



# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Near East & South Asia**

**IRAQ**

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# Near East & South Asia

## IRAQ

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20 August 1991

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**SAIRI: Multiparty Law Aims To Keep Saddam in Power**

*LD0807225691 Tehran IRNA in English 1556 GMT  
8 Jul 91*

[Text] Tehran, July 8, IRNA—The approval of the multiparty law by the Iraqi parliament was termed by a spokesman of the opposition Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI) as “a move aimed at keeping Saddam in power.”

The spokesman told IRNA here today that the move is an attempt to ease the international pressure on the Iraqi Government.

Iraq's National Assembly on Thursday approved a law which allows opposition parties but gives the ruling Ba'th Party the sole right to operate within the armed forces and security services. The 34-clause law also says new parties must defend Iraq's sovereignty and unity and “take pride in the achievements” of the July 1968 revolution which brought the Ba'th Party to power.

The proposed law also bars the creation of religious parties as they would “divide the country and lay it open to outside interference.”

“This law has no difference in terms of contents and goals with the previous law of the “pledge of [the] National Progressive Front”, used by the Ba'thist regime since the 1970's,” the SAIRI spokesman said.

Noting that the objectives of the Ba'th Party have been included in the new law, the spokesman said it openly invites all to keep politics and religion as two separate things.

**Saddam Orders Salary Increase for Judges**

*JN237161091 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio First  
Program Network in Arabic 1400 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[Text] Leader President Saddam Husayn has ordered that the salary of a judge at the Court of Cassation be raised to 1,000 dinars. In a statement to INA, Justice Minister Shabib al-Maliki described this decision as the appreciation by leader President Saddam Husayn of the significant tasks shouldered by the Court of Cassation judges to achieve justice. He also described this decision as an enhancement of the status of the judiciary and judges, and as an expression of his excellency the president's profound faith in the lofty mission of the judiciary and his eagerness to entrench the principles of justice and the rule of law. The minister indicated that the men of the judiciary and justice take pride in this noble gesture, and stressed their pledge to remain servants of justice and carriers of its torch.

**Taha Yasin Ramadan on Internal, Foreign Situation**

*91S90041A Nicosia AL-HADAF in Arabic 2 Jun 91  
pp 18-20*

[Interview with the first deputy prime minister by Muhammad al-Masri in Sanaa; date not given]

[Text] Suddenly, the people present began to whisper. An extraordinary stirring began to spread throughout the presidential palace, where the Yemeni president, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih was receiving the congratulations of fraternal governmental delegations and parties. The camera flashes began to sparkle. An important guest had entered, Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadan, the first deputy prime minister of the Iraqi republic, who had come at the head of an Iraqi delegation to join in the celebrations of the Yemeni people.

We immediately worked out plans for an exclusive interview with him, especially now, when public opinion is rarely permitted to become familiar with the Iraqi view of events. We wanted to know how the Iraqi leadership views the events of recent months and the spirit in which it is planning for the future. The following is the interview:

[Al-Masri] Mr. First Deputy Prime Minister, after the thunder of the cannons has stopped, and after the events of previous months, the Arab citizen needs to know what is really happening. What is your appraisal of the trial which you have undergone? How do you evaluate the results of the war?

[Ramadan] Not everyone can perceive the results of the mother of battles, for it is a battle of a new sort, unknown by humanity for centuries. The sacrifices which we made in it were great. However, the results will appear only after a time. Accordingly, one needs awareness and originality to arrive at a true appraisal. In this respect, national intellectuals among our nation's people, especially journalists, have a prominent role. They bear a major responsibility in appraising what happened, and in continuously playing the positive role which they played during the battles.

The battle has begun, but it is not over. The military aspect is only one page of the conspiracy that has targeted Iraq outwardly and the Arab psyche and Arab aspirations toward progress inwardly. The responsibility of an aware media is not to permit the defeat of the Arab individual and to maintain his high morale and hopes for a promising future.

We in Iraq have been subjected to enormous material losses. Nonetheless, it is possible to compensate for these losses. What cannot be compensated for is [a loss of] morale. The important thing is how do we maintain the Arab's frame of mind. Herein lies the role of the national press. We in Iraq have people who have confronted the war. They still have that same spirit and belief in principles, which they elevated, and continue to elevate

better than before, benefitting, of course, from the lessons of the circumstances of the military battle.

I return to the question to say that we must distinguish between what we call flexibility in the language of politics and a fundamental position. We must not abandon principles on the argument of being unable to confront the aggression. We say that everything has ended and that power is in the hands of this or that power. However, whoever says that is either ignorant or to be doubted.

What we cannot achieve today we can achieve later. Consequently, we must never forgo achieving it, because, at that point, we will be living without principles. If our Arab citizen is made to choose between living under a certain circumstance or martyrdom, he chooses martyrdom.

[Al-Masri] Will the first deputy prime minister permit us to move to a more complicated subject. Why did Iraq not withdraw from Kuwait after the issuance of Security Council Resolution 678, which sanctions the use of force against Iraq? Do you not believe that doing so could have enabled Iraq to avoid those sacrifices which it has made?

[Ramadan] If history were turned back, we in Iraq would adopt the same position which we took. It is not unrealistic to affirm that Kuwait is a part of Iraq. Rather, we are fully convinced of it. When we discovered the existence of a conspiracy against us, we found that the most appropriate way to confront it is to explode the abscess. After we entered [Kuwait], it was not expected that we would withdraw merely upon the Americans and their collaborators telling us: Withdraw, or we will strike you.

We expected the aggression. We did not think for one moment that America and its collaborators would applaud us. They would have struck Iraq regardless of whether it entered Kuwait. In [entering] Kuwait, we found a legitimate way to [achieve] our objectives that could also provide us with the possibility of a confrontation with fewer losses. If we had withdrawn following the issuance of the resolution, that would have resulted in a defeat and setback for all Arab, national, patriotic elements. We said no to the forces of aggression. This is the beginning of the road, even if it leads to losses. Previously, we said yes and were defeated; and the military defeat turned into a defeat of the Arab mentality, attitude, and ethics. The era in which the Arabs fought for several hours, then begged for help from others and abandoned their declared goals must end. Therefore, when we announced on 15 February our willingness to withdraw, we affirmed the principles for which we had fought: the unity of the Arab nation, the unity of Iraq, the Palestinian cause, the Arabs' oil for the Arabs, etc. We believe that when one martyr himself, his principles must not be martyred with him. In that way alone does his martyrdom have meaning for subsequent generations.

The mere agreement of 30 states, among them major powers, to oppose Iraq is in itself a first-time victory for the Arabs [because, it indicates Iraq's power, given that so many nations grouped together to oppose it]. Then, that was followed by fighting that lasted 42 days, and it was preceded by a year of an economic blockade which is still continuing. These facts together suffice to indicate the extent to which the Arab nation has developed compared to ten or 20 years ago.

In this vicious time, in which America is exploiting the entire world to serve it, a country of 18 million cannot defeat 30 countries. The mere assembly of these countries to oppose Iraq is an indication of Iraq's power. How would it be if the Arab nation were unified. We have made sacrifices, and we will harvest the fruit subsequently. Our basic reliance is on the people and its national leadership. It has been proven that the majority of the Arab peoples, including the peoples whose leaders participated in the aggression against Iraq, supported the goals of the battle. The mustering occurred all at once. There are many who have not given all that they can give due to fear. However, the day will come when they will give everything that they have. If we take into account the reality imposed on the Arab people and the circumstances being experienced by political movements, we see that the level of behavior during the war was good, and that it confirms that the Arab nation is in good health.

Naturally, there have been differences between one arena and another. This is not a shortcoming, because there have been differences between Iraqi governorates. We say this as encouragement [tahfiz]. In reality, everyone is a hero, and each hero has his weight.

[Al-Masri] How do you view the near future? What is needed in your opinion?

[Ramadan] It is necessary to deepen public awareness and to stress that we have emerged from the battle victorious, despite the sacrifices, because we have not conceded our principles. The Arab Prophet was victorious in some battles and defeated in others. He did not abandon Islam during the defeats. We have living examples in our history. We Arabs consider the tripartite aggression against the Suez Canal in 1956 a victory, even though it led to the occupation of the canal militarily by the countries that mounted the aggression.

Estimates of the enemies stated that Iraq would be able to supply its population with fuel only after five years and at a cost of 5 to 7 billion, in addition to international aid in terms of equipment, etc. However, what happened is that our citizens have been able to reactivate the refineries within five weeks. This is an indication of our citizens' quality, combative spirit, and advanced capabilities.

[Al-Masri] Your excellency, despite what Iraq has put forth in recent months, despite its agreement to UN resolutions on the Gulf crisis, and despite the disappearance of all of the reasons that led to the war, the United

States and its allies are nonetheless continuing in their resolve to maintain the economic blockade of Iraq. What do they want of Iraq and the Iraqi leadership?

[Ramadan] I believe that those who were previously unconvinced of our positions and of the intentions of the Americans and the Zionists have now become convinced. The destruction inflicted by the United States on Iraq has no relation to Kuwait. This is where the role of the Arab citizen in confronting the conspiracy comes into play, especially regarding the economic blockade.

We believe that discussion of the economic blockade is not obtaining its full due in the Arab media or in the statements and positions of national parties. The United States and the countries of the West are applying an economic blockade against us on the pretext of human rights. They are now in northern Iraq providing food and aid to a number of saboteurs. At the same time, they are starving 18 million Iraqis and preventing Iraq from exporting so that it can import its requirements.

Everyone's primary slogan should aim to criticize the economic blockade. This is the essence of the problem. All other issues are secondary issues. The American presence in the north is idle talk [hura'], because we are cooperating with it with the necessary flexibility at this stage. All of that will collapse as soon as the economic blockade ends. Movement on the Arab scene is needed to engage the attention of the American, British, and French embassies in order to end the blockade and the policy of starvation.

[Al-Masri] Several countries are considered friendly to the Arabs in one way or another, such as the Soviet Union, China, and most countries of the world. Why, in your opinion, do they not assume a role in lifting the economic blockade imposed on the Iraqi people?

[Ramadan] We must derive the lessons of the mother of battles. A basic lesson is that the Arab nation has no friends. I very much mean what I say. However, of course that does not mean that we do not maintain relations with other countries. Relations are based on common interests, which vary from one country to the next.

If the Soviet Union and China had been determined to prevent the aggression against Iraq, that aggression would not have occurred. The course of events after our acceptance of Resolution 660 has led us to believe that the Soviet Union is moving close to the objectives of the American plan. Our Arab nation is daily subjected to insult. It is necessary to benefit from the lessons of the mother of battles. If [the Arab nation] were a poor nation, what happened to it would not have happened. The Gulf [countries] paid America and its allies \$55 billion as the price of the aggression against Iraq, and Husni Mubarak is involved with them in that; he is now carrying his suitcase, going to Europe to beg for a cancellation of a part of Egypt's debts.

That provides us with an idea of the level to which several of our Arab leaders have sunk. What is the value of living in a climate of begging. It is better for 50 million Arabs to live in honor than for 250 million Arabs to live in hunger and humiliation.

[Al-Masri] After the end of the military phase of the Gulf war, how do you view the possibility of reuniting Arab ranks? What is the Arabs' position on the new international order? How has the Palestinian problem been affected?

[Ramadan] The important thing regarding the United States and the West is for Israel to remain secure. For this reason, they struck the Arabs; they struck Iraq, which is a strategic country among the confrontation states. At present, our hope lies with the Arab peoples and the virtuous among Arab rulers. Even these rulers will not be able to do much unless they extend their hands to their peoples and unleash all of the energies of those peoples.

Yesterday, I asked President 'Arafat whether he believes that the American political initiatives will result in anything that serves the interest of the Palestinian people, inasmuch as all indications point to Israel not withdrawing from one inch, given the new balance of power. Likewise, America will not apply pressure on Israel: What America wants now is to cut off the bad part of the mother of battles and to eliminate the Palestinian problem.

I told President 'Arafat: You can be flexible and engage in tactics, provided that you do not make a mistake or make a statement or take a position that leads to concessions. Even if you agree to all of the United States' demands, Israel will say no to the PLO and no to all of the Palestinian demands. We are not saying 'do not deal with the currently existing situation,' but deal with it logically, because you might not obtain anything.

The United States has declared that it will not withdraw from Iraqi territory until after the Kurds return. When we struck at several Kurdish conspirators, America not only applied Security Council resolutions, it also applied pressure. Regarding the Palestinian issue, it [the United States] announces its regret. All of this is happening in the name of the new international order.

Political dealings at this stage are beneficial, provided that they do not lead to a setback or the abandonment of fundamental positions, because that would shatter the resolve of the ordinary citizen. In my estimation, a Palestinian-Jordanian mutual understanding at this stage is good. King Husayn has informed me officially that he is conveying to the United States that he will reject the formation of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, unless he is requested to form such a delegation officially by the PLO, and that, when the Palestinian subject is brought up, the Palestinians must speak for themselves.

[Al-Masri] Numerous forces have attempted to exploit the Kurdish problem. The result has been a social tragedy. Discussions are now being held between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish opposition. What is the status of these discussions? Do they include only the Kurdish problem, or do they also include disputes with other opposition parties?

[Ramadan] The discussions being held now with al-Barazani and al-Talibani pertain solely to the Kurdish problem and self-rule. The dialogue is proceeding positively. We believe that we will achieve everything shortly, barring any unexpected development.

[Al-Masri] There are disputes between you and Iran regarding the aircraft that took refuge there during the aggression against you. What is the status of efforts to resolve these disputes? More importantly, did you make a prior agreement with Iran on this matter?

[Ramadan] A meeting between technical people of the two parties will be held very shortly. We must not hold illusions regarding the perfidious Iranian position. They stabbed us from within while we were facing an attack, in full coordination with the United States. They sent their elements into Iraq. Those elements stole everything, from military equipment to food. Can such a position on the part of a neighboring, Muslim country toward its Muslim neighbor be imagined? They killed many whom they captured, including civilians, party men, and soldiers, because they were Iraqis.

Why did all of that happen? We opened with them a new page of good relations and visits. They claim that they are opposed to the great satan. Then, it turns out that they are collaborating with America.

In any case, we are attempting to proceed with them quietly, so that we can ascertain their latest positions. There are Arab mediations, and the aircraft which they received must be returned. There is no prior agreement regarding the aircraft. However, when we were compelled, we told them: We will send you aircraft. The number of aircraft is known, and the United States is aware of the number and types of aircraft.

