must not economize on them. It is also time to realize that foreign political "production" is one of the most profitable spheres for serious capital investments, capable of bringing the country a maximum profit. By the logic of things, allocations for the development of disarmament projects and other rightly important foreign policy problems, the solution of which promises a tremendous profit for our economy, are now no less important than investments in other areas.

Other countries by no means stint on them. For instance, in the United States of America the federal allocations for scientific research and experimental design development work on international problems exceeded 200 million dollars in 1988. The U.S. Peace Institute alone, which serves the State Department, has an annual budget of 10 million. The ministries of foreign affairs of countries, such as Austria and Finland, receive 1 million and about 4 million, respectively, for scientific research needs. We, the main foreign policy department of a great

power, by hook or by crook, "win" 110,000 rubles for the fulfillment of economic contract themes in 1988-1989.

The absence in the MID budget of an article on expenditures for scientific development works seems archaic to us. We must achieve goal-oriented financing for the scientific needs of diplomacy.

Yet another reserve is hidden in intelligent coordination of plans for scientific research, financed by the state budget, with the practical needs of foreign policy. We far from intend to monopolize the state order for science or, moreover, to trade in the sphere of basic research. However, we have a right to participate in its formation.

For this purpose, an agreement on cooperation between the MID and the Academy of Sciences was developed, and basic forms of interaction were stipulated. Similar agreements were offered to the State Committee on Education and to departmental scientific centers.

The spectrum for cooperation is the broadest. We are waiting for counter-offers. Meanwhile, we are concentrating heightened attention on the following key topics:

**Concepts of the new political thinking.** Having entered the sphere of practical politics, a great deal of material has accumulated which needs theoretical interpretation. These are the problems of correlating common human and national interests, politics and morals, the de-ideologizing of inter-state relations, new measurements for international security, and other political and philosophical categories.

**Limited inclusion of the Soviet economy in the world economic process.** Here, both a general theoretical interpretation, as well as a detailed expert analysis of specific projects and measures are important.

I already mentioned the cardinal shifts in socialist countries and the restructuring of traditional state and geopolitical structures. We are extremely interested in **analysis of these processes and prediction of their possible consequences.**

We need to develop **scientific grounds for converting the whole complex of ties with friendly, neighboring, socialist countries** to new principles.

**New parameters for international security in the post-Geneva and post-Vienna periods,** i.e., the military, political, and economic consequences of possible agreements on reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and U.S., and of the substantial reduction of troops and regular armaments in Europe.

**Intensification of research in international law,** particularly in an undeveloped sector, such as law of peoples. By our observations, this is one of the most backward sectors. Despite the number of scientific institutions working in this area, their output is small. Often, we simply do not know where what is being done. Right now, a coordination center is being formed in the MID, called on to accumulate and direct coordinated efforts

toward practical implementation of a concept for the supremacy of international law, for creating a universal legal order.

**A scientific vision for the future development of the scientific and technical revolution, for creating a system of ecological security, and for development of demographic processes,** in other words, for tendencies that may have considerable influence on the life of mankind and the shaping of world policy in the 21st century.

**The elimination of "blank spots" from the history of our interrelations** with a number of states. This work, difficult in all respects, should be intensified. There are problems with access to archives, but we intend to eliminate the obstacles in researchers' paths.

**The cultural component of foreign policy, the so-called diplomacy of culture.** Here, we need to cooperate with the institutes of archaeology, ethnography, geography, native population, culture and art studies, with creative VUZs and the USSR Academy of the Arts.

**Scientific grounds for conversion.** Developing these, together with us, is the direct responsibility of scientists working in the military-industrial complex.

As before, our interest in studying public opinion, in conducting **sociological research** on the questions of the foreign policy activity of the Soviet state is great. Despite the limited nature of our possibilities, we have made some steps in this direction ourselves and are doing research with the help of academic institutes. However, this is still not enough. In our opinion, it is not enough only to study public opinion. We must think of how to shape and use it. In general, this is virgin land and we cannot upturn it alone.

The ministry is prepared to participate most directly in the drafting by the USSR Academy of Sciences and by scientific centers of plans for scientific research on international subjects, taking the enumerated and other needs of ours into account.

In conclusion, perhaps one consideration is not entirely correct. Matters today are taking shape, such that everyone is preoccupied by present concerns. Everyone is looking for something, striving for something, and there is simply no time to think. What about guidelines for the future? Are we losing them in the fuss over our political daily bread?

All of our talks with partners begin with their questions about the fate of perestroika. We would very much like to formulate the proper answers not only at the rostrums of parliaments and meetings, but also in the walls of institutes and laboratories, in factory shops and mine pits, in fields and farms. We all, as never before, need calm work in the name of the future. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## PERESTROYKA: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE

### A Difficult Choice. 1989 Economic Review

905B0016C Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 23-34

[Article by Yegor Timurovich Gaydar, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] At the beginning of 1989, when the problems of derangement of state finances finally came to the center of attention, inflationary processes had already acquired their own inertia, and control was lost over the dynamics of personal monetary incomes. The government was faced with a dilemma: either take decisive steps for financial improvement and intensify the reform, or tighten control over payment for labor and prices and strengthen the administrative regulation of economic life, i.e., retreat. All socialist countries that have tried to transform their economic management system have faced a similar choice of alternatives. China in the early 1980s is an example of the first, and the dismantling of economic reform mechanisms in the late 1960s in the USSR—of the second. Last year, we had to make a choice once more.

A characteristic feature of the past year was the contradictory combination of insufficiently consistent anti-inflationary measures with forced steps which undermine the effectiveness of introduced economic regulators. The traditional administrative system of management is no longer able normally to serve the reproductive process, yet conditions have not been created for effective operation of market mechanisms. A unique situation of economic powerlessness is arising. If we look for historical analogues here, the development of events, most of all, brings to mind Poland in the second half of the 1970s.

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In a short-term perspective, the intensity of inflationary processes in the economy is determined by three most important parameters. These are the balance of the state budget's incomes and outlays, the capital investments of enterprises, and the amount of savings of enterprises and of the population. When voluntary (not forced, as we have today) savings are large, it is possible to permit a large state budget deficit or to export credit resources on broad scales. If savings are small, outlays must either be strictly limited by incomes mobilized on a healthy basis, or one must bring in capital from abroad and become a debtor. If neither one, nor the other is done successfully, the growth of inflation is inevitable.

Last year, factors, making it possible to count on strengthening the incentives for savings, were not made effective. The responsibility of enterprises for their level of solvency remained low (on 1 December 1989, overdue debts on short-term loans and mutual accounts amounted to 31.6 billion rubles). The average percentage

rate for short-term credit was 2.8 percent, and for long-term there is only a 0.82 annual percentage rate, i.e., it is obviously lower than the rates of monetary devaluation. In other words, going into debt and not repaying borrowed money on time is simply profitable. The increasingly more persistent talk about a future money exchange has become a serious factor, undermining interest in monetary savings. Whereas, regardless of this, the remainders of funds in the accounts of enterprises and the population's deposits continued to grow, this can only be explained by the fact that this process is compulsory in nature. It reflected only an increasing shortage of resources.

Capital investments, financed at the expense of enterprises' own funds, continued to increase, although at slower rates than in 1988. In this situation, the entire weight of anti-inflationary policy objectively fell on the state budget. Urgent and energetic steps to sharply reduce its deficit were required.

The budget approved for 1989 still completely continued the dangerous course toward intensification of financial disproportions, which the government followed in the first years of the 5-year period. At the beginning of the year, a search started for ways to stabilize the situation. Many measures called for at this time remained on paper. For example, the assignment for cooperatives and the population to implement industrial- and technical-purpose production reserves, amounting to 1.6 billion rubles for the year, was fulfilled by only 2.3 percent. Some measures had to be rejected, in general, as politically unacceptable.

However, as one could assume (*KOMMUNIST*, No 2, 1989), basic attention remained fixed on defense expenditures, centralized state capital investments, and the utilization of hard currency resources. Policy in these areas is becoming more rational. The question of reducing defense expenditures has moved onto a practical plane for the first time in the last quarter-century. The limits on centralized investments, just recently approved in the plan, are being reduced by 7.5 billion rubles. After a difficult struggle, a redistribution of hard currency is starting for the purpose of increasing industrial consumer goods.

Anti-inflationary measures are absolutely necessary and became imminent long ago. However, unfortunately, they are obviously inadequate in terms of scale. After all, the social burden on state finances is increasing in parallel. The sizes of subsidies, especially those sent to the agroindustrial complex, continue to grow rapidly. The tendency to decrease deductions from profits into the budget is not being broken successfully. On the whole, the budget deficit is not decreasing. It has stabilized at the dangerous level of 10 percent of the gross national product, and remains the strongest catalyst for inflation.

There is a simple criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of financial regulation under conditions of reform:

does it enable us to consistently remove administrative restrictions on price movement and to replace commands with control of combined demand? After all, a market without prices which balance supply and demand is a very strange and ineffective mechanism. Precisely from this viewpoint, the weakness of the policy being carried out is displayed quite clearly. The end of the year was marked by passing a set of measures, aimed at restricting enterprises' price-setting rights, already modest without this. Having failed to halt the wave of inflation through financial means, once again we are trying to overcome economic laws through force of order.

The rapid growth of personal monetary incomes, on which universal attention was fixed last year, is not the cause of financial problems, but a consequence of them. The combination of inflation and regressive taxation, in which the rapid growth of enterprises' profits occurs against the background of reduction in state incomes, is a known and proven path to collapse of the financial system. When the amount of enterprises' economic incentive funds almost doubles over the year, the funds accumulated in them should, one way or another, carve their way and come out in cash payments.

Of course, the government could not indifferently observe how these funds are raining down into the consumer market, rendering hopeless any efforts aimed at stabilizing it. It is attempting to limit the growth of earnings, and is first re-establishing control over the correlation between the increase of payment for labor and its productivity, then introducing taxation on the growth of the wage fund. However, the enterprises are disinclined to reconcile themselves to the fact that funds, which they consider theirs on legal grounds, are being frozen. The natural response is a reduction in the output of acutely needed production, as well as demands for tax privileges. As a result, there the rates of economic growth decline and labor conflicts intensify. The rapid growth of nominal personal incomes against the background of stagnating industry, and the growing influence of suppressed inflation on all processes in general are characteristic features of economic powerlessness. For example, in 1977-1980 in Poland, average earnings grew by 41 percent, but the national income did not increase.

Hierarchical ties, which one way or another had regulated the reproduction process before, clearly weakened last year. On mass scales, enterprises are refusing to accept state orders or are disrupting the fulfillment of them, and are shipping production to non-plan, more profitable consumers, capable of offering something in exchange. Despite a good grain harvest, significantly higher than in 1988 (211 and 195 billion tons, respectively), state grain purchases decreased noticeably. Regions are disrupting deliveries of food to Union-wide stocks (fulfillment of planned meat deliveries in 1989: Latvia—71 percent; Estonia—80 percent; Moldavia—83 percent). Production is being imported and exported to and from the country, in circumvention of all licensing

whatsoever and of established restrictions. The ministries can achieve little by command. Their main means of influence, still preserved, is the monopoly on delivery of materials and component items.

Although administrative restrictions still allow us to restrain price growth rates at a relatively low level, a situation is taking shape, well familiar to those who study hyperinflation. Business activity is switching from looking for ways to raise the production effectiveness to speculative operations. Enterprises are striving to rid themselves of money as soon as possible, to invest it in any kind of material resource. Non-monetary exchange in kind is preferred. Incidentally, this only relates to domestic money: The sphere of operations with hard currency accounts is expanding in parallel, and the process of economic "dollarization" is beginning.

An important detail: Whereas in 1986-1987, under the influence of a stricter credit policy, the growth rates of working capital in reserves of commodity and material values slowed, in 1988 they grew once again by 9.4 billion rubles. The process of their rapid increase continued last year. On 1 October, the combined reserves of commodity and material values reached 542.9 billion rubles, having surpassed the normative level by almost 247 billion rubles. Part of material resources serves barter operations, playing the role of means of circulation. Perhaps, today the world's most cumbersome and expensive monetary system has taken shape here.

It is not easy at all to regulate and forecast resource flows mediated by barter transactions. The role of incidental factors, such as the share of production that enterprises can dispose of independently and its exchange profitability, is great. In this situation, the most important sectors are in a dangerous position. For example, while electrical energy is hard to exchange for the requisite production resources, this does not mean that it is possible to get by without it.

Expanding the independence of republic and local bodies of power in regulating the socioeconomic development of territories is a natural process, an inseparable, component part of the reform. Self-management cannot be effective if it is not based on the autonomy of republic and local budgets, if the expenditure of every kopek is sanctioned and controlled by higher bodies. However, right now the tendencies of regional economies, which are going much further in the direction of local exclusivity, are clearly marked. Everywhere, people are discussing how to prohibit the export of goods from a region, how to prevent implementation of above-plan production beyond the bounds of an oblast, or how to force enterprises of Union-wide or republic subordination to work for the needs of a rayon, city, or oblast. This bacchanalia of local protectionism is enough to horrify any sensible economist, aware of its consequences. The last time such an epidemic seized the world on broad scales was in the 1920s and early 1930s. It had to be paid for by a historically unprecedented depth of economic crisis. However, the closing off of economic ties in



regions is only a natural reaction to the collapse of the command system of regulation, uncompensated for by the formation of a full-fledged market.

2

Against the background of deranged finances and monetary circulation, the economy's production subsystem until recently demonstrated a relatively high stability. The inertia of the Soviet economy, which we have cursed repeatedly, and not without grounds, played the role of a powerful stabilizer here (see table).

**Table**  
**Growth Rates (in percent, by methodology,**  
**compared with plan)**

| Indicators               | Average annual, 1981-1985 | Average annual, according to 20th 5-Year Plan | 1988 | 1989  |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|---|------|-------|
| National income produced | 3.2*                      | 4.2   | 4.4  | 3.3** |
| Output of industry       | 3.6*                      | 4.6   | 3.9  | 1.7   |
| Output of agriculture    | 1.0                       | 2.7   | 1.7* | 0.8   |

\* Elaborated data from USSR Goskomstat.

\*\* Taking into account actual change of prices—2.4 percent.

Until the end of 1988 and beginning of 1989, basically, we successfully avoided a significant non-plan drop in output of the most important types of production. However, approximately since mid-1989, under the influence of increased social tension, all crisis phenomena to a high degree have spread to the production sphere as well. The production cost of industrial production has started to increase. In the RSFSR, the growth of industrial production in the first half-year was 2.1 percent, and in the third quarter it dropped to 0.6 percent. Throughout the country on the whole, rates decreased from 2.7 to 1 percent, respectively.

For 1989, out of 144 of the most important types of industrial production taken into account in periodic book-keeping, in 64 of them output decreased as compared to 1988. For the year, the production of petroleum and gas condensate dropped by 17 million tons, of coal—32 million tons; of minerals—2.9 million tons; light automobiles—44,000 pieces. The reduction in production volume is not cause for alarm in all cases. Something else is important. For many types of production, this process is occurring despite an intention, clearly stated in the plan, to increase output. The center is increasingly less in control of the situation.

The loss of control in the sphere of capital investments is displayed especially graphically. The 15 March 1989 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution again stated the need to limit construction

and to raise the demand for observation of its normative time periods. In practice, events developed in a directly opposite manner last year.

The full budget cost of industrial construction grew by 32.4 billion rubles. The number of projects temporarily halted or shut down was 24,600, but to make up for it, the construction of 146,600 new projects was started. The average accounting duration for the industrial construction cycle increased by 6 percent and, as before, exceeds the normative level by a factor of more than 2. The commissioning of fixed capital, even calculated in rubles, has been decreasing since 1987. According to preliminary data, the volume of unfinished construction at the expense of state capital investments increased by approximately 20 billion rubles over the year.

The first years of the 5-year period were marked by attempts to accelerate economic growth through a sharp increase in capital investments. Their weightiest result was an about 60 billion ruble increase in unfinished construction, embodied in open foundation ditches, laid foundations, and unfinished frames. In this regard, the situation is reminiscent of Poland in the 1970s.

The overall disorganization of construction did not bypass the social sphere. The shifts achieved here in 1985-1987, the substantial increase in the commissioning of housing, hospitals, and schools was, perhaps, the most graphic proof of the economy's turn toward the person. However, even a priority sector cannot be isolated from national economic processes. Regardless of efforts made both by the center, as well as by local areas, the volumes of housing constructed at the expense of state capital investments started to decrease since the second half of 1988. This process was not successfully stopped last year. Over the year, the commissioning of total area of residential buildings decreased by 4 percent; of schools—by 9; and of hospitals—by 16. The line for improved housing conditions continues to grow, and there were already about 14 million families waiting in by the end of 1989.

3

The most important factor, which determined the situation in the consumer market last year, was the race for personal incomes and for the sale of alcohol. There were moments when it seemed as though, a little bit more, and vodka would win. The increase in wine and vodka production was 24.3 percent. The turnover tax from their sale surpassed the 1985 level by 8.2 billion. In the first half-year, the reduction of retail trade commodity reserves was halted, and reserves even increased by 0.6 billion rubles. However, experience has again shown that it is impossible to outrun the printing press. Personal monetary incomes increased by approximately 13 percent over the year. Payments through the wage fund alone increased by 45 billion rubles in the national economy. The average monthly earnings of workers and employees grew faster than outlined in the plan by a factor of about 3. In the second half-year, the process of

reducing commodity reserves was renewed: Their volumes decreased by about a billion rubles, and were almost 11 billion rubles less than the norm by the end of the year.

In such a situation, the growth of production hardly has a noticeable influence on the degree of scarcity of specific groups of goods. Shifts in solvent demand, caused by the growth of nominal incomes, and waves of consumer panic determine the situation. For example, the output of sewing machines in 1985-1989 increased by only 3 percent. Conversely, the production of washing machines increased fairly rapidly, and 1.6 billion pieces (32 percent) more were produced than in 1985. However, neither the one, nor the other can be had for sale. Deliveries of refrigerators for trade in 1985-1989 not only did not increase, but even decreased, and the increase in their export sale was telling. Deliveries of color televisions increased by a factor of 1.5. Yet, reserves of these and other goods in retail trade have decreased, signaling aggravation of a shortage.

Perhaps, the situation with soap and synthetic detergents was talked and written about most of all last year. High-level meetings were held repeatedly and culprits were punished. Having concentrated significant resources here, we managed to raise their production volume by 128,000 tons. Imports increased by a factor of almost 10. Deliveries for trade grew by 45 percent. Nevertheless, commodity reserves continued to decrease. By 1 December 1989, they were lower than in 1985 by a factor of 2-4. In 78 percent of cities studied by the USSR Goskomstat, detergents were sold using coupons. Meanwhile, while the forces and attention of higher bodies of management were concentrated on solving the soap problem, notebooks, pencils, writing paper, toothbrushes, household shoes, Pioneer uniforms, kerosene, and many other items fell into the circle of scarce goods.

The process of development of normed supply continued. Practically everywhere, sugar was sold by ration cards. Out of 146 cities studied, meat and fowl were distributed by ration cards in 33, butter—in 20, and tea—in 16. Regardless of the rapid growth in vodka production, it was sold in 16 cities by coupons. The rapid reduction in reserves of a whole range of everyday goods is creating objective prerequisites for further expansion of the ration card system.

It had been proposed to increase the production of consumer goods by 10 percent over the year. We did not succeed in fulfilling the plan. Goods received for trade amounted to 13.5 billion rubles less than planned.

The supply of food products remained at the 1988 level. The most accessible reserves for increasing the sale of meat, related to reducing the number of livestock, had basically been used in preceding years. Regardless of continuing mass purchases of fodder (importation of grain increased by 4.6 billion tons in 9 months), the

growth in meat and milk production has slowed. Deliveries of fish continued to decrease. Over the year, the kolkhoz market price for potatoes rose by 8 percent, for vegetables—by 10. This is stimulating the shift of demand to flour, cereals, and macaroni items. Although their sale has not decreased, serious stoppages have occurred in the trade of these goods. In November, flour was unavailable for sale in 5 percent of the cities studied, porridge—in 47 percent, and macaroni—in 48 percent of the cities.

If we exclude the increase in sales, obtained due to alcohol, importation, raising prices, and the sale of goods to enterprises and organizations, the remainder (on the order of 6 billion rubles) characterizes the results of work by all sectors of the national economy to increase the output of consumer goods. In this regard, the methodology, which enabled us to plan an increase in the output of consumer goods by 66 billion rubles in 1990, evokes many questions.

4

When society tears at aggravated social contradictions, the temptation is especially great to solve the problems, constantly arising in the production sphere and the consumer market, at the expense of increased foreign debt.

In Poland, imports from developed capitalist countries increased by a factor of 5.5 in 1971-1978. Billions of dollars were invested in large-scale, ineffective investment projects. Adequate growth and the output of competitive production was not successfully achieved. The country was forced to an ever greater extent to rely on foreign credit in order somehow to cope with current problems. It had to refuse purchases of materials and component parts, needed for the normal use of existing capacities. The forced reduction in production and in real personal incomes acted as the detonator for socio-economic crisis.

The government's report to the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies emphasized that the deficit in the hard currency balance is a special deficit, the most dangerous and destructive of all balance deficits. Unfortunately, this growing concern was not implemented in real measures, aimed at reducing ineffective imports and stimulating export. The country's foreign economic position continued to worsen. In 1988-1989, the overall volume of exports increased by 0.1 percent, while imports grew by 15.5 percent. The coefficient of debt maintenance (the ratio of regular payments for settling long- or short-term credit and interest on all credit to hard currency receipts) in the current year exceeds 35 percent (Poland: 25 percent in 1971, and 61 percent in 1978). In 9 months, the reserves of unregulated imported equipment grew by 27 percent. On 1 October 1989, it already comprised 5.8 billion rubles.

Here is the typical situation, which has taken shape in several projects being constructed in cooperation with foreign companies.

The Astrakhan gas complex: The sharp worsening of the ecological situation in the lower reaches of the Volga forced the restriction of production volumes in the first line. However, while using the planned capacity by less than half, harmful emissions over the first 8 months of last year exceeded the annual norm. Regardless of the protests of Gosstroy and Goskompriroda, which refused to approve the design for the complex's second line, construction continues and all the imported equipment and materials, costing 220 million hard currency rubles, have been received on site.

The Blagoveshchensk complex for producing polyester fiber: Construction began in 1985, at a estimated cost of 1.2 billion rubles. Equipment in Japan is being received on site. Not only is there no place to install it, but there is not even any place to store it normally, which, quite obviously, enables foreign companies to entirely deny responsibility for the equipment's ability to function.

Recently, along with the growth in convertible hard currency debt, debts to several socialist countries are also increasing rapidly. This is forcing us to study the grounds for contracts concluded with them with special caution.

One of the largest integration projects is the construction of the Krivoy Rog mining and concentration combine for oxidized ores. At a cost of 1.6 billion rubles, it is being implemented jointly with Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Romania. Work began in 1985, before approval of the project. The combine is supposed to go into service in 1990. At the present time, it has already been admitted that construction will not be successfully completed before 1994. The USSR Construction Bank in 1987 called the government's attention to the fact that construction is being done on an unprofitable project which does not meet the requirements of scientific and technical progress, and that by the time accounts with the partners are settled, the USSR's losses will reach at least 2 billion rubles. The USSR Gosstroy examined the project in 1986 and 1987 and returned it both times for additional development due to unsatisfied technical and economic indicators. In 1988, a special interdepartmental commission was created, which reached the conclusion of the ineffectiveness of building the combine and its nonconformity with the interests of the USSR. Construction continues.

Several times last year, KOMMUNIST raised the question of a gigantic project, which calls for creating five petroleum-gas-chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast (KOMMUNIST, Nos 2, 5, 8, 11, 1989). The speech by a deputy from the Tobolskiy territorial electoral district, V.N. Matyukh, at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies gives a good idea of the subsequent development of events: "In May 1989, the working group of the USSR Gosplan State Expert Commission, having examined the materials presented, concluded that the national economic effectiveness of this project was not proven and that implementation of the resolution in full is inexpedient. The question was raised at the 1st Congress of

People's Deputies, and the government changed its position and supported creating only two of the five, the Tobolskiy and Surgutskiy complexes, in the near future. Their technical and economic grounds were studied by USSR Gosstroy. Its basic conclusion was that the stipulated time periods for finishing the project are groundless and the decisions to sign the constituent documents were made prematurely. The USSR Foreign Economic Bank, after considering the project, concluded that the hard currency financial conditions proposed by the Western side are unacceptable. Implementation of the project will lead to a further dangerous growth of foreign debt. It was emphasized that even a 1-year delay in commissioning the Tobolskiy complex will cause the country to have to settle credit amounting to 287 million dollars. The USSR Council of Minister's reaction to these doubts was its 10 November 1989 resolution: It seems, we will build not two, but three complexes. On 28 November, USSR Minkhimneftprom signed an agreement with foreign companies to create a joint enterprise.

After all this, the USSR Gosplan State Expert Commission resolution passed on 29 November appears, indicating the need to review the hard currency financial conditions for construction of the Tobolskiy complex and the insufficient development of technical and economic grounds for the Surgutskiy complex on the whole. Now, it has only historical value. In 1990, it was planned to fulfill construction and assembly work on the Surgutskiy complex amounting to 95 million rubles, on Tobolskiy—18 million, and on Novourengoyskiy—30 million rubles.

It goes without saying, ineffective foreign trade transactions are no news to us. However, since traditional command methods are already being rejected, yet there is still no strict market discipline, the risk of uncontrolled growth of debt increases several-fold. When control over the investment sphere is lost and in 11 months only 34 of the 367 most important projects included in the state order are successfully commissioned, now is a fine time to become involved in large-scale purchases of equipment!

Unregulated, imported equipment amounting to 1.2 billion rubles is concentrated in enterprises which are part of USSR Minkhimneftprom, the State Gas Concern, and the "Agrokhim" Association. However, is this really the sum total? Right now, these organizations are holding talks on creating nine large joint enterprises, and proposing hard currency outlays amounting to over 17 billion dollars. The Foreign Economic Bank is directing attention to the fact that, in all these projects, rights and responsibilities are distributed unequally, and our country carries virtually the entire risk. It emphasizes that not one of the expert studies carried out has confirmed their economic effectiveness, and there is no independent market analysis. Moreover, all this poorly coordinated activity extremely negatively influences our relations with foreign banks, worsening the conditions

under which they are prepared to grant us credit. Meanwhile, contracts are being signed and construction work is starting.

Time will show who will answer for the country's inevitable hard currency losses. Meanwhile, the people making decisions are obviously sure that nobody will. Precisely thus, it is possible to drag the country into a pit of debt.

## 5

The most important fact, without consideration of which it is impossible to understand the national economic processes of last year, was the increasing politicizing of the economy. Even in March, attempts were made to patch holes in the budget in the traditional fiscal way. The time periods for raising the untaxed minimum wage are being postponed (an annual savings of 110 million rubles). Increasing the time period for payment of aid for children in poor families (savings of 135 million rubles) and increasing the duration of partially paid maternity leave (a savings of 75 million rubles) is being delayed. Raising the scant wages for workers in culture (a savings of 70 million rubles) is being pushed back, etc. These economically meaningless steps and miserly sums are incompatible with the scales of the financial disproportions, and the choice of social groups that ought to pay for financial improvement is strange. After the spring elections of USSR People's Deputies, it became impossible to continue such a policy. The amounts of funds allocated for solving social problems are beginning to grow rapidly, but the allocations stipulated for the future are losing touch with the realities of a seriously ailing economy. Against a background of just and worried words about the need for extraordinary measures of economy, an extraordinary distribution of money is noted.

The growth of political activeness under conditions of the worsening economic situation and growing distrust in the ability of central agencies to solve problems that long ago became imminent, inevitably manifests in an escalation of alarms, into a redistribution fervor. The dominant theme in speeches on economic subjects: Reduce taxes and allocate more funds from the budget, raise wholesale prices but do not touch retail prices, expand the rights of enterprises and free them of responsibility, and grant new credits and write off old ones.

Labor conflicts and strikes have shown that requirements made of the state can be reinforced not at all just by impassioned speeches, that there are powerful levers for pressuring the bodies of power. One group's successes in protecting its interests encourages the efforts of others.

Before the beginning of 1989, the so-called inflation of demand, caused by errors in economic policy and inability to bring the funds allocated for developing various sectors into accord with existing financial resources, had a determining influence on economic development. Later, the situation changed. The increased social tension limits the center's freedom of

action, and itself becomes a cause of a phenomenon, known in economic literature as conflict inflation.

This process arises when society is deeply divided on the fundamental issues of economic policy, when social groups are unprepared to reach agreement in searches for ways to distribute limited resources, and not one of them is strong enough to unconditionally thrust its will on the others. Miners, railway workers, farmers, and cooperative workers are energetically standing up for their interests. Their representatives are demonstrating rigid intolerance. Meanwhile, the printing press is deciding issues, on which the bodies of power were unable to reach an agreement.

The American economist A. Hirshman, author of research on inflationary processes in Latin America, noted back in the early 1960s that conflict inflation is not at all the worst substitute for civil war. However, it can play its role only when prices are determined by an impartial market mechanism. In our country, where society considers the government responsible not only for the price of meat, but also for the cost of furs, gold, and delicacies, the valve that allows us to let off pressure when it reaches a dangerous level is tightly closed.

A flare-up of inflation is a situation encountered by countries, most diverse in terms of their level of development and socioeconomic structure. A wealth of experience has been accumulated in the world on the conduct of anti-inflationary policy. The time periods and intensity of renewal of inflationary tendencies are determined by specific factors, but in most mechanisms for short-term stabilization there is a great deal in common. The often discussed example of Bolivia, where an inflation of thousands of percent a year was successfully halted without introducing administrative control of prices and monetary reform, practically in 2 weeks, is exceptional only in terms of time period, not in terms of essence.

Under our conditions, the basic tasks and tools for anti-inflationary policy are entirely obvious. There are no professional secrets here whatsoever. We must reduce the growth rates of the monetary mass (of course, it is a question not only of cash, but also of the sum total of broader monetary aggregates, including, among others, the funds in enterprise accounts). We must sharply decrease the state budget deficit and bring the volume of subsidies into conformity with existing financial resources. We must temporarily decrease the volume of capital investments of enterprises and relieve the base sectors on this basis, having ensured the possibility of a balanced reduction in centralized state capital investments. We must begin to cut back overdeveloped sectors and ineffective industries. We must encourage savings, raise the percentage rate to a level that balances supply and demand, and sharply toughen sanctions for insolvency. We must reject the elevated, unreal exchange rate for the ruble and form a hard currency market. Having ensured control over the dynamics of combined demand, we can begin unfreezing prices.

Measures, similar in terms of content, have enabled countries, in incomparably worse positions, to slow down inflation. Our possibilities for economic maneuvering are far from exhausted. For instance, reducing the volumes of investment activity, primarily of centralized capital investments, will enable us to free the significant share of hard currency resources aimed at their support. Implementation through the mechanism of a hard currency market of even the 25-30 percent of convertible hard currency resources, whose use is not attached to existing vitally important industries, would enable us at the same time to sharply decrease the budget deficit and reduce the capital surpluses of production development funds. It would be a serious step on the path to convertibility of the ruble.

There are no grounds for fearing artificial lowering of the exchange rate for national hard currency. The effectiveness of such a policy in combination with strict regulation of the monetary mass has been verified by experience in the FRG, Japan, and the new industrialized countries of Asia, which have consciously carried it out over an extended time. The influence of a decline in the exchange rate for the national hard currency on accelerating internal inflation in the USSR will be limited, due to the isolation of internal prices from world market prices.

The problem lies in the fact that, despite all the economic obviousness of anti-inflationary measures, their implementation is always extremely difficult politically. There is no popular, easy way making it possible to balance the claims of social groups with the economy's possibilities. Society is divided among itself, and interests in limiting taxes, slowing the increase of prices, and eliminating the deficit oppose the aspiration to preserve some economic structures, albeit ineffective, and customary guarantees which can only exist at the expense of incommensurate taxes and inflationary financing.

Today, the most important sociopolitical factor is the conflict between the agroindustrial complex, which for the time being is in no state to produce food with socially acceptable outlays, and consumers, who do not intend to defray its actual expenditures. In this conflict, the state acts as the intermediary, as everyone's scapegoat. The size of subsidies made for the agroindustrial complex has already surpassed 10 percent of the gross national product (in developed capitalist countries, whose experience is often referred to, it is 1-3 percent of the GNP, as a rule) and continues to increase rapidly. Nobody is prepared to finance such tempestuous growth at the expense of raising taxes, or to halt it.

When there is no resolve sufficiently strictly to carry out a policy of reducing combined demand, it remains to hope for a miracle, for managing, in a unsettled economy with a non-functioning market, to sharply raise the effectiveness of economic management and increase the volume of output. It seems that for precisely this reason,

and not at all due to misunderstanding of real possibilities, boundless optimism, based on nothing, remains a distinctive feature of the plans being made.

Politics in a democratic society, or even one that is being democratized, is also the art of being popular, of using support. Professor G. Stein, chairman of the president's economic council during the time of R. Nixon, directed attention to the fact that the economic programs of U.S. presidents are similar in one key element. They promise to do great favors for everyone and, in this regard, not cost anyone, or almost anyone, anything. An entire industry exists for manufacturing pseudo-scientific works, making it possible to give such an unwise program the halo of intellectual respectability. Work in this sphere is little-respected among professional scientists, but to make up for this, it is highly profitable. Tempestuous support of regressive monetary reform both by conservatives, as well as by radicals, attests to the fact that a market for such ideas is taking shape in the USSR as well.

In discussions of monetary reform, as a rule, two essentially different tasks, which said reform is proposed to help solve, are confused. On the one hand, there is ensuring social justice and eliminating monetary accumulations of a non-labor nature, and on the other—stabilization of the market situation. Essentially, it is a question not of a supplement, but of choice. With the distribution of savings that has taken shape, a monetary reform aimed only at removing the part of savings that obviously is unearned will have almost no effect on the volume of the monetary mass, but the inevitable acceleration of money circulation will urge on inflation. As a measure aimed at ensuring social justice, it is extremely ineffective. High-status groups, more actively included in the functioning of the shadow economy, have the greatest opportunities to convert monetary savings into other forms or to bypass the established restrictions on exchange. In order to regulate differentiation of incomes, it is far more logical to force the introduction of a unified system of taxation on the basis of tax declarations.

A reform making it possible to substantially reduce the volume of monetary mass in the hands of the population is, in a social respect, an extremely strict measure, seriously offending the interests of broad social groups. Moreover, it contributes to stabilizing the economy only in the event that the state has already coped with current financial problems and does not need the population's savings for the financial deficit of its own budget. When these prerequisites are created, but the flow of previously accumulated money continues to rain down in the market without restraint, a temporary freeze of the population's monetary resources may be necessary. Right now, our situation is fundamentally different: The state needs credit resources.

However, by the way, this is not all directly related to the problem. After all, the success of popular ideas is not at all related to their probable practical results. The logic of political struggle and mass psychology are far more

important. The overwhelming majority of people firmly believe that they have no non-labor savings. A universal way to solve economic problems, offending virtually nobody's interests, is being suggested. The loathsome enemy, whom the people are rising against (organized crime), seems toy-like in these speeches. Otherwise, it would be impossible to conquer it with the cardboard sword of regressive monetary reform. They are inventing some kind of special mafia, one that has never heard of the existence of a hard currency black market, about possibilities of placing funds in gold, gemstones, antiques, and narcotics, incapable of finding channels for turning old money into new. A mafia, whose might lies not in its streamlined organization, information, and connections, but in sacks of devaluing rubles. And they will defeat it in one blow!

Meanwhile, we speak figuratively about the empty shelves of stores. After all, something does, nonetheless, remain on them. They will truly become empty, if a mass flight from money begins. Those who wish to understand how this could occur need only read the Polish newspapers from the early 1980s.

Recently, democratic elections were held in Chili for the first time after the fascist coup. The previous elections were held in 1970. At that time, summarizing the results of his unsuccessful struggle against conflict inflation, President E. Frei wrote: "From a technical point of view, the procedures for restraining inflation are well known. However, that which occurs here is reminiscent of a situation, in which you call the doctor, but later do not want to take the medicine. The problems are primarily political. Everyone wants someone else to make the sacrifices. Every year I presented laws that would make it possible to control inflation, and every year they were not approved. Yet later, the same people who refused to pass these laws blamed the government for inflation.

In the near future, it is simplest of all not to take additional serious steps to stabilize the financial situation and monetary circulation and to continue the policy of expanding the independence of enterprises, its reinforcement in new laws. The problem lies in the fact that, with all the seeming political attractiveness, economically such a course is the most dangerous. If we follow it, economic development will soon be entirely beyond the state's control, suppressed inflation will turn into open inflation, and the government and the ruling party will be responsible for this.

Only the combination of intensified reform with a real stabilization program, making it possible to bring combined demand into accordance with supply, can set the foundation for stable development of the national economy. Regardless of serious errors that were made, we still have an opportunity, having chosen this course, to correct the situation. However, only a strong, consistent anti-inflationary policy offers hope for success. Attempts to postpone fundamental political decisions as long as possible will cause us to be forced to make them

anyhow, but in an even more difficult situation. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda". "Kommunist", 1990

### **Difficult Choice: Economic Survey for the Year 1989. Position of a People's Deputy**

*905B0016D Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 35-42*

[Discussion among G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, GSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman; A. Denisov, professor at Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M.I. Kalinin; K. Lavrov, chairman of the board, USSR Union of Theater Workers; G. Lisichkin, chief of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Economics of the World Socialist System; and N. Travkin, student, Moscow Higher Party School, prepared by V. Dymarskiy, Yu. Kudryavtsev, and A. Leshchevskiy]

[Text] In our opinion, a good tradition has started: during the working days of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, KOMMUNIST invited several of congress participants to an open discussion to deeply investigate the events that are occurring, debate the prospects for our development, and share their worries and doubts. This happened during the 1st Congress of People's Deputies (see KOMMUNIST, No 10, 1989); the next meeting was held on the free day of the 2nd Congress, 17 December. G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, GSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman; A. Denisov, professor at the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M.I. Kalinin; K. Lavrov, chairman of the board, USSR Union of Theater Workers; G. Lisichkin, chief of sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Economics of the World Socialist System; and N. Travkin, student, Moscow Higher Party School, voiced their opinions.

All the meeting participants are not only people's deputies, but also CPSU members. Although they touched on various, most acute topics (above all, the problem of economic improvement, which was actively discussed at that time in the Congress), the main question nonetheless was: How do communists feel in the parliament, how do they assess their activity, and what thoughts on the party's role and place in renewing society are sparked by participation in the work of the higher body of power? The discussion began with this.

