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KOMMUNIST

No 18, December 1988

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27 MARCH 1989

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KOMMUNIST

No 18, December 1988

Living Idea of Renewal

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No 18, Dec 88 (signed to press 5 Dec 88) pp 3-7*

[Editorial article]

[Text] This issue of KOMMUNIST is unusual. One could say that our journal's home is full of guests and that everything is as usual: same cover, same sections and typeface. This time, however, we are offering the reader, in our modest translation and, naturally, selection, 19 authors from 15 different Soviet publications, ranging from the Far East to the Baltic, from wall newspapers and factory house organs to academic journals.

The editors had not planned for such an issue. The idea of an issue-collection, an issue-anthology of "best political articles," came from reader Yu.N. Tepper, from Kiev. In particular, in agreeing with the modern satirist that "today it is more interesting to read than to live," he went on to say: "To live is difficult. People to whom perestroika means being reduced to nothing are stronger, better organized and more stubborn than people favoring a breakthrough. The work which the journal is doing today means support of the people in favor of perestroika, a support on which they are entitled."

On the eve of the new year of 1989, critically looking back, we nonetheless hope that our reader is right and is not greatly exaggerating, and that spiritual support given by the press means indeed a great deal to those who struggle for perestroika and for a humane and democratic socialism.

However, we rejected the idea of collecting in this issue mandatorily the "best" articles published during the year. Some of them are indeed the best. They are quite well known and were extensively disseminated, for they were published in popular monthlies and weeklies in the individual capitals. Others do not entirely coincide with the trend and profile of our journal and it would be inappropriate to reprint them without proper comments. That is why we preferred to take a different way and try to offer the reader the daily live dynamics of social thinking, which is taking place on different levels of intensiveness and with varying success, but ubiquitously. We selected the most typical and meaningful press articles, primarily from journals—republic and local. The reader will be able to see for himself that conceptual renovation, new thinking, and revival of creative Marxist thinking are not beautiful yet meaningless words but daily work which is taking place everywhere, on all social levels, and gathering strength with every passing day.

We have the right to disagree with some shifts and emphases of live ideas which aspire to the truth. However, this does not eliminate our respect for them and understanding of their social and scientific value. Nor does it block our desire to provide them with a broader outlet than in the past. The articles assembled here, each one in its own way, characterize the spiritual-moral dynamics of society and the party and, in their totality, we hope, enable us to understand that the intellectual work which is taking place in the country is not reduced in the least to the activities of a few journalists in the capital. If the local press, the oblast and rayon in particular, is poor in thoughts and is sluggish in its scholastic-formal reproduction of post-April party ideas, which is frequently the case, the only thing this indicates is that minds, knowledge, experience and human talent remain ignored, and creative resources are left unused or are even suppressed. Never, even during the darkest years—the years of fear and stagnation—was the grayness of the press a reflection of the true condition of the popular mind and popular understanding of things and of true party consciousness. In producing this issue, as a type of survey of the contemporary press, naturally not complete but also limited by our possibilities (several articles have been abridged), we thus expressed our wish to support the efforts of all of our colleagues who are consistently and fearlessly following the path of perestroika and are seeing to it that, above all, the party press maintain a high intellectual and moral authority and is the true voice of the people and the party, the voice of reason and conscience.

Let us be objective: that which is taking place in the social and spiritual life of our society is historically significant and, actually, unprecedented. Recalling the 1920s or 1960s, we see that the situation was similar but not the same. Or else, it was quite different. In the 1920s, leaving behind the Civil War and "war communism," the revolution sought peaceful and optimally clear ways of development, while retaining sufficiently broad concepts concerning the cultural foundations and future of socialism. In the 1960s, for the first time in nearly 3 decades, the revolution was given the opportunity of looking at the past and tried to understand what had happened to it, and the sinister transformations and misfortunes it had gone through. The situation today is different: the features of the 1920s and those of the 1960s have blended within a new historical picture, encompassing, in addition to the abandoned and unresolved problems of the past, the hopes, problems and painful questions and restored the socialist hopes of the new period, the mid-1980s, with their truly revolutionary thirst for cleansing and renovation of the ideals of the October Revolution and their experienced and ever clearer orientation toward the priority of human values, the priority of democracy and humanism.

However new, inspired and decisive this historical image may be, absolute purity and completeness are inaccessible: By what miracle could we make instantly disappear

the distorting, destroying and equalizing power of many years of total dogmatism, political fear and immoderate state supervision and civic apathy?

This must be taken into consideration. The outbreak, the explosion of spiritual energy in society is not a metaphor remote from reality, but a reality which finds itself restrained in terms of ordinary definitions. Such an outbreak or explosion is the stronger and more unpredictable the thicker becomes the scab of mental and social customs and the greater the inertia of the old customary and uncritical motion and the more stubborn become all varieties of lies and pharisaic behavior in the course of their resistance. It is true that one cannot live endlessly with suppressed wishes, blocked ideas and unattained hopes, and with unnecessary knowledge and unanswered questions. However, the harsh and bitter truth is that it was precisely thus that we lived for decades....

Such a depressing conclusion does not mean that all ideas had been blocked and all interests suppressed and that all knowledge remained unasked for. A great deal of that which was necessary to maintain our great power status was done persistently, well and responsibly. We are discussing something else, however: the mental and moral status of society, the quality of its self-awareness and self-respect and its relations with a state which had exaggerated its rights and, finally, the possibility of the equal application of the best efforts of every person—party and nonparty member, believer and nonbeliever, male or female, young and old, urban or rural resident. Unquestionably, in the depth of society, in the depth of popular life the development of ideas and the acquisition of knowledge never stopped; bright minds and talented hands were never destroyed. Many examples prove this fact, although we must not forget that quite frequently tragic neglect was their lot.

A powerful intellectual initiative by the new party leadership was necessary in order to disrupt the established order according to which thinking was essentially centralized and monopolized, when it was implanted and disseminated from above while the movement of the mind from below—"the great initiative" of the working people!—was not even considered. Something was "organized" within comfortable limits and in specific directions....

Glasnost as a standard of socialist daily life, codified by the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, is not amazing in itself. What is amazing is the wealth, the variety of opinions, ideas, suggestions and initiatives for which it provided an outlet. Therefore, this entire wealth of thought was waiting for its hour to strike and, therefore, readiness for change had long existed within the people.

New thinking, like any other thinking, whatever its name, can be neither decreed nor imposed. There must be a historical predisposition for it and there simply

must be a need for it. New thinking matured since the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It already existed in our society but as though not entirely mature, almost concealed, and it was as yet to emerge on the surface of life, to be named and to be "legalized." It was named, marking the greatest possible shift in the hierarchy of socialist social values toward man and mankind, defining their place in the center of contemporary Marxist philosophy.

The initial reckoning point in the articles we are offering to the reader is man in the socialist country, his toil and the free development of his personality, his civic obligations and rights, and his prosperity and happiness. Whatever we may be discussing—international security, the development of science as a major prerequisite for progress, preserving what is nationally specific in culture, combining education with professionalism, the state based on law or the role of philosophy and social theory today—everything is essentially related to the single idea of the destiny of man under socialism and the further destiny of socialism itself, the ways of its comprehensive reorganization and renovation. There is a clear awareness that the real status of man in the state and his real possibilities, real life and real value of his life are determined by the level of development and dignity of society and the extent of its democracy and socialism.

V.I. Vernadskiy, whose statements on problems of the science of philosophy are reproduced here, warned against the creation of "greenhouse conditions" for any given officially protected trend of thought, for this inevitably leads to the "dying out" of all creativity. An atmosphere of open and free competition and discussion, created by perestroika, clearly identifies the weakness of some theoretical elaborations whose "safety" was artificially protected for decades through nonintellectual methods. "A free thought," V.I. Vernadskiy wrote, "is the foundation of philosophical creativity; it does not tolerate and support chains." Let us add that it does not put chains either on itself or on others; for otherwise it pays not only through its inability to engage in ideological self-defense but also becomes totally dependent on unscientific factors. The problems which, for example, are considered in the article on Russia and Marx by M. Geftler, and the very structure of his thoughts could trigger a variety of responses. However, it is precisely this type of fearless dynamics of a questing mind that can awaken not a narrow-textbook or superficially propagandist but a living, creative and truly contemporary interest in the history and fate of Marxism in Russia.

More than anything else, the true scientist makes us think and think through to the end, without ignoring "uncomfortable" and "unpleasant" facts which destroy the value of a concept. We hope that it is this precise approach that was adopted on this topic, in this issue of the journal.

In the time since April 1985, the party has let it be clearly understood that it does not claim to have a monopoly on the truth in each specific case and in each area of

scientific or artistic quest, and that it is ready to seek this truth and advance toward it along with society and the people, together with literature, art and science. The further destinies of the revolution and socialism depend on the joint work, on the joint creativity displayed by all constructive and socialist-oriented forces in the country, the ability to hear out and win over opponents, the ability to rally anyone ready for joint efforts and to assume responsibility for the good of the people.

Within this pluralistic movement of social thinking, which finds an outlet in newspapers and journals, we find today a variety of disparate trends. It would be difficult to qualify some of them as constructive. A closer look at some current statements concerning the October Revolution, would show that V.G. Korolenko, whose sharp letters addressed to A.V. Lunacharskiy opposing coercion by "commissars" have to do with a comment in this issue, describing much more accurately his Bolshevik contemporaries than do their present accusers. The clear mark of thoughtlessness and little knowledge is found in occasional statements of this kind. However, in order to promote a criticism of the entire revolutionary history of the country, do we need somewhat serious arguments or, in general, should we try to understand the logic of the human struggle for a better life, which is what makes history? Why? Is it in order to promote and encourage confused passions, which are mysterious and boring and which do not shine with intellect and cultivate stories about "Masons," who made mother Russia deviate from the just path, or else the nationalistic attacks mounted against "Moscow's omnipotence?"

Expanding the area of glasnost and pluralistic exchange of views, unexpectedly turned out paralleled by a noticeable decline in the cultural and ethical standards of the debates. This makes all the more urgent the participation in such debates of truly progressive and competent representatives of the public's thinking, who can counter the irrationalism of strongly supported myths with the rationalism of strict and objective scientific knowledge.

We believe that competence and conscientiousness, scientific grounds and perspicacity, loyalty to life and its true interests and needs are the determining feature of the articles included in this survey and anthology-like issue. They include arguments, critiques, the experience of perestroika and the dramatic recollection of the days of the revolution. Most importantly, they include the living thoughts of our contemporaries who have adopted perestroika as a long awaited opportunity to wage a real struggle for the democratization of the country, its economic revival, and socialism, which is the heir of all that is best in world culture.

We repeat: we are offering to you not a holiday of the mind but its daily work in the interpretation of life, perestroika, history and the future.

Naturally, such work knows neither respite nor an end. However, it will remain no more than a word or an abundance of words, albeit most accurate and outstanding, unless they are followed by action, by systematic and decisive action. The September and November CPSU Central Committee plenums and the regular and extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as well as the sessions of the Supreme Soviet Presidium indicated that the first stage in the reform of the political system in the country in all the most important areas has been undertaken. Major and essential changes are taking place in the structure of the party apparatus, its cadres and its ways and means of work. The forthcoming elections for people's deputies of the USSR will take place on the basis of the free expression of the will of the voters and a real competitiveness among candidates and the active role of all social organizations and mass information media. The party opposes quotas and excessive organization, and is relying on the force of persuasion and example.

The open and democratic conduct of governmental affairs, strengthening legal guarantees against abuses of power and authoritarianism are becoming visible features of the present. Taking into consideration the specific interests of the different nationalities and ethnic groups and of all citizens in the country, the party and the state are structuring a national policy which relies on the strictest possible observance of the constitutional principles of socialist federalism and the equality of rights of all Soviet republics and all citizens of the Soviet Union regardless of their national origin. Expanding the rights of Union and autonomous republics and harmonizing their relations within the USSR are the foundations of present national policy. A great deal remains to be done to reduce the social and political tension in individual republics and to ensure the consolidation of social forces rallied around the ideas of perestroika, while preserving the political and moral initiative of the party and all of its organizations. However, as experience indicates, such an initiative belongs only to those who share the live idea of renovation, who analyze reality boldly, like Marxists, who promptly sense its sensitive areas and accurately and fully express the interests of the working people and of the entire Soviet people. Spiritual and practical initiatives are firmly interrelated and their unity is a guarantee for success.

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Historical Reality and Social Theory

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[Article by Yustinas Karosas, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent; reprinted from the journal KOMMUNIST, Lithuania, No 4, 1988]

[Text] Today, when a critical re-evaluation of many previously durable economic, political, cultural and ideological values is underway, we must analyze the

status of social theory and social awareness in general in the life of the people. The point is that social consciousness unquestionably participated in the creation of these values, which are today being decisively reconsidered: social life, as a process of the more or less purposeful activities of the people, can be achieved only with a certain intermediary activity of the mind. Although at various stages of social history such an intermediary activity may quite typical and quite heterogeneous, there is no society which remain viable and active without social consciousness. This is one of the specific features of society, which distinguish human life from the strictly spontaneous natural process.

Although social consciousness is a layered phenomenon, which could be considered in a variety of aspects, clearly, theory is its most important social part. Theory shapes the principles of social relations and substantiates them in a certain way; furthermore, theory develops the methodology of social thinking, i.e., it shapes the common principles of social thought.

Bearing in mind the last circumstance, today we can take social theory to task with full justification: we could accuse it of developing stagnation phenomena in economic and spiritual life, which threatens the development of our social life. Today resolutions and the press both most emphatically state that social science owes a debt to social practice and that this debt must be settled as quickly as possible. In the course of solving this problem we must answer, above all, the closely interrelated questions of what is social theory and what is it that it can accomplish?

Clearly, we are right to claim that both in our philosophical literature and in ideological activities an exaggerated attitude toward social theory has been established: it is believed that theory can change and reorganize social life in the same way that it can help us to change nature. This view enables us thoughtlessly to accuse theory if anything in the course of the implementation of social programs develops unexpectedly and, above all, to accuse it of having insufficiently accurately predicted the real situation and confused wishes with reality.

A type of sociopolitical situation which forced social thinking to adapt to arbitrarily ideologized reality and appearances, ignoring the objective nature of the social process, developed. Naturally, social theory of this kind could not fail but harm social practice, particularly because it had established the methodological frame for a variety of theoretical computations in the areas of political economy, law and politics. However, that is not the only trouble. The greatest harm that was caused is that for many decades this theory had a great influence on the social awareness of the people. It helped to shape the stereotype of dogmatic thinking: a specific mind-set which makes it difficult to speak of practical efficiency.

Naturally, this mental stereotype cannot disappear all of a sudden, however efficient the ideas of perestroika and new thinking may be. Something which has existed for decades and, to a certain extent, has simply become an organic part of the people's minds, cannot be changed overnight. One way or another, the shaping of a new thinking is a major phenomenon which directly depends on the sociopractical conditions of social life. More than anything else, we find here one of the most complex problems of perestroika which makes the restructuring of our society not a short-term act but a lengthy process. It would be a miracle for people who grew up, who worked and who were formed during a period of stagnation in social thinking to begin to think in a new way in a few days, months or even years.

In speaking of the condition of social theory and social awareness in general, which developed during the period of spiritual stagnation, we must not forget that during that period as well there also existed both sober critical thinking and true civic conscience. Incidentally, there has been no historical age in which a scientific way of thinking has been totally absent. Its critical nature has always found a place for itself.

The charges against social theory we mentioned are, obviously, not a sufficient basis for concluding that social theory alone is to be blamed for the sluggishness of social thought or for its low practical efficiency. We should not ignore the fact that in no society could social theory be or is actually independent: it is part of the existing economic and political life of that society. Therefore, if within society an arbitrary viewpoint concerning social reality gains the upper hand, and if the creation of illusory and dogmatic theories is stimulated and, with the use of Draconic means a struggle is waged against critical thinking, sooner or later dogmatized and uncritical theories are bound to appear. In that case the conscience of the scientist and the moral factors which can protect the individual from such a "temptation" cannot block the path of dogmatizing social theory as a universal phenomenon. It is a well-known fact that social theory in our country was simply issued assignments with predetermined solutions, i.e., it undertook studies while clearly aware of the desired results (sociological studies conducted during those years are a specific example). In such theoretical studies it was necessary to rely on the views of one authority or another as self-evident. Disagreeing with such opinions was considered even a political error with possible fatal consequences. Under such circumstances, how could we accuse social theory alone for the spiritual stagnation of society or the ineffective assistance provided by theory to social practice?

This question should be considered not only as an aspiration on the part of the social sciences to defend their honor or to justify social theory by blaming others. It is an attempt at determining the real place which social theory holds in the life of society. Since defining the real

place of social theory in social life is by no means a simple task, we should provide a certain clarification as to what is social theory from the Marxist viewpoint and what it can do.

In developing the methodology for the explanation of social reality, Marx was guided by the materialistic concept that the objective content of social awareness is a specific manifestation of social life. He considered social awareness nothing other than the realized process of practical human life. Therefore, this awareness is the result not of pure reason: its "production" has a raw material which the mind can realize and reconstruct but cannot create through its own efforts. This was the general principle which guided Marxist materialism, explaining everything through awareness, that which is created by reconstructing nature, reorganized through human activities, and that which becomes social reality through theoretical reconstruction. Essentially, however, it is at that point that the similarity between natural science and social awareness ends and differences between these two phenomena of awareness begin.

The point is that both nature and social reality, as objects and sources of theoretical reconstruction, are radically different. Such differences may be briefly defined as follows: nature is a reality which exists by itself, spontaneously and independently of the people; social reality is the result of the creativity of the people themselves. Social life is, above all, a set of certain interrelationships among people; it is literally blended with the objectives, aspirations and interests of individuals. Therefore, the Marxist concept of history, which acknowledges the sociopractical nature of consciousness, also includes the teleological nature of social awareness and the link between social theory and human interest and accepts that social theory is a theory of a special type, determined not only and exclusively gnosologically but also in terms of its sociopractical, its value parameter. In other words, unlike natural science awareness, which is only technologically involved, social awareness is involved above all ideologically as an expression of social reality and social nature which always become interwoven with what should be. There neither is nor could there be any social theory which would be gnosologically pure and deprived of any connection with any kind of interest expressed by a social group. Therefore, Marxism aspires to the rehabilitation of the objective nature of social theory without separating it from the interests of the people but, conversely, most closely linking theory to such interests.

The combination of the content of social theory with the always subjective nature of class interests is a combination of two opposites which, on the surface, could seem to harm the objective nature of theory, i.e., its scientific nature. Therefore, the different social concepts, both before and after Marx, have sought ways of separating theory from the influence of class interests. Once it became clear that this was impossible, the idea was accepted that a scientific social theory was impossible: at

best it could be only a subjective theory of cultural values. This approach, however, is an indication of spiritual fatigue, a proof that in order to solve the problem of the objective nature of the content of social theory the activities of pure reason are insufficient and that we should seek another point of support. The social concept of Marxism, which considers as the real basis for the explanation the awareness of actually existing production relations in society and the economic structure, which determines the entire nature of all other interrelationships among people, notes that in the presence of deformed and alienated reciprocal relations and the domination of narrow-class interests in society social consciousness as well becomes misshaped, distorted and faulty. In short, if because of a certain condition of development of the production process society is divided, the social theory assumes a fictitious nature and is nothing but a proper reflection of the actual life of the people. The fictitious nature of social theory and its erroneousness in this case are, in their own way, accurate and real. The fictitiousness reflects that which actually exists in reality: a narrow class interest which, however, embodies the objective requirements of overall social development at a specific historical stage.

Under such rather complex conditions, the manifestation of the objective needs of social development, expressed through the interests of a single class, is no more than a social theory of an illusory or fictitious nature which, in addition to institutional activities, can regulate to a certain extent and stimulate human social behavior. A mystified social theory, under the conditions of alienation, is not the subjective fabrication of oppressors aimed at deceiving the oppressed but a natural form of spiritual self-manifestation of alienated social relations, deprived of a historical alternative. Therefore, it is by the presence of such an illusory and mystified awareness that we can determine whether society has eliminated the actual material prerequisites for social alienation. Deprived of illusions, social theory is not the product of pure intellect but, above all, the consequence of material-practical conditions which correct the deformation of the social structure. The shaping of the social concept of Marxism itself, as we know, was directly related to the appearance of new particular material-practical conditions for social life. Objectively this concept became possible only when prerequisites developed for the shaping of a classless society and when the class interests which reached the level of ensuring the social domination of such a society became, in terms of their objective content, universal.

Marxist methodology acknowledges that surmounting the conflict between the "interests" of social theory and its objective nature is possible in only one way: through human practices which can create the type of socio-economic potential which enables us to eliminate class differentiations or, in other words, the antagonism of conflicting human interests. Therefore, pitting the objective nature of social theory against its party orientation can be eliminated not by theory but by practice.

Such an approach to the origin of social theory and its attitude toward material social life is also a recognition of the different position held by theory throughout history. As long as it was believed that social ideas are the product of pure reason alone we ascribed them a decisive role in social life. If it was believed that ideas make the world there was an intensive search for the most advanced ideas and for the ever more efficient means of their dissemination among people. In short, the reorganization of society was considered to be a purely theoretical problem: let us raise good and just people and our society will become good and just. Without belittling in the least the tremendous role which lofty ideas play in the spiritual and practical history of society, let us point out that at all times the more hope was placed on ideas the smaller have been their actual returns. In the final account, the ideas which came to fruition in history were those which expressed the vital needs of real social forces and the true needs of society. Ideas which remained hanging in the air from the sociopractical viewpoint proved, as a rule, to be of short duration: even though generating tremendous enthusiasm, they soon lost their attractiveness. Even the most attractive ideas and the theories which expressed them can do nothing more than what can be accomplished by sociopractical reality. Therefore, the idea of the omnipotence of social theory is a feature of the insufficient maturity of practical social life.

But what can social theory accomplish if its content and ideals are based on reality and depend on it? Does this not represent any depreciation of spiritual values in social life and the adoption of a gross economic approach to man and society? These are not rhetorical questions alone, and this is an old argument of the opponents of Marxism.

A practically oriented social theory can earmark the overall trends in the development of society and formulate topical problems of social reality and, to a certain extent, project a future picture of social life. All of this is very important in terms of social progress and, therefore, of human life. It contributes to the consolidation of human activities, giving them a common direction. In this case history is the intermediary between the actually existing conditions of social life, with their material and technical parameters, and the practical activities of the people, who are the exclusive and the real motors of social life. As such an intermediary, social theory also creates efficient social practice: it is by no means all the same to specific social history as to what kind of theory guides its makers, who are practical workers. We must not forget in this case that it is insufficient simply to formulate even the most accurate and most scientific theoretical ideas: the most important problem always remains that of the practical implementation of these ideas, their conversion into reality.

In criticizing the materialists of the 17th-18th centuries, Marx pointed out that the information model they suggested for the reorganization of society would have

been adequate only if man had been a purely spiritual, a theoretical rather than practical being. As a social practical being, his life is quite different not only from theory. Human behavior and actions in social life are determined by material needs, egotistical aspirations, passions, character features, and so on. Marxism acknowledges that the most noteworthy among these motivations for human social behavior are practical interests. Although history tells us of numerous examples of altruism, self-sacrifice and even total self-denial, as a rule man acts in accordance with what suits him practically. Therefore, the tremendous efforts aimed at creating an abstract moral absolute, which would determine human behavior and would limit his egotism and greed, have usually yielded rather miserable results.

After making a critical evaluation of the results of these efforts, Marx refused to consider theory and the dissemination of its ideas as an independent and most important constructive power in social life. Theory and the dissemination of its ideas should serve the material and practical tasks of society. Theoretical ideas are important if they direct people toward efficient practical activities and restrict their personal aspirations for the sake of social objectives (so far, as a result of its material immaturity, differences have existed in society between private and social interests and such a theoretical or ideological restriction has been necessary). The mobilizing function of theory in society becomes all the more productive the more real is the content of the social ideals formulated within it, i.e., the more this content is based on existing social reality. In this sense social ideas are not invented but discovered in the course of human life itself. Theory helps man better to realize the nature of real life and his possibilities and to adjust his behavior to the needs of the entire society. However, no theory can force man to act in a specific way. In general, in real life man rarely behaves strictly as instructed by outsiders. Even the external obligations which are assigned to him by society in a variety of institutional forms are efficiently performed only when man himself accepts them, i.e., after he has converted them into his inner obligation, a matter of his own conscience. It is in this sense that we say that the only true maker of history is the person who acts on his own volition. Nothing and no one other than man himself, neither economic necessity nor the power of the state, can create or change social reality. It is only by acknowledging this prerequisite that the human factor can be considered a decisive motive force in the social process.

Social reality itself and its internal organization are the objective background against which man, in proving himself, always acts according to his own considerations. He may have a different perception of this background—objective reality—but, acting practically, he cannot ignore it. Naturally, a person who properly realizes social reality gains a certain advantage compared to someone who is either unaware of or has a rather confused idea of that reality. This does not mean, however, that theory could teach man how to live. Man is not only instructed

by life. He learns how to live through his own efforts. We have long been familiar with the natural scientific principle that "knowledge is power" in the area of social relations which, as we pointed out, is not free from the interests of the people, assumes a variety of manifestations and is much more complex compared to the interrelationship between man and nature. Unless this is taken into consideration and the natural scientific model of changes in reality is directly transferred into the realm of human life, the specific nature of man is ignored and the general theoretical orientation of social theory is harmed. This is the channel through which extreme objectivism or vulgar economism penetrate social theory, distorting its nature in precisely the same way as voluntarism or pure subjectivism.

In formulating the basic laws of social development and unraveling the greatest mystery of history, the founders of Marxist social theory were guided by the idea that the history of human society has an objective framework through which it manifests itself: the economic structure. Since that structure has material parameters it can be scientifically studied. Such a study would show that the structural order governing the existence of society is a reconstruction of the social laws according to which the history of society is essentially not different from the history of nature. However, this does not lead in the least to the conclusion that in the social process the laws are manifested regardless man or his will, i.e., as a kind of autonomous force which ignores even the makers of the historical process—the people. The objective need for history, which is restructured by social laws, is the work of people who have their own will and desires. Even when people are not scientifically aware of this objective need and it appears spontaneously, nonetheless objective historical necessity is the result of human activities. It is true that in this case it may seem to the people that they do one thing and the result is entirely different: it is that which can objectively exist under the existing historical circumstances. Briefly said, objectivity in history is the result of the subjective actions of man which, in turn, are determined by historical objectivity embodied in the values of material and spiritual culture created by previous generations. Therefore, a social theory which would like to be classified as scientific should interrelate these aspects of the real historical process rather than separate one from the other, not to mention pit one against the other.

The Marxist social concept, which formulated the postulate of the secondary role played by theory in terms of reality and the social conventionality of theory, does not belittle the significance of social theory in human life or exaggerate it but merely indicates the actual place of theory in history. The history of society, as the product of human activities, cannot be made without a specific awareness, i.e., without a specific theoretical intermediary factor which links people to the objective conditions governing their activities, in the same way that the life of the individual cannot be manifested without his own self-manifestation: awareness and an increasingly

broader and richer spiritual range. In this respect social theory and social awareness in general are true factors which confirm history. However, in terms of its origin and functioning, social theory is not pure or entirely autonomous. It is subordinated to social practice in all of its essential aspects. Therefore, Marxist social theory structures its concepts not on the basis of abstract postulates of goodness and justice but on the objective content of practical social life. It is only such a theory which, itself, being the product of a certain social age, could combine plans for its concepts with the practical opportunities offered by reality, and only such a theory could be of importance in the development of social life and, therefore, on the growth of the universal capabilities of the individual.

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Yesterday's Problems of Tomorrow

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[Discussion between Aleksey Sevastyanovich Revaykin, doctor of economic sciences, head of the Department of Socioeconomic Problems, USSR Academy of Sciences Far-East Department Institute of Economic Studies, and Mikhail Ivanovich Ledenev, candidate of economic sciences, head of the Manpower Reproduction Sector of the same institute, moderated by S. Korniyenko; reprinted from the journal DALNIY VOSTOK No 7, 1988, Khabarovsk]

[Text] For many years the ever growing importance of the economy of the Far East in the development of the country has been emphasized, and the accelerated pace of development of this rich area has been contemplated. The state program for the comprehensive development of production forces of the Far East, the Buryat ASSR and Chita Oblast until the year 2000, which was adopted last year is one more proof of this fact. The figures cited on the faster development of the economy of this area look impressive. This is natural, and we have become accustomed to this. We must increase the potential and improve prosperity.... However, it is only recently that we have remembered the main factor: man. Yet the power and reputation of a state are based not only on wide fields and powerful modern enterprises but also on the healthy spirit of the citizens, confident in themselves and in their future, loving their land, managing it intelligently and teaching their own children how to do that. It is precisely such a harmoniously developed person-citizen who is the supreme objective of the socialist state. To what extent does an important state document, such as the Program For Accelerating the Development of the Far East, take into consideration the interests of the people who live in but have still not truly developed this harsh area? This is a topic discussed by Aleksey Sevastyanovich Revaykin, doctor of economic sciences, head of the Department of Socioeconomic Problems, USSR Academy of Sciences

Far-Eastern Department Institute of Economic Research, and Mikhail Ivanovich Ledenev, candidate of economic sciences, head of the Manpower Reproduction Sector in the same institute.

[Correspondent] The need for this discussion appeared not only because now more than ever we have become concerned with the interests of the specific individual and that the words "Human Factor" are inscribed in bold letters on the banner of perestroyka. It is also a question of the fact that many readers would like to know the nature of this long-term state program. Is it the latest offensive mounted by ministries and departments in developing this inaccessible area or a set of vital steps focused on the interests of the population of the Far East?

[Revaykin] The long-term state program for the comprehensive development of production forces calls for giving priority to the solution of social problems as the key to all other; problems of man and his living conditions become the cornerstone. The following data provide an idea of the scale of development of the social sphere: we are planning to build 101 million square meters of housing, which will make it possible to increase the availability of housing for every resident of the Far East to 20 or more square meters, and to provide each family with a comfortable apartment or individual home. The task has been set of raising the level of availability to the regional population of sociocultural amenities to a level which will exceed the country's average. Following are specific assignments: build general education schools for 1,073,000 students, preschool institutions for 492,900 children, install 53,000 hospital beds and build polyclinics which can handle 113,000 visits per shift. A substantial development of the network of sanatorium-resort, prophylactic treatment and physical culture-recovery institutions and tourism and recreation centers is planned.

But here is something which makes us prick our ears: the program is described as governmental but is largely imbued with the spirit of departmentalism. Assignments related to the development of the social sphere have been issued to various ministries and departments. One does not see very clearly the priorities in the quality changes contemplated in the development of production forces in the Far East.

[Ledenev] This is a very important question: What is being done today to develop the Far East? We frequently hear the following: increase the contribution of the Far East to the development of the country. However, is this the sole purpose for the development of our vast area? Generally speaking, what does a developed territory mean? It is a territory which ensures favorable conditions for the activities of man with qualitatively new standards. In simpler terms, the person must have a type of home, family and job worthy of his life, and a surrounding which helps his personality grow, as well as a land which prospers through his toil...

This may not appear excessive. Nonetheless, much of it is lacking in the lives of Far Easterners. In terms of many important parameters, the local population's living standard remains below the average-Union indicators. The result is that this area has been and remains no more than an event in the biography of millions of people. Now, displaying the greatest possible feeling of responsibility, we must acknowledge the following: a public economy cannot be considered efficient unless it provides normal living conditions and the development of the person's individuality. Unless this occurs, human limitations may have different manifestations, such as egotism, irresponsibility, hack work or indifference, including indifference to one's own fate.

[Revaykin] During the period of formulation of the program and after its adoption, I repeatedly met with senior personnel of the Gosplan and the USSR State Committee for Labor. I became firmly convinced that they paid insufficient attention to the fact that an excessive number of important and difficult social problems had accumulated in the Far East, requiring for their solution the abandonment of the old approach: underestimating the role and place of the area, economically and politically.

Naturally, the appropriation of huge capital investments for the development of the Far East, including the social area, is very important. However, experience indicates that in the past as well the area was not kept short of capital investments. However, the allocated funds remained systematically due to lack of manpower, skilled in particular. The main feature today should be the development of a stable population (the opposite of the temporary worker) and upgrading the quality of the labor potential. In this connection, the creation of the proper socioeconomic conditions is a prime task in the development of production forces.

The study of the real living conditions of the working people in the Far East has indicated that the basic regional wage coefficients in the territory do not compensate for the necessary additional outlays for population and manpower reproduction. Making the system of regional wage coefficients better consistent with the actual living conditions of the Far-Eastern population (which means increasing regional coefficients by approximately 20 percent) is based above all on the need to keep the population, the cadres, in the area and, which is equally important, to meet the requirements of social justice.

Another important reserve is the following: our institute submitted to the USSR State Committee for Labor suggestions on improving the practice of wage supplements for people living and training in the North. Naturally, such payments should not be indirect, as is being done presently, but must be directly related to individual end labor results. Wage supplements for practical training must be earned, in the full meaning of this term.

Unfortunately, no real changes are taking place in securing for the population the necessary commodities and foodstuffs. In the past 15 years the gap between earnings and availability of goods and paid services on a per capita basis has nearly doubled and accounts for about 25 percent of the sum of population expenditures on goods and services.

Some central departments are displaying excessive optimism on the matter of self-support with animal husbandry goods in the Far East. At the present time per capita meat and milk production in the area amounts to slightly over one-half of actual consumption and, in terms of efficient standards, it is less than 50 percent. Without making the local authorities any less responsible for the development of animal husbandry in the area, we must realistically assess the possibilities and not mistake wish for reality.

In order to surmount the substantial lag and, furthermore, to establish a priority in the development of the social area, huge capital investments are required. It would be no exaggeration to say that the most pressing problem which is holding back the development of the social area is the lack of construction workers and, particularly, their low skills. Considering the overall tremendous scarcity of skilled manpower in the area, ensuring the implementation of a large-scale program for the development of the social area with local construction cadres is unrealistic.

Consequently, despite the entire importance of ensuring the fuller utilization of available cadres (manpower reserves here are considerable) we must recruit skilled construction workers from other parts of the country through purposeful selection and, possibly, the signing of labor contracts for no less than 5 years and offering corresponding material benefits. In order to retain such cadres, it would be expedient for the maximal amount of training wage supplements in the southern part of the Far East to be paid to anyone who, at the time of their introduction, had been at work for 5 or more years, and to tie such payments to individual end labor results.

[Correspondent] Obviously, however, it is not enough to speak of how to pay greater attention to human needs and provide each family with everything it needs, for during the period of stagnation certain deformations occurred and the active principles of human activities were damaged....

[Ledenev] I was tremendously impressed by V. Rasputin's novel "*Pozhar*" [Fire]. The writer depicted the burning and already burned out souls of the people in a Siberian settlement. They can no longer be revived by additional social benefits or concern for their needs. The saying in such cases is that a beggar is not afraid of fire.

One out of three Far Easterners works in the extraction and shipment of sea products, ore and timber. Let us ask ourselves: The way their work and life are currently

organized, do they have any other means of support? No, naturally. Therefore, the type of people recruited here are "Arkharovs," as V. Rasputin describes them, or, as they say in the Far East, "scourges."

But let us look at ourselves, where are our own props in this kind of life? The home, as essentially meaning a place where people live from one generation to another, does not exist. But if there is no home, is there land on which one could build one? This problem too is being resolved simplistically. Work. What kind of work? In the absolute majority of places our work has become day labor. The people with whom we go to work or spend our leisure time are the same type of day laborers as we are.

In order to be a master of something one must be its owner. Yet neither you nor I own any property. Our property is common. Incidentally, it would befit us to look at this type of nonsense. That which belongs to everyone is no longer owned. It is high time, finally, to realize that this situation can no longer continue. Why do we not have homes? Because we are not given any. And why are we not? Because essentially our entire added product and a certain part of what the state needs are regularly taken away from us for building the various barracks-type multiple-apartment homes and giving us impersonal housing.

The inscription on our banner reads: The free and comprehensive development of man. But we are still quite distant from comprehensive development and, if we are to attain it, material prerequisites, such as do not exist today, must be created. But where are these economic conditions which would enable you and me to develop freely? Such conditions will appear when a significant portion of the added product we have created is left at our disposal. If it is being transferred in its totality to the state, as is the case now, the result will be mediocrity expressed in tens of millions of "reproductions."

[Revaykin] According to Marx, the added product in a communist society will be transformed from a means of oppression and exploitation under capitalism into a source of growing abundance and will become a material prerequisite for the free and comprehensive development of all members of society.

In our present society the basic means of production are owned by the state (which is not the same as belonging to the whole nation). Hence it is the state that is the owner of the overwhelming majority of the overall output, including the added product. This means that it is being handled by that same state. The practical experience of the so-called period of stagnation revealed that not always was the added and also the necessary product used in the interest of everyone. This is confirmed by the technocratic approach to the development of the social sphere, favoritism, and the huge bureaucratic state apparatus. We are essentially dealing with the alienation of

the worker from the results of his work and, subsequently, of the means through which man can produce material goods. This is the economic base for the existence not of an owner but of a day worker. In his eyes what is ours is nobody's. Consequently, he develops a corresponding attitude toward the public good and public life. A person who is insufficiently paid for his work quickly loses interest in it. Its results worsen and sometimes are reduced to naught. Under the current distribution of social benefits, some people earn more than their work deserves. This is even worse. Such people are unable to engage in productive work and inevitably become degraded....

[Ledenev] Such extremes have never turned out to benefit society. If we speak of social justice, the necessary amount of the added product should go the producer. The state should not withhold from your wage funds for housing construction, so that later the state would "grace" you by the year 2000 with an apartment, who knows in what district, on what floor and with what amenities. The way this should be handled is the following: receive all that is owed to you and build or purchase your own housing in accordance with your own way of life and wishes. Nor should money be withheld from your earnings to subsidize agricultural production. Why, for example, sell meat at 2 rubles when, as it were, you can never buy it at state prices? If meat costs 5 rubles, sell it for 5 rubles but also pay me my full earnings. Who benefits from the fact that in our socialist society prices of food staples have remained virtually unchanged for decades at the cost of paying higher prices for many industrial commodities? Let us live honestly and pay everyone according to his work. It is precisely this that would be socially fair.

[Revaykin] Today we must frankly point out that in order to ensure the democratization of society, it is my firm conviction that we need democratization in the distribution of the social product. This means the distribution of means of output and their results among direct producers.

[Ledenev] Speaking honestly, in recent decades we have corrupted millions of people and taught them how not to work with a feeling of responsibility. In the course of several decades we killed the proprietor, the owner in man. To this day the word "private merchant" retains a negative connotation.

[Correspondent] What should our solution be?

[Ledenev] The solution is the following: correlate the forms of ownership with the level of development of production forces, in accordance with quality and the person; the person must not be idealized and we must not try to ingratiate ourselves with him. Such an attitude would enhance the role of individual and cooperative ownership. Unquestionably, the significance of state ownership remains decisive. Nonetheless, all of these types of ownership should be equal. We must point out

that state ownership is not the most progressive ownership from the viewpoint of its social aspect. At this point we must watch out, for it provides the very environment in which bureaucrats and sneaks grow up and multiply.

Currently the enterprises are being converted to full cost accounting and self-financing and we must say bluntly and daringly: Comrades, this is not simply a form of simple reconstruction of the economy but also a certain approach to the reconstruction of ownership. Under these circumstances such a step is necessary. The person must become responsible and feel like a real owner.

[Correspondent] What specifically will the new economic management conditions do for the Far East?

[Ledenev] A great deal. We started this talk with an attempt to formulate a concept for the development of the Far East and defined the central feature of the concept: the creation of favorable conditions for human activities. This is a rather complex matter, for we are not rid of yesterday's problems which are influencing the future. Currently some 8 million people live in the Far East. To provide them with everything they need, as we mentioned, would be very expensive. However, no other way is possible. What to do? Should we resort again to state subsidies? But where and when has life developed steadily on the basis of subsidies?

What is the Far East? It is an exceptionally complex territory for human activities. Furthermore, it is quite distant from the leading parts of the country. Such territories can be developed only through a very high level of development of production forces and production relations. State and political interests imperatively dictated that Russia should go East. From the strictly economic viewpoint, however, such advance was premature. The situation was further worsened by the fact that, to a large extent, this territory was developed by the state under the conditions of an administrative management method. If we compare today our economic management of the area with the scale of the development of the North of Canada or Alaska, the progress achieved by these areas is insignificant compared to ours. Why? Because in those areas cost effectiveness is not theoretical but very real. In our country, as we know, cost accounting has always been a theoretical concept. Why did we build in the Far East a large number of a great variety of enterprises, including machine building, clothing, and textiles, for which today we lack materials and manpower? All such items must be shipped from afar, after which we must ship out the output, which proves to be exceptionally costly. Why is this being done so uneconomically? At this point we return to the same old problem: the fact that ownership in our country is state ownership which, under these circumstances of economic management became, essentially nobody's....

This discussion on present and future difficulties is not a happy one. In converting to real cost accounting many production facilities will find themselves in a difficult

situation. However, even enterprises which are doing well today must be quite thrifty and cautious. Regional wage coefficients have been established today for all Far Easterners; many of them have been increased; Northern hardship and experience supplements have been instituted. It is important to bear in mind that in the future as well the people's requirements concerning improvements in the living standard and the quality of the habitat will increase. The conclusion, therefore, is the following: industry in the Far East must be expanded particularly cautiously and with restraint. It must be based on particularly effective and unique resources and the latest equipment and technology.

[Correspondent] Obviously, under the new economic management conditions weak enterprises will fail and be closed down. This applies to enterprises whose equipment has long become worn out, where there is a great deal of manual labor and an acute shortage of manpower....

[Revaykin] I would say the following: today we need urgently a form of certification of Far-Eastern enterprises concerning the possibility of their existence under the new economic management conditions.

Let me re-emphasize that in the Far East we must develop above all sectors based on natural resources and create in them production conditions worthy of man. Let us look at timber. Millions of cubic meters could be extracted and huge forests could be destroyed, shifting procurement workers from one place to another, setting up new timber farms and hastily building temporary settlements.... However, it is also possible to make comprehensive use of the tayga, utilize its natural bounties economically and organize the thorough processing of the lumber at small modern enterprises. Incidentally, various forms of ownership are possible here, including cooperatives. The same could be done with the fishing industry. It is time truly to undertake to develop coastal fishing, build here processing enterprises and produce dozens of varieties of tasty goods in demand. The benefits would be double. The country would obtain a substantial increase in food supplies and the people will become firmly settled by the sea. Here as well, once again there arises the question of creating specific prerequisites for every person to become the master of his home and his life....

[Ledenev] When other people think for you, when you are not the master of your destiny, you are pitied. Let me repeat again: when the added product becomes superior to man, man is bound to lose his personality. In our country, for many years, all we could see was the "community" of people, the "toil of the mass," which should live in the same type of small premises, dress in the same manner, and eat and think uniformly.

[Correspondent] In order to develop the personality, in addition to the necessary material conditions, we must ensure a suitable job for everyone and provide the

individual with the opportunity to reveal his capabilities more fully. Today, however, there are many millions of people employed in heavy, physical and unattractive work and we cannot provide everyone, in one fell swoop, interesting and creative work....

[Ledenev] Not true! It is possible to ensure for everyone interesting and creative work. The main thing is the approach, the attitude toward the work. Let us consider the spreading of manure on the fields: Is that an interesting job? But has anyone ever refused to do it in his own dacha plot? It is being done with the greatest of pleasures, for the person is working on his own plot and is its full master. He thinks of the end result of his efforts and keeps inventing and creating, for he is handling his own property. Property is by no means a word of abuse....

[Correspondent] Does this mean that we should promote in the individual that same feeling of ownership at his main job?

[Ledenev] It is not all that simple. Today many people are unwilling to assume such ownership, because the old method is more convenient: work below average but live an average and, sometimes, above average life, at the expense of others. It is simpler and easier to be a day worker. We have millions of such people in our country. That is what must be understood, and that is the main difficulty of perestroika.... In this case we must not delude ourselves even for a minute. In order to advance perestroika we must substantially broaden the area of cooperative and personal ownership. The forms of cooperative ownership are numerous. What is socialism, according to Lenin? It is a system of civilized members of cooperatives.

[Revaykin] Despite the obvious establishment of a large-scale machine industry, our country still lacks everything that is necessary in order to reach a level of actual production and labor socialization with which it would be economically and socially "profitable" to ensure the efficient employment of all able-bodied people in production. The existence of tens of millions of workers engaged in hard and unskilled and underproductive toil is the cost of formal socialization, the consequence of which is inefficient work. A person performing unskilled manual labor is an underproductive worker. Meanwhile, he demands of society a compensation for his unskilled labor. Who pays for this? Someone else! The state takes from that someone else part of what he has created and gives that to the underproductive worker. It is thus that faith in justice has been undermined in the former while the other will not feel the need to become skilled. We have many people who should, above all, engage in individual labor activity or organize themselves in cooperatives.

[Correspondent] What will the result be? There will be some production sectors with unmechanized labor. What will this bring about? Would we benefit a great deal in terms of developing the personality by creating a cooperative of unskilled workers?

[Revaykin] Naturally, this would be an extreme case although let us note that development is not always the way from good to better and then to best. Development experiences difficulties and contradictions, and so on. Even with a four-trillion national revenue, the state could become poorer with every passing year, for we are converting labor into materials not by the best possible means. In other words, the number of items is increasing but they are not in demand. They remain in warehouses or, at best, are recycled. With this state of affairs returns per ruble of materialized labor are increasingly declining. According to reports our social wealth seems to be increasing, the figures are growing.... However, all of this is becoming not a source of our development but an obstruction. Here is a paradox: the more we act, the worse we live. Those who underestimate individual labor and cooperative activities do not realize that the member of a cooperative will not work for the market unless there is demand for his goods. Meanwhile, state enterprises are successfully surviving by converting billions of rubles into unusable goods. We must radically restructure public production. The first step in that direction must be the adoption of the Law on the State Enterprise.

[Correspondent] Let us consider this. The Law On the State Enterprise was enacted in January 1988. So far, however, we could read in the press or hear at high level conferences cases of harming the economic autonomy of enterprises by associations, main administrations and ministries. In other words, it is the the same old story: words do not match deeds. Perhaps as long as such numerous bureaucratic superstructures remain above the producing enterprises there can be no autonomy, interest, or initiative in the labor collectives. For example, as long as the RAPO and oblast APO exist, as in the past they will be "managing" sovkhoses and kolkhoses. As long as ministries exist, they will be patching tears in their sector at the expense of the leading enterprises and, therefore, will be harming them. As in the past, cost accounting remains a formality. A simple example is that of trade enterprises converted to cost accounting. Does this mean that each store has the right to accept for sale only the commodity which it could market successfully without even storing in its own warehouse items which are not in demand? Such is not the case. Shelves continue to be crowded with unsaleable and unfit goods. What is the problem? Could it be that all of this is being done under pressure, or for the sake of fulfilling the plan?

