

JPRS-UMA-92-020

3 JUNE 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

19980120 077

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

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3 June 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Transbaykal MD to Form Separate Cossack Regiment

92UM1041A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 May 92 First edition p 1

[Article by Capt A. Davidyuk under the "Direct Line" rubric: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Report from Chita: Cossacks Forming Own Regiment, Recruitment in Progress"]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported on the expectation that the RF [Russian Federation] President and Parliament will soon pass a number of laws dealing with Cossacks about to serve in the Russian Army. It is assumed that each Cossack area will have its "own" military unit.

Speaking to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents, Colonel General Valeriy Tretyakov, commander of the Transbaykal Military District, remarked that the Cossacks will be assisted, with the first regiment of this kind to be stationed in Dauria.

Thirty-eight volunteers—new personnel entering the service—have already been selected to form a Cossack squadron. Virtually all the selectees are members of the old military class. This kind of person is given preference in establishing this unit. However, other youths expressing their intent to honor their service obligation in the Cossack regiment will also be afforded the opportunity of doing so.

All recruits will be assigned to a training subunit for acquisition of a military specialty; only upon completion of this training will they be ordered to duty at a Cossack station. Officers will be specially selected from among military cadre. The question of the particular uniform to be worn has not yet been decided. It appears that, for the present, the trouser stripes to be worn by soldiers serving in the new unit will be the only way in which the uniform is to differ. A representative of the Transbaykal Military District has arrived at the Chita induction station to sign on volunteers.

### Unresolved Property Questions For Northern Group

92UM1042A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 May 92 First Edition p 1

[Colonel B. Berezovskiy, Northern Group of Forces acting deputy commander for construction and billeting of troops, interviewed by unidentified correspondent: "Withdrawal of Northern Group of Forces: We're Leaving, Our Houses Are Staying"]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Northern Group of Forces is proceeding according to plan. The units and subunits are leaving their military compounds, and the families of officers and warrant officers are leaving their well-appointed apartments. The real property being left behind, which our side has appraised at \$400 million, is being turned over to the Polish side.

Unfortunately, this process is not going as smoothly as one would like. Colonel B. Berezovskiy, Northern Group of Forces acting deputy commander for construction and troop billeting, told our correspondent about the problems involved in the transfer and acceptance of property.

[Berezovskiy] The process of turning our troop garrisons over to the Polish side began in May of last year. As of today, we have transferred 1,726 buildings, 749 of them our own and 977 of them leased. All told, 6,764 installations will be turned over.

Polish mass media are creating an unhealthy atmosphere over the transfer of compounds. Articles are being published that suggest that we, after turning over the buildings that we ourselves built, still owe Poland something. That is what happened in Swidnica, where we transferred 11 well-built multiunit apartment buildings to the Polish side. Then it was stated that they supposedly fail to meet Polish construction standards. We were told that while a 45-apartment building costs 1.2 billion zlotys, it will take 1.5 billion to repair it. In other words, after turning the apartment building over, we supposedly somehow still owe the Poles 300 million zlotys.

In my opinion, these claims are utterly unfounded. And the figures were taken out of thin air. Or take this example, involving a boiler facility in Swidnica. Our opponents claim that its gas-purifying unit was installed in a way that violated standards and regulations. Yet these things were built according to a Polish blueprint and by the Poles themselves! We merely financed the construction, putting nearly 400,000 rubles into the gas-purifying unit. Who is going to repay us for that?

Or consider this problem, although it really shouldn't concern us. Some of the installations we are now turning over to the Polish side are simply being cleaned out by thieves. In Swidnica, we turned over some residential buildings in the fall and concluded an agreement under which we would heat them. The Polish side took on the job of providing security. But before cold weather began, the heating systems in some of the buildings had come unsealed—parts of the heating equipment had been removed and stolen. Yet Polish television showed with relish pictures of plundered apartments.

But probably the biggest difficulty is that as of today, the transfer and acceptance procedures have yet to be completely worked out. Brigadier General Z. Ostrowski, the Polish government's representative for issues relating to the presence of Russian Federation troops in Poland, unilaterally sent an official letter to military officials concerning how they were to accept real property from representatives of the Northern Group of Forces. But he proposed his own form to be filled out for the transaction, without taking our opinion into account. Despite the fact that we had discussed this matter several times and proposed our own variants.

Article eight of the 1956 treaty signed by the Polish People's Republic and the USSR is the source of of an especially large number of disagreements. It says that we are obliged to transfer facilities in suitable condition. But

what does the notion "suitable condition" mean? Each side interprets this in its own way. After the war, 50 percent to 60 percent of all the buildings in the areas where units of the Northern Group of Forces were stationed were completely destroyed. The overwhelming majority of the rest were badly damaged. But technically, it is considered that we occupied them in "suitable condition." And we have no official document with which we can confirm what the real situation was. Incidentally, nor does the Polish side have anything with which to substantiate its claims.

In the acceptance process, Polish city authorities sometimes refuse to take into account depreciation periods and essentially try to get us to pay for a leased old building as if it were new.

The disagreements become disputes, nothing gets done. We have proposed to the Polish side various ways to solve seemingly intractable problems. Under one of our most recent proposals, we would give 25 percent of the value of the buildings we constructed for their repair and to satisfy possible claims against us for ecological damage caused. But the Poles didn't agree with the figures. Then we proposed that a number of facilities be chosen in order to conduct a specific analysis and to determine exactly how much it will cost to repair them. The proposal is still up in the air.

True, in some respects mutual understanding is being reached with the Polish side. For example, in officer centers and clubs, the interiors are often finished with costly materials such as marble and granite. They contain good furniture and are tastefully decorated. Is all this to be ripped out and removed? Polish representatives, after inspecting one of the officer centers, agreed with our proposal to determine the cost of the finishing and equipment and to give us construction materials of equivalent value. Both we and the people who will use the building come out ahead. If only all the problems could be solved like this—in a mutually beneficial way!

But unfortunately, the process of turning the buildings we occupy over to the Polish side has slowed somewhat of late. The fact is that after transferring 749 of our own buildings, we haven't received a single zloty for them. And about 50 percent of these buildings are already being used by the Polish side. The reason is that no protocol has yet been signed on resolving property and financial issues.

As of today, we have transferred to the Polish side property valued at roughly \$75 million to \$80 million, but nothing has been deposited in our country's treasury. And for us, this money means a great deal. The group of forces has almost 7,500 officers who do not have homes in the CIS. At current housing costs, the 13 billion zlotys that the group received from the sale of movable property is enough to build just one 60-unit apartment building. This hardly meets our needs.

I very much hope that the diplomats and politicians are able to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution to this vital problem.

### **Tashkent Agreement on Pension Provision for Servicemen**

*92UM1063A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 92 First edition p 1*

[Agreement signed by representatives of Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine: "Agreement on the Procedures for Pension Provision for Servicemen and Their Families and State Insurance for Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States Servicemen"]

[Text]

#### **We Are Continuing to Publish Official Documents Adopted at the Tashkent Session of the CIS Heads of States and Governments That Began in the May 23 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Issue.**

States which are participants of this agreement will henceforth be called "member-states",

- based on the 14 February 1992 agreement between the Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States on social and legal guarantees for servicemen and individuals who have been released from military service and their family members and on the 13 March 1992 agreements on guarantees of the rights of Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States citizens in the area of pension provision, and,
- while expressing the desire to cooperate in the area of social security for servicemen, individuals who have been discharged from military service, and their families, we have agreed to the following:

#### **Article 1.**

Pension provision and mandatory state insurance for servicemen of the Commonwealth Member-States armed forces and other military formations created by the legal organs of these states, the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces, the Armed Forces and other military formations of the former USSR, and also pension provision for the families of these servicemen are carried out under the conditions and according to the standards and procedures that have been prescribed or that will be prescribed by law of the member-states on the territory of which the indicated servicemen and their families reside, and until the adoption of legislative acts on these issues by these states,—under the conditions and according to the norms and procedures prescribed by the law of the former USSR. In so doing, the level of pension provision for servicemen and their families that has been prescribed by the laws of the member-states in accordance with the 14 February 1992 agreement on social and legal guarantees for servicemen, individuals who have been released from military service, and their family members may not be at a level lower than the one previously prescribed by legal and other normative acts of the former USSR.

#### **Article 2.**

Service (including on preferential terms) in the Armed Forces and other military formations is calculated in years

served for granting pensions to servicemen as indicated in Article 1 of this agreement and in the procedures prescribed by law of the member-states on the territory of which servicemen have performed their service.

The amount of the monetary allowances (earnings) for granting pensions to servicemen and their families is determined according to the procedures prescribed by the law of the member-states on the territory of which servicemen or their families reside.

#### Article 3.

Expenditures on pension provision for servicemen and their families and mandatory state insurance for servicemen will be implemented by the member-states at the expense of their budgets without reciprocal payments between states.

#### Article 4.

Member-states assume the obligation to inform each other about the normative documents that are in force in their states that have been adopted based on coordinated legislative acts on pension provision for servicemen and their families and mandatory state insurance for servicemen, subsequent changes to it, and also the implementation of standing cooperation while clarifying the obligations that are significant for the timely and proper resolution of pension provision and mandatory state insurance issues.

#### Article 5.

Issues associated with the employment of this agreement will, when necessary, be examined by the Member-States Ministers of Defense Council, and also by the Commonwealth member-states ministries of defense (committees for defense) on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

#### Article 6.

The agreement enters into force the moment it is signed. Done at the city of Tashkent on 15 May 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The original copy will be preserved in the Republic of Byelarus government archives, which will send a certified copy of it to the states that have signed this agreement.

The document was signed by representatives of Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

#### CIS Agreement on Law Enforcement Bodies in Armed Forces

92UM1065A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 May 92 First edition p 3

[Agreement on Law-Enforcement Bodies in Joint Armed Forces and Armed Forces of Member-States of Commonwealth of Independent States]

[Text] The states participating in this Agreement in order to ensure legal protection for military personnel in the Joint Armed Forces and the armed forces of member-states of the Commonwealth, law and order, and to monitor observance of the law,

and to investigate and have the courts consider violations of the law,

have reached agreement on the following:

#### Article 1

The member-states will ensure that military-legal and military-procuratorial agencies located within their territory will be able to carry out their assigned missions during the transitional period.

#### Article 2

Military-judicial and military-procuratorial agencies will carry out their functions during the transitional period in accordance with the following provisions;

- military-legal and military-procuratorial agencies are a component of the judicial and the procuratorial bodies of the member-states in which they are located;
- the above agencies are governed by laws in effect in the given member-state;
- they exercise authority over all military formations located within the territory of the given member-state and its own armed forces;
- when necessary the member-states extend the authority of said agencies;
- the member-states provide the financing and the materials and equipment for military-judicial and military-procuratorial agencies under their jurisdiction and retain the existing procedure whereby military personnel serve in them, as well as the established legal rights, benefits, advantages and guarantees of their implementation set forth in agreements between the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

#### Article 3

The member-states will continue to interact in the improvement of legislation and in other matters promoting the conduct of a coordinated legal policy and lawmaking praxis in the Joint Armed Forces and the armed forces of member-states of the Commonwealth.

#### Article 4

This agreement takes effect at the time of its signing.

Executed in the city of Tashkent on 15 May 1992 with one original copy in the Russian language. The original is kept in the government archives of the Republic of Byelarus, which will send certified copies to the states which have signed this agreement.

This document was signed by representatives of the governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

### On Organization of Medical Care for Servicemen

92UM1065B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 27 May 92 First edition p 3

[Agreement on Organization of Medical Care for Servicemen and Their Families and for Blue-and White-Collar Workers in the Armed Forces of Member-States of the Commonwealth and in the Joint Armed Forces]

[Text] The states which are signatories to this agreement, hereinafter referred to as "member-states," governed by the 14 February 1992 agreement among member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States on social and legal guarantees for military personnel and individuals released from the military service, and their families,

considering the importance of medical care for servicemen and their families, blue- and white-collar workers of the armed forces of the Commonwealth member-states and the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, with respect to maintaining the combat capability of the troops and naval forces,

have agreed on the following:

#### Article 1

When the medical indications call for it, military personnel of the armed forces of the Commonwealth member-states and the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are sent for medical examination and treatment to military medical facilities of the Commonwealth states without discrimination. In the absence of military medical facilities at the place of service or of residence and in emergencies medical assistance is provided without impediment also directly at civilian medical facilities of the member-states, regardless of their departmental affiliation.

#### Article 2

The families of military personnel, blue- and white-collar workers of the Commonwealth member-states and the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are provided with medical assistance at medical facilities of local health agencies on an equal basis with citizens of the given member-states.

Whenever this is impossible (at closed or remote garrisons and in the groups of forces), medical assistance is provided at military medical facilities of the given garrisons and groups of forces.

#### Article 3

Treatment at sanatoria and resorts and organized rest for military personnel and their families, blue- and white-collar workers in the armed forces of the Commonwealth member-states and the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are provided at military sanatoria, vacation and tourist centers under contractual terms, including the benefits established by law as well as by normative enactments of the member-states of the Commonwealth and states of the former USSR, if its laws are not in conflict with the laws of the member-states.

#### Article 4

The cost of supporting the children of blue- and white-collar workers of the armed forces of member-states of the Commonwealth and the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth at preschool facilities is paid by the procedure and in the amounts established by laws of the member-state in which the children's facilities are located.

#### Article 5

Sanitation and hygienic, and antiepidemic measures in military units and at establishments, military educational institutions and enterprises and in organizations of the armed forces of Commonwealth member-states and the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth are effected in accordance with laws of the member-state in which they are located. In the Joint Armed Forces, also in accordance with orders and directives issued by the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, if they are not in conflict with laws of the member-states.

#### Article 6

The Agreement takes effect at the time of its signing.

Executed in the city of Tashkent on 15 May 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The original is kept in the archives of the Republic of Byelorussia, which will send a certified copy to the states which have signed this Agreement.

## CIS: GROUND TROOPS

### Problems, Uncertain Future for Army Unit in Germany

92UM1028A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 May 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Colonel S. Pashayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The 'Lucky' Division Is Burdened with Problems Which No One Is Working To Solve"]

[Text] If you would have predicted to Major-General A. Nutrikhin, a graduate of the General Staff Military Academy, that in two years he would be taking a visiting journalist not to some outstanding regiment but to an ordinary dump, you would have been brushed aside. Is this the epicenter of concerns for the commander of a division being withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces?

In the final days of last April, it was no longer a matter of priorities. Without any systems, I traveled for more than an hour with a concerned Anatoliy Mikhaylovich [Nutrikhin] over the neglected plot of land of the former driver training area of a disbanded army training regiment, stopping first at piles of bent concrete slabs, then at heaps of asphalt crumbled by jackhammers, and then piles of junk cars.

Before, this driver training area was intensively used by both our army and the German army. Now, deprived of a host, in a matter of months it has turned into a "wild" dumping ground, thereby increasing the already vast area of ecological responsibility of the commander of the guards tank division. The secret of this "installation's" popularity

is rather ordinary—salvaging any garbage in Germany is worth considerable money. But here, it is an unwanted rash. You do not enclose a former driver training area with barbed wire or post guards every 100 meters around its perimeter (where is their legal status stipulated?). And they dump, most often at night and with enviable regularity.

Voices are already ringing out on the part of the Germans: the territory was assigned to the Western Group of Forces—clean it up. Nutrikhin counters: we will plow up the roads and fill in the obstacles, but the piles of garbage are not ours. They are not dismantling the structures on any of the local Russian garrisons, resurfacing any of the roads, or getting rid of the outdated “Trabants” and “Vartburgs.”

God only knows how these squabbles will end; go to the official level, as they say. For some here, there is a great temptation to shift the burden of responsibility for the ecological barbarity of their fellow countrymen to the departing Russians. But they also must understand the division commander. He is unable to eliminate this dump—he accounts for every vehicle and every person on the eve of the withdrawal. And why should the Russians haul someone else's garbage and still pay for it with currency?

Of course, this is not the only concern weighing upon the commander today. There are other ones that are more weighty. It would seem such luck for the present times has struck him and his subordinates—their large unit will survive and will not fall under the merciless knife of reductions. A united collective of likeminded professionals will be preserved, and the traditions of the renowned Carpathian-Berlin, Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Division will not suddenly stop. What is more, each family not having housing in the CIS (and there are about 1,500 such families in the division) has been promised a flat in the areas of the new deployment, and not simply a temporary structure or some dilapidated house. Turkish builders are erecting houses of an improved design for them in Slonim and Baranovich. Representatives of the regiments and members of unit women's councils visiting there just shake their heads—they are incomparable.

But here is the problem—the division trains will start out on the road in the summer, but the scheduled date for completion of the construction work is late fall. Moreover, subcontractor personnel were reduced substantially recently—some of the workers, they say, have been recalled home in connection with the earthquake in Turkey. The families should be delayed for two-three months so as not to create chaos and doom people to additional rigors, but who will make such a decision today? The same commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces—and he would be glad to intervene, but he is bound hand and foot by the rigid shackles of agreements already concluded.

Another alarming thing is that the promised flats, or a considerable portion of them, may “slip away” somewhere unknown at the last minute. There are more than enough examples of them turning up in the hands of people having

nothing whatsoever to do with the Western Group of Forces, in that same Byelarus, incidentally. The solution would seem obvious: the Germans finance the construction, and they should give those leaving Germany special certificates for housing. Simple, reliable, fair. But this mechanism apparently does not suit everyone.

“Houses for the division” is a concept far more extensive than many imagine. For it is not only the families of officers and warrant officers who are planning to leave. The new deployment locations of the regiments and battalions must also have high-quality barracks, mess halls, store rooms, and substantial storage facilities for combat equipment.

Moreover, the base on which a soldier's and officer's skills are forged and polished—field training facilities—is virtually out of commission. Swindlers of all sorts pilfered from the gunnery ranges and firing ranges everything they could get their hands on the night before the arrival of the division's forward detachment in Slonim—boards, doors, frames, cables, pipes... Now, they have to start all over—lay power lines, run communications, raise towers. It would be okay if all the necessary materials were there, but today it is an insoluble problem to get a kilogram of nails or a sheet of plywood.

Is that all? Of course not. Another area of concern and uncertainty is economics. The Western Group of Forces, as we know, is under Russian jurisdiction. Financing of the life, service, and combat training of the soldiers of the former USSR located here comes from the Russian treasury and from funds allocated under the corresponding treaty with Germany. What are the tank division's prospects in this sense? At what time, at what geographic point does the baton of financing pass to Byelarus receiving the division? How will this be accomplished in practice?

To the question of whether or not these problems have been stipulated, representatives of numerous delegations, including high-ranking delegations from Byelarus, and division commander Major-General A. Nutrikhin, and commander of the guards tank army Major-General L. Shevtsov have answered unequivocally: No. But, you see, the deadline for the final withdrawal is not far off, and the appropriate expenditures should already have been planned and put into the republic's budget. This involves considerable amounts with many zeros. Moreover, money alone cannot maintain and support the continuous cycle of the division's vital activities. It requires construction materials, fuel, spare parts, food, medicines, uniforms...

A separate question is from the political sphere. Just one fact: there are 298 Byelarusians in the entire guards division, including 92 soldiers and noncommissioned officers. The division is departing for a sovereign republic—what then? Who will guarantee that in the future someone will not get the temptation abruptly to change the correlation of “ours” and “theirs” in the national armed forces?

For the time being, few are calmed by the explanations and promises given on this account. They are not worth much in our unpredictable times. Fears regarding the possible retaking of the oath by officer personnel have not been

removed in the collectives. Understandably, no one can force anyone to take the oath. But there are other methods. In Ukraine, as they say, those refusing to bow their head to the yellow-and-blue flag were simply shown to the door.

Another thing. Thousands of people will soon arrive in sovereign Byelarus. What do they know about its rich history, culture, and literature? About the laws passed here with respect to servicemen? About the position of political and social movements in questions of military organizational development? Whom does this concern? And does it concern anyone at all? Today you will not find a single issue of Byelarusian newspapers in the division's units. People are essentially isolated, separated from the problems which their future fellow countrymen are experiencing today. One officer put it this way: at least send messengers to Brest for the press. Indeed, how can we get along without it? Nothing but detailed, timely, reliable information can relieve unnecessary tension, dispel hidden concerns, and make people feel they are equal citizens of a state whose interests they intend to serve honestly.

The entire Western Group of Forces will follow with heightened attention how the division's move is accomplished and how it is received and set up. And not just the Western Group of Forces. This is the first example of a civilized, honest division of the army, a division that is not burdened by stresses, disputes, firing, and blood. If we are able to pass over the underwater rocks, it will set a precedent that gives hope for the peaceful resolution of many disputes that have not subsided. It will be a unique experience—experience of new relations between republics in the military sphere aimed at cooperation and comprehensive interaction. Is this not what we, doomed by history itself to be neighbors, are striving for?

In bidding farewell to Major-General Nutrikhin, we agreed: correspondents of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in the Western Group of Forces and in the Byelarusian Military District will revisit the problems of the "lucky" division in the summer. First—accompanying the trains of the guards division from Dresden; second—meeting them at Slonim and Baranovich.

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### Submarine Commander on Current Conditions, Nuclear Arms

92UM1029A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 May 92 First edition p 4

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Yegorovich Stenkin, nuclear-powered strategic submarine commander, by Captain 2d Rank M. Lukanin; place and date not given: "I Am Tied to the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] They went to sea on combat duty in November of last year, back when the USSR existed. They returned now to the CIS, to a new life for themselves. Before, submariners were recommended for state awards for cruises such as they had. Now, the joy of returning home is mixed with other feelings unknown up to now: So, who are we now? The Navy's elite or a burden? Have we been turned into some

chessmen in an incomprehensible game of politicians over the nuclear button? Does Russia need us? From now on, what kind of a future do we have in general?

This is the situation in which I met with Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Yegorovich Stenkin, commander of a nuclear-powered strategic submarine.

[Lukanin] The attention of the entire world is now riveted on the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union, particularly in connection with the division of the armed forces. The top Russian leadership has given repeated assurances that it is in complete control of the situation with its nuclear weapons. I am interested in finding out your opinion. Did such rapid changes in the country have an effect on the course of combat duty?

[Stenkin] If you mean the moods of the people, personal experiences added to each, of course. A military person must not think about the future with alarm, about how some or other changes in politics will affect his fate. We are professionals and, honestly doing our job, have a right to expect that the state will remember its obligations to those who serve it faithfully.

But, as it seems to me, the period of uncertainty was lived through more critically on shore; at sea it was easier. The crew is cohesive, reliable, and tested; each person knows precisely what he has to do. In short, everything was the same as always. In general, the cruise went surprisingly calmly, even without petty arguments.

[Lukanin] Not a single scheduled mission during the cruise was changed?

[Stenkin] We received no such orders. We operated in conditions normal for combat duty.

[Lukanin] Do you know where the ballistic missiles that your ship carries are aimed?

[Stenkin] No. Information about this is encoded on perforated tape. I know, like each person on the crew, what I am supposed to and need to know for my duty position. The data which I have available to me on a cruise make it possible merely to guess in general terms about the missiles' direction of flight. But, in essence, it is quite senseless to talk about targets, taking into account the yield and, consequently, the consequences of using modern nuclear strategic arms, both ours and foreign ones.

[Lukanin] Nikolay Yegorovich, doesn't this incomparable responsibility depress you? After all, the fate of the entire planet and all people living on it is in your hands.

[Stenkin] I have faith in the common sense of politicians. But a nuclear-free world is for the time being, unfortunately, a beautiful dream, nothing more. It is possible that Margaret Thatcher was right when she said that thanks to the strategy of nuclear deterrence, we have managed to avoid global conflicts. You ask about responsibility... Yes, my fellow "strategic" commanders and I are fully aware of it. Perhaps more than anyone else. Our whole life, if you will, is structured around this responsibility. Only on leave can I permit myself small earthly joys: for example, to go fishing or hunting. All the rest of the time, no matter where

I am off ship, I must have communications with the command authorities and be ready within 1-1.5 hours to be in place and begin command and control. You can say that I am tied to the nuclear button. Even if I go visiting somewhere, there is a problem if there is no telephone.

[Lukanin] Do you regret having chosen such a destiny? I know many people are also interested in the material prosperity of nuclear submarine commanders.

[Stenkin] About the choice of way of life. Yes, I am absolutely satisfied with it. I believe that I have been fortunate. By birth I am from Altay, from a simple family. I have four brothers who are also in the military, and my daughter married a naval school officer candidate. Now my grandson Yurka is growing up and we will make him a navyman also. I am happy that we are making a family nest of Stenkin submariners. Is it really possible to change such a life for something else?

It is a pity that difficult times have come for everyone now and that the prestige of naval service is declining. I have a remarkable officer on my crew—Captain-Lieutenant Aleksandr Morkovin, commander of a computer group. He is a clever person and indispensable on cruises, but he has submitted a request for discharge: he stayed too long in positions somewhere and at 35 feels he has no prospects. I will never understand this. Why do we have such an attitude towards people? We squeeze out all the juices and then forget even to say thank you. I am afraid to imagine if we tear down the nuclear submarine fleet; we won't be worth a plug nickel then.

As far as the material aspect of our life is concerned... In March we interviewed the sailors and petty officers on the ship and asked them what salary they would consider acceptable if they would agree to serve under a contract. The majority of them rejected the very idea of a contract for such service for any amount of money, and only three cited a minimal amount of 10,000 rubles for a start, so to speak. As a commander of a nuclear submarine and having served my entire life on Kamchatka, I am not sure that after all the current pay raises and extra pay for special duty conditions and the like I would receive close to that. And the seamen set another condition—mandatory resolution of the housing problem. But this is a fantasy.

[Lukanin] But you finally can be congratulated on your new home. You moved into a three-room flat.

[Stenkin] Yes, at 40 years. Incidentally, I have been in this garrison since I was a lieutenant. In just my first year as an officer I moved five or six times. In all, again within the same garrison, I have had to move more than 10 times. But this is normal. I am not complaining; no one here is spoiled by the living conditions.

[Lukanin] You said that it is easier for the crew on a cruise, under water. How can this be?

[Stenkin] It makes a lot of sense. On an independent cruise, I know that everything depends on me as the commander. Each person does a specific job. No one scolds anyone for anything, which cannot be said about shore duty. As commander of the largest underwater

missile-carrying cruiser, for example, I have to supervise the cleaning up of the territory on the military installation, clearing away snow, and look for shovels and brooms. I have to invent roundabout ways so that the submarine is not left in the rear without the necessary supplies. Hydraulic fluid, let's say. You see, it is in extremely short supply, and you cannot get it in the usual way for anything. But this is a topic for another conversation, and a very long one: how we are supported on shore. I am not sure that during the war seamen had to wear out their shirts and shoes until they had holes. But now this is common everywhere.

Or look at the replacements they are sending lately to the nuclear submarines. Here is the official efficiency report for one of the seamen, an Arab by nationality, as was indicated in the record, and who supposedly was trained in acoustics at a training detachment: He is secretive, vindictive, quick-tempered, violent... In addition, he is absolutely deaf in his right ear due to a chronic illness. And this is an acoustics operator! Is this a mockery? Nevertheless, they say: educate him yourself, there is no one else. And that is what you do: we educate him, put up with him, and fuss with him. It is practically impossible to get rid of unsuitable compulsory-service specialists.

*Later we had tea in the kitchen in the Stenkins' new, not yet completely furnished flat. Nikolay Yegorovich calmed down at the kitchen table from his constant problems as a commander and again said that despite everything, he believes in better times. The recent cruise was, as was already mentioned, a pleasant surprise—not a single accident! And how well they celebrated the New Year submerged, and what imagination they demonstrated in celebrating submariners' birthdays or organizing the Neptune holiday for young seamen experiencing for the first time the compression of the hull in the depths of the ocean waters!*

*Listening to her husband, Nikolay Yegorovich's wife, Zinaida Nikolayevna, sometimes almost noticeably frowned and tapped her fist furtively on the wooden table. Not to put a jinx on you, commander, we know what it actually is like for you on the cruises.*

*A rare, happy moment in their life: the family was all together, and almost two full months of leave lie ahead. But when he returns, Captain 1st Rank Stenkin will again have to go to sea.*

#### **Aleksin on Soviet/CIS Sub Accidents**

92UM1045A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 21 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Navy Press Center Chief Rear-Admiral Valeriy Aleksin by Aleksandr Mozgovoy, under the rubric: "Secret": "Is The Navy Sinking?"]

[Text] An accident at sea inevitably draws attention to itself, especially accidents with military ships equipped with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Last year, Green Peace, the international ecological organization, published a report on the accident rate in our navy. Compiled based on open press reports and information received from Western intelligence sources, it contains

many errors. That is why for the purpose of providing truthful information to society, the CIS Naval Main Staff is presenting, for the first time, information about accidents in the Navy for the last five years which were previously assigned to the secret category.

We asked the Navy's Chief Navigator and Press Center Chief Rear-Admiral Valeriy Aleksin to comment on the unprecedented list provided by the Naval Main Staff. He sailed in submarines for 16 years, he himself has frequently burned and sank (in the direct and not in the figurative sense), and has participated in the investigations of several dozen accidents.

[Mozgovoy] The list you have submitted is impressive. But how complete is it? (Right now, we are publishing the list of only the submarines that experienced accidents).

[Aleksin] Practically all accidents have been taken into account on the list, maybe with the exception of accidents with several small craft and roadstead shallow-draft support ships about which the U.S. Navy also does not provide information. The fact that, in its report, Green Peace cites 12 accidents for the USSR Navy during the years 1987-1991 attests to its completeness. Our list contains 46, that is, nearly four times as many.

[Mozgovoy] They assert abroad that accidents occur more often in our navy than in the U.S. and other Western countries' navies. Is that so?

[Aleksin] No, the accident rate in our Navy is not higher but is significantly lower than in other countries' navies according to a number of indicators. In recent years, a comprehensive accident prevention method has been introduced. As a result, we have managed to reduce the accident rate by a factor of three during the last five years (1987-1991) as compared to the preceding five-year average annual number of accidents. Running aground has been reduced by a factor of four and ship collisions have become six times less frequent. The number of technical break-downs (explosions, fires, sinkings) has been reduced by a factor of 1.5, although we must admit that it is the technical accident rate that constitutes more than half of all accidents in the navy in recent years and, as a rule, results in the most serious consequences.

The development of new, more effective and reliable survivability support systems is being conducted right now in the Navy. The extinguishing of a fire in February 1992 on board the Pacific Fleet's large antisubmarine warfare ship, ADMIRAL ZAKHAROV, is a graphic result of that work. And although, unfortunately, one sailor died while the fire was being extinguished, we managed to avoid significant casualties. For comparison: the large antisubmarine warfare ship OTVAZHNYI completely burned and sank during a similar type of fire in 1974 in the Black Sea Fleet and, nearly 40 men died in the process.

[Mozgovoy] Accidents on ships with nuclear power plants cause special concern in both our and foreign society. The thought is being increasingly developed in the foreign press that the CIS Navy needs to reject the use of nuclear

submarines as soon as possible since malfunctions on them can result in ecological catastrophes. What can you say on that score?

