


JPRS-EER-90-032
15 MARCH 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

East Europe

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

**Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited**

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

19980204 007

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

East Europe

JPRS-EER-90-032

CONTENTS

15 MARCH 1990

POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Draft of People's Party's Program [*LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE 20 Jan*] 1

HUNGARY

- National List of Major Party Candidates [*NEPSZABADSAG 10 Feb*] 5

YUGOSLAVIA

- Noted Defense Lawyer Cites Shortcomings in Legal System [*START 11 Nov*] 19

MILITARY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- SPIEGEL Series on GDR State Security Service [*Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 5, 12, 19 Feb*] 31

POLAND

- Military Armaments Plants Manager on Cuts in Orders, Restructuring
[*ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI 29 Dec-1 Jan*] 50

ECONOMIC

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Economic Outlook for 1990 Summarized [*HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 8 Dec*] 53
Long-Term Prospects for Agriculture Viewed [*Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN 14 Feb*] 55
Financial, Legal Aspects of Contract Agriculture Viewed [*ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY 4 Jan*] 56

HUNGARY

- Bankruptcy Liquidation, Reorganization Situation Discussed [*FIGYELO 4 Jan*] 58
SZDSZ Issues 'Program For Changing Regimes' [*HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 20 Jan*] 59

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Draft of People's Party's Program

90EC0273A Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech
20 Jan 90 pp 3, 6

[Text]

Draft of Czechoslovak People's Party Program

The Czechoslovak People's Party is a free, independent political party with its own clearly defined ideological and political program. It is one of the political forces with equal rights in the independent democratic Czechoslovak State.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is a historic Czech political party, with roots in the proven traditions of the Czech nation, built on the foundations of the social-Christian movement.

The Czechoslovak People's Party mindful of its responsibility to the people of this country, considers it its right and its duty to follow up on everything positive it has achieved in its past, and to contribute above all by an infusion of Christian values to the moral, political, economic, social and cultural rebirth of the entire society, to multiply the good in it.

The Czechoslovak People's Party wants to become a modern, active, and creative political force in a pluralistic democratic system.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is convinced that only free peoples can be happy, and that only real freedom ensures the development of human creativity and an all-inclusive progress of society.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is a Christian party:

- that starts with the premise that Christians have the duty to participate in public life and bear co-responsibility for the development of society. It enables its members to engage actively in public affairs, and thus it effectively contributes to the realization of the general good;
- that proceeds in its program and all its activities on the basis of the Christian world view and presents to citizens the Christian way of understanding today's world, society, and man's mission;
- that joins together in an ecumenical spirit Christians of all Christian denominations as entities having equal rights. But it does not shut itself off to other citizens of the Christian way of thinking, whose personal life is in harmony with the moral values of Christian principles, so long as they identify themselves with the program of the Czechoslovak People's Party;
- that scientifically analyzes and generalizes the requirements of believing citizens, with the goal of applying them in the creation and implementation of state policy, in creating legal norms, and in creating a pluralistic democratic society;

- that creates its own Christian special-interest associations and clubs, including youth and women's organizations;
- that cooperates with other Christian and democratic parties within the state as well as abroad; and
- that is the party of all Christians and in that sense is nondenominational. By being nondenominational, it gives equal status to all its members regardless of their membership in any particular church or religious society.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is a democratic party.

- In its own activities it follows democratic principles, and adheres to them unfailingly;
- in its relationship to the state it promotes full internal democracy in the political as well as economic sphere;
- it opposes on principle and absolutely totalitarianism in any form;
- it promotes the maintenance and broadening of the freedom of conscience, belief, speech, press, assembly, freedom of entrepreneurship, scientific research, political association, and electoral and other freedoms, as they are formulated in the Treaty on Human Rights;
- it acts and cooperates with the Civic Forum and all democratic political forces in society on principles of equal rights, tolerance, and mutual respect;
- its goal is that the renewal of democracy in society would enable citizens to elect in free elections the party they trust. Only in a democratic environment can political parties be an effective barrier against the abuse of political and economic power.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is a non-socialist party:

- Its ideological base consists in a spiritual, and not a materialistic understanding of the world;
- it proceeds from the fact that socialism took the ideals of good, justice, and equality from Christianity and proclaimed them, but did not succeed in fulfilling them in societal practice;
- it rejects force, revolution, and class struggle as a means for achieving any goal whatsoever;
- it chooses the way of evolution and social reform to ensure the well-being of all citizens and to create a just society;
- it rejects collective anonymity in which personal responsibility and the creativity of an individual are lost.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is a participant in forming governmental structures.

- As one of the historical political parties it has long been the co-creator of our political system;
- it consistently promotes the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and the creation of a reliably functioning system of checks and balances;
- it shares in the planning and control of our state policies [in a way] commensurate with its strength;
- it shares effectively in creating the structure of the agencies of state power and administration.

The basic orientation and approach of the Czechoslovak Peoples' Party to solving the most important questions of society's life

The Czechoslovak People's Party bases its approach and its own activities on Christian principles, which are motivated primarily by:

- respect for everything that was created,
- Christian love for one's fellow man, and
- love for one's country.

1. Man and Society

Life is a sacred gift and the highest form of God's creative plan is man.

Therefore the Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- the legal and physical protection of life; it rejects abortion, euthanasia, and the death sentence;
- the full spiritual development of every individual and his creative abilities, and respect for man as a unique, one-lifetime being;
- the creation of equitable necessary conditions for a happy, content life for the people in our country; and
- understanding work for society as the basic dimension of the existence of man in his creative process, fulfilling the Creator's purpose.

2. The Family

The basic unit of society is the family, in the spiritual, moral, biological, economic, and social sense.

The family creates an irreplaceable environment for a natural, healthy, and happy development of the human personality.

Therefore, the Czechoslovak People's Party stands for these principles:

- Entry into marriage with a full realization that it is a permanent union, to which both partners must commit themselves at all times. To achieve a harmonious life together of which the natural fulfillment and pinnacle of happiness is the creation and gift of a new life, the partners must consistently deepen mutual understanding, tolerance, and the ability to forgive;
- acceptance of any newly created life with love, respect, and joy, and the emphatic rejection of any intervention aimed at ending that life,
- regard of the family as a community of love, in which character traits are formed, mental abilities are developed, and the relation of man to society is molded; and
- creating such economic conditions for the family that would enable the mother to devote herself fully to her natural role—bringing up the children and creating a loving, serene family environment.

For that reason, the Czechoslovak People's Party is endeavoring to introduce an equalizing contribution to mothers up to the 6th year of age of her last child (so-called family payment);

- to legally and socially strengthen and stabilize the role of the family and to plan effective help for families with a greater number of children; and
- to bring up young people to enter marriage with greater responsibility, and to strengthen the moral and esthetic upbringing of youth.

3. School, Upbringing, Education

The Czechoslovak People's Party strives to increase the general educational level of the nation in harmony with its cultural traditions.

To this end, the entire system of upbringing and education must be fundamentally re-evaluated and effectively modified.

The school system must support the development of the personality of each individual according to his intelligence and abilities.

For those reasons, teachers, too, must express themselves as personalities, and guide students toward love, truth, nation, country, and truthful history. The basic task of education is to prepare young people in the best way possible to apply themselves in life according to their talents and interests.

Therefore, the Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- absolute freedom and tolerance in expressing a world view in schools and educational establishments, and respect for the right of the parents to determine the ideological orientation of their children;
- presenting in schools an all-around, objective, comprehensive, and truthful overview of our past, including the cultural contribution and influence of Christianity;
- providing students access to all understandable philosophies;
- strengthening and developing in the educational process not only the intellectual but also the moral attributes of each individual; introducing in place of sex education comprehensive moral education;
- the return of those teachers and educators who, as a result of discriminatory measures, had to leave the field of education in the past;
- restoration of parochial schools;
- placing in educational positions teachers who are believers;
- the importance of the masculine pedagogic influence in education, and the elimination of its excessive feminization;
- talent, grades, and attitude to the subject of study to be the sole decisive criterion for admittance to studies;
- substantial increase in the teaching of foreign languages, including classical;
- student exchange and short-term practical experience in the field, as a common method of the educational process; and

—modification of the range and subject matter of the curricula, particularly in the primary schools, commensurate with the age of the child, leaving out everything that is not germane to life, to avoid overloading the students.

4. Nation, Fatherland, and State

The Czechoslovak People's Party holds the opinion that a state comes into existence as a result of the will and need of its citizens, and therefore it must serve them, rather than citizens serving the state.

A well-functioning state then becomes a true fatherland for the citizens and the nation.

Therefore the Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- reviving an aware love of one's country and national pride, with reference to the rich history and tradition of our nations;
- ensuring full equality of citizenship of our two nations, all nationalities and national groups living on the soil of the state;
- pluralistic democracy as the basic political practice in the state, which will never again allow a one-party government;
- creation of such democratic environment in which a natural, healthy, not a rapacious, competition among political directions, ideologies, and parties could take place;
- creation of such a government of the people that would embody moral authority and would be the reflection of the current political stratification of our people, and will be the result of general, free, and secret elections in which citizens will express their will;
- the fact that the only representative of the people are freely elected representative bodies subject to public control;
- proper functioning of the state, which consists in all-around improvement of the living conditions of man and ensures general well-being for all citizens in accord with the will of the majority and respect for the minority;
- harmony of the legal code with the basic, generally recognized moral principles in such a way that the reverence and respect for the law is revived and a legal state is fully restored;
- independence of courts and judges;
- cleansing of any debased judiciary or legal code according to the principle of truth and justice;
- thorough rehabilitation of all those unjustly prosecuted and persecuted for their political views or religious belief;
- depoliticizing of the army and police, so that these units again serve the people and gain the trust of the public;
- shortening the basic military service in accord with the real internal needs and the international situation;
- introduction of reserve military service;
- reduction of the numbers of the police and the army;

- creation of constitutional and administrative courts; and
- encoding the mentioned principles, including other democratic principles, in the new constitution.

5. Religion, Churches, and Church Communion

The current renaissance of religious feeling proved that religion is not the "opiate of the people" as Marxists insist, but an indestructible moral category that is the expression of the intrinsic ties of the creature with its Creator, given to man by the act of creation.

- The Czechoslovak People's Party joins together all believers of all Christian denominations and in their interest cooperates closely with all churches and their representatives, and
- shares in a specific way in supporting the activities of various Christian associations, communions and clubs of Christian youths and women;
- the Czechoslovak People's Party considers religion to be an inseparable component of the spiritual culture of society which significantly influenced our nation, and whose influence led to the emergence of such greats as St. Wenceslas, St. Agnes of Bohemia, Zdislava the Blessed, and the thinkers Jan Hus, Jan Amos Komensky, and others;
- the Czechoslovak People's Party is fully cognizant of the cultural and humanitarian contribution of the churches to our nations, the contribution of Cyril and Methodius, as well as the contribution of the charitable activities of religious orders, religious communions, and laymen's associations;
- the Czechoslovak People's Party stands for absolute autonomy of the churches in the area of religious life, and non-interference of the state in their internal affairs, and
- strives for the adoption of fair religious laws and the creation of good conditions for the life of the churches and religious associations and their continued development;
- the Czechoslovak People's Party stands for the broadest possible access of priests to prisons, hospitals, psychiatric institutions, social services establishments, and pensioners' homes.

6. Health Care and Social Services Policy

Christian principles enjoin each person to take appropriate care not only of his own health, but also the health of his fellow men, including responsibility for a healthy spiritual and physical development of children and youths.

Work in the social services area, including specific care for the afflicted, the needy, and the elderly, is the fulfillment of the service to one's fellow men in practice.

The Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- truthful and timely provision of information to the public about identified defects in the food supply and the environment which affect negatively the health of

- the people and particularly of children, including information about proposed or adopted measures;
- improving the overall level of our health care so that it is at least comparable to the world standard;
- quick state grants for equipping health care facilities and ensuring an adequate supply of effective medication and necessary health care materials;
- making possible a free choice of a physician by a patient, and evaluating physicians according to their patients and results of treatment;
- determining the choice of students for health sciences also according to their attitude to those sciences, and motivate students to adopt a dedicated and sensitive attitude to the sick;
- returning sisters of religious orders back to health care;
- support of the idea of SOS villages where abandoned children are brought up in substitute family environment by responsible married couples, support of foster-parenthood, possibly other types of substitute parenting and individual care;
- achieving such social justice in the social services that every citizen can feel as a dignified and worthwhile member of society; in this connection, also for carrying out the adjustment of low pensions;
- giving special attention to helping disabled citizens and creating conditions for absorbing them into society;
- construction of charitable homes, which would ensure the care for needy citizens in a manner respectful of their privacy; and
- construction of multi-generation apartments which would enable children and parents to live together and thus prevent their abandonment.

7. Culture

The Czechoslovak People's Party is fully cognizant of the importance of the cultural legacy of our forebears as well as the fact that we are a small nation in the heart of Europe.

These facts have to be taken as a starting point and our contemporary democratic culture built on them. National culture is an irreplaceable component of European and global culture, which permeates it and influences it.

The Czechoslovak People's Party understands culture not only as an intellectual maturity and technological development, but above all as decency, understanding, integrity, self-sacrifice, as well as social maturity, which are the hallmarks of a truly cultured society.

It is convinced of the need for balance in the development of civilizing technology and culture, science and religion, mind and heart.

The Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- full creative freedom of science and cultural creativity and elimination of censorship;
- appropriate development of emotional, esthetic and ethical education by all forms of culture and art;

- returning to the culture and purity of language, the spoken and the written word, according to the principles that "language is the cathedral and the citadel of the nation";
- increasing funds for the repair and maintenance of our cultural and historical relics, particularly the long-neglected religious buildings; and
- making certain that esthetics are considered when planning construction for an area, and for ensuring harmony with the natural environment and immediate surroundings.

8. Economy

The economy should ensure, while keeping in mind the environmental protection priorities, as adequate material needs as possible for the life of the individual, family, and society.

The Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- introduction of all forms of ownership in the economic sphere and creating for them equitable legal and factual conditions, so that they can assist, differentially and therefore efficiently, a successful development of the national economy;
- private entrepreneurship as the most efficient form of making use of people's abilities and intelligence with emphasis on a direct relationship of work with its results;
- placing in managerial positions responsible workers, professionally able, of good character and unimpeachable, regardless of their political affiliation;
- economic cooperation with countries with developed market economies, gaining foreign experience and knowledge which lead to economic prosperity; and
- in wage policy, a direct relationship between earnings and achieved economic result, which ensures that labor is expended sensibly and efficiently, as provides pleasure in it and a just reward;
- the Czechoslovak People's Party understands labor as the basic dimension of man's existence in his creative process by which man completes and develops the Creator's work. Thus human labor acquires a further, metaphysical dimension which has the power to motivate a believer to engage in honest and worthwhile work.

9. Agriculture

In its agricultural program, the Czechoslovak People's Party considers as most important the restoration of the elemental relationship of the farmer to the soil on which he farms, and to the place where he lives. Here also lie the roots of the deep love and reverence of our forebears for the soil, whose fruits always provided nourishment for the nation.

We ascribe the ecological damage to the countryside precisely to the forcible disruption of all the inner traditional linkages which have been developing in the countryside for centuries, and which introduced the

farmer into the order of Creation as a freely deciding, independent being, conscious of the importance of his work.

The Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- drafting and passing such laws that would comprehensively and justly solve the problems of the countryside and agriculture, provide equal conditions for farming the soil while putting into effect various forms of ownership, and above all eliminate those absurd legal norms which make the institution of using the soil and agricultural buildings superior to the institution of ownership (the owner has far fewer rights than the user);
- ensuring wholesome, quality food for the nation;
- direct shipment of agricultural products to the market so that consumers have the possibility of purchasing fresh agricultural products; and
- farming the soil without further harm to the environment and depletion of the soil.

10. Environment

The Czechoslovak People's Party considers nature to be a living organism, sensitive to the interference of man which disrupts its natural balance. The consequences of the damage to nature affect negatively not only nature but also man's life.

The Czechoslovak People's Party approaches environmental problems in direct relationship with the solution of economic, social, agricultural, and other problems.

The Czechoslovak People's Party stands for:

- adoption of effective legal and factual measures which will prevent to the maximum degree further deterioration of the environment, including strict controls for implementing them;
- setting aside necessary financial means, including foreign currency, for improving the damaged environment, and controlling their use for the stated objectives;
- utilizing natural gas in place of the currently used traditional solid fuels;
- not allowing the construction of gigantic projects which substantially alter the character of nature and climatic and other natural conditions;
- carrying out any greater intrusion into nature thoughtfully and on the basis of professional studies, with the goal of avoiding disruption of natural balances; and
- cooperating with other countries for an effective protection of the environment.

11. Peace and International Relations

The Czechoslovak People's Party considers peace and peaceful coexistence of nations and countries to be an essential precondition for the existence of the human society and therefore also a necessity of global politics.

The Czechoslovak People's Party takes as its starting point the broader concept of peace as tranquillity that is

the natural fruit of man's behavior in harmony with the order of the Creator; any deviation from this order then brings unrest, confusion, and chaos.

To strive for peace means to strive for tranquillity and harmony in the soul of man.

The Czechoslovak People's Party is conscious of the fact that without peace and love in the heart neither national nor international understanding is possible.

And therefore by applying Christian principles it promotes:

- respect for mutual sovereignty and equal partnership relations with all democratic states;
- substantial arms reduction with the condition that the savings will be used to solve the urgent needs in the area of ecology and for improving the living and social standards of less developed countries;
- the realization of a global international community of justice, equality, and mutual conciliation by gradual liquidation of the present power groupings in the world;
- mutually advantageous cooperation on the international scale, particularly in the economic area, and development of all other political, cultural, and social relations;
- contribution through international policy to the solution of problems of the global community in such a way that all countries achieve full equality and political and economic freedom; and
- restoration of full diplomatic contacts with the Vatican; welcoming the Holy Father John Paul II to Czechoslovakia.

The program of the Czechoslovak People's Party contains the basic directions of the Party's approach to the individual areas of the life of man and society. It stems from Christian principles, which make possible, we are convinced, the quickest possible return to a democratic life of society and the improvement of the spiritual and physical development of every individual, including the improvement in the quality of social and other conditions.

The Czechoslovak People's Party can base the realization of this program on its historical roots and as a modern Christian party exert influence within the political structure of the state, and share successfully in the democratic development of Czechoslovakia.

HUNGARY

National List of Major Party Candidates

25000637 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
10 Feb 90 pp 6-7

[Table of candidates: "Persons Nominated and Supported by the Parties: Those Who Are Running in the First Round"]

[Text] Note: We were told by those who provided us with this data that their lists were not final; they may include inaccuracies, and changes may occur. Blank

spaces indicate that, based on information received thus far, there are no candidates and no data is available. (Source: the election offices of the parties.)

Voting District	Budapest District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1	I-II	Klara Ungar	Istvan Haeffler	no candidate	Zsolt Semjen	Gyorgy Banffy
2	II	Gergely Bendeguz Cseh	Istvan Morvai	Janos Vadasz	Dr. Gyorgy Rubovszky	Attila Zsigmond
3	III	Istvan Hegedus	Dr. Balazs Dolhai	Mrs. Laszlo Kovacs	Dr. Tivadar Lochner	Csaba Siklos
4	III	—	Imre Szogi	Menyhert Lakatos	Sandor Gyorey	Laszlo Sarossy
5	IV	Mihaly Szechenyi	Sandor Gyulai	Mrs. Lajos Bozso	Odon Sutta	Gyula Fekete Jr.
6	IV-XV	—	Ferenc Naszadi	Dr. Istvan Palfalvi	Gyorgy Pinter	Istvan Inczeffi
7	V-XIII	—	Geza Papp	Dr. Bela Szalma	Dr. Nandor Rott	Dr. Gyorgy Schamschula
8	VI	Peter Molnar	Dr. Rudolf Deme	Emil Kiss	Dr. Frigyes Miklay	Kalman Katona
9	VII	Gyorgy Kerenyi	Geza Mikolay	no candidate	Dr. Miklos Gaspar	Csaba Erhardt
10	VII-VIII	Zoltan Rockenbauer	Peter Szabo	Dr. Tamas Fekete	Laszlo Lantzky	Dr. Tamas Somogyi
11	VIII	Gergely Barath	Gyorgy Lajos Nemeth	Dr. Jozsef Sebes	Sandor Lippay	Laszlo Marothi
12	IX	Tamas Tirts	Dr. Ferenc Dekany	Dr. Frigyes Tallosy	Miklos Furedy	Dr. Ivan Szabo
13	IX-XX	Viktor Orban	—	Dr. Jozsef Mero	Gabor Csordas	Dr. Gyula Zacsek
14	X	Zsuzsa Hartyanyi	Dr. Laszlo Matyas Ivanyi	Sandor Rimoczi	Mihaly Flandora	Laszlo Dobos
15	XI	Gabor Fodor	Janos Rostas	Dr. Peter Biacs	Dr. Laszlo Griggassy	Dr. Miklos Csapodi
16	XI	Tamas Deutsch	Janos Kis	Laszlo Morvai	Andras Bato	Dr. Gabor Perjes
17	XI	Szilard Sasvari	Istvan Szigetvari	Dr. Margit Buzna	Dr. Marius Halama	Dr. Zoltan Katai
18	XII	Gabor Stiedl	Dr. Gyorgy Balogh	Dr. Laszlo Ivan	Dr. Laszlo Surjan	Bela Horvath
19	XIII	Zoltan Csatari	Elemer Olah	Gyorgy Kovacs	Miklos Budavari	Attila Csaji
20	XIII	Miklos Sandor	Dr. Sandor Gyorivanyi	Mrs. Jozsef Czimkoczky	Dr. Gyorgy Giczy	Kata Beke
21	XIV	Lajos Gyori-Molnar	Dr. Miklos Zsak	Magda Obert	Dr. Gabor Sugar	Dr. Laszlo Arva
22	XIV	Laszlo Akos Nemeth	Bela Majoros	Mrs. Jozsef Varga	Peter Harrach	Imre Csepella
23	XV	Zoltan Bogdany	Pal Dragon	Istvan Boros	Richard Solt	Dr. Laszlo Hornok
24	XVI	Dr. Janos Ader	Tibor Balazs	Zoltan Dome	Istvan Simon	Janos Palotas
25	XVII	Imre Frajna	Dr. Zoltan Sasvari	Dr. Istvan Kalnoki Gyongyossy	Dr. Gyorgy Nemesszeghy	Dr. Gabor Balla
26	X-XVIII	Tamas Tercsak	—	Mrs. Pal Gellen	Gyula Sonnevend	Janos Denes
27	XVIII	—	Marton Medveczky	Janos Pandi	Mrs. Dr. Sandor Farkas	Dr. Zoltan Szelezky

Voting District	Budapest District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
28	XIX	—	Mrs. Kiss (Edit Kiraly)	Jozsef Hefter	Dr. Bela Szabo	Dr. Andras Attila Fodor
29	XX	—	Dr. Ferenc Bereczky	Dr. Miklos Fulop	Janos Unyi Jr.	Dr. Bela Vizy
30	XXI	Laszlo Kaman	—	Dr. Dezso Bolla	Dr. Janos Szirtes	Dr. Janos Gyurko
31	XXI	—	—	no candidate	—	Geza Homoki
32	XXII	Zsolt Nemeth	Dr. Janos Zalafoldi	Dr. Tibor Toth	Mrs. Szepesfalvi (Marta Magassy)	Peter Meszaros

Voting District	Budapest District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1	I-II	Dr. Istvan Kis-zely	Laszlo Udvarhelyi	Ivan Vitanyi	Mrs. Kiss (Eva Schaffer)	Dr. Alajos Dornbach
2	II	—	Attila Moravcsik	Gyula Bubla	Ferenc Kepecs	Dr. Matyas Eorsi
3	III	Laszlo Sebestyen	Attila Regoci	Dr. Sandor Orosz	Zsolt Harsanyi	Dr. Bela Levay
4	III	Laszlo Bihari	Gyula Kovacs	Dr. Laszlo Kelen	Gyorgy Szecsi	Gabor Ivanyi
5	IV	Dr. Balint Balogh	Zoltan Kerekes	Gabor Csizmar	Samuel Beke	Dr. Istvan Meszaros
6	IV-XV	Gyorgy Pallos	Elemer Csaba	Ambrus Szantai Sarkozy	Dr. Endre Borbely Jr.	Dr. Ferenc Torok
7	V-XIII	Rezso Szij	Dr. Peter Bogнар	Lajos Matyas Szabo	Mihaly Forgach	Miklos Tamas Gaspar
8	VI	Dr. Ferenc Pecze	Janos Kalman	(undecided) Laszlo Pal	Dr. Anna Petrasovits	Jozsef Szekhelyi
9	VII	Samuel Benedekfi	Mrs. Dr. Jozsef Aggod	Pal Fillo	Dr. Gyorgy Hahn	Dr. Gabor Demszky
10	VII-VIII	Dr. Jozsef Buzas	Dr. Gergely Gaal	Zoltan Szabo	Laszlo Lugossy	Tamas Raj
11	VIII	Emil Szentesi	Jozsef Doka	Mrs. Kosa (Dr. Magda Kovacs)	Janos Bolcskey	Miklos Haraszti
12	IX	Andras Marton	Laszlo Hevessy	Sandor Fekete	Sandor Kiss	Dr. Peter Tolgyessy
13	IX-XX	Gyorgy Gyurka	Andras Szechy	Laszlo Robert	Laszlo Sag	Miklos Szabo
14	X	Dr. Geza Szilagyi	Pal Baranyai, Dr. Ferenc Harangozo	Dr. Tamas Egri	Dr. Lidia Hars	Antal Horvath
15	XI	Tibor Liska	Gabor Benyovszky	Gyorgy Markos	Sandor Bacskai	Dr. Peter Hack
16	XI	Istvan O. Szabo	Tamas Hirschler	Karoly Hellner	Dr. Janos Grad	Ferenc Koszeg
17	XI	Eszter M. Molnar	Tibor Lengyel	Ildiko Monostori	Gabor Szilagyi	Tamas Bauer
18	XII	Dr. Bela Kozma	Dr. Laszlo Erdei	Dr. Bela Fabry	Dr. Janos Sik	Mihaly Raday
19	XIII	Dr. Gyorgy Varga	Karoly Kovacs	Dr. Istvan Kiss	Gyorgy Fischer	Ivan Darvas
20	XIII	Dr. Tibor Nemeth	Pal Kollat	Gyorgy Marosan Jr.	Antal Muller	Laszlo Rajk
21	XIV	Dr. Janos Skulteti	Sandor Dauda, Dr. Peter Bogнар	Csaba Vass	Pal Laszlo Nagy	Balint Magyar
22	XIV	Gyozo Libisch	Dr. Jozsef Hajdu	Magdolna Vanko	Ivan Kaszas	Ivan Peto
23	XV	Ferenc Deak	Dr. Ferenc Szilard, Elemer Csaba	Attila Siklosi	Dr. Erno Spencz	Imre Mecs

Voting District	Budapest District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
24	XVI	Dr. Katalin Skulteti	Pal Majdan	Mrs. Lestar (Maria Varga)	Dr. Pal Benyo	Gabor Veg
25	XVII	Ferenc Radics	Mrs. Sandor Toth	Mrs. Voros (Dr. Judit Ban)	Dr. Alpar Toth	Istvan Szent-Ivanyi
26	X-XVIII	Jozsef Lindmayer	Dr. Ferenc Harangozo	Bela Katona	Karoly Szoke	Zoltan Fedak
27	XVIII	Arpad Balogh	Frigyes Lukacs	Arpad Kenyeres	Istvan Arkgyan	Dr. Janos Somogyi
28	XIX	Lajos Nemes	Gyula Zentai, Andras Szechy	Istvan Fejes	Laszlo Berces	Istvan Kohalmi
29	XX	—	Peter Sajban	Jozsef Gabor	Gusztav Gyulay	Marta Balogh
30	XXI	Blanka Kozma	Gyula Nogradi	Miklos Kisari	Mihaly Ivancso	Dr. Tamas Szasz
31	XXI	—	Ferenc Suli	Peter Csaba	Janos Weber	Dr. Karoly Lotz
32	XXII	Mihaly Lakos	Dr. Kalman Docze	Dr. Gyorgy Koteles	Dezso Jaczko	Gabriella Beki

