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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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### Public Reaction to Nationalist Informals

90UN0790A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 11 Jan 90 p 2

[Report by I. Losev: "Slogans on the Square"]

[Text] More than two months have passed since publication of the remarks on the unsanctioned demonstration by the "Rossy" civic patriotic association in Teatralnyy Square ("Slogans on the Square," 22 October 1989), but comments about it are still coming in from readers. There are varying and sometimes diametrically opposed views on the event that was described and on the Russian patriotic movement in general, and the pile that has accumulated on my desk prompt me to take up my pen.

Of what do the Rossy people and the newspaper readers accuse us? Here is a typical letter, sent by Professor L.Ye. Gakkel of the Leningrad State Conservatory.

"I was astonished at how I. Losev differs from S. Shevchuk (the author of the piece in VECHERNNY LENINGRAD on the same subject—author's note), and describe in such different tones the demonstration by the Rossy civic association on Teatralnyy Square, and would also like to note that LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA'S usual orientation is correct, while I was not a witness to this demonstration, at least during the initial stage. If you had not seen the slogan for yourself: 'Russian teachers for Russian schools.' If you had not heard it for yourself from the lips of the demonstrators standing in silence at the pedestal: 'We shall never solve Russian problems until we get rid of the kikes.'

"Perhaps in the darkness I failed to see something or hear something (a correct reservation—author's note). But even from the remarks made by I. Losev it is clear that the Rossy people want 'total nationalization of cultural institutions on the Russian territory of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR].' In the West the word 'nationalization' means 'switching to state ownership,' but what can it mean in our case except 'change in the cadre make-up of cultural institutions according to national affiliation'? (or 'a return to national roots'—author's note). This is how I understood the aspirations of the Rossy people in the Oktyabrskiy rayon executive committee [rayispolkom], and I understood correctly. And so I suggest that it would be correct to say that LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA through the medium of its author has demonstrated a commendable rejection of the usual hypocrisy of official ideological policy, namely, that nationalism is now being greeted not only in deeds but also in words!"

Reader N. Salev called the demonstration an "anti-Semitic bacchanalia." Yu.M. Benin called the Rossy people "nationalists" and "fascists." A.L. Ryvlin called them a "disgraceful mob."

Of course, there were also other letters in the editor's mail.

"You informed us Leningraders about an important event very objectively and without superfluous comment, wrote T. Golovkina. And this is the opinion of our reader Lukyanova (she gave only her family name): 'Patriotism is the only thing that can now save our country and our city from ideological chaos.'"

Party, war, and labor veteran I.N. Moiseyevkov thinks: "The goals of the Rossy people are very fine. They are the ideas and aspirations of many honest Russian working people. There must be a renaissance in Russia."

"As an hereditary Russian intellectual I am an internationalist, but my heart aches when they try to shift the misfortunes and sins of the administrative system onto the Russians," complains 45-year-old communist N.A. Khaminov in his letter.

"We read your article collectively and concluded that the Rossy people are acting correctly! The Russian people are not against Jews. We are Jews and we believe that Russia should be led by Russian people while other nations should live in tranquillity and work creatively. Take, for example, the Jew Ya. Frenkel. Here is a Man with a capital 'M.' He made no claims to manage Russian culture, he created culture. He was a Russian soul and he gave his heart sincerely to people. Russia should be Russian, while for the Jews it remains their Russian homeland." [signed] A.V. Feldman.

V.M. Kasatkin discusses the role and place of the Russian intelligentsia.

"In M.S. Gorbachev's interview for the TF-1 French television company published 2 October 1985 in the newspaper PRAVDA, the following was stated: 'If there is any country in which Jews enjoy the kind of political and other rights that they do in our country I would like to hear about it. The Jewish population, which makes up 0.69 percent of the entire population has been afforded a representation in political and cultural life equal to at least 10 to 20 percent of the entire population.'"

A simple mathematical calculation shows that one Jew in five living in the USSR is working in the field of culture or politics. How can this be explained?

On 31 January 1986 a creative evening for the poet A. Voznesenskiy took place in the "Oktyabrskiy" hall. The poet was warmly praised by the intelligentsia of Leningrad, who called him "Ionian." To be honest I was expecting to hear indignation from those present, saying that this was the **Russian** intelligentsia. I was mistaken. The response to the poet was stormy applause.

Leningrad is a unique city that incorporates the wealth of the cultural and scientific thought of many peoples and countries. That was how Peter I dreamed of it. But not through the "cocooned" existence of the intellectual creme de la creme, but through Russia. The "creme de la creme," which has divorced itself from its roots,

becomes "Ionic" and begins to work for itself, taking advantage of its magnificent intellect. Russian is the least of their worries...

This is precisely why we now read in the newspapers about the meetings, demonstrations, and so forth. The problems cannot be driven inward. If they are they will corrupt society just like a disease. The problems must be brought out for all to see. Only then can a sensible version be found for resolving them. This cannot yet be seen."

I would like to conclude this survey of readers' opinions on Russian "patriotism or chauvinism" with a letter from T.I. Kuznetsova.

"My attention was drawn to a group of people near the M.I. Glinka memorial and a gathering of the militia. I managed to read the slogans in the hands of the young people before they were taken away by the militia, and people standing there in the crowd explained the essence of what was going on. The arrest of the Rossy people made people indignant, and passions heated. Then many unjust words were hurled at the demonstrators and the Russian nation, and at the Jews. After hearing these high words from the people of Leningrad I went on my way, thinking over what I had seen and heard.

"Some people in the crowd were frightened by the Rossy slogans and so they accused them of 'fascism,' 'nationalism' and 'anti-Semitism.' But tell me, what will be 'fascist' about it if in Russian schools a Russian teacher teaches Russian children Russian history and culture? As far as I am aware the Russian intelligentsia supports a revival of the national schools in the union republics. There has been talk about setting up such schools here in Leningrad.

"Why is it that we calmly accept schools for Latvian and Moldavian and Udmurt children, recognizing that it is natural and regular for national teaching staff to work in them, but any attempt to move to this kind of school for Russian children evokes a storm of indignation from certain circles? Why do not the Tatars or the Latvians protest against this?

"Previously I would never have thought like this but now it has involuntarily caught my attention. For example, the slogan 'Jewish teachers for Jewish schools!' (if someone proposes it) would not evoke any frenzy of cries of 'Zionists! Russophobes!' But preservation of those remnants of truly Russian national culture that might today or tomorrow disappear without trace is a matter of honor for the Russian people if they do not decide to become the 'Ivan who does not remember his people.'"

Different letters, different opinions... I am not about to try to convince one side of the correctness of the other, but I shall express my own attitude toward the subject of the polemic.

In my opinion it is time to understand that the national feelings of not just numerically small but also numerically large peoples deserve respect. The confrontation and the reluctance to engage in dialogue, and the attempts by one side to pretend that there are no problems provide cause for concern. There are problems. And the longer we postpone the resolution of them, the more acute they become for us. And all the "i's" can be dotted only through joint effort, not in any way by shifting the blame onto an opponent.

Finally, I am convinced that true internationalism lies not in belittling one's own national worth, as some of the letters to the editor would like. A desire to revive one's own national culture, which was at one time recognized throughout the world and has now declined to nothing, is not nationalism. Let us decide what is patriotism and what is chauvinism from the standpoint of the law rather than from the standpoint of representatives of particular nationalities.

### Democratic Union Events 'Political Lie'

90UN0807 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 4

[Article by G. Drugoveyko: "A Dance in the Style of the Old Calendar"]

[Text] Every sortie of the DS [Democratic Union] is another political lie. The last event relied on the historical ignorance of the people passing by.

The "Democratic Union" is a fairly well-known group (according to data from sociologists, 63 percent of Muscovites have heard of it). It does not fare so well with respect to popularity. Their ideological principles (We specially note: Ideological principles are theory, not social activity) are interesting to 20 percent of the others who live in the city.

The DS held its usual event the day before yesterday. This time it was an unsanctioned rally on the occasion of the 72d anniversary of the disbanding of the Constituent Assembly.

Our editorial office receives many letters about the DS. On the eve of the rally I read all the available mail in which Muscovites expressed their attitude toward this organization. Their attitude is not merely negative—it is simply condemning. In any case there was not a word of support in the letters.

"The DS operates as though everything were happening in an insane asylum. They frighten people and try to knock them off balance. The orgies on Pushkin Square showed the incredible malice of their leaders. The leaders of this 'union' are in favor of a bourgeois republic. Do they understand that this path would lead us not to the threshold of the 21st century but to the grip of the 19th century? And through which misfortunes—do they understand this? Do our people really deserve such journeys backward through the centuries?

"We see our life realistically. We see the difficulties and the omissions and the mistakes and the tragedies. But where can these new extremes lead?

"I believe that only together, through peacefully overcoming the difficult legacy of old deceptions and stereotypes, shall we turn life toward better times. Relying on reason, kindness, and freedom, which liberate man's creative energy, oriented toward creativity and not destruction, is it possible to return the desired life to normal people."

V. Shidlovskiy wrote this letter on 14 December of last year. I quote it because it is typical. N. Berezhetskaya, M. Amosova, T. Balanchuk, G. Novikov, and many, many others write principally the same thing. Sometimes they are more severe, more demanding, and more categorical.

For the sake of objectivity one must say that in half a year there have been five or six letters in favor of the DS in which our newspaper was reproached for its prejudice. I think these people would consider a story about the DS to be fair only if it fully corresponded to their personal opinion, mood, and world view. The problem is that for every person these things really are personal.

And so at exactly 1800 hours on 18 January in front of the Pushkin monument the event of the DS began...

At the foot of the monument stood a young man (I would guess he was about 20) with a sign saying "The CPSU is the tyrant of the people" and he gave a speech. It was contradictory and confused. And it was contradictory in its own way: not because he was excited but because he was poorly informed. There would hardly be anybody who could hear and understand what he said. The young man was replaced by a girl who called for those present to move over to the monument to Yuriy Dolgorukiy, promising that the main events would take place there.

About 200 people moved down the middle of Gorkiy Street to the Mossovet [Moscow Soviet]. Thank God they got there all in one piece. There were a few more people at Soviet Square. I thought there might be 300 active participants in the rally and about 1,000 curious onlookers.

Again someone spoke. Speakers replaced one another. I am not sure that those in attendance understood the speeches. Except, of course, those who knew what they were talking about without listening. And judging from the content of the leaflets the DS spread throughout Moscow the night before, this is what they were saying...

...On 5 January (old style) 1918 the Bolsheviks disbanded the Constituent Assembly, which was a real democratic phenomenon in Russia. At that same time communists shot at peaceful demonstrations of workers in Petrograd...

...The communists are usurpers, tyrants, totalitarians, anti-patriots, and fascists. And so forth and so on. And even more malicious, more hateful, and more psychopathic...

...Our consciousness is not free because it was formed under the pressure of totalitarianism, in lies, in fear, in slavery. And so, boycott the elections...

Incidentally, I note that as long as the DS hoped to participate in the power there was no discussion of a boycott or the helplessness of our consciousness.

...We shall move to democracy, freedom, abundance, and other kinds of blessings only through returning to the Constituent Assembly.

From the broken words I managed to figure out in spite of myself I can say that the speeches had precisely this content. And the DS placards confirm that this was the case.

For example, there was this slogan: "Romania has revolted and we are tolerating this?" I do not quote this text because it is the most negative. It is simply that here is an obvious paradox. In the DS documents it is constantly declared that they intend to fight the communist by nonviolent means. One wonders if any kind of logic could make the program not contradict what it says on the placards. Why ask this question? After all, anyone can say, write, or profess whatever he wants to. A free person should be free. This is true. But the DS accuses the entire world of putting up with untruth. So it seems wrong to fool themselves at the same time.

Many various subjects were developed at that meeting.

This, for example, is one of the most amusing... A DS member shouts into the crowd:

"Novodvorskaya is supposed to come here. They could arrest her. We should go meet her."

Somebody responds to him:

"Why are you shouting? She will get here."

Without missing a step the DS member angrily throws (there is no other way to put it) an answer into the face of the person who does not want to organize a meeting for Novodvorskaya:

"You are a provocateur!"

It turns out that the "provocateur" is a member of the DS. The "greeter" calms people down:

"He is not a provocateur. He is one of us—a DS member!"

In general the situation in the square was intense. All one had to do was express the slightest disagreement with the DS and that person immediately had a whole series of "honorary titles" conferred upon him: provocateur, functionary, slave of the system, toady, and so forth. It is strange, for this union is supposed to be democratic.

Another subject—one of the spicy ones. An elderly, skinny (this is an important detail) person, judging from everything, someone who had worked hard in his day,

said something that displeased the "democrat" standing next to him. The old man had had to listen to a lot of all kinds of stuff. Including this:

"You are doing the party's bidding. Look how shiny your cheeks are!"—this came from a person about 25 years old, clearly not exhausted by work, either mental or physical, suffering rather from obesity than malnutrition. And with what insistence he demanded that the old man "show his hand." The hands of a functionary, he said...

At 1900 hours the OMON (special purpose militia detachment) began to push the rally-goers away from the monument to the founder of Moscow. The DS formed small groups of people several times. The OMON dispersed them. A couple of DS members were arrested. And Novodvorskaya was among them. The DS supporters asked the militia which rayon people's court the leaders were being taken to and they set out for there. They all knew the scenario in detail. It had all happened before.

But still each sortie of the DS is another lie. This time it was variations on the theme of the Constituent Assembly which, as always, relies on our ignorance of history.

So perhaps we should clarify what happened on 5 January 1918 (18 January in the new calendar). We went to Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences Nikolay Romanovich Andrukhov. He said:

During the nine months of its existence the temporary bourgeois government, in spite of repeated promises, did not convene the Constituent Assembly. And the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars], V.I. Lenin, on 27 October 1917 signed a decree of the Soviet Government scheduling elections to the Constituent Assembly on 12 November.

In the elections the Bolsheviks received 25 percent of the votes, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks—62 percent, and the bourgeois parties—13 percent. Since there were about 100 different political parties in Russia, to assert that this is evidence of the defeat of the Bolsheviks is incorrect at best. The Bolsheviks were supported by workers of large industrial centers, particularly Moscow and Petrograd, the soldiers on the Northern and Western fronts, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet, and many army garrisons in the rear. A serious analysis shows that the composition of the Constituent Assembly did not reflect the real alignment of political forces in the country or the real feelings of the working masses, especially the peasantry.

The Constituent Assembly opened on 5 (18) January 1918. At it the chairman of the VTsIK [All-Union Central Executive Committee] (which included 62 Bolsheviks, 29 left-wing Social Democrats, and 10 representatives of other political parties), Y.M. Sverdlov made public the "Declaration of the Rights of Working and Exploited People" and asked the deputies to discuss it

and also the decrees of the Second Congress of the Soviet on peace and on land. Sverdlov called for approval of these decrees. The Constituent Assembly refused not only to support but even to discuss the first democratic laws of the October Revolution and Soviet power. Moreover, it rejected them in the form of an ultimatum, offering its own drafts which were directed toward overthrowing the new social and state structure, immediately restoring capitalist policies in the country, and turning the political power over to the bourgeoisie. No political party in the world after coming to power as a result of a popular revolution, naturally, would stand for that.

Multiparty (!) in composition, the VTsIK on 6 January 1918 adopted a decree to disband the Constituent Assembly, having declared its demands to be illegal and contradictory to the will of the workers of Russia. On that day V.I. Lenin said: "The people wanted to convene a Constituent Assembly and we convened it. But now they have experienced what the notorious Constituent Assembly is. And now we have fulfilled the will of the people, the will which says: All power to the Soviets..."

Strictly speaking, it is difficult to confirm or deny the assertion of the DS that "on the day of the opening of the Constituent Assembly the Bolsheviks shot into mass peaceful demonstrations with slogans in support of popular representation." I once again looked through a multitude of the most varied Soviet and foreign sources (and not only communist ones). I found nothing of the kind in them.

And in general this is a widespread device for political agitation: to make a quite incredible fabricated statement without referring to a single historical fact. And then let them try to refute it. Armed counterrevolutionary uprisings broke out in January 1918. Naturally, the Soviets responded to these with arms. If they want to and since they feel no responsibility for truthfulness, why not mention some of these episodes of "shooting into a peaceful demonstration." After all this is not a scholarly debate but a—flight of the imagination.

The original fighters for truth of history, present-day freedom, and the clear recognition of their compatriots have rallied around the flag of the DS. For each date of the obsolete calendar they have a new lie. Such was the dance before the Mossovet to the accompaniment of historical fables.

### Social Democrats as 'Mensheviks' Viewed

90UN0804A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 2

[A. Chaplygin, V. Syrnikov report on constituent congress of Social Democratic Association: "First Forum of Soviet Mensheviks"]

[Text] The constituent congress of the Social Democratic Association opened today in Tallinn.

"Approximately 200 representatives—participants in various republic, kray, and oblast organizations, movements, clubs, and parties from the whole Soviet Union, people who share the ideas and values of social democracy, those who by specific practical activity have for several years now aspired to the creation in our society of guarantees of political, economic, and social democracy—are participating in the congress," Oleg Rumyantsev, co-chairman of the Moscow "Democratic Perestroika" Club and member of the congress' organizing commission, told your ETA [Estonian Press Agency] correspondents. "This year we felt the need to move from the level of informal get-together to the level of some sort of proto-party structure. This is what I would call the Association—an alliance of proto-parties based on the confederative principle. This year will evidently be pivotal in the development of our reform, which is already becoming cramped within the framework of the strict corset of 'revolution from above'. The political process will obviously reach some entirely new level and, possibly, will be regulated by political parties. We must be ready for this, have a working infrastructure and information and political connections and broaden our social base. It is this, evidently, which will be the concern of the Association which the congress beginning today is to found and whose program documents—a declaration of principles and provisional rules—it is to adopt."

Participants in the Inter-Regional Group of deputies took an active part in preparing the congress. Some of them have been participating in the congress also. Your ETA correspondents asked Academician Viktor Palm, USSR people's deputy, to share his impressions.

"This congress is a specific response to a popular phrase which simply does not correspond to reality: 'The party initiated perestroika'. Nothing of the sort. The party brought the country to the need for perestroika, but it itself was initiated by a small group of people who came to be in the party leadership and availed themselves of the evolved traditions of influence of the leadership on party affairs. I do not in the least wish to belittle the significance of this event, but it is not, after all, a question of the party as a whole. The party has not yet started perestroika but is trailing behind, in Estonia included. I am speaking extremely mildly and politely and have no wish to lend pungency to my words. We are now seeking alternative paths of political organization. This is happening in two directions: first, movements which lack the characteristics of classical parties and unite people in accordance with the principle of carefully devised programs. Although the people's fronts have long had their own programs and are akin to parties in this respect. Second, the creation of specific political organizations which wish to assume the activity which the Communist Party now has little hope of realizing. Of course, we do not desire the creation of many parties because this would lead to a scattering of forces."

[Correspondents] What is the optimum number of parties for our country, in your opinion?

[Palm] It is not a question of the number of parties. They should cover the range necessary for regulation, a "socio-economic thermostat," I would say. Society in the direct sense is uncontrollable, as is any system composed of a large number of elements. And as in the simple thermostat, it is impossible in society to maintain one and the same "temperature"—it will "jump" from the upper to the lower limits. And the parties should regulate this "temperature," that is, the correlation of the efficiency of the economy and social protection. This regulation in a normal society depends on the wishes of the people, which elect for themselves this party or the other.

[Correspondents] Today's congress has been called various things in the media. The newspaper RESPUBLIKA, for example, called it the "first forum of Soviet Mensheviks"....

[Palm] This is probably so—in the sense that organizationally we are even fewer than they were. But if we set aside the direct meaning of the word "Mensheviks," there is some truth in it. Yes, the Mensheviks headed by Plekhanov painted clearly for Lenin the picture of what would happen were he to organize such a party and what would happen were he to relinquish power to such a party in such a country and at such a time. All these forecasts came true and with interest. It may be said, therefore, that it is the Plekhanov, social democratic line which is being continued here—not directly, of course.

[Correspondents] And the final question. Are you today, as you attend this historic event, an optimist?

[Palm] Genetically I am an optimist. I therefore "rotate"—this impulse does occur. However, a pessimist is an optimist with good information. I would like to end with this.

### Report on Social Democrats' Forum in Tartu

90UN0806A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 14 Jan 90 pp 3, 7

[Article by V. Ivanov: "Is It Worth Building the 'Society of the Future?'" ]

[Text] To write "hot on the trail" of an event that is more or less important is always difficult. And just as "the big picture is seen from a distance," it is also necessary to go though a distance in time in order to get permanent impressions after a sufficiently distinct picture has developed. And for that reason also, it is necessary to compare an event with its entire surroundings, in order to determine the true scale of what happened.

However, a newspaper's job is to present current material which has not yet gotten old (and in our time, when almost every hour brings something new, information ages very quickly). Therefore, it is necessary to risk appearing subjective in something, but at the same time giving preference to urgency. And it remains only to hope that today's reader is already sufficiently experienced to figure out for himself where the truth lies.



Just one more detail "from me." During the two days of work of the first Estonian Forum of "Social Democracy in Contemporary Europe and the Political Future of Estonia" (Tartu, 10-12 January of this year), I more than once caught myself when my "internal censor" demanded categorically: "This must be stopped!" But the invisible opponent answered reasonably each time: "Perhaps what they are saying here is unpleasant to hear, but, you see, a lot of what they say, unfortunately, is the truth!..." Therefore, I propose to the reader as well: Let us not reject out of hand things that we do not agree with. Even if in form, and sometimes in content, the speeches at the Forum seem to us to contradict that which we have become accustomed to over the previous years. We will not begin to follow the "internal censor"—we will try, nonetheless, to think over what we have seen and heard calmly.

One of the first—if you have in mind the Estonian participants of the Forum (and many foreign guests spoke here)—to take the floor was Vello Saatpalu, the leader of the Democratic Labor Party. Readers of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA were able to familiarize themselves with the basic positions of this trend in the pre-election interview that was given to our newspaper by Paul Lepp, deputy chairman of the DPT [Democratic Labor Party] (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 27 October 1989). At the Forum, V. Saatpalu spoke about his vision of the future Estonia. In his opinion, the discourse should only concern a free and independent republic as an independent state. This is not new. The methods proposed by the speaker to achieve this objective are interesting. I will avoid direct quotes, inasmuch as I took notes from a translation, and some inaccuracies are possible in doing this, but the account of V. Saatpalu's speech went approximately like this.

If we will talk about an independent Estonia within the structure of the USSR, then problems inevitably will arise and will continue to arise about how to compensate mutual expenditures in accounts between the republics in their direct relations, and also between the republics and the center. And no court will ever be able to conclusively figure out all of the fine points of these accounts. However, if Estonia secedes from the structure of the USSR, in the opinion of the speaker, the following participants could sit at the negotiation table on the question of compensations: The United Nations Organization, as a mediator and a guarantor of the achievement of a just resolution; the USSR and Germany (though the speaker did not specify which of the two Germany's), as countries that directly affected the postwar status of Estonia; the Baltic states (also including Estonia); the new European political forces (here also no interpretation was given as to what specifically was intended); and, finally, the United States and Great Britain, who were together in Yalta and Tehran, and who also took part in the postwar division of Europe and the world. It will then be possible to consider in detail: Who owes how much to whom, and to establish the terms of payment of compensation.

In defining this layout of forces, the speaker made one substantial reservation: In his opinion, the Soviet Union (Russia, as he put it) will not be able to adopt a correct decision with complete definiteness until such time as the October Revolution is recognized as a catastrophe for the country...

We will also make our own reservation: Apart from V. Saatpalu, not one of the other speakers supported this point of view. At least not in so direct a form.

Though here the speaker admitted that the formation of an independent Estonian state will require quite a lot of time, and that in the first (embryonic, the speaker said) stage, a fair period will be spent in negotiations with the Soviet Union. "But," Saatpalu emphasized again, "we must conduct them with dignity and determination."

Speaking about whom or what type of a personality he would like to see at the head of an independent Estonian state, Vello Saatpalu enumerated in order of increasing preference: Margaret Thatcher; afterwards—Ingvar Carlsson, "even though he comes under the red flag (I. Carlsson is not only the prime minister, but also the chairman of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Sweden—editorial note), which is not acceptable to the Estonian people"; and, even better, Achille Occhetto (general secretary of the Italian Communist Party—editorial note). "Do not pay any attention to the fact that Occhetto is a communist; this does not mean anything, because he says that he is not seeking to build socialism, but that he wants a democratic society that is built by taking socialist values into account," is the way the speaker characterized the last of the candidates he proposed. ...I will be so bold as to come out with a brief commentary. According to many previous speeches by Vello Saatpalu in the press and from various rostrums, audiences got the impression that he is a sober and sound-thinking person and politician. It cannot be ruled out that his speech at the Social Democracy Forum was partly dictated by a desire to "motivate the public," and to show that those assembled here are still at a crossroads, in a stage of formation, while the Democratic Labor Party is already a formed movement, which can allow itself to do some lecturing to its "smaller brothers." However, it is possible that my impressions are wrong.

But, let us turn to the speeches of other speakers.

Rejn Vejdemann, apparently, does not need special recommendations. We will mention only that he is a member of a group of activists which signed the theses of the program, "On the path to the Estonian Social Democratic (Independence) Party [ESDPN]," which, in fact, also organized the Tartu Forum.

Here are some of the main ideas that were heard in his speech at the Forum. In Bolshevik practice, the fundamental subject of activity was missing—the person. They placed the main emphasis on the state, society, and collectivism. And all of us (that is, the ESDPN—editorial note) must keep this in mind, because that kind

of danger faces every new movement. In creating a new Estonian independent state, we must not let it be transformed into a self-sufficing force, "a thing unto itself."

Rejn Vihalemm (also one of those who initiated the creation of the ESDPN): Every political movement that makes a claim to a significant role in society is tempted to manipulate public opinion, for which an instrument is usually created—a party. This is precisely the fate that befell the Communist Party—its attempts to organize itself led to the fact that it began to claim (and afterwards it accomplished this in practice) the leading role in society. Such actions almost inevitably lead to subjectivism in policy, in ideology, and in all other spheres of life. Social democracy goes along another path: It discovers the laws of development of society and follows them, at times helping the self-organizing and self-developing principle. It is not possible to build a society behind a desk, as was done by the founders and followers of communism, and their successors, and afterwards embody this model in practice. It is necessary to adhere to the principles of freedom and justice, not attempting to create them artificially according to one's own discretion. Does this mean that a person is relegated to the role of passive "follower?" Exactly the opposite: It is the kind of ideology that activates people and awakens their initiative, but in doing this directs this initiative not to an alteration of reality "in the image of oneself," but to an ability to react and reconstruct oneself in accordance with the necessary and objective laws and demands of reality.

"The person is not the king of nature, as many of us have come to believe, but he is also not a pawn in the hands of dark forces," is the way R. Vihalemm concluded his speech.

(It is necessary here to make a small correction. Because of a poor translation, and also because on one subject—"Marxism and Contemporary Social Democracy"—there were two speakers, it is possible that I attributed the thoughts and statements of Julo Kaevats to R. Vihalemm. However, this is not a serious error, because their positions are similar.)

The last person to speak at this meeting was Marju Lauristin. But today we will not start to set forth the contents of her speech in summary form, inasmuch as one of the forthcoming issues of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA will carry an interview with her, which was given on the last day of the work of the Forum.

...A few more words about the "roundtable" discussion of the Forum, in which foreign guests participated—representatives of social democratic parties and movements of Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, Finland, Hungary, the FRG, and France. Many of them frankly cautioned their kindred spirits in Estonia about the danger of excessive idealization of the bourgeois-democratic path of development, inasmuch as their society is nowhere near as harmonious as it might seem, and that there are no fewer problems in the West than in

today's Estonia and in the USSR in general (although these problems have a somewhat different character).

### Tallinn Hosts Social Democrats' Congress

90UN0805A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 16 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Oleg Rumyantsev, co-chairman of the Social Democratic Association and the Moscow Democratic Perestroika Club, by ETA correspondents A. Chaplygin and V.V. Syrnikov: "Association Formed"; place and date not given]

[Text] The constituent congress of the Social Democratic Association [SDA] was held 13-14 January in Tallinn. Following the conclusion of the congress, Oleg Rumyantsev, a co-chairman of the SDA and co-chairman of the Moscow Democratic Perestroika Club, answered journalists' questions.

[Rumyantsev] I believe that we have done good work during these two days. First of all, we have finally within the framework of a constituent congress, and not some get-together, adopted a decision on the founding of the SDA, adopted fundamental documents and our platform, and determined who we are and what values unite us. We have adopted rules which, in my opinion, are a viable document that is sufficiently flexible and which at the same time establishes certain standards, in accordance with which we will work organizationally. Finally, we have elected highly representative bodies, without which no organization can function. They are made up of people who have shown in practice that they are capable of organizing a democratic movement, and this is very important now, when this movement has switched to the phase of party building, to the phase of creation of the political form of our practical activity. The stage of people's fronts is naturally coming to an end. This was an emotional outburst, a kind of 'wave' of popular activity which rolled onto the granite stage of the system and slid down from this stage. What is needed now is something different—carving niches in this stage and entrenching ourselves in them. Otherwise we will not master this monolith. The congress was this very phenomenon—we have dug ourselves in, and the familiar idea of the social democrats existing as a constructive opposition has begun to be cultivated in the public mind. People are beginning to get to know our vision of how society needs to be transformed—not to build the new man, of course, but to ensure normal conditions for transition to a multiparty parliamentary system, to a controlled market economy, and so forth. We succeeded in doing all of this at the congress to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, the question of the creation of an organizing committee of a Russian Social Democratic Party generally was raised at the congress.

[Correspondents] But there is already the SDA....

[Rumyantsev] The SDA is a confederative structure, an association, an alliance of parties, movements, and so forth. The question of the creation of a mass, influential,

social democratic party in Russia will arise, nonetheless, both Afanasyev and myself in my political report and many others spoke about this. Most likely, there will be a separation of some faction from the CPSU, which will subsequently be structured organizationally. The amalgamation of honest reformers in the party and democratic forces and the workers movement will make it possible to create for this a firm social base, and the social democrats will finally be able to influence decisionmaking. After all, the indecisiveness in the implementation of perestroika today is even more dangerous than the imperfection of the decisions themselves.

[Correspondents] So, it may be said that you are leaving Tallinn with a sense of duty having been done. What are your plans? [Rumyantsev] It is now very important to concentrate on the elections, on the election campaign, on getting as many of our candidates elected to the parliaments of Russia, the Ukraine, and other republics as possible. We need to have not several persons in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies but an effective faction that will from the very outset define itself as social democratic. This will, of course, be difficult. I, for example, have been nominated four times in Moscow—by two public organizations, inhabitants and an industrial outfit, and everything is being done to close the door on me. This has happened three times already. So, first, a social democratic faction. Second, use of the organizational structure which was determined at this congress.

[Correspondents] A little more detail about this, if possible.

[Rumyantsev] We elected a council of representatives, which will be formed from representatives of each organization which becomes a part of the SDA; an executive committee as the working body, which is subordinate both to the congresses and the council; three co-chairmen: Vello Saatpalu, chairman of the Estonian Democratic Labor Party, Nikolay Tutov, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who has formed in the Supreme Soviet a social democratic faction of more than 70 people, and myself; and an editorial council, which will deal with the organization of social democratic publications throughout the country.

[Correspondents] How do you intend to combine parliamentary and extraparliamentary forms of activity?

[Rumyantsev] We cannot turn our back on the forms of self-management, strike committees, and committees which may arise in this region or the other. We need to ensure that these bodies do not undermine the existing authorities and simultaneously monitor the latter if they prove ineffective, thereby limiting the efficacy of their decisions which would contribute to getting perestroika moving.

We must be able to use extraparliamentary forms of activity to the extent that the authorities understand that we are prepared to bear responsibility for our actions because for us respect for the law is very important. Our

actions, if we take such, will be nonviolent and will not be aimed at the overthrow of the existing system.

[Correspondents] On what basis did Estonia's social democrats take part in the congress?

[Rumyantsev] They were primarily Vello Saatpalu, chairman of the Estonian Democratic Labor Party, his deputy Paul Lepp, and Iosif Yurovskiy, Aleksandr Solts, and Aare Lapynin, members of the Organizing Council of the Russian Social Democratic Party—they helped greatly in the organization of the congress. In addition, they took part as delegates.

[Correspondents] A resolution concerning the Baltic area was adopted at the congress....

[Rumyantsev] Yes, it is short, and I will permit myself to read you it: "The constituent congress of the SDA, confirming its devotion to the social democratic principle of observance of nations' right to self-determination; taking into consideration the illegal nature of the Soviet Union's incorporation of the Baltic area in 1940, confirmed once again by the findings of the commission of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the decisions of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Supreme Soviets; affirming the undoubted justice of the aspirations of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian peoples to the state independence of their countries, declares its solidarity with the Baltic social democratic movement championing these aspirations and expresses the hope that the processes of the achievement of the state sovereignty of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will contribute to national and social concord in the Baltic and also the democratic development of Russia and the other union states and the preservation of civil peace."

### Continuation of Estonian Democratic Party Program

90UN0775A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII  
in Russian 12 Jan 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Theses for the Program of the Democratic Party: Education and Culture"; continuation of report begun in MOLODEZH ESTONII 15 Dec 89]

[Text] 1. General propositions.

1.1. Recognizing the right to education as an inalienable human right, the DP [Democratic Party] sees its goal as the effort to achieve the maximum possible conditions for obtaining an education in Estonia in the indigenous language.

1.2. The DP is concerned with the problem of integrating the Russian-language school in Estonia into the local cultural environment and opposes its one-sided orientation toward the higher schools of the RSFSR, believing it proper to provide the sort of education that orients graduates toward the world system of higher education.

1.3. The school in Estonia should be open both to the East and to the West. At the same time, the DP considers it absolutely essential to orient the Russian school toward Russian spiritual traditions, and toward the acquaintance through it with the values of world culture and Estonian national culture.

## 2. The secondary school.

2.1. In the areas of secondary education, the DP considers it absolutely essential to categorically reject repressiveness and an obsession with percentages, and to orient the school toward the humanization of instruction. The DP rejects the idea of mandatory secondary education as an unrealistic idea that has discredited itself.

2.2. The DP favors the establishment of schools of various types, emphases, tendencies, areas of specialization, etc, and favors a diversity of curriculums and instructional styles and methods. The DP believes that students should be given the maximum opportunity to select the emphasis, tendency and package of curriculums and requirements. Only such a measure will make the school genuinely democratic.

2.3. The DP favors a partially self-supporting school. This means that the essential minimum of education accepted in civilized society should be provided at state expense. Everything over and above that should be partially paid for by parents, as well as by sponsors and voluntary contributors.

2.4. The DP favors having the teacher occupy a place in society that befits his profession. This should be achieved, first of all, by improving his material well-being. To that end, it is necessary to devise a system for rewarding the teacher not so much for quantity of work (number of hours) as for its quality.

2.5. A stop must be put to bureaucrats' arbitrary actions vis-a-vis teachers. That requires establishing a system of independent qualifications commissions capable of objectively evaluating the quality of a teacher's work in order that, as a result, a title might be conferred on the given teacher that corresponds to his qualifications. A system of titles (grades) will make it possible to evaluate the quality of pedagogical work.

2.6. The DP deems it necessary to depoliticize and demilitarize the school. Any open propaganda for any sort of political or ideological doctrines should be eliminated from school curriculums.

2.7. The DP considers one of the most urgent tasks in the area of education to be a fundamental improvement of the physical facilities and equipment of general-education schools. School buildings should be brought into conformity with the demands of hygiene: sound proofing, cleanliness, air temperature, room dimensions, etc. Special attention today should be devoted to equipping schools with duplicating equipment, which will

make it possible to supply students locally with necessary study aids. In the future lies the shift to computerization of the instructional process.

## 3. The higher school.

3.1. The DP believes that the higher school in Estonia should be integrated into the world system of higher education. This means the possibility for a secondary-school graduate to receive a higher education both within the republic (given the availability of a higher school with the appropriate specialization) and in another state.

3.2. The higher school in Estonia, like the secondary school, should be depoliticized and demilitarized. Nationality, religious belief and world view should not be preliminary conditions for admission to higher schools.

3.3. It is necessary to increase the number of specialties with instruction in Russian at Tartu University, with a view to the eventual organization of a center for obtaining a higher education in Russian. The DP opposes attempts to exploit the idea of forming a Russian University without the appropriate scientific base, physical facilities and equipment, instructional staff and public demand. Such a "Russian University" would graduate specialists with a diploma but no knowledge.

3.4. The number of places for students in higher school should not be restricted to the republic's requirements. A certain overproduction of specialists is useful for creating competition in that area under the conditions of a market economy.

## 4. Cultural institutions, the mass media, etc.

4.1. The state of the people's culture is determined by, in addition to everything else, the condition of museums, theaters, libraries and other cultural institutions. The interests of culture in Estonia demand the unconditional state and public protection of those institutions. The deterioration of the condition of those institutions or the deterioration of working conditions in them is intolerable.

4.2. All monument sites associated with national cultures in Estonia should be protected by the state, and the necessary funds allocated for this purpose.

4.3. It is necessary to expand book trade with the RSFSR and also with foreign countries publishing literature in Russian. The DP proposes consideration of the question of establishing a Russkaya Kniga [Russian Book] Store in Tallinn.

4.4. The interests of culture require efforts to achieve the organization within Estonia of a Russian-language publishing house and allocation of the necessary materials and equipment for it.