[Revaykin] A running train should not be stopped midway. One cannot immediately gather the necessary momentum. Your statement indicates that we need a healthy socialist rivalry, a market. The road to harmony in economic management goes through cost accounting and self-financing.

[Correspondent] Well, let us hope that, sooner or later, we shall choose the right way and gather the necessary momentum which is so pressingly needed by our economy.... Now here is something else: we said that the Far

East needs modern enterprises which will extensively process valuable local resources. No such enterprises exist because of the great amount of funds needed to create them. Now, however, when a huge amount of 200 billion rubles has been allocated for the implementation of the long-term program....

[Revaykin] According to the program the volume of capital investments is assessed at more than 230 billion rubles. This is a tremendous amount, the purpose of which is to ensure the development in the Far East of a highly efficient national economic complex with its own major resource and scientific-production base, optimal economic structure and developed social environment, an organic part of the system of all-Union and international division of labor, and upgrading the role of the area in the national economic complex. Such a governmental target and its achievement require the radical structural reorganization of the Far-Eastern national economy. Unfortunately, however, the funds are traditionally distributed among ministries and departments, "each according to his share," and capital investments are allocated according to the principle of who will use them better rather than on whom does the development of the Far East mainly depend in reaching new levels of economic and social progress.

It is high time for us to start looking into the 21st century. In the Far East, meanwhile, to this day concepts such as "computerization," "robotics" and so on, are still science fiction. The current imperfect production system, if we pursue its present development, will subsequently require significantly more resources than it does today. Let us add to this that the countries on the Pacific rim will be developing quite tempestuously in the 21st century. Could our Far East successfully compete with them? In order to be able to, we must create the type of working and living conditions and a production system such that our closest neighbors could say, yes, this is the type of socialism worth fighting for. However, if the production system remains as it is now, no scale or volume, not to mention tremendous plans, would earn us any respect in the rest of the world. Furthermore, we personally must not relax.

[Correspondent] Therefore, do we need urgently to add something to the program for the long-term development of production forces in the Far East?

[Revaykin] What we need today is a sober analysis of the program, not in order to question the plans but, in accordance with the aspects which have developed under the new conditions of economic management, make the necessary refinements and establish ways for more efficiently reaching the targets of the program and, above all, solving the key problem, that of giving priority to the solution of social problems.

The pressure applied by the ministries on the USSR Gosplan influenced the formulation of the program. Unfortunately, the Gosplan departments are also based

on the sectorial principle. Therefore, the program has come out largely as a combination of sectorial interests. It has even allocated the various projects and resources not by krays and oblasts but by ministry. As to the social part of the program, even the amount appropriated for such strictly "human" projects is not mentioned. Therefore, the old situation could be repeated: the ministries will be pursuing above all their own economic interests....

[Correspondent] In this connection, let us mention the sources of financing this program. Under the new economic management conditions profits are the source of enterprise development. Could the program be financed by the Far Easterners themselves?

[Revaykin] According to the specialists within the system of the USSR Gosplan representative in charge of the Far-Eastern economic area, assuming that the entire profit generated by Far-Eastern enterprises is concentrated on financing the program, such a profit would provide approximately two-thirds of the necessary capital investments. According to regulations, withholdings from profits for the state budget and the superior organizations amount to no more than 17 percent. Consequently, the implementation of the program will call for increased efficiency in the work of Far-Eastern enterprises and a protectionist governmental policy.

[Correspondent] If we were to pin-point the problem: What is the specific feature distinguishing the Far East and perestrojka?

[Revaykin] "The purpose of perestrojka," M.S. Gorbachev noted in his report "October and Perestrojka: The Revolution Goes On," "is to restore in full, theoretically as well as practically, the Leninist concept of socialism in which the absolute priority goes to the working person with his ideals, interests, humanistic values in the economy, social and political relations and culture." The specific feature of the Far East is that many problems which must be solved on the way to this objective are more difficult and, therefore, will require greater efforts. The main thing is to upgrade the labor and social activeness of every working person in the Far East.

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To Learn the Truth

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[Article by Igor Yakovlevich Bogdanov, reprinted from the journal ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, No 5, 1988, Tashkent]

[Text] Igor Yakovlevich Bogdanov is head of laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources. Repeatedly and at different times he has visited Uzbekistan and is

well familiar with its problems. He has participated most directly in the formulation of the long-range comprehensive program for the socioeconomic development of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. That was the specific reason for which the editors of ZVEZDA VOSTOKA asked him to share his views on the current situation in the republic and the ways of surmounting contradictions in its various areas.

Some of the views expressed by I.Ya. Bogdanov may seem arguable. Unquestionably, however, the only way to achieve an objective assessment, to eliminate shortcomings and ensure a renovation requires a critical view.

Why is interest in the republics of Central Asia and, particularly, Uzbekistan so great today?

I believe that such increase is related to the governmental decree on terminating the efforts to transfer the flow of Siberian water to the area. We must point out that the stir was great. People were "for" or "against," some of them had heart attacks and others made careers of it, and there was a struggle. Now, however, as the people say, it was glasnost and the public who emerged victorious, after which the question immediately arose: How will Central Asia and Uzbekistan continue to exist and develop their economy, for their previous plans included both hope for and reliance on Siberian water, something which now is not about to take place?

But is it exclusively the fact that the water transfer was abandoned that made the profound study of the problems of development of production forces in the area necessary? Naturally, no. The reason is much deeper and more serious or, if you wish, tragic. Yes, precisely tragic.

What am I referring to, above all? Above all, to the human factor. We talk a great deal about it today and show concern. As in the past, however, millions of officials are shuffling on their desks millions of bits of paper covered with all kinds of percentage figures and no one truly gives a thought of the fact that in it is precisely in the human area that the tragedy has developed. In my view, it is that we are losing in Uzbekistan a generation of people, who believed in their land, who loved their land, and who worked it with joy and inspiration. Instead, we are developing people who have adapted to the conditions which took shape here in recent decades: conditions marked by theft, figure padding, fraud and reciprocal guarantees. This is truly frightening.

The entire country was literally shaken up by the publications in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA ("Zone of Silence") and PRAVDA ("Cobra Over the Gold"). These staggering articles are being retyped from the newspapers and passed from hand to hand. You may ask, are there thieves only in Uzbekistan? Unfortunately, to our shame, no. However, the scale of stealing in the republic is unprecedented! Tens of millions and billions of rubles are stuffing the pockets of shady dealers armed with power and party cards. How can an honest person

live in Uzbekistan? What is he guilty of? Is he guilty of the fact that, night and day, breaking his back, he works the cotton fields, in order to be able, with difficulty, to feed his numerous children? What should he feel under the established conditions? Why is it that his children cannot eat as much meat or drink as much milk as they need? Why are they growing physically weak, why do they study only half the year and why is that in the armed forces they are frequently selected only for the construction troops?

In the past 2 years the public product shortfall exceeded 4 billion rubles; the growth rates of the national income are declining and so is labor productivity. The farmers' income is dropping. Who benefited from the magnificent suburban hotels, built for "high" guests, from the indescribable splendid dachas "for the bosses," the "royal villages" and "nobility centers?" Meanwhile, thousands of schools in the republic are in a state of semi-breakdown, children must attend school in three shifts, and there is a severe shortage of preschool institutions, hospitals, polyclinics, etc.

"What happened, what kind of administrative catastrophe, which I would not like to describe as national but, nonetheless, this is the word that comes to mind, has afflicted this republic?" (I am quoting Ch. Aytmatov's "Perestroyka and Glasnost Means Survival," PRAVDA, 12 February 1988—author).

"What type of collapse of moral foundations has hit this land and why is it that abuses and crimes in the thrust toward gold, literally and metaphorically, have turned into a tragedy afflicting the virtually entire people?"

Yes, one can only agree with Aytmatov. The fault lies in the lies and hypocrisy, which have become the unspoken standard and rule in the hierarchy of relations among the various categories and groups of the bureaucratic world, the officials above all. Everything began with lies. The lie is the mother of all vices.

We visited the Karshinskaya Steppe. As you can well understand, a commission coming from Moscow will not be taken to a poor sovkhov but to the best. Such a commission is welcomed today without luxury, for it is perestroyka, but nonetheless with proper solemnity. We were shown splendid two-story homes made of reinforced concrete, rising in the middle of the steppe. We were shown virgin-land farms and private plots and excellent buildings on them. From afar everything looks beautiful, but we were not allowed to approach the homes. We insisted that we had to. We spoke to the people, we looked around. What did we see? In that same beautiful two-story house which was built for virgin-land workers, matching urban standards, the bathtub had been removed, to make space for housing a cow. Hay for the cow and onions harvested from the private plot had been stuffed in the bathroom. There was terrifying poverty in the house, there was no furniture, and standing in the middle of the room was a small stove with a

pipe leading to the window and the window itself was somehow patched with plywood. We asked why the bathtub and the toilets were thrown out and it was explained to us that there were no draining pipes. There is a sewer but it ends with a single pipe at the end of the settlement....

How can people live under such conditions? Who invented such an "urban" type of life for them? And after all this we ask why are people unwilling to move from the densely populated Fergana Valley to the newly developed virgin-land areas? We hide behind traditions and the low mobility of the people. The answer, however, is as simple as the truth: no one is thinking of the working person. Is this not the main explanation for the fact that in 23 years not even one-half of the billions invested in the development of the Karshinskaya Steppe has been recovered?

We trumpeted throughout the world the adoption of an essentially new approach to the development of the desert: a comprehensive approach, which would mean building virgin land sovkhoves using the conveyer-belt method. What stands behind these words? What stands behind the hurrahs? Five quintals per hectare of cotton, an annual harm to the republic's economy in the order of 100 million rubles and dutifully pinned winner badges on the jackets of the developers. Add to this the ruined hopes of thousands of families who had decided to start a new life, improve their material situation and their children's minds. Such is the nature of this lie and that is the way it appears and those are its victims.

That is the target toward which perestroyka in Uzbekistan must be directed above all, in an atmosphere of glasnost, honesty and frankness and against lies and hypocrisy, against theft and subservience to officialdom.

Let us deeply honor the toiling Uzbek! It was his splendid hands, blackened from work, his golden hands, that brought our country its independence in cotton, and Uzbekistan deservedly earned the fame of leading cotton producer. But let us find within ourselves the courage to say today that from being the national pride of the republic cotton has turned into its national catastrophe. It is that same cotton that has become the source of immense wealth and source of large-scale crime. It is the domination of cotton and the intensified development of a single crop that undermined the foundations of the fertility of the land and the physical and moral health of the people. Ever new thousands and thousands of hectares were being hastily developed in the feverish pursuit of ever new ephemeral profits, while the desert followed in the footsteps of the developers. The Aral has been lost and saline sands are advancing irrepressibly around it; an ecological catastrophe is threatening to spread throughout the area. Meanwhile, we are still trapped by the past, by self-delusion: nothing particularly terrible has happened, and if we only could get a little bit of Siberian water we would then be able to...

Let us abandon this insane pursuit of cotton growing. Let us stop and think: How shall we continue to live? What, how, and how much should be produced in Uzbekistan?

I do not know about you, but I am unable to understand how this republic, in which the soil and weather conditions are much more favorable for crop growing and animal husbandry than anywhere else in the country, is unable to feed its population! Food is supplied to Uzbekistan from Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Ukraine and the Baltic area, to the point that soybeans are being shipped here from the Maritime Kray.

What is even stranger is that all our efforts to change the structure of agricultural production in the republic in order to ensure its self-support with meat and dairy goods are not being strongly supported in the republic itself. However sensible the formulated arguments may have been, everything follows the old system. Plans for cotton production remain virtually the same, cotton production costs are insane and recommendations and suggestions on alternate choices for farming, developed by the republic's scientists, are being rejected.

The country's planning authorities are displaying an inflexible view. We are being told that we shall never accept a further reduction in the volume of cotton production. Meanwhile scientists, a commission headed by A.G. Aganbegyan, have proved through their computations that the republic is not ready to produce today 5 million tons and it cannot do so, for this would only mean more arm twisting.

We suggest that by 1990 the production of cotton be reduced to 4.5 million tons and, subsequently, without increasing the area in cotton, exclusively by improving the land and upgrading farming standards and increased yields, by the year 2000, i.e., within a decade, to increase the volume to 5 million tons. Throughout the world cotton growing has, for a long time, been developing exclusively by increasing yields. In the past 40 years cotton production in the world has doubled while areas in cotton have been reduced by 10 percent. In our country we are still oriented toward increasing the areas in cotton and the number of people employed in cotton growing is continuing to increase.

Let us consider, above all, what use is made of the land in cotton in the republic. The cotton crop planted on 112,000 hectares does not exceed 10 quintals per hectare; output averages no more than 15 quintals over 150,000 hectares, and no more than 20 over 266,000 hectares. That is where we locate the losses and social underdevelopment. However, other statistics exist, of a more optimistic nature: an average of 35 to 40 quintals on 190,000 hectares, over 40 and as much as 50 quintals over 93,000 and the average on another 10,000 hectares is 50 or more quintals per hectare!

And if you were to ask whether a solution exists to the economic and social impasse in which Uzbekistan has found itself, I can firmly say: "There is one!" The solution is to improve land use and organize the proper management of the economy. I am being told that it is impossible drastically to upgrade yields; yet the figures I have just quoted prove that it is possible. It is possible where the necessary conditions to this effect have been created, and where there is a wish....

We suggest that the amount of cotton be reduced, that the areas be stabilized. Meanwhile, Comrade Kadyrov, the republic's Council of Ministers chairman, counters with the following argument: if you reduce the amount you will reduce the number of jobs in agriculture; each job is worth 20,000 rubles. Therefore, you must give us—at which point he names a cosmic figure—that much money for us to create new jobs. I do understand that there is a labor surplus in the area. However, the position taken by the republic, as represented by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, I refuse to understand: you may reduce but you must also give us. This is a difficult condition to be met by the country.

I have heard another objection as well: the republic could become self-sufficient in milk and meat but only if cotton production is reduced to 1 million tons. I do not agree with such estimates, for the starting point for such computations is based on cotton yields averaging 20 quintals per hectare. Yet growing cotton even with an average of 30 quintals is quite costly to the state. The country is paying a high price for Uzbek cotton. It would be cheaper to import it.

Let me try to prove this with specific figures.

For a long time cotton has been considered one of the most profitable crops in irrigated farming. Objectively considered, this profitability is relatively high largely due to state price policy. On the one hand, the state encouraged cotton production and thus gained its cotton independence; on the other, by raising cotton purchase prices it strengthened the economy of the Central Asian republics and improved the prosperity of their peoples.

Year after year, on a parallel basis, cotton production costs increased. In 20 years, since with 1965, it has nearly doubled, leaping from 28.8 to 54.3 rubles.

Let us now consider how the cost computation system operates today. It includes only current outlays, i.e., those which are incurred directly by the farms themselves, such as wages, cost of fertilizer, current equipment repairs, fuels and lubricants, amortization withholdings, and so on. The highest share in the structure of outlays is that of wages. Wages increased without a corresponding increase in labor productivity, for the sector was being increasingly saturated with manpower.

Speaking of production costs, let us point out that they do not take into consideration today the tremendous and ever increasing expenditures of the state for land development, digging canals or operating hydraulic equipment systems. If we were to compute them, it would turn out that efficiency in cotton growing is much lower than we think it is.

As you probably know, the decision has already been made of introducing payments for the water, land and manpower. The moment this mechanism is actually applied we shall be facing a sad fact: a computation of possible water outlays alone was based on an average yield of 28 quintals per hectare and water expenditures ranging between 5,000 and 8,000 cubic meters per hectare, at which point cotton growing becomes unprofitable. With an estimated cost of water ranging from 3 to 5 kopeks per cubic meter, water expenditures per quintal of cotton will range between 5 and 14.5 rubles. Wherever excess water is used, the cost of the water may reach 50 rubles. On the other hand, wherever crops averaging 50 quintals per hectare are raised, which is entirely realistic, water outlays could drop to 5-8 rubles.

Therefore, water alone would increase the actual cost of cotton production by an average of 40 percent, with fluctuations based on yields and water consumption, ranging between 10 and 60 percent. Assuming that we were to spend more water by a factor of 5-7, as is the case today, and raise yields to no more than 32 quintals per hectare, which is precisely the figure provided by the republic's Gosplan for the year 2010, water costs alone would exceed 140 rubles, i.e., this would double the current cotton purchase prices. We have not even estimated the cost of developing the land, the operation of hydraulic power and reclamation systems, or the labor and transportation to the fields of urban residents and school students, recruited in huge numbers to work the cotton fields.

The true computation of all outlays would result in a drastic increase in the number of losing farms in the republic. In order to correct the situation we would have, once again, drastically to increase the level of purchase prices if the farms are to make ends meet. However the state has only one pocket and outlays and wages come out of that same pocket which must acquire funds in order to be able to disburse them.

I believe that such computations would make the republic rely less zealously on the profitability of cotton. The actual cost of cotton growing is an exceptionally important feature as the starting point in substantiating the long-term development of the republic. We must now farm on the basis of economic methods, with open eyes, aware of production costs. For even ignoring the actual outlays, the number of losing or underprofitable farms in the republic is not diminishing. In 1986 there were 430 losing sovkhoses, or 47 percent of the total. And although some 500 sovkhoses were losing, there were

300 new sovkhoses under construction! What kind of economy could withstand this situation?! The Gosagroprom should not plunder the republic and the state with such impunity!

We must radically change the correlation of capital investments between new construction and the reconstruction of the old land, in favor of the latter. A great deal has been said on this subject and hydrologists and reclamation personnel have been thoroughly abused for substandard building of reclamation systems; they were abused for the situation of the Aral Sea and yet now, once again, there are those who call for increasing the size of irrigated areas in the Aral Basin. How? Out of funds which should be channeled into the reconstruction of the land and its improvement. Has the republic still not realized that this path will lead to an ecological, economic and social catastrophe! It is precisely this that will happen, for today has it not been universally acknowledged that it is precisely the failure to restructure reclamation systems that led to increased morbidity, including diseases long forgotten by the civilized world, and to increased infant mortality? As reported by the press, in terms of this indicator some rayons in the republic are in a situation as bad as that of Paraguay and Thailand. Is this not another overwhelming fact?

Instead of undertaking the solution of social problems, more construction is planned, this time on the right and left banks of water collectors along the Amudarya, in order to make the water, contaminated by pesticides, herbicides and defoliants, flow into the Aral Sea. Yet it is in that same water that, during the hot season, children will swim and will the temptation not arise of using this water to irrigate fields and gardens?! And what will the Aral Basin become? A hell of toxic chemicals. Toxic evaporations will not, alas, bring about prosperity to the area. Yet this will cost billions of rubles only so that the Minvodkhoz and the Main Central Asian Sovkhoz Irrigation Building Administration may go on leading a carefree life!

The republic's cotton growing complex needs profound radical perestroyka, a reconstruction, above all because of its low efficiency. This applies, above all, to the "lower stories," characterized by high labor outlays and antiquated irrigation methods and, therefore, the inefficient use of water and low yields.

The cotton complex must be completed "on the upper levels" as well, i.e., we must develop the final production stages so that the end result is not a raw material or a semi-finished item but finished goods.

The radical reconstruction of the complex and its basic modernization could become one of the main links in accelerated regional industrialization and conversion of the entire economic and social structure of the region, and drastic enhancement of the efficiency of the entire Uzbek national economy.

For the time being, however, no unanimity has been achieved in the views concerning the future of the republic. All in all, this problem, which is of prime significance to Uzbekistan, has been insufficiently studied. It has been discussed for a number of years, many papers have been written and numerous conferences have been held. The main thing, however, practical results, has not been achieved. There is no clarity on one of the main problems of the development strategy.

Today the Uzbek cotton complex is a typical example of what a raw material orientation of the economy could lead to. Its exaggerated development has led to a one-sided development of the national economy, created an illusion that the existence of a huge rural population is justified and contributed to the preservation of long obsolete economic and social relations.

Basic science characterizes the lagging of Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the country, with the unfinished nature of three of the most important sociohistorical processes: industrialization, urbanization and demographic revolution.

I do not claim in the least that family planning is the only way to lower the demographic pressure on regional economic resources. Other ways exist as well, such as, for example, migration from the republic. However, for the time being we cannot speak of any substantial migration from Central Asia to other parts of the country. The outflow is very small in the case of native ethnic groups. Those who are leaving consist essentially of members of the nonnative population—Russians, Ukrainians, and so on. The study of the professional and skill standards of those who leave indicates that there is an uncontrolled outflow of highly skilled personnel, who are greatly needed by the industry of the Central Asian republics.

The industrialization of the republic must be continued. With this I agree. Industrialization requires significant economic resources and major capital investments. Where should they come from? Above all, they should be internal and come out of the national income. However, would this suffice?

It is common knowledge that in 1985 and in subsequent years little changed and if it changed it was for the worse: the national per capita income in the Central Asian republics did not exceed 58 percent of the Union average. The scarcity of internal sources could be replenished with outside income. This is accomplished precisely by using the national income in this area, over and above the income it generates. However, even in this case it averages 62 percent per capita, compared to the average for the Union. In order to equalize the indicators, the overall used national income in the area should be increased to 71 percent of the generated income, or 61.6 billion rubles. This would mean that we should redistribute, in favor of Central Asia, about 5 percent of the national income generated by the other republics in the country. If such a share of redistribution would be

maintained over a long period of time, along with a higher norm of accumulation in the area, which would exceed the average for the Union, only then could we create material prerequisites which would ensure the faster development of industry and other nonagricultural sectors in the area.

However much we increase the assistance provided by the all-Union fund, ensuring a long-term existence of an area which spends 50 percent more than it produces is very difficult. The limited nature of resources will constantly encourage the regional economy to seek not the most efficient but the least capital intensive, and not intensive but extensive development. Under contemporary conditions, this leads to the predatory use of natural resources, making it necessary, in the interest of development, to use to the utmost all that nature has created and which could be produced at no cost. But what then? Then what will occur is what is happening in the Aral area. However, as we can see, Central Asia is as yet unwilling to abandon this path.

However this is not exclusively a question of capital investments. Industrial ministries are unwilling to go into Central Asia and Uzbekistan, for the reason that the efficiency of funds invested there is significantly lower and conditions for the use of capital investments are worse. Above all, there is a scarcity of skilled manpower which, in turn, is the result of the underdeveloped nature of traditions and standards of industrial labor, unwillingness and inability to work in factories and the fact that the population does not feel the need to do so. The ministries have gained bitter experience in this area: enterprises were built with no one to work in them. Furthermore, why create new enterprises when available capacities are not used fully, enterprises work essentially in one shift and ads for workers may be seen everywhere.... Therefore, who will be concerned with the republic unless it is the republic itself? Let us frankly admit that the rural schools in Uzbekistan cannot teach anyone anything.

The republic developed a good form of worker training: sending trainees to vocational-technical schools around the country. However, any good idea could be wasted if the attitude toward it is bureaucratic. Frequently a good intention turns into more or less lengthy trips to Russian cities at the expense of the state.

Who will bring order in our own home? The only one who can is its owner and his family.

Let us, first of all, settle the matter of the cotton. We keep repeating: cotton, cotton! We do not require such huge amounts of cotton produced at such a high—excessively high!—cost. We use cotton today whether necessary or not necessary in the least, including in areas where it could be successfully replaced by artificial fibers. For example, the U.S. output of synthetic fibers is higher than ours by a factor of 3.5; in 1986 its production totaled 5 million tons. Today no one can tell exactly

precisely how much cotton we need, of what quality and what strength. A technology already exists which allows us to manufacture very decent fibers consisting almost entirely of waste products.

Finally, it is time to remember that the main purpose of economics is not indicators, gross output or profit. Man is the main objective of economic activities, so that he could be well fed, clothed and shod. That is precisely and above all what we must think about. Let Uzbeks grow grapes, that same famous Uzbek kishmish, which cannot be grown anywhere else in the world; let them grow watermelons, with their unique variety which has been virtually forgotten by the people. Where elsewhere could such rich and sweet watermelons grow? What about walnuts and almonds? And what about dried apricots, with their most valuable medicinal properties? To the best of my knowledge, today even in the republic itself the prices of these age-old gifts of Uzbek land have reached incredible dimensions, and not everyone can afford them.

On the other hand, such labor intensive sectors could absorb thousands of surplus workers in the countryside. In the course of time the wide scale production of dried fruits could become a major export item. Today, however, to our shame, we are importing raisins which, alone, is costing us hundreds of millions of rubles.

We must come to our senses, drop out of the insane race and engage in thoughtful farming. We must give the land to its true owners and not to managers. We must become familiar with its structure: this area should be planted in cotton, that one in feed crops and that other one in vegetables, fruits and grapes and what is left should be leased to the people, and let them grow what they want, such as watermelons, cantaloupes or broom twigs, let them market their produce fearlessly, with the proud awareness that it is the result of honest toil.

As to cotton, as we said, we must increase its yields. We must use more productive strains which, I believe, should once and for all be developed by the huge army of selection workers in the republic. Already now, some brigades in Khorezma Oblast for example, are harvesting 65 quintals per hectare. These brigades are working on the basis of the family contracting principle. What is most important is that however many appeals may be made in Uzbekistan to practice crop rotation, they would be useless. Here the people want to do it by themselves, without any pressure or threats. They produce above-plan cotton and livestock feeds and grow food crops and all on those same areas. The main thing is not to hinder the peasants and to concentrate all facilities on those who are truly producing, and let them make their own plans without being issued guiding instructions.

We are saying that there are no jobs for the people. Do we not use this as a pretext to conceal our own irresponsibility, inefficiency and lack of initiative? If a woman

has three children, she should be considered a working woman. Therefore, we should not manipulate statistical figures. Such a woman is engaged in a difficult and noble work for which she will be held responsible. Furthermore, today infinite opportunities exist for the creation of cooperatives. Dozens, hundreds and thousands of cooperatives could be created, if we act intelligently. They will help find employment for the people in the service area, for nowhere more than in Uzbekistan has the service industry such low standards. Let the people start processing recycled materials and waste, of which there are millions of tons in the republic, totaling billions of frozen rubles. If such processing is economically organized and used, there would be no labor surplus whatsoever.

The republic must organize its economy in such a way that its population will not experience the difficulties it is facing today.

We believe that the republic has no right to demand a constant redistribution of the national income produced in other Union republics which work more efficiently. Each republic must spend on its own needs funds proportional to the national income it generates. There is in this an element of social justice in relations among Union republics.

The restructuring of the management system taking place in the country is still avoiding interethnic and interregional relations. Yet a number of pressing problems have accumulated in that area and it is time to start considering them publicly. We should not delude ourselves and convince one-another that there are neither parochialism nor nationalistic distortions in our country. One of the reasons which triggers them is violations of the organic connection between the measure of labor and the measure of consumption, which leads to a distortion of the principle of social justice and, subsequently, to the spoiling of moral values, such as Soviet patriotism, ideological convictions, labor enthusiasm, and so on.

The new economic mechanism must become the base of perestroika, objectively combining all-Union with local interests and responsibility for the results of economic activities.

Self-support, i.e., a surplus of the created public product over production costs, must become the common principle on the basis of which economic relations are structured between Union republics and all-Union authorities, and among themselves. It is only under such circumstances that one could rest confident that the republic will add to the social wealth rather than diminish it. At the same time, such a principle of relations will create a firm responsibility on the part of the republics for the efficient use of natural, manpower and production resources, not in terms of accounts or statistical indicators but of actual cash revenue earned by sectors and republics.

Let us point out that, starting with the 1930s, significant deformations and violations of the Leninist principles of structuring the union among republics developed and continue to exist in relations between Union authorities and republics.

In many areas the Union authorities regulate the economic, cultural, political and spiritual life of the republics. All sorts of bureaucratic distortions are triggering not the best possible reaction in the local areas and, sometimes, even reactions which assume a nationalistic aspect.

Some republics, having adjusted to such conditions, choose to adopt a position of dependency, displaying a passive and irresponsible attitude. In other words, they assume a position which suits them in all respects.

The time has come to broaden the rights of Union republics, not in words but in fact. Each one of them has the right independently to solve the problems of its social and economic development. This should provide extensive opportunities for initiative and a variety of experiences in the activities of the individual republics. The range of problems to be solved by Union authorities should be reduced to a minimum.

This does not mean in the least that the Union republics should not receive needed aid and support. On the contrary, reciprocal relations among them will strengthen and develop on the basis of economic contracts and plans for cooperation and mutual aid based on equivalence.

All of these problems are currently being profoundly studied by scientists and, apparently, will soon be offered for extensive public debate.

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A State of Law Is the Objective. Editors' Roundtable'

18020006e Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 18, Dec 88 (signed to press 5 Dec 88) pp 30-36

[Roundtable of the editors of KOMMUNIST ESTONII No 10, 1988]

[Text] A new period has begun in the country's life, a period which is important from the viewpoint of intensification of perestroika: the implementation of the reform of the political system, as earmarked at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. The latest roundtable sponsored by the editors, at the beginning of August 1988, dealt with an exchange of views on some of the most essential stipulations of the party conference. The meeting was attended by Professor Igor Gryazin, head of the Theory and History Of the State and Law Department, Tartu State University, doctor of juridical sciences; Eenok Kornel, deputy head, Juridical Department, Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet

Presidium; Toomas Mendelson, chairman, Tartu City Executive Committee; Yaano Odar, deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Court; Vello Saluste, first secretary of Tallinn's Leninskiy Raykom, Estonian Communist Party; and Gustav Tynspoyeg, chairman, Estonian SSR People's Control Committee (currently first deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers).

The roundtable was chaired by Viktor Vakht, member of the editorial collegium of the journal KOMMUNIST ESTONII and secretary of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The editors were represented by Viktor Peterson, deputy editor-in-chief, and Ants Lang, head of the Soviet Building Department.

[V. Vakht] It is unnecessary to mention the significance of the problems which we intend to discuss today. They are drawing the attention of the public, sometimes expressed in rather complex intertwining viewpoints, and reappear in a new fashion in the daily work of people working in various areas of our political system. As was clearly said at the party conference, we shall not be able to deal with the tasks of perestroika without a fundamental reform of the political system. One of the foundations of perestroika is the all-round democratization of social life.

In discussing the reform of the political system, we should mention, above all, the question of the restructuring and democratization of the soviets of people's deputies, which are the political foundations of our state.

[G. Tynspoyeg] I believe that the entire problem should be considered in the light that the reform of the political system will add great stability to the two pillars of perestroika: the radical economic reform and the process of democratization. The opportunities inherent in socialist democracy are unlikely to become apparent without such a reform.

[I. Gryazin] When we speak of the soviets of people's deputies as the foundations of our statehood, we must immediately point out that the concept of "soviet" or "Soviet" has several meanings. We speak of the soviets as a political institution with a certain ideological content to which we relate ideological and cultural values and traditions (the Soviet state, Soviet culture, Soviet way of life, etc.). From the juridical viewpoint, we consider the soviets as representing a certain parliamentary, a representative form of government. There should be a theoretical distinction made between these two aspects.

Historically, the soviets appeared as a simplest possible form of expression of the will of the people, the simplest form of parliamentarianism. However, historical experience proves that the simplest form is by no means the most durable and most stable. Toward the end of the 1920s, when Stalin began to dominate the governmental

institutions, he stopped taking the soviets into consideration as power bodies. They proved incapable of opposing the pressure of the "leader"-dictator. The simplest form of democracy turned out to be the easiest to convert into something formal, and even into its own opposite.

In pursuing this somewhat unusual thought, let me emphasize that if we wish to achieve a further development and strengthening of the soviets as the foundations of our state and form of political life, their activities should be made more comprehensive from the procedural viewpoint. This would make their work more stable and reliable. Of late a number of noted Soviet legal experts have written about the need to give the soviets some parliamentary features and to convert them perhaps into "semi-parliamentary" representative authorities.

Let us consider, for example, a parliamentary procedure such as the consideration of draft bills in several readings and their final adoption, but only after their third reading. A more complex electoral procedure as well may seem, as a first approximation, undemocratic or bureaucratic. However, it too gives the representative authorities greater stability and reliability. In order to ensure the full power of the soviets, the most important thing is clearly to determine their range of competence and electoral procedure.

The following thought comes to mind as well: a clever demagogue could, at any given meeting or session (quite possibly at the session of the soviet itself) impose his own will on the majority.

Therefore, a more complex procedure in solving problems would exclude such a psychological accident. Had our Supreme Soviet had a greater number of various permanent groups among which, naturally, differences of opinion could arise, as a rule personal ambitions would start counteracting arguments and popular representation as a whole would oppose such manipulations more firmly.

Nor should we forget the fact that the different ethnic groups in our country have different political traditions and levels of political standards. Therefore, the procedures governing the functioning of the political system should always take into consideration the political experience of one national group or another.

[G. Tynspoyeg] For many years I worked as chairman of a rayon executive committee and have seen many resolutions on upgrading the role of the soviets. Actually, it was a question of broadening the rights of the executive committees, i.e., of the executive authorities. Clearly, the functions of management agencies will broaden even further once the republic has converted to full cost accounting. The current radical reform calls, in general, for transferring the full power to the soviets, with real guarantees consisting of a precise demarcation of the functions of the party and soviet authorities.

So far the work of the soviets in cities and rayons has been headed by the executive committees. It was they who drafted the agenda of the sessions and prepared draft resolutions for the individual departments, submitted by the deputies usually on the eve of the session itself. Now the local soviets (with the exception of rural and settlement) will have their own standing authority, a presidium, which will organize the work of this representative body. This will free the deputies from the petty supervision of the administrative apparatus.

[T. Mendelson] The factors which restrict the full power of the soviets are indeed numerous. To this day our city soviet is unable to determine its role and purpose. In general it is not competent to make decisions on many problems of vital importance to the urban residents. Indeed, the effectiveness of the resolutions passed by the city soviet on one item or another varies. Centralism and departmental interests, which dominated matters for a long time under the administrative-command system, slowly emasculated the actual power and authority of the soviets.

[A. Lang] In my view, the real and full power of the soviets on their territory should be based on their own finances, local economic self-management and territorial cost accounting.

[G. Tynspoyeg] The principle of territorial management was reflected in the resolutions of the 19th Party Conference, and the viewpoint expressed by our delegation on converting the republic to economic self-management and cost accounting was also supported at the conference. The implementation of this principle will also broaden the rights of the local soviets which will simply become forced increasingly to cope with economic problems.

However, let us also accept the fact that for a number of reasons, some of them subjective, the local soviet authorities do not make full use even of the rights and prerogatives granted to them by our current legislation. The People's Control Committee analyzed the condition of individual housing construction. The study clearly established that in Tallinn, Tartu and other cities, not all applicants are being allotted plots for individual construction; the paper work for the approval of blueprints and issuing construction permits is handled bureaucratically. There are many shortcomings in the organization of the sale of construction materials to the population. Meanwhile, the corresponding governmental resolutions make it mandatory for city and rayon executive committees to solve such problems in the interest of the citizens efficiently.

[T. Mendelson] I accept the criticism as far as the activities of the executive apparatus is concerned. However, there is also some truth in the fact that that same local soviet does not have the right to determine the size of the lot which can be assigned to a person and whether that person has the right to build a big house on that lot.

[V. Saluste] I too have 15 years of experience in soviet work. Regardless of who may have been the city "father" at one time or another, many of the pious wishes contained in the resolutions issued by superior authorities remained nothing but pious wishes and as it were, the comprehensive development of the urban economy did not take place. To this day the development of Mustamyaie and Yysmyae, not to mention Lasnamyaie, remains unfinished. Today no one can tell us how much money is needed, for example, to eliminate the great delay in the development of material facilities for urban trade.

[T. Mendelson] As long as a Union department will be annulling our resolutions, begging your pardon,... there will be no choice other than to apply pressure, naturally through legitimate means, on that department so that, in the final account, it may be forced to take our views into consideration.

Naturally, we also need a new law on the soviets. In that case their competence could be made consistent with the requirements of perestroyka, as was pointed out at the party conference.

Changing the basic rules for making the Union, republic and local budgets is a major problem. Today the city budget is formulated within the framework of outlays sanctioned by "superior" authorities, and the funds for that budget come either from the Union or the republic budget. The opposite should be the case: in establishing the local budget we should proceed from possible income from economic organizations and citizens of a given territory and accordingly plan expenditures and firm rate withholdings for the republic and Union budgets.

[I. Gryazin] In this case we should be guided by a general as well as important principle: the most efficient form of structuring relations with big enterprises under superior jurisdiction is their fair taxation. All enterprises on a given territory, regardless of departmental affiliation should, as a rule, be taxed. Let us imagine, for example, that the Tartu Measuring Equipment Plant would withhold from its profit 40 percent for the city budget, 20 percent for the republic budget and 10 percent for each department. The collective of that enterprise could do whatever it wants with the rest. It is obvious that the percentage figures I have named are arbitrary but in principle it is precisely a fair, flexible and stable taxation system that would make it possible to ensure the best possible combination of the interests of the labor collective, the area and the entire state.

[T. Mendelson] The reform of the political system, and the restructuring of the work of the local soviets are raising a number of new problems. Prior to the party conference we discussed the CPSU Central Committee Theses at a city soviet session. The conclusion we reached was that the number of people's deputies should be reduced and some deputies should become "year-round" paid deputies, who would be elected to the

presidium of the soviet and organize the activities of the city soviet. The following practical problem will arise in the immediate future: what should the composition of the soviet presidium be? If it consists of public personalities, it is unlikely that anything would change.

As to demarcating between the functions of the soviet as an organ of state authority and its executive committee as an administrative authority, the following question arises: What would be the role and what would be the rights of the executive committee (I am referring to its elected members) if a soviet presidium already exists? The Tartu City Soviet has repeatedly practiced the system of having the sessions prepared exclusively by the deputies themselves and the standing commissions, without any interference of the apparatus of the executive committee.

[V. Vakht] It is a fact that strengthening the power of the soviets and the restructuring of their activities raise a number of questions which have remained unanswered so far. At the last session of the task force of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, a violent argument broke out for or against a number of concepts: Should the soviet presidium deal exclusively with organizing the activities of the deputies or, between sessions, also pass resolutions in the name of the soviet? How to organize technical services for deputies relieved of their professional activities? What should be, under the new circumstances, the structure of the soviet and the apparatus of the executive committee? Should the right be given to any voter in a given administrative-territorial unit to elect the chairman of the soviet, and so on?

Obviously, simple answers to all these questions cannot be found in a single session. For that reason, the task force deemed necessary to ask the views and suggestions of the executive committees of city, rayon and even some rural soviets. As we know, the best criterion of truth is practical experience. Therefore, in the immediate future structural innovations and new principles governing the activities of the soviets must be tested in several of our cities and rural rayons, Tartu and Khaapsalu, for instance. It is thus that we would gain the necessary experience in restructuring the activities of the soviets on all levels, should they have a newly elected membership next year.

[V. Vakht] The Soviet Constitution codifies the historically developed leading role of the CPSU in our society. The party organizations are the nucleus of our state and public organizations and labor collectives. The universally known principle is that the CPSU implements its policies through the party members who work in these organizations and operates within the framework of the fundamental and other laws.

The demarcation of functions between party and state authorities was qualified in the conference's resolutions as a key problem of perestroyka, for which reason we must firmly abandon the distortions of the period of

stagnation. It is no secret that in the past the party authorities simply issued orders to the soviet apparatus; they achieved the implementation of their decisions by applying pressure on the soviets and, furthermore, did not deem the strict observance of legality necessary.

[V. Peterson] Over a long period of time, we painfully realized that so far the leading role of the party in our society has been misunderstood (the party is involved with everything, the party must deal with all petty matters!). It was precisely this that deprived the soviets of their real power. Whatever the level we may be considering, actually the power is in the hands of the party authorities. It is they who decide all essential problems, while the soviet and its executive committee act only as the party's appendage.

Both social and personal experience lead me to express a single thought which may initially seem totally unacceptable and absurd: it is as though the law, the legal standards become inoperative at the point at which the party apparatus begins to act. This is not because the apparatus consists exclusively of malicious violators of the law. Not in the least. It took years and decades before the exclusive position of the party authority was established in the soviet and economic units. The party authority did not have to take anyone into consideration. It acted in accordance with the current line and the formula which developed somewhere within the party apparatus that "there is a view" which does not mandatorily have to be consistent with the laws. The various manifestations of this "view" reflect a certain level of our legal consciousness and legal standards which, unfortunately, are not particularly high. This is common knowledge, and the party workers are no exception.

[A. Lang] As a journalist with legal training, I have always been puzzled by formulations in official reports on sessions of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Buro such as, for example, relieving someone from his obligations as deputy chairman of the Estonian SSSR Council of Ministers, or someone else of his position as the republic's prosecutor. I believe that I understand accurately the role of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee in terms of cadre problems pertaining to party members but I fail to understand why in using such formulations does the Central Committee assume the constitutional rights of other institutions within our political system, in this case the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR prosecutor's general office. In such cases it would be obviously not all that difficult to find a proper formulation from the party leadership's viewpoint.

[I. Gryazin] V. Vakht said that the role played by the party in our political system is known in its general features. In general features yes but, conceptually, some questions remain unanswered. We say with conviction that the party is the leading force, the nucleus of our society, and so on. However, this assertion is not a legal

category but a figure of speech. We are faced with a paradox: it is a "leading force" without responsibility. Should it not be necessary for society to define more accurately the prerogatives of the CPSU as a political party so that the following could happen: for example, when the first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee signs any kind of important political decision, he should also know what his actual responsibility is.

[V. Peterson] Who can say, how can we determine the line where the real and necessary party leadership ends and the substitution, petty supervision, begins? No one could probably give a clear answer. Each raykom secretary, shall we say, draws such a line in his relationship with state authorities by eye, where it seems to him that it should pass. Whereas the functions of executive committees are more or less prescribed in the laws on the local soviets, nothing regulates the party's leadership. Everything is being done, so to say, on the level of someone's intelligence. If that person is imbued with a democratic spirit, it is good; but what if the person is authoritarian? In short, it is a question of the fact that the party statutes are insufficient in terms of the necessary legal control of activities of party committees; the statutes deal with internal party relations and cannot encompass the full complexity of daily life.

[V. Saluste] It seems to me that in terms of demarcating between the functions of party and soviet authorities, the situation in our republic is somewhat better than elsewhere. Let me honestly say that while I was the chairman of the Leninskiy Rayon Executive Committee in Tallinn, not once did the party raykom interfere in our affairs. It is true that we discussed jointly so-called strategic problems. Now I try to develop in the same style my relations with the executive committee, not to supervise it or assume its functions. I cannot agree with the assertion that the party apparatus ignores the laws. Wherever this is allowed to occur, the party agencies lose all authority.

The question of universal legal training was sharply raised at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Such training should be given to both party and soviet cadres.

Combining the positions of first raykom secretary and rayon soviet chairman was debated at the party conference and the debate is continuing. Initially I was skeptical on this subject but now I think that probably the political leader of the city or the rayon could successfully head also the most prestigious authority of the state system—the soviet of people's deputies. Naturally, in this case a great deal depends on the personality of the party committee secretary. Furthermore, the resolution adopted at the conference does not make it an absolute requirement, for it is a question only of the desirability, as a rule, of combining the two positions. Any authoritative and experienced deputy could be made chairman of the soviet, as a full-time job.

[V. Peterson] On paper everything is smooth. In reality, however, everything is much more complex. We cannot fail to consider for example the tremendous inertia of the old, from which our society is clearly not about to be rid soon. For, as the people now say, we are only learning democracy. The lack of democratic traditions will affect voting (it is still the candidate recommended by superiors who will be elected) and we do not know how the doubling of power will be manifested in the activities of the elected person: Will he be able sensibly to handle it? Once again we are entrusting our destinies to a personality, a leader, a hero, whether local or on the national scale, granting him unlimited power. Yet our entire and tragic past cries out against this.

We need mechanisms, we need legal mechanisms, having already decided to establish a socialist state of law. It is been said quite accurately that for ages our country has been ruled by people instead of laws.

[Ya. Odar] No two authorities can exist simultaneously, any more than a party and a soviet system can exist separately. The power must be concentrated in the same hands.

[I. Gryazin] Here, sitting around this table, we can consider a great variety of political structures. However, we must not forget that the final, the real power under the conditions of perestroika must nonetheless remain in the hands of the people, the electorate. If the people and their deputies would like to see a leader of the People's Front as a chairman of the soviet, for example, it is that person who should be elected to that position, regardless of recommendations.

Here we discussed various authorities—party, soviet, executive, etc. Let me engage Ya. Odar in a discussion on yet another authority: the judiciary. In my view, it will significantly influence the course of perestroika.

[Ya. Odar] Initially, we said here that the system of soviets appeared in its simplest forms, combining legislative, executive and judicial powers. It seems to me that Lenin's understanding of the nature of a soviet system, at its initial stage was, obviously, the only accurate one, for otherwise in a peasant Russia seizing and holding the power would have been impossible. Lenin, however, was a great dialectician, and I am not confident that under the present sociopolitical conditions, for example, he would have continued to support such a principle of unity of different powers. Under current conditions life leads us to the classical principle of the division of power, according to which legislative, executive and judicial authorities function independently.

[V. Peterson] It looks as though the theory of the division of powers formulated by Montesquieu is not the way we have interpreted it for many long years. It may make sense, perhaps, to borrow the rational kernel of this theory.

[Ya. Odar] We need an independent judiciary. This must be an institution which would steadily supervise whether the state functions as a constitutional state or does not. The reform of the political system stipulates such a control on the highest level, represented by the committee for constitutional supervision. However, conventionally it could nonetheless be considered a judicial authority.

[V. Saluste] Obviously, the same type of high constitutional supervision will be set-up in the Union republics as well.

[V. Vakht] No other way is possible.

[Ya. Odar] One of the principles of the state of law is that not only does the state have the right to demand of the citizen a certain type of behavior but also the citizen has the right to demand of the state the protection of his legitimate rights. The citizen must know that there is an impartial governmental authority to which it could turn at any time for help and that this umpire, based on the law, will competently determine whether in any given case either officials or state authorities have acted legally.

[I. Gryazin] The principle of the state of law can be briefly formulated as follows: all authorities must worship a single god, which is the law expressing the will of the people. The law "speaks" through the judicial authority. It may happen, for example, that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet may pass a law which disagrees with the Constitution, thus violating it. The court would reject the application of this law, for it is the Constitution that is the supreme law.