[Al-Masri] Regarding democracy, how is the near future shaping up?

[Ramadan] Fortunately, the subject of democracy preceded all of these events. The upcoming stage will have a special character and meaning. We will make efforts to develop formulas for political life, because it is a basic means to advance the level of our capabilities and the capacities of our people. In the next few weeks, we will place the final touches on all of the laws and regulations, and they will be presented to the people.

### Opposition Leader on Internal Rebellion

91AE0456D London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
16 Jun 91 p 4

[Interview with Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim by 'Ali Nun in Tehran; date not given]

[Text] Mr. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, is considered one of the most prominent leaders of the Iraqi opposition. AL-HAYAH interviewed him at his headquarters in the Iranian capital after a major escalation in Iranian and Iraqi opposition political attacks against Baghdad and increased reporting in Teheran on preparations by the Iraqi forces to launch a "major offensive" against pockets of resisters and refugees in the lakes area in southern Iraq.

Al-Hakim emphasizes that the "rebellion against the Iraqi regime is non-sectarian and non-secessionist." He stresses that its primary goal has been to "sweep away the dictatorship." He does not agree that its pace is slackening and that the West was initially sympathetic toward it. Nor does he approve of the negotiations being conducted in Baghdad between the Kurdish opposition and the Iraqi leadership; he believes that they will fail because "the regime has nothing to offer." He believes that the "Kurds have perhaps fallen into the Iraqi regime's trap."

The following is the text of the interview:

[Nun] What is the accuracy of the reports being heard frequently in Tehran regarding preparations by the Iraqi Army to attack the opposition in parts of southern Iraq?

[Al-Hakim] Almost a month ago, we received reports stating that the Iraqi regime was preparing for a large-scale offensive against the lakes area, which has been blockaded economically and militarily for about two months. Since 26 May 1991, the regime has been waging an air campaign with helicopters against the city of [al-Jabayish] in the middle of the lake area and the area surrounding it. This campaign failed to achieve anything after it encountered strong resistance on the part of the mujahidin. There are also reports of military operations continuing in the lake area.

[Nun] From where are the resistance fighters staging—from Iran?

[Al-Hakim] The Iraqi map highlights matters clearly. The area between al-Nasiriyah to the west, the Majnun Islands to the east, al-Basrah to the south, and the area of al-'Amarah to the north, includes many lakes, the largest of which is Lake al-Hammar to the west and Lake Hawizah in the east of the area. Within the area of these lakes, there are reeds, villages, and cultivated land amid swamps. A very large number of Iraqi tribes live in this area. The regime recently launched a media attack. An editorial in AL-THAWRAH was filled with insults against the population of this area, some of whom fled when the government began to attack the cities and kill

the youths and those who did not collaborate with the Iraqi Army in the suppression operation.

The regime is well-known for its oppression. It used missiles, long-range artillery, tanks, and helicopters, which are the only effective means in the lakes area, since tanks cannot move in the swamps. The people there are defending themselves. Sometimes they launch counter-attacks to thwart the Army's operations, which aim to eradicate them. They are in a defensive posture, and no more than that.

#### From Baghdad to Al-Basrah

[Nun] How many have been wounded since the start of opposition and "rebellion" operations?

[Al-Hakim] A precise count is not available yet. The areas that witnessed collective killing operations were under the government's control. The government has not provided precise figures, even regarding the war with the countries of the alliance. However, several officers of the government are circulating estimates that put the number of persons killed at 400,000. Our estimates are higher, because the hospitals in the areas in where the rebellion has been occurring have been subjected to collective killing operations against all of the wounded hospitalized in them. In the al-Husayni Hospital in Karbala', about 30,000 persons were killed, and, in the al-Jumhuri Hospital in al-Najaf and the Saddam Hospital, which the rebels have renamed Martyr al-Sadr Hospital, all those present were killed and their bodies thrown from the windows.

Helicopters came to al-Najaf and the personnel on them ordered the city's population to leave the city, because they wanted to blow it up completely. Tens of thousands left. Then, those helicopters returned to attack them. Some estimate that about 15,000 to 20,000 were killed.

[Nun] Is the large number of victims the result of the rebellion, or does it also include those who were killed during the Gulf war?

[Al-Hakim] No. When an Iraqi officer was asked about the number killed in the war, he mentioned about 100,000, and he estimated the number of those killed after the war at four times this figure. Our information indicates that the number of civilians who were killed in the Western bombardment did not exceed 30,000 persons.

[Nun] Some believe that the "rebellion" has been extinguished quickly.

[Al-Hakim] The rebellion in the south has not been extinguished. Initially, the people gained full control of the cities in confronting the party and police organizations that had been controlling matters in the cities, in addition to the military units there. When units loyal to Saddam—called the Republican Guard—came, supported by groups of mercenaries and some hypocrites, they bombarded the cities with missiles and intended to

destroy residential areas. The government gained control of the cities. However, the rebellion is still continuing, even in Baghdad. We have information to the effect that al-Thawrah City has been witnessing military operations for about two weeks. Movement at night is almost prohibited, and the random killing is continuing, especially in al-Basrah. The situation in the interior resembles conditions on the fronts.

#### The Kurds Erred

[Nun] Why has there been a decline in the sympathy that emerged initially for the rebellion?

[Al-Hakim] Who was sympathetic?

[Nun] The West supports you and the Kurds in northern Iraq, if you want examples of political sympathy on the part of some countries! Then, the Kurds entered into negotiations with Baghdad, and Jalal Talabani (the secretary general of the National Federation of Kurdistan) stated that Western public opinion was frightened off when the Shi'ah declared that they wanted to establish an Islamic state. How do you view this thesis, and what is your opinion on the negotiations between the Kurds and Baghdad?

[Al-Hakim] What I know is that the West did not initially display any sympathy toward the rebellion. Moreover, the American position on the rebellion was clear. It contained something of an accusation against the rebellion to the effect that it is sectarian and secessionist. The Kurds were also the object of strong criticism, which deemed their movement secessionist, and there was fear of it. For example, the display of the Communist Party's flag in Kurdish areas was a sensitive issue with the West.

After the rebellion began to assume a humanitarian dimension due to the large-scale migration from northern and southern Iraq, sympathy was renewed in the Western world, because many facts were clarified. The most important of these is that the rebellion is popular and spontaneous, not sectarian or secessionist, that its basic goal is to remove the dictatorship, and that its slogan is the rejection of the foolish policies pursued by the regime regarding the Gulf war. In any case, sympathy with the rebellion was late in coming.

On the other hand, we hope that the Kurdish brothers will obtain their legitimate political, cultural, and social rights. These were among our basic demands, and we defended them. However, we believe that they are making a mistake by negotiating with the regime. They might be falling into a trap and a big trick engineered by the regime, because the regime has nothing to give them. For example, when it promises them reconstruction and compensation for damages, it has nothing. Rather, it is giving them a destroyed country and is adding to their problems. Another problem is that the entire world has condemned the regime. The regime is isolated domestically and abroad and has entered into a war of genocide with its people. Entering into negotiations with the

regime constitutes a weak point in political action to demand rights. Therefore, we believe that these negotiations are subject to very broad criticism in circles of the Kurdish people. Yesterday, the fraternal uncle of Mr. Mas'ud Barazani (the chairman of the Kurdish Democratic Party), Shaykh Muhammad Khalid Barazani, spoke very grimly about these negotiations, emphasizing that he advised against entering into them.

These negotiations are not in the Kurdish people's interest. Rather, they serve the regime's interest. Nonetheless, the Kurds are our brothers, and we will continue to stand by their side, because our cause is one, and we hope that they will realize these facts and change their position.

[Nun] Do you believe that there are disagreements within the Kurdish opposition regarding negotiations with Baghdad?

[Al-Hakim] There are several disagreements regarding tactical moves. Several Kurdish parties are clearly opposed to the negotiations, as are the heads of the Kurdish tribes, who represent the strongest, broadest sector, and who mounted the rebellion.

[Nun] What about the issue of Shi'ite religious scholar and leader Ayatollah Abolqasim al-Kho'i?

[Al-Hakim] He was attacked by the regime and arrested with all of his sons and advisers. They were subsequently transported forcibly to Baghdad and forced to make certain statements. When circumstances developed domestically and abroad regarding this issue, the regime returned him and his eldest son to his home, where it placed him under house arrest.

### **Magazine Owner Reportedly Abducted, Taken to Baghdad**

*NC0907141191 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Opposition in Arabic 1300 GMT 9 Jul 91*

[Text] The Voice of Iraqi Opposition Radio has learned that Dr. Samir Khayri, owner of the Paris-based KULL AL-'ARAB magazine, recently fled from Paris to Tunis with his wife and children after he was asked to go to Baghdad.

Reliable sources say that Iraqi intelligence men abducted him from Tunis 20 days ago and took him to Baghdad because of important information he has. Khayri is an intelligence officer of the despot Saddam Husayn and has close relations with the Iraqi regime.

Khayri's wife and children are still in Tunis. The Tunisian authorities are trying to contact the Iraqis about Khayri, but so far their efforts have been fruitless.

### **AL-SHIRA' Profiles Mujahidin Movement**

*91AE0456A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 10 Jun 91 pp 28-31*

[Report by Hasan Sabra and Zayn Hammud]

[Text] AL-SHIRA' continues to plunge into the sea of modern Iraq, which can only be understood by opening the dossier on "the Islamic movements," which reveals something of the struggle in this Arab country with its centuries-old Islamic heritage.

In this issue, we shed light on the genesis of the Mujahidin [Holy Warriors] movement, note the ideological foundations on which it is based, and mention the most salient stations through which it passed in arriving at an internal division due to numerous internal and external factors.

There are two outstanding matters that must be treated in depth in any discussion of the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement, its history, the circumstances of its genesis, and what distinguishes it from other parties and Islamic organizations active in the Iraqi opposition to the rule of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn.

The first is the large, qualitative military operations which it has carried out against the Iraqi regime and the shocks to which it subjected that regime as a result of those operations. The second is the Mujahidin Movement's link to the authority [i.e., qualified source of emulation] of Muhsin al-Hakim, based on the extension of al-Hakim's authority through the authority of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was martyred in the late eighties.

This connection is perhaps among the reasons for the movement's strong, effective presence in the Iraqi opposition arena and in Iraqi fundamentalist circles, despite its relatively brief presence in the confrontation arena—having been founded in 1979—whereas some of the other Iraqi organizations and parties were established more than 30 years ago.

In 1979, in the feverish climate galvanized by the start of the Islamic revolution in Iran, a group of Muslim youths in Iraq gathered. Its members admired and sympathized with Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. The group established the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement to assume the tasks of the new stage which Iraq had entered, which "required the fundamentalists to escalate the confrontation against the regime and to establish a revolution on the model of its sister in Iran, with a view toward establishing Islamic rule in Iraq."

A relationship developed between the members of the group, who were among al-Sadr's emulators, and the martyr [al-Sadr]. This was a special relationship that became increasingly closer through the members understanding of Imam al-Sadr's theses regarding political action based on rightly guided, resistant authority—theses toward which Imam al-Sadr was striving at the time.



As the result of this special relationship, al-Sadr ordered this group to form a movement to "gather together all of those missionaries [risaliyin] who are not connected with any of the primary organizations in the Iraqi political arena (namely, the al-Da'wah Party and the Islamic Action Organization) and who are not concerned with the conflicts between the two [above organizations], especially inasmuch as these two groups are, in martyr Muhammad Baqir's opinion, only a minority relative to all of the Iraqi, Muslim people, who are longing for a change and the establishment of the rule of Islam in Iraq."

#### Against al-Da'wah

This means, in the opinion of a number of observers who followed this period closely, that al-Sadr once again took a position against the al-Da'wah Party (the first time was when he issued a formal legal opinion in 1975 disapproving of the combination of affiliation with the religious domain with [membership in] an Islamic party, which is mentioned in the seventh segment of this series, which pertains to the al-Da'wah Party). Although considerable discussion has arisen over whether this position is true or alleged, some regard it as logical and consistent with al-Sadr's aims: At the time, he primarily needed an instrument for bringing together persons not affiliated with Islamic parties in order to use their energies to effect the revolution, in an attempt to create alternatives to previous party experiments, which had not emphasized their presence in the arena for numerous reasons.

The important thing is that the link between al-Sadr and this group of Muslim youths began through his deputy, Muhammad al-Hashimi, who resided in Tehran during the revolution. This was accompanied by a call on the part of al-Sadr to Mahdi al-Hakim (assassinated in Sudan in 1980), who was residing at the time in Dubayy, to resume his direct political activity. Most of the youths in the group were residing in Europe (France and Britain) and several Arab countries (Lebanon, Syria, and in the Gulf), in addition to Iraq, especially in the holy city of al-Najaf.

At the outset of its activity, the Movement used the method of operating in committees linked pyramidally to a major authority, in this case, Mahmud al-Hashimi. In mid-1979, these activities in Europe produced a movement called the "Islamic Liberation Movement."

If it is clear that al-Sadr ordered the establishment of the Movement, its actual founder is 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Hakim (the son of Muhsin al-Hakim and the brother of Mahdi and Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, with whom the Movement sympathized in particular more so than with other Iraqi Islamic leaders. The firm relationship between the Movement and Muhammad Baqir is attributed to the Movement's activity, although that activity was not visible at the time due to the dangerous situation in Iraq and the Movement's employment of the

principle of dissimulation [which is allowed in Shi'ite Islam under duress or in the face of threatening damage], especially inasmuch as Muhammad Baqir had not presented his true position on the Movement as the result of being monitored after being sentenced to life imprisonment then released after the demonstrations in 1977).

#### Al-Sadr and Al-Hakim

Before the establishment of the Mujahidin Movement, 'Abd-al-'Aziz was a student of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. However, despite this relationship, 'Abd-al-'Aziz did not join the Islamic al-Da'wah Party, which the latter founded, because his father, Muhsin al-Hakim, advised al-Sadr to have a concern that is broader, in Islamic terms, than any party, even if that party is the al-Da'wah Party. This advice compelled 'Abd-al-'Aziz to be a student of al-Sadr without being an active, primary member of the al-Da'wah Party.