G. Gumbaridze. The main result of the work of our parliament in its new form was, in my opinion, the significant increase in the level of state and legal thinking of the people's deputies. Constructive proposals are being made and interesting discussions are being held. Maybe we do spend a great deal of time on them sometimes, but these hours are far from lost. Many of the proposals, not passed today, will unquestionably be of value in the future. There is not a trace of the conservative, inert atmosphere, in which Supreme Soviet sessions were held in past times.

It should be noted that a new atmosphere is gradually being created in the Union republic parliaments as well. In particular, it is quite interesting that the last session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, which drafted resolutions on a genuinely democratic, alternative basis, having reflected the opinion of the republic's broad public, was rich in events.

The position of communists, of our party in many ways determines the course of the country's parliament. However, this occurs far from automatically. It is simply that the party, having been the initiator of perestroika and having led it, as a rule, proposes the most rational and constructive solutions. The main point is that these resolutions are the fruit of collective searches. Nobody thrusts them on anyone.

**K. Lavrov.** It is very important that resolutions be the fruit of collective efforts, in the course of which not a single proposal is swept from the threshold. However, it seems to me, established procedures within the party still hinder this. I realize that party discipline must be maintained. Yet, how many times must we listen to fashionable expressions of the type: "The party will not understand you!" I spoke of this at the Congress as well. The party is not some faceless and monumental thing. It is made up of individuals with their own views on life. It is an association of people who have converged in their views under the influence of arguments, not because they are obliged to act thus, being party members. That is the main point. We have fallen behind greatly in this sense, due to which the party in many ways is also losing its authority. Moreover, our party was always "at the head," no matter what happened and, therefore, everything was done in its name. We have become accustomed to thinking that everything that has or has not been achieved was the result of party activity.

Or the following question: Why, for instance, when one state was divided, due to certain historical processes, into two states, are things always worse in the half that took our path? Every normal person asks himself this, on receiving information about how people live, for instance, in North and South Korea, or in West and East Germany. To add further to our troubles and disorders, this means that there is, apparently, some kind of flaw in the idea itself (or rather, in the methods of its implementation), due to which we can in no way exit the circle of problems and achieve the standard of living reached by peoples in the countries that chose a different path. In all likelihood, we should study this, not simply talk over and over again about values and principles, which we allegedly cannot forgo.

For me, the main criterion and principle is that people live well, that a person be happy, free, and provided for materially and spiritually. This is society's task, but it is addressed, above all, to the party, since ours is in the vanguard, which is even written in the Constitution.

I personally feel a kind of inner conflict: on the one hand, I realize that we should support one or another specific

resolution or measure, yet on the other, I feel that these often contradict my convictions and views. I must attempt somehow to join the one to the other, so that I can state with a clean conscience: Yes, I, being a party member, support this position, because as a person, as an individual, I am certain of its rightness. I strive for this in my work as a deputy. It seems, this is not just my problem. Right now, it faces many. After all, more than 80 percent of the deputies are communists.

Incidentally, this figure, in my opinion, does not attest so much to some kind of special trust by the voters in the party, so much as to the fact that they elected, above all, decent, active people.

**A. Denisov.** Often, despite the fact that a candidate is a party member.

**K. Lavrov.** That is precisely it! It is a paradox: party membership, to be frank, often acted as a negative factor, but nonetheless communists make up the overwhelming majority of those elected. It means that the situation with decent people is not really so bad in the party!

**N. Travkin.** It seems, our entire political and economic system was built in such a way that an initiative-minded person simply cannot realize his aspirations without joining the party. That is an explanation for the paradox.

It is unfortunate that, to this day, honest conversation in the party and about the party has not been fully held. We continue to play with slogans: "The party is the sole guarantor of perestroika," etc. At the same time, we state that perestroika is occurring in the GDR, as well as in Czechoslovakia. So, who is the guarantor there?

Moreover, I am certain that the party and the party body are different things. The caste of bureaucrats is not the party masses, in the name of whom it sanctions truth. The cause of this situation is clear: the universal state system, in which property is in the hands of the party and the state. The laws of economics operate further. Where does the surplus product go? The master gathers it into the state budget and says: Now, dear fellow citizens, we will make everyone happy through re-distribution. Yet, apparatchiks sit in all corners, related to the distribution of that which the people created. They say not "I," but "we." They speak in the name of the whole party, an entire people: "We have consulted," "we have decided,"...

How is it possible, in a period of democratization and glasnost, to declare that the party is the guiding force and at the same time hold the CPSU Central Committee Plenum behind closed doors on the eve of the Congress of People's Deputies?

Follow the events in the congress. If somebody speaks up to criticize a government program, a big functionary takes the rostrum after him. For instance, Filshin spoke, and then right after him—the first secretary of the Bashkir CPSU Obkom... They are poles apart! Yet, both

are party members. However, for some reason some consider themselves truly party members, while others immediately relate to the camp of extremists.

Or read V. Mesyats' speech to the section. With what does it begin? With the fact that the Congress should answer a question: Will the newly created democratic bodies be able to influence the situation in the country, to bring it out of the crisis? It ends with the following summary: the only force capable of this is the party. It turns out that everything that was formed—the Congress, the Supreme Soviet—are just a game, and here “we will pull you out.” Who is this “we?”

In order for everything to move from a standstill, cardinal changes in the economy and steps toward destatification are needed. Why have successes been achieved in foreign policy? Because they said: common human values are higher than class interests. They must also be recognized in our economy. One of these values is the market.

**G. Lisichkin.** We have talked about how a communist feels in the parliament. Let me say that, both as a party member, as well as a deputy, I can do nothing. Really, it has only become slightly easier to voice one viewpoint or another in the press. I hope that the academic group recently formed among the deputies will be able to consolidate the voice of the minority.

However, the creation of such a group must not be considered an attempt to oppose the party itself or, moreover, as an aspiration to remove it from the political arena. I am not defending absolutism, but I am convinced: one procedure ought to be replaced by another procedure, and not by chaos. Right now, it would turn out so: Brush away the party, and what will there be? I am a journalist and have to travel a great deal. How many times have I been convinced: so long as there is a party raykom secretary, who can even somehow manage the situation, order is maintained. Right now, if everything were swept up right away, a new Makhno would appear, as we have already observed in our history. Enough is enough. The intelligentsia ought to realize this and not especially rush processes, because there is nothing more terrible than the calamities and civil wars that we have already endured.

As far as the party's vanguard role is concerned, right now is precisely the most critical point, when the party could perform this role brilliantly if, for instance, the General Secretary would be the first to reject the program, proposed by the government.

Furthermore, we say that we must support and defend Gorbachev, and this is true. The point here is not some sort of loyal aspiration to please the leader of perestroika, but the fact that the fate of our culture, intelligentsia, and common human values, which we have suddenly started remembering, is associated with his name. This means defending the leading, creative forces of society. However, I would even put it somewhat more sharply: sometimes, we must protect Gorbachev from...

Gorbachev! What am I talking about? The fact is, he does not always have enough consistency and firmness, if even regarding the same government program, of which I already spoke.

What makes Gorbachev's opponents strong? Those who appeal to the basest feelings of people, who speculate on low levels of political culture. This is the richest soil for demagogues! Here, the mass information media ought to be more actively involved in work to explain to people, when they press invitations on newly-appeared pied-pipers of Hammelin!

**A. Denisov.** I am very worried that floods of dogmatic stereotypes are raining down on perestroika now. Will perestroika withstand it? People often tell us people's deputies: “You people in the parliament are trying to instill capitalism.” This is based on certain ideological norms, beyond which it is supposedly impossible to step. For example, it is simply asserted: private ownership is unacceptable for us. One gets the impression that we have converted our scientific world outlook and study into dogma. Essentially, this is dogmatism, since it appeals to certain imperishable standards.

Not a single science maintains its axioms untouched over the course of 150 years. Yet, we contrive to preach various stuffy standards, to put it frankly, and one of them, I would say, the most “sacred cow,” is the myth of the nature of private ownership. Marx was not mistaken when he sought the sources of exploitation in it, and he rightly found them there. However, he did not look for it in other forms of ownership. In our experience, we have brilliantly proven that state ownership, in which deductions from produced value are far greater, than any private owner is in a position to do, can full well be a source of exploitation, and a most cruel source at that. The mechanism is simple: we “strip” the hired laborer under the cover of social funds, promising through them to return to him later that which was taken from the produced value. However, in reality the accessibility of these social funds is highly conditional for him. To make up for this, it is literally unlimited for some. Thus, those for whom access to public funds is unlimited are essentially exploiting those, for whom the funds are inaccessible. This is entirely obvious. Moreover, I am inclined to claim that any form of ownership is fraught with exploitation, otherwise it could not exist. It would seem, under the joint-stock form of ownership, in which the laborers themselves own the stocks, there are no traces of exploitation whatsoever. Indeed, there are! After all, there will be a different number of stocks available, and some people will buy more, others less. He who has more stock will start to exploit those who have less or none at all. Under our system of equalization, the idler exploits the worker. In short, the form of ownership does not automatically guarantee social justice.

Here, the question of the criteria of socialist nature suggests itself. It is an extraordinarily important question, because we (i.e., legislators) are always being pressured precisely with this. No sooner than you try to



introduce a somewhat radical law, you immediately hear: It is unsocialist! I remember how it was drummed into us in school: the rights of the individual are a bourgeois invention. Yet, now we are declaring that they are common human values, an inalienable part of socialism which is generally inconceivable without broad humanitarian rights.

All this talk that we are borrowing something bourgeois is naive. We should be historical materialists, not idealists, as it often turns out in practice. We are assuming that our ideological concepts can be thrust on the economy and human life. Everything should be precisely to the contrary! The ideology of socialism was created so that things would be better for the person, so he could become freer. We are enslaving him with ideology.

If we stand nonetheless on the ground of historical materialism, we must admit that certain signs of socialism are inevitably appearing in the depths of capitalism and, consequently, it is no longer possible for this reason to indiscriminately reject everything coming from there. Yet, this is not so, people are distressed: Oh, borrowing from capitalists! Well, so what? We are borrowing, but it is already socialist.

**N. Travkin.** I completely agree with Anatoliy Alekseyevich on the subject of dogma. I remember how Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev spoke of dogmatism in one of his trips through the country. One of the workers asked: What stage are we in, what do you call our society? He answered: "We are already getting on in years, but you are young—what difference, what you call it, as long as it is good for the person." I will accept this at face value. We need not brush aside everything accumulated by people over centuries, but take that which suits us in whole blocks.

**G. Lisichkin.** As far as common human values are concerned, I consider one of them to be money, which the state really does not have. That is why the building we are now erecting constantly collapses. It is no accident that Lenin started his own perestroika with a solution of this problem, and put hard currency into circulation. The economy was offered, so to speak, a cement mortar capable of holding together the bricks of transformations. But today? Five years have passed, yet the measures that could have promoted the creation of such cement have not even been mentioned on the Congress agenda. It is impossible to postpone radical economic reform for some distant time. What are we waiting for?

Annually, the country loses billions of rubles through mismanagement, almost more than during all the war years. This is really terrible! We will never get off our hands and knees, on which we are crawling in the economy. Yet, the deputies are reproached for inactivity and for discrediting the new bodies of power. What kind of "all power to the soviets" is there without money, without the cement, without a forest?

Incidentally, it seems to me, that is why the second circuit of elections is taking place far more passively. Above all, it is becoming clear to people that the deputies of various hierarchies are not solving vital problems. "Playing politics," possibly, is of interest to some, but the rest need bread, meat, soap! Yet, these problems are not within the strengths of deputies, who have no tools for solving them. Hence, many receive the impression of a talk-shop, and the further this goes, the more it will annoy people.

**Editors' question.** *It can often be observed that the communist deputies not only disagree with each other on one thing or another, but hold directly opposite views relating to basic problems. Is this a division within the party itself?*

**G. Gumbaridze.** I see nothing wrong with a difference of positions and I would not call it division. The united program (by the way, hopelessly out of date), and united statutes do not at all mean that genuine unity lies in the similarity of the proposals being made. Like-minded thinking is not one idea, mechanically duplicated in all the people in the hall. It is a common goal, common ideals, and a common aspiration toward the well-being of the people and the Fatherland. I think that party discipline should consist not of unthinking subordination, not of a lack of one's own opinion, but precisely of creative interpretation of all processes and problems. Every communist should, unquestionably, fulfill the resolutions of the party body and be subject to party discipline. However, this cannot deprive him of rights to further express his own opinions on the essence of one problem or another. In my opinion, this is the essence of a civilized approach to intra-party democracy.

**N. Travkin.** The party's improvement as a mass organization is occurring precisely now. However, at the same time the resistance of conservatives, especially in the party apparatus, is also strengthening. Incidentally, that is why it is impossible to purge the party ranks, which people often talk about today. Precisely the ones who have begun to awaken would be cleaned out. What is the solution? Renovation of the cadre structure along all vertical lines. We should start with the primary organizations.

**G. Lisichkin.** When we speak of such broad categories, for some reason we always conceive of them as some kind of monolith. For example, the "people," the "party," "the people and the party united." However, after all, the party, like the people, is no monolith! Its cadre structure is determined by that which it chooses as a criterion for its own activity. Who joins it, Uncle Shchukar or Savva Morozov? The formed is needed for figure-padding, deception, and gross output, and the latter is intrinsically rejected.

**K. Lavrov.** I agree with Gennadiy Stepanovich, when he talked about the definite drop in the atmosphere of the present-day Congress, compared to the previous one. The feeling of helplessness has increased. You remember, the slogan "All power to the soviets!" was

proclaimed. It means that the congress of people's deputies is a higher body of power. However, over the last half year we have realized that little has changed, and the CPSU Central Committee nonetheless has remained the higher body, as well as the party apparatus, which Nikolay Ilich mentioned. We are like a kind of formation. Everything is still resolved "over there," in the Central Committee and the apparatus.

**A. Denisov.** If only it were resolved! I assume that the Central Committee would be named leader by all, if it really would effectively solve the radical problems of perestroyka.

**N. Travkin.** I would like to continue this thought. The distribution economy has nurtured a feeling of envy in our people. It has hardened and become almost a basic "motive force." Cooperative workers started living well—ban them! Burn the buildings of your leasing neighbor! Artists and scientists are earning a great deal of money—take it away! We cannot get rid of this feeling quickly, but we can direct it along a constructive track. The higher powers, including the party Central Committee, ought to firmly announce: the laws will protect those who want to work better and live better. You must not burn down your neighbor: You will be thrown in jail. Then, what is there left for him to do with his envy? Only one thing remains—work the same as your neighbor does. However, how come such laws are not being passed? Apparently, the elite are afraid of losing the functions of distribution.

**G. Lisichkin.** In my opinion, the drama of perestroyka lies in the fact that it is not socially oriented. In conceiving of the NEP, Lenin immediately chose the social group and social stratum which would pull this wagon. He set his stake on prosperous peasants and on energetic, enterprising citizens. Remember the kind of NEP men the movies show us: they constantly swill champagne, dance the tango, and ride around in troikas. However, what were they really up to? Just try to maintain an enterprise in a state of competitiveness while carousing! You will never dance the tango or drink champagne!

**A. Denisov.** Our society inherited the Lumpen ideology from Stalin—make everything, distribute everything—and to this day we cannot part with it. Universality was the basic orientation.

**N. Travkin.** Consequently, we must change our priorities in ideology. Today, we should have a cult of enterprising people, we should start the destatification of the economy. It is a crime that to this day a boot shop should have to feed a trust, main administration, and ministry, that hairdressers across the Union must cut hair for 40 kopeks, because the ministry also gets its trim and shave. Only enterprising people will be able to bring our society out of this dead end. Yet, for the time being we are pressuring these people, instead of helping them.

**A. Denisov.** With all our might we must announce that equalization is a method for the exploitation of working people by idlers. We must generally use the terminology, understood by dogmatists.

**Editors' question.** *Nonetheless, what should the party do and not do?*

**G. Gumbaridze.** If we speak of its influence on the country's parliament, the party should not use pressure in any form. It can function, operating only on the strength of logic, on conviction, on the rightness of the resolutions being proposed. I think there is no need whatsoever to create additional bodies in parliament, according to the party line. Say what you will, the authority of our party in society is sufficiently high and does not require bureaucratic support in the form of some sort of additional apparatus. After all, if we create a parliamentary party body, it inevitably will have to form an apparatus. Then, believe me, it would be even more difficult to make decisions, and trust in the deputies would be lost.

We do not have to be like the parliaments of other countries in every way, the more so since our party is objectively assigned a somewhat different role. One way or another, for now the Soviet people are relating their hopes precisely to the party. In this regard, recently they are criticizing precisely us, the communists, most of all. Paradoxical though it may seem, in my opinion, this also displays trust.

As far as political methods of leadership in general are concerned, this may be the most difficult question. I would say the following: to take political methods to arms today means constantly, every day, learning from life, not locking oneself into a kind of organizational framework, not propagating patterns and conventions. This means going ahead or, at least, staying at the same level with the masses, accumulating their interests, not dragging, but precisely leading them along.

**Editors' question.** *Judging by everything, do the communist and the chosen of the people within you argue among themselves?*

**G. Gumbaridze.** Is it worthwhile in general to draw a line between the party's political line and the interests of voters? In my opinion, a communist cannot help but gather public moods in himself and react to them. Hence, our natural, fixed attention to the problems of the economy, spiritual values, and our concern for their solution, which, incidentally, is obvious from our conversation today.

**G. Lisichkin.** It seems to me that the party should help assert objective economic laws and emancipate the workers and peasants. So long as it is not defending those who work in production, but the bureaucratic apparatus, its authority will decline.

**A. Denisov.** It is good that there is a polarization of opinions in our Supreme Soviet. This is normal for a democratic society. All contradictions should be solved democratically, but for the time being we do not have the skill and culture—neither political, nor democratic, nor any other kind. In my opinion, the most important role of the party as the political vanguard is to instill this culture. Unfortunately, for the time being it is not fully performing this task, when it ought to set an example.

In general, we should adhere to our own ideology. Our unity lies in this. The more so, since Marxism was right with respect to the prospects for development of mankind—it is going toward socialism, objectively, moving by the logic of history toward a society of social justice. Here, there is no dissent whatsoever. Yet, the methods... They are always subjective, they depend on culture, traditions, ethnic features, and finally, mentality. Common sense is still, thank heavens, alive in the people and prevails over ideological dogma.

Let me say even more: I am surprised that I am receiving so many letters in support of alternative laws, where private ownership figures as my "contribution." At first, I thought they would tear me to pieces! The situation is quite different, it seems.

**N. Travkin.** I did an experiment. I held meetings with the voters literally a week before the congress. I visited big enterprises. I came to an understanding: first, you ask me whatever you want, and at the end I will ask you to vote on the question of private ownership. It was rare when even five votes against it were collected. All the rest were for its introduction. Yet, a comrade stands up in the Congress and says that the people, they say, are against private ownership and will not accept it. Indeed, where is this people, in the name of whom he speaks?

**K. Lavrov.** Really, a great deal has been formalized here. We are in no way succeeding in rejecting this legacy of the administrative command system. I sometimes ask myself: Why is there a party organization in the theater? I remember my 33 years of experience in work with Tovstonogov. The party organization in it literally did nothing, and simply could not interfere in anything. I cannot imagine how the party organization secretary could argue with Tovstonogov, a non-party member! Tovstonogov would promptly throw him by the shoulders. On the other hand, Georgiy Aleksandrovich led everyone like the most progressive communist. So, what was there for the secretary to interfere with?

**N. Travkin.** He should not interfere in production matters either in a theater, or on a construction site. In production, the party has enough other problems. The task of administration and the labor collective council—starting up an economic mechanism, obtaining a profit and, with it, ensuring the development of production and growth in the incomes of those who work there.

However, someone should look at things more broadly and remember that there are people who devoted their labor resources to the enterprise and the country and are already "overboard" (some on pensions, others are invalids). We must also take care of them. The following topic: soon, for instance, stocks will appear. Really, the capitalization of money is not such a shameful thing. Should stocks be sold outside an enterprise or not? The answer is clear for the working people, for the administrator, and for the labor collective council: Why take credit at a bank and pay interest, when you can sell stocks "outside the gate," paying dividends to these people instead of bank interest? Who can estimate, without prejudice, to what one or another step will lead? I think that everything listed is the concern of the party organization. It can no longer command, but it can persuade. There is something human in every person. We must operate on this.

**G. Lisichkin.** Most likely, that said by us today will seem excessively sharp to some, and our requirements—too radical, but they are caused by a great alarm for the fate of the changes that have started in society. For those over 50, this is the last chance to abruptly change the country's life for the better.

**N. Travkin.** The conservatives, who are grasping for power, also have a last chance.

**G. Lisichkin.** However, we get a last chance too. COPY-RIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Congress Participants Speak About Themselves. Sociological Study

905B0016E Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 43-46

[Survey results by the sociological service of the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies]

[Text] The sociological service of the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies continued the work begun in the first Congress. The results of two instant surveys conducted on 15 and 22 December 1989 (1,173 deputies participated in the first, and 1,131—in the second), have been processed.

Let us immediately present a table, making it possible to compare answers to the question: "Were your hopes and expectations for the proceedings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies justified?" (here and subsequently given in percentages of those surveyed):

|                     | First Congress |        |        | Second Congress |             |
|---------------------|----------------|--------|--------|-----------------|-------------|
|                     | 27 May         | 2 June | 9 June | 15 December     | 22 December |
| Yes (On the Whole)  | 55             | 50     | 53     | 41              | 44          |
| No (On the Whole)   | 40             | 43     | 42     | 52              | 53          |
| Unable to Determine | 5              | 7      | 5      | 7               | 3           |

Why were there fewer positive assessments of the proceedings of the higher body of power? To some extent, the explanation lies in how the deputies assess their own

contribution to the congress. Of those surveyed, 39 percent were satisfied with their personal participation (in the 1st Congress—43 percent), but 55 percent were

not. The main reasons for feelings of dissatisfaction were given (the results of the survey for the 1st Congress are given in parentheses):

|  |    |      |
|--|----|------|
| —Put Name Down to Speak, But Was Not Given the Floor | 32 | (39) |
| —Did Not Dare to Speak                               | 14 | (16) |
| —Did Not Speak as Well, as Would Have Wished         | 4  | (2)  |
| —My Suggestions Were Not Understood by the Majority  | 4  | (3)  |
| —My Suggestions Were Not Supported by the Majority   | 5  | (2)  |

|   |    |      |
|---|----|------|
| —I Disagreed With Some Congress Resolutions | 39 | (31) |
| —I Disagreed With Most Congress Resolutions | 9  | (9)  |
| —Other                                      | 3  | (2)  |

The surveys showed that by the end of the congress, its emotional atmosphere had become more complex. Against an overall background of increasing tension, more hope, optimism, and confidence was displayed at the same time. Answers to the question of what feelings the deputies predominantly experienced during the Congress are distributed as follows:

|            | 15 December | 22 December |              | 15 December | 22 December |
|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| Optimism   | 25          | 32          | Pessimism    | 21          | 25          |
| Calm       | 15          | 12          | Tension      | 45          | 53          |
| Hope       | 49          | 51          | Skepticism   | 14          | 15          |
| Interest   | 40          | 48          | Indifference | 4           | 3           |
| Confidence | 24          | 37          | Dismay       | 11          | 13          |

A number of factors cause such a wide scattering of moods. In the opinion of 50 percent of those surveyed, during the period between the two congresses life in the country became more complicated. It is obvious that the deputies cannot help but feel their political responsibility for that which is occurring. In this regard, the majority (54 percent) critically rate the results of their own work in this period, and 40 percent of the deputies name the following as the basic difficulties: the abundance of pressing problems; objective impossibility of helping the voters on a number of sharp, vitally important problems; the insufficient, in their opinion, attention to deputy needs; the absence of a Law on the Status of USSR People's Deputies and of necessary conditions for their work in local areas; and a lack of time.

Apparently, deputies among the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet are experiencing an unaccustomed

psychological burden and tension. Is this not the reason that, as the sociological survey of USSR Supreme Soviet members (23 November 1989) showed, only 37 percent of them wish to continue work as a parliament member the next term?

On the whole, judging by the deputies' answers, the contradiction between the level of development of processes of democratization and expansion of glasnost, on the one hand, and the condition of the economy and the population's standard of living, on the other, is being aggravated; the process of forming a law-governed state is progressing more slowly, than they would like.

Here is how the people's deputies rated the change in the state of affairs in the country during the period between the two Congresses:

|   | Improved | Remained the Same | Worsened | Unable to Determine |
|---|----------|-------------------|----------|---------------------|
| —Influence of Citizens on State Policy, Development of Social Self-Management                                   | 50       | 30                | 11       | 9                   |
| —Condition of the Economy, Standard of Living, and People's Material Situation                                  | 3        | 25                | 65       | 7                   |
| Legal Foundations of the State, Law and Order, Socialist Legality, Observing the Principle of Social Justice    | 11       | 41                | 36       | 12                  |
| Glasnost, Openness, Freedom of Speech, Possibility of Honestly and Fearlessly Expressing Oneself on any Problem | 64       | 21                | 9        | 6                   |
| The Country's International Position  | 75       | 11                | 5        | 9                   |
| Life in the Country on the Whole  | 3        | 30                | 56       | 11                  |

Despite the diversity of approaches and the existence of different, often mutually exclusively ways to solve topical problems, a sufficiently stable nucleus is taking shape in the deputy corps, which often determines the nature of decisions made by the congress. In addition, the degree of consolidation of deputies sometimes approaches "critical mass" (50 percent), but sometimes falls below this limit. The splitting of deputy positions was displayed in assessments of the USSR Council of Ministers report "On Measures to Improve the Economy, Stages of Economic Reform, and Fundamental Approaches to Development of the 13th 5-Year Plan." 49 percent of those surveyed on 15 December basically approved the report, while 46 percent did not agree with a number of its clauses.

Most deputies, as a rule, are satisfied with the results of the Supreme Soviet's legislative activity. Along with this, the laws and draft laws, aimed at regulation of economic relations (on ownership, land, lease and lease relations, a unified tax system, etc.), are evoking disapproval from a significant share of the deputies: one-third of them included the passing of these laws (or approval of corresponding draft laws) among the Supreme Soviet resolutions with which they disagreed.

The survey results indicate that the people's deputies have entered the stage of shaping a collective self-awareness, of joint drafting of norms for political conduct in the Congress. Of those surveyed, 74 percent emphasized the expediency of using the experience of parliaments in other countries, and of establishing the responsibility of a deputy for incorrect statements aimed at other deputies; 83 percent of the deputies condemn the practice of obstructionism. Of them, 58 percent consider it intolerable when some deputies, standing up for their opinions, leave the meeting hall and do not participate in voting. However, 25 percent also note that "these deputies have no other way," but they nonetheless condemn the form itself of expression of such will.

Judging by the deputies' answers to the sociological service's questions, the reasons for the psychological tension mentioned above lie, above all, in the sphere of the professional political interaction of the deputies, in

the disagreement of their positions and views on a number of important issues (59 percent of those surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with the degree of agreement), and in the low level of political culture in discussions (73 percent of deputies noted this).

There are still several sociological features in the collective image of a "man of the Congress," the typical representative of the deputy body. He is a person who is trying to be true to his convictions and ideals (a feature noted by 68 percent of those surveyed), and a supporter of consolidation and agreement (64 percent). He aspires to knowledge, since he is unsure that he always has sufficient information for effective work (58 percent). When making critical remarks, he tries to observe tact and political sensitivity (56 percent), and he adheres to that which is proven by experience and reinforced by tradition (47 percent). However, all this does not come easily—deputy work is exhausting for him, and he is often tired (51 percent).

More detailed analysis of the survey results shows, however, that in this case life is full of schemes customary for us. Only 6 percent of those surveyed (according to self-assessments) possess a full set of these qualities (and only one of the deputies who participated in the survey did not find even one of them in himself). Therefore, it is not surprising that, for instance, most supporters of consolidation and agreement, like most of their opponents, selected five identical features of the "ideal image" as their own self-characteristics. Their viewpoints diverged only on the sixth point: some noted an aspiration in themselves to "keep everything, proven by experience" (56 percent), while others, conversely, were disposed "toward a decisive break with the old" (52 percent).

The inner positions of deputies and their general directions are differentiated and change in a clash with specific situations. Two-thirds of the deputies are no longer in a stage of agreement, and only one in three pays attention to the need to reach agreement. Here is the distribution of answers to the question: "What do you take into account before voting, when you make a decision?"

|  | Always | Often | Sometimes | No Answer |
|--|--------|-------|-----------|-----------|
| —Content of Question Under Discussion                        | 76     | 10    | 2         | 12        |
| —Authority and Competence of Author(s) of Suggested Proposal | 14     | 19    | 8         | 59        |
| —Position of One's Voters                                    | 41     | 28    | 6         | 25        |
| —Position of One's Deputy Group                              | 13     | 20    | 28        | 39        |
| —Possible Position of Most Deputies                          | 3      | 8     | 38        | 51        |
| —Need to Reach Agreement in the Congress                     | 16     | 19    | 27        | 38        |
| —Position of the Presidium                                   | 2      | 7     | 34        | 57        |

Almost 70 percent of those surveyed stated that they in practice always remember the position of their voters and their responsibility to them. In solving state-wide problems, external "local pressure" on the deputy may play a negative role. However, the predominant orientation of the deputies toward the content of issues being discussed (86 percent) acts as a more significant factor for them and, if necessary, is capable of neutralizing the "superfluous" influence of voters. On the whole, the survey results show that the deputies feel fairly independent when voting.

During the proceedings of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, a re-interpretation of the role of new institutions for representative power is occurring in the solution of the country's pressing problems. Is their work successful or not? Of those surveyed, 41 percent rated the work of the Congress of People's Deputies positively, of the USSR Supreme Soviet—73 percent, and of the Council of Ministers—34 percent.

In the deputies' opinion, there is an obvious imbalance in power functions between the legislative and executive bodies. Only 8 percent believe that the functions of legislative and executive power are balanced properly. In the opinion of 48 percent of those surveyed, the government's actual power exceeds the volume of authorities, granted to it by the legislators. Along with this, 29 percent remarked that legislators too actively interfere in the current activity of the government. Regardless of the critical assessment of its activity (48 percent were basically not satisfied), the deputies expressed trust in the government, having voted for its suggested program to improve the economy. Most of them (61 percent) expressed a readiness to share responsibility with the government for implementation of this program.

USSR People's Deputies consider strengthening the role of the soviets the most important direction for improving the political system of Soviet society: 69 percent of those surveyed indicated this. In second place in terms of significance, the deputies raised the problem of demarcating the functions of party and state bodies. In addition to this, the rates of such demarcation lag behind the expectations of USSR people's deputies: 67 percent think that the process is too slow, and only 17

percent maintain the opinion that is developing normally, according to the needs of society.

The fact that only one-fourth of those surveyed supported the development of a multi-party system and an even small number of deputies (16 percent) relate the improvement of the political system to the activity of independent associations of citizens, calls attention to itself.

Furthermore, the aspiration toward greater influence of the people on the process of developing and making political decisions is characteristic of the deputies. The referendum is the most effective method for implementing the potential collective reason of the people, in the opinion of most of those surveyed (53 percent). In this regard, many deputies (63 percent) think that it will be necessary to resort to a referendum in the near future.

Yet another question for the deputies: "What, in your opinion, may lead to the dangerous destabilization of the situation in the country?"

The answers were:

|  |    |
|--|----|
| —International Conflicts                             | 65 |
| —Increased Economic Difficulties                     | 58 |
| —Growth in Crime                                     | 35 |
| —Mass Strikes  | 31 |
| —Increased Scarcity of Goods                         | 27 |
| —Increasing Economic Inequality Among the Population | 21 |
| —Strong Republics, Weak Center                       | 5  |
| —Foreign Political Factors                           | 3  |

Understandably, the efforts of USSR people's deputies alone are not enough to prevent destabilizing development. Political interaction with various institutions of power and society is necessary. Participants in the 1st Congress were asked: Whose help do you count on in your deputy work? Their prediction then, as can be seen from the table below, was in many ways confirmed during the survey held during the 2nd Congress. The following picture was revealed:

| On the Part Of                       | Assistance |        | Opposition |        |
|--------------------------------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|
|                                      | Expected   | Result | Expected   | Result |
| —Voters                              | 54         | 52     | 1          | 1      |
| —Local Soviets of People's Deputies  | 36         | 30     | 3          | 10     |
| —Local Party Committees              | 33         | 33     | 8          | 15     |
| —Local Economic Agencies             | 22         | 24     | 5          | 12     |
| —Local Law Enforcement Agencies      | 21         | 21     | 3          | 6      |
| —Local Press, Radio and Television   | 49         | 52     | 2          | 10     |
| —Independent Association of Citizens | 21         | 30     | 7          | 9      |
| —Your Own Labor Collectives          | 40         | 66     | 1          | 2      |

Expectations of support from one's voters and from the local mass information media were justified. Yet, the deputies clearly underestimated the assistance from their own labor collectives.

In a number of cases, the deputies encountered a restrained attitude on the part of local bodies of power. Only one in five received the necessary assistance from law enforcement agencies and one in three—from party committees. Probably, it is still too early to speak of political partnership between the deputies and local authorities. However, there are also no grounds for claims of a sharp political struggle between them. Although the USSR people's deputies expected somewhat less local opposition, on the whole the amounts of assistance that they received noticeably exceeded the amount of opposition.

In their current activity, the deputies were helped by independent organizations and associations to a greater extent, than supposed. Today, the level of their partnership is entirely comparable to the level of cooperation with local authorities and is characterized by a tendency to increase.

Taking into account the complex relations between some deputies and local authorities, we can assume a sharp struggle in the upcoming campaign for elections to republic and local soviets, since most deputies are disposed toward active participation in these elections. Nine percent of the deputies intend to receive a second deputy mandate, and 56 percent plan to support the pre-election campaigns of like-minded candidates. Twenty-eight percent of deputies want to participate in monitoring the observation of the Law on Elections; deputies from territorial (34 percent), national-territorial districts (32 percent), and from the CPSU (35 percent) are especially inclined to do this.

These are the basic results of the instant surveys of participants in the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The documents were prepared and presented to the journal's editorial office by a research collective of sociologists consisting of: V. Varakin, M. Gnevasheva, A. Grigoryev, V. Gubernatorov, L. Zenkova, L. Kitayev-Smyk, I. Kazakov, A. Nikitin, A. Sukharev, O. Tkachenko, and S. Tumanov, headed by N. Betaneli, V. Lapayeva and V. Lukin. COPY-RIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## RENOVATION OF SOCIETY— RENOVATION OF THE PARTY

### Electoral Struggle and Political Technologies

905B0016F Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2,  
Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 47-52

[Article by D. Vydrin, candidate of philosophical sciences, Kiev; continued publication of debate materials (see KOMMUNIST Nos 12-18, 1989; No 1, 1990)]

[Text] Today there is no simpler or easier way of becoming popular with the voters than that of criticizing, scouring and "debunking" apparatchiks of various ilk.

This method, which appeared, on the one hand, on the crest of a wave of just discontent with the command-administrative distortions of socialism, is characterized, on the other hand, with that which, in my view, one could describe as the "street peddler syndrome," which is a mixture of aggressiveness and abstractness. Shout to a street peddler that a criminal is being taken away and the peddler would immediately shout so loudly as to paralyze all analytical capabilities: "Criminal!" However, the peddler would not even think of the fact that a person could be arrested for robbery but also for defending the peddler's freedom. Today, in my view, such a "syndrome" is affecting many people who share popular assertions such as "all apparatchiks have always been nothing but bureaucrats and spongers," or the old incantation to the effect that allegedly the leading officials are "the best among the best," and the "bearers of the loftiest practical and human qualities."

To underestimate this sickness today is very dangerous although, we must point out that any, even excessive summations, false abstractions and myths do not appear from scratch. That is what makes so important an objective interpretation of recent errors and blunders which led to the fact that in the course of the electoral campaign the negative stereotype of "apparatchik" frequently not only was not surmounted, although it was precisely the electoral campaign situation that provided the necessary opportunities to this effect, but was even worsened by the efforts of the party and soviet personnel themselves.

As to the fact that mistakes were made, however much one may wish it, it would be difficult to doubt it. Occasionally the crazy idea would come to mind, probably not only in my case alone, that some professional political workers on different levels, people whom we saw "in action," in the thick of electoral meetings, encounters and debates, had set themselves the task of bringing down their campaigning managers or colleagues and, at the same time, to damage the reputation of their own establishments. There is an ironical but essentially, quite profound statement that any complex problem may have its simple and entirely clear yet... wrong solution. Unfortunately, in the course of the elections for USSR People's Deputies, last spring, we could notice frequently the way some apparatchiks acted fully in accordance with this principle. In particular, here and there the simplest and worst possible solution was applied: literally to duplicate in meeting the electorate the actions of the loudest and most tempestuous opponents among the members of informal organizations. The former shouted most loudly "shame!" while the others shouted "down!" The former shouted "bureaucrats!" and the latter, "extremists!" There was booing, trampling feet, "manhandling," and preventing "outsider" speakers from speaking, on both parts.

The behavior of the second side seemed all the more strange remembering that its representatives controlled the posters with lofty party appeals and were wearing

those same strict identical clothes on the basis of which one could faultlessly identify the personnel of the respective establishments.

It was not only the clothing of the members of the support group and confidants of the high officials, consisting of members of the apparat, that was traditional. In the final account, appearance is not the main thing, although if we get into the details of political activities, we should say that **image making**, which is a subsection of the professional political study of the laws governing the shaping and influence of the image of the political leader, as it influences the minds of the people, also indicates the importance of the appearance of a politician. Incidentally, this was demonstrated at the miners' meetings, held during the strikes, at which the expensive prim suits worn by some members of the apparat contrasted sharply with the worker's overalls.

Let us not look for excessive fine points: if someone cares for a specific style of clothing to fit the occasion, let this also be part of pluralism in fashion, so to say. The fact that the ideas contained in electoral programs, platforms, principles, positions and speeches should not be surrendered to the bureaucracy, is a different matter.

For example, if we compare the leaflets issued by the different candidates, one could identify in frequent cases, literally at a glance, where such leaflets originated: within establishments, initiative groups, clubs or associations. If in the latter case one would come across journalistic and propaganda expressions and if in the three sentences opening with "so-and-so is concerned...", "warns...", "dares...", the essence of the electoral program was expressed concisely, emotionally and intelligibly, and the views of opponents were commented upon with suitable irony, in the former case the picture was frequently different. In a number of cases it was a set of general views, emasculated slogans which were not marked by individuality, sincerity and independent thinking, such as "I fully support the line..." Such texts were also accompanied by the pictures of the campaigners taken, as a rule, by that same official photographer.

