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Near East & South Asia

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Egyptian Officials on Relations With Iran

92AF1101A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
7 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by 'Abd al-Nabi 'Abd al-Sattar]

[Text] Egyptian-Iranian relations are likely to improve, though not to be normalized as some people speculate, on the basis of recent statements emanating from Cairo and Tehran and as a result of the cautious flirtation between the two sides. But anyone taking a closer look at the relations between Egypt and Iran will certainly realize that the points of differences between them are greater and deeper than those of agreement.

An Egyptian diplomatic source pointed out that the chronic problem in Egyptian-Iranian relations came about with the Iranian revolution and Tehran's attempts to export its revolution to Egypt.

He said Egypt is far too big to allow any country or regime to interfere in its internal affairs.

The source added that Egypt is aware of the importance of dealing with all countries of the world regardless of the political system that each adopts. Cairo has, on the basis of this view, stressed its readiness to deal with Iran on the grounds that it is an Islamic country and Egypt has common interests with it that call for cooperation.

Counselor Naji al-Ghatrifi, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman declined to comment on reports that a breakthrough in the Egyptian-Iranian relations is imminent.

He said the two countries are two of the biggest Islamic states and share common interests and, in the final analysis right must prevail.

On his part, Roland Hogerne, the International Red Cross representative in the Middle East and Cairo, said that all the Egyptian prisoners detained in Iran were released in two batches in 1990. There is no information that Egyptian prisoners still exist in Tehran.

The problem of the existence of Egyptians detained in Iran was one of the Iranian means of putting pressure on the Egyptian government before world opinion.

Iran deliberately leaked reports that the number of Egyptian prisoners it is holding has reached 20,000. This was proved to be untrue, since 89 prisoners were released in two batches, most of whom were fishermen fishing in Kuwaiti coastal area close to Iran's territorial waters.

Iranian accusations said that the Egyptian prisoners were mercenaries in the Iraqi army during the Iraq-Iran war. But Iraq announced that the Egyptian prisoners in Iran were civilians employed by the Iraqi Southern Petroleum Organization on the islands of Kharj and Majnoon.

As Egypt stepped up its media pressure against the [Iranian] government in order to end the question of the prisoners in Iran, Egyptian Prime Minister Dr. 'Atif

Sidqi prepared a bill to withdraw Egyptian citizenship from any volunteer who enlists in foreign armies. (The bill has not yet materialized)

Despite the continuing Syrian mediation in order to bring views closer between Egypt and Iran, which began with the resumption of the Syrian-Egyptian relations in December 1989, statements by both sides were sufficient to abort any progress in this mediation.

Recently political observers noted that Egyptian concern over the strategic alliance between Iran and Sudan has increased, particularly since this alliance coincides with Khartoum playing host to extremist Egyptian elements in order to be trained on acts of violence and terrorism.

Campaigns between Cairo and Tehran continued until foreign ministers of both countries 'Amr Musa and Ali Akbar Velayati met at the end of May in Bali during the ministerial conference of the nonaligned states.

It was agreed during the meeting (that lasted half an hour only) that there is a need to halt media campaigns between Cairo and Tehran in order to create the proper climate for the gradual normalization of relations between them.

The Egyptian-Iranian disputes are not confined to the regional conflict in the area or to Iran's role in Sudan. There are other equally serious issues, foremost of which is Iran's insistence that Egypt abandon Camp David and sever its relations with Israel before diplomatic relations between Cairo and Tehran can be resumed. In addition to that, there are outstanding financial problems, such as Iran's share in the frozen funds in the capital of the Bank of Egypt-Iran for Development, which is about \$1 billion. There is also the question of the fate of Egypt-Iran Textile Company in Suez, and payments on the \$25 million Iranian buses deal which Egypt has not made since the end of the late Shah's regime.

Egyptian-Iranian Relations Analyzed

92AF1061A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
9 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Muhammad al-Sa'id 'Abd-al-Mu'min, professor of Iranian Studies at 'Ayn Shams University]

[Text] In the past few weeks Egyptian-Iranian relations witnessed a positive move toward normalization. Encouraging statements are being made in this regard by officials in Cairo and Tehran, particularly since the meetings held between Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati that took place during several international conferences in which Egypt and Iran participated. Meanwhile, some people express reservations and caution about the restoration of normal relations between the two countries. The following study, written by a specialist in Iranian affairs, seeks to pin-point the advantages of the restoration of relations and the fears it arouses.

There is no doubt that the question of Egyptian-Iranian relations is one of the subjects that has not been given due attention, particularly by the specialists. Also there is no doubt that many of the facts relating to this subject are still vague and need explaining because they go back to ancient times and still exist up to this day. Although much has been said about them in books, in forums, or in the newspapers, yet they remain contradictory and do not withstand scientific scrutiny.

If the purpose of raising the question of Egyptian-Iranian relations is to look into the future of these relations, we should open the file of these relations right from the beginning, and pore over certain principal issues contained in this file.

In order to be able to adopt a scientific and clear stand toward these questions, we must first pose a basic question and try to answer it in light of issues under discussion. The question is: Why have the Egyptian-Iranian relations always been linked to Ma'awiya's [seventh century caliph renowned for his craftiness] knot, which if slackened at one end it becomes tense at the other?

Perhaps these relations sometimes assume the form of competition and other times of alliance and yet other times in the form of antagonism or hostility though without hatred. But they were never of the type that caused bloodshed.

If we realize that the secret behind the various forms of Egyptian-Iranian relations lie in the fact that at one time the two countries were the cradle of human civilization and carried the torch of science and civilization in the dark ages of the old world, and have been and still are the two wings of Islamic civilization and two axis of the region, we would be proceeding in the right direction to open the file of relations between them.

Civilization Continuity

Perhaps the first question that we should discuss in this regard is the continuity of ancient civilization, a matter that is firmly rooted in the history of the pharaohs and the ancient Persians, although this raises certain questions in the field of political contact between both sides. The following is the most important question:

Why didn't the pharaohs of ancient Egypt think of annexing Iran to their kingdom, while emperors of ancient Iran have sought to annex Egypt to their country?

Perhaps the obvious answer is that Egypt's Pharaoh were not in need of Iran then, considering the expertise and the wealth they possessed which was sufficient to satisfy their ambitious and even more, to the point of claiming divinity (have I not the kingdom of Egypt and these rivers that flow underneath me), which is contrary to the Persian kings who claimed a divine mandate to rule the world.

In fact, relations between the two countries were established through an exchange of expertise—scientists, physicians, technicians, and craftsmen—but the pharaohs did not see the need to go beyond these relations, to move to the rougher type of relationship dictated by the interests of the Persian kings because of environmental pressures and the mounting need for wealth resources and means to build civilization. Meanwhile, the Egyptians kept their relative distance because of preoccupation in internal affairs. The emperors then resolved to link together the two greatest cultures and to unite the two greatest kingdoms.

If the Egyptians have contributed to building the culture of the Achaemenian state through cooperation and the exchange of expertise in the era of Cyrus, Qambiz's ambitions called for the need to maintain or preserve this Egyptian source even if by force, for fear that the pharaoh's preoccupation with other affairs might cut off this source. Despite what Greek historian Herodotus said about Qambiz's reasons for invading Egypt, this historian also mentioned among other things that Egypt's Pharaoh Amazes sent "N Yetis", an Egyptian princess, daughter of his predecessor King Ibris, to be the wife of the Iranian Cyrus, and that his eldest son, Qambiz, who assumed the throne after him was his son from that princess.

If Achaemenian King Darius I ordered digging a canal, Pharaoh Nkhaw laid the plans for digging it between the Nile and the Red Sea. Iranian canal excavation experts participated with the Egyptians in realizing this important accomplishment of civilization, so that a maritime trade route between the east and the west could be completed by linking the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. The Egyptians fought Salami's battle side by side with the Iranians against the Greeks and did extremely well in this important battle.

The Iranians, according to sources, adopted the Egyptian script and wrote with it; took the medicine and treated with it; and adopted the Egyptian calendar and went by it.

Orientalist Prostid says: Generally we can say that Persian King Darius, like the contemporary Japanese, was adept at copying the best in the great civilizations that were around him in order to use those things in his government. For soon he realized the importance of the Egyptian calendar that divides the year into 12 months, each consisting of 30 days. He ordered that this calendar be adopted in the Persian government. Darius also admired Egyptian progress in medicine. He ordered one of his chief priests to rebuild an Egyptian medical school in San al-Hajar, west of the delta, whose buildings were destroyed. This story is inscribed on the base of a statue of the chief priest in the Vatican's museum in Rome.

Greek historian Herodotus says that Iranian king Cyrus asked Egypt's Pharaoh Amazes to send to his court one of the most proficient eye doctors, just as Khosrow Anushirvan, most famous emperor of the Sassan

Empire, invited many Egyptian scientists to take part in teaching in Jundi Shapour University which he established in order to keep abreast with the University of Alexandria.

Perhaps these occurrences in the early history of both countries indicate that it is impossible for the two countries to remain far from one another. They confirm that Ma'awiyah's knot still exists in the relations between them.

Egyptian-Iranian Relationship by Marriage

The second question in the file that we should ponder is the Egyptian-Iranian relationship by marriage—kinship marriage, creed marriage, language marriage, and literature marriage. These relationships by marriage are far too numerous to be counted in the ancient, Islamic, and contemporary eras. The Islamic eras have witnessed a flourishing relationship by marriage. Relationship by marriage based on kinship begins with the venerable companion [of Prophet Muhammad] Salman al-Farisi and his two honorable daughters, followed by 'Awn Yazid al-Jirjati, and Har'amah Bin-'Aayun, and ending with Princess Fawziyah's [King Farouk's sister] marriage.

Relationships by marriage based on creed reached their peak in the era of the Fatimide state in Egypt when the Fatimides established a center for ideological call in Iran from which senior ideological advocates graduated.

There is no doubt that the famous Iranian traveller and thinker Nasir Khosrow, chief advocate Hibatallah al-Shirazi, and Ismailite leader al-Hasan al-Sabah top the list of Fatimide advocates in Iran.

As for relationship by marriage in the language, it is a fact known to the layman and to the educated, for which there is no need for evidence, beginning with Persian vocabulary which entered the colloquial Egyptian and the classical Arabic in Egypt before the Turks and during their rule. Even the Farsi grammar influenced many of the expressions and colloquial dialogues in Egypt.

If we talk about literary marriages, we can hardly find a poet in the Farsi literature who does not mention in his poetry the name of Egypt, its description, its cities, its villages, its scholars, its jurists, its men of letters, its Nile, its pharaohs and their priests, the politicians of Egypt, the pyramids, Wadi Musa, al-Tur mountain, Joseph and Zlikha, Egyptian [historian] Dhu al-Nun, Egyptian stories, Egyptian textiles and many other things. Likewise, we find in the Egyptian literature many Persian names, legends, and stories.

Perhaps these relationships by marriage reveal a deep secret that binds the two countries together in various forms of relationships, ties, or bonds. This secret perhaps will lead us to the third question in the file of the Egyptian-Iranian relations, which is that Iranian scholars, thinkers, and men of letters frequently visit Egypt. They come to visit it as a fundamental necessity for completing their scholarly development, and reside in Egypt for as long as they like.

Egypt's image is clear and evident in the Iranian thought and the Iranian literature. In fact it is clearer than Iran's image in the Egyptian literature. Also books abound with discussions between Egyptian and Iranian scholars, poetry contests between poets of both countries, and Sufi instructions. Such names are far too many to count.

The Intellect and Ideology

But the serious issue that we should focus on in the Egyptian-Iranian relations file is the intellectual and ideological relationship. It is an incontrovertible fact that the political and ideological thought of any people is the sum total of a number of intellectual components of which national identity comes first. There is no doubt that the independence of the political and ideological thought of every people is based on this national premise. On the basis of this view, it can be said that the Egyptian-Iranian relations in this field were generally negative, although they included two positive points, which are as follows:

First: In the Islamic eras, Egyptian and Iranian thinkers represented two parallel trends in the general Islamic thought, one representing the right of center in Egypt and the other the left of center in Iran. They were able to inter-relate during various periods of the Islamic world's history and to meet at the center point of the theological thought that combines the reformist center and the revolutionary center. One of its most important phenomena was the convergence around the thought of the Prophet's family, the Fatimides thought, the Jamal-al-Din [al-Afghani; noted Islamic scholar] thought, and ending with the thought of bringing the creeds closer together.

Second: The exchange of revolutionary reform thought between Egypt and Iran during the Islamic history of both countries. This was expressed in the movement for self-rule and independence from the Abbaside caliphate, confronting the advance of the Moguls and the Crusaders, the parliamentary revolution [not further identified], Mossadegh's movement, the nationalization of oil in Iran, the 23 July revolution [in Egypt], the nationalization of the Suez Canal in Egypt, and the Islamic movements in both Egypt and Iran.

Thus, we arrive at the fundamental conclusion in studying the Egyptian-Iranian relations file, that Egyptian-Iranian relations are not merely a political form or set of diplomatic exchanges that have their own basis, rules, and boundaries at which one can stop. Rather, when the official door to relations is open, these relations will automatically expand to include all fields of human activities in both countries. Thought will be first in this activity.

Intellectual exchange will not stop at the political, economic, or administrative interests. Indeed, it will expand to include all issues of creed, practical persuasion, and the very method of government.

Pros and Cons

To be fair, we must note here all the positive and negative aspects expected from such openness:

First: The pluses:

1. Getting acquainted with the Iranian experiment in the exercise of direct Islamic rule in order to gauge its success or failure, and with the strong and weak points in the ruling regime, and benefiting from this direct knowledge in developing or confronting the ideological political thought in Egypt.
2. Learning about the principles of the Islamic revolution in Iran through the legitimate channels that could discuss these principles, simplify them, and explain the points of agreement and disagreement, without unreasonable argument stemming from ignorance of the facts of these principles, and free from arousing fear of them, attracting unenlightened young people to them, or the lack of any real criterion as a result of exporting these principles in ambiguous and provocative manner.
3. Testing Egypt's ability to launch democratic initiatives in order to come to understanding with Muslim fundamentalism in the interest of the national climate and reaching understanding with the Islamic people and the people of the region.
4. Proving Egypt's leading role not only among the Arab peoples but also among the Islamic peoples in maintaining the national and general Islamic interest, and the utilization of this role in international forums.
5. Confirming the Egyptian policy's ability to deal with all parties independently.
6. Realizing economic benefits in the long term and perhaps in the short term. Revising the economic systems which the Iranians applied after the revolution, and exploiting mediation between Iran and other countries in order to realize economic and political benefits.
7. Helping to maintain stability on the domestic front while reviewing the method of dealing with the Islamic groups in Egypt.
8. Winning over new elements for the Egyptian policy in order to realize its interests in the New World Order that would help it to launch initiatives in international relationships.

Second: The Minuses:

1. The promotion of some extremist groups that imagine that exporting the revolution is possible with Iran's assistance to these groups in order to bring pressure on the government. This can be brought under control by conscious coordination of the security policies that have proved their success and the superior quality of the organs that carry them out, bearing in mind that Iran will have no justification to support extremist Islamic elements.

2. The effect of this openness in Egypt's relations with some parties hostile to Iran. This can be avoided by establishing controls on these relations and opening dialogue lines with the various institutions in Iran, and using experts and specialists in Iranian affairs in order to deal with problems that might arise in the future.

3. The failure to realize the desired economic benefits in the short term, which though may be true in the short term, it is out of the question in the long term.

4. The trouble being felt by some countries because of fear of Iran exporting its Islamic revolution through Egypt. This can be dealt with by taking conscious steps to convince these countries of the need and importance of dealing with Iran and its Islamic revolution in curbing terror and revolutionary chaos in the region, now that security in the Gulf and the region has stabilized.

5. Rejection by Israel and the United States of this Egyptian move for fear of affecting the peace treaty and the progress of peace talks between the Arabs and Israel, and Israel's political and media campaign against the Egyptian move. This can be dealt with by launching counter political and media campaigns that would explain the positive character of this move in curbing Iranian opposition to the peace negotiations.

In any case, we should not blame the advocates of easing the Egyptian-Iranian relations, but should put before them the negative aspects of such easing that might put stress on the government's security, media, cultural, educational, religious, economic, and political organs. This being the case, it would be useful to apply a gradual and controlled relaxation of the situation. The controls should not be just procedural as represented in mutual respect and noninterference in the domestic affairs.

Rather, the controls should be in the form of initiatives proposing solutions to all the points of difference between the two states as an effective means to create confidence and stable relations founded on a sound and strong basis, because every time a problem between the two sides is solved, the sphere of good relations would expand, whereas an uncontrolled relaxation of relations could be highly costly.

Also there is no doubt that adopting the principle of "shut the door" [that brings ill winds] in the face of Iran will not achieve real stability. The winds of relations blowing from Iran will outflank the official entrance and will reach the cultural, information, educational, and economic outlets that are known and unknown, expected and unexpected. We have much evidence to this effect in the file of the Egyptian-Iranian relations.

If a door is opened unexpectedly and without prior planning, the relations will end up in chaos and create further confusion and trouble and will harm our society, culture, and the minds of young people—all of which will be beyond the control of our official and popular organs.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

British Report Alleged To Urge Coexistence

92AE0531A Paris AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic
29 Jun 92 pp 22-25

[Report from London by Amin al-Siba'i: "Dialogues Ward Partition Curse Off the Middle East"]

[Text] A confidential British report claims that the virus of civil wars and painful partitions will not migrate from Eastern Europe to the Arab region if the Arabs heed four caveats.

The report, prepared by a team of British experts on Gulf and Middle East affairs, was presented at a closed-door symposium held in London recently to discuss the chain of developments sweeping the world and the potential for the Middle East in general, and the Gulf region in particular, to be afflicted with the curse of territorial wars that has thrown the states of the former Soviet Union into the hell of racial and sectarian strife, risking territorial partition.

The British experts said in their report, prepared for a closed-door discussion and not for publication, that despite numerous similarities between the countries of Europe and those of the Middle East, such as the emergence of religious movements in certain countries, the Middle East is not likely to follow the example of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union thanks to conditions in the region and to the presence of effective countries of centralized power, such as Saudi Arabia, capable of confronting elements that would affect change through the use of force.

The report reviews political developments in the Middle East and raises up specific points to warn against overlooking the dangers that threaten several Arab countries, such as growing fundamentalism and attempts by certain non-Arab forces to infiltrate Arab decision making which could undermine the security of numerous Arab countries even though they would not be able to achieve the ultimate objective of usurping power, instigating civil wars, or partitioning a single country into warring states.

The report includes a list of recommendations to countries of the Middle East and the major powers that its authors believe could inoculate the Middle East against 'infection' by the Soviet virus.

Those recommendations include:

- Intensify and expand efforts to arrive at an equitable and stable Arab-Israeli solution to the Palestinian problem.
- Help poor nations carry out development plans and projects.
- Reduce annual military expenditures on armies and instruments of war in favor of bolstering internal security forces.

- Adopt a nuclear non-proliferation treaty in all countries of the region.

The discussions that followed made it obvious that most experts are not comfortable with or optimistic about the extremist government policies pursued by the Likud coalition for years, right up to last month.

Some of those experts volunteered the information that Israeli leaders are adamant in their policy of exhausting Arab countries with war until their resources are drained and they are forced in the future to submit to conditions and demands that they have so far rejected.

Even though the experts acknowledge that fact and expect the region to be engulfed in future wars, they are certain that the virus of civil wars and partitions will not spread in the area. Among the reasons they cite is that the disease has been arrested in Lebanon, thanks to the collective will of the Lebanese themselves, after a 16-year civil war that was not able to spread to neighboring countries.

That has also been destroyed in Iraq, almost, thanks to the collective will of the Iraqis themselves, and especially the Kurds among them, despite the regime's policies that would have resulted in the partition of any other country. Partition was warded off because Iraqi unity was supported by other influential Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and by all the other Arab countries that separate their rejection of the regime that pushed the Iraqis into the war of Kuwaiti occupation, from their support for Iraqi unity and sovereignty and the security of its people as an Arab country with a role, an entity, a legacy, and a civilization.

Having dismissed the likelihood of a war of partition in the Middle East, the discussion touched on a series of recommendations intended to reinforce the area's stability and insulate it from the changes that currently sweep Europe and threaten other countries on other continents.

Some of those recommendations call upon the pivotal Arab states to develop their security and peaceful policies within their sphere and to handle issues and problems through calm dialogue untainted by internal conflict or foreign intervention.

This is where Saudi Arabia's policies distinguish themselves as a role model that could help sidestep risks and foster peace, security, and stability in the Gulf and in the Middle East.

A recent example of that policy and its effectiveness was moves by Saudi Arabia to expand the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and endeavor by all means to resolve long-standing border disputes among some of the states in the region.

The Kingdom has played a fundamental role in the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and to protect its borders against those who would fool with them. The

Kingdom always dedicates all its resources to benevolence and to generate the understanding that Bahrain and Qatar need to settle their border dispute through dialogue, negotiation, and brotherly cooperation.

The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, has welcomed cooperation with the Sultanate of Oman in bolstering their bilateral relations and in expanding the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to bring bilateral cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman to the final stages of brotherly agreement on the border issue between them.

The Kingdom also welcomes, within the context of its efforts to avoid conflicts in the Arab region, all initiatives to settle the issue of joint borders with Yemen, in spite of harsh accusations and media attacks and in spite of the particular position taken by the Yemeni regime during the Gulf crisis.

Saudi Arabia's attitude towards the border issue with Yemen is rooted in its vision for the region's future which must be built on brotherhood, cooperation, righteousness, and giving everyone his due.

If a step remains to be taken towards a final solution to the border issue, it must be taken by the Yemeni side. Saudi Arabia does not seek, nor has it ever attempted, to interfere in the internal affairs of Arab or other countries, and it is not about to deviate from this established policy. Nor does it seek to impose changes of, or on, ruling regimes. Rather, it always strives for good relations and understanding with whoever takes the initiative to prove goodwill and desire to cooperate.

That perspective presupposes that the initiative towards understanding, dialogue, and cooperation in resolving problems and conflicts should come from the Yemeni side, provided that any such initiative is based on a firm foundation of truth, commitment, and goodwill towards the Kingdom, and on abandoning, in actuality and not just in words, the policies adopted during the Gulf crisis.

If the Yemeni side were truly willing to seek fundamental solutions to issues such as the border dispute, it should make that clearly apparent in its policies, intentions, and positions to be stated in official communiqués supplanting all previous negative positions and statements. This is a mandated prerequisite for any dialogue in order to reassure the Saudi people that Yemen has returned to a policy of cooperation, brotherhood, and neighborliness, and that it has determined to pursue policies based on fundamental changes in its attitude towards the Kingdom.

Yemeni officials, as a Gulf official put it, must realize deep inside that Saudi Arabia is protective of the stability of countries of the region and that it has no interest in stirring up trouble in any Arab country, and most certainly not in Yemen. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia has always extended considerable aid to the Yemeni people at all stages of cooperation.

The experts concluded that all regimes have opposition, which is something desirable in government in order to ward off missteps and mistakes. However, if the opposition's contacts extend beyond its own people and borders to forces abroad, it turns into time bomb that threatens stability. Even more so if the opposition is rooted in objectives that undermine the unity of land, the sovereignty of the state, or the security of the people.