'Abd-al-'Aziz continued to act in the framework of the authority of his father, in addition to being connected with Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, without implying a contradiction, because al-Sadr's authority and personality developed under the auspices of Muhsin al-Hakim's authority, and al-Sadr continued to support the latter's authority despite many claims to the contrary. There are many indications and numerous facts that corroborate this, including:

1. When the Iraqi regime accused Mahdi al-Hakim of spying for foreign forces in 1969, al-Sadr went to Lebanon to arouse public opinion and defend al-Hakim's authority. He contacted Imam Musa al-Sadr. Subsequently, he published a book entitled "Iraq's Ordeal Today [mihnat al-'iraq al-yawm]," which contains cables from Imam al-Sadr to the Arab heads of state, especially [Egyptian President] Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, in which he complains about what the religious authority in al-Najaf was being subjected to as the result of the rulers' deviation.
2. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr formulated the historical statement delivered by Mahdi al-Hakim at the tomb of Imam 'Ali (upon him be peace) on 28 Safar [the second month of the Muslim calendar] 1969 on the anniversary of the death of the prophet (God bless him and grant him salvation), and he delivered that statement at a gathering convened by the late Imam Muhsin al-Hakim.
3. When he [al-Hakim] withdrew into his home in al-Kufah in protest of the practices of Saddam's regime in Baghdad, by virtue of the authority which he represented, martyr al-Sadr urged people to continue visiting al-Hakim at his home, saying: "We must not leave al-Hakim alone in this ordeal."

These examples clarify the connection between the Mujahidin Movement and the authority of al-Hakim based on the Movement's commitment to the clerics' line. Defined briefly, the Movement is a combative movement, especially inasmuch as the circumstances of its genesis are ones of military confrontation following

the intensification of the struggle against the regime. Therefore, its supporters regard it as the military arm of the clerics' line, although others fought before it. Perhaps what distinguishes the Movement from others in this regard is that it was the first to launch suicide operations.

### Two Lines and a Presence

In any case, the Movement was persecuted by Iraq's security apparatus after it carried out a series of military operations against Saddam's regime, in the context of the acceleration of events inside Iraq, which prompted discussion in the Movement regarding the utility of military action. This discussion produced two lines:

1. One group adopted the line of political and media action against the regime, without military action. This line provides evidence of this group's affiliation with the ideas of the al-Da'wah Party, which, at the time, rejected combat, relying instead on the method of the intellectual elite and media activity, because the circumstances, in its view, were not yet ripe. This group included a number of untested intellectuals unable to bear fighting and hardships.

2. Another group adopted the line of military action with a political and media cover, and the exploitation of such action on the political and media level. This line subsequently produced the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement.

Both lines were linked to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's authority. The contradiction between the two lines, despite their linkage to the same authority, can be explained by the absence of continuity regarding the link with the authority and the absence of a perception of a need for a linkage. This is because there is a rule which states that the religious authority, in its occupation with the political struggle, embraces all cases arising from this clash. This is considered one of the most important characteristics of Islamic action based on the idea of authority [i.e., persons qualified as a source of emulation], which is the alternative that the Movement adopted, instead of party or individual Islamic action.

With the widening of the gulf between the propositions of the two lines, an appeal was made to al-Sadr's deputy, Mahmud al-Hashimi, to arbitrate. He was of the opinion that, due to the need to consolidate each set of propositions, both groups should act according to their respective methods, as long as their actions ultimately serve a single line.

Inasmuch as the first line produced a group of pacifistic oppositionists who did not engage in armed clashes, but were instead concerned with calling for demonstrations (especially outside Iraq), this study will focus on the role of the second line, from which the [Iraqi] Mujahidin Movement emanated, which adopted the method of the armed struggle and struck a number of positions inside and outside Iraq. Its most important actions include the throwing of grenades at the headquarters of Ba'th Party organizations and security directorates in Baghdad, al-Najaf, al-Basrah, and al-'Amarah, and other acts

directed against Iraqi embassies and organizations abroad. This military action was accompanied by the domestic distribution of publications and statements that advocated opposition to Saddam.

Due to these activities, the movement gained an important place in the minds of Iraqis and attracted major media attention in a very short time, which made it a primary force in the Islamic movement (along with the al-Da'wah Party and the Islamic Action organization). Even Saddam Husayn was compelled early on to recognize the Movement by attacking it in a televised speech. This qualitative acceleration of the Movement increased foreign interest in it and, at the same time, the domestic burden on it, which was reflected in the following developments:

1. Intense interest in the Movement developed, exceeding the ability of the Movement's cadres to absorb youths interested in joining it.

2. The movement began to tend toward developing itself from a religious-devotional movement into a political-religious organization with diversified domains and activities.

3. The Movement established contact with different countries and forces hostile to the Iraqi regime, especially Iran, Syria, and Libya.

4. Many military personnel and Iraqi officers became interested in the Movement, based on close personal relations with a number of the Movement's members, especially those connected with the religious authority or those seeking a connection with it.

5. Abroad, there was a large expansion and an intensive deployment in different countries, where the Mujahidin Movement emerged as a primary force in Iraqi fundamentalist opposition circles.

Among the movement's most important concerns following this expansion was to relocate abroad Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, one of the clerics of the Mujahidin in the opposition and the son of Muhsin al-Hakim, because he was threatened at any time with the issuance of an order to execute him along with a number of clerics who were actually executed.

### The Martyrdom of al-Sadr and the Exodus From Iraq

After the development of a clash with the Iraqi regime and the regime's resorting to violence following increased losses among its ranks and the state of confusion that befell it due to the escalation of armed opposition to it, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was arrested and charged with responsibility for the armed opposition. Five days later, he and his sister, Bint-al-Huda, the fundamentalist writer and the owner of AL-QISAS AL-ISLAMIYAH [Islamic Narratives] were eliminated.

At that time, the opposition groups and religious authorities were compelled to leave Iraq after having obtained from al-Sadr, before his martyrdom, special permission

to leave the country. al-Sadr had issued a secret formal legal opinion allowing only those who obtained special permission from him to leave Iraq.

Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and his brother, 'Abd-al-'Aziz, are among the most important figures who left Iraq with a number of young, combative cadres. Their departure was preceded by small groups of combatants that the regime forced to emigrate in April and May of 1980.

The departure of the two men led to a qualitative change. Muhammad Baqir and 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Hakim went to Damascus and stayed there for three months, devoting themselves to planning the next stage. In Syria, they met their brother, Mahdi al-Hakim, who had arrived from Dubayy shortly before they arrived in Syria.

If Muhammad Baqir preferred to quietly plan the next stage, as his supporters have maintained, 'Abd-al-'Aziz was active from the first day of his arrival, calling on the combatant cadres to rally around him and reform and reorganize the Movement.

At the same time, however, a number of cadres of the Movement held long meetings that resulted in the formation of committees tasked with examining its organizational structure. They considered the Islamic action committees tantamount to an organizational framework and its engine, with the proviso that these committees be linked to a consultative body, comprising mainly the founding cadres. However, 'Abd-al-'Aziz did not agree to this structure, saying: Let us defer action on this matter until the Islamic action committees mature. This meant a rejection of the consultative body. Consequently, a rupture occurred between the cadres and 'Abd-al-'Aziz, and two trends developed in the Mujahidin Movement.

The first trend calls for employing the organizational structure [mentioned in the preceding paragraph] and making decisions according to the Shari'ah based on consultation, consensus, and the principle of majority and minority to ensure the establishment of an organized movement.

The second trend calls for decisionmaking to be linked to the authority, which is the authority of 'Abd-al-'Aziz, and for the cadres to be linked ideologically and organizationally to this authority.

A separation occurred between the two groups. Each group began to issue publications in its own name. 'Abd-al-'Aziz's group adopted the name "The Iraqi Mujahidin Movement," and the group comprising the cadres adopted the name "The Mujahidin Movement in Iraq."

A reading of the two groups' publications reveals a basic difference between them. The Mujahidin Movement in Iraq is based on the premise that Iraq is considered an inseparable part of the Arab nation, and that the struggle to topple the Iraqi regime is linked to the general Arab, Islamic struggle. It calls on the Iraqi people to be

concerned with the issues of the Arab nation, and it calls for Arab unity based on an Islamic outlook and for the liberation of Palestine, which is Arab-Islamic territory. It regards the principle of liberating all of Palestine as the central focus of the Arab-Islamic struggle. As for the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement, its theoretical propositions are not different from those of other Islamic movements in Iran and the Arab and Islamic countries. It disregards issues of nationalism and focuses on toppling the Iraqi regime and establishing an Islamic government, without specifying a program or basic premises to be applied after the ruling regime in Iraq is toppled.

#### Al-Sadr's Will

This difference between the two groups has prevented either of them from adhering to the authority's line on political action. As far as both are concerned, this authority is the authority of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the leadership of Imam Khomeini and the clerics who represent al-Sadr. Prominent in this group are Mahmud al-Hashimi, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, and Mahdi al-Hakim (before his assassination).

In a secret message sent before his death by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Imam Khomeini, which he recommended be published after his death, he requested that these names be authorized to act as his representatives in his absence in the affairs of the Islamic movements in Iraq, subject to Imam Khomeini's right to change and add to these names as he sees fit.

It should be mentioned that the Mujahidin Movement in Iraq—which, one gathers from it, employs political action—was the only party to publish al-Sadr's will, considering it a basic document of the struggle in Iraq. The will was taped on cassettes and distributed throughout Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and other areas in Europe and Asia where there is an Islamic presence.

The following are the most salient points of the will:

1. It calls for national unity in Iraq between Arabs and other minorities based on Islamic unity to topple the regime of Saddam Husayn, and it calls for religious unity between the "sons of 'Umar [the Sunnis] and the sons of 'Ali [Shi'ites]."
2. It calls for giving the Iraqi people the right to determine the next government through a free, comprehensive referendum.
3. It imposes a religious duty on every Iraqi inside Iraq and every Muslim outside Iraq to strive and to make every sacrifice to topple the Iraqi regime and to liberate Islamic soil in Iraq.

After the declaration of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in the autumn of 1982, the two groups (the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement and the Mujahidin Movement in Iraq) joined the Majlis and declared their support for it. However, conflicts within the

council escalated due to the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement's closeness to Majlis Chairman Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, and the Mujahidin Movement in Iraq's positions similar to those of the other Iraqi Islamic organizations and parties.

The schism between the two groups contributed to their losing much of the thrust which they enjoyed at first. Many think that the Movement could have played a different, more effective role and had a greater presence had it preserved its unity and cohesion.

### Movements

After the separation, the following emerged regarding the political activity of the two groups:

1. The Mujahidin Movement in Iraq did not restrict its activity to Iraq and Iran. Rather, its activity has also included other countries, including Syria and Libya. It established friendly relations with them and alliances with other Iraqi national forces and Arab liberation forces in the region.

2. The Iraqi Mujahidin Movement has restricted its activity to strengthening its relations with Iran. Although it has established good relations with Syria, it has yet to clearly establish relations with other Arab and Iraqi forces.

Regarding military activity, the following is salient:

1. The Mujahidin Movement in Iraq: Among its most important military activities was blowing up the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in the winter of 1982, after which it issued a communique. It also blew up Iraqi installations abroad, especially in European capitals, after which it issued communiqués.

2. Among the important activities of the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement was blowing up the Interior and Planning Ministry, bombing a car in front of the radio and television broadcast headquarters, other explosions in front of the Information Ministry and the Iraqi News Agency, and an attempt to assassinate [Culture and Information Minister] Latif Nusayyif Jasim.

Following these operations, the Iraqi regime arrested the entire al-Hakim family in Iraq, including women, children, and the elderly, and killed six of its senior clerics.

Regarding the publications issued by the two movements, the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement issues a weekly newspaper, *LIWA' AL-SADR*, while the other movement does not issue any publication in particular and its communiqués indicate that it does not use this method of operation. Its media activity is restricted to the issuance of communiqués and publications on Iraqi and Arab occasions.

[Box]

### Nationalism

According to one of its leaders, the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement does not have an aversion to Arab nationalism "because it is our nationalism." However, the Islam in which it believes, he continues, "is an international system open to all peoples."

Quoting Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (upon him be peace), he states, "It is not fanatical for a person to love his people. However, it is fanatical for someone to regard the worst of his people as better than the best of other peoples."

[Box]

### The Family

The al-Hakim family, which includes about 90 religious and scholarly figures, has been one of the most persecuted, suppressed, detained, and tortured families. During a single campaign in 1983, 17 prominent members of the family were executed, including jurist 'Abd-al-Sahib al-Hakim, 'Ala' Muhammad Husayn, 'Abd-al-Majid, Ahmad Muhammad Rida, Kamal Yusuf, and 'Abd-al-Wahhab Yusuf.

A number of family members continue to be "hostages" in Iraqi prisoners, while the rest have fled abroad. Very few of them remain in the country.

[Box]

### Rule by Religious Legal Consultation [faqih]

Despite its adherence to the line of the Iraqi Mujahidin's clerics, the Iraqi Mujahidin Movement has not adopted a position on rule by religious legal consultation that is consistent with that adherence. Moreover, they were considered among the strongest adherents of rule by religious legal consultation during the days of Imam Khomeini. This has been reflected in relations with Iran, especially since many accuse the movement of being a mere framework that receives its instructions from the Iranian leadership.

[Box]

### The Most Prominent Operations

The Mujahidin Movement was the first Iraqi group to employ suicide operations in 1981, when Abu-Nidal drove a car into weapons depots in the Abu-Gharib Military Camp and blew up the car and himself.

A second suicide operation was carried out by martyr Abu-Jihad. He blew up the headquarters of the Popular Army in al-Harithiyah in Baghdad.

A third operation was carried out by martyr Abu-Ballal, who blew up the Interior and Planning Ministry in Baghdad. As a result, the Non-Aligned Conference was moved from Baghdad to New Delhi.

A fourth operation was carried out by martyr Abu-al-Fida' (a Sunni), in which he blew up the 14-story Iraqi News Agency.

Two operations were carried out in a single day: the explosion of the radio and television headquarters in al-Salihyah and the Air Force Headquarters in the al-Alwiyah area in Baghdad. These operations were carried out by martyr Abu-'Ammar and martyr Abu-'Ata' (the latter is a Kurdish Sunni).

### Parties, Constitution Discussed

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[Article by Khalil 'Abd-Rabbu]

[Text] Baghdad—Kazim says that he is experiencing his best days in many, many years. He loves a test and hardships. Moreover, he is a slave to them, he states in describing his relation to them. He has had a passionate relationship with them that goes back 25 years. If his wife had not been understanding and accepting of this second wife, "perhaps I would have been married to books, paper, and the pen," he tells me.

