

JPRS-UMA-92-015
29 APRIL 1992



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JPRS Report

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

19980120 072

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Condition, Use of Training Range Viewed

92UM0841A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
17 Mar 92 p 2

[Interview with Col Mikhail Kvasko, chief, Combined Arms District Proving Grounds, by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Lt Col Viktor Shvyrev: "Grounds Not Sleeping"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are NARODNAYA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] The first machinegun and automatic rifle shots resounded several decades ago on a piece of forsaken Chernigov land. This was the start of activity at the proving grounds, which were intended for improving the tactical, weapons, and specialized training of units and subunits making up the Kiev Military District.

The installation grew with time; it eventually became known as the "Combined Arms District Proving Grounds." It the ensuing years it was to be a site for carrying out a large number of various exercises, testing and introduction of many new forms and methods of conducting combat activities, and providing good field training for thousands of enlisted, non-commissioned, warrant officer, and commissioned personnel.

What is being done at present? What problems are occupying the minds of specialists there? These and other topics were discussed in our correspondent's interview with Colonel Mikhail Kvasko, who is the chief of the Combined Arms District Proving Grounds.

[Shvyrev] Mikhail Dmitriyevich, this is the third day of my visit to your installation, and I have yet to hear a single shot fired. Is this not a sign that the pace of training on the grounds has slackened?

[Kvasko] I intend to tell you the plain truth. The amount of firing and the pace of training are indeed not the same as before. The causes are well-known: Units are suffering a shortage of fuel and personnel, and, in addition, of money to pay for officers and warrant officers for their stay. Conditions being what they are, commanders are attempting to make maximum use of battalion training grounds, classrooms, and simulators. The effectiveness of this kind of training is somewhat lower, of course. What can be done about it? It is now necessary to select the lesser of two evils.

[Shvyrev] In the event there is no improvement in providing the troops with everything they need, are you afraid that your subordinates will find themselves unemployed?

[Kvasko] Of course not. Difficult as it may become—say in the case of fuel—proving ground training activities will continue. Even now they are taking place, incidentally. Trainees are making use, virtually on a daily basis, of the tank training area, fighting vehicle gunnery training facilities, and small-arms firing ranges. The tactical training area is also not lying idle. For example,

tomorrow it will be the location of a tank company's distance firing; the day after, of a battalion tactical demonstration with live firing. Motorized riflemen, aviators, and artillerymen will work on combat training missions in concert with tankmen.

Plans call for carrying out platoon and company firing practice, and two-sided FTXs. In a word, our specialists will not have time to sit around and become bored.

[Shvyrev] Today, a time when there is a shortage in virtually everything, one hears many suggestions relative to maintaining a proper training program. The one I favor the most involves forming a training battalion which with its personnel and equipment would offer instruction to both local subunits and those located some distance from the grounds. Could you comment on that?

[Kvasko] This idea has shown up before. It previously did not advance beyond the talking stage, but I believe that it should now be adopted without hesitation. It promises to deliver substantial advantages. They include dispensing with movement of materiel long distances, saving of fuel otherwise used for transport, and elimination of unnecessary wear and tear of vehicles. Relative to delivering personnel to the grounds, commanders would not have to face difficulties that otherwise may arise.

I can add to the above. I believe that now is a time when it is wiser to carry out monthly rather than weekly field training. This would bring a higher return, relieving subunits of frequent transits.

[Shvyrev] The last few years have seen the grounds undergo frequent expansions, acquire additional training areas, and receive improved monitoring apparatus. Mikhail Dmitriyevich, do you think that there is a need to create even more training facilities and provide new ones for the grounds?

[Kvasko] There really is no need for that. The equipment presently available on the grounds completely fulfills the present requirements of troop training. I refer principally to the tactical training area, tank gunnery range, small-arms combat training range, and the tank training area. Some of these facilities, just recently placed into service, have already earned the praise of commanders and their subordinates.

Of the facilities in use, I would like to single out the tactical training area. Its size and equipment make it possible to carry out company, battalion, and regimental tactical training, and this of both a defensive and offensive nature.

The total training area we have here is extensive, as you can see. It is quite difficult to keep it all under control. That is why we feel compelled to ask the commanders of local regiments to furnish a dozen or so of troops to keep order at the facilities. Our requests have not always been satisfied, unfortunately, especially quite recently. I do

realize that subunits are suffering personnel shortages. Nonetheless, I hope that this does not become a source of friction between us.

I would like to take this opportunity to make a request of commanders and personnel of subunits that make frequent use of our grounds. Please clean up all areas you use before you set out for home. Do you expect us to go behind you and pick up trash and haul it to the dump, repair damaged equipment, and fill up holes you make?

Let me tell you what is causing us concern. This year, as never before, there have been more frequent cases of abuse of grounds equipment by the local populace. I cite several examples.

Malefactors recently broke down the door of a vehicle building and took parts from a diesel engine; they pilfered four tables and 20 chairs from the ordnance area. The "Marshall Tower" also did not escape harm. Several windows were removed and the remaining windows smashed. Items that have "slipped away" under cover of darkness include panels, cables, and cable equipment. We are also caused considerable trouble by hunters, who use tower windows, markers, and stands for firing practice. We inform the law enforcement agencies of each incident. Some of the latter are conducting investigations. Even that does not make things any better for us.

[Shvyrev] It seems that now, more than ever before, it is necessary for personnel to treat training facilities with care, employ equipment economically.

[Kvasko] Absolutely. Just consider the following costs: A single cubic meter of plywood (a material we use the most) costs us about 20,000 rubles; a kilogram of nails, 18 rubles; one tonne of gravel, 192 rubles; one cubic meter of lumber, 1,500 rubles. Prices have risen, but acquisition of materials has become considerably more difficult. To get that plywood, we were forced to send a man to Balagoye in Nizhegorod Oblast. Therefore, we have no choice but to count our money and think of ways to make targets and cable equipment last longer.

[Shvyrev] Now, with the nascent market economy, it is probably necessary to think about the commercial aspect of matters. For example, why not offer tactical presentations and equipment demonstrations on the grounds for a fee?

[Kvasko] What can I say? It is possible that it will come to that. We are presently not set up for that. Relative to commercial activity, we received permission last year to sell equipment declared surplus by the Central and Western Groups of Forces. This includes rails, target carts, and electric motors. These items are bought up by local operators for use on their farms. The proceeds from the sale are employed to fill needs of the grounds.

[Shvyrev] Now for the final question. I heard that your subordinates underwent a training performance evaluation last year. Was this done on the whim of a superior, or is it

a matter of serious involvement of grounds specialists in initiation of ongoing training for themselves?

[Kvasko] It must be owned that the previous grounds leadership showed little interest in training for its personnel; it was primarily concerned with delivering training to other subunits. It is not to be blamed for that: It was a position into which the leadership was involuntarily placed. We, realizing that this could not go on indefinitely, insisted that our specialists be afforded the opportunity of undergoing systematic training. That is what they are receiving this year. Now every Monday the men are given non-equipment, drill, and physical training; they benefit from hands-on instruction in repair, servicing, and operation of grounds equipment. And, I can tell you, they take great interest in their training.

Desertion From Western Group of Forces Declining

92UM0853A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 92
Morning Edition p 7

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondents Nikolay Burbyga and Sergey Mostovshchikov, Berlin-Moscow: "A Serviceman Is Obligated To Stoically Endure the Difficulties of Service Under Conditions of Capitalism"]

[Text] As Western Group of Forces commanding officers note with satisfaction, the number of soldiers, officers, and warrant officers who desire to desert from units in Germany that are located directly behind the barriers of KPP [regimental command posts] decreases each year. The problem of mass desertion, an urgent problem several years ago, already no longer worries army commanders since even the majority of those who previously could have deserted have now returned. Having found out that it is practically impossible to obtain German citizenship or an adequate amount of money—all the more so since you need to work a lot and well, deserters, despite the threat of arrest and trial, have once again preferred the advantages of the socialist way of life. They have returned to their special fenced-in world that conducts its existence according to its own unwritten laws and traditions. A world which was previously called the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

A Brick Does not Strike and a Saber Does not Cut Our Head

Judging by conversations, the functioning model of the obvious advantage of native troops over the large units of their former allies in the victory over Germany now continues to serve in our Berlin motorized rifle brigade. This is either a soldier or a sergeant who has become famous through his solo performance during one of the friendly meetings between Soviet military personnel and their colleagues from the U.S. Army Berlin Mechanized Infantry Brigade. As they describe it, before the eyes of the dumbfounded Americans, our soldier selflessly rested his chin on his saber and his fellow serviceman

just as selflessly broke a brick with a sledgehammer on the head of the comrade who is ready for labor or defense.

They also cited other arguments for us, as new people, who have been sent to visit the American brigade in Berlin. Our fellow countrymen trustingly told us that the Americans are nothing to look at. Well, O.K., their life is lusher than ours but then their warriors are weaker. They spend only a third as much time as their WGF counterparts conducting combat training, the soldiers drink beer and chase women in the evenings, and they generally do not know how to march properly.

We nevertheless drove over, thanks to the assistance of the Western Group of Forces commander and Soviet Berlin Brigade Liaison Officer Major Tigran Strelchen, who participates in allied forces working sessions in Germany every week. The itinerary of our trip did not provide for bricks or a saber and was sooner like a trip on a tourist route, hurriedly laid out for Russian journalists on the territory occupied by the U.S. Army in Berlin.

There we met First Lieutenant Mark Yockey, a deputy company commander of one of the brigade's infantry battalions. He was a sight for sore eyes. A strong, broad-shouldered military man who regularly undergoes, like all U.S. Army officers, weight checks and physical fitness testing, he began his service as a rank and file soldier, then graduated from the University of San Diego and returned to the army as an officer.

Under the supervision of our special partner, who was attached to us to monitor the purely personal nature of the questions for servicemen, Mark Yockey said that the American Government is concerned about him, his wife, and child. He lives in a two-bedroom apartment with a kitchen and living room, which the state pays for, and it also pays him \$2,400 per month (approximately six months salary for a Soviet lieutenant in Germany). The impending reduction of American troops in Berlin does not frighten him since his life will nevertheless remain wonderful and marvelous.

"Yes, sir," said Specialist Wright, who was also scheduled for an interview with Soviet journalists (specialist is an American army serviceman's rank and, once promoted to it, he is no longer a private but has still not yet become a sergeant), and led us to the company area which is like a dormitory with rooms for one or two people. Specialist Wright lives in his own room alone surrounded by posters of Arnold Schwarzenegger and similar muscular lads, a large SONY television, a microwave oven, and a stereo tape recorder purchased with his hard-earned soldier's pay. The government is also concerned about him and pays him \$700 per month (the salary of a colonel or of the Soviet Forces Berlin motorized rifle brigade commander).

Specialist Wright reports for duty in the U.S. Army at 6:00 a.m. and gets off at 5:30 p.m. During this time he has the opportunity to eat three times at no charge at the mess hall and to be involved with his combat training

and also with the training of his subordinates. Specialist Wright does not have the opportunity or desire to sweep the street, to iron his own uniform, to dig trenches, or to sew undercollars which do not exist, to wash lavatories, to level borders or to copy editorials from TIME magazine in a pad for political classes.

After 5:30 p.m., if Specialist Wright is not scheduled for alert duty, he can put on his jeans and jacket, get in his car, and drive to the city of Berlin to drink beer and to dance at a discotheque since the psychologists' special service does not recommend that soldiers be confined to themselves and hang around the unit area. By the way, Specialist Wright can also not go anywhere, he can go to the cafeteria in the unit area, to the gym or simply sit in his room and write a letter to his mother about how Soviet journalists attempted a dozen times to explain the meaning of the riddle word *gaupvakhta* [stockade] to his Commander, 1st Lt Yockey. Only a court can deprive an American soldier of his freedom for any sort of crime and this is well-known to each lad.

No one has ever broken bricks on Specialist Wright's head and he does not understand why anyone would want to do that. He also does not understand why it is necessary to have a degree of combat readiness around-the-clock right now in Berlin that allows, in a matter of minutes, to get tanks and other vehicles out onto the street. Specialist Wright also realizes that in modern war (God forbid! of course) not brute force to kill the enemy, not endurance in consuming bad food or a pretty military song, but electronics, good communications systems, and equipment that is in good working order will decide everything.

Montana imeni Lenin

Right now duty in Germany, like no other, is a CIS citizen's honorable duty. They think that it is not too easy to end up here.

Stabilization of the local economy and the introduction of the West German mark into native purses has changed our people beyond recognition. Smiling wives and children in various types of clothing, senior lieutenants with baby carriages for their purchases who do not carry canned beer because it tastes sour, kiwi in ice cream, strawberries year-around, frankfurters, frankfurters, frankfurters, and asparagus for dinner.

Our rank and file soldier in the Western Group of Forces receives 25 bundesmarks per month which is already pretty good by Soviet standards. He can give part of his salary to the master sergeant for safekeeping in order to save money for demobilization to purchase trousers and a not very expensive stereo tape recorder.

Our soldier does not have the concept of the end of the duty day for the Homeland. He is on alert around-the-clock: he fires, drives a military vehicle, marches, enlightens himself politically and humanely, sings, sweeps, washes, cleans, digs, and lives in the barracks which, no matter how you paint it, is still like a labor

camp barracks, and he also attempts to endure those two years for which his native country, not knowing for what misdeeds, has deprived him of his sex life. He can only catch sight of Germany while on duty at the regimental command post, during collective photo taking visits to the city, and also while visiting the nearest points of interest. Beer, which is literally drunk by everyone around him, is a banned beverage.

Officers can drink beer. They can also drink ABSOLYUT or SMIRNOFF'S vodka which is nearly twice as cheap in the unit area than in surrounding Germany: goods that are sold at allied troop garrisons are not subject to taxes. Our officers' salaries fluctuate from 700-1,200 marks per month depending on rank. This money entirely compensates for the deprivation of freedom which affects not nearly only soldiers. Officers' travel in Germany is regulated by the Soviet troop withdrawal treaty and also by the orders of the commander.

So, for example, our officer can drive into Germany without a visa but with a stamp in a foreign passport that confirms that he is a WGF serviceman. According to the idea, free travel is authorized only through the former East Germany and now also throughout the territory of West Germany. But in fact the officer does not have the right to drive from another city to, for example, Berlin and this may cause unpleasantness if he is seen by Soviet patrols. There were generally very few officers legally in West Berlin despite the fact that now city transport moves freely there. Moreover, they can not travel freely everywhere even on the territory of their own military garrisons. In Wunsdorf, for example, where the commander-in-chief's headquarters is located, such a complex pass system operates within the garrison that changes nearly on a daily basis that, say, today you purchased sausage in this store but tomorrow they will not permit you within cannon shot of it. It is also extremely difficult to drive out from the unit in a vehicle and later to drive back into it.

All purchases are made, as a rule, in the military garrison because it is cheap. Of course, the selection does not compare with the West German selection but it is heaven on earth compared to the CIS. You can also permit yourself a trip to the German store PLUS which gives large discounts when purchasing goods in small quantities. Germans of modest circumstances and our officers are constant clients here.

The first and most important purchase for a person who has begun to serve in Germany—is a pair of Montana sweats for 36 marks and cheap, probably Korean, white running shoes. A person, feeling like a European after this, can shift to more serious procedures. The target of our army's most intense interest in Germany is the automobile. At that Soviet automobiles, since right now the Germans are getting rid of them and selling them for next to nothing and, furthermore, stolen Zhigulis are hijacked here from neighboring countries and also, naturally, sell for next to nothing.

According to the experts, you can buy an old Moskvich for 100 marks on a good market day since it would cost the owner more to take it to a junkyard. With a certain knack, you can find totally reconditioned Zhiguli VAZ-2105's for a total of 1,000 marks and good 9000's for 3,000-4,000, if you are lucky. Some officers had phenomenal success a year to a year and a half ago, having bought KamAZ's from some Germans for 500 marks (!) a piece. The native population surrendered these large vehicles for next to nothing after reunification. Having obtained a truck, you do not have to send home a container with items by train because they will steal from you in the Homeland. Load everything in your personal KamAZ and head home.

However, the most farsighted people do not buy anything simply because—of petty- bourgeois perceptions. Like it or not, the image of the Homeland will sooner or later visit you, even in Germany. Because of this, you are beside yourself because, having returned, there simply will not be any place to live for many people. Therefore, if you accumulate some resources, then just due to that fact you can purchase a roof over your head at the now insane prices at home. You need a lot of money to do that, and they don't pay you very much. Therefore, you need to make some money.

Stand in Economic Formation!

Soviet business—is a peculiar thing. A military business is generally something else. They told us about a certain German businessman by the name of Unman Jurgen who one day decided to put his jukeboxes in our Officers' Club with a long-term goal: When the troops leave, he will submit a claim to the local authorities that, allegedly, this is my property, give me the entire building. Of course, it is all the same to us, moreover that the businessman offered to overhaul the billets of the entire Officers' Club at his own expense for permitting him to install the jukeboxes. Therefore, he overhauled the officers' club and here, the military commanders' commission. They say he made good and accurate repairs. And what is this about jukeboxes? Remove the jukeboxes, they are inappropriate. And that is how they played...

And in general, things are turning out best of all, they say, at the military store. Having remained a planned socialist organization, the local military store has quite successfully mastered the capitalism that surrounds it. Not a single foreign person ever manages to penetrate the intricacies of goods deliveries to garrison shelves. Cigarettes with names that no one in the civilized world knows, semi-underground products from still more underground suppliers and, finally, games with firms at the difference of prices in German and in garrison stores.

Sometimes this difference is so substantial that it is more profitable for our military businessmen to not sell anything to their fellow citizens but to come to an agreement with a firm so that it will allegedly give the goods to the military store but in fact sell everything itself at higher

prices. The profits are shared. Furthermore, for individual businessmen, our units are an ideal sales market for goods that do not sell at all now in Germany. Any thing—poor quality clothing, consumer goods, poor cosmetics, and so forth—attracts our defenders of the Homeland as bribes for our bureaucrats who have the capability to decide what to buy for the military store and what not to buy. Of course, any proposals to open firm sales stores on unit territory, even with Russian personnel, remain only proposals.

Not all business ideas pass by the fathers-commanders. Army commanders have recently authorized the placement of advertising on the garrison's outer fence for which they are paid good money. The money also goes for salaries and for aid to officers to purchase housing in the CIS. They willingly buy scrap metal from us. But theft still remains the most popular way to conduct business with us.

It is practically impossible to steal or to sell weapons, no matter what the Germans accuse us of doing. All of the Kalashnikovs and ammunition that find their way onto the black market, as a rule, are from the stores of the former GDR [German Democratic Republic] army. But our army still has no place to go! Besides assault rifles, there is also gasoline, coal, wood, and so on and so forth. Germans purchase fuel stolen by soldiers for 50 pfennigs per liter (in our language—fenushkov) and they pay up to 40 marks for a truckload of coal, and they are also making deals with Soviet emigres, the concentration of which around military facilities of their fellow citizens is quite heavy.

Sometimes all of this appears to be incomprehensibly amazing since just a wooden barrier separates our people in Germany from normal life. Later you stop being amazed. Up to now, for example, you can only call from East Berlin to West Berlin via code: the communications systems in the city, which for nearly 30 years were separated by a wall that was built in a single night, have become too different.

CIS: POLICY

Volkogonov on Creation of New Ministry

92UM0903A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Apr 92 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Colonel-General Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, chairman of the Russian Federation State Commission for the Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army and Navy, by Captain 3rd Rank V. Yermolin: "Eight Questions for Colonel-General Dmitriy Volkogonov, chairman of the Russian Federation State Commission for the Creation of the Ministry of Defense, Army and Navy"]

[Text]

[Yermolin] Dmitriy Antonovich, what tasks have been assigned to your commission?

[Volkogonov] The President was quite terse when he formulated these tasks: we need to take, in a very short period of time, under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation all units that are located on its territory, and also all units in Germany, Poland, the Baltic Region, in the Transcaucasus, Mongolia and, finally, those division-sized and smaller units that have not yet been taken under the jurisdiction of the CIS republics and which have not become part of national formations. I want to stress: we cannot leave a single unit of the former Union Armed Forces ownerless. All Russians [rossiyane]—soldiers, army and naval warrant officers, and officers—have the right to socio-political protection from Russia and each will receive that protection. Right now the most important thing is to form the Russian army as rapidly as possible.

[Yermolin] As far as I understand it, the Russian army will be created not from nothing but based on the CIS Allied Armed Forces?

[Volkogonov] Yes, that was my proposal to the President. We have the former Union Ministry of Defense, we have the General Staff, and we have structures which it would be irrational not to use. Incidentally, we need to bear in mind—the creation of the command and control systems alone will cost us billions. If we begin from nothing.

[Yermolin] The CIS Allied Armed Forces do not belong to Russia alone. Have any preliminary consultations whatsoever been conducted with the other Commonwealth countries and with that same Ukraine?

[Volkogonov] But did Ukraine really consult with anyone when it unilaterally created its own Armed Forces? Or a number of other republics? I think that the creation of its own army is—an internal matter for each state. Here, as you know, we are not acting as the initiators. Now this already does not require any agreements whatsoever. As for the CIS Allied Armed Forces, after the appropriate negotiations with the representatives of the Commonwealth countries, we are delegating to the Allied Armed Forces a very insignificant portion of the specialists for work in CIS joint defense structures, as compared to the Ministry of Defense. And we have place for the Allied Armed Forces structures in our country—the complex of buildings of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization.

[Yermolin] It is easy to assume that the issue of jurisdiction will become one of the problematic issues. Each republic has its own view here.

[Volkogonov] We have created a special group for a normal decision in the negotiating channel of the issues of the transfer of CIS Allied Armed Forces troop units to Russian jurisdiction. Generals K. Kobets and B. Pyankov head it. We advocate a dialogue on this issue. And we have no intentions at all of snatching or cutting

off something from someone. We simply want to clarify the republics' intentions with regard to units which we, by the way, are financing.

[Yermolin] Say a few words about the Russian Ministry of Defense itself.

[Volkogonov] One of our commission's groups will be involved with the elaboration of the structure and functions of the Ministry of Defense. Two primary directions of the ministry's work are being proposed. One is a sort of "civilian" direction (it is no accident that it is Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin who has been appointed first deputy minister of defense). Its sphere—is social protection of servicemen, arms purchases, military-political issues, budget-financial issues, and so on. Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev will head the strictly military direction. Administrative structures will be significantly reduced—by 40-45 percent, and there will be more civilian than military departments in the ministry. Troop command and control issues will remain with the General Staff.

[Yermolin] Are large reductions in the troops also being proposed?

[Volkogonov] It is inevitable. Russia "cannot stretch" to a two million-man army. The optimal number of personnel is 1.2 to 1.3 million men. But, the President also told me this, not a single servicemen who has been released from the army will be bypassed in the context of social assistance. The reduction—will only be with the simultaneous resolution of first of all the apartment issue. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was slightly inaccurate when it interpreted my words about material assistance to those servicemen who have been released into the reserve. We will attempt to partially pay to purchase either their own home in a rural area or an apartment for not all, but only for those servicemen who do not have housing. But this is a draft for now.

[Yermolin] Dmitriy Antonovich, the commission was just created but there is already quite a bit of noise surrounding it in political circles. Specially, Commission Member G. Starovoytova thinks that "there are two few civilians and too many old regime generals on the commission." A number of democratic movements and, first of all, "Military Men for Democracy", also think that the composition of the commission is not very democratic.

[Volkogonov] First of all, the composition of the commission, as far as I know, was formed in the presidential structures and the committees of parliament and was coordinated with the appropriate deputy commissions and the suggestions of the General Staff and of the former Ministry of Defense were used. We could have blown up the composition of the commission to several hundred people in order to not offend anyone. But we are not isolating ourselves from anyone and we are ready for any constructive cooperation... And this is all of our fate—we are all divided into two camps that are constantly feuding among themselves. All of society. And

until we have a strong liberal-democratic center which would be above all of these battles, things will not progress in our country. As for the composition, then S. Shakhray, and S. Filatov, and G. Starovoytova herself are on it... Yes you will publish the composition of the commission in your newspaper and let the readers themselves judge just how undemocratic we are (From the editor—we propose publishing the composition of the commission in the 14 April issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA).

[Yermolin] And the last question, how long does your commission intend to work?

[Volkogonov] We hope to deal with our task in a month. It would be good if we could already announce the creation of the Russian Federation army and navy on May 9. This will be the Armed Forces which will inherit the glorious combat traditions of the Russian and Soviet Army.

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Tver Arranges for Arrival of 6th Motorized-Rifle Division

92UM0930A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Apr 92 p 8

[Article by Vitaliy Potapov under the rubric "The Army": "The Tver Numbers Have Grown"]

[Text] Tver—The redeployment of troops from the European countries (and not just from there), from once fraternal republics, has caused serious concern for many local officials. It means that thousands of guests will have to be received and provided for, and, will in time be called fellow residents of Tver. With their own cares....

The Tver city administration decided to proceed in this matter in a somewhat unexpected way. They went to Poland on their own and... urgently requested that the 6th Motorized-Rifle Division, which was being withdrawn from that country, come to them, to Tver, the capital of the Upper Volga Region.

It is probably all because Aleksandr Belousov, head of the Tver administration, caught on to the fact last fall that it had become clear the military post was not going to escape an invasion of new military personnel. New in the sense that Tver has its own Military Air Academy (a half-dozen generals alone), military scientific research institutes, military units, of course, and even a Suvorov school. And is the word "avoid" appropriate when referring to the very difficult and painful processes which have swept over our army in recent months? All living together. And the obstinate egotism of some local authorities who, by hook or by crook, evade the "honored duty" to accept servicemen without a home, is producing human dramas, wearing people down with the

muddle and resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of pieces of expensive equipment. Also a loss of faith in any sort of common sense by the "man with the weapon."

"Yes, the army needs help today," A. Belousov said. "We need to help our children and brothers, our compatriots. How far down does one have to get to be reminded that "they have nowhere to live" and "nothing to eat."

A technical man to the core, we can see that Aleksandr Belousov is a fairly emotional man. He undertook to resolve all the issues involved in a constructive manner, however. He wrote a letter to Ye. Shaposhnikov. The former minister of defense met with the services involved in Moscow and Tver. He traveled to Poland. Mutual understanding was reached, and the machinery was activated.

No, it was not all so simple. And the 3,000 apartments which need to be built at Tver within three years will not materialize, of course. A solution was found, however. Together with the military department they found a way to announce a competition among several foreign companies. It seems that the Turks and the Finns will do the building. In addition to apartments, it is planned to lay a 16-kilometer water line and acquire a new boiler-house. The undertaking has also been eased by the fact that the city has vacant barracks (the property of a so-called billeting division, reserve), hangars and storage facilities. And so, a new town will spring up in the area of the legendary Tver Proletarka, the first 500 "Finnish-Turkish" apartments by the end of this year.

"And yet, Aleksandr Petrovich, can it be that the city was not seeking some benefit (excuse the candor) for itself in these considerable problems (other units will follow the 6th Motorized-Rifle Division)?"