[Ya. Odar] I have been a judge for many years. I must admit that in both juridical practices and legal thinking, in the course of time a certain change has taken place. Here is one example of recent judicial practice: a citizen from Lillekyula tried to sue the city authorities for the fact that during a high flood the sewer lines systematically flooded his basement. Be it said to our shame, the court refused to consider the case. The prosecutor advised the citizen to turn to the executive committee, and the executive committee simply ignored him. He found no protection in addressing himself to the court, for the court actually took the side of the departments. The question is the following: Where, in the final account, could a citizen find protection?

[I. Gryazin] In principle, there should be no situation according to which, should there be a conflict between a citizen and the state, the citizen would not be able to sue in court for whatever reason. This would apply, for example, to the refusal of the MVD OVIR to issue a visa for a trip to visit an aunt in Canada.

[A. Lang] We must honestly acknowledge that during the period of stagnation ensuring the protection of the political, social and civic rights of the Soviet people had

been reduced to virtually zero. The present course charted by the party toward strengthening the safeguards of the rights of citizens should lead to substantial broadening of the range of competence of the courts. Extensive work remains to be done in the area of perfecting legislation and democratizing law-making.

[V. Peterson] As proof of the idea expressed earlier, let me cite a typical example: if memory serves, this occurred at the start of the 1970s, when the Tallinn Party Gorkom and city executive committee passed a joint resolution on taking steps against cadre turnover. The motivations of the two authorities were entirely understandable, for cadre turnover is both our difficulty and our scourge. The resolution imposed restrictions on transferring from one job to another within the same year. Such restrictions may be somewhat justified from the sociopolitical viewpoint. Nonetheless, they are a direct violation of the labor rights of citizens, as stipulated in the labor code.

[Ya. Odar] The planned judicial reform will be paralleled by a legislative reform. It will affect material and procedural law. Enhancing the authority of the courts and strengthening their material facilities will be a major part of the judicial reform. The overall unanimous view is that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should set up an autonomous investigative authority which should include the previous investigative apparatus of the prosecutor's office. The right to a proper defense presumes strengthening the right of defense counsel to participate in the criminal prosecution process the moment the suspect is detained or charged with a crime. This, however, presumes a substantial increase in the number of skilled lawyers.

The most important problems of the judicial-legal reform must be solved, naturally, above all on the Union level. Nonetheless, we must have within the republic the possibility of thoroughly analyzing all draft bills. Unfortunately, in this area strange occurrences are frequent: we may be informed by the press that a given Union law has been passed. Even this way, the essence of one resolution or another passed by the USSR Council of Ministers is presented only briefly. Forgive me, but how can we speak here of the accurate application of the laws?

The question of ensuring the real independence of judges and, therefore, of strengthening the authority of the courts, is exceptionally pressing. I believe that it is time to abandon the current procedure for the election of people's judges. It would be better for judges to be appointed for life by the republic's Supreme Soviet. The judges must be aware of their total independence from anyone, so that not even the highest-placed official or authority could influence their actions.

[I. Gryazin] If we were to quintuple the salary of judges and appoint them for life, a high-ranking party manager could telephone a judge as frequently as he likes; even a

threat of being expelled from the party would not influence the judge's actions which will be guided exclusively by the law and his own conscience. Naturally, the other question which will arise at that point would be that of the qualification of the judges.

In pursuing our discussion on the state of law, let me say that jurists and legal experts in the republic are ready to assume the implementation of the primary tasks: drafting a new constitution and law on the court system of the Estonian SSR. The drafting of electoral laws is another important and urgent task.

Despite all of this, let me particularly emphasize that in no case should we hurry with the drafting of a new constitution. The draft should not take 3 months but several years. We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of formulating a fundamental or any other important law on the basis of current interests and short-time prospects. My suggestion is the following: let us not change quickly the entire text of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR but add supplements to it, based on the concept of the republic's cost accounting, changed structure of governmental authorities and the administrative apparatus, the electoral law and other necessary amendments. This will enable anyone to see the changes which perestroika has made to the Constitution.

[G. Tynspoyeg] A number of conference resolutions deal with strengthening the control functions of the soviets, broadening the rights of people's control bodies and upgrading their authority.

It is more important to prevent rather than to simply expose shortcomings. For example, should it turn out that no real possibilities exist for implementing any given resolution, we should exercise the right of legislative initiative with a view to its abrogation.

According to the contemplated uniform control system, it is essentially public controllers who will function in enterprises and establishments. The labor collectives will democratically elect a public control authority and its chairman who must report to the entire collective.

We started to create a uniform control system at some enterprises even before the party conference. In 14 large labor collectives we combined within a single people's control group the party organization commissions controlling administrative activities, the respective trade union commissions and the "Komsomol beacon." At large enterprises the chairman of such a group should be a full-time official.

It is clear that we must somewhat strengthen the people's control committees on the rayon and city levels.

On the republic level we must also assume control over the work of the executive-managerial apparatus and coordinate the activities of the entire control system, based on the principle that within a single year an

enterprise may be thoroughly investigated no more than once. This means, however, that we must quite efficiently coordinate the control activities of different departments. We are also being assigned to provide them with methodical guidance.

One of the tasks of people's control is to upgrade the overall administrative standards of the state apparatus and the economic authorities. It is not possible to check legal regulations down to their slightest details. A correct behavior, customs and ways of managing current affairs are needed in management.

[E. Kornel] Let me add to this yet another important concept, that of having a political standard. The standard of development of the political system must be consistent with a political standard which, in our country, is still in its embryonic stage. In my view, the role of the study of politics as a branch of the social sciences must be drastically enhanced. On behalf of a group of jurists we suggested at one of the conferences of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee to initiate, starting with this school year, the training of experts in politics at TGU. Our suggestion was considered.

Let me say a few words on the attitude toward the administrative apparatus and its personnel. I would like us to see the administrative apparatus not as a gathering of some kind of hardened bureaucratic paper shufflers on whom one could fire at will but a body of competent specialists of a needed brain trust, without which management is impossible. Requirements concerning the competence of the personnel of such an apparatus and their political and labor standards must be drastically enhanced under the new circumstances. In my view, it would be dangerous to engage in the thoughtless destruction of the apparatus and its unconsidered automatic reduction.

[G. Tynspoyeg] The greatest possible attention should be paid to the administrative apparatus. Its spiritual potential should not be wasted. Unfortunately, occasionally the press behaves toward the administrative apparatus as though it consists of trees in a forest, to be cut down with an ax.

Let me also mention the current noticeable enhancement of the people's civic activities. It is a fact that the People's Front is expressing today, in its essential features, the hopes and aspirations of the people. For that reason, all management bodies must find the possibility of establishing contacts and cooperating with this movement. The republic's People's Control Committee supports the viewpoint that we can include in our work plans the study of the reasons for the various social disorders exposed by the People's Front.

[E. Kornel] To a certain extent, I have been pressed into service as a legal consultant to the initiative center of the Estonian People's Front. Before taking up the subject of

the People's Front, let me express a few remarks on the subject of today's discussion. We discussed the reform of the political system on the basis of its individual elements. The question which reality raises, however, is the following: How, during the period of perestroyka, should the structure of our entire political system be changed, what should be eliminated from or added to it? Each unit within the system has its specific objective and function although their roles may be different. Personally, I believe that one of the units of the political system should mandatorily include the mass information media. Nor could we avoid the following question: Does affiliation with a political system make any social organization a political one? Legal and political experts should think hard about this question.

Now as to the new social movements and organizations. A series of manifestations of political pluralism have appeared, such as societies and associations which give themselves political functions. This is quite a serious problem. In the past everything was clear: some social organizations were political and were a part of the political system while other were considered professional associations, such as creative unions, and so on.

[V. Vakht] The Supreme Soviet Presidium discussed these problems and a motion was submitted to the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee of clearly defining in the republic's Fundamental Law the type of social organizations which will be part of the political system. The current vague formulation of "cooperative and other social organizations" does not essentially mean anything. A truck gardening cooperative is also a cooperative organization but, naturally, we do not consider it part of the political system. This question becomes particularly pressing in connection with the drafting of new electoral laws. "New" organizations are competing with each other in claiming the right to nominate candidates for deputies.

[E. Kornel] The legislator must accurately define which organizations within the political system will be granted political rights. This question must be solved at the very next session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Personally, I believe that the status of political organization must be granted to the People's Front, the "greens," and the peace movements. The way this will be reflected in the Constitution is a different matter.

[I. Gryazin] This problem indeed must be solved quickly. The best would be for the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet officially to approve a complete list which should start as follows: "The following shall be part of the political system of the Estonian SSR...." I too would include in this list both the People's Front and the "greens." But let us not seek arguments and definitions today.

[E. Kornel] The expected resolution of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on mass social movements (I assume that the People's Front will operate precisely as a mass

public movement) and the new electoral laws will define the legal status of these organizations and movements. We must also define the procedure for governmental recognition and registration of new social organizations.

As a whole, today the situation is such that it is as yet too early to predict specifically the nature of the final status of these movements and organizations and the forms of their cooperation with other units of the political system. A great deal depends on their objectives and basic documents. This is something to think about. I am in favor of political pluralism but, at the same time, I categorically oppose identifying the role of the party in our political system with the status and role of any other organization which also proclaims itself political.

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'Sore Spots' in the Work of the Apparatus

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[Article by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bozhanov, head of lecturers' group, Minsk Obkom, Belorussian Communist Party, candidate of historical sciences; reprinted from KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII No 12, 1987; No 9, 1988]

[Text] How to work today in the party apparatus? We hear and read that one must work with initiative and creativity, assume total responsibility and think critically. But just try to behave so independently. Are there many among those who must promote perestroika and struggle for it who would dare, at meetings in their collectives, evaluate someone's work regardless of his position? Such phenomena are exceptionally infrequent. The system of penalties for shortcomings is poorly used in the party apparatus. Yet now we have remembered and are applying it. Most strangely, it turned out to be aimed above all at those who try to do more, who believe in the need for a direct and frank discussion about omissions and problems. Secrecy, concealment, and lack of explanation of reasons are the method applied in making decisions concerning punishments. Naturally, those who display initiative err more frequently than those who smartly claim to be deaf and live according to the principle that "times may change but the chiefs stay on."

A situation quite amazing from the viewpoint of common sense has become apparent. It turns out that the most difficult and dangerous thing is to display a passion for the fulfillment of one's official obligations. Dedication to the work, duty and independence in decision-making are frequently interpreted as lack of discipline or infringement on someone else's authority. Many managers, including some within the party apparatus, have become accustomed to the fact that an official is always ready to set his own work aside and, the moment he is asked, perform another urgent assignment. In such cases it is useless to speak of one's creative thoughts and work

plans. This phenomenon is so common that many associates within the apparatus essentially structure their working day on this basis and have an advantage over the others. Yet how frequently this "very important" assignment somehow imperceptibly vanishes and, after a while, is remembered by no one.

Unfortunately, to this day it is virtually impossible to oppose this method of rushes and campaigns. Whereas in any project this is bad, it is inadmissible and harmful in ideological work, for the result is nothing other than a combination of "one step forward and two steps back." It is true, however, that the "step forward" is publicized while the other part is concealed.

Somehow speaking of our labor incentives is not acceptable. It is considered that incentives are generated by the very position held in the party committee and by the feeling of duty. Unquestionably, this creates a great deal of obligations and enhances the best qualities of the worker. Nonetheless, real life is not all that simple. In the course of my work in the apparatus I have had the opportunity to observe the way some people irrepressibly climbed up the official ladder while others remained in the same position for many years and eventually ended there. However, if we try to compare their qualities and special data (with rare exceptions), which is a requirement before an appointment is made, they cannot be found. Open any personal file. The documents give nothing but a foggy idea of the business, political and moral qualities of the person. But if the results of labor activities are not reflected in the private file, how are we to develop an objective opinion about an official? Most frequently, on the basis of a subjective view about him, expressed by his superiors. It is at this point that a tangled knot appears. Let me bluntly say (how else can we speak among us?) that in the party apparatus as well there are many employees who, as in the past, serve individuals instead of causes and never rise above the opinion of their manager. Subservience and respect for rank which, obviously, will not be eliminated in a couple of days, still define the situation in the apparatus and the behavior and fate of many workers. One unwittingly reaches the sad conclusion that under such circumstances it is impossible to work. All that is required is simply to avoid personal responsibility, be in good repute and show no initiative whatsoever.

Let us point out that the work style in the apparatus of many party committees remains excessively centralized. "The First said," "the First thinks," the "First agrees (or disagrees)," and so on, are the cliches of an authoritarian power, alongside which the opinions and thoughts of other officials, particularly on the lower level, are important only if they support the "First." We have forgotten how to discuss, how to defend our viewpoint. Should this be attempted, the customary statement is frequently heard: "Think what you wish but obey your orders." This frequently dampens cadre initiative and lowers their social responsibility. It questions their professional experience and competence. Trust in cadres remains

low. Some documents of secondary importance or even ordinary actions must be cleared with a number of managers of higher ranks. Occasionally, it becomes a question not of the matter itself but of properly presenting it to one's superiors. I would say that such a phenomenon has become an element in the obstruction mechanism.

The practice of cadre promotion, which is one of the powerful incentives for their work, is unsatisfactory. As a rule, any future promotion is closely concealed from the collective. Adding names to the reserve becomes even more mysterious. Everyone knows that such a list exists but not one of the "reservists" knows where to find it.

I believe that glasnost in this case must be increased. Incidentally, that is the way Nesvizhskiy Raykom, Belorussian Communist Party, operates. In that rayon a person assigned to the reserve is told about his possible future work, trained for it and tested in action. This reveals the strong and weak points of the person, which enables him to develop a more self-critical attitude and determine whether he is capable for the job. However, alas, so far such restructuring innovations are infrequent. I believe that the personnel should have the right to be promoted to vacancies within the party committee apparatus and the various sectors on the basis of a competitive selection, regardless of the feelings of superiors. This would make the work more interesting.

The time of stagnation is behind us. We are now in a beneficial period of creative aspirations and responsible attitude toward the work. The party calls for broadening perestroika and its intensification calls for increasing our exigency toward party committees and the personnel of the apparatus.

Incidentally, the primary party and trade union organizations have not become involved in promoting the labor incentive of cadres within the party apparatus, protecting them from red tape and bureaucratism and ensuring their labor safety. Yes, our work demands tremendous stress and certain self-restrictions and self-discipline. In frequent cases evenings, Saturdays, Sundays and even holidays are spent in the endless drafting or transcribing of various papers. There is no time to broaden one's cultural outlook or spend one's leisure time with the family. Naturally, all of this extracts its toll.

We must point out that, in many cases, our planning is exceptionally poor. Most frequently it is arbitrary instructions that have a ruinous impact on it. To this day no serious method exists in the formulation of the work plans of party committees or criteria with which to assess their implementation. As it were, the plenums and buros remain the centers of events and everything else is based on them but quite arbitrarily. For some reason it is the custom of many party committees not to sum up the

results of the implementation of their plans. End results become diluted, and it is difficult to determine what has been accomplished or lost by the fault of an individual official.

I believe that the concept of planning on the lower levels is a more accurate one for the party apparatus as well, for it takes into consideration the opinions of those who are directly in the thick of daily actions related to the implementation of the plan. The end result must clearly define the efficiency of the various specific forms of work with people.

I do not know whether my ideas are worthy of the attention of the public. I am deeply convinced, however, that the obstruction mechanism is not located somewhere around us but, frequently, within ourselves. Yet the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum stipulated that however the party behaves so will perestroika, for perestroika was initiated by the party. The ideas of perestroika have already profoundly entered the awareness of the people. They are implemented through the energy, persistence and profound interest of the people. This, incidentally, is the reason for the profound strength of socialism and a powerful force of its development. The problem is for the local party authorities and, above all, their apparatus, not to fall behind the events but to be at the head of perestroika and to be able truly to start by reorganizing itself.

The letter "Sore Spots' In the Work of the Apparatus," which came out in KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII (No 12, 1987) triggered a lively interest among the readers. On the eve of the all-Union Party Conference, many of them took part in the discussion of this sharp presentation. Now the conference is behind us. What is happening with the "sore spots," how are they being treated, what type of difficulties and problems appear? In answer to the request of the editors of KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII, V.A. Bozhanov, the letter's author, shared his views on such legitimate readers' questions.

Once More On the Subject Of the 'Sore Spots'

The 19th All-Union Party Conference became a landmark in the country's life. It provided clear guidelines "for the further sailing of the revolution." Statements, addresses and articles which were considered in the past as requiring particular daring and civic dedication were considered at the conference a norm, a law of life. It became clear that in addition to daring statements what is needed today, to an even greater extent, is daring actions in order to achieve practical results. "We need new qualitative changes in our development....", M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the conference.

In my letter I discussed the elements of the obstruction mechanism which, in my view, exists in the party apparatus. Having closely followed the debates related to the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Theses for

the All-Union Party Conference and, subsequently, having followed directly the proceedings of the conference itself, I found in them numerous confirmations of these thoughts.

The reaction which my colleagues in the apparatus had to the letter proved to be quite restrained. Much greater support came from colleagues from other party committees. In some of them the article became a topic of discussion at party meetings and conferences of the apparatus. I heard strict reprimands as well. It turns out that today it is easier to criticize CPSU Central Committee Politburo members than the immediate local leadership (although the article did not criticize anyone specifically). Essentially the objections could be reduced to the following: the first secretary is elected at a plenary meeting; the apparatus works with the party committee members and, therefore, with the "First;" hence the "First" should be obeyed instead of voicing a discontent concerning his rights; as to democracy, one must as yet grow up to it.

Such is the nature of discussions in the 4th year of perestrojka, under the conditions of discussing the CPSU Central Committee Theses for the Party Conference! Unwittingly, this triggers a feeling of disturbance and mental confusion. Could it be that there indeed is such a law of nature and of our life that while there is motion on the upper levels there is calm and eternal silence at the lower end? No, the conference proved that the party is ready not only to hear the bitter truth about its activities but also to demand of the party organizations to deal with the obstruction mechanism and firmly and quickly to master new forms and methods. When I am asked in the course of my addresses to labor collectives what has changed in 3 years in the work of the apparatus of the Minsk Party Obkom, I mention with pleasure the ability to maintain in the oblast, as a whole, decent national economic indicators, and the application, for the first time, of the competitive selection of full-time party obkom personnel, such as the elections for the rector of the Marxism-Leninism University at the Minsk Party Obkom. I also mention the widening practice of the appointment of party, soviet, Komsomol and economic cadres through a competitive electoral system, and the efforts of the real work organizers of perestrojka, of which we have many. I mention the frequent addresses delivered to labor collectives, the party and economic aktivs and the young by the group of lecturers of the Belorussian Communist Party Obkom.

I speak yet I feel that I am missing a great deal. Yes, the situation both in the oblast and the party obkom apparatus is changing. However, a great deal of essential features remain the same. As in the past, there is no atmosphere conducive to a comradely exchange of views and debates. We have not become accustomed to such an atmosphere, we have not developed the habit for it. If someone would raise such a question, he can only strengthen once again his belief that nothing will come out of it. That is what frequently happens. There is a

book for children entitled "*What Is My Head Thinking About?*" What are our minds thinking when we sit at conferences and do our jobs, when we go "to the people?" What is there left for them to think when everything is presented to them in the guise of an endless monologue, in terms of instructions, sermons and assignments? God forbid that they should forget something.

Working "with the people" is a separate topic. As a rule, we, party workers, behave quite circumspectly and with restraint. We avoid sharp situations. We are afraid of expressing a personal opinion. It is believed that anything we do should be the right thing and that it should cause no doubts, not to mention any kind of aggravations, in the people around us. We are taken strictly to task for deviations. The anachronism of such a behavior today openly clashes with the task which was set at the party conference of "promoting party policy in a new way, through the methods of ideological-political and organizational work among the masses." It was noted and triggered a critical attitude on the part of the party conference delegates concerning the speeches of a number of party committee secretaries. In the past, such an anonymous behavior, holding the monopoly of speech, seemed authoritative. Today there is not one rostrum but many and in order to be authoritative, in the course of a competitive struggle one must win over the attention and interest of the audience. Occasionally, under such circumstances, the emancipation of the so-called informal associations becomes even more interesting and appears more daring. It is thus that the real struggle for the masses becomes part of life, a struggle which we proclaimed for many long years but did not implement. Today this struggle is only developing but, unquestionably, under the conditions of democracy it will become a real factor in the country's sociopolitical life. The party conference acknowledged it as a method for promoting the party's influence under the new conditions.

It is time, it is high time to free the party workers from the constraints of excessive organization and the fettering of their thoughts and actions, and to turn them into true ideological party fighters. How to accomplish this? We must formulate in advance an efficient long-term plan. The existing plans are unsuitable because they proceed on the basis of form rather than content. One or 2 months after the adoption of the plan it becomes clear that the plan is one thing while life is something else. Engaging in strictly practical work cannot yield major results. A firm foundation has been laid in the republic's capital for serious work: the department of social science information of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences (for some reason it is kept very "secret"), the Party History Institute of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, the sociological services and, finally, the practical work done by each one of us. However, all of these operate separately. An isolated informal rebel should not find himself surrounded by the personnel of law enforcement authorities; we must not assert our ruling position simply by wrecking or stopping initiatives.

I believe that it was a mistake to stop the practical science conferences which we regularly held in the past, for we need a laboratory of ideas. The currently popular roundtables could also become a convenient method. Party workers must speak on the radio and television or write in the press a great deal more. Above all, there must be greater trust in and attention paid to those who acquire such experience.

We worry about the fate of perestroika and the ability of the party cadres to abandon their own stereotypes and to rise above intraparty egotism. Without developing our own habits of comradely and democratic contacts within our own organization or apparat, we could hardly be convincing and attractive to others, to those whom, as was noted at the party conference, we must inspire and enthuse for perestroika by virtue of our social duty. There is no alternative: the opportunity we were given must be used to the fullest extent.

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Management Paradoxes

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[Article by V. Spirin, deputy chief, automated control systems department of the casting plant in Nabe-rezhnyye Chelny; reprinted from the house organ RABOCHIY KAMAZA No 78, 1988 (1,336)]

[Text] Is the ASU a real management system? The question may seem inappropriate. There are thousands of ASU on different levels and for different purposes, and thousands of computer centers working in all sectors of the national economy. As defined, the "ASUP is an organizational-technical complex which ensures increased production management efficiency on the basis of the use of economic-mathematical methods and contemporary data processing systems." Indeed, technical facilities exist and economic-mathematical methods are being used. What then is the problem? The truth is that a "minor nuance" remains: "ensuring improved management efficiency."

A Shock From... Effect

Let us try to consider this "nuance" in greater detail, for it is precisely within it that we find the meaning and need for automating management functions. To start with, let us ask any manager, whether traditional or member of the ASU Service: Is it rare for an ASUP to have been installed while the size of the administrative personnel has not only not been reduced but has even increased significantly by adding programmers and specialists for handling and repairing technical ASU facilities? The answer most likely will be that this is by no means an exception but, as a rule, a system. The experts bitterly joke that "as a result of the installation of ASUP economic results frequently worsen."

Nor was this avoided at the KamAZ. To justify it, the following idea was floated: yes, the number of personnel increased but the quality of management has improved to such an extent that without the ASU the apparat would have had to be increased much more. This is a conventional reduction of the administrative personnel. As a rule, in support of the accuracy of this idea data are quoted on differences in the speed of data processing by man and computer.

For lack of space, let us leave strict proof of the inadequacy of such computations aside. Let us adopt a simpler method: let us turn off for a while the ASUP (which, in practical terms, is a frequent phenomenon at the KamAZ because of breakdowns and other hitches) and let us consider changes in the quality of management. As a rule, disengaging the system (this does not apply to payroll computation or the solution of some planning and bookkeeping problems), remain unnoticed at the plant. In particular, the assembly ASU could be stopped and the conveyor belt would not even notice the difference. This means that the traditional management system reliably duplicates the ASU.

A Short Excursion Into History

A great many features at the KamAZ are good and even the best in the country which, unfortunately, cannot be said of the control system. What brought such a situation about? Let us try to find an answer by comparing the experience of the development, installation and functioning of the ASU at the VAZ and the KamAZ.

Whereas the VAZ system became a subject of pride and study by other enterprises in the country, the same could not be said as yet of the KamAZ. The value of the comparison is that it enables us to single out our typical errors. In this case we cannot take into consideration the very popular references to the lack of computer equipment (at the KamAZ imported computer systems alone exceed 200), or the lack of suitable methodology (our ASU was set up after the VAZ ASU).

The people in Togliatti immediately realized the need for unifying the construction, technological and organizational plans for the enterprise and all three were developed and applied simultaneously. The theory of organizational systems includes a concept such as "customs," which are unwritten rules of action which have become part of daily use and are the most efficient means of applying the rules. Thus, the organizational plan of the VAZ was essentially implemented from the very beginning on the basis of customs, and remains strong to this day. An overall organizational plan has still not been formulated at the KamAZ.

Ilf and Petrov made a curious sociological observation: the passengers in a streetcar may change but the microclimate—a quarrel which may have broken out in the morning—would remain for the balance of the day. A

similar conclusion may be drawn concerning the VAZ and the KamAZ: managements change but the microclimate of the organizational plans remains.

The next difference is that of priorities in production automation. The VAZ people paid prime attention to the assembly shop. In our plant the ASU in the assembly shop is, to this day, of decorative value only although, technologically, our assembly work is more complex.

The approaches to the basic subdivision of ASUP—controlling the organization of a production (UOP)—are also substantially different. Whereas at the VAZ this management was closer to basic production and, as a basic management unit was the first to begin work, in our association it is at some distance from the production process. Communications between the UOP and the various plants are unsatisfactory and the information is transmitted by motor vehicle and presented in tabular form.

This error has deeper consequences. The UOP of the VAZ is an integral subdivision. It develops and applies an integrated ASU, which includes the management of technological processes (ASU TP), as well as the production process. The direct users of the system are the production workers. The UOP at the KamAZ, conversely, abandoned in 1976 the development of the structures and functions of the subdivisions within the association and the ASU TP. Separate ASU services were set up at each individual plant. It is they that primarily define the policy of computerization of management processes.

The result was that the UOP became a subdivision with unclear tasks and responsibilities. Furthermore, in turn, in 1986 it was separated from its computer center. Furthermore, in order to catch up with the omissions, in 1985 yet another ASU Service was set up—the SAPR Management (automated design system) and the ASU TP. The result of such abundance of services is that the integration of the automated control system at the KamAZ became more difficult.

The efficient use of ASUP technical facilities firmly requires their inclusion within a single computer network. The experience in the joint development of such networks with the use of general purpose computer centers has been acquired even by enterprises under other ministries (such as in Tomsk). Is it more difficult to solve this problem at the KamAZ, considering that essentially there should be no departmental barriers among its individual plants?

Bureaucracy Against the Computer

However, let us go back to the beginning of this article. What should be done for the ASUP to be able truly to implement its purpose? Let us try to find the answer by considering the actual situation which has developed under enterprise management. A peculiar twin-power

system has developed, and is quite clearly demarcated: traditional management and its computerized under-study. It is even more accurate to say that the real power is in the hand of the traditional managers (including, and precisely for this reason, the top management), while the ASU Service acts, as a rule, as a partner with an allowance.

The result? The “traditionalists” manage on the basis of the old ways and means while the ASUP Service, which works on a long-term basis and consumes the enterprise resources has no essential influence on upgrading management efficiency. What does this lead to? The “traditionalists” engage in major unproductive outlays or, rather, they are forced to it by scientific and technical progress. On the other hand, a trend has been noted among ASU specialists themselves toward preserving this abnormal situation. They are doing something interesting, programming various things, relying on computers and, at the same time, printing tables, without being particularly worried if a couple of days later their tables are used at the food stand to wrap products. A strong motivation is needed in order to “spoil one’s own life.” No such motivations may be found among the top management.

The result is that despite all the necessary conditions for the creation of an efficient ASUP, it turns out simpler, by mutual agreement, to deal essentially with accountability problems and transport by car information from the plants to the IBM 370/158 computer with telecommunication facilities. The print-outs are then taken to the warehousing and distribution personnel, i.e., they are used by the middle and lower echelons while the management technology of the 1940s and 1950s is still being used on the higher management levels.

Yet it is precisely in this area that we find the main advantages of computerization. Thus, only about 70 of the 1,200 sets that must be assembled in a motor vehicle according to plan are being assembled at the KamAZ. Hence the annual imbalance between accountability and bookkeeping data and losses in the millions of rubles. What has the result of a lack of an efficient ASU in assembly line work led to? To distortions in assembling technology and the creation of intermediate unplanned warehouse stocks and even to significant structural systems, such as splitting the automotive assembly plant into two plants and the organization of powerful dispatcher services. If one could opt for a choice between computerization or bureaucratization, the higher management would not choose computerization.

Furthermore, all of this is occurring against a peculiar psychological background. In general, the ASU specialists feel that they are not earning their pay. However much they resent this, they are unwilling to leave such an interesting work without responsibility, and to “find themselves in the humdrum of production life,” where stress and specific responsibility are frequent occurrences. The traditional managers are proud of the fact

that it is precisely they who are the decision makers. God is with them, with their heart attacks, night vigils and disputes! Yet they alone run the show! Somewhere deep within themselves they realize that this situation cannot last forever and that soon this must come to an end. Yet, how unwilling they are to retrain "in their old age." How passionately such managers abuse "that ASUP," without thinking that its decisive factor, nonetheless, is human.

Naturally, we have deliberately painted an exaggerated picture of such "traditionalists" in order to emphasize their negative sides. Nonetheless, this picture is not all that unrealistic. Today all too many people who are behind the "steering wheel" are masters of nothing but a single computing tool: a bureaucratic invention with beads strung on a wire, on the basis of which they make their decisions.

But what happens to the promise of trying to find an answer to the question of what to do so that the ASUP could truly become a management system? It seems to me that it can be derived from all that we have written here.

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Captives of Postdogmatism

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[Article by Varlam Varlamovich Keshelava, editor in chief of the journal KOMMUNIST GRUZII, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor; reprinted from the journal KOMMUNIST GRUZII No 10, 1988]

[Text] "... A party which lives under conditions of ideological comfort and which has determined that it holds the truth in its hands and that it does not have to seek that truth on a daily basis but merely take it out of its safe is a party which risks to lose its spiritual and moral authority, revolutionary nature and ability to act as the political vanguard of society." Such feelings, which were voiced in the report submitted at the 19th Party Conference, could seriously threaten the intellectual merits of Marxism-Leninism if we indulge in and fail to rebuff them. They are entirely intolerable today, when changes of fatal significance to the country and to socialism as a whole are accumulating in our country's life. The drastic enhancement of the tonality of the spiritual life of society, at a time when our development is taking a sharp turn in order to leave behind its state of stagnation, and when the "ways and means of taking practical experience closer to the end objectives and ideals of communism" are being defined is an indication of the significant increase in the interest shown in general questions and is not only a legitimate but very hopeful phenomenon.

We know that periods of historical changes are marked by a sharp ideological struggle and clashes among views, positions and evaluations. The depth of the current and the major forthcoming changes can be determined by the amplitude of their differences. In this sense the current perestroika is no different. In marking a sharp turn in the development of our society, it triggered and could not fail to trigger a pluralism of views and interpretations covering a broad range of socioeconomic and cultural-political problems. Whereas there are those, for example, who welcome the economic reform and see no alternative in the further progress of socialism, in the eyes of others, conversely, it is a virtual attempt against its foundations. Equally great differences exist in assessments of the programs for the renovation of the socio-political and cultural-ideological areas, carried out by the party.

In such a nonstandard period, the existence of different and very disparate assessments should not alarm anyone. Our time itself demands daring approaches and unusual decisions. Consequently, today we should sound the alarm for the lack of fearless efforts to understand the nature of our time honestly and completely, to determine what was it that triggered stagnation and how to leave it behind us. Actually, this desire is very strong, but what we need is greater competence.

In the press (more on the Union level, but also the republics) we occasionally come to statements and assertions pertaining to conceptual problems which may seem, at a first glance, a serious challenge to dogmatism, which is setting everyone's teeth on edge. And although such writings contain a great deal of exaggerations, they trigger by their emotional rejection of stagnation the sincere sympathy and support of the public. That precisely is what makes it necessary to acquire a more thorough view of the coordinates of the new thinking, to determine what the new reading of the works of the founders of Marxism should yield and define the legacy which we must reject or carry with us as our permanent spiritual value.

It would be unforgivable, in this respect, to ignore the opportunity offered by Engels' fundamental work "*Anti-Duhring*," which came out some 110 years ago, and V.I. Lenin's work "*Marxism and Revisionism*," which was published 80 years ago.

There is no need whatsoever to publicize Engels' "*Anti-Duhring*." This work was ignored neither by its supporters nor its detractors. It has remained in the center of endless disputes about Marxism, still taking place among philosophers, economists and political scientists. This is no accident. Engels' "*Anti-Duhring*" is, in the series of Marxist works which followed "*Das Kapital*," one in which, for the first time, the new theory was presented as a huge synthesis of philosophical, economic and political ideas. Based on Engels' interpretation of the structure of

Marxism, in this work Lenin listed dialectical materialism, economic theory and social science as its three parts forming an indivisible entity.

In order not to repeat the arguments we find in the very popular Leninist article "Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism," let us refer to the work "*Marxism and Revisionism*," we mentioned. Structurally, it is strictly consistent with "*Anti-Duhring*." In other words, like Engels' work, it begins with a philosophical discussion and a criticism of retreats from materialism and dialectical materialism. This is followed by an analysis of the revision of Marx's economic views. It concludes by exposing the stir concerning the foundations of Marxist political doctrine and, above all, the rejection of the theory of classes and the class struggle.

As we can see, Lenin supported Engels' understanding of the structure of Marxism. He fully shared the idea of the integrity and monolithic unity of its components. It is precisely this feature that he singles out as the insurmountable advantage of Marxism. By pitting its consistency, order and logical lack of conflict against the latest ideological trends of the 20th century in philosophy, economics and politics, against which he had to struggle tirelessly, Lenin emphasized their theoretical amorphousness and inconsistency or, in short, their eclectic nature, considering this to be their insurmountable faults. Conversely, he was always captivated by the purposefulness of Marxism.

Today few historians of science are interested in Eugene Duhring. Some information on his works may be found in encyclopedias. The fact that he is nonetheless remembered is due, obviously, more than anything else to the author of "*Anti-Duhring*." After a most decisive rejection of a vulgarizing conceptual confusion, economic superficiality and socialist idle talk which, in his words, were the dominant features of many literary workers who had undertaken to refute Marxism, Engels perpetuated Duhring's name by adding the prefix "anti."

After an exchange of views with Marx, Engels decided to speak out against one of the then fashionable promoters of pseudosocialism and petit-bourgeois ideology also essentially because of the opportunity he was given to present, in its fundamental features, the system of proletarian revolutionary doctrine.

One of the most important methodological ideas formulated and directly and practically implemented by Engels in "*Anti-Duhring*," concerning the theory he shared with Marx, is the systemic principle. For that reason this work can be described with full justification as the encyclopedia of Marxism, as well as a work thanks to which Marxism was clearly presented as a theory of an encyclopedic nature.

This last circumstance is of essential significance. Ignoring or underestimating the fact that, taken in its entirety, Marxism is a system of internally interrelated and reciprocally complementing and substantiating philosophical, economic and sociopolitical views, has been the cause of many misunderstandings and even deliberate distortions of its nature. Today we must pay attention to this aspect, for to this day Western critics of Marxism willingly practice its dismemberment.

Even during Marx's and Engels' lifetime, their ideological opponents made efforts to prove that Marxism does not have a theoretical pivot which would tie together its various parts in an indivisible entity. They found ascribing to Marxism views alien to it easier by rejecting the coordination among its structural components. In philosophy, for example, it was "supplemented" by neo-Kantianism, empiriocriticism, Machism and other idealistic concepts. The economic doctrine was subjected to a similar treatment. Frequently scientific socialism was replaced by ethical and petit-bourgeois socialism.

This trend has been preserved to this day. We can even say that today the dismemberment of Marxism has gone beyond the level it had reached in the past.

To begin with, as in the past, the critics concentrate on philosophical materialism. Many of them separate Marx from Engels and pit one against the other. They proclaim that the materialistic interpretation of Marx's philosophical views should be entirely on Engels' conscience; that Marx himself had allegedly never been a materialist; and that the philosophical materialism, which obtained its final form in "*Anti-Duhring*," was exclusively Engels' offspring with which Marx had nothing to do.

We shall not undertake here to prove how stupid such assertions can be or engage in their refutation. A great deal has already been written on this subject. What is more important is to understand not what is being claimed but where it comes from and what is its purpose, and what motivates and substantiates for one interpretation or another. Approaching from this viewpoint the negation of the legitimacy of considering Marx's philosophy as materialistic, we can easily identify the uninterrupted chain of interdependencies which leads to a suppression of a fundamental Marxist feature: its systematic nature.

Departmentalization legitimizes, so to say, the departmental approach to Marxism: philosophy, political economy and socialist theory act not as interwoven but as separate features, as ideologically neutral if not entirely alien concepts. As a result, the powerful force of this revolutionary doctrine, which is based on the inviolable foundations of the new materialism which enabled Marx to determine, on the one hand, the mechanism of action of the objective laws governing capitalist production and provide an understanding of the natural-historical nature of the process of socioeconomic development and, on the other, to raise socialism to the level of a science, is reduced to naught.

In Lenin's view, what is the merit of Marx and Engels in philosophy? What, from his viewpoint, is particularly characteristic of their attitude toward philosophical legacy? Above all, Lenin emphasizes the fact that the founders of Marxism did not simply support the viewpoint of philosophical materialism; they did not limit themselves merely to a defense of its principles, but developed and promoted it primarily by applying materialism to the study of sociohistorical phenomena and systematically promoted its principles in the social sciences. In Lenin's view, consequently, what played a decisive role was that, having discovered a new "continent," which was totally unknown and inaccessible to the old materialism—the system of economic relations—Marx and Engels rushed beyond the limits of materialistic nature philosophy and inordinately broadened, by this token, its cognitive area. They laid a material foundation under the sociopolitical sciences, indicating through their writings how fruitful the objective method of knowledge, the method of dialectical materialism, was in the social sciences.

In general, as G.A. Bagaturiya, the noted Soviet student of Marx, points out with full justification, the development of Marxism is a means of its existence. Ossification and stagnation are mortally contraindicated to it and alien to its nature. This was constantly pointed out by both Marx and Engels. The latter is the author of the well familiar warning that Marxist theory should not be taken as a prescribed system, that it is not a set of unappealable complete truths but a method for the study of various phenomena. In emphasizing the creative nature of Marxism, V.I. Lenin loved to repeat that he considered it not a dogma but a manual for action.

However, dogmatism clearly gained the upper hand as the years increasingly separated us from the Great October Revolution and, particularly, after the publication of the "*Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)*." There was a drastic decline in original research. The time came for the writing of textbooks and school aids. Commenting became the main if not the only intellectual occupation of socialist scientists. Marxist concepts were zealously classified, grouped and broken down by chapter and paragraph. In the final account, the "training variant" overshadowed the living and developing Marxism, which had always remained open to new developments. Presented in a form shaped to meet the needs of pedagogy, Marxism was presented as a set of permanent dogmas which were both emasculated and depressingly impressive, killing any live, restless and seeking ideas. For a long time an ossified mask concealed the true aspect of Marxism and its original openness and creative (revolutionary) nature.

What is paradoxical is that this happened to Marxism which, through Leninism, had become enriched with the revolutionary experience of the 20th century and had thus acquired an unparalleled impetus for uninterrupted development. However, the hard and despotically developing historical period which, for the sake of brevity, we

describe as the period of the cult of personality, had its merciless logic: The ideological imperatives which were given priority averaged, equalized and standardized thinking. Durable stereotypes developed, consistent with the needs of the state. Postulates, not excessively burdened by a theoretical concept yet easily understandable and mastered, were canonized. The most favorable conditions existed for the blossoming of dogmatism. The unprejudiced study of reality yielded to a simulation of true knowledge.

Decades of command-pressure management methods, applicable not to the economy alone, were most pitifully reflected, and not in the least, in the humanities. It is here that, probably, the greatest harm was caused. Is this not confirmed by the exceptionally low prestige of the humanities in the eyes of public opinion? Whereas in the arts and literature, despite most bitter losses, there nonetheless existed a relatively broader opportunity for free quest and creative self-expression, nothing even resembling a choice was left to the social sciences which were made entirely and totally captive of ideological taboos.

Despite the periodical campaigns mounted against dogmatism, whose disgrace was repeatedly and publicly proclaimed, as though as a mockery it impudently grew and strengthened. However, once the Talmudic stupor reached its peak, the view which opened was one of the unseemly face of dogmatism. In the course of its natural breakdown the callousness of the indifference toward theory, bordering on cynicism, previously concealed behind a militant intolerance of anyone else's views, became apparent.

I believe that I would not be all that wrong by claiming that today we are the captives of a postdogmatic period. Although we hear on all sides appeals to crush dogmatism, it seems to me, for example, that today it is not the main danger which we must fight. We have fallen below dogmatism. But is there such a place? It turns out that there is a level below that of dogmatism! On that level (if we can still use the word level at this point!) we are dealing with the products of decay: mental anemia with overripe infantilism.

How can we explain otherwise the sad facts according to which social scientists—philosophers, political economists, party historians and specialists in scientific communism—are sluggishly reacting to a variety of statements which they would have never ignored in the past? This striking indifference is yet another proof that the dogmatists do not fear any display of faith in the sanctity of a concept, claims of holding the monopoly on truth, promoted to the rank of an absolute, or even their own orthodox frenzy. What makes dogmatism frightening is that it invariably inflicts a profound sclerosis to the mind. It is precisely this type of scholasticism that made it, during the period of omnipotent rule, merciless and

demagogic, concealing its emptiness. Today its sterility has yielded a poisonous crop which conceals, through scorn of principles, a scorn toward the truth.

Otherwise, it would be difficult to assess the shameful silence which is maintained by the social scientists in the face of publications which contain insultingly squalid descriptions of Marxism. Probably the best explanation for the position they hold (if the term position applies!) would be that, feeling their own guilt, they are deliberately avoiding to criticize, perfectly realizing that, otherwise, they would have to start by criticizing themselves, with self-criticism. The broad circles of the intelligentsia, who have a second or even third-hand knowledge of Marxism, are familiar with it essentially on the basis of the notorious "training variant" or, which is even worse, they have drawn information about it from the experience of their contacts with its ignorant popularizers from whom Marxism should be thoroughly protected, for they are more harmful to it than its overt opponents.

Under such circumstances, how deserved are condemnations of a writer, journalist, literary worker or specialist in the precise sciences accused of having an erroneous view of Marxism? If they have a very vague idea of its conceptual foundations and their views on the correlation between life and thought are, to say the least, naive-primitive; if they are unfamiliar with the nature of the superiority of contemporary (dialectical) materialism over idealism and the previous and long surmounted metaphysical materialism; if furthermore they have not realized that awareness, which stopped a long time ago being to contemporary materialism merely a passive (mirror) reflection of reality, considered as an active revolutionary-transforming force which creates new forms of life, should we not blame for all such "ifs" above all those whose duty it was to recreate the true image of Marxism which, with its almost physically tangible intellectual power would eliminate any tendency to engage in thoughtless statements concerning its principles in order not to share the fictitious glory of Herostratus?

Therefore, there is an urgent need for social science, liberated from the pressure of dogmatic ordinariness, energetically to engage in the study of a broad range of contemporary problems. It can fulfill this duty with the help of Marxist-Leninist methodology. Using the latter not as an incantation or a Procrustean bed in which any fact should be made to fit, but as a means for the objective analysis of the facts, social science can provide independent and scientifically rich solutions. The task, consequently, is not to abandon this methodology but to ensure its most profound mastery and creative application.

We are indeed acknowledging today that the time has come for a new perusal of some ideas of Marx and Lenin. However, this has nothing in common with hasty and slipshod conclusions which question the scientific value of the systemic conceptual postulates of Marxism. Yet

without the decisive use of philosophical materialism, there can be no Marxism as a streamlined system. Instead of the great doctrine of our time, which powerfully rises above the other theories by virtue of its depth and streamlined nature, we would be facing an eclectic mixture of disparate views and claims.

The importance which Lenin ascribed to materialism as the philosophical foundation of Marxism can be seen from the fact that he rejected from the outset any deviation from it or the aspiration to harmonize the basic difference between materialism and idealism or to reconcile them within Marxist philosophy; he condemned such efforts as base revisionism. His criticism became merciless whenever such a revision was done under the banner of improving and surmounting any imaginary one-sidedness and theoretical purism of Marxism.

As to the examples of conceptual confusion, which we mentioned, based on the Leninist criteria they could hardly be qualified as philosophical revisionism. We should abstain from doing this for at least two reasons: first, because their authors do not claim in the least to be "correcting" Marx or even to be thinking in the line of Marxist (materialistic) traditions. Second, such statements are made not only outside the framework of Marxist philosophy but also of professional philosophical culture. Like any other amateurish judgment, by virtue of their obvious theoretical helplessness they are, if one may say so, under the aegis of the presumption of innocence. In addressing ourselves to revisionism we cannot use the words of Jan Hus: "O, sancta simplicitas!" ("Oh, holy simplicity!").

Nonetheless, such groundless assertions from the theoretical viewpoint, which surreptitiously erode the materialistic foundations of Marxist outlook, are not all that harmless in fact, as it may occasionally seem, if left without a critical answer. Therefore, the social scientists must clearly realize their task: There must be two sides in conducting a first-rate dialogue, something which we are learning to do today.

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Are We Aware of the Integrality of National Culture?

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[Article by Ivan Mikhaylovich Dzyuba, literary critic and publicist; reprinted from the newspaper KULTURA I ZHITTYA, 24 January 1988, Kiev]

[Text] This is a very big topic which we shall try to analyze here in its most general features. The main, the principal question which immediately arises is that of the structural completeness of contemporary Ukrainian national culture.

A realistic approach to it would force us to acknowledge that today Ukrainian national culture is a culture with an incomplete structure. This is due, first of all, to the fact that many of its sectors have been weakened while other do not exist at all. Second, because the Ukrainian language is not fulfilling all of its social and cultural functions and because a national language is, nonetheless, the backbone of national culture. Even the non-verbal arts are indirectly related to language, to concepts which take shape with the help of language and even with the very sound of the language (let us recall the statement by Academician B. Asafyev on the "intonation background of the nation"—the essential prototypes of musical and poetic intonations which, turned around, are found within the national system of speech). In general, when entire strata of the nation no longer use the Ukrainian language, this tremendously impoverishes the content of Ukrainian speech, lowering its intellectual and spiritual potential, i.e., in the final account, emasculating Ukrainian national culture. For culture consists not only of works of art but also of the entire set of spiritual acts expressed in ordinary words, as the creativity of every individual. Let us recall A. Potebni's thought that poetry is spread throughout ordinary speech....