The secret of the change that has affected his life is that, for the first time after a long absence, he has returned to journalistic writing with voracity and desire, after he had sworn to leave it and devoted himself to reading and writing literature and literary criticism, because, in this area, he could at least write what he wanted and convey what he felt, far from the eyes of the censor. Whereas, if he had continued in journalism, he would have had to distance himself from what he wanted to write and write what they wanted. Not wanting that, he left journalism.

Within a brief period, Kazim has written eight articles on the need to democratize society, the corruption of some people, and the changes that are needed. However, as soon as he finished writing these articles, he was faced with the difficult problem of narrow-minded censorship, albeit, this time, in his own home. "My wife and twin daughters were struck with fear when I gave them my articles to read before I submitted them to the editing director. They were strongly determined that I not publish them. They will arrest you they told me. After a long discussion, we reached a compromise: I would lighten the tone somewhat."

Among the eight articles written by Kazim, only two were published. "The others are in the desk drawer of the editor-in-chief." There are many people in Iraq, such as Kazim's family and his boss, who still regard with great wariness the policy of spreading democracy in the country, which the Iraqi leadership announced, specifically, in the famous speech given by Saddam Husayn on 16 March 1991.

"It is not easy, after many years of denial and pressure, for the people to immediately believe that a fundamental change has occurred, or will occur."

Kazim adds: "There are still people who are afraid of jeopardizing their gains and positions. Therefore, they are attempting to curb any movement toward democracy. I have lost my fear. I view any situation leading us to concessions as leading us to silence in exchange for a few gains—a house, a car, food.

I ask Kazim where he obtained this courage. He responds: "From the street. Most of the people have begun to talk without fear. I go to the lines of people standing in front of the supply organizations. All of the people are talking, at home, in the coffee house, in the bus. They are talking everywhere in the street. I felt that I had to speak in the newspaper." Actually, for the first time in more than 20 years, people have begun to read, in the state-run Iraqi newspapers, articles which are characterized by boldness and clear, trenchant criticism of the hiding places of error, the bureaucracy, and corruption, and which call for full democracy. It was inevitable that the old [guard] would sharpen its pencils to attack those who had begun to write about forbidden things. Some of the old [guard] used styles resembling those which they used in the old days. Some attempted to use new styles clothed in objectivity and graveness, such as "the supply of bread and reconstruction are more important to the citizen than democracy, and they have priority," or "democracy will only lead the country into chaos and greater fragmentation and division, when the country needs unity."

The articles which replied to these concepts struck and refuted them to the very core. One article asks: "Has living for years without democracy made our lives better?" Another disputes the idea of according priority to bread over freedom: "True, the provision of bread and reconstruction have priority. However, what guarantee is there against the corrupt encroaching on the bread and the reconstruction funds. What guarantee is there that reconstruction plans will proceed in the direction of serving society if society does not exercise its role in supervising and monitoring them. Man does not live by bread alone."

"Of course, forces opposed to democratization will arise and will oppose it, because it is against their special interests," an Iraqi intellectual tells me. It is only in the absence of democracy that anti-democracy symbols can accumulate wealth and privileges.

He adds: Because the party exercises exclusive power, it has lost a sense of competition with other forces and ideas, because its power is guaranteed. Its cadres and members have lost their concern for intellectual and political issues, because they do not perceive a need to develop their ideas to confront and compete with other ideas.

Actually, the perception of the need to carry out extensive, democratic reforms is not a result of the recent Gulf war. Rather, the war left behind a perception of the need to quicken and expedite democratic reforms. The results

of the Gulf war left behind an explosive, popular atmosphere. People have begun, perhaps for the first time in a long time, to pose questions and to think aloud, very much aloud. Abu-Muhammad, a construction worker who lives in one of the low-income, poor quarters of Baghdad, tells me: "For the first time, I am hearing my neighbors speaking out. For the first time, I am seeing people thinking and using their minds, asking why what happened happened. If we had had a voice, a role, or a movement, perhaps we could have changed the course of events."

The Iraqi leadership's perception of a change began with the end of the war with Iran in 1988. Then, there was a strong sense of the depth of the economic and social crises threatening to shake the foundations of the country and the regime, and there was a perception that the government could not continue without introducing serious, radical changes to its primary methods. The economic situation had reached the brink of disaster. Aid from the Gulf countries had dried up, oil prices had dropped substantially, and the country's revenues no longer sufficed to finance industry, the huge military machine that had been built during the war with Iran, and stimulate the economy, which had come to rely substantially on the importation of primary materials. Most importantly, the country's revenues no longer sufficed to feed 18 million people, who had become accustomed to a type of prosperity made possible by the availability of a large supply of consumer items at subsidized and inexpensive prices in the markets.

Agriculture was also in a difficult position. The agricultural policy that had been pursued failed to produce enough food in a country with two major rivers and fertile land. The country was compelled to import wheat from America and poultry from France! We should also not forget the effect on the supply of agricultural manpower of the transformation of a large number of peasants into soldiers.

Therefore, in late 1988 and early 1989, state and party leaders began to discuss what needed to be done. A strong tendency emerged. Among its prominent figures were President Saddam Husayn, the current prime minister, Sa'dun Hammadi, and several members of the Iraqi leadership, such as Tariq 'Aziz. This trend was of the opinion that, in order to activate society and ensure its entry into economic development processes, measures were needed to end the state of alienation between the citizen and the government through the removal of the causes that led to this alienation. These figures put forth the need to: create a climate of freedom of the press and political freedom; end censorship of intellectual pursuits, books, and ideas; allow party plurality; apply the law of the country to everyone; stop the practices of the agencies, especially the security agencies regarding citizens; permit free travel; and preserve personal freedoms for every person residing in the country. Therefore, it was proposed to draft a new constitution for the country which would formulate these matters.

Of course, voices opposed to all of that emerged. Some maintained that democracy, based on a unique model, existed in Iraq in the form of popular democracy, in which the people can express its opinion through the organizations of the party and the public associations that it leads. According to this view, shortcomings and deficiencies, if they exist, can be corrected by existing mechanisms, without need for change.

The war and its aftermath revealed numerous shortcomings and resulted in the highest priority being attached to changing the political system. Therefore, it came as no shock that the first speech delivered by the Iraqi president after the war, on 16 March, contained assurances of the undertaking of such a change.

Two primary questions now constitute the main topic of discussion in official circles and among intellectuals, educated persons, and concerned parties. One concerns the new constitution that will legislate these changes and clarify their scope and how far the current government wishes to go with them. The second issue concerns party plurality, i.e., how will this process be effected, which parties will be permitted, and will the government have the right to intervene to allow one or another party to engage in activity?

Regarding the new constitution, according to Iraqi officials, there are discussions at different levels regarding the draft of the new constitution, which was published in late July 1990.

One reading of this draft reveals the existence of articles that guarantee individual, political, and legal freedoms, and permit plurality and the formation of parties. However, at the same time, another reading reveals "general rules," which must be complied with, and "barriers," which must [not] be jumped over. A number of citizens have expressed to me reservations regarding these general rules and barriers. They believe that their presence impedes the true process of democratization, and they fear that the enactment of a constitution that includes them would make the subsequent pursuit of democratization difficult.

Among these general rules, for example, is one which stipulates the qualifications of the president of the republic, the prime minister, ministers, and members of the consultative council and parliament: Whoever obtains one of these positions must believe in the principles and goals of the 17-30 July Revolution, and must have made contributions to the "glorious sacredness [qadisiyah] of Saddam;" he must moreover must believe that the sacredness of Saddam "has strengthened the glory of the crown of Iraq and the Arab nation, and that it is the only way to preserve Iraq," etc. These general rules—nay stipulations—are tantamount in effect to the imposition of a single hue on anyone who wants to engage in politics and its worries. Such general rules contradict the need for diverse, multiple judgments and principles under a pluralistic, free system.

Debate also surrounds the replacement of the Revolution Command Council [RCC] by a consultative council. Such a council would have virtually the same authorities as those of the RCC, which is slated to be disbanded following the enactment of the constitution. The only difference is that the narrow circle of the RCC would be replaced by a council comprising 50 members, half of whom would be appointed by the president of the republic, and half of whom would be elected by direct, secret balloting.

Many observations have also been prompted by the considerable authorities granted by the new constitution to the president of the republic. These authorities greatly exceed the authorities granted to a president in a presidential system. According to the new constitution, the president would have the authority to appointment and even to dismiss a wide range of officials, from the prime minister and his staff, to judges and ambassadors. Such authority would be at the expense of the authorities of the executive, legislative, and judiciary authorities. Also, under the [proposed] constitution, if the president promulgates a law and refers it to the consultative council, and the latter rejects it, the president has the authority to disband the council.

The second point which is currently provoking debate concerns party plurality. Thousands of debates are occurring around the question of whether the regime has the authority to permit or prohibit the formation of parties. Which parties would be permitted, and which would be prohibited? Some uphold a view that would prohibit the formation of sectarian parties. This means, for example, prohibiting parties such as the al-Da'wah Party, and, especially, Kurdish parties, because some could interpret the restriction of membership in these parties to Kurds, to the exclusion of Arabs, as a call for national secession. In addition, some believe that the parties in exile should not be permitted to return, because, for example, they opposed the war with Iran. However, at the same time, there is an emerging trend which maintains that as long as the principle of party plurality is enacted, no one has the right to veto this or that party, and that, consequently, it is necessary to begin a national dialogue with everyone in order to reach an agreement on general principles that regulate political life. This trend states that, in the framework of such a dialogue and agreement, efforts would be made to establish lines which must not be crossed by those active in politics, e.g., refrainment from propaganda or programs conducive to the incitement of sectarian and national chauvinism in the country. Efforts would also be made to create competition between parties based on democratic foundations that eliminate violence, confrontation, and tension.

An Iraqi intellectual strongly blames forces of the opposition in exile, especially the democratic and liberal wing of the opposition. [He states:] They disappointed hopes during the crisis which we have experienced. We had expected a democratic alternative to emerge from their conference in Beirut. They only offered rehashed general

slogans. Moreover, they cannot agree among themselves, despite the critical circumstances being experienced by the country and the region. This intellectual adds that "bitterness is aroused by the fact that they did nothing serious to disclose the American, Atlantic [NATO], and Israeli massacres against their people. They did not organize campaigns of solidarity with their people, who were being slaughtered. They could have at least collected medicine and milk for children and told the world about the killing of civilians and the destruction of the future of the country and its people. This [inaction], not the war to remove Iraq from Kuwait, is a crime."

When I asked a taxi driver if he preferred to see the opposition in exile in power, he told me spontaneously and derisively: "My friend, there are 20, 30 parties. If they obtain power, they will disagree over positions. If they cannot agree abroad, how can they agree here?"

Such fear is widespread among circles of the educated, the enlightened, and intellectuals. They fear that their dreams of change and democratic transformation will be shattered by waves of sectarian and nationalistic extremism. Moreover, they fear that the alternative would be backward [salafiyah], oppressive [zalamiyah] forces. Therefore, such groups believe that the only way to guarantee democratic change is to fight the forces of sectarian and nationalistic extremism on the one hand, and to support the changes occurring now in Iraq on the other hand.

On the other hand, the central government's success in repairing damaged oil installations and some electricity and water stations, supplying the people with refined oil products, improving electricity and water service, providing food, repairing some of the destruction caused by the war, and starting a dialogue with the Kurdish movement—all of these factors have reinforced the feeling that a strong, cohesive central government is needed to get the country through the post-war reconstruction period. This is in addition to their desire for the government to undertake fundamental reforms, especially regarding the political system.

Regarding the limits of the measures that will be effected in this regard, an Iraqi official, an intellectual who strongly supports the democratic opening, told me that "we are now in a trial phase. The limit to which we are currently adhering is what you see in the newspapers—critical articles, and nothing more than that. We do not want to move quickly. The situation is sensitive and complicated. The economic blockade against us, the reawakening of chronic problems, such as the Kurdish problem, and the problem and the security area are causing us to focus on priorities such as providing food and services and confronting political campaigns. Actually, if they (he means the West) want democracy, they should give us room to breathe. Then, we would be free to fight for change."



For the most part, one notes that the fear of many intellectual and aware elements is due to the continuation of campaigns of pressure and the blockade. Conservative elements hostile to democracy will exploit these circumstances to continue to impose emergency measures on the country. It is also feared that the Iraqi Army's mission could change into that of an "internal police force," i.e., because of its current role in maintaining security in the country, its could subsequently assume the role of maintaining internal security in the country.

Among many whom I met, there is a strong feeling that Western attempts to topple the head of the government are an affront to them and their national and patriotic sentiments. One Iraqi intellectual states: "We will not accept the Americans imposing on us who will rule us. Any change shall be our task alone."

In the same context, an Iraqi official, to whom I referred above, states: "We do not want change to transform Iraq into another Egypt. We will never accept, in any form, the creation in Iraq of another Sadat."

The United States' goal of establishing a political order subordinate to it, politically and economically, is clear to most of the intellectual and aware elements of different trends, both independents and those affiliated with parties. What they want from democracy, he says, is to place Iraq in a new historic phase, in which it grows and flourishes, but remains independent, strong, and not subject to anyone.

### **Jasim Meets Jordanian Bar Delegates, Comments on 'Siege'**

*JN317112891 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0938 GMT  
31 Jul 91*

[Excerpt] Baghdad, INA—Latif Nusayyif Jasim, a member of the Ba'th Party's Regional Command and secretary of the central bureau of the Party's professional and popular organization, has affirmed that the Iraq of the Arab nation has won history and true pan-Arab principles to its side because it confronted the 30-nation Atlantic-Zionist aggression.

The Ba'th Party's Regional Command Member Jasim said today at a meeting with a delegation from the Jordanian Bar Association headed by Mr. Adib Hawatimah, that the aggression targeted Iraq—land, people, and history. However, President Saddam Husayn's historic, true leadership and his honorable people thwarted this conspiracy.

He added that the struggling Iraqis have succeeded in gaining themselves, as well as the noble stands and principles, despite the material losses, and history will not have mercy on those traitors, agents, and all evil aggressors against Iraq's territory and holy shrines.

Mr. Latif Nusayyif Jasim wondered about the existence of human rights and international legitimacy as regards

the Zionist-American insistence on maintaining the economic siege on Iraq and banning milk from reaching the children and elderly.