4.5. In addition to maintaining the existing broadcast time of programs of Central and Leningrad television,

the DP considers it advisable to establish independent Russian editorial boards at Estonian television and radio.

4.6. The DP favors placing the editorial offices of the newspaper VECHERNIY TALLINN under the administration of the city soviet, without division into Russian and Estonian editorial boards, in order to ensure adequacy of information for city inhabitants regardless of their nationalities.

4.7. The DP favors the establishment of a Russian Culture Center and the allocation of a suitable building for it.

The Program Committee invites the DP's supporters to the old House of Political Education, 3 Sakala, room No 2, every Friday at 6 pm for discussion of the published theses for the Democratic Party's program.

#### **Georgian-Armenian Friction, Problems in Akhalkalaki**

18130043 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 7 Dec 89 pp 2-3

[Article by Grigol Rukhaia: "Dzhavakhetian Diaries"]

[Text] My seat-mate was a talkative man.

Although it was cold at first in the Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki bus, we were having such a good time that we hardly even cared whether it was hot or cold until we reached our destination. "My goodness, the Lord certainly tested us Georgians and Armenians this year—the natural disasters in Dzhavakhetia, Colchidia, and Adjara, and that terrible earthquake in the Spitak-Stepanavan district."

The old man was silent for awhile, then continued:

"But I think we face even greater tests ahead!"

The old man, who had seen so much trouble in his life, thought a while in silence, and then said:

"I sure hope we Armenians don't make a mistake.... You don't have to look far for examples—consider, sir, the Tartars, Abkhazians and Ossetians! Listen to their fine 'logic': We're here, and so this is our land! You bet I remember the year 1913, the Vorontsov-Dashkov era, when some of our elders made an absurd—even imperialistic—demand, namely that Dzhavakhetia should be joined to Armenia because there were only a handful of Georgians there and the Armenians were in the majority! Yes, I remember very well.... I've looked into the history of it. You know, our people almost ate Academician Adonts alive because he told the truth, namely that Armenia's national hero Vardan Mamikonian was a Laz, in other words a Georgian, by origin. That's what's written in the annals. Because of the word Chen [=Chan, meaning Laz], people once thought that the man was Chinese.... But you had your own historian Ivane Dzhevakhishvili, an honest man who spoke the truth.... I'm

proud that Adonts was also an honest scientist.... I ask you, what did it matter whether Vardan had an ancestor who was Georgian? Not a bit. Quite the contrary. It even raised him in the estimation of decent Armenians. When did the Georgians ever make a fuss about Saiatnova being a Georgian, even though, as we know, Saiatnova wrote real masterpieces of Georgian poetry.... If you ask me, I'm thankful for one thing: Namely, the Tashir district, with its citadel at Lore, which is now in Stepavan Rayon, is a part of Georgia. I've looked into the Armenian sources, and you know what's written there? The Armenians call that district 'Georgian Field.' I'm also grateful that you folks haven't raised a fuss about it, because you sincerely sympathize with our troubles.... No, we won't interfere with the Georgians; these are different times, different relations...."

The sky grew dark; it was getting ready to rain.

Uncle Ovanes got out a cigarette, smoothed it between his fingers, then remembered that smoking was forbidden and put it back in the pack.

"There was a First Secretary in Akhalkalaki, name of Stepanyan. A young man, a very good man. But the local hucksters hounded him, made a fuss, and had him removed. The ordinary working people still remember him with affection. What I want to say is, what happened this year wouldn't have happened if Stepanyan was still in. I was in the bazaar that day, then I went to the Rayon center; if you go there you will see that it is just a few dozen meters from the bazaar to the Center. There was a group of guys in front of the movie theater, talking loudly. I saw Khachika, an acquaintance of mine. He told me some people had come to the Raykom from the Georgian government, probably to see about the problems of the Georgian villages.

"The government people intended to go to Bogdanovka. But I found out the next day that when they reached the outskirts of Bogdanovka they were met by women, young people and children lying in the road. What could the Tbilisi people do? They couldn't run over them. Now I ask you, who was it that warned the Bogdanovkans that the Georgian government had sent somebody down to revive the Georgian villages, and told them not to let them in? Was it me? Was it Khachika? Of course not! It had to be the Raykom or the Rayispolkom leadership! What I want to say is, our rayon needs an honest, non-chauvinistic leader, one who won't disgrace the Armenian people. Yes, that's what we need.... Recently I read in the newspaper that restoration workers from Tbilisi were prevented from entering the church at Grtila by some local residents, who even abused them. What I want to know is, who was it that egged the local young people on that way? Wasn't it the rayon leadership? There's no two ways about it. What do we decent Armenians need that kind of attitude for? I have often debated this subject, mostly successfully.... But can you imagine—all it takes is for someone to hoist the Armenian flag (it's called the Dashnak flag) and the young people think it's an accomplished fact!"

"Do you know what I tell the young people? And not just young people either. I'll tell you. We are two Christian nations, small in numbers, on the brink of extinction, and we ought to take care of one another, back each other up, not try to steal one another's lands. I hope to God Georgia won't fall, because that will also seal Armenia's fate, it will wipe out Hayastan's whole history, that's what it'll do! I've told them, 'You lowlifes, we've been living on the land of Dzhavakhetia for 160 years now to escape the Turkish monster, don't you think we ought to be a little grateful?' Let me remind you that in any rayon, four men decide any issue. They are the first secretary, the rayispolkom chairman, the procurator, and the judge. That's the way it is here. The local Georgians are often upset. And well they might be. After all, all four top men here are Armenians. If there were only some kind of balance, it wouldn't take much; two of the four ought to be Georgians. Just for balance, you see. I'll give you an example and let you judge for yourself. Once there was a Kotelia man, name of Metreveli, working in the Tbilisi Academy of Arts. I was told that he earned 450 rubles a month. He got homesick in the perestroyka era, came back to Kotelia, and took a job as head of the education department. I think he was a docent. So he came back to the village, but unless you have a plot of land you can't make it. So he asked the rayispolkom chairman, who put him off a week, then a month, and finally, after a lot of hocus-pocus, assigned the man a specific plot in the village. But the docent's joy was short-lived. He planted potatoes on his land and thought he was going to get a good harvest, and then what happened? Someone came and assigned his plot to the zone where houses are supposed to be built for the Adjarian victims of natural disaster. Metreveli understood that the rayispolkom chairman had screwed him.... So that's the kind of boss and benefactor he is, not the kind of guy who will stand up for you...."

Uncle Ovanes told me a great deal more on our long and tiring journey, stories of Dzhavakhetia's history and recent times. I was surprised how lucidly this ordinary old man judged everything from the perspective of the past and the future, how simply but accurately he put things and events in their place. Finally, as we were getting off the bus at the station in Akhalkalaki, he said goodbye and, with a smile, told me that if any hot-headed young men had heard what he said, he would have been labeled a real traitor of Armenia. We parted like old friends, and unfortunately I didn't even get his last name.

There was just one bus in the station with a Georgian sign on it, destination Chunchkha. I got on that bus feeling warm and comfortable.

"Why aren't there Georgian signs on the other buses?" I asked the driver.

"You think that's odd?" he answered. "I've had a couple of fights about it with the young people of Diliskari. Previously, the regularly scheduled buses had signs in Russian and Armenian. Now that I've put on a Georgian

sign, they act offended, they don't like it. I was about to back down, but Tamaz Paichadze, the TV director, talked to me last month and told me not to be discouraged. He said, 'You are just defending your language; surely anything you do to protect it will be forgiven.' Well sir, one time in Diliskari some people blocked my way, I jumped out of the bus and scattered those rascals with my tire iron. Evidently only a few of those guys were upset about the Georgian sign, because I have quite a few friends in Diliskari."

Indeed, a number of people lifted their hands in greeting to the driver as we rolled through the streets of Diliskari (I'm referring to that village by its previous name, because for some reason people have taken to calling it Diliska!). And the driver of the Chunchkha bus nodded happily to his friends and acquaintances.

Soon we came to the village of Ptena. There's a lot of new construction there. One row of two-story houses has already been completed, and you can see laundry flapping in the breeze on the balconies. Before long we came to Chunchkha. Here and there among the houses that have been or are being built you can see big tents such as I had glimpsed in Ms. Eter Chichinadze's television reports on Dzhavakhetia.

"And King David saith, 'Let there be cities, and let cities spring up....' Here we are," our driver exclaimed as we passengers slowly got off the bus.

I knew from the newspapers that the first house in Chunchkha had been built using funds and manpower provided by the staff of the television studio; the main construction organization was Transkavkazstroy. That organization had built 27 two-story houses—in just a couple of months.

"The builders worked their heads off," said Tamaz Kirtava, the deputy chairman of Transkavkazstroy. "They did the impossible. Besides our organization, people from Rustavi built ten fine homes down here below, God bless them!"

Mr. Tamaz, in his manner and looks, with his shoulder-length flowing hair, resembles one of our old Georgian battle commanders.

"Incidentally," he continued, "13 houses were built in Chunchkha by Kuravodstroy, the organization that was supposed to be doing work in Bogdanovka this year"—and at these words I was suddenly reminded of what Uncle Ovanes told me about the young people who lay down in the road on the outskirts of Bogdanovka.

Next to the "TV studio house" the young people had joined several tents together to hold a party.

"We're having a celebration tomorrow," Mr. Tamaz explained. "Malkhaz Papidze, an Adjarian boy, and Larisa Mikeladze, a Dzhavakhetian girl, are going to get married. This is a symbolic moment in the history of the revived village. Most of the cost of the wedding is to be paid for by Transkavkazstroy." In addition to Tamaz

Kirtava, wedding preparations were being carried out by a couple of other Tamazes—director Tamaz Paichadze and Chunchkha Kolkhoz Chairman Tamaz Melikidze.

The young kolkhoz chairman told me, "80 percent of the people in our village are pensioners. So this is a real celebration, God has not forgotten us Dzhavakhetians, our flesh and blood; he has sent our brother Adjarians here to join us."

Tricolor Georgian flags wave above the Chunchkha Secondary School, and other places too. The teachers' collective has decided to immortalize the name of our national hero Merab Kostava by giving it to the school. Others who deserve praise are some young people from Chiatura who are building a big A-frame in the school yard. Their leader, Paata Bregavdze, explained that half of the building will accommodate classrooms and laboratories, while the other half will house the teachers that have moved here. The Republic Sports Committee is providing them with soccer balls, basketballs, rugby balls, and volleyballs.

The school director had some reproachful words for the Ministry of Education for not setting aside quotas for Dzhavakhetian youngsters, who seem to have been forgotten by God and country and cannot compete in VUZ entrance exams with city youngsters who have been tutored. Some blame should also go to the Ministry of Culture, because not one Georgian village has a regular clubhouse for meetings and gatherings, a place to deal with urgent problems. And how many other ministries and departments are failing to meet Dzhavakhetia's needs? Can't somebody do something? People here are getting discouraged!

The job of settling Adjarians in the villages is being administered in a single "Georgian" office that is located in the Akhalkalaki Raykom, with a sign on the door that says Headquarters. At present, the Headquarters is being run by Deputy Adjarian Planning Committee Chairman Anzor Tsetskhladze and Khulo Rayispolkom Chairman Taniel Nizharadze. They are competently dealing with a thousand problems that keep cropping up. They are totally and thoroughly aware of the patriotic obligations that our nation's history and present needs have assigned them. Within the space of one day they have to make the rounds of Kotelia, Okami, Ptena, Azmana, Apnia, Gogasheni, and Chunchkha.

We have already talked about the construction in Chunchkha.

Agrostroy has built 42 houses in Kotelia (including 14 for Dzhavakhetians), and they will complete 14 more by year's end. Headquarters officials are especially appreciative of the dedicated efforts of a 150-man team of students from Tbilisi State University and the talents of Deputy Agrostroy Chairman Demur Kovziridze.

Agrostroy has turned 33 houses over to the Commission in Okami, and 25 more will be ready by year's end. Also

worthy of mention is Grazhdanpromstroy, which has completed 44 houses and intends to build 11 more by the end of the year.

Borzhomis Kurortstroy has completed five houses in Ptena and will complete one more by year's end. But Tbiltonnelstroy is in trouble, and it is supposed to deliver 17 completed houses by the new year.

Tsekavshiri has started construction on 44 houses in Azmana and is supposed to complete 11 this year.

In Apnia, the Therapy Institute is supposed to build one house before this year is out, the Aviation Plant is supposed to build two, and Gruzgidrostroy is supposed to complete 35.

In Gogasheni, Kavtonnelstroy completed 30 houses on 30 November, and the Municipal Operations Ministry is to complete two houses by 31 December.

We have mentioned a number of large outfits and charitable organizations that are making a patriotic contribution toward providing practical help to their homeless brothers. But where are the other ministries, state committees, societies, institutes, and factories and plants which desire to build just as many good houses in Dzhavakhetia? Maybe they are waiting for 1990, when the construction units and builders are to be shifted to Bogdanovka Rayon. It's as if people thought there were plenty of time. Spring is not all that far off, and all of Georgia will soon see who gets things done and who is a phony.

It was interesting to me to learn that there are six other historic Georgian villages in Akhalkalaki Rayon that are urgently in need of help.

There is a Georgian elementary school in Murodzhaketi. If just 40 Adjarian or Svan families settle there next year, the school and the village (which has a mixed population) will come back to life. The village of Khospio also has a mixed population. There is a Catholic church and an eight-year school. If 30 or 40 households settle there, it will improve the demographic situation.

There is an elementary school in Baraleti. Settlement there must begin as soon as possible, so that there are enough students enrolled for the 1990-1991 school year to avoid closing the school. The village is hoping for 25 to 35 families.

There is an elementary school and several Georgian households in Gokio. The village has a lot of land, and if 50 to 60 families settle there it will help to restore the demographic balance.

There are also a few Georgian-speaking households in Varevani. There is an old Georgian church. If 30 or 40 families settle there, it will bring the Georgian spirit back to the district.

Kilda, which is located south of Chunchkha, is called "the Mikeladzes' village" by the Dzhavakhetians.



Because of the vicissitudes of fate, the Mikeladzes had to move to Okami and other villages. The urgent issue on the agenda now is to bring the Mikeladzes, the Sesadzes, and other families back to their native Kilda, where there is plenty of fertile farm land. This district could accommodate 40 to 50 families of disaster victims—if, of course, the Transcaucasian Red Banner Military District Command will show some compassion.

Readers will also be interested to learn of this alarming fact: Out of 70,000 residents of Akhalkalaki Rayon, only 2,000 are listed as Georgians in their passports. And when you consider that the inhabitants of Khulgumo, Bavra, Kartikami, and Turtskhi are Armenianized Georgians, you might even be surprised. But there is nothing surprising about it. Thanks to the "vigor" of our neighboring tribe, the "takeover" of Dzhavakhetia has made the demographic situation catastrophic in the district. In Khizabavra (Aspindza Rayon) one brother is Georgian and has the name Khutsishvili, while another brother, who lives in Turtskhi, is listed as Armenian in his passport and bears the name of Khutsyan. A brother in Akhalkalaki is named Okrodze, while his brother in Turtskhi bears the name Okroyan, and so on and so forth.

Coming to the forefront in consideration of these facts is the example of Georgians in Abkhazia, who, against their will, are listed as Abkhazians in their passports. I may be wrong, but it seems to me that this renaming of Georgians in Abkhazia and Dzhavakhetia is mainly the fault of the Georgian government, which is supposed to be responsible for protecting and taking care of its nation, its people. We are fully aware, after all, that our neighboring Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have never stopped providing overt or covert help to their own sons and daughters over a span of 70 years, and have done everything they could for the welfare of their own people. We can only applaud them, their patriotism and courage. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same for our own nation's leaders. This is no time for handwringing. The Georgian hearth must be revived in Dzhavakhetia as soon as possible; that should be one of our most urgent concerns today!

Uncle Ovanes was right: Armenian workers have distinguished themselves helping Georgians on the construction projects of various villages. I think that they will work even harder to support the Georgians and help them get established, to make up for unseemly acts earlier. I saw evidence of this the next day, in the courtyard of the St. George's Church, when His Holiness Ilia II, the Patriarch of All Georgia, baptized newborns and Adjarians, and Armenians too were baptized in the Georgian church, as a sign that our two ancient tribes have the same path and goal—to free and liberate ourselves from the vise that binds us, and then, once liberated, to respect and cherish one another. This is the obligation placed upon us by the unquenchable rays of Vakhtang Gorgasal's and Vardan Mamikonyan's magical swords slicing through the mist of the ages, through the endless darkness.

It was a wonderful sight to see, there in the courtyard of St. George's Church, filled with villagers and guests. Just as the Patriarch set foot inside the courtyard, the sun went behind the clouds and a chill breeze blew, but the church bells rang and the Patriarch's beatific smile warmed the Zedgenidzes and Zaridzes, the Mikeladzes and Tetvadzes, the Kartvelishvilis and Paksadzes—all those whose hearts beat emotionally in response to the sound of the bells during those wondrous moments.

The presence of the Patriarch and his retinue, the holy fathers, was enhanced by two tall, robust Georgian lads outfitted in brand-new smocks and trousers wearing white hoods over their shoulders, as befitted the occasion.

And the pealing of the bells rose higher and higher, like a ray of light, like a prayer of hope above the ancient land of Dzhavakhetia.

P.S. I am aware that the Elva Scientific-Production Association and Omar Grigolashvili, the chairman of its trade union committee, have been among the first to dedicate their efforts to the rebirth of Dzhavakhetia, to supply inspiration, and to provide practical coordination with the capital city and the public at large. And if I have refrained from mentioning them here today, it is deliberate. One of this newspaper's correspondents is preparing a major article about their good deeds.

**Georgian School Course in Kartvelian Languages Urged**  
*18130037 Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO*  
*in Georgian No. 51, 22 Dec 89 p 16*

[Article by Amiran Kaladze: "Let Us Admonish, Teach, Inculcate!"]

[Text] I must apologize to the reader for the fact that, as a man who is a mere dilettante when it comes to linguistics and the science of language, I am taking the liberty of expressing an opinion on matters which, as the saying goes, are outside my competence.

I can only justify myself to specialists by saying that the proposal I make below, which is an extremely simple one and is dictated by purely noble motives, is not new but old—that is, it is not mine alone. What is regrettable is that we have yet to take a single concrete step to act on the desire that we have.

What I am talking about is the teaching of the foundations (at least a short course) of the Kartvelian languages in Georgian schools.

Today, when the republic's educational system is taking an increasingly pronounced national position, when our scientists are working diligently to develop new school textbooks suitable for the present day, when national and only national guidelines are taken to be the starting point for the upbringing and education of our young, when pseudo-political disciplines of random and doubtful



value are being confidently replaced not only by the historical truth that has finally been released from its years of captivity, but also by spiritual and morally cleansed theological disciplines, it is essential that we admonish, teach, and inculcate new generations—from the first grade on—with the full richness and beauty of our Georgian mother tongue, so that each and every Georgian might exult and thrill to the feeling of unified, complete, and full-fledged Georgianness!

Inasmuch as "it is believed that the Kartvelian languages stem from a single original language, Proto-Kartvelian, which broke down into dialects and developed further to result in Georgian, Zan, and Svan" (Georgian Soviet Encyclopedia, volume 10, page 465), it is only natural that each one of these languages should sound equally native and pleasant to each and every Georgian east and west.

I am convinced that every Georgian parent wants his son or daughter to understand, love, and be equally proud of every ray gleaming from the multifaceted jewel of our ancestral language, whether it be Mingrelian, Svan, or Zan! After all, it was his love for the ancestral language that prompted our revered Akaki to exclaim in verse, "Each resounds in his own tune, each in his own voice... Our Georgia is a singing lute, we are the strings upon it."

I do not desire that my children, here in our motherland, our Mestia and Zugdidi, should hear but fail to understand words like mizh and gherbet, torondzhi and mapshalia, lileo and tsira koggale [words and expressions in Mingrelian and Svan]! In order to prevent this, we need something that is totally simple and natural: Georgian schools, from the first grade on, should teach the foundations of the Kartvelian languages (we might give the course a different name; I'll leave that to the specialists). If just one hour is devoted to the subject per week, and the students hear, learn, and assimilate each jewel-like dialect of their native language, after they have graduated from secondary school they will have a rich vocabulary that is fully sufficient to nurture a *sense of Kartvelian unity*!

I'm not sure how people will take this idea of mine, but if I had thought for one moment while writing these lines that I was asking for something impossible or unacceptable, you can be sure that I wouldn't have said a word. But I am confident that readers will agree with me and support the idea.

I don't know about other people, but on this same subject, I am personally disappointed not only because my generation was never taught religion in school, but also because we were never exposed to the foundations of the Kartvelian languages.

Today, however, I am certain somehow that such rich works and studies as A. Shanidze's "Comparative Dictionary of Laz-Mingrelian-Georgian," Ivane Dzhavakhishvili's "The Original Nature and Relationship of the Georgian and Caucasian Languages," V. Topuria's "The Svan Language," G. Akhvlediani's "Foundations of

General Phonetics," and others are just waiting to be translated out of the narrowly specialized language of science into a language suitable for children in school textbooks....

Now that our Education Ministry, Linguistics Institute, the Ganatleba and Nakaduli publishing houses, and other outfits involved in the humanities are setting good examples of harmoniously pulling the nation's yoke, I have no doubt that, thanks to their characteristic diligence, by 1 September of next year our school students will have in their hands a cherished book called "Foundations of the Kartvelian Languages."

### More on Georgian Political Parties Conference

18130038 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 26 Dec 89 pp 4-5

[Announcement of the Initiative Group To Organize the First Conference of Georgian Political Parties, Social Associations and Organizations]

[Text] On 7 December our newspaper published an announcement by the Initiative Group To Organize the First Conference of Georgian Political Parties, Social Associations and Organizations, under the title "To All Political Parties, Social Associations and Organizations." Here is our latest announcement.

By 15 December of this year, the following organizations had expressed the desire to take part in the conference:

1. The David the Builder Society;
2. The National Democratic Party, Fourth Group;
3. The Georgian Democratic Party;
4. The National Justice Party;
5. The National Concord Association;
6. The Georgian People's Front;
7. The Ilia Chavchavadze Society;
8. "Democratic Elections in Georgia";
9. The Tianeti Patriots Group.

Other political parties, social associations and organizations are advised to submit the number of members included in their organizations before 30 December of this year in order to determine the number of delegates. Organizations taking part in the conference have the right to invite guests from counterpart parties, societies, or organizations in other republics. Registration of invited guests will take place before the conference is opened, in the presence of the head of the delegation.

The Initiative Group will not be responsible for reserving hotel accommodations for guests.

The themes of problems to be discussed at the conference are not limited. The Initiative Group suggests the following issues:

- I. Georgia's internal political situation;
- II. Ways to resolve ethnic conflicts;
- III. Demographic problems and ways to resolve them;
- IV. Georgia's neutrality;
- V. Caucasia—a united front;
- VI. Collaboration with opposition forces in other republics;
- VII. Georgia's economy and prospects for its development;
- VIII. Miscellaneous.

There will be no limit to the number of speakers at the conference. The time limit will be 10 to 15 minutes for each speaker. Speakers must submit to the Organizing Committee by 10 January 1990 a single sheet of paper showing, in typed form, the title of the speech, the identity of the speaker, and a brief abstract. The same information must be shown on the same sheet in Russian and English. Time will be set aside for invited guests to deliver a speech if they so desire.

We request that organizations taking part in the conference assign one representative to the Initiative Group on 30 December at 12:00 to work on the organizing committee.

The conference is scheduled to be held 22-25 January 1990.

**Andro Torotaze, for the Information Group** [as printed]

Our address is: 380028 Tbilisi, I. Chavchavadze Prospekt 3, Tbilisi State University Building 2, Room 104, Telephone 23-66-49.

#### **'Adjarian Separatism' Rumors Called Groundless**

*18130035 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 21 Dec 89 p 5*

[Letter by Mikheil Makharadze: "To the Editors of AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI"]

[Text] In our article in your newspaper, titled "An Open Letter to Adjarian Council of Ministers Chairman Mr. Guram Chigogidze" (30 Dec 1989 [as printed]), we explained the concept of separatism and, on that basis, emphasized that even the most assiduous attempt by five or six men to form some group cannot be called "Adjarian separatism." Despite all this, there were still those who got the idea that there really is a separatist mentality in Adjara. This incorrect tendency was also revealed in a television report. I refer to the Moambe Program broadcast of 11 December, which reported a large rally in Batumi on 10 December 1989. During the broadcast it was stated that participants in the rally denounced the attempt at "Adjarian separatism." In fact, nothing of the sort was stated at the rally, nor could it have been, because any "Adjarian separatism" as such does not

exist! At the rally there was passing reference to the "activities" of that group of five to six men who call themselves the "Adjarian Society to Promote Perestroika." It is neither a legal entity nor, I repeat, can it be considered a manifestation of "Adjarian separatism." In general, however, it is desirable and essential that leaders have an understanding of the article devoted to vital problems of Georgia and not confine themselves just to reading headlines, and not raise a hullabaloo over a superficial reading of it.

In addition, our open letter contained a regrettable error. In particular, we stated that after 12 April, the first protest letters in SABCHOTA ACHARA concerning the tragedy in Tbilisi on 9 April did not appear until 18 April. Because in this instance our main focus was on the Adjarian leadership's silence in regard to the tragedy of 9 April, we failed to notice that the newspaper did in fact publish numerous protest reactions on 14 and 15 April (the newspaper did not come out on 16 and 17 April). As we see, it was because of the inadvertent error due to our carelessness that a shadow was cast upon SABCHOTA ACHARA's correct position in regard to the tragedy of 9 April.

The blame for the error rests solely with me, and so I offer my sincere apologies to the editors of SABCHOTA ACHARA.

#### **Adjarian Prime Minister Chided for 'Separatism' Rumors**

*18130036 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 21 Dec 89 p 5*

[Article by Ilia Nakashidze, senior teacher, department of theoretical electrical technology, Georgian Polytechnic Institute: "Nothing but the Truth!"]

[Text] The phrase, "Adjarian separatism," uttered by Adjarian SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Mr. Guram Chigogidze from the speakers' stand at the November 1989 session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet for all of Georgia to hear, has outraged every true Georgian and gladdened those who wish us ill. It started a lot of tongue-wagging, conjectures, and has resulted in false rumors. The reason for this is clear. Mr. Guram Chigogidze did not take the trouble to explain to the session just what he meant by the phrase "Adjarian separatism," how it was manifested, what the autonomous republic's leadership has done to thwart such an attempt, and if there was such an attempt, who its instigators were and what forces they drew support from. Unfortunately, participants in the session greeted his statement with silence. As far as we know, no one attempted to deny it (that is, the "attempt of Adjarian separatism") after the session either.

It must be stated that Adjara has always been a special object of all Georgia's love, attention, and concern. All the more reason, then, that everyone took this combination of the terms Adjara and separatism so hard. A number of Georgian intellectuals we talked to doubted

that there had even been an attempt at "Adjarian separatism" and endorsed the general belief that in view of Georgia's present complicated demographic and ethnopolitical situations, Adjaria must play a special role in all of Georgia's struggle for independence and national consolidation. But Chigogidze's statement, and especially the silence toward it, did generate grounds for suspicion.

Fortunately, the 30 November edition of AKHALGAZDA KOMUNISTI published Doctor of Philosophy Mikheil Makharadze's "Open Letter to Adjarian SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Mr. Guram Chigogidze," in which the author showed convincingly that it was unwarranted to call some group of five or six men in Batumi a manifestation of "Adjarian separatism." He correctly pointed out that the condition and support for the group's formation and activities has been the autonomous republic leadership's (and not just Mr. Guram Chigogidze's) totally incomprehensible passivity toward recent alarming processes in Georgia.

Makharadze's letter cut the ground from under all the tongue-wagging and rumors. For this, both the author of the letter and the editors deserve our thanks.

### Charity Efforts in Resettlement of Adjarians Misdirected

18130039 Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
28 Nov 89 p 3

[Article by Giuli Dzidziguri, chairman of the board of the Rustaveli Society's Dzhavakhetia Association: "Charity: If We Can Only Pay It Back! Dzhavakhetia and the Dzhavakhetia Association"]

[Text] A group of young people wrote a letter from Dzhavakhetia. "What's going on, people," they asked. "It seems like all Georgia has descended upon Dzhavakhetia, like Europeans first discovering America."

A lot is going on, my friends, I hardly know where to start. The fact is, however, that after so much time spent in aimless wandering, the just path of St. Ilia the Righteous has finally been revealed. We have finally seen that "self-initiative alone can save us from our woes" (Ilia). It is that path, that faith that has brought us to Dzhavakhetia.

We are seeking our motherland, our lost motherland and the Georgians who were lost in it. We must build for you a home and habitation, light your hearth, share our heart's warmth, inspire you with spiritual courage.

This is the cause we have envisioned, and if not everything turns out as we wish it, it is only because knowledge is needed in addition to desire and industriousness. "There is a great deal that we Georgians lack, but our biggest lack is that we do not yet know how to undertake public endeavors, how to prevail, how to take charge" (Ilia).

We have enough troubles anyway and no one should burden us with more. History is to blame for the fact that we have never been very successful at self-government, and history will simply have to forgive us.

Just between us, there is nothing especially unusual in this. As in just about everything, in charity as well we have no moderation, we put "too much salt on our mercy and end up making it brackish." It has become impossible to curb all the people anxious to do good. An unending stream rushes toward Dzhavakhetia in trucks loaded with food and household and other goods. Akhalkalaki's Adjarian Settlement Headquarters and village leaders are kept busy distributing all the donations. "People's charity" has become ungoverned and dangerous. In connection with the distribution of donations, in some villages the excesses have now reached the verge of criminality.

Dzhavakhetia Association's board of directors has repeatedly asked the public to refrain from the harmful practice of uncontrolled charity. Our admonitions, however, have not yielded the desired results.

Anyone who has been to Dzhavakhetia at least once on a mission of mercy has found out for himself that in addition to generosity and good will, charity requires the utmost culture. It is essential to realize that charity is an evil rather than a good when, wittingly or not, it kindles dangerous base passions. It is essential to understand that charity becomes useless unless there is justice.

One shouldn't look a gift horse in the mouth, but it is wrong to thoughtlessly give one person a fine steed and another person a nag. If the envy that is sown with good intentions were merely naive, it would not be worth discussing.

How can we explain to "touring charity givers" that charity is an extremely responsible business of national importance rather than amusement, entertainment or a "mass cultural" event just for fun.

How can we explain to arrogant people that it is wrong to wave a red 10-ruble note around in the village square, in front of everyone? That a proud mountaineer is not a bagpipe player at a provincial wedding?

Fortunately and encouragingly, we have also seen that the art and ability to do good has not entirely disappeared among our people. A sufficient number of people have managed to do good without hurting anyone's human dignity. Everything has been done easily and simply. In order to ensure that every box full of donations, every packet, and every item went to a specific person, these people got right busy and went down to Dzhavakhetia "on their own," or, before they even went to Dzhavakhetia, dropped in on us at the Dzhavakhetia Association, found out what was going on, stated what they wanted to do, and asked for advice and directions. If the heart is willing....

What has been, has been.... It looks like things are going to work out.

Now let's think about how to help the "helpless." What we have here is something that can be solved with practically nothing other than common sense.

In contrast to individual charity, public charity requires a certain amount of organization. Everyone would like to "build a town," and what more could anyone wish? However, we townbuilders really ought to agree on where to build it, what to build, how to build it, who should build what, who should be in charge of what, and who should be in charge of whom? "Isn't it time to put an end to the fragmentation, and say we've had enough of what has plagued us to this day? Enough, gentlemen, enough!" (Ilia).

Indeed, gentlemen, haven't we had enough?!

There is one substantial organization that is building a... bookstore costing 85,000 rubles in one of Dzhavakhetia's villages. Quite apart from any trade volume such a store might have, even in the far future, shouldn't we ask whether the Dzhavakhetian peasant would even be able to read his purchased book in his mud hut, where family members can hardly recognize one another in the daytime, let alone the writing in a book? You know, 85,000 rubles would be enough to build two houses, and get two families out of their mud huts.

God grant we may see a time when every village has a bookstore, but today, when all our wounds have opened at once, when not a day passes without some new trouble or worry descending upon us, when thousands of homeless people need help and everybody is holding onto every kopeck, I don't think we have the right to squander the nation's wealth on upper-class frivolities.

Charitable people are sparing neither time nor energy nor funds in their efforts to help Dzhavakhetia. Under such conditions, even elementary coordination of their efforts would be sufficient to essentially solve Dzhavakhetia's problems in three or four years. What we need to do above all, at the outset, is to say no to the improvised "donations system." Based on our ultimate goal, the most acceptable and optimal form of charity should consist of concentrating donated funds and using them for direct purposes.... In particular, the funds should be used to develop a powerful economic base in the region, one which will provide the peasant with the capacity for not only simple but also expanded reproduction.

If we set up a good farm operation for the peasant (build him a house and yard, a cattle shed, and a hay barn, buy him some cows and sheep, and provide him with farm equipment), he will not need any "gift" from us. He will get on his feet through his own efforts, become strong, and start taking care of us.

Unfortunately, the practice of charity today makes us think that we have a great many difficulties to overcome

in this regard. Practically the only method a charity organization uses to raise funds is exhortation.

At the present stage of national resurgence, this method would undoubtedly work—if people were not doubtful. We must get used to the idea that times have changed, and no one any longer accepts a mustache hair for an IOU. All these "countless accounts" have so discredited all kinds of "accounts" that people won't go near them.

And they're right. Until we learn how to count, we cannot count on "accounts." People have to know what and whom their hard earned money is being spent on.

What is to be done?

The Dzhavakhetia Association thought about the "expectable" results in advance and specially included in its charter a number of articles designed not to give any grounds for malicious doubts:

"Organizations which are included in the Association shall participate directly in the planning and implementation of charity endeavors."

"Dzhavakhetia's board of directors shall publish regular, detailed reports about the Association's financial activities."

"The Association's documents shall be open not only to the Audit Commission but also to any member of society and any opponent."

We couldn't think of anything more. If anyone has worked out a more reliable and effective system of control, let him come forth with it; the Association will accept it without hesitation. In fact, the Association believes that the competence of charity should not be confined just to control. Its rights should be much more broad, realistic and tangible. It seems perfectly acceptable to us, in particular, for enterprises, organizations, or private individuals to deposit earmarked funds into the Association's account and then, within the limits of the funds, decide themselves what specific problems they should be used for.

At first our Association was envisioned as a "charitable society to help victims of natural disasters." It soon became clear that the most pressing, urgent, and essential business to be done was to take care of new settlers in Dzhavakhetia, and then it was "discovered" that Dzhavakhetia's native population was in as much trouble as the homeless Adjarians. It was for this reason that we narrowed the scope of the Association, which is reflected in its name. Nevertheless, the name of the Association—Dzhavakhetia—is to some extent temporary and provisional. To the extent that we are able to, we are already attempting to provide at least a little help to Adjarian victims who find themselves in other regions. Recently, 42,000 rubles worth of knitwear was sent to people staying temporarily in Khulo Rayon (the benefactor in this case was the knitwear factory of the Georgian Municipal Management and Consumer Services Ministry).

In the next few days we will be providing the same kind of help to Adjarians who have settled in Vani and Khoni rayons. We can't do much without funds, and we are well aware that we have not yet done everything we must for the Svans who have moved down out of the mountains to settle.

If the Association gets on its feet, it can regain its original status. Because we have planned natural disasters, because we have challenged nature to a stupid and arrogant duel, we have no other choice: society must set up a permanent fund for the healing of wounds caused by natural disasters.

So far, however, all our Association's attention is focused on Dzhavakhetia. As of today, the Association includes more than 150 organizations. Many of them have chosen a difficult but very practical, direct and vital form of charity—they have formed individual groups and have taken particular villages under their wing.

For example—and just by way of example—I will name several such groups. There is Gruzneft Production Association, the Petroleum Scientific-Research Institute, the Trade Ministry, the Tbilisi Department Store, and a number of institutes of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, which have taken the village of Okami under their wing. For more than three months now, all kinds of people have been traveling the roads of Dzhavakhetia, looking in on each household, hearing people's complaints, extending a helping hand. The "general guardian" of the village of Chunchkhi is the Elva Production Association; Tsekavshiri has not only taken the village of Azmana under its wing—it won't even let anyone else build it. God bless them, they have undertaken a wonderful cause, but... the power of threat is also at work.

More than 20 medical institutions in Tbilisi have joined together as a professional group and formed a "Medical Assembly." The Assembly has drawn up a schedule of medical services for every Georgian village in Dzhavakhetia and has already started to work. The job of dealing with matters connected with education and upbringing has been taken over by several Tbilisi secondary schools, again grouped in a professional manner. Agroprom's Joint-Use Computer Center has provided four Georgian schools in Dzhavakhetia with school supplies.

A special group attached to the Dzhavakhetia Association's board of directors is working on cadre policies with the long-term goal (five or six years) of supplying Dzhavakhetia's Georgian villages with all the necessary specialists, local cadres with a secondary vocational or higher education. We are training Dzhavakhetia's secondary school graduates in exam subjects, free of charge. The Georgian Trade Union Council has pledged to allot an additional stipend to students in the region.

We have assigned small organizations, individual groups, and private persons to take families with many children under their wing. Because many of them had nothing to their name, they rushed to Dzhavakhetia, rolled up their sleeves and spent their vacations working at the construction sites for nothing.