Naturally, the competition was more complex and the reasons for the defeat of some and the victories of other candidates were more profound. Even to list all the reasons is no simple matter. One characteristic of the political struggle, however, which was manifested during those elections and which, incidentally, was noted by our Russian political experts nearly 100 years ago, should be especially mentioned: initially, in politics the advantage belongs to the person who is less responsible and less finicky in the promises he makes to the voters. The truly responsible personnel, i.e., those who are responsible not only because of their official positions but also their character, find it hard to compete, in terms of external color and abundance of promises, with those whose economic, social and political imagination is totally unrestricted.

However, in my view this real problem is being exaggerated, particularly by some leaders who lost in the previous elections for people's deputies. Publicly and in official establishments (in the latter in particular) it was repeatedly claimed that, for example, some members of informal organizations won exclusively because, allegedly in contrast to considered and realistic programs of officials who were candidates, they promised inconceivable economic miracles, social benefits and political freedoms. It is claimed that the programs of the candidates-officials were imbued with a spirit of strict party and state discipline, which looked to many voters less attractive than the liberal anarchic platforms of the opponents. Well, such claims carry a portion of truth, but no more than that! We should not think of the voters as mindless and ready to follow the first person who comes across, for not all Soviet people suffer from the "street peddler's syndrome!"

It is rather a question of the fact that, referring to their responsibility related to the high political positions they hold, some "apparat" candidates did not make use of even one-tenth of the freedom of political and social initiatives which is now provided on the basis of the current party and state directives. In my view, they were unable to use even one-hundredth of the potential for political and social creativity which any professional politician should have used, based, incidentally, on professional political personnel (the apparat). However, social scientists who can help the most worthy members of political institutions and the party committees as well as, naturally, the other people involved in political life, are developing the type of campaign technologies which would be consistent with the interests of the voters and could be used by candidates for deputies who would like to eliminate the feature of the "apparatchik-bureaucrat" which has taken shape in the mind of some of the population.

### Components and Results

Political technology is a system of systematic actions aimed at achieving the necessary political result. It includes both means of achieving an immediate local result (tactical) as well as means of obtaining profound global results (strategic).

What determines the effectiveness and reliability of political technology? What is the foundation for its effectiveness and, respectively, the success of those who develop it? I believe that, above all, this applies to the **detailed scientific inventory taking and hierarchical classification of the gravest social problems of a given area**, and the manner, sequence and form in which they are refracted through the **interests and needs** of the population.

This stipulation may seem trivial. Unfortunately, it is not always observed, for any more or less experienced practical party leader usually believes that he is thoroughly familiar with the problems of his own "economy," that he can "sense them," that he has "cut his



teeth on them," etc. However, to "sense" and "know" are not synonymous at all. Many political experts begin their lectures in the VUZs with the simplest different examples of the essential differences between **opinion** in politics as a prerogative of common sense and **knowledge**, as a result of a scientific approach to the target. Unfortunately, this difference is by no means always realized by practical politicians, particularly in the local areas. For example, every manager on the city level knows that there are problems with housing, soap, etc. However, he is hardly capable of rating such problems by seriousness, not to mention classifying them by social group.

The point is that the political vision of reality is possible only through the lens of specific **political information**. Practical politicians love to repeat that "in politics any petty matter must assume a decisive significance." Although this is true, political information cannot be reduced to a thousand petty matters. It describes above all the actual situation and the expectations of the various social groups, on the basis of which one could judge of the trends of development of their interrelationships (the possibility of strengthening their alliances or the appearance of tension and hostility), and their relations with the state and various social institutions. That is why neither the "petty" fragmented information, which characterizes random facts of life, nor the "extremely big," broad information, which describes society and its areas as a whole, is political (or, more precisely, domestic political) information.

Not only trains can collide. Interests, expectations and objective living conditions and their reflection in the various social communities most frequently are places where political clashes originate. Information about the people's interests should not be fragmented or excessively broad but precisely such as to provide the opportunity not to ignore such collisions. For the time being, unfortunately one comes across a professional political worker on the local level who has specific political information about his own area. With a certain averaged sociopolitical data, few such officials could describe the size of the "consumer basket" by social (ethnic) stratum, figures on the life span and infant mortality among managers and workers, availability of housing of, shall we say, apparat personnel and the technical intelligentsia, or the number of party and nonparty members....

It is a question of possessing the most necessary knowledge in politics. A more refined political information such as, for example, one dealing with the attitude toward various aspects of perestroika on the part of the individual social groups, the extent of their aspiration and readiness for self-management, and so on, are dealt with by single officials on the lower levels. With the availability of detailed information one could, in my view, prevent the aggravation of some national problems and avoid strikes. The lack of such information is usually explained by practical politicians as "involvement with current affairs," and insufficient time and means for

gathering it. The study of "current affairs," as a phenomenon of political work, indicates that such work is frequently the result not of objective circumstances or the "ill will" of the superior leadership but basic inability to select incoming data and unwillingness or fear to block the channels through which the party committees receive a variety of useless information which clogs information systems and hinder analytical activities. For example, information "about everything," including the personal life of party members, creates the temptation to order individuals about instead of dealing with politics, which means managing social relations.

The next prerequisite for the development of efficient political technologies is **the identification and gradation of views and demands of the voters concerning the qualities of the future elected official**, to which they link the possibility for the implementation of their interests. Here as well the common sense of the party worker, unfortunately, frequently does not work: in last spring's elections some even quite experienced politicians unsuccessfully tried to guess what would impress the voters, more in terms of the biography of candidates for deputies. For example, the questionable hypothesis was raised to the effect that the voters value more than anything else the political experience of the candidate and, accordingly, the emphasis was put on depicting the type of institutions and the length of time the specific candidate for deputy had worked.

Meanwhile, the most basic sociological studies could indicate (if made) that the voters would prefer to vote for candidates not exclusively enriched (or burdened?) with past experience and even not simply competent in political matters but, above all, for people who are sincere, approachable and daring. In a word, the working people would vote on the basis of the fact that today certain moral qualities are sometimes more important in politics than professional training, for it is precisely they that lay the foundation on which one could base a law-governed socialist state.

However, many, including some experienced apparat personnel, were unable to perceive such a frame of mind and did not correspondingly amend their electoral political strategy and tactics. They failed to notice them not because of the lack of special services engaged in the study of public opinion, although some complex surveys, in my view, were not necessary, but because the apparat in many areas merely translated the views "downwards" rather than acted as a storage battery and a spokesman for the public opinion of the voters.

The real political struggle demands of the party committees, their full-time personnel in particular, knowledge and skillful use of the specific **laws of electoral campaigning**. As we know, no more than a few years ago, phenomena and concepts such as "election engineering" or "election tactics" were considered exclusive attributes of bourgeois politics and categories used in Western political studies, and the possibility itself of their use under socialist conditions was rejected out of hand.

Today we are dealing with the opposite extreme: some political science theoreticians are trying mechanically to duplicate foreign methods for assessing and estimating electoral situations and "arming" with them our practical politicians.

The point, however, is that under the conditions currently prevailing in our country, in all likelihood there are other laws in operation compared to those of the developed bourgeois countries which, as a rule, have profound democratic traditions. For example, many foreign political experts believe that it suffices to take into consideration the following basic factors in order accurately to predict electoral results: socioeconomic conditions in the electoral district, level of political standard, nature of political traditions among the various social groups in the district, characteristics of the political structure within the area and activeness of sociopolitical organizations and associations. In frequent cases the influence of all the factors on voting results are not studied on each separate occasion, for their stable correlations have been determined. For example, very stable ties exist between the social structure of electoral districts and voting results: in the FRG the correlation between the percentage of blue collar workers among the voters and the number of votes cast for the German Social Democratic Party is 0.99, i.e., it is almost a direct correlation.

Under our circumstances, we are only beginning the study of such interconnections between political theoreticians and practical workers. The last elections for USSR People's Deputies presented a large number of professional guesses. Thus, for the time being it is difficult to explain why cases of two neighboring rayons, identical in terms of all the groups of basic factors indicated above and voting for the same candidate, had different indices of localization (i.e., the correlation between the share of votes cast in the rayon and the number of votes throughout the district) by a factor of 16 or more, according to our computations.

Finally, **political marketing** is a necessary element of electoral campaigning. The paradox is that of late there has been a great deal of talk in our country about marketing in economic life, although it is precisely here, in my view, that the concept is premature, for the first prerequisite is, as we know, a surplus of supply over demand. Politics is probably the only area of activities of our society in which already now supply (the number of candidates) exceeds demand (deputy mandates) yet it is precisely here that efforts are made to avoid the use of this term.

What does political marketing mean? It is by no means agitation with its, as a rule, energetic but unsystematic influence through identical means applied among different social strata and groups. Nor is it advertising, which presumes a certain embellishment of the practical and moral qualities of the candidates. Political marketing means, above all, a knowledgeable, purposeful and accurate presentation to the various social and

ethnic groups of voters the actual qualities and merits of the candidate for deputy in which they are particularly interested.

The elections of the spring of 1989 clearly indicated that the various groups of voters have specific reactions even to forms of electoral agitation: leaflets or face-to-face meetings with candidates, and radio or television speeches. Thus, university students are particularly interested in leaflets while the retired are impressed by receiving personal mail from the candidate; almost all are identically impressed by the "television hypnosis." We know of a case in which a single speech on television in support of a candidate substantially changed his rating and enabled him to outstrip his rival who, judging by the sociological sampling, had previously enjoyed significantly greater popularity among the voters. In short, using specialized methods, one could and should project not only what to say and who to say it to (naturally, within the limits of one's own convictions) but also the nature of the ways and means of informing the voters about the electoral platform of the candidate for deputy.

#### Strengthening the Platforms

The study of several dozen electoral platforms of candidates of different social status, educational level, place of residence, and so on, indicates that in this area so far intuition, randomness and opinions prevail instead of knowledge, system and method. For example, the basic common shortcoming of many candidates supported by informal associations is the negativism of their political platforms, which prevails over a constructive analysis of the situation. Some candidates for deputy mandates structure their speeches almost exclusively on the basis of accusations and scourging of the "enemies" of perestroika among whom they include, based on the moods of the individual groups of voters, virtually all ethnic, social and professional groups. In my view, it is precisely such "platforms" that should be countered above all through constructive, humanistic and scientific and politically tested platforms supported by candidates nominated by the local party organizations. However, as both practical experience and theoretical analysis have indicated, for the time being few platforms submitted by such candidates have been consistent with these requirements.

Which are the most important among the many principles governing the formulation of political platforms? The alpha and omega of a "strong" platform, which can withstand competition, is the principal, the clearly formulated **target** which can rally the interests of the population and ensure support of a candidate on the part of various social groups and social associations. In speaking of the role of target-setting in politics, it would be useful to remember an old aphorism: "If one does not know the end objective one cannot decide; without deciding, one cannot be firm; without being firm, one cannot be calm." Could it be that, indeed, fussiness in

political actions, which is occasionally noticed to this day, has to do precisely with an unclear vision of basic political objectives?

A typical error in political activities is substituting means of attaining an objective for the objective itself. This has frequently been the case throughout our history and, as in the past, such "history" is being projected on the local level. For example, an "abundance" of milk is proclaimed as the target; however, no one knows whether splashes of this milk could reach the consumer baskets of the population in the area. If we have seriously undertaken to achieve fundamental objectives of our society, such as the well-being of the people, culture, freedom, safety, and so on, it is precisely such matters that must be reflected in the platform. They must be given a gradual schedule, and concretized in accordance with the local economic, social, political, ethnic, ecological and other conditions. As we know, V.I. Lenin said that what sickens people most are political generalities.

A necessary prerequisite for a reliable platform is the **concreteness** of the description of the mechanisms to be applied in reaching set targets. For example, if we speak of the absolute power of the soviets as the basic mechanism for achieving and ensuring civil rights and individual freedoms, we must indicate precisely the type of power (the ways and means of implementation of power relations are numerous) and the extent to which they must be available to the Soviet authorities on different levels, their hierarchy, etc. Today it is not possible to do without new models of interaction between party and soviet agencies or without defining the targets and methods of party activities. The specific nature of national and local conditions, the problems of local self-administration in particular, could, naturally, be dissolved within an extremely general slogan "for democratization." However, what the voters would like to know above all is how are **their** problems viewed by the local party authority and political headquarters and how the latter understand the depth and boundaries of economic autonomy and self-management in their specific economic, ethnic and social regional relationships.

In the formulation and elaboration of a political platform, it is necessary to take into consideration the rule which exists in politics according to which the significance and role of the professional politician, as the author of a socially significant idea, decline as this idea is accepted and somehow absorbed by the masses.

Clearly, that is why many of the electoral platforms of the local party organizations, saturated with accurate but by now trivial concepts, frequently fail to attract the attention of the voters. This is understandable, for politics is not history: it lives in the present and not in the past. In this case past merits are "accepted for information purposes only," while the voters vote for those who are demonstrating today their ability to ensure the further development of political ideas and social creativity.

An electoral political platform is strong also with its **motivations**. In other words, familiarity with it should provide a clear answer, in as much as this is possible, to every person: what advantages and what economic, social, democratic and spiritual goods will benefit his family and his collective and himself personally, if the views expressed in the platform are successfully acted upon.

Naturally, **the language of the political platform** must also be clear, understandable, precise and vivid. We must not forget that the history of politics is familiar with cases in which the reputation of major personalities has been severely damaged by a single wrongly chosen word in their political program. In our country, unfortunately, many political platforms in the local areas occasionally appear like pale copies of general party documents, which have little in common with the interests of the specific voters of a given area and, consequently, are viewed by them as political blather.

Is the contemporary party apparatus, particularly the primary one, the provincial apparatus, with its "political genetic stock" which developed in the pre-perestroika periods in our history, able efficiently to solve the problems which are facing the party and society? Is it able, specifically, to participate in the electoral struggle on a highly professional basis?

The best answers to such questions are, naturally, the examples of the creative work done by local party committees. Such examples exist. In particular, in the course of the already mentioned spring elections of last year, I was able to study the work of a group of associates in one of the provincial gorkoms of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Thanks to the efforts of the initiators, who were not only guided by instructions but had thoroughly studied, down to petty matters, the interests and expectations of the voters and the practical experience of the local political clubs and autonomous associations, they formulated what, in my view, were theoretically correct and practically attainable strategy and tactics of the electoral struggle; they had formulated a "target tree" and developed ways and means of electoral campaigning. It was worth noting that the apparatchiks provided comprehensive intellectual and organizational support not to the candidate who had been named by superiors but to a "non-nomenclature" candidate, a party member who was respected in the city. Their view was shared by the majority of voters.

Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that for the time being the local party committees must surmount an inadmissibly large number of objective obstacles on their way to waging an efficient political and, in particular, electoral campaigning. One of their main difficulties is the pace at which the functions of the local party committee change. In the majority of cases, as in the past, it is viewed and used by the superior authorities essentially as an organized mechanism for transmitting the views and instructions of superior authorities and individuals. Under those circumstances, many political

experts and party workers assume, in my view justifiably, that the base party committees, particularly the primary ones, must radically change their functions. They must be not merely the transmission mechanism for passing on instructions from above but storage batteries and spokesmen for the moods, needs and expectations of the "lower strata," of the working people. Without this, without an extensive democratization of internal party life, not even the best planned political technologies or even the most impeccable political marketing and strong electoral political platforms would change the situation for the better. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Problems of Democratization. The Discussion Continues

905B0016G Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 52-54

[Commentary by A. Zrazhevskiy and I. Rysich, docents, CPSU History Department, Dnepropetrovsk Agricultural Institute, Dnepropetrovsk]

#### [Text] The Party Apparatus: View From Within

S. Kozlov: "...The criticism of the party apparatus, which has become widespread in recent years, blamed for its alleged omnipotence does not, in the majority of cases, have adequately substantive grounds." (KOMMUNIST No 14, 1989).

#### Not to Defend but to Redo

Let us immediately note that all the questions raised by the consultant to the Kaliningrad CPSU Obkom are not new. They are being extensively discussed by the mass information media from the theoretical and the practical viewpoints. According to our estimates, in 1989 KOMMUNIST alone published several articles on the activities of the party apparatus. Unlike what S. Kozlov claims in his article, we consider them both practical and useful. The effort to ignore this criticism leads to the idea that Kozlov's article is the result of a specific social instruction issued by that same apparatus.

Ignoring the historical reality of the development of the special role of the party apparatus, the author tries totally to ignore the methodology of the problem. In our view, however, it is hardly possible to enter into a discussion without a study of the reasons for the domination of the party by the party apparatus, for this approach appears nondialectical. The author cites to us the concept of the "party apparatus," borrowed from the 1987 "Party Building Dictionary," which was justifiably criticized in the party press for simplification and for distancing itself from today's realities. It would have been better if S. Kozlov had quoted the thoughts which Stalin expressed in this connection as early as 1920: "Comrades, those who actually run the country are not those who choose delegates.... No. The country is actually run by those who have control over the executive apparatuses..., who manage these apparatuses" ("Soch." [Works], vol 4, p 366). Today

the concept of "party apparatus" needs a new interpretation in terms of category, not to mention a practical updating of the work of the entire party apparatus and it should above all be a question of creating an entity of executive party authorities and their personnel new in terms of content and work principles. In his considerations, however, the author has taken a different path, for which reason he willy-nilly contradicts the conclusions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

If we consider the party apparatus from Kozlov's standpoint, the result is that it has no right to make independent decisions whatsoever. This may seem theoretically correct but then it is a question of the apparatus of a ruling party. In that sense, it cannot be separated from sociopolitical life or daily activities. Let us take as an example the party committee on the rayon level. Here most decisions are made by the elected authority—the raykom bureau. To begin with, however, it is the apparatus that drafts these resolutions. Second, the bureau consists mostly of representatives of that same apparatus: three raykom secretaries (in no single party committee has there ever been a classification into elected and appointed personnel. All of them are considered responsible apparatus workers), the head of the organizational department and, sometimes, the party commission chairman. These are ex officio bureau members. Let us add to them nomenclature personnel, such as the executive committee chairman, the secretary of the Komsomol raykom, and the chairman of the rayon people's control committee. "From the outside," if one could say so, members of the bureau are one or two economic managers and one or two workers (kolkhoz members). This is the situation everywhere. Understandably, all raykom resolutions are not only drafted but also adopted by the apparatus.

Therefore, Kozlov's opinion, to the effect that the apparatus has no right to make decisions is, in our view, very mistaken. Let us add to this that the elected authority (raykom members and candidate members) is frequently unaware of the resolutions which the bureau in fact adopts in its name. In the best of cases, it is informed of the fact at the next plenum, as a fait accompli.

Let us note that, in frequent cases, the author contradicts himself. Thus, he claims that "the role of the elected authorities had indeed been weakened in the recent past in some party organizations, as a result of which in a number of cases the apparatus was forced to assume the performance of some extraneous functions" (authors' emphasis). He writes this after assuring us that the apparatus allegedly has no right to make independent decisions. Where are logic and consistency here?

In his efforts to cite examples proving that many party members are unaware of the distinction between elected and apparatus personnel, the author voids many of his own conclusions, for it is precisely sociopolitical practice that is the yardstick in determining the category of "party apparatus." The prescription which the author suggests in

solving the problem is to speak out more frequently, both orally and in the press, about the mechanism and the principles which govern the shaping of party authorities. This seems naive, for it is necessary radically to change the very mechanism and the principles governing the work of elected and executive authorities.

In our view, this work should begin by staffing elective bodies on a broad democratic basis: based on recommendations of primary party organizations, as a result of talks, the study of platforms, mandatory consideration of the desire to work and, naturally, rejecting the already compromised practice of selecting candidates based on quotas of workers, employees, women, Komsomol members, etc.

As to the choice of members of the party committee apparatus, the opinion of the primary party organization must not consist of a formal agreement as has been the case so far, but constitute a decisive argument, for it is precisely the party organization that assumes responsibility for the political, practical and moral qualities of the recommended candidate. Furthermore, the party organization must assume obligations concerning the future of the party member should he be dismissed from the party committee apparatus. It is precisely this that will provide the necessary guarantees to the "apparatchiks," which are so strongly urged by S. Kozlov.

We believe that the author's conclusion to the effect that in frequent cases criticism of the apparatus suits the party leaders does not sound all that convincing. How could it be to their advantage if they are part of the same entity? Furthermore, the author himself points out their responsibility for the selection of apparatus cadres. At this point the weakness of his arguments becomes obvious. This can be explained perhaps by the great desire to defend himself and his colleagues at all cost. Today, however, the party apparatus needs not a defense but a restructuring of its forms and methods of work. In that sense helping it is truly necessary.

#### Excerpts From Letters

**N. Trunov**, chairman of the party commission at the Nadym CPSU Gorkom, Tyumen Oblast:

I fully share Comrade Kozlov's views on the need to strengthen the social guarantees given full-time party workers. I felt the practical need for this personally: after 14 years of work within the party apparatus and, naturally, having become disqualified as a lawyer, I was faced with a life which had absolutely no future.

My suggestion is the following: the superior party committee (obkom or central committee) should, after an official is no longer in party work, guarantee him free upgrading of his qualification in the skill which he had before his transfer to the apparatus. Skills can be upgraded by offering special courses for former party workers, sponsored by the party schools or national economy institutes.

**A. Ilin**, candidate of economic sciences, CPSU member, Voroshilovgrad:

For many years I have been employed in trade union and party work, full or part-time. I have always noticed the large number of departments in the raykoms, gorkoms and obkoms and the large number of people they employ, essentially engaged in gathering information on what is taking place at enterprises and farms and drawing up reports.

If the party committees are agencies of political leadership, they should act precisely as such. Therefore, I believe that they do not need departments dealing with industry, agriculture and transportation or employ instructors in these areas.

I believe that it is not always and everywhere necessary to have full-time personnel. One could use consultants and experts who have other jobs and are paid a fee for participation in party work. The numerical correlation between full-time workers and part-timers should be stipulated at party conferences on the basis of the financial possibilities of the given party organizations. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## SOCIAL PRIORITIES

### Aral Sea: Options

905B0016H Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 55-65

[Article by Andrey Vladimirovich Vasilyev and Maksim Iosifovich Krans, *KOMMUNIST* special correspondents]

[Text] Today the best way to admire the beauties of the Aral is from an airplane. It is unlikely that anyone would have any pleasure in walking or driving an all-terrain vehicle across the man-made desert which surrounds the sea in a tight ring. Quite suddenly the squares of cultivated fields are replaced by a brown steppe with reddish salt marshes. Then come the sand dunes. Visibility becomes poor, for over the former bottom of the Aral Sea floats a fine suspension of salt and sand. The pilot turns our AN toward the Amudarya. That is quite a river. Naturally, its waters cannot be described as high but at least the river is there. However, the closer we approach the Aral less grounds for optimism remain. The river becomes increasingly smaller and, finally, turns into a streak glistening in the sun. However, it falls short of the sea shore by dozens of kilometers. Only waves of sand are moved by the wind along the dried river bed.

"Is it possible that some of the water may be flowing under the sand?" asks Usnatdin Matkarimov, chairman of the Karakalpak Environmental Protection Committee, shouting above the roar of the engines. This is his first day on the job and his initial impressions are not the best. Rakhim Takhirov, his colleague from Khorezma

Oblast, sadly waves his arms. No scientific investigation is needed to realize that this year not too much water from the Amudarya has reached the Aral. Generally speaking, there are no reasons whatsoever to assume that in 1990, in accordance with the stipulations of Resolution No 1,110 of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, millions of cubic meters of water will flow into the increasingly shallow sea. Could a miracle happen? The oblast leadership, however, and the specialists with whom we talked, have long stopped believing in such miracles. Nor do they believe that the resolution itself will be implemented within the stipulated deadlines.

Although unquestionably passed from the best of motivations and the unquestionably lofty objectives, the resolution was drafted in the spirit of the "good" old traditions and the methods for its implementation are described in the all too familiar instructions: "intensify," "energize," "secure," "increase the role"... Like many other such documents, it is suggested that technocratic tasks be implemented with the help of technocratic methods. No clear concept binding together political, economic, social, demographic and ideological processes, such as they occur in this area, was offered. Above all, the sight of man becomes lost in the main thing—the energetic appeals and encouraging figures. This applies not to the abstract, the "average" person but the entirely specific person who lives here, in cities or villages, with his customs and traditions and specific oriental way and type of social relations.

Naturally, if the new hospitals, polyclinics and water mains are built as planned, they would make the life of the people somewhat easier. Something or other has already been accomplished, but all too little! There is a shortage of resources, construction materials and equipment. It is not only the fact that, considering the economic difficulties of the country, and the budget "hunger," the promised billions were not appropriated for this region. Even if they had been, they would have long sunk into the sand, for no mechanism for the comprehensive resolution of the situation prevailing in the basin of the Aral Sea was provided.

What is happening today in the Aral region? A great deal was written about the catastrophic ecological and socioeconomic situation of this area, particularly during the period of the fierce struggle between proponents and opponents of turning the Northern and Siberian rivers around. After the familiar resolutions were adopted, the concern of the public somewhat quieted down, as though their very proclamation had already solved all problems. Nonetheless, year after year the situation continues to worsen. Unfortunately, we do not have full data which would enable us to describe the entire picture. However, nor are such data available to the state authorities or scientific research institutes. Yet even the partial information which we were able to gather in the course of our assignment indicate that an extremely serious situation exists.

This is manifested above all in the intensifying threat to the health and very life of the Aral population. Many of our interlocutors clearly stated that this population is threatened with total extinction. Rakhim Takhirov, the chairman of the Khorezma Oblast State Environmental Protection Committee, believes that unless radical steps are taken, in some 10 years not a single person will be left here. In the recently held examination of the population in Karakalpakiya it was established that more than 70 percent of adults and over 80 percent of children suffer from one or several diseases. Approximately similar indicators were found in neighboring Tashauz and Kzyl-Orda Oblasts.

According to Madiyar Salayev, a physician and activist of the Uzbek Public Committee for Saving the Aral, 900 out of 1,000 new mothers in the Karakalpak ASSR suffer from anemia. For comparison's sake, let us point out that in Uzbekistan and in the country at large, the respective figures are 254 and 84. Obviously, a sick mother gives birth to a sick child. In the coastal areas of the autonomous republic one out of nine infants lives less than 1 year. Children die not only because of the water and air poisoned with defoliants and pesticides but also from drinking their mother's milk, particularly in the case of women working in the cotton fields. In Karakalpakiya 20 percent or even 25 percent of men called for military service are judged physically unfit. This is the result not only of diseases but also chronic malnutrition: in the majority of rural families flat cakes and tea are the basic food of the population.

In a period of 14 years, 36 major centers of disease outbreaks were recorded in Kzyl-Orda Oblast. Hepatitis, dysentery, allergies and anemia are the most widespread. We were told by Zulfiya Atadzhanova, head of a ward at the interrayon hospital in Shavat, that according to her observations as much as 97 percent of the population in some kolkhozes in Khorezma Oblast suffer from such diseases. One of the main reasons for this, in her view, is the low quality of drinking water, which has long stopped meeting any kind of health standards. Actually, the famous kok tea which one is offered is inevitably saline, as are the Coca Cola and the grapes grown locally. In the hotel you are immediately warned not to drink water from the tap. There are as much as 2 or 3 grams of salt per liter, not to mention a bouquet of other "additives." Yet, there was a time when they said here: do not insult the land by considering it infinite and do not pollute the water, believing that it is abundant."...

Therefore, morbidity is increasing and infant mortality is rising; the life span is shortening. Meanwhile, there is a catastrophic shortage of hospitals, polyclinics, maternity homes and outpatient clinics, and even physicians to staff the functioning medical establishments. However, such a difficult situation has developed in the Aral area not only in health care. Our feeling was that there is here a shortage of everything—schools, kindergartens, houses of culture, housing, jobs, prime necessity goods and water. The only thing that is not in short supply is human life; at least concern for it has never been

considered primary. The region has exhausted its possibilities in this type of development. Statistical indicators which were given to us on our request, broken down by oblast, show total stagnation of economic and social processes. In the past, as the Aral became shallower, the population living around the sea would move to other areas. Today there is nowhere else to go.

The dictionary defines the concept "syndrome" as a combination of symptoms with a common mechanism of appearance and characterizing a specific morbid condition of the body. Could one describe the critical situation which has developed around the Aral as a unique manifestation, an exceptional case? Hardly. A situation with similar symptoms of similar origin, may be noticed in Kalmykiya, West Siberia, Moldavia and other parts of the country. Here, at the banks of the Aral, it is simply that the diseases of our economy and social policies were manifested particularly sharply and have become chronic. Unless the "Aral syndrome" is not studied thoroughly, and unless the proper lessons are not drawn and an efficient mechanism for the struggle against such "hereditary" diseases formulated, such catastrophes will keep recurring but on an even broader scale....

"The experience of Chernobyl and Spitak proved our total lack of preparedness to deal with such situations. Nonetheless, the 'tangibility' of these two tragedies drew the attention of the country and made it necessary to harness forces and facilities to deal with the consequences," said Boris Porfiryev, candidate of economic sciences, and one of the few people in the Soviet Union specializing in the theory of management under emergency situations. "In the case of the Aral everything was treated differently. The catastrophe was of a "sliding" nature. That is perhaps the reason for which there was no such great interest on the part of society."

"It is a question of a catastrophe of a global scale," was the assessment of the situation given by Aleksey Retezum, doctor of geographic sciences. "It is not only a question of the fact that an entire sea is disappearing from the map of the earth, although this, in itself, is horrifying. The sandstorms triggered by such changes in the climate and the moving of millions of tons of salt and dust over huge distances could bring about unpredictable consequences. As in the past, however, we continue merely to register the worsening situation in the Aral area although it is high time to try to anticipate what is awaiting us in the immediate future and, on this basis, plan our actions."

Kuzhaniyaz Isentayev, deputy chairman of the Council for the Study of Production Forces of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, believes the following:

"The problem of the Aral area is both ecological and socioeconomic. Since we acknowledge that, given the present management methods, it cannot be resolved, this means that we need a new idea, a new concept. An extreme situation requires extraordinary measures...."

We extracted these statements from the minutes of a meeting which was held in the small Uzbek city of Shavat. It brought together sociologists, economists, demographers, geographers, legal experts, ecologists, and party and soviet managers from the three Union republics which border on the Aral, as well as experts from Moscow. It was sponsored by KOMMUNIST, the USSR Academy of Sciences and Uzbekistan. Both in terms of the proceedings and representation, the meetings of the Shavat group were unusual. This was a kind of "brainstorming." It is perhaps the very first time that specialists in such different fields had gathered to discuss the problem of the Aral area. Also unusual was the fact that, paradoxical though this might seem, despite the entire similarity of the situation in the neighboring oblasts, their leaderships had not met even a single time to formulate ways of resolving the crisis.

Meanwhile, no one doubted that a solution had to be found, urgently at that. All participants noted that the basin of the Aral had become an area of ecological catastrophe. Incidentally, that is precisely the way the situation in the area was assessed in the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which came out 1 month later, "On Urgent Measures for the Ecological Healing of the Country." It is true that the task set in this document is limited exclusively to reviving the Aral Sea. The concept and the suggestions formulated in Shavat included a basically different approach. The sea and the population along its banks could be saved only by changing the social and economic situation around the Aral. It was a question of granting a special status to this catastrophic area and to establishing a special socioeconomic zone within the oblasts which had suffered from the consequences of the ecological catastrophe.

It would be difficult to identify the specific authors of the idea. Possibly this is a question of collective creativity based on the objective realities of the area and the characteristics of its development. One could also say that this time the idea was not "prompted" by the center and that many of its elements took shape locally.

The idea is based on unifying the efforts of Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Kazakhstan to solve the vital problems of the Aral area. So far, they have tried to resolve the crisis only on the basis of their own forces. Each of the republics, in the hope of untangling the knot of problems, pulled its own string, thereby making the tangle even worse. The republics built their own canals and roads, sometimes parallel to each other, developing their own ecological problems which were not coordinated and interconnected at all, trying by all means, fair and foul, to obtain as much water as possible, totally unconcerned with their neighbors. This, on the one hand. On the other, the understanding matured and strengthened that they would be unable to deal alone with the rising catastrophe. It was above all this feeling that was developed in people who were familiar with the problems of this area not on the basis of notes and lengthy reports but by personal exposure to real life.

In the case of Khorezma Oblast this problem is lack of land and surplus manpower. Currently there is an average of 0.21 hectares per resident. Kazak Khalimbetov, oblast executive committee chairman, has estimated that in the next 10 years, taking into consideration population growth, this figure would drop to 0.16 hectares. In the neighboring Tashauz Oblast, which borders Turkmenia, there is a surplus of land and a shortage of people. That is why, as were told by Yuldash Khadzhiev, chairman of the Uzbekistan Kolkhoz in Khorezma, he considered it a real salvation when Radzhabay Rakhimberdiyev, chairman of the Tashauz Kolkhoz imeni Chkalov, agreed to lease him some land. Both farms benefited. Meanwhile, the republics have not yet reached the point of understanding the need for such horizontal cooperation which "violates" territorial boundaries.

"The strict interrepublic borders are obstructing the development of the area," said Amin Kalandarov, first secretary of Shavatskiy Raykom, Uzbek Communist Party, addressing the meeting. "Without them we could make a more efficient use of natural resources and, finally, eliminate unemployment. In our rayon alone almost 10 percent of the population are not engaged in public production. The opinion has long been accepted by our people that we must join forces."

"The peoples living on the shores of the Aral are historically related," noted Sabir Kamalov, member of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Presidium of the Karakalpak branch of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences. "Our past history does not include any fratricidal wars or bloody interethnic clashes. To this day Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Uzbeks and Turkmens easily find a common language. This gives us an even better reason to join efforts to cope with the common difficulty."

"Let me point out yet another important aspect of the problem which we must resolve," said Abdulla Safayev, doctor of economic sciences, in his address. "Today, when centrifugal trends have intensified throughout the country, three republics are suggesting here, around the Aral, an entirely different way of solving problems. They view the solution not as one of separation but of joining efforts."

However, what form should such a unification assume? In addition to borders, this process is hindered by centralized planning and the current system of financing and allocation of resources and the structure of relations with republic leading authorities and with the center. Above all, any effort at granting a separate status to the Aral area may be interpreted as a desire for separatism. That is precisely why the question of autonomy of the Aral region was not even discussed. Each of the oblasts will remain within its own republic. The zone would be given a special legal and socioeconomic status for a specific period of time, let us say 15 to 20 years. In other words, its existence will be based on the time needed to solve the regional problems.

Naturally, so far our country has had no experience in such a project. Nor is such experience available elsewhere else in the world, although someone mentioned that in the United States the practice exists of setting up a kind of "problem district." For example, if mosquitoes would appear in some area, its territory would be classified a "mosquito district." Its boundaries would delineate the specific "disaster area," regardless of the states in which the area is located. A temporary managing authority is set up, temporary taxes are levied, and all of this remains until the situation goes back to normal. In the opinion of most of the participants of the "brainstorming," the same principle should be adopted as a basis in managing the socioeconomic Aral zone.

"The concept of temporary law exists in international legal practices," Boris Porfiryev emphasized. "Such a law is passed in emergency situations, to deal with the consequences of natural disasters. If such a law is passed concerning the Aral, the zone would be given a clear legal status. Accordingly, new organizational structures would be created. The draft Law on Environmental Protection includes a stipulation concerning areas of ecological disaster, listing their emergency rights. We are suggesting that a special socioeconomic system be developed here, which would not only make it possible to solve environmental protection problems but would also contribute to the accelerated modernization of the area."

"As a jurist, I see no obstacle whatsoever to setting up such a zone, to the extent to which it could be considered a joint interrepublic project," noted Vladimir Andreyev, doctor of juridical sciences, and participant in the "brainstorming." "Nonetheless, if we wish to activate here essentially new socioeconomic mechanisms, which are still not functioning in the rest of the country, a special system of legislative acts should be adopted, even though temporary. They should include a wide range of problems: the creation of a coordinating center and defining its rights, including the right to appeal directly to the USSR Supreme Soviet and to international organizations, its interrelationship with the oblast soviets and the republic and central authorities, financing principles, a system of special facilities for the local enterprises and foreign capital, and population taxes. I would classify such problems into two groups. The first would include tasks of the transitional period and the second would deal with long-term problems. To us, legal experts, such a zone would enable us experimentally to develop here new legislative concepts which could subsequently be applied on a national scale."

We must point out that the idea of testing within a special socioeconomic zone of the most daring and innovative models was liked by many scientists and economic managers who had come to Shavat. It was precisely this item that triggered the greatest interest and the most heated arguments. It was a question of a radical structural reorganization of the regional economy, the extensive introduction of various forms of a market-oriented economy, the creation of joint enterprises, sources of financing, priority of tasks, and changes in the



way of life itself of the local population, mandatorily taking its interests into consideration.

Some questions led to other and by no means could all of them be answered on the spot. Gradually, however, in the course of the debates which went on even after the sessions were closed, the new concept was developed block by block. Initially outlined only in its general features and with obvious gaps, nonetheless the idea assumed a visible shape. However, as Aleksandr Arbatov, deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources, justifiably noted, it could become viable only if the area is granted economic autonomy and if the ways of its development are defined by the local population itself and not by the central and republic planning authorities.

We cannot claim that Arbatov's suggestion was unconditionally supported. Some participants in the meeting expressed justifiable fears that if the Aral area is "excluded" from the system of the Gosplan and the Gossnab, considering the conditions of centralized procurement with resources, it would be short-changed. A purely psychological factor operated as well: the habit of living according to the laws of the plan-distribution system, for which reason there were those who suggested half-measures such as, for example, reducing to the 70 percent level (and why not to the 60 or 50 percent level?) the state orders for cotton and allowing the balance to be sold freely. There were those who put great hope on republic cost accounting. However, others justifiably countered by saying that it is precisely in such a case that no funds would be obtained. Albert Ryvkin, from the USSR Academy of Sciences All-Union Scientific Research Systems Research Institute, noted that territorial cost accounting could have quite adverse consequences for the Aral area. It would be based on republic and by no means regional oblast interests, the more so since in order to correct the situation huge funds would be required.

Where would the money come from? This question kept arising in the course of the debates. A great variety of options were suggested, ranging from target financing out of the state budget to attracting foreign capital. It was obvious that under the present circumstances it would be utopian to particularly rely on obtaining more billions of rubles from the center. Although aid would be mandatory, the main reliance should be on mobilizing internal resources by modernizing and engaging in the structural reorganization of the entire regional economy.