He said that trading with human rights and international legitimacy has been exposed before the Arab people and the people of the entire world. [passage omitted]

### **Implications of al-Mashat Presence in Canada**

*91AE0485A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Jun 91 p 17*

[Article by Shmuel Segev: "Iraqi Scud on the Mulroney Government"]

[Text]The parliamentary commission of inquiry that examined the circumstances of the accelerated immigration of Dr. Muhammed al-Mashat, formerly the Iraqi ambassador to Washington and the person who ardently defended Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait, has completed its work and is supposed to submit its conclusions to the speaker of the Canadian parliament soon.

Even if the conclusions do not lead to Mashat's deportation from Canada, an entirely unflattering picture of the manner of functioning of Brian Mulroney's government is drawn from the testimony submitted thus far—officials acted without authority [and] supervisory levels and ministers did not know what was going on in their offices.

Despite the commission of inquiry, whatever its recommendations, the manner in which Mashat arrived to Canada is likely to remain a mystery for many years. According to the official version, the Iraqi diplomat arrived in Canada as a retired immigrant, because his life was in danger. According to other sources, Dr. al-Mashat was a double agent. Publicly, he ardently defended Saddam Husayn's policy and supported the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq, but secretly, he had reservations about this policy and reported continuously to the United States and its allies on the intentions and moves of his government. These sources claim that in order to prevent Mashat's exposure as an American agent, asylum was arranged for him in Canada, rather than in the United States.

The "Mashat affair" began on 15 January of this year, approximately 36 hours prior to the commencement of the air attack against Iraq. According to information delivered by a Palestinian official in the information office of the Arab League in the United States with regard to the "double messages" of the Iraqi ambassador to Washington, Dr. al-Mashat was summoned by the Iraqi foreign minister, Taraq 'Aziz, to come to Baghdad for "consultations." Mashat, a diplomat who previously served as ambassador to Vienna, Paris, and London, and served for a period as minister of education in his country, understood precisely the meaning of the "consultations" to which he was summoned. Several weeks previously, the Iraqi charges d'affaires in Morocco was



summoned for similar "consultations," and was executed as soon as he arrived in Baghdad. Mashat was determined to prevent a similar fate to himself.

On 15 January, Mashat and his wife, Samar, left Washington on their way to Baghdad, with a stopover in London. With the help of "friends," the ticket was changed, and the couple continued on its way to Vienna, in order to fly from there to Amman and from there [to go] by car to Baghdad. In Vienna, however, the ambassador's wife suddenly fell "ill," and the date of the ambassador's return to Baghdad was postponed again and again. When Saddam's suspicions with regard to the intentions of his ambassador to Washington intensified, Hardan al-Takhriti, Saddam Husayn's brother, was sent to Vienna to influence Mashat to return to Baghdad. Al-Takhriti, under the cover of Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, coordinates the activities of Iraqi intelligence in Europe. Hardan threatened Mashat, and when the threats did not work, he offered the former ambassador an "enticement": Saddam Husayn's commitment to appoint him president of Mosul University. But Mashat maintained his refusal.

The Iraqi diplomat held a more effective weapon. He threatened that if they tried to assassinate him, he would make public the details of the secret meetings of the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry during the period of Shimon Peres, Avrashe Tamir, with Taraq 'Aziz and with Nizar Hamdan, who served as ambassador to Washington prior to Mashat and now serves as deputy foreign minister in Baghdad. The threat worked. Saddam Husayn, who professed to defend the rights of the Palestinians by his invasion of Kuwait, could not allow himself such a revelation.

At this stage, the preparations for Mashat's immigration to Canada were already in full force. On 27 February, when Saddam's military collapse was already certain, Ju'ad Hashem, formerly a minister in the Iraqi Government and now in exile in Toronto, called Anthony Vincent, the security officer of the Canadian Ministry for External Affairs and the coordinator of political matters with regard to the war against terrorism, and informed him of Mashat's intentions of defecting to Canada. Hashem belonged to a group of Iraqi exiles dependent upon various Western intelligence services. At the same time, Alan Gottlieb, a respected Jewish attorney from Winnipeg who served in the past as the Canadian ambassador to Washington and currently manages a thriving office for economic consultation in Toronto, called Raymond Kartain, the number two man at the Canadian Ministry for External Affairs, with the same message.

Following the two appeals, the interministerial committee dealing with the issue of political defectors convened in Ottawa on 28 February. Representatives of the Ministry for External Affairs and the Ministry of State for Immigration and the defense and intelligence services participate in the committee. The committee examined Mashat's request, and in accordance with its

recommendation, the Canadian intelligence service contacted the intelligence agencies of the United States, Britain, and Austria, in an effort to obtain information about Mashat and his activities. At the end of the meeting, Anthony Vincent sent a "top secret" message to Ernest Bergbush, the immigration officer at the Canadian Embassy in Vienna, which contained notification that Mashat was likely to appeal to him and that, in light of the danger to his life, the Iraqi ambassador was seeking to defect to Canada. Bergbush was ordered to interview Mashat in the presence of the embassy's intelligence officer, and to deal with the matter confidentially and quickly.

Indeed, on 3 March, Bergbush called Mashat and suggested that he come to the building of the Canadian Embassy in Vienna. It was agreed that the ambassador's wife would come to the consulate building the next day in order to receive the necessary forms and that a day later Bergbush and a "colleague" would meet with the couple at the embassy building.

The meeting lasted several hours and upon its conclusion, the intelligence officer issued a three page report to Ottawa. The report is still secret, but according to what was published in the Canadian press, the content of the conversation sufficed to determine that Mashat is not an important "intelligence objective," and therefore it is not justified to treat him as a defector. The intelligence officer claimed that there was no real danger to Mashat's life. He maintained that at the time that Baghdad was going up in flames and Saddam Husayn was dealing with the revolts of the Shiites and the Kurds, the "war against Mashat" was not at the top of Saddam's list of priorities. He suspected that Mashat's claims that his life was in danger were merely intended to accelerate the care of his matter.

On 7 March, the interministerial committee once again convened in Ottawa, in order to discuss the report of the intelligence officer in Vienna. In addition to this report, the immigration officer in Vienna issued a memorandum which contained a recommendation to consider Mashat's matter as if he were a "retired immigrant." He claimed that Canada grants 20,000 immigration permits every year, and Mashat could be one of the recipients of the permits. The committee accepted this recommendation and even decided to draft a memorandum to the secretary of state for external affairs and the minister of immigration on this matter. The memorandum was drafted only on 5 April, several days after Mashat, his wife, and his son had already arrived in Canada. In circumstances that have yet to be clarified sufficiently, and despite the instructions to Vienna to treat Mashat's matter according to the regular procedures, Mashat was granted special treatment. On 30 March, the Mashat family landed in Toronto and continued immediately to Vancouver.

Upon the exposure of the affair on 7 May, an attempt initially was made to cover up the matter. Afterward, incredible details were exposed about the manner in

which the government functioned. Thus, for example, it was clarified that the memorandum of the interministerial committee that was written on 5 April reached the table of the minister of immigration, Barbara McDougal, (who, in the interim, has become the secretary of state for external affairs), only on 19 April, while Joe Clark, the secretary of state for external affairs (who, in the interim, was removed from this position) did not see the memorandum at all. His assistant did not maintain that the issue was urgent and justified the minister's treatment.

Now, everyone is anticipating the publication of the report and the conclusions. Perhaps we have before us a new affair likely to determine the fate of the Mulroney government.

### Proper Role of Censorship Examined

91AE0429B Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
3 May 91 p 7

[Commentary by Widad Naji]

[Text] The media, led by the press, began some time ago to play a responsible role in disclosing the ineffective performance of some state agencies, present proposals to remedy it, and provide a positive appraisal of all aspects of tireless, earnest work to serve society for the purpose of democratizing it in the future to help overcome the effects of the barbaric, American-Atlantic [i.e., NATO] aggression against Iraq, in its numerous phases, and restore Iraq's original, national, cultural face.

We do not go beyond the facts in saying that this responsible media role is not new. The media previously played an important role in several phases of the revolutionary building experiment in Iraq, especially in the second half of the seventies. In this role, the media shed light for citizens on the ineffective performance of some state organizations, and it called on their administrative leaders to call to account those responsible for this ineffective performance and to overcome it to promote rapid, economic, social progress. Commander Saddam Husayn used to personally monitor the interaction between the media and administrative apparatuses and the final result of this interaction regarding service to society.

No one denies that the most important positive effect of this creative course in building [the revolution] was clearly evident in Iraq's ability to mobilize its human and material energies to repel the forces of backwardness and racism, which aimed to encroach on Iraq's independence and sovereignty. It was also evident in the achievement of a bracing victory in the eight-year war. It was inevitable that this long war would leave its negative effects on society, including a decline in the media's role in actively monitoring administrative agencies, due to its preoccupation with covering the savage battles on the border on the one hand, and the need for centralization, which was dictated by the decisive challenges of managing the affairs of life on the other hand.

The state's administrative bureaucracy apparently found this an opportune time to catch its breath and adjust the conduct [siyaqat] of its activity, so as to curb the media's role in monitoring its performance and to create a type of formal coexistence between it and the new formulas prescribed by the revolution to promote economic and administrative progress. It thus began to respond to the few observations published by the newspapers regarding the hardships [mu'anah] experienced by citizens with these or those organizations, which are characterized by falsehood, falsification of facts, the shirking of responsibility, insistence on pushing for the implementation of erroneous policies, and opposition to anyone who believes in working to change conditions for the better.

To perfect the dimensions of the bureaucratic game, some administrative elements purchased the consciences of several junior journalists tasked with monitoring performance level by showering them with gifts and favoring them with privileges and preferences in obtaining the products of companies monitored by the media—all of this in exchange for transforming press reports or news items into a vital means of promoting and commending administrative officials and conveying a bright image of performance based on the official's desire rather than the true state of administrative affairs. Thus, for many years, the newspapers abounded with dozens of press reports of this type. Instead of playing its true, monitoring role, the media became a propaganda tool for elements of the administrative bureaucracy.

This led to the growth of illegitimate interests in several production and service organizations. There was also an increase in the number of elements who benefitted from the exceptional circumstances stemming from the war, and these elements' interests parted company, on the whole and in detail, with any true democratic program that aimed to disclose and try to correct ineffectiveness. This was driven by disdain for the monitoring role of the media, whose activity had begun to recover under the direct guidance of Commander Saddam Husayn immediately after the eight-year war. This emerged clearly in the sharply convulsive responses of several administrative agencies to negative observations published in domestic newspapers. These agencies employed a method of discourse far from the recognized minimum of civilized, ethical dealings, and they attempted to smooth over obvious indications of their ineffective performance with high-sounding sentences and big words devoid of the essential meaning of action.

With the recovery of the media—led by domestic newspapers—of its responsible role in criticizing blame-worthy social and administrative phenomena after the 30-state aggression against Iraq, and in preparation for the deepening of democratic practices and the expansion of popular participation in the making and implementation of decisions, which had been approved by the political leadership years ago, but was prevented from being properly implemented by the circumstances of the war and the aggression, it seemed to some as if the press had entered through a new door through which it had not

entered previously. Reactions ranged from satisfaction with this course as a free atmosphere for citizens to express their concerns and their desire to participate in remedying aspects of the defect in society, to a convulsive response to the method of publishing blameworthy phenomena and criticizing negative practices in precisely this stage, which threatened a kind of alignment with the forces of apostasy, which enjoy the support and backing of imperialist and Zionist forces, which declare their aspiration to sweep away the revolutionary regime in Iraq.

The truth is that this view is somewhat exaggerated in view of the facts. The media plays a major role in most political regimes, albeit to varying degrees with respect to the monitoring of the performance of governments and individuals and the expression of the majority's opinion on important events. This role has earned the media the nickname "fourth authority," after the legislative, judicial, and executive authorities. If the role of the media in capitalist systems, which are based on the sanctification of individual freedom at the expense of the totality and the struggle of class interests, is to help absorb popular resentment against representatives of the major monopolist interests to permit the latter to control society economically, politically, militarily, and culturally [insaniyan], the role of the media in revolutionary experiments that incorporate freedom and democracy in the foundation of their ideological edifice, such as the experiment in Iraq, assumes extraordinary importance in increasing mass awareness of the nature of the great challenges and in shedding light on basic aspects of the defect in society, so as to enjoin the government to establish correct solutions to achieve the qualitative provision of all aspects of life.

This means that the special circumstances being experienced by the country following the 30-state aggression and the persistence of imperialist and Zionist forces in their agitative, conspiratory role, do not justify the silencing of the media regarding its performance of its responsible role. On the contrary, these special circumstances require great courage to criticize and honesty in

diagnosing blameworthy phenomena, because these are the only means to overcome the effects of the barbaric, American-Atlantic aggression in record time and to cause the enemies to miss an opportunity to pull events in a direction that leads to major setbacks, as happened to Egypt after 1956.

In this period, we do not expect the press and other media to reach full maturity in fulfilling their desired role. All published views and observations should not be regarded as unassailable facts. Moreover, error, the faulty appraisal of positions, and [illegible word] criticism—problems that certainly exist—cannot be surmounted for a while. Dialogue arising from differences of opinion helps to provide mature solutions and correct views, all the more so when the goal is to continue the building process, progress, and the cultural revival, despite the challenges of enemies.

#### **Status of al-Mawsil TV, al-Basrah Radio Stations**

*JN2906080291 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0610 GMT  
29 Jun 91*

[Text] The al-Mawsil television station will resume operations at the end of July after it has been rebuilt by the technical cadres of the Ministry of Culture and Information.

The newspaper AL-QADISIYAH quoted a responsible source at the Ministry in its issue today as saying that work is under way to complete reconstruction of the al-Basrah radio station.

The source said that ceremonies will be held on 17 July to inaugurate the al-Thawrah [revolution] television station and the al-Hurriyah [freedom] radio station which have been built, thanks to exceptional efforts made by the ministry's workers and technicians.

It is to be recalled that the al-Mawsil television and al-Basrah radio stations were targets for the savage raids launched by the United States and its allies against Iraq with a view to damaging cultural, scientific, economic, and health facilities and institutions.