Baranya County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Pecs	—	Sandor Szeles	Dr. Zoltan Igloi	—	Dr. Bertalan Andrasfalvy
2 Pecs	Zoltan Trombitas	Ferenc Galbacs	Dr. Maria Dunai	—	Dr. Sandor Mednyanszky
3 Pecs	Andrea Barta	Miklos Bogner	Dr. Bela Sipos	—	Andras Pap
4 Komlo	Jozsef Levay	Istvan Timaffy	Gabor Huszka	—	Dr. Jozsef Hoppa
5 Mohacs	Zsuzsa Szabo	Dr. Miklos Ferenc	Janos T. Kovacs	—	Dr. Ferenc Biro
6 Siklos	—	Dr. Ferenc Jozsef Nagy	Dr. Miklos Horvath	—	Janos Krebsz
7 Szigetvar	—	Ferenc Szomor	Sandor Szeghy	—	Dr. Jozsef Kapronczay

Baranya County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Pecs	—	Istvan Szalontai	Viktor Spolar	Mozes Kovacs	Dr. Levente Varga
2 Pecs	Sandor Cziraki	Ferenc Cseresnyes	Mrs. Molnar (Katalin Szili)	Dr. Otto Angyal	Jozsef Getto
3 Pecs	Mrs. Olah (Judit Csalog)	Gyula Toke	Jozsef Vonyo	Zoltan Buri	Zoltan Bretter
4 Komlo	Mrs. Gyula Barath	Istvan Prohaszka	Dr. Huba Kiss	Jozsef Szabo	Gedeon Fekete
5 Mohacs	Zsuzsanna Kovacs	—	Laszlo Puch	Bela Kovesi	Jozsef Werner
6 Siklos	—	Zoltan Vasarhelyi	Margit Szujko	Dr. Lajos Medgyes	Dr. Peter Heindl
7 Szigetvar	Istvan Nemeth	Zoltan Kecskemeti Jr	Matyas Fekete	Sandor Vizsloi	Dr. Laszlo Molvay

Bacs-Kiskun County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Kecskemet	Laszlo Hertelendy	—	Mrs. Dr. Bela Fcher	—	Dr. Gyula Panczel
2 Kecskemet	Zsolt Sarkadi	—	Dr. Endre Banyai	—	Dr. Fabian Jozsa
3 Tiszakecske	Andras Racz	—	Sandor Varga	—	—
4 Kunszentmiklos	—	—	Pal Martus, Bela Sitkei	—	—
5 Kiskunfelegyhaza	—	—	Dr. Maria Patyi, Dr. Gyorgy Borotai	—	—
6 Kiskoros	Gyorgy Gtavszky	—	Janos Szabo, Sandor Csipko	—	—
7 Kalocsa	Antal Feric	—	Dr. Ferenc Markus	—	Endre Raffai
8 Kiskunhalas	—	—	Mihaly Racz Fodor	—	Jozsef Ikotity
9 Baja	—	—	Dr. Istvan Vajtai, Dr. Antal Zorn	—	Dr. Gergely Harkay
10 Bacsalmas	—	—	Istvan Kiss, Sandor Vargay	—	Dr. Gabor Patocskai

Bacs-Kiskun County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Kecskemet	Klara Kovacs	Mrs. Janos Balogh	Attila Nagy	Bela Toth	Dr. Laszlo Sandor
2 Kecskemet	—	Laszlo Forgo	Laszlo Bruszel	Istvan Bano	Tamas Toth
3 Tiszakecske	—	Jozsef Eros	Sandor Varga	Janos Molnar	Dr. Ferenc Frigyessy
4 Kunszentmiklos	—	Miklos Czerna	Janos Aranyi	Dr. Laszlo Kovacs	Janos Sarro
5 Kiskunfelegyhaza	Gyorgy Toldi	—	Dr. Istvan Garai	Dr. Ferenc Vedres	Dr. Laszlo Reczi
6 Kiskoros	Pal Henter	Laszlo Lepid	Mrs. Jozsef Moravcsik	Dr. Imre Borbely	Dr. Bela Szenohradzski
7 Kalocsa	Geza Szekelyhidy	—	Janos Gonde	Laszlo Szervics	Dr. Geza Andriska
8 Kiskunhalas	Dr. Laszlo Farkas	Karoly Kollar	Daniel Forczek	Jozsef F. Nagy	Zoltan Toth
9 Baja	Istvan Tacsi	Dr. Laszlo Fekete	Miklos Varhalmi	Ferenc Papp	Andras Nagy
10 Bacsalmas	Dr. Attila Szoboszlai	—	Dr. Imre Szall	Jakab Ujvari	Dr. Peter Sztantics

Bekes County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Bekescsaba	Attila Petho	Dr. Geza Zsiros	Pal Kutyej	—	Zoltan Szokolay
2 Gyula	Karoly Durko	Ferenc Tar	Mrs. Jozsef Varju	—	Dr. Andras Liptak
3 Bekes	Edit Bellus	Dr. Gyula Pasztor	no candidate	—	Istvan Csurka
4 Szeghalom	Boleszav Pelcsinszky	Istvan Kazinczy	Dr. Lajos Nyeki	—	Balint Lada
5 Szarvas	—	Lajos Hunya	no candidate	—	no one running
6 Oroshaza	Sandor Miszlaj	Tibor Domokos	no candidate	—	Zoltan Varga
7 Mezokovacsghaza	Zoltan Fulop	Istvan Bakos	Bertalan Sudi	—	Dr. Katalin Rempert

Bekes County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Bekescsaba	Dr. Kond Ferdinandy	Janos Kendra	Dr. Imre Simon	Jozsef Farago	Dr. Zoltan Denes
2 Gyula	Mrs. Sebestyen (Ilona Farkas)	Peter Hotya	Dr. Zoltan Arpasi	Pal Miklos	Peter Kadar
3 Bekes	Gyorgy Rokszin	Gyorgy Morocz	Dr. Bela Janki	Jozsef Farkas	Sandor Sos
4 Szeghalom	Mihaly Pali	Karoly Kiss	Mihaly Lehoczky	Gabor Scinta	Dr. Boleszlav Pelcsinszky
5 Szarvas	Jeno Miklya	—	Peter Kovacs	Imre Keri	Zoltan Deme
6 Oroshaza	Dr. Vince Hanyecz	Antal Zalai	Imre Olajos	Tibor Lakatos	Sandor Toth
7 Mezokovacsghaza	—	Frigyes Puja	Pal Vastagh	Pal Farkas	Dr. Zsolt Hevesi

Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Miskolc	—	Zsolt Rajkai	Dr. Csaba Csorba	—	Tibor Balazsi
2 Miskolc	Robert Repassy	Gyula Gonda	Dr. Gabor Paj	—	Dr. Istvan Balas
3 Miskolc	—	Tamas Barkoczy	Gabor Cservenyak	—	Lajos Mile
4 Miskolc	Tamas Vadcsur	Dr. Geza Ivan	Dr. Istvan Barkoczy	—	Dr. Gyorgy Kiss
5 Ozd	Miklos Meszaros	Balazs Partos	Mrs. Gyula Filep	—	Istvan Kis Sunyi
6 Sajoszentpeter	—	Istvan Maczo	Tamas Szendrei	—	Arpad Miklos
7 Kazincbarcika	—	Zsigmond Teme	Dr. Arpad Balla	—	Istvan Toth
8 Edeleny	Laszlo Urban	Dr. Zoltan Szarka	Imre Slezsak	—	Dr. Jozsef Domokos
9 Encs	—	Dr. Gyula Kiss	Janos Gulyas	—	Dr. Agnes Maczko
10 Satoraljaijuehely	—	Dr. Zoltan Csukas	Gabor Koncz	—	Dr. Jozsef Nagy Bozsoki
11 Szerencs	—	Laszlo Pelsoczy	Dr. Zoltan Karasz	—	Dr. Albert Toth
12 Leninvaros	—	Gyula Fedor	Bela Galba	—	Imre Laszlo Toth
13 Mezokovesd	—	Dr. Gyula Dobos	Dr. Laszlo Horvath	—	Ferenc Pesti

Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Miskolc	—	Dr. Gyula Emodi	Pal Toth	Gyorgy Atusak	Bela Latran
2 Miskolc	—	Dr. Lorant Lorinc	Sandor Tompa	Zsolt Andras Zoltay	Dr. Laszlo Matyi
3 Miskolc	Ferenc Mezo	Dezso Markusz	Katalin Korinthus	Laszlo Vegh	Eva Timar
4 Miskolc	—	Sandor Nyiro	Andras Roudzik	Dr. Viktor Bocsko	Dr. Pal Bodo
5 Ozd	—	Janos Csizmar	Jozsef Rando	Ferenc Kovacs	Csaba Koos
6 Sajoszentpeter	Dr. Andras Juhasz	Laszlo Hornyik	Dr. Andras Peter	Ferenc Rabi	Istvan Samu
7 Kazincbarcika	—	Tibor Orjovics	Dr. Balint Kiraly	Istvan Gasko	Piroska Csorba
8 Edeleny	Dr. Barna Vodila	Ferenc Horvath	Mrs. Barta (Julia Horvath)	Lajos Nagy	Dr. Zoltan Hatvani
9 Encs	Dr. Istvan Bodnar	—	Dr. Gyorgy Boholy	Janos Szivak	Jozsef Dobozi
10 Satoraljaijuehely	Ferenc Beres	—	Karoly Nemeth	Regina Medve	Pal Juhasz
11 Szerencs	—	Janos Kertesz	Miklos Nemeth	Istvan Biro	Bela Vitanyi
12 Leninvaros	—	Karoly Szentirmai	Istvan Bali	Attila Laszlo Matyus	Dr. Geza Zabos
13 Mezokovesd	Jozsef Mezei	Jozsef Elek	Jozsef Molnar	Istvan Szekeres	Gabor Koncz

Csongrad County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Szeged	Miklos Kalocsay	Andras Siklosi	Dr. Laszlo Abraham	—	Erno Raffay
2 Szeged	—	Csaba Veres	Dr. Laszlo Toth	—	Zoltan Kiraly
3 Szeged	Pal Lippay	Janos Soos	Dr. Jenő Batyai	—	Jozsef Bratinka
4 Csongrad	—	Istvan Pinter	Dr. Bela Simandy	—	Mrs. Istvan Harmath
5 Szentcsanak	—	Karoly Imre	Dr. Gyorgy Horvath	—	Dr. Lehel Gyorgy Papp
6 Hodmezovasarhely	—	Dr. Lajos Szabo	Dr. Janos Palinko, Istvan Lehmann	—	Ferenc Grezsa Jr.
7 Mako	Ferenc Fazekas	Dr. Sandor Santa	Istvan Toth	—	Dr. Zoltan Mihaly

Csongrad County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Szeged	Istvan Martonosi	Dr. Ferenc Gesztesi	Mrs. Novak (Anna Halasz)	Zoltan Szekeley	Dr. Balint Rozsnyai
2 Szeged	Dr. Denes Fejer	Dr. Gyula Krajko	Dr. Mihaly Szabo	Szilveszter Peter	Attila Janko
3 Szeged	Dr. Karoly Toth	Jozsef Perjesi	Jozsef Annus	Gyorgy Szerencses	Edit Rozsa
4 Csongrad	Szilveszter Forgeteg	Zsuzsanna Pataki	Laszlo Juhasz	Laszlo Szucs	Zoltan Rantal
5 Szentcsanak	Ferenc Dobos	Pal Bertus	Dr. Attila Demeter	Istvan Bene	Bela Laszlo
6 Hodmezovasarhely	Zsolt Szoboszlai	Ferenc Havranek	Laszlo Harmai	Gyula Szabo	Ferenc Farkas
7 Mako	Gyula Lakatos	Gyula Szilagyi	Matyas Weber	Istvan Gavadi	Dr. Dezso Kertesz

Fejer County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Szekesfehervar	Istvan Nagy	Ignac Kovacs	Istvan Balsay	—	Sandor Andras Szabo
2 Szekesfehervar	Robert Golubeff	Jozsef Pinter	Istvan Pajor	—	Dr. Miklos Horvath
3 Dunaujvaros	Zsolt Deak	Gyorgy Toth	Zsolt Domotor	—	Istvan Illesy
4 Gardony	—	Pal Meszaros	Janos Heteyi	—	Gyorgy Szilasy
5 Mor	—	Jozsef Horvath	Dr. Boaz Kiss	—	Lajos Zsebok
6 Sarbogard	—	Gyorgy Szabo	Dr. Laszlo Woth	—	Vince Palasti
7 Bicske	—	Istvan Izing	Antal Pats	—	Andras Varsanyi

Fejer County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Szekesfehervar	Zoltan Mahr	Janos Szabo	Zoltan Vancsik	Janos Horvath	Jozsef Mozs
2 Szekesfehervar	Dr. Dani Lukacs	Sandor Cseh Bognar	Peter Sudi	Jozsef Huczek	Dr. Gabor Vilagosi
3 Dunaujvaros	—	Arpad Loy	Dr. Pal Kovacs	Lajos Vas	Dr. Istvan Felix
4 Gardony	Lajos Bogar	—	Jozsef Aron	Peter Csordas	Dr. Bela Bako
5 Mor	—	Karoly Szekeres	Dr. Peter Siraly	Istvan Kis	Pal Szaghmeister
6 Sarbogard	Jozsef Szanto	Laszlo Rosta	Sandor Fodor	Csaba Fekete Rimis	Zoltan Hajdu
7 Bicske	Istvan Barinka	—	Tamas Szabo	Elek Lencse	Andras Meszaros

Gyor-Sopron County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Gyor	—	Dr. Janos Szabo	Mrs. Gebert, Marta Gombas	—	Dr. Laszlo Medgyasszai
2 Gyor	—	Dr. Attila Ersek	Dr. Janos Rechnitzer	—	Dr. Andras Bajtay
3 Gyor	Peter Nemeth	Gyula Keszthelyi	Laszlo Horvath	—	Lajos Bako
4 Mosonmagyaróvár	Janos Pap	Janos Szanto	Dr. Lajos Kosa	—	Dr. Laszlo Szekelyhidi
5 Csorna	—	Laszlo Turi	Vilmos Nemeth	—	Dr. Jozsef Nemeth
6 Kapuvar	—	Dr. Gyula Bakody	Pal Tuba	—	Jozsef Abraham
7 Sopron	Jozsef Szajer	Janos Podor	Dr. Laszlo Bolyki	—	Dr. Laszlo Karpati

Gyor-Sopron County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Gyor	—	—	Balazs Pozsgai	Jozsef Pal	Dorottya Buki
2 Gyor	—	Sandor Beres	Mrs. Sandor Szabo	Lajos Raveltzer	Erno Kolozsvari
3 Gyor	—	—	Dr. Ferenc Bako	Zoltan Koczli	Dr. Karoly Rab
4 Mosonmagyaróvár	—	Laszlo Winkler	Laszlo Winkler	Mrs. Tibor Cvetkovics	Jozsef Finta
5 Csorna	—	—	Dr. Karoly Balogh	Dr. Janos Kis	Janos Balogh
6 Kapuvar	Gabor Brummer	—	Pal Tuba	Istvan Szigeti	Dr. Tivadar Horvath
7 Sopron	—	Denes Kormendi	Imre Pozsgay	Sandor Richly	Dr. Miklos Arszin

Hajdu-Bihar County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Debrecen	Andras Sasdi	Sandor Cseh	Attila Gyorffy	—	Dr. Akos Gali
2 Debrecen	Dr. Laszlo Palnik	Jozsef Nagy	Istvan Hajdu	—	Attila Fejes
3 Debrecen	Lajos Kosa	Bela Kovacs	Barnabas Mandi	—	Dr. Gyula Erdo
4 Hajduhadhazteglas	—	Janos Arany	Sandor Kertesz	—	Sandor Kormos
5 Berettyoujfalu	—	Andras Belgyar	Dr. Istvan Ujhelyi	—	Jozsef Sapi
6 Puspokladany	—	Attila Bank	Dr. Kalman Gere	—	Dezso Farkas
7 Hajduszoboszlo	Tibor Schari	Lajos Farkas	Gusztav Lekai	—	Dr. Jenő Papp
8 Balmazújváros	—	Istvan Kemeny	Istvan Orcsik	—	Lajos Zsupos
9 Hajduboszormeny	—	Dr. Imre Olah	Dr. Tibor Almasi	—	Miklos Nyakas

Hajdu-Bihar County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Debrecen	—	Dr. Bela Baranyi	Richard Roder	Bela Barcza	Gyorgy Tabajdi
2 Debrecen	Dr. Gyorgy Matuz	Lajos Nagy	Dr. Istvan Orosz	Jozsef Vollein	Dr. Zoltan Bertha
3 Debrecen	—	Mrs. Istvan Gal	Dr. Ferenc Bojan	Bela Figula	Dr. Mihaly Mozes
4 Hajduhadhazteglas	Jozsef Csorban	Ferenc Molnar	undecided	Csaba Szalai	Pal Gajdos
5 Berettyoujfalu	Dr. Imre Nagy	Laszlo Szabo	Dr. Zoltan Daroczi	Mrs. Balogh (Eva Torok)	Roza Hodosan

Hajdu-Bihar County (Continued)

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
6 Puspokladany	Istvan Nagy	Gabor Jakob	Matyas Szuros	Dr. Peter Korosi	Jozsef Ordasi
7 Hajduszoboszlo	Gyula Erdei	Mrs. Benke (Valeria Kiss)	Mrs. Laszlo Torok	Gusztav Lekai	Janos Domokos
8 Balmazujvaros	Imre Nadasdi	Imre Tar	Jozsef Csige	Ferenc Nemethy	Jozsef Szekely
9 Hajduboszormeny	—	Gabor Szekeres	Dr. Jozsef Nagy	Istvan Varjasi	Dr. Tibor Molnar

Heves County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Eger	Zsuzsa Farkas	Dr. Miklos Somodi	Zsolt Kadar	—	Bela Szarvas
2 Petervasara and vicinity	—	—	Gyorgy Szakacs	—	Jozsef Kelemen
3 Gyongyos	Bertalan Korenszky	Imre Peto	Ferenc Csepany	—	Endre Pokorny
4 Hatvan	Janos Kovacs	Peter Banfalvy	Gyula Horvath	—	Dr. Miklos Baranyai
5 Heves	—	Andras Piszko	Laszlo Ozsvari	—	Jozsef Pongracz
6 Fuzesabony	—	Mrs. Laszlo Hidvegi	Laszlo Berenyi	—	Istvan Elek

Heves County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Eger	Mihaly Toth	Joachim Vasas	Denes Barsony	Janos Korompai	Dr. Rudolf Novak
2 Petervasara and vicinity	—	Mrs. Tibor Ferenc	Marton Szanto	Gyula Tarjanyi	Laszlo Horvath
3 Gyongyos	Istvan Mezei	Istvan Der	Mrs. Sandor Rajki	Gyongyi Kristof	Bertalan Komenczi
4 Hatvan	—	Dr. Bela Nagy	Ervin Kisterenyi	Mari Torocsik	Dr. Imre Bajusz
5 Heves	—	Bela Sztankovics	Emil Szoke	Pal Miko	Mrs. Kovacs (Magdolna Nagy)
6 Fuzesabony	Dr. Istvan Kamras	Istvan Blaho	Tibor Toth	Dr. Endre Komar	Aniko Horvath

Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Jaszbereny	—	Istvan Szigeti	Laszlo Dobos	—	Dr. Laszlo Petho
2 Jaszapati	Ferenc Antal	Dr. Bela Mizsei	Sandor Torok	—	Dr. Akos Kecskes
3 Szolnok	Attila Varhegyi	Zsolt Posta	Dr. Magdolna Szoro	—	Istvan Halasz
4 Szolnok	Aniko Levai	Tibor Dinka	Zoltan Hunya	—	Laszlo Petronyak
5 Kunszentmarton	—	Dr. Miklos K. Csontos	Dr. Laszlo Sari	—	Dr. Imre Korosi
6 Mezotur	—	Kalman Vincze	Sandor Perjesi	—	—
7 Kunhegyes	—	Valeria Szunyogh	Dr. Zsigmond Sipos	—	Dr. Lajos Szabo
8 Karcag	Mihaly Varga	Imre Dogei	Peter Boka	—	Dr. Janos Szabo

Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Jaszbereny	—	Dr. Gabor Janosi	Dr. Zoltan Jakus	—	Dr. Zoltan Kiss
2 Jaszapati	—	—	Laszlo Gyarmati	Laszlo Adam	Dr. Laszlo Juhasz
3 Szolnok	—	Ferenc Nagy	Dr. Karoly Szegedi	Dr. Dezso Palfi	Zoltan Hortobagyi
4 Szolnok	Mihaly Torocsik	Mrs. Janos Pozderka	Odon Kovacs Libor	Istvan Iloh	Tamas Fodor
5 Kunszentmarton	—	—	Istvan Jauernik	Kalman Olah	Dr. Edit Kis
6 Mezotur	Bela Szeremley	Janos Papp	Dr. Denes Draskovits	Dr. Laszlo Bujdoso	Gyula Arvai
7 Kunhegyes	—	—	Imre Herbaly	Mrs. Imre Mezei	Antal Tolnai
8 Karcag	Mihaly Bugar	—	Jozsef Danyi	Dr. Zoltan Buhaj	Lajos Csecskedi

Komarom-Esztergom County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Tatabanya	Janos Albert	Csaba Balint	Gyozo Hubay	—	Jozsef Pordan
2 Oroszlany	Robert Ricotti	Laszlo Hanko	—	—	Dr. Attila Kalman
3 Tata	—	Dr. Janos Markus	Sandor Nagy, Zoltan Kiraly	—	Sandor Szabo
4 Almasfuzito	Zsolt Asboth	Geza Timothy	Dr. Miklos Havas	—	Janos Toth Kurucz
5 Esztergom	Janos Pal Knapp	Ferenc Csoka	Dr. Tamas Nemes	—	Zsolt Horvath

Komarom-Esztergom County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Tatabanya	—	Dr. Gyorgy Revesz	Laszlo Zsiros	Laszlo Aczelhazi	Gabor Szalay
2 Oroszlany	—	Tibor Nagy	Laszlo Mindszenti	Csaba Zsadanyi Nagy	Dr. Tamas Freund
3 Tata	—	Sandor Habakusz	Dr. Istvan Budahazi	Jeno Nagy	Sandor Deak
4 Almasfuzito	—	Laszlo Kiss	Andras Bojthe	Gabor Zoltay	Szilard Soleczki
5 Esztergom	Dr. Szilveszter Komaromi	Csaba Kiss	Dr. Zoltan Haller	Laszlo Diosdi	Dr. Geza Arato

Nograd County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Salgotarjan	—	Pal Hutyan	Ferenc Szabo	—	Zoltan Spada
2 Paszto	Peter Kriston	Laszlo Fenes	Ferenc Kovats, Mrs. Dr. Laszlo Kovesi	—	Jozsef Kadarkuti
3 Szecseny	Timea Barany	Peter Herman	Tibor Csonka	—	Oszkar Frisch
4 Balassagyarmat	Tibor Toth	Dr. Sandor Imre	Istvan Csikasz, Bela Kalacska	—	Dr. Laszlo Csekey

Nograd County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Salgotarjan	—	Tibor Szilagyi	Dr. Jozsef Rozgonyi	Andras Kovacs	Istvan Gusztos
2 Paszto	Jozsef Barna	Imre Geczi	Istvan Vida	Dr. Tibor Bene	Dr. Laszlo Novak
3 Szecseny	Csaba Komorczy	Otto Kalmar	Sandor Hausel	Dr. Andras Boholy	Dr. Attila Kakkuk
4 Balassagyarmat	Sandor Bohm	Jeno Somogyi, Jozsef Kurti	Janos Arato	Jozsef Babcsa	Janos Hlacsok

Pest County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Szob	Andras Telegdy	Vilmos Bereczki	Bela Pasztor, Ferenc Ritzl	—	Zoltan Bogardi
2 Vac	Dr. Tibor Kenez	Dr. Attila Gruber	Dr. Csaba Chikan	—	Dr. Tamas Katona
3 Dunakeszi	Gabor Nagy	Laszlo Albert	Dr. Istvan Kukorelli	—	Janos Sz. Toth
4 Godollo	—	Laszlo Csujá	Mrs. Vass (Ilona Nyeki)	—	Gabor Roszik
5 Aszod	Bela Glattfelder	Mrs. Istvan Torda	Dr. Ferenc Juhasz	—	Dr. Pal Becker
6 Nagykata	—	Dr. Karoly Hajnal	Dr. Istvan Szalay	—	Gabor Farkas
7 Monor	Gabor Hegely	Zoltan Horogh	Istvan Pracski	—	Dr. Gabor Torok
8 Erd	Andras T. Meszaros	Istvan Prepeliczay	Istvan Takacs, Dr. Andras Aradszki	—	Dr. Laszlo Kovacs
9 Budaors	—	Istvan Ronahathy	Jozsef Joos	—	Karoly Javor
10 Pilisvorosvar	Attila Folcz	Miklos Borz	Ferenc Gaspar, Mihaly Szenasi	—	Rudolf Szauter
11 Szentendre	Andras Szalay	Sandor Varhegyi	Sandor Forrai	—	Dr. Peter Szel
12 Szigetszentmiklos	—	Dr. Matyas Helmeczy	Dr. Tibor Bernath	—	Almos Fazekas
13 Rackeve	—	Jozsef Frank	no candidate	—	Dr. Ferenc Vona
14 Dabas	—	Istvan Horvath	Jozsef Tanyi	—	Laszlo Lorantfy
15 Cegled	Attila Laszip	Bela Arany	Laszlo Krekacs	—	Dr. Miklos Reti
16 Nagykoros	—	Albert Huszar	—	—	Dr. Sandor Kulin

Pest County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Szob	Denes Kiss	Mihaly Gyurcsik	Laszlo Balogh	Bela Farkas	Jozsef Ormandy
2 Vac	—	Jozsef Frieszl	Laszlo Labai	Mrs. Bonifert (Marta Szigeti)	Istvan Vass
3 Dunakeszi	—	—	Lajos Varga	Imre Danyi	Dr. Robert Kiss
4 Godollo	Mrs. Vass (Ilona Nyeki)	Laszlo Cs. Nagy	Laszlo Korosfoi	Jozsef Daroczi	Dr. Antal Hajagos
5 Aszod	Andras Godor	—	Laszlo Varga	Dr. Peter Toth	Dr. Jozsef Jolesz
6 Nagykata	—	—	Andras Banati	Erno Ormandlaky	Mrs. Gyorgy Bodrogi
7 Monor	Laszlo Olah	—	Csaba Hamori	Laszlo Veres	Mrs. Dr. Miklos Jos
8 Erd	Istvan Gotzinger	Balint Novak	Janos Pataki	Dr. Tamas Dizseri	Jozsef Gyurcsok
9 Budaors	Dr. Bela Locsmandy	—	Imre Zink	Mrs. Gellert Horvath	Peter Szuhay
10 Pilisvorosvar	Jeno Korosi	—	Jozsef Andrasko	Dr. Valeria Szabo	Miklos Hajdufy

Pest County (Continued)

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
11 Szentendre	Lajos Retai	Dezso Galantai	Gabor Miakich	Tibor Baranyai	Gyorgyi Bindoffer
12 Szigetszentmiklos	—	—	Dr. Laszlo Szendroi	Gyorgy Rostas Farkas	Gabor Kuncze
13 Rackeve	—	Sandor Kiraly	Mihaly Kocsis	Laszlo Nyari	Mrs. Czombos (Eva Venczel)
14 Dabas	Dr. Istvan Garas	—	Imre Gondos	Dr. Laszlo Hunyadi	Ferenc Mala
15 Cegled	Zoltan Krekacs	—	Istvan Giba	Iren Racz	Dr. Dezso Suranyi
16 Nagykoros	Dr. Istvan Koltai	—	Laszlo Lakos	Mihaly Banhalmi	Tibor Abraham

Somogy County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Kaposvar	—	Ferenc Lengyel	Dr. Janos Jasinka	—	Peter Szabados
2 Kaposvar	Zoltan Makai	Mrs. Dr. Laszlo Tarjan	Ferenc Kosa	—	Gyorgy Szigetvari
3 Siofok	—	Gellert Barkoczy	Dr. Ferenc Novak	—	Janos Horvath
4 Boglarlelle	—	Bela Nemeth	Dr. Ferenc Barabas	—	Dr. Antal Gaal
5 Marcali	—	Jozsef Istvan	Dr. Ferenc Horvath	—	Ferenc Katai
6 Nagyatad	Maria Szabo	Dr. Imre Sipos	Dr. Ferenc Horvath	—	Tamas Nagybacskai