[Aleksin] The operational reliability of nuclear submarines is not only our problem. It equally affects the navies of all countries that have nuclear-powered ships. According to Green Peace's data, 12 fires, two main propulsion plant accidents, six weapons and equipment accidents, one explosion, and one compartment flooding occurred on U.S. Navy nuclear submarines in 1989 alone. Furthermore, three groundings and nine collisions were recorded. We have never had any such thing occur in one year.

But I share the fear of those who think that nuclear submarine accidents can become ecological catastrophes. That is why it is necessary to reduce the probability of such accidents to zero. Here, on the one hand, it is important to increase the reliability of power plants and, on the other hand, to ensure the safety of nuclear submarine navigation. Unfortunately, the recent incident in the Barents Sea with the U.S. Naval submarine Baton Rouge attests to the irresponsibility of those who sent this ship into Russian territorial waters. If a commander of our nuclear submarine, the displacement of which is greater than the American submarine and the hull of which is manufactured from more durable material, had begun to surface 5-7 seconds earlier, the blow against the Baton Rouge's hull would have struck not the fairwater but the powerful forward end. The American submarine would have been lost in less than a minute. They most probably would not have managed to shutdown the reactor and then an ecological catastrophe would have occurred which would have inflicted serious damage not only to Russia but to the Scandinavian states.

[Mozgovoy] The Green Peace report cites two cases of the loss of Soviet nuclear submarines which had not previously been reported. The report asserts that a submarine sank at the end of 1968 or at the beginning of 1969 in Kola Bay. Another was lost in the Pacific Ocean after a collision with the American submarine TAUTAG in 1970...

[Aleksin] The first accident occurred in October 1968 in the Barents Sea. An Echo-II Class submarine, commanded by Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Shekhovtsov collided with a foreign submarine while submerged in a combat training range. But the submarine was not lost and safely returned to base. It remains in the line until the present time. The second incident also occurred in a combat training range, only in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Kamchatka. In June 1970, the American nuclear submarine TAUTAG collided with our submarine which was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Boris Bagdasaryan. The blow fell on the aft stabilizer and on the iron bossing of the right shaft line. The boat began to sink to the depth but, thanks to the commander's and crew's competent actions, they managed to save it. The submarine surfaced, reached base, and sailed for many more years in the Pacific Ocean Fleet after being repaired.

[Mozgovoy] But is the current reduction of the accident rate in our Navy not associated with the fact that ships are standing idle at their bases and not putting out to sea due to a shortage of fuel?

[Aleksin] Three-fourths of the accidents in the Navy occur off the coasts, at bases and at plants. So, it is not the reduction of the number of long cruises that affects the reduction of the accident rate but those steps to ensure safety which I discussed above.

[Mozgovoy] Is cooperation to reduce the accident rate possible between the CIS Navy and navies of the United States and the other Western powers?

[Aleksin] The most correct policy to increase the safety regime on the oceans is the reduction of the naval activities of all states, the development of confidence-building measures and the restriction and reduction of naval weapons. We have already unilaterally reduced the number of our missile submarines that are on combat patrol by a factor of four and we have completely withdrawn our submarines from the coasts of the United States.

The Soviet-American Agreement on Preventing Incidents on the High Seas and in the Airspace Above Them has already been successfully functioning for 20 years. Such agreements have been concluded with Canada and with nine European states. However, the activities of submarines are actually outside the framework of the agreements and, in our opinion, it is accidents with submarines that pose the greatest threat. Therefore, at the next meeting of CIS Navy and U.S. Navy representatives which will occur in several days in Moscow, we will propose to our partners that we examine the issue on the prevention of incidents with submarines. Our proposal has been accepted by the American side.

Finally, we are prepared to share our considerable and valuable experience on reduction of the accident rate with the military seamen of the United States and the other NATO countries. As far as I know, Chief of U.S. Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso has expressed interest in our initiative.

#### **Submarine Accidents (1987-1991)**

On February 18, 1987, a fire broke out in the forward compartment of a Foxtrot Class submarine while it sailed on the surface in Peter the Great Bay. Six crew members perished. The submarine returned to base.

On March 1, 1987, a Charlie Class nuclear submarine went aground while sailing on the surface in Avachinskiy Bay near the shore and sustained minor damage to the outer hull.

On October 28, 1987, a Northern Fleet Tango Class submarine went aground while putting to sea at night from the Liepaya outer harbor into the Baltic Sea. The submarine was not damaged due to the soft muddy ground.

On November 11, 1987, a Delta-III Class nuclear missile submarine hit another submarine while being remooored at a Northern Fleet base due to inertia while backing up. Both submarines received insignificant damage.

On May 9, 1988, a Delta-I Class nuclear missile submarine hit the submerged portion of an iceberg in the Arctic. The submarine received light damage to the bow section of the hull, continued to sail independently according to plan and safely returned to base.

On October 8-9, 1988, the main engines of a Foxtrot Class submarine malfunctioned in the central portion of the South China Sea. It ended up in a tropical typhoon and received damage to the outer hull. The submarine was towed to the base at Cam Ranh.

On November 21, 1988, a Delta-I Class nuclear missile submarine received light damage to the fairwater while surfacing into the ice, continued to sail independently according to plan and safely returned to base.

On April 7, 1989, the Mike Class nuclear torpedo submarine KOMSOMOLETS sank in the Norwegian Sea as a result of a compartment fire in the aft compartment. Forty two crewmembers died.

On June 26, 1989, a main propulsion plant first loop water cooling system rupture occurred on an Echo-II Class submarine in the Norwegian Sea. The submarine returned to base under auxiliary power while surfaced and accompanied by rescue vessels. Some personnel received heightened radiation exposure.

On July 16, 1989, an Alpha Class nuclear torpedo submarine in the Barents Sea surfaced to eliminate a steam pipeline link and shifted to diesel power. The malfunction was eliminated at sea and the submarine returned to base with the main power plant operating in the normal mode. The radiation situation had not deteriorated.

On December 5, 1989, a jettisonable model nuclear missile fell into the sea as a result of an unsuccessful training launch from a Delta-IV Class nuclear missile submarine in the White Sea. The submarine was not damaged and onboard propulsion and control systems functioned without discrepancies.

On August 12, 1989, a Foxtrot Class diesel submarine caught the net of the Norwegian fishing trawler Orion in the Norwegian Sea. The submarine surfaced and freed itself from the net.

On November 2, 1989, a Foxtrot Class diesel submarine tore the net of the Norwegian Trawler T.O. Sinyor in the Barents Sea 50 miles off the coast of Norway.

On March 19, 1990, the high pressure air system on a Typhoon Class nuclear missile submarine became contaminated with grease in the Barents Sea. The submarine returned to base.

On January 26, 1991, a Foxtrot Class submarine that had been removed from the inventory sank at a pier in Vladivostok. Submarine crewmembers were uninjured. The submarine was salvaged from the bottom.

On March 19, 1991, a Foxtrot Class submarine damaged the nets of the NEL-136 Polish seiner in the Baltic Sea.

On September 27, 1991, a solid-fuel missile accident occurred while conducting missile firing training on a

Typhoon Class nuclear submarine in the White Sea. The missile silo hatch was damaged. The crew was uninjured. There was no ecological damage to the water area.

### Frolov on Plan to Raise Komsomolets

92UM1046A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 May 92 p 6

[Article by Dmitriy Frolov: "Nuclear Submarine Komsomolets May Rise from Bottom—Alternative to American Plan Offered"]

[Text] The domain of Captain Nemo, in which the lion's share of the glory was provided by riches that sank to the ocean bottom along with the ships carrying them, captured the imagination of more than just young readers of the Jules Verne best seller. Although the raising of sunken ships and their cargo is rich in history, this activity is taking on another aspect: that of prevention of ecological disasters that may have truly unpredictable consequences brought on by objects lying in the depths of the world's oceans. As a quite recent and graphic example of this we may cite the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets, which sank in the Norwegian Sea in April of 1988. Her loss gave rise to a host of arguments that continue to this day. The talk is not only of the causes and circumstances, but also the consequences of the accident. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that a ship carrying a nuclear reactor aboard, lying on the ocean floor in the area of the Gulf Stream, at the ocean's crossroads, a location where Norway harvests 60 percent of the fish exported to many countries of the world, is something that can be done without. The arguments deal largely with what to do about the situation.

Most ecologists fear that corrosion of the reactor vessel can cause leakage of radioactive materials into the seawater. Also a source of concern are munitions, including two torpedoes armed with nuclear warheads, which if damaged by rust can render the waters radioactive in a radius of 200,000 kilometers. This kind of argument is presented by persons who advocate taking immediate action, but there are other points of view.

Norwegian specialists have grave reservations about safety of the salvage process. They fear that the ship's damped reactor can self-start in the event the submarine rolls over during the raising process. They also do not exclude the possibility of radioactive contamination caused by nonchemical deterioration. A negative attitude toward raising the remains of the Komsomolets can also be heard in our midst. This kind of feeling was expressed by Navy Chief Navigator Valeriy Aleksin, who pointed out that, among other considerations, Russia lacks the funds to undertake this project.

Speaking of finances, present estimates point to a need for about a quarter billion dollars. This was the amount quoted by a Netherlands deep-sea operation consortium, which had been selected by the Central Naval Technical Equipment Design Bureau Rubin of the USSR Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] (which created the Komsomolets, incidentally) as the agent handling

the submarine's raising. The main argument put forth by Rubin's experts was their belief that the domestic approach cannot be successful, since the absence of a material and technical base renders it impossible to make the activity a reality.

Indeed, there are at the present time only two vessels that measure up to the requirements posed by this kind of task. One of them—named the Glomar Explorer—belongs to the United States. She was built in 1974 to raise a Soviet submarine that sank in the Pacific Ocean, a craft that was of considerable value to military specialists. The Glomar Explorer, built in an atmosphere of secrecy, was fitted out as a drillship. The other vessel, made by the Italians, features two cranes, with each rated at 7,000 tonnes; she is the one the Dutch propose to employ to raise the Komsomolets. In the event they are awarded the contract, it will be necessary for them to modernize the lifting machine, which is designed to go down to 400 meters, whereas the sub is lying 1,665 meters below the ocean surface.

However, marine technical equipment specialists disagree with the idea that this is the only way to solve the problem. Included in this category is a group of staffers of the Saint Petersburg Marine Technical University that has proposed the creation of an alternative solution in the form of a special technical system which they call the Sunken Object Recovery System [KPZO]. Preliminary estimates have it that this creation will cost 10 million dollars less than the Dutch project.

"Another consideration here is that Russia will wind up owning a ship that can and should be used now and will be useful for other jobs," stressed Aleksey Vasilyev, one of the originators of the KPZO. He states that a refitted tanker can serve as the ship's basic topsides. The idea is to raise the submarine by means of lowering a platform provided with several circular claws that would hold the craft securely during the ascent and transport while protecting her from damage, as happened to the Americans. It would be possible to replace the claws if necessary. They would also be needed in the event a decision is made to discontinue raising the submarine, instead encasing her in a vault and leaving her on the ocean floor.

Devices such as a scoop or an electromagnet could be employed to raise fragments of ships' hulls or other items such as chemical projectiles lying on the Baltic's bottom since the Second World War and constituting a source of horror for ecologists and ordinary residents of the adjacent countries.

What must be pointed out is that there is no consensus relative to solution of this problem. Russia's Minister of Ecology Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, for example, believes that we ought not act too hastily, that for the present we should instead rely on the insulating characteristics of the seawater. This tactic, which finds its origin in the view that it is better to let sleeping dogs lie, is the opposite of that advocated by a number of his colleagues. Nevertheless, the fact remains that sooner or later something must be done about those projectiles.

The developers of the KPZO are of the opinion that the Baltic countries should, as interested parties, participate in providing financing. This would include the Baltic states that were formerly Union republics, since it was in their territorial waters that most of the ships unloaded their chemical weapons. According to ITAR-TASS, which quotes a Naval officer who was involved in this kind of operation, 45,000 to 50,000 tonnes of chemical munitions were dropped into the water in only the area of Kristans Island [transliteration] and 56 kilometers from the Liepaja harbor buoy.

There is a possibility that the matter will take a turn in a completely new direction in the event the Baltic countries arrive at the conclusion that they possess the right to demand compensation for whatever harm may be caused.

In one way or another, the above is a problem, as is the Komsomolets matter, that must be resolved in a spirit of close cooperation, which is why the KPZO adherents favor setting up an open international competition for projects. The entries would be judged by a commission that would be completely free of any departmental affiliation.

"We are not so naive as to think that we will prevail out of hand, without becoming involved in a competitive struggle", said Aleksey Vasilyev in reference to this topic. "But we have faith in the feasibility of our research and development results."

Feasibility work so far has involved the use of a small model; plans call for further testing this summer, using another model, one that is larger, in an open body of water. The role of a submarine at that time will be filled by a torpedo. It should be understood that it will be of the training kind, and—in contradistinction to the Komsomolets—the torpedo will be completely safe.

#### **Kurchatov Complaint: Failure to Raise Komsomolets is Ecological Disaster**

*92UM1047A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 21 May 92 p 2*

[Article by Associate Professor, Retired Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Kurchatov, under the rubric: "Open Letter to the Leaders of the Russian Federation": "A Fully-Cocked Nuclear Mine"]

[Text] Last Tuesday, Moscow television, and previously a number of Scandinavian newspapers, reported that, according to the testimony of Western experts, signs of leaking radiation have been detected from the Soviet nuclear submarine Komsomolets that sank in the Norwegian Sea three years ago. The measurements that have been conducted have still not recorded a noticeable deviation from the background standard.

Recently, Military Expert A.I. Kurchatov's open letter to the Russian Federation leadership, which ponders the problems associated with the possible threat of a nuclear disaster, arrived at the editorial offices. We think that it is also of interest for the reader-at-large.

A real threat of radiation contamination of the land, the destruction of large and the disappearance of small states

and the appearance of millions of "ecological" refugees who will be compelled to seek refuge in other countries and on other continents has hung over Europe like the Sword of Damocles...

#### **The Source of the Danger**

The nuclear submarine Komsomolets with nuclear weapons on board, which sank in the Norwegian Sea on April 7, 1989, has become that threat. For three years, the electrochemical processes (seawater—a good electrolyte among the heterogeneous metals) has significantly destroyed its hull and assemblies. According to expert calculations, radioactive contamination of the environment—Europe's richest fish basin—has already begun or will soon begin.

Due to a lack of hard currency, the attempt to salvage the boat last year did not take place. Hopes have also dimmed for the near future. The Dutch firm that had intended to carry out this work estimates its services will cost \$200 million. However, the CIS's hard currency treasury is empty.

Add to everything else the fact that there is no safe salvage variation. The Dutch plan—on two cables from a floating crane—is technically imperfect. In its current form, this is rather an unintentional preparation of super-Chernobyls. There are grounds for this conclusion. Right now Komsomolets is not simply a sunken ship. Time and corrosion have transformed it into an enormous, super-dangerous, fully-cocked nuclear mine. The Dutch are not considering the specific nature of the object being salvaged, the probable (or impending) leak of radioactive materials, the possibilities of a new drop to the bottom and the destruction of the corroded submarine. Even the Americans in operation "Jennifer" with more precise equipment did not avoid this.

#### **The Scenario for a Potential Tragedy**

The technical safety systems that survived exclude the possibility of a uranium and plutonium chain reaction for now. The nuclear submarine's new drop to the bottom could destroy that protection and cause an explosion of all nuclear ammunition. A nuclear explosion of that force at a depth of 1,640 meters would raise 1,000 times more radionuclides than there were during the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant] Unit Four accident from the bottom of the sea into the atmosphere and air currents will carry hundreds of "Chernobyls" to the south, southeast and southwest of Europe. An invisible carpet of death would cover vast territories between the Urals and the Atlantic for decades.

The heaviest particles of the radioactive clouds would fall out in Scandinavia, the northwest of Russia, Iceland, and other islands of the Arctic. Medium particles will reach the Ufa-Saratov-Kharkov-Kiev-Paris-London line. High-altitude air currents will carry the lightest fractions to Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, the Middle East, and to the northern regions of Africa, Spain and Portugal. At the same time, the underwater explosion will give rise to the giant waves of a Tsunami. They will destroy some cities and ports and cast ships onto the shore...

The basis for these predictions are realistic. It is appropriate to recall the test of the first U.S. hydrogen bomb in 1954 in the Pacific Ocean (at an altitude of 40 meters). Radioactive rain killed Japanese fishermen 1,500 miles from the point of the explosion. There is more than one nuclear weapon on the Komsomolets...

In our opinion, shipbuilding technology that permits even a millionth of a fraction of such a risk must be categorically rejected.

	Dutch Technology	Yevrika [Eureka] Technology
Maximum Lift Capacity	8,000 tons	Over 200,000 tons
Maximum Lift Depth	2,000 meters	12,000 meters
Cost of Salvaging the Komsomolets:		
—a) Without a Protective Sarcophagus	\$200 million	\$50 million
—b) In a Protective Sarcophagus	Not Applicable	\$80 million
Preparation Time for the Lift	2 years	Up to 3 months
Requirement for Foreign Equipment and Experts	100 percent	Not Required
Dependence of Nuclear Submarine Salvage on Time of Year	Only July, August	At Any Time of the Year
Possibility to Earn Hard Currency for Salvaging the Nuclear Submarine in a Year	No	Unlimited
Is Complete Safety Guaranteed for Salvaging the Komsomolets?	No	Totally Guaranteed
Capability to Salvage Ships From Great Ocean Depths	Not Applicable	Salvaging a U.S. Aircraft Carrier From Maximum Depth Is Possible

#### An Alternative to the Dutch Project

So, the Dutch have offered their services. Academician I. Spasskiy, appointed Chief of USSR Ship Salvaging, willingly supported them. His entourage (strong in nuclear shipbuilding but not in ship salvaging) realized quite a few comforts and benefits in this.

In contrast to official science, Yevrika, an informal association of scientists, inventors and practical people, has solved the problem in its own way. What are the capabilities and advantages of the alternate variation?

Strict compliance with two conditions are necessary to safely salvage the nuclear submarine: a very slow raising (pressure drops may destroy the protective systems) and total exclusion of a new dangerous drop to the bottom (deformation and destruction of the hull, reactor, and the

containers with the nuclear weapons is possible). Our experts can comply with these conditions ideally under super-strict international control. The Komsomolets can be delivered to a port of refuge in a protective sarcophagus while submerged while moving at a distance of 20-30 meters over the surface of the sea bottom.

The primary elements of the new technology have successfully undergone unofficial tests in the Baltic under unfavorable weather conditions.

#### Hard Currency for the Komsomolets

Now about resources.

In the recalculation at world prices, Academician I. Spasskiy's deal with the Dutch will cost Russia 17 tons of pure gold with the lack of firm guarantees for a safe salvage. This is an irretrievable loss of very major sums of hard currency that is in extremely short supply and that will never be returned.

With certain personal guarantees of the Russian Federation President, Yevrika may itself earn hard currency not only for salvaging the super-dangerous submarine. Figuratively speaking, the developers are ready to give Russia an entire boxcar load of gold bars in this operation. Our technologists can once again open two very major sources of hard currency resources which right now are practically not being used or are being barbarously stolen by the Mafioso structures.

**Internal.** Recently the CIS Naval Commander's deputies (two admirals and a colonel-general) discussed a deal on the construction of 30,000 apartments for our naval seamen in the United States. In exchange, the American firm will receive over 400 naval ships and 400 aircraft that have been written off during the last five years as scrap and also a significant portion of the strategic reserve of ferrous metals—285 surface ships and submarines that have been sunk in CIS harbors.

The concern about the seamen is praiseworthy. However, the sphere of business is clearly not for admirals. Consciously or thoughtlessly, they have let go of very valuable strategic reserves for next to nothing and have thereby permitted the Americans to save several billion dollars.

This is not the first masterpiece of this "business". The press has already reported on the sale of the written-off submarine to Italy. The Navy's "profit" was a total of \$2,200, although the official price for one ton of scrap metal on the world market is nearly \$140. If this is called business, then what is robbery?

Right now criminal business permits "making" from \$10 to \$40 per ton of scrap metal. We propose reprocessing all scrap metal according to our technology into semifinished products of which there is a shortage on the world market and to receive from \$400 to \$600 per ton. These same Americans will build, not 30,000 but, 200,000 apartments (that's how many officers and naval and army warrant officers we have right now without apartments) with the

money earned. There will be \$1.5-2 billion over and above that. There will be more than enough to salvage the Komsomolets.

**Foreign Sources of Hard Currency.** The new principles for combating gravitation, the lack of expensive diving work, floating cranes and pontoon equipment reduces the cost of salvaging using Yevrika's technology by a factor of 10-100 (depending on the depth). It is extremely unprofitable in all countries (expenditures greatly exceed profits). Therefore, the bottoms of seas and oceans have become a cemetery for thousands of ships, whose numbers annually increase by nearly 300.

Salvaging sunken ships for scrap metal using Yevrika's technology can provide annual profits of up to 600 percent at shallow depths, up to 300 percent at medium depths, and 200 percent at great depths for each dollar invested. The new technology is a "philosophers' stone" that is capable of transforming iron into pure gold.

Only totally irresponsible or corrupt bureaucrats can deprive Russia of hard currency from these sources.

#### "Architects" and Accomplices of a Disaster

The main obstacle to salvaging the Komsomolets is the paralysis of state will and responsibility (malicious intent has also not been excluded) in the highest echelons of power.

It would seem that fate had given us the opportunity to salvage the nuclear submarine already in June 1989. We sent more than 10 similar letters to the country's former president. Some kind of executive discipline was still being maintained in the state at that time and the boat could have been salvaged for a total of 30 million rubles. However, the president did not give us the money, although this sum was 1.5 times less than the cost of his palace at Foros and 25 times less than the Dutch services that had been offered.

We have in hand official letters of the leaders of the former USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding. While manifesting extraordinary interest in the secrets of the latest technology, they attempted to take possession of it only on a free-of-charge basis and without guarantees of recognition of Yevrika's scientific priority. This is a hardy relapse of old thinking: our bureaucrats have always considered someone else's inventions to be their own undivided property and the informalists-inventors—to be intellectual misfits without rights.

Matters are no better today. We have appealed to the leaders' state wisdom more than 10 times but we were unsuccessful. Advisor to the Russian Federation President, General of the Army K.I. Kobets responded for all of them. In a conversation, he remarked: "I do not support you." We sent letters to G. Popov, A. Sobchak, G. Starovoytova, G. Yakunin, O. Rummyantsev, and to another 10 Democratic Russia deputies. However, for some reason they did not wish to manifest their concern about Russia's fate.

The refusal of K.I. Kobets and the people's deputies compelled us to appeal to the leaders of Western countries for support. One of the letters ended up in the hands of specialists. NATO experts were unanimous: Yevrika's predictions on the probability of a global disaster are real.

The further development of events: The Naval Main Staff has drastically changed its attitude toward Academician I. Spasskiy's plan, having recognized the imperfection of the Dutch technology and that "a disaster may break out that is comparable to Chernobyl" with an unsuccessful salvage variation of the nuclear submarine. In the second half of April 1992, a session of the Murmansk Oblsociety [oblast soviet] of people's deputies specially examined the issue of the threat of radiation contamination of the Kola Peninsula.

At the same time, opposing forces also became active. On May 7, Petersburg television showed the film "Lyudi—lodki" ["People—Submarines"] where an attempt was undertaken to calm society and to reanimate the plan of Academician I. Spasskiy and his Dutch colleagues.

It would be more peaceful for all of us if the leadership of the famous Rubin TsKB [Central Design Bureau] had not manifested dilettantism in a field of which it knew little but had utilized its rich potential on its direct assignment: they had sooner corrected design defects on nuclear submarines. Not one U.S. nuclear submarine but several of ours sank in the 1980's. This creates a serious ecological threat for the lives of our fellow countrymen.

So, we have sent over 30 similar letters to representatives of higher legislative and executive rule of Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Russia. There has not been an adequate response. Right now all hopes are on the "fourth estate" in society. We need to destroy the information blockade and unite efforts which would exclude any possibility of new Chernobyls for Russia, the CIS, and other European countries. Our leaders have long known about this but they are not taking the proper steps right now. Inaction before danger is the prologue of the end of Russia.

## CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

### Russian Veterans' Organization Charter

92UM1013A Moscow VETERAN No 15-16, May 92  
(Signed to press 4 May 92) p 14

[Charter of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans of War, Labor, the Armed Forces and Health-Care Agencies]

[Text]

### I. General Provisions

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans of War, Labor, the Armed Forces and Health-Care Agencies (hereafter called All-Russian Veterans' Organization or Veterans' Organization) was established to protect the rights and interests of pensioners and ensure that they are treated with dignity in the society.

It functions on the basis of volunteer participation, self-government and equality for organization members in accordance with the Constitution of the RSFSR and laws of the RSFSR.

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans unites veterans' organizations of republics, krays and oblasts, the city of Moscow, the city of Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in the RSFSR.

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans nominates its candidates for people's deputies in accordance with the laws of the RSFSR, enjoys the right to legislative initiative, submits to state agencies and administrative organizations proposals for improving the life and rights of veterans, works closely with the Supreme Soviet and the Government of the RSFSR, the councils of people's deputies and their executive bodies, cooperates with public and religious organizations of sovereign states, effects international contacts and links with veterans' agencies of other nations.

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans is a legal person and has current accounts and other accounts in bank establishments, a round seal, letter-heads and other essential accessories.

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans is located in the city of Moscow.

## II. The Goals and Tasks of the Organization

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans:

- protects the socioeconomic, labor and personal rights and liberties of the older generation and works to improve their material welfare, living conditions, trade, personal-service, medical and other kinds of services; monitors the observance of laws on pensions and the benefits established for veterans, helps to involve them in labor to the extent that they are able, engages in charitable work, arranges production and management work for veterans' organizations and establishes enterprises with various forms of ownership;
- promotes the establishment of good moral and spiritual values in the society and the preservation and enrichment of the natural cultural and the traditions of peoples of the Russian Federation; involves veterans in the patriotic indoctrination of the youth and in the transfer of the best traditions in labor and service to the homeland to the youth;
- promotes civic harmony and peace among peoples and combats all manifestations of racism, chauvinism and nationalism;
- takes part in the public movement to prevent war and to settle international and inter-ethnic disputes and conflicts by peaceful means;
- participates in the work of maintaining military graves, monuments, obelisks and memorial boards, and the establishment of museums of combat glory to immortalize the military and labor feats of the people.

In accordance with its designated missions the All-Russian Organization of Veterans:

- participates in sessions of the councils of people's deputies and their executive bodies during the discussion of matters pertaining to the life of veterans;
- recommends its own representatives to participate in the work of soviet agencies, public councils, committees and foundations, and commissions at enterprises, establishments and organizations;
- acquaints itself by the established procedure with the work of enterprises, establishments and organizations involved in serving the population to resolve issues affecting the interests of veterans;
- performs production administration work and sets up enterprises and economically accountable organizations with the authority of legal persons to perform its statutory jobs;
- engages in foreign economic activities in accordance with the law;
- speaks out in the press, on television and radio on the functioning of veterans' organizations;
- implements other plenary powers provided for in the Law of the USSR on Public Associations, in legislative enactments of the RSFSR and decisions of local agencies of state authority and government.

## III. Membership, Rights and Duties

Membership in the All-Russian Organization of Veterans is open to people receiving pensions based on age or length of service as well as those who have been awarded the Veteran of Labor or Veteran of the Armed Forces medal residing in the Russian Federation, regardless of nationality, party or religious affiliation, who accept the goals of the veterans' movement and the organization's charter.

Membership in the All-Russian Organization of Veterans is granted at a general meeting of members of the primary organization on the basis of an oral request from the potential member.

A veteran has the right:

- to the support of the veteran's organization for protecting his rights and interests in relations with state and management agencies, and public organizations, as well as in the case of his nomination as a candidate for people's deputy;
- to elect or be elected to the governing bodies of veterans' organizations at all levels;
- to participate in the discussion of matters pertaining to the work of veterans' organizations.

Veterans take part (to the extent of their abilities and consistent with their state of health) in the achievement of the goals and tasks of the organization, perform assignments for the veterans' councils, help to enhance the prestige of the veterans' organizations in the population and support it financially on a voluntary basis.

A veteran may leave the All-Russian Organization of Veterans by submitting a request to be removed from the organization or may be expelled for violating the charter. Decisions to expel members are made by the primary organizations.

#### **IV. The Organizational Structure of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans**

The All-Russian Organization of Veterans is arranged according to production territory.

The basic units of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans are primary veterans' organizations set up at enterprises, in organizations, at educational institutions and in military collectives and residential areas. In large primary organizations veterans' councils may be set up for shops and for apartment buildings.

Veterans' organizations encompass councils, sections and groups (of war veterans from the same regiment and participants in the military operations in Afghanistan or other countries), veterans' clubs and associations based on professional interests and problems of the veterans' movement.

All veterans' organizations are independent in their functioning and acquire the rights of a legal person by the established procedure.

#### **V. The Authority and the Procedure for Forming the Governing Bodies of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans**

The Veterans' Congress of the RSFSR is the highest agency of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans. It is convened once every 5 years.

Extra congresses may be convened at the initiative of the All-Russian Veterans' Council at the request of at least one third of the total number of oblast, kray and republic organizations.

The Veterans' Council of the RSFSR:

—defines the basic orientation of the work of veterans' organizations;

The Veterans' Congress of the RSFSR:

—hears reports from the All-Russian Veterans' Council and passes decrees based on them;

—approves the Charter of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans, makes amendments and changes and approves the Statute on the Auditing Commission;

—elects an All-Russian Veterans' Council and an auditing commission with a makeup specified by the congress;

—discusses other matters pertaining to the work of the veterans' organization.

In the interim between congresses the All-Russian Organization of Veterans is directed by the All-Russian Veterans' Council.

Plenums of the All-Russian Council are held as necessary, but at least once a year. Plenary sessions are considered to

have a quorum if at least half the members of the All-Russian Council are present. Decisions are adopted for the All-Russian Veterans Council by a vote of a majority present.

The All-Russian Veterans' Council:

—elects a council chairman, deputy council chairmen and a council executive secretary;

—convenes the Veteran's Council of the RSFSR, including extra congresses, and establishes the standard for representation and the procedure for electing candidates to the congress;

—represents the All-Russian Organization of Veterans in state and public agencies and organizations, works out the position of the veterans' organization on draft laws and decrees of higher agencies and the republic administration;

—participates with other concerned organizations in the study of problems of the veterans' movement, and works out practical and scientific proposals on them;

—replaces part of the council membership (up to a third of its members) when necessary. The All-Russian Council elects a presidium of the All-Russian Veterans' Council to direct the All-Russian Veterans' Organization in the interim between congresses, consisting of a chairman, a deputy chairman, a council executive secretary and members of the presidium in the numbers specified by the council.

The Chairman of the All-Russian Veterans' Council:

—arranges for the implementation of decisions coming out of council plenums, represents the All-Russian Organization of Veterans in relations with state, public and cooperative organizations both in the Russian Federation and abroad, conducts meetings of the presidium and its bureau and issues instructions.