**Trade Minister Terms Economic Embargo 'Ugly Crime'***JN097141991 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1325 GMT  
9 Jul 91*

[Text] Trade Minister Dr. Muhammad Mahdi Salih has described the economic and medical embargo, which has been imposed on Iraq since last year, as an ugly crime and as setting a dangerous precedent. During a meeting today with Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, secretary general of the Tunisian Progressive Socialist Assembly, the minister affirmed Iraq's determination to abort the aggressive, evil objectives of the blockade, represented by starvation and spreading epidemics among the Iraqi people. Ahmed Nejib Chebbi and his delegation expressed deep appreciation for the Iraqi people's confrontation of and steadfastness against the aggressors. They expressed pride in the Iraqi people's resolve to reconstruct and stressed the Tunisian people's solidarity with the Iraqi people to foil the unjust economic embargo.

**Editorial on Impact of Economic Blockade***91AE0456C Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
22 May 91 p 3*

[Editorial By Dr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahal, Baghdad University, School of Agriculture]

[Text] The harvest season is continuing these days in the governorates. Farmers and peasants in our country have a nice name for the harvest season. They call it the "harvest wedding," because of its joyful aspects and meanings, the way its collective production activity resembles a wedding feast where many come together charitably and lovingly. This is also because wedding feasts in Iraq have their traditions and methods for achieving success and being staged in an organized, joyous manner, in which each individual plays an enthusiastic role motivated by zeal and heartfelt joy.

In order for this year's harvest season to represent a true wedding in which we all rejoice and participate to make it a consummate success, we—organizations of the state, combined, and private sector, all good farmers, peasants, and persons connected with this field—are strongly urged to make an organized, precise, and rapid effort, exploiting all available mechanical and human capabilities and all sound, highly efficient means and methods. We are called upon to do so, even though the combines recently made available do not fully cover the requirements of harvesting the areas planted with wheat and barley crops, estimated at more than 16 million dunams, of which 80 percent is planted with wheat. These large areas are based on the large-scale acreage utilization campaign—implemented with praiseworthy efforts by those who participated in it—to confront the hostile economic and food blockade against [passage illegible].

However, we can say that [passage illegible] machines (combines in particular), according to carefully studied and fair formulas (the agriculture and irrigation

branches have played and are playing an important role in this process), in addition to work in a genuine cooperative spirit. These are among the primary requirements of a successful harvest. The second fact, which is obvious, is that the harvest process depends on a specific time and the use of the appropriate type of combine depending on the species of grain to be harvested. These factors are very important, because proceeding according to them is a basic means of limiting losses during the harvest.

The reader might not imagine the meaning and effect of losses: Losses are the amounts or values recorded in the stages of production which fall short of the goal of being consumed by society and fulfilling the desire to satisfy the human need for basic elements to continue human life in the best manner. Scientific means confirm that loss during the harvest process might total 5 percent and 3 percent of manually harvested wheat and barley, respectively, and 6 percent and 2.5 percent of mechanically harvested wheat and barley, respectively, although mechanized harvesting has advantages and is an irreplaceable, exemplary, modern method.

In studying other losses of the wheat crop before it reaches the central storehouses, it has been found that the percentage of loss is not negligible at all. Losses total 7 percent in threshing and winnowing, 4 percent during transport and collection, and 20 percent during storage, receipt, and main storage. Based on these percentages, which are contained in studies for 1988 by the Planning Ministry's Central Agency for Statistics, it becomes clear that wheat and barley losses during and after the harvest total 37.5 percent in Iraq. It is worth mentioning that grain losses during pre-harvest production stages total an estimated 5 to 30 percent in most developing countries.

These wheat and barley losses in Iraq, according to the Planning Ministry's statistics, translate into 265,000 tons worth 47.6 million dinars per year. This amount is considered a major loss for the country, which directly or indirectly denies millions of people the consumption or returns of this lost amount. The values of this loss were recorded in a year in which the price of a ton of wheat was calculated at 140 dinars and the price of a ton of barley was calculated at 120 dinars.

However, the last price list announced before the start of the current harvest season and the state's confirmation of the purchase of first-class wheat at a price of 800 dinars per ton, second-class wheat at a price of 700 dinars per ton, and barley at a price of 500 dinars per ton, in addition to the costs of transport (30 dinars [per ton]), engine fuel and oil to facilitate the producers' and farmers' work, and the establishment of numerous grain receipt centers in the governorates—all of that requires us to make redoubled, precise efforts to minimize losses. Moreover, the matter requires the reinforcement of heartfelt faith linked with scientific and technical efforts, lest one grain of wheat be lost without a clear, justified reason.

Simple calculations of the expected wheat and barley yields for this season forecast a good level relative to the difficult circumstances which Iraq is facing. However, the figures warn of more than 120 million dinars in losses, if all of the instructions, recommendations, and guidelines do not resound strongly in the minds and hearts of all concerned parties and with an understanding of the problem that is damaging the Iraqi national economy. The Iraqi economy was subjected to a most devastating and hostile action before 2 August 1990, when the export of some grains to Iraq was suspended, and subsequently, during the 30-nation aggression until now, with the imposition of an unjust, economic blockade that has resulted in severe shortages of food goods necessary for the lives of Iraqi citizens. In order for the agricultural sector to play a beneficial role in confronting the economic war still being waged against our economy in general, we should start by including the following elements in the harvest wedding:

- The implementation of harvest operations as quickly as possible when the crops reach maturity.
- The optimum utilization of all available combines and other agricultural machinery connected to harvest operations, efforts to repair breakdowns immediately, the full utilization of available reserve equipment, and concern with technical capabilities regarding on-site and local maintenance.
- The efficient, high-quality marketing of grain to receiving centers.
- The continued receipt of grain marketed to the central storehouses and silos with the same determination and competence, and the avoidance of any breach that causes a loss of grain destined for the market or main storage.
- The adoption of other measures needed to transport, market, and store the harvest, and to distribute it to central and private mills, and other measures to be undertaken by agencies of the agricultural and commercial sector now assuming these tasks.

Despite our busy, daily activity, we do not forget the recommendations of the commander of the march, President Saddam Husayn, may God preserve him, on his visit to the city of al-Mawsil on 4 May 1991. He instructs us when he says: "Life does not fight its adversaries with the sword alone, but with the pen, the sword, and the economy—everything in its place." During the same visit, His excellency also states: "If our population organizes itself to deal with life, Iraq will flourish economically from al-Basrah to al-Mawsil without its oil, and it will live based on its effort and the labor of its sons."

Through the blessed effort and labor of the sons of the people, and with the arrow of their minds, we shall begin to rebuild a towering economic and cultural edifice, and goodness and bounty will again be plentiful.

### **Agriculture Minister Meets Visiting Romanian Official**

*JN087113591 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0950 GMT  
8 Jul 91*

[Text] Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud 'Abdallah met today with Mr. Valentin Ionita, senior undersecretary at the Romanian Ministry of Chemical and Petrochemical Industry, and the delegation accompanying him.

During the meeting, they reviewed means of bolstering relations between the two countries in the agricultural field to serve the interests of their two peoples.

### **Jordanian Group Sends 72 Metric Tons of Flour**

*JN168155191 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1250 GMT  
16 Jul 91*

[Text] Baghdad, 16 Jul (INA)—A new consignment of foodstuffs, donated by the Union of Jordanian Bank Employees to contribute to breaking the economic blockade imposed on Iraq, arrived in Baghdad today.

Fadil Mahmud Gharib, chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions, told INA that the new consignment consists of 72 metric tons of flour, which will be distributed to the families of the martyrs of the General Federation of Trade Unions through consumer cooperative societies.

### **Hammadi Discusses Means of Modernizing Agriculture**

*JN097174391 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network  
in Arabic 1600 GMT 9 Jul 91*

[Text] Prime Minister Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi has stressed the need to draw on scientific agriculture and modernize the agricultural means of production in Iraq.

While chairing a meeting attended by Agriculture and Irrigation Minister 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud al-Sabban and some agricultural officials today, Dr. Hammadi added that the process of rejuvenating agriculture in Iraq requires that special attention be given to agricultural research, guidance, and preventive treatment in accordance with a future outlook; that red tape be eliminated; and that agricultural work be mechanized. Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi went on to say, "Rejuvenating agriculture requires that production methods be adopted that are compatible with the special agricultural situation in Iraq." He noted that it is important to give incentives to those working in the agricultural sector and to tackle the problems that hamper the agricultural process in a manner that helps increase and improve agricultural production. During the meeting, the conferees affirmed the importance of reducing crop losses and providing agricultural products with preventive treatments by bringing about the conditions for this treatment and the education of qualified technical cadres to conduct preventive treatment, apply pesticides, and modernize air

application methods. The conferees also urged the development of quarantine operations and urged contacting research centers at ministries and universities to benefit from and apply their experience.

### **Iraqi Airways on Restoration Plans of Aircraft, Airport**

*JN286165091 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1516 GMT  
28 Jun 91*

[Text] A specialized working team from Iraqi Airways has completed testing and maintenance on six passenger planes belonging to the company and which are currently parked at Amman Airport.

Nur-al-Din Safi, the company's director general, told INA today that four Boeing 727's and two Boeing 707's have been granted new maintenance certificates that will enable them to operate safely. He added that the company has completed the necessary preparations to restore operation to its air fleet as soon as the air embargo on Iraq is lifted, and that all the fleet's planes are safe. He said that other technical teams are preparing to perform new tests and maintenance on all the fleet's planes as soon as they return to the homeland, in order to prepare them for transporting passengers and resuming domestic and international flights.

The company's director general said the company's six-story building at Saddam International Airport has been rebuilt after being damaged by bombing from the aircraft of the American-NATO-Zionist aggression, and that company employees have resumed their work at this building.

He noted that the first phase of the reconstruction of three hangars of the company's planes at Saddam International Airport has been completed following the removal of all the sheet metal that fell on them as a result of the concentrated missile shelling of the hangars. He added that the second phase will begin on the first of next month, and that this phase will include the processes of laser testing of the hangar structures to determine the suitability of the iron poles and to replace the damaged ones. He said that the third phase will include the reinstallation of the automatic fire extinguishers, the heating, electricity, and anti-bird equipment, and cranes. He said that all these phases will be completed by the end of this year.

### **Arab Agricultural Investments Encouraged**

*JN097140991 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1110 GMT  
9 Jul 91*

[Text] Baghdad, 9 Jul (INA)—The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation has instructed its branches in the governorates to take the necessary measures to define the areas and locations of arable land that can be offered to Arab investors for agricultural ventures.

The ministry noted that the easing of requirements for investments on this land and the outlining of proposed

formulas on the nature of investments are designed to give Arab investors the chance to contribute to agricultural development in Iraq.

These measures are intended to encourage Arab investment in the economic development process to support Arab economic integration; to organize Arab investment in services, agricultural, industrial, and tourist projects; and to provide backing for these ventures.

### **Commission Formed To Curb Smuggling, 'Profiteering'**

*JN227185691 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio First  
Program Network in Arabic 1600 GMT 22 Jul 91*

[Text] Prime Minister Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi has stressed the need for popular and trade organizations to play an effective role in creating an enlightened public opinion to help identify defects and pinpoint tampering with prices and attempts at profiteering at citizens' expense. During his meeting today with several heads and representatives of trade and popular organizations and bodies, Dr. Hammadi urged that the spirit of individual and collective initiative be spread to create a popular opinion that, along with the state institutions, will help to curb high prices.

Dr. Hammadi explained the serious consequences of cattle and serial smuggling and its negative impact on prices of meat and foodstuffs. He highlighted the measures being taken to curb this phenomenon and the efforts made by the state and its institutions to secure the supply foodstuffs to citizens.

It was decided during the meeting to set up a national commission to fight high prices and monopolies. The commission will be composed of representatives of trade unions, popular organizations, and the concerned government institutions. It will try to identify the reasons for high prices, propose suitable solutions, and find acceptable reasons to minimize profits in essential commodities, especially food, in the interest of the consumer. The commission will also organize public awareness seminars highlighting the need for all groups of the society to work to reduce prices. It will also follow up increases in prices and wages, explain their causes, announce them, and contact those directly responsible for high prices to curb this phenomenon.

The commission will also expose the dimensions of the continuing conspiracy against Iraq by the forces of aggressive alliance, as reflected in the continued unjust economic blockade against the Iraqi people. It will hold intensive contacts with humanitarian international organization to inform international public opinion of the nature and objectives of the aggression. It will also contact all international nongovernmental bodies to explain the suffering of Iraqi people, children and elderly as a result of the unjust economic blockade.

It was decided that the commission hold its first meeting on Thursday [25 July]. The participants in the meeting

emphasized the need to activate the productivity of rural women and families to provide food.

**Official Goes to Cairo To Attend Insurance Meeting**

*JN2707124291 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1145 GMT  
27 Jul 91*

[Text] Baghdad—A representative of the Ministry of Finance left for Cairo today to participate in the meetings of the executive committee of the Afro-Asian union

for insurance and reinsurance scheduled to begin on Wednesday and continue for a few days.

The official, general manager of the Iraqi insurance company, said the committee will discuss a date for convening the next meeting of the union's general assembly. It will also discuss other subjects dealing with insurance and reinsurance in Afro-Asian countries.

Participating in the meetings are [word indistinct] African and Asian countries, including Iraq.

### Captured War Documents Examined

91AE0456B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
11 Jun 91 pp 36-41

[Analysis by Staff Major General Salah-al-Din Salim and Staff Major General Muhammad Yusri Murad; monitored by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam]

[Text] Cairo—After the liberation of Kuwait, several Iraqi military documents were discovered, some of which AL-MAJALLAH was able to obtain. The documents clearly indicate the weakness and ineffectiveness that prevailed in Iraq's military machine. AL-MAJALLAH presented some of these documents to Staff Major General Salah-al-Din Salim and Staff Major General Muhammad Yusri Murad, who studied and analyzed them.

The military documents show that the Iraqi Army was suited to deterring and threatening (military legends have been woven around the surprises that were anticipated), but not to fighting. Therefore, the severe military defeat suffered by Iraq's armed forces was not due solely to the Iraqi leadership's erroneous strategic calculations, but also to the Iraqi forces' poor combat effectiveness and to deficient operational conditions in the military operations theater. While it may be easy to see the strategic conditions that led to the defeat, it is not so easy to analyze the tactical conditions that led to the military collapse, unless such an analysis is performed in light of the "military documents." These documents indicate that Iraq's leadership was fighting a losing war from the start.