Unfortunately, not a single cooperative so far has expressed any desire to join Dzhavakhetia Association or even contribute one-time aid. What's wrong with you people? Our country needs help now. Don't wait until you get rich, and don't plead poverty. "We are poor," we cry, but it is only the poor of this earth who know what help is, brotherhood in a time of need. For this reason, we are more hopeful that the Georgian, who is so generous in everything, will be even more generous in charity and will not hesitate to contribute to his brothers in need" (Ilia).

Dzhavakhetia has so many faithful and dedicated "poor" patrons that there is no way Dzhavakhetia's new history can be written without taking note of their contributions. The fact that society knows practically nothing about them is primarily their own "fault," also the fault of the board of directors of our Dzhavakhetia Association. That's what we thought before, and we have not changed our opinion: advertising is not becoming to a giver of charity; he should do his deeds quietly, without fanfare.... Nevertheless, the age of advertising compels us to make a small adjustment in this. We have set up a press group under the Dzhavakhetia Association, which provides information to the public about the Association's activities, noting the specific contributions of individual members. This is essential because anyone who continues or intends to do charity work in Dzhavakhetia without going through the Dzhavakhetia Association should at least be informed what has already been done and what needs to be done. It would also be good if charity givers who are not on good terms with the Dzhavakhetia Association would tell us their ideas, so that we do not waste our time worrying about them.

But the best thing, gentlemen, is to put an end to "fragmentation and bickering." All of us who are concerned about Dzhavakhetia's problems must join together in one force and get right to work.

The "carefree" life is past; history has not only started to move—it has accelerated at a dangerous, fateful pace, and if we fail to keep in step with it, it will certainly cast us upon the dustheap. Like it or not, history has assigned us a historic responsibility. Whether we can or not, we must rise to the demanding level of the times.

Today for the first time we present the following essential data concerning the Association: 000700176, USSR Zhilsotsbank, Georgian Republic Bank Operations Administration. Dzhavakhetia Association, Rustaveli Society.

**The author has requested that the fee for this article be deposited in the Dzhavakhetia Association's account**

### **We Shall Be Tolerant And Open**

*18080093A Riga CINA in Latvian 25 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by K. Eihmanis (Eikhmanis), Chief of the Department for the Protection of Constitutional State Order of the LaSSR KGB: "We Shall Be Tolerant And Open. The State Security Committee During Glasnost"]

[Text] With glasnost growing ever wider, a variety of materials about the State Security Committee and its activities has appeared in the press, radio, and TV.

In connection with the course of our state moving toward democracy and glasnost, USSR KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov has already spoken to TV viewers about the changes in the KGB, Latvian SSR KGB Chairman Stanislav Zukulis gave an interview to the magazine AVOTS, and Deputy Chairman Yanis Trubinsh gave an interview to the producers of the TV program "Labvakar." The work of the rayon units was discussed in the interviews given by Aldis Robezhnieks, chief of the KGB department of the Cesisskiy rayon; Chief of the KGB department of the Saldusskiy rayon Grushkevich; Imants Sormulis, chief of the KGB department of the Ventspilsskiy rayon, and others. The producers of the program "Labvakar", namely, radio journalist I. Abola, LATVIJAS JAUNATNE correspondent A. Shablovskis, and others have tried to describe our activities to the best of their abilities in historical context and in context of today's realities.

IZVESTIYA on 27 Oct 89 in the article "Changes in KGB" published an interview with the USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov concerning the organization of the department for the protection of the constitutional state order and its tasks. The new department is organized in accordance with a governmental decree, and the same decree has abolished the former 5th Department that was organized in 1967 to fight against the ideological diversion of the enemy. These organizational changes have a fundamental nature, because they illustrate the changes in the KGB system and the important changes both in the country and in international relations.

Undoubtedly, the protection of constitutional state order is the function of not only the new unit, but, as specified in the constitution, it is the task of the entire state, demanding responsibility from all state and public organizations, persons with authority, and all citizens. The new KGB unit carries out its own specific functions in this complex environment by strictly obeying the existing laws and working within the framework of its service regulations.

The 5th Department, which was formed in 1967, organized its counterintelligence work against acts of ideological diversion and worked in accordance with the guidelines of the existing laws. These laws were found later to be imprecise (for example, Article 65 of the Latvian SSR Criminal Code - anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) and were allowed a broad interpretation, with the result that the KGB was considered to be performing tasks which were unsuitable.

We recognize these errors. However, nobody should have the right to offend the young chekist generation working today in some abstract criminal activity. And journalists should not become spreaders of biased and false information just because the theme is topical. This

occurred during several radio broadcasts in which "recollections" of H. Antons, supposedly a former employee of the Ministry of State Security, were quoted about his work in Talsinskiy rayon. There is no need to comment on these "recollections", but I will only add that this man has never worked in the the above-mentioned state service, and it was determined that he was discharged from the Red Army in 1946 for health reasons and thus freed from the requirements of compulsory military service.

How should one describe such "historical" facts and such people with "recollections"? It seems that they should elevate the level of their sense of honesty and professionalism so that they can present only the real facts objectively. However, perhaps such publications have other goals?

Every year our organization receives thousands of letters concerning various problems. Some of the letters are commentary on the events taking place in our society, including these broadcasts and publications. Thus, one of our readers writes the following in regard to the program "Labvakar" on 15 Oct 89: "...We have a certain societal attitude toward the various press publications and TV programs. Undoubtedly, the interview given by the former KGB worker Troicis to the program "Labvakar" on 15 Oct 89 was (for some people) quite shocking ... His presentation belonged to the so-called "dirty" methods mode. The service, which, as he admits himself, he betrayed, is necessary for any country's security, and it will be necessary for a long time to come. Otherwise there will be anarchy. The behavior of Troicis should be negatively qualified as ugly to the highest degree and, one may say, an act generally unworthy of a human being. The TV journalists should also have had a higher level of culture.

... It is in vain to search for moral principles in Troicis' action... This interview generally reminds us of what is called "yellow journalism" in the West.

There are more letters of the same type, and the writers (usually with a differing point of view) are not going to write to those radio, TV, and newspaper journalists who see only one type of pluralism, namely, the one which benefits them.

In this connection, the unsupported and eloquent statements made by various authors that the "KGB has always fought against the people" and presently is working against the bright forces struggling for the independence of Latvia, are improper to a lesser degree. Such statements are untrue, since the KGB has never fought against the Latvian people and also now does not act against those organizations that comply with the constitutional norms. I must add here that the editorial boards "forget" to publish the KGB responses in connection with the incorrect, or distorted information that was published on pages of some of these publications. For example, PADOMJU JAUNATNE has not published a response to the incorrect information in the article

"Justice And Indifference Behind Closed Doors?" in its issue dated 3 Jun 89, which stated that the KGB is allegedly using the rest facilities in the Cesisskiy rayon that were built by prisoners.

As was mentioned before, our main task is to disclose and to prevent the foreign special services from organizing and using anti-state groups; to warn about and to prevent certain people from performing hostile actions which are directed toward subversion or to changing the foundations of the Soviet state and society by violent means; to discover and prevent terrorist acts; by using specific force and means to participate in prevention of mass disorders, to fight organized crime (in cooperation with militia), and to fight any extremist acts, if they are directed against the constitutional state order.

Those are today the main tasks and basic principles of the department for the protection of the Soviet constitutional state order. We will try to keep the public informed to the greatest degree possible with real facts and about crimes prevented, because we are interested in keeping the public informed with objective information about us and our activities, without excessive emotion and without specially created misinformation.

### Diplomacy of Glasnost

18080091A Riga CINA in Latvian 18 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with the Latvian SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eizens Pochs [Eizhens Pochs] by TEVZEMES AVIZE editorial staff member P. Ducmanis [Dutsmanis]: "Diplomacy of Glasnost"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Ducmanis] After the war, the duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in our government were performed as an additional duty by the Ministers of Culture or Education and, during recent decades, by the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Having made this statement, I want to ask you my first question: Today you are the first Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Soviet Latvia who is a career diplomat charged with these duties alone. Does this fact mean that the importance and volume of work of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has increased? If so, please specify the directions and volume of these increases. They have great importance in regard to the first indications of the legal sovereignty of Latvia.

[Pochs] At the present time, the Latvian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is undergoing a period of radical changes. We are thinking about new structural units that would meet the realities of today's and perhaps tomorrow's Latvia. If we want to achieve the status of a civilized state the republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I would say, should have a special place in the government. In any state in the world, ministries of foreign affairs have a universal character both with regard to internal state problems and foreign relations. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should assume its proper

place within the state apparatus of the republic and should establish its own reputation which will, of course, take a certain amount of time, material resources, and most importantly, people to meet the requirements. The basis for all these changes will be, as you have mentioned in your question, the first legal indications [of Latvian sovereignty]. And, based upon this legal foundation, we can proceed with the rest by conforming with the Latvian SSR Constitution, decisions of the Supreme Soviet, and other regulatory acts that apply to the activities of any ministry, including those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of December when I was appointed to this job, the leaders of the republic, as well as the leaders of the Supreme Soviet, gave me a certain *carte blanche*, that is, certain rights in this transformation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which I have discussed before. I hope that after about one month, we will be able to discuss openly concepts and precisely formulated priorities by looking at long-term prospects with regard to the states and countries that belong to our sphere of interest as partners for resolving the problems of greatest interest to the republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will serve the Latvian people. We do not need contacts for the sake of contacts or cooperation for the sake of cooperation. The end result of contacts and cooperation should bring a concrete result felt by every person living in Latvia.

Firstly—and I consider this to be the most important issue—could be the development of foreign economic ties. At present, it seems, almost all republic ministries and authorities to a greater or lesser degree work together with foreign firms and organizations. Many enterprises, collective farms, factories, and associations have already established such contacts. This is good, but my first impression at least is that some kind of marathon has begun where everybody is in a hurry, but this rush may hurt the choice of partners, the determination of concrete directions of cooperation, etc. Therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is ready to serve as a mediator in the selection of such contacts and it will not hamper, but rather will help to recommend, to name—and perhaps with the help of a proper state departmental authority as a go-between—will bring the partners together and will create a mutually beneficial dialogue. That is, it will promote in practice the principles of the highest degree of goodwill by taking into consideration the opportunities that the respective republic enterprise or association can provide the foreign partners and by evaluating its real possibilities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be involved in such important issues as the study of markets in neighboring and other countries, competitive markets analyses, and the studies of foreign investments. This can be done by obtaining the respective information through diplomatic channels, which is more accurate and objective than that obtained by reading the foreign press. This will be one of the directions that is being considered and, in any case, it will be built on a real foundation.



The second direction is cooperation in the field of ecology and environment protection. This is a very large and important issue and it is absolutely incomprehensible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to be involved, since the Latvian ecology is also the problem of the neighboring countries, first of all, the problem of environment protection in the Scandinavian countries and that of all the Baltic Sea basin. Therefore, we will do everything we can in order to actively participate in the development of this cooperation. How much a particular country pollutes the Baltic Sea is a problem for experts, but the politicians could be the mediators in the joint study of this problem, primarily by organizing discussions, etc. Here, a concrete idea was proposed by the governments of Sweden and Poland to organize this summer in Gotland a conference of the Baltic Sea basin countries, including Latvia of course.

The third direction when we discuss economics, trade, ecology, and other issues, is cooperation with the organizations of the Northern countries, which directly reflect the interests of these countries, by establishing cooperation in various fields: in the economy, in ecology, and in contacts between people. Last year the Nordic Council repeatedly expressed its readiness to discuss the issue of opportunities for cooperation with the Baltic republics and the parts of the Russian federation that belong to this region.

The aforementioned activities could proceed only after all these issues are thoroughly weighed and examined here in the republic by our economists, lawyers and historians, thus obtaining an objective conclusion as to how, when and to what degree to cooperate with a particular country. Therefore, in our Supreme Soviet, with the mediation and participation of the members of parliament, we could form this **open diplomacy** informing all the Latvian people, the entire Latvian society, about these concrete steps, thus assuring their support. At the same time, we should stress that our political and economic development will in no way be at the expense of other nations. It is the result of our own honest attitude toward existing realities. We do not threaten anybody. We should consider all potential partners and opponents, if we want us to consider them.

Economic cooperation, trade and economy could be solved using the experience that has been obtained in different regions of the world, especially in Europe. This is the European Common Market, ASEAN countries in Asia, and the previously mentioned Nordic Council. Therefore, we intend in the nearest future to analyze and carefully learn the structure and essence of these economic organizations and to take the features that would be applicable for decisionmaking and work in today's Latvia.

However, in order for us to serve as mediators abroad, we must have a representative of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in various countries, first of all in the Scandinavian countries and West Germany. This representative would work to directly protect our interests,

would inform us about events in the spheres of interest of our economic, scientific, cultural, and other communities. The Latvian presence in neighboring countries, as well as in Canada and the USA, is at the present time a justifiable step indeed. Understandably, we hope that we will also receive help from the aforementioned countries. Also, speaking of economic ties, I can add that we do not have any reasons to expect Uncle Sam to come with a large bag filled with economic assistance and give us charitable gifts. It is wrong to hope for that today, there is no reason for that, and therefore only the production of goods that are competitive not only in the Soviet market, but also in the European and world markets, is the basis of the problem's solution, the essence of the matter, and the task which we together must resolve. To rely upon the limited natural resources of the republic and their export is undesirable and even dangerous.

I really do not know a single country that would support our economy. Therefore, if there was a time when we were talking so much about collective work and the collective responsibility, which often did not provide any tangible results in my opinion, now the time has come for every person to build his own personal responsibility.

[Ducmanis] Today, during perestroika, there is a lot of talk in political circles of a joint foreign policy of the federation of sovereign republics. One should ask, what are the present working relations between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Latvian SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and how will they develop in the near future?

[Pochs] Relations between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those of the union republics with regard to the development of foreign relations and other urgent problems is an issue that does not stand still but changes daily and changes direction toward the greater independence of the republics. Despite the fact that Article 73 of the USSR Constitution specifies the rights of the center, there is simultaneously Article 80 of the constitution that specifies the status of relations between the republics and foreign states. Therefore, these constitutional norms should be used to the fullest extent. We are going to do exactly that, and if there is something missing either in the USSR or the LaSSR Constitution, it will not preclude us from a creative approach toward resolving other problems, because one cannot list everything that is allowed. By weighing and reasonably approaching the essence of issues, we can now move more freely and more independently in the direction of a variety of forms, if we are talking about cooperation, using the entire keyboard for the development of contacts. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is very supportive of any valuable idea concerning the development and realization of joint foreign relations.

However, I agree with the thought that the past areas of competence of the central and peripheral ministries of foreign affairs should be revised.



[Ducmanis] Prior to leaving for Riga, did you have a discussion with the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze? Our readers would be interested in the content of this meeting, of course, along its general lines.

[Pochs] Prior to my departure to Riga, I had a conversation with the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and his deputies, and I must say that all of them to perhaps different degrees expressed their support for the sovereignty of the republic in developing contacts with foreign countries and with great understanding supported my specific thoughts on the subject.

Undoubtedly, foreign policy and defense matters are the prerogatives of the center, but there is, however, an entire series of issues in addition to those that we have already mentioned which any republic, including Latvia, can develop and shape.

[Ducmanis] What is your opinion about the development of ties between Latvia and foreign countries in the near future? Very recently, under the auspices of the Society for Friendship and Cultural Exchanges between Latvia and Foreign Countries, Latvia and Israel established a program of cooperation between the creative communities of these countries. What will be the attitude of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs toward this program? Are we still to take into account that diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel have not been restored yet?

[Pochs] I have no doubts that the Society for Friendship and Cultural Exchanges between Latvia and Foreign Countries has contacts with many countries. As to the organization of a civic entity in the interests of the Latvian and the Israeli publics, I should say that it is a special issue. In my opinion, the small Soviet consular group with severely limited working responsibilities that at the present time is located in Tel-Aviv, represents a certain step in the development of wider consular relations. This step has been made in the direction that is favored by many representatives of our state and by various organizations in Israel. I think that we have approached the time when it will be possible to examine another issue, namely, not only consular relations, but also diplomatic ones, because life itself dictates it, since the interest in it is obvious, and there are many specific forms that could be developed using the mutual desire and interest. As we know, very many former Soviet citizens live in this country who, after they left for Israel, lost their Soviet citizenship, but we cannot say that they have lost everything that ties them with their Motherland. This circumstance should be taken into account in our time of humanization, especially within the framework of the Vienna documents and other juridical acts, when we are talking about the principles of cooperation.

[Ducmanis] Our neighboring republics, in particular Belorussia, which is also a UN member, Estonia, and Lithuania also have their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Obviously, under the new circumstances, they will also

have substantially closer contacts and information exchange compared with the past. You should know this, because back in December you were the first deputy chief of the consular department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Pochs] The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the neighboring republics, for example, those in Belorussia and Lithuania, have many more employees. However, they also have their own problems similar to ours, but the profile of their work is much wider than we have. They have their ministers for a long time. Therefore, it will be interesting to learn how they work and what their priorities are. We think that in the near future our workers will have the possibility to exchange experiences and to hear them out. Especially, when the economic reforms and the economic sovereignty of the Baltic republics lead them also toward the creation of a Baltic common market. Here too, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will have to participate in the creation of this common market, as well as in the cooperation with other countries.

[Ducmanis] Lately, one can see the increased activities of the organizations, firms, and individuals involved in international business. Not everything in this field goes normally, mainly due to the lack of experience and the overestimation of one's capabilities. What could be the role of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking into account that these problems are usually within the scope of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Pochs] Your question includes the answer. Indeed, our interested people should lower their expectations and develop a more realistic view of Latvian manufacturers and possible foreign partners.

Any cooperation today depends on reserves of convertible hard currency. Where are such reserves in Latvia? As I know, this is a very painful issue, and these reserves and funds we can obtain only as a result of an exchange by selling our products. Because, as I have said before, at the present time I have not heard that some country would be ready to finance our projects and provide us with long-term credits. We may talk about some particular firms and organizations, but not about anything else.

[Passage omitted] I would not argue that my long-time service in the diplomatic corps of the USSR, that is, of a great power, has left its imprint on my way of thinking, and, therefore, I consider the foreign policy of the former Latvian Republic, as well as that of other small nations, to be subordinated to the policies of the great powers and see very little independence in it. [Passage omitted]

#### **Ukrainian Philosopher, Kiev Rukh Chief on Perestroika**

*90UNO762A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 January 90 Second Edition p 4*

[Interview with M.V. Popovich: "The Science of Life," by M. Odinets, time and place not indicated]

[Text] In an article entitled "Socialist Ideas and Revolutionary Perestroika" published in PRAVDA in the late fall of last year, M.S. Gorbachev noted that perestroika opens up wide possibilities for the spiritual development of individuals and the society in which they live. Doctor of Philosophy Miroslav Vladimirovich Popovich has worked in the Institute of Philosophy of the Ukrainian Academy of Science for approximately a third of a century; he is the director of one of the divisions of the institute and president of the Ukrainian Philosophical Society. We interviewed him concerning the problems of spiritual life within the framework of perestroika.

[Popovich] I find it difficult to begin, since, let me put it this way, philosophy is not a very popular profession today. Furthermore it compromised itself significantly during the reign of conservatism. And too we all need concrete solutions, concrete actions, and here it would seem that the philosopher, in his role of researcher and interpreter of social processes, is less necessary than, let's say, an economist or lawyer.

[Odinets] That is only the superficial impression...

[Popovich] Yes, of course. But I must say that for a long time we all were swamped with obligations to publish multivolume works devoted to interpretation of the latest political developments. We were criticized for the fact that we had nothing fresh or new to say. But every time a new idea was followed with any fervor, there was trouble. This was especially true at the juncture of the sixties and seventies, when the inertia of the Khrushchev years was waning and "order" was being established. Things were tight, but nevertheless we worked. As it happened for all these years, I and my colleagues occupied ourselves primarily with natural sciences, physics, mathematics, and logic. We did this for our souls...

[Odinets] Undoubtedly, you would write something and put it away in your desk ...

[Popovich] I must confess that I wrote quite a lot for the desk. But, when I look at it now, much of what I wrote then seems simply out of date. But I want to say about my other colleagues who were working in an analogous situation that during those years we generated a great deal of philosophical thought. We couldn't put everything in writing, but we could think, try to interpret phenomena, and look ahead. And for this reason the 5-year period of perestroika was not a surprise to us. Of course, it brought many new facts and new data and posed new questions. And there are problems of a sort which philosophers find the most difficult to solve, involving how to achieve the future that we desire. Counting on the fingers, as they say, doesn't help. And here it is important to emphasize that the social sciences, the broad spectrum of sciences about humans, are just like the other sciences. They must be governed by the same criteria of scientific validity as other spheres of human knowledge. From this standpoint, philosophers, can have vastly more confidence today in our approach to creating definitive ideas concerning how our society

must be organized. Philosophers must not give birth to ideals, but they must understand what the heterogeneous collection of social disciplines are talking about, and interpret the reality in which we live today. Here, it seems to me that the philosopher, in the area of natural sciences as well in the area of social sciences, is in a better position than others. He can see with more clarity and accuracy the weakness and strengths of even those branches of knowledge in which he himself is not competent. However, he is competent concerning how every branch of knowledge is generally constructed. Perhaps, it would be appropriate here to touch on a burning issue—how does Marxism look today.

In my youth, as a graduate student at the Institute of Philosophy living a vagabond life, I rented a room near Kiev...

[Odinets] By the way, could you give us please a brief picture of the story of your life.

[Popovich] Before I was a graduate student, I was director of a school in Ternopolsk oblast. I was born in the area of Zhitomir.

[Odinets] You share your birthplace with some illustrious people—Lesya Ukrainka, Korolenko, Dombrovskiy, Koroleva.

[Popovich] Yes, I am proud of that. When I worked on Ukrainian television, I conducted a series called, "The Boundaries of Knowledge" and more than once a program was devoted to someone born in Zhitomir. The roots of my genealogy go back to the cossacks and to the peasants. My mother's father was a peasant of average means, he was exiled and died in the Urals as a special immigrant.

So, when I as graduate student living in Kiev without a permanent address and without an identity card, but with two children, attempted to legalize my status with regard to living quarters, I had an encounter with the police. Finding out where I worked, the officer announced, "Unfortunately we will have to refuse. We register only Marxists." It turned out that this was how the identity card desk referred to students of the highest party school. One could have laughed, but it wasn't that funny, as it turned out. The exclusive association of Marxism with [government] departments is an evil that we now need to talk about as loudly as possible. After all anyone who received a salary from the appropriate department considered himself a Marxist. And we need to think about the fact that our philosophy, if it wants to be considered true Marxism, must be built on the same criteria as any theory laying claim to truth. We must be bold not only with regard to the phenomena of today, but also with respect to what we have inherited. What I mean here is how, for example, the followers of Einstein treated his ideas. They were, in my opinion as a social scientist, merciless. But only this allowed the ideas of the brilliant scientist to triumph, to turn into a harmonious, well-grounded science.

[Odinets] In this country Einstein was accused of being an idealist..

[Popovich] These were black pages in the history of our science. I remember the horrifying discussions, which covered even the foundations of mathematics. I witness their demise, since I graduated from Kiev university in 1953, but, as a student, I paid close attention to the processes that were occurring. However, even later, Lysenkoism continued to be the last bastion of obscurantism.

Returning to evaluation of the role of our field of science, I want to note that it would be a profound error to consider that philosophers must rule the world, as Plato dreamed long ago. The return of prestige to philosophy in no way means that the philosopher should become some kind of higher judge of the processes of social development.

[Odinets] And yet Aristotle was the mentor of Alexander the Great, who conquered the world..

[Popovich] Yes, that is true, but humanity does not need pupils who strive to think monistically and in this spirit construct a state in which they claim everyone will be happy. In my opinion, this was the essence of the period we have just lived through. The ideals of rationalism of the nineteenth century, permeated with the spirit of science, was, to a significant extent the source of authoritarianism, so to speak, with the best intentions.

[Odinets] Some have dreamed about a society based on the same kind of order as nature...

[Popovich] Then the only order that many have thought of is one such as would be imposed by a machine. After all God as the creator and prime mover of everything on Earth is conceived as the builder of a kind of machine. The idea of the ideal clock work, purported to underlie human existence, inspired many thinkers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Speaking of illusions which have become obsolete and which gave rise to totalitarian methods for controlling society, I would identify their sources as the convictions of the social-democrats of Europe that prevailed during that period. They believed that all that was needed for society to be organized rationally was for a socialist monopoly to replace the monopoly of capitalism. One can read this in many theoreticians of that period. Of course we should not condemn all the socialists of the past for our own errors, we simply were unable to learn what we needed soon enough, and this circumstance played an important role.

[Odinets] Perhaps there wasn't enough time?

[Popovich] I don't think so. After all in the early twenties time had begun to introduce drastic corrections into the party Program accepted at the VIIth congress in 1919 and permeated with the ideas of war Communism based on the rationalism of the nineteenth century. At that time Lenin reacted very rapidly to the first signs that we

were going astray. And it was our misfortune that we were subsequently unable to develop the heritage of Lenin. It is no accident that only the maniacal insanity of Stalin made us close our eyes to everything that was happening in reality and crawl on our stomachs back to the implementation of the ideology of war Communism. Thus we should and could have learned.

By the way for a long time now the best philosophers and thinkers of the twentieth century have felt, conjectured, and asserted that society is not a machine, it is not a mechanism that can be controlled, even if at its helm were Plato's philosophers or Aristotle's sages. What the task involves is correcting the working of the mechanism, seeing those errors that occur, and trying to ensure some degree of reliability. Ignoring this was what led to the grave condition our country is in now. And today there is no disputing that there was a spiritual Chernobyl, one which occurred vastly before the nuclear one.

As we become familiar with material on the events preceding the disaster at the Chernobyl atomic energy plant, we see an alarming phenomenon. The level of competence of the officials in charge of atomic industry was substantially lower than that of the average worker in the atomic plant. And this is no accident. Lack of competence of executives is a phenomenon with deep historical roots. Someone once joked grimly that all one needs to do is introduce fools into the arena of history and they will take care of all the rest themselves. Unfortunately, this is no metaphor. And it is an (indisputable) fact that our science has not played, and still, unfortunately, does not play the role which it must play in a civilized society. I can also attest to this as a longtime worker of the republic's Academy of Sciences. The Academy fulfills the function of a government department, in which people are constantly attempting to save money. This is a principle left over from the past—that is its lot. And this principle operates immutably, it has especially negative results today when cost accounting is wreaking havoc. Everything that is applicable to soap and cleansers is applied to science. But the results of this will become clear 20 years from now. And things will be very bad indeed if we do not take appropriate measures.

To avoid this, social sciences and philosophy must be categorized as fundamental so that it will not be permissible to attempt to save money on them. Philosophy must be so classified because it is a science extremely important to the development of society, although not a science in the strictest meaning of the word. This is its weakness but also its strength, since philosophy has always attracted certain strivings and ideals and has formulated humanistic values. In this case, of course, the harm done to humanity, to our society during the periods of Stalinism and stagnation, has been incomparable. And now the first task for everyone is to elevate philosophy, raise it to the place where it belongs.

Here is one of the most important aspects in the domain philosophy. In our republic a law will be enacted conferring official status on the Ukrainian language. To many

people this appears to be a matter only for linguists, teachers, and lawyers. But in fact this issue is vastly more far-reaching. We are speaking of a national rebirth. And this does not mean merely that everything in, let's say, several years will be done in Ukrainian. Here it is extremely important to understand that during the course of this process the level of national culture must be permeated with all those wonderful rich native rich traditions, both the ones that are remembered and those that are forgotten, having been violently expurgated from memory and ignored for decades.

[Odinets] I would like you to say something about the sources of the spiritual life of the Ukrainian people.

[Popovich] Accounts of the history of Ukrainian culture usually begin with Shevchenko or with the forties of the last century. If they start earlier, then with Kotlyarevskiy, and if still earlier, then with Skorovoda. Ivan Drach, Krymskiy and I wrote a book about him. For 12 years this book was banned and was only issued a few years ago. It was banned because, in the opinion of the "editors", it made Skorovoda appear to be too European a thinker, not a simple enough man. They claimed the book contained too much classicism, etc. The sources of the spiritual culture of the Ukrainian people go back to the epoch conventionally referred to as the epoch of the Kiev-Mogilyanskiy Academy, to Petr Mogil and a whole series of thinkers. They all wore the robes of Christian priests. Once, when the first collection of the work of Feofan Prokopovich was issued, his portrait was needed. But the author was wearing the robes of the church. This presented a big problem. Terrible resistance had to be overcome before his portrait could appear in the book.

For many years it was very difficult and complicated to make contact with these sources. Yes and even now not everything has been done. We have a huge backlog of writings from the time of Kiev-Mogilyanskiy, written in Latin. They were translated and can be found in the library, there are huge collections, and it is essential that they be published. And there are many others awaiting translation. And there are still other treasures, which we have little idea of. Indeed our ideas of the Kirillo-Mefodiyevskiy (Cyril and Methodius) brotherhood is based on one-sided interpretations.

They always emphasize calls for blood, the axe, and revolt overshadowing the profound humanistic essence of Shevchenko's world view. The main thing, and I am convinced of this, about him was: "Come to your senses! Be human! cried the great Kobzar. Or it will go badly with you!" And here he was united with his colleagues in the Kirillo-Mefodiyevskiy brotherhood, undeservedly forgotten and very little known to us. I would also focus on Mikhail Dragomanov as a source of high citizenship, internationalism, and humanism, as a source of socialist ideas in the history of Ukrainian thought. Judging by the one-sided treatment of the quotation from Lenin's working notes, in which the latter censures not only Dragomanov but, Ivan Franco as well, the full nature of

this individual has been obscured. And yet it was Dragomanov who was a fervent supporter of Ukrainian culture at the highest worldwide level, who fought against khutorism (a khutor is a Ukrainian farm) in his ranks, and advocated looking to the most advanced Russian culture, the great humanistic traditions of Russian literature. Now is the time for us to remember all this and restore it. Finally, we must simply and honorably say that it is inappropriate today to continue the tradition of only a single branch and a single social theory from the beginning of the twentieth century. There was also a humanistic social tradition in Ukrainian culture of the early twentieth century, represented by such names as Mikhail Grushevskiy, Vladimir Vinichenko and many others. I am not afraid to include Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskiy among them.

[Odinets] He was the first president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

[Popovich] Yes, he considered himself a part of Ukrainian culture. He was an enormously great thinker. Now, his works are appearing; many had been kept back, since he did not think like everyone else.

We should be proud of our heritage, the contribution made by the Ukrainian people to worldwide culture. We must use these great riches. But, of course, the best traditions of the past can not be assimilated if we look only to the distant past, to our own house, if we do not remember that our cultural riches belong to the whole world, if our culture is not permeated with the humanistic tradition of Dostoyevskiy and Tolstoy, the humanist tradition of the West and East.

[Odinets] Lev Nikolayevich [i.e., Tolstoy] thought very highly of Skovoroda..

[Popovich] Well, here I have a lot to say since I thoroughly researched Tolstoy's interest. The personal influence of Skovoroda was passed down to his pupil Kovalevskiy, then to Solovyev, then to Verdyayev and others. Skovoroda's influence can be seen in the works of Mikhail Bulgakov, who was close to the circles of the Kiev ecclesiastical academy.

[Odinets] In your opinion, what conditions must there be to foster the rebirth of Ukrainian culture?

[Popovich] This process, in seems to me, is irreversible. Restructuring itself is impossible without the rebirth of all peoples of our country, and in particular, the Ukrainians. The prerequisites for this, are the same as for stable development of our society. In particular, this involves strengthening and developing the civic principle in society. I place great hope in what will come from the resurgence of interest in our past and equally in the future. This appears in the work of various volunteer organization, which are now sprouting up like mushrooms. I am one of the leaders of the "Rukh" movement for perestroika in the Ukraine. And I am proud of this. This is a whole other topic and I think that PRAVDA

will find the opportunity to treat it seriously and objectively and will thoroughly discuss it some time. But now I would just like to emphasize the main point, that the creation of a civic society is a necessary prerequisite for political, economic and cultural development in all corners of our nation.

[Odinets] Since you have touched on Rukh, I will use the opportunity to note that we reported on its constituent congress and came out against, not the movement per se, but against those extremist manifestations which were expressed in the speeches of many orators, against the focus of a certain portion of those speaking on compromising the party and the existing order and on seizing power.

[Popovich] I cannot agree with those assessments, which I read in your reports, the ones by you and Tikhomirov, as well as by Drozd from Lvov. But I do not think that we can resolve these issues now. The only thing on which I insist categorically is the assertion that we have not learned how to live in an atmosphere of political pluralism. Every manifestation of political dissent is immediately met with bayonets. But political pluralism is a fact, whether we like it or not. We must learn how to live in this atmosphere.

As for "Rukh", then it is completely natural that it encompasses many different political tendencies and even political organizations, although, as you know, "Rukh" does not acknowledge collective membership and all that anyone who wants to be a member must do is accept the program. No one can argue against the fact that our program is fully focused on restructuring and is neither extremist, nor rightist nor leftist. It is the program of a volunteer organization fighting for the renewal of socialism. I want to insist that such an approach to volunteer organizations allows those Communists who participate in them to help perestroika. I am a member of the CPSU and do not renounce my membership. I believe that in any area of life I must implement the policy of the party, the party ideals as I understand them, regardless of whether my superiors approve of my position or not. I say this because, unfortunately, I have gotten into any number of conflicts in this area. And I can only stand up for the policy of the party when I have openly spoken with people of opposite political opinions and convictions. As long as we have not learned to understand this, as long as we consider that any political manifestation of an ideology unacceptable to us is something culpable, we will not have a civic society.

[Odinets] We happened to hear your discussion on Ukrainian television with a representative of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, L. Kravchuk, now secretary of the Central Committee. This was a very interesting, profound conversation on a highly critical political topic in the form of a chat between highly educated, opponents who respected each other. And there was nothing insulting in the way each one addressed the other, there were no farfetched, groundless accusations and this impressed the audience of many millions who listened to

the dialogue. But the constituent congress of Rukh and many of the meetings organized by the movement were quite another matter. At these meetings, loud insults were addressed to the party, to our country, to socialism, and vulgar, sordid, demeaning words were said about Lenin and Leninism, his image was cynically desecrated, and the organizers of the congress or meetings did nothing to suppress this. And, one thought, could this be the voice of the people, and of public opinion? No! How can we, representatives of the party press, see and hear all this and remain silent, fail to express our principled opinion, our evaluation of such attacks? No, we cannot be silent, we cannot drop a curtsy—this goes against our conscience, although I agree with you that we need to learn to understand each other.

[Popovich] Here, all that remains for me to say is that the directors of the conference, like the directors of the meetings, to the extent they were able, attempted to make overly zealous orators see reason. I am greatly frightened by flare ups of resentment, of implacability both from the left and from the right. This is what can ruin us and here there can be no two opinions. As for passions, then I would like to draw an analogy to our All-Union parliament. I, for example, do not like it when they berate the sessions of the Supreme Soviet or the Congress of People's Deputies, calling them a lot of hot air. The people have not yet had their fill of enjoying their freedom, and it turns out they are already growing sick of it. But after all we must remember the poetry of freedom, the people have never been in such an atmosphere and have never seen or heard what is being talked about from the Moscow tribunal. Many millions sat up past midnight at their televisions and attentively followed what was happening in the Kremlevskiy Palace of Congresses. The people got enjoyment from what they saw—from the fact that anything could be said. Even if someone got carried away, or someone was insulting, they liked that too. After all insults fly in the West. In bourgeois parliaments, they even have fist fights. We must value freedom. I remember the words of the great philosopher Berdyayev, who experienced an apocalyptic premonition when he realized that the revolution was at a stage where people were already sick of freedom and wanted bread. Of course, now we, philosophers as well as economists and lawyers, must think first of all of how to feed the masses, but we are nevertheless obliged to appreciate our spiritual victories more than anything else. We will have spirituality, a spiritual culture, we will respect each other, there will be freedom. And there will be freedom—we will find a way to solve the most vulgar, coarse, and simple human problems.

[Odinets] What is the current state of philosophical thinking in the Ukraine?

[Popovich] I must say that our republic has been lucky in that regard. It so happened that the Institute of Philosophy was headed by the outstanding scholar Pavel Vasilyevich Kopnin for a long time. He was able to lay firm foundations here. He was highly respected not only among his friends, but among his opponents, of whom

there were quite a few. After him the institute was directed without a break by Vladimir Illarionovich Shinkaruk, for whom I feel profound respect. He was able to cover his chest (with medals) and still maintain Kopnin's hard won gains. Recently, expanding philosophical thought has been playing an increasing role in the life of society. At the end of last year, at the conference of the Ukrainian Philosophical Society, we decided that our relationship with the All-Union society would be that of an affiliate, based on a special agreement. In so far as I can judge, this was met with understanding and approval, since we were not attempting to weaken our ties and interactions with the philosophers of Moscow, Leningrad, and other republics. On the contrary, we want to intensify our contacts. This is not hindered by the fact that we intend to strengthen our ties with foreign colleagues, we plan to develop contacts with the Ukrainian diaspora. Moreover, we would like to strengthen the role of local organizations of societies in the university towns of Lvov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kharkov. And also with philosophical clubs. We are a very poor organization, and are trying to give all our resources to the young. I am referring first and foremost to the school for young philosophers in Alusht.

[Odinets] And how are things with the young philosophers?