The Presidium of the All-Russian Veteran's Council:

—provides practical assistance to veterans' organizations, summarizes and disseminates their beneficial work experience;

—arranges for the implementation of decisions coming out of congresses and plenums of the All-Russian Veterans' Council, and sets up commissions and other council bodies for individual areas of the work;

—sets up economically accountable organizations and joint enterprises, which may be with foreign companies and organizations, other economically accountable associations and a fund for veterans organizations, allocates money for charitable purposes and participates in the establishment of a bank;

—approves the estimate of expenses for the All-Russian Veterans' Council;

—forms a bureau of the presidium consisting of the chairman of the All-Russian Council of Veterans, the first deputy and the deputy chairman, the executive secretary and three members of the presidium;

—holds sessions as necessary, but at least once every 4 months.

The presidium bureau:

—monitors the implementation of decisions coming out of plenums and presidiums of the All-Russian Veterans' Council;

—approves the list of staff members;

—specifies the amount of incentives for activists in the veterans' organizations and workers in administration within the limits of the estimate;

—decides on operational matters of the Council of Veterans.

The Auditing Commission of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans performs its work in accordance with the Statute on the Auditing Commission approved by the Veterans Congress of the RSFSR. Members of the Auditing Commission participate in council plenums.

The highest body of the republic, kray, oblast, Moscow city, Saint Petersburg city, Leningrad Oblast, district, rayon, city and city rayon (prefecture) veterans' organization is the republic, kray, oblast, district, rayon, city or city rayon (prefecture) conference, which elects its own veterans' council to handle its daily affairs. A republic kray, oblast, Moscow city, Saint Petersburg city and Leningrad Oblast, Moscow city, Saint Petersburg city, Leningrad Oblast, and district conference is convened once every 5 years; a rayon, city, city rayon (prefecture) conference, once every 2 or 3 years.

Republic, kray, oblast, Moscow city, Saint Petersburg city and Leningrad Oblast, district, rayon and rayon city veterans' councils:

—direct and coordinate the work of veterans' organizations and keep the public informed on their work;

—represent veterans of the region in state and public agencies and organizations;

—keep a registry of members of the veterans' organizations;

—form commissions and other formations for individual areas of the work, involving a broad range of the veterans' aktiv in them;

—set up a fund (branch fund) for veterans;

—conduct report-and-election conferences, at which they elect the veterans' councils and auditing commissions by open ballot.

#### VI. Primary Veterans' Organizations

Primary veterans organizations at enterprises and establishments, on kolkhozes and sovkhoses, educational institutions, in the residential communities, in settlement and rural councils elect a veterans' organization council consisting of a chairman, a deputy chairman and council members in numbers set by a general veterans' assembly

by open ballot for a period of 2-3 years. A chairman and a secretary are elected instead of a council in organizations with fewer than 25 veterans.

Veterans assemblies are convened to discuss their work as necessary, but at least once a year, and elect delegates to rayon, city and city rayon conferences.

The primary veterans' organizations:

—keep a registry of the veterans;

—protect the honor, dignity and good name of veterans, look after them and help them to improve their material and personal-service conditions and help them obtain medical services;

—study the material situation of veterans;

—arrange for veterans to participate in public-political life and help to educate the youth;

—establish relations with insurance organizations;

—set up veterans' clubs;

—maintain close ties with military units and military commissariats, and conduct joint projects with them.

#### VII. Funds and Property of Veterans' Organizations

The funds of veterans' organizations are formed with voluntary dues and contributions;

revenues from lectures, exhibits, lotteries and other activities; income from production and economic and publishing activities;

other revenues not forbidden by law.

Veterans organizations have their own buildings, installations, housing pool, equipment, furnishings, cultural and educational, and health facilities, monetary funds, stocks, other securities and other property essential to support the work specified in this Charter.

They may also own publishing houses and other enterprises, charitable institutions, sanatoria and various other rest facilities created with funds of the veterans' organization.

Veterans' organizations may establish their own mass media.

Veterans' councils at all levels use their money at their own discretion and voluntarily designate a percentage of their monetary funds for the higher veterans' councils.

#### VIII. Shutting Down a Veterans' Organization

A veterans' organization may be shut down by decision of a veterans' congress or a court. All property and money remaining after an organization's functioning has stopped is used for statutory purposes.

This Charter was ratified at the 2nd Report-and-Election Conference of the All-Russian Organization of Veterans of War, Labor and the Armed Forces on 27 November 1991.

### Interview with Head of CIS Armed Forces Press Center

92UM1033A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 May 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with CIS Joint Armed Forces Press Center Chief Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Yakovlevich Medvedev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel O. Falichev: "Credo—Objectivity, Honesty, and Efficiency"]

[Text] They call the mass media the fourth estate which attests to its influence in society. An important place belongs to press centers that accumulate and disseminate information, including the CIS Joint Armed Forces Press Center of which Lieutenant Colonel N. Medvedev recently became the head.

[Falichev] Nikolay Yakovlevich, you were a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA staff member and a professional journalist in the recent past. And in 1989 you were invited into the press group which had been created which with time was also transformed into the Press Center. What has remained in your memory from that period?

[Medvedev] Unfortunately, I did not obtain any satisfaction during the 1.5-2 years of work. Still, there was a great distance from the desired to the actual. As for our press group, it actually existed on a nominal basis. Contacts with all of the mass media were not regular in nature. Departmental obstruction of those who depended on the submission of information and a declarative understanding of glasnost had an impact. Yes and there was something to hide: the attempt of certain officials to leave everything as it was.

[Falichev] What is the Press Center's structure? What subdivisions does it consist of?

[Medvedev] The Press Center is the leading department of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Information Directorate. It consists of three groups. Cooperation with the native mass media (contact telephone: 293-39-14) is in the sphere of activity of the first group. The second group primarily works with the foreign press (296-03-65). And the third group is involved with the organization and conduct of briefings and press conferences. We have a staff of 14 people. The officers are primarily journalists.

[Falichev] What tasks does the Press Center face?

[Medvedev] One of the primary tasks is maintenance of standing working contacts with the central organs of the press, radio and television to ensure objective and comprehensive coverage of the life and activity of the Armed Forces. The Press Center conducts accreditation of mass media representatives—both native and foreign—and renders assistance to them in the preparation of radio and television broadcasts, newspaper articles, and regularly organizes press conferences and briefings on timely problems in the life and activity of the Armed Forces... We prepare a digest of articles on defense issues that have been published in central publications on a daily basis and disseminate it among the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief's staff and in some Russian state structures.

[Falichev] Are you satisfied with how the Press Center is being operated today?

[Medvedev] It is early to talk about satisfaction. I think that we have begun to more actively cooperate with the mass media. The Press Center receives 30-40 telephone calls practically on a daily basis. And we have to provide an accurate argumentative response to each call. Both foreign and our journalists call. They are interested in literally everything that affects the life and activity of the Armed Forces.

I want to stress: we do not simply skillfully use information—we are responsible for its reliability and veracity. Why do I focus attention on that? The fact is that recently various "intermediaries" are appearing who are attempting to organize briefings and press conferences and are sending foreign journalists to various army and navy units and institutions while bypassing the Information Directorate. In the process, they are not assuming any responsibility for possible errors and consequences. I repeat: we advocate openness [otkrytost] and close contact with all the mass media and the representatives of the various directorates and ruling structures. But we oppose such piracy in work, if I can express it that way, as certain cases attest that are not always selfless. We oppose transforming Armed Forces units and subunits into open exhibition areas. The Information Directorate and the Press Center have the exclusive right to organize the information process. I am already not talking about what are and remain state interests and the need to preserve military secrets.

[Falichev] Incidentally, as a result of the attempt to tell society the entire truth about the army, good and bad, aren't you experiencing some pressure and attempts to measure out information in doses according to someone's taste or mood?

[Medvedev] When I came here, there was fear on that score. I am amazed but this is a fact: to this day, we are not experiencing any pressure from anyone. The Press Center chief practically has to solve many things himself. Naturally, while consulting with the chief of the Information Directorate, experts, etc. But we do not receive orders of the type "give or don't give". On the contrary, while organizing the information process within the already existing information structures, I would say that new cooperation with journalists is even encouraged, a spirit of partnership, mutual respect and responsibility for the reliability of the information being disseminated is being asserted. And the information is free of propaganda. And we ourselves simply would not be able to ensure strict compliance with these criteria. Why? The Press Center operates in the Information Directorate and its success depends on close cooperation with its other subdivisions and with directorates of the General Staff, CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's Directorate, the headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, and the Commonwealth states ministries of defense.

As for problems, of course, there are some. It may sound strange but as of today we have, let me put it this way, no

facilities to conduct briefings or press conferences. For example, we have been forced to utilize the TsDSA [Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M.V. Frunze] to do that. They willingly let us into the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Press Center where we jointly conduct press conferences. But I think that we will manage to solve this problem with time. Like the other—to create an Armed Forces Press Club where military and civilian journalists could exchange opinions, argue, and talk with politicians, scholars, and military leaders. Incidentally, we recently managed to achieve some progress in solving many problems. But for now such a problem remains, for example, such as supplying the Press Center with modern authorized equipment: computers, faxes, multi-functional telephone communications... It is also characteristic for military district and fleet press centers.

Our credo in work is objectivity, honesty, and efficiency. And we intend to realize it within the single information space not only of Russia but also of the CIS Joint Armed Forces through the press centers of the branches of the Armed Forces, fleets, military districts, and organs for work with society and communications with the press at division-sized units and armies... I think that our associates must be more active and they themselves must appear in the press, on television and on radio.

Indifferent bureaucrats must not work at the press center. People must work at the press center who, through their previous work experience and who are professionals in spirit, are in fact capable of implementing the army's information policy of openness [otkrytost] for society.

#### **Interview with Emergency Situations Committee Chief**

*92UM1043A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 92 First edition p 2*

[Interview with Russian State Committee for Civil Defense Matters, Emergency Situations and the Elimination of Natural Disasters Inspectorate Chief Colonel Sergey Mikhaylovich Kudinov by Captain 3rd Rank A. Peltz: "The GKChS Is Beginning To Function..."]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Dossier. S.M. Kudinov. Born in 1947. Graduated from Suvorov Military School and Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School.

In 1981, he was sent to Afghanistan and was chief of the political department of an independent airborne regiment at Bagrama. Later he was deputy chief of the Pskov Airborne Division political department and chief of the Pskov VVDKU [Airborne Command School] political department. He was elected a people's deputy of the Ryazan Oblsovet [Oblast Soviet].

In December 1990, he was released from the Armed Forces for... an official discrepancy. A conflict with the VDV [Airborne Troops] and the USSR Ministry of Defense leadership as a result of the rather well-known September "airborne troops excursion to Moscow" served as the cause.

In September 1991, he was restored to the cadres of the Armed Forces. Since January 1992, he has been State Committee for Civil Defense Matters, Emergency Situations and the Elimination of Natural Disasters (GKChS) inspectorate chief.

#### **Russian State Committee for Civil Defense Matters, Emergency Situations and the Elimination of Natural Disasters Inspectorate Chief Colonel Sergey Kudinov Invites Only Professionals**

[Peltz] Sergey Mikhaylovich, does the abbreviation GKChS not cause any quite specific associations with you?

[Kudinov] There is an assonance. But believe me, our committee's tasks and missions are quite different. Its creation and the corresponding Decree of the then still President of the RSFSR was signed on November 19, 1991 and was caused, as they say, by life itself.

The fact is that we always were practically defenseless before misfortune, already not talking about serious catastrophes and natural disasters. Recall the earthquake in Armenia or the disaster at Chernobyl. Besides the pain and suffering to the victims, a feeling of despair also arose: we were simply incapable of rendering timely and effective assistance to people. There was nothing. Neither special vehicles, equipment, nor trained specialists. We dismantled the piles of rubble with our hands and a crowbar and we threw out radioactive debris with shovels. In a word, everything was like in that saying—the time to lock the barn door is not after the horse has been stolen...

Ultimately, common sense prevailed and the state assumed responsibility for the resolution of all problems in connection with emergency situations that emerge. So, the State Committee for Civil Defense Matters, Emergency Situations and the Elimination of Natural Disasters was created.

And what are we involved with? First of all with ensuring the creation of a Russian Warning and Response System in emergency situations, we coordinate the activities of the agencies of state rule for protection of the population and national property from catastrophes, accidents, natural disasters, we develop state programs, we carry out supervision of the fulfillment of measures for the prevention of emergency situations on Russian territory, and we directly conduct work on the elimination of the consequences of various natural disasters.

[Peltz] Are there already results?

[Kudinov] Oh, we have enough work. We are a rich country, unfortunately including in all sorts of accidents and emergency situations. Yes and it is difficult to suggest another with the irresponsibility, criminal callousness, and slovenliness that have encompassed us. Add here utterly obsolete technology, worn out equipment, and a total lack of control. As a result, for example, more than 90 major accidents and catastrophes occurred in April alone. Eighty seven people died and 340 were injured. The damage inflicted to the national economy is estimated at 100 million rubles.

[Peltz] Then, let us name addresses.

[Kudinov] Khabarovsk held us in tension practically all winter. The city was frozen. We helped them with everything that we could. We had only begun to breathe easier when there was a new misfortune at the end of March. As a result of a major accident at a pumping station, more than 120,000 cubic meters of waste ended up in the Amur. The threat of poisoning the city's running water was great and only timely protective measures permitted us to avoid the emergence of dangerous epidemics.

Later Ufa. They prevented a very serious misfortune at a petroleum processing plant. The unique operation was conducted using military engineers under the leadership of Colonel Aleksandr Averchenko. At that time, they managed to lay a piece of a plant pipe weighing 700 tons in its prepared location using a directed charge, thus avoiding unpredictable destruction.

A new address is Tuva. A plague epidemic infected cattle. Sick animals ended up in Mongolia. The epidemic could have attained new dimensions. And once again we could not get by without the assistance of soldiers, now already from the Siberian Military District. We also became rescuers—we worked in minus 45° weather and literally hollowed out the frozen carcasses, transported them using helicopters, and stored and burned them.

The Riga-Moscow Train wreck near Podsozenka Station. Thanks to PVO [Air Defense] troops units and subunits which were the first to turn up there. Moscow Military District helicopter crewmen, who quickly flew a dozen sorties with doctors, rescuers, and other specialists, also splendidly helped.

Of the last events—a fire at the military depots in Armenia. I think that our experimental IL-76 aircraft contributed significant assistance in fighting the fire.

Incidentally, this same aircraft helped to extinguish the fire at the artillery depots in Vladivostok. Five sorties were flown and more than 40 tons of water were dropped. And although 47 of the 52 storage areas were destroyed by fire, we managed to prevent the ignition of rocket projectiles thanks to it. Today, it is hard to talk about the damage inflicted and the 50,000 people who were evacuated. But our experts along with representatives of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the local authorities continue to render needed assistance to eliminate the consequences of the fire. Our group headed by Deputy Committee Chief Lieutenant-General A. Tkachev has been in Vladivostok since the day it began.

[Peltz] Sergey Mikhaylovich, you often mention the military. Tell me frankly: who will come to our aid first—your rescuers or the soldiers?

[Kudinov] Gratitude to the military specialists is entirely justified. We are not in competition. We work in close contact. Moreover, a special document even exists according to which the CIS Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief's directorate transfers military command and control organs, institutions, and civil defense troops that are located on its territory to the jurisdiction of the Russian GKChS.

But we are counting on the creation of our own forces that are capable of operating, say, like the military. First of all this is a question of the creation of a central airmobile detachment of rescuers.

[Peltz] If you can, in more detail...

[Kudinov] The detachment will be small, approximately 200 people. The selection of rescuers will be conducted on a competitive basis. The requirements are high. We are assigning priority to those people who have served in the airborne and border troops and in spetsnaz [Special Forces] units. A candidate must have a middle education, be an instructor or a top-class athlete in some sport, desirably mountain climbing, parachuting, scuba diving, and similar sports. The physical requirements are also high: an airmobile detachment rescuer must be able to do at least 50 push ups, 18 pull ups on the horizontal bar, be a good swimmer, run three kilometers in 10 minutes, know the basics of survival under various natural conditions, know how to render first aid...

[Peltz] Will the detachment begin to function soon?

[Kudinov] There is a government decision on creating the detachment. But there are enough problems and paradoxical ones at that. For example, this profession—rescuer—has never been and still is not in the wage classification. This reminds me of the situation with stuntmen. They exist, they work, they risk, and there is no such profession. In order to avoid that, we went out with a proposal to "legalize" this specialty and to determine the level of training for specialists. So we soon hope to have 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and international class rescuers. Everything will depend on the level of personal training. The preliminary salary will be R3,000 plus various factors for the degree of complication of the operations, conditions, etc.

[Peltz] Sergey Mikhaylovich, wouldn't it be easier to prevent misfortunes rather than to be involved in eliminating their consequences?

[Kudinov] Our committee is also involved quite seriously with that. There are several directorates in its structure that are especially involved with the prevention of all kinds of ChS's [Emergency Situations]. There are also special departments, for example, synoptic analysis, analysis, and prediction of natural, technological and socio-economic emergency situations. This year, the government is investing R120 million in the science of prediction. An even greater sum will be spent on supporting research which Russia's leading institutes will conduct based on committee orders.

We need to do this since an increase in the number of emergency situations is being observed. In contrast to last year, transportation accidents have increased by a factor of 4.5 and fires at industrial enterprises have increased by a factor of three. The number of manmade accidents and catastrophes has increased by a factor of eight.

[Peltz] Recently rumors have circulated about a possible earthquake in Moscow. Are you prepared for that?

[Kudinov] Of course, rumors are rumors. But scientists and scholars are arguing about whether these rumors are supported by reality. We have calculated the probability of an earthquake and have arrived at the conclusion that there still was a certain seismic tension in our area. So far, experts from the Institute of Earth Physics cannot definitively say just what occurred in Sasovo of Ryazan Oblast. An explosion? Then—of what? An earthquake? There is no precise answer. So, it is better to be ready for everything, including, it would seem, for the most improbable things, like an earthquake in Moscow. And we were ready.

[Peltz] So, the GKChS has begun to function. And what do you see in its future?

[Kudinov] Today, it is very difficult to guess. But... In my opinion, this is first of all—a major scientific center for the prevention of all kinds of emergency situations. An organization that has, when necessary, broad rights for the coordination of the activities of all state services and institutions and that has the most modern systems to fight for people's lives and their safety. In a word, This must be a state safety system that gives people hope that help will arrive in a timely manner during any misfortunes and during the most complicated situations.

#### Interview with Chief of Railroad Troops

92UM1056A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 May 92 First edition p 3

[Interview with CIS Joint Armed Forces Railroad Troops Chief Lieutenant-General Grigoriy Iosifovich Kogatko by CIS Joint Armed Forces Press Center Associate Lieutenant Colonel V. Uvatenko: "Those Called Upon to Build and Defend"]

[Text] From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA dossier: Lieutenant-General Grigoriy Iosifovich Kogatko was born in 1944 in the village of Bolshaya Aleksandrovka in Novobugskiy Rayon, Nikolayevsk Oblast. After graduation from a railroad transportation technicum, he was drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces. He performed compulsory service in the railroad troops. In 1963, he received his initial officer rank and commanded a platoon, company, battalion, brigade, and corps. In recent years, he headed the Leningrad Higher Railroad Troops and Military Transport Communications School imeni M.V. Frunze and the CIS Joint Armed Forces Vehicular Directorate. He is a Hero of Socialist Labor.

He is married and has two children.

Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin has signed the Decree "On Russian Federation Railroad Troops". We requested that CIS Joint Armed Forces Railroad Troops Chief Lieutenant-General Grigoriy Kogatko comment on the provisions of this decree.

[Uvatenko] Grigoriy Iosifovich, as far as I know, the railroad troops have been impatiently awaiting this decree and with it—specificity in work and duty...

[Kogatko] Well now there is that specificity. All railroad troop division-sized and smaller units, institutions, military educational institutions and enterprises deployed on

Russian Federation territory have been accepted under Russian jurisdiction. The Russian Federation Railroad Troops have been created which will carry out missions in its interest.

I recall that, in 1851, Russia became the first country in the world in whose army railroad troops were created and comprehensively developed. The first military railroad units were formed at that time to guard and operate the Petersburg-Moscow railroad. In the wars which Russia conducted in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the present century, Russian railroad troops demonstrated that they are a necessary component of an army in the field. At the beginning of 1918, the railroad troops were disbanded through a strong-willed decision. But time has put everything in its place. And now, the President's Decree first of all confirms the need for these troops to exist.

[Uvatenko] Will the troops' primary missions undergo changes?

[Kogatko] The Russian Railroad Troops will, as before, carry out the tasks of guarding equipment and restoring and building railroads on Russian Federation territory in the interest of ensuring the defense of Russia and the resolution of other tasks. Henceforth, they will function under Russian Minarchstroy [Ministry of Architecture and Construction] and, as before, cooperate with the Russian Ministry of Railways and Transstroy State Corporation. In their activities the troops are guided by Russian Presidential decrees, Russian Federation laws and, on issues of combat and mobilization readiness, by RF [Russian Federation] military directorate organ documents. The manning procedures, conditions and terms of service, pension provision, privileges and benefits for personnel that have been prescribed for them have been preserved for the railroad troops. Financing, material and technical supply and other types of support for the troops are carried out at the expense of the republic budget and funds.

[Uvatenko] Is financing of construction programs also being kept in mind?

[Kogatko] Yes, of course. In peacetime, that is the military railroad men's primary mission. So, after the war, our troops built the Western Karelian Main Line, the Klyukvennyy-Sayansk, Izdel-Ob, Tyumen-Tobolsk-Surgut lines and others. The troops have completed and are completing a significant amount of work on the development of railroad junctions and stations. Spurs have been constructed to VAZ [Volga Motor Vehicle Factory] and KamAZ [Kamsk Motor Vehicle Factory], Cherepovet Metallurgical Combine, major electrical power plants, and to industrial and agricultural enterprises. In recent years, military railroad workers have toiled on the construction of 1500 kilometers of the eastern portion of BAM [Baykal-Amur Line], the new Meret-Central Siberian Line, and second tracks on the freight traffic sectors of Tyumen-Surgut, Abakan-Tayshet, Roshchino-Vyborg and Gatchina-Mga-Budogoshch. Railroad spurs have been built to Yerkovetsk and Luchegorsk open pit coal mines, Solnechniy Mine-Enrichment Combine in Khabarovsk Kray,

and to defense facilities. On average, the troops annually put more than 500 kilometers of various types of railroad track into operation on Russian territory. This is 25-30 percent of what the transport builders do on the whole.

[Uvatenko] Excuse a somewhat banal question: what is a "headache" for the chief of the railroad troops today?

[Kogatko] More than likely it is not about what, but about whom. About people. The specific nature of a railroad troop's duty is such that he is on the road and separated from his family for nine months per year. Therefore I see my primary task to do everything possible to improve the social-everyday living conditions of personnel, officers and warrant officers. Right now the Russian government has made a decision in accordance with which a rayon coefficient of 1.7 has been established which will be added to salaries for railroad troops military units that are involved with the construction of BAM and with the construction of the Berkaitit-Tommot-Yakutsk railway line. This is a major matter, although of course it does not solve all of the problems...

[Uvatenko] Housing is certainly the most serious problem?

[Kogatko] Yes, today we have nearly 3,000 families without apartments with all of the conveniences although I will say that several years ago the number of people without apartments in the troops had reached up to 6,000. Right now a comprehensive program to provide servicemen with individual apartments with all of the conveniences has been developed and is being implemented. In 1990, 2,000 officers and warrant officers' families and last year more than 1,500 families held housewarmings. This

year we plan to build 1,800 apartments. If we manage to maintain these housing construction rates, in the next four years every family of military railway men will be provided with housing with all of the conveniences.

Intensive construction of barracks, headquarters, clubs, and gymnasiums from modular prefabricated designs that are manufactured at our plants is also being conducted. Modern housing and everyday services complexes have been created on rail and highway routes to house personnel under field conditions.

There is one other problem. The complicated political and demographic situation in the country must have a negative impact on manning the troops with personnel.

[Uvatenko] What is the solution?

[Kogatko] Increase the productivity of labor. Therefore, utilization of scientific-technical progress in transportation construction and the restoration of railroads is receiving priority significance. Our scientists, engineers and technical workers are persistently working on the creation of highly productive equipment suites and the broad introduction of industrialization and fundamentally new technologies that ensure high rates of construction-restoration work. The issues of consolidating our own industrial and production facilities remains serious.

Of course, the processes that are occurring in the country today are not sidestepping the railroad troops. The disruption of economic ties with regions and the breakdown of centralized deliveries is seriously complicating the fulfillment of assigned missions. I think that the Presidential Decree will help us to accelerate the solution of the problems.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Delegates Comments on Troop Withdrawal Talks

*LD0105205692 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 28 Apr 92*

[Report by Roma Pakeniene on Lithuanian-Russian talks on former USSR Army troop withdrawal from Lithuania, including recorded remarks by Romualdas Ozolas and Gediminas Serksnys, members of the Lithuanian expert delegation at the talks]

[Text] As we have already reported, the third meeting this year of the Lithuanian and Russian experts concerning the withdrawal of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union was concluded last Friday in Vilnius. It was officially announced that the Lithuanian side did not foresee the possibility of continuing to look for a solution to the technical aspects of the troops' withdrawal. Aleksandras Abisala, head of the expert group, said that Russia continues to be unwilling to discuss the date of the troops' final withdrawal and compensation for the harm inflicted by the armed forces. It is hoped that the Lithuanian and Russian state negotiation delegations, or even the leaders of the states themselves, will answer the most important political questions.

However, according to Romualdas Ozolas, one of the Lithuanian experts who by the way has a great deal of experience in negotiating with the Soviet Union, and now with Russia, noted that although work by the experts was very difficult and slow, it still yielded certain results. For example, the documents prepared by the Lithuanian side compelled the Russian side to take a very specific step last week: to provide an evaluation of these documents and to propose their own wording of them.

The issues concerning the legal aspects of the troops' withdrawal as well as the issue of compensation for ecological and other harm inflicted, and issues concerning mutual social assistance, are dealt with by the sub-group headed by Romualdas Ozolas. A document on the legal definition of the life of the servicemen who are currently in Lithuania was discussed at the latest meeting. The Lithuanian side declared clearly and categorically that only the laws of the Republic of Lithuania are valid at the military units deployed in Lithuania. The servicemen are granted only the right of behavior [as heard] as defined by the Military Statute. According to Romualdas Ozolas, success has been achieved in proving the legality of our demands, although a great deal of time was needed to achieve this.

[Ozolas] In the amendments of their drafts, the Russians are aiming at legalizing the principle of territoriality. The Russians are trying to adhere to this concept, presenting the proposal that it should be taken for granted that the laws of the Russian Federation are valid on the territories of the military units. They copied this concept from the Russian-German Treaty, according to which it was made possible for the military townlets to use Russian laws. However, this is absolutely unacceptable to us, and would be illegal here, because only the laws of the Republic of Lithuania are valid in our state. Having presented our

essential criticism, we agreed to meet or to send the draft versions by post. These versions will be specifically worded to show what was agreed after all the long talks as a rightful [demand] from our side. Therefore, I regard the fact that they withdrew their demand on territoriality as a result which on no account could be labelled as negative.

However, whether they are going to agree later with what they agreed in sub-groups sitting at the negotiation table, or whether they will be given instructions to ignore the agreement is another story.

[Pakeniene] According to Romualdas Ozolas, one of the most important legal questions with regard to the presence of the armed forces in Lithuania is the crimes committed by Soviet servicemen outside the territories of the military units. This problem was also discussed at the meeting of groups of experts in Vilnius.

[Ozolas] They could not understand how a certain legal status with regard to these military units could nevertheless be maintained if the Russian laws were not valid. We told them that when a crime is committed, we immediately make claims accordingly against the servicemen who committed a crime. It is neither they nor their military procuracy—which has no right to be here or any other military juridical bodies—but the juridical bodies of our Republic who detain these offenders, take them into custody, and then the matters related to the investigation of their offense are decided together with the institutions of the Russian state and not the military unit.

We proposed to them that it could be worded in the most general way; something like this: The Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs addresses to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in its turn takes the matter either to the Russian General Procuracy or the Russian High Court, or to any other specific institution which would decide on the matter accordingly. Here I believe it is an absolutely normal and orderly way of deciding matters of this nature.

[Pakeniene] When asked about the failed discussions on compensation for damage done to Lithuania by the Soviet Armed Forces since 1940, Romualdas Ozolas refused to give any further comment. One thing was clear, he said, that the extent of the damage officially announced, which amounts to \$230 billion, is a very approximate figure. This figure will be considerably higher. Anyway, said Romualdas Ozolas, the process of negotiations is necessary because it proves once again that it is not we but Russia which does not want to carry out what both state leaders agreed upon.

Another Lithuanian negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Gediminas Serksnys, also speaks about the negotiation process, which is progressing somewhat. According to him, only one document has been completed and confirmed by both sides: the technical protocol on handing over the territories, and control of the withdrawal process. However, the three draft agreements which had been prepared and handed in by the Lithuanian side so far are progressing with great difficulty. For example, the sub-unit headed by Gediminas Serksnys, which deals with preparing the general document on the final date and the conditions of the

withdrawal, witnessed many arguments last week. The Russian proposals in many cases are not acceptable to us, said Gediminas Serksnys. However, we will attempt to look for solutions acceptable to both sides. In addition, there are articles which have already been coordinated and which satisfy both sides. On the other hand, the interlocutor said, to a great extent the work of experts is futile if there are no political decisions on the final date of the withdrawal, or on compensation for the damage. The work would proceed at a significantly greater speed and it would be more fruitful.

[Serksnys] Now, for example, when coordinating individual articles or individual questions, the line of argument quite often used is: We do not know. Many problems would no longer arise if an agreement were reached whereby the troops would be withdrawn this year, which is what we have been aiming at all the time. Then all the articles which speak about some long-term observations and so on would become irrelevant.

For example, we have received the Russian proposal on their obligations according to the treaty on the medium- and short-range missiles; that we should be present at the location of deployment. We answered that we were not a place of deployment. Then there are other things similar to these. However, all these would not have to be discussed if political decisions were made. These would become irrelevant. We would not need them at all because many problems which we have been discussing of late—for example, concerning some legal concepts, social guarantees, and so on—in many cases are long term issues. If this is only for say a half-year period then these decide nothing. The Russian experts keep stressing issues of this kind, and from this we draw the conclusion that their aim is to delay the whole affair and to arrange matters in such a way that the armed forces' withdrawal is delayed for as long as possible.

[Pakeniene] Incidentally, Gediminas Serksnys said that apart from the negotiation process, the movement of troops, which has become more active, and other factors which indicate that Russia is delaying the solution of the problem vital to Lithuania causes great concern today.

[Serksnys] First, you probably know that the visit to Lithuania by First Deputy Foreign Minister Shelov-Kovedyayev, the special envoy of the Russian president, has been postponed. A telephone message was received on Friday [date not specified]. We received a telephone message saying that because of the great amount of work, and because of the absence of Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Shelov-Kovedyayev was unable to come, and that his visit has been postponed to the beginning of May.