In order to ward off the 'virus' of partition, civil war, and blows to peace and stability, the West and other countries of the world are betting more and more on the peace process to resolve the Palestinian issue and on Saudi Arabia's role and efforts to close the file on bilateral conflicts, bolster cooperation in facing the larger issues, and avoid conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, and understanding.

This is the only avenue to success.

Libyan Official, Egyptian Minister Confer

*NC0808132792 Cairo MENA in English 1220 GMT
8 Aug 92*

[Text] Cairo, August 8—(MENA)—Dr. Yusif Wali, deputy premier and minister of agriculture and land reclamation, received today Muhammad Mahmud al-Hijazi, Libyan secretary general of the People's Congress for cooperation with Egypt, who is on a current visit here.

The meeting dealt with the agricultural projects which are to be discussed during the third session of the Egyptian-Libyan committee, slated for late September in Tripoli.

A delegation of experts in the fields of agricultural research and combating pests is to be dispatched to Libya during this month to set up the basis of joint projects in these domains.

Al-Hijazi hailed the achievements accomplished by Egyptian land reclamation companies in cultivating the desert and the digging of subterranean water wells in Libya.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Fatah, Hamas Leaders Discuss Current Conflict

*92AE0527A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
17 Jul 92 p 8*

[Interview with Hamas leader Dr Mahmud al-Zahhar and Fatah leader Dr Zakariya al-Agha by Huda al-Husayni; place and date not given: "Causes of Erupting Conflict Between Fatah and Hamas in Two Interviews With Leaders from Gaza"]

[Text] Fatah and Hamas have agreed to halt their internecine fighting but the fire is still burning under the ashes. This week's AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT interview is

with two leaders: Dr. Zakariya al-Agha from Fatah and Dr. Mahmud al-Zahhar from Hamas.

The two contradicted one another and accused each other and spoke of the other in a generalized sense using phrases as "they, they said, they say." The sounds were tense and the hopes were big. But it is not known on whom these hopes depend.

Dr. Zakariya al-Agha, a member of the delegation to the peace negotiations, has negotiated with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and has taken part in the Madrid and Washington talks. He is from Gaza and he says that the documents Hamas claims to possess are forgeries. Dr. Mahmud al-Zahhar is a Hamas leader who has been jailed by Israel several times. He says that the Islamists do not and will not recognize the State of Israel and that the documents they hold against Fatah are real and that nobody has denied them. He added that elections must be held so the Palestinian people at home and abroad can select their true representatives.

Following is the text of the two interviews with al-Agha and al-Zahhar:

[Husayni] As Hamas, don't you think that if what is happening in Gaza extends to the West Bank, it will constitute the beginning of a factional sedition?

[Zahhar] Truly, what is happening is a sedition but not a factional sedition, contrary to what is being said. However, we hope that the internecine fighting will not extend to the West Bank. Efforts are being made now to contain the conflict in the Strip. So we don't wish to express pessimistic ideas about the possibility of the conflict extending to the Bank because our reasonable brothers from there and from behind the (1948) Green Line have come to contain what is occurring in Gaza. Consequently, the conflict will not be exported to them.

[Husayni] Are there political reasons behind what has happened in Gaza Strip?

[Zahhar] What has happened in Gaza is, briefly, the discovery of a plot to assassinate Islamist figures.

A conditional ultimatum has been sent to them—Fatah—that if any Islamist is attacked, the response will take the same form. The objective isn't to create sedition but to prevent it. The murder of one or more Islamist figures signifies the adoption of a destructive policy, regardless of disagreement in opinion, belief, or policy. We mustn't resort to physical liquidation as a means to adopt under any circumstance. Generally, the response to the ultimatum has been severe and violent. A number of leaflets underlining this intention have been issued. We have the documents and we have submitted them to the reconciliation committee. Thus, the intention to murder is there. The plan had been prepared in such a way as to be covered with a fake agreement which was announced at the time (last month) but denied [by us]

later so executions and assassinations couldn't be perpetrated under the cover of a fake agreement. This continued to be the situation until the other side (Fatah) escalated matters by opening fire at a gathering conveying condolences at the home of Dr. Muhammad Saqr in Bani Suhayla on the occasion of the death of his mother. Five people who just happened to be present at the condolences session were wounded. Conditions intensified and then an agreement was signed on 6 July. Violations were committed after that agreement which was followed by a second agreement that was concluded yesterday (14 July). We implore God to give it success.

[Husayni] Are you certain that there is a plan against you? What is your evidence?

[Zahhar] The question of what the evidence is makes me say that the evidence is found in the leaflets. If you wish to know, I will tell you that four leaflets issued after the crisis developed say, "The dimensions of the crimes committed by Hamas since the inception of the intifadah [uprising] to this time make Hamas subject to being brought to revolutionary justice and to a security interrogation similar to the interrogation conducted with any lackey."

This is obvious. The same thing is contained in the initial warning or in the premeditated plan.

[Husayni] But Fatah says that these things are fake.

[Zahhar] The statements are fake?

[Husayni] Yes.

[Zahhar] Then what do you say to the fact that the statements exist and that nobody has denied them?

[Husayni] In whose name were they issued?

[Zahhar] In the name of the Unified Command—Fatah. There are other leaflets signed by Fatah's Hawks. "We hear only from you that they are fake.

[Husayni] Dr. Zakariya al-Agha told me in an interview yesterday that they are fake.

[Zahhar] If Zakariya al-Agha has told you that they are fake, then we beg you to contact Ra'id Salah, Faysal al-Husayni, Sa'ib 'Urayqat, Tariq 'Abd-al-Hayy, or the entire Reconciliation Committee and ask them if Zakariya has made such statements. He has told you this because you are far away in London. But nobody in Gaza has said that the leaflets are fake. Al-Agha is the only one to say it, and he has said it to you.

[Husayni] Do you believe now that he has attacked you and that you aren't the aggressors?

[Zahhar] We, out of fear of being attacked, have warned them. I again assure you that the leaflets aren't fake: first, because nobody has denied them and, second, because those who distributed them are Fatah elements in the area whom we know.

[Husayni] Why do you answer violence with violence?

[Zahhar] Allah is great! Why do you side with them? Do we have to wait until they murder us and then tell them: Thank you, and may God keep you safe?

God, may He be praised and exalted, says: "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits" [Koran 2:190], "if then any one transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress ye likewise against him," [Koran 2:194] and "in the recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree)" [Koran 42:40].

[Husayni] You have accused Fatah of fabricating problems with Hamas because it is going to make serious concessions. What are these concessions?

[Zahhar] Ask them about the opinion they held on the Palestine issue in 1965 and the opinion they hold now. What did they say at the outset? They said that Palestine extends from the sea to the river. But what do they say now? They spoke of the armed struggle and the rifle in the past. What do they say now? In the past, they said that there is no alternative to an independent Palestinian delegation. They said that the PLO will do the negotiating and that they wouldn't cede their principle. What have they accepted now? Moreover, can we know what their position is on Jerusalem and why they have agreed to a joint conference whereas they rejected Camp David in 1981? However, when we ask questions, it doesn't mean that we want to force them to embrace a certain policy. When they decided to choose their path, nobody put obstacles in their way. They were allowed to go to Madrid and to negotiate in Washington and Moscow. Nobody objected. To the contrary, they are the party that criticized others. They want all the people to be convinced of what they say, and this is something that is unattainable in this world. All that is required is that no attack be committed against us so that there will be no sedition.

[Husayni] They say that Hamas wants to liquidate all members of the peace negotiations delegation.

[Zahhar] Who has said this? What is the proof? They have been left alone since Madrid and nobody has said anything to them about any issue. What is the proof that we want to liquidate the delegation members? Since the Madrid conference on 30 October 1991 and to this day, who among them has been threatened, warned, or assaulted?

[Husayni] An 'Arafat adviser has accused conspiring elements of trying to continue to fan the fires of sedition in Gaza. Have you arrested any such elements?

[Zahhar] I will tell you this: Today in Khan Yunis, people well known for their immoral behavior and their evident lackeyhood attacked the mosque (al-Rahmah Mosque). Everybody knows who these people are. Recently, we agreed to consider whoever violates this [latest] agreement a plotter. The people who made the

attack today are from Gaza, and we know them. They have been carrying arms openly and still sleeping in their homes [without fear of being arrested by Israelis].

[Husayni] Do you mean that they are elements from Fatah?

[Zahhar] One faction attacks the mosque. The problem is between the Islamists and Fatah. So where would we place those who attack us?

[Husayni] On what terms would you agree to unite the ranks?

[Zahhar] God, may he be praised and exalted, says: "And hold fast, all together, by the rope which God (stretches for you), and be not divided among yourselves" [Koran 3:103]. God's rope is God's book, i.e. the Koran. If they accept the Koran, then we agree that they be the officers and we the soldiers.

[Husayni] Does Hamas consider the PLO the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative?

[Zahhar] Address your question to the ordinary citizen. Let the people discuss the issue of sole and legitimate representation.

[Husayni] What about you as Hamas?

[Zahhar] Have you heard that Hamas has projected an alternative at any time?

[Husayni] But does Hamas consider the PLO the sole legitimate representative?

[Zahhar] I say that the PLO represents the Palestinians now in terms of political particulars. But in terms of the "law of Islam," it doesn't represent them. When the PLO declares that it will embrace the Islamic method and application, then it will represent all factions of the Palestinian people, both Muslim and non-Muslim.

[Husayni] You say in Hamas that you are opposed to Israel. You are a Hamas leader and yet you negotiate openly with Fatah to pacify the conditions. To date, Israel hasn't arrested you. So, is this the beginning of coexistence with Israel, for example?

[Zahhar] This is a strange projection, by God. I am not negotiating in Hamas' name. I am one of a group of people who belong to the Islamic tendency and who have no connection with the [Hamas] organization. Israel has no security suspicions against these people.

In this regard, I am exactly the same as Zakariya al-Agha. What applies to him also applies to me, to 'Abd-al-Rahman Hamad, and to 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rantisi. Consequently, if this signifies coexistence with Israel, then let me make this clear to you: We don't and will not recognize Israel's existence as a state. As an individual and as an Islamic tendency, we will absolutely not recognize it.

The other side (Fatah) has said that it agrees to two states and to coexistence. They have agreed to resolution 181. When 'Arafat was asked about the PLO charter, he said Cadue. He said it in French, not in Arabic.

We don't accept Israel's existence as a state on a single inch of Islamic land. We have said it frankly. The law of Islam says that not an inch of Palestine's land may be ceded. Today or tomorrow, an Islamic government must be established in Palestine, regardless of whether Israel likes it or not.

[Husayni] What do you call the entity existing currently on Palestine's soil currently?

[Zahhar] We say that it is an illegitimate entity.

[Husayni] Meaning that you don't see in Yitzhak Rabin's assumption of the premiership an opportunity to enhance the peace process?

[Zahhar] What kind of projection is this? Some people have hailed Rabin's presence as if Rabin will bring relief! What is the difference between Rabin and Shamir on these issues: South Lebanon, the Golan, Jerusalem, the settlements, and self-rule?

[Husayni] One wants to grant self-rule and the other doesn't.

[Zahhar] The first to project the self-rule question was Menachem Begin. Shamir then projected the issue in 1989. So both want to grant self-rule.

[Husayni] Don't you want peace?

[Zahhar] Our name is Muslims [the peaceable] and we belong to a creed called Islam. Our greeting on earth is "peace be upon you." Their [the Jews'] greeting when they utter it is "peace." The name of our God, Whom we obey in everything great and small, is "the Peace." Therefore, we are for peace. But we aren't for surrender.

[Husayni] And you aren't for Israel?

[Zahhar] I consider this question an insult.

[Husayni] You aren't for a Jewish people living in Palestine?

[Zahhar] We agree to have the Jewish people live in our country under the banner of Islam. We have done this a thousand times in history. We did it when we "abandoned" Andalusia and when the Muslims and the Jews were expelled from it. We received the Jews in North Africa where they continue to live under the protection of Islam and the Muslims.

[Husayni] Therefore, the fighting between you and Fatah is not because of statements and threats but due to political reasons?

[Zahhar] There are accumulated problems between us. For example, there is the problem of the suspended Islamic University salaries and there is the PLO position

on recognizing the graduation degrees issued by the university. We have our position on the Islamic vocational institutions. If these institutions are managed by Islamists, their appropriations are cut off. Moreover, the funds which are collected in the Palestinian people's name from all the Palestinian people abroad must be divided among the people. They shouldn't be collected in the people's name and then given to a certain faction.

[Husayni] So it is a question of money?

[Zahhar] It is a question of rights, and rights aren't incompatible with faith. In any case, there are numerous issues pending between us. It mustn't be said that the causes that have led to the internecine fighting are connected with a political position. In political matters, we have let them do what they wish to do.

[Husayni] Can you stop them?

[Zahhar] We don't think of stopping them because "there can be no coercion in faith." If we don't coerce man in the issue of faith, how could we coerce him in political issues?

[Husayni] Regarding the elections at home, will you take part in them?

[Zahhar] If elections are a goal, then we reject them because what are we going to do after the elections? But if the elections are a means, then let them tell us what their objective is. Is it to manage our domestic affairs? But then, what about the Palestine issue?

[Husayni] A Hamas member (Abu-Marzuq) has met with the Syrian Salvation Group and told them that Hamas will take part in the elections so it can win and can then foil the peace process.

[Zahhar] Perhaps this is the man's personal opinion or the opinion of the people in the area where he lives. But to date, there has been absolutely no specific decision to participate or not participate. We want to find out first what the elections are for.

[Husayni] Who will acquaint and familiarize you with the elections objective?

[Zahhar] Israel. Let it say what the elections objective is. Is it a self-administration? We rejected such an administration long ago. If they are for self-rule, they are rejected also. If they are for the purpose of giving the Palestinian people the opportunity to select their representatives at home and abroad so they will be the Palestinian people's true and unconditional representatives, then there is a possibility, but only after the goal and the objective becomes known. If Israel agrees to international supervision in place of supervision by the occupation, then we can talk.

[Husayni] A Fatah official has said that Fatah must cooperate with Hamas and that there must be no confrontation. So why don't you cooperate with the Fatah leaders who support you?

[Zahhar] We hope this man's opinion represents the majority and that all Palestinians will cooperate for the Palestinian people's interest. This is a wise man and I hope that his opinion will become a basis for the relations.

[Husayni] What is your opinion of Rabin's invitation to the Arab leaders to go to the Knesset and talk peace? What is your interpretation of this invitation?

[Zahhar] He (Rabin) knows that the Arab nation is fatigued. He will receive these leaders, inflate them, and say that they are national heroes. But when they return to their countries, they will be shot and nobody will even walk in their funerals.

Dr. Zakariya Al-Agha

[Husayni] Why are you fighting Hamas?

[Agha] God forgive you. We aren't fighting anybody and history records that we haven't fought [attacked] anybody. We try as hard as possible to avoid even repelling attacks against us. We represent the Palestinian people's conscience. We and the Palestinian people can never be in two opposed trenches. We consider all the national Palestinian forces sisterly forces and we always seek to cooperate and coordinate with them. Under no circumstance could we consider attacking anybody.

[Husayni] Are there political causes behind the ongoing internecine fighting between Hamas and Fatah?

[Agha] By God, I don't know. You can ask the brothers in Hamas. However, I would like to say that we have found ourselves slandered and accused of plotting against their leaders. This is false and untrue. We have told them so and we have assured them that it is untrue. Our leadership abroad has also emphasized this to them. But they have used these pretexts to provoke us and to initiate what has happened.

[Husayni] What is their objective behind what has happened?

[Agha] Generally, we have agreed with them to end the provocations, to form committees to investigate what has happened, and to deal with issues pending. We don't wish to fan the fires and reopen the wounds but rather wish to turn a new leaf now. You can address any questions pertaining to the goals of what has happened to them.

[Husayni] Some Hamas members abroad have shown us a written order from Yasir 'Arafat to kill and pursue Hamas leaders.

[Agha] The report is untrue and the document is a forgery. I am completely certain that brother Abu-'Ammar is innocent of this, Fatah Movement is innocent of it, and the PLO is innocent of it. Assertions by our leadership have always noted the need for dialogue and for improving our relations with Hamas and with all the Palestinian forces. We have always been advised to

avoid any friction with any Palestinian side. This has been emphasized by Abu-'Ammar personally and by our leadership abroad. One cannot believe under any circumstance that what has been reported is true. Our leadership abroad has denied it and we have confirmed the denial at home. I don't think that what they have shown is true. The document is a forgery.

[Husayni] Who stands behind Fatah's Hawks?

[Agha] This issue... To tell the truth... They say that they are Fatah's military wing. This is what they say in their statements.

[Husayni] Don't you know who they are?

[Agha] I don't know who they are.

[Husayni] How can you reach agreement with Hamas if Fatah's Hawks, whom you don't know, say: "No to dialogue, no to an understanding, and no to meeting with the Likud agents?"

[Agha] To begin, this is untrue. It is also a part of the campaign of lies against the movement and against us. We regret this greatly. From the first moment, we tried to avoid a sedition with all our might. When they sent threats to some of our brothers, we went to them and told them what was in the threats. They said that the reason was the plot. We assured them that there was no plot and we tried as hard as we could to develop a solution satisfactory to all. We tried to issue a joint statement denouncing and condemning any attempt to attack their leaders. But they turned us down and said: Even if you issue such denunciation, we will persist in our position.

[Husayni] But Fatah's Hawks say that they will pursue them even in the mosques... Is this document also a forgery?

[Agha] Sister, don't attach too much [to what they say]! Have you read the threatening letter they have sent? It says a whole lot. 'Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Battalions issue statement after statement containing many disgraceful things. The truth is that I am ashamed to mention what is in them. In its latest statement, dated 7 July 1992, Hamas has even considered itself the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative. This is what it has said verbatim.

There are statements and counter-statements and we may not be pleased with what they contain. But it must be known that under no circumstance did we initiate the crisis.

[Husayni] Is there no fear that the mere statement that the Hawks will pursue them in mosques will encourage the Israelis to follow the same method?

[Agha] Sister, nobody has approached the mosques. The mosques around which problems developed are the mosques from which problems emerged.

We cannot imagine that anybody performing the worship rites will be pursued or harassed in mosques. With all our respect for mosques and despite the sensitive issue of mosques and our rejection of any attempt to undermine them, the fact is that mosques have been exploited by our brothers who have used Friday sermons for instigation and who have proceeded from mosques to attack innocent people on several issues.

[Husayni] A Fatah Central Committee statement issued in Tunis has expressed astonishment that the first Amman accord denies the presence of a plan behind which Fatah stands, as Hamas says. On the basis of this denial, it seems as if there was a plan. So have you received directions from Tunis on how to conclude a new accord?

[Agha] We respect and appreciate our brothers abroad. There is no separation between the interior and the exterior and there is no contradiction between anything we and the brothers abroad do, considering that our work complements theirs and their work complements ours. All the announcements we have heard from abroad and all the statements brother Abu-'Ammar has made have stressed the need to meet, develop a solution, and reach an agreement with the brothers in Hamas. This has been the main emphasis. There has been no incitement or anything like that. Instructions have always urged self-restraint and not allowing ourselves to be drawn into sedition. All this has been clear in the Central Committee statements. In the address brother Abu-'Ammar delivered on the anniversary of the 56th month of the intifadah, the emphasis was on efforts to contain the sedition.

[Husayni] But we have heard that you have been instructed to carry on with the feud and that the instruction came from some Fatah cadres.

[Agha] This is wrong, untrue, and I deny it decisively. Our entire leadership has put the emphasis on containing the sedition and extinguishing its fires and on the need to end the fighting and engage in dialogue.

[Husayni] You have said that Fatah circles have documents on a Hamas plan to assassinate members of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks.

[Agha] When did I say such things?

[Husayni] You have stated this to a news agency.

[Agha] I mean... We have said... Regarding the documents issue, we do in fact have something about such a statement. Generally, I wish to focus...

[Husayni] Did you have documents in your possession?

[Agha] We don't wish to regurgitate the past or re-live past days that were difficult for us. We wish to turn a new leaf with the brothers in Hamas, with all the Palestinian factions, and with all our masses. Our people had enough hardship in recent days and they are suffering enough hardship under the occupation. We want all to deal with

open hearts and with goodwill. I wish to say that our hearts and our minds are open and that we are fully prepared to cooperate with every Palestinian national movement, with every religious movement, and with...

[Husayni] Cooperate on what basis?

[Agha] There are numerous elements that unite us. It suffices that we are facing the occupation together. There is no disagreement between us over the occupation. There may be disagreements on ideology or on other issues pertaining to the post-occupation and post-liberation phase. These are issues which we can postpone and on which we can disagree after the occupation is eliminated. But we are not permitted to disagree now because the enemy surrounds us and because we must try as hard as possible to rid ourselves of this occupation, plant hope, and attain a peace treaty that ensures our people's legitimate rights.

[Husayni] Now that conditions between Fatah and Hamas have nearly subsided, has the threat of assassinations disappeared?

[Agha] What assassinations?

[Husayni] Assassination of the Palestinian delegation members.

[Agha] I want to assert for the 100th time that there is no assassination plan. I hope it is the same case with our brothers and that Hamas is opposed to this thing.

[Husayni] During the negotiations with Hamas, it became obvious that you are Fatah's representative in Gaza.

[Agha] The truth is that it isn't a matter of being a representative or not a representative. There are notables who can help and who can influence the various parties. It is on this basis that we got together and appealed to the various factions, whether belonging to us or to the brothers who sat across from us. We have all tried to influence the disputing factions. It is on this basis that we met, as did the notables who came from inside [the West Bank]. We were all peace makers and we tried to extinguish the fires.

[Husayni] What position will Israel take if you declare your representation [of Fatah]?

[Agha] Who has said that we have declared our representation? None of the people who took part in the talks has declared that he represents a certain party. We are men of goodwill and peace makers.

[Husayni] It is said that Fatah fears elections.

[Agha] I don't imagine that the question is one of fearing or not fearing. Besides, why should Fatah be afraid? Fundamentally, the party that is in fear is the party that adopts a line opposed to the Palestinian masses' interests. Therefore, such a party fears that the masses will punish it and will not support it. I believe that the

brothers in Fatah and in the PLO are working to regain the Palestinian people's rights. Thus, they cannot be in conflict with and opposition to the masses' interests. So they cannot fear the opinion the people have of them.

[Husayni] It is said that Fatah fears elections because Hamas will win and will be the transitional authority replacing the PLO.

[Agha] The brothers in Fatah don't wish to run unopposed. The masses are the umpire, and the evidence is abundant. Elections have been held in the Gaza Strip institutions, and we don't wish to say what happened in them. All I want to say is that the people are the umpire and that everybody should respect what the people decide.

[Husayni] Is it true that there is an agreement between Fatah and the Americans that Hamas will not be allowed to take part in the elections unless it agrees to the state...?

[Agha] I have absolutely no knowledge of such a thing. The leadership abroad can be asked. But I wish to assure you that according to my information, this is absolutely untrue.

[Husayni] Do you think that there will be elections?

[Agha] In general, we are negotiating with the Israelis to develop for the Palestinian problem a solution based on resolutions 242 and 338, meaning total Israeli withdrawal and attaining the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, particularly their right to self-determination and to establishing their state. This solution is in two phases:

The first is the transitional phase. The position we have presented and will continue to present to the Israeli side is that we are determined to have the authority fully transferred from the Israeli side to the Palestinian side during the transitional period through general elections in which a central Palestinian authority is elected. This authority is to be the source of government and the replacement for the existing Israeli authority.