"The Aral zone has two problems each one of which should have its respective sources and financing methods," said Ovsey Shkaratan, doctor of historical sciences. "The first and the main one is saving the lives and health of the people and, above all, of the growing generation. All available possibilities should be used to achieve this objective and no form of aid should be rejected. I am confident that here, in the area, the people are justly relying on a certain altruism, regardless of

whether they would receive aid from the Union budget, public organizations or foreign entrepreneurs and foundations. Organizing medical services, developing a system for supplying the population with drinking water and ecologically pure food products, building houses of rest and sanatoriums outside the zone threatening the health of the people, would not cost very much. However major funds would be required for a structural reorganization of the economy. At this point we must frankly say that our country is unable today to act as such a donor. Consequently, foreign investors must be attracted. This, however, will not be free aid, for such investors must be interested and they must be offered something in return...."

What could attract foreign businessmen to the Aral zone? Cotton? Unlikely, for its quality is low and the situation on the world cotton market is quite stressed. For example, the most advantageous contract concluded of late by the Shavat Cotton Ginning Mill, which we visited, was a deal with Japan to sell the cotton seed husks. Would foreign investors be interested in an agricultural sector? Well, there is something to think about here. The specific climate of this area would make it possible to grow many crops in demand. There also are useful minerals, particularly in Kzyl-Orda Oblast.

Tourism also has a good potential, for here some pearls of the Orient, such as Khiva and Kunya-Urgench, are located. Some time ago an effort was made to organize a joint tourist company with the Norwegians. Unfortunately, matters did not go beyond talks, for our partners were frightened by the need to develop, virtually from scratch, the entire infrastructure which would serve lovers of exotica. This failure, however, does not mean at all that we should not reconsider this project.

Nonetheless, the main wealth of this area is its manpower for which not always is there any use. As a rule, the young people here are secondary school graduates and have inherited labor traditions and, which is quite important, a great desire to work. That is why, as the participants in the "brainstorming session" noted, foreign investors should be oriented toward building in the Aral zone modern labor-intensive industries. To this effect, however, yet another condition must be met: the area must be granted the status of free economic zone, with low customs fees, advantageous taxation, a different foreign exchange system and substantially less governmental control over the activities of foreign companies and joint enterprises compared to the rest of the Soviet territory.

Such preferential conditions should be created also for Soviet production associations coming here from other republics, in order to interest them in opening their branches in the area, along with separate plants and factories. According to Kazak Khalimbetov the latter is preferable, for branches transfer most of their profits to their "masters." Industrialization would make it possible to find jobs for tens of thousands of unemployed and raise the living standard of the population.

Despite the great unanimity with which the people accepted the need for a structural reorganization of the economy, not a trace of such unanimity remained when the question of the direction it should take was raised. Such differences of opinion were quite similar to the roundtable sessions sponsored by the editors of our journal in Tashkent, where this basic problem triggered the most heated controversy (KOMMUNIST No 14, 1989). Some believed that all efforts should be concentrated on organizing a modern agriculture but of an industrial type, with the full cycle of processing, cotton above all. The thus established infrastructure would provide the necessary number of jobs. Others, referring to the examples of South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, insisted that this should be started with small enterprises operating on the basis of most advanced technology and producing goods competitive on the global market. Perhaps Aleksandr Krenke, doctor of geographic sciences, was right by supporting the "golden middle:" "The strategy should be a multipurpose one and be implemented through a variety of means."

Furthermore, according to the participants in the Shavat meeting, in order to take the area out of its depression scope should be provided for initiative and enterprise. Contemporary forms of economic management should be used, such as joint ownership, leasing, family contracting, individual labor activity and cooperatives. The destatification of ownership would create conditions for flexibly reacting to changes in market supply and demand. For the time being, the inflexibility of the governmental system for the purchasing of agricultural commodities, the numerous prohibitions and restrictions suppress all manifestations of independent thinking and enterprise. I recall a discussion we had with Zarip Ramatov, hero of socialist labor and chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Chkalov, Khorezma Oblast. In 1989 the farm harvested a record-setting melon crop but the virtually entire crop became spoiled.

The 19th volume of the publication "*Russia. Complete Geographic Description of our Fatherland*," edited by V.P. Semenov-Tyan-Shanskiy mentions that as early as the 9th century Khorezma melons were famous throughout the East. They were shipped to the palaces of khaliphs in special lead-lined containers filled with snow. The price of such melons was as high as 700 dirkhems which, at that time, was high. Characteristically, at the turn of our own century, this area had remained one of the main suppliers of melon crops. Let us set aside the fact that despite technical progress today, as a rule, 50 percent of the melons rot on the way and never reach their destination. Since ancient times in these areas the technology of dry-curing has been used. Today we still purchase in the stores dry-cured Vietnamese melons, if we are lucky. We have the raw material and we have the technology. What is lacking? What is lacking is enterprise and freedom of action, i.e., precisely that which setting up a special socioeconomic zone would provide.

Would the peasants grow cotton under new conditions of economic management? We posed this question to many kolkhoz chairmen. There were a variety of answers but, as a whole, the impression was that they would not like to abandon cotton entirely. Here the crops are high and the people are professionally oriented toward cotton growing. However, the general opinion was that cotton crops should be limited to 50 percent of the entire area in order to grow, on the thus released land, vegetables, fruits, grapes and, finally, practice the virtually forgotten crop rotation system. In recent years, when the consequences of a one-crop cultivation, pernicious to people and nature, became widely known, we took the excessively simplistic approach to the "cotton problem." This is probably what was done in its time with the corn which, immediately after Khrushchev was removed and uprooted even where it yielded splendid crops. What to sow and how much of it is a different matter which must be decided by the peasants themselves.

Meanwhile, despite the appeals to put an end to one-crop cultivation, everything remains unchanged. It is true that, in opening the meeting in Shavat, Rimadzhan Khudaybergenlova, first secretary of Khorezma Obkom, Uzbek Communist Party, gave the assurance that "of late we have reduced the amount of land in cotton and the offensive against a single crop cultivation is continuing." Nonetheless, cotton remains the "king of the fields." Our trip in the Aral area coincided with the peak of the cotton harvest. Why conceal it, as in the past, it resembled a battle and it was as though from frontline communiques that daily reports were published in the press and, with the same enthusiasm, the local leaders appeared on radio and television with the appeals familiar to many generations. Despite official prohibitions, meanwhile, children continued to work in the fields poisoned with defoliant. However, if a battle is being fought it means that there are not only victors but also casualties. We should not accuse exclusively the local leaders of this, for their actions are based on the current economic management conditions and the strictness of the state orders which have remained unchanged.

The "shop mentality" has sunk deeply in our consciousness! This does not apply to the Aral area alone. Vadim Tkach, candidate of economic sciences, bitterly spoke of the old tradition of considering our country as one single plant. Therefore, if it is a plant it should have shops: Astrakhan Oblast, vegetables; West Siberia, petroleum; the virgin lands, grain; Yamal, natural gas; Central Asia, cotton. Each one of them must ensure the independence of its sector so that the country could develop without fearing cyclical declines and crises which, allegedly, occur in the capitalist world only.

It was such a mentality of "besieged fortress" (as defined by A. Arbatov) that took us to total dislocation. Incidentally, we should not ascribe the idea of "cotton independence" to our system. As early as 1913, Prince V. Masalskiy wrote: "Considering... the tremendous importance of cotton growing not only for this area but for all

of Russia, the question naturally arises of further developing in Central Asia cotton production to such a level which would enable us to meet our needs with our own raw materials and thus be free from depending on North America." The suggestions formulated by Prince Masalskiy were implemented only under the Soviet system, but on a scale of which he could not even dream. The entire Central Asia became a huge cotton field. This "white gold" was almost evenly traded for orders and high titles. To the people, however, this turned into slave labor, poverty and disease.

Everywhere in Khorezma there is cotton. It penetrates urban residential districts, grows along roads, and the Shavat Party Raykom, where the meeting was held, seemed to be standing in the middle of a cotton field. Surrounding the traditional monuments to Lenin were not flowers but those same cotton shrubs. Cotton fields have become an inseparable part not only of the local landscape but also the way of life. Its rhythm is based not on the changes of seasons but the extent to which the cotton bolls are ripening. We repeatedly heard many managers say that cotton here feeds the people. Could it be that it merely allows them somehow to make ends meet? The average wage in that same Shavatskiy Rayon is 140 rubles but then the families average between five and 12 children!

We visited the Kolkhoz imeni XIX Partsyezd on a day of celebration. One of the brigades was the first to fulfill its plan and it was on this occasion that its members had gathered at the kolkhoz club. The people seemed ageless. Faces burned by the sun, tired to the point of indifference. Hired musicians were playing. The kolkhoz members, one after another, approached the chairman who was presenting gifts. Women were given kerchiefs and men were being presented with shirts which were sewed thousands of kilometers away, made out of that same cotton grown here with hellish efforts, for in order to pick 1 kilogram of raw cotton one must bend 300 times while the daily norm is 80 kilograms. This takes place several months running, from September to virtually December, initially under the burning sun and at the end, sometimes, also under falling snow.

The virtually entire cotton picking in Khorezma is manual. A quintal takes 30 to 35 man hours (compared with 1.8 for wheat). The neighboring oblasts have long converted to machine picking. Here the people are unable to afford this luxury, for losses are excessively high. In such a case it would be impossible to reach the planned figure, which is higher here than in Tashauz or, let us say, Karakalpakiya.

"We are being told that we must solve our problems by ourselves but the Gosplan continues to dictate," bitterly said Amin Kalandarov. "Gorbachev calls for independence but here what rules is the state order and the plan. As it is, we are not masters of our land."

During the "brainstorming" frequent suggestions were made to raise the price of cotton as though this would be

a universal medicine which would heal all the ills of the area. However, the economists who were present proved that without a price-setting reform such a step would only trigger a chain reaction of price increases for other products. Clearly, the question nonetheless is not whether to raise the price of cotton or leave it unchanged but the need to determine the real requirements of the country for cotton and its actual value, with the help of the market mechanism. At that point, providing that there is economic independence, naturally, the area would be able to determine by itself whether it finds growing such crops profitable.

It seemed to us that in the course of the debate on prices, the aspiration of some groups to keep in the Aral area the cotton structure of the economy was clearly manifested. Their economic and social interests are related to the growing of a single crop and are closely coordinated with those of the water resource managers, to whom reducing areas under cotton would mean losing their command positions in the area. To both the only possible way of development remains the extensive method, which presumes the use of ever new areas and the digging of more long canals. Therefore, the personnel of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources welcomed like a gift of destiny Resolution No 1,110, according to which those who had played an important role in bringing this kray to its present condition were instructed to rescue it. Once again the idea is being revived of turning around the Northern and Siberian rivers. The need to go back to this utopian project is once again being mentioned in republic central committees and academies of sciences. This topic was heard also in the "brainstorming."

"Despite the seemingly always present lack of moisture here, in recent decades the moisture has been excessively wasted, in the hope that the water which would come from the North would wash away the old sins," said Sergey Gubin, deputy chairman of the Council for the Coordination of Scientific Activities of Academy of Sciences of Union Republics under the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, one of the organizers of the Shavat meeting, expressing the view of the majority of the participants. "How could one seriously speak of this today, if everyone knows that the building of canals would require no less than 20 years and would cost much more than the amount requested by the Minvodkhoz?! Furthermore, would water come here at all? Would it not be taken away along the way, as is the case with the Amudarya and the Syrdarya? Meanwhile, what will happen to the Aral and the people living by its shores?"

Yet another major objection exists. The "water injection" would preserve the economic and social ills of the area. It would prevent abandoning the extensive development and would hinder the modernizing of the economy and of society itself. One must learn to live according to his means, consistent with available resources. It is precisely a structural reorganization that would make it possible to harness them. In turn, this presumes ending the rule of cotton and increasing areas under crops which require less moisture, use of the latest

irrigation and ginning technologies, differentiated payments for water, and abandoning unnecessary water reservoirs. Under the present circumstances of economic management only palliative steps are possible whereas the creation of a special socioeconomic zone would make it possible to put all such resources to use.

Incidentally, as the writer Pirmat Shermukhamedov, chairman of the Uzbek Public Committee for the Salvation of the Aral, pointed out, no one knows precisely what the water stocks are in the area. A study made by the activists in the movement indicated that official reports have simply "forgotten" to include many canals and water reservoirs. Abay Tursunov, head of the hydrological laboratory of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography and member of the Republic Committee for the Problems of the Aral and Balkhash, said it could be possible to supply the Aral Sea from internal reserves the necessary 30 cubic kilometers of water. It is difficult to believe that, feeling themselves the true masters of the land, the population of the Aral area would abandon this wealth and would prefer the Minvodkhoz projects which do not promise any tangible benefits to anyone other than their authors.

Although in the discussion of the new concept it seemed that the debate was occasionally drifting and becoming lost in specific problems, in fact the discussion dealt with interrelated problems, for the increased shallowness of the Aral, the single cotton crop and the structural reorganization of the economy affect, in the final account, the lives of millions of people. The tragedy of this sea is not the cause but, above all, the consequence of the difficult socioeconomic situation which has developed here. That is why it is a question less of how to deal with the ecological catastrophe than, to a greater extent, of eliminating the reasons which are causing it, and thereby preventing a recurrence of this situation; it was a question not of raising indicators but of comprehensive development, aimed at the transformation of society; not of plugging holes but of the possibility of making a quality leap in the development of the area and in the living standard of the local population.

"The key task of turning the Aral area into a socioeconomic zone with a special juridical status and a system of privileges involves including the "immune" mechanisms of self-organization and the self-recovery of the social organism," noted at the final session Anatoliy Vishnevskiy, doctor of economic sciences. "The zone would make it possible to create the necessary conditions for accelerated modernization. However, such changes must not be decreed from above but stem from within. In other words, the population, together with the present power structure, should develop a profound interest and need for such modernization."

Yes, mankind advances more successfully when it is motivated by public interest which it considered its own. Will this combination occur once again? Judging by the views expressed in the course of the Shavat meeting and

the reaction of scientists, of some leaders and representatives of public organizations in the republics, there are reasons to believe in such a possibility. Naturally, this concept will need serious work (which is currently being done by enthusiasts from several scientific organizations); comprehensive studies will have to be made of the processes occurring in the area; possibly, a white paper will have to be issued and a serious survey of public opinion in Central Asia and Kazakhstan will have to be taken. This would result in specific suggestions submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

It is not excluded that as a result of a strict domestic and international expert assessment, this idea may undergo substantial changes. This is natural, for its authors do not claim to possess the final truth. In any case, it would provide an impetus to the formulation of a general concept, which is so greatly needed today for this area. It will make it possible to rally the efforts of all interested parties, those who are not indifferent to the fate of the Aral and its population. However, this can be achieved only if man, in accordance with the new concept, is finally considered not a means but a target of development, and that a strong social policy is converted from a slogan into an instrument for change. At that point the prosperity of this area will be measured not in terms of the kilometers of canals laid and tons of cotton delivered to the state but of concepts which are so far considered secondary: health, sufficiency, dignity of man and his satisfaction with life. At that point the "Aral syndrome" will remain in history textbooks as an example of the terrible ecological and socioeconomic situation out of which mankind was nonetheless able to extricate itself.

Written in Urgench-Khiva-Shavat-Tashauz-Kunya-Urgench-Nukus-Muynak-Moscow. COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## SPIRITUAL LIFE OF SOCIETY

### The Artist and Authority

905B00161 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2,  
Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 66-75

[Article by Vadim Mikhaylovich Polevoy, USSR Academy of Fine Arts corresponding member, secretary of the board of the USSR Painters' Union, laureate of the USSR State Prize]

[Text] With this article by V.M. Polevoy we are initiating a discussion on a topic which is unlikely to leave indifferent the majority of our readers. It pertains to one of the "eternal" problems of political and spiritual-cultural life, i.e., the correlation between art and politics, between the artist and the authorities, creative individuality and the social control over creative work. Although we should not artificially broaden the area of such research, it would be hard not to notice that in this case it naturally shifts to

another plane, presuming the solution of the more general problems of the interconnection among art, artistic creativity and society.

The origins of this problem may be traced to the very origins of history. In any case, already in antiquity it had clearly assumed the aspect precisely of a philosophical problem and since that time has tirelessly excited the minds of artists and philosophers, of anyone who is not indifferent to the fate of the arts. In each social age this question was raised and solved in an original manner, becoming particularly relevant during periods of sharp social change.

Today life in our graphic arts is developing under the sign of renovation. It is consistent with the restructuring of the entire social organism of artistic culture, including art and the esthetic awareness of society, the creative activities and contacts between the arts and the public, the interconnection between the artists and the authorities and the question of the self-governing of art. In order to find our way in the present complex and dynamic situation, we must turn, above all, to the most essential statement on problems of artistic culture, included in the resolution of the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies. Let us cite, verbatim: "The USSR Congress of People's Deputies declares its support of the type of policy and practice in the area of culture which ensure the freedom of artistic creativity and grant unlimited access of the working people to the achievements of culture which enriches the spiritual world of man."

This was a noteworthy statement made at the congress! Nonetheless, one could question the realism of this comprehensive program for cultural activities as expressed in the declaration, for usually such programs have remained unattainable ideals, something like a universal panacea. What matters is something else: the congress' resolution proclaimed the freedom of creativity and asserted the principle of democratization of artistic culture directly, clearly, without equivocation or any stipulations related to circumstances and without the various types of clarifications which turn the concept of freedom into its opposite.

These are no joking matters. Thousands of years of practical experience have taught us that they demand the greatest possible caution. We must consider both the history and the present condition of artistic affairs. Let us not forget that from the very first days of the Soviet system the state apparatus firmly assumed control over artistic culture. The most important problems were resolved by the Sovnarkom and an extremely broad range of artistic problems were considered within the range of competence of the People's Commissariat of Education and a number of other governmental departments. Naturally, the soviets as well dealt with such matters. In particular, the Moscow and Petrograd soviets dedicated a great deal of efforts to them. However, the role of the soviets turned to be incomparably smaller than that of the central establishments. In the course of

time the influence of people's commissariats, committees and ministries became overwhelming, while, year after year, the self-governing authorities wasted away. It would be instructive to make a comparative study of the principles and experience in popular rule and the apparatus in the area of artistic culture. In this respect we are familiar with the clashes between the People's Commissariat of Education and the soviets. Obviously, we must clearly study all of this and not be hasty in drawing premature conclusions. For a long time, for better or for worse, the state apparatus exerted its power in artistic life. As to how the democratic system would behave remains as yet unclear. Will popular rule take a tangible hand in managing art and will it consider it possible to interfere in such affairs? Problems of the arts were not seriously discussed at the congress of people's deputies but the commissions and ministries held the financial affairs of the arts in their stranglehold.<sup>1</sup>

There are reasons to assume that a new interconnection between Art and Authority is developing today. Indeed, during the first years of the Soviet system the artist taught us how to equate art with the bayonet, with ferrous metallurgy, with plan indicators in directives. In turn, the authority persistently argued and seemed to have convinced everyone that the role of the arts would increase at a headlong pace in the course of the spiritual and material progress of society. Did this not lead to a weakening of the customary reciprocal liking between these two forces? Why could this happen? Was it not because art itself had created something unimaginable, something like the inopportune dissemination of sculptural forgeries or meaningless murals which clogged up our cities? Was it not because the powers that be overdid their management of art to such an extent that they distanced themselves from what they had done? Let us consider the analytical materials in the article "Two Legacies" published in KOMMUNIST (No 9, 1989). And let us recall yet another circumstance: there is a type of disease known as "managerial obligation," which is some kind of self-delusion in managerial activities. The entire myth is that allegedly without such activities art would perish and the people would plunge into darkness. That is why those who hold the leading positions judge and organize everything precisely in the light of such official obligation. Ignoring the question of competence, they become inspired by an imaginary necessity and undertake to correct the style in the arts and redo artistic tastes to their own liking. We do not have to look far for examples of victims of such self-delusion.

Therefore, today the question is not one of "managerial obligation" but is formulated much more broadly: defining the tasks, objectives and methods of managerial activities in the area of artistic culture as a whole and, above all, in artistic creativity; it is a question of trusting the artist, of esthetic taste and of the preferences of society. Unlike the ordinary governing directives and demagogic appeals, the congresses of people's deputies have displayed a new attitude toward artistic affairs. It is thus that popular rule displayed political tactfulness and

tried to abstain from interfering, from invading from the outside the complex inner processes governing the development of contemporary artistic culture. Spontaneously or purposefully it realizes that artistic creativity can be least of all subject to majority rule, as Lenin pointed out at the turn of the century (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 12, p 101), and that problems of artistic creativity and esthetic taste cannot be solved via the ballot box. It is obvious that no power, whether that of the majority over the minority or the dictatorship of an individual, can create art. It could help, it could assist its development or, conversely, hinder or even distort this process. No leadership and no support, instruction or wish can take the place of artistic creativity itself. Put otherwise, art can be created only by the forces of the individual and in accordance with the individual's nature, the development of which is an objective process. In brief, it is a question of autonomy in the nature and behavior of the arts, i.e., of art as such. In any case, let us not confuse this concept with that of "art for art's sake," for these are two different concepts.

It may appear as though nothing could be more self-evident than the fact that art exists precisely as art. Yet how many meanings have been assigned and how many objectives have been set and are being set for art in real life! Naturally, art has an infinity of meanings. We can even light-heartedly accept art as something specific and not recognize it as anything else. All the necessary reasons exist to provide different interpretations of the nature and properties of art. Thus, in innumerable dissertations on lower or higher levels, in thick or thin volumes, in long or short articles and reports, in various ways and from different viewpoints, art has been convincingly interpreted as a form of awareness, knowledge, reflection, construction, expression, need, implementation, intercourse, production, hedonism, etc., as a manifestation of ideology, sociology, political science, propaganda, party-mindedness, nationality, and so on and so forth. A long list of various works could be quoted. Unfortunately, such a list would include virtually no studies which would interpret art simply as such.

Essentially, we are facing the problem of the specific meaning and significance of art. Art is sovereign, in whatever category, even the loftiest, we may classify it. Unquestionably, art does not exist outside a world outlook. Try, for instance, to classify into categories—materialistic and idealistic—the forms and trends of Soviet art. Even the seemingly most clear and most tangible elementary conceptual division of our art and its masters into "believers" and "nonbelievers" would not yield any tangible results.<sup>2</sup> For instance, efforts to reduce philosophical materialism to artistic realism and to give it a consistent meaning would appear naive, to say the least. In general, what right do we have mandatorily to reduce artistic trends to philosophical doctrines? Unfortunately, to this day we have still not realized that philosophy should deal with philosophy and that its intention to regulate art (or politics, economics, and so on) cannot bring anything good. Actually, this is a separate topic which exceeds the limits of artistic problems.

Unquestionably, art does not exist outside a class ideology. Could its basic essence and purpose be reduced to such ideology? In a certain sense, they take place as a counterbalance to and stand above class ideology. The experience acquired in the shaping and development of Soviet artistic culture has proved that the concept of having a purely proletarian class ideological artistic culture revealed the unproductive nature, the falseness of this idea. "Pure" proletarian art proved to be fiction. As it frees itself from applied ideological affiliation, art assumes an independent significance in the activities of mankind. It took several decades before we could once again acknowledge the priority of universal human values over class interests and free art from the ideological imperative.

It is equally unquestionable that art does not exist outside of politics, regardless of the way it may behave—whether it is obedient or obstinate or whether it ignores politics. There have even been cases of degeneration of artistic creativity into political activities. Art itself is to be blamed for this: it can anticipate storms and outdistance a political directive. However, responsibility for the sovereignty and blossoming of art falls above all on art policy. It is precisely in such a case that policy comes in close contact with art. We recognize that so far we have not studied and interpreted the history of Soviet art policy. As a rule, we refer to the Leninist principles. The author of the present article does it too. However, has the time not come to determine what it is that we usually mean when we refer to Lenin's art policy? How accurate and precise are our concepts?

To begin with, do we not frequently consider as essential Leninist concepts the variety itself of views and opinions which are quoted by the authors of memoirs and stories about Lenin? We have at our disposal V.I. Lenin's Complete Collected Works. Are we right in this case to ascribe unquestionable significance to so-called canonized or apocryphal records by our witnesses? For example, should we not consider Klara Tsetkin personally responsible for the familiar text of her talk with Vladimir Ilich, for it is precisely she who compiled and published it? Incidentally, we know that for many long years we used a by no means ideal translation. Nonetheless, we ascribe to this text absolute significance as the Leninist formulation of Soviet art policy. Furthermore, we directly quote it as though these words were written by Vladimir Ilich himself. Let us recall his categorical remark: "...Never quote my speeches (their text is always poor and always inaccurately cited); you should quote only my **works**" (op. cit., vol 54, p 204). Is it not useful, in this connection, on the eve of the Leninist anniversary in 1990, to engage in inventory taking of the texts, records and interpretations, including those pertaining to art culture, and to cleanse Lenin's thoughts from gossips and legends?

Second, how accurate and convincing are our efforts to reconstruct Lenin's art policy and how should we assess them? Here as well we need a thorough critical study. The new ideas and vital experience which developed under the Soviet system and the planning notes and

excerpts from them are all a hypothetical basic historical-political material. In the course of time and in accordance with the new political situation art policy was shaped, playing a positive as well as a negative role in the history of our culture, and a rigid system developed. The result was the triple symbol of faith of art policy: party-mindedness, nationality and socialist realism, which began to operate like the statutes of an esthetic patrol service. In the same spirit artistic creativity was assigned political responsibility which, in general, is alien to the nature of art. Realism assumed the significance of a disciplinary political doctrine, something like an absolute formula: Soviet power plus realism. The question is, have we become free from such misinterpreted dogmatic schemes? Everything seems to indicate that we have not. We are as yet to surmount some esthetic anomalies....

Let us go back to considerations about art as such and turn to its functions. It is impossible to answer this question in its totality. Let us say the following: in a certain sense art is the servant of everyone; the only one who is not served by it is the one who does not hire it and use it for its purpose. For ages art has served the propagation of the faith. It embodies ideas originating outside art and gives them a sensory plastic shape. Philosophy frequently resorts to art to illustrate its doctrines and, in general, during periods when philosophy loses its ability to understand life, it prefers to romp in the gardens of the fine arts. Politics systematically turns to art as an instrument and visual aid. Morality as well loves to use art for its own purposes, for which reason it puts strict demands on art concerning the status of public morality, as though it is art and not public morality itself that is responsible. In some cases literature and the arts are held responsible for socioeconomic and other difficulties. Briefly, in this harsh world anything may happen to the helpless muses. Occasionally, however, art itself volunteers for extraneous functions and pretends to be science, faith or philosophy, triggering claims against itself, which could have been avoided entirely. Therefore, occasionally art pays for its excessive ambitions. By claiming that the purpose of beauty is to save the world, as though the world could be governed on the basis of esthetic laws, it finds itself in a stupid and ridiculous situation. One could indulge in such "outstanding ideal situations" only after the material prerequisites for normal life and for the continuation of the human species have been provided. Naturally, by no means are all human activities carried out on the basis of the laws of beauty. Vast areas have nothing to do with esthetics, and if they do they distort all concepts concerning the meaning and purpose of art.

Also very questionable are simplistic views on the purpose of art as a mandatory instrument in shaping a harmoniously perfect individual. Ideally, it is true that the individual must awaken the artist within himself and develop him. This is true with one most important caveat: by no means could every individual be an artist. It would be much more useful for some individuals to be

encouraged to develop as scientists, politicians and so on. The development of the artist requires a special talent without which the only result is the multiplication of other hacks and more graphomaniacs.

Therefore, the ideal objective of art is to provoke profound questions. One could say that this blindingly superb intent is so good as to ignore its implementation. However, speculative elaborations concerning the harmoniously perfect individual and the surrounding world lead to obvious esthetic equalization raised to its absolute, to its ideal level. In real practice, a symmetric order leads to equalization in "underculture." This develops with the help of institutions promoting esthetic upbringing and is disseminated with the clear assistance of popular communications media and, naturally, promotes averaged mass art.

Therefore, art has tremendous opportunities and its objectives are complex and varied. However, all of this can and must take place in accordance with the nature of art and its own dimension. Let us quote A.S. Pushkin on this subject: "You ask about the purpose? Here it is: the purpose of poetry is poetry...." In the final account, the ontological, the functional, the teleological properties of art lead to the conclusion of its independence and intrinsic value in social and personal life. One way or another, this problem will always remain. From this point of view it would be useful to look at the general history of the graphic arts. Major lessons are taught by periods when artistic activities are governed by the will of a despot and when the diktat of religious faith or any other dogma has led even to banning art, and when totalitarian regimes, whatever the system, have made a fool of both the artist and the public. However, there also are periods when art and artistic culture of society experience a particular upsurge in independence and autonomy. Without such sources they dry out and creativity cannot advance. I believe that we would not be wrong in classifying the our time as a vivid and vivifying outbreak of the liberation of creativity and the democratization of artistic culture.

Perestroika removed the mandatory taboos. The stylistic idols to which the orthodox prayed and anathematized their renegades have crumbled. Broad and daring creative initiative has been awakened in the atmosphere of glasnost. A multi-colored wave of artistic exhibits which, only recently, would have been incredible, has welled. The museums opened their restricted areas and presented us with the forbidden masterpieces of domestic art. We saw in art galleries the works of seemingly forever banned foreign artists. The living ties between art and the public are multiplying, involving within them ever new circles of creative forces and the mass public. The realization is developing today that struggle, confrontation and clashes are not consistent with the nature of art. Struggle, naturally, is inherent in the life of art as a form of social activity. However, it is waged not through artistic but through nonartistic means. No one can claim to be the owner of the artistic means of waging such a struggle. Through its own forces

art cannot suppress or eliminate any type of art. Each art offers its arguments without infringing on its neighbor. Endless possibilities for accomplishments in artistic culture, in terms of time and space, are opening for all the arts. They have no reason to share! The money and the support of the authorities are the nonartistic means of struggle applied precisely in such cases.

In artistic life today, as in other areas of social life, the principle of pluralism has earned recognition. Our contemporary artistic culture is becoming stratified into several levels and areas literally in front of our own eyes, regardless of how hard we tried in the past to conceal this circumstance for the sake of proclaiming the ideals of homogeneousness and universality. The standards of artistic tastes and interests of the different social groups within our society could be established only within some kind of ideological and esthetic test tube, or else the standards of "first rate" national artistic culture could be formulated in order mandatorily, if not coercively, to eliminate an imaginary "backwardness" (such as in classical ballet, opera, paintings and other arts). It is time, finally, to acknowledge the natural, and organic variety of levels and areas in the multinational artistic culture of our society, which would include an awareness of the reality and objective nature of both mass and highly developed culture, sublimated by a vanguard elitism.

Graphic art is developing in such a complex and dynamic environment. The traditional principles of socialist realism presumed a one-dimensional artistic process; in the course of perestroika it is assuming a multidimensional nature. In this sense our graphic art becomes part of the global artistic process, consistent with its numerous trends and establishing its own equally multiple trends. It could seem chaotic if we look at it from the viewpoint of ideological-artistic and organizational regulations. In fact, however, this is a truly free artistic creativity, which independently chooses its own styles, methods, ideas and forms. All of its trends are legitimate also in terms of organizational-material status. This must be taken into consideration as being an unquestionable reality. Under the new circumstances the typological divisions of graphic art as well must be defined on the basis of new characteristics.

It is possible to single out three basic trends in the arts today different in terms of dimensions and nature.

The purpose of the **streamlined array of professional creativity**, accepted by art experts and supported by state and strong public organizations. It is precisely this that defined the path taken by our graphic arts in their history. Within it a variety of stylistic biases developed; at one point the Painters' Union symbolized free artistry while the Academy of Fine Arts was the standard of some kind of esthetic law, etc. In the long run, however, former opposites come closer to each other and today all of these artistic forces have merged, in the final account, into a single body. Such art rejected officialdom. It is reviving its creative life, etc. What is most typical is that

the traditionally acknowledged professional creativity lost its monopoly rule in artistic culture. In a certain sense, it is losing the reciprocal interest between art and the public and frequently surrenders to others innovative quests. It is thus that two additional contemporary artistic forces are becoming consolidated.

The **powerful stream of populist art** has emerged on the surface of our artistic life. It consists of a number of past masters of the depiction of ordinary life, heart-clutching historical motifs and creators of bazaar kitsh. Populist art is accompanied by the trust of the mass audiences, similarity of widespread emotions, simplicity of sensations and, therefore, does not require any special esthetic experience. This art enjoys mass success measured in terms of the scale of sports events. Secretly, for example, painters in other styles occasionally experience a jealous indignation triggered by the success of populism. Let their consolation be the fact that the history of art quickly forgets about such art and art critics pay no attention to it.

Initially, the **small detachment of vanguard artists**, who presented their works at major exhibits in recent years, horrified art circles and the broad public. Indeed, for a number of decades we kept frightening ourselves with the nightmare of purposeless or purposeful vanguard works, ascribing to them all the abnormalities we could think of. Starting with the 1950s, the art of our vanguard artists became frozen in an icy climate like the frozen sounds of the horn blown by Baron Munchausen. Finally, of late, the suppressed sounds of vanguard art began to sound in full force and joined the multiple voices of contemporary art. Listening, we realized that it was precisely the opposite, that it was abnormal to deny its right to life along with the other trends in art. It is no accident that vanguard art proclaimed the active social form of painting, known as "social art," and contributed to a new upsurge in the field of political posters....

Perhaps we are talking about the equal rights of different artistic trends which developed within the multichanneled bed of our contemporary art.

In this case it is not a question of the nature of a given trend, whether it is major or minor, or the way it appears to us today, whether it is real or fictitious. Essentially it is a question of the fact that it is precisely in the totality of such trends that the topical problems of artistic culture as a whole must be solved. Let us cite here a number of general major problems in the presence of which problems of style, artistic trends, methods, and so on, seem like minor particulars.

One of the most pressing problems of artistic culture of the 20th century is that of art and nonart. What should be considered art or, conversely, not considered art? Naturally, this question could be asked concerning any other age: for example, did medieval man consider an icon a work of art or a manifestation of holiness; could we consider modern design as art or as scientific and



technical activity or else as a border area which combines the two principles? We could go on. The answer to this question is based not only on the nature of art. In order to acknowledge a phenomenon as art we need the balloting of public awareness. Therefore, the line which separates art from the reality surrounding it changes constantly. During crucial periods of sociocultural history such fluctuations become particularly shaky. Thus, vanguard art is always operating on the borderline, finding within it new subjects of artistic creativity not considered by traditional art. It formulates its own methods of artistic thinking and means of representation. In any case, it would be extremely equivocal to pass a final judgment as to what are the boundaries of contemporary art before this problem has been solved.

Furthermore, a protracted scandal developed in the area of 20th century art culture: art quarrels with beauty! Naturally, some of its areas preserve contacts with what was aesthetically beautiful: we also know that not only in our but also in previous ages art has been inhabited by disgusting considerations of corpses, murders, cruelties and torture. Many such spectacles have been preserved in the areas of religious and nonreligious art and a great number of various criminals, on horseback or on foot, have been inspiredly glorified by art for their base deeds! In our time as well art has had great success in this field. In the 20th century, however, something exceptional took place: the two trends catastrophically broke down. The joy of the senses, a feeling of the abundance of beauty, forms, colors, styles and attractive composition were all concentrated above all in the material environment, in the world of commodities. Art stopped being interested in beauty to the extent to which it concentrated on the main painful problems of human life and became imbued with the cruelty of the world. Compare an art exhibit with a store window. The first tortures the soul while the second (naturally, it is a question of store windows in the Western world) pleases the eyes. In those circumstances art promotes counteraesthetic ideas while the public, in turn, develop counteraesthetic antibodies in the course of constant exposures to anti-art environment in towns and other settlements.

It is true that today the essence is not found in "beauty" in the least. Contemporary art profoundly reflects the upheavals of the age not only in the sum total of its works but also in its condition, its self-awareness. This includes interruptions of progress and the crisis in artistic creativity. We see in the life of artistic characters not only that which has already occurred or is occurring but also that which could occur or, in general, will not become part of reality. In that case, in its own way art models a possible variant for the solution of vital problems. Are we able to uncode such models presented by art? Does the conflict between art and nonart include an esthetic model of the conflict between creative and destructive forces of reality? Should we not take a close look at the panorama of contemporary world art? Is contemporary art not discussing problems of the survival of mankind and the apocalyptic end of its history? Therefore, it is not

a question of a given style or trend in art. The main problems of life are interpreted by art in the entirety of creative freedom, integrity and reciprocity among its multichanneled processes.

However, the freedom of creativity, acquired in the course of perestroika, and the liberation of art from the petty supervision of directive-mandating authorities, and the acknowledgment of artistic dissidence and free thought do not entirely coincide with the process of democratization of artistic life. It is here that the material and organizational foundations of artistic activities are secured and many problems of such activities are indeed resolved by majority vote of customers and viewers. Briefly stated, perestroika in this environment is a multifaceted and multitiered process. It changes and partially recreates a structure of artistic life, developing its democratized forms. The main thing is that perestroika has formulated and strengthened in the core of artistic life the problem of the independence, the self-governing of art. In this sense we can consider that perestroika in artistic life has already taken place to a certain extent. It is for that reason, probably, that it is time to think of the tasks in the new, post-perestroika situation, for one should hardly consider perestroika a permanent process.

We shall not discuss in this article problems of the shaping of the new party and state organizational activities in the field of art.<sup>3</sup> Naturally, we could consider the positive and the negative experience in the work of the party authorities in the area of artistic life. However, we are hardly able to submit a prescription for improving the new policy in the arts. It is as yet to be shaped as an objective process which, for the time being, is behind reality and its requirements. One could also tangibly depict the great efforts in the area of state art policy as well as its failures which led to a decline in museum activities, in art education in the country, the wasted efforts on the monuments to Victory, etc.

Let us turn, nonetheless, to the problems of the self-governing of art and its individual and social activities. We know that the social voluntary creative organization of painters is a creative association. The role of the USSR Union of Painters is great and responsible. Without it it would be impossible to shape and develop our contemporary graphic art. The association is the supporter and defender of the painter who, as we know, does not receive a guaranteed wage or hold an official position. Nonetheless, in recent years major contradictions have ripened within the creative association.

First, let us not forget that the creative association was conceived as the original sin of the administrative system which duplicated the structure of official institutions. If the Painters' Union would perish, the reason would be above all the fact that it would suffocate from bureaucratic officialdom. It is already suffocating.

Second, the independence of artistic life triggers the mentality of corporate self-satisfaction. It is supported

by customs according to which the painters themselves set up their own art councils which accept commissions and which rate and pay for the work. Within such a closed circle the competitive principle disappears and the incentive for artistic creativity is lost. The average time-server blossoms in such an environment.

Third, as time passed, the USSR Painters' Union became the monopoly holder of artistic life, outside of which no one was allowed to engage in creative work. In recent years, however, the union found itself in an entirely new situation. The activities of informal organizations which appeared within it set up their own mechanism for exhibits and propaganda and for attracting local and foreign funds.