"That is just the point," he answered, "not to be parasites on one another but to live as equals, with mutual benefit. We will have to strain ourselves to provide the officer housing, but as time goes by our young men will serve in this division, that is, serve right near home. The unit command element is selling us the extra equipment—which we need very much but is not to be found anywhere—at prices far lower than on the exchange. (Incidentally, there are more than enough takers. The military commercial structures have not been dozing all this time, and, unfortunately, there are plenty of people who would like to get a slice of the military pie even though they have no basis or right to it.) Furthermore, the division's move to the Upper Volga Region will help us with the food situation. The appropriate documents have been drawn up, everything has been paid for....

In the meantime the first 200 servicemen from the 6th Motorized-Rifle Division have already arrived on the banks of the Volga from the banks of the Visla. We understand that the officers and warrant officers will have to wait a while for their authorizations for apartments, but even now they are certainly not living in field

conditions. Well-outfitted dormitories and a winter Pioneer camp are already in operation. The beautiful and ancient city, so fittingly placed by history on the "Petersburg to Moscow" route is accepting the new addition to Tver's population gladly and with an understanding of the situation.

Reliable rumors are being received from Poland that some officers who submitted requests for discharge on the threshold of the redeployment of the Northern Group of Forces have taken back those requests.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

PVO Chief of Staff Sinitsyn Interviewed

92UM0837A Moscow VESTNIK
PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY in Russian
No 1, Jan 1992 pp 3-5

[interview with Col Gen V.P. Sinitsyn, chief of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces, by VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY chief editor: "Colonel General V.P. Sinitsyn, chief of the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces: 'A Lot of Work Lies Ahead'"]

[Text] Col Gen V.P. Sinitsyn was born in the village of Slavynino in the Vologda region. He has served in the armed forces more than 30 years. He has commanded an antiaircraft missile battalion, a regiment, a formation and a large formation of the PVO [Air Defense] Forces. His latest position was deputy PVO, commander in chief for VUZs [higher educational institutions] and chief of PRO VUZs. The chief editor of the magazine VESTNIK PROTIVOVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY talks with the new chief of the Main Staff on the role and place of staffs in the ongoing military reform and the changes occurring in the Air Defense Forces.

[Editor] Viktor Pavlovich, in view of your experience in the forces, there is probably no point in saying that you are already fairly familiar with the range of your new duties. It would be interesting for those readers of the magazine who are meeting you for the first time today, however, to learn in general what problems you are presently working on and what your important and responsible position involves.

[Sinitsyn] Absolutely. My former position, which I occupied for several years, provides me with a fairly accurate picture of the entire range of problems facing the PVO Main Staff. To put it in popular terms, I have been entrusted with heading the main agency by means of which the commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces directs all the forces and assets under his command. My main job is therefore one of achieving a situation in which the decisions and orders of the commander in chief are executed most effectively. I still see my role as a fairly active one, however.

The PVO Main Staff has to demonstrate initiative and work out proposals for the commander in chief on the

most important aspects of the daily functioning of the troops and their operational structure, as well as command and control of everyday operations and in the case of extreme situations. The staff gives serious attention to matters of planning the combat employment of the PVO formations, working out weapons development programs and monitoring subordinate structures. Naturally, at different times first these problems then others will move to the fore.

I like to break the tasks facing me down into "important" and "secondary" tasks, because since they exist, they must be accomplished or resolved well and in a timely manner. One of the most urgent problems today is that of working out ways to reform the PVO in light of the conversion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into the Commonwealth of Independent States. A great deal also has to be done with respect to adjusting plans for rearming the PVO in view of the well-known economic difficulties and the reduction of allocations for weapons and military equipment and of the numerical strength of the troops. In this situation we regard our main objective to be that of preventing a lowering of the capabilities of the PVO Forces for performing their main mission, that of protecting the air borders of our homeland.

I can say without exaggeration that we are also devoting attention to matters of improving the combat readiness of the PVO Forces, strengthening military discipline and providing social protection for the servicemen and their families.

[Editor] The readers of PROTIVVOZDUSHNOY OBORONY are already familiar with the viewpoint of our new commander in chief on impending changes in the Air Defense Forces. He expressed himself in the previous issue. What do you think of these changes? What prospects do you envisage for the anti-aircraft missile troops, the fighter aviation, radiotechnical troops, the space forces?

[Sinitsyn] We have accumulated many problems, which must be resolved. However, I want particularly to stress the fact that over a period of many years a smoothly organized, deeply echeloned air defense system has been developed in the nation. Its reorganization must be approached in a calculated manner, on the basis of a thorough study and taking into account the military-political situation and the nation's economic capabilities. Furthermore, the combat readiness of the troops in every situation must conform to the degree of military threat and ensure that the state is reliably defended.

Now, about prospects for development. In view of the reduction of outlays for defense and of the numerical strength of the forces, it is planned to focus the main attention on direct coverage of the most important economic facilities and the main groupings of armed forces. The mission of preventing an aerospace attack will be accomplished with over-the-horizon, space and

other assets. And in general the development of missile-space defense will focus on enhancing combat capabilities with respect to detecting a missile attack, monitoring space and antimissile defense in strict accordance with the 1972 Antimissile Defense Agreement.

It is planned to develop the anti-aircraft missile troops and the aviation by equipping them with new types of more effective aircraft and mobile anti-aircraft missile systems and by improving the groupings.

Improvement of the radiotechnical troops will be based on the establishment of a unified and automated radar system for the nation.

I want particularly to point out that it would be extremely difficult to establish an effective air defense system for individual republics. Furthermore, this would require large forces and funds. I am profoundly convinced that the air defense system—and in the future an aerospace defense system—must be a unified system for our entire Commonwealth of Independent States.

[Editor] Viktor Pavlovich, perhaps more problems of various kinds have accumulated in the PVO Forces than in any other branch. And although it will be two months before the readers see this interview, it is doubtful that anything will have changed drastically. How do you view the role of the staff in the resolution of these problems? What, in your opinion, should be the priorities?

[Sinitsyn] Yes, many problems have accumulated in the PVO Forces as a result of their distribution, their missions and a number of subjective factors.

At the present time the low manning level of PVO formations and units is the most acute problem facing them. This is significantly affecting the actual state of their combat readiness and their performance of alert duty. A situation has developed in some anti-aircraft missile formations and units in which the combat crews are standing alert duty at the outer edge of their strength and capabilities. The shortage of personnel in some subunits makes it impossible even to make up two full shifts to replace one another. The situation could become even more difficult if we do not take steps promptly and train new, lead specialists to operate the combat equipment and maintain the combat readiness of the subunits.

There is also another aspect of the problem of organizing PVO alert duty. We know that it was developed over a period of many years and that a great deal of money was spent on it. It covers practically all areas of the nation. The agencies of command and control of the alert forces have been united into a single command and control system equipped with automation. Naturally, a breakdown of individual components of this system located in a number of different areas would substantially affect the system as a whole and significantly reduce its capabilities.

I believe that this fact should be taken into account for making decisions on reforming the armed forces.

[Editor] Market relations are penetrating commandingly into all areas of our life and service. Let us be frank. Many of us are not prepared for such drastic changes. In your opinion, what should the commanders and staffs do in this situation? How should they conduct themselves?

[Sinitsyn] First of all, we need to focus our main effort on improving the housing and personal-service conditions of the officers and warrant officers. Additional funds will be needed to accomplish this priority task.

[Editor] At this stage the developing market conditions have significantly exacerbated the problem of providing the servicemen and their families with food and supplying them with foodstuffs and manufactured goods through the military trade system due to a drastic cut in supplies. What is the solution to this?

[Sinitsyn] We need to seek and find reserves for the production and the mutually advantageous acquisition of essential items locally. This will entail extending greater authority to the commanders and staffs in economic affairs and management. They must improve the subsidiary farms of units and subunits and provide the officers and warrant officers with personal plots and the collective means of working them. We need to be bold in releasing written-off equipment to those interested in this.

In general, we need to revise the incentives in the management work performed by commanders, officers and warrant officers of the staffs and the rear service. We need to make more extensive use of material incentives, increase the bonus funds through contractual and commercial activities by the formations, units and subunits, and find ways to pay extra for combining positions in the performance of economic tasks.

[Editor] Discuss at least briefly the complex relations now developing between the main military commissariat and military industry. What are your thoughts and predictions?

[Sinitsyn] Recently, in the situation of reduced activities by the Union defense industry ministries, relations between the client and the scientific production association, the design offices and the plants have involved the establishment of direct linkages.

Extensive cooperation among production associations distributed over practically the entire territory is a basic feature of orders for research and development and regular production. The breakup of the USSR and the declaration of republic sovereignty over enterprises of the defense complex are disrupting economic ties, which is having an extremely negative effect with respect to filling orders for research and development, particularly for weapons and military equipment.

The processes involving orders for and the development of weapons and military equipment are being negatively

affected by the defectiveness or the absence of laws establishing priority and legal and economic protection for defense orders in the situation of conversion and the transition to market relations and privatization of industrial enterprises.

The cost of military goods has recently increased drastically (2-fold or more). Coupled with the simultaneous reduction of budget allocations for the development and acquisition of weapons, this is making it necessary considerably to curtail the scope of research and development and reduce production volumes. Unless laws are passed to protect the defense budget against inflation and other factors causing prices to rise, this process could result in a breakdown of the defense industry and to irreparable losses in the area of national defense.

Steps must be taken to provide the PVO Forces with everything needed within the bounds of the concept of defense adequacy. For this purpose, under the Agreement on an Economic Alliance, we must see that the "beginning-to-end" order is retained for all goods for the Ministry of Defense.

We need to work out an effective system of administrative control of the process of providing the armed forces with weapons and equipment both on the part of the new Commonwealth's central agencies and in the independent states making it up, defining the authority and the responsibility of the Union and republic agencies in these matters.

Finally, we must work out legislatively the procedures for forming the new Union's defense budget with the participation of the sovereign states and define the procedure for effecting deductions into the Union defense budget.

In a market economy, in my opinion, all of the large enterprises of the defense branches of industry should be left under single control. Material and technical supply would be effected through regional exchanges of the military department, with priority for commodity transactions going to enterprises filling military orders.

The problems facing us urgently demand that we complete the development and passage of an entire group of laws giving priority to defense orders in the new state legal and economic conditions in the immediate future, including a Law on Economic Support for Defense, a Law on the Provision of Goods for Defense Needs, a Law on the Procedure for the Formation and Execution of the Military Budget and a Law on the Mobilizational Preparation of the National Economy and the Procedure for Financing it.

[Editor] Just two or three years ago higher commanders were ordinarily not asked such questions. The times are different today, however. And I have no doubt, as an example, that the readers of our magazine would like to know the personal likes and dislikes of the chief of the main staff. What do you like in the way of music, literature, drama, the movies? In general, tell us a little

about yourself and your family. How do you spend your leisure time? What would you wish for the readers of our—yours too, by the way—VESTNIK?

[Sinitsyn] The war and the difficult postwar years were my lot in childhood. The readers are already familiar with my career. I might add that most of it was spent in the Transcaucasus. My wife, my son and daughter shared with me always and in every way the hardships and adversities which are the lot of the military man. I like classical, folk and stage music. In literature I prefer historical works. I have a decent library. Unfortunately, I attend the theater and the movies only occasionally.

I would like for the magazine's readers—and they are mostly young people—to see in the difficult service, and particularly in these hard times, not just the difficult problems. Remember your responsibility to the state and always feel an inner need to serve the people. The occupation of the military man, defender of the homeland, has always been an honored one, and I want very much for it to stay that way.

[Editor] Thank you for the interview.

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MIG-29 Cannibalized for Parts

92UM0927A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Apr 92
First edition in Russian p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Vetakh, Volga-Ural Military District: "'Donor' Aircraft"]

[Text] For several weeks now, representatives of the plant where they manufacture MIG-29 interceptors have not been able to begin comprehensive modifications to equipment on one of the aircraft located in the technical maintenance unit of an aviation regiment. The aircraft is forced to stand idle at the production area of the technical maintenance unit due to the fact that assemblies have been removed by specialists to maintain other aircraft of the subunit operational.

"'Donor' aircraft—this colorful simile has become in great vogue in the lexicon of the aviation specialists of our regiment," says Major V. Goryaev, chief of the technical maintenance unit. "The problem is that due to the chronic shortage of assemblies and parts for the MIG-29 interceptor, they are forced to take them from one aircraft and install them on others."

In his words, the deputy commander of the regiment for aviation engineer service, Lt Col A. Pitkevich, reluctantly violates the requirements of regulations, once again giving in to the persistent requests of the chiefs of the aviation technical detachments of the squadrons. You see, for the pilots of the regiment, each aircraft is worth its weight in gold, since the number of aircraft

assigned here determines, above all, the amount of flying time and, so, advancement in the training program for level of proficiency rating.

This is despite the fact that the regiment's engineer regularly compiles requests for delivery of spare parts, "sits" on the telephone, and sends telegrams to the district's Air Force Headquarters. But, it seems, there is not much hope for any noticeable improvement in supply. This year there were times that an aircraft interceptor would stand idle for a month before a part was received. And these are not the only difficulties. The regiment's pilots have lost quite a bit of flying time due to poor delivery of oil, tires, and so forth.

Specialists from the sheetmetal and machining group trade a half-liter of vodka for electrodes for arc welding to repair ground equipment. Recently, in a search for paint, they even used an excavating machine to uncover an old "burial place" of local technicians where there was supposed to be some amount of paint which was once put away by our predecessors who maintained the MIG-17.

In short, the situation with aviation technical support is complex. As they say, we will find a way out of the situation by hook or by crook, including by cannibalizing aircraft. But what about tomorrow?

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Black Sea Ship Construction Deputy General Director Interviewed

92UM0931A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview by Capt 2nd Rank V. Pasyakin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, with Ivan Iosifovich Vinnik, deputy general director for ship construction at the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant: "Butcher of the Fleet's Future, or, What Taras Bulba Felt When He Killed His Own Son"]

[Text] At a meeting with the Black Sea sailors, Fleet Adm Vladimir Chernavin, commander of CIS naval forces, told them that more than 130 new ships and vessels are in varying degrees of completion today. But will the fleet receive them? If the more than 50 ships which are over 60% complete only the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag found itself at the public's center of attention. Its construction had been halted due to a lack of funds. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA came out with an initiative to complete this ship with volunteer contributions. But these were only good intentions on the part of the editorial board, the newspaper readers and patriots of our fleet. What awaits the Varyag and other ships under construction in reality?

Our correspondent interviewed Ivan Iosifovich Vinnik, general director for ship construction at the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant, on this subject.

[Vinnik] We have four ships of the Navy at our plant right now. Three of them are afloat and one is in a building slip," Ivan Iosifovich said. "The GUK [Main Shipbuilding Administration], our general client, halted their construction in October of last year due to lack of funds in the budget. Work on them stopped in January. Since the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Ulyanovsk with its nuclear steam-generating plant is a long way from completed, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to scrap it.

[Pasyakin] But this ship represents the highest level of our shipbuilding. We finally reached the level of construction of that class of ships which the Americans, for example, have long been building. The Ulyanovsk is more than just the embodied labor of scientists and designers. It also represents enormous financial, labor and energy outlays. How many years have gone into the construction of the Ulyanovsk? How do you feel now that the cutting-up of the latest TAKR [heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser] has begun?

[Vinnik] You have touched upon one of the most painful issues for us. The Ulyanovsk is indeed the peak, the pinnacle, of a class of ships which only a great power can build. Unfortunately, however, that pinnacle proved to be out of reach for us. The Ulyanovsk was under construction four years. With the Union's collapse we were forced not only to halt its construction but to scrap it, which will take close to another year and enormous additional outlays. How do we feel about this? Probably the way Taras Bulba felt when he killed his son. And our "son" is not to blame for anything. We had no other choice.

[Pasyakin] And what awaits the TAKR Varyag, which, as we know, is around 70% finished?

[Vinnik] While the decision on the Ulyanovsk has already been made and is being implemented, the fate of the Varyag is not known. Neither the GUK nor the government of Ukraine is prepared to make a decision yet. It is suggested that we find a buyer....

[Pasyakin] But the ship's construction will have to be completed in order to sell it advantageously, will it not?

[Vinnik] That is true. But how can we complete it when the funds are not being allocated? We need to find a sponsor who will finance the rest of the TAKR's construction and then purchase it. Ukraine does not need the Varyag. The Black Sea is an internal sea, and it makes no sense to keep such a ship here. Even if Russia can use the ship, it does not have the funds....

In addition, the supply system has totally broken down. We lack the most essential things, those without which neither a ship nor a vessel can be built. They include metal, lumber, rolled iron.... The accustomed economic relations among the republic-states have been replaced with customs and barriers to the import and export of raw materials and finished products. Russia can no longer ship lumber, of which tens of thousands of cubic

meters is needed, to the plant without a license, and Ukraine cannot ship out the plant's products, which are needed in many places, without a license.

[Pasyakin] Due to the halt in the construction of military ships the plant will probably re-specialize for the output of civilian products, will it not?

[Vinnik] Clearly. We have already launched a tender for refueling nuclear-powered submarines three months ahead of schedule in order to free the fourth slip, where construction of the first section of a tender for Norway was begun on 14 February. In all we have contracts to build three tankers with a deadweight of 45,000 tons each for the Norwegians. As we know, Ukraine is working on an agreement with Iran and other Near East countries to supply them with oil, which means that Iran will need its own tanker fleet. So we shall begin building tankers. In short, we shall link the shipbuilding program and Ukraine's national economic plans.

Our main job, one might say, in these difficult times is to retain the shipbuilding personnel. Our plant is one of a kind. Only our plant could build the Varyag-class ships, for example. The ChSZ [Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant] has built just about every class of ships and vessels, including submarines, tankers and containerships. The uniqueness of the ChSZ lies also in the fact that anchors weighing more than 2,250 kilograms are built here and nowhere else. Only our plant produces 53-mm and larger chains. That is, not a single large vessel or ship can get by without our products.

[Pasyakin] It is my understanding that the plant was visited by a commission headed by Ukraine's minister of the defense complex and conversion. Has it made any kind of decisions?

[Vinnik] The commission's mission was to determine the status of the ships, to study the possibility of converting the plant and make decisions on the fate of the ships: whether to sell them or mothball them. In addition, we have to consider the fact that mothballing requires a great deal of money. In the Varyag's case it will cost more to mothball it than to complete its construction. We do not yet know the ultimate decision.

Commander Refutes Ukrainian Claims on Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantry

92UM0868A Moscow PATRIOT in Russian No 12-13 Mar 92 p 4

[Interview with Naval Coastal Forces Chief Lieutenant-General Ivan Sidorovich Skuratov by PATRIOT Correspondent Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Belorus: "Naval Coastal Forces Chief Lieutenant-General I.S. Skuratov: 'I Am Alarmed About the Fate of the "Black Berets" in the Black Sea"']

[Text] General Ivan Skuratov has service in coastal units of the Baltic, Pacific Ocean, and Black Sea fleets behind him. He is a highly-educated officer. In due course, he

graduated from the Black Sea Higher Naval School, the Naval Academy, and later the General Staff Academy. And from all of them—with distinction. A candidate of military sciences, he is the author of much basic research on the combat application of naval coastal forces.

As we have already reported in previous issues of *PATRIOT*, Ukrainian Ministry of Defense representatives and emissaries from the Union of Ukrainian Officers, *Rukh* [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika] and other public organizations have recently begun to frequent the Black Sea Fleet. Active propaganda is being conducted among ship personnel and in coastal units to take the oath of loyalty to Ukraine.

Let us frankly state that for some reason special attention is being devoted to the "black berets"—the naval infantry. In so doing, they are not hiding their intentions to achieve the inclusion of the black berets in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

What is the fate of the black berets in the Black Sea Fleet today? Naval Coastal Forces Chief Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov answers *PATRIOT* Correspondent Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Belorus' questions.

[Belorus] Tell me, Ivan Sidorovich, just what is our naval infantry today, including in the Black Sea?

[Skuratov] Naval Infantry (MP) is organizationally part of the navy's coastal troops as a combat arm. It is nearly 12,000 men, organizationally—one division and four brigades. Nearly a fifth of our naval infantry is in the Black Sea Fleet.

For comparison, I will point out that the U.S. Marines total more than 190,000 men. This is four divisions and several dozen detachments, four air wings (more than 1,000 aircraft and helicopters) and four rear services groups. Expeditionary formations that are capable of independently carrying out operational missions can be created from the enumerated troops to conduct combat operations in remote areas when various military conflicts arise.

Naval infantry, along with air assault forces are a special, unique combat arm. It is capable of successfully operating on land and of attacking enemy rear areas from the sea and air in the tactical depth. To do this, naval infantry is equipped as a rule with modern amphibious vehicles—BTR-80's [armored transport vehicle], BMP-3's [armored personnel vehicle], BM PTUR [Anti-tank wire-guided missile combat vehicle], Nona 120 mm self-propelled artillery, Gnozdik 122 mm guns, Tunguska anti-aircraft missile-cannon systems, and with various types of effective portable weapons.

Special requirements are also made in the training of all categories of naval infantrymen. They must know how to do everything that is required of servicemen of Ground Forces combined arms division-sized and smaller units. Furthermore, they must know how to perform an amphibious assault, including swimming, be masters at

hand-to-hand combat, be especially hardy and strong, and be capable of waging war when surrounded, when outnumbered, alone, or when part of isolated subunits.

[Belorus] Well that's good, but does Ukraine have any weighty arguments whatsoever to claim the Black Sea Fleet naval infantry?

[Skuratov] In my view, this issue is extremely important. It is fundamental for the resolution of the problem that has emerged. To answer it, I must proceed from the historically developed objective reality and the need for the naval infantry according to its purpose.

We all know that Peter I created the naval infantry in the Russian Navy in 1705 as it was created in a number of the world's other naval powers (in England—in 1664, in the United States—in 1775). Since that time, naval infantry has become an integral component of the Russian Navy, including in the Black Sea.

The Baltic Fleet, in which the 1st Independent Naval Infantry Brigade was formed on May 15, 1940, became the progenitor of Soviet Naval Infantry (its first generation). This is also the origin of the Black Sea Naval Infantry. It manifested its best combat and patriotic qualities during the defense and subsequent liberation of Odessa, Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosiya, and Novorossiysk from the Fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War. In so doing, it operated in the Black Sea as part of the unified USSR Navy.

Today, some politicians and leaders of political-nationalistic movements, that support the policy of dividing everything and everyone, use the position of the republics, states or peoples at an historical moment that is favorable to them as a trump "argument" (as a rule, they cite the conditions prior to the formation of the USSR). So, I will point out that Ukraine does not have any basis to claim the Black Sea Naval Infantry from these positions.

In short, I do not see any weighty grounds whatsoever, either from historical positions or from the realities of today, for the "removal" of the Black Sea Naval Infantry from the CIS Allied Armed Forces.

[Belorus] But from the military point of view, is there a need for Ukraine to have its own naval infantry?

[Skuratov] As you understand, the need to have naval infantry, just like other military formations, in the armed forces of any state in accordance with the canons of military science must be determined first of all by the presence of definite military missions that must be carried out by some forces or other and by some formations or other. Naval infantry's primary task—is the landing of amphibious assault forces. Of all of those people who "advocate" the transfer of the Black Sea Naval Infantry to the Ukrainian Armed Forces with whom I have had the opportunity to talk, no one could intelligibly, I am already not talking—argumentatively and with professional competence—explain the missions

and possible utilization of naval infantry in the Ukrainian navy. Land amphibious assault forces—where? To defend themselves or to attack on land—from whom and against whom?

If to defend themselves (attack) on land, ground forces division-sized and smaller units have been tasked to do that. There are so many ground forces that have been made part of the armed forces and that have taken the oath of loyalty to Ukraine that some of them will certainly be disbanded, based on analysis of the statements of the Ukrainian military leadership on the planned strength of the army. Why then is this “struggle” occurring for the naval infantry?

If naval infantry is needed for operations and amphibious assaults, then an amphibious assault is not only naval infantry! In aggregate, this is also an adequate quantity of amphibious assault craft, including modern Zubr type hovercraft, fire support ships, minesweepers, helicopters (ship-based combat and transport-assault helicopters) and many other things. Ukraine has none of this. It is extremely expensive to create such a navy for landings and employment of one naval infantry brigade. There are no facilities in Ukraine for the construction of the ships listed.

Yes and let us once again return to the issue—where will the assault force disembark? Not in Novorossiysk, Poti, or Sukhumi...

[Belorus] As a professional who has defended his dissertation on the problems of naval infantry, tell me, do all naval powers have this combat arm?

[Skuratov] I have already pointed out that the United States has the largest naval infantry. It is capable of carrying out very substantial missions. In my opinion, England's naval infantry (one brigade and several other subunits) is also a real force which the Anglo-Argentine war for the Falklands confirmed in 1982.

Other countries, even those that have substantial navies—Germany, France, and Italy—do not have any naval infantry at all or have small naval infantries—no more than from a battalion to a regiment.

[Belorus] And isn't the “amusement” of a country having its own naval infantry too costly?

[Skuratov] I would say that it is even very costly! Significantly more expensive than ground forces which is explained by the required complement of ships, aircraft, and also other men and equipment which a state must have if its naval infantry is not to appear to be “poteshnyy” troops [regiments of boy soldiers under Peter I].

Therefore, it is most rational, advisable and advantageous for the state for the peoples of all countries that are Commonwealth of Independent States member-states to have naval infantry within the Allied Armed Forces.

[Belorus] Then it is appropriate to ask, but will Ukraine's naval infantry be able, in the event it is created, to be precisely naval infantry and not a “poteshnyy” combat arm?

[Skuratov] I do not know the plans and intentions of the Ukrainian military leadership. But, while considering what has been said previously, I think that this is extremely difficult and expensive for Ukraine as a state. But is it necessary? And will Ukraine resort to any expenditures for the construction and maintenance of amphibious assault forces for the sake of one thing—to have its own naval infantry at any price?

Even the Navy as a whole, with centralized financing of its expenditures by the former USSR, required more than 15 years to revive the naval infantry after it had been disbanded in the 1950's. Only in recent years have we begun to attain the level of support for the naval infantry with required equipment and weaponry and the development of modern assault ships, including hovercraft. They are still inadequate right now, including in the Black Sea Fleet. In short, this problem exists even for the united Navy but it will be still more acute and complicated for Ukraine, if not to say, insurmountable.

[Belorus] And what is the attitude of the black berets themselves toward the Ukraine's plans to “privatize” the naval infantry brigade?

[Skuratov] The majority of officers, warrant officers and compulsory service seamen unambiguously understand the need for the status of coastal troops, and of the Naval Infantry as their component—as a combat arm of the CIS Navy, and are prepared to faithfully serve the people of the commonwealth states, including the people of Ukraine. Confirmation of that is the fact that more than three-fourths of the younger generation, who were drafted into the coastal troops from the territory of Ukraine, have taken the CIS oath.