[Husayni] But what if Hamas wins?

[Agha] If the brothers in Hamas agree to take part in this political process and if elections are held and they win, then we are democrats and the people are democratic. Palestinians are the most democratic of all Arab peoples, regardless of whether what is involved is elections at home or elections in our councils abroad. We support whomever the people select because we submit to the people's will.

[Husayni] Will Fatah run for election with an independent list of candidates or will its list include all PLO factions?

[Agha] This question is premature and I cannot answer it. We have a long time ahead of us before we reach this point. If we manage to reach it, we will do what is appropriate.

[Husayni] But the elections will be held in October.

[Agha] The end of October is the ceiling set by the United States for the start of the transitional phase. But this doesn't mean that it is certain the elections will be held on 1 November. We hope, and we work with the Americans so the schedules will be observed. But the fact is that we aren't certain about this date.

[Husayni] Do you think that 'Arafat has asked Egyptian President Husni Mubarak to intercede with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to influence Hamas in Gaza?

[Agha] I wasn't present and I don't know what took place between brother Abu-'Ammar and President Mubarak. Abu-'Ammar can be asked about this.

[Husayni] What condition will develop in Gaza if Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin returns the strip to Egypt?

[Agha] Again, we don't wish to anticipate the developments. In our opinion, there must be a comprehensive solution for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. We will then discuss any other matters, such as what you are projecting, in time and will make the necessary decisions. However, nobody has made such proposals to us. When anybody presents a proposal to us, we can discuss it and make a decision. But I wish to affirm that we reject any separate solution for the Gaza Strip alone or for the West Bank alone. The solution must encompass the occupied Palestinian territories.

[Husayni] Are you certain that internecine fighting won't be resumed?

[Agha] I have great hope in God, may He be praised and exalted, and in the Palestinian people and I am certain that the parties concerned will observe this agreement. I hope that I am right and that the fighting is over because what we have felt is that all our Palestinian people's masses are opposed to this fighting. I don't imagine that there is any Palestinian force that wishes to continue to be in conflict with the masses.

[Husayni] Do you suspect that there are elements from outside that try to ignite a sedition?

[Agha] This is possible. The parties concerned work carefully and cautiously to anticipate and bury this possibility in the cradle.

[Husayni] Do you have a word for Hamas?

[Agha] I want to assure the brothers in Hamas that nobody wishes to inflict harm on them or to offend them. We respect their opinions and their viewpoint and we aspire to see disagreement between us settled by dialogue, to coordinate our positions, and to serve the Palestinian interest.

The Palestinian arena is spacious enough to accommodate everybody. Nobody wishes to deny anybody's presence. We hope that the brothers in Hamas will enjoy this

same awareness and that we will march together to achieve the Palestinian objectives and our people's right to self-determination.

Businessman's Perspective on Saudization

*92AE0523A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic
12 Jul 92 p 13*

["A Rebuttal to False Saudization: AL-Nadda Establishment Director Opens Dialogue and Presents a Comprehensive Vision for the National Saudization Plan; Commercial Use of National Wealth Subject to Saudization"]

[Text] Following the issue that was raised by AL-MADINA about the false Saudization before the blessed 'Id al-'Adha, we opened the door to a dialogue on this subject. Subsequently we received many relevant comments, most important of which is the following from the director of the al-Nadda Establishment, Mr. 'Abdul Wahhab 'Usayri:

With reference to what was published on pages 12 and 13 of AL-MADINA Issue #9126 of 8/11/1412 H which included comments and personal views expressed during your interview with some dignitaries about issues such as:

- the role of the private sector in employing citizens
- employment agencies and their role in concealing employment opportunities from Saudi nationals and the use of foreign manpower
- uncommitted manpower
- Saudization

We would like to inform you that we have some deductions and remarks which we would like to present to you regarding the issues that were raised during the different interviews.

1. Regarding the role of the private sector and the responsibility it bears for giving employment opportunities to foreign manpower rather than to Saudi citizens, condemning it as if it only existed to give employment opportunities to foreigners and also to give them attractive salaries and treat them just like Saudis: We find that the private sector has its justification. Where the national plan aimed at gradually replacing foreign manpower with citizens is not being implemented and where there is a provision in the government purchasing regulations that stipulates taking the least expensive bids in tendering contracts, the contractor must base his study and offer on the lowest expenses, the most important element of which is cheap labor, characteristic of foreign manpower and available in the labor market. He will also try to import this kind of labor as long as that is allowed while disregarding the relatively expensive local manpower in simple application of the law of supply and demand. We find that the Saudis have been hurt because there are always others who will accept lower wages. The point here to remember is that the basic objective of the private sector which is to make a profit. The private sector is just following the steps of the first party,

regardless of who it is, looking out for its own interests and decreasing its costs. The issue needs to be studied on the official and popular levels in order to devise a plan for Saudization that can render the Saudi economy completely independent. In this respect, the private sector has the right to take all necessary measures to enable it to reach a balance between total revenues and total expenses, such that it can make a profit, which is the most important criterion for the success of any project. These measures could include minimizing expenditures on wages or utilizing advanced technology to decrease manpower requirements and thus minimize expenditures for wages. In this case, the private sector would not be victimizing foreign workers if they were let go, because the responsibility to supply employment opportunities is that of their own countries. Thus, we conclude an important point that affirms what we referred to earlier; namely, the importance of having a national plan devised by both the government and the private sector, as this responsibility does not fall upon the private sector alone.

2. Regarding employment agencies: We find that these agencies represent a wide-ranging source of imported foreign manpower. They also engage in many practices of which we are all aware which makes them a very serious competitor capable of freezing out Saudi workers and blocking their employment opportunities. We recommend outlawing these agencies as long as there are Saudi employment offices which are officially licensed to work as agents for recommending and employing national manpower. The very rare specialists or those that are not available within our national manpower resources could be the only permissible exceptions.

3. The uncommitted employment is a phenomenon that resulted, in our opinion, from giving a carte blanche for importing employees, whether to those who directly need them or to those who make a business of importing foreign labor, using false activities with false documents. We think that this is the most serious obstacle to giving Saudis employment opportunities. It also leads to a flagrant victimization of the foreign laborer. We call for enforcing strict rules on both the importer of foreign employees, as well as the foreign laborer himself. These rules will be set by all the concerned parties and official departments.

4. True Saudization is a national objective which should have a comprehensive national plan. The world is developing at a very rapid pace and any delay in developing this plan will lead to an aggravation of the problem, and making it unmanageable. The Saudi economy should draw upon all of its resources to assure its independence and self-reliance. We have many qualified graduates from all specialized colleges and higher institutes who could be relied upon to manage the production process and the national economy. It is essential that we not be dependent on any outsiders.

There is the possibility that things may change in such a way that we cannot guarantee the complete building of

our economy or the management of the departments and institutions of the state. We do not deny the contributions of foreign labor. However, time changes and accordingly needs change also. The situation in the first stages of development required a dependence on foreign manpower. The current stage, however, demands that we reconsider and reevaluate. We need to establish our independence by means of management, implementation and self-reliance. The economic, social and educational level in the kingdom combined with the huge stock of acquired experience and college graduates represents an undeniable public wealth that should be utilized.

Let us imagine a situation in which the foreign countries withdrew their nationals from the kingdom and sent them back home. What would that situation bring? The answer is known to everyone. Some other countries, including Saudi Arabia, have gone through such an experience. The human element is the key factor in production and in the national economy. Let us all imagine that the assets of a certain country have been frozen in all foreign banks. There is no doubt that this country would suffer a complete paralysis. The same thing would happen if the workforce of a certain country had been frozen by withdrawing it or by not utilizing it. The situation would be identical—a complete paralysis.

If the national alternative workforce is not available, then it is vital that we develop a plan to develop that national workforce as an alternative to foreign labor. From this point we started our argument that true Saudization is a national objective for which we must have a plan. It is a well-known fact that the plan cannot be devised top-down. It has to be divided into subplans, each to be devised by the concerned department. At the end, these subplans must be integrated into a comprehensive plan that includes the objectives of all the subplans. Applying this theory to the Saudization plan, we find that the concerned departments are numerous and they include:

1. The ministries of Finance, National Economy, Commerce, Planning, Labor, Social Affairs, Education, Information, Interior as well as all the scientific and social departments.

2. The private sector with all its companies and corporations.

3. The Saudi nationals and especially the graduates of schools, institutes and colleges where the subplans must be submitted in an effort to realize the national objective of Saudization. The plan must be put in its final form by the Cabinet and then approved and implemented. It must have different levels of implementation. For this, there should be an implementation schedule that requires:

1. A complete revision of all decrees, laws, regulations and systems for reformulating in accordance with the national plan.

2. A complete inventory of all manpower resources, identified as Saudi or non-Saudi, with a breakdown of each one as to specialization, profession and job whether working for the government or for the private sector. Foreign manpower should be subclassified by country to take into account which countries are depended upon more than other.

3. A complete inventory of all graduates; also, an educational plan linking training with the actual job requirements in both sectors.

4. Publication of the plan by the news media in order to generate public discussion and participation and to solicit feedback regarding changing trends. 5. A determination of the required labor reserve, both present and future, and of the numbers that can and cannot be provided locally, with a view to filling the gap in accordance with the national plan and the timetable.

It is also important to develop rules and regulations to curb the demand for foreign manpower and to increase the demand for national manpower. This objective requires the following:

1. A complete inventory of the uncommitted manpower to repatriate it.

2. A complete evaluation of the needs of the governmental and non-governmental departments to specify their actual labor needs with a view to replacing the foreign manpower with national labor.

3. Abandoning the requirement of granting contracts to the least expensive bids in the books of specifications for government contracts, so as to discourage bidders from using cheap foreign labor and factoring it into their studies and bids. The original requirement might appear good on the surface, but in the long run it leads to:

a) Disregarding the national citizens who require high salaries.

b) Destroying the national economy, as there is no compatibility between educational and experience levels of the cheap labor and of the highly technological level of the country's departments. This imbalance leads to misuse and bad maintenance, which further leads to breakdowns and to misuse of public funds.

c) Draining the national economy to replace inoperative equipment. This procedure is part of a vicious cycle.

d) Losing the element of national loyalty that connects the human element to its assets. This leads to mismanagement. This sense of belonging should be enhanced by means of linking the citizen to the nation's assets. (If you want something done well, do it yourself).

4. Increasing the contract period, in particular building contracts, to five years to give more incentive to the national element to work for the private sector engaged in such activities. This is because a five-year job security is much better than a three-year job security.

5. Issuing regulations for the Labor Commission to stop issuing permits for importing foreign workers, except with rare specializations or those not available locally.

6. Encouraging Saudis to study and seek training in all fields of endeavor.

7. Encouraging Saudi nationals to work in the private sector by giving them credit for their years of experience in the private sector when they seek employment or promotion in the government sector; and also, by establishing a system for promotions and raises in the private sector. Such incentives would encourage Saudis not to prefer one sector over another, gradually eliminating such preferences as long as there are enough guarantees of equal job security.

To guarantee the enforcement of such regulations, we need to consider other means of creating the necessary link between all government departments and the national labor force, such that Saudis would be encouraged to seek employment in the private sector. These means include:

1. Attaching special importance to the role of the Saudi employment offices and supporting them both morally and financially, as well as requiring them to verify the existence or non-existence of the required labor when submitting a request to import foreign labor. There should be greater co-ordination between the employment offices and the Labor Commission on this issue.

2. Registering graduates through their academic institutions with the Labor Commission and the employment offices in order for these departments to have sufficient information and statistics.

3. Requiring graduates to work for one year in the private sector during which they would be paid by the government. This procedure would be under the supervision of the Labor Commission and the employment offices which would issue certificates of service completion. Such certificate would be a requirement for seeking employment in the government. This procedure would guarantee the private sector its role in training and providing the national cadres with job opportunities.

4. Directing the private sector institutions to seek the assistance of the employment offices in filling their job vacancies. This procedure would be performed in co-operation with the Labor Commission.

5. Paying from the national treasury a monthly social allowance to Saudis working in the private sector as long as they are employed in the private sector.

6. Providing government financial assistance to the employment offices to help them perform their role in helping all concerned parties to realize the Saudization objective. This would assure that the employment offices could perform the duties currently performed by those employment agencies which currently have a monopoly over supplying employers with their required personnel. Subsequently, regulations should

be issued to gradually outlaw the existing employment agencies, according to a timetable consistent with the Saudization plan. It should be taken into account that the principle of specialization on which most of these agencies operate is not that rare and that many companies and corporations would not find it difficult to perform such an activity, especially since it does not require a great deal of work and it is very rewarding financially. There is no doubt that opening the door to competition would be very beneficial.

Lastly, we come to another aspect of our visualization of the Saudization process, namely, that of the computer. There are those who think that it shall do away with many employment opportunities for the Saudis. However, from the previous analysis we conclude that implementing the above-mentioned plan would provide a huge number of employment opportunities for the national workforce as a result of eliminating foreign manpower. Furthermore, it is not true that the computer will replace the human element. It is there for accuracy and speed. We have never heard of a computer that functions as a manager, engineer, accountant, plumber, driver or electrician. On the contrary, the use of computers will demand more manual labor and will create more job opportunities. It is comparable to a calculator. This is in addition to the fact that man-made computer programs are not axioms. They are programs that need updating and changing. The programs that exist today will not be suitable tomorrow. Life has a very rapid rhythm. Computers are suitable for temporary activities in the field of accounting and other computerized activities. These fields need more human elements to keep pace with the rapid flow of work. In conclusion we find that implementation of a comprehensive Saudization plan and an increase in the use of computers shall provide employment opportunities both in the present and in the future to the developing Saudi youth. The Saudis are lacking in intelligence, skill and experience. This fact is self evident in many fields. All we have to do is do change some of our concepts relating to employment in the private sector. This is because there are misconceptions regarding working for the private sector. These misconceptions will change once all the previously mentioned guarantees are provided and once the true Saudization plan is implemented. Once more I would like to indicate that the process of replacement in the current stage of the Saudi economy has to be carried out gradually in order to replace the foreign manpower with national one. May Allah guide us all.

Palestinians Polled on Current Political Situation

*TA0608151392 Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic
6 Aug 92 pp 1, 11*

[Text] Jerusalem—The Asil Study and Research Center conducted a survey among Palestinians from 25 July to 1 August on the current political situation. The survey included 853 male and female Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip between the ages of 16 and 65.

In response to the question: Do you think that freezing the so-called political settlements is enough to push the peace process forward? The answers were as follows: Yes, 13 percent; no, 81 percent; and no opinion, 6 percent.

The second question was: Do you support the continuation of negotiations over autonomy without linkage to the final stage of a settlement? The answers were: Yes, 11 percent; no, 84 percent; and no opinion, 5 percent.

The third question was: In light of the formation of the new Israeli Government, do you believe that it is necessary to modify the conditions on the participation of Palestinians in the negotiations? The answers were: Yes, 66 percent; no, 27 percent; and no opinion, 7 percent.

The fourth question was: According to your assessment of the Palestinian delegation's performance since the start of the Madrid talks, do you believe that the delegation should undergo a change? The answers were: Fundamental change, 24 percent; partial change, 43 percent; no change, 20 percent; and no opinion, 13 percent.

The center pointed out that the margin of error is about 2 percent.

Poll Shows Majority Oppose Peace Talk Participation

TA20081552 Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic
20 Aug 92 p 1

[Text] Jerusalem—The Asil Office for Information and Research conducted a poll on 17 and 18 August that included areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, excluding the Ramallah region, on the issue of Palestinian participation in the round of upcoming negotiations in Washington. The poll's only question was answered by 914 persons chosen at random, with the following results:

Question: In the wake of the U.S. Administration's granting of the loan guarantees to Israel, do you believe that the Palestinian delegation should boycott the upcoming round of negotiations in Washington?

Yes, 64 percent; no, 27 percent; no opinion, 9 percent.

The poll's results by town were as follows:

Town	Yes	No	No Opinion
Gaza	83%	14%	3%
Nabulus	58%	18%	24%
Hebron	47%	43%	10%
Bethlehem	62%	31%	7%
Tulkarm	52%	42%	6%
Jerusalem	75%	22%	3%
Janin	64%	29%	7%

Palestinian Culture Week Opens in East Jerusalem

TA2008192292 Jerusalem Israel Television Network
in Hebrew 1800 GMT 20 Aug 92

[Excerpts] For the first time since 1967, a Palestinian Culture Week was launched in East Jerusalem tonight. In the framework of the Palestinian Culture Week, theater and culture shows will be put on, Palestinian works of art displayed, and athletic events held. The event, which was organized by the Palestinian Culture and Communications Committee, will be attended by residents of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. [passage omitted]

This is the first time Israel has allowed Palestinians in the territories to stage a cultural event of this scope. The cost of the project stands at \$50,000, and the financing was raised both locally and overseas. Tonight, about 10,000 people arrived from Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip to attend the opening ceremony. [passage omitted]

KUWAIT

Official Says \$50 Billion Spent on Recovery

92AE0539A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic
18 Jul 92 p 10

[Interview with Dr. Muhammad al-Sabah, member of the Kuwaiti Supreme Planning Council, by Hamad al-Basir: "\$50 Billion for Liberation, Repair of Installations; Investment Portfolio Awaits Rise in Oil Exports;" first four paragraphs AL-HAYAH introduction; place and date not given]

[Text] Dr. Muhammad al-Sabah, member of the Supreme Planning Council, stated that the Kuwaiti Government has so far spent \$50 billion on the liberation and on rebuilding the oil industry. He added: "We cannot rebuild our investment portfolio, until the elements of Kuwaiti national wealth are rebuilt and oil is being exported in suitable quantities."

Al-Sabah, who chairs the Supreme Planning Council's Economic Committee, said during an interview with AL-HAYAH that he expected "the Kuwaiti economic structure to be rebuilt during the next few years, so that a Kuwaiti majority can be achieved in the labor market." He pointed out that governmental expenditure will be concentrated, in the present stage, "on refitting the oil industry."

He said that the government is now studying and discussing the "National Charter for Reform and Development," which the Supreme Planning Council has said is an expression of one view of the required path that Kuwait should follow after liberation. He confirmed that "the current proposal is to transfer the assets of certain commercial activities and public utilities from public sector assets to the private sector."

The following is the text of the interview:

[al-Basir] The National Charter for Reform and Development, submitted by the Supreme Planning Council, was recently published. What is the document's position with regard to the current governmental rebuilding efforts?

[al-Sabah] One must point out that the Supreme Planning Council does not represent a governmental agency, since more than 16 council members represent the private sector. The council's job is to come up with independent concepts for the government to utilize in drawing up the five-year development plan, upon which we have relied in past years.

In the present circumstances, there is no five-year plan, but rather, a transitional plan to counter the destruction left behind by the Iraqi invader. The charter that we submitted represents the Supreme Planning Council's view of the course of development in Kuwait for the present difficult period. The government is still discussing the charter and has not yet given its opinion, although we expect to get that before the end of this month, so that it will be in harmony and coordinated with the transitional plan and the state's general budget.

[al-Basir] The charter stipulates that "reform is the basis of the constitution." How does the charter view Kuwait's domestic policy?

[al-Sabah] The charter states that the constitution, which orders relationships within the Kuwaiti entity, is the basic starting point for the continuation of developmental life. It is the basis to which we return to resume the development course and, certainly first, it is the basis upon which Kuwaiti society is built, as cited in the constitution. The constitution must not be regarded as only defining political relationships, but rather, its articles include several provisions with regard to development and the individual's role in development, as well as the role of both the public and private sectors in achieving that development.

[al-Basir] The Supreme Planning Council's charter calls on Kuwait to "use its foreign relations to strengthen its economic interests and its security requirements. Will that affect Kuwait's growth plans in the Arab nations?"

[al-Sabah] In Kuwait—since independence—we have pursued a "helping hand" policy, since we have bestowed aid on Arab and developing nations without limit or obligation. The Kuwaiti Development Fund was the first of its kind in the Arab world, and has given unequalled assistance to Arab and Islamic countries. We have now entered a new stage. We have come to realize that this method was not completely appropriate. The Arab nations must understand what Kuwait has given them and do business with Kuwait on that basis. In light of the lack of good intentions by certain governments, we must be clear in our economic relations. The people's

right to their natural wealth must be stressed and, consequently, their right to dispose that wealth to achieve their best interests.

[al-Basir] How do Kuwaiti planners view the ideal population composition for Kuwait?

[al-Sabah] The basic idea of development in Kuwait is to exploit the oil wealth to set up a development program to achieve a Kuwaiti economy upon which future Kuwaitis may rely. When we began that, we needed foreign expertise. As a result, we used a great deal of imported labor. Kuwait's view vis-a-vis its Arab brothers contributed toward pursuing an open door policy, which resulted in making Kuwaitis a minority in their own country. Kuwait became the model of a "welfare state" in the Arab region, inasmuch as it contained 120 nationalities, with most of the imported workers from Arab countries. After the Iraqi attack, and the destruction it left behind, the picture has changed and financial resources have been considerably reduced. That requires "belt tightening" and the return to a development formula based on a Kuwaiti majority in the labor market.

Therefore, the goals of the new population composition are "developmental before political," because if Kuwaitis were to continue as a minority in their country, the Kuwaitis' development program would be neither feasible nor realistic.

Our goal now is to double the percentage of Kuwaitis in the labor market. This is not a simple process, but development, in general, is a complex process.

[al-Basir] Do you want a specific number with regard to percentages of population representation in Kuwait?

[al-Sabah] The absolute size of the population is a meaningless number. On the contrary, the population should be measured by the available and relative resources that we want, not a fixed percentage, but rather, a dynamic number. If we desire to be the majority, any number over 50 percent is a majority. When will we achieve this percentage? This depends on the development program and its requirements.

The charter talks about a transitional period, during which the economy's structure is restored. There is a great deal of economic activity that ought not continue to be done in Kuwait. One idea being followed now is "investment of some funds in activities for which labor is available in Egypt and Syria. Recently, a company was established in Egypt, capitalized at \$500 million, and a \$200 million company in Syria."

In the past, we wanted everything in Kuwait. This is a mistake. What is needed is for us to create a Kuwaiti economy that is compatible with local economic factors and represented by a small population and high technology.

The charter included the number, 60 percent of the Kuwaiti population by the end of the century, on the assumption that the economic situation at that time

would support that number. Now, a process of "Kuwait only for the Kuwaitis" would be impractical and would operate on an unsound basis.

[al-Basir] There are rumors about population quotas for imported labor, so that no migrant community would be more than 10 percent of the total population.

[al-Sabah] Such quotas are unlikely and are not recommended. The percentage of every nationality relates primarily to the kind of expertise that this nationality provides. The priority is still for Arab nationalities, who are compatible with Kuwait's customs and heritage.

[al-Basir] In light of the shortfall with regard to financial resources, what are Kuwait's priorities at the present time?

[al-Sabah] Of course, spending will be concentrated on covering the costs of Kuwait's liberation and on reconstruction, especially rebuilding the oil industry and enabling Kuwait to export oil which, in turn, will provide financial resources and reduce the deficit.

[al-Basir] How have these expenses affected Kuwait's investments abroad and the balance of "future generations' reserves"? Is there a plan to rebuild reserves and investments?