Actually, what should be understood by the term Ukrainian national culture? What amount of phenomena does it encompass? Quite frequently, consciously or subconsciously, we ignore this question as though suggested by the devil. What we mean by Ukrainian culture is simply the mechanical sum of cultural phenomena existing on Ukrainian territory. That is how the mass information organs operate most frequently and so do, unfortunately, many critics who study the problems of the contemporary cinema, theater, television or stage. I learned from a monograph, for example, that we have literally hundreds of Ukrainian documentaries, and feature and musical television films. However, we know perfectly well that they are in fact extremely few. I realize that a researcher must use the entire set of facts related to a specific type of art. In this case, however, he must objectively, precisely and substantiatedly distinguish among them on the basis of a number of features, including that of national artistic quality, taking into consideration the dialectics of integration and differentiation in art. The tendency to dilute Ukrainian national culture in the flood of productions created on Ukrainian territory, in the Odessa movie studio or the Kiev printing combine, for example, invalidates the question of the national quality of this culture and, perhaps, of culture itself in general.

The opposite extreme exists as well, which is equally unmotivated and dangerous, less because of its social than its creative consequences. It is true that it has no public form of expression but endures quite strongly among artists and, so to say, individual esthetic concepts of representatives of the various arts. I am referring to a peculiar sort of purism which vigilantly limits the realm of Ukrainian culture to manifestations which are exclusively Ukrainian-language oriented in the case of the

verbal arts (a criterion which is by no means always unconditional!) And, in the case of nonverbal arts, phenomena which bear the clear features of traditional national styles (which is quite questionable!). This leads to subjectivistic evaluations, bias, intolerance or even a militant rejection not only of what is new but of anything which does not meet one's own limited tastes or views and, furthermore, even a painful view on anything of this nature, as something hostile, as an almost cleverly formulated international subversion of Ukrainian art. Such is the price, a price which could be even stiffer, that must be paid for the thoughtless or crafty deviation and cunningly wise concealment or officially optimistic expression of problems of the national character of contemporary Ukrainian culture.

Naturally, all of these problems are vast and difficult. They demand tremendous efforts on the level of their theoretical interpretation and of specific study of the various means used in literary, motion picture, music and art studies. However, at this point we would like to direct the attention to that which is more or less obvious: The cultural situation in the Ukraine could be depicted as three concentric circles. The first and the widest is the cultural given, the sum total of facts which exist in the Ukraine or enter it, and so on. The second, with a somewhat smaller radius, is the entire culture which is being created in the Ukraine. The third and even smaller circle is the Ukrainian national culture, strictly speaking. In principle, this is the cultural structure of any ethnic group (particularly in a multinational country), for no single ethnic group lives exclusively through its own culture, and no culture exists separately. What is specific to the Ukraine in this case is only the special correlation among the sizes of the areas encompassed within these circles and, possibly, the less clear demarcation of the boundaries which separate them.

Essentially, throughout the Ukraine today national culture functions as a neighbor of Russian culture, surrounded by Russian culture, in a dialectical interaction with it (which includes cooperation, mutual aid, competition and rivalry), including the type of Russian culture which is being created in the Ukraine by both the Russian and Ukrainian populations. Here and there, particularly in the big cities, the basic tone of cultural life is set by Russian rather than Ukrainian culture. Such is the actual correlation between their potentials.

The other side of this reality is the flexibility, looseness and, in some cases, impossibility to identify the boundaries separating Ukrainian from Russian culture in the Ukraine. Even in the area of fiction, identification based on the linguistic characteristic triggers some doubts or requires certain corrections. Is it possible not to consider as part of Ukrainian literature, let us say, the novels by D. Mordovets and G. Danilevskiy, which deal with Ukrainian history yet are written in the Russian language, but whose characters are not only of Ukrainian origin but also have a specific Ukrainian orientation and, let us say, are Ukrainian patriots? Is Gogol strictly

a Russian writer? Can we consider as not being part of Ukrainian literature the Russian-language works of Ye. Grebenok and G. Kvitok or the Russian novels by T. Shevchenko? Can we question the affiliation with Ukrainian culture of the tremendous volume of scientific works in philology, folklore studies, ethnography, history, and so on, written by Ukrainian 19th century scientists in the Russian language because of circumstances familiar to us?

Obviously, today as well the linguistic criterion is not the only determinant in terms of fiction. Incomparably more complex and delicate may be the problem of the national-cultural identification of phenomena in the other arts, painting and music in particular. The criterion of correlation with tradition is not always reliable and, in some cases, such correlation could be false, for the development of art takes place also by rejecting tradition, emphatically opposing it or even militantly rejecting it. There also is the routine suspicion of anything new. Let us recall that the music composed by N. Lysenko, the poetry and plays of Lesya Ukrainka and the prose of O. Kobylanskaya and M. Kotsyubinskiy were considered by some of their compatriots and contemporaries as "non-national." And what can we say about the avant garde and futurists of the 1920s who, frequently for the sake of sensationalism, resorted to extreme forms of rejection of tradition. Is it only now that we are beginning to realize, for example, that the works of Mikhayla Semenko were a profoundly national phenomenon despite their proclaimed antitraditionalism and "antinational" slogans and outbursts. Something similar could be said about the paintings of A. Bogomazov and V. Palmov. Possibly, after a while it will be acknowledged that even some of those abstractionists who, at that time, were being exhibited at the Polytechnical Institute, were somewhat influenced by the color and plastic traditions of Ukrainian folk art.

In any case, we must neither separate nor confuse historical with current criteria. History deals with accomplished facts, be they desirable or undesirable; our time and our people create the facts and try to choose the most expedient trend. The conscious men of Ukrainian culture cannot fail to support its national definition, for it is a question of the historical destinies of the people and because the national definition of culture is the most important guarantee of the future existence of the nation as such. Naturally, each national culture carries within it something international. It interacts with other cultures and, in the case of Ukrainian culture, this interaction is of a special nature, as we pointed out, bearing in mind its status as part of the multinational Soviet socialist culture and the strong cohesive, helping and, at the same time, uniting and competitive presence of Russian culture in the Ukraine.

But let us now go back to the structure of contemporary Ukrainian national culture and the incomplete nature of this structure. Whereas so far we discussed spiritual culture mostly, let us now consider the entire spiritual culture, all spiritual creativity.

Let us begin with the political culture as one of the most important and decisive. We have a number of general political publications in the Ukrainian language, such as republic and other newspapers, more than one-half of the copies of the journal KOMUNIST UKRAINI, some of the output of Politizdat Ukrainy, and some VUZ social science courses. Unfortunately, over the past decades the situation worsened steadily. An increasing number of political and social science publications are no longer being published in the Ukrainian language; an increasing number of VUZ courses are no longer taught in Ukrainian; political life on all levels is not being discussed in Ukrainian, not to mention mass political education. Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s our political personalities not only instilled a political awareness among the popular masses in the Ukrainian language, but also dealt with the various categories of Ukrainian culture and history, today this tradition has been lost. All of this, put together, has resulted in a significant weakening of the political aspect of our national culture, although, at the same time, it would be obviously erroneous to absolutize the significance of the linguistic factor in political activities and in political spiritual creativity. Furthermore, there has been a tangible increase in the potential of Ukrainian-language political thinking thanks to the recently active outstanding publicistic works of writers, such as O. Gonchar, P. Zagrebenny, D. Pavlychko, B. Oleynik, I. Drach, V. Yavorivskiy, S. Plachinda and others.

The tremendous potential of Ukrainian science has become a major structural part of our spiritual life. Its successes and accomplishments are objects of our national pride. And personalities such as Glushkov and Amosov and the Paton dynasty (and previously that of A. Bogomolets), having become objects of artistic or essay-documentary works in Ukrainian literature, have also become prototypes of a certain moral-esthetic significance. Science has given us artists and writers although, possibly, not so many as Russian science has given to Russian literature. In general, the high standard of Ukrainian science is influencing the intellectual level of the society and the conceptual area of our spirituality and, partially, the development of the Ukrainian language. Unfortunately, this influence has been limited by some annoying circumstances which developed in recent decades, which tangibly narrowed the national-cultural aspect of Ukrainian science (let me stipulate that I do not ignore the international nature of science and its methodology but am merely referring to its affiliation with national culture). This applies above all to the fact that virtually all scientific journals have converted from the Ukrainian to the Russian language. No less alarming is the following: Not so long ago, born on the crest of a powerful cultural upsurge of the people, the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences was the brain center, the headquarters of Ukrainian national culture, and its leaders, from Vernadskiy to Bogomolets, not only felt a personal involvement with Ukrainian culture but also were the generators of ideas for its development and promoters of corresponding actions, embodying the

national cultural self-awareness. Today the academy of sciences has lost this role, not even noticing the way this happened. Today we are pleased by the very fact that, although at their own risk and peril, some scientists in the nonhumanitarian areas are displaying a certain interest in the fate of Ukrainian national culture and Ukrainian language, as is the case, for example, of the noted biochemist M. Gulyy, who participated in the debate on what is national and international, sponsored by the journal PRAPOR.

Let us not forget that we have a network of scientific research institutions dealing with the humanities, within that same academy of sciences. They are doing a great deal, year after year, in the study and, partially, the publication of the cultural legacy, and in interpreting contemporary processes in culture and the arts. Actually, the energy of the initiative of such institutes should, clearly, be greater, as should the volume of their basic works on essential problems of the status, problems and future of Ukrainian national culture. Furthermore, the ordinary human, patriotic and civic responsibility for it should be manifested more firmly and substantially. Is a linguist or a philosopher not the same as writers, and what armor is protecting them from the concerns which inevitably arise the moment they clash with real life? At that point, why is it not the linguists but the writers who, although belatedly, pose the question of language on the state-political level and are continuing to bear the main burden of its solution? Why is it that, with few exceptions, it is not architects and historians who are the "strike force" of that part of the public which is struggling for the preservation of historical monuments and is popularizing related knowledge? Why is it that philosophers are not providing concepts of our cultural legacy, interpreting the summed up character of our culture or developing problems of Ukrainian national culture as an integral phenomenon? Could it be that in all these areas (and many others like them) we find a manifestation of the imbalance existing within culture as a system?

In recent decades the "vertical" orientation of the economy and excessive centralization of all areas of social life also brought about corresponding distortions in the sociocultural area, national-cultural losses determined by the degradation of "horizontal" structures; this was manifested in a variety of ways, from the emasculation of the real power of the local authorities to the withering away and bureaucratization of the cultural activities of the population, the failing of folk crafts, and so on. Nonetheless, Ukrainians remain one of the few peoples of Europe who are still preserving folk artistic creativity, such as pottery, embroidery, paintings, weaving, and so on. However, we are little familiar with such crafts, value them little and support them even less. On one occasion I. Drach wrote the wonderful poem "Ukrainian Gains Over Paris," and, to say the least, introduced the name Zaliznyak in the galaxy of Ukrainian art. But who other than specialists is familiar with A. Ganzha or A. Selyuchenko, who expressed through ceramics, with such great talent, the spirit of the people and their imagery? They

have not become facts in our cultural awareness. But are they alone? One may think that everyone would be familiar with the name Mariya Primachenko. Meanwhile, however, an album with reproductions of her works was published for the last time 25 years ago and for many years her new paintings have been grabbed by smart dealers and many of these paintings have become forever lost to the Ukraine. And what about Katerina Bilokur? Who, we may ask, would be unfamiliar with her writing? Here as well, however, this is not the precise situation. Her albums are not being published all that frequently or on a suitable quality level, and a book of her letters has not been published. Furthermore, is it not time to think of a Katerina Bilokur museum? Her home is small, architecturally sound; it contains her paintings and memorabilia. Music and Shevchenko's poetry with which she lived can be heard quietly in the background.... Actually, we could dream of a great deal. Nonetheless, today more and more is already being done compared to the past to preserve folk art and developed crafts and to begin properly to assess the traditional culture of rural life and morality. We meet among the enthusiasts in this project literary workers and writers. Let us recall the persistent work done by S. Pushik, Vasiliy Skurativskiy, V. Pepa and others.

There was a time when A. Dovzhenko dreamed of making an ethnographic movie about the Ukraine, to show "the beauty of the native land which is feeding all of us, not only with bread and butter, but with many customs, concepts, songs, thoughts, and the feeling of patriotism of our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers and our descendants." Obviously, an ethnographic approach in such a broad and profound interpretation as a profoundly personal link with the native land is a necessary prerequisite for the viability, purposefulness and beauty of any artistic endeavor. But what happens if art is blind and deaf toward the land on which it would like to stand can be seen through the example of contemporary architecture. Generally speaking, in our country it is as though architecture has been totally eliminated from the concept of national art. Actually, it is being simply identified with current construction projects. It would be hard to say when was the last time that the task was deliberately set of linking somehow the problem of urban construction with the formulation of a national-original architectural style and the creation of architectural artistic values related to national traditions. This may have occurred toward the end of the 20s and beginning of the 1930s, when the latest wave of Ukrainian neo-Baroque met with the first and soon thereafter receding waves of constructivism. Even taking Kiev as an example of urban construction, we can see the way national traditions and ways were ignored and so were the landscape and historical noteworthy features, not to mention their destruction. Some positive changes have taken place in recent years. Characteristically, and not accidentally, they are manifested wherever architecture takes into consideration the natural environment and restores its cooperation with its traditional ally—monument art, ceramics, etc.

As early as the 1950s, with his typical perspicacity, A. Dovzhenko raised the question of rural construction and most passionately attacked architects and construction workers who were deaf to the demands, traditions and beauty of the Ukrainian village. At that time his ideas were ignored. Today a few things have changed. However, there is no basic solution to the problem of harmoniously combining and promoting the interaction between house construction and the natural, economic and cultural-historical landscape of the rural countryside. Perhaps this will not occur so long as architecture does not regain its status of an art, and so long as architects have not learned how to think in categories of national culture, for historically it is precisely the national specifics of architecture that held the secret of combining originality with beauty, utilitarianism with esthetics and universal with local features.

Therefore, here as well the specific problems of one area of culture approach the problem of its wholeness. The interconnection among different arts is particularly clear in their relations with literature. It is precisely literature that is holding the broadest "front" of interaction with the other arts and, naturally, it is precisely to it that most questions and claims are addressed, the more so since today Ukrainian literature is insufficiently nurturing the other arts with ideas, topics, themes and texts. The representatives of these arts are justified in their claims although the guilt here is reciprocal, for had they displayed greater interest and reciprocal understanding they would have found more features to draw from Ukrainian literature.

Let us take the theater. Directors are complaining that there are virtually no modern plays. This is so. However, M. Kulish, I. Kocherga, M. Irchan and Ya. Mamontov are not being staged. Several thoughtful typical plays were written by A. Pidsukha in the 1960s, but they as well were not staged. Russian theaters willingly stage the works of the Russian literary classics. In the Ukraine, after the staging of "The Land" by V. Vasilko by the theater in Chernovtsy, no noticeable efforts of this kind were noted until recently, when the Theater imeni Franko in Kiev staged a show based on I. Kotlyarevskiy's "Eneid." Obviously, something could be found in contemporary Ukrainian literature. For example, the amateur META theater in Lvov successfully performed the play "Marusya Churay," based on Lina Kostenko's novel, until it was "stopped." It is true that of late it has been taken up in Kiev once more. Finally, how not to recall that so far the Ukrainian theater has still not found the key to staging the poetic-philosophical plays of Lesa Ukrainka and her "small dramas."

What about the motion pictures? All of us recall the brilliant successes which marked the use by talented cinematographers of the works of M. Kotsyubinskiy and V. Stefanik. Unfortunately, this upsurge of the Ukrainian motion picture was stopped (although in its use of literature there were vivid events, such as the screening of "Flock of Swans," written by V. Zemlyak and directed

by I. Mikolaychuk). Today once again we take an encouraging albeit delayed look at Grigor Tyutyunnik and Ye. Gutsal. However, also interesting in terms of motion pictures would be the works by I. Chendey, A. Dimarov, B. Kharchuk, Val. Shevchuk, V. Drozd and V. Yavorivskiy. I believe that with interested attention and concern for Ukrainian national culture, the works of these and other Ukrainian authors could provide topics, characters and ideas. Finally, a great deal depends on the director's interpretation.

This is not an effort on my part to justify literature and to shift all blame to the "related professions." No, literature today is not providing material or supporting the other arts properly. Some of them it even keeps on hungry rations. For example, if today we would set ourselves the objective to organize truly and not fictitiously the Ukrainian operetta or an entertainment show, we would immediately feel an acute shortage of literary material. On the other hand, however, there will be no such material as long as there is no demand for it, i.e., until proper artistic forms and organizations have made their appearance. These are two interdependent aspects of a single process.

The full functioning of national culture requires the development of popular and entertaining genres and forms, such as various types of shows, circus and other performances, entertaining motion pictures, songs, etc. or, in short, a youth and urban subcultures. The prevalent opinion here is that none of that is necessary and that which exists is adequate (in its Ukrainian forms), for any other developments would only spoil national culture. It is claimed that we need only masterpieces of high art. However, such masterpieces will not be created without the substratum of mass culture, without ensuring the full functioning of all of its levels and areas, without interaction and counteraction, without the struggle against different currents and trends and even different levels of taste and quality, for a complex exchange takes place within the cultural system and because the dialectical law which functions in art is that quantity turns into quality, a certain snob view of the opposite notwithstanding. Let us recall what A. Dovzhenko said on the subject of the catastrophic consequences of the notorious postwar decree on reducing the production of motion pictures but improving their quality: "That is a revenge for the lack of realization that beauty is identified through comparison and that quality grows out of quantity."

We pay particularly little attention to youth subculture. Some kind of fatal pattern had developed here, according to which it is precisely among Ukrainian literary workers that develop some kind of Savonarolas—zealous fighters, initially against tight trousers, then against long hair, against the hula-hoop, rock and roll, etc. (while fighters against some other phenomena were far fewer). I recall that when the youth popular (albeit not our) song "Besame Mucho" became popular, a Ukrainian poet published in the journal PERETS a pamphlet mocking

the words. To this day such attacks on youth subculture remain quite popular. That is the reason for which we have lost all the battles against youth life style and cultural fashions and continue to lose them. Let us look at rock. Are the people in the Baltic area not being more sensible by giving it a national slant? Similar attempts have been made in Belorussia as well. In the final account, such attempts were also made in the Ukraine as early as the 1960s but met with no support. Understandably, we would like to hear our folk songs more frequently, rather than "metal." However, nothing in this area can be accomplished by groundless opposition or coercion, not to mention prohibitions and cancellations. Youth subculture can be "conquered" only from within. Naturally, we are still hoping that the increased attention paid to the esthetic upbringing of children and young people, on whom today the school and the representatives of the arts intend to concentrate, will help.

So far we have discussed the "horizontal" structure of culture, the forms, types of art and areas of functioning. We could also speak of the geographic "horizontal," the spatial dissemination and functioning of culture. This too has its problems, some of which are clear while others should be studied. Not all areas in the Ukraine are equally "saturated" with national culture. We know little about and make little use of regional folk cultures, local creative forces, peripheral artistic collectives, and so on. All of these areas are still insufficiently included within the broader cultural process, within national cultural life. We know nothing of the existence or nonexistence of vestiges of Ukrainian culture in places where Ukrainians have resettled extensively beyond the republic—in the Kuban, Kazakhstan or Siberia, or else even Moscow, where hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians live. We totally ignore (not to mention supervise) Ukrainian cultural forces in the neighboring socialist countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. We would like to know what it is that they are doing, unfortunately without our assistance! Yet they are doing a great deal. Here are no more than two facts: The popular culture museum in Svidnica in Czechoslovakia (where 40,000 Ukrainians live) regularly produces thick volumes of scientific works in precisely the same number of copies (1,000-1,500) that our own academy of sciences produces of similar (although half in terms of volume) for the 50 million Ukrainians. (Naturally, the overall number of works published in the Ukraine is incomparably greater, but it would be ridiculous to even mention this!) The second fact: In Yugoslavia Ukrainians and Russians have reprinted five volumes of the Ukrainian studies by V. Gnatyuk, while we have not even thought about it. Obviously, many of us would acquire with a great deal of pleasure these and other publications produced by our brothers in the socialist countries, along with their newspapers and journals. However, no possibility exists of doing so, not to mention the possibility of acquiring literary and artistic publications and scientific works by Ukrainians living in the West, for not all of them are anti-Soviet! It is true that the "Ukraine" society is still doing something to acquaint our public with the

cultural life of progressive and "neutral" Ukrainians in the West, although this is being done on a very small scale.

Clearly, the time has come to see to it that the Soviet Ukrainian people gain access to anything which is progressive, in the broad meaning of the term, pertaining to Ukrainian culture and which promotes goodness and beauty, created in various parts of our country and on other continents.

An even more important problem is that of the structure of Ukrainian culture considered in terms of the historical "vertical." In this area it is particularly vulnerable. It is a question of the constant breaks in development and tradition lines, as a result of sad historical circumstances and the present insufficient knowledge of the cultural legacy and the inaccessibility of some of its areas. The enumeration of literary works and, particularly, works of science which are not being reissued and have become inaccessible to the people would take an excessively long space. Let us consider music. The fact that an interest in ancient music has been revived and that many works of the Baroque period have been restored in a somewhat more "popular" style is a positive development. However, a great deal more remains unused, actually, lacking in cultural life, pertaining to the latter period! When shall we hear once again Lysenko's "The Rapids," "Jan Hus," "Ivan Pidkova" and "Gamaliya?" When shall we hear again S. Lyudkevich's "Caucasus;" perhaps during the Shevchenko anniversary? His "Order" is also not heard all that frequently. Furthermore, how well are we, I mean by this not specialists-researchers but a much broader circle of music lovers and, possibly, ordinary musicians, familiar with A. Koshitsa, the legacy of A. Vakhnyanin, N. Nizhankivskiy, M. Kalachevskiy, V. Sokalskiy, V. Verkhovynets, K. Boguslavskiy and M. Verikovskiy; are their works frequently performed? All such works indeed exist and could be included in our cultural life. The situation with many works of paintings and architecture is even worse: They have been lost, some under our very eyes, while others are continuing to perish. A great deal has been lost but a great deal remains which could be saved and which must be saved. A great many other works are unknown to us, have not reached us and it is as though they do not exist. Wherever we may be looking, an untouched amount of work is waiting for us, bearing in mind that numerous people have worked and are working with sweat on their brows.

This absolutely requires the joint efforts of all detachments of the artistic intelligentsia, all units of our culture and all of its participants. Actually, not only for the sake of this project but also for the normal development of each sector of art and culture and for the full functioning of culture as an entity. It would be also quite desirable to coordinate the activities and professionally creative cooperation of theoreticians, estheticists, researchers and critics in the various arts.

In my view, we could as of now suggest some specific steps. Obviously, to start with, we should think of how to organize and maintain permanent contacts among experts in the field of literature, art and music (without excluding the artists themselves, naturally), and among the respective creative associations, organizations and printed organs. We could jointly discuss problems which, one way or another, affect the entire national culture as an integral system. This could apply to the preservation and mastery of the cultural legacy in its entire variety and volume, and interrelated phenomena; esthetic upbringing, particularly in the schools; and increasing exposure to Ukrainian art and literature. Strictly creative problems could be discussed as well, such as how to understand national traditions, innovation and avant garde developments, how to struggle for the quality of culture, and how to evaluate one specific effort or another. It would be useful, in my view, for the representatives of different arts to discuss any new outstanding phenomenon of a specific type of art from the viewpoint of its general esthetic and general cultural significance.

Discussing such problems on television would be quite appropriate. Finally, the very problem of Ukrainian culture as an entity could become a topic for a republic scientific-artistic conference or a forum, involving the participation of masters of the arts, estheticists, philosophers, sociologists, culture experts, historians, and so on, with the subsequent publication of their materials in a scientific collection. This would stimulate cultural studies and, possibly, to some extent the cultural process itself.

There was a time when artists would rally around a certain creative platform rather than genre. Let us remember the M. Staritskiy-N. Lysenko group, the numerous creative associations of the 1920s and journals, such as ISKUSSTVO, LITERATURNAYA YARMARKA or UNIVERSALNIY ZHURNAL. Today this cannot be revived, in any case not as it was then. Perhaps, however, we should consider that in addition to professional creative associations there could be some creative associations consisting of groups of workers in different arts, who could formulate some new ideas or support a certain esthetic platform, or else again carry out a certain common cultural assignment or a large-scale cultural action? In addition to the journal issued by a creative association, let us conceive of an organ issued by a group of representatives of different arts who are developing their own creative line and competing with other. In any case, we need a sort of "magnetic" field which would rally the power lines of the different arts, like those which were created in the past by people such as V. Ellan-Blakitnyy, Les Kurbas, M. Boychuk, the Krichevskiy brothers and others, people displaying an overall cultural world outlook and promoters of a high cultural mission, as well as creators of new national artistic styles on a general cultural scale.

Finally, our creative associations and artistic organizations should act on a coordinated basis, not limiting

themselves to common anniversary celebrations but above all, together with the UkSSR Ministry of Culture and other state authorities and scientific organizations, formulate a long-term strategy for the development of Ukrainian national culture.

Here again we must mention the need for a philosophical and sociological concept of Ukrainian national culture and its comprehensive esthetic concretizing, as well as the need for everyone to learn how to think in terms of not strictly professional categories, but also categories of Ukrainian culture as an entity, as a system; the need for a proper self-awareness and a respective spiritual condition which could be described as interpretive and inspired patriotism combined with a universal broad outlook.

Naturally, all of us realize that a strong and viable national culture is possible only as a culture open to the world, a culture which encompasses and organically transforms the wealth and gains of all Soviet socialist cultures and the progressive culture of the world and, in turn, and only thus enriches them with its own values, as it exists and develops as an equal.

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'Why They?'

18020006j Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 18, Dec 88 (signed to press 5 Dec 88) pp 61-62

[Article by F. Boretskiy; reprinted from BARRIKADA, a school newspaper]

[Text] "Initial data: BARRIKADA is an interscholastic newspaper published in 15 to 30 copies. Distributed in no less than 15 schools in Moscow, Kiev and Riga. So far five issues have come out" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 11 November 1988).

Following are a few articles from two issues of this interscholastic house newspaper, which came out in the 1987/88 school year.

Both my own mood and personal experience indicate that the value of the Komsomol stock has dropped on the market of youth spiritual food. Of late the Youth League itself has begun to mention this although, it is true, indirectly, hiding behind statistical figures. For example, in the book "VLKSM ot Syezda k Syezdu" [The Komsomol From Congress to Congress] (Moscow, 1987), published by Molodaya Gvardiya, indicates in its section on "Organization Increases Our Strength Tenfold," that in 1986 alone the number of Komsomol members declined by 1,087,363. Furthermore, these are merely quantitative data; a great deal of other information may be found as well. However, we are not discussing the reasons which have brought the Komsomol to such a pitiful condition but what is it that this organization is doing

today, in order somehow to correct the situation? Obviously, the question of "What is the Komsomol doing today?" could be answered by anyone, on the basis of the work which is being done in his own school Komsomol organization: nothing. Partial progressive changes, by no means initiated by the Komsomol, are being made in some schools, with difficulty. Furthermore, is it possible radically to change the ways and means of Komsomol work without touching upon the question of the contemporaneity and suitability of the present structure of this youth association? Are the present reforms in the Komsomol the type of half-way measures which are so convenient to the bureaucracy?

No less interesting is the following question: What will become of those who did not make it in the league and, particularly, those who would not be lured into joining the Komsomol for ideological considerations? For the activities of the masses, however low they may have been, are not diminishing and, of late, have been growing. And while the Komsomol is trying to rebuild itself from the wreckage, a variety of informal groups are growing. Many of them are chauvinistic, Stalinist, pro-Western, bourgeois, extremist, and so on, to whom gaining a certain political capital is more important than the democratization of society.

What is the Komsomol's attitude toward this? Most frequently, there is no reaction. The Komsomol is insufficiently knowledgeable and cohesive to be able to influence the other mass organizations and trends, and operating in the old administrative-order style is no longer all that simple today.

For that reason, the tremendous positive role played by socialist political clubs is that, since they work not with Komsomol officials and young career seekers but with active young people, they are creating a true counterbalance to reactionary trends within the informal movements and do not supply the latter with the additional members they need for their growth. However, the various political associations, clubs and circles do not exist simply for drawing the "nonparty youth" away from the "bad" games (those who do not belong to the Komsomol do not belong to them either). Such recruiting is only a side effect of their activities. The activities of political clubs with a socialist orientation are aimed at creating normal conditions for studying, working and living. However, they do not intend to jump at every single individual and protect him from the vicissitudes of fate. The people themselves must struggle against that which obstructs them ("everyone forges his own happiness"). Furthermore, who has the right to decide what hinders someone else, and who is his friend and who is his enemy? However, in order for everyone to engage in "forging" his own happiness, a feeling of personal dignity is needed, first of all. People must be helped to restore within themselves this feeling and help to understand that it is precisely they who must have control over their lives rather than an official giving orders. We must

awaken the obedient philistine who, in a state of lethargic slumber, allows parasitical elements to handle that which belongs to him. These are the motivations which should concern the political clubs.

The state of universal obedience and subordination is triggered by a certain ideological policy which has lasted long enough. A number of historical and political facts were either concealed from us or presented in a distorted manner which, actually, is even worse. At the same time, a certain mental stereotype was being promoted: everything in our country is good and in their country bad. It was through such a stereotyped lens that the people looked at the world. For that reason, even the truthful information which, on rare occasions, could find its audience did not, alas, yield comforting results and could not show up through the stereotypes. The lens refracted in a biased view the new and restless thoughts. There was nothing to think about. Therefore, the thoughts themselves were few. Yet if there were more thoughts and more truths, as well as different ideas and suggestions, it is possible that many errors in our history could have been avoided. To provide truthful information for thinking and develop a taste for thinking and making it vitally necessary and useful for everyone is yet another task of the political clubs.

We should not be teaching some people strictly politics and others strictly some kind of profession. Everyone must be a politician. However, to this effect politics must become maximally accessible. This, actually, is the way to ensuring a normal (rich) life. Simply a life in the course of which a person is well fed, clothed, shod and works in order to live but does not live in order to work. Hearing this, the bureaucrat may start shrieking: "You are a demagogue! You are playing with words!" Forgive me, but to the best of my knowledge it is not people who must exist for the sake of communism but communism which must exist for the sake of the people. What kind of communism would it be if people cannot live a human life?

Generally speaking, the best politician is the person who, day after day, steadily risks political suicide as he struggles for the rights of the people, teaching them how to become involved in that struggle, sharing with them his full knowledge, ability, skill and activeness. The best politician is the person who destroys politics, which will simply disappear when reason has spread and taken over from stupidity. As it disappears, the politician himself will have to abandon his profession.

That is why school political clubs must pay greater attention to domestic problems (the Komsomol in general and the specific schools in particular), and ask themselves the following question: Is this the way normal people should live? Or else, are we yet once again obediently lining up behind the words "one must"

(although it is unclear for whose sake) or "all of this is for you, you must understand" (again here as well one does not understand anything and probably even knows that no one needs any of this).

It is high time to shove aside the question of unemployment in Britain and the imperialist enemies existing in the minds of the members of political clubs of official school structures, in favor of an awareness of elementary gross violations of the rights of students and teachers. It is time to understand that they too have the right to live without degradations and lies.

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History?

18020006k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 18, Dec 88 (signed to press 5 Dec 88) pp 62-63

[Article by A. Baranov, reprinted from the school newspaper BARRIKADA]

[Text] "Alliance," "Community," and some other Moscow clubs and groups have organized and are holding seminars on problems of history. Why is this needed? Are we, secondary and university students, not taught history, starting with 7 years in school and, subsequently, in the institute? Why do we need this "voluntary activity," and what does it consist of?

As we try to answer this question inevitably another one arises: What precise type of history is being taught to us in the school? Naturally, I do not refer to Medieval history or the history of the ancient world. This occurred a long time ago and may it rest in peace. However, reading the textbooks on Soviet history for the 9th and 10th grades one discovers a great deal of interesting features. Naturally, I am unable to provide a qualified critique of such textbooks, and it would be foolish on my part to try to do so within the limitations of a newspaper article; with the help of a few examples, however, let me prove the fact that they (the textbooks) are totally unsuitable for the reason alone that they have little in common with historical truth.

KOMSOMOLKA recently published an interview with a Japanese historian who had compiled a similar textbook for Japanese school students. The newspaper discussed the conflict between this scientist and the local censorship, which forced the author repeatedly to rewrite his work. Matters reached the courts. The point is that according to the censor, history should be a "photocopy without a caption:" bare facts and nothing else. Conversely, the professor tried to introduce some clarity in all questions and to put captions under all photographs. Yet, reading our own history textbook, the impression develops that we have captions without photographs, captions on which the censor worked zealously (I would think that in our own schools there have been more variants of history than in the Japanese). Examples? Be

my guest: let us open the textbook for the 9th grade. On page 24 there are two full...paragraphs on the Social Revolutionary Party. And I quote: "The S.R. formulated revolutionary-democratic requirements on the agrarian problem: the elimination of estate land-ownership and equal distribution of the land among peasants, and preservation of the community."

But was that all? Was that the entire program of the S.R.? It further states: "this program, however, was petit bourgeois, utopian." Here we have it! But even if this moderate-liberal requirement was considered utopian by the authors of the textbook, what would you think by reading the bolshevik program, which is found in the book a few pages later? The following biting political labels follow the quotation: "This was a party of the petite bourgeoisie, above all of the petit bourgeois strata in the countryside. All that was socialist in it was its name." Nonetheless, these same "petit bourgeois strata" accounted for the majority of the Russian population, for which reason it was not astounding that the S.R. program was much more popular than that of the bolsheviks, which was aimed at the proletariat. The textbook does not mention a single word on the theoretical works of the S.R. and throughout it this very large prerevolutionary party in the country is mentioned just a few times, in passing. But were we dealing exclusively with the S.R.? Mensheviks and Cadets are also mentioned "incidentally," and anarchists are not mentioned at all as a political trend.

Naturally, I am not trying to whitewash the S.R. or the anarchists, let us say. Facts, however, are stubborn things and a book such as a history textbook should present them in full. What can I get from the labels?

History should not consist of a caption under a blank spot, as in the case in these textbooks. Where is there a mention of the "worker opposition" and its leaders, the outstanding revolutionaries Shlyapnikov and Kollontay? Where is the full description of the basic stages in the internal party struggle? Where can we read about the positive features of the activities of Bukharin, Tomskiy and Rykov? Where do we find a truthful description of collectivization? Where does it describe Stalinist repressions and the reasons which triggered them? The list of such questions could be extended but even these are sufficient.

A history textbook can only be an aid in the study of the legends promoted during the "stagnation" period. I quote from the "Introduction" to the work: "Facts borrowed from newspapers and journals and radio and television programs will help you to recreate the outstanding features of our socialist age...." The trouble is that today we read and hear one thing in the press and on the radio, while finding something entirely different in the "History Of the USSR." We catch glimpses of "dynamic economic growth," "powerful production and scientific and technical potential," "further strengthening and development," and so on. Let us not even

enumerate them. As to the facts, it is as though here (if they are unpleasant) they are either distorted or concealed. There is virtually no mention of the promoters of the cult of personality, their victims, the supporters of Khrushchev, or the personalities during the period of stagnation. Is this history?

After all this, is it necessary to explain why "independent" lectures and seminars are being organized? At such gatherings we try to provide objective information and cover problems from different viewpoints. For example, our "Alliance" seminar deals with problems of development of socialist thought. It is headed by quite competent people—history students. Our task is to eliminate the question mark after the word "history." History should be taught as it actually occurred. The very first lecture dealt with the development of the informal movement in our country which, incidentally, would make sense to describe in BARRIKADA; it was followed by a long cycle of lectures on the anarchists and anarchism, Bakunin, Kropotkin and their followers. We recently completed another cycle of lectures on the evolution of the S.R. Party. Naturally, in the course of the seminar classes we inevitably touch upon not only matters strictly dealing to the topic but also related theoretical problems. The final lectures dealt with the Makhnov movement and left-wing terrorism in Europe. Naturally, the range of problems remains very narrow but the seminar has not ended. We are learning not for the sake of the school but of life.

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The Plan

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[Article by M. Shirayev and M. Yambayev; reprinted from the school newspaper BARRIKADA]

[Text] Significant improvements in school curricula and textbooks should be a major structural component of school perestroika. This applies above all to history and social science textbooks. We know that work is currently underway to review school curricula, for which reason we would like to submit our suggestions about the course in USSR history.

What is the main feature which makes the old history textbook unsuitable? To begin with, lack of objectivity and insufficient accuracy of the presented material. Second, the nondialectical approach to the historical process. This problem is worth discussing in greater detail. All events are considered only from a single viewpoint without providing any proof that other viewpoints are erroneous, while the accuracy of the selected one is asserted a priori. We also note an underestimating or omission of objective and subjective factors which influence the course of history. Thus, in describing the reasons for the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, we can

trace an almost fatalistic approach, while the appearance of the cult of personality is explained almost exclusively in terms of subjective aspects. Incidentally, this phenomenon and its consequences are presented in the history course extremely partially. Another negative aspect is that virtually the entire history of the USSR after the revolution is described as void of contradictions which, as we know, are the motive force of progress.

Finally, it would be inexpedient, naturally, to introduce in secondary school a serious course in philosophy. However, the method suggested by Marxism-Leninism should be used as extensively as possible.

The contemporary young person (secondary school student or graduate, university student, worker, etc.) who, in his time, did not find answers in the textbook or realized that it was not telling him everything, was forced to listen to the Western radio stations, which have speculated for a long time on the "blank spots" in our history. The mass amount of contemporary publications on the repressions, the cult of Stalin's personality, and so on, contains a share of sensationalism and, in some cases, bias and subjectivism.

The result is that (now) the young person develops the idea that the 1930s were exclusively a time of repressions whereas the 1950s and up to the beginning of 1960s were a period that was somehow bright and good. At this point, that same young person thinks: "But the 'voices' have been telling us about this for a long time and all of this turns out to be the truth." Such is the price we must pay for sanctimoniousness and hypocrisy.

The following could be classified as the main shortcomings of the current history textbooks for the 9th and 10th grades:

1. Unusually boring style.
2. The history of the building of socialism in the USSR is described as a very smooth and even process, as though no errors whatsoever were made.
3. Anonymity and many "blank spots," the main among which are the following:
 - a. The repressions of the end of the 1930s;
 - b. Errors committed at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War;
 - c. The postwar times (until the mid 1950s);
 - d. The mid-1950s-beginning of 1960s, as a time of democratization of Soviet society and a time of errors in foreign and domestic policy;

e. Mention of different personalities who, nonetheless, played a significant role in our history, such as Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskiy, Trotsky, Zinovyev, Kamenev and others. The history of the Great Patriotic War is inconceivable without mentioning Molotov. The evaluation of these people should be undertaken in a Leninist fashion ("Letter To the Congress"), i.e., we must depict them not one-sidedly but with their positive and negative sides. The events of the end of the 1930s cannot be fully interpreted without mentioning Beriia and Yezhov.

Secondary school students should be able confidently to answer (rather than stumble and remain silent, as was the case with the first "Position" Program) the following question: "Who headed the Soviet government after V.I. Lenin?" For this is our history! In work on the new Soviet history textbooks for the senior grades, the history of the last 20 years must be described honestly and truthfully. All those guilty of the phenomena of stagnation in all areas of our lives must be named.

History textbooks and history in general must be aimed at the future, for the purpose of studying history is to understand the laws governing the development of society, a knowledge which will be necessary both today and in the future. It will help us in the future to prevent such errors in our progress and to build a society according to its laws and not despite them.

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V.I. Vernadskiy's Works and Philosophy

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[Article by V.I. Vernadskiy; reprinted from the journal FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI No 4, 1988. With preface by I. Mochalov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor]

[Text] Philosophy plays a tremendous role in the creative legacy of V.I. Vernadskiy.

The basic view of the scientist on the correlation between philosophy and science developed in its essential aspects at the turn of the 20th century. "I look at the importance of philosophy in the development of knowledge quite differently from the majority of naturalists, and ascribe to it a tremendous fructifying significance," he wrote to his wife on 24 July 1902. "It seems to me that these are aspects of a single process, aspects which are entirely inevitable and inseparable. They are formulated exclusively in our own mind. If one of them would disappear the growth of the other would come to an end. The development of scientific thinking cannot long survive on the basis of deductions or inductions. It must have its roots in another area which contains more poetry and imagination: the area of **philosophy**. Philosophy always includes the **embryos**, and sometimes even anticipates entire areas of the future development of science, and it is only thanks to the simultaneous work of the human

mind in this area that a proper criticism of inevitably schematic scientific elaborations is obtained. The significance of philosophy as the **roots** and the vital atmosphere of scientific research can be clearly and precisely traced in the history of development of scientific thought" (AAN, f. 518, op. 7, d. 48, l. 54).

The philosophical saturation of the specialized natural science works written by V.I. Vernadskiy drastically increased starting with the 1920s; this was related above all to the development of the theory of the biosphere and of the problem of biogeochemistry, closely interwoven with conceptual, sociohumanitarian and ecological problems. In the mid-1920s, V.I. Vernadskiy wrote: "The inevitability of philosophical work in the case of natural scientists is becoming increasingly clear to me, along with the impossibility to ignore it.... Unquestionably, philosophical problems have never stopped to captivate my mind and I kept returning to them; frequently to me they were a way of relaxing; some of them were related to general concepts in my scientific outlook" (AAN, f. 518, op. 1, d. 160, l. 15, reverse).

The following "Note On the Nomination of Academy Members In the Department of Philosophical Sciences," which is published here for the first time and was submitted by the author to one of the commissions in charge of electing new members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, dates from the time of the qualitatively new philosophical upsurge which took place in V.I. Vernadskiy's works. What is most interesting is not the very fact that V.I. Vernadskiy opposed the nomination of A.M. Deborin, but precisely the substantiation of this opposition which has a clearly manifested philosophical nature and which was so typical of Vernadskiy.

It is worth remembering that this was a rather complex period in the development of domestic philosophy (see "*Istoriya Filosofii v SSSR*" [History of Philosophy In the USSR], vol 5, book 1, Moscow, 1985, pp 204-252). The start of an alliance between natural scientists and Marxist philosophers in some scientific areas, physics in particular (the source of which was related to the familiar philosophical legacy of V.I. Lenin—the 1922 article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism"), was greatly obstructed and, in some cases, turned back, not the least reason for which was the frequently underproductive and largely scholastic polemics among philosophers themselves. Two main conflicting trends were singled out among them: those of the "mechanists" and the "Deborinists" (subsequently labeled "Menshevik-lining idealists"). Phenomena of stagnation in philosophical thinking and the separation of philosophy from the needs and problems of scientific knowledge and social practice were becoming increasingly clear.

Relations between V.I. Vernadskiy and Soviet philosophers who spoke on behalf of dialectical materialism were difficult. The works of this naturalist, who dealt with living matter and biogeochemistry and his theory of the biosphere were frequently criticized sharply. His

opponents stubbornly looked for manifestations of "idealism" or any other type of "ideological counterrevolution," and frequently the charges assumed a political coloring.

V.I. Vernadskiy was forced publicly and most firmly to counter the attacks (those of A.M. Deborin in particular) not only because they were basically false but also because they could hinder his scientific work. "As a result of my investigation," wrote V.I. Vernadskiy in his response, "Academician Deborin reached the conclusion that I am a mystic and the founder of a new religious-philosophical system; others have described me as a vitalist, neovitalist, fideist, idealist, mechanist or mystic.... I must clearly and firmly object to all such definitions, not only because I consider them insulting to myself but because, as addressed to me, they are false and thoughtless, expressed by people who are talking about something they have no idea and which they are unwilling to consider in depth. Naturally, to consider in depth is no easy matter. It requires extensive and difficult efforts" (V.I. Vernadskiy, "On the Subject of the Critical Remarks Made by Academician A.M. Deborin," *Izvestiya AN SSSR* [Notices of the USSR Academy of Sciences], department of mathematical and natural sciences, No 3, 1933, p 406). The editorial-publishing council of the Academy of Sciences preferred to grant the "last word" to that same A.M. Deborin and in that same issue of *Izvestiya*, his new article "Critical Remarks On the Critical Remarks Made by Academician V.I. Vernadskiy" was published, the form and content of which did not deviate from his previous style.

In the 1930s, under the influence of "philosophical" censorship (anonymous, as a rule) Vernadskiy's opportunities for freely presenting in the press the results of his scientific research were increasingly reduced.... Here is what he himself said on the subject: "The biogeochemical essays, were to come out in 1930 under the title of *Living Matter*." That same year, however, the situation concerning censorship drastically worsened and *Living Matter*, (about which references had already been published) did not come out. I immediately began to agitate but it was only in 1936 that I was able to have the book published under a different title (this having been a period when "biological" books could not be published".... It took 10 years of my persistent efforts. Censorship became even more ignorant, 'philosophical' censorship in particular" (V.I. Vernadskiy, letter to P.L. Dravert, dated 16 September 1940. Manuscript department, Omsk Oblast Museum).

According to Vernadskiy, the components of true philosophy and the base of its tremendous impact on the spiritual life of society and human culture as a whole are found in the free creative philosophy of the gifted individual, not bound by any predetermined canons and standards.

It is sometimes said that "yes, naturally, Vernadskiy was a great scientist but he was unable to understand Marxism. He was not a supporter of dialectical materialism...."

What can we say on this subject?

V.I. Vernadskiy's world outlook was a most complex spiritual phenomenon: in its creatively restructured type it imbued all most important achievements of domestic and world culture, including philosophy. It is as yet to be studied and studied again.

An inner integrity and unity make V.I. Vernadskiy's world outlook accurate, despite all changes, variations and inevitable "fluctuations" of science. This applies to Big science, in the area of which V.I. Vernadskiy worked and in which he, with his students, followers and colleagues, concentrated their efforts. Quite frequently, involved with each single step in the process of the tremendous revolutionary changes of the 19th and, particularly, the 20th centuries, with each one of its steps that science "invaded" philosophy.