Second, the Russian minister of justice was to come this week in order to sign an agreement on legal cooperation with our Ministry of Justice. This is an agreement which was handed to us on 31 January, when the first meeting of the delegations took place. Later this agreement was dealt with by the Ministry of Justice on the Lithuanian side. The agreement has been initialed and it was to be signed. Yet

again we received a report at the end of last week asking that we postpone the signing until a later date in May. This is the second fact.

Third, the reinforcement of the Russian Armed Forces in Lithuania has begun. If before there were separate incidents of this nature—several tens of people in Siauliai and Telsiai were detained by officials of our Defense Ministry, some of them were deported from Lithuania—now several hundred conscripts have been brought in to the military townlets in the forests of Kazlu Ruda. We have voiced our objections to the Russian delegation, because according to the decision made by our government, the additional contingent may only be brought in as a replacement of the already existing contingent, and only with the permission of our government.

If I am not mistaken this decision was adopted in December or January. Meanwhile they are bringing in a new contingent, which involves large numbers, without consulting anyone. I can say that there are around 500-600 people, and according to our reports this number could be increased. This indicates that Russia is aware of this, because we have already sent several notes to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that they must not do this. They know about the situation for sure. We made a protest again during the negotiations; however, they do not take any action and continue to violate our sovereignty by introducing additional troops.

#### **Incidents Against CIS Army Units in Baltics Noted**

*92UM1032A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 92 First edition p 1*

[Article by Col V. Gavrilenko, Col M. Ziemins and Capt 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "They Are Pressing the Russian Army to Leave the Baltic Area, and They Are Not Selective About Their Means"]

[Text] **Complicated events are occurring in Latvia and Lithuania right now.**

On 14 May, at the little town of Garkalne near Riga, Pvt Nikolay Palyev was wounded in the leg by a round from an assault rifle while Russian border troops were dismantling a communication cable. Militiamen from the Riga regiment commanded by Roberts Zhillers were the ones who fired.

The incident is actually typical of the current situation in the republic with respect to military property of the former USSR. As we know, the Latvian Supreme Council passed a decree stating that all real estate of the former Soviet Army belongs to the republic. The military, including the border troops, which have come under Russia's jurisdiction since then, do not recognize this decree, since it was adopted unilaterally, as they say. The latest incident arose over cable which personnel of the Baltic Border District had laid.

This is what Lt Col Anatoliy Brakovitskiy, commander of a communications battalion in the Baltic Border District, had to say on the matter:

"I received the order to dismantle the armor-plated, multichannel communication cable laid through the Garkalne Forest in case of a war back at the end of the '80s. Sixty men and I set out on motor vehicles. At approximately 09:30 some local residents came up. One of them showed his deputy's identification and asked what we were doing. I answered, and the individual got onto his bicycle and left. A few minutes later a Latvian minibus and a Moskvich carrying militiamen drove up. They were armed with pistols and assault rifles. I want to point out that none of us was armed. One of the militiamen approached our vehicle and shot two tires."

Commenting on the situation, Girts Kristovskis, chief of militia for the Latvian Republic, said that the militiamen, of whom there were 45 or 50, ordered the Russian border troops to stop digging up the cable. "When their commander refused to obey the orders of the militiamen and ordered the soldiers to continue digging, the militiamen warned the soldiers not to go near the cable. Otherwise they would fire."

Such incidents are also occurring in Lithuania. Six fuel supply vehicles of the Kaunas Airborne Division were executing a march. The column was proceeding in the prescribed manner, and the cargo contained a permit from the uyezd commandant. In the area of Panemune, at the departure for Rokai, the vehicles were stopped by agents of Lithuania's Ministry of Area Security. Upon checking out the documents and verifying that the column's movement was legal, agents of the ministry demanded that the senior member of the column (a warrant officer) give them a tonne of fuel. The warrant officer refused and ordered the vehicles to move on. Shots were fired, and the tires on two vehicles were punctured.

"I immediately dispatched an officer to the scene," Major-General Valeriy Khatskevich, commander of the airborne division, said. All the tankers returned to the unit. This incident was dangerous because there were wooden residences nearby, around 20 meters away. God forbid that a bullet had struck a tank.... From now on, in order to avoid such incidents, all columns will have an armed escort and we shall post our own guard next to the area security posts."

It turns out that there is a document called Temporary Rules Governing Travel by Motor Transport Vehicles of Military Units Under Russian Jurisdiction and Stationed in the Lithuanian Republic. The document was approved on 14 May by the Ministry of Area Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania. According to the document military vehicles are permitted to travel only with a special permit from the chief of the uyezd commandant's office. There are also three kinds of passes. One-time, temporary and permanent. They are issued on the basis of requests, which the commanders must submit no later than 3 days in advance; 10 days in the case of columns.

Major-General Khatskevich received such a document.

"What right do the Ministry of Area Security and the police have to set laws for troops, even if they belong to a foreign army?" Valeriy Khatskevich asked. "That is a matter for the government."

Many commanders of Russian units temporarily located in the Baltic area are presently dealing with these and similar matters. Talks between Russia and the Baltic nations on the temporary presence and the withdrawal of these troops are continuing. The temptation to hasten events on the part of some people in the Baltic states, however, sometimes overcomes the desire of their governments to achieve a prudent and mutually acceptable decision on problems pertaining to the presence of Russian troops there. As we can see, these aspirations sometimes take forms as extreme as they are offensive.

And finally, the desire to rid themselves of the troops of a foreign state is one thing, while the unenviable fate of the Russian enlisted man and officer is another. While the diplomats talk, they are suffering insults and degradation. They are armed, by the way. This is pointed out for the diplomats. In order not to have to investigate any such incidents in the future.

#### **Moldovan Open-Border Policy Problem for Ukraine**

*92UM1034A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 May 92 First edition pp 1,3*

[Article by Capt B. Soldatenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Reporting in This Issue": "Friendship Is Friendship, but Posts Are Not the Same" or "What Our Correspondents Saw on One Immediate Border"]

[Text] **At the building housing Ukraine's Security Directorate for Vinnitsa Oblast, when we were given an opportunity to see the border, we were somewhat surprised. After all, it was several hundred kilometers to the nearest border, the border with Romania. We received a smile in response, however, and reassurances. Ahead lay the route to the nearest border, the border with Moldova.**

Beyond the window of the RAF service vehicle one glimpsed small villages with modern two-story cottages, but one could also see little old clay homes. Tractors were at work in the fields, and carefree kids played in the streets. In short, life proceeded as it should, and it was difficult to believe that one could no longer simply wander through these beautiful woods and fields without identification. We were in a border zone, a fact communicated to the drivers by a small, bright sign at the side of the road: "Attention! You are entering a border zone."

A few dozen kilometers further on we found ourselves at the edge of the city of Mogilev-Podolsk, near the famous Friendship bridge. A small truck with border troops and armed militiamen standing at the entrance to the bridge and inspecting all motor vehicles gave eloquent testimony, without words, that we were on a real border.

"For many years an ordinary GAI [State Motor-Vehicle Inspectorate] had stood here," we were told by Major of

Militia P. Melnik, chief of the permanent special Friendship post. "After our state became sovereign, however, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued regulations governing the transport of goods and essential food items in and out of the republic, the GAI post was replaced with a kind of border check point, whose duties now include both passport verification and customs inspection."

"Unfortunately, this was very necessary," Petr Ivanovich continued. "Our neighbor, Moldova, has practically opened up its borders with Romania, thereby giving foreign citizens free entry to its territory. It should be pointed out that Ukraine does not intend to do the same. Unlike our "neighbor" we cannot allow onto our territory foreign tourists whose visas expired last year and have not been renewed. One could cite many examples of this."

Indeed, standing next to a motor vehicle with a Romanian license was a living "example," surrounded by border troops and just-arrived militiamen. It turned out that they had detained Romanian citizen G. Georgine, who had an expired visa and authorization to enter the territory of the USSR. (Despite the fact that the former republics are now sovereign, the border stamp has not been changed.) He was attempting to roll on into Russia. He was very upset by the fact that the Ukrainian border troops were so fussy and were forcing him to return to Moldovan territory.

"Unfortunately, we detain more than just one or two such violators of the passport regulations in a day," said Lt S. Kuzmenko, deputy chief for combat training at the border post. "Most of them are, like Georgine, tourists from Romania. Some residents traveling over this Friendship bridge to Ukraine also lack documents. One cannot call them out-and-out criminals, because for many years of joint life many Ukrainians and Moldovans have become related and work together. There are Ukrainians in Moldova, and Moldovans here in Ukraine. For them we do not have rigid passport rules, although they must have a passport for crossing the border."

This is not the only thing complicating the work of the border troops, however. Documents sometimes have to be checked right out in the open. In bad weather they are checked in a small field shack at the side of the road, which is usually inhabited by construction workers. And it is only planned to set up a real border check point here in the near future.

We followed a border troop around the field shack, the original border check point. There is not a lot of furniture inside: a desk, several chairs and a table lamp. There is none of the special equipment for detecting erasures or defects in foreign passports.

The main problem, it seemed to us, is not just the lack of special equipment for the border troops but also the personnel. It is certainly not professionals who work here but border troops from nearby border posts. Take that senior border detail of Warrant Officer S. Gutsu. How could one speak of professionalism, when he assumed the position of warrant officer/inspector only a few months ago?

When we attempted to ask a representative of the border post about this, he only threw up his hands and said that when there is a real border check point here, there will also be professionals.

The militiamen have just as many problems. They too have been assigned work not consistent with their official duties. The militiamen have practically been customs agents since 3 November 1991. And the results show that they are fairly good ones. During just the first four months of this year they have returned more than 4 million rubles to republic circulation. Food products worth more than 1 million rubles were also returned to Ukraine.

For example, a resident of Orgeyev in Moldova attempted to transport some videotapes out of Ukraine. A court fined him 300 rubles and made him return the purchase to the store. Another resident of Moldova wanted to pass through customs three bicycles allegedly bought in Kiev. The court also fined him. Only 100 rubles, to be sure.

One should not become upset with the militia. They are just implementing the decree passed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and confiscating items on the list of goods which may not be taken out of the republic. Some businessmen want to profiteer on the other side of the border with the goods they take out of Ukraine. A certain resident of Moldova, F. Chaban, for example, attempted to smuggle out 1,000 faucets and mixers for bathtubs worth 830,000 rubles. A people's court turned all of the confiscated items over to be sold.

The seizure of a batch of 97 hunting rifles brought into the Republic of Moldova on their way to Chisinau from Izhevsk by border troops of the Friendship special post was the most significant incident in recent months, however.

The sun was sinking lower and lower, and it seemed that the bright red disk would touch the smooth surface of the river at any time. The last rays slid over the banks of what are now two sovereign states. One of them struck the bright sign at the entrance to the bridge. Breaking up into thousands of tiny sunrays, it fell upon the metal of a border troop's assault rifle.

Lighting up for only a moment, it was possible to make out on the sign "This bridge was named in honor of the development of good-neighborly relations between Moldavia and Ukraine."

#### **Netkachev on 14th Army Concerns**

*92UN1367A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 21, 20 May 92 p 2*

[Reader's question and report on interview with Yuriy Netkachev, commander of the 14th Army, by Yefim Bershin; place and date not given: "Soldiers Cry Too, Until They Go Into Battle"]

[Text] When the units stationed in the Dniester region began to be transferred to CIS command, there was the episode involving the seizure of the civil defense regiment in Kochiyery. How did that turn out? The question is for 14th Army Commander Yuriy Netkachev.

"The regiment was previously under the command of the Deputy Chief of the Odessa Military District for Civil Defense," explained Netkachev. "But in all the confusion and changing of commands it was simply forgotten. It ended up not belonging to anybody. As a result there was an attack and seizure of weapons."

[Bershin] But still there is the danger that not only automatic weapons but also more serious arms—tanks, rockets, helicopters—might fall into the hands of the warring parties.

[Netkachev] Of course there is. We have taken measures so that people from the outside cannot start up technical equipment and we have mined some of the warehouses. But at the same time some of the technical equipment has been made combat ready. After all, there is a real threat to the military units and the families of the military servicemen. Even though the war in the Dniester region is being waged unprofessionally from a military standpoint, people are still dying.

[Bershin] And what do the officers think about this?

[Netkachev] Just put yourself in their position and you will understand what they are thinking. For months the officers and warrant officers have been confined to their barracks, they cannot see their wives and children, and they are constantly being subjected to insults from the Moldovan press. Their nerves will not stand it. Many even say so: If this unnecessary war does not come to an end in the near future, we cannot vouch for our behavior. It will end the same way anyway. That is the way it is.[end Netkachev]

Now the troops stationed in this region have been placed under Russia's jurisdiction. But this does not change much. Since, according to the information of Ye. Shaposhnikov's deputy, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov, all the military warehouses, bases, and garrisons on the right bank of the Dniester have been surrounded and blocked off by the police. There was an attempt to seize the Beltsy Missile Brigade but the garrison resisted and the attackers fled. Nonetheless it is impossible to remove the technical equipment from the right bank without a battle. And to turn it over to Chisinau would mean to contribute to having the Dniester region leveled to the ground. After all, in addition to the Beltsy rocket brigade, which is equipped with the latest equipment systems, on the right bank there is also the Ungeny Artillery Regiment, which is armed with 90 heavy weapons, and the 86th Fighter Aviation Regiment in Markuleshty, where 30 MiG-29 fighters are located.

Subunits of the 14th Army quartered in the Dniester region still feel free. But recently M. Snegur insistently demanded that they be moved into Russia. How will it end? Up to this point the army has not intervened in events. But if it receives an order to withdraw from this abundant southern land it cannot be ruled out that the officers and warrant officers will not want to leave their homes, apartments, plots of land, and families, and, driven into a corner, they might simply augment the Dniester military formations. Along with their technical equipment. And then we will not be able to say that the war in the Dniester region is not professional.

### Pressure On 14th Army Continues In Dniester Region

92UM1049A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
22 May 92 First Edition p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Gavrilenko and Colonel N. Mulyar: "Dniester Region: Pressure on Military From Both Parties to Conflict Continues"]

[Text] The heading of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's article yesterday on events in the Dniester region contained the words "the reckless bravada of the 'guardsmen.'" They were revving up tanks that had been seized from the 14th Army in plain view of Moldovan positions. They were tickling the opponent's nerves, as they say. But these little games didn't last long—in the end the tank guns "started talking." On May 20, the PMR [Dniester Moldovan Republic] guardsmen fired a shell from a tank and "took out" a police post outside the village of Korzhevo. Then came a response to the artillery fire from the right bank.

Incidentally, about that artillery fire. Only a month ago, it was sporadic and random, so to speak. Now the situation is completely different. "When you are in the fire zone and observing it," Fyodor Dobrov, a deputy to the Dniester Republic Supreme Soviet, told us by telephone, "you get the feeling that this is no longer what it was only recently. The fire is conducted in a carefully planned manner, in keeping with all the rules of military science. It is apparent that professionals have gone to work." Yes, the fire has become more accurate. Several direct hits on the dam at the Dubossary hydroelectric station are evidence of this.

Meanwhile, the command of the 14th Army categorically refuses to allow its subunits to enter the conflict on the Dniester region's side. "We are maintaining strict neutrality," Colonel Aleksandr Baranov, deputy commander for personnel work, told us, "and it is simply impossible for us to have an officer, warrant officer, or soldier who in some way, secretly and imperceptibly, is involved in combat operations or skirmishes. Not to mention entire subunits. Everything we have is in plain sight and accounted for. Yes, some guardsmen seized an armored group. But we know how that was done: once again, under the cover of a crowd—women and children."

In general, the situation of the 14th Army is being aggravated along with the situation outside Dubossary. The 14th Army military council has issued yet another statement. Among other things, it says that the leaders of certain public movements are carrying on propaganda among soldiers in Tiraspol with the aim of persuading them to switch to the jurisdiction of the Dniester region. Attempts are being made to persuade soldiers that they and their families will become victims of the conflict in the near future. The psychological pressure on the soldiers and certain doubts among them is what made possible the seizure of the military hardware. Its use could have unpredictable consequences.

And what about the politicians? Moldovan President Mircha Snegur continues to regard the fact that army equipment appeared in the guardsmen's positions on May 19 as direct armed aggression by Russia against Moldova.

And he sees the shelling on May 19 of a military compound in Dubossary as a provocation by the separatists. He sent a telegram to Boris Yeltsin in which he expresses bewilderment at the fact that after 22 hours, there was still no reaction from the latter. "Before our very eyes and with the direct involvement of Russia's 14th Army, something that can and must be solved by peaceful means is developing into an international armed conflict," Mircha Snegur wrote in the telegram.

However, there has been a reaction from Russia. A May 20 statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the events in Moldova expresses serious concern over the sharp aggravation of the situation in the vicinity of Dubossary, which has claimed several lives. The statement points out that continuing attempts to settle the conflict in the left-bank areas of Moldova by armed means poses the risk of destabilizing the situation outside the region as well. In this regard, the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on the parties to the conflict "to scrupulously observe the cease-fire agreement, in keeping with the Chisinau Declaration of the foreign ministers of Russia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania of April 6, 1992, and to implement a reciprocal withdrawal of armed units."

Finally, the Romanian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement on the Dniester region, expressing "special concern in connection with military operations begun on the evening of May 19, 1992, by subunits of the 14th Army against law-enforcement forces of the Republic of Moldova." The statement was read out at a press conference by foreign ministry official spokesman Trayan Kebeleu. Emphasizing the "need for the earliest possible commencement of that army's withdrawal" from Moldova, the Romanian Foreign Ministry called attention to the "special responsibility of the Russian Federation government," which must take necessary measures to ensure that the 14th Army "maintains complete neutrality" in the Dniester region conflict.

So, then, is the 14th Army fighting in the Dniester region or not? It is fighting. Against fabrications, speculation, outright blackmail, and political pressure. It is fighting attempts to really draw it into the armed conflict. And this war is no less exhausting than the one in which blood is actually being spilled.

## UKRAINE

### **Military Prosecutor on Removal of Equipment to Russia, Crime**

92UM1037B Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian  
No 70, 16 Apr 92 p 7

[Interview with Carpathian Military District Military Procurator Major-General of Justice Vasily Grigoryevich Melnichuk by GOLOS UKRAINY Correspondent Oksana Telenchi, Lvov: "Who Will Stop the Deserters: Carpathian Military District Military Procurator Major-General of Justice Vasily Melnichuk Answers These and Other Questions"]

[Text] Major-General of Justice Vasily Melnichuk, Military Prosecutor of the Carpathian Military District answers this and other questions

[Telenchi] Vasily Grigoryevich, I would like to start the conversation with the "extraordinary occurrence" which is currently on everybody's lips. As you know, on February 13, 1992, 13 aviation regiment officers who were stationed in Khmel'nitskiy Oblast hijacked six combat aircraft. What can be said about the progress of the investigation and the political consequences of these actions?

[Melnichuk] It was planned in advance and a well thought-out act—an attempt to play the "army card" which involved not just these 13 officers. The hijackers had reliable support and guarantees from above. A "corridor" was prepared for the flight, really, in order to end up in the sky over Moscow you need to submit a request ten days in advance and receive permission from the Central Flight Control Facility. The Procurator's Office has instituted criminal proceedings, but the investigators are not being permitted to meet with the pilots and the persons responsible who participated in the unprecedented flight. Acting Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General Malyukov has declared that neither the pilots nor the aircraft, each of which cost approximately 40 million rubles, would be subject to return since, as far as he was concerned, the 24th Air Army does not belong to Ukraine and therefore the flight was authorized.

On 3 March a telegram addressed to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Commander of the 24th Air Army arrived from Marshal Shaposhnikov which contained the following:

"As a result of the investigation that was conducted, it has been established that the flight of six SU-24 aircraft and the removal of the Battle Flag were carried out as a protest against the actions of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense leadership with regard to the personnel of several Armed Forces units stationed on its territory whose personnel did not take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. As a result, the aircraft crews who flew to Russian territory will not be returned to their former duty location because they are not Ukrainian citizens and making them accountable for this would have the nature of persecuting them for their political convictions."

The high command displayed touching concern for the families of the deserters. Six KaMAz trucks arrived in Starokonstantinov and hauled away their household goods. I have never encountered such attention to subordinates in all my years of service. I myself have moved from place to place 23 times and nobody shared my concerns...

[Telenchi] In our army, it is as if there is a departmental-property cold war...

[Melnichuk] The former center will not yield positions and it is resorting to cheap political speculation which may turn out to be very expensive if it concerns the army, weapons and equipment. The hijacking of the aircraft from the Starokonstantinov Aviation Regiment is only one of

many cases of the CIS's camouflaged political themes and requirements to steal our state property. On February 6, 1992, a week before the airplane hijacking from Starokonstantinov mentioned above, six aircraft that were performing training flights landed not in Stry where the weather conditions were allegedly poor, but in Bobruysk. That flight was also planned beforehand. Division Commander General Tomov's order on redeploying six aircraft to Bobruysk Airfield, apparently for training purposes, attests to that. The aircraft have not yet returned. We are very concerned by the numerous violations of the Ukrainian president's 31 December 1991 Decree "On the Procedures for the Sale of Physical Assets, Vehicles, Arms, and Real Estate by Armed Forces troops on Ukrainian territory" to which the commanders of military units subordinate to the former USSR Ministry of Defense central directorates resort.

Based on a January 10 1992 enciphered telegram from Air Army (Smolensk) Commander Lieutenant-General of Aviation Konstantinov, Unit Commander (Stry, Lvov Oblast) Colonel Fomin was ordered to create the conditions for dismantling 24 obsolete TU-16 aircraft. Special teams arrived from the defense industry enterprises located in the cities of Bobruysk and Engels in Saratov Oblast and did their business. They stipulated that precious and non-ferrous metals, assemblies, and power plants of the disassembled aircraft, that were worth a total of R80 million, would be exported from Ukrainian territory, but the Carpathian Military District military procurator warned them about these illegal activities. Criminal proceedings have been filed on this case.

By the way, the state of suspense at military units affects their crime situation and the moral-psychological climate. Commanders do not know if there will be a tomorrow or if their subunits will remain part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In that same Stry, only 20 officers and 28 warrant officers have sworn the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, in addition to those outside the military unit at the military commissariat. Because Military Unit 36662 Commander Col Fomin told the officers who appealed to him that he would not permit them to carry out that ritual on the territory of a unit subordinate to... the Russian Federation (!). After that, Col Fomin pointed out, in front of the entire formation, that Major Korzh, who had organized the oath, was introducing dissension among personnel and interfering with their work. But Major-General Tomov said that Major Korzh was divulging military secrets and "recommended" that he not be permitted on the facility where he was serving or on the airfield in general. In this military unit, they have even begun to complete personal cases of 48 officers and warrant officers who do not conform to duties.

[Telenchi] The current army is a unique alloy of aggressiveness, on the one side, and lack of protection, on the other. Just how do you prevent the crimes and illegal actions of commanders under conditions when subordination is valued above the law?

An order is an order. In the army, they do not discuss it but they carry it out...

[Melnichuk] Yesterday's union army is collapsing; national Armed Forces are just being born, but the people remain the same. It will take more than a few years to train military cadres in the new thinking. So, crime in the army is increasing. First and foremost, the theft of weapons and ammunition, abuse of power, and relations, as we say, at variance with regulations.

[Telenchi] Crime is also increasing in the civilian environment.

[Melnichuk] The military, who have access to weapons, are in a somewhat closed environment, which is the military unit, and therefore have greater opportunities to violate a person's rights than any of the civilian leaders. For example, illegal stockades function at some military units. Division Commander Major-General of Aviation V. Avdonin ordered the creation of a so-called "room for the temporarily detained," without lighting, heat, plank beds or stools in the basement of the barracks. Some of those arrested have been deprived of hot meals and not even taken out to the toilet. Servicemen have made a sign on the wall: "You are worse than dogs and jackals". The procurator raised the issue of holding Major-General of Aviation Avdonin accountable, but the former USSR Ministry of Defense ignored our requests. Many army officials privately and openly say that they do not need a military procurator because he interferes with their work.

Despite all of the barriers, despite the telephone and epistolary right, which until now has been thriving in army practice, we really do "interfere" in the official welfare of many commanders and leaders. In just a year's time, more than 1,000 officials were disciplined or held materially accountable and 30 crimes associated with weapons thefts were discovered. Precious metals worth more than R15 million were taken into account and 562 persons were rehabilitated. Consider that military procurators do not have criminal investigation or other operational services and that only one officer is involved with rehabilitation issues. The others were released without looking toward the future.

At one time, it cost me dearly to institute criminal proceedings against the chief of a political department and to arrest him for theft. He was defended by General Lizichev, chief of the former Main Political Directorate. He insisted for a long time that I suspend the case. In the final analysis, the thief ended up under an amnesty because he had been awarded a medal. They did not even expel him from the Party. And many of his patrons recouped their losses against me: my name was deleted from the promotion list more than once. There have been 23 transfers from place to place—that is a kind of hidden punishment for my disobedience...

[Telenchi] Vasilii Grigoryevich, you worked for so many years outside Ukraine but still speak Ukrainian fluently...

[Melnichuk] I was born in Rovenshchina. My family always spoke Ukrainian at home, but my children did not have the opportunity to study it in the schools in Transbaikal and Khabarovsk Kray, although many Ukrainians

live there. All my life I have dreamed of returning to Ukraine and for the sake of this have turned down many prestigious assignments.

[Telenchi] We know many sad things about today's army: deaths, severe injuries, and trauma... Does it raise real men?

[Melnychuk] It does. If the men themselves want that. If their parents want that. Right now many young men are deserting from the army not only due to arbitrariness. They want to be closer to their homes, even when they serve in the neighboring oblast. They desert due to real difficulties: the army is not a health resort. They do not, even though the law grants them that right.

[Telenchi] And do you know how to give tit for tat?

[Melnychuk] I do. Otherwise I would not be a military procurator.

### **Resolution on Additional Measures to Ensure Non-Nuclear Status**

92UM1035B Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian  
17 Apr 92 p 3

[Decree of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on Supplementary Measures to Ensure Ukraine Gains Non-Nuclear Status]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Council, pursuant to the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 June 1990 and the Statement of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine of 24 October 1991 and which proclaimed:

- Ukraine's intention to observe in the future non-nuclear principles and the right of Ukraine to monitor the nonemployment of nuclear weapons located on its territory,
- Confirming Ukraine's intention to sign the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
- Considering that the government of the Russian Federation and the Command of the Strategic Forces have not established, as was provided in the Agreement on Joint Measures for Dealing with Nuclear Weapons of 21 December 1991, a system for implementing effective technical surveillance, including by Ukraine, over the nonemployment of the nuclear weapons located on its territory,
- Considering the high responsibility of Ukraine for making certain that the nuclear delivery systems which are being removed from its territory to the territory of the Russian Federation are destroyed under reliable international supervision. This supervision should ensure the nonemployment of the nuclear components from these delivery systems for the remanufacturing of the weapons and a ban on their exporting to other states,
- In focusing on the fact that the destruction of the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory should be carried out under the conditions of a guarantee for Ukraine's national security,

—Considering it essential under the conditions of Ukraine's independence to provide a thorough study of the political, economic, financial, ecological and other consequences of eliminating the nuclear weapons,

#### **Decreases:**

1. To confirm the policy set by Ukraine of peaceful collaboration with the entire world community, nonalignment with any blocs, neutrality and the observance of the three non-nuclear principles in the future.
2. To consider it advisable not to allow the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory until such time that it has been possible to work out and introduce a mechanism of international inspection for their destruction with Ukraine's participation in this.
3. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is to immediately adopt the appropriate measures for ensuring effective technical monitoring by Ukraine of the nonemployment of the nuclear weapons located on its territory.
4. It is recommended that the Ukrainian President enter into talks with the leaders of the world's nuclear states over a comprehensive solution to the problems related to the elimination of nuclear weapons, in considering the necessity of the fastest introduction of the 1991 START Agreement.
5. The commissions of the Ukrainian Supreme Council for the questions of defense and state security, for foreign affairs, for the questions of planning, the budget, finances and prices, for the questions of developing the basic national economic sectors, and for the questions of ecology and rational use of nature, in April of this year are to review the entire range of questions involved in nuclear disarmament, in particular the economic, financial, ecological, organizational and other aspects of destroying the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory, including the use of their components for peaceful purposes. This is to be done from the viewpoint of providing guarantees for the security and foreign political interests of Ukraine with the involvement of specialists from the ministries, departments and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences as well as independent experts when this is required.
6. The Agreement on Joint Measures Involving Nuclear Weapons of 21 December 1991, the Agreement Between the CIS Member States on the Strategic Forces of 30 December 1991 and the Agreement Between the CIS Member States on the Status of the Strategic Forces of 14 February 1992 are to be submitted to the Ukrainian government for ratification by the Ukrainian Supreme Council.
7. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is to take measures to man the Strategic Forces located on Ukrainian territory using servicemen from the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
8. Supervision over the execution of the current Decree is entrusted to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

[Signed] I. Plyushch, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council  
Kiev  
9 April 1991.

**Resolution on Military Policy**

92UM1035A Kiev *GOLOS UKRAINY* in Russian  
17 Apr 92 p 3

[Decree of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on the State of Carrying Out Ukraine Military Policy and Implementing the Legislative Enactments on the Questions in the Military Sphere]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Council notes that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Command of the Ukrainian Border Troops and the leadership of the Ukrainian Security Service have not worked sufficiently to carry out the requirements of the Ukrainian legislative enactments dealing with questions in the military sphere.

Up to the present they have not completed the organizing of the military formations in accord with the requirements of the Decree of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of 24 August 1991 On Military Formations in Ukraine. The questions of logistic, financial and food supply of the Armed Forces are being solved unsatisfactorily and the required housing conditions are not being established for the servicemen and the members of their families.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been slow in resolving personnel questions and up to the present has not established the ministry collegium.

The absence of the necessary government management structures to coordinate the activities of the state, military, economic, scientific and other bodies in the interests of Ukrainian defense has led to a decline and collapse of the defense complex.

**The Ukrainian Supreme Council Decrees:**

1. In considering the insufficient coordinating of actions between certain countries in the Commonwealth on the questions of military reform and the organizational development of the Armed Forces, the constant intervention in Ukrainian domestic affairs by the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and in which Ukraine is not a member, as well as the high level of responsibility of Ukraine to the international community for the possible negative consequences of unforeseen actions by the Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, in accord with the international agreements signed by Ukraine, all the military formations stationed on Ukrainian territory are to be put directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the President of Ukraine.

2. It is to be recommended to the Ukrainian President:

—That there should be a review of the question of establishing an effective management system for the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, as well as ensuring complete production cycles for the weapons, military equipment and supplies for the needs of the Armed Forces and other Ukrainian military formations;

—That under the leadership of the vice prime minister, a body should be established for the state administration and coordination of the activities of the ministries,

departments and economic, scientific and public associations in the interests of state defense, for protecting its economic, military and scientific-technical interests and state, military and commercial secrecy as well as the intellectual property of Ukraine.

3. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is to settle immediately the question of improving the monetary support of the personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the other military formations, and accelerate the elaboration and implementation of a state program for housing construction for the servicemen. Measures are to be taken to return to Ukraine the servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens and who have expressed a desire to serve on the territory of their state.