Regardless of the possibilities, the figures on Iraqi military power that were in circulation in the critical months before the war did not reflect the reality in the operations theater. The enormous size of Iraq's regular ground forces—"900,000 soldiers, 5,500 tanks, 4,200 self-propelled and towed artillery units, and 100,000 armored vehicles"—belied significant points of military weakness, especially in the quality of Iraqi weapons systems, which could have been compared and measured against the amount and types of the allied forces' arms before the war. Then, there were weak points in the Iraqi forces' ability to use these weapons, military discipline, and morale—matters which could not have been measured before the war. However, the "Iraqi military documents" that were discovered show that the Iraqi Army was not truly capable of implementing a military policy such as that pursued by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn when he decided to invade and annex Kuwait. This became clear early on, when 160 Iraqi officers were executed under the Iraqi president's personal supervision on the first day of the invasion, after they refused to participate in the Kuwait operation. This came after the invasion of Kuwait, when Saddam found himself faced with the problem of having to fight with all of his forces, not just his loyal Republican Guard (the 8th Corps), which had initially been tasked with invading Kuwait. He was thus compelled to deal with the problems of a

large army suffering from declining morale, problems which he must have thought he could disregard, as long as he believed that there would be no war.

### Three Important Phenomena

Numerous judgments and analyses of the war to liberate Kuwait have appeared, especially on the reasons for the Iraqi defeat. Most of the analyses have focussed on noting and measuring the effects of the military balance of forces on the course of operations—given that this balance is a decisive factor that determines victory or defeat—apart from other elements that are difficult to define in this context, such as the soldiers' faith, loyalty, conviction in the defense of principles, military discipline, view of the nature of the mission which they are carrying out, will to fight, training level, relationships with their field commanders, agreement with the method of their senior political and military leadership in dealing with events, and other similar elements that ultimately determine the troops' combat effectiveness.

In this series, we will deal with these factors, primarily military discipline and morale, based on three important phenomena that spread throughout the ranks of the Iraqi armed forces, as shown by the Iraqi military documents. These phenomena are:

1. The deterioration of military discipline in the Iraqi forces.
2. The drop in morale due to the soldiers' psychological breakdown.
3. The spread of absenteeism and desertion from the combat arena.

These factors have a major effect on the course of armed conflicts and the outcomes of battles, given the importance of their comprehensive strategic dimensions in balance equations; they can lead to victory or defeat. Needless to say, these factors determine the combat effectiveness of troops in confronting organized opposing forces, not in confronting an unarmed people or organized plundering of a neighboring state's resources.

### Lack of Discipline in the Army

The documents indicate the extent of the decline of the Iraqi armed forces' combat effectiveness in different stages due to the deterioration of military discipline. Discipline is considered a mainstay of military personnel, a basic characteristic of soldiers in all armies, and a characteristic which distinguishes military organizations from other state agencies or organizations. Military discipline is represented by an honorable military appearance; an obligation to remain duty bound in one's behavior; confidence in one's self, leadership, and subordinates; mutual respect and obedience; and a willingness to exert oneself, give, and place the collective interest above individual interests.

A tracking of Iraqi troops' discipline in the war to liberate Kuwait indicates that these aspects of discipline



were almost completely absent among Iraqi troops. Such a lack of discipline can be a semi-chronic feature in some armies in specific stages. Since the Iraqi-Iranian war ended, the Iraqi Army has witnessed the beginnings of internal "fragmentation." This was visible, to a large degree, to persons who closely follow the development of the Iraqi military. One such manifestation of this lack of discipline is the "misuse of combat equipment" in many combat formations, as made clear by "document no. 1," which is dated 7 April 1989, i.e., 16 months before Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. Regarding artillery units of the 51st Mechanized Infantry Division in late March 1989, the document notes that some chemical companies and formations were using chemical warfare vehicles—designed to decontaminate personnel, weapons, equipment, and land affected by chemical contamination—to transport water. This has a major effect on the vehicles' effectiveness, not to mention the importance of maintaining the continual combat readiness of these vehicles. The document highlights the forces' carelessness, according to Colonel "Yahya Mahmud," the commander of the division's artillery at the time. This document also indicates the division command's loss of control over activities within the division, and it highlights the unavailability of adequate of water transport, which compelled the soldiers, perhaps with the knowledge of several junior commanders, to use these chemical decontamination vehicles for other than their dedicated purpose. The misuse of such vehicles expanded to the point where the command of the 2nd Corps informed the division artillery command of this observation, which compelled it to issue a strict order, according to the document, categorically prohibiting the use of the vehicles for this purpose. This indicates the extent to which military discipline was lacking in that period.

#### Deterioration of Relations Among Personnel

It seems that this situation deteriorated within the Iraqi forces after 1989, throughout 1990, and, to a large degree, throughout the crisis. Disregarding the military pressures which Iraqi troops had been facing throughout the months of the crisis, on 16 January 1991, the day after military operations began, the chairmanship of the Iraqi Army staff issued a circular to all commanders drawing attention to a serious phenomenon that seems to have existed prior to this date. This is the theft and destruction of chemical and toxic material and technical and laboratory equipment. The chairmanship of the staff ordered that the necessary measures be taken to protect this material and equipment, and it authorized the security agencies to oversee this. Perhaps the staff command feared external sabotage; however, the reference to theft strongly points to a lack of internal discipline.

The "third document" demonstrates another, more pervasive lack of discipline. This document includes the recorded observations of the 68th Special Forces Brigade commander during his visit to the second company in one of the brigade's battalions. Although army units are customarily at the peak of their discipline when commanders visit, the brigade commander nonetheless

noted a low level of discipline at the personnel level, which indicates dereliction on the part of junior commanders in controlling their units. The manifestations of this low level of discipline were unshaven hair, a lack of concern for general cleanliness, dirty headquarters, dirty chest cartridge pouches, and the failure of the company and platoon commanders to be on top of all of that. This required the regiment commander, to which the battalion is subordinate, to issue a strict order to remedy these problems and to call violators to account by means of more severe penalties.

Of note in this document is that the visit occurred on 2 February 1991, during the air raids, which demonstrates the extent to which the units' military discipline had declined during the war due to the psychological effects of the aerial bombardment, which made them not care about anything, even their personal hygiene, which is customary during wars.

At the same time, relations between commanders and soldiers, and between of different unit commanders in the Iraqi Army were not good. Moreover, according to "document number four," they were extremely bad. A type of alienation prevailed among junior commanders following the forces' invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It seems that the international counter-mobilization, which began to escalate in mid-August 1990, had a strong psychological effect on officers and soldiers.

#### On the Brink of Military Collapse

The third manifestation of the decline of the Iraqi armed forces' combat effectiveness, compared to the combat effectiveness of allied forces, especially during the months of the crisis and the war, is the drop in morale and the gradual psychological breakdown of soldiers and officers at specific levels as the crisis escalated and moved toward war.

The documents indicate that the Iraqi Army's nerves became more frayed as February approached. January 15 was the line of death as far as Iraqi soldiers in the operations theater were concerned. In one way or another, they surely knew the extent of the strategic gap between their army and the allied forces. Under the pressures of the "countdown," the anticipation of a bruising attack of an unknown magnitude from an unknown direction, and the Iraqi forces' adherence to a defensive plan, grave symptoms began to spread in the Iraqi Army, as stated by document number six. The soldiers' suicidal tendencies increased. Some of the soldiers preferred immediate death "at their own hands" to the slow death of waiting for a method of death about which they knew nothing and which might be more painful than suicide.

In the deployment area of the 104th Infantry Brigade, which is subordinate to the 15th Infantry Division, there was an increase in suicides, or what the document calls harming oneself in a dreadful manner, in the first days of January that compelled the brigade commander to send a number of messages to his division command

requesting an explanation for these cases and a method deemed appropriate by the division command for dealing with them. This compelled the division command to send "two letters" to the brigade command a few days before military operations began, and then a third letter after the air raids began. The collapse of morale increased. The document states that suicide attempts had spread within the brigade, accompanied by negative repercussions that affect the soldier, commander, and unit. The letter recommends to the brigade commander that he monitor these negative factors and limit the impetuses of suicide and its psychological repercussions.

At the same time, according to the document, a new phenomenon emerged that usually accompanies a drop in morale. This is the loss of weapons, which indicates that indifference and carelessness prevailed in the forces with the approach of 15 January. Document number seven indicates that this deteriorated further after 15 January. In this regard, the document notes two things:

1. The phenomenon of self-harm escalated with the start of the intense air raids against Iraqi forces, which added enormously to the psychological pressure on the Iraqi soldier, due to the new state of anticipation for the ground attack, which weighed more heavily on the soldiers. Document number seven was issued after 25,000 sorties had been carried out. One can imagine the suicide rate when the raids exceeded 80,000.

Within the army command, concern focused on other matters quite removed from what was happening in the field units. The Iraqi general command did not attempt to contain the rapid deterioration within units as the result of internal circumstances and a shortage of supplies. Perhaps they were not capable of doing so because of the continuing air raids. Also, they did not inform the senior leadership about the psychological breakdown in the units, which would have allowed the leadership to make the appropriate decision to withdraw the forces from Kuwait before a complete collapse occurred. Document number eight covers matters with which the general command was concerned at virtually the same time as the incidents mentioned in document number seven, specifically at the start of the war, 16-22 January 1991. During this period, the command was focusing on possible allied operations to apply psychological pressure on Iraq's soldiers by waging concentrated psychological warfare against them.

An appraisal by the chairmanship of the army staff that was issued to all units, determines that "a team of American psychological warfare specialists can put together and record a cassette tape of the voice of President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God preserve him, lasting 12 minutes, by selecting and arranging sentences from the conversations and speeches of his excellency. The tape might include a request directed at personnel of the armed forces to surrender and throw down their arms in the interest of the Iraqi people and the Arab nation. The tape will be broadcast over directed

broadcasts upon the outbreak of the 'aggression' against the country." This document highlights a number of matters:

1. that the Iraqi president wanted to avoid the effect of psychological warfare on his forces;
2. that the general command was not paying much attention to what was happening inside field formations and did not try to contain internal frustration as much as it made efforts to contain external factors.

### Desertion From the Field

There are many indications that the specter of military defeat began to deprive Iraqi soldiers of sleep in early fall 1990. Different arrangements had begun to be made in the military operations theater and in the international arena for the start of the final stage of the Gulf crisis. This led, under pressure from different causes and motivations, to an increase in absenteeism and desertion from military service and from the operations theater. The specter of defeat was not the only cause for this. There was also the specter of death, in light of successive events that were moving the crisis closer to war. In any case, desertion from service is ultimately a reaction to a worsening of one's psychological state, the collapse of morale, the soldiers' loss of confidence in their leaders, and their surrender to a spirit of defeat. This makes them lose their faith in their national duty and makes them think only of saving themselves.

One Iraqi document, issued by the Ba'th Party regional leadership, points to a basic reason which the leadership believed could be behind the soldiers' desertion early in the crisis, before the real countdown to war began, specifically on 17 February 1990, according to justifications by several Iraqi soldiers who deserted and were apprehended.

It seems that the senior Iraqi leadership realized that the motives for desertion are more complex than what was presented by previous reports. Desertion began to increase alarmingly in September, October, and November 1990. As a result, the leadership formed a committee to examine the motives for desertion and ways to treat them. A 4-member committee was formed from the personal services directorate, and the psychological guidance administration, and two members from military intelligence. The committee held a number of meetings, after which two groups were formed to make field visits to 3rd Corps and the 4th Corps deserters' units. The visits were carried out on a presumably scientific basis. A questionnaire that had been prepared to ascertain the reasons and motives for desertion was used. In its final report issued on 7 November 1990, the committee ascertained 15 causes of desertion, the most important of which are:

1. the tribal [bedouin] affiliation of some of the deserters;
2. the instability of the units from the outset;
3. an inability to tolerate military service;

4. disruption of vacations at the start of the Kuwait operations;
5. religious fanaticism by some of them;
6. weakness of the citizen;
7. weakness of family ties;
8. a poor material situation for some of them;
9. administrative shortcomings at different levels;
10. the fact that a number of them joined their units recently and were unable to acclimate to these units;
11. the existence of unsealed areas that facilitate desertions;
12. the low cultural level of the deserters and the effect of hostile media and the fifth column on the faint-hearted.

Thus, the causes were manifold. However, as we stated earlier, no one dared speak of the soldiers' loyalty to the political leadership and their opinion of the invasion itself. The document contains many causes and attempts to blame external factors, such as a weak cultural level, the hostile media, a fifth column, etc.

However, the recommendations submitted by the committee did not solve the problem. Instead, the solution came in the form of direct orders from Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to unit commanders. The orders are summarized in a number of paragraphs in the Revolutionary Command Council's resolution of 22 February 1991, a week before the end of fighting, which pertained to deserters from military service. [These orders are contained in] document number 12, which was issued after collective desertions by Iraqi units had escalated following 37 days of fighting and 91,000 air sorties. By that time, these sorties, at least half of which were offensive, had lowered Iraqi troop morale to the lowest possible level. By that time, Iraqi units military losses had resulted in the loss of 40 percent of their combat effectiveness and more than 75 percent of their military supply lines. It was only after the ground war had drawn very near, and the allied forces command had disseminated leaflets over Iraqi positions to persuade soldiers to save themselves before the attack, that the Iraqi leadership adopted the view that the problem could only be solved by drastic decisions balanced by a full pardon for personnel who returned to service, in an attempt to contain the situation before the decisive hours.

The resolution issued by the leadership stipulates the following:

1. a pardon for personnel who evade military service if they voluntarily turn themselves in to their units;
2. the execution, by the party organization, of any evader who is caught.

Regarding the same document, it is noted that the circulars that had been issued by the various division commands, including the 42nd Infantry Division, emphasized the importance of only informing pertinent agencies of the resolution's content, rather than announcing it. The circulars also emphasized preventing the document from being leaked to hostile parties, except for the paragraph pertaining to the pardon, which would

be broadcast and published in the media. The Iraqi military documents give evidence of other dimensions of the problem of the desertion. Until the outbreak of the war, the problem of desertion occupied the Iraqi military leadership more than the management of expected military operations. Even the Iraqi defense minister issued, on 16 December, a resolution which document number 13 sets forth on the increased monitoring of accesses that facilitate desertion into the "territory of Najd and al-Hijaz [Saudi Arabia]" (according to the document). The resolution attaches extreme importance to this matter. This is considered one of the few responses to the report issued by the above-mentioned committee on desertion after measures taken prior to the committee's formation failed to prevent desertions. In October, these measures culminated in the formation of "execution teams."