As a person who not simply "thinks about dialectics," supplying his reasoning with certain frequently secondary "examples from science," but as a philosopher and creative scientist who was truly involved in dialectics, which was quite natural (and, alas, so often difficult to understand!), V.I. Vernadskiy could not subjectively accept and "digest" the superficial dialectics of the views of his contemporary philosophers—"dialectical materialists." He could not, for the nature of his work, starting with the 1920s if not earlier, had outstripped the philosophical forms assumed by dialectics in the works of the philosophers of that time. V.I. Vernadskiy's work did not "fit" this framework in the least. It was too narrow for him.

We approach at this point a more personal psychological aspect: the aspiration of the scientist to preserve and protect his inner independence, freedom of thought and freedom of research, including research in philosophy. That is precisely why in the course of his long life V.I. Vernadskiy did not "swear loyalty!" to any specific philosophical system. However, he highly valued the works of the great philosophers, including the Marxist classics, the creators of dialectical materialism. V.I. Vernadskiy considered Marx, Engels and Lenin as "free thinking, and comprehensively educated people," and "philosophically trained thinkers" (V.I. Vernadskiy, "Letters To B.L. Lichkov, dated 5 January 1939 and 22 May 1942. V.I. Vernadskiy's office, museum, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry imeni V.I. Vernadskiy).

Unquestionably, V.I. Vernadskiy's extremely rich cultural legacy "works" both for perestroika of our society as a whole as well as the restructuring of philosophy in particular. Unfortunately, however, we are deprived of the possibility of making full use of significant areas of intellectual aspects of this legacy. Why? The reason is both simple and, in a way, complex. It is necessary for perestroika itself, in turn, truly to begin "working" on the basis of V.I. Vernadskiy's legacy. In order to achieve this we must surmount the "obstruction mechanism,"

which, alas, exists and is supported by specific individuals, many of whom are quite influential. The most instructive and quite contemporary "lesson taught by V.I. Vernadskiy" can be learned by us, philosophers, and mastered truly only when the "lesson of truth," this essential quintessence of perestroyka, will organically become part of the flesh and blood of our attitude toward the legacy of this great scientist and philosopher who, during his lifetime, always remained irreconcilably hostile to any kind of time serving, fear, falsehood and lies.

Note On the Election of An Academy Member In the Department of Philosophical Sciences (AAN, f. 518, op. 1, d. 314, ll. 1-17)

Submitted on 20 November 1928.

Speaking in the commission which considered nominations for the department of philosophical sciences, I spoke out against making A.M. Deborin a member of the Academy. Three academicians shared this view.

I deem it my duty to present in this note the reasons which motivated me to make this decision. My decision remained unchanged even after I studied references submitted by the majority in the commission on A.M. Deborin's scientific activities.

1

I assume, above all, that the Academy of Sciences must choose as a member not a **philosopher** as such, but a **scientist**, a representative of the **philosophical sciences**. It should nominate not representatives of a given philosophical trend or philosophers who have developed one philosophical problem or another or are formulating their own philosophical system, but scientists who are doing scientific work in areas of scientific knowledge which for reasons of their very foundations are most closely related to philosophy—philosophical scientific disciplines such as, for instance, the history of philosophy, logic, psychology, and so on.

It is true that the influence of philosophy as such, its problems and systems and the influence of metaphysics on scientific thinking are tremendous. The development of extensive scientific creativity is impossible and has never been noticed without parallel philosophical work. A scientist who approaches any major scientific summation inevitably comes across philosophical concepts and must take into consideration the philosophical work of the mind. He always, inevitably, uses in his work the achievements of philosophy. Conversely, in his thoughts the philosopher inevitably relies on scientific facts, summations and hypotheses. The interpenetration between scientific and philosophical creative work and their reciprocal influence, are absolutely clear and unquestionable.

There have been philosophers who have also been very great scientists—researchers and creators of new developments in science. Suffice it to recall Leibnitz and Descartes. Philosophers who deal with the history of philosophy, logic and psychology—the philosophical sciences—may have also been scientists who sought scientific truth through the scientific ways of many but not all works of Zeller, Lasswitz, Wundt, Spencer and others, which are as much philosophical as they are scientifically creative. However, there also have been philosophers who were not only not creative workers in science or research scientists, but who, in their effort to penetrate the areas of science by applying the ways and means of thinking through which they achieved what is eternally valuable and major in philosophy, failed and found themselves in a state of sharp conflict with the science of their time. The course of the scientific progress of knowledge illuminated even more clearly and unquestionably their inevitable error and the falsity of their basic premise that they could achieve scientific results with creative methods alien to science. In this respect they shared the fate of poetically and religiously inspired people who also frequently entered with their own elaborations the area of scientific knowledge, which was alien to them in terms of its structure.

Clear examples of such basic unsuccessful attempts are, for example, the scientific elaborations and research conducted by F. Bacon, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer and Auguste Conte. This was manifested most clearly whenever they applied their philosophy research to the natural and mathematical sciences. Naturally, they too had scientific achievements. However, these were the result either of intuition or of guesses, surrounded by a swarm of erroneous and impossible assertions, expressed more or less scientifically. In science their work neither had nor has any significance. It is important only to the extent to which they influenced philosophical thinking and reinterpreted philosophical problems, reflecting radically the methods and concepts on which scientific creativity is based.

The same fate befell scientists such as, for examples, naturalists who used philosophical methods and tried, with their help, to seek something that was new and specific in their own area. Such was the destiny of a number of major scientists who used the philosophical methods of the nature philosophers in the science of nature, including outstanding minds, such as L. Oken or Lamarque. A great deal of their work was worthless. Under the influence of German philosophy at the start of the 19th century—that of Schelling and Hegel in particular—scientific work in the area of precise knowledge, particularly in countries with German culture, qualitatively declined. The work of a number of naturalists, who vainly tried, through dialectics or on the basis of reasoning alone, to resolve or formulate scientific problems was, in the course of time, rejected and proved to be a harmful delusion.

This is both inevitable and understandable. Basic differences exist between scientific and philosophical thinking. There is only one science. In their final development, the conclusions it reaches are universally binding. There is, in the final account, only one botany, one zoology and one geometry.... The entire history of science clearly proves this unity of science, applicable to all mankind. Scientific facts and scientific empirical summations are binding to any scientist and philosopher; they and they alone are the foundations of science. Even in ideal mathematical elaborations the link with the scientific foundations of knowledge cannot be broken. This is the reason for its strength and significance. Scientific theories and scientific hypotheses, which are of particular interest in philosophical thinking, are transient forms of scientific creativity. They not only change radically or are constantly disputed but they are also mandatory to the extent to which there either is no or there has been no presentation of a sum of precise facts or scientific empirical summations which would contradict them. The single universally mandatory foundation of science consists not of hypotheses and theories but of scientific facts and empirical summations.

Scientists have frequently approached and constantly approach philosophical problems in the course of their scientific work the way they constantly formulate theories and hypotheses. In this area they are on solid grounds to the extent to which they rely on the inviolable foundations of precise empirical knowledge and the greatest ideal geometrical and analytical elaboration of mankind which proceeds from empirical knowledge and does not contradict it, and which led in the 19th and 20th centuries to the striking and ever greater blossoming of modern mathematics. In such cases the philosophical significance and influence of such scientists could be tremendous, as it was, for example, in the works of Galileo and, in our time, Helmholtz or Einstein.¹ All of them followed scientific research methods in the philosophical aspects of their work.

As something drastically different from science, general mandatory achievements do not exist in philosophy. There has been no age in the history of human thinking during which there has been a single philosophy, the way, at all times, there has been a single science within the limits we indicated. However the deeply penetrating age-old aspiration of philosophy to achieve unity and a philosophical system and concept, universally binding to all of them, is utopia. This has not been achieved and can never be achieved.

In any case, this has never existed. It did not exist in the age of domination of Western European scholasticism despite what was believed at one point, nor does it exist at present.

Frequently and always most conflicting philosophical systems and elaborations have simultaneously existed and exist, sharing equal rights and successes. The problems of philosophical thinking are also radically different.

Philosophical thinking can exist only in the variety of its manifestations and develops by following the complex path of this variety.

There is only one foundation for science and its evolution follows a different path.

This difference becomes apparent in the study of the history of philosophy and the history of scientific knowledge over the past 2000 years. The achievements of philosophy have been slow and few. Systems dating from antiquity are still with us. Meanwhile, science has changed radically, leaving no stone unturned.

This difference is not accidental. It is rooted in the profound differences which exist between these two spiritual manifestations of mankind.

2

Under those circumstances, electing in one of our departments—physical-mathematical or the humanities—one or two philosophers as such is hardly possible.

Where to stop? What criterion to adopt?

Finally, why should we settle for the single candidate suggested by the commission? Why should we choose A.M. Deborin as representing the philosophy of dialectical materialism?

Today mankind is experiencing tremendous and ever-growing excitement and upsurge in the area of philosophical creativity. This is determined by essentially three circumstances. On the one hand, and above all, the explosion of scientific creativity² which characterizes our time and which makes us radically to reconsider the most basic scientific elaborations of the world—its model, hypothetical concepts of it, and scientific theories which make us structure an entire array of new hypotheses and theories, which are radically different from the old. On the other hand, new facts and empirical summations are entering science with exceptional speed, not only in areas it has long occupied but also in areas which lead to the creation of new scientific disciplines and new and previously unknown sums of scientific facts and summations.

During such times (as was the case at the start of the 17th century), always under the influence of the growth of scientific knowledge and a new scientific world outlook, inevitably philosophy undertakes new creative work. Today as well we note in this a manifestation of the profound interest shown in philosophical problems on the part of mankind and in the creation of new philosophical systems and the radical restructuring of the old, which is currently taking place throughout the world.

This vivid and ever-growing revival of creative philosophical thinking and its new and only initial blossoming are triggered by other circumstances as well. However

great it may have seemed to the generation which preceded mine, the closed world of Western European civilization has been replaced by a new world of civilization encompassing all mankind. For the first time Indian and Chinese thought—the philosophical work of generations of thinkers—is being applied in our philosophical thinking to such a tremendous extent. This influence, which began in the 19th century but had never reached such depth, forces us to take a new look at all the old philosophical problems and poses new ones. It opens new and previously unexpected ways for philosophical quests.

Finally, there also has been a third phenomenon. The upheaval, which shook up the human personality to its very depth, which was brought about by the 1914-1918 War and the most profound social restructuring related to our revolution and the ever increasing significance of Asian civilization, alien to that of Europe, are leading to an upsurge in philosophical thinking. Under these influences and, unquestionably, in close connection with the restructuring of science, a religious quest has been revived, an interest in which is manifested in a great variety of forms, including militant atheism,³ to a historically unparalleled degree in our country as well and, in terms of its global spread, has also reached an unparalleled importance. The complex idea of the deity—thanks to its rejection—is exciting the mind. These profound religious quests and religious concerns are the third foundation for the blossoming of philosophical quests today.

A characteristic feature of contemporary philosophical growth is the search for new ways and the exceptional revival of positive philosophical elaborations. The old systems are not being revived as such. So far, the exceptions to this have been neo-Thomism and dialectical materialism. It is difficult to say whether they will be able, while remaining active, to stand for a long period of time on the foundation of the scientific achievements of the past, considering the basic changes to which the scientific picture of the cosmos is being subjected. It is clear, in any case, that reviving and preserving in their entirety in the 20th century the ideological elaborations of the 13th or 18th centuries and of the first half of the 19th century—even in their basic aspects—is a most difficult task which, in all likelihood, seems unattainable. If the course of scientific knowledge is progressing at the same speed, soon the philosophical concepts of Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, Marx and Engels⁴ will equally turn out to be obsolete and distant from our time and no corrections whatsoever could keep them alive. They can only provide a start for new philosophical trends which, in frequent cases, will be as distant from them as are some new neo-Kantian trends from Kant's philosophy, which triggered them. Philosophy is seeking the new; it has by no means settled as yet. However, I would be hardly mistaken by pointing out that the revival and strengthening of its idealistic trends is a characteristic feature of our time.

This movement is only beginning and no one knows as yet what it will bring about, and how the old philosophical systems which would like to remain alive in the current restructuring of philosophical elaborations will change.

If we deem useful and necessary the creation of a single center for mutual work by philosophers whose basic ideas are mutually exclusive, is it possible, with this in mind, to elect to the Academy one or two philosophers? In that case, actually, we should create a philosophical academy or a philosophical department of the Academy of Sciences, in which all main living trends in philosophical work of our time or in our country would be represented. It is very unlikely, however, that anyone would actually raise the question of such an organization in our country and whether such an organization would be of any use. To the extent to which such contacts among heterogeneous philosophical trends is necessary, the need is met by free international philosophy congresses and a free philosophy press.

If nonetheless we have to accept today as member of the Academy of Sciences a philosopher as a thinker who is building or developing a philosophical system, essentially, ignoring the circumstances prevailing in our country and remaining on the international foundations of science, naturally we cannot choose a representative of philosophical thinking such as Deborin, for the reason alone that taken on the basis of its global aspect, dialectical materialism is quite unnoticeable in contemporary philosophical thinking, for it is a vestige of Hegelianism,⁵ which is becoming increasingly remote from us. Naturally, one could have faith in its future although the facts do not point in that direction. The contemporary interest in Hegelianism, as in other past trends such as, for instance, Thomism, is by no means characteristic of our time. Furthermore, it is more related to the idealistic manifestations of Hegelianism than to its materialist manifestations. We should choose among the trends which are taking place in science today, as closer to materialism, a form of positivism, such as behaviorism, rather than dialectical materialism. But even that trend in philosophical thinking is not all that noticeable in contemporary philosophical developments.

3

In connection with the elections, another idea, based not on the international foundations of science but on the circumstances of our own life, arises.

On the one hand, in our country all the different trends in philosophical thinking cannot be manifested, and Russian philosophy lacks virtually any possible opportunity to enter our country from the outside, with the exception of dialectical materialism.

There is hardly any doubt that this state of affairs is a transitional and temporary phenomenon, for in the 20th century freedom of thought cannot be artificially restricted for long. This becomes particularly impossible when mankind is presently in the throes of a powerful awakening of philosophical exploration. Such explorations will spontaneously develop in our country as well and spread among the philosophers and inevitably, sooner or later, will have a powerful impact in its spiritual life. The privileged status granted to dialectical materialism in our country inevitably puts it in the condition of a greenhouse and will bring within it the withering away of creative philosophical thinking, as has always and inevitably been the case with any officially protected philosophical doctrines. Freedom of thought is the foundation of philosophical creativity; it neither tolerates nor keeps chains.

If, as it is being claimed, the socialist system which exists in our country needs the existence of dialectical materialism, it is obvious that in order to be a power to be reckoned with, its privileged status should be amended and other trends of philosophical thought should be granted the opportunity to surface.

Be that as it may, so far it is only dialectical materialism that can be displayed in our country. It is pointed out that the Academy must include a representative of official philosophy, for its work is being done in a socialist country. What type of representative should this person be? Clearly, he should enjoy an unquestionably high prestige and a recognition, if not on the free global arena of philosophical thinking, which is hardly possible in the case of official philosophy, at least in a large country such as ours, and participate in the ideological quests within the ruling party. It is obvious, nonetheless, that an academician could be, both essentially and according to the statutes, only a person who is considered a major scientist by his contemporaries, engaged in some work which they highly rate from the international viewpoint, work which is considered quite important.

Does A.M. Deborin meet all of these requirements?

I believe that he does not. Today there is no single trend within Russian dialectical materialism. There are at least two trends struggling within it: one which is closer to the Hegelianism of the mid-19th century, of which A.M. Deborin is a noted representative; the other, which is closer to the real materialism of the 18th century, is represented by individuals who are at least of the same caliber: (L.I.) Akselrod-Ortodoks, (A.K.) Timiryazev and (S.Yu.) Semkovskiy.

A.M. Deborin is an authority to his followers but his philosophical opponents within the party do not grant him **absolutely** any philosophical significance.

Currently there is a heated dispute, which has led to a several publications. Either side denies to the other any affiliation with true dialectical materialism. Naturally, it

is only philosophers or philosophy historians who may be able to determine who is right and who is wrong. What matters to us is merely to note that even in his own circles A.M. Deborin is not an acknowledged authority as a dialectical materialist linked to Marxism.

To the contrary, he is the topic of fierce polemics and his views and statements are considered suspect as being heretical from the viewpoint of Marxism and materialism.

There is yet another side to this argument, which should not leave us indifferent. Although we may not be able to judge who is right and who is wrong in his ideas concerning dialectical materialism from the Marxist viewpoint, we can and must evaluate the reflection of both views on dialectical materialism on precise scientific work in our country. In this case we see the existence of very major differences in both trends and it seems to me that the trend headed by A.M. Deborin could, in terms of scientific work, lead to results undesirable from the viewpoint of the growth of scientific knowledge in our country.

Essentially, science and scientific work can coexist with any philosophical system. Essentially there is no scientific and unscientific philosophy. There is no philosophy which would coincide in its elaborations with science and would be substantially more needed by such science than any other.

Science uses the results of all philosophical work, i.e., of all of its trends without exception, for philosophical thinking can advance only through variety. Science encounters it in basic concepts (space, time, motion, etc.) on the basis of which it structures its own picture, and in the theories and hypotheses with the help of which it penetrates the area of the unknown. In this case, whenever I speak of science, I have in mind the precise sciences—the natural sciences and mathematics. I believe that essentially the same should apply to the sciences of man. They too must advance and can properly develop only with the help of scientific methods rather than achievements in philosophy.

This applies to any kind of philosophy. In this case dialectical materialism is no different from other philosophical trends.

The trend of dialectical materialism which A.M. Deborin represents is repeating today the old error of Hegelianism, which already collapsed once. This is not the first time that Hegelian dialectics is trying to penetrate the natural sciences and mathematics: in the first half of the 19th century Hegelianism led to unscientific elaborations, mainly in German and, partially, in our own science, and weakened scientific work. Both Hegelian trends—idealistic and materialistic—penetrated science. The results were identical.

Hardly any scientific worker would doubt that today we would come closer to that same sad result—to scholastic elaborations instead of precise knowledge. Reading today the still few works written by naturalists, biologists essentially, who try to follow that path, one can never determine whether these people are truly writing in the 20th century; occasionally one has a feeling of going back to the experience of our ancestors.

In this respect, the other trend in Russian dialectical materialism, headed by M.A. Deborin's philosophical opponents, is more in harmony with 20th century science. It is more realistic, for it is more distant from Hegelianism and closer to the old materialism of the 18th century, which was based on scientific accomplishments, developing them logically, occasionally ignoring reality but never trying to structure scientific work in such a way as always to fit its own concepts.

This has always been the source of its strength and of the great importance which it has frequently had in terms of the natural sciences.

4

It seems to me that all that was said on the status of Deborin's philosophy trend in contemporary reality should not affect his selection as member of the Academy, representing the philosophical sciences, had he been a major scientific researcher in any given philosophical science.

The Academy must evaluate a philosopher as a scientist. It chooses its members on the basis of that cycle of sciences, regardless of whether a given researcher is a philosopher or is not and what is his status in terms of the philosophical trend.

When on my suggestion the Academy of Sciences added to the range of subjects under its jurisdiction representatives which it wished to include within it, those representing the philosophical sciences,⁶ it never had in mind to include a representative of philosophy. It was a question of representatives of the philosophical sciences. This was clearly formulated in its bylaws.

The point is that in the historical development of thinking, some major scientific disciplines originated within philosophy and slowly, in the course of the efforts of several generations, developed as individual sciences.

Such an inception of such areas of knowledge is not accidental; it is based on the close link between those precise scientific disciplines and philosophical problems and a philosophical mind set. It has never been possible entirely to separate these sectors of knowledge from philosophy.

Noteworthy among them are three disciplines: psychology, logic and history of philosophy.

Today the Academy of Sciences cannot exclude these areas of science from its jurisdiction without harming its work. We have invariably always come across the need to solve one problem or another related to them. At times there were people among us, such as A.S. Lappo-Danilevskiy, who were researchers in these sciences. Introducing among us a major research scientist, who is doing scientific work in these areas, is exceptionally important precisely in our time of restructuring of the scientific picture of the world and the upsurge in philosophical research.

The scientific upsurge we are experiencing has been manifested, perhaps for the first time in the history of thinking, in the fact that one of the scientific disciplines has become linked most closely with philosophy by the nature of its scientific work and any work done within it cannot be entirely separated from philosophical exploration. This is part of the analysis related to mathematical logic, axiomatics, etc. These mathematical disciplines could be classified as philosophical disciplines.

In terms of academic positions in these disciplines, we must apply the very same requirements which we formulate for the other academic departments: the existence of major, outstanding first-rate scientific works in these areas of knowledge.

As far as A.M. Deborin is concerned, it is a question only of his works in the history of philosophy.

It is clear also from the response by the majority of the electoral commission that A.M. Deborin has not as yet written any work of such significance.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Vernadskiy met Albert Einstein in June 1927 during the "Week of Russian Scientists and Russian Science" in Berlin. V.I. Vernadskiy valued Einstein quite highly, considering him the greatest philosopher of the 20th century.

2. The concept of "explosion of scientific creativity" was introduced first by V.I. Vernadskiy in his historical-scientific works. It is identical to the concept of "scientific revolution." The latter term was also used by V.I. Vernadskiy although much less frequently.

3. V.I. Vernadskiy considered atheism a kind of "upside-down religion." For greater details concerning V.I. Vernadskiy's attitude toward religion and his so-called religiousness see I.I. Mochalov, "V.I. Vernadskiy and Religion," in VOPROSY ISTORII YESTESTVOZNA-NIYA I TEKHNIKI No 2, 1988.

4. Toward the end of the 1930s V.I. Vernadskiy substantially refined and developed his evaluation of Marx and Engels as philosophers, particularly in the book "Nauchnaya Mysl Kak Planetnoye Yavleniye" [Scientific

Thought As a Planetary Phenomenon] (1938). In particular, he emphasized the organic connection between Marxist philosophy and the struggle of the toiling masses for their social liberation. He considered this the main virtue and historical significance of Marx's and Engels' (as well as V.I. Lenin's) activities in the creation of the noosphere.

5. In terms of the works of A.M. Deborin and the members of his "school," Vernadskiy's characterization of dialectical materialism as a vestige of Hegelianism is entirely substantiated.

6. Naturally, this claim must be investigated. However, I am unfamiliar with any pertinent documents to this effect. Possibly a confirmation of this statement will be found in the minutes of the general meetings of the Academy of Sciences. At this point let me merely point out that the special commission which was created on V.I. Vernadskiy's suggestion in 1921 in the Academy included also representatives of the history of philosophy, i.e., of philosophical science, and was initially known as "Commission On the History of Science, Philosophy and Technology" (subsequently "Commission On the History of Knowledge").

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Perestroika of Science and Science of Perestroika
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[Article by Sergey Vasilyevich Goldin, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, head of laboratory, USSR Academy of Sciences Siberian Department Institute of Geology and Geophysics; reprinted from the newspaper NAUKA V SIBIRI, Novosibirsk, Nos 17-18, 1988]

[Text]

Symptoms and Disease

Science is not simply a system of knowledge. It also means people who have mastered such knowledge and are multiplying it, rallied within a specific social structure. Science is part of society and if the symptoms of any disease are noticed in society, the same symptoms are noticed in science as well. The full healing of science is impossible without the healing of the entire society. However, this does not mean that such healing will come by itself. Society consists of real living institutions. In some of them such processes are slower than in other, depending on the specific efforts of the people. The healing of science is, above all, a matter for the scientists themselves. However, it is also the concern of the entire society, for society is not indifferent to the way scientists work, the way they are encouraged and what they accomplish.

Our emotions are most frequently directed against the symptoms rather than the diseases themselves. How many have been the pikes and lances that have been broken in opposing the system of the defense of dissertations and in the struggle related to the system of electing members to the Academy! However, the elimination of the symptoms does not heal the people; if the disease remains, it is bound to appear somewhere else. Our main disease is the bureaucratization of science, its excessive centralization and, as a consequence, the insufficient standard of democracy and internal creative freedom. What is the point of complaining that those elected to the Academy are primarily directors of institutes and their deputies, if a "cult of position" has developed in the society and if the administration of science (production, etc.) is considered the most important component of that social structure, more important than the direct creative process?

In the final account, there is nothing bad in the fact that science organizers are elected in a specific agency (whether this deserves additional pay is a different matter). The outstanding role of organizers in the development of some scientific and technical areas is universally known and, unquestionably, the organizers of science deserve social recognition.

The trouble is that the role of management and organization has been excessively exaggerated in terms of all components of scientific activities, particularly in basic research. The difficulty also is that the new value guidelines which were imposed and which, unquestionably, influenced the behavior of the scientific worker were not paralleled at all by changes in the old ideals. This led to the appearance of a major gap between practical life and ideals. In turn, this could not fail to reduce the role of moral motivations and to strengthen the pragmatic approach.

Let us take as an example the status of a full member of the Academy. According to the regulations, the academician must be a scientist credited with outstanding scientific achievements which have enriched domestic and world science. Most of the elected academicians, however, turn out to be administrators. We either force our outstanding scientists to engage in administrative activities, alien to the majority of creative individuals (from which we lose a great deal) or else we hinder the growth of the scientists who do not hold leading positions, for outstanding scientists and administrators are, in their majority, simply different people.... Furthermore, what to do with the moral guidelines which must be provided to the young scientists?

Exaggerating the role of organizational-administrative activities leads to confusing purely scientific measures with criteria. We proclaim the need for basic developments while in fact we demand of each scientific result (in order to acknowledge it) an applied significance and its practical use. Is this not the reason for the fact that the significance of a basic research topic can be assessed (and

not only always at that) exclusively by scientists at work, whereas applied significance is simply rated by the scientific bureaucracy? Furthermore, something very important, the constant incentive of the applied trend justifies the activities of the scientific bureaucracy in the eyes of the state.

Meanwhile science, both in theory and in experimentation, must solve problems needed for the development of science itself, for strengthening its potential and for ensuring its very existence. By no means should each formula become the basis of an applied method. New facts and new knowledge are, in themselves, much more important! However, this is not all. We frequently forget the significance of the explanatory function of a scientific theory. Results which lead to a new level of understanding and reinterpretation of already existing systems of facts are also exceptionally important. I know of truly outstanding scientists who set the standards in the development of entire scientific areas, the results of which are little known to applied science but are taken into consideration by all theoreticians in that same area. Need we add that the path of such scientists leading to the Academy has by no means been smooth!

Universities and academies, N. Viner wrote, "exist thanks to belief in the fact that the advancement of knowledge is a benefit which, in the final account, should benefit all mankind." The share of funds which society can allocate for the development of science, aimed not at present concerns, however important they may be, but at the future, is the measure of civilization attained by a society and of its spiritual maturity!

Not By Bread Alone....

Unquestionably, science needs urgent repairs, a new organizational structure. To this day, many of the reports delivered on different levels indicate that it would suffice to concentrate the efforts of scientists on promising areas, eliminate petty topics and duplication in scientific fields and promote competition in other and, furthermore, demand of the scientists to focus their will and stress their efforts and everything else will come by itself. Obviously, there are times when we should appeal to the feeling of duty. There have been such times in the country's life (but in those situations there was no need for appeals, for the people themselves understood). As a standard of daily scientific organization, however, appeals or pressure are inefficient. Concepts concerning their effectiveness may be classified among the other social utopias. It is time, in the search for organizational forms, to proceed from real incentives and motivations which inspire scientists in the course of their creative efforts.

An entire range of motivations and incentives affect every single individual engaged in scientific activities. Usually, however, one of them is dominant, and in this sense different people are motivated by different incentives. First among them should be the natural curiosity

and eagerness to find the truth. A joke which is popular among scientific workers and which can be traced almost to the 18th century is that "science is a means of satisfying one's curiosity at the expense of the state." This may be considered a joke, humor. However, I do not like it. Whatever one may say, it implies that the scientist is slightly more than a loafer. Yet it is this type of curiosity and aspiration to attain the truth that is the highest (morally) motivation for engaging in science. Scientific work is difficult work of exceptional usefulness to society and, unquestionably, should be paid for in full. If one may joke in this manner on the subject of science, let us recall to those who like to "pressure," "concentrate" and "appeal" the joke of N.V. Timofeyev-Resovskiy: "Science is a happy woman and does not tolerate the seriousness of the spider."

Scientists to whom curiosity and attraction to the truth and interpretation of facts are dominant features, given the present gap between practice and ideals, turn out to be the worst suffering category, for incentive is fine but social recognition is needed by everyone. In any case, self-assertion, ambition and, finally, pride are not alien to the personality of the scientist.

In addition to the aspiration to reach the truth, which is a specific motivation in science, science also has incentives and motivations which are universally human, so to say, which are characteristic of other types of active efforts as well. This includes subordinating (identifying, as Galbraith said) one's own targets to the solution of a certain problem formulated by the scientific society (such as the development of ecologically clean sources of energy, conquest of space, and so on). In the present situation, such scientists, who tend to work on long-range projects, do not always find adequate motivations for their activities. The next incentive is the use (adaptation, in Galbraith's terminology) of the objectives of the scientific community for one's own self-assertion. In the present situation the energy of such workers is spent on organizational activities. Let us include among the leading incentives the direct material interest which always become leading if material incentive is below a certain threshold, based on age, family status, the country's average wage, and the power of other incentives. With the present wage system, as a rule, the young married scientific workers are dominated by material incentive, the long-term influence of which is bound to suppress "loftier" work motivations.

Although some incentives may be preferable to other (personally, I would put in first place the aspiration to attain the truth), it would be extremely improper to ignore any one of them. To begin with, to a certain extent they characterize the researcher himself. There is nothing bad in this, for such is human nature. During different periods in the life of a person, priority is assumed by different incentives. A scientist who deals with science on the basis of adaptation, may simply be dominated by the excitement of solving a specific problem. As we already pointed out, in some situations

material incentive could assume priority. Secondly, with a proper organization of science the energy of all categories of scientific workers is used for good purposes. Nature has quite wisely made people different. Science needs all sorts—optimists and pessimists, people who learn quickly or slowly, those who generate and those who execute, critics, and enthusiasts. The only bad result is when the pessimist becomes the head of a collective while the generator of ideas is forced to engage in routine work.

The main objective which should be pursued in the organization of science is ensuring the existence of a creative atmosphere (without planning and with a minimum of accountability) in the area of basic research, and the possibility of rapidly concentrating efforts on the solution of topical scientific and technical problems.

I realize that the prerequisite of absence of planning is unusual and, perhaps, may seem to some unacceptable from the positions of socialism. Nonetheless, the time has come to admit that it is precisely in the case of socialism that the most important thing is creative activeness and the initiative of all members of society. Whatever one may say, however, initiative and activeness are being restrained under conditions of rigid centralism (which is not in the least equivalent to the idea of socialism). Whereas in the first years of the Soviet system centralization was justified because of the insufficiently high cultural standard of the popular masses and the hostile or neutral ideological position held by a substantial segment of the intelligentsia, today the situation has changed radically: our scientific cadres were born under the Soviet system and were raised by it. We cannot achieve true creative activeness as a result of the latest campaign and appeals to the conscience. We must create the objective prerequisites for it.

What Hinders Perestroika?

It is sometimes said that the main obstacle to perestroika is the power of specific stereotypes in the minds of some and even of many members of society, and the inability and unwillingness to work in a new way. It seems to me that to rely exclusively on restructuring the stereotypes of individual awareness is another kind of social utopia. A person cannot restructure his mind by command. The reason for which he did not work at full capacity is by no means his lack of awareness that one must work well. There are those who "matured" to perestroika long before it was proclaimed (otherwise it would not have been proclaimed); some are now maturing and the majority could change their behavior (and subsequently their awareness) as a result of the changed circumstances and the changed organization of labor and material conditions, once again motivated by their way of life. The main obstruction to perestroika lies elsewhere: in the rules governing the behavior of existing social institutions and social structures.

Apparently, the basic law which applies to any social and professional organization (or to any living community) is the aspiration to survive and expand (strengthen), which increases a hundredfold whenever there is a change in the "external environment." It is not astounding, therefore, that bureaucratic structures make use of perestroika precisely for such purposes. It is not a question in the least of conservatism in the thinking of individual representatives of the bureaucratic structure, but the fact that entire organizations are aspiring not only to preserve their old status but also to strengthen it (subjectively but sincerely the representatives of such organizations express their sympathy with perestroika as a whole and for the entire country).

To prove this, let us consider perestroika in science in two of its aspects: the electiveness of its leaders and the planning system. According to the new regulation, the various departments of the Academy of Sciences will choose institute directors among the nominees, whose candidacies will be discussed at meetings of their collective, and will take into consideration the results of such discussions. On the surface this is properly conceived: the opinions of the "upper" and "lower" strata are taken into consideration. However, in this case they are based on the erroneous premise that the system of elections should guarantee the appointment of the "best" nominee. Even if we accept this postulate, it is difficult to understand why the final decision must be made by the "upper" echelons? At that point we should acknowledge that scientists (candidates of sciences, doctors of sciences, professors) have a lesser understanding of their own work than workers and engineers in industrial enterprises, where the final decision is that of the collective, have of theirs. Apparently, the belief is that the collective of an institute will be interested above all in choosing as its director a person it finds convenient. Why is this bad? Initially plant collectives as well will be choosing "convenient" and by no means strict directors, and it is only the strict conditions of cost accounting that will force them, in the final account, to seek for themselves managers who are initiative-minded, enterprising and exigent. In academic science cost accounting will always play a subordinate role, for which reason the need for strict and exigent directors would be hardly felt by the collectives themselves (other than collectives which are entirely oriented toward the solution of urgent scientific and technical problems).

What makes a "convenient" director unsuitable? Precisely the fact that he destroys the bureaucratic myth of the need for centralization, strict obedience and the need for a system of requirements and planning from above, i.e., all that which nurtures bureaucratism.

I repeat, however, it is by no means a question of guaranteeing the choice of the most "convenient" director. As we know, guarantees are provided only by insurance policies. In fact, the system of appointing managers determines the "vector of responsibility:" To whom is the manager answerable? The appointment of a manager

from above (in this case the term "electing" is inappropriate) means strengthening centralization and the bureaucratic principle. This is emphasized in the new regulation through the stipulation that an institute director could be removed "from above" at any time. What is the result? The manager will be oriented "upwards." This orientation will inevitably become dominant in his thinking. In turn, this makes the entire collective dependent on the director. Naturally, today any institute can get rid of a director displaying dictatorial manners. Thank God, was could cite such examples. However, this is achieved at the cost of "blood shedding battles," which disrupt the collective for long periods of time. Collective letters are written, commissions are set up, endless meetings and held and reciprocal accusations hurled.... In my view, such Pyrrhic victories only emphasize the unacceptability of the existing procedure for appointing directors.

The Planning of Science

Basic science does not need planning. Furthermore, planning is alien to its nature. Could one plan the search for new trends? As to trends which have confirmed their promising nature, like any other human community, scientists are influenced by fashion (remember the recent boom on the subject of "hot" superconductivity!); therefore, one should not become excited about promising trends which are bound to attract the attention of the scientists.

Inherent in science is a natural coordination of the work. What could be more unpleasant than reading in the press an article describing the results of a project on which one is still working or is intending to publish! The scientific worker himself tries to select topics on which no one else is working. If he is working on a topic aware of the fact that it is also being studied at another institute, this means that he relies on obtaining better results or is approaching the solution of the problem from another angle. This, in turn, proves the existence of healthy competition.

What the scientist needs is not coordination but information on research done elsewhere, in a maximally accessible form. Personal contacts during assignments, seminars, conferences and consultations are the natural sources for such information. The bureaucrats in science naively (a naivete which is no longer so touching) assume that in order to coordinate the function of a conference it is important to give it a name (a coordination conference!), involve the participation of representatives of the administration (the coordinators) and pass extensive resolutions (which no one reads). Reality, however, indicates that the more lively and informal a contact is, the more natural is the coordination and the closer scientific cooperation becomes.

But let us return to planning. The planning system from below, which has existed so far (according to which the head of laboratory would include in the plan what he and

his associates intend to accomplish), although useless, had the advantage of not demanding a great deal of effort. It could have been converted into an information system on current research. Such a source of information did not compete with conferences or symposia but anticipated information which could be obtained as a result of personal contacts. However, such an information system can be developed only if each laboratory has a terminal connected to a respective data bank. Otherwise it is a waste of time and money.

By saying that the existing system of planning did not require major efforts I was referring, naturally, to annual planning. To plan for 5 years in advance is nothing but a violation of the mind. This may have been suitable in the case of researchers who deal with the same topic for many long years or even decades (whether this benefits science is a different matter!). But what about those whose range of interests changes from time to time? It would have been desirable for such changes to match the 5-year periods! I do not claim in the least that man cannot plan his own life. However, the time period of planning depends on the individual. Some people plan for a month or a year, while others plan for 5 or 10 years in advance. However, the personal plans of an individual are not mandatory! Individual planning is one of the means of developing a conscious attitude toward one's life and work, a means of structuring a priority of objectives (for a given period in time) but no more! Let us recall Leo Tolstoy's diaries: Was he able to implement his own plans, which he drew up for each few months in his life? They were an endless chain of failures in planning! And what happened? Was his very life not a tremendous accomplishment, never planned in advance?

Planning creative work (and fulfilling the plan!) in a 5-year period is difficult. Actually scientists, who are not stupid, adapt to anything. We learn how to write vague formulations to which we ascribe a pseudospecific form. We learn who to trick and who not to trick, for the reason that the study and analysis of such plans (done mostly by secretaries, other than plans for institutes) is most likely not done by anyone, for this would indeed be a waste of time.

In addition to the plan for scientific research drafted "from below," there also were general academic programs and specialized programs which were implemented on the basis of cooperation contracts between the Academy and ministries, as well as projects based on GKNT resolutions. I shall not discuss the unquestionable significance of such programs which contributed additional funding for scientific research. It is more important in our case to trace the way this affected the work of individual researchers, for it is a question not of reducing expenditures for science but increasing the efficiency of scientific research conducted by specific individuals! Obviously, a certain share of the subsidies granted for such programs goes to some performers. Possibly, such funds are used for the creation of new

scientific subdivisions and for purchasing new equipment. However, such subsidies virtually never reach the majority of performers who include their topics in the programs we mentioned. The inclusion of the topic in the program is considered an official acknowledgment of the applied significance of the research projects. This presents no difficulty. One can always include a topic (it would be difficult to imagine a work of science which would be useless from the position of such programs). Nor was the responsibility great, for virtually no subsidies were appropriated. The question arises of how to assess the effectiveness of such programs: Would it be only for that part of the studies which are directly subsidized or for the sum total of performers who have included their topics as part of such programs? Does this not conceal a system of "padding" according to which the performer will report the same results in different programs without obtaining a single kopek for his efforts?

The new planning system which is being contemplated is being structured as planning "from above" (so much for perestrojka!). It is a type of bureaucratic swell from which one would like "quickly and by leaps" run to the highest possible mountain. The plan is being divided into several long-term programs (general-academic, departmental, regional, etc.); each one of them will be headed by a coordinator who will summon coordination and work conferences. I do not know whether the honored coordinators would draft a program until the year 2000, based on the real capabilities, possibilities and interests of the numerous performers. Judging by the programs already received, the problem will be solved simply: the scientists in the head academic institutes (or, rather, the institutes in which the coordinators are at work) will set their own topics as a basis for general academic programs. Naturally, we shall adapt to this as well. But let us exclaim yet once again: Who are we kidding by planning something which essentially does not lend itself to planning?

Naturally, we shall adapt! Furthermore, I can boldly claim that no planning system whatsoever will have any direct adverse effect on my scientific work, anymore than it has in the past (is that not the reason for which we continue to tolerate the existing state of affairs?). The harm would be moderated. To begin with, the scientific administration will grow and funds which could be used to provide material support for scientific activities will be spent on something entirely different. Second, the bureaucratic myth of the exceptional importance of organizational-administrative activities will be strengthened even further and, consequently, once again the prestige of strictly scientific work will decline.

Dreams and Reality

I am not against general academic programs and state orders placed with sectors or individual enterprises. However, they should not affect the essential financing of basic science (although here as well there could be

exceptions: basic work in ecology and in the area of the comprehensive study of man could use steady state support). Programs and orders should help to promote additional (and real) financing, which would lead to the concentration of efforts needed in solving vital scientific and technical problems. What matters most here is the concentration of efforts and funds.

I imagine the following ideal situation: the head of a laboratory would be addressed as follows: "Dear comrade so-and-so, please concentrate the efforts of your laboratory on thus-and-such a problem. As compensation for amending the individual plans of the laboratory personnel, the following material reward is suggested. Furthermore, your laboratory would receive additional computer facilities and the necessary equipment. If such conditions do not suit you we shall look elsewhere for other performers." Following a discussion with his associates, the head of the laboratory would accept or refuse the order. The order may not find takers, which would merely mean that its stipulations should be amended. Should the order turn out to be advantageous to many laboratories, it would be expedient to announce a competition for the best work program. It may happen that a suitable laboratory does not exist, for which reason at that point a temporary scientific collective could be set up (again backed by real money and real equipment), recruiting specialists from other institutes and even from out of town. Should the solution of a scientific and technical problem require the efforts of several laboratories and even organizations, the formulation of a program for such studies itself would be a major problem which should be resolved by placing an order with one of the laboratories (among the possible performers) not included even in the annual planning system. Nor is a situation excluded according to which the urgent nature of a scientific and technical problem has been realized by the scientists before industry. At that point the respective order could be initiated by the scientists themselves.

At this point we approach the problem of the application of scientific results. It would be difficult to name any other problem (in scientific life) of which we could be more sick and tired as this one. I already pointed out that in frequent cases application is the main yardstick in evaluating scientific activities (in summing up socialist competition results, defense of dissertations, etc.). The application process itself takes a great deal of time and effort and frequently ends with a few more papers on application. Unquestionably, in half the cases the scientist engaged in application is not dealing with his own project. The poor application of scientific and technical achievements may be explained not by accusing the scientists of carelessness but strictly by the fact that our production process has proved to be unreceptive to science. It is precisely the organization of the production process that must be changed. As long as the production process is not interested in the steady application of scientific achievements (to this effect cost accounting alone is insufficient, we also need competition and ruble convertibility, for only the convertible ruble could

enhance the quality of goods and lower their cost to the level of international standards), the efforts of the scientists in the area of application will remain a barbaric waste of the intellectual potential of the country, with frequently miserable results. Naturally, there are exceptions to this rule: some high-standard progressive managers of enterprises may be found along with exceptionally "persistent" scientists. They do exist but it is not they who make the weather.

The sectorial institutes, which should become the intermediaries between the theoreticians from the Academy and the production process, are more interested in originality (in the sense of authorship rights) rather than the efficiency of their own research.

Ideally, sectorial science should be fully financed out of orders placed by industry. At the initial stage of cost accounting, however, until the market has begun to operate (by virtue of the monopoly nature of our production process this will not occur soon), our enterprises would hardly feel an urgent need for science (the more so since the lack of convertible currency makes them independent of the world situation). Therefore, sectorial science, operating under cost accounting, could vanish entirely. I believe that reducing sectorial science would be useful but it should not be allowed to perish. Let me point out that as a result of the drop in petroleum prices, oil and geophysical companies in the West have drastically reduced their volume of output without, however, reducing their scientific subdivisions.

Unlike sectorial science, basic science must be independent of the production process. The additional subsidies (consisting of enterprise orders) which will go to academic science, with a view to encouraging applied research, will unquestionably draw scientists away from strictly basic research. It is necessary, therefore, to organize additional financing of long-term research by social foundations (independent of the state).

Could something be done so that the spirit of creativity, rather than the letter of regulations, become determining in science? One could hardly rely on the scientific administration, for has anyone ever voluntarily given up power? For the time being, the administration of the Academy has responded to the struggle against bureaucracy in an entirely bureaucratic spirit, by creating a corresponding commission which, as is commonplace, has already drafted its initial circulars. Generally speaking, any administrative step (demand, disband...) is senseless for, in the final account, it brings about a new bureaucracy. I am familiar with only one "tough" resolution which would make any sense: it is for the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences to report to the public on the number of Nobel Prize winners over a 5-year period. At that point the entire administration would be concerned with all the components required for scientific creativity!

Science needs democratization. However, science itself must help society in finding efficient ways of democratization, the path to which is very difficult. Any drastic steps could create instability, the only solution to which is always the same: introduce stricter authoritarianism. On the other hand, half-way measures would also be of no help. The bureaucratic structures can rebuild themselves and centralization has a tendency to strengthen, for to many people (without sufficient inner freedom) it is a greater advantage to be subordinate, while chiefs can always be found. The only possibility lies in establishing a dynamic balance, a homeostasis, in which centralizing and decentralizing trends will become balanced in the course of an even struggle. We keep proclaiming the need for criticism and self-criticism. The situation regarding self-criticism will always be bad. However much we may appeal to the people to engage in self-criticism they are not (not all of them, naturally) capable of it. We must not rely on this. Furthermore, good criticism is possible only when the critic has a backing which makes him independent of those he criticizes.

Is the Scientist Loyal?

Centralized planning is alien to basic science. This no working scientist can fail to sense. Planning in science, however, is by no means an invention of malicious defenders of the administrative style. It has much deeper sociopsychological roots.

I claim that "the scientist has the right to choose his topic of research according to his own views." Is there anything criminal in this? In the final account, more than anyone else the scientist understands the nature of his work and knows better than others what is more necessary compared to something else. Could it be that he will choose something of greater interest to him? Where are the guarantees that he will proceed in all situations on the basis of the interests of the state? Would he not start doing that which he wants, naturally, at the expense of the state? Would then everyone start doing what they want? Would this not turn into a universal permissiveness? Such a stereotype—the concept that the individual who has been granted real freedom of choice will begin to apply it against the interests of the country—is a stereotype which should be described as one of mistrust or presumption of disloyalty (the twin of the presumption of guilt) and is a stereotype affecting all of us.

Personally, I know perfectly well that in my own practice I have dealt only with that which I have chosen myself and that no creative person can work otherwise, and the fact that most achievements in world science have been based on free choice. Nonetheless, the doubt is gnawing: Could this be considered permissiveness? I may be a specialist (everyone in his heart considers himself a specialist!) but someone else who probably knows less, would he also be allowed to do that which he judges necessary?

Let us say with Herten that the Russian people paid with their freedom for their liberation from the Tatar-Mongol yoke, and claim that the Soviet people as well had to pay a stiff price on the sociopsychological level for the fierce postrevolutionary clashes, the stress of the first 5-year plans and the war. That which had become the standard of wartime—total subordination of individual to public interests and alienation of social from individual interests—had a strong impact on the standards of life in times of peace. It is an unquestionable fact that these standards influenced, above all, creative activities. Was this not the topic of Mayakovskiy's brilliant line: "I calmed myself down, with my own song stuck in my throat?" It is not up to us to judge (post facto!) whether the sacrifice of the poet was justified, the more so since sometimes Mayakovskiy sang "at the top of his voice."