[Popovich] This is a serious problem. Heroic efforts are being applied to nurture new philosophical growth in the philosophical department of the Kiev State University imeni Shevchenko. During the years of Stalinism and stagnation there was a large gap between what was taught and the level and nature of the philosophical interests of academic circles. By giving courses and special course at the university and introducing new forms of joint work we are trying to lessen this gap. Nevertheless, for the present it is very difficult to train a young philosopher to become a professional. We are greatly hampered by the entrenchment of the curriculum. And moreover, after graduating from the vuz the future philosopher has to find work for himself.

[Odinets] I have a friend, Nikolay Anatolevich Didyk. He graduated from the department of philosophy of

Kiev State University and later worked in a school as a teacher. Then he was recommended to be secretary of the party raykom. In Kiev, when he was interviewed in the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, the secretary of the Central Committee, learning that the candidate for secretary was trained in philosophy, fretted about why he wanted the post and doubted that he would be able to do the work and spent a long time interrogating him about whether he knew how to milk cows, mow hay, and lay silage. N.A. Didyk coped with all this. Now he is chairman of the Vinitsk Oblast ispolkom.

[Popovich] When I worked as a school director, I had to answer for the milk yield and began my working day visiting farms, and had to deal with the livestock. This, of course, was ridiculous, a better way has to be found to affect the lives of the intelligentsia, but in general I had to deal with reality in a different way.

Now people have a great urge for political activity and even for the philosophical problems of real life. I wouldn't have imagined this. The following example shows how great the interest is—as the chairman of the Kiev organization of Rukh for a long time I spoke daily with many people. And I must say that this activity gratified my philosophical ambition. I saw how useful we can be to people, because we can, at the very least, understand and make sense of what is happening around us. I want to speak about our experience with elections. In the workers rayons of Kiev many members of the intelligentsia were nominated as candidates. Ultimately the workers will nominate their own leaders. But it is a good thing that they show trust in the intelligentsia. This is a very auspicious fact. People want deputies who understand the meaning of what is happening around us and know where we should go next.

[Odinets] Were you also nominated as a candidate for deputy?

[Popovich] Yes. And I had a difficult time deciding to accept. I amnot proposing simple programs or offering simple solutions. But it seems to me that I know where they should be sought. If faith is shown in me, I will try to apply all my powers, the experience and knowledge I accumulated during these years for the victory of perestroika.

**Yugoslav Lawyer Advocates Protective Legal System***90UN0836A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 3*

[Interview with Yugoslav Lawyer Sava Andzhelkovich, by staff correspondent V. Khlystun: "Man And The Law: A Yugoslav Lawyer On The Problem Of Human Rights Under Socialism"]

[Text] Belgrade—What allows the authorities to violate human rights? For socialist states have so many laws that they would seem to protect the innocent citizen from all quarters. When I framed the topic of our discussion in these terms, lawyer Sava Andzhelkovich proposed that we start with Caligula.

The incident is well known. After Caligula had firmly consolidated his power, he rode to the Senate on his favorite horse and declared it a senator. And the obedient venerable assembly submissively agreed.

"What does this illustrate?" Sava looked at me and asked.

[Correspondent] That he who has the most power is right!

[Andzhelkovich] And not only that, but also the lack of controls on power. And we, unfortunately, have fully adopted the principle of the "horse in the Senate" as a feature of socialism. One of the most perfect constitutions was the 1936 Soviet Constitution. And at the same time, it was reduced to naught by Vyshinskiy when he declared that the Constitution applied only to those who were committed to the people, the state, and the ideals of the revolution, and that it in no way extended to so-called antipeople elements. And so the question arises: Who has the right to decide if I am an antipeople element or not?! In those times, people quickly appeared who began declaring all nonconformists to be enemies of the state and the people. So not all proved equal before the law. And forgive me for the pointed comparison, but it was then that the "horse" entered the Senate, that the power monopoly of the "leading and guiding force of society"—the party—was proclaimed.

[Correspondent] Does a similar practice exist in your country?

[Andzhelkovich] It has existed and exists today. We have even gone further: We have adopted legislative acts that apply to a single person—the country's former President. The first sets regulations governing the use of Tito's name and image (1977), and the other deals with protecting the name, image, and work of Tito (1984). I recently spoke out publicly against these laws, as they have no legal right to exist.

[Correspondent] In what way are they detrimental to the ordinary citizen?

[Andzhelkovich] They can be used to convict any person who doesn't think the way he is told to. This amounts to the enslavement of the most valuable thing that a free person has—his thoughts! And I will say more: These laws essentially protect not Tito—as a citizen, he is protected by the general laws—but the functionaries who have come to power; these laws protect their seats, their privileges, and their status.

[Correspondent] Your point is not entirely clear.

[Andzhelkovich] I am talking about an attempt to divide people into categories of a high and low order, to not only make them unequal before the law but also codify this by acts of state.

I will never forget the trial of a certain young man. He was convicted solely for having his own opinion. It's shameful to say, but his personal diaries, confiscated in a search, were used as evidence against him. Meanwhile, there are leaders who oppose the things Tito espoused not just in word but also in deed, and none of them have been tried.

[Correspondent] Today many people—people in your country as well—are trying to accuse the party of all manner of sins. But human rights and the violation of these rights—are these things directly linked with ideology?

[Andzhelkovich] Let me clarify: The culprit is not the party as such but those dishonest representatives of the party that have infiltrated the highest echelons of party administration. A small digression is needed here for clarity. Closed trials, denunciations, and camps were features not of your country alone. We didn't avoid all those things either. The memoirs of people who, for example, went through Goly Island, where political prisoners were held, differ little from what is said about the Stalinist camps. To convict and punish a person because he does not agree with you ideologically is utterly absurd from the standpoint of legality. Let any party judge its members as it sees fit, but why should it judge those who do not belong to it and who think differently? The worthy theses born of the revolution were subsequently supplanted in practice and transformed into their antitheses. Take the principle of democratic centralism. How good it would be if decisions on serious issues were taken by all, from top to bottom, and then carried all by everybody. That is a referendum! However, what actually happened? Decisions started being formulated at the top and then sent down.

[Correspondent] How did the legal profession come to be deprived of its voice?

[Andzhelkovich] First, the party's ruling clique became merged with the state—or, more precisely, became the authorities in the state. And naturally, it tried to provide legislative protection above all for itself, and from all quarters. Second, with its own organizations in the army, police, the courts, the procuracy, and the bar, the party exerted a direct effect on their work. And third, the

enactment of a great many laws that were often ambiguous and not completely clear made the citizen utterly defenseless and vulnerable. But the most serious "gain" was the fourth: People were transformed from individuals with specific names into the masses.

[Correspondent] The third point is not quite clear: Can a large number of laws really be harmful to society? There are indeed very many laws, statutes, and other acts in your country. I read somewhere that there is a law for every fourth Yugoslav. That's a lot, of course, but on the other hand, everything is clearly spelled out!

[Andzhelkovich] I see your comment as ironic. In reality, things are not spelled but muddled. All this is inaccessible to the understanding of the ordinary person who is far removed from the legal profession. Nor are they easy for the specialist. For example, we have the following practice: When a new law is promulgated, a seminar is convened, and intelligent people start explaining how its various provisions are to be interpreted.

[Correspondent] What's so bad about that?

[Andzhelkovich] Excuse me, but why should a law have to be explained? After all, it's a law, which should have just one meaning, just one interpretation. Meanwhile, anyone will tell you that we have many laws that can be interpreted in various ways. A judge can modify something at his own discretion (mood) or at the behest of "higher-ups." And there are some laws that were adopted just to be on the safe side, as it were. There is no particular need for them, but they apply to everyone. They may go unused for a time, but at the needed moment and against an objectionable person such laws go to work very rapidly.

[Correspondent] Is it that easy to bring charges against a person? For even our laws have articles that punish slander.

[Andzhelkovich] The institution of bringing charges in our state is no doubt very deficient. An accusation brought against a person seems not to be considered unlawful. At any rate, in my 20 years' experience as a lawyer, not once have I seen in the docket, say, a procurator who was being held legally accountable for a false charge against some citizen. But there are many examples of the other kind.

[Correspondent] I know that you, Sava, are the first and so far only Yugoslav lawyer who has filed suit against a procurator whose charges were never proven and proved to be fabricated. What was the outcome of that incident?

[Andzhelkovich] Yes, in Croatia last year, Yova Opachich, a member of the rural intelligentsia and a Serb by nationality, was charged with inciting national hatred. In reality, the man merely wanted to preserve his people's national culture. Fifteen lawyers from various parts of Yugoslavia voluntarily undertook to defend Opachich. To many, it was clear that he was being tried on trumped-up charges. Opachich was opposed by local

officials, who have enormous power. The trial collapsed, and I brought suit against the prosecutor. Nothing has happened yet, nor will it in the near future, I fear.

[Correspondent] Why?

[Andzhelkovich] The whole problem is that the authorities are all part of a single entity. In socialist countries, including Yugoslavia, the police, courts, and procuracy are in practice not separate; on the contrary, they cooperate. The good old rule of separation of the authorities, which holds that the lawgiver, the executive, and the "controller" (meaning oversight) should be completely independent of one another, has been forgotten. And in our country, in addition to all that, they also work under the wing of a single party. How in the world are they going to try one other!?

[Correspondent] Lawyers have "dropped out" of that system of oneness of the authorities. Or am I mistaken?

[Andzhelkovich] Not at all. Institutions of defense exist—in your country, for example, the collective lawyers associations serve this purpose. Our preference has been that each lawyer work individually. Of course, this is a big step toward independence. However, I have the feeling from my own experience that the defense lawyer still serves as a kind of decoration in our country. If someone has to be convicted by order from above or by desire of the court, few people are going to listen to the defense lawyer. This is the flip side of that oneness of the authorities! I cannot give any client of mine a firm promise that I will defend him and win the case, even if I am convinced of his innocence. I defended one citizen who had been charged with stealing 1,160 dinars for three years. Three years! And yet the amount involved was a mere trifle. In a face-saving move, the court ultimately handed down a compromise decision—with a probationary punishment. Meanwhile, you have probably read that we have leaders who caused enormous losses but have been the subject of no legal proceedings. They are from the very group who consider themselves citizens of a higher class. Can we speak of any sort of law-governed country here? The lawyer is very undesirable, he is a hindrance, he is always in the opposition, so to speak. Once I was even flatly told the following: "The court, as an aggravating circumstance, also took into consideration the conduct of the defense lawyer."

[Correspondent] Aren't we getting into particulars now?

[Andzhelkovich] Falsehood against one person is always falsehood against the entire society. It may seem that just one person suffers, but in fact everyone suffers: The bell never tolls for just one citizen.

[Correspondent] I agree. Nevertheless, the changes taking place in your country are so substantive that they can't help but have an impact on the legal sphere.

[Andzhelkovich] Yes, there are many changes, and if it weren't for them I wouldn't be speaking with you so freely. But there is inertia-bound thinking. A person



whose thoughts were enslaved for so long ceases to trust the state; he no longer believes that he can live in it in total safety, with the confidence that his rights will not be violated. It takes time. Many parties and unions have appeared in our country. The one-party monopoly on power is becoming a thing of the past, but a number of other problems are cropping up.

[Correspondent] What are you referring to?

[Andzhelkovich] Elections were held recently in the republic of Serbia. They were widely discussed and said to have been completely free. But what happened? Virtually the same people who had been at the helm before were elected. Why? Inertia-bound thinking? Perhaps, but that doesn't make things any better. I can say that not a single lawyer became a member of an administrative body, though some had been nominated. All the lawyers "fell through" in the candidate screening process. They were "not recommended." Yet even in the prewar period, there were no less than 17 lawyers in our state bodies. I say this not out of a sense that my own profession has been slighted, no. Something else is at stake. Until administrative bodies have in them people who, if only by the nature of their work, are in opposition to the authorities and to the monopoly to some extent, we're not going to get far. Human rights will continue to be violated. The newly pluralism, meanwhile, has yet to speak its piece. We must wait. And something else is important as well: Lawyers play almost no part in drafting laws. They are drawn up by old and tested cadres. But we know who picks these cadres and why they are so obedient! Have you wondered why, precisely at a time when there seems to be greater democracy and people are breathing more freely, societies committed to protecting human rights have started springing up all over?

[Correspondent] Probably because at times of transition, when many things are unclear, the ordinary citizen gets lost in the confusion [teryayetsya] and, as a result, becomes more vulnerable.

[Andzhelkovich] That's absolutely right! What is pluralism of parties? Nothing less than a power struggle. I wouldn't say that all the new leaders have good intentions. What we often see is elementary drive to satisfy one's own ambitions, a struggle to achieve group objectives, an effort to protect someone's personal interests. In such "muddy waters," who's worried about the average citizen?!

[Correspondent] But I've noticed that the leaders of newly formed parties in your country often speak in the name of these citizens, in the name of the people.

[Andzhelkovich] That's the problem. In my view, now is the time when the people need our professional help. You will agree that the legal and political culture of our country is not on a very high level. We make almost no use of such democratic methods as referendums, public no-confidence in elected officials, or period checks on the work of government bodies. Yes, at rallies our people

demand and get the resignation of certain officials, but this should be done on a professional, regular, and legal basis. Not spontaneously.

[Correspondent] Are you trying to say, Sava, that lawyers will "save the world"?

[Andzhelkovich] I am. But with one correction. Not just lawyers but professional and honest legal specialists who can help the average person gain an understanding (and not a muddled picture, as used to be the case) of his rights. It is no doubt appropriate here to recall Cicero's famous words that we can become free only when we become slaves of the law.

### New Laws on Judicial System Considered

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[Interview with Professor Alexander Yakovlev, LLD, people's deputy of the USSR, by MOSCOW NEWS correspondent Vladimir Shevelyov]

[Text] Last week the Supreme Soviet session approved several laws and resolutions concerning courts in the USSR. These include: on the procedure of appealing unlawful actions of state administration bodies and officials; on liability for contempt of court; on the oath of allegiance to be taken by people's assessors; on their disciplinary liability, recall and release before the expiration of their term; and on the qualification certification of judges. Professor Alexander Yakovlev, LLD, people's deputy of the USSR, takes a look at the new laws in a talk with MN correspondent Vladimir Shevelyov.

[Correspondent] It looks as if you attach special importance to these laws?

[Yakovlev] History has taught us some bitter lessons. Stalin's Constitution proclaimed the inviolability of the individual, the right to work, all power to the Soviets.... But did we have any of this in fact? It means that it is not enough to vindicate humane, progressive laws, there is also a need to ensure that they be fulfilled. How? Suppose a law tells me: you have a right to housing. But I'm given no housing. Where shall I go? Who will compel government officials (and other citizens) to comply with the law, to translate the law into reality? This can be done solely by the court. And only if this happens shall we say: the law is not fiction.

[Correspondent] On top of the package of the laws in question is the law "On the procedure of appealing unlawful actions of state administration bodies and officials infringing upon the rights of citizens." Why?

[Yakovlev] The court decides the dispute that has arisen in the framework of the mutually acceptable norm of law. When it comes to individual citizens, everything is clear: the sides are equal by their social status. But now we have from one side the powerful all-mighty state, and

from the other—a citizen, some tiny social grain of sand. The forces are patently unequal. But the grandeur and dignity of democracy lie exactly in the fact that both the citizen and the state are equal before the law. The newly adopted law. "On the procedure of appealing" provides a serious basis under this equality, and vindicates a citizen's right to dispute with state administration bodies and officials. Both sides can compete on equal terms, and the court is in duty bound to listen—with respect and attention—to the arguments of both.

[Correspondent] But, after all, the possibility of lodging a complaint in court against the actions of officials existed in the past as well.

[Yakovlev] Quite right. The Constitution (Article 58) formalizes the right of citizens to lodge a complaint against the actions of officials, state and public bodies. But of all things—the article puts it on record: "Complaints shall be examined according to the procedure and within the time limit established by law." No such law has been in existence for a long time. In 1987 there appeared a law which seemed to have laid down the procedure for implementing the article of the Constitution. But, honestly, this was an example of a cunning law, a semblance of law. Someone's unkind hand added wording which immediately paralyzed the entire mechanism: it turns out that a citizen can lodge a complaint solely against a personal action by an official; he/she is helpless when it comes to a collective decision (which happens much more often) when he/she is faced not by an individual, but by an organization.

[Correspondent] Has the new law been stripped of everything harmful?

[Yakovlev] I think that past experience has not been lost: now the right to lodge a complaint in court against both individual and collective decisions by officials and state administration bodies has been assured. Although, of course, practice alone will reveal all the merits and defects of law making in full measure.

[Correspondent] Aren't you afraid that the courts will be inundated with complaints? After all, there are so many people who feel they have been treated unjustly.

[Yakovlev] Of course, quite a number of people will decide to run to the court every time they feel dissatisfied with something. A person has not been admitted to an institution of higher learning, has been given what he/she thinks is the wrong grade, has been denied domicile registration, is receiving a lower pension than he/she should. But even if the decisions are ruthless, or silly but they do not transgress the law, the court will not help the individual. All of us will have to learn to distinguish: in this case, the law has been violated, but in this, there is a need to work for a repeal of ineffective and obsolete regulations and to demand changes in state administration bodies, but it's impossible to demand that the court amend laws to suit your wish or complaint. A law-based state can't be built in this way.

[Correspondent] It's quite a science.

[Yakovlev] Therefore the law on lodging complaints will be introduced not all at once, but beginning with July 1 next year—so that both the courts should have enough time to prepare themselves and those responsible for fostering legal culture should be able to explain to citizens explicitly how they can use the new law to further their interests.

[Correspondent] Will the higher standard of legal culture rid judges of overtime?

[Yakovlev] To some extent it will. But the main trouble lies elsewhere. We have built an excessively state-run society. Our shoemaker is a government employee. And if the state is responsible for everyday services, it is possible to complain in court against a shoemaker's bad performance. If the state keeps everything under its control, let it be responsible for everything. It is possible that the new law and the presentation in court of many claims, which are absurd from the standpoint of common sense, will make the state give up functions which are not intrinsically inherent in it. And consequently, the courts will deal more with the performance of their duties.

[Correspondent] If the court has been assigned with such a responsible mission, there is evidently a need to provide decent conditions for its work.

[Yakovlev] Pride of place among such conditions is given to independence. Therefore one of the new laws—that on liability for contempt of court—begins with these words: "Any attempt to pressure judges or people's assessors aimed at preventing them from carrying out a comprehensive, complete and objective examination of a specific case or securing the passage of an unlawful court ruling shall be punished..." And the penalties are severe: a fine of up to a thousand roubles, imprisonment for a term of up to three years. Here they are, the innocent phone calls to the judge ("You take a more careful look over there," "The public is agitated," "You will not be understood," etc.), for which the press repeatedly used to severely criticize overzealous chiefs, but they minded their own business. Today, I believe, they will have to think twice.... However, let us not create illusions. It is not at all simple to implement this norm or to break bad traditions. The Criminal Code contains a section: "Crime Against Justice." But have we often heard of a judge having been put on trial for passing a patently unjust verdict? And yet today there is much greater possibility than ever before to discipline those who will try, by hook or by crook, to pressure a judge who is deciding a specific case.

[Correspondent] By allotting a big part in society to the court and entrusting a responsible mission to it, we hope that the judge is always a person with a statesmanly mode of thinking, with a sharpened sense of justice, a broad horizon, etc. But this is not always so, am I correct?

[Yakovlev] The judges are human beings with all human weaknesses. Yet, if they have been rid of dependence on the powers that be and placed in natural conditions, by the very logic of their role they will be moved towards being consistent with this role. Their position is such that, having listened to all the "pros" and "cons," they must make decisions on which individuals' well-being, destiny and life depend. I think that it is hard not to feel this lofty responsibility or not to try and comply with one's predestination.

[Correspondent] Do you think that the new laws make it possible to be more accurate in appraising judges' merits and shortcomings?

[Yakovlev] Professionals must be appraised by professionals. A physician's fate must be decided not by government officials, but by highly skilled physicians. At all times, and everywhere, an artisan's skill has been judged by the most skilful craftsmen. But who of us issues permission to engage in individual enterprise? The executive committee. And who used to decide the destiny of judges? Not the highest professionals either. In this connection I am gladdened by the fact that now a provision has been accepted on certifying colleges which will be called upon to see to it that according to their service duties, that all judges will take special exams, and that their activities will be subjected to regular checkups. This will, incidentally, also augment a judge's independence.

[Correspondent] Will the judge now be sworn in?

[Yakovlev] Yes. And also people's assessors. Look at what they specifically swear to do: "With lofty civic responsibility to fulfil the duties conferred upon me, always to be just and humane, principled and impartial..." Already in ancient times there were formulated the most important actions of a worthy ruler: "And he gave people good laws and wise judges." Indeed, what else can be more important for society's normal life?

### Further Study of Shadow Economy Needed To Combat Criminal Activity

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[Article by Yelena Kolesnikova: "Underground Millionaires in the Shadow Economy"]

[Text] Underground millionaires are controlling amounts of money which the ordinary Soviet individual has never dreamed about. And in order to combat unearned income successfully, a thorough study must be undertaken of the processes taking place in the shadow economy.

In the picture, we see a large city. Similar to the image of the mythological Janus, it is divided into two parts: light and dark. Everyday life is depicted in the first—people

hurry to work, smoke pours from the chimneys of plants and factories and heavily laden trains recede into the distance. In the dark part also, nothing of an unusual nature is taking place—everything is familiar. "Wrongdoers" are removing the products of their own enterprise through a hole in a fence, enterprising citizens are cleaning railroad cars and sewing machines are chattering in underground shops...

The artist had written down dozens of impressive figures. And the idea was the same—to reveal that it was possible to earn money by illegal means. And nobody was overlooked nor neglected. There were bribe-takers and speculators, cooperation specialists and racketeers, leaders who were caught embezzling and even drug dealers. Money flows from both parts of the city by means of two rivers. Thus a transparent flow merges with a muddy one and the turbulent mass becomes mixed along its entire route. It is a terrible allegory.

I saw this picture in the office of a well known economist. I was interested in knowing who the artist was.

"A colleague painted it when he was preparing for a seminar on the shadow economy," replied a scientist. However, he did not mention the author's name, an obvious reference to the modesty displayed by the author of the canvas.

In examining the diminutive dark figures, I was suddenly struck by the thought: I am generally not curious as to how these people appear in real life, what morals they profess or how they spend their easy money. I was alarmed by still another concern—how many of them are there today? In my opinion, this is an important question. Indeed, we find the concept of critical mass not only in nuclear physics but also in economics. When the amount of goods not backed up by money exceeds it, financial turnover breaks down and destructive forces commence in society. But they can be controlled in the light portion of this same symbolic city. In the dark section, one can only grope his way forward.

During the 2d Congress of People's Deputies to the USSR, I recall that someone made the recommendation that the Minister of Internal Affairs cite the specific underground millionaires in his report. V. Bakatin, who referred to the fact that the court will decide who the guilty parties are, cited only several figures. They are impressive. Since 1985, the organs of justice have transferred over to the courts cases for 629 individuals accused of theft or bribe-taking—fines amounting to more than 1 million rubles were imposed upon 65 of them. These were the ones that came to light, but how many still remained?

This is a rhetorical question and there is hardly anyone who can provide an accurate answer for it.

### What Does the Tip of the Iceberg Look Like?

When N.S. Khrushchev was informed regarding the first million rubles' worth of theft, he could not believe it for

a long period of time. After the second and third cases, he ceased being surprised and launched an active campaign against such illegal undertakings and other means for plundering national property. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers entitled "Measures for Preventing Fraud and for Strengthening Control Over the Reliability of Reports on the Carrying Out of Plans and Obligations" was published in the spring of 1961. Operational brigades of inspectors were created and surprise audits were started. I daresay this tactic—a strategy carried forward with the best of intentions—produced perceptible results. But one fact is beyond question—the change in the country's leadership also changed the attitude towards the problems of the shadow economy.

What occurred during the time of Brezhnev is now generally well known. It makes no sense to enumerate even the most severe cases or to cite the large amounts of theft and bribes which took place during Leonid Ilich's time and even later. Rather allow me to mention a chief concern—by 1985, a pivotal year in the life of our society, the shadow economy had already become stronger and was functioning as an independent and well organized mechanism. Almost each one of us felt its pressure.

On 1 January 1985, the total amount of shortages, theft and losses in the trade organizations alone amounted to 171 million rubles. It was clear to all that this was only the tip of the iceberg and that our control would not be enough. Judge for yourself—at the same time, the USSR TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] was selectively studying the family budgets of manual and office workers. It turned out that almost 10 out of every 100 rubles were used for purchasing goods from private individuals and naturally at speculative prices. The situation was even worse in the case of construction materials: in acquiring them on the side, a family spent one fifth of its family budget. A similar situation prevailed in the rural areas, only kolkhoz members were required to pay one and a half times more for certain goods. The situation was especially tense for rural workers in Armenia—for the purchasing of fabrics and clothing, by-passing stores, they spent one third of their budget and for construction materials—slightly less than one half.

According to data supplied by the All-Union Institute for Studying the Population's Demand for Consumer Goods and Trade Conditions, almost one half of the automobile owners who were questioned stated that they obtained their spare parts at speculative prices from private parties. Nine out of every ten members of horticultural associations stated that they acquired construction materials in the same manner. One out of every three garden sheds was built through the illegal use of state equipment. A firm tax was even established—for 1 hour of operation of a motorized crane, a payment of 55-75 rubles was required and for a bulldozer or excavator—35 rubles. The use of "collateral" workers was fair compared to their present rates.

According to estimates by this institute, the overall expenses for purchasing clothing, footwear and other wardrobe items exceeded by 4-4.5 billion rubles the volume of their sales through stores. It is easy to guess where the remainder went—into the pockets of businessmen and speculators. And the total amount of income obtained by private parties for various services to the population amounted to 14-16 billion rubles annually—this information was furnished by NIEI [Scientific Research Institute of Economics] of USSR Gosplan.

Theft during purchases of products from the population has become especially widespread. The wrongdoers have developed truly a thousand and one methods for obtaining unearned income. They have lowered the grade and quality of goods and they have purchased and sold non-existent products. A short and incomplete list of the methods employed for carrying out such fraud fills up several pages in a report by the USSR Procurator's Office. The difference between the wholesale and retail price for fuel brought about the present and non-cinematographic "kings" of the gas pumps. The owners of automobiles acquired more than one half of their fuel on the side and the annual profit of the wrongdoers has exceeded 2 billion rubles. Each year roughly 3-4 billion rubles have been paid out for construction work not completed and for transport—2-3 billion rubles.

Do these figures reflect the true situation? Hardly—it is impossible to uncover everything and many escape being caught. The economic deformations have brought about ruinous changes in consciousness, in social psychology and in the morals of society. Moreover, these losses cannot be measured. A truism—it is difficult to cure an illness that has been neglected. And when a doctor encounters a difficult case, his first task is to select a treatment strategy.

The working group of specialists created in 1986 by a decision handed down by the CPSU Central Committee should have developed a strategy for combating the shadow economy. This committee included representatives of USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Finance, the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, USSR Ministry of Justice, USSR Procurator's Office, USSR State Committee for Statistics and the USSR Academy of Sciences. I held discussions with many experts assigned to this group—respected financiers, lawyers, economists and statisticians. I wished to learn where they began their work and specifically what tasks they undertook to complete. Indeed, as is well known, the goal determines the means. I listened to various opinions, some of which at times were contradictory in nature. But the overall result of all of the statements was unfavorable—I was unable to develop a unanimous view of the problem. And yet there were many specific recommendations—some that were extremely sensible and others, in my opinion, questionable. One could only ask if the situation would have changed greatly if the group had not existed. I believe that it would have, since we learn from our mistakes.

Let us begin with the income that was not taken into consideration. The working group persistently recommended stronger control over the system for issuing income declarations. As is known, the local soviets of people's deputies are authorized to demand such declarations from citizens who build individual homes or who purchase expensive objects. But this right is rarely exercised—in actual practice, nobody demands anything from anybody else. In 1987, the USSR Ministry of Finance requested information on the number of declarations obtained from the local financial organs. It turned out that approximately 70,000 were issued over a period of 6 months, with slightly less than 4,000 of the more suspicious declarations being sent to the organs of internal affairs for inspection. And what happened? Retaining the style of the report by the USSR Ministry of Finance, I quote: "The financial organs do not have at their disposal examples of the facts uncovered based upon the declarations delivered." Simply stated, the declarations did not provide any assistance in uncovering the cheaters. In analyzing the reasons for the failure, the department admitted: its personnel lacked the experience and skills needed for carrying out such checks. Moreover, they were not authorized to conduct an inquiry. The following conclusion was drawn: the question concerning abolishment of the obligation of a citizen to present a declaration when completing a transaction in excess of 10,000 rubles must be studied.

But the working group insisted—control must be increased.

For combating the wrongdoers, for example, a recommendation was made to intensify economic and administrative responsibility for theft. Thus, in the case of a first-time violation, the damage should be replaced by a tenfold amount and for a second violation—the individual should be discharged from the enterprise. In addition, the responsibility of enterprise and organization leaders, bookkeepers and auditors for the quality of inventory work and audits must be raised. Is this not the familiar style of the administrative control method? Provision was not made for situations involving the removal from a plant of an economically unprofitable working group. Is this a contradiction? Not at all. A fine amounting to a tenfold amount appears to be an economic measure only at first glance. Imagine for yourself a wrongdoer who specializes in cheap stuffing boxes or gaskets. What does it mean to him to have to pay a tenfold or other fine, if through speculation he is obtaining hundreds or thousands of rubles? The group proposed to deal very strictly with those caught red-handed obtaining illegal income. For example, the pay for metalworkers engaged in the repair of sanitary equipment in an apartment could immediately be lowered by one fourth and for repeated offenses—by one half. In the face of such stern measures, he will forget how to "make money on the side." There was one other curious proposal—to reduce by threefold the pensions for citizens who repeatedly steal state funds. Even if of advanced age, they should be subject to punishment.

There is no point to continuing further in this same spirit. I wrote down only the verbs from the advice furnished by the working group. Their authoritative tone—to strengthen, obligate and force—eloquently reveals from which arsenal an attempt was made to seize weapons for launching an attack on the shadow economy only recently.

For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that the economists did not propose a concentration of efforts on special measures for combating unearned income, but rather they called for strengthening the processes of democratization and accelerating the radical economic reform. It is difficult to object, just as it is difficult to carry out these recommendations. Each step involves difficulty.

Systematic studies are underway in many countries on the reasons for the appearance and the developmental trends for the shadow economy, and international symposiums and seminars are being organized. But as yet, no success is being realized in overcoming it. The author of a serious monograph dedicated to this painful problem, Konando De Soto, is appealing for a rejection of the illusion that a change for the better can be realized in the economy by launching a sudden attack in the absence of experimentation. The less than fruitful work by the working group is more than enough confirmation of this fact.

And while a strategy is being developed, the legal protection organs have started functioning in a more decisive manner. During the 1986-1987 period, they uncovered almost 200,000 incidents of theft of socialist property. Criminal groups were exposed which had been in operation for an extended period of time in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, Azerbaijan, Moscow, in Volgograd Oblast and in other regions of the country. In all, more than two million mercenary crimes were uncovered during this period and almost as many individuals were called to account for themselves. Valuables, property, 175 kilograms of gold and platinum and one half ton of silver were recovered from these criminals.

In all probability, it would not have been necessary to discuss the operations of the working group in such detail were it not for an old truism—even negative results are important in science. At the very least, this experiment revealed how helpless we are before a serious problem and how we are attempting to solve it in a very unprofessional manner. It was by no means an accident that V. Bakatin, in his report to the 2d Congress of People's Deputies, commented that scientific studies of the shadow economy by governmental organs and economic departments were neither orders nor actually organized. Thus the time is at hand for organizing them.

#### Portrait of a Newly Rich Soviet Individual

If you please, the word "portrait" as used here is not entirely accurate—a line sketch would be more appropriate. The USSR Minister of Internal Affairs was correct—there were no extensive overall studies, but some work was nevertheless carried out.

"We studied various types of economic activity that were forbidden officially," stated a leader of a branch of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of USSR Gosplan and Doctor of Economic Sciences T. Koryagina. "And they can be divided into two large groups—criminal and non-criminal. The first group includes theft and the production of illegal products—in short, everything that in legal language is referred to as crime. The second group includes various types of earnings, which for a number of reasons are not subject to state accounting. For example, so-called non-recorded services by tailors, metalworkers and typists."

"We gathered our information by various means," continued Tatyana Ivanovna. "We collected data on the balance of monetary income and expenditures, the results of sociological studies in which the respondent answered the question as to how he obtained goods or services, and reports from the USSR Procurator's Office and the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. Our workers met with the operators of an underground business. It bears mentioning that I also shared this opportunity—naturally, I was not interested in the true names nor in passport data. I foresee some indignation on the part of some readers—you mean to say you are covering these operators? But we, if you will excuse the pun, are not investigators but rather researchers and thus we have other tasks. Here is an example. A talented and clever 42-year-old millionaire possessing a higher education acquired capital and organized an underground department. He worked day and night, acquired raw materials and contracted for the marketing of his products. I saw their goods—fashionable, durable and, not surprisingly, they sold like hotcakes. Today he is the chairman of a cooperative and he has invested considerable resources in the work."

"Had he changed from an illegal operator into a respected businessman? And did he escape unscathed despite his previous activity?"

"This would seem to be the case. In the legislation of all civilized countries, there are articles which call for punishment for the laundering of 'black' money, but we have made no such provision. We have only started to create a tax inspection—a most important state service. I will illustrate its operational effectiveness using only one example—certainly, not drawn from our practice. Almost 50 villas, an astronomical number of automobiles and valuables were confiscated from one mafia type in Mexico. As a cover, he had a completely legal but modest business—he was unable to prove that all of the property was purchased using honest money and naturally in keeping with the local laws. And the case opened against the mafia type began it would seem with a trifle—with a visit by a tax inspector."

One cannot view the forecast by T. Koryagina for the immediate future as being optimistic. In her opinion, approximately 30,000 underground millionaires are already operating in the USSR at the present time.

Tatyana estimates the turnover in shady capital to be on the order of 70-90 billion rubles. True, other specialists are operating on the basis of a broader range of figures—from 25 to 350 billion rubles. It is impossible to check to see who is closest to the truth. Only one point everyone agrees upon—the clear trend towards an increase in the "black market" money. Comrade Koryagina assumes that in the near future the turnover in this money will amount to 100-130 billion rubles.

The criminal nature of the shadow economy is becoming stronger. Underground capital, acquired more or less innocently, for example from the production of ladies jackets or hats, attracts all types of suspicious subjects. The mechanism is a simple one: more money demands more concern. Protection, messengers and personal bodyguards are appearing. Workers with a high intellect are not being hired for such positions; strong muscles are needed here. But as a result of earning considerably more than ordinary citizens, these young people quickly accumulate their own capital and then also start up their own businesses. If they lack the capabilities required for organizing an underground department or something on this order, they can quickly shift over to making a living from drugs, prostitution, a racket or from organized thievery.

"The tastes of the newly rich Soviet individuals are changing," stated Tatyana Ivanovna. "Today they are interested in currency and in trips abroad. They desire elementary representation. I recently learned of one individual who became rich—and hardly legally—by working in the goldfields. Today he has invested his funds in the operation of a joint enterprise, he has become president of an association, he visits branch firms and he exercises control over them. And just try to establish his guilt."

"Perhaps it is not necessary and perhaps such individuals should be assigned as enterprise leaders." You have in all probability encountered this point of view in other publications. And so what? The individual did not spend his money on food, he did not squander it and he organized the production of useful goods.

A healthy economy cannot be developed based upon illegal money. Appeals are being heard at the present time: let us sell small unprofitable factories and other state property. It is maintained that they can be of benefit if placed in other more concerned hands. Well, but who will buy it if we choose to sell. It is not likely that we will be the purchasers. Let us not confuse enterprise with elementary dishonesty. Operators, even those who have legalized their capital, continue to follow game rules in the business world that are by no means economical in nature. For example, in striving for monopolism they are mercilessly eliminating competitors and at times this is being done physically. Rather than economics, is this not a crime?

Paradoxically, our official economics is encouraging the shadow economy. The more the flaws in it, the greater

the turnover in underground capital. Legislation is also playing an important role. Its divergence from the interests of the people and life's realities is serving to stimulate illegal earnings.

One eminent specialist in shady business, Raphael De Gratsi, maintains that in Italy, for example, there is not one industrial or agricultural branch or sphere of services that has succeeded in avoiding a shady influence. Underground work is even specialized in some regions. In Naples, a preference is being shown for secretly sewing clothing, footwear and gloves and even shipping goods for export, and in the country's northern cities electronic equipment is being manufactured underground. Many welders, electricians, painters, upholsterers and plasterers are working illegally in France. In the FRG, the trade administration of one city uncovered a region in which almost every home was built through the efforts of independent workers. Spanish enterprises rarely inform their financial institutes regarding the true number of workers. They may cite the names of 5-6 workers, when 50-60 are actually working. Administrative staff workers in Japan organize secret firms for so-called "weekend work." They provide consultation on Saturdays and Sundays for the owners of average size enterprises and assist them in improving their operations.

By the end of the 1970's, the black market economy in West European countries accounted for 5-6 percent of the state economy, and in the U.S.A. the figure was somewhat more. However, it should be emphasized that in accordance with Koryagina's classification, none of these activities are criminal in nature and thus pose no danger to society or to the state economy. It is enough to merely remove the tax limitations and simplify the rules for the holding down of more than one job, and that which is secret will suddenly become known. Moreover, each lira, mark or franc will be earned by productive labor.