Faced with these and other new problems, surmounting the inertia of its static mass, the creative union undertook to somewhat democratize its self-management. The need arose to make a change in the directions along which the structure of the creative union was shaped—by shop, area, style, ethnic features and administrative-territorial divisions. The most profound problems appeared in the ideological-artistic area where a double understanding of the painters' union arose—on the one hand as a closed organization of like-minded people and, on the other, an organization which includes a variety of artistic trends, open to the free participation of a variety of creative groups and associations. It would be hardly sensible to try to solve this problem definitively. Usually, the answers to such questions appear in the course of life itself. However, a possible fruitful trend is already found in the new draft of the Statutes of the USSR Painters' Union, which were enacted at the 16 March 1989 All-Union Conference. These statutes will be subjected to other drafts and adopted at the next eighth Congress of USSR Painters. The Painters' Union rejected the old regulatory interpretations of artistic style and method and proclaimed the principles of freedom of artistic creativity. In this connection, the statutes stipulated the right to establish creative associations within the USSR Painters' Union.

In the new draft the view that the USSR Painters' Union is a federation of equal unions of painters in Union and autonomous republics, with their creative, organizational and financial-economic autonomy and with the right to have their own bylaws, is of substantial significance. Similar rights are granted to the unions in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Therefore, the Painters' Union formulates problems which are consistent with the democratic processes occurring in the public awareness of a multinational country. We must point out that the silent graphic art, having caught up now with the noisy types of artistic activities, formulated a number of problems of a national nature and of the internationalism of artistic life. In the course of the discussion of the legal independence of the national painters organizations and their economic autonomy, some delegations left the conference but returned for debates on such problems. In the final account, a reciprocal agreement among the various parties was reached. It would be

naive, however, to believe that the conclusions of such debates are definitive. The discussion goes on and is intensifying. In this connection, there is a discussion of the basic problem of whether the USSR Painters' Union is performing a managing or coordinating role.

New problems may be detected today concerning the correlation between the shop interests of painters in different fields, organized by section. In this case problems of the equality of the individual arts and their interconnection with the overall activities of the creative union arise, a union the purpose of which is to perform the role of social patron, acting in the new pluralistic situation.

Such is today's experience in the democratization of the USSR Painters' Union and in the area of securing creative freedom. Does this experience meet the needs of art and artistic culture as a whole, does it strengthen their right as creative individuals and does it embody trust in the painter? It can be said that at the present time the state of affairs is consistent with the new draft of the Statutes of the USSR Painters' Union. Let us put it this way: democracy and love of freedom must be such that no one should find it necessary to drop out of the USSR Painters' Union. The creative unity of painters within a creative association should be a prerequisite for the freedom of art and the democratization of artistic life. Who and to what extent could and should ensure and implement these ideas? This is above all a matter for the painters themselves to decide, but not only for them alone! The new democratic rule faced the problems of the arts at the congresses of USSR People's Deputies and, as we saw, it wisely avoided unnecessary admonitions. The congresses taught a lesson in art policy by taking a course to autonomy and self-management of our fine arts. What did they contribute that was advantageous to the legal and economic status of the arts? Was it new problems and conflicts between authorities and the artists? It is along these difficult roads that creativity and the artistic life in our country are being renovated.

#### Footnotes

1. What does this mean? Read the answer of A. Vasnetsov, chairman of the board of the USSR Painters' Union in *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI* (No 2, 1990): "Death. New taxes. A tenfold or higher increase in the rents for studios and other murderous financial-administrative actions on the part of the departments cannot be withstood by the painters. The people are already beginning to go to cooperatives. There is intensified commercialism and the young and the active are leaving for foreign countries...."

2. In order not to cast uncalled for aspersions on the reputations of a number of most deserving Soviet painters, let us refer to V.I. Lenin's suggestion of allowing religious communists to remain party members (see op. cit., vol 54, p 440). Particularly substantial are his views on the interrelationship between revolutionary

artistic creativity and idealistic outlook (see vol 19, pp 250-252; vol 47, p 143; vol 48, p 161).

3. As we know, usually three basic organizational forms of artistic life are considered: party, state and social. The few publications on such problems reflect the contemporary dynamics of these forms and the concepts about them. It is obvious that even in the latest publications (see the collection "*Perestroyka Obshchestvennogo Soznaniya i Kulturnaya Politika KPSS*" [Perestroyka in the Social Awareness and CPSU Cultural Policy]. Mysl, Moscow, 1989) in addition to new topical concepts, some views inevitably become obsolete. In this connection, contemporary experience is being constantly updated. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### MARGINAL NOTES

#### On Einstein's 'Stalinism,' Etc.

905B0016J Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 76-81

[Article by G. Gorelik, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the History of the Natural Sciences and Technology]

#### [Text]New Historical Law or Global Liberal Conspiracy

Based on the lessons of the development of physics, I.R. Shafarevich, the noted Soviet mathematician, proclaimed a new historical law which sheds light on the destinies of our country.<sup>1</sup> He detected in the European liberal intelligentsia, which believes in the progress of mankind, one of the main supports (or, if you wish, external props) of Stalinism. One could interpret Shafarevich also in the sense that Stalinism is considered a tool of liberalism, for they share a common "technocentrist" objective: "To convert nature and society into a single cosmic machine controlled out of a single center." According to Shafarevich, this objective would be considered by the liberal-Stalinists to justify all means. It was along the dirty road to this objective that progressive<sup>2</sup> liberals and Stalinists dragged into the mud another, a "cosmocentrist," plan for a social world system, a perfect model (if not the perfect model) of which is the civilization of the Russian countryside which has been developing in the course of millennia.

Actually, the main topic in Shafarevich's article applies less to the past than to the future. The essence of this basic (although not new) question is the following: How could (should) the structure of human civilization be organized when the limited nature of the earth's resources is becoming incompatible with the expansive industrial development characteristic of the new times. The features of this incompatibility have already been manifested in global ecological problems. However, the question itself is not new and could be found in the views expressed by Malthus in the 19th century.

Leaving this serious matter for later, let us turn to the "law" which Shafarevich has discovered existing at the tip of his pen.

In order to prove the existence of a global conspiracy by progressive liberals in support of Stalinism, he uses as tangible proof statements by dozens of "spiritual leaders of the Western world." He lets every one of them say a few sentences taken, naturally, not only out of historical context but also simply out of their own texts. An exception to this is Albert Einstein, whose letter to one I. Levin is quoted in full: from "Dear Sir" to "sincere respects."

Such an attention paid to this great physicist would give the reader reasons to consider him one of the central figures of said conspiracy and for us to concentrate precisely on Einstein's outlook and his attitude toward socialism as an idea and to Stalinist socialism.

The letter which Shafarevich cites was written by Einstein in answer to an appeal which Levin addressed to him to sign a protest on the subject of executions in the USSR following Kirov's assassination on 1 December. Einstein refused and advised Levin, in general, to drop this idea.

In order accurately to understand this situation and, even more so, to be able to judge it, one should know a few things about both Einstein and the year 1934 and, above all, about the letter which he answered with a refusal and in which it would be difficult to ignore the main argument: "It is vitally necessary to raise the loud Jewish voice against terror in Russia in order to make the protest against Nazi terror more effective."

Those who have first-hand knowledge of Einstein's world outlook clearly understand that such a connection, such moral politicking were profoundly alien to him. Although Einstein most warmly (and openly) sympathized with the victims of anti-Semitism, the Jewish people heard from him less admissions of love than harsh appeals to their feeling of dignity and snide remarks at cowards who shut their eyes. Taking up the defense of the persecuted, Einstein obeyed not the voice of the blood but that of the conscience. Yet, he was asked to "promote" worldwide sympathy for the victims of fascist anti-Semitism with the help of Jewish protest against bolshevik terror in Russia! He did not accept such deals.

However in order to clarify the actual situation, the moral purity of the great physicist alone does not suffice. An equally important role was played by Einstein's attitude toward socialism as an idea and toward Soviet Russia as an attempt at implementing this idea.

In the initial decades of the 20th century, the concepts of socialism as an essential implementation of the age-old dream of social justice dominated many of the best minds of Europe. Concepts of socialism differed greatly, ranging from semireligious and moral-ethical to "purely

scientific." Equally varied were the reasons which turned the minds of the liberal intelligentsia toward a society of social justice.

To combine all of these reasons within a technocentrist utopia would be, to say the least, a very daring hypothesis. The ideal of technocentrism, extracted by Shafarevich from a few Soviet texts of the 1920s, is quite unnoticeable in those accused of liberal Stalinism, such as Einstein, Bernard Shaw, and others.

The true reasons for sympathy for socialism among the intelligentsia in the first decades of the 20th century do not need the simple solving of a puzzle but serious historical research. One such reason is that starting with the second half of the 19th century the prestige of natural science rose sharply in the eyes of society and so did a certain "natural scientific" nature of the Marxist approach to socialism. The history of the first decades and, above all, the world war and the 1929 world depression also greatly contributed to a feeling that the radical transformation of society was inevitable. Naturally, little time is left for social thinking to a physicist who has totally dedicated his life to his own profession, and whose creative legacy does not include any theoretically expanded picture of the socialist structure of society. Such a picture is replaced rather by a few clearly sketched ideas.

#### Theoretical and Empirical Socialism

To Einstein, for example, socialism has a social-ethical purpose. It must surmount and outstrip the predatory phase of social development in which economic anarchy and unrestricted rivalry lead to the waste of human toil and to maiming the social self-awareness of the individual, reduced to egotism and hopeless loneliness. Such maiming of the individual is the worst evil of capitalism. The only way to eliminate this evil is to establish a socialist economy and an educational system oriented toward social objectives. Means of production must belong to society and be used on a planned basis. A planned economy, which coordinates production with the needs of society, would distribute work among all able-bodied people and would guarantee a living to all. In addition to developing the natural capabilities of the individual, the educational system would also try to develop within him a feeling of responsibility for his fellow citizens instead of glorifying power and success in our present society. However, Einstein emphasized, a planned economy does not as yet mean socialism, for it could be paralleled by the total enslavement of the individual.<sup>3</sup>

A person who grew up in the atmosphere of developed Stalinist socialism would find it difficult to distinguish between expressions such as "planned economy," "public property," "social need" and the customary "real socialist" meaning. However, this becomes necessary if one is to understand Einstein.

In order to understand Einstein's socialism it is also important to know that the great scientist assigned to

science a very modest social role. In his view, in itself science cannot originate social objectives or even instill them in individuals. This can be accomplished only by individuals with lofty ethical ideals.

Adding to this Einstein's disgust for violence and the herd instinct, one can easily imagine that his attitude toward the building of socialism in Soviet Russia was by no means one of unconditional support. While sympathizing with the bright aspirations of the Russian revolutionaries, he did not believe in the expediency of the method they had chosen, although he became one of the founders of the "Friends of the New Russia" Society. Considered as famous in Soviet Russia as in Europe, he was honored by being elected to the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1922. However, he did not assume the obligation of maintaining diplomatic discretion. In 1925 Einstein supported the publication of proof of the existence of the Solovetskiye camps. Here is what wrote about him in 1931 a journal which considered itself the central organ of scientific information in the USSR and whose editors included N.I. Bukharin, A.F. Ioffe, V.F. Kagan, N.K. Koltsov, G.M. Krzhizhanovskiy, S.F. Oldenburg, O.Yu. Shmidt and others: "...In October 1930 Mr. Albert Einstein, the great physicist, poor philosopher and no good politician..., expressed his political credo: 'My political ideal is democracy.... That is why I have always been a passionate opponent of the type of regimes which currently exist in Russia and Italy.' It was then that the professor signed a protest... to the execution by firing squad of 48 blackguards who, headed by refrigeration professor Ryazantsev... promoted hunger."<sup>4</sup>

In the 1934 letter as well, which Shafarevich quotes as proof, Einstein calls things by their proper name: he qualifies execution by firing squad without trial as a political assassination. However, Einstein refused to equate Soviet Russia with the tsarist regime, Nazi Germany and fascist Italy (as the protest drafted by I. Levin asked him to do). There were reasons for this, in addition to the immoral idea on which the protest was based. These four countries were quite different from each other. However unacceptable the political regime which had been established in Soviet Russia may have been to Einstein, he could not ignore the fundamental differences among these four different social structures. The USSR was building a planned economy which was a necessary, although according to Einstein insufficient, prerequisite for social justice. In this case one could see with the naked eye the link between the social and the personal, which was so precious to Einstein. The fact that the "armed" eye, could see into the socially silent depths something different, was another matter. Whose eyes were so equipped?!

Soviet society was not simply closed but uniquely impermeable. At that time, in 1935, Einstein's colleague, the noted scientist and sensibly thinking P.L. Kapitsa, after 13 years of civilized life in England, has been unceremoniously and rudely detained in his homeland, one could say put under house arrest and although reacting to his situation quite violently, nonetheless had faith in the

healthy nature and tremendous opportunities of Soviet society. Social life was so impenetrable that the Russian intelligentsia, engaged in creative work, did not notice the horrible catastrophe of the peasantry. Failure to notice the opaqueness itself was greatly helped by the public enthusiasm of creation, which was a reality, regardless of how it may have been praised and, subsequently, mocked or bemoaned. This reality is confirmed by the very name of the journal which published in 1989 this article by I.R. Shafarevich but which was born in 1925, when the author of this article was not even two years old.

When we speak of the natural-scientific intelligentsia of the 1920s and 1930s, added to the social opaqueness of Soviet society let us add the professional attitude toward empirical data. When a physicist is told that in a vessel with a gas a few molecules are showing greater velocity he does not immediately jump to the conclusion that the gas temperature is high but demands information on the average velocity of the molecules in the vessel. The convincingness of isolated facts depends on the overall situation and previous experience. To describe the execution without trial a political assassination is one thing, but to pass on this basis a sentence on society as a whole, without a trial, is something entirely different. Shafarevich writes that the attitude of the "liberals" toward the Soviet Union began to change after the case of the doctors, quite "heavily" insinuating (in other of his articles) the fact that this case affected almost exclusively stateless Russophobes or, as they were known then, cosmopolites. However, this case could be considered differently: as the first official acknowledgment by the state of the criminal nature of its justice. Such an isolated fact assumes an entirely different importance, sufficient to pass sentence over a social system.

The attitude toward the USSR in the 1930s on the part of its foreign well-wishers was largely defined by the shadow of fascism hanging over the world. In speaking of the striking blindness displayed by Feuchtwanger in Moscow in 1937, Shafarevich manages to use this as proof of his charges, as though familiarity with violence increases sensitivity to it. Alas, what happens in reality is something else: habit dulls sensitivity, particularly when it is a question of violence used to oppose violence.

An antifascist exile, thinking of the one-on-one clash with the ugly Nazi monster, bitterly discovered that he was unable to keep his own hands clean. World politics in the prewar period did not allow the possibility to choose between what was absolutely pure and absolutely impure. If anyone wished to remain with absolutely clean hands he should have rejected the world. At that point, however, the question of the purity of his conscience would have arisen.

#### **Physical-Mathematical Problems of Social History**

Immediately the defeat of fascism by the united nations, a force which led them to even greater unity compared to the threat of fascist slavery, appeared in the world. This

was a physical force in terms of its nature and mushroom-shaped in form. One of the first to realize the political potential of this new force and the need for a "new political thinking" which was based on this life or death necessity was Einstein. Making use of his personal status for social purposes, he persistently appealed to the world, through the UN, for a serious evaluation of the new situation. Although he had supporters, many of his colleagues, not to mention politicians, were unable to grasp what he said. The physical-technical and political realities of the end of the 1940s were insurmountable obstacles blocking their views of the future. In particular, in 1947 four most noted Soviet physicists—S.I. Vavilov, A.F. Ioffe, N.N. Semenov and A.N. Frumkin—tried, in an open letter to Einstein, to "make him listen to reason," ascribing him the role of spokesman for American imperialism. Bertrand Russell, the noted British mathematician and philosopher, considered admissible even a nuclear war if no other way was possible to put an end to communist dictatorship.

Clearly aware that heaven on earth will not appear either in Uncle Sam's possessions or Uncle Joe's empire, Einstein perfectly realized that the Stalins of this world come and go but mankind remains alone with a weapon for universal destruction. For that reason, knowing a great deal about the country of real socialism and also aware of the way people in that country were fighting reactionary Einsteinianism, he nonetheless thought about the path of mankind, doomed to unity or death, a path which ran between economic anarchy and political slavery, a path leading to humane and democratic socialism.

Today, when the new political thinking is already embodied in international declarations and treaties, and when the expression itself has become a newspaper cliché, it would be quite instructive to consider the nonobviousness of the new vision of the world and how nonobvious was the new political postulate when it was born. Such considerations make us turn with respect to the thoughts and actions of actual people on Einstein's scale in real history.

In our confused times there is a great temptation to "guess" the future of history (world or merely domestic) with the help of a simple system. Unlike mathematics, however, in history simplicity is worse than robbery. The simplistic stripped-down historical perception of the world could cause substantial difficulties to those who make history.

It is very difficult to prove this by purely logical means. However, extensive historical experience confirms it quite clearly.

I.R. Shafarevich believes that he has been able to make substantial progress in the understanding of history by adding the word "big" to the expression "enemies of the people." Let God be his judge! A pair of eyes which would closely and lovingly look at the history of Russia is bound to notice the unavoidable contribution made to

it by the "small" nations. This contribution became firmly part of the Russian language itself in which many words come from the Turkik; "main" Russian words, such as Ivan da Marya are of Jewish origin. Let us not even mention the way the spiritual world which was born in the course of interaction with the "small" nations of the Mediterranean was adopted, blossomed and bore fruit in Russia. However, this can be noticed by eyes armed with respect for history.

We must acknowledge that Shafarevich's "socio-logical" elaborations show perhaps concern for the destinies of mankind, something which cannot be said about some of our contemporaries, who justify their disgust for various types of "foreigners," without looking at their own biography while mounting raids on history. The trophies with which they came back after such raids may be more or less valuable. However, testimony extracted from history is worth no more than testimony beaten out of people.

Although the information provided here suffices to undermine the concept of Western liberal Stalinism, clearly, it is insufficient for acquiring an idea of the conceptual history of socialism in the 20th century. After this history will have been written, it will probably find a place also for Einstein's views expressed in the middle of the century. At that time Einstein clearly saw that "attaining socialism will require the resolution of some extremely difficult sociopolitical problems:

"How is it possible, taking into consideration the far-reaching centralization of political and economic power, to prevent bureaucracy from becoming omnipotent and despotic?

"How can the rights of the individual and a democratic opposition to the power of the bureaucracy be secured?"

These questions are being considered today in our country as well. This means that the history of socialism has still not come to an end. As to the legacy of the age of Stalin's socialism, which is agonizing in front of our own eyes, as we already pointed out, this legacy suffices, although not equally, to everyone—Stalinists and non-Stalinists, socialists and antisocialists.

Let us go back to the problem of the final lot of civilization on earth, which Shafarevich considers basic. Without discussing here the features of civilization which are considered necessary and most desirable from the philosophical, religious or other viewpoints, let us pay attention to the fact that it is a question of a truly bright future of mankind, of a civilization in which there will be a place for the labor of the peasant and research in the area of the physical-mathematical problems of the world. As we can see, the very object of discussion and concern about it is by no means new.

Is shedding the brightest light on the present not the best method for building a bright future?

#### Footnotes

1. I.R. Shafarevich, "Two Roads to the Same Precipice," NOVYY MIR No 7, 1989, pp 147-165.
2. If in newspaper vocabulary of the recent past the word "progressive" was politically synonymous with the word "good," to Shafarevich it was an antonym.
3. A. Einstein, "Why Socialism?" MONTHLY REVIEW, an independent socialist magazine. Vol 1, No 1, 1949. For the Russian translation see KOMMUNIST No 17, 1989.
4. E. Kolman, "Backpedaling in Einstein's Philosophy." NAUCHNOYE SLOVO No 1, 1931, p 13. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES

### The Chernobyl Syndrome in Nuclear Power Engineering. What to Do?

905B0016K Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 82-92

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[Text] The post-Chernobyl situation which developed in the country's nuclear power industry turned out to be as unique as the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. Ten years ago, N.A. Dollezhal and I published an article in KOMMUNIST (No 14, 1979) in which, to the extent to which glasnost was permitted at that time, we drew the attention of the public to the difficulties in the nuclear "kingdom." Today the problems have become even worse. The crisis situation prevailing in the Soviet nuclear power industry has raised the classical questions: Who is to be blamed and what is to be done?

### The Nuclear Power Industry is a Social Problem

The difficulty of the situation is caused not only because of human casualties and the scale of the direct and, above all, the indirect material losses resulting from the accident. Equally important is the fact of the almost comprehensive development in the people of a sensation of an intangible radiation danger. This intangibility psychologically leads to a rather high extent of public conviction of the existence of this danger which, in frequent cases, is nonetheless greatly exaggerated. On the other hand, practical experience in the field of nuclear energy has provided and continues to provide rich food for justified discontent and for the appearance of negative emotions. In the current sociopolitical climate, these are manifested both as organized and as mass spontaneous negativism toward the nuclear power industry.

We know that public opinion judges of a sociotechnical phenomenon not on the basis of its combined indicators but of the most negative events they triggered. A very

important factor which encourages mistrust in nuclear power plants is the existence of a wide territory of durable radioactive contamination surrounding the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Signals, information and rumors continue to originate here about the inadequate radiobiological and social protection of hundreds of thousands of people. A radioactive hotbed which will generate fear and mistrust, not to say hatred of nuclear power industry, will be surrounding Chernobyl for decades to come.

The worst part of all in this situation is that the area of contamination has substantially widened after the accident. There were two reasons for this. Significant densely populated territories, one way or another contaminated by radioactive fallout, remained simply ignored in the first months after the accident. A governmental commission was at work, a report on the accident and its consequences was being hastily drafted and, naturally, many people preferred to see in those consequences "more fewer than greater damages." Furthermore, the dynamics of biocenoses, atmospheric-weather processes and the inevitable human activities in the contaminated areas result in the spreading of radioactivity.

However right the specialists in radiation medicine may be in opposing the exaggeration of the danger, the concept that there is no limit to the impact of radiation on man remains unrefuted. According to it, any dose of radiation in excess of the natural background can take a variety of pathological aspects. Naturally, the overall picture determines the likelihood of one specific manifestation or another. It is the greater the more it exceeds the natural background. However, the essential presence of the likelihood indicates an acknowledgment of the essential unavoidability, of the inevitability of the occurrence of a dangerous event over a specific period of time affecting the population of one area of another. This means that a person exposed to higher radiation (or the threat of it), aware of this fact, lives as though under the sword of Damocles, realizing that he is unable either to prevent the tragic event which is rising above him or else to influence its nature. This condition provides a sufficient psychological background for the manifestation of a mass radiophobia.

The problem of the nuclear power industry in the USSR has become almost entirely a social problem. The sociopsychological phenomenon which developed cannot be ignored, for it is quite strong and effective. All of this could be described as a crisis in a major national economic area which is unable to make the type of contribution to the development of the economy on which the state relied for decades.

For the first time in the 35 years of development of the nuclear power industry there has been a several hundred percent reduction in the installation of nuclear power capacities, compared with the 1986-1990 plan, a significant delay in the commissioning of nuclear power turbines, already built and ready to be started, deleting from the plans the manufacturing of power turbines and

prematurely shutting them down, reducing the concentration of nuclear power industry capacities at the various sites, etc. All of this took place above all under the influence of the objections of the public.

The important fact is that this phenomenon is not abating but, instead, is widening. As a rule, it takes the aspect of the protection of regional interests, for the protest is triggered usually and specifically by the building of a given nuclear power plant and not of nuclear power plants in general. Scientific and technical forces of the local scientific and training institutions and universities become involved in this process. In the majority of cases they arguably point out faults in the blueprints and in the organization of the work. We must point out that such shortcomings, errors, scorn for local conditions and simply absurdities are frequently found in nuclear energy practices, for the managers of this sector have never tried truly to take into consideration the interests of the local public and the local infrastructure. In their ambitious promotion of governmental energy interests, for decades they were able to ignore public opinion hiding behind a thick screen of secrecy.

The outburst of social activeness on the subject of nuclear energy is, unquestionably, a positive phenomenon. Entire scientific trends have begun to develop which, in the pre-Chernobyl period, were either ignored or were totally lacking. This includes the probabilities analysis of the safety of nuclear power plants, the interaction between man and machines, and the experimental-testing substantiation of nuclear plant safety.

However, these are internal processes, which remain invisible to the broad public; no "thaw" concerning the nuclear power industry can be felt. The mood of the public will change as time passes. Today, however, it is steadily fed by negative facts and it is naive to expect that the rejection will turn into acceptance all by itself. In order for the nuclear power industry to be able to prove to the public at large its role as a safe, economical and ecologically advantageous source of energy, all operating nuclear power plants must prove such qualities on a daily basis. Above all, they must mandatorily become psychologically acceptable to the population of the specific areas.

The decline which has started in commissioning nuclear power plant capacities must be actively compensated by laying the strategic (technical and organizational) foundations of the approaching new stage in the development and utilization of the next generation of nuclear electric power plants.

#### **Will There Be a Nuclear Power Industry or Not?**

Turning the nuclear power industry into a fetish and absolutizing its characteristics as an "inexhaustible source of energy" led to the creation of the mass myth of a possible orientation toward establishing a "multi-atomic" power industry in the country. The implementation of a technical policy based on this slogan could cause nothing but harm. In such an imaginary role the

nuclear power industry could serve only the purposes of an energy-wasting, resource-wasting and financially wasteful stagnating economy. The hopes for a generous supply of electric power, which left no place for contradictions between the need of the national economy for energy and the possibility of satisfying it, do not provide any impetus for the development and the self-advancement of the economy from the energy viewpoint. To a large extent the nuclear power plants contributed and, to this day, continue to contribute to the pernicious economy of stagnation.

This is not the fault of the nuclear power industry. It is impossible to manufacture more electric power than can be used: if such power has been generated, by this very token it has already been consumed. Essentially, nuclear power plants were being built to satisfy the excessive demands for services to an energy-wasteful economy.

Nonetheless, the nuclear power plants offer substantial ecological advantages (naturally, with a normal exploitation) compared with plants using organic fuel or hydraulic power. Let us remember that approximately 25 percent of air pollution results from operating a power industry based on combustion. Should our national economy become based on efficient energy-conserving technologies, nuclear power plants could become a powerful means of improving the ecological situation by taking over from conventional power plants. However, such retooling of the power industry which could improve its structure from the ecological-resource viewpoint, did not take place. Conversely, the energy-wasting economy demanded an ever greater increase in nuclear power plant capacities. The perennial scarcity of electric power reduced to a dangerous minimum the necessary reserve capacities and demanded the virtually total retention of obsolete and physically worn out thermoelectric power plants.

That is why the present scale of operating nuclear power plants could be described, with no particular exaggeration, as an economic burden, a punishment which the country's economy must suffer from because of its inability to implement an energy-conserving technical policy.

Furthermore, if we proceed from the experience in energy conservation acquired by the Western countries, the share of energy generated by nuclear power plants (about 12 percent) could be more than adequately compensated with the development of energy-conserving technologies. Merely increasing the efficiency with which electric power is consumed and conserved in the social area of the national economy would lead to savings comparable to the current amount of energy generated by nuclear power plants. Possibilities of conserving energy in the industrial sector are even greater. In viewing from this viewpoint the strategic objectives of perestroika we must take into consideration the energy consequences of attaining its objectives. In this case the

decisive factors are, first of all, closing down the repeatedly criticized production for its own sake and, second, the initiated conversion of the defense sectors.

Therefore, from the viewpoint of the objectives of a radical economic reform, which calls for reaching high public production efficiency, the question of "to build or not to build nuclear power plants?" turns into a question of energy tactics, while the question of "should there be a nuclear power industry or not?" becomes a matter of energy strategy. In principle, we cannot do without the use of nuclear power industry as a powerful factor for improving the ecological situation in the country.

#### **Propaganda and Real Targets**

We should abandon the hope that a change in public opinion in support of a nuclear power industry could be achieved with little effort, easily, by publicizing the advantages of nuclear power plants, something on which the entire attention of the official authorities has been currently concentrated. To hope for success through edifying propaganda would be naive and useless. As a rule, it triggers the opposite effect: the persistent repetition of appeals generates the desire to ignore them.

There have been more than enough blatant lies against a background of total secrecy. Let us consider, perhaps, the 32 years of naive "nonevent" of the explosion of containers with radioactive waste in the Southern Urals. The entire world was familiar with this occurrence as early as the 1960s. How greatly ashamed were our noted specialists in the field of nuclear power industry of the official representative of the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building. On the eve of the official acknowledgment of this accident, in their meeting with students and teachers they had to pretend not to understand the nature of the direct questions asked at the meetings concerning obvious facts, or else try to avoid the topic. Furthermore, the event was officially acknowledged not because the people realized the entire inappropriateness of the continuing silence. No, it was forced by the new procedure of the forming of the country's government. At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, this childish game of adults playing hide-and-seek would have been totally inappropriate. The management of the nuclear sector gave a truly royal gift to the public and to its own scientific and engineering corps: it ordered that all restrictions on the publication of information related to peaceful nuclear activities be lifted (with the exception of authorship rights). All that remained was to draw a line between peaceful and nonpeaceful activities. In the nuclear industry, which is highly ambivalent, this is not all that simple, for which reason the guardians of the regime are in no hurry to obey the order of the leadership and some of them pretend to be totally unfamiliar with it.

We are faced with the need to take radical organizational-economic legislatively codified steps which would give the nuclear power industry social dynamism, scientific and technical flexibility and adaptability, consistent



with the reorganization of the political structure of society and the implemented economic reform. Such steps should affect both the tactics and the strategy of the nuclear power industry.

It is time to abandon the nuclear-energy hopes and stereotypes which had developed during the pre-Chernobyl period and which, regardless of everything else, continue to maintain a firm grip on the minds of many power and nuclear power managers.

We must abandon the hope that the ice of public mistrust in the nuclear power industry could be thawed in the next few years or else ignored in implementing the plans for the building of nuclear power plants and enterprises for their external fuel supplies. The formulation of inapplicable plans, as we know, is nothing new in our country. This applies to an even greater extent to the nuclear power industry: from the very beginning it became a way of life but not of the sort which would enable us to seek for ourselves and from the public the consolation of the salutary word "underfulfilled." No, the implementation of old initially drawn up 5-year plans for the commissioning of nuclear power capacities remained on the steady 30-40 percent level. One of the main reasons was the striking incompetence of the planning authorities, convinced of the fact that a nuclear power plant is simply a variety of a power plant using coal or natural gas....

We must publicly and responsibly proclaim the principle of nuclear power "noninterference" in the natural and social environment and in the economic structure of the Ukraine (including the Crimea), Belorussia, the Baltic area, Moldavia, the Caucasus, the Northern Caucasus, and Russia's southwestern, western and central areas. This would be an indication of respect for the awakened and even seething public opinion and, above all, the opinion of the population of the victimized areas in the Ukraine, Belorussia and Bryansk Oblast.

The problem of locating nuclear power plants in an orderly manner, ending the practice of building them as indicated by Moscow, on sites located thousands of kilometers away from the corridors of power, has a long history. It was initiated as early as 1975 by the former (now deceased) First Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building (today the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry) A.I. Churin. An excellent specialist and splendid organizer, he was well familiar with "what a nasty thing" (a direct quote) nuclear power energy could be unless controlled. The following ideas and considerations, based on the economic and geographic features of the European part of the USSR, where nuclear power plants are being primarily built, were included in a work on improving the efficiency of locating nuclear-power capacities, drafted at that time jointly by several Moscow organizations. The area of their present location is west of the Volga River-Volga-Baltic Canal line. This is an area inhabited by more than 160 million people, with a concentration of land and water resources which are becoming increasingly scarce.

According to the conclusions which were drawn at that time, as the resources which determine the current scattered deployment of nuclear power plants become exhausted (the vast amounts of water needed to cool the turbine condensers, available land for building nuclear power plants and cities for the personnel, proper conditions for dispersing in the environment the high volume of so-called effluent heat and suitable distance from cities), they should be built in areas in which such resources and possibilities are adequate. This applies to the European north and northeast. According to estimates, the ecological capacity for the location of a nuclear power plant here is approximately 100 times higher than the present scale of capacities of nuclear power plants in our country. Distances to the centers consuming electric power in the European part remain within the range of 1,500-1,700 kilometers, which is acceptable if the power is transmitted along superhigh tension cables.

The next important conclusion deals with the problem of the safety of transporting large quantities of spent and strongly radioactive fuel from nuclear power plants, and its regenerating and burial. From this viewpoint (as well as for economy reasons) it would be advantageous to combine nuclear power plants within large complexes whose overall capacity would reach 30 to 40 million kilowatts. This would also facilitate the decommissioning of worn-out nuclear power turbines by rotating their dismantling and replacement with new turbines. Such complexes, together with their cities, would be permanent installations. This would create excellent prerequisites for their building, development and availability of social amenities.

This, incidentally, solves the problem of minimizing consequences in cases of radiation accidents or deliberate destruction of a nuclear plant. In the final account, it is the habitability, the viability of territories adjacent to a nuclear plant that must be protected.

Efforts to find approaches to minimize the consequences of any deliberate destruction of a nuclear plant have been made in the past, including with the participation of specialists from the Ministry of Defense. To a large extent such work was initiated at the start of the 1980s, following the publication in the United States of B. Ramberg's monograph "*Destruction of Nuclear Energy Systems in Times of War*." The author analyzed the sites where nuclear power plants are located, the predominant direction of the winds, the possible scale of radioactive pollution and other catastrophic consequences of a deliberate destruction of Soviet nuclear power plants. In the course of the debates even the most inconceivable and amusing suggestions were formulated such as, for instance, "closing down all nuclear plants 1 month prior to any anticipated hit" or "laying charges under nuclear power plants and exploding them should an enemy missile approach, so that the wreckage which would be formed would prevent the dissemination of radioactivity" (!). As it were, nothing remains from such efforts other than "entertaining" memories. The balance of fear

was used as consolation: if they destroy ours we shall retaliate against theirs.... The only sensible suggestion—building underground nuclear power plants—was rejected as being excessively costly.

Despite the unquestionable advantages of power complexes, today they can be considered only as a strategic objective of large-scale nuclear power industry. It is clearer than ever now that solving the problems of the population of one area at the expense of another is impossible. However, all methods for the location (complexes and "clusters" of nuclear power plants, built both on the surface and underground) could be possible and acceptable, providing that they are built not on the basis of arbitrary methods of coercive "introduction" of nuclear power plants in the local infrastructure but through the incomparably more efficient adaptable-economic and legal methods. We shall return to this later.

#### Should Efforts be Dispersed or Concentrated?

Another stereotype of the pre-Chernobyl period was the conviction that nuclear sources of energy could be the answer to everything. It is true that few people remember the work done on nuclear airplanes, trains and riverboats with nuclear engines.... The absurdity of such projects has long been realized. Nuclear power sources for commercial purposes are profitable only if developed on a sufficiently large scale (with rare exceptions).

Successes achieved in designing large nuclear power units triggered the desire to create the so-called small nuclear power industry for remote areas of the USSR (essentially northern and northeastern). In previous decades, however, we succeeded in building only one small nuclear power plant—the Bilibin—generating a power of some 50,000 kilowatts and, at the same time, supplying heat to the adjacent industrial and residential complex. The main reasons for such modest successes are purely economic: the high cost and the need for highly skilled personnel per unit capacity of small nuclear power plants. To this day, however, efforts to resolve this hopeless problem have not been abandoned.

Meanwhile, particularly after Chernobyl, the specialists started looking at wind power. Successes were achieved in developing domestic wind-power generating machines on a large scale. Projects for quite powerful (up to 50,000 kilowatts) wind powered plants are being developed. The ecological attractiveness of such systems is unquestionable. They are also economical, for they do not require permanent servicing personnel. Naturally, they also have shortcomings which are entirely surmountable (or tolerable).

Studies of the wind potential in our country indicated that it is tremendous. About 30 percent of the country's territory would be suitable for building wind power generating stations. With minor exceptions, these are precisely the areas the power needs of which are to be partially met by large scale and entirely by small scale nuclear power plants.

Naturally, there could not even be a question of supplying the entire country with power with wind-power generators. This has been proved. However, it is precisely such generators that could provide suitable backing in some areas of operation of the nuclear power industry and have the power "monopoly" in many remote areas. Obviously, the range of their unquestionable economic competitiveness, compared with nuclear power plants, would not exceed 50,000 kilowatts.

Another area of ambitious nuclear-power aspirations is that of energy-technological efforts to create high-temperature nuclear reactors. The hopes for their extensive application are essentially related to the following energy problems:

In ferrous metallurgy—the direct recovery of iron from iron ore;

In the chemical industry—economizing on natural gas and obtaining, above all, nitrogen fertilizers;

In heat supplies—transmitting latent heat over large distances via converted natural gas, in a cycle of reversible thermochemical reactions;

In heat processing of low grade coal, with a view to obtaining high grade liquid, gaseous and solid fuel.

Work in the first three areas has been under way since the beginning of the 1970s. A great deal of money has been spent with virtually no results. However, on the basis of an agreement which was concluded in June of 1989, an experimental high-temperature reactor module is being purchased from the FRG for 400 million marks. It will be installed in Dimitrovgrad. The Germans did not want to have it built in their own country, the economic situation having changed for such projects and their completion no longer making any sense. Thus, in ferrous metallurgy the task now is not to increase the already excessively huge and no longer needed steel production with the help of nuclear reactors but to reduce it with the so-called uncorrelated use (up to 40 percent) of other materials, such as aluminum. The production of aluminum requires electric power, i.e., the use of ordinary nuclear power plants. In the chemical industry, the use of nuclear reactors in encouraging natural gas economy, with a view to increasing the production of nitrogen fertilizers and, therefore, increasing the amount of nitrates in agricultural products is, in general, questionable. Finally, the processes of population urbanization and concentration leave virtually no place for expensive heat supplies to scattered heat consumers, using inefficient converted natural gas.

The only attractive alternative is coal processing with the heat generated by nuclear reactors: this ensures the ecologically clean mass production of high grade fuel which, unless proved to be excessively expensive, could be used both in condensation electric power plants and for household purposes.

It is only such a reduced and, essentially, economically streamlined place and role of the nuclear power industry in the national economy and the use, out of the many developed scientific and technical trends, of a single one—a consolidated electric power production—that would enable us to lighten the burden of nuclear energy on the public's mind, not to mention the social and economic aspects of the matter.

Preventing the economically unjustified expansion of nuclear power systems in the various economic sectors and parts of the country would have yet another positive consequence. The less reactors there are and the more narrow their "professional orientation" is, the greater will be the guarantee of safety and the lesser would be the likelihood of radiation accidents. This is particularly important today, given the current unsatisfactory attitude toward labor discipline and virtually total irresponsibility. The current exceptionally low standard of handling most complex equipment, which includes nuclear facilities, cannot be improved within a short time, considering the size of the country and all areas of the national economy.