At the same time, I must say that there are some servicemen among the black berets who advocate a Ukrainian naval infantry and some of them have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. In so doing, they are based only on the territorial thesis. As a result of this, naturally, the question arises in light of recent events in Crimea—how will the cited “argument” operate with regard to the naval infantry and to the Black Sea Fleet as a whole in the event of the actual division of Crimea into an independent state within the CIS?

[Belorus] What do you think, will “isolating” the Black Sea Fleet black berets from the Navy's Naval Infantry main complement and “locking” it within the Ukrainian Navy impact the future service of officers?

[Skuratov] I think that it will have an impact and for the worse. First of all due to many factors, several of which we discussed above. As for the futures of officers, what can they be within one brigade? There is only one position for a colonel and there are no positions for

generals. Nine servicemen from the Coastal Troops have been awarded the rank of major-general in the Navy in the last three years alone.

[Belorus] And what is the future of the black berets in the Navy?

[Skuratov] At this moment, it is very difficult to unambiguously "describe in glowing terms" the future of Naval Infantry because it will depend on the outcome of the search for the status of the Allied Armed Forces, the doctrinal precepts on collective defense of the CIS countries that are being developed, the directions of military reform, the impending reduction of the strength of the Allied Armed Forces, the amount of financing for the armed forces and other factors.

I cannot firmly say what the future of naval infantry, or the future of the Navy's coastal forces as a whole, will be. Under any conditions, all the more so under conditions of a quantitative reduction of the Allied Armed Forces, we are obliged to think not only about reducing qualitative specifications but, on the contrary, about increasing qualitative specifications. This is our work, our duty, and obligation to the peoples of the CIS and that is why the commonwealth supports us. We have specific studies of some directions and rough drafts of others. Which ones? Excuse me, but it is premature to discuss this, this is our secret.

[Belorus] Do the black berets as before remain the navy's offensive strike combat arm?

[Skuratov] It is not altogether appropriate to pose the question in that manner. The naval infantry never was an offensive strike combat arm capable of independently carrying out major operational missions while attacking from the sea. It is too small to do this and it does not have its own air forces, like for example the United States, and it does not reduce to expeditionary formations. Furthermore, there are insufficient amphibious forces in the fleets. Naval infantry does not have the required strike potential to conduct large-scale offensive operations from the sea. And, according to our doctrine, there is no need for that.

[Belorus] Reports have been encountered in the press on Russia's claim to the entire Navy, and, consequently, also to the black berets?

[Skuratov] I have heard such conversations. But they have primarily originated with opponents in Ukraine who have utilized the allegedly existing statements of the Russian leadership about the Black Sea Fleet being Russia's property as a final argument for the Black Sea Fleet and the Naval Infantry. They have especially attempted to link B.N. Yeltsin's trip to Novorossiysk and his meeting with fleet seamen to this.

I must say that these conversations are groundless. Moreover, the Russian President's statements are well-known in which he stressed that Russia will not create its own Armed Forces and, consequently, Navy as long as

the CIS Allied Armed Forces exist and there is a glimmer of hope to maintain them as a collective system of defense. I am personally in complete agreement with this.

As a result, I will cite one interesting aspect. You know that nearly all services of the Armed Forces and many combat arms have their own holiday. For example, Tank Crewmen Day, VDV [Airborne Troops] Day, and so forth. Naval infantry does not have such a day although it is the oldest combat arm. Thousands of black berets, both on active duty and in the reserves, are demanding the elimination of this injustice. We think that it would be good for a Russian Presidential Decree (coordinated with the CIS heads of state) to declare November 16th (the date Peter I created the Naval Infantry) Naval Infantry Day.

[Belorus] And how is the situation that has developed affecting the combat readiness of naval infantry units?

[Skuratov] Certainly only for the worse. You said at one time that you fought in naval infantry units in the Black Sea during the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, you obviously know very well how the situation in the state, in the region, or at some sector of the front or other affects the mood of the soldiers. The uncertainty and dissension that reign in our country today are introducing chaos, worsening order, lowering the moral state and mood toward combat readiness, worsening the quality of duty performance, and promoting the theft of weapons and the perpetration of incidents.

This case is indicative. In the battalion which Major A. Rozhmanov (Union of Ukrainian Officers member) commanded until recently, the organization of duty and responsibility for performing duties among servicemen had fallen to such a low level that the theft of a large-caliber (14.5 mm) machinegun from an armored personnel vehicle even became possible. I personally am very worried about the fate of the black berets.

[Belorus] Is Ukraine only claiming the Naval Infantry or is it also claiming other naval coastal forces units?

[Skuratov] As far as I know—other units, too. But the situation with them is still more unclear and complicated for Ukraine. For example, why advocate the inclusion of fleet coastal defense divisions and purely combined arms divisions in the Ukrainian Armed Forces if Ukraine has so many ground forces that a significant portion of them will be subject to being disbanded or reduced.

Coastal defense units, probably more so than even naval infantry units, will gradually degenerate and will cease to exist. In any case, this will affect missile units. BRAV [coastal missile and artillery troops] missile systems are obsolete and coastal artillery has long since been obsolete. The outstanding self-propelled coastal artillery system that will replace it and also the new missile systems in the future are much more expensive and more

complicated than the existing systems. Their development and production, from the economic and technological aspect, was a complex matter even for the Navy as a whole. All the more so since this will be a backbreaking burden for a state, taken individually. Furthermore, both the missile and artillery systems are being developed in Russia. We must also not forget about the problem of training officers and other servicemen of this complicated, narrow specialty for the troops and also about the future of officers within one or two regiments. Therefore, it is hardly possible that coastal missile and artillery troop units will exist in the future in Ukraine as combat capable troops, at least at their current qualitative state.

[Belorus] And finally, Ivan Sidorovich. What do you see as the most optimistic and advisable solution to the situation?

[Skuratov] While considering today's realities and the prospects for strengthening comprehensive ties among the CIS countries and the trend of the expanding movement in Crimea for its independence and the lack of any national military formations whatsoever on the peninsula—the solution is only the preservation of a unified Navy and the coastal troops within it as a definite component of the CIS Armed Forces. I believe this and I hope for this because, as they say, there is no other way.

Lt-Gen Skuratov: Naval Infantry Inalienable Part of Fleet

92UM0911A Moscow ZHIZN in Russian
No 12 (116), Mar 92 p 10

[Interview with Lt Gen Ivan Skuratov by ZHIZN correspondent Vladimir Khovratovich: "The Fate of the Naval Infantry"]

[Text] How was it formed? Our correspondent interviewed Lt Gen Ivan Skuratov, chief of the Navy's Coastal Troops, on the subject.

[Skuratov] First I would like to make a clarification. It would probably be more correct to say that we are engaged in a process of finding ways for the joint armed forces to exist, which are mutually advantageous to all the CIS nations and which ensure the collective security of the entire Commonwealth.

As you know, however, certain states are simultaneously engaged in forming their own national armed forces (Ukraine). In certain regions some politicians and nationalistic political groups are also unilaterally "privatizing" military units, equipment, posts, weapons and so forth located within the republics.

To a certain degree this applies to the Black Sea Fleet because of claims to it by Ukraine's leadership. But what is the fleet? It is an operational-strategic formation designated for performing operational-strategic missions for the entire commonwealth on the latter's southern flank.

The problem is also affecting the Naval Infantry (MP), since it has historically been an inseparable arm of the Russian fleet and continues to be such in the Navy.

[Khovratovich] Can the Naval Infantry be separated from the fleet? If not, then why?

[Skuratov] From the military standpoint, taking into account the specific purpose and combat application of the Naval Infantry, it cannot be separated from the fleets. Otherwise, it will be not the Naval Infantry but either "show and play" troops or ordinary combined-arms units with only a minimal capability for being landed and taking part in naval landing operations. It is with good reason, after all, that in practically all the world's nations which have a naval infantry it is a part of the navy.

The Naval Infantry is more than just well-prepared and well-trained troops. They are special troops specially armed and specially prepared to operate in one of the most difficult types of warfare, the naval landing operation. A naval landing operation involves various types of landing ships, including ground-effect machines, fire support ships, minesweeping forces, security ships for the landing area, various auxiliary ships.... Can the Naval Infantry be separated from them and trained separately—as part of military district forces, let us say?

I know from many years of personal experience that this is impossible outside of the fleet.

[Khovratovich] Does Ukraine understand what it is undertaking when it demands that the Naval Infantry be separated from the CIS Joint Armed Forces and made a part of its national armed forces?

[Skuratov] That question should be addressed to Ukraine's military leadership. During the past 3 months I have repeatedly visited the Black Sea Fleet. The command element of the fleet's Coastal Troops and I have to meet and talk with representatives of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense as well as with public organizations (Rukh, the Ukraine Officer's Union).

I must say that none of them has been able to justify from the military point of view the need for such a move or its economic expediency. Only one "argument" comes through: Everything on my territory is mine.

Nor have we heard a professionally competent justification of the designation, the training or the employment of the Naval Infantry. We have the following questions. How do they foresee providing the Naval Infantry with the special-purpose, floating weapons produced in Russia? What will be the future of officers serving within just a brigade? Will Ukraine set up the production of its own landing ships and procure them in other nations or "finish" off what is left in the Black Sea Fleet? Has anyone calculated the cost of maintaining and developing the Naval Infantry, and has the nation been made aware of this?

[Khovratovich] NATO has a single command, but the national armies are subordinate only to their own governments. How do you view this problem for us?

[Skuratov] NATO is a military-political bloc of a number of states set up in a situation in which the independent states already existed and had their own national armed forces. Each nation already had not only a developed army but also its own military industry, its officer training system and everything else essential to an army.

When our former republics split up into independent states, the CIS members had a single armed force, unified weapons and a single system for producing and developing them, a single system of military schools and academies for training officers, a unified system of communications, command and control, an interwoven system of troop deployment and naval basing, a single system for fortifying the territory and much more.

[Khovratovich] Is a professional army and, naturally, a professional Naval Infantry a matter of the immediate or the remote future?

[Skuratov] If we are talking about absolute, that is, 100-percent "professionalizing" of the army, in my opinion this would not be expedient for the CIS Joint Armed Forces. This is confirmed by the existing manning procedure and the experience of the armed forces of many developed states. It seems to me that the mixed, combined manning principle is more suitable for us, whereby the officers and warrant officers are professionals, some of the enlisted men serve under contract out of the military reserve or as first-term military personnel, and some personnel serve under military obligation.

With respect to the Naval Infantry, the more attractive idea is for them to be strictly professional or to serve under contract, as in the USA. I do not believe this would be the thing to do, however. I am in favor of the combined principle.

Black Sea Fleet Delegations Hold Press Conference

92UM0892A Kiev *GOLOS UKRAINY* in Russian
9 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by *GOLOS UKRAINY* special correspondent Vladimir Skachko: "The Fleet Must be Divided"]

[Text] Sevastopol—After dinner on 7 April some of the Ukrainian delegation led by Vasilii Durdinets, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, and Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, Ukrainian first deputy defense minister, accompanied by the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, went to the fleet training center to meet with representatives of naval brigades stationed in Sevastopol.

Vasilii Durdinets familiarized himself with the basic provisions of military policy and doctrine, and then said that

Ukraine intends to resolve all controversial questions through negotiation and is prepared to develop its own armed forces to defend the external borders, not to use them in internal conflicts or political "dismantlings."

"Our army numbers 200,000 to 220,000 men, perhaps fewer, but they should be highly professional troops who are protected on both the legal and social planes," he said, and he called on sailors in the Navy to take part in developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

As other representatives of the Ukrainian delegation stated later, these kinds of meetings held in the military units and labor collectives in Sevastopol, and other military people and civilians have demanded maximum definition in Ukraine as soon as possible on this issue which is so complex for everyone. Member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Yaroslav Kondratyev said that he personally had met with some of the marines, and the military people were totally unable to understand why Ukraine is dragging its feet with respect to decisive action in its attitude toward the Black Sea Fleet. "Even social issues are of less interest to them. They want to know whom they are serving and whose orders they should obey," he said. "But perhaps Leonid Kravchuk, for example, will be able to relieve the fleet commander, Igor Kasatonov, of his duties?" I asked. "Perhaps, but he will most probably wait for an agreed approach in this matter."

Meanwhile, at the training center, Igor Kasatonov spoke after Vasilii Durdinets. He confirmed his desire to be subordinate only to the orders of Marshal Shaposhnikov, and he stated that Leonid Kravchuk's decree is for him not at an adequate level and that multilateral decisions are needed in this matter. Calling on the CIS heads of state to accelerate a resolution, Igor Kasatonov pointedly called the president of Russia "Comrade Yeltsin" but the president of Ukraine, after a pause, simply Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk. Vasilii Durdinets reported that in adopting the decree on the fleet on his own territory, Leonid Kravchuk considers that Boris Yeltsin's decree has no legal foundation. But the Ukrainian delegation sent a telegram to Marshal Shaposhnikov in which it demanded the urgent dispatch of a delegation from the commander of the CIS joint armed forces and navy for talks about the division of the Black Sea Fleet. By evening it had also become known that the Ukrainian side had sent to Moscow its own version of the list of ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet that should become part of the CIS strategic forces, and which forces should remain in Ukraine. As is known, Moscow did respond, and a delegation led by the CIS naval commander, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, was sent to Sevastopol.

On 8 April it became known that Kiev had given permission for Chernavin to land at Sevastopol. The Ukrainian delegation postponed its own departure for the Ukrainian capital.

On 8 April the newly appointed commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Vice Admiral Boris Kozhin, gave his own first press conference. Boris Kozhin said that a desire for clarification for himself had been the main motive that had prompted him to agree to the proposal from the Ukrainian minister of defense to accept the appointment. "I have served Ukraine since 1968, but lately, like many Black Sea Fleet people, I have been tortured by the question: 'Who am I? Whom do I serve?' And I realized that I am a citizen of Ukraine. It was human duty that forced me to become the commander of its navy and to occupy this post in today's complex conditions."

Talking about the concept of developing Ukraine's navy, Boris Kozhin said that it must fulfill three main missions. First, to preserve the favorable operational regime in the Black Sea region, to which end the Ukrainian naval forces should be used. Second, to safeguard the economic zone and ensure the security of ships and safeguard industrial activity and communications, and third, to safeguard and protect the maritime borders of Ukraine and deal with contraband. "We will define our resources proceeding from these missions, and we will know how many ships and other equipment we will need. In this way we will also determine the composition of the Ukrainian navy, which will include surface ships and submarines, communications, and coastal defenses and so forth. This approach has all the calculations and justifications," he said.

Responding to the question of whether or not he was sure that his orders would be obeyed, Boris Kozhin said this: "I would not be commander were I not sure of this. First, I am creating all the conditions needed for this, and second, each order will be justified from the standpoint of its necessity. Mutual relations within the Ukrainian navy will be built on respect for the individual. This is my main position. Never in my life have I given a single order that would serve as a reason for confrontation. Everything must be done from the position of respect for each other."

With respect to future mutual relations between the Ukrainian navy and the Black Sea Fleet, Boris Kozhin said that he did not want to see the existence of any parallel structures in the fleet. That is why a political decision is needed in this matter that would put everything in its proper place.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

New Billeting Chief Kotylev Interviewed
92UM0846B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Mar 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Allied Armed Forces Main Housing Operations

Directorate Chief Major-General Nikolay Ivanovich Kotylev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent P. Altunin: "Housing for the Army—Today and Tomorrow—First Interview in His New Post"]

[Text] Major-General Nikolay Ivanovich Kotylev was quite recently assigned to the post of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Allied Armed Forces Main Housing Operations Directorate Chief.

From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's file: Nikolay Ivanovich Kotylev was born in 1938 in the village of Taynikskoye in Moscow Oblast's Mytishchinskiy Rayon. He graduated from Leningrad Higher Military Engineering-Construction School in 1964. While in the troops, he passed through all of the duty levels of the housing operations service. He has been first deputy chief of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] Main Housing Operations Directorate since 1988.

[Altunin] Nikolay Ivanovich, the housing situation in the Armed Forces is changing literally every month. And everything is for the worse...

[Kotylev] The situation is really difficult. It is being complicated by the withdrawal of troops from the countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia and by the redeployments of units from the territories of certain republics. In 1991, according to our own plan, CIS Allied Armed Forces put into operation 3.4 million square meters of total apartment living space, including the fact that the Russian Federation plan was 100.2 percent fulfilled. This permitted us to provide housing to 107,700 families, including to 77,400 servicemen's families without apartments. Despite the steps we have taken, as of January 1, 1992, 195,800 families do not have apartments.

[Altunin] One can figure out what the reasons are...

[Kotylev] First: not only are apartment shortages not being eliminated, they are increasing. At the beginning of this year, the shortage totaled 656,100 square meters, including 413,200 square meters of living space throughout the Russian Federation. Second: the shortage is great even in housing construction under Ministry of Defense cost sharing—1,016,200 square meters.

The issue of providing housing to officers and army and naval warrant officers who have been released into the reserve is very acute, and also their resettlement from restricted and remote military garrisons.

[Altunin] And just what prospects does the 19 February Russian Presidential Decree open?

[Kotylev] First of all, it officially confirms the statement he made at the All-Army Officers Assembly: in 1992, to put an end to the housing debt owed to servicemen by the governments of the republics within the Russian Federation, organs of executive power of krais, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Further, that it is, of course, very important that the decree grant the right to transfer, free

of charge, apartments in buildings of the state and departmental housing fund to the personal property of the officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel who have served more than 20 calendar years and who currently occupy them. This right is being extended to those personnel who have been released into the reserve or who have retired due to age, illness, staff reductions, or due to a restricted state of health and who have 20 or more calendar years of service, war participants, soldiers-internationalists, and also family members of servicemen who were killed or who died as a result of wounds, contusions, injuries, or illnesses associated with the performance of their military service duties.

[Altunin] But privatization of apartments is also occurring in that manner throughout the country. What is new here?

[Kotylev] First of all, it is not occurring but has only begun and only in Moscow and St. Petersburg. It is hard to say how long it will continue. But here, in accordance with CIS Allied Armed Forces Order No. 80, dated February 24, 1992, which contradicts the Presidential Decree, housing construction organs are obliged to develop within a month and disseminate to the troops the procedures for the transfer of gratis housing property.

[Altunin] There have been very many letters and telephone calls to the editorial offices with regard to the benefits and taxes associated with the privatization of housing.

[Kotylev] I can remind you about the fact that the Law of the RSFSR "On Taxes on Property of Physical Persons" releases from payment of taxes Heroes of the Soviet Union or individuals who have been awarded the Order of Glory 3rd Class; Class 1 and 2 disabled persons; participants of the Civil or Great Patriotic Wars and other combat operations for the defense of the USSR and former partisans; individuals who were exposed to radiation at Chernobyl; pensioners are released from payment of taxes on structures, buildings, and works; and also soldiers, sailors, sergeants, master sergeants, and warrant officers among servicemen—during their period of active duty military service.

The Presidential Decree prescribed the new provisions: officers, warrant officers, and extended service personnel who have been released into the reserve or who have retired due to age, illness, staff reductions, or due to a restricted state of health and who have 20 or more calendar years of service pay 50 percent of the cost of utilities and living space in state or departmental housing occupied by them and their family members. Here, everything must be understood as it was written. And if the REU has not received orders on this score, it will receive them. For example, the Moscow government has already issued such instructions.

[Altunin] Many people ask: just what are utilities?

[Kotylev] In accordance with the RSFSR Housing Code, utilities are: water, gas, electricity, heat, and others.

[Altunin] Telephone?

[Kotylev] Telephone is not among them. Only individual disabled persons have benefits for payment for telephone use.

[Altunin] Can you say anything more specific with regard to the 50 percent payments for privatized and also for cooperative housing?

[Kotylev] Right now a special resolution is being prepared. In it they will also find the reflection of the issue of privatization of departmental (do not confuse it with office space!) housing and also payments for it and other issues.

[Altunin] The decree discusses granting plots of land, not subject to repayment, for construction of individual homes and gardens with an area of 0.10 hectares in urban settlements and 0.25 hectares in rural locations. Whom does this provision affect?

[Kotylev] Only servicemen without apartments and those who need improved housing conditions (in Moscow, for example, if there is less than five square meters per family member). Incidentally, they are released from payment of the portion of the land tax that is part of the Russian Republic Budget.

[Altunin] The standards of monetary compensation to lease housing have been increased for servicemen without apartments. Of course, the sum is small...

[Kotylev] I agree. It is 150-850 rubles. But it is still a help. Along with that the amount of material assistance, not subject to repayment, that has been rendered to servicemen-members of housing-construction (housing) cooperatives and individual construction has been increased. You agree that 50 percent compensation for the remaining cost after the first payment is a tidy sum!

As for the procedures for rendering this financial aid that is not subject to repayment, they have not endured any special changes. Aid will be received by servicemen who do not have apartments and by those who need improved living quarters who have served flawlessly and continuously in the Armed Forces for more than 15 calendar years. The unit commander makes the decision to render assistance based on the serviceman's request and on the housing commission's conclusion. The amount of the financial aid, that is not subject to repayment, is transferred, via a bookkeeping transaction, to the account of the cooperative or bank where the loan was obtained.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Carpathian MD Wants Bombers Returned

92UM0881A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Apr 92 p 1

[UKRINFORM report: "Six Strategic Bombers Have Not Returned From Bobruysk"]

[Text] THE CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT IS AWAITING THE RETURN OF SIX STRATEGIC BOMBERS THAT WERE ILLEGALLY REDEPLOYED ON 6 FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR FROM THE STRYI LONG RANGE AVIATION REGIMENT TO BOBRUYSK. THIS WAS REPORTED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE BY MAJOR GENERAL OF JUSTICE VASILY MELNICHUK, THE MILITARY PROSECUTOR OF THE CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT.

Organs of the military prosecutor disclosed this fact quite accidentally. An investigation is being conducted in the regiment, which is located near Lvov, in the affair of the attempt of an unsanctioned removal of strategic bombers subject to a drawdown, and also the transfer to Smolensk of motor vehicle equipment at a general cost of up to one million rubles. All of this was done by the unit command after the decree of President Leonid Kravchuk on prohibiting the removal of combat equipment and armaments from the territory of the republic without a license by the minister of defense of the republic.

While conducting the inquiry, the investigators ascertained that six aircraft flew out to Bobruysk, allegedly for combat training. According to the order of the command of Air Force strategic formations, they were supposed to have returned on 21 February. However, the bombers have not been returned to the regiment as of the present time. Information on this incident was transmitted to the presidents of Russia and Ukraine and to the procurators-general of the two states.

Agreement on Transferring CIS Officers to Ukraine

92UM0889A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
7 Apr 92 p 1

["Protocol": "On the Agreement Between the High Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the Organization of Training of Officer Personnel, and the Procedure for the Transfer (Detachment) and Discharge of Officer Personnel and Warrant Officers"]

[Text] The High Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, referred to henceforth as the "contracting parties"—Have reached an agreement on the following:

Article 1

The contracting parties will implement coordinated measures directed at ensuring the existing procedure for performing military service, and the transfer (detachment) of officer personnel and warrant officers in accordance with legislation of the member states of the Commonwealth.

Article 2

The contracting parties recognize the necessity of employing military higher educational institutions for the purpose of training officer personnel to meet the need for them in the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and in Ukraine's own armed forces. The training of military personnel for the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, starting in 1992, is implemented by military higher educational institutions according to requests on a contract-agreement basis between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the High Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, except for persons indicated in Article 3 of this protocol.

Article 3

The contracting parties consider it necessary to grant cadets and students the right to continue and complete training in a military higher educational institution in which they enrolled before the signing of this protocol, free of charge.

The contracting parties commit themselves to conduct an exchange of cadets who express a desire to transfer from a military higher educational institution of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to a military higher educational institution subordinate to the High Command of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces], in accordance with legislation of member states of the Commonwealth.

Article 4

The contracting parties pledge themselves to accept all graduates of military higher educational institutions who enrolled for training before the signing of this protocol, and who express a desire, and have reasons for this in accordance with existing legislation, to undergo service in the armed forces on the territory of the member state of the Commonwealth that they choose.

Promotion of persons to the first officer rank who express a desire after graduating from a military higher educational institution to perform military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be conducted by the Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

Promotion of persons to the first officer rank who express a desire after graduating from a military higher educational institution of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to perform military service on the territories of other member states of the Commonwealth will be conducted by the Commander in Chief of the CIS

Combined Armed Forces (ministers of defense and chairmen of the defense committees of Commonwealth member states.)

Article 5

The transfer (detachment) of officer personnel and warrant officers who express a desire to be transferred from the CIS Combined Armed Forces to the Ukrainian Armed Forces for future performance of military service will be implemented on a decision of the High Command of the CIS Combined Armed Forces after receiving the concurrence (inquiry) of the minister of defense of Ukraine.

Article 6

The transfer (detachment) of officer personnel and warrant officers who express a desire to be transferred from the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the CIS Combined Armed Forces for future performance of military service will be implemented by a decision of the minister of defense of Ukraine after receiving the concurrence (inquiry) of the Commander in Chief of the CIS Combined Armed Forces.

Article 7

The contracting parties pledge themselves not to prevent officer personnel and warrant officers from transferring from one of the armed forces to another, if there are reasons for this in accordance with the existing legislation of member states of the Commonwealth.

The contracting parties will not allow any kind of pressure on servicemen who declare a desire to be transferred from the Combined Armed Forces of the Commonwealth to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and vice versa, and also infringement of the rights and freedoms of the aforementioned servicemen.

Article 8

The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine commits itself to send to the Main Directorate of Personnel of the CIS Combined Armed Forces copies of orders on the appointment of officer personnel who performed military service on the territory of Ukraine as of 3 January 1992 and who expressed a desire to perform military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in order to exclude them from the personnel rosters of the CIS Combined Armed Forces.

The High Command of the CIS Combined Armed Forces undertakes to transmit all personnel records of officers and warrant officers removed from the rosters of the CIS Combined Armed Forces and transferred (detached) to the Armed Forces of Ukraine through proper channels to the Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The contracting parties commit themselves to submit data that confirms service in areas that give a right to qualify for length of service privilege calculations and

other privileges, and also other reference data associated with the confirmation of service of officer personnel and warrant officers.

Article 9

The contracting parties pledge themselves not to prevent officer personnel and warrant officers from choosing their place of residence on discharge from military service.

Discharge from military service of officer personnel and warrant officers who choose a new place of residence after discharge will be conducted by orders of competent officials, where the servicemen are performing their service, in accordance with the legislation in force in member states of the Commonwealth.

Removal of the aforementioned servicemen from personnel rosters and assignment to the chosen place of residence is conducted after their complete discharge at the place of service.

Article 10

This protocol goes into effect from the moment of its signing.

Accomplished in the city of Kiev on 2 April 1992.