Somogy County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Kaposvar	—	Dr. Maria Horvath	Dr. Tibor De Sorgo	Mrs. Istvan Szolosi	Dr. Bela Kiraly
2 Kaposvar	—	Imre Szabo	Andras Paszthy	Gyorgyi Lea Kiss	Dr. Gabor Pogany
3 Siofok	Csaba Varga	Miklos Ferenci	Dr. Jozsef Hazas	Albert Racz	Dr. Andras Paris
4 Boglarlelle	Dr. Sandor Gyenis	Dr. Lajos Kamu	Gyula Horn	Jozsef Schiller	Ferenc Kardos
5 Marcali	Janos Toldi	Istvan Lazar	Dr. Tamas Zugmann	Dr. Janos Novak	Peter Vermes
6 Nagyatad	—	Laszlo Persing	Laszlo Beke	Jozsef Bakas	Zoltan Orzsi

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Nyiregyhaza	Istvan Szentaszalyi	Dr. Miklos Nagy	Odon Merza	—	Dr. Peter Takacs
2 Nyiregyhaza	Laszlo Madi	Jozsef Gombos	Dr. Akos Bodnar	—	Dr. Geza Szilassy
3 Tiszavasvari	Istvan Clear	Dr. Ferenc Veress	no candidate	—	Istvan Varkonyi
4 Nagykallo	Kristof Kallay	Dr. Tibor Kiss	Mrs. Soltész (Ilona Padar)	—	Mrs. Jozsef Ratko
5 Baktaloranthaza	—	Mrs. Antal Farkas	Jozsef Szabados	—	Ferenc Jakab
6 Nyirbator	Robert Marosvari	Pal Balint	Karoly Kith	—	Dr. Laszlo Szendrei
7 Kisvarda	Gabor Csicsak	Balazs Revesz	Zoltan Sarossi	—	Mrs. Lengyel (Eva Toth)
8 Vasarosnameny	Lajos Bodnar	Szabo	Arpad Mathe Toth	—	Sandor M. Szucs
9 Mateszalka	—	Jozsef Torgyan	Dr. Miklos Vekony	—	Dr. Laszlo More
10 Fehergyarmat	—	Dr. Sandor Kavassy	Jozsef Konya	—	Laszlo Toth

Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Nyiregyhaza	—	Mrs. Szolosi (Eva Fitos)	Ferenc Kosa	Istvan Geger	Geza Laborczi
2 Nyiregyhaza	—	Laszlo Petho	Ferenc Bajta	Mrs. Barkocz	Istvan Lenti
3 Tiszavasvari	Dr. Arpad Olajos	Janos Berecz	Laszlo Kiss	Miklos Farkas	Laszlo Makkai
4 Nagykallo	Sandor Tanyi	Dr. Endre Horvath	Gyula Erdei	—	Kristof Kallai
5 Baktaloranthaza	Mrs. Istvan Kun	—	Janos Rucza	Mihaly Szucs	Laszlo Kozma
6 Nyirbator	—	Laszlo Iglodi	Janos Veres	—	Zsolt Fejes
7 Kisvarda	—	Tibor Koi	Dr. Imre Szabo	Antal Szanadi	Mrs. Dr. Bela Kriveczky
8 Vasarosnameny	Lajos Biro	—	Miklos Kelemen	—	Tamas Ivanyi
9 Mateszalka	Mihaly Czine	Imre Fabian	Karoly Varga	—	Istvan Domotor
10 Fehergyarmat	Karoly Molnar	Mihaly Katza	Dr. Bela Laszlo	Geza Dano	Zsigmond Siket

Tolna County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Szekszard	Peter Koczko	—	Mrs. Nyakas, Agnes Mohai	—	Dr. Gabor Ternak
2 Bonyhad	—	—	no candidate	—	Janos Figler
3 Dombovar	Jozsef Kling	—	Dr. Jozsef Solymosi	—	Gyorgy Ohnmacht
4 Paks	—	—	no candidate	—	Lajos Horvath
5 Tamasi	—	—	Janos Varga	—	Dr. Ibolya David

Tolna County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Szekszard	Dr. Judit Zaborszky	Zoltan Benko	Gyorgy Janossy	Pal Istvan Kis	Sandor Polyak
2 Bonyhad	Jozsef Pal	Erno Babel	Dr. Janos Simon	Zoltan Szeles	Jozsef Simony
3 Dombovar	Aranka Joo	Tibor Zsuro	Dr. Jozsef Kiss	Konrad Jung	Imre Barcza
4 Paks	Sandor Szalai Bognar	Laszlo Szugyi	Dr. Imre Radochay	Ferenc Lakatos	Attila Sarhegyi
5 Tamasi	Ferenc Lonhard	Janos Beres	Janos Molnar	Dr. Tibor Farkas	Mrs. Kiraly (Stefania Bekefi)

Vas County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Szombathely	Agota Hajnal	Tibor Buki	Janos Heckenast	—	Dr. Csaba Hende
2 Szombathely	Laszlo Kovacs	Bela Nemeth	Dr. Laszlo Szabo	—	Adam Karoly
3 Koszeg	Ferenc Galavics	Janos Eles	Tamas Basthy	—	Tamas Csapo
4 Sarvar	—	Dr. Tibor Denes	Otto Inzsel	—	Dr. Ferenc Gombos
5 Kormend	—	Dezso Balogh	Imre Meszaros	—	Lajos Fur

Vas County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Szombathely	Dr. Karoly Polgar	Pal Rapli	Dr. Gyorgy Ipkovits	Laszlo Pek	Dr. Miklos Hanko Farago
2 Szombathely	Jozsef Denes	Mrs. Nemeth (Erzsebet Koblev)	Jozsef Simon	Mrs. Jozsef Morsi	Jeno Racskai
3 Koszeg	Pal Nemeth	Janos Sardy	Nandor Felcsiki	Dr. Geza Kalasz	Vilmos Horvath
4 Sarvar	Dr. Istvan Poczik	Lajos Marocza	Imre Szabo	Laszlo Tarcis	Dr. Endre Monostori
5 Kormend	Dr. Tamas Kiss	Dr. Istvan Bankits	Dr. Ferenc Stipkovits	Dr. Jozsef Pesti	Bela Meszaros

Veszprem County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Ajka	—	Dr. Gyorgy Vilagosi	Dr. Istvan Mikola	—	Dr. Erzsebet Pusztai
2 Balatonfured	—	Imre Csonka	Istvan Szabo	—	Dr. Tamas Szabo
3 Papa	Laszlo Kover	Laszlo Banusz	Mrs. Lajos Schlecht	—	Dr. Tibor Penzes
4 Tapolca	—	Bela Janosa	Janos Sebok	—	Istvan Csizmadia
5 Varpalota	Peter Patenai	Laszlo Cziffra	Janos Csovari	—	Istvan Varsanyi
6 Veszprem	—	Ferenc Csizmadia	Lajos Tatay	—	Dr. Balazs Horvath
7 Veszprem	Zsuzsa Szelenyi	Istvan Bella	Dr. Jozsef Tolgyesi	—	Dr. Sandor Papp

Veszprem County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Ajka	—	—	Istvan Kalocsan	Sandor Molnar	Peter Madai
2 Balatonfured	Dezso Horvath	—	Dr. Istvan Ungvari	Istvan Orosz	Gyula Szor
3 Papa	—	Gabor Legman	Zoltan Gombos	Mrs. Imre Gyimrothi Gyenge	Dr. Laszlo Kover
4 Tapolca	Lajos Varga	Peter Szabo	Tamas Toth	Robert Czapp	Dr. Gyula Sary
5 Varpalota	Jozsef Hogyor	Csaba Rozsa	Tibor Leszkovszki	Dr. Istvan Kormoczi	Dr. Pal Huszar
6 Veszprem	Emod Migray	Lajos Horvath	Istvan Asztalos	Bela Gelencser	Dr. Lajos Shiszler
7 Veszprem	Laszlo Bodis	Gyula Thurmer	Bela Csaba	Dr. Laszlo Jozsa	Csaba D. Veress

Zala County

Voting District	Association of Young Democrats	Independent Small-holders, Agricultural Workers, and Bourgeois Party	Patriotic Election Coalition	Christian Democratic People's Party	Hungarian Democratic Forum
1 Zalaegerszeg	Csaba Bayer	Janos Szunyogh	Dr. Lajos Meszaros	—	Dr. Gyula Marx
2 Nagykanizsa	—	Ferenc Antalits	Laszlo Harkany	—	Attila Tranoczky
3 Keszthely	—	Janos Siklosi	Sandor Angyalosi	—	Denes Csengey
4 Lenti	Janos Szerdahelyi	—	Dr. Denes Palfi	—	Tihamer Toth
5 Zalaszentgrot	Robert Tamasa	—	Dr. Laszlo Belso	—	Robert Rudics

Zala County

Voting District	Hungarian People's Party	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party	Hungarian Socialist Party	Social Democratic Party of Hungary	Alliance of Free Democrats
1 Zalaegerszeg	—	Dr. Lajos Banfai	Mrs. Karasz (Dr. Lidia Racz)	Janos Tuboly	Dr. Istvan Szigethy
2 Nagykanizsa	—	Dr. Jozsef Vass	Laszlo Vari	Zoltan Nemeth	Karoly Solti
3 Keszthely	Dr. Simon Tibor Zala	Jozsef Deak	Dr. Ferenc Ligetvari	Andras Bartha	Pal Villanyi
4 Lenti	—	—	Balazs Szabo	Jozsef Pal	Lajos Ferenc Varga
5 Zalaszentgrot	Gabor Berkes	Jozsef Horvath	Laszlo Varga	Janos Tompos	Miklos Ari

YUGOSLAVIA

Noted Defense Lawyer Cites Shortcomings in Legal System

90EB0158A Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian
11 Nov 89 pp 16-21, 63, 73

[Interview with Srdja M. Popovic, chief partner in Belgrade law firm "Popovic, Popovic, Samardzija, and Popovic," by Srdjan Dvornik; date and place not given]

[Text] Making the defense of those accused of political crime a permanent part of one's law practice in a system where the constants of fundamental human, civil, and political rights do not apply—that is a phenomenon from another world. Indeed it is. Srdja M. Popovic, a 52-year-old lawyer, is the head of the prestigious Belgrade firm of attorneys which his father Miodrag founded back in 1933 and which today includes among its impressive clientele the American Express Corp., Chase Manhattan Bank, Rank Xerox, Coca-Cola Export, and dozens of others. He says that more than 100 years of "past labor" have been invested in the firm "Popovic, Popovic, Samardzija, and Popovic" (the first Popovic was Miodrag, who died in 1987, and the last his daughter Gordena; but the subject of our interview says his son might soon join the firm as well...), but today it also employs several attorneys in addition to the partners. Placed alongside the Big World image of business success, the defense of political losers marked with the indelible label "enemy" and the tug-of-war through the courts and prisons in which you even have to prove that official persons are not permitted to use bad language, has to seem at least as exotic as the appearance of Popovic's prestigious clients in the Yugoslav "political economy."

The explanation that this is the bizarre hobby of a successful businessman can hardly be squared with a persistence that has endured for a quarter of a century now (if not longer). Perhaps passionate devotion to some particular political outlook? His first major political case—the trial of M. Mihajlov and the other "democrats" (this is not irony, but the name which they wished to give to their party)—certainly did not involve people whose political outlooks coincided with those of the people whom Popovic defended after the events in 1968 and later. The protagonists in our movement of contestation adopted him to such an extent that the little poem scribbled on a flier that was

passed around the courtroom during one of the trials in 1970 is still remembered in the folklore of 1968:

*Walls, walls,
But where is the door?
Please get me
Srdja the lawyer!*

Now, although he really did become friends with many of them, to this day there are still people on his client list under political indictments who in 1968 could only have represented the opposite side; let us mention only Dr. Marko Veselica. Popovic is obviously defending something in all these trials, but that something is not any particular political interest.

The extreme example of this is the defense of Andrija Artukovic, of which he was to say in an interview with NON (NOVE OMLADINSKE NOVINE) in Belgrade in the fall of 1986 that he took the case precisely because it was unpopular. He even stipulated conditions (which Artukovic's son accepted): He could not defend the Ustasha cause and the Independent State of Croatia, nor could he deny the genocide—but that did not work against the maximum effort in the defense, an effort which, as shown by a portion of this interview, a portion in which he was particularly interested, has not relented even today. Nevertheless, it seems, one should take the man at his word: that is, that we are "dealing" with defense of the very right to legal proceedings, the right to the status of a full-fledged citizen belonging to everyone who has not been convicted under the final judgment of an independent court...of everything that is so superficially inferred—or ignored—in the everyday use of the phrase "law-governed state."

On the occasion already mentioned, he complained that among the victims of subordination of the law to political interest there is not by any means an absolute readiness to recognize everyone's right in abstracto...and he concludes the thought with an unfinished sentence which the editors of the youth newspaper used as a headline: "I am not a Serb, but a lawyer." In our conversation, he recalls how this vocation has imbued the entire life of the best representatives of the legal tradition of members of the Belgrade bar and how his father introduced himself merely as: "Miodrag Popovic, lawyer." But even that generation of his predecessors had to discover that defense of the law, for all its refusal to be classified in a political party, creates a

"party" in opposition to the system. Which is why he takes part in political actions to change legislation—against thought crime, in favor of recognition of equality before the law regardless of political convictions.... But in the trial which he considers the farthest reach of an unsuccessful policy, there was no opportunity to be defense counsel in the first instance. He was called as a witness in the trial of the six participants in the Belgrade "independent university" (which was sufficient as formal grounds to prevent him from being defense counsel), although in the opinion of the court there was nothing he could testify about. On an earlier occasion, a defendant was promised a lower sentence if he did not hire him for his defense (he defended him on appeal). And so on....

In short, Srdja Popovic, lawyer.

[START] How did you happen to become probably our best-known "lawyer for political defendants"?

[Popovic] I do not know even myself. A certain family tradition probably had an important role. My father did a great deal of defense work in trials like this. Communists before the war and their political opponents after it. When I came into his firm in 1960, he was then the age I am now, and he felt that he was too old for this kind of practice, which I am beginning to understand. This kind of practice requires the investment of immense effort, work, patience, self-control, and the results are at best close to "positive zero." Usually, the best you can hope for is to win all the battles and lose the war. It is an immense handicap to enter the game with a charge against you. You are playing with a marked deck or, in chess jargon, you start out with a handicap of five major pieces, and also the rules change constantly in an unpredictable way; in this game, every pawn can pass you when you least expect it. This, of course, tires out a man, although there is a pleasure in that professional challenge of a game in which you carry such a heavy handicap. It puts a higher value on your victories. The first major case I defended was the case of Mihailo Mihailov, Pedja Ristic, Leonid Sejka, Franjo Zenko, Daniel Ivin, Mar-ijan Batinic and others who had tried to establish a democratic party. That was in 1966. They were, of course, arrested at once. Today, even the Socialist Alliance could sign at the bottom of its program. After that came 1968. I was still young and could communicate easily with young people. I felt a sympathy for them in their moral rebellion, in their attempt to stand tall, although their political programs were, of course, confused and contradictory and politically illiterate. At that time, an entire generation spoke up spontaneously, demanding the right to live its own life, and not just to carry out programs of their elders. I defended many of those students, with many I became friends and have remained friends to this day. Those trials aroused widespread interest, and it seems to me that they made me a specialist, so that others also began to come to me.

[START] And now after more than 25 years' experience, which case would you single out today as the most interesting, the one from which you learned the most, or

perhaps the case which was the sign of some decisive political change of direction?

[Popovic] You always learn something, although, of course, you learn less and less as time passes; things begin to recur in a murderously boring way. The most interesting defenses were for me those in proceedings to prohibit various books, magazines, and newspapers. Analyzing the content which is being prohibited and preparing the defense, you have to learn a lot about many topics, mostly political, which the banned authors have been concerned with. Aside from that there is less tension, because the stakes are not a man's life, and you can experiment more freely with various approaches. However, I think that in terms of general political importance the "trial of the six" was the most decisive. I played a part in that trial only on appeal. I would single it out since I think that that trial, along with that of Djogo, say, whom I also defended, destroyed a stable pattern of the political trial in postwar Yugoslavia. It upset the rhythm in which the system pulsed like a kind of heart. That system, torn by its contradictory impulse to truly legitimize itself, that is, to obtain the political support of the citizenry, and the impulse to nevertheless control everything, would become ultimately broader and narrower, first it would grant liberties, then it would take them away, at regular intervals. It initiated reforms and terminated reforms, it initiated dialogue and terminated dialogue. At the time of the "trial of the six," that rhythm was trying to mow down the 1,000 flowers which had bloomed, it was a time of cutting flowers...and when that was not successful, all the subsequent attempts, from the White Paper to, say, Opacic, were unsuccessful. The heart had "skipped a beat."

[START] What kind of stable pattern was it that was operative up to that time?

[Popovic] You see, I have been involved in this for 25 years, and in the course of that time newspapermen, especially from abroad, would come to me every five or six years and ask me excitedly "And now a liberalization is under way in your country?" or "They are coming down hard on dissenters in your country." In a small segment of time, it really could look like that. However, in fact this is all one process, like walking, your back foot is pointed backward, and you make progress with the front foot. That is, the party, which makes decisions about the political situation and in that area, as soon as it feels weak begins to put on great political pressure and begins to say: "We will not stop short even of administrative measures," and so on, and then these trials begin. As soon as people become frightened, when they fall silent, the party feels a bit better and also wants to have some legitimacy, and then begins what is referred to as the process of democratization, and people are given a little free rein. However, very soon it becomes evident that this is now actually undermining legitimacy, and there is a new swing to repression; that is the way the pendulum moves. Thus, you have a strange phenomenon in Yugoslavia with these political trials in that people are tried, for example, for what they said two, three, five, or even seven years before. Which means that during the period of liberalization lists are kept, and when

it is felt that things have gone too far, then there are trials based on those lists. But the process behind that facade is always the same.

[START] But all of you who make a public commitment against such trials nevertheless behave as though that process was not so inevitable.

[Popovic] The question of opportunity is another matter, since there is a constant assessment of whether to initiate trials or not. For instance, the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe is approaching, we need loans, Tito is supposed to get the Nobel Prize...those are all elements of a purely tactical nature which decide how much freedom Yugoslav citizens will be granted at a particular moment. When that situation changes, and when opportunity no longer demands that those considerations be respected, the policy also changes, but actually nothing is changing. What happened with the trial of the six, for example, is that the pendulum was not able to swing back to the other side. That was the first time it failed. A need was felt for the criticism to become very radical and to begin to touch what we call the "permanent commitments," i.e., legitimacy was seriously shaken, there was a desire to halt that process, but it was unsuccessful. The resistance was too great.

[START] What are the chances, on the basis of your experience, of winning a political trial?

[Popovic] There have been cases in which people were acquitted, and I do not take credit for that, just as I do not blame myself that many of them were convicted. The client always determines the defense. It may not be the client's primary interest to stay out of prison. There are people who are "saving their own skin," and then you follow that flow. However, there are people to whom it is much more important to defend their honor and dignity or their right to think differently, or they see the trial as an opportunity to give publicity to their political views, regardless of the consequences, and in such a case you cannot disavow someone. You have to go along with him. If that is his tactic, then, of course, the chances of a favorable outcome are minimal. There is something else that is interesting, but I do not know the answer. It would be interesting to see what is the percentage of acquittals in political trials compared to the same percentage in ordinary criminal trials....

[START] ...And there are no statistics on that?

[Popovic] There are no statistics on that. I think they would show that the percentage of acquittals of charges for political crimes is very low. Surprisingly, there are quite a few verdicts where you manage to achieve significant reductions of the sentence in the subsequent phases of proceedings, in the higher courts; Seselj, for instance, from 8 years to 1.5, Veselica from 11 to 7, Selic from seven years to one.... But that is another matter. This is because the lower court does not want to take any risk and would rather "make a mistake" on the side of being overzealous and to display sternness toward the adversary, rather than being too easy. And then the higher court, which has

greater political authority and does not have to prove itself to that extent, because it has already gotten where it was supposed to get, allows itself to moderate that. Or again, the same thing happens when the first court pronounces its verdict, and there is an "uproar" in public, or pressure from outside and inside, and there is some retreat under that pressure, and the sentence is reduced even quite significantly. I think this is only evidence that there is no such thing as an independent court here, since the court is obviously subject to pressures, even pressures of that kind. It gives in to the pressure to convict the accused, but it also gives in to the pressure to moderate the sentence later on. Just look at the case of Opacic: as a practical matter I welcome his acquittal, but this obviously occurred under pressure.

[START] Something like a sign of bad conscience?

[Popovic] No doubt about it, this was done under pressure. Had there been silence, if no one had paid any attention to him, he would have gotten 3 years.

[START] I was just about to ask you, on the basis of your experience, how much, judging by the "artillery preparation," was he "supposed" to get?

[Popovic] Three years. At least on the basis of what I know about this. I defended a Hungarian in Vojvodina last year who said far "less" than Opacic; for example, he was accused among other things of not liking to listen to Serbian folk music, of having said that he did not like that "hillbilly music," and in so doing, the prosecutor said, he had "deprecated Serbian folk art." The court in Subotica sentenced him to 2.5 years in the first case. He also said that the Hungarians did not have enough theaters and books in Hungarian, that the cultural development of Hungarians in Yugoslavia was being frustrated, that Hungarians had more rights in Hungary—which I think is a notorious fact—so that by those standards what Opacic said would mean 3 years. However, there was no one to raise his voice for that man there, and he was convicted.

[START] That topic obviously goes beyond the pressures of the moment under which court verdicts are rendered. How much does our legal system itself, even the Constitution, contribute to the possibility of making political activity criminal?

[Popovic] It is a rather simple matter, and I think that at this point all Yugoslavs have figured out what is really going on. First of all, we have a constitution in force which does not guarantee citizens equality before the law regardless of political commitments. This is not by accident; it was not some oversight. This is in keeping with the ideological foundations of that constitution. The Constitution by definition restricted the rights and freedoms of Yugoslav citizens not only in terms of the same such rights and freedoms of others, but also by virtue of something which is referred to as "the interests of the socialist community." In the preamble of the Constitution you can see that "the interest of the working class" is one of the principal ones among those

"interests of the socialist community." That interest is articulated, represented, and defended by the LCY. Accordingly, all rights and freedoms granted to citizens by the Constitution are limited by the assessment of the LCY as to what is in the interest of the working class and what is not. In other words, that entire body of human rights in Yugoslav constitutions—it is identical in the constitutions of the republics—may look very fine from outside, and full of all kinds of things, but there is a small hole drilled in it through which it can all leak out.

[START] How?

[Popovic] As soon as the competent political factor says that something is counterrevolutionary, there are no longer any rights to which you can appeal. Because their scope is determined by that political assessment, and, which makes it still worse, that assessment is made after the fact. Thus, you get retroactive application of the law. The best example of that is application of Article 114 of the SFRY Criminal Law, and that the way it has been applied in Croatia and in Kosovo (which is the main place where it has been applied), and elsewhere the people have been called to account for the official policy of the central committees. They have been held accountable for what they did in a time when that was official policy. When the policy changed, hundreds of people were automatically pushed over into the criminal sphere. After the fact. They could not have known that that political assessment would change. If you look at the statistics, you will see that that Article 114 is not in fact ever applied except moments when there are radical changes of direction in political assessments of certain issues. It serves in fact as an instrument for changing a policy, it makes the change of direction convincing and clear to everyone, and, as they say, it "breaks down the resistance." Which means that if sympathizers of that faction which has ended up in the minority still have any illusions, they had better be quiet.

[START] What about the laws? They ought to be more definite than the Constitution.

[Popovic] Very indefinite laws necessarily must follow from constitutional provisions of that kind. Those vague laws use unbounded terms such as "true" (what does the word "true" mean), an act "aimed" at "bringing down the power of the working class," "against brotherhood and unity," and the "achievements," and so on. What does that word "aimed" mean? This necessitates an entire series of very subjective conclusions, and that court—which we require to be independent—when it receives an indictment of this kind, must by the nature of things use the political assessments of the authority. I will illustrate this with an example: I defended in the case of the ban of Nebojsa Popov's book "Drustveni sukobi" [Social Conflicts]. This is a scholarly book with a bibliography running to 600 items, about 500 footnotes, containing a whole series of political assessments which are backed up with a great many arguments and documentation, regardless of whether they are accurate, whether they are true. Of course, they are not all true; if

they were, that would mean that Nebojsa Popov had grasped the truth about Yugoslav society...of course, they could not all be true.

[START] But how can the court "ascertain" that?

[Popovic] Here is what happens: When the court is forced to assess whether Nebojsa Popov's book and his conclusions are true, it ought to read all those 600 books in the bibliography and those 200 books which Nebojsa Popov read, which that court did not, and then evaluate the truth of his political assessments. And as a practical matter that court did not do so, nor is that its duty, but the law still has to be applied. It must ascertain whether it is true or not. How will it ascertain that? Then the safest thing for it to do is simply to compare the assessments of Nebojsa Popov with the official political assessments, and if they do not agree, it proclaims them untrue. The court has no other way out. And it was the legislator himself who put the court in that situation when it gave it an impossible task to perform.

[START] Which means that political bias is not (only) a matter of psychology and ideology, but is also a part of the system that is built into the court's function?

[Popovic] You see here that the function of political legislation—when we are talking about verbal crimes—is to protect legitimacy. By coercion. And if—as you surely know—legitimacy is defined as belief in the optimum nature of the existing political institutions, this means that you want to impose that belief by force. And that is inquisition: imposition of belief by force. At the same time, this also explains why the political trials exist in such systems. They exist above all because the authority is aware that it is not legitimate, that is, it is never certain that it is legitimate, since it has never exposed itself to an opposition, nor has it exposed itself to free elections, and there is no confirmation whatsoever about how the citizenry, the "people," react to that authority. Thus, it is always in a state of paranoid fear, since it is not certain of its own legitimacy, which has not been verified in the way in which it is verified in democratic societies. This occurs particularly when power is first taken, when that doubt is greatest, and in moments of crisis, when it is felt that that legitimacy is in question, when a crisis of legitimacy occurs. It is a characteristic of our country at this point that trials of that kind are relatively difficult to carry out, but in my opinion that is because the crisis of legitimacy has crossed a threshold beyond which it cannot be suppressed even by such means. The balance of power has changed. If you like, the system is not functioning any longer. It is no longer a question of freedom given to us, but a freedom which has been taken....

[START] In speaking about the cases you have defended, we almost constantly run up against the category of differing political opinion—so often that we all begin to pass over things which ought to amaze us: How is it that in our country thinking (expressed, of course) is treated

both judicially and politically as an act, as a kind of physical attack on the system?

[Popovic] For thinking being treated as an act we have to thank a "legal theory" which has been developed by the "theoreticians" of this system, and according to which thinking prepares the act. If the act prepared is very dangerous, such as "counterrevolution," for example, then even the most remote preparatory acts should be prohibited. This is taken so far as to prohibit even the expression of opinion, an elementary and necessary psychological need of man as a social creature. Life is actually being prohibited. In the light of what we have already said, this should not surprise us. This has already grown to become an entire view of the world. When we speak, say, about our fundamental commitments which we will never back away from, about the right to self-determination which has been consumed, about the right to associate that has been consumed, we are saying that entire generations are being prohibited from living their life: that is, from having their own fundamental commissions, from their own self-determination and association. We tell them that they must repeat the life of their fathers, those fathers who have left these debts. That is cruel. But it demonstrates a general need of the system to prohibit movement, to preserve society as it is forever. That is, of course, impossible.

[START] But almost all those who oppose the consequences of such standards—constitutional and legal—have appeared to receive an effective response, at least recently: "You yourself are advocating a law-governed state; well then, there is the law, and please keep silent when the court or the administration acts according to it"! What do we actually mean when we say "law-governed state," and are our standards truly those of the law?

[Popovic] No, they are not. And that law they are pointing out to you only appears to be a law, just as the Constitution on which it was enacted is only apparently a constitution, and just as the obligation of the state to honor is only an apparent obligation, assumed, as they say in the law, under a "si volam" clause ("if I please"), which makes it legally null and void. If such standards have any legal effect—it would consist of "prescribing" the tyranny of whoever enacts and applies such "laws." The fact that those "laws" are enacted through bodies which are responsible for enacting laws and bear such a title does not make them laws by that fact. Legal theory knows what the necessary content of a law is. A law-governed state is a state in which the will of yesterday, expressed unambiguously in a law, places an obligation on today. It is based, then, on domination of the principle of legal security over the principle of expediency. It carries out the will of yesterday, which is clearly fixed in the law, regardless of whether this suits some interest today, even though it be the interest of the state itself which enacted that law and is applying it.

[START] And what is not a law-governed state?