The nuclear power industry, at least at present, should not be surrounded by the halo of some kind of energy panacea. Its main and exceptionally important national economic function is the centralized production of electric power at large nuclear power plants and the generating of heat as a by-product. For the time being, this is more than sufficient.

#### From a 'Power' Past to an Economic Future

The numerous organizational and legal problems in our sector cannot be solved as a result of the squabble which has developed in the mass information media and on television between proponents and opponents of the nuclear power industry. Frequently this squabble is consistent with the aphorism that that which cannot be proved cannot be refuted and can only be rejected.

For decades the solution of pressing nuclear problems has been obstructed by the system of nuclear power development: the strict governmental management hierarchy, budget financing, the exclusively official rather than commercial customers, and economic irresponsibility. The operating organizational and management stereotypes make the nuclear power economy similar to the repeatedly criticized Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources: we do our own planning, decide our own projects, do the building ourselves and determine economic and other results again by ourselves.

So far, essentially, nuclear power plants were ordered by the center, for the sake of an Energy Program, which remained intangible to the population. The center considered one area or another with its resources a target which was either suitable or unsuitable for the location of a nuclear power plant and the latter's expediency was dictated by "superior state interests." In some cases, such interests could coincide with those of the area, but in other, as was the case with the Ignalinskaya Nuclear Power Plant, they conflicted with them from the very start.

No one would even think that the building of a nuclear power plant would involve politics, relations among nationalities, public opinion, sociology, ideology and ecology. It was no accident that the pre-Chernobyl nuclear leadership acted "on the periphery," as it would in a self-service store: it took what it wanted, with the only difference that in a store one must also pay....

The situation changes immediately the moment the "periphery" acquires the status of economically independent area, based on cost accounting. The needs of that area for energy are inevitable and, perhaps, its gaining the status of a customer, who is responsible and truly interested in solving his own energy problems, becomes inevitable. Options are possible, such as, for example, the unification, based on energy interests, of several such customers with a view to building large electric power plants. In this case, in addition to meeting their own power needs, they could also consider trading energy; for example, they could sell electric power to other cost accounting areas or to foreign countries. In all cases, however, an important result is achieved: the pyramid of energy rule assumes a normal position.

It is the sum of the thus shaped energy needs of economically autonomous regions that should lead to the formulation of the country's energy program, including its nuclear energy component, rather than what had so far been the case, when it was actually self-seeking.

This approach makes the problem of nuclear plant alienation substantially easier to solve. From a status which opposes the pressure of central departments, the region assumes the position of owner, responsible for supplying its enterprise with energy. Psychologically, morally and organizationally, this is an already entirely different position from that of dependency, particularly if the region (the customer) and the power organization (contractor-agent) has sufficient rights which allow it economically to interest the population and the enterprises of the area where the building of a nuclear power plant is contemplated. Furthermore, it is economically expedient to consider the distance to the power plant as a yardstick in determining the scale of benefits and compensations to people who live or work within such areas.

The system of economic steps and compensations, extensively applied abroad in locating a nuclear power plant, is a powerful factor in developing a loyal attitude toward such a plant. Payments as compensation for fear, risk, inconvenience and the current psychological incompatibility with nuclear power plants is a normal economic measure in a law-governed state. In our country, however, all we have are centralized rates for all types of energy, uniform for the entire country. This is an obvious anachronism.

The combination of "cost accounting region with cost accounting nuclear energy organization" would unquestionably facilitate the solution of nuclear power industry problems, and not only those involving public opinion. It would include referenda on building nuclear power plants.

One could confidently say that if today a national referendum would be held on whether to build or not to build nuclear power plants, the overwhelming majority of the population would be against. In a law-governed democratic state priority in making a final decision on such matter should be the prerogative of public opinion and not of specialists, even the most highly respected ones. However, the solution should be sought on the local rather than all-Union level. The right and possibility of said combination to use economic instruments in favor of nuclear power plants would unquestionably influence the results of a local referendum and, most likely, matters will not even reach that far, the more so since with a public choice of the type of energy source, based on the possible local options, the ecological advantages of nuclear power plants would be obvious to all (or almost all). The necessary guarantees to the local population with such an organization of the matter could be provided by the specific responsible organization.

This approach, however, requires changes in ownership relations in the nuclear power industry. We need economically autonomous companies or consortiums which would bring together design-construction, building-installation and machine building organizations and associations which would include groups of operating nuclear power plants. Under the strict conditions of economic survival, such organizations would be forced to develop the necessary efficiency, mobility and ability to adapt. One could rest confident that they would not remain unused. The inevitable need for energy in economically autonomous regions and the strictness of ecological influences, should organic fuel be used for electric power supplies, make the nuclear-energy business promising and profitable.

At the same time, it is unquestionable that the current cumbersome and clumsy nuclear power management hierarchy can only block the reaching of this target. Does it make any sense for the Ministry of Atomic Energy to merge with the Ministry of Medium Machine Building into an even bigger ministry—the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry? What we need is not a consolidation but a decentralization based on total economic autonomy of enterprises.

The solution of these and other timely problems requires a Law on Nuclear Energy. Although in the USSR the nuclear power industry already affects the interests of millions of people (those living around nuclear power plants and in the Chernobyl zone), no such law has been passed. It is as though the nuclear power industry does not have a legal existence. Meanwhile, the rights and interests of the people involved with it remain totally unprotected.

The drafting of such a law was started a long time ago, during the period of stagnation. Eventually, it was distributed among the scientific public for purposes of familiarization. The accompanying letter, signed by the former head of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau on the Fuel and Energy Complex reads that the project was approved by and coordinated with 37 (?) ministries

and departments (although, true, the old ones). The purpose of such a high figure was obviously to mesmerize the scientific public and to make it quiver in the face of such a legislative output.

However, all it takes is a close study of the draft to realize immediately why it was approved by such an impressive list of superior administrative bodies: naturally, they liked this document. In our time, however, characterized by a more demanding attitude not only toward nuclear energy and not only concerning the quality and thoroughness with which the various laws have been drafted but, above all, the legal codification of the priority of universal human values and, particularly, national self-awareness, unavoidable serious objections must be raised against it.

The draft law regulates the quite unsuitable and obsolete practices of operating nuclear facilities in the country, based on the principle of command-administrative managerial egocentrism. It does not take into consideration the trends and new opportunities for the organization of a more flexible practice in connection with the political and economic reforms being implemented in the country and the strengthening of republic autonomy and local self-management.

Priority must be given to public opinion in solving the two most important problems affecting the direct interests of the population in the specific areas, as well as the country's reputation: the condemnation of land for the location of nuclear facilities (projects) and the acceptance by the USSR of spent nuclear fuel from foreign nuclear power plants built with our participation and the subsequent handling of the thus generated radioactive waste. The draft does not include this. In my view, the first question is within the range of competence of Union republics and local soviets of people's deputies; the second falls within the competence of the USSR Supreme Soviet, for it touches upon a number of existing foreign economic agreements.

We know that the pre-Chernobyl leadership of the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building had de-facto instituted a demeaning practice: collecting the spent and strongly radioactive fuel from foreign nuclear power plants built with our help, for long-term storage and subsequently, after regeneration, burying the resulting radioactive waste. No such practices can be found anywhere else any more. In this case we are "first in the world." Recently the press reported that local enthusiasts had exposed near Krasnoyarsk a secretly built underground storage facility for international, so to say, liquid waste. Let us note that this did not apply to solid, containerized and relatively safe waste, about which a great deal is being enthusiastically spoken, but liquid, fluid waste.

Naturally, the problem of radioactive waste is quite complex. All countries building nuclear power plants are trying to find a solution acceptable to the public. Today this has become the main stumbling stone in the global

nuclear power industry. However, within the framework of the concept of a European home this problem could be solved openly, on the basis of international cooperation and under the aegis of MAGATE. It is possible to find very small areas which never, in any case not in the next few thousand years, could become suitable for human habitation.

The areas of radioactive contamination of the territories around Chernobyl and in the Southern Urals must be given a legal status. Today they are semi-legal, they are semi-concealed. The special conditions in these areas will last for many decades into the future. That is why we must legislatively codify their status as areas to be kept under international control and be studied. Clearly, it would be expedient to grant them the status of radiobiospheric reservations and to include them in UNESCO's list of the world legacies, for whatever the case, these areas are also another unique human legacy....

The main shortcoming of the draft law is that all the rights have been given to the central Moscow authorities while under them there are only obligations. We must radically broaden the range of competence of Union and autonomous republics, local soviets of people's deputies and nuclear enterprises and associations in terms of regulating social relations which develop in the area of utilization of atomic energy. Their rights must include the possibility of controlling legal, environmental protection, health care, economic, national-cadre, financial, scientific and technical, professional and social relations which develop in the course of the interaction between nuclear power plants and their social and natural environments.

The draft law contains nothing of the kind. Yet this is necessary in order to give the nuclear power industry a "human face" and a democratic-legal aspect. This must be pointed out now, in advance, for one could sense the desire of the departments to make this law totally meaningless or not binding.

Recently, this author met with students and teachers of a world famous higher educational institution. In a talk about the present and about views concerning the future of the nuclear power industry I complained that this sector greatly needs an influx of bright and young minds, the drain of which, in connection with the crisis situation in this area, is obvious. We need fresh forces, for the new problems which must be solved in order to surmount the crisis are located not only in the nuclear power industry itself but also around it. People brought to life atomic energy and it is people who compromised it. The energy itself is totally innocent. At the end of the talk I was stopped by two teachers. "We understand your concerns and alarms," they said, "but we do not share them in the least. We shall do everything possible to turn students away from future activities in the field of nuclear power energy. Without the influx of fresh forces it will weaken and die and this would serve it right!"

I am convinced that this will not take place. Perhaps not immediately, but the nuclear power industry will pull out

of its crisis. A mandatory condition to this effect, however, is to undertake the serious, the radical restructuring of nuclear power industry thinking. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## PUBLIC OPINION

### Readers Think, Argue, Suggest

905B0016L Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 93-101

[Text] V. Kurochkin, rear admiral, candidate of technical sciences: Crisis in the Economy?

Journalists have begun lightheartedly and with enthusiasm to write a great deal about our economy. Sometimes they write with a certain bitterness about it, in the way they wrote in the past about capitalism. Unquestionably, it is better to know the bitter truth than deliberately to mislead ourselves and act like ostriches. However, errors could also be the result of turning realities upside-down. In the past, all conceivable and inconceivable qualities had been ascribed to our economy. Today it is being ascribed nothing but faults and treated scornfully. Under our very eyes a flourishing queen has been converted into a pitiful, wretched, and thoroughly sick old woman. This is a strange metamorphosis. Because of such total criticism, I do not consider it a sin to say a few words in defense of this poor cripple. Considering the general discontent caused by shortages, naturally this is not very safe and is unlikely to be understood. Nonetheless, let me risk it. Let us follow the principle of "question everything," the more so since in itself such a drastic change in concepts is simply worth a few thoughts.

The thoughts of economic journalists have been expressed most fully and clearly in the most topical and, one could even say, currently fashionable topic: the economic crisis. Until recently we were profoundly convinced that this alien disease was not threatening our economy. We were proud of its immunity and were absolutely amazed to find out simply that we were "sliding toward a crisis." However, the crisis began to gather strength quickly and became extremely important.

It is the epicenter of the "earthquake" of social considerations and the moods of the people. The threat of crisis shook up the Supreme Soviet as well. The time of the advent of an economic collapse was even predicted: in 2 to 3 years. Belief in the possibility of a crisis is spreading like an epidemic and is assuming, as Marx liked to say, the strength of a popular prejudice. Crises and collapses have become our daily nightmare.

Nonetheless, noteworthy is the curious fact that the very origins of the crisis have been shoved aside. Few economists have convincingly sketched the portrait, the reasons, the symptoms and the consequences of this terrifying collapse. Our crisis remains mysterious in terms of origin and nature, like an UFO.

We have heard more than enough about trends and sliding toward a crisis and have become reconciled with the possibility of this attack, fearfully awaiting the calamities; of late it has become apparent that the hurricane has already passed. It turns out that the crisis (if we are to trust the latest writings of a number of economists) had already taken place at the start of the 1980s, although at that time it had remained unnoticed by official science. It is not clear whether we should breathe a sigh of relief or else be saddened by the fact that we overlooked this event. We assumed that the crisis is a major catastrophe, something like a fire or a flood. It turns out that this was something like a quark, an invisible particle the appearance of which can only be mathematically computed.

The pulling out of the crisis at the beginning of the 1980s was related by the author who discovered it to "extreme measures:" strengthened discipline, struggle against alcoholism, and the lengthening of the working day. It is of interest to note that those same "extreme measures" have been named in some recent publications. However, no great significance was ascribed to them, and the view was even expressed that such steps did not rescue but, conversely, hurt the economy: they did not help us to avoid the crisis but took us closer to it, i.e., it was precisely the policy of accelerating the growth rates that, in the final account, lead to the crisis. Therefore, it should have been a question not of accelerating but of slowing the economy down.

These arguments make sense. Indeed, the steady expansion of reproduction could lead to the absolute domination of the principle of production for its own sake, when the economy will be forced to work only for itself, eating up available resources, and a time may come when it will be even unable to secure its own resources. Therefore, the crisis is considered to be in the future, although the statistical data published in the press lead to the conclusion that the crisis is behind us, like a precipice over which we have jumped. It is true that, at the same time, data on the drop of the national income in 1988 are quoted. However, could this fact be considered a reliable symptom of the growing economic crisis? This may possibly be the case, with many stipulations and a mandatory prerequisite: that the drop in the national income was the result of internal economic ills, i.e., of the production process itself. If the income dropped as a result of the drop in petroleum prices or a wrong investment policy such as, for example, the freezing of capital in "long-term construction projects" or political instability, banning vodka sales or, in other words, external reasons, this is no proof of any illness in the economic organism but, conversely, an indication of its endurance, and its ability to withstand the blows of fate, adverse circumstances and wrong decisions. The Patriotic War proved this convincingly. In the first months of combat operations no less than a third of the economy was destroyed. There was no income and there were only losses. The reason that the catastrophe did not occur under the disastrous conditions of the war is perhaps

because the economy has a very strong reserve of resistance to dislocation and destruction. Incidentally, it is precisely this quality of the socialist economy that was named in the past as one of the main reasons for the victory.

Neither could inflation, commodity shortages, an unbalanced budget, and so on, be considered indications of the crisis. Consequently, in drafting anticrisis treatment measures, we risk to bury the economy, for the result will be like the words of the song: "I am being treated for a cold but I am suffering from anguish."

If we were to apply the new methods used by a number of statisticians and systematically assess the entire 1980s, without making allowances for the years of perestroika, it would turn out that the general average trend of decline in the growth of income existed, exists and is continuing. We are experiencing this trend quite tangibly. We also acknowledge the sad fact that the attitude toward labor has worsened and that income will be declining even faster. The fluctuations of individual indicators and periods of "improved situation" could, naturally, be interpreted as a credit to perestroika. However, as Academician L. Abalkin says, "let us be honest and principle-minded.... In the past 2 to 3 years a series of major errors were made.... In the 3 years of the 5-year plan we failed to fulfill the plan for the national income...." At the same time, valiant efforts were made to solve all problems in all parts of the country immediately, without the required suitable means, which led to increased expenditures which, as early as 1984, began to exceed revenue. Since that year the state has been in debt. However, this too is by no means a crisis. Naturally, we could also qualify as a crisis lack of revenue, the national debt and commodity shortages. With this kind of approach, we must be suffering from a great deal of crises, the latest and most equivocal of which is the shortage of soap.

A crisis, as we know, means a resolution, a turning point. A crisis in a free economy with a commodity system, resolves a number of contradictions, above all those existing between production and the market. The market refuses to absorb that which has been produced for trade purposes, freely, without a plan. Fourier was the first to describe this phenomenon as the crisis of abundance. One could say that a crisis is like blood-letting. Competition is the mother of crisis. A crisis triggers monopoly, thus restricting the realm of competition. We have neither market nor competition. Furthermore, the economists themselves are dreaming of introducing them in the economy. We have in our country a plan and a monopoly, i.e., the totally opposite reason and prerequisite for crises. The latest crisis, the revolution, ended with the fact that, reaching its ideal in resolving contradictions, it led to monopoly and conscious production control, thus eliminating the contradiction itself. An economy free from crises acquired new diseases of its own. Monopoly, having absorbed competition and the market and, with them, the crisis itself, also destroyed the inherent tendency of the economy to plunge into

feverish activities and renovation. That is why our economy is suffering not from crises but, quite the opposite, from their impossibility to occur. It has eliminated the capacity for spontaneous and objective self-regulation.

Having lost its commodity character, abolished the market and replaced it with a plan and deliberate control, finally the production process acquired an important quality: stability, and lack of crises which affected prebourgeois production forms. At the same time, however, it also developed a disease manifested in sluggishness, slowness, tendency to stagnate, etc.

Economists who see the market, competition and private ownership as ways of healing our economy but who also, at the same time, proclaim the existence of a crisis and a catastrophe, in all likelihood have no clear idea of the nature of the problem, to say the least. As long as there is a plan and a monopoly it is ridiculous to fear a crisis. It is precisely the road to the market which will inevitably lead to a crisis. One must be absolutely clear on this fact and not mislead the people, the state or oneself in order to avoid, once again, a desperate search for the culprit.

The faults of our economic management system are actually rooted in the lack of crises, for "problems can accumulate if left unresolved." We have no mechanism for halting production even if such production no longer makes any sense and if we are producing something which no one needs. That is precisely why light industry could calmly and steadily work for the sake of piling goods in the warehouses while the ill-starred Minvodkhoz is pouring billions into the ground.

A crisis is a calamity but also a blessing, for it spontaneously resolves the contradictions, takes the economy out of its impasse, cleanses, renovates, straightens out, heals, rejuvenates, and so on. The trouble afflicting our economy is not the crisis but, precisely, the opposite: the fact that it is unable to generate a crisis, lacking the property of self-regulation, dooming itself to slow ossification and decay, like water in a stagnant pool. There is no one to take it out of its stagnation other than the official who now is being blamed by everyone for his bureaucratism but who must follow instructions stipulated in the plan, i.e., the law, and cannot substitute for the functions of the crisis, nor should and could he do so, above all because so far the economists have not developed the mechanism which would take the place of a crisis in our economy. Instead of formulating such a mechanism, it is not being suggested to us simply to return to the past. If some economists have detected a real crisis, logically they should not be afraid and frighten us but be pleased, and we should build a monument to them as people have to the discoverer of the smallpox vaccine. Unfortunately, it is too early to commission such a monument.

One may apply the concept of "crisis" to indicate other phenomena as well, even most insignificant ones, in the same way that one could hunt swallows with a cannon.

N.I. Bukharin himself used this concept but, emphasizing the conventionality of the term, stipulated that "it is our crisis." Now, it is being peremptorily stated that "we had a crisis," thus arbitrarily ascribing to the socialist economy patterns of a capitalist economy which are alien to it.

Unquestionably, the economy is sick. However, the diagnosis of the disease and the suggested means of treatment are so controversial that they legitimately raise questions, particularly when surgical measures are suggested.

**L. Kirilyuk, docent, Department of Soviet Literature, Penza Pedagogical Institute: New Program, Old Half-Truth**

Pedagogical institutes are guided in teaching Russian Soviet literature by the curriculum issued by the USSR State Committee for Public Education. We started the 1989/90 school year with a new curriculum. However, the study of this curriculum has triggered not simply a puzzlement but also real indignation. Naturally, we were not astounded that it was drafted by a group of authors who had been interpreting the history of Russian Soviet literature in curriculums and textbooks for decades. We had unwittingly become accustomed to this. What amazed us was something else: the curriculum was approved by the Administration for Training, Upgrading Skills and Retraining Pedagogical cadres of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, with no options, as a mandatory document on the basis of which the basic course of Soviet literature should be taught. The only freedom the teachers were given was to recommend to the students supplementary reading.

Briefly, what is unsatisfactory in the new curriculum?

To begin with, Soviet literature is described, historically, as a single, straightforward process of the appearance, development and attainment of socialist realism. If we apply the Zhdanovist definition of the method, the introduction proclaims the start, and the end sings a triumphant hymn, claiming the "unity of the creative method and variety of individualities of writers within the stream of socialist realism." The term "socialist realism" is used as an indication of high degree of creativity. The chapters dealing with Gorkiy, Mayakovskiy, Fadeyev, Bednyy, Furmanov and Leonov begin with words such as "founder," "initiator," "originator" and similar other descriptions. The "transition to the positions of socialist realism" is ascribed to S. Yesenin. The other singled-out writers (Sholokhov, Tvardovskiy, Fedin etc.) have not been awarded this distinction. Correspondingly, in the survey chapters Soviet literature is described as a phenomenon of socialist realism.

Second, the history of our literature is presented in a thoroughly purged, sorted out and straightened out aspect. It does not mention anything inconsistent with the ideological standards of the period of stagnation. Actually, the real literary process is not even mentioned. The RAPP is classified as part of the literary groups of

the 1920s and nothing else is said about it. The same treatment is given to the VKP(b) Central Committee 1932 Resolution, the proceedings of the First Writers' Congress and the resolutions on ideological problems (1946-1948). The description of literature of the 1930s includes a single sentence, "the adverse influence of the cult of personality on the literary process." This is the only mention of the tragic parts of the history of our multinational literature.

Nor does the curriculum mention the CPSU Central Committee Decree on Surmounting the Cult of Personality, or the 1958 Resolution "On Correcting Errors...", which triggered the hope that the resolutions on the Leningrad journals would be annulled. The RAPP critical "club," the exposure criticism of the 1930s, which was terrible in terms of its consequences, and the campaign against the so-called stateless cosmopolites and the shameful actions taken against writers in the 1950s to the 1970s are not mentioned.

The lack of objectivity has also influenced the chapters dealing with individual writers. For example, it is as though Tvardovskiy never wrote the poem "Terkin in this World." Gorkiy, Fadeyev, A. Tolstoy and other writers are presented in a simplistic "straightened out" manner.

Third, the history of Soviet literature is presented in the spirit of the old clichés and stereotypes. Suffice it to mention the interpretation of M. Sholokhov's novel "Virgin Land Upturned:" "A profound and truthful depiction of social renovation;" "the depiction in this work of agricultural collectivization is one of most profound revolutionary change. There are sharp class conflicts;" and "the role of 'Virgin Land Upturned' in the development of Soviet literature."

The literary process, with its ideological and esthetic searches, conflicts, terrible years of Stalinism and Zhdanovism, and the dramatic clashes accompanying the actual developments have been carefully concealed, and hidden behind meaningless, standardized, high-sounding phrases and definitions. There is not even a hint of conflicts on the ideological-artistic level or the writing of works which opposed the officially praised literature. The authors make extensive use of the method of enumeration: the result is the elimination of the lines separating transitional and insignificant works from works which became events in literary and social life.

Fourth, the curriculum undervalues Soviet literature of the 1970s and, particularly, the 1980s. In practical terms, the course in Soviet literature has been reduced to the study of the literature of the "Stalinist" period. Decades have passed, the social and artistic atmosphere of our life has changed, new generations of writers entered literature, and social, practical and esthetic realities different from those of the senior generation took shape. Literary life in recent years has assumed a tempestuous nature and the social value of the literature related to pere-stroyka has increased immeasurably. Yet, as was the case

decades ago, the curriculum ends with Sholokhov and Leonov. Those same 80 hours have been allocated for the entire course. Nor has the ratio of hours changed. Whereas 9 hours are being allocated to the postwar decade (1946-1955), it is recommended to cover the subsequent period, from 1956 to the present, which is 34 years, in 6 hours, i.e., the suggestion is that we limit ourselves to a brief survey and enumeration.

Fifth, there is a noticeably subjectivistic approach on the part of the authors in drafting the curriculum. For example, all four novels by Yu. Bondarev are considered mandatory and it is recommended that "The Final Volleys" and "Moments" be read. The list, however, does not include noted works by A. Akhmatova, A. Platonov, A. Bek and A. Rybakov and A. Tvardovskiy's poem "By the Right of Memory." This approach also affects the index of teaching, scientific and critical publications (A. Metchenko, L. Yershov, P. Vykhodtsev, A. Khvatov and some of the authors of the curriculum). Noted critics and literary experts, who had a different view of the development of Soviet literature, are not recommended.

In my view, this curriculum is not simply the result of the thoughtless work based on old models but a deliberate position, a dangerous opposition to the principles of truth, objectivity and fairness, on which the true history of Soviet literature must be built. What makes it even more dangerous is that we are asked to proceed on the basis of this confrontation with the training of the future teachers.

**V. Solodovnikov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries: Why False Interpretations?**

Of late our public has sharply discussed the question of the aid which the Soviet Union provides to the developing countries, and the amount of such aid. This interest is understandable. Nonetheless, a variety of conflicting data on this matter have appeared in the press, thus disinforming the people and creating distorted views. For example, in its issue No 27 for 1989 the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY reported that in 1986 that aid reached 1.7 percent of the Soviet GNP. In No 38 for the same year, we were informed in the same newspaper by an official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the figure for 1988 was 1.4 percent, i.e., a 0.3 percent reduction. However, in issue No 192 of 10 July 1989 IZVESTIYA claimed, based on 1987 results, that our aid to the developing countries was no more than 0.3-0.5 percent of the GNP. Whom should we believe? Such percentages are the equivalent of many billions of rubles and dollars.

Official data should be published on the dynamics of our economic aid to the developing countries for the past 20 years, based on the following classification: free economic aid, interest-bearing credits and loans, and humanitarian aid. I also think that a separate item



should include data on military assistance. The countries which are the recipients of economic and military aid should be named.

We must do this in order to put an end to a variety of myths and misinterpretations.

#### Excerpts from Letters

**B. Chernov**, director, Nikolsk Boarding School, Kostroma Oblast:

We discuss and argue about a great deal a variety of economic and national problems and freely label our opponents any way we like. Essentially, however, the one problem which faces us is the restoration of the morality of political power and, consequently, the restoration of morality in society. If we are able to solve this problem we would be able to resolve the other as well.

**O. Konovalyuk**, Mytishchi:

Naturally, the new political thinking, as well as the dialogue with non-Marxist ideological trends are legitimate processes. By the logic of their development, they lead to a rejection of a blanket criticism of bourgeois ideology and of the "image of the enemy." Nonetheless, this does not eliminate in the least our Marxist outlook, ideological values and need to oppose contemporary varieties of anti-Sovietism. Yet, strange though this might seem, our press has virtually abandoned publications on problems of ideology; rarely are seminars and theoretical conferences on such topics held. Major errors in ideological work have been frequently noted, including at CPSU Central Committee conferences. However, no noticeable changes have taken place. All of this is a subject of serious concern.

**G. Atarbekov**, CPSU member since 1949, Moscow:

I was interested in the discussion of the draft Law on Ownership (KOMMUNIST No 18, 1989). In my view, it would make sense to hold such roundtable meetings regularly for all draft bills submitted to nationwide discussion. In addition to the views of specialists and officials, it would be good to analyze the responses of the readers and to direct their suggestions to the respective committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

**V. Bartashevich**, Minsk:

Currently cooperatives are being set up to provide services to the disabled and the very old. However, is everyone able to pay for their services? Why should not pioneers organize deliveries of those products and medicines to people cared for at home? There are philanthropic funds, the Red Cross, and so on, which could encourage the children engaged in such good deeds by awarding them travel vouchers to Pioneer camps or trips. I believe that such a form of services could be organized by the local soviets on whose new membership we put such great hope.

#### Responses to Our Publications

*P. Taov, "Why Do We Need Understudy Trade Unions," KOMMUNIST No 14, 1989.*

**G. Reznikov**, Moscow:

I question the expediency and the need for labor collective councils. From the very beginning I spoke out against them and now my doubts have been confirmed through personal experience (since 1987 I have acted as deputy chairman, chairman and member of a labor collective council). The concept was for such councils to defend the interests of the working people. But what about the trade unions? It is being said that they have stopped fulfilling their functions and that they are dominated by bureaucratism. Therefore, they should be "returned" to their proper channel and their customary work style changed. The new organizations set up at the enterprises, the labor collective councils, occasionally do not know what to do. They frequently duplicate the work of trade union committees, as a result of which the latter fulfill their obligations even worse. We were issued a special chart defining the rights of the labor collective councils and the trade union committees. I shall not undertake to make comparisons between them here although, in my view, they are, to say the least, absurd.

I agree with those who believe that the labor collective council is a far-fetched, an artificial body. Credit for achieving a variety of production successes has begun to be awarded to it but, in fact, such is not the case. I am convinced that it is not necessary to create two public agencies elected by the same collective members. One of them has its statutes and rights and its own "area of management." What does the other one have?

I believe that the question raised in KOMMUNIST is timely and relevant. We must change that which reality has not justified. There is nothing special about this and we must learn how to do it, for we are functioning in a revolutionary time of perestroika, renovation and glasnost. Let us observe these principles. I doubt that my considerations will be printed, but I wish they were.

*E. Yusupov, "Excesses Are Being Eliminated," KOMMUNIST No 8, 1989.*

**M. Shukurov**, member of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences, Dushanbe:

In his official answer to that part of the article by Ye. Zeymal "Nationalities and Their Languages Under Socialism" (KOMMUNIST No 15, 1988) which discussed errors concerning Tajiks living in Uzbekistan, committed in the past and still not corrected, E. Yusupov, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences member, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Relations Among Nationalities and International Upbringing, reported that "...today in Uzbekistan the excesses committed against

minorities in the 1930s and during the period of stagnation are being firmly eliminated." He then enumerates the steps which were taken to eliminate such excesses. However, many items in this enumeration are not consistent with reality.

Thus, E. Yusupov reports that "many Tajiks, whose parents were forced to register as Uzbeks in the 1930s, received new passports in which their national affiliation was listed correctly." Actually, this did not take place, for there still is no resolution passed by the USSR Council of Ministers which would permit such an operation. The need to speed up this project was mentioned by K. Makhkamov at the First Congress of People's Deputies. However, even after the corresponding resolution is passed, it would be hardly possible rapidly to eliminate the consequences of the grossest possible violations of justice. Efforts to soften their nature and to instill the idea that nothing particular took place and that everything can be easily corrected would hardly help matters.

The answer further claims that eight new schools providing instruction in the Tajik language were opened in Samarkand for the 1988/89 school year and that oblast newspapers in Bukhara and Samarkand have begun publication in the Uzbek, Russian and Tajik languages. Actually, classes in Tajik were opened in Samarkand and not schools. One Tajik class was opened in Bukhara, the only one of its kind with a population of 224,000, the majority of whom, according to expert assessments, are Tajiks. No oblast newspapers in the Tajik language have been published in Bukhara or Samarkand. If such publications are planned this is commendable. However, to report this as an accomplished fact was not justified at that time.

In conclusion E. Yusupov writes that "frankly speaking, the national interests of the Tajik population (in Uzbekistan—author) are being satisfied better than those of other ethnic groups." The fact that, it turns out, things could be even worse, is hardly reassuring.

*New Thinking in International Affairs. Roundtable Meeting Between KOMMUNIST and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy, KOMMUNIST No 8, 1989.*

**N. Radichuk**, teacher, labor veteran, Novovolynsk, Volynsk Oblast:

In the course of the debates, once again the question of the correlation between class and universal human interests was raised. In my view, all misunderstandings and misinterpretations concerning the correlation between the interests of the working class and mankind as a whole may be found in the lack of understanding of their dialectical nature. Dialectics demand that we see in any interconnection not only the coordination of interacting sides but also their subordination or, in other words, it presumes the ability to single out the leading side. This also applies to the correlation between the interests of the proletariat and all mankind. If we raise here the

question of priority and the leading side, everything would fall in its proper place.

To this day there is a popular concept (either considered Marxist or else ascribed to Marxism) according to which since the working class performs the historical mission of the liberation of mankind, any one of its interests is also consistent with the interests of mankind. In this formula everything seems so logically convincing and provable that it is no easy matter to identify the loophole leading to the distortion of the truth. Also, here the interests of the working class are taken as the foundation. However, the criterion for the accurate understanding of such interests is their consistency with the interests of mankind. In other words, the interests of the working class are consistent with those which serve the interests of mankind.

#### Journalist's Notes

**V. Gogunskiy, correspondent of the oblast newspaper RADIANSKE PODILLYA, Khmel'nitskiy: What Does Continuity Mean?**

The first secretary of the rayon party committee and the new director of a big enterprise of Union significance, located in the same rayon clashed in the rayon center, the very name of which emphasizes its smallness. They clashed to such an extent that the differences between them were soon unnoticed only by those who, in general, are unwilling to notice anything whatsoever. After an initial clash of positions between these two personalities, many people were holding their breath curiously waiting for the further development of nerve-tingling events.

Unfortunately, such clashes increased and were no longer always kept within the bounds of propriety although the director stopped going to the raykom unless it was absolutely necessary, while "the first" stopped visiting the enterprise altogether. The main "food" nurturing the ill-will of the two sides were the instructions issued on behalf of the party leader and the views of the economic manager on the work style of the raykom and its first secretary. Naturally, information coming from either side suitably reached the "addresses."

"What was actually happening? It was the usual Turgenyev conflict between fathers and sons," was the way a comrade wisened by practical and official experience assessed the existing unhealthy situation, adding that had the director been older no misunderstandings whatsoever would have developed....

Could this matter be reduced to a generational conflict? It would be impossible to list all the reasons which intensified reciprocal dislike and even hostility. Furthermore, this is not particularly necessary. Two of them, however, are worth mentioning. The first is the drastically diverging attitudes toward so-called sponsorship aid by the industrial enterprise to the village. Instructions to this effect issued by the raykom had reduced the plant to the role of a "fire brigade," the purpose of which was to patch the innumerable tears in kolkhoz life. The

director, in turn, considered his task to be elsewhere: establishing long-term partnership relations based on the economic interest of the sides.

The second was the "silent" passions triggered by the culture and sports palace, which, to this day, has not been built in the rayon center. The enterprise undertook to build it with the sole condition that the rayon authorities provide the blueprint for the building. Although this is not the most difficult problem here, for a long time nothing at all was done. Was it to spite the initiator? Litigation for trifling reasons made the director indignant, the more so since according to his "fresh" observations, during that time the clergy, without any particular stress or personality conflicts, expanded and restored the local Roman Catholic church. Now, on holidays, thousands of pilgrims come here from everywhere....

The conflict reached its highest point at the party obkom plenum. Here the first secretary traditionally felt himself in his native element, for which reason he decided to wage a decisive battle against the disobedient manager. He showed no restraint in choosing his epithets, for his opponent was not present in the hall and, therefore, could not raise any objections. In other words, once again glasnost became a one way street.

The point, however, is that regardless of how strong the effect of the "first word" may be, today it is no longer omnipotent. In short, although the participants in the plenum were predisposed to accept the expository speech of their colleague, nonetheless the question had to be resolved radically, in its essence, and not in words alone. This was done by the obkom secretaries, this time no longer in public. As a result of this, the conflict situation which had been dragging on, was resolved favorably. Said raykom first secretary became ex-secretary, for he was quietly transferred to another position, which was less "threatening" to those around him. Meanwhile, no one is preventing the plant director from engaging in long-term planning and work....

Such was the end of the story in the province. Was it necessary to let it take so much time and space, someone may ask. Are such clashes all that infrequent in the "boondocks?" They have occurred in the past, they occur now and will occur in the future. This is unquestionable: they have been and they are. They have taken place and are taking place much more frequently than common sense would allow. Should they be left freely to multiply in the future, and even more so in the "boondocks?" In my view, these are questions which we are the least prepared for or intend to answer. Why?

Clearly, because of the way our mentality is structured. Let us assume that a Central Committee Politburo member would resign. Everyone would react to this profoundly and such a news item would be extensively commented upon. Conversely, replacing a party leader in a rayon, city or even oblast is almost immediately forgotten. Yet it is precisely these people who, above all,

determine the frame of mind of thousands of party members, the atmosphere in hundreds of primary party organizations and, finally, to a certain extent, the welfare of an entire region. Such a peculiar perception of personality changes leaves a certain mark also in our way of thinking. Personally, although I am of a respectable age and have acquired long party seniority, I have rarely noticed such considerations to become instructive in terms of the future, at least in the circle of those who should engage in fruitful thinking by virtue of their position.

Let us think about it. In the case I described, the party raykom first secretary had "ruled" the same place in a totalitarian manner for slightly under 2 decades. One would be quite naive not to believe that after all that time he would not leave quite a number of bad marks. That is precisely what happened. The metastasis of a semi-literate and, therefore, militant petty tyranny has been able to imbue all pores of local life. What is worse, is that it contaminated and corrupted the minds of the people, most of whom remained in their previous positions.

Naturally, they include managers (one of whom is today's first secretary) who, albeit in various extents, nonetheless took the former party official as their model. Personally, I was not amazed in the least by the fact that the director's program for sensible partnership relations (today such a program has the blessings of the highest authorities) in that rayon is experiencing implementation difficulties to this day. This is a "modest" payment but for what? I would say for loyalty and support of so-called continuity, a continuity which, to this day, we essentially sacredly honor and, by this token, have converted into a curious sociopolitical phenomenon of our reality.

I do not intend at this point to add up all the distortions or estimate all the losses incurred as a result of the energetic application of continuity. Examples, including some of an immeasurably greater scale, I would think, could be recalled and cited by anyone. What is there to be amazed at if anything which is even remotely related to such "continuity" continues to be part of it. Worse, continuity has been used and continues to be used in pursuit of base human motivations, such as falsehood, time-serving, love of power and greed, etc.

Anyone who is not indifferent to the events can only be encouraged by the fact that 5 years ago, for the first time, a crushing blow was dealt at continuity as we understand and interpret it. This view is based on what I believe to be the courageous, principle-minded and profound rejection by the new leaders of our party of loyalty to the old traditions and actions. As a result of this step we undertook to restructure all aspects of our life—governmental, party and even personal. Naturally, some started earlier than others and some were more energetic while others were more passive. There are also those who to this day do not intend to join the ranks. That is probably why perestroyka brought us a large number of unpredictable

and dramatic events. Naturally, this triggered the discontent of many of its overt and potential supporters. However, is this reason enough to become bogged down between the sharp banks of perestroyka? The reasons which hinder the implementation of plans accepted by the people would include, in my view, that same continuity which is still sacredly protected on the lower levels of the party structure. It is protected, as in the past, in a great variety of hypostases. Specifically, one can see this in the following:

At a meeting with journalists, the party gorkom first secretary quite insistently emphasized that the citizens are now fully supplied with potatoes and basic vegetables which, it is claimed, was not the case in the past. The gorkom (which implied the apparat and the first secretary, personally) had worked very hard to complete the building of a vegetable storage bin and to procure the necessary foodstuffs. In short, this was a barely concealed self-glorification, coupled with references to how difficult all this was. Another subtext was easy to note: on the eve of the forthcoming elections for local soviets of people's deputies, this accomplishment should be credited to the members of the gorkom....