Let me point out, incidentally, that in peacetime, wartime standards inevitably weaken and become ineffective. Yet we are unfamiliar with other measures. This leads to the appearance of an odd nostalgia for wartime discipline and, once again, supporters of tightening up the screws make an appearance.

Yet in a stable social situation, virtually every individual is interested in the growth of the national wealth and in law and order. This interest becomes dominant if the person feels his own involvement in the management of the country and if the ideals which are being proclaimed do not diverge from practices. That is why democratization is needed not only so that the managers, finally, to face those for whose sake the state exists but, mainly, to enable us to say with full justification: we are the state!

The correlation between the individual and the state, between the individual and society, is one of the most complex problems of contemporary socialist society and an undeveloped area of the social sciences (including philosophy, sociology and psychology). In particular, so far, psychology has limited itself to the behavior of the individual in small social groups, for which reason the concept I expressed on the a priori loyalty of the individual clearly is not a scientific judgment. Unquestionably, most people are born with the inclination toward a sensible correlation between egotism and altruism. In the course of an ordinary upbringing, the individual learns how to combine his interests with those of the group of people of which he considers himself a part. Obviously, the maximal group (family, friends, enterprise, city, country and mankind), whose interests the individual deems necessary to take into consideration (on an average, for the majority of the population) is a major component of what one could describe as the social maturity of society. The socialist social structure must be attuned to real social maturity and contain incentives for its enhancement.

What we need is to define the measure of freedom reached by our heterogeneous society. However, we cannot learn democracy without taking the path of democratization.

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Education, Professionalism and Perestroika

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[Text] The thought of the inadmissibility of replacing actions with words, of professionalism with incompetence and of shifting the moral assessment of labor from end results to meaningless promises and assertions runs through all party documents of recent years, starting with the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress. This is understandable. Under the conditions of revolutionary perestroika, Soviet society is experiencing a most pressing need for the type of working people whose attitude toward labor will be distinguished by full and purposeful positive features, combining spiritual with practical principles, and serving as a standard for conscientiousness and high professionalism. Lenin pointed out that we find ten times more valuable "... a 'specialist in science and technology' who knows his work than a boastful communist who is ready, any time, day and night, to write 'theses,' formulate 'slogans,' and voice meaningless abstractions. Let there be greater knowledge of facts and less people who claim communist principle-mindedness in their arguments." These wise Leninist words seem to have been written for our own time, letting every member of our society to determine accurately his own position within perestroika. In the period of stagnation, however, they were ignored and if quoted occasionally, it was exclusively with a view to concealing individual lack of competence and immorality. This was based on the principle that "if I criticize something it consequently does not apply to myself." This tactics worked successfully for a long time. In the final account, they led to the fact that surveys became more important than professionalism and culture. In turn, this helped to replacing competence and education with the authority of organizational abilities. This led to the dictatorship of the administrator over the free personality of the worker.

"Activities" concealed behind highly sullen slogans dealt the country tremendous material and, which is even worse, moral damage. Careerism, embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, fraud, hypocrisy, boastfulness, social parasitism, hack work, egocentrism and so on, peacefully coexisted, supplementing each other, and steadily doing their destructive work. It is clear that under such situations professionalism and the education of the working person, as the most essential quality, were not in demand.

The development and consolidation of this trend were actively helped by state statistics, which depicted all social spiritual life in rose-tinted colors. It was thanks to such statistics, for example, that we knew that the USSR was first in the world in the number of workers with the highest standard of cultural and technical training, and that 883 out of 1000 people employed in the national economy (1986 data) had higher and secondary (full or partial) training, whereas in 1939 there were only 123, etc. If we were interested in the successes achieved by the public education system in Moldavia, here as well achievements were impressive. Suffice it to say that prior to the establishment of the Soviet system, 85 percent of the population in some rayons were illiterate whereas today, i.e., in 1986, there were 836 individuals with higher and secondary (full or partial) training per 1000 people employed in the national economy.

Unquestionably, these facts convincingly prove the greatness of the socialist system. Times change, however, and in the light of the new attitude of the people toward the victories we have won, the same facts acquire a different coloring. It would be probably much more sensible to chose as the main guideline in our life not the past but the future, and to compare our potential not with the results we have achieved but with the scale of the new tasks. This is a law of human life, which indicates a progressive trend in the historical process. The needs and requirements of the contemporary person have immeasurably increased. Social realities and the economic and political conditions for surviving in this world have changed. For example, whereas in the past, at the start of the Soviet system, the quantitative indicator was the main criterion of successes achieved in labor, with the strengthening of socialism it began to indicate its groundlessness. Nonetheless, the old management stereotypes remained in force. This is confirmed by the fact that today's training of specialists in our country is essentially pursuing the same old objective in solving the problem of universal literacy, i.e., it is aimed at attaining high quantitative indicators. Such "continuity" is quite harmful, for under the changing circumstances the value of quantity changes as well. Enthusiasm displayed about successes achieved in wiping out illiteracy today look anachronistic and insulting in terms of our patriotism. Our time demands the extensive practical application of dialectically flexible proofs of the advantages of socialism and their clear description through statistical ways and means. In each case the guideline of quality must be used (naturally, without eliminating the quantitative guideline) and assigned unquestionable priority. In fact, as we know, the situation is the exact opposite, including that in education.

Let us cite a few examples. Thus, in the 1960s the capital-labor ratio had increased by a factor of 1.43 while the average level of applied knowledge by no more than a factor of 1.07. This brought about a lowering of public production efficiency. This negative trend continues to prevail. The use of progressive equipment and technology in industry, as numerous articles published in the

press indicate, is not yielding proper results due to the low level of knowledge of the workers. Progress, therefore, consists not of installing a costly machine in a shop but ensuring its highly efficient operation. What is the use of a robot if it cannot replace even a single person? Unfortunately, this happens quite frequently, as a result of the unskilled use of new equipment.

We are quite concerned about the situation in the health care area. We know that we have the highest number of physicians in the world: more than 1.2 million. However, the professional standard of many of them is extremely low. Approximately 40 percent of young specialists are displaying professional ignorance in the full meaning of the term: they are unable to perform even the simplest surgery, read an electrocardiogram or an x-ray diagram, etc.

Or else let us take the level of development of research in molecular genetics. It would be difficult to find in our country today even 50 noted geneticists, although we have as many biologists as the United States. It is precisely to a large extent for that reason that lately solving the urgent problems relative to the efficient protection of plants and animals from diseases, intensified selection, achieving an ecological balance, and so on, have been encountering major difficulties.

In Moldavia these and many other negative phenomena are manifested no less (and sometimes even more) emphatically. In order to avoid duplication, let us turn to strictly local cases. For example, how can we explain the fact that during the last earthquake in our republic some new residential and public buildings were thoroughly damaged? The answer given in the press and also voiced from high rostra was stereotypical and simple: "The result of irresponsibility," "unconscientious attitude toward obligations," and so on, and so forth. The root of the evil, in other words, was sought primarily in the immorality of construction workers. To a certain extent, this may be true. However, is this the full truth? I do not think so. Equally guilty for the destructive consequences of the elements is the incompetence of the administrative authorities, designers, the personnel of house building combines and plans of the ZhBI, construction engineers and installation workers, technical supervisory personnel, and others. But then how could they be competent if, for example, the training of workers in vocational technical schools in the republic is conducted almost according to the rules set in Krylov's fable, which teaches us that "the trouble comes the moment the shoemaker begins to bake pies and the baker starts making shoes...." Here is proof: at the SPTU-73 of Grigoriopolskiy Rayon plasterers are being trained by a veterinarian, while in the Beltskiy SPTU-46 a psychology teacher is teaching armature work to the future construction workers; at the Rybnitskiy SPTU-71 the physics teacher is training general-purpose machine-tractor operators. The situation in the regular schools is no better: thus, today more than 1,100 teachers without

pedagogical training are teaching the republic's children. Even in urban schools there are more than 300 such "specialists," 54 of whom in the republic's capital.

Public opinion in the country is concerned by the growing lack of education and professionalism, the symptoms of which are obvious: reduced level of training efficiency in the schools of all levels; widened gap between education and practical activities; increased opposition to innovation in training and education methods; actual substitution of the Marxist principle of polytechnical training with artisanship, inherent in the current labor training system in general education schools; a lack of highly educated people in the management system; a noticeable drop in the prestige of titles compared to utilitarian values, and so on. Concern is being voiced ever more frequently and loudly: "The impression is that the educational system has declined: the university student reminds us of the secondary school senior of the past; the graduate student reminds of an undergraduate student;" "in ten to 15 years we shall not only lack highly educated people but in general, people with any kind of education." There are serious reasons for such fears, for today we are harvesting the results of the residual financing principle. Had the 27th CPSU Congress not put an end to this, our society would have been unable to avoid major internal upheavals in the future. Already now the development of democracy and improvements in the planning and management systems are making increasing demands on the knowledge of the working people.

Revolutionary changes in social life demand of the individual proof of high efficiency not only in the strictly professional area but also on a much broader scale: as a subject of social policy in the labor collective, as a citizen knowledgeable defending the interests of society, and as a spiritually rich personality, able rationally to use his leisure time and material sufficiency.

The more extensively and rapidly science becomes a direct production force, the more urgent becomes the need for high-quality workers who can find their way anywhere, i.e., operate not only under the influence of the requirements of the job but also of the overall social environment. Naturally, such activities are developed through a corresponding general education and vocational-skill training. However, one condition must be observed: no disproportions should be allowed to exist between the level of education and the conditions in which such education is applied, for disproportions inevitably lead to a reduced labor productivity, cadre turnover and dissatisfaction with the work.

"Perestroika needs an intelligent person, loyal to the cause of socialism, competent and professionally trained," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his address to the 20th Komsomol Congress. The accuracy of this statement is unquestionable. It must be adopted as the main guideline in the selection and placement of cadres if we are to avoid the errors of the past. Alas, experience proves that for the time being we lack the courage to

adopt it. Let us consider our own republic. The cadre mechanism is functioning by itself, within a kind of isolated structure, and so does social reality, unrelated to it. From the viewpoint of common sense one cannot understand why the process of advancement of individual workers up the official ladder takes place hastily and without reason and why (which is the main thing!) is this not related to specific labor results scored in the old job but appears to be taking place randomly?

The situation which has developed in this area leads to rather sad thoughts. The reason, above all, is that it conflicts with the socially acknowledged value system; it destroys or deforms the moral foundations of the people, thus reducing the labor energy which is so greatly needed today by the country. It is our deep conviction that on the path of perestroika the situation will not change for the better as long as the leadership does not include competent people and as long as the new mechanism for cadre selection and placement has not become functional.

Here is another feature: as we know, Lenin rated every party member on the basis of the level of his knowledge and specific actions, and persistently cautioned against the temptation to consider as a quality the fact that he had a party card. Yet at a meeting with the faculty and students of the philology department of the KGPI imeni I. Kryange, N.A. Tsyu, first secretary of the Kishinev Party Committee, Moldavian Communist Party, complained that "last year 22 party members applied to institute while you enrolled only seven. Three CPSU members petitioned to join your department but you accepted not one." What to do with such secondary school graduates? Apparently, they should be led to understand that under the conditions of perestroika the party member must be a leader in his collective in terms of his level of competence and professionalism and that the modern specialist trained by the VUZ should stand out above all by his high morality and knowledge, skill, practicality, love of work and desire for self-education, and that the only privilege of member of the Leninist party is to be an active fighter for shining ideals.

Therefore, high level training and professionalism are the most important qualities of the modern worker and the main prerequisites for his successful work, which cannot be compensated either by a position, marks of distinction or a party card. The party documents, above all those which define the basic tasks and ways of reform of general education and professional schools, perestroika in higher and secondary specialized training and radical improvements in the quality of training and use of specialists in the national economy, record this important truth in its full magnitude and clarity. It is precisely here, in this area, that prerequisites for the success of perestroika are created.

We would like to single out two problems which must be solved without delay: a. The future specialists working in the national economy should develop the ability to think

independently and creatively. They must freely find their way in the steadily acquired scientific information and focus their attention on its fundamental aspects; b. It is necessary to surmount the specific "alienation" barrier separating young people from the practical application of their efforts or, in other words, ensure unity between training and practice, as required today. The extensive development of computer literacy, the organization of the most active ways and means of teaching the various disciplines, establishing strong relations with specialized enterprises and establishments, strengthening material and technical facilities of schools, improving material incentives, and so on, are the urgent tasks formulated in the party's directives. The establishment of a "unified system of continuing education," the need for which was indicated at the 27th CPSU Congress, is possible only on the basis of major achievements in this area. Otherwise the interpenetration between the two social phenomena—education and labor—may not develop in the desired manner. Yet such a turn of events would be inadmissible in terms of the further normal life of society. As early as the 1920s, Academician S.G. Strumilin noted that the new equipment demands of those who are to master it the main thing: urgently to upgrade their skills, acquire practical experience and add to their knowledge, i.e., work while training and learn while working. Whereas this view was pertinent to that time, today it is a hundred times more so. The accelerated renovation of working equipment and technologies, the unparalleled increase in the complexity of handling them and the increased uncertainty in work behavior all formulate major requirements concerning the urgent high quality and flexible "arming" of the worker.

Exceptionally important to continuing education is the fact that each unit in the reorganized educational system, while strictly implementing its "local" specific functions, must also work toward achieving common end results. Preschool institutions, secondary general education schools, SPTU, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions, and production scientific and technical (economic) propaganda and information and upgrading the skills through a great variety of forms (courses, seminars, people's universities, IPK, FPK, etc.) must all be coordinated and organized optimally in accordance with the fundamental party stipulation of accelerating socioeconomic development.

The range in shaping an educated individual, as we may see, is quite broad: from early professionalism to the skill of the greatest specialist. However, this should not be understood in excessively narrow terms, as some kind of rigid system for controlling such progress. The connection between the links of the single chain of continuing education must be mobile and flexible. It must allow for a certain freedom in "interconnecting" the links. For example, we must not rely on early professionalism in general education schools and guide the student to a choice of labor skill, persistently instilling in him the idea of the need to join the PTU or even promote its

practical implementation through organizational decisions. Having obtained a secondary (and, frequently, partial secondary) training, all roads must become widely open to the young person. The young person himself must have the right freely to handle his own spiritual potential and to choose his area of work according to his own views, talents and capabilities. This would be advantageous above all to society which, in the course of time, will have at its disposal highly efficient workers, with a healthy world outlook and sense of optimism. This is first. Second, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, the characteristic features of which today are computerization and robotics, it would be hardly sensible to turn the school into something like an artisan school and to eliminate the distinction between it and the PTU. Yet, essentially, until recently such a task was being actively promoted. In particular, it was planned, within 5 to 10 years, to add to the universal secondary education of young people universal vocational training, allowing the young people to master a skill even prior to starting their independent labor careers. It would be no exaggeration to say that had such far-fetched plans been implemented, society would have suffered a damage which would have been difficult to correct. However, the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which discussed the course of perestroika in secondary and higher schools and the party's tasks for its implementation, justifiably vetoed such plans.

Nor should the following fact be ignored: while we are planning a conversion to universal vocational education of young people, in the developed countries, Japan for example, the idea is being promoted of introducing general higher education. This requires a certain caution, particularly if we consider the problem from the viewpoint of the long-term development of our country. Let us consider this but on the basis of actual facts. The USSR State Committee for Labor has drafted a list of professions for which it would be advisable to train worker cadres. A total of 760 professions have been listed for general education schools, based on the fact that for more than 120 of them the training process will be pursued in vocational-technical schools or on the job, directly. In order to develop a clear idea of the quality of the training of cadres for the remaining 640 professions, to be handled by the schools, no active imagination is needed. It is by no means a matter of the lack in the schools of talented and skilled educators, scarcity of material facilities or futility of the idea of the "territorial-production" student recruitment, although we should not ignore such depressing facts, but that under the influence of the totality of negative factors the process of socialization of the individuality of the student will be destroyed; the natural course of its development will be violently interrupted. This circumstance cannot fail to trigger major apprehensions.

Many such types of work in which our secondary school students are engaged, totally ignoring their individual inclinations, are quite similar in terms of their content to

the labor of the legendary Sisyphus. There is more to it, however. Their main fault is their lack of connection with knowledge learned in class. The supporters of such a "system" of labor training frequently appeal, in justifying themselves, to the works of the Marxist-Leninist classics, in which the idea of the need to combine the training process with production toil is clearly stipulated. However, the entire trouble is that they understand this idea on a purely mechanical and vulgar basis, i.e., as the requirement that in addition to their studies, the students must be involved in some kind of labor, regardless of its nature. Marx, Engels and Lenin, however, linked training with labor in a profoundly dialectical manner. That is precisely why they formulated the idea of developing polytechnical secondary schools and involving the students in productive labor not only unrelated to the idea of early professionalism but also opposed to it. Suffice it to recall what Lenin wrote in his notes on Krupskaya's theses "On Polytechnical Education:" "We must avoid early specialization; we must draft an instruction to this effect." Unfortunately, we ignored this wise counsel.

Furthermore, we should not even try to promote illusions as to the level at which the students will master the set of skills in which they will be trained on a combined basis by "school-PTU-production job." Practical experience indicates that yesterday's school students who enroll in a PTU show a very low level of knowledge, quite well illustrated by the annual control tests taken by first year PTU students in Kishinev, based on secondary school curricula. Last September the average test grade did not exceed 2.8. This is confirmed by the ever growing number of students dropping out of Moldavian VUZs. Let us take as an example the KPI imeni S. Lazo. In the 1984/85, 1985/86 and 1986/87 school years, respectively 275, 665 and 920 young people had to drop out due to poor general education training! And this was despite a certain liberalism displayed by some members of the institute's faculty and administrative personnel. In the foreseeable future, we believe, this situation will not change for the better. On the one hand, the reason is that the secondary school found itself in a profound impasse and vocational guidance in its activities became totally paralyzed. In the confusion which developed in social relations, it is not all that simple to define "what is good and what is bad," and balance, for example, the prestige of a commodity expert with that of an engineer and reach the only accurate solution. The result is that many young people enter a polytechnical or any other VUZ "blindly", and some of them are motivated simply by the arrogant aspiration to "become somebody" at all cost, and then let the chips fall where they may. Briefly, the situation can be described as follows: "There is both a surplus and a shortage of engineers." On the other hand, such dynamics is encouraging yet another, this time positive, factor, for which reason it includes an encouraging principle. This refers to the stricter requirements concerning university students under the conditions of the restructuring of the higher schools and the entire society. Is it worth mentioning that this will make VUZ

life exceptionally more difficult? It turns out, by the development of circumstances, metaphorically speaking, the VUZ finds itself between the hammer and the anvil.

Perhaps, in order to be truly efficient, the unified system of continuous education should grant the possibility, particularly on the level of the secondary school, of "a break in the continuity," i.e., giving the student a free choice as to the type of VUZ and the profession to which the student is most attracted. Furthermore, if it tries to become a true generator of the labor activeness of the future worker, the schools must show daily concern for supplying its pupils not with a complete sum of knowledge or a professional training developed to the point of automation but, to put it briefly, with **rich opportunities** for the efficient assimilation of the surrounding world. In this context the most attractive, in our view, would be the viewpoint according to which the time has come for decisively converting public education in the country to the track of intensification of the spiritual life of the individual and developing within him the type of qualities without which the revolutionary process of *perestroika* could become bogged down.

Despite the existence of breakdowns and isolated tangles within the unified continuous education system, to being with it provides favorable conditions for the intensive socialization of the individual and for the permanent growth of his intellectual potential; second, by tirelessly generating ever new knowledge, it blends such knowledge with labor activities and thus ascribes to such activities an active and dynamic condition which, in turn, becomes a powerful impetus for promoting the next round in the field of theory. The dialectical connection between education and the skilled training of the individual for the work he will be performing and the manifested activeness in this case is obvious. In order to solve the production problems which man faces in the course of the labor process, he must possess a set of information of various kinds—basic, additional and those developed by himself. As a rule, the results of this are the following: interest in the job doubles, a kind of passion develops with the aspiration to test one's capabilities and, as a result of accomplishments, provide an objective assessment of oneself. This movement becomes so stable and comprehensive that it could be justifiably qualified as a type of sociological law. It is obvious that upgrading production skills leads to equally positive results.

We are pleased to note in this connection that in the past 10 years the growth rates in the number of workers holding 4th to 6th grades was double the growth rate of unskilled workers. However, we cannot unconditionally claim on this basis the existence of a straight influence of education and skill factors on the labor activeness of the individual. An investigation revealed that major difficulties are encountered in the functioning of this mechanism, difficulties which, despite all expectations, are yielding the direct opposite effect, i.e., they hinder the development of the independent activities of the worker.

In order to clarify the nature of this problem better, let us ask the following: What is preferable in terms of the quality of incentive for the production activeness of the individual: a "surplus" in the level of education and professionalism or, conversely, a "scarcity?" On the surface, the answer seems simple: "Naturally, a surplus," some people would answer with conviction. We must point out that they would not err if by education they mean a general cultural training, and a certain amount of basic knowledge. Obviously, education is the most important means for the socialization of the individual. It lowers the threshold of the individual's reaction to a number of external influence factors. This circumstance is related, in particular, to the growth of the professionalism of the worker and a display on his part of a profound interest in labor activeness, an interest which, without a certain level of education, would hardly be possible. Increasing the interest in the purely functional aspect of activities is supplemented, as a rule, by an interest in the sociomoral, the political aspect of the matter which, essentially, is of the same origin: the education of the individual. The combination of the two incentives with favorable production conditions inevitably generates the labor activeness of the worker, giving it the energy needed for accelerated development. Therefore, the concern frequently expressed on the subject of the negative consequences of "surplus" education, appears groundless.

As to vocational training, the possibility of achieving it is much more complex. In this case the decisive role is played, naturally, not by education but by available vacancies which, in turn, depend on the development of public production, its technical facilities, the nature of the work, and so on. This is an extraordinarily important aspect. It indicates that the manifestation of professionalism is possible only if it is consistent with the objective requirements governing social labor. If professional training is low as a result of the poor organization of the training process or for reasons of any other organizational difficulties, we would be facing the obstruction of "scarcity." If vocational training exceeds than the requirements we mentioned, we are facing an obstruction created by "surplus."

Either situation is equally unacceptable in terms of generating labor activeness, for which reason their typical imbalance of factors must be promptly corrected. In practice, equal attention by no means being paid to them. For example, there is virtually no critical analysis made by scientists or a thoughtful study by corresponding management authorities of an imbalance related to a "surplus." Meanwhile, on this level the situation does not change for the better. Statistical data indicate that in recent decades the contradiction between the quality of manpower and the possibility of its application has become drastically aggravated. Suffice it to say that in 1986 about 4 million graduate specialists worked in positions for which they were overqualified. In order to eliminate this anomaly we need, in our view, a system of interrelated measures in which economic instruments

would play a special role: the conversion of enterprises to full cost accounting, self-financing and self-support, and a radical technical retooling of the production process which, actually, is what is being done today. This will result in a natural improvement in relations between the level of education and labor activeness. It is self-evident that a collective working under the new economic management conditions will observe zealously and tirelessly the condition of such relationship, for its production successes will be largely determined by its quality.

Achieving a high level of education by a worker is by no means a self-seeking aim but merely the initial and, therefore, incomplete impetus in promoting his labor activeness. Another impetus is his professional-skill training. The aggressive nature of the "education-skill-activeness" system follows roughly the following pattern: on the one hand, education creates prerequisites for independent activities in labor; on the other, as it actively operates in that direction, in turn it becomes dependent on it, on the thus increasing professional skill of the people and the need to solve the problems which arise in this connection. A peculiar result of the conflicting correlation between these aspects is the need to add to one's knowledge and to enhance cultural and technical standards, i.e., the need for increased skill training. Hence the logical connection: if the educational factor favorably influences an active attitude toward labor and an active attitude toward labor, paralleled by increased skill grades, stimulates the desire to improve the educational level, the conclusion is that the educational factor has an inherent motivating force leading to self-development. Clearly, this factor should be qualified as a manifestation of the following law: a certain level of skill is consistent with a certain level of education, thus multiplying the possibility of the participation of the worker in socialist competition, production management, higher labor productivity, scientific and technical creativity, and so on. Sociological studies have indicated that one out of 50 1st and 2nd grade workers, one out of 10 of 3rd and 4th grade, one out of 2 5th grade and two out of three in the 6th grade workers are rationalizers. Another ratio develops similarly: the higher the rate-skill grade becomes, the more intensive becomes the aspiration to achieve even better results in that area. A convincing example of this phenomenon has been described by the German sociologist R. Stolberg. According to data he has quoted, the greatest readiness to improve one's skills is shown by individuals between the ages of 26 and 40 (about 60 percent); groups of workers with completed secondary education (60 percent); skilled workers (about 60 percent); and servicing automatic machines and control systems (70 percent). Conversely, a certain restraint in this respect is found among the following: individuals over 40 (40 percent); unskilled workers (no more than 20 percent); workers engaged in unskilled or underskilled manual labor (respectively 24 and 30 percent); and those belonging to a group showing the characteristics of a negative attitude toward labor (25 percent).

On the surface this situation seems paradoxical: people with an array of positive qualities are trying to consolidate and increase them, while those who do not have them show no willingness to change any aspect of their situation for the better. In fact, it demonstrates the inconsistency of the coordinated effect of factors which determine work behavior. Naturally, the psychological mood plays a certain role in this respect: a feeling of helplessness in the face of new equipment; inner depression caused by the awareness that the time needed to increase one's individual labor potential has been lost; lack of confidence that by increasing one's professional-skill training substantial changes would occur in status (it is indicative that there are such frequent cases of engineering and technical personnel concealing their diplomas with a view to taking blue collar jobs). It is also obvious that the lack of education and necessary skills not only does not make it possible to assume an active stance in labor but also hinders the full realization of the high social and individual value of education and skills. As the years go by the process of obstruction increases and, in the final account, "takes out" of circulation the comprehensive production ties which constitute the valuable capital of the worker's activeness.

We must point out that today, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, even highly skilled workers with a good reputation as masters of their work, are having difficulties with this kind of pressure. "They," writes L.I. Abalkin, "are totally unable to accept the fact that a machine is 'more intelligent' than they, that it can replace their skill, which took them years to acquire. Meanwhile, the young workers, recent PTU graduates, sometimes easily master even the most complex and modern equipment. One must not ignore this somewhat unexpected yet important aspect of the 'man-equipment' interaction." Such a formulation of the question, in our view, is quite constructive. It enables us to formulate the actual problem: if a worker, considered skilled according to our present standards, remains passive in the face of the powerful "brain" of the machine, to begin with what actions should be taken so that he could trust the power of his own mind and thus surmount a depressing technical alienation; second, what to do under such conditions with social groups, such as unskilled or underskilled workers, whose situation becomes worsened by additional difficulties?

As to the first part of the problem, everything seems quite simple. Uncertainly, timidity and fear are, as a rule, the result of lack of knowledge. In order to eliminate such "deactivating" features, they must be dynamically reinforced up to a level which exceeds that of the old skills and which updates the creative aspect of labor activities. In planning the process for assimilating new equipment and putting together labor collectives, we must not ignore the conventional yet truly existing differences in the volumes of actual professional-skill training and the expected levels based on objective requirements of advanced equipment and technology.

The other part of the problem is more difficult. It is self-evident that its solution as well presumes (to an even greater extent!) the need to apply energetic efforts aimed at increasing the professional knowledge of the various worker categories. Fast successes in this area are much more difficult to achieve, for the distance separating the extremes is great: from a practically total lack of skill to a level of skill consistent with the requirements of the present. This circumstance favors the shaping of the needs of the worker to upgrade the level of his specialized knowledge. If the worker is not young, the personal attraction for professional growth is almost entirely undermined. Since such situations sharply clash with the interest displayed by society in developing the labor activeness of the individual, they cause grave concern. This is particularly relevant today, when conditions for the reproduction of negative phenomena are still present, and when the process of radical restructuring in the areas of the economy, education and upbringing is only gathering the necessary momentum and, here and there, has become thoroughly stuck. It is no secret, for example, that the installation of new equipment and use of new technology and the purposeful implementation of steps to automate and improve the efficiency of the production process formulate the strictest possible requirements precisely in terms of jobs held by unskilled people. Yet the number of such people, unfortunately, remains quite high. We could claim, with a certain degree of confidence, that in the foreseeable future it will not only not drop but, conversely, will even increase, above all as a result of the difficulties which, as we already noted, are being experienced today by the general education schools.

However, it is not only a question of the fact that manpower training is being provided on a very low standard, as a result of which its economic efficiency is reduced. The problem has another equally important aspect. The individual's production activeness does not end in the least with his job. Under certain circumstances, it displays a tendency to broaden the range of his activities and to increase. Thus, the more skilled and better educated a worker is, the greater are his changes of ignoring narrow attractions and entering the broad circle of socioproduction relations and realizing more completely his spiritual needs. It has been scientifically established that wherever the necessary conditions for the unhindered manifestation of the spiritual potential are absent, activeness in labor, however high it may be initially, gradually declines. Conversely, wherever everything necessary is provided for the development of independent activities, such activities become not only stabilized but acquire a new meaning.

The behavior of the individual at work depends on a number of factors, the most important among which are the basic and "situational" social relations, the technical standard of the production process, the economic and management mechanisms, the moral and political climate in the collective and the degree of education and professionalism of each one of its members. In this case

significant variations are possible, based on the strength and nature of influence of external factors. Individual workers with a low level of general erudition frequently develop high professionalism and conscientiousness in their jobs. Conversely, the knowledge of an individual could be quite comprehensive and profound while his production indicators may remain insignificant. Such a gap existed during the period of stagnation and will always exist wherever irritating barriers will be erected to separate the cultural standard of the individual from the conditions governing his existence.

Labor morality does not provide the necessary aspiration to merge with erudition, for it operates on a narrow base: the primitive nature of labor functions and the aspiration strictly to achieve the necessary material sufficiency, satisfaction with something which one ought to oppose, and so on. Morality is not inherent in man in the Kantian sense of the word but, conversely, is the product of the influence of the social environment, education, contacts, knowledge, labor and so on. Therefore, it is pedagogically erroneous and politically harmful to appeal to it under the conditions of a clearly unorganized social environment or labor situation. Many problems which our society is encountering today stem precisely from this situation. It is knowledge alone that can give a person conscious resolve, resourcefulness and sensible initiative.

The highly educated worker, the specialist, warmly wishes (given the availability of objective conditions) personally to master situations arising in life and work and to become their true master.

To support this aspiration and ensure optimal conditions for its development and full realization and to create a mechanism for enhancing the potential of the individual are among the leading and most important tasks of perestroika taking place in our country.

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Russia and Marx

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[Article by Mikhail Yakovlevich Gefter, candidate of historical sciences, reprinted from the journal *RABOCHIIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR* No 4, 1988]

[Text] Russia and Marx: this is not the same as saying Marx and Russia and not at all the same as Marx about Russia. The first topic is not broader but different. Its subject is not statements by themselves, evaluations or even forecasts. It deals with the relationship between two equivalent values, the very equivalence of which requires an explanation and raises questions which go beyond the 1848-1883 period.

That is why it is not Marx and Russia but, initially, it is Russia. It is post-reform Russia, not fitting the context of any other historical age, as it was seen, in terms of world history, by Marx. This was a Russia "trying to catch up" and unable to do so. It was not simply a lagging Russia but a Russia aware of its lagging: outside the world movement, and aware of this situation and its gravity, painfully (with an awareness of this pain!) rushing ahead. Where to? It was an open question and a question that had to remain open. Was Russia itself, questing Russia, fated to keep it open?

That is why it is only at that point, a mandatory one, that we have Marx and Russia. We have Russia locked within itself. We have "Marx's world," seeking in Russia an as yet imprecisely formulated question.... Did Marx come out of this meeting well?

We could make our task much easier if, guided by the stipulated hierarchy of values, we would start presenting matters as follows: Russia asked questions and Marx answered; Russia embodied "the capacity to ask questions" to the extent to which Marx embodied "the capacity to answer them." We must forget this simplicity when we take up this topic and we begin to sense it, with all of its components and consequences, the main one among which are "those which peacefully lie deep within the earth," and, once again consider the correlation of the initial values: post-reform Russia and Marx (sensing yet once again not the fabricated, not the intentional conventionality of superiority and lag but the one created and renovated by history, which is even more obvious in the area of the spirit than in so-called material life). At that point "Marx and Russia" are no longer answers to questions but questions answering other questions. This becomes a **dialogue of questions**. It is questions which make other questions more pointed: it is a trial by extension.

It is a matter of equal greatness, of going beyond the "1848-1883" period and beyond the range of universal history.

It is not since yesterday that I began to be interested in the dialogue between Marx and Russia. I became aware of Russia which set the beginning of Lenin's thoughts, through the prehistory of the birth of the idea of the "two ways" ("American" and "Prussian"), an idea which completed the development of Vladimir Ulyanov as Lenin, and remained a problem within Lenin, with periods of "neglect" and resumption of the problem, not necessarily in its initial form. I believe that Lenin's entire spiritual odyssey could be presented as transformations of his main idea and the transformations themselves explain, perhaps better than anything else, the ups and downs in action, in the center in which Lenin acted, making such action "his own." The deeper I went into this topic, the more I broadened its frame and the more I questioned the possibility of somehow simply correlating this concept, like its creator, with classical Marxism. It is easy to imagine its concretizing, its **actual** extension.

It is even simpler to present this as an impoverishment, as provincialism ("it is in the same but at a different time, in another world!" "It is entirely different for it has different roots, a different legacy.") Such explanations are too narrow although they do not lack interesting observations and unexpected challenging analogies.

How much time has passed since N.A. Berdyayev made "Russian communism" part of the Apocalypse? Some of the contemporary followers of Berdyayev's tradition forget even the name of its initiator. To the historical researcher, Berdyayev is excessively metaphysical; to those who reject innuendoes he is insufficiently consistent and even evasive; to officialdom he, naturally, is one of the worst falsifiers. In my view, his book remains valuable to this day, not only because of some valuable parts or even the overall formulation of the problem but the feelings which imbue it: to understand "Russian communism" means to understand the world and if the former cannot be understood the reasons should be sought in the misunderstanding of the latter.

It is thus that from the birth of the "two ways" I returned to Lenin who remained loyal to himself, and from the surmounting of this myth promoted by the state to the puzzle of the real entity: to Lenin the process of self-identification, it seemed, left no place for doubting and his competition against himself was closed to outsiders; from his inner world he went to the big world along the bridges whose both actual and nominal name was Russia. Russia, actual with its range and destinies, its quests and defeats; nominal, for it could not be reduced (both the old and the new) to something unified and simple: it was not a country but a world within the world, whose existence seemed to ask mankind: to be or not to be?

It was this Russia that stood between Lenin and Marx. Within Lenin it argued with the classical "universal" Marx; classical Marxism clashed with Russia as it was and as it was to become.... From "two ways" to a single one. From the anticipation of alternatives to action and the triumph of action. From triumph to the tragedy of dissipation. The "gap" which opened to Herten, the Russian exile, to the European revolutionism of 1793-1848, became the new Russian space, which experienced its great revolution: the vastness of our Russia.

But did this apply to Russia alone?

What I am offering here are no more than notes on this topic. To a certain extent (and, naturally, most concisely) I am trying to reproduce the march, both my own and that of my comrades, toward its current understanding. We begin by "rereading" the texts and finding in them, although repeatedly rewritten, that which we failed to notice in the past, such as Marx's Russia and Lenin's attitude toward it. We see the striking consistency of what is related to the birth of what was strictly Leninist and, at the same time, what surrounded it; that which clearly hindered direct contacts but which was very important to understand precisely.

Why, for example, did Lenin, who lively reacted to any new publication of Marx's legacy, particularly his correspondence, which led, as he expressed it himself, to the "intimate" life of the mind, ignore a major event, such as the 1908 publication of the letters exchanged between Marx and N.F. Daniyelson who was, as we know, the founder of the economic theory of Populism? Could it be that Lenin was blocked by the closeness between these two people, the similarity of their ideas as to the present and the probable future of post-reform Russia? Yet he himself had experienced by them a significant change, and his earlier (of the 1890s and the time of ISKRA) and the by then no longer "orthodox" view on Populism had not only found support in his own economic analysis and the experience of the Russian Revolution, but had also stretched to the limits of the world, for it is precisely the world, and no less, that could be seen beyond rebellious peasant Russia and awakening Asia. This world began to speak in a Populist language.

This puzzles no one today. This voice is heard more clearly than other. It is unequivocally universal. It is not limited by the continents. It crosses all barriers. It is reflected on the screens of all different ideologies, faiths and scientific and unscientific concepts. But what about it in the past? At that time it was easy to present it as atavistic. In the eyes of the first Russian Marxist, the Populists were "utopian since the days of yore." Actually, what specifically could such a peripheral utopia contribute to universal history, the laws of which had already been discovered and understood? Today we can justifiably claim that the destinies of Marxism itself depended, above all, on the answer to this question. It is true that in Lenin it did not trigger even the slightest doubt. He was prepared to interpret the broadening of Populism as one more proof of the accuracy of Marx's theory. However, that same readiness was an encumbrance. The revival of utopia to an unparalleled degree, in all possible forms (and actions!) of the mass consciousness included the question of the reasons for it, of its material substratum. The future turned out to be both practically and theoretically dependent on the past. Marx's accuracy had, at least, to be confirmed.

Lenin sought the answer to this question in the logic of "*Das Kapital*." From the very beginning his attention was absorbed by the problem of the transition: the transformation of precapitalist systems into capitalism, a transformation which was taking place under special circumstances, when capitalism itself was the dominant feature of comprehensive development, a capitalism which was mature and was progressing toward its own end. Any transition is, therefore, a particle of a progress toward this apparent, tangible and immediate end. There is no break between its logical and historical aspects but there is a problem.

On the surface the "Populist" 1905 and even the "Populism" of its extension beyond the borders of Asiatic Russia proved that the age of the classical bourgeois society had finally reached a scale which had been

inherent in its foundation. Therefore, Russia could and should resemble the France of 1789-1793, not identified with but nor simply compared to it, and it was just as natural and logical to see in distant Asia (and in all other parts of the world which were still in a state of deep slumber) the situation of Russia tripled or ten times stronger. "The Western bourgeoisie which is being faced by its grave-digger—the proletariat—is rotten. In Asia, however, there still is a bourgeoisie which can represent a sincere, combative and consistent democracy...." What kind of bourgeoisie was that? Its main representatives and social mainstay were the Russian and the Asian peasant. They were the "worthy comrade of the great preachers and personalities of the end of the 18th century in France."

Admittedly, these words are somewhat disturbing for being so straight-forward. But could one doubt their sincerity and seriousness? We sense here something more than journalistic zeal. We sense passion. It is the passionate wish of such a person to see such a world. This vision combined things which essentially could not be combined within a single part of the same process which was moving from one continent to another. The difference between Rousseau and the peasant-monarchist who claimed from the rostrum of the State Duma that "God's land means nobody's land," was nonetheless a difference in both of space and time, creating a civilization which was inconceivable outside (and without) the **personality**. And whereas the link between "ages" separated by centuries, was the individual (the civilian society), could a thought aimed at unity in the final and immediate account bypass this connection, as a problem seeking a solution, whatever it may be? We unwittingly recall Marx's words voiced much earlier, in his first communications on the peasant reform being prepared in Russia. Indicating the signs that liberation from above, with a contemplated retention of the corvée for a long period of time, added to with the patrimonial power of the landowners, following the Prussian model, even if it were not to trigger the opposition of the nobility (which was inevitable) would, in any case, unleash the element of peasant uprisings, he wrote with hope and with almost providential enthusiasm: "And if this were to happen, this will be the Russian 1793; the rule of terror by these semi-Asiatic serfs will be unparalleled in history. However, it will be the second turning point in the history of Russia and, in the final account, it will replace the fictitious civilization introduced by Peter the Great with a true universal civilization."

Many of these statements fit with each other. However, there also are lacks of coincidences. The terror of the semi-Asiatic serfs, carrying the burden of the post-reform Russian leap was not, in Lenin's eyes, the most desirable solution, at least as far as Lenin was concerned in 1912. Lenin could not agree with the fact that, most likely, Russia would immediately begin by duplicating the situation of 1793, although he spoke of a revolution of the 1789 type. He unquestionably believed that it was precisely that which would occur; on the eve of 1905 as

well as later he structured the entire Bolshevik tactics on the basis of this fact. Furthermore, he structured Bolshevism itself in such a way as to make 20th century Russia capable of bringing about a "peasant bourgeois revolution." It was to be bourgeois but also peasant. It was to be a special variant (or even more than a variant) of the European and the North American precedents: with many of its attributes, the most important of which was the "left-wing bloc", a democratic dictatorship by all classes constituting the people, and with many of its results, the main one of which was to clear the grounds for an unrestrained, free bourgeois development "on the ground level." The 1905 credo meant a "gigantic development of **capitalist** progress...."

It is doubtful that Marx had all of this in mind in 1858. The "unparalleled" terrorism of the peasants, who would confront on a one-to-one basis the "fictitious civilization" of the Russian emperors was considered by him rather as a tremendous choice, a kind of historical solar flare rather than the insurmountable consequence of the universal laws of commodity output. Some 20 years later, he would describe the thunder of the Populists as being a "specifically Russian, historically inevitable means of action on the subject of which one should moralize, for or against, as little as one should on the subject of an earthquake on Chios." Naturally, a great deal of water had passed under the bridge between the eve of the peasant reform and 1 March, on the one hand, and Lenin's time, on the other. However, the difference which we sense applies, nonetheless, less to circumstances than to the logic of the dynamics of the mind.

We note that to Lenin the peasantry was by no means the type of same category which it was to Marx or, at least, to the Marx who wrote "*Das Kapital*." The Russian and the Asian peasant as a revolutionary bourgeois was no longer a symbol and not even a mental analogue. According to Lenin, this peasant was a real, a live coparticipant in universal change. He was not its only subject but one of them. As the problem was set, he was one of the builders of a global bourgeois society. The other problem of this subject cannot be resolved now, both because he has neither matured nor, wherever he is a subject, is there any place for him. The first postulate: mankind can reach socialism only after having exhausted all the possibilities of capitalist progress. The second postulate: universal and general are synonymous terms; the difference between the first and the second is only in terms of time and form. No more but also no less, for differences in forms and times and, particularly, place, are by no means petty matters. This is one of the greatest of the "specific truths." The East will be able to leave behind the "18th century" because it not simply has the experience of its predecessors. Experience is a special factor: it is an ideal brought from the outside. Paradoxically, the **bourgeois nature** of the Russian-Asiatic subject, consisting of millions of people, is derived from the European **socialist** ideal, having processed this ideal into action; it derives from the nonbourgeois method of this type of reworking, the purpose of which is to provide a maximally bourgeois, a universal bourgeois result.

What does that make Populism? Is it merely an illusion, a dream of bypassing the capitalist phase of development or a reactionary theory about the "warning" of capitalism (reactionary, Lenin claimed in that same year 1912)? Was that all? It was not. The fact that it was not was sensed by Lenin much earlier, as he proved through fierce debates, rejecting the accusations of the orthodox and persuading his own supporters. It is more likely, however, that on each occasion he had to convince himself as well. His favorite image was that of a fictitiously false cover which concealed a democratic, a progressive-radical nucleus. But was he all that convincing and dialectical? In my view, this difficulty frequently arose in his mind also after 1905, on the threshold of the other revolution which could no longer be a literal repetition of the first: Russia had changed, not only on the "ground" level but also "at the top;" the world which was abandoning free competition, which had not as yet reached all of Russia, not to mention Asia, the non-Western human ocean, "that" world had changed. Did this mean saying good-bye to Populism as a reality in a problem?... Long before those crucial times of the autumn of 1917, when Lenin adopted as his agrarian program of the proletarian revolution the peasant, the Populist, the S.R. land demand (adopted and thus, therefore, won!), and even before that, did he not argue with himself, emphasizing with particular firmness the universal-historical truth of Populism? Populism was real despite its "fictitiousness" in terms of its "formal-economic meaning."

It is true that in making this widely quoted statement, Lenin referred to Engels' authority. However, Engels was speaking of the early utopians, bearing in mind that anticipation of the doom of capitalism was contained in their moral protest against it, against a capitalism which was only arising and had by no means as yet fulfilled its task. What about Lenin? What did he understand by "formal-economic?" Within the limits of the words, he meant the same thing. Twentieth century peasant democracy is valuable because of its rejection of feudalism and serfdom and mercilessness in its struggle for objective bourgeois progress; however, confusing this objective meaning with subjective-socialist sympathies and elitist aspirations was nothing but "words, words and more words...." which, at that, were not all that innocuous, for the grave-digging class was already confronting "dying" capitalism. Under these circumstances was it possible to have a systematic revolutionism if its carriers did not stand alongside the proletariat, and could there not appear a reactionary socialism if it was not scientific and Marxist? To Lenin the answer was obvious. It is true that this answer had another other side as well: **mandatory hegemony**, as its prime condition, subordination of the grave-digger to his own immediate demands, which were the universal and, perhaps, also "alien" interests. This was the beginning, the first point. There is no leadership without self-denial. The main objective is invalid if an intermediary one (new republican Russia, a free country of free people) is not "one's own" cherished objective.

Do we not hear at this point through Lenin the sacrilegious Edward Bernstein? Whatever we may say, the difference between them is extremely big, if we recall the circumstances and the price which the Russian vanguard had to pay for such an "intermediate" objective. Nonetheless, fundamental though it might have been, this difference was not to become worrisome. Today a great deal of what happened then is obvious, thanks to the surreptitiously growing decline of orthodoxy which rejects from the start Bernstein's problem heresy. At that time, however, did not Georgiy Valentinovich Plekhanov, one of the strongest anti-Bernsteinians, call Lenin to "Marxist order?" Plekhanov was not against a peasant land war. He merely opposed its enhancement to the level of a theoretical principle. It was easier for Plekhanov to accept the terror of the semi-Asiatic muzhik who, in the final account (and only in the final account) would lead, and not by himself, to replacing the fictitious civilization of Peter the Great with a "true and universal" civilization rather than forgo for this sake the success (important but transient) of the "logical values" of Marxism. Logical meant universal; universal means without deviation but not going beyond that, for going beyond that means questioning the universal nature of such values or imperceptibly replacing them with other values which are obviously unable to become universal, for there can be no two universal truths.