[al-Sabah] We own investments in various parts of the world, whose total value is indeterminate and depends on the market value, which fluctuates from time to time. We don't know precisely how much we own, but we clearly know how much we have spent so far. It is upwards of \$50 billion, most of which has gone to cover the expenses of the War of Liberation and rebuilding the oil industry. We will be unable to rebuild an investment portfolio, before rebuilding the components of Kuwait's national wealth, so that we can export oil in appropriate quantities.

This also applies to the reserves, which represent a pioneering and unprecedented idea. Kuwait decided to impose a tax on the present generation, equivalent to 10 percent of the annual national income, for the next generations. It is called the "future generations' reserve." The law pertaining to this reserve included a clause prohibiting touching these reserves before 2000. That law was enacted in 1976. However, the Iraqi invasion destroyed this idea, along with other laudable concepts, and forced us to borrow from these reserves. Nevertheless, all of Kuwait's income, even in the present circumstances, is taxed 10 percent for future generations.

[al-Basir] International reports have been published concerning the expected rise in oil prices in the next few years. Do you think that this will cure Kuwait's financial problems?

[al-Sabah] An unnatural increase in oil prices is a matter that calls not for optimism, but the reverse. The world is now a small village. The unnatural rise in the price of any

commodity will create many problems, including inflation and economic recession. These indicators are international, and their negative shadows will have greater impact on the poor world than on the other.

Oil is a commodity that must be represented by its natural economic value. My personal evaluation is that demand for oil will increase proportionately at the same rate as oil production increases, with Russian oil and Middle Asian oil entering the international market. This will give the impression that oil prices are maintaining their levels, if a slight increase does not occur. Gulf nations have a primary role and an international responsibility; it is not in their interests to increase oil prices unnaturally.

[al-Basir] Official statements abound concerning serious plans to transfer public sector organizations to the private sector. To what extent has this idea been implemented?

[al-Sabah] This idea was cited in the National Charter for Reform and Development. It relies on the fact that the economy in Kuwait is free, but that the increased role for the state as a mover of the national economy has, with the passage of time, led to marginalizing the role of the private sector and to governmental administration with regard to economic changes.

We believe that the government's natural role is to monitor and supervise economic activities and services, not carry them out. We have recently proposed a well-studied program to guide this relationship between the public and private sectors, so as to utilize this factor.

Naturally, moving some services to the private sector will increase some prices, because the prices imposed by the public sector were unrealistic. However, these costs to the consumer will be temporary and are part of the cost that the community must pay.

Over the short term, it would be ill-advised to transfer certain services to the private sector, such as electricity. Commercial activities are currently being proposed for transfer, such as government ownership of certain companies, public utilities, gasoline stations, and other things.

LEBANON

Final Text of Rent Law Bill Approved

92AE0524A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 16 Jun 92 p 7

[Article: "Parliamentary Committees Approve Final Draft of Rent Law Bill; Permanency Modified and Law Is To Expire by End of 1995"]

[Text] The joint finance, budget, administration, justice, public works, transport, housing, cooperatives, and labor committees have approved the modified real estate rent

law bill in its amended form as drafted by the mini-committee. The committees then adjourned their meetings until tomorrow, Wednesday, morning to study the provisions pertaining to non-housing rent so the bill will be ready to be included in the agenda of the first general session which will be held to pass the bill with a single article, as the deputies expect.

It is worth noting that the most significant modification introduced to the bill is the decision to view it as a provisional bill that expires at the end of 1995 whereas it had been previously viewed as a permanent bill.

The committees met yesterday under the chairmanship of Speaker Husayn al-Husayni and in the presence of 24 committee members and representatives of the ministries of finance, justice, housing, and cooperatives. Following is the text of the bill as approved in its final form yesterday:

Article 1

All developed real estate rent contracts concluded prior to the promulgation of this law shall be subject to the provisions of this law. Wherever it occurs in this law, the phrase 'rent contracts' shall be understood to mean developed real estate rent contracts.

Article 2

The following shall be exempted from the provisions of this law:

- A. Contracts for arable lands and buildings attached to them.
- B. Seasonal lease contracts pertaining to summer and winter resorts.
- C. Contracts in accordance with which commercial and industrial firms, apartment building owners, and business owners generally provide their workers with housing free of charge or in return for a fee.
- D. Contracts for villas that are rented for investment and that meet the following specifications:

The villa may consist of one or more floors, must be rented to one tenant, must have a garden, a garage, heating equipment, and a water heater. The tenant shall incur the insurance cost, provided that these specifications are met at the onset of the initial lease.

If a landlord does not wish to renew the contract for an exempted villa, he shall notify the tenant at least three months before the lease expires by open and registered postal letter or in accordance with a letter by a notary public and shall pay the tenant a lump sum compensation amounting to sixfold the final year's rent.

If the landlord fails to make the notification mentioned in the above paragraph, the lease shall be considered renewed for another year.

E. Occupancy of state-owned or municipal public property.

F. Rent contracts for furnished places classified as tourist places.

Article 3

Any prior contravening agreement notwithstanding and taking into consideration the exemptions specified in article 2, rent contracts concluded or extended prior to the promulgation of this law shall be extended until 31 December 1995 within the conditions and provisions stipulated by this law.

The extension shall be made annually in the tenant's interest. The tenant shall be entitled to cede his right to the extension, provided that he makes known his wish not to extend two months before the extended annual contract expires by open and registered postal letter or in accordance with a letter by a notary public.

A relinquishment of the right to extension made between 1 January 1987 and the date on which this law goes into effect shall remain valid. A relinquishment of the right to extension made under the provisions of the previous laws shall also remain valid.

Section 2: Rental of Residential Places

Article 4

Places rented by a single contract, whether for housing or other purposes, shall be considered residential places.

Article 5

If a tenant passes away or leaves the leased property, the following, plus those noted in the original contract, shall by law replace the tenant as beneficiary of the contract in accordance with the final or amended conditions stipulated in the contract:

- A. The tenant's spouse, parents, and children who live with the tenant in the rented property, excluding others who have left the rented property and resided elsewhere.
- B. Relatives who have lived with the tenant in the rented property in accordance with the landlord's written approval and who have continued to occupy the property without interruption.

Article 6

Rates:

A. Rent rates shall be multiplied as follows:

First, rents concluded before 1 January 1954: 28 times.

Second, rents concluded as of 1 January 1954 and through 31 December 1962: 22 times.

Third, rents concluded as of 1 January 1962 and through 31 December 1966: 19 times.

Fourth, rents concluded as of 1 January 1967 and through 31 December 1972: 14 times.

Fifth, rents concluded as of 1 January 1973 and through 31 December 1978: tenfold.

Sixth, rents concluded as of 1 January 1979 and through 31 December 1982: sixfold.

Seventh, rents concluded as of 1 January 1983 and through 31 December 1984: fourfold.

Eighth, rents concluded as of 1 January 1985 and through 31 December 1985: threefold.

Ninth, leases concluded as of 1 January 1986 and through 31 December 1986: twofold.

To calculate the increased rent, the rate payable by the tenant on 31 December 1986 shall be used as a base, taking into account the consensual increase introduced after enactment of amended law No. 20/82. Any excess surpassing the legal increase shall be a gained right belonging to the lessor. Any deficit below the legal increase must be paid by the tenant.

After the increase, the rent rates specified in paragraph A of this article shall be fixed and increased gradually by a rate amounting to one-half the special increase added to the first part of the salary as defined in the decrees setting the minimum wage level for employees and workers as of 1 July 1987 and as of the date of each subsequent increase.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of this paragraph, any increase to which the tenant agrees shall be considered consensual and the tenant shall not be required to pay it by law. Consensual relinquishment of the abovementioned legal reductions [as published] shall not be considered a consensual increase.

When a contract contains parts that are subject to various provisions governing the rate increase, the rate shall, when necessary, be divided into segments in order to determine the increase.

B. Rents concluded as of 1 January 1987 shall be increased gradually at rates equaling one half the special increase added repeatedly to the first part of the salary as determined by the decrees setting the minimum wage level for employees and workers.

C. The increases stipulated in A and B shall be payable as of the date on which this law goes into force, without any retroactive effect.

Article 7

Relinquishment of rented property and sub-letting:

A tenant may not relinquish or sublet leased property partially or completely without the owner's written approval and according to agreed conditions.

If the original tenant relinquishes leased property and if he is permitted to do so by the original or legally extended rent contract, those to whom the property is relinquished shall benefit from the legal extension and shall replace the original tenant. Their relationship shall be with the owner directly.

In case of total or partial sub-letting with the owner's explicit approval in the original or extended contract, the rental relationship shall continue to be confined to the landlord and the original tenant. The sub-let period shall end with the end of the original lease period.

The landlord shall summon the secondary tenant to court in any lawsuit filed against the primary tenant. A decision issued against a primary tenant shall have the force of a decision against the secondary tenant. However, the secondary tenant may demand compensation from the primary tenant in case it is proven that the latter has acted with illwill, mistakenly, or negligently.

Article 8

Reclaiming leased property:

First:

A. A landlord may demand to reclaim leased property for the purpose of his residence or the residence of one of his offspring, provided that he proves that there is a family urgency that compels him to demand to reclaim the property and that the landlord or whoever demands to reclaim the property for his use has no other suitable, habitable, and unoccupied residence equal in level to the leased property sought to be reclaimed and within a distance of 15 km from this property.

A landlord may also demand to reclaim leased property adjacent to his residence if the purpose is to annex the leased property to his residence so as to secure his family's residential needs.

B. A landlord who owns a hospital, an educational or charitable institution, or an orphanage and who has leased a part of his property or properties that are adjacent to the residence may reclaim this part, provided that it is annexed to the main property or used to serve the institution's objectives.

C. A landlord may demand to reclaim a leased property if the objective is to demolish this property and to build a new structure in its place. To build new installations, a landlord may demand to reclaim a structure existing on the land if this structure occupies less than one half the area permitted to be built by law or if he wishes to add two or more new floors to the structure.

To reclaim a structure, it shall be required that this structure be technically necessary for building the new installations. A landlord wishing to add another floor to his leased building may demand to reclaim the part of the leased property that is necessary technically for building the new installations.

A landlord demanding to reclaim leased property in accordance with the above paragraphs A, B, and C shall pay the tenant a fair compensation assessed by the courts, provided that it amounts to no less than 25 percent and no more than 50 percent the value of the leased property.

The compensation shall amount to 40 percent the value of the leased property if the property has been occupied for no more than 10 years.

The compensation shall amount to 50 percent if the property has been occupied for more than 10 years.

Second, in all cases of property reclaimed in return for compensation:

The compensation shall be determined on the basis of the property value on the date when the court decision is issued in light of the assessory elements contained in the lawsuit.

Article 9

A landlord who has regained his property in accordance with the provisions of this law shall pay the tenant an additional compensation amounting to one half the sum of the compensation determined by the court as a (replacement) allowance. The tenant shall not be required to prove that he has incurred damage in the following two cases:

1. If leased property has been reclaimed for one of the two purposes stated in paragraphs A and B of article 8 of this law and if the landlord has failed, without any legitimate justification, to use the property for the stated purpose within one year as of the date of evacuation or if the landlord has failed, without any legitimate justification, to use it for the stated purpose for a period of three years, at least.

2. If leased property has been reclaimed to be demolished and rebuilt for the purpose stated in paragraph C of article 8 of this law and if the landlord has failed, without legitimate justifications, to begin reconstruction within a period of one year as of the date of the eviction of the last tenant and if he fails, without any legitimate justification, to complete work on the project within a period of no more than five years, if he uses the reclaimed leased property for his personal residence or benefit, or if he rents it to others within the abovementioned one-year period.

Article 10

Nullification of extension right:

A tenant's right to extension shall be dropped and an eviction sentence shall be issued against the tenant or against whoever replaces him legally in the following cases:

A. If he fails to pay the rent he owes within a period of two months as of the date on which he is notified

personally or through a grownup member of his family living with him by registered open letter with a receipt of delivery, by a letter addressed to him by a notary public, or by a warning issued to him by the enforcement department in accordance with the provisions of article 23 of this law.

In case it is impossible to make the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph, notification shall be made through announcement in two domestic dailies designated by the urgent cases magistrate after he makes certain of the impossibility of notification. The announcement shall be made at the lessor's request in the form of a free summons that is not subject to any fee or revenue stamp. A copy of the notification shall be affixed to the door of the leased property by a court officer. A grace period of two months shall be given as of the date of the latest announcement or affixed notification.

In case it is impossible to convey an ultimatum issued by the enforcement department, notification shall be made by announcement in accordance with the same [above] rules on a decision made by the enforcement department chairman.

B. If leased property is damaged by misuse, abnormal use, or use in a manner incompatible with the contract terms without the lessor's written approval.

A tenant's use of a part of the property leased to him as a residence to engage in his free trade because of security reasons that have forced him to abandon his place of work shall not be considered a form of misuse. In this case, the landlord is not entitled to demand any compensation from the tenant. On the other hand, the tenant may not demand any additional compensation for this part in case it is reclaimed by the landlord.

Any equipment installed in leased property at the tenant's expense shall not be considered a form of misuse, provided that it does not undermine the firmness of the building. Such installations include lifts, water tanks, heating and air conditioning equipment, water heaters, and simple and superficial ornamental and decorative work.

A tenant wishing to take advantage of the provisions of this article concerning the penalty of loss of the tenant's right to extension shall bring the lessor before an independent civil court magistrate to request permission to carry out the intended work. The tenant must detail this work so as to enable the court to determine how legal and appropriate it is.

The tenant or tenants shall incur the cost of insurance against all risks that may emanate from the planned work, the cost of carrying out the abovementioned work, and the cost of restoring remodeled or damaged parts to their original condition. The tenants shall not have the right to demand the cost or part thereof from the landlord, whether during their occupation of the property or when such work is completed.

The value of improvements resulting from the works mentioned in the above paragraph B shall not be included in computing the compensation for reclaimed property or in computing the fair replacement allowance.

C. If the tenant relinquishes the leased property or if he sublets it totally or partially without the landlord's written approval or in violation of the original or extended lease contract. In this case, the sub-tenant or the party to whom the leased property is relinquished shall be included in the lawsuit.

D. If the tenant occupies by way of lease, and without any family necessity, more than one residence separated by no more than 15 km. In such a case, the tenant has to decide within six months as of the date on which this law is issued in which property he wishes to take advantage of the extension right.

E. If the tenant owns three-quarters of an unoccupied residence that is suitable for his residence or of a standard equal to that of the leased property which he occupies in the same city or village and if it is within no more than 15 km from the leased property.

In these cases, the husband, wife, underage children, and the tenant's grownup dependent children shall be considered one person in the application of these two paragraphs, unless the children meet the family emergency condition stated in paragraph A of article eight of this law, on condition that the property is occupied for residence within one year as of the date on which it becomes vacant and appropriated and provided that it is inhabited for three years continually, at least.

The following shall be exempted from the provisions of paragraphs D and E:

A case in which the tenant and others, who along with the tenant are considered one person, own an apartment for use as a business or tourist office or which they use to practice a certain profession and actually exploit it for this purpose within six months as of the date of appropriation and continue to use it for the same purpose for three years at least under threat of the penalty of loss of right to extension without any compensation.

A case in which the tenant has been forced to abandon the leased property as a consequence of the security events that have developed since 15 April 1975 and has resided in a building in which he owns three quarters at least, provided that the tenant resumes his occupation of the leased property within one year as of the date on which this law goes into force if the leased property is habitable or within one year as of the date on which the property is made habitable.

A case in which the tenant has become the owner of a residence that has been vacant between 15 April 1975 and the date on which this law is promulgated, provided that the residence has been sold before the issuance of this law.

F. If the tenant has abandoned the leased property for non-security reasons for a period of one uninterrupted year as of the date on which this law goes into effect, even if he has continued to pay the rent.

Lebanese citizens employed in and assigned to official Lebanese bodies abroad shall be exempted from this paragraph.

G. If the tenant has abandoned the leased property for non-security reasons for a period of six uninterrupted months, if he has been in arrears, and if he has had no known address through which he could be notified by the landlord to make the payment or if he has not chosen a residence at which to be notified by the landlord through a registered open letter coupled with a receipt of delivery in accordance with the notification rules stated in paragraph A of this article.

H. If a non-Lebanese tenant has abandoned the leased property for an uninterrupted period of six months.

Article 11

Military personnel who occupied before the enactment of this law or of amended law No. 20/1982 residences in enactment of the laws on the confiscation of residences for the housing of military personnel may continue to occupy after they retire the residences confiscated for their benefit at the latest rental rate they have been paying their landlords, plus the legal increase established in article six of this law, provided that the confiscation date is considered the initial occupation date for the purpose of calculating the increase rate.

In case the property reclamation provisions are applied to the military who are subject to this article, the compensation owed them shall be set at one half the value of the compensation dictated in accordance with article eight of this law.

LIBYA

Bakkush Discusses Prospects for Political Change
92AF1039A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
12 Jul 92 p 5

[Interview with former Libyan Prime Minister 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Bakkush; place and date not given]

[Text] Cairo—Former Libyan prime minister 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Bakkush emphasized, in a special interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, that his country's crisis with England, the United States, and France stemming from explosion of civilian jetliners over Scotland and Niger will not end safely or be resolved peacefully.

Al-Bakkush, who was Libya's prime minister in 1967-1968, just before Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi took power, explained this assertion by stating that Libyan involvement in this and other terrorist incidents is patently clear.

The former Libyan prime minister—who became a leading Libyan opposition figure after disagreeing with Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi and moving to Cairo—based his charge of the complicity of Libyan citizens on reports published in Western newspapers, which, he said, “Do not create facts out of nothing. Also, the entire world, including the Arab world, has become fed up completely with the Libyan regime’s terrorist practices during the past 23 years. Virtually no capital in the world has been spared these practices.”

The following is the text of the interview:

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] In your opinion, how far can the Lockerbie crisis between Libya and the three Western capitals go?

[al-Bakkush] It is difficult to predict the end of the crisis. However, I can say that it will not end safely. Libyan involvement in it is clear, although I have no evidence of this. I do not believe that the three Western countries—France, England, and the United States—can enter into any settlement regarding this case, because it involves so many victims—and their families are pursuing this matter in an organized fashion—and because, as far as I know, the investigations into the Lockerbie case and the case of the French plane point strongly toward the indictment of Libya. There is enough [evidence] to indict now, but I cannot say whether there is enough to convict. Another important point is that these three countries, and the entire world, including the Arab world, have become fed up with the Libyan regime’s terrorist practices. This regime, has been engaged in planning, financing, and carrying out acts of terror for 23 years now against Arabs, foreigners, and planes. Al-Qadhafi’s bureaus have violated security and killed everywhere in the world, including in Libya and many Arab capitals. Their behavior is no secret. This is not an accusation [but a fact]. For the Libyan regime, until the Lockerbie crisis occurred, boasted of this activity and regarded it as Libya’s mission in this era. Al-Qadhafi has declared in his speeches, on every occasion, that these practices were not terrorism, but a battle to liberate humanity throughout the world. He acknowledged his financing of terror organizations in Japan, the Philippines, Northern Ireland, and in Nicaragua, and the financing of the Japanese Red Army and the German Baader-Meinhoff gang.

Regarding Africa, Libya has claimed responsibility for terrorist acts in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

It has also claimed responsibility for assassination attempts in Egypt and Pakistan. Virtually every capital in the world has been damaged in some way by al-Qadhafi’s terrorism.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] You say that you have evidence for an indictment but not a conviction of the Libyan regime for complicity in terrorist acts. Does this statement contradict the legal principle of being innocent until proven guilty?

[al-Bakkush] It is said that the law distinguishes between evidence for an indictment and evidence of guilt. An indictment and trial are two separate stages. An indictment precedes the judging of guilt or innocence. We are in the indictment stage. We have heard and read about evidence published in the West which justifies indicting the two Libyans [allegedly] involved in the Lockerbie case and the activity of the five others accused of complicity in the downing of the French plane over Niger. I maintain that this evidence does not justify a verdict of guilty. However, it affirms the need to indict these two persons. Later, when the others responsible for the French plane are tried, they will be given an opportunity to defend themselves, in the course of which it will become clear whether there is evidence justifying a conviction. The charge now being leveled did not originate in thin air. It is based on published facts regarding: the Libyans’ connection to Malta and the suitcase in which explosives were placed; the connection of Libyan agents to the purchase of explosives in Switzerland; and Libyan Airlines’ link with the placement of the suitcase which exploded in the Pan American plane over Lockerbie—i.e. the transport of that suitcase from Malta to Frankfurt and then its introduction into the American plane. Evidence has also been presented for indicting the Libyans who provided the suitcase of explosives that was placed in the plane in collusion with persons from the Congo and Zaire. Evidence, no doubt, exists for an indictment, in addition to Libya’s long, extensive history in terrorism cases. However, we have not yet reached the stage of conviction and sentencing, which is something else.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Pardon me. I am not defending terrorism, but you are basing your view on reports published in Western newspapers by countries which were actually damaged by the two plane incidents. Are you so trusting of the Western media’s credibility and the West’s attitude toward the Arab countries, especially regarding a case that concerns an Arab people’s future and security? Have you placed yourself as a judge who decides cases in which an investigation that is above suspicion has yet to be conducted?

[al-Bakkush] First, this case concerns the Libyan regime’s security, not the Libyan people’s security. I am convinced of the charges which have been published regarding the Libyan regime’s complicity in the Lockerbie plane and French plane incidents for two reasons. The first, which is not the key reason, is that these people do not fabricate facts out of nothing. The second, most important reason is the Libyan regime’s behavior and history over a 23-year period. I know, as do most Libyans, that the Libyan regime engages in acts of terror that do not serve the interests of Libya, the Arabs, or the Libyan people. I am not at all accusing the Libyan regime or trumping up a charge of terrorism, [but stating facts]. For terrorism has been among the Libyan regime’s sources of pride. Colonel al-Qadhafi openly states this in the press, on the radio, on television, and in his speeches. When an attempt was made to assassinate me,

and he believed that it had succeeded, Libyan radio and television announced that the people's revolutionary committees had executed the people's judgement regarding "someone." The same applies to other terrorist operations that occurred in various parts in the world. The Libyan regime claimed responsibility for and boasted of them, saying that its mission is to liberate humanity throughout the world. No one is accusing the Libyan regime. [It is unnecessary, because it has pointed the finger at itself.] However, when the Libyan regime fell into this crisis and was confronted for the first time by a truly firm position on the part of the Western countries, it entered into a dilemma. Perhaps we know that the Libyan regime provided Britain with information on Libyan assistance for the [Irish] Republican Army in Northern Ireland, and it later acknowledged that it supplied them with weapons, funds, and all of those capabilities to practice that terrorism. Al-Qadhdhafi used to boast that he hosted terrorists in Libya from everywhere in the world and from every "denomination" and race. The sad part is that Libya has no interest or goal in the practice of terrorism, which is a crime in any case. If we cannot justify this practice of terrorism, perhaps we can explain it as being intended to serve some interest of Libya or Arabism. However, Libya has no interest which is served by aiding terrorism in Nicaragua, the Philippines, Japan, Germany, Northern Ireland, and South America. Moreover, Libya and the Arabs have no interest in supporting, financing, and sheltering terrorism in any Arab country. Libya has aided terrorist activity in Tunisia. It has acknowledged and declared as much openly, and it was at the bottom of a crisis. [It has aided terrorist activity] in Morocco, Egypt, and the other African countries as well. The Libyan regime has fallen into a crisis in which, for the first time, it is confused about what to do. This crisis is throttling the regime, which is not acting well in choosing a way to extricate itself from it. The essence of the crisis is that al-Qadhdhafi cannot hand over the Libyan suspects, because he would thereby acknowledge that he gave them their orders and supervised and planned terrorist operations. We all know that Libya is ruled by one man. He does not share power, decisionmaking, or even his thoughts with anyone. No one can believe that a few officials in Libyan intelligence spent millions of dollars, purchased explosives, took up secret operations, and placed suitcases containing explosives on planes merely because their moods so dictated. This is state policy, and the Libyan regime moreover acknowledges it as such. As far as we Libyans are concerned as a people, we are outside of the matter. But we hope that the entire world will confront Libya. Our salvation from al-Qadhdhafi lies in this confrontation, because the suffering caused to the Libyan people by al-Qadhdhafi is greater than the suffering caused to it by the world. Unfortunately, the West and Arab world has been lenient with al-Qadhdhafi. They have allowed him to use Libya's resources freely. Only now, when their own citizens are hurt, and they despair of reforming al-Qadhdhafi, do they act. We are optimistic about the

West confronting al-Qadhdhafi, because such a confrontation places the regime in a dilemma leading to its demise. There is no joy in them striking Libya. It is a situation of a ruler who is destroying the country.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Does that mean that you are wagering on foreign intervention in your country as the only way to deliver the people from its suffering. Is such a bet not a condemnation of patriotic Libyan forces?