[Popovic] By contrast with the law-governed state, there is a state whose "legal" order is based on domination of the principle of expediency. For instance, "the law is what is good for the German people," as Hitler said, or "the law is what is in the interest of the working class," as Stalin said, and then Radbruch calls that state a police state. The standards of that kind of legislation are characterized by an unexpressed or incompletely, unclearly, and ambiguously expressed will today, so that tomorrow the changeable and everyday interests proclaimed to be the supreme value of the system can be pursued by appealing to that kind of "standard." In this case, the standard is no longer set up so that it clearly prescribes the conditions of its validity and is then unconditionally valid, but it leaves open the conditions of its validity and tells the person to whom it is addressed to apply or not to apply the standard, or to apply it in this or that way depending on how that would serve "our purpose." In such a state, the entire law is instrumentalized, arbitrariness is prescribed which is restricted only by the political assessment of what serves our purpose, and what does not. A "law" which does not resolve a conflict of interest, but applies only under condition that it is in someone's interest, is no law at all. These are actually administrative acts dressed up in different clothing.

[START] For example?

[Popovic] If you have the "right" to a passport only when this does not go against the interests of state security, and those interests are determined by an administrative agency at its own free discretion, which need not be substantiated, then you do not have any right at all. You may in fact even have a passport, but you do not have a right to it in the sense that one must be issued to you if you meet clearly defined conditions. Eight faculty members were expelled from the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University under a law which allowed this to be done "in the general interest." What kind of right to work is that? None. It is conditional upon the arbitrary assessment of some "general interest." And if it has been made so arbitrarily conditional, then it does not exist as a right. Whoever interprets those "interests" has a completely free hand, he is "obligated" to honor your right only if he wishes, "si volam," he has no obligation to you whatsoever, and this means that you do not have any right at all.

[START] Nevertheless, in the practice of a lawyer who must defend before courts which judge according to the laws such as they are, there necessarily must be an appeal at least to certain elements of the law which can be found in those laws. Judging by your cases known to me, it seems that the court is capable of even passing calmly over explicit and unambiguous standards which actually put you, the defense counsel, in the right. Is that really possible?

[Popovic] I should say so. That is even the most frequent case concerning explicit and unambiguous norms, which by and large is true of procedural norms. Precisely

because they cannot be stretched any way you like, as is the case, for example, with provisions about verbal crimes or counterrevolution. Even here, there are norms that can be stretched, but not so many of them. A procedural norm that is often violated in political trials is the standard that the court cannot use in evidence the statement of a presumptive witness made to the SUP [Secretariat of Interior Affairs] in what is referred to as an informative conversation. In political trials, the courts do this regularly. I had the case of a Hungarian writer in Subotica who was charged with inciting ethnic enmity. SUP gathered statements from people around him, and that is what he was charged with. The investigating judge examined the witnesses by presenting them those statements and asking whether that was what they said in the SUP? When they confirmed this, he copied that into the minutes as their judicial interrogation. Then in the trial the witnesses all say that the SUP intimidated them, frightened them, made promises to them, interrogated them even for 17 hours through the night, in short, extorted the statements from them, that none of what they said was true. The District Court in Subotica found the accused guilty and based its verdict on evidence given to the investigating judge, but actually it was based on statements obtained by coercion in the SUP. Had the court respected procedural norms, it would have had to find that the statements of the SUP could not be used in proceedings at all, least of all used to confront a witness, since this put pressure on him to repeat what he said to law enforcement agencies under circumstances that were not controlled. I read that this is done on a large scale, and I have had many such experiences. As for material standards, they do not have to be violated so much, since they can be stretched.

[START] Because the crimes are vague?

[Popovic] Yes. However, the standards are set up more firmly concerning procedure; they cannot be ideologized, everyone knows what judicial procedure is, it cannot be politicized to such an extent, above all because it also applies to the conventional criminal. One of the most serious procedural violations in political trials is refusing material defense to the accused. The court simply does not allow the accused to prove his innocence. It simply proclaims that evidence to be superfluous. I defended Paraga at his trial in Zagreb. He was accused of untruthfully representing the living conditions in certain prisons on Croatia. The Republic Secretariat for Jurisprudence, which is accountable for the state in the prisons, filed a criminal charge. The only evidence on which the court based its verdict was the official report of that same secretariat to the effect that the situation in the prisons is wonderful, and it was in turn based on confidential reports of the prison administrations to which Paraga was pointing. We listened to that evidence, and then we offered 108 pieces of evidence, mainly the testimony of people who had felt the benefits of those conditions at first hand. The evidence was devastating. The court refused to allow it, arguing that it was not to the point....

[START] What does "refusing" mean? Did it refute it, or did it disallow it?

[Popovic] It did not allow that evidence to be presented in the trial. For it, the bare denial of the executive authority responsible for that situation in the prisons was sufficient. The court simply did not allow the material truth to be established and...which is typical of our courts...it pronounced against the accused a suspended sentence and prohibited him from public expression, required that he be silent.... It thus appeared that the court realized where the truth lay, but at the same time it protected the responsible executive agency which had demanded this by filing the criminal charge.

[START] In such a proceeding, is it a question of direct violations of procedural standards?

[Popovic] Well, even a layman realizes that. The right of the accused to defend himself at all has almost no content whatsoever if that right is reduced to mere denial. His main right is to present evidence in his favor. Without the right to present evidence, he is nothing more than an object of proceedings. The court can never reject what is called conflicting evidence, evidence can be superfluous only if it continues to prove facts which the court feels have already been established, but never evidence to the contrary. Hearing the other side in fact means listening to its evidence, not its denial of the charge. But if those rights are persistently violated in practice, that practice begins to be legitimized automatically. Then you have a decline in professional competence, since nothing even needs to be known if nothing has to be duly substantiated. There is a growing feeling that actually everything is permitted, and the only thing that is important is not to make a political mistake. All the rest is "formality" and "grumbling between lawyers." And that view has its basis even in the Constitution itself, in its spirit and its essence, in domination of the principle of expediency which the Constitution postulates. If you are on the "good side" and represent "our cause," say the general interest or interest of the working class or something of the kind, it is not important that you have made a mistake in this or that form. The only important thing is that you did not cause what is referred to as political damage. And this is where that takes you. I will take the liberty to tell you this story: In Artukovic's trial, the indictment failed to fulfill a procedural requirement of furnishing the court all the papers in the case. Earlier interrogations of the major witness, on whose testimony the entire charge was based, remained in the prosecutor's briefcase. We, of course, noted that and asked the court to order the prosecutor's office to turn over those records or as part of its official duty obtain it from another court which had previously interrogated Avdic in this case. The court rejected our motion. We were defending on the basis of an incomplete record. The court convicted the accused on the basis of an incomplete record and sentenced him to death. It pronounced an unlawful death sentence—and that in a case that was announced as a world test of Yugoslav jurisprudence. Then, those records came out, and it was evident from

them that Avdic was giving false testimony. The only consequence of that is that Gajski, the judge, became the top man in the Croatian judiciary. The assessment is probably that he perhaps did make a professional mistake, but not a political mistake. It would be politically unimaginable to force the star witness to lie in such a trial, it would have been politically unthinkable to acquit Artukovic, which is what would have had to happen if the procedure had been respected. The court decided to make the professional mistake instead of the political mistake, and he was promoted.

[START] Is there something that the public can do concerning these violations...?

[Popovic] Can I tell you something in that connection? When the public in spite of everything manages to make itself heard on some case, then it is immediately said: "Pressure is being put on the court." As though that court and that judge depend for their existence upon the public, not upon those political bigwigs who stop at nothing to prejudice guilt in a political trial. And the public has learned something. It puts pressure on political factors, forcing them to relent in their pressure on the court. It is clear to everyone who is the decisive factor. The public does not believe in an independent court. That is why very frequently it no longer even says "This is not right," but will use "craft" and will say: "Well, this is neither in the interest of that authority, nor in the interest of the LCY," "and so it is not in your interest either." So even the public resorts to that talk about interest, merely attempting to reinterpret that interest for the person who is making the decision. Only when that public becomes too outspoken and excited does it produce a new interest in politics, and in order to calm down that public, it then truly comes to have a real interest in backing off a step or two, rarely completely.

[START] Exactly who, with the exactness of a lawyer, may not make public statements about cases sub judice?

[Popovic] Well, first of all, the person on whom the judge depends, since his pressure is the only effective one, and that is the power of the state. In those political systems in which there is a separation of powers, this applies above all to the other two branches—the executive and legislative. However, in our country there is no separation of powers, not even at the institutional level; under our Constitution, power is unified, since it has a single source—the "working class." In that sense, the court is not independent even under the Constitution. Second, a statement may not be made to the effect that the accused is guilty. It is permitted to say that he is innocent. Why? What is the difference? Well, the difference is that even the law itself presumes innocence, and one can speak of guilt only when a criminal court has issued a final verdict. To say that someone is guilty of a crime before the court has spoken constitutes the crime of slander even if later the accused should be found guilty. This is a crime for which no one in this country has ever been held accountable.

[START] Does public commitment help at all?

[Popovic] I can say from my own experience that public protests help if they reach a certain intensity. Below that threshold they may even be counterproductive. Because they show that the accused is not alone, and he thereby becomes more dangerous in the perception of the persecutors, and he is still weak enough so that he can be beaten, so then he should be beaten more fiercely. If you cross that threshold, assessment of the political opportunity changes, the trial becomes too expensive, you are dealing with too broad a front, and it is better not to advance along it so quickly.

[START] And are those who initiate political trials capable of drawing any lesson from it, or is it later just as easy to file criminal charges for political activity?

[Popovic] I have the impression that the public is encouraged by every success it has, while on the other side, it seems to me, lessons are learned much more slowly. They are learned much more slowly because on that side something fundamental has to be changed. That form of repression—I must reiterate this—is inherent in that system, and that is why it "learns" more slowly, since it contradicts its nature to learn that definitively. It feels that if it were ever to fully comprehend that in the manner in which the public sees it, it would cut off the branch it is sitting on. So with every new trial that comes along, a person thinks: "Well, it is not possible that this will actually be carried out!"—and yet every time it is. And you see that the person carrying it out has actually received a political whipping before, but it did not teach him anything, and this happens all over again every time. The most recent is the trial of Vllasi. Well, who can fail to understand what this will evoke? All kinds of protests? But it is going forward, since that is the momentum of the system.

[START] In connection with the upcoming trial of Azem Vllasi, as a guest of the Council of the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, you specifically cautioned that it is dangerous to use the views of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] in the indictment. This is obviously related to that basing of the "right" which we have been talking about on "interest." However, today there is no longer an unambiguous ideological interpretation of that interest which the LCY represented, as can in fact be seen in the question of whose interest it is to try Vllasi—the Yugoslav interest, the Serbian interest (or perhaps Serb interest), or the Kosovo interest (Albanian interest)? So really, whose trial is this?

[Popovic] This type of system is built on the assumption of establishing a powerful central interpreter and coordinator. When that element of the system disappeared (with Tito's death), the entire system showed itself incapable of functioning normally. The so-called federalization or confederalization of the party is completely normal. It is even strange how long it took to occur. What we are experiencing now is the day after Tito's

death. It took nine years. This is that slow motion of ours. Everyone was asking with good reason what would happen after Tito's death? Well, here it is. In order to be successful, the politician today does not legitimize himself by acceptance "from above"; he is no longer co-opted into power, he must legitimize himself at home. That also changes his tactics. Everyone takes hold of some element of the system according to local preference, and then he builds local legitimacy on that element and wages a struggle within the party, trying to impose that interest as the universal one. Every republic leadership is saving itself in its own way and is accusing all the others, which are doing the same thing, of tearing it down. All of them together are destroying the legitimacy of the entire party. Thus, one beats the other with centralism, the latter replies with separatism; the second beats the third with counterrevolution; the third beats the fourth with dogmatism and Stalinism; the fourth beats the fifth with liberalism...there is something here for everyone, this arsenal was accumulated over 40 years and is now accessible to everyone, since there is no longer a central place that would issue gun permits. I do not want to evade your question: Vllasi is being tried in the interest of the Serbian political leadership. In a law-based state in which legislation and the courts have not been instrumentalized, a trial like this could not even be imagined. That is, it is a case in which the winners in a struggle within the party want to drive the defeated into the ground, using for that purpose the court, which in a law-governed state would have to be above all parties. I have read the indictment of Vllasi, and the political conceptions contained in that indictment deserve analysis. According to that indictment, I quote from memory, Azem Vllasi "had a strong influence on the popular masses," "he spoke the longest, they embraced him, and kissed him," the citizens assembled "greeted him enthusiastically," "he was given one ovation after another," "his name was shouted," "they sang songs," and, by contrast with the others, "they did not whistle him down." Put simply, he is popular. However, he was defeated in that struggle within the party, and now that popularity of his is dangerous to the victors, it could resurrect him. That is why now in the indictment that popularity of his is said to be apparent, while the popularity of the victors is the only real popularity. It is explained that the workers "had a poor understanding of the nature of the person they were greeting," "that they had no idea why they were demonstrating and gathering in public," "that they neither realized nor understood their own demands," since they are "uninformed, untaught, subjugated, and dependent," by contrast with the victor, it must be inferred, is well understood by his followers, who have realized, understood, and knew what he wanted, since they are informed, educated, free, and independent. The court cannot, of course, be a place for deciding whose popularity is "real," and whose is "apparent." Asking that of the court is the same as calling upon it to use the coercion of the state in a

political struggle. In a law-governed state, in a parliamentary democracy—the voters and only the voters make that decision. The court has nothing to do with that.

[START] There is another peculiar thing in the indictment of Vllasi, although this is not the first time it has turned up. The prosecutor alludes to the speech of Lazar Mojsov in the Federal Assembly: Mojsov asserted there that the SFRY Presidency was aware of the entire strategic plan of the "counterrevolution" in Kosovo, and that assertion of his is now being used as a charge against Vllasi. A few years ago, when Aziz Kelmendi killed four soldiers in Paracin, Defense Minister Branko Mamula once again in the Assembly spoke about the over 200 cases that had been discovered of outlaw organizations of Albanian soldiers. What can be concluded from these subsequent discoveries of full-blown conspiracies? Is it that the authorities are constructing a pretext for reprisals after the fact, or perhaps it is precisely those who "knew" what was being prepared that themselves should now be held accountable?

[Popovic] I do not wish to join in the universal passion for writing indictments, especially not as a lawyer, especially not in a state which is not governed by law. I would say, however, that what is involved here is something that Franz Neumann refers to as the generally "conspiratorial theory of history" which has been operative in our country for half a century. It first took the form of the "capitalist encirclement." Certain sinister forces are always after us, and the salvation lies in identification with the leader. When the masses are unable to grasp the process of history, a natural fear arises. Thanks to manipulation by the leader, it becomes a neurotic fear of persecution, and salvation is sought in an absolute duel with one person, the historical process is personified, just as the plots of the devil are personified. Fear is overcome through identification with the leader. Our system created fertile soil for that theory, since it created the isolated human being filled with fear who then displays aggressive instincts and the need to identify. I think that this is the truth about Yugoslavia as a whole, although the process has not progressed equally everywhere. But that isolated person and his fear of what he does not understand is everywhere, and we are attracted by that conspiratorial theory of history everywhere.

[START] Might it not be said that there is a certain ironical "luck" in those cases when influential politicians publicly prejudice the guilt of political defendants, since then at least it is clearly evident that there is political influence on the court...?

[Popovic] Of course, this could also be done secretly, and it probably is done secretly much more than it is done publicly.... But I think that in the case of prejudicial statements made publicly, it is once again not a question of pressure on the court, since when it can be done secretly, why would it be done in public? Here, it is a question of pressure on the public, and the purpose is to let it know that if it protests, it will have the political

authority to deal with, that it is destroying a high political authority, and that it is better for it to keep its mouth shut. This is "made known," and that is what makes it public. For instance, if the chief of state proclaims someone guilty, then I come into direct conflict with the chief of state if I say he is innocent. The point is for me to think about what I will do now!

[START] In the interview with NON almost exactly 3 years ago, you said that in our country there can be no question of the possibility of specializing in defending political defendants in the way that certain members of the prewar generation did, Veljko Kovacevic and Jora Barovic....

[Popovic] Well, today I certainly would qualify that statement. Several lawyers have emerged, younger than I, who defend many such cases. To be sure, even today one cannot speak about specialization, but today you nevertheless do have Zeljko Olujic, Silvije Degen, Aleksandar Lojpur, Tanja Petovar, the younger Barovic (Nikola), and another of Vllasi's defense attorneys—Rajko Danilovic, and Drago Demsar....

[START] Yes, but obviously the conditions still do not exist for specialization. It would be good if it were a question of there not being work for lawyers like that; but when, as you said on the occasion referred to, there are as many as 500 such indictments a year, something else is involved. In altogether practical terms, what is the proportion of political cases in the practice of Srdja Popovic?

[Popovic] It depends on the point of view from which you make the estimate. According to time invested or material results, that share ranges from small to very small. On the basis of energy invested, it is very great, since here there is no routine, and because it is very difficult to find in oneself, to build in oneself, the motivation to invest immense labor and persistence, when the prospects of success are slim. When you finally succeed, and it is more and more difficult every time, when you are satisfied that you have done your job and relax, you are standing in the courthouse corridor and waiting for the decision, and you always think one and the same thing, "It is not possible that even this one will be convicted," but somewhere you know that he will, since they always do it, although it always seems impossible. That is what drives you to seek your motivation on the other side. In the awareness that you are performing a public service, that you are not defending just that person, who is here the most important, but also all the others, future and past, that you are defending a principle, that you are helping people to at least remain upright and perhaps even making some contribution to educating the public and indeed even the court itself and the prosecutor, that you are contributing a bit to changing some kind of overall climate in which such things were possible yesterday, and are already a bit less possible even today, that you are making such trials a bit more expensive for politics, that perhaps you are having an impact on the assessment of the opportunity for

initiating future ones. When I see how slowly it goes, I think it is good that these younger people have come along, people whose experience has not been so black and who can commit themselves with more innocence and belief in success, with stronger motivation, and thereby also with a greater penetrating force. I am becoming more and more aware that in the law, at least in this kind of law, experience need not be a decisive advantage.

[START] Perhaps not, but in your defenses you constantly note the presence of a certain intellectual dimension of the attorney's independence. This is not flattery: I am referring to the fact that in many cases you have managed to give a certain new direction to the defense, to discover some new point of support. I remember when I was a student, reading in PRAXIS, No 1-2, 1973, the text of your concluding statement in the trial against Bozidar Jaksic in Sarajevo, and I experienced as a kind of discovery your refusal to argue the truthfulness of the assertion for which Jaksic had been indicted. Today, such things may seem trivial, clear to anyone familiar with the law, but it seems to me that at the time that entire casting of the burden of proof from the defense to the prosecution was an important innovation. But here it is not a question of experience, but some background is nevertheless necessary....

[Popovic] I am glad you asked me that, since I want to recognize a great debt. This is a debt to a type of lawyer that has unfortunately disappeared, people, for instance, like Dr. Savo Strugar, my father, Vojislav Lukic, Veljko Kovacevic, and many others whom I had the good fortune to know. These were lawyers who saw the law as a calling, a vocation, in the sense in which we speak about the medical or clerical calling, as a service to which one subordinates his entire life. I learned a great deal from them in a professional way, since they were excellent lawyers, with broad legal learning, but much more about the professional ethics of the legal profession. These, that is, were people who defended not only with technical arguments, but with their entire life. They exuded an immense moral authority, because not only were they much more fundamentally and better educated than my generation—which, for instance, even in the mid-fifties learned criminal procedure from the Soviet textbooks of Strogovich, member of the academy, who quotes Vyshinskiy on every other page—but also because our socialization was different both as people and as lawyers. They pursued their calling with a fanatic responsibility to the client and they bravely defended the dignity of the bar before those for whom it was a "remnant of the old," a reactionary institution of the rotten bourgeois society.

[START] Is it possible that consistency to that extent could have survived at that time?

[Popovic] It is tragic that they also had to bend, but never more than they actually had to if they were to continue to be lawyers. I learned everything I know from them. I learned from them that a lawyer must not

commit himself to a party, that he owes his loyalty to his client and no one else, that he must not be frightened by any authority, not even if it speaks with the voice of the people or its public. That generation experienced hard times. It defended under impossible conditions when even in front of the courthouse the public was chanting "Death sentence!" and spitting on the accused, and the lawyers defended by alluding to some political speech of the day before instead of the law, when the accused was handed the indictment in the trial itself, and the time allowed for the appeal was 24 hours. And through those difficult times they preserved an accurate accounting in their internal bookkeeping, they preserved the scorned legal consciousness even though it was of no use to them, on the contrary. I was lucky enough to meet such people very early through my father. And when I was beginning my own practice, it was already considerably easier, and I decided to follow that tradition in the better times that had come, to at least behave as though I were in a law-governed state. And it soon turned out, since the revolutionary enthusiasm had already passed, that that gave my client a favorable position, that here the indictment and often even the court were on an awkward terrain which was not theirs, that they were not accustomed to it.

[START] Nevertheless, political assessments, in opposition to the law, have remained relevant for a long time. In the case which I have already mentioned—the trial of Bozidar Jaksic—you conceived the defense 16 years ago in two steps, at least as it is compressed in the defense counsel's concluding statement. First, you explicitly challenged the right of the prosecutor and the court to require that the accused prove the truthfulness of his published opinions, and secondly, in a very brief survey you moved on to a line of argument that was inherently political.

[Popovic] Today, I see that defense as eclectic and indeed even inconsistent. In it, it is true that I first demanded that the trial be conducted according to the principles of legal procedure, and I insisted on the right to express opinions, and then I showed that in those opinions—contrary to the assertions of the public prosecutor—there was a compatibility of interests with "social commitments." Today, I would defend him solely on the basis of the law. Since today the law, at least in good part, has nevertheless become even a content of the consciousness of the man in the street. The life of society is striving to "fit" into a legal system. This is evident, for example, from the fact that this is today the interest of the economy as well. Today, it is more difficult even for the court to pass over legal arguments, when there are no political arguments, since this has become a demand of the public. Here again, life has made inroads. The life of society needs a legal system in order to save the energy which is squandered to an immense degree by the constant search for ad hoc solutions. It needs abstract norms that apply to every case of a particular kind.

[START] This means that the law-governed state is for the first time getting the support of an emerging liberal and democratic political mindset. But that is not the only line of development we are seeing. So, if today it is easier for the lawyer to defend on the basis of the law, even in political trials, would it be so easy today, without irony, for the lawyer Srdja Popovic to say, as he did 3 years ago, "I am not a Serb, but a lawyer"?

[Popovic] It would be harder.

[START] I feel here that I almost have to say that I am putting this question to you in Zagreb....

[Popovic] ...Well, I certainly would rather say that in Belgrade, but it is no matter, I say it wherever I can.

[START] Yes, but there is certainly something improper when everyone who comes from a particular place is treated as a specialist responsible for events in his own "community." I am actually interested in a process which could affect everyone: that new political mindset, which supports demands for the law-governed state, has grown up out of the disintegration of the ideological community "of interests of the socialist community"; but does it not seem to you that people in Yugoslavia have a greater affinity for another predemocratic sense of community, above all ethnic, than they do for the option of a democratic community of autonomous citizens?

[Popovic] Well, if we look around ourselves, that does seem to be an accurate assessment, undoubtedly accurate. But I am not at all certain that this is something given once and for all, or whether it is something inherent in the people on this soil. I at least hope that people will realize, something that I think the Slovenians in particular do not realize, that no one is going to save himself on his own. All the nationalisms in Yugoslavia are condemned to failure, since many factors are involved in deciding whether Yugoslavia will remain as a state or not, including international factors which are much more important than all of our exchanges of fire over republic boundaries. As I have already said, republic leaderships are playing on those passions, manipulating them, and thereby constantly and irresponsibly generating new conflicts, fueling unrealistic hopes that "our people will win." No one is going to win here, and I think that people will realize this, at least at the edge of the abyss, if not sooner....

[START] But it is precisely in those particularities, in those differences, that a great many people today—at least as far as one can conclude, say, from the letters of readers or the behavior of the emerging opinion makers—see a sign of greater freedom. Or perhaps even that is yet another success of certain "northwestern" segments of the LC [League of Communists] in imposing, as you say, their goods on the taste of the domestic market?

[Popovic] Greater freedom does, of course, exist, but it is not a consequence of the system's dysfunctionality. We are still a state, and there does exist a relatively "free

flow of people and ideas" within the state. We have several parallel political systems, which consequently are diluted and ineffective. If for certain reasons you are allowed to say something in Zagreb, I take the position that this is something I am also permitted to say in Belgrade, and if in actuality I am not allowed to do so for certain other reasons, in the end they still let me get away with it so that it does not turn out that "we" are less democratic than "they." This is a kind of freedom, but it is a function of those differences in tactics, while the goal and strategy are the same: hold on to a power which is tottering. That is what the crisis of the League of Communists is about, and it means greater freedom because the legitimacy of the party cannot be achieved in a universal way and with the same means over the entire territory of Yugoslavia. And when they grieve for the unified League of Communists, they are actually grieving because each of them cannot impose his own weapons, the weapons which help him at home. After all, those others destroy him. So that the conflict in the League of Communists is actually a conflict over a specific policy and over the means of preserving the monopoly of the party. And the strategic objectives cannot be questioned, because all of those authorities derive their monopoly from the monopoly of the LCY in the Yugoslav sociopolitical system. They have to be agreed on that point, otherwise they all go down together.

[START] When you speak about that lack of synchronization, it would be interesting to examine an exemplary case of something that happened in Belgrade. During the trial of "the six," Vlado Mijanovic and the others, Belgrade on the one hand indisputably has the status of a center of liberal and democratic political culture in Yugoslavia over several decades, but the participants in that culture on the other hand have been constantly protesting in public that they live in a city with the most penetrating repressive apparatus, where there have been the most bans of newspapers and magazines, political court trials.... And now, for the general opinion, the liberalism of Belgrade has been in the past for two years now, but there are no political trials....

[Popovic] ...And you do not count the trial in Kosovo?

[START] Well, yes. Belgrade is indicative of all of Serbia, but I was actually thinking of what is happening just within it....

[Popovic] That is true, there are no political trials, but I think there have been no political trials in Belgrade since two things were realized: One, that that front is very broad and that initiating political trials would mean engaging in a political struggle with an uncertain outcome, and second, that the political dissatisfaction could not be otherwise channeled and used. And from the standpoint of political technology, that was a rather wise decision. Better to have an uncertain ally than a dangerous enemy. And that is the trap into which I think the Serbian intelligentsia has fallen.

[START] By consenting to be the ally?

[Popovic] Yes. Although I think that the breadth of that alliance is first of all not as great as it seems. People who have preserved their good sense, and there are quite a few such, are waiting for "that to blow over," for the simple reason that in an irrational situation no arguments do any good; on the contrary, they may be contraindicated. Second, one segment of the intelligentsia will wake up when it sees that there is no progress in the institutionalization of those freedoms as civil and especially political rights, and there will not be progress. For the present, it is satisfied with the actual freedom granted it for the moment, but tomorrow it may be taken away. Third, a segment of that intelligentsia is mistakenly counting on not being used in that alliance, but on its using its ally, which is the way with these "quick" alliances. That alliance is not much to look at, nor is it sincere, and it will not last forever either.

[START] But even a great many highly principled intellectuals, who certainly cannot be included among such "allies," have estimated that the emergence on the political scene of what is called the people is an important contribution to the democratic potential for changing the system. Incidentally, even a number of distinguished and publicly committed Croats think that the "alliance with the masses" of the Croatian party leadership in 1970 and 1971 brought with it a certain democratic achievement. Were those then and this today real concessions?

[Popovic] I do not believe it, neither in the first case nor in the second. Always those are only "freedoms for something" where the individual whose freedom is in question is reduced to an instrument at the service of the collectivity. The "masses," the "people," do not line up behind some program, but behind some slogan: Croatia has been plundered, unified Serbia, Italia a noi. A kind of ideological construction is subsequently built into the existing political facts, but the basic thing is this: first power, and then the program. This suits those "masses," which I do not speak of pejoratively, since these are the homeless in a devastated social fabric, isolated people outside all real social relations, unemployed, isolated atoms which can no longer take the accidental and incomprehensible aspects of reality, who long for the complete consistency offered by those slogans and who flee reality, since they thereby condemn the world in which they are forced to live and in which they cannot exist. This flight affords them a minimum of self-respect without which it is difficult for a man to live. These movements do not gain success because of transient demagogy, but because of the visible reality of the rallies and the "power of a live organization." The victories are not meant to achieve anything in particular; it is the victories themselves that people want. Today, you often hear that the Serbian people have "finally recovered their honor," "found their soul," and the like. That is because even such victories, deprived of content, are necessary for those people to recover their self-respect. It is unfair to consider that mass brutal and retrograde; the

people who make it up are above all isolated, deprived of normal social relations, unhappy.