[Signed] For the CIS Combined Armed Forces
Deputy Commander in Chief of the CIS Combined Armed Forces for Personnel
Colonel General Yu. Rodionov

[Signed] For the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine
Lieutenant General I. Bizhan

Equipment To Be Transferred to Chechen Jurisdiction

92UM0939C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Natalya Pachegina: "General Dudayev Will Have His Own Army: Army Units on Republic Territory Are Transferring to Chechen Jurisdiction. But the Grozny Garrison Is Withdrawing"]

[Text]

The Chechen Republic

An agreement on the transfer of CIS units to Chechen jurisdiction has been reached at the negotiations between the Chechen Republic President and CIS Allied Armed Forces Commander's Representative Gromov.

As we all know, Chechen Republic President Dudayev proposed that Russia create a collective security system in the region in due course. This Chechen initiative was one of the points of the negotiating process between the Chechen Republic and Russia that began in Dagomys nearly a month ago. The Chechen side set forth the

demand on the transfer of CIS units on republic territory to Chechen jurisdiction as one condition. It seems that CIS Allied Armed Forces Deputy Commander General Boris Gromov's visit to Grozny disappointed local strategists. The Commonwealth Allied Armed Forces representative, who diplomatically avoided the proposals to maintain a single military-strategic space and allied armed forces, agreed to the transfer of former Soviet Army units to Chechen under republic jurisdiction.

An agreement was also reached on the withdrawal of Grozny Military Garrison personnel and facilities beyond republic borders as a result of the two generals' meeting. In the opinion of Chechen Republic National Security Service Head Ibragim Suleymenov, this is the only fact that merits a positive assessment. Grozny Garrison personnel, represented by mainly officers (rank and file soldiers, including Chechen Republic citizens, deserted several months ago), are demanding from the authorities expenditures for defense that are too great. Furthermore, the Chechen side thinks that it is the military that is the source of tension in the republic. According to national security department data, there have been cases of arms sales and provocations by the officers. One of the leading causes of the Chechen Republic's extremely categorical demand to solve the problem of the military is the fact that they already have not received their salaries for several months now and the content of "NZ" [reserve supplies] depots have been going for officers' allowances for a long time.

The withdrawal of Grozny Garrison army units, according to the generals' decision, will be carried out under a double security detail: the Chechen side is allocating the National Guard to do this and the local military must themselves organize a security detail for the material assets being shipped to Russia.

The result of Gromov's visit, said Suleymenov, compels Chechen to create its own army: "We understand that this is an expensive amusement, a collective security system would have suited us quite well, but Russia would not agree to that." For information: The National Guard, formed during the first days of the Chechen "revolution" and the squadron that watches over the president himself, were initially called the foundation of a national army.

Cossacks Split Over Dneister Conflict

92UM0939B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 2

[Postfaktum Article: "Internal Conflict in the Russian Cossacks"]

[Text] "Russian Cossacks did not charge Sergey Meshcheryakov, Ataman of the Union of Cossacks of the Oblast Don Voysko to act on its behalf at the 6th Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies." The telegram sent by the Russian Union of Cossacks to Don Cossacks also states that Meshcheryakov did not participate in the work of the Russian Union of Cossacks

Atamans Council on the issue of taking the required steps in the Dneister Region. In the words of the 24 Cossack atamans and Russian Voysko Cossacks who signed the telegram, instead of this Meshcheryakov used the time of his stay in Moscow for meetings and consultations with a number of Russian deputies "who are known for their unpatriotic sentiments and who actively conduct work to create a schism in the Cossack community." However, the telegram did not list their names. The Russian Cossack atamans also expressed concern about the situation in the leadership of the Don Cossacks and request Cossacks to examine this issue at their council.

Kleipeda Troops Demand Solutions to 'Social Protection' Problems

92UM0922A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Zinovyev: "From Kleipeda: The Interested Parties Sat at the Negotiating Table Only After the Incident with Guards Colonel I. Chernykh"]

[Text] In recent years, quite a few problems have accumulated with servicemen of Kleipeda Garrison, the resolution of which is impeded by the absence of proper cooperation with local governing bodies. First of all—these are issues of social and legal protection. The recent seizure by Lithuanian police of Guards Colonel Ivan Chernykh, commander of the Baltic Fleet Coastal Defense Troops division based in Kleipeda, has once again exacerbated the acuteness of these problems.

After this, how will relations develop between servicemen and the local authorities? A businesslike but, at the same time, correct conversation on this theme went on for more than a three-hour meeting of representatives of the Kleipeda Garrison unit Officers Assemblies and the city leadership.

The servicemen's position, if you judge by the speech of Coastal Defense Division Chief of Staff Colonel Vladimir Kerskiy, is as follows: since the troops deployed in the region are under Russian jurisdiction, then all actions with regard to them "must be coordinated with the appropriate Russian leadership." We need to put a decisive end to any type of excesses that affect the honor and dignity of servicemen. In so doing, servicemen are obliged to respect the laws and sovereignty of the Lithuanian State. In cases when "non-standard situations" arise, especially those concerning issues of protection of servicemen, their family members, and also safeguarding arms and military equipment, military collective Officers Assemblies retain the right to act using every available means, up to the employment of weapons.

Rodionov Notes Problem of Ukrainian Officers

92UM0929A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 92 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Col Gen Yu. Rodionov, deputy Commander in Chief for Cadres of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by Lt Col V. Silkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Russia and Ukraine Will Exchange Military Personnel"]

[Text] Despite recent statement by the politicians on the need for coordinated action in the resolution of defense matters, a number of sovereign states have decided to form their own armies. Servicemen born in the national entities or expressing a desire to swear loyalty to them are being drafted to their banners.

Many officers studying at academies and institutes and cadets at military schools have found themselves facing a dilemma. Officers serving in the forces are also concerned. How are "patronage" hubs in Cadres policy to be developed now? This was the main subject of an interview by our part-time correspondent with Col Gen Yu. Rodionov, deputy commander in chief for Cadres of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces].

[Silkin] Yuriy Nikolaevich, more and more frequently servicemen are submitting requests to the Cadres agencies to be allowed to continue serving in the armed forces of this or that sovereign state of the CIS. Are these requests valid?

[Rodionov] Yes, they are. After all, this is a matter of the future of the officers and warrant officers and of the well-being of their families. Who will assign a pension for serving in the armed forces of the USSR? Will a Ukrainian graduate of a Russian VUZ [higher educational institution] be given an assignment in Ukraine? Can an officer who refuses to take the oath of loyalty in another state of the CIS receive housing and an equivalent assignment in Russia? Questions like these have to be answered everyday today. I shall be frank, however, and say that we are simply not in a position to resolve these matters unilaterally....

[Silkin] Then perhaps we need to work more persistently to establish channels to the ministries and defense committees of those CIS states where the most problems are occurring.

[Rodionov] In fact authorized representatives of the CIS signed the Agreement on the Principles for Manning the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS and for Serving in Them in Kiev on 20 March. The document was not signed by Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovitch Kravchuk, however. The system for training military cadres in Ukraine would have been cut back drastically. And we know that Ukraine has 33 military schools training specialists for the CIS. At the same time Ukrainian officers account for 17.6% of the officers in the Joint Armed Forces and for 20% of those at VUZs.

The matter had to be resolved somehow, and we have taken the first step in that direction. What was it? After working it out with Lt Gen I. Vizhak, deputy Ukrainian minister of defense, we signed a protocol on organizing the training of officers and the transfer (detachment) of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers.

It recognizes the need to use the military educational institutions for meeting the needs for officers of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces and the Ukraine's own armed forces. What does this actually involve? Beginning in 1992 the training of military cadres will be performed by the military educational institutions on the basis of contracts between the Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and the High Command of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces. Those students and cadets who are already training will be able to complete the military educational institutions which they entered prior to the signing of the protocol.

[Silkin] Without charge?

[Rodionov] Yes. For those entering a VUZ this year, however, there will have to be an accounting with both sides. The calculation methods are being worked out....

[Silkin] But what if a cadet still does not want to serve under the Ukrainian flag, will he be able to transfer to another school? To the Omsk VOKU [Combined-Arms Higher Command School], for example?

[Rodionov] He will, and not just to the Omsk or the Saint Petersburg school. Laws passed by the Commonwealth states provide for the exchange of students desiring to transfer from military educational institutions of the Ukraine's Ministry of Defense to military educational institutions under the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. This could even be a school located at Samarkand, Alma-Ata or Kazan.

[Silkin] Yuriy Nikolayevich, there is a great deal of talk to the effect that Ukraine may not accept graduates of military VUZs who entered the training prior to the signing of the protocol you have mentioned....

[Rodionov] We have reached an agreement that individuals who submit requests for transfer and have a basis for this (the right to citizenship, family circumstances and other factors) will be accepted for service in the Ukraine's armed forces upon completing the military academy or school. The subsequent fate of these graduates will depend upon them, however. In short, the graduates themselves have to make the choice, and it is our job to help them realize their choice.

[Silkin] Let us assume that this matter is settled. What about the conferring of the primary officer's rank upon the graduates?

[Rodionov] The Ukrainian minister of defense will confer the first officer's rank upon those who express a desire to serve in the Ukraine's armed forces upon graduating from a military academy. Those who wish to serve in the Joint Armed Forces following graduation

will be promoted to officer's rank by the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

[Silkin] Could you tell us in somewhat greater detail about the actual mechanism for transferring military personnel. It may perhaps sound simple, but no one has an absolute guarantee against bureaucratic hitches.

[Rodionov] I can. The detachment of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers expressing a desire to transfer to continue their service from the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces to the Ukraine's armed forces will be by a decision of the high command of the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces upon receiving the agreement (request) from the Ukrainian minister of defense.

To me an aspect of fundamental importance here is the fact that under the current laws of the Commonwealth states the commitments accepted will not prevent officers, seagoing or shore-based warrant officers from transferring from the armed forces on one side to those of the other if there is a basis for this. In addition, they do not permit pressure to be applied to any serviceman who expresses a desire to transfer from the Joint Armed Forces to the Ukraine's armed forces or vice versa, and rule out any infringement upon their rights or liberties. The main thing is that the officer agrees and there be a request for him from the interested side.

With respect to the specific time frame the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has committed itself to send copies of assignment orders for officers serving in Ukraine as of 3 January 1992 who have indicated a desire to continue serving in the Ukraine's armed forces to the Main Cadres Directorate of the CIS Joint Armed Forces for removal from the personnel roster of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. The High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces will in turn transfer to the Cadres Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine all records of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers removed from the rosters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and transferred to the armed forces of Ukraine.

[Silkin] One final question, Yuriy Nikolayevich. Is it not going to happen that some missing entry in a personal file will affect the individual's receipt of a pension, let us say, or the registration of a detached serviceman?

[Rodionov] We have committed ourselves to provide all information confirming service in regions for which extra accrual of service time and other special benefits are specified. Other information confirming the service of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers will also be provided. So we hope that the records will contain adequate information. What about registration? This is in great part the prerogative of local authorities. As far as the functions of the Main Cadres Directorate are concerned, we will not create any obstacles to servicemen released into the reserve in their selection of a place of residence—taking the existing registration rules into account, of course. It should just be born in mind that the release from the military service of officers,

seagoing and shore-based warrant officers who have chosen a new place of residence following their release is carried out by order of the officials in charge where the servicemen are serving and in accordance with current laws of the Commonwealth states. Their removal from the personnel rosters and their dispatch to their chosen place of residence will, as always, be performed only after a complete clearance at the service site.

Georgia Accused of Training Armenian Troops

92UM0922D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Transcaucasus Military District Chronicles": "Stubborn Figures in the Background... of Neutrality"]

[Text] The Azeri Ministry of Defense has issued a statement on the fact that 1,200 cadets of Armenian nationality are going through accelerated courses of training in a number of military specialties at some training subunits on the territory of Georgia. They link their training with the name of Lieutenant-General I. Oganyak and assert that in three weeks they will complete their training and will be assigned to Armenian Army subunits that are conducting combat operations on the border with Azerbaijan and in Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, as reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA by Transcaucasus Military District Assistant Commander for Personnel Colonel B. Belchenko, these accusations are absolutely groundless. First of all, on the mythical number 1,200. During autumn 1991, a total of nearly 400 men were drafted from Armenia. Of them, more than 160 continue to perform military service and the rest are absent without leave and have gone home.

Furthermore, in Belchenko's words, the military district command authorities can also be accused, with equal success, of training both Armenian and Azeri military specialists since servicemen of Azeri nationality are also performing their duties at military district training subunits as a result of last year's agreements.

Families of Servicemen Transferred From Azerbaijan to Novosibirsk

92UM0922B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major S. Shopin: "From Novosibirsk: It Is Still Cold Here But the Families of Servicemen From the Transcaucasus Are Being Warmly Greeted"]

[Text] During the last several days VTA [Military Transport Aviation] aircraft brought 73 families of servicemen from Azerbaijan to Novosibirsk, among whom were 54 children.

The worsening confrontation in Azerbaijan and attack against units and military garrisons have compelled the

families of officers and warrant officers to leave their homes and to seek refuge with relatives and dear ones in Russia. Many took needed household goods with them. And the Siberian Military District helped them to reach their relatives in Siberia.

In the words of Military District Rear Services Chief of Staff Colonel Aleksandr Obukhov, the required number of railroad containers were prepared and personnel were assigned to assist with loading household goods upon the arrival of the aircraft from the Transcaucasus. And trucks delivered the household goods to the 40 families who have relatives in Novosibirsk.

As Obukhov noted, in the event of a massive evacuation of servicemen's families from "hot spots", temporary quarters have been identified, the organization of hot food has been provided for, and the required number of motor vehicles have been allocated for them by order of Siberian Military District Commander Colonel-General Viktor Kopylov.

Azerbaijan Recalls Servicemen from Baltic

92UM0922E Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Transcaucasus Military District Chronicles": "Under Their Own Roof or the Latest Migration of Military Personnel"]

[Text] A draft law on recalling citizens who are performing military service in the Baltic states was reviewed at an Azerbaijan National Soviet session that occurred recently. But for now while considering the request of the leaders of these countries and also the leadership of Byelarus, the National Soviet decided to recall its citizens who are performing duty on the territory of these states. The Republic Cabinet of Ministers and Ministry of Defense and the heads of executive power for the city of Baku have been tasked to insure the further performance of service in the ranks of the Azerbaijan National Army for those servicemen who have arrived.

In its turn, the Byelarus delegation, headed by former Transcaucasus Military District Military Council Member and currently Byelarus Ministry of Defense Representative Lieutenant-General A. Novikov, is working among the troops of the military district. The delegation, in the words of Republic of Byelarus Council of Ministers Board Deputy Chief Colonel V. Pavlov, has the goal of discussing the issue on the return to their homeland of compulsory service military personnel, who were drafted in Byelarus based on previously adopted agreements.

Military 'Hostages' Seized by Azerbaijan

92UM0922F Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed article, under the rubric: "Transcaucasus Military District Chronicles": "The Hostages Have Not Yet Been Returned. A Protest to the Azeri Leadership"]

[Text] The Transcaucasus Military District Military Council has distributed a statement which states that already on 16 February 1992 Azeri OMON [special-purpose militia detachments] representatives had seized Colonel Aleksandr Pavlenko, Captain Alfred Idrisov, and Private Vyacheslav Gaynas as hostages. Despite repeated negotiations with the leadership of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Republic and promises to release them, the servicemen continue to be detained. As a result, the military district military council has expressed a decisive protest to the leadership of Azerbaijan and to the Nakhichevan Republic and personally to Supreme Najlis Chairman Gaydar Alnev. And it demanded the immediate release of the servicemen.

UKRAINE

Kravchuk Statement to Men of Black Sea Fleet

92UM0880A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
3 Apr 92 p 1

["Statement of the President of Ukraine"]

[Text] I was prompted to address a statement to the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and workers and employees of the Black Sea Fleet by the following circumstances.

Attempts at flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign state of Ukraine have been made of late on the part of high-ranking military leaders and the mass media of the former Union. Legislative instruments pertaining to the organizational development of its armed forces which have been adopted in the republic are being subjected to revision. Agreements on military issues signed by the heads of state of the CIS are being distorted. Orders, primarily to units and forces of the fleet, provoking the political and social malaise of the servicemen and inciting national discord in the military outfits are being sent.

We cannot let this pass unremarked since such actions distort the essence of our policy and incline the servicemen toward an ill-disposed attitude toward the sovereign state on whose territory they are located and where almost the entire Black Sea Fleet is based.

I consider it necessary to confirm once again certain fundamental propositions of our policy, military policy included.

Having proclaimed its independence, Ukraine has as of 3 January of this year embarked on the creation of its own armed forces. It is doing this exclusively on a legal basis and complying strictly with the international commitments and the commitments ensuing from agreements among participants in the CIS which it has assumed.

Our military policy is aimed at the realization of nuclear-free, non-bloc status and is winning approval throughout the world. We will act consistently here, observing agreements and accords, given strict supervision.

Ukraine, as a young independent state, is participating actively in negotiating processes both within the framework of the CIS and with other states of the world community, firmly upholding here the interests of its people and adhering to generally accepted international principles.

We have no territorial claims on any state and see no people as an enemy. Ukraine is prepared for honest, equal cooperation with all countries, but at the same time does not accept any diktat, from whomsoever it may emanate.

It is at least odd that these elementary truths are not understood by the top military and managerial structures of the former USSR, including the leadership of the Navy, which is constantly attempting to impose on us its position and its vision of the problem, disregarding the policy of the Ukrainian state. There is obvious distortion of the actual state of affairs here, use is being made of disinformation and direct intimidation of the servicemen who took an oath of loyalty to Ukraine, and chauvinist hysteria under the flag of combating nationalism is being ignited. This is not inscribed in any legal provisions and is nothing other than outright disrespect for our policy and our statehood and the right of our people to independently dispose of what is on their land.

Such high-handed actions cannot pass without a due response. They confront us with the task of taking decisive steps to protect the interests of our people and the forces located on the territory of Ukraine, of the Black Sea Fleet included.

The fate of the fleet and its people concern us no less and incomparably more than the zealots from the Navy leadership. We cannot farm out its solution to the admirals inasmuch as this is not a military but a state-political problem, which could have far-reaching consequences for the fate of peace. We are becoming increasingly disturbed by the attempt of military structures to stand above independent states and to decide most complex political questions by way of diktat.

I have faith that the seamen of the Black Sea Fleet will comprehend these intricacies and intrigues, will not give in to pressure, and will reflect on whether the admirals can know the sailors' interests better than they themselves.

Sailors and soldiers, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers, officers and workers and employees of the fleet! Families of sailors of the Black Sea Fleet! The Ukrainian state will protect you and seek full and unconditional compliance with the accords within the framework of the CIS.

Ukraine will have a fleet as part of its armed forces. And will have not as much as the admirals deign to allocate us but as much as is necessary for the sufficient and reliable defense of the sea boundaries of the sovereign state.

I ask you to support this position of ours and act in defense of justice.

Upon formation of the Ukrainian Navy we will abide strictly by the agreements signed by the heads of state in Minsk and Kiev. We see our fleet as being nuclear-free, but sufficiently powerful for maintaining stability in this important region.

We will abide strictly by the Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen Who Serve on the Territory of Ukraine and Their Families," which has been enacted in Ukraine, and also the agreement among participants in the CIS on social and legal safeguards of servicemen and persons discharged from military service and their families.

We guarantee all of them proper conditions for military service, employment, and normal living. Even today we are financing and will continue to finance from our treasury the support of all troops and forces located on the territory of Ukraine and will adopt the measures necessary to improve the material position of the military, sailors included.

I call on the men of the Black Sea Fleet and all who have tied their lives to the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine to display at this difficult time forbearance, understanding, and good sense in the name of the building of our sovereign state and its armed forces, and a better life for the people of Ukraine and their own future on hospitable Ukrainian soil.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, President of Ukraine.

Ukrainian Law on Alternative Service

92UM0865A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
21 Mar 92 p 10

[Ukrainian Law on Alternative Service, signed by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, Kiev, 12 December 1991: "Law of Ukraine on Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service"]

[Text] Proceeding based upon the universal military service obligation that is prescribed by the state and freedom of conscience that is guaranteed by the Ukrainian Constitution, this Law defines the organizational-legal bases of alternative service.

SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. Alternative service is state service outside of the Armed Forces or other military formations which is introduced instead of the military service.

Article 2. Ukrainian citizens have the right to alternative (nonmilitary) service as a method of discharging their universal military service obligation if they have genuine religious convictions with regard to religious organizations that function in accordance with the law and whose teachings do not permit the use of weapons or service in the Armed Forces.

Article 3. In accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, this Law and other legislative acts, citizens who perform alternative service enjoy all of the socio-economic, political and personal rights and freedoms, with the exception of those defined by this Law, and carry out the duties of Ukrainian citizens.

A citizen performing alternative service retains the right to the housing which he occupied prior to being drafted to serve and his place on the list to obtain housing according to his permanent residence and work, and also previous work (position) which he performed (occupied) prior to being drafted, and, in the event there was none, other equivalent work (position) at the same, or if the worker agrees, at another enterprise, institution, or organization. He enjoys a priority right to retention at work during a reduction of the work force or staff for a period of two years from the date of his release from alternative service.

Article 4. Citizens not subject to assignment to alternative service are:

- a) those who, in accordance with the law, are released from the draft for compulsory active military service; and,
- b) those who, in accordance with the law, are granted deferments from the draft for compulsory active military duty (for the period the deferment is in force).

Article 5. Citizens perform alternative service at state enterprises, at social security, public health, and environmental institutions and organizations, and also in the sphere of communal agriculture, etc.

Citizens cannot perform alternative service at enterprises or establishments that are located on private property.

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers will define the list of economic sectors and enterprises.

Article 6. The alternative service term is twice as long as the compulsory active military service term.

The time a citizen is on alternative service is counted in his total labor length of service. This time also counts as uninterrupted labor service and in the length of work service in one's specialty with the condition that the citizen begins working no later than three months after being released from alternative service.

Article 7. Commissions on alternative service affairs are being formed to resolve questions on alternative service: republic, Crimean ASSR, oblast, city (republic subordinated cities) and, when required, rayon and city commissions.

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers approves the provision on the commission on alternative service affairs and on procedures for performing alternative service.

Article 8. A citizen may not evade alternative service regardless of its terms or nature.

When a citizen evades alternative service, the commission on alternative service affairs repeals the decision on the assignment to alternative service, and the citizen and the military commissariat are notified about the decision in writing within three days.

Article 9. This law and other Ukrainian legislative acts define the procedures for performing alternative service.

SECTION 2. PROCEDURES FOR ASSIGNMENT TO ALTERNATIVE SERVICE

Article 10. To perform alternative service, the citizens indicated in Article 2 of this Law personally submit a written application to the commission on alternative service affairs based on their place of residence, beginning from the time they are placed on the military registration list, but no later than six months prior to the initiation of the period prescribed by law for the draft for compulsory active military service.

Citizens who have performed compulsory active military service submit this application no later than the day of the draft for military assemblies.

Article 11. The Commission on Alternative Service Affairs is obliged to accept an application on an assignment to alternative service and to notify the citizen in writing about the date of his appearance at a commission session.

Article 12. The application on assignment to alternative service will be considered by the commission on alternative service affairs within a two-month period in the presence of the citizen.

A citizen is released from study or work to appear at a commission session with retention of his average monthly wage.

A citizen will be notified in writing on a refusal to consider an application as a result of the citizen's absence.

Article 13. The commission on alternative service affairs makes a decision on the performance of alternative service when there are genuine religious convictions and issues it to the applicant.

An assignment for the performance of alternative service is presented to the citizen after processing by the draft commission.

In the event it refuses to allow a citizen to perform alternative service, the commission will not consider a repeat application submitted on the same grounds.

SECTION 3. PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE SERVICE

Article 14. As a rule, citizens perform alternative service within the populated area in which they permanently

reside or in an area where they may have the opportunity to return to their permanent residence on a daily basis.

In the event citizens do not perform alternative service near their residences, the enterprise owner or his authorized organ is obliged, from the day work begins, to provide them a room in a dormitory or other well-equipped temporary housing.

The commission on alternative service affairs determines the location where the alternative service is to be performed.

The commission may change the location where a citizen performs alternative service based on the needs of society.

Article 15. A citizen is obliged to appear to perform alternative service at the location and time indicated on the assignment.

Article 16. The owner of the enterprise or his authorized organ, where a citizen has been assigned to perform alternative service, is obliged to provide him with the work indicated on the assignment and to notify the appropriate commission on alternative service affairs about this within three days.

Article 17. Labor relations between a citizen who is performing alternative service and the enterprise are carried out in accordance with the written terms of the labor contract and are regulated by the Ukrainian law on labor with the exceptions provided by this Law.

The labor contract concluded between the citizen and the enterprise owner or his authorized organ cannot be prematurely abrogated at the initiative of either party.

A citizen who is performing alternative service cannot be assigned to a position associated with carrying out organizational-management or administrative-management duties, work at more than one job, or be involved with entrepreneurial activities.

Article 18. The alternative service term begins on the day indicated in the assignment.

Days of absence without a valid reason and also periods while under administrative arrest are not counted in the alternative service term. In so doing, the term for which the labor contract was concluded will be extended by the number of days not worked.

The particular features of the religious belief with regard to days off are considered when possible in the labor contract when defining the work and relaxation regime without decreasing the number of prescribed work days.

Article 19. Professional training and retraining of citizens while performing alternative service are carried out individually and directly at the enterprise.

Article 20. While performing alternative service, a citizen has the right to submit to the commission on alternative service affairs a statement of justification with regard to changing the location of performance of

alternative service and also early release from it on the grounds prescribed by this Law.

Article 21. In the event an enterprise, institution or organization where the citizen is performing alternative service is eliminated, the owner or his authorized organ is obliged to notify the commission on alternative service affairs about this in the prescribed manner.

SECTION 4. TERMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE SERVICE

Article 22. Alternative service ends upon expiration of the term of the labor contract or ahead of time according to a decision of the commission on alternative service affairs.

Article 23. Alternative service is interrupted or terminated early in the event :

- a) when a citizen is drafted for compulsory active military service at his own request;
- b) when medical-social board of experts organs recognize a citizen as unfit for further performance of military service due to his state of health;
- c) when a citizen receives the right to a draft deferment for compulsory active military service in cases provided by law; and,
- d) when sentencing a citizen to being incarcerated.

In the event of its resumption, citizens perform alternative service within the prescribed time period until they reach the age of 30.

Article 24. In the event a citizen violates labor discipline, which in accordance with Ukrainian labor law is grounds to abrogate the labor contract at the initiative of the owner or his authorized organ, the owner of the enterprise or his authorized organ has the right to submit a request to the commission on alternative service affairs on early abrogation of the labor contract.

The commission will consider this request within 10 days and, if there are sufficient grounds, will terminate the performance of alternative service ahead of time. After this, the citizen will be subject to the draft for compulsory active military service or for periodic military training on general grounds.