[al-Bakkush] This does not imply a condemnation of the Libyan people. The Libyan people are victims and prisoners of al-Qadhdhafi and his regime. We in Libya were delivered from Italian colonialism by the entry of British armies. I am not speaking about a personal interest, but on behalf of the citizens and the Libyan people, because I know what it is suffering from and I have lived as a part of it. We do not like colonialism. We fought it in our youth, and we are still fighting it in the hope of becoming free from it and obtaining a measure of freedom, respect, and human rights. The problem here is not one of temperament. The mere fact that the ruler is from the fatherland does not entitle him to freely use its resources. We did not despise colonialism based on a temperamental position, but because we believed that ridding ourselves of colonialism would lead to our obtainment of freedom. However, what happened is that al-Qadhdhafi deprived us of every freedom using a method which colonialism would not dare to use. Life is not a theory written about in a newspaper. Life is something which is lived every day. [Under] al-Qadhdhafi's method of rule in Libya, and the method of sabotage and setting loose gangs of people's committees, the country does not know who is governing whom. If al-Qadhdhafi were a normal dictator with whom we differed regarding his method of ruling the country, we would rally around him if he found himself confronting foreigners in a crisis. However, the matter is not as such. Al-Qadhdhafi invalidates everything within us. He has ruled us in the worst possible way.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Am I to understand from your remarks that you are relying on foreign forces to play the natural role of leaders of the Libyan people's patriotic forces?

[al-Bakkush] No, I am not saying that. Rather, I was explaining a current situation in Libya. I am critical of the position of intellectuals and those concerned with public affairs throughout the entire Arab nation. They are misled by any dictator who pushes or pulls them to join him in fighting a battle which he himself fabricates. Then, after he finishes it, he wheels around to subjugate them. The idea is that the opposition falls silent if the ruling regime faces a conflict with any foreign state. This must end. That is one point. Another is that I believe that the duty to get rid of al-Qadhdhafi's regime is the duty of the Libyan people alone. The Libyan opposition has a role in raising the torch, agitating, and keeping alive the firebrand of the opposition position. The entire matter rests completely on the Libyan people. But you are asking me about an existing international crisis. I did

not cause it. Al-Qadhdhafi did, and the Libyan people is paying the price being exacted by the air blockade now being imposed on it. And the imposition of more extensive blockades will cause it to pay more in terms of its freedom, need for food, security, etc. I am telling you about something real that is happening. I did not hope for it. But my commentary on it depicts the Libyan people's true sentiments. The Libyans do not want the regime to extricate itself from this crisis, on the hope that this crisis will give them an opportunity to get rid of this regime. I do not expect, as some do, that the Americans, the British, or the French will arrest and remove al-Qadhdhafi, telling the Libyan people, please, practice democracy. This will not happen. The position of the Americans, the British, and the French on al-Qadhdhafi does not stem from al-Qadhdhafi being a dictator and undemocratic. They have known this for 23 years. They had a "butter and honey" relation with him when their interests agreed with him. They have taken their current position vis-a-vis al-Qadhdhafi because of his practice of terrorism against them—because the fire has reached their citizens. Had al-Qadhdhafi's oppression and terror been limited to the Libyans alone, the West would not have been roused. However, these Western countries have taken action in their interest. And here, their interest coincides with the Libyan people's interest. When a tyrant rules you, you do not only hope for an end to his crisis [but an end to him as well].

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] I would like to dwell on two basic points which you raise. The first concerns your disapproval of the intellectuals' demand that you refrain from opposing the regime when it is exposed to a foreign danger which it itself created. This is not what I meant. Rather, I meant the Libyan opposition's role in removing this regime, which we afflict with the blemish of terrorism and dictatorship, given that you are a leading figure of this opposition. The second point concerns your hope for an intensification of the Libyan regime's crisis. Will this not affect your family and kin in Libya?

[al-Bakkush] Regarding the Libyan opposition's role, you know that no Arab opposition can by itself change a regime. The task of the Libyan opposition abroad does not go beyond raising the banner of opposition. You cannot change a regime through correspondence from abroad, especially when no one is truly standing by your side. All countries of the world currently have a dispute with al-Qadhdhafi because his terrorism affects them frequently. However, when they were dreaming that he would be cured of this terrorism, at the same time that they had interests in Libyan oil, they did not think of taking a hostile position against al-Qadhdhafi or his regime.

Regarding the second part of the question, I speak on behalf of the Libyans, not just myself. Moreover, I am conveying to you the Libyans' feeling, which I know very well. They are at the end of their tether under al-Qadhdhafi's regime. Believe me, the situation is so distressing that they are hoping for deliverance from him

at any price. They are therefore happy when the regime is beset by a crisis. However, when the regime maintains composure in its foreign relations, and everyone is pampering him as they have, the Libyans feel sorrow. It is truly strange for a people to hope that its government falls into a crisis. However, the reason for this is the deviation of al-Qadhdhafi's regime. This deviation has been so extreme that we, the Libyan opposition, believe that al-Qadhdhafi's problem is [not] a political problem—and we are not traditional oppositionists—but a humanitarian problem. It is as if al-Qadhdhafi hijacked the Libyan people in a plane. We do not differ with al-Qadhdhafi on the method of government and administration. If we did, we would respect and honor him [despite our differences]. If we were demanding democracy, we would be willing to persuade a dictator, who enjoys little wisdom and respect of the world, [to embrace it].

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] A minor observation concerns the first part of your response to the question, which is your remark [which implies] Third World and Arab regimes are changed through conspiracies. Does this remark not do a serious injustice to the abilities of Arab peoples to produce change?

[al-Bakkush] I am an Arab with experience and sincerity. The Arab peoples have been deceived enough. Most Arab and Third World peoples suffer as they do because they are backward. Their will has become flabby with disuse. The will, like the muscles, becomes flabby if it is not used. Revolutions consist of a meeting at night between a group of officers bearing arms who capture the radio station and declare a new regime. The people follow them until others seize the radio station in the same way.

They say that there is a precedent in Sudan. Based on my information, I believe that the army was the instigator. The former president carried out a coup. Then, another carried out a coup against him. In the same vein, it happened in the days of Lieutenant General 'Abbud that the people went out into the streets and slept in front of the tanks after being incited to do so by a group from the army in order to topple another group.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Excuse me if I point out that you make a distinction between the military establishment and the people, whereas, in reality, members of the military establishment and those in charge of it are a part of the citizenry.

[al-Bakkush] I do not mean that. The military establishment consists of citizens who are no different from ordinary citizens. However, because they bear arms, they are a tool of the government and the only ones able to seize the government.

Even military people in modern Arab history have not gone out into the street with their arms demanding that the ruler resign. They deliver the coup de grace to him at night, capture the radio station, and declare a coup. In other words, there is no real resistance.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Do you believe that the new Libyan orientation, or the declaration of good Libyan intentions and the Geneva Libyan-British meeting, are a prelude to Libya's declaration of its complete innocence of any terrorist incidents?

[al-Bakkush] I believe that, were the Libyan regime and Colonel al-Qadhafi innocent of the Lockerbie and French plane incidents, he would hand over the suspects. However, the fact that he has not done so indicates his involvement in the matter. That is one point. Another point is that I know that Libya has offered, through an Arab country and through an Arab League official, to hand over the suspects on condition that the matter stop at these two suspects, and that they [the concerned Western countries] do not prosecute others responsible for this incident, because the Libyan regime fears that the indictment will go to the top. Al-Qadhafi continues to refuse to hand over the suspects, not because he is concerned for Libya's sovereignty or his own personal sovereignty, but because he fears that the uncovering of the chain of persons responsible for the incident will lead ultimately to him. I know for certain that he offered to hand over the suspects provided that the matter go no further. However, the other party rejected this idea, saying that it is seeking to try the two suspects, and that, if it becomes clear that someone is behind them, it will seek to try that person. This is the dilemma in which the regime finds itself, plain and simple. The Libyan regime will not change. It is an anomalous case. It will neither change nor improve its behavior in crises. It is not concerned for the safety of its agents or intelligence officials.

Based on our monitoring of the true events in this crisis, not fabricated events as some journalists have done, when the Libyan regime failed to obtain an agreement to limit the indictment to the two suspects, it began to carry out maneuvers. Most of these maneuvers have been attempts to scoff at the world. The regime provided information on [Libyan] aid for the Irish [Republican] Army, thinking that this measure would lead to a settlement with the British and Americans, who would forget the Lockerbie incident, and they [the Libyans] would help them regarding other subjects [by furnishing information on Libya's terrorist connections].

However, these countries are apparently adhering to the UN resolution. The most important point in the Security Council's resolution concerns the extradition of the suspects for trial in Britain or America. The Security Council's resolutions also require Libya to furnish Britain and the United States with information on Libya's connections with terrorism in Britain and the United States.

However, what al-Qadhafi has done consists of a partial agreement to the implementation of part of the Security Council's resolution, which they [the United States, Britain, and France] have officially said is unsatisfactory. They are continuing to adhere to the Security

Council's resolutions by demanding the extradition of the two suspects and the other unknown suspects in the French plane case.

JANA Editor Refutes Report on Relations With Egypt

*LD1808161192 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1145 GMT
18 Aug 92*

[Text] Tripoli, 18 Aug JANA—The AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT newspaper, which is issued in London in Arabic, said that Major General Jallud will visit Cairo in the context of what it described as improving relations between the Great Jamahiriyah and Egypt. The editor of local affairs at JANA asked who had informed the newspaper that these relations were not good. The editor said that the relations between the two fraternal countries, Egypt and Libya, are deep and strong and do not allow for the existence of [word indistinct] for speculation and inference by the aforementioned newspaper.

Iranian Envoy Holds Talks With Officials in Tripoli

*LD0608174192 Tehran IRNA in English 1403 GMT
4 Aug 92*

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 4, IRNA—Foreign Minister Director-General for Middle East-North African Affairs, Hojjat ol-Eslam Kazim Khonsari, held separate meetings with senior Libyan officials in Tripoli today.

Khonsari in his meeting with member of Revolutionary Command Council, 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, reviewed Tehran-Tripoli relations as well as recent regional developments.

Khonsari referring to the West's pressures on Libya, hoped that a solution would be soon found to the present problem.

Later in the day, the Iranian official and Libya's Secretary of the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Ibrahim Mohamed Bashari, surveyed bilateral relations, issues of mutual interests and regional upheavals.

JANA Comments on British Official's Remarks

*LD2308092392 Tripoli JANA in English 0803 GMT
23 Aug 92*

[Text] Tripoli, Hanibal [Aug] 23, JAMAHIRYAH NEWS AGENCY—The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that the decision of Britain in cooperation with America and France to set up a buffer zone to protect the Shi'ites in southern Iraq will not be affected at all by the prison sentence passed by Baghdad for entering Iraq illegally.

JANA's editor for Arab affairs commented on this statement. He said: "It seems that dividing a nation and tearing it up is not important in the opinion of the

British official. In other words, this is not an important nation, but if the issue concerns a British national, care should be taken to make sure that such action would not affect him."

SUDAN

Editorial Urges Awareness of Iranian Motives

92AF1063A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
3 Jul 92 p 15

[Article by Amir Taheri: "From Tehran to Khartoum"]

[Text] If you were to draw a list of Sudan's most important needs, what would you choose?

I don't know your answer, but my choice would be clear. I would put "peace" at the top of the list, followed by financial and technical aid necessary to avoid total famine and to spare the national economy complete collapse.

But what Tehran chose this week (according to press reports), went in the opposition direction. Iran decided to help the Sudanese group to strengthen its military machine in the hope of maintaining its rule throughout the country with force.

If reports from Iran are true, that country intends to invest a large amount of money in this project in return for Sudan providing Iran with a marine base in addition to other "military facilities" to be used by the Revolutionary Guard.

This is an interesting bargain.

Iran will lose the confidence of the Sudanese people the majority of whom feel frustrated by the present situation. Sooner or later, and I believe it will be sooner, a change will take place in Khartoum. Iran will be categorized among a losers.

Iran began to look toward Sudan as a potential base for its operations since the 1970s, much before the mullas' revolution, at the time the Soviet Union seemed to be at the peak of its might. As for the western world under U.S. leadership, it seemed to be on the retreat.

The strategists in Tehran looked at the map and saw a disturbing picture. Iran and the Gulf region as a whole were being gradually encircled by pro-Moscow regimes in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Iraq.

The Soviets had a major air base in Bahram near Kabul, a 50 minute flight from the Gulf of Oman. The Soviets were also present in Socotra Island which belongs to South Yemen and, of course, the port of Aden. After having lost the port of Berbera in Somalia, they gained a place for themselves on the Eritrean coast on the Red Sea. Additionally, the Soviets enjoyed a bigger and closer facilities in the Gulf, by which we mean the facilities and the right to frequent visits to Iraq's port of Umm Qasr.

In 1977 the Institute of Strategic Studies in Teheran estimated that there are 30,000 Soviet and allied soliders, including Cubans, Czechs, and East Germans in the pro-Soviet countries. The Soviets also had a base in South Yemen to train Mojahedin Khalq and Fedayee Khalq and other guerilla groups that were then opposed to Iran.

All this, plus the fact that the entire Caucasus and Central Asia were under Moscow's control, made the planners feel as if a noose has been thrown around Iran's neck and were being tightened. In order to break this tightening noose they sought to establish a counter circle that would include Somalia, which shifted from the Soviet bloc to the Western camp, Sudan, and North Yemen.

Basically Iran's policy was seeking a containment operation and halting subsequent expansion of Soviet military presence in the Gulf region and around it. Iran sometimes adopted the policy of "pushing backward" which aimed at taking the battle into the countries under Soviet influence.

It was believed that the black African countries, because of their economic problems and political crises, would become the field of the major battle. As for Sudan, the biggest African country, it was, of course, a major prize which had to be denied to the Soviet Union.

Thus, the tiny Sudanese naval fleet emerged with Iranian funding, training, and technical support. Tehran also sought to establish land bases which can be used for launching attacks on Marxist Ethiopia.

The military aspects of the Iranian-Sudanese relations were complemented with major projects for the development of Sudan's tremendous agricultural potentials. The fourth Iranian five-year plan allocated \$2.3 billion for investment in Sudan. In fact, Iran has actually invested \$450 million in non-military projects in Sudan between 1975 and 1978.

When the mullas took over power in 1979, they cancelled Iranian foreign aid projects, including scheduled investments in Sudan.

Iran's interest in Sudan crystallized on the basis of cold politico-military calculations. But the Shah's regime was not an ideological regime; it lacked an exportable social model. He did not wish to interfere in Sudan's internal political affairs and was content and satisfied as long as Sudan remained outside the Soviet camp.

But there were times when the Iranian moves looked far beyond. Attacks were launched on South Yemen in Hawf Bay, and the Sudanese territory was used for the penetration of Ethiopia. Iraq's Kurds were armed and trained to fight the Baghdad regime and sometimes the Iranian regular forces were used to save the Kurds and rescue them from being cornered.

But generally Tehran's policy was defensive and basically directed at limiting subsequent expansion of Soviet influence.

During the past decade and half the international and regional situation has changed dramatically. The Soviet empire has collapsed and the tension resulting from the contest between the major powers no longer influences regional policies. The Marxist regimes in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan have disappeared. As for the Caucasus and Central Asia, they are no longer under Moscow's domination. In other words, the startling events that have taken place in the past five years have realized the greatest dreams of the advocates of the policy of "pushing back the aggressive onslaught."

In other words, Tehran is not in need of any military presence in Sudan or in any place outside its borders to protect its long range security interests. Iran would risk losing much trust if it appeared to be involved in looking for bases to be used in carrying out external operations.

Sudan will emerge from all this with a major loss. An alliance with revolutionary Iran is quite different from the alliance Sudan concluded with the Iranian regime under the Shah. As I have already said, the former Iranian regime lacked an exportable ideology. The present ruling regime considers it to be its duty to carry its model to all the corners of the world. It was no coincidence that the number of Iranian mullas who visited Sudan during the past year or so was equal to that of the Iranian technicians and diplomats who visited Khartoum.

Tehran's present government is seeking to win allies who would rally under the banner of its doctrine. Revolutionary regimes are automatically inclined to export their ideologies.

Iran says today that it wants to export its revolution peacefully and not through military operations or other means.

Unless there is evidence to the contrary, there is no need to doubt such statement. But the situation would differ when Iran directly supports a ruling regime or a certain movement. Lebanon's Hizballah is compelled to follow the Iranian policy and ideology to the letter. The same thing applies to other movements which Iran supports in a dozen countries or more.

Consequently, Sudan has to barter part of its political independence in return for Iranian financial and military support, and for this reason Sudan might emerge from this jumble as the biggest loser.

Exclusive financial and military reliance on Tehran could deprive Khartoum of alternative choices not only in the field of foreign relations, but also in the field of domestic policy. A clear early evidence of this is apparent in the Sudanese capital where pictures of late Khomeini and his successor Khamenei are hung on

walls, in shop windows, and in offices as well as in the Iranian-financed "cultural centers."

Commenting on this, Ayatollah Ahmed Janati, head of the Islamic Propaganda Bureau, said Sudan is the "most fertile soil for the propagation of the Imam's revolutionary teachings."

The Sudanese leaders would be wise to reflect on the situation in Lebanon.

Iran had at all times supported the Shi'ite community in Lebanon both politically and financially. But during the Shah's era this support, despite the strong political motive behind it, remained without ideological glamor. At that time Tehran supported all the Lebanese Shi'ites regardless of how they exercised their beliefs and which ayatollah they preferred.

As for the revolutionary mullas, they want to dictate their own religious views, which has resulted in rifts within the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. These rifts have led to innumerable military clashes between the Hizballah, the Amal movement, and the "Islamic Amal" movement as a result of which thousands of Shi'ites have been killed or wounded.

Of course, these excuses should not be taken as a call against strengthening friendship ties with Iran. Far from it. I believe that all the countries should seek dialogue with Iran and establish close amicable relations with it wherever and whenever it is possible, for the situation in Iran is not going to last forever.

Therefore, seeking friendship with Iran is fair, just, and necessary. But the thing that goes beyond that and that is indeed dangerous is the exclusive reliance on Tehran. This seems to be the policy the ruling group in Sudan is pursuing, the policy that is partly due to despair. But what the Sudanese leaders fail to realize is that their very own positions will be endangered wherever and whenever they become totally dependent on the Iranian situation.

Iran, like the rest of the ideological regimes wants, to have "friends" in power in the countries that need Tehran's assistance. This is neither hypocritical nor ill intention. It is a natural characteristic of revolutionary regimes to accept nothing short of total loyalty.

IMF Sets Conditions for Revised Status

*92AF1062A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
25 Jul 92 p 9*

[Article by Malak Ja'far: "IMF About To Remove the Sudan From 'Uncooperative Countries' List"]

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT learned from reliable World Bank sources that the ban on Sudan's dealings with the IMF, and implicitly with the World Bank, will be lifted before year-end. An announcement to that effect is expected 3 Aug.

The sources explained that cooperation by the two world agencies with the Sudan would depend on two conditions set by their boards at a recent meeting in Washington between IMF and World Bank officials and the Sudanese minister of finance.

The sources added that the IMF pledged during that meeting to consider lifting the "uncooperative country" status it attached to the Sudan last year, and that the two agencies impressed upon the Sudanese finance minister the importance of reaching a peaceful solution to the Southern Sudan problem and of expanding the circle of Sudanese rule as prerequisites for supporting the Khartoum government's economic reform measures. The sources declined to reveal whether IMF officials made it clear to the Sudan that continued future [as published] cooperation by the IMF and the World Bank would depend on the realization of those two goals.

Sudanese Finance Minister 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that he apprised IMF and World Bank officials at his meeting with them in Washington last week, of the Sudanese economy's progress after recent structural changes that began by floating the pound exchange rate and include most recently the lifting foreign exchange controls. Hamdi added that he requested the meeting in order to alert officials of the two world organizations to recent economic measures adopted by the Sudan over a short period of time and without benefit of foreign aid. He asked at the conclusion of the meeting that the menacing tone of Fund communications in recent months, which have implied a "threat to dismiss the Sudan from IMF membership," be changed to the more redeeming approach of lifting the penalties imposed on the country. The Sudanese finance minister pointed out that placing the Sudan on the IMF's list of "uncooperative countries" was in consequence of the country's inability to service its indebtedness to the Fund and to other donor nations. He explained that the Sudan had suspended repayments in the mid-eighties because of limited resources.

World Bank sources told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT yesterday in a telephone interview that last week's meeting in Washington was not at the request of the Sudanese finance minister. Rather, the Bank deemed the timing appropriate for the Sudanese minister to request a meeting with IMF and Bank directors to review Sudanese conditions in the wake of its fundamental economic reforms. The sources added that both agencies are satisfied with the progress of Sudanese economic reforms but that those reforms are doomed to collapse without a peaceful solution to the Southern Sudan problem and without expanding the circle of participation in Sudanese rule.

On another issue, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT inquired of the Sudanese finance minister about the availability of convertible foreign exchange needed to support pound exchange rates now that exchange controls have been lifted. 'Abd-al-Rahim Hamdi responded that a foreign exchange cover is not needed to support pound rates

which was an old practice of the seventies that is no longer valid. He explained that pound exchange rates would be supported by increased Sudanese exports.

World Bank sources said in answer to the same question that the Sudan will be able to cover its currency in the short term but that its exports are unlikely to support its currency's exchange rate over the long term. The sources added that the Sudan depends on farm products for all its cash exports, exposing to the risk of market conditions, export prices, and harvest fluctuations.

The sources emphasized that it is important for the Sudan to restore its "cooperating country" status with the IMF because that would mean the resumption of donor aid which would, in turn, provide the long term cover needed [for agricultural shortfalls].

The sources added that all of that is a function of foreign investor confidence in the Sudanese economy which cannot be won without a peaceful solution to the problem of the south and without expanding the circle of rule.