Our shady business is distinguished by the criminal nature of savings. And almost each economic innovation encourages new methods for obtaining unearned money—there is Ostapu Benderu with his 400 comparatively honest methods for obtaining the money of others.

#### Chain Reaction of Crime

Only recently have cooperatives appeared in our country and yet bribe-taking and the appropriation of monetary credits are flourishing in this sphere. According to data supplied by the USSR Procurator's Office, one out of every three thefts occurring in cooperatives is either large or especially large. The damage sustained by the state alone amounted to 150 million rubles. It was hoped, as the saying goes, that a system of civilized industrialists would be created, and instead an "active pumping of state resources into cooperatives occurred."

Incidents involving the sale of resources abroad in exchange for deficit goods became widespread in nature. It is distressing to have to admit, and yet such foreign

trade transactions were of little benefit to the homeland. The mass buying up of large batches of food and industrial goods in stores is continuing. According to bank data, in 1988 alone the cooperatives removed 3 billion rubles' worth of goods from the retail trade.

Allow me to state that I am not an opponent of the cooperative movement and have no intention of analyzing here its strong and weak aspects. This is the subject for a separate discussion. I am alarmed by the manner in which one negative result is capable of provoking others. Certainly, the goods purchased by cooperative specialists did not end up on the scrap pile. Nevertheless, they reached the consumer at inflated prices. Thus the army of speculators increased in size. According to computations by USSR Goskomstat [State Committee on Statistics], the profit realized by operators from the resale of industrial goods amounted to more than 1 billion rubles. This is a record figure.

By closing down the wholesale trade, goods are naturally sold through the black market. This then paralyzes the work of the trade organizations and, even worse, their workers actively join in illegal business. During the last one and a half years alone, more than 2 million thefts and shortages were uncovered and the sale of deficit goods from warehouses became a common occurrence. A type of "joint enterprise" is already appearing in some areas, with state or cooperative stores being directed by criminals. Here is an example. For several years in a row, one Baku store was managed by Mamedov, an individual who had never worked before. All of his orders were carried out by official managers. And not without benefit for themselves—together with the "boss," they misappropriated 200,000 rubles.

The majority of the specialists with whom I spoke were of the same opinion: if society is paralyzed by shortages, then any and all economic innovations must be introduced into operational practice in a well thought out manner. And there should be no embarrassment over having to introduce corrections into the draft laws or governmental decisions, even if they were introduced into operations only recently. If this were not done, the best of them could open up loopholes for obtaining criminal income.

Here is an illustration: the savings banks of union republics were authorized to issue loans to citizens for the construction of gardening buildings and individual homes and also for the repair of housing. But although this right existed, the funds made available for credit purposes were limited. This shortage immediately became fertile ground for crime. The chairman of the administration of the Savings Bank of the Armenian SSR, Abovyan, in an agreement with his employees, began issuing loans for bribes. Such bureaucratic difficulties were created for those citizens to whom loans were issued on a favorable basis that they soon yielded: they paid in order to obtain the money. Bribes—only the beginning of the path leading to wealth. Before long, an



entire criminal group appeared and it included representatives of regional banks of Yerevan. During a brief interval of time, these "financiers," in addition to bribes, stole 100,000 rubles from their own bank.

In the USSR Procurator's Office, the officials were convinced: this incident was merely a prelude to an irrepressible symphony of "banking" affairs and that before long others would appear. And precisely so. Recently, an incident involving the deputy manager of the Dnepropetrovsk Municipal Administration of Promstroybank G. Spasov was revealed: sensing that the state was too sparing in its issuing of loans, he accepted a bribe for promising to provide one half million rubles' worth of credit to an agricultural cooperative.

When I read the articles of ultra-progressive economists who recommend the sale, as rapidly as possible, of unprofitable state enterprises to private individuals, the undertaking of various business undertakings and the elimination of all restrictions, I recall the fears expressed by my contemporaries—but will not the shadow economy gain more ground officially and will not the hour be at hand when a solution for this difficult situation will no longer be possible?

#### A Vote for Perestroika

This essay does not claim to be complete—the problems of shady activities are just as complicated as any economic processes in which the interests of millions of people are intertwined in a strange and at times unpredictable manner. And certainly, there are no ready answers here: before such solutions can be prescribed, we must define that which we intend to wage a campaign against, what income can be considered as earned and that which is unearned. We have witnessed the adoption of decisions which by no means have produced the results expected. The "campaign" against drunkenness and against negative phenomena in the development of cooperations—these are some of the more important examples and yet by no means the only ones. And international and modest domestic experience reveals: cavalry attacks along this front will not produce victory, and prolonged battles, a long siege and perhaps temporary retreats are inevitable.

Our national economy services many economic institutes and departments. And although many complaints are received regarding their work, nevertheless our scientists study this "undisguised" economics in a more or less thorough and purposeful manner. The phenomena taking place in illegal business should be studied just as intently. Rather than spasmodically, as is the case at the present time, they should be analyzed on a constant basis. This is why I believe a governmental program is needed for the problems of the shadow economy. The best research personnel should be united under the aegis of Gosplan, GKNT [State Committee for Science and Engineering of the USSR Council of Ministers] and the

USSR Academy of Sciences and, if possible, thought should be given to the creation of a specialized scientific center.

This is especially important today, during this stage devoted to radically transforming the economic mechanism. We are aware of the negative manifestations of underground business and we sense the social tension that they created in society. But we can scarcely imagine fully all of the danger posed by the shadow economy. And this danger is indeed serious—indeed our new businessmen, paradoxically, are becoming active advocates of perestroika. Economists A. Buzgalin and A. Kolganov view this as an extremely alarming trend, since the economic innovations of perestroika are making it possible to legalize unjustly acquired capital. Thus a need exists for clearly defining the role to be played by shady businessmen who act in concert with corrupt officials under the conditions imposed by uncontrolled development of a market economy. It will be difficult to move forward if our legs are weighed down by lumps of heavy dirt

#### Militia, Security Forces Report Equipment Shortages

90UN0696A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 1, Jan 90 p 12

[Article by G. Lomanov: "Only Courage Is Not in Short Supply"]

[Text] In all honesty, it is frightening to write about this.

However, we cannot but write.

It is frightening because if, God forbid, these lines are read by someone who is long overdue in jail they will make him more brazen and boost his conviction that he can get away with anything because the criminals will understand that our militia is equipped as poorly as can be. However, getting nervous is beside the point; don't the criminals know this, see this anyway? It looks like we have been ignoring the obvious too long...

Almost a year ago, the chief of the just created department for combating organized crime at the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], A. Sadyatskas, bitterly told me that they have to drive cars which should have been scrapped long ago whereas the racketeers speed around in VAZ "model sixes" with augmented engines. Never mind the Zhiguli; shadow economy operators have Volvos and Mercedeses. Just try chasing them in a beat-up Volga! According to summary operations reports, the organized groups have radios as well—perhaps, modern, imported ones rather than the ancient Mayaks of the militia. In general, "they" have quite a lot of stuff. We should not portray present-day "business guys" as some kind of criminal types which can only sing dashing limericks accompanied by their guitars. They are not the ones who rule the roost now, others do. Many of them do not drink or smoke, engage in sports, and do not blow their money



away in restaurants but rather invest it in real estate and cooperatives; they are well organized and equipped. What about the militia?

Our press which sang the praises of the internal affairs organs without restraint in the years of stagnation and subsequently criticized them sharply on the eve of glasnost has finally turned to objective analysis. Many problems came to light: low pay for the work which is quite dangerous and associated with risking one's life; acute housing shortages; lack of legal protection and of social facilities. As far as the technical equipment of the militia is concerned, the press touches on it only in passing, among other things. I understand colleagues: It is difficult to write about this.

Personally, I had difficulty taking up this topic, though I had been thinking about it all the time. What came out was not an article but rather an endless list of goods in short supply. Could it be that this is a case when bare facts sound weightier than literary flourishes?

The MVD has prepared and referred to the USSR Council of Ministers for consideration a draft of priority measures for combating crime in 1990 and 1991 coordinated with the Councils of Ministers of union republics. The draft also provides for reissuing equipment to law-enforcement organs on a large scale. These issues were raised sharply in the report by USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V.V. Bakatin to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Joint efforts by scientists, designers, and production personnel in various industries and strict compliance with the government decisions already adopted are necessary in order to resolve these issues. How are the decisions being carried out?

Following the resolution of the supreme legislative organ of our country "On Resolutely Stepping Up the Fight Against Crime," a government instruction was issued. It could have enhanced the arsenal of the militia substantially...had it been complied with strictly. Alas, some organizations and enterprises treated it as another "piece of paperwork."

For example, the government allocated to the MVD 4,000 cars. If we take into account the fact that the militia's allocation for last year was 3,800 cars this was a major addition. The Volga and Ulyanovsk Car Works started deliveries immediately.

V. Yakubovskiy, deputy chief of the USSR MVD Main Administration for Material-Technical and Military Supply, said: "For their part, managers of the Production Associations AvtoVAZ and Moskvich acted for two months as if the government instruction did not apply to them. We had to virtually fight for the cars allocated to us, and deliveries began only toward the end of the year. The Orsha Radio Factory failed to supply 1,300 walkie-talkies because the Minelektronprom [Ministry of the Electronics Industry] and the Minelektrotekhpribor [Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making] could not furnish subcontracted

parts to the enterprise. Incidentally, this plant is constantly in arrears on deliveries to us; they fail to come up with deliveries year after year. Overall, we asked for 255,000 sets of radio equipment for this year. When setting control statistics, the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] intended to allocate 175,000, and by the end of the year the Ministry was assigned a quota...of 125,000 sets. Where are we to get the missing communications equipment? We are going to purchase about 40,000 in Bulgaria and Hungary, but this is not a solution. Could it be that our electronic industry cannot develop this product line? Besides, what use are the walkie-talkies if there are no batteries for them? The plants got "generous" and promised the militia as many as 150,000 batteries this year whereas we need no fewer than 900,000...

The list of sloppy suppliers and missing equipment can go on and on. The poor equipment of forensic laboratories is particularly alarming. We have read in the newspapers many times how the experts have helped in finding a dangerous criminal using a fiber from the jacket or a barely noticeable scratch on the fender of a car. These are not idle inventions—in the course of my work as a journalist I have encountered such cases on many occasions. It is no myth either that a criminal always leaves traces. One only has to wonder how the forensic specialists manage to distinguish these traces using their obsolete microscopes.

Even these are not available everywhere. The availability of optical-mechanical and physical-chemical equipment in the laboratories amounts to one-third, at best one-half of the needs. Chromatographs, spectrophotometers, and X-ray fluorescence analyzers are lacking. Our industry does not produce equipment that is badly needed in order to investigate crimes; what equipment is produced does not meet the specific demands of forensic experts.

Now, two facts, a pleasant one and a sad one. However, even the joyful fact does not make us optimistic. So, the first fact: Well-known designer V. Zaytsev has been asked to design a new uniform for the militia and internal troops. Despite this, the apprehension is that the outfits of the guardians of order will soon differ very little from those of guerrilla fighters. Indeed, I am certain that the splendid artist will develop excellent designs. The problem is as follows: Who is going to make them and how? It is disadvantageous and unprofitable. The Leningrad Metal Accessories Association failed to fill an order for uniform insignia last year, and this year filled it only 70 percent. The Alaverda Production Association of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Light Industry is in arrears to the tune of 30,000 field uniforms. The Chimkent and Guryev Meat-Packing Combines refused to deliver sheepskins. Perhaps they believe that a sentry is not a big noise, and he can stand guard in bitter cold in a coat lined with cheap artificial lining rather than warm sheepskin.

The second fact: Workers at an enterprise refused to produce handcuffs. Do you know why? Due to moral

considerations. I would be interested to know: If on a dark street hooligans beat up one of those "humanists" will he yell with indignation "where is the militia when we need it?" Or will he say, subscribing to the principle of nonopposition to the evil of violence: "Well, guys, let me have it again. Do you know how much I hate these 'pigs' with their handcuffs?" I doubt this.

Other enterprises do not agonize over moral issues and just jack up prices so high that the modest militia budget begins to come apart. Could it be that the guardians of order will have to tie up the criminals with reins, as they used to do to horse thieves in villages? Incidentally, I saw disposable handcuffs—to be sure, foreign rather than domestically produced. This is a plastic band with a clasp—if the loose end is pushed through the clasp and tightened there is no way to get out of it. You deliver a ruffian to his destination, and cut the band. It is fast, simple, and cheap. However, I believe that our militiamen will not live to see our industry come up with this "elaborate" device. After all, it costs next to nothing, so nobody will be eager to go to all the trouble.

V. Yakubovskiy says: "Transition to economic accountability and direct contacts exacerbates still further our situation which is difficult to begin with. Enterprises turn down our orders and insist on contract prices. Here are just a few examples. The Kostroma Ship and Metal-Working Plant is asking that we contribute 3,000 rubles [R] more for every cutter to the production development fund. All in all, this is not an ungodly sum. The Batumi Plant of the Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] raised the price for the 1390 cutter by more than R17,000; it was not inexpensive to begin with—R22,600. In essence, the tactical and technical characteristics of the vessel have remained the same despite the price nearly doubling. Meanwhile, the law-enforcement organs are financed from the budget. So, where is the spare money to come from?"

Viktor Ivanovich went on to say: "We understand full-well how many gaps there are in our economy, and this is why we do not complain too much. We try to produce certain things in our own facilities, we fight for some things, beg for some. However, we cannot go around hat in hand forever. After all, some of our suppliers just ignore government resolutions. Besides, not just any equipment is fit for use in the organs of internal affairs. For example, we need cars and motorcycles with improved dynamic characteristics, specially equipped vans, speedboats, light helicopters. We need portable tape recorders and cameras, video recorders, and complete laboratory sets for specialists. What the Ministry receives is equipment with standard characteristics and consumer appliances."

I asked V. Yakubovskiy: "Where is a way out? After all, economic accountability is going to spread to still new spheres of production. I understand that a Sony or Phillips dictating machine is better by one order of magnitude than the Desna tape recorder. However, we cannot rely on imports only."

Vladimir Ivanovich said: "As I see it, there are two ways to ameliorate the situation relatively quickly. In the first case, let us give the producers incentives. For example, clothing, means of individual protection, motor boats and engines for them, and some other kinds of products can be classified as consumer goods produced by the plants to the output of which, as is known, economic incentives apply. In the rest of the cases, rigid state orders are needed. As far as the long term is concerned, I believe that the government program of reinforcing the law-enforcement organs should pay due attention to the issues of technical equipment."

We have summoned up our courage to admit that the criminal underworld in our country is growing and organizing. Let us be frank—the tycoons of underground business and the "commandos" serving them have no difficulty acquiring everything they need, from a foreign limousine to a video recorder, from a personal computer to a car phone. There is no dearth of money in the organized groups: They travel abroad and bring things; the black market and used-goods stores are wide open for them.

We should not be stingy with equipment for the law-enforcement agencies if we want to live peacefully and walk the streets with confidence. Contemporary criminals are not dashing fellows wearing traveling caps; you cannot get them with your bare hands.

#### Center for Juridical Education Established

90UN0310B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 46, 18-24 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by Chairman V. Merkulov: "The All-Union Center for Universal Juridical Education"]

[Text] The All-Union Center for Universal Juridical Education has been established under the management board of the "Znaniye" All-Union Society. At the center, faculties have been organized and are working to raise the qualifications of managers of enterprises and their structural subdivisions. The center is prepared to provide legal training to peoples' deputies, executive committee [ispolkom] workers, and teachers at schools, technical schools, institutions and professional and technical schools who are conducting classes on the fundamentals of Soviet law.

Instruction is provided without interruption to production (at night for 2 and ½ or 3 and ½ months; for up to 10 months by correspondence). Classroom lectures are conducted at the board of the "Znaniye" All-Union Society. For classes of 25-30 or more people, classes can even be conducted directly at enterprises, organizations or educational institutions.

At the center, they give lectures and conduct practical classes and consultation, do business role playing, and also analyze industrial and legal situations. Students study the system of state management organs and their legal status, the organizational, social, technological,

technical and economic key factors for improving the management apparatus, problems of worker and management legislation and ways to resolve them, problems associated with business contacts, and documentation and efficient work with documents.

After completion of the course of study (generally about 140 study hours) and successful completion of the final work (passing examinations), students receive a diploma attesting to their higher qualifications.

Highly qualified teachers from leading educational and scientific institutions, supervisors and specialists from the management of appropriate industrial sectors of the national economy, and practicing workers from the law and order organs are enlisted to conduct classes and consultations.

Upon application by organizations or individual citizens, the center will prepare standard documentation on various questions of Soviet law and the legal regulation of management activities.

One type of service provided by the center is individual legal help to workers. It also signs contracts with enterprises, institutions and organizations for contract consultation on juridical issues.

The center can help in the creation and organization of a fund for informational literature in enterprise and institution libraries and also assist in setting up analogous centers under the "Znaniye" Society.

Our address is: 101813, Moscow, Center, 4 Serov Thoroughfare, Entry 7.

For information telephone 925-56-68.

V. Merkulov, chairman,  
All-Union Center for Universal Juridical Education

### **Criminal Activity in Cooperative Sector Detailed**

90UN0812A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Fedorovich Chernyshev, sector head, CPSU MGK State and Legal Department, by Sh. Muladzhanov: "Are Business and the Law Compatible?"; time, place not given]

[Text] In our recent conversation with Vladimir Fedorovich Chernyshev, sector head, CPSU MGK [Ministry of State Cooperatives] State and Legal Department (published in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 2 December 1989), the topic of crime in the cooperatives and around this growing sphere was touched upon only in general terms. Recent events, and the readers' insistent requests force us to return to the conversation for a more detailed talk.

[Chernyshev] Before concentrating on the legal aspect of the development of the cooperative movement, I would all the same like to sketch for you the general situation in this sector of the socioeconomic "front." There are now

about 15,000 cooperatives registered in the capital; over two-thirds are functioning, and about 400,000 people work in them. During three quarters of last year alone, they sold goods and services worth over R3 billion, which is a level significantly higher than in 1988. On the other hand, the proportion of cooperatives in the production sector of consumption in Moscow was reduced in 1989 from 17.9 to 11.3 percent, and in the service sector, from 30.1 to 9.5 percent.

[Correspondent] There only seem to be contradictions between the indices cited, right? Cooperatives are more frequently selling not their own production, but something that has already been produced at state enterprises. Whatever has been decided at various levels, by means of being middlemen in some form or another, the cooperative movement is more actively squeezing out those who are trying to offer the city the production of their own goods, which are so necessary...

[Chernyshev] The thing is that neither the cooperatives' raw material nor technological bases has yet been granted the authorities' attention, and no motions toward improvement have been noted here. Hence the distortions in the development of cooperatives, and hence many forms of violations. Let us say, can a criminogenic situation in the area of realization of construction materials not be created when for the 569 construction cooperatives active in the capital there are only 11 cooperatives producing materials for their needs, and these are capable of meeting only 2-3 percent of their demands? After all, even the state enterprises of the construction industry are not sensibly supplied. Then you have a guard over the materials in extremely short supply in the Moscow home supply trade stores, but still you cannot manage to guard it. In spite of the legislation, they let it go to the cooperatives in large quantities. And they do not even do the paperwork according to the rules. In just the five cooperatives checked in Babushkinskiy, Volgogradskiy, Gagarinskiy, and Cheremushkinskiy rayons, R500,000 worth of construction materials were detected whose purchase did not go through documentation. Nor do the businessmen in the food trade lag behind in this.

But a very plausible justification rings out in each case: The cooperatives have very few opportunities to obtain equipment, instruments, and raw materials on a legal basis. The situation with the allocation of premises is also changing very slowly. As a rule, the rayispolkoms cite the lack of available space. Yet why do they still stubbornly avoid conducting the inventory of the capital's entire non-housing space, as we proposed a long time ago? Nor is the gorispolkom making haste with this matter. Here is where convenient situations are created for extortionists. For example, last year the head of the repair and construction administration trust "MGUs-petsremstroymentazh", and the director of the "Fruit and Vegetable" store No. 3, Volgogradskiy ORPO [Department of Leading Party Organs] were detained upon receiving bribes in exchange for granting space...

[Correspondent] But after all, that is a drop in the bucket. Unofficial data testify to a turnover of millions in bribes on these grounds, and you have revealed 20 cases in a year. What is the reason?

[Chernyshev] There are several reasons, and they are widely known—the cooperatives' lack of desire to collaborate with the law enforcement organs, to expose extortionists; the insufficient professionalism of the BKhSS [Bureau for Combatting the Embezzlement of Socialist Property], and the passivity of other law enforcement organs.

But I would not limit this to citing direct extortion; it frequently takes hidden forms. Either officials themselves or their relatives are brought into the cooperative's staff—and a system of the greatest favor to the "team" is ensured. Abuses, forgery, and hack-work flourish abundantly in such situations. Here is just one example. The "Uzor" construction-repair cooperative was created at the Moscow pipe plant. It was headed by the chief of the repair-construction shop of that same enterprise, and it happened that his direct official responsibilities included ensuring repair of the buildings and premises, and one of the cooperative members became chief of plant supply. Can you imagine how famously they worked there?

Another version. USSR Gosstroy, in accordance with a contract with the "Agro" cooperative created under the USSR Architectural Fund, disbursed to it R45,000 for developing equipment for reinforced concrete product plants. It was the Gosstroy officials who saw to it that meeting this task cost the cooperative "only" R28,000... In fact, they did not lift a finger. And the cooperative was granted materials long since discharged to the Moscow Oblast Main Administration for Construction.

[Correspondent] It is not easy to create a cooperative, to start work. But here it is in operation. Let us suppose that everything needed is received according to the law. Which link in the further chain is the most criminogenic one?

[Chernyshev] It is difficult to distinguish, since many violations are being registered on the most disparate grounds. For example, under what sort of conditions are the cooperatives' products being produced? Frequently in unsanitary, fire-hazard conditions. "Klen" in Taganskiy Rayon contrived on its own to set up a construction shelter and store there, without the necessary precautionary measures, two acetylene tanks. And there was a stove nearby... The result was a fire, an explosion, the death of one of those who took part in eliminating the accident. Over just three quarters, six incidents of safety equipment violation with fatal outcomes have been noted in the cooperatives.

And sometimes, the conditions in which the products are prepared... Take the "Romashka" cooperative in Leninogradskiy Rayon; it starts to turn out something by the name of "marmelade." Even after the most painstaking study of the recipes, you could not find in it any

ingredients such as honey, syrup, food extracts, or anything else recommended by cookbooks. What was this "three-tiered something" made out of? At the moment of checking, there were on hand eggs, sugar, a kettle full of drying oil, and blueing for dyeing fabric. The prepared mass was poured through a rusty drip pan, and then the finished "product" was placed in boxes. And all of this against a background of filth and a lack of sanitation. On the other hand, the price of the "marmelade" was at the "brand-name" level—over five rubles per kilogram.

[Correspondent] We have heard various opinions regarding the prices for the cooperatives' products...

[Chernyshev] Whether we are moving toward a distributional system or a free market, the law is still in effect. The cooperatives must observe it. And there has indeed been a multitude of violations here. Inflated prices for products or services sold were revealed in one out of every six cooperatives checked by the state trade inspection, with the participation of other controlling organs. The treatment and wellness facility "LiK" in a sensational process overcharged the population by almost R900,000 over 9 months of last year, hardly a humane tariff. They sometimes do not even pity their brothers in the movement. For example, "Ira" overcharged R850,000 for the sale of "The Collection of Normative Acts and Recommendations on Matters of Creating and Organizing the Activity of Cooperatives." It is no accident that according to the data of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, nine out of every ten polled felt that the prices for cooperative products are excessively high.

[Correspondent] It is possible to cite other information from that same source as well. Thus, 70 percent of those polled associate the higher cost of living, cheaper goods being washed out of trade, and finally, the sharp growth in crime with the appearance of the cooperatives. On the first two positions, the viewpoint seems debatable to me. We must not take only one from the range of causes and forget the rest. But as far as the crime boom is concerned... The cooperatives have harbored ex-convicts, and the opportunity to launder "dirty" money, and a field for racketeering, and still many other things which stimulate the crisis in lawfulness.

[Chernyshev] The quantity of mercenary crimes last year doubled by comparison to 1988. And this in not only, alas, in that small portion which we call disclosed. The cooperatives frequently become centers of criminal formations. Brief reports have flashed through the press that the special subdivision of Moscow criminal investigations has shut down the criminal activity of the so-called Lyubertsy and Solntsevskiy groups. On their record are about 100 crimes committed in the capital, frequently, ones in the serious categories. Some 115 members of these groups have been brought up on criminal charges. Who headed them? It turned out that Lyubertsy group was commanded by the previously convicted S. Lazarev and S. Zubritskiy, workers of the

Moscow "Nika" wholesale-trade cooperative. S. Timofeyev, S. Mikhailov, V. Averin, and Ye. Lyustranov, the leaders of the Solntsevskiy group, were taken into the "Fond" cooperative, created by the Moscow cultural fund. Cultural cooperative my eye; a search turned up two pistols, three sawed-off shotguns, a grenade, and other ammunition.

Those with prior convictions of violations of the law on cooperatives frequently get cozy positions. N. Elefterov, previously convicted for offering bribes, was designated the "Olimpa" head accountant in Leninskiy Rayon. And who are his comrades? The chairman and two members of the cooperative, Baku residents, who have worked in the capital field for almost a year without a residence permit. In that same rayon, the chairman of the "Tsent" cooperative was a "specialist" previously convicted for large-scale embezzlement.

[Correspondent] In speaking with staffers of the people's courts and arbitration, I repeatedly hear a barrage of arguments as similar as twins: The cooperatives are wrecking the fulfillment of contracts concluded with state enterprises or soviet organs. It seems that this phenomenon cannot be viewed one-sidedly. Objective difficulties, failures in the supply of raw materials, and derangements in transportation work must be taken into consideration. But all the same...

[Chernyshev] But all the same, many cases are linked to the cooperatives' aspiration to get the maximum advance, accepting circumstances obviously beyond one's strength. Among the particularly distinguished ones here the "Tekhnika" cooperative, which you know well, may be named.

For example, it concluded a contract with the Moscow power institute to develop program materials for personal computers, having designated an obviously unrealistic 3-month execution period. An elementary check revealed the veiled nature of the deal: They were speaking of the sale of imported computing equipment. The cooperative concluded analogous agreements with the Lead Information and Computing Center of the RSFSR Ministry of Consumer Services, and the Moscow Yaroslavskaya passenger station... Through these contracts alone, the cooperative members received almost R2 million, meeting their obligations by only 96,000. And all the talk about the mythical tens of millions of rubles lost by "Tekhnika" because of the press and the financial organs is a bluff, behind which are hiding deals not backed by realistic opportunities, and attempts to make money at the expense of others. Especially interesting from this point of view are the attempts to publicly rehabilitate unsuccessful businessmen. The most recent of these—published in the December issue of the magazine ZHURNALIST—is simply amazing for its lack of any logic or objectivity.

[Correspondent] Nor is everything in order with ethics there: In accusing others of prejudice and "whipping" colleagues who have made so bold as to criticize the

dealmakers, A. Mazepa's journalism does not seem to attach any significance to the fact that the "Tekhnika" cooperative serves...in the press service. I think that one may agree with it only on one count: The cooperatives who have made capital are more frequently and openly buying journalists today. Incidentally, just as they do specialists of other professions, even up to judges.

[Chernyshev] Here I would like to touch upon the topics of competence and responsibility. They are obviously lacking not only among the journalists writing about the cooperatives. And not only among the staffers of the law enforcement organs who have been a bit behind the growth rate in the criminal elements' qualifications. At times, the contracts with cooperative members are concluded on such an ignorant level that one is simply amazed: Who is working as the leader of the corresponding ministry and department subdivisions, who is heading other enterprises and institutions? And how are the banking organs exercising control over the credits they issue, for what are these credits frequently issued? You cannot always tell whether these are ignorant people making decisions or malefactors, especially when the documentation in the cooperatives themselves, in the ispolkoms, and in other institutions is at times executed at an extremely unqualified level.

And those desiring to fish in troubled waters—here they are. And here already "Alkov," created under the "Sovintsenter" association, is rushing to collaborate with one of the foreign firms and a joint enterprise with "Esttek," side-stepping the law to exchange R1 billion for \$230 million. "Tezlya" and "Volga" were limited by nonconvertible hard currency, and they attempted to receive in savings banks in a number of oblasts certificates for R23 million in clearing accounts, in order to later convert them to cash. The ignorance of officials, the confusion—that is what takes up at least 30 percent of the expenses of the given financial and statistical organs—and that is what is exploited by the dirty dealmakers.

[Correspondent] Speaking of concrete facts, we have not touched upon here the topic of improving legislation, of rescinding a plethora of unnecessary normative acts interfering with the normal development of the cooperative movement.

[Chernyshev] There is hardly any sense in making a tongue twister out of it, against the backdrop of well-known speeches in parliament and the press, the discussion of the draft concerning the regulation of the cooperatives' activity in the capital, which, incidentally, contains a wealth of judicially ignorant positions... Let our conversation be food for thought. And for the activation of those healthy forces which must undoubtedly prevail in the sphere of cooperatives. And well, we can get back to the improvement of legal norms at the next meeting, relying on the letters from the readers of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

### Latvian MVD Official Against Clemency for Adolescents

90UN0817A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
7 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kheruvimskiy, chief of the Latvian SSR MVD Administration of Preventive Service: "Dangerous to Society"]

[Text] I read V. Rubstov's article, "A Court or a Mockery of a Court?" published in SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 6 December 1989. In it the author reflects upon the court process for juvenile affairs. In particular, he feels that the courts frequently hand down in such cases sentences which are too severe.

These problems are close to me. Our administration coordinates the activities of the internal affairs organs for violation prevention among minors. I understand the good intentions of the article's author, yet I cannot agree with certain of his opinions.

To be convincing, I will begin with the figures. In our republic over 11 months of 1989, 2,884 crimes were perpetrated by minors—one out of every three crimes registered. Minors are guilty of 9 murders, 6 cases of infliction of serious bodily harm, 38 robberies, 21 rapes, and 168 thefts. Some 70 percent of the crimes were committed with mercenary motives. Teenage group crime is growing at a threatening rate. An alarming tendency has been noted of committing group crimes in entire series, from 10 to 50, rather than 1 or 2 crimes.

It stands to reason that the juveniles who have started down the road of violations are no less dangerous to society than are the adult criminals—they are not playing childish pranks.

Are there grounds for reproaching the judges in excess severity toward minors? I believe that there are none, more likely, the contrary. Here is a typical example.

People's judge Yurmaly considered the activity of two groups of teenagers. One group had committed 22 crimes, the other, 12. The court showed humanity: It set punishment with a suspended sentence. All those on trial were free, including the group's leaders, A. Lebedev and V. Oleynik. The teenagers, feeling that they had not been punished, not only failed to acknowledge their guilt, but attracted seven kids to the group and committed about 50 more crimes.

I am hardly campaigning for stiffer sentencing, for mandatory incarceration; it is well known that the corrective labor institutions are not the best place for re-education. Yet I am absolutely opposed to humanness toward criminals causing harm to society. It is impermissible to reflect aloud, in tears, that here, they say, they put this "little boy" in prison; the court turns into a mockery of a court.

Yes, of course the circumstances of every case must be thoroughly studied. And it must be precisely determined whether it is an adolescent standing before the court or a guy who will turn 18 any day now.

The people's courts now make broad use of punishment not associated with incarceration—probationary and suspended sentences. But is it correct to leave free those who have committed over 10 serious violations? Thus, the people's judge in Ogrskiy Rayon sentenced to 3 years probationary incarceration S. Grinberg, born 1972, who had committed 30 crimes in a group with adults, and had been examined 7 times previously by the commission on juvenile affairs. He currently continues to lead his anti-social life style.

There are more than a few such examples. In 1989, 85 crimes were committed by convicted teenagers with suspended sentences. Was it necessary to let such people go free?

Incorrectly comprehending humaneness, investigators do not always apply to the procurators for arrest warrants when necessary, and the procurators, in turn, "squawk" about issuing the demanded warrant. And the teenagers under investigation continue to commit crimes.

G. Yakubauskas, a 17-year-old Yelgava resident, committed 11 crimes during his preliminary investigation; his fellow townsman and equal in age, S. Dementyev, 7 crimes. The list could be continued.

So what basis is there to complain about the cruelty toward juvenile violators of the law?

V. Rubstov's article cites a certain undersized, puny little guy who went through a rape trial, got 2 years' imprisonment, but was released after 18 months. We speak of A. Timofeyev, a former student at the Rezeknenskiy State Professional-Technical College No 14. He is now already 18 years old.

On 5 February 1987, Timofeyev and two other minors invited a girl to a discotheque, having beforehand conspired to rape her. They tricked the girl into the woods.

Timofeyev fully acknowledged his guilt at the trial. The court took into consideration the frank confession and the age of the accused, and applied article 41 of the Latvian SSR Criminal Code, setting a measure of punishment beneath the lowest limit. I do not know how the article's author feels, but Timofeyev does not arouse my sympathy, personally. And there is no need to talk about the cruelty of the court, or the correction of some court error by means of early release of a rapist.

Perhaps the commission on juvenile affairs is showing excessively strong measures? The facts speak differently.

A. Ustimenko and V. Frolov of Ogre were brought before the rayispolkom commission for theft and other violations, seven (!) times in spite of the law, and each time,

the commission made its decision for only their probationary direction to a special educational institution. Now Ustimenko and Frolov have over 20 crimes on their record. The investigation is underway, and they remain free.

An important task of the commission is to control the behavior of teenagers who have been convicted without incarceration. By law, material about a convict who has committed three administrative violations must be sent to the court for a reduction in the suspension of the sentence. In practice, it sometimes works out otherwise.

The commission under the Daugavpilskiy rayispolkom declined a petition to the IDN [Juvenile Affairs Inspection] for the removal of the suspensions of A. Danilov and Ye. Fokin, who renounced work and study, and were wandering as vagrants. Soon afterwards, Danilov was arrested for rape.

Such examples are not isolated.

I cannot agree with V. Rubtsov's assertion that the IDN only hangs on the kids the "labels of potential criminals, establishing the appropriate supervision over them."

There are over 6,000 teenagers registered in the republic IDN. (I hope that the article's author knows that only those who have already started down the slippery path of violations are taken into the register). Each inspector is responsible on the average for 35 such teenagers from the 4,000-5,000 kids who live in the sector served, and for whom to some extent he also has to watch out in the sense of prevention. Moreover, he must also work with the parents, without giving his own children enough attention.

Schools more frequently want to rid themselves of "problem" teenagers, and to set up these "dunces" in work—frequently an unresolvable problem under the conditions of enterprises making the transition to economic accountability, when a full work contribution is expected from each worker.

The "Teenager" operation conducted in the republic in September-October 1989 revealed 1,096 kids who were not engaged either in study or socially useful work. This is the contingent which most frequently falls under the influence of the criminal elements.

Teen clubs, of which there had been few, are now closing, and the premises are being given to cooperatives. For example, recently in Riga's Kirovskiy Rayon, Housing groups [ZhERs—not further identified] No. 13 and No. 32 were given to cooperatives—as pure income—the "Olimpiya" club for a video salon, and the "Planeta" club for computer games.

The Komsomol has simply forgotten about pedagogical patronage. The commission for assistance to the family and the school is assisting no one and is only noted in reports. It has been some time since members of Komsomol operations brigades were to be found at the

IDN. It works out that only the militia inspectors are carrying out individual work with teenagers.

"Does it bother us that the number of children about whom, in effect, nobody is thinking, is growing?" V. Rubtsov poses the question. Here he is absolutely correct: Children have to be noticed before they perpetrate violations. It is justly noted in the article that "We have all around us an entire system of social and legal children's protection that is not working harmoniously." It is necessary to improve it, as well as criminal legislation.

The first steps in this direction have been taken: On 1 December 1989, the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree "On Immediate Measures to Strengthen Law and Order in the Republic and to Intensify the Fight Against Crime." A group was created to develop the draft of the system for preventing violations and defending the interests of minors. It includes, in particular, representatives of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the MVD, and Latvian State University imeni P. Stuchka.

Possibly, courts should be created to consider cases linked to juvenile crimes. Not the commissions, who have outlived their purpose, but the courts should do assignments to the special educational institutions. It is advisable to create in the local soviet ispolkoms departments for the defense of children's and teenagers' rights.

A true show of humanism toward minors is the improvement of prevention work. Criminals cannot go unpunished only because they have not yet turned 18 years of age. We cannot fail to take into consideration the fact that the criminal world has gotten substantially younger. Teenagers dangerous to society must not roam freely, continuing their encroachment upon the property, health, and even the life of citizens.