The actual dispute, although unmentioned at least by one of the sides, was precisely about this. Lenin was governed step-by-step or, rather, leap-by-leap, by such lacks of coincidences. These were not even lacks of coincidences but opposites. "Formal-economic" is equal to capitalism up to its peak—the monopoly. In what sense was the Populist moral process real in terms of that capitalism (in 1912 Lenin knew of no other)? What universal future did it anticipate? It progressed from guesses to concepts and from concepts to the outlines of a world outlook. The essence of the historical drama which was developing was a conflict between two capitalisms in one. Bourgeois civilization was split. Its unity was in the past but the implementation of this unity was in the future. For that reason the "reunification" of the unity was an open question. The answer lay in the means of surmounting the age-old established obstacle the closeness of which, "one's own" was the dominant Asiatic spirit.

The main problem was one of method. Lenin was too loyal to Marxism to rely on "Chios" and too much of a Russian to trust the mole of history which, whatever the case, keeps burrowing. Lenin's "two ways" if we consider this closely, are not only two trends and two possible prospects of agrarian-capitalist development. They also mean two postrevolutionary types of progress and two utopias: a liberal and a peasant, a Populist. Were they of equal value? To Lenin the tactician, naturally, they were not. What about to Lenin the theoretician? The "American" way was the key to the "Prussian" way. Populism was a key to liberalism. Together with liberalism comes

the merciless struggle for the muzhik, for the "American" way, and for the world, for a means of entering it. Liberalism was "worse" than Populist utopia, for it was based on what was, and not only even on the existing semi-serfdom Russia but on the actual, the established world. What about Marxism? In what respect was its "ideal" advanced beyond the limits of that world leading to the utopia of the "times of yore?"

The ends do not meet. This disparity is the start of the future, of future ups and future downs; it is a start of alternatives which go beyond the range of the country and the area. If an alternative means taking different directions in the search for a universal development, what is its embryo if not a means which carries within itself protocapitalism, the protocivilization of Russia and Asia, as a necessary integral part of the world, of mankind? Can the second be achieved without the first, and what about the first itself? We see in Populism the elimination of this division as well as the possibility of new divisions. **A bipolar world is a bipolar subject.** Can this be achieved practically and can it be theoretically justified? Lenin (realizing it!) claimed that it was both attainable and justifiable. Naturally, this was not to take place immediately and the intellectual impetus did not directly coincide with much greater action. Coincidence is the final period of the age. It combines civilization with socialism. However, this also means that each step toward the end must be a stage in their combination. It is both an "aspect" of rapprochement as well as a conflicting reciprocal understanding! Naturally, these were not the words Lenin used. However, the logic of the hypothesis itself (violating its own logic) created the image of the alternative: the impossibility of a single and the possibility of a general subject. Therefore, the duplicity which strikes the orthodox Marxist concerning the awareness of the "lowest of the low" means, to him, coming closer to the truth. In the final account, everything will be made to fit. Truth and the billions of people will come to the world of Marx, and precisely and exclusively to it.

As the 20th century draws to an end, how not to ask ourselves: Is this the case? Have the billions of people and the truth come to Marx's world? Could they, will they be able to do that? We must assume that Lenin would have rejected our question in 1912 or later, and to the very end. To us this question is primary. At this point we do not discuss the extent to which and at what cost were the forecasts and computations made by Lenin justified. For the time being, we are limiting ourselves to tracing the dynamics of his thoughts. We are concerned with Lenin's closeness to and separation from Marx on the central point which is decisive to both: **the world** in its correlation with **universality**.

Willy-nilly, we go back to the old, very old topic: to Lenin's Russian roots. On the one hand, this is an almost forbidden and, on the other, an almost trite topic. In this area I sense a secret which has not been entirely unraveled. This is indeed a Russian secret but its topic goes

beyond Russia. What proof could be stronger than that of "Russian Populism" expressed by Marx, partially in his early years but, mainly in his old age; by Marx who had plunged into the thick of historical events; by Marx to whom the discovery of the primitive community was not the only discovery but one of the most important incentives to review his own initial postulates (did they penetrate only in terms of time with the "tactical" reorientation toward clandestine Russia?); to Marx, who argued, but with whom? With the Russian revolutionaries, as follows: "...One should not particularly fear the world 'archaic.'" Thus, should we consider (and what scale should we use?) who had more "Populism" within himself: Lenin, throughout his life, or the old Marx? It would be more productive, it seems to me, to compare Lenin's "Populism" with Marx's "Populism." Were they equal or else is it that wherever there is maximal closeness there also is maximal difference?

To Marx Populism was inseparable from Russia and Russia was inseparable from the destinies of the European Revolution. These were two opposite relations. The first was colored by recollections of 1848 and 1849. Russia was the policeman of Europe, there was none other. Anything which, on that side of the border, was united in terms of its incompatibility with revolution, development and civilization (concepts which were essentially one and the same to Marx ever since his "*German Ideology*"). If there was to be or not to be a European-global revolution meant whether there would be or not be a Russian empire. Marx's sentence was the following: there will be no "Muscovite" empire. All efforts had to be concentrated there. That revolution itself would inevitably inaugurate an age of class battles and fights among nations, and its optimal form would be a revolutionary war against the empire. The bridgehead was Poland and the immediate objective was its liberation as well as the democratic unification of Germany despite the Prussian claim to hegemony; both at the beginning and as a result of it there would be the consolidation of Europe and a chain reaction of change triggered by consolidated revolutionary Europe in the rest of the world, near and far. Any fact, including the one which confirmed the arising social upheavals within Russia, was considered from this main viewpoint. Having read (in 1870) N. Flerovskiy's "*The Situation of the Working Class In Russia*," Marx summed up in a letter to Engels his own impressions: "In any case, it seems to me, what follows from Flerovskiy, is that the fall of the Russian state should take place in the immediate future."

The turning point was toward the end of the 1870s. Europe had already turned into a continent of large national states. A bourgeois system had been established in two extreme "points:" North America and Japan. The International had left the stage, yielding to national social democrats. The world was becoming simultaneously both smaller and less adaptable to unity. The sensitive spot was unadaptability. Did Marx abandon his doubt which he had put down on paper that same year,

by welcoming the terror of the semi-Asiatic serfs: "To us the difficult question is the following: on the continent the revolution is nearing and will immediately assume a socialist nature. However, would it not be inevitably suppressed in that small corner, considering that on an immeasurably greater space held by bourgeois society an ascending movement is still taking place?" Slightly less than 20 years had passed since that time. Did Marx retain this corroding doubt, this almost virtual confidence in the "inevitable" doom of a continental revolution, this time no longer as a result of clashes with the "Mongols," or with the ossified and immobile Muscovy, but as a result of the clash with an irrepressively expanding bourgeois civilization?

Today we are concerned less with the specific chances which were considered by Marx than with the very problem he formulated. Let us describe it: the **clash of development in different directions**. This is no longer the "second struggle" (the battle between progressive and conservative nations) side-by-side with the class battle, the first one, and within it, but also a third struggle, which stands above the other two: ascension versus ascension. Advance versus advance. Development versus development.

This is the point at which we must mention precisely the clash and not merely the conflict, for the outcome of it separates life from death. We question the fate of the problem. We try to sense its dynamics within Marx, within his main work, within his articles and his letters. The continuity is interrupted if we look for a verbatim interpretation. All of a sudden we find something "unexpected," from the mid-1870s to the beginning of the mid-1880s, thanks to his meeting with the Russian Populists and Russian Populism. All of a sudden, they are noticed. This is a meeting-acknowledgment of the very fact of its existence and, furthermore, its equal rights. We know that the latter disturbed many people close to Marx and others. Had the impatience of the revolutionary dominated the strict thinking of the scientist? Let us not reject the part played by impatience. However, this alone cannot explain the drastic nature of the change. The sense of this equality should be reconstructed and even guessed: the older Marx is brief. It is tempting to present his changing materialistic understanding of history. He was indeed not orthodox. However, this consoling statement does not cover the huge topic of the spiritual crisis in which Russia played a role similar to that of Germany during the age of the "*Communist Manifesto*" or England in the age of "*Das Kapital*," but, perhaps, a qualitatively different role, for it questioned the prototype: the world as a unified bourgeois civilian community, the "economic social system." The world as a single negation of it, as the only age of a unitarian revolution, the result of which would be **mankind in communism**.

It was no longer a question of deadlines as such or of how much time could be gained by a Russian revolution in terms of establishing a socialist Europe. Was it the point

that on the Western European continent (plus North America) the arms of the world clock were moving faster or the fact that the hour they showed were different? The 1845 formula which Marx had observed almost throughout his entire life, "communism is empirically possible only as the action of ruling nations, and made 'immediately'....," no longer demanded any clarification but a radical review or, more accurately, its rejection.

It was another Russia that came to Marx with Populism. The state-monster did not fit the plan. As a rudiment of the middle ages, it was distinguished by an excessively high negative (and, unchanging, as Marx insisted) activeness, which needed an analysis which took this phenomenon outside its universal-historical foundations. We can say with hindsight that the perspicacious views which were expressed by Marx on this subject, taking them in terms of their historical and philosophical context, rather revealed a lack of conceptual means and the impossibility of making Russia fit one of the existing diagrams (such as the "Asian production method"). With Marx we see how he increasingly developed the outlines of a unique centaur: an almost primitive agricultural foundation with a bourgeois civilization above it and, subsequently, penetrating the lower strata (and thereby corrupting the whole). However, to Marx the problem was, nonetheless, not the evaluation or the definition, but the elimination of the danger. Was an anti-Russian revolutionary struggle sufficient to this effect, even if it were to engulf the entire continent and England? (The action of the "ruling nations" should indeed take place immediately by virtue of a number of reasons, this being one of the main).

It would have been simpler to assume that the mill of capitalism would grind the Eurasian bloc frozen by time, for the world had already become cosmopolitan, the "Manifesto" claimed; the bourgeoisie was on the eve of redoing in its own image and semblance anything "even the most barbaric nations." Subsequently as well, in 1858, it was precisely Russia that Marx had in mind when he spoke of the ascending movement of bourgeois society to an "immeasurably greater space" than that corner of the Western European continent which was prepared to adopt socialism. However, it was more than simply time that elapsed between these two views, time which included the years 1849 (and 1863....); Marx's image of the world had surreptitiously changed as well. The already established bourgeois society, as it had been perceived by the author of the "Manifesto," "experienced, for the second time, its 16th century." For the second time! That was the essence: **Capitalism had a second start**. It was precisely this second start of capitalism that he studied in "*Das Kapital*." Could its laws be the exact duplication of the past? And could its origins remain unchanged: this was not a retrospectively recreated picture of the appearance of the bourgeois world in any one of its parts, but a genesis, the dynamics of this world itself, full and mature (genesis as a form of surmounting, as an "aspect" of self-negation). I think that Marx realized that capitalism was not only not

age-old as such but that it also was not age-old in terms of the universal condition, the premises of which would be mandatorily inherent in all human communities. The ladder which led to the peak, to capitalism, was quite narrow. He had to broaden it himself. His "absolute movement of establishment," and it alone, would create the "forms preceding capitalism" throughout the earth. But was this indeed the case, in the final account? As would be later asked by the timely correspondent of Marx and Engels from Petersburg, Nikolay Frantsevich Daniyelson: "But what about theoretically? Where are we headed?"

Post-reform Russia was revealing gaps between thought and action. Capitalism, which was shifting its historical foundations, essentially violated the age-old synchronous nature of the communist revolution. The concept of "immediately" became increasingly illusory. New obstacles were added to the old by the "ascending movement." However, this was not all. The main thing was not the fact that the stage was being pitted against itself but the appearance of new powerful sources of quasicivilization. It was precisely the capitalism of the "second 16th century" that was able to arm the archaic regimes with the tools and means adequate for modernization, in dimensions which, prior to that, had required a profound revolutionary change and comprehensive spiritual and political restructuring. It was a quasicivilization not only because of the shortened and more complex path. The path itself was different. It was an alternative preceded by a minus sign. It was not a question of "things" without "relations among things," but a restriction of the scope of the latter. Such relations, obeying the old and the renovated correlation, introduced within the power system, henceforth were acquiring properties which were contrary to civilization. Civilization brought them to a standstill. Wherever they had appeared, in their own original place, material relations had brought to the individual alienation. However, they had taken the individual into consideration and the possibility that the individual would resist as well as the possibility that resisting individuals would unite. Quasicivilization was arming itself with alienation: it was without individuals and against individuals. What could the individual oppose to this? The economic problem not simply increased, promoting clashes between man and society. Such clashes became "basic" wherever the process of organization entered with spasmodic speed the period of breakdown of "precapitalist monoliths," the area of disintegration and the latter acquired the strange property of moving in an unknown direction from somewhere to somewhere. It began moving toward something and only then asked but from where?

We shall not emphasize that the situation we described was precisely the way it was conceived by Marx. However, we have reasonable grounds to claim that Marx did consider such thoughts. They came from different sides and in different forms. His meeting with Russia and Populism was preceded by the logical and theoretical difficulties of completing "*Das Kapital*," as well as the

positive and negative aspects of the European movement, the lessons of the International and the "non-Marxist" Commune. However, Russia, Populism and all the rest somehow became concentrated within a single point. At this point it was already an anachronism to speak of ruling nations. Did this mean that now, among those who were to make communism, Marx had found a place for all without exception? This would be arguable. Marx was not a sentimental person about anything, including even his most profound—internationalist sympathies and feelings. Conversely, he was particularly exigent and even strict. His turn to the Russians was not due to starry-eyed idealism. If his words on the arising "Russian Commune" were, to a certain extent, emotional, it was an emotion which reflected not only hope but also a new vision of the world.

Nonetheless, what was Marx hoping for? Was he hoping that the Russian Revolution and those "boys" who would make it come true would be able to interrupt (!) the "ascending movement" of bourgeois society at home and thus unleash a socialist revolution in Europe! Did he truly assume that, having selected as a base the agricultural community (in which absolutism and the "capitalist fever" had made breeches but no more than that) the Russian Revolution would be able to introduce something entirely new in the evolution of the world and that this novelty would be a special movement (coming from different ends and with different levels of development) leading to the rediscovered universal foundations of a "natural historical" development? Although different from the previous ones, they would be just as natural or even more so. At that point, whatever would start them was not all that important. That question had lost its previous importance and, with it, the strict condition of initial maturity. The world was more mature. Furthermore, the very concept of maturity was to be reconsidered. Also worth reconsidering was the way material maturity was correlated to spiritual maturity, what was the nature of either, and how they could be combined so that the world which was moving in different directions would find within itself a new tie, a new unity. **It was not to move toward its primordial state, lost forever, but to the rediscovered prime foundation: toward the single future which was also the past.** At that point the question arose: Should one fear the word "archaic?"

In either case, what developed in Marx's mind and was only partially reflected in the almost coded rough drafts of the so-called answer to Vera Zasulich, may be entirely classified as one of the "crazy ideas." In any case, it is difficult to make them fit the mainstream of political economy. Furthermore, the historical attraction for the "bare fact" was a search for the only door through which man could reach him, the monist, who fought and lived as an integral entity. In this respect as well the Russian Raznochintsy were to him of "heuristic" value: not being tied to firm social positions and places in life and even to their native land, they were simply people who were personages acting within history and against history. Could it be that in this case Marx recalled the words of

his own teacher: In universal history, development is not simply a peaceful process which takes place without struggle, but a difficult and reluctantly done work aimed against oneself?

Someone wittingly assumed that had Newton been presented with the theory of relativity he would have understood it but would have been quite amazed. It is possible that Hegel would have understood Marx's doubts although his amazement would have been probably even greater. In any case, he would have sympathized with Marx's efforts: to preserve the entity by recreating it. But did Marx's contemporaries and supporters note or understand the questions and quests of the elderly Marx? And would have they been understood and accepted by Lenin, the one who was to follow him in the future?

It seems to me that Lenin's restraint concerning Marx's attitude toward Russia and, particularly, said correspondence with Daniyelson was not accidental. Did Lenin sense here something which could disturb the sequence of logic in a doctrine which was imbued with a single principle corresponding to the unity of the subject itself? Today I find it difficult to answer this question with confidence; to this day the inner Leninist thoughts remain terra incognita. I could add today that there are a great many things that I do not know in areas in which everything seems to be "known," discovered or published. As I thought of the way Russia and Marx looked at each other, I incidentally began to understand Lenin better.

It is thus that the topic of the dialogue arises: Russia with Marx, and Marx with Russia. Actually, we are as yet to determine whether this was a dialogue. On Marx's part this appears not to create any doubt. But what about on the part of Russia? In general, do we have the right to speak of a dialogue between a country and a philosopher who represented some kind of overall human entity and was able to express it with a single voice? I believe that we have the right to do so, if this voice does not assert or average a variety of answers but asks, insists on the right to ask, asks for questions, feeling that a great deal or virtually everything depends on this.

"Who can forget his own logical story, who can forget the way the first doubt arose in his heart.... and the way it subsequently expanded further and further, reaching the most sacred possessions of the soul? This precisely is the terrible judgment of the mind. To kill beliefs is not all that easy as it may seem; it is difficult to part with the thoughts with which we grew up, to which we have become accustomed, which nurtured and consoled us, and to sacrifice them seems ungrateful." These words were said by Herten, as he burned his bridges after the June slaughter of 1848, as he doomed himself to exile in order not to have his "logical story" destroyed, in order not to yield to internal and external censorship but to

maintain the concept of his homeland with his mind intact. "The point is to surrender something we consider precious if we are convinced that it is false."

I am quoting these words not for the sake of providing the notorious subtext and even not for the sake of the coincidences which have taught my generation a great deal. What attracts me in this case, however, more than anything else, is the "logical story," its special historical role. Actually, we should not speak of a single "story" but of two: Russian and European. In the Russian, Herten was destined to write one of the first chapters or, at least, the first in the Russian language. Marx represented an entire age of the new European culture. Did he need to punish various "beliefs" and be tortured by this? But what does need mean, in general, in this sense? Nothing other than the impossibility to start differently. Luther's "Here I stand. I can do no other," was said in the 16th century. In the 19th, however, it would have sounded almost tasteless. The emphasis on the "I" poorly agreed with the strict conceptual architecture of mature Western thought. Greater barriers existed between Herten and Marx. The differences between them were deeper than differences between ideas. The differences lie in their personalities and language. Iskander's thoughts cannot be separated from the story of his life. Was it a question of individual "mutation" or something greater? Turgenev had told Herten that he had brilliantly distorted the native language, referring to the freedom with which the latter treated syntax. We also feel that it is only after Herten's crushing of the volcanic rock of letters—Belinskiy's notebooks—that Russian speech definitively crossed the line which separated image from concept. We can guess that no other way was possible to combine them and that this simultaneous philosophical and linguistic revolution was necessary and unique in the case of Russia, making it possible, for the first time, to see Russia as part of mankind, and for Russia to enter mankind, to become aware of itself as part of it and as an obstruction to it. An obstruction, above all, and penetrating this world by realizing the obstruction.

This is not an idyll but a tragedy in many acts. It has its start and its long extension in the 1840s, that "outstanding decade." The prologue was 14 December, which led to the disappearance of an entire stratum of people and, furthermore, the illusion that Russia could be Europeanized. This was a catastrophe, not a simple defeat. Its scale was determined not by the number of casualties or the barbarism of the punishment but by the gap of time. In seeking the future, the mind turned to the past. Pushkin's "The Prophet," was a call for and an obligation to the protagonists: several pages separated from the "stanzas," addressed to Nicholas. The idea of a second Peter the Great, "a revolutionary on the throne," appeared immediately after the catastrophe, and colored an entire age. It would be naive to ascribe the "reconciliation with reality" to the set of pious but meaningless wishes.

Would the descendent, like his predecessors, prove to be capable to civilize on the surface a virtually endless area which was held together only by the authority? A great variety of people had in mind not even some kind of strictly defined form of social and political structure but, rather, a civilization—an education and a process—roughly as it was understood in the 18th century, but lacking its naive optimism and rationalist teleology. The government intended to act “in the sense of European enlightenment.” Pushkin reported approvingly to Vyazemskiy 5 years after Nicholas ascended to the throne, and that same year, after reading the “*History of the Russian People*,” by Polevoy, the author felt the desire to “apply” to Russia the system used by the latest historians (such as Guisot). “You must also realize that Russia has never had anything in common with the rest of Europe; that its history demands a different way of thinking, a different formula.... Do not say that **no other way was possible**. Had this been the truth, the historian would become an astronomer and the events in human life could have been predicted in various calendars, like solar eclipses. Providence, however, is not algebra. As the simple people say, the human mind is not a prophet but a guesser. It can see the overall course of developments and could draw from it profound assumptions, which are frequently justified by time but it cannot predict the event, the powerful and instant weapon of insight.”

Let us agree that to this day these words sound relevant: thoughts on the destinies of Russia are related to a critical attitude toward the idea of predetermined history. We cannot avoid it but that is not the equivalent to its blind acceptance. Randomness plays a role: in Pushkin's eyes this included Napoleon, Pollignac, Peter the Great and Pugachev, the young landowner Dubrovskiy and the petty official Yevgeniy, who were helpless in the face of the “idol riding a bronze horse,” but whose brief rebellion affected the miracle maker, instantly becoming his equals. The case was personified in the individual person but nonetheless became a “tool of providence,” embodied in the people.

Post-Decembrism proved Russia that a nation, like history, does not convert from a fact into a **problem**. These were two opposites, two extremes. The first was that “the people are silent.” They were silent in the most critical times of their history. Was this total obedience, dull apathy or also a concealed moral stance which does not accept but obeys and obeys only brutal force, but also a fictitious knowledge, traditional and official, alien, and imposed by fatalism? Was this the reason for the suddenness, the instantaneousness of conversion to the other extreme: “Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless.” Without sense means without mercy. It was a special rebellious mercilessness which revealed a concealed weakness within the most powerful authority and which questioned the success of any effort at civilization unless it made some sense and contributed to the independence of the mind, and if it opposed the organization of a **society of individuals**.

The civilization of the upper crust and a static nation are one side of the coin. What about the other? Is it possible, in addition to the authorities, together with the empire to civilize “rebellion?” Would it be possible with an enlightened “rebellion” once again to open a window to Europe? If not, is there any other solution? In other words: could all of Russia become (and remain) a society of individuals?... We should look again into the origins of yet another surprise: the direct conversion of the post-Decembrist despair and quest into “Russian socialism.” If we abandon the temptation of reducing it to the Russian economy, apparently mercilessly leading to a bourgeois system and, respectively to the classical struggle between classes, what does this become? A filiation of ideas or the latest oriental trend in the West? Is this a groundlessness, which is feverishly seeking grounds, resorting to this effect to extreme words and actions?

This is an old and endlessly renewed dispute. Essentially, the arguments remain the same, again and again sharpened by the circumstances. I shall allow myself a single remark of a methodological nature. It applies, above all, to the supporters of “ordinary Marxism.” I believe, however, that it would be of importance also to the opponents who proclaim the primacy or total independence of the spirit and the total independence of historical events from any laws and regulations. I mean by this not general principles but our truly puzzling case. Our “black box,” is the **Russia of impossibilities**. Is there a key to it?

The “key” is related to a system, and the system is related to schematism but there is no solution. Schematizing is better but necessary; it is only the adjustment that is dangerous and inadmissible. The difference between the two is almost imperceptible yet it is basic. Do we notice, in this case as well, that we are trying to prove something which silently presumes that it has been proven even before we begin our study? Namely, a coincidence between the grounds for the universal process and the economic, “material” civilization and the “world of commodities,” as well as the ubiquitousness of divisions and conflicts, inconceivable without it. This question has two parts. On the one hand, does unity of thought stipulate unity of history, the unity of historical destinies, and does the second reflect in the first? This may seem a meaningless question. Actually, is this not the reason for which the migrating spirit can cross any border? Is it not the reason for which it finds itself at home anywhere and in any “home” it assumes a specific aspect (developed or embryonic, compressed or moving, caused by invasions from the outside or the “temporary” triumph of domestic routine) affecting those same principles and postulates which ensure universal-historical advancement?

Naturally, ideas are not indifferent to circumstances (nor are circumstances indifferent to ideas). The vulgar sociologist forgets the “feedback,” while we do not. We know, in particular, that the present and even the past of the world may become its future, and that this local

future will, naturally, not be a simple repetition. Adaptation is a two-sided matter. It not only renovates but also turns back; it not only generates sharp critics of the "future in the past," but also gives birth to monsters of simplification and of streamlining the past at the expense of man and humanity. Ideas are not simply a passive element in such clashes which, the closer they are to our time, the harsher and broader they are. Does contemporary materialistic awareness have the right to classify all of this as an exception to the law without sacrificing, along with the facts, its own support of determinism? It is easy to write that exceptions are a symptom of the existence of a broader law; the specific must be greater than the general, not only because it has many more colors, it is more whimsical and more "alive." It is also superior in terms of its **opposition to the general**, and this opposition in history is substantially different from a situation relative to "pure" knowledge. In the latter case we have a clash between minds and characters whereas here we also have clashes among nations, states, social asymmetries, and "voices of the blood;" here we find a clash between the superior morality of the brain and the lower "gene," and any historical theory which refuses to include all of this within its subject becomes a mute weapon of the dominant passions and people. Our case was precisely of this kind, although for many reasons it is difficult to acknowledge this and even more difficult to understand it. It is difficult to acknowledge that generality and universality are not identical concepts but are even opposites; progress is only one of the components, one of the "vectors" of human evolution. That which remains outside of it, which has been brought to life by it, which has brought it into motion and has mastered it and opposed it (including, and even more so, also as a result of assimilation and "application") is no less important in such evolution than its "universal-historical progress." Let us abstract ourselves from it; some people abstract themselves with words and others with bombs and tanks; some try to dull the sharpness of the question of philanthropy while others promote an impatience, which is equally just and blind. There also is the "possibility" of saying the following: that is no concern of mine. However, the earth is too small to hide behind in the face of unpleasant truths or from something which is as yet become the truth or which could become the truth (should it succeed...). Meanwhile, this is a question without answer; it is precisely within it that we find the competition among the different "vectors" of human evolution and, particularly, the material nature of opposition to "material" progress (there has never been any other type of progress), a progress born of the new European civilization with all of its pros and cons which defined the limits of that civilization and its borders not only in space but also in time.

The opposition born of its global expansion and occurring within it pertains to the cons. However, this is only on the surface. The material nature of this opposition may or may not look like progress. This is, nonetheless, another type of "matter." It is both more physical and

more spiritual. It is closer to the earth. It is the material nature of billions of people and of individuals and there is nothing more tragic than the interrelationship between these extremes, their cohabitation and clashes, quite different in terms of aspect and nature, from the classical struggle among classes (which does not make it any more peaceful or any less significant in terms of its impact on universal destinies). This is a con from which a new pro develops. It is a critique of the foundations of history, productive to the extent to which it criticizes itself. Could those who seek a solution by bypassing it find it?

I dare to claim that the inscription on the entrance reads: Russia. In the broadest possible meaning of the term, covering all of its centuries and concentrated within a few decades of the 19th century; the sharpest challenge to progress is that of Nikolay Pavlovich, who lays a claim to the role of master of Europe. The first question without answer, the first outline of the pro is foggy but expressed with an incredibly motivating power: Chaadayev's "Philosophical Letters." He himself, embodying a question without an answer, a madman avoided by virtually all other madmen, and still not rehabilitated by the state.... Twenty years later Herten, from whose head and heart came out that which started "Russian socialism," "from this bank of the river," was to write (arguing but, in fact, saying good-bye to his Moscow friends): "Show this to Petr Yakovlevich, and he would say, 'yes, I shaped him, he is my pupil.' Ten years later, in arguing with Herten and his young supporters, Chernyshevskiy would summon as his ally the author of the "Apology of a Madman." Could it be that the title of this last work by Chaadayev, as though his justification, was addressed to his contemporaries or, over their heads, to us?

From Chaadayev, across the entire 19th century, there is one thought, one general idea: there is no other possibility for Russia to become part of mankind other than by "undertaking the education of all mankind." **Not to repeat but to begin.** This is for its own sake but, nonetheless, not ignoring the "foreign" pages which are not simply instructive but also mandatory, for we find in them the foundations of development: continuity through negation and through the criticism of history itself. Chaadayev could not see how the problem he formulated could be resolved. Could one "learn" how to criticize history if there was no history? Could one begin a history where there was no incentive to criticize or the custom to do so? This was a magic circle which, however, was being broken, initially by "outside" and "unnecessary" people and, subsequently, by the moral Raznochintsy. "This was a change from a circle to motion. From isolation to an environment: it was an embryonic society within the social and political organism, which did not recognize any ties other than those based on the power and returning to it. It was an endless series of clashes: the link between the power and the people and between people and history. These were ever new gaps in time. Historical Russia was moving ahead through defeats. In 1850 Herten wrote to Moisey Hess (at that time a supporter of Marx): "In Russia we are suffering

only from infantile underdevelopment and material need. However, the future belongs to us." Again he said: "...There is no future, for it is made by people and unless we continue to rot in our backwardness, perhaps out of Russia will, in fact, come out the Avortement. This is our cause, our vocation."

What a striking inconsistency: the future belongs to us and yet there is no future. But how straight and revealing is this antinomy, without even the slightest effort to avoid it. That is the way Russian tradition in criticizing history was developing. History clashed with tradition, expelling it not only from the outside but also from within and, ever more frequently, from within. From the "Apology of a Madman" to the apology of vocation, to the apology of the soil and the spirit and the action, and to the statism of the soil and the vocation, the spirit and the action, the future and the past. The clashes were taking place on new grounds and the expansion of such grounds made the clashes fiercer.

This goes on through the entire 19th century and into the 20, from isolated individuals to millions of people and from millions of people to isolated individuals. Is it not strange: Lenin alone? Leading alone, alone with his own questions to which, once again, there is no answer. Estimating the chances of restraining rushing postrevolutionary Russia: the chances of Russia remaining within the world, retaining the revolution in Russia, doubly retaining something which (he understood) would not happen unless there was a development on the grounds of civilization. Through the NEP, turning back to the thought of the "two ways," trying to reorganize it within the as yet untried model of revolutionary reformism and socialist gradualism (in the Russian and Western versions). Again, relying in his predictions on the East, on India, China, "and so on," whose progress (he was convinced) "had definitively taken the path of the general European capitalist scale." Asking, himself and others, the question: had the "general line... of world history" changed after October, without answering directly but clearly tending to answer in the negative. No, it had not changed. General and world history were one and the same. There simply could be no other history, it was not allowed to be different. Had it been or become different he too would have had to become different. It was too late for that. It was too late for him. As far as the others were concerned, those who were close to or not so close to him, was it still too early for that?!

Departing is a huge topic. The departure of people who have left their mark on history, who were not indifferent to history. Long after them would follow something which is by no means necessary. Frequently there would be a rejection, there would be an aftermath, a certain simulation and, even more frequently, a rejection, both subconscious and deliberate; a rejection—imitation and rejection—is a murder but that too is considered an extension, and not only the consideration but the fictitiousness becomes reality in which instead of dogmata and rage there is imitation and reverence. Obviously,

there is a very fierce law: the true continuators are not the direct heirs. The French Revolution continued throughout Europe (and not only in Europe), while France was paying for its "leap" by falling behind those who were rushing ahead, converting its "liberty, equality and fraternity" into technology, into fixed capital, into the skill of machine toil, factory legislation, the triumphant march of the "universal equivalent" and experimental knowledge. Is it all that simple to glimpse behind this the continuation of the agony of the Jacobins, the groundless projects of Saint-Just, or the blood of Baboeuf? Thermidor is, naturally, not the equivalent of progress but nor is it a contradiction of progress. If we agree with the fact that there are different types of progress (types, degrees and forms), we should then acknowledge that there also are different "Thermidors." At that point the most vital question is the following: Who converts the thrust of history into a new standard, a new daily occurrence, a new "conservatism," and if so how?

This topic is one of the most important to Lenin as he leaves the scene. "Shall we be able to complete our immediate project or not?" What if not? He asked that question. He was not entirely sure. Perhaps he doubted.... In the final pages of this "logical story," as in the past, characters are preceded by concepts and the final Leninist view reminds us of that of Herten: "We must surrender what is most precious if we realize that it is not true...."

After more than half a century, we can barely see any cracks in the dynamics of the thought. To penetrate in depth, to cleanse both the upper and lower parts from "simplistic views" is perhaps even more difficult than to penetrate, through a medieval palimpsest into the initial text. Is it astounding that the true object of thought remains a deeply held secret, although this "subject" is no longer filed in the special archives but is open to all? The hieroglyphs—the words in the final dictations, fragments, have not been put together. Have they not been combined or are they impossible to combine? What prevented him: Was it the lack of conditions for the implementation of the new, his own, mixed "NEP Russia," or a prerequisite for its birth, as a form and prerequisite for a **universal-general** development? Could it be that it was both: both a premature nature and a monistic prohibition, as well as unyielding evil of the days which passed, one after another, filled with concern, the old concerns which had accompanied him throughout his entire life (would the doctrinaires of bourgeois democracy and supporters of concessions for the sake of a radical principle not ease the revolutionary pressure?), as well as entirely new concerns which grew out of the uncompromising nature of the age and were embodied in the people in power, the new Jacobins, to whom no change was possible other than through the masses and the state and the masses within the state (until that cherished moment when it would "wither away" having emptied itself of all its meaning)?

Marx's world, consolidated within an organization and revolutionary power "for a time," was this not the lever which Archimedes needed? Was this not a lever which moved everyone from his well settled place? Now, however, in whose hands would it fall, how would it be handled? These were no cracks in the dynamics of the mind but seeming failures, bridges invisible on the outside. The unity of those 50 years (or else a hundred years, does this make all that much of a difference?), which were to change both him and the unity of human development, existed without breaks, outside the visible chain of strictly consistent transformations. Once again, we ask ourselves: Why? Was it because life had retreated? Because that was not the right time? Would this right time come, not a time of self-Thermidor but an entirely new Thermidor, Marx's anti-world and Lenin's anti-Russia?

"Genius comes in anticipation of benefits and angrily avenges its departure." Can we agree today with this conciliatory and hopeless code of Pasternak's "Superior Disease?" Supporters of extreme views would be the least likely to agree. To some, reality is something that happened, identical to hope. Others will accept neither a "genius" nor the concealed idea of fate. They feel closer to guilt, in the literal and figurative sense. Furthermore, what kind of "faith" could exist in the rational 20th century? Is this a figure of eloquence or avoidance of responsibility? Is it the punishing hand of Nemesis? Today the saying of a prison inmate sounds simpler and more accurate: God waits a long time but strikes hard.

Nonetheless, we have fate! We have the fate of the ancients and the Shakespeare. We have the fate which dooms those who have stepped over the threshold of the ideal concept, those who swim against the current. The anachronism of concepts only shades the depth of the phenomenon, a phenomenon in which we find interwoven the great and the banal, the inertia first gained by the people and its peculiar turns (in speech and in people!). Will the renovated power, the calendar "future" cope with it, will it cope other than by "organizing the eternal meaning of man?"

One yesterday we could say that he who believes that this phenomenon, proclaimed by Russia in our century (and not by Russia alone) is neither mandatory nor universal, should explain its randomness as well. Today we can no longer limit ourselves to this, clearly not only because the suggested explanations do not satisfy us. The explanations themselves have become part of contemporary history; their "insufficiency" triggers, in turn, new clashes, forming a closed circle from which, it seems, there is no way out. The past is not leaving us, for we cannot find a place for it and it may be merely located in a still existing dogmatism, which is not retreating, or else in the overt or semihidden apologetics; there is no place for it in the tried areas of classical awareness. The notorious "zig-zag" or the broken up "backwardness" of Russia do not fit even the Procrustean bed. Will one of the greatest tragedies of the world end once and for all in a regional pasture?

The disagreement between ideas and facts is related to the phenomenon itself. The understanding of the world is different from the world. This is not the first time, but is it the last? That is the entire matter.

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Debate on Matters of Principle

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[Review by Anatolii Aleksandrovich Slinko, professor at the Voronezh State Pedagogical Institute; review of the letters of V.G. Korolenko to A.V. Lunacharskiy; reprinted from the journal PODYEM No 8, 1988, Voronezh]

[Text]

1

The six letters which V.G. Korolenko wrote to A.V. Lunacharskiy in 1920, and which were published abroad in 1922,¹ have not been closely studied by Soviet historiography and, to this day, are most frequently perceived only as proofs of the ideological limitations of the great writer, who had made a negative assessment of the October Revolution and the political system based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Views have already been expressed by contemporary scientists, however, which indicate the need to take a closer look at the last articles by this writer whose entire life was spent, in words and deeds, in the defense of the ideals of democracy and humanism. As justly assessed by Yu.A. Andreyev, Korolenko's attitude toward the October Revolution clearly reveals a similarity with the views held by M. Gorkiy.² Another researcher has quite aptly noted that "some encyclopedic works and special articles about V.G. Korolenko bypass the question of his political views in the period of the October Revolution and Civil War, or else do not present them quite accurately."³ This applies not only to "encyclopedic works." Indeed, the most authoritative studies of V.G. Korolenko (the best among them, in our view, remains the monograph by G.A. Byaliy⁴) do not even try to give us a detailed idea of Korolenko's evolution in his views in relation to the course of the socialist revolution and the Civil War in Russia.

Like many personalities in the Russian radical intelligentsia, who were close to the "people's socialists," "social revolutionaries," and Mensheviks, and like many noted members of the international social democratic movement, Korolenko unconditionally condemned the October Revolution, describing it as an "adventure."⁵ In his letter to A.V. Lunacharskiy, which was a response to the uprising in Petrograd (Korolenko knew him well as a literary worker and author of the critical study "*What Does V.G. Korolenko Teach Us. On the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of His Literary Activities*"⁶), the writer

emphasizes as a characteristic symptom M. Gorkiy's alienation from the event which had just taken place: "People like Gorkiy are leaving while people like Yasinskiy are coming. I congratulate you, former writer and now minister-commissar, citizen Lunacharskiy, with this symbolic change."⁷ The meaning of this statement becomes entirely clear if we take into consideration that to Korolenko Gorkiy was the conscience of Russian literature and one of its acknowledged authorities, while I. Yasinskiy was the "old reptile," always ready to grovel at the feet of the authorities.

No more than 3 years passed between the first open letter to A.V. Lunacharskiy, which was written in 1917, and the six written in 1920. However, in terms of their significance, these 3 years exceed an entire epoch of peaceful "gradual" development. From a rejection of the Soviet system, Korolenko came to its de facto recognition, acknowledging that in Russia there was no alternative to cooperating with the new political order which, however, in a number of respects, as in the past, triggered the writer's opposition. From total rejection to discussion was the path covered by the writer in his assessment of the Soviet government. It was as though this path fit into Lenin's prediction voiced as early as in one of his 1918 articles: "Facts are stubborn things, says an English proverb. In the past few months we have had to experience the type of facts which indicate the greatest possible upheaval in world history. These facts are forcing the petit bourgeois democrats in Russia, despite their hatred of Bolshevism, which appeared in the course of our internal party struggle, to turn from hostility to Bolshevism initially to neutrality and, subsequently, to its support. The objective circumstances which had particularly sharply repelled from us such patriotic democrats, have vanished. Global objective circumstances have come which force them to take our side."⁸

Unquestionably, Korolenko was one of those "patriotic democrats" we mentioned, although he felt no "hatred of Bolshevism," caused by the "history of intraparty struggle." His ideological sympathies were with the Russian peasant democracy ("the masters of the minds" to this writer were N.G. Chernyshevskiy and N.K. Mikhaylovskiy, and the latter more so than the former⁹, being politically close to the N.S. the "popular socialists," who were the imitators of Russian Populism. However, as early as the turn of the 20th century, Korolenko had held a "special" view of Marxism, without any exaggerations or polemical hatred, assessing it as an influential trend in the Russian liberation movement.¹⁰ It was no accident that during the revolution the writer felt close to the petit bourgeois trend within the Russian social democratic movement ("almost a Menshevik," as Lenin defined him). Even before the October Revolution, not without respect although with critical stipulations, Korolenko had acknowledged the relevance and consistency of the Bolshevik platform without, actually, understanding it in its entirety. "Bolsheviks, Bolsheviks!" he wrote to A.G. Gornfeld on 29 August 1917. "In their own crazy way they are consistent. Actually, everyone is a Bolshevik

only without that kind of lunatic persistency. Everyone is in favor of a revolution, a "bourgeois" revolution, naturally, providing that it is social. No one can reject it...."¹¹ Korolenko clearly realized the unfinished nature of the bourgeois-democratic revolution which had failed to solve the "social problem." However, he feared political dictatorship and violence as possible results of the intensifying process: "It is from such a background that Napoleon came to be" (145). At a sharp turn in history he condemned the antagonism among parties which were previously opposing the tsarist regime, as being a way which led to terror: "On top of all else, terror is practiced by both sides. Some kind of malicious spiders killing each other. What would be the use of murdering Lenin? Actually, even an attempt on his life would be problematical. However, it would be stupid on the part of Chernov to threaten with terror. Generally speaking, I considered him more intelligent than that" (149).

Living in Poltava during the period of the Civil War, Korolenko had the opportunity to see in action many political forces which claimed to replace the Soviet system. As an observant and truthful writer, he could not fail to notice their total groundlessness. His letters to Gornfeld contain a devastating characterization of the temporary "masters" of the Ukraine. "There is no rule whatsoever other, naturally, than that of the German," he wrote in describing the period of "Getman" domination. "Everywhere we have 'restoration,' with former 'officials with special assignments,' crawling out of nowhere.... All meetings of workers are already being banned, a persecution of trade unions is being initiated, and so on. I do not expect anything good to come out of this" (154-155). His description of the Denikin rule was even more devastating: "Last year we were ruled by the Denikin forces which introduced 'order.' Entering Poltava, they spent 3 days plundering the Jews and, before leaving, they organized a slaughter unparalleled even in our Jewish-hating countries. People were shot to death without trial, and there were other scandalous happenings. Personally, I had to deal with the chief of 'counter-intelligence.' He turned out to be a former policeman with all typical police mannerisms.... In general, from that side we can expect nothing other than savage reaction" (173). "It is the opposite of utopia" (176). Such was the assessment of the writer of the ideological underlining of the Denikin movement. During the Civil War period the idea of the inadmissibility of foreign intervention in Russian affairs runs throughout Korolenko's correspondence. "Here we think of the allies with no particular enthusiasm," he wrote at the start of 1919. "Obviously, we must live through that disease without outside operatives, while the 'volunteers,' seem to be bringing with them the darkest possible reaction" (165). Korolenko firmly opposed the suggestions of Peshekhonov and Myakotin to publish RUSSKOYE BOGATSTVO in Odessa, which was occupied by the French (see 165-169). In May 1920 he affirmed his position: "In general, I increasingly support the idea that Russia must suffer through its misfortunes and errors by itself, without outside supervision" (179). In another

letter, that same year, he wrote: "I have no faith in the 'generals,' or in the Entente.... I already saw what the Denikin people are like. I do not believe that the Vranghel people would be very different, although I have not seen them yet. Furthermore, it is being said, the Poles are already killing the Jews, which is one of the characteristics of the failure to pass a civic test" (189).

The course of the Civil War in Russia led Korolenko to the need to acknowledge the Soviet system and to engage in a dialogue with it as the only real political force. At the very start of the Civil War he tried to provide an objective assessment of the new system: "In our area the Bolsheviks are doing a great many stupid things although they are not being as savage as they could.... For the time being, it seems, they have not shot to kill anyone. However, the petit bourgeois is frightened and the statements made by the Bolsheviks are quite frightening...." (164). In 1920, despite his disagreement with some principles and actions of the Soviet system, Korolenko acknowledges that it is enjoying the support of the working people. "In our area? What can I tell you?..." he turned to his correspondent. "I tell Bolsheviks I know that they know how to make a proper entry. They immediately put an end to plunder and killings. This was what happened here again. In general, we feel this time a certain moderation and greater calm. However... once again we are in an emergency situation. It is true that so far there have been no executions without trials and, in general, so far it is only two looting Red Army men who were sentenced to be shot. In my view, however, we are living on top of a volcano. Communism is triggering among the population a general hatred but... is nonetheless winning the elections. This says a great deal...." (p 177). Nonetheless, Korolenko's statements confirm the unconditional rejection of the economic principles of "war communism:" "Hunger is appearing here as well.... What is more likely is that a purely utopian policy cannot bring anything good. The destruction of the entire economic system is being pursued at a fast clip. In such cases Sunday or Saturday work will not help" (174). However, a critical approach to the economic policy of the Bolsheviks does not exclude hope in his assessment of the immediate future: "Perhaps, finally, the situation will eventually be realized even by the rulers whom, nonetheless, I see to be the Bolsheviks" (174). The previous year a sharp turn had been taken toward the new economic policy, and Korolenko pointed out that "a great deal of effort and stress will be necessary to acknowledge one's errors and, if possible, to correct them. However, this the most desirable. Whether this will be possible the future will show, a future in which I may no longer anticipate. Yet, I would be very curious to see it" (179).

In proclaiming that he was acknowledging the socialist ideal as the only one worthy of mankind, Korolenko himself tried to earmark the principles on the basis of which he was close to or differed from the new system: "...I consider myself a socialist quite sincerely and warmly. I do not consider myself either a Bolshevik or a

communist, or even a Menshevik or a "popular socialist," as do our comrades. I consider myself a socialist in the sense that I acknowledge that freedom without social justice is incomplete and unattainable. To me, however, freedom is a necessary prerequisite for social justice rather than the opposite, as is the case with communism today" (188).

These were the main points of the arguments which were included in the six letters to A.V. Lunacharskiy.

2

The reason for writing to the people's commissar of education of Soviet Russia was the latter's visit to Poltava and the writer's interceding for the people arrested by the Cheka. The activities of the extraordinary commissions, in general, were condemned by Korolenko in principle. Punishment without a trial, on an administrative basis, had been very rare even under tsarism: "During that time and after it a large number of incredible scandals took place but even then it had not been openly acknowledged that it was permissible to gather in the hands of a single investigative authority the right to pass sentences (including the death penalty. The activities of the Bolsheviks extraordinary investigative commissions are an example which is perhaps unique in the history of civilized nations."¹² The police administrations did not have the right to execute people: "Your extraordinary authorities have this right and use it with horrifying freedom and ease" (36).