Article 25. The commission's decision with regard to terminating alternative service ahead of time is binding both for the enterprise owner or his authorized organ, and also for the citizen and is grounds for the abrogation of the compulsory labor contract with the citizen.

Article 26. In the event a citizen is drafted for compulsory active military service, the alternative service term will not be counted in the military service term.

Article 27. After release from alternative service, a citizen is obliged to register at the military commissariat and at the commission on alternative service affairs at the location of his permanent residence within three days.

This procedure is also in force in the event a citizen changes his place of residence.

Article 28. Citizens, who have been released from performing military service due to their religious convictions, may be drafted to clean up after catastrophes or natural disasters, and also for other public work no more than three times (each time for a period of up to 6 months) within the age limits prescribed for performance of military service in the reserve.

Questions of labor relations on the primary work location are regulated by the law on military service in this case.

Article 29. Decisions of the commission on alternative service affairs may be appealed at a court proceeding.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk,
President of Ukraine
Kiev, 12 December 1991.

UKRAINIAN SUPREME SOVIET RESOLUTION

On the Procedures for Implementing the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service"

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To implement the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service" as of 1 January 1992.

2. To prescribe that, prior to bringing republic law in compliance with the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service," they will use laws that are in force, insofar as they do not contradict this Law.

The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commissions will submit for Ukrainian Supreme Soviet review recommendations for bringing laws into compliance with the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service" by 15 February 1992.

3. The Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service" is being applied to the legal system of relations between individuals and organizations which will arise after this Law is put into force.

4. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers will elaborate the Regulations on the Commissions on Alternative Service Affairs and on Procedures for Alternative Service by 1 February 1992, and form a republic commission on alternative service affairs, define a list of the sectors of the national economy and enterprises where Ukrainian citizens will be assigned to perform alternative service and also a list of religious organizations (creeds) that are active in Ukraine whose beliefs prohibit the use of arms and service in the Armed Forces by 15 February 1992.

The Crimean ASSR Council of Ministers and executive committees of Oblast Soviets of Peoples' Deputies will form appropriate commissions on alternative service affairs by 1 March 1992.

5. Prescribe that the commission on alternative service affairs during the Spring 1992 draft into the armed forces

will accept statements from citizens wishing to perform alternative service until 1 April 1992. In the future, statements will be accepted in accordance with this Law.

[Signed] I. Plyushch, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman
Kiev
12 December 1992.

Officers' Assemblies to Deal With "Social Questions"

92UM0870B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
28 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Col I. Mininkov, chairman of the PAVVKUS Officers' Union, under the rubric "Response": "Unite the Officer Corps for 28 Feb 92; What Can the Officers' Assembly Do?"]

[Text] These are difficult times for the military collectives. There is not enough money or materiel to maintain, let alone enhance the combat readiness of the military units. We are therefore forced to forego command-post, special tactical and other exercises. Even in the training of future officers, we are forced to curtail the field exercises because of a lack of fuels and lubricants for the motor transport and other equipment and the communication systems.

Life is forcing us to seek new means and methods for training the future professionals in military affairs. In this situation unity and solidarity of instructors, commanders and trainers are needed as never before. The role of the officers' assemblies is therefore growing. In connection with this I would like to express my thoughts on the elimination of 'sore spots' in the life of the officers and other servicemen.

I would mention the fact that in the article "Rally the Officer Corps," Maj G. Klyuchikov, quoting Capt 1st Rank O. Bodruk, consultant to the minister of defense of Ukraine, did not entirely accurately interpret the Statute on the Officers' Assembly in the Armed Forces. The author stated that the "officers' assembly, of which the chairman is always the commander, is a stillborn. A fifth wheel on the cart, it is incapable of providing social protection for the officer."

This conclusion would have been valid had it appeared in the newspaper prior to 6 October 1991, because the present Statute on the Officers' Assembly states: "At a general meeting of members of the officers' assembly a council of the officers' assembly, a chairman of the officers' assembly and his deputy are elected by secret ballot. While the previous Statute on the Officers' Assembly (in effect until 6 October 1991) specified that "The commander of the military unit is the chairman of the officers' assembly," under the present statute he may be any member of the collective.

This is precisely how officers of the VVKUS [expansion not given] proceeded in re-electing the leadership of the officers' assembly on 22 November 1991. Maj Gen F.

Kiparis, chief of the school and deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, initiated the re-election"

In keeping with its extensive authority, our council of the officers' assembly defined the composition and the main areas of work of the commissions (working groups). A total of four commissions were formed, with 4-8 members each. In our current work we have already realized that we made an error when we included an insufficient number of members of the council of the officers' assembly on the commissions for the observance of legality and justice and for the resolution of social and personal-service problems.

The situation which has developed with respect to social protection for servicemen has defined most of our effort to review letters, complaints and statements pertaining to the lack of apartments, dachas and garden plots. A great deal of time has also been spent resolving conflicts among officers due to failure to act on the part of the commission for monitoring the military trade system.

The first commission, headed by Lt Col A. Petukhov, immediately set about working out the ceremony for accepting officers into the officers assembly. It is also responsible for studying the performance of military duty and the professional training of the school's permanent staff, and considers matters pertaining to the awarding of military ranks and the honoring of those who excel.

Unfortunately, this commission is presently giving little attention to matters pertaining to the reform of the armed forces of Ukraine.

During the period of administration of the oath a climate was created in which each serviceman could make his own choice. Indeed, more than 20 of the officers in our collective did not take the oath. This is less than 8% of the entire officer corps. Some of them are presently being transferred to Russia, Byelarus, Moldova or Kazakhstan. The command element is helping them find suitable assignments.

Matters of uniting the officer corps are coming to the fore today as never before. Expressing the thoughts of comrades in the joint service, I cannot imagine Ukrainian and Russian officers leading their men against one another to resolve issues pertaining to the Crimea or to the establishment of the borders between Kharkov and Belgorod, Sumy and Kursk oblasts. Why do we need these borders right now?

We know how acute the housing problem has become. As of 1 January 1992 the number of personnel without apartments had grown to 21,500. Also disturbing is the fact that the commander of the KVO [Kiev Military District] now has 1,500 officers under his command. And if Ukrainian servicemen return to the homeland from other republics of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], the housing problem will become even more acute.

These pressing problems are discussed at sessions of the officers' union council. We take the recommendations submitted into account and make the appropriate decisions.

Among other things, the officers have concluded that it is essential to extend to the regular personnel the right to implement requests to build individual homes, to have housing built by ZhSK [housing construction cooperatives] and to use dormitories. We hope that the officers' opinion will be considered by the government of Ukraine.

The officers are also disturbed about their pay, of course. Citing the fact that pay scales have been raised for officers serving in Russia, they tell me as chairman of the officers' assembly: "Why don't you talk to Col Martirosyan? After all, Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk promised that the rates for the officers would be higher than those in Russia, if only by 0.1%." I have to tell them, unfortunately, that no decisions have been adopted on the matter yet.

It is now becoming clear to almost everyone that it will be necessary to release officers without apartments into the reserve. So we have to find a way out of this situation, to enable those without apartments to find their own—with real help from the state, of course.

We have accomplished some things in this respect. Groups have been set up by the officers' assembly council to demand land plots for individual houses, to establish housing construction cooperatives, find jobs for the wives of servicemen, place children into kindergartens and nurseries, and obtain plots for gardens. I would mention the fact that the chairmen of local kolkhozes liked our offer to help repair radio equipment and motor vehicles, to prepare electronic computers for operating and to open preparatory courses for admission to military and civilian VUZs [higher educational institutions].

At our school 156 people do not have apartments. We recently sent our requests and suggestions on the housing problem in the name of Maj Gen F. Kiparis, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, and the officers' assembly to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Col Gen K. Morozov, minister of defense, and Col V. Martirosyan.

In conclusion, something about the functioning of the commission for organizing leisure-time activities for officers and for social problems. It has worked hard, and this has had a beneficial effect with respect to uniting the officers' corps. Not long ago, for example, there were rumors of the illegal construction of dachas and homes. An investigation by commission members showed that these facts did not conform to the reality in the vast majority of cases. It was noted, to be sure, that certain officers had tried to keep a secret the fact that they had purchased a wooden house, even though they were on the list for a plot of land for a garden and an orchard.

Life has convincingly confirmed the fact that an active officers' assembly and its council can exert a positive influence with respect to the resolution of social and personal-service and other matters. And consequently, with respect to uniting the officers' collective. In the aforementioned article we stated that we are in favor of "everything valuable which is within the capability of this public institution."

Ukraine Determines Pay Levels for Officers, NCOs

92UM0888A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Apr 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 161, signed by Ukrainian Prime Minister V. Fokin and Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Minister V. Pekhota, dated 31 March 1992: "Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 161 'On Monetary Maintenance of Ukrainian Armed Forces Servicemen'"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers RESOLVES:

1. To establish the salaries Ukrainian Armed Forces of officers, naval and army warrant officers, extended service military personnel, and female servicemen for primary typical positions in accordance with Tables No. 1 and 2.

Table No. 1—Salaries of Ukrainian Armed Forces Officers According to Primary Typical Positions

Position Designation	Salary Amount (in Rubles per Month)
Military District Commander	4,000
Army Commander	3,600
Corps Commander	2,900-3,100
Division Commander	2,700-2,900
Brigade Commander	2,500-2,700
Regimental Commander	2,400-2,500
Battalion, Artillery Battalion Commander	2,200-2,400
Company, Artillery Battery Commander	2,000-2,200
Platoon Commander	1,800-2,000

Table No. 2—Salaries of Ukrainian Armed Forces Army and Naval Warrant Officers, Extended Service Military Personnel, and Female Servicemen According to Primary Typical Positions

Wage Category	Salary Amount (in Rubles per Month)
1	1,370-1,420
2	1,420-1,470
3	1,470-1,520
4	1,520-1,570
5	1,570-1,620
6	1,620-1,670
7	1,670-1,720
8	1,720-1,780
9	1,780-1,920

PAY:

—to servicemen (except for compulsory service military personnel) salaries according to military rank and a

percentage increase for years served in accordance with Tables No. 3 and 4;

Table No. 3—Salaries of Servicemen (Other Than Compulsory Service Military Personnel According to Military Rank

Military Rank	Salary Amount (in Rubles per Month)
Junior Sergeant, Petty Officer 2nd Class	35
Sergeant, Petty Officer 1st Class	45
Senior Sergeant, Chief Petty Officer	55
Master Sergeant, Master Chief Petty Officer	65
Army, Naval Warrant Officer	75
Senior Army, Naval Warrant Officer	95
Junior Lieutenant	210
Lieutenant	230
Senior Lieutenant	245
Captain, Captain-Lieutenant	265
Major, Captain 3rd Rank	285
Lieutenant Colonel, Captain 2nd Rank	305
Colonel, Captain 1st Rank	340
Major-General, Rear Admiral	380
Lieutenant-General, Vice Admiral	420
Colonel-General, Admiral	475
General of the Army	535

Table No. 4—Amounts of Percentage Increases for Years Served to the Salaries of Servicemen (Other Than Compulsory Service Military Personnel

Years Served	Percentage Amount of Increase
More than 2 years	5
More than 5 years	10
More than 10 years	15
More than 15 years	20
More than 20 years	25
More than 25 years	30
More than 30 years	40

NOTE: The amount of the percentage increase is calculated from the amounts of the salary [based upon position held] and the salary for military rank.

—to compulsory service military personnel, cadets of military educational institutions, Suvorov cadets, Nakhimov cadets, and pupils of military musical schools and military units salaries in accordance with Tables 5 and 6;

Table No. 5—Salaries of Compulsory Service Military Personnel

Wage Category	Salary Amount (in Rubles per Month)	
	For the 1st and 2nd Years of Service	For the 3rd Year of Service
1	95	100
2	100	110
3	110	120
4	120	130
5	130	140
6	140	150

NOTE: Salaries include monetary compensation instead of a tobacco ration.

Table No. 6—Salaries of Military Educational Institutions Cadets, Suvorov Cadets, Nakhimov Cadets, and Pupils of Military Musical Schools and Military Units

	Salary Amount (in Rubles per Month)
Cadets Who Did Not Serve on Active Military Duty Before Enrolling for Studies:	
—a) Higher Military Educational Institutions	150
—b) Middle Military Schools and Junior Officer Training Courses	130
Cadets Who Are Orphaned Children or Children Who Were Left Without The Guardianship of Parents:	
—a) Higher Military Educational Institutions	195
—b) Middle Military Schools and Junior Officer Training Courses	160
Suvorov Cadets, Nakhimov Cadets, and Pupils of Military Musical Schools and Military Units	90

NOTE: 1. The salaries of cadets who were army or naval warrant officers, extended service or compulsory service military personnel are prescribed according to the last official positions which they occupied at military units prior to enrolling for studies.

2. Cadets' salaries include monetary compensation instead of a tobacco ration.

- to compulsory service military personnel, upon release from military service, lump sum assistance in the amount of 500 rubles; and indicated individuals who were orphaned children and children who were left without the guardianship of parents—R2,000;
- to officers, warrant officers, extended service military personnel and female servicemen—a lump sum monetary reward for maintenance of high combat readiness of troops, model performance of duty and flawless discipline in the amount of two months salary per year and material assistance in the amount of one month's salary per year;
- to servicemen (other than compulsory service military personnel) to whom the issue of food at state expense

is not conducted, monetary compensation instead of a food ration in the amount of the cost of a soldier's ration, computed according to actual prices; and,

—to servicemen (other than compulsory service military personnel) in the event of the absence of permanent housing and to higher military educational institution cadets who have a family, when there are no family dormitories, monetary compensation for them to sub-lease (lease) housing in the amount of actual expenditures but no more than R300; and to individuals who have families totaling three or more people—up to R350 (depending on the populated areas in which they live).

2. The force of paragraph 1 of this decree extends to servicemen of the Border Troops, Ukrainian National Guard, civil defense troops and other military formations created by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and also to servicemen who perform their military duties in Ukrainian ministries, departments, organizations, and institutions.

3. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for Matters of the Defense of the Ukrainian State Border, the Main Directorate of the Ukrainian National Guard Commander, and the administrative bodies of other Ukrainian military formations;

a) determine the salaries at all other servicemen's positions with regard to salary amounts that have been prescribed by this decree for the primary typical positions;

b) approve with the coordination of the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor:

—the procedures for calculating years of service of servicemen for payment of a percentage increase;

—the amount of the increase for special service conditions, rewards for skills and other additional types of monetary support of an incentive nature;

—position wage lists of warrant officers, extended service and compulsory service military personnel and female servicemen; and,

—within a month, wages and salaries of workers and employees of Ukrainian Armed Forces military units, institutions, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations and other military formations in accordance with the salary terms approved by the Ukrainian government or by other bodies on its behalf for public health, education, and cultural institutions and other organizations and enterprises.

4. Recognize those decrees that are no longer in force, the fourth paragraph of point 4 of Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 10, 9 January 1992.

[Signed] V. Fokin
Ukrainian Prime Minister

[Signed] V. Pekhota
Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Minister

Oblast Meetings Precede Officers' Congress*92UM0881B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
1 Apr 92 p 1*

[Interview with Yevgeniy Gryniv, people's deputy of Ukraine, by Captain Yevgeniy Partin, NARODNAYA ARMIYA free-lance correspondent; place and date not given: "In Preparation for the Third Congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine—'The Army Must Remain Outside Politics...'"]

[Text] On the threshold of the Third Congress of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, at oblast conferences that are taking place everywhere, officers are deciding what the union is to be like and adopting appeals to the congress and to the minister of defense. Quite a few sensible proposals on the reformation of the armed forces can be heard. Deputies of soviets at various levels, who are troubled by the fate of the army, are taking an active part in them. They are talking with activists, meeting with soldiers, and elaborating their positions.

People's Deputy of Ukraine Yevgeniy Gryniv shares his thoughts on the work of the Union of Officers of Ukraine and its future with our free-lance correspondent.

[Partin] What was your impression from the contacts with the activists of Lvov organizations of the Union of Officers of Ukraine?

[Gryniv] I am somewhat distressed by the lag in views. I look at them, and I see myself a year to a year and a half ago. Servicemen are actively raising questions which were decided in the "civilian sector" a long time ago. The impression is created that they jumped onto the train at full speed and that they are continuing to talk about what they went past a long time ago.

It seems to me that this is happening because some of the officers did not realize that the state and its structures have not only been proclaimed, but that they are already functioning. Therefore, the formulation of many questions is taking place at a populist level, from the standpoint of "rally" democracy.

For example, the problem of the transfer of Ukrainian officers from Russia deserves serious attention. Today, there are 19,000 applications with such a request in the Supreme Soviet. And one can understand these people: They want to serve their own people on their own land. Members of the SOU [Union of Officers of Ukraine] in their speeches are demanding the immediate return of these servicemen to Ukraine. However, do we have the real capabilities for this? After all, not more than one and a half thousand who want it can be provided housing. But what is to be done with the others? Settle them in a tree branch hut or a dirt hut? I do not think that this is the official approach to a resolution of the problem. It is necessary to see the distance between desire and capability.

[Partin] What demands of the Union of Officers of Ukraine do you consider insufficiently justified. With what do you agree?

[Gryniv] I do not like the emphasis being placed on attention to the nationality question. If we are talking today about the prospects of building a professional army, then it is necessary to remember that the profession is not determined by national origin.

A proper and not a national army is being established in the republic. The first is substantially different from the second specifically according to the principle of manning. Recall the "revolutionary guards" in Iran and the armed forces that existed simultaneously with them. Different tasks and different approaches to their resolution. Of course, it is necessary to talk about the lack of responsibility among various commanders for the assigned sector of work and the strikebreaking attitude in the fulfillment of their duties. But these are purely service questions that do not depend on where and to whom one or another officer was born. They, incidentally, should be monitored by the Union of Officers of Ukraine.

In this respect, the selection of the present command staff of the armed forces is of special significance. But we should not hurry here. The process in question is intended for more than one day. The question could have been put this way as late as yesterday, when it was being decided: either—or. Today, the question is already about the qualitative replacement of army personnel.

Someone might object that this way is slow and does not guarantee success. But let us face the facts. If we, democrat deputies, had raised the question two and a half years ago precisely like this—with us or against us—then it is unlikely that the parliament of Ukraine would have succeeded in doing as much as it is doing today. At that time, there were only 108 of us. Now there are 276. From where? Not as a result of by-elections, but most of all owing to a reorientation of the deputies.

It seems to me that this process is positive and that it has to be stimulated. By no means cut off those who are beginning to mature and who are being attracted to us. The SOU has to play first fiddle in this, being the fixer and organizer of this work among the servicemen.

[Partin] It is very likely that you had occasion to hear about two concepts of the development of SOU? The supporters of one see in it, so to say, just a military trade union. Others are attempting to give the organization a political status. Which is preferable?

[Gryniv] I am impressed by the strategic task of the Union of Officers of Ukraine—the future development of an independent state and its armed forces. But as for the tactics, then here, in my opinion, there are certain aspects that raise doubt.

First of all, the SOU is a social organization, whose decisions should have the weight only of a recommendation. I did not sense in meetings with activists that they are striving to acquire some kind of executive function. These are different things. Unfortunately, similar efforts to bring pressure on executive authority by

rally methods came to the army from the "civilian sector." There is also one more reason that led certain officers into the political arena.

The present union was created when there still was no minister of defense of Ukraine. At that time, the organization, in fact, defended the interests of the future Ukrainian Army by itself. And a big thanks to it! However, today the leadership organ of the armed forces of the republic is already working. And the only question now concerns qualitative changes. I am confident that in the review of specific problems it is impossible not to take the opinion of the union into account, but it does not make the final decision.

This comes most of all from the concept adopted by the Supreme Soviet which states: The army must remain outside politics even in the period of building the national state. Therefore, the SOU, it seems to me, should be involved not in politics, but with a specific task: the social protection of servicemen and the members of their families, and influence on the quality of combat training, the performance of service, and strengthening discipline. I believe that there is no need to set up yet another political structure.

And last. I have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to work very much with our officers in getting them to realize at what stage we are and to teach them to assess their capabilities realistically. Because, any cause can be ruined by assigning excessive tasks, even perfectly proper ones.

I want to believe that common sense and proper consideration will make it possible for the Union of Officers of Ukraine to continue its creative work in the building of the armed forces and that it will not be permitted to get caught up in political passions.

Officers' Union Congress Opens

92UM0886A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Apr 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Sergey Koryukov, fifth-year cadet of the Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School: "A Lot of Work Ahead—Third Congress of Union of Officers of Ukraine Opens in Kiev Today"]

[Text] After the "winter hibernation," the market place of independence has awakened. The rally of 15 March highlights one important fact out of a lot of similar measures: The armed forces are prepared to enter the arena of political struggle—more accurately, their most active and progressive part (and not the reactionary part as in Russia).

Concern over the unsatisfactory pace and erroneous directions in the resolution of questions of building the army was apparent at the rally. Questions were put point blank on changing the government and conducting early elections to parliament on a multiparty basis before the end of the year.

Some may be frightened by the fact that the army is beginning to show an interest in politics. But is it at their own whim? Analysis of the situation in which the emerging armed forces find themselves makes it possible to reach an unambiguous conclusion: The accelerating politicization of the army is an objective process.

At the present time, Ukraine is moving along the path of building a civilized democratic state. When we build such a state, there will be no need for the "man with the rifle" to go into the sphere of politics. For the creation of suitable living and service conditions for himself, he will be able to agree completely with legislative restrictions on some civil rights associated with the specific nature of military service.

But what do we have now? Do we have a moral right to prohibit a military person from contributing within his power to the quick building of a rich democratic state and to fight for a guarantee of humane conditions for himself right now?

The peculiarities of service create specific difficulties here. The representatives of other professions are applying effective methods to obtain necessary privileges and pay increases. We have seen this more than once: A strike is declared, and at the same time the Supreme Soviet building is picketed, but the most daring of them issues a threatening ultimatum from the parliamentary rostrum. You do not have to wait long for a positive result. This version was employed repeatedly and not unsuccessfully by the militia.

The military do not have a right to strike and to other forms of protest and, therefore, to put it mildly, they are deceived. The blatant defects in the monetary allowances for officers, in comparison with the pay of music teachers, bus drivers, etc., reach catastrophic scales. Servicemen in Ukraine risk being transformed into the most impoverished part of the population. The situation is no better for workers and employees of the army.

Therefore, I think, for example, that the accusation that the Union of Officers of Ukraine in some way resembles a military party is groundless. There are some from alternative organizations who propose to limit themselves exclusively to trade union work on a "rayon scale." Moreover, similar attitudes are also growing inside some oblast SOU [Union of Officers of Ukraine] organizations.

In this difficult time of changes in which we live, the army is faced with too many problems, both global and those that cannot be discerned from the capital heights. And all of these problems are tightly intertwined with those that confront society as a whole.

The civic duty of progressive officer-citizens of Ukraine does not permit standing aside from the processes of building their own statehood. The future of each of our officers, warrant officers, and soldiers depends on what the new Ukrainian army will be like. But what the army will be like in many ways depends on us ourselves, on the

activity of those who want to see the army of Ukraine strong, well supplied, and capable of defending the inviolability of the borders and the territorial integrity of the country.

Established at the dawn of the current democratic changes, the Union of Officers of Ukraine is intended to consolidate the efforts of all of the people for a resolution of common tasks. No one has a right to dispute its enormous services to the cause of establishing the armed forces of Ukraine. But in practice, there is truth to the remark of the famous politician and commander Napoleon Bonaparte that two types of people emerge in a revolution: those who make the revolution and those who use its results.

V. Martirosyan was right when he said at the Second Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] Congress that there actually is no Ukrainian Army yet. There are already hundreds of thousands of people, who for various reasons signed their names on lists to take the oath. Among these, only a small part is a real force capable at any moment of coming to the defense of the young Ukrainian democracy. It is impossible to distinguish these few from the others now, after the massive adoption of the oath. And in the process of the beginning reduction, which does not always involve patriots of Ukraine, exactly those will be discharged who constitute the foundation of a national army in their units.

It is difficult not to agree with Vilen Arutyunovich in the absence of logic on certain aspects of grand military policy. New Ukrainian generals are emerging, and they have forgotten everything that V.A. Martirosyan did for the army in recent years. But, after all, bewilderment in this regard is being expressed not only by military officers, but also by peoples' deputies.

What was said earlier does not by any means denote the need to divide the army according to nationality features, and the Union of Officers of Ukraine is not a union of Ukrainian officers. There is ample proof of this, beginning with the fact that the president of the union himself is Armenian.

One can also recall an excerpt from a speech by Stepan Khmara at the Second SOU Congress, when he said that Colonel General K.P. Morozov, our minister of defense, is Russian, but we all respect him, because he is a person with democratic views.

While building a democratic state, and being brutally pressed for time, we simply are obliged to do things in such a way that the key posts, both in society as a whole and in the army, are occupied specifically by democrats and patriots of Ukraine. We must rely on the initiative of the president that he will count on democratic forces and that he expects their support.

If Rukh will help in the selection of the necessary personnel for the "civilian sector," then the Union of Officers must take on this work in the army. A decision on this question was adopted at the time of the Second

SOU Congress in the fall of last year, but the wagon, as the saying goes, has not budged.

This is not the usual campaign for the distribution of seats and portfolios. People like this are absolutely necessary in the troops. They must exercise state control over the implementation of military policy of Ukraine, strict adherence to the laws, decisions, and resolutions of organs of authority. It is necessary with their help to conduct all of the required work in troop units in order to create a Ukrainian Army out of the redesignated units of the Soviet Army.

There is an impenetrable forest of work here. People's Deputy V. Pilipchuk sagaciously noted that if not all of the "i's" are dotted in time, and it is not made clear "who is who," then "later we will find a half million soldiers who will be beating themselves in the chest..." Tens and hundreds of thousands of officer-citizens scattered by the will of fate over the entire territory of the USSR, remain outside our army, at a time when frequently double-dyed GKChP-ists [State Committee for the State of the Emergency supporters] settle in Ukraine, acquiring positions and ranks.

As a rule, people with reactionary and conservative views simultaneously are the most incompetent in a professional sense. Actively coming out against the independence of Ukraine, persecuting progressively-minded people, they are trying in the new army to sting those against whom they could not settle scores earlier.

But if an enemy turns out to be a professional, then, as was said by President L.M. Kravchuk at the Second Rukh Congress, he is more dangerous, because this professional, knowing our weak points, can fight against us more effectively.

One would like to think that the answers to the posed questions, which, I am convinced, are disturbing not only for me, will be found by the Third SOU Congress.

In summarizing what has been said, I want to emphasize again: Victory has not been achieved, we must not be complacent—a lot of work is ahead. We must preserve—no, increase by many times—the perkiness, activeness, and effectiveness of our work, concentrating the maximum efforts on the "personnel" question.