### **Ukrainian Regional KGB Head on Image, Changes, Dissidents**

90UN0563A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 22 Nov 89 p 3

[Interview with Lvov Oblast KGB Head S. I. Malyk by O. Telenchi: "We Are Building a Bridge of Trust. Dialog With S. I. Malyk, Head of the Ukrainian SSR KGB Lvov Oblast Administration"]

[Text] Perestroika and glasnost have introduced correctives into the activities of the organs of state security, which until recently were not very well known to the broader public, although the excessive secrecy of that department was by no means always dictated by the interests of the state. In 1918, YEZHENEDELNIK ChK was published openly, where people could read the orders and directives of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the reports of the departments, reports from the territories occupied by the White Guards, and even lists of counterrevolutionaries sentenced by the Soviet authorities. The bulletin did not last long; only six



issues came out, and since that time our knowledge of the work of the organs of state security have been formed primarily under the influence of motion pictures and popular television films. But now the mask of secrecy has been removed, and recently we have come to find out a great deal both about the exploits of the Chekists and about the criminal activities of particular officials of the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. Now the functions of the organs of state security have been reduced somewhat. Abundant archival documents have been brought to light, and necessary correctives have been made in the laws. This marks the beginning of a great effort that must be carried out in order to ensure the legal status of the KGB.

Our correspondent interviewed S. I. Malyk, head of the Ukrainian SSR KGB Lvov Oblast Administration, concerning the role of the organs of state security in our life today, and the tasks and problems facing workers in that sector.

[Correspondent] It is no secret to you, Stanislav Ivanovych, that for some considerable length of time the KGB constituted a "state within a state" which held a patent on ultimate truth. Parents would invoke this "boogeyman" to disobedient children. When I started out in Lvov University, we were also afraid of the "invisible boogeymen," thinking that every student group must have its KGB collaborator, and we even tried to guess just who it was.

[Malyk] Every group? You're flattering us....

[Correspondent] At that time, erroneous notions about the state security workers were shaped under the influence of the mask of secrecy; now, however, notions are shaped considerably under the influence of numerous articles about Stalin's repressions and the persecution of "dissidents" during the stagnation period.

[Malyk] I have been working in the organs of state security for over 40 years, and I know their history from more than just books. I cannot agree that the portrait of the Chekist should be depicted in exclusively black colors.

In raising the curtain of the past, we ought to look at more than just the bloody deeds. Even during the worst years of the repressions, not everyone was a Beriia. Consider this: We speak of the Stalin-Beriia regime and thereby point up the secondary role of the law enforcement organs, their submission to the political system. Even during that period, the "state within a state" was by no means totally autonomous and independent.

Quite frequently, the organs of the KGB are accused of total violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. It is an unfounded accusation, and later on I will attempt to prove it. But when it comes to espionage, terrorism, and sabotage (the kind of crimes that are difficult to fight using traditional methods), the law allows us to employ forms and methods of work that are necessary for it—this is justified by the interests of state security.

As for the "patent on truth," I should like to state that in the past the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the organs of the KGB were not always precisely delineated, and quite a few officials of various departments and organizations, in attempting to protect themselves and avoid responsibility for particular decisions, asked the KGB for help. Even in trivial matters. The situation truly began to change after the 20th Party Congress, but political inertia and the old stereotypes and notions about our organization persist to this day. This is attested by the still widespread rhetorical question, "What's the KGB thinking of?" Other people, contrariwise, think that the KGB is everywhere and sees everything.... No extremes in notions about our organization correspond to the true state of affairs. Obviously we need to do some serious explanatory work, meet with people more often and answer questions without reservations and "conditions." Such meetings are already being held. And the initiative is often taken by particular individuals or groups who are interested in creating a negative idea about the organs of state security.

[Correspondent] Would you please characterize the basic functions and character traits of today's KGB worker, his level of education, social culture (knowledge of languages, literature and the arts, psychology, philosophy) and also the principles by which cadres are selected to work in the organs of the KGB.

[Malyk] The main functions of the organs of state security, in particular our administration, are to combat the subversive efforts of the Western special services, foreign anti-Soviet organizations, to protect state secrets in the economy, prevent emergencies and extraordinary actions, combat smugglers and currency speculators, render prompt aid to border guards in protecting the frontiers, and fight organized crime.

In late September of this year we received over a thousand requests, appeals, and complaints from citizens. Strange as it seems, however, we are very frequently appealed to as a last resort by persons who have lost all hope of a fair solution to their problems relating to matters which are not in our jurisdiction. We practically never get repeat complaints, probably because the KGB system has instituted an efficient procedure for working with citizens' letters and complaints, a procedure which rules out the possibility of delays and uncertainties in responses. All responses are made in the shortest possible time.

Operations workers in the organs of state security, as well as anyone preparing to enter service in the KGB, face a number of obligatory requirements: a state of health that meets the requirements of military VUZes, a secondary or higher education, and substantial life experience obtained through practical work in the national economy. Candidates for service in the KGB are recommended by party and Komsomol committees and labor collectives. The recommendations are examined at open party or Komsomol meetings. Candidates go through



various courses of instruction in the department's educational institutions. If necessary they are provided with fundamental training in a foreign language. There is also compulsory study of philosophy, the psychology of the individual and the psychology of the collective, and legal, military, and special disciplines. Acceptance into KGB service does not involve any restrictions relating to nationality, the profile of one's higher education, and so on. Presently employed in the KGB administration are specialists of a great variety of profiles. The majority of them are Ukrainians, working hand in hand with representatives of 11 other nationalities. The KGB system provides for continuous upgrading of the qualifications of every worker in matters of the professions, and in the legal and historical and cultural fields. Let me take this opportunity, on behalf of the entire collective of the Ukrainian KGB, to express our sincere thanks to the scientists of the Lvov University for a cycle of interesting fundamental lectures.

One of the most important tasks of the organs of state security is the rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism. We sincerely share the nation's sorrow and are doing everything we can to restore the good names of all those who were repressed unlawfully during the period of the Cult. The most highly qualified investigators and operations workers of the Ukrainian KGB are involved in reviewing the cases of victims of repressions. Over 7000 cases are being reviewed, and more than 2200 persons have been rehabilitated. For the most part we are successfully tracing the relatives of the victims of repression, and they, in accordance with present legislation, are given documents concerning the rehabilitation of their loved ones; property and other claims are settled through the executive committees of local soviets. Similar work was being done back in the mid-1950s, and at that time a total of around 10,000 persons were rehabilitated.

All archival criminal cases without exception are now undergoing review. I should like to say that 78 persons involved in 56 cases have been denied rehabilitation. They include traitors to the Fatherland, members of gangs [bandforuvannya] and other persons whose crimes are not covered by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 16 January 1989.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Ivanovych, what does perestroika mean in the organs of state security? To what extent have their activities been subject to legal control during the perestroika period? I should also like to dwell in detail on your attitude toward the informal organizations as well as the court trials that took place in the 1970s.

[Malyk] The organs of the KGB form a part of the state organism. All the complexities of life and the shortcomings of the social and economic system inevitably impact on us as well. Perestroika has directly impinged upon the system of KGB procedures [ustanovy] and brought about a number of structural and qualitative changes: the so-called Fifth Administration of the KGB has been liquidated, subunits have been created to protect the

constitutional principles of the state and combat organized crime. We have given concrete form to our functional obligations, got rid of old functions that constituted a burden to us, and mapped out priority directions of activity. The concept of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda has been eliminated from juridical practice, and criteria for assessing illegal activities have been made more concrete. For those who consider the organs of the KGB "a state within a state," I should like to emphasize once more: the organs of the KGB cannot be independent of the state, because in their activities they are guided by the laws and normative acts that are drawn up and approved by the country's highest legislative authority.

We are not remaining aloof from the process of creating a state of law, and we are especially desirous that this come about as quickly as possible. The republic and the country are already in great need of a well-considered, validated body of laws which will effectively protect every person against any infringements on his rights. As soon as possible I should like to see the adoption of a law on state security which would regulate the legal status and concrete actions of organs of the KGB.

I also think we need a law on social associations which would regulate their activities and promote perestroika. In some informals, however, dazzling slogans and fashionable appeals serve as a front for nothing other than the desire to ruin, liquidate, and bring down.... Perestroika should mean rebuilding, creation, not ruination.

As for doubts as to the fairness of court sentences in the 1970s against "dissidents," I can say that anyone who believes himself to be convicted illegally has the right, guaranteed by law, to appeal the court's decision and to get the case reviewed.

I believe, however, that we need to look more deeply into these matters. The court sentences of the 1970s resulted from the fight against "dissidents" not by the KGB but by the social and political system of the time, a part of which, to be sure, included the law enforcement organs, which operated within the framework of the laws of the time without violating them.

Now as to relations between the Ukrainian KGB and persons who served their sentence. At all times they were unforgivable [neprostymyy]. For this reason we undertook to talk with them even when they obviously did not desire it. And with many we were able to structure our relations in such a manner that for the most part it primarily benefited them. For example, as a result of persistent and very difficult and quarrelsome discussions, many persons at various times refrained from unlawful acts.

The organs of state security have an innate, humane attitude toward people, and it is a pity that the public at large knows less about that than about the wrongdoing of the former NKVD.

Certain of today's leaders of the informal associations of Lvov who have served sentences cannot deny that the Ukrainian KGB itself, among others at the time, took the trouble to see to it that they were given residence permits in Lvov, that it resolved questions relating to placing them in jobs at a time when a kind of vacuum had formed around them. Because managers of enterprises preferred to have nothing to do with such people. When we saw someone who needed help, we helped him as well as we could.

These people cannot accuse the KGB of any discrimination in regard to their children. Those who wished to go to school are either in school or have graduated from college.

Now as to political labels. Really, both "rightists" and "leftists" resort to them all too quickly. However, there are labels and there are political characterizations; they ought not to be confused. What are we to call those who demand the liquidation of the CPSU or the Ukraine's secession from the USSR? Those who call for the revival of OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] and its fellow-traveling organizations of the Plast type? Those who call for a struggle to rehabilitate former members of OUN-UPA [Ukrainian Rebel Army] as being victims of Stalin's repressions? And in general is it reasonable to formulate the question that way?

Recently, representatives of UKhS [Ukrainian-Helsinki Association] have been complaining that people are calling them extremists. If you get a chance, observe some of their speeches at rallies: there's not a speech that does not contain dozens of labels and specific depictions of various persons. There is an absence of cultivated debate, there is legal ignorance of numerous participants in the rallies. How about calls for strikes and demonstrations? Such irony: Vyacheslav Chornovil himself calling for prophylactic strikes, the man who stopped going to work in February 1988. Other leaders of the UKhS, also, do not work anywhere.

And if you analyze the basic document of the UKhS—their declaration of principles—and compare it with the documents of the last, the 7th "Grand Assembly" of foreign units of the Ukrainian nationalists, you will see that the basic, fundamental postulates of the declaration have been plagiarized, namely: the idea of an independent Ukrainian state, the demand to create national armed forces, the call to legalize the Greek-Catholic Church, and so on. How does this similarity come about? In my opinion, it comes from the similarity of the ideas and goals, also the necessity of obtaining substantial material aid from abroad. Automobiles, personal computers, video and sound recorders—all of these cost much more in the USSR, yet they are being sent in abundance to the leaders of UKhS from abroad. Public donations make up a particular "item of income" for the UKhS. They don't even demand a "company report" concerning expenditures, and never suspect the kind of dramatic situations that arise during the distribution of the foreign gifts and Soviet rubles....

Speaking of dissidents and the radicalization of views on the prospects of the development of society, commentary is necessary on the somewhat one-sidedness of our democracy and glasnost. Consider, for example, those places on Lenin Prospekt where plans call for erecting a monument to T. H. Shevchenko. It has now been transformed into a kind of improvised "agitation center" in which unverified, tendentious, and in some cases openly untruthful information is freely purveyed. The overwhelming majority of visitors to the "agitation center," noting the efficiency with which samizdat publicizes events, are still critical of what is written. Yet a great many Lvovians are inclined to believe samizdat.

The fact remains that so far we are losing the political debate in competition with the informal speakers. I emphasize that we are not losing because we have nothing to say but rather because we are not participating enough.

[Correspondent] Recently there have been many attempts to attribute the "authorship" of all kinds of provocations to the KGB administration, for example the distribution of leaflets and rumors about "Jewish and Muscovite pogroms." This has given rise to a hostile attitude toward organs of state security among some segments of Lvovians. How are such things perceived by workers in the administration?

[Malyk] As for the provocative rumors which we have been accused of by leaders of the UKhS, I see this as a rather cheap trick to compromise the organs of state security in the eyes of the public. It's like a criminal running away and yelling, "Stop thief!" Under conditions of the state of law that we are building, anyone who accuses someone will be obligated to submit incontrovertible proof. In the absence of such, it is slander. Incidentally, the spokesmen for UKhS not only know how to make noise but also how to keep silent: in response to an article by V. Kovtun, head of the Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon Department of the Ukrainian KGB, Radio Liberty and its correspondent Mykhaylo Horyn have so far kept silent, for they have nothing to say.... In response to a cycle of articles by Alim Lysyuk of LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA, titled "Two-Faced Janus, or Once More About UKhS," the "patriots of the alliance" swarmed around the editorial offices and demanded to see the author and the editor. But when the author and the editor came out and proposed sitting down at the editors' desk for a detailed examination of the UKhS's claims, it turned out that, in fact, they had no claims. No discussion took place.

I should like to take this opportunity to say that any attempts to accuse the organs of state security of spreading provocative rumors among the population of Lvov and the oblast are absolutely groundless. All the prerequisites and general political background for such are not created by the Ukrainian KGB but those who benefit from such rumors.

I should like to remind the spokesman for OUN-UPA once more that before launching military action against the "forest-dwellers" [lisovyki], the Soviet authorities repeatedly announced an amnesty for those who gave up. And thousands of people came out of the underground and returned to normal life. Frequently, Chekist operations were preceded by considerable explanatory work among the people, urging them to persuade their relatives to come out of the woods. And only after all peaceful means were exhausted did the authorities resort to repressive measures. A fugitive [skhron] who was caught was never destroyed immediately. In all cases, the bandits were immediately given the chance to give themselves up and save their life. They were given a chance to reflect. However, war is war: those who would not give up, died....

People who remember that period will agree with me that alongside individual cases of violation of the law there were examples of the humanism and compassion of workers of the NKVD in relations with the people.

Unkindly disposed people who will not trouble themselves to look at the facts claim that the organs of the KGB are a burden on the people. Let me explain to them that we could support ourselves on the basis of self-financing for more than one five-year period. Take this recent example. Not long ago, the Mostiska Customs Station, with the active participation of our officers, thwarted an attempt to smuggle out 81 icons of the 16th through 18th centuries, items which were, frankly, priceless. Foreign catalogs appraise such things in the tens of millions of dollars. The customs officers, by the way, kept a certain percentage of the reward. That is not provided in our case.

A few years ago, administrations of the KGB caught a big gang of criminals who were engaged in currency speculation. The criminals included six foreign citizens. The total amount of the confiscated currency exceeded one million dollars. Criminal proceedings were instituted against about 20 persons. All the confiscated material valuables were turned over to the state.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Ivanovych, how do you personally perceive any guarantees of the irreversibility of

processes of democratization? Readers often ask how this tumultuous revolutionary perestroyka, with its abrupt turning points, is going to end up. People fear a return of the totalitarian regime.

[Malyk] I am apprehensive about the birth of a new type of totalitarianism under the mask of democracy. Is it really democracy when members of the Plast military-sports camp, which your newspaper has written about, teach the martial arts of karate and hand-to-hand combat under the Banderite banner? It's the adults who have organized everything. Whom are those youngsters supposed to defend, and against whom?

Is it really democracy when a crowd of thousands attempts to "bring the oblast procuracy to its knees"? Is it really democracy when over 3000 blindly hostile young people, after repeated explanations by the deputy chief of the MVD administration of the oblast executive committee and the chief of the city department of internal affairs, after proposals to discuss all complaints in a normal atmosphere around a table with representatives of the public, storm the militia? Isn't that mob totalitarianism?

And the total disrespect for the law passed by the new composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet? Isn't that reverse totalitarianism?

I have lived a long while on this earth, and I also frequently ask myself how it will all end. I believe that this question is one that both sides of our "Lvov standoff" ought to ask themselves. I believe that reason, the wisdom of society, will help to overcome the chaotic force of the crowd. Democracy is, above all, law and order.

In my opinion, the most reliable guarantees of the irreversibility of perestroyka and democratization lie in constantly perfecting legislation and establishing general order in society and all its state and political institutions of supreme legislative authority—the Congress of People's Deputies, elected by democratic means. Hence, further development of society to a large extent depends on the choices you and I make.

### Belorussian Resolution on Chernobyl Cleanup

90UN0858B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 1

[Resolution issued by the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers in Minsk; date not given]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers notes that in 1990, it was necessary to resettle 7,454 families in the republic from populated points subjected to radioactive contamination as the result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station [AES] in which the radiation dose might reach 35 rems, and from populated points where the content of radionuclides in the soil on agricultural land adjacent to them is 40 curies per square km or more, including 3,521 families from Gomel Oblast, 3,831 families from Mogilev Oblast, and 102 families from Brestsk Oblast.

In order to accelerate resolution of questions pertaining to the resettlement of this number of families, the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers resolves the following:

1. To adopt the proposal of the oblast executive committees [oblastpolkoms] to provide 2,691 apartments during the first quarter of 1990 for citizens who resettle out of populated points subjected to radioactive contamination, broken down as follows:

1.1. One thousand five hundred seventy-eight [apartments] for the inhabitants of Gomel Oblast, including 628 in that oblast, 200 in Brestsk Oblast, 300 in Vitebsk Oblast, 250 in Grodno Oblast, and 200 in Minsk Oblast;

1.2. One thousand eleven [apartments] for the inhabitants of Gomel Oblast, including 270 in that oblast, 140 in Brestsk Oblast, 301 in Vitebsk Oblast, 150 in Grodno Oblast, and 150 in Minsk Oblast;

1.3. One hundred two apartments in Brestsk Oblast for the inhabitants of that oblast.

To take under advisement the fact that the Minsk Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] will be allocated 236 apartments for citizens who are not able-bodied for resettlement in housing near close relatives (if need be in improved housing conditions), including 100 for the inhabitants of Gomel Oblast and 136 for inhabitants of Mogilev Oblast.

2. To oblige the Gomel and Mogilev Oblispolkoms [Oblast Soviet Executive Committees] jointly with the Brest, Vitebsk, Grodno, and Minsk Gorispolkoms to provide during the first quarter of 1990 for the resettlement to permanent places of residence of 2,927 families from populated points as provided for in List 1 (a, b) of the Stet Program for the Cleanup in the Belorussian SSR Following the Accident at the Chernobyl AES for the Period 1990-1995, giving priority to families that have children aged under 14 years, pregnant women, and persons for whom for medical reasons it is not recommended that they live in those populated points.

3. The Gomel and Mogilev Oblispolkoms, jointly with the Belorussia trade union council will, if necessary, provide for accommodation of families resettled to the new housing settlements, at their request, in sanatoria and health-maintenance facilities, rest homes and pioneer camps in use year round, for temporary residence in 1990 until construction of these settlements has been completed.

4. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Trade, Belorussian Cooperative Union, Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, and Belorussian SSR Ministry of Public Education, and the oblastpolkoms and rayispolkoms [rayon soviet executive committees] shall, if necessary, organize at sanatoria, health-maintenance facilities, rest homes, and pioneer camps to which inhabitants from regions contaminated with radionuclides are sent trade in everyday commodities and provide medical care for citizens, and also teaching and training processes for schoolchildren and children of preschool age who have been resettled with their parents.

M. Kovalev, chairman,  
Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.  
A. Sokolovskiy, deputy chief,  
Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers—  
Administration of Affairs.

### Proceedings of First Ukrainian Ecology Congress Reported

90UN0561A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 15 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by special correspondent V. Smaha: "The Greens Are Still Green. Polemical Notes From the First Congress of the Green World Ecological Association"]

[Excerpts] Life changes, and we along with it. Two years ago a young bearded informal, rather exotic to look at, brought to the editors an announcement about the formation of the Green World Association, attached to the Ukrainian Peace Committee. The desire to outstrip everybody is probably one of newspaperdom's professional diseases. Therefore, I moved quickly to sign to press the first announcement in the Soviet press about the formation of the Ukrainian Greens. And the next day I was compelled to argue a long time, apparently, about the reliability of the fact. For some reason the news caused consternation in the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Environmental Protection. And I asked that young bearded informal prior to the Greens Congress—such things do happen—for an invitation for one of the officials of the State Committee for Environmental Protection!

From not wanting even to believe in the creation of Green World to wanting to take part in the work of its congress is, you must agree, quite a change. Reasonably enough, the Association immediately registered officially with the State Committee. It seems to me this is one of the most positive changes in our life. Without fruitful cooperation of both the state environmental protection

organ and the independent ecology organization, in my opinion, nothing substantial at all can be achieved. Why?

Regular readers of this newspaper already know the answer to that question. Since the start of the year we have, in the course of a special newspaper campaign, been monitoring the implementation of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On the Radical Restructuring of Environmental Protection in the Country." And we have found that in implementing the decree, the departments (and they have plenty of experience in this) have skillfully translated the thing into a kind of long-term project [dovgobud]. At present the environmental protection organs, as one of our writers put it, are rather like "the premature child of an apparatus game." Not even a statute [polozhennya] on the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection yet exists in nature.... And, undoubtedly, it will be able to overcome the resistance of the departments only with the help of the public. Unquestionably, the Ukrainian Green World has stated its position most fully and consistently in our republic.

It is not surprising that RADYANSKA UKRAYINA printed Green World's draft charter, gave a forum to its leaders, and held public discussions of the Greens' steering document. [passage omitted]

And now—the Green World Congress. Over 600 delegates from all areas of the republic gathered in the Kiev Artists House, and there were guests from Great Britain, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Canada, and the United States.... The Congress was participated in by USSR people's deputies and representatives of party, soviet, and environmental protection organs. Green World welcomed outstanding writers Oles Honchar and Borys Oliynyk. The Association's program was discussed and adopted, and its charter and a packet of resolutions were approved.

In short, the event turned out beautifully and, on the whole, positively. One must certainly endorse the Ukrainian Greens' noble slogan, "Survival, Democracy, Humanism." One must certainly recognize the progressive nature of the principles of the Association's existence as proclaimed in Green World's documents: Non-violent action, a diversity of public initiatives, a struggle for complete ecological glasnost. And one has to give credit to the skillful propaganda efforts of the Greens.

The first issue of the newspaper ZELENYY SVIT was distributed at the Congress. Its editor (an interesting precedent), M. Prylutsky, was elected by direct secret ballot. And Kiev artists and the creative group of the outstanding film "Nabat" did a good job of designing the facilities of the Congress.

Anyone who wanted to could inspect a map of the Ukraine's ecological troubles, which was dotted with the black blotches of all kinds of pollution. It showed convincingly that the Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozhye regions are on the brink of ecological disaster. And wherever the environment and people can no longer

stand the industrial burden, centers of the Greens are to be found. What kind of people work in them? I must confess it was a pleasure to meet the authors of numerous articles on ecology problems at the Congress, articles I was preparing to print sometime: people like V. Bilolid, an engineer in the South Ukrainian AES [nuclear power plant]; A. Shevchuk, a teacher from Odessa; V. Boreyk, a representative of student environmental squads of the Ukraine; Kiev writer D. Kulynyak; and Yu. Vysochyn, a designer from Cherkassk....

Green World today, in my view, is a rather variegated phenomenon. Noble ideas of protecting the environment have made it possible for a variety of people to take part in its work—people like A. Koval, head of the Nikolayev Obkom's [oblast party committee's] Ideology Department, and Bishop Jonathan; V. Kukhar, vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and M. Bidzilya, head of Rukh's Ecology Commission.... And that ability of the Ukrainian Greens to consolidate the efforts of representatives of literally all strata of society is probably the Association's strongest feature today.

Yuriy Shcherbak, the outstanding writer and USSR people's deputy who is the leader of Green World, proposed that the possible paths of organizing the Association's development be discussed at the Congress. As is well known, there are three basic forms of Greens organization in the world. The first is the kind of Association that now exists in the Ukraine, a voluntary association of a variety of groups on a platform of fighting to avert an ecological crisis. In the second, the apolitical nature of the Greens is emphasized, of the kind, in particular, that is argued for by Peter Wilkinson, the representative of the well-known Greenpeace organization. And, finally, the formation of a Greens Party. Such a party, in fact, is active in the political arena of the FRG.

In conversation with journalists, Yuriy Shcherbak emphasized that a "Western model" is by no means envisioned. He went on to say, "We don't see ourselves as an opposition party. A confrontation with the Communist Party is out of the question. In fact, it is perfectly possible to be a member of both the Communist and the Greens parties. Examples of this kind of collaboration already exist. Kiev's Moscow Raykom [rayon committee] has become a collective member of Green World. Our republic's Greens do not need political power. A Greens Party is necessary to fight for the passage of political decisions having to do with ecological problems. It is also needed so that the new ecological thinking can, with the help of Greens deputies, exert influence from the Supreme Soviet down to the village soviets and become the norm in our society."

I believe Yuriy Shcherbak's sincerity. But inasmuch as his idea was endorsed by the majority of the votes at the Congress, and Point 12 of the Green World Program speaks of the intention to start preparations for the creation of a Greens Party, I should like to express my own thoughts on the matter. A party, as we know, means

politics. And politics, as some great man put it, is the art of the possible. Let's think about this: Would the recent substantial successes of the Ukrainian Greens have been possible at all without the Association's characteristic ability to unite the efforts of all?

M. Zolotukhin from Nikolayev spoke at the Congress. The obkom and oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] supported the Greens. The construction of new units of the South Ukrainian AES was halted. S. Shuvaynikov, from the Crimea, reported uneasiness on the part of the people in the oblast. Might not the nuclear power workers sometime, after the halting of construction on the Crimean AES, turn the simulator [trenazher] into a working plant? A representative of the public might imagine. It must be kept in mind, however, that without the support of the scientists of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the leaders of party and state organs (no need to give their names) at the republic level, there would have been no decision to halt the construction of the Crimean AES at all. However, to imagine that it was not representatives of the Association that were involved in resolving such serious issues but rather people of the Greens Party, which, as has been mentioned, "does not need political power," existing just to "make political decisions..." would not, in my opinion, yield good results.

No one denies that solving big ecological problems requires not only reform of the political system but economic reform as well. But such processes are already underway and are gathering force. And no one is preventing Green World from taking part in them. Let's be frank: There were those among the guests at the Congress who were visibly disturbed by talk about a Greens Party. But others among the delegates fell into real euphoria over that formulation of the issue. For this reason, during speeches by I. Lyakh, the deputy head of the Ukrainian State Committee for Environmental Protection, or V. Kukhar, the vice-president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Congress resembled a rally. And I couldn't help thinking, How green our Ukrainian Greens still are, in a political sense! I would liken the state of the Association today to that of an adolescent who perceives action only in terms of black and white, without shades of color, either "real rotten" or "super." But no serious politician can afford emotions that might influence decisions on serious issues. Yet, as was shown in Odessa, they are doing so in Green World.

A lot of time on the first day of the Congress was spent in making eloquent speeches, while representatives of youth (as some students told me) were for some time not admitted to the speaker's stand by the Presidium. Why, incidentally, were the Presidium and the directive organs of Green World, elected on the basis of a slate [spysok], by open ballot?

It isn't logical to talk lavishly of democracy and yet organize the work of the Congress on the model of the unfortunate recent past. And in the very documents of

the Congress one can find childish demands alongside mature and useful proposals.

Let's take a look, for example, at the Congress's resolution "On the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Environmental Protection." Alongside the perfectly logical proposal to place the republic Committee for Environmental Protection under the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, which is consistent with the content of reform of the political system, we find a proposal to remove certain of its officials from their posts. Yet, as everyone knows, it is those officials who have been helping to implement decisions on restructuring environmental protection to the fullest extent. And the Green World Congress had the opportunity to enable them to draw for support on the still very powerful force of public opinion. Instead, a confrontation might arise that nobody wants.... Would that benefit or harm Green World itself?

Let me remind you, moreover, that the Association's strength lies primarily in its support from progressive scientists. What was the use of voting that V. Kukhar, the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences, was not yet ready to be accepted into the ranks of the Greens? I'm sorry but that's nonsense. And it benefited only those who have long dreamed of driving a wedge between the Academy of Sciences and Green World. Someone at the Congress posted a leaflet calling for the construction of some kind of "European-scale" plant in the Chernobyl zone to process nuclear wastes. Everything in it seemed true enough, but a knowledgeable person can immediately see how, by means of nearly imperceptible distortions of the facts, even the most worthwhile cause can be turned into a truly malicious cause...

In future issues, RADYANSKA UKRAYINA intends to publish a documentary analysis of the essence of the cause, and we very much hope that it will effectively put an end to tongue-wagging [balachky]. I will confess, therefore, that I personally was struck by how much the very appearance of that leaflet resembled, so to speak, an attack on Green World "from the left." There have also been attacks "from the right." Consider, for example, the attempt to foist [protyahty] upon the Association's directive organs one of the most eminent pushers of the infamous "project of the century"—the Danube-Dnepr Canal. But he wasn't elected. And the aforementioned leaflet was, finally, properly evaluated by the delegates, torn down, and thrown in the trashcan....

In my opinion, such acts show that the overwhelming majority of our Ukrainian Greens are intelligent people, and that the Green World Congress quite accurately reflected a state of public consciousness that, while not simple, is on the whole positive. We need to be realistic and realize that it is not the childish mistakes in some of the formulated resolutions, but rather the sincere desire of hundreds of thousands of people to protect their native earth, that is directing all the processes in Green World. That's why I'm convinced that common sense will triumph and the maturity of the Ukrainian Greens will carry the day.

### Attack at 'Aprel' Writers Group Meeting Described

90UN0796A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 24 Jan 90 p 2

[Report by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondent V. Cherkesov, retired colonel of justice: "Pogromists in the Central House of Letters"]

[Text] [Robert Rozhdestvenskiy] This was not the first meeting of "Aprel." The announced "open microphone" was nothing new either. Even before, meetings had been held where whoever so desired, including nonmembers of the Union of Writers, could speak, ask questions, or express an opinion on any problem. People could either agree or disagree with them. And although the arguments were at times quite heated, despite all the goading, everything was just fine.

Then, that night, when the chairman found out that several dozen young people calling themselves "Russian patriots" were in the hall, he calmly opened the meeting and even said that he was prepared to offer these guests the floor.

Everything started happening almost at once.

The "guests" had a megaphone that was so loud it completely drowned out the loudspeakers. They announced: "But we have no intention of holding a discussion with you." Then whooping, cursing, malicious outcries, threats: "Half-breeds! Yid-Masons! Get your asses out of here! We're calling our own meeting! The next time we're coming here with submachineguns." So much for the "news of literary life."

I still can't forget one megaphone phrase: "You who have broken away from Russian writers..." There is something in that phrase that's inappropriate for a shout, something previously prepared. And very familiar in intonation. Perhaps I'm mistaken, but that intonation reminded me of the now well-known plenum of the RSFSR Union of Writers held a few months ago. True, then, at the plenum, only theoreticians of racial purity in our literature spoke. Today, in the same hall, practitioners were speaking as well. The "inspired writer's word" was followed by actual deed.

A deed that smacked of pogrom.

Nationalism can call itself patriotism as much as it likes. However, by its very essence, according to the natural laws of its development, it will still turn into fascism. The most ordinary fascism with all the consequences inherent to that ideology.

The chief consequence in such instances is often blood. After all, that is what is flowing. That and tears...

Is this really the path to a revived spirituality?

[Vladimir Kornilov] It feels rather awkward to be writing about what happened here when in Baku blood is flowing and people are being thrown from the roof simply for

being Armenians. After all, in the Central House of Letters three dozen or so guys altogether shouted threats at Jews that are as old as the world and promised next time to come with submachineguns instead of a megaphone. True, one older woman had her arm twisted as they tried to take away her camera; two writers were struck (one of them, Anatoliy Kurchatkin, had his glasses broken and his eyes hurt). But still, this is not Baku, not Sumgait!

However, it didn't start with a murder there either. There too it all built up by degrees until, as we say, the "organizational rails" were set. That is why we cannot be silent about these thirty or so young hoods. After all, someone needs them, someone sent them.

Try to march just ten meters down the axis street of Gorky—immediately you'll be dragged off to the police station, whereas they have been known to march in columns of several hundred. Try to gather a handful of people on Red Square. Seven such brave souls did just that in August 1968 and immediately found themselves behind bars. But here, please, bring whoever you want to an unauthorized meeting, even people's deputies. Try, finally, to walk into the House of Letters without a membership card. No, a strong arm is felt behind all this, and one cannot help but think that someone is assembling from these young hoods a Praetorian guard.

But we do have a Constitution, and now even a Constitutional Oversight Committee. They are obligated to do away with these excesses.

[Vladimir Dudintsev] In my opinion, the chief goal of the demonstration held at the last meeting of "Aprel" was to strike a blow against what has been achieved in the course of perestroika. It lines right up with the Leningrad meeting where there was a poster: "Politburo to Account." And with the facts of the crude "torpedoing" and "gagging" of progressive speakers at the first Congress of People's Deputies. I myself saw the slogan: "A.N. Yakovlev—Get out of the Politburo!" hung by young hoods at our meeting. I have deep respect for Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev as a politician, as a scholar, as a diplomat, and as a writer as well. So I feel that the Central House of Letters incident was inspired and well thought out by someone. I say "someone" because the people from the "Pamyat" society whom I saw at the writers' meeting—dull-eyed people with puffy faces, unwashed, uncombed, looking more like criminals (I saw the corresponding emblems on their jackets)—they are incapable of political thinking. They are capable only of executing someone's will. And judging by how energetically they were "stoking away" at the meeting, I submit they were well paid. Well, anti-Jewish shouts have always served as a smokescreen for us. The appearance of that symptom is the surest signal of public danger threatening everyone who thinks progressively. And, of course, not only Jews but us as well, the reviving Russian intelligentsia, in whose interests "Pamyat" extremists awkwardly take refuge.



**Investigation Attempt: What Measures Were Taken by the Organs of Law and Order in Connection with the Events of 18 January at the Central House of Letters [TsDL]?**

Responding to a call from the Central House of Letters administration, two police officers proved incapable of bringing about order. The police had to be called again. The supplementary detail that came attempted to enter into negotiations with the so-called patriots. They were called out of the hall. Somehow, though, the police never got the most active participants in the provocation. One K. V. Astashvili (he calls himself Smirnov), who shouted pogromist anti-Semitic slogans over the megaphone in front of everyone, was handed over by the police at the TsDL entrance to two unknown persons, whereupon they beat an utterly calm retreat. This is the account given by participants in the writers' meeting who went to the 83rd police station in order to give the necessary explanations. Here they were treated crudely, jeeringly, familiarly. They got the impression that the detained brawlers and not the victimized writers enjoyed particular sympathy. This is confirmed by the conversation I had there the next day with police chief I. D. Chevka and his deputy A. M. Suchkov.

[I. D. Chevka] I haven't studied the report yet, therefore I'm not going to answer any questions... We did not arrest anyone or record anyone's name... We did not force anyone to come to the police station, both sides suggested coming to the station to sort things out and they did. There were no victims. One writer's glasses broke in his hands.

[A. M. Suchkov] It's the writers' own fault... One of the writers called the scandal's initiators "fascists." That's when the fight broke out...

In order to get more exhaustive information on the measures taken, we called N. A. Gerasimov, executive head of RUVD (Russian Internal Affairs Administration). "What, don't you have anything to write about?" he asked. "Blood is flowing in Azerbaijan, and what are you doing? I have no desire to talk with you." And he hung up. Does that mean we're going to wait until the pogromists take off their gloves everywhere?

True, the next day our conversation with Gerasimov was quite proper, but unfortunately just as lacking in results. "Until the investigation is over," he said, "your editors are going to get no more information. That's the law." Yes, according to the law, news media cannot make public materials in their possession. But we are not asking to be told all the details about the course of the investigation. However, there are many alarming questions to which society has a right to answers today. Why wasn't the obvious leader of the brawlers Smirnov-Astashvili brought in to the police? Who were those people to whom the police gave him over? Why were the writers spoken to at the 83rd police station in that unwarranted tone? And finally, what happened on 18 January at the TsDL must be categorized according to the law not only as malicious vandalism but also as

group actions directed toward inciting national strife (art. 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code; punishment—up to ten years imprisonment). According to this fact the investigation ought to be conducted by the prosecutor's office, not the police. However, the prosecutor's office, as we know, is not doing so. Why?

And more. As became clear, K. V. Astashvili, who was let go in peace and who is a worker at the "Sapfir" enterprise, has been nominated as a candidate for deputy to the Pervomayskiy Rayon Soviet by the "Fatherland" society. And citizen E. M. Lugovoy, who took part in the brawl and is a photo journalist for LYUBERETSKAYA PRAVDA, is a candidate for deputy to the Moscow Soviet. Can people of such ways really represent the interests of the people in the organs of power?

\* \* \*

*We have been informed by the USSR Union of Writers that the administration's secretariat has addressed a request to the prosecutor's office to conduct a thorough investigation into this matter and punish the guilty parties.*

**But the Meeting Was Held**

Despite the outrageous incidents, after a while the "Aprel" meeting was continued and its task finally completed. An organizational committee of the all-union association of writers "Aprel" was created and practical steps for calling its constituent assembly in April 1990 were discussed.

The meeting was led by I. Duel, Ye. Yevtushenko, and Ya. Kostyukovskiy. Among the speakers were S. Bukchin (Minsk), T. Gaydar, A. Zlobin, V. Kavtorin (Leningrad), P. Katayev, V. Leonovich, V. Oskotskiy, A. Rekemchuk, Vad. Sokolov, B. Sernov, T. Tolstaya, Yu. Edlis, people's deputies V. Samarin and G. Starovoytova. It was resolved to invite writers from all regions of the country to participate in the organizational committee and to prepare for a draft charter for the association for conference approval.