World Bank sources also revealed that they discussed with the Sudanese finance minister specific steps to contain the worsening budget deficit. While commending recent Sudanese economic reforms, the sources warned that the continued conflict in the south lies at the core of the persistent Sudanese budgetary deficit.

Commentary Examines Anniversary Celebration Day

92AF1063B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
3 Jul 92 p 15

[Article by Muhammad Hasan al-Ahmad]

[Text] London—Many provocative questions have been raised regarding the Sudanese regime's celebration of the third anniversary of the [Islamic] Front coup against the government. They all are legitimate questions, though some are astonishing. This has given rise to speculations and conjectures. The first question concerns the anniversary of this coup which customarily falls on 30 June; it is the day the anniversary should be celebrated. Although the regime declared that day an official holiday, yet it announced the postponement of celebrations, giving the excuse that President al-Bashir on that day will be in Dakkar in order to attend the African summit. This excuse is lacking in logic, unconvincing, and shows no respect for the institutions functioning at the highest level of the state. The ruling regime ought to have acted as follows:

—Either the president will record his speech in order to be broadcast and televised on 30 June, or Vice President Maj. Gen. Muhammad al-Zubayr Salih will deliver the anniversary speech according to the political outlines and guidelines agreed upon, particularly

since the time difference between the date of convening the OAU summit and the coup anniversary was only 24 hours.

—The other alternative: If the importance of the speech and the policies and guidelines that were supposed to be proclaimed required that President al-Bashir should deal with them personally, it would have been more appropriate and correct for al-Bashir to remain in Khartoum and charge Maj. Gen. al-Zubayr Muhammad Salih, deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council [RCC] and minister of interior, with attending the OAU summit in Dakkar, especially since Sudan's policies regarding what the summit was going to discuss have already been decided upon and proclaimed in all the media channels. This is particularly true with regard to the attack on the idea of establishing a OAU peace force. Al-Bashir has personally launched the attack before the conference was held and he was followed by Foreign Minister Ahmad Sahlul.

Because of these two reasons, the regime's behind postponing the celebration of the third anniversary of its assuming power seems flawed. The regime has prepared a new town square for holding the celebrations that has cost millions of Sudanese pounds despite Sudan's critical economic difficulties. This is also despite the regime's earlier statements attacking the democratic regime for what it called "extravagant expenditures." There is no room for comparison here between the regime's allegations and what was actually happening in the past. The excuses given have not convinced the Sudanese who are known for their political perceptions, astuteness, and conclusions that seldom are wrong. Those who are more politically perceptive among them raise questions and explore issues. This has embarrassed the regime and prompted it to hint, or renew its hint, that the celebration has been postponed because al-Bashir wanted to announce on that day the fall of Torit, Garang's headquarters and his biggest and last bastion. This was to be accompanied by certain pro-regime organs spreading rumors, including, for example, saying that the Green Square [the celebration site], despite all the efforts that have been made to complete it, is still waiting for the last touches before it is complete, including the rostrum on which al-Bashir was supposed to stand before the people. But all these justifications have failed to distract the people from looking for what's really going on behind the scenes, something that has generated a tremendous amount of conclusions and speculations. But before delving into these suppositions and speculations we would like to cite an established fact that is beyond any doubt, in the hope that this will be a factor in monitoring the conjectures and speculations, and perhaps what could be described as rumors.

During Sudan's independence celebration early this year, the ruling Islamic Front regime considered the idea of al-Bashir declaring on this occasion the sixth constitutional order that abolishes the RCC and transfers all its powers to al-Bashir personally, and to change the title

"chairman of the revolution command council" to head of state. It was said that al-Bashir signed this presidential order on 30 December 1991, but it has not yet been announced so far, neither at the independence celebrations nor at the coup anniversary. Six months have passed from the time the presidential order was prepared and signed to this day.

There is no doubt that drafting the presidential order did not take place in a void. The failure to issue it and announce it on that occasion was not an arbitrary thing. The failure to announce it on the coup anniversary can only be construed to mean that the reasons and problems surrounding its issuance still exist. What are these problems?

Some observers of the Sudanese scene believe that personal issues are the source of the problems. It is the question of who among the RCC members will lose their positions. In fact, the RCC members have lost this influential quality about two years ago or so, according to the article that provides that decisions are issued and signed in the name of the RCC chairman and not in the name of the Council. This categorization of the RCC decision prompted the people to wonder then whether this was a coup by an individual or by a group. With their distinctive political sense, the Sudanese realized that the coup was the work of the Islamic Front. Otherwise, why did some of the Front's leaders block the declaration of the sixth constitutional order that gives him [al-Bashir] all the powers of the RCC and calls him head of state instead of the RCC chairman?

There is more than one explanation and more than one possibility, but perhaps the most significant thing to focus on here is the claim by some people that the military character should not overshadow the regime's civilian character, and that the position of head of state should be assigned to the leader, who in this case is Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, who was behind freezing the constitutional order in the first place. Others say reviving the idea of issuing this order now would be a revival of the tug of war that characterized the conditions and implications that complicated the idea of preparing the sixth order in the first place, along with other subsequent developments, most significant of which is Dr. al-Turabi's health condition in the wake of the attack on him in Canada.

It is also being said that the Front's command is confused and showing signs of division with regard to who is going to succeed al-Turabi. While Deputy Secretary General 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha is assuming the responsibility according to the Front's statutes, some senior command members believe in forming a five-man council, including the deputy secretary general, to assume leadership responsibility, even if only temporarily. But the deputy secretary general rejected the idea completely and considered it a violation of the Front's statutes. It is also being said that the outbreak of disputes was behind the idea of speeding up al-Turabi's return from Canada despite the doctors' advice that he should

stay another month in Canada, Switzerland, or Britain. It appears that al-Turabi's return to Khartoum has eased the disputes, even if nominally. It has also been reported that certain sources insisted that the [anniversary] speech should include the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the immediate application of Islamic penal code, in addition to doing other things about which the people in Khartoum whisper.

An evidence of the existence of differences within the Front's power hierarchy is that the Sudanese security authority detained Mahjub 'Urwah, a prominent Front member and publisher and chief editor of the newspaper AL-SUDANI, for a whole day in order to investigate him regarding his invitation to [former prime minister] al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to deliver a lecture, which later was cancelled. It is noted that Mahjub 'Urwah is one of the appointed members in the National Assembly. An Arab newspaper published a protest letter he submitted to the Assembly speaker in which he launched a violent attack against the security organs for violating his parliamentary immunity. There is no doubt that this incident and all the conditions surrounding it left an impression among the people that there are real disputes between conflicting trends in the Front with regard to the hideous practices of the oppressive security organs. This has led to the conclusion that certain Front leaders have come to the conclusion that the regime has come to a deadend and that conditions call for finding a way out. On the other had, some observers believe all that is being said about differences within the Front is no more than differences over the proportion of power division between the military and the civilians, both between the military and the civilians or between factions of the civilians themselves, all of which should be viewed only as tactical differences. In any case, the few coming days might provide a definite answer to many of these questions.

TUNISIA

Excerpts From Driss Report Published

92AF1133A Tunis REALITES in French
24-30 Jul 92 pp 5-9

["Excerpts" from report to the president of the republic by Rashid Driss, president of the Higher Committee on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, concerning the implementation of recommendations by the investigating committee; date of report not given: "Driss Report: the Main Points"; first three paragraphs are REALITES introduction]

[Text] Tunisians felt prouder of their country when the president of the republic authorized publication of the final report presented to him by Rashid Driss, president of the Higher Committee on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

Publication of the Driss Report is to the credit of this country's regime, which was not afraid to reveal a certain number of unfortunate mistakes as well as a set of measures favoring freedoms with which national and international public opinion have little experience.

Following publication of the complete Driss report by the daily newspapers, we here present our readers with extensive excerpts from that report. (Passages in bold-face are by the editors of REALITES.)

Ministry of Interior and Freedoms

The publication of the measures adopted by Abdallah Kallel's ministry is truly impressive. All observers regard that set of measures as being worthy of a country genuinely concerned about human rights, even though mistakes or excessively slow enforcement may give rise to some questions.

Reading the measures adopted in favor of prisoners and about the Ministry of Interior's concern to ensure that the police respect human dignity enables one to say that the fight to bring about a "policed" police force is well underway even though an additional effort must be made to improve relations between the police and the citizens.

Officer Training

As a consequence of its attachment to Tunisia's basic stance and choices in the new era of democracy and human rights, the Ministry of Interior has adopted a set of measures aimed at the safeguarding of human dignity and the complete protection of human rights.

In light of the following data, which were supplied to us by the Ministry of Interior, we can identify three types of measures.

1. The addition of instruction regarding human rights to training programs for cadres and officers of the security forces. This in accordance with Circular No. 504 dated 15 June 1991, addressed to the secretary of state to the minister of state/minister of interior in charge of public authorities for his information and to the general directors of the security forces for purposes of execution and follow-up, the reason being a concern to draw attention not only to the duties of the Security Directorate's cadres and their need to exhibit civilized behavior and treat the citizens correctly but also to the penalties they will incur if they violate individual freedom or overstep their authority.

2. The promulgation of directives addressed to the Security Directorate's cadres and encouraging them to show more respect for human rights and public freedoms by having them sign a commitment when they begin their duties. This in accordance with Circular No. 72 dated 24 February 1992, which stipulates that each police officer is obligated to stay informed concerning Tunisian laws and provisions and international conventions that are binding on Tunisia in connection with human rights.

3. The promulgation and dissemination of a number of circulars and documents relative to human rights and public freedoms:

- a) Circular No. 895 dated 16 December 1991 ordering that the text of the specific oath to be taken by police officers be posted in all offices of the Security Directorate. By that oath, officers promise to show loyalty and respect for the law in carrying out their duties and to defend the nation's integrity in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of Law No. 82-70 dated 6 August 1982 relative to the security forces.
- b) Circular No. 904 dated 24 December 1991 relative to dissemination of the UN code of conduct setting forth the rules of behavior to be observed by officials responsible for enforcing laws and ensuring the widest possible compliance with those rules.
- c) Circular No. 6 dated 3 January 1992 setting forth the way in which citizens should be treated and calling on police authorities to understand the citizens' problems, to treat the citizens with courtesy and civility, to use firmness only within the limits allowed by law, and to avoid falling into abuses of authority that would expose their perpetrators to the possibility of legal action.
- d) Circular No. 53 dated 12 February 1992 drawing attention to the kind of behavior to be observed by agents of the Security Directorate in dealing with citizens, this as a result of certain problems that have arisen between citizens and members of the Security Directorate. The same circular instructs agents of the Security Directorate to improve their relations with the citizens and to work constantly in the higher interest of the nation.
- e) Circular No. 46 dated 19 February 1992 relative to dissemination of the UN declaration regarding the minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners, the concern here being to confirm Tunisia's policy for the new era in connection with freedoms, democracy, and human rights and to round out the state's efforts in connection with the administration of prisons and the treatment of prisoners, considering the real role of detention centers in social rehabilitation.
- f) Circular No. 72 dated 24 February 1992 concerning the signing by agents of the Security Directorate of the commitment regarding respect for human rights and public freedoms.

4. Preparation of a manual setting forth the behavior to be observed by police officers responsible for law enforcement in the field of human rights and the distribution of that manual to all units for their use as a working reference and basic set of rules.

5. The preparation of a coherent program as part of the training policy with a view to holding seminars for members of the security forces, the topic for reflection

being issues calling for a strengthening of cooperation and mutual respect between citizens and agents of the Security Directorate.

6. On instructions from the president of the republic, a unit in charge of human rights and the concerns of the citizens has been set up within the Ministry of Interior. Among other things, that unit is responsible for providing information to families seeking news of incarcerated relatives and wanting to know where those relatives are being held.

7. The posting in the offices of security units of the text of the specific oath required of agents of the National Security Directorate and the UN code as well as the posting in all prisons of the UN declaration regarding the minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners.

8. The holding of awareness meetings and seminars with the various prison wardens, basically in order to define and explain standards and data for the purpose of clarifying prison policy, restructuring the prisons, and continuing the process of making prison personnel aware of their responsibilities and providing for their supervision.

9. The establishment of prison councils that will meet periodically at the unit level under the warden's supervision for the purpose of studying all cases and regularly submitting reports to the authorities, who will do their best to iron out difficulties and find appropriate and timely solutions.

10. The establishment of a school for the training and retraining of cadres and employees of the prison and reeducation services in Borj Touil.

11. The General Directorate of Prison and Reeducation Services has designed a coherent program for testing the knowledge of its employees on their assimilation of internal prison regulations. The test results will be considered in calculating the efficiency bonus and assigning annual scores.

12. The establishment of social action units in all prisons. Those units will be placed under the authority of psychologists and sociologists, and their purpose will be to provide various services for the prisoner and his family during his incarceration and after his release. Those services have consisted of the following, among other things:

- a) The supplying of clothing, toys, and food products to needy prisoners and the children of prisoners.
- b) Intervention on behalf of certain prisoners who have been released to persuade certain firms to give them stable employment and in some cases reinstate them in their former jobs.

- c) The establishment of a social fund in each prison establishment for the purpose of supplying needy prisoners with financial assistance when they leave prison and enabling them to procure medicines not available in the prison infirmary.
- d) Authorization for prisoners to attend the funerals of their deceased ascendants and descendants as well as other family functions.
- e) The installation of waiting rooms equipped with all the necessary facilities for prison visitors.
- f) The setting up of a health service within the General Directorate of Prison and Reeducation Services that will be responsible for meeting the health needs of prisoners, assigning full-time physicians to some prisons, and calling in National Health Service physicians in various special fields to examine prisoners in each prison.
- g) Eight other miscellaneous measures.

Accidents

The issue of people dying during interrogation has been tackled courageously. Only the democratic countries have dared to publish information on this subject. What is certain is that at no time has any prisoner or fugitive been killed in cold blood.

In authorizing the publication of information on these events, the Tunisian regime has shown remarkable courage and thereby cleared itself of suspicion. It is true that mistakes have happened, but in no way do they point to a policy conceived and implemented to weaken the extremists. Those regrettable accidents—those pointless deaths—were explained in the Driss report.

The conscience of the Tunisians has been relieved, because a death that remains unexplained leaves room for every suspicion.

Shortcomings

It emerges from these exhaustive and detailed data that the Ministry of Interior has adopted a set of important measures that will safeguard human rights. However, we draw attention to the appropriateness of continuing the training and retraining of Security Directorate agents and to the need to subject them to periodic testing to be sure that they have perfectly assimilated the content of the above-mentioned circulars, the purpose being to avoid abuses and practices contrary to law. In that respect, the Ministry of Interior's departments have taken the necessary legal steps against those who have failed in their duty and exceeded the limits of legality in their relations with others. Those incidents, which involve a number of Security Directorate agents of various ranks, are the following:

- a) The national guard station in Douar Hicher: the agents involved were incarcerated in the Tunis Civil Prison and placed at the disposal of the military

justice system pending completion of the criminal investigation and their appearance before the court.

- b) The Jendouba case: a cadre in the Security Directorate was brought before the Higher National Police Council, which decided to remove him from office for abuse of power and for conduct damaging the prestige of the organization to which he belonged.

- c) The Gaafour case: the agent involved was subjected to the following:

First, a criminal conviction equal to five years in prison, a fine of 120 dinars, and the payment of one symbolic millime for abuse of power.

Second, an administration measure consisting of his dismissal from the service.

- d) The case involving the use of violence against a foreign woman: the guilty party was prosecuted even though the victim did not wish to press charges. He was eventually sentenced to three months in prison and dismissed from the service.

- e) The Nabeul case: following the implication of a Security Directorate agent in a morals case, that agent was prosecuted. Although the case was dismissed for lack of evidence, the department took disciplinary action by ordering that he be suspended for two weeks and transferred.

- f) The case of a Security Directorate agent who was implicated in a criminal investigation and charged with shooting at other people and being drunk: the Public Prosecutor's Office was notified of the case, and the examining magistrate of the Court of First Instance in Kasserine began an investigation and ordered the agent committed to prison. In addition, and because of the seriousness of the actions in question, the service decided to dismiss him.

As for the rest, and according to the report prepared by the Ministry of Justice, we learn that 116 Security Directorate agents are implicated in 105 cases involving various kinds of abuse of power. Investigations have been started in response to complaints filed with public prosecutors.

In that connection, the report by the Ministry of Justice draws attention to the following facts:

- a) Fifty-five agents have been convicted and given varying sentences depending on the seriousness of the abuse in question.
- b) A nonsuit was declared in two cases.
- c) Only one case was dismissed for lack of evidence.
- d) The criminal investigation of about 50 other cases is continuing.

The Ministry of Justice points out that Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows individuals having

an interest in a case that has been closed to initiate public prosecution on their own responsibility, just as Article 109 of the same code allows a plaintiff claiming damages in a criminal case to appeal the examining magistrate's decisions if they harm his interests.

Other Decisions

Following the recommendations contained in the report dated September 1991, Mr. President, you ordered the adoption of measures that would safeguard and ensure respect for human rights in all areas and in all circumstances. For its part, the Ministry of Justice was responsible for the following measures and decisions:

1. The dissemination of education regarding human rights and the strengthening of awareness of individual rights through establishment of the position of "guidance judge" ("juge-aiguilleur") effective this year. His job will be to assist the citizens and advise them as to the best means of recourse and the most effective procedure for defending their interests.

2. Instruction at the Higher Institute of the Bench regarding the principles of human rights, international conventions ratified by Tunisia, the role of the United Nations and NGO's [nongovernmental organizations] in that field, the protection of life and freedom of opinion, respect for equality, the fight against all forms of discrimination, and so on.

5. [as published] The rehabilitation of prisoners.

In view of the interest shown by the chief of state in the rehabilitation of prisoners and their social reintegration, the draft amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure called for making the restoration of civil rights automatic without a prior petition or a decision by the Commission on Pardons being required.

Pending adoption of that provision, the Commission on Pardons has already made its working method more flexible. For instance, it approved 4,173 petitions for rehabilitation and 1,862 requests for pardon in 1991 alone.

Visits to a Number of Police and National Guard Stations

We visited a number of police and National Guard stations and contacted their top officials. We have the honor of reporting the following to Your Excellency:

1. The stations have received all the circulars issued by the Ministry of Interior for the purpose of protecting human rights and improving relations between Security Directorate personnel and the citizens.

2. The UN "Code of Conduct" and the circulars issued by the Ministry of Interior, particularly the texts for taking the oath and making the commitment, are indeed posted in the office of the director, in the post office lobby, and in the offices of certain officials.

3. We found that a number of station commanders have licentiates in law.

4. We found that the holding capacity of the jails in those centers barely exceeds four prisoners, whereas the number arrested in peak periods goes as high as 15. Moreover, the premises usually lack the basic conveniences necessary for safeguarding human dignity. The prisoners we contacted in those premises did not complain of cruel treatment or of unauthorized extensions of their detention. Some of them complained, however, about the conditions of their arrest, and this clearly confirms the need to enforce the law relative to the keeping of detention records and to take care to prevent the shortcomings and carelessness noted in our report dated September 1991.

Visits to a Number of Prisons

We also visited a number of prisons located in the northern and central regions and noted the living conditions of prisoners convicted in connection with various cases. We noted the following:

1. The General Directorate of Prison Establishments oversees enforcement of internal prison regulations with great firmness. Not only are the services required by those regulations provided, but provisions of an organizational nature have also been adopted for the following purposes:

- a) To make clear the minimum rules to be observed in the treatment of prisoners and to punish police officers against whom complaints have been lodged with the warden.
- b) To post the documents concerning the rights and duties of prisoners on the doors of all detention cells.

We also noted that the 9 April Prison has offices set aside for interviews between lawyers and their clients. The lawyers we contacted there assured us that the conditions in which they carry out their tasks in the prisons are normal.

Meetings With a Number of Prisoners

We met with a large number of prisoners implicated in various cases, some involving common law and others relating to illegal activities. Some of them complained of the following:

- a) Unauthorized extensions of their detention; a minority also complained of mistreatment.
- b) Lengthy interrogation; a minority also complained of having undergone their first interrogations late at night.
- c) An extremely small number of prisoners complained of having been forced to sign documents which they were unable to read in their entirety.
- d) The lengthy delay between the conclusion of the investigation phase and the start of the trial.

In addition, a number of prisoners made the following suggestions:

- a) Introduce longer visiting hours.
- b) Allow some of them to be transferred to prisons closer to their native regions so as to spare their families the strain endured to visit them, since such visits often become infrequent when the place of detention is far from the place where the prisoner's family lives.
- c) Provide prisoners who are studying the scientific documents they need.
- d) Allow prisoners—especially those incarcerated in crowded prisons such as the 9 April Prison—to take two baths a week in the summer.
- e) Provide the prisoners with access to news.

Most of the prisoners we contacted praised their good treatment in the prisons and said they enjoyed their recognized rights as regards food and care as well as their right to take a bath, take walks, and receive visits.

Those who had suffered mistreatment at the hands of certain police officers said that a change for the better had occurred—a change that was due, according to the director general of prison establishments, to the punishment meted out to the guilty police officers.

Visit to the Public Prosecutor in Grombalia (2 June 1992) and Visit to the Public Prosecutor Attached to the Military Court (10 June 1992)

The purpose of these two visits was to learn what may have motivated the holding of prisoners beyond the legal period and to request some explanation of the results of the criminal investigations into deaths due to the use of violence.

The public prosecutor attached to the military court told us that the institution for which he is responsible has a limited number of examining magistrates, with the result that cases drag on for a long time and their investigation is delayed, but that detention under remand does not exceed the allowed period.

Regarding the cases of recorded deaths, he said he had ordered a rogatory commission for the purpose of conducting a new investigation of those deaths.

When we asked about the extent to which it would be possible to ensure the reintegration of prisoners released for lack of evidence proving their guilt, he answered that criminal proceedings are independent of disciplinary proceedings, which are subject to special procedures and provisions under the control of the administrative court.

For his part, the public prosecutor in Grombalia assured us that there were no recorded cases of abuse on the part of the Criminal Investigation Police. He also told us that notice of arrest is given by telegram or official report. Concerning the two deaths that occurred in Cap-Bon in obscure circumstances, he pointed out that both cases

had been closed only temporarily in compliance with Article 121 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and said that a new investigation could be started if new information came to light. In response to our request for clarification concerning the effectiveness of the position of guidance judge, he told us that the results had been positive, that he had appointed three of his colleagues to take turns performing that duty, and that the latter were doing a gigantic job.

Solicitude

It needs to be honestly said that President Ben Ali's decision to authorize publication of the report is a comfort to all citizens concerned about public freedoms and human rights. The president's courage has enabled transparency and democracy to take a decisive step in the direction of freedoms.

By granting compensation to the victims' families, the regime has revealed the absence of any desire to hound families whose members have been the victims of government errors.

In reading the report in question, one can only experience a feeling of hope for the future of Tunisia, which is not the "prisoners' hell" that certain people have tried to make us think it is.