However, the activities of the Cheka were only one of the questions raised by the writer. The destruction of production facilities and the inefficiency of coercion in economics, the maximalism displayed by the new system and the moral unpreparedness of the masses were all reduced to a single situation which faced Lenin and his fellow workers as well as their opponents, who included Korolenko: a socialist revolution in a relatively backward semi-Asiatic peasant country. The indirect yet nonetheless obvious conclusion runs through Korolenko's considerations: even the most radical revolution cannot fail to adopt the coloring of the environment in which it is made. In the case of socialism "many prerequisites are needed, such as political freedom, education, the development of new social fabrics on the old grounds, and increasing changes in institutions and in human mores" (12). Russia was still far from providing such conditions. It was no accident that the hope that the revolution in Russia would stimulate a revolutionary explosion in the more developed European countries and a reliance on a global revolution and the founding of a worldwide republic of soviets proved to be illusory. "The visit of a delegation of British workers," Korolenko noted, "ended with a bitter letter which Lenin sent them, displaying his coolness and disappointment. Meanwhile, from the East, the Soviet republic is receiving warm congratulations.... Whenever you decide clearly to imagine for yourself the picture of these strange Oriental meetings on the squares before the Mosques, where

itinerary dervishes call upon their audience, kneeling on their rugs, to wage a holy war on the Europeans, combined with greetings to the Russian Soviet republic, you would hardly be able to say that it is a question of progress as understood by Marx and Engels.... It is rather the opposite: Asia is responding to what it feels in you to be close to it, to what is Asiatic" (13, 14).

By conceiving of Russia above all as a peasant country, truly ignorant of basic civil rights or political freedoms (although, in a limited sense, having reached a bourgeois-democratic level), and in a period of a few months transformed from autocracy to a communist government and from a dictatorship by the nobility to a dictatorship by the proletariat, Korolenko notes the inevitable cost of such a conversion. Capitalism, as the Marxist had justifiably pointed out as early as the end of the 19th century in their polemics with the Populists, cannot be reduced merely to the parasitism of the bourgeois and exploitation and "coupon clipping." To the other semifeudal countries, to which Russia belongs, capitalism had certain positive consequences. It taught a more progressive organization of production. "In absolutely the same way as the lie of the dictatorship by the nobility," Korolenko wrote, "which substituted in the class consciousness of the peasantry the concepts of parasitism and drunkenness, your formula replaced it with the role of the production organizer: the concept of the poor organizer is one exclusively of a plunderer.... Tactically, you found it to your advantage to increase the people's hatred of capitalism and to set the popular masses against Russian capitalism, the way a combat detachment is set to attack a fortress.... You captured the fortress and left it to be plundered. You only forgot that this fortress is the property of the people, achieved through a "beneficial process," and that the machinery developed by Russian capitalism has a great deal which could be improved upon and developed further, rather than destroyed.... By saying this, I do not mean exclusively material values in terms of the factories and plants, machine and railroads created by capitalism but also the new processes and skills, the new social structure which you, Marxists, had in mind yourselves by proving the beneficial nature of the 'capitalist stage'" (20-21). According to the writer, "the true victory of the social revolution, if it were destined to take place, would be not to destroy the capitalist production apparatus but to master it and make it work on the basis of new principles" (22).

Korolenko harshly criticized not only the economic doctrine of "war communism," which had brought about the wrecking of the production process and the violation of the "natural trade relations" between town and country, replacing them with the artificial steps of "coerced alienation." He believed that the positive, albeit class limited, experience of bourgeois democracy should not be ignored in the political and legal relations of the newly established system. In converting from the present to the future, here as well "not everything should be subject to destruction and routing" (23). In the view of the writer, the establishment of the principles of

freedom of thought, speech, assembly and press, which took shape in the age of bourgeois-democratic revolutions, were not simple "bourgeois prejudices," but "a necessary tool for the distant future, a kind of palladium, achieved by mankind after a long and fruitful struggle and progress" (23). The development of socialism is impossible without the development of democracy. The rejection of these principles in a country which has essentially never known even a bourgeois democracy and has not experienced those principles through its own history could become a major obstacle to the development of the socialist awareness and moral standards of the people. The very rejection of democratic freedoms in a country which experienced many centuries of political despotism and knows nothing better falls on fertile grounds: "It is only we, who never knew in full such freedoms and did not learn how to use them, together with the people, only we can proclaim them 'bourgeois prejudices,' which are only hindering the cause of justice" (23). The very ease of the conversion from one variety of dictatorship to another (although qualitatively opposite, claiming to express the will of the majority) is a symptom of a civic underdevelopment of the masses, for which reason it would be an arrogant illusion to believe that the Russian people can take the vanguard position in world progress: "This is your tremendous error which, again and again, reminds us of the Slavophilic myth of our 'God-anointed people,' and, to an even greater extent, our national fable about Ivanushka who, without learning any science had outstripped all sciences and who could do everything without effort, if so ordered by a fish. The very ease with which you are able to lead the popular masses indicates not our readiness to adopt a socialist system but, conversely, the immaturity of our people" (23-24). Not every rejection of the habits of bourgeois society marks a readiness for socialism (see 25); the absence of such habits only facilitated the beginning of the process but will have an inevitable adverse effect on its expansion and development, unless the Russian people learn democracy. "You may assume in all likelihood," Korolenko wrote, "that I love our people no less than any Bolshevik; you may also assume that I proved this throughout my entire life, which is now nearing its end.... However, I love our people not blindly, as an environment suitable for one experiment or another, but as they are in reality.... In terms of character and natural gifts our people are no worse than the best people in the world, which makes me love them. However, they are far behind in the development of a moral standard.... We are as yet to go through a lengthy and harsh learning. You are speaking of communism. You do not mention the fact that communism is still something unshaped and indefinite and that so far you have not made clear what you understand by it, for a social change in that direction needs **different mores**" (26-27).

Korolenko tried to provide his own explanation concerning the revival of bureaucratism under the new system: "In the past it was recognized that Russia was autocratically governed by the tsar. However, the moment the

will of this poor autocrat would somewhat disagree with the intentions of the ruling bureaucracy, the latter had thousands of ways to force the autocrat to obey. Is the present "dictator" not subject, poor devil, to the same? How do you find out and manifest his will? There is no free press or free voting in our country" (34).

Korolenko concentrated his main ideas in his address to the Soviet government in his sixth and final letter. He accused the new system of maximalism and the hasty aspiration to squeeze the complex process of the reality of life in the Procrustean bed of theoretical schemes: "Your scheme has totally suppressed the imagination. You have no clear idea of how complex reality is.... You are only the mathematicians of socialism with its logic and schematics" (37-38). The writer repeatedly went back to his idea: "...You lightheartedly undertook your schematic experimentation in the hope that this will merely be a signal for a universal maximalist revolution. You yourselves should already see that you were wrong.... Working Europe will not follow your way and Russia, which has become accustomed to obeying any kind of oppression, having failed to convey a way of expressing its true opinion, is forced to follow this sad and dark way in total isolation" (42).

Recalling the conclusion of the utopian socialists to the effect that mankind should transform itself before eliminating ownership and converting to a communist way of life, Korolenko cautioned against the immediate and coercive application of the principles of communism in an unprepared social environment; he cautioned against the barracks structure of society and the simple and rigid solution of complex social and moral problems: "In general, the process of this distribution which you have undertaken to promote so lightheartedly, is a process of long and difficult preparation of 'objective and subjective conditions' which require the full stressing of general activity and, above all, freedom. It is only such activities and freedom to engage in all kinds of experiments that would indicate what can withstand the criticism of practical life and what is doomed to perish" (43). The coercive application of "immediate" "hasty" communism is an obstruction and hindrance on the way to real socialism, the implementation of which, according to the writer, "is the most vital task of our time" (44). Quoting a clever Ukrainian peasant, who said that "...the trouble is that the human hand is so made that it is easier for man to grab than to see," which expressed a skeptical attitude toward the socialist ideals, Korolenko pointed out that "naturally, it is not a question of hands but of hearts. The hearts must be transformed. In order to do so, we must begin by changing the institutions. In turns, this requires freedom of thought and creative initiatives leading to new forms of life. To restrain such activities within society and the people is a crime committed by our recently deposed government. However, another equally severe crime is to impose by force new forms of life, the advantages of which have not been realized as yet by the people and with which the people can not

become familiar as yet through their own creative experience. You too should be blamed for this. You have replaced instincts with orders and you are waiting for the people's nature to change by your order. There will be retribution for such an encroachment on the freedom of self-determination of the people" (44-45).

The socialist restructuring of society is blocked above all by the moral unpreparedness and backwardness of the masses, which is fraught with most painful manifestations and consequences for the future: "...A people which has still not learned how to master the machinery of the vote, which is unable to formulate a prevalent opinion, which undertakes the structure of social justice through individual plunder (you are plundering what was plundered), and which is beginning to form the kingdom of justice by allowing mass thoughtless executions, which have gone on for years, such a people is still far from assuming the leadership of the best aspirations of mankind. It must first learn itself before it can teach others.

"You defeated the volunteers, Denikin, Yudenich, Kolchak and the Poles and will probably defeat Vrangal as well. Possibly, the armed intervention of the Entente will also end in your victory: this would trigger in the people a spirit of patriotism which you vainly tried to kill for the sake of internationalism, forgetting that the idea of fatherland remains the highest achievement on the path of mankind toward unity, a unity which, probably, will be achieved only through the unification of the fatherland. In short, you are winning on all fronts without noticing the internal ills which makes you helpless in the face of nature".... (46-47).

"A nation deserves the type of government it has." In recalling this ancient truth, Korolenko believed that "war communism" is a refraction of the slavish features of the people's awareness, developed in the past: "...You were the natural representatives of the Russian people, with their habit of arbitrariness and naive expectations that "everything will be done immediately," and with the absence of even embryos of sensible organization and creativity" (48-90).

The writer fully admits that the leaders of the Soviet state are able to realize the critical nature of the existing situation and to revise the way of the country's economic and political development. In his view, one should not fear the democratization of political life: "It would be normal for the country to have in it represented all shades of thought, even the most extreme and unreasonable ones. Live struggle blocks decay and transforms even unreasonable aspirations into a kind of inoculation: that which seems unreasonable and harmful for a given period frequently protects forces to be used in the future" (48). According to Yu.A. Andreyev, the writer detects "great perspicacity,"¹³ by suggesting to the Bolsheviks, 1 year prior to the introduction of the NEP, "to take in hand the healthy reaction in order to be able to master it and to restrain the unhealthy, savage and unreasonable reaction" (47). In addressing himself to the

Soviet government through A.V. Lunacharskiy, Korolenko displays a considerable amount of historical optimism: "...The real beneficial miracle would be for you, finally, to realize that you are alone, not only within European socialism, but also in the already initiated withdrawal away from you of your own worker environment, not to mention the positive hatred felt by the countryside toward your communism, to realize this and abandon the fatal path of violence. However, this must be done honestly and in full. Perhaps you still have sufficient strength to take a new direction. You must frankly admit the errors you made along with your own people. The main one is that you have eliminated a great deal of features of the capitalist system prematurely and that a possible standard of socialism can be applied **only in a free country.**

"Governments fall because of lies... and perhaps there is still time to go back to the truth. I am confident that the people, who have blindly followed the path of coercion, will follow, with a happy awakened awareness, the path of return to freedom" (49)

3

The idea of the development of democracy as a prerequisite for the successful progress of society toward socialism, which is so relevant today, was the most important component of Korolenko's humanistic concepts. The strong and weak sides of this concept become clear in comparing it with the doctrine of revolutionary humanism as expressed in the post-October articles written by V.I. Lenin. An effort to make such a comparison may be found in the book by Yu.A. Andreyev, which we mentioned. To begin with, however, such an attempt could hardly be considered sufficiently full and exhaustive. Secondly, it does not suitably take into consideration the dialectics of Lenin's mind and its dynamics, based on revolutionary practice.

Above all, we cannot fail to see that the views shown by Lenin and Korolenko on the historical prerequisites for revolution in Russia, and the conditions of backwardness and political and moral underdevelopment coincide in some essential aspects. Furthermore, Lenin formulated these features even more sharply and harshly. "In a number of very essential aspects," Lenin wrote 5 years before the revolution, "Russia is unquestionably an Asian country, one of the wildest, most medieval and shamefully backward Asian countries" (21, 401). Variations of this viewpoint are repeatedly found in Lenin's post-October writings. Feeling the natural pride in the working class and working people in Russia, who made the first victorious socialist revolution in the world, Lenin retained the high enthusiasm of party and national self-criticism in evaluating the political and moral standards of the masses, acknowledging that their present levels are creating tremendous difficulties in the course of the revolutionary process. "The more backward a country is," he pointed out at the 7th Extraordinary Congress of the RKP(b), "a country which was forced, by

virtue of the vicissitudes of history, to start a socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for that country to convert from the old capitalist to socialist relations" (36, 5-6). He pursues this thought as follows: "Anyone who considered the economic prerequisites for a socialist revolution in Europe could not fail clearly to realize that it would be immeasurably more difficult to start a revolution in Europe and immeasurably easier to start it in our country, but also that it would be more difficult to pursue it in our country" (36, 10). Lenin repeatedly returned to this idea: "I have already had the opportunity to repeat frequently that, compared to the progressive countries, it was easier for the Russians to initiate a great proletarian revolution, but it will be more difficult for them to pursue it, and take it to its final victory, in the sense of the complete organization of a socialist society" (38, 306). In his report to the Moscow Guberniya Conference of Plant Committees on 23 July 1918, Lenin emphasized that "...We take into consideration that the progressive role played by the Russian proletariat in the global labor movement cannot be explained in terms of the country's economic development but precisely through its opposite: Russia's backwardness, and the inability of the so-called domestic bourgeoisie to cope with the tremendous tasks related to the war and to ending it, tasks which motivated the proletariat to seize the political power and establish its own class dictatorship" (36, 529).

That is why Lenin was far from the aspiration to impose the "Russian variant" of a socialist revolution to the rest of the world: "It would be ridiculous to present our revolution as some kind of ideal for all countries and to imagine that it had made a series of brilliant discoveries and introduced a cluster of socialist innovations. I have never heard anyone say this, and I claim that we shall never hear it from anyone. We have practical experience in taking the initial steps for the destruction of capitalism in a country in which there is a particular correlation between the proletariat and the peasantry. Nothing else. If we were to puff up like frogs, we would become ridiculous throughout the world and will be looked at as simple braggarts" (38, 180).

Lenin did not overestimate in the least the qualities of the Russian national character, for which reason any attempt to impose a communist ideology (Lenin's views are, unquestionably, the most adequate in expressing such an ideology) or the Slavophilic thought of the "God-chosen people," upon the Russian people as the "chosen" people in the matter of a socialist change, would look strange and even comical. "It is important not only to initiate," Lenin wrote, "but also to withstand and this is something that our Russians do not know how to do.... Here is a feature of the Russian character: if nothing is brought to its conclusion, without urging a Russian to apply his entire strength, he immediately slackens" (41, 144). "Russians are poor workers compared to the progressive nations" (36, 189) are words which need no comment. "We know how small is in Russia the stratum of progressive and conscientious

workers" (36, 369), Lenin pointed out soon after the revolution. "We took over from Tsarist Russia what was the worst, bureaucratism and Oblomovism, which is literally strangling us, and were unable to take what was **sensible**" (44, 398) he later emphasized. Practical activities frequently made it necessary to recall the "...Accursed habit of Russian Oblomovs to put everything and everyone to sleep" (53, 160). Lenin used the term "truly Russian" in describing bureaucratism and bribery as phenomena which paralleled political and moral life in revolutionary Russia and which passed into the Soviet machinery. Bureaucratism triggered Lenin's particular concern and ire: "In our country any project carried out by all economic authorities suffers from bureaucratism more than from anything else. The communists have turned into bureaucrats. If anything would doom us it would be that" (54, 180); "our worst internal enemy is the bureaucrat..." (45, 15). V.I. Lenin did not separate party and national self-criticism from a feeling of national dignity. They are manifestations of the conscience and honor of the Russian communist to whom truth stands above party and national ambitions.

The main distinction between the views held by Lenin and Korolenko was that Lenin had profound faith in the creative and transforming power of the socialist revolution, in the fact that the revolutionary process, as it involves into active political life millions of people, stimulates the conversion of the entire society to a higher political and moral standard, i.e., that it contributes to the "transformation of the heart" which Korolenko believed to be a necessary prerequisite for the success of the initiated social experiment.

It cannot be said that Lenin's views on the revolutionary process remained unchanged after October 1917. Unquestionably, reality made its own corrections. The belief that "the future belongs to the establishment of a Soviet system throughout the world" (40, 146) was replaced by a statement on "the dragging out of the socialist revolution throughout the world" (42, 21) and the admission that "the revolution in Europe did not develop as did our revolution" (42, 314). Confidence that the young generation "will live in a communist society in 10 to 20 years" (41, 318) was corrected with a more cautious prognosis: "We know that today we cannot introduce a socialist order. God willing, under our children or, perhaps, grandchildren, such a system will be established in our country" (39, 380). As we know, the idea of converting to socialism as taking an entire age is emphasized in one of Lenin's final works, his famous article "On the Cooperative" (45; 372, 376). However, there is something permanent in Lenin's view: the concept of revolutionary optimism. From his viewpoint, the lack of culture and civilization made exceptionally difficult the intensification of the revolutionary process and hinders progress toward socialism, imposing a particular responsibility upon those who are in the vanguard of the movement, but by no means making it impossible. "In order to create socialism, you say, we need civilization," Lenin wrote in one of his last works.

"Very well. But why could we not begin by developing the type of prerequisites for civilization in our country such as expelling the landowners and exiling the Russian capitalists and only then initiate a movement toward socialism? In what little booklets have you read that such switches in the customary historical order are either inadmissible or impossible?" (45, 381).

Lenin's political philosophy—a philosophy of action—called for a constant testing of theory through practice, a constant search, a constituent part of which was a revision of concepts which had not confirmed their accuracy.

Lenin objected with angry irony to those who blamed the Soviet system for having destroyed the production process without replacing it with something else: "We are accused of destructions as a result of our revolution.... Who are the accusers? The lackeys of the bourgeoisie, that same bourgeoisie which, in 4 years of imperialist war, destroyed virtually all European culture, brought Europe to a level of barbarism, savagery and hunger. That same bourgeoisie now demands of us to make a revolution not on the basis of such destructions and not among the wreckage of culture, the wreckage and ruins created by the war, and not with people who had turned into savages as a result of the war. Oh, how humane and just this bourgeoisie is!" (37, 59)

Lenin's formulation of the problems of the significance of the cooperative, state capitalism, concessions, conversion from allotments to tax-in-kind and, finally, the new economic policy as a whole, are all facts which hardly prove that the role of the bourgeoisie as production organizer had been ignored. "...We must learn socialism from the biggest organizers of capitalism" (36, 137). Lenin expressed this thought immediately after the revolution. Immediately after the end of the Civil War he emphasized that although "war communism" was necessary, it was a temporary, a forced step (see 46, 220). Grave errors were made in that case: "...We were wrong by deciding to undertake the immediate conversion to a system of communist production and distribution" (44, 157).

Let us note yet another statement by the head of the Soviet government opposing forced standardization, equalization and insufficient consideration of local conditions: "...Such a huge agrarian country with poor railroads, endless space, different climates, different agricultural conditions, and so on, inevitably presumes a certain freedom of trade for the local population and local industry on a local scale. In this respect we have sinned a great deal by going too far: we have gone too far toward the nationalization of trade and industry and closing down local commerce. Was this an error? Unquestionably, it was.

"In this respect we did a great deal which was simply wrong and it would be the greatest of crimes not to see or realize the fact that we failed to show, we did not know how to show moderation" (43, 63). This fact "should not be concealed in our agitation and propaganda" (43, 64).

Least of all were dogmatism, mental ossification or claim to infallibility and the final truth inherent in Lenin: "We must clearly consider as lost communists who may imagine that a universal-historical 'undertaking,' such as completing the foundations of a socialist economy (particularly in a country with a petty peasantry) could be accomplished without errors, retreats and repeated corrections of unfinished or improperly carried out projects. Those communists who have not perished (and, most likely, will not perish) are the ones who do not allow themselves to fall into illusions or depressions, who preserve the strength and flexibility of the organism for 'starting all over again' in approaching this most difficult task" (44, 418). And, as though wishing to develop this idea further, he said that "we must not conceal our errors from the enemy. Anyone who fears this is not a revolutionary" (44, 33).

It would be an extreme oversimplification to blame Lenin for failure to understand or estimate accurately the relatively progressive nature of capitalism in production organization, compared to previous social systems, or for a lack of aspiration to make use of positive experience in the organization of the economy, as developed by capitalism. "We must take the entire knowledge left by capitalism...." is a thought expressed by Lenin, which is considered by social scientists today. In calling for mistrust and skepticism toward those who blab excessively and all too frequently about things such as, for instance, "proletarian culture," Lenin emphasized in one of his last articles that "...we could start with the actually existing bourgeois culture and, to begin with, do without the particularly extreme types of culture of the prebourgeois order, i.e., the standards of an officialdom or serfdom, and so on" (45, 389).

One of the main accusations leveled by Korolenko against the Soviet government is that of suppressing democratic freedoms and considering the freedom of assembly, speech and press as nothing but bourgeois prejudices. Lenin's articles, which reflected the course of the revolution and the Civil War in Russia, prove that here as well the writer, judging the events on the basis of humanistic positions, had an inaccurate and insufficiently profound concept of both the theoretical ideas and practical activities of his opponents.

"The development of democracy to the end, and finding the necessary forms for such a development, testing them in practice, and so on, are all among the structural tasks in the struggle for a social revolution" (33, 79) was the way Lenin conceived, on the eve of the socialist revolution, the intensification of the revolutionary process in Russia. Nor did he forget this principle under the conditions of the Civil War, which marked an unparalleled intensification and fierceness of the class struggle.

Thus, in defining the policy toward the peasantry, Lenin emphasized: "...We must learn from the peasants the means of converting to a better system and we must not dare to give orders! Such is the rule we have set

ourselves" (38, 201). He further said that "our decrees on peasant farming are basically correct.... However, if the decrees are correct it is improper to impose them on the peasant by force" (38, 202). Let us point out that, being a convinced supporter of the development of socialist relations in the countryside, Lenin nonetheless remained a sober realist in the practical solution of this problem: "The problem of the kolkhozes is not the next on the agenda. I know that kolkhozes are still so poorly organized and in such a pitiful condition that they justify being described as an almshouse.... We must rely on the private peasant who will not change in the immediate future, and we should not dream of a conversion to socialism and collectivization" (42; 180, 181).

It is common knowledge that during the time of the October Revolution the Bolsheviks did not reject cooperation with the left-wing petit-bourgeois parties. They displayed loyalty and tolerance even toward the enemy and it was only the white terror unleashed by the counterrevolution that forced them to resort to retaliatory steps: "After the revolution of 25 October (7 November) 1917, we did not close down even the bourgeois press and there was not even a question of any terror. We freed not only many of Kerenskiy's ministers but also Krasnov, who had fought against us. It was only after the exploiters, i.e., the capitalists, began to develop their opposition that we undertook systematically to suppress it, including the use of terror" (39, 113-114). This "bloody path," as Lenin pointed out, was "imposed upon the Soviet system (see 38, 261) and under these circumstances repeating general truths about democratic freedoms looked like "burning' marsh gas" (see 44, 83) and a way to conceal counterrevolutionary actions: "I have always said that parliamentarianism is splendid but that these are not times for parliamentarianism" (38, 294). Naturally, in that situation Korolenko's views were sharply criticized by Lenin (see 51, 48). General statements proclaiming the principles of democracy, freedom and equality had been debased, trampled into the mud by the Russian counterrevolution. "In the South, the peasants were ready to curse the Bolsheviks," Lenin wrote. "However, when Denikin approached, shrieking about democracy (since it is not only Mensheviks and S.R. who are shrieking about it, for this word can be found in each line of Denikin's newspaper), the peasants started fighting him, quickly realizing, from personal experience, that whipping and plunder were hiding behind beautiful words" (39, 88). What the Denikin system was in practice was perfectly well known to Korolenko as well. The experience of the Civil War led Lenin to the idea of the inevitability of revolutionary violence under the existing circumstances: "Without revolutionary violence aimed at the open enemies of the workers and peasants the opposition of the... exploiters cannot be crushed" (40, 117). What is characteristic, however, is that even at that time Lenin raised the question of limiting the violence: "This terror has been imposed upon us by the terrorism of the Entente, the terrorism of universal-powerful capitalism, which has strangled and is strangling and sentencing to hungry

death workers and peasants for fighting for the freedom of their country. Each step in our victories over this prime reason and cause of terror will inevitably and invariably be paralleled by the fact that in our administration we shall avoid this by using the means of persuasion and influence" (39, 404-405). Acknowledging violence triggered by the interests of defending the revolution, "a revolution is worth something only if it is able to defend itself..." (37, 122) Lenin always remembered that socialism is the opponent of coercing people in principle. "Socialism is against exerting violence over nations. This is unquestionable," he noted in his polemics with Kautskiy. "Socialism is in general against exerting violence over people. However, other than the christian anarchists and the Tolstoyans, no one has as yet drawn the conclusion that socialism is against revolutionary violence" (37, 296).

Let us point out that the justice of forced violence, aimed against the oppressors, was defended by Korolenko precisely in his arguments against Tolstoyanism in the 1880s, in his outstanding story "The Legend of Flora, Agrippa and Menachem, Son of Yehuda," which was highly rated by A.V. Lunacharskiy as early as 1903: "Peace cannot be bought with anything other than struggle. Such is the meaning of this beautiful 'Legend of Flora,'... The representatives of the predatory principle are armed to the teeth and if those who support the aspiration toward harmony act like peaceful sheep, goodbye freedom and human dignity! The morality dictated by nature is as distant from the morality of slaves, as is the earth from the sky."¹⁴

As to the activities of the extraordinary commissions, unquestionably, Lenin considered them an efficient way of defending the revolution and as revolutionary violence in answer to the violent actions of the enemies of the revolution. This does not mean in the least that he was always pleased with the activities of these commissions in the local areas. He was particular concerned by reports on the activities of the Cheka precisely in the Ukraine, where events which had triggered Korolenko's appeal to Lunacharskiy had taken place. "Kamenev says, and proclaims," Lenin wrote to M.I. Latsis, "that several noted Chekists assert that in the Ukraine the Cheka has brought a great deal of evil"... (50, 338). At the peak of the Civil War Lenin supported the suggestion of F.E. Dzerzhinskiy, the head of the VChK, of abolishing the death penalty: "As to the basic steps in our domestic policy which, in the past 2 months may be singled out to a greater or lesser extent among the current projects, particularly important is the following resolution which must be ratified by the VTsIK. It is a resolution on abolishing abolition of the death penalty. You know that immediately after the main victory over Denikin, after Rostov was captured, Comrade Dzerzhinskiy, the head of the VChK and of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, submitted a motion to the Sovnarkom and implemented it in his own department, abolishing any death penalty which depended on the Cheka" (40, 100).

The problem of the development of democracy in the Soviet state faced Lenin from the very first days of the revolution and became particularly pressing immediately following the end of the Civil War. Repeatedly confirming that our state is one suffering from bureaucratic distortion, Lenin emphasized that "when we are being told about the insufficient promotion of democracy, we say: this is absolutely accurate. Yes, it has not been promoted in our country sufficiently. In this respect we need both help and instructions on how to promote it. We must undertake its true promotion rather than talk about it" (43, 38).

4

The unique social experiment in the restructuring of society on a socialist basis, initiated by the Great October Revolution, could not as yet provide a clear idea of the features of real socialism: it required exploration, thinking, testing, repetitions and practical tests. "We cannot describe socialism," Lenin wrote in 1918. "We do not know, we cannot say what type of socialism there will be and when will its finished forms be attained" (36, 65). It was entirely clear, however, that as he earmarked the outlines of the future social organization, Lenin was convinced that socialism was inconceivable without the extensive development of democracy and without asserting the principle of democratic centralism.

The "Letter To the Congress," Lenin's final address to the party, is imbued with a concerned premonition of the consequences which could occur as a result of insufficient democracy on the higher power echelons.

As we know, a reserve and incentive for building socialism, such as the development and intensification of democracy, was not applied in full. This fact could hardly be considered as fatally inevitable, explained by the characteristics of the patriarchal awareness, lack of democratic traditions and institutions in previous Russian history, and the general lack of culture and civilization, although all of them created certain prerequisites leading to the establishment of an administrative-bureaucratic style in the management of the party and the country. If the measures stipulated by Lenin, aimed at surmounting bureaucratism and promoting the democratization of Soviet society, starting with the party, had been implemented, and had Lenin headed the revolutionary transformation for yet another 10 to 15 years, unquestionably the process of cooperativization and socialist restructuring in the country would have been more flexible and there would have been no violations of socialist legality, culminated by the blood orgy of 1937-1938.

Korolenko's thought of democratization as a prerequisite for the fruitful development of socialist society does not essentially contradict but is in harmony with even earlier thoughts expressed by Lenin. However, this was a Leninist concept which was fructified by revolutionary

practice and was more profound, more efficient and more dialectical. This thought becomes particularly relevant in the new round of history, at its present stage.

In speaking at the meeting with representatives of the French public, M.S. Gorbachev noted: "We may be asking why was it that previously, at various stages, the processes of perfecting Soviet society failed. Soviet society advanced during that entire time. However, it was unable to reach a higher standard in the sense of social, political, cultural and scientific and technical progress. Why did initiatives, major initiatives, fail? Such was the case before and after the war, particularly after the 20th Congress, for at that time a great effort was made. However, it was not brought to completion, but stopped midway. Why did this happen? We are quite concerned with this question, for that is precisely why we must study history, so that we may extract from it certain lessons. The main lesson is that the processes which were initiated in the past and the efforts at reform in the political, economic and social areas were not backed by the expansion and development of democracy and by involving within these processes the working people themselves, the entire society, through the mechanisms of democracy. This was the main reason for failures in the past."

The democratic renovation of Soviet society is a major structural component and powerful instrument of its perestroika.

The age of democratic renovation of the land of the soviets makes us read and reinterpret in a new way the honest and courageous words of V.G. Korolenko, the great Russian writer, and see in these words, which are the actual testament of the writer, not only the limitations of abstract humanism and bourgeois-democratic illusions but also a kernel of truth without the acknowledgment of which the development and advancement of socialism is impossible.

Footnotes

1. V.G. Korolenko. "Shest Pisem k Lunacharskomu" [Six Letters to Lunacharskiy]. SOVREMENNYE ZAPISKI, vol 9, pp 3-49 (Korolenko's letters to Lunacharskiy were published in NOVYY MIR No 10, 1988, from another source—editors).

2. See Yu.A. Andreyev. "Revolutsiya i Literatura" [Revolution and Literature], Moscow, 1975, p 60.

3. Yu.M. Gamretskiy. "Intelligentsia and Revolution in the Ukraine." In the book "Intelligentsiya i Revolyutsiya XX Vek" [Intelligentsia and Revolution in the 20th Century]. Moscow, 1985, p 189.

4. G.A. Balyy. "Korolenko." Leningrad, 1983.

5. Quoted from "Intelligentsiya..." p 189.

6. OBRAZOVANIYE, No 9. St. Petersburg, 1903. On Lunacharskiy's attitude toward Korolenko see Yu.P. Demin. "A.V. Lunacharskiy on V.G. Korolenko." In the book "V.G. Korolenko i Russkaya Literatura" [V.G. Korolenko and Russian Literature]. Perm, 1987, pp 53-59.

7. Vladimir Korolenko. "The Triumph of the Victors," RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, No 265, 3 December 1917.

8. V.I. Lenin. "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 37, p 191. Subsequent references to said edition will list volume and page only.

9. See, among others, V.G. Korolenko, "Sobr. Soch. v 10-ti Tomakh" [Collected Works in Ten Volumes]. Moscow, 1955, vol 8 p 65; V.G. Korolenko, "Land, Land!" (Observations, Thoughts, Notes). GOLOS MINUV-SHEGO, No 1, 1922, pp24, 28.

10. See, for instance, Note 9: vol 10, p 244.

11. "Pisma V.G. Korolenko k A.G. Gornfeldu" [V.G. Korolenko's Letters to A.G. Gornfeld], Leningrad, 1924, p 145. Subsequent references to this edition given in the text.

12. See Note 1, vol 9, p 5. Subsequent references to this edition given in the text.

13. Yu.V. Andreyev, op. cit., p 60.

14. A. Lunacharskiy. "What Does V.G. Korolenko Teach?" On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of his literary activities. OBRAZOVANIYE, No 9, St. Petersburg, 1903, pp 140-141.

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Security and Cost Effectiveness

18020006r Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 18, Dec 88 (signed to press 5 Dec 88) pp 115-119

[Article by Igor Yevgeniyevich Malashenko, candidate of philosophical sciences, scientific secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute; reprinted from the journal VEK XX I MIR No 5, 1988]

[Text] In most countries problems of security and foreign policy are the focal point of sharp ideological and political debates, in the course of which the "upper strata" try to maintain the official course in the face of criticism coming from a variety of sides. This state of affairs did not appear accidentally: However irritating to policy makers statements in the press and by the public may occasionally be, such discussions help to develop alternate approaches and to avoid a number of errors and blunders.

Strange though it may seem, the invitation of the "higher ups" extended to our press to join in the debate on foreign policy problems has remained virtually unanswered. Naturally, this is largely the result of the lack of tradition in having such debates. Furthermore, many are those who tend nervously to look at foreign countries, where any "unorthodox" viewpoint voiced in the USSR is usually described as a symptom of changes in official position, a "signal" addressed at one country or another or at some circles within that country, and so on.

Nonetheless, I doubt that under the conditions of the fast development of glasnost, which is destroying the customary canons, such obstacles could play a decisive role. The reason is found rather in the fact that we tend to consider problems of ensuring security and safeguarding the foreign policy interests of the country as distinct from problems of internal development, as a separate and somewhat mysterious "thing within itself."

However, we are well familiar with Lenin's thought that it is unscientific to separate foreign policy from politics in general. This is not a purely theoretical matter. It follows from it that the foreign activities of the state must be directly related to the tasks of the overall development of society. Yet, as was pointed out at a meeting of the aktiv of Soviet diplomatic workers in June 1987, the foreign service "has been fulfilling its obligations alienated from the basic vital interests of the country. This, precisely, is true departmentalism, when the function of foreign policy becomes self-seeking."

I think that many people feel that there is nothing detrimental in such "self-seeking." For could there be any more important objective than that of ensuring the security of our country in the international arena, an objective which is the focal point of our foreign and military policy? For a number of years it seemed to us that in order to solve the problem of security it would suffice to protect our country from an external threat, and that we had proved our readiness to pay any price for the solution of this problem. This is entirely natural, taking into consideration the tragic experience of our history. However, in this case we overlooked the fact that problems were accumulating in society—economic, social and national—which, in the long run, were truly capable of weakening our security, for in the final account, this security is based on a dynamically developing socialist social system.

The solution of the problems which accumulated in our society requires the mobilization of all resources which we no longer can waste thoughtlessly. The country must not incur additional expenditures caused by the need to maintain its defense capability and protect its legitimate foreign policy interests. In listing our options and suggesting solutions and recommendations, we must compare material outlays as well, and the anti-outlay principle must also be applied in politics.

Naturally, in this area the respective departments could accomplish a great deal, but not everything. It would not be entirely fair to charge the ministries engaged in maintaining defense capability and securing the country's foreign policy interests with the exclusive responsibility for having adopted a departmental approach to such problems.

The diplomatic service and the Armed Forces are inseparable parts of our society, which reflect both our successes and problems. Departmentalism is an inevitable offspring of the omnipotent Administrative System which developed in our society. If administrative-bureaucratic management methods have "suppressed" economic methods, and if there is no developed system of democratic procedures in the country, such as to enable us to balance the interests of the individual departments, each one of them would inevitably begin to consider its own assignments as self-seeking targets. If such is the case, all departments would try to increase outlays in their own area, considered as being the most important. The intrinsic feature of the Administrative System is not only departmentalism but also the outlay approach to the economy and even an entire outlay philosophy.

If a society invests billions of rubles in the latest "project of the century," by this very token or, as logicians say, by definition, this project becomes the embodiment of the supreme wisdom and the question of its actual social usefulness is simply not raised. The cost of such an approach is huge: Hypnotized by building huge hydroelectric power plants, society as a whole (ignoring individual protests) somehow did not consider the millions of hectares of fertile land flooded, the ecological problems which were thus created, and so on. However, the implementation of such plans was backed by the interests of very definite departments, as was particularly clearly manifested in the course of the debates on the project of "turning" the northern rivers, when several ministries and other organizations desperately tried to present their own interests as those of society.

First of all, we must honestly look at our problems in all areas, and realistically assess the interests of all departments. It is unlikely, for example, that any one of our ministries has been able to avoid the departmental approach, for which reason we should not think that Minenergo, for instance, is trapped by departmental interests, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense have been able to avoid this in its entirety.

Furthermore, can we trust that they have never acted on the basis of the outlay principle in ensuring the security of our country? The outlay approach to the development of industry which, for decades, followed the extensive way, led to the fact that the cost of unused production capacities exceeds 100 billion rubles. Is it possible that, based on the same principle, we may have created some unnecessary armament systems?

This is not a stretched-out parallel, for in the defense sector of our economy the laws of the Administrative System operate in their purest variety. Furthermore, in the prewar years this system was largely created for the sake of securing the country's reliable defense potential and ensuring the accelerated development of the defense industry.

The tank (along with the tractor) became one of the symbols of the country's industrialization, a subject of our pride, even before the war. "The armor is strong and our tanks are fast...." At the start of the war these words had a bitter taste: At the very dawn of its existence the Administrative System was breaking down and errors became apparent in the training of the Armed Forces, caused, according to B. Vannikov, the former people's commissar of armaments and, subsequently, people's commissar of ammunition, by "amateurish superficiality." Nonetheless, the huge outlays for the creation of a war industry were recovered a hundred fold in the course of the war: One of the components of our victory was the fact that we outstripped Germany in the production of basic types of weapons—guns, aircraft and tanks. We remembered this well.

We also mastered a long time ago the fact that the more capital investments we make in heavy industry, for example, and, correspondingly, the more coal we mine, smelt steel and produce tractors, the stronger our economy becomes. And does it not seem to us occasionally that the more tanks we have the more inviolable our borders become? But in that case we are essentially basing everything on the notorious "gross output," which is an inevitable companion of the outlay approach. For example, we produce more tractors than the United States by a factor of 6-7. However, we are short of tractors, for a significant percentage of the tractor fleet is idling for a variety of reasons. Therefore, from a symbol of successful industrialization, alas, sometimes the tractor turns into proof of the inability of the Administrative System to adapt to the true contemporary needs of the national economy.

Our ill-wishers in the West have converted the tank into a symbol of the "Soviet threat," tirelessly speaking of our "tank superiority." We know that a great deal of such fears are a put on. However, are we certain that the outlay principle here as well has not played a malicious joke on us? For it is recognized in the West that many Soviet tanks are of obsolete models. Naturally, this is good, for we are thus able to moderate fears caused by the "threat from the East." Perhaps, however, we should ask ourselves whether we should not give up some part of our obsolete military ordnance which, possibly, is simply supporting the "gross indicators?" Today our industry urgently faces the task of getting rid of the old equipment (its operational life in our country is one of the longest in the world). Do our military not face a similar problem? We know that, compared to the Warsaw Pact, NATO has a much greater number of antitank weapons. Naturally,

each side makes its own choice. Yet antitank armaments are much less expensive than tanks. Therefore, is it practical to emphasize the more expensive weapon?

The cost of the outlay approach becomes particularly noticeable when discussing nuclear weapons. In the prenuclear world it is only quantitatively and qualitatively equal forces on either side that could balance each other. Correspondingly, increasing such forces could, in principle, provide one of the sides with greater security. The situation radically changed in the nuclear missile age, when the growth of nuclear arsenals in itself is no longer capable of providing greater security. For in today's circumstances, each side has retained the ability to destroy the opposite society and thus to prevent it from attacking.

There is no doubt that even the most limited nuclear war in Europe would be a catastrophe of unparalleled size. This does not apply to nuclear war alone. Under circumstances in which about 200 reactors of nuclear power plants are located on the European continent, any war would turn Europe into at least something resembling the environs of Chernobyl.

Yet in the European part of our country we had deployed 243 units of RSD-10 alone, carrying more than 700 warheads. Naturally, this deployment was based on an entire system of arguments and clear military logic. However, was there no logic also in the plan of "turning around" the northern rivers?

The point is that today, increasingly, securing safety becomes not a military-technical but a political problem. This entails the need to take as a basis precisely political considerations in making any decision in this area (how, for example, would another society react to our actions? And, consequently, would our actions harm our own interests?). We have clearly underestimated political factors. There is nothing astounding in this.

If ensuring security is, so to say, a departmental task, how could we rest assured that it would be solved as a political problem? An open democratic debate is needed in order to consider the entire variety of political factors and, above all, to determine what is consistent and what is inconsistent with the social interest. As a result, in formulating a decision, we would be able to rely not exclusively on a departmental viewpoint.

If society is able to discuss economic problems openly and with unquestionable usefulness to itself, why should it not engage in an equally fruitful discussion of the ways and means of ensuring its own safety? As we are increasingly becoming convinced, these are interrelated problems. Would we have deployed such a large number of our medium-range missiles had we not been influenced by the outlay approach and the magic of gross indicators? Conversely, are we not inflicting additional costs to our economy as a result of the departmental approach adopted to problems of security?

The fact that according to the INF Treaty we shall have to reduce a larger number of weapons than the Americans triggered a certain concern among some Soviet people, despite authoritative explanations provided by the experts to the effect that there were no reasons for such concern. This, however, is not astounding, for it is based on the following customary logic: If we reduce more weapons on the basis of the "gross approach," our security becomes, respectively, "lesser" than the American.

Naturally, gaining a universal awareness of the realities of the nuclear missile age will demand some time. Awaiting us, we hope, are new agreements and, above all, the agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive armaments. Should such an agreement be enacted, happily the United States would have to reduce a larger number of warheads than we.

Nonetheless, the security of the United States would not suffer in the least, anymore than would ours as a result of the INF Treaty.

Problems will appear however, I believe, in this connection as well. Why, for example, are all Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) classified, as in the past, with American designations? This is an extension of the story of the RSD-10, which, for many years, was known only by its American designation of SS-20? Yet, honestly speaking, we are fed up with describing our missiles with names invented by the CIA, anymore than we were willing, in the past, to rely on published foreign data on the condition of our economy.

The following question is worth asking: Why do the Americans have six types of strategic missiles while we have 13? Is this rational? Any person familiar with a similar problem in industry would say that this means a drastic increase in the cost of technical services, higher expenditures for training the personnel, and so on. I am reminded of this, for example, when I go into the Moscow subway with its different models and modifications of escalators, which confuses even experienced repair workers. I do realize that a missile is not an escalator but, obviously, this makes the cost of the system even higher.

Our party set the task of being guided in ensuring the country's safety by the principle of sensible sufficiency. In addition to everything else, this means the use of the anti-outlay approach to maintaining our defense capability on the proper level. To achieve this, however, we must begin by understanding where and when in the past we violated this principle. Naturally, a defense economy is a very special item which does not always duplicate the development of the economy as a whole. This makes it even more important to determine the laws on the basis of which it operates. Should it turn out that the parallels drawn up in this article are wrong, this could only please us. It would mean that in the past as well some of our

departments had been able to avoid the cost of maintaining the Administrative System and the outlay approach. In that case, this experience would be made available to our entire society.

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Chronicle

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[Text] A KOMMUNIST delegation visited Italy on the invitation of the editors of the journal RINASCITA, the political and theoretical organ of the Italian Communist Party. Meetings were held with the leaderships of the provincial committees of the Italian Communist Party in Lombardy and Liguria and the Italian Communist Party federations in Milan, Genoa and Florence. Problems relative to perestroika in the CPSU and Soviet society and the preparations by the Italian communists for their 18th congress were discussed in an atmosphere of total openness and comradely reciprocal understanding. The delegation was given the opportunity to attend a discussion of the draft pre-congress document at a party meeting. In Genoa KOMMUNIST representatives participated in a public debate on "Gorbachev and the New Course in the USSR."

The heads of the organization of stevedores in Genoa took the delegation on a tour of one of the largest ports in the Mediterranean. An interested discussion was held here on the role of the cooperative movement and ways of upgrading labor productivity and ensuring the social protection of the working people. The delegation visited the municipalities of Milan and Florence, where exchanges of views were held on the content and forms of democracy and on the political reform in the Soviet Union.

KOMMUNIST personnel met with their colleagues in the editorial premises of the newspapers CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Milan and XIX SECOLO in Genoa. An extensive and frank discussion was held on the role of the mass information media in the life of contemporary society, glasnost and work standards in the press.

In a discussion with the management of the Credito Italiano Bank, problems of the economic reform in the USSR, the significance and forms of international economic cooperation and its role in strengthening reciprocal understanding, trust and improving the political atmosphere in Europe, were discussed.

A discussion was held at the political studies department of the University of Florence on organizing and strengthening contacts between Italian and Soviet social scientists and the possibility for a broader acquaintanceship among scientists and students and postgraduate students with life in both countries.

The work trends of the journals RINASCITA and KOMMUNIST were discussed in a warm and friendly atmosphere at the RINASCITA editorial premises in Rome. The participants in the meeting exchanged views on the role of the printed word in the life of their respective communist parties and the problems which arise in connection with the pace of contemporary life and the need to pay constant and proper attention to our time and on work forms under the conditions of perestroika in the CPSU and preparations for the 18th Congress of the Italian Communist Party. The belief was expressed of the need for close cooperation between the journals and exchange of views on topical problems of the theory and practice of party life.

The KOMMUNIST delegation was received by Antonio Rubbi, head of the international department of the Italian Communist Party Central Committee.

In accordance with the plan for interparty cooperation a delegation of the journal NOVO VREME, the theoretical organ of the BCP Central Committee, is visiting the Soviet Union, headed by T. Yordanov, deputy responsible editor, and Z. Stoyanov, member of the editorial collegium. At a meeting in the editorial premises, an exchange of views was held on problems of the further intensification of cooperation between the two fraternal publications. In the course of their visit to the Latvian SSR, the Bulgarian journalists met with representatives of the republic's mass information media. The Bulgarian delegation was received by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

Rene Moje Moscuera, secretary general of the Ecuadoran Communist Party Central Committee, visited the editorial premises. Problems of the shaping of a contemporary concept of socialism and the renovation of its ideology, triggered by perestroika, and the new processes occurring in the international arena, were discussed in the

course of a comradely talk. The guest described the struggle waged by communists and all left-wing forces in Ecuador for a democratic alternative.

Problems of democratization of social and party life, the economic reform and foreign policy were discussed at a meeting between readers and contributors from the All-Union State Library for Foreign Literature and representatives of KOMMUNIST.

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