4. Within the period of a month, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense is to organize the ministry collegium and complete the filling of the vacant leadership and command positions with highly qualified military specialists.

5. It is to be recommended that the publications of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, the ministries and departments, the Ukrainian State Television and Radio Company, the newspapers and magazines provide systematic and objective coverage of Ukrainian policy in the area of the organizational development and activities of the Armed Forces, the Border Troops, the Ukrainian National Guard and the other military formations and instill in the Ukrainian citizens a respect for the defenders of their state, in addition to a readiness for military service.

6. Supervision over the execution of the current Decree is to be entrusted to the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

[Signed] I. Plyushch, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council

Kiev

8 April 1992.

**Weapons Thefts Increase in Ukraine**

92UM0983A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
21 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by unidentified UKRINFORM correspondent: "Weapons Still Slipping Away"]

[Text] The increase in thefts of weapons and ammunition from military units stationed in Ukraine is becoming a growing threat. There were as many instances of this crime occurring in February of this year alone as in all of 1991. An indication of the danger posed by this phenomenon is the fact that 25,000 "pieces" have been recovered from criminally-inclined persons in this republic in the last two years.

Informed sources state that, in nine out of 10 cases, criminals involved in weapons thefts use blackmail and threats against members of servicemen's families. The perpetrators often use hostages—women and children as a

rule—in their attacks on posts. Even though only one case of “slipping away” of weapons and ammunition is traceable to carelessness of the responsible authorities and failure to observe regulation procedures on the part of guard personnel, the situation is causing definite alarm. This is due the the fact that only military personnel have access to weapons.

### **Group to Aid Return of Ukraine Troops**

*92UM1038C Kiev VECHERNIY KIEV in Russian  
30 Apr 92 p 4*

[Report by Anatoliy Smetanin under the rubric “Military Affairs”: “They Returned With Hope”]

[Text] A few days ago a group of officers from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine headed by Col Ivan Khaletskiy was working in the Transcaucasus Military District, which consists of territory of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In a meeting with the command element of the Transcaucasus Military District they worked out the procedure for returning Ukrainian servicemen to the republic. It included soldiers, NCOs, warrant officers and officers. Ivan Pavlovich reports that the reception was cool. They prevailed upon us not to leave the district and the southern borders exposed, as though Ukraine is obligated to protect borders hundreds of kilometers from its own.

“In short, the transfer of our troops has begun and we hope that no one stops it. We shall fulfill the president’s decree,” Colonel Khaletskiy assured us at the end of the telephone conversation.

### **Lvov Officers Criticize Cadres Policy**

*92UM1037A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
1 May 92 p 1*

[Article by Captain Yevgeniy Partin, under the rubric: “News from the Carpathian Military District”: “Cadres Are Resolving Everything”]

[Text] And Galicia has once again turned out to be the leader of democratic reforms. This time it is a question of the organizational development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The first Union of Ukrainian Officers Oblast Organization Chairmen Coordinating Council session recently occurred in Lvov on the territory of which Carpathian Military District troops are stationed.

The Ukrainian President’s Representative for Lvov Oblast S. Davymuk, Carpathian Military District Deputy Commander Major-General V. Kondratenko, Air Army Commander Major-General of Aviation V. Antonets, PVO [Air Defense] Corps Commander Major-General A. Oliferov, and representatives of the National Guard and the SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] participated in the work. The main issue raised by the speakers was the need for the most rapid examination of the personnel policy currently being conducted in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The renewal of the army largely depends on those who are in leading positions today. However, according to Coordinating Council Representative Reserve Lieutenant Colonel O. Zelinskiy, in a majority of cases personnel

questions are resolved in the old manner and the fates of people are at times in the hands of those who have not taken the oath of loyalty to Ukraine. The work of the efficiency report boards also leaves much to be desired. Despite the appropriate Ministry of Defense directive, personnel reassignments in the military district continue to be conducted without coordination with the local organs of power and without considering the opinions of the Union of Ukrainian Officers.

All of this results in the fact that officers and generals are ending up in key posts who recently opposed Ukrainian statehood and the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

All of those present agreed that it is no longer possible to tolerate this state of affairs.

Summing up what was said by Union of Ukrainian Officers activists, Presidential Representative S. Davymuk assured those gathered that henceforth it will more persistently affect the conduct of personnel policy in the units deployed on subdepartmental territory. It is possible that this right will be delegated to presidential representatives in other oblasts in which Carpathian Military District troops are deployed.

During the Coordinating Council’s work, an Appeal to the Ukrainian President, to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense and to the Carpathian Military District Commander was prepared and unanimously adopted.

It specifically proposes reexamination of the manning principle and the selection and appointment of generals and officers to leading positions in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense while proceeding from the availability of housing in Kiev; creation of a new provision on the work of efficiency report boards; appointment of representatives from Union of Ukrainian Officers members to military units from independent battalions and higher and their involvement in the work of military councils at all levels; and, the introduction of new rank insignia in the army that reflect the national symbol as soon as possible.

### **Counterintelligence Chief on Border Problems, Chance of Coup**

*92UM1036A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
1 May 92 p 1*

Interview with Ukrainian Security Service Military Counterintelligence Directorate Chief Colonel Aleksandr Skipalskiy by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: “First Interview in the New Post”: “Ukrainian Security Service Military Counterintelligence Directorate Chief Colonel Aleksandr Skipalskiy: ‘A Coup Is Doomed to Failure...’”]

[Text]

[Klyuchikov] What distinguishes the Ukrainian Security Service Military Counterintelligence from the former KGB?

[Skipalskiy] On the one hand, the functions of counterintelligence have remained unchanged—neutralization of intelligence activities. And no historic changes whatsoever are changing the essence of our work. But, on the other hand, fundamental changes have occurred with Ukraine's declaration of independence. If the KGB zealously stood on guard of the imperial structures since the KGB itself was an integral part of them, the Ukrainian Security Service is called upon to defend the democratic gains of the people of independent Ukraine.

Just a year ago, counterintelligence, which had the courage to openly support the idea of a sovereign Ukraine, was immediately included in the category of traitors. But today military counterintelligence, in close contact with the Armed Forces, the Border Troops and the National Guard, is specializing in ensuring the reliable defense of the sovereignty of our young state.

In accordance with the president's Decree, we carry out counterintelligence support of all military formations on the territory of Ukraine, while operating in strict compliance with the Laws "On the Ukrainian Security Service" and "On Operational-Investigative Activities" that have been adopted for the first time.

These concepts, about which it was not customary to speak, are widely used in these laws. I will cite several excerpts:

"Operational-Investigative Activities" are based on the principles of legality, observance of human rights and freedoms, and cooperation with administrative organs and the population".

"The restriction of human legal rights and freedoms that entail responsibility in accordance with the law are prohibited".

"Citizens of Ukraine are informed about the Security Service's activities through the mass media and through other methods".

As you can see, each line of these laws, by which we are unfailingly guided in our activities, has been permeated with the spirit of democracy.

[Klyuchikov] The disintegration of the former USSR, the difficult formation of our young state, and the emergence of seats of tension on its borders—how has all of this impacted the activities of foreign intelligence agents?

[Skipalskiy] Naturally, foreign intelligence activities have noticeably increased under conditions of the destabilization of the situation. The governments of many countries want to have reliable information, first of all about the fate of nuclear weapons on our territory and about the reliability of our control over them. And we are seeing that our competitors are attempting to obtain this information at any price.

It is another matter that Ukraine, having announced its nuclear-free status, also does not intend to hide anything from world society. We do not have any reason to dodge. Any international commission can familiarize itself with

nuclear weapons storage conditions. Therefore, counterintelligence is not impeding other states from forming an objective opinion on this problem.

Intelligence always has been and will be. This is one of man's most ancient professions which is even mentioned in the Bible. Intelligence agents' work methods have been perfected through the centuries, while continuing to be improved even today. We need to note that real professionals work in foreign intelligence who skillfully use all sources of information.

That is how it has always been: one side has attempted to protect its secrets and the other has attempted to use every possible method to obtain them. And if these secrets end up in the wrong hands, you need to blame not the intelligence agents but yourself and your irresponsibility.

As a result, I would like to appeal to all servicemen: in the current situation of instability, do not forget that vigilance is the task not only of counterintelligence but also of every person in uniform. Each of us is obliged to provide a high degree of protection to the state and military secrets with which we are associated in our practical activities.

I need to point out that the majority of servicemen understand this very well. By way of illustration, the commanders of the Odessa and Carpathian military districts realize the importance of counterintelligence measures and skillfully cooperate with our directorate for the purpose of preventing undesirable consequences.

I know quite a few disciplined officers who skillfully organize the performance of guard duty which to a certain degree is a form of cooperation with counterintelligence. This is also vigilance.

And nevertheless, I will not hide that quite a few problems are emerging in our service due to the confusion that has arisen with documentation and the numerous redeployments of military units and equipment.

[Klyuchikov] How real for Ukraine is a military coup attempt? It is no secret that quite a few officers advocate unified Armed Forces. The number of dissatisfied servicemen is increasing and the lack of social protection of servicemen...

[Skipalskiy] It is impossible to deny that threat under current conditions. However, there is no real basis for a coup within Ukraine and it is doomed to failure beforehand. Certain preconditions which are being inspired from without will without fail end up in the Security Service's field of vision.

Another question is—will the servicemen support that attempt? I am personally confident that they will not. The events of August 1991 and knowledge of the situation in the troops provide grounds for that. The absolute majority of servicemen of various ranks, like the people of Ukraine, have consciously perceived the emergence of our independent state. The results of the referendum attest to that. And the position of a small group of people who are fanatically devoted to imperial ideas are not finding broad support.

But we must not lose control of the situation. The distribution of leaflets, the purpose of which is to involve the army in a political struggle, has been noted at a number of military units deployed in the Crimea. The Crimea Republic Movement has significantly increased its activities among servicemen. Attempts are being undertaken to form underground structures in the army and in the navy.

However, on the whole the attempt to involve the army in political games has not found a responsive chord among officers. The majority of them do not desire to participate in the activities of any parties or organizations whatsoever.

I direct your attention to the fact that there is a serious housing problem in the Armed Forces. By way of illustration, in our directorate every third worker does not have an apartment. Many people feel themselves to be socially unprotected on the eve of the army reduction that is being prepared. But, despite this, they will not manage to involve servicemen in illegal structures. I think that Ukraine can already today be proud of its sons who serve in its Armed Forces.

I want to thank the servicemen for this restraint and ability to orient themselves in a difficult situation. This is the manifestation of real patriotism with regard to Ukraine.

[Klyuchikov] Have cases recently been recorded of weapons being pumped from depots to "hot spots"?

[Skipalskiy] I am not superstitious but I knock on wood in these cases. As they say, God has shown mercy to us for now. Indeed, there are individual cases of attacks against sentries and attempts to steal weapons from depots. So, they hit a guard in the head with a sharp object at a Khmelnitskiy military unit and stole an assault rifle and two loaded clips. We found out who the criminals were after several days.

There was a case of the theft of 20 "barrels" from a military unit of school students in the Crimea. The stolen weapons were also found and returned.

But I must say that, according to our data, there are quite a few individuals who are hunting for weapons in Ukraine. And let our conversation serve as a warning to those who perform sentry and guard duty. While guarding weapons, you are guarding your own lives and the lives of your dear ones.

Although I think that we do not need this number of weapons depots that have been concentrated on Ukrainian territory. These weapons should be sold in accordance with existing international regulations and the money earned should be sent to solve servicemen's social problems.

[Klyuchikov] Based on what criteria are personnel selected for Ukrainian counterintelligence? Haven't former KGB agents brought with them the principles and works methods of Beriya's NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]?

[Skipalskiy] Beriya's methods had already been condemned during the time of the Khrushchev thaw. Former KGB Chairman Yu. Andropov did much to restore legitimacy to a definite part of the KGB's work. Yes and for us

perestroika did not pass in vain. As the events of August 1991 demonstrated, even among state security workers there were quite a few people with progressive convictions who decisively advocated the protection of democracy during a difficult hour.

That is whom we are primarily relying on during the process of forming the Ukrainian Security Service.

However, the bacilli of cruelty and illegality are hardy. It is easy to sow them but it takes years to combat them. That is why each of our agents is being assigned to the service all over again while undergoing a discussion in the collective and a certification board. In the process, we are seriously cautioning him that he needs to work under the conditions of a rule-of-law state. And if democratic principles do not become the basis of his activities, we are decisively parting with this agent.

In the process, we are reserving the possibility for a person to confess. If we persecute these people for errors committed previously for which they have sincerely repented, little will distinguish us from the former GPU [State Political Administration]—NKVD—MGB [Ministry of State Security]. Therefore, I advocate national reconciliation and consolidation.

[Klyuchikov] Could you provide a brief analysis of the events which are occurring on the border with Moldova and in the Crimea?

[Skipalskiy] Today counterintelligence, jointly with the Armed Forces, the Border Troops and the National Guard, are carrying out a timely and very important Ukrainian Presidential Decree on Reinforcing the Protection of the Borders with Moldova.

I direct your attention to the fact the operating mechanism of the events in the Dniester Republic is largely similar to the scenario which the escalation of tensions in other "hot spots" has followed.

Here is an example for you. Former 14th Army Commander General Yakovlev is handing out weapons to illegal military formations on the territory of sovereign Moldova. But we understand very well that no general can independently make such decisions and in the process remain absolutely unpunished. Hence, the question arises for a sensible man: Who is standing behind Yakovlev? And why is he handing out weapons?

This situation very much reminds me of the "Georgian" variation. That same handwriting is also being followed in the Crimea. Admiral I. Kasatonov is grossly violating the laws of Ukraine, while obviously carrying out the social order of his patrons. There is one goal for all of these actions—to maintain sovereign states in constant tension and to prevent them from concentrating their efforts on the solution of severe economic and social problems.

And see how ruthless these forces are. They are prepared to cast millions of peoples' fates and lives into the brutal mechanism of empire for the sake of attaining their own political goals.

The president and government of Ukraine have a different position which they at times criticize for being excessively soft. No, they are not soft but they are trying to adhere to civilized methods of solving problems and attempting to prevent conflicts. In this situation, I consider counterintelligence's primary task to be the need to concentrate all efforts in order to prevent external and internal reactionary forces from involving our state in a bloody, fratricidal conflict.

In conclusion, I want to wish all servicemen to strengthen and improve our combat cooperation and brotherhood.

**Ukraine-Turkey Support Nuclear-Free Black Sea**  
*92UM1052B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
7 May 92 p 1

[Article: "A Nuclear-Free Black Sea?"]

[Text] UKRINFORM—The Ukraine and Turkey have expressed support for removing nuclear weapons from the Black Sea basin, announced Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk at a press conference at the Ankara Airport prior to his departure from Turkey. "A nuclear-free Black Sea can become an example not only for the region but also for the entire world," he said.

The problem of returning Crimean Tatars to their homeland, the head of the Ukrainian state noted, is not just a regional problem, and it must be solved at the interstate level. The Turkish side, he emphasized, gave a positive assessment to our steps in the direction of repatriation of Crimean Tatars.

Leonid Kravchuk reported that a great deal of attention was devoted in the Ukrainian-Turkish talks in Ankara to the situation in Nagornny Karabakh and in the Caucasus. He pointed out in this case that the Ukraine and Turkey are doing everything possible to ensure stability in this region. The sides also exchanged opinions regarding the future of the CIS. The Ukrainian president noted that unanimity was reached in all issues that were discussed.

**Commission to Develop Military Symbols**

*92UM1050E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
8 May 92 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Vasiliy Bilan, commission member: "The Work of Preparing Military Symbols Has Begun"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry's Commission to Develop Military Symbols of the Armed Forces held its first organizational meeting under the guidance of Major-General Aleksandr Kolomiitsev, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. An order of the Minister of Defense regulating the composition, objectives and work procedures of the commission was announced. In particular, it is comprised of representatives of all directorates of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff, and Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan was approved as its leader. The work of generalizing and preparing materials on military symbols must be completed by as early as 15 July.

The amount of work that must be done is not small. Simple copying of symbols already in existence will not be allowed. The Ukraine and its armed forces have their own ancient historical traditions and symbols, which must be accounted for to the maximum in drawing up the modern variants. With this purpose in mind, there are plans for deeply studying the similar experience in the time of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and the conceptual approaches to solving this problem taken in different countries of the world. The appropriate literature has already been collected together, and responsibilities have been apportioned.

Proposals on the content and design of the Colors, combat decorations, commemorative and revolving banners and pennants, identifying marks on military equipment and uniform insignias have to be drawn up. Honorary titles of large formations and units, the official repertoire of the military band service, and the procedures for adding names of servicemen to the honor rolls of units and subunits in perpetuity, and the names of honored privates (seamen), must be formulated.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Defense has already received many proposals on the design of military symbols since the first days of development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The commission invites historical scientists, artists and all who are able to submit interesting proposals to participate further in the work. Ideas may be sent or brought directly to the editor's office of NARODNAYA ARMIYA, which has been instructed to keep readers widely informed on the progress of the work to prepare our military symbols.

**Resolution on Carrying Out Law on Military Obligation**

*92UM1050D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
12 May 92 p 1

["Resolution of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on the Procedure for Enacting the Ukrainian Law 'On the Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service'"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet **RESOLVES:**

1. To enact the Ukrainian Law "On the Universal Military Service Obligation and Military Service" from the day of its publication.

2. To instruct the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers:

—to submit proposals to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet on amending and supplementing legislative acts as required by this Law;

—to write, within three months' time, a draft statute on military service by Ukrainian citizens and a draft statute on preconscrip and conscript training in educational institutions of the educational system, and to submit them to the President of the Ukraine for approval.

[Signed] Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet I. Plyushch  
Kiev, 25 March 1992

### **Russian Press Disputes Kravchuk Comments on Nuclear Weapons**

*92UM1050A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 May 92 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Gorenko, correspondent: "There Are No Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Ukraine"]

[Text] At 0115 on the night of 5-6 May 1992 the last item of tactical nuclear ammunition was transported out of Ukrainian territory. Thus the Ukraine has freed its territory of deadly weapons ahead of the deadline in full correspondence with the agreements. Henceforth only strategic nuclear weapons will be present in the Ukraine; according to the plan, they will be transferred to Russia in stages through the end of 1994.

Despite this obvious fact the Russian press has done some extremely biased reporting on this historical event, in a sense raising doubts about the accomplishments. For example IZVESTIYA reported to readers on Friday that Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk announced in the USA that tactical weapons were still present in the Ukraine; concurrently Moscow had made public the fact that the last item of ammunition had been transported out. Either not all weapons had been transferred, the newspaper suggested, or the Ukrainian president "was unaware of what was happening with nuclear weapons in the state."

The political undertone of the article is obvious. And the fault lies not with journalist Viktor Litovkin. The position of the Russian political leadership can be sensed between the lines of the piece. It continues to structure relations with the Ukraine using the tactics of ambush, and not of a balanced, respectful relationship with a sovereign state and its president. Like in the rooster game: It doesn't matter what you peck at, just as long as you keep pecking! All that is left to do in this situation is to pity those in the former center who are having so much difficulty in giving up imperial ambitions.

There are no tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukraine!

There was no mistake in the president's words, or in the actions that really occurred. At the moment that L. Kravchuk was speaking those words, the president did not have in his possession the report from the Ukraine that the weapons had been removed. That he didn't was the fault of Russia, which did have the time to speculate on the situation, but "didn't have the time" to make sure that the coded message confirming that the train had safely reached its destination would arrive promptly from the 12th Administration of the former USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

All of this, and everything else associated with removal of nuclear ammunition from the Ukraine, was explained on 8 May in a briefing for Ukrainian and foreign journalists by Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Lieutenant General I. Bizhan.

In particular, Ivan Vasilyevich communicated that after removal of ammunition was halted, an agreement was reached between the Ukraine and Russia, and a protocol was signed, according to which control over the storage

and subsequent destruction of the ammunition was organized by the Ukraine; as for the remaining 176 rockets belonging to the strategic forces, "there will be difficulties of a technical and economic nature": The reference was to the fact that the 130 rockets contain liquid fuel that presents a danger to the ecology in the event of their improper dismantling, and so on.

The deputy minister informed the journalists that the Ukraine has developed dependable control criteria making substitution or surreptitious removal of the ammunition impossible.

The main leitmotif of the briefing was obvious: The Ukraine is clearly and consistently fulfilling its pledges, and if it is not in a hurry to shout its accomplishments to all the world, it is only because it wishes to behave responsibly and carefully in matters of nuclear weapons.

### **Carpathian MD Sets Up Staff to Deal With Special Concerns of Servicemen**

*92UM1053B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
7 May 92 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Nikifor Lisitsa, Carpathian Military District: "Social Protection for Military Servicemen: Is an Unofficial Department Up to It?"]

[Text] The problem of social and legal protection of military servicemen is more serious than it has ever been in the forces. And there are substantial reasons for this. There is the decline in material welfare of the families of servicemen in connection with the so-called liberalization of prices, and aggravation of the housing problem, and difficulties with pension support, and satisfaction of the privileges of Afghanistan veterans and Chernobyl victims, and much else. But perhaps the transfer of officers who are Ukrainian citizens to their motherland and transfer of those who did not take the oath to other states remain the most acute problem.

Every person in the above-named categories of servicemen urgently needs to have his lawful rights satisfied, and his interests observed. Certain measures are being implemented in this direction on the part of the young sovereign state. The Ukrainian laws "On Social and Legal Protection of Military Servicemen and Their Families" and "On Pension Support to Military Servicemen and to Executives and the Rank and File of Internal Affairs Organs" have already been adopted, and a special committee has been established under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers with the job of dealing with the problems of social and legal protection.

Some other measures are also being implemented locally as well. In particular, the headquarters of the Carpathian Military District has established an unofficial department of social and legal protection of military servicemen. Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Ovcharuk, the deputy chief of the Department of Moral and Psychological Training, has assumed leadership of it on the basis of public support. It is staffed by representatives from the personnel directorate,

the billeting operation directorate, the commander's legal service, the district's press center, the medical service and some other organizations.

The unofficial department was given a month to prepare for work. But as things turned out, it began working on specific projects much earlier. Because many servicemen apply to the district headquarters every day for help in solving a particular problem. For example Major Nikolay Pasternak, who was serving in the Turkestan Military District, requested assistance in obtaining a transfer to the Ukraine. His unit was overmanned since December of last year, and he had not been provided any housing. To add to that, he had a wife and two children as dependents.

Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Sosevich, assistant chief of a division motor vehicle service, also came here from the Turkestan Military District. He also expressed a desire to continue service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Battalion commander Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Arsenyuk, who had already served 11 years in the Transbaykal Military District, also wished to return to his motherland. Captain Sergey Vorobyev came from the Western Group of Forces. The officer was born and raised in Lvov, and he also wanted to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Dozens of other servicemen coming to the unofficial department could also be listed. But there is no need to, because I would like to discuss not the quantity but the results of the work. For example the commission was able to fulfill the desire of only one of the above-named officers. And even that was by a lucky accident: A vacant position of equal responsibility was found for Senior Lieutenant Sosevich. A job was found for his wife in her own specialty right away in his hometown, where his mother owns her own house.

But the rest have not been lucky yet. Neither Lieutenant-Colonel Arsenyuk, nor Captain Vorobyev, nor Major Pasternak was ever able to find an equal vacant position in the district. And unfortunately, such cases are the majority. If we also add those who seek help in gaining transfers to other states, the statistics become even less reassuring.

What is the explanation for such poor results in the work of the unofficial department of social and legal protection of military servicemen? The cause lies mainly in the approach to this work. All of the department's colleagues work on the basis of public support, as was mentioned above. But no one has released them from their duties at their official posts. Each one of them has a large area of responsibility, and sometimes they are simply not up to the added load.

Moreover the associates of this department are not endowed with any kind of power. Therefore, whenever they approach any bureaucratic department they do so as petitioners, who are often waved off like annoying flies. Moreover it is felt in some administrations that these officers have no business getting into such things, and that they are poking their noses into places uninvited.

Nor of course can the unofficial department count on any material and technical support. How can there be any talk

of computers when even envelopes in which to mail correspondence to various organizations are unavailable?

The second reason for the ineffectiveness of the work of the unofficial department lies in its isolation from the corresponding structures both vertically and horizontally. And the recently established Committee for Problems of Social and Legal Support to Military Servicemen under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is itself still undergoing formation, and therefore little support and assistance can be expected from it.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ovcharuk and his colleagues do not as yet have ties with similar departments in the Odessa Military District and in the Ukrainian Air Force. And the smaller formations—armies, divisions—do not have any officially appointed people to solve the social and legal problems of servicemen.

The district's department for social and legal protection of military servicemen has not established close interaction with the Ukrainian Officers' Union, which proclaimed solving such problems to be one of its main objectives in its charter.

All of the above is having a negative effect on the results of the unofficial department's work. And it is already obvious that it is not up to solving the social and legal problems of military servicemen. What solution is seen for this situation?

First of all an official subunit staffed by specialists competent in particular areas should be formed. Moreover people who not only could but also want to do such difficult work must be selected. They must be endowed with the corresponding powers, and their activities must be completely supported.

Moreover there is a need for creating a well conceived structure out of specialists and departments dealing with the problems of social and legal protection. It could be organized on the basis of the territorial principle—in each oblast, as well as in correspondence with the structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the National Guards, and the border and internal troops. It should also have ties with the committee that has already been established, headed by Major-General Vilen Martirosyan.

These departments or other formations will work together closely with public organizations such as the Ukrainian Officers' Union, the Afghanistan War Veterans' Union, the "Chernobyl" Union and others. And the numerous appeals by servicemen to different departments with requests for assistance are evidence that they will have quite enough to do.

#### **Carpathian MD Trade Chief on Commercial Activities**

*92UM1051A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
8 May 92 p 1*

[Interview with Colonel Oleg Viktorovich Kurevin, chief of the Trade Directorate of the Carpathian Military District, by correspondent Captain Yevgeniy Partin; place and date not given: "The Military Trade System Is Marching Toward the Market..."]

[Text] Each of us has been in the role of the customer. And you probably won't find anyone who is indifferent to the prodigious prices, the endless lines for inexpensive goods of adequate quality, and rumors of a trade mafia.

**Our part-time correspondent Captain Yevgeniy Partin met with Colonel O. Kurevin, chief of the Carpathian Military District's Trade Directorate, to clear up the idle gossip, to get answers to urgent questions, and to learn what we are to expect from military trade in the immediate future.**

[Partin] Oleg Viktorovich, is the military trade system in the district working with a "plus" or a "minus" in this time of entry into market relations?

[Kurevin] Figures would answer this question best of all. In three months of this year the commodity turnover volume was 465 million rubles. This is 60 percent of the commodity turnover of all of last year.

Is this a little, or is it a lot, with regard for the rise in prices? Judge for yourself. In 1990 retail commodity turnover in the district's trade system increased by R52 million in comparable prices. Despite the difficulties we encountered in January—introduction of coupons, the increase in prices—commodity turnover rose by 102 percent.

All of this says that colleagues of the military trade directorate are striving to use their knowledge and work experience to do everything possible to satisfy the needs of military servicemen and their families, even in the complex economic situation.

Here are just a few ways in which we are able to fill store shelves to a certain degree.

First of all the structure of the commercial service was renewed. The work of its colleagues is assuming primary importance in this time of establishment of market relations: Ties with former trade partners were broken, but it is not that easy to sign new contracts. However, military trade workers just keep working at it, and they have already achieved some results.

The geography of their activity extends from the Far East to the Baltics. It is precisely owing to the contracts we have signed that we were able to obtain 25 percent more products than the amount money had been allocated for. Commercial services of the military trade system have become more active locally, making it possible to sell goods out of oblast resources worth R81.3 million.

Conversion has borne its fruit. We have sold a total of R10 million worth of goods manufactured by defense industry.

Our main reserve today is direct contracts. They make it possible to solve the problems of delivering high quality goods on time. Here is just one example.

Last year we never did receive enough fish products. The republic office of Ukrybpromsbyt [not further identified] did not sign any contracts in 1992 with any of the water basins. So we established business ties with the Far East, and we have already received 270 tons of fish.

The most important task today is to create a production base on the district's territory that could independently

solve the most acute problems of providing for military servicemen. The way in which the trade directorate was able to supply socks to the stores is an example of this kind.

Everyone remembers how half a year ago uniform socks became a scarce item. Rather than waiting for help "from above," we organized their local manufacture. Today output capacities have also been created in the district to make sausages and some other products.

In general, the future lies with new ideas and with those who are able to implement them. This is understood quite well in the trade directorate.

[Partin] The impression is created that there are no problems in your "firm." Could it really be that you never suffer any losses?

[Kurevin] Unfortunately they do occur. In the conditions of transition to a market economy, as with other cost-accounting enterprises the military trade system found itself in a critical situation. The decrease in consumer demand connected with liberalization of prices on consumer goods on one hand and the sharp increase in expenditures on trade and personal services on the other led to losses of over R2 million in just the first quarter of 1992. The reason for this lay not so much in the more than tenfold increase in prices on transportation services, heat and electric power and of building rent and the cost of communications, as in a weak tax policy. For example we are forced to deduct R86 into various funds out of every R100 of wages received by our workers. Tax on added value is automatically excluded from the results of our activity. Thus in three months of this year we lost R10.3 million we previously planned to receive.

There are other problems as well. There is no body of standards on the work of the military trade system in the newly established Ukrainian Armed Forces. There are no funds with which to develop the material and equipment base. We were allocated R3.8 million in 1991 prices for this. We plan to use R600,000 in self-help projects. But these assets are still on paper, because our organization is not identified as a structural unit in the Material Funds Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Because specific suppliers of construction materials have not been assigned to us, we are unable to carry out the planned work.

Motor transportation is in danger of shut-down due to a shortage of spare parts, which had previously been provided by the district's motor vehicle service. Finding highly qualified personnel is a serious problem. On one hand the market brings on unemployment. Four hundred twenty of our colleagues had to be laid off due to the reduction in forces, and around 1,500 persons are on unpaid leave. On the other hand there are not enough executives. Smart and competent workers are leaving for the MP [not further identified], the SP [not further identified] and other organizations.

It is difficult to select people for executive positions in public food services enterprises. Thus in the last few years the director of the public food services combine in the city

of Lvov was changed four times. It is a hard business to run, and it must deal with many different sectors. There are no funds. Not only must the work be organized, but also goods and raw materials must be provided.

Great difficulties arise in hiring personnel in remote and small garrisons. We often hire nonspecialists in such places, which means a reduction in the level of services.

[Partin] What sort of funds were allocated to the district for this year? Will there be larger quantities of goods?

[Kurevin] The trade directorate placed orders for 1992 for the amount of goods necessary to satisfy servicemen of the Carpathian Military District. Our needs were brought to the awareness of all levels of authority, beginning with the Rear Services Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and ending with the Cabinet of Ministers.

The levels to which our orders were satisfied were 16 percent for clothing, 20 percent for fabric, 24 percent for complex durable goods, 60 percent for electronic goods, 70 percent for dishware, 3 percent for carpeting and 7 percent for furniture. Funds have still not been allocated for a number of goods.