On 7 October 1990, after desertions escalated, the Iraqi general command issued orders to prevent desertions from defensive positions by: forming trusted party groups composed of detachments, each composed of at least 10 military personnel and party men in each regiment, under the supervision of the military commander and the party official; formulating a plan to control choke points on roads; and forming a detachment at the headquarters of each combat formation, composed of the same or a greater number of personnel who were to be stationed at choke points on roads specified by the brigade or the division. More importantly, division security was tasked to supervise these measures and the previously mentioned committees were granted the authority to execute deserters. This is contained in document number 14. Baghdad Radio denied this.

More seriously, power struggles were dominating the Iraqi leadership's judgment in handling desertions, despite the important military ramifications of desertions. As the number of deserters increased and desertions were formally addressed in units' communiques to the senior command during December 1990, the focus of the general command, in its efforts to contain and monitor desertions, turned to Kurdish soldiers. This was specifically because of the tension that had begun to appear in northern Iraq at the time. The chairmanship of the army staff ordered units, according to document number 15 issued on 31 December 1990, to provide it with a consolidated situation report with the names of Kurdish deserters and their full addresses, by governorate, within five days. This means that plans had already been made to investigate Kurdish deserters and to take revenge against them and their families, so that Kurdish desertion in particular would cease, and so that they would not join forces with Kurdish groups had begun to reorganize somewhat in northern Iraq.

The military documents mentioned above decisively show the gradually expanding collapse within the Iraqi Army during the crisis, even before the war started. It should be understood that this large army was suffering from chronic diseases whose symptoms could not be treated.

**[box 1, document 1] Presidential Order To Execute Deserters from Military Service****Resolution**

Second:—1—The implementation of the punishment of execution by the party organization regarding each person who deserts from military service and is apprehended after the said period.

(First) After the ascertainment of the crime of desertion, with official approval by the military unit or the pertinent conscription agency:

2. An absent person or a truant who is apprehended shall be sent to his military unit for the implementation of the military laws and regulations pertaining to him.

Saddam Husayn President of the Revolutionary Command Council

**[box 1, document 2]**

In the name of God the merciful and the compassionate  
Top Secret Eyes Only  
Command 42nd Infantry Division  
Administration and [passage illegible]  
No. / /25  
Date: Rajib 1411 A.H. February 1991  
[passage illegible] (M.B.J.) [passage illegible] Subject:  
Resolution

[passage illegible] of a copy of Resolution No. 20 of 1991 of the Revolutionary Command Council, transmitted in letter 1412 of the chairmanship of the presidential administration on 22 January 1991, transmitted in the letter of the Defense Ministry administration [cut off text]

**[box 2] Standing Warning Against Psychological Warfare**

In the name of God the merciful and the compassionate  
[manuscript entries in top right corner:] 28/23 January 1991 3412 [end of manuscript entries]  
Headquarters 1st Regiment, 606th Infantry Brigade  
No. / / / / 220  
Date: Jumada II; 22 January 1991  
To: All companies (S. 2)  
Subject: Information

Letter 397 of the Chairmanship of the Army of 16 January 1991, transmitted in letter 225 of the Gulf Operations Command of 17 January 1991, transmitted in letter 225 of the [word illegible] Forces Command of 17 January 1991, transmitted to us in a letter to Infantry 606/H/84 on 20 January 1991.

1. A team of American specialists in psychological warfare can put together and record a cassette tape of the voice of President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God preserve him, lasting 12 minutes, by selecting and arranging sentences from the conversations and speeches of his excellency. The tape might include a request directed at personnel of the armed forces to surrender

and throw down their arms in the interest of the Iraqi people and the Arab nation. The tape will be broadcast over directed broadcasts upon the outbreak of the aggression against the country and after the destruction of Iraqi radio and television media broadcasting agencies.

2. The following is ordered:

a. Circulate the above information to all of our members and warn them in advance, so that this deception and similar deceptions of psychological warfare do not [passage illegible] them.

b. The president commander (may God protect him), our army and our great people are not surrendering and will not surrender to the aggressors [passage illegible] and every Iraqi is a [passage illegible] hero who sacrifices for the commander, homeland, and the nation.

We request that the necessary measures be taken and that notification be made in writing, so that the commanders can ascertain definitely that the information reached the last soldier today.

[illegible manuscript entries]

[illegible signature] Yunis Muhsin Fathi [illegible]/  
Commander of 1st Regiment, 606th Infantry Brigade  
22 January 1991

**[box 3] The Formation of Party Execution Teams in Each Regiment**

Document Number 14

2. The Handling of Escapees:

In accordance with the directives of the Military Bureau issued pursuant to its top secret letter 27418/M.' of 7 October 1990 addressed to the Defense Ministry administration, the following is ordered:

a. The formation of detachments composed of at least ten military personnel and party men in each regiment under the supervision of a military commander and a party official. A plan shall be formulated for stationing these detachments at crucial points on the roads.

b. The formation of a detachment at the headquarters of each formation composed of the same or a greater number, which shall be stationed at crucial points on the roads to be determined by the brigade and the division.

c. Division security shall supervise the precise implementation of said measures, and Gulf Operations Command security and the committees mentioned above shall be granted the authority to execute deserters.

d. The issuances of non-compensation papers to allow a combatant's return to the rear to evacuate the [passage illegible] or to transfer materiel and deliver spoils etc., provided that they are not used excessively.

e. The inclusion of members of the security agencies in the above instructions. Every agency shall establish a plan to prevent escape.

**[box 4] A Special Committee To Examine the Causes of Desertion**

In the Name of God, the merciful and the compassionate  
Top Secret Eyes Only  
Headquarters 1st Regiment, 606th Infantry Brigade  
Number/ /188  
Date: Jumada I 1411; 15 January 1990  
To all Companies (S. 2) Subject: Circular

Letter 2793 of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army of 3 December 1990, transmitted in top secret eyes only letter 39 of the Gulf Operations Command of 6 November 1990, transmitted in top secret eyes only letter 189 of the [word illegible] Forces of 10 December 1990, transmitted to us in top secret eyes only letter 377 of Special Forces Brigade/65/operations of 12 December 1990. Herein enclosed is a copy of the resolution of the special committee to study the flight of military personnel to Najd and al-Hijaz. We request that the necessary measures be taken, and that the articles and recommendations contained in the study be implemented.

[illegible manuscript entries]  
[illegible signature] Faysal 'Aziz Hasan Commander, 1st Regiment, 606th Infantry Brigade  
14 December 1990 TR (H.B.J.)  
Top Secret Eyes Only

**[box 5] Lack of Trust Regarding Kurdish Officers**

Secret Express Letter  
Time of writing and day: 12 Jumada II 1411 A.H. 12 January 1990  
Number 15  
21  
Directorate of Special Forces  
List (B).....[word illegible] of the people  
68

[passage illegible]/branch/2/19/3. Administrative Agency Notification 25164 of 21 December 1990, based on original document of secret letter 3462 of the chairmanship of the Army Staff of 20 December [1990]. You are ordered to supply us with a consolidated situation [report] with all of the names of Kurdish deserters and their full addresses classified according to governorate within five days of the date of this request.

[illegible manuscript entries]  
[illegible signature] Special Forces Colonel H. of the Special Forces 12 January 1990  
Secret Express Letter

**[box 6] One of Numerous Documents Pertaining to the Phenomenon and Causes of Desertion**

Top Secret Eyes Only

1. Top secret eyes only letter 5918 of the Army Staff Chairman of 2 November 1990 regarding conducting a study in the General Military Intelligence Directorate on cases of military personnel fleeing to Najd and al-Hijaz and to ascertain the reasons and motives of these cases

and ways to handle them. Participants in this study include representatives of the Psychological Guidance Directorate and the Directorate of Personal Services.

2. A committee shall be formed of the following representatives:

- a. Brigadier General Mahmud Shakir Mahmud, representative of the Personal Services Directorate.
- b. Colonel [illegible] Asdaq [illegible], representative of the General Military Intelligence Directorate.
- c. Lt. Colonel [illegible] 'Ali [Haydarshiyah], representative of the Psychological Guidance Directorate.
- d. Captain [illegible] 'Abdallah Muhammad, representative of the General Military Intelligence Directorate.

3. The Objective

To study cases of military personnel fleeing to Najd and al-Hijaz and to determine the reasons and motives for these cases and ways to handle them.

4. The committee convened a number of meetings and formed two groups to make field visits to units of deserters from the 3rd Corps and 4th Corps. The field visits were carried out in the two corps to the section level, and a questionnaire formulated for this purpose was used to ascertain the reasons and motives for desertion. The following became clear in [passage illegible]

a. Causes and Motives for Desertion

I. The tribal [bedouin] connection of some of the deserters.

[cut off text]

**[box 7] A Lack of Discipline Regarding Virtually Everything**

Secret Eyes Only  
Toward God and Imminent Victory  
1st Regiment, Special Forces Brigade [cut off text]  
Number H.  
Date: 2 February 1991  
To: All Companies (S. 2) Subject: Handling of Negative Aspects

Secret letter of our brigade/H/2/10310 on 29 January 1991. In a visit by the brigade commander to the sector of the second company of your unit, the following negative aspects were observed. You are requested to examine and treat such negative aspects. Otherwise, we will call to account violators by means of the severest punishments.

1. Unshaven hair of some ranks.
2. The [non-]execution of duties.
3. Dirtiness of the combatants' chest cartridge pouches.
4. Dirtiness of headquarters and positions of the ranks, and a lack of concern with cleanliness.
5. The failure of the commander of the company and the platoon to monitor members of his company.

[illegible signature] Major, Special Forces [illegible] Commander, 1st Regiment, Special Forces Brigade 6 [cut-off text] [illegible] 1991  
Secret Eyes Only

**Health Minister Arrives in Cuba for Talks***JN227190091 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1814 GMT  
22 Jul 91*

[Text] Havana, INA—Iraqi Health Minister 'Abd-al-Salam Muhammad Sa'id arrived in Havana yesterday evening at the head of a delegation visiting Cuba for several days.

He will hold talks with his Cuban counterpart on ways to bolster and promote relations between the two countries in the medical and health fields.

**Kurds Urged To Obey Kurdistan Front's Instructions***JN237193591 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan  
in Arabic 1625 GMT 23 Jul 91*

[Unattributed commentary entitled: "Adherence To Our Political Leadership's Instructions is the Right Way To Realize Our Aims"]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners: The masses in any society, especially the downtrodden and those whose rights have been usurped, have the right to resort to demonstrations and peaceful strikes to express their rights and demands and voice their complaints and problems. [passage omitted]

Experience has shown that anarchy, anger, and violence do not solve people's problems. On the contrary, they will exacerbate them and aggravate the schism between the authorities and the masses. This means that calmness, self-restraint, cool nerves, and open-mindedness must be exercised. Therefore, the problem must be dealt with by the two sides. It needs clarity of expression, slogans, demands, and concepts, as well as calm understanding.

The world is living in an era of democratic transformations and an age of respect for human rights and freedom. This reality should be understood, and a sound response to it is what we need. Kurdistan is witnessing a special phase within the new phase which our country, Iraq, is witnessing, namely the phase of negotiations and brotherly understanding aimed at dealing with the Kurdish question and implementing autonomy in accordance with a new law for Kurdistan. It is the phase of accepting democracy and political pluralism on the level of Iraq as a whole. This requires a high and joint sense of national responsibility and a spirit of cooperation and brotherhood in order to accomplish what we are aspiring for in terms of prosperity, joint interests, Arab-Kurdish brotherhood, and a sound Iraqi national unity aimed at realizing peace, freedom, justice, and social equality in our country.

The Kurdistan Front and its leadership have made a correct and sound evaluation of this phase in accordance with our people's interests and Iraqi national unity. Therefore, adherence to the Front's instructions and guidance by the peshmergas and the Kurdish masses will

facilitate the attainment of our goals and legitimate aspirations: concluding the negotiations by realizing a genuine autonomy for Kurdistan and the democracy for Iraq. Let us all cooperate and adhere to discipline and order and obey the Kurdistan Front's political instructions.

**Paper Asks All Iraqis To Shoulder National Duties***JN237100991 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0756 GMT  
23 Jul 91*

[Text] Baghdad, 23 Jul (INA)—The newspaper AL-THAWRAH has affirmed that the timing and political significance of the two decisions to pardon Iraqis who have fled the country for political reasons, political prisoners and detainees inside Iraq, and those who have committed the crime of fleeing their military service or being late in signing up, are representative of the process of preparing for the new political stage in Iraq and implementing the comprehensive national program. The newspaper, which is the mouthpiece of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, said in its editorial today that these two decisions also represent a step which complements the honest and serious call by President Saddam Husayn to all Iraqi citizens who care about Iraq's independence, sovereignty, unity, and future to participate in the new experiment. It adds, "The two decisions constitute a sound introduction to this experiment, since they effectively and truly contribute toward forgetting the past, with all its contradictions and complications, and provide the Iraqis, even all escapees or those who committed crimes, with a good opportunity to take a new look at their behavior and stands and start a new stage based on serving, defending, and preserving Iraq as a dear, powerful, and prosperous country against which the enemies will collapse, and as a lighthouse by which friends and the sons of the nation are guided." The newspaper AL-THAWRAH notes in its article that the 17-30 July revolution has once again manifested, through its actions, that it is truly a bloodless revolution that is concerned about not forfeiting any Iraqi, even if he has been a deviant person or an escapee for some time. It believes in all its people and opens its arms wide to every loyal, believing Iraqi, in whatever way he demonstrates this belief. This revolution honestly demonstrated its deep awareness and comprehensive understanding of the nature of the difficulties of this time, as well as the requirements to overcome these difficulties and create an atmosphere of trust, optimism, interaction, and joint action. The paper stresses that with these two decisions, and the measures and arrangements preceding them and preparing for this new stage, the revolution affirmed its political credibility and seriousness in implementing its promises and projects. They also prove that the revolution is determined to proceed with this new experiment by expanding party pluralism and elections on all levels. It says that the nationalist Iraqis who have a sense of their true national responsibilities are called upon more than ever before to express their nationalism and show that they belong to Iraq by

honestly responding to President Saddam Husayn's call and cooperating with the leadership to shoulder the duties of the new stage, the stage of party pluralism and developing and strengthening democratic practice in Iraq. It adds that the duty of reconstructing what was destroyed by the U.S.-Atlantic aggression, bolstering the

march of national steadfastness, and completing the establishment of democratic institutions in various fields is not the responsibility of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party alone, but the duty of loyal nationalist Iraqis and all those to whom the leadership opened wide the door to participate in realizing these honorable national duties.

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