Concerning Suspicious Deaths

The investigating commission concluded in its report dated 11 September 1991 that a number of deaths had occurred in obscure and suspicious circumstances. We have gathered the following information concerning those deaths:

1. Criminal investigations are currently under way in the case of two deaths that are presumed to have taken place during detention: the victims are Abdellaziz Mehouchi and Abderraouf Laaribi.
2. Criminal investigations are also being conducted in connection with three deaths about which the Ministry of Interior has stated the following:
 - a) Ameer Degachi jumped from the fourth floor while being interrogated.
 - b) Abdelwaheb Abdelli was never in custody; while being arrested, he was killed by a shot fired by a police officer whom he was trying to resist by brandishing a knife.
 - c) Concerning Fethi Khiari, the Ministry of Interior said that his health had deteriorated while he was under arrest and that he had died while being taken to the hospital. The investigation of this case is continuing.
3. Two other deaths occurred after the investigating commission completed its work: those of Faycal Barakat and Rashid Chammakhi.
 - a) Concerning Faycal Barakat, the minutes of the preliminary investigation indicate that he died in a

highway accident and that the police reported that fact to the Public Prosecutor's Office, which opened an investigation under the responsibility of the examining magistrate of the Court of First Instance in Grombalia. The case number is 13458.

- b) Rashid Chammakhi died of a heart attack a few hours after being arrested.

We feel that those two deaths also occurred under suspicious circumstances and that even though the files related to them have been closed, it appears that new information has come to light to justify starting a new investigation of both cases in accordance with Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Concerning Humanitarian Aid Supplied to the Families of the Deceased

In a letter dated 15 May 1992 and addressed to the president of the Higher Committee on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, the chief adviser to the president of the republic in charge of human rights noted your decision to provide humanitarian aid for the families of the deceased individuals. Here is the text of that letter:

"To Mr. Rashid Driss, president of the Higher Committee on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms.

Subject: Humanitarian aid.

In sending you my respectful greetings, I have the honor to inform you, in your capacity as the president of the republic's personal appointee to prepare a report on implementation of the recommendations made by the investigating commission, that His Excellency decided that, without prejudice to the possible outcome of the criminal proceedings underway, the following humanitarian aid should be provided:

1. In the case of Abderraouf Laaribi, it was decided that cash assistance in the amount of 3,000 dinars and a monthly allowance of 100 dinars would be paid to his wife, Najoua Chaabani.
2. In the case of Ameer Degachi, it was decided that assistance in the amount of 2,000 dinars and a monthly allowance of 100 dinars would be paid to his mother, Aicha Balti.
3. In the case of Abdellaziz Mehouchi, it was decided that assistance in the amount of 3,000 dinars and a monthly allowance of 100 dinars would be paid to his wife, Latifa Dridi, and that one year would be added to his period of employment so that she may benefit from proportional retirement.
4. In the case of Abdelwaheb Abdelli, it was decided that assistance in the amount of 2,000 dinars and a monthly allowance of 100 dinars would be paid to his father, Salah Abdelli.

5. In the case of Fethi Khiari, it was decided that assistance in the amount of 3,000 dinars and an allowance of 100 dinars would be paid to his wife, Sihem Chaabani.

The assistance in question was paid to the recipients on 2, 4, and 5 May 1992.

Sadok Chaabane, Chief adviser to the president of the republic in charge of human rights."

It would be appropriate to make the same humanitarian decision in the cases of Faycal Barakat and Rashid Chammakhi, both of whom died after the report dated 11 September 1991 was prepared, and to do so pending the final outcome of the criminal investigation of those two deaths.

Interviews Granted to Families of Deceased

At the offices of the Higher Committee on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, we met with the father and widow of Abderraouf Laaribi, the widow of Abdellaziz Mehouchi, and the mother of Ameer Degachi. They all said they were touched by your humanitarian gesture on their behalf.

During our interview, they said that the deceased were in perfect health and that none of them was suffering from any specific disease.

Concerning the criminal investigations into the deaths of their relatives, they stated unanimously that they had not been summoned for questioning and to give their testimony.

On the other hand, some of them raised questions concerning the small pensions granted to certain widows, considering the brief period during which their husbands had worked, and complained of the precarious social situation of their families.

Decline in Sfax Political Activities Examined

92AF0986A Tunis REALITES in Arabic 18 Jun 92 p 20

[Article by 'Ammad al-Hadri: "Some Parties Inactive, Hiding"]

[Text] Political parties and groups, and behind the scenes political activities in Sfax have recently been marked by considerable lassitude and inactivity. This observation could be deduced by anyone who follows provincial life, especially if he compared the situation today with what it was two or three years ago.

Since 1988, Sfax has experienced a notable political movement, which began with the establishment of branches and groups of several political parties, holding demonstrations, meetings, and conducting intensive activities. The purpose of this activity was to achieve the maximum results possible for the movement in the

spring 1989 elections, inasmuch as Sfax had a record number—on the national level—of candidate slates for the legislature.

Accordingly, matters have changed since that important, national incident, and the situation today is marked by considerable lassitude and an absence—almost total—of movement and activity.

The Communist Party recorded the final departure of its branch leader, Professor Mahmoud Ben Jomaa. His activities were totally nonexistent, after he had been able—in 1988 and 1989—to organize political demonstrations, and especially, cultural and intellectual activities (exhibitions, the distribution of books, seminars, etc.).

The Socialist Party for Progress has headed for stagnation at as fast a pace as its ascent. This party—directly after its establishment—was able to gather more than 1,000 affiliations. This was sufficient to end the “mood” of some members of the party’s group to terminate the party itself in Sfax. With respect to the Socialist Progressive Grouping, its activities are far from those it recorded during the legislative period. It is obvious that the enthusiasm of Professor Abdelwahab Matar, the head of its branch, is not enough to raise the party’s activity levels.

As for the ‘Popular Unity,’ it has experienced the biggest and fastest fluctuations in Sfax. After the legislative [elections], an important group withdrew from this party, including Mohammed Boukethir, in order to join a splinter movement, led by Jeloul Azzouna. However, before long, it broke away from him to join in an alliance with the Movement of Popular Unity, before splitting off once again to return to the party, or rather, so that Boukethir could become chief of the Sfax group! In the nature of things, these consecutive schisms (which we have condensed!) considerably weakened the party, whose activities today are nearly nonexistent.

With regard to the Movement of Socialist Democrats, it has gone through a serious rift—as it has on the national level—to the point of announcing the ouster of Secretary General Mohammed Abid and replacing him with Hedi Ounis. Everyone knows that the former was credited with breaking an agreement and the latter with breaking Ben Jaafar. This change was quickly denied by the Political Office. However, the split in the group’s structure continues. It is known that, during the movement’s recent conference, the province lost its membership in the Political Office. This is what Professor Mohammed Barkiya took upon himself, before he withdrew from the movement and joined the ruling party.

The Democratic Unionist Federation attempts, from time to time, to carry out a specific activity. Perhaps events on the Arab level have helped it considerably. However, the party has had some disputes—or more

precisely, differences—between the provincial and central groups. Perhaps the most important of these differences was last autumn’s statement that demanded expediting holding the convention.

This party also experienced the withdrawal of two prominent persons (Abdallah Chebbi and Tayeb Abid) from the elections, which reduced the number of Political Office members representing the province from three to one (al-Hedi Belhaj).

This situation has been reflected in certain other political organizations, most importantly, the Human Rights Defense League, whose Sfax branch was one of the most prominent in the country. A number of educational forums and meetings had been organized, but the departure of the branch head, Abdelhamed al-Heseiri, to Tunis for professional reasons, as well as certain financial difficulties and prior disputes, was behind the complete cessation of branch activity.

In order to discuss the general political situation in the province, it is necessary to turn to the ruling party and the professional organizations.

The discussion will continue.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Four Bases of Power Structure Examined

*92AE0511C London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
24 Jun 92 pp 24-27*

[Article by Hassan Abu-Talib: “Fact of Partition Still Standing”; “Four Bases of Yemeni Power: Army-Tribe-Party-Bureaucracy”]

[Text] Cairo—Many elements of the Yemeni scene have changed, including power structures, political parties, influential personalities, information organs, and political stance; despite this, many feel that the “core” is still the same. What we mean by “core” here is the set of principles and conventions that governed, and continue to govern, the political domain, and which serve to maneuver change in a particular direction. Although it is true that the forces of modernization have made an impact and new forms of political interaction have come into play during the last two years, the “core” may yet have the final word, or at the least the capacity to influence events in such manner that they do not get out of hand or go beyond control.

With regard to the “power game rules”—who takes what and what goes to whom—they are not always known in present-day Yemen, though at times they are candid and open. This is politics, trying to decree its new fundamentals in a traditional society undergoing transformation into modernity. Thus, there are many who believe that this file will not be closed before passing through a long period of trial, a kind of childbirth labor that precedes a newborn’s first breath of life.

The question, then, is: What can we say about the current happenings in Yemen, about the power struggles, or about the riddle-like relationship between the two power-sharing parties? What do we understand about the social forces that have not evolved yet and that remain burdened by traditional values which directly overlap with tribal, clan and sectarian allegiances, yet on whom public and political party values has been imposed? What about those sectors of society that have achieved some measure of education, but who now feel restricted and ineffectual, despite a heartfelt devotion to the service and development of their nation? What can we say about the opportunities for modernization and development that have not yet borne fruit? And, finally, how do we understand the traditional forces and entities (tribes as social entities with specific mores, traditions, and bonds) upon whom an unfamiliar relational environment has been imposed (factionalism, volunteer organizations, and all new aspects of organization)? Undoubtedly these are important and overlapping aspects that cannot be dissociated from one another.

In a few words, how may political power in the unified Yemen be understood? Before taking up the answer, despite its precautions and interdictions, three observations should be taken into account: First, the struggle for the reigns of power in the unified Yemen is in essence an extension of the state of struggle during the time of partition. However, there are two facets to the dispute: first, the current struggle is a peaceful one, having adopted democracy and its conditions and mechanisms as the method of confrontation or enticement; second, the interplay now occurs within a single country, while in the past it occurred between two countries. The importance of this point is that it cancels out certain approaches that were available during partition, at least in theory, for confronting each other. What we mean here specifically is the military mode and confrontation with armies. But unity brings a situation which advances new methods appropriate to the game of democracy and plurality.

The second observation concerns the grand programs on which the struggle resolves, these being the same programs that existed during partition. These are the conceptions advanced for the future identity of the Yemeni state. At this point, three programs may be cited: first, a reformist and progressive one, perhaps characterized by attendant sluggishness and extreme caution. This is the General People's Congress, headed by President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, which previously held sway in the northern half as the political formula under which all movements and political forces sought refuge. Its principal distinction is the attempt it makes to couple the traditional with the modern, showing deference to the traditions of the country while generating changes in the structure and institutions of the state. This program sometimes employs methods that are more personal than institutional.

The second program is more modern, comprehensive, and radical, yet without ties to socialism in its earlier,

traditional context. Neither is it linked to the role of the party in monopolizing power and truth; rather, its links are to conceptualizations of social justice, political freedom, and the law-and-order state and, simultaneously, to political initiative centered on the notion of broad alliance led by the party itself with the participation of the General People's Congress. This is the Yemeni Socialist Party program, which autocratically governed the southern half in the past.

The third political program is that of the religious state. Its distinctive features are not yet clear, but it advances such claims as the application of Islamic law and the preservation of Yemeni social customs, understood by some to be a curtailment of the role and institutions of the modern state. The program advocates economic freedom, and allows scientists a role in political life. However, it expands on only a few social gains, while many details on the prospects of political plurality are missing. This program is that of the Yemeni Reform Congregation, which articulates a fundamentalist tribal alliance. It is known that the beginnings of this congregation came at the start of 1991 as a form of engagement and investment in the mechanisms of democracy.

The last observation concerns the outcome of the confrontation between these three major programs, whether via the ballot box or other means, the results of which will forge the identity of the Yemeni state of the future. From here springs an interest in the alliances each side will attempt to form with those parties and political forces actually at work in the Yemeni arena, foremost among whom are the Nasirists, the Ba'athists, and parties founded on religious motifs, conferring upon such parties enlightened or novel interpretations. It is anticipated that the Yemeni political arena will witness, during the few remaining months of the transition period which ends next November, several instances of coordination and alliance and perhaps even coalition.

These three observations point to a huge confrontation involving interactive and interconnected elements. None of these elements—the tribe, army, party, or bureaucracy—can be justly understood for its influence without knowledge of the bearing of union on each.

The Tribe Between Ascendancy and Constriction

Discourse on the tribe in the Yemen has its peculiarities, as the tribe is a traditional social construct characterized by stability. This is contrary to the concept of the tribe in many bedouin societies, which are marked by constant decamping from one location to another. Agriculture and force are the basis for stability. In contrast to its counterpart in the northern half, a tribe from the southern half does not have as great a presence or influence. This is attributable to the dissimilarity of political experience during partition. For, despite modernization efforts in the north, the tribe as a social entity has not come to an end as it has in the south, where most

of the manifestations and instrumentalities of party and government activity have replaced the manifestations of tribal affiliation.

Union has affected the northern tribes in ways that appears opposite to its effects on the southern tribes. Factionalism and pluralism, endorsed as a means of political activity in the unified state, have resulted in a diminished influence for the tribe of the north, an influence that was more widespread prior to union. It has even become incumbent upon the tribe to affiliate itself with various parties having conflicting viewpoints and political programs. In other words, the existence of parties has eroded to some extent the moral authority and function of the tribe. Moreover, the former shaykh of a tribe has been obligated to choose a party or to form one himself in order to give expression to his thoughts and opinions or to vie for power or to participate in various political institutions.

In the past or prior to union, when a prominent shaykh from an influential tribe invited other shaykhs to reflect on a strictly tribal matter or on one that affected tribal interests, the invitees were obligated to respond in accordance with tribal custom. Today, however, a shaykh's invitation may be refused, go unanswered, or at the least have its antecedents questioned, as such invitation is viewed from an either partisan or tribal perspective. It is important for the other shaykhs to know in what capacity they were invited. From a practical standpoint, it has become necessary to differentiate between tribal and party affairs, even amongst those prominent shaykhs possessing power and influence within their tribes and throughout the Yemen.

This measure appears as a prelude to the diminution of the influence of the tribe in favor of the party; this is the organizational formula with the modernizing content. However, a cautionary note must be sounded here: The tribe retains a role in the expansion of party work itself, by way of providing the party with followers, members, and funds, a fact which gives the tribe a measure of influence unavailable to it in the past, and which contrasts with the form of influence withdrawn from it and its natural leaders. Herein is embedded an anachronism whose final bearing will be known only over time: Has the tribe absorbed by the party, or vice versa?

Southern tribes provide another, albeit contrasting, example by virtue of their existence in an atmosphere of freedom and plurality which has allowed for self-expression and the open discussion of specific and general issues. Following a period of political and moral suppression after independence which continued until reunification, the tribes now found it an opportune time to resume their traditional functions.

At this point we are able to earmark the characteristics of the southern tribe by way of widely known particulars and incidents. Among the particulars, we note the flaunting of weaponry, and among the incidents, for example, we cite the al-Mahrah tribal meeting, held in

October 1991 for the first time since the independence of the (former) south. In the meeting alluded to, tribal social and developmental affairs were scrutinized, and conceptualizations of a number of matters affecting the Yemeni state were put forth, especially the re-drawing of borders with Oman. It is known that these tribes refused certain items of the agreement reached by the Yemeni government, on the grounds that the agreement was a concession of a portion of Yemeni lands in which branches of the al-Mahrah tribes had wandered since time immemorial. After the government's clarifications, these tribes revised their positions in respect of the text of the agreement and its clauses.

The relative curtailment of powers of the tribe in the north and the ascendance of the tribe in the south present an important problem that worries many Yemenis: What is the nature of the alternative sociopolitical construct that will be capable of bridging the gap left by the sudden absence of the tribe, at a time when the centralized and modernized state has not firmly established itself, and the democratic plurality experiment and its modern mechanisms have not yet attained stability? The matter of gravest concern in this field is the relationship between the tribe, on the one hand, and party pluralism, on the other. Does party pluralism necessarily imply a pluralism of tribal affiliation and its distribution and employment in favor of one party or another, or will the tribe absorb the partisanship phenomenon completely, transforming it into an instrument of political struggle? The problem takes on greater urgency when a tribe is equipped with all the means necessary to make it an auxiliary of the party. The dangers that lurk here are not exclusively political in nature, but social and psychological as well. Their intensification will serve to sunder and splinter Yemeni society, making it an easy target for confrontations having undesirable consequences.

The Army and the Defense of Legitimacy

For its part, the army is an instrument of power, whether in the Yemen during partition or in the Yemen of today. In this regard, the army resembles the tribe, having undergone numerous preemptory changes, not only in its structure and consolidation, but in the philosophy of its role as well. The army is a discernible obsession of many Yemenis. In everyone's view, the main yardstick of success in the unified state is its capacity to develop a truly integrated army, in which past allegiances to one part of the country or another are dissolved in favor of the unified Yemen. These obsessions and fears are attributable to the false steps taken by the program to unify the two former Yemeni armies. This was a cause for the apathy that prevailed in the relationship of the two parties in power during late December and April of last year.

According to the program that was adopted no more than ten days prior to declaration of union, the consolidation of the army and the weeding out of the consequences of politicization of the former southern army,

followed by the formulation and implementation of a new moral indoctrination plan suited to the new state of affairs, would have taken from four to six years. With regard to both minimum and maximum time frames, the requisite time was longer than the transition period, set at only two and one half years.

Thus the gravity of the problem is that the fact of partition has not been eliminated, and there are those who voice reservation about the holding of elections in the upcoming period before obtaining conclusive proof of the consolidation of the army, whose ancient allegiances remain unchanged or at the least whose remnants remain effective. These remnants are apparent in the continuity of certain figures at their posts. Such figures are closely associated with the power formula, with the mechanisms of continuity of power, with the distribution of gains, and with enticement of tribal allegiances from here and there. From the point of view of those parties outside of power, these figures are a manifestation of a state of corruption that must be resisted and expelled. However, from the point of view of the forces in power, these same figures are a manifestation of the hard-pressed autonomy by which the country subsists. Were they to be removed now, the scene would change to one of chaos and unrest.

Dickering over the reconstitution of the manpower and weaponry levels of the unified Yemeni army is an ongoing exercise. The government's latest bent, not that of the political leadership, is that two things are required of the army: first, a reduction in its general expenditures so as to lighten the burden on an already overtaxed and sparsely-funded state budget and, second, a reduction in its numbers in accordance with a graduated timetable. Within the army itself there are those who are favorably disposed to this suggestion, and believe that it is more apropos for the army and for the union itself. The majority of this team belong to the army's high command, who are of southern origin. However, the majority of high commanders of northern origin are of the opinion that this suggestion could lead to a lessening of the "state's" chances of attracting the forces it wishes to attract for one reason or another. Its implementation would stir up trouble with the tribal tributaries and springheads that form a major portion of the former army of the north.

The future, appropriate shape of the army is of more than theoretical interest; it profoundly mirrors the balance of power between the two partners in government and their closest allies outside of power. While one side of this problem touches on the struggle against numerous negative elements that have found their way into a sector of the army, another side touches upon the positive redefinition of the army's role after consolidation and its transformation from an entity with a potential for bias toward one side or another in a power struggle to a professional army with a recognized and specified role in the defense of the nation and the safeguarding of constitutional legality founded on democratic pluralism.

The Division of Power

The third element of power in the unified Yemen is the party. As was the case in the north of the past, the party in the south has its conventions with regard to power monopolization, merger with the state and its various institutions and organs, and in monopolization of truth, decision making, and executive power. For its part, the single party experience has undergone vast changes, for instead of a single party in power, authority has been divided among two parties, each with its own opinions, interactions, expertise and programs. But rather than seeking now a joint-monopoly on truth and power, these two parties are giving room to the observer, the accountant, the dissenter and the protester, these being the remnants of the parties which swayed the Yemeni political scene after union.

Although officials of the two parties in power express pride in the division of power in the new state, and in their granting partisan plurality to other political entities, the horse is of a different color to those parties still outside of power, who perceive in the division of this power and the exclusion of some political entities from it a danger to the future of the Yemen because of its potential exclusion of qualified Yemeni cadres from the work of modernizing and developing the country. Such debate has raged since the inception of the new state, attributing to this division of power all of the mistakes made in the Yemeni experiment. It is also likely to continue as long as the two parties in power hold sway over the future of the nation, whether it be in agreement or disagreement.

Union has had inconsistent results for the two parties in power and for the other parties. Among the positive results for the two parties in power has been the expansion of their spheres of activity to include all Yemeni soil, after having been restricted to one half of it for so long, as well as their continuation in positions of power, benefitting from all of the country's capabilities and its moral authority. Negative consequences, on the other hand, are limited to the defection of many party operatives and cadres, with the intention of either forming new parties or affiliating themselves with parties more attuned to their beliefs. The absence of a monopoly on power, and the need to pursue a new course in rank and file initiatives, different from those pursued earlier, are matters that generate much friction and schisms within every party, affecting political performance in the eyes of rank and file members. Thus, the defection by Islamic fundamentalists from the General People's Congress to join the Yemeni Reform Congregation deprived the Congress of an important and influential component of members and delegates; the same applies to those affiliated with the Ba'athist Party and the Nasirist movement. Perhaps a perfect example of the negative consequences encountered would be the defection, last March, of Colonel Mujahid Abu-Shawarib, who held a prominent post in the Congress' politburo, with the express intent of joining the Ba'athist Party. A similar incident occurred in the Yemeni Socialist Party. Thus, there are those who

have been adversely affected by pluralism and democracy. Some, designating themselves the Fattah Correctional Current, are calling for a rationalization of the party organization; others are affiliated with former president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad; others criticize the performance of the present leadership, and yet others voluntarily interrupt their party activities as an expression of protest.

Despite these shortcomings, the two parties in power are those abler to continue in that position, and despite all adversity, are headed towards masterful coordination. It is expected that in the next phase a text will be formulated, on the strength of which legislative elections will be held, with the intent of joint success, to be followed by a settlement of power sharing side by side with certain personalities from other parties in adornment of the democratic mien. This conceptualization is the one more generally held among those parties outside of power, and is the one with which apprehensions concerning the fate of democracy and pluralism are justified, as these parties perceive it to be a masterful involution of the future and the rights of others, in addition to being a denial of the fundamentals of the peaceful reciprocation of democracy.

From One Fluster to Another

Bureaucracy is the fourth element of Yemeni power, being no less influential than the three other elements. The importance of the bureaucracy stems from its function as the intermediary between the political system and the citizen. The reach of its capabilities and efficacy reflects on the vigor of the state. At present the Yemeni administrative apparatus is characterized by given traits that considerably curtail its essentially limited capabilities. Thus numerical inflation, resulting from the total amalgamation of the two administrative apparatuses of the former Yemeni states, exists. Employees and administrators of the various government institutions and agencies number 270,000-300,000, in addition to 65,000 soldiers comprising the armed forces. This is a large number by the standards of the unified Yemeni state with its limited resources.

The immensity of the number involved has its burdensome consequences, as the administrative apparatus depletes, in the form of salaries, more than one half of the general budget. Allocations for total salaries in the 1991 budget depleted 26 billion Yemeni riyals from a total budget of 50 billion riyals; in other words, more than one half of the budget was expended exclusively on salaries, thereby adversely affecting all other developmental items, as the latter were allocated sums inappropriate to the importance and vitality of these items to total developmental and modernization needs.