Decree Subordinating All Units in Ukraine to Ministry of Defense

*92UM0918A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Apr 91 p 1*

[Decree of the President of Ukraine: "On Urgent Measures for Organizational Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text] To implement the Ukrainian Law on Armed Forces of Ukraine and the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine of 24 August 1991 on Military Units in Ukraine and also in connection with the interference of

the leadership of the Russian Federation and the Main Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces in the internal affairs of Ukraine, the resulting exacerbation of the social and political situation in the troops located on the territory of Ukraine and not part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the lack of proper command and control, I DECREE:

1. To subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine all military units stationed on the territory of Ukraine and not indicated in Article 1 of the Decree of the President of Ukraine of 12 December 1991 on Armed Forces of Ukraine.

To transfer to the operational subordination of the commander of the CIS Strategic Forces the strategic nuclear forces stationed on the territory for the period until they are completely disbanded to ensure control over nuclear weapons. The procedure for accomplishing this shall be governed by a special agreement.

2. To organize the Navy of Ukraine based on the forces of the Black Sea Fleet stationed on the territory of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine shall begin organizing Navy command and control bodies after coordinating with the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces the list of ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet which are temporarily transferred to the operational subordination of the command of the CIS Strategic Forces.

3. The Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine shall organize direct command and control (administrative command and control for Strategic Forces) of all troops stationed on the territory of Ukraine and ensure their constant combat readiness and maintenance of military discipline.

4. This decree shall be disseminated to all military units and institutions and announced to all personnel.

5. This decree shall enter into force on the day of its signing.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk
City of Kiev
5 April 1992

Ukrainian Parliament Denounces Ruskoy Visit to Crimea

92UM0918B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
8 Apr 92 p 1

[Statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Pertaining to the Black Sea Fleet]

[Text] Lately, political figures and statesmen of the Russian Federation and naval command authorities of the CIS Joint Armed Forces have been attempting to aggravate and thereby destabilize the situation surrounding the Black Sea Fleet. There are undisguised

threats to take the entire Black Sea Fleet under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

The trip by Vice President A.V. Rutskoy of the Russian Federation on 3-4 April to Sevastopol and the statements made by him both with respect to the fleet and the future fate of Crimea evoked special indignation among the public of Ukraine. We view them as an attempt at direct interference in the internal affairs of an independent state.

The commander of the CIS Navy and his deputies are making visits, sending to the Black Sea Fleet telegrams and appeals in which they exceed their official powers, and taking it upon themselves to give a political and legal assessment of the activities not only of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine but also of the supreme legislative and executive bodies of Ukraine, which is intolerable.

The command of the Black Sea Fleet, headed by I.V. Kasatonov, is impertinently ignoring the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, conducting undisguised anti-Ukrainian propaganda among servicemen, and inflaming inter-ethnic dissension.

In building its own armed forces on a clear legal basis, Ukraine has repeatedly expressed its position with respect to the Black Sea Fleet at meetings of the leaders of states and at talks with the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR. Ukraine has made a considerable contribution to the organizational development of the Baltic, Northern, Pacific, and Black Sea fleets of the former USSR. Having the right to inherit its share of the entire Navy of the former USSR, Ukraine lays claim only to that portion of the Black Sea Fleet which is registered to its ports, which is considerably less than Ukraine's contribution to the Navy of the former USSR.

Ukraine will consistently strengthen its statehood and persistently build its own Armed Forces, including a Navy. The Ukrainian state guarantees social and legal protection for servicemen and their family members.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet proposes to the President of Ukraine, as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, guided by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine of 24 August 1991 on Military Units in Ukraine and by the laws and other legislative acts of Ukraine, to take the necessary steps without delay to create the Navy of Ukraine.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine appeals to the population of Crimea and servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet to preserve public order and not give in to the influence of provocative statements on the part of the command of the CIS Navy and individual leaders of the Russian Federation.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine appeals to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation to support our aspirations to normalize the situation that has taken shape over the Black Sea Fleet.

"Sociopsychological" Directorate to Replace Political Directorate*92UM0919A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
8 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article by Anatoliy Zubkov: "Know Your Homeland, Ukrainian Soldier"]

[Text] A meeting between the leadership of the Sociopsychological Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense with Kiev correspondents on 1 April was devoted to developing effective collaboration between the mass information media and the Armed Forces of an independent Ukraine.

Generally speaking, this was the first professional acquaintance of the press representatives with the workers from the new service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This service is living through the period of its establishment.

Previously, in the army of the totalitarian, completely ideologized state, the education of the personnel was the concern of the so-called political bodies, said the directorate's chief, Col Vladimir Mulyava, in talking with the correspondents. In the very word "political body" one could feel that the soldier was viewed by the communist ideologist not as a living person, with his thoughts, feelings, joys and misfortunes, but as a mute cog in the political system, a "homo politicus."

At present, when Ukraine is establishing its own independent democratic state and its own national army, there has been a major change in the forms of work with the soldiers and officers. The organization of the Armed Forces in the future will be based on the humanistic principles of common human morality. This is also the basic task of the service which in the Ukrainian Army has replaced the discredited political bodies, emphasized Col V. Mulyava.

It is no accident that this service is called sociopsychological. It will employ not politicians but precisely social psychologists. The sphere of their concern will be the harmonizing of the personal relations of the military collectives, the establishing of nonviolent, mutually respectful contacts and the ability to promptly establish a psychological dialogue in order to maintain a healthy moral climate in the subunit.

The leaders of the Sociopsychological Directorate informed the journalists that instead of the detested "political exercises" the Ukrainian Armed Forces will introduce hours of humanitarian studies. The men will study the history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Army, the culture, traditions and habits of the peoples living in our independent state. Even recently this was called with unconcealed irritation and even with malice nothing more than "nationalism" and "Banderov teachings." Certainly the Soviet ideologists for many decades concealed in every possible way the true, correct history of Ukraine, or they presented it in a greatly distorted form.

Now every soldier must be informed of the truth about this people to whom he has sworn his loyalty, about the heroes who fought for the freedom of their homeland in the UNR [Ukrainian People's Republic] in the ranks of the Sich Riflemen and the Ukrainian Rebel Army.

Here the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense will be greatly aided by the correspondents, by the representatives of the creative unions and social organizations.

Col V. Mulyava and the leaders of the departments of the Sociopsychological Directorate proposed to the press workers that they collaborate more closely, that they write more often objective reports and articles on the processes occurring in the military, that they tell about the good deeds of the Ukrainian troops, that they strictly bring out negative facts and criticize those commanders who have not rid themselves of the ossified neo-Bolshevik and pro-Moscow thinking and who are impeding the development of the Armed Forces of independent Ukraine.

The meetings of the leadership of the Sociopsychological Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense with the press workers from now on will become a regular event.

Ukraine Navy Commander on Tasks of Navy, Equipment Needs*92UM0938A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
14 Apr 92 p 2*

[Interview With Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin by GOLOS UKRAINY Special Correspondent Vladimir Skachko, under the rubric: "New Appointments": "Boris Kozhin: 'I Respect the Man and I Stand on That'"]

[Text] Local journalist colleagues, who are acquainted with naval life, have said the following about the designation of Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin as Ukrainian Navy Commander, who until recently was a Crimean naval base commander: you could not have hoped for better. The young, promising, high-class officer and naval affairs expert is respected among Black Sea Fleet personnel. The military personnel, with whom we had the opportunity to socialize, have also said the same thing about B. Kozhin.

But the main thing is that, with this appointment, Ukraine beat the main trump card from the hands of those who opposed the creation of the Ukrainian Navy on the grounds, they said, that there are no high-class naval experts in Kiev and therefore there is nothing to talk about. Of course, this is not true and from now on there is such a man on the Ukrainian Naval Olympus.

So what does Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin think about the Ukrainian Navy?

[Kozhin] My position is to proceed in everything from the point of view of the expediency of the Ukrainian

Navy's missions. Today one can sink to the level that we will begin to cut ships in half: so many percent there and so many percent here. That is absurd. In my opinion, first of all we need to define the missions that the Ukrainian must carry out. It is on this basis that we must calculate the required composition of the combat capable forces. While already personally making a preliminary "estimate", I have determined for myself that the Ukrainian Navy must consist of antisubmarine [ASW] warfare ships, surface forces, minesweeping task forces, offshore defense ships, submarine forces, and also naval aviation and shore defense forces. Of course, this is still an approximate structural diagram.

[Skachko] But what missions must the Ukrainian Navy carry out?

[Kozhin] First of all, the most important geopolitical mission is maintenance of a favorable regime in this operational zone. Second, practical protection of the economic zone, guaranteeing the safety of ships and industrial activity and protection of the sea lines of communication. It takes a long time to say but this is the essence of the Navy's function. Third, protection and defense of Ukraine's maritime borders, its coastal zone, and combating smuggling.

[Skachko] Under conditions of complicated relations between Ukraine and Russia and the same situation in Sevastopol, outstanding courage was certainly required from you personally in order to agree to assume this post. Still, what prompted you to make that decision?

[Kozhin] First of all, what I see around me today. Many seamen are asking themselves this question: Who am I? I am no exception. I have been in Sevastopol since 1968 and in Ukraine in general since 1961. That is, I am a citizen of Ukraine. And when the Ukrainian minister of defense offered me this responsible and serious post, I thought that it was my human duty to take it. And I would certainly ask everyone who knows me, remembers me and served with me to proceed precisely from these positions while structuring relations with me. And not from some other positions...

[Skachko] Today, I repeat, there is a complicated socio-political situation in Sevastopol. Aren't you afraid that your designation will increase passions?

[Kozhin] There must be firmness of convictions in everything. In the near future, having finally determined my own positions, I will meet with everyone in order to talk about everything normally and humanely and to exchange opinions. I am convinced that we certainly have areas of common interest. And we will proceed from them while solving the main task: And the main thing today is to stabilize the situation. But I will never in my life give an order that can cause confrontation or incite tension! Everything will be resolved normally, from the positions of respect for each other.

[Skachko] And where did your military career take you in the Black Sea Fleet?

[Kozhin] I began my career from a naval school and my friends and I will celebrate our first 25th year anniversary of service in the active navy next year. In 1968, I arrived here as a young lieutenant. I began as assistant commander of a small antisubmarine warfare [ASW] craft, having tasked myself to become the commanding officer as soon as possible and to pass the test for an independent ship handling clearance. Six months later, Division Commander Admiral Yuriy Kudryavtsev administered that test to me. After that, my service of course proceeded with difficulty but with continuous advancement. From 1969, I was a ship commanding officer, then was assigned as deputy commanding officer of a patrol escort. In 1970-1971, higher officers courses in Leningrad, then commanding officer of a patrol escort ship which is still in our fleet force right now. Then five years of long cruises, combat duty in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic, and port calls in nearly all the states of North Africa. After this, having not yet reached my 30th birthday, I became chief of staff of a ship fleet force. Three years later, the Naval Academy and after that commander of a fleet force at Sevastopol, seven years of difficult, responsible, but interesting duty and work with people.

Later I worked at a naval base headquarters, six years as its chief of staff, became a rear admiral and commander of a Crimean naval base. You know my fate today.

[Skachko] Did you receive the rank of rear admiral long ago?

[Kozhin] Exactly one and a half years ago.

[Skachko] Where will the Ukrainian Navy's headquarters be located?

[Kozhin] I think it will be in Sevastopol. From there, we will lead the new, modern Ukrainian Navy. Duty in it will be a joy. I would immediately like to warn everyone that there will not be any sort of general reduction or cutting up of ships. The Ukrainian minister of defense has already defined the five-year program of development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Navy, too. Everything will occur calmly and systematically. The Armed Forces will also accept people for duty and release them from it. Why am I talking like this? Because I frequently hear from the mouths of officer-seamen: they say, they will take and cut up the ships. But it is impossible to do this under any circumstances and it will not be like that. On the contrary, we will extend the lives of these ships through good maintenance in order to create a combat capable Ukrainian fleet within the Ukrainian Navy.

[Skachko] Your actions with regard to the commander of a small ASW craft who recently transferred from the Crimean naval base to the flag of the Black Sea Fleet commander?

[Kozhin] This case is unambiguous. Unfortunately, our surveillance system and our procedure compliance system did not work. But of course we need to look after

and not make severe conclusions with regard to the senior lieutenant who did this. Because he is a fine officer and God grant him good future service.

[Skachko] When will the political decision be made and when will the Black Sea Fleet become part of the Ukrainian Navy and how will you, a rear admiral, command an admiral, a man who is senior in rank?

[Kozhin] According to the established procedures. I would not like for there to be any parallel structures in the navy: here is the Navy and there is the Black Sea Fleet. Today the civilized formation of Ukrainian Navy command and control is occurring and for now Igor Kasatonov does not envision my command. But this really complex issue will also be resolved with a political resolution of the fate of the Black Sea Fleet.

[Skachko] And how are your relations with Admiral Igor Kasatonov?

[Kozhin] For my part—normal. We served together at one time and carried out ASW missions and competitive maritime search missions together. We had normal professional contacts. At that time, I was a captain 2nd rank and was sincerely happy when Igor Vladimirovich received the rank of rear admiral. We also encountered each other and had contact during our later service. What is more, I will tell you: Igor Kasatonov is an outstanding methods expert. At one time, FLAG RODINY published the fleet commander's methodological notes on the issues of duty organization, procedures and methods for executing combat exercises and missions at sea, etc. So, I reproduced these methodological elaborations at the print plant and handed one to each officer as guidance in the practical management of affairs. I deeply respect Admiral Kasatonov.

[Skachko] Today, Igor Kasatonov has released many Black Sea Fleet officers who have taken the oath to Ukraine from their posts and from military service. What is your attitude toward that?

[Kozhin] I consider these actions of Kasatonov's to be incorrect because taking the oath—this is the creation for each serviceman of his own internal moral climate. Therefore, it is incorrect to release personnel from service for internal convictions. We need a rational approach in everything and to create such conditions so that each man feels free and uninhibited—of course, if this will not harm the performance of official duties. This, I repeat, is my main position. We will create these conditions—and we do not need to release anyone.

[Skachko] On behalf of GOLOS UKRAINY readers, permit me to wish you a most rapid political solution of the Black Sea Fleet problem and peace and tranquility on this earth.

[Kozhin] Thank you. This is also my personal point of view which I am certain is supported by many people here. The main thing is that all issues be resolved competently and in a civilized manner, with knowledge

of the matter. So that there is no confrontation. I am sorry and hurt to the depth of my soul if you want to do everything as best you can but you immediately encounter a high wall of misunderstanding. This is not how it should be and then we will determine everything.

And once again I want to address everyone with whom I have had the opportunity to serve at one time or other. This is first of all our respected veterans. I have always remembered and will remember how much these people gave to me personally in my formation as a military seaman, beginning in 1968 and continuing to this day. I have gone through the school of life from lieutenant to admiral among them.

I would like to address my friends, officers, warrant officers, and seamen and wish them the very best. Believe me, the time will very rapidly come when we will create the Ukrainian Navy from ships that are equipped with the most modern equipment and on which, as the basis of my work as commander, respect for man will be as it should be and where the man, officer and seaman will be the center of attention and concern.

Black Sea Fleet Spetsnaz Unit Takes Oath

92UM0938B Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
14 Apr 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "They Have Taken the Oath of Loyalty to Ukraine"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Security Service Press Center reports that on 9 April 1992 the Ukrainian Security Service Directorate Chief for Nikoyayevskiy Oblast Colonel V.I. Trofimenko administered the oath to a Black Sea Fleet Intelligence Directorate spetsnaz military unit based on oblast territory.

The oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine was taken by 85 percent of the officers and warrant officers and by 100 percent of other servicemen. The officers who remained aloof from the solemn act related to it with understanding. At their request, they will be assigned to the former Union republics of which they are citizens to perform further military service.

The special purpose military unit is ready at any moment to carry out the orders of the Ukrainian President and Ministry of Defense.

The state flag of Independent Ukraine flutters over the territory of the Spetsnaz servicemen's quarters.

Ukraine Adopts Law on Military Pensions

92UM0923A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
18 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Kaushanskiy: "A Long-Awaited Law: The Law on Pensions"]

[Text] Of the voluminous package of legislative acts dealing with military issues passed by the Ukraine parliament, the law on pensions for military personnel is probably one awaited the most. The latter in its first reading brought forth an avalanche of deputies' questions in the Supreme Council, since it involves the interests of combat veterans, pensioners of the former Soviet Army, men presently in the service of the Ukraine Armed Forces, internal affairs workers, "Afghans," and persons who were involved in cleanup operations after the Chernobyl accident. In accordance with the law, which was passed at the parliamentary session recently held in Kiev, commissioned personnel are to receive a pension in the amount of 50 percent for 20 years of service, plus 3 percent for each year served beyond 20 years, with the total not to exceed 70 percent. The additional amount, designated also for participants of the Great Patriotic War, will henceforth cost the Ukraine 221 rubles. This particular amount will rise with increase in the minimum age-related pension in a market environment. This supplementary amount is also to be paid to former servicemen disabled in line of duty. The law allows for substantial percentage changes in disability pensions for war veterans.

Provision is made for an annual increase in pension payments on the basis of indexing of family income. This increase as specified in the document must constitute at least 2 percent of the minimum age-related pension.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Law on Status of Azerbaijani Armed Forces

Text of Law

925D0266A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
20 Feb 92 pp 2-3

[Text of "Azerbaijani Republic Law on the Status of Military Personnel," signed by A. Mutalibov, president of the Azerbaijani Republic, in Baku on 25 December 1991]

[Text]

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 1. The Legal Status of Military Personnel

1. The mission of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, defined by the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic," and the conditions and nature of military service determine the status of military personnel, which includes the rights, duties, guarantees of their implementation, and the responsibility established by the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic and other legislative documents of the Azerbaijani Republic.

2. Military personnel enjoy the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic, with additions and restrictions dictated by the special features of military

service and set forth in this Law and other legislation of the Azerbaijani Republic. Military personnel perform all the duties of citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic, as well as the duties determined by their status.

3. No person has the right to deprive servicemen and members of their families of any rights and freedoms or to restrict them in the rights stipulated by the Constitution and laws of the Azerbaijani Republic for citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic unless this is in conformity with the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Limitation of a serviceman's citizenship rights, as well as the granting of additional rights and assignment of additional duties dictated by the special features of military service, are determined by the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic," the current Law, and other legislation of the Azerbaijani Republic and regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

4. The responsibility of military personnel is set forth in legislation of the Azerbaijani Republic and takes into account the special features of the status of servicemen.

ARTICLE 2. Individuals Who Have the Status of Military Personnel

1. In conformity with this Law, citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic and citizens of other states who are performing military service in the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, in the border troops of the Azerbaijani Republic, and in other military units established in conformity with laws of the Azerbaijani Republic, as well as those in military reserve training, have the status of military personnel.

2. Servicemen include: officer personnel, military personnel in extended service, students in military educational institutions, sergeants, ranking noncommissioned officers, and soldiers and sailors who have been inducted.

3. The status of military personnel is not extended to persons who are performing alternative service (labor conscription) in state labor detachments or humanitarian and municipal services in conformity with the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic."

4. The status of servicemen is retained for the entire period that they are held prisoner, as well as when they are interned in neutral countries, if they have not violated the military oath of allegiance or committed crimes specified by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 3. Acquiring and Losing the Status of Military Personnel

Citizens acquire the status of military personnel on the day they are inducted into the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic or enter the service as a volunteer or under contract, called up for training, or enter military educational institutions, and they lose this status

upon their discharge from the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, beginning on the day they are removed from the rosters of a military unit, dismissed or expelled from military educational institutions, or complete reserve training in the procedure set forth in laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 4. Performance of Military Service by Servicemen

1. The substance and extent of the rights, duties, and responsibility of military personnel depend on whether or not they exist when the duties of military service are performed.

2. Military personnel are performing the duties of military service in all cases when they are actually being carried out, including when they are taking part in combat operations, engaged in exercises, on combat alert (combat duty), on daily or garrison details, in reserve training, on detached duty, when on their way to or from their place of work, and in other cases. When necessary, a serviceman must carry out his duties at any time and at any place when ordered by his commander (superior) or at his own initiative.

3. Military personnel are representatives of the authorities when they are performing the duties of military service related to the powers of authority over citizens which they have been granted in accordance with laws of the Azerbaijani Republic. Disobedience to them and encroachment upon them under these conditions entails liability in conformity with laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 5. Legislation on the Status of Military Personnel

Legislation on the status of servicemen in the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic consists of the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic," the current law, and other laws of the Azerbaijani Republic which set forth the duties and responsibility of military personnel, based on the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic and taking into account the international and legal obligations of the Azerbaijani Republic.

CHAPTER 2. THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

ARTICLE 6. Political Rights and Freedoms

1. In conformity with the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic, military personnel who are citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic have the right to elect and be elected to state elective organs of the Azerbaijani Republic and to take part in national discussions and voting (referendums).

Servicemen who have expressed the desire to be a candidate in elections for the appropriate state organs of the Azerbaijani Republic are to inform their immediate commander (superior) of this.

2. Military personnel are guided in their official activity by requirements of the Constitution and other laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and may not become members of political parties and mass public movements which pursue political objectives.

3. Military personnel are guaranteed freedom of speech and the press, as well as freedom of their convictions and freedom to express them if state and military secrets are not divulged.

ARTICLE 7. Freedom of Conscience

1. Military personnel are guaranteed freedom of religious persuasion.

2. Military personnel are not relieved of responsibility for performing their military duties by their religious persuasions.

ARTICLE 8. Personal Immunity

Military personnel are guaranteed personal immunity.

A serviceman may be arrested on the basis of a sanction issued by the public prosecutor or the verdict of a court, and he may be arrested by the commander (superior officer) of a military unit in a disciplinary procedure and confined in a guardhouse (ship's brig) in conformity with requirements of regulations of the Azerbaijani Republic Armed Forces.

ARTICLE 9. The Right to Work

1. The time spent in actual military service and service under contract is counted toward the length of citizens' labor service.

Time spent by servicemen in military service under special conditions is counted toward the length of labor service under preferential conditions in the procedure established by the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic."

The use of military personnel during their period of military service for work and the performance of duties not provided for by military service is authorized in a procedure stipulated by the President of the Azerbaijani Republic.

2. Military personnel are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, artistic, and other creativity unless this is detrimental to their performance of the duties of military service.

3. In individual cases, military personnel (except inductees) may be authorized in a personnel procedure by the commander of a military unit (the individual in charge of a military institution or organization) to combine his duties with work at state and public enterprises and in institutions and organizations associated with scientific, instructional, inventive, and consultative activity.

4. When servicemen are discharged from military service, they are guaranteed placement in a job which takes into account education they have received and their specialization.

Heads of local executive organs must ensure that servicemen who have been discharged are placed in jobs which take their specialization into account no later than a month from the day of application. If servicemen who do not have the right to a pension are not placed in a job within a month of their discharge from military service, they are paid a monthly allowance from the budget of the local authorities concerned in the amount and procedure stipulated by the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On employment in the Azerbaijani Republic." The head of the local executive authority has the responsibility to provide for priority assignment of employees from the ranks of officer personnel and those in extended military service who have been discharged to educational institutions for training, retraining, and skill improvement.

5. In order to provide vocational training for servicemen subject to discharge to work in the national economy, instruction is to be organized to train these persons in civilian specializations in military units and institutions, where this is possible, or at the appropriate state enterprises, or in institutions and organizations of the region concerned, during time not used in the performance of military service duties.

6. In order to provide financial assistance and everyday services to military personnel who have been discharged, a fund for their social protection may be established by the local executive authorities with money voluntarily contributed by enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens.

7. Individuals who worked before their callup for military service retain their right to return to work at the same enterprise, institution, or organization in their former job or an equivalent position.

ARTICLE 10. The Right to Monetary and Material Support

1. The Azerbaijani Republic is establishing the material and other conditions which military personnel need to perform their duties in military service, taking into account their special nature and their priority over other forms of state service.

2. Military personnel have the right to receive monetary allowances from the state, depending on the conditions of military service, their skills, military vocation, military rank, and length of military service. At the same time, the minimum rate of pay for positions held by officer personnel and personnel in extended military service may not be lower than the average wages of state employees in the Azerbaijani Republic.

When the salaries of state employees are raised and the cost of living index is changed, the norms of monetary allowances for military personnel are increased as well.

The procedure for providing allowances for military personnel and the change in norms for these allowances are established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

3. Servicemen who have incomes for each family member which are lower than the subsistence minimum established in the Azerbaijani Republic are paid monetary allowances in the procedure and amounts established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

4. Servicemen and members of their families enjoy preferential taxes and fees in conformity with laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

5. Military personnel receive food and clothing from the state in accordance with the norms established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, and they have the right to monetary compensation for food and clothing. When the cost of living index in the Azerbaijani Republic is changed, the norms for monetary compensation are revised by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

6. Military personnel and members of their families have the right to privileges in rail, air, maritime, and motor vehicle transportation. At the same time, military personnel in extended service may use all forms of transportation (except taxis) free of charge.

ARTICLE 11. The Right to Rest

1. The right of military personnel to rest is ensured by on-duty time limited to no more than 41 hours per week, weekly rest days, holidays, annual leave and other paid leave (except for inductees), as well as daily rest and food breaks.

The duration and distribution of on-duty time are determined by the daily routine of the military unit and regulation of the on-duty time of officers and military personnel in extended service in conformity with requirements to provide for the combat readiness of the military unit (subunit).

The length of the on-duty week is set at:

—6 days and one day off for inductees and students at military educational institutions; and

—5 days and 2 days off for officers and military personnel in extended service.

Exercises, ship cruises, field firing, and other measures associated with combat and mobilization preparedness are to be conducted in accordance with the command's plans without limiting the duration of on-duty time.

Officers are granted 45 days of regular leave per year, military personnel in extended service are granted 30 days, and soldiers and sergeants are given 10 days, not counting the time taken to get to the leave address and return.

Short compassionate leaves of 10 days are granted to all military personnel, as well as to inductees as an incentive. At their request, officer personnel are granted regular leave of 3 months in one of the last 3 years of their service before being discharged and transferred to the reserves or retired because of age in order to deal with matters related to their discharge from military service.

2. Inductees have the right to be discharged from a military unit's location. The length of time and procedure for a discharge are established by military regulations.

ARTICLE 12. The Right to be Provided With Housing

1. Military personnel (except for inductees) and family members living with them are provided with official housing which meets the standards set by Azerbaijani Republic laws no later than 3 months after a serviceman's arrival at his duty station. Official housing is assigned with funds from the Azerbaijani Republic Ministry of Defense, other ministries and departments, and the heads of local executive authorities. Until they receive official housing, military personnel and members of their families are registered for the duty station (the address of the military unit as a temporary residence), and they are given monetary compensation to rent (sublet) temporary housing as established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

Students in military higher educational institutions who have families are quartered in family dormitories; in the event that there are no such dormitories, they are given monetary compensation to rent (sublet) temporary housing as established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

2. Officer personnel and servicemen in extended service who are discharged and transferred to the reserves or retired because of age, illness, personnel reductions, or family considerations are provided with housing first of all by the heads of local executive authority, but no later than 6 months from the date of arrival at the place of residence chosen, taking the existing registration procedure into account. At the same time, housing is provided for military personnel in extended service in the procedure cited if they have served for 15 calendar years or more, and housing is provided for them if they have served no less than 5 calendar years when they are discharged because of personnel reductions in the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic. For this purpose, 3 years before servicemen are discharged because of age, they are included, upon application by the command, in the lists of those who need housing by heads of the local executive authority for the place of residence chosen. Heads of the local executive authority notify the command within 3 months of arrangements for these servicemen to receive housing.