In connection with this incident, at the suggestion of Ye. Yevtushenko, those gathered approved the declaration unanimously.

**Ways To Increase Growth of Small Cities Noted**

90UN0723A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
19 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by A. Zholkov, chief, Sector of Settlement and Comprehensive Development of Populated Points, Council for the Study of Production Forces Under USSR Gosplan: "Exhausted Springs: Why Are Russia's Small Cities Dragging Out A Wretched Existence?"

[Text] The deepening of the social trend in the economy requires a multifaceted analysis of Russia's urban potential. There is an objectively heightened attention being paid to cities, their sense of self-awareness—financial,



economic, cultural, and moral—and the introduction of regional cost accounting. Because, after all, it is specifically the urban environment which will become the primary field of action for the mechanism of self-government and self-financing.

The Leninist definition of the role to be played by cities as the engines of progress is timely even nowadays. However, breakdowns in the operation of these engines are becoming more and more evident. At present more than 73 percent of Russia's entire population lives in its cities; this, by the way, is more than in all the remaining union republics. The concentration of the population in Russia's cities considerably exceeds the union indicator, which is equal to 66 percent. These cited figures are not just random. They reflect an undesirable tendency. The large cities continue to drain population away from the surrounding territories, thus depriving the land of its proper agricultural upkeep.

An impartial analysis likewise elucidates the unfavorable situation in the development of Russia's urban population itself, a skewing in the direction of concentrating the urban population in the large and largest cities. Thus, during the last 20 years the number of people living in cities with a population of a million or more increased from 15.4 million to 23.7 million. An even more significant population increase is to be observed in Russia's largest cities. But now at the other pole of urban potential—in the small cities—the picture, unfortunately, is different. Since 1970 the population of Russia's small cities has decreased and quite substantially so.

I can foresee the following objection: It will be said that this phenomenon is a common one throughout the entire world. Yes, that is the case. But there are different kinds of urbanization. In fact, in many developed countries the proportion of city-dwellers is higher than it is in Russia. In the United States, for example, they comprise 76 percent of the total population. However, in that country only 16 percent live in cities with populations of more than half a million. The remaining city-dwellers, i.e., the overwhelming majority of them, are "registered" specifically in the small cities.

Russia's small cities these days are dragging out a truly wretched existence. Their common scourge is a lack of roads. Out of 720 small cities, 106 are situated at a distance of more than 50 (!) kilometers from a railroad.

Most of these cities, which are losing population are old Russian cities, the "roots on the nation." Take Vologda Oblast, for example: Velikiy Ustyug, Totma, Ustyuzhna.... Here too is the oldest small city—Belozersk; it is part of Russian history itself. Moreover, the number of people living in this "patriarch" among cities is only 12,000—right on the borderline of the Census definition for a city.

We do not need to prove that settling people through a territory is an extremely important compositional, social aspect of the economy. But the crisis of the cities has many features. And, therefore, counteracting it must be

comprehensive, multifaceted, and coordinated. In this connection it would be feasible to pose the question of developing a targeted, comprehensive program for developing urban potential in tandem with the guidelines of the upcoming five-year plan. Its most important "connecting-rod" is activating the development of the small and medium-sized cities, as well as employing all measures to restrain the growth of the large and largest ones. Moreover, the economic guidance from above must be organically connected with urban self-government from below—as a genuine foundation for the qualitative transformation of the urban environment. The shortage of resources must be bridged and covered by a city's free and creative initiative. Moreover, urban self-government should be based on expanding communal property ownership, the legal possibilities of administering the activity of all the economic facilities located on the given city's territory, a firm tax-and-budgetary system, direct monitoring controls on the city's apparatus for administering the population, and, finally, the opportunity for each city to have its own urban-planning and building code.

The foundation of any self-government is self-financing and the independence of the entire budgetary and tax process. Therefore, we must, first of all, change the correlation between the central budget and the budget of the local Soviet. It is not a matter of eliminating the practice of subsidies. The center is, after all, still the center. The truth obviously consists of an intelligent combination of local independence and initiative with republic-level strategy. The new financial-and-budgetary mechanism of self-government should, first of all, provide a ratio between the revenues of the municipal budgets and the efficiency of the regional economy. Commerce, authority, and intelligent management will put the local leadership on a solid track and will fill its activity with human content. But the budgets of cities must also be formulated on the basis of long-term norms for deductions from the general state revenues, taxes, and payments from the profits of all enterprises situated in the city, regardless of their administrative subordination.

In my opinion, the time has come for us to create an All-Russian organization of cities (association or union), within the framework of which we can work out and implement a strategy of urban development, balanced on the scales of collective common sense.

### **Belorussia Seeks Chernobyl Relief Abroad**

*90UN0882A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 3*

[Interview with A.Ye Gurinovich, Belorussian SSR minister of foreign affairs, by unidentified BELTA correspondent: "The Whole World Against the Misfortune"; place and date not given]

[Text] The Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Ministry of Foreign Affairs is doing a great deal of work

to attract international organizations within the UN body and the foreign public to help in dealing with the consequences of the Chernobyl accident on the republic territory. A BELTA correspondent talks with A.Ye. Gurinovich, Belorussian SSR minister of foreign affairs, about this.

[Gurinovich] Last year, the minister reported, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helped to bring to our republic a group of foreign radiation safety experts recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and other international organizations. They conducted a series of monitoring measurements and discussed questions of radiation safety with Belorussian scientists. In October the IAEA Secretariat allocated \$50,000 to the republic to acquire certain kinds of complex equipment before the end of 1989. Requests have been made to the IAEA to implement a more significant program this year and in subsequent years, including the delivery of equipment, joint work, and grants for Belorussian specialists to spend time abroad. Now, with the participation of workers from the Ministry, work is being done on the question of setting up on the territory of the Belorussian SSR a branch of the Chernobyl International Scientific Research Center. Proposals dealing with a possible joint project with the United Nations Environmental Program [UNEP], WHO, and the Belorussian SSR with the goal of dealing with the consequences of the accident on Belorussian SSR territory have been drawn up and submitted for review by UNEP. Steps have been taken to recruit other international organizations for this work, including UNESCO, UNICEF, and others.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Yemelyanovich, what has been done with respect to the appeal from public organizations in the republic to fellow countrymen and other people of goodwill abroad?

[Gurinovich] We have been making efforts to circulate this appeal, translated into foreign languages, at sessions and conferences of international organizations and among the public in countries where the Belorussian SSR has representation in international organizations—New York, Vienna, Geneva, and Paris. References have been made to it in statements by the republic's representatives at international forums. For example, during the course of the work of the 44th UN General Assembly Session in New York, this appeal was circulated among all UN member states. It has been published in three newspapers that circulate in New York, giving the number of the open account of the permanent representation of the Belorussian SSR in the United Nations for the transfer of funds.

[Correspondent] Please say a few words about funds that have already been received.

[Gurinovich] The most active responses to the appeal have come from workers in Belorussian SSR institutions abroad, workers in the secretariats of international organizations from the republic, and also other Soviet citizens working abroad. They have contributed about \$5,000 of their own savings. This has already been used

to buy 14 highly accurate dosimeters, which are already in use in the republic, and also 28,000 disposal syringes and needles. Collection of funds continues. I would like to note in particular the students at the Soviet school in New York, who organized a bake sale using sweets that they made themselves, and with the money received acquired about 1,000 disposal syringes.

[Correspondent] And what has been the response of foreign citizens to the appeal?

[Gurinovich] They have already transferred \$1,100 into a special account opened in New York. The American pharmaceuticals company Andzhon [name as published] has expressed its readiness to send medicines and medical equipment to the Belorussian SSR to treat children. Contacts have been established with a number of businessmen and religious and other figures.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, should be done to activate funds from abroad?

[Gurinovich] In my opinion, this would be helped by adding to the republic program for the cleanup following the accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Station] an international section and by disseminating abroad information about the consequences of the accident and the republic's needs. This could be done, including at the government level, by making use of the possibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Correspondent] Is there anything else that you would like to say?

[Gurinovich] Permit me through the republic mass media to express my gratitude and thanks to all diplomats and experts from the Belorussian SSR working abroad, and to other Soviet citizens abroad, for their charity and voluntary contributions to the fund for help in the cleanup following the accident at the Chernobyl AES on the territory of our republic. We are also indebted to those foreign citizens who have responded to our misfortune.

#### **Latvian Council for Religious Affairs Reorganized**

18004007A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 4, 22-28  
Jan 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Department for Religious Affairs"]

[Text] The reorganized Latvian SSR Council for Religious Affairs under the USSR Council of Ministers is now called the Department for Religious Affairs. Henceforth it is accountable to the republic Council of Ministers. The Church is taking an active part in the processes occurring in the republic. In Latvia at present, where there are nine active confessions [churches], more than 640 parishes are registered and there are about 400 clergymen. Relations with the Church will be simplified with the introduction of

the republic department; this pertains in particular to publishing activities, travel abroad by clergymen, and other matters.

The republic Supreme Soviet commission is continuing work on the Latvian SSR law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations". Representatives of all confessions are taking part in this work.

### Political Discussion Clubs' Role in Youth Political Education

90UN0689A Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 18, Dec 89 pp 87-88

[Article by A. Strokanov, sector chief, and V. Lepekhin, instructor in the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Komsomol Central Committee: "What Kind of Political Education Do Young People Need?"]

[Text] Recently there has been an ever increasing need to answer the question of whether the system of Komsomol political education is necessary under present conditions. Speaking frankly, young people react negatively to any attempts to force yesterday's students to sit at school desks once again and to repeat what they have "passed" only recently. Of course, we cannot ignore the level of socio-political training, which the school or VUZ provides today. Alas, this level still is often low and does not meet the demands of life. But is the system of Komsomol political education capable of filling in the gaps and omissions in the teaching of social studies in the school and the teaching of party history, political economy or philosophy at the VUZ level? The answer can only be negative.

After all, for many years we counted on Komsomol political education to provide young people with a system of knowledge. From this came the unwieldy academic programs and the desire to do everything according to the methods used in party studies. The excessive organization, the formalism and the school-type methods for the conduct of political studies—that is what the Komsomol organizations successfully adopted from the party members. While party studies were able (and in some places are still able) to hold on through discipline and "compulsoriness," Komsomol studies are coming apart at every seam under these conditions. Not to mention the fact the youth political schools and seminars are given the lowest priority when propagandists are assigned. But even the best of them could not impart to the system of Komsomol political training a truly educational nature; they could not become instructors. The very orientation of political studies—the fact that it is aimed at obviously unrealistic goals—prevented and continues to prevent the propagandists from displaying in full measure their strongest points and qualities.

That is why the question "Is the political education of young people necessary?" should be replaced with another: "What kind of political education is necessary for young people?" There must be a shift away from academic programs and boring educational materials to open and honest conversation with young people on the basis of dialog. With the communists coming out ever more decisively against the old

approaches to political studies, such approaches are simply ruinous for the Komsomol. At the same time a free creative search for new forms of political education enriches the Komsomol organizations and helps them to extricate themselves from the crisis.

Political discussion clubs for young people are acquiring ever greater popularity in the country. At the start of this year there were about 8,000 of them. How do they attract young men and women? Above all by their democratic nature. No one is attempting to determine "from above" the work content and form, or to make accusations of political immaturity against those who bring up the most controversial and unexpected questions for discussion. Typically the discussion clubs operate within the framework of informal youth associations with a socio-political orientation or they are quite closely related to them.

What attitude should the Komsomol committees take toward the political clubs? This is by no means an idle question. The problem is that at first some Komsomol workers decided to take a position as detached observers with regard to the political club movement. There is, they say, a system of political education, but many discussion clubs do not "subscribe" to it... In fact, almost every political club has its own flavor, characteristic of it alone. The activities of the clubs are various and at times unpredictable; their composition is diverse and heterogeneous. The club may bring together youth and middle-aged people, for several months or for years. There may be five people or 100, who meet with each other once every two or three months or weekly. Is there any need to be frightened by such diversity? Certainly not.

Another problem is that by no means all Komsomol workers are capable of directing young people's political clubs. We are not talking about "paper" leadership and statistical summaries, in which everything is supposed to be "broken down to the number of pencils" and figures on the number of listeners, lessons and propagandists are supposed to be provided. This we have learned how to do. It is important that every Komsomol leader be able to become a genuine leader of young people, to carry on a dialog with them as equals. But some of our Komsomol committee secretaries come to the political discussion club as "inspectors" called on to judge whether the work here has the right slant. And sometimes these comrades do not resolve to hold their tongues; they express their viewpoint and get into an argument.

Probably the time has come to say with all determination to Komsomol workers that the youth political discussion club is that proving ground where their professional qualities, including competence, are tested. Here they take the political maturity examination. If a person does not pass it, if he walks away from a direct and open conversation with young people, that means he is not suited for Komsomol work.

The trend now is that the political clubs are gradually crowding out such traditional forms of Komsomol political education as schools and seminars. Not everyone

likes this. One hears the opinion, for example, that the political club has not "grown up" to the level which makes it possible for this form of study to become an equal among others, that it does not provide a system of knowledge. But did and do the current Komsomol political schools and seminars really provide such a system? Why pretend the desirable is the actual? Setting unrealistic goals and tasks before Komsomol political education and ignoring the interests and requirements of young people undermine the authority of the Komsomol. And we should not hang on for dear life to forms of study which do not enjoy popularity among young men and women. It would seem that the cause does not win if we overemphasize the good points of any one form of political study and the weak aspects and inadequacies of others. In each case it is important to proceed from life, to be guided by common sense, to put the interests of young people in first place.

In no way can one agree with those who think that the pursuit of knowledge which takes place in the political discussion clubs only amounts to "incompetent conversation by incompetent people." The favorite argument advanced by certain zealots of traditional Komsomol political education amounts to saying that serious study takes place only in political schools and seminars, while all the rest is "mere talk," a "refusal to study Marxism-Leninism," or the "substitution of political talk for serious study." Experience refutes such accusations. Many political discussion clubs steer young people toward independent work with primary sources, toward political self-education. And this is something which the Komsomol committees must support in every way possible.

At the political club of Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, which has been running here for more than two years, a good tradition has been established: any member of the political club may prepare a five-10-minute report for the upcoming discussion. They began by holding "anti-Stalinist" discussions. The speakers constantly turned to the classic works of Marxism-Leninism and to party documents. Many found that the lesson on the subject of "The Cult of Personality as a Phenomenon" left a lasting impression on them. The participants included representatives from the various MGU departments: philosophers, legal scholars, economists, psychologists and historians.

It should be especially emphasized that the political clubs contribute to an organic combination of theoretical studies and practice. They make it possible to resolve in large part that problem over which our system of Komsomol political education has "stumbled," causing it to remain in a crisis state. Previously those who attended the schools and seminars had to be convinced of the need to acquire political knowledge. But young people saw that this knowledge was frequently far from the truth, that often it was simply not in accordance with reality or with the actual state of affairs in society. Studies of this kind could only be built on "compulsoriness."

By the very nature of its work the political club helps to make people more politically active; it helps to draw them not only into the discussion of problems but also into the practical realization of any sensible proposals and ideas. In the political clubs young people move from explaining the essence of cost accountability [khozraschet] to eliminating the factors which are holding up its application at their own enterprise. They move from ecological studies to the organization of conservation measures such as rallies and subbotniks (voluntary weekend work), from conversations about democracy to the nomination of their own candidates for deputy and the development of election platforms. Yesterday's listeners are becoming active and equal participants in the educational process, fully conscious of their own responsibility for everything that takes place in the labor collective and in the country.

However, there are times when one comes across sessions during which criticism of the past and of our entire reality become virtually the main focus. Participants in the discussion sometimes raze to the ground the positions of those who are attempting to evaluate the past and the present objectively, to see the positives and negatives of events and phenomena. But they do not attempt to put forward a constructive program or even practical proposals. Here what is required is comradely counsel, consultation, including help from older people, above all from party workers and activists.

What, for example is the secret of the success of the political discussion club at the Oktyabrskiy Komsomol Raykom in the city of Kirov? The political club is headed by I. Kuimov, secretary of the Komsomol Raykom, and T. Zhukova, chief of the political education unit of the party raykom. Party workers, scholars and representatives from informal associations are invited regularly to attend the study sessions. Analysis and criticism of inadequacies are accompanied without fail by a joint collective search for ways to resolve specific problems.

Superfluous rules and excessive organization must be eliminated decisively from the system of Komsomol political education. What and how young people should study, what kind of educational programs and aids should be suggested to them, are not to be determined in the quiet of offices. Let young men and women themselves, based on their own interests and requirements, decide what knowledge they need. And certainly many of them will vote for political discussion clubs.

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#### **Komsomol Secretary, Others Examine Range of Youth Issues**

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[Interview with S. Smirnov, Komsomol Central Committee secretary, others, by journalist A. Petrov: "The Young Generation: Concerns and Fears"]

[Text] Can youth be considered a socially undefended group? What is the reason for the dependence of certain young people and how can it be overcome?

Are a single, integrated state youth policy and a law on youth as its legal basis needed?

Is society really facing the youth problem as a problem of the formation of a qualitatively new generation?

Why is the Komsomol in crisis? What should it be like today?

USSR people's deputies, scientists, and the Komsomol Central Committee secretary reflect upon these complex issues.

### Is A Law On Youth Necessary?

Andrey Plotnikov, USSR people's deputy

Today, youth is troubled by the fact that it frequently has to make do with low-level work, with an uncomfortable everyday life, and with the impossibility of receiving housing. The general dissatisfaction with life is extraordinarily high, even getting to the point of not accepting it. But while some are being disillusioned, others are attending rallies.

As a former chairman of a council of young specialists, I came up against various life situations on almost a daily basis. The situation was very difficult. At our combine alone, we ceased accepting new work applicants from among VUZ graduates three or four times. Many were forced to work outside of their specialties; we accept many young specialists as laboratory assistants and operators; they work in anticipation of the opportunity to labor in their professions. Things are the same for young workers who have received their training in our two base SPTU [agricultural professional-technical college]. Of course, we cannot become fixated on only the material aspects of life, even though in many ways, they determine the inner self-perceptions of the young person. But after all, things are no better with meeting cultural demands. In our Kirovo-Chepetsk, a city of 100,000, there is only one (!) movie theater. There is no point in talking about either its reperory, or the existence of other "centers" of culture.

Today, youth not only has no defense; it is also deprived of the opportunity to defend its rights, since they are not legislatively reinforced. It has one possibility—to request from the older generation. That is why the dependency of youth, talk of which has already become familiar, is generated by their lack of rights. When I familiarized myself with the draft law on youth, I regarded it with a fair amount of skepticism. Why do we need yet another law; would it not be better to think about how to force those already in existence to work? Later, when I began to delve into the problem and attempted to understand how to possibly advocate youth interests on a state level, I came to the simple conclusion of its necessity. A multitude of people concerned with this issue have worked through a similar evolution of opinions. They did not pause on the rejection of the draft, suspecting

youth of striving to grab a piece of the budgetary pie, but rather understood that the foundation of the future must be laid today. And this will be done by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs, which, vividly speaking, is a committee on affairs of the future. All new draft law and acts must be studied assiduously from the position of how they affect the status of youth. Without a radical change in society's attitude toward youth, we will not be spared its dependency, we will not manage to create conditions to manifest initiative and independence. It is hardly worth explaining how important this is for modern production and science.

In my view, an entire block of laws on the social provision of all the least defended groups, including youth, is vitally necessary. And it must come into effect before our economy makes the transition to market relations. Otherwise, all monetary increments will quickly be reduced to nil without taking into consideration the increasing cost of living.

A situation has come about in which a portion of the resources received by pensioners go to their children and grandchildren in the form of gifts and monetary assistance. Such a "custom" has come into being with us: Do not go visiting your children empty-handed. But is this good? Perhaps it would be more correct to grant youth the opportunity to allocate for themselves those resources which befall them anyway. I recall that I was surprised by the certainty in his correctness of one of our major political leaders who, in responding to the question of how students and young specialists can live on the money they receive, responded that they can, since the parents help them. Just think, parents' aid is already natural, and is almost raised to the rank of a state policy! And how awkward it was to later hear from him about the "consumer tendencies" in the youth sphere.

We advocate the necessity of adopting the law on youth and developing a youth policy not in order to separate youth into a privileged layer. Conditions are needed under which it would be possible to demand of us our full intellectual output in production, in aiding the elderly, in creating strong families and bringing up children. Society is united; our problems are its problems. To pretend that we must decide everything for ourselves can only lead to the non-appearance of a new generation ready for the summons of the time, and ready to lead the country to a new level.

### It Is Not Worth Making Haste

Yuri Kakhn, USSR Supreme Soviet member

Serious problems face youth in practically all spheres of life—in everyday life, in labor, and in education. They have been neglected to the point where it is useless to try to find solutions to them through one-time measures, commands, and orders.

Each generation chooses its path as if it were new. And whatever else can be said, despite their autonomy, a system of values, spiritual and moral ideal grows on a

material basis. But under the basic relations existing today, a person sees that good work and profound knowledge are not a value, and do not particularly influence his life. The consequence of such a position is the spiritual crisis which has infected the young generation. The entire depth of the situation which has come about is just beginning to be realized. And the fact that we see many young faces at the rallies just testifies to the search for new paths for extricating ourselves from the deadlock, to the comprehension of their interests, and to the aspiration to overcome alienation from social life.

It seems to me that the Komsomol in its present form is incapable of justifying youth's expectations, of defending it against injustice from without, and of helping disclose accumulated internal potential. In Estonia, we are already restructuring the Komsomol organization. This must be viewed realistically: the Komsomol is becoming one of many participants in the youth movement, and it still faced with struggling for its authority, and winning anew the recognition and trust of the young.

I have my own point of view as far as the law on youth is concerned. It is necessary, of course, but the prepared draft nevertheless considers the resolution of youth problems primarily within the framework of the administrative-command system. We hope to dismantle the existing structure of government and replace it with a democratic one. As an economist, I am troubled by the fact that the given draft law joins poorly into the new system of economic relations being formed today. Under the new economic conditions, many elements of the draft will simply prove unnecessary, and in the administrative command system, incidentally, they cannot not be realized all the same. For example, the statute that the local organs of power must do all possible to promote the resolution of youth problems. Now this relies upon how each individual staffer of the local soviets understands youth policy, and its embodiment depends only upon his mood. Genuine power and material resources are needed for full realization; for now, there are none. I think that the cause must be structured thusly: Youth organizations, in the form of their elected organs, participate in the allocation of the local budget, and determine the tasks of the development of the social sphere, designating priorities. They become a sort of task for the ispolkoms, under which the resources will be allocated. In my opinion, such structural subdivisions are very necessary. In such a case, there will be no need to require the ispolkoms to assist youth by law.

It is natural that the draft law on youth could not be prepared with consideration for society's new political structure. After all, it is just now coming together. But is it necessary to adopt a law for 2 or 3 years? Perhaps it is worth waiting a bit?

#### **Monopolism Is Destroying The Komsomol.**

**Viktor Minin, USSR Supreme Soviet member, deputy chairman of the Committee on Youth Affairs**

Hardly anyone would be surprised by the words that the Komsomol is now in a crisis. Its manifestations are innumerable—from the emergence of amateur sociopolitical associations to the formation of the independent communist youth league of Lithuania; from the mass refusals to join the Komsomol and the reduction of its numbers to the emphasized indifferent and nihilistic attitude toward the organization on the part of many members. It is a primitive point of view when the causes of a crisis are seen in an incompetent leadership, in the dominance of the "bureaucrats" in the Central Committee, in the unimproved structure of management. Such an understanding of the situation will take us no further than to a conclusion on the need for reduction, renewal, and reorganization of the apparatus of the Komsomol's organs. As practice has shown, such "shake-ups" do not strengthen, but weaken our league, destroying the link between the superior and inferior organizations, which took years to form, and not creating anything new. The Komsomol's authority is falling, but at the same time, young people's propensity for politics is enormous. And not the least because many young people already realize the fact that only they can resolve their social, economic, and other problems. They are not hoping that someone else will defend their interests, but rather they are self-organizing for the expression and realization of their demands. Youth's consolidation will allow it to defend itself from those forces which, at breakthrough points of history, strive to solve their problems at the expense of the social strata which have the least. We speak of the necessity of forming and conducting a youth policy. In my view, for this we also need the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs as a legislative instrument for the development of such a policy.

It seems to me that that pace of the changes taking place in society do not suit youth. Its demands are outstripping the possibilities actually existing. And youth will rise behind the banners under which there are concrete actions aimed at the further development of reform; there is space to manifest energy. But true, a certain sector of young people are among the extreme radicals; it affiliates itself with extremist groups of a different interpretation. With its regulated nature, excessively firm structure, lack of independence, and dependence upon the party organs, the Komsomol does not suit them. But why must the Komsomol be the only sociopolitical organization? Let other youth associations expressing the interests of various youth groups grow up next to them. And with equal rights, as partners, they will join the USSR league of youth organizations.

Thus will be eliminated the artificial contradiction that you are either a member of the Komsomol or you are antisocial. Belonging to a group whose legal status has not been determined not only does not impose any sort of social responsibility upon its members, but even pushes them toward illegal steps. I think that the Komsomol must reject monopoly and encourage the political and organizational delimitation of youth structures, from the perspective of unification, naturally. In

such a case, when millions of members who just formally belonged to it leave, we will manage not only to make it a viable organization and raise its authority, but will also include these millions who have left in vital activity through the newly-created organizations.

Of course, all these changes must be carried out on a serious basis. The law on youth is vitally necessary for us; and entire chapter of it must be dedicated to the legal status of youth organizations. Only under the condition of the new law-governed order does it make sense to be concerned with the structural transformations of public organizations. This issue will arise sooner or later, and better to remove it in time.

### **Youth Must Be Given An Advance...**

**Andris Viltsans, USSR Supreme Soviet member**

What is youth? When we speak of the law on youth being prepared, it is very important to determine whom we consider to be in this group, and on what basis. Any judicial act cannot be formulated diffusely; its very application in practice depends upon its single meaning and clarity of thought.

From my point of view, this is a sociodemographic group whose members are in a phase of social and professional development, and are actively assimilating the cultural legacy of previous generations, and are geared toward the future. It is probably impossible to include such a concept in a law. Therefore, probably, the draft's authors proposed a compromise version: to consider as youth all those under 30 years of age. This may be accepted as a working definition, but sociologists and lawyers basically need to think about a more complete and precise definition.

Youth's problems must be actively developed. Their essence lies not only in youth's traditional conflict with the older generation, but with the very society renewing itself. Natural contradictions are exacerbated by the fact that our society is at a breakthrough stage. At times, the political and ideological orientation points have been washed away; the accustomed ideals are being critically examined, and there is no one single vision of the future. Can the advice of the older generation always be accepted unconditionally by the young. Of course not. Moreover, we not infrequently see that direct assistance is rejected as an attempt to interfere in personal affairs, to bind one up in someone else's viewpoint.

Among the difficulties of the young generation's socialization is the complicated professional establishment of young workers and specialists. It is, after all, not so much a matter of desiring or not desiring to work assiduously so much as the fact that under the transition to new economic relations, youth and certain other poorly defended social strata are in a grave situation.

For example, in Latvia now each enterprise must pay a round sum of money to the local soviet for the young specialist it invites. This is almost a means of compensation for the expenses for utilization of the social-living

structure being formed. And the VUZ must be paid for training this young specialist. And after all, this is nothing other than a blow to youth's interests, since it is more advantageous for the enterprises to "win over" a good worker from outside than to take upon themselves the cares of turning yesterday's graduate into a professional. I am convinced that the enterprise's payments must be less if it gives a young specialist a job.

It is becoming all the more obvious that the differing opinion on the privileged status of youth, and the doors opening up for it everywhere are nothing more than the usual myth. I cite the figures. For example, of the third of the population which has less than R100 income per capita, the majority are young families. As sociological research indicates, over 50 percent of new families cannot get by without their parents' help, while simultaneously creating more than one-third of the national income, youth has at its command an insignificant portion of it. This disproportion has come about as the result of a violation of the principle of payment for labor, for the end result.

You will agree that if the young family has an apartment and can maintain itself, then more responsibility may be demanded of it, concern for the older generation, a return for society. And if youth is given an advance today, then it will soon be returned with high interest. The question arises: Where will this money come from? Of course, it should not be taken from other strata of the population. Other sources of financing, and a redistribution of resource allocation must be sought. For example, the draft law on youth proposed allowing mothers with children under age three not to work. Here in Latvia it has been precisely calculated that it is cheaper to leave the mothers at home, with material provisions, than to build the lacking number of kindergartens, equip them, and train new teachers and care providers. From the economic point of view, it is advantageous to do so, and I will not even mention how much better it is for the child to be raised within the family. Such a decision has already been made, and will soon begin to "work." Yet how many more such opportunities still exist!

I think that society should understand that it has come up against the problem of youth as a qualitatively new generation, the problem of its own future.

### **The "New Generation" And The Law-Governed State**

**Dzhakhan Pollyeva, candidate of jurisprudence, leader of the temporary youth creative collective for developing the draft law on youth**

Naturally, there is nothing surprising about the fact that a foursome of Komsomol deputies associated with the Komsomol order in which the adoption of the law on youth is almost the most important topic, "votes" in such unanimity to bring it to life. It is possible that someone will spot in this a manifestation of group egoism. In the meantime, few people know that at the outset there were in the chorus of the law's opponents almost all the young scientists who consequently came to



be its developers, a portion of the Komsomol deputies, and many other young people who in one way or another participated in discussing this issue. There were... Until they themselves looked into the depth of youth problems, which have become some of the day's most urgent ones, the most painful facets of our society. And they must be resolved, consequently, at the very highest, indeed, the state level.

The "fathers and sons" arguments over the law on youth in many ways stem from the fact that youth policy is still being perceived as a fairly narrow, strictly social activity which, in the opinion of the "fathers," must from now on be conducted by the state with regard to the complete vital forces of the young generation. The paternalistic, "giving" characteristics in even the most benevolent evaluations of the youth policy predominate not only in the stereotyped ideas of the mass consciousness, but are even found in the utterances of those individuals who by virtue of the positions they hold are faced with the realization of this policy within the framework of the system of state governance. However, the new distributional relations, the fair division of the "budgetary pie" (upon which the young deputies are insisting, since 43 percent of the country's able-bodied population is youth under 30)—this is only a small part of the entire range of issues which in their totality represent a single-minded, well-thought out, and genuinely state youth policy. But today, the resolution of even an entire layer of the young generation's socioeconomic problems, without consideration of a number of sociopolitical factors, is obviously insufficient.

Of course, it is in no way possible to reconcile oneself to the fact that only 7 percent of the national income is spent on the development of education in the USSR, rather than 9-12 percent, as in those countries where growth in national welfare is directly linked to the cultivation of society's intellectual potential. Undoubtedly, the fact that one of every three recent PTU [professional-technical college] graduates polled cannot find work is also cause for alarm. Yet it is even worse when unemployment in the social production sphere and the insufficiency of social and cultural development "drive" the Kazan, Fergana, and Novyy Uzen teenagers (and this list could be continued) into the street, urging them to commit mass violations of the law.

Of course, it is sad to realize that in the level of stipend payments for children (two-thirds of whom are born to families where the couple is under 30 years of age), we lag behind countries such as Hungary or Czechoslovakia by a factor of two or even three. Yet the fact that the absence of a state policy to maintain the optimum family composition is leading not only to profound demographic distortions, but also to changes in the national structure of our federated state causes great alarm. When the country's population reproduction on the whole, in which the negative growth in the Baltic region is compensated by the large families of the Central Asian republics, this means the appearance, on the one hand, not only of labor surplus, but of labor-shortage regions,

which at times can lead to social tension, conflicts, and the concomitant major migratory processes. And as practice has already shown, from these it is not at all far to the consequences of interethnic and political order.

Many prominent specialists assert, not without basis, that the modern demographic policy is the one at the foundation of its youth policy, for the "demographic climate" today is in many ways determined by young families. That is why the developers of the draft law "On the General Principles of the State Youth Policy in the USSR" took it upon themselves in the working procedure of the named law on youth the task of bringing the obsolete and ineffective system of assisting families with children into correspondence with today's level of economic development and the needs of the population.

However, the 6 months of practice in discussing draft laws in the Supreme Soviet has shown that the majority of deputies considers it possible to regulate by an all-union law only those relations which cannot be resolved independently by the union and autonomous republics, naturally, without detriment to the Union of SSRs as a whole. Moreover, issues of social policy must undoubtedly be transferred to the competence of republic legislation.

On the other hand, for many decades now, the representatives of legal sciences have advocated the viewpoint that all the citizens' vitally important rights and responsibilities, just as the procedure for their implementation, must be regulated solely by laws. Scholars insist that all the state's citizens be ensured a necessary minimum of socioeconomic opportunities, that is, that this minimum be guaranteed by a direct-action general union law. Such a great quantity of acts adopted by the Government in the form of decrees or orders is explained by precisely such a lack of clear and valid direct-action laws.

Is this contradiction permissible? Yes, if the entire "package" of changes in and supplements to the so-called "sub-legal" (that is, instructional legislation is presented for simultaneous discussion with the draft law (especially when it treats the legal fortification of an entire trend in state activity). Therefore, thinking of the problems of young families, is was sufficient in our draft to stipulate the principles of giving the family credit, and the partial repayment of loans based upon the birth of children; preference for certain types of credit today granted from the "adult" population to youth having higher incomes are to be granted on more general terms. Supplemental opportunities for the improvement of the social status of young families are the affair of the republics themselves. Yet parallel to this, the group of developers prepared its own proposals for changing the decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers on an entire range of social issues, as well as its own work-up addressing the draft laws on protecting maternity and child provisions and the rights of the child being prepared today.

This particularly concerns the system of payment of stipends for children. For example, approximately 2



million large families receive stipends, with the stipend for the fourth child being 4 rubles per month, and the fifth, 6 rubles. It is proposed that the birth of a second and third child be stimulated on the union level, and hardly by such conditional financial measures. And the issues of encouraging the birth of all subsequent children in the family should be granted to the republic's legislation, to be dependent upon their concrete demographic situation. By thus curtailing the unwieldy list of 14 types of payments in existence today, and by strengthening their efficacy, we must resolve the issues of other types of material support for families.

Under the conditions of the modern "transitional" economy, it is very important to ensure young people's transition from study to labor through the organs, to guarantee the occupation of young specialists and qualified workers. One other task of the youth law is linked to this—to lessen, at least to some degree, the malevolence of the problems of the advancing social stratification, one of the sources of which, to no small extent, will be the difference in the social production opportunities between young and more experienced workers. Of course, under conditions of developed goods and monetary relations and a normally functioning economic mechanism, in many ways this problem would resolve itself. And then the wishes of people's deputy Yuri Kakhn on the exclusion from the draft of those legal norms which in his words are suited only to an administrative command system of governance would be genuinely fair. In the meantime, we must be realists and all the same make ourselves aware of the fact that it is now, during this period of unstable, transitional relations that the law protecting youth is needed more than ever. Until the purely administrative system of governance reluctantly yields its positions in the production sphere, until a valid system of "social economy" with its inherent flexible taxation policy develops in our state, and finally, until the danger of youth becoming one of the victims of the transition period disappears, we cannot permit ourselves to "not make haste" and take up a wait-and-see position.

We are just on the threshold of realizing what was understood and accepted several decades ago in many other countries having analogous laws. And it may undoubtedly be considered a gain if even the purely parliamentary function of the law associated with the removal of material (and along with them, spiritual) problems of the period we are living through is executed over the course of at least a several years. But the draft law also takes into consideration the situation when economic methods come to replace the administrative methods of governance which are, unfortunately, still in effect. The law also contains statutes for the material stimulation of enterprises to take youth into the work more eagerly. The impermissibility of attracting young people to any sort of economic production work without the mandatory processing of contractual (labor and civil) and legal relations, or payment of the appropriate recompense is established; sanctions are stiffened for failure

to observe the so-called reservation of accepting individuals of a young age on the job.

An understanding of the most important tasks of the draft law would be incomplete if we fail to direct attention to the "blocks" of the draft law which are conditionally called "organizational" and "political." The law must ensure youth's "leap" to democracy, to the political system forming itself anew, to parliamentary forms of political activity. Since we do not have today a new law on public associations appropriate to the modern democratic trends, our developers' collective proposed a legal procedure of registration and activity of youth amateur activity organizations, for the time being called "informals" in common usage. It offers membership by age; a flexible, mobile program of operation, and the necessity of differentiation between the strictly youth social initiatives and movements and the "extremist" structures, the "ringleaders," among whom people are far from young.

A special procedure of activity for youth associations somewhat distinct from that of all public organizations is needed today because the opportunity for satisfaction of specifically youth interests within the framework of an independently functioning organization immediately distinguishes the bearers of these interests from other social or asocial groupings. The "field" for exploiting youth in political speculation also becomes narrower. Moreover, through the mechanism of public activity, minors today have the opportunity to compensate for their lack of political status conditioned by age restrictions on electoral rights. In the view of the developers, it is also very important to provide these organizations with material support from the state (subsidies, tax privileges).

If we consider that there are also anti-social associations functioning among youth groups, then the research indicates that they comprise no more than 4-5 percent, and are easily identified by the criteria long since defined by criminal legislation. In effect, the extremist, criminal groups of young people are already scarcely "amateur associations of youth," but something else. According to the data of the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School under the Komsomol Central Committee, genuine youth initiatives are functioning today in more than 200 trends, and up to 70-80 percent of their participants are Komsomol members. And the state's indubitable task must become to assist their development, their integration into society's social and political life.