This may indeed be the case and the people would take it into consideration, for so far, unfortunately, there have been few real changes for the better here. Furthermore, as I well recall, 1 year ago the citizens would virtually have to fight for potatoes in the stores, and not sold at state prices at that. Consequently, the good change is indeed a fact. Nonetheless, there is something grating here which prevents us from praising the gorkom and its first secretary. I remember that only 1 year ago both the committee and the leader of the city party organization refused to assume responsibility for the scandals and frayed nerves in the face of semi-empty vegetable store shelves. Anyone could be blamed for the shortages but not the party personnel. Frankly, in principle, one could even accept this but with the mandatory stipulation that the fact that the vegetable store now has its shelves full should not be credited to the party apparatchik. In that case everything would balance on the scales of objectivity and decency. Meanwhile, we are forced to mention yet another variety of continuity, which reminds us of a rotating door: the local party authorities skillfully add to their credit even the slightest economic accomplishment and with equal skill distance themselves from any sort of economic difficulties in their area.

Did such a stance appear only yesterday? Naturally, no. The aspiration to lay claims, to glorify oneself while actually not sharing any real responsibility even for significant faults and failures is also, as we know, a long lasting tradition. This tradition is quite attractive and convenient for many people. Therefore, it is being passed on particularly carefully. Need we prove where such "continuity" has taken us and still frequently keeps taking us?

I cannot handle all the hypostases with which continuity presents us. Therefore, deliberately narrowing the framework of this discussion, I raise no more than two questions to be answered by myself and others: Is it possible, first of all, to continue to accept a practice

according to which the second secretary or the chairman of the executive committee of the soviet of people's deputies is elected to replace a failed first secretary? My answer is firmly in the negative. Let us look at truth in the eyes. These people, it seems to me, either deliberately tried to "expose" their boss over the years or were so dominated by him that they rarely dared use their own wings to fly.

If this is the case, does the rayon benefit all that much if such people take over the leadership? Hardly. Alternate elections would also hardly improve the situation, particularly if they are held without the participation of "fresh" forces from the outside. Such elections become nothing more than playing at democracy, paying a due to "fashion." Perhaps the optimal variant would be "a person from the outside." However, this would not solve the entire problem. Logic indicates that when a leader resigns so should the "team" which was set up under his command. Only thus would we be able to break the chain of distorted continuity.

Second, it is time to legitimize as part of the activities of the party committee, whatever its level, the organic combination of its rights with its responsibilities. Such a combination, naturally, should not remain on the level of a simple declaration, for we have had quite a lot of such declarations and today the sympathy of the people cannot be earned this way. What could become an indicator of such a truly meaningful combination? I believe, the lack of specifically "local" manifestations of social tension and other sensitive areas, i.e., anything which irritates and angers the people not in general but in connection with the activities and actions of specific individuals.

In turn, individuals elected to hold responsible positions and who are aware of the mechanism of their accountability to the masses would think about establishing an essentially new type of continuity. They would systematically cleanse it from all accretions and subordinate their actions to their main purpose: serving the interests and the good of the people, rather than of their elected representatives. Any other variant, any other "criterion" or "approach," many of which have been fabricated, should be considered a clever game played by the party bureaucracy. However, sooner or later the masses would recognize such a play and would categorically reject it. Incidentally, they would reject it along with the bureaucracy itself.

Now, on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress, a process of reinterpreting a number of truths which, in the past, seemed inviolable, a reinterpreting on an unprecedented scale, is continuing within the party and society. It is becoming most obvious that frequently such truths are no more than dogmas which tie us in heavy chains. Unfortunately, such is also the case of continuity within the party or, rather, that into which it was degenerated in the course of decades. If we mobilize the live and creative thinking of the party members aimed at the radical renovation of the CPSU Statutes, it would be expedient to pay close attention to this principle of

internal party life. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## SCIENCE AND EDUCATION

### Status and Prospects of Social Sciences. Theses

905B0016M Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 102-112

[Text] The social renovation of all areas of life of Soviet society urgently needs profound study and identification of the laws and trends of its development. Without changes in the theoretical and ordinary awareness we cannot solve long-term and current problems of perestroika, change the attitude toward labor, upgrade the political standards of the masses and enhance their activities as subjects of the historical process or systematically and fully bring to light the humanistic and democratic nature of socialism. "Socialism is as yet to become properly aware of itself, in accordance with the profound meaning invested in it as a primordial idea" (M.S. Gorbachev, "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroika," KOMMUNIST No 18, 1989, p 4).

The purpose of the following theses is to promote a discussion of the contemporary condition of Soviet social sciences and to formulate some scientific research and organizational problems. They were drafted by the USSR Academy of Sciences Social Science Section, jointly with the Academy of Social Sciences, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Institute of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee.

1. The main and determining shortcomings in the state of the social sciences were the noticeable alienation of these sciences from life, their inability profoundly to highlight the socioeconomic, political and spiritual-moral processes occurring in our life, the determination of their reasons and trends of further development and, hence, the weak role which these sciences play in the restructuring of socialist society, their insignificant influence on public awareness and the decline of their prestige among the masses.

For a number of decades Soviet social sciences remained isolated from world science, ignoring the creative achievements of domestic thinking and failing to master the contemporary method of scientific research. The decisive reason for such deformations, which led to a crisis in the social sciences, was the long rule of the command-administrative bureaucratic system in managing the country and, correspondingly, science.

The crisis in the social sciences was worsened by artificially restraining the growth of the cadre potential of social sciences, trained by the higher education system, and the residual principle applied in financing and ensuring the material and technical support of the sciences by society. The predominance of technocratic

concepts led to assigning the least priority to the humanitarian disciplines and to underestimating the significance of spiritual culture.

2. The present perestroika substantially changes the trend in the development of the social sciences. Democratization, assertion of glasnost and the universal aspiration to renovate and heal society contributed to the revival of social science and encouraged scientists to seek answers to numerous problems concerning the past, present and future of our country. The social need for a profound analysis of social reality and above all for finding constructive solutions to the problems facing society are intensifying.

Nonetheless, the social sciences in the USSR have not come out of their condition of crisis. No scientific studies have been made of many social science problems. Another fact is the insufficient willingness of many social scientists actively to involve themselves in the processes of perestroika and renovation of socialism. Another influence is that of the poverty of research tools and the professional lack of training in conducting investigations on a contemporary global standard.

The poor involvement of science in the processes of the formulation and implementation of major governmental resolutions may result in particularly difficult consequences. To this day the aspiration on the part of state and party authorities to do without socioscientific substantiation of suggested innovations and without the extensive use of truthful and full information about the political, economic, social and spiritual processes occurring within society, has still not been eliminated.

3. The profound restructuring of the social sciences requires the decisive updating of their methodological arsenal, a revision of relations with ideology and political practices, and rejection of thoughtless and uncritical commenting on already passed socioeconomic and political resolutions. It presumes the study of human society as an integral system from the positions of historicism and of its objective laws and existing social, national, regional and other contradictions, and a materialistic understanding of social progress, the motive force of which is the interaction and the struggle among social, economic and other human interests, from the positions of a general civilized approach, assigning a priority to universal human values, democracy and humanism. All of these concepts are among the most important achievements in global history and are the foundations of the scientific concepts of man and society.

We must firmly abandon the dogmatic approach to the Marxist legacy and the thoughtless application to the present of anything said by the classics. Science is incompatible with a religious attitude toward the works of its founders. In studying their works, we must distinguish between that which played its role during certain historical periods, what remained a hypothesis, what was distorted and vulgarized in the past and what, to this day, remains a live and constructive force.

4. The radical renovation of the social sciences is inconceivable without surmounting theoretical-methodological stereotypes and without enriching the methodological and conceptual apparatus, developing a variety of schools and trends, formulating a variety of concepts and scientific theories and ensuring the close unity between social and natural sciences. It is only on this basis that we can develop a truly broad view of the world. Scientific truth is the result of the creative study of real processes occurring in the contemporary world, in society and in the individual.

Dialectical materialism is a philosophical methodology for scientific knowledge, which formulates the broadest possible principles for the study of reality. Nonetheless, it cannot be considered a sum total of rules the observance of which automatically ensures accurate knowledge of the world. A large number of general scientific and specific methodological trends and approaches exist in contemporary social sciences, without the mastery of which it would be difficult to hope for any success in our research. The results of economic thinking, political studies, sociology, psychology, the development of artistic culture, and so on, do not become harmful and unacceptable to us if they are the result of methods different from the Marxist ones. The path to the truth may be different and claiming a monopoly on methodology which proclaims in advance that it is the only scientific and accurate one, does not contribute in the least to making new discoveries, the discovery of as yet unknown laws and the creation of fruitful theories and permanent cultural values. The end assessment of knowledge is the exclusive result of social practices.

5. The interests of perestroika and the creative developments of science, including the science of society, require a deeper understanding of the correlation between science and ideology. These are interacting yet separate forms of social awareness. Ideology is a target of scientific analysis while science is the foundation of the existence of an effective and progressive ideology. Historical experience in the building of socialism in different countries proves the pernicious nature of trying to make social development fit some kind of abstract ideological concepts. Nonetheless, no science or society can do without relying on various values. In socialist society, they must include the comprehensive enhancement of man and his freedom and dignity, the development of the independence and social, political and economic activeness of all social classes and strata, nations and ethnic groups, and the positive interaction between the state and various sociopolitical systems.

6. The object of study by the social sciences cannot be limited to any given age or socioeconomic system or area. Nonetheless, today the highest priority in the work of Soviet social scientists and our civic duty is the profound study of the society in which we live and its place and role in the world process. It is precisely thus that we can contribute to its renovation, renaissance and strengthening of democracy and humanism and higher

moral values, preserve and develop the best achievements of human civilization and formulate more profound and realistic concepts concerning the ideals of communism.

It would make sense, on the basis of the evaluation of the attained results and the price we paid for them compared to other countries, clearly to determine the extent to which progress in our development in the areas of economics, politics, morality and culture can be assessed. We also need a systematic study of the social, economic, political and moral harm which was caused by authoritarian-bureaucratic "socialism."

It can be said that today it is no longer simply a question of restructuring the "old building," which was constructed on the basis of governmental ownership and held together by the command-administrative system, but also of creating the socialist society of the 21st century, which will be organically included in the process of development of global civilization. It is a question of building, of the creative transformation of all social, economic and political structures and institutions. Such a process of restructuring of socialist society could be quite lengthy.

7. The task of the scientists is not simply to interpret the world but also to open ways leading to its advancement. To this effect it is necessary to study and evaluate the various choices in social development. This poses yet another key problem: on the basis of what positions and how to assess, consistent with what, and how to shape today the objectives of socialist development, as we broaden the humanistic traditions of Marxism? The answer to this question, at least in its general aspects, is clear: from the positions of universal human values, democracy and humanism.

The concept that universal human values have priority over class, regional and national values holds a most important position among the conceptual stipulations formulated in the years of perestroika. Its consistent and comprehensive identification enables us to see and scientifically to interpret the contradictory unity within the historical process. The globalizing of economic relations, the threat of nuclear mutual destruction, and the severe ecological crises are not only changing human awareness but are also demanding an interpretation and a new conceptual approach on the theoretical level. The new political thinking in foreign policy, the understanding that the final objective of any social progress should be the good of man and that the free development of everyone is a prerequisite for the free development of all have been acknowledged. Obviously, in the course of the practical implementation of the idea of new political thinking in international relations, the center of gravity in the competition between the two global systems, while retaining class, national and regional interests, will increasingly shift to the area of the "human dimension:" the economic, political and social freedom of the individual, the enhancement of the quality of life of every

person, the standard of spiritual culture and the strengthening of reciprocal understanding among people.

8. Today, as we study the ways of further development of socialism, we need a multiple-choice approach and the formulation of a variety of models and concepts of scientific and practical value. However, we must not consider a single one of them as an established ideal, once and for all. Some of them may turn out utopian; others, attained under various conditions, may subsequently become obsolete and be replaced. For that reason, today we must not lay the methodological foundations for a future confrontation between political and scientific positions and proclaim any specific model of development of socialist society as being the absolute "truth," the only possible one for all times and all nations.

Since many processes related to the renovation of socialism, occurring both in our country and elsewhere, essentially turn out to be features of modern civilization, the very concept of "socialism" must be refined and redefined. Increasingly it is becoming synonymous with the steady and systematically developing and intensifying democracy under the conditions of a pluralism of forms of ownership, which ensures to every person the free and equitable choice of forms of labor and implementation of the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his labor."

9. The study of the matter indicates that in contemporary capitalist societies as well quite a noticeable albeit quite disparate trend toward changes in social relations is appearing, manifested in the enhanced social protection of many social strata, the policy of equalization of population income levels, the increased share of collective forms of ownership and the strengthening of the economic independence and legal protection of the individual. Such processes are taking place against a background of class confrontations; the increased power of international and multinational capital, fierce competition for markets and raw materials, and recurrences of the "power politics" in the international arena. However, even against such a background the processes of socialization of social relations are visibly distinct.

The ideas of a general advance toward civilization are only beginning to make their way, for which reason it is important to understand the sense in which both socialism and capitalism are part of the same human civilization. Is socialism the only alternative to capitalism? What is the basis for the commonality of technological and many socioeconomic, political and cultural features and characteristics of socialist and capitalist societies, and where will the multiple options of their development be manifested today and in the future? Finally, what in socialism is strictly socialist and what is of a general civilization nature? What are the objective foundations for coexistence, interaction and integration between these systems?

10. We can classify as universal human values not only the ideas of humanism, social justice, and economic independence, the legal protection of the individual and the global achievements of artistic culture, but also many specific institutions of civilization which developed in the course of history. This applies, above all, to phenomena in economic and social life, such as ownership, commodity-market production, separation among legislative, executive and judicial powers, the law-governed state, local (territorial) self-management, etc. Unquestionably, these phenomena bear the mark of the past—the negative aspects of private property, class antagonisms, domination by the haves, international conflicts and wars. Nonetheless, many historically developed institutions of past ages are manifestations of profound universal human principles and achievements of global culture. They are regulators of social life developed through the centuries. The task of our social sciences is to remove from the historically developed institutions and past regulatory mechanisms aspects and manifestations are related to periods of exploitation in human history and display and use to the fullest extent their universal human and civilizing potential. Cleansed from the burden of the exploiting past, the institutions and regulatory mechanisms of civilization and universal human values also assume the significance of socialist values.

Perestroika puts on the agenda of the social scientists the study of the processes of integrating within the socialist system qualities, features and concepts such as enterprise, creativity, autonomy, risk, openness, and tolerance toward other views and ways of thinking.

11. The radical reorganization of society cannot proceed smoothly and without contradictions. Under the conditions of growing social and economic stress, the social scientists assume a special moral responsibility for the destinies of the country. They must formulate a scientific concept of perestroika and its stages, objectives and means of implementation. This must be done quickly, in anticipation of events and with the formulation of a variety of optional social structures and models for the economic and sociopolitical structure of our society.

The central features in the concept of perestroika are economic problems. In this connection, we must answer a number of questions: What should be the socialist economic so that all members of society have guaranteed socioeconomic rights, capabilities, interests and needs; is it possible, and if so how, to achieve a combination of high economic efficiency with firm social guarantees; are hired labor and creative development of the individual and the conversion of labor into prime vital need compatible?

12. The key to the solution of such problems is found in the reorganization of ownership. Past experience proves that the monopoly of state ownership allowed the administrative apparatus to dictate conditions which cause the alienation of man from the results of his toil. Profound

studies must be made of the ways and means of "destatification" of ownership and the introduction of a multiple-system economy which would be consistent with the contemporary level of production forces.

The high road in this process is one of involving the working people in collective ownership relations and creating organizations of lessees, people's enterprises and production and construction cooperatives, which would make it possible sharply to limit the area of hired labor by subordinate workers. We must determine the means for the implementation of all forms of ownership, create a socialist market, and define its possibilities, place and role in the planned development of the economy. It is a question of a market controlled not through administrative-command but economic methods—taxes, credits, priorities in price setting, etc. It is important to determine the optimal extent of decentralization of the decision-making levels. Economic management must be based on social programs and all links in economic relations must, in the final account, lead to the consumer.

13. The absence of efficient incentives and conditions for scientific and technical progress, the clash between scientific and technical monopoly, including that of the military-industrial complex, and the level of utilization of the achievements of science and technology in the entire national economy, are among the topical problems of development of the national economy. We must reinterpret the significance and role of the latest stages in scientific and technical progress in terms of solving food, energy, raw material, demographic, ecological and other most pressing domestic economic problems. It would be hard to deny that the latest technologies—electronics, information industry, robotics, biotechnology, flexible production facilities and others—are not part of the existing economic mechanism but are present within it as alien elements, coexisting with long obsolete technologies. The conversion by the industrially developed countries to the type of economy in which the dominant features are knowledge and information services is, in our case, a matter of the very distant future. This is one of the important reasons explaining the lag in the quality of life of the Soviet person behind global standards.

Another equally important task is the study of ways to ecologize the economy. Environmental protection steps can no longer be considered a matter of choice or of the "good will" of enterprise managers. The ecological imperative of our time is such that, if neglected, the efficiency of our entire national economy would turn into huge and irrecoverable losses to the health of the people and the quality of the environment.

14. The concept of the common European and global home and of one mankind gives priority in scientific research to problems of the fuller and more profound inclusion of the Soviet national economy in the global economy and of upgrading the role of foreign economic relations, particularly in their new forms, which are being currently shaped. Practical participation in the

international division of labor, interaction with the regional and common markets of capitalist countries, and inclusion within the global financial system, as well as the creation of free economic zones, joint enterprises, consortiums, and other forms of enterprise in the country create a number of theoretical and practical difficulties, the prompt elimination of which is a prerequisite for the successful development of such forms of economic life. The study not only of positive but also negative consequences of the new stages of scientific and technical progress in the developed and the newly industrialized countries—unemployment, disqualification of labor, impoverishment of the individual, uncontrolled growth of huge cities, worsened ecological conditions, and so on—would make it possible to shape a policy for economic and technical development which would prevent the repetition of such errors and straighten the path leading to the achievements of science and technology.

15. The profound changes in the economy are the foundations for the moral renovation of Soviet society. The systematic implementation of the principle of material incentive under socialism not only does not conflict with its moral values but will enable us to achieve a breakthrough in vitally important areas, such as enhancing the social prestige of conscientious high quality labor and skill, initiative, and competence, gradually leading to the elimination of equalization and dependency stereotypes in social awareness and in practice, and help the people to understand the interconnection between the quality of labor and its results and its social assessment.

One may expect that the economic reform and the reorganization of the forms of ownership would inevitably lead to the intensive modification of the social structure of Soviet society. It is becoming increasingly clear that in the period of domination of the administrative-command system processes of destructuralization of Soviet society occurred, which were considered, including by the social scientists, a movement toward increasing social homogeneity. Today the conversion of state enterprises to various forms of cost accounting, the introduction of leasing relations, the restoration of cooperatives, the creation of mixed enterprises, and so on, have already provided an impetus for the development of a more varied social structure. It is important not to fall behind in the scientific analysis of such processes. In this case we must surmount simplistic and vulgarized concepts of the social structure of society as being based on class alone. In the study of the various sociostructural formations, including those based on profession and age and related to changed forms of ownership, it would be expedient to consider not only material factors which influence changes in the social structure but also spiritual, noncoinciding, and specific interests of social groups and strata.

16. The process of economic liberation of the individual, surmounting alienation from ownership and labor and its results, as the essence of economic change, are most



closely interacting with the establishment of a democratic political system and the strengthening of the ideas of freedom, equality and justice. The social sciences must determine the historical significance of the democratic institutions and principles established in the world. They must reinterpret them within the framework of the socialist political system and project their further development. The study of the political system of socialist society, based on new theoretical foundations, is extremely necessary. Such a study must lead to practical recommendations contributing to the irreversibility of shifting the power to the people, to the soviets as people's authorities, and the assertion of democracy and freedom. So far the mechanisms governing the functioning of the renovated soviets have been insufficiently studied.

17. The work of the congresses of USSR People's Deputies, the legislative activities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the increased independent initiatives of the working people have drastically increased the number of subjects of sociopolitical action, including also as a result of the appearance of a number of social movements, people's fronts and other informal organizations. A redistribution of power functions is taking place among party, soviet, economic and other social forces. These complex processes as well must be profoundly studied.

A positive review is needed of the attitude of our science and practices toward political parties and trends in other countries with socialist or social democratic orientation. This presumes the search for a common language with all social scientists and political leaders regardless of party affiliation, as long as they are in favor of peace and progress, democratization, humanism, a new political thinking and a progressive development of human civilization. We must engage in a constructive dialogue also with men of science, culture and religion, who have a different vision of the world and the processes within it, without rejecting the natural aspiration of every person to provide his own interpretation to contemporary events.

18. The socialist law-governed state, toward which we aspire, must secure and protect the rights and legitimate interests of the individual and the equality of one and all in the eyes of the law, preventing different interpretations and eliminating any arbitrariness whatsoever, or usurpation of power. Many features of the mechanisms governing the functioning of such a state are as yet to be created. They must include the legal principles which were formulated in the course of many centuries of practical experience in the development of mankind and which have become an organic value of culture: supremacy of the law; mutual responsibility of the citizens and the state; high degree of social protection; firm guarantees of the rights and implementation of legitimate interests of the individual.

A scientifically substantiated legislative strategy must be developed on a long-range basis, consistent with the specific stages of perestroika. Most draft bills are, for the

time being, haphazard, drafted by interested departments, as a result of which the public interests and the interests and rights of the individual are not always represented in full. There are virtually no scientific foundations for legal policy in various areas of our society, such as labor, social insurance, the political rights of citizens, the protection of the individual and property, the protection of the family and the child, etc.

At the present stage in our society a double problem must be solved: all opportunities for the independent and free development of the individual and the labor collectives must be identified; at the same time, we must strengthen guarantees for a firm order, discipline, organization, responsibility and secure the legal foundations for the struggle against crime and for upgrading respect for Soviet laws.

19. The economic, political and social programs of perestroika in the USSR are taking place in a multinational, polyethnic country, in which the system of interaction among all-Union, national-state and national-administrative authorities require a radical revision, the more so since in a number of areas relations among ethnic groups have become stressed to the breaking point. We must, on the basis of new and contemporary views, reinterpret the principles of socialist federalism. Its development and strengthening presume the democratization of relations between republics and the USSR, broadening the rights of Union republics and autonomous formations, increasing the autonomy of republics and their independence in terms of their economic, social and cultural development, formulating mechanisms for the self-financing of republics, coordinating national with all-Union interests, etc.

The sciences—juridical, ethnopolitical and historical—using the experience acquired by the socialist countries and proceeding from universal human values, must define, under such circumstances, the optimal principles and forms of unification and interaction among nations on a firm legal basis.

20. The approach which allows for variety in the creation of political, economic and cultural institutions in various areas and among the different ethnic groups in the country, requires a scientifically substantiated approach. The implementation of this approach requires specific knowledge of the nations, of national-regional features governing the establishment and development of socio-economic ways of life and their spiritual and cultural potential and, finally, their reaction to the various perestroika processes. Such knowledge can be obtained only in the course of specialized ethnological, ethnographic and ethnoeconomic studies.

It is entirely obvious, from the theoretical viewpoint, that the past views of nations and ethnic groups have become obsolete. The factors which shape them by no means consist exclusively of objective parameters, such as territory, common economic life and language. Historical experience confirms the tremendous significance

of subjective factors in the peoples' lives and, above all, their national self-awareness, historical memory, awareness of interests and objectives, i.e., precisely phenomena which have been least of all studied by the social scientists.

21. A new approach must be adopted toward the interpretation of the status and prospects in the development of the culture of the Soviet peoples. This includes morality, standards, values, people's ideals which determine their approach to labor, political activities, interpersonality relations, and way of life. The problem of state languages has found itself in the center of stormy political events. In this connection, the task has appeared of formulating basic stipulations shaping the theory of national-linguistic and national-cultural relations. Without any prejudices or adornments, we must fully restore to life all historical events related to the life of any big or small nation, the appearance of national statehood and the unification of Soviet republics and their economic, political and cultural development.

22. Changes in the spiritual life of Soviet people, the growth of social self-awareness and the aspiration toward moral renovation are both a prerequisite and a consequence of the processes stimulated by perestroika. Correspondingly, another urgent task is that of upgrading the theoretical standard of cultural, ethical and sociopsychological studies and the study of religious and atheistic awareness. We must reinterpret morality as a universal human phenomenon which imbues all aspects of life and consciousness, culture and politics. We must broaden the subjects of our studies by studying the eternal problems of human existence (life, death, happiness, freedom of will and conscience, etc.), as well as the questions raised by the present stage of human civilization (the ethics of nonviolence, freedom of choice for every nation concerning its way of development, the ethics of ecology, the ethics of science, international intercourse, moral freedom and historical necessity, mercantilism and spiritual values, etc.). The concept of the tremendous role of morality under socialism makes it necessary to pay greater attention to the moral aspects, to the moral significance of political, economic and legal decisions made.

We must restore in the public's consciousness universal human principles and concepts, such as justice, charity, humaneness and decency. The study of the origins and contemporary meaning of such concepts and of the reasons for their deformation becomes a most important task. We must study the forms of religious and atheistic awareness, trends in that area, and problems of the relationship between church and state.

23. Disparities between theory and practice and words and actions have led to the mass spreading of social and economic passiveness, conformism, pragmatism and scornful attitude toward legal standards and moral values. A healthy economy and a democratic political system are the foundations for surmounting such moral and spiritual deformations. However, equally important

in this case is involvement with world culture and interpretation of new strata of domestic artistic culture, including that created by Russians abroad, and developing a view of culture as being a single many-faceted process in the spiritual life of society.

Obviously, today we must once again raise the question of the criteria of cultural progress, abandon dogmatized concepts concerning the ideals of morality, and assess the true nature and role of the principles of socialist realism in artistic creativity and in the development of the culture of Soviet society, including concepts such as party-mindedness, nationality and class in their correlation with world culture and universal human values.

24. The elimination of dogmatic and vulgar-sociological concepts presumes paying greater attention to the social sciences and to the specific portion of humanitarian knowledge. Soviet social sciences must make use of their full potential both in engaging in basic research and in the development of applied recommendations for political, socioeconomic and cultural-educational practices, through journalistic activities, with the help of the mass information media and through direct contacts with the people. The Soviet social scientist is a citizen with professional knowledge in the most complex area of science, the knowledge of man and society, and he must apply such knowledge for the good of the people.

25. The restructuring of the social sciences cannot be successful without new forms of organization of basic and applied research. Their planning must be made more flexible and free from bureaucracy. The idea of the total conversion of the humanities to cost accounting is a mistaken one. We need a combined financing system, which could include general state subsidies and specific subsidies for the development of specific problems, fees paid by interested departments and establishments for applied projects based on cost accounting, and other methods for financing research.

In terms of general social science projects, the new financial mechanism must be aimed not only at ensuring the profitability of scientific work and printed publications but at the creation of conditions which would stimulate the creative labor of social scientists, above all of those who display a truly high scientific potential.

26. The gradual transition to a flexible structure by temporary scientific collectives working on specific research projects would contribute to solving the problem of promoting original scientific ideas, supporting creative individuals and stimulating more actively higher-quality labor. Many such collectives should be interdisciplinary. As global experience indicates, the free transfer of cadres (on a contractual basis) among scientific institutions and VUZs teaching the humanities would be very useful. In addition to state orders, the scientific plans of institutes should be based on the open competition among research projects.

Comprehensive target programs are the most important form of intensive development of the social sciences and

the summation of their results. This calls for the creation of a flexible and mobile system of scientific research institutes, consisting of a small permanent staff, recruiting, on a contractual basis, temporary personnel. We must not fear the formation of a number of small similar institutions if this could develop competitiveness and a healthy creative rivalry among different projects and programs.

A conversion to planning within the framework of comprehensive programs and the broadening of competitive principles call for strengthening the role of scientific councils and converting them into competent and responsible expert bodies which organize and coordinate scientific research. It would be quite timely to set up forecasting centers and regularly make situational, economic, social and political analyses.

27. The state of crisis in the social sciences gives priority to decisively upgrading the level of professional training of scientific cadres. This requires, above all, the improvement of postgraduate studies and the organization of permanent strong ties among scientific subdivisions and respective departments of VUZs in order to identify scientifically promising young people. In work with young social scientists it would be expedient to convert to competition and contractual relations which would free them from petty supervision and ensure their independence and responsibility. Students must become more extensively involved in scientific research, scientific seminars, creative collectives, and so on. The training of highly skilled social scientists must be improved.

28. At the present stage the social sciences can develop fruitfully only with the all-round and objective study of practical experience and the formulation of alternate options and models for the theoretical interpretation of reality. In this connection, problems of ensuring the availability of statistical materials and archives to social scientists and their access to a variety of socioeconomic and political information sources become even more pressing. We must more boldly engage in creative debates, in the course of which, in an open and democratic form, the results of the activities of the various scientific schools could be compared.

29. It is important, in order to develop the social sciences, constantly to inform social science students and the entire scientific public of the achievements of foreign social sciences in order to encourage the variety of contacts between Soviet and foreign scientists working in different areas; the latter's works must be translated and published.

30. Perestroika in the social sciences must be based on modern material and technical facilities which would ensure the availability of the necessary adequate resources for the development of each social science discipline. Greater attention must be paid to the extensive application in social science research of contemporary computer and organizational equipment and to

improvements in the living conditions and the satisfaction of the cultural requirements of the scientists.

31. The scientific public should especially study and discuss problems of democratization of management in the sciences and upgrading the role of all scientific workers, professors and instructors in VUZs, and graduate and undergraduate students in this process. The founding of scientific societies and associations, strengthening their ties with the USSR Academy of Sciences and the academies of sciences of Union republics, and the active participation of scientists in sociopolitical, humanitarian and cultural activities are not only necessary prerequisites for fruitful and efficient research but also create in the area of the social sciences a beneficial sociopsychological climate and a healthy moral atmosphere which contributes to strengthening the creative activeness of scientists and upgrading the prestige of our science.

The Soviet social sciences face most serious tasks, the most important among which is to surmount the crisis in which they existed for many decades. Restoring the status of the social sciences as an autonomous and responsible subject of the people's spiritual life will provide a powerful impetus for the revival of research, the purpose of which is to identify the processes which determine the course of perestroika, the renovation of socialism and the development of the entire global civilization. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

## CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

### Eastern Europe: Path to Purification

905B0016N Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2,  
Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 113-126

[Interviews prepared and conducted by *KOMMUNIST* special correspondents Sergey Kolesnikov and Vadim Nekrasov in Berlin, and Yevgeniy Shashkov in Prague]

[Text] As a result of the impressive and highly dramatic events which took place in the Eastern European countries, the authoritarian power system collapsed. The people re-entered the historical arena. No forces could hold back their constructive energy or restrict manifestations of political maturity. The ruling parties which had committed major errors and thereby largely discredited themselves in the eyes of the working people in recent years, faced the need to make a decisive break with the past and find ways with which to gain the trust of the masses. Complex and contradictory processes are developing differently in each separate country. They are linked by a common and single objective of the revolutionary movement: the creation of a truly democratic and humane society.

How is the new historical experience developing, and what could our perestroika learn from it are the topics of a fast

survey in which G. Gizi, chairman of the SED-PDS, V. Havel, the president of Czechoslovakia, C. Cisarz, one of the leaders of the 1968 "Prague Spring," and M. Pavlova-Silvanskaya, Soviet political scientist and leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, with whose notes we open our survey, express their views.

### Facing a New Choice

Gradually, the world is regaining its balance after the upheaval, after the drastic changes in the political climate in four Eastern European countries in just the final month and a half of 1989. The paradox is that this chain of political coups d'etat and of revolutions "from above" and "from below" was no surprise at all. Conversely, political scientists the world over had predicted and expected it. The "explosion" and "series of detonating blasts," and the "domino effect" were metaphors, initially frightening by their vagueness, had been jumping from one article to another and from one mouth to another for so long as to appear trite. Actually, they were considered worn-out from excessive use only until the time, through confused prophecies, history began to advance at a headlong pace under the very eyes of all mankind.

There was more than sufficient sociopolitical fuel accumulated in Eastern Europe. One did not have to be a political medium to sense this. However, even a medium cannot predict precisely when, where and for what reason could changes "rush in" and, above all, what forms they could assume and whether they would they tear the foundations of the future fabric of cooperation among countries and nations, which had been woven with such great difficulty. When they used the word "explosion," politicians and journalists had in mind not the "Prague Spring" and not even the "Polish August" but rather the "Hungarian October," in the hope that it will not be repeated.

However, life proved to have in reserve a much greater stock of varieties than even the most unrestrained imagination of political scientists or newsmen. In one year the tension which had been accumulating for some time eased throughout Eastern Europe and, fortunately, the anticipated worst occurred virtually nowhere.

Hardly anyone would deny that there was an explosion of popular anger in Romania. However, there was the GDR, where hundreds of thousands of people assembled for meetings in the large cities, with purely German pedantry: once a week, at a stipulated day and hour.... Have you ever heard of a social explosion on schedule? What about Czechoslovakia? It is being said that if those leading a demonstration would order through a megaphone half a million citizens of Prague, rallied on the Letna, to take two steps back the crowd would obediently retreat as much as was ordered. There was no Khodynka. Could this be considered an explosion? In my view, yes, for the leap from 100 demonstrators to 100,000 occurred with unparalleled vigor in a couple of days. Only the day

before only students and actors protested; the next day, all of working Prague, and the day after that, the entire country. The same pace was kept in the GDR. Under the pressure of the street, the power structure crumbled like a house of cards and the worn-out "transmission belts" tore. Nothing helped, even a fast anticipation. In the GDR and Czechoslovakia the system fell like a ripe fruit, brought down by the powerful sound wave of the chant: "We are the people!" "Resign!" How could we not classify this as explosions? In Bulgaria they were heard like a dulled echo but even that proved sufficient to bring into motion political processes which otherwise could have been delayed after the change in the superior leadership.

By contrast, the tempestuous events of the end of the year somewhat changed the view on the course of transformations in Poland and Hungary. Until recently, our mass information media frightened us with the threat of extremism and confrontation in those countries, promising to the reader that "time will show all." What did time show? In Poland, for example, some inveterate "extremists" became state leaders and even ministers. The ship of state, however, did not sink as a result but keeps tacking, not without hitches, naturally, but more or less steadily; in any case, there are neither casualties nor dislocations. Such things occurred elsewhere, where neo-Stalinists and fanatics resisted to the end, defending their principles against the people. Against the background of a sharp turn of events in the other Eastern European countries, despite their complex problems, Poland and Hungary appear as almost models of a smooth evolution of society. In all probability, this will not be forever. Tension will begin to develop once again. However, having avoided the explosion initially, these nations and their leaders have the opportunity to prevent explosions in the future, already having at their disposal a new political system which facilitates the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Having deliberately chosen the path of dialogue with other forces and of talks with the purpose of reaching a consensus, the PZPR and the MSZMP saved a great deal of valuable time needed to heal their national economies. Those who followed their example only at the end of last year are as yet to go through the process of elections, forming a government and drafting a program. All of this demands time, time and more time.... "Time proved" that the measure of true progress in solving the most pressing economic and political problems is inversely proportional to the stubbornness with which a galaxy of elderly leaders with a neo-Stalinist background resisted any true reforms and changes, particularly those involving political pluralism. They resisted so strongly that the new leadership had to apologize to the people for the crisis in which society had found itself as a result of the mistakes and abuses of the former officials. Their opposition was such that at the present round in the social spiral, nothing was left to the ruling parties other than to drop the constitutional stipulation of their leading role.

The Romanian tragedy proved more clearly than anything else that the more carefully all safety valves through which dissidence or dissatisfaction could be released are blocked, the more unstable the regime turns out to be, in the final account, the more inevitable and dangerous is the explosion, and the more destructive it becomes.

In half a dozen Eastern European countries the policy of "blocking" became anachronistic, not least because the seventh, the largest country, pledged to observe the letter and the spirit of international law, guaranteeing its allies the freedom of choice of social system and totally unlimited sovereignty. Those who had become accustomed to rule with an "iron hand" lost the convenient opportunity of looking at the USSR, thinking: let us have the smaller of two evils. Yet how firmly had the past image of the Soviet Union—the guardian of the inflexible status quo in the Warsaw Pact—been rooted in the minds of the supporters of the totalitarian past, for Ion Ceausescu, the dictator's brother and deputy minister of defense, to turn to our envoy requesting armed assistance! This is something for Soviet politicians and diplomats to think about. Obviously, until the very end Bucharest saw in the awards presented to the leader and in the observance of Warsaw Pact protocol something more than bare formality. This is a serious moral lesson applicable not only to the past.

Consequently, the power methods of ruling not only lead society to the precipice or to an explosion. Violence turns to be a fuse as well. This could be seen in Romania, the GDR and Czechoslovakia although, naturally, the dispersal of demonstrations cannot be compared to the atrocities committed by "securitate." Both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe society had tolerated violence for quite some time, providing that it was applied only to the enemy, not to the personal enemy of the ruler or the powerful official but to the enemy of the people, for the system described itself as being of the people. Jailing people on the basis of false charges and even secret executions could somehow be concealed behind silence, slander and propaganda manipulations. Firing into the crowd and the atrocities of the security service in Timisoara was something else, and so was firing at participants in the Leipzig meeting. Even the unimplemented plan for such firing means an end to the regime, for hundreds of thousands of individuals are already the people. The savage police reprisals against the student demonstration also marked the end of the regime. A line was crossed beyond which the regime lost its legitimacy.

It was a double loss of legitimacy, for at the turn of the 21st century, in the eastern part of our continent the understanding is growing of the senselessness of coercion, whatever noble objectives may be claimed in its justification. Romania is particularly indicative in this sense: it seemed that the wave of revenge and mob law was just about ready to flood the country, so that the chain of cruelty would not be broken. However, only a few days after the victory of the revolution its leaders

were able to rise above the just anger and emotions; for the sake of the future they stood up against the fatal spiral of fratricide and abolished the death penalty.

Exposures related to the way of life of the party-state leadership were yet another fuse. For the ordinary person, accustomed to relying on his five senses and his common sense, not abstract laws but, above all, universally accepted considerations of an ethical nature indicate a socialist system. To feel oneself more or less equal to others in terms of the living standard is a very substantial sociopsychological argument, even regardless of our domestic communal traditions which are so frequently quoted. Material equality is an even more convincing argument in favor of the justice of a system than is a poor society. The people are willing to tolerate scarcity but only if it is shared by all, including the leadership. It is no accident that fictitious personal asceticism played a key role in Staliniana as it did in the cult of Mao and other leaders of the same ilk.