However, despite the failings and deficiencies, no other alternative to the experiment of combining the two administrative apparatuses exists. On a practical level, this experiment has brought about other significant problems, the most prominent of which is the disparity

between the administrative expertise of the former northern apparatus and its cadres and that of its southern counterpart. This disparity is manifest in several forms, one being that the Socialist Party in the south would undertake the total direction of the performance of bureaucracy, causing top- or mid-level bureaucrats to be deprived of the opportunity to take initiative. With the loss of the role of the party as a guide and overseer of every facet of life in the south, such bureaucrats were flung into the unenviable position of having to steer without a "compass" or instructions on how to avoid pitfalls, thereby becoming obligated to adjust to a new reality, the principal component of which is dealing with a new decision-making authority in the capital, Sanaa—far removed from the previous capital of 'Aden—including all the attendant psychological complexities and vastly different administrative procedures. Moreover, the scarcity of financial resources limits the capacity of these to act or to take initiative.

As far as the bureaucracy in the north is concerned, it does not differ much from the state of fluster in which the bureaucracy of the south finds itself, as merger has meant weighting certain cadres over others, preferring a certain expertise to others, and upsetting tribal balances that had been grafted together with political and military ties and had enjoyed stability for a long time within the bureaucracy of the north. These are the liaisons directly responsible for the infraction of legal regulations and guidelines, for the prevalence of patronage and insider connections, and for the high standing enjoyed by confidants; they are consequently responsible also for the powerlessness of top leadership, and the spread of several passive manifestations which diminished the capacity of the political system to limit the political corruption. Moreover, bureaucracy has become an end unto itself, rather than merely an intermediary between citizen and the political system.

Fairness demands that we take note of the fact that the current government fully recognizes the enormity of the complexities facing the administrative apparatus and their long-term political and social perils. Within the program titled "Political, Economic, Administrative and Fiscal Reform", submitted by the prime minister to the chamber of deputies in June 1991, are many ideas that aim at confronting the manifestations of corruption, passivity, patronage, and bribery. However, the issue is not one of good intentions alone, while the government of 33 ministers is itself an object of criticism. As such, these are a vivid expression of the swelling of the bureaucratic apparatus at its pinnacle, and are altogether an embodiment of the networks that accompanied the resurrection of the unified Yemen.

Perhaps the improvement or deterioration that will befall bureaucracy will occur to the extent it befalls the other three components of power. Good intentions alone do not create a more developed and modern state, one that is more defined by law and order. Herein lies the challenge.

Al-Aryani Interviewed on Border Agreement With Oman

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pp 23-26

[Interview by 'Afaf Zayn with Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Aryani in Sanaa, date not given; headlines: "In an Exclusive Interview, Yemeni Foreign Minister Reveals Account of Border Agreement with Oman"; "Summit Meeting Between Yemeni President and Sultan Qabus Before or After Signature of Border Agreement Between the Two Countries"]

[Text] In an exclusive interview with AL-WASAT, Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Aryani revealed what may be the detailed and precise account of the agreement to re-draw the borders between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman, and touched upon the diverse internal, regional, international and historical facets of this agreement.

In this interview, al-Aryani did not rule out the convening of a summit meeting between Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and the Sultan of Oman Qabus bin Sa'id "before or after signature of the border agreement between the two countries".

Since 1984, al-Aryani has held the position of foreign minister of the Republic of Yemen, in addition to that of first deputy to the prime minister, in the northern half of the Yemeni homeland prior to declaration of unity. He is politically affiliated with the [Common People's Congress] Party, which currently shares power in Sanaa, and is among the political leaders taking part in the [Congress] Party's "permanent committee," that is, the party's politburo. Al-Aryani retained his position as foreign minister of the Republic of Yemen following declaration of unity between the two halves of the country on 22 May 1990. It is noted that, despite his candor, the Yemeni foreign minister is not the declared enemy of any Yemeni political faction. A prominent Republic of Yemen policy planner, he had established friendly relations with the (former) Soviet Union and the United States, where he had pursued his higher studies, culminating in a doctorate in biology from the prestigious Yale University in 1986. Since then, al-Aryani has been in Sanaa, where he has held several prominent posts, culminating in his assumption of the foreign minister's post, considered the most sensitive and specialized of Yemen's ministries. What follows is the text of the exclusive interview with al-Aryani, in which the Yemeni Minister reveals important details of the border agreement with the Sultanate of Oman

[Zayn] It is noticed that, since the reconciliation accord between their two countries in 1982, Yemeni and Omani officials meet regularly to discuss the border issue between the two countries. And also, since the beginning of last November, there has been an intensification in letter exchange between the two countries, in a manner contrary to the past. What are the considerations that

have granted extreme priority to the dossier on the re-drawing of borders between the two nations?

[al-Aryani] In the unity state, the border issue holds precedence for the Republic of Yemen. In the unity government's first pronouncement, Yemeni Prime Minister Haidar Abu-Bakr al-Attas declared Sanaa's willingness to put an end to the border issues. And, hence, interest in the Yemeni-Omani border question has not been merely a special case, but an aspect of comprehensive interest that the Yemeni unified state is devoting to border issues. Were it not for the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in 1990, the issue of borders with Oman would have been resolved in 1990, and at the latest by mid 1991. The matter of re-drawing the borders with the Sultanate of Oman did not assume priority over other issues. As I had indicated at the beginning of last November, the concern that made the question of borders with the Sultanate of Oman take on such an accelerated course was the desire of both sides to achieve an agreement. Thus, when the concerned parties show intent, it becomes easy to achieve a solution to the border problem.

[Zayn] In this framework, it was rumored that some discord existed between the two sides on a pivotal matter—the 1965 treaty—which was signed by the Sultanate of Oman and the British protectorate forces during latter's rule over the East Aden Protectorate, or the Yemeni al-Mahrah Governorate bordering the Sultanate of Oman. At the time, Omani officials' proclamations emphasized that the 1965 treaty constituted the basis for any negotiation with the Republic of Yemen. At the same time, Sanaa refused to consider the 1965 treaty as a basis for negotiation. Has the agreement you reached with the Sultanate of Oman overcome this difficulty?

[al-Aryani] Negotiations between ourselves and Oman have been aimed at surmounting this problem. What you mentioned concerning the historical background of the 1965 borders is true, though we do not refer to it as the "1965 agreement". The borders stipulated by the 1965 lines are tantamount to a bilateral agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the British protectorate authorities, the latter obligated to the (then) Sultan of al-Mahrah Governorate, that the question of borders between him and his neighbors not be decided without his knowledge. These matters are of a historical character. After the Omani forces had succeeded, in 1974, in suppressing the Dhofar Revolution led by the Oman Liberation Front, the 1965 demarcation was transmuted into what may be called the "fait accompli status," in the sense the Omani forces were concentrated in the area and considered it the established border. Yet the extent of willingness of both Yemeni and Omani sides to reach agreement had invalidated this meandering demarcation, transforming it into a straight line.

[Zayn] Is it possible to say that the intensification of contacts and exchange of letters between Sanaa and Muscat, since last November, was aimed at overcoming this complication?

[al-Aryani] Precisely.

[Zayn] In what sense has the text of the 1965 agreement been surplanted?

[al-Aryani] We overcame the agreement in the sense that the meandering line was transformed into a straight line beginning from the Indian Ocean at Cape [Dharbat] 'Ali, after which it hurls itself towards the desert. This line is capped, in a very limited sense, at the [Habrut] district, at a distance not exceeding an area of 24 square kilometers. [Habrut] is an Omani-Yemeni area, in which the Omanis have a triangle whose area does not exceed 24 square kilometers. When the meandering 1965 line is transformed into a straight line, the Republic of Yemen will regain an area of over 4 square kilometers.

[Zayn] Do you believe that this area refutes the accusations, which were hurled at the Yemeni government when it opened the border dossier with the Sultanate of Oman last fall, alleging that the Yemen had ceded an area of 15 square kilometers in the al-Mahrah Governorate of Yemen in favor of Oman?

[al-Aryani] The party that criticized the Yemeni government was driven by the complexity of historical right, and this is a claim that is difficult to defend. It is natural that people differ; however, in the final analysis, it is the government, and not individuals, that draws up final agreements. The distinguishing feature of the agreement between the Yemen and Oman is its transcendence of the fait accompli problem. The final agreement with Muscat followed a new line that was not drawn by Britain. Britain had achieved the demarcation of 1965, and before that the Hickinbotham demarcation. Hikam Botham was Governor of Aden at the time, and he had drawn another line in the late 50's and early 60's. More than did the text of the 1965 agreement, Hickinbotham's border plans favored the former eastern protectorate at the expense of Oman. Our latest agreement with the Sultanate of Oman overcomes the 1965 demarcation, which is a modification of the Hickinbotham line. The latest agreement, reached in harmony, provides for adoption of the line running straight from Cape ["Khirbat] 'Ali on the ocean to [Jiroot], and from [Jiroot] to the Rub' al-Khali in a non-meandering fashion.

What Did Bush Say?

[Zayn] It was rumored, prior to the latest agreement between the Yemen and Oman, that Muscat had linked the idea of making progress in its relations with Sanaa to its winning some major accomplishments in re-drawing the borders between the two nations. What are the attributes of this border agreement, and is the most prominent of these attributes the infusion of new vitality in Yemeni-Omani relations?

[al-Aryani] The most prominent attribute of this agreement is spotlighting the willingness of both parties to come to terms, followed by the acceptance by both

parties of the idea of foregoing what has been called the fait accompli borders, and to disengage from historical complexities.

[Zayn] It was rumored, according to Western diplomatic sources in Sanaa, that prior to reaching the latest agreement with the Sultanate of Oman, Yemen had received a diplomatic note from the American administration. What was contained in this note, and did it play any role in prompting the Yemeni and Omani sides to speed up resolution of the border problem?

[al-Aryani] The Republic of Yemen was not the only party that received a copy of the American note. The note has no relationship to the borders-with-Oman dossier. The note expresses President George Bush's administration's point of view, to the effect that border problems cannot be resolved by other than peaceful means, and through adoption of one of four options: arbitration, negotiation, mediation, or litigation (in the International Court of Justice). The American note also expressed the American administration's concern over possibility of the outbreak of conflict over the borders to the extent that would infringe upon the security and safety of the citizens of other countries.

[Zayn] Was the option embraced by Sanaa and Muscat one of the four mentioned by the American note?

[al-Aryani] We accepted the negotiation option, so as to surmount the text of the 1965 agreement, and to get the better of the difficulties of historical complexities.

[Zayn] From a substantive viewpoint, besides the considerations mentioned, did you in Yemen have the clear conviction that the full normalization of relations between Oman and the Yemen could not be achieved without closure of the common borders dossier? And what were the spontaneous motives that contributed to achievement of the final agreement with the Sultanate of Oman?

[al-Aryani] The sons of al-Mahrah Governorate, which extends across the terrain of both countries, suffer from extremely harsh human conditions. Families are divided on both sides of the fait accompli borders. Should a citizen of the Yemeni al-Mahrah Governorate wish to visit his relatives in the Omani half of the governorate, he must first obtain an entry permit to the Sultanate of Oman. Then it would be mandatory to travel by plane from Sanaa to Muscat, and from there proceed overland by vehicle to the Omani governorate of al-Mahrah, which does not exceed a few kilometers distance from his home in the Yemeni governorate of al-Mahrah. Non-resolution of the border tragedies becomes a cause for major human suffering. From this point of view, the latest agreement with the Sultanate of Oman will remove the illogical impediment that disrupts the human relations between family, kin and friends. The latest agreement achieves Yemeni citizens' goals of contact and economic exchange with their brethren in the Sultanate of Oman. Our brothers in Oman possess a civilized understanding of the border problem, and they tell us:

"We do not wish the borders to become as walls separating peoples, but rather as conduits of contact." Thus the latest agreement renders the matter clear, firmly establishes rights, and imparts, on both sides of the border, the imprint of continuity of security and stability.

Lessons of the Gulf War

[Zayn] Besides the substantive and spontaneous reasons that you mentioned, has Sanaa benefitted from the lessons brought about by the second Gulf war resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait?

[al-Aryani] Of course, the most prominent lesson of this war is the impossibility of changing the existing borders between nations by the use of force. We opposed this matter from the start. We believe that negotiation is the preferred means in dealing with border dossiers. The negotiation option with the Sultanate of Oman resulted in our overcoming the text of the 1965 demarcation.

[Zayn] The technical committee commissioned with re-drawing the borders between the Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman met once during 1982 in Abu Dhabi. Today, following conclusion of the new agreement with Muscat, will a new committee be formed, or is there a specific body, procedurally, that will undertake implementation of the agreement?

[al-Aryani] Procedurally, there exist major landmarks that must be achieved. In light of these landmarks, the agreement will embrace main items that would be signed along with their addenda, and which contain citizens' rights, on both sides, with respect to movement, passage and disposal of customs matters. This is succeeded by the detailed demarcation of borders, after endorsement of the agreement with its major landmarks. A specialized firm may perform the second procedural phase which follows signature of the agreement in its principle form.

[Zayn] Is it to be construed from your words that the principle landmarks of the agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman are now clear, and that they have been found agreeable?

[al-Aryani] Yes, the main points of the agreement have been established on paper and we wish to implement them in their natural state.

[Zayn] Is there an approximate date for signing the agreement, and will the signature take place, as has been rumored, during a bilateral summit between President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id, and will the convening of the bilateral summit be linked to conclusion of this agreement?

[al-Aryani] Firstly, the conclusion of the agreement is linked to winding up the drafting phase and to verification thereof by way of observation and ascertainment of specific items in their natural state. The matter does not require more than a few weeks time. On the other hand,

when will the agreement be signed? And will it be signed at a bilateral summit level between the presidents of the two countries? These are subjects that will be pursued subsequent to finalization of executive matters. The summit between President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id may be held before or after signature of the border agreement. The matter is unconditional, and the summit has no relationship to the agreement.

[Zayn] Do you believe that the agreement to re-draw the borders between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman will result in the realization of substantive conditions that would turn a new page at the regional level?

[al-Aryani] The agreement between us and the Sultanate of Oman is an auspicious beginning. The Republic of Yemen, or any of its neighbors, may proceed with equal parity to close their common borders dossier. Negotiation with the Sultanate of Oman began in 1982, was halted in 1984, and resumed in 1987. Effectuation of the agreement with Muscat took nearly a decade. Negotiations between Oman and ourselves began with fanciful accusations. As a logical negotiation stance, the two sides agreed that each tell its tale, then search for the legitimacy and legality of each side's claims. The two sides continued to meet and part company, having before their eyes objective, factual understanding, and the avoidance of the complexity of litigation (International Court of Justice) and the use of force.

Overcoming Historical Complexities

[Zayn] What are the new developments that enabled Sanaa and Muscat to surmount their "fanciful accusations," as you have put it, and that contributed to maturation of the negotiation stance?

[al-Aryani] Yemeni unity engendered mutual trust between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman. This trust is boundless and increasing, and is much greater than that which existed between Muscat and what was known, prior to unity, as the southern half of the Yemeni homeland. Yemeni unity increased the Omani side's confidence and optimism in the prospect of any agreement it entered into with the Republic of Yemen, as Muscat could now ascertain that the Yemeni side had become more serious and insistent in its endeavor to establish stable relations with it and with all neighboring countries. You know, the historical circumstances that accompanied the emergence of the southern half following its independence, and the political inclinations of our brothers in the southern portion of the nation, had transformed the earlier logbook of relations between the Sultanate of Oman and what was known as the southern half into pages immersed in blood. This bloody chronicle continued to produce its consequences despite the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1982. The elements of mistrust remained in force continually between the two sides. Yemeni unity facilitated the substantive conditions that convinced our

brothers in Muscat that the phase into which the Republic of Yemen had entered would enable it to deal on a new parity with all its neighbors irrespective of historical legacies.

[Zayn] In newspaper releases recently you mentioned that the agreement with the Sultanate of Oman had been concluded, and let others say what they may about this agreement: renunciation, negligence ... What are the merits of these statements, and has the Yemen, in its latest agreement with the Sultanate of Oman, renounced specific claims you had alluded to earlier by pronouncing them "fanciful"; for example, specific Yemeni claims concerning certain Omani lands, including the island of Kuria Muria and a portion of al-Mahrah Governorate between the two countries?

[al-Aryani] What you are asking with regard to statements attributed to me is in connection to a question directed to me at a news conference that was held here in Sanaa some months ago. A Yemeni journalist asked me: "When will you sign the agreement with Oman by virtue of which you will relinquish Yemeni lands in favor of Oman?"

[Zayn] What precisely did you mean when you said, just a moment ago, that "both parties had fanciful claims"? What are the merits of this statement?

[al-Aryani] Both the Yemeni and Omani parties had unrealistic claims, especially in the domain of historical legitimacy and those aspects close to legal right. Despite that, we were able to surmount these historical complexities; for example, historically Dhofar is a Yemeni area, and up to 300 years ago, its governor was appointed in Sanaa. Historically, the Omani al-'Azd tribes were Yemeni, emerging from the Ma'rib area; most of the inhabitants of Oman are of the al-'Azd. The claims propounded by the Yemeni and Omani sides were based on ancient historical considerations. It is natural that, when negotiating, I would inevitably resort to certain considerations, regardless of whether they dated back to an earlier time. It is natural that the Yemenis possess grand claims, and that the Omanis possess grand counterclaims. This is succeeded by the accentuation of historical documents phase, and the negotiation process bursts forth with the objective of circumventing historical complexities, the ascendance of the logic of co-existence, and the desire to implement good-neighbor policy.

[Zayn] Do you believe that the agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman will result in substantive conditions that will afford the opportunity to open up a new page between the Yemen and certain other countries, with whom relations have been strained since the invasion of Kuwait crisis?

[al-Aryani] The re-drawing agreement with the Sultanate of Oman should logically be a source of security and confidence for all. This agreement proves that the Republic of Yemen is not one of those countries that

pursues uneven means, as a principle, to solve its problems. However, I am unable to speak on behalf of others. I pray to God that this agreement becomes a cause for reassurance and confidence between our country and others. The Sultanate of Oman undertakes mediation between ourselves and the Cooperation Council countries. This is a standing imperative and an interconnected effort, at the official behest of Sanaa. And it is a praiseworthy effort which commenced at the end of the second Gulf crisis.

Electoral, Democratic, Oil Industry Challenges

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pp 24-25*

[Article by 'Afaf Zayn: "Yemen Facing Three Challenges"]

[Text] The Republic of Yemen currently faces three basic internal challenges which can be formulated in the following questions:

- Is it possible to consummate and render successful the experience of Yemeni unity; i.e., is it possible to actually achieve democracy at the applied and practical levels?
- In what way is it possible to end conclusively the political violence and intensification of the phenomenon of assassination and incidents of revenge?
- Is it possible to draw upon the oil wealth to develop and improve Yemeni society?

Upon declaration of the birth of Yemeni unity on 22 May 1990, "unity," as a slogan, represented the height of Yemeni aspirations. However, with the transformation of the slogan into reality, embodied in federal agreements that end the division between the two halves of Yemen, the Yemeni people have come to feel that the slogan was brighter than the practical reality, and that this discrepancy has engendered a feeling of frustration in the Yemeni citizen. Declaration of Yemeni unity coincided with the first foreign policy test facing the emergent Republic of Yemen, namely, Yemen's position on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the ensuing crisis, a foreign policy position that led to the deterioration of economic conditions in the country.

Yemeni Prime Minister Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas spoke to AL-WASAT about the immense disparity between the visions and expectations of the slogan and its workable realities, when all was placed on the touchstone of application and trial. The magnitude of disparity between that which was hoped for in Yemeni unity and its method of application, and the results achieved by the Republic of Yemen two years after declaration of unity, prompted the Yemeni Prime Minister to declare: "Unity was achieved by means of the two parties dividing up the posts, while it was presupposed that unity would originate from the coalescence of visions and the rallying of other parties". Since inception of the transition period two years ago, the two ruling, power-sharing parties (the Socialist and Popular People's

Congress) have endeavored to contrive an acceptable formula for inclusion of other political parties in the task of assuming national responsibility. A four-person committee was formed to draft the formula for coordination between the [Socialist Congress] and the other parties. However, the transition period is near its end, with only five months remaining, and there is still no crystallization of a formula for participation and coordination with the other parties, especially the Yemeni Reform Party. Consequently, the government has confronted this task and drawn up a "political progress and economic reform" program. The Yemeni Prime Minister held intensive meetings with the political parties to draft an acceptable groundwork for a cooperation and coordination pact among Yemeni parties. Despite this, the report continues on the prospects for formation of a broad frontline alliance forging the political parties before start of preparations for legislative elections.

In view of the incapacity of the two parties in power to draft an acceptable formula for allowing the remaining Yemeni parties the opportunity to participate in the assumption of responsibility, it appears that democracy in the Yemen is facing a quandary. The two main parties have not even settled their own differences. Vice President and Executive Council Member 'Ali Salim al-Bidh returned recently from Aden following a political hiatus that lasted several weeks, returning on Sanaa's second anniversary of the declaration of unity. This suggests that participation by the remaining parties appears even more doubtful, perhaps even impossible. Shaykh 'Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-'Ahmar, Chairman of the Yemeni Reform Party, commented on the government's clumsy efforts to include others thusly: "They themselves bear the responsibility. Everything in the Yemen takes on the impression of immediacy. The employee does not perform his duties as required, and the official has a profound perception for the need to safeguard his gains and little else. We charge the political leadership with the responsibility for deterioration of conditions in the country."

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for the upcoming months. This electoral entitlement is causing added worry and tension to those concerned with the future of the Yemen. Associated with all of this is intensification of the political assassination phenomenon, which Prime Minister Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas has described as "politicized retaliation". While political leadership figures accuse international powers of lying in wait for the

Republic of Yemen, party operatives outside of government look to "conspiracy logic" as a convenient rack on which to hang the Yemeni government's failures to deliver that which it had promised.

The Yemeni government and political leadership publicly acknowledge the difficulty of the phase and the magnitude of the challenges to be confronted. While the government stands behind the "bulwark" of the national construction and economic reform program, being guided by it in the implementation of the plan for security and the reconstruction of state enterprises, certain influential political leaders call into question the adopted method for execution of the "program", the approval for which has "entangled" the political leadership which has no other practical and realistic plan of implementation. Thus, Haydar Abu-Bakr al-'Attas' government finds itself caught in a cross-fire between the existing authorities and those parties who are not participating in government. Al-'Attas' government believes that the absence of trust and the various conflicts of interest are some of the most perilous threats that menace the fulfillment of state plans.

The Yemeni government recognizes that exaggerated discourse on democracy is the prevailing attitude in Yemeni affairs; meanwhile, a cooperation and coordination pact between the government and the opposition parties has not yet seen the light of day. From its executive perch, the Yemeni government suffers from internal ambivalence. While it is true that the sundering experienced under the two political doctrines has theoretically ended with the declaration of unity, sundering continues in a perpetuated duality of vision and perspective.

It appears that oil, the primary vital resource in Yemen besides other natural raw materials, is among the foremost elements to be threatened by this perpetuated duality of perspective, thought and performance. Consequently, al-'Attas' government has entrusted the business of oil, industry and mining to one of the most prominent of Yemeni pragmatists, Dr. Muhammad Sa'id al-'Attar, Yemeni minister of industry and development who, for his part, attempts to shield this vital resource from the complications of dual political performance and government bureaucracy. Al-'Attar is of the opinion, as is Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Karim al-Aryani, that the pursuit of a good-neighbor policy and the appeal for coexistence are the most prominent conditions required to allow the Republic of Yemen the opportunity to utilize oil for state development. Within this framework, Yemeni pragmatists are betting on the agreement to re-draw the borders with the Sultanate of Oman, and on the potential consequences of this agreement.

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