It must be said that we are not sitting idly. We are holding exhibitions and meetings. But this work has not produced tangible results. Suppliers are willing to provide goods only on a barter basis. But it is simply criminal to export metals and raw materials out of the Ukraine in exchange for pantyhose.

Nor is there anything we can say to cheer up would-be car owners. Many plants have unilaterally torn up their contracts with us. Orders have still not been placed for motor vehicles, even with regard for price indexing.

[Partin] When I visit the district's units I often hear that scarce goods are not reaching the servicemen because military trade workers are dealing under the table.

[Kurevin] Despite the great amount of work being done by the trade directorate, unfortunately such facts are still encountered. We are taking steps to see that an associate who has committed a violation is seriously punished, and that he refrains from thoughtless actions in the future. Here are a few figures. Last year 829 persons were subjected to disciplinary punishment. Forty-one persons were fired after departmental inspections for concealing goods, for underweighing, for overcharging and so on.

However, this is only one side of the coin. I would like to note that the customers themselves often create conditions for dishonest salesclerks. Everyone knows that a people's control commission is supposed to operate in every store. Its members are supposed to divide the goods that come in collectively, on the basis of their conscience. But let's look the truth in the eye. When the simplest things fetch insane prices in the country, when the resale of state articles at "free" prices is rampant everywhere, it is difficult to avoid the temptation not only for the salesclerk but also other members of such commissions. Unfortunately we know of

cases where certain officers not only covered up the dealings of trade workers but also encouraged them to violate trading rules.

Much also depends on the position of garrison leaders. Wherever the command doesn't skim off the best goods for itself from the store, and where it keeps the work of the store commission strictly under control, the trade outlet works without reproach.

[Partin] Is there a special store for the command under the district headquarters?

[Kurevin] There is no such store. There used to be a special order desk at the headquarters store, which anyone wanting to could use. Home delivery added 10 percent to the cost of an order.

Something could be said about differences in the assortment in this store and in some other store. But all of it depends on the director. He who is able to sign advantageous agreements for product deliveries is the one who gets the goods. For example the director of the headquarters store received around 30 tons of cheese from Transcarpathia last year. That was completely his doing, and not ours, or that of the district leadership.

[Partin] Does the trade directorate chief have funds for furniture, motor vehicles and other goods?

[Kurevin] Everything here is distributed among the military trade organizations, beginning with vehicles and ending with needles. Even the district troop commander does not have a reserve of motor vehicles. Although I do know from talking with the trade directorate chiefs of other districts that funds have been created there to reward the best officers. The main thing I would like to say in connection with that is this: It is time for us to learn to divide trade functions with the public in mind. Anything that has to do with the distribution of funds is within the jurisdiction of the trade directorate. Our job is to make sure that distribution of goods among different units in the district is just. Moreover we continually update our information on such distributions, and we take it into account.

But as far as work locally is concerned, there are of course a mass of problems. I sympathize with both Afghanistan veterans and the victims of Chernobyl. But when the store commission has at least one officer who had experienced the war in Afghanistan or the Chernobyl disaster as one of its members, he will never forget about his comrades. Yes, perhaps the quantities of goods are not large, and perhaps there are not enough of them, but the best should go to those deserving them the most. This is something everyone must work toward.

#### **Kuznetsov Chronicles Events Surrounding Dismissal**

*92UM1039A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 May 92 p 4*

[Article by former Simferopol Corps Commander Major-General V. Kuznetsov, compiled by A. Orlov: "I Did not Sully the Honor: Former Simferopol Corps Commander

Major-General V. Kuznetsov Recreates the Chronicle of his Release from the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text] Everything began like this. In March, I was invited to Kiev for a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense efficiency report board. All officers and generals who, through the whim of fate have found themselves Ukrainian Army servicemen for a very short period of time, have passed through these boards. I met Colonel Lazorin, a Ministry of Defense adviser, before the board.

And this is a new encounter. This man is an efficiency report board member. My fate was in his hands. Then I heard a question directed to me: "If the need arises, will you fight Russia?" I answered that of course I did not intend to fight against Russia. And did I need to explain that Russia is my Homeland...

I left Kiev in a rotten mood. Have we in fact really lived to see this? Have such changes really occurred in us since yesterday when we still served one Fatherland and one people? In a word, I had to make my choice...

On April 30 at 10:00, I was to fly to Kiev for a meeting. I had been summoned there by a telegram. But duty delayed me and my Deputy Corps Commander flew there instead of me. After dinner, toward evening, I learned that an aircraft from Kiev had landed at the military airfield in Simferopol. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Acting Chief of the Main Staff Lieutenant-General Zhivitsa had arrived.

A group arrived at corps headquarters. In my absence, they demanded that the Chief of Staff assemble the staff officers. On this holiday evening, the majority of the officers were at home and an assembly was announced.

I arrived at corps headquarters... I exchanged greetings with Lieutenant-General Zhivitsa. I complained that he had not reported his arrival beforehand—right now not even a hotel room had been reserved. The General responded that as it happened they had come to see me.

The staff officers had assembled. Zhivitsa invited them into the office, opened a folder, and read: "Ukrainian Minister of Defense order..." In accordance with the order, I was designated Chief of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Main Staff Troop Training and Inspection Directorate and Major-General V. Paliy was assigned to replace me—he had also arrived to do this...

This turn of events was totally unexpected for my fellow servicemen: I was also dumbfounded: they married me off without me. But maybe it was the reverse—had they divorced me from the corps? I categorically stated: "I command the corps!..."

The officers soon dispersed. The open confrontation with Kiev had already actually begun from that moment.

On May 1, a clearly unhealthy situation developed in the unit. Some sort of secret dual authority was established. Suddenly without any reason, they began to insistently assign Corps Chief of Staff Major-General Lepikhov to Odessa. The reason is well known—he openly supported me. Other officers were temporarily assigned to "remote locations". I requested that unit officers conduct an

officers' assembly: if they trust me to remain as commander—I will remain and, if they express no-confidence, I will leave. The officers' assemblies in the units were not fated to occur. They were blocked at the Military District Commander's Directorate and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense level. But the corps staff officers gathered at their assembly—33 men nearly unanimously, with one against, expressed the demand for the previous commander to be left in place. I must confess that I took heart: the people not only believe in me but in justice.

In subsequent days, various military ranks began to arrive from Kiev and Odessa. All of my first deputies were practically removed from their posts in two days.

The confrontation, that was caused by the "commissar" activities of those who had arrived, continued on May 2. A rumor about what was occurring spread throughout the city. Pickets appeared at the gates. Political passions began to boil around the corps...

On May 3-4, practically I alone from the previous staff was left at corps headquarters. They had dispatched the officers on various assignments. Odessa Military District Commander Lieutenant-General Radetskiy arrived. The Ukrainian Minister of Defense ordered him to accept command of the corps. They essentially evicted me from my office. I had to gather my clothing and things in a bundle and move to another office. The meeting with Lieutenant-General Radetskiy was strained although we had known each other since the times of our studies at the Academy imeni Frunze.

I made contact with Moscow several times during this period, trying to find support. In general, this did not amount to anything. As appeals to Crimean deputies at various levels also did not produce results.

May 5. The main event of that day was the beginning of the Crimean Supreme Soviet session. The first issue that the session examined was the situation surrounding the corps. A request to the President of Ukraine to cease carrying out the Ukrainian Minister of Defense order was adopted. There was no reaction at all from Kravchuk—he had left for the United States. However, one can assume that the voice of the Crimean Supreme Soviet will not be heard in Kiev.

On the evening of May 7, I was forced to announce a hunger strike. How else could I protest against injustice? Major-General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lepikhov, our wives, and Corps Staff Officer Colonel Vladimir Vasilyevich Gavrilov joined me in the hunger strike. We decided that the hunger strike would last five days...

On May 13 I was invited to a district electoral commission where I received certification as a candidate for Crimean Supreme Soviet deputy. When I returned to the corps, they would not let me into the headquarters. Lieutenant-General Kuznetsov, a general with the same last name, came out onto the porch and handed me a piece of paper: an order on my release from the army. The second paragraph of the order was a paragraph on the transfer of documents on me to the Ukrainian Procurator General...

I do not think that I lost this confrontation. I have not played the hypocrite. I think that I have not sullied either my civilian or my officer honor...

### Reactions to Kuznetsov Removal

92UM1050F Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
7 May 92 p 1

[News release from the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "Angered by General Kuznetsov's Position"]

[Text] The political situation in the Crimea is now in the center of attention of the public at large. Passions regarding the Black Sea Fleet did not have a chance to die down before the issue of the former commander of the 32d Army Corps, the headquarters of which is stationed in the city of Simferopol, arose at the instigation of certain short-sighted politicians. Major-General V. Kuznetsov, the corps commander, is clearly digressing into some sort of political game, as may be deduced from his reaction to an order of the Ukrainian minister of defense appointing him to an important position in the administrative staff of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense—a reaction atypical of a person with military ambitions.

This behavior of the corps commander elicited a storm of anger and indignation in almost all large strategic formations, combined units and units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The Ukrainian President and Minister of Defense as well as the leadership of the Crimean Republic received numerous telegrams from servicemen condemning the unlawful actions of the former commander of the 32d Army Corps. "Major-General V. Ye. Kuznetsov forgot the lessons of the August events of 1991, and the impermissibility of participation of the army and servicemen in the political struggle within the country. His actions aimed at drawing subordinates into this dirty game can provoke mistrust in the absolutely overwhelming majority of Russian-speaking generals and officers who consciously supported the Ukraine's course toward state independence and made whatever contribution they could to the development of its armed forces."

"Having taken an oath of allegiance to the people of the Ukraine, we support the course of the Supreme Soviet, the president and government of our country toward reinforcement of state independence and creation of our own armed forces that could dependably defend its integrity, sovereignty and multi-ethnic population...."

"Our position is firm—to fulfill decrees of the president and orders of the minister of defense, and to faithfully serve the people of the Ukraine"—such was the leitmotif of telegrams reaching the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

### Ministry Denies Provocation in Matter of Kuznetsov

92UM1050C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
12 May 92 p 1

Article by Captain D. Shkurko, senior officer of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service: "A Cheap Play for a Former Corps Commander"]

[Text] It must be admitted that recently some of the programs on Russian television have been offering the curious layman's mind rich food for thought. As recently as on 7 May the notion of the pathological bloodthirstiness of the Ukrainian military was insistently injected into our minds from the blue screens. We must give credit to the journalistic excellence of our Russian colleagues. The play was acted out as if according to a script. There was the entourage on the backdrop of Simferopol's spring streets, crowded with masses of people and covered with posters of known content appealing to bruised egos, and the "eastern guest" in a Cossack's hat, and even the main hero in the full but charming face of former army corps commander Major-General Valeriy Kuznetsov. The general who revealed to the world with an unexplainable melancholy in his eyes that members of the certification commission of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense asked him a direct question: "Will you fight against Russia?" To which Kuznetsov firmly replied: "No," with which began all of the misadventures of his career—dismissal from his position, and so on.

"No one ever posed the question in that way during examination of Kuznetsov's candidacy," was what Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan, chief of the Certification Commission of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, said as a rebuttal to the fabrications in a briefing for foreign journalists. There was no intention to remove him from his position. On the contrary a promotion associated with appointment to the administrative staff of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense awaited General Kuznetsov.

Kuznetsov lied, giving his own interpretation to obvious things. But this doesn't fit within the framework of the well-rehearsed script. As is true, by the way, of the direct question asked of Lieutenant-General V. Radetskiy, commander of the Odessa Military District by an unnamed representative of the Crimean public: "Will you fight against Russia?" On the spot the Commander, who honorably replied that any transgressions upon the sovereignty of the Ukraine would receive a worthy rebuff, was represented as something of an aggressor who devours Russian children. What can I say? Obviously not all representatives of the respected Crimean public are so scrupulous as not to descend to provocations....

Well, let God be their judge. As well as future generations, which will judge each according to his deeds, be they noble or shameful.

But the matter lies not with the question itself. What is important is the purpose with which it was posed. The goal is as obvious and provocative as the question itself. To divide the army. But its most terrifying goal is to divide the people. If you intend to fight, then you are a Ukrainian. If

not, then you are a Russian. And there can be nothing in common between you except mutual enmity and mistrust.

Every event of our turbulent times has its own inexorable law. Without imposing my point of view on anyone, I will try to follow the logic of the phenomenon described above.

When the state is ill, its traditions are ill as well. One of the traditions of the former superpower was to constantly seek the enemy "as a means of mobilizing and unifying the laborers." The internal enemy (the counterrevolution, enemies of the people, dissidents and so on) and the external enemy (world, American, Japanese and other sorts of imperialism and militarism). But then ideas generating internal enemies ceased to exist. And much can't be said for external enemies in recent times either. In the meantime the empire has fallen apart, problems are weighing heavily, and things are so uncomfortable without a good, reliable, terrifying enemy compelling you to tighten your belt and plug your ears. So why not find him in the Ukraine, in this breadbasket and forge that decided on its own to drop out of the parade of "pocket" sovereign states and transform into a mighty and competitive modern state? So they created a row about the fleet, and in an instant the Crimea is in turmoil. If you can't solve your own problems, then solve someone else's. The benefit is obvious. The public is distracted, and there is someone on whom to lay the blame for economic difficulties. And if the Ukraine cannot be stopped, then at least play some dirty tricks on it so that it wouldn't be able to go very far.

Of course, you won't hear anything of this in the public statements of Russian politicians. But this is precisely the idea that their actions obviously embody. The great-power psychology is difficult to eradicate. And so, it may be concluded from a psychological point of view that Russian ships are under the command of mad captains; also mad are those who were responsible for the question itself: "Will you fight against Russia?"

## BYELARUS

### Decree on Financial Benefits for Military Personnel

925D0415A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 1 May 92 p 2

["Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus on Measures for Strengthening the Social Protection of Servicemen"]

[Text] For the purposes of strengthening the social protection of servicemen of the armed forces, border, railroad, and internal troops of the Republic of Byelarus, and providing suitable conditions for the performance of military service duties, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus decrees:

#### 1. Establish, starting from 1 February 1992:

—position pay for initial officer positions (platoon commander and equivalent positions) in the amount of 1,800-1,950 rubles [R], and for other officer personnel

positions—in the amount of the position pay being received, increased by 90 percent;

—military rank pay for officer personnel in the amount of double the military rank pay received by these persons up to 1 January 1992 (except officers of the internal troops);

—position pay for warrant officers, extended service servicemen, and women accepted for active military service in positions of soldiers, sergeants, and master sergeants, in the following amounts: first pay grade—R1,370-R1,500; second—R1,400-R1,540; third—R1,440-R1,570; fourth—R1,470-R1,610; fifth—R1,500-R1,650; sixth—R1,570-R1,710; seventh—R1,650-R1,780; eighth—R1,710-R1,850, and ninth—R1,780-R1,920.

Pay for merit promotions for the indicated servicemen is paid in the following amounts: junior sergeant—R50, sergeant—R70; senior sergeant—R90; master sergeant—R110; warrant officer—R130; senior warrant officer—R150.

The percentage increment for length of service is established in the order and amounts stipulated in the normative acts in effect for officer personnel.

Extended service servicemen are paid additional types of monetary allowances and benefits that are calculated based on rank pay in the same order as for warrant officers;

#### 2. Pay:

from 1 February 1992:

—monetary remuneration and increments to servicemen for special conditions of service; performance of combat alert duty; parachute jumps (airborne assault with equipment) that were established previously in rubles, with an increase by a factor of two, and those established in percentages—without the employment of maximum sum limits;

—monetary remuneration and increments for proficiency qualification (proficiency, qualification category) stipulated by existing legislation in the following amounts:

—officer personnel (except military pilots and navigators, instructor military pilots and navigators, and also physicians- surgeons who operate on patients in hospitals), warrant officers, and servicemen on extended service (including medical specialists and pharmacists) who have a second-class rating (category), three percent of position pay, first class (category)—five percent, master class (higher category)—seven percent;

—military pilots and navigators (instructor military pilots and navigators) and surgeons who operate on patients in hospitals, who have the second class (category), five percent of position pay, first class (category)—eight percent, master class (higher category)—10 percent;

—compulsory service servicemen who have a second-class rating, R10, and first class—R15;

starting on 19 February 1992:

—compulsory service servicemen on discharge from military service, a lump-sum allowance amounting to R500, and for those who are orphans and children left without the care of parents, R2,000;

—servicemen (except compulsory service servicemen) who are not provided with housing accommodations for permanent residency or hostels, monetary remuneration for subrental (rental) of temporary living accommodations in the amount of actual expenses, but not more than: in the city of Minsk—R300 per month, in other cities and rayon centers—R200, and in various settlements—R150. For those servicemen who have three or four members of a family living with them, the indicated amounts of monetary compensation are increased by R50 per month.

3. Provide servicemen who have gone through 15 or more calendar years of service faultlessly, and who are not provided with living accommodations, or who need an improvement in living accommodations, who join housing construction (housing) cooperatives, or who build individual dwelling houses, financial assistance free of charge at the place of service in the amount of 50 percent of the cost of cooperative housing, or of the bank credit received for the construction of an individual dwelling house.

4. Do not levy an income tax on servicemen's monetary benefits, monetary remuneration, and other payments they receive in connection with the fulfillment of military service duties.

5. Starting on 1 March 1992, increase by 45 percent wage rates and position pay of workers and employees of military units, military educational institutions, and organizations subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and the Main Directorate of Border Troops under the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus, who have not switched to the remuneration of labor in effect in the republic.

6. Pay officers, warrant officers, extended service servicemen and servicewomen a lump-sum monetary remuneration for maintaining high operational readiness of troops, for conscientious performance of service duties and for faultless discipline in the amount of two months' pay per year.

Annually, render material assistance to the indicated categories of servicemen in the amount of a month's pay.

7. Reimburse officer personnel, warrant officers, extended service servicemen, workers, and employees of military units, military educational institutions, enterprises, establishments, and organizations subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and the Main Directorate of the Border Troops subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus for expenses associated with temporary duty according to the norms established in the Republic of Byelarus.

[Signed] **Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus**

**V. KEBICH**

**Office Manager of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus**

**N. KAVKO**

### **Byelarus Appoints Defense Deputy**

*92UM1079A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 May 92 p 1*

[Article: "A New Appointment—With New Tasks"]

[Text] Yesterday Aleksandr Tushinskiy, a 47-year-old electronics engineer and doctor of technical sciences, was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of Byelarus. He previously served as general director of the Minsk Computer Equipment NPO [Scientific Production Association].

It was announced at the new administrator's introduction to journalists that his main job will be to build the structures of Byelarus's defense industry on a new basis in connection with the formation of Byelarus's own armed forces now underway.

## **BALTIC STATES**

### **Military Journal Highlights Problems With New Recruits**

*92UN1255C Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 8 Apr 92 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "KARYS About the New Draftees"]

[Text] "To put it mildly, not a single one among them radiates patriotism. They love Lithuania, they say, but, for all I know, they love their home more. They had hardly arrived when they already started inquiring, when are you going to let us visit the family..." This is how in this year's third issue of the magazine KARYS, a commander of a training center is talking about young Lithuanian soldiers who were sent to Snieckus to perform their military service.

The commander is indignant because the young men are even unwilling to wash themselves! "I am not lying, we are driving them like some he-goats to the wash-room," he asserts and then he corrects himself by saying that not all of them are like that. There are some good, tidy lads, "but many, especially those who have arrived from Klaipeda, give us trouble..." According to the commander, visiting higher officials have counseled them not to press the young soldiers too hard, but this advice is dubious, since an army without discipline and order is not an army.

The same issue of the magazine contains a report, titled "As a Soldier I Shall Go to Defend My Dear Homeland," which tells about nice Lithuanian customs honoring the defenders of the Fatherland and about the problems now facing the military authorities. Quite a few gallant young men are joining the Lithuanian army, but the report does not refrain from exposing the pampered and the disappointed ones: "They told us—by January 1st you shall be in your posts, then—or January 10th, 20th... All we get is promises and we do not believe in anything any longer..."

Listening to the commanding officers' opinions about the soldiers and to the soldiers' views of the commanding officers, one may probably form an objective picture of the service in Snieckus.

The medical commissions also received their share of criticism. Allegedly, they have not changed at all. This is how they examined the recruits' health: "They asked me to come into the consulting room, told me to stick out my tongue, asked me if I was healthy, and that was all—go and serve." What can one say about those doctors if "they even sent us a man who has been suffering from gonorrhea for more than half a year," the report says.

### State Service Chief Reports on Spring Call Up Progress

92UN1347A Riga SM SEGODNYA in Russian  
29 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Doniks, chief of the republic administration on state service and mobilization, by Dm. Mart, place and date not given: "The Spring Call Up: So Far, Through Competition..."]

[Text] "Latvia does not have an army; Latvia has self-defense forces!" maintains Aleksandr Doniks, chief of the republic administration on state service and mobilization.

As is known, military draft offices of the former USSR were liquidated on the territory of the Latvian Republic after the August putsch. These facilities are now occupied by Latvian rayon state service administrations.

The situation with the call up for the state service, which started on 1 April, may be considered satisfactory. Only the best are accepted, on the basis of competition. Six hundred young men have already appeared at the rayon state service administrations. All in all, 1,500 Latvian youths will be affected by the spring call up. Actually, a thousand or two more are needed. There is no place to put them, however, since, as Doniks put it, "the Russian Army so far has not transferred a single facility to us."

[Mart] Is it necessary to go through driver or diver training before the call up—the way it used to be in the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for Collaboration with the Army, Air Force, and the Navy]?

[Doniks] No. We call up all permanent residents of the republic, regardless of their nationality, who have reached the age of 19. Before they reach that age they can do whatever they please.

[Mart] SM SEGODNYA reader O.I. Kvashna from Liepaja is afraid for her son: "With the current discrimination against the Russian-speaking people in the Latvian Army, even more cruel hazing than that in the former Soviet Army is possible."

[Doniks] People's perception of the Latvian army has been formed on the basis of the situation that existed in the Soviet Army. We do not have any discrimination. I think that if a person does not have any objections in principle to serving the interests of Latvia, we will be happy to take him.

[Mart] What should people who do not speak Latvian do?

[Doniks] No problem; we will teach them! First they will learn a couple of words: "right" and "left;" then more

complex orders; and six months later they will start speaking Latvian. I myself learned Russian this way at the time.

[Mart] Already 600 people have been called up. How many of them are Russians?

[Doniks] This is a purely communist approach—to count people by nationality. For us, everyone is equal.

[Mart] We get contacted by young people who want to serve in the Russian Army.

[Doniks] A man has to serve in the army of the state of which he is a citizen. I think the choice of army is closely related to the issue of granting citizenship—at the start of service they have to take an oath of allegiance to Latvia, or Russia, and so on. So let them decide on their own.

[Mart] How much are Latvian servicemen paid?

[Doniks] We have a two-year military service or a year-and-a-half labor service. During this period of time each military serviceman gets one-third of the Latvian minimum wage, and each "laborer" gets the full minimum wage.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Structure, Size, Tasks, Training of Armenian Armed Forces Discussed

92UM1023A Yerevan RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA  
in Russian 3 Apr 92 p 2, 4 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Nelson Aleksanyan, under the rubric: "Defense": "Reflections on a National Army"]

[3 Apr 92 p 2]

[Text] An army is one of the most important state institutions, and it is called upon to carry out specific functions which no other state structure other than it can carry out. The most important of these functions is defense of the state from an external threat and protection of the existing system. All of the rest are only derivatives of the main function. Therefore, each country is interested in the creation of powerful and effective armed forces. The proportion of the army and the separate branches of service largely depends on a number of quite specific circumstances—the level of economic development, population size, foreign and domestic policy and the state's geostrategic position. The larger and richer the country, the larger or stronger the army it can permit itself. The external or internal threat also leads to the growth of the armed forces. Each state's military doctrine and national armed forces concept are developed while considering these and a multitude of other factors.

The might of any army primarily depends on the country's level of economic development. It is the level of economic development that determines how many men it is possible to maintain under arms and how they will be armed and equipped, without overexerting and without diverting excessive material and human resources. Thus, the formula "what kind of state—that kind of army" is the determining factor. On the other hand, the times when

God was on the side of large battalions have already passed. Right now God is on the side of effective battalions. Operation Desert Storm against Iraq very clearly proved that. At the same time, history also demonstrates that totalitarianism and the militarization that is inevitably associated with it somehow or other leads to the death or the collapse of the country, even despite the absence of a real military threat and super-excessive armed forces. The newest example of that was the inglorious end of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO].

Having encountered direct military aggression, the Republic of Armenia has also been compelled to begin thinking about creating its own armed forces. Spontaneously and semi-spontaneously created detachments and units in principle are incapable of carrying out the functions of a real regular army—they are fine for the time being or at a moment when just any armed forces are needed to oppose aggression and to defend the country's border. High moral and combat spirit is only slightly capable of compensating for poor proficiency and a shortage of weapons. Recent debates in the republic parliament have demonstrated that we have already begun to think about that. However, the discussion of military draft laws was frequently decorative-patriotic and extremely dilettantish in nature. The aspiration to create our own armed forces forced to the back burner the need to forestall development of a national military doctrine and the very concept of a national army.

What sort of our republic national armed forces would I like to see?

**STRENGTH.** At the present time, the NATO countries have the best and most modern armed forces. It is the "European standard" that we are attempting to take as the basis. However, we must consider that the disappearance of the military threat from the USSR and the WTO inevitably must result in a definite reexamination of armed forces strength toward their reduction. That is, the principle of reasonable sufficiency, the criteria of the required minimum, is beginning to operate at full force. Analysis of the strength of the U.S. and European NATO member-countries armed forces demonstrates that there is an average of one serviceman per 150 people in their countries. Obviously this is the level that is considered acceptable and does not overexert the economy. In the near future, this ratio will be increased, most likely to 1:200 or 1:250. However, the proportion of 1:150 is the average and the spread throughout Europe is quite great—from 1:270 for Ireland to 1:46 for Greece. For the former USSR, the ratio of army to population was 1:70 and, in so doing, the Union was considered to be a sufficiently militarized country.

For states of other regions, the proportions of army to population also shift depending on the level of political tension or involvement in conflicts. So, Japan, with a population of 124,000,000 and which is not participating in any conflicts, has armed forces numbering 249,000 men (1:500) whereas Iraq, with a population of 19,000,000, has a 1,000,000 man army (1:19). In Israel, this indicator is 1:32, in Jordan—1:40, and in Syria—1:31.

Thus, one can assume that, from the point of view of the criteria of reasonable sufficiency, an army to population proportion of 1:200 is obviously optimal for countries that have not been involved in conflicts and that do not sense an external threat.

If you extrapolate these calculations with regard to Armenia, the correlation of 1:200 with a population of 4,000,000 people will result in a 20,000-man army for our republic. Under the theoretically maximum militarization (1:35), the army's strength may total nearly 110,000-120,000 men which is clearly an unbearable burden. While proceeding based upon the current political and economic conditions in which the republic has found itself, and the criteria of reasonable sufficiency, the total strength of Armenia's armed forces may be determined by the quite reasonable strength of 30,000-35,000 men (1:120—close to the "European standard"). Incidentally, it is obvious that approximately this number of CIS troops are in Armenia: three divisions and some independent units.

It can be demonstrated that armed forces with a strength of 30,000-35,000 will not be able to ensure the republic's security: Azerbaijan plans to have an army of 100,000 men and the armed forces of Turkey have 620,000 men, and Iran—504,000 men. However, the fact is that a state rarely calculates exclusively on its own forces in the matter of ensuring its own security. Treaties of mutual assistance and a collective security system have enormous significance—we should also not exclude this realistic path for Armenia. Furthermore, a small, but well-trained and well-equipped modern army is quite capable of rebuffing a much more numerous aggressor. And here we move right up to the other important aspects of the concept of a modern national army. You can increase the combat readiness and might of small armed forces through its modern organization, structure, arms and training.

**ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE.** There is no need to copy the organization and structure of the former Soviet Army: as even our "hawks" have been compelled to admit through clenched teeth, they are largely obsolete and unsuitable for modern warfare.

However, at first Armenia has to have what already exists—if only a national army is not created on other, more modern principles. That which is suitable for enormous armies is poorly suited for small armies and the reverse. The quasi-partisan volunteer detachments that were engendered for all of us by well-known circumstances, along with all of the shortcomings that are inherent to formations of that type, also had quite obvious advantages. It would simply be sinful not to take advantage of that experience. Just what are these advantages?

First of all, of course, high combat spirit and mobility, flexibility of use and a significant degree of autonomy. Modern military thought imparts primary significance to these qualities, along with highly effective weapons. The corps and division structure that recently still dominated is largely viewed and recognized as advisable only for many thousand-man armies.

The majority of countries are shifting to a less cumbersome brigade system, but in several countries, which for one reason or another are compelled to conduct combat operations in inaccessible locations (mountains, jungles), the battalion or even the company has become the basic military unit, and are, to a considerable extent, broken down into independent combat groups—which we refer to as “dzhokat” or “khumb”.

Thus, the brigade and the battalion—independent combat units capable of planning and conducting combat operations independently and for a sufficiently prolonged period of time—can and should become the organizational basis of the future national army of Armenia. A large part of the required support systems must be directly built in to their structure. Analysis of foreign armies indicates that the trend to reinforce combat and fire support of brigades and battalions, and even companies, by attaching heavier authorized weapons to them—heavier not in the sense of weight but of effectiveness—is an ever increasing trend. So, for example, the acceptance into the inventory of platoons and squads of under-barrel and hand-held grenade launchers, and also antitank missile systems (RPG's [antitank grenade launchers] or PTURS's [antitank guided missiles]) has substantially increased their power. Automatic antipersonnel and antitank grenades have substantially reduced the requirement for artillery support of units.

The creation of primarily light infantry and mountain rifle or jaeger units will become exceptionally important for the Armenian national army—Armenia's geographic conditions and relief do not generally suggest another solution. Highly mobile (airmobile) mountain jaeger units, equipped with light but effective weapons, can be airlifted in several hours to practically any region of the republic and successfully oppose a much more heavily-armed enemy.

Everything that has been said above leads to the quite justified conclusion that even small lightly-armed subunits of a national army are capable of substantially guaranteeing the security of the republic's borders with minimal field fortification of the border strip.

While considering the proposed strength of the national army, these light infantry or mountain jaeger units need to total somewhere near half or two-thirds of it—15,000-20,000 men. This is from 20 to 30 modern battalions or 5-8 brigades. The creation of 1-2 tank, 2-3 motorized rifle, 1-2 artillery brigades, a PVO [air defense] brigade, and a brigade or battalion of special troops appears to be reasonable.

(Conclusion in the next issue.)

[4 Apr 92 p 2]

[Text] (Conclusion. Beginning in No 64)

**WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.** The army's capability to carry out missions assigned to the armed forces depends to an enormous degree on its level of equipment with modern weapons and equipment. Tanks and army aviation are a modern army's main strike force. After the appearance of

various generations of antitank helicopters and PTURS's (it is thought that one helicopter is capable of destroying up to 16 tanks prior to its destruction), the role of tanks in foreign armies has been reduced, although they are still an awesome combat force. In foreign armies there is one tank per 100-120 servicemen, whereas there is one antitank weapon for a total of 5-10 servicemen, which makes tank breakthroughs quite problematical prior to the suppression of PTO's [antitank weapons]. At the same time, the significance of such combat weapons as helicopters has very greatly increased during recent decades, primarily due to their multi-mission capability. So, each American division has an army aviation battalion—from 100 helicopters of various types in a light infantry division to 402 helicopters in an airmobile division.