Personnel discharged for transfer to the reserves or for retirement are compensated by the heads of local executive authority, in the procedure established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers, for the rental

of temporary housing after 3 months of their arrival at the place of residence chosen and before they receive housing.

Servicemen who were disabled in the performance of their military duties and who were discharged because of this are provided with housing out of turn at the place of residence chosen.

3. Officer personnel with the rank of "colonel" or its equivalent or higher, both on active duty and discharged for transfer to the reserve or for retirement, and military personnel who hold academic degrees are provided with additional living space as established by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

4. Officer personnel and personnel in extended service on active duty, as well as officers discharged for transfer to the reserves or for retirement because of age, health, reduction of personnel, or family considerations and who have 15 calendar years of service or more are paid for the housing which they and their family members occupy and for public services with a reduction of 50 percent.

5. Military personnel (except inductees) have the right to join house-building (housing) cooperatives and to purchase and build individual houses on preferential terms, regardless of the length of military service at a given settlement.

Financial assistance is provided at their duty station free of charge to military personnel who have joined house-building (housing) cooperatives or who are building (buying) a separate house and do not have another permanent dwelling so that they can pay off the debts incurred for housing or to repay bank credit received to build a separate house: at the rate of 50 percent for those who have continuous irreproachable service for 15 calendar years or more and 100 percent for those with 20 calendar years of service or more.

The procedure and rules for providing financial assistance free of charge to pay off the debt for cooperative housing or Gosbank credits are extended to the military personnel cited in this paragraph who have been discharged and transferred to the reserves or retired and who are members of house-building (housing) cooperatives) and individual builders.

Military personnel who have 15 calendar years of service or more are given the right to join house-building (housing) cooperatives in those localities where they are living after being discharged and transferred to the reserves or retired (if the localities are in the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic).

Local soviets of people's deputies and the heads of local executive authority must allocate plots of land and provide assistance in building and obtaining construction materials to officer personnel and servicemen in extended service who have expressed the desire to take

part in individual housing construction or to purchase houses, including in a rural locality.

6. Military personnel (except inductees) who have been discharged and transferred to the reserves or retired because of age, health, personnel reduction, or family considerations and who have 20 calendar years of service or more are relieved of the obligation to pay a land tax and rent for the land.

7. For officer personnel discharged and transferred to the reserves or retired because of age, health, personnel reduction, or family considerations and who have 15 years of service or more, no less than 3 calendar years of which were in the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, the state quarters they occupy or have been given at the place of residence chosen are transferred to their personal ownership without charge.

8. For military personnel serving under contract for up to 3 years and members of their families, the housing which they occupied before being assigned to military service from the reserves is retained. These servicemen may not be excluded from the lists to receive housing during the period of their military service.

9. Servicemen who are inductees, except for sailors and senior noncommissioned officers serving aboard ship, are quartered in barracks in conformity with regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

For servicemen who are inducted, the housing which they occupied before being called up for military service is retained, and they may not be removed from the lists to receive housing. The families of inductees pay 50 percent less for the living quarters which they occupy.

10. In the event that the rights to housing stipulated by this article are violated, military personnel, persons discharged from military service and transferred to the reserves or retired, and members of their families have the right to appeal to the court to bring action against the head of the local executive authority concerned, the organs of military administration, or any state organ to meet their legal rights and be compensated for damages.

ARTICLE 13. The Right to Health Protection and Compensation for Harm to Health

1. Military personnel have the right to medical treatment through public health, epidemiological, and therapeutic-preventive measures, continuous health examination, and all forms of medical attention in medical subunits, units, and institutions, and to receive medicines without charge.

Inpatient or outpatient medical examination is a compulsory requirement for military personnel.

2. When there are no military medical institutions where military personnel are serving, as well as when it is necessary to provide emergency medical treatment, this

treatment is provided in civilian public health institutions, regardless of their departmental affiliation, free of charge.

3. Medical treatment is provided for the families of military personnel without special preference over other citizens. When it is impossible to obtain medical attention in civilian public health institutions, they are provided with all forms of medical assistance by military medical institutions equally with military personnel.

4. Military personnel and members of their families (except the families of inductees) have the right to health resort treatment in sanatoriums and rest homes and to obtain vouchers for rest at boarding houses and tourist centers with preferential terms to pay for the vouchers.

5. The right to medical attention in military medical institutions, health resort treatment, and rest is retained for senior and higher-ranking officers who have been discharged and transferred to the reserve or retired because of age, health, personnel reduction, or family considerations and who have served for 20 years or more; for other officers with the same length of service who have been discharged because of illness; for members of their families (wife and children below age 16); and for the wives of senior and higher-ranking officers who have died and pensioners who are receiving a pension because of the loss of a breadwinner.

6. In the event that performance of their official duties has been harmful to their health, military personnel have the right to be compensated in the procedure and under the conditions stipulated by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 14. The Right to Education

1. Military personnel have the right to enter military educational institutions and skill improvement courses and to be taught in these institutions and courses.

2. Officer personnel and military personnel in extended service have the right to receive evening and correspondence instruction at civilian educational institutions.

3. Inductees are authorized to attend evening general education schools at the location where they are performing their military service.

4. Military personnel discharged with a favorable reference from their military service enjoy the right to preferential enrollment in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions and admission to the preparatory section of higher educational institutions.

ARTICLE 15. The Right to a Pension

1. The right of military personnel and their families to a pension after discharge is guaranteed by the state and established by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

2. Pensions for servicemen are paid with allotments assigned for this purpose from the state budget of the

Azerbaijani Republic. Pensions are provided for servicemen in the amount and procedure established by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic, regardless of the location of their residence after discharge from the armed forces.

ARTICLE 16. The Right to Hold a Military Rank and the Right to Receive a Commendation

1. A serviceman has the right to receive the next military rank in good time, taking into account his training, the service he is performing, and the position that he holds, in conformity with the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic." Military personnel who have demonstrated high moral and combat qualities in performing their military service duties in an exemplary manner may be awarded a rank higher than that stipulated for the position held by the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic" or a grade higher than the rank held.

2. For diligence and excellence in service, military personnel have the right to a commendation, and for courage and valor demonstrated in the performance of their military duty and exemplary fulfillment of the obligations of military service, they may be awarded decorations of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 17. The Right to Change the Place of Service

Military personnel have the right to change their place of service because of their health or the health of their family members, or for compassionate reasons, and to complete a period of service established by the Azerbaijani Republic Ministry of Defense in localities with special conditions.

ARTICLE 18. The Right of Military Personnel to a Discharge From Military Service

1. Military personnel who have completed the period of service established by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic or stipulated by a contract, as well as those who have reached the age limit for military service or are considered unfit for military service in peacetime, have the right to be discharged and transferred to the reserve or retired.

Officer personnel and personnel in extended service may be discharged at their request before expiration of their period of military service for family considerations; in addition, officers may be discharged at their request after 5 years of service as an officer.

2. Military personnel have the right to be discharged from military service at the locality where they had a continuous residence before being called up or joining military service, or they have the right to choose any other locality in the Azerbaijani Republic for their residence (except the city of Baku), taking the existing procedure for registration into account.

ARTICLE 19. The Right to Bear, Keep and Use Arms

Military personnel have the right to bear, keep, and use authorized (personal) weapons in the performance of their military duties and in off-duty hours in the procedure stipulated by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 20. The Right to Receive Allowances and Other Benefits

1. Military personnel and members of their families may be paid monetary allowances in the amounts and procedure stipulated by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

2. Inductees have the right to send letters from their military unit free of postage. Letters and parcels addressed by inductees to the place where their military service is performed are mailed free of postage. The personal clothing of citizens called up for military service is mailed in parcels free of postage.

ARTICLE 21. The Right of the Families of Military Personnel to Social Protection

1. The following guarantees are established for members of the families of officers and personnel in extended service to ensure that their rights are upheld in matters of labor relationships and social security:

- a) the preferential right to be accepted for work and to remain at a job when there is a manpower or staff reduction. The heads of local executive authority; the managers of state enterprises, institutions, and organizations; garrison commanders; and the commanders of military units must take steps to place the wives of servicemen in jobs no later than 1 month after their request is made;
- b) priority in admission to educational institutions for training, retraining, and skill improvement, with discontinuation of work and payment of the average monthly wage for the position they are training for during the period of instruction;
- c) at the request of the military command, organization of small enterprises, branches, shops, and sections (production facilities) in towns, villages, and settlements in rural areas where military units are stationed and there is no opportunity for job placement by the heads of local executive authority, ministries and departments, and state enterprises, institutions, and organizations;
- d) an annual vacation for the wives of servicemen (at their request) when their husbands are granted leave;
- e) payment of allowances in the amount of their earnings to the wives of servicemen for temporary inability to work, regardless of their length of service;
- f) payment of allowances in the amount of their average monthly earnings to the wives (husbands) of military personnel when a labor agreement with them is canceled when a husband (wife) is transferred to duty in another locality;

- g) assignment of the wives (husbands) of military personnel who have completed higher and secondary specialized educational institutions to work in the locality where the husband (wife) is serving, and the right to seek job placement independently when this is not possible or when they so choose;
- h) inclusion in the total length of service needed to receive an old-age pension of the entire period that a wife lives with her husband in localities where there is no opportunity for job placement in her specialty, but no longer than 15 years; and
- i) payment of a monetary allowance to the unemployed wives of military personnel in the amount of the minimum wage established for workers and employees in the Azerbaijani Republic in the event that there is no opportunity for job placement in the locality where the husband is serving.

2. The heads of local executive authority are to provide financial assistance to the families of inducted servicemen which have incomes for each family member which are below the established subsistence minimum in the amount and procedure set by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Cancellation of a work agreement with an inducted serviceman's wife at the administration's initiative is not permitted, except for systematic violation of labor laws.

When an enterprise, institution, or organization is abolished, the wives of inducted servicemen should be placed in jobs by the heads of local executive authority no later than 2 weeks after the enterprise, institution, or organization is abolished.

3. A monetary allowance is paid for the children of inducted servicemen and students of military educational institutions (inductees and civilian youth) in the amount and procedure established by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

4. The heads of local executive authority must arrange to put the children of servicemen in nursery schools, kindergartens, and boarding schools for the place of residence no later than 1 month after application is made, regardless of the departmental affiliation of these children's institutions. Servicemen are given compensation to keep the children in preschool institutions in the procedure and amount established by the appropriate ministries and departments to which the servicemen are subordinate.

5. In the event of the death of the serviceman or person discharged from military service, his family receives the right to the benefits it had, unless otherwise stipulated by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

6. The families of servicemen who have died (been killed) are paid allowances in the amounts established by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 22. The Right to Make Suggestions, Statements, and Complaints

1. Military personnel have the right to make suggestions and statements to state organs, public organizations and associations, and military administrative organs, as well as to make complaints in the established procedure about the illegal actions of officials, state organs, public organizations and associations, and military administrative organs, as well as citizens (including military personnel).

2. Complaints by servicemen about failure to provide an authorized allowance, about official orders (actions) by their commanders (supervisors) or other military personnel which are illegal and other problems in official military relationships are submitted, reviewed, and settled in the procedure stipulated by regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Military personnel also have the right to lodge a complaint with the court about illegal actions by officials and organs of military administration which exceed the limits of authorized relationships and infringe upon the rights and personal dignity of military personnel.

3. Obstructing the submission of a complaint and subjecting the person who makes it to punishment or persecution is prohibited. Those guilty of this are called to account in conformity with laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

A serviceman who makes a complaint which contains deliberately false information or slander is answerable in conformity with laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 23. Restriction of the Rights of Servicemen Because of Their Military Service

1. Depending on the nature and conditions of their military service and special characteristics in the performance of their official duties, military personnel are restricted in the rights established for citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic:

- a) military personnel do not have the right to strike;
- b) military personnel may not be members of trade unions;
- c) military personnel are forbidden to engage in private entrepreneurial activity or to be paid regularly for positions in cooperatives which conduct production and intermediary activity;
- d) the rest time of military personnel may be limited (on-duty time may be increased) in the procedure set forth in regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic;
- e) inducted servicemen are not authorized to attend civilian higher and secondary specialized educational institutions;
- f) military personnel are prohibited from going abroad for permanent residence; and
- g) military personnel are restricted in choosing a place of residence and in their freedom to move because of the deployment conditions of military units.

2. An inducted serviceman's leave may be reduced by the number of days spent in the guardhouse.

ARTICLE 24. General Duties

1. Aside from the duties stipulated for citizens of the Azerbaijani Republic, military personnel perform additional duties stemming from the special nature of military service.

2. In conformity with the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic," military personnel have the duty:

- to protect the interests of the Azerbaijani Republic, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence;
- to take a military oath of allegiance to the Azerbaijani Republic;
- to strictly adhere to the Constitution and other laws of the Azerbaijani Republic and to carry out the orders of commanders and supervisors without question; and
- to perform other duties stipulated by regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

3. The official duties of military personnel and the procedure for carrying out these duties are specified by regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, as well as by normative documents issued on the basis of decisions by the Azerbaijani Republic's higher organs of authority and administration.

ARTICLE 25. Special Duties

Military personnel perform special duties when they are on combat duty, in combat service, on daily detail and garrison detail, and when they are enlisted to cope with the consequences of natural disasters, as well as in other cases stipulated by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic. The nature of these duties and the procedure for carrying them out are defined by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic, regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, and other documents.

CHAPTER 3. GUARANTEES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL STATUS

ARTICLE 26. The Duty and Responsibility of State Organs, Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations, and Officials in Providing for the Status of Military Personnel

1. State organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, officials, and commanders (supervisors) of military administrative organs are to provide for the status of military personnel within the limits of their powers and responsibilities. Officials guilty of failure to perform their duties or of carrying them out improperly in providing for the rights and legal interests of military personnel are to be called to account in conformity with the law.

2. Officer personnel and military personnel in extended service who have been discharged and transferred to the reserves and who have been deprived of their military rank or demoted in rank because of illegal activities are

reinstated in their previous rank, in military service, and in a position no lower than that previously held at the previous location of their service or study in military educational institutions when decided by the court. The time from the day of a serviceman's illegal discharge to the day of reinstatement in military service, and the time illegally under arrest and serving a sentence as the result of an illegal conviction are counted in the period of military service, the length of service in a military rank, the length of service in appropriate positions, and the length of service to qualify for a pension; for inducted servicemen, the time is counted in the period of military service.

Military personnel deprived of living quarters as the result of illegal actions are returned to the living quarters they occupied previously within a month or they are provided with well-equipped housing of equal value out of turn within no more than 3 months.

3. The harm caused to military personnel as the result of illegal actions by inquiry and preliminary investigation organs, the public prosecutor's office, and the court is compensated by the Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijani Republic and other ministries and departments in the procedure specified by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

ARTICLE 27. Compulsory State Personal Insurance for Servicemen

Military personnel will have compulsory state personal insurance from the time they join (are assigned) to military service (training) in case they are killed (die), are injured (are wounded, receive contusions), or their health deteriorates during the period they are performing the duties of military service or in the event of accidents or illnesses related to their military service. The state guarantees social security for persons who lose the ability to work during military service.

The procedure and conditions for insurance and amounts of insurance payments are specified by the Azerbaijani Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

ARTICLE 28. Provision of Living Accommodations for Families of Deceased Servicemen

When necessary, the family of a serviceman killed in performing the duties of military service is given the right to receive a well-equipped apartment or improvement in living conditions through the state housing fund out of turn no later than 6 months after the date of the serviceman's death.

ARTICLE 29. Compensation to a Serviceman for Damage Caused by the Breakage, Destruction, or Loss of His Personal Property

The damage to a serviceman and his family caused by the breakage, destruction, or loss of personal property resulting from the serviceman's performance of his military duties are to be compensated in full in the procedure established by laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

**CHAPTER 4. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
MILITARY PERSONNEL**

**ARTICLE 30. Disciplinary, Administrative, and
Criminal Responsibility**

1. Military personnel bear responsibility for violating the law in conformity with legislation of the Azerbaijan Republic which is in force.

Military personnel, regardless of military rank and official position, are equal before the law.

2. Military personnel bear disciplinary responsibility in the procedure established by regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

3. For violating highway traffic rules, the rules for hunting, fishing, and protection of fish reserves, and the rules governing customs and contraband, military personnel are given administrative penalties in the form of correctional work and administrative arrest. For committing other administrative violations of the law, servicemen bear responsibility in conformity with regulations of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijani Republic.

4. Military personnel bear criminal responsibility without special preferences for committing common criminal offenses. For an offense against the established procedure for performance of military service, they bear criminal responsibility for military offenses in conformity with the laws of the Azerbaijani Republic.

**ARTICLE 31. Criminal Legal Proceedings Involving
Military Personnel**

1. Criminal cases involving military personnel are investigated by the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Azerbaijani Republic and within the jurisdiction of courts in the Azerbaijani Republic.

2. Legal proceedings in criminal cases involving military personnel are conducted in conformity with legislation on criminal law procedures of the Azerbaijani Republic.

3. Military personnel against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted may be kept under arrest in a garrison guardhouse as preventive punishment.

[Signed] A. Mutalibov, president of the Azerbaijani Republic
Baku, 25 December 1991

Decree on Implementation

925D0266B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
20 Feb 92 p 3

[Text of "Decree of the National Council of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet Implementing the Law 'On the Status of Military Personnel'" signed by E. Kafarova, chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet, in Baku on 28 December 1991]

[Text] The National Council of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet resolves:

To implement the Azerbaijani Republic Law "On the status of military personnel" beginning on 1 January 1992.

[Signed] E. Kafarova, chairman of the Azerbaijani Republic Supreme Soviet
Baku, 28 December 1991

**Georgia Plans Own Army; Armenia Concerned
With Military Parity**

92UM0939A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Senior Lieutenants V. Russu and V. Denisov, under the rubric: "From the Transcaucasus Military District": "Georgia Plans to Create Its Own Army and Armenia Plans the 'Privatization' of Arms in the Transcaucasus Military District"]

[Text] At a military department head press conference that occurred at the Republic of Georgia Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant-General L. Sharashenidze announced the creation of Georgia's own armed forces with a strength of up to 20,000 men. Conscription into the army will begin on 10 May. The term of service for Georgian armed forces servicemen will be 1.5 years. The minister noted that conscripts will perform their service only on the territory of their own republic.

Meanwhile, Armenian Minister of Defense Vazgin Sarkisyan, who arrived in Tbilisi on an unofficial visit for a meeting with Transcaucasus Military District Commander and Russian Federation Authorized Representative Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev, raised issues associated with military parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Armenian minister also requested, for the purpose of resolving the conflict, the transfer to the Armenian side of part of the arms of the Transcaucasus Military District. Valeriy Patrikeyev answered with a refusal, stating that these issues must be resolved at the inter-governmental level.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

**Uzbekistan Decree on Servicemen in Other
Republics**

92UM0876B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 March 92 p 1

["Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan: On the Recall of Conscript Servicemen Drafted from the Republic of Uzbekistan"]

[Text] As a result of the contradictory situation that has developed on the territory of the states of the former USSR in a number of places where military formations and units of the combined armed forces of the CIS are deployed, there is a need for active social and legal

protection of conscript servicemen who are citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan. This question is especially pressing in the republics that are not part of the CIS.

In a number of republics that have declared the establishment of their own national armies, an attempt is being made to nationalize and privatize not only combat equipment and arms but also personnel, forcing servicemen drafted from Uzbekistan to take the oath of allegiance to those republics. There is a serious threat to the life and safety of our citizens in those regions where intense efforts are being made to involve military units in the resolution of interethnic conflicts.

All of this does not ensure the necessary conditions of service for citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and it arouses the justified alarm of parents for their sons, which is indicated by their numerous appeals to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic.

In connection with the aforementioned, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan decrees:

1. In a month's time, recall servicemen drafted from the Republic of Uzbekistan who are performing service at the present time in military units deployed on the territory of those states that are not part of the CIS (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia), those that are establishing their own armed forces (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), and the Transcaucasus Military District and the Caspian Flotilla.

2. The Cabinet of Ministers under the president of Uzbekistan:

a) henceforth, will not send servicemen-citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan to perform service in military units of the combined armed forces of the CIS deployed in regions and states indicated in paragraph 1 of this resolution, with the exception of service on contract.

b) until the adoption of the law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "On Universal Military Service," servicemen who are recalled from military units in accordance with paragraph 1, and who have served not less than 18 months, will be discharged into the reserve.

c) compulsory-service servicemen, recalled in accordance with paragraph 1 and who are not subject to discharge into the reserve, will be assigned to replace CIS troops that are part of the Turkestan Military District, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, troops of the national security service, national guard brigades, and also, with their concurrence, to formations of alternative service detachments.

3. Representative and executive organs of authority of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, oblasts and the city of Tashkent, and the Ministry of Defense Affairs will pay maximum attention to the early discharge into the reserve of servicemen (paragraph 2b) and to undertake specific measures for their job placement and, if necessary, for their continued training.

4. Monitoring the execution of this resolution is entrusted to the committee of the Supreme Soviet on questions of state and public safety, defense, and social protection of servicemen (Comrade V.R. Niyazmatov).

5. This decree will be published in the press.

[Signed] Sh. Yuldashev, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Tashkent,
16 March 1992

Turkmen Defense Minister on Tasks, Composition of Forces

92UM0876A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 11 Mar 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General A.A. Kopekov, minister of defense of Turkmenistan, by A. Kurbanova, Turkmen PRESS correspondent; place and date not given: "The Armed Forces Are of a Defensive Nature"]

[Text] The state of Turkmenistan is taking its first steps to real independence today. One of them is the creation of its own military concept, and, in this connection, the organization of a Ministry for Defense Affairs.

A Turkmen PRESS correspondent asked Lieutenant General A.A. Kopekov, minister of defense, to talk about the main directions of activity of the new ministry.

[Kopekov] The Ministry for Defense Affairs was established as an organ to coordinate the actions of armed forces that are deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan. It is called on to maintain liaison both with the military departments of the sovereign states of the Commonwealth and with its combined armed forces. Military policy will be of a defensive nature. All military commissariats, civil defense, and the defense sports-technical society of Turkmenistan (OSTOT) have come under the jurisdiction of the ministry. The staff of the ministry itself will not exceed 200 persons,

[Kurbanova] And Border and Internal Troops?

[Kopekov] The Border Troops are subordinate to their own committee, which was established in the Commonwealth, and the Internal Troops have their own ministry. When necessary, we will coordinate our actions.

[Kurbanova] Danatar Avdyevich, when working out the agreements on military questions in Minsk the ministers of defense of the countries of the CIS initialed 13 of 14 documents, but the heads of state, only eight. You took part in the work of this meeting. Why did this happen?

[Kopekov] The work in Minsk was hard, but both the military men and the heads of state nonetheless achieved agreement on the main items. The status of the strategic forces and the higher military organs of the CIS, the legal basis for the activity of the armed forces, and social guarantees for servicemen were defined. Strict control is

now being established over the strategic forces that are deployed in Turkmenistan, and a more moderate form of centralization and control over conventional armed forces.

In addition to military questions, the presidents examined a whole package of economic agreements, and they simply did not have enough time. Military agreements concerning which it was felt that not enough work had been done on the technical aspects were postponed until the next meeting, which will be held in Kiev on 20 March.

[Kurbanova] How will the military service be financed? Many of the states are now taking under their jurisdiction general purpose armed forces deployed on their territory. Does this not signify full independence both in providing necessities to everyone and in actions?

[Kopekov] A decision was made in Minsk on a common military budget, with shared participation by every state. Fixed payments are determined on the basis of an integrated index calculated from data on produced national income and size of population. Assuming jurisdiction of armed forces, of course, signifies some kind of self-sufficiency, but it cannot be total. After all, many problems still exist; for example, technical equipment and scientific-technical support that still does not submit to resolution by individual states.

As life shows, the laws that are being adopted on jurisdiction of armed forces reflect more an attempt to divide to one's advantage that which is common and created jointly. "Pulling the blanket to one's own side" is unfortunately also occurring in the military environment. There have also been attempts to remove arms and transport from our territory, without coordination with the ministry. Such actions are being stopped. The Turkmen Military District which exists in the transition period also coordinates its actions with the ministry.

[Kurbanova] Do you still have compulsory military service?

[Kopekov] It is still maintained, and it is unambiguous.

[Kurbanova] The first ukase of your ministry was about conscripts' early discharge into the reserve. What dictated this?

[Kopekov] The necessity to open up a place of duty for young men who are returning from other states of the CIS. We are receiving a lot of letters with requests for a transfer to Turkmenistan. Where it is possible we exchange conscripts, and we ask that officers be reassigned to our command. Lists are being compiled now of these servicemen, and their organizational transfer is being prepared.

But conscripts of December 1991 will serve one year and six months, and those in the Navy—two years. Service will be one year for those with higher education. This is also in the Minsk agreement. We will send only volunteers to serve in CIS states.

[Kurbanova] It is known that many servicemen are absent without leave. How will their fate be decided?

[Kopekov] We are preparing a law that provides very stiff measures for deserters, including criminal responsibility. They are supposed to resolve all of their problems on a legal basis through the military commissariats. Their terms of service will be extended for the time of their absence.

[Kurbanova] How will military personnel be trained; after all, there are no military schools on the territory of Turkmenistan?

[Kopekov] Those who are now studying in schools will finish their training as usual. We also hope to reach an agreement with Russia on the free training of our officers in its military schools. It will be paid for in other CIS states. We plan to become familiar with military matters in Turkey, where our officers will also receive knowledge.

[Kurbanova] What functions will the national guard fulfill?

[Kopekov] In principle, this is an honor guard for ritual formations on official visits and meetings. This service will emphasize the national traditions and customs of the Turkmen people. It will have no more than 500 people.

[Kurbanova] And a question that is directly for you, Danatar Abdyevich. How do you entertain yourself in your free time? Do you have any free time?

[Kopekov] Very little. Mainly, I rest with a good book. Not long ago I read "Slaves" by Sadriiddin Ayni. I got a lot of pleasure from it. I continue my interest in geography, and I have been a subscriber to "Around the World" for more than 30 years. This has been a passion with me ever since I decided to join the geography faculty of the Chardzhou Pedagogical Institute. My first profession—geography teacher—is purely civilian. I like basketball, to watch and to play. At one time I had a first-class ranking. I try to keep an athletic figure now.

[Kurbanova] You worked for more than 30 years in state security organs, and you went from an investigative officer to chairman of the committee. Does the experience you acquired over the years help you today?