As one of the most important organizational guarantors of the implementation of youth policy, the creation of a special organ of state administration, the Council on Youth Affairs, continues; representatives of all-union youth organizations, and all public movements who can bring the youth policy into life with concern will participate in it. The creation of a social service for youth affairs is envisaged; its direct task will be prevention of

unfavorable influence of the milieu and concrete, day-to-day assistance to minors, unsettled teenagers, young families, and all young people needing assistance. In the minds of the authors of the draft law, there must be "social workers," a category of employees quite frequently encountered in foreign countries, to help those who have returned from corrective labor institutions, and the so-called "special" educational institutions for juvenile violators, to help the judges with juvenile justice. The principles of the courts' work for minors, on an equal basis with the principle of judicial responsibility applied to them, are also subjects of the draft law on youth.

Yet today, when the law on youth is still a draft, only 4.3 percent of the young people polled feel that their interests are well reflected in current legislation. Only 9.4 percent are certain of their social protection. Some 69.9 percent feel that youth organizations other than the Komsomol are needed, and about 90 percent think that the Komsomol must participate much more actively in the work of the soviets of people's deputies. All of this is data of social research conducted during the work on the draft law. The results also indicated that the majority of young people expressed themselves in favor of the law on youth, even though a significant portion of them fear its possible ineffective realization in practice. Well, the fears are rightful, yet in many ways they will be removed with the changes in the system of legislation in effect today and its administration in accordance with the principles of the genuinely law-governed state, and the principles of the life of the civil society being formed.

### The Fate Of The Komsomol

#### Journalist A. Petrov converses with Komsomol Central Committee Secretary S. Smirnov

[Correspondent] Stanislav Alekseyevich, I will not be mistaken in saying that the development of the draft law on youth, and the fundamental principles of youth policy began at the Komsomol's initiative. I think that here, the Komsomol based its work on the interests of youth, and turned to the conclusion of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on the need for a strong, integrated youth policy, guaranteeing a general state approach to the resolution of youth problems. Yet time passes, and there are no results.

[Smirnov] I will begin with the fact that the draft law "On the General Principles of the State Youth Policy in the USSR" was prepared by the temporary creative collective, which comprises young lawyers, sociologists, and economists. The document was discussed at a Komsomol Central Committee plenum on the eve of the Congress of People's Deputies and was recommended for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The saddest thing today, however, is that public opinion is still not unconditionally on the side of a state policy toward youth. Could it be that we have still not learned to draw lessons from events long past, or not at all long past? Obviously, in reality, one of the stereotypes which

has become most deep-rooted in our consciousness is the dogma of the supposed non-confrontational flow of the process of youth's socialization under socialism, the complete unity of the older and younger generations in our society. Of course, in that case, what particular youth problems can there be? What is there to be surprised about that during the confirmation of Valeriy Tsybukh as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs not one of the deputies asked him a single question?

In their own way, the results of the poll of 1300 Komsomol committee secretaries conducted in April 1989 by Higher Komsomol School associates also conform to natural law: Only 17 percent of those polled assessed the attitude of their collective's administrations to be concerned and solicitous. They are bitter that even many of our progressively thinking social scientists, political scientists, and economists whose voices people listen to carefully have cast the idea of the law on youth in doubt. For example, N. Shmelev, who not long ago appeared in the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, plainly declared that he did not like the very phrasing of the issue of adopting a special law on youth.

Many do not at all want to see that the current situation practically condemns youth to an immeasurably prolonged maturation. Everywhere around now, a young person by 30 does not possess the material conditions for an independent life, and is frequently deprived of prospects. While among workers of all ages, one in three is under the socially based level, among young workers, it is almost one out of every two! One in seven is capable of making ends meet on his own earnings, with difficulty. Today, two-thirds of young workers live in dormitories of rent a corner, figuring on a separate apartment only after 8-10 years. The material status of other categories, let us say, of young specialists or students, is even more depressing. The introduction of economically accountable methods led to teenagers and young people gradually beginning to break away from production to start on their own without yet having the proper qualifications. Not having found opportunities for self-realization and achieving success in life, a portion of youth is receding into the "social underground," falling into deep apathy, or the opposite, submitting to extremist moods, and entering into conflict with the Criminal Code. According to USSR Procuracy data, last year 18,000 members of youth groups who had committed about 2,000 fights, brawls, disorders, and other violations of public order were registered by the internal affairs organs. And the strangest thing is that a "new morality" is being born, justifying the most immoral acts. For example, racketeers, who are primarily young people, call themselves society's orderlies, observers of social justice, forcibly redistributing illicitly gotten gains. But is it really thinkable in a law-governed state to combat crime with criminal methods?

[Correspondent] But what are the arguments of the sides in opposition with regard to the draft law?

[Smirnov] It was asserted at the beginning that youth itself is not very interested in this law, as being adopted at the Komsomol's initiative, it supposedly would allow for the legislative fortification of the Komsomol bureaucracy. Yet even the first public discussion with the participation of the draft law's authors manifested the entire groundlessness of such fears. And the results of sociological research in various territories of the country bespeak the fact that from 65 to 84 percent of the young men and women polled consider the law's adoption to be necessary.

Nor is it possible to take seriously the "disclosure" arguments and reproaches of the Komsomol that it is resorting to a seemingly incorrect means to return to itself authority among young people. Allow me, but where is the incorrectness here? No one is hiding anything. On the contrary, it was announced on more than one occasion, from the highest tribunes, that in the past the Komsomol lacked this genuine concern for the defense of young people's interests.

And is it really such a convincing thesis that after the law on youth will follow a chain reaction, that laws on invalids, housewives, and single mothers must be adopted? Further on, they say, these laws will begin to compete, and we will once again have an abundance of privileges unconfirmed by material wealth.

Yet in a law-governed state founded upon the ideas of humanism, the functioning of an entire group of so-called social laws is completely natural and inevitable; they determine the fundamental principles of state social policy with regard to those categories and population groups needing special defense and support. All of this has long since existed in both socialist and capitalist countries where laws on youth function in an extremely branched system of social legislation. And by adopting the law on pension provision, we, in effect, have started on the same route.

Yet the most devastating argument against the law on youth resounds in unison along with the Philistine's fears. They say that the law is aimed at giving youth people certain advantages and privileges to the detriment of others, and is thus essentially immoral. Here one wishes to ask: Is the current situation, when grown children are forced to consider not only their parents pocketbooks, but sometimes even a portion of their grandparents' modest pensions as "their own" any more moral? Anyone not ruled by rumors and emotions who familiarizes himself with the draft on a first hand basis will probably be convinced that it does not even hint at the creation of some sort of special greenhouse conditions for youth. We are speaking about a certain minimum which the Government will guarantee for the formation of a socially active individual, who in the future will not count on a "kind uncle", but rather on himself, on his own efforts, knowledge, and labor skills. The given draft law does not stipulate granting youth any sort of right supplemental to those already existing in the USSR Constitution and laws. It is aimed at eliminating

those complications which exist in the realization of these rights, that is, it must serve the cause of ensuring these rights.

Yet the youth policy is aimed not only at resolving social issues and increasing the material welfare of young people. The policy sets as its task the active involvement of young citizens in society's political life. After all, this is where the rights of individual categories of youth are infringed upon today. For example, in the elections of USSR people's deputies, we came across the situation where it turned out that students (one of the most numerous categories of youth) do not have the status of members of labor collectives. As a result, in many locations they did not have the political right to nominate candidates for deputy or to vote in the nomination of teachers and associates by collectives.

And why, nevertheless, is the idea of a state youth policy having such a hard time forging ahead? To some extent, this is probably linked to a certain conservatism of the mass consciousness, in which the idea has become rooted that in order to temper its character, youth absolutely must experience a spell of adversity and worldly difficulties. Nor should it be thrown out of the equation that the law on youth is a legal act which for the time being is not joining the system of effective law.

I am certain that when the debates on the draft law on youth policy begin in the USSR Supreme Soviet, the deputies from the Komsomol will not sit mum; they will become the initiators of the discussion of youth's status in society, youth's responsibility to it, and at the same time, of society's responsibility to the young population.

[Correspondent] It is to be wished that your predictions come to pass. All the more so because the young deputies will have to advocate their positions and, in the final analysis, youth's interests not by their numbers, but by their capabilities.

[Smirnov] I find your thought understandable. Indeed, we do not have the right to close our eyes to the fact that the elections of USSR people's deputies have not brought us laurels. Judge for yourself. Among the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies of the 11th convocation (the elections took place in 1984), 22 percent of the deputies were under age 30. And according to the results of the 1989 elections, only 187 whose age did not exceed 30 became people's deputies, or 8 percent of the total number of deputies.

The Komsomol's lackluster performance in the electoral campaign is probably partially explained by the lack of experience. Yes, of course, the 75-seat quota the Komsomol received by legislative procedure was reassuring. But does this serve as a justification for the deplorable fact that in 67 kray and oblast Komsomol organizations the right to nominate their own candidates for USSR people's deputy was not utilized?

Ahead are election to republic and local soviets, where there will be no guaranteed representation of the Komsomol. I think that I will not be mistaken in saying that the participation in the elections to republic and local soviets in the near future are becoming almost the main sector of the activity of Komsomol committees, by whose results we may place an objective grade upon our alliance's capability for self-renewal and self-development. And if someone asserts today that winning deputy seats for the Komsomol is not a goal in itself, one may agree with him only in part. For without a strong Komsomol core in the local soviets, implementing a youth policy on the city and rayon level will be an extraordinarily difficult, if not altogether impossible cause.

[Correspondent] Having thoroughly analyzed the situation in the Komsomol, the 22nd Komsomol Congress called is a "pre-crisis" state. Just 2 and 1/2 years later, a regular Komsomol Central Committee plenum evaluated the state of affairs in the league with an even more grim and alarming concept: a crisis. The questions immediately arise here: Could it be that the congress did not have the heart to call a spade a spade? Or was it simply mistaken in its diagnosis? Or instead of the anticipated corrections of matters in the Komsomol, they have simply become worse?

[Smirnov] I think that the mercilessly critical analysis which resounded from the tribune of the 22nd Komsomol Congress was on the whole precise and accurate. Although it became obvious with time that in certain positions we had not yet gotten to the very roots of the negative processes in the Komsomol, in some matters, the consequences were taken for the causes. It seems to me that we could not ultimately explain the depth of youth's alienation from our league, I repeat, from the league, and not just from the Komsomol apparatus. We probably could not fully realize how firmly and fundamentally installed our youth organization is in all the administrative command system, and it would be naive to hope that a slow, painful dismantling of this system will not slow down perestroika in the Komsomol, its "withering away" [razgosudarstvleniye].

However, I am convinced that we went in the right direction from the congress, in the direction of democratization, the central links of which were the decentralization of administration, competitive elections of secretaries of Komsomol committees, a new order of financial-economic activity, reduction and structural perestroika of the Komsomol apparatus. It is another matter that not everyone everywhere has set out on this new path quickly and confidently, without delay or over-cautiousness. The restructuring of the Komsomol apparatus was frequently reduced to a simple personnel reduction, not to radical changes in the means of activity, sparing functions not usual for the Komsomol.

Life itself has led us to the realization of the fact that the strongest brake on the path to renewal of our league is its very structure, that is, the "stagnant" model, based on

superfluous centralization, the hierarchy of Komsomol structures, and the low receptivity to any sort of amateur activity of primary organizations. In light of this, it is not surprising that the democratization begun by the 22nd Komsomol Congress did not reach the "primaries," not to mention actual young people. According to the sociologists' data, only 22 percent of Komsomol members perceive perestroika in the activity of their Komsomol organizations to any degree. Sad but true: There have been cases of a collective exodus from the Komsomol. And the most terrible thing is that it is frequently the people with initiative, who are not indifferent that are leaving; they are disillusioned in their aspirations. They are leaving, and the "passive," those who could not care less are staying.

[Correspondent] But are we not exaggerating the role of the organizational factor? It seems to me that at the base of the Komsomol's crisis is the lack of coincidence of its ideas and slogans with genuine reality. This is the circumstance which led to a fair portion of young people losing their spiritual-moral orientation points.

[Smirnov] I would like to clarify that youth is not disillusioned most of all in our socialist ideal, or in our socialist values as such, for youth is essentially very humanitarian, just, and uncompromising. It categorically rejects those inappropriate methods and means by which we attempted to achieve these values, the confirmation of the socialist ideal. The uniqueness of the situation which have come about in the Komsomol is in the fact that for many years now, the Komsomol has not had its own program. It was felt that the entire sense of the Komsomol's activity consists of executing the CPSU program. True, the Komsomol's goals are expounded in its Charter in a very general form. Owing to such a specific function of the Komsomol Charter, sanctifying both the ideological and organizational principles of our league, it is completely natural and logical that the problems of developing the new charter are at the center of the discussions today. Three draft charters were introduced for the judgement of the participants in the 8th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum (July 1989). These drafts, containing a number of common positions and approaches, imply a different structure of the Komsomol, and differ from one another in their treatment of the fundamental principles of the organization's life and activity. But in one way or another, they all lead us to a new model of the Komsomol, which is seen as a league of the ideologically like-minded, convinced supporters of democratic, humane socialism united for the sake of active participation in society's renewal. From an organization subordinating the individual, the Komsomol must turn into an organization capable of considering and realizing the diverse spiritual, economic, and social interests of all categories of youth, effectively assisting the self-realization of the individual.

Of course, a detailed conception of the internal perestroika of the Komsomol remains to be created. As we know, the 9th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decided to introduce for consideration by the Komsomol

organization material prepared by the Komsomol Central Committee for discussion on the Komsomol draft charter. The 21st Komsomol Congress, to take place in the spring of 1990, will sum up the discussion. The congress is called upon to confirm the new model of the Komsomol. Perhaps it is not worth anticipating the decisions of the congress. Yet it seems worthwhile to mention certain principally important innovations which are, so to say, this model's points of departure, and are encountering broad support among the Komsomol aktiv and members of our league. So, for example, public opinion is decidedly inclined to preserve as a basic principle the territorial-production structure of the Komsomol, and make it more flexible, ensuring the opportunity to create new structures to inventory the specific interests of various categories of Komsomol members. The idea of the need to define and limit the competition of the center, as well as to broaden the independence of the Komsomol of the union republics, even up to granting them their own charters and programs does not cause any doubts. Of course, these documents must basically rely upon the Komsomol Charter and Program, which allow them to make concrete the common Komsomol tasks with consideration for local specifics.

[Correspondent] Obviously, the issue of the interaction of the party and the Komsomol must be resolved in a new way in the new model.

[Smirnov] Without a doubt. After all, for many long years, the party was the guide for the Komsomol in the literal sense of the word. And our famous slogan, "The party said, 'This must be done!'" and the Komsomol replied, "Yes, sir!" reflected the essence of our mutual relations quite accurately. It is not difficult to notice that under such a set-up, the Komsomol changes from being an independent subject of political action into being a passive object, allocated purely executive functions. Not just the secondary causes of the lowering of the Komsomol's authority in the eyes of young people should be seen in the unjustified interference and the trivial guardianship on the part of party committees. The simple conviction has been formed in both the party and the Komsomol today: The previous practice of interrelations has outlived itself, and is unacceptable under modern conditions. However, the departure from standing canon is difficult and contradictory.

The results of a poll of leaders of rayon and city Komsomol organizations in Belorussia is indicative of many things. Only one in eight noted that the party committees respect and observe the organizational independence of the Komsomol, and that the initiatives and efforts of the Komsomol cadres and aktiv encountered complete mutual understanding on the part of the senior comrades. To be fair, it must be said that since the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference which recognized the need to change the style of interrelation of party and Komsomol committees, there have been more examples of cases when, without waiting for the so to say official

announcement of complete political trust, the Komsomol organs are not ashamed to defend their legal rights.

An incident which occurred at the Kazakh Komsomol Central Committee is edifying in this regard. When the issue of releasing from his official post, in accordance with a submitted declaration, the energetic, assertive Komsomol Central Committee Secretary S. Darmanbayev, who will not let himself be framed by anyone's position, the plenum participants did not raise their hands out of force of habit, but resolved to get to the heart of the matter. And on the spot it became clear that "his personal desire" was actually hiding quite different motives—the pressure of the party apparatus, and accusations of "incompetent guidance of the youth press." As a result, the Central Committee members did not find sufficient grounds for S. Darmanbayev to leave the post to which he had recently been elected.

The transition from administering to comradely interaction, to make things brief, is the essence of the changes which must take place in the interrelations of the party and the Komsomol. Without this, it is difficult to plan on the transformation of the Komsomol into a genuinely independent, self-managing organization, consciously guiding the party's common political line, its ideological platform.

[Correspondent] The 22nd Congress of the Lithuanian Komsomol provoked complex evaluations; it adopted a resolution to create a communist league of the republic youth as an independent organization. The Komsomol was faced with a new situation. How should this be regarded? After all, the decisions made in Vilnius contradict today's norms of Komsomol life.

[Smirnov] The Lithuanian Komsomol congress decided to sign an agreement with the all-union Komsomol, and expressed itself as favoring direct relations with the Komsomol organizations of the other union republics. The leaders of the Lithuanian Komsomol are convinced that the congress made the only correct decisions possible to allow giving a new impulse to the youth communist movement in the republic. In Lithuania, at the Komsomol's initiative, the republic draft law on youth has already been brought up for public discussion. After its adoption, the creation of a parliament of Lithuanian youth is proposed, in which various social categories of youth and their social organizations would be represented.

Yet all the same... We cannot get over the impression that in the decisions of the 22nd Congress of the Lithuanian Komsomol emotions took the upper hand, not theory or logic. Can it be correct that in the KSM [Communist Youth League] Charter the achievement of complete state sovereignty is declared to be task number one?

The problems arising in light of the Lithuanian Komsomol congress held were carefully studied by a commission of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Upon hearing its conclusions, the 9th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum by majority vote recognized that the congress's decisions indeed contradict the Komsomol charter norms. On this issue, it was noted in the resolution that: The new youth organization created in Lithuania—the Communist Youth League of Lithuania—is not a constituent of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]. It was resolved that during the course of re-registration of Komsomol members, young people desiring to maintain their chartered ties to the Komsomol must have such an opportunity.

Something should be said about the “global” aspect of the problem. Many are inclined to quite reasonably feel that the Komsomol has overgrown the phase of being a stable monolith and is today undergoing a process of differentiation, of specification of certain parts and finding links with another, yet principally new, level and order.

Here, however, the question arises, how to transform our “Komsomol monolith” without simultaneously turning it into something amorphous and incapacitated? The Lithuanian Komsomol members have proposed and begun to implement their own version. It is not difficult to convince ourselves that if it were realized everywhere, we would arrive at a confederation of youth leagues. Yes, such a model has its advocates not only in Lithuania. I respect their motives, but I cannot fail to heed the counter-arguments: Are the champions of confederation taking into full consideration the entire complexity of the situation in society, the actual level of youth political culture and democratic traditions; is there not hastiness here, and conjunctural quick-wittedness?

In favoring the functioning of genuinely independent communist youth leagues in each republic, which together comprise a single whole, the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol], the Central Committee decisively opposes attempts to implement demarcation of youth of various nationalities under the slogan of the independence of local organizations.

And we must nevertheless recognize that neither a new charter, not a new model of the Komsomol may be a goal in itself. For however fruitful discussion or creative searchings are, it is not they which create the atmosphere in the Komsomol; first and foremost is actual deeds which are capable of leading our league out of the crisis and returning authority to it, deeds which reflect the genuine, rather than the invented interests of young men and women.

[Correspondent] In my opinion, the only thing with which the Komsomol may save itself is economic activity.

[Smirnov] Of course, I would not agree with such a straightforward assertion. Indeed, the “Komsomol economy” is picking up speed. Over 500 centers of youth science and technology creativity now exist in the country, and about 4,000 youth centers concerned with

production and commercial activity. they have approximately R2 billion in annual turnover. In this we cannot fail to see that the “economization” of the Komsomol has its problems. Around these same youth centers revolve more than a few dealmakers who are interested in nothing more than making a “fast buck” [“zhivaya kopeyka”]. Yet on the whole, the Komsomol’s economic activity is a healthy, necessary phenomenon, lending supplemental opportunity for creatively thinking young people with initiative to realize themselves, to show their capabilities, which, it is a shame to deny, in previous times remained unclaimed. And that, you will agree, is already not so much an economic problem as a sociopolitical one. Yet without at all belittling the significance of the economic factor, I would risk noting that the mainline to restoration of the Komsomol’s authority is the practical confirmation of its status as a sociopolitical organization.

[Correspondent] So under modern conditions, what must be the sociopolitical activity of the Komsomol?

[Smirnov] The Komsomol rallies youth on the basis of the ideas of perestroika, the ideas of socialism renewing itself, of common human and socialist values, on the basis of constructive work in the name of all these goals. This is our political platform. Let us not simplify it: Youth’s arrival as a serious social force in the arena of political life is accompanied by complex and contradictory phenomena. And the Komsomol’s voice must resound at meetings and rallies at full force during the resolution of labor and social conflicts. The Komsomol committees do not have the right to retreat to the sidelines, to take an indifferent position when Komsomol members are allowing themselves to participate in various enactments under openly anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, and nationalistic slogans. Ideological spinelessness, world-view omnivorousness contradict the very essence of our league, which calls itself communist.

I think that the main orientation point for the Komsomol’s perestroika is the further democratization and expansion of rights, and the increase of the responsibility of the local Komsomol organs, the primary organizations. It is important that the “primaries,” just as the production and territorial committees, perceived and behaved themselves in a masterful manner in resolving urgent economic and social problems, the entire circle of issues concerning the life, labor, and everyday existence of youth.

Perhaps everyone today is in agreement that the Komsomol’s political work should have its basis in its own program. Such a document, which is called upon to strengthen our position, the Komsomol’s strategy and tactics, is currently being prepared, and will be adopted by the 22nd Komsomol Congress. It must also be said that the program’s development is being conducted publicly, openly, as evidenced by the the Komsomol Central Committee Program Declarations for the 21st Komsomol Congress, published in the mass information media. I am convinced that our league’s authority among

youth, and within society as a whole, will in many ways depend upon to what degree the Komsomol can become a conduit of the boldest and most constructive ideas and actions for improving socialist society, take an independent position in all areas of our life, how it manages to utilize the opportunity not only to participate in the development and execution of program decisions, but in proposing to society its own alternative conceptions of economic issues, social life, politics, the ecology, etc., as well as defending them on any level. It is also beyond doubt that today, the Komsomol must have its own view on all events, its own opinion, evaluating them in its own way, without fearing to promulgate that assessment.

In using here the term "Komsomol," I have in mind not only the Central Committee, as is usually used. I think that today, under the conditions of democratization, there can be no talk of binding for its part the Komsomol Central Committee to some sort of evaluation or position as the only true one. With common goals, any elected Komsomol organ, any primary organization has the right to hold and declare its viewpoint on any phenomenon of our reality. And there is no reason to wait in the localities as to what the Komsomol Central Committee will say about this or that issue. And there is nothing horrifying about the conclusion, let us say, or the raykom or obkom differing from the viewpoint of the central organ. This is what genuine pluralism of opinion is about.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Alekseyevich, I think that you would agree that the Komsomol's problem is a constituent part of the more general problem of the youth movement as a whole. It is difficult to name a country in the world where this problem has not become acute and topical. For a long time, we declared ourselves to be exceptional, as if we considered the issue to have been removed from the agenda. Now, it seems, we have seen the light.

[Smirnov] We will be faithful to historical truth. Those who stood at the source of our league held sacred that the Komsomol would reflect the interests of all Soviet youth. And they steadfastly proceeded toward that goal, at times setting their hopes in organizational means which in the best case were capable of leading only to unanimity for show, unacceptable in any democratic society. And however quickly we are today moving toward such a society, we must naturally recognize the presence of a broad range of the most diverse political, social, and spiritual interests of young people, which even one super-modern organization is not in a condition to accumulate. It is notable that according to data from sociological research conducted by the scientists at the Scientific Research Institute of the Higher Komsomol School, only 18.7 percent of the Komsomol members polled stated that the creation of other youth organizations in addition to the Komsomol was inadvisable. Nor will we forget that V.I. Lenin allowed the existence of various youth associations and leagues.

Frankly speaking, the de facto de-monopolization of the youth movement is already taking place, as is evidenced by the presence of a great number of amateur groups and

associations. But de jure, it would seem that all is peace and tranquility, for the informal associations are without rights and no one is obliged to seriously reckon with them. In my opinion, the further such an unnatural state is preserved, the fewer chances remain to avoid political confrontation within the Komsomol itself. The most acceptable way out is the empowerment of the Law on Voluntary Societies, Organs of Public Amateur Activity, and Amateur Associations.

It is not difficult to picture as the result that a certain portion of Komsomol members will flow away to the new organizations, and that an atmosphere of competition in the struggle for youth will arise. But is it worthwhile for us to get terrified over this? Yes, the situation demands of the Komsomol daily affirmation of the right to political leadership in the youth movement. Yet on the other hand, the right received in a real political struggle will be genuinely weighty, and not declarative, having its trials only in under conditions of political comfort.

By actively participating in the political struggle, without waiving the fundamental ideological principles, the Komsomol must at the same time be disposed to seeking a compromise with other youth associations in the resolution of the complex problems of perestroika. Only in such a case will there come, after the demarcation, mutual cooperation of the overwhelming majority of them and genuine solidarity of many around the Komsomol for the joint solution of both specific youth problems and problems troubling all society—ecological, sociological, and economic problems. And this is the natural path toward the creation of a league of youth organizations, a type of youth parliament for the country, in which all youth associations operating within the framework of the constitution will be represented and have equal rights and responsibilities. It is an understandable matter that there can be no talk of any sort of cooperation or partnership of the Komsomol with regard to organizations of an anti-social, anti-Soviet tendency, whose activity leads to a destabilization of the situation. Today we come up against the fact that the development of a new model of the Komsomol requires serious scientific research. Among the research topics, for example, is the issue of democratic centralization, which undoubtedly played a major role in the strengthening of the Komsomol, and the consolidation of the efforts of the Komsomol members. Unfortunately, both in the Komsomol and in the party construction, democratic centralization came in the Stalinist interpretation primarily to mean excessive intensification of centralization to the detriment of democratization. Does this correspond to the spirit of our times? And it is coincidental that the 20th Komsomol Congress, having already recognized the right of each primary organization, under the unity of Komsomol goals and tasks, to independently choose the forms and methods of its work, and to a great extent approach in a new way the treatment of the essence of the principle of democratic socialism.



Yet today we must proceed further, and at times we must proceed without having clear, scientifically proven orientation points. In my opinion, their absence serves as the reason why certain comrades propose exchanging the principle of democratism in the Komsomol for a new principle—that of “democratic unity,” enabling, according to the intent of this idea’s authors, the provision of genuine solidarity and collectivism of the Komsomol, without setting hopes on centralization. Of course, such a point of view also has the right to its existence, yet it seems to me that at the present time we must return to the Leninist interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism in its full scope. And on this basis, we must take up the search for the solutions to problems as complex as the sensible reduction of the centralist principle, the respect for the right of both the majority and the minority with mandatory implementation of the majority decisions. Yet the mechanism must be developed so that the minority may appeal to superior organs and to public opinion.

The scientific comprehension of the foundations of the future territorial structure of the Komsomol is a matter of no lesser importance. The chief question here, to which science must provide the answer, is to what extent are the principles upon which our federated state is constructed equal to the principles of the structure of a sociopolitical organization.

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**Problems in Turkmen SSR Komsomol Discussed**  
*18350033C Ashkhabad MUGALLYMLAR GAZET in Turkmen 29 Oct 89 p 3*

[Interview with G. B. Geldiyeva, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmenistan LKSM: “We Must Educate A Worthy Generation”]

[Text][Editorial Introduction] Seventy one years have passed since the establishment of the VLKSM. How is the Komsomol celebrating its anniversary? What kind of issues stand before our republic’s Komsomol members today? What sort of duties are glasnost and perestroyka placing before the youths? This was the subject of a conversation between our special correspondent and G. B. Geldiyev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmenistan LKSM.

[Interviewer] At anniversaries one normally turns to the phases through which one is passing and the roads taken. If one were to follow custom, one would have to talk about the glorious traditions which will never fade into the depths of history of the Turkmenistan Komsomol. But it is difficult to talk about all the good works in the space of one article. Thus it would be more appropriate if we began the talk directly with the pulsebeat of today.

[Geldiyeva] A good idea. This is a period of concrete work. Thus, today’s duties interest everyone more and more deeply. The 20th Congress of the VLKSM brought

many changes to Komsomol life. As in the country as a whole, political events also became confused in the Komsomol. At the 7th and 8th plenums of the CC VLKSM a detailed analysis was made of the situation taking place in the Union of Youths. Various ideas emerged: some said the Komsomol stood before a crisis, others said that we were on the verge of a crisis, and others that we were on the verge of a deep crisis, and even others that we stood on the edge of a precipice. In fact, the situation is not analogous, but is still extremely tense. As you know the Lithuanian Komsomol has left the VLKSM and established a Union of Communist Youth. Youth unions in the other Baltic republics are following the same course. Here, we would express the idea of the bureau of the Central Committee of the republic’s Komsomol, namely, that our Union must remain whole, indivisible.

[Interviewer] The years of stagnation exerted a negative influence on all spheres of our society. The Komsomol’s reputation also sunk rather low during those years. Tell me, in your opinion, how do you account for its sinking so low?

[Geldiyeva] As you know, emphasis was given to the administrative-command style of leadership during those years. In all work there was the pursuit of fame and superficial awards. Beginning from the lowest ranks everyone was dependent on the center; in fact, despite the federative principles of our Union, it was as if there were no independence. Taking the situation which occurred in the Komsomol as a whole, it was not we Komsomols or the Komsomol workers who were at fault or the Komsomol as an organization. The authoritarian principles of leadership exerted a powerful influence on these. The fact that there was no financial base in the Komsomol and, in many contexts, there is not one now, is related to the economic situation which has come about in our country.

As a result of all the negative processes there were also many shortcomings in Komsomol work. In many instances the selection of cadres was neglected. Localism was very powerful in this issue. Now it is completely different. More precisely, we got on the Leninist road in the Central Committee apparatus by maintaining the regional distribution of cadres. In the selection of cadres stringent requirements in work competence, political preparedness and faith in the general work are imposed. The rights of Komsomol committees have been strengthened; full autonomy has been given to Komsomol oblast and rayon committees: finance and travel are under their purview.

At the present time one of the basic questions is the enrichment of the spiritual culture of youth. In this sector attention to the emergence of the rich legacy of national traditions and people’s talents and to initiating propaganda for them has been strengthened. An ensemble of dutar players based on folk bardic traditions has been established in two places, at the Komsomol’s Ashkhabad city Soviet raykom and in Tashauz. At the



raykom mentioned above the experimental "Nagysh" organization of youth is operating. The master jeweler Ata Gurbangulyyev is heading the organization. With the goal of improving moral-esthetic education for youth even further, there are positive developments in developing the song genre in the republic, in propagandizing the best modern works of Turkmen composers and poets, and in exposing their talented works. I assume that many know about the "Nama-89" republic radio contest. This contest was organized by the CC LKSMT of Turkmenistan, the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Television and Radio and the presidium of the Turkmen SSR Composers Union. The contest will last until 31 December of this year.

[Interviewer] They talk about feeling a revival process during the time you have worked at the CC LKSMT, or during the time you headed its ideological department. How do you view this characterization?

[Geldiyeva] In general, a renewal was spread throughout the society in this period. Four years have passed since the start of perestroyka. In this time we learned to move courageously on the road of socialist realism. In general all processes have changed. The press has changed. Generally, I would connect the renewal process with the changes taking place in our society as a whole.

[Interviewer] Not very much time has gone by since you assumed leadership of the LKSMT. We remember the days in August: many people must recall that at a time when many were wrangling for the first secretary position, you came forth with a platform. What kind of changes have taken place in the your job?

[Geldiyev] I always think about what was specified in the program. It consisted of 7 points: these were duties like democratizing Komsomol work, giving Komsomol committees the right to become economic enterprises, the problem of youths who are studying, and introducing international relations to children's and youth organizations. Recently the republic conference of students took place. In it student youths defined the direction of work for the future. Now student councils have been established at republic institutions of higher learning. The council directs its work at resolving the problems of student youth. And, the points of the 1984 decree on party leadership of the Komsomol are not being achieved. We often run into shortcomings in the VLKSM, even at the lower ranks. If there had been a long-term effort to resolve questions pertaining to youth at the Central Committee or obkom level, it would not have coincided with the views of the Komsomol by party committees at the lower level. Sometimes we have a very strong relationship with party workers (i.e., one of the leaders at a factory or other organizations is responsible for the Komsomol), but what are all the other communists doing? Every one of these should be taking responsibility for educating the developing generation.

In general, there is no systematic approach to this question. There are accounting reports which are only on

paper. Thus, in order to strengthen party leadership over the Komsomol, we are preparing a joint plenum of the CC LKSMT and the CC TuCP. Before the plenum we are conducting a wide survey on this issue. Then we will go to the plenum with a clear guideline and will build on the decrees of this plenum in the future.

[Interviewer] By training you are a philologist, a teacher of Russian language and literature. It would be interesting if you would discuss your years as a pedagogue.

[Geldiyev] I graduated from the Red Banner of Labor M. Gor'kiy Turkmen State University's faculty of Russian language and literature in 1982. I was sent to work at the No.3 secondary school in Krasnovodsk city. At first I was a teacher, then, in the last two years I held the job of organizer of extracurricular activity and external educational work with children. These years were an interesting and influential period in my life. I could never forget the work conducted jointly with the school's social organizations. The thematic evenings, discussions and walks were very interesting...

[Interviewer] Thank you. Are you still very interested in school life now?

[Geldiyeva] The social organization of youths and work connected with their education are, in fact, direct duties of the Komsomol. This work takes us among the youth whether we want it or not. For us there is no way to disassociate ourselves from the school, which is where the future is being educated.

Today many problems have accumulated in the life of the school. The knowledge and education of the growing generation have turned into a job of all the people. Many difficulties are being confronted in implementing school reform. The February (1988) plenum of the CC CPSU and the All-Union Congress of Educational Workers set forth major duties. We must have a multifaceted, friendly relationship with the schools of today. We must conduct especially intensive work with the youth, especially the Komsomol youth who are a symbol of striving and energy. The data on criminal activity among adolescent youth in our country is very disturbing. This process is neither increasing nor diminishing. The educational work of Komsomol organizations must give special attention to work with "difficult" children. We have to remove formalism from the educational work conducted with "difficult" children. We must direct their free time toward useful work and make wide use of the existing experience in this sector.

[Interviewer] You are in direct telephonic contact with Komsomol members. How useful is this in your work?

[Geldiyeva] We set up these telephone connections for the first time as CC secretaries. It leads to frank and open talks with the youth. It is always helpful to us to feel the pulse. The youths have many questions on difficulties emerging in the democratization of Komsomol work. Sometimes there are unexpected questions...

[Interviewer] What questions are alarming the educators?

[Geldiyeva] In the schools there are teachers' Komsomol groups, students' Komsomol groups and some other independent groups. Dozens of questions come up on uniting two organizations, attaching secretaries who have lost their jobs in other organizations to us and exchanging the "Burgutjik" military-sports games for modern games. We try to accommodate their wishes and place great importance on examining every question in depth.

[Interviewer] Govkher Ballyyevna, the political campaign is going on at the present time. Are the election-accounting meetings proceeding according to expectations?

[Geldiyeva] We are following the election-accounting meetings with great interest. Workers in the apparatus are going to the places noted on the chart. If we were to talk about what the impact of this work would be, it would be that we expect real evaluations of the work at the accounting-election meetings and solutions to the problems of youth. If earlier talks were directed essentially at the exploitation of spare time, now the talks are about social-economic analyses, internal union affairs, and materials from the Congress of USSR Peoples Deputies and sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. At meetings Komsomols talk about nationality questions and bilingualism in the republic. The youth are electing Komsomol committee secretaries in a democratic atmosphere and on the basis of alternative possibilities. But one could say that this situation is not characteristic everywhere.

There is nothing that should be kept secret. Accounting-election meetings are not being held according to demands at most Komsomol committees. Situations like long and superficial reports, poor speeches, tedium, the absence of any effort to revive the primary organization, hypocrisy and passivity persist. At meetings in which responsible workers of the CC LKSMT participate, the duties of Komsomol committees at a time of perestroyka are noted in generalities. VLKSM members took part passively in the large annual meeting. The fact that meetings are either not held or put off until another time is a common occurrence.

[Interviewer] Govkher Ballyyevna, could you tell us about your desires for youth in connection with the anniversary of the Komsomol?

[Geldiyeva] The Komsomol period is a time of youth, a time of unbounded enthusiasm and energy. This energy among youth must not be dampened. I would like to see all youth in the front ranks of perestroyka. The new generation, the perestroyka generation, is growing and maturing in front of our eyes; preparing the rising generation, a worthy generation, is a grave responsibility for our entire society. And basic responsibility for doing this duty falls to the teachers and pedagogues of today.

[Interviewer] Many thanks for your talk! We believe that your valuable leadership will create deep changes in the life of the Turkmenistan Komsomol and that you will support all the positive innovations to completely cleanse the Komsomol of formalism.

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