While considering our republic's difficult terrain and its relative inaccessibility to tanks, one can assume that our future national army will not require a large number of tanks, according to my calculations, a total of nearly 250 tanks, or even less, which is even lower than the lower “European standard”. It is the same with regard to armored transport vehicles and armored personnel vehicles—there may be a minimum number of them in units and subunits. The principle of reasonable sufficiency and the calculations demonstrate that the proportion of tanks and armored vehicles is approximately 1:2.5.

Close-combat weapons with an effective range of 3-5 kilometers are one of the most important components of a modern army's combat might. This type of weapon includes, besides hand firearms, under-barrel and hand-held grenade launchers, PTURS's, and company mortars (primarily self-propelled in foreign armies). The future Armenian army must be largely saturated with these weapons—with their exclusively low prices, they are at the same time quite effective. Simplicity of maintenance and use, ease of transportation, and a small crew—2-6 men—are one of its main characteristics.

Of course, all of this does not exclude heavy weapons—field artillery pieces and heavy mortars, RSZO's [multiple rocket launchers], and also the required anti-aircraft cover—anti-aircraft cannons, machineguns, and both land-based, mobile and portable anti-aircraft missile complexes. Facilities and units, right down to companies must be covered by some weapons or other (an American infantry division has 24 Chaparral ZUR's [surface-to-air missiles], 24 Vulcan ZSU's [self-propelled anti-aircraft guns], and 68 Stinger PZRK's [man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems] for 18,000 personnel).

And, of course, a brigade or battalion of combat helicopters—60-100—is absolutely necessary, that are capable of increasing the fire power, several times over, that is needed in support of units.

Modern equipment and clothing for a soldier have great significance. Materials from bullet-proof “kevlar” material are being used to develop new clothing (the Israeli Army has already transitioned to them), special glasses protect soldiers' eyes from laser radiation, mini-radios built into helmets provide individual communications within line of

sight, boots with metal inserts and insoles protect feet from mines, and individual thermal gunsights and helmet devices permit them to operate with confidence at night, in fog or in smoke.

All of these improvements have already undergone combat testing and many countries have already long ago accepted them into their inventories. Only God knows how matters stand with all of this in the army of the former USSR but, judging by everything, it stands poorly. The only innovation here—a more modern and comfortable uniform—is the “Afghanka” [uniform developed for use in Afghanistan].

And we need to direct special attention to one other circumstance. Inadequate combat proficiency, the inability to dig trenches, camouflage themselves, to crawl, and to move to the attack will for a long time yet obviously be the scourge of the newly created national armies. And as a result, the presence of expert marksmen in units and subunits may play an exclusive role in all possible local clashes. Two to three well-trained expert marksmen in suitable locations can in principle control a strip of up to five kilometers along the front and up to a kilometer in depth. While knocking out commanders, machinegun or mortar crews, while destroying drivers and their vehicles using aimed fire, they can sow panic among the enemy, disrupt regrouping, and also generally thwart an attack. An expert marksman with a powerful, noiseless rifle and fine optics can totally paralyze a significant sector of the enemy front, whereas totally disproportional men and equipment are required to neutralize him.

I think that each platoon and each combat group of the future Armenian national army must have one good expert marksman.

**MANNING AND COMBAT TRAINING.** Judging by everything, the manning of national armies will be based on massive conscription for quite a long time yet: a professional army will still be expensive at first. Therefore, it seems advisable to man the army on the mixed principle. We need to create a kind of elite subunit or unit for those servicemen who have agreed to serve on contract (3-5-10 years). Service here must be highly paid (really highly paid). It is this elite unit with high class professionals (on the level of assault forces or spetsnaz [special forces]) that will become the embryo of a national army—at first a company, then a battalion and a brigade. We must arm and equip this elite unit with the most modern weapons and saturate it with all of the required support systems.

The other large part of the army will be regularly replenished with new recruits (term of service—up to 18 months). While considering that the total number of conscripts remains stable, we can more strictly select new recruits, drastically increase medical and psychological supervision, conduct mandatory testing, and select those conscripts who are really fit for military service. The monetary and clothing allowances of servicemen will be subject to improvement when possible. After completion of compulsory service, they can be offered a contract and be transferred to elite units or sent to officers' school.

Combat training of troops also must be fundamentally changed. The ghastly falsification of reports and flagrant formalism which characterized the military training system—pre-conscription army and reservists—must be completely eradicated. Combat training and total mastery of a military specialty—that must be placed at the head of the list. So, for example, two-three hours per month is totally adequate for drill training and “shagistika” [square-bashing]—it doesn't cause anything besides quiet ferocity and a hatred for drill. Another couple of hours is still adequate for all possible parades.

During American parades, soldiers poorly maintain their distance and cover and they sometimes do not swing their arms in time... But does that mean that the American Army is poorly trained?

Only in our “invincible and legendary” army could a soldier serve his two years without having once fired a weapon or having dug a trench. I am already not talking about that laughingstock that is called training assemblies. What, if not a mockery, can you call this “training” when potential officers are not permitted to fire even one clip the first time they take a pistol in their hands, sit in an armored transport vehicle, or load a cannon?! What kind of country, that kind of army... If we want to become a real country, we must think about a real army.

A cheap army is the direct path to defeat. The army must cost only as much as it **should** cost. To split hairs on minor details or to save on “matches” is fatally dangerous in this matter. No, I am not suggesting pumping money and equipment above any reasonable level into the army. But each soldier must be trained to fire—and to do this he needs at least 100 rounds each month to accurately hit the target. He must be taught to drive a tank, BTR [armored transport vehicle], and a BMP [armored personnel vehicle]—and to do this he must drive them and get involved with their maintenance. He must normally master grenade launchers and PTURS—and to do this he needs at least one launch per day. Let it not be with a combat round at first but also not from a rifle thrust into the barrel of a long-range howitzer. Every possible kind of simulator, in which a new recruit learns as much as he needs and not as much as he should, exists in all **normal** armies. It is a funny thing: in one foreign army where service is by contract, the number of rounds issued for initial training is practically unlimited, then later, if they do not hit the target, the cost of the rounds and shells that have been wasted are deducted from their pay. The result: in a year, each soldier willy-nilly becomes an expert marksman!

The maximum approximation of combat conditions—that is the basis of modern combat training and that person who dreams about a real army must really remember that.

All possible moral and material incentives exist that are capable to some degree or other of increasing the combat proficiency of the troops. For example, among them are pay differentials for servicemen depending on their successes, regular review of salaries toward increasing or reducing them, and instilling pride precisely in their own unit or subunit.

The use of the military-teaching experience of those leading countries in a military sense, like the United States, the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], England, and Japan, can be of enormous practical benefit.

So, we will attempt to sum up.

The defensive military doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency demand from Armenia the creation of a relatively small in number but highly professional armed forces that are equipped with the most modern and highly accurate weapons as possible and with a powerful antitank and anti-aircraft defense system. The army must be adapted to the maximum extent possible to our theater of military operations—light infantry, mountain jaeger, and desirably airmobile.

Its high combat qualities must be provided through outstanding proficiency, the capability for autonomous operations, ease of command and control of units, and the proper physical and moral training of servicemen.

It must be initially manned according to a dual principle. Emphasis in the daily training of the troops must be made precisely on combat training, physical training, making the performance of required practical skills automatic, and cultivating a sense of responsibility and pride.

The quantity and quality of weapons that exist and are stored on the territory of the republic entirely permit us to begin to resolve these tasks with the goal of creating a full-fledged national army.

### **Georgia Pledges Neutrality, Plans Structure of Armed Forces**

92UM1022A Moscow *LESNAYA GAZETA* in Russian  
30 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by *LESNAYA GAZETA* correspondent M. Pichkhadze: "Georgia to Maintain Neutrality"]

[Text] Republic Minister of Defense General L. Sharashenidze has stated that Georgia is to maintain neutrality. Speaking to journalists, he spoke of the structure of the Armed Forces. The Regular Army will possess an approximate strength of 20,000 men. To be stationed on the territory of Georgia will be two infantry corps, an airborne force, and a naval force. The Republic will receive her legal "piece of the pie" upon division of the Black Sea Fleet.

"One of the items we are laying claim to is the Poti Naval Base. The issue of transfer of Transcaucasus Military District facilities to us has not yet been decided. As long as the Army is stationed here, we cannot simply say nothing," the general said emphatically. "I myself, accompanied by my family, was transferred 18 times to various posts. I lived in heated railroad cars; I know all about that."

In the not too distant future we intend to assume the assurance of state border security, inviolability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. The State Supreme Council has already passed a decree calling for induction into the Unified Armed Forces.

How much will it cost the taxpayers to maintain the Georgian Army? An exact figure was not quoted. But,

according to what the minister said, to maintain a single brigade the cost will amount to one billion rubles.

### **Georgia Forms Air Force**

92UM1022B Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 8 May 92 p 3

[NEGAZ report: "Georgia Forming Own Air Force"]

[Text] The former Republic Center for Air Training and Air Transportation of Georgia, located in the city of Bolnisi, is being turned over to the future Air Force. This republic center is to house an aviation center for initial training of national cadre and aviation specialists to be created there. Intensive negotiations are being held with the authorities of the Air Force and PVO [Air Defense] of the Transcaucasus Military District relative to transferring some combat materiel and ground support equipment to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia.

### **Georgia Negotiates With Abkhazia Over Army Formation**

92UM1080A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 9 May 92 p 3

[Article by Tengiz Pachkoria under the rubric "Abkhazia": "Abkhazia Has its Own View on the Principles for Forming the Georgian Army"]

[Text] The chairman of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia informed a delegation from the State Council of the Georgian Republic that Abkhazia has its own view on the principles for forming the Georgian Army.

A delegation from the State Council of the Georgian Republic was in Sukhumi on 6 and 7 May. Chairman of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia Vladislav Ardzinba met with Minister of Defense of the Georgian Republic Levan Sharashenidze on 6 May. During the meeting Levan Sharashenidze briefed Vladislav Ardzinba on action taken to form a regular army of the Georgian Republic. The defense minister raised the issue of placing Abkhazia's internal troops under the authority of Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs and that of participation by Abkhazia in the formation of a united armed force for Georgia based on the extraterritorial principle. Levan Sharashenidze voiced the idea of stationing units of Georgia's armed forces inside Abkhazia. Vladislav Ardzinba, however, insisted on the territorial principle for the performance of military service, which would allow recruits from Abkhazia to serve in their homeland. He also commented that an opportunity to perform alternative service must be provided in Abkhazia. In addition, Vladislav Ardzinba stressed the fact that all matters pertaining to military policy could be decided only after an appropriate agreement is reached at the highest level, between the leadership of the Armed Forces of Abkhazia and the leadership of the Republic of Georgia, and that military matters should be coordinated between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Georgia and Abkhazia's Council for Coordinating Military Units.

### Georgian Military Advisor on Relations with CIS States

92UM1069A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 May 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Lt Gen Levan Sharashenidze, chief military advisor, Georgia Ministry of Defense, by Lt Col A. Dergilev: "Georgia: Military Cooperation with Russia to Continue"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Georgia was represented at the Tashkent meeting of heads of CIS member states as an observer. As such, the country did not sign any documents attendant to the meeting. This being the case, what sort of military cooperation will she pursue with the Commonwealth countries?

The above is the topic of a conversation we held with Lieutenant General Levan Sharashenidze, chief military advisor, Georgian Ministry of Defense, who was a member of the republic's delegation to the Tashkent meeting.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] According to the Moscow news media, the Georgian delegation was in no hurry to attend the Tashkent meeting, and, as a matter of fact, was late in joining the participants. Could the reason for this be political, or is this attributable to something else?

[Sharashenidze] Our delegation, headed by Tengiz Sigua, did fly to Tashkent on time, but we did not attend the military leadership conferences chaired by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. Why not? Because we are not a member of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. In all the other activities we did participate.

I personally attended all the preliminary meetings which produced the package of documents on military issues being prepared for the Tashkent meeting.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are the results of the Tashkent meeting of any practical significance for Georgia? Has the meeting exerted any influence on the process of constructing Georgia's army?

[Sharashenidze] No influence whatsoever. And it has not been of any practical significance to us, but we did take in all that transpired at the conference. We also believe this kind of meeting to be useful as a kind of channel of communication. If something like that did not exist at the present time, it would be impossible to effect construction of the Armed Forces, and a civilized state could not function normally in general.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Then, Levan Levanovich, why has Georgia not signed the Collective Security Treaty?

[Sharashenidze] We are not opposed to the idea of collective security, but we cannot enter this arrangement, since Georgia is not a member of the CIS. The decision as to joining this structure lies within the exclusive purview of parliament, a body Georgia does not yet have. Our delegation was not authorized to sign any documents.

Other factors also come into play. They have to do with our disagreement with the armaments quotas allotted us; they are not in line with our geo-political and strategic military situation.

However, I must stress that the fact that we did not sign the treaty ought not be construed as our having a misunderstanding of a political, or, especially, military, nature with Russia or with any other CIS members. We stand ready to work with them in the military area and cooperate in repelling external aggression.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] So, Georgia is not a participant in the CIS collective security system. What happens next? Will Georgia demand that the Russian troops be withdrawn from her soil?

[Sharashenidze] That question is meaningless. The fact that we did not sign the Collective Security Treaty is no indication whatsoever of a change in our intention to live in peace with Russia. We even stand ready to cooperate in repelling external aggression. I say emphatically that, with our republic building a law-governed democratic state, this kind of issue must be decided in a civilized manner. The matter of withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian soil will be dealt with in due time via bilateral talks.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does this mean that Georgia's not signing the Collective Security Treaty will have some effect on the future of the Transcaucasus Military District?

[Sharashenidze] There will be no effect. As a matter of fact, I tell you that Georgia's State Council is doing all it can so that Russian servicemen and their dependents are not discriminated against; it in addition enjoys good relations with the leadership and staff of the Transcaucasus Military District. Also good are the relations between the Russian Group of Forces and the Georgia Ministry of Defense.

## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### Uzbekistan Recruits to Serve in Republic

92UM1040A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
7 May 92 p 1

[Article by UzA Correspondent U. Mirzayarov: "Army Service in the Homeland"]

[Text] Within the staff of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, a meeting was held for the leaders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Karakalpakstan, the administrations for defense affairs of the Tashkent city and oblast khokimiyats [councils] as well as the chairmen of the commissions for induction into military service. Measures were discussed to implement the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted on 18 April of the current year on calling up Uzbekistan citizens for active military and alternative service. The meeting was chaired by the State Adviser of the Uzbekistan Republic President, T.A. Alimov.

The Chief Consultant on the Staff of the Uzbekistan President B.E. Kasymov reported to those present.

A majority of our fellows will do their military service in their homeland, in Uzbekistan, it was emphasized at the meeting. Parents sending their sons to serve in the army should keep one particular feature in mind. Certain draftees who begin to carry out their military duties on Uzbekistan territory can be sent for special military training to other republics such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on a competitive basis for 2 or 3 months and at the longest for a half-year. As yet Uzbekistan still does not possess the possibilities and conditions for fully training the military personnel in all the required specialties.

Moreover, if the draftees so desire to serve in other republics, with the written approval of their parents for this, their requests will be granted. But in such cases their service will be carried out under the strict supervision of the Uzbekistan Armed Forces with the complete protection of the interests of the republic's citizens.

## OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS

### **Bashkorostan Recruits to Serve at Home**

92UM1081A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 May 92 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Bashkorostan"]

[Text] It was decided at a 12 May meeting of the Armed Forces of Bashkorostan to keep Bashkir recruits in the republic to perform their active military duty here.

They will be assigned to fill vacancies in subunits of the internal troops and civil defense forces and in military construction units, as well as in line units deployed in the republic. This decision was adopted by the presidium of the armed forces "for purposes of maintaining law and order, for mopping up following natural disasters and accidents, and for implementing measures to improve the ecological situation" and "in order to maintain closer contact with the military units."

The induction of citizens of the republic for active military duty in forces located outside of the Russian Federation, under the presidium's decision, will be a voluntary matter for the draftee and his parents.

## ARMS TRADE

**Possible Arms Sales in Persian Gulf Noted**

924C1457A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 20, 13 May 92 p 9

[Article by Sergey Medvedko, LG correspondent, Damascus: "SU-27: Going to the Emirates? What Was Our Military Doing on the Banks of the Persian Gulf?" First paragraph is in bold font in the original.]

**[Text] A small part of the military equipment that belonged to the USSR holds out promises of quick, but more importantly, real money when it is sold. It would appear, however, that delivery is now being made to the Near East and not to the traditional clients of the former USSR.**

In searching for new clients, Russia has turned its attention to an area where until recently, neither equipment nor people from the USSR were barely ever seen—the area of the Arab monarchist states of the Persian Gulf. Russia, according to Arab observers, is on the threshold of a new market which until now had been a restricted zone for her. Only Western arms merchants could trade there.

At the same time that the media strongly highlighted the visit to the region of A. Kozyrev, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, details of the arrival of a high-ranking Russian military delegation stayed pretty well in the shadows. From diplomatic and military sources, however, it became known that the Russian military mission headed by General Aleksandr Galkin, arrived with a package of proposals for selling arms and conducted successful negotiations. The timing of the trip and the conclusion of a possible deal was convenient for both parties: The countries of the Persian Gulf, still having fresh memories of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, are undergoing a "rearmament syndrome," while the former USSR is undergoing a financial and economic crisis. The two parties may thus be useful to one another.

Russian military merchants are looking optimistically at the new market. And they have good reason. They have a number of trump cards. Soviet equipment, in many respects, is not only not inferior to, but even superior to Western equipment, while prices are very low—sometimes several times lower than analogous samples of Western arms. The delegation, having visited the United Arab Emirates, is hoping especially to sell the modern MIG-29 and SU-27 fighter-bombers, T-72 tanks, as well as the S-300 anti-missile system which, our experts believe is superior to even the American "Patriot" system.

People in countries of the Persian Gulf do not believe that the United States and Western countries should have a monopoly on arms sales in this region.

**Follow up on Investigation of Unlawful Sale of 6 Su-15s**

92UM1062A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major A. Ivanov, under the rubric: "A Journalist Conducts an Investigation": "How They Sold the Aircraft: Postscript to a Television Sensation"]

[Text] On a Friday in April, Aleksandr Nevzorov "set off" the latest information bomb on the television program "600 sekund" [600 Seconds]. In detective style, the telejournalist revealed how the military had "forced" on entrepreneurs for next to nothing six combat fighter-interceptors that had just undergone major repairs. And they, in turn, had carried out a series of manipulations and were prepared to sell the military equipment abroad.

In the next few days, quite a few telephone calls were received at various levels of authority, including at the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial offices. Readers asked how could it happen that flyable combat Su-15s were sold to firms for a price of 7,000 rubles each? And what was this—a dubious deal shrouded in total secrecy or just the latest television hoax?

At the garrison military prosecutor's office, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Yu. Silanov, who filed the criminal case with regard to the sale of six Su-15s by the Lomonosov Military Aviation Technical School to Initsiativa Commercial Production Center, reported that the military district military procurator's office is now conducting an investigation.

While carefully reading copies of the documents, explanatory notes, reports and the conclusions of experts, I gradually delved into the inside information about this unusual deal with its multitude of contradictions. I least of all wanted to accuse someone of negligence or a job-related crime or to excuse it. Let the organs of justice do that. I will dwell on the facts, express my opinion with regard to what, in my view, served as the peculiar stimulus for the development of this story.

So, on 23 January 1992, Initsiativa Commercial Industrial Center Small State Enterprise [MGP], in the person of General Director V. Pukhlyak and Lomonosov VATU [Military Aviation Technical School] Head Colonel V. Babkin concluded Contract No. 1-A to clean up the school grounds and to utilize the waste. To complete the work, the client (LVATU) was obliged to transfer to Initsiativa the utilized equipment (six Su-15s) for use only as simulators for starting and connecting malfunctioning power supplies and hydraulic assemblies.

The appendix to the contract listed that an agreement had been reached on the amount of the cost for the deal and the amount was R54,000, taking taxes into account.

On that very day, a document was signed, in accordance with which the school transferred to Initsiativa for use for its own purposes (in the form of aeroclub exhibits, etc.), aircraft from which, as listed in the document, navigational gear, out of trim hydraulics, inoperable instruments, engines, etc., had been removed.

Thus, the deal was concluded in a single day. And on the following day a new firm, "P. Aleks LTD" entered the arena, whose President V. Rezvyi had concluded an agreement with Babkin and Pukhlyak that the firm would receive six Su-15s and was obliged to use them only as museum exhibits, simulators, and castings.

From Colonel V. Babkin's explanatory note to the procurator's office: "At the end of February, Pukhlyak called me and said that Rezvyi, the leader of P. Aleks, planned to sell two aircraft to Sweden. This troubled me and I asked Major V. Matskovskiy (acting school deputy commander for weaponry—A.I.): had all of the equipment been removed from the aircraft? He reported that he had not managed to remove the gunsights. And there was also something else that had not been removed... Then, at the end of March, I sent him to Sosnovoborsk DOSAAF Airfield to remove the remaining instruments. But the representatives of the private enterprise would not permit him access to the aircraft."

From the letter of the P. Aleks LTD firm leadership to Lomonosov VATU commander and to Initsiativa MGP's general director:

"On March 11, an attempt to dismantle and breakdown these aircraft by LVATU servicemen was thwarted. I remind you that these aircraft are the property of P. Aleks LTD and at the present time we have commercial offers for their sale... While proceeding from what has been set forth, I remind you about the criminal and financial liability for damaging the firm's property. I ask you to take steps on the case cited."

No less threatening a letter was sent to the organs of the military procurator. P. Aleks was certainly quite worried about shipping the Su-15's abroad in the best possible condition. This type of aircraft had never been sold abroad and experts have told me that there are none in any of the world's aircraft collections. Certainly many foreign aviation buffs would have paid quite substantial sums in hard currency in order to acquire these aircraft which have already been removed from the inventory and therefore will disappear from airfields in the near future and with which the most sensational stories in the entire world are associated. One has only to mention one thing—the use of the Su-15 to shoot down the South Korean Boeing in the Far East.

But it seems that disappointment awaits the businessmen. According to the military procurator's evidence, Gosarbitrazh [State Committee for Arbitration] has issued an arrest warrant for the military equipment sold to P. Aleks and has accepted for review the case about the legality of the deal itself.

So, why did the school need to sell the fighter aircraft? This is perhaps the most contradictory issue on which the investigatory group headed by Military District Assistant Military Procurator Major of Justice K. Baryshnikov is attempting to shed light.

And everything began with the fact that at the end of June 1991 the Lomonosov School head requested 10-12 MIG-23 and Su-15 aircraft from the PVO [Air Defense] Troops Commander-in-Chief's Directorate to improve the practical level of training for aircraft mechanics.

And although LVATU does not train specialists for the Su-15, and it has twice as many MIG's as it should have,

for some reason questions did not arise at the VUZ [higher educational institution] and aviation troop directorates.

"We are not stingy with aircraft for schools," explained Major-General of Aviation V. Ishutko. "As a result of the reduction, the reserves of Su-15's we have at the bases will be cut up for scrap, regardless of whether or not their service life has been exceeded."

Two weeks later, Acting PVO Aviation Chief Major-General of Aviation L. Bokov, via an enciphered message, tasked Stavropol VVAULSH [Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots and Navigators] command authorities (because only that school has pilots who fly Su-15's) to accept 16 aircraft with minimum remaining service life at the repair enterprise at Novosibirsk and to fly 12 of them to Pushkin Airfield for the Lomonosov School.

The LVATU head had to accept the aircraft, bring them to a non-operable state and use them for the training process.

In October 1991, the first six aircraft, which had undergone major overhaul and with a remaining service life of from 600 to 1,500 hours, landed near Saint Petersburg. Incidentally, the repair of each aircraft cost R65,000. Add here the expenditures for the pilots' flights from Stavropol to Siberia, temporary duty assignment costs, the cost of the fuel used to ferry the aircraft from Novosibirsk to Pushkin and you obtain an impressive sum.

Three months passed before the Su-15's left the last airfield apron near the city on the Neva. But they left not as military aircraft but as scrap metal. According to the report of PVO Troops Main Staff Commission Chairman Colonel K. Besko who conducted the official investigation on this case, part of the instruments containing precious metals, onboard radars, and the engines were left unremoved on the aircraft.

I think that it is impossible to avoid the opinion of now former VATU Chief Colonel V. Babkin (the PVO Troops commander removed him from his post after criminal charges were filed) on the reason for concluding the deal. This is what he said:

"They requested the Su-15s to work out repair techniques for combat and operational damage. But they didn't think that complications would arise with transportation. They needed special equipment to tow the aircraft from the airfield to the school, and that is approximately 90 kilometers. And neither Leningrad Military District aviation nor we had it. Several times, beginning in October, I assigned tasks to my subordinates and I myself called the PVO aircraft directorate with a request for assistance. From there they brushed everything aside: they said, that is your problem, solve it yourselves. I regret that I did not send a written request because now many are disavowing it because they do not want to share the responsibility.

"And here again the command authority of the airfield, while expecting a visit of a foreign delegation, demanded the immediate removal of the Su-15s. That is how the deal took place."

I am quoting Babkin's words not because I want to alleviate the officer's guilt. Not at all. It is because everything that he said—is from his personal point of view which many do not share. But a pattern is seen here which hardly anyone can refute—the inadequately specific assistance that higher organs devoted to the school. Not so long ago, our newspaper wrote about the complicated material-technical situation in which this educational institution had found itself. LVATU has been resubordinated to the services and to a military district four times in the last nine years and everything has remained at the previous level. The school has been a part of the PVO Troops for two years. During that time, progress has been noted toward the solution of acute problems but there are no resources to radically correct the situation due to today's extremely severe economic situation.

But there is another side of the coin. Many people with whom I talked at the school, are convinced—it is impossible to conduct commercial activities in the army and navy as before.

And this is why. The Armed Forces have been compelled to rid themselves of that which has now turned out to be excess. But *trac* deals are being concluded, as a rule, in a narrow circle, behind closed doors, and at times by totally incompetent people. It seems to me that it is difficult to defend the state's and therefore the army's true interests and to avoid selfish abuse under these conditions.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### Civilian Military Workers Union forms

92UM1053A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
9 May 92 p 4

Article by correspondent Vasily Goshko: "New Trade Union Created: But Will It Solve the Social Problems That Have Risen Before Blue and White Collar Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces?"

[Text] The constituent congress of the Trade Union of Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was held in Kiev. This move was motivated by the continually declining material status of civilian specialists toiling in military collectives. Many of them work in the most critical jobs, and they ensure the high combat readiness of the personnel of units and services. But they have found their lives to be totally unprotected. They suffer both in wages and in other blessings. This is not made up: It is as real as it can be. So many examples of injustice were brought up at the congress that it was simply painful to listen to them all.

What did the speakers talk about?

First of all the standard of living of blue and white collar workers has dropped dramatically in the conditions of the transition to market relations. As an example Dmitriy Miroshnichenko noted that problems of labor protection require immediate solution, and real concern for the health of laborers must be displayed.

Let us delve into these problems more deeply. A preliminary analysis of wages paid in the first quarter of 1992

produced the following results: While workers in Ukrainian medical institutions receive a wage of 1,510 rubles, workers in military medical institutions receive 824; workers in public education receive 1,610, while those in military educational institutions receive 928; personnel of state institutions financed by the budget receive 1,038, while workers in similar institutions of the Ministry of Defense receive 610. Why such imbalances? Jumping a little ahead of myself, let me note that no one was able to give a reasonable answer to this question. This was because not a single financial worker attended the trade union's constituent congress, even though they were invited to participate in its proceedings.

What can be expected from the next rise in prices? The speakers emphasized that increasing prices are putting army blue and white collar workers at the brink of disaster. The people are losing faith in the protection the state can offer, and they are losing patience with it.

Many difficult and heart-wrenching situations arise in connection with liquidation and reorganization of enterprises and military schools, with manning reductions, and with losses of jobs. People's destinies are affected, and for every person that is laid off, a family and children suffer. What is the position of the trade union? It is the common opinion that the trade union should require the administration to submit economic substantiations for reducing the number of workers. The list of persons subject to dismissal should be discussed openly and thoroughly at a meeting of the labor collective, in which decisions as to who possesses the greatest right to remain at work could be decided. The criteria of such a decision might include qualifications, labor productivity, number of dependents, time at work at the given enterprise, and others. All of this is in the labor legislation, and it need only be applied.

The statement made by Vasily Belikov, a worker from the trade union organization in Dnepropetrovsk, was even more emotionally charged. He announced quite openly that the financial organs of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense are showing no concern for blue and white collar workers. Wage increases were approved on paper, but only for from 5 to 10 rubles. This can't be anything but a joke at the expense of these people. Vasily Pavlovich also wondered why servicewomen working in military commissariats receive a salary of 3,000 rubles, while a female civilian worker holding a similar position receives a salary six times lower. Cases were related, by the way, in which the latter, who are specialists with considerable experience as a rule, train the former—yesterday's 10th graders, who had just put on a uniform a week previously.

In the opinion of Miron Mikhnovskiy, a representative of the territorial committee of the trade union of the Carpathian Military District, the salaries of blue and white collar workers must be brought into correspondence with the existing salaries at enterprises and organizations within the national economy. They must correspond to the level of education, qualifications and the position occupied. Each person has the right to equal wages for equal labor.

Another problem Miron Iosifovich dwelled on was this. Today, the airmen lack a repair pool, there are no spare parts, conversion is at a standstill, and finished products are not being delivered to those requesting them. A direct threat of lay-off of qualified workers is being created, and many experienced specialists are leaving. Can there be any talk of combat readiness of any level under such conditions?

There is a city by the name of Balakleya in Kharkov Oblast. A military industrial enterprise that had formerly been enshrouded in the deepest secrecy is located here. Now that the Ukraine is creating its own armed forces, certain sections and shops are being shut down here, unique equipment is being dismantled, and machine tools and apparatus are being removed. And concurrently with this, trade union committee chairman V. Klyashchov emphasized, people servicing the production process are being laid off. Is all of this being done a little too quickly? One would think that military specialists should have analyzed what is needed today for the Ukraine's dependable defense, and provided accurate calculations to the government. Because if all of this will have to be set up all over again, it will be many times more expensive than what it would cost now to maintain things as they are. By the way, the enterprise had already undergone the same thing once before in its history.

Providing housing to people remains an acute problem. Many blue and white collar workers have to wait up to 10 years and more to receive an apartment, and many retire without their own nook. At the moment there is no money to build any housing.