[START] Can it be said that the Croat and Slovenian intelligentsia (to limit myself to the presumptuous team of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) are to some extent doing the same thing as the Serbian intelligentsia, if only by anticipating, in a way "voluntarily," that pressure of the politically manipulated mass?

[Popovic] Well, it seems to me that intellectuals all over Yugoslavia are falling into that trap, to a greater or lesser degree, of course, the theory of conspiracy is spreading like an epidemic and is being mutually stimulated from one "community" to another. Thus, the intellectuals who until yesterday were independent in their views are lining up behind their central committees out of fear of the others, not realizing that that fear is being used for manipulation in the service of interests much more particular than ethnic interests. But just let us be clear about this: I accept the right of every nationality to adopt its own constitution, and I think that the right to self-determination all the way to secession is the sovereign right of every nationality. It cannot be finally consumed, above all because there are new generations coming who are not bound by anyone's signature, that is, by the signatures of "their ancestors." And that applies both in general to the sociopolitical system in Yugoslavia—I am speaking again about what people would like to freeze once and for all under the term "fundamental commitments"—and also when it comes to the self-determination of a nationality. Nor can the young Slovene be bound by the decision of his father or grandfather about whether they will secede or not, since he is living his life, the only one, not to be repeated, now, he has the right to decide on that. However, when I saw those faces in the Slovenian Assembly and in front of it, that pathos, that emotion, that unanimity, I did not like it much—because life is not so simple.

[START] Let us take something else that would come under legal questions, but it occurred as a specific case of one "community." This is the trial of "the four" in Ljubljana. What sort of defectiveness of the legal system was demonstrated in that case?

[Popovic] First, a purely technical question of the law, since I have read the indictment, one perhaps might speak of guilt only in the case of Borstner, who was the only one of them who divulged a secret entrusted to him in performance of his duty. As soon as that secret is "out," and comes into the hands of someone who does not have the duty to preserve it, there can no longer be a question of crime. What most of the talk was about aside from that technical point of law was the use of the language and the question of the jurisdiction of the military court.

[START] Around us there is a rather widespread reference to the fear of political dominance of the politically

effective Serbian leadership beyond the boundaries of Serbia, the fear of Serbia's "hegemony" or even the hegemony of the Serbian nationality. At the same time, certain possible reforms of the political system—regardless of whether the proposals come from Milosevic's team or not—are interpreted as the means of that dominance or treated as though they would at least help him involuntarily. Is there a basis for that fear?

[Popovic] In the general situation in which we find ourselves, there is the basis for all fears, but what frightens me the most is that all those fears are manipulated so easily, including the fear of "hegemony." When one manipulation is set up in opposition to another one, this merely strengthens them all together. The problem lies more deeply in the situation which makes that manipulation possible. Unless that charmed circle is broken by a showdown with all manipulations at the same time, we will not get anywhere. In my opinion, if that can be achieved at all, it can be done, aside from "educational efforts" like the one in which we are taking part now, only by political pluralism, which probably would not eliminate that manipulation at first, but would make it more complicated, more diverse, more contradictory, and thereby also less effective for all the manipulators. In their fight for the center, they would all have to become more reasonable, and that means less effective.

[START] It seems to me that the critical point is precisely that—to what extent demands for protection of civil rights can be generalized in our country. When people commit themselves publicly to the defense of rights, they seem to take an ambiguous position: they are demanding a right, but they cannot appeal to a right, because it does not exist in the laws and constitutions. All they can actually do is to appeal to the bigwigs not to apply the authority which they have been given in the norms. Is this not a kind of seeking of privileges, of a special right, even for special groups—so that there have even been cases when this was written in a petition: "We do not allow poets to be arrested," or: "We defend the right of sociologists to speak in public," instead of demanding the general right for citizens *in abstracto*?

[Popovic] First of all, the reason for that, as we have already said, is that the laws are apparent laws. What they call "laws" do not have the content which they must have in legal theory; for example, they must clearly define the conditions of their application, they must make a particular behavior mandatory for both the authority and the individual, and there must exist an independent court.... So, that entire appearance of a legal system justifies the demands of the public that such a law not be applied in the specific case when this suits me. It is paradoxical here—so it seems—that people are simultaneously demanding a law-governed state and demanding that the law not be applied. However, there is actually no paradox when you see that those laws are not real laws and that that legal system which is in effect is not any legal system at all.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SPIEGEL Series on GDR State Security Service

90EG0158A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
Vol 44, 5, 12, 19 Feb 90

[Unattributed article: "Shield and Sword of the Party—SPIEGEL Series on the Powers and Repressive Practices of the GDR State Security Service (1)"]

[5 Feb pp 50-82]

Part I

[Text] All perpetrators are also victims. Many victims are likewise perpetrators or at least potential perpetrators. This resulted in an indissoluble system of dependencies, a kind of system of accomplices. And the supremacy of the apparatus arose.—GDR film director Frank Beyer on 23 November 1989.

Two old men met every Tuesday afternoon on the third floor of the somber marbled Central Committee building at the Werder Market in East Berlin. Protected by a triple cordon of selected State Security men—the first group controlled the driveway, the second the entrance, and the third was posted in front of the elevator—the old men conferred after the close of each weekly Politburo meeting on the security situation of the republic that they controlled.

For a long time, the report that Minister Erich Mielke, chief of State Security (Stasi) since 1957 and now 82 years old, gave to his comrade-in-arms Erich Honecker, SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] general secretary since 1976 and now 77, was unequivocal: the Stasi had everything—almost—under control.

In the words of Egon Krenz, 52, for many years security chief of the state party SED, who overthrew Honecker on 18 October and also deprived Mielke of his power a month later: "Under the control of the old security apparatus, the entire society was managed and the citizens incapacitated."

And: "The State Security was a state within the state."

In the year after "1984," for which George Orwell had sketched his vision of the omnipresent and omniscient big brother state, Mielke issued his "Service Instruction Two" on measures "to prevent, uncover and combat underground political activity." Thus, "they sought a total all-encompassing surveillance," according to Manfred Sauer, the government's authorized representative for the liquidation of the Stasi, in an interim report for the GDR Council of Ministers on 15 January.

Indeed, with Honecker's blessing Mielke had spread an extensive net over the country. Those caught in it were dissidents and they were brought to reason; grumblers were registered and reprimanded; those in the opposition were intimidated and punished outside of constitutional norms; all citizens should know that no latitude

was foreseen for their own development in this variety of the real existing socialism. They had to assume that any of their movements was registered, controlled, stored, and prosecuted.

They were supposed to behave in such a manner that the state within the state, the Stasi-troop within the SED apparatus with the leading old men at the top, would have no reason to take exception—they should be obedient and cringing tattlers. Citizens degenerated into informers and young people became hangers-on. Critical people were declared criminals and an already divided country was divided again: into snoops and investigated persons, into hunters and the hunted and into perpetrators and victims. The victims who were caught by the octopus' arms of the Stasi often had no choice but to adapt; the repression created new helpers for itself, the most important one being the ever-present fear.

In retrospect, what is now gushing from the archives of the Stasi offices—to the extent that it was not sent out of the country or to the paper shredder—or what is being told by the affected citizens is making the real existing socialism into a surveillance state of the worst kind. The most vehement critics of the GDR in the West would have dismissed the truth as a polemical exaggeration.

At the end, the State Security, named after the Ministry for State Security (MfS) and in the official version of the GDR not to be confused with the security service of the Nazis, had:

- 85,000 permanent employees and at least 109,000 unofficial employees; along with the People's Army (173,000), it was the largest employer in the country;
- a huge arsenal of weapons: 124,593 pistols, 76,592 submachine guns, 3,611 rifles, 766 heavy machine guns, 3,537 antitank rifles; it was the largest weapons carrier of the Peoples' Army;
- substantial real estate: 2,037 buildings, dwellings or lots, including 652 in Berlin alone; Stasi employees could rest amongst their fellows in 24 convalescent homes with 2,058 beds;
- a city in the city as central headquarters: The MfS resided in 3,000 rooms in the East Berlin ward of Lichtenberg. The East Berlin district administration worked in (another) 1,000 rooms. In the vicinity of each of the 14 district capitals as well as 12 km from the Wandlitz settlement for the prominent, construction parties had dug underground bunkered command staffs for local and state mission control at a tremendous expense, as though they had nothing else to do in the GDR;
- data on about one-third of its citizens: 5 million names were stored in the central MfS computer. A scarcely believable control of the mail and telephones—in many cities every letter was opened and one out of two conversations was tapped—increased the amount of

information on unpopular people in the data banks and filing cabinets of the Stasi.

At the end, the Moloch was financed with M 3.6 billion annually from the GDR state budget and hence from the victims. The expense was not for the republic but for the supremacy of the state party and its leadership.

Mielke's army of informers was ubiquitous for four decades. The people have not forgotten the lesson and still equate the SED, renamed PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism], with the hated state snoopers.

New abbreviations do not help: angry demonstrators wrote "PDS" on their posters when they stormed the Stasi headquarters on 15 January and by no means did they thereby intend to advertise for the "Party of Democratic Socialism." For them, PDS stood for "Party of the Stasi."

The reverse is true: the Ministry for State Security was always the security headquarters of the party. It did not secure the state but the dictatorship of the SED; it was not responsible to parliament but to the party; its minister was always a member of the SED Central Committee.

The Stasi employees did not swear allegiance to the constitution. They pledged to "fulfill all orders of the party and government unconditionally and honorably with creative initiative."

At the district and regional level as well as in the major enterprises, the interlocking between SED and Stasi was just as close and the command lines were clear: the Stasi chief regularly gave a "security report" to the respective "mission control"—which included the first and second SED secretaries, the SED security representative, the chief of the People's Police and the corresponding structure of the National Peoples' Army—and presented a "working plan on security questions": a catalog against unpopular individuals.

In the opinion of former Stasi officers, therefore, there has never been a separation of party and state security, as ex-SED chief Egon Krenz tried to make people believe the week before last during a hearing before the Roundtable.

The interlocking was so complete, says an MfS colonel who has now been dismissed, "that written orders were not even required." When an SED regional director expressed a desire or recommendation to the head of a regional administration of the MfS, "then that was as good as an order." At the same time, Stasi employees could also turn to SED organizations when they needed something for the surveillance of church functions or opposition groups.

Whether and to what extent the respective SED governors used their secret service against the people, "depended only upon the temperament of the leading official," also says Major General Heinz Engelhardt, who has been entrusted with the disbanding of the MfS.

In principle, the MfS was always there for the SED as the "shield and sword of the party."

The ties with the party were also close within the "firm," as the octopus-agency liked to call itself, and the control through the internal MfS party organizations was rigid. The relationship between the superior and subordinates was always reflected in the ranks within the SED bodies, at the top of which stood Major General Horst Felber, first secretary of the "district administration" and Central Committee member. Every Stasi agent was trained to conform not only as a soldier but also as a party member. "That extended from the district offices to the command board," according to Horst Lehmann (name changed by editor's office), until recently an officer at the Stasi headquarters on Normannenstrasse in Berlin.

A parliamentary control of the super agency was not foreseen at any level, nor did it ever exist. To be sure, the Peoples' Chamber, representation of the people on the paper of the constitution, carried out the founding act in a correct Prussian manner when it approved the law establishing the "Ministry for State Security" on 8 February 1950.

But this law did not say anything about the tasks, structure, and powers of the agency—the functionaries regulated that among themselves. Officially they only proclaimed the "class mission of the party to the MfS not to permit surprises by the enemy and to prevent his subversive attacks against the constitutional bases of the GDR"—a rubbery formula that permitted practically everything, above all the uncontrolled spying on dissidents.

No important personnel decision outside of the sacrosanct SED party apparatus took place in the GDR without the approval of the state security. All persons, Stasi chief Mielke had ordered in the Guideline 1/82, "who are to be given significant security functions, rights, permits, or authorizations" must allow their political reliability to be checked out by the ministry.

And everything was significant: whether someone was drafted into military service or wanted to become a combine director, applied for a trade license or sought to matriculate in the university, the state security always sat hidden in the background and took part in the decision. No one could become anything without the Stasi.

In these "security checks," the apparatus used every means to screen the personal and career environment of the involved person, sent informal employees to bother him, and interrogated friends, colleagues, and neighbors. Frequently all of the close relatives were subjected to the same procedure.

People were turned down for a "negative political attitude" or the "unclear nature" of contacts with Western countries. Thus, whole groups of scientists and ambitious economists were prevented from taking leading positions with no indication of the real reasons for

their rejection and the path of students to the university or to a vacation in the West with "Jugendtourist" was blocked.

Everyone drafted into the army was caught in this fine net of scrutiny. For an employee of the responsible MfS district administration disguised as an officer of the National Peoples' Army also sat at the table during the induction examination and decided on the possible use of the inductee on the basis of his "political reliability."

Every politically undesirable statement recorded by Stasi informers at this time or later in the military service remained in the Stasi archives for an unlimited time. Thus, a critical word about Walter Ulbricht in 1964 could lead to the disapproval of a foreign trip 20 years later.

Big Brother was everywhere and forgot nothing.

The army of spies and informers, called "unofficial employees," wore uniforms and civilian clothing. Stasi snoops appeared as customs collectors and waiters, soldiers, and Jehovah's Witnesses.

There were theology students who had their studies paid for by the Stasi in exchange for information about the university—an investment with prospects over the long term. For the office of sleuths was not satisfied with this. It was not until after their final exams that these church people were truly valuable to the security fanatics—with tips and pointers from the churches, the only nonstate area that was open to dissidents.

As travel guides or chambermaids, as train conductors or stewardesses, unofficial employees kept their eyes and ears open and spied on tourists, citizens of the GDR, colleagues, and frequently themselves.

Not even in prison was anyone safe from them: good information on fellow prisoners was always helpful; anyone toeing the line could count on being released early for good behavior.

The long ears of the state informers extended even to the rock and pop music scene. Prominent musicians were under contract with Mielke. They were not supposed to explain the hit parade to the authorities but to give the names of people who wanted to flee or emigrate.

Meanwhile, former Stasi employees who became unemployed and destitute after the turnaround are now offering lists with the names of actual or invented informers, who are supposedly still giving the Stasi information from the executive boards of all of the new parties.

"The MfS," according to Gen. Heinz Engelhardt, acting chief and trustee, "was present in practically all social areas."

The Main Department XX—it was responsible for the surveillance of dissidents and was run by Lieutenant

General Kienberg—with its 392 full-time cadres and employees had, according to Engelhardt, "only" 1,306 unofficial employees.

But this number does not say anything about the army of informers in the country; their number was considerably larger. For "unofficial employees" were recruited and activated by no means only by the headquarters on Normannenstrasse but also by regional and district administrations. Anyone who wanted to amount to anything in the widely ramified Stasi bureaucracy had to recruit new unofficial employees; the earnings and chances for promotion of future cadres in the provinces depended upon this.

Only top officials of the SED were excepted and not allowed to be recruited as unofficial employees. Anyway, it was expected of a loyal SED functionary that he would tell Big Brother about everything that could be dangerous to the party.

According to official Stasi data, about 5 million of the 16 million citizens of the GDR were registered in the Central Persons Data Bank—statistically almost one out of three, including infants, children and the elderly.

There were no limits in the last 10 years to the growth of the state security power machinery. The more incredible the praise of the socialist achievements became, the greater was the fear of the SED princes of the dissatisfaction in their own people and the more unscrupulous were their efforts to force the development of their security apparatus. "At the end of the 1970's at the latest," reports ex-officer Lehmann, "things just got out of control and became more and more insane."

Thus, all "operationally active" departments developed their network of unofficial employees right into the remotest corners of the society. "Under pressure from above," remembers Lehmann, "a real competition developed in the recruiting of informers. It became critical for those who did not recruit 25 new people a year, for it went into their evaluation." Each case worker had to handle 50-60 meetings per month and simultaneously take care of about 35 informers.

In view of this fact, former Stasi officers also consider the information of the government commission for the dissolving of the ministry on the extent of the spying system to be greatly underestimated. There were not 109,000 unofficial employees, as Modrow's representative Sauer stated at the Roundtable, but "probably 10 times that number" (Lehmann) of informers served the empire of the Stasi chief, Mielke.

The apparatus itself grew along with the army of informers. The bureaucratic outlays increased immeasurably to handle the incoming flood of information. Even before a potential unofficial employee was recruited, a voluminous file had to be established on him. Only after involved investigations in sometimes a

dozen other departments as well as in the regional and district offices could there even be an initial approaching of the future employee.

By that time, however, the responsible case worker knew, according to Lehmann, "almost everything" about his victim. And there were always some minor infractions such as the diversion of goods "to the detriment of socialist property," for which "reparations" could be demanded. "On this basis," recalls a former leader of informers, "a conversation was almost always enough to make people submit."

That happened in the same way with perpetrators as well as victims. The snoopers von Normannenstrasse and the many MfS branches throughout the country oriented themselves on a checklist of 101 points with the simple title: "Instructions on the Achievement of a Personality Picture." The record that was written for the office files after the investigation presented a transparent individual.

His attitude toward work ("Only for money, competent to perform his tasks, how does he react to sudden difficulties?") was illuminated, just as was his "position toward and in the collective" ("Does he have authority and what is the basis for it?") or his "attitude toward the observance of secrecy—discretion, sense of responsibility, vigilance, indifference, talkativeness, failure to comply with the duty to report?"

The investigators asked about hobbies ("photography, movies, stamps, garden") and for a description of the kind of reading that the person prefers; they noted "special knowledge and abilities" (foreign languages and communications, for example) as well as the "attitude...toward defense readiness, the USSR, and other socialist countries."

"Differences between official and personal opinions" were registered, as were the "size and location of the apartment and its furnishings," "dealings with dubious persons" or "contacts with relatives and acquaintances in capital countries: in person or in letters and how frequently?"

The most space was given to the "character rating," which the Stasi detectives understood to mean even the kind of body language: "Natural, adroit, unaffected, elastic, gracious, smooth, frugal, calm, fluid, rigid, soft, nervous, clumsy, awkward, fidgety, unpolished, affected, arrogant, lax."

They asked about their articulation ("fluent, stammering, lulling?") and manner of expression ("refined, verbose, wooing?") as well as "emotions and moods," grasp ("dull, critical?"), ability to react ("quick or dull-witted?") or discernment ("sober, uncritical, gullible?").

The state snoopers were also interested in the memory of the observed citizen ("good, fragmentary, sluggish?") and especially in his sexual behavior. There were six

headings to fill out—"carnal, unrestrained, unsteady, disciplined, uncontrolled, boastful?"

A two-page report of the responsible Stasi troop in Kamenz District "on the securing of the Catholic youth pilgrimage" in Rosenthal is a downright typical example of the desire of the Stasi troop to collect and control. To observe this utterly insignificant event, a working staff of seven people was formed and a detailed operational plan was agreed upon ("0800 departure with motorcycles to the decentralized assembly points," "0930 participation of all operating forces in the procession"). The objective of the investigation:

"The attention of all comrades is to be directed to the determination of the prevailing opinions in the assessment of the pilgrimage by the participants. The typical response on their participation."

The mail was opened to a tremendous extent—at Stand 12 of the Gera Railroad Post Office, for example. For decades the employees of the Stasi department PZF (Postal Customs Search) sat separately in comfortable rooms with a refrigerator and coffeemaker, secured by a double door and out of sight. Through a separate entrance, they were handed baskets full of outgoing mail to the West, thousands of letters every day. Letters were selected at random, steam opened, read and evaluated.

A register that was continually being expanded facilitated the increased control of dissidents, those desiring to emigrate, homosexuals, and right-wing extremists. When the steam specialists—an employee: "The room had to be repapered every six months"—were finished, the "Technical Department" sealed the letters once again. Damaged letters were thrown away.

Money gifts in letters that according to GDR law were supposed to be sent back were collected by type of currency and picked up every two weeks by an employee of the Berlin headquarters. A former Stasi employee from Saalfeld reports that "DM4,000 per week" were collected in this way even in small offices.

The flood of data was organized and channeled—about 80 tons of files were found and have since been sealed in Gera alone—by a hierarchically interlocked apparatus carefully shielded against outside forces which under the principle of "divide and conquer" supposedly revealed the respective responsible person only in sectors.

At the regional level, this was the respective first secretary of the SED, who was also always chief of the regional mission control (BEL) and thus one of the most powerful people in the locality. He controlled not only the use of the local Stasi and People's Police, whose chiefs had to follow his orders, but also the regional council and even the army, which was represented in the BEL by the chief of the respective military district command.

Supposedly the information from the regions came together only in the office of Erich Mielke and supposedly he was the only one who shared his knowledge with

General Secretary Erich Honecker. Supposedly no one else was informed—legends after the revolution that are no more believable than the assertions of leading Nazis after 1945 that they had known nothing of the terror and concentration camps.

As proof of the exclusivity of the few people who knew, Stasi officers present the special private telephone network (Stasi jargon: WeTsche-Network) that with only 200 participants connected all of the top people in the party and State Security. House 43 on the grounds in Berlin-Lichtenberg, which is protected against all electromagnetic waves in the manner of a Faraday cage, is the exchange for that network. It likewise stands for the enormous technical outlays of the Stasi state, in which "money played to role at all," according to a former MfS communications technician.

But the circle of the informed was probably by no means so exclusive and small.

Even at the regional level, the deputy MfS chief and the head of Department II with responsibility for security matters were informed. And on Normannenstrasse in Berlin as well, Mielke was not the only one who knew.

The apparatus also functioned without the chief, as shown by the documents that have come to light so far. Whether Mielke was on vacation or out hunting, whether he got excited in the stands of honor about the bad passes of the soccer players of the Stasi's own Dynamo soccer club in Berlin and stomped on his hat in anger, when the referee granted the opposing team a penalty kick operations on Normannenstrasse proceeded without a hitch.

His deputies—Werner Grossmann, Gerhard Neiber, Rudolf Mittig, and Wolfgang Schwanitz—were often better informed about day-to-day affairs than the minister. As in every agency, the advisers and departmental chiefs also discussed official matters even in this secret service. The information could often be obtained more quickly in the dining hall than from the chief.

Only the espionage organization "Main Department for Intelligence," managed by Markus ("Mischa") Wolf until 1985 and responsible for the "spies" operating in foreign countries, segregated itself from the house.

Whatever happened domestically was covered almost completely by the Stasi-octopus. Foreigners and transients, students and soldiers, policemen and musicians, artists and church people—all occupational groups were covered by some department or other of the huge apparatus, as were probably most public buildings: last week bugs were found on the walls of the individual rooms as well as in the rest rooms of the excursion restaurant at the Napoleon monument in Jena-Cospeda, where employees of the Jena Zeiss works regularly met with foreign guests. Perfect monitoring devices were also installed in the largest foreign exchange hotels.

And whenever Big Brother wanted, he struck out against—in the Stasi jargon—the politically negative persons with the full force of his spying and monitoring apparatus.

The conversations of such critics of the regime as Robert Havemann, Wolf Biermann, Stefan Heym, or Wolfgang Templin were tapped for months, their letters were opened and every visitor was registered and checked out. Unofficial Stasi employees monitored them and their friends, all of their movements were photographed and every car trip was followed. In the case of Robert Havemann, the MfS went so far as to register all of his friends and relatives who came to his burial and then "to illuminate them in depth" individually, according to a former Stasi major.

Templin was tortured through subtle postcard terror. Stasi people inserted sham newspaper ads under his address ("Will buy your sealskin coat, will pay 5,600 marks" or "I will pay you 24,000 marks for your Wartburg Tourist"). The point of the psychological terror was the instruction to the sellers: "Since my leg is now in a cast and I unfortunately cannot come myself, I ask you to visit me or deliver it." The uninvited customers and goods came in droves to Templin, who is now leader of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights.

As late as last December, when the Stasi had already been abolished, Juergen Doeller, member of the Democratic Awakening in Erfurt, discovered a bug in the hood of his anorak with a microphone, battery, sender and two paper-thin antenna wires; range: 2-4 km. The snoopers wanted to be there in the democratization as well.

At the end, for Mielke's State Security it was no longer a matter of uncovering conspiratorial or secret behavior. The obvious and ubiquitous presence was meant to spread fear, to intimidate the opposition and to isolate them from their political friends and then to destroy their morale bit by bit until they finally capitulate or, giving in to the constant pressure, flee to the West.

The State Security was not squeamish about tracking down political enemies and pestering them with power or cunning, depending upon the circumstances. One of their favorite tricks was large-scale conspiratorial searches of apartments, in which evidence was gathered for subsequent official searches by the public prosecutor's office.

Generally organized by the Main Department VIII specializing in observation and searches, several dozen MfS employees were used in these actions to cover up the illegal action. For an ingenious system guaranteed the undisturbed work of the Stasi burglars before the opening of the involved person's apartment with a skeleton key or picklock.

All inhabitants of the involved house and, in the case of multistory houses, the inhabitants of all neighboring floors were systematically guided out of the house and "tied up" outside, as the Stasi puts it. Pensioners

received an appointment with their doctors, workers were summoned by the party secretary of the plant, and school children had to stay late under the supervision of their teachers. During the search, dozens of Stasi employees secured things on the outside and reported by radio when one of the tenants was loose.

Only when everything was secure did the special team from Department VIII numbering at least six break into the apartment and begin the search. Before the housebreakers for the state rummaged through clothes cabinets, shelves, and chests of drawers, they recorded the position of every book, every handkerchief and every shirt with an instantaneous developing camera so that they could put everything back as it was when they were finished. They looked for anything that appeared politically suspect: newspapers, money and correspondence from the West, leaflets from the opposition and letters critical of the government.

After the search team had left the apartment, all new information on the occupant was carefully registered and kept in the Stasi archives. If they had found enough, the same MfS employees showed up at the apartment door a few days later: quite officially together with the investigators of the public prosecutor's office, identified as "employees of the investigatory agency" and very well informed about the hiding places of the incriminating material that they sought.

Then came the interrogations.

The executors of the SED security doctrine were generally able to break down their victims without resorting to physical force. For trained interrogation specialists sat in all regional and district offices, who ultimately got their prisoners to make the statements that they wanted to hear even without threats of torture. The investigators always used the method of putting the detained person in a state of complete helplessness and absence of rights until, says a former Stasi prisoner, "you do not give a hoot for your own life and you do not care about anything."

The most important means was to make it clear to the prisoner that no law, no lawyer and no friend or relative could prevent the state security from holding him until it had the right answer—sometimes even for years.

Many victims are subsequently hardly able to describe how the interrogations proceeded. Because formally the interrogators generally behaved properly; no certain information is known about torture methods from recent years.

The interrogators used mental torture. Without the right to remain silent and to consult with a lawyer of one's own choice and without the limitation of detention pending trial to a foreseeable time, it was almost always possible, according to taped records from the Potsdam Stasi office, to give the prisoners the feeling of complete hopelessness within a few days

Horst Lademann, an economist and director of an enterprise for metalworking in Frankfurt/Oder, for example, learned how utterly exhausting this strategy was. He had "become guilty" in the eyes of the surveillance machinery through an expensive poor investment in his enterprise. Denounced by an employee for personal enrichment, in the fall of 1985 he ended up in the clutches of the investigators of the then Frankfurt Stasi General Engelhardt.

He tried for 11 months to resist the mental torture by his interrogators. He spent the nights and weekends in a windowless individual cell of just 10 square meters and he spent the days under interrogation by alternating Stasi officers. They asked him the same question over and over again and repeatedly accused him of the same thing.

The subtle threats increased after three months. The former prisoner told a team from SPIEGEL-TV: "At the time they said that no one's health has held up here for more than six months, think about that." With the words "For you it is your life, for us it is only our job," soon after that they threatened him with a further doubling of his time in detention prior to trial.

Step for step, says Lademann, they broke down his resistance until he himself finally began to doubt his own innocence and signed the confession "just to get out again sometime." Lademann: "To be interrogated every day for 11 months eventually has a sufficient psychological effect and one does not have to be beaten."

Such cases and thousands of similar ones were what in 40 years of SED domination and especially in its last decade gave the population the certain knowledge that in the end they would not be able to elude the myrmidons of state security. "This feeling," thinks the Frankfurt parson Christian Gehlsen, speaker of a citizen's group that is fighting for rehabilitation, "this fear that an enemy is lurking in the darkness who can crush you at any time has by no means disappeared and much too many still have that deep inside themselves."