[Kopekov] Of course, and I thank fate that I made the right choice at one time. I do not lose touch with the collective of the Committee for State Security. Especially because we have a lot of questions that can only be resolved jointly.

Turkmen Decree on Military Call-Up

92UM0902A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Turkmenistan dealing with military discharge and conscription of eligible male citizens]

[Text]

**DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
TURKMENISTAN****DISCHARGE INTO THE RESERVE OF
SERVICEMEN FROM THE ARMED FORCES,
BORDER TROOPS, AND INTERNAL TROOPS
STATIONED ON TURKESSTAN SOIL UPON
COMPLETION OF THE ESTABLISHED TERM
OF COMPULSORY SERVICE, AND SCHEDULED
CONSCRIPTION OF CITIZENS OF
TURKMENISTAN FOR ACTIVE SERVICE**

In accordance with the constitutional Turkmenistan Law on Independence and Statehood Basis of Turkmenistan, I do hereby DECREE:

1. To discharge into the reserve, in April-June of 1992, from the Armed Forces, Border Troops, and Internal Troops stationed on Turkmenistan soil, those servicemen who have completed the established term of compulsory military service.
2. To issue a call for induction into compulsory military service, in April-June of 1992, of male citizens of Turkmenistan attaining the age of 18 years by the day of call-up who are not entitled to a draft deferment, and for the induction of citizens of older draft age no longer entitled to draft deferment.
3. This Decree is to take effect as of the instant of its publishing.

[Signed] President of Turkmenistan S. NIYAZOV
Ashkhabad, 27 March 1992

OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS**Formation of National Guard in Tatarstan Viewed**
*92UM0922C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Apr 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Volga-Ural Military District Press Center Chief Colonel A. Bondarenko and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel V. Gavrilenko: "'Well, We Do Understand Each Other...' Tatarstan Has Announced that It Does not Intend to Have Its Own Army. But Isn't the National Guard That Is Currently Being Created Its Prototype?"]

[Text] On a recent Russian Television "Bez retushi" [Without Retouching] broadcast, a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent posed a question to the next guest President of Tatarstan M. Shaymiyev: does the republic intend to create its own armed formations and, finally, an army? The broadcast occurred on the eve of the referendum and Mintimer Sharshyuvich [name illegible] did not doubt the success of it.

Having considered the question to be entirely natural and understandable in the situation that is developing, he nevertheless answered that Tatarstan does not have such intentions. He had to explain: several state sovereignizations have already occurred before our eyes that began with one set of slogans and ended with another. To this, the President responded that Tatarstan delegates defense issues to Russia. And he finished in the tactful manner that is inherent to him: "Well, we understand each other..."

But right now we have had to remind him about this short dialogue in the television studio. Recall and firmly establish what is not trivial and not innocuous and how it could have appeared at first glance, was the issue. And does "we understand each other" not signify the main thing—to attain sovereignty, but there everything will already settle onto the well-trodden normal path which Lithuania began to travel and which General D. Dudayev now successfully continues to follow...

So, what has compelled us to become alarmed?

JUST RECENTLY mail, addressed to Private Ramil Salakhov arrived at Nth unit that is deployed in the Urals in the city of Naberezhnyye Chelny, delivered an unusual document that is called a draft notice. This draft notice specifically states: "... The People of Tatarstan in the person of the All-Tatar Social Center and the command authorities of the newly created Tatarstan National Guard request that commanders of all units and subunits grant early the release of soldiers and officers of all ranks who were drafted from the republic. Tatarstan will take under its protection and patronage all servicemen of Tatar nationality who have voluntarily left military units and guarantee their future performance of military duty in the ranks of the newly created Tatarstan National Guard or MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

And the signatures: Naberezhnyye Chelny All-Tatar Social Center Chairman- Coordinator Z. Advatullin and Naberezhnyye Chelny Region National Guard Commander F. Gataullin.

While remembering the television broadcast with M. Shaymnev's participation and Republic Vice President V. Likhachev's repeated statements that such public statements and actions of public organizations are unconstitutional and, therefore, will be prosecuted according to the law, one would, as they say, be restricted to establishing the facts. But the fact is that such facts are increasing with every passing day. And putting it more precisely, the scale of the distribution of these same types of appeals, statements, and calls are rapidly increasing in recent times. As a rule, they are addressed to Volga-Ural Military District servicemen and now also to Tatarstan conscripts.

Obviously, having sensed this total impunity, the All-Tatar Social Center [VOTs] shifted from words to action. Reserve Colonel Z. Zaynullin, former chairman of the social sciences department of Riga Higher Military Political School, is at the source of VOTs. Reserve

Lieutenant Colonel K. Shaykhutdinov directly guides this. With the support of the Ittifak and Azatlyk parties, a list of volunteers for the Tatarstan National Guard that totals more than 600 men has been announced. The list is continuing right now in the cities of Naberezhnyye Chelny, Alnetyevsk, and Nizhnekamsk. The self-styled founders of their army are attempting to enlist into the national guard servicemen of Tatar nationality who have left their units and who have arrived in the republic. The number of deserters already totals more than 150 men. Furthermore, there are nearly 800 conscripts in the republic who have expressed their unwillingness to serve in the Russian Armed Forces.

At the same time, training of national guard members has begun in eastern single combat sections for now. Assembly training is being carried out under the leadership of reserve officers.

The Volga-Ural Military District command authorities hear this optimistic answer from the leadership of Tatarstan in response to their very well-founded concern with regard to this development of events: "The situation is under control." But something else that is familiar is also heard in this sentence: "We understand each other..." We think there is also something else: But have the republic authorities not changed this sentence of many meanings when they announce their control over the situation and those people who are creating this situation?

ARMS TRADE

Excess Tanks, Aircraft May Be Sold

92UM0846A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by K. Belyaninov: "The Armor Is Strong and the Tanks Are Being Rapidly Unloaded"]

[Text] The Russian parliament has finally resolved the problem of several tens of thousands of tanks that have been left in the middle of the broad and mostly snow-covered Siberian expanses. The Law on Conversion of the Defense Industry gives enterprises "the right to export raw materials, materials and equipment in the event it is impossible to utilize them for the production of civilian products."

However, in the words of Russian Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Conversion Chairman Vitaliy Vitebskiy, no one intends to open the sale of nuclear weapons components although the lawmakers also do not exclude cases of ordinary theft. These same tanks and aircraft will be sold just like before and really the primary portion of the profit will be transferred to the manufacturers themselves. And although there are enough offers from foreign firms for now, Vitaliy Vitebskiy is not certain that arms exports will yield a considerable profit.

Prices are simply falling catastrophically due to the sale of excess arms by CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and Eastern European countries.

Potential Loss if Finland Chooses Mirage over MIG

92UM0906A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 92
Morning Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent Marat Zubko, Helsinki: "Russia Will Lose Two Billion if Finland Purchases Mirages Instead of MIGs"]

[Text] Finland's charming Defense Minister Elizabeth Rehn is carefully studying the issue of the purchase of a shipment of the newest fighter aircraft for the country's air forces.

Finnish authorities have set two essential conditions for the future deliveries. First of all, the Finnish side will pay for the entire shipment of fighter aircraft with return deliveries of its own goods. Secondly, the Finns are stipulating the right for themselves to demand that the exports make appropriate technical improvements to the combat aircraft, if necessary.

These provisos have not had any impact on the aspirations of the leading arms exporting states to obtain the enormous Finnish contract. Among the real competitors for the deliveries are the manufacturers of the American Phantoms, French Mirages, the quite new Swedish JAS, who are replacing the famous Viggens, and also the Soviet MIG-29s.

The Finnish military have become very painstakingly familiar with the combat aircraft. They have also visited our country to examine the MIGs. But, if you judge by the local press, the Finnish Ministry of Defense's interest in Russia has clearly begun to weaken of late.

People in the know assert that the matter here is not so much the technical specifications of the MIGs themselves as much as the inadequate aggressiveness of the Russian side which has, as far as I know, not responded in earnest to the Finnish terms. And that is too bad! The two billion dollar contract would be very apropos for us right now.

German Interest in Buying MIG-29's Viewed

92UM0907A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 9

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Correspondent Valentin Zapevalov, Bonn: "'MIG-29'—in the Air, 'EGER-90'—in the Building Docks: How Will This 'Aircraft Odyssey' End?"]

[Text] Agents of Messerschmidt—Belkov Blom (MBB) and Deutsche Aerospace have begun to visit Bonn frequently. As it has become clear, the EGER-90 fighter aircraft—the brainchild of the German military-industrial complex, has turned out to be in jeopardy. This largest military project in the entire history of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] is being realized jointly with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain.

Today there is a political and military thaw outside. Yesterday's enemies have become partners. Disarmament, and quite thorough disarmament, is on the agenda. And the question has been raised: Does the West need an armada of 600 fighter aircraft?! Furthermore, the Social-Democrats, the opposition in Bonn, most frequently pose this question.

But here's the other side of the coin: FRG military experts have discovered an alternative to the future European super aircraft. We are talking about Soviet MIG-29 fighter aircraft. In contrast to the EGER-90 which has not yet even managed to take off into the air for test flights, the MIG's are already in the Bundeswehr inventory—Germany obtained a total of 24 of the latest aircraft after the unification of the country and the merger of the two German armies. The Luftwaffe aces who have tested them are in ecstasy: they are light, highly maneuverable, all-weather aircraft. It is true that the electronics are poor but one can correct that, think ministry of defense experts. The main thing is that the MIG-29 is substantially cheaper than its western competitor. And, as SDPG [German Social Democratic Party] Bundestag Deputy and Former Bundeswehr General Manfred Opel explained, the Russians are ready for a "Geschäft" [deal] with Bonn. There allegedly is the possibility of purchasing 200 such aircraft with spare parts. In so doing, in Opel's words, they can get 50 aircraft immediately and the rest at the end of this year. The total amount of the deal is 4 billion marks, that is 20

million marks each. (For information: Deutsche Aerospace and MBB are demanding 150 million marks for each EGER-90 and this sum will increase to 220 million with the total combat filling).

It is hard to say how the "aircraft odyssey" will end. But something else is interesting: either we have agreed to sell high-class goods at dumping prices and, therefore, we have tons of hard currency? Or did Deputy Opel dream up all of this?

FROM THE EDITOR: The CIS Allied Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's Directorate refused to comment on the information about the sale of MIG-29 aircraft at the commercial center.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

Solovev NPO Workers Found 'Permavia'

92UM0856B Moscow DELOVYYE LYUDI in Russian
No 1 (19), Jan 92 pp 19-21

Article by Grigoriy Volchek under the rubric "The Company's Visiting Card": "Permavia": Stocks—New Weapon of the Defense Industry"]

[Text] The selling of stocks in enterprises to private individuals not employed by the A/O [joint-stock company] is still a rarity in the developing state sector of the Soviet economy. Particularly in the defense complex. There are exceptions even here, however. The joint-stock company Permavia is an example.

The joint-stock company Permavia was founded by 120 private individuals, workers at the NPO [scientific production association] Aviadvigatel of the former engine design office known in the West as the "Solovyev Firm." The NPO develops aviation engines for various types of aircraft, including combat fighters. The founders acquired 14,500 preferred shares and decided to issue more than 80,000 common shares at 250 rubles each, for a total of more than 20 million rubles. Registration for shares is being carried out in three stages, up to April 1992. By November 1991 more than half of the declared statutory assets had been collected, but the market value of the Permavia shares had grown 4-fold from the 250-ruble face value. According to assertions by Yuriy Gantman, director of the Sigma-2 firm and exclusive agent for Permavia stocks, the market value of the stocks will reach five times their face value by January-February 1992, will sell for even more from private individuals and in the stock markets.

Permavia is also incurring a bonded debt totaling 5 million rubles. The bonds are also selling for considerably more than their face value. The entire difference between the face value and the current price of the Permavia stocks goes into a reserve fund, which already considerably exceeds the statutory amount. The money is put into circulation. Among other things, it is loaned out at commercial interest rates to individuals (so-called

"credit-trust operations"). There is a generously financed advertising campaign (costing in the millions of rubles, the specialists believe). It is possible that Permavia's advertising during the first quarter of 1992 has approached that of the Menatep Interbank Association, the Alisa Exchange and the MMM Corporation, which have made the most noise.

An Old American Trick

The common Permavia shares paid dividends of 15% in 1991 and promise at least 25% in 1992 and 35% in 1993. Dividends are paid quarterly. The president of Permavia, 40-year-old Valeriy Tsatiashvili believes that the actual amounts of the dividends paid will be even greater. "We have exceeded the original expectations in all aspects of our operation. The same thing will most likely occur with the dividends," he said.

Permavia's managers believe that many shareholders are drawn by the opportunity to invest money in an enterprise producing real products and rendering real services. This psychological factor is extremely significant given the shortages which have enveloped the nation. Prices for goods and services, as we know, are increasing at rates corresponding to inflation and devaluation of the ruble. The people at Permavia say that as of now there has not been a single recorded case of A/O shares being returned to Permavia.

The amount of shares sold to "a single entity," according to the A/O charter, is not to exceed 5% of the statutory fund. "This is an old American trick," says Valeriy Tsatiashvili, who studied for three months at the Main Business School at Oklahoma State University (Tulsa, Oklahoma). "Extensive Western business experience has shown that 10 people can never reach an ultimate agreement among themselves. This means that a controlling block of shares—50% (5 multiplied by 10)—will never be controlled by any pool undesirable to us."

Every investor receives from the A/O a special issue prospectus, a 40-page booklet containing a message from the president, information on the issue body, excerpts from Permavia documents, diagrams, drawings, tables, graphs and a description of the company's future prospects. Any rank-and-file investor can learn, for example, that by the end of 1993 Permavia plans to control 43.5 million rubles of its own capital and 5 million in loans; its production volume will exceed 36 million and net profits will reach 16 million rubles (plus 2.7 million U.S. dollars), for a profitability level of 70% and a capital-return rate of 2.8 rubles per ruble of capital.

First the Soviet Market, Then the Western Market

The plans for the A/O include four main types of activity: repair of aircraft engines at its own production base, charter transport operations using its own and leased aircraft, the production of motor vehicle, ship and aircraft versions of rotary engines based on the Vazov prototype, and the production of metal furniture.

According to Tsatiashvili, it is planned for around 10% of the repair work to be in the form of Western orders. The percentage is to be approximately the same for air transport operations. With respect to the rotary engines (RPD), Permavia is negotiating on the matter with Switzerland, Sweden, the FRG and England.

Tsatiashvili is also convinced that Permavia's metal furniture has a chance in the saturated Western market. "Look at this," he says, leafing through a Dutch furniture catalog. A basic office chair costs 150, 200, 300, even 700 dollars. The technology and the materials are no problem for us. We can produce tens of thousands of chairs. Most important, however, is the fact that Permavia is prepared to sell them far more cheaply than foreign companies. The initial organizing period at the A/O is over.

Permavia is shaping its own program, selecting the personnel, and procuring the spare parts, raw and processed materials. The first scheduled engine repairs were performed in 1991 by integral teams (under the payment-for-the-job system) in Dvigatel Scientific Production Association premises on the D-30 class of engines designed by Pavel Solovyev. In 1992 the number of engines repaired will reach double-digit figures and should bring in more than 3 million rubles in profits.

In response to numerous requests from the workers, Permavia has promised to provide Perm with satellite television, to enable Perm residents to view more than 20 television channels from various nations of the world at minimal cost through the MTSAT system. Permavia also promises to dress Perm residents better, launching the production of leather and fur clothing for this purpose.

Will It Be "Chase the Leader?"

Permavia's example proved tempting for many Perm enterprises in the state sector, particularly the defense industry. The industrial giants have produced "for war" for many decades but have recently experienced torpidity and convulsions generated by the relentless, frequently chaotic conversion. Several of the city fathers have already asked Tsatiashvili for Permavia's package of founding and technical organizational documents. Many enterprises are offering to cooperate with Permavia. The Krasnokamsk Machinery Plant is allocating space to the A/O—more precisely, unfinished production buildings. The NPO imeni Kirov, which produces powder, explosives and missile fuel, is also prepared to make premises available. A machine-building design office which is a part of the Iskra NPO is also entering into cooperation with Permavia. Cooperation with the A/O could be the final hope for Iskra because the branch's boss, the once all-powerful Ministry of General Machine Building, abandoned the NPO for 1992 without suppliers, without a clear plan, a production program or sources of financing.

The giant BELTA Production Association (the former Association imeni October Revolution) is also being drawn into cooperation with Permavia. BELTA belongs to the Ministry of the Defense Industry and produces, in

addition to bicycles and running gear for passenger cars, an enormous amount of ammunition, the need for which has dropped drastically. The development and manufacture by Belta, together with Permavia and another defense enterprise, the Aggregate Association imeni Kalinin, of various types of sets of metal furniture for offices, homes, hotels, kindergartens and dachas, therefore offers a good chance for conversion (and therefore, for survival in the market situation).

A program for the production of plastic boats, in case it is successfully launched, will require an even greater degree of cooperation of the Perm defense industry. Permavia intends to involve practically all of the city's largest enterprises in the production of this high-technology product: the Motorostroitel, Iskra and Morion associations, the branch of the Central Institute of Materials Science, the NPO imeni Kirov, the aggregate design office, the Kama Ship-Building Plant and a large number of other organizations. The idea is also supported by the city management, which worked out the Tekhnopark program providing for accelerated growth of high-technology, scientific-intensive industry in Perm. Negotiations are presently underway with one Swiss company for the purchase of operational models of the boat. These "toys" also cost from 10,000 to 100,000 U.S. dollars or more in the West. The equivalent in rubles has not yet been determined, because these boats have never been produced or procured in the Union.

Polet Association's Experience With Conversion

92UM0820A Moscow VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT
in Russian No 12, Mar 92 p 4

[Article by R. Ziangirova: "'Polet' Not Dreams, But Reality"]

[Text] A year ago VT [VOZDUSHNYY TRANSPORT] wrote about the process of conversion taking place at the Omsk aerospace concern "Polet," one of the largest enterprises of the military-industrial complex in the Siberian region. At that time the paper reported about the possibility of producing at "Polet" a small liner for commercial aviation, the An-74. It also told about the problems arising for Siberian aircraft manufacturers in connection with the possible reformation of the industry. A year has passed and today "Polet" is working on a multitude of other problems, which have originated from the process of conversion.

Certainly, one may already say unequivocally that economists and politicians have turned out to be incompetent in matters of conversion. For what was initially thought to be constructive, has in the end proven destructive. Judge for yourselves: During the four to five years of conversion, many programs were written. Like economic programs, however, they were never realized due to their inherent inviability. Having dubbed the defense industries "fat cats," they cast them, so to speak, to the mercy of fate.

Under these circumstances, "Polet" was forced to independently determine its own fundamental course for development. One of the major reasons that led to taking such a serious step was the absence of business ties between enterprises in related spheres of industry. For instance, petroleum chemistry enterprises are faced with the problem of a severe shortage of spare parts and equipment. They purchase these items with hard currency, thereby financing the development of the manufacturing industry in the West at the expense of our raw materials. The defense industry could organize similar production at their own sites here if they were paid in hard currency, and proceeds could then be put toward the conversion of our machine-building industry here at home. Unfortunately, however, this is not being done. Thus, "Polet's" program for survival is exacting and intrinsically very logical:

- Design and create a low-orbit satellite communications system to facilitate telecommunications between users at any point on the globe;
- Produce the An-74 multi-purpose aircraft;
- Organize the production of "Tempol" washing machines together with France;
- Produce equipment for laying pipes and cables without trenches;
- Manufacture diesel fuel separators for ships;
- Organize an enterprise to produce medical technology;
- Organize the commercial activity of independent enterprises, with PO [the Industrial Association] "Polet" as the founder.

Conversion does not come without a price. All of these avenues, developed at the plant's initiative, will therefore require a great deal of means. Incidentally, at "Polet" it was planned that engines would be produced for sixteen "Buran" each year. There are 64 of them. The construction of a two hundred thousand square meter structure for them was begun. It is now planned that this structure will be used for An-74 aircraft in order to boost their production up to 100 a year. And "Polet" will grow. Whether it becomes a concern or a corporation is not that important, because the form of management is changing: each sub-unit will have its own director. Only general guidance will be given by the central body.

Naturally, once talk began of creating new methods of management, it became impossible to skirt the question of privatization. The general director of "Polet," Valentin Zaytsev, firmly believes that privatization of defense enterprises will proceed slowly and smoothly, and in conjunction with a meticulous property value assessment. This is because every republic participating in the space program has a need for the unique testing units and equipment that namely many of the defense enterprises have.

"Polet" in particular, is not yet being privatized. Because of a particular concern, the plant is remaining a state enterprise. It could, of course, be transferred over into the private ownership of the members of the work collective, creating a joint-stock company. A large number of problems, however, would immediately arise,

such as the obsolete fixed assets and acute need for renovation. And I doubt that once a "stockholder," a person will work twice as hard. That is a lie. For 74 years the majority has mastered a single principle: "How to live in order to get the most while giving the least." Now their welfare depends on whether the enterprise fulfills the plan or not. And the smaller the plan, the more you get.

How can this system be changed?

Everything should be contingent upon profit, and the director should be paid a certain proportion of earned profits. This will work as an incentive. I have already introduced a similar system: several directors and top specialists will not receive a fixed salary and guaranteed bonus, but a proportion of the profit received.

"Polet's" most urgent problem is the forced reduction of production volumes within the industry. In 1990, the Omsk enterprise produced 420 thousand washing machines. Now, at best, 380-390 thousand will be produced. The reason for this is quite simple: slowed deliveries. Tbilisi, Poltava, and many other cities have gone over to strictly using barter relations. In this apparently lies one of the main reasons for the disappearance of goods: everything is being bartered. Even the plant director—what business is this of his?!—busies himself with what to buy for the plant; shoes, cigarettes, suits.

In your view, Valentin Ivanovich, what will the fate of industrial giants like "Polet" be? Won't they start to fall apart under such circumstances?

I think that the manufacturing giants will be here in the future. There is, for example, "Boeing." There military and commercial goods are produced, known for being competitive and of good quality. And 120 thousand people work there, including those at assembly plant No. 60. And finally there is "Polet." This plant does not exclusively focus on military-industrial production. At "Polet" washing machines are also produced, 420 thousand a year, as well as a mass of other consumer good items.

We are involved in entrepreneurial activities. "Polet" is even producing a KOSPAS-type satellite for purely commercial purposes. Military production makes up 30-32 percent of the overall volume of production. Thus, "Polet" is a symbiosis of industries that have taken shape in response to circumstantial pressures. And it will exist for many, many years to come. An enormous task, such as creating a new airplane, is not and never has been accomplished by a small enterprise. Our problem, however, is of a totally different nature: How to entice workers and specialists to come to the plant and earn, rather than simply collect their pay.

In the case of "Polet" you can be sure of the same "minuses" that are present in the free market reform proposed by the Russian government. It is not a matter of "right or wrong," but rather a lack of mechanisms for realization. The process of disintegration taking place in

industry is continuing. The movement toward sovereignty is growing, and politics are being used as an economic weapon. All the new structures are burgeoning, demanding huge amounts of resources: national armies, customs bureaus, ministries, etc. The development of commercial structures to the detriment of material production will not yield positive results. The matter is also complicated by the intent of Russia itself to implement reforms apart from the former Union republics. For example, "Polet" receives parts orders from almost every region of the country, and feels the results of the political battle on its own "hide."

What can be done here? After all, so much effort has been focused on overcoming the situation, but not on being constructive.

We have gone our own way for a long time, and now that we are realizing that it is not leading to anything good we have set out to go the way of the majority - continued the general director of "Polet," V. Zaytsev. During the 45 years following the war, Germany transformed into a prospering state. We, on the other hand, with our blood, and later with impoverishment, rebuilt with an iron will what had been destroyed, but prosperity did and still does not threaten us. Sooner or later this system had to collapse. You cannot build a bright future with the aid of force and dictatorship, for the world is guided by entirely different laws. We are just beginning to apprehend what they are. We hope that our "apprenticeship" process is one of success.

This is what we all hope for, just as we hope that those who dream of attaining new heights, i.e. "Polet," will in reality "fly," even if only a little.

Uranium Enrichment Plant to Produce Catalytic Converters

92UM0856A Moscow RADIKAL in Russian
No 10 (67), Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Leonid Zavorskiy: "Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy Has Shifted Toward Conversion"]

[Text] At the beginning of March Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy, the Russian Electrochemical Consortium (UEKhK) and the American Engelhard Corporation announced the signing in Yekaterinburg of an agreement on the transfer of American technology and patents for the production of catalytic converters (catalysts) of motor-vehicle exhaust gases.

Under the terms of the agreement Engelhard Corporation, a world leader in the production of these converters, will assist UEKhK with the construction of Russia's first catalytic converter plant at the Yekaterinburg Electrochemical Plant, which, among other things, enriches uranium for military purposes. The corporation will also assist with the training of workers, development of the production system, the testing and technical servicing of the product. It is planned for the plant,

which will have a capacity of 2 million converters annually, to go into production in mid-1994.

According to Russia's First Deputy Minister of Nuclear Power B. Nikipelov, this agreement is essentially the first large contribution to the industry's conversion. There are problems along the path of the agreement's implementation, however.

Catalytic converters reduce harmful emissions into the atmosphere by converting nitric oxides, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons into harmless elements, but they are effective only when used with unleaded gas. It is not planned to begin producing this kind of gas in Russia before 1995, and the catalyzers will be installed primarily on vehicles for export. Fuel consumption by vehicles equipped with catalyzers will increase by 2-3%. This is a major factor, considering the acute shortage of gas, which will doubtfully be eliminated in the foreseeable future. The production of nonethyl gas will entail a major restructuring of the entire operation of the fuel and energy complex, including, among other things, the complete replacement of lead-contaminated gas lines. And although we must pay for ecology, the cost may be excessive. The equipment of motor vehicles with catalytic converters will inevitably increase their price. Enormous sums may go into the replacement of obsolete technology for producing motor-vehicle engines. At the same time, the tax system, which presently provides no incentives for using ecologically cleaner equipment, does not encourage the adoption of catalytic converters.

The need to improve ecological laws and the absence of incentives for observing them also continues to be a major problem, even if the appropriate articles are worked out. As a result the actual advantages of the agreement can benefit only a certain part of the motor vehicle industry for now, that which produces for export. The catalyzers will reduce the cost of adapting motor vehicles for the Western market by 20%.

Representatives of Russia's Ministry of Nuclear Energy and UEKhK therefore view the immediate prospects with extremely cautious optimism. The latter is counting on performing research in the field of catalytic converters and adapting not only our own technology but Western technology as well for diesel engines. The ministry expects to earn significant amounts of hard currency from the export of the finished product envisaged by the agreement.

According to unofficial information UEKhK hopes by means of its contacts with the Engelhard Corporation to penetrate the Western market with its aerospace products, of which electrochemical current-generators for Buran-class ships are an example.

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