What did delegates to the trade union's constituent congress propose specifically? First of all, the need for signing an agreement between the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and an organ established by the trade union. In their opinion this document should clearly reflect the principles governing mutual relations between them, and the ways of resolving the most important issues and problems. The inconsistency in wages between workers of the Ministry of Defense and corresponding categories of specialists in civilian enterprises, organizations and institutions must be eliminated. This pertains primarily to workers of military medical institutions, repair enterprises, rayon billeting operation units, housing administrations and others. In drafting the state program for providing housing to military servicemen, it is important to consider the demand for it by blue and white collar workers. There are many problems associated with providing specialists with the appropriate clothing and footwear and other personal protective resources, as well as special food and soap, and with publishing a standard statute on internal work schedules, and other documents.

The constituent congress established the trade union of workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This will doubtlessly lead to consolidation of trade union organizations, many of which had formerly acted separately. Specific requirements on the corresponding organs were determined, and the immediate objectives were identified. All of this will doubtlessly increase its role in solving the social problems that have arisen before blue and white collar

workers. But only in the event that the new council does not transform into the drive belt of the corresponding chiefs, and instead becomes an organ that really fights for laborers. Dmitriy Miroshnichenko was elected chairman of the Council of the Ukrainian Armed Forces trade union.

And one last thing. Colonel Vladimir Mulyava, chief of the Social and Psychological Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, took part in the proceedings of the trade union's constituent congress, and spoke at it. The one sad thing is that this was the only executive who attended this measure of such great importance, during which not only social protection of the people but also other problems of state importance were discussed.

### **Future of Nuclear Weapons Establishments Pondered**

#### **Mikhaylov at International Conference**

*924P0140A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 92 Morning Edition p 6*

[Article by Sergey Mushkaterov: "Problems of Our Closed Cities Discussed in Norway"]

[Text] **Russia is no longer producing highly enriched plutonium for military purposes, and it is destroying more nuclear weapons than it is producing. According to the Associated Press this was communicated by Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov, who spoke at the opening of a conference in the Norwegian city of Stavangar devoted to the problems of closed cities in the former Soviet Union.**

Around 700,000 persons are currently living in Arzamas-16, Penza-19, Tomsk-7, Sverdlovsk-16 and other closed cities that cannot be found on ordinary maps of the former USSR. But they will hardly remain closed forever. Mikhaylov expressed the hope at the conference that some of them may be opened in as little as five years.

How is this to be done, how are these cities to be switched to peaceful rails? These questions are being discussed at the three-day conference in Stavangar by 30 scientists and representatives from 10 closed cities, Russian officials, and experts from Scandinavia, the USA, Great Britain and other countries. By the way, according to Mikhaylov many of his colleagues participating in the forum were abroad for the first time in their lives, while just a few years ago this was simply impossible to imagine. This fact alone attests to the uniqueness of the conference.

Judging from reports from news agencies, statements made by our participants to the forum are attracting most of the attention for the moment. In particular, the Associated Press cites Mikhaylov saying that Russia plans to close two military reactors this year, and another two over the next few years. He also assured Western participants that components and technology for nuclear weapon production will not be leaked abroad out of Russia. In turn, the mayor of Arzamas-16 said that there is no "brain drain" out of the closed cities either.

Much was also said about the assistance that the West could provide to scientists in closed cities. In Mikhaylov's opinion Western firms could sign contracts for particular jobs with the scientists so that they could continue working without leaving the country. He emphasized in this case: "We don't need charity. We have qualified specialists who want to work, if the West is interested in this."

### Scientists Comment

924P0140B *Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 92 Morning Edition p 8*

[Article: "Arzamas-16 Shows Its Face"]

[Text] It is not easy to get into this city even today, but even after granting permission for the visit, our hosts limited our stay to two days.

A few words on the city's history. After the Americans successfully tested their atomic bomb, Stalin took all steps to accelerate efforts to create Russian nuclear weapons. A site in the southeast of Gorkiy Oblast, where suitable housing was already available, was chosen as the place to organize the center for the bomb's development and production. The nuclear scientists occupied buildings in Sarovskaya Desert. There was a technical base of sorts—a plant producing projectiles for Katyusha rocket launchers. And there were no special problems with manpower—the famous "Mordvinian camps" were a few kilometers away. In August 1949 the first test was conducted on the "article," as they referred to it, and the city that had grown up by this time became the center of a race of many years for possession of increasingly more sophisticated nuclear weapons.

The situation that has now evolved evokes different reactions from the scientists. Twice Hero of Socialist Labor, four-time State Prize laureate, Lenin Prize laureate, chief designer for 30 years, and the person who developed the nuclear filling for all types of intercontinental as well as tactical rockets, Samvel Grigoryevich Kocharyants is categorically opposed to a return to the past, feeling that work could go on successfully even in the present situation.

Lieutenant-General of Aviation Yevgeniy Arkadyevich Negin, an academician who bears the Gold Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor, has the diametrically opposite point of view:

"We are being asked to work under the conditions of market relations. This is impossible. It is my firm conviction that only budget financing in its full volume can save our sector. There are no alternatives to nuclear weapons, and we cannot play around with the country's defense capabilities. After all, the reductions the United States has agreed to have no influence on its defense capabilities."

Yevgeniy Arkadyevich does not believe that the danger that our nuclear scientists might leave the country exists, feeling that they are sufficiently patriotic to share the country's difficulties, but the fact that the most talented young scientists are leaving for small enterprises and other commercial organizations troubles him greatly.

By the way, many unique things have been created here within the framework of conversion. Mark Prelas, the leader of the delegation of American nuclear scientists who visited the secret cities of Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, wrote in the newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR that "...Russian scientists possess world-class 'know-how' that can be used for peaceful purposes, but they need assistance from Western entrepreneurs. Their scientists have attained astounding results in materials science, nuclear technology and laser physics."

And in fact, the developments that we were shown—from the world's tiniest X-ray machine to a polyclinic on wheels—are capable of amazing the most discriminating specialist.

### MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

#### Czechoslovakia-Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreement

92UM0983B *Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "For Partnership and Neighborly Relations"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Georgiy Zhivitsa, who is the Acting Chief of the Main Staff of the Ukraine Armed Forces, made a working visit on 21 through 23 of April to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. On this visit he met with CSFR Minister of Defense Vacek, Chief of General Staff of the CSFR Armed Forces Lieutenant General Pezl [transliteration], and other officials.

The prospects for cooperation were discussed; and mutually advantageous ties between the defense ministries of the two countries were established. The visit's accomplishments resulted in the signing of an agreement on bilateral cooperation between the defense ministries of the Ukraine and the CSFR for the period 1992-1993.

The agreement is designed to resolve definite problems related to material and technical supplies, air defense, and flight safety in the airspace over the common borders. The agreement includes exchange of scientific information, joint training of specialists, the initiation of measures intended to provide mutual assistance via civil defense units of the two countries for cleanup operations following natural disasters and major industrial accidents, and other items declared to be of mutual interest.

The visit paved the way for the signing of an interbranch agreement between the Federal Ministry of Defense of the CSFR and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine involving bilateral military cooperation. The document will be signed in a meeting of the two governments upon development of general terms that will govern cooperation between the CSFR and Ukraine.

\* \* \*

Russian radio and television provided information on the meeting of the Ukrainian military delegation in the CSFR. It was stated in news programs that the agreement that has

been signed by the defense ministries of the two countries amounts to permission for the Ukraine to supply the CSFR with arms. The Ukraine Ministry of Defense Press Service declares that this assertion has no basis in fact. The Ukraine minister of defense told us, in the Foreign Affairs Administration, that, during the visit, no mention was made of supplying weapons.

Press Service, Ukraine Ministry of Defense

### UNPROFOR Prospects of Keeping Peace in Yugoslavia

92UM1048A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
22 May 92 First edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Special Correspondent Colonel A. Oliynik: "The UN Operation in Yugoslavia: Will It Result in Defending the Peace in this Multinational Country?"]

[Text] On the evening of 13 February, radio and television agencies of the entire world transmitted a special report from New York: the UN Security Council had made the long-awaited decision to establish a military contingent of UN forces in Yugoslavia. They planned to conduct the deployment of a 14,000-man corps, which included a Russian infantry battalion for the first time, in a very short period of time in the disputed territories in Croatia, including Western and Eastern Slovenia and Serbian Krajina. Thus began this large-scale UN operation, which received the official designation UNPROFOR, "UN Peacekeeping Forces".

This is an alarming trend of our latest history: states and peoples increasingly cannot sort things out in their own country without the blue helmets and blue berets. The blue UN flag with the globe in the center that is bordered by a palm wreath has flown over almost every continent in recent years and UN armed forces have been deployed to various points to prevent military operations between belligerent parties. In the last four years alone, UN forces have been dispatched to various countries 13 times, as many as in the past 40 years.

What is more, the shadow of the blue flag is already stretched out on our "transparent" borders. A war of destruction is occurring in Nagorno-Karabakh, people are dying in the Dniester Republic and South Ossetia, and there is trouble in the Crimea...

UNPROFOR has become the 24th UN peacekeeping operation. It is one of the largest and most expensive: according to preliminary estimates, this operation will cost the world community more than \$1.5 billion. Here are just a few of the key factors of the operation in which 31 countries have participated.

1. The military contingent is 14,000 men, of which 10,400 make up 12 reinforced infantry battalions, in which there are four aircraft and 26 helicopters. There are also eight support units in the UN forces: a Canadian combat engineer battalion, a Dutch communications battalion, a Finnish construction subunit, military medics from Norway and Great Britain, and a headquarters company

from Sweden... Besides military servicemen, UN police forces are participating in the operation—approximately 500 people (among them are 30 Russian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] agents—author's comment) and more than 500 civilian employees.

2. The UN's minimum term of service is 12 months. However, observers have grounds to think that the blue helmets might be detained in Yugoslavia for a significantly longer period. Though there have been statements to the contrary.

3. The Yugoslav Federal Army must withdraw from Croatia and the irregular troop formations (Croatian and Serbian) must be disarmed.

The report on the approval of the UNPROFOR's mandate was greeted with enthusiasm in Belgrade and Zagreb. Even M. Babich, the implacable former leader of Serbian Krajina who opposed the UN mission for a long time, has withdrawn his objections to the deployment of the UN forces. Croatian President F. Tudjman has also agreed to the Security Council resolution, however, he stressed that the Croatian leadership is not abandoning its plans to restore its own laws and political and financial system on the territory of Serbian Krajina despite the presence of the blue helmets.

The diagram, which we are reprinting from the Yugoslav newspaper POLITIKA [Translator Note: Not included with this article], quite clearly indicates in which areas the UN battalions are deployed; flags designate the cities where the sector headquarters are located and the family names of their commanders are indicated. Sector East (Istok) is led by VDV [airborne troops] Staff Officer Colonel Aleksandr Khromchenkov and not Tomchenkov as is erroneously indicated in the diagram. As our newspaper has already frequently reported, a section has been "cut out" in the eastern sector for the Russian infantry battalion.

Since the beginning of April, the UN corps has been assembling in the Balkans via air, sea, railroads and highways. It has not occurred without embarrassment. Aircraft with Kenyan servicemen on board were turned around while they were already flying to Belgrade by a command from UN headquarters. It seems they had no uniforms or light weapons.

Unfortunately, there were also blunders during the deployment of the Russian infantry battalion. As we know, our blue helmets were dispatched to the Balkans by combined means—by air and by rail. If the airlift of people by VTA [Military Transport Aviation] aircraft was organized and occurred precisely on 17 April, you can't say that about the rail transport movements. The entire matter is that route was selected from Russia for some unknown reason through Poland, the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], Austria and then Slovenia and Croatia. As they say, to Moscow via Vladivostok.

"Having learned about the route of travel when the first rail transport movements were already on the way, I immediately reported to the ambassador and to the

center," Colonel V. Shepilov, the military attache to the Russian embassy in Belgrade, told me. "After all, the rail line of communication between Croatia and Serbia had already been cut for six months. We managed with great difficulty to change the route of travel for our six rail transport movements through Hungary and to coordinate it with UN representatives and Yugoslav competent organs.

Instead of four days, the Russian soldiers spent 10-12 days on the road. And they did not travel by coach, but in freight cars: they slept on plank beds and they did not have toilet facilities. Incidentally, our newspaper also wrote about that when the first rail transport movement started out, but everyone who was responsible for the transport movement of our blue helmets remained deaf to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's criticism. But then, half of Europe learned with amazement about the travel conditions for the Russian blue helmets. In order to somehow maintain UN prestige, representatives of Germany, Austria and Hungary hitched sleeping cars to the rail transport movement for the people and fed them. "Believe me, I was ashamed that I, a Russian officer from the UN forces, was traveling like a prisoner," Major B. Sushchak, commander of one of the rail transport movements, told me bitterly.

As a result, I cannot pass over yet another factor, coverage of our blue helmets' arrival in Yugoslavia in the Russian press. The country's mass media, which was attached to the military contingents in the UN forces, reported on their arrival at deployment locations (for example, the French battalion was accompanied by more than 50 French correspondents—author's comment.) Unfortunately, few wrote about the Russian soldiers. And it is all because Captain 1st Rank V. Pavlov, a regular officer from the General Staff, placed his distinctive veto on coverage of this event in the press, citing strict instructions from... the UN. By way of illustration, he did not authorize the author of these lines, who had been especially sent to Yugoslavia to cover the activities of our blue helmets by a decision of the chief of the General Staff, to fly with our paratroopers. He acted in the same way with the correspondents from IZVESTIYA and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA...

One should speak separately about the budget for the UNPROFOR operation. The \$634 million sum proposed by the UN Secretary—which is almost equal to the budget of all of last year's peacekeeping operations—was called excessive. Russia first raised the "money" issue, Russia's share in these operations is 14 percent. The United States supported us with 30 percent of the expenditures. As a result, The General Assembly approved the operation's budget for 12 months in the sum of 611 million dollars. In the process, Yugoslavia assumed responsibility for all transportation expenditures for the travel of UN representatives and provided free lodging, transportation and other types of service.

You must not think that our participation in UN operations brings only losses. For example, Russia is paid from \$988 to \$1,274 per month for each soldier of the Russian battalion in Yugoslavia. Plus \$70 for wear and tear on

uniforms. The total sum of compensation is \$523,000. Incidentally, as I was told at the UN forces mission in Belgrade, the UN had already sent the entire sum to Russia, in dollars, in the middle of April. And here I must talk about payment in hard currency for our blue helmets. The Russians were probably alone among UN forces who stepped on Yugoslav soil without a cent in their pockets. It shamed and sickened me to see how our soldiers "bummed" cigarettes from the Serbs at the same time that their colleagues from Belgium were dining in restaurants at Sombor Station, where the Russian rail transport movements and their vehicles had arrived...

The UNPROFOR Force had developed more or less successfully until recently. As planned, the infantry battalions that had arrived had concentrated in their sectors by April 25 and had begun deploying and equipping entry control points and preparing housing. I managed to participate in the deployment of our blue helmets in the populated areas of Tenya, Vukovar, Orolik, Hiyemtsy and Lipovtsy. Their inhabitants warmly greeted our soldiers and reacted with understanding to the peacekeeping mission.

"The blue helmets are our last hope for restoring peace and tranquility on our land," Ivan Petrakovich, an elderly Serb, told me in the ruins of Orolik. "We can no longer endure the violence and the hatred..."

As my journalist-colleagues told me in Belgrade, the deployment of UN forces in other sectors had been just as successful.

However, it seems that subsequent events in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a serious impediment to the fulfillment of the UN peacekeeping mission. As has become known, on 16 May, UN troop headquarters in Sarajevo was fired upon and Commanding General Nambiyar ordered the evacuation of the headquarters subunit to Belgrade. UN representatives are increasingly coming under fire from hostile factions. So, near Sarajevo a UN jeep carrying Canadian servicemen was stopped and their equipment and the jeep were seized. An armored personnel carrier manned by Frenchmen was blown up by a mine in the southern sector. There were wounded...

The situation in other regions of the conflict is changeable. As before, the cease fire agreement is being violated by both sides. In recent days the firing around Osijek has not fallen silent and there is a nightly artillery duel near the village of Mirkovtsi. So, UN servicemen are replacing their blue berets with blue helmets for safety reasons.

As a result, UN Secretary-General B. Boutros-Ghali was compelled to declare: "The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tragic, dangerous and totally violent. I do not believe that there are any conditions for peacekeeping forces in this phase of the clashes".

So the question—will the UN operation in Yugoslavia result in keeping the peace—is still open...

## SECURITY SERVICES

### Units to Transfer to Border Troops

92UM1050B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 May 92 p 1

[News release from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service: "Military Posts Transferred to Border Troops"]

[Text] In accordance with a directive of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense signed on 15 June 1992, several military units and military posts of the Odessa and Carpathian military districts will be transferred to the State Committee for Protection of the Ukrainian State Border.

The units are to be transferred together with their listed personnel, their peacetime allocations of materials and equipment, the barracks pool, apartment furnishings, communal structures, equipment, the training material base and the housing pool. According to an announcement of the State Committee for Protection of the Ukrainian State Border the necessary number of junior specialists and young replenishments called up in spring 1992 will be allocated additionally in order to man the border troops.

### Deputy Chief of Border Troops Named

92UM1038A Kiev POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY  
in Russian No 18, 17 Apr 92 p 1

[Report: "Chief of Staff of Ukraine's Border Troops Named"]

[Text] Major-General Viktor Ivanovich Bannykh has been named First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Protection of the State Border of Ukraine and Chief of Staff of the Border Troops of Ukraine by a decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Major-General V.I. Bannykh was born on 28 June 1949. He graduated from the Higher Border-Troop School and from the Military Academy in the field of law. He has served in various command positions in the Eastern, Transbaykal and Western border districts. He has recently been serving as Deputy Commander of the Border Troops of Ukraine. He is married and has two children.

### Weapons Confiscated Along Ukraine-Moldova Border

92UM1038B Kiev POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY  
in Russian No 18, 17 Apr 92 p 1

[Report by press service of Ukraine Border Troops: "The Situation Is Unchanged"]

[Text] The press service of the Border Troops of Ukraine reports that there have been no significant changes on the state border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. The Border Troops together with the National Guard and internal affairs agencies are implementing the measures specified in the Statute on the Special Zone in the Area of the State Border With the Republic of Moldova.

Since they began guarding the state border, the Border Troops have confiscated 12 pistols, five assault rifles and machine guns, 19 grenades, two rifles, more than 100

hunting rifles, 18 gas canisters, more than a thousand shells for semiautomatic weapons, 200 pistol cartridges and around 100 hunting knives.

More than 50,000 people and around 60,000 vehicles were inspected and permitted to continue across the state border in April. More than 250 citizens from foreign states who attempted to enter Ukraine without visas were apprehended and returned to Moldova. Tourist busses from Feodosiya, Kremenchug, Golovka, Donetsk and Kherson were turned back at the Moldovan border. The State Committee for Protection of the State Border of Ukraine reminds us again that tourist trips through Ukraine into the Republic of Moldova are temporarily forbidden by a decree of the president of Ukraine.

### Refugee, Weapons Situation on Moldovan Border Viewed

92UM1052A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
8 May 92 p 2

[Article by Major Aleksey Trubitsyn and Major Mikhail Kaminskiy: "Special Security Zone"]

[Text] The line from the old song surfaced in our memories when on one day of our trip we found ourselves in the small rayon town of Krasnyye Okny. That's Red Lakes in the Moldovan translation. Leaden clouds hovered not far above the houses on the converging slopes of the ravine. From the window of the building housing the republic state border security headquarters, the clouds seemed especially gloomy.

It is to this place, to this building, that the threads of communication extend from all of the subunits and checkpoints. Rooms located on the third and fourth floors contain the operational staffs of the border troops, the military, the National Guard, the militia and the Security Service.

We need the border troops, because all of these other services are operationally subordinated to them. Major-General V. Bondar, First Deputy Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Ukrainian State Border Security Administration, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Vovk, the chief of the Border Liaison Group, were both in the office. The telephones were ringing off their hooks.

### 3. The Clouds Drift by Gloomily at the Border

"More journalists," Aleksandr Ivanovich Vovk smiled as he examined our documents. "You're the fourth group in the last few days."

What can we say? The interest newspapermen have been showing in events on the border of Moldova and the Ukraine and in the events in the Dniester region of the Moldovan Republic is understandable. This is not unfortunately a local armed conflict, as might seem from first inspection. The problem of postwar borders and the validity of the Helsinki Agreement regarding their inviolability has taken on critical proportions here. The first to violate this agreement was Germany, which united into a single state; it was followed by Yugoslavia, which broke up into separate republics. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan also has the same roots. Territorial claims are being made by many countries against their neighbors, and

if this process becomes irreversible, it will be a great misfortune. This pertains especially to the borders of republics comprising the former Union.

In our opinion Colonel-General I. Kalinichenko, Commander-in-Chief of Border Troops of the Commonwealth countries, was absolutely right when he said directly in an interview with the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that if we are able to preserve our external borders, we will avoid change of our internal ones.

However, the external border has already quavered in Moldova. An agreement it has concluded with Romania simplifying border crossings on the basis of domestic passports led to a situation where Romanian citizens are now being detained in Vyborg, and on the Soviet-Korean and Soviet-Chinese borders.

Moldova essentially displayed national egoism in relation to other members of the Commonwealth, thus violating Article 3 of the agreement on securing the state borders. This article reads: "Commonwealth states pledge for their own security not to undertake actions at state borders and in marine economic zones that infringe upon the political, economic and other interests of CIS states." This agreement, which was signed incidentally in Kiev, bears Moldova's signature as well.

It was precisely this step by its neighbor, Colonel-General Kalinichenko feels, that primarily explains the Ukraine's actions of establishing special security on the border with Moldova.

"But that's not the only reason," Major-General Bondar joined the conversation. "Weapons are being supplied to Moldova from Romania at full speed. That includes Belgian weapons. And it is no longer disputed by anyone that Romanian-produced assault rifles and mortars are killing peaceful inhabitants in the Dniester region. Note that the combat activities are exclusively on the left bank of the Dniester."

The border guards are also troubled by the refugee question. Their flow has been increasing recently. According to incomplete data around 400,000 persons, primarily women and children, have already crossed the border.

As we persuaded ourselves, few of the persons we spoke with believed in the possibility of peacefully resolving the conflict between Moldova and the Dniester region. Because the first negotiations, which in the estimation of the mass media were to achieve some sort of progress, ended with Moldova's announcement of a state of emergency. The negotiations reached an impasse almost immediately. There is of course some hope for the Russian initiative, which essentially calls for finding an acceptable compromise, of a temporary nature so to speak, right away. And for returning to this problem later on if attempts are made to unite Moldova with Romania—something that people in the Dniester region of the Moldovan Republic fear most of all.

But even these hopes are weak, because passions in the region have reached the explosive point. Even women are now rising to the defense of the Dniester region. And given

the way things are in such situations, their actions are unpredictable. It was precisely owing to a women's strike committee headed by the local Joan of Arc—Galina Andreyeva—that the armory of the military unit in Parkany was completely cleaned out in the night of 14-15 March. Under the cover of 500-600 women, Cossacks and Guards soldiers flattened the defenses, cleared the mines from the approaches to the armory, and removed a large quantity of weapons.

It was this committee that supported deportation of the families of 14th Army servicemen after the well-publicized skirmishes between the military and the Guards soldiers. It was G. Andreyeva, Army Commander Major-General Yu. Netkachev admitted in an interview with the newspaper SUVERENNAYA MOLDOVA [as published], and her strike committee that sentenced the Army Commander to death by hanging, and Army Counterintelligence Chief Colonel Yu. Stepygin as well.

We note in passing that as far as newspapers published in Moldova and the Dniester region are concerned, they are completely opposite in their evaluations of the same events. But the following is becoming increasingly more obvious: "Fortune hunters" are traveling to the region of combat activities not only to defend the Dniester region. Some of them have just one goal—to take away weapons purchased or stolen in the zone.

"The weapons are our main headache," Vladimir Mikhaylovich Bondar admitted. "That's now. But what will happen if the conflict spreads right up to the border, and the Cossacks rush the Don? We cannot exclude such a turn of events. Naturally all volunteers will be returning with weapons. But where will they surface later on?"

For the moment, the quantity of weapons and ammunition "bagged" in the special security zone is not that great. A little over 50 firearms, around 150 units of silent weapons, grenades and cartridges, gas-operated guns and gas bottles.

But it must be said that the border is still not being protected as reliably as would be wanted. Far from all country roads are dependably covered. And if someone wants to badly enough, the checkpoints can be detoured. And as regards arms traders, they have the experience and they are used to the risks—this is nothing new to them.

This is why efforts are being made at a forced pace to create border control detachments. One of them will be stationed in Kotovsk, and it will place territory presently belonging to motorized riflemen under its protection.

Active preventive work is also being conducted with the local population, and the number of militia detachments working under rural soviets is growing. It may be boldly asserted that such an influx of troops, militia, National Guards and the Security Service has never been witnessed in these locales.

It would be sufficient to say that Lieutenant Colonel A. Lavnichenko's Guards soldiers are backed up by another motorized rifle regiment, standing by in its barracks to respond to any "unforeseen circumstances." Fifty-seven militia detachments formed in the special security zone

out of commandeered MVD associates have already begun work. Owing to this, there has been a dramatic increase in the percentage of crimes that have been solved; 340 have been committed since 1 March.

Over half of the 5,657 persons living in the zone with prior convictions have received preventive counseling from militia organs. During this time, 1,750 drunk drivers were identified, and around 160 violations of the traffic regulations were prevented. Administrative punishment was applied to 1,416 violators.

Life in the rayons within the special security zone has become more tranquil. People are breathing more freely. The armed conflict has certainly made its impression upon the psychology of local inhabitants. And even now, by the way, the things they talk while waiting in lines at the stores and bus stops are often still the same: There was gunfire again in Dubossary and Rybnitsa....

According to a report from the republic headquarters of the state border security forces, the Moldovan armed forces are regrouping their troops, establishing three springboards for a possible offensive against the Dniester region. This is evidence of expansion of the military conflict along its front.

And one other thing: Combat units are being formed at full speed in Moldova and in the Dneister region. In the latter for example, a decision was made to create an army of 12,000, which would surpass the forces there today by four times.

"The situation remains tense, and it has a tendency to grow more acute," was what Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Vovk had to say about recent events in the Dniester region.

We left Krasnyye Okny in the early evening. The weather had not changed. The discussion in the public bus centered on the recent events on the left bank of the Dniester. The people were already aware that negotiations to peacefully resolve the conflict had fallen through once again.

"When will this all end?" an elderly woman sighed on hearing the report from her neighbor. "So many people have already died."

This sorrowful exclamation was a reproach against those who are caught up in nationalistic fervor and who are attempting to overstep the lines of civilized behavior. It is a reproach against the many leaders of the highest ranks who have proclaimed the importance of internal policy but have no intention of doing anything about it. As always, the people suffer as a result.

#### In Lieu of a Postscript

While this article was being prepared for publication, events in the Dniester region appeared to have turned into a peaceful channel. True, the exchanges of fire are still continuing, but the desire of the opposing sides to find a political compromise in the conflict is growing. We would hope that common sense will prevail after all, and Moldova will not transform into a second Nagorny Karabakh.

#### Regulations Still Problem for Ussuri Border Patrols

92UM1070A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
28 May 92 First edition p 4

[Article by Captain V. Sokirko: "Feeling Sorry for the Country"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Flying above the border guard subunit stationed on the picturesque shore of the deep Ussuri is the Russian tricolor. It was raised here as early as the past autumn by unanimous vote of the soldiers assigned to this small post. "As long as we are standing watch over Russia's borders, guarding her Far Eastern boundaries," said post chief Major Sergey Guz, "then this is where the symbol of statehood should be displayed."

The flag flying above the subunit may be a sign of the changed times, but the border troops by and large are carrying on their duties in the same old way. Details are still sent out to patrol the border. An alert group rides out in response to a signal. (This is an area full of bears which roam about without "respecting" the security system's barbed wire.) Bread is still baked and, on Saturdays, the unit's bathhouse is operated. No changes there. But hold on: Border troop strength in the subunit is down by more than 50 percent; the three remaining vehicles are near the end of their life-span; fuel allocations are pitifully inadequate; and monies for officer salaries are sufficient to cover only their food ration expenses. Nevertheless, the men are "towing the line," for they know that, although the country is suffering a malaise, the concept of "inviolability and sacredness" of the borders has not been abolished by anyone, and that it is they, and no one else, who will guard her—the Motherland.

In times past, when our relations with neighboring China were—to put it mildly—less than cordial, this section of the border was considered to be "hot." An increased state of combat readiness was considered to be normal for border troop subunits, which were ready—if it came to that—to offer armed resistance to any kind of provocation. Today, thanks be to God, the situation is different. And the state border is becoming less forbidding. The border now is clearly designated in the channel, thus rendering the river accessible for joint use.

I obtained permission to ride out into the river in a boat with a detail, to see for myself what was there.

There is quite a large number of junks—Chinese fishermen—busily plying the Ussuri's waters. Senior Lieutenant Dmitriy Talipov went on to explain further: "Just now in this sector of the subunit there are 25 boats. Some of them are located in our waters. As soon as the junks see a border guard boat headed their way, they hurriedly cross over to the other side of the channel line. When they feel it is safe, they lose no time getting back to the same spot. If our boat executes a turn back in their direction, the Chinese clear the area again. So we play this cat-and-mouse game."

At the troop subunit I was handed the "Border Troop Behavior Guide." You can find in that the answers to many questions.

I read in the above that "PSKR and PMK craft (the patrol ships and boats used) are not to initiate any actions conducive to causing an incident or accident, nor are they to make any show of power or brandish any weapons. In the conduct of maneuvers in or near populated areas, wharves, and fishing spots, they are to reduce their speed, taking precautions with a view toward preventing capsizing and collision with Chinese watercraft, or swamping the latter with discharge from PMK waterjets."

I realize that the "Behavior Guide" was written with the "big political picture" in mind, the idea being to prevent border conflict. However, is the Chinese side trying to normalize relations by saddling its citizens with the same kind of demands if they get into territory belonging to a neighboring country? Really, now!

Let me quote what Lieutenant General Vladimir Butenko, Far Eastern Border District commander, has to say:

"It should be understood that the district's border troops take measures necessary to intercept poaching. But, legal standards being what they are, this is quite difficult to do."

What recourse do we have? There is one, and it is in line with what other countries do: We detain the violator on our shore and hold him until the Chinese side pays a fine for his release. The fine is in foreign currency, of course.

There is an uneasiness on Russia's borders, the same as in the former USSR, incidentally. The republics went and established their "national households," quickly setting up their internal customhouses and border posts, seemingly forgetting their external interests. And what has happened? Japanese "Kawasakis" are arrogantly dropping their nets into the coastal waters of the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin; Iranian smugglers cross the border en masse into the Transcaucasus; Rumanian tourists, with their entry into Moldova simplified, get as far as the Vladivostok area.

It was noted long ago that the weaker a country, the more claims made against it by her neighbors. This is the situation in which our former Union finds itself: It no longer possesses the power it once had, and it is necessary to strive and strive again for a new and reliable authority. And the ones hit most directly by this are the border troops, for they must deal personally with the "influx" of uninvited guests. They are keeping watch over their native borders, of course, as required by their military duties. But alas! Doing this is becoming more difficult with every passing day.

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