Anyone who became conspicuous and ended up in the register of the snoopers too often did not have to wait long for a visit. The regional administration of the Stasi notified the responsible district administration that there was suspicion of criminal offenses. In the operational bunker that citizens stormed in Tautenhain in the Thuringian district of Eisenberg, they found lists with politically conspicuous persons and next to them a list of the internment camps foreseen for the Gera Region—the romantic Greiz Castle, Burg Weida, and Burg Ranis. "Only for people who in a state of defense would affect the defense capability and that could also be certain groups of foreigners," says Gera's Stasi chief Michael Trostorff. The Geneva Convention legitimized such plans for the case of emergency, he says.

The GDR considered itself to be an emergency. The MfS was always ready to serve the party and state leadership

not only in the interrogation and harassing of people in the opposition but also in the satisfaction of private needs.

Thus, on behalf of the Agitation and Propaganda Department in the 1970's, the Imagery Interpretation Center copied dozens of pornographic and James Bond films that were then shown to small numbers of people in the film hall of the ministry or in the movie room of the Wandlitz Politburo ghetto.

It was always late at night that a courier brought rolls of film to the laboratory from West Berlin. There they were quickly duplicated over night and sent back to the West by courier early the next morning. The copying of films did not stop until it was easier and cheaper to get video films there.

But party chief Erich Honecker, Prime Minister Willi Stoph and Minister Mielke nonchalantly continued to have their private photographs from hunting and vacation trips and family celebrations enlarged by the Stasi photo experts. Here, just as in Wandlitz, this order applied to all those who were immediately at the service of the SED leaders: "Every wish, as unusual as it may be, must be carried out."

Prime Minister Willi Stoph, who has numerous relatives in the West who often visited him in East Berlin, had organized a special service for his clan.

A stairway led from Platform B of the Intraurban Railroad Station Friedrichstrasse to a special exit that was always guarded by a Stasi man with a special mission. The only people who could come out here were those who knew the code word or who could show the second half of a picture postcard. As a rule, they were DKP [German Communist Party] delegations from the West, spies and top Stasi functionaries.

In the case of Stoph's relatives, the (then still) good name was sufficient and a state limousine was always waiting in front of the door to take the visitor where he wanted to go.

[Box, p 54]

A State Within the State: Structure of the State Security in the GDR Before the Revolution

- SED Regional Administration secretary: Major General Felber, Central Committee member
- Ministry for State Security (MfS)

Minister: Army General Erich Mielke
Personal Adviser: Lieutenant General Carlsohn

- Board secretary: Lieutenant General Ludwig
- Deputies of the minister:

Lieutenant General Grossmann
Lieutenant General Neiber
Colonel General Mittig
Lieutenant General Schwanitz

MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR INTELLIGENCE (HVA)

For the Reconnoitering of the FRG

Lieutenant General Grossmann
Divided into areas, including, for example, Bundeswehr, state apparatus, secret services, industry; infiltration of GDR agents camouflaged as "emigration" (through Hungary and the CSSR in 1989).

MAIN DEPARTMENT I

Securing of the National People's Army (NVA) and the Border Troops (GT)

Lieutenant General Dietze
Offices in all of the larger army facilities; close network of spies at all levels of the NVA and GT.

MAIN DEPARTMENT II

Counterespionage

Lieutenant General Kraatsch
Surveillance of foreign missions and journalists; MfS employees as personnel for foreigners.

MAIN DEPARTMENT III

Electronic reconnaissance

Major General Maennchen
Monitoring of radio and telephone communications; especially monitoring of telephone calls between the FRG and West Berlin.

MAIN DEPARTMENT VI

Securing and Control of the Border

Major General Fiedler
Passport control units at all border crossings; informers and monitoring equipment in GDR hotels preferred by foreigners; informers in travel groups of GDR citizens.

MAIN DEPARTMENT VII

Securing of the Agencies of the Ministry of the Interior

Major General Buechner
Primarily monitoring of the political reliability of the police; informers in regional and district offices and among the inmates in GDR prisons.

MAIN DEPARTMENT VIII

Observation

Major General Coburger
Observation of individual persons; securing of transit routes, including through informers at filling stations and roadside cafes; "conspirative" (illegal) searches of dwellings; collecting of information on "target persons" in their residential area through informers.

MAIN DEPARTMENT IX**Investigatory Department**

Major General Fister

Primarily occupied by jurists; most of the judicial inquiries were aimed at those deviating from the official SED line.

DEPARTMENT X

Major General Damm

Liaison with the secret services of the fraternal socialist countries.

DEPARTMENT XI**Securing of the Cryptographic Service and Intelligence**

Major General Birke

Security checks on all citizens of the GDR employed in the area of radio and teleprinter traffic.

DEPARTMENT XII**Central Files**

Colonel Roth

Every person in whom an MfS department is interested is initially registered in these files, even before operational measures. Data collection: information to the MfS departments.

DEPARTMENT XIV**MfS Facilities for Pretrial Detention**

Colonel Rataizick

DEPARTMENT XVII**Pass Bureaus/West Berlin**

Colonel Janssen

MAIN DEPARTMENT XVIII**Securing of the National Economy**

Lieutenant General Kleine

Control of all combines, enterprises, agricultural facilities and the Academy of Science; approval of official foreign trips; classification of GDR citizens as "sensitive personnel"; use of informers.

MAIN DEPARTMENT XIX**Securing of Traffic**

Major General Braun

Offices and use of informers in the German Imperial Railroad, Interflug, and truck traffic across borders; special antiterror units.

MAIN DEPARTMENT XX**Combating of 'Political and Ideological Diversion' (PiD) and 'Political Underground Activities' (PuT)**

Lieutenant General Kienberg

Areas: church, youth, public education, state apparatus, public health, culture policy, sports; infiltration of informers into the "underground scene" and into opposition groups and movements.

DEPARTMENT XXII**Antiterrorism**

Colonel Franz

DEPARTMENT M**Monitoring of the Mail**

Colonel Strobel

Seizing of all postal shipments; opening of letters, copying and storing of "relevant texts."

MAIN DEPARTMENT PS**Protection of Persons and Facilities**

Major General Wolf

"Personal escorts" of the SED leaders; all persons working in Wandlitz were employees of Department PS; with Guard Regiment "Feliks Dzierzynski."

DEPARTMENT 26**Monitoring of the GDR Telephone and Telecommunications System**

Major General Leber

DEPARTMENT 32**Operational and Technical Sector**

Major General Schmidt

TELECOMMUNICATION ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT**ARMAMENT AND CHEMICAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT****MAIN DEPARTMENT FOR CADRE AND TRAINING****Internal Security**

Major General Moeller

Investigation of MfS employees.

CENTRAL PERSONNEL DATA BANK

Computerized data collection; parallel to records in Department XII.

CENTRAL OPERATIONAL STAFF

Operational Planning for Big Events

Colonel Sommer

COMMERCIAL COORDINATION AREA (BKK)

Colonel Meinel

CENTRAL MEDICAL SERVICE

Major General Klein

REAR SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Colonel Weimann

Equipment, construction and securing of the infrastructure

CENTRAL COORDINATION GROUP (ZKG)

Processing of Applications for Emigration

Major General Niebling

Investigation of applicants. Search for reasons for a rejection.

CENTRAL EVALUATION AND INFORMATION GROUP (ZA/G)

Analysis and Evaluation

Lieutenant General Irmeler

Summarized reports for the SED leadership.

MINISTER WORK GROUP

Special Missions for Mielke

Major General Geissler

Informers: "unofficial employees" (IM) and "officers in special operations" (OibE)

[12 Feb pp 128-146]

Part II

[Unattributed article: "Shield and Sword of the Party—SPIEGEL Series on the Powers and Repressive Practices of the GDR State Security Service (II)"]

[Text] Erich Mielke, 82, the onetime undisputed commanding general of Stasi, is the picture of misery today. The man who used to head a staff of 200,000 permanent and contract employees already seemed somewhat schizophrenic when he last appeared before the Volkskammer [People's Chamber] on 13 November, crying out to the population he once muzzled: "I love you all." But now, inside the Berlin-Rummelsburg prison, he has lost his self-control altogether.

The old man continues to jangle the nerves of his guards (who used to guard Mielke's victims in these very cells in days goneby) by issuing orders to imaginary underlings in a loud voice. He asked for a telephone so many times that the supervisor finally had one installed in his cell.

Since that time things have calmed down. Mielke speaks into the mouthpiece of the phone for hours—to no one. The telephone is not connected.

Members of Mielke's old staff say that he used to hold court like a medieval prince. For months at a time, only a select circle of advisers and lackeys would get to see him. Accounts of major events would have to be submitted to him in writing down to the last detail; staff members were never allowed to voice ideas of their own. "It was a regular cult," one former staffer recalls. "One had to suppress every idea and emotion of one's own. Even the department heads did not dare speak up."

The SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] leaders' fetish about security was so excessive that every field of activities was placed under systematic surveillance.

Main Department I, for example, was responsible for security of the NVA [National People's Army] and the Border Troops. It focused its solicitous attention on all uniformed personnel from the time of call-up to the final military exercise.

The initial impression the draftee made at induction would already decide whether he would be stationed in the deep south of the republic or along the border to the capitalist FRG.

If the Stasi took note of a soldier's "lack of reliability" during the course of his military service, he would be transferred to the interior of the country without being told the reason why.

Over the years, the main departments developed a gigantic life of their own. Under the leadership and the lust for power of the 27 commanding generals some departments took on so much of a life of their own that they became a virtually complete intelligence service in their own right.

Under the direction of Lieutenant General Dietze, Main Department I which was responsible for monitoring the entire military establishment of the GDR, for example, established a vast surveillance apparatus of its own in addition to the thousands of special officers operating on its behalf inside the People's Army even though such surveillance activities really were the responsibility of Main Department VIII.

At the same time, Dietze systematically expanded the scope of operations of his own armed units. In the form of S-companies, he used them for special assignments along the border. If early information was obtained about plans for "flight from the republic," a former Stasi soldier reports, an S-company would set up an ambush in the border area in question. These same special units were also used to fake successful escapes to the West for the purpose of infiltrating agents.

The job of Main Department II ("counterintelligence") was to keep an eye on all outsiders—particularly on Western journalists. As part of Stasi's enemy image these were included among the "legal positions of the enemy."

Their offices ("legal bases") were wiretapped and placed under constant surveillance.

When a West German correspondent tripped over a telephone wire by accident and ripped his telephone out of the wall in the process, he did not have to wait long to get it fixed. Within a short time, repairmen showed up, saying they had orders to fix the telephone.

Ulrich Schwarz, the correspondent of DER SPIEGEL, was under surveillance, too. Shortly after leaving his office one day, he remembered that he left his pocket diary with all the telephone numbers lying on his desk. He drove back immediately only to find the diary gone. But by the time got back from his appointment hours later the diary was back on his desk.

Main Department III whose job it was to install wiretaps and monitor telephone traffic with foreign countries has closed up shop according to official reports. Stasi General Heinz Engelhardt announced that "the capability has been shut down; the equipment has been dismantled." But the experts are sure that the wiretaps are still in place and that telephone conversations are still being taped.

Main Department VII was responsible for the interior ministry and, as a consequence, for the police. Its orders were always followed immediately.

Thus, Friedrich Dickel, the then interior minister, did not learn that he had outlawed the "New Forum" and declared that opposition group's activities to be unconstitutional until he heard it on the radio.

Main Department VII was responsible for the republic-wide beatings of demonstrators on 7 October 1989 as well as for the first draft of the travel legislation which was swept away by a storm of indignation within days. The staff members of Department VII were either considered employees of the interior ministry (bearing ministry ID's) or members of the criminal police.

Main Department VIII, which had offices both at Stasi headquarters and at every Stasi district bureau, also operated on a republic-wide basis. It was the special unit responsible for surveillance, searches, and arrests; the rough stuff department secretly referred to as "Eavesdrop and Grab, Inc."

On their TV monitors, the staff of Main Department VIII kept an eye on all tourist travel between the FRG and West Berlin. TV cameras were set up along the roads and at all parking areas. If a Trabi as much as parked next to a Western vehicle, the situation was photographed as "evidence of possible contact." If the Trabi driver applied for a job or for permission to take a foreign trip sometime later, he would find as likely as not that he was out of luck.

Stasi had recruited a large number of unofficial staff members among all those who held jobs along the transit routes, e.g., gas station attendants, waiters, traffic

policemen. Their reports were collected at the Michendorf Autobahn motel where Main Department VIII had set up an office of its own.

The so-called investigation department IX, charged with conducting inquiries in criminal cases, also expanded its operations far beyond its original area of responsibility. Because the friendly intelligence services in the Warsaw Pact countries did not feel like keeping a watchful eye on GDR citizens in addition to their other duties a large number of Department IX agents were always on the job at Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Romanian vacation spots to keep GDR citizens from making contact with vacationers from the West or hatching escape plans.

A check of the files has revealed that Major General Niebing's "central coordination group for restraining applications for travel permits" was also active in foreign countries. Informers working for the FRG organization "Hilferufe von drueben" [Cries for Help from the Other Side] were in the group's pay and opposition leaders on temporary travel permits such as Wolfgang Templin were watched around the clock.

All the while, new special departments whose responsibilities were not always clear even to Stasi insiders were set up at the interconnected 75-acre headquarters complex in Berlin. A supersecret "Ministers Working Group" (AGM), established on Mielke's orders and headed by Major General Ruemmler, was responsible for setting up the network of bunkers "in preparation of measures to be taken in a defense emergency" as well as the acquisition of special weapon technologies and the training center for special agents near Berlin.

A separate department was developed to handle the activities of Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, "a special operations officer," who provided the SED leadership clique with financial security it desired. Colonel Meinel, the head of the "commercial coordination" staff saw to it that the foreign currency and arms sales operations proceeded smoothly.

Even low-ranking Stasi soldiers were aware of how eager Schalck and his friends were to engage in profit-making ventures. When a promised large-scale shipment of sub-machine guns from the Soviet Union destined for an African arms dealer failed to show up around 1984, Heinel [sic] and Schalck raided the ministry arsenal and dispatched the equipment of Stasi's own Feliks Dzierzynski Regiment instead. "For weeks, there was not a single Kalashnikov rifle to be had in the whole regiment," one of those who had to give up his says.

Main Department XVIII, responsible for the GDR economy, was also one of Mielke's key operations.

The department not only checked future combine directors for political reliability but also GDR plants and combines for toeing the line.

Those who didn't were blacklisted by Department XVIII and taken out of circulation, if the need arose. A good many promising managerial careers came to a premature end in this manner.

At times, the intelligence establishment not only had to do its bit for state security but also for the greater glory of the republic. Just prior to Republic Day in 1988 when the GDR's own megabit chip still had not gone into production, the intelligence department, whose subdepartments 14 and 15 had long been responsible for science and technology (SWT), was called on for help.

Circumventing the Cocom embargo, SWT bought the microchip on the world market and smuggled it to East Berlin in the summer of 1988 where Wolfgang Biermann, the head of the Carl Zeiss Jena combine, presented it to Erich Honecker amid a good deal of propaganda fanfare. Honecker, in turn, presented this outstanding example of East German inventive genius to Soviet party leader and head of state Mikhail Gorbachev.

Stasi's heart and brain was Main Department XX, the department for dissidents which operated religiously according to the principles which a Dresden-based commission composed of citizens and government officials for the investigation of Stasi activities has described in the following manner:

Everyone is a potential security risk.

To be sure, one must know *everything*

Security has precedence over law.

Main Department XX kept "political parties" and "mass organizations" under surveillance. It was responsible for combating "political-ideological diversion" (PiD) and "subversive political activities" (PuT).

Using an entire army of informers, it infiltrated the churches and youth organizations, sports clubs, hospitals, skinheads, rockers and neo-Fascists.

In itself, however, spying on people did not completely satisfy the party leadership. Increasingly, the mounting worry that the oppressed population might resort to mass demonstrations and uprisings was reflected in the state security service's large-scale operations from the mid-eighties onward.

"Clearly, the leadership was getting more and more worried," a Stasi member says.

Hundreds of conspicuously inconspicuous men would invariably show up at municipal festivities or government-sponsored hunting parties; at church congresses or at the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND press banquet and elsewhere. Especially when soccer teams from the West such as Werder Bremen played in neighboring countries, e.g., in Brno, Czechoslovakia (which always was a special attraction for GDR fans) dozens of Stasi agents would go along.

They would note down everyone who waved the West German flag or started to sing the German national anthem flushed with victory.

In the mid-eighties, as the SED leadership's security hysteria kept mounting, the climate inside the security apparatus gradually grew more and more tense. Ideological training was stepped up, Stasi members report, and the enemy image became harsher as time went on.

The individual departments began to seal themselves off one from the other. Earlier, almost all surveillance photographs were developed and enlarged in one central laboratory. But now the district headquarters and main departments all fell back on their own facilities.

Given this crisis atmosphere, staff members would discuss only what was absolutely necessary in the hallways and cafeterias. Criticism, rare as it was in the ministry in the best of times, was totally absent now.

The basic rule was that a Stasi agent should only have access to the files, photographs, and instructions that immediately pertained to his particular job. The doctrine that everyone was a potential enemy of the state and the party now applied to the Stasi staff as well. The perpetrators became victims of the apparatus.

But the staff which was used to hunting and gathering did not believe it had what it took to talk back or protest. Heavy as the pressure of the omnipresent surveillance system was on the population, the intimidating effect it had on its own soldiers and officers was just as formidable. "In words of one syllable, we were taught to obey like slaves," says former Stasi officer Horst Lehmann, who worked at Normannenstrasse in Berlin for 20 years.

Fear of being denounced by their colleagues was compounded by stressful relations among friends and family. Stasi soldiers were not permitted to talk about their jobs at home. Many of them had to maintain a cover story about some sham existence even vis-a-vis their wives and close relatives. "It was a totally schizophrenic situation," Lehmann says. "We were unable to lead a normal life."

The Stasi leadership introduced safety measures at all levels to guard against possible party renegades, troublemakers, and Western spies. The dreaded Main Department for cadre and indoctrination led by Maj. Gen. Moeller widened the scope of its security checks throughout the apparatus. Unpopular and unorthodox staff members were placed under surveillance like dissidents and both they and their families were subjected to pressure.

Particularly suspicious employees would be placed in Stasi detention cells for several days. At the end, the cadre department "acted just about the way we always pictured the Nazi Gestapo," one former officer says.

The staffers were checked for watchfulness vis-a-vis the class enemy on a regular basis. Stasi officers would add

"control letters" containing treasonous material composed in house to the mountains of mail and packages the employees had to open and check at the post offices. If these manufactured letters were not found and reported, the culprits were reprimanded, their salaries were cut or they were not promoted.

Strict precautionary measures were taken to guard against the possibility of Stasi staffers succumbing to Western indoctrination. Whenever tourist groups or combine delegations travelled to the FRG, to the Netherlands or some other capitalist country several Stasi agents would accompany them and would keep an eye on each other just in case. Stasi staffers even had to be on their guard in front of TV sets. Tuning to Western stations was strictly forbidden.

There were whistleblowers everywhere.

The ministry's very first order of business was to make sure of obedience and faithful service on the part of its employees during the initial staff selection process.

Stasi would hire only those whose security investigation showed that they were above reproach ideologically and "totally reliable" and had no relatives or friends in the West.

As members of the ministry for state security, the employees were totally subject to the demands of the party and the ministry itself, up to and including his private life.

In the handwritten statement they were required to submit upon entering service all new Stasi employees not only pledged to maintain secrecy and to fulfill every mission assigned to them by the party to the best of their ability. They also promised to report "all changes in their personal status and that of their relatives"; to select friends and spouses according to "cadre-political requirements" and even to keep their projected marriage secret until the actual wedding day.

Obedience was not merely enforced by means of threats, disciplinary measures, and mutual control but also paid for in the form of special privileges—just as it was in the top echelons of the party. The M 2000 average monthly salary of Stasi employees was higher than the GDR average and the higher the employees rose in the hierarchy, the higher the reward for zealous performance and strict adherence to the party line would be.

Every "head of service unit" was entitled to a Lada automobile plus driver, every general was assigned a Citroen; theirs to use after office hours and on vacations as well. Higher-ranking Stasi officers spent their vacations among themselves in Stasi vacation resorts. Regular staff would be provided with space at normal Stasi vacation homes only once every eight years while the top echelons got to stay at Interhotel-level officers' resorts.

But the top brass, i.e., the heads of the main departments, did not even have to bother about these vacation resorts. Many of them simply requisitioned Stasi villas as

their private dachas and had Stasi staff keep house for them. Dozens of ministry yachts and motor boats were kept for their private use on Berlin's Mueggelsee.

They also made use of their privileges in lesser ways. Like the party bosses in Wandlitz, the higher-ranking Stasi officers bought Western goods at low prices in so-called executive shops in Berlin.

To the chagrin of their subordinates, department and service unit heads also received a monthly M 150 IM or unofficial staff check to which IM control officers were controlled although they had long since stopped getting their hands dirty in running their IM's.

The hardening and tightening of the security doctrine in the mid-eighties also resulted in a militarization of the apparatus.

Since the ministry for state security thought of itself as a "military organ," every Stasi officer kept a "field service uniform" and a full combat pack in his closet at his place of work. In the weapon depots of the various duty stations the pistols, rifles and machine guns were ready and waiting.

Dress rehearsals for war situations were held on a regular basis. For three or four days at a time, one Stasi officer relates, employees of the East Berlin ministry would go to the training grounds of the Stasi guard regiment "Feliks Dzierzynski" near Teupitz. Men and women, initially housed in tents and subsequently in barracks, receiving training on how to deal with a national emergency.

These military exercises were so realistic, the Stasi officer says, that women would break down and cry when the commanders described the situation at the outset, i.e., that enemy forces were just outside Berlin and that the Stasi women's children had already been flown out to the Soviet Union for safekeeping.

Now that GDR premier Hans Modrow at long last appears to be getting serious about the dissolution of Stasi and its successor organization, Nasi, the onetime oppressors are making more of a fuss than their victims. Those who lost their jobs had their promised transition pay cut from three years to 12 months by Modrow. In self-help groups, former Stasi staffers are trying to find out what they, their organization and their bosses did wrong. At East Berlin schools in the vicinity of Normanenstrasse, the children of Stasi employees are attacking their fellow students and teachers because neither they, nor their parents can see any reason for accepting collective guilt.

Ibrahim Boehme, the executive head of the GDR's SPD [Social Democratic Party], has already come out in favor of a "kind of rehabilitation" for former Stasi staffers and is calling for a "rehabilitation certificate," analogous to those issued during the denazification process, for those who were mere pawns of the system.

Without a doubt that proposal is being made too soon. The citizens of the GDR, who were the real victims of the Stasi dictatorship, are not yet ready to forgive. At this juncture, dealing with the past has priority over the realization that the new democratic beginning must be coped with. Only the politicians who are looking beyond 18 March are aware of the problem. Lothar de Maiziere, the chairman of the East CDU [Christian Democratic Union], feels that there has to be an amnesty after the election. "We cannot afford to conduct a witch-hunt," he says.

In some places the witch-hunt is in full swing. That, too, is understandable. The victims are looking for justice and for the first time in GDR history they feel there may be a chance of obtaining it. Given the present state of society, it is probably too early for legal decisions and restitution. The first order of business will be to decide how Stasi power can be permanently eliminated, how the staff can be meaningfully reabsorbed and how the dossiers can be stored or destroyed without fear of indiscretion or wrongful use.

But the dissolution of the bureaucratic and dreaded secret police colossus which Modrow has been promising ever since 14 December is the most delicate and dangerous tightrope act of the East German revolution.

A start has been by the citizens committees and control groups which have been forming since early December in the aftermath of the countrywide storming of the huge fortress-like structures of the Mielke empire in all the Bezirk and Kreis capitals.

They have been constantly busy trying to cool down the recurring outbursts of popular anger against Stasi and to direct the demand for rehabilitation of the victims and punishment of the responsible officials into proper legal channels.

But in their attempt to dismantle this unique organization, this all-powerful surveillance machine, without violence and private revenge the revolutionary citizen comptrollers became entangled in the almost labyrinthine intelligence agency web. They soon realized that even as they attempted to deal a death blow to the SED's intelligence power base they were putting the very foundations of the state into question.

As a consequence, many citizen committees allowed the hastily dispatched representatives of the Modrow government to persuade them to let the seemingly indispensable foreign intelligence and counter intelligence departments continue operating. This would have meant that the old ministry would have spawned an FRG-model agency for the protection of the constitution and an intelligence service.

But gradually it became clear to many that it was impossible to destroy the SED system in this manner. To this day, Mielke's men are taking advantage of every gap in citizen control to block or delay revelation of their old structures.

The committee for the dissolution of the Berlin bezirk office of the ministry even had to threaten to call a warning strike at the Roundtable discussions before it was given a list of the many thousands of buildings and apartments in the Berlin area which were part of state security service's farflung infrastructure.

And even then the groups that went to check out the information discovered that they had by no means been given the addresses of all the locations. Film editor and committee member Klaus Wendler reports that he receives almost daily telephone calls from worried citizens or anonymous information from former Stasi soldiers providing new clues to his committee. In many instances, Stasi staffers still working at their desks try to save their jobs by camouflaging their operations. The ministry's computer center, for example, transformed itself into a "state enterprise" by changing the nameplate on its door even though it was not clear what kind of work was being done there.

The committee was also faced with an unpleasant surprise at the old home of the Berlin district administration. The last of the district officers on duty there said that the building was turned over to the city council and a day care center two years earlier. But following a bomb threat, it turned out that a superbly equipped telephone surveillance facility was still operating behind closed doors in the cellar. A Roundtable control commission even discovered that the radio and data transmission center of surveillance department VIII on Koepenicker Allee was still in full operation on 31 January. Up to that time, a colonel on duty said, the plan was to turn the entire facility over intelligence chief Grossmann's "main intelligence administration."

"One cannot help thinking that they are systematically trying to give us the runaround," Wendler says.

In addition, most control group members are out of their depth as they tackle the self-created assignments they took on more or less by accident in the first throes of the revolution. For the most part, they do not have the necessary organizational skills or the experience to see through the web of secrecy.

More importantly, the individual members frequently distrust each other. "The fact is that we have to go on the assumption that Stasi types make up one-third of the committee membership," one delegate of the Erfurt initiative complains. What is more, the new Normannstrasse guardians have come to realize that Western intelligence services, too, are interested in their findings. Under the circumstances, the absence of individual members for several days provides cause for alarm. Of course there are "lucrative offers being made for providing certain information," one committee members says.

Before long, one of the committee members had to give up his job for a time because others suspected him of

working for the West German intelligence service. But the state prosecutor's investigation did not turn up any evidence.

Under the circumstances, the committees themselves unintentionally get caught up in the intelligence vortex and frequently get their signals crossed. The members of the "protection of sources and data security" working group, for example, have had the complete building and construction plans of the entire ministry complex in their possession for quite some time. But since they readily agreed to keep secret all the information given to them by the government commission and by Maj. Gen. Engelhardt, the last reigning Stasi chief, they kept that information to themselves while other working groups were still prevailing on the government to turn the plans over. They had also long since received a list of all former department heads while the Roundtable's security working group which had far greater authority was still looking for that same information.

As unsure of themselves as they were, the more suspicious ones among them pushed through a resolution calling on the committee to investigate itself to start with. Under the supervision of the state prosecutor the heads of the various committees went into action in mid-January, making use of the central registry data bank of the dreaded Main Department XII to examine the content of their own personal files. One of the Erfurt delegates called this move "utter idiocy." How can one turn to intelligence files to prove one's own honesty, he said.

Some of the committee members are beginning to feel the wrath of fired Stasi employees. "Leave us alone or you'll get plugged," said one anonymous letter addressed to citizen comptrollers belonging to Democratic Awakening. Peter Benicke, a Berlin committee member, says he received more than 50 anonymous threatening calls in a single night after his telephone number became public knowledge. He was shocked, he says, "at the hatred that is surfacing all over again. There are thousands of people running around dangerously fantasizing about violence."

Time and again, people are voicing the fear that the fired lackeys of the Mielke empire might regroup in the underground and sabotage the future of the new GDR. "They will keep on conspiring," Benicke says. "After all, that is what they were taught to do." A former senior Stasi officer voiced similar fears. The ties linking the thousands of employees, informers, and their former bosses are "extremely close," he says. "Thus it is totally unthinkable that they might disband from one day to the next." The entire unofficial network and the numerous special operations officers in particular could be activated at any time. "Such thought patterns cannot be abolished by decree."