That Profumo, the British minister, dallied with women of easy virtue, or that Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka was exposed for bribery are merely indications of many such cases. When the public in the GDR, Bulgaria or Romania finds out that the general secretary whose speeches invariably anathematize decaying capitalism, has an account in a Swiss bank or 30 cottages, this inevitably converts into a catastrophe for the Communist Party, for it is conceived as a violation of the moral values which are the main legitimacy of the system. The events in the four Eastern European countries assumed such an explosive nature also because the holders of power were discredited not as a result of speculative circumstances but of absolutely specific actions. Such actions affected the profound universal human moral values in a clear and unquestionable form. Each such case focused, as though through a lens, the social aggressiveness which had developed in society and concentrated it on a single spot. This started a fire and, subsequently, an explosion.

Such a total loss of moral authority in the eyes of the masses and the discrediting of party officials and, through them, the party, is a strike from which the latter would find it extremely difficult to recover, the more so since all that has taken place over the past month and a half in Eastern Europe is perceived by public opinion not as isolated cases but as a single unit. Whether we wish it or not, the terrible Romanian reality defames the entire socialist system.

Having lost faith in the old ethical guidelines, the people in the Eastern European countries began to look for a different morality. This becomes easy if a society, which has suddenly become open, allows its citizens independently, and without any ideological prejudices, to compare life under different socioeconomic systems. The choice is quite expressively indicated by the emigration which, in the past year, has become an incredibly mass phenomenon: according to the estimates of the Polish

weekly POLITIKA, more than 1 million people left the socialist countries for the West.

The socialist ideal turned out gravely compromised above all in the eyes of the young, as confirmed by sociological studies conducted in all Warsaw Pact countries. The new generation is entering life with the type of moods such that the hope that an easy cosmetic patch-up in the ranks of the Eastern European communist parties would enable them relatively rapidly to rebuild their former positions and return to power has no strong foundations. This factor will have a long impact also on the nature of relations between the CPSU and its partners in Eastern Europe and of our foreign policy toward our Western neighbors.

What kind of assessment of the events in Eastern Europe could be made by our society? It would be difficult to imagine any more convincing arguments in favor of the historical inevitability of radical change, moral purification and the definitive and irrevocable rejection of the power style of leadership. The trump cards of those who, ignoring the facts, stubbornly called for using the hidden potential of the administrative system, were defeated everywhere. Arguments in favor of reanimation of authoritarian management methods in social life have shriveled like shagreen leather over the past 6 months. The hardest possible blows at the ideas of the supporters of the directive-command "paradise" were the exposures in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Romania dealt the last blow at the barracks-communist slant. What is left? All that is left is to seek new ways of development. For example, without any excessive noise, within its own economic life Vietnam turned a "green light" to market-oriented relations and petty private ownership (which, incidentally, had an immediate beneficial effect on the availability of goods). China is continuing with the economic reforms of the previous decade. What will allow the supporters of administrative-command socialism now to emphasize its attractiveness, merits and historical gains? The theoreticians of neo-Stalinism have been deprived of the actual proof that the social structure they suggest—despite the entire seeming logic of their views and outstanding ability to put together complex mosaics out of quotations—could successfully function in real life.

A world in which the ideas of socialism were conquering ever new countries and continents, where the socialist community was the decisive revolutionary force of our time and where the nations lived as a united single family and the parties were close to each other like brothers, turned out, when tested, to be more of an illusion than reality. The Stalinist model of socialist building, imposed upon other countries, hindered their progress. The crisis became irreversible. The socialist "camp," created by an authoritarian system, died. The old Eastern Europe no longer exists and the outlines of a new one are merely beginning to transpire. The changes occurred not by themselves. The impetus came from Soviet perestroika, and all the proper reasons exist to see

in the occurring processes a return to the natural historical social progress, one which is not deformed by outside pressure, and which would take better into consideration the specific features of individual countries. The new role of the Soviet Union in Eastern European affairs will not cause us any fatal harm. Rather the opposite, it would enable us to make objectives with current possibilities sensibly consistent.

The peaceful evolution of the Eastern European countries will improve the situation throughout the world and broaden international cooperation. It alone can increase opportunities for the faster development of Eastern Europe and the use of the socialist elements which are part of the practices of highly developed industrial societies. In the final account, this is the way to preserve the long-term possibilities for the development of humanistic and democratic societies consistent with the socialist ideal.

**Gregor Gizi: "The Crisis Cannot be Surmounted Without the SED- PDS"**

More than 95 percent of the delegates who attended the extraordinary conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, last December, voted to elect Gregor Gizi party chairman. He is 41, doctor of law, chairman of the Council of GDR Lawyers' Collegium. He became known in society and the party as a result of his efforts to defend so-called dissidents.

**KOMMUNIST:** What is characteristic of the processes currently occurring in the GDR and what is the main result of the extraordinary party congress? What role will it play in the revolutionary changes?

**Gregor Gizi:** Let me begin with a preliminary remark. Our country is experiencing a difficult situation. The irresponsibility, criminal actions and arrogance of the former leadership in its attitude toward the people and support of mental stereotypes became the reasons for the profound discrediting of the party. The masses which took to the streets achieved a radical renovation of policy. The events literally drowned the republic. Today we can already say that it is precisely in the course of the street demonstrations, people's representative authorities, roundtable meetings and daily work that the people realize that the crisis cannot be surmounted without the SED-PDS.

As to the extraordinary congress, let us emphasize that as we begin a new life, we are fully resolved to cleanse ourselves, to get rid of the Stalinist legacy. This is a prerequisite for the success of democratic socialism. The sessions of the congress at Berlin's Dynamo Palace of Sports were quite lively. Occasionally opposite views clashed. The delegates called things by their names and openly spoke out in favor of change. Many party members regained confidence in themselves and began to act with greater cohesion.

As to the results of the congress, let me single out three aspects: first, a discussion on the program and the

forthcoming objectives of the SED-PDS has been initiated within our party. In the statutes adopted at the congress, which will be improved before the next congress, the party stated that it will be the political representative of the social interests of all working people. It is with this in mind that we are entering the electoral struggle for the people's chamber, set for 6 May 1990.

Second, the extraordinary congress proved that the SED-PDS favors the existence of a sovereign GDR, as opposed to a "great" Germany of right-wing forces. We shall not allow any spreading of neo-Nazism or right-wing radicalism in our country. Public opinion surveys confirm that our views are shared by the majority of the people. This also applies to problems of the European peace order, eliminating the division of the continent and building a common European home. In that sense, we favor a "contractual community" with the FRG.

We are well aware of the fact that our neighbors and all nations in Europe are closely following the development of relations between the two German states. Understanding their concern, we are prepared to assume our share of responsibility for the preservation of peace. Within the country we intend to continue to do everything possible so that, together with the other parties, public organizations and new democratic movements, we can defend the sovereignty of the GDR and win over those who hesitate for, clearly, there are some who do not realize what is at stake.

Third, I would like to point out that the congress formulated many specific proposals in the interest of democratic socialism. We supported the Modrow government.

**KOMMUNIST:** What are the basic principles in the program for action of the new party leadership in the economic, political and spiritual areas? In your opinion, what is the correlation between the critical and the creative aspects in party activities?

**Gizi:** Naturally, given the limits of this kind of interview, I can indicate merely the general outline of our concept of democratic socialism. It was impossible, in the course of a few days, to draft a mature party program. Such a program cannot be issued "from above." It must develop "from below." The draft documents were made public. At the next congress we shall definitely pass the proper resolution concerning them. As I pointed out, we favor democratic socialism on German soil. By this we understand the following: unrestricted people's rule and a law-governed state, constitutionally guaranteed political pluralism, and a parliament which has been democratically elected and enjoys high reputation. It is a question of radically changing the entire political system in our country rather than of cosmetic repairs.

We must quite quickly lay the legal foundations for the process of democratization of society, particularly as they pertain to the democratic electoral law, the law on parties, the law on mass information media, the law on

the status of enterprises, and others. Roundtable meetings will not be merely a temporary phenomenon in the GDR's political system. We consider them a major element of democratic debate on basic problems of politics and specific topics. Naturally, they neither can nor should take the place of a parliament or of respective governmental authorities. However, roundtable meetings could help to surmount mistrust within society. They should provide real opportunities for interaction among all democratic forces.

The primary task in the field of economics is to preserve our economy's ability to function and secure population supplies. We must also prevent the further blood-letting and "bargain selling" of the GDR. At present this is quite a difficult matter. Nonetheless, we support the economic reform earmarked by Modrow's coalition government, the essence of which is the taking of urgent medium-term and long-term measures aimed at economic consolidation and radical restructuring. The basic elements of the party's views on such problems were listed at the congress: preserving the public ownership of the most important means of production, effective assistance to cooperatives and private initiative in industry and agriculture, trade and crafts and strengthening cooperative, state and private ownership in agriculture.

On this basis we shall redefine the correlation between plan and market and the role and realm of competence of combines, enterprises and cooperatives. We are striving to develop a productive modern economy, consistent with present and future ecological requirements, an economy oriented toward the actual needs of the people. All of this is attainable only with the strict observance of the principle of wages based on labor, combined with the new ideas of the correlation between productivity and social protection for all citizens in our country. The GDR economy will become increasingly open to efficient international cooperation and division of labor. The party proceeds from the fact that the Soviet Union remains the most important partner of the republic.

We support the basic socialist values and their legal protection. This involves liberating spiritual life from dogmatism, narrow-mindedness and edification, abandoning any prejudices in the development of science, education and culture, and creating all the necessary prerequisites for the free development of the individual and his capabilities and talents. It is precisely in that area that we see major omissions. Naturally, this includes tolerance of variety of opinions, and freeing schools and VUZs and science as a whole from any outside petty supervision.

Let me say a few words about **the second part of the question**, which deals with the correlation between the critical and creative aspects in our party's activities. Understandably, the type of sharp turn which we must make today (at this point the CPSU experience coincides with ours) is impossible without a profound analysis of the past. Justifiably the party and hundreds of thousands of honest comrades, society, demand systematic actions

in settling accounts with the past, and a break with the wrong policy. We must mercilessly expose the reasons for all deformations in society and abuses of power, corruption and subjectivism. Only thus can we create reliable guarantees against any repeat of distortions. For a long time the "discussion of errors" was equated within the party with harmful or even hostile activities. Lack of criticism and complacency prevailed. Today the party needs a critical self-assessment, a creative concern, and a proper standard of discussions. In this respect as well the extraordinary congress said something new.

**KOMMUNIST:** What were the results of 40 years of development of the GDR? Were these, as is sometimes being said, lost years or was a certain base established for further work? What socialist traditions and what type of experience acquired in 40 years will you carry with you to the future democratic and socialist Germany?

**Gizi:** The 40 years of GDR are by no means lost years. Those who claim the opposite have a coarsened overall picture, blocked by current bitterness and disappointment. Through their own forces, on the material and spiritual wreckage left by the Nazi rule, the people built an essentially socialist state, despite all of its deformations, a state which was able to establish itself despite the fierce opposition of its enemies, a state which gained a reputation throughout the world. A great deal of that which was accomplished will be passed on to our descendants. Over the past 40 years we achieved a high standard of education and skills for the overwhelming majority of the people. There was social protection for all and a living standard which rose, albeit slowly, unburdened by unemployment and a housing problem. This too is part of our achievements. We created a cooperated agriculture. Despite the many erroneous orders "from above," the peasants remained peasants. They were able significantly to upgrade labor productivity and their own well-being.

Fascism and chauvinism were rejected by society. The people favor peace and friendship among nations and an alliance with the Soviet Union and their socialist neighbors and with all socialist and progressive countries, parties and movements. However, we could have achieved significantly more—politically, economically and culturally—had we been able to rid ourselves earlier of the Stalinist system which held back the creative forces of the people and, in the final account, which led society to stagnation and crisis.

Today we rely heavily on the experience which was acquired particularly during the first years after liberation from fascism. I am referring to the great idea of the communists about a revolution which frees man from all forms of exploitation and slavery, the parliamentary traditions of social democracy, favoring reform and communal self-management, the legacy of the anti-fascist resistance, the struggle against war and militarism, anti-Semitism and racism, or else pacifistic actions in opposition of violence and in favor of tolerance.

We are currently going through a stage of very critical re-evaluation of the results of our 40 years of development and we can see that which has retained its value and has survived despite errors and anomalies: a feeling of solidarity, readiness for productive toil, aspiration for social protection and justice, and high civic activeness in matters of peace, disarmament, international partnership for the sake of security. We can rely on this as we follow the path of democratic socialism in a sovereign GDR.

We shall do everything which depends on us so that, together with the other equal parties and social forces, we can create the type of social organism which would combine a law-governed state, real democracy, economic power and ecological health, social protection and freedom for all. All of this we link to the concept of socialism.

**KOMMUNIST:** How do you conceive of the role of the new GDR in building a common European home and in developing cooperation with the other socialist countries?

**Gizi:** Our party would like the GDR to encourage a basic turn in European intergovernmental relations toward demilitarization and democratization, variety within unity and joint progress by the European countries through cooperation. To this effect we require the interaction among nations and states within the framework of a European peace order. That is how we conceive of building a common European home.

The GDR will be able to participate in this process only if it retains its statehood. Naturally, we can see and feel the historically appeared features of national commonality between the Germans of both countries. Nonetheless, the existence of the two German states is a guarantee for peace, security and stability, something which the other nations of Europe and the rest of the world would not like to abandon. That is why we believe that a solution of the German problem is acceptable only within the framework of a common European process. Partnership between the two German states is consistent with the interests of our neighbors and the rest of the world, for it is a guarantee that no threat whatsoever would ever originate on German soil. That is why we favor firm respect for the European borders which appeared as a result of World War II, which was unleashed by Germany, and above all the Oder-Neisse border with Poland. We favor full recognition of European treaties, particularly the Helsinki process. We are in favor of the type of cooperation between Berlin, as our capital, and West Berlin, which would take place within a common European dimension and would contribute to the development of economic, cultural and spiritual life on our continents. In our view, West Berlin must participate in the treaties signed with the FRG on the basis of the quadripartite accords. At the same time, we unequivocally state that those who are demanding today a specific German way of unification (of the two German



states—editors) outside a European unification are playing with fire, whether they realize it or not.

Should the border separating the two German states be removed prior to European unification, claims would arise in many parts of Europe about revising the borders. New hotbeds of tension would appear. This would create a major threat to peace, once again caused by the Germans.

We, GDR socialists, proclaim our support of the allied obligations assumed by the GDR and favor greater politization and democratization of the Warsaw Pact. We are in favor of increasing the extent and intensiveness of spiritual and cultural ties with the Soviet Union, our socialist neighbors and all other socialist countries. We are in favor of expanding tourism and the development of all forms of friendly relations based on reciprocal interests.

Let me assure you that the SED-PDS, although it considers friendship and cooperation with the CPSU and the Soviet Union exceptionally necessary and useful, does not have a pragmatic attitude toward them. Our attitude toward the Soviet Union is a question of internationalist conviction, a matter of the mind and the heart. The German Left, whether left-wing social democrats, socialists or communists, has always been the friend of the Soviet Union. Many progressive German intellectuals and men of culture and the arts have manifested their solidarity with the country of the Red October. Mikhail Gorbachev's message met with great response at our congress.

#### **Cestmir Cisarz: "Politics Does Not Tolerate Stagnation"**

This statement, which we have used to head this interview, was made by a person who, alongside A. Dubcek, became one of the symbols of the 1968 "Prague Spring." From March to August 1968 he was member of the CZCP Central Committee Presidium. From the autumn of 1968 to October 1969 he was chairman of the Czech National Council. In March 1970 he was expelled from the CZCP. At that time he was 50. He is a political scientist and author of a number of works on the theory of democratic and humane socialism.

**KOMMUNIST:** Of late a great deal is being said and written in Czechoslovakia about the lost 20 years. You as well have frequently spoken out on this topic. Let us narrow this question, however, and discuss mainly the last 2 years which were lost in the renovation of society by the former CZCP leadership, headed by Jakes.

**Cestmir Cisarz:** Nonetheless, I would begin with 1985. The moment perestrojka was initiated in the USSR, opportunities appeared for the honest expression of opinions and the truthful analysis of the situation; the members of the CZCP, who had been deprived of their party cards after 1968, expected the same to occur in Czechoslovakia. We hoped that the Central Committee and the party's leadership would include forces which

would condemn the vicious practices of the past. Unfortunately, this did not occur. The former ideologue J. Fojtik said that all that was being done in the Soviet Union was for us a stage we had crossed a long time ago and that it was not necessary for us to revise party policy. We, former members of the CZCP, clearly realized that this was a case of camouflage, that the party's leadership was unwilling to change anything. Furthermore, considerations were expressed according to which Soviet perestrojka was a kind of "transitional period," an adventure. The view which predominated in the CZCP Central Committee was that the situation in the country was stable, everything was proceeding normally, and there was no reason for the party to take any kind of renovation steps. This continued until January 1987, when the first cautious statements began to appear within the CZCP Central Committee to the effect that Czechoslovakia would have to have some kind of restructuring. In my view, it was already then that we had fallen behind in renovation by nearly 2 years.

Eventually, the CZCP leadership announced that it too was initiating perestrojka. However, this was presented as some kind of cosmetic operation. Although calls for democratization were sounded, millions of party and nonparty members remained, as before, deprived of a voice. This was a "democratization" only for the apparat and there was not even a question of any kind of dialogue with the people. I recall, in this connection, one of the first manifestations of such "democratization:" a television roundtable meeting. This was an entertaining show: eight participants simulated a debate. Essentially, however, their speeches were like duplicates of the same text.

Such "democratization" lasted another 2 full years, until January 1989, when the first major clash between police and demonstrators, mainly students, occurred on the occasion of the anniversary of Jan Palah, who set himself afire. On that occasion I wrote a commentary entitled "Palah's Week." That week in January turned out to be truly catastrophic for the CZCP leadership: for the first time, its total helplessness, its inability to solve arising problems through political methods and to understand the entire depth of the crisis in which the country had found itself, were manifested most emphatically. Nonetheless, the government was able to cling to power for yet another almost full year, relying on repressive forces. Clashes between police and demonstrators occurred on 21 August and 28 October 1989. These were the last desperate signals sent to the CZCP. The events of 17 November 1989 were the last drop which made the cup of the people's indignation overflow.

To sum it up, let me point out that neglecting the need for radical restructuring and renovation led to increased tension within society. The rank-and-file party members were paralyzed by the fear of repressive measures by the party apparat. The party's authority declined. Unlike 1968, when the process of renovation had begun within the party and been taken up by its leadership, more than 20 years later, no real renovation trends existed in the party. This process was initiated outside the CZCP,

directly within the society, the broad popular masses. Meanwhile, the political gentlemen, as I describe the former CZCP leadership, continued to label as "opposition" any renovation trend born outside the CZCP. This, in particular, immediately included the "Renaissance" Club which was founded by former party members at the start of 1989. We, who were aspiring to restore the idea of 1968 on a modern basis, were instantly labeled by the CZCP Central Committee as "enemies" and "paid agents of the West." Similar labels were put on the other forces of renovation within the Czechoslovak people.

The only description of such a political approach could be none other than savage. Millions of citizens in the country could not be "agents of the West." In short, the more than 4 years which had passed, were not only lost years from the viewpoint of the fact that absolutely nothing had been done to renovate, to restructure the society, but also because this was a period of total discrediting of the CZCP, something which it had done with its own hands. Instead of becoming the vanguard of social renovation, it became the main obstacle on the path of radical reforms, so tightly was it bound by its huge apparat structures, both party and governmental, which, although had lately begun to use perestrojka terminology, essentially remained the main opponents of radical change. However, the people cannot be deceived. On 17 November this barrier as well was crossed. After the tragic events in the center of Prague, the virtually entire population of the city rose. Therefore, the November actions were not some kind of student rebellion but a national movement which broke down the ruling party.

**KOMMUNIST:** Therefore, the renovation of Czechoslovak society is only now beginning, in December of 1989. Do you think that, after the old party leadership had expelled from the ranks of the CZCP some 500,000 reform-minded party members, who participated in the "Prague Spring," the party itself could initiate any radical restructuring in the country?

**Cisarz:** It seems to me that, in principle, it could have done so as early as 4 years ago, considering how strong the impetus from the outside was. Naturally, however, to do this the party had to be rid of a substantial number of leaders who had discredited themselves. This was not easy to do. Here again I must mention the events of nearly 20 years ago. The point is that Gustav Husak always viewed the party as a monolith, based on inviolable unity. He considered incredible the very possibility of a drastic change of generations in the party's leadership. People held leading positions for periods of 30 years. This was considered normal. Some of them turned into some sort of party governors-general, something which we did not have even before World War II! In as much as we had a nobility, most of it was German. When the leading party officials begin to believe that they have "blue blood," the indication is that that party is approaching its decline.

**KOMMUNIST:** Nonetheless, did G. Husak have any opportunity for reform?

**Cisarz:** Yes, indeed he had. However, he lost it. His first actions, following his election to the position of party leader, were constructive. He said that everything positive which had existed in the concepts of the Czechoslovak reform should be preserved and implemented on an organized basis. In other words, he wanted to avoid uncontrolled development and keep his fingers on the pulse beat of the reform. In principle, such a policy could have been welcome. However, he was unable to pursue it even for a single year. Why? The point is that, having eliminated from leading positions the reform communists, he opened the way to the top to the most inveterate dogmatists and sectarians, essentially becoming their "hostage." Soon afterwards he found himself relying on an entirely different party aktiv compared to the one which existed when he took over as party leader. The CZCP lost nearly half a million of its most active members, who were ready to fight for it. Who was left? Essentially passive people, time-servers, dogmatists and Stalinists. Actually, this process was even more difficult than under A. Novotny, against whom G. Husak had spoken out in his time. The CZCP began to wither away.

A lawyer by training, G. Husak had a poor understanding of economic problems. As a result, he probably failed to notice the way the apparat had suggested to him economic policy options which left not even a trace of the 1968 Reform. In my view, this was what was the most tragic for the country. A rather primitive concept prevailed in the party's leadership: all that is necessary is to feed the people well, provide some material and social guarantees, and their ruling mandate will be eternal. Although indeed, in our market, compared with other countries in Eastern Europe, the situation as a whole was favorable, and the people had no problem with food, there were also dachas and cars, there was always something or other being prohibited in the country. It was precisely this that was the major error, although as far as a state of mind is concerned, our people could hardly be classified as rebellious. They had withstood those 20 years and even when, by the end of November, the peaceful revolution began, not a single shop window or grassy lawn suffered. No one could fault the people for lack of tolerance.

**KOMMUNIST:** How to explain, therefore, the following: at the recent extraordinary CZCP Congress, when words about democracy, and humanism were heard from the rostrum, many delegates in the hall booed them. Is it possible for dogmatism and neo-Stalinism to leave such profound traces?

**Cisarz:** Our misfortune is that over the past 20 years many members of the leading party body, from party committees of primary organizations and raykoms to the superior echelons, had developed a style of behavior as though they were the actual masters of the country and the people were their subjects. This is a real calamity which was further worsened by the fact that many of the

people who had replaced those expelled after the "Prague Spring" lacked basic culture and education. Unquestionably, they were always aware of this, for which reason they asserted their superiority not through their intellect but through power instruments. Incidentally, all cadre policy during that time was based on the same principles. These are the typical features of an "apparatus party." The entire experience in party work in a developed or developing society indicates that the people who do the best work in the party are those who are the best in their profession, regardless of whether they are workers, teachers or physicians. But who educates the party? Not its activists but the apparatchiks or, to be even more precise, employees who are good only when it comes to drafting references and writing speeches in their offices. That is not all. They fear the members of worker collectives and are poorly acquainted with their way of life and concerns.

As to the congress delegates, in my view many of them have still not abandoned the old way of thinking according to which the majority of them considered the party's role as their own the moment they had attained a party position. This means that they had no authority as individuals. This lack was compensated by the authority of power. Essentially, these were the same old birthmarks of Stalinism. The present CZCP is as yet to get rid of them. I spoke of this openly with the new party leadership with whom I met recently. The initial steps have been taken by the CZCP in the struggle against neo-Stalinism. However, these are merely the initial steps.

**KOMMUNIST:** The program of the Czechoslovak government of national accord stipulates, starting with January 1990, a profound reform in political, social and economic life and a sharp turn toward establishing a market-style economy. This is favored by Vaclav Havel, the leader of the Civic Forum and by you as well. What happened to the slogans raised during the "Prague Spring?" Its leaders operated under the slogan of "socialism with a human face" and "democratic socialism." In today's Prague, covered with posters and leaflets, not once did I see those slogans. It seemed to me that the young people consider them an anachronism. Have they become obsolete?

**Cisarz:** To begin with, it is only the supporters of the old way of thinking that can see a threat to socialism in the elements of market relations. As to our 20-year old slogans, indeed, the present generation no longer supports them. The very term "socialism," regardless of qualifying adjectives, triggers a negative reaction in today's youth. The fault for this is entirely that of the CZCP. Naturally, it did not do this consciously but nonetheless it did it itself. J. Havlin, the author of our school reform, proclaimed that what was decisive in raising the young generation are communist convictions and not knowledge. This slogan was taken up by the zealous administrators in public education. In VUZs students were not allowed to take exams on basic subjects before passing a test or an examination in Marxism.

Naturally, this did not apply to the real, the critical and live Marxist doctrine but to our "Talmudist" interpretation. After graduation, the young people did not even want to hear about it. Obviously, it was no accident that one of the first demands of the students during the November demonstrations was "down with Marxism in the training process!" followed by "down with single party rule!"

**KOMMUNIST:** Could a renovated CZCP hope that some of the intellectual potential of the party, which was thrown "overboard" after 1968 will join it? How do you assess the chances of the CZCP at the forthcoming parliamentary elections and what is your attitude toward the Civic Forum?

**Cisarz:** It seems to me that out of the 500,000 people expelled from the CZCP a few dozen, perhaps a hundred people will return. No one wants to have anything to do with the party. This is sad but is a fact. We, the ex-members, are known in the country as the "party of the expelled." Some of the younger people even suggested that they set up their own left-wing party, similar to the Hungarian Socialist Party, which was created last October on the basis of the former MSZMP. Such moods exist in the present CZCP as well, as found in the "Democratic Forum of Communists" group, which is part of the CZCP and has 60,000 members. Naturally, this is a minority compared with the more than 1.5 million CZCP members. On the other hand, however, one way or another new left-wing parties will appear on our political horizon. It seems to me that the future belongs not to the "organized monsters" but to the small parties.

As to today's CZCP, the leadership of which was assumed by L. Adamec after the congress, it seems to me that despite the energetic attitude of the new leader, the current difficult period in the party could last for years. The problem is that there are virtually no personalities within the party who could attract the people. If at the forthcoming parliamentary elections of May-June the party would garner 20 percent of the vote it could consider this a success. For this to happen, however, a very active electoral program is needed. The CZCP has totally lost its experience in electoral campaigning. It has become accustomed to order the people and not to fight for their support.

As to the Civic Forum, it was a movement which was born 2 days after the dispersal of the students. This occurred at the joint meeting of all opposition forces. One of the principal merits of the Civic Forum is that all the thousands-strong demonstrations which were held in Prague and other cities were extraordinarily well-organized. The political coup d'etat in the country took place without casualties or excesses. Essentially, the Civic Forum used the tactic of the communists in 1948. It is only that the vector of the development of events was turned in another direction.

The members of the Civic Forum drew valuable lessons from the February 1948 Coup and, in terms of tactics, did not invent anything new. In precisely the same way that the communists felt in their time, the Civic Forum felt that its authority is strengthening. It began to capture one position after another at a headlong pace. It destroyed all the antidemocratic barriers which Jakes and his predecessors had erected. Even the nomination of Havel as candidate for the presidency is also part of the arsenal of the CZCP tactics of more than 40 years ago. I have a positive attitude toward all this. Such is the logic of the political struggle.

What do I see that is negative in the current process? Unfortunately, as the way to democracy is being opened, occasionally it has been necessary to resort to methods which were not all that democratic.

**KOMMUNIST:** Our outstanding story-teller Yevgeniy Shvarts said on this occasion that in order to defeat the dragon one must become one!

**Cisarz:** Almost. In order for the present coup to have taken place it was necessary to resort to a certain political and psychological pressure. On the other hand, otherwise we would have been unable to get rid of the old regime. The main thing is that the Civic Forum systematically achieved all that had been promised to the people: respect for the democratic rights of all citizens without exceptions, preventing repressive measures against political enemies, and free elections in which all political parties, including the CZCP, participate on an equal basis. In the course of time the Civic Forum could convert into an essentially new foundation for national accord, a kind of renovated National Front.

**Vaclav Havel: "I Have Not Been and Will Not Be a Member of the Party"**

Such was the short answer to one of the questions asked by KOMMUNIST's special correspondent, asked of Vaclav Havel, today president of Czechoslovakia, shortly before the elections. This 53-year old playwright, who in 20 years saw not one of his plays staged on the Czechoslovak theater, became one of the leading directors of the actions which, only yesterday, seemed to many nothing other than a splendid theme for a surrealist theater. Today it is a reality, known as the Czechoslovak "gentle" revolution. It is not played on the theater proscenium. It is played throughout the country and the actors are the entire people.

For entirely understandable reasons today we are more interested not in Havel's literary works and his practical experience although both unquestionably deserve our attention, but in his views and judgments on various problems. An idea of them may be acquired from Havel's speeches on Czechoslovak television and his answers to questions asked by foreign journalists, including from KOMMUNIST, at press conferences. We have combined them by topic.

#### **On the Attitude Toward Czechoslovak Communists and Socialism**

"Both Civic Forum and the Society Against Violence are not conspiracies against the communists. To begin with, our movements are not conspiratorial. In my view, today what matters more is not the type of party card one carries but whether one is a friend of democracy and peaceful development or, conversely, one favors the old order."

"Both Civic Forum and the Society Against Violence recommended as members of the government many communists such as, for example, Mr. Komarek and did not recommend some nonparty people who had compromised themselves. The 1,7 million members of the CZCP are not a kind of biological or moral species distinct from anyone else. Most of them were forced to keep silent for 20 years, as were the rest of us. Many of them, however, despite the difficulty involved, nonetheless accomplished good things. Dozens of worthy people worked on a planned concept for a radical economic reform which will not involve social upheavals, unemployment or inflation, as is feared by some. Many of them were party members, many of them were ex-communists and nonparty people. The truth is also, however, that the totalitarian system was defended with the bayonets of the Communist Party and that virtually all party members bear heightened responsibility for the state of decay in which our country found itself. This responsibility makes it incumbent upon them to draw proper conclusions and to work, perhaps even harder than all the rest, for the free future of all of us.... We ask all party members if, naturally, they wish it themselves, to renovate their party as quickly as possible, and to put at its head their best people, people with whom one can work and, in general, talk."

"On that level Mr. Adamec deserves great credit. He was the first to initiate talks with us. Our trust in the new prime minister, Mr. Calfa, is growing with every passing hour. If the rest of the communists would act the same way, this can only benefit our peoples and we would not have to fear anyone."

"Once I considered myself a supporter of socialist ideas. Some 15 years ago, however, I stopped using the word 'socialism,' for within our linguistic context it had lost any meaning whatsoever. It became a worn-out cliché used by the bureaucratic authority. If these people, who had no imagination, stopped liking someone, they labeled him an antisocialist element. Socialism was identified with Messrs. Jakes and Stepan. All of this, however, does not mean that I do not dream of social justice. It seems to me that the only way to achieve it is through a pluralistic economy, be it state enterprises, stock holding companies, cooperatives, self-managing enterprises or private enterprises. I consider more important the very renovation of the absolute autonomy of the subjects of economic activities and the market mechanism. Naturally, all of this must be related to a rational social policy. We have an abundant number of

examples around us from which to draw. However, they may be found rather in countries being run by social democrats and not communists."

#### Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

"Several days ago, when the leader of East Germany visited Prague, we agreed that Germany should be united. However, this can occur only when those who fear 'greater' Germany would stop fearing it. This will take place only when Europe becomes a single community of free and peace-loving countries."

"We would like to see them (the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia—editors) withdrawn as soon as possible. However, we are realists and realize that this decision should be linked to a general European disarmament process. We would be pleased if the strategists in Moscow and the West would act faster."

"If I am elected president and am given the opportunity to talk to Mr. Gorbachev, I will tell him roughly the same which I already said here in Prague to the representative of the CPSU Central Committee: above all, he should not be concerned with the development of events in Czechoslovakia. Such fears should not arise even if the word 'socialist' is deleted from the name of the country. The Soviet Union should rather fear a number of countries who describe themselves as such...." COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

#### Short Book Review

905B00160 *Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) pp 127-128*

[Text] "*Novaya Filosofiya Mira i Vneshnepoliticheskaya Deyatel'nost' KPSS*" [The New Philosophy of Peace and CPSU Foreign Policy Activities]. Academician Ye.M. Primakov, head of the group of authors. Politizdat, Moscow, 1989, 255 pages. Reviewed by Yu. Kuznets, doctor of historical sciences.

This book will interest people who are not especially involved with international problems. This is explained not only with the relevance of the problems it discusses, many of which, as it were, have not been the subject of profound studies. The authors try not simply to "describe" the course of events, as has been frequently the case in the past, but to identify the motive forces, contradictoriness and unity of global processes, the global nature of the new challenges to mankind and the need to provide comprehensive answers based on global consensus and on a universal human basis.

This indeed demands a new philosophy of peace. The work analyzes the origins of this new philosophy: the changed living conditions in the world community, the contemporary stage of the scientific and technical revolution, the development of universal interrelationships

and interdependencies under the influence of the tempestuous scientific and technical revolution and its consequences, and the appearance of real possibilities both for the progress of mankind as well as for its self-destruction. It is in this context that the new theoretical platform of the CPSU foreign policy course is considered.

Rereading V.I. Lenin, the authors bring to light the logic of development of the concept of peaceful coexistence, pointing out the fact that it was accepted by the party and the country as a fundamental foreign policy stipulation not immediately and not without hesitations, and that it was established in the course of a sharp struggle with the supporters of the course of "straightening out" the historical process and pitting revolution against peace and subordinating the policy of peaceful coexistence to narrowly and falsely conceived class interests. This policy has assumed a new quality, embodied in the program for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, which indeed has no alternative and which is consistent with the nature of a contemporary interrelated world in which there can be no safety for some if other are threatened.

The threat to civilization comes today not only from differences and conflicts between social systems, as was the case in the past, but also from violations of the ecological health of the planet and, above all, the oversaturation of the contemporary world with super-weapons. It was established, more than 20 years ago, that 400 nuclear charges on the megaton level would suffice to cause to any one of the sides "unacceptable harm." Yet already by the start of the 1980s 400 nuclear charges accounted for no more than 5 to 10 percent of the available potential of the USSR and the United States (see p 93). The theory of "superarmaments" and their consequences threw international relations into a state of crisis, the solution of which is possible only through the implementation of a comprehensive disarmament program.

The authors also pay attention to the problem of regional conflicts, which are sources of increased threat to peace. The analysis of the mechanism of their escalation is of interest, as it creates a threat of growing from a regional to a global level, and so does the initial effort to localize such conflicts by settling them on the basis of compromise and national reconciliation.

In addressing themselves to the most important areas of our foreign policy—interaction with the socialist countries, relations with the liberated countries and political dialogue with the capitalist countries—the authors concentrate on the new phenomena in these areas and on the new approaches taken by the CPSU to the study of such phenomena. The reader will appreciate the nonstandard classification of sections pertaining to Eastern Europe, Sino-Soviet relations, difficulties of socialist orientation and cooperation between the USSR and third world countries, and the development of a dialogue with the Western countries in the second half of the 1980s. Let us

note the fact that global problems have been included in this book on CPSU foreign policy.

Having read the book, let us express a few wishes on the further development of this topic. Let us consider above all the correlation between party and state foreign policy under the conditions of perestroika. In the past, one was always considered synonymous with the other. Since the CPSU is the ruling party, its foreign policy activities cannot fail to define the country's foreign policy as well. It is both interesting and timely, however, to ask the following: How, taking the further development of democratization and glasnost into consideration, will the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Union and autonomous republics and the broad public make a contribution to shaping the Soviet foreign policy course? What is the peculiarity and distinction between governmental foreign policy and CPSU international activities and how will the latter correlate with the former? A great deal of new developments are taking place in this area. The social base of our foreign policy is becoming, so to say, richer, broader and more active. The Soviet public is steadily guided by CPSU foreign policy activities but also tries to make its positive contribution to the cause of peace not only on a formal basis, as in the past, but differently. We would like to read about all this in greater detail.

Furthermore, it has already been quite widely acknowledged that the most neglected and stagnant has been the country's foreign policy activities precisely in the economic area. However, this matter has not been adequately covered in the book. We would like to draw the attention of the authors not only to the foreign economic area as such but also to the experience which was rapidly gained in its restructuring through democratization, the broadened range of its participants and internal initiatives and possibilities.

Finally, the ecological trend in our foreign policy activities could have been described more extensively. The international agreements involving the participation of the USSR should have been covered more extensively, particularly in terms of the new commitments assumed by the USSR in the area of environmental protection. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Chronicle

905B0016P Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 17 Jan 90) p 128

[Text] Representatives of the journal sponsored a round-table debate with the participants in the all-Union seminar on problems of improving the teaching of social disciplines in vocational-technical schools and with personnel of the USSR State Committee for Public Education. Problems related to the democratization of Soviet society, perestroika in the party, implementation of the economic reform and the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe were discussed.

A meeting was held between *KOMMUNIST* associates and the party aktiv of Shchelkovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. Problems of participation of the journal in solving the problems of perestroika and asserting the new political thinking in the international arena were considered. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990.

### Publication Data

905B0016Q Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 90

English Title: *KOMMUNIST*, No 2, January 1990

Russian title: *KOMMUNIST*, 2 (1354), Yanvar 1990

Editors: N.B. Bikkenin (editor-in-chief), A.I. Antipov, E.A. Arab-Ogly, B.S. Arkhipov, K.N. Brutents, Ye.T. Gaydar, I.A. Dedkov, O.R. Latsis, V.N. Nekrasov, Ye.Z. Razumov, N.N. Sibiryakov, Yu.A. Sklyarov, V.P. Trubnikov, P.N. Fedoseyev, S.F. Yarmolyuk.

Publishing House: Izdatelstvo "Pravda"

Place of Publication: Moscow

Date of Publication: January 1990

Signed to Press: 17 January 1990

Copies: 615,000 COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Kommunist", 1990

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