The hardware and the software still exists. On 29 January, for example, a Western expert discovered that the data processing unit in room 127 of Stasi headquarters in

Gera was still operational. In the hall next to the room there were still 25 sacks bulging with shredded files ready to be carted away. The data had long since been transferred to diskettes and removed. An emulator (a kind of adapter) had been left behind. Its presence leads one to conclude that the information was transferred from eight-inch diskettes to a central data bank. The main computer could not be found, however. And, by its own admission, the citizens committee is unable to access the system because Lutz Kretschmer, the Stasi employee who knows the passwords and access code, has since been dismissed and supposedly cannot be located.

Mistrust and suspicion—no more than that.

In order to shed some light on the situation and to destroy the apparatus root and branch, "we have no other choice than to set up a small intelligence group ourselves," says graphic artist Werner Fischer, the delegate of the Peace and Human Rights Initiative who was given the job of supervising the dissolution of Stasi by the Round Table. Without "professional structures," he says, it will be impossible to do "this monster" in.

For his part, Engelhardt believes continued conspiratorial activities by former senior Stasi officers is "totally out of the question." Western intelligence sources, too, dismiss speculation about a possible Putsch by the old Stasi faithful—such as made the rounds after publication of a telex message in early December 1989 which originated at Stasi headquarters in Gera and contained a fair number of keep-the-faith slogans. The structures favoring the continued existence of the ministry for state security are no more; a return to the worst features of Stalinism seems inconceivable.

Information about an alleged "Operation Alpha" are also discounted in the West. According to this rumor, senior Stasi officers have gone underground, holding down jobs in enterprises, ministries and associations, ready to establish a new intelligence service and constitutional protection agency after the election. But critics say that Modrow means business. If the opposition should take over the government after the election, there is no reason to fear establishment of a constitutional protection agency made up of former Stasi staffers.

One important reason why people are afraid of Stasi all over again probably is that the government has tried to absolve all the senior Stasi generals from any responsibility whatever with the exception of aged Erich Mielke. Engelhardt says that the 85 "leadership cadres" are "psychologically and physically broken men" just sitting around in their apartments. But thus far the GDR population and its control committees who have been taught by bitter experience to be suspicious have yet to get proof that this is so.

Many of the victims will certainly not sit still if all the blame for the ministry's crimes is pinned on aged Mielke. Former general Peter Koch has already been jailed in Brandenburg and in Potsdam five senior Stasi

officers have been indicted for "usurpation of government prerogatives" and "criminal theft." Gerhard Lange, the head of the Stasi bezirk office in Suhl, most likely wanted to avoid this fate: he shot himself two weeks ago in his apartment.

Now the Stasi watchdogs are beginning to ask questions about the responsibility of Col. Gen. (ret) Markus Wolf, who headed the state security ministry's intelligence division until 1985. His assertion that he can stand up "in good conscience" for his own work and that of his staff seems more and more implausible. "Wolf's department worked exactly like all the other operational departments," says former officer Lehmann. Their work was not focused exclusively on foreign countries. "They were involved in the whole export sector," Lehmann adds. "None of the arms deals could ever have been transacted without Wolf."

Many citizens of the GDR are unhappy about the fact that it still unclear what the future disposition of the mountains of documents stemming from the surveillance state era will be. In many towns hundreds of citizens have asked the courts to rehabilitate them or to provide restitution for the psychological terror they suffered at the hands of Stasi. All told, Justice Minister Kurt Wuensche estimates, GDR courts will probably have to deal with more than 40,000 such cases in the years ahead. Which is why CDU chief de Maiziere has come out against destruction of the documents. "The victims have a right to restitution," he says.

But no one knows how this is to be handled. In many instances the paper legacy left behind by the Mielke empire confronts the citizens committees and prosecuting attorneys with a chaotic collection of documents which is proving almost impossible to disentangle.

Stasi watchdog Wendler calls it a "big mistake" that the many documents from the bezirk and kreis offices were collected and sealed at central locations. "Now no one can tell what's what any more," Wendler says. Now that the documents are out of sequence "the stuff is practically useless." In many places, the control committees have turned to archivists to sort the material and save what still can be saved.

There is also a general albeit mistaken belief that the Stasi files on individual citizens were collected in a single location. In contrast to their wiretapping operations, the Stasi generals were suspicious of using advanced data storage techniques. Because of their fear of the vulnerability of large data processing facilities, it was not until the early eighties that they approved the establishment of a central data bank. But even this "central personal data bank" merely contains information on which department dealt with and had the particular individual on file.

Under the circumstances, Wendler says, individual demands "to see my file make no sense at all. In many cases, these files don't even exist." As a rule, the same

individual turns up in the files of a variety of departments instead, linked to data on informers or other individuals under surveillance.

The easiest part of the job would be to rehabilitate all those who were actually placed on trial because the court documents have remained intact at most of the Stasi bezirk headquarters. But some of the citizens committees still balk at the demands of the courts to turn over the sealed "documents of injustice" to state prosecutors or judges. At a delegates' meeting which took place in the auditorium of Stasi headquarters in Berlin, Herr Fischer, the Roundtable's Stasi comptroller, said "there is no basis of trust that would us to turn the documents over to the state prosecutor's office" until the legal system itself got rid of incriminated members of its own staff.

What about the culprits? In altering the foreigner pension law on 31 January, the Bonn government ruled that as of 1 February emigres who "lent substantial support to a system of political oppression" in their homelands may no longer lay claim to a pension in the FRG. The cabinet decision which appears to be a popular one and has all the earmarks of retribution, is no doubt unconstitutional: the type of work a person has done cannot be a criterion for the granting of a pension.

For all that, the number of former Stasi members making their way to the West is by no means excessive, at least insofar as FRG intelligence services and authorities are able to tell. A few dozen have reported in; some presented themselves at the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and told about their work.

A good many still have their old jobs, e.g., the IM's in public administration or in the diplomatic service. Since the great upheaval not a single transfer in the embassies and consulates of the GDR has been reported—although it is virtually certain that four out of every five diplomats worked on behalf of Stasi.



Mielke told the investigating committee that he was not aware "of any wrongdoing"; that all his actions were strictly constitutional. Under these circumstances, how can one expect his underlings to see the light?

Most of them are trying to change their occupations while remaining in the GDR. Up to 20 December 1989, Stasi Maj Hofmeister was responsible for the tourist guides and staff of the Thuringen [Thuringia] Tourist (state) travel agency in Erfurt.

Hofmeister has been back since 3 January. This time, his job is that of "comptroller" in the auditing department.

As the demonstrators had demanded, some Stasi staffers actually did make the move to factory jobs and mining. Others went underground and started working as drivers for bottling plants or sanitation departments. A handful of Stasi agents abroad reported to the BND, the FRG intelligence service and received permanent contract employment.

Mielke's Empire. Layout of the Ministry for State Security in East Berlin



Key:

1. Parking lot
 2. Traffic security
 3. Cadre department
 4. Mail control point
 5. Communications, government communications, switching center, WeTsche network
 6. Fiscal division
 7. Vopo (security)
 8. Zoschke stadium
 9. Mass organizations, imagery interpretation center, social services
 10. Social service center, health inspection
 11. Reception, security, social services
 12. SED and FDJ kreis headquarters
 13. Security of (GDR) economy
 14. Dispensary
 15. Underground ammunition bunker
 16. Guard regiment
 17. Security for main government organs, mass organizations; cultural and sports facilities
 18. Main Department Intelligence
 19. Minister's office
 20. Restaurant
 21. Power and water supply, heating plant, repair shop
 22. Security of (GDR) economy
 23. Counterintelligence
 24. Operations staff
 25. Evaluation and information group
 26. Counterintelligence
 27. Central list of persons data bank
 28. Screening of emigration and exit permit requests
-

A few stayed put. Stasi Maj. Mies in Dresden, who was charged by the local investigating committee with responsibility for beatings during confrontations at the main railroad station, now heads the unit guarding the old Stasi headquarters on Bautzener Strasse. His job is to make sure the files do not disappear.

The military is really making life easy for itself. In the past, Stasi agents were assigned to each and every NVA unit. They wore army uniforms but took their orders from the ministry for state security. These agents were called VO's [liaison officers] but were derisively called Vee Zeros. The official designation was "Administration 2000." Adm. Theodor Hoffmann, the GDR defense minister, sent out a coded message ("750 from Wostock") on 26 January, containing the following instructions:

- establish military-political analysis groups and/or officers as temporary non-structural working units in permanent groups;
- focus messages and analyses on the following situations/events;
- requests by superiors/subordinates and/or other individuals which could not be responded to and satisfied by the Armed Forces;

- signs of riots and demonstrations by members of the armed forces;
- serious violations of discipline in units and/or activities by members of the Armed Forces which endanger the security of weapons and ammunition dumps as well as other technology;
- appearance of neofascist, extreme right- or left-wing literature;
- peculiarities in media news coverage.

The analysis groups and/or officers are instructed to take up their work as of 29 January 1990.

It seems as though Stasi officers can simply keep their uniforms on. All they have to do now is submit their old familiar reports to a new authority.

[19 Feb pp 106-109]

Part III

[Unattributed article: "Shield and Sword of the Party—SPIEGEL Series on the Powers and Investigative Practices of the GDR State Security Service (III)"]

[Text] Even today, snoopers are not welcome in the forest of Freienbrink. Men wearing uniforms of the

GDR customs police make driving through it impossible. The big gate is opened for entering and departing trucks and for "authorized personnel."

The forest section of approximately four square kilometers, located directly next to the Autobahn approximately eight kilometers southeast of East Berlin, is secured in the same way as the former intra-German border: Guard towers and high fences with barbed wire, behind them the inevitable death strip, neatly raked.

As a "military restricted zone," the area was for years off limits to the GDR population. Soldiers of the Guard Regiment Feliks Dzierzynski secured the area around the clock with loaded weapons.

These precautions were justified and still are. The need for secrecy continues to exist even now, following the beginning of the new era, for the "Installation Freienbrink" was one of the most sensitive and most secret addresses in the realm of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] and the Ministry for State Security [MfS]. Hidden here was the most disreputable storage depot of the MfS—Erich Mielke's robbers' den.

Hoarded and dealt with underhandedly here were the things that citizens who had fled the country or who had been put in jail had left behind: furniture and household items, family heirlooms and costume jewelry, shoes and clothing, radios, tape recorders, record players, television sets.

Here a climate of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" prevailed: Everybody who got along with the head of the department could help himself to the MfS goods—it goes without saying that this included the top-ranking comrades from Wandlitz, but it also included the colleagues from the other departments as well, provided they were needed as confederates and accessories.

Here, in the middle of the woods, a most audacious German-German job was pulled off by the state security people: From 1984 on, every package of the FRG postal system [Bundespost] which wound up somewhere in the GDR by mistake was not sent back to the FRG but sent to Freienbrink instead and rifled—the biggest state-organized postal theft of all times.

No doubt it was the postal controls which had been carried out on a gigantic scale for decades which in the course of time had whetted the appetite of the MfS controllers. For Mielke's snoopers had more than just the technical capability to listen in at any time on any telephone conversation they pleased. In addition, every good-sized post office had rooms in which local intelligence employees opened postal items—letters which were steamed open (and then resealed with poor-quality GDR white glue); packets and packages, even if they were being mailed from one GDR address to another.

In one package mailed from Jena in the late 1980's, SPIEGEL correspondent Ulrich Schwarz found a filing card on which the following text had been hand-written in ink:

"I have enclosed this letter so as to establish contact with you. I am working for the MfS and would be willing to sell information to you or to the Federal Intelligence Agency [Bundesnachrichtendienst—BND] or Salzgitter. If interested call xxxxxx after 7 pm.

"When you call, please mention that you are calling in connection with the sale of postage stamps.

"Lieutenant"

The control of letters and packages was one of the supporting pillars of the MfS empire. In East Berlin alone, 600 MfS officers were engaged at monitoring the mail of potential or presumed opponents of the regime.

A legal basis for this activity did not exist. While state agencies were permitted by law to engage in wire-tapping, Mielke was never able to have postal secrecy violations legalized as well.

This had no effect on the effort expended. Department M (its motto: "We are everywhere") had its people assigned in every city, in every district, in every railroad station, in every post office.

In Berlin, the controllers of letter mail in the main railroad station occupied a whole floor. Packages were searched at the Wriezener Bahnhof [railroad station in East Berlin-Friedrichshain, formerly Schlesischer Bahnhof]. The system used was the same: on the conveyor belt located in the middle of the room, the analysts had to "screen" the postal items as they passed by. A letter-and-package controller had been drilled to the point where he could store up to 4,000 addresses in his head. Whoever was working at the belt only had to know the streets and names for which to look and then remove the items from the belt.

Baerbel Bohley and Rainer Eppelmann naturally belonged to this targeted group, as did Ingrid Koeppe and Wolfgang Templin, Rolf Henrich, and Ibrahim Boehme; also writers Stefan Heym, Christa Wolf, Stephan Hermlin, Volker Braun, and Christoph Hein—the list was constantly being updated. Anyone sitting at the negotiating table today or already a member of the government was most certainly included at one time or other in Mielke's "red file" (underground).

The security service underlings were especially on the lookout for questionable literary products: If Henrich's book "Der vormundschaftliche Staat" or Christa Wolf's "Stoerfall" were discovered, it had to be reported immediately to the very top level.

In Freienbrink, however, the shipments were not reglued or retied after being opened; there they were stolen. The extent of this theft can hardly be expressed in figures.

The deputy attorney general of the GDR, Lothar Reuther, last week spoke of "M 6.5 million," a gigantic understatement.

For in using this figure, Reuther was referring only to the cash money which had been removed from "...postal items during the last three years." The prosecutor said nothing about the material damage which the security service thieves caused during their many years of stealing packages.

The 6.5-million figure used by him comes from a different source: The GDR national bank had advised the prosecutors who were investigating this case of "out-and-out postal robbery" (Reuther) that, during the past 3 years, the MfS had deposited 6.5 million—in West Marks and foreign currency—to their accounts, money that had been obtained as the result of postal controls.

A large part of the mail theft proceeds was returned to the MfS by the national bank for the purpose of financing the activity of MfS "spotters" in the West. The struggle against the enemy of the working class was financed with that enemy's own money.

Hurt, to be sure, were private persons and firms who perceived themselves not as enemies of the working class but as patrons of the FRG postal system. They were the actual losers: Only if they had registered or insured the missing items did the FRG postal system reimburse them for their loss.

How much the security service really stole can only be roughly surmised. Eye witnesses report that the huge warehouse—approximately 150 meters long, 20 meters wide and five meters high—had sometimes not been big enough to hold the loot, even though it served only as a transit depot and the stolen goods were constantly being transported away.

Especially during the weeks before Christmas and Easter, the flood of packages swelled so much that temporary personnel had to be requested. One of the official package slashers recalls that "at peak times the building was filled to the top. We were hardly able to keep up any more."

Already from 1972 on, all GDR post offices had instructions to forward all misdirected packages from the FRG to the MfS for examination. The reason: The espionage department needed to keep track of the West German traffic of goods. Department M, responsible for postal and letter controls, acquired a new field office, the M/4 stationed in Freienbrink.

The longer the security service people rummaged through the West German packages, the greater became the appetite of their leaders. Initially, the state octopus only swung into action sporadically. Since 1984, however, everything crossing the border as actual or presumed misdirected mail was taken.

There are indications that Mielke's mail theft troop had helpers in the FRG who assisted in the rerouting of the

stream of packages and goods. A former security service helper from Freienbrink reports that every third package that he had to open in Freienbrink had not looked like a misrouted package but rather like a normal package destined for the GDR: "How these things got over here? The notation 'DDR' was put on them in big black letters, and then we had them."

A coincidence? Or planned?

The FRG postal service does not want to rule out the possibility that the security service had helpers who placed the notation "DDR" on the packages. When presorting the packages on the conveyor belt, every postal employee notes first the country designator and then the first two digits of the postal code number.

An item sent to a West Berlin address (postal code 1000) will almost surely go to the eastern part of the city (postal code begins with 10) if the address contains the notation "DDR." Instead of to Munich (postal code 8000), mail bearing the "DDR" notation went to Dresden (8010), and mail that was supposed to go to Hamburg (2000) went to the village of Gerswalde (2092) in the Uckermark, in the area of Neubrandenburg.

Twice a month—and before Christmas and Easter twice a week—couriers of Department M/4 had to make pickup runs through all the districts with a five-ton truck: first the "northern tour," then the "southern tour." In Freienbrink, every item was first X-rayed. A report had to be prepared—this was Prussia, after all—concerning the probable content, which the duty officer signed.

The package then went to the "resolution room." The contents were placed on shelves by merchandise categories, the empty cartons were sent to the paper mill for reprocessing into toilet paper, which is famous for its unyielding hardness—recycling a la GDR.

In order to conceal the theft and not make their colleagues in the West suspicious, Department M/4 sent about five percent of the misdirected packages—worthless stuff, most of the time—back to the West.

The Ministry for Post & Telecommunications in Bonn was unable to accomplish anything. According to a ministry official: "We had known for a long time that there was a systematic swindle being perpetrated here. But it was tremendously difficult to uncover the system."

Officials in Bonn tried repeatedly at German-German postal negotiations to make this problem a topic for discussion: Of 20 million packages sent each year to the East, after all, approximately 200,000 did not arrive at their destination. This equated to a misrouted package quota of one percent instead of the usual 0.02 percent. But there was no reply from the Eastern postal system.

Another reason that the security service haul from the stream of West German merchandise was so successful was that no citizen and no firm in the FRG could know

that postal shipments only intended to be routed within the Federal Republic would miss their destination by so much.

How much the West Germans trusted their postal system is evidenced by the assortment of merchandise that was unpacked in Freienbrink: Mielke's people had a supply of everything that was of good quality and expensive in the West, ranging from an expensive color TV with remote control to a cable-ready VCR, from a complete stamp collection to a steam-driven toy locomotive, from a surfboard to Italian men's shoes, from expensive family jewels to a 1,000-Mark bill.

Part of the loot was immediately turned over to the Department for Commercial Coordination, headed by currency procurer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, which sold them in the West. M/4 employees can recall that Schalck was once supposed to take over a whole shipment of brand-new Monopoly games—the security service bosses felt that the game could not be played in the GDR for ideological reasons.

In dealing with other Western achievements, one was less fussy. The medical supply of the aged SED leaders consisted almost without exception of stolen medications from the FRG.

Requests received from the Politburo housing area in Wandlitz were always given priority treatment. At the home of the former president of the People's Chamber, Horst Sindermann, one found numerous complete television sets and VCR's plus two expensive stereo sets in the basement. The prince of the SED had had other unusual wishes filled as well. From his hunting lodge, an electric and a video cable, each three kilometers long, led to a forest clearing.

There a searchlight and a camera were installed. From his bedroom, the aged huntsman observed on the picture tube which deer it was that was grazing on his clearing.

Also profiting from the loot were the mid-level and higher-level leaders of the MfS. At special shops, which were supplied by Freienbrink, they were able to buy Western goods taken from MfS stocks for East marks at an exchange rate of 1:1.

Only the security service helpers at the scene of the action got nothing. They were not even permitted to keep a bar of chocolate or a 10-Mark bill for themselves—a real MfS officer, thus they were told by the head of their department, Major General Rudi Strobel, "does not work for money, but for his consciousness."

Principles as sublime as this did not apply to the general, to be sure. Although he was only one of many department heads in the MfS hierarchy, Strobel acted like an absolutist prince.

Whoever enjoyed his favor could come and unabashedly take whatever he wanted. "Once a general officer came and asked for toys for his grandchildren," a state security slave recalls, who himself never got anything, "another

time it was chocolate. We got nothing out of it, we were not permitted to take anything, and nothing was sold to us. For us, everything was taboo."

Every piece of bread or cake which turned up when the packages were opened had to be immediately put into a special barrel—for the boars of the general, an avid hunter. In addition to a Fiat Regata and a motor yacht, he had at his disposal an old forester's house ("Installation Linde"), which had been converted at state expense into a vacation house with sauna and solarium. Strobel is now under arrest.

In the Freienbrink installation, as well, many things are being done differently than in Mielke's time. The regiment is now commanded here by the customs administration, which has absorbed many a deserving former MfS man.

Shortly before his arrest, Comrade Strobel had managed to have the evidence of the mass theft organized by him destroyed. The shelves in the warehouse were emptied, the records shredded. But the traces of the past have not been completely eradicated.

Still standing among the trees and on the parking lots at Freienbrink are approximately 2,000 Trabant, Wartburg, and Lada automobiles—the remains of the mass exodus of last summer.

Returning the vehicles to the GDR proved to be a laborious process: Hundreds of MfS employees were taken by bus to Prague and Budapest. There they had to restore the automobiles, some of which had been badly cannibalized and ready for junking, at least sufficiently to permit them to be driven back to the GDR. Some of them were missing the steering wheel, others had no driver's seat, still others had flat tires.

During Mielke's reign, the automobile problem would surely have been solved more simply. But the days when a transporter loaded with automobiles can be driven to Berlin past the customs guards, and the cargo divided up among deserving comrades, are apparently really over.

"We are dealing here, after all, with the property of former GDR citizens, one cannot simply sell these things," the MfS insolvency liquidator Heinz Engelhardt has learned.

Truly, the Ministry for State Security is now no longer what it once was.

POLAND

Military Armaments Plants Manager on Cuts in Orders, Restructuring

90EP0286B Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 29 Dec 89-01 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Ireneusz Rosiak, director of the military armaments plants in Krakow, by Roman Przewiczewski; date and place not given]

[Text] [ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] About one year ago deputies in the last term of the Sejm visited the WZU [Military Armaments Plants] in Krakow. Much was said about prospects and increased special production, but today

[Rosiak] Today it looks entirely different. Personally, I believe there is nothing strange in this. Our lives have changed, the military's needs have changed and, thus, a plant operating for the armed forces must also change.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] These statements sound like obvious truths. However, I know that you harbor many questions and doubts.

[Rosiak] Frankly speaking, can it be otherwise? For a good cause our plants found themselves in an unenviable position.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Why?

[Rosiak] Because they are military plants!

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] That explains nothing. What is more, you probably read that plants designated as defense enterprises were privileged. They received bonuses for special production, their taxes were lower, they could rely on rebates and the like. Journalists did not fabricate this.

[Rosiak] Just one minute! If special production was such a tidbit then why did not everyone undertake such production? Let me remind you of one other thing: during the 1980-81 period, when strikes were the order of the day, production stoppages were unthinkable in our plants, actually unthinkable! Also, please remember that we initiated 'reform' in 1982. Someone clever, always outside the office, figured out that the production increase index will be used to evaluate an enterprise's economic situation. The larger the index, the better the plant and its ability to increase wages. And do you know what happened?

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] I remember. The would-be bankrupts advanced almost to the forefront in wages paid and those plants in which production did not decrease, in general

[Rosiak]learned through bitter experience! Some had production increases of 20 to 90 percent and hoisted wages upward, while we only sought reserves. If that was not enough, the famous FAZs [Vocational Mobilization and Retraining Fund] appeared shortly afterward. In other words the assumption was that one could pay people above-board or, again, for production increases. If increased wages were not followed by increased productivity, the treasurer was supposed to be uncompromising. At military briefings we heard even something different: he who pays FAZ in practice works against the government. Therefore, could a military plant even think about overstepping the proper threshold beyond which it would have to deal with the announced regulations? Of course not! We paid only what was necessary and not one zloty more. But others

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] It should be added that others went for everything and did not fear the treasury. They received monies from the FAZ that would truly spin one's head and

[Rosiak] Let me say as frankly and simply as possible that these monies were never repaid! First there was nominal criticism at a government meeting or Central Committee plenum. Later, delicately as possible, the matter was hushed up. I know of cases where if the director had to repay his FAZ, his enterprise would be placed under the auctioneer's mallet. It did not happen so. Instead, the next time, the 'economy' favored those who were shrewd and not honest.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Mr. Director, now it is supposed to be different.

[Rosiak] I believe that in the end it will be so. However, there is now another element, the one you mentioned at the start of our talk: a military plant does not see its future as clearly as any civilian plant does.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] A short time ago you said that the needs of the armed forces have changed, and, therefore, a plant operating for the armed forces must also change.

[Rosiak] Yes, it is easy to say that but who really knows what lurks behind those uncertain and vague words? A plant must change, this is true. But what kind of change? In fact, at the WZU the ex-deputies talked about increased special production and well-devised, beautiful plans, but today it is merely a memory. We are truly experiencing the restructuring of the armed forces! We see on TV that this and that military unit is disbanding and donating its banner to a museum. But we are aware that this fact will result in significantly reduced orders for us.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Is this really happening?

[Rosiak] Depending on the item, our military work has decreased 30 to 80 percent!

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] What does this mean in practice? Do you have any work? Do you have free production capacity, unused potential?

[Rosiak] We are a military plant. We were created to fill military needs. We are obligated to heed the command. However, we cannot neglect economy, that is, earning our keep. Our plants have never been or will be subsidized by the Ministry of National Defense or the national budget.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Therefore, between military requirements and economy, are there fields in which you can demonstrate your enterprise?

[Rosiak] Of course! I hear and read everywhere that restructuring of industry is now an outmoded idea. It is outmoded because practice has made it obsolete. Thus, I pose the question: Who truly knows the situation in

which military plants find themselves? Perhaps this sounds immodest but I believe that many civilian enterprises could learn a good lesson from us.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] A lesson in efficiency?

[Rosiak] I would rather say—in flexibility. To put it simply, we do not have military orders, but we do have free production capacity. Thus, we must seek work from non-military sources. It should be remembered here that as novices in new production we cannot rely on additional supplies of steel, paints or other materials.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] This does not sound too encouraging.

[Rosiak] That is not all. ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI already described the Military Motor Vehicle Facilities which have shifted from military to civilian production. However, it is unfortunate that you did not emphasize that these plants are in a much better situation than the remaining military plants. The problem is that the greater the specialization in production, the more difficult it is to shift to other work. The Military Motor Vehicle Facilities can continue to overhaul vehicles, but now it will be civilian and not military vehicles. But, in the given situation, what, for example, can aircraft, communication equipment or armaments plants do? In addition, we were set up to overhaul and not produce, and, therefore, if we want to change the enterprise's profile we must be assured of new machinery and technology.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Are you saying that the situation has become pat?

[Rosiak] No. All along I have argued that one cannot equate a military person with standing at attention and taking orders. I wear a uniform, but at the same time I am a manager because I must be. This applies to me and other military people in enterprise management. We did not wait for any kind of guidelines. We did not expect the minister of defense to find additional funding to improve our economic situation. We started looking for other income sources on our own.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] I believe you were not very successful in the beginning.

[Rosiak] That is the way it is in life. We believed in slogans! So much was said about the need to produce for agriculture that we believed it. We researched the market, we traveled here and there, we talked with farmers and knew what to build. The deal appeared to be

obvious: we paid for documentation and together we will improve supplies to the rural areas.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Did the idea misfire?

[Rosiak] It was even worse. The factory in Strzelce Opolskie and the State Agricultural Machine Stations in Puck informed us that they were not interested in our proposals. In other words, they were, are and will be monopolists because it is better for them!

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Did you think of getting some senators or Rural Solidarity activists interested in this matter?

[Rosiak] Sir, we have no time to wait. If we do not earn money we will go bankrupt, that is the truth. We know, and not only in Krakow, that words are not the same as action, and that the desire to do something is not the same as the ability to do it. In addition, no bank would respect the explanation that someone or another did not want to "share" their production with us. Thus we would not have utilized our production capabilities and sensational headlines would have appeared in the newspapers that a military enterprise has gone bankrupt.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Therefore, you did not start to produce sorting machines or potato harvesters, and then

[Rosiak] We are producing what is lacking in the marketplace. First of all we are producing single-axis agricultural trailers. We are producing computer desks, several types of lamps and kitchen cabinets.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] I heard about those cabinets, especially that they are very expensive. Sir, who could afford to buy them?

[Rosiak] Are you not yet thinking in terms of market categories? I agree, their prices are high. But they are made of wood, and they are sold in 5 minutes or less when they appear in the stores.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] However, some may think it strange: a Military Armaments Plant ... and such production?

[Rosiak] I will tell you something more: we will start producing "teeth" for agricultural cultivators. We rework automobile wheel rims. We clean and paint large structures, for example, the Jelcz truck. On our own we developed a prototype of a 200-liter concrete mixer. But above all we continue to guarantee completely military needs. After all, that is what our enterprise was created for.

[ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI] Thank you for the interview.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economic Outlook for 1990 Summarized

90EC0246A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in
Czech 8 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Eng Milan Jurceka, candidate of sciences, deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission: "Soberly and Realistically Into the Year 1990"]

[Text] At its 30 November 1989 session, the Czechoslovak Government approved the state plan for economic and social development of Czechoslovakia for the year 1990. It thus created the fundamental prerequisites for specifying the tasks of the state plan for individual economic entities in such a way that they would be in a position to know the specific conditions for their activities prior to the beginning of next year, permitting them to compile their own economic plans on that basis and to forge a connection between the aims of the central authorities and the intentions of the organizations involved.

The plan for 1990 was processed and handled under extraordinary circumstances. It contains fundamental intentions and will yet be fine-tuned in a number of areas. It must primarily react to the current stormy social developments—particularly to the specific proposals and recommendations which have arisen from or are yet to arise from ongoing national discussions.

However, we must regard the 1990 plan soberly and realistically, since the entire national economy is moving at a fast pace. The plan is based on the realistic situation in the economy, on the fact that the enterprise sphere and the central authorities will gradually become accustomed to the new economic conditions. In the economy, in the daily economic activities of enterprises and organizations, pious wishes or excess optimism are not applicable, but rather hard economic realities prevail in which our national economy currently finds itself.

Principal Intentions

The following basic intentions form the axis of the plan for 1990:

- Preferential treatment is accorded to the renewal of economic balance, primarily in the domestic market, over the dynamics of growth in the national economy. This is shown primarily in the planned reduction of the volume of investments, as compared with 1989, by 4.1 percent, primarily with respect to the construction component of such investments. This reduction will continue, accompanied by a growth in national income by 2.5 percent;
- Extraordinary emphasis is being placed on securing the standard of living of the populace, including actions to protect the environment. It is anticipated that retail turnover will increase by 2.1 percent and personal consumption by 1.7 percent, while real income for the populace will rise by 2.2 percent. The

number of completed apartment units will increase by 13 percent, the number of modernized apartments by 25 percent compared to 1989. It is proposed that construction projects in the ecological program be accomplished at a value of approximately Kcs 6 billion, which represents a growth of 24 percent in comparison with the anticipated actual situation for 1989. The plan outputs contain a new category which lists ecological investments initiated in 1990;

- The people's social security is being safeguarded; the critical situation in health care is being solved more resolutely. The plan anticipates the valorization of pensions, effective 1 October 1990. For this purpose, reserves of Kcs 1 billion are set aside; budgetary expenditures and health care will rise by 7.6 percent over 1989, and the health care industry budget is to be strengthened by Kcs 1.39 billion at the expense of expenditures in defense spending;
- The plan includes the intention not to increase our indebtedness with respect to nonsocialist countries (with the exception of express pro-export short-term return programs) and contains provisions to reduce the positive trade balance with respect to CEMA countries. The plan contains a directive to unblock Czechoslovak outstanding debts in developing countries with the goal of importing primarily electronic consumer goods for the Czechoslovak domestic market. Our indebtedness in nonsocialist countries next year is anticipated to be \$6.7 billion U.S.—in other words, approximately at this year's level. The overall turnover in foreign trade with respect to the socialist countries is being lowered by 1.8 percent (in 1989 it was Kcs 245.9 billion in FOB prices, as compared with Kcs 241.6 billion in 1990);
- We are beginning to make structural changes. A shutdown program is anticipated for the area of uranium mining. The volume of production in this industry is being reduced by 16.7 percent in comparison with 1989, which will result in a reduction in the volume of subsidies by Kcs 550 million. The plan solves this extraordinarily sensitive problem in a comprehensive manner, together with its social impacts, including the solution to the requalification problem. We anticipate more definite structural changes within the framework of the 9th Five-Year Plan which is under preparation.

New Conditions

Effective 1 January of next year, the Czechoslovak economy will be managed by a new method. Even in the face of all of its shortcomings, it is necessary for 1990 to proceed from those measures which have already been adopted. In part, the plan acquires an indicative image and, for the development of organizations, those financial resources which are at their disposal will become decisive. In comparison to the existing system of management, the most patent expression of the change becomes manifest in the outputs of the state plan with respect to economic organizations where a perceptible transition is being made from material tasks toward the

use of economic instruments of management while expressly restricting the number of binding outputs of the state plan.

For all economic organizations, the following standards are primarily applicable as binding outputs:

- On a national scale, a unified standard basic obligatory payment to the developmental fund from profits at a magnitude of 0.5 percent of the value of production funds;
- A national uniform standard minimum in the reserve fund equaling 0.2 percent of the value of net production;
- A national uniform standard of minimum allocations to the fund of cultural and social needs from profits at a volume of 1.9 percent of the volume of wage funds;
- A branch-differentiated standard allocation to the developmental fund from expenditures for noncapital expenses for the development of science and technology at a level of 0.38 percent for communications through 9.58 percent for the electrotechnical industry—determined on the basis of a percent share from the added value, that is to say, from net production, increased by the volume of write-offs;
- A differentiated wage standard in one or another form (an incremental standard or a tariff method of wage regulation);
- A differentiated standard of minimum taxes (or allocations) in relation to the central foreign exchange resource.

A global comparison indicates that, in 1990, there will be a substantial reduction in the extent of binding outputs for socialist organizations, in comparison with 1989.

The state plan (measured by the number of binding indicators data) for 1989 contained a total of 1,529 items. The plan for 1990 contains a total of 618 items of a binding output nature, intended to address socialist organizations. This is a matter of reducing the binding outputs of the state plan for 1990 by 55 percent—in other words, we are reducing the number of binding outputs by more than was anticipated at the time the plan was being prepared.

Whereas at the beginning of the 8th Five-Year Plan, the planning system operated with a total of 769 material balances (including 260 balances approved by the government, 178 balances approved at the level of the ministries, and 331 balances approved at the level of the economic production units), in 1989 the operation involves 222 balances. For 1990, the planning system will operate with 116 balances, which will result in 209 limits of consumption. This change is the first step toward the gradual replacement of a directive type of distribution system by a system in which enterprises enter into economic contracts among each other for purposes of material-technical supplies as is the case in developed market economies.

It is possible to anticipate by estimate that the average number of binding inputs and outputs in a typical

enterprise will fall approximately within the range of 25 to 35 items. An exception will be the large state enterprises where basic assortments of products are produced; it can be estimated that they will have even as many as 150 binding outputs. With respect to the other outputs, the plan has only an indicative character for enterprises.

An independent output in the state plan is represented by the specific rules for the current orientation of the economy for 1990, which will be published separately. Even now, we emphasize that these rules exclude any adjustment to the standards in the course of the year. We intend to use this procedure to begin the process of renewing the confidence of the enterprises with respect to the central authorities.

In preparing the plan for 1990, we judged the question of possible inflationary pressures which could arise from the transition to the new economic mechanism in a very responsible manner. From this standpoint, capital construction is the most threatened area. Since 1 January 1989, therefore, we introduced the rule calling for the obligatory deposit of 50 percent of the budgetary costs of the project, in cash, even prior to issuing the construction permit. This measure, which does not deprive anyone of any money, is intended to limit the untenable volume of construction starts for new projects. By the end of 1989, we shall reevaluate the question of introducing a regulating tax on construction investments.

Further Progress

The national economic central authorities have been charged with breaking down the outputs of the state plan to the organizational level as rapidly as possible so as to assure the continuous production and activities of enterprises and organizations from the very beginning of 1990.

The appropriate ministries shall, by 22 December 1989, undertake the specification of state plan outputs to the enterprise and organizational level. They shall also organize the activities of those enterprises where it is necessary to clarify and explain the intentions of the state plan for 1990 under conditions of the existing economic mechanism.

On these bases, the enterprises shall work out their own economic plans which must accord priority treatment to the binding outputs of the state plan, as well as to economic obligations which have already been concluded. The enterprises are not obligated to submit these plans to anyone for approval. Also, in their own jurisdictions, changes can be made, provided the binding outputs are met.

We expect the economic sphere to provide information on safeguarding the outputs of the state plan in the economic plans of organizations by 28 February 1990 in such a manner as to make it possible for the government to be informed regarding the status of safeguarding the state plan by 15 March 1990.

The plan for 1990 cannot be understood and judged separately from the ongoing social process, nor from the realistic status of our economy. The plan cannot become isolated from these events; on the contrary, it must react to them with flexibility. This reaction should primarily occur in its central portion, particularly through the utilization of reserves in such a manner that the fundamental relationship between the central authorities and the economic sphere should be preserved for the year 1990.

Long-Term Prospects for Agriculture Viewed

90EC0308A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
14 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Emil Cakajda, first deputy minister of agriculture and food of Czechoslovakia, by S. Pomerantsev: "A Look to the Year 2010"; first paragraph is SELSKAYA ZHIZN]

[Text] "What conclusions were drawn by the CSSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food from the results of the XI Congress of Czechoslovakian Agricultural Cooperatives which took place in December 1989?" First Deputy Minister Emil Chakayda talks about this in a conversation with our correspondent S. Pomerantsev.

[Pomerantsev] Peasants, by their very nature, are reserved. Nonetheless, the overall mood of their congress, and this is also a measure of the current social-political situation in Czechoslovakia, was critical. There were quite a few criticisms directed at your ministry. What kind of a reaction was there to this?

[Cakajda] We have been attentive to the opinions of people not only at the congress but also during preparation for the congress, at rayon conferences and in the cooperatives themselves. For that reason we were able to come out with answers to many questions at the congress. Right now there is a detailed analysis underway of the materials presented at the congress. Each and every proposal will be analyzed. We will determine who specifically will carry them out and in what time frame.

[Pomerantsev] What is the essence of the main problems presented by the members of the peasant cooperatives?

[Cakajda] The majority of questions deal with the new regulations of the industry's economic mechanism which have been in operation since 1 January 1989. A number of others are, unfortunately, the same problems which were posed at the previous congress five years ago. Serious complaints remain regarding the quality and specifications of agricultural equipment and there are demands to increase deliveries and improve the quality of pesticides and other chemical tools. The problem of the inadequate level of mechanization in vegetable and fruit production is particularly bothersome. In this area of production neither our equipment manufacturers nor the "Agromash" international society of socialist countries has justified the farmers' expectations.

[Pomerantsev] The peasants also were not very flattering in their assessment at the congress of the policy regarding capital investment.

[Cakajda] The problem here is the emergency decision of the CSSR government to forbid the construction of any type of new facility beginning 1 May 1989. It has affected all branches of the economy. In recent years our ministry has exceeded the capital investment program and has even been subjected to criticism by the government. But people are convinced that it is necessary particularly in agriculture to build at a minimum as much as before if not more. After all, we are not only talking about satisfying vital needs of the people but also about essential ecological demands. That is why reaction to this decision has been so sensitive.

[Pomerantsev] About a year ago you told SELSKAYA ZHIZN about the new regulations regarding the economic mechanism to which the agricultural industrial complex (APK) has converted. The APK was one of the first branches of Czechoslovakian agriculture to take this step. Is it possible to talk about results yet?

[Cakajda] We can already say that in general the new mechanism is not working badly. But I won't hide the fact that there are many details which need to be worked out. Criticism has been directed, for example, at the procurement prices for several kinds of products. They need to be improved.

[Pomerantsev] A number of times we have had the opportunity to hear from the chairmen of cooperatives that the new regulations have negatively affected the economic conditions of management. How can you explain this?

[Cakajda] That's true. For many farms the economic conditions have become harsher. That can be explained by the following. An important element of the new mechanism is a detailed categorization of farms depending upon the soil and climatic conditions in which they find themselves. Each cooperative is relegated to one of 42 groups. The farms of the first 21 groups pay a land tax and the rest, in contrast, receive differential increases to their procurement prices. So there are quite a few enterprises which used to take advantage of benefits according to the old categories, which wasn't always justified, and which now not only have been deprived of those benefits but are obliged to pay a tax. And it is twice as high as it used to be under the old system. I have to say that there are a large number of letters now in the ministry from farms demanding that their membership in one category or another be reconsidered. Of course, they all will be analyzed but only justifiable requests will be satisfied.

[Pomerantsev] According to the new regulations the farms also pay a 50 percent tax based on overall salary. This was introduced in order to stimulate production to be less labor-intensive. Does this innovation accomplish that goal?

[Cakajda] We shouldn't forget that the farms' costs, which have increased because of this tax (in all by 20 billion koruna), will be compensated by an increase in procurement prices. It will be possible to evaluate this effect when the results of this first year become known. I can only say that a different tendency is beginning to show itself: the farms are simply refusing to produce the kind of goods which require large labor expenditures. We will be obligated to get involved in this area.

[Pomerantsev] In what way?

[Cakajda] Exclusively through economic and price levers.

[Pomerantsev] They say that agriculture in the CSSR receives many subsidies from the state.

[Cakajda] Let's take a look at where that opinion comes from. In the first place, wholesale prices of certain products are higher than retail prices, and the state, not wanting to raise the latter, supports them. But that is really a subsidy for the consumer. The second side to subsidies is conditioned by the objective peculiarities of agrarian production. These are such that our procurement prices on the average compensate only 80 percent of the farm's actual production costs. The remaining 20 percent is covered by so-called additional price levers. Is it fair to call this a subsidy to agriculture?"

[Pomerantsev] Besides the improvement of the economic mechanism, what is your ministry working on now?

[Cakajda] We are finishing the elaboration of a program to guarantee food supplies to the population, which is designed for the years up to 2010. The people who worked on it included not only those responsible for production but doctors as well. Because the goal of the program is a healthy food supply for the population. It's a known fact that Czechoslovakia has achieved rather high figures for per capita consumption of food products and for some types of food...too high. But on the other hand, we are lagging behind the level, let's say, of certain neighboring countries in the consumption of fruits and vegetables. The food policy of the coming decades here will be oriented towards the problems of quality, assortment of food products and providing a balanced diet for people.

[Pomerantsev] During the congress, negotiations took place with the Soviet delegation which was headed by First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V.V. Nikitin. What did you talk about?

[Cakajda] About the many aspects of collaboration. In particular, about the opportunities for the establishment of a joint fishing enterprise and about the methods to improve conditions for the development of direct contacts between farms. Right now over 70 of our cooperatives maintain such contacts with Soviet collective farms.

[Pomerantsev] What is the future of direct contacts? What is hindering them?

[Cakajda] They have a future if collaboration is economically beneficial to the partners. After all, nobody is going to subsidize such contacts from the sidelines. The obstacle has been deficiencies in mutual accounting procedures. Until recently settling accounts could only be conducted by payments in kind. Now this limitation has been removed. The farms can settle accounts with each other in kind or in national currency. So one could say, that normal relations are being established in this area as well.

Financial, Legal Aspects of Contract Agriculture Viewed

90EC0246E Prague ZEMEDLSKE NOVINY in Czech 4 Jan 90 p 7

[Article by Eng Oldrich Zavodny, candidate of sciences, Federal Ministry of Agricultural Alimentation: "Agricultural Production on a Contractual Basis"]

[Text] Under current conditions, certain contractual forms have proven to facilitate the irrational commitment in some agricultural production areas of citizens, cooperative workers, or employees of state farms (hereinafter only referred to as citizens) over and above the framework of a standard work agreement or regular working conditions. In this regard, not only is their free time used, but also suitable facilities, secondary or otherwise unutilized sources of fodder, as well as the material interests of citizens in acquiring supplemental sources of income.

Recently, in addition to the fattening of steers, such forms have expanded into plant production, particularly in areas for which agricultural enterprises do not have sufficient manpower in view of the seasonal nature of these functions or their demanding nature.

There are many examples of contractual fattening of steers and hogs, as well as of contractual production of vegetables, cultivation of grapes, etc. Legal regulations enable the fulfillment of contracts regarding delivery by enterprises even through deliveries of agricultural products from cooperative members or, under given conditions, from other citizens. In return for these deliveries, agricultural enterprises in Production Economic Groups Nos 21-42 acquire the right to differential surcharges. Similarly, agricultural enterprises in these cases have the right to collect surcharges and bonuses with respect to bulk prices—something which is particularly applicable to vegetables.

Contracts between agricultural enterprises and citizens which were reached earlier and which pertain to live-stock products stated for the most part that the animal in question would remain the enterprise's property and that the citizen would receive the bulk price for the fattened animal, minus the costs incurred by the agricultural enterprise (for making the feed available). The majority

of agricultural enterprises proceeded in this manner even in concluding contracts during 1989. Contracts for some plant products were negotiated in a similar manner and specified that the crops were the property of the cooperative or the state farm.

New rules covering economic mechanisms and published in the ZPoK clearly serve to motivate a number of agricultural enterprises to expand this type of production which we shall provisionally describe as "contractual production."

As of 1 January 1989, a tax on wages and remuneration was introduced in agriculture, surcharges were expanded with respect to bulk prices which, in the case of fruit and vegetables, cover this newly introduced tax. As a new item, the law on agricultural taxes deals with the taxation of income derived by citizens for agricultural products. At that, surcharges pertaining to bulk prices of vegetables and fruit as well as to most other products were established for socialist agricultural organizations which pay such taxes based on total wages and remuneration. This tax is not applicable to citizens.

A change in these rules, therefore, requires a change in the approach by agricultural enterprises in concluding contracts on contractual production. Many enterprises have realized the necessity to change the existing practice of concluding contracts; some of them asked for a judgment by the Ministry of Finance to be on the safe side.

Thus, the entire problem focused on judging the nature of the concluded contracts. The Federal Ministry of Finance, pursuant to the position requested by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, characterizes a contract for such contractual production as being in the nature of a labor law contract because the animals being fattened and the crops remain the property of the agricultural organization. From this, it is reasoned that this cannot be anything other than a contract concluded according to valid labor laws and cooperative regulations, that is to say, a contract concluded in accordance with the appropriate labor law and the law on agricultural cooperatives. In such a case, then, the content of such a contract deals with the execution of work. As far as cooperative members themselves are concerned, such an activity involves an agreement on working conditions covering the cooperative member or else the agreement should be modified with an agreement on secondary working obligations (Section 54 of the Agricultural Cooperative Law).

From contracts handled in this way, it is then evident that the agricultural organization will reward the citizen for work performed (care for animals or crops) with wages and possibly [reimbursing] other personal expenditures, and will cover his substantive and other expenses connected with the work done. A basis for determining the overall remuneration could be the bulk price of the appropriate quality class of the product from which the agricultural organization would subtract its

expenditures (for example, even the appropriate portion of the tax on the plot or possibly a share of the profit). At the same time, taking into account their conditions (standards) a determination would be made as to which part of the total remuneration was actually a wage.

This specification of the remuneration for work is not only a question of fulfilling the substantive essence of the labor law relationship, but, at the same time, is a prerequisite for a just handling of the payments obligation with respect to the state budget. In the example, the agricultural enterprise pays a tax on total wages and remuneration, based on the calculated wage (remuneration) which is paid for a citizen's work (a unified agricultural cooperative would also pay a contribution for social security); this portion of the citizen's income is subject to income tax.

Of the remaining portion of the payment made, the citizen pays a separate tax for the payments for feed and bedding he receives from his own production, in the form of an income tax derived from agricultural production according to law No 172/1988 Sb and pays a tax on payments received for utilizing his own property and rights by way of an income tax according to law No 145/1961 Sb. Payments made to the citizen for the purchase of fodder, for the amount of electric energy consumed, etc., are not subject to taxation (this restriction will be listed in more detail in communications of the Federal Ministry of Finance which will be published in the Federal Ministry of Finance Official Gazette).

It is not tenable for agricultural organizations to claim surcharges for contractual production, payable on top of bulk prices which are predominantly paid for purposes of the full or partial compensation of the introduced tax on the volume of wages and remuneration, but, in actual fact, did not pay this tax to the state. It is, thus, just for the enterprises, to the extent to which it draws these surcharges, to simultaneously pay the appropriate tax. Because contractual production is reflected, to a certain extent, even in net production, it even creates wage funds within the framework of the rules for their regulation.

A complicated situation in this regard arose in 1989 when contracts were, for the most part, concluded in the old way and the tax obligations were handled according to the new law on agricultural taxes which became effective 1 January 1989. In the interest of overcoming this conflict, since it would also be necessary to adjust already concluded contracts and to retroactively change bookkeeping entries, the Ministry of Finance of Czechoslovakia, the CSR, and the SSR agreed that incorrectly concluded contracts would not be amended and unfulfilled tax obligations based on them for 1989 would not be the subject of collection, as long as agricultural enterprises were not proceeding in harmony with legal regulations. This means that for the year 1989 the enterprises will not pay the above tax based on the volume of wages and remuneration (or possible contributions to social insurance and wage taxes). The citizen

will report his entire income for taxation purposes as income based on agricultural production. (Of course, to the extent to which the organization was already proceeding in the spirit of the new legal regulations, it will not insist on the return of the tax already paid).

However, in 1990, all agricultural organizations must adapt their procedures to the new law, including contracts concluded prior to 1 January 1990 and payable in 1990. Appropriate amendments will also be conducted in the accounting regulations.

Appropriate communications covering the procedure of financial directorates will be issued by the Ministry of Finance of the CSSR or by the republic ministries of finance, prices, and wages. To facilitate the preparation of contracts, the Federal Ministry of Finance is also preparing samples with which enterprises will be familiarized in a suitable manner.

HUNGARY

Bankruptcy Liquidation, Reorganization Situation Discussed

25000610C Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
4 Jan 90 p 6

[Interview with Bankruptcy Reorganization Organization President Dr. Laszlo Redei by "Sebok": "... And Will There Be Reorganization?"; date and place not given; first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] The government encourages bankruptcy proceedings, so to speak, and irrespective of that, next year's business conditions are expected to move a far greater number of enterprises than before into impossible situations. But help must be provided in regard to structural change and survival to enterprises which appear to show signs of lasting viability, where there is hope for recovery. The government, on the other hand, is not willing to engage itself in bankruptcy reorganization. We asked Dr Laszlo Redei, the president of the Bankruptcy Reorganization Organization just how these opposite endeavors may be streamlined.

[FIGYELO] As part of the 1990 state budget they approved 2.5 billion forints to support the Bankruptcy Reorganization Fund. What will this sum permit you to accomplish?

[Redei] This is not a large sum indeed, the state allocates only 0.4 percent of all the expenditures for the financial support of bankruptcy reorganization. Firstly, part of this amount was spent last year already, because there always exist some carryover items, and there may be occasions in which development approved by us does not produce results in an already reorganized enterprise, and then, based on the credit guaranty provided, claims established by banks must be paid from the Fund.

And insofar as the relative size of this amount is concerned, the Fund's funding level was the same last year,

but considering this year's prices this amount will, from the outset, suffice for assistance to be provided to fewer enterprise, whereas the number of cases referred to us will most certainly increase.

[FIGYELO] Wouldn't the Fund receive repayments from financial assistance provided earlier?

[Redei] Only negligible amounts appear on the revenue side, because most of the funds we provide in the course of reorganization constitute provisions not subject to repayment, rather than loans.

[FIGYELO] Accordingly, this year your organization will be able to assist in fewer instances and with smaller amounts in placing troubled enterprises back on their feet. Therefore there is an even greater need for you to join creditors in establishing financial order at places worthy of that. Is there a chance for such association?

[Redei] From the outset, the basic principle of bankruptcy reorganization calls for cooperation among creditors, so that they make allowances in the interest of settling the situation of a given enterprise, and the state should join in this effort with its own means.

But for the time being we much rather hope that creditors, including commercial banks will seek out the organization and will cooperate. As of now the situation may be characterized by the fact that shippers by all means want to enforce all their claims. They do not think this matter through, namely that after a successful reorganization they may recover even the entire amount of their claim, but if they force an enterprise into bankruptcy they will receive only a fraction of their claim.

Quite naturally, one should not be amazed about the creditors' narrow view, because in Hungary the reorganization system has been established only a few years ago, while these bargaining mechanisms have been used in developed industrial countries for about 200 years.

Nevertheless, in a few serious situations commercial banks are already seeking opportunities for a sober compromise. Accordingly, although slowly, the classic method of bankruptcy reorganization is beginning to function also in Hungary.

[FIGYELO] The government communique states that the organization is obligated to make a statement concerning the fate of troubled enterprises within 48 hours, as to whether the organization agrees to provide financial support. Is this requirement realistic? Can this deadline be met in a responsible manner?

[Redei] Only after a thorough investigation and analysis would it be possible to make a decision in regard to the reorganization of an enterprise which experiences lasting insolvency. We would be unable to tell whether a firm can be reorganized or if it is beyond saving, unless we know why that enterprise got into trouble, how it got into trouble, and the production, management and market situation at that enterprise.

In general we require 30 days in order to make a sound decision; we are able to say yes or no within that period of time. Accordingly, we may promise a much faster decision only in relatively simple cases.

[FIGYELO] The government took the position not to initiate reorganization proceedings, and that this decision should serve as guidance to the Organization, according to the official communique. How should this statement be interpreted?

[Redei] I can only state my own interpretation of this communique because we have not received any separate official directive—all we know in this regard is what we read in the newspapers. According to the legal choreography applicable to liquidation and reorganization, the finance minister renders a decision concerning reorganization. If he says no, liquidation will start in most instances, but certain organs, such as the founder, may turn to the government nevertheless, and request reorganization. Therefore, in my view the government communique you just quoted may be understood to say that the government will refrain from receiving such requests, and therefore the government, i.e. the finance minister will have the final word in this regard.

In conclusion I definitely would like to state, however, that in the Hungarian public mind, and perhaps also in practice, the distinction between reorganization and liquidation is too great. This is so, because liquidation will not always result in the complete discontinuation of activities, or that the location of a factory will be tilled and sprinkled with salt. Usually there are areas of activities alongside each other in firms that have become insolvent, some of which are ripe for discontinuation, while others are viable and may carry on. Whatever may be preserved must be preserved, and if we interpret the term "liquidation" in this way, we will find that the extent of unemployment that presents itself in response to the increasing number of liquidation must not be regarded as so frightening, and must not be presented in that way either.

SZDSZ Issues 'Program For Changing Regimes'

26000610D Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 20 Jan 90 p 8

[Unattributed article: "SZDSZ: Program to Encourage Entrepreneurship"]

[Text] Despite four decades of distrust, persecution and oppression, the private sector is the sole truly successful branch of the Hungarian economy, according to the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] program that encourages entrepreneurship, made public last week. Experts within this organization state that it would be a mistake to abide by emotions or by short-term election considerations and to automatically support actions designed to protect workplaces, as those take place in the state-cooperative sector. "...Although we acknowledge the fact that large enterprise concerns must also be

resolved, we make the establishment of new private enterprises, and the strengthening of existing private enterprises the primary centerpiece of our economic policy concept. We are doing so, because in Hungary this constitutes the decisive element in transforming the economic structure as well as proprietary conditions," according to the program. One should not be talking about competition neutrality. The competitive disadvantages experienced by mostly small- and medium-sized private ventures should be liquidated in a consistent manner instead, according to the SZDSZ.

The SZDSZ has as its goal to rapidly increase the number and weight of private ventures. They believe that in order to accomplish this the first thing to be done would be to reduce prejudice manifested by those in power and the resultant lack of confidence on part of entrepreneurs, and to encourage entrepreneurship. "The first step in this direction would be to make amends to those whose property has been expropriated after the communists took power, and to issue a statement on behalf of the Hungarian state that these people suffered an injustice. Moral satisfaction, and even a symbolic financial reparation that could be provided in the country's present situation would also signal to the public, and within that to Hungarian and foreign investors, that the Hungarian nation guarantees the security of investments," according to the SZDSZ.

The next step designed to reduce the disadvantage would be to consistently implement proprietary reform. The SZDSZ document entitled "The Program For Changing Regimes" committed itself to rapid and radical reprivatization. Nevertheless, equal chances must be ensured: "In the eyes of private entrepreneurs who endeavor to prevail (and in the eyes of workers whose future is uncertain) the fact that the existing privileged situation of large enterprise managers represents an advantage to them also in the future economy exerts a extremely demoralizing effect," the SZDSZ argues.

Equal opportunity must be established also in regard to other capital goods, and primarily in the foreign exchange market. This means no less than the fact that while abiding by legal provisions governing foreign exchange, private entrepreneurs would be able to transact business in the external market under the same conditions as enterprises owned by the state or by cooperatives can. Authors of the program are aware of the fact that a majority of entrepreneurs regards the high tax rates and high social security rates as unrealistic. The program states that "advocating a general reduction of taxes would accrue us only cheap popularity." The SZDSZ believes that decisions of this nature should be left to local autonomous governments. Only these governments are capable of judging whether they should lure entrepreneurs with low taxes, or if they should keep entrepreneurs out with high taxes. There is a definite need to provide for the protection of the political interests of private entrepreneurs, the SZDSZ program to encourage entrepreneurship concludes.

10
